Post-Education-For-All and Sustainable Development Paradigm : Structural Changes with Diversifying Actors and Norms 9781784412708, 9781784412715

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POST-EDUCATION-FOR-ALL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: STRUCTURAL CHANGES WITH DIVERSIFYING ACTORS AND NORMS

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION AND SOCIETY Series Editor: Alexander W. Wiseman Recent Volumes: Series Editor from Volume 11: Alexander W. Wiseman Volume 16: Volume 17: Volume 18: Volume 19: Volume 20: Volume 21: Volume 22: Volume 23: Volume 24: Volume 25: Volume 26: Volume 27: Volume 28:

Education Strategy in the Developing World: Revising the World Bank’s Education Policy Community Colleges Worldwide: Investigating the Global Phenomenon The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Education Worldwide Teacher Reforms around the World: Implementations and Outcomes Annual Review of Comparative and International Education 2013 The Development of Higher Education in Africa: Prospects and Challenges Out of the Shadows: The Global Intensification of Supplementary Education International Educational Innovation and Public Sector Entrepreneurship Education for a Knowledge Society in Arabian Gulf Countries Annual Review of Comparative and International Education 2014 Comparative Sciences: Interdisciplinary Approaches Promoting and Sustaining a Quality Teacher Workforce Annual Review of Comparative and International Education 2015

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION AND SOCIETY VOLUME 29

POST-EDUCATION-FOR-ALL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: STRUCTURAL CHANGES WITH DIVERSIFYING ACTORS AND NORMS EDITED BY SHOKO YAMADA Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan

United Kingdom – North America – Japan India – Malaysia – China



Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2016 Copyright © 2016 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permissions service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. Any opinions expressed in the chapters are those of the authors. Whilst Emerald makes every effort to ensure the quality and accuracy of its content, Emerald makes no representation implied or otherwise, as to the chapters’ suitability and application and disclaims any warranties, express or implied, to their use. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-78441-271-5 ISSN: 1479-3679 (Series)

CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS RECOMMENDATIONS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATION

THEORIZING THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Shoko Yamada PART I POST-EFA DISCOURSE IN THE HISTORICAL, STRUCTURAL, NORMATIVE, AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS EDUCATION FOR ALL AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE: ISSUES AND TENSIONS Leon Tikly POST-EFA GLOBAL DISCOURSE: THE PROCESS OF SHAPING THE SHARED VIEW OF THE ‘EDUCATION COMMUNITY’ Shoko Yamada ASIAN REGIONALITY AND POST-2015 CONSULTATION: DONORS’ SELF-IMAGES AND THE DISCOURSE Shoko Yamada PART II PERSPECTIVES FROM ASIA AND PACIFIC: CASES OF TRADITIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL DONORS JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL AID IN TRANSITION: THE CHALLENGE TO TRANSFORM FROM A TRADITIONAL DONOR TO A NEW PARTNER Shoko Yamada and Kazuhiro Yoshida THE KOREAN MODEL OF ODA: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF ITS CONCEPT AND PRACTICES REFLECTED IN EDUCATIONAL ODA Bong Gun Chung

POSITIONING CHINA’S AID TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND POST-2015 Changsong Niu and Jing Liu SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: INDIA’S PROGRAMME OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE – NATURE, SIZE AND FUNCTIONING Jandhyala B. G. Tilak THE UNITED STATES – A “TRADITIONAL” OUTLIER IN TRANSITION James H. Williams CONCLUSION Shoko Yamada ABOUT THE AUTHORS INDEX

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Bong Gun Chung Jing Liu Changsong Niu Leon Tikly Jandhyala B. G. Tilak James H. Williams Shoko Yamada Kazuhiro Yoshida

Institute of Education Research, College of Education, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua City, China School of Education, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK; Centre for Education Rights and Transformation, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa; Centre for International Teacher Education, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, India Graduate School of Education and Human Development, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan Center for the Study of International Cooperation in Education, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan

Post-Education-for-All and Sustainable Development Paradigm focuses on how the post 2015 agenda in education and development is being socially constructed by an increasingly diverse set of international and national actors. It provides fascinating details about the motivations – political, normative, historical, and technical – of those involved in creating a new international aid and development paradigm in education. A major strength of the book is to view these on-going shifts in tone, structure and substance from the perspectives of ‘nontraditional’ Asian actors. Another is the rich pool of qualitative interviews integrated into the analysis. Overall, this informative and timely book deserves to be carefully read and widely discussed. – Aaron Benavot, Director, Global Education Monitoring Report (GEM Report), UNESCO

Reforming the international education architecture is a top priority. Less clear is what to prioritize in doing so, beyond the obvious of increasing aid and other international flows. This volume helps us think about what must be prioritized, based on two unique new perspectives. First, it analyzes the very unusual period, in historical terms, during which the current Sustainable Development Goal for education was set, a period very different from that 25 years ago when the predecessor Education for All goals were adopted. Second, it takes an Asian perspective, crucial as so many Asian countries have shifted during this period from being aid recipients to emerging aid donors, as Asian countries have a particular view of the role of the state, and as Asian countries, more than many western ones, have been concerned about the value of education not only in terms of the skills of their populations but also as a means to the moral underpinning of society, both locally and globally. – Nicholas Burnett, Managing Director, Results for Development; Former UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Education

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS How do we know the right direction of ‘development’ for a society or its people? And how does this perceived ‘right’ direction of development become a consensus among those working in international development? These questions have been with me from the early stages of my career as a consultant for educational development in the 1990s. Fashionable approaches, such as human resources planning, cost sharing of social services including education, decentralization, vocationalization of education and so on, have come and gone, regardless of whether societies were ‘developing’ as intended. When one prescription failed to create positive results, policymakers promoted the next trend as the solution. Such was the case when the poverty reduction paradigm emerged after the era of neoliberal structural adjustment of the 1980s had slashed public expenditures on social services and was said to have increased disparities. ‘Development’ is a value-laden term, which inherently suggests that something must be changed for improved status. It also involves interventions from the outside to facilitate the processes of change. We rarely question who decided the direction of global trends in educational development and for what ends. Instead, taking the fundamental direction as given, a large part of discussion among professionals in this field is concentrated on strategies and methodologies of implementing, monitoring and reinventing programmes. These haunting questions of who and why drove me to analyse two different historical discourses on policymaking for international education development: the discourse surrounding British colonial education in the early 20th century (Yamada 2003) and that of the early 21st century in the midst of the universal primary education movement (Yamada, 2010). The pendulum looks to be shifting perennially between vocationalization and generalization of the curriculum, between central planning and decentralization and between basic education for the disadvantaged and technical or higher education for the human resource needs of industry and state-led development agendas. By and large, similar arguments for and against approaches in vogue have been repeated throughout history. Still, the international community has made a constant effort to set a global policy framework that would overarch different national contexts. This continuous process of reform may itself have been a mechanism to boost the momentum and maintain the field of international development. Under the Education for All (EFA) global agenda for educational development, a review of achievements was scheduled for the years leading up to 2015, to culminate in the adoption of renewed goals. Though this process seemed to be an ordinary self-boosting exercise of the educational development community, after witnessing it as a participant, I came to sense that it was a little different from earlier processes, happening in tandem with more fundamental structural changes involving new types of actors and means of interaction. It seemed quite significant, not only academically but also for the informed practices in this field, that we closely examine the global discourse in this crucial timing. That is how we started this project to analyse the nature of the paradigm shift toward a post-2015 agenda. Given the fast-shifting

focuses of discussion and widely scattered voices from all corners of the world, it was challenging to capture the nature of the discourse. At the same time, we were driven by the belief that it would be more difficult to track the processes later, given that much of the discussion took place outside of the formal, recorded channels of consensus building. In 2012 I started to conceptualize this research and to exchange ideas with the authors of the country cases in Part II of this volume. A symposium on Asian donors in the education sector sparked a 2014 special issue of the journal Asian Education and Development Studies that discussed the history, philosophies and mechanisms of educational aid given by donors in the Asia-Pacific region (Yamada 2014). While the authors of Part II of this volume provide indepth analysis of their respective countries, the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the “Education Community”’ presents interviews and text analysis on the global post-2015 discourse, picking up from around the end of 2013. Dr. Leon Tikly, the author of the chapter ‘Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance: Issues and Tensions’, took on the difficult task of providing an historical overview of the vast discourse on EFA up to the middle of the last decade. I am not sure how successful we were in pinning down the dynamics and theorizing about them, given that our interviewing and document collecting took place right in the midst of the changing process. We have to wait for the judgement of readers, but hope that the effort to capture systematically why, how, and what has been discussed, not merely to participate in the discourse on the global agenda reform, will make some contribution to academia and the international educational development community. Finally, on behalf of the authors, I would like to express sincere gratitude to anonymous peer reviewers of chapters for improving the quality of our work. Appreciation also goes to people who made important comments on the presentations we gave in the conference session and meetings in advance of this publication. I also owe a great deal of thanks to those anonymous interviewees who candidly shared their opinions and observations of the post-2015 consultation process. Although I cannot write their names here, some of them even gave additional comments on my research after the interview. As an Asian scholar with serious commitments to education for all, Shoko Yamada Editor

REFERENCES Yamada, S. (2003). Global discourse and local response in educational policy process: The case of achimota school in colonial Ghana (gold coast). Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University. Yamada, S. (Ed.). (2010). Multiple conceptions of education for all and efa development goals: The processes of adopting a global agenda in the policies of Kenya (p. 255). Tanzania: VDM Publisher. Yamada, S. (Ed.). (2014). Special issue on Asian donors and changing landscape of international educational cooperation: Exploring uniqueness and diversity. Asian Education and Development Studies, 3(1), pp. 2–94.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION AARDO

Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization

ACER

Australian Council for Educational Research

AIIB

Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank

APREC

Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASER Centre

Annual Status of Education Report Centre

ASPBAE

Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education

AU

African Union

BIMST EC

Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

CARICOM

Caribbean Community

CCNGO

Collective Consultation of NGOs (on EFA)

CELAC

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

CFAC

China Follow-up Action Committee

CFT C

Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation

CI

Confucius Institute

CIDC

Committee for International Development Cooperation

CIDRN

China International Development Research Network

CSC

China Scholarship Council

CSOs

Civil Society Organizations

DAC

Development Assistance Committee

DESA

Department of Economic and Social Affairs

DfID

Department for International Development

DOICE

Department of International Cooperation and Exchange

DOL

Department of Labor

DPA

Development Partnership Administration

E-9

Nine Populous Countries that Face Challenges in Achieving EFA Goals: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan

ECCE

Early Childhood Care and Education

ECPC

Ethio-China Polytechnic College

EDCF

Economic Development Cooperation Fund

EFA

Education for All

EI

Education International

ESCAP

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

ESD

Education for Sustainable Development

ESF

Economic Support Fund

EU

European Union

EXIM Bank Export-Import Bank FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

FOCACs

Forums on China-Africa Cooperation

FT I

Fast T rack Initiative

G8

Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States

G20

Group of 20: 19 Individual Countries and the EU

GCE

Global Campaign for Education

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GEM

Global EFA Meetings

GFAT M

Global Fund to Fight Aids, T B and Malaria

GMR

Global Monitoring Report

GNI

Gross National Income

GPE

Global Partnership for Education

HIPC

Heavily Indebted Poor Country

HLF

High-Level Forum

HLG

High-Level Group

HRD

Human Resource Development

IAP

International Advisory Panel

IAPD

Indian Agency for Partnership in Development

IAU

International Association of Universities

IAVU

India-Africa Virtual University

IBSA

India, Brazil, and South Africa

ICCR

Indian Council of Cultural Relations

ICT

Information and Communication Technology

IDA

International Development Association

IDCR

Indian Development Cooperation Research

IDTs’

International Development Targets

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IOR-ARC

Indian Ocean Rim – Association for Regional Cooperation

IPAL

International Platform for Assessing Learning

IPRCC

International Poverty Reduction Center in China

IR

International Relations

IT EC

Indian Technical Economic Cooperation

JBIC

Japan Bank for International Cooperation

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

JNNE

Japan NGO Network for Education

KDI

Korea Development Institute

KDS

Korean Institute for Development Strategy

KEDI

Korean Education Development Institute

KICE

Korean Institute of Curriculum and Evaluation

KIEP

Korean Institute for International Economic Policy

KRIVET

Korean Research Institute for Vocational Education and T raining

KSP

Knowledge Sharing Program

LDCs

Least Developed Countries

LMT F

Learning Metrics Task Force

MCA

Millennium Challenge Account

MDGs

Millennium Development Goals

MESC

Ministry of Education, Science and Culture

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MGC

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation

MIT I

Ministry of Economy, T rade, and Industry

MOE

Ministry of Education

MOF

Ministry of Finance

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFAT

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and T rade

MOFCOM

Ministry of Commerce

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations

NORRAG

Network for International Policies and Cooperation in Education and T raining

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPM

Office of Prime Minister

OWG

Open Working Group

PASEC

Programme d’Analyse des Syste‘mes Educatifs de la Confe´rence des Ministres de l’Education des Pays Ayant le Franc¸ais en Partage

PERFAR

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

PISA

Programme for International Student Assessment

PRSPs

Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes

QDDR

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

Rio+20

UN Conference on Sustainable Development in June 2012

SAARC

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SACMEQ

Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality

SAPs

Structural Adjustment Polices

SC SCAAP

Steering Committee Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme

SDG4

Fourth of the SDGs/Sustainable Development Goal 4

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SDP

Small Development Project

SEAMEO

Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization

SOM

Chinese-African Senior Officials Meeting

SSA

Security Supporting Assistance

SSDC

South-South Development Cooperation

SWAPs

Sector Wide Programs

TAG

Technical Advisory Group

TALIS

Teaching and Learning International Survey

TAZARA

Tanzania-Zambia Railway

T ICA

T hailand International Cooperation Agency

T IMSS

T rends in International Mathematics and Science Study

T UT E

T ianjin University of Technology and Education

T VET

Technical and Vocational Education and T raining

UN

United Nations

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on T rade and Development

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR

UN High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNIDO

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UPE

Universal Primary Education

USAID

US Agency for International Development

WCEFA

World Conference on Education for All

WEF

World Education Forum

WG

Working Group

WT O

World T rade Organization

THEORIZING THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Shoko Yamada

ABSTRACT This chapter will situate the global paradigm shift toward Post-Education-For-All (Post-EFA) not only in the policy trends in the field of international education development, but also in the academic context of international relations and comparative education. The chapter highlights three dimensions which characterize the paradigm shift; namely, discourse on norms, diversifying actors, and the changed mode of communication and participation in the global consultation processes. The existing formal structure of the EFA global governance is based on multilateralism which recognizes sovereign nation-states, representing national interests, as the participants. However, such an assumption is eroding, given that there is a growing number of state and nonstate actors who influence decision-making not only through conventional formal channels, but also informally. Urging the revision of theories of multilateralism, the chapter introduces the attention given to nontraditional donors and horizontal networks of civil society actors in this volume. The introduction also shows that that the widening basis of participation in the global consultation processes on post-EFA and advanced communication technology have changed the ways in which discourse is formulated. While the amount and the speed of exchanging information have been enhanced and different types of actors have been encouraged to take part, it also obliges scholars to adopt innovative methods of analyzing discourse formation. The chapter also demonstrates the importance of the focus on the Asia-Pacific region, which is composed of diverse actors who often underscore Asian cultural roots in contrast to Western hegemony. By focusing on the discourse, actors, and the structure through which the consensus views on the post-EFA agenda were built, the volume attempts to untangle the nature of the post-EFA paradigm shift, at the global, Asia-Pacific regional, and national levels.

Keywords: Paradigm shift; global discourse: Post-EFA; emerging donors; multilateralism

Historians of later generations may call the period between 1990 and 2015 the age of alignment and harmonization, between the time when Education for All (EFA) development goals and the target date for the achievement of the EFA goals were agreed on and signed by delegates of 155 countries and 150 organizations in Jomtien, Thailand. During this period, an exclusive circle of donors, composed of multilateral organizations and a small number of aidproviding countries, built consensus on norms and methods of aid for international educational development. The members of this circle watch and regulate each other so as to maintain consistency among themselves regarding the thematic focus of their aid programmes, the process of implementation, and the modes of negotiation with developing country governments. Even within the 25 years of the EFA era, the first decade would have been the period to prepare the architecture for global consensus building, mutual monitoring, and resource concentration. However, since the turn of the millennium, global governance on educational development has become increasingly institutionalized. Among various events and programmes that happened in the first half of the first decade of the new millennium, to mention only major ones, are the following: The World Education Forum (WEF) was held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000 to adjust the goals to be achieved by 2015 and boost commitment to them. At the UN Millennium Summit in New York in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including a goal for education, were signed by the delegates of 189 UN member states. The annual EFA Global Monitoring Report was launched in 2002 as an initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to monitor progress, highlighting different aspects of EFA goals every year. In 2002 the World Bank established the EFA Fast Track Initiative (later renamed the Global Partnership for Education) to pool funds from bilateral and multilateral donors specifically to assist developing countries in achieving EFA goals. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was publicized in 2005. During the period after 2000, the year of the Global Education Forum in Dakar and the Millennium Summit in New York, the well-designed governance structure under the common normative framework of MDGs and, in the education sector, EFA goals served as the foundation for discourse among governments and organizations involved in international development. The fundamental principles of poverty reduction and securing basic human rights for all have driven policy measures to expand social services for disadvantaged populations at

both the global and national levels. The massive concentration of resources and interventions that happened in the education sector to achieve universal primary education (UPE) was backed by this poverty-reduction paradigm. Regardless that there were six EFA goals and that UPE was only one of them, the nature of the paradigm, whose undercurrent principles to prioritize pro-poor measures were shared across various forums and structures, effected to converge the discussions and practices onto the narrow field of UPE (Avant, Finnemore, & Sell, 2010, pp. 14–16; Mundy, 2010, pp. 333–335). In a way, such mechanisms of tight self-control and unification of goals were a form of maturation after decades of questing for efficiency and effectiveness of aid for educational development in the post-World War II era. They also represented an achievement of multilateralism in which actors with different interests collaborated for the common good (Chabbott, 2003; Jones & Coleman, 2005). Some analysts, however, criticized the excessive standardization imposed by the EFA framework (Carnoy, 1999; Torres, 1998). Whether one focuses on their positive or negative effects, at the bottom line, there was an agreement that the policies and practices of educational development had converged along the consensus built at the multilateral forum. However, the bonds of the EFA global structure started to erode, and the nature of the global structure as well as the interaction among governments, civil society organizations (CSOs), and intergovernmental organizations has continued to change as 2015, the target year for the EFA goals and MDGs, has approached. While there were strenuous efforts to evaluate the extent to which the globally concerted interventions had brought about the aimed-for results and what impediments remained, the new global agenda to replace the MDGs was already scheduled to be adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, the socalled Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Summit, and education was to be one of the SDGs. The process of developing the post-MDGs, or SDGs, went hand in hand with that on the post-EFA education agenda. Terms such as ‘post-EFA’, ‘post-2015’, and ‘post-MDGs’ were sprinkled everywhere in the documents and statements appearing in the few years before and after the SDG summit. The agenda-setting processes themselves have been overwhelmingly vast and complicated. Truly, the SDGs symbolize the transition from the shared ideology of poverty reduction to that of sustainable development. Various conferences and meetings to consult with stakeholders in the process of developing the agenda provided the platforms for expressing and exchanging ideas, which gradually took shape as the ‘consensus view’. However, the norms and the formal meetings to set targets were only the tip of an iceberg. Fundamental changes were happening simultaneously to all facets of the global governance structure on educational development: institutions, norms, participants and their modes of communication. In this sense, the current transformative process should be considered not simply as an evolution from one stage of multilateralism to another but a fundamental paradigm shift that requires examination of the situation with fresh eyes instead of application or extension of the existing frames of reference. This edited volume will highlight the forces behind the paradigm shift in the field of international educational development from three major dimensions. The first is the discourse

on the impact of interventions under EFA goals and on the vision after the EFA target year, 2015. Thanks to focused efforts during the EFA era, UPE has been mostly achieved. Ironically, the near-achievement of the UPE goal is causing the fragmentation of ideas about the next step, which has made unified acts among governments, CSOs, and intergovernmental organizations more difficult than ever. As discussed in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, while there was a general agreement that the quality of education will be a focus of the next education agenda, ideas about quality and the assessment of learning outcomes, unlike increased enrolment, are diverse and depend on the realities faced by the respective actors and the people they represent. As a result, the effort to find common ground across diverse voices tends to lead to abstract and broad agreement at a rather philosophical level. Regardless, the processes of developing a common set of targets creates dynamics and power relationships among the actors who take part and try to influence the debate. These dynamics have formed a significant basis for the actions and discussions regarding the post-EFA agenda, which was adopted as the fourth of the SDGs (SDG4) in September 2015. The second dimension of the paradigm shift is the actors involved in the global discourse. First, from the middle of the first decade of this century, there arose a new type of donor country – those that used to be recipients but have become providers of aid. They are different from the traditional category of donors in some significant ways. Their most outstanding feature is that the majority of them are not bound by the rules and consensus of the traditional donor community. Instead, they are driven to assist other countries by their own rationales and historical backgrounds. Because some of these new powers, such as China and some Middle Eastern countries, expanded their commitments in a rapid and unique way, they caught a great deal of attention and have often been characterized as a threat to the existing aid structure (Davies, 2010; Woods, 2008). However, the issue that has not been discussed much is whether donors have ever been unanimous. This volume aims not to contrast traditional and emerging donors dichotomously but to treat each donor state as a unit that has a unique mode of operation, and to describe each state’s purpose, philosophy and approach to educational development according to its domestic and international conditions, which change in response to context. While the category of ‘donors’ has become less self-evident and tight, the situations surrounding ‘recipients’ of aid have also changed. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia have achieved higher rates of annual economic growth than most of the advanced economies (International Monetary Fund, 2015). This reality has blurred the power contrast between the ‘donors’ and the ‘recipients’, and opened more space for negotiation and adoption of nonconventional modes of assistance, such as South-South cooperation and third-country training. Another category of emerging actors is CSOs, whose horizontal network contrasts with the vertical relationships among states and intergovernmental organizations. Traditionally, the decision-making of the global governance structure is based on conferences among representatives of the national governments. International relations are considered based on the Westphalian assumption of the sovereignty of nation-states. According to this assumption,

while nation-states have absolute authority over their territories and people, internationally there is no higher power to rule over and intervene into the domain of state sovereignty. Therefore, decision-making within international organizations and the structure for global governance are matters of consensus building instead of order and control (Acharya & Buzan, 2010, p. 99; Ikenberry, 2011, p. 3; Weber, 2005, pp. 14–20). However, the increased presence of civil society actors may challenge or undermine the decisions and strategies developed by state governments. While the imagined community of donors is losing its bond of identity, exchange of information and leverage through informal and/or nonstate channels are increasing in importance (Kelly, 2007, pp. 85–97). The broadening of scope as discussions turned to post-2015 issues created more chances for nonstate actors to leverage the process. Owing partly to the enhanced means of virtual communication and information sharing, horizontal cross-feeding of ideas and information adds another facet to a global governance structure designed to build consensus among sovereign nation-states. In sum, the traditional relationships among actors in the multilateral governance structure have been changed by the emergence of new types of actors, such as nontraditional donors and civil society networks. As I will discuss in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, the gap between the changed dynamics and the conventional structure has been filled informally, further enhancing the role of those nontraditional actors, particularly CSOs. Closely related to the second dimension of change is the third, the mode of communication and participation in the global consultation processes. One of the major characteristics of the post-2015 discourse was the greatly broadened basis of participation compared with the process leading up to WEF-Dakar or earlier processes. While CSOs gained formal seats of representation at WEF-Dakar and afterward, they were only a handful of seats. Even so, to legitimize their representation, major international NGOs and federations of international and national NGOs made systematic efforts to collect voices from various corners of their membership in both the Global North and the Global South. United Nations agencies also collected comments on the achievements and challenges of EFA through online consultation. The advancement of information technology contributed greatly to realizing such broad-based participation and consultation. Nowadays, teleconferences across national borders have become pretty common, reducing the cost of meeting as well as the barrier of communication between those who physically sit in the conference room and those who support and observe them virtually. Such technological advancement has benefited those who used to be excluded from the conventional structure of decision-making, such as CSOs, while state actors have tended to continue relying on conventional modes of communication through bureaucratic channels. Moreover, it is possible for individuals who do not even belong to CSOs, which have their own structures of representation, to contribute comments directly to the global discourse. Online consultation by UN agencies is an example of direct linkage between individuals and the global discourse, bypassing national and regional processes. Any interested parties and individuals can post their comments on blogs, Facebook pages and other online locations. Most of the organizations involved in the post-2015 discourse have their own

websites, while there are sites established for the sake of online discussion and sharing of information among people interested in international educational development. With the hurdle to participation so greatly lowered, the amount of information exchanged became vast and was transmitted constantly. While this third dimension enhanced the pace of discourse and encouraged different types of actors to take part, it also demanded that scholars adopt innovative methods of analysing discourse, which I will discuss later. Based on the dimensions of and actors in the EFA and post-EFA discourse conceptualized earlier, this volume will examine, on the one hand, domestic/internal conditions that determine the behaviour and priorities of various state and nonstate actors in their international educational aid and, on the other hand, the global dynamics and conditions that characterize the national/institutional response. State actors discussed in this volume are China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States. The political documents of Thailand are also analyzed in the chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation; Donors’ Self-Image and the discourse’ albeit lightly compared to other listed states. The volume will investigate, as crosscutting dimensions that influence state actors, horizontal and vertical mechanisms of setting the tone of educational aid. Based on examination of the respective actors and dimensions, the book will synthesize the discussion by untangling the process of interplay among state and nonstate actors at the national, regional and global levels and investigate how such processes are leading to a paradigm shift. The particular focus will be on the Asia-Pacific region for the following reasons: (1) This region is composed of different types of stateactors – traditional and nontraditional donors as well as recipients – and demonstrates a variety of unique positions in the landscape of international educational aid because of its diversity, (2) The donor governments of this region tend to highlight their Asian uniqueness in their policy statements while trying to accommodate the universal principles of human rights, equity and so on, (3) Regional bodies, both intergovernmental and civil society networks, are well established and play their own role in mediating between the national and the global, and in developing Asian regionality. The countries this volume highlights are distinctive in their own history, philosophy, structure and practice of educational aid. At the same time, some (particularly the northeast Asian countries) share similar philosophical roots, which could be considered ‘Asianness’. As we witness the transition from the EFA to the post-2015 paradigm, it would be meaningful not only to review the achievements and drawbacks of practices in developing countries and at the global level but also to pinpoint elements that are causing change in agendas, modes of operation, structures, and relationships among actors. While the normative transition from EFA to the post-2015 period is a significant moment to measure the direction in which the field is moving, it is also a rare opportunity to examine whether the changing realities can be explained by existing theories and frames of reference from academic fields such as international relations and comparative education. Post-2015 development has provided the momentum for diverse groups of people involved in international development to express their ideas or claim their positions using the common terms ‘post-2015’, ‘post-EFA’, and ‘post-MDGs’. Therefore, the analysis of discourse surrounding these fashionable terms

will reveal the motives of actors involved in the discourse and their power relationships, which are also backed by the structure for governance and implementation of the shared agenda. Based on these considerations, the following sections will provide some background to this volume in relation to theories about international relations and comparative education. By doing so, they will attempt to situate the current work in the greater theoretical map. The section ‘The EFA Era and Studies on Global Structures for Education and Development’ will overview the key aspects of EFA discourse and the structure of global governance, discussing theories and literature on international relations in general and multilateralism in particular. It will also consider the potential of discourse analysis in reviewing the ongoing transformation of the global consensus-building mechanism. The section ‘Interactions among Diversifying Actors’ will examine how the new types of donors are characterized in implementing agencies’ reports and academic articles. While the works reviewed in this chapter will be mostly written from the perspective of Western or traditional donors, I will investigate whether the reconstruction of the notions of ‘development’ and ‘education’ by these nontraditional, nonWestern actors may help us to capture some elements that contribute to the paradigm shift. Regarding another group of nontraditional actors, CSOs, I will review the academic discussion, particularly by scholars on international relations.

THE EFA ERA AND STUDIES ON GLOBAL STRUCTURES FOR EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT Reviewing the EFA Process As argued earlier, the period between 1990 and 2015 is characterized by the extreme convergence of priorities and methods of providing aid in international educational development. Such convergence did not happen overnight but was based on past experience and accumulated efforts towards institutionalization and standardization. Most directly, it resulted from compunctions about the aid practices of the 1980s, which were said to be inefficient due to rivalries among donors and a self-serving focus on topics and fields of assistance that promoted donors’ own agendas, not necessarily the overall developmental needs of the assisted countries. In addition, the rather exclusive focus on basic (primary and lower secondary) education under the EFA paradigm was driven by the principles of the welfare state and the rights-based approach (Dunne & Wheeler, 1999; Noel, 2005). As for why the old issue of poverty reduction was ‘rediscovered’ as the global political agenda, Noel (2005) raised the idea that the conception of justice makes actors receptive to the issues before them and prepares the ground for different actors to converge and debate further. According to Noel, by being ‘rediscovered’ as a response to the failure of past policy

discourses, the perennial issue of poverty provided the platform to discuss common challenges (2005, pp. 6–20). The idea of poverty reduction emerged in reaction to the extreme neoliberal economic principles of minimizing the function of the public sector and social services, which dominated development practices throughout the 1980s under structural adjustment programmes. In sum, the characteristics of the principles and the modalities of aid in the EFA era were formulated in response to experiences in the earlier period and characterized by prioritization of social services, particularly in areas that directly benefited underprivileged populations. In addition, due to the problems caused by uncoordinated aid flows, donors concentrated the channels of communication and resource distribution in the governments of developing countries, rather than working directly with local CSOs or communities. Among the six EFA goals, in fact, not all have received equal attention. Two of them – UPE and the elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education – were linked with the greater aid discourse, which emphasized the aid for the underprivileged and poor, and were integrated into the MDGs. This emphasis meant that UPE and gender parity in education were promoted to a higher status than the other goals and bundled together with goals in fields outside education, such as reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (Yamada, 2010). Thanks to this prioritization, enrolment rates have dramatically improved even in the countries with the lowest educational indicators.1 Improved access to education was a rather straightforward goal, for which the results of investment are visible and measurable – increased numbers of facilities and teachers. In fact, it was the only area in which the agendas of major stakeholders such as UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme have coincided (Chabbott, 1998, p. 212; Jones & Coleman, 2005, p. 42). However, a view widely shared among people closely involved in EFA governance is that the narrow focus on one of the six EFA goals impeded the flow of resources to certain areas of education, causing unbalanced development of educational administration (Shaeffer, 2014). Among educationists who are not satisfied with a simple functionalist conception of education as an investment for human capital development, there has long been the drive to promote more comprehensive notions of education. Against this background, the near-achievement of the UPE goal opened a Pandora’s box regarding the next global agenda. In the past few years, many donors revised their education-sector assistance strategies (e.g. Department for International Development, 2010; Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA], 2010; United States Agency for International Development, 2011; World Bank, 2011), and in fact, some of them have revised (JICA, 2015) or are currently revising their assistance strategies in accordance with the adopted SDGs and Framework for Action in the education sector. One commonality to their strategies is a broadening of scope from an exclusive focus on universal basic schooling to other aspects of basic education or to other subsectors such as secondary, postsecondary, or technical and vocational education. Although some countries that had traditionally allocated larger proportions of aid to postsecondary education shifted their resources to basic education during the EFA era, they tended later to swing back to their original field of strength.2 At the same time, some donors still focus on basic education, but on

different aspects of it.3 For example, the United States and the United Kingdom both focus on the quality of education, but the United States concentrates particularly on improving the learning outcomes of students in the early grades while the United Kingdom aims more broadly at education system improvement through teacher training, learning assessment and early childhood education. The strategies of the World Bank and many other donors emphasize that learning happens not only in schools but also in workplaces. This emphasis has caused issues such as lifelong learning, nonformal and informal education and skills formation for youth and adults to come up frequently in the post-EFA discourse. Why and how did those issues catch fire in the discourse? The chapters in this volume, particularly those in Part I, will examine this question closely.

Theories about Global Mechanisms of International Educational Development Among comparative educationists, one of the major scholarly domains has been describing the mechanisms by which certain forms and models of education spread widely across different societies. In a mechanism known as policy borrowing, ideas from another country’s policy may be copied, imitated, and adapted to the policies of the borrower nation. Educational policies are sometimes imported in this way when policymakers want to legitimize a policy that they already favour (Halpin & Troyna, 1995, pp. 307–308; Phillips & Ochs, 2003, p. 454; Robertson & Waltman, 1993, p. 29). Policies borrowed for political reasons may be met with resistance, adjustment, or compromise among the citizens affected (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). In explaining the diffusion of some policy ideas to multiple societies simultaneously, some have pointed to a shared assumption that a certain type of school culture is a condition for running a nation effectively. World culturalists, as they are called, assume the existence of a shared ‘world culture’ that makes a particular schooling model appeal to multiple countries (Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Benavot, Cha, Kamens, Meyer & Wong, 1991; Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer, 1985; Meyer & Ramirez, 2000). Outside the aid arena, Baker and LeTendre (2005) demonstrated such voluntary adoption among countries with little difference in economic and diplomatic power by analysing students’ scores in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, when one analyses the diffusion of educational models and ideas to developing countries, especially to the aid-dependent ones, it is difficult to overlook the power imbalance between the side that provides the model and the side that adopts it. World-system theorists sharply point out the imposition of policies by external actors, especially donor organizations, on developing countries without due respect to their sovereignty in educational policymaking (Arnove, 1980; Samoff, 1999). While world-system theorists focus on the vertical relationship between assisting countries/organizations and developing countries, multilateralists pay attention to the processes by which organizations (predominantly donors) with different motives and characteristics interact with each other and formulate the shared norms and agenda of international educational development (Chabbott,

1998, 2003; Jones, 1999; Mundy, 1999, 2007). According to Ruggie (1992), multilateralism refers to an international governance of multiple countries working in concert on a given issue, which involves not only formal institutions but also norms and practices (pp. 565–567). World culture theory, world system theory, and multilateralism have been employed and have effectively explained, from different perspectives, the global discourse and practices of international educational development in the EFA era. However, these theories are all based on the assumption that one model or a couple of dominant models would influence the whole world either voluntarily, through coercion, or through multilateral efforts to promote the common good. They do not assume a multipolar power structure, which may influence actors from different directions at different levels, causing intermingling of diverse sources of influence. Nowadays, it is often difficult to tell who the borrower and the lender of a policy idea are because of the constant cross-feeding of ideas. The resultant hybrid ideas, which often occur unconsciously, are adapted by the respective participants to their own societies and sometimes brought back to the global discourse after a fundamental metamorphosis. In this sense, the analysis of the global mechanism of international educational development, which is one of the core interests of comparative educationists, would require a new step to theorize the changing landscape through a multipolar structure among actors who constantly cross-feed and hybridize ideas. Another dimension that traditional multilateralism cannot fully explain is the increasing role that nonstate actors play in the global governance structure. Within the tradition of international relations theory, classic structuralism assumed that international relations are established among sovereign nation-states that have absolute authority over their territories, and that domestic politics and decision-making are in a domain independent of international dynamics. The domestic decision-making structure is considered hierarchical, with a clear centre that has a monopoly on the legitimate uses of power, and with a distribution of labour among various branches of government. There are differences between the realists, who consider the relationship among state actors to be fundamentally competitive and conflictual (Buzan, Jones, & Little, 1993; Campbell, 1999), and the idealists, who believe that states can set aside their differences and unite for the greater good (Beiz, 1999; Bull, 1987). Regardless, both camps of scholars conceive of international relations as interactions among state actors whose behaviour is based on rationality in decision-making. While the domestic realm is ordered hierarchically with a legitimate authority, the international system is not a law-bound realm (i.e. it exists in a state of anarchy) but is controlled by power games among nation-states. Therefore, the balance of power among nation-states, who seek the advantage in the competitive relationship, will lead to security and stability in the international realm (Holmes, 2011; Kivimaki, 2012; Yiyun, 2010). Against this tradition of exclusive focus on nation-states and their power politics on the international scene (Bennet, 1995), there are increasing efforts to describe the complex mechanisms of global governance involving civil society actors (Kelly, 2007; Morin, 2010). In the field of comparative education, however, regardless of the long tradition of studying international educational policy exchange and multilateralism, works that comprehensively

analyse the structure, discourse, and practices of actors other than those in the traditional category of donors have been limited, except for stocktaking records by CSOs (Verger & Novelli, 2012). Therefore, this volume will attempt to advance the theoretical framework for analysing international educational multilateralism, extending recent works on international relations and incorporating ideas from broader social science.

Analysis of the Changing Nature of International Relations In contrast to structuralist theories of international relations, which see the international system as anarchy defined by structure, there are constructivist scholars, who pay greater attention to the process and the cultural and social aspects of interaction among actors, whose nature is determined by their perspectives and interests (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). Unlike the conventional explanation that the structure of global governance and rule will bring about a balance of power, constructivists believe the nature of anarchy depends on how the respective actors conceive of the anarchy and behave based on that conception (Wendt, 1998). This analytical standpoint opens the way to theorizing the complex, multi-layered discourses in which not only state actors and international organizations but also civil society networks participate. While the analysis of discourse is based on the linguistic study of the words, purely linguistic decoding would not lead to the understanding of the context in which language assigns meaning to the ‘object’ of, in the case of this volume, the post-2015 agenda. Rather, discourse has to be understood in expanded terms to include the ‘complex group of relations’ within which the ‘truth’ about the term is produced and eventually comes to be accepted as such (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 18). In other words, the analysis of discourse is to untangle the process of interplay and mutual enforcement among language, subjective agencies who use the language, and structure (Wight, 2006). Also, according to this conception of discourse, ontology and epistemology are always intertwined, suggesting that the analysis of language detached from materiality is incomplete because language constitutes a seamless part of power strategies, forms of knowledge and practices (Wight, 2006, pp. 20–21; see also Doty, 1993; Onuf, 1989). In this sense, it is important for this volume not only to look at how things are discussed and decided but also at what ideas are discussed as the key concepts to be reflected in the post-2015 agenda and why they are assigned significance. For example, the discussions on the post-2015 agenda have happened in all 17 areas listed in the SDGs, not education alone. Although what this volume presents as the analysis of post-EFA discourse would have a great deal in common with what has happened in other sectors, it should not be considered apart from the ontology of educational development in respective localities and in the world. Not only educational development but international development as a whole has largely been neglected in international relations studies. One of the reasons is that, unlike issues of security and energy, where bare national interests crushes, discussions on development in general have looked to international relations scholars, too idealistic with their mantra of

humanism and liberalism. In a way, such idealism may itself serve to mask aspirations for extending hegemony or securing access to markets or resources. Still, on the surface, idealism was taken as a sign that development cooperation was not a major concern for national governments, and hence for international relations scholars, in terms of global power politics. However, as most of us who have been working in this field for certain period of time know, this is a false conception of the nature of the field. Escobar (1995) and Gupta (1998) have pointed out that the meaning of development differs according to who uses the word and in what context. As constructivists suggest, language expresses different styles of thought derived from different perspectives. The term development does not represent an uncontested ideal but has been challenged by people with different identities and backgrounds, particularly by those in the Global South. Still, as Noel has argued, the language of development or poverty reduction, which are often discussed as moral principles and values, plays a role in laying the common ground of global actions on which actors with diverse interests converge (2005, pp. 23–24). Based on these considerations, the analysis of global discourse on development, specifically on educational development, is of no less importance than any other topic for international relations studies. Rather, particularly because of the seemingly idealistic nature of thought on education and development, the effort to dig deeper than the surface to shed light on the dynamics among state and nonstate actors in this arena would contribute greatly towards extending the horizon of academic discussions on global governance (Avant et al., 2010). In the face of the transition from the EFA-MDG era to the post-2015 era, the conceptual framework of international educational development is transforming. The channels of participation in the discourse have become multi-layered, and at the same time it is not difficult to jump around in the hierarchical order of the formal structure of representation. Advanced information technology makes it possible to connect two or more points that have never been connected before, and the horizontal and vertical linkages among actors and their reciprocal influences create the power to transform the structure itself. At the same time, the paradigm shift we are experiencing is not a drastic delink from past values and ways of doing things. Progressive ideas cannot be recognized and valued unless they are presented in a manner that makes sense in the existing value framework. New ideas that emerge as modifications to the existing framework gradually change the meanings of words and values attached to them, eventually requiring structural changes. Therefore, in the process towards post-2015, continuity and disconnection, creation and succession have happened simultaneously. As Holmes suggested, the paradigm shift happens not naturally, but when members accept that the existing value framework cannot fit the realities and that the field is in need of a refreshed paradigm (2011, p. 284). The recognition that the realities to be described and their backgrounds have changed qualitatively has led to innovation in the methods used to analyse the discourse. In addition to the conventional method of coding key documents qualitatively by reading through them, in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, I have used quantitative analysis of the frequency of and interrelation among words used in the large number of texts published on the Internet. Because this was a

pilot study, the quantitative data that I could actually cite were limited and supplementary to the outcomes of the qualitative text analysis and interviews. Still, the quantitative analysis covered 1,720 texts occupying nearly 20,000 KB of memory in plain text format. This massive collection of voices from all around the world is powerful enough to change the nature of the structure and interactions among actors, and I believe readers will recognize the necessity of methodological innovation in the discourse analysis.

INTERACTIONS AMONG DIVERSIFYING ACTORS Nonstate Channels of Influence Given the broadened participation in the discourse and changed dynamics of decision-making in the global governance mechanism, one cannot neglect the roles played by the horizontal networks of nonstate actors. One such actor is the Global Campaign for Education (GCE), a global federation of CSOs specialized in the field of international educational development. CGE was established in 1999 with the aim of delivering a unified voice from civil society to WEF-Dakar in 2000, and it overarches various professional groups such as teachers’ unions; childrens’ rights campaigners; and organizations working for poverty reduction and development at the national, regional, and international levels. Member organizations come from almost 100 countries and include both the recipients and the providers of official development assistance (ODA). GCE makes it clear that its mission is advocacy, research, and monitoring of development projects ‘to make sure that states act to deliver the right of everyone to a free, quality public education’ (Global Campaign for Education, 2013, p. 1). Education International (EI), a member of GCE, is the network of teachers’ unions around the world. Aside from GCE and EI, many other international NGOs, such as Save the Children, ActionAid, Plan International, and Oxfam, to name a few, are active in the education sector, both implementing field projects in developing countries and doing advocacy on the international scene. Further, various civil society networks that work on issues such as poverty reduction, MDGs, human rights, and so forth also cover education among their fields of concern for advocacy. The roles they play in leveraging national and global agenda setting, accumulating research, and monitoring the processes of practice are growing bigger and bigger. According to Kelly (2007, pp. 85–87), these networks are loose, decentralized structures with many nodes around the world. They are characterized by their commitment to the issues, connecting individuals and institutions with expertise. They are fundamentally different from nation-state actors, whose behaviour is determined by their interest in their own survival or the elevation of their position in international politics, but not necessarily by a commitment to certain norms or values (see also Florini, 2000; Lipschutz & Mayer, 1996). The raison d’être of an advocacy-oriented civil society network is to transform the interests and priorities of

other actors, whether they be state governments, private corporations, or international organizations. While civil society networks work at the nexus of advocacy and expertise, interacting with other actors at the global and country levels, using public statements and mobilizing their own networks of information, they also monitor the practices of governments in relation to stated policies and pressure them to attend to any issues left out of practice. Civil society networks have two contradictory natures. On the one hand, being united by the common mission but loosely structured, they act flexibly and simultaneously on multiple fronts. In this respect, the core of the network, from which the ‘representative’ voices emanate, becomes blurred (Kelly, 2007, p. 87). On the other hand, while the network enhances the impact of the individual CSOs’ voices, the structure of the network necessitates some restrictions as to policy choices. Member CSOs face a strategic dilemma because moves at one level affect the other, yet the organizations have to satisfy both (Morin, 2010, p. 309). Therefore, the larger the number of members, the more abstract the network’s messages tend to be, due to the difficulty of finding a common denominator. This is why messages from CSO networks that took part in the post-EFA discourse were more likely to be linked with abstract concepts such as human rights and the fundamental role of education in sustainable development than the messages of technical specialist groups that focus on specific issues, such as assessment or finance. Another important issue to be highlighted is that the leaders of these vast and diverse networks play quite a significant role. Internally, they mobilize and consult with the members in order to speak with a common voice, while externally, they choose the means they think will influence the other actors most effectively, and in this processes they may modify the internally agreed-on policy choices at their discretion (Morin, 2010, p. 323). Based on the studies reviewed above, this volume will closely examine the backgrounds of members, the structures, and the resultant characteristics and behaviour of civil society networks in the global discourse on the post-EFA agenda, particularly in the chapters ‘Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance: Issues and Tensions’ and ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’.

Nontraditional Bilateral Donors The second significant group of actors in the current fundamental structural change is the former recipient countries of aid that have become donors. For people who are used to the traditional donor community’s way of doing things, emerging donors look very different from and sometimes even threatening to the existing structure. Many traditional donors have commissioned research to grasp the current status and trends of assistance by these emerging donors (Humphrey, 2011; Manning, 2006; Rowlands, 2008; Sato, Shiga, Kobayashi & Kondo, 2010). At first, the term ‘emerging donor’ was used almost interchangeably with ‘non-DAC donor’ (i.e. not a member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee). However, the

29 DAC memberships are largely limited to Europe and North America; the exceptions are Japan (a member since 1961) and South Korea (since 2010). This fact indicates that the DAC/non-DAC dichotomy is far short of grasping reality. Chun, Munyi, and Lee (2010) provided other categorizations, namely, OECD/European Union (EU) members; OECD/nonEU members; EU/non-OECD members; and non-OECD/non-EU members (pp. 790–791). The more common categorization is by region – Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Middle East – and the most studied countries are the BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (case studies of the BRICS countries include International Development Research Centre, 2008; Network for Policy Research Review and Advice on Education and Training, 2010; and ONE International, 2010). There are also studies on the operations of emerging donors from the viewpoint of recipient countries (Kassenova, 2009; Nordtveit, 2011; Sato, Shiga, Kobayashi & Kondo, 2011). Table 1 indicates that as of 2010, nearly 30 per cent of bilateral ODA was provided by non-DAC member countries, which is far from negligible. Moreover, the aid resources flowing from non-DAC donors are on an upward trend. Particularly, the increase in aid from China is remarkable. According to one study that put together financial data scattered across the government, China can be ranked as the 6th biggest of the DAC donors, after the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and France. Its rank has increased from 16th in 10 years (Kitano & Harada, 2014, pp. 10–21). At the same time, these nontraditional donors are so diverse in terms of size of funds, areas of activity, geographic focus, motivations, history of providing aid and domestic structure of planning and implementing aid that it is difficult to capture their characteristics as a group. A large part of them are small in their fund size and support only nearby countries with historical and cultural ties. Examples of this type of donor are Thailand and eastern European countries (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, p. 2; Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency, 2009, pp. 1–2). However, some of these donors are providing technical cooperation to countries on other continents by sharing their own development experience (in a mechanism known as South-South cooperation) (Chisholm & Steiner-Khamsi, 2009; Tilak, 2016). Also, as some critics have pointed out, these donors are not necessarily new in their commitment to financial and technical cooperation (Davies, 2010, pp. 19–20; King, 2010b, p. 8). While China is increasing the amount of its aid rapidly, particularly aid to Africa, the position of the government is that it has been assisting countries in Africa and Asia based on the principle of solidarity for several decades (King, 2010a; Niu and Liu, 2016). In fact, although these donors have become visible to the traditional aid community over the past few years, they have their own historical origins and perspectives on development that may not necessarily fit well with the logic on which the current aid discourse is constructed (Six, 2009). China and India, two Asian ‘emerging’ donors taken up in this volume, seem to use these stated unique historical origins of ODA as the signal that their framework of development assistance, which they prefer to call ‘cooperation’, is fundamentally different from or even the antithesis of the Western framework (see also the Chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’ by Yamada). Meanwhile, those traditional donors who treated the nontraditional

ones as ‘emerging’ started to accept the latter’s claim to be both old and unique, while trying to incorporate them under the umbrella of the established donor community represented by OECD-DAC so that they would follow the common principles, modalities, and approaches. To showcase this enlargement of scope, the DAC High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which was hosted in 2011 by new DAC member South Korea, has published a statement promoting a broad range of aid modalities, including South-South cooperation and public-private partnership, neither of which used to be considered a mainstream modality. It is yet to be seen whether such minor changes and expansion of the scope of the DAC framework will lead to stability in the global ODA governance structure or to its collapse from within. In either case, to grasp the causes and effects of the transformation more accurately, it is necessary to overcome the simplistic binary contrast and static characterization of traditional and emerging donors based on the conventional frame of reference. Table 1. 2010 Net Disbursements by Donor (in Millions of U.S. Dollars). DAC members Japan

7,337

T he United States

26,586

T he United Kingdom

8,017

France

7,787

Germany

8,036

DAC members total

90,957

Non-DAC members China

3,000

India

610

Brazil

437

Russia

200

South Africa

109

Israel

138

T urkey

780

EU members

Providers of South-South cooperation

Czech Republic

249

Hungary

107

Poland

372

Romania

123

Chinese Taipei

435

T hailand

179

Kuwait

Arab donors

Saudi Arabia

All donors total

283 5,564 131,108

Source: Calculated based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010). Note: DAC = Development Assistance Committee.

Rationale for Focusing on Actors in the Asia-Pacific Region While nontraditional types of donors are diverse, it is not correct to assume that the traditional group has been unanimous. In fact, some donors have struggled to follow the coordinated aid expectations of the DAC community because their domestic systems and environment are not

supportive of DAC expectations. For example, countries such as Japan and the United States have faced constant pressure to explain their reasons for not aligning with the dominant modes of assistance, particularly budget support and the sector-wide approach, and to justify their aid projects, which have been often criticized for standing apart from the overall development goals of the assisted countries (Department for International Development, 1999, p. 65). However, as the group of emerging donors has come to the forefront, the landscape has been changing. When only a few countries did not adopt the agreed-on modalities, they were considered outliers. However, with the tide of nontraditional donors rising, the issue is not any more inclusion or exclusion but fragmentation of the imagined donor group and the changing gravity of discourse. As Simmel (1991) said, ‘the human being is a bordering creature’ (p. 10) who constantly draws lines to differentiate him or herself from others. Distinctions based on social, cultural, physical or symbolic characteristics define who a person is (Marotta, 2008, p. 298). This theoretical framework of identity formation can be applied to the case of the traditional donor community, in which donors define the nature of the community by common principles, traditions, modes of operation and practices. Anderson (1983) characterized the collective identity as being composed of internal functions and external functions. Internal functions are elements that strengthen a sense of belonging and bind the members to shared rules and expectations; external functions demonstrate members’ distinctiveness to the outside (pp. 21–40). These internal and external functions work to strengthen the border between the members (‘us’) and nonmembers (‘others’) and secure their identities. The ‘othering’ among the traditional donor community was one form of boundary maintenance, while criticism against emerging donors based on a stereotypic dichotomy was another form of othering. The cases of Japan and the United States, taken up in the chapters ‘Japanese Educational Aid in Transition: The Challenge to Transform from a Traditional Donor to a New Partner’ (by Yamada and Yoshida) and ‘USA – A “Traditional” Outlier in Transition’ (by Williams), are important to illustrate the diversity of policies and practices among donors even within the traditional group. This volume will also discuss Asian donors with diverse characteristics. The cases of Asian donors China, India, South Korea and Thailand4 will provide the opportunity to see if there are any Asian regional features, even though each country has a clearly different history and different reasons for committing to international development aid. Japan’s case will stand at the intersection between traditional outliers and the Asian group. By looking at these peripheral donors – peripheral not financially but normatively – this volume will also untangle how the traditional donor group has been maintained and how the donors categorized as others or outliers affect the established framework. In the current situation, with the relationships among actors multi-layered and multi-faceted, it is often difficult to determine who are ‘we’ and who are ‘others’. Those considered to be part of ‘us’ may turn out to be ‘others’ when seen from different dimensions. The Asia-Pacific region, which is composed of diverse actors, will showcase how the shared notion of international development and the structure and rules to substantiate it will take shape despite different interests. Japan was the first non-Western DAC member. In the 1980s, its ODA was criticized for its commercial motivation, just as countries such as China are now criticized. At that time Japan’s

argument was that it was sharing its own experience of development so that the assisted countries could achieve self-reliance rapidly. Japan’s argument for solidarity and sharing of experience has been taken over by northeast Asian donors, namely South Korea and China, who came to the scene much later. In addition, Japan has always been in the ambivalent position of being both a DAC member and an Asian latecomer. This struggle has now been taken up by South Korea as one of the main concerns of aid officials there (Chung, 2016; Korean Association for International Development and Cooperation, and Korea International Cooperation Agency, 2011). Somewhat common but different reactions to the mainstream discourse among northeast Asian donors will provide opportunities to consider the differential impact the international environment will have on these countries. As discussed in the chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ SelfImages and the Discourse’, there are more similarities than differences in the stated philosophies, logics and approaches of ‘Korean’, ‘Japanese’, or ‘Chinese’ models of development aid, regardless of their rivalry and desire to demonstrate uniqueness. These commonalities at the roots of their aid programmes might be the Asian conceptions of development and education, which they both tacitly and overtly contrast with Western values. The case of the United States will provide a reference point for considering the factors that constitute Asianness while also demonstrating differences from mainstream traditional donors in approach and logic.

Challenges to International Relations Theories from the Non-West When the Cold War ended, Francis Fukuyama argued that the liberal democracy originating from the West, particularly the United States, was widely considered to be the final form of human government and that there would be no further ideological evolution except for its universalization (Fukuyama, 1992). However, the increasing presence of non-Western state and nonstate actors and the resultant changes in the balance of power invited criticism about the appropriateness of that assumption. There are growing challenges to the Eurocentric view of mainstream international relations as shaped by the historical contingencies of 19th-century Europe. International development from the end of the Second World War until the first decade of the present millennium has, despite shifts in trends and emphases in the norms and practices, maintained a structure based on multilateralism among sovereign states and a notion of development as the evolution of developing countries towards a higher state of modernism (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 5). The refinement of system and rules, and the improvement of professionalism were all based on these principles. However, some scholars have argued that the structure and principles that have been presented as universal should be questioned from their foundation. According to them, even the critical international relations theories (including postmodernism, poststructuralism, feminism and Marxist theory) have taken those modernist human-oriented approaches as a given, although they criticized but did not consider international relations completely away from them (Acharya, 2011, pp. 629–630; Kivimaki,

2012, pp. 420–422). Regardless that various scholars have expressed a sense of the misfit of Western international relations or development theories in making sense of ideas and practices outside of the West, it is difficult to readily identify theories in these fields developed outside of the West. Facing this reality, Acharya pointed out ‘a possibility that … they are hidden from the Western discourse by language barriers or by being located in areas of study outside the Western-defined international relations realm’ (Acharaya 2007, p. 295). In Asia, as discussed in the chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’, in the heyday of the ‘East Asian miracle’ in the 1980s and early 1990s, Confucian thought and communitarianism were behind the state-led development and ‘Asian’ work ethic that Asian political leaders promoted as an alternative to liberal Western individualistic values. However, such statements are often made in diplomatic contexts to support these countries’ practices but not so much in the academic discourse. There also has not been much effort to theorize Asian orientations to international relations in contrast to those of the West. Such pragmatism itself is embedded in Confucianism, which may cause a fundamental difference in the analytical attitudes of scholars and, by extension, their drive for theory building. In this volume, although it is beyond our scope to establish any new international relations or development theory, one of our aims is to shed light on the notions of development, education, and schools, which have been used as universal norms but may be conceptualized differently in Asia than elsewhere. The chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’ tries to untangle the meanings attached to these concepts in the aid policy documents of Asian donors. By doing so, it will examine how these countries’ policy frameworks match or mismatch that of mainstream EFA and, in the case of mismatches, how those have happened, according to historically developed Asian systems and philosophical bases.

CONCLUSION After a period of large-scale convergence of norms and methods of international education aid, the field is now experiencing a paradigm shift. To grasp the nature of the change and the factors that have caused it, this volume will examine major actors in the discourse according to three dimensions. One dimension is the discourse on the impact of interventions under EFA goals and the prospects after EFA. The second dimension is the increasing presence of new types of state actors, which is shifting the gravity among state actors and fragmenting the identity of the donor community. The third dimension of the paradigm shift is the horizontal network of actors that causes influence to flow in multiple directions, making it difficult to identify categories of actors with distinct characteristics. According to these dimensions, the volume will examine the national, regional and global conditions that determine the behaviour and priorities of

various state and nonstate actors in their international educational aid. One way in which this publication could be significant is its contribution to the body of literature on cross-border exchange of educational ideas, which has been one of the major themes of research in comparative education. Oft-cited theories in this field, such as the world culture theory, multilateralism, or educational borrowing, have been meant to explain the domestic and international factors that influence educational policymaking and the mechanisms of such influence globally and nationally. However, these existing theories are not necessarily able to describe the multipolar situation of the current world of international educational development, which requires advancing a theoretical framework based on case studies of the phenomena and actors in front of us. This volume attempts to expand the theoretical horizon of comparative education based on the accumulated research and interests in this issue. Another way in which this volume can be significant is that it describes cases of emerging donors and civil society networks not only separately but as interrelated phenomena within the global structure of educational development, as it undergoes a paradigm shift. Since the issues related to nontraditional types of donors are attracting a great deal of attention from both academics and practitioners, a collection of case studies written by scholars of the respective countries who are themselves closely involved in the policymaking and practices of educational aid is, of itself, important and informative. For the sake of comparison, the case studies of China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States were written based on the same thematic criteria: (1) the relationship between domestic political agendas and aid priorities; (2) the degree of interference into the policy setting, agenda setting and implementation of projects in assisted countries; (3) modalities of aid – programme, budget support, project, scholarship, and so forth; (4) rationales for aid; (5) levels of alignment with and influence on other donors; (6) decision-making mechanisms and (7) influential actors in policymaking. In this sense, the volume will meet the demands of people who want an overview of the characteristics of these state actors. Similarly, the chapter on the civil society network (the chapter Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’) highlights the kinds of actors that have not been discussed as the main object of research in the field of comparative education. At the same time, the volume goes beyond the parallel presentation of case studies. The paradigm shift of international educational development has not been caused solely by the diversification of state actors. It is also linked with the fragmentation of norms and practices after the concentration on UPE under EFA and the MDGs. Also, the relationship between state and civil society actors complicates the globalized discourse. While the whole international development business depends largely on state and private-sector finance, civil society actors attempt to leverage the power relation by providing expertise and advocacy through global mission-driven networks. Therefore, one should analyse the globally shared norms, local interests, structure, and interactions among diverse actors as interwoven parts of the global process of the paradigm shift. I hope this volume’s attempt to capture a comprehensive picture of these dynamics will appeal not only to scholars of comparative education but also to scholars of international politics, cultural studies, and other relevant social science fields.

Still another unique attribute of this book is its introduction of the perspective of Asian regionality in the analysis of international educational aid. Education or human resource development is given special importance in the Asian idea of national development, which resonates repeatedly in the policy statements of Asian donors, particularly China, Japan, and South Korea. The philosophies of Asian donors are based on Asian ideas about national or social development, but at the same time they are mixed with Western justifications for the value of education, such as human rights, neoliberalism, and the functionality of literacy. By bringing such Asian philosophies of education into the scope of analysis, the volume will examine the regionality and culturality of ideas and avoid falling into rootless cultural relativism, which would not lead to theoretical breakthrough from alternative perspectives.

CHAPTERS IN THIS VOLUME Following this chapter, which maps out the location of this volume in the theories of international relations and comparative education, there are eight chapters. The chapters ‘Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance: Issues and Tensions’, ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’ and ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’ constitute Part I, which untangles the context of post-EFA discourse at both the global and the regional levels. These chapters will review the development of global governance and discourse in this field since 1990, while examining the contemporary situation from multiple dimensions such as structure, norms, geopolitics and actors involved. In the chapter ‘Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance: Issues and Tensions’, Leon Tikly traces the genealogy of the education for all movement between 1990 and 2005. The chapter sets out the achievements of EFA, including some success in uniting diverse interests around a common set of goals. It will also discuss key tensions related to the Northern- and Western-led nature of EFA, tensions between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and issues associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank, the tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets, and associated tensions between economic and rights-based views of EFA. In the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, Yamada examines the interplay among actors who took part in the process of consensus building towards a post-2015 education agenda via different channels of global governance, including both formal and informal channels. Based on interviews and qualitative textual analysis, the chapter will introduce major groups of actors and their major issues of concern, decision-making structures, modes of communication, and relationships with other actors. Then, based on an understanding of the characteristics of the various channels and actors, the chapter presents the structural issues that arose during the analysis of the post-2015 discourse and the educational issues that emerged as the shared concerns of the ‘education

community’. The chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’ shifts the focus to the Asia-Pacific region, while continuing to examine the discourse on EFA and developing the post-EFA agenda. Yamada reveals that the region has two faces: one imaginary and the other functional. There is a common trend across Asian donors to refer to their historical ties with regions and countries to which they provide assistance and their traditional notions of education and development. In this sense, the imagined community of Asia with common cultural roots is perceived by policymakers as a unit. At the same time, with the broadened participatory structure of EFA governance, administratively, too, the importance of the region has increased as a stage between the national and global levels. The second part of the volume, beginning with the chapter ‘Japanese Educational Aid in Transition: The Challenge to Transform from a Traditional Donor to a New Partner’, contains case studies of donor countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter ‘Japanese Educational Aid in Transition: The Challenge to Transform from a Traditional Donor to a New Partner’, by Yamada and Kazuhiro Yoshida, is on Japan, the sole non-Western country that has been a member of DAC since its inception. The chapter describes the dilemma experienced by Japan between the West and non-West. It examines the philosophical foundations of Japanese aid policies in the changing political, economic, and social contexts from the 1950s to the present. The chapter also points out that the increased presence of other Asian donors in recent years has caused Japanese ODA policies to be driven more by national interests than by global humanitarianism, which is clearly seen in the Development Cooperation Charter adopted in 2014. The chapter ‘The Korean Model of ODA: A Critical Review of Its Concept and Practices Reflected in Educational ODA’, by Bong Gun Chun, describes the transformation of Korean ODA, which gradually shaped the country’s self-confidence as a donor that joined DAC in 2010. The Korean government promotes a so-called Korean ODA model to share its economic development knowledge and experiences with developing countries. The chapter also demonstrates the cleavage of ODA policies between ministries, particularly those of finance and foreign affairs. Chun points out that Korean ODA is strongly driven by its economic orientation, affecting its policies on education programmes, which highlight higher education as well as technical and vocational education and training, while neglecting basic education. In the chapter ‘Positioning China’s Aid to Educational Development in Africa: Past, Present, & Post-2015’, Changsong Niu and Jing Liu examine the background of Chinese educational cooperation, particularly with Africa. The authors highlight three dimensions of transformations in Chinese aid policies to Africa: ideological shift, expansion of countries to assist and changed emphasis from economic pragmatism to humanitarianism. Meanwhile, the chapter indicates a continuity of the philosophy of solidarity, morality, and reciprocity in China’s South-South cooperation for African educational development. The analysis also shows that China’s educational aid heavily focuses on higher education, short- and long-term training programmes, scholarships and Chinese language education. The authors point out the

dual role China tries to play: on the one hand as the biggest developing country and on the other hand as the norm setter of the donor discourse. The chapter ‘South-South Cooperation: India’s Programme of Development Assistance – Nature, Size and Functioning’, by Jandhyala B.G. Tilak, is on India. Despite the oft-applied category of ‘emerging donor’, India’s history of development cooperation dates back to immediately after independence, and the Indian government prefers to call it ‘South-South development cooperation’. In this chapter, the special features of India’s programme, its unique character, and its overall prospects are highlighted. India allocates a limited amount of resources for educational aid, while training programmes are an important component of various aid programmes. Tilak emphasizes that India has a great potential to emerge as a major donor country. The chapter ‘USA – A “Traditional” Outlier in Transition’ is about the United States, one of the traditional donors. In spite of having the largest ODA budget among bilateral donors, it has been treated as an outlier in modes of operation, scope and nature of activities and place within government. James Williams highlights the divide between humanitarian/development and diplomatic/security rationales in decision-making regarding U.S. foreign aid. The budget is split nearly in half between them. The causes of this tension are identified as the constant need to justify foreign aid, attributed to the isolationism persistent in U.S. politics; the particularly adversarial institutions of U.S. policymaking and the transparency that leaves these processes open. To conclude the volume, in the last chapter, Yamada summarizes the arguments presented in the volume and discusses the meanings of the post-2015 discourse for the so-called education community, which in itself has an ambiguous and virtual existence. How were the contents of the discourse structured through the process of consensus building in global, regional and national platforms? Who participated in the multi-layered processes and with what motivations? The concluding chapter will also discuss the theoretical contributions this volume has made.

NOTES 1. Among the countries whose primary gross enrolment rate was below 40 per cent in 1990 (Afghanistan 29 per cent, Burkina Faso 30 per cent, Eritrea 20 per cent, Ethiopia 37 per cent, Guinea 36 per cent, Niger 27 per cent), only Eritrea did not reach 50 per cent enrolment, while Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Guinea achieved close to 100 per cent (World Bank, 2013). 2. For example, in 2009, for the top three providers of ODA to education (excluding international organizations), the share of postsecondary education in the total direct ODA to education is more than half (69.7 per cent for Germany, 59.8 per cent for France and 52.2 per cent for Japan) (UNESCO, 2012). 3. The top fourth to sixth education donors allocate larger portions of their resources to basic education (40 per cent for the United Kingdom, 65.6 per cent for the United States and 51.9 per cent for the Netherlands) (UNESCO, 2012). 4. The cases of China, India and South Korea are discussed independently in Chapters ‘The Korean Model of ODA: A Critical Review of Its Concept and Practices Reflected in Educational ODA’, ‘Positioning China’s Aid to Educational Development in Africa: Past, Present, & Post-2015’, and ‘South-South Cooperation: India’s Programme of Development Assistance – Nature, Size and Functioning’, respectively, in addition to the comparative analysis of policy papers in Chapter

‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’. Thailand is discussed only in Chapter ‘‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’’.

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PART I POST-EFA DISCOURSE IN THE HISTORICAL, STRUCTURAL, NORMATIVE, AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS

EDUCATION FOR ALL AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE: ISSUES AND TENSIONS Leon Tikly

ABSTRACT The chapter traces the genealogy of the Education for All (EFA) Movement understood as a global regime of educational governance between 1990 and 2005. The chapter sets out the achievements of EFA including some success in uniting diverse interests around a common set of goals. It will also discuss the key tensions related to the Northern and Western-led nature of EFA; tensions between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and the issues associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank; the tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets; and the associated tensions between more economistic and rights-based views of EFA. It will be argued that the development of these tensions can be understood in relation to different kinds of power linked to the international political economy and to the impact of other global regimes. Keywords: Education for all; global governance; governance regime

INTRODUCTION The aim in this chapter is to provide an understanding of Education for All (EFA) as an evolving global regime of educational governance. The chapter will outline key historical events in the period between 1990 and 2005 that have been the key in shaping EFA as a movement. It is hoped that such an analysis will provide a useful context for considering other contributions to this volume that deal with more recent developments in EFA in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and development agenda.1 In developing understanding the chapter will set out the achievements of EFA including the extent to which it has proved successful in uniting diverse interests around a common set of goals as well as on the

identification of key tensions. These include the Northern and Western-led nature of EFA both in terms of its governance and its underlying norms and values; tensions between the multilateral agencies over the leadership of EFA and issues associated with the hegemonic status assumed by the World Bank; the tension between a wider EFA agenda and a narrower focus on a few quantifiable targets; associated tensions between more economistic and rightsbased views of EFA. It will be argued that the development of these tensions can be seen in relation to the exercise of different kinds of power linked to the broader international political economy as well as to the relationship between EFA and other global regimes. The chapter will commence by presenting a conceptual framework for understanding EFA as a global regime of educational governance and in relation to different forms of power. This will provide a basis for a discussion of key events in the development of EFA through which key issues and tensions will be traced.

UNDERSTANDING EFA ARCHITECTURE AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE In seeking to explain the development of EFA the chapter will build on recent work on global governance in the field of international relations (e.g. Barnett & Duvall, 2014; Digwerth & Pattberg, 2006; Mosse, 2005; Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013; Ruggie, 2014) including a more specialised literature that has sought to apply the concept to education (e.g. Jones, 2005; Mundy & Manion, 2014; Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Mundy & Verger, 2015). In an oft-quoted passage, the UN-endorsed report on global governance provided the following definition: Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have either agreed to or perceive to be in their interests …. At a global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving nongovernmental organisations, citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are the global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence. (Commission for Global Governance, 1995 in Mundy & Manion, 2014, p. 41)

The idea of global governance has emerged relatively recently as an alternative to the previous, state-centred way of understanding how global issues such as EFA are governed. Mundy and Manion (2014) explain the emergence of the concept in relation to three phenomena that are deeply implicated in the emergence of the EFA architecture. Firstly, the end of the cold war signalled a shift from bilateral to multilateral support for education and other areas of donor assistance. Secondly, the development of contemporary globalisation which has been associated with the opening up of national boundaries, and the strengthening of regional and multilateral institutions that although influenced by national governments (and in particular powerful national governments and alliances of governments) operate with a degree of relative

autonomy. Thirdly, as careful scholarship has shown (e.g. Jones, 2006; Jones & Coleman, 2005; Mundy & Verger, 2015), global issues such as EFA are shaped by tensions and contradictions linked to the peculiarities of organisational structure, purpose, norms and values of these institutions as much as they are by overt national or global interests. Important for our discussion, global governance understood in these terms is contested in that the effects of global flows and networks are mediated and modified at the regional and local levels. Significant here has been the emergence of a global civil society that has at times challenged and modified dominant global agendas, and this has had implications for the way that EFA has been shaped (see also, Tikly, 2001). At a theoretical level the end of the cold war and the deepening of globalisation processes have increasingly been explained in terms of constructivist theories of international relations in which shared normative and ideational structures and processes – of which EFA is an example – are seen as influencing the actions of actors at different levels including national governments. Extending the above, EFA can best be understood as an educational example of a ‘governance regime’. Regimes are commonly defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 29). In this sense EFA has involved the convergence of key governmental and non-governmental institutions at the global, regional and national levels around a distinct series of international agreements, framework documents, protocols and reports as will be discussed. Significantly, as Mundy and Manion (2014) explain, EFA has emerged from previous education and development regimes (below). It is also the case that EFA sits alongside other regimes. Of significance here, for example, is the regime around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); around international assessments and educational policy development clustered around the OECD, which continues to have an impact on EFA thinking; regimes concerned with aid effectiveness and regimes in other sectors that have influenced the EFA agenda such as those around the global campaign against HIV/AIDS and those concerning the regulation of global markets. We will return to a consideration of the implications of this in the discussion below. The work of the international relations theorists (Barnett & Duvall, 2014) has been found particularly valuable in understanding the tensions at the heart of EFA. These scholars argue that much work on global governance has not included a sustained consideration of power and that ‘this is paradoxical because governance and power are inextricably linked. Governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power. To account for how global activities are guided and how world orders are produced, therefore, requires careful and explicit analysis of the workings of power’ (p. 2). The authors define power as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’ (p. 3). They distinguish between different kinds of power that operate within the sphere of international relations. They are each relatively autonomous, linked to different global structures and causal mechanisms with different loci and have causes and effects at different levels and scales. They

define compulsory power as comprising the relations of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another. In the context of the present discussion this is most obvious that it will be argued in the conditionalities that have been attached to aid. A second type of power is institutional in which states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. In relation to the development of EFA it is manifested in the historical dominance of the interests of powerful, Western nations in the governance structures of global financial institutions such as the World Bank (e.g. Jones, 2005, 2006). Similarly, the OECD which has been influential, as we will see in the development of EFA discourse, is made up of an exclusive club of highly industrialised countries. EFA discourses, it will be suggested, are also the outcome of contestation between different institutions and between multilateral organisations and global civil society each wielding different amounts of institutional power. Barnett and Duval also identify structural power, which concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the working of the global capitalist economy, in producing unequal social relations of production between capital and labour. Class relationships of dominance and subordination in international relationships also intersect in complex ways with those of gender and race (Rupert, 2014). Although less obvious to observe empirically in relation to the development of EFA, an understanding of structural power is nonetheless fundamental for understanding the wider political global economy against which the development of EFA must be understood. Although a detailed discussion of the nature of structural power is beyond the scope of the present chapter, reference will be made to deeper analyses of the relationship between education and the global political economy that have been undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g. Robertson et al., 2007; Tikly, 2003, 2004). Finally, productive power is the socially diffused production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification including the way that ‘development’ itself is defined and understood. As with structural power the workings of productive power are less obvious than those of compulsory and institutional power but no less important than other kinds of power for understanding how the identities of different actors are constituted and the policies of different institutions are discursively framed. In the sections below, it will be argued that the underlying view of education and development informing EFA has been informed by dominant economistic discourses on the one hand and by rights-based discourses on the other. Importantly for our analysis the different forms of power do not operate in isolation from each other but interact. Thus, for example, the ability for governments or groups of governments to exercise compulsory power over other governments relies on the extent of institutional power within institutions that preside over global governance regimes and indeed to the relative power exercised by competing institutions in the context of specific regimes. Institutional power is in turn linked to how ruling coalitions within national governments are positioned in relation to global markets. Productive power can be seen to operate in and through different ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) clustered around different disciplinary understandings of education and development that can inform the workings and programmes of

different institutions sometimes in contradictory ways.

THE GENEALOGY OF EFA AS A GLOBAL REGIME OF EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE The focus of this section is on tracing the genealogy of EFA as a regime of global governance. The section will be organised around discussion of key events including the Jomtien and Dakar conferences on EFA in the so-called decade of conferences which set out the vision of EFA in a series of principles; the DAC/OECD framework and millennium summit which endorsed the use of time-bound targets as a means for holding governments and donors to account for delivering on EFA; the Fast Track Initiative (later to evolve into a Global Partnership for Education) which provided a mechanism for donors to pool resources around key EFA priorities and the Rome and Paris Declarations and protocols which set out a series of principles relating to aid effectiveness. A rich literature describing the key moments in the emergence of the EFA architecture already exists and has been useful for the present discussion. The aim here is not to repeat this rich history in detail. Rather, as suggested in the introduction it is to identify key tensions that have characterised EFA and to relate these to a consideration of the influence of different kinds of power. Before proceeding to a discussion of events pivotal to the development of EFA it is important to provide some historical context. As many commentators have pointed out, EFA needs to be seen against the background of the wider shift in development thinking between the so-called Washington and post-Washington consensuses. The emergence of EFA needs to be set against the crisis of the so-called Washington consensus and the emergence of the postWashington consensus. Much has been written about this shift (see e.g. Robertson et al., 2007). The Washington consensus can be seen as a response to the global economic crisis of the 1970s and was influenced by the spread of neo-liberal thinking linked to the rise of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States. At the heart of neoliberalism is the idea of rolling back the state, increasing the role for the private sector and liberalising trade. More specifically, and in relation to the low-income world, the Washington consensus was linked to the introduction of Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Polices (SAPs) by the World Bank and IMF. SAPS linked lending to low-income countries to conditionalities. In Barnett and Duvall’s (2014) terms this equates to the use of compulsory power by the international financial institutions to impose aid conditionalities on low-income countries. In public services including health and education these conditionalities generally amounted to the introduction of user fees, privatisation and decentralisation. The underlying rationale was that these measures would make services more accountable to the public and drive up the quality of services through encouraging diversification and competition between service providers. However, SAPS had disastrous consequences for the poor (Samoff, 1994).

The introduction of user fees, for example, led to a decline in enrolments in many low-income countries. As some commentators have argued, the growth in the overall levels of poverty and inequality associated with the imposition of SAPs can be seen as an expression of structural power in the global economy as these policies were seen to work in the interests of global and national elites rather than those of the poor (see Tikly, 2003, p. 4; Robertson et al., 2007; Rupert, 2014). The period also saw a realignment in the balance of institutional power linked to growing criticisms of the World Bank/IMF Washington Consensus reforms from a variety of sources from the United Nations institutions to civil society organisations and NGOs in the global North and South (Cornia, 2001; Walton & Seddon, 1994). Some of these tensions have their roots in historical differences between a more economist approach to development embraced by the international financial institutions on the one hand and the more rights-based approach adopted by the UN agencies and many NGOs on the other hand. There was also a mounting evidence from cross-national studies as to the failure of SAPs to address poverty. It was argued that structural adjustment polices were undermining the capacity of low-income countries to ensure stability and social cohesion and to provide for the most vulnerable sections of society. The call for ‘adjustment with a human face’ (Cornia, 2001) represented a challenge to the international financial institutions and the failure of SAPs to either reduce poverty and inequality or to achieve sustained economic growth in low-income countries. For their part, the global financial institutions blamed the failure of SAPs on poor governance including inefficiency, mismanagement, over-centralised services and corruption. The emerging so-called post-Washington consensus thus emphasised poverty alleviation through providing a safety net for the poorest, a greater emphasis on social cohesion and the need for ‘good governance’ including great accountability of governments in the use of public funds and decentralisation. At the heart of the realignment of institutional power in the context of the shift to the post-Washington consensus was a closer coming together of the major multilateral agencies including the various UN agencies and the international financial institutions around a common commitment to poverty reduction which came to be seen as synonymous with development itself (Robertson et al., 2007). There was also a greater recognition of the significance of civil society organisations and NGOs in human development through their role in promoting social capital. From 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) began to replace SAPs as the IMF/World Bank mechanism to develop national policy agreements. PRSPs were supposed to be ‘countrydriven’ and thus would promote strong national ownership of development strategies including broad and active involvement of civil society. They were also ‘result orientated’ with a clear focus on benefiting the poor, ‘comprehensive’ in their understanding of the multidimensional nature of poverty, ‘partnership oriented’ involving careful coordination between all the different stakeholders and donors and ‘long term’ with a view to addressing poverty reduction. In educational terms PRSPs were linked to the removal of user fees for basic education to encourage access for the poorest and to a continued emphasis on decentralisation and privatisation and the prioritisation of Universal Primary Education. The post-Washington

consensus in education as in other spheres thus provided both a degree of continuity and change on the Washington consensus. It also demonstrated despite the realignment in power the continuing influence/hegemony of the global financial institutions within the field of education and development. The emergence of EFA needs to be understood against this broader background. Education was seen by the World Bank as central to poverty alleviation through its role in promoting economic growth. In addition, education, particularly for girls, was also perceived to have other benefits including improved health and a reduction in fertility rates (Robertson et al., 2007). There was also an emerging sense of global collective responsibility for access to basic education not just for the purposes of economic development but also as a universal human right. The Bank’s commitment to Universal Primary Education (UPE), which came to lie at the heart of EFA, in fact emerged during the Washington Consensus era. The negative effects of SAPs on enrolments proved to be a source of contradiction with the goals of UPE. From the 1990s, however, and in the context of the post-Washington consensus, funding for UPE began to be represented more as an issue for donors and the international community as much as for national governments. This shift in thinking from education being seen primarily as a national concern to one that lay at the centre of the international development agenda provided the basis for the emergence of EFA as a global regime of educational governance.

JOMTIEN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFA VISION The origin of the concept of EFA is generally associated with the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in Jomtien in 1990 which resulted in the World Declaration on Education for All and a Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs (Inter-Agency Commission, 1990). The WCEFA was one of seven World Conferences held during the 1990s, the others being in the areas of children (New York, September 1990); environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992); human rights (Vienna, 1993); population (Cairo, 1994); social development (Copenhagen, 1995); women (Beijing, 1995); human settlements (Istanbul, 1996); food security (Rome, 1996) and climate change (Kyoto, 1997). The conference was attended by some 1,500 participants, representing national and multinational donor agencies, national governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, the education research community as well as specialists in other sectors (Buchert, 1995). The Declaration stipulated the goal of EFA as attainable by 2000 and listed the strategies by which to reach it. The goal was rooted in the following principles: Education as a fundamental right; The importance of education for a safer, healthier, more prosperous and environmentally

sound world and for social, economic and cultural progress, tolerance and International cooperation; The importance of education for personal and social improvement; The value and validity of traditional knowledge and indigenous cultural heritage in their own rights and as a promoter of development; The deficiency of the current provision of education in terms of quantity, quality and relevance and The recognition that sounds basic education is fundamental to the strengthening of higher levels of education and a scientific and technological literacy and capacity and thus to self-reliant development stipulated the goal of EFA as attainable by the year 2000 and listed the strategies by which to reach it. The framework for action suggested six dimensions rather than specific targets or goals, and these are set out in Table 1. The seeds of many of the tensions at the heart of EFA were present at the outset in the WCEFA. Firstly, in terms of the balance of institutional power within the emerging aid architecture, although the Jomtien conference included a wide range of stakeholders from Northern and Southern countries, it was still primarily Northern-led. As King has put it: If we were to summarize the role of southern governments, researchers and NGOs in affecting substantially the content of the Jomtien Declaration and Framework for Action, it was minor, if not minimal. Of course, key personnel were included in the international steering group, there were regional meetings held in southern capitals to discuss particular drafts, and there were NGO partners and government representatives in most of the official national delegations. But the core drafting personnel were drawn from the multilateral agencies. What national governments actually thought about the excision from the global education agenda of secondary, technical and vocational education and training, and higher education is not recorded in the Declaration or the Framework. The mere fact of its being a World Conference at which 155 national delegations were present is judged to be sufficient to suggest that the Jomtien agenda was widely shared across the world—which it almost certainly was not. (King, 2007, p. 380)

The limited role of Southern governments in formulating the Jomtien EFA agenda has led King to question the extent to which the agenda can be considered to be truly ‘owned’ by Southern countries. Secondly, although Jomtien was jointly sponsored by five multilateral agencies, it was the World Bank that assumed a dominant position in relation to the WCEFA reflected in the appointment of Wadi Haddad, formerly of the World Bank’s central education policy department into the position of chief executive (Jones & Coleman, 2005; King, 2007). The dominance of the World Bank was reflected in its role in the lead up to WCEFA in developing and championing a shared vision drawing on its own work over several decades on the role of basic education as a key to national development. However, although there was an agreement that EFA should focus on a notion of ‘basic education’ and on ‘basic learning needs’ there were differences in the way that these were interpreted. UNESCO, building on earlier conceptualisations of community education, championed an expanded understanding of basic education to embrace early childhood education, primary education, basic secondary and vocational education as well as adult literacy. For the World Bank and UNICEF the focus was very much on primary education and it

was this focus that became increasingly dominant throughout the EFA period, reflected, for example, in the MDGs (below). The emphasis on primary education as the best way of linking education and development persisted despite the preferences of many low-income country governments and arguments about the importance of post-primary education (see Birdsall, 1996; Hayman, 2005; Palmer, 2006; Post et al., 2004; Tikly, 2003). One explanation of this continuing emphasis on primary education may be found in the methodologies and associated funding policies of the World Bank. The rates-of-return analyses pioneered by Psacharopoulos (1985) showed that the rates of return to investments in primary education were higher than those from investing in vocational or tertiary education, and these analyses drove Bank lending policy in education increasingly from 1980 onward. The influence of rates-of-return analysis on setting the global education agenda can be seen in Barnett and Duvall’s (2014) terms as a specific example of the exercise of ‘productive power’, that is as the dominance in discursive terms of a particular conception of education and economic growth. In the 1980s lending to the primary sector made up 18.9% of bank funding to education; in the 1990s it made up 35.6% and in 2001, 45%. The corresponding figures for vocational post-secondary education, for instance, were 25.1%, 7.5% and 8.1% for the respective periods (Robertson et al., 2007). The dominance of this kind of analysis and reasoning is recognised both by those in the World Bank who supported and promoted it (see Psacharopoulos, 2006; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004) and by those who criticised and opposed it (see Heyneman, 2003).

DAC/OECD REPORT ON ‘SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY’ By 1996 and the EFA mid-term conference in Amman it was already clear that EFA would not be achieved by 2000. During the same year the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a report entitled ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation’ (OECD/DAC, 1996). Its purpose was to synthesise the lessons learned for the first seven world congresses (above). The significance of the report for the emerging EFA regime was that it reinforced the idea of time-bound development targets that pre-figured the MDGs. The ideas of a general time-bound education target to achieve EFA had previously been championed by UNICEF and was reflected in the Jomtien Framework for Action (above). For the most part, however, the six dimensions of EFA were presented more in the form of guidelines rather than measurable targets. In this sense the intervention of the OECD can be seen as a key moment in the development of productive power linked to an economistic view of education and development. The two targets that related to education were:

Universal primary education by 2015 Demonstrated progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005. As with most of the other development targets in the report the date for achieving UPE was set at 2015. The setting of the gender target at 2005 can be seen as a consequence of the development of the gender equity target within a different regime of global governance involving overlapping but different actors and institutions than those involved in EFA concerned with gender equity (King, 2007; Unterhalter, 2013). The targets provide continuity on themes that began to emerge in Jomtien. For example, it reinforces the Northern-led nature of EFA and the use of compulsory power. Thus whilst the report contains much rhetoric about the need for partnership between Northern and Southern countries in achieving human development the report goes on to add that the targets … represent only a proposal of what we as donors consider to be helpful measures of progress to inspire effective development cooperation. Their achievement will require agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own national goals and locally owned strategies. (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 9)

As Robertson et al. (2007) argue, the power relations between donors and low-income countries implied here are clear. Whilst the targets are presented as only a proposal of what ‘we as donors consider helpful’, it is difficult to imagine them being resisted by the recipients of aid, whose contribution will be ‘agreement and commitment through their own national goals’ (see also King, 2007). In terms of the conceptualisation of EFA the report contributed to the narrowing of the EFA agenda to focus on UPE in keeping with the dominant view of EFA within the World Bank. In this sense the report provides an important milestone in the development of productive power linked to an economistic discourse. As King and Rose (2005) have argued, as so often happens in the setting of international policy objectives, the more measurable, quantitative goals take precedence over the other factors that the OECD/DAC Report also sought to emphasise, including the need for a highly context-dependent approach which ‘gives a very different feel from the one-size-fits-all shape of the IDTs’ (p. 364). The report in fact argued that ‘these goals must be pursued country-by-country through individual approaches that reflect local conditions and locally owned strategies’ (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2). It argued that there were a whole series of ‘qualitative factors’ that were ‘essential to the attainment of these measurable goals’ (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2). These included capacity development for democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law. These critical qualifications of the quantitative targets get completely side-lined in the presentation of the new ‘global development partnership effort’ around the six ‘realisable’ goals (OECD/DAC, 1996, p. 2).

THE DAKAR FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

The Dakar Framework for Action and EFA targets were agreed at the World Education Forum, held in Dakar, Senegal in 2000. The event was organised by the International Consultative Forum on Education for All (the EFA Forum), a body created in 1991 to monitor EFA and composed of representatives of the five international agencies that sponsored the initiative – UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank – and of bilateral cooperation agencies, governments and NGOs, as well as by some education specialists. Like Jomtien, over a thousand people, representing governments, civil society and international agencies, attended the Forum. The purpose was to present the global results of the evaluation of the Decade of ‘Education for All’ (EFA) launched in Jomtien and to adopt a new Framework for Action in order to continue the task. As was already evident half way through the decade, the six goals set in Jomtien for the year 2000 had not been met. Thus, the Framework for Action adopted in Dakar basically ‘reaffirmed’ the vision of the goals laid down in Jomtien, but extended them for another 15 years, until 2015 reflecting the time frame for the DAC/OECD targets (once again with the exception of the gender targets). Table 1 compares the Dakar and Jomtien targets. Table 1. Jomtien and Dakar Goals Compared. 1990–2000: Jomtien

2000–2015: Dakar

1. Expansion of early childhood care and development activities, including 1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, family and community interventions, especially for poor, disadvantaged and especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children. disabled children. 2. Universal access to, and completion of, primary education (or whatever higher level of education is considered as ‘basic’) by the year 2000.

2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality.

3. Improvement in learning achievement such that an agreed percentage of an 3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met appropriate age cohort (e.g. 80% 14-year-olds) attains or surpasses a defined through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes. level of necessary learning achievement. 4. Reduction in the adult illiteracy rate (the appropriate age cohort to be 4. Achieving a 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially determined in each country) to, say, one-half its 1990 level by the year for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all 2000, with sufficient emphasis on female literacy to significantly reduce the adults. current disparity between the male and female illiteracy rates. 5. Expansion of provision of basic education and training in other essential skills required by youth and adults, with programme effectiveness assessed in terms behavioural changes and impacts on health, employment and productivity.

5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.

6. Increased acquisition by individuals and families of the knowledge, skills and values required for better living and sound and sustainable development, made 6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of available through all educational channels including the mass media, other all so that recognised and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, forms of modern and traditional communication, and social action, with especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills. effectiveness assessed in terms of behavioural change.

Source: Torres (2001).

UNESCO was given responsibility by the Forum for monitoring progress towards the Dakar goals. UNESCO has developed a whole infrastructure to monitor progress towards the Dakar Goals and MDGs including the High-Level Group (HLG) on EFA, Working Group (WG) on EFA and International Advisory Panel (IAP) on EFA. It has convened regular meetings of these entities to review EFA progress based on the EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR), which is submitted annually to the Director-general of UNESCO. The report is translated into 11 languages and widely disseminated. It is written to appeal to a range of stakeholders, although there is some evidence that it is more widely read by members of the

donor community than by national governments (King, 2007). Nonetheless, the GMR has played a significant role over the years in the development of a more nuanced view of EFA. Through the use of increasingly sophisticated statistical analysis and the commissioning of numerous background papers by leading experts in the field of education and development, the GMR has played an intellectual leadership role in relation to EFA. Rather than simply reporting development in achieving targets, the GMR has also attempted to set the agenda in key areas through the use of thematised annual publications. As such the reports can be interpreted as an example of the development of productive power linked to a rights-based discourse. There are several points relating to the composition of the Dakar Forum that are relevant for understanding the structure of the EFA architecture. Firstly, the conference was characterised by in-fighting between the key sponsoring agencies particularly between UNESCO and UNICEF. In terms of institutional power dynamics it reflected open competition between the multilateral organisations over leadership of global education and the EFA regime in particular. Whilst UNICEF resented the fact that governments had endorsed UNESCO’s leadership role over EFA, UNESCO resented that the UN had given UNICEF leadership over education for girls. Each institution was also dismissive of the technical capabilities of the other. The only institution that appeared to not have problems with its identity was the World Bank that maintained its relative position of hegemony within the sponsoring organisations (Jones & Coleman, 2005; Torres, 2001). Like Jomtien, the Forum was also Northern dominated. As Torres argued at the time: One salient feature (which was noted with displeasure by several national delegations) was the overbearing presence of functionaries from international agencies at the conference as a whole and on the various panels and committees, especially the two most important and most coveted: the Drafting Committee and the ‘Futures Group’. The latter was charged with suggesting mechanisms for following up the commitments made at the Forum up until 2015. (2001, p. 1)

Of the governments and NGOs present from Southern countries, there was a further imbalance in that some regions including Latin America and South Asia were particularly underrepresented. Furthermore, as King (2007) has pointed out, only one plenary speech was made by a representative of a low-income country, namely the president of Senegal. All the other speakers were either from the multilateral agencies, representatives of global civil society or of donor countries. Interestingly, in terms of the view of global governance presented earlier, the emerging concept of EFA was contested. During the same week as the Dakar conference, an ‘alternative’ EFA event, the International Consultation of NGOs was held immediately before Dakar. The Consultation was organised by the NGOs belonging to the Global Campaign for Education launched in 1999 by two international NGOs, Oxfam and ActionAid and later joined by Education International (EI), the international confederation of teacher organisations. This campaign, was critical of the work done by the EFA movement during the 1990s and put forward its own Global Action Plan to achieve EFA. Some of those who took part in the NGO event also participated in the official conference, a number of them fulfilling important functions at it. As Mundy and Murphy’s (2001) research showed at the time, some of the claims

were met. Amongst these were inclusion of the wording ‘free’ education; endorsement of the idea of national educational forums and an expanded definition of education that includes commitment to early childhood education and adult literacy and, a commitment to annual highlevel EFA review meetings. The campaigners did not wield sufficient compulsory power, however, to realise their more further-reaching goals including a clear commitment of resources by rich country governments including minimum investment targets and a new international funding mechanism for education development under joint International Organisation, government and civil south oversight. Despite its (limited) achievements, the Global Campaign for Education along with the overall role of NGOs in Dakar was subject to criticism by Southern-based NGOs for putting forward a Northern-led agenda. As Mundy and Murphy argued ‘the overall pattern of relationships among NGOs at Dakar tended to mimic the structure of the centre-periphery relations in the world system, in which Northern actors play leadership roles’ (2001, p. 123). In terms of how EFA was conceptualised as a result of the Dakar process, it is clear from the comparison of goals between Jomtien and Dakar in Table 1 that there was a degree of continuity between the two reflecting some success on the part of UNESCO in (re-)asserting a more holistic view of basic education, a move also supported by many of the NGOs present. Interestingly, the goals also show a subtle shift towards the notion of education quality linked to improved learning outcomes, particularly in literacy and numeracy. As will be discussed in other contributions to the current volume, this is significant in terms of the subsequent move towards the notion of ‘access plus quality’ at the heart of current debates about EFA. Although the increased emphasis on quality was presented as a complementary goal to that of achieving increases in access, Dakar also foreshadowed a growing tension between access and quality at the heart of the MDGs as will be discussed below.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS THE DOMINANT MANIFESTATION OF EFA A key point of reference that has become inextricably associated with EFA are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These arose in the context of a different but overlapping global regime of governance, namely that associated with the Millennium Declaration that was agreed at the Millennium Summit in New York in 2000 which followed five months after the Dakar conference. The process by which the actual MDGs were developed occurred through the Millennium Project, an agency especially set up for this purpose. Task forces were created for each of the goals, and they issued background papers, interim reports and a summary report a few years later for the MDG + 5 UN summit which followed up on progress on each of the MDGs. The two MDGs that relate to education are:

MDG 2: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. MDG 3: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015. From our point of view, the way that the MDGs have been developed and implemented have had profound implications for the nature of EFA as a regime of global educational governance. Firstly, although the MDGs arose from the Millennium Declaration and Summit processes they were actually developed and refined by working groups within the UN and are narrower in scope than the Declaration. Secondly, given that the education MDGs in particular represent such a narrowing of scope compared to the Dakar Framework, it is easy to conclude that in terms of institutional power, UNESCO had less of an influence in their formulation than it had on the Dakar and Jomtien goals (King, 2007). Thirdly, as with the other events seminal to the development of EFA, although the MDGs (along with the Dakar Framework) clearly enjoy considerable support across large sections of the international development community including many donors and NGOs, there remain issues of Northern dominance in the process of defining the MDGs and a concomitant lack of Southern ownership. As several commentators have observed, it is often difficult to reconcile the realisation of the specific MDG targets with national development priorities (Hayman, 2007; King, 2004, 2007). In her study of the Rwandan education sector, for example, Hayman has pointed to the real tensions between investing in basic education to fulfil the MDGs and in other sectors of education including higher education to realise other national development priorities (see also Tikly, 2003). As King (2007) points out, further evidence of the Northern-led nature of the MDG process is that whereas all of the goals relation to low-income countries are time-bound, the one goal relating to commitments from Northern countries is not time-bound. In terms of how the MDGs as a related but separate global regime of governance have impacted on EFA, it is possible to conclude the following. Firstly, as alluded to above, the education MDGs represent a considerable narrowing of focus compared to the Dakar Framework but yet became the major focal point for how the aspirations of EFA subsequently became interpreted in popular and policy discourse. MDG 2, which relates to access to education is focused on the achievement of UPE which provides continuity on earlier World Bank discourses relating to UPE for the 1980s. Secondly, there has been a very real tension between the rhetoric of the MDGs and the ability of governments to realise them. By 2005 the gender MDG had been the first to be missed. This in turn highlights the often substantial differences in capacity between countries in achieving the MDGs. It was this observation relatively early on in the process which was to lead donors to establish the Fact Track Initiative (below). More fundamentally the above tension highlights a contradiction between the focus of the MDGs on social indicators of development and the reality that that many low-income countries do not have the economic means of achieving them due to their positioning on the periphery of the global economy. This is linked to inequalities in institutional power between rich and poor

countries in terms of their influence on global regimes concerned with the regulation of global trade and finance that have a major impact on the capacity of African governments to implement favourable macroeconomic and fiscal policy (see e.g. Ndikumana, 2014). This has implications for EFA as an educational regime of governance and in particular the need to consider EFA and other social regimes such as the MDGs as part of a wider ‘regime complex’ (Orsini et al., 2013) that includes regimes linked to global economic regulation. It also draws attention to an aspect of the MDGs and of donor support for education in general that there is a tendency for donor aid linked to the MDGs to foster dependency. In some countries, donor support for education makes up more than 50% of the education budget raising real concerns about the extent to which it fosters local leadership on the one hand and is sustainable in the long term on the other (King, 2007). A final point relates to the tension implicit in MDG 3 between the realisation of gender parity though equal enrolments and the more far reaching goal of gender equity that Subrahmanian (2005) describes in terms of gender rights to, in and through education. That is to say, that there has been a tension in the EFA project between basic access to education (implicit in the emphasis on UPE) and the experiences of girls once they are in school. That includes forms of discrimination that deny them equal access to parts of the curriculum and sexualised violence (see e.g. Milligan, 2014). Denial of girls access to a good quality education has contributed to unequal educational outcomes between girls and boys. In explaining this phenomenon Unterhalter (2013) draws attention to the historical disconnect between networks dedicated to gender equity within the MDG regime and those associated with education, and this point is also taken up below whilst DeJaeghere draws attention to the differential ability of many country-level NGOs to advance issues of gender justice both at a national and at a global level in relation to the MDGs (Dejaeghere, Parks, & Unterhalter, 2013).

THE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE The Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) emerged from the commitment made at the Dakar World Education Forum (WEF) in 2000 to a Global Initiative. This was initiated by NGOs and supported by UNESCO, with the aim of holding donors to account with respect to mobilisation of additional technical and financial resources needed to accelerate progress towards the EFA goals. In particular, its aim was to ensure that donors would fulfil their commitment made at the WEF that ‘No countries seriously committed to EFA will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by a lack of resources’. Further motivation was provided by another global regime, this time the Monterrey Consensus in 2002, at which ministers of finance indicated that they were committed to substantially increasing overseas development assistance (ODA) (Rose, 2005). Concerns that UNESCO lacked the capacity and confidence of key bilateral donors to lead the Global Initiative, resulted in the World Bank taking on a

coordinating role, with a shift from a ‘Global’ to a ‘Fast Track’ Initiative (Rose, 2003). As a consequence, an FTI Secretariat was established within the World Bank, with the support of other donors. The FTI was launched in April 2002. Despite strong political commitment, initial pledges to the FTI were limited due to concerns over the perceived centralised nature and lack of clarity about the purpose of the initiative (below). Following changes to the structure and with the adoption of the Framework Agreement in 2004, however, pledges began to rise. In keeping with debates about aid effectiveness, countries were invited to join if they were judged to have in place a robust education sector development plan. In this way the FTI was designed to ‘reward’ countries that prioritised basic education in keeping with the MDGs. The FTI was organised around a ‘Virtual Fund’ which incorporated donor countries existing bilateral arrangements with recipient countries and a ‘Catalytic Fund’ that was intended to benefit ‘donor orphans’, (i.e. countries that had five donors or fewer contributing $1 million per year to the education sector) and was targeted at building capacity within the education sector that would enable them to develop credible education plans. From the point of view of understanding EFA as a global regime of educational governance, it is quite clear that the initiative provided continuity on previous themes whilst also signalling new directions in the structure of EFA as well as in the norms and values that underpinned it. As with previous initiatives and in terms of the dynamics of institutional power there was considerable in-fighting between the multilateral agencies over initial control of the FTI and as with previous initiatives it was the World Bank that proved hegemonic. The FTI was often perceived by the other agencies as a ‘World Bank Programme’ (Bermingham, 2011; Jones & Coleman, 2005). Indeed, UNESCO only became a member of the FTI steering committee in 2004 but was not formally involved in decision-making processes at the trust fund meetings. UNICEF was only invited to join the steering committee in 2006. Contests over the nature and direction of FTI were not only horizontal, between multilateral agencies but also involved vertical struggles between the World Bank and individual country donors and with civil society organisations and networks at country and global level. There was from the outset considerable confusion about the purpose of the FTI. Seventeen countries were invited to join the partnership, but there was no commitment at the time for member countries to commit substantial amounts of money. Part of this confusion revolved around the issue of whether it should become a Global Fund for Education to match the Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM) which was being developed at the same time. From the perspective of the present chapter this is another example of how global regimes need to be understood in relation to other global regimes, this time around health. Initially, many leaders were reluctant to support an initiative which remained conceptually vague. There were also tensions at the outset between the World Bank and some leading donors including DfID who objected to the centralised nature of the initiative that it was claimed would undermine local decision-making. This led eventually to the devolution of country-level endorsement for joining the Fund to the local donor group who would assess the viability of the education sector plan against international benchmarks. In exchange, local donor groups

were expected to contribute more to their existing bilateral programmes. There were also concerns that the fund through only providing support to countries with already developed education plans, marginalised those that had traditionally not received donor support and the fact that it did not address the needs of the so-called ‘big five’ countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan) where more than half the children out of school lived. This in turn led to the development of the Virtual Fund which incorporated donors existing bilateral programmes and the World Bank managed Catalytic Fund which provided capacity building support to ‘donor orphan’ countries (see above). The adoption of a common framework in 2004 led to increases in donor support and by 2005 the FTI was judged to be having more of a positive effect at country level. A consensus emerged between donors that the FTI provided a means for increased donor coordination, alignment and harmonisation in keeping with debates about aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration (below). Indeed, the FTI received endorsements by the G8 and the UN Millennium Summit in 2005. As with previous initiatives, global civil society also played a role in shaping the FTI at key junctures. The Global Campaign for Education played a leading advocacy role in the establishment of the FTI. The Make Poverty History Campaign and the concerted civil society campaigns around the G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005 were also influential in re-invigorating donor commitments to the FTI. Also characteristic of earlier events in the development of EFA was the subordinate role played by low-income countries and governments. Even after responsibility for evaluating country plans had been devolved to country level they continued to be evaluated against global benchmarks that provided a disciplinary mechanism by which largely Northern donors could coerce national governments in the global South towards prioritising global agendas – in this case a narrowed down version of the MDGs – which at times, as we have seen are at odds with national development agendas that may involve investing in a more balanced way across different sub-sectors of education. This can be seen as an example of the use of compulsory power, albeit in more subtle form than was the case with the imposition of SAPs.

THE ROME AND PARIS DECLARATIONS ON AID EFFECTIVENESS Discussion of the FTI draws attention to a key set of issues and tensions that have characterised EFA since inception, namely those surrounding ‘aid effectiveness’. For example, attempts were made to align the FTI with the principles of aid effectiveness and donor harmonisation that were emerging from the first high-level donor forum in Rome (OECD/DAC, 2003). The Rome Declaration listed the following priority actions: that development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and timing of the

countries receiving it; that donor efforts concentrate on delegating cooperation and increasing the flexibility of staff on country programmes and projects; and, that good practice be encouraged and monitored, backed by analytic work to help strengthen the leadership that recipient countries can take in determining their development path. The Second High-Level Forum resulted in the Paris Declaration (2005) which was an important landmark in the development of the discourse around aid effectiveness. It presented itself as ‘a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development’. It provided a series of specific implementation measures and established a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments. The Paris Declaration outlined the following five principles for making aid more effective: 1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems. 3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication. 4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured. 5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. Although it has been followed up by the more recent Accra and Busan high-level meetings discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is fair to say that the Paris Declaration was pivotal in shaping the current debate on aid effectiveness. In terms of our analysis the principles of aid effectiveness constitute like the MDGs, a parallel regime of global governance that reinforces EFA but also provides potential sources of tension. In terms of institutional power, the Paris Declaration represented a growing consensus amongst donor and recipient countries around underling principles governing aid. There is a tension, however, in that although the Paris Declaration included most of the low-income countries and the BRIC economies, these emerging donors have never been integral to the EFA agenda and indeed, as other contributions to this volume indicate to have increasingly pursued their own agendas. These institutional relationships call into question, the likelihood of achieving a core principle of aid effectiveness, namely that of harmonisation. In terms of productive power, the way that aid effectiveness has become defined also has implications for how EFA is conceptualised. The aid effectiveness discourse as set out in the Paris Declaration is fundamentally an economic discourse about seeking to achieve maximum return on aid. This is reflected, for instance in the increasing move towards ‘payment by results’ by key donors such as DfID. It feeds into a reductionist view of the relationship

between education understood as a narrow set of quantifiable indicators and development understood principally in terms of economic growth. As such it stands in contrast to more expansive, rights-based conceptualisations of education and development. Secondly, there is a tension between the concept of aid effectiveness and the way that EFA has up until now been implemented. It has been suggested, for example, that the principle of ‘ownership’ is compromised by the limited choice that low-income national governments have in accepting the conditionalities that go along with aid. For example, through linking aid to MDGs or other targets that may not in fact coincide with national development priorities and the use of global benchmarks to evaluate education sector plans. The principle of ownership is often related to government ownership rather than to that of civil society organisations that may indeed oppose government policy. In this sense ‘ownership’ is understood principally as a ‘technical’ principle rather than a political and normative one liked to an understanding of the political economy of different countries. As has been suggested, a major obstacle to genuine ownership is the dependency that much educational aid fosters. Finally, ‘accountability’ appears as ‘one way traffic’ in the discourse of aid effectiveness as it is applied to EFA. As we have seen, the only EFA target that is typically not time-bound is that relating to the proportion of GDP that ought to be committed to aid, including educational aid, in wealthy countries. In this respect, discourses of aid effectiveness are separated out from an analysis of global political economy and a broader understanding of the legitimatory role played by aid in a global economy marked by historically rooted structural inequality in wealth and power between nations.

CONCLUSION In this final section an attempt will be made to draw together the main themes and arguments in the chapter. It is suggested that conceptualising EFA as an example of a global regime of educational governance provides a useful lens through which to critically consider the changing institutional relationships and underling norms and values that comprise the EFA aid architecture. In particular, applying a global governance framework makes it possible to consider the extent to which EFA has shaped through the exercise of different forms of power and through its relationship to other global regimes of governance. Firstly, in relation to the exercise of institutional power, EFA has been successful in bringing together under its umbrella a diverse range of low-income countries including more recently, post-conflict nations and fragile states and coordinating the activities of a range of bilateral country donors. Nonetheless, there have been on-going contests over the governance of EFA between multilateral organisations. Historically in the period under review the World Bank has proved hegemonic in these struggles despite the continued claims to ownership of EFA by UNESCO and to a lesser extent UNICEF. Global civil society has had some influence particularly in an advocacy role.

Related to the above has been the Northern-led nature of EFA. Despite the rhetoric of inclusivity both in the context of the World Education Forums and in the governing structures of the institutions most closely associated with EFA, the overall agenda remains Northern- – and indeed – Western-led. This is evidenced in the dominance of Northern interests within the governance structures of the leading institutions that have in turn been reflected in the processes through which key EFA frameworks and protocols have been developed. It is also reflected in the use of compulsory power to ensure that education sector plans adhere to EFA principles in the context, for example, of the FTI Fund. This is in contrast to the use of fewer conditionalities to ensure Northern country compliance with meeting development targets. Whatever compulsory power has been exerted on high-income countries has often been as a consequence of campaigns on the part of global civil society. It has been suggested that here too, however, it has most often been Northern rather than indigenous, Southern-led organisations that have had most ‘voice’ in global debates and forums. There have also been some discernible shifts in the way that EFA has been conceptualised. The broad vision, based on an expanded notion of EFA and linked to a rights-based agenda has been superseded by a focus on a narrower set of time-bound targets exemplified by the MDGs although there is some evidence that the debate may be broadening out once again in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and development debate. Despite the title of ‘Education for All’, the narrowing of targets implied by the MDGs and the way that funding has been channelled, particularly in the early days of the FTI have tended to favour low-income countries that have had the capacity to develop robust education sector development plans. Many, particularly marginalised and disadvantaged groups, were neglected as a consequence of this and of a lack of nuance in the way that funding was targeted within countries. One can see this as an aspect of the effects of a particular form of productive power in which narrow and easily quantifiable targets are favoured over more nuanced quantitative and qualitative targets. The advocacy work of reports such as the GMR and the quantitative and qualitative evidence base on which it draws have provided an alternative source of productive power, linked to a more rights-based emphasis on targeting the most marginalised. It is also important to consider EFA in relation to other regimes of global governance. It has been suggested that EFA has developed sometimes in tension with other global regimes, most notably those governing, the MDGs, aid effectiveness and gender. This has provided both a source of strength for EFA in helping to shape its character and a source of tension through providing contrasting rationale for action and in the definition of targets. On the other hand, EFA has also failed to engage with other key areas of global governance including health despite the potential lessons that can be learnt from such an engagement. In order to become more sustainable as an area of social development and in order to tackle the dependency of many low-income countries on donor support, it has been suggested that EFA also needs to be seen in relation to global regimes in the economic sphere including those governing trade and financial markets over which low-income countries also have limited control. To conclude, EFA as a global regime has proved remarkably resilient in the face of considerable tensions and contradictions. Only time will tell, however, whether it will

continue to adapt in the context of the emerging post-2015 education and development agenda or, whether it will need to fundamentally transform itself into a new global regime of educational governance if it is to survive. Much of this it has been suggested will depend on the extent to which governmental and non-governmental actors are able to recognise and engage with power imbalances at the heart of EFA and to line EFA up more coherently with other areas of global governance.

NOTE 1. In this regard the chapter is also timely given the on-going reviews of the outcomes and processes of EFA currently being undertaken by UNESCO. See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-forall/resources/national-efa-2015-reviews/. Last accessed on August 6, 2015.

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POST-EFA GLOBAL DISCOURSE: THE PROCESS OF SHAPING THE SHARED VIEW OF THE ‘EDUCATION COMMUNITY’ Shoko Yamada

ABSTRACT This chapter will examine the interplay among actors who took part in the process of consensus building towards a post-2015 education agenda via different channels of global governance, including both formal and informal channels. Most of the forums and entities established as part of the global governance structure are composed of representatives from UN or UNESCO member states, civil society organizations (CSOs) and UN agencies. However, each of these categories has diverse constituent groups; representing these groups is not as straightforward a task as the governance structure seems to assume. Therefore, based on interviews and qualitative text analysis, this chapter will introduce major groups of actors and their major issues of concern, decision-making structure, mode of communication and relationship with other actors. Then, based on an understanding of the characteristics of the various channels and actors, it will present the structural issues that arose during the analysis of post-2015 discourse and the educational issues that emerged as the shared concerns of the ‘education community’. While most of the analysis to untangle the nature of discourse relies on qualitative analysis of texts and interviews, the end of this chapter will also demonstrate the trends of discourse in quantitative terms. What was the post-2015 discourse for the so-called education community, which in itself has an ambiguous and virtual existence? The keywords post-2015 and postEFA provide us with an opportunity to untangle how shared norms and codes of conduct were shaped at the global scale. Keywords: Global governance; shared norms; Post-2015 discourse; U.N. member states; civil society organizations

INTRODUCTION The process of negotiating the post-2015 education agenda has been extremely complicated. Many reports have appeared on the Web, together with blog comments, Tweets and online consultations, which provide opportunities for a much wider population than the exclusive circle of international education specialists to know about and take part in the process. Regardless, the flood of information has caused confusion rather than clarification for those who try to predict the direction of the discourse. Too many things happen on too many different channels simultaneously. As I write this chapter, the process is still underway. The World Education Forum (WEF) in Incheon, South Korea, ended in May 2015, having gathered 1,500 stakeholders, decision makers and activists. Led by UNESCO, the meeting resulted in a unanimous declaration from the education community on targets and means of implementation. In turn, the Incheon Declaration was the education community’s input into the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in September 2015 by member states and multilateral agencies. Incheon also saw the development of the Framework for Action, a set of principles and guidelines for implementing the Incheon Declaration. The original plan was to make WEF-Incheon the last stage of building global consensus on education targets up to the year 2030. However, because the consultation on the SDGs went on even after Incheon, there was continued strenuous lobbying to ensure that the education community’s proposal would be reflected in the final version of Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG 4). SDG 4 is the sole education-related goal out of 17 SDGs, bundling seven targets and three means of implementation to support them. The efforts were not only to make the SDG 4 as identical as possible to the proposal from the education community, but also, for some stakeholders, to promote their issues of concern higher in SDG 4 than they were in the Incheon Declaration, albeit not to change the text fundamentally. Such informal attempts at leveraging and lobbying after WEF-Incheon were caused by the fact that the global effort of consensus building in the education community ran parallel to that of the SDGs without formal unification. Aside from informal negotiations, large conferences on these issues also occurred after WEF-Incheon: the Oslo Summit on Education for Development and the Addis Ababa Conference on Financing for Development, both in July 2015. The former, hosted by the Norwegian government, brought in many of the same constituents as WEF-Incheon. The latter was not specifically on education. However, the issue of financing has been one of the major issues of discussion throughout the post-2015 discourse at large, as well as an issue of growing concern in the education community. Therefore, Oslo and Addis Ababa were considered important formal avenues to lobby for specific issues within education or to enhance the positioning of education in the broader SDG process. In addition to these formal and informal lobbying efforts, which are rather a political endeavour, the technical discussion about indicators to measure the level of achievement of goals and targets was also far from completion. In fact, the UN Secretariat has reportedly already given up on deepening the discussion about indicators before September 2015,

deciding instead to follow a step-by-step approach: First adopt the goals and targets in the General Assembly in September and afterwards start the process of technical refinement of indicators. All in all, until the post-2015 goals are accepted and become fully operational, there is still a long way to go. As long as the broader SDG process continues, post-2015 education discourse will not end either. When I started this research project in late 2013, it looked as if everything was planned and directed towards WEF-Incheon in May 2015. However, when the time actually came, I considered whether I should stop collecting data there and start writing, or continue data collection until September or even after that. In fact, I am still collecting data. Still, based on my observations of the discourse for a couple of months after Incheon, I concluded that it is reasonable to limit the focus of this chapter to the period between 2013, when the discussion of education post-2015 began, until WEF-Incheon to highlight the unique nature of post-2015 education discourse in contrast to past processes in this same field, which is the primary objective of this volume. The architecture designed to build consensus on a post-2015 education agenda had various arms to ensure broad participation, such as a Collective Consultation of NGOs (CCNGO), ministerial meetings with the E-91 and BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and regional conferences. The process was designed to feed all of these ideas and voices to UNESCO’s EFA (Education for All) Steering Committee, which is entrusted with directing the whole field and designing the outlines of joint statements and action programmes. The EFA Steering Committee in turn comprises representatives from the respective regions, mostly nominated by member states; from civil society networks, namely the Global Campaign for Education and Education International and from the EFA convening agencies, namely UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Bank. The process involved reviewing the achievements of EFA at the national level; aggregating the results at the regional and global levels and gathering comments from civil societies, member states and other stakeholders on the issues to be highlighted in the post-EFA agenda. After all, this complicated architecture was designed to allow the education community to develop and agree on a set of post-EFA goals based on the achievements and experience of EFA. Once the agenda and framework for action are agreed upon, the Steering Committee will be charged with the responsibility of monitoring the process and pushing forward the commitment to achieve the goals. This chapter will examine the interplay in the process of consensus building towards a post-2015 education agenda among actors who took part in the process via different channels of global governance, including both formal and informal channels. Conferences and committees have their own framework and mode of participation. Even when the actors try to influence the process informally, certain behavioural patterns are determined by the characteristics of the process. Therefore, this chapter will first review the formal architecture for building consensus towards a post-2015 agenda. As mentioned above, one of the complications of this whole process is the parallel structures of the post-MDG, or SDG, consultation and the post-EFA process in the education sector. This chapter will quickly

describe the mechanisms on both sides and how they connect to each other from time to time. After that, it will untangle the characteristics of different groups of actors. Most of the forums and entities established as part of the global governance structure are composed of representatives from UN or UNESCO member states, civil society organizations (CSOs) and UN agencies. However, each of these categories has diverse constituent groups; representing these groups is not as straightforward a task as the governance structure seems to assume. Therefore, based on interviews and qualitative text analysis, this chapter will introduce major groups of actors and their major issues of concern, decision-making structure, mode of communication and relationship with other actors. Then, based on an understanding of the characteristics of the various channels and actors, it will present the structural issues that arose during the analysis of post-2015 discourse and the educational issues that emerged as the shared concerns of the ‘education community’. While most of the analysis to untangle the nature of discourse relies on qualitative analysis of texts and interviews, the end of this chapter will also demonstrate the trends of discourse in quantitative terms. What was the post-2015 discourse for the so-called education community, which in itself has an ambiguous and virtual existence? The key words post-2015 and post-EFA provide us an opportunity to untangle how shared norms and codes of conduct were shaped at the global scale.

Methodology To achieve the above-mentioned objective of the chapter, I have combined some methods of data collection and analysis. One major source of data is interviews, and another is texts made public in the form of reports, declarations, minutes of meetings and blog comments. First of all, I conducted interviews with individuals closely involved in the process of agenda setting at the global and regional levels. Thanks to advancements in communication technology, I managed to interview people from Asia, Europe, North and South America, and Africa, most of whom I haven’t physically met but talked with via Skype. As discussed later, the advancement of information technology is one of the significant factors that enabled active advocacy by the CSOs that collected voices from various corners of the world. The technology not only changed the style of global discourse but also caused me as a researcher to adopt a new approach to data collection. Skype allowed me to interview people without actually meeting them but required me to prepare more thoroughly in advance by reading materials to know about the interviewee and his or her organization so as to fill in for the lack of exposure to nonverbal cues, such as gesture and facial expression. Thirty-four interviewees were chosen from CSOs and UN agencies, with the addition of a couple of university-based academics and government officials, by snowball sampling, that is, through introductions from the earlier interviewees. The criteria for selection were (1) that the person be in charge of advocacy and/or policymaking in education for his or her organization and (2) that the person be directly involved in the global process of agenda setting, either as a

member of one of the committees on post-EFA global architecture (Fig. 1), as a spokesperson for an active CSO that lobbies for inclusion of certain values in the forthcoming global goals, or as a technical expert in assessment or another specific area related to the goals. Some participants were active at not only the global but also the regional or national level, although the main focus of the interview was participants’ perspectives on and efforts to influence the global decision-making discourse rather than the in-country process. Not only to diversify the interviewees between official (international organizations and their member states) and nonofficial (civil society) actors, I have also tried to balance the regional representation. While the majority of interviewees were in Europe, North America and Asia, I managed to involve one interviewee from the African continent. Table 1 provides a rough profile of the interviewees. Although the basis of participation was broadened considerably during the post2015 discussion, as compared with the period before the WEF in Dakar in 2000, when it comes to core decision-making at the global level, the number of participants was still small. It was so small, in fact, that disclosing any more information than that contained in Table 1 would also disclose the identity of many of the interviewees. Therefore, in the interest of anonymity, any reference to the backgrounds of interviewees will be kept to a minimum.

Fig. 1. Major Conferences and Events Regarding the Post-EFA Agenda and SDGs. Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 1. List of Interviewees.

At some of the international conferences related to post-2015 planning, I had a chance to take part as participant-cum-observer. I participated in the Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference, held in August 2014 to discuss the Muscat Agreement, the declaration made at the preliminary global education forum in Muscat, Oman, in May 2014 and the UNESCO World

Conference on Education for Sustainable Development in Nagoya, Japan, in November 2014. Through colleagues in civil society networks, I also gained opportunities to take part in some of the CSO meetings that were held side by side with these international forums. Texts are significant modes of discourse. As discussed in the introduction to this volume, the analysis of textual as well as spoken discourse yields important data to untangle the contextual uses of language and the processes through which participants in the discursive practices attach specific meanings to terms, which often reflect social relations and identities, power asymmetry and social struggle (Bhatia, 2004; Titscher & Jenner, 2000). There have been abundant publications regarding the post-2015 education agenda by various authors, including both institutions, such as multilateral and bilateral donors, CSOs and research institutions; and individuals, such as university academics, development consultants and practitioners, and part-time bloggers. Given the global scale of the discourse, it is indispensable to analyse those texts. At the same time, it is not possible to read all of these daily-increasing texts and to code them according to the qualitative coding rules. Therefore, it was necessary to consider some methods of handling the voluminous textual data quantitatively. Meanwhile, it would misguide the interpretation to treat frequently cited documents such as declarations of key conferences and major reports by UN agencies equally with writings by casual bloggers, without close examination of key documents. Because of these considerations, I decided to combine a quantitative text analysis with the qualitative one. First, I read through the minutes of meetings and materials distributed at the committees that have constituted the formal architecture of participation in the process of implementing and monitoring EFA and of developing the post-2015 education agenda. I also reviewed the declarations, speeches and presentations made at global conferences regarding EFA. I used ATLAS.ti, a software programme for qualitative data analysis, to code 264 files, ranging from one-page conference programmes to several-hundred-page reports, according to the concepts treated (Table 2). Then I examined the relationships among the codes against the background of the texts and the institutions and individuals who publicized them. The networks of key concepts that emerged from this analysis were used, first, to closely examine the process in which the discourse took shape and to reveal the interests and positions of different actors in the discourse. At the same time, the key concepts themselves were used as the reference for the quantitative analysis. For example, I checked the change over time of the frequency of words found in the conceptual networks. I also used the key concepts as external codes in comparing groups of texts. Table 2. Documents Used for Qualitative Analysis.

For the sake of quantitative analysis, websites listed in Table 3 were regularly checked and documents downloaded. My team began collecting materials at the beginning of 2014. However, because websites maintain materials of the past, particularly when they are considered important, the texts collected cover the period from December 2011 to May 2015.

As the process of negotiating the post-2015 development agenda continues, my team continues the regular document download. However, as stated earlier, I have decided to limit the analysis for this chapter to the period until the WEF in Incheon, South Korea, in May 2015. Except for some follow-up materials published right after WEF-Incheon, any materials issued after June 2015 were not included in this analysis. The total number of texts used for the analysis was 1,720 (2 for year 2011, 60 for 2012, 127 for 2013, 953 for 2014 and 578 for 2015); they occupied nearly 20,000 KB of memory in plain-text format. For the analysis we used KH Coder, a free software programme for text mining. Text mining is a process to derive patterns and trends through statistical investigation of word frequency distributions and the interrelations among words. The statistical identification of patterns in word usage across a large number of texts on educational development, particularly on the post-2015 agenda, enabled me to verify the findings from the qualitative analysis of interviews, observations and texts. It also served to field test the effectiveness of quantitative text analysis in the era of mass participation in discourse formation. Table 3. List of Websites from Which Texts Were Obtained. http://en.unesco.org/gem-report/post-2015_policy_papers 1. UNESCO

http://en.unesco.org/gem-report/post-2015_useful_links http://en.unesco.org/gem-report/post-2015_blog

2. Global education first initiative

http://www.globaleducationfirst.org/news_stories.html

3. Global campaign for education

http://www.campaignforeducation.org/en/news

4. UNESCO Bangkok

http://www.unescobkk.org/education/resources/resources/news

5. Brookings Institution

http://www.brookings.edu/research/topics/education#/?tab=4

6. World education blog

https://efareport.wordpress.com/2014/05/

7. International network for education in emergencies blog

http://www.ineesite.org/en/blog

8. NORRAG (Network for International Policies and Cooperation in Education and https://norrag.wordpress.com/ T raining) News 9. Global development + education, The Guardian

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/globaldevelopment+education/education

10. Social watch

http://www.socialwatch.org/

11. Beyond 2015

http://www.beyond2015.org/blogs-media http://www.beyond2015.org/content/relevant-research

12. Education in crisis

http://educationincrisis.net/themes/efa-mdgs-and-post-2015

13. Open society foundations

http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/issues/education-youth

14. Post2015.org

http://post2015.org/category/resources/ http://post2015.org/category/opinion/

Source: Compiled by the author.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONSENSUS BUILDING TOWARDS A POST-2015 EDUCATION AGENDA As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of the process in the last few years was the parallel structure of consensus building between the post-MDGs and post-EFA consultations. The idea of launching the SDGs was first put on the table of discussion at the UN Conference

on Sustainable Development in June 2012 (Rio + 20). Rio + 20 was the third international conference on sustainable development, beginning with the Earth Summit in 1992 in Rio and aimed at achieving environmental and economic sustainability of society globally. The outcome document of the Rio + 20 summit, The Future We Want, called for the unification of the SDG and follow-up of the MDG processes (United Nations, 2012). In the last two decades, the global governance mechanism for environmental issues and that for international development have evolved separately. However, during this period, societies – both in the Global North and South – and their problems have become increasingly interconnected, requiring concerted action from global society, going beyond the dichotomy between the aidproviding North and the recipient South. Therefore, logically, it makes sense to merge the agendas under MDGs, which have more specifically focussed on issues in developing countries, into the greater SDGs. At the same time, these interconnections resulted in the further complication of the consultation process. The fact that there are 17 goals listed as SDGs, accompanied by 169 proposed targets and 304 indicators, suggests how tangled the process can be. In terms of SDGs, education is only one of the 17 goals, along with other areas such as poverty reduction, health, sanitation, equity, energy, economic growth, infrastructure, habitation, climate change, biodiversity and justice. However, under SDG 4, which is to ensure inclusive, equitable and quality education for all generations, there are seven targets, which are linked with the agendas raised from the education community via UNESCO and other channels. Therefore, in fact, from the perspective of the education community, in a practical sense, the list of goals is actually those seven ‘targets’, which are to contribute to the overarching goal of inclusive, equitable and quality education. Those are the contents that have been discussed through the complicated post-EFA participatory mechanism. Fig. 1 depicts the parallel consultation processes for SDGs and post-EFA. The former was first led by the High-Level Panel and later by the Open Working Group (OWG), both of which were organized according to agreements reached at UN summits and administered by the UN Secretariat. The latter has basically been driven by UNESCO, a UN agency with a ‘special mandate in education’ (UNESCO, 2015b). While UNESCO takes the lead in setting the norms and providing global forums for developing and exchanging ideas in this field, other multilateral organizations that work in education and relevant fields are also involved in the decision-making architecture established by UNESCO. For example, the EFA Steering Committee has representatives from ‘EFA convening agencies’, namely UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank, in addition to those representing UNESCO member states, E-9 countries, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), civil society and the private sector (UNESCO, 2012b). It is not the major purpose of this chapter to provide details of the committees, initiatives, and conferences that were in place as the formal mechanisms of consensus building and global governance along the two lines of SDGs and post-EFA discussions. Of the numerous details, many that were important to insiders may not matter to outside observers. Moreover, the processes were so complicated, with many documents and stakeholders, that it becomes easy

to lose sight of the overall picture of the discourse if we pursue details in specific dimensions. Therefore, the following is a limited description of the structure and procedure to set the basis for later discussion.

The SDG Process and UN Secretariat-Led Mechanisms In July 2012, to follow-up the agreement at the Rio + 20 meeting to launch the mechanism to develop SDGs, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the names of 27 members of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The panel was also mandated by the 2010 MDG Summit. The 27 names included former and current heads of state and of ministries, and leaders from civil society and the private sector. The task of this panel was to make ‘recommendations regarding the vision and shape of a post-2015 development agenda’ (United Nations Secretariat, 2012, p. 1) in its final output report to the secretary-general. It was also expected to make recommendations on the mechanisms of ‘global partnership’ to build political consensus on an ‘ambitious yet achievable post-2015 development agenda’ (United Nations Secretariat, 2012, p. 1). As mandated, the panel’s communiqué, announced in May 2013, highlighted the importance of reshaping global governance for development, sustainable growth, environmental protection, strengthened means of implementing development programmes and data accumulation for progress monitoring and results-oriented implementation (High-Level Panel, 2013). The document was simple but laid out the major courses of discussion: mechanisms, norms, means of implementation and assessment. The Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals was established to elaborate specific goals to constitute the SDGs. The UN General Assembly of January 2013 endorsed the proposal of Rio + 20 to develop international goals for sustainable development and formed the OWG, composed of 30 members representing five UN regional groups, cochaired by the delegates of Hungary and Kenya (United Nations General Assembly, 2013). As the outcome, the OWG was mandated to prepare a proposal on specific contents of SDGs. The members of the OWG were the diplomatic delegates of member states, who were supposed to represent the consensus view of the region, including those states whose delegates were not selected to be the OWG members. In August 2014 the OWG released its proposal, which for the first time in the process listed the initial outline of the SDGs, comprising 17 goals accompanied by targets that break down the respective goals (United Nations General Assembly, 2014a). Based on the OWG’s proposal, the secretary-general presented the synthesis report to the UN General Assembly, which endorsed the proposed list of SDGs as the basis for further elaboration (United Nations General Assembly, 2014b). The formal multilateral consultation process towards developing SDGs ended with the General Assembly in December 2014, and the process shifted to intergovernmental negotiation. There have been meetings that provided opportunities for member states to comment on the draft of the outcome document to be adopted at the UN Sustainable

Development Summit in September 2015. Alongside them, more technical discussions on specific issues such as means of implementing SDGs – including finance, indicators for monitoring progress and wording and contents of targets under each goal – have continued, involving technical experts and major civil society stakeholders. One important issue is that the participants in these UN political negotiations – the HighLevel Panel, OWG and intergovernmental negotiators – are not specialists in any of the potential fields to be included in SDGs nor do they have full-time staff to work on this process. The UN Secretariat did the sweat work of coordination and drafting, although it had a symbolic value of accumulating the steps of participation by member states. Therefore, throughout this political process of SDG development, it was rather natural that interest groups had a significant role in contributing ideas (even as to wording of goals and targets). At the same time, the interest groups also tried to influence the process so that their concerns would be reflected in the outcome document. Regarding education, such leveraging efforts have continued throughout the SDG development process via both formal and informal channels, as might have been the case in many other fields. This point will be elaborated later in this chapter. The UN Secretariat also initiated thematic mechanisms for participation. The Thematic Consultation on Education began in February 2012 with a series of sessions with CSOs at the regional level, including virtual participation through the Internet. Based on inputs received through the regional and online processes, the global Thematic Consultation was launched in March 2013 at a meeting in Dakar, Senegal, with UNICEF and UNESCO as lead agencies. Other multilateral agencies, such as the International Labour Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank, together with bilateral donors, such as Canada and Germany, have acted in an advisory role. There were also civil society representatives. The mandate of the Thematic Consultation meetings was similar to those of post-EFA meetings led by UNESCO: to review the achievement and challenges of EFA implementation and to consider the post-2015 steps. The preliminary Thematic Consultation also led to the launch of the Global Education First Initiative under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. It is a fixed-term initiative for five years, with the aim of advocating and raising resources to accelerate progress towards achieving EFA goals. Particular focus is given to (1) universal access to basic education, (2) quality of education and (3) global citizenship education. This initiative is directly linked with neither the post-EFA/SDG agenda-setting processes nor implementation of any field-level education programmes. However, its steering committee is composed of the executive members of education-related multilateral organizations, as always, together with representatives from civil society groups such as the Global Campaign for Education and Education International, from the philanthropic Qatar Foundation for Education and from business consulting firm Accenture. In relation to the missions of this initiative to advocate and raise resources, it is also worth highlighting that the steering committee includes a youth advocate as well as Desmond Tutu, archbishop emeritus of Cape Town and historic antiapartheid leader (Global Education First Initiative, 2012). In fact, the youth group under this

initiative was quite active, linking youth leaders across the world.

The Post-EFA Process and the UNESCO-Led Mechanisms The Structure of EFA and the Post-EFA Consultation As mentioned earlier, the formal process of global policy dialogue in education is mostly coordinated by UNESCO, while there is a large space of informal negotiation outside of this formal process. Fig. 2 shows the EFA/post-EFA consultation structure. This structure has evolved gradually since WEF 2000 in Dakar. As some of the interviewees have pointed out, after Dakar there was a shared recognition of the need to institutionalize global governance and progress monitoring, based on the experience of 10 years after the World Conference on EFA in Jomtien (Interviewee 20). In addition to reaffirming EFA goals, the Dakar forum produced the Framework for Action, which was translated into action a piece at a time.

Fig. 2. EFA and Post-EFA Global Architecture for Consultation and Decision-Making. Source: Compiled by the author.

The EFA Global Monitoring Report (EFA-GMR) was launched in 2002 as an instrument to assess global progress towards achieving the six EFA goals. Although it is based at UNESCO in Paris, the team is independent from its donors, including UNESCO, in its analysis and opinions (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2012a). The EFA-GMR has been published annually since 2012, providing analysis on achievements of and challenges to EFA goals from different dimensions, such as gender, quality, literacy, conflict and skills.

Similarly, following the proposal of the Dakar forum, the EFA High-Level Group was launched in 2002 to mobilize political support for EFA and participation by ministers, senior officials of multilateral and bilateral agencies, and leaders of civil society. Convened annually by the director-general of UNESCO, the group served to assure authoritative commitment from the governments of member states to achieving the six EFA educational goals. After the major reform of the EFA global governance structure, the High-Level Group was replaced by the EFA High-Level Forum (HLF), conceived as ‘small and flexible’ so as to enhance its role as ‘a lever for political commitment and technical and financial resource mobilization’ (UNESCO Executive Board, 2011, p. 2). The EFA Steering Committee (SC) was also introduced by the 2011 reform. The HighLevel Group and six working groups were introduced after the WEF-Dakar to collaboratively push forward the EFA activities, in which the former to drive the political commitments and the latter to attend to specific themes and technical concerns. However, as Robinson suggests, from the beginning, there arose question about division of labour and accountability among these groups (2014, n.d.) The SC, which replaced them became the brain of the EFA structure, so to speak, while the GMR feeds information and ideas for consideration, and the HLF endorses the decisions. The SC provides ‘strategic guidance on all aspects of EFA, i.e. monitoring, research, global advocacy, knowledge-sharing and partnership for specific issues such as financing’ and is ‘a driving force for the global EFA movement’ (UNESCO Executive Board, 2011, p. 3). The SC has 18 members, including country representatives from each UNESCO region plus the E-9 Initiative, as well as representatives from the EFA convening agencies, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the OECD, NGOs, the private sector and Education International, the global federation of teachers’ unions. The SC, the HLF and the Global EFA Meetings, discussed below, are the mechanisms to develop political consensus and strategize. On the other hand, the Post-2015 Education Indicators Technical Advisory Group (TAG) of the EFA Steering Committee provides technical guidance, specifically on assessment indicators, to the SC. It includes experts from the EFA-GMR Team, the OECD, UNESCO, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UNICEF and the World Bank. Its role is to provide feedback on the proposed post-EFA targets, to provide recommendations for indicators and to lay out a measurement agenda that meets the demands of the new education and development frameworks (Post-2015 Education Indicators TAG, 2014, p. 1). The issue of assessment and the relevant indicators have been discussed heatedly throughout the post-2015 discourse in both the post-EFA and SDG processes. No matter how well elaborated the goals and targets, unless progress towards them can be monitored and evaluated, the efforts devoted to their development will be in vain. However, as discussed later, the perspectives of technical experts and those of political decision makers are based on different senses of priority: one on measurability and data availability and the other on global consensus and the impact of the message. Major Forums towards Post-EFA and the Challenges of Setting Unified Agendas Originally, the High-Level Group and OWG met separately, but the 2011 reform introduced a

single, unified annual event, the Global EFA Meetings (GEM) (Robinson, 2014). The first GEM was held in 2012, with the purpose of assessing progress and then substantively discussing and agreeing on next steps for the following year. The EFA-GMR and reports from respective regions are presented at the GEM as the basis for discussion. The participants are drawn from UNESCO’s member states, EFA convening agencies, bilateral agencies, the UN and regional organizations, CSOs, the private sector, research institutions and foundations. To increase the sense of ownership of the EFA process by the UNESCO member states, representatives of the member states are selected through a participatory process in which each region elects eight countries to represent the region at the GEM on a biennial rotating basis. The outcomes of the discussion at the GEM become the basis of the HLF agenda (UNESCO Executive Board, 2011, pp. 2–3). As Fig. 2 shows, the meetings of the member states are hierarchically structured from the national to the global level. In addition to the regular participation mechanisms for member states, there are special meetings for some groups of states – BRICS and E-9 – to ensure that the countries whose commitments are crucial for achieving EFA goals become closely involved. There are also CCNGOs to ensure that voices from civil society are heard and incorporated in the formal discussion. The CCNGO has the longest history of any global educational structure organized by UNESCO, having existed since 1984. Over the years, the scope of the CCNGO has evolved to cover the EFA goals (UNESCO, 2012a). It is one significant channel of civil society participation, although in recent years all EFA organs and forums have had the active presence of civil society actors. As the post-2015 discourse intensified, the GEM came to play a symbolic role as the forum for confirming internally and announcing externally the proposed list of post-EFA goals that had gradually taken shape. The GEM in Muscat, Oman, in May 2014 was the last occasion for the global education community to convene before WEF-Incheon in May 2015. The post-EFA education agenda and the Framework for Action were supposed to be adopted at WEFIncheon, which coincided with the target date of the Dakar goals. In reality, as discussed below, the post-EFA agenda was not announced at Incheon; instead, the Incheon Declaration expressed support for the SDGs as ‘a main driver of development’ (UNESCO, 2015c, p. 6). At Muscat, in addition to examining progress on EFA goals, a centre of the discussion was the road map to WEF-Incheon, including drafting a post-EFA agenda. That draft agenda, called the Muscat Agreement, was the outcome of negotiations of various interests and demands expressed through formal and informal channels. Comments on and inputs into the Muscat Agreement were made at regional EFA conferences and a CCNGO meeting that took place over the next several months (Fig. 1). Although the agreement was still a draft without specific numeric targets, it served as the standard for discussion of the education agenda throughout the process until WEF-Incheon. It also became the basis of SDG 4, the education-related goal under the SDG framework, in the OWG proposal that was made in August 2014 and later in the final version declared at the Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015. Even though the Muscat Agreement was considered the consensus of the whole education community and became the standard, there were differing views, as one might expect when the basis of participation is as broad as the post-EFA/SDG discourse. Therefore, the process after

Muscat was filled with suggestions for redefinition of terms and phrases. Meanwhile, the people at the core of the EFA structure were recognizing the importance of aligning the postEFA process with that of the SDGs, based on the experience that only two of the six EFA goals were incorporated into the MDGs and, as a result, the four EFA goals left out of the MDG framework were sidelined both in the global development discourse and in national processes of policymaking and implementation (Interviewee 19). Many observers consider a globally shared set of targets to be an indispensable condition for drawing resources and political commitment from governments and development partners (Shaeffer, 2014). At the earlier stage of the SDG consultation process, some participants were worried that education may not secure a stand-alone goal but would be treated as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue – a fundamental issue that touches on all fields but is not treated as a field in its own right. Therefore, education advocates applauded the inclusion in the OWG proposal of SDG 4, which adopted nearly fully the composition of targets and the phrases used in the Muscat Agreement (Interviewee 13). The post-EFA structure was to review what had been done in education during the EFA period, particularly after WEF 2000 in Dakar, and to build consensus on aims for the next 15 years. Therefore, the process has its own internal logic that had developed throughout the quarter-century history of the EFA paradigm since the World Conference on EFA in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990. This accumulated collective memory as a community of education experts and agencies is the backbone of the post-EFA discourse, and the finely designed structure for it is based on continuous efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of global education governance. Therefore, it is not an option to give them up altogether and simply be a part of the SDG process as one of the thematic groups. Still, it was considered necessary to avoid by all means a situation in which post-EFA goals might create a parallel mechanism and parallel priorities to those of the SDGs. As UNESCO does not have a strong and stable financial basis, as a matter of comparative advantage among the EFA convening agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, the World Bank and UNESCO), it has assumed the role of norm setter, rather than implementer or funder (Chabbott, 2009, pp. 18–24; Jones & Coleman, 2005, pp. 75–78). However, the gradual formation of mechanisms to translate the global agenda into practice after the launch of the MDGs in 2000 made UNESCO aware that agencies with resources and field-level operations in developing countries exercise more direct influence on the course of realizing goals than the resourceless norm setter. Therefore, even if the picture is wonderfully drawn through the UNESCO process, for it to be fully recognized in the global governance structure and be given adequate resources for implementation, it should be aligned perfectly with the post-MDG agenda, namely the SDGs (EFA Steering Committee, 2014; Interviewee 34). Because of these considerations, regardless of its original plan, the EFA Steering Committee decided not to announce the final version of the post-EFA goals at WEF-Incheon but instead to declare full support for the SDGs. Instead of taking the risk of finding SDG 4 to be significantly different from the version presented by the education community at Incheon in May 2015, the committee chose to expect actors of the education community to lobby through

various channels so that the version of SDG 4 to be adopted in New York in September would be as close as possible to what the education community had agreed to in Muscat in May 2014. In other words, the formal consultation process on the post-2015 agenda within the education community ended in Incheon, and discussions that continued after that should be considered, regardless of their enthusiastic dynamism, informal lobbying efforts.

ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE DISCOURSE We cannot reach full consensus fundamentally …. People have been talking about how post-2015 is a Christmas tree …. You can’t have a 10-page thing from education alone. So [we are] trying to see … what can be fitted into a reasonable length without compromising on content and length … while keeping in mind the principles of [our organization] which are in its constitution … [and] have to be there. Within those principles, just try to see how much we can put into a 3- to 4-page document. (Interviewee 17)

Although I have referred to the ‘education community’ in the singular form, that does not mean its constituents have a unanimous voice. In the hierarchical EFA consultation structure, voices raised in the GEMs are considered to express the consensus of the region the speaker represents, while regional voices are supposed to be shaped by critical examination of national practices and policies related to EFA. So far as one looks at the records of a global forum like GEM, it is difficult to imagine how diverse the realities and opinions are on the ground, because they are funnelled and streamlined at several stages to be put down in unified statements. Just how diverse the views of stakeholders in a region can be and how such diversity is negotiated to be expressed as a unified voice will be examined in the next chapter. Differences of opinion are seen not only intra- and interregionally, but also by the type of organization a person represents, its mission and the specific context in which the person works. One difference of the post-2015 discourse from that of the earlier period was, as almost all interviewees recognize, the expanded basis of participation. Before the WEF in Dakar, EFA was mostly the issue of the public sector, and there was little participation of civil society actors in the scene. However, the closeness of the circle limited the impact of the initiative itself and caused a gradual decrease of engagement among convening multilateral agencies except for UNESCO (Wright, 2014). There was a disappointment in the lack of progress towards the agenda agreed upon at Jomtien and ‘a strong feeling that UNESCO is not leading adequately’ (O’Rourke, 2014, p. 1). Several witnesses report that it was civil society actors who came into this vacuum and played dynamic roles to ‘reawaken general interest and commitment’ to act on the common agenda (Osttveit, 2014, p. 1; see also Archer, 2014; Interviewee 20). In 1999, some key civil society groups organized themselves into a global network of national and regional federations of CSOs, which was named the Global Campaign for Education (GCE).2 GCE’s founding aim was to ensure that WEF-Dakar would recognize the

educational crisis and maintain the international commitment to achieving the EFA goals. GCE presented its collective inputs on the draft Dakar Framework of Action, worked to make statements at the official NGO pre-meeting, and made sure GCE representatives were elected as members of the final drafting committee (Interviewee 10). WEF-Dakar was, therefore, the stage for the civil society actors to lay the foundation for wider and more systematic participation in setting and monitoring the agenda in the global education community. At Dakar, civil society actors ensured that their representatives would have positions in key EFA governance bodies such as the High-Level Group, the OWG, and later the EFA Steering Committee. At both regional and global levels, it became a common basic arrangement for major consultation meetings such as GEM to have civil society representatives. The expanded presence of civil society actors was not only a phenomenon restricted to the UNESCO-led EFA governance structure but it was also common to GPE, the UN Secretary-General’s Global Education First Initiative, the UN Thematic Consultation on Education and other key entities that drive the global trends of this field. In sum, there are two broad categories of actors: one is state governments and the multilateral agencies regulated by the decision-making bodies composed of member states and the other is the civil society actors who work across national boundaries and through both formal and informal channels. As I argued in the introduction to this volume, the driving force for these two categories of actors is fundamentally different. The first is motivated by national interests, while the second is driven by the mission or professional concerns of a specialist group. One of the significant factors that made the current discourse unique is that the latter group expanded its influence greatly, while the former is also diversifying. At the same time, regardless of the broadened and diversified participation, at the end of the consultation process, stakeholders have to reach a common proposal. In fact, the ‘education community’ came up with the Muscat Agreement and Incheon Statement, which were unanimously adopted. Therefore, ideas that came from various actors were somehow streamlined and standardized into a concise list of goals and targets. So how were these core ideas shaped and what kinds of people participated in the process of shaping them? What kind of orientation did they have and how did they find common ground? To find the answers to these questions, this section will examine the characteristics of key groups of actors. Since in many cases, people took part in the process as the ‘representatives’ of some category of actors, I treat them as collective agencies, instead of individuals with subjective motivations. In reality, not all the ‘representatives’ were faithful mouthpieces for their groups, while others were rather stubborn and unwilling to negotiate in defending their collective interests. In fact, given that the key participants who took part in major meetings and conferences overlapped greatly, their personalities and personal views would have significant impact on the direction of discourse. However, since it is both difficult and ethically inappropriate to refer to individuals by name, the discussion below will focus on collective characteristics of groups, except for cases when individuals’ opinions were publicized under their own names.

Civil Society Actors In the expanded space of civil society participation, there are groups of actors that have different driving mechanisms or motives for their members to take part in the discourse. While there are groups whose networks involve members from both the Global South and the Global North, others are more issue specific, with less inclusive membership. Although civil society representatives have participated in the formal consultation process via the EFA Steering Committee, Thematic Consultation group, CCNGOs and various conferences, a large part of their actions have been taken outside of meeting rooms. Mission-Driven Civil Society Organizations GCE is the biggest civil society group in terms of the number of member organizations and geographic coverage. Under GCE, there are more than 80 education coalitions that have their own memberships, comprising teachers’ unions, NGOs and other CSOs involved in education. Its governing board is composed of representatives from the teaching profession, international NGOs, organizations committed to the issues of children’s rights and child labour and coalitions representing regions (Global Campaign for Education, 2015). I categorize GCE as a form of mission-driven organization because it is united under the common goal of promoting universal values of education. One of the interviewees summarized the organization’s goal as follows: We do have a dedicated umbrella educational goal that should be an inclusive education goal so that from that one goal we can flow out a set of additional objectives and/or targets. You want a high-level goal which is consistent with the right-based approach so we are articulating the link between human rights frameworks and development frameworks. It should address not just children and youth but lifelong learning so we want to take a perspective that is inclusive of all generations and that it should be not just focused on access but also focused on quality. (Interviewee 16)

The goal itself is broad, reflecting the diversity of the constituting members of GCE. It overarches organizations committed to the education of children and youth as well as those committed to adult literacy education. It also involves teachers’ unions, activists against child labour and so on. Even among large international NGOs there is variation on the specific issues of education they highlight. For example, there are NGOs like Plan International and Save the Children, which generally focus on children’s rights and well-being, including education. Plan International’s campaign focused on girls’ education demonstrates a high level of visibility in the education community globally and nationally. There are NGOs that deal with issues related to both adults and children, such as ActionAid and OXFAM, to name a few. However, in terms of governing structure, these organizations are very different; while 80 per cent of the board members of ActionAid come from the Global South, nearly 90 per cent of the headquarters of OXFAM’s constituting entities are based in Global North. (Interviewees 1, 3, 5, 10; Plan International, 2013; Save the Children UK, 2013). Such differences in priorities and governing structures result in the different operational strengths of these international NGOs; some have a strong presence in the field and try to organize voices from stakeholders in the Global South,

while others are more experienced in high-level advocacy and diplomacy. In the case of regional and national federations under GCE, the member organizations are even more diverse, including fairly small community-level organizations and those run by devoted individuals without systematic governing bodies. In the case of Japan, where I live, the Japan NGO Network for Education (JNNE) has 23 member organizations, out of which only a handful have full-time advocacy and policy staff. Some are Japanese offices or affiliates of international NGOs, while others are national NGOs that conduct small-scale projects in developing countries. JNNE itself is run voluntarily by the staff of member organizations. Although JNNE is a member of Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE) and hence of GCE, the realities faced by the majority of its members are distant from the post-EFA advocacy or policy dialogue (Interviewees 2 and 11). Such dualism of orientations towards global advocacy and field-level operation are seen in most countries in both the North and the South, which often makes the matter of policy dialogue and advocacy the business of a small circle of CSO ‘representatives’. Regardless of such diversity and inherent sources of contradiction, these organizations share the characteristic that a significant motive behind their work is a sense of mission: the idea that people have to act to make a world where everybody’s fundamental rights are ensured regardless of sex, age or cultural background, and where no one lives in poverty. However broad their message, they are driven to organize themselves to influence the processes of negotiating the global agenda because they are committed to the universal values of human rights, equity and justice. Constituency-Based Civil Society Organizations Unlike mission-driven CSOs, which are mostly run by people outside of classrooms and the local societies for which they work, constituency-based CSOs are organized for and represent the people directly concerned in educational and developmental activities. One such organization that is most influential in this field is Education International (EI), the federation of unions for teachers and education employees. EI has 403 member organizations from all around the world, with the governing body composed of representatives from regions. There are seven regional offices, plus the headquarters in Brussels. Although members are all organizations for teachers and education employees, the levels of education they work for stretch from kindergarten to secondary, technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and higher education institutions. Therefore, as Interviewee 33 pointed out, it is a challenge to establish lines of communication with all member organizations and ensure that they make informed decisions, even before talking of presenting a consensus view to the global post-EFA discourse. EI picks up various topics for research; a few examples of recent ones include teachers’ perspectives on the Bologna Process for higher education integration in Europe, on international assessment by Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS), and on privatization of education. In relation to EFA, EI conducted a large-scale questionnaire survey to collect teachers’ views on the challenges and achievements of EFA, the results of which were released at WEF-Incheon

(Education International, 2015; Interviewee 33). Despite the diversity, one clear basis for the activities of EI is promoting the interests of teachers and education employees, alongside quality and equity of education. Since EI is also a powerful member of GCE, it advocates for quality and equity in much the same manner as a mission-driven CSO. At the same time, messages from EI are couched within its nature as a teachers’ union. This point will be elaborated later in relation to the educational issues highlighted in the post-EFA discourse. The International Association of Universities (IAU) has also been involved in the global post-EFA consultation. Its members are from 120 countries around the world, including both educational institutions and their federations. It is physically based at UNESCO but is an independent membership organization neither funded nor mandated by UNESCO. Although the larger part of the post-EFA discussion is focused on basic education, that focus, Interviewee 14 argued, is a bias caused by the selective integration of the EFA goal regarding basic education into the MDGs. The six goals of EFA are more comprehensive and include higher education. Therefore, on behalf of the constituent institutions and federations, the aim of the delegates from IAU to EFA-related meetings is to demonstrate the importance of higher education for the systemic development of the education system and to advocate for researchbased implementation of educational activities. Philanthropies While the above-mentioned two categories of CSOs are the actors directly involved in the implementation of various programmes and discussion of the global agenda, there are civil society actors who sponsor CSOs for conducting their activities but do not consider themselves as the main characters of the scene. According to Interviewee 29, civil society is a space for organizations that work with people on the ground. Private foundations are not actors of civil society because they do not have a constituency to represent. Their decisions are made not on behalf of a constituency but according to the mission set by the organization itself. The role of foundations is to respond to the needs of organizations that represent the perspectives of the critical mass of people involved in the activities concerned, in this case, education (see also Interviewee 27). Still, because they don’t have infinite funds and staff capacity to accept all the proposals they receive, foundations have criteria for the activities and organizations they will support. These criteria for sponsorship send a message from the foundation that, even if indirectly through funded CSOs, serves as food for discourse. The Open Society Foundations are a US-headquartered family of offices and foundations that support global education programmes, among many other fields. Unlike the health sector, there are not many private institutional sponsors of education. They support programmes by Education International, the federation of teachers’ unions. The group also commissioned research to explore the possibilities of assessing the outcomes of teaching and learning holistically, instead of narrowing them to ‘measurable’ indicators (Open Society Foundations, 2015). This series of commissioned research is based on a critical observation of discourse on

the post-EFA agenda and is clearly meant to throw a stone into the trend of quantification of monitoring indicators for global targets (Williams, 2015), instead of staying as a quiet supporting player. Besides the Open Society Foundations, there are other foundations supporting EFA-related programmes, such as the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, La Fondation Paul GérinLajoie and the Varkey Foundation. There are also foundations in countries outside of the traditional donor countries, such as the Qatar Foundation in Qatar or the Aga Khan Foundation, founded by an Islamic royal, although they are not much involved in policy dialogue on the post-2015 agenda.

Multilateral Organizations and Groups While civil society actors are connected across national borders horizontally, multilateral organizations are the institutions of international governance for multiple countries working in concert on a given issue. Basically, they are institutions to administer the matters of intergovernmental relationships. Regardless of its predominantly governmental nature, however, given the rapidly growing influence from civil society actors technically, normatively, and politically, it is becoming common to see civil society representatives in various kinds of meetings and groups organized by multilateral organizations. Therefore, in this section, after summarizing the key multilateral organizations concerned with education, which are also the convening agencies of the WEFs, I will then touch on the thematic specialist groups whose members come from national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and CSOs. It is getting increasingly difficult to make a clear-cut segregation between the vertical channels of governmental-intergovernmental organizations and civil society. Therefore, this section treats the autonomous thematic specialist groups as a multilateral group. I also treat them as a separate category from forums for review and consultation on EFA and the post-EFA process in general, which were treated earlier in this chapter, because they are not a part of the formal structure and the process of political consultation on post-2015 concerns, but are organized for specific technical and professional purposes. They are, at the same time, different from the civil society actors discussed earlier, because CSOs try to influence or critically review the work of governments, which are external to them. In the multilateral technical groups, people wearing the caps of government, CSO, academic and intergovernmental organization work together for common objectives. UNESCO and WEF Convening Agencies: UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP and the World Bank The Dakar Framework for Action adopted at WEF 2000 made the position of UNESCO as EFA global coordinator much clearer than before, as it is the sole UN organization specialized in education (EFA Steering Committee, 2012). UNESCO being the lead agency, there are four other multilateral convening agencies that have been assigned the role of pushing EFA forward since Jomtien: UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP and the World Bank. Still, at inception, UNESCO

considered the level of involvement of the five EFA convening agencies ‘uneven’ (UNESCO, 2012d, p. 2). This was one of the motives for UNESCO to reform the EFA coordination mechanism in 2012 to develop closer collaboration among convening agencies. Respective convening agencies have their own priority areas according to their mandates, while the six goals of EFA cover various dimensions of education comprehensively. Therefore, even though the four convening agencies work for promoting education in one way or another, it is difficult for them to sustain the same level of commitment to EFA as UNESCO in all dimensions. Among the four other agencies, probably UNICEF is the closest partner with UNESCO, having co-led the post-EFA process with UNESCO within the UN system. The report on the Thematic Consultation on Education was written under the joint leadership of these two agencies and was submitted to the High-Level Panel through The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), which coordinates norm setting for the UN’s work in international development (Interviewee 31; UNICEF & UNESCO, 2013). According to one of the interviewees, the main concerns of UNICEF are equity, learning and early childhood education. Although UNICEF will make an effort for the whole post-EFA agenda to be well defined and meaningful, even if other targets are not adequately addressed, UNICEF is primarily concerned about the goals on these UNICEF-concerned areas to be operational (Interviewee 28). UNFPA is, as its name indicates, a lead agency on population issues, particularly related to family planning, and child and maternal health. Prevention of HIV/AIDS is among the key areas of activity for UNFPA. Health-related goals were not included in the education-related SDG 4, regardless of continuous advocacy by UNFPA to include such language (UNESCO, 2008). Instead, in April 2015, UNESCO and UNFPA signed a strategic partnership agreement on the post-2015 agenda that highlights the importance of ‘implementing integrated education approaches and programmes on issues related to population, sexual and reproductive health, gender-based violence, and HIV/AIDS, together with universal access to quality education and rights of young people’ (UNESCO, 2015d, p. 1). UNDP leads UN agencies in harmonizing their programmes for systemic reform of the governance structure for development. While it emphasizes the importance of sustainable development and democratic governance, its position on education is not very conspicuous, except that it promotes a rights-based approach and equity. Rather, because UNDP serves as co-chair, together with DESA, of the Sustainable Development Working Group in the UN system, the reason for having UNDP represented on the EFA Steering Committee as a convening agency is to secure a direct link between the post-EFA and SDG processes (UNDP, 2015). The World Bank is not a part of the UN system and is not directly involved in the UN interagency coordination process. Regardless, the significant presence of the World Bank throughout the EFA era is hardly unrecognized, backed by its financial resources and knowledge generation. In its role as financing agency, the World Bank has been known as the champion of the human capital theory, which sees education as an investment for the formation of a skilled workforce (Becker, 2006, p. 292). Throughout the period after the World

Conference on EFA in Jomtien in 1990, the World Bank has been driven by the economic perspective of educational investment, which is in clear contrast to the rights-based approach of UNESCO. The investment in basic education was considered to have the highest rate of return compared with other educational sub-sectors, which served as the backbone of the concentration of aid to this sub-sector (Psacharopoulos, 1994). The partial incorporation of two EFA goals, those on universal basic education and gender equity, in the MDGs cannot be understood without considering the World Bank’s emphasis on basic education backed by its strong financial and knowledge base to actualize its commitment (Jones & Coleman, 2005, pp. 115–135). The assumption that human capital formation happens basically through formal schooling made the World Bank focus on formal education under EFA. However, from the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, there arose the reflection that school-based education does not prepare youth with adequate vocational and life skills, which causes a supply-demand mismatch in the labour market and, hence, high youth unemployment (Johanson & Adams, 2004). Based on that observation, the bank started to lead the discourse on skills and employment, which enlarged its scope from a narrow focus on school-based education to one that encompasses informal learning, such as apprenticeship. Meanwhile, it continues to be involved in quality improvement of formal basic and secondary education. As for the post-2015 discourse on education per se, the World Bank’s presence does not stand out. However, as discussed later, it has driven the discussion on skills and training, which is one of the key educational themes of the discourse. Global Partnership for Education GPE is an international body launched in 2002. It was called the Fast Track Initiative until being renamed GPE in 2011. The mission of GPE is similar to that of other global organizations mentioned in this volume: to ensure quality education for all children. One feature of this organization that makes it different from other initiatives led by multilateral agencies is that it is a donor itself, with a pooled fund contributed by member donors to support developing-country governments in designing and implementing education-sector plans. It also provides funds for national civil society education coalitions in the countries that are eligible for its financial support. GPE also supports CSOs at the regional and global levels through the network of the Global Campaign for Education. Originally it was an initiative by the World Bank, but it is now autonomous, with its own board of directors, composed of multilateral and bilateral donors, civil society and private-sector representatives and developing-country members (Global Partnership for Education, 2011). The board members of GPE, particularly those representing CSOs and multilateral agencies, highly overlap with those of the EFA Steering Committee, the UN Thematic Consultation on Education, CCNGOs and other forums. Therefore, it may be even considered as a part of formal global governance structure on education. Still, as an autonomous entity with its own funding schemes and agenda, it was not much involved in the post-EFA discourse at the beginning (Interviewee 13). However, in the domestic process of lobbying by CSOs in donor countries, the issue of financial contribution to GPE is often discussed in a seamless

linkage with the importance of the commitment to the post-2015 agenda (Interviewees 2, 3 and 8). These two issues lead to the same message that the governmental financial contribution to the achievement of a global education agenda has to be increased. In many cases, GPE has been considered and used as a channel to propel the achievement of one of the EFA goals, universal basic education. GPE is also helping to facilitate the formation of the International Platform for Assessing Learning (IPAL), which will provide technical and financial support for developing countries to build the capacity of national learning assessment (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2014, pp. 20–25). In sum, GPE is independent but closely reflects the discussions happening in other parts of the global education structure and, although not directly involved in the post-2015 discourse per se, it is going to play a major role in implementing the adopted education targets under the SDGs, particularly on learning assessment. Theme-Specific Groups While IPAL is planned as the implementation mechanism for assessment, in the process of consultation towards a post-2015 agenda, a major group that has led research and discussion on assessment of learning outcomes is the Learning Metrics Task Force (LMTF), a team jointly convened by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institution. Its objective is to raise awareness of the importance of learning and access to education. It has also proposed a framework for conceptualizing different domains of learning, such as numeracy and mathematics, social and emotional learning, learning approaches and cognition, and literacy and communication (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2013a, 2013b). As a technical group, it aimed to propose how to define the different types of competencies that are expected to be developed through education and the actual outcomes of learning, in addition to consulting on approaches and indicators for measuring learning outcomes (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2013a, 2013b). LMTF’s member organizations include CSOs, research divisions of regional intergovernmental organizations, bilateral and multilateral donors, and public and private research institutions. Its working groups also include university-based academics. Assessment of learning outcomes became a major issue in the post-EFA discourse, and LMTF is one of the key actors that not only proposed an actual framework and tools for assessment but also called for a mindset change from exclusive focus on access during the EFA period to considering the outcomes of education towards the post-EFA era. Since it was an issue of hot debate, various initiatives and groups worked on it from different angles, which will be discussed later. One such actor on learning outcomes, the EFA Technical Advisory Group, has been working on indicators to assess the learning outcomes. It is not an autonomous specialist group but a support team under the EFA Steering Committee, composed of UN staff, that aims to translate the post-EFA education targets into measurable indicators. There is also a specialized group on the issues of teachers, the International Task Force on Teachers for EFA. While Education International is the federation of teachers’ unions, this task force includes stakeholders other than teachers themselves, namely national governments,

intergovernmental organizations, CSOs and bilateral and multilateral donors. Its mission is to coordinate international efforts to secure sufficient numbers of qualified teachers, the lack of which is considered to be one of the major impediments to achieving EFA goals. The task force organizes regional and international policy dialogues and campaigns to promote the importance of supporting teachers for improving the learning environment and opportunities for children and youth. In addition, it conducts research and expert meetings to enrich the knowledge base on teachers’ issues so that policymakers will make informed decisions. This task force, along with Education International, has played a significant role in raising organized voices on behalf of teachers (International Task Force on Teachers for EFA, 2013). Debates on issues of relevance to teachers will be revisited below.

The Private Sector During this research, some interviewees pointed out the increasing presence of the private sector and its effect on the direction of the discourse (Interviewees 6 and 9). Most of the cases interviewees raised were significantly related to SDGs, particularly to environmental and economic issues, but outside the education sector. One of the interviewees hinted that pressure from the private sector threatened to keep education from securing a stand-alone goal in the SDGs which suggests that there are few private companies interested in education sector per se and that they are likely to consider education as a part of other goals (Interviewee 33). Pearson PLC, a media conglomerate that includes a major educational publisher, is represented on the board of GPE (Global Partnership for Education, 2015), although the company’s role and level of commitment are unclear. Altogether, there was not much discussion about the private sector’s involvement in the global discourse on the education agenda. That may be partly due to my lack of attention, but it is also largely due to lack of private-sector presence. Considering the growing attention on private schools and innovative financing for education, the role of the private sector may expand in the coming years.

State Governments Needless to say, state governments are significant actors, too, in global governance of education. They are the constituents of the intergovernmental organizations and are always given opportunities for expressing national perspectives on the issues on the table. Civil society actors and UN agencies dominated the scene when they moulded and drafted the agenda, but the last few steps towards formulation of the SDGs was predominantly for delegates from member states. In December 2014, after submission of the UN secretarygeneral’s synthesis report, based on the OWG’s recommendations, to the general assembly, the process of intergovernmental negotiation started. Of course, the CSOs and multilateral actors have continued the effort of lobbying the state delegates to support their causes. Although such

lobbying often proved effective, it still represents indirect intervention; it was the member states who cast the votes. Despite the importance of state governments, their bureaucracies and the domestic contexts of stakeholder consultation are too diverse to be treated in detail in this chapter, whose main objective is to delineate the dynamics of the global discourse and its relation to the governance structure. The next chapter will examine the domestic processes of some countries in Asia in an effort to grasp the Asian regional mechanism. Still, that will not lead to any generalization about country processes that can be applied to regions outside of Asia.

ISSUES REGARDING ACTORS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE Structure, Discourse and Agencies The structure of global governance has become well-articulated thanks to concerted efforts in the 25 years since Jomtien. The basis of participation was expanded greatly during the period after WEF-Dakar in 2000. As post-WWII theories of international relations have regarded nation-states as the units of representation and participation, the global architecture has developed accordingly (Ruggie, 1992). As the voices of nation-states have been shaped through the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy and the political process of election for collective representation of constituencies, the global governance architecture is also hierarchical, accumulating voices from the national to the regional level, with high-order decision-making at the global level. The same has applied to the architecture for global educational governance, with the formal channels predominantly for national representatives. At the same time, such a hierarchical structure tends to take on a political nature that reflects the power balance among ministries or issues that attract public attention domestically. Politicians are under pressure from their constituencies and would find it difficult to promote a global agenda unless it has a visible link with their commitment to domestic issues. National governments are not unanimous entities, and ministries have different orientations according to their mandates. Therefore, the opinions that the national delegates express in the meetings hosted by UN agencies may not necessarily be based on thorough consultation within the government, but instead may be biased by the orientation of a particular ministry, or even an office of a ministry, and by powerful political champions of certain interests. In such a process, professional or technical considerations on the issues concerned are likely to be sidelined. The growth of civil society space outside of the formal global governance structure is not a coincidence but a natural consequence of the limited room for specialists to voice their views free from national interests. The UNESCO-led post-2015 education-specific consultation mechanism is linked with

national governments through ministries of education, whereas the process led by UN Secretariat in New York, that of the greater SDGs, involves ministries in charge of foreign affairs. Therefore, as many interviewees suggested, there is often a serious lack of coordination between ministries that represent governments in Paris and in New York. In spite of the effort people in the education community to elaborate the draft education agenda, it is only a preliminary process to feed ideas into one of the SDG goals according to the designated consultation structure towards September 2015. Final decisions will be made in New York, where education people have limited direct influence. This concern was expressed particularly by people in or associated with UNESCO, who characterized the SDG process as much more political than the post-EFA process (Interviewee 20). In the post-EFA consultation, people share a basic understanding of the issues, but once the proposal is passed to New York, the vote is in the hands of member state representatives who are not specialists on any issues listed under the SDGs, including education (Interviewee 19). That is one of the reasons why interviewees from CSOs emphasized leverage through the domestic process of member states, together with a direct appeal to the global processes on SDGs and post-EFA issues (Interviewees 12, 15 and 23). One of the interviewees suggested that if WEF-Incheon had been scheduled after the September 2015 Sustainable Development Summit, instead of the previous May, the logic might be smoother to break down the broad, general SDG 4 targets into more specific frameworks for action (Interviewee 20), although that might have opened the way for the education community to be completely left out of the discourse on SDGs, giving no advance input. As mentioned earlier, in one way or another, almost all interviewees expressed concern about the parallel, rather than integrated, post-EFA and SDG processes. The parallel agenda, they contended, will create a parallel implementation structure, which will impede the flow of resources to certain areas of education and burden the national ministries of education with duplicate administrative tasks (Interviewee 4; Shaeffer, 2014). Some people argued that to make sure the efforts of the education community are not in vain, the message should be narrowed to only a few simple targets that are straightforward to monitor (Interviewee 34), while other people asserted that we shouldn’t give up on demonstrating the fundamental importance of developing people’s minds in favour of simple, measurable indicators (Interviewee 21). Putting that philosophical debate aside for later examination, one thing that informants agree on is that the intergovernmental channel is not sufficient to push forward the demands of stakeholders from the education community. Civil societies’ role is significant in bridging the gap among stakeholders at each level of discourse. The formal structure functions well only with lubricating acts by individuals who personally communicate with people who wear different caps but share a vision at least in one or two dimensions. Such informal lubrication not only by CSOs but also by those in convening agencies, supports the formal process within the education community and among actors outside of this specialized community. At the same time, individuals’ acts are conditioned by the perspectives and mandates of the institutions they belong to. In this sense, the characteristics of the major categories of actors explained above

provide clues to the behaviour of individuals in the discourse. Mission-driven CSOs and specialist groups play a unique role in promoting ideas because they represent not constituencies but values shared by people who work to realize them. They are not restricted by national interests, but work simultaneously across countries under the common values. The constituency-based CSOs would behave a little differently due to their important mandate to promote benefits for their constituencies. For example, Education International cannot but advocate for teachers’ work environment, training, motivation and so on. At the same time, it is one of the major members of GCE, the biggest mission-driven CSO in this field, and works under the common goal of achieving equitable access to quality education for all. Balancing of different and often diverse demands is a major issue that surfaces everywhere in the broad-based but representative participation. Another factor that needs to be pointed out regarding individual participants in the discourse is that people’s acts and utterances are conditioned not only by their institutional affiliations and positions in those institutions but also by their professional backgrounds. Some interviewees were not trained as educationists but had backgrounds in political science, public administration or law, backgrounds that are particularly common among full-time staff on advocacy and policy (Interviewees 6, 9and 12). These staff people accumulated their experience as professionals in advocacy across different sectors. One interviewee pointed out that such professional advocates know how to negotiate and do not adhere to their groups’ missions too much, whereas specialists in a particular field, be it education, health, or whatever, tend to have a stronger attachment to the issues and find it difficult to compromise in some cases (Interviewee 34). In sum, the discourse is created by the interplay between subjectivity of individuals that represent categories of institutional actors. These individuals represent their institutional goals, while the characteristics of the institutions and the professional backgrounds affect their ways and degrees of ‘representation’. Some issues have been raised repeatedly and discussed from various dimensions, yet many other issues have not been picked up as a common concern of the participants in the discourse. Fig. 3 demonstrates how the actors take part in and influence the consultation process through layers of channels in both formal and informal spaces. The global governance structure provides formal venues and procedures for the discourse, although the discourse happens in the much larger informal space outside of it. While the structure gives shape to the discourse, the demand from the actual interactions leads to structural reforms such as the increase in seats for CSO representatives in the formal structure after Dakar and the major reform of the EFA governance structure in 2012.

Fig. 3. The Multiple Relationships between Formal and Informal Structures. Source: Compiled by the author.

Broad-Based Participation and Oligopoly of High-Level Decisions While the formal structure has been increasingly articulated and the participation mechanism has become multi-layered, the lists of members of the committees, conferences and groups highly overlap at the global level (putting aside regional and national levels, which have completely different dynamics). The institutional actors delineated above are the ones almost always included in such lists, together with people in charge of education in the convening agencies. It is not only the institutions but also the individuals who represent these institutions often overlap across venues. Therefore, even though the structure looks too complicated to follow, with parallel post-EFA and SDG processes, in fact, at least in terms of education, the proposals and comments in major reports such as that of UN Thematic Consultation, UNESCO’s position paper on post-MDGs, the Muscat Agreement and the Incheon Declaration, as well as ad hoc comments from EFA Steering Committee, come from similar groups of people. The documents mutually reinforce, and earlier reports give foundation to later reports, as if all these formal venues organized under the UN system regarding education are steps towards a final outcome document from the ‘education community’. Everybody agrees that there are now many more chances for civil society actors to participate. Positions for CSOs in the formal venues for high-level decision-making are only one dimension of the broad-based participation. What is actually broad-based is the steps of consultation from the ground. The UN Thematic Consultation invited input from individuals online, together with national consultation through ministry channels. On the side of UNESCO,

alongside the post-EFA discussion there was a long process of national EFA reviews beginning in mid-2013 to assess to what extent each country had achieved respective EFA goals, identify challenges and highlight good practices. As for CSOs, major international NGOs published reports based on their field experience and consultation with stakeholders in the countries where they operate projects. Not only the formal UN-led structure but also CSOs adopted the approach of hierarchical consultations to ensure participation from the ground to the regional and global levels. That way, the representation by a small group of people at a high level is considered to be legitimate (Interviewee 19). At the same time, it is easy to imagine that once many people’s voices have been heard, it would be difficult to reach consensus in a real sense. In my research, I always asked interviewees if there are any difficulties in reaching consensus amid such a wide range of stakeholders. Like Interviewee 17, quoted earlier, some informants said it is impossible to reach full consensus. An anonymous interviewee even called the participation scheme a means of gas drainage to divert people’s complaints that their voices were not heard. Others, however, felt that it is possible to represent the common interests of the group. According to some interviewees from CSOs, no matter how diverse the situations and demands faced by stakeholders may be, representatives of a CSO share the fundamental value raised as the institutional mission, which they promote as the collective voice (Interviewees 14, 15 and 33). At the same time, these informants say it is important to sensitize stakeholders to that mission because the post-2015 discourse is so far removed from the realities faced by local NGOs doing field projects that stakeholders may not see the key points of the discourse. An important role of CSO federations is to build capacity to improve the effectiveness of country-level advocacy and monitoring (Interviewees 15 and 16). Representing the shared value while sensitizing members to it would require a delicate balance, because it may fall to indoctrinate uninformed members with what supposed to be ‘the shared view’. Anyhow, one cannot continue listening to people forever, because there is a deadline by which the whole ‘education community’ must adopt a statement unanimously. ‘Drafting’ of statements is a symbolic procedure. At GEM-Muscat in 2014, WEF-Incheon in 2015, and EFA regional conferences, there were drafting committees composed of members of the EFA Steering Committee and UN Secretariat, plus a few other relevant people such as regional representatives. An initial draft of the statement was provided to participants at the beginning of the conference. Each evening, after the day’s discussions, the drafting committee worked to incorporate comments from member states and CSO representatives, building a final draft that would be provided for adoption at the end of the conference. According to the official report, there were more than 1,500 participants at WEF-Incheon. Out of this large number, only official representatives of member states and CSOs were permitted to speak in the main conference room, putting aside thematic sessions and side events. Still, speaking in the plenary meeting did not always mean a speaker’s opinion would be written in the final statement. The drafting committee wrote down the statement on behalf of everyone who took part in the long-tailed participation process. While I myself have observed only a couple of meetings in the education-specific process,

according to some interviewees who observed some OWG meetings in New York, it looked ‘unmanageable’ there (Interviewees 22 and 28). Because national delegates in New York do not come from ministries of education, they have little to say that is based on expertise or experience in the field. Still, delegates from each member state are given the microphone, one after another, to make a speech, with no intervention from the chair and no discussion. At the end of the session, there comes a summary report. Who writes these reports, based on what discussion? The focus of summary depends greatly on the interpretation by the rapporteur.

Legitimacy of Representation While I point out that high-level decisions are in the hands of a small number of people, I am neither criticizing nor supporting that arrangement; it is an observation. Another observation needs to be highlighted regarding broad-based participation, and that is representation. When there is such a large number of stakeholders, direct participation is not possible, of course. Thanks to advances in information technology and transportation, it has become much easier in recent years to get connected with people at a physical distance. Therefore, hearing people’s voices, which is one-directional communication, is possible. However, trying to exchange ideas and reach agreement is more complicated. It is not only a matter of language and means of communication. Rather, it is a matter of logic and vocabularies used in the process of discussion. Earlier in this section I noted that some CSO people consider it necessary to sensitize or to develop the capacities of their members, because not all of them understand the key issues in the discourse or the values behind them. In other words, to take part, one needs to know the values, logic and vocabularies used in the discussion. Otherwise, whatever one might say in the process of consultation will be put aside as a mere expression of desire without contextualization. The true representatives of the stakeholders are those who translate the desires expressed by the people on the ground into the language of discourse. Just being an education specialist is not enough to take part in this seemingly complicated post-2015 discourse. On the other hand, one may not necessarily need to have hands-on experience teaching or working for education projects, as long as one is fast enough to pick up the tone of discourse. Advocacy specialists are good at that. Within the CSOs, people from various locations must Skype, email, or meet each other before compiling reports or statements. The people I interviewed said such processes were typically facilitated by staff members from the Global North (Interviewees 5, 13 and 15). In general, people in the Global South devote themselves more to making changes in the classrooms and villages, while people in the Global North see the importance of leveraging the process towards developing a global agenda that will have vast implications for the resources and attention their programmes will receive. In the sense that those who facilitate the internal consultation of CSOs are not faithfully transmitting the voices of people on the ground but instead translate to fit to the discourse, their ‘representation’ may not be ‘legitimate’ in a strict sense. But their behaviour is rational because that way, they defend benefits for

stakeholders in the Global South. In some cases, it is not clear whom a ‘representative’ speaks for. In global forums like GEM and WEF, some participants are eloquent but seem not to speak for the group whose cap they wear. This is often true of member state representatives, whose selection is at the discretion of the respective states. A member state’s representative is not always an official from the most informed ministry; in some cases, it is not even an official. On the other hand, even high officials from ministries of education may arrive at the forum without any advance briefing from their staff, leaving them unsure about what to say, even though they are given opportunities to speak. CSO people looking for opportunities to push forward their educational causes may strategically whisper some hints into the ears of these lost ministers. The issues I have discussed regarding structure, participation and representation are largely a matter of the politics of negotiation and power relationships among actors. However, as I stated in the introduction to this volume, epistemology shaped in the discourse is always rooted in the ontology of educational practices. In this sense, it is important to look at substantial and technical dimensions that relate to the educational issues to be discussed and actual implementation of the agenda once it’s agreed. Based on this consideration, now I would like to turn to the contents of the educational issues highlighted in the discourse.

EMERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE OF KEY ISSUES Review of EFA Experience and Education Targets in SDGs EFA Reviews From mid-2013 until WEF-Incheon, national EFA reviews have taken place, in which UNESCO member states assess progress towards the six EFA goals and identify issues and challenges so as to create momentum for enhanced national commitment to make a last push towards achieving goals by the target year of 2015 (Global Education for All meeting, 2012). Reports on these national reviews were submitted and presented at regional meetings. A similar review effort was made by civil society (Collective Consultation of NGOs on Education for All, 2014) and by the EFA Global Monitoring Report Team. The 2015 issue of EFA-GMR was devoted to this purpose under the title Education for All 2000–2015: Achievements and Challenges and was launched at WEF-Incheon (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015). Given the diversity of the situations and the lack of standardization in format and approach, it is difficult to summarize the review reports from member states, regions, and civil societies. It is one of the challenges of the post-EFA era that after those straightforward numeric targets, such as increased enrolment or numbers of facilities and teachers, have seen remarkable progress, other educational issues left to be attended to are more complicated and context specific. It is natural that the EFA reviews present diverse realities and the diagnosis of such realities. The importance of ‘country process’ has been

highlighted repeatedly in the post-EFA discourse, although there is no clear strategy for balancing the need for country-specific operation and monitoring with the need for overarching norms and assessments at the global level. While this issue will be revisited later, this section, instead of trying to wrap up the reviews from member states and other stakeholders, will summarize the review of EFA-GMR 2015 regarding achievement, emerging issues and challenges (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015). Regarding EFA Goal 1 (see EFA goals, Box 1) on early childhood care and education (ECCE), the GMR reports that out of 147 countries with data, nearly half (47 per cent) have reached the goal, and in 2012, 184 million children were enroled in pre-primary education worldwide, a 64 per cent increase from 1999 (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, p. 47). Child mortality has been reduced by nearly 50 per cent through improved nutrition. Yet the progress is uneven, and children in poor households and rural areas have much lower access to ECCE. The difference is also large across countries.

Box 1: Education for All Goals. Goal 1: Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children. Goal 2: Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality. Goal 3: Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes. Goal 4: Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults. Goal 5: Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality. Goal 6: Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills. Source: UNESCO (2015e).

Goal 2 saw the most visible progress, thanks to concerted financial and technical assistance from the international community to the primary sub-sector of education. This was one of the two EFA goals that were incorporated into the MDGs, together with the one on gender equality (Goal 5). The primary-school net enrolment ratio has improved from 84 to 93 per cent between 1999 and 2015. Improvement was particularly dramatic in countries that used to have low educational indicators. Among 17 countries that achieved more than a 20 per cent

increase in net primary-school enrolment in the same period, 11 are in sub-Saharan Africa (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, pp. 79–80). In the wake of this remarkable progress, however, there are still 58 million children who are out of school. They are marginalized for various sociocultural and physical reasons such as disability, ethnic or linguistic background, geographic location, sex and conflict. The assessment of outcomes for Goal 3 is more complicated than that of the first two goals because the methods of assessing ‘skills’ have not been established and because educationsector specialists have not accumulated data to systematically monitor issues of vocational and life skills. Therefore, most of the data cited in the GMR are about lower secondary education, which has been defined as the period of preparation for the majority of learners – those who are not promoted to senior secondary education – before entering the world of work. According to the GMR, the lower secondary gross enrolment ratio increased from 71 to 85 per cent between 1999 and 2012 (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, pp. 112–113). The situation is diverse across countries, and the intercountry gap in enrolment rate is wider than that for primary education. The adult literacy rate (Goal 4) did not see as much improvement as the rates of basic (ECCE, primary and lower secondary) education. The illiteracy rate has dropped only slightly, from 18 per cent in 2000 to 14 per cent in 2015 (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, pp. 137–138). The target of halving illiteracy by 2015 was not achieved. Compared with the clear international commitment to promote basic education, the push for adult literacy education was ambiguous, a major cause of this lack of progress (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, p. 145). Gender parity in literacy has shown some progress but not enough to achieve complete parity by 2015. Gender parity and equality (Goal 5) have seen progress in many countries. The countries that had fewer than 9 girls in school for every 10 boys in 1999 became less than half in 2014 (from 33 to 16 per cent). The countries that achieved gender parity reached 69 and 48 per cent, respectively, for the primary and secondary levels (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, pp. 155–157). Improvement in parity was larger in countries that used to have a more severe equality problem. Still, girls from low-income households are less likely to be enroled in school than richer girls (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, p. 158). Goal 6, on the quality of education, is in fact the most debated goal in the post-EFA context and has been extended to several SDG targets such as those related to teachers, learning outcomes, and various types of cognitive and noncognitive skills and knowledge. From the middle of the first decade of this century, people in the education community started to recognize that access to basic education has been improving greatly in most countries, but this progress has not been accompanied by enhanced quality of learning. Staying in school doesn’t guarantee that learners will acquire expected knowledge and skills. Disappointment in progress on this goal is also linked with the frustration of the education community that only Goals 2 and 5 of EFA, which are merged into the MDGs, get funding and policy priorities. Universal basic education, Goal 2, aims to universalize access to education but doesn’t address the quality of education in school.

Related to Goal 6, the number of pupils a teacher teaches at a time (pupil:teacher ratio) in primary schools decreased in 83 per cent of the 146 countries with data which is considered as the sign of quality improvement with smaller number of students to be handled by a teacher at a time. At the lower secondary level, 87 out of 105 countries with data achieved a pupil:teacher ratio below 30:1 (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, p. 187). The report draws data from various international learning assessments, such as PISA, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ), to compare learning outcomes by time frame and by country. It also discusses factors important to improving learning, such as teachers, school-community relations, curriculum and teaching-learning materials. However, the analysis cannot but be sketchy, because indicators to assess the learning outcomes were not inscribed in the EFA monitoring mechanism. Signatory governments of the Dakar Declaration were bound to collect data designated for monitoring the progress on EFA goals, but at that time the issue of educational quality was still on the back burner and the indicators to assess it were not elaborated much. Pupil:teacher ratio, pupil:textbook ratio and number of trained teachers are meaningful indicators on the quality of the schooling process, but they do not measure how well teachers teach and students learn. To sum up the lessons from the EFA period and link those with the post-EFA agenda, various dimensions of educational practices that seem to be related to the processes and outcomes of learning have been brought to the forefront. At the same time, because of the expanded access to primary and lower secondary education, there is increasing demand for education at the senior secondary and tertiary levels. Yet there are children who are still left out of basic schools due to various factors of marginalization. Goal 4 on adult literacy was left almost unattended throughout the EFA period. Towards the post-EFA era, there arose a powerful argument that education is a lifelong practice that happens not only in school but also outside of it (e.g. UNESCO, 2015a; UNESCO Executive Board, 2014). The six goals of EFA were already comprehensive, stretching from ECCE to adult literacy. However, as already discussed, many people express regret that the implementation processes of EFA and the MDGs became parallel and that educational considerations outside of the access targets highlighted in the MDGs were not paid due attention. It is partly in reaction to this past experience that the education community has come up with SDG targets that are more detailed and linked with teaching and learning processes and their outcomes. At the same time, it is inherent to the nature of education that it is related to all aspects of human life, insofar as a human being is a creature who learns. A large part of the learning experience is conditioned by the context and unique to each learner. Again, it is an ambivalence embedded in this whole business of setting the global education agenda that while people look for global comparability and a centralized structure, they also cherish the holistic nature of education and its potential to lay the foundation for development of both individuals and societies. SDG Targets and Means of Implementation Table 4 compares education targets proposed in the Muscat Agreement and the OWG proposal

with the ones adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit. On the surface, they don’t look much different. However, as must be apparent by now, the choice of each word and phrase has involved politics among actors with different normative orientations and behavioural principles. It is not the purpose of this chapter to follow such politics too far, but I will point out a few issues that have changed across the documents. Table 4. Comparison of Goals and Targets Listed in Three Documents. Muscat Agreement (May 2014)

SDG 4 in OWG Proposal (August 2014)

SDG 4 Adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit (September 2015)

Goal

Goal

Goal

Ensure equitable and inclusive quality education and lifelong learning for all by 2030 as the overarching goal of the post-2015 education agenda.

Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.

Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.

Target 1: By 2030, at least x% of girls and boys are ready for primary school through participation in Target 1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys quality early childhood care and education, complete free, equitable and quality primary and including at least one year of free and compulsory secondary education leading to relevant and pre-primary education, with particular attention effective learning outcomes. to gender equality and the most marginalized.

Target 1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes.

Target 2: By 2030, all girls and boys complete free Target 2: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have Target 2: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have and compulsory quality basic education of at least access to quality early childhood development, access to quality early childhood development, 9 years and achieve relevant learning outcomes, care and pre-primary education so that they are care and pre-primary education so that they are with particular attention to gender equality and ready for primary education. ready for primary education. the most marginalized. Target 3: By 2030, all youth and at least x% of Target 3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women Target 3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women adults reach a proficiency level in literacy and and men to affordable and quality technical, and men to affordable and quality technical, numeracy sufficient to fully participate in society, vocational and tertiary education, including vocational and tertiary education, including with particular attention to girls and women and university. university. the most marginalized. Target 4: By 2030, at least x% of youth and y per cent of adults have the knowledge and skills for decent work and life through technical and vocational, upper secondary and tertiary education and training, with particular attention to gender equality and the most marginalized.

Target 4: By 2030, increase by x% the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship.

Target 4: By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship.

Target 5: By 2030, all learners acquire knowledge, skills, values and attitudes to establish sustainable and peaceful societies, including through global citizenship education and education for sustainable development.

Target 5: By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.

Target 5: By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.

Target 6: By 2030, all governments ensure that all learners are taught by qualified, professionally trained, motivated and well-supported teachers.

Target 6: By 2030, ensure that all youth and at least Target 6: By 2030, ensure that all youth and a x% of adults, both men and women, achieve substantial proportion of adults, both men and literacy and numeracy. women, achieve literacy and numeracy.

Target 7: By 2030, all countries allocate at least 4–6 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) or at least 15–20 per cent of their public expenditure to education, prioritizing groups most in need; and strengthen financial cooperation for education, prioritizing countries most in need.

Target 7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire Target 7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and equality, promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence, global citizenship and appreciation nonviolence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development. to sustainable development. Means of implementation

Means of implementation

4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all.

4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, noniolent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all.

4.b By 2020, expand by x% globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing states and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and

4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing states and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and

communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries.

communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries.

4.c By 2030, increase by x% the supply of qualified 4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of teachers, including through international qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing states. small island developing states.

Sources: UNESCO (2014a); United Nations (2015); United Nations General Assembly (2014a).

SDG 4, which was adopted in New York in September 2015, is summarized as follows: Target 1: Universal access to free, equitable, quality, relevant, and effective primary and secondary education Target 2: Universal access to quality ECCE Target 3: Equitable and universal access to TVET and tertiary education Target 4: Increased number of youth and adults with technical and vocational skills Target 5: Disparity by gender and vulnerability eliminated Target 6: Universal achievement of literacy and numeracy Target 7: Knowledge and skills for sustainable development Means of implementation 1. Prepare facilities for inclusive and effective learning 2. Establish scholarships 3. Increase the supply of qualified teachers While Targets 1 and 2 are the direct extension of Goal 1 and 2 of EFA, their scope was enlarged to make primary education not only universally accessible but also equitable, quality, relevant, and effective. These added adjectives, in fact, represent a whole range of ideas about school leadership, administration, curriculum, psychology, and social context. As a result of extensive consultation with stakeholders and in spite of an effort to come up with a concise list of targets, people involved in the high-level decision-making for the Post-EFA agenda opened the way to give multiple meanings to a single word. In the political process, it was unavoidable to contain diversity within boxes of convenient words, but those boxes will have to be reopened when it comes time to translate them into indicators for monitoring and assessment, an activity postponed for later discussion. The target for ECCE is also raised to make it universal. When the education community adopted the Muscat Agreement, the numeric target for ECCE was left as ‘x%’, but the target was raised after Muscat through informal lobbying, particularly from civil society. Targets 3 and 4 are about skills and training for youth and adults beyond lower secondary education. Tertiary education, not listed in EFA goals, is brought into the scope, while the phrase ‘adult literacy’ has disappeared, with the concept merged into ‘literacy and numeracy for all youths and adults’ in Target 6. Again, Target 3 in the SDG4 adopted at the U.N. Summit

aims higher than the proposal of Muscat to make TVET and tertiary education available to ‘all men and women’. Target 5, on equity, extends Goal 5 of EFA on gender equality by including other vulnerable groups within its scope. In the Muscat Agreement, gender equality was not a standalone target but was treated as cutting across all targets. Equity was one of the central messages of GCE, which is equipped with sophisticated advocacy techniques and staff. The upgrading of equity to a stand-alone target owes a debt to GCE’s and other civil society actors’ leverage. One of the characteristics of the education targets of the SDGs compared with those of EFA is that the SDGs pay a great deal of attention to the contents of skills acquired as a result of education. Target 6 is on numeracy and literacy, which are, according to the LMTF classification, among seven domains of learning (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2013a, 2013b, p. 11). Target 7 is also about skills and knowledge to be acquired through education, but these are more sociocultural and behavioural, such as education for sustainable development, human rights, gender equality, peace and global citizenship. Target 4 is also along this line, highlighting vocational skills as educational outcomes, instead of focusing on access to or provision of education. Therefore, three out of seven SDG targets on education are about skills to be acquired. This is a fundamental paradigm shift and a challenge for the education community as to how to globally monitor progress in the acquisition of skills, which are neither visible nor countable like textbooks or school buildings. The adopted SDGs list three means of implementation, besides targets, which were not proposed in the Muscat Agreement. Two targets listed in the Muscat Agreement were not included in the final SDGs – the one on teachers (Target 6) and the one on governmental budget allocation for education (Target 7). Target 6 was promoted strongly by the CSOs, backed by teaching professionals. A senior policy officer of a constituency-based CSO said that the organization ‘really pushed’ for the target on teachers to be included in order to ensure relevant quality of education by means of qualified and well-supported teachers. The same officer expressed the CSO’s happiness that the target was included in the Muscat Agreement (Interviewee 33). Civil society has also been seen as a necessary watchdog over the financial target to ensure governmental commitment, both in the donor countries that provide educational aid and in the developing countries where the interventions are to be made for achieving the goals (Interviewee 2). In general, CSOs were pretty happy with the targets and their phrasing in the Muscat Agreement of the education community, and worked hard to get them into the SDGs as much as possible. However, as discussed earlier, the SDG process in New York was led by noneducationists, and ministries in charge of foreign affairs of the member states have strong influence there. After all, the teacher target proposed in Muscat has survived, not among the targets but in the means of implementation, as part of the physical, financial, and human resources important for achieving the targets. The two other means of implementation listed in SDG 4 are educational facilities and scholarships. These ideas did not occur through the consultation within the education

community at all but were added by the SDG OWG, pushed for strongly by the G20 (Group of 20) member states (Interviewee 28). As will be discussed extensively in the next chapter, emerging donors like China and Brazil that constitute the G20 are oriented towards supporting the recipient government more by capacity building, by means of infrastructure building and training for government officials, than by touching on the technical substance of governmental services. In the case of education, instead of working on curriculum, teachers, skills, and so on, they tend to build school facilities and provide scholarships for government officials to study in their countries. In addition, since they are new actors as donors, they don’t have many specialists and strategies for sector-specific aid programmes. Therefore, representatives of G20 countries are either not seen or, even if present, not very vocal in the UNESCO-led post2015 discourse. Still, they used opportunities to influence the targets, through the New York process, to authorize these areas of their strength as means of implementation for the global agenda. Meanwhile, Target 7 of Muscat Agreement, which tried to bind national governments to put aside a certain proportion of their national budget for education, did not survive the SDG process, as none of the member states, either from the Global North or South, were supportive of the idea of tying themselves to such a financial target.

The Pandora’s Box Named ‘Quality of Education’: Key Issues Fig. 4 depicts the major educational ideas raised and discussed in the couple of years leading up to September 2015. The mandates or the collective vision of the actors determines the kinds of ideas each actor promotes. Institutional characteristics also determine the mode of communication they use to advocate for their ideas to be put down in the SDG targets. For example, civil society actors are very strategic with professional advocacy staff and utilize both formal and informal channels, whereas member states exercise power directly in various global forums because they are formally given chances to express their perspectives. CSOs try to influence member state representatives by lobbying outside of the conference rooms, but when the member states have their own agenda to promote, that may override any consensus among the actors of the education community, because the member states are the ones who will have voices in the last stages of the formal process. While technical specialists tend to be more realistic and consider what is available and possible, CSOs and UNESCO are more likely to talk of broad philosophical values such as the role of education in sustainable development or education as a human right. CSOs, particularly mission-driven ones, are united by common values, while the realities faced by their member organizations and their specific fields of operation are diverse. That makes them promote broad norms to overarch the differences. UNESCO’s perspective tends to be normative, because part of its mission is to lead global normative discussion on education.

Fig. 4. Educational Ideas Brought into the Discourse by Actors through the Post-2015 Processes. Source: Compiled by the author.

Achieving Meaningful and Visible Educational Changes: Learning Outcomes, Skills and Assessment Learning Outcomes and Indicators to Measure Them. Among some issues that were widely discussed, learning outcomes must have been at the core of the discourse. These are also closely linked with other issues, such as teachers, assessment and the various types of skills and knowledge to be acquired by learners. The exclusive focus on access, which people in the education community often attribute to the fact that only the target on access was included in the MDGs, caused an imbalanced development of the education system in many countries. There were millions of overcrowded classrooms without enough basic inputs, such as qualified teachers, textbooks and furniture. Therefore, the quality issue was highlighted as urgent in most of the education-sector policies of governments whose educational indicators were lower. Goal 6 of EFA, on quality of education, was designed to be monitored by indicators such as a reduced number of pupils per teacher, provision of textbooks for core subjects per pupil, and improved conditions of the learning environment. While these data are important to understand the situation in which pupils learn, they are all indicators about inputs but not the outcomes of schooling. Given this situation, an increasing number of countries let their students take part in international assessments of learning outcomes (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2015, pp. 190–195). There are also civil society initiatives to assess literacy and numeracy skills of youth and children, such as the Annual Status of Education Report Centre (ASER Centre) in India or Uwezo in East Africa, which were both established after WEF-Dakar, in 2008 and

2009, respectively (Annual Status of Education Report Centre, 2015; Uwezo, 2011). After all, school is an institution that is meant to transform learners to better states in one way or another. The direction or the type of intended change would be different for different education systems. But examining the conditions of and inputs into educational processes would not be satisfactory to judge the effectiveness or quality of education. During the post-Dakar period, through the regular global and regional meetings and monitoring of EFA progress, a broad consensus was gradually shaped in the education community that learning outcomes are at the core of the quality of education. Within this consensus, though, there are diverse approaches to the issue of learning and its outcomes. Some stakeholders conceptualize learning outcomes at a broad, normative level that overarches the learning of cognitive, noncognitive, numeracy, literacy, vocational and technical, scientific, physical, cultural and social skills. Others, particularly specialists in quantitative measurement, assert that outcomes included in the global agenda must be limited to those that can be measured by standardized indicators collected through national monitoring mechanisms. What one cannot monitor with objective indicators and compare globally, they argue, is a mere political statement, not a practical benchmark. For example, Target 7 of SDG 4 lists various types of knowledge and skills as the desired outcomes from education, such as democracy, global citizenship, peace and sustainable development. To know if learners have acquired these skills and knowledge would require the invention of methods for assessing changes in the attitudes and values of learners, which would be highly subjective and context specific. For some technical specialists on measurement, Target 7 was the ‘Oh-My-God Target’ or the ‘Garbage-Bin Target’ because it was hard for them to imagine how to measure the acquisition of the skills listed there (Interviewee 28). In sum, learning outcomes and indicators are two sides of the same coin. The debate about them is also a matter of balance between, on the one hand, the drive for developing globally shared targets and, on the other hand, the diverse realities on the ground and the nature of education, whose outcomes are not always seen immediately or directly. Some stakeholders consider that hard-to-measure target as, in fact, central to the quality of education, feeling that one should resist the trend of MDGs and SDGs towards relying on immediately measurable indicators (Interviewees 10, 17, 21 and 29). Such opinions naturally come from organizations, typically CSOs and UNESCO, that involve a sizable number of education professionals and academics, who tend to trust the potential of education to develop the minds of people. Here is a difference of perspective, depending on whether one considers education to be a principle or a service. If it is seen as a service, it also involves a consideration of assessment as a tool for monitoring the implementation. It also involves administrative consideration of the division of tasks among stakeholders. But from the standpoint of education as a fundamental value, nobody can deny its role in human societies, not to mention a sustainable world. It is so fundamental that it seems too narrow to treat it as only one of many SDGs. It is a right for everyone, regardless of age, sex, place of living, culture or any other attribute. At the same time, the education community well recognizes that unless they are

accompanied by clear indicators, targets will have difficulty surviving the competition against the other 16 SDGs. Resources are limited, and the capacity of traditional donor countries to finance development activities is declining, while the global agenda is more multidimensional and, probably, more costly. Not only that, but without clear indicators, it will become difficult for governments to grasp, implement, and monitor the targets. Indicators are not only to make global assessment possible but also guide the national governments in translating broad, abstract targets into operation. Based on this perceived need for translating a global target into national practices, the EFA Steering Committee proposed providing ‘benchmarks’ in the post2015 Framework for Action for national governments to refer to. In sum, the discourse on learning outcomes and indicators is a matter of one’s perspective not only on the nature of education but also on that of administration, finance and politics (EFA Steering Committee, 2014, pp. 7–8). In relation to indicators, as mentioned earlier, LMTF was a major force, involving multilateral organizations, research institutes, and both mission-driven and constituency-based CSOs. The conceptual framework of the domains of learning proposed by LMTF is comprehensive and involves domains both relatively straightforward and hard to measure. The working groups on reading and numeracy tend to move faster, while the ones looking at behavioural changes do not move very fast. Outside of LMTF, there are initiatives to propose approaches to assess targets that are said to be difficult to measure. For example, the Open Society Foundations commissioned a series of research studies to develop indicators for the quality, equity and sustainability of education (Wilkinson et al., 2015). There are also various studies about assessment of the outcomes related to global citizenship education and education for sustainable development (UNESCO, 2012d; UNESCO, 2013). Reading is one of the learning domains whose indicators have been considered by various stakeholders. There was a meeting in March 2014 convened by the World Bank and UNESCO Institute for Statistics, with participation by representatives from international assessment bodies such as PASEC (Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la Conférence des Ministres de l’Education des Pays Ayant le Français en Partage), SACMEQ, ACER (the Australian Council for Educational Research) and Uwezo; from universities and research institutes; from multilateral and bilateral donors such as the UK Department for International Development (DfID), UNICEF and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and from international NGOs and consulting firms. The meeting raised a lot of ideas about desirable characteristics for indicators, but there was a general agreement that the urgent need is to develop global reading indicators that are ‘technically strong, easily communicable and contextually relevant and flexible’ (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2014, p. 3). Several agencies emphasize improvement of reading competency in the early grades because they consider reading the foundation for success in later grades. UNICEF provides technical and financial support to countries that develop their own early learning and development standards for children younger than six. Also, improvement of early-grade reading has been a focus of USAID since 2011 (US Agency for International Development [USAID], 2015). An initiative that grew out of LMTF, called the Learning Metrics Partnership,

aims to support national governments to develop national learning metrics and to build the capacity of assessment personnel with a focus on learning outcomes (Learning Metrics Partnership, 2014). Building upon the work from the reading group, a virtual working group on numeracy indicators was also launched in April 2014. Convened by the German development cooperation agencies GIZ and BMZ, it involved technical experts from, again, various assessment agencies, universities, research institutes, international NGOs, the UNESCO Institute of Statistics and UNICEF. Similar to the groups involved in the meetings on reading, this group also intends to identify potential indicators related to numeracy, with a focus on the early grades (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2014, p. 4).

Various Types of Skills and Knowledge. Reading (literacy) and numeracy have attracted the greatest attention among the various types of skills and knowledge to be acquired through education. This is so because these two are listed separately from other domains of learning as Target 6 of SDG 4. Two other targets related to skills and knowledge are Targets 4 and 7. Target 4 focuses on the vocational and technical skills needed to acquire a decent job. In the last several years, the issue of work-related skills development has been regularly discussed in the education community as the area that links education with labour and industry, and as a potential solution to the unemployment or sustained poverty of most people who do not complete basic schooling (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, 2012b). Therefore the issue has been hot and has attracted promoters. At the same time, it is a domain that falls outside the specialization of most of the educationists who drive the mainstream post-EFA discourse. The world of work, to which the TVET institutes are expected to be responsive, is not what most educationists are accustomed to studying. Therefore, it is fine to talk about the value and the structure of skills development, but when it comes to the quality and assessment of the acquired skills, it is often beyond the scope of educationists. There are bilateral and multilateral donors who promote TVET and skills development actively, such as the World Bank, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Korea and Japan. In addition, a group called the Network for International Policies and Cooperation in Education and Training (NORRAG) often publishes collections of essays by practitioners and academics on this topic (King, 2011; King, 2013). However, they did not make as much of a lobbying effort as the supporters of other domains of learning during post-EFA discussions, nor did it make a concerted effort to come up with global indicators. Industrial skills are more market driven than other skills, making them even more difficult to standardize than other domains of learning, a situation that may have discouraged TVET supporters from engaging in the discussion at the global level. Target 7 lists many hard-to-measure domains of learning, which basically involve attitudinal changes of learners based on certain values, such as democracy, sustainable development or global citizenship. In fact, education for each of the values listed in Target 7 has its own history and accumulated research that has attempted to provide a framework and practical guidelines for implementers. For example, the Japanese government sponsored UNESCO’s programme on the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, which

ended in 2014 with the World Education for Sustainable Development Conference in Nagoya, Japan. There are numerous case studies of good practices in education for sustainable development, published by UNESCO, the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, the Asia-Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO, and many other bodies (e.g. Tilbury & Janousek, 2006; UNESCO, 2007; UNESCO, 2012c). Similarly, the Korean government sponsors global citizenship education, another field with numerous publications (e.g. UNESCO, 2013). Many of these studies are about indicators, evidence that efforts are being made to develop standards for assessment. It is certainly true that indicators for Target 7 will be more difficult to develop than those for other targets. At the same time, it should be pointed out that there has not been any joint effort to synthesize the contents or to develop global indicators for this target. Rather, each of the listed values represents the pet project of specific stakeholders who are hard to negotiate with. As mentioned earlier (Fig. 4), member states can leverage directly through formal channels not only in Paris but also in New York; at the same time, their representatives are not always specialists in education. Moreover, the governments that have their own pet projects tend to instruct their representatives to ensure that their projects survive in the outcome documents of the conferences. This in part explains why education for sustainable development and global citizenship education appear in Target 7. The concern about the deteriorating quality of education, which has been confirmed repeatedly through the EFA reviews, brought this broad issue to the forefront of the post-EFA discourse. Learning outcomes are one of the most debated topics in this context. The consideration about outcomes is based on the recognition of the teaching and learning processes which take place with the aim of achieving improved skills and knowledge of learners. The importance of the teaching and learning process will not diminish. Therefore, inputs to the process, such as ‘qualified, professionally trained, motivated and well-supported teachers’, which Target 6 proposed in the Muscat Agreement, or textbooks and learner-friendly facilities continue to be important. At the same time, the finally adopted SDG 4 targets gave a central place to learners’ acquisition of skills and knowledge, and assigned the inputs for educational processes, including teachers, the position of means of implementation. In other words, this time in the post-EFA paradigm, the fundamental message shared across targets is to improve skills and knowledge of learners, with decreased weight on provision of or access to educational services. Improvement towards what direction? That question has opened up room for diverse discussion. Assessment is not simply a technical matter of measurement but involves a judgement about the essence of the knowledge to be acquired in the respective domain of learning. Therefore, the challenge of assessment is not restricted to what one would call the ‘hard-to-measure’ skills listed in Target 7. Setting of indicators for any learning domains listed in SDG 4 can be the topic of heated debate. Such considerations about educational contents have proceeded simultaneously with the political process of lobbying, leveraging, and representation of interests from specific constituencies and member states. The interplay among educational ideas, technical considerations and politics in the complex representation game has obscured the direction to which this whole post-EFA discourse leads.

To Operationalize SDG 4 Education Targets: Country Process and Financing However finely elaborated the consultation mechanism is, the major part of the negotiation towards developing a global agenda happens at the global level. Therefore, the discussion there is abstract, which would be useful for setting a broad framework but not for determining practices on the ground. In fact, at the point of adopting SDG 4, many issues about implementation are left for future discussion, such as global indicators, benchmarks and national implementation plans. Therefore, from the quantitative analysis of texts I conducted, surprisingly but at the same time understandably, the phrase country process is one of the 10 most frequently occurring words/phrases across 1,720 documents analysed, together with learning outcomes, indicators, education, SDGs, and teachers. Another frequently occurring word is finance, a result of concerns about funding for programmes for achieving the goals within the expanded scope of the global agenda. Although the next section contains a detailed discussion of the quantitative text analysis results, here I am going to highlight two popular issues of discussion regarding operationalization of targets: country process and finance. There are two perspectives on the country process: the top-down and the bottom-up perspectives. As depicted in Fig. 2, the global consultation mechanism is structured in a hierarchical manner, and both CSOs and the national government have their own channels of representation to regional and global forums. At the same time, national CSOs and their coalitions take on the role of ensuring that their global missions are reflected in governmental policies on educational development. Representing the interests of member CSOs in the country is only one dimension of the role they play. In other words, if we see representation as the bottom-up function of CSOs, then advocacy and participation in the national policymaking process has a top-down nature, in the sense that it is part of the simultaneous effort of the global CSO community to influence the government based on the common mission. Nevertheless, the act of leveraging the policy process is not achieved well by just appealing one’s issues of concern in the public space, but also requires CSOs to fill the gap of communication among stakeholders. For example, many interviewees pointed out the lack of coordination or the difference of orientation between the ministry of education and that of foreign affairs (Interviewees 12, 15 and 23). To ensure that the agreement reached in the global education community would be reflected in the SDG process in New York, where the voices of member states have strong power, someone within the respective countries has to take on the role of bridging the ministries. First, CSOs try to advocate their issues of concern to the ministry of education so that the country’s input into the post-EFA process will incorporate the CSOs’ appeal. Meanwhile, they monitor the practices of the government in its implementation of EFA goals and exert pressure when the effort seems not enough to achieve the goals. Further, they try to mobilize support from the general public, politicians, and other relevant ministries. The general commitment to achieve broad-based participation in the global governance structure has also pushed CSOs to collect the voices of people on the ground and scale them up into a unified national voice to feed to the global discourse, in both the Global South and the Global North. All in all, the capacities that regional and global CSO communities expect of the

national CSOs on advocacy are high and multifaceted, although national CSOs tend not to perform them fully. That is why regional and global CSO federations try to provide technical and financial support to their national counterparts to develop their capacities (Interviewees 7 and 16). While national CSOs’ appeal is based on the global mission, their strategies and priorities depend on the national context. For example, in a Nordic country, whose government is known for its welfarism, the mission-driven CSOs and the government share the principle of equity and a rights-based approach to development cooperation. Therefore, the CSOs’ relationship with the government is that of a like-minded partnership, and the representative of this government is a potential channel for global civil society to reflect its views in the formal consultation, particularly in New York (Interviewee 23). An East Asian country is a major donor to UNESCO, and its voice through the formal EFA consultation process is considered to carry weight. At the same time, the discrepancy between this country’s ministries of education and of foreign affairs is significant, and the ministries of foreign affairs and of finance do not prioritize aid for the education sector. The government also has a tradition of allocating more aid to tertiary education and TVET. Therefore, CSOs constantly advocate for an increased budget for aid to basic education (Interviewees 2 and 18). When there are domestic issues of hot debate, such as national education reform or migration policies, it would be difficult to attract public and governmental support for educational issues overseas. In such cases, civil society actors attempt to link their argument with domestic ones so as to make it relevant in the national context (Interviewees 6, 7, 9 and 12). The CSOs in developing countries face completely different national contexts because the interventions for achieving EFA happen in their own countries, and their government implements them with support from donors. In this case, CSOs bear the role of assisting the government through research or by operating projects, while at the same time they critically monitor and advocate for accelerated commitments (Interviewees 15 and 17). The national advocacy strategy is also influenced by other stakeholders, such as the private sector, and by civil society actors in other sectors, such as health, poverty reduction and the like. In cases where education CSOs are working hand in hand with other CSOs, sometimes it may not be easy to isolate educational issues in the midst of other urgent issues in the greater development CSO community. In terms of monitoring and assessment of progress in relation to the global agenda, it is widely recognized that actual changes happen only at the country level. In this sense also, then, the country process is important. As this chapter is being written, only the global targets have been adopted by the UN member states and multilateral organizations. Indicators are to be discussed later. Therefore, even though the country process is recognized as important in the context of assessment, nothing has really happened at the country level. As mentioned earlier, the EFA Steering Committee plans to provide benchmarks that can serve as a reference for national governments to develop their own post-2015 national implementation plans; these benchmarks are slated to appear in the Framework for Action that is to be adopted at a special meeting at UNESCO in October/November 2015. It has been an issue of debate how ambitious

the global targets should be, since ambition may sacrifice practicality. As it turns out, the adopted SDG 4 is ambitious and broad, a natural result of the fact that most of the stakeholders involved in the global consultation wanted their issues of concern to be included, with an ambitious level of expected achievement serving as the polar star to guide travellers. Accordingly, there arose the need for support for national governments to translate the global agenda into practice. Various schemes are under preparation to support national governments in implementation. LMTF is planning an initiative to support national governments in developing national learning metrics (Learning Metrics Partnership, 2014). GPE is also preparing an international platform to provide technical and financial assistance for national governments to build the capacity for national learning assessment (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2014). Since it is going to be the national governments who develop national assessment frameworks and indicators, it is not an exaggeration to say that the success of key SDG 4 targets related to learning depends on the capacity of the governments not only to plan but also to collect data, monitor the progress and improve the learning outcomes. The issue of financing is also discussed as a part of the national process. Financing for development is no longer an exclusive responsibility of multilateral and bilateral donors. While new donors that used to be recipients of aid have emerged on the scene of international educational development, the amount of aid disbursed from the traditional donors has decreased year by year. Meanwhile, though the economic growth rate is higher in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa than in Europe (World Bank, 2014), donors are expected to continue supporting educational development. GPE continues to serve as the multilateral financing mechanism specifically to support national governments in developing educationsector programmes and implementing activities that enhance the pace towards achieving global education targets. Still, these would not be sufficient. Therefore there has been active discussion about domestic financing and innovative financing. Governments are expected to reform their tax systems to squeeze out more resources for development. At the same time, it is also suggested that the means to acquire financial contributions from industries, private foundations and individual sponsors should be improvised within the country. In this context of financing, private schools are also considered as an option to reduce the financial burden on the government to achieve the global targets (Collective Consultation of NGOs on Education for All, 2014, p. 1; EFA Steering Committee, 2015, pp. 1–5; Joint E-9 Statement on Education Beyond 2015, 2014, p. 5; UNESCO Executive Board, 2014, p. 5). In fact, the issue of financing for education is a part of the broader discussion about development financing across the sectors involved in the discourse on the post-2015 agenda. The Third International Conference on Financing for Education was held in mid-July 2015, just two months after WEFIncheon, to discuss financing mechanisms and strategies. This is one of the issues destined to be a core concern for the whole development community in the post-2015 period. Still, at the point of writing this chapter, substantial arrangements for innovative resource mobilization are yet to be observed.

TRENDS FOUND IN THE LARGE-SAMPLE QUANTITATIVE TEXT ANALYSIS As explained in the ‘Methodology’ section, in addition to the interviews, observation and qualitative text analysis, I have also conducted a quantitative analysis of the large number of texts made public regarding post-2015 educational development. Because of improved communication technology and broadened participation in the post-EFA consultation process, there has been an explosion of texts, from conference reports to blog posts, on this topic. The volume is so overwhelming that many observers gave up on keeping up. At the same time, an analysis based only on documents publicized through the formal channels of the post-EFA and SDG consultations would face the criticism of one-sidedness, considering the much larger proportion of materials published outside of these channels. Therefore, this section will present the results of a quantitative analysis of 1,720 texts published between December 2011 and May 2015. The texts were all downloaded from the websites listed in Table 3. The total number of words in the texts was 3,147,990, out of which those that derived from the same stem were treated as the same word. As a result, the total number of unique words left for analysis was 74,323. Although the number of words was large, more than 60 per cent were used only once or twice (66.04 per cent). A large proportion of the words were articles, particles, and symbols. Partly to avoid burdening the computer and partly to focus on the aspects on which the attention of text authors converges, I have limited most of my analysis to words that appear more than 1,000 times across texts. As a result, the number of words that were directly included in the analysis was 0.36 per cent of the total analysable words but provided a more meaningful picture than when I ran the software with a larger number of words, which often appeared without clear mutual relationships. I have also treated some words that are frequently used in compound as one word. A hundred compound words were incorporated in the processing, including expressions such as sustainable development, human rights and post-2015 development agenda. Based on the initial explorative analysis such as cross-tabulation and clustering, I identified 15 groups of words: (1) teachers and students, (2) learning outcomes, (3) quality of education, (4) global agenda, (5) national development, (6) girls’ education, (7) human rights, (8) country process, (9) resource needs, (10) health and education, (11) global consultation, (12) work skills, (13) data/indicators, (14) socioeconomic development and (15) equality.3 Fig. 5 is the result of cluster analysis among these 15 groups of words. Cluster analysis is a method of finding the pattern of relationships among groups. Groups with similar patterns of usage are connected by lines and constitute a smaller number of clusters. The 15 groups of words constituted 6 clusters based on similarities and co-occurrence. Based on the characteristics of sentences and words included in each cluster, I have named them as follows: .

– Cluster I: Fundamental principles Composed of groups (7) and (14), which are about human rights and socioeconomic

development, respectively. Involves sentences that highlight why education is necessary. – Cluster II: National issues Composed of groups (5), (8) and (15), which are about national development, country process, and equality, respectively. Involves sentences that focus on country-level consultation, data collection, monitoring, and implementation. – Cluster III: Global issues Composed of groups (4), (11) and (13), which are about global agenda, global consultation, and data/indicators, respectively. The largest cluster in terms of sentences involved, followed by Cluster I. – Cluster IV: Learning conditions Composed of groups (1), (6), and (10), which are about teachers and students, girls’ education, and health issues, respectively. The sentences linked with this cluster touch on the classroom conditions, socioeconomic background, and health conditions of learners. – Cluster V: Skills Composed of groups (9) and (12), which are about resource needs and work skills, respectively. The sentences in this cluster argue the urgent need for resource mobilization for educational development programmes, particularly in relation to work-related skills development. – Cluster VI: Quality of education Composed of groups (2) and (3), which are about learning outcomes and quality of education. This cluster is about learning outcomes, particularly their assessment, in relation to the urge to concentrate efforts on improvement of educational quality.

Fig. 5. Clusters of Frequently Used Words Identified from the Quantitative Analysis of 1,720 Documents. Source: Compiled by the author.

As readers will recognize, the clusters identified through the quantitative text analysis, which handled the vast amount of texts mechanically, demonstrate a similar picture of the global discourse to that painted by the qualitative analysis provided earlier in this chapter. While a large part of the texts were devoted to global procedure, framework and universal principles of education, there is also significant emphasis on national development and classroom conditions. Learning outcomes, skills, teachers, gender and equity are hot issues. At the same time, those issues regarding the operationalization of the post-EFA agenda, such as data and indicators, country process and resource mobilization, are also highlighted. The analysis shown in Fig. 5 includes all the documents I have collected starting in December 2011. However, in the early part of this period, the materials apparently addressing the post-EFA agenda were few and sporadic. As indicated in the ‘Methodology’ section, there were only 2 documents from 2011, while in 2014 there were 953 – that is, close to 1,000. In the half year from January to June 2015, there were 578 documents. In sum, the height of the discourse was between 2014 and 2015, while there was an increasing attention towards the end of 2013. Based on this observation, Fig. 6 examines the change over time in the share of the six clusters referred to in the texts. Each bar represents a half-year period from January 2013 to May 2015.

Fig. 6. Share of Six Clusters of Words by Period (January 2013–May 2015). Source: Compiled by the author.

References to ‘global issues’ take the biggest share and have grown over time. In the first half of 2013, this cluster constituted 33.8 per cent among the six clusters, but it steadily increased, up to 44.8 per cent in the first half of 2015. It occupies almost half of the post-EFA textual discourse. Another cluster that constitutes a large share is the one on ‘fundamental principles’. In the first half of 2013, its share was 41.4 per cent, even greater than the share of the ‘global issues’ cluster, but it has decreased gradually. It still occupies a large proportion (21.6 per cent), but almost equal to the share of the ‘learning conditions’ cluster (21.7 per cent), which started out as a small cluster in the first half of 2013 (8.1 per cent). This trend suggests that the focus of the discourse has shifted from setting the grand philosophical basis to examining more specific issues related to learning conditions, such as teachers and girls’ education. Probably because of the strategic campaign by some CSOs, girls’ education has constantly occupied a high position in the discourse, while teacher-related issues were also constantly raised. Interest in issues related to the planning and implementation of development programmes at the national level has been consistent at around 9–13 per cent. At the same time, probably because the major focus was on the global process, even though there were passing references

to and reminders of the importance of country or national processes, the discussion of issues at the national level did not expand much in the context of the post-2015 discourse. Reflecting the fact that the quality of education and skills development were among the key targets of SDG 4, these clusters have also been consistent topics of discourse. At the same time, their shares in total word usage were neither large nor on increasing trends. One of the possible causes for such significant but relatively little reference to these issues, whose significance was recognized from the qualitative analysis, would be the sampling. Because the materials were gathered from websites that deposit key reports and statements, based on the criterion that they are publicized with stated linkage to post-2015 planning, the sampling may have overlooked those texts that touch on more specific issues without reference to the post2015 agenda or EFA. At the same time, the collection of 1,720 texts within about three years is pretty comprehensive. Therefore, regardless of the possible bias, I would be able to say that, in general, the textual discourse on post-2015 education focuses more on procedure, framework, principles and the indicators for assessment at the global level, and less on specific educational and country-level issues.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have examined the process through which the discourse on a post-EFA agenda has taken shape, focusing on the period between 2013 and May 2015, the month when WEFIncheon was held. The terms ‘post-2015’ or ‘post-EFA’ served as the platform for groups of people who have different ideas about and interests in education to present their perspectives. The EFA structure is based on layers of consultations in which the representatives of civil societies, member states and convening agencies participated. These categories of representation are developed based on the long history of post-WWII multilateralism. The multilateralism specifically on EFA has been institutionalized since the World Conference on EFA in Jomtien in 1990. Moreover, the space of participation for civil society actors was enlarged after WEF-Dakar in 2000. This historically developed structure gives formality and credibility to the statements announced through it as the authoritative principles for the people involved in educational development programmes to follow or to refer to. At the same time, one of the significant differences of post-EFA discourse from earlier ones is that a great deal of the discourse has happened outside of the formal structure. This is partly because of the enhanced professionalization of civil society actors as advocates. While the national delegates represent the interests of their governments, which are not necessarily based on the consideration of the universal value of education, civil society actors are horizontally linked with their counterparts in other parts of the world through the broadly shared norms of achieving equitable access to quality education and lifelong learning. In this sense, the expanded space of civil society participation is a result not only of improved capacity and leverage on their part, but also of increased demands to fill the gap between state

representation, multilateral decision-making and the technical and professional inputs required for global agenda setting. To put it differently, the advancement of civil society actors suggests the limitations of the conventional structure of global governance based on state representation, and in extension, the post-WWII multilateralism at its foundation. This chapter has demonstrated that there are civil society actors with diverse functions and motives. Some of them are driven by shared missions, others by the common interests of their constituencies and still others by technical and professional considerations on specific issues. All in all, except for a couple of seats for representation at each conference venue, civil society actors work outside of the formal channels while exerting significant influence indirectly. As another challenge to the post-WWII multilateralism, nontraditional donors have emerged, changing the dynamics of intergovernmental processes. This mechanism is not discussed at length in this chapter because the analysis of the global discourse revealed the involvement of individuals who wear the caps of convening agencies, regional representatives, CSOs and technical specialists, but not so much those with national flags. This is particularly so in sector-specific discourse such as the one on education. In the SDG consultation process in New York, the nature of discourse will be fundamentally different, as I have suggested in this chapter. The issue of nontraditional donors will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, which focuses on the discourse at the regional level. The broadened basis of participation leads to a natural question, which in fact pushed me to start this research project. It seems everybody has a chance to be heard, even though online consultations or blog comments. How are all of these voices incorporated into one unanimous outcome document? Among interviewees, the responses are diverse: some of them said that the representation in a true sense is not possible, or that the longish consultation process is just a show for people to feel acknowledged; others said that they cannot transmit all the specific wishes and demands, but represent the common values shared across their constituencies. In fact, these seemingly different opinions are capturing the same issue but with different understandings about what ‘representation’ should be. Broad-based participation requires bold translations. Everybody in this ‘education community’ should share the fundamental principle of the importance of education. Based on this assumption, the experienced translators, either as group representatives in the formal meetings or as members of a declaration drafting team or as an advocate, extract the important essences of the voices of the people they represent. As I described, the top of the EFA governance structure is sharply pointed, with a small number of people whose names appear everywhere. Still, without these experienced translators, how could this vast process reach a conclusion? Representation in the sense of direct quoting may not be possible, but good translation should be. Regarding the educational issues that were highlighted through the post-EFA discourse, I should say that the ‘education community’ opened the Pandora’s box of educational quality. Partly in reaction to the earlier EFA process, in which the quantitative target of increased access to education was disproportionately emphasized, and partly because the increased access revealed the degradation of quality more clearly than ever, the emphasis on this dimension of education under the post-EFA discussion was an unavoidable course. At the same

time, issues of quality directly relate to conceptions of the role of education in society, desired outcomes, important content to learn and skills and knowledge that learners need to be equipped with. As I have reviewed in this chapter, in fact, the majority of SDG 4 targets touch on issues related to outcomes and skills that, in turn, are matters of quality. Which dimension of skills and knowledge should be highlighted, for which age group? Is education for employment, for better learning at a later age, or for social development? The scope is not restricted to the school-aged population but also touches on adults and diverse sites of learning. There are strenuous efforts particularly by the technical specialists in assessment to specify the mode of assessing learning outcomes. Since their work of breaking down the ambitious targets into measurable indicators is still at the early stage, there will be a great deal of discussion to follow. While the process to agree on the overall framework of the post-EFA agenda was largely a matter of politics among convening agencies, CSOs and member states, when it comes to converting the goals to actual contents to be implemented and assessed, the debate happens more between people who are driven by technical considerations and practicality, and those who trust in the fundamental value of education for sustainable development and for the development of the whole personality. The latter group argues that education should not be reduced to easily measurable domains. The post-EFA process towards the Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 could be said to be the triumph of the educationists in the sense that, unlike after WEF-Dakar, the targets proposed by the education community were almost fully reflected in the SDGs, the broader normative framework for global development. At the same time, ironically, this full incorporation into the SDG framework has postponed discussions on implementation and assessments for a later process. Similarly, issues like financing and the country process are raised in the global discourse repeatedly as the keys for successful implementation, but the details are not yet defined. The finely designed structure of EFA global governance has served to cross-feed ideas among actors repeatedly, which then led to the creation of the shared views of the so-called education community. It is not clear who constitutes the education community. However, this notion and the joint proposal from it have been constructed throughout the process of EFA review and post-2015 consultation. The repeated reference to the announced principles, in this case the post-EFA agenda, will continue to confirm ideas that were only vaguely shared at the beginning. Multilateral institutions like the Global Partnership for Education and initiatives for establishing the global framework of assessing educational outcomes would also serve to give substance to the discourse with practical guidelines and accumulated ‘good practices’. The analysis presented here is a snapshot of the ongoing discourse, and I hope to continue the analysis of the process after the agenda has been set. A methodological challenge I tried to tackle in the analysis for this chapter was how to handle the large-scale text data. In the age of advanced information technology, the pace of text-based discourse has increased greatly. The number of texts posted on the Web is enormous, particularly when the topic is hot like the post-2015 discussion. In this situation, there is an urgent need for pushing the technical horizon of text-based discourse analysis. After myriad error messages and computer shutdowns, what I could present here as the outcome of

the analysis is limited. Regardless, I wish I could propose an approach to discourse analysis that would match the changed form and pace of interactions among agencies involved.

NOTES 1. The E-9 are the nine populous countries that face challenges in achieving EFA goals: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan. In 1992, UNESCO launched an initiative for sharing experiences among these countries and monitoring progress (UNESCO, 2014b). 2. GCE united several groups and movements, including Education International, the global federation of teachers’ unions; the Elimu campaign, led by the international NGO ActionAid; Education Now!, led by OXFAM, another international NGO and the Global March Against Child Labour, an alliance based on mass mobilization in the Global South (Archer, 2014). 3. The words that constitute each groups are as follows: (1) child, school, teacher, student; (2) outcome and learn; (3) improve, access, and quality; (4) sustainable development, goal, target, and achieve; (5) country and develop; (6) girl, woman, and education; (7) human right, organization, international, state, and impact; (8) national, government, policy, development, and level; (9) resource, need, and ensure; (10) health, public, include, and education; (11) education, UNESCO, UN, development, process, political, new, global, framework, and report; (12) work, skill, need, group, support, provide, programme/program, and community; (13) data, datum, indicator, and number; (14) social and economic and (15) poverty, inequality, issue, challenge, address, and people.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express sincere appreciation to those anonymous interviewees who candidly shared their opinions and observations of the post-2015 consultation process. Although I cannot write their names here, some of them even gave additional comments on my research after the interview. Takashi Miyake and the executive members of Japan NGO Network for Education (JNNE) connected me with the first group of interviewees, who became the important gates to a wider circle of informants. I also owe a great deal of thanks for technical assistance in the process of conducting the data analysis from the team of Takeshi Furuhashi and Tomohiro Yoshikawa of the School of Engineering, Nagoya University. Special gratitude goes to Shingo Tsukioka, a master’s student of engineering, for providing tireless support to me, an amateur text miner. Koichi Higuchi of Ritsumeikan University, developer of the software KH Coder, also provided timely and detailed advice on overcoming various technical problems. The study was also made possible by the support of two PhD students who worked as my research assistants, Xuemei Li and Natsuki Kondo, in taking charge of the laborious work of downloading texts from the Web. I also would like to express my sincere appreciation to my former colleague Naohiro Takizawa, of Ritsumeikan University, for our initial brainstorming and suggestions.

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ASIAN REGIONALITY AND POST-2015 CONSULTATION: DONORS’ SELF-IMAGES AND THE DISCOURSE Shoko Yamada

ABSTRACT This chapter highlights the characteristics of Asia through the analysis of policyrelated documents by five donor countries, namely Japan, South Korea, China, India and Thailand. It will also examine the roles played by regional bodies such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and ASPBAE (the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education) as the horizontal channels influencing aid policies in respective countries. Together with the analysis of the national and organizational policies, the regional process of building consensus on the post-2015 agenda is examined, with a particular focus on the AsiaPacific Regional Education Conference (APREC) held in August 2014. The analysis reveals that the region has two faces: one is imaginary and the other is functional. There is a common trend across Asian donors to refer to their historical ties with regions and countries to which they provide assistance and their traditional notions of education and development. They highlight Asian features in contrast to conventional aid principles and approaches based on the Western value system, either apparently or in a muted manner. In this sense, the imagined community of Asia with common cultural roots is perceived by the policymakers across the board. At the same time, administratively, the importance of the region as a stage between the national and global levels is recognized increasingly in the multilateral global governance structure. With this broadened participatory structure, as discussed in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, the expected function of the region to transmit the norms and requests from the global level and to collect and summarize national voices has increased. Keywords: Regionality; Asia; aid policy; historical and cultural root; governance structure

INTRODUCTION Following the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’, which focused on the global trend, this chapter will shift to the regional level, namely Asia. As discussed earlier, recent efforts have emphasized the importance of the country-level process. Compared with the earlier period, when the agenda to be agreed on at the global level was more simple and straightforward, such as increasing school enrolment or certified teachers, the direction for the post-2015 agenda has been less clear and less focused. For example, learning outcomes, one of the key areas of discussion, can take on diverse meanings and practices depending on the sociocultural contexts and the administrative conditions of the respective education systems. Given this ambiguity of targets, it has been said that the global agenda will be a set of guiding principles or a general framework, while actual adaptation of the principles and framework will happen at the country level in response to diverse needs in local contexts. On the one hand, it is natural and desirable to foster the country process. On the other hand, it is impossible to feed issues and ideas from countries directly into the global discussions. In the decision-making structure, there should be certain filters to streamline and give order to country-level voices before linking them to the global forum. Because of these needs, the role of regions, both in the intergovernmental and nongovernmental channels, is increasing. Regardless of this increased importance, however, it is not well known how the representative voices of the region are shaped. One of the reasons for closely examining the Asia region in this chapter is the region’s potential to showcase the dynamics among actors in the post-2015 education discourse. The most obvious sign of changes in the landscape is the movement of national governments that used to be recipients of aid to the forefront of discourse. Some of them directly take part in the formal consultation channels for education led by UNESCO, as described in the chapter ‘PostEFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’, while others exert a significant influence without participating in such conventional channels of consensus building. A clear example of the former is South Korea, which hosted the World Education Forum in May 2015. Thailand, too, has played an active role in the formal structure of regional coordination, while also taking a leading position in the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and other sub-regional channels in Southeast Asia. China exemplifies the latter approach. China did not send delegates to the Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference, where the Bangkok Statement was adopted as a joint regional input from Asia to the post-2015 educational agenda. Regardless, it has exercised its influence through the intergovernmental consultation in New York on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), bypassing the longish education-sector consultation. China’s presence as a donor has increased dramatically in the last several years, and its self-acclaimed difference in its principles of and approaches to aid has caught the attention of many observers, both academics and practitioners. While the emergence of nonconventional donors is a significant element of the paradigm shift, Asia is composed of countries that occupy more diverse positions in the development

discourse than just being conventional or nonconventional donors. It also has aid-dependent, lower-income developing countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal; middle-income countries that depend less on grant aid for providing basic social services but more on loans for infrastructure building and countries that have started to provide aid while still receiving aid, such as India and Thailand (World Bank, 2015). The increasingly active roles played by civil society organizations (CSOs) add another dimension to this picture. Therefore, to analyse the characteristics of diverse actors and relationships among them in Asia is to capture the nature of the global discourse on post-2015 education in an epitome. In fact, given its diversity, it is unclear how unanimous an ‘Asian’ voice can be, or if there is anything like a unanimous voice at all. As for the goals of educational development, the economic level of a country is closely linked with its ability to achieve global goals for its formal education system, putting aside traditional or religious education. This fact naturally leads to a difference in emphasis among governments in the discussion about post-2015 goals. On the one hand, some countries are concerned about the quality of basic education or teachers’ professional development. On the other hand, countries that intend to attract foreign direct investments and boost their economy – such as India or the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – tend to stress the importance of technical and vocational education and training, and of higher education. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea, who promote their own educational programmes (education for sustainable development and global citizenship education, respectively) try to sell their programmes and ideas in the development discourse but are not eager to have their domestic education issues highlighted. The coexistence of actors who talk of their own development and of other people’s development makes the ‘regional’ discussion complicated, with some of the actors wearing the hats of aid provider and developing society simultaneously. Regardless of this complexity, Asia is treated as a unit, with repercussions for the self-image of Asians as the unified treatment reconfirms (or even creates) common Asian characteristics. In other words, Asians consider themselves to be Asians because they are treated as such from within and outside of the geographic boundaries of Asia, which are themselves ambiguous and constantly changing. This chapter will examine what constitutes an Asian notion of development and education by looking at the philosophical foundations of Asian donors’ aid programmes. The reason that I focus on donors even though Asia is composed of both recipients and providers of aid is that the desire to demonstrate unique approaches towards development and education is clearer in donors’ aid-related documents than in policy papers by recipient countries. Recipients’ policies tend to be more standardized in following the global trend. That is, to receive funds and technical support from the outside requires governments to meet donors’ expectations, resulting in convergence of the education-sector policies of recipient countries along globally shared norms and modalities. Since the early years of the 21st century, traditional donors have sought to increase aid effectiveness by coordinating their interventions and fostering recipient governments’ ownership of the interventions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2008). According to an analysis I provided elsewhere, these coordinating efforts had the effect of standardizing educational development programmes

across the Global South while leaving the concept of ‘ownership’ by recipient governments within the common framework of poverty reduction and universal primary education (Yamada, 2010). As I argued then, the process of adapting and implementing those standardized policies involves a lot of reinterpretation. Still, identifying nationally unique justifications and motives solely from the documents, without additional interviews or observations, is much more difficult in the case of recipient than of donor governments. Since the purpose of this chapter is to compare and identify the commonalities and differences in values and ideological frameworks through the analysis of documents, I decided not to include recipient countries in my scope. I selected five donor countries to analyse: Japan, South Korea, China, India and Thailand. In addition to these national governments, I also analysed documents from two regional bodies, SEAMEO and the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE). Both SEAMEO and ASPBAE are regional educational network entities, the former an intergovernmental organization and the latter a regional federation of CSOs. Examining these two bodies will help us capture how such regional actors play their roles in shaping regional voices. In this study, ASPBAE is the only entity not tied to government. Government documents, which make up the majority of the materials I analyse here, cannot capture the relationship between the government and civil society actors, regardless of the important role civil society plays in the discourse. Hence I included the regional CSO coalition in order to capture CSO characteristics, not at the respective country level, but at least at the regional level. Analysis of civil society activities in the respective countries will be entrusted to later chapters. The following analysis suggests some common tendencies among the educational aid policies of the examined countries, which may be attributed to their cultural heritage or to the historical origins of international cooperation. The analysis here is not intended to verify whether or not the programmes follow the principles stated in the documents in their implementation. Instead, it treats culture and history as cards that policymakers use to strengthen their argument, not necessarily elements linked to their aid practices. Also, such appeals of uniqueness do not lead to regional consensus straightforwardly because, as some historians of Asianism have argued, the appeal of regionality is closely linked with the thirst for demonstrating national superiority (Aoki, 1998, pp. 32–37). Still, it would be meaningful to examine how their advancement by donors and their appeal on the political front are related to the process of renewing the global framework for international educational development, particularly in the Asia region. Administratively, in the EFA and post-EFA consultation processes, the region is one place where national voices are funnelled to the global level. At the same time, the region cannot be understood in its true nature unless it is situated in the imagination of the people who constitute it historically, culturally, and politically. The year 2015 was important in Asia not only because of the revision of the global agenda but also because ASEAN was to integrate its member states economically by the end of 2015. The prospect of economic integration has significant implications on the visions of member states regarding education for the formation of human capital to vitalize the economy and

regarding ASEAN citizenship. Also, the prospect of South Korea’s hosting the World Education Forum in May 2015 has been a significant undercurrent of the discourse among Asian scholars and professionals involved in this process, which I have been witnessing while being an active participant. What is the value-added from Asia? This question is closely linked with the tacit pride in and the search for hidden treasures in Asian characteristics of education and development.

‘ASIANISM’ AS IMAGINATION Asia is a diverse region. It is the most populous region in the world, containing China and India, the top two countries in population (World Bank, 2015). Geographically, it makes up the large area of the Eurasian supercontinent beyond Europe. As Said pointed out years ago, Asia, or the Orient, was defined as a concept to cover areas, people and cultures that did not fall into what constituted the Occident (Said, 1977). As a result, according to most geographers’ definitions, the area classified as Asia stretches from Turkey on the west to Japan on the east, and from Russia on the north to Indonesia on the south (National Geographic atlas of the world, 2014). There are, however, other approaches to categorization. The World Bank divides the countries that are geographically Asia into four sub-regional groups: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia (World Bank, 2015). On the other hand, UNESCO’s Asia and the Pacific is a rather big group, with 50 member countries in southern, southeastern and northeastern Asia, as well as the Pacific (UNESCO, 2015b). UNICEF divides the region into two groups: South Asia, and East Asia and Pacific. Finally, both UNESCO and UNICEF exclude countries in the Arabian Peninsula from Asia (UNICEF, 2015). In a nutshell, unlike Europe or America, there is no clear, shared understanding about the boundaries of Asia. Regardless of this ambiguity, there have been recurring calls for rediscovery of the uniqueness and strength inherent in Asian societies. There are both internal and external reasons to consider Asia as a single region. Historically, whenever the Western imagination could not make sense of phenomena in this region, they were exoticized and attributed to Asian peculiarities. Although this attitude would seem to belong to a time when there was limited knowledge and understanding about Asia, in fact it persists and surfaces from time to time. Moreover, the search for Asian peculiarities has been initiated from within the region as much as from outside. For example, in the late 19th century, Japanese pan-Asianism, which eventually led to military aggression towards nearby countries, emerged when Japan opened the country to the world and started modernization. The threat of Western colonization spurred Japanese political leaders and ideologues to speed up the process of modernization, which was a synonym for Westernization. At the same time, the sense of threat also led to the idea of pan-Asianism to unify Asia (under the leadership of Japan) to protect its own territory and sovereignty (Aoki,

1998, pp. 32–39; Matsumoto, 2000, pp. 47–52; Muto, 2009, pp. 14–23). Later, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ‘East Asian miracle’ was a popular topic of discussion among people trying to discover the common characteristics that enabled the ‘East Asian tigers’ (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) to achieve dramatic economic growth. These ‘tigers’ were followed by other Asian economies, such as those of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, that also demonstrated high growth rates. The so-called flying geese model of Asian development was widely referred to as the common pattern for these emerging economies to industrialize, by expanding the basis of value-added manufacturing, starting with substituting low-value-added imports for domestic commodities (Akamatsu, 1962). While some analysts have attributed the success of this Asian model to the countries’ industry policies or centralized governments (World Bank, 1993), others looked for commonalities of tradition and culture, and identified collectivism and discipline as having originated from Confucianism (I. Kim, 1992; Vandermeersch, 1987). Later, in the 1990s, Mahatir Mohamad, former prime minister of Malaysia, promoted ‘Asian values’ as the social, cultural and historical foundation of political ideology to unify the Asian people under a common pan-Asian identity (Mahatir, 1997). In his famous book Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington argued that the cultural and religious identities of people will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world, and the Confucian and Islamic civilizations in Asia will be a potential threat to Western civilization (1996). In response, Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean scholar, urged critical self-reflection by Asians on the region’s cultural and religious heritage to avoid a clash of civilizations (Mabubani, 1998). In sum, through either fear or hope, those both inside and outside Asia faced the dynamic economic growth in the region in the 1990s with keen interest in the sources of Asian uniqueness. These discussions rarely questioned whether there are true common Asian values and, if so, what their substance is. As Yamazaki described it, the image of Asia ‘wanders about like a monster’ with massive energy but without a clear contour or face (1997, pp. 9–10). In this sense, even though the elements that purportedly constitute Asian characteristics are found in traditional practices and values, they are closely linked with the pragmatic need to justify the acts of certain groups or institutions in the sociopolitical or economic scene. Recently, the discourse on Asian uniqueness is resurging. China, as many observers must recognize, demonstrates its uniqueness not only by being Asian but by being an emerging economy and a major force in the G20 and the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Several other Asian countries are gaining recognition as donors, while Japan has been a member donor of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for a half century. Interestingly, most of the Asian donors talk of their unique models of development and aid, and attribute their uniqueness to their culture and history. On the one hand, the official development assistance (ODA) policies of national governments reflect the nationalistic rivalry among neighbouring countries and tend to claim that all aspects of their unique model are rooted in their own national tradition. On the other hand, they share the underlying desire to propose a

different approach to development aid in contrast to the Western framework, which leads them to rely on Asianism either overtly or tacitly. The degree of difference from the established norms and modalities that respective governments would like to exhibit may vary. Therefore, countries like China and India tend to contrast their aid philosophies more clearly against the DAC framework, while Japan and Korea try to be unique within it. It is yet to be known whether these ‘models’ of Asian donor countries have truly concrete components or are just a nice wrap to demonstrate pride in their distinctiveness from Western donors. However, it is a tide of appeal that one may fairly say is the expression of Asianism from within Asia. The rise of Asianism is not a self-contained murmur but to some extent a reaction to the sense of concern from the conventional norm setters of development discourse that the growing presence of some actors in Asia may affect ways of doing things in this field. As Okakura stated, it may be something like a ghost living in the imagination (1920). However, when there are many people who imagine it, the ghost will take substance.

Pieces of Culture and History Employed in Asianism It is important to know some foundational elements of culture and tradition that have been borrowed to promote the contemporary Asianism. Historically, in the geographic areas that roughly correspond to so-called Asia, there have been two major cultural spheres whose religion, philosophy, writing system, vocabulary and arts have influenced and been incorporated into local practices and beliefs: the Indosphere and the Chinosphere (Vandermeersch, 1987) The areas east of India are widely influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism and their accompanying traditions and arts, which spread to South, Southeast and East Asia through inland and ocean routes. The Chinosphere, which is often discussed in relation to Confucianism and the Chinese writing system, spread overlappingly. Because of the crossfertilization of local cultures and Indo- or Chino-civilizations, scholars state that there are some significant commonalities across Asian cultures, in terms of norms, values and attitudes (Okakura, 1920; Suzuki, 1997). The characteristics can be summarized as (1) seamless continuity between the self and society, (2) harmony and balance under the centralized authority of government and (3) pragmatism. One of the cultural traits that is unanimously reported from the Chino- and Indospheres is the lack of separation between the self and the universe. For example, in traditional Chinese thought, the social structure is conceived as a system of relations connecting individuals who cannot exist independently (Rosker, 2010, pp. 80–83; Wen, 2011, p. 269). The individual self, say the Indian Upanishads, is a seamless part of the fundamental principle of the universe, namely Brahman. The subjective self is surrounded by and is part of the universe but also shares the common essence of the universe. Therefore, acts of the universe are equated with acts of the self (Tachikawa, 1992, pp. 16–20; T. Wada, personal communication, December 16, 2014). According to this epistemology of Chinese and Indian traditional thought, individuals are recognized in dynamic relationship to the environment and other individuals, which are

constantly in motion. These philosophies don’t reject individuality, but they do not recognize universal rights or the dignity of individuals outside this context (Lu, 2011, p. 171). In both Chinese and Indian traditional thought systems, society is conceptualized as hierarchical. Such a structural conception is extended to the nation, in which the vertical relationship between the ruler and the ruled is the foundation of bureaucracy. The legitimacy of rulers’ authority is in their morality as rulers, not in a social contract with the ruled, as is the case in Western political thought. In both Chinese and Indian traditions, the social structure is to be maintained in balance and harmony. Social cohesion is more valued than fulfilment of individual desire. Some scholars point out that such conceptions about social structure are less likely to lead to the idea of ‘development’ or investment for future progress (I. Kim, 1992, p. 102). The government, or the ruler, should ensure the welfare of the people through virtuous rule. This philosophy inherently envisages a centralized government supported by bureaucracy, which is functional without the politics of contrasting interests within it. Another common cultural trait of the Indo- and Chinospheres is their pragmatism. While some sects of Buddhism treat metaphysics as separate from practice, both Confucianism and Hinduism consider metaphysics inseparable from practice (Stephens, 2009, pp. 57–62). Still, philosophical practice is not just based in experience but also has an ethical dimension. As an individual practice, its aim is to become a better person, not as a segregated existence but through intersubjective, communal discourse. Based on these broad commonalities of values in the Indo- and Chinospheres, the following sections will highlight Asian philosophies of education and development in order to help readers understand the language of culture and tradition that is used in Asian donors’ policy documents. Perspectives on Education in Traditional Asian Philosophies As Vandermeersch argued, compared with Western societies, Confucian societies traditionally value education highly, a value widely shared among societies that use the Chinese writing system (1987, pp. 178–182). Many scholars have attributed the high economic growth potential of countries with a Confucian tradition to the existence of an educated workforce (I. Kim, 1992, pp. 19–20). Confucian education has two seemingly contradictory characteristics: one is its trust in experience-based learning in broad social contexts and the other is its highly meritocratic and standardized orientation. In either case, however, education is considered not a matter of knowledge acquisition only but of character development as well. The idea of experience-based learning leads to a conception of education as not restricted by a school system, a curriculum, or textbooks. Education, in this view, exists to develop the internal harmony of individuals, which seamlessly links with social harmony. Confucian education also emphasizes character development (Araki, 2013, pp. 133–135; Okakura, 1920, p. 39). Such a broad conception has led to Asian donors’ tendency to emphasize the importance of education but not necessarily to allocate a large proportion of their aid to the so-called education sector or, more specifically, to basic education. Another characteristic of education in Confucian societies is its close relationship with

career development in a centralized hierarchy. Since the capacity of people in power is assessed by their level of learning in terms of both morality and knowledge, instead of hereditary classes, the traditional Confucian system relied on rigorous examinations for the appointment of higher-level civil servants. Highly competitive school entrance examinations, observed today in Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China, are rooted in the meritocratic system of Confucianism. Still, highly educated persons are assumed to be self-disciplined and ascetic; they are expected to use knowledge for society as a whole, instead of for their personal fulfilment (I. Kim, 1992, pp. 111–112; Morikawa, 1990, p. 124). Putting examinations aside, general trust in education as a process of character development and social advancement has been a strong drive for people in the Confucian tradition. While the standardizing tendency is linked with a dimension of Confucianism that perceives social relationships in a hierarchical order, there is also a strong belief that education can happen in various settings outside of formal schools because learning should be related to practice. The moralistic and holistic approach of education in Confucianism seems to be common to Indian traditional values as well. Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), an influential Indian writer, philosopher, and educationist, believed education does not merely give learners information but makes them realize their relationship and harmony with all existence on Earth. ‘One of the important insights of Tagore’s educational vision was his stress on human relationships and universality [emphasis added]’ (Samuel, 2011, p. 1164). Similarly, Mahatma Gandhi (Gandhi, 2002, p. 14) and Shibli Nu’mani, a 19th century Muslim scholar (Parveen, 2011, pp. 220–225), taught that education can happen in any setting and derives from balance and harmony with one’s community and surroundings. Mahatma Gandhi was even critical of formal education for separating the material aspect of learning from the moral (Gandhi, 2002, p. 16). Perspectives on Development in Traditional Asian Philosophies As discussed earlier, since the Asian traditional philosophies are oriented towards harmony and balance, there is no strong drive for social change. Moral learning is introspective, and change starts from within oneself instead of through external forces (Aoki, 1998, p. 148; T. Wada, personal communication, December 16, 2014). Even if some ideas or catalysts may be external, it is oneself and, in extension, society itself that chooses and adopts them. Phrases that Asian donors use, such as ‘support for self-help efforts’ or ‘self-reliance’, can be considered in line with such traditional values. Donors aim not to give direction from outside of the recipient society but to hear what recipients want to do and support it. As conceptualized in Asian philosophy, the vertical hierarchy is a characteristic of social order, and metaphysics is not separable from practice. Therefore philosophy is not only a matter of ideas but also is reflected in the actual structure of the government and society. Thus the orientation towards harmony also assumes harmony in the governmental structure, a harmony backed by the morality of the rulers, the bureaucrats and the ruled. The flying geese model, said to be a successful development model for Asia, is based on centralized decision-

making matched by trust and industrious commitment on the part of the general public. This experience and traditional values have contributed to Asians’ assumption that government representatives fulfil their moral responsibility to work for the benefit of the public. Therefore, aid provided through an agreement with the government is also assumed to be distributed for the benefit of all citizens. It is not desirable for outsiders to control how the benefit will be shared because the leader must be in charge. This assumption persist in the aid programs of Asian donors, regardless that the trust in the political leaders has often been overturned by the corrupt governments in their own countries. Traditional Asian philosophy views bureaucracy in rather a functionalist manner, without considering its political nature. Instead of politics, any problems tend to be attributed to the morality of people who didn’t fulfil their functions, which again leads to the emphasis on moral education and capacity development. According to traditional Asian philosophy, it is difficult to imagine any universal values because human existence is relational, with values that will constantly change depending on other elements in the society. Outsiders cannot judge what is good for a society based on the experience in another society. If one extends this philosophical foundation in a strict sense, Asian donors could not support MDGs or EFA or any global agenda because, in their conception, there is no universally applicable framework for development. In reality, all five Asian countries discussed in this chapter have signed declarations on EFA, MDGs and SDGs. Therefore, traditional values will not fully overwrite governments’ current political decisions. At the same time, they will continue to be frames of reference on which people rely from time to time, consciously or unconsciously, to legitimatize their policies and practices.

DONOR COUNTRIES IN ASIA: ACTORS WITH VERTICAL DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS Based on the review of elements constituting Asianness, this chapter will examine reports and documents issued by the ministries and agencies involved in international development cooperation within five donor countries in the Asia region. When they are available, I will also look at the texts of formal speeches by high officials and political leaders of these bodies. I will try to demonstrate these countries’ strategies in referring to ‘Asianness’ and their uniqueness, based on their perceived geopolitical positions, their macroeconomic positions and the historico-cultural roots of their philosophies of international cooperation and development. Since the focus will be on the logic of and justifications for their commitment to certain forms and contents of foreign aid, this chapter does not aim to examine whether the stated objectives were achieved in practice or not. Among the five donor countries discussed below, only Japan has been a member of the Western DAC community from the start of OECD-DAC in 1960. While South Korea became a member of OECD-DAC in 2010, other Asian donors discussed here – China, India and

Thailand – are still practicing outside of the DAC framework, though they pay attention to the framework and try to demonstrate the legitimacy of their aid programmes according to globally accepted norms and principles. Still, among these countries, there is more room for national interests and concerns specific to the country environment to influence their aid philosophies and models, compared with DAC donors. Compared with China, whose development aid is expanding at a dramatic pace, other non-DAC donors discussed in this chapter may seem less significant in the discourse on international development. However, the distinct characteristics of their approaches towards international development cooperation provide some hints at Asian regional features. India’s history of a nonalignment partnership with countries in Asia and Africa is unique, while India also has a strong drive to aid the neighbouring countries in the South Asia sub-region for economic and geopolitical reasons. Thailand, as a centre of Indochina, is committed to helping neighbouring countries reduce disparities and to securing the basis of regional development.

Japan: Traditional Donor with Asian Face This chapter will not devote much space to the outcome of Japanese policy analysis because Kazuhiro Yoshida and I will fully present that in the chapter ‘Japanese Educational Aid in Transition: The Challenge to Transform from a Traditional Donor to a New Partner’. Here I will limit myself to emphasizing that one of the backbones of Japanese aid philosophy is trust in human resource development, which is a much broader concept than school-based education. The Japanese word hitozukuri means ‘investment in people’. Referring to the strategy of a feudal lord in the 19th century, a Japanese prime minister highlighted the importance of education and Japanese willingness to provide support for education in developing countries. At the same time, the notion of hitozukuri is, as we will discuss in the chapter ‘Japanese Educational Aid in Transition: The Challenge to Transform from a Traditional Donor to a New Partner’, not necessarily about support for school-based education. Most of the Japanese technical cooperation projects have components of capacity development for counterpart staff in the recipient countries. Interaction between Japanese experts and in-country counterparts is considered important for transferring not only techniques but also the Japanese work ethic and attitudes. There has been a lot of discussion about the Japanese model of development cooperation among practitioners and policymakers. It is basically to share the experience of Japan’s own development. Instead of providing a prescription for development, the Japanese considered it more meaningful to disclose what Japan has done for its own development so that the people of the recipient countries can choose useful practices to adopt. There is also a collective belief among people involved in the aid discourse that the Japanese approach to aid, which is to package a loan for infrastructure building with a grant for human resource development, has contributed to many Asian countries’ taking off economically. This sense of achievement led to the promotion of the ‘Japanese aid model’ in other regions, such as Africa (Yamada, 2015, pp.

40–42). Japan started to provide aid in the 1950s, when it hadn’t yet recovered from the damage from WWII. Although it was a member of DAC, the original reason for its giving aid was to compensate for losses caused by Japanese occupation during the war; providing aid was not necessarily driven by benevolence or commitment to universal values like human rights. In the 1980s, Western donors criticized Japan’s ODA for its commercial motivation, with a large proportion of loans for constructing economic infrastructure such as ports, roads, and factories accompanied by grants for training the personnel who would operate the facilities constructed with Japanese loans. Japan was also criticized for the high rate of resource reflux caused by tying the loan-related projects to Japanese private companies through conditions on procurement. In a way, this situation was similar to the one faced by nontraditional donors like China in the first decade of this century, when they were criticized as being a ‘rogues’ donor for not following the agreed-upon rules in the donor community (Naím, 2007). Being a developing country itself, Japan was in no position to legitimize its aid as pure support for universal causes. At the same time, Japan did take pride in the high quality of its education system and the human resources it cultivated. Therefore, it started giving aid under the principle of sharing its experience with neighbouring countries. Gradually, the principles of mutual assistance and support for self-help efforts took shape, going back to the traditional values of Japanese society. Outsiders, in the Japanese view, must not intervene in recipients’ choice of how to utilize the provided resources and technologies, but instead must support them to develop by themselves. Education is considered the foundation of self-help development because its aim is to enhance the capacity of the country to plan its own course of development and put that plan into practice. Neighbouring northeast Asian countries, such as Korea and China, which will be discussed later, have also used such a line of argument. The fact that Japan was the first non-Western member of DAC led to the fundamental ambivalence of Japanese aid policies between its historically rooted philosophical foundation and the demand for adapting to the Western-originated norms of development aid as a modernizing prospect. This normative struggle is also reflected to the practices of Japanese aid projects, which have made a major shift since the beginning of 1990s, when Japan became a top donor.

South Korea: Emerging Actor Trying to Lead Both Traditional and Nontraditional Donors The ambivalence between the desires to be unique and to align with the normative and methodological framework of conventional donors, which Japan has long been juggling, was passed along to South Korea when it joined OECD-DAC in 2010. The South Korean government admits itself to be a new actor in this international development arena, while it aspires to be influential in it. The fact that the South Korean government hosted the G20 summit in 2010, co-hosted the Fourth High-Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) with OECD in 2011, and co-hosted the World Education Forum with UNESCO in 2015 indicates this

aspiration for leadership. An official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) expected that the country’s participation in DAC’s agenda and norm setting process would enable South Korea to universalize its model of its own socioeconomic development and of development aid (cited in S. Kim, 2011, p. 816). Former president Myung-bak Lee initiated a strong campaign, domestically and internationally, to push South Korea into a global leadership position, a campaign that has been taken up by the current government of Geun-hye Park. With the news that South Korea was going to host the G20 summit in 2010, Lee addressed his fellow citizens: During the past century, we suffered the pain of watching our destiny fall into the hands of world powers because we were too weak. We also suffered the division of the country during the Cold War. It was not until 1991 that Korea became a member of the United Nations. The Republic has now, however, become one of the leading players in the international community recognized by advanced countries … [N]ow Korea has emerged as a pacesetter in helping forge a new framework for the world order … The Summit, a gathering of leaders from 20 major countries, is not simply a consultative forum. It is a new global mechanism extending the G8 regime that played a role as an unofficial steering committee in the international community before the global economic crisis set in …. Korea, as the chair of the G20 Summit, will actively engage in decisive discussions to come up with a summit agenda, and choose additional nations to participate and coordinate agreements. In addition, the country will proactively suggest alternatives for the newly emerging international order. (Lee, 2010; emphasis added)

Here Lee describes a South Korea that suffered from war, poverty and powerlessness, yet went on to become one of the world’s leaders. He praises the country for having joined the United Nations, the established mechanism for maintaining the world order, while pointing out that the G20 is a new mechanism with enlarged membership. This logic hints at the intention to promote Korea as a leader not only in the conventional circle of leadership among developed countries but also among the emerging and developing countries. This double-front strategy of aspiration for leadership is also seen clearly in various governmental statements regarding international development aid. As a former recipient-turned donor, South Korea promotes itself as a symbol of ‘aid effectiveness’ because it successfully utilized aid and achieved its current state of development within half a century of war devastation in the early 1950s (Ahn, 2010, p. 1; S.-U. Kim, 2011, p. 2). To provide aid, therefore, is said to be a ‘moral obligation’ for Korea, a way to return the benefits to other countries that need assistance (Park, 2011, p. 3). This ‘international thankyou campaign’ (S. Kim, 2011, p. 805) was led by officials including President Myung-bak Lee himself on the occasions of a visit to Africa and the G20 summit. After just having become a member of OECD-DAC in 2010, South Korea hosted DAC’s HLF-4 in 2011. In the DAC Senior Level Forum held in April 2011, a few months before HLF-4, Bong-hyun Kim, deputy minister of MOFAT, confirmed the country’s commitment to achieving the MDGs, calling it ‘the supreme goal of the global aid community’ (B. Kim, 2011) while highlighting the strategic importance of HLF-4 in South Korea in linking agendas brought from conventional and emerging multilateral forums in order to develop a new paradigm:

Busan [HLF-4] will provide a unique opportunity to link the HLF-4 narrative of improving aid effectiveness to the UN narrative of achieving the MDGs by 2015, and to the G20 narrative of promoting sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth. By seeking convergence, the HLF-4 can contribute to developing a more coherent paradigm for aid and to dramatically increasing the impact of development cooperation on actual development. (B. Kim, 2011; emphasis added)

The stated commitment to the MDGs and the UN-Bretton Woods multilateral aid mechanism (Economic Development Cooperation Fund, Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2008, pp. 36–38; Korea International Cooperation Agency, 2011, p. 5, 2015, p. 17) is always sensitively balanced with the desire to claim a leadership position and to provide a unique Korean development model. In terms of the size of ODA, South Korea is not a big donor, having given US$1.75 billion in 2013, or 5.7 per cent of the United States’ ODA and 15 per cent of Japan’s. The country recently ranked 16th among DAC donors (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2015). South Korean ODA is barely 25 per cent of China’s, according to an estimate by Kitano and Harada (2014). Korean thirst for diplomatic leadership is astonishing, given this relatively minor financial presence and fairly recent participation in the global aid discourse. As discussed below, the patterns of Korean and Japanese ODA are similar in many senses, but a clear difference is that in Japan there was no overt and concerted effort to promote a unique Japanese model until Japan became the top bilateral ODA provider in 1989. The difference could partly be attributed to the fact that Japan was defeated after its colonial occupation of Asia, so its ODA started as a form of war compensation, whereas in South Korea, ODA is a symbol of triumphant development that enables it to give a return gift to disadvantaged countries. Elements of the So-Called Korean Model The drive for global leadership is closely linked with the effort to demonstrate a unique Korean model of national development and aid provision. Officials assert that as a ‘recipientturned-donor’, South Korea has first-hand experience with the challenges developing countries now face. Therefore, by sharing its experience, South Korea can contribute to the selfmotivated development process of developing countries. (More discussion on this point appears in the chapter by Chung (2016), in this volume). The successful experiences of South Korea include capacity building, growth of priority industries via centralized planning and regulation, and effective use of resources (Min, 2011, pp. 3–7). In a country that lacks natural resources and domestic capital, the foundation that allowed Korea to achieve its miraculous development was human resources – this is a statement often heard, particularly in meetings that involve education officials (K. Kim, 2012). At the same time, the strong initiative of the government in setting goals and implementing programmes, instead of following the laissezfaire principles of neoliberalism, is considered to be fundamental. This drive is typical of the East Asian tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – which achieved rapid economic growth and industrialization between the 1960s and the 1990s (Economic Development Cooperation Fund, Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2008, pp. 4–6). The experience of an export-led economy under developmental autocracy was supported

by timely aid from overseas, particularly loans. Immediately after WWII, the loans provided to South Korea were mostly from the United States, which was gradually replaced by Japan as the primary lender. Several Korean scholars point out the pivotal role the loans played, particularly those from Japan, in sustaining the building of infrastructure for the South Korean economic takeoff (Chun, Munyi, & Lee, 2010, pp. 4–5; S. Kim, 2011, pp. 806–807). At the same time, South Korea became a ‘successful aid recipient’ because it had the basis of exportled industrialization and the capacity to effectively utilize the aid, thus reducing external dependence quickly. In this sense, aid for infrastructure building should be in tandem with human resource and capacity development (Lim, 2011, p. 16). Lim (2011) applied the South Korean experience of its own development to the context of development aid, arguing that it is not realistic for aiddependent countries to claim ownership of decision-making. In other words, only those countries that have initiated industrialization and have the capacity to plan can talk of selfreliance. At the same time, as soon as such countries have their own established mechanisms, albeit immature, they should not be intervened with excessively. This argument matches the perspective of Japan in providing aid to South Korea in the process of its economic take-off. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, one of the popular definitions of the ‘Japanese model’ of development cooperation is a package of loans for infrastructure building plus technical cooperation for human resource development, which is followed by Japanese private-sector investment. The effectiveness of this model was claimed to be proved with the cases of Asian countries that achieved an economic takeoff with Japanese ODA (Yamada, 2015, pp. 38–39). Thus, the Japanese and Korean models are like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, showing the common phenomena from opposite directions, namely from the donor’s and the recipient’s sides, based on the shared values of egalitarian partnership, mutual benefit, and support for self-help (Kimura, 2011, pp. 2–3; Watson, 2012, p. 82). As Chun, Munyi and Lee pointed out, South Korea’s ratio of grant aid to total ODA is one of the lowest among DAC donors, together with Japan and Portugal (2010, pp. 790–791). A high ratio of concessional loans is accompanied by other characteristics commonly seen in Japanese and South Korean ODA: a strong orientation towards economic growth and privatesector investment, and a concentration of aid to Asia and middle-income countries. Concessional loans account for 47 per cent of the total aid, while the OECD-DAC target is for grants to be as much as 86 per cent of total ODA. The sector that receives the biggest share of the ODA budget is economic infrastructure (36 per cent), followed by social infrastructure (35 per cent) – meaning that aid for infrastructure building adds up to more than 70 per cent. Of Korean bilateral ODA, 43 per cent goes to Asian countries while 14 per cent goes to Africa (Prime Minister’s Office, Republic of Korea, 2015). In contrast, during fiscal year 2012, the ratio of loans in Japan’s total ODA budget was 41.9 per cent, out of which Asian countries received 56.2 per cent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, 2014, pp. 32, 164– 165). According to an analysis by Kan, Lee, and Park (2011), among DAC countries, it is only South Korea and Japan whose aid has a statistically significant correlation with the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the aid recipient countries. Despite the good will of Kan,

Lee and Park in demonstrating some common positive characteristics of Japanese and Korean ODA, close linkage between ODA and FDI would be rather a source of criticism from DAC members for tying the aid with the commercial interests of donor countries. In fact, what Japan has been struggling to overcome since the 1980s is the constant monitoring and guidance by DAC to improve the grant element and reduce aid tied to its own commercial interests. For South Korea, it is rather recent that such concepts as poverty reduction, human rights, gender and sustainable development came to be discussed in the context of development aid. Before 2010, when the country’s Basic Law on International Development Cooperation was passed, aid was predominantly a matter of economic cooperation (Ahn, 2010, p. 3). Until then, humanitarian aid had been more the concern of NGOs than of the government. By joining DAC and the community of traditional donors, the South Korean government took up the responsibility of reforming its structure and modalities of aid, in accordance with the DAC framework for aid effectiveness. The desire to promote a distinct Korean model while leading the global discourse through conventional channels put South Korea in a dilemma between economic benefit and humanitarianism. Some observers described this situation as an identity crisis between realities and ethical rhetoric (S. Kim, 2011, p. 802; Lim, 2011, p. 25; Watson, 2012, p. 90). But the issue is more twisted than that. The homegrown rhetoric to justify conventional South Korean aid practices would have been self-reliance and mutual benefit, which may or may not match the practices on the ground because practices are influenced by national interests and street-level tactics. On the one hand, the South Korean government use these homegrown norms to label its unique model of development aid. However, it is also trying to bend the country’s customary way of doing things to fit its practices to the foreign rhetoric of humanitarianism and a rights-based approach. The coexistence of principles originating from different cultural bases is one of the reasons for the identity crisis and conflicts of interest within the governmental structure. Trust in Education Demonstrated through the Knowledge Sharing Programme As the chapter by Chung (2016) indicates, the amount of South Korean ODA allocated for the education sector is around 20 per cent, which is considerably high. At the same time, the large part of education ODA goes to secondary and higher education, while the allocation to basic education is around 20% of it. As for Japan, education receives only 6 per cent of total ODA, out of which 32 per cent goes to basic education. Compared with South Korea, Japan can be said to have aligned more with the globally concerted effort of improving access to and quality of basic education. Regardless, compared with the United States (80 per cent of education ODA to basic education), Norway (72 per cent), Sweden (65 per cent) and the United Kingdom (61 per cent), which prioritize basic education greatly, the difference in the patterns of resource allocation in Japan and Korea is clear (UNESCO, 2015a). As Chung’s chapter critically analyses, South Korea tends to consider educational aid a tool to contribute to economic development, not so much a matter of human rights or an expression of the principles of the MDGs for poverty reduction. Naturally, the country gives more emphasis to technical and vocational education and training (TVET) than to basic

education. The very powerful camp of TVET supporters in the government structure gives the promoters of education for the sake of human development and rights a difficult fight to defend their ground. It is not the purpose of this chapter to judge which area of education or which principle of aid is better than others. However, I can safely state that it is not only South Korea that considers education a component to achieve economic development. That view is pretty common across Asian donors. This fact doesn’t indicate that Asian donors consider education secondary to economic infrastructure. It is rather opposite, while the logic of emphasizing education would be different from that of Western donor community. The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) must be mentioned as representative of the South Korean notion of education. The brochure of the programme defines KSP as ‘a knowledgeintensive development and economic cooperation programme designed to share Korea’s experience with partner countries’ (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea Development Institute, and Export-Import Bank of Korea, n.d., p. 3). KSP has three pillars of activities: (1) policy consultation, called bilateral KSP; (2) joint consultation through international organizations (multilateral KSP) and (3) modularization of Korea’s development experience (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea Development Institute, and Export-Import Bank of Korea, n.d., p. 3). KSP is based on the idea that as a recipient-turned donor, South Korea has experiences that developing countries would want to learn from and follow. Also, at the bottom of this logic is a strong trust in knowledge and education as the engine for development. The pragmatic lessons of success and failure are shared through a consultation process with a Korean team of advisors in areas such as the knowledge-based economy, financial services, economic crisis management, infrastructure and human resource development. As this lineup of areas in which KSP provides support shows, the programme does not fall into the domain of the so-called education sector. It is jointly run by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Korea Development Institute, and the Export-Import Bank of Korea, without involving the education ministry or specialists in education. KSP is also linked with the muted expectation to foster a sentimental bonding with developing countries based on the common experience of colonialism, extreme poverty and civil war (S. Kim, 2011), which is similar to the Chinese idea of soft power. Such programmes to share experience and build emotional bonds are classified as educational aid in China, albeit a different interpretation of the term from that of the conventional donor community. As its neighbours do, the Korean government also spends a large sum of resources on scholarships for developing countries’ officials to learn at higher education institutions in Korea. In addition to programmes in existing universities, the country established a school in 1998 specifically for the purpose of global leadership training at the postgraduate level, called the Korean Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management. The holistic notion of education in northeast Asia, which involves not only knowledge acquisition but also character formation, provides the basis for still other type of educational programmes. Similar to education for sustainable development (ESD), which Japan pushed forward in the decade between 2005 and 2014, South Korea has been making an effort to

mainstream global citizenship education (GCE). Both ESD and GCE are concerned about not only acquisition of knowledge and skills but also a change in the attitudes and behaviour of learners, enabling them to live well in the sustainable world as global citizens, regardless of the diversity of race, culture or language. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that ESD and GCE are clustered together under Target 7 of SDG 4. It is symbolic that both Japan and Korea have proposed disseminating these rather abstract and ethical educational ideas, which suggest the cultural traits of northeast Asia, through the channel of UNESCO. These countries try to claim uniqueness and leadership within the established multilateral structure but not outside of it. Bridging the New and Traditional Paradigms HLF-4, hosted by the South Korean government in 2011, was a watershed event in the sense that it acknowledged the diverse modalities of aid, such as South-South cooperation and partnerships with various actors such as CSOs, private-sector companies and nontraditional donors. Unlike earlier HLFs in Paris (2005) and Accra (2008), it wasn’t oriented towards tightening control over the list of acceptable modalities of aid around five principles of aid effectiveness – ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. While the principles were maintained, the force of standardization was weakened so as to encourage nontraditional donors to be on board. This tone cannot, of course, be fully attributed to the initiative of the South Korean government. The dramatic increase in the presence of nontraditional donors, particularly China, forced the conventional donor community to compromise, giving up on tightening the code of conduct and on criticizing ‘rogue’ donors for not following it. Therefore, the strong message of broad-based partnership and promotion of South-South cooperation is the result of coincidence between the changing global dynamics and Korean desire for leadership. The South Korean government stage-managed its own role in the global aid discourse to bridge between the old and new paradigms. This kind of Korean staging strategy, which also helped its bid to host what became WEF-Incheon, is distinct from the practices of both Japan and China, regardless of the similarities in philosophical basis among their aid policies.

China: A Giant in Thirst for Hegemony It is difficult to get an overview of Chinese development cooperation because of the tendency of the Chinese government to publicize selectively and limitedly, and due to the lack of a coordinating body among the various parts of the government involved. Still, according to a laborious estimation by Kitano and Harada (2014), knitting scattered pieces of information, the country’s net expenditure on items that are equivalent to the DAC definition of ODA was approximately US$7.1 billion in 2013. On that basis, China can be ranked as the 6th biggest of the DAC donors after the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and France. Its rank has increased from 16th in 10 years (Kitano & Harada, 2014, pp. 10–21). In addition to its growing presence financially and physically, the vocal appeal by the Chinese government

for its unique approach of ‘win-win’ cooperation has surprised, or even intimidated, scholars and practitioners who are familiar with the existing norms and modalities that have given shape to and regulated the whole field of international development. The limited information available further mystifies Chinese aid and enhances anxiety. When China’s ‘emergence’ started to capture the world’s attention, there arose heated criticism that China was providing ‘rogue aid’ (Naím, 2007) that did not follow the agreedupon modalities but looked to be a tool for achieving the national interests of the recipient country, particularly in access to mineral resources (Calderisi, 2007). Gradually, instead of attacking the country for being shamelessly different, the traditional donor community started trying to sensitize China’s policymakers and government officials so that they would bring China’s aid programmes closer to, even if not fully incorporated under, the umbrella of the OECD-DAC framework. In 2009, OECD-DAC and the International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC) organized a study group to ‘share experiences and promote learning’ about poverty reduction and development in China and Africa (International Poverty Reduction Center in China, 2015). However, as Ohno recalled, the influence of this group on the Chinese government and its aid policy seems not to have been significant, because the small number of Chinese who participated in this group were all academics, not government officials (2012, pp. 3–5). HLF-4, held in Busan, South Korea, in 2011, declared the ‘global partnership for effective development cooperation’, including non-DAC donors, with China at the top of the list. Thus, in the effort to include China, the framework itself was modified (Busan High-Level Forum 4, 2011, p. 1). In the widely cited book The Beijing Consensus, Ramo argued that the rise of China is changing the power structure in the field of international development (2004). While neoliberal reforms based on the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus did not reduce poverty or change the dichotomous structure of developed versus developing countries, the developmental model that China provided has attracted the leaders of developing countries as an alternative path that may enable them to catch up at a fast rate (Ramo, 2004, pp. 13–21; see also Brautigam, 2009, pp. 2–3). It is also said that criticizing Chinese aid without seeing the developmental effects on the ground or the perspectives of the aid recipients is dogmatic and lacks reflection on the appropriateness of traditional aid itself (Brautigam, 2009, pp. 13–17; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power, 2010, pp. 874–875). Given such discussions, there is a growing number of studies that try to clarify the exact areas of difference between traditional donors and China (Kobayashi, 2012; Lengauer, 2011) and how differently they are perceived by the recipient governments (Cheng, Fang, & Lien, 2012). There are also case studies of countries, mostly in Africa, that receive China’s assistance (e.g. Angola – Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Corkin, 2011; Inada, 2012; Tanzania – Furukawa, 2014; Ghana – Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; South Africa – King, 2010). These studies reveal that recipient countries have their own strategies for combining aid from China and from other donors to achieve their own national plans, and there is no convincing evidence that aid provided according to the DAC aid effectiveness principles is any better than Chinese aid in its outcomes (Kobayashi, 2012, p. 29).

In addition to overseas scholars, Chinese scholars also have active discussions on China’s development aid. The domestic scholarly discussion also highlights Chinese characteristics but tries more to strengthen the logic and philosophical foundation of Chinese overseas support, particularly that to Africa, and to define the unique ‘Chinese model’ in contrast to the traditional ‘Western model’.1 In other words, instead of critically analysing it in a detached manner, Chinese scholars tend to write as academic supporters to the government. Given the limited number of primary materials from the government available in English, the following analysis, in addition to government materials, will include publications by Chinese scholars to untangle the self-image of China – or the image with which China tried to present itself. The historical development and implementation structure of Chinese aid, as well as philosophies, are discussed extensively in the chapter by Niu and Liu (2016) in this volume. Therefore, the purpose of the analysis in this section is to highlight the ways in which government officials and supporters present Chinese principles and norms of development cooperation, in comparison with those of other Asian donors. Several terms are used by Chinese scholars and in Chinese governmental documents with specific meanings, such as soft power, Chinese model, win-win relationship, and human resource development, not to mention South-South cooperation, which is used by various donors with different nuances of meaning. References to Confucianism and historical ties with the supported countries are frequent. The following section will examine how these particular terms are used and in what contexts. The long history of China’s foreign aid, which dates back to the 1950s, is often referred to as the basis of today’s ties with the recipient countries and the background of China’s aid philosophy (Huang, 2000, pp. 45–47; Information Office of the State Council, 2011; Li, Haifang, Huaqiong, Aiping, & Wenping, 2012, pp. 11–14). As some critics point out, the early period of China’s development aid was characterized by Communist ideology and motives to ally with countries under a common ideology (Okada, 2011, pp. 32–82; see also Lengauer, 2011, p. 51; Cheng et al., 2012, pp. 3–5). Today, the word ‘Communism’ cannot be found in policy documents any more, but the principles of aid established by the early 1960s are still the philosophical backbone of Chinese aid. In 1964 the Chinese government declared ‘Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries’, which read as follows: 1. China always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing foreign aid. 2. China never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges. 3. China helps lighten the burden of recipient countries as much as possible. 4. China aims at helping recipient countries to gradually achieve self-reliance and independent development. 5. China strives to develop aid projects that require less investment but yield quicker results. 6. China provides the best-quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture.

7. In providing technical assistance, China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques. 8. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. (Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 2015; emphasis added) Equality and Support for Self-Reliance Among the eight principles, the first one indicates that Chinese aid is for mutual benefit and that the relationship between China and the recipient country is equal. Therefore, China’s aid comes without imposing any conditions, as Western donors do with prescriptions of neoliberal governmental reform (Principle 2). Instead, China supports the process of self-reliant and independent development of the recipient countries with their own initiatives (Principle 4). Principles 3 and 5 suggest that Chinese aid is recipient friendly in its practice, not causing a heavy administrative burden or requiring a longish procedure for approval, and yielding ‘quick results’. According to Hudson, in general, 60 per cent of the world’s aid recipient countries receive up to 15 per cent of the initially planned disbursement, while the other 40 per cent receive less, and 40 per cent of nondisbursements are considered to be due to a failure to meet policy conditionality (2013, pp. 109–110). Compared with that, the commitments made by Chinese high officials are said to be more likely to be implemented, faster, and in a top-down manner (Chan, 2013, pp. 35–38).2 In sum, the philosophy of aid that espouses egalitarianism and mutuality between China and the recipient goes in tandem with fast and responsive decision-making and constitutes an attractive alternative for recipient governments that have been frustrated with the interventionism of traditional donors. Putting aside the issues concerning implementation, however, in terms of philosophy, China’s messages of equal partnership and support for endogenous development are not unique to China. They overlap largely with what Japan has stated from the beginning of its foreign aid in the 1950s, or South Korea since it joined OECD-DAC (see the chapters by Chung (2016) and by Yamada & Yoshida (2016)). Although they would not state in their policy documents that they have learned from the experience of neighbouring countries, in fact, the logic of legitimization and the modalities used for aid have many common traits among Asian countries, particularly among Japan, South Korea and China (Shimomura, 2012; Wang, 2012).3 Such mutual adaptation of policy frameworks must be made easier by the commonalities of culture and tradition, which give frames of reference to policymakers. Instead of the philosophy itself, what is new is China’s strategy of creating the image of a unique alternative power in contrast to the West. Africa and Soft Power Although it is a popular approach among policymakers to look into history to legitimize current practices, history is particularly useful in understanding Chinese aid to Africa. The concentration of publications and governmental statements on Africa, together with the frequent visits by high officials and the hosting of Forums on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCACs),

which have been held every three years since 2000, are important signs of the Chinese strategy to create the image of a unique donor. FOCAC invites leaders of 50 African states that have diplomatic relations with China and to whom China has pledged financial and technical assistance in an amount that has increased each time. In terms of the geographic distribution of China’s aid, while 45.7 per cent goes to Africa, 32.8 per cent is for Asia and 12.7 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean (Information Office of the State Council, 2011). Considering the heavy concentration of Japanese ODA in Asia in the early 1990s or of South Korean ODA today, China’s resources are distributed in a rather balanced manner. In addition, forums for China’s regional cooperation are held not only with Africa but also with the Arab regions, Latin America and the Caribbean and central Asia (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). Regardless, while information on other forums is limited, there is a website on FOCAC, with various conference materials and statements provided in English.4 Corkin calls Chinese aid to Africa ‘prestige diplomacy’, meant to establish a favourable relationship with African states by demonstrating that China prioritizes them (2011, p. 62). Not only African leaders but also scholars and aid officials outside of China are also fascinated by the presented image of ‘Sino-African cooperation’, which, of course, has significant substance along with its grand presentation. The geographic emphasis on Africa is closely linked with the concept of ‘soft power’, a phrase widely used among Chinese officials and scholars. The concept of soft power, as developed by Nye (2005), involves the ability to attract people and make them willingly submit to one’s influence, unlike hard power, which coerces people through military or economic means. Chinese officials adopted this concept. In 2006, then-President Hu Jintao spoke of hard and soft power to the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group: The increase in our nation’s international status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defense, as well as in soft power such as culture. (cited in Li, 2008, p. 289)

Li argued that soft power exercised through various programmes to foster the Sino-African relationship makes African leaders willing to learn and follow China’s way of industrialization ‘in exchange for natural resources’; he continued, ‘public and cultural diplomacy are key areas of soft power’ (2013b, pp. 2–3). Along this line of thinking, he argued that FOCAC is an effective means ‘to establish its country’s image and promote its international position and influence through actively ensuring that its social and human development activities on the continent become a reality in a very short time’ (Li, 2013b, p. 7). As this statement indicates, the Chinese version of soft power is a concept that overarches different motives for providing development aid, such as access to resources, trade, security and increased global influence. These bare national interests were wrapped in, on the one hand, the notion of soft power, and on the other hand, the ideology of egalitarian partnership, symbolically represented by China’s principles for aid, which were rediscovered in dusty archives of the 1960s. In fact, the Chinese government does not hide these national interests. The sixth principle for aid cited above clearly states that Chinese aid comes with Chinesemanufactured products. Also, Article 24 of the Measures for the Administration of Foreign

Aid, announced by the Ministry of Commerce in 2014, indicates that ‘the implementation of technical aid projects should project the superiority of Chinese soft power’ by demonstrating ‘technical maturity, variety in forms and economic practicality’ (Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 2014, p. 6). Aid should be mutually beneficial, based on a ‘winwin’ partnership. Based on this logic, so far as both recipient countries and China make gains for economic growth, Chinese officials do not feel a necessity to justify their aid according to the Western notion of effective aid. Education and Human Resource Development Another idea often presented in relation to soft power is education, or human resource development. Li argued that China has a blueprint for extending soft power by attracting the minds of people through education, academic exchanges, training, and skills development (2013b, p. 3). The seventh principle for aid highlights the Chinese commitment to human resource development by stating ‘China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master’ the provided techniques. From 2010 to 2012, China held 1,951 training programmes and trained a total of 49,148 people from developing countries around the world, both on specific techniques and for academic degrees (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). In Sino-African cooperation, China has steadily increased its aid to education and human resource development ever since the first FOCAC in 2000. The Human Resources Development Fund, which China established in 2000, has gradually grown, and the 20 + 20 Cooperation Plan facilitates bilateral cooperation between 20 Chinese universities and 20 African universities. FOCAC V in 2012 also indicated that China will provide an annual US$2 million in a trust fund to UNESCO for development of education, particularly higher education, in Africa (Huang & Xie, 2012, p. 12; Li, 2013a, pp. 28–30). Confucius Institutes, which offer programmes on Chinese culture and language, are also considered a part of educational aid and are increasing rapidly in Africa and around the world. They have caught the attention of international observers as the symbol of the Chinese strategy of extending soft power (Yang, 2010). After all, most of China’s aid programmes have components of human resource development. This is somewhat similar to the programmes of countries reviewed in this chapter, particularly the ones in northeast Asia. As discussed earlier, trust in educational investment is a common undercurrent in the region. However, the concept of employing soft power to explain the value of aid for education and human resource development looks foreign, regardless of the serious effort of Chinese officials and scholars to strengthen the logic. As several observers have pointed out, the stated egalitarianism of Chinese aid conflicts with the idea of using soft power to attract support from the leaders of developing countries (Chan, 2013; King, 2013; Nordtveit, 2009). The latter is a desire for hegemony, for building a vertical relationship with the supporters of the Chinese model of development and aid. The fact that a lot of Chinese scholars tout the superiority of the Chinese approach over the Western interventionist approach indicates the inherent nature of

this debate, which contrasts two types of donor-recipient relationships but does not necessarily propose a horizontal partnership (Babaci-Wilhite, Geo-Jaja, & Lou, 2012; Liu, 2014). Some scholars point out that the reciprocity in the traditional Chinese notion of guanxi (‘relationship’) does not necessarily mean a horizontal relationship but often means a vertical relationship, such as that between the ruler and the ruled or the parent and the child. Historically, the subject countries had paid tribute to China, and in return for that, they enjoyed the benefit of high culture and advanced knowledge from the Middle Kingdom, China. Applying this memory of the political system in Chinese history, Lengauer and Chan unanimously argued that in the reciprocal aid relationship, China expects recipient countries to provide resources and diplomatic or commercial benefits to China, in return for which they receive aid (Chan, 2013, pp. 11–15; Lengauer, 2011, pp. 42–43). It is an Asian version of a patron-client relationship, in which the rulers are responsible for educating the ruled (Lengauer, 2011, p. 44). What Is Unique about the ‘Chinese Model’? As reviewed here, China has a strong drive for demonstrating its uniqueness. In this globalized world, it would be difficult to find a nation-state whose political and economic system and the philosophy behind it is completely insulated from the influence from other societies. Therefore, the constituting elements of the so-called Chinese model are familiar to, at least, Asian observers. The developmental model that is led by a centralized bureaucracy is common to the so-called four East Asian tigers, countries that achieved rapid economic growth in the 1980s. An aid package emphasizing private sector and infrastructure development is what China received after WWII from traditional donors, particularly Japan (Wang, 2012, pp. 189–205). Trust in education and human resource development is seen across countries with a Confucian tradition. What is fundamentally different in China from neighbouring countries would be the indifference towards aligning with the existing paradigm. While South Korea and Japan have been trying to modify or repackage their aid programmes to fit the agreed-upon framework of traditional donors since they joined OECD-DAC, China is not bothered by the framework. It rather tries to highlight the differences in a strategic manner. The desire to exercise soft power gives a very different flavour to Chinese aid in general, and its education and human resource development programmes in particular, by grafting the patron-client structure to the traditional holistic notion of education.

India: A History of Nonalignment and Geopolitics As Tilak (2016) argues in this volume, regardless of the widespread assumption that India has recently ‘emerged’ from recipient status to that of provider of technical and financial assistance, the Indian government traces the origin of its overseas assistance back to the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). This movement developed from the Asia-Africa Conference held

in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. After a few years’ preparation for institutionalization, in 1961 the first Conference of Non-aligned Heads of State or Government was convened, with representatives from 25 countries (Non-aligned Movement, 2015).5 India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was among the founding members of NAM, together with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2012). It is symbolic that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has recently published a document on NAM not only to overview it but also to revisit its historical significance and principles in today’s context. According to this document, the validity of the 10 principles agreed upon at Bandung in 1955 was confirmed with some modifications in the 14th Summit in Havana, Cuba, in 2006. Among the principles consistent throughout these 50 years are unity and solidarity between all its members while respecting diversity, self-determination of peoples and rejection of coercion and hegemonic domination, and nonintervention or noninterference in the internal affairs of another country (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2012, pp. 1–7). Originally, these principles emerged in the struggle to gain independence from colonialism. Therefore self-determination and nonintervention were the shared political agenda among NAM member countries or territories, which aimed to eliminate control and interference by the colonial powers. Unity and solidarity were the strategy of these countries to confront the powerful states collectively without being fragmented. During the Cold War era, the group referred to itself as the third pole of the international discourse, rejecting alignment with the two dominant blocs of the East and the West. As the Indian Ministry of External Affairs itself admits, the raison d’être of NAM seemed to be lost with the end of Cold War. However, after a period of lying low in the 1990s, it rediscovered its role to provide alternative channels for diplomatic or economic negotiation. ‘The third world’ was a category promoted by NAM to defend the member states’ interest against external domination, and it has been accepted in the West as a close synonym for ‘developing countries’. Today, the principles and history of NAM are revisited by the member states as the backbone of their proactive actions for constituting the third pole in the international scene. As one of the founding members of NAM, India would have found it natural to situate its overseas development assistance in this historical and ideological context. As a donor, in fiscal year 2013/2014, the Indian government budgeted US$1.4 billion for development assistance (total of grants, loans and technical cooperation), which is close to the outlay of Finland (US$1.44 billion), 17th of the DAC member countries after South Korea, with US$1.76 billion (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2015). Therefore, as for the size of contribution, India has already reached the equivalent of some traditional donors. Still, the Indian government does not issue many policy documents on development cooperation. As discussed in detail in the chapter by Tilak, there was no central unit to coordinate the development assistance programmes operated by different ministries and offices until 2012, when the Development Partnership Administration was formed within the Ministry of External Affairs. In addition, India is still a large recipient of ODA while ‘emerging’ as a donor. In

2012, the amount of ODA it received was US$1.691 million, making it the 16th biggest recipient in the world. Still, its aid dependency has decreased sharply, as it was the 8th biggest recipient as late as 2008 (United Nations, 2015, p. 17). Given this situation, while there are abundant documents on received aid, those on provided aid are limited and tend to be specific to bilateral aid agreements between Indian and recipient governments. Therefore, to know the rationales and principles of Indian ODA, I looked into not only government documents but also publications by think tanks working closely with the government on development cooperation. The few documents I could place my hands on unanimously claimed that India is not a new donor, referring to the history of nonalignment (Indian Development Cooperation Research [IDCR], 2013, pp. 2–3; 2015, p. 1; Sharan, Campbell, & Rubin, 2013, p. 3). The principles of cooperation that are highlighted in relation to this history are equal partnership, solidarity, and demand-driven assistance. For example, Ambassador P. S. Raghavan, Special Secretary, Development Partnership Administration (DPA), Ministry of External Affairs, stated the following in a meeting titled ‘India’s Foreign Policy: New Initiatives for Development Partnership’: The DPA is based on the philosophy of South-South cooperation, in which no country is a donor or recipient, but ‘sharers’ of each other’s developmental experiences. The DPA is concerned that any cooperation agreement that India enters into should continue to reflect the Indian philosophy of development cooperation i.e. demand-driven, nonprescriptive and matching the development aspirations of the country in which projects are being carried out. (Raghavan, 2013, p. 3; emphasis added)

South-South cooperation, highlighted as one of the nonconventional modes of international cooperation in the Busan High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, is repeatedly mentioned as the form of cooperation that represents the idea of India’s sharing developmental experience with peer developing countries. India identifies itself as a sharer but not a giver. As the statement by Ambassador Raghavan suggests, this philosophy of solidarity-based development assistance will often lead to the criticism – either in an inhibited or an aggressive tone – against Western ‘aid’ that comes with conditionalities and may cause harm rather than benefit. Sharan et al. (2013) described the proceedings at a round-table meeting on India’s development cooperation held in 2013: [The participants discussed] the ways in which vested interests of donor nations can distort development assistance. In this respect, there was support for India’s approach of ‘demand-driven aid’ that responds to the priorities of developing countries …. They also outlined a vision of development aid (including trade, investment and technology transfer) that offers an alternative to the OECD definition of aid. It was argued that India’s approach is more transparent than that of Western states, whose aid policies may be perceived to reflect hidden agendas relating to economic and geo-strategic interest. (Sharan et al., 2013, p. 6; emphasis added)

This discussion reveals to us another characteristic of Indian cooperation: It is not restricted to ODA but includes trade and investment in its scope as well. Ambassador Shyam Saran, a former foreign secretary and chairman of the Research and Information System for Developing Countries, argued that ‘promoting Indian investment in other developing countries has become a major component of South-South cooperation’ (Saran, 2012, p. 5). Since the promotion of trade and investment is considered to be mutually beneficial for India and

counterpart countries, measures such as the 2008 Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme for the 49 Least Developed Countries or export guarantees for Indian enterprises are also considered a part of cooperation. Trade interest in South-South cooperation is also closely linked with geopolitics, security, and resource diplomacy. For example, assistance with capacity development and infrastructure building for basic social services in Afghanistan are justified, on the one hand, as a means to ‘pave the way for India’s private sector to find a market for its goods and services in Afghanistan’, and on the other hand, to mitigate the ‘security concern’ of the Afghan fragility and presence of militant powers that may spread to bordering India (IDCR, 2013, p. 12). Since 2000, Afghanistan has been the second largest recipient of Indian development assistance (total of grants, technical cooperation, and loans) after Bhutan, with its accumulated contribution said to reach as much as US$2 billion (IDCR, 2013, p. 11). Access to resources and commercial benefits are common interests of Indian assistance programmes for different regions. In addition, assistance to the nearby countries in South and Southeast Asia is often discussed as a matter of geopolitics, while that given to Africa is defined according to the history of nonalignment (Sharan et al., 2013, p. 3). Particularly in Asia, rivalry against China, given its growing investment in the region and the tensions in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, drives India to strengthen its bilateral commercial and security cooperation with countries like Vietnam and the Maldives (IDCR, 2013, pp. 7–10). Given that India is still a developing country with various domestic issues to attend to, the balance between domestic and international development issues is a matter of serious concern. Therefore, to gain popular support for providing overseas assistance, it is repeatedly pointed out that public awareness should be raised through partnerships with CSOs and academics (Raghavan, 2013, p. 3; Sharan et al., 2013, pp. 5–13). At the same time, to make sense of participating in international cooperation with India’s limited resources, participation is naturally linked tightly with national interests such as security, trade, and diplomacy. Compared with China’s, India’s challenge against Western hegemony is less vocal, probably because India still relies heavily on aid from the West. Unlike Thailand, its South-South cooperation is not linked with the concept of triangular cooperation, a form of technical cooperation to lower-income developing countries with financial support from the multilateral organizations or donors with bigger financial capacities. Indian cooperation is largely bilateral, with a smaller proportion provided through multilateral channels. While it is difficult to specify the amount of contribution to different multilateral organizations, India increasingly tries to work through multilateral channels other than the UN or Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), such as the African Union or the Southern African Development Community (IDCR, 2013, p. 2). Here is a sensitive equilibrium. On the one hand, India has a desire to exercise a global influence through the channel of the UN, of which India is a founding member. One of the key principles of NAM, which is maintained even today, is to foster multilateralism in trust of the central role of the UN (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2012, pp. 4–5). Therefore, the purpose of NAM is not to reject the existing dominant multilateral structure but to object to unilateral dominance by the

West within it. In addition, India depends on aid provided through traditional multilateral and bilateral channels from DAC member countries. It actively participates in the global development discourse wearing the cap of recipient. When one witnesses the vocal presence of Indian delegates in the regional and global forum to discuss educational development, it doesn’t seem that India is also providing financial support in a size comparable to that of some DAC countries. At the same time, the South-South cooperation for the peer developing countries through bilateral and nontraditional multilateral channels continues to serve the philosophy of solidarity as well as the national interests of geopolitical and economic stability. India is fully committed to the achievement of the MDGs and global consensus building through the UN system, while it criticizes the agenda-driven interventions by Western donors into the domestic issues of sovereign states. As Tilak argues in his chapter in this volume, India does not have a large programme for educational cooperation except for scholarships. However, similar to other Asian donors discussed here, the whole idea of South-South cooperation is based on trust in the support for capacity building and sharing the experience, which is, according to the Asian notion, pretty educational.

Thailand: Sub-Regional Coordinator for ASEAN Integration Unlike the three northeast Asian donors whose financial commitment to international development cooperation was ranked 4th, 6th and 16th in 2013 – Japan, China and South Korea, respectively – Thailand is a much smaller donor. In 2012, its ODA was recorded as US$37 million, which is approximately 0.01 per cent of its GDP (Miller & Prapha, 2013), 3 per cent of Korea’s ODA, and 0.5 per cent of Japan’s ODA (OECD, 2015). It doesn’t claim to do South-South cooperation with its own financial resources much, but it does a lot of triangular cooperation. Although it was only after the 1990s that Thailand became a donor in the financial sense, it has been providing technical assistance to other developing countries, mostly those it borders. Thailand uses the form of cooperation called by such names as NorthSouth-South cooperation, partnership cooperation, or triangular cooperation to supplement the financial contribution of bilateral and multilateral traditional donors with its technical knowhow and knowledge to share with other developing countries. Against the popular label of ‘emerging donor’ attached to countries that are shifting from recipient to donor of aid, the Thai government promotes itself as a ‘development partner’: [I]n view of its role currently undertaken in the realm of development cooperation, Thailand sees itself as a ‘development partner’, rather than an ‘emerging donor’. Having undergone 40 years of experience in receiving foreign aid, Thailand well recognizes the importance of the partner countries’ demands and appropriate technology transferred through aid programme for improving its development level in various sectors that help eliminate social, economic, and environmental problems, and ultimately lead to a stable growth and sustainable development. (Thailand International Cooperation Agency [TICA], 2015a, p. 21; emphasis added)

China and India also do not appreciate the label of ‘emerging donor’ and prefer to emphasize that what they do is South-South cooperation based on partnership with recipient

countries. The egalitarianism accompanied by postcolonial sentiment that is found in the arguments by Chinese and Indian governments does not exist in Thai statements. Unlike these countries, Thailand does not try to highlight that it has a longer history of development aid than Western observers would imagine or that there is a profound historico-philosophical basis for its international cooperation. Instead, Thailand presents itself as a partner for development in a more functional sense. Partnership in the context of Thai ODA is multifaceted. The partners include traditional donors, recipient countries, countries at a similar developmental stage as Thailand, and private-sector companies. The Thai government proactively establishes bilateral partnership agreements with traditional donors such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Singapore, Sweden and the United States. It also has partnership programmes with multilateral donors including the Colombo Plan Secretariat, the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF (TICA, 2009, p. 6, 2010, pp. 27–29, 2015a). Through the partnership with these donors, Thailand can learn from their experience in providing aid and in economic and social development, knowledge that Thailand will then share with countries that are receiving triangular cooperation. Such an approach is also said to be in line with the principle of aid effectiveness in the DAC Paris Declaration, as it helps Thailand to harmonize its ODA with that of the donor with whom it works (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Thai Government, 2015; TICA, 2009, p. 6). At the other end of triangular cooperation, Thailand has also established various bilateral and multilateral partnership programmes with recipient countries, particularly in Indochina. For example, the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy is a framework to bridge the economic gap among Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand. There are also Greater Mekong Sub-region cooperation and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, which basically share the same objective to minimize the gap in economic and social well-being and infrastructure conditions among ASEAN member countries so that the economic integration of ASEAN will go smoothly. The major recipients of aid under these initiatives are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. The partnership approach is considered to be suitable when the sub-region contains a country like Myanmar that has long been under economic sanctions imposed by donor countries and cannot receive direct bilateral ODA from traditional donors (TICA, 2015a). These four countries also receive 60 per cent of the Thai bilateral ODA. Whereas, Thai ODA distributed to countries outside Southeast Asia is much smaller in proportion, out of a relatively small total amount: 18 per cent to South Asia and the Middle East, 8.2 per cent to Africa and 3.7 per cent to Latin America (TICA, 2015a). This fact indicates that Thailand plays the role of mediating between the donors and recipients in the Indochina sub-region. On the one hand, it helps traditional donors to design programmes well fitted to local needs and contexts to improve the efficiency of technology transfer. On the other hand, it leads sub-regional development by sharing its own experience and knowledge through various training programmes, study tours, and scholarships. As the government summarizes, the main missions of Thai cooperation are (1) promoting economic and social

development; (2) enhancing capacity development; (3) exchanging knowledge and experience and (4) fostering partnership and multi-collaboration, with particular focus on the Indochina sub-region (TICA, 2015b, p. 3). Sharing experience through training programmes, study tours and scholarships is considered to be a more effective means for the capacity development of these countries than field-based operation of projects, as Thailand has limited financial resources for field projects to make visible impacts (TICA, 2015a). The focus on sub-regional development also leads us to another type of partnership, one with the private sector. Providing an admittedly small amount of ODA, the Thai government points out that FDI and remittance flows to neighbouring countries are considerably greater than ODA. According to Miller and Prapha, as of 2011, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam received an estimated US$1.898 million in FDI, US$394 million in remittance flows, and US$21 million in ODA (2013, p. 8). A considerable number of migrant workers from these countries, working in Thailand, other Southeast Asian countries, and the Middle East, remit to their families at home. FDIs from within and outside would push up the economy of the subregion as a whole. Therefore, as a basic condition for attracting investments and achieving economic growth, Thailand is deeply concerned about the gap in basic socioeconomic conditions and infrastructure among countries in Indochina, because such a gap will become a ‘weak link’ in the network of ‘regional public goods’ that will be the condition for further development of the whole sub-region (TICA, 2009, pp. 47–48). Capacity Development and Education for Regional Integration As other Asian donors do, Thailand also emphasizes the importance of sharing its own development experience and knowledge with less developed countries. At the same time, it does not harbour any strong desire to promote its own development model. The philosophical characteristics of Thai cooperation are expressed in the Knowledge Sharing Programs done by the Thai government itself, not as a part of triangular cooperation. The Thai government promotes a set of ethical principles domestically, called the ‘sufficiency economy’, that it is now applying to international development cooperation. According to a brochure prepared by the Thai government for a training programme for government officials of Francophone African countries, the sufficiency economy is a philosophy ‘devised by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej. [It] … stresses the middle path as an overriding principle for appropriate conduct by the populace at all levels’ (TICA, n.d.). Instead of competing to gain more at the expense of others, this philosophy emphasizes moderation and humility. Someone who knows the local context well and uses appropriate technology can achieve a moderate path for development. The sufficiency economy also leads to the idea that industrialization should be aimed in a sustainable manner by carefully managing the risk and avoiding damage to the natural environment (TICA, 2015b, pp. 29–31). Such holistic and ethical ways of conceptualizing development, and their presentation as attitudinal principles for the officials of developingcountry governments, hints at the common Asian philosophy that high officials should be equipped not only with techniques and knowledge but also with the moral capacity to lead the

public. As discussed in relation to Japanese aid for capacity development, Asian donors tend to believe transferred technology cannot take root unless the ethics and committed attitude of the experts who teach the technology are also transferred to and internalized by the participants in development aid projects. Nevertheless, Thailand is a small donor whose main function is not to conduct its own aid programmes but to supplement traditional donors with training and study tours in triangular cooperation. Therefore, its unique idea about development is not pushed to the forefront of the development discourse, although it exists as an undercurrent. Education is one of the priority areas of Thailand’s bilateral ODA, together with health, the environment and agriculture. The justification for this priority comes not from the philosophy of the sufficiency economy or a desire for capacity development but from concern about the gap in ‘public goods’ among countries in the sub-region. Everyone should benefit from public goods such as education and health care, which will be the basis for equitable social and human development (TICA, 2009, p. 47). Such an argument is also made in relation to the global agenda that the support for public goods also contributes to the achievement of MDGs. As we have already seen, the concern about the gap in public goods in the sub-region is not purely a humanitarian one but largely a matter of economic and political stability. Better educated human resources will attract more FDIs in lower-income developing countries of the sub-region. Also, increased domestic employment will decrease the labour migration to Thailand, which is causing a tension between Thai and migrant workers. In the case of Thailand, therefore, human resource development through knowledge sharing and bilateral aid for neighbouring countries in the education sector are determined by different dynamics; the former is by triangular cooperation with traditional donors and recipient countries, while the latter is by concern for regional balance and stability. At the same time, both kinds of educational cooperation in the broad sense are oriented towards ASEAN integration, with Thailand as the leader and script writer of the development paths of the subregion.

HORIZONTAL NETWORKS IN THE REGION As discussed in the introduction to this volume, the post-2015 discourse is shaped by a web of horizontal and vertical bodies that represent voices of stakeholders on the ground. The warp threads of the tapestry are woven by the representatives of the states, whose decision-making structure is vertical along the ministerial divisions. The results of the decision are announced through the channel of official representatives of the government. At the same time, the tapestry cannot be completed without the weft treads, the horizontal network of actors who are driven by missions or professional concerns cutting across the political or economic agendas of the state governments. Typical examples of such networks would be professional organizations like teachers’ associations or federations of NGOs. We have examined the philosophies and motivations for international development

cooperation among five Asian states. This section will turn to the horizontal networks in this region: the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE). The former is the network of ministries of education in southeast Asia6 and the latter is a regional association of more than 200 CSOs and individuals working for quality improvement of education. Since SEAMEO is an intergovernmental association, it may look to be more vertical than horizontal. However, it is a voluntary but not formal representative of constituent governments and focuses on networking, knowledge sharing, and capacity development of member states and their institutions. In this sense, SEAMEO is more horizontal in its nature and may influence national policies on educational development through the ministries of education of member states, but it is not directly involved in their decision-making.

SEAMEO: Intergovernmental Forum for Regional Networking in Education SEAMEO was established in 1965 with the mission to promote regional cooperation and partnership by providing forums among policymakers and experts and to conduct research on issues of common regional concern in the areas of education, culture, and science. Under a council consisting of the education ministers of member countries, it has its secretariat in Bangkok and 21 specialist institutions across member countries that undertake training and research programmes in various fields of education, science and culture. As for education, 21st century skills (character education, entrepreneurship education, information and communication technology, language and literacy, and science and technology literacy) are among the priority areas, together with EFA, higher education, and education for sustainable development (Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization [SEAMEO], 2015). SEAMEO College, launched in 2013, is a key programme to serve as the regional platform for sharing ideas for educational innovation in terms of curricula, teaching and learning methods, and new educational technologies. While it provides the forum for strategic dialogues for education ministers of member countries with internationally acknowledged educators and scholars, it also accumulates country case studies, conducts training programmes for government officials, and carries out research to promote educational innovation. Depending on the specific topics of studies and training programmes it conducts, SEAMEO College works in collaboration with SEAMEO specialist institutions. As a regional association of the ministers of education, it is natural for SEAMEO to prioritize educational issues according to their perceived needs in the economic, cultural, and educational contexts of Southeast Asia. For SEAMEO, as was the case with Thai ODA, ASEAN integration is the prime concern. For ASEAN member countries, the year 2015 is important not only because of the revision of Millennium Development Goals. It is also, and more importantly, the year of ASEAN economic integration to create a single market and production base by reducing the barriers to economic interaction such as trade and investment. Given this context, as a high official of one of the specialized institutions of SEAMEO

commented in an interview,7 education tends to be discussed ‘not for education’s sake, but … driven by economics’ (Interviewee 24). The official continued: One major way of developing the country’s human resources is through education. [For that purpose], there’s the [role expected to be played by] basic education, as well as career preparation, vocational-technical, and of course, academic professional preparation. Since ASEAN integration is driven by [the demand for] shared and expanded Asian markets, and then, of course, [it accompanies] labour and workforce mobility. Then all countries would struggle to keep abreast with the others so that we will not have a problem when … a qualified teacher in the Philippines moves to Thailand and cannot work there as a professional, because of the limited preparation they would have, or different systems adopted. Those are among the practical concerns. (Interviewee 24; similar comments by Interviewee 25; emphasis added)

As this statement indicates, an integrated ASEAN will create a large market, which is expected to encourage further FDI. At the same time, the foreseen increase in labour migration requires standardization of educational credentials and the quality of skills among workers trained in different national education systems but with the same level of certificate. The mobility is not only among workers but also among students. Internationalization and networking of higher education institutions in ASEAN member countries, and the compatibility of their systems, are also considered to be significant issues (Jeradechakul, 2015; Waitayangkoon, 2014). SEAMEO also highlights the importance of international cooperation for basic education and fundamental systemic reforms for countries with less developed education systems, such as Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014; Shaeffer, 2014, p. 14). Although the organization’s documents refer to the global agendas of the MDGs and EFA, the major drive for supporting basic education in member countries is concern about uneven development, which would clog the resource flows and damage the smooth economic growth of the sub-region. The humanitarian cause for fulfilling the basic human needs is important but comes secondary to the economic one. With the aim of creating a unified ASEAN community by 2020, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, passed in 2003, raised three pillars to constitute the community: political and security, economic, and sociocultural (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, pp. 1–3). Although education is the foundation for all three pillars to establish the ASEAN community, it is raised as a priority sector for the third pillar, the ‘ASEAN sociocultural community’, to nurture human resources for sustained development in a harmonious and people-centred ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014). In this context of ASEAN integration, the term ‘21st-century skills’ is frequently used. The term is popularly used to loosely overarch the cognitive, noncognitive and interpersonal skills (so-called soft skills) that are required for individuals to live well in the globalized, information-rich 21st century world by selecting the right set of information to grasp the situation, by thinking critically and by acting for sustainable and productive lives, with tolerance and understanding for diversities. Adapting this broad concept, Shaeffer listed the following as the areas of 21st century skills for citizens of ASEAN member countries: (1) moral education (e.g. character development and democracy education); (2) global citizenship education; (3) critical thinking, teamwork, problem-solving, entrepreneurship; (4) media, information and communication technology, and financial literacy; (5) conflict resolution, peace building, and social cohesion and (6) mitigation of climate change and disaster risks

(2014, p. 23). Talking of 21st century skills does not provide any concrete picture about how educational practices in each member country would be designed. In fact, the educational practices reported by the representatives of the member countries at various SEAMEO conferences are quite diverse. As one of the interviewees stated, SEAMEO does ‘soft advocacy’ by sharing successful experiences and ideas for innovation (Interviewee 24). In SEAMEO’s documents, the idea of ‘sharing experience’ is stated repeatedly, similar to the Asian donor countries discussed earlier. Unlike national aid agencies, for a regional network like SEAMEO, there is no nationalistic connotation of ‘sharing’ to promote the development model of one’s own society. Instead of looking into history for lessons or uniqueness, SEAMEO staff emphasize its role in innovation and providing the forum for identifying the common future of the ASEAN community and paths to reach it from the educational perspective. SEAMEO’s workshop in January 2014, titled ‘Post-2015 Education Scenarios and PostEFA Education Agenda in Southeast Asia’ (SEAMEO, 2015), was attended by ministers and high officials from 11 member countries; staff members of SEAMEO centres, secretariat and affiliate institutes and international resource people. The workshop was intended to (1) examine global and regional discourse on MDGs, EFA and the post-2015 discourse; (2) review respective country cases and challenges; (3) identify the gaps between the discourse and the realities and (4) determine the post-2015 education agenda specific to Southeast Asia, including the roles of stakeholders and mechanisms for implementation. Participants even had a group discussion about future scenarios facilitated by a specialist in future studies invited from the United States. Given the diversity of situations and educational needs among member countries, the conference report does not provide any clear, streamlined scenario or action plan for beyond 2015. Still, it is notable that SEAMEO tries to come up with uniquely Southeast Asian approaches to educational development for the post-2015 era through its roles of facilitation, research and training. Skills for the 21st century is a symbolic term to represent the desire to identify the catalytic roles of education in formulating the ASEAN identity through ‘the paradigm shift from the old thinking of integration into the new … picture of Southeast Asia’ (Interviewee 25). In Asia, there is a certain tendency to look outside of the classroom or outside of formal education, listening first to the learners themselves to search for better ways of teaching and learning. In relation to that idea, Interviewee 24 pointed out the communal nature of learning in Asia, citing the example of distance education programmes. According to him, such programmes are more effective when SEAMEO invites participants in a group rather than as individuals, because in that way, people learn collectively through intra-group dynamics (Interviewee 24). It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine how much such arguments about Asian characteristics of education are based on evidence or rooted in cultural practices. What I would like to highlight here is the expressed desire to find commonalities in the subregion. What is characteristic about SEAMEO is that such a desire is directed not so much towards re-examination of the past, but rather towards foreseeing and designing the future. The interviewee also suggested that the notion of education represented in EFA is old but

SEAMEO wants to find something more innovative and meaningful in the Southeast Asian context. What exactly are the innovative agendas? That question is yet to be answered. For SEAMEO, the global post-2015 discourse is the momentum to call the attention of ministries of education and other stakeholders in member countries to the important role of education in formulating a common sub-regional identity and preparing a high-quality workforce for successful ASEAN integration. Therefore, when they use the term post-2015, what SEAMEO members are talking about is often regional rather than global. Of course, SEAMEO sends representatives to various conferences hosted by multilateral organizations or governments of other regions, who will report back to the constituent governments. At the same time, there is limited, if not no, intention of leveraging the global discourse by proactively demonstrating regional perspectives. In light of the rather confused picture presented by the drafts of the post-2015 education agenda so far, it seems not so clear whether SEAMEO can get any useful insights from it, as much as it is not clear what Southeast Asia can or should contribute to it.

ASPBAE: Regional Body for Coordinating/Representing CSOs A fundamental difference of ASPBAE from donor countries and the intergovernmental network entity discussed above is that ASPBAE does not represent any governmental concerns at either the national or the regional level. In the case of SEAMEO, even though it is a horizontal network without a strong enforcement mechanism for the ideas it promotes, what its members discuss or research is in line with the issues that ministries of education and the governments of ASEAN member countries in general are interested in. ASPBAE, in contrast, is not accountable to governments. It is accountable to more than 200 member CSOs working in the Asia-Pacific region. It is also a member to the Global Campaign for Education, a global CSO federation that was discussed extensively in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’. In fact, ASPBAE is one of the most active and well organized advocates of the educational causes among the Global Campaign for Education members. The broadly shared mission of these organizations is ‘to promote quality education for all and transformative and liberating, lifelong adult education and learning’ (Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education [ASPBAE], 2015). The mission of ASPBAE is threefold: to provide training courses, consultations and workshops for building the capacity of member CSOs; to conduct advocacy linking global discussion on the issues of educational development with national processes of educational planning and practices and to build strategic partnerships for educational advocacy at the global, regional and national levels, with national education coalitions, teachers’ unions, campaign networks and other civil society groups and institutions in order to hold governments and the international donor community accountable for meeting education targets and commitments (ASPBAE, 2014). The philosophical basis of its advocacy is that education is a

fundamental human right, and governments bear the prime responsibility to ensure access to free, compulsory basic education of good quality to all citizens. Therefore, ASPBAE’s and its member organizations’ perspective is not influenced by economic, geopolitical or historicocultural valuations of education, as was the case with other entities discussed above. Instead, they are driven by a common conviction of the universal importance of the right to quality basic education. In this sense, ASPBAE is a typical example of a civil society network, which Kelly describes as ‘nodes in webs of experts and other committed groups encircling’ the issue of educational rights and playing active roles when campaigns are called for (2007, pp. 85–86). According to interviews with a couple of executive members, there is a common understanding that ASPBAE is to coordinate CSOs working at the national level so that they will be updated on the issues and agenda discussed at the global level and able to lobby to achieve the agenda in their respective countries. Since education is considered a public good that has to be provided by the government, it is important that CSOs monitor governmental policymaking and implementation, and ensure that the educational service is delivered along the lines of global consensus. For CSOs to fulfil these roles, updating information, sensitizing people on the importance of issues, coordinated research-based lobbying and leadership are important capacities to be developed. Therefore, one of the executive members of ASPBAE whom I interviewed said that half of his working time is spent in consultations with national coalitions and their member CSOs, while he constantly flies around the globe to actively take part in advocacy not only at the regional level but also through the CSO channels at the global level, such as the Global Campaign for Education or Collective Consultations of NGOs hosted by UNESCO (Interviewee 16). While a large part of ASPBAE’s member national CSO federations are from the Global South, the organization also involves Northern CSOs, which try to work in partnership with governments and philanthropies for research collaboration or financial support. ASPBAE also works closely with northern organization outside of AsiaPacific region, which includes DVV International, a Germany-based international CSO specialized in adult education; northern members of the Global Partnership for Education; the Dutch government; the Open Society Institutes; the Commonwealth Educational Fund and various UN organizations (ASPBAE, 2013). From its establishment in 1964, promotion of formal and nonformal adult education has been a key mandate of ASPBAE, together with the achievement of universal compulsory basic education. Also, regarding the emergent post-2015 development agenda, ASPBAE was one of the forces that advocated for education to be a stand-alone goal, instead of being incorporated under a broad social development goal. Unlike the Global Campaign for Education, which has Education International, the global federation of teachers’ unions, as a member, ASPBAE does not involve teachers’ unions directly. Still, many national CSO coalitions under ASPBAE either involve teachers’ unions directly or work closely with them. Therefore ASPBAE also highlights teachers’ issues, including opportunities for training, a good working environment, financial and nonfinancial incentives and various other conditions for effective teaching and learning activities. Further, in recent years, the issue of financing educational services has

received growing attention. Given that the scope of basic education has expanded to include early childhood and lower secondary education, while the amount of ODA for the education sector is decreasing in total, the mechanisms for financing basic education are considered to be an important issue of discussion at both the global and national levels. In this context, with the financial support of the Open Society Foundations, ASPBAE has conducted case studies of education privatization and public-private partnerships in India, Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The outcomes of this research will be used as the basis for policy briefs, position papers and policy recommendations on the issues of privatization and public-private partnerships in education (ASPBAE, 2014, pp. 15–17). One of the characteristics of ASPBAE as the regional coalition of CSOs is that its member organizations are not only in recipient countries but also in donor countries. This diversity of positions in terms of development aid and conditions of educational development is peculiar to Asia compared with any other regions in the world. Having both Northern and Southern CSOs under the same framework, ASPBAE has North-South contrast within itself. On the one hand, the CSO coalitions in countries like Japan, Australia or South Korea are expected to approach their ministries of foreign affairs, finance and education to draw their resources and attention to humanitarian aid for universal basic education and lifelong learning in other countries. Also, most of these countries’ member CSOs are implementing field-based projects in developing countries, mobilizing donations from individual donors and from public and private funding agencies. On the other hand, the coalitions in developing countries are advocating for more financial resources from governmental and nongovernmental channels and to improve the policies and their implementation so as to achieve universal quality basic education in their own societies. As one of the interviewees stated, the broadened scope of the post-2015 development agenda requires both developing and developed countries to strive to mitigate the social gaps that exist not only between countries but also between groups within a country (Interviewee 16). The fact that there are CSOs from both receiving and providing sides of development aid makes Asian civil society discourse the miniature of global civil society. As discussed in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, having diverse member organizations from both North and South, while sharing the common broad framework of promoting the rights-based approach to achieving equitable, quality education, it is an inherent challenge for this kind of broad-based coalition to legitimately represent the whole CSO community.

INTERPLAY AMONG NATIONAL INTERESTS, UNIVERSAL VALUES AND REGIONALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-2015 DISCUSSIONS

The actors involved in the regional discourse on educational development are diverse, including state and nonstate actors, conventional and emerging donors, horizontal regional networks of CSOs and ministries of education, mission-driven advocates of the universal value of a rights-based education and promoters of national interests. The post-2015 process is a key momentum for them to converge their attention on the common arena in an effort either to leverage the decision-making process to mainstream their areas of interest or to use this global movement to review their domestic or regional issues. While it is certain that the year 2015 had a crucial meaning in the international educational development discourse, the dynamics of Asian actors had started to change even before that. After all, for national governments, the discourse on the global agenda, no matter how influential it will be in the coming 15 years, is like an air battle that is not deeply rooted in bureaucratic or political concerns. Analysis of the policy documents disclosed the national interests and self-images of Asian donors, which provide the basis of their mode of political interaction and operation of international development programmes. The donors examined in this study look into their own history and culture to find the sources for legitimizing their unique position. While most of them are revising their aid policies for the post-2015 period, such policy changes should not be captured solely as a matter of adapting global trends to the national framework but also as the balance between national interests and the estimated responsibility for global issues. In creating the self-image of the country, the region serves as the imagined category of distinctiveness, which is loosely related to the practices of these countries as donors like a floating cloud. While the Asianism claimed in diplomatic contexts is to a large extent imaginary, in practice the region has become an important unit in the process of global consensus building. Therefore, in August 2014, admittedly as a key regional forum to discuss the post-EFA agenda proposed in the Muscat Agreement two months earlier, the Asia and Pacific Regional Education Conference (APREC) was held in Bangkok, Thailand, organized by the UNESCO Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau of Education in collaboration with Thailand’s Ministry of Education. The Bangkok Statement, which was adopted at the end of this conference, was treated as the unanimous input of the Asia-Pacific region to the global discourse. In sum, on the one hand, Asia is an ambiguous category whose boundaries have been redrawn constantly, based on the perceived power and location of the societies to which the person or the group belongs in the world. On the other hand, as administrative categories – plural because the method of categorization varies according to multilateral structures – the Asia and Asia-Pacific regions are enhancing their importance in the global hierarchy of consensus building, as a stage to funnel the diverse voices from the member countries and the actors from civil society and the private sector. This section will summarize the common historico-cultural traits of aid policies of Asian donor countries in relation to educational development. It will also highlight where their policy frameworks divert from each other and why. After that, I will turn to the function played by the region as the stage between the national and the global in the post-EFA consultation process. Some observation on the interactions among delegates at APREC will be referred to,

to untangle the actual mode of consensus building at the regional level.

Asia in the Imagination: Common Historical and Cultural Bases for the Philosophies of Asian Donors Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the five countries and two regional entities that were reviewed above. While SEAMEO and ASPBAE are network organizations that horizontally link member states and organizations, the five donor countries have a more hierarchical structure, composed of ministries that are divided according to the domains of work, and of parliaments where statesmen represent their constituencies. Statements by the education sub-government are not purely driven by educational considerations because the sub-government is part of the government, which is a kind of syndicate of sub-governments unified under overarching national interests. Similarly, the ODA sub-government is not independent of national interests either. Putting aside SEAMEO, which is the network of education ministers of the member countries, ASPBAE is fundamentally different in the sense that it is driven by the shared mission of promoting equitable quality education regardless of the nationalities of the members. Table 1. Characteristics of Asian Actors.

Among the five donor states, one of the commonalities is the emphasis on partnership and sharing of experience. The states also value initiatives from the side of the recipients of assistance. To take the initiative for their own development, countries have to develop the capacity to plan and absorb external assistance in a constructive manner. These ideas are mutually linked and presented in close relationship with the states’ history and culture. The origin of development cooperation in India goes back to the Non-aligned Movement, which was founded to foster the solidarity of the Third World countries. Therefore, it is claimed that the relationship between the supporting and the supported is based on the principle of equality and mutuality. Similar logic applies to the principle of win-win cooperation by China. China also reminds us that it is not a donor that ‘emerged’ recently, but it started its overseas assistance as early as the 1950s for fellow Communist countries. Japan has pointed out for many years that it was a recipient of aid before turning to a donor. Therefore, its assistance is not to impose prescriptions, but to suggest options based on its own developmental experience. South Korea adopts a similar logic of recipient-turned donor. These countries, either overtly or tacitly, contrast their partnership-based approach to aid with that of Western countries, which is prescriptive and based on hierarchical relations between the donor and the recipient. The counteractive arguments to the conventional aid architecture are stronger among non-DAC, nontraditional donors, namely India and China, although similar sentiments to differentiate themselves from Western counterparts are recognizable among South Korea and Japan, the DAC donors. Thailand also highlights its partnership with neighbouring recipient countries in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s stance towards Western donors is more neutral than that of the other four donors, partly because it presents itself as the hub of triangular cooperation, mediating between the multilateral and traditional donors who provide funds and the recipient countries who receive technical support provided by Thailand, which conducts programmes with funds from other donors. The roots of the partnership approach and experience sharing are commonly found in the

modern history in which these five countries establish relationships with other countries, both less developed and more industrialized ones. At the same time, as an undercurrent, there are some philosophical traits from the ancient past that are common to the Indosphere and the Chinosphere. As discussed earlier, in these Asian spheres of civilization, a society is considered to exist in the harmony of the self and the universe. Maturity comes from introspective learning. Even when the stimuli are brought from outside, it is oneself and, in extension, the society itself that chooses and adapts them. Therefore, the best that outsiders can do is to catalyse the change by providing some seeds for inspiration without telling recipients which way to go. There is also a trust in the morality of the leaders of the states and functional neutrality of bureaucracy because they exist to serve the populace. To extend this philosophy about states and development, donors are not supposed to intervene in the domain of state sovereignty because the recipient’s policymakers and bureaucracy should have the capacity both morally and technically to choose good things for their people. Of course, such optimism is often betrayed even within their own countries, let alone recipient governments. Still, I should point this out as a background of Asian bilateralism, particularly that of China, which is often criticized for giving aid to satisfy the short-sighted demands of high officials and political leaders, such as construction of a gigantic presidential palace or parliament building, divorced from the lives of the large disadvantaged population. At the bottom of such aid is an attitude that the outsiders believe in the morality and instrumentality of the recipient government. The principle of mutuality between the supporter and the supported also makes the boundary between ODA and trade ambiguous. The notion that aid should be based on pure benevolence without any expectation of return benefit is foreign to many Asian societies. Asian pragmatism and orientation towards harmony are less likely to lead to a sense of guilt for expecting benefits in return for the aid, either in terms of economy, security, or diplomacy. The DAC framework, in contrast, draws a clear line between ODA and trade, and the bare national interests of donors tend to be suppressed in the Western aid discourse, although they may tacitly exist. The link between ODA and trade is overtly made in policy documents of India, China and Thailand. Japanese and South Korean documents make no such straightforward expression, but as pointed out earlier, in both countries, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider at least one of the roles of ODA to be to promote national interests, particularly trade interests. When it comes to education, in Asian traditional understanding, there is no universal truth or standard set of knowledge, but learning is always contextual and relational. As demonstrated earlier, the concept of education espoused by Asian donors tends to be broader than the so-called education sector, because any form of learning that develops learners’ moral and technical capacity can be education. That’s how capacity development is highlighted in the aid policies of Asian donors. A large part of such aid may not be categorized as aid to the education sector, but in the Asian conception is highly educational. In fact, China categorizes various training programmes and Chinese language teaching as part of educational aid, which is different from the DAC classification.

Within the formal education system, Asian donors tend to give heavy weight to TVET, which has been the stronghold of educational aid in Japan and South Korea, followed by higher education. Both countries, which are DAC donors, have gone through drastic reorientation of educational aid to increase aid for basic education in order to align with the bottom-up and rights-based trend of EFA and the MDGs. However, the inherent characteristic is still there and surfaces from time to time, as the chapters by Chung (2016) and by Yamada & Yoshida (2016) describe. Asian education tends to be more pragmatic and oriented towards the formation of a skilled workforce and leadership. China and India also highlight TVET and higher education. Another characteristic of educational ideas common to Asian countries is holism and morality. Although the purpose of education is to acquire practical skills and knowledge relevant to the context, it cannot be separated from morality. A person with knowledge but without moral capacity is not truly educated. Given this tradition, it would not have been a coincidence that two northeast Asian countries, Japan and South Korea, are the champions of two educational programmes that aim to change the attitudes and values of learners through processes not restricted to curricular-based education. Japan has backed programmes on education for sustainable development (ESD) and the decade of ESD (2005–2014), and South Korea is promoting global citizenship education (GCE). On the political front, there is a rivalry between countries to compete on similar ground within the broad field of education. At the same time, it is worth considering why the initiatives to promote ESD and GCE, which have clear ethical and societal emphasis but also a great deal of ambiguity as to the contents and modes of implementation, came from the countries with Asian educational values. I should also remind readers of the philosophy of the sufficiency economy promoted by the Thai government through training programmes for African government officials. The sufficiency economy is balancing the desires of different actors, instead of pursuing maximum individual benefits, so as to achieve harmonious and sustainable development.

Background of Claimed Asianness While Asian donors share historical and cultural roots that give them a unique regional character, there is also a certain geopolitical background that pushes these governments to rediscover their roots as signs of uniqueness to highlight. As reviewed earlier in this chapter, in the past, Asianism has surged when there was a shared sense of threat from external control or, on the other hand, a perceived improvement of Asians’ status in the world. The recurrent gesture of unique Asia is a resistance to the Western hegemony according to whose value system Asian societies were defined and judged. When Western power is dominant in the macro political and economic scenes, but not as threatening as colonial occupation, against which people would call for solidarity for resistance, Asianism would be rather muted. It surfaces only when peoples in Asia become confident enough to propose an alternative to the hegemony or desperate to defend themselves in the contest between the West and the East. It is therefore symbolic that in the late 19th century, Japanese pan-Asianism, which

eventually led to military aggression into nearby countries, emerged when Japan opened the country to the world and started modernization. The threat of Western colonization urged Japanese political leaders and ideologues to speed up the process of modernization, which is a synonym for Westernization. At the same time, the sense of threat also led to the idea of panAsianism as a way to unify Asia (under the leadership of Japan) to protect its own territory and sovereignty. In this sense, the ideologies of Westernization and Asianism in 19th and early 20th century Japan were not mutually exclusive but rather originated from the same root: the desire to theorize a defence against Western colonization (Matsumoto, 2000, pp. 47–52). It is also important to recognize that the argument for pan-Asianism in this period was the flip side of nationalism. The ideology of regional unity does not emerge when there is no drive for demonstrating the commonalities and strengths of the people within a nation-state (Aoki, 1998, pp. 32–39). Observers of later generations point out that at the bottom of Japanese political ideology of the time, there was a rivalry against China, which had long been the centre of the Chinosphere from which Japan had absorbed advanced technologies, culture and systems (Muto, 2009, pp. 14–23). Promoters of Westernization argued that Japan would leave China behind and join the industrialized West. Promoters of pan-Asianism tried to find a rich and unique Asian culture, whose most sophisticated expression is to be found in Japan (Okakura, 1920). In sum, ideologies emerge in response to changing social, political, and economic contexts, and provide normative points of reference for practitioners who would pick convenient ideas from different sources and blend them to justify their policies and plans, one of the results of which was military aggression. Also, this modern history of Japanese Asianism suggests the close relationships among the logics behind Westernization, Asianism, and nationalism. The Asianism surge was driven by the desire not only to strengthen the boundary with European civilization but also to demonstrate the superiority of one’s own country within Asia, as the most authentic and legitimate representative of the region. To apply these considerations to the current aid discourse in Asia, in fact, the rivalry among northeast Asian donors is as strong as the desire to propose a model of development cooperation as an alternative to the conventional Western-led DAC framework. Admittedly, scholars of South Korea and China have studied the Japanese aid model and then digested it to be made into a Korean or Chinese model of aid (Wang, 2012). These three countries are similar in that all of them sprinkle their documents with the idea of their ‘model’. The structures of ODA sub-governments in South Korea and Thailand are said to have followed the Japanese example. Borrowing of ideas for policy and administration from other countries and societies always happens. In fact, Japan borrowed a lot from China and Korea in its earlier history. What I would like to point out here is the close interests and mimicking that have contributed to the convergence of aid philosophies among these countries. At the same time, their rivalry also made them claim theirs is more original, authentic and effective than others. As much as there are rivalries, there is a common desire to propose an alternative to the hegemony of international development. Such a desire has been there since Japan was the sole non-Western DAC member. However, from the mid-1980s on, Japan has made a great deal of

effort to align itself with the DAC framework while hesitantly expressing its uniqueness. One small island nation in Asia is powerless to present a countermeasure. At the same time, it took a pride in the fact that it is the only country that managed to join the Western donor community. However, in the last decade, the landscape of the donor community has changed dramatically, and a major source of change was the nontraditional donors, particularly those in Asia, whose presence increased dramatically. There arose various initiatives from the G20 and BRICS countries to establish alternative channels of development aid such as BRICS Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Such a shift of gravity in the aid community prepared the stage for neo-Asianism to emerge. Asianism in the imagination of the policymakers of these donor countries is the product of mixed sentiment along with the desire to be appreciated in the existing hegemony, the appeal to stand out as a unique leader, and nationalism based on the rivalry within Asia. At the same time, the regionality imagined here does not necessarily match with the region as a unit for decision-making. In the case of Southeast Asia, the discourse on ASEAN integration is tied in with the reality of economic interactions and cross-border flow of workers. Therefore, the imagined community accompanies substance. On the other hand, for Asia as a whole, such a shared reality does not exist among diverse countries.

The Region as an Intermediate Stage in the Global Discourse Regardless of the ambiguity of imagined Asianism and the political drive for constructing and referring to it, the participatory mechanism of global education governance has prepared regional forums that have clear substance and reality, in the sense that participants are to discuss the common issues and come up with consensus statements. It doesn’t matter how diverse are the interests and views brought to the forum. The statements and declarations that are adopted there will start to walk by themselves as the ‘unanimous’ voice from the AsiaPacific region and be fed into the global discourse. In August 2014, an important regional conference in the process of developing a post-EFA agenda was held in Bangkok, Thailand. The Asia and Pacific Regional Education Conference (APREC), as it was called, convened within less than two months of the Global EFA Meeting in Muscat, Oman, where the initial proposal on the post-EFA agenda was agreed upon by participating UNESCO member states, CSOs, and multilateral agencies. APREC was the first regional conference to discuss and provide regional feedback on the Muscat Agreement, followed by other regional conferences until early 2015. The dynamics of APREC are similar to those examined in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’ regarding the formal channels of consensus building at the global level. Here again, the civil society delegates were very strategic and active, trying to ensure that their main messages about equity, quality, lifelong learning, and finance would be incorporated into the outcome document, the Bangkok Statement, to be adopted at the end of a few days. Whereas some of the national

delegates came with statements prescribed by their ministries to be appealed in the conference hall regardless of the direction of the discussion, others were freer to express their personal views, regardless of their governmental caps. Still others arrived with no speech, no memo, and very little familiarity with the mode of discourse in the post-EFA consultation process. ASPBAE, the regional CSO federation, was generous enough to allow me to observe the strategizing meeting held the day before the opening of APREC. The participants in this preparatory meeting were representatives of CSO coalitions from both donor and recipient countries. In fact, the process for advocacy at APREC started even before delegates came to Bangkok. The ASPBAE secretariat had distributed information about the procedure to register for APREC. One could not register simply by accessing the APREC website and typing in one’s name because UNESCO Bangkok would accept only those whose names were found in the list of participants provided by their governments. The number of seats was limited for both government and CSO delegates from the respective countries. Therefore, detailed instructions were sent to member coalitions from ASPBAE to ensure they would get the deserved seats. ASPBAE also secured a travel fund for its members from the Global Partnership for Education, booked hotel accommodations and shared conference materials from UNESCO and updates on the latest discussions distributed by the Global Campaign for Education, its global counterpart. The constant flood of emails may have been overwhelming for some member CSOs to absorb, but the strategizing meeting helped them to know what they had to appeal in which kinds of approaches. During APREC, while there were several thematic sessions between plenary meetings, ASPBAE members divided themselves to make sure somebody would be in all the respective sessions. Based on the pre-meeting, all ASPBAE members knew what to appeal there. At the end of each day, they reviewed their advocacy work and discussed how they could do better the next day. ASPBAE members talked to their own government delegates to sensitize them to the importance of the issues related to a rights-based approach and equitable quality education. Some talked to governmental delegates who looked isolated and lost to advise them of what to say in the plenary meeting. Besides this coordinated advocacy inside and outside of the meeting rooms, their core members spoke in front of media or spoke up in the plenary meeting as an official speaker for their CSO and were thus involved in the drafting of the Bangkok Statement. As readers would recognize from the above observation, CSO actors work as a team, regardless of their nationalities, and are highly strategic in order to push through their common messages. Unlike national governments, which are driven by national interests and mutual rivalry, they act as the catalytic agents to bridge the gap of communication to achieve the shared mission. Most of the interviewees from CSOs applauded their achievement at APREC, because the contents there went deeper into the areas they promoted than did the Open Working Group proposal. The drafting committee, composed of a small number of people, spent hours after each day’s meetings incorporating discussion to finalize the statement. The issue was what to incorporate from the series of sometimes unrelated statements by delegates. Since I wasn’t in

the room, I cannot tell exactly how the process was. I just saw people come out from the committee meetings with exhausted faces and heard them commenting on the severe debate. On the one hand, there was an opinion that the Bangkok Statement had to reflect uniquely Asian voices and needs in its comments on the Muscat Agreement. On the other hand, since APREC was the first regional meeting, there was a consideration to make it a model for other regions to follow, not to muddle the Muscat Agreement but to generally support it. The finalized Bangkok Statement, while it ‘fully endorse[d] the vision, principles and targets laid out in the Muscat Agreement’, raised regional priority areas: lifelong learning, equity, skills for work and life, quality and teachers, information and communication technology, and governance and financing (UNESCO, 2014, p. 2). In this process of broad participation whose discussion was open-ended, as argued in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, it is to some extent unavoidable that the members of the drafting committee use their discretion to build the ‘unanimous voice’. After all, the delegates will adopt it, given that their voices have been heard and noted. What, then, was the function of APREC in the global consultation process on the post-EFA agenda? Although the regional level is considered an important intermediary stage between the national and the global, member states do not speak only at this level but have channels to influence the global discussion directly. Similarly, for the CSOs, the regional meetings are a kind of milestone on the road to WEF-Incheon in May 2015 and the SDG summit in September 2015. It is important for them to proceed with each step steadily. However, in the sense that their message is consistent regardless of the region, Asianness doesn’t count greatly for CSOs. In this formal consultation meeting, what mattered as regional characteristics were educational issues the countries of the region face, instead of culture or history, which would constitute the unique principles of education. One value of the regional stage of consultation is that it follows procedures to legitimize the final statement from the education community as being based on accumulated participation from the bottom-up. The region is not expected to fundamentally contradict the global proposal but to authorize it.

CONCLUSION This chapter attempted to highlight the characteristics of Asia through the analysis of policyrelated documents by five donor countries and two regional entities. It has also examined the process of building consensus on the post-2015 agenda with particular focus on the AsiaPacific Regional Education Conference (APREC) held in August 2014. The aid policies of respective states and the dynamics at a regional conference are not unrelated but often driven by completely different kinds of motives and dynamics. The analysis revealed that the region has two faces: one is imaginary and the other is functional. In the documents reviewed, there is a common trend across Asian donors to refer to

their historical ties with regions and countries to whom they provide assistance and their traditional notions of education and development. They highlight Asian features in contrast to conventional aid principles and approaches based on the Western value system, either apparently or in a muted manner. Asianism, which has emerged repeatedly in the history of this region, seems to resurge among these donor countries. In this sense, it seems that the Asia that shares a common cultural and historical foundation exists only in the minds of state policymakers. At the same time, such appeals of regional commonalities, which are said to serve as the alternatives to the European model, are not based on a consensus across countries. On the contrary, as this chapter demonstrated, the claim of regional uniqueness is a signal of national interests in which the card of regionality is used to strengthen countries’ positions and arguments. There is often severe rivalry among countries that make a similar assertion of their regional character. At the same time, administratively, the importance of the region as a stage between the national and global levels is recognized increasingly in the multilateral global governance structure. The state actors have diversified in the last decade while the relative political and economic power of conventional ‘industrialized’ G10 member countries has sunk. The emergence of G20 and other nonconventional leaders of intergovernmental processes has changed the gravity in the established multilateral mechanisms. At the same time, civil society actors have improved their professionality as advocates and enhanced their presence at all levels, from the national to the global stage. There is also the private sector, which raises stronger voices than ever in the discourse on the global agenda and governance. Actors have diversified and the basis of participation has broadened, while the pace of communication and information exchange has quickened due to advanced technologies. With this broadened participatory structure, naturally, the expected function of the region to transmit the norms and requests from the global level and to collect and summarize national voices has increased. At the same time, as the observation of APREC indicates, given the national interests and different realities represented by state delegates, it is difficult to reach consensus in the plenary meetings. In fact, plenary meetings are occasions for national delegates to express their countries’ perspectives but not to compromise or to undertake a technically detailed discussion. In this sense, the regional platform in the global governance structure is rather a protocol, which is necessary to legitimize the final outcomes and draw the commitment of national governments to the adopted global agenda. Most of the governments and entities analysed in this chapter issued or are preparing position papers regarding the post-2015 agenda. In this sense, they are trying to find their place in the renewed global paradigm. At the same time, policies on development and aid are not directly linked with the process of regional consensus building. National governments are less likely to develop horizontal partnerships than are civil society actors. As they are the member states of multilateral organizations, it is possible, and probably more efficient, to appeal their national messages to the global forum. As a result, the regional platforms have limited substantial impacts regardless of the importance they are given in the governance mechanism. Observation of the regional consultation process has also revealed the continued centrality

of national governments, actors with a vertical structure of decision-making and operation, regardless of the enhanced role of horizontally connected civil society actors. Probably because the region is closer to the realities of respective countries and because the number of participants is smaller, respective state perspectives stand out more than at the global forums, where more emphasis is placed on universal principles and values. At the same time, the vocal presence of state representatives doesn’t necessarily mean that their voices will be mainstreamed, because most of them are not organized and supported by the technical means for implementation and monitoring. While in general the imagined Asianness and the region as an administrative unit do not correspond to each other, in Southeast Asia the link between imagination and substance seems to be tighter. That sub-region, as the Thai government and SEAMEO have imagined it, has many practical programmes and initiatives to mutually support and strengthen the ties among constituting countries. For this sub-region, 2015 is rather the year of ASEAN integration than that of revising the global agenda. The reality of cross-border exchange of people, both highly educated professionals and workers, and economic interaction gives substance to the imagined commonalities of the sub-region. The issues discussed at the ASEAN and SEAMEO forums are directly linked with the actual measures for standardizing and integrating the national systems not only economically but also socially. In other parts of Asia, such common realities are yet to be found. Because of that, as Yamazaki described it, the image of Asia ‘wanders about like a monster’ with massive energy but without a clear contour or face (1997, pp. 9–10).

NOTES 1. According to Watanabe’s (2012) review, issues highlighted in the Chinese scholarly work on development aid falls into three types: (1) development aid as a diplomatic tool of the Chinese government (soft power, cultural diplomacy, Chinese model etc.); (2) the relationship with the existing international development regime (whether to follow, pursue China’s own path, or establish a new order with developing countries) and (3) challenges in operationalizing aid and the measures to solve them (evaluation, cost, implementation structure and promotion of understanding of Chinese aid by other countries). 2. Chan also points out that this manner of decision-making lacks professional consideration of such concerns as the balance between China’s financial capacity and the length and interest rates for the loan repayment, or the risk involved in investing in politically unstable countries (2013, p. 38). 3. Wang has reviewed accumulated research on Japanese ODA by Chinese scholars and concluded that the ‘trinity model’ of Japanese ODA, which combined trade, investments and aid, has been adopted by China as an effective approach (2012). 4. www.focac.org/eng/ 5. The 26 countries represented at this conference were Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Yugoslavia. 6. The member states of SEAMEO are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam. 7. See Table 1 of the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’ for details about interviews.

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PART II PERSPECTIVES FROM ASIA AND PACIFIC: CASES OF TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS

JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL AID IN TRANSITION: THE CHALLENGE TO TRANSFORM FROM A TRADITIONAL DONOR TO A NEW PARTNER Shoko Yamada and Kazuhiro Yoshida

ABSTRACT As the sole Asian country in the DAC donor community until South Korea joined in 2010, Japan has been struggling with the pressure to align with the norms and modalities of the community, while having a different history of aid from Western donors and desiring to be unique. This chapter untangles the domestic and international factors that have affected policy making and implementation of the Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), particularly in education, at different times in its history. The philosophical foundations of Japanese aid policies are examined in the changing political, economic, and social contexts from the 1950s up to the present. As the Education for All paradigm took the stage, Japanese education ODA has shifted from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s to primary education from technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and higher education. However, in the post-2015 process, the policies have swung back to give equal emphasis to TVET and higher education as to basic education, reflecting the global trend to make the agenda more comprehensive. While the convergence with the global trend is clear in Japanese ODA, the hesitant desire to be unique always forces Japanese ODA officials and scholars to discuss and try to demonstrate the “Japanese model” of development and aid. The chapter also points out that the increased presence of other Asian donors in recent years has made Japanese ODA policies driven more by national interests than by global humanitarianism, which is clearly seen in the Development Cooperation Charter adopted in 2014. Keywords: Japan; ODA policies; Japanese model; Human resource development; OECD

The prosperity of a country, the growth of cities – everything depends on people. Build schools and develop people of ability. —Torasaburo Kobayashi, high-ranking advisor of a feudal lord in 1870, cited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002)

What is the Japanese model of development assistance? This question has occupied the minds of people involved in Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) provided to lessdeveloped countries throughout its history. The strong desire to demonstrate its uniqueness was pursued, however, closely linked with the desire to maintain membership in the donors’ circle by conforming to the norms and modalities required by the aid effectiveness discourse. The position of Japan as the first Asian country that achieved economic growth and joined the camp of industrialized countries brought a mixed sense of pride and humility, which overshadowed the characteristics of Japanese decision making on ODA. In this chapter, we untangle the factors that contributed to the formation of Japanese ODA characteristics, particularly in the fields of education and human resource development. The analysis will be made from three dimensions, namely (1) philosophy, (2) organizational structures of decision making and operation, and (3) practices reflected in the policy documents and aid activities in developing countries. As the opening quote by a 19th-century warrior at the head of this chapter indicates trust in the importance of investment in education has always been at the center of the Japanese conception of nation building. By extension, it constituted a pillar of the Japanese philosophy of assisting developing countries, which gives the examination of education and human resource development particular importance when studying the nature of Japanese ODA. The quote wasn’t taken from the historical literature but from the first official policy document on aid for basic education, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan in 2002. This fact indicates that the officials and scholars involved in the formulation of this significant policy document looked into Japan’s national history for a justification of its aid practices. At the same time, the philosophy and practices of Japanese ODA were conditioned by the historical contingence of post-World War II international relations surrounding Japan, a defeated country, and the domestic power politics and sectionalism in the bureaucracy. As such, philosophy, organizational structure, and practices are intertwined tightly. At the same time, even when the basic principles and organizational structure of the government do not change, the change in contexts – both internationally and domestically – will cause some modifications of aid practices and the emphasis of basic principles. Therefore, in this chapter, the analysis of three aspects of Japanese educational aid will be presented according to the time periods, which are characterized by some international and domestic conditions. The periodization we will use is (1) the 1950s through the end of the 1980s, (2) the 1990s through the middle of the 2000s, and (3) the recent few years. The first period represents the process in which Japan formulated its basic philosophies and system in the face of the demand to develop a new relationship with Asian countries it conceived during the war, simultaneously pursuing its own recovery and development. The second period is the Japanese heyday as one of the dominant bilateral ODA providers in the world. Being a major actor is, however, not what Japan is used to, given that its efforts have always been directed to conforming and being

accepted instead of setting norms or leading. The transformation of the system and redefinition of Japan’s role as a donor in this period indicates how a state called “reactive” (Calder, 1988) has tried to reorient itself to demonstrate its uniqueness as a leading actor. The last period reflects two major changes domestically and internationally, namely the decline of Japanese economic power and the amount of ODA and the new geopolitics among donors with emerging actors such as Korea, China, and India. The emergence of new actors has coincided with the massive debates about new agenda for the decades following the year 2015 which are demanding a fundamental change of the paradigm with which Japan has labored to align. Facing such a dramatic change of contexts and challenges to the global norms, the analysis of educational aid, which has been linked with the Japanese philosophy of investing in people and has been a testing ground of aid modalities on which donors have agreed, illuminates how Japan is going to balance the long-lasting, often contradictory desire for conformity and uniqueness. The study is based on the analysis of governmental policy documents and reports, minutes of ODA consultative meetings, and statistical data on Japanese financial and technical developmental assistance. The major methodology was discourse analysis of primary documents, while secondary sources are used to supplement.

THEORIES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS TO JAPANESE ODA There have been many theories that try to explain the domestic mechanisms of states and their dialectics with international relations. Classic structuralism assumed that international relations are established among sovereign nation-states that have absolute authority over their territories and that domestic politics and decision making are in the domain that is independent of international dynamics. Domestic decision-making structure is considered hierarchical, with a clear center that has a monopoly on the legitimate uses of power and a distribution of labor among various branches of government. On the other hand, international relations are characterized as horizontal among sovereign nation-states with no clear center of power. There are differences between the realists, who consider the relationship among state actors to be fundamentally competitive and conflictual (Buzan, Jones, & Little, 1993; Campbell, 1999), and the idealists, who believe that the states can set aside their differences and unite for the greater good (Beiz, 1999; Bull, 1987). Regardless, both camps of scholars on international relations conceive the rationality of decision making as a fundamental behavior of actors in international politics. In contrast to structuralist theories of international relations, there are constructivist scholars who consider that international order is neither necessarily conflictual nor cooperative (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). According to them, the nature of international order is

determined by the way states see and make use of international relations and depends on what their identities and interests are. The analysis of Japanese ODA, specifically educational aid, demonstrates that the complex nature of Japanese identity politics has affected the nature of Japanese ODA and that decisions made at the ministerial level drove centerless practices of it. In these senses, Japanese ODA practices cannot be explained by the structuralist theories of international relations, which assume hierarchical domestic order and rational choices made by state governments without being influenced by subjective factors such as identities and interests, which change in response to the environment. In this chapter, we will apply a constructivist approach in untangling the factors affecting Japanese educational aid both domestically and internationally and how the context changed over time. As constructivist international relations theorists point out, people’s and states’ ways of conceiving and taking part in international relations is constantly negotiated and not static. The longitudinal analysis of Japanese educational aid will highlight such fluid construction of the justifications and practices of aid.

THE EARLY STAGE OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (1950S–1980S): NONINTERVENTIONISM AND THE GERM OF THE “JAPANESE MODEL” Emergence as a Donor and Support for Industrial Human Resource Development Japanese ODA originated in 1954 when Japan began a modest level of technical aid through the Colombo Plan with war reparation payments to southeast Asian countries. The Colombo plan was an international technical aid program for former British colonies in Asia, launched in 1950. In the face of rising tension during the cold war, it was also meant to maintain close cooperation between Asia and the democratic camp represented by the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States pressured Japan to share responsibility for stabilizing Asia as an ally; in addition, Japanese foreign aid was seen as a form of war reparation. Japan was defeated after the military diffusion and colonization of Asian countries, which left Japan with a duty to compensate these countries (Shimomura, 2005, pp. 46–47). A major form of reparational aid was economic and industrial infrastructure in sectors such as shipbuilding, automotive manufacturing, and other manufacturing. These infrastructure projects often accompanied training of professionals in the relevant fields. Technical cooperation, which consisted of the training of people in assisted countries and the dispatch of Japanese experts and volunteers, became one of the pillars of Japanese ODA, together with grants and loans. According to a report by the Japan International Cooperation

Agency (JICA), out of 961 technical cooperation projects conducted by Japan from 1966 to 2003, about one-third (28.9%) were designed for the development of human resources, while the other two-thirds were for technology development and research (Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA], 2005a, p. 15). Among the projects that fell into the category of human resource development, the so-called education sector, which involved formal educational institutions such as universities and technical training centers, took the largest but not dominant share (30%) (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Areas of Focus among Technical Cooperation Projects Designed for Human Resource Development (1966–2003). Source: Calculated based on Japan International Cooperation Agency (2005a, p. 15).

Even those projects that supported educational institutions were for technical, engineering, and vocational capacity building related to major industries. A large part of these industryrelated human resource development projects were not considered aid for the education sector according to the criteria of the donors’ circle, which considered education more liberal and literary. Notwithstanding such criticism, Japanese aid has been firmly based on its trust in the virtue of investment in people, which would be considered “education” if the term were defined differently.

Japanese Aid Philosophies and Hitozukuri – Cultivation of People Even though Japan was badly defeated in the war, there has been a persistent sense of pride in the minds of the Japanese people in being the first non-Western country to have achieved industrialization rivaling the West’s in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Japan’s post-World War II quick economic recovery starting in the early 1950s and membership in the donor community have reminded the Japanese of their inherent strengths. As a basis of such strength, Hitozukuri – cultivation of people – was repeatedly highlighted. A brochure that MOFA published in 2004 on the 50th anniversary of Japanese ODA concisely traces the philosophy that was gradually formulated in the discourse among ODA officials, academics, and the nongovernmental sector: It is a Japanese faith based on the experiences of its own post-war development and international cooperation in Asia that Hitozukuri is the foundation of nation-building. The developmental problems in developing countries cannot be solved without self-help effort of the countries themselves. Also, without people who carry out development works, we cannot expect a country to make a self-help effort. To develop reliable human resources for the nation building is a crucial factor for the success of mid- and longterm development of the country …. Based on such consideration, Hitozukuri by means of Japanese ODA has been conducted in various fields, which include agriculture and fishery, health and medicine, education, vocational training, administration, and environment, across various regions in the world. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2004, p. 4, emphasis added)

Self-help has been another characteristic of Japanese aid philosophy throughout its history. The aid programs of Western donors were more prescriptive in nature (Orr, 1990, p. 57) based on fashionable theories or donors’ agendas. For example, in the field of education, the theory of manpower planning was widely promoted in the 1960s and 1970s and caused greater priority to be given to secondary and higher education in aid projects (Jones, 1992, p. 182). On the other hand, the Japanese approach tends not to have clear common goals but is more hands-off, which takes the view that goal setting is a domestic matter of the assisted country. As discussed later, such differences of orientation increasingly tormented Japanese ODA officials as Japan became a bigger donor. The philosophy of assisting the self-help effort was not so obvious at the beginning but gradually took shape in response to several factors. One factor was that Japanese ODA started as a form of war reparation. The failure of the assimilationist approach of Japanese colonialism made post-war governments and decision makers particularly cautious about imposing ideas and values on Asian developing countries, which would have caused suspicions about Japanese intentions of spreading its hegemony. Specifically, MOFA considered that aid for lower levels of education was taboo, which is related to the values and formation of national identities, and that it has to be left in the hands of the respective governments (Kamibeppu, 2002, pp. 81–83; Saito, 2008a, p. 113). Orr (1990) also points out an administrative factor. Japan did not have professionals who had technical expertise and experience in planning and implementing ODA programs. Requestbased assistance was appealing not only for developing countries that wished to see some respect for their own initiatives but also for the Japanese government in charge of ODA to

minimize its administrative burden (Orr, 1990, p. 28, 59–60). A significant weight given to the economic aspect of development by Japanese ODA is also explained along this line. For a country itself in the process of recovery, it was not easy to provide assistance unless Japan benefited mutually and yielded resources for ODA to continue (Rix, 1993, pp. 29–30). The bottom line for any other factors that would have contributed to the formation of the philosophy of aid for “self-help efforts” was a desire to be different from Western donors and a sense of responsibility for demonstrating a model to the countries that follow on the developmental path (Sawamura, 2002, pp. 340–342). As the above excerpt from MOFA’s 50year anniversary report indicates, it has been widely accepted that Japan’s own developmental experience and deep-rooted trust in and commitment to human resource development would provide a model for developing countries. However, the definition of “Japanese model” was not clear and often was interpreted differently across the ministries and agencies involved in ODA.

Complicated Decision-Making Mechanism and Its Effects on Educational Aid For people who have worked in or with the Japanese government on ODA, it is routine practice to handle the different ministerial perspectives. Particularly in the early 1990s, when Japan became a major ODA provider to the world, Japan garnered significant attention from the international community regarding what it intended to do. In fact, it has often been difficult to tell if there is any unanimous framework or objectives to Japanese ODA, even after efforts to unify the various channels of decision making and implementation, and to develop overarching policies. Before such efforts were made in the 1990s, differences were clearer and often competitive. There are three major ministries and two implementing organizations involved in decision making and practices for ODA, namely MOFA; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry; JICA that provides mainly technical cooperation under MOFA; and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund-Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) that provides loan assistance under the Ministry of Finance.1 Even among the three ministries listed above, the interests and the definitions of development aid were different. While the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s concern was predominantly that of trade promotion for the Japanese private sector, MOFA saw ODA as one means to achieve the diplomatic goals of Japan (Orr, 1990, p. 53; Rix, 1993, pp. 18–19). In addition, implementing agencies – JICA and JBIC – have sometimes experienced mismatches of perspectives between themselves and supervising ministries that tend to apply their own ministerial standards and perspectives to overseas developmental work. The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (MESC; MEXT after 2001)2 is one of the sector-specific ministries that are involved in ODA provision. Although human resource development has always been a basic philosophy of Japanese ODA, MESC has not been a major actor in the discourse on ODA.

MESC has provided a large number of scholarships for Asian students, which formed networks of Japanese universities’ alumni who became influential in their respective countries. In 1954, the scholarship scheme started with 23 students from southeast Asia; the number has steadily increased and became 2,536 foreign students from more than 60 countries in 1971 (Ministry of Education, Science and Culture [MESC], 1980, p. 331). Putting aside the scholarship scheme, for any of the grant aid, loans, or technical cooperation projects, MESC was sidelined in the ODA discourse. This was partly because the center of Japanese aid philosophy was human resource development but not education as a sector. However, a more significant cause would have been the relatively powerless position of MESC in the bureaucratic politics of the Japanese bureaucracy. MESC’s history of educational cooperation, which had rather separate dynamics from the mainstream of Japanese ODA, has been examined closely by Kamibeppu (2002) and Saito (2008a, 2008b, 2011). While the Japanese history of post-war ODA is generally traced back to 1954, when Japan joined the Colombo Plan, for education, subgovernment membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1951 – even before the termination of the U.S. occupation – provided a significant leverage point (MESC, 1980, pp. 387–390). As a member of UNESCO, MESC took part in the Asian regional conference for educational development hosted by UNESCO and signed the Karachi Plan in 1960. The Karachi Plan declared at least seven years’ free compulsory education to be universalized across Asia by 1980 and advanced that countries are to assist others to achieve this goal. Following this conference, in 1961, MESC dispatched study teams to investigate educational conditions in developing countries in southeast Asia and the Middle East so that it could come up with areas of and approaches toward assistance it could provide these countries. In 1962, it hosted UNESCO’s first regional conference for ministers of education to review the progress made on the Karachi Plan in Tokyo (Chiba, 2009; Saito, 2008b). While the ODA subgovernment was hesitant to commit to basic education as it is a field of national values, MESC was proactive in international forums promoting basic education in developing countries. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, UNESCO hosted regional conferences to agree on a common framework for the education policies of national governments. The principals agreed there are basically the same: One is to see education as a human right which the society is responsible to provide all citizens with, and based on this notion, universalized basic education was considered as a sign of ensuring the rights of individuals. Such principles are quite familiar to those who have worked in the ODA field since the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) held in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990. However, in Japan, until the end of the 1980s, the norms and principles that were discussed at the international forums on development did not influence the logic of bureaucracy and justifications that made sense domestically. At least in the education sector, MESC was more exposed to the international discourse on the norms of assistance and tried to theorize the benefit of internationalism beyond nation-states, where education is considered an issue of national sovereignty. However, MESC did not have much influence on decision making about ODA within the Japanese government. Gradually, assistance for developing countries became

an issue of lower priority in MESC, while education to promote international understanding or the scholarly exchange received higher priority.

JAPAN AS A TOP DONOR AND THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL AGENDAS (LATE 1980S TO MID-2000S) Until the end of the 1980s, Japanese ODA had been characterized by the large amount of funds allocated to infrastructure building and technology transfer for industrial growth. In the field of education, most of the assistance was in the form of scholarships to learn at Japanese universities, technical and vocational education and training linked with industries to which Japan provided other assistance, and science and mathematics education at the secondary level. Throughout the 1980s, the amount of Japanese ODA increased, and it became the biggest among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) countries in 1989. Inversely, the criticism against it that has arisen is that the process of decision making is unclear. As Japanese economic power increased, there was growing criticism against Japan for being an “economic animal” and using aid for its own commercial interests. This type of criticism of self-centered aid is similar in nature to what we often hear these days regarding nontraditional donors, particularly China. The donor community has sometimes reacted negatively to countries that rapidly increase their presence. This may be because their different ways of doing things and different logics and decision-making mechanisms are difficult to understand from outside and seem to threaten ODA predictability and equilibrium among donors. Facing such criticism, however, the reactions of Japan then and China today stand in contract. In the late 1980s, Japan was not ready to stand out as a completely peculiar economic giant because of its historically developed identity complex between the West and the East. On one hand, Japan was proud of having joined the group of Western industrialized countries and enjoyed its status. The status accompanied a duty to take up a similar level of international responsibility and to conform with the shared rules (Kamibeppu, 2002, p. 41; Orr, 1990, p. 4, 137). In terms of development aid, it resulted in Japan’s reforming ODA to deliver quality and quantity in accordance with the DAC standard. Japanese aid for human resource development hasn’t fit conveniently with the DAC classification of education aid. Unless the size of inputs and results were presented in a comparable manner, the efforts would not be acknowledged and appreciated internationally. This may not be crucial for a country whose objective of providing aid is not linked with the desire for donor status. Being unable to be an easygoing outlier or to lead the Western donors in setting norms and rules, Japan started a large-scale ODA reform in the beginning of the

1990s to conform to the external standard. On the other hand, in Japan, there always existed a self-perceived sense of uniqueness. The idea of a Japanese model appeared repeatedly in the aid discourse based on Japan’s contradictory desire to be unique and to be a leader. There were diverse ways of defining the Japanese model, however. One version of the Japanese model, which is often stated by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (MITI), private-sector companies, and trade-oriented people, could be summarized as a package of Japanese ODA for economic and social infrastructure building and private-sector investment. It is said that such a public-private partnership approach to development assistance has contributed to the economic take-off of Asian countries (MOFA, 2004; Hanatani, 2008; “Zadankai,” 2008; see also Yamada, 2011). It has also been believed that Japan’s own path of development is something of worth to be reviewed and packaged for developing countries to learn from. Graduate degree programs to train the professionals of international development works, which were established in the 1990s,3 received many government officials from developing countries on Japanese scholarships. These graduate programs have had courses to teach Japanese development experience – some of whose textbooks were published (e.g., Ohno, 2005). In the field of education, JICA formed a study team in 2002 and reviewed the educational history of Japan after the Meiji Restoration (1867) until 1990s according to the developmental issues encountered in today’s developing countries such as quantitative expansion, quality improvement, management, finance, girls’ education, and education in remote areas (JICA, 2005b). The period from 1989, when Japan first became the No. 1 ODA provider, until the mid2000s, when the relative amount of Japanese ODA started to decrease, was characterized by ambivalence between the desire to lead and to follow, to be unique and to be similar. This period coincided with a major shift in the guiding principles and operational frameworks in international development. The structural adjustment policies that were conditional for World Bank/International Monetary Fund loans and other donors’ assistance in the 1980s faced growing criticism that they increased the gap of income and welfare and that the poverty rate in many developing countries became even higher. The stage was set for the shift from a marketoriented, laissez-faire development paradigm to a welfare state paradigm that prioritized the distribution of wealth and poverty reduction over the accumulation of gross income through the promotion of priority industry.

Trends of ODA Policies and the Structural Reform The very first Japanese ODA Charter, released in 1992, became the basic policy document overarching the different parts of government involved in foreign aid. In the section titled “Philosophy,” the document states, “Taking advantage of Japan’s experience as the first nation in Asia to become a developed country, Japan has utilized its ODA to actively support

economic and social infrastructure development, human resource development, and institution building” (MOFA, 1992, p. 1, emphasis added). The charter emphasized the Japanese philosophy of request-based assistance and attention to the local context while emphasizing the importance of global issues such as environment and population. In this first charter, it was stated that the geographic focus is on Asian countries, but by the time the charter was revised in 2003, the recipients of Japanese ODA had been diversified dramatically. According to Fig. 2, ODA for Asia, which constituted nearly 60% in 1990, became 36.5% in 2009 while Africa increased its share from 12% to 23.1%. Compared to the 1970s and 1980s, when the aid was closely linked with the historical and strategic relationship with Asia, after the 1990s, the aid became more influenced by the global agenda – which focused on poverty reduction and basic social services in less-developed countries, most of which exist in Africa and south Asia – than on the industrial advancement of middleincome countries.

Fig. 2. Trends in Japanese Bilateral Overseas Development Assistance, by Region. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010, p. 41).

When the ODA Charter was revised in 2003, in addition to the familiar principles of supporting self-help efforts and utilizing Japanese expertise and experience, the principle of partnerships with the international community and the perspective of “human security” were introduced (MOFA, 2003, p. 2). Partnership with the international community is a reflection of a series of discussions about aid effectiveness at DAC and other international forums. The first priority issue raised in the 2003 charter was “poverty reduction” (MOFA, 2003,

p. 3). One of the difficulties experienced by the ODA implementers was to reconcile the principle of poverty reduction, which has a holistic nature, with the bureaucracy, which is divided along the lines of sector and aid schemes such as grant, loan, and technical cooperation. As discussed earlier, bureaucratic sectionalism without core authority has been an inherent restriction for Japanese aid to have strategic coherence. This fact not only irritated outside people who tried to make sense of what Japan was trying to achieve but also frustrated Japanese officials themselves in their efforts to implement effective activities in response to the needs of developing countries. After years of discussion and hope, finally in 2008, JICA and JBIC, two ODA implementing agencies, were merged to be in charge of a large part of the grant, loan, and technical cooperation project under a single roof at JICA.

Norms and Modalities of Global Consensus: Education for All (EFA), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and Principles of Aid Effectiveness In 1990, WCEFA was held in Jomtien, Thailand. Six development goals were agreed on and aggregately came to be called EFA. Their aim was to achieve universal access to primary education of acceptable quality for all school-age children, without fees charged, in tandem with the elimination of gender disparities. EFA’s aims also included the expansion of early childhood care, adult education, and improvement of the adult literacy rate. These EFA goals were not achieved but were endorsed again in 2000 at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal. There are factors that make EFA discourse and practices essentially different from the ones in the earlier period. Since the mid-1990s, a new way of providing aid has been institutionalized, in which donor organizations are expected to collaborate beyond the difference of missions and modes of assistance to achieve common goals. It used to be that developing countries that were bound to achieve the global agenda and aid providers were only loosely expected to contribute to its achievement. But the EFA framework brought various actors onto the stage of policy dialogue: developing country governments, multilateral and bilateral donors, and civil society organizations (Jones, 2007, p. 534; Mundy, 2007, p. 33). The EFA paradigm developed in tandem with the effort to reform the methods of providing aid. The Paris Declaration, which was agreed on in a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, made the following guiding principles for donors: (1) to support developing countries’ self-guided effort of policy making and implementation (“ownership”); (2) to eliminate duplication of aid activities among different donors and to increase alignment of aid with assisted countries’ priorities, systems, and procedures (“harmonization”); and (3) to increase partnership among donors, between the government and donors, and with other stakeholders so as to make activities as cost-effective as possible in achieving MDGs (“partnership”) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005). The education sector became a testing ground for these new ideas to promote aid effectiveness. Education recaptured the attention of the international aid community, together

with the health sector and other sectors, which were said to be pro-poor, directly reaching out to the disadvantaged segment of the population. The introduction of MDGs brought social services for the masses to the forefront of aid discourse, which had been downplayed for eating up public resources without much return in the short run, and often became the object of streamlining in the era of structural adjustment. In this paradigm, basic education was of greater priority than higher-level education because of its direct link with the masses.

The Transformation of Japanese Educational Cooperation after WCEFA Scholars and practitioners who have first-hand experience of the discourse on educational cooperation since 1990 unanimously point out the impact of WCEFA, which led to a fundamental change in Japanese educational cooperation (Kayashima, 1999, p. 1; Saito, 2011, p. 42; Utsumi, 2001, pp. 57–58; Yokozeki & Sawamura, 2000, pp. 175–176). Before 1990, the education subgovernment was sidelined in ODA discourse and its international activities including those through UNESCO that were not linked with aid practices for human resource development by the ODA subgovernment. However, things started to change gradually but firmly after WCEFA. The Japanese delegates to WCEFA comprised staff members of MESC, in charge of international affairs; the UNESCO national commission; and representatives of the National Institute for Educational Policy Research. There were also observers from JICA. Right after WCEFA, JICA employed an advisor on educational issues in 1991 and started a training course for education experts (Kayashima, 1999, p. 1; Saito, 2011, pp. 41–45). In 1992, JICA organized the Thematic Study Group on Development and Education (Kaihatsu to Kyoiku Bunyabetsu Enjyo Kenkyukai), whose report became the first-ever report on the education sector in JICA (Yokozeki & Sawamura, 2000, p. 175). In this report, basic education was clearly made a priority area of JICA’s educational cooperation, together with educational administration, both of which had been avoided in Japanese ODA until then. It was also proposed that the amount allocated for the education sector (including vocational education) would be raised to 15% of the total ODA by 2000 (JICA, 2004). As Table 1 shows, the share of education in the bilateral ODA rarely reached 10% and fluctuated between 5% and 8%. Still the ambitious goal set in this report reflects the zeal of the people involved. Table 1. Educational Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), by Type and Share in Total Bilateral ODA (in Millions of U.S. Dollars).

The 1990s were a period for mainstreaming basic education led by education specialists who were directly exposed to the international discourse. In this process, the relationship between JICA and MESC became closer. While areas such as tertiary, technical, and vocational education, on which Japan had traditionally focused, still occupied a large part of Japanese educational ODA, resources allocated to basic education steadily increased. Fig. 3 indicates the expenditure trends in JICA’s technical cooperation projects by educational subsector. Between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, allocation for basic education doubled from 6 billion to 12 billion yen. Among three schemes of Japanese ODA, namely grants, technical cooperation, and loans, technical cooperation increased at high rates during this period (see Table 1), and a growing proportion of it was for projects in the basic education subsector.

Fig. 3. Trends of Japan International Cooperation Agency’s Technical Cooperation in Education, by Subsector. Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (2005c).

In the 1990s, there was a lot of discussion about the forms and contents of basic education projects that would meet the global agenda and standards while utilizing the experience of Japanese educational cooperation and fulfilling the conditions of the domestic financial and administrative system and ODA schemes. The struggle to shift the mindset of ODA officials from hardware provision to technical support for improving the contents of educational services was enormous. The increase in technical cooperation, particularly in the basic education field, indicates that Japanese educational ODA had shifted from noninterventionism to proactive involvement in the process of changing the educational system, teacher training, and teaching and learning processes in the classroom. Teacher training to improve science and mathematics education is a characteristic model that was thought out in the early 1990s to adapt the Japanese experience of earlier educational cooperation to the new demands for close involvement in the development process. For decades, Japan dispatched many science and mathematics teachers to schools in developing countries as volunteers. It also provided equipment to school laboratories for science education. However, this assistance was ad hoc and not strategically linked to the improvement of education in the assisted countries. Technical cooperation projects for science and mathematics teacher education started in the early 1990s in Asian countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia and then extended to Africa (Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa) and Latin America (Honduras). Some of these projects had significant impacts in the respective countries’ teachers’ in-service training systems and upscaled to be a regional network for disseminating the lessons. For example, the Strengthening of Mathematics and Science in Secondary Education project in Kenya, which started in 1998, is now a network of 27 countries in Africa and provides training and

information for government administrators and teachers’ trainers to implement similar projects in their own countries (JICA, 2010b).4 In addition to the in-service training of science and mathematics teachers, JICA has developed some areas of technical cooperation that now constitute pillars of Japanese educational ODA, such as community-based school management, girls’ education, and university networks for engineering capacity development (JICA, 2010a). Japanese ODA subgovernment, particularly JICA, has tried to find ways to follow the global trends by developing successful projects in basic and secondary education. It has also increased the activities to touch on the contents of social services because it was criticized for commercial motivations and heavy emphasis on infrastructure building. As a result of efforts to meet the standards of the donor community, the principle of request-based assistance became nothing but a formality. When a donor tries to follow an agenda that was set before hearing the interests of the recipients, room to accept the recipients’ requests would be limited. The globally shared principle that the ownership of the aid-receiving governments should be fostered is a slippery concept and easily becomes an empty slogan when the donors have agendas brought from elsewhere (Yamada, 2010). The Basic Education for Growth Initiative was the first education-sector assistance policy announced by MOFA in 2002, after extensive discussion among scholars and officials from MOFA, JICA, and MEXT (renamed from MESC in 2001). The opening quote is from the Basic Education for Growth Initiative statement, which preached the value of investment in people as the foundation of development. Linking the global agenda of EFA with the Japanese traditional conviction of human resource development, the chapter lists familiar principles of support for self-help efforts, sensitivity to cultural diversity and local contexts, and utilization of Japanese experience in juxtaposition with principles of aid effectiveness such as partnership and alignment. In a fundamental sense, the effort to “foster ownership” in adopting global agenda, which is promoted in Paris Declaration, is different from the attitude of responding to the needs expressed by the aid recipients. However, in translating the Japanese notion of localism to English, the word “ownership” was frequently used, as if it is a bridge between the global and national norms and to allow the co-existence of the DAC framework and unique Japanese model. It should also be pointed out that, regardless of the efforts to shift from TVET and higher education to basic education, throughout the period observed, Japan’s education cooperation by loan assistance have largely focused on higher education with only a few exceptions. Most of the loans were dedicated to strengthening the country’s capacity of raising human resources in key areas through the hardware support for universities and providing scholarships to study in Japan. In a retrospect, such persistence of traditional characteristics of Japanese educational cooperation, both in terms of philosophy and practice, has suggested the possibility of their revival which was suppressed during the EFA period.

RECENT MOVES TOWARD POST-2015

Globally, the 2010s can be characterized as a period of review and search for the new direction. As the target year of 2015 approaches for the achievement of EFA goals and MDGs approaches, many donors are updating their educational policy documents. Also discussion about the agendas for the post-EFA-MDG era is heightened. MOFA and JICA announced their education cooperation policy and position papers, respectively, in 2011, similar to many other donors (e.g., United States Agency for International Development, 2011; World Bank, 2011). One strategy common to all is the broadening scope from an exclusive focus on basic education. While Japan broke away from exclusive emphasis on basic education and included higher, technical, and vocational education in its strategy, the World Bank strategy draws attention to the fact that learning happens not only in schools but also in workplaces. It also highlights that learning is a lifelong process, not only for youth and children. Other donors such as the United States Agency for International Development focus on the quality of education, particularly students’ learning outcomes. This change in focus is a response to the rapid increase in the number of children enrolled in the basic education, which has brought about two consequences – the deteriorating learning conditions and the urgent need to provide learning space for the secondary education. While the Japanese economy seems to be slowly picking up in the mid-decade of 2010s after two decades of stagnation, the government remains preoccupied with facing serious domestic challenges to respond to consequences of the demographic change and to reinvigorate its own economy by boosting domestic demands and promoting exports. This resulted in the marginalization of the conventional roles of development aid to perform the responsibility of a developed nation, pushing down Japan to the fifth in rank among DAC donors in the amount of ODA net disbursement (MOFA, 2011). In contrast to the period when Japan tried to detach ODA from national interests and to improve its moral status as a humanitarian contributor for international welfare, it is now finding new roles of ODA, making it beneficial for people both in developing countries and in Japan. In February 2015, the cabinet adopted a new ODA Charter building on the report of the Expert Council and reflecting on the result of public consultation. The Charter sets the fundamental principles and framework of Japanese ODA, including education. It was first decided in 1993 and went through some minor revisions in 2003. Much debatably, the current Charter, renaming it as Development Cooperation Charter, includes the emphasis on trade promotion, cooperation (particularly economic) through non-ODA channels, and proactive support to peacekeeping operations. While continuing to highlight Japan’s roles in humanitarian assistance and poverty reduction, relative weight is lessened to humanitarian and social development in this enlarged scope. Rather, the emphasis is more on economic aspects of development which are mutually beneficial for the recipient countries and Japan. In this context, the direct reference to “education” is kept minimal, except for the industrial human resource development which is closely linked with economic cooperation.5 Concurrently, there are initiatives taken by some key players which counterbalance the commercial and diplomatic drives. In July 2014, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) organized the Council on International Educational

Cooperation to conceive a new direction of Japanese education cooperation. The deliberations in the Council are in line with the general tone of the post-2015 global education agenda that underscores the importance of improving learning and its outcomes (UNESCO, 2014). For this, they recognize the need and potentials of bringing into the mainstream of international cooperation a broader range of partners, including academia, the private sector and the civil society (Yoshida, Kuroda, & Yamada, 2015). Similarly, JICA has launched an internal process to review the 2010 position paper and is reorienting its education cooperation so that all its cooperation will contribute to producing positive effects on learning improvement. These initiatives are expected to strengthen Japan’s contribution both to the practices of international education development and to its discourse. Behind the revision of ODA Charter, many critics point out that there is a drive for protecting Japanese comparative advantage in the international development scene. On the one hand, the rise of China, who seems not hide its national interests and militarism for territorial expansion, intimidates Japanese government (Asahi Shinbun, 2015). Before it loses the ground it holds now, Japan should also allow itself to use the ODA for the diplomatic interests and promotion of exports and investments by Japanese private companies. It is a characteristic attitude of the current Abe government of the Liberal Democratic Party. At the same time, the fact that Abe is re-elected with a great majority of support indicates that, after two decades of stagnation, Japanese constituents are tired of policy measures which do not demonstrate immediate improvement of their economic and living conditions, and it is more difficult to get their support to ODA programs which aim to contribute to noble but distant causes.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have demonstrated the nature of Japanese educational aid, which has changed greatly in response to demands from within and outside the country while maintaining its fundamental characteristics. Analysis was presented according to the three dimensions of philosophy, organizational structures, and practices for three time periods, namely the 1950s through the end of the 1980s, the 1990s through the middle of the 2000s, and the recent few years. An unchanged backbone of Japanese ODA is its philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of investment in people, Hitozukuri. This philosophy of Hitozukuri gives the study of Japanese educational ODA symbolic importance, although the conception of education as a sector administered by education ministries seems not to capture well what Japan has meant and done for Hitozukuri in developing countries. Japan assisted developing countries to improve their human capital because it conceived that competent people enable the nation to stand and advance by itself. The philosophy of assisting the self-help effort of developing countries is thus closely linked with trust in investment in human recourses. Based on this philosophy, Japanese ODA has maintained the principle of noninterference and request-based

assistance, as competent people of the assisted country can plan and decide what they need from outside aid. These days, we hear echoes of these philosophies from other Asian donors that may be considered characteristics of donors emerging from the state of recipient or confusion reliance on education. What troubled Japan throughout the history of its post-war foreign aid was its position in the donor community. Japanese ODA started not to demonstrate benevolence or to maintain political relationships with the former colonies but to provide what recipients would want as war compensation and establish economic relationships detached from apparent political drives. This hands-off, demand-driven way of defining ODA would partly explain the structure of decision making and practices that have long been divided along the ministerial line without a central agency staffed with professionals. The education subgovernment had been exposed to global discourse on educational development through its membership in UNESCO, but it didn’t affect overall practices of the ODA subgovernment. Regardless of the assumptions of many international relations theorists and observers of ODA, Japanese aid has been practiced without a center of power, which made it appear inconsistent and unprincipled. In fact, it has been driven by domestic logics and mechanisms and has reflected the ministerial rivalry and economic concerns within Japan directly. It changed dramatically once Japan became one of the top donors at the end of the 1980s. It was no longer possible to enjoy the status of donor while being indifferent to shared norms. For the first time in the history of Japanese ODA, the government started major reform in its domestic structure and announced the ODA Charter to the outside world to show the position of Japan in this field. Therefore, the domestic structural change was a result of a new role Japan was expected to fill internationally. Japan tried to maintain the consistency of its aid practice by constantly reconfirming its principles of Hitozukuri, support for self-help, and request-based assistance. Such repeated reconfirmation was linked with the desire to be unique. At the same time, demands from within and outside of the country to align with the global agenda of EFA and MDGs and to conform to the aid modalities shared in the Paris Declaration changed the definitions of Japanese principles gradually. The flip side of the alignment with the global agenda was the reduction of the principles of self-help and requestbased assistance to something close to a mere expression of courtesy. The original idea of Hitozukuri stretched wider than the education sector. Rather, there was not much education aid per se before the 1990s, without MESC at the core of the discourse. As discussed, after the 1990s, aid for basic education increased dramatically in relation to the global trend to assist basic social services. As constructivist international relations theorists conceptualize, the Japanese history of educational aid shows domestic structure is not independent of international dynamics. National decisions and practices about educational aid have changed in response to the position of Japan in international society, domestic conditions, and relationships with other international actors. One string that connects the transformation process of the system and practices was Japan’s philosophy of aid, which Japan constantly tried to link with its history and identity as a nation that emerged first through the modernization process to compete with

Western countries and later from the ashes of defeat in World War II. Japanese limbo between the desire to conform and the desire to be unique can be compared to that between pride of superiority and humility as a sole Asian donor. The issue Japan will face now is that the frame of reference against which Japan has tried to demonstrate its conformity and superiority is blurred and contested with the emergence of donors outside of the conventional donor community. The Japanese claim of uniqueness has been carefully maintained within the donor community’s normative and procedural framework. The recently announced Development Cooperation Charter indicates the shifting center of gravity. The global discourse on the post-2015 agenda is directed at broader international values, such as sustainable growth, in contrast to the domestic debates which are increasingly driven by diplomatic and economic national interests. Such divergence between global idealism, on one hand, and pragmatism and egocentricity at the national level, on the other hand, is experienced not only in Japan but in many countries. Academics and professionals, who are more exposed to the professional and up-to-date discussions on international educational cooperation, tend to share the common concerns with experts in other countries through horizontal networks, while national interests seem to play out more significantly in the national bureaucratic decision making than during the EFA period when the donor community was tightly self-regulated under DAC framework. In this context, one can anticipate more vocal expressions of Japanese unique model will be found in the ODA policies and statements in the coming years, instead of toning them down for the interest of global conformity.

NOTES 1. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established in 1974 to be in charge of conducting technical cooperation. It took over the responsibilities of two preceding organizations: Japan Asian Association, established in 1954, and Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, established in 1962. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) is a public financial institution created in 1999 and is in charge of providing low-interest loans to developing countries. Its predecessor in the area of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans was the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, which was established in 1961. In 2008, JBIC merged with JICA for the sake of unifying the ODA implementation agency and streamlining the operation. 2. It was renamed the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2001, when it merged with the Science and Technology Agency. 3. As the urgency of ODA reform was recognized, in the early 1990s, the government initiated the graduate-level training of professionals in planning and administration of development activities in Japan and developing countries. New graduate schools were established at four national universities for this purpose: Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University (1991); Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University (1992); Graduate School of International Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University (1994); National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (1997). 4. This type of assistance is called South-South Cooperation, in contrast to technology transfer from the North to the South, because a developing country that was supported by Japan and accumulated experience and expertise will, in turn, transfer what it has learned to other developing countries (JICA, 2009). 5. In fact some major conventional donor countries are also taking a similar shift in its aid strategy. The United Kingdom, for instance, is emphasizing economic development more, though it is significantly increasing the “aid” volume in recent years (Kilik, 2014).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This chapter is extended based on the following paper: Yamada (2014).

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THE KOREAN MODEL OF ODA: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF ITS CONCEPT AND PRACTICES REFLECTED IN EDUCATIONAL ODA Bong Gun Chung

ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is to critically review the Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy in terms of its context, actors, structures, and values so as to find how these characteristics are reflected in the education ODA of Korea. Previous studies, documents of Korean Government, and ODA-related statistics are reviewed. Self-confident in being transformed from a poor recipient country to a DAC donor, Korean government emphasizes the so-called Korean ODA Model in sharing its economic development knowledge and experiences with the developing countries. Despite the coordination effort by Prime Minister’s Office, government ministries tend to pursue its own ODA policies, while the finance ministry and the ministry of foreign affairs play major roles. As a result Korean ODA is economyoriented, fragmented, and uncoordinated in planning and implementation. This study has found that such characteristics of Korean ODA are also reflected in the education ODA. For instance, TVET and higher education are the priority, while basic education is neglected, and the education ministry has its own ODA policies and programs. Outside studies on Korean ODA policy is rather scarce, furthermore, critical reviews other than policy advocacy are hard to find, particularly in English. This study will be a good start for further ones to understand the Korean ODA policy including education. Keywords: Official Development Assistance (ODA); Development Assistance Committee; Korean model of ODA; Educational ODA; recipient-to-donor country; Korean ODA policy

INTRODUCTION

In 2010 Korea became a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).1 As the government of Korea emphasizes greatly that Korea is a recipient-turned-to-donor country, they have been eager to share its experiences of development with other developing countries. Despite of its long history of a highly organized state in East Asia, in early twentieth century Korea had failed in modernization that resulted in the colonial occupation by Japan, division of the nation into two Koreas, devastating Korean War from 1950 to 1953, and the instable armistice, not a peace treaty, under extreme military tension that has continued to this day. During the 1950s the aid from the west contributed to reconstruction from the war and in the 1960s the nation started its economic development plans dependent on foreign loans and grants. The success of economic development plans was marvelous enough to be named as “The Miracle on Han River.” Although other East Asian countries such as Taiwan and Singapore have also shown a remarkable economic development, Korea draws much attention from international development community owing to its recent history of oppression, devastation, and recovery to prosperity. Fig. 1 shows the trend of foreign aid that Korea has received after its independence in 1945 that amounted to 12 billion total in USD. The bilateral assistance and the concessional loan comprised a large share, while that of the grants decreased, implying that economic development policies made use of those foreign resources.

Fig. 1. Amounts of Assistance South Korea received (in Million USD). Source: http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/pdf/Amounts%20of%20Assistance%20South%20Korea%20Received.pdf

From those historical experiences of the nation’s development from the bottom to the top, Korean government officials in development policy making seem to believe that Korea alone can most effectively help developing countries, as Korea knows well both sides of developing and being developed.2 There are other countries that are also recipient-turned-to-donor status like Korea, but in the DAC Korea is the only donor of such unique experiences.3 Based on such a national pride, the Korean government has been trying to invent the so-

called “Korean model of ODA.” In one aspect, there is nothing peculiar that a donor country seeks for its own Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies and practices. And in fact, the donors in the DAC are all different from one another in its ODA policy orientation. However, Korean government deliberately and openly expresses its concern on realizing certain uniqueness in its ODA policy. The gist of the Korean ODA Model is revealed well in the rationale of a program called KSP,4 Knowledge Sharing Program, that places emphasis on delivering Korea’s own knowledge of development rather than physical resources, particularly in areas where Korea believes in its strength. The World Bank, emphasizing the knowledge economy in the World Development Report (1998/1999), even pointed out the importance of education for development by a direct comparison of Ghana and Korea as shown in Fig. 2. Although such a blatant comparison is problematic not only in itself but also in its methods and data, it has given out an impressive image of the development of Korea.

Fig. 2. Trends in Real GDP per Capita in Ghana and the Republic of Korea. Source: World Development Report (1998/1999).

Other characteristics of Korean ODA are small amount of ODA budget compared to the size of its large economy, concentration on middle income countries rather than on povertystricken LDCs, focusing more on Asian countries than those needy ones in Africa and other regions (OECD, 2011, pp. 170–171).5 Korea’s relative disregard of the poorest countries seems to be related to the fact that the loan seeking to avoid any possibility of default comprises a significant portion of its ODA. Recently, the Korean government has been scaling up the amount of ODA as pledged in the G20 and others despite the global economic crisis and the downturn of the nation’s economy. Fig. 3 shows that the GNI ratio of Korea’s ODA has doubled from 2007 to 2012, which was remarkable considering the global economic downturns.

Fig. 3. Total Net ODA and % to GNI (Net Disbursement, USD Million). Source: http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.result.Overview.do

Lately, Korea had increased its ODA volume from 2011 to 2012 by 17.6%, although the absolute amount of total ODA was relatively small as shown in Fig. 4. This was impressive to international development community, as most of the other DAC members, for instance, Spain, Italy, and Iceland, reduced their contribution drastically due to the economic constraints, seizing up the European economy.

Fig. 4. Changes in the Total Amount of Net ODA (USD Million). Source: stats.oecd.org, retrieved from OECD.Stat Extracts, September 28, 2014.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the overall trend of increase in the ODA volume, the ratio of education ODA to the total amount actually has been decreased and instable across the years as shown in Table 1. Although the importance of education is said to be acknowledged in Korean ODA, in fact, the Korean government puts more emphasis on economy, such as infrastructure, transportation, energy, and telecommunication. Also, the fluctuation of the ratio over the years reveals that the education ODA has been implemented without a long-term planning and concrete policy directions. That the Korean education ODA is mostly of shortterm project type rather than long-term engagement contributes to the instability of the annual percentage to total ODA expenditure. In this respect, the unpredictability of Korean education ODA causes problems to the recipient side. Table 1. Amount and Percent of Education ODA to Total ODA.

At any rate, as the amount increases, policy concerns are focused on purposefulness, effectiveness, and efficiency of implementation. Thus, the implementation of Korean ODA is emphasized to become more in line with concrete policy guidelines, that is, the Korean Model of ODA. As a result, the Korean government has prioritized areas such as economic planning, health, human resources development, public administration, ICT, etc., to concentrate on its assistance. The government also selected 26 developing countries6 as the strategic countries against others based on diplomatic relations as well as prospects for effective development assistance outcomes. In the discourses of Korean development the role of education, or human resource, has always been emphasized as one of the prime contributors as Korea lacks natural resources. Most of the Koreans believe that education is the key to social and economic upward mobility of individuals. In a similar vein, they believe that national development is also dependent on education. Thus, education is regarded as an important part in Korean ODA by policy makers. However, emphasis on education in Korean ODA policy shows some peculiarity, that is,

education is deemed as a tool for economic development. In this regard, this study starts with a question, “In the Korean ODA Model, why does the Korean educational ODA have a large share of TVET, while that of basic education is so small?” During the past decades, the international development community has been emphasizing on the provision of basic education, as shown in the EFA and the MDG. Korea seems to have been diverted from this international movement. In this regard, the objective of this study aims at critically reviewing the concept and practices of Korean ODA and its influence on education sector ODA by searching for the causes of the characteristics and problems in the Korean ODA. Further, this study focused on how those controversial traits are reflected in the educational ODA of Korea in respect to its more emphasis on TVET than basic education. In the following pages, based on literatures and government documents, the author will suggest an analytical framework to review the overall Korean ODA in terms of policy context, structures and actors, and the belief and values engaged in decision makings on ODA. Based on these aspects of analysis, the characteristics and its causes of Korean ODA are interpreted. Then, this study tries to analyze how they exert influences on the education ODA.

PREVIOUS STUDIES Donor’s ODA model seems to be not so much common in research community. Perhaps, it is due to the recognition that any donor might have its own policy preferences. The two DAC review reports on Korean ODA (OECD 2008, 2012) do not particularly mention the Korean government’s emphasis on setting up a Korean ODA Model. Jerve (2006) looked into the topic of the ODA model in his “Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development Assistance?” After reviewing the cases of Japan, China, India, and South Korea discussed in a seminar, he pointed out that there is not one Asian model of aid. Rather, particularly in Japan and Korea the discourse on ODA model is needed to root aid policies in something national. It sheds light on the aspect of the domestic politics of aid in Korea. By emphasizing the Korean model as a unique example of success from poverty the Korean government seems to legitimize the increase in ODA budget while garnering the support and national pride from the people. Kang, Lee, and Park (2009) found that Japan and Korea have resemblances in aid allocations by type, region, income, sector, particularly at micro level in the relationship between aid and FDI. This study extended the analysis on the ODA model to political economy by concluding that Japan and Korea are contrasted with other donors that are not so much relating their aid to FDI or its substitutes. On the other hand, Kalinowski (2010) criticized the Korean ODA policy that some lessons from the Korean development experiences such as being favored much from the protectionism of the past and the control on FDIs are deliberately omitted in its emphasis on bridging the developed and the developing world.

Chun, Munyi, and Lee (2010) argues that the Korean ODA lacks consensus on the fundamental issues such as the objective of Korean ODA. This study gives some clue to understand why the Korean ODA includes even conflicting goals such as humanitarian and nature resource acquisition.7 Choi (2011) pointed out that in regard to the aid effectiveness Korean ODA policy does not comply with agree-upon international norms of humanitarianoriented aid, also disregarding the OECD-DAC guidelines. There are not many studies that put a focus on Korean educational ODA. Previously, a terminology like international cooperation in education sector rather than ODA was used and often became the subject of several policy studies (Chun et al., 2002). Gradually, policy concerns extended to development assistance, and Chang (2007) suggested to include the development issues in the future direction for MOE’s educational cooperation policies. Yoo et al. (2006, 2007) and Kim (2006) tried for the first time to design the strategy for educational development and cooperation policies for the MOE. Government interest in other donor countries was raised, so that Jeong (2006) and Chung and Hong (2008) introduced the ODA discourses in the OECD to Korea. Park (2009) presented the facts, issues, and problems of Korean educational ODA. Lee et al. (2008) analyzed the educational ODA policies and practices to suggest policy improvement. Some critical views also appeared, as shown in Chung’s research of Korean educational ODA in relation to the Aid Effectiveness Principles. Those are among the small number of studies so far that dealt with the current states and policy issues for educational cooperation with developing countries. Also, education research institutes such as KEDI, KRIVET, and KICE carried out several evaluation and policy reviews regarding TVET and ICT (Choi et al., 2007a, 2007b; KDS, 2009). On the other hand, the economic research institutes such as the KIEP produced several key analyses and policy proposals of ODA focusing on economic cooperation with developing countries (Park, 2007). Those studies are influential in that they work as a guideline for government’s policy making in ODA across the ministries. In this respect, the concepts and proposals that are originally devised for economic cooperation tend to have a significant impact on the discussion of education ODA. For instance, economists’ suggestion to invent a Korean Model of ODA in subsectors is echoed by education researchers, so as to suggest a Korean Model of educational ODA by the KEDI (Lee et al., 2008).

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK The analytical frame of this study tries to shed lights on four aspects of what is going on in the Korean educational ODA. They are the context, the organizational structure, the actors, and the beliefs and values involved in the recent development in Korean ODA. These four components combined become a critical framework commonly used in historical sociology of education (Morrow & Torres, 1995). In this study this analytical framework is applied to the Korean ODA and its education sector.

Context The most significant change in the policy environment of Korean ODA is, needless to say, that it has finally become a member of the DAC in 2010. It was the year when 14 years had passed since Korea became an OECD member in 1996 promising to abide to the OECD acquis. By becoming a DAC member the Korean government is expected to respect the norms and practices of fellow donor countries. This requires considerable reforms and changes in the systems, rules, and practices of the Korean ODA. For instance, the OECD Special Review of Korea which was conducted prior to the admission to the DAC pointed out the fragmented aid architecture, the lack of coordination and cooperation among the related ministries, the high level of tied aid, allocation to too many recipient countries with small amount of aid, more aid effectiveness, more humanitarian aid, etc. (OECD, 2008). While the Korean government seriously tried to respond to these recommendations, the G20 Summit and the HLF-4 were held in Korea in a very timely manner. The G20 Summit emphasized the development issues in relation to the global economic crises. At the G20 Summit the heads of the states discussed that development and co-prosperity are important for a sustainable global economy. At the HLF-4 the Korean government pledged that Korea, once a recipient country, would play the role of bridging between the developed and the developing countries with Korea’s own experiences of socioeconomic development (Kalinowski, 2010; Kim & Lee, 2013).

Organizational Structure In Korea the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation was enacted in 2010 by which the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) is mandated to coordinate the ODA activities of different ministries. This is a political compromise between the powerful ministries in the ODA, failed in merging them. The Framework Act states that the OPM has to plan and monitor regularly the ODA policies and implementation by establishing a committee consisting of officials and private experts (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5. Organizational Structure for Korean ODA. Source: http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.structure.Overview.do

The Korean government pledged to increase its ODA budget up to 0.25% of GNI by 2015. This is a three-fold increase from the base year of 2011. Such a rapid increase and structured ODA budget request needs more of an effective and efficient organization with a clarification of goals, methods, and outcome evaluation of the ODA. In this regard, the DAC Special Review (OECD, 2008) pointed out the fragmented organizational structure of the Korean ODA. The Korean government did not establish a unified one, such as UISAID or the New JICA. Although the coordination by the Prime Minister’s Office is an improved form of the ODA governance in Korea, in reality, the coordination is not always done as expected. The partition of ODA funds and types by the finance ministry and the foreign ministry as shown in Fig. 5 is an evidence of an expedient compromise between the two powerful ministries. Therefore, it can be said that the organizational fragmentation problem of the DAC still exists. And the other ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, often exacerbate the fragmentation by insisting on ODA programs of their own financing and expertise.

Actors The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) under the auspice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Korea Export and Import Bank under the control of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance are the two main agencies in the Korean ODA. The former mostly handles grants, the Korean Peace Corps, and training programs for recipients, while the latter

deals with loans mostly for facilities and infrastructure. Other than these two big agencies, a number of ministries have their own ODA-related programs, mostly training and donations in their respective field. Both the KOICA and the EXIM encourage universities and CSOs with funding to initiate or participate in ODA activities, such as providing personnel training, facility maintenance, and technical assistance. The Ministry of Education as an actor of the ODA in the education sector is by nature a domestic-oriented government organization. Therefore, the educational ODA with a basic nature of international-related works are likely to be overshadowed by domestic policy priorities. The under manned international affairs bureau in the MOE is in charge of all the foreign-related administration and policy making of the ministry, literally inundated by routine works. The ODA is just a small portion of that. As such, most of the officials in the Ministry of Education do not have any work experience in international affairs let alone the ODA, so as to have insufficient expertise and understanding as well.

Beliefs and Values Arguably, economic growth is at the core of Korean ODA. Korea’s experience of rising from a poverty-stricken country to a world economic player seems to strongly affect the way Koreans, government officials, opinion leaders, and public, view the development issues in the global community. Putting priority on economic development characterizes the allocation of Korea’s ODA fund with less attention given to other basic needs areas such as humanitarian aid, education, health, and the like (Choi, 2011). Indeed, concerns on economic aspects prevail in Korea’s ODA policy discussion, as they seem to believe that without economic growth other developmental goals would be unachievable. Such an emphasis on economy in the Korean ODA is supported in theory and practice by those who believe in the role of economic policies of the Korean government. The government-led market-oriented development policies are highlighted. Responding to the requests from developing countries with a firm belief that development knowledge could be transferred, Korean government is compiling a series of analyses and case studies of its past policy experiences under the title of Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP). The KSP seems to be “the elite-led ODA model” (Watson, 2012) in that it is from the top government ranking officials, between the leaders of the donor and the recipient countries less responding to the grass-root people’s needs. In this respect, the beliefs and values in the Korean ODA are unilateral in nature rather than mutual, perhaps, based on somewhat false or illegitimate understanding of the recipients’ power elites rather than people. Frequently excited by questions and requests from the leaders of the developed countries visiting Korea or whom they meet in international gatherings, the Korean government officials strengthen their firm belief in sharing Korea’s development experiences and knowledge.

THE KOREAN MODEL OF ODA The admission to the DAC made the Korean government review its past practices of ODA. Responding, in part and indirectly as well, to the recommendations by the DAC peer review, the concept of “Korean Model of ODA” emerged within the government and its affiliated R&D institutes, such as KIEP, KDI, and KEDI.8 The core concept of Korean Model of ODA reflects the tendency of Korean policy makers and researchers who believe that the Korean case of development is so unique that it deserves a differentiation from other donor practices. Key practical features of the Korean Model of ODA are emphasis on the unique and successful development of Korea, sharing of the knowledge of development rather than providing physical support, selection, and concentration on several ODA subjects in which Korea’s commitment can expect concrete outcomes, and prioritization of the countries and regions based on Korea’s national interest (Kwon, 2006; OPM, 2010). Such characteristics powerfully work in practice as a guideline for making policy choices. Thus, the Korean Model of ODA comes from the context of Korea’s successful development experiences. As discussed above, the organizational structure, methods and resources of ODA of the Korean government are based on inter-ministerial coordination. The government is eager or obliged as well to share its development experiences and knowledge with others. Indeed, the idea of developing a Korean Model of ODA includes a strong moral sentiment that Korea should have to pay back to the global community for the aid it had received. The characteristics of the Korean Model of ODA can be interpreted in terms of its orientations in practice, for instance, eclectic mix of idealism and realism, pragmatic and instrumental approach to aid and development. These somewhat confused orientations are at odds with the morality emphasis of Korean ODA, that is, helping the poor by paying back in thankfulness for the aid Korea received. As hardly deniable in political economy aspects of any aid, indeed, the idealism of humanitarianism, philanthropy, and globalism are entangled eclectically with economic interests of the Korean government in ODA, such as natural resources, trade relations, and diplomatic influence. Particularly, in domestic policy discourses the need for natural resource acquisition from developing countries is almost openly emphasized as the rationale for ODA. In a similar vein, expressions such as exporting the Korean development experiences in return for economic gains or national prestige frequently appears in news media. It may be true that hardly any donor country is free from the conflict between idealism and realism in ODA. However, in Korea as a new and inexperienced donor the realism of pursuing economic interests frequently and openly as well outweighs other values and consideration of the idealism. The weak position of idealism in Korean ODA policy, notwithstanding the moral emphasis, is revealed in its ignorance to humanitarian aid (Kim, 2011). Moreover, although the Korean government tries to combine idealism and realism in an eclectic way, the Korean ODA is also at odds with the norms and recommendations commonly accepted in international development

community such as aid effectiveness, untied principles, and aid modalities like SWAPs.9 In an aspect, Korean government’s emphasis on the KSP shows its pragmatic and instrumentalist approach to development. The KSP has complied around150 modules of development experiences each of which aims for the use of developing countries to emulate or learn the lessons for policy making (KDI, 2011). In a way, the KSP’s endeavor started a form of consulting business among ex-officials of Korean government. As such, from the self-confidence from its own success story of development the Korean government expects its ODA to be visible and successful. The KSP is a tool for planning and implementing Korea’s ODA programs. Such an orientation in KSP emphasizes a pragmatic approach to development. The pragmatism in Korean ODA policy is in tune with the doctrine of the government of then President Lee Myung-bak. It seems that a pragmatic attitude of “what works is the best policy” underlies ODA policy making. Also, it is one of the causes of the eclecticism in Korean ODA. Other characteristic aspect of Korean ODA is its small scale nature. As shown in Fig. 6, the scale of Korean ODA is quite small both in its amount and the ratio to GNI considering the size of the economy. Although the Korean government has pledged to triple its ODA amount up to .25% to the GNI by 2015, it is still below the OECD average. Moreover, considering the unclear economic outlook and the rising needs for welfare expenditure in domestic scene, a scaling up of the ODA will not be so much optimistic.

Fig. 6. Ratio of ODA/GNI of DAC Members. Source: stats.oecd.org, retrieved from OECD.Stat Extracts, Sept 28, 2014.

Such a restraint on the resource for the ODA makes the government to search for a Korean style ODA that emphasizes on efficiency with minimum inputs, selectiveness, knowledge

sharing rather than large scale of physical support for development. On the other hand, it seems to be that the emphasis on efficiency leads to a quantitative evaluation of ODA projects. Indeed, numbers are the powerful evidence for budget authorities to request for more funds. However, some sectors such as education have difficulties in quantification of its outcomes and achievements. Emphasis on quantification is likely to limit ODA projects to those quantifiable while disregarding others unquantifiable. This again leads to an emphasis on economic projects and programs in Korean ODA. While the characteristics of the Korean ODA are as such shown above, a critical review reveals further problems distinct from its policy assumptions and implementation. Certainly, Korea’s economic development is a success story. However, it is not so much certain how it was possible for Korea to escape the poverty rising to one of the global economic powers. There were numerous factors involved. For instance, American support from the Cold War, the bureaucratic authoritarianism, the north south division and rivalry, Japanese legacy and influences, favorable world trade environment, the role of the state and market intervention, education and HRD, etc. are some of the topics in the analyses on Korean development stories.10 However, as economic studies are dominating, other disciplines such as political economy, sociology, history, education, anthropology, and literary studies are not contributing much to the understanding of Korean development. The idea of knowledge sharing assumes that Korean experiences and practices can be transferred to different countries. Based on this belief in transferability Korean ODA policy makers behave themselves as bridging the developing and the developed countries. However, let alone the limited analyses and understanding of the Korean development, the transferability itself has been doubted in international development community. Nevertheless, being inspired by developing countries that ask the Korean government to share its experiences of development, those officials and public research institutes come to have a firm belief in the transferability of the KSP.11 Their confidence on Korea’s economic growth leads to a belief that Korea has achieved a unique and unprecedented success that can be a role model for assimilation to developing countries. Such a perception is problematic not only in that the idiosyncratic developmental path of Korea cannot be easily transplanted, but also that the idea of sharing the knowledge is in fact a one-way transmission of Korean experiences. Such a self-centeredness of Korean ODA is partly due to the lack of studies and data about its recipient countries. Considering the relatively short time lapsed as a donor, it seems to be inevitable the Korean ODA policy making should have to rely on foreign sources such as international development banks. Information about recipient countries are mostly collected through short-term visits to the countries as regional studies of respective countries are weak.12 As Korea itself does not know well about its counterpart in ODA, the knowledge sharing in practice is not likely to be tailored to the needs of the recipients. If the KSP represents the mentality of Korean ODA, the fulfillment of aid effectiveness principles reveals the implementation problems coming from the self-centeredness and the pride in the uniqueness. The aid effectiveness indicators in Korean ODA show that Korean

ODA is falling short of the expectations of both the donor and the recipient. As shown in Table 2 from the DAC Special Review of Korea, the Korean ODA has been somewhat negligent in abiding to the aid effectiveness principles and indicators. Table 2. Indicators of Aid Effectiveness, Korea.

Although considering that it was only in the year 2010 when Korea became the DAC member, such a wide divergence from the DAC aid effectiveness principles seems to be problematic. Table 2 shows that the Korean ODA is failing in meeting the global baselines particularly in terms of alignment and harmonization. This certainly seems to be related to the self-centeredness in implementing the Korean ODA, rather than related to the short-time span of being a donor.

PROBLEMS OF THE EDUCATIONAL ODA In the global development community, education is always one of the prime goals as shown in the EFA and the MDG. However, discussions on education as a developmental goal are quite complicated with much tension, as the value and nature of education reveal multiple dimensions, often in conflict, such as individual and social, fundamental and instrumental. For instance, the underlying conflict between the EFA and the MDG Goal 2 (Universal Primary Education (UPE)) championed, respectively, by the so-called UN group and the Bretton Woods Institutions has been well documented (Heyneman, 2003, 2009; King, 2007). In a similar vein, the education ODA of Korea has the feature of such a value conflict, particularly between instrumentalism and fundamentalism. Putting more emphasis on education’s instrumental value for economic development, for instance, the Korean government deliberately places high policy priority on vocational training and HRD virtually ignoring primary and secondary education. Although the ODA allocation to higher education seems to have a large share, most of them are scholarships to those who are invited to Korea.13 The current state of the education ODA of Korea seems to be the outcome of interplay among the factors as discussed above: contingency, structure, actor, and value and belief. The education ODA is situated as a subsector of the government’s ODA policy, so as to be guided by the goals and methods as mentioned above. The characteristics and the problems of Korean ODA discussed above, such as priority on economy, emphasis on knowledge sharing, selfcenteredness, small scale nature, are also found in its subsector of educational ODA. As a subsector, the implementation structure of education ODA is fragmented between the ministry of education and the finance and the foreign affairs ministries, so that intra-ministry conflict with rivalry and cooperation as well are common phenomena. The ministry of education as the actor of education ODA is innately a domestic policy-oriented organization lacking policy expertise for ODA. The values and beliefs underlying the education ODA of Korea are not clearly established and shared among the related parties. On the other hand, the development of Korean education in terms of its rapid expansion up to the tertiary level as shown in Fig. 7 and the remarkable quality achievement as shown in PISA in Table 3 draws much attention from developing countries, as well as the World Bank, and the OECD. Referring to PISA results, the OECD even regards Korea as an example of achieving both quality and quantity of education.14

Fig. 7. Enrollment Rates of Each School Level, 1945–2005. Source: World Bank (2008, p. 214).

Table 3. PISA Results of Korea.

Indeed, Korea’s completion of universal primary and secondary education along with the highest tertiary enrollment rate in one generation is impressive and is praised for its contribution to economic growth.15 In this vein, the Korean government sees the education sector in Korean ODA as one of the key strategic areas where Korea’s meaningful contribution could be made.16 Stimulated by the KSP in economic sector, the Korean Education

Development Institute (KEDI) and the Ministry of Education adopted the concept and practices of the KSP to the education ODA However, such an intense interest and the high reputation from abroad on Korean education seem to give some confusing signals to Korean education ODA, that is, whether to emphasize on fundamental or instrumental perspectives. It is partly because such a high praise on Korean educational achievements is mostly based on instrumental perspectives on education less attentive to fundamental values such as basic human right for learning and beyond for social and political life. In this respect, the Korean education ODA policy is eclectic and confusing as well regarding provision of educational opportunity as a basic human right, academic achievement through test score competition in high stake exams, hum an resource development for industrialization and labor market, income and economic growth, and rapid expansion of tertiary education institutes. Thus, Korean education ODA is placed in a contingency of mixed signals and demands from abroad, while in the domestic arena policy discussion regarding the aims of Korean education ODA is not so much tried so far, particularly, in the academia of education studies. Even if some agreement is reached for the aim of education ODA, the transferability of Korean experiences in educational development requires careful analyses and understanding of the various factors working behind the Korean case. For instance, the high stake exam, socioeconomic valuation and rewards to education, the centralized educational administration, the traditional culture of learning in Korea cannot be easily emulated in other countries in different time and space. In this regard, knowledge sharing type of education ODA is likely to be problematic if it tries to transfer or “export” in the worst terminology the Korean educational development experiences to recipient countries. Also, there is a kind of mismatch between the demand and the provision in Korean educational ODA. Whereas developing countries and international development agencies are more interested in Korea’s successful provision of basic education, the Korean government seems to be more eager to provide vocational education and training to them. As shown in Fig. 8, the TVET at secondary level and non-formal institutions outweighs the basic education in Korean education ODA. Taking into account that the postsecondary support is almost composed of scholarships, the TVET is the priority of Korean government. This is a significant mismatch between the donor Korea and its educational ODA recipients. It also reveals the self-centeredness of Korean ODA in that the Korean government seems to support what they want rather than what the others want.

Fig. 8. Composition of Educational ODA Expenditure, 2011 USD Thousand. Source: Data extracted on 19 September 2013 13:56 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

It seems that Korea’s emphasis on TVET comes from the instrumentalist tendency and the economic emphasis in the Korean ODA concept.17 Rather than following the universal values and global efforts such as EFA and MDGs, Korea insists on its own priority by subjugating education to economy. One other reason for emphasizing the TVET is the small size of Korean ODA. Considering the limited amount of the ODA budget the Korean policy makers favor a concentration of the fund and visible outcomes in a short term. For these purposes TVET is more desirable than universal primary education. Table 4 shows Korea’s small portion of basic education compared to other donors in the educational ODA. Table 4. ODA Expenditure by Educational Sectors in USD Millions, 2010.

Such an emphasis on TVET and instrumentalist approach seems to be caused by the structural arrangement regarding education ODA policy making. As pointed out before the education ODA is a subsector of Korean ODA. Fig. 5 of the organizational structure of Korean ODA implementation shows the place of the education ministry being included in the “other ministries” between the two main pillars of the finance and the foreign policy ministries. In this respect, the instrumentalism in Korean education ODA can be seen as structured tendency. Regarding the actors of Korean education ODA who are working in such a structure, there are two inter-related characteristics. One is that education ODA is mostly done by those

outside of the education ministry and the other is that education ODA experts are few in number and weak in its influences. In this regard, the prevalence of instrumentalism in Korea’s education ODA can be said to have caused by the lack of active participation by education experts. Usually, Korean education officials, scholars, and the public struggle with domestic educational problems such as private tutoring, school violence, youth unemployment, and the like happening in Korea, so that they are not yet much interested in global issues happening outside of the country, such as issues of educational ODA to support developing countries. On behalf of education experts, economists, economy and finance ministries officials, and diplomats have taken charge of education ODA so as to weaken educational perspectives and values in Korea’s education ODA. The Prime Minister’s Office announced the education, training, and HRD sector as one of Korea’s strategic areas to concentrate its ODA funds and activities. Notwithstanding, educational institutions, experts, and activists are not represented in Korean educational ODA policy making. Thus, the emphasis on TVET indicates the lack of understanding of the value of education, particularly, basic education, community learning, and life skills. Such a dearth of participation from education scholars and professionals also results in insufficient amount of studies on the political and social contribution of education in development. On the other hand, it doesn’t seem to be acknowledged by those economists and ODA officials that basic education is the very foundation for any successful TVET program. Also, even the KSP which is strongly believed to substantially contribute to developing countries requires educational provision first in recipient countries to build the capacity to learn and assimilate. Democratization, freedom, equity, humanity, social diversity and integration, in other words, the institution building, would have not been possible in Korea without education and individual capability building. The KSP included the completion of primary education in Korea during the 1950s as one of the learning modules for the purpose of disseminating to developing countries. Indeed, the expansion of primary education in the 1950s had become the basis of human resources for the industrialization started early in the 1960s. However, it is still an instrumental view narrowly focusing on education for economic development. There are numerous other ODA subjects for educational development of Korea that are not studied in depth neither by educationists nor economists, such as expansion and selection mechanism of secondary and tertiary education, teacher provision, textbooks and curriculum development, measurement and evaluation, science and technology education, governance, etc.

CONCLUDING REMARKS In 2010 becoming a member of the OECD-DAC, Korea has emerged as a new donor in the international development community. Being an OECD member Korea agrees to accept the OECD acquis in ODA, while they eagerly want to develop its own modality, interests, and

value of ODA. Reviews in this study on the characteristics of Korean ODA reveal the tension between the norms and the idiosyncrasy underneath the policy of Korean government. The relationship between education and economy in Korean policy making has been a complicated one, contending each other in terms of values and practices. Such a complex relationship is reflected in Korea’s ODA. While the emphasis on economy and economist perspective and methods prevail in policy making of Korean ODA, education is regarded as a functional instrument for economic growth. This is insufficient. The significance of education in ODA should be reviewed in regard to its contribution to intrinsic values such as individual freedom and capability, social and political development, and cultural integrity. The experience of Korean educational development should be studied more in depth and reinterpreted in those perspectives.

NOTES 1. Korea as a donor started earlier as the Korea International Cooperation Agency(KOICA) was established in 1991 and the Economic Development Cooperation Fund(EDCF) in 1987. Korea became a member of the OECD in 1996 excluding the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The finance and economy ministries were reluctant to graduate from the status of developing country not giving up the benefits accrued to it. However, the aspiration to have a full membership had been persisted in the government encouraged by the economic recovery from the 1997 foreign currency crisis and continued progress thereafter. 2. President Lee’s speech at HLF-4, http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/hlf/documents/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110_10 3. As of 2014, DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 4. KSP was initiated by the World Bank and the KDI in early 2000 by which Korean government officials were dispatched to the World Bank to share Korea’s developmental policy experiences. Expert exchanges and conferences have become frequent since then. 5. In 2011, out of the total 1,623,626,000 USD the education sector was allocated with 199,158,000 USD, that is, 12.3%, while that of the economic infrastructure was 36.8%. (Estimated from the data extracted on September 21, 2013 11:48 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 6. These are Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Philippines, Bangladesh, Mongol, Laos, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, East Timor, Columbia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Solomon Islands, Ghana, DR Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Cameroon, Rwanda, and Uganda. 7. The previous government of Lee Myung-bak openly and somewhat naively as well called in various domestic occasions the Korean ODA as diplomacy of natural resource acquisition. As Korean economy is heavily dependent on import of natural resources such as oil, minerals, and agricultural products, such an emphasis on resource acquisition was believed to be persuasive to public opinion to justify the rapid increase in the ODA budget. 8. These are Korea Institute of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute, and Korean Educational Development Institute. 9. As of 2013, there is not a single case of SWAP implemented in the KOICA and the Korea EXIM Bank, the two major funding agency of Korean ODA. Their reluctance seems to be supported by recent criticisms on the effectiveness of SWAPs. 10. During the 1980s and 1990s until the financial crisis East Asian economic miracle had been studied by many development economists, for instance, Amsden (1992), Page (1994), Koo (1993) to name a few. In case of Korea, the role of the state in economic planning and export-oriented industrial support was highlighted. Those experiences are now reappearing in the KSP in collaboration with the World Bank. 11. The World Bank (1998/1999, 2000) has been publicizing the success story of Korea widely that draws attention from developing countries.

12. There is a surge of publishing the Country Partnership Report (CPRs) after the 2010 DAC admission, particularly for those 26 selected as focused recipients. Those are the Korean versions somewhat equivalent to the PRSP of the World Bank. Most of them are based on IO’s country background reports, statistics, short-term visits, and interviews of Korean residence, businessmen, and Korean aid workers in the region. Moreover, the CPRs are in Korean language that are never to be shared with recipients or other donors. 13. As of 2013 out of the budget for higher education-related ODA (66 billion Korean Won) of the ministry of education, 93.7% is allocated for the Global Korea Scholarship. (Calculated from The Annual Audit Report by Expenditure, Ministry Education, Science and Technology, p. 205, 266, 288.) 14. Barry McGaw, a former director of OECD, said in a presentation at Seoul in June 2005 that Korea is at the achievement level which can be considered to be of high quality and high equity. 15. The World Bank has argued in a working paper on the long-term effect of education on income growth and welfare loss (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2011). As an example, they compared Korea and Pakistan so as to highlight the successful educational provision in Korea. 16. OPM (2010). 17. Kwon (2006).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This chapter is extended based on the following paper: Chung (2014).

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POSITIONING CHINA’S AID TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND POST-2015 Changsong Niu and Jing Liu

ABSTRACT This chapter aims to investigate and interpret China’s educational aid by analyzing its history, philosophies, and practices in Africa. The study is based on review and analysis of governmental documents, reports, academic papers, and news by Chinese and foreign scholars on China’s aid, particularly educational aid to Africa. The analysis unveils three transformations of China’s aid “from pro-ideology to deideology,” “from single area to multiple areas,” and “from pragmatic economy driven to sustainable and humane economy focused” in Africa. Meanwhile, it indicates a continuity of the philosophy of solidarity, morality, and reciprocity in China’s South-South cooperation with African educational development. The analysis also shows China’s educational aid does not match well with the framework of the Western donors. China, under the FOCAC framework, is devoted to higher education cooperation, human resources training program, scholarship, and Chinese language education with African partners. With the growth of its economic and political influence, China will play multiple roles as the biggest developing country and as an active promoter and provider for South-South cooperation in the negotiation and construction of the post-2015 agenda. Nevertheless, we assume China will keep a pragmatic higher education cooperation with its developing country partners to inclusively link it with business, technology transfer, and peopleto-people exchange. This study delivers a comprehensive review and analysis of paradigm shift, philosophy, mechanism, and practice of China’s educational aid to Africa to fill up the literature gap in this field. It also timely presents China’s stance toward discussion on the post-2015 agenda. Keywords: China; Africa; South-South cooperation; solidarity; mutual benefit; higher education

INTRODUCTION … The Post-2015 Development Agenda, while focusing on poverty eradication and promotion of common development, should attach great importance to addressing the inequality and disparity between the North and the South and build a renewed global development partnership of win-win cooperation … Wang, Sergey, and Sushma (2015)

In a Joint Communique of the 13th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, India, and China on February 2, 2015, the ministers’ statement shows their stance for the post-2015 development agenda mentioned above. While the EFA 2015 targets are closing to the final curtain, there are increasing world-wide debates both on the post-2015 agenda itself and the participation of donors from the North and the South. China, as the biggest developing country and an emerging power in international cooperation, is considered as a conservative actor in the current construction of the post-2015 agenda (King, 2014; Mao, 2014). Nevertheless, in the planning of the 6th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to be held in South Africa in 2015, there is the possibility that the post-2015 agenda might be integrated in the FOCAC discussion (Zhang, 2014a). China has a long history of educational exchange and cooperation with the African countries (He, 2007b; King, 2010). China-Africa cooperation represents a specific example of South-South cooperation (Chen & Zhang, 2015). In this chapter, we will investigate the positioning of China’s aid to educational development in Africa as a case study in order to understand (a) the continuity and changes of China’s aid to education in Africa; (b) the formulation of China’s practices by their culture, philosophy, development experiences, and worldview; (c) the decision-making mechanisms and practices of China’s aid to education in Africa; and (d) the extent to which China has devoted attention to the discussion about the post2015 agenda.

CHINA’S AID TO AFRICA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE China started its development aid to Africa in the 1950s. Based on the changes in the domestic and international environment and the different agendas in different periods, China’s foreign aid can be divided into three phases, stretching from the 1950s to the present era.1 China’s educational aid to Africa can be understood and explained in the contexts of China-Africa relations and China’s domestic development. The historiography of China’s assistance to Africa indicates that China’s aid is not new. China’s engagement with Africa has continued for the past 60 years and has demonstrated unique features of a cooperative model. The following section indicates three transformations of China’s engagement in Africa, including “from proideology to de-ideology,” “from single area to multiple areas,” and “from pragmatic economydriven to sustainable and humane economy-focused.”

The First Phase (1950–1978) This period was characterized by the use of aid as a political and ideological tool to gain international support and solidify China’s own independence (Li, 2007). During this period, China gave its foreign aid to the countries in the Third World and supported liberation movements of African countries still under colonial rule. After the Bandung conference in 1955, and particularly after the split of the Sino-Soviet relation, China’s foreign aid shifted its focus to those “China-friendly” countries that recognized its One-China policy. In 1956, China provided grants to Egypt in support to its movements to claim its independence.2 In the same year, four Egyptian students arrived in China to study fine arts, philosophy, and agriculture, and seven Chinese students went to Egypt to study Arabic, culture, and history according to the China-Egypt Cultural Cooperation Agreement (He, 2007b). In 1963, China sent medical teams to Algeria. In 1964, during Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Mali and Ghana, he launched “China’s Eight Principles of Economic and Technical Assistance” which featured equality, mutual benefit, and no conditionalities (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a). The principles are still the key guideline of China’s foreign policy. The construction of the 1,800 mile Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA or Tanzam Railway)3 in the 1970s was the largest project ever undertaken by China at that time. It was built to eliminate Zambia’s economic dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa. This project could be said to have covered a large-scale attempt to transfer skills to thousands of workers and supervisors in Zambia and Tanzania (King, 2007). In the 1960s, the Chinese government began to value the relations with the newly independent African countries. Reciprocal exchange of the representatives of both sides promoted mutual educational cooperation. In response to specific demands from African countries, China dispatched some science teachers and experts to Mali and Guinea and donated £30,000 to the University of Dar Es Salaam for teaching capacity building. In the same spirit, China gifted some teaching materials to African countries (Wang, 2000). However, with the advent of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, almost all links concerning education exchanges were cut off with other countries. From 1949 to 1978, China’s foreign policy was deeply affected by the international political situation. Therefore, the aim of its foreign aid, mainly in form of the lending equipment assistance and technical assistance, was to win the political support from “The Third World.” Little or no weight was given to economic benefits, despite the fact that China’s own domestic economic situation was far from optimal. However, by 1978, China had established diplomatic relations with 43 African countries (Li, 2007).

The Second Phase (1979–1999) After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, China’s foreign policy shifted its focus from

ideological overseas alliances to domestic economic development. So the total amount of foreign assistance decreased dramatically with the decline of bilateral trade between China and Africa.4 Meanwhile, China’s assistance to Africa took on pragmatic dimensions, provided aid in more diversified and flexible ways, emphasized economic benefits and long-term results. In 1983, the Chinese government proposed the Four Principles of China-Africa economic and technological cooperation, which reaffirmed the rationales of “equality and mutual benefit, efficiency, diversity and attainment of common progress” (Li, 2006, p. 16). China began to employ other forms of economic assistance such as preferential and discounted loans, and cooperative and joint ventures for projects in Africa (Li, 2006). By the end of 1987, they had completed 388 projects in Africa (Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng, & He, 2012). Moreover, China started to reform its foreign trade and foreign assistance institutions. In 1993, the Chinese government set up the Foreign Aid Fund for Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects to support Chinese smalland medium-sized enterprises to build joint ventures or conduct cooperation with companies from the recipient counties. In terms of educational cooperation, in 1989, China launched “Higher education and Science Research Project” for Africa to assist in building some science labs in African universities5 in accordance with the central government’s policy spirit of the promotion and improvement of intellectual aid and technical and cultural exchange with African countries.

The Third Phase (2000 to the Present) Since the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, China-Africa partnership has entered into a new period. FOCAC provided a unique diplomatic mechanism and platform for mutual experience sharing and a long-term cooperation between China and Africa. In this period, economic and trade cooperation, together with people-to-people and cultural cooperation are considered as “two indispensable wheels” of China-Africa cooperation (Li, 2014). At the five FOCAC meetings between 2000 and 2012,6 the Chinese government pledged to implement measures to support African economic and social development, which covered areas such as agriculture, education, human resources training, health, security, and energy. In addition to traditional bilateral cooperation, China has facilitated multilateral negotiation and dialogue with the recipient countries at the international and regional level. Under the framework of FOCAC, China-Africa educational cooperation covers the following areas: (a) human resources training; (b) higher education partnership; (c) rural school construction; (d) Chinese language teaching; (e) Chinese government scholarship; (f) scholar and student exchange. Since the fifth FOCAC meeting, the China and Africa relationship is set to substantially change, since social and cultural exchanges, and people-to-people contact are to be given more attention. This is a change from the old partnership driven by the political and economic priorities. In 2013, President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Africa as the head of state demonstrated

China’s efforts to strengthen brotherly ties with African countries. Xi stated China and Africa have been “a community of shared destinies” (Xi, 2013). Under Xi’s administration, China has highlighted a new and diversified policy momentum in Africa. First, China is seeking collaborations with African nongovernmental organizations and helping more to resolve the livelihood problems of Africa. China has spent half of its overseas aid budget on Africa, focusing on anti-poverty, agriculture and clean-water projects, and disaster relief. Second, besides the bilateral cooperation with the individual Africa country, China also works closely with the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations in a variety of fields. Third, the FOCAC mechanism is being modified with “461 China-Africa Cooperation Framework” proposed by Premier Li Keqiang during his speech in Addis Ababa in 2014. The digit 4 in the framework stands for adherence to the principles of equal treatment, solidarity and mutual trust, tolerance and development, innovation and cooperation; the digit 6 stands for cooperation in the fields of industry, finance, poverty reduction, environmental protection, educational and cultural exchanges, and peace and security; and the digit 1 for perfecting FOCAC that started in the year 2000 (Li, 2014). The historical review above unveils three transformations of China’s engagement in Africa, including “from pro-ideology to de-ideology,” “from single area to multiple areas,” and “from pragmatic economy driven to sustainable and humane economy focused” under the South-South cooperation framework. The following section interprets the philosophies of China’s aid policy to explore the change of logics in the paradigm shift.

PHILOSOPHIES OF CHINA’S FOREIGN AID POLICY From the late 1990s, China’s engagement with Africa has aroused doubts and criticisms including the so-called traditional donors. Critical comments, particularly from the traditional donors, claim that the main driver of China’s interest in Africa is to secure energy and resources (Davies, Edinger, Tay, & Naidu, 2008; Six, 2009). Moreover, China’s aid policies and practices do not match well with the current development discourse constructed by the traditional donors. How should we understand China’s foreign aid policy and its difference from those of the traditional donors? How should we apply these understandings to policies and practice of China-Africa educational cooperation? It is necessary and important to understand and interpret the new donors’ approaches through looking at their own history, culture, and philosophies (Yamada, 2014). National policy and strategy are embedded in the state’s cultural norms and values. And policy is determined by culture debate rather than a real political-economic calculation (Liu, 2013). This section aims at interpreting characteristics of China’s foreign aid through linking China’s discourse on foreign aid, and China-Africa educational cooperation in particular, with traditional Chinese culture and values, China’s experiences in social development, China’s experiences as a recipient country, and China’s foreign policy.

Chinese Culture of Solidarity as a Core Value Firstly, the following analysis elucidates a clear reflection of Chinese culture of solidarity as a core value in China’s foreign aid policy and their practices in China-African education cooperation. More specifically, these are presented by the idea of harmony, friendship, the emphasis on mutual benefit, and the attitude toward charity and education. Harmony ( , he) Harmony is considered as the core value of Confucianism in Chinese culture. With the influence of the culture of harmony, such as “harmony between man and nature, (tianrenheyi)” and “harmony is invaluable, (heweigui),” the beliefs of family harmony, neighborhood harmony, and good interpersonal relationships have been deeply adopted in daily life of Chinese (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a). The terms such as peace and harmony have become the keywords in China’s foreign aid policy documents. Peaceful co-existence has been considered as the main foundation of China’s foreign policy since the 1950s. The continuity of the emphasis on peace can be identified in China’s Foreign Aid published in 2014 (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2014). However, harmony does not suggest sameness. Confucians believe that a harmonious world relies on diverse things existing in the same world. For example, in Chinese, there is a key phrase “unity without uniformity, (heerbutong).” The traditional Chinese thinking indicates that diversity creates a lively world (Li, 2006). This kind of thinking can be found in China’s foreign aid policies. For example, the first White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid published in 2011 clarifies that “China respects recipient countries’ right to independently select their own path and model of development” (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, p. 4).7 It means that the Chinese government believes the diverse paths of development can lead to a harmonious development of the world. It also can explain why China keeps emphasizing the no interference in recipient countries’ internal affairs. China’s foreign aid policy does not aim at changing the economic and political structure of the recipient countries (Li & Wu, 2009). Friendship ( , youyi) The term “Friendship” is taken as one of five basic human relationships of the harmonious world in Confucianism. The importance of friendship has been adopted as a key concept into China’s foreign aid policy. In China’s African Policy launched in 2006, the part of China’s relations with Africa started with “China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange” (MOFA, 2006, p. 2). During the visit to Kenya by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of PRC in January 2015, how to improve the capacity of self-development of “African friends” was emphasized in his TV interview (Wang, 2015). Kobayashi (2008) interpreted the relationship between China as a donor and the recipient country as a friendship. China’s foreign aid is an act of friendship with the overall goal of achieving world harmony. His analysis on the statement of China’s government shows China as a member of the developing

world taking their aid as a kind of help among poor friends. In 1989, Deng Xiaoping interpreted the aid from China to Burundi as a symbol of friendship between poor friends in the third world during the conversation with Burundi’s President (Shu, 2010). The emphasis on mutual understanding and friendship can be identified in the names of many China-assisted projects, such as Nouakchoott’s Friendship Port in Mauritania, Friendship School in the Republic of Cote d’lvoire, Sino-Egypt Friendship Model School (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011b; MOFCOM, 2010). According to FOCAC (2012b), China helped Africa to build 50 China-Africa friendship schools. Niu (2014a) interpreted the objective of China’s education cooperation with Africa as strengthening mutual understanding and friendship. Mutual Benefit ( , huhuihuli) Mutual benefit is another key concept of China’s traditional culture. According to Guo (2009), the Analects says that kindness will enable you to employ the services of others. In general, it means the emperor needs to treat his people well so as to receive their support. Traditionally, it stands for a logic for managing a harmonious society. Once people receive kindness from the emperor or government, they will give support to the emperor or government to maintain a harmonious nation. In China’s culture, kindness and benefit are not contradictory. In order to get benefit, people should show kindness first. Giving kindness and getting benefit will keep a harmonious and stable society (Xing, 2014). In 2013, Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the concept of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness as the basic principles of our neighborhood diplomacy.8 In the Confucian view, mutual benefit within harmony does not influence mutual benefit. Meanwhile, Confucian thought provides the background for the concept of win-win cooperation and of mutual benefit (Li, 2006). The emphasis on mutual benefit can be found in Premier Zhou’s Eight Principles of China’s aid to foreign countries in 1964. Since then the Chinese Government has always been following the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Kobayashi, 2008; Liu, 2008a; Shu, 2010; Zhang & Huang, 2012). This point can be understood through the focus on a harmonious relationship which implies mutual complement and mutual support between the parties. The cooperation in higher education between Africa and China can also be considered as an example of mutual benefit. The cooperation may have strengthened the African universities’ capacity of management and enhanced their capacity to solve problems by utilizing their local knowledge (Niu, 2014a). Meanwhile, this partnership is becoming one pathway for the internationalization of China’s higher education (King, 2013). Attitudes toward Charity and Education As part of Chinese culture, there is an idiom “Never eating a handout, (bushijielaizhishi)” which can be interpreted as the attitude of Chinese toward receiving helps or aid without dignity. According to King (2013), this notion shows historically a Chinese preference to work much harder rather than receiving aid or donations. One of the basic

features of China’s foreign aid is to help recipient countries build up their self-development capacity (Ramo, 2004). In the Eight Principles for China’s aid to foreign countries, it emphasizes “the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development” (quoted in King, 2013, p. 213). Similarly, the China’s Foreign Aid policy published in 2011 also shows the focus on self-development capacity of recipient countries. It says …In providing foreign aid, China does its best to help recipient countries to foster local personnel and technical forces, build infrastructure, and develop and use domestic resources, so as to lay a foundation for future development and embarkation on the road of self-reliance and independent development. (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011, p. 4)

More importantly, Confucianism believed education played a unique social function which is indispensable for social stability and development (Guo, 2009). They hold that leaders should rely on the education of people to reinforce and further develop human ethics. There is a Confucian saying: “if you plan for a year, plant a seed. If for a hundred years, teach the people” (Lengauer, 2012). Moreover, another idiom “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day” can also be applied to Chinese attitude toward education. In contrast to simply giving a man fish, traditional Chinese culture shows emphasis on a sustainable and lifelong effect of teaching man to fish. In the Eight Principles for China’s Aid in 1964, the Chinese government emphasized they will train the personnel of the recipient country to fully master techniques which they provided (quote in King, 2013, p. 213). In addition, through bilateral and multilateral channels, China runs research and training programs for government officials and education programs for developing countries.

China’s Experiences in Social Development Secondly, the Chinese way of doing foreign aid is shaped by China’s own experiences and history of social development. The core concept of China’s African Policy is not to promote a China’s Model for other developing countries but to emphasize on the search for common development, mutual understanding, and joint learning (Liu, 2008b). The so-called Beijing Consensus which is a widely debated concept around “China’s Development Model” takes economic change as social change. According to Ramo (2004), this approach uses economics and governance to improve society.9 Similarly, Cheng, Fang, and Lien (2012) pointed out that China focuses more on productive sectors in contrast to the social sectors and poverty reduction emphasized by the traditional donors. Moreover, China takes education as a means for generating socialist market economy and promoting economic collaboration (Liu, 2013). According to FOCAC (2005), relevant education has a significant effect on economic development and poverty of elimination. Meanwhile, China emphasized the importance of capacity building through technical training. Based on its own history, China gained experience of how important the human capital and

technological skills are for poor countries to catch up in the global market (Cheng, Fang, & Lien, 2012). This can explain why the Chinese government provided many scholarships for African universities, and training courses for technical and vocational education. There are two aspects which make China’s aid in education distinct from other donors. On the one hand, China’s support to education in other developing countries largely depends on Chinese resources, Chinese staff, and Chinese universities. On the other hand, China’s human resources development is aimed at fostering managerial and technical personnel in various fields and master degree professional training programs (King, 2013). These are different from traditional donors whose main targets are largely related to the MDGs and basic education. This can be interpreted as a focus on fostering human resources more generally for contributing to economic development mentioned above, rather than a formal education support program. In contrast to the basic education-centered EFA goals or the MDGs, China gives more attention to higher education. It is shaped by China’s experience in educational development after the economic reform in particular. In contrast to the disaster of higher education during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, the enrollment rate of basic education in China was relatively higher than higher education in the beginning of Deng’s economic revolution. Both the Chinese government and international organizations considered higher education in China suffered most during the “Lost decade.” Therefore, both sides gave particular promotion of higher education development. According to Gu (2001, p. 21), “the first 10 World Bank projects to China were all higher education related.” Accordingly, China may utilize their experience in higher education cooperation with international organizations as their experience to initiate higher education cooperation with African countries instead of basic education.

China’s Experiences as Recipient Country Thirdly, we argue that China’s foreign aid policy is formulated by China’s experiences as recipient country. China’s engagement in African often simply repeats patterns established by the West and Japan in China. China learned how aid could be mixed with other forms of economic engagement and observed how aid would benefit both the donor and the recipient (Brautigam, 2009; Cheng et al., 2012; May, Giles, & Marus, 2010). On the one hand, China’s emphasis on self-reliance in development may be influenced by their experiences in economic and technical cooperation with Soviet Union in the 1960s and Japan and other western donors in the 1980s. The abrupt cancellation of aid from the Soviet Union in the 1960s left the Chinese leadership with a negative image of dependence on aid and drove them toward the policy of self-reliance by refusing aid from foreign countries in the next 20 years (Kobayashi, 2008; Zhang & Huang, 2012). The politicization of Japan’s ODA to China also strengthened China’s stance for being self-dependent. Inada (2002) pointed out that the Japanese government considered China as a potential market and a major supplier of raw materials to Japan. He also pointed out that Japan’s ODA to China has become a political issue. The granting of ODA is related to political and strategic factors such as an end to

nuclear testing, a reduction in arms exports, modest military expenditures, and respect of human rights (Inada, 2002). The politicization of Japan’s ODA to China created a negative reaction that deteriorated the Sino-Japanese relationship. On the other hand, China learned the importance of human recourse development for economic development through Japan’s ODA. According to Inada (2002), Japanese ODA to China also contains a large number of human resource development programs which finances the training of around 900 people every year. Whereas in the 1980s this training program focused on industrial technologies, in the 1990s the focus shifted to corporate management and capacity building in judicial and administrative systems. Japan’s ODA to China stared to shift from infrastructure and capital centered to people-centered ODA to China in 2000 (Okada, 2008). The discussion on the shift emphasized the necessity to pay more attention to poverty reduction, environment issues, and education.

South-South Cooperation Lastly, it is necessary to reconsider the philosophy of China’s foreign aid through the framework of South-South Cooperation instead of discussing it within the framework of international cooperation by traditional donors. The South-South cooperation agenda and South-South cooperation initiatives must be determined by the countries of the south, guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual benefit.10 According to Lengauer (2012), the concept of China’s aid is still considered as cooperation between developing countries under South-South cooperation framework. The first white paper on China’s foreign aid policy published in 2011 starts with the sentence “China is a developing county.” (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, 2011b, para.1). It clearly indicates China’s stance as member of the developing world in South-South cooperation. This document also emphasized China’s aid is under the South-South cooperation framework with the concern to conduct complementary and fruitful trilateral and regional cooperation on the basis of respecting the needs of recipient countries and jointly promote the process of global poverty alleviation (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, 2011b). According to Kobayashi (2008), this can be considered as a vision of South-South cooperation, a form of cooperation in which developing countries commonly share development experience and technologies to advance development effectively. Respect for the sovereignty of the recipient countries and absence of conditionalities have been maintained to date. The first paragraph of the second white paper on China’s Foreign Aid 2014 showed that China’s foreign assistance to other developing countries is within the framework of SouthSouth cooperation: China is the world’s largest developing country. In its development, it has endeavored to integrate the interests of the Chinese people with people of other countries, providing assistance to the best of its ability to other developing countries within the framework of South-South cooperation to support and help other developing countries, especially the least developed countries (LDCs), to reduce poverty and improve livelihood …. (Information Office of the State Council,

China, 2014)

This stance explains why China has kept emphasizing a mutual learning process between China and Africa rather than one-way learning process for developing countries. Moreover, it also shows the consensus between China’s philosophy of foreign aid and the features of SouthSouth Cooperation, such as the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit.

Toward the Post-2015 Entering into 2015, there has been an increasing number of discussions and debates on whether and how China will take part in discussion and formation on the post-2015 development agenda.11 Studies show that China has not been actively (or conservatively) participating in the post-2015 debates (King, 2014; Mao, 2014; Zhang, 2014b). As Mao (2014) pointed out, the current attitude of China toward the post-2015 agenda shows their willingness to act as a developing country keen on achieving its own development and avoiding taking too much international responsibility. Nevertheless, policy review shows a continuity of China’s philosophy in international cooperation, such as its respect for diversity as well as its respect for the independence of all countries in determining development strategies and development models (MOFA, 2013; Ye & Fues, 2014). Moreover, China continues to emphasize the friendship among developing countries and its position in the South-South cooperation framework. Review of China’s Aid Policy published in 2011 and 2014 shows the Chinese government has started adding up discourse on the MDGs with their commitments to their friends in the developing world (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, 2011b, 2014). The policy of 2011 declared “China will continue to promote South-South cooperation … promote the realization of the UN Millennium Development Goals …” (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, 2011b, “Conclusion” section, para.2). In a word, this section indicates that a continuity in Chinese traditional philosophy, culture, and development experience has significantly influenced China’s foreign aid polices to the developing world. In order to further visualize the implication of these philosophies on China’s practices in international cooperation, the following sections provide analysis of decision-making mechanisms and practices in China-Africa educational cooperation as case study to visualize educational cooperation with China’s characteristics and link the discussion on China’s position in the post-2015 development agenda.

THE DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION

MECHANISM OF CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION FOCAC has become the most important policy framework for China-Africa cooperation in a range of sectors. While education is not perceived as separate sector in the framework, it is possible to analyze the key components of the FOCAC framework to explain the decisionmaking mechanism of China-Africa educational cooperation. The highest policy-decision organ in China is the National People’s Congress. China’s supreme executive body is the State Council under which there are 28 ministries. FOCAC is led by the State Council and operates according to the Chinese national system. In order to implement measures committed by Chinese government at FOCAC, in 2000 China established the Chinese follow-up Action Committee (CFAC) of FOCAC which included 27 government institutions in the process. The three core ministries in the Committee are Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the administrative institution authorized by the State Council to be responsible for foreign trade and international economic cooperation. To perform these responsibilities, 25 functional departments were set up under MOFCOM. The relevant functions of MOFCOM in terms of foreign aid are the following: Formulate related rules and regulations in the management of foreign economic cooperation and trade. Organize and coordinate the negotiation and signing of foreign government loans. Approve foreign aid projects. Exercise sector management in foreign cooperation projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is officially responsible for overall foreign policy. However, MOFCOM has been playing an increasingly important role in the interpretation and implementation of foreign aid policy (Corkin, 2011). Before 2000, the Foreign Affairs Department in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was in charge of the overall budget on foreign aid. However, adjustments implemented after 2000 moved this responsibility to the concerned departments of respective ministries and committees. FOCAC’s policy-making mechanism is characterized by multi-level interactions between China and Africa based on equity and mutual respect through various exchange and communication channels (Li et al., 2012). Over the past 12 years, FOCAC has instituted a number of conferences and dialogue mechanisms at various levels and in different forms. The first level is the direct interaction between heads of the Chinese and African states. One example is the political consultations between Chinese and African foreign ministers on the sidelines of UN General Assembly. The second level is the Chinese-African Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). SOM is held between any two FOCAC sessions to discuss the implementation of measures and to prepare for the next ministerial conference. The third and the most fundamental level is the interaction between Chinese and African diplomats and the

host countries.

The Choice of Projects The Chinese side takes initiatives, then collects opinions and requests from the African side. After producing a first draft version of possibilities, the Chinese side gets a second-round feedback from Africa before making the selection of projects (Li & Liu, 2012).

Multi-Level Interactions in Decision-Making Procedure Through the Chinese embassies in African countries, the Chinese side collects cooperation requests of the African countries. Although Chinese ambassadors and the economic and trade counselors have relatively low decision-making authority, they work closely with local African communities (and local civil societies) and play a vital role in the decision-making process (Li & Liu, 2012). At the same time, African diplomats in Beijing contact their own capitals and put forward some opinions and suggestions from African countries regarding Chinese assistance projects.

The Role of the CFAC The CFAC is made up of 27 member units, which coordinate and collaborate to fulfill the commitments at FOCAC. The CFAC regularly communicates with Chinese embassies to ascertain the demands from the African side. The Action Committee holds meetings with African diplomatic corps every two or three months to discuss the implementation of measures committed at the last ministerial conference and to negotiate the possible cooperation programs at the next conference. The Department of Africa under MFA acts as the secretariat of the Follow-up Action Committee, along with the Department of West Asia and Africa under MOFCOM. Together, they are responsible for coordinating both the Chinese and African embassies, drafting and submitting reports to the MOF in order to apply for disbursement, etc. Although the MOF does not participate directly in the decision-making process, it makes the final decision on which projects will be supported, based on the proposals from the MFA and MOFCOM (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Institutional Framework of FOCAC Structure. Source: Li and Liu (2012).

The Chinese Embassy which reports directly to the MFA and the Economic Counselor’s Office, which reports to the MOFCOM, are responsible for the implementation of foreign aid programs of the country to which they are accredited. China Exim Bank, established in 1994, is responsible for concessional loan programs. The implementation of aid projects also involves the coordination and support from other ministries and committees, such as Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Public Security, and the National Women’s Federation. Because many central government ministries and agencies as well as sub-national governments are involved in aid activities, MOFCOM, MFA, and MOF officially established national foreign aid inter-agency liaison mechanism in 2008. In February 2011, the liaison mechanism was progressed into the inter-ministry/agency coordination mechanism. It is noteworthy that some sub-forums have been set up under FOCAC, such as FOCAC Science and Technology Forum, FOCAC Cultural Ministers’ Forum, FOCAC Think Tanks Forum. The institutionalization of these sub-forums is broadening China-Africa cooperation and bringing out a new dynamism of the China-Africa cooperation. In the education sector, the MOE is responsible for China-Africa educational cooperation, providing human resource development support. The Department of International Cooperation and Exchange (DOICE) under the MOE directly takes charge of training programs and university cooperation. The China-Africa 20 + 20 higher education cooperation plan was launched in 2010. The China Scholarship Council (CSC), which is a non-profit institution affiliated with the MOE, takes charge of management of African students studying in China. The Office of Chinese Language Council International (or Hanban)/the CI headquarter is in charge of the administration of Confucius Institutes. The Ministry of Commerce facilitates public bidding by Chinese companies on aid projects, such as school construction, and provides professional training for African countries (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. The Institutional Framework of China’s Education Assistance to Africa. Source: Prepared by the authors.

According to the description above, which is somewhat different from the DAC donors, several ministries and organizations are involved in the decision-making process of China’s cooperation with African countries. The current fragmented systems with many programs from different ministries are not conducive to the effective implementation of the education cooperation programs. Another obvious difference is that the whole system of FOCAC lacks the evidence-based feedback and evaluation mechanism.

THE PRACTICE OF SINO-AFRICA EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION The analysis of practice of China’s educational cooperation to Africa shows that there is limited engagement of China with the EFA goals and the MDGs on education of African countries except for school construction.12 China’s engagement with education and training in Africa gives more emphasis on higher education, training program, TVET, and scholarships under the umbrella of South-South cooperation and mutual benefit. More interestingly, the educational cooperation is widely involved in other social and economic development sectors rather than simply limited to the education sector itself.

School Construction School construction is the field which is mostly related to the EFA agenda and the MDGs. In 2006, Chinese government decided to help African countries to build 100 rural schools from 2007 to 2009 (FOCAC, 2006). In 2009, China has fulfilled the commitment by building 107 rural primary schools in Africa (Niu, 2014a). Moreover, in the same year, Chinese pledged to provide 50 China-Africa Friendship Schools (FOCAC, 2009). The White paper on China’s Foreign Aid 2014 shows from 2010 to 2012 China has committed its pledge with building 150 primary and secondary schools in Africa (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2014). In principle, China’s aid delivers completed projects based on the request from recipients. The Chinese side conducts survey and provides feedback regarding the plan submitted by the related departments of the recipient side. Then, they call for bids domestically and select the construction company. After the construction, the African side is in charge of school management (Niu, 2014b; Nordtveit, 2011; Yuan, 2011). The tied aid can be considered as an approach for achieving the mutual benefit. Moreover, the way of providing school construction instead of providing construction fund makes China’s education cooperation with African countries more visible. It also prevents corruption in school construction (Niu, 2014b). Besides these, China also built schools for vocational training and education and higher education. They helped Ethiopia to build the Ethio-China Polytechnic College (ECPC) between 2005 and 2007. China also has been responsible for the construction of a new Fendell campus of the University of Liberia, a Science and Technology University for Malawi which was just opened to students in 2013 (King, 2013).

Technical Vocational Education and Training Besides school construction for TVET, China also provides assistance for teaching and curriculum development. China has been involved in the reform of agricultural technical and vocational education and training system in Ethiopia since 2001. From 2001 to 2012, China dispatched over 400 teachers to Ethiopia to train the local teachers working in agricultural vocational and technical education (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2014). The ECPC has adopted China-Ethiopia cooperative running of the institute and has established partnership with Tianjin University of Technology and Education (TUTE).13 The Chinese government dispatches about 10 professional teachers and 5 administrative staff to the college per year. They jointly teach courses with their Ethiopian colleagues, and collaboratively develop curricula and compile teaching materials. Also, they build cooperative linkages with Chinese companies in Ethiopia and some local companies and training centers in order to improve students’ practical skills and facilitate their placement and future employment. Furthermore, the cooperation for technology transfer and training also includes global

telecom enterprises of China, such as ZTE and Huawei. ZTE provided training services to 1,000 Ethiopian engineers and to the key technical personnel for ultimately improving their comprehensive skills. They also sent 100 Ethiopians to ZTE University in China for more advanced training. Moreover, ZTE also offered local college students access to their training labs as corporate social responsibility. Similarly, Huawei also has decided to open their training center to engineering students from universities around Nairobi as well as to upgrade their training center into a research and development center for the local students to develop and test their own inventions (King, 2013). Apparently, such technology transfer and training not only can strengthen the mutual trust between local employees and Chinese companies but also can foster human resources for the development of telecom industry in the specific country.

Higher Education Cooperation Higher education cooperation between China and Africa has a long history and diverse activities. In general, it includes scholarships, institutional cooperation, Chinese language education, and high-level communication. Scholarships Scholarships for university study in China have been a traditional component of China’s education assistance since the 1950s (Niu, 2010). Scholarships provide African students opportunities to study in China. They also cultivate talents in all fields that make contributions to African development and to facilitate diverse cooperation between China and Africa. In general, there are five types of scholarships for African students, including Chinese government scholarship, Confucius Institute scholarship, Local government scholarship, University scholarship, and Enterprises scholarships.14 From 2000 to 2011, China has received 79,000 African students, including 33,000 government scholarship students (Lou, 2014). In 2012, they offered 6,717 government scholarships to African countries (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2014). Institutional Cooperation The higher education institutional cooperation between China and Africa started from the 1950s. There was limited scale of such cooperation until the 1990s (He, 2007b).From 2000, the start of FOCAC took this cooperation into a new stage. The new modality gives more emphasis on the cooperation among the individual universities. The “China-Africa 20 + 20 higher education cooperation plan,” initiated in 2010, is designed to promote capacity building and internationalization of higher education institutions through one-to-one inter-institutional collaboration between universities in African and China (FOCAC, 2009; MOE, 2012; Yuan, 2011). These partner universities have implemented a variety of cooperation based on mutual

comparative advantages, such as collaborative research, faculty and/or student exchange, training, course teaching, co-writing of teaching materials development, building and equipping the laboratory, co-sponsoring symposiums. MOE of China provides different amounts of annual funding to these partnerships according to their proposals and budget. Then Chinese partner universities offer matching grants for the project. Through this platform, some Chinese universities have established courses and majors which have met the needs of African universities. As a mutual benefit, they could upgrade their internationalization through expanding admission scale of international students and exploring the possibilities for joint school management. Meanwhile, this partnership also promoted industry and technology transfer for Chinese enterprises in Africa (Lou, 2014). In addition, FOCAC has initiated China-Africa Think Tank Forum and China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan (2010–2012) to promote interaction and exchanges between the academia of China and Africa (FOCAC, 2012a; Information Office of the State Council, China, 2013). Chinese Language Education Chinese language education has become a main pillar for promoting culture exchange and mutual understanding between China and Africa since the 1950s. With the rapid development of Confucius Institutes (CI) initiated by the Chinese government from 2004, there have been 37 CIs and 10 Confucius Classrooms in 31 African countries (Hanban, 2010). The CI is a nonprofit education organization for Chinese language education and culture exchange outside of China. Hanban provides grants for the creation of CIs, supplies teaching materials and facilitates cooperation between the partner institutions in China and abroad which run CI. Moreover, they are in charge of dispatching experienced language teachers and volunteers from China.15 The typical arrangement of African CIs is that they are hosted by an African University with the partnership of a university in China. Since 2004, about 106 volunteers and teachers have taught Chinese in African CIs. In addition, Hanban has established the Confucius Institute Scholarship Program to encourage African students and Chinese language teachers to strengthen their language skills and conduct research regarding Chinese language and culture in China. For example, in 2009, the Nairobi CI provided a range of shorter and longer term language training in China, including master degree, four-year bachelor degree, one-year training course, one-semester training course, and four-week training courses (King, 2010). High-Level Communication A Forum for Sino-Africa University Presidents represents a high-level communication for higher education cooperation between China and Africa. It started from 2006 in order to exchange experiences in high education reform and international cooperation (Zhang, 2012). Moreover, a Seminar among UNESCO-China-African universities was held in Paris in 2011. It provided three sides with common experiences and procedures in higher education management. It also promoted a multilateral cooperation among UNESCO-Africa-China.

Human Resource Development Cooperation In China’s context, human resource development cooperation refers to different kinds of research and training programs for government officials, education programs, technical training programs, and other personnel exchange programs for developing countries (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2011a, 2011b). The Chinese Government took the training for professional personnel in the developing countries as their responsibility in the national education development strategy (The State Council, 2010). These training projects can be categorized into two types, including short-term training course (about 2–3 weeks) for African government official from different departments, and short-term course (between six months and a year) for training professional technicians, focusing on practical skills such as agro meteorology, medical techniques, and hybrid rice technology (Niu, 2014a; Nordtveit, 2011). Since the mid-1990s, China has been supporting the capacity building for other developing countries through enlarging the scale of technical training and hosting training programs for officials from developing countries to China. In 2000, China set up an African Human Resources Development Foundation for training African personnel. In 2006, the Chinese Government further committed its role this fund (MOFA, 2006). Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce jointly established master education program for developing countries in 2008. It aims at fostering high-level human resource to accommodate the diverse needs for human resources training in these countries. There were 252 trainees from 40 African countries joining this program between 2008 and 2011 (MOE, 2012, p. 71). Between 2000 and 2012, it is estimated that no less than 45,000 African professionals took part in short-term training in China funded by the African Human Resources Development Foundation (King, 2013). From 2010 to 2012, China ran training sessions with a total capacity of 27,318 trainees for officials and technical personnel from 54 countries and regions in Africa. The training sessions covered the fields of public management, energy, health, social security, and manufacturing (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2013). In the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Chinese government announced “African Talents Program” to train 30,000 African professionals in various sectors (FOCAC, 2012a; Information Office of the State Council, China, 2014). Only a handful of these courses are related directly to the education sector (King, 2010). Ministry of Education has set up 10 “foreign aid resources bases” in universities. Since 2000, they have entrusted these resources bases and other institutions to offer 78 seminars, including 45 seminars on vocational education, distance education, education management, and early childhood education. About 1,443 education officials, university presidents, middle school headmasters, scholars, and teachers from over 40 African countries have taken part in the seminars (MOE, 2012; Niu, 2014a). Above all, the analysis untangled China’s engagement in educational cooperation to Africa. Firstly, different from traditional donors, China made more efforts on scholarships for higher education, TVET, training program, and language education rather than basic education related

to EFA goals or the MDGs. Secondly, China’s engagement in aid to education is reciprocity oriented. However, it is a product or service based but not direct financial investment based. Thirdly, the education assistance is not limited to education sector but more closely related to the overall aid for social and economic development of recipients (King, 2010; Yuan, 2011).

POSITIONING CHINA’S AID IN THE POST-2015 AGENDA We started this chapter with reviewing the historical change of China’s foreign aid to African education in particular. If we have to label a “paradigm shift” in this change, then we would like to define the trajectory as three transformations, including “from pro-ideology to deideology,” “from single area to multiple area,” and “from pragmatic economy driven to sustainable and humane economy focused.” This chapter indicates a “pragmatic and mutual benefit driven” foreign aid of China which is different from the Western donors. Moreover, the analysis of China’s aid policy and practice indicates China’s aid continuously embeds its culture, development experience and foreign policy presented by the following key terms: (1) solidarity and moralism; (2) developing country; and (3) South-South Cooperation. Moralism is the means for fulfilling solidarity through friendship, harmony, and mutual benefit. Positioning itself as a developing country and as a provider of South-South cooperation helped China to establish an equal partnership which both China and its friends in the developing world preferred. Moreover, the analysis above also elucidates some of China’s unique feature of educational aid; these do not fit well with the Western donors’ framework of aid to education development. Firstly, China gives more emphasis on school construction, professional training, and higher education cooperation rather than basic education widely supported by the Western donors. Secondly, following a reciprocity oriented aid policy, China prefers more product/or service delivery aid rather than direct finance-based projects. Moreover, these projects are closely linked with each other and involve multiple stakeholders through business investment and technology transfer. In terms of the discussion on post-2015 in China’s aid agenda, there are two issues for further discussion and consideration. Firstly, document review shows China’s willingness to act as provider for South-South cooperation and speak in “global language” about development and international cooperation for construction of post-2015 agenda (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, & United Nations System in China, 2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China published China’s Position paper on the Development Agenda beyond 2015 in 2013. Meanwhile, the foreign aid policy of 2014 indicates China’s financial assistance to lowincome developing countries to promote the realization of the MDGs (Information Office of the State Council, China, 2014). Moreover, in the fifth Ministerial Conference of Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation, the conference declaration shows China’s concern on the post-MDGs framework of sustainable development (FOCAC, 2012b). More interestingly, China’s interests

in international education cooperation is also written in the Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010–2020). It emphasized the promotion of international aid to education through human resource development for developing countries. Chinese scholars interpreted it as China’s willingness to further share China’s development experience to international community in order to change the situation of the developed dominated international cooperation. They believe China should confidently take such responsibility as a big developing county (Gu & Shi, 2010; The State Council, 2010). Secondly, despite of this, it indicates that China has different priority for the post-2015 agenda and has more interest in making their own priority agenda under the South-South cooperation framework rather than the world-wide one (King, 2014). China continuously takes poverty reduction and the promotion of common development as the major tasks for development agenda beyond 2015 (Mao, 2014; MOFA, 2013). It shows a different stance of a developing country toward the core task in the post-MDGs framework (Mao, 2014; Ye & Fues, 2014; Zhang, 2014b). Moreover, China takes the role of North-South cooperation as the core channel for the post-2015 agenda construction while considering the South-South cooperation as supplement the former (Mao, 2014). More importantly, within the South-South cooperation framework, China is willing to act as a provider for other developing countries under its own agenda for a mutual harmonious and prosperous world. Apparently, through trade and investment, China has been investigating a unique approach for achieving common development among developing countries for the post-2015. It includes diverse platforms, such as FOCAC, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-CELAC Forum, and the newly launched “One Belt One Road” project and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In addition, China’s moderate attitude toward the MDGs can be interpreted in the light of China’s development experience. China considered its achievement in implementation of the MDGs as more likely the achievement of China’s own national development strategy. Furthermore, they fulfilled their universal primary education and nine-year compulsory education before the fully implementation of the MDGs after 2000 (King, 2014; Li, 2013; Mao, 2014). Arguably, China’s aid policy on educational development and practice is formulated by its cultural norms, development experience and China’s worldview in different historical periods. The experience in the past shows a paradigm shift of China’s aid “from pro-ideology driven to sustainable and humane economy focused.” Also, there is a continuity of the philosophy of solidarity, morality and reciprocity in China’s aid to the developing world. However, the analysis of the current aid policy and practice shows China’s aid to educational development does not match well with the framework of the Western donor. China, under the South-South cooperation framework, is devoted to constructing its own aid agenda with the developing world. With the growth of economic and political influence, China will play multiple roles as the biggest developing country, an active promotor and provider for the South-South cooperation in the negotiation and construction of the post-2015 agenda. In terms of aid to educational development, we assume China’s policy and practice will continue to be different from the Western donors. Aid to education development will be kept pragmatic through higher education cooperation. And it will be inclusively linked with business, technology transfer,

and people-to-people exchange between China, Africa, and the rest of the developing world.

NOTES 1. Scholars hold to different opinions about the period division of China’s foreign aid. For example, Li and Wu (2009) divided China’s ODA into three stages: the first stage is from 1950 to 1973; the second stage is from 1974 to 1990; from 1991 to the present is the third stage. 2. Egypt, which was independent in 1922, is the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China. 3. The project of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway lasted for seven years from 1970 to 1976. China provided a $500 million interest free loan for the project. 4. The data of China’s foreign assistance is different one from another according to different statistics by different scholars but these scholars share the same idea on the trend of aid commitments. See Kobayashi (2008); Kim (1989, p. 38). 5. From 1995 till the end of 2003, about 21 advanced laboratories were set up in African universities (He, 2007). 6. Five FOCAC meetings have been held so far – the first was in Beijing in 2000, the second in Addis Ababa in 2003, the third in Beijing in 2006, the fourth in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt in 2009, and the fifth in Beijing in 2012. 7. Also see Information Office of the State Council, China, (2011a, 2011b) and MOFA (2006). 8. See Embark on a new journey of China’s diplomacy. Addressed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Symposium, New starting point, new thinking and new practice 2013: China and the World, Beijing, December 16, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.en84.com/nonfiction/remarks/201312/00014081.html 9. Ramo (2004) elaborated three theorems of Beijing Consensus including the usage of innovation for reform; sustainability and equality in development; and self-determination. 10. See United Nations office for South-South cooperation homepage. Retrieved from http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc.html 11. Following the emphasis on tracking and monitoring the position of China on the post-2015 agenda by King (2014), the authors’ observation on public seminars hosted or jointed hosted by CIDRN during July 2013 and June 2014 shows the warming up regarding this issue among academics and think tanks in China. Thus 5 out of 10 public seminars from 2013 to 2014 were relevant to the post-2015 development agenda (CIDRN, 2014, p. 3). 12. According to He (2007), between the 1950s and the 1980s, China dispatched teachers of mathematics, physics and chemistry at basic education level to Africa. 13. China also established Tianjin University of Technology and Education (TUTE) as the first base for educational cooperation in Africa to be in charge of vocational training for African countries, dispatch of teachers to Africa and trainings in China for teachers from Africa. In recent years, TUTE has already closely cooperated with vocational and technical schools of Ethiopia in textile, machining, automobile repair, road, and bridge construction (He, 2007b). 14. Also see http://www.csc.edu.cn/laihua/scholarship.aspx 15. See Hanban’s homepage for more details. Retrieved from http://english.hanban.org/

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This chapter is extended based on the following paper: Niu (2013). The research has been supported by Ministry of Education in China(15JZD033), and is a part of a larger study of Cultural Cooperation and People-to-People Exchanges between China and Foreign Countries. The Ministry is not responsible for the views expressed in this chapter.

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SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: INDIA’S PROGRAMME OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE – NATURE, SIZE AND FUNCTIONING Jandhyala B. G. Tilak

ABSTRACT India is described as an emerging donor. Actually India has started providing development assistance to developing countries immediately after independence. The amount of aid was relatively small, but grew over the years to a recognisable size. The chapter reviews the long experience of India in the framework of development assistance which is laid in the foundational principles of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC). In the process of the review, the special features of the India’s programme, its unique character and overall prospects are highlighted. In the absence of reliable data on total and sector-wise assistance, the chapter concentrates on one major component of assistance, viz., technical cooperation a substantial part of which is devoted to training, that is, to the development of human capital. The analysis shows that given certain unique features of its aid programme, India has a great potential to emerge as a major donor country, and even to rank among big traditional donor countries. It can also influence the global aid architecture. There are many lessons that others can learn from the ‘Indian model of aid’. However, there are certain problems and challenges that India has to address for it to become a major international player in the aid business. One of the most important problems refers to the absence of detailed information. The available details on India’s assistance are sketchy and confusing; there are no detailed and consolidated statements of assistance, and it is only now a proper formal agency to coordinate all external assistance and to provide effective management in a cohesive manner has been set up. The analytical and critical account of India’s aid programme presented here is hoped to provide valuable fresh insights into the whole issue and should be of considerable academic and policy value. Keywords: India; foreign aid; international aid; development assistance; emerging donor; ITEC; South-South Development Cooperation (SSCD)

INTRODUCTION The international aid scene was until recently dominated by a few advanced OECD countries. But as Woods (2008) described, ‘a silent revolution is taking place in the development assistance regime’. Traditional donors have not been in a position to address some of the serious concerns of the developing countries, particularly relating to non-intrusion, sovereignty and benefit incidence of aid (donors benefiting more than the others). Some of the developing countries launched programmes of development assistance to provide assistance to fellowdeveloping countries, addressing these concerns. Their attempts have been robust. Today some of these countries, which are essentially non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors, are being recognised as ‘emerging (re-merging) donors’ (Mawdsley, 2012), ‘nontraditional donors’ (Kragelund, 2011), ‘new development partners’ (Park, 2011) or as ‘Southern providers’ (UNDCF, 2013), which are viewed as a challenge to the traditional donors and/or are having significant impact on the global aid architecture triggering a sea change in international aid (Langton, 2012). The total aid from these non-traditional donors seems to constitute about 30 per cent of the total global aid (Yamada, 2013). All this does not mean that these developing countries had never earlier provided aid to other developing countries. They are not necessarily new in their activities of financial aid and technical cooperation (Davies, 2010; King, 2010). As Mawdsley (2012) stated, many developing countries have historically contributed to significant share of official aid, [but] Western academic and policy analysts have tended to overlook their roles and activities – something that is now changing. Mainly in the broad framework of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), which began with the Colombo Plan established in 1950, to promote collective intergovernmental effort towards cooperative economic and social development of member countries in Asia and the Pacific, developing countries began providing assistance to fellow-developing countries in the 1950s. This received further fillip from the Bandung (Asian-African) Conference in 1955 that brought together 29 countries from Asia and Africa and which established Asian-African Strategic partnership aiming at mutual interest and cooperation (Kahin, 1956), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and the formation of the Group of 77 (G-77) in 1964. The Busan conference in 2011 marks a major turning point and gives full legitimacy to South-South cooperation as a development cooperation modality (deRenzio & Seifert, 2014). India was one of the above mentioned four major participants in the first one and is a founder member of the later groups, in addition to the Colombo Plan.1 Over the years the model of aid based on the principle of SSDC emerged gradually as a distinct model from the standard DAC model of the West and the Arab model (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). Of the many nations often described as emerging donors, India, along with China is considered as a major donor (Langton, 2012; Roche, 2012). For a long period, India has been described as a poor, major aid-recipient country. It is only of late, having graduated from the status of low income country to a middle income country in the classification of the World Bank and having discontinued in 2003 receiving of bilateral aid from all but five major countries (Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United

States), India is being begun to be recognised as an emerging economic power, as a resurgent and powerful state, with an annual rate of growth of about 7–9 per cent, as the South Asian giant, and as ‘an emerging donor’, or as a ‘re-emerging donor’ (Mawdsley, 2012), when it gained momentum in recent years and its foreign assistance touched the level of $1.6 billion in 2015–2016,2 next only to China among developing country donors (Mullen & Ganguly, 2012). Now it is projected that this would go up to $3.5 billion annually, that is, nearly 0.2 per cent of GDP, which makes India to rank among the big donors in the world (Ninan, 2013). In fact, with a foreign aid budget which more than double the net foreign aid receipts of $655 million in 2014–2015 it is felt that India with eventually becomes a net exporter of development assistance, as shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. India’s Foreign Aid: Outflows and Inflows. Source: https://www.devex.com/news/in-latest-indian-budget-aid-spendingdwarfs-aid-receipts-82915

It may not be proper to describe India as a new donor country or as an emerging donor. India has been giving substantial amounts of aid to other countries since independence. Probably India is one of the oldest aid providers, even compared with traditional donors. India’s external assistance programme began as early as in the 1950s, immediately after independence, with its assistance to Nepal, Bhutan and Burma, the three neighbouring countries having strong historical, cultural and social bonds with India. Providing mainly technical assistance during the last 5-6 decades, India has finally emerged as a country to provide big amounts of direct cash transfers and subsidised loans. In short, ‘India has quietly become a significant provider of development assistance to other less developed countries’ (Agrawal, 2007). Though India has been one of the largest aid-receivers, it is now recognised as an emerging competitor in the international aid business, competing with China and other BRICS

countries, viz., Brazil, Russia and South Africa, on the one hand and the established OECD donor countries on the other. India’s long history of aid practice, including its modalities was recognised by some scholars, though only recently. For example, Kondoh, Kobayashi, Shiga, and Sat (2010) observed, ‘India, as a full-fledged donor with a long history of aid-giving, has a full set of aid modalities similar to those of traditional donors and incorporates both bilateral and multilateral aid’.

INDIA AND SOUTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: INDIA’S AID PROGRAMME India has a small traditional aid programme of grants and assistance for a long time; its programme started with giving aid to Nepal under the Colombo Plan in the early 1950s. Though small in the size, India’s contribution constituted fifth largest among the donor states and first among the developing states included in the Plan (Dutt, 1980). Though Colombo Plan is a multilateral agreement in form, in its operation it was largely a bilateral arrangement. Under the Colombo Plan, India sent experts to as many as 64 countries and trained until 1961 as many as 1,442 members, and an additional 3,550 between 1961 and 1971 in India in areas such as engineering, forestry, agriculture, power, finance and administration. India’s aid under the Colombo Plan between 1950 and 1971 was estimated to be about Rs. 40 million. Today India provides aid under different modalities. The total external assistance provided by India has grown steadily for a long period and in the recent years the rate of growth has been quite impressive. In 2011 the total assistance provided by India is estimated to be about $1.5 billion (Mullen & Ganguly, 2012). In addition, India has pledged $5 billion aid to Africa in the form of concessional loans in 2011. It also pledged $700 million to help establish new institutions and training programmes in African countries in consultation with African Union. It also promised 10,000 new scholarships for the India-Africa Virtual University and 22,000 scholarships for studying in India (Guardian, 25 May 2011).3 India has also offered Bangladesh a $1 billion loan package. The India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Trust Fund (founded in 2003) in which India is a major partner, provides an innovative means of delivering assistance to other countries. Each of the three countries has to contribute $1 million annually to this Fund. India is also a member of the Afghanistan Donors Group and has been its largest donor. This is clear that the Colombo Plan is not the only major channel through which development has been provided by India. Other major channels include the Indian Technical Economic Cooperation (ITEC), the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP) and the Export and Import (EXIM) Bank of India. Most of the development assistance could be classified into three major components: (a) project assistance to developing countries like Bhutan and in recent years to Afghanistan, (b) technical assistance to as many as 158 countries mostly in Asia and Africa under the Colombo Plan, the ITEC, the

SCAAP and (c) loans through the EXIM Bank. While substantial assistance (under the Colombo Plan, ITEC and SCAAP) is provided through the Ministry of External Affairs, lines of credit are provided by the EXIM Bank, which is a constituent part of the Ministry of Finance. Lines of credit with subsidised interest rates – soft loans are provided through the EXIM Bank of India for financing imports of Indian equipment, technology, projects, goods and services on deferred credit terms.4 In other words, the total assistance is a ‘mixed bag’ of project assistance, purchase subsidies, lines of credit, travel costs, technical training etc., provided to developing countries including some of the fragile states and strife-ridden countries. Reliable comprehensive estimates of India’s total assistance are not available, and available ones vary widely from each other and with no proper definitions, no necessary details, and no proper consolidated statements, they are indeed confusing. Hence any trend analysis is rather impossible. This is a common problem with many of the non-DAC countries (see Sinha & Hubbard, 2012); the problem is also aggravated as aid and foreign policy issues have historically been insulated from public discourse (Mawdsley, 2012). There are no proper definitions of development assistance, or of aid. India is not a member of the DAC of the OECD and its assistance is not categorised as ‘official development assistance’ (ODA). After all, DAC’s donor classification is ‘selective and insular, effectively discriminating against non-Western and Southern donors (Kapoor, 2008, p. 89). India’s assistance is called development assistance/cooperation and not ‘aid’. In line with the principle of SSDC, both the country that provides assistance and those that receive assistance are referred to as development partners and not as donors and aid-recipients. Further, an important problem is until recently there is no nodal agency to effectively manage and coordinate all the programmes relating to assistance flowing from different sources in India. An associated and equally important problem is the absence of budget categories of assistance. All development assistance does not flow under clear budget headings. As a result of all this, there are no consolidated estimates of India’s total assistance and the very limited data that is available in public domain does not help one to make any clear appraisal of the magnitude, quality, and nature of assistance, and assistance by sectors and activity.5 Noting the growing magnitude of external economic assistance programmes, it is only in 2012 an overseas development assistance agency called Development Partnership Administration (DPA) was set up under the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, which is vested with the responsibility of overseeing all aid projects through all stages from the stage of conception, formulation, launch, execution, completion, monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment (MOE, 2015).6 It is expected to help in consolidation of all outgoing aid, streamline all administrative matters related to this process and provide overall unified administration of development assistance flowing from various ministries.7 This is described as a significant and definitive step in right direction (Roychoudhury, 2013; see also Horaváth, 2013). With these limitations, let us note a few available estimates.8 Data presented need to be noted with caution, as they are collected from several primary and secondary sources; all of them are not strictly comparable. So, one has to interpret the available estimates with

discretion. The various kinds of aid that flow from various sources in India can be categorised as shown in Fig. 2. Some of the available statistics refer to the assistance provided through the Ministry of External Affairs only, and some through Ministry of Finance, and many exclude either and also aid flown through other channels. But actually the total assistance includes bilateral and multilateral assistance, in addition to contributions to international organisations.9

Fig. 2. India’s Development Assistance. Source: Adapted from Kondoh et al. (2010).

India’s accumulated aid over the last three decades is estimated to be over $2.5 billion (Agrawal, 2010). Walz and Ramachandran (2011) report that the estimates of India’s total aid vary between $488 million (0.04 per cent of gross national income) and $2171 million (0.16 per cent of gross national income) in 2009. Smith, Fordelone, and Zimmermann (2010) estimate the figure to be $610 million (2008–2009). Langton (2012) reports this to exceed $2 billion a year. Chaturvedi (2012) puts this figure for the most recent period at $3 billion. According to another estimate (Bijoy, 2010), total estimated foreign aid in 2008–2009 was of the order of Rs. 266,712 million. According to Chanana (2010), India’s total foreign aid-related budget has increased from $526 million in 2004 to $785 million (Rs. 36.6 million) in 2010, as shown in Table 1. It was estimated to have increased to $1,293 million in 2013–2014, excluding lines of control. These

amounts include grants and loans, which constitute the major bulk – nearly 85 per cent, contributions to international organisations, investment in international financial institutions and EXIM Bank-related expenditure. The corresponding estimate of the total for 1998–1999 was Rs. 9,955 million. Aid through Ministry of External Affairs is estimated to have recorded a significant increase over the years; it increased in 2000 constant prices, from about $112 million in 1966 to about $400 million in 2010 (Fuchs & Vadlamannati, 2012). But for a big allocation in 1972 to Bangladesh (approximately Rs. 18,000 million grants and concessional loans), the growth has been slow until the early 1990s. The rate of growth is much higher after 1991. Loans form still a small share of the total. There is a steep decline in the total aid between 2008 and 2010. It appears that economic slowdown and cuts in the inflow of aid did affect the outflow of aid. Further, under the India Development Initiative,10 and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative,11 India has also written-off debts and restructured commercial debts; the total debts written off were of about $37 million and many more debt relief agreements were in pipeline (Chanana, 2009). Table 1. India’s Foreign Aid-Related Budget, 2004–2010 (Rs. Million).

India makes huge contributions to international organisations.12 Such contributions increased from Rs. 1,621 million in 1998–1999 to Rs. 3,531 million in 2008–2009 (Table 2). The latter figure excludes allocations made to international financial institutions to the tune of Rs. 171 million (Bijoy, 2010). In 2003 India became a net creditor to the IMF and a contributor to the World Food Programme. India is one of the largest contributors to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) set up in 1971, which provides developmental assistance for conducting workshops, deputing technical advisors and capacity building. Table 2. India’s Contributions to International Organisations (US$ Million).

India also makes sizeable contributions to the World Bank and United Nations (UN) organisations. In addition to the World Bank, it makes subscriptions and contributions to the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank. It has a strong relationship with the UN system and contributes in the form of peace keeping forces to human security and also to disaster relief etc.,13 and other UN programmes. India contributes to the UN organisations and also to the UN budget. Total such contributions increased from $68 million in 2005–2006 to $121 million in 2010–2011. India is among the largest contributors to the new UN Democracy Fund (Agrawal, 2007). It recently became a donor to the World Bank’s Trust Fund for South-South Learning. It also makes contributions to the Global Environment Facility and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. These contributions come from various ministries of the government of India. In short, funding of provision of global public goods lies ‘at the heart of the country’s interaction with multilateral institutions, coupled with its concern about the under-representation of developing countries in those bodies that define global public goods’ (Price, 2011). It is widely acknowledged that India provides a range of global public goods. The whole programme of development assistance is executed by various ministries and institutions, led by the Ministry of External Affairs. Sizeable assistance also flows from the Ministry of Finance. Putting the assistance from all the miniseries together, the total

government aid budget aid was estimated to be Rs. 26,241 million in 2008, which was Rs. 18,001 million in 2002 (Kondoh et al., 2010). Aid budget of the Ministry of External Affairs accounts for above 80 per cent of this total, and that of the Ministry of Finance 12 per cent; the balance is accounted by other ministries. The relative share of the Ministry of External Affairs has also increased over the years; it was 67 per cent in 2002 (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Growth in India’s Aid Budget, by Sources. Source: Based on Kondoh et al. (2010). Note: MOE: Ministry of External Affairs; MOF: Ministry of Finance.

Of the several components of India’s external assistance, technical cooperation is a very important one. In 2012–2013, nearly 40 per cent of the budget of the Ministry of External Affairs and 58 per cent of the total foreign aid budget of India pertains to technical and economic cooperation with other countries (and another 13.4 per cent to loans to foreign government enterprises (Standing Committee on External Affairs, 2012).14 Most of the assistance under technical cooperation flows through the ITEC.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION: ASSISTANCE FOR TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT ITEC is the major flagship programme of India’s development assistance. It is mostly devoted to training, capacity building and other ‘soft’ investments. As explained earlier, no detailed data are available to examine the trends in aid in general or education-related aid in particular. Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2012) estimated that out of the total aid given by the Ministry of External Affairs, education sector accounted for 3.1 per cent in 2008–2010. But, according to

Agrawal (2012), of the total official aid, education and skills accounts for about 30 per cent. Education is an important priority sector of India’s grants, along with rural development, health and technical cooperation (UNESC, 2008). The Small Development Project (SDP) programme of assistance launched in 2003 focuses on areas like infrastructure development and capacity building in the areas of education, health and community development. Since IBSA stresses that education is vital for development, it is likely that contributions to education sector will be substantial under the IBSA programme. India finances liberally the newly set up South Asia University, which is meant for the South Asian students. India is also setting up Nalanda International University which also caters to the needs of many foreign students. Both are funded by the Ministry of External Affairs and are located in India. Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR), funded by the Ministry of External Affairs, is responsible for cultural exchange programmes including bringing in foreign students, teachers and artists to India for various short periods. The budget of the ICCR was $15 million in 2007–2008. About 2,000 foreign students come to India on average every year to study in Indian universities with the fellowship provided Government of India and administered by the ICCR (Grover, 2011). There are several scholarship schemes such as the General Cultural Scholarships Scheme, Commonwealth Fellowship Plan, Colombo Plan, SAARC Fellowship Scheme, and special schemes for Sri Lanka, Mauritius and African researchers (see Agrawal, 2012). India spends about Rs. 500 million annually on ITEC activities. About 40 per cent of the ITEC budget is spent on training, which can be described as assistance for development of human capital. ITEC allocations do include specific amounts for scholarships and for building education institutions. In addition to providing opportunities for formal training programmes in India, and deputing Indian experts abroad for a variety of purposes, some of the activities under ITEC, relating to education include building of schools (in Maldives), assistance in the transformation of the education system of South Africa, establishment of Plastic Technology Demonstration Centre in Namibia, Vocational Training Centre for Construction Sector in Indonesia, teaching unemployed youth in South Africa, useful trades such making biscuits, or binding books, teaching Vietnamese students to converse in English, establishment of Vocational Training Centre for Small and Medium Enterprises in Senegal and Zimbabwe, Vietnam, Mongolia, Afghanistan and Indonesia and sharing of experience in dry-farming techniques with Iraq (Bijoy, 2010). Capacity building and development of human resources have been the important concerns of the ITEC programme (Grover, 2011). The ITEC, fully funded by the Government of India, was instituted in 1964 as a bilateral programme of assistance of the Government of India as a ‘partnership for mutual benefit,’ based on the principle of ‘equality’. By the 1970s, ITEC had become the most predominant programme of India’s external assistance. Through ITEC, India has provided over $2 billion worth of technical assistance to developing countries (RAMC, 2010). The Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP) is a sister programme which covers only African countries. Under ITEC and the SCAAP together, more than 150 countries in Asia, East Europe (including former USSR), Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean as well as Pacific and small island countries share with India its developmental experience in

various fields.15 The assistance under ITEC/SCAAP Programme, which is in the form of grants, includes six major components: (a) Training civilian and defence personnel of nominees from ITEC partner countries in India; (b) projects and project-related activities such as feasibility studies of development projects and consultancy services, including preparation of techno-economic surveys; (c) provision of experts to other countries to assist their development; (d) study tours for personnel nominated by recipient countries; (e) gifs and donations of equipment at the request of partner countries; and (f) humanitarian assistance, including aid for disaster relief. The programme implies not only provision of skilled manpower, experts and financial resources, but also transfer of technology. Though the ITEC Programme has been envisaged essentially as a bilateral programme, on quite a few occasions ITEC provides funding technical cooperation programmes planned in regional, inter-regional and trilateral contexts such as Economic Commission for Africa, AfroAsian Rural Reconstruction Organization, Southern African Development Community, Industrial Development Unit of Commonwealth Secretariat, UNIDO, G-77 and G-15. In more recent years, activities of ITEC activities also covered regional and multilateral organisations like Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), African Union (AU), Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization (AARDO), PanAfrican Parliament, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), World Trade Organization (WTO) and Indian Ocean Rim – Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). The focus areas of the core training programmes of the ITEC are categorised as16: government courses (e.g. governance, parliamentary studies, accounts etc.), information technology and telecommunications, management, skills and rural development, technical, specialised areas, and environment and renewable energy.17 Currently nearly 50 per cent of the slots (trainee places) in ITEC programmes are in information technology. Since the beginning, ITEC has been a major vehicle for providing technical assistance. The training programmes aim at capacity building, empowerment and upgrading of skills. In 2015–2016 around 280 short-term, medium-term and long-term programmes are offered in India every year in 47 public and private institutions,18 covering a wide range of special areas such as information technology, auditing, accounts and finance, crime records, standardisation, parliamentary studies, rural development, rural electrification, tool design, scientific instruments, production management, remote sensing, pharmaceuticals, mass communication, labour issues, entrepreneurship development, railways signalling, textile research, statistics, bank management, technical teachers training, and educational planning and administration. In addition, ITEC also offers programmes for defence personnel.19 All costs of the participants including travel, visa, fee, accommodation, living allowances, book allowance, study tour, medical facilities, and all other expenses of the trainees are covered by the ITEC. Under ITEC, project assistance is also provided for instance, for establishing vocational training programmes in Indonesia and Afghanistan. In 2012 about 161 countries, recognised as ITEC ‘partner’ countries, benefited from the

ITEC and SCAAP. There is also a big increase in the number of trainees under the programme. In 1999 the number of training slots allotted was around 3,000, which increased to 7,400 in 2011–2012. Additionally, under the Technical Cooperation Scheme, another 500 civilian training slots were given to 18 member countries of the Colombo Plan in 2011–2012. In all, according to recent estimates, there are above 60,000 alumni of the ITEC programme in various parts of the world. Though small in money transfers – in fact, there is little outflow of funds from India under training – ITEC ‘bore fruit’, as thousands of bureaucrats and politicians from several developing countries received their educational training in India and India earned enormous goodwill. A large number of ITEC training slots have been enjoyed by Sub-Saharan Africa. As observed by Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2012), the distribution of ITEC training programmes favours Sub-Saharan Africa. Thirty six per cent of the total slots between 1998 and 2005 were allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa, 20 per cent to South-East Asia, 15 per cent to Middle East and North Africa, 13 per cent to post-Soviet transition countries and only 10 per cent to South Asia. Thus the focus of the ITEC has been Sub-Saharan Africa (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Assistance through ITEC. Source: Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2012).

However, it is interesting to note that in the total technical cooperation budget, of which training is one major component, Sub-Saharan African countries receive only 5.6 per cent and neighbouring Asian countries receive the maximum, as shown in Table 3. Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2012) also noted that a lion’s share, nearly 85 per cent, of the aid administered by the Ministry of External Affairs was allotted to South Asian countries such as Bhutan and Nepal during 2008–2010 and a tiny share was accounted by Sub-Saharan Africa. But there are several projects being launched in Africa, as a part of the total external assistance programme, such as the Pan-African e-Network Project that was launched in 2004, which aims at improving schooling and health situation in African countries. Apart from building 10 superspeciality hospitals and 53 general hospitals, the project with a commitment of $100 million aims at connecting 53 educational institutions across Africa via satellite fibre-optic network.

The project covers 29 countries in the region. It also aims at creation of India-Africa Virtual University (IAVU) intended to meet demand in Africa for higher education in Indian institutions, by providing 10,000 new scholarships to African students. The IAVU project with an estimated cost of US$ 3.5 million and annual cost of over US$ 0.5 million, envisages formations of academic programmes, promotion of collaboration in distance education, coordination of special action plans and strengthening of the consultation mechanisms mediating education exchanges between India and African nations (Duclos, 2012). Table 3. India’s Technical Cooperation Budget, 2014–2015.

Further, India is funding several projects in Africa. Earlier in 2008, India offered a $5.4 billion worth of aid to Africa at the first India-Africa Summit in Delhi focusing on regional integration through infrastructure development. Much more assistance was promised in the second Summit in 2011. India offered an additional $700 million to establish new institutions and training programmes in consultation with the African Union and its institutions (Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). The assistance is for establishment of 19 new training institutions in Africa in coordination with the African Union; 4 of these will serve all the countries in Africa – one is on information technology, one on foreign trade, one on diamond polishing and one on educational planning. The programme of assistance also covers setting of 10 vocational training institutions and five human settlement institutions for training in the construction of low cost housing. African Union decides the location of the institutes, the partner country in Africa will provide land and construct buildings, and India will run the institutes for three years until they become self-sustaining. In addition, over the years, India has provided substantial aid to many African nations such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya and Angola and is still in the process of supporting development in these countries. In all, India’s aid to Africa has been found to have grown at a compound annual growth rate of 22 per cent over the past 10 years (Ramachandran & Walz, 2010). Over the next five years, India has promised $1.87 billion annually to Africa (Ninan, 2013).

As already stated, ITEC is not confined to Sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly two-thirds of the ITEC slots are provided to developing countries in other regions of the world including in South and South-East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Commonwealth of Independent States. India’s development assistance for investment in human capital development and capacity building are spread all over the developing world. In all, India’s external assistance to human capital related programmes seems to be quite significant.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS What Are the Salient Features of India’s Development Assistance Programme? India’s external assistance programme is quite old, and has grown in size, and is still growing. In the last few years, marked shifts in the architecture of India’s development assistance – in the size, direction, nature and motives have taken place. India is also a major aid-receiver, but the government is consciously reducing the inflow of aid. As has already been shown, India is eventually emerging as a net aid-giver. India’s approach in providing assistance to others is also influenced by its own experience as a recipient of aid. In terms of geographical focus, India concentrates on neighbouring countries in Asia – South Asia and Afghanistan, as it aims at political and economic stability of the region. But its assistance programme is increasingly covering countries outside the immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Substantial assistance also flew to Africa and in recent years the assistance is getting extended to Central Asia, islands in Pacific Ocean, South-East Asia and to Latin America and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Gradually its programme of assistance is getting extended to different corners of the world. The preference in its aid programme is bilateral assistance: bilateral assistance is substantial, though India also provides assistance on multilateral platforms, apart from making big contributions to international organisations, including UNCTAD, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, ESCAP, IMF, IDA, UNDP etc. Though the size of the loans is increasing, a big shift from grants to loans or soft loans is yet to be seen. The motives of India’s external assistance programme are varied and blurring (Price, 2004). Its focus on South Asia revolves around considerations for regional leadership and influence, besides stability in the region while its assistance to Africa can be seen as complementary set of political and commercial interests, for example, first to support struggle against colonialism and apartheid, to strengthen NAM movement, and to express solidarity with the countries of the third world; in more recent years for access to African energy resources and its interest in multilateral forums could be to promote its strategic interests (Agrawal, 2007). All this lead Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2012) to describe India as a ‘needy’ donor.

During the Cold War period, influenced by the NAM and anti-colonialism, India’s programme of assistance was largely influenced by political ideological considerations, but with the end of the Cold War, the programme became more apolitical. With the economic liberalisation of the economy in the 1990s, the aid policy has become more pragmatic and is guided by strategic economic interests (Kondoh et al., 2010). India’s development assistance to South Asian countries focuses on infrastructure, health and education, and the assistance to African countries focused more on technical training, though assistance to infrastructure building is also rapidly growing. It may also be stated that India faces less competition in its programme of assistance in South Asia, while India has to face fierce competition with China and others in its programmes in Africa. But the competition even in Africa is less for India in the area of technical cooperation – essentially training, compared to assistance in terms of loans and grants for infrastructure and other tangible projects. The total amount of aid that flows from India, on which we have varying estimates, is still small, compared to the ODA of the OECD countries or countries like China. But the real significance of the programme lies not so much in the magnitude of assistance – grants, or loans or technical cooperation or financial resources flowing, but rather, as noted by the RAMC (2010), in ‘the character of the relationship expressed by these exchanges, especially when compared with traditional North-South development cooperation’.

What Is the Special, If Not Unique, Character of India’s Development Assistance? India believes in the spirit of SSDC, and this has been a traditional pillar of the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Accordingly, its programme of external assistance is based on the foundational principles Panchsheel and the Bandung conference, which formed the spirit of the SSDC. SSDC is based on ‘the principles of solidarity, non-interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect of independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and the local content’ (Accra Agenda for Action of the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2008). The relationship between the countries is not donor and recipient, but of partners and the goal is collective self-reliance. India’s programme of assistance is firmly based on principles of the Nehruvian notion of non-interference. The approach is characterised by a principle of solidarity with others. There is empathy based on shared identify and experience. Its assistance aims at bolstering the development efforts of the recipient country. Virtues of solidarity, mutual benefit, partnership and recognition of reciprocity – sharing of learning and best practice, in the whole process are well emphasised, in contrast to the traditional donor debate over recipients’ needs versus donors’ interests (Rowlands, 2008). As a result, compared to aid programmes of traditional donors, Indian programme is not associated with any ‘discredited or fashionable’ conditionalities or policy prescriptions. India’s programme is designed, inter alia, to promote local capacity building and ownership.

India has gained huge ‘goodwill’ with its novel aid strategies and ‘soft power’ approach. ‘Much of India’s success in its relations with the developing world has been built through its traditional aid programme and a shared colonial history with countries in Africa and elsewhere’ (Ramachandran & Walz, 2010). Assistance, that too coming in the name of development cooperation from a fellow-developing country which was also a victim of colonialism is viewed not as a neo-colonial tool, but as healthy developmental assistance. India’s expertise is based on experience of a developing country, with a long tradition of stable democracy, and an ex-colony, which is much more relevant to other developing countries than that of the West. The quality of Indian goods and services could be more appropriate and prices reasonable. The programme of assistance is also associated with less procedural requirements, quicker disbursements and flexible terms, though some assistance is tied to the purchase of goods and services from India. In contrast, as Woods (2008) observed, many developing countries are ‘sceptical of promises’ and ‘way of conditionalities’ and ‘fatigued by heavy bureaucratic and burdensome delivery systems’ associated with Western aid programmes that also perpetuate aid-dependence. On the other hand, the idea of the Indian programmes of assistance in general, and of the SDP in particular, is that it should meet local needs, and should be managed by local communities and institutions, minimising project implementation costs. Local ownership of the programme is the most important feature (Chaturvedi, 2012). India does not have strong commercial interests in its major programmes of technical cooperation. For instance, it was clearly stated that India’s ‘long term vision of extending technical and economic assistance to other countries is to secure friendship and cooperation with the partner countries, enhance goodwill for India among the peoples of these countries and further peace and stability in the world leading to a more secure world for the nations at large’ (Standing Committee on External Affairs, 2012, p. 34). Though widely recognised as a major emerging donor, India refused to sign the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), to be a part of OECD’s DAC, and/or to align with major traditional donors and ‘to be seen as reproducing traditional donor recipient hierarchies’ (Rowlands, 2008). It also resisted pressures at Busan (2008) to be a part of ‘triangular development cooperation’ according to which, donors in North and South join together to aid another country in the South. Rather, it plans to maintain its identity and retain the principle of SSDC in all its assistance programmes. As Mullen and Ganguly (2012) observed, ‘due to India’s status as an emerging economy, a consolidated democracy, and a developing country free form colonial influence, Indian foreign assistance has great legitimacy in the eyes of other emerging countries …. It is this legitimacy that differentiates Indian development assistance and is likely to bolster its soft power’. With such special features, India’s programme is recognised as ‘an Indian model of aid’ (Oglesby, 2005, p. 30). Some of these features are worth noting and traditional donors may even find something to learn from Indian practice and experience, rather than criticising India and other emerging donors as ‘free riders’ who benefit from conditions for effective aid prepared by traditional donors and not contribute to maintain it (Woods, 2008) or expecting them to follow the order (Davies, 2010). After all, the very presence of countries like India

and China in the aid arena offers many new insights, besides challenges to the traditional donors (Rowlands, 2008).

What Are the Prospects and What Are the Challenges That India Face? The entry of counties like India (and China) into the aid arena in a big way in the recent years, though they have been aid-givers for a long time, is fared to be causing changes in the geographies of economic and political power relations. India, leading the SSDC, seems to be posing challenges to the very character of the established aid architecture of the traditional donors, including the standards and norms they have developed. As described in the Economist (13 April, 2011) ‘big developing countries are shaking up the world of aid’. India is nowadays widely recognised as a major emerging or as a ‘re-emerging’ donor – or as a ‘development partner’. India has a few specific comparative advantages, building on which India can play a bigger role in the international arena of development cooperation. First, it earned a lot of goodwill from the developing countries with its programme of assistance over several decades. Second, while many developed countries continue to be in economic crisis and suffering from long periods of recession, India’s growth, on the other hand, is still positive and high. With a large economic base – fourth largest economy of the world in terms of PPP GDP in the world,20 India is regarded as a giant economic power playing a key role in several multilateral groups such as BRIC, BRICS, G-20, G-77, IBSA, World Bank, IMF, NAM, SAARC, UN, WTO, Commonwealth etc., and as one influencing the agenda of groups such as G-8, even if it is not a member. Third, with a large network of educational, training and research institutions in public and private sector, India’s human capital base is strong; morover, it has advantages in language and in IT skills. Fourth, the rapid growth of the IT (information technology) sector, ‘in view of its alleged aptitude to foster capacity-building, inclusive growth, and knowledge transference’, can help in escalation of India’s efforts in expanding cooperation to other countries (Duclos, 2012). Fifth, India is widely seen as championing and providing a range of public goods and ‘has the potential to offer more’ (Price, 2011, p. 1), and through this, India can become a big power in the international arena. In short, in addition to not just becoming ‘a conduit between the Global North and the LDCs’ (Kumar, Dickerson, & Tandon, 2012, p. 39), India has a great potential to become a more significant player on its own in development assistance. But there are quite a few challenges that India faces. Presently its programme of assistance is very small in size. For India to become a big player, it has to substantially increase its budget allocations for assistance. Given the high levels of poverty in the country and reliance on aid from traditional bilateral and multilateral aid organisations for its own development, this is indeed a big challenge. The challenge becomes stronger, as it has to compete with countries like China and other traditional mainstream donors. Second, with a large part of the assistance being grants and technical assistance (training), and focusing on local capacity building, India has amassed

goodwill. If this is sacrificed in favour of commercial interests, India may be accused of the same that India levels against traditional donors. There is a need to strike a balance between grants, loans and technical cooperation and to balance multiple interests of the assistance programme. Third, there is need to maintain detailed database, and consolidated statements of various types of aid, the sources and activities and put the database in public domain for sound research, effective policy making and to be transparent. Fourth, there is a need for a clear statement from the government outlining coherent long-term policy of development assistance. Now that a new dedicated one umbrella development agency is set up in 2012 to deploy, measure, coordinate, monitor and consolidate all aid programmes of the country, it is hoped that this will produce a well-articulated development assistance policy statement that helps in chalking out a harmonised development assistance programme of India for the future.

NOTES 1. India’s Panchsheel, the five principles, viz., mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, emphasised by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru formed the basis for the Bandung Conference, the Colombo, Plan, and the NAM. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Principles_of_Peaceful_Coexistence). Manmohan Singh, India’s Prime Minister (2004–2014) was the Secretary General of the South Commission, which prepared a report that stressed the importance of South-South Cooperation in the changing times. See South Commission (1990). 2. We note later, the several figures on India’s total external assistance are confusing. 3. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/may/25/india-pledges-5bn-to-help-african-statesmeet-mdgs 4. LOCs are generally extended to overseas financial institutions, regional development banks, sovereign governments and other entities overseas, to enable buyers in those countries to import goods and services from India on deferred credit terms. A line of credit is not considered as a foreign aid instrument, but rather as an instrument for promoting international trade. It is used as a tool not only to enhance market diversification but also as an effective market entry mechanism for small and medium Indian enterprises. See Sinha and Hubbard (2011). But they are also often treated as a part of the total assistance/aid. The total lines of credit that India had offered through the EXIM Bank was to the tune of $4,500 million in 2010 (Sinha & Hubbard, 2011). 5. As a result, even a major international source of data on external aid like Aiddata.org does not have much information on aid outflows from India. 6. In the preceding years there were proposals to institute ‘India Development Assistance’ (2003), ‘Indian International Development Cooperation Agency’ (2007) and ‘Indian Agency for Partnership in Development’ (IAPD) (2011). But none materialised. 7. Immediately the DPA is expected to oversee $11.3 billion assistance over the next 5–7 years (Patel, 2011). 8. It is not attempted here to reconcile the several confusing and contradictory statistics. 9. Often the line between foreign direct investment and aid/assistance is blurred, as is the line between aid and trade. 10. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-04-12/international-usiness/27268819_1_%20international-financialinstitutions-rbi-governor-bimal-jalan-quota-formula. By launching the ‘Initiative’ in 2003, India repositioned itself in the international development community, as a major aid provider to give grants or project assistance to developing countries in Africa, South Asia and other developing nations. Nothing is known later about the Initiative, except that the Government has written off debt worth $30 million due to it from seven heavily indebted countries as part of the Initiative. 11. It was originally launched in 1996 by the G7. 12. Though such contributions may not be considered as ‘direct’ aid, they are listed as a part of India’s foreign aid-related budgets. 13. India has been recognised as an important humanitarian donor. See Horaváth (2013). 14. See also http://www.mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/budget/Budget_11-12_Eng.pdf and https://www.devex.com/news/in-latest-

indian-budget-aid-spending-dwarfs-aid-receipts-82915 15. See http://itec.mea.gov.in for more details and a complete list of countries covered. 16. See http://itec.mea.gov.in/. However, the categorisation does not seem to be neat and non-overlapping 17. These are only civilian training programmes. Training programmes for defence personnel include security and strategic studies, defence management, marine and aeronautical engineering, logistics and management etc., and they cater to the needs of all the three wings of defence services, viz., army, air force and navy. 18. http://itec.mea.gov.in/?1320?000. See also ITEC: Civilian training programme 2010–11. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 2011. 19. The focus in this chapter is on training civilian personnel. 20. http://www.therichest.org/world/worlds-largest-economies/

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This chapter is an extended version of Tilak (2013).

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development in an age of scarcity and uncertainty: New Values, voices and alliances or increased resilience. University of York. Retrieved from http://eadi.org/gc2011/grover-447.pdf. Accessed on 5 August 2014. Horaváth, A. (2013). India as a humanitarian donor in the 21st Century. Paper presented in the 27th BASAS Annual Conference, University of Leeds, April 3–5. Retrieved from http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2013/Horvath_2013_BASAS_india.pdf. Accessed on 5 August 2014. Kahin, G. M. (1956). The Asian-African conference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kapoor, I. (2008). The postcolonial politics of development. London: Routldege. King, K. (2010). Editorial: New actors – Old paradigms? NORRAG News, September, No. 44. Retrieved from http://www.norrag.org/issues/article/1317/n/editorial-new-actors--old-paradigms-%5b1%5d.html. Accessed on 1 July 2014. Kondoh, H., Kobayashi, T., Shiga, H., & Sat, J. (2010). Diversity and transformation of aid patterns in Asia’s “Emerging Donors.” JICA-RI Working Paper No. 21. JICA Research Institute, Tokyo. Retrieved from http://jicari.jica.go.jp/publication/assets/JICA-RI_WP_No.21_2010.pdf. Accessed on 10 March 2015. Kragelund, P. (2011). Back to basics? The rejuvenation of non-traditional donors’ development cooperation with Africa. Development and Change, 42(2), 585–607. Kumar, R., Dickerson, M., & Tandon, S. (2012). South-South cooperation: Aid effectiveness and India. In S. Kelegama (Ed.), Foreign aid in South Asia: The emerging scenario (pp. 28–44). New Delhi: Sage. Langton, N. (2012). Emerging economies like India’s make aid recipients the new donors. In Asia (Asia Foundation). Retrieved from http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2012/02/29/emerging-economies-like-indias-make-aid-recipients-the-new-donors/. Accessed on 20 March 2016. Mawdsley, E. (2012). From recipients to donors: Emerging powers and the changing landscape. London: Zed Books. Ministry of External Affairs (MOE). (2015). The development partnership administration. Government of India. Retrieved from http://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm. Accessed on 5 November 2015. Mullen, R. D., & Ganguly, S. (2012). The rise of India’s soft power: It’s not just bollywood and yoga anymore. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the_rise_of_indian_soft_power. Accessed on 8 May 2014. Ninan, T. N. (2013). India as ‘Aid’ Giver. Business Standard. Retrieved from http://www.businessstandard.com/article/opinion/t-n-ninan-india-as-aid-giver-113020200097_1.html. Accessed on 2 February 2014. Oglesby, G. (2005). India’s evolution from aid recipent to humanitarian aid donor. Master’s thesis. University of Cambridge. Park, K.-H. (2011). New development partners and a global development partnership. In H. Kharas, K. Makina, & W. Jung (Eds.), Catalyzing development: A new vision for aid (pp. 38–60). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Patel, N. (2011). India to create central foreign aid agency. The Guardian, global development. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jul/26/india-foreign-aid-agency. Accessed on 26 July 2014. Price, G. (2004). India’s aid dynamics: From recipient to donor? Asia Programme Working Paper. Chatham House, London. Price, G. (2011). For the global good. India’s developing international role. London: Chatham House. Ramachandran, V., & Walz, J. (2010). India emerges as an aid donor. Centre for Global Development. Retrieved from http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/10/india-emerges-as-an-aid-donor.php. Accessed on 10 July 2014. Reality of Aid Management Committee (RAMC). (2010). South-South development cooperation: A challenge to the aid system? In South-South development cooperation: A challenge to the aid system? The Reality of Aid Project. Ibon Books, Quezon City, Philippines. Retrieved from http://www.realityofaid.org/roa-reports/index/secid/373/South-South-DevelopmentCooperation-A-challenge-to-the-aid-system. Accessed on 10 July 2014. Roche, E. (2012). India goes from aid beneficiary to donor. Mint & the Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BToxm8wd11xe45wSBbkqGO/India-goes-from-aid-beneficiary-to-donor.html. Accessed on 1 July 2014. Rowlands, D. (2008). Emerging donors in international development assistance: A synthesis report. IDRC, Ottawa. Roychoudhury, S. (2013). India’s external aid: Lessons and opportunities. Economic and Political Weekly, 48(36), (7 September), 22–26. Sinha, P., & Hubbard, M. (2011). DAC (traditional) & Non-DAC (emerging) donors at the crossroads: The problem of export credits. Paper presented in the Seminar on Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty: New Values, Voices and Alliances for Increased Resilience. University of York, September 19–22. (work in progress). Retrieved from

http://www.bhamlive3.bham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/idd/research/aid-data/problemexport-credits.pdf. Accessed on 1 November 2015. Sinha, P., & Hubbard, M. (2012). The non-DAC donor’s data availability index. International Development Department, University of Birmingham. Retrieved from http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/governmentsociety/idd/research/aid-data/chapter1.pdf Smith, K., Fordelone, T. Y., & Zimmermann, F. (2010). Beyond the DAC: The welcome role of other providers of development co-operation. DCD Issues Brief, May. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dac/45361474.pdf South Commission. (1990). The challenge to the south: Report of the south commission. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Standing Committee on External Affairs. (2012). Fourteenth report of the standing committee on external affairs: Ministry of external affairs: Demands for grants (2012–2013). New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat. Retrieved from http://www.bihartimes.in/Newsbihar/2012/May/MEA%20Demand%20for%20Grants%202012-13.pdf. Accessed on 1 December 2015. Tilak, J. B. G. (2013). South-South cooperation: India’s programme of development assistance – nature, size and functioning. Asian Education and Development Studies, 3(1), 58–75. UNDCF. (2013). South-South cooperation: Issues and emerging challenges. Conference of the United Nations Development Forum, New Delhi, April 15–16. United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC). (2008). Background study for the development cooperation forum: Trends in south-south and triangular development cooperation. United Nations Economic and Social Council. Walz, J., & Ramachandran, V. (2011). Brave new world: A literature review of emerging donors and the changing nature of foreign assistance. Working Paper No. 273. Center for Global Development, MA. Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance. International Affairs, 84(6), 1205–1221. Retrieved from http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wpcontent/uploads/ChinaNew%20per%20cent20donorsIA.pdf. Accessed on 2 July 2014. Yamada, S. (2013). Changing environment of education sector assistance: International trends, Asian donors and Japan. International Symposium on Asian Emerging Donors and Japan in Education Sector Development Cooperation, Nagoya University and Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo. Zimmermann, F., & Smith, K. (2011). More money, more actors, more ideas for development co-operation. Journal of International Development, 23(5), 722–738.

THE UNITED STATES – A “TRADITIONAL” OUTLIER IN TRANSITION James H. Williams

ABSTRACT Since World War II, the United States has played a leading role in development assistance in both volume of funds and role. Though the largest bilateral development agency, USAID is somewhat of an outlier in modes of operation, scope and nature of activities, and place within government. This chapter examines the development and character of U.S. foreign assistance. Like others, the United States provides foreign aid for multiple reasons – to relieve suffering and promote longterm economic and social development, to gain favor with allies, to open markets, to help ensure national security. Security and diplomacy do play a large role in U.S. foreign aid, even in basic education. In the context of U.S. internal politics, both humanitarian/development and diplomatic/security rationales have been necessary to sustain public and government support for foreign aid. Still neither rationale has prevailed; the budget is split nearly in half. The need for a humanitarian rationale may be characteristic of U.S. foreign assistance along with the emphasis on democracy. Yet these programs have sometimes been distorted by the diplomatic rationale and the security needs of the state. Many of these tensions and the constant need to justify foreign aid likely derive from the perennial periodic isolationist thread of U.S. politics, the particular adversarial institutions of U.S. policymaking, and the transparency which leaves these processes open. Even so, U.S. development assistance has played a prominent role in the trajectory of international development post-World War II, and has worked to address many of the great challenges of the times. Keywords: USAID; U.S. foreign assistance; educational assistance; development; donors

U.S. aid – in education and other sectors – has always been a leader in terms of volume and role (the primary aid agency, USAID is the world’s largest bilateral development agency), and

somewhat of an outlier in terms of modes of operation, scope and nature of activities, and place within government. The first part of the chapter examines the somewhat unique development and character of foreign assistance in the United States. The second half turns to education. This perspective will provide, it is hoped, a better understanding of how educational assistance from the United States resembles and differs from development assistance provided by other bilateral donors. Finally, likely themes of U.S. educational assistance moving forward are highlighted as post-2015 development and education agendas draw into sharper focus.

U.S. FOREIGN AID AS CONTEXT As elsewhere, foreign aid serves multiple purposes in the United States. For most of its history in the United States, the goals of diplomacy and development have been foremost in foreign aid. Sometimes working in harmony, these goals often compete for policy supremacy. In the past decade, development and diplomacy have been supplemented with defense in the “three pillars of U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy, defense, and development” (Rice, 2006; U.S. Department of State, 2010). From the beginning, foreign aid has been controversial in the United States.1 Neither diplomatic rationale nor development rationale alone has been sufficient to sustain political commitment, nor has either rationale become strong enough to triumph. Regardless, U.S. government’s commitment to foreign aid, though perennially contested, has become the norm within the United States. Though manifested externally, the dynamics of U.S. foreign aid largely reflect domestic political responses to domestic and international issues. Lancaster speaks of: “an enduring dualism in aid’s purposes, arising from conflicting ideas involving foreign aid that were amplified by American political institutions, strengthened by the interests engaged in aid, and embedded in the organization of U.S. aid” (2007, p. 107). At the outset, it may be useful to clarify terms. “International assistance” refers to all funds and support, public and private, provided by the U.S. “Foreign aid” represents all assistance that the U.S. government provides other countries. Foreign aid includes development spending, but also money to military and political allies for strategic or military purposes. “Official development assistance” (ODA) is the official term used by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and does not include military aid. As an umbrella term, foreign aid includes ODA. In recent years, however, some political and security initiatives, including portions of reconstruction work in Iraq and Afghanistan, may also be counted as ODA (Oxfam). The earliest U.S. debate about foreign aid appears to have taken place in 1794, when legislation was proposed giving US$10,000 (US) to the government of France for relief of 3,000 French refugees fleeing a slave revolt in French St. Domingo who had settled in Baltimore (Lancaster, 2007). Supporters based their arguments on humanitarian grounds;

opponents argued that government had no legitimate or Constitutional role in providing charity. Similar debates have taken place at a number of points throughout U.S. history, from discussion in 1847 of aid to Ireland in the face of the Potato Famine, through modest assistance to Latin America in the early 20th century, to the emergence of foreign aid as a regular function of U.S. government post-World War II to the present. Foreign aid continues to be contested, though rationales vary. Opponents may cite the lack of demonstrated effectiveness of foreign aid, or its poor administration by government agencies. Criticism is often directed at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the chief government agency charged with implementation of development aid.2 Most proponents of aid make humanitarian arguments, others base their support on security concerns – that the United States cannot be secure in a world of poverty. Others make commercial claims, that aid opens markets for U.S. commodities and products, or that stable, democratic, free-market economies are generally good for U.S. business (and security). Free markets are generally, though not always, seen as compatible with representative democracy. Depending on ideological persuasion, some see development and security rationales as consistent with each other. Others see them as potentially, often fundamentally, at odds. These debates parallel and derive from perennial domestic U.S. debates on isolationism versus “engagement” with the rest of the world, as well as “realist” versus “idealist” bases for engagement, and “liberal” and “conservative” political beliefs.

Institutionalization of U.S. Foreign Aid Though humanitarian and diplomacy assistance was provided earlier, foreign aid as a permanent function of government is a post-World War II phenomenon, initiated by the United States in response to the Cold War in Europe (Picard & Buss, 2009). In early 1947, the British government indicated it would be unable to continue to aid Greece and Turkey in responding to communist threats (Lancaster, 2007). President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall felt the United States had to act to prevent “Soviet penetration” (Lancaster, 2007, p. 64). Economic aid as well as military assistance was needed to stabilize and grow their economies so as to resist the appeal of Communism, a policy which became known as the Truman Doctrine. Soon thereafter, the Marshall Plan was announced, a US$13 billion program to support reconstruction and economic stabilization in devastated post-War Europe. The Marshall Plan’s goals were a mix of humanitarian, commercial, and diplomatic/security related. An undeniable component was to stop the spread of Communism. These moves were supplemented in 1949 by Truman’s Point Four program. These programs, none of which had long-term economic and social development as their primary purpose, were all intended to end after their objectives were reached. That the United States continued to provide foreign aid attests: to the ongoing need for economic and social development; the usefulness of aid to create Cold War alliances and provide monetary support to governments under direct Communist pressure; as well as to

persistent, sometimes dominant, calls for humanitarian intervention. In the post-war period, dozens of new countries emerged from colonial rule, and a competition developed between the “First” and “Second” Worlds for attentions of “the Third World.” A first meeting of “nonaligned” developing countries was held in 1954 in Bandung, Indonesia, with calls for assistance from the “developed” world. Rostow and other academics provided a theory and path for modernization and development (Rostow, 1960), which helped provide a rationale for foreign aid in promoting long-term social and economic development in “under-developed countries.” These ideas found fertile ground in the Kennedy administration, which launched a “Decade of Development” with establishment in 1961 of USAID, the first government agency with a primary responsibility for development; the U.S. Peace Corps, and the Alliance for Progress. These agencies, especially the Alliance for Progress, aimed both at “doing good,” that is, promoting economic and social development, and countering Cuban and other communist influence in Latin America. U.S. government began offering aid to most newly independent countries in Africa and Asia. USAID was originally established as a sub-Cabinet-level agency, semi-autonomous from the State Department, a position it occupied until the past decade. USAID was given responsibility for administering the three major bilateral development programs – Development Assistance, Security Supporting Assistance (later renamed the Economic Support Fund or ESF), and PL480, which managed food aid. Development Assistance funds were allocated and administered by USAID, though country allocations were sometimes negotiated with the State Department. These funds were used to support economic and social development projects in low-income countries. SSA/ESF funds were mostly allocated by State Department but implemented by USAID. Initially, SSA/ESF funds provided balance of payments support for countries making substantial security investments at U.S. request. Later funds were used for development purposes, though always in “strategic” locations. The budget for food aid came from the Department of Agriculture, but the program was largely managed by USAID. Used mainly for development and relief purposes, food aid has occasionally been used to support diplomatic and other initiatives. Food aid is a complex issue closely intertwined with alternative delivery systems for funding development activities in partner countries such as school feeding programs as well as with domestic agricultural policy, surpluses and markets, price supports and subsidies. The Treasury Department was given responsibility for contributions to multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and later debt relief. The State Department also organized U.S. contributions to United Nations development agencies as well as programs for refugees, and a variety of specific smaller programs related to particular State Department initiatives (e.g., programs aiming to replace cocaine and heroin with other crops). Established in the 1960s, this basic architecture remains largely intact, though additional agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Account have been created and others such as the Department of Labor (DOL) have been tasked with particular a

foreign aid portfolio, such as, in the case of DOL, initiatives combatting child labor.

Later Decades Later initiatives built on this basic architecture, though with shifting foci. The 1970s saw increased emphasis on “basic needs,” rural development, and participation of beneficiaries in development projects. As a basic service, education began to play a greater role in development thinking among non-educators. The 1970s also saw the signing of the Camp David accord, which saw high levels of foreign aid to Egypt and Israel, aid which continues to the present. U.S., international, and national NGOs played a greater role in development, as USAID contracted out projects. The 1970s also saw criticisms of USAID and of the overall coordination of aid activities. The 1980s witnessed a political shift to more conservative, neoliberal governments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Attention turned to the macroeconomic context of countries, the debt crisis and “structural adjustment programs” required by the IMF. The neoliberal climate proved also hospitable for the growth of NGOs, as U.S. government agencies privatized implementation of major components of development work. With hiring freezes at USAID, increasing numbers of staff working at the agency were hired through nontraditional mechanisms. In 1989 the Socialist governments of Eastern Europe fell, and by 1991 the Soviet Union had dissolved into 15 constituent republics. A substantial amount of U.S. foreign aid shifted in diplomatic focus from the Cold War to assisting the “transition” of formerly Communist countries to democratic political systems and market economies. NGOs received a further boost as U.S. government worked to promote vibrant civil societies in those societies (and elsewhere) as alternatives to overly centralized and inefficient government. During the same period, a certain “donor fatigue” set in among U.S. Congress and the American people, and levels of U.S. foreign aid fell to their lowest point since World War II. This changed with the attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States mobilized to protect itself, initiating wars in Afghanistan and later Iraq. Even more than before, military aid was directed to U.S. allies and strategic partners. Funding for development and humanitarian aid as well as basic education increased over the 2000s. Development was elevated to the third pillar of U.S. foreign policy, supplementing diplomacy and defense. The Department of Defense became an important player in development as new doctrines of warfare were articulated. “Nation-building” as a goal of aid had always been controversial, but General Petreaus’s notion of an “armed social work” model of nation-building took hold for a period. The lines between defense and development further blurred; funding for construction and rehabilitation of schools in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, came under the Department of Defense. Policymakers worried about complex humanitarian emergencies and failed states, as conflict increasingly took place within rather than among states, and as civilians became greater targets. The notion of state fragility emerged. Failed or fragile states provide opportunities for radicalized military movements to

grow, and traditional forms of development assistance are complicated by the lack of capacity or will on the part of governments in fragile contexts to provide basic services. At the international level, donors became increasingly concerned about “aid effectiveness.” A series of international meetings was organized by OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) between major international donors and recipients in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011). These meetings developed increasingly specific targets and mechanisms for measuring attainment of concepts from the 2005 Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness: Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems. Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. (OECD, 2005) The 2008 Accra meeting reinforced the commitment to implementation and expanded involvement to include emerging economies, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds and civil society organizations in the discussions. In the 2011 Busan meeting, participation was expanded to include South-South co-operators, the BRICS, and private funders. This reflected roles for new actors such as large foundations – the Gates Foundation, Soros, Hewlett, the Aga Khan Foundations, etc. – as well as, in the U.S. case, faith-based organizations, in funding and global agenda-setting. Significantly for this volume, new donors such as China, Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates emerged. In 2004, the United States established the Millennium Challenge Corporation to provide funding through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to countries with demonstrably strong governance and in need of finance for development. More than 24 countries have received MCA assistance, mostly for infrastructure (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). Development officials looked ahead to 2015, the target date for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (as well as the Education for All goals). While some countries were on target to reach their goals, many were not. At the same time, many development specialists decried limitations of the MDGs.

Persistent Issues The 1960s saw the beginning of several trends that continue to the present. One such trend relates to questions about the effectiveness of foreign aid. Such questions are often raised by

members of Congress to which USAID reports. Concerns about the effectiveness of aid are sometimes coupled with questions about whether the United States should be involved in development assistance at all. Also continuing to the present is the political vulnerability of foreign aid and the bureaucratic vulnerability of USAID. American political institutions, with the separation of powers and an adversarial political process, amplify Americans’ polarized feelings about foreign aid. Its controversial nature coupled with the need for ongoing Congressional approval make foreign aid an easy target for opponents as well as advocates and those with interests in foreign aid – NGOs, farmers, churches, etc. Lacking the Cabinetlevel influence of the State Department and having only its semi-autonomous relationship with State, USAID has often had to struggle to maintain its independence and its decision-making authority as well as its staff. In 1962, USAID employed 8,600 staff under career-length contracts; by 2009, this had fallen to 2,900 (USAID, 2010). Arguments for independence include the need, felt by development professionals, to promote development goals independently of short-term diplomatic and foreign policy agendas. This issue was finally settled when USAID lost its semi-independent status and was formally incorporated into the State Department.3 USAID is a decentralized organization, with half its U.S. staff overseas in USAID missions, where much of the funding is allocated and many of the programming decisions made. For example, in the education sector, technical leadership within USAID is housed in the Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) in Washington. However, education programs are designed and implemented in the USAID missions in each recipient country. This structure allows for a considerable degree of country-led development, with particular country initiatives negotiated between government and USAID mission. At the same time, it embodies an ongoing tension between the priorities of Washington and the field.

Nature of U.S. Development Assistance Complex Delivery U.S. foreign aid efforts are rather fragmented as indicated above by the multiplicity of agencies involved (more than 25). Additionally, as Lancaster notes in her analysis of five major bilateral donors, the U.S. foreign aid system is likely the most adversarial (Lancaster, 2007). These characteristics might be seen as characteristic of U.S. political philosophy and organization, where power is dispersed among diverse even adversarial units. In government this is described as a system of “checks and balances.” U.S. foreign aid is delivered through a variety of means to the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local communities, etc. In some cases, aid is provided directly to a government (budgetary support) under an agreement to undertake policy reform, generally or in a specific sector where government is the main actor, such as education or health care. Generally, however, U.S. government works through contracting organizations, often U.S.-based, to implement its programs: individual personal service contractors,

consulting firms, non-profit NGOs, universities, private voluntary organizations, including faith-based organizations, and for-profit contractors. Most U.S. aid is delivered through grants rather than loans, but the form of grants vary: cash transfers, equipment and commodities, infrastructure, training, technical assistance and expertise, and small grants. Between 1962 and 1988, loans for economic and military assistance made up 32% of all aid. This declined to less than 1% in 2001. In 2009, no U.S. aid was made in the form of loans. The United States has supported the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and has forgiven US$24.9 billion owed by foreign governments between 1990 and 2008 (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). Table 1 presents data from the Hudson Institute, which shows total U.S. “net economic engagement with developing countries in 2010. The table indicates the diversity and scale of flows of funds from the United States, and the comparatively modest share of public funds. Table 1. U.S. Total “Net Economic Engagement” with Developing Countries, 2010 (in Billions of Dollars).

US$

%

U.S. Official Development Assistance

30.4

U.S. Private Philanthropy

39

8.3

Foundations

4.6

1.3

Corporations

7.6

2.1

Private and voluntary organizations

14

3.8

Volunteerism

3.7

1.0

Universities and colleges

1.9

0.5

Religious organizations

7.2

2.0

Remittances

95.8

26.2

U.S. Private Capital Flows

161.2

44.1

10.7

Source: Hudson Institute (2012), Table 1.

The number of agencies administering traditional and non-traditional aid has grown over the past decade. The major agencies administering aid are listed in Table 2. Table 2. Major U.S. Government Aid Account Budgets (Traditional Aid, FY2012). U.S. Agency for International Development

$16,800 a

42.7%

U.S. Department of State

10,500 b

26.7%

U.S. Department of Defense

7,650 c

19.5%

U.S. Department of the T reasury

3,000

7.6%

Millennium Challenge Corporation

  898

2.3%

Peace Corps

  375

1.0%

T rade and Development Agency (T DA)

  50

0.1%

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

–

0.0%

Inter-American Development Foundation

   23

0.1%

African Development Foundation

  30

0.1%

aExcludes agency operating expenses. bIncludes

only programs solely managed by State Department. State Department has policy authority over many other programs, budgeted through other agencies. cExcludes state-building activities and infrastructure construction, funded through defense appropriations legislation and training of Iraqi and Afghan police and military. Source: Tarnoff and Lawson (2011).

High Absolute Levels of Aid, but Less as a Share of National Income The United States is the world’s largest bilateral funding agency. This has been the case since World War II, except for a few years between 1989 and 2002 when Japan contributed the most. In FY2012 USAID provided bilateral aid to 147 countries. That year, U.S. foreign aid totaled US$37.7 billion (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). This figure does not include all public and private funds transferred to low-income countries. Still, the amount of assistance has varied substantially over the years, as shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. U.S. Foreign Aid: FY1946-FY2010. Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables, FY2011; annual appropriations legislation and CRS calculations. Figure taken from Tarnoff and Lawson (2011, p. 16).

Comparable figures for overall foreign aid (including military aid) are not available for other countries. However, the DAC compiles comparable data on members’ Official Development Assistance (ODA). Fig. 2 compares levels of ODA in FY2009 across the top 15 members (OECD, 2008).

Fig. 2. Official Development Assistance from Major Donors, 2009 (in Millions, US$). Source: OECD/DAC. Includes all countries providing at least $2 billion in ODA in 2009. Figure taken from Tarnoff and Lawson (2011, p. 20).

At that point, the United States contributed more than twice that of its nearest neighbor, France, and more than the combined contributions of any two of the other major OECD donors. However, in terms of the percentage of gross national income devoted to foreign aid, the United States contributes substantially less (around 0.20% of GNI) than other DAC members (0.31% of GNI across all DAC members). This is less than one-third the target set by DAC members, and one-fifth of the 1% target set by President Kennedy in 1961. Not surprisingly, shifts in government spending reflect major changes in policy, shown in Fig. 3. Spending rises in line with international agreements and engagements especially those related to security concerns in the Middle East and recently South Asia. Spending falls with overall cuts in expenditures, with reduced threats, for example, the end of the Cold War, and “aid fatigue.”

Fig. 3. Foreign Aid Funding Trends, FY1977-FY2010. Source: Budget of the United States Government: Historic Tables Fiscal Year 2011, Table 5.1: Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction, 1976–2013; appropriations acts for FY2010. Figure taken from Tarnoff and Lawson (2011, p. 18).

Complex Objectives Different components of U.S. foreign aid serve a diverse set of purposes. One way to understand these purposes is to examine program areas and assistance levels. Table 3 presents program areas managed by the USAID and the Department of State with a framework of five strategic objectives developed by the Director of Foreign Assistance at the State Department in 2006, to organize the myriad programs. The table includes 90% of “traditional foreign aid” for FY2012. Note that it does not include the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, other independent agencies, or contributions to international financial institutions. Nor does it include non-traditional foreign aid such as Department of Defense programs, which have grown in recent years (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). Table 3. Department of State & USAID Foreign Assistance by DFA Objective & Program Area, FY2012 (in Millions of Dollars). Aid Objectives and Program Peace and security

Est FY2012

%

10,595

32.9

  Counter-terrorism

518

1.6

  Combating WMD

328

1.0

8,457

26.2

  Stabilization/security sector reform   Counter-narcotics

678

2.1

  T ransnational crime

86

0.3

  Conflict mitigation

528

1.6

10,560

32.7

  Health

9,073

28.1

  Education

1,106

3.4

381

1.2

2,596

8.1

Investing in people

  Social services/protection of vulnerable Governing justly and democratically

  Rule of Law and human rights

951

2.9

  Good governance

906

2.8

  Political competition

234

0.7

  Civil society

507

1.6

Promoting economic growth

4,405

13.7

  Macroeconomic growth

343

1.1

  T rade and investment

184

0.6

81

0.2

930

2.9

1,401

4.3

  Private sector competitiveness

507

1.6

  Economic opportunity

194

0.6

  Environment

767

2.4

Humanitarian assistance

4,091

12.7

  Protection, assistance and solutions

3,894

12.1

150

0.5

47

0.1

  Financial sector   Infrastructure   Agriculture

  Disaster readiness   Migration management

Source: USAID and Department of State budget documents, ForeignAssistance.gov, in Tarnoff and Lawson (2012, p. 5).

Even a superficial examination suggests the breadth of U.S. foreign aid efforts—from peace and security, to investing in people, governance, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. The peace and security objective includes a wide range of security programs from transnational crime to counter-narcotics to combating weapons of mass destruction. In estimated FY2012 figures, it represents the largest allocation of aid, followed closely by investing in people. (Education still represents only 10.5% of investing in people and 3.4% of total aid.) Various programs under “governing justly and democratically,” “promoting economic growth,” and “humanitarian assistance” account for the remaining third of aid. A more comprehensive way to understand U.S. foreign aid is to organize foreign aid accounts in the U.S. budget according to purpose and organizational delivery. This approach captures all “traditional aid,” a larger pool than the DFA framework but still excludes programs run by other agencies not funded through traditional aid budget accounts as well as substantial amounts spent by the Defense Department. Examined in this way, assistance for development and humanitarian purposes accounts for 56% of U.S. foreign aid, including bilateral development, multilateral development, and humanitarian assistance. Bilateral aid accounts for 33% of U.S. foreign aid in FY2012, supporting long-term projects in economic reform, private sector development, environmental protection, promotion of democracy, population control, and health. Recent years have seen greater attention to basic education, water and sanitation, and support for treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, etc. (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). Bilateral assistance also goes to institutions such as the Peace Corps, African Development Foundation, Trade and Development Agency, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Multilateral development assistance accounts for 11% of U.S. foreign assistance in FY2012, going to international organizations such as UNICEF and UNDP and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and UNESCO.4 Humanitarian assistance accounts for 11% of U.S. foreign assistance in FY2012, with funds aimed at alleviating the effects of humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian assistance goes to State Department, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Committee of the Red Cross to

assist refugees and provide relief and rehabilitation to victims of disasters. Humanitarian aid also includes the Food for Peace program (or PL480) which provides food aid in U.S. agricultural output for humanitarian relief, development activities by NGOs or the World Food Programme. Since 2002, commodities, technical assistance, and financing are made available for school feeding and nutrition programs (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). In addition to development and humanitarian funding, a second major category of U.S. foreign aid funds projects with both development and political or strategic purposes. The primary purpose of this account is to promote U.S. economic, political or security interests directly, as well as some activities that resemble traditional development projects. In FY2012, 27% of total assistance was provided through this type of account. Most of this funding is disbursed through the Economic Support Fund (ESF). For a number of years, the bulk of this funding supported the Middle East Peace Process. While Egypt, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Jordan still receive ESF funds, funding priorities have shifted, since 9/11, to countries of strategic significance in counteracting terrorism. More than half of the FY2012 funding, for example, went to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). In FY2012, 27% of U.S. foreign aid went to an account that directly supports security. This includes civilian assistance to prevent terrorism, illegal narcotics, crime and weapons as well as training of the Iraqi police force, anti-terrorist and nonproliferation activities and military assistance to help allies purchase military equipment and receive training. Most funds go to provide security for Israel and Egypt, though some funding is used to train foreign military, to support voluntary non-UN peacekeeping operations, and for an African crisis response force. These funds do not include non-traditional foreign aid provided since 2002 through Department of Defense appropriations for military support of Iraq and Afghanistan. In FY2012, this funding totaled more than US$11 billion. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of aid by type of funding account. As can be seen, slightly more than half of U.S. foreign aid in FY2012 was allocated to development activities (bilateral, multilateral development and humanitarian aid). Driven substantially by two presidential initiatives, the Millennium Challenge Account and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), development and humanitarian assistance have accounted for more than half of U.S. foreign aid since 2006, levels not seen since 1980 (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). The remainder of funding serves a variety of diplomatic/security functions, including in some cases a development component.

Fig. 4. Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid, by Account Type FY2010 (Percentages Shown). Source: Tarnoff and Lawson (2011).

As noted, much of the increase in development and humanitarian aid over the past decade has gone to health programs, particularly programs to address HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and maternal and child health. In 2004, President Bush initiated the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) with a target of treating 2 million people infected with HIV and caring for 10 million AIDS orphans and infected individuals. Funding amounted to US$18 billion. The program was expanded to include malaria and tuberculosis and reauthorized in 2008 with US$48 billion for FY2009 to FY2013. In 2009, President Obama introduced the Global Health Initiative to include all health programs, with funding promised at US$63 billion. In these ways, funding for health programs has increased 500% over the past decade. Civilian security aid has increased with anti-terror and counter-narcotics programs. However, military security aid has fallen as a share of total aid, from a high of 42% in 1984 to 26% in 2004 to 12% in FY2012. Microenterprise, basic education, and water and sanitation have grown in prominence. Funding for basic education grew from US$95 million in FY1997 to US$981 million in FY2010 but cut back to US$800 million for FY2012 (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). Recent decades have seen a decline in funding for agriculture, at one time, USAID’s largest development sector. However, the Obama administration has worked to increase funding for agriculture, rural development, and environmental programs. Strategic Recipients Table 4 lists the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid in FY2002 and FY2012. Table 4. Top Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid, FY2002 and FY2012 (Millions of Current Dollars).

In both years, Israel is the top recipient, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.5 The ranking among the three shifted, with Iraq joining the top five in Colombia’s place. Funding for Egypt has fallen, while support for Pakistan has more than doubled, and funding for Afghanistan has grown three and a half times. Jordan remains high, while India, Indonesia, and the two Latin American countries and the four “transition” countries in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia formerly under socialist regimes have fallen off the list of top recipients in favor of seven countries from sub-Saharan Africa and the West Bank/Gaza. Still, the aid that goes to Israel is almost as great as that to the bottom six countries on the 2012 list, and the combined funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan is nearly that for the bottom eight of the top recipient countries. Aid to education is best seen in light of this complex, rather politicized, and fragmented organizational context. U.S. development assistance to education is provided by multiple organizations, USAID as well as other public agencies and non-governmental implementers. Programming is substantially decentralized, aid is provided primarily in project modality, often with multiple purposes. The education sector is but one of a number, and its share of total funding is rather modest.

AID IN EDUCATION In the early decades of organized U.S. foreign assistance, education played a relatively small role in the thinking about aid and its allocations. Some funding was allocated to training of

foreign students in the United States, and funds were allocated to promote higher education. In the 1970s, literacy and adult learning and to a certain extent non-formal education were funded in line with the emphasis on basic needs. Primary and secondary education played little role. Over time, however, the emphasis began to shift. Though education had always had its supporters within the sector, from around the late 1980s, education began to be seen as more of an investment and less as a service by those outside education. Influential reports appeared about the strong relationship between education, particularly of girls and women, and lower fertility rates, improved child and family health, effects which appeared to be intergenerational and permanent. By 1993, Lawrence Summers, Chief Economist at the World Bank at the time, argued that girls’ education was “the most influential investment” a country could make: “educating girls quite possibly yields a higher rate of return than any other investment available in the developing world” (Summers, 1992, p. 108). At the same time, within education policy circles internationally, the emphasis was shifting to primary and basic education. Psacharopoulos and colleagues at the World Bank carried out an extensive series of research studies extending over many countries and years documenting the high public rates of return to investment in primary education, especially as compared with higher and secondary education. These studies, which subsequent research has nuanced to a considerable degree, nonetheless helped convince many of the major funding agencies including USAID to shift their focus to primary or basic education, away from secondary and post-secondary education, vocational education, early childhood education, and adult literacy. In addition, less and less attention was given to aid through training grants. A global consensus developed among multilateral and bilateral, international organizations involved in education, and NGOs that basic education was essential to human and national development (Chabbott, 2003). A series of global conferences, a global set of educational participation goals known as Education for All and a system for monitoring movement toward those goals were established, beginning with the Education for All Conference of 1990 in Jomtien, Thailand, and continuing with the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000, and the World Education Forum of 2015. Education, and especially basic education, came to assume a much more prominent place on the global agenda. This can be seen in increases for education funding by most donors as well as greater proportions of funding aimed at basic education. Millennium Development Goal No. 2 is to “achieve universal primary education.” As a result, USAID along with most other donors began to focus more attention on education in general and basic education in particular. Still, by the time of the World Education Forum of 2000 in Dakar, it was clear that few countries were going to meet the ambitious goals set out in Jomtiem, and that a redoubling of efforts was needed to move toward universal education. In 2000, a new set of Education for All (EFA) goals were established for 2015. Also in 2000, the Millennium Summit of the United Nations made commitments to achieving eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Goal #2 (to achieve universal primary education) is directly related to education (UN, 2014b). Around the same time, the education of girls assumed greater prominence in USAID and

more generally. MDG 3 seeks to promote gender equality and empower women. EFA Goal 5 focuses on gender in particular: “Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality” (UNESCO, 2014). Goals 2 and 4 explicitly mention girls in relation to eliminating gender disparities in educational participation. Across the agency USAID emphasized gender as a critical part of development work. Within the education sector, many projects focused on gender for part or all of their work. Recognizing the slow pace of donor approval and disbursement of funds, the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) was launched in 2002 to speed funds to countries willing and able to demonstrate capacity to manage funds well. Though the FTI came under considerable criticism during its mid-term review, it was reconstituted as the Global Partnership for Education and has distinguished itself from its origins in the World Bank to include a broad range of stakeholders including traditional donors but also civil society organizations, private sector firms working in education, teachers unions, and so forth (Global Partnership for Education, 2014). After a drop in funding for education activities during the 1990s (in parallel with declines in overall funding for U.S. foreign aid), USAID’s funding for education rose during the 2000s. Allocations to basic education increased from US$67 million in FY1990 to US$135 million in FY1992 and 1993 then back to US$98 million in FY1997-2000 (Ingram, 2009, p. 7). After 2001, funding rose steadily to a high of US$981 million for FY2010. President Obama came into office in 2009 with a campaign proposal to establish a US$2 billion Global Education Fund. Hillary Clinton, while Senator, co-sponsored a bill that would have increased annual funding for basic education to US$3 billion. Though not realized, these lofty goals suggest the increased importance placed by U.S. policymakers on basic education. Even so, less than 3% of total foreign aid goes to the education sector, and even less to basic education (Ingram, 2009).

Targets for U.S. Education Aid In the early 2000s, studies found that most U.S. basic education funding went toward: Education policy and support to the education system Community involvement Improvements in instructional quality School management and institutional leadership Strengthening systems for the education sector. Lower levels of funding were allocated to: development of curriculum and materials, infrastructure, supply of instructional materials, and measurement of learning outcomes

(USAID, 2007, 2009). Even so, funding supported a broad range of initiatives aimed broadly at helping build the institutional capacity for further educational development. In 2005, the Bush administration developed an education strategy (USAID, 2005) that emphasized the facilitating role that investments in education play in achieving other development goals as well as the notion that “at the heart of the strategy is basic education” (p. v). The strategy continues: … basic education: facilitating the acquisition of basic skills, such as literacy, numeracy, and critical thinking that enable people and nations to thrive in a changing economic environment. USAID programs emphasize both expanding access to underserved groups (such as girls, the poor, the disabled, and people in rural areas) and improving the overall quality of education and its relevance. (p. v)

Basic education is defined “broadly” to include primary education as well as early childhood education and care, secondary school (formal and non-formal), teacher training, literacy, and basic skills for adults and out-of-school youth (USAID, 2005, p. 7). Two objectives are stated, “Objective 1: Promoting Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education,” and “Objective 2: Beyond Basic Education: Enhancing Knowledge and Skills for Productivity” (USAID, 2005, pp. 7, 11). Objective 1 includes: equitable access, quality, flexibility beyond primary education, promoting policy reform, building institutional capacity, improving instruction, institutional reform, educational infrastructure, and a special emphasis on girls. Objective 2 emphasizes workforce development and higher education. The strategy states as its principles that the Agency will be: “allocating resources according to country need and commitment,” “taking a sector-wide approach,” “increasing efficiency,” “promoting sustainability,” “collaborating actively,” and “supporting innovation” (USAID, 2005, pp. 13– 14). Several points seem of particular relevance to this discussion. From the rationale, one is struck by the emphasis on the economic instrumentality of education as well as the focus on marginal, “underserved” groups. From the definition of basic education and the objectives, one is struck by the breadth of ambition – USAID’s strategy is to work with essentially all levels and kinds of education (with the possible exception of vocational-technical education) to improve equity and access and quality. Finally one is struck by the focus on institutions – “institutional capacity,” “institutional reform,” “policy reform.” Analysis of U.S. education development projects by the authors suggests that U.S. projects often include a component that works to “fix” or “reform” the system being aided. Thus, U.S. support to basic education is likely to include funding for development activities, technical assistance, and often a policy reform dimension. A second general observation is the assumption that universal education, at least at the primary and basic levels, is assumed to be good and unproblematic (Williams, Brown, & Kwan, 2014).6 Chapman and Quijada studied evaluations of USAID basic education projects between 1980 and 2005 (2009). Cumulatively, the 33 projects represented US$733 million in funding. The projects worked toward improving student access, retention, and learning. However, most of the attention in the evaluations was devoted to checking client satisfaction and tracking inputs rather than assessing project accomplishments against project goals. Indeed, very few

projects were designed to allow for rigorous assessment achievement of project goals. Projects tended to over-promise results at the design stage. In the few projects that did examine outcomes rigorously, learning and retention gains were found, but they were modest, considerably so in comparison with promises in project design documents.

Current Education Strategy As noted, the Obama administration entered office with high goals for basic education. Mediated by financial realities, the administration developed its own education strategy, “Opportunity through Learning.” Though the rationales for education aid resemble those of the earlier strategy, the goals and approaches to realizing those goals differ substantially, reflecting to some extent evolution of thinking about education within USAID: Goal One: Improved reading skills for 100 million children in primary grades by 2015; Goal Two: Improved ability of tertiary and workforce development programs to produce a workforce with relevant skills to support country development goals by 2015; and Goal Three: Increased equitable access to education in crisis and conflict environments for 15 million learners by 2015. (USAID, 2011a) (emphasis in original) The strategy speaks of grounding itself in Obama’s Global Development Policy, of “investing education resources strategically to achieve measurable and sustainable educational outcomes through enhanced selectivity, focus, country-led programming, division of labor and innovation … Evaluation, gender integration, and sustainability are to “undergird all of our investments. We will look for opportunities to achieve greater impact and scale, based on a country’s commitment to reform, potential to achieve rapid results, and relative educational need … As a result, USAID’s future global education footprint is expected to evolve in shape and size, and to be more closely coordinated with partner governments, civil society, other donors, and the private sector” (USAID, 2011a, p. 1). Consistent with past education aid policies are the emphases on gender, sustainability, country reform and commitment, and educational need as well as a focus on basic education (though admittedly a single dimension of it) and a focus on tertiary and workforce development. New is the heightened focus on specificity and quantification – “100 million children,” “15 million learners.” Earlier in the document, the strategy says that “investments would be informed by … the most current evidence based analysis of educational effectiveness …” (USAID, 2011a, p. 1). The mention of “measurable outcomes” is especially prominent in contrast to earlier documents. This is perhaps a reflection of the current global and domestic discourse in education and public administration more broadly, which emphasizes measurement of and accountability for outcomes (Engel & Williams, 2013; Robertson, Verger, Mundy, & Menashy, 2014), evidence-based research as a basis for policy, etc., and it reflects

the Obama administration’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which aims to base foreign aid budgets “not on dollars spent, but on outcomes achieved” (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 16) as well as USAID’s Evaluation Policy of 2011 (USAID, 2011b). The focus on reading resulted from the confluence of several developments: a frustration with the lack of measureable outcomes in education, a body of research that emphasized the importance of early reading to all subsequent achievement, a series of assessments that found extremely low reading capacity among school children in a number of low-income countries, and availability of instructional methodologies that targeted the mechanics of reading. The emphasis on reading has led to a broad shift in education programming toward early grades reading (as well as early grade mathematics). It has raised interest in a variety of ways: on local assessment, linking of test results with national policy, mother tongue instruction, and so forth. At the same time, the focus on reading has the effect of shifting resources and attention away from long-standing efforts to build the institutional capacity of national education systems. It may work against the principle of country-led development, where projects are negotiated at the national level between national government and the USAID mission. At the same time, the strategy emphasizes cooperation. Along with other donors, there is increasing attention to the principles of aid effectiveness articulated in the Paris Declaration. The United States continues active involvement in the Global Partnership for Education. It takes part in most or all meetings of donors, thus working toward greater harmonization and coordination at the host country level. Still, the United States, almost alone except for Japan among traditional donors, provides most of its assistance in project form rather than budgetary support. Congress requires that U.S. Government be able to account for expenditures and impact of all U.S. funds, thus complicating harmonization at the international level and flexibility as to funding modality.7 Even so, the United States has worked to reduce the proportion of its aid “tied” to U.S. venders, with 25% of its aid “tied” in 2008/2009, as compared with 14% for all DAC donors (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2012). Finally, the importance given to provision of education in crisis and conflict environments suggests increased recognition of the importance of education in conflict-and fragility-affected contexts, the high concentration of out-of-school children and youth in such places, and the ways in which education can contribute to or reduce the likelihood of conflict. This coincides with a growing awareness in the international community of the relationship between conflict, development, and lack of participation in school. A number of projects focus on education in contexts affected by conflict, and which have a high strategic importance to U.S. interests (Ignatowski, 2007). Projects also focus on youth, working to enhance their employability and civic engagement (Butler, Taggart, & Chervin, 2014). These objectives support global initiatives in education such as EFA and the MDGs. However, the language and targets remain somewhat distinct from the global discourse, filling a niche in global efforts to promote education perhaps, or, potentially, the agenda of an agency striking out on its own. Now, with the departure of the administrator as this volume goes to

press, it will be interesting to see how the agency moves forward with its education agenda and programming.

POST-2015 AND THE FUTURE With 2015, the global community has moved toward adoption of a new set of development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs include education, replacing the MDGs and EFA goals. In contrast to the MDGs in particular, the SDGs are much broader in target and scope. In contrast to the MDGs, which focused primarily on poverty reduction in low and middle-income countries, the SDGs broaden the notion of development, including developed as well as developing economies and emphasizing a much more holistic view of development, a much wider scope and increased number of goals. The SDGs incorporate the challenges of climate change and sustainability; economic and social inequality; the linkages between governance, peace, and justice; and they emphasize an increasingly diverse set of actors in development. Current SDG targets for the education goal emphasize completion of primary and secondary school, quality, and equity, along with relevant and effective outcomes. The targets aim for universal access to early childhood and pre-primary education as well as technical, vocational, and tertiary education including university. The targets emphasize acquisition of skills for work, the elimination of disparities across social groups, and inclusive education. In addition to literacy and numeracy, the education targets seek to “promote sustainable development, including … education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development” (UNESCO, 2015). It is an ambitious agenda, and there is little clarity on funding, which will require more commitment, given the broader goals, than did the MDGs and EFA Goals. Many of the targets are aspirational. Still the goals encompass a much broader and humane perspective on development, a perspective that includes industrialized nations in the project of development. While projecting the future is risky, we would hazard that in the context of Post-2015 agreements, USAID’s education work (and U.S. foreign assistance in education) can be expected to exhibit several themes, as follows (Williams, Brown, & Kwan, 2014).

Basic Education and Beyond While basic education is continued to be prioritized in educational funding, other levels of education are likely to receive increased attention – early childhood education and care, vocational education, post-secondary education, including universities.

An Emphasis on Learning The focus on quality of education will surely be sustained and amplified. Educational outcomes will assume even greater prominence even as U.S. government agencies, and others, redouble their efforts to measure and track those outcomes. Even if the USAID moves beyond its current goal of 100 million children learning to read, future goals are likely to be framed in terms of learning outcomes. Initiatives to support learning outcomes are likely to be supported to the extent they can show a direct linkage between input and outcome. Less-specific institution-building agendas of the past are less likely to be funded, it would seem, with the possible exception of fragile contexts or those affected by conflict.

Metrics and Accountability As budgets remain flat, government in general and U.S. development assistance in education and more broadly will focus on the specification and measurement of project goals, linked to accountability, and funding. Measurement challenges will grow more severe as development ambitions grow in line with greater expectations of the SDGs. While the United States has sought to influence the adoption and implementation of the SDGs and will certainly support them, it is not clear whether U.S. development assistance in education will aim as high in future goals, or whether it will focus on more concrete goals and objectives.

Greater Attention to Youth Given the dynamic growth of youth populations around the world, especially in politically volatile areas, youth are likely to be targeted for greater programmatic attention, in education and other sectors. Based on current activities, USAID can be expected to focus much of its youth work on skills for employment and entrepreneurship as well as civic engagement and leadership.

Ongoing Work in Areas Affected by Conflict In light of the need to address needs of learners in areas conflict-affected parts of the world, and given U.S. strategic and security interests, educational projects are likely to continue to be developed in and for such areas. This is important; development is more difficult in conflictaffected spaces, and fewer resources are available in such in such contexts.

Continued Emphasis on Equity for Excluded Populations

U.S. education aid is expected to continue to support the inclusion of marginal groups, especially girls and potentially children with disabilities, and rural populations.

Increasing Roles for Non-State Actors in Education In parallel with developments internationally, U.S. educational assistance is likely to see a greater role for business, NGOs, civic associations including faith-based organizations, foundations, think tanks, and so forth in partnering to set development agendas, implement development projects, and fund development goals.

An Ongoing Impulse to Fix Things Much of USAID’s work has traditionally aimed in one way or another at addressing the deeper causes of a problem, as opposed to simply filling a need. U.S. education policy documents often speak of reform (in the United States as well as outside). A number of development projects contain an element often implicit of addressing an underlying problem. This impulse, part of the national political DNA, is likely, we would guess, to continue.

CONCLUSIONS Several distinctive patterns become clear about U.S. foreign aid in general, and the subset of education aid. As with all countries, the United States provides foreign aid for multiple reasons, to relieve suffering and promote long-term economic and social development, to gain favor with potential allies and influence government decisions in a favorable direction, to open markets for tradable goods and commodities, to help ensure – in the long and short-run – national security. Security and diplomacy do seem to play a large role in U.S. foreign aid, even in education, even at the basic level. Development, diplomacy, and defense have been linked in the presentation of U.S. power, in ways that make many of us who are much more interested in social and economic development for its own sake uncomfortable. Nonetheless, it would appear that in the context of U.S. internal politics, both humanitarian/development and diplomatic/security rationales have been necessary to sustain public and government willingness to support foreign aid. Neither rationale has overtaken the other; the budget is split almost in half. The need for a particularly humanitarian rationale may be a characteristic of U.S. foreign assistance. Almost certainly, the emphasis on democracy is. Yet this emphasis, as with other of the more humanitarian or development goals, has sometimes, perhaps frequently, been distorted by the diplomatic rationale and perceptions of the security needs of the state. Many of these tensions and the constant need to justify foreign aid likely derive from the

perennial isolationist thread of U.S. politics, the particular adversarial institutions of U.S. policymaking, and the transparency which allows all of this to be open. As the world’s largest bilateral donor, the United States has realized a number of accomplishments. An earlier Agency webpage listed a series of accomplishments, including the following:

More than 3 million lives are saved every year through USAID immunization programs. Oral rehydration therapy, a low cost and easily administered solution developed through USAID programs in Bangladesh, is credited with saving tens of millions of lives around the globe. Forty-three of the top 50 consumer nations of American agricultural products were once U.S. foreign aid recipients. Between 1990 and 1993, U.S. exports to developing and transition countries increased by US$46 billion. USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 36 of the 57 nations that successfully made the transition to democratic government during this period. Agricultural research sponsored by the United States sparked the “Green Revolution” in India. These breakthroughs in agricultural technology and practices resulted in the most dramatic increase in agricultural yields and production in the history of mankind, allowing nations like India and Bangladesh to become nearly food self-sufficient. More than 50 million couples worldwide use family planning as a direct result of USAID’s population program. Since 1987, USAID has initiated HIV/AIDS prevention programs in 32 countries, and is the recognized technical leader in the design and development of these programs in the developing world. Over 850,000 people have been reached with USAID HIV prevention education, and 40,000 people have been trained to support HIV/AIDS programs in their own countries. (USAID, n.d. Retrieved April 14, 2014 from http://transition.usaid.gov/about_usaid/accompli.html) From a purely development perspective, we would suggest that reform loosen the linkages between development and diplomacy and defense. U.S. agencies working to provide foreign aid should hew, we argue, to their development impulse, focus on the long-term foreign policy objectives of partnership in a prosperous world, where people have a meaningful voice in the decisions that affect their lives and those of their families, communities, and nations. USAID and other U.S. government agencies have long sought to build the capacity of institutions in its partner countries, to ground and sustain the particulars of development initiatives. In the important search for demonstrable and concrete results that characterizes the current discourse, we hope the leadership will remember the values and virtues of cooperation, partnership, and assistance – over the long haul – with those with whom it wishes to live securely and in peace. Foreign aid, carried out in partnership with an eye to the long view, can lay the groundwork for stability, peace, and prosperity.

NOTES 1. The U.S. public typically reports the perception that foreign aid accounts for upward of one-third of the U.S. budget, in the face of the reality of less than 1% including military aid. Development-oriented assistance accounts for less than one half of 1% of the U.S. budget (Oxfam, n.d.). 2. See, for example, an influential article by Andrew Natsios, then-Administrator of USAID, criticizing the agency’s “counter bureaucracy” (Natsios, 2010). 3. Recent years have seen increased staffing, with substantial numbers of new professionals entering USAID. 4. U.S. funding to UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, has varied. One of the founders of UNESCO immediately after World War II, the United States has shifted support from full membership and full payment of dues in the early decades, to withdrawal from the organization in 1984 by President Reagan, to rejoining in 2007 under President Obama, to failure to pay dues since 2011 as a result of the organization’s vote to admit Palestine as a full member of UNESCO (Wanner, 2015). UNESCO remains controversial, with general agreement as to its vision coupled with substantial criticism of its operations and efficiency (see, e.g., Heyneman, 1999; Smith et al., 2007). 5. Much of the assistance to Egypt and virtually all to Israel is in the form of military aid. 6. Scholars point out the complexity of development and development assistance in a world of unequal power (see, e.g., Easterly, 2007; Klees, 2010). Additionally, despite these formal goals, one major purpose of U.S. foreign aid is to support foreign policy and national security goals. Thus, in FY2010, Pakistan and Afghanistan received more than one-third of U.S basic education aid (Ingram, 2009). 7. Additionally, complicating efforts to improve aid effectiveness, Congress “earmarks” a substantial proportion of foreign aid funding for particular, specified purposes.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This chapter is an extended version of the following paper: Williams (2013).

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CONCLUSION Education 2030, the framework for action over the next 15 years, was adopted at the high-level meeting convened before the Education Commission of the 38th UNESCO General Conference in November 2015. Through Education 2030, the draft framework for action that was presented and discussed at the World Education Forum (WEF) in Incheon has been formally put into action. Still, the post-2015 process is just at the outset of operationalizing the targets included in the fourth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG4). As discussed in this volume’s respective chapters, the discourse up until WEF-Incheon had focused on preparing the common normative ground. Substantial discussions continue about translating rather abstract targets into concrete practices and indicators. Since the Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015, the focus of discussion has shifted to technical and operational levels, and the units of interaction tend to be smaller and more specific than when the whole education community was involved in the common objective of establishing the global agenda. The couple of years leading up to WEF-Incheon and the SDG Summit, the period during which the attention of the global education community converged on developing the post-2015 agenda, was therefore an unparalleled opportunity to capture the dynamics among actors and the changing characteristics of the structure. The analysis in this volume revealed that the Education for All (EFA) structure was based on layers of consultation in which the representatives of member states, multilateral agencies and civil society organizations (CSOs) participated. This structure of representation was based on the assumptions of traditional international relations (IR) theories that the units of participation in forums for international development are the sovereign nation-states. Therefore the formal EFA governance structure prioritizes the voices of state representatives. Regardless of the growing presence of civil society actors, as closely examined in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, their room for participation is limited in the formal channel. At the same time, the voices from state representatives are, as IR theorists rightly point out, influenced by national interests. Because the representatives sent to EFA-related meetings were likely to be from ministries of education, their concerns tend to be domestic and they were not purely committed to the cause of advancing education globally. The misfit between the formal governance structure and the task of establishing the post-EFA agenda occurred precisely because of the assumption of sovereign state representation at the core of IR theories. State representatives convene not out of a pure sense of mission to achieve global welfare but in order to juggle the power balance to maximize their national interests. Even their stated commitment to global causes may be a tactic of the diplomatic game. But the global development agenda, being highly ideological and normative, cannot be derived through a series of statements by national delegates. Therefore, it is rather a natural phenomenon that the mission-driven actors who present consistent normative messages fill the gap between the structure and the task of agenda setting. As described in this volume, the informal channels of discourse have expanded

dramatically in the post-2015 process, providing room for various civil society actors to bridge across states and multilateral organizations horizontally. In contrast to the traditional conception of multilateralism, based on representation of states whose voices are constructed through the vertical hierarchical structure, this volume proposes a conception of the global discourse mechanism in which vertical and horizontal actors mutually reinforce each other in a nexus densely interwoven at national, regional and global levels. With the constant appeal from CSOs to incorporate their policy suggestions, nowadays it is difficult to tell whether the governmental policy is purely based on ideas from within the government. At the same time, CSOs’ strategies are adapted to the national context to a great extent, although CSOs act based on their globally shared principles. Such mutual influence between the actors happens at various levels within vertical and horizontal structures. This reality requires reconceptualization of ‘international relations’ in terms of this network of cloudlike interest groups, not restricted to the nation-states. At the same time, this volume highlighted the presence of nontraditional state actors, which also challenges the existing global governance structure. The structure functions well when the actors play their assigned roles according to its rules. But if the number of actors who act outside of its scope increases, the effectiveness of the structure will be damaged. Not all UNESCO member states were active in the EFA consultation process, but that fact does not exclude the possibility that they will influence post-EFA agenda setting through other channels. UN-based multilateralism has created parallel structures for sector-specific and general decision-making. The post-EFA discussion has mostly been through the education-specific channel directed by UNESCO in Paris. However, agreement in the education community is not the end of the procedure. Accordingly, the proposal from the education community was then brought to the larger platform of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in New York. Since UN member states have chances to speak through both channels, there was room for them to add components to or modify the agenda brought by the education community to New York. In the case of SDG4, the education-related SDG, no drastic changes were made except for some additions to the means of implementation. Still, in the course of consultation, some in the education community expressed concern about possible interruption of the process after WEFIncheon. Thus the multiplicity of tracks under the UN system creates room for actors to juggle their concerns. In addition, other multilateral forums are emerging outside of the UN-Bretton Woods structure. For example, the BRICS Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank were established by the initiatives of emerging economies as alternative structures for multilateral development aid. In sum, on the one hand, the misfit between the task of agenda setting and the conventional formal structure of global governance have created a large space for discourse through informal channels. On the other hand, the formal structure itself has developed into multiple channels, a change caused not only by the inherent nature of the UN structure but also by the behaviour of state actors who try to pursue their national interests outside of the conventional structure of multilateralism. Comparative educationists have long been trying to theorize the mechanisms by which some societies borrow educational models and ideas from other societies. In the current

multidimensional process of cross-feeding ideas, participated in by diverse actors from all corners of the world, it is difficult to single out the ‘borrower’ and the ‘lender’. It may be possible to track such borrowings in the written records of formal meetings, but what one can see in such a formal process is just the tip of the iceberg of the global discourse. This volume has tried to analyse norms, actors and structures as independent elements, albeit closely linked, because they have independent dynamics. Norms are transformed outside of the recorded meetings, actors try to influence by various means and the structures change separately but in relation to the normative transformation and the acts of actors. Respective actors have their own decision-making mechanisms. Nation-states are composed of ministries and offices that function as parts of the state and work coherently to achieve its collective goals. An official of a ministry of education who attends a UNESCO meeting has his own interests and expressed his ideas under the name of the country he represent. At the same time, he clearly recognizes his instrumentality as the ministerial and state representative, which is also a core assumption of the global governance structure itself. In this sense, the commitment of state representatives to educational principles cannot but be secondary to the general national interests. In relation to that, the analysis of aid policies of Asian donors suggests that the self-image created by the nation-state influences its strategies for diplomatic relationships, including those concerning development aid. The perceived diplomatic and macroeconomic position of the country affects how the country presents itself in the international scene, and aid, including that for education, is used as a tool for promoting the country’s self-image. Of course, no discussion about aid makes light of its contribution to humanitarianism and global welfare. Still, no national aid strategy can be considered without an assumption or hope that it will strengthen the position of the country internationally. In this sense, as the country cases in Part II have indicated, international development cooperation strategy stands in the balance of coordination among sub-governments and domestic groups with different interests. It is not a coincidence that the case studies from Japan, South Korea, China and the United States highlight the confrontation of different values and power games among domestic actors. Civil society networks also have developed finely designed structures as they have expanded in scale, regardless of their flexibility compared with the state actors. While they were characterized in this volume as horizontal in contrast to the verticality of nation-states, in fact, there are vertical relationships within civil society networks. The relationship between Global South and Global North is immanent in the networks, and to ensure the legitimacy of representation of civil society is a challenge, given the diversity and potential contradictions within the widely extended networks. The flip side of this fact is that civil society actors succeeded in institutionalizing themselves and become effective policy advocates. Considering the consensus reached after the broad-based participation in the current global governance structure, it is difficult to imagine that the post-2015 agenda in front of our eyes directly reflects the voices of classroom teachers, students or development workers on the ground. Naturally, there are layers of interpretation and summary from the ground level up to the point when the representatives of CSOs express their collective opinions on the global stage. In a

sense, the leaders of CSOs and other actors who interpret and summarize voices from their stakeholders are part of the actual authors of the agenda. At the same time, these authors have not been unanimous. As a result of the mutual influence and the search for middle ground among leaders who represent their people, the agenda has been collectively tempered. Within these dynamics, what does the region mean as a unit? In the chapter ‘Asian Regionality and Post-2015 Consultation: Donors’ Self-Images and the Discourse’, I argued that Asia is unique in the sense that it is composed of diverse actors, both donors and recipients, and both traditional and nontraditional donors. In addition, many countries can appeal to the global platform directly without going through any coordination at the regional level. Therefore, in Asia, the region as an administrative unit often becomes a mere passing point instead of the site for unifying the voices. Putting that aside, as the hub of capacity building or research on issues of common interest, the regional platform seems to function effectively in Asia, where countries and institutions with higher capacity support others. Parallel to the functional dimension of the region, this volume points out that the Asian actors tend to refer to the imagined community of Asia as the basis of their uniqueness in the international scene. The analysis of policy documents of Asian donors demonstrated that the desire to emphasize their unique approaches to development aid made Asian donors look into the historical and cultural traits of their societies. In this sense, the appeal of Asianness and the rivalry against neighbouring Asian donors are two sides of the same coin. The claim of uniqueness inherently suggests that one’s country is more authentically Asian than others. Unlike the popular assumption that regionalism and nationalism are mutually exclusive, among Asian donors, promotion of the self-image of the nation often coexists with reaffirmation of regionality. Finally, I would like to point out the characteristics of education as the ontology of the discourse on the global agenda. The epistemological character of discourse may have been similar across various fields involved in the post-2015 agenda setting process. However, the discourse is constructed around the contents of the agenda, which is discussed based on the educational realities observed or experienced by the people who take part in the consultation process. One thing that would be most visible as characteristic of this field is that the discourse tends to be abstract instead of pragmatic or technical. There are several possible reasons for that. First, educational practices largely depend on context. Unlike vaccination to control disease, whose practice is the same across different settings, education depends on the teachers, culture, education system and learners. In fact, effective education for one learner may be ineffective for another. Therefore, successful practices in a locality cannot be straightforwardly brought to the global discourse. It is often difficult to specify how many of the diverse practices can be classified as activities to achieve specific global targets, because any educational practice tends to aim at multiple objectives. The context-bound nature of education also leads us to consider the ambiguous merit of tackling educational challenges at the global level. This context is clearly different from that of agendas such as controlling cross-border transmission of infectious diseases or minimizing global warming or pollution, which anybody would recognize as issues requiring globally concerted efforts. Further, many educationists resist the functionalist perspective on education, which treats education as a mere

technical procedure to develop human resources equipped with practical skills and knowledge. Rather, they would highlight the potential of education to bring forth the talents buried in the mind of learners, to empower them and to develop their character. In addition, the mission-driven CSOs, who are active advocates of the cause of education in the global discourse, are composed of diverse stakeholders in both the Global North and the Global South. While the messages from mission-driven CSOs tend to be ideological, their internal diversity makes them even more abstract so as to represent the common denominator of their stakeholders’ opinions. Another cause of the ideological nature of educational discourse is the lack of influence from the private sector. Textbook, testing and educational research firms took part in the post-EFA discourse, but their commitments were limited. Innovative financing is said to be important to secure the financial resources to implement the ever-expanding targets of the SDGs. In the field of education, too, public-private partnerships or other means to involve the private sector in educational practices are discussed. Still, at the stage of post-EFA agenda setting, commercial interests, which are more likely to drive the discourse to pragmatism, were limited, leaving the discussion to be determined by politics and idealism. After the SDG summit, the process is now shifting to a more technical stage to specify the practical measures to be adopted and to develop indicators to monitor progress. In this sense, actors are trying to digest the abstract targets under SDG4 into more pragmatic steps to follow. At the same time, the education community increasingly emphasizes the role of education in developing the values, attitudes and behaviours that allow people to respect others, foster the natural environment and live together with people of different backgrounds. According to educationists, education is the fundamental component that should cut across all the areas listed under the SDGs. Such a perspective on the role of education would lead to educational practices that are more morally oriented, difficult to measure, highly dependent on context and diverse in practice. As an educationist, I personally support this perspective. The challenge would be to find ways to make the impact of such education visible or, as many pragmatists say, measurable and globally comparable. This line of thinking, then, leads to another question: Do we really need to compare educational practices globally, given that education has fundamentally a local nature? On the other hand, when the discourse turns away from global comparison, it may signal the beginning of the end for a global structure of educational development.

Shoko Yamada Editor

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Bong Gun Chung is a research fellow at the Institute of Education Research and also an instructor at the Global Education Cooperation Program of College of Education, Seoul National University. Since 2011 he has been involved in Korea’s education projects in Uganda, Rwanda, Haiti, Kenya, Botswana, and Lao PDR. Recently, he worked for the preparation of the World Education Forum 2015 at Incheon, Korea. He is originally from the Ministry of Education where he served for 30 years in policy areas such as education reform, HRD, and international cooperation. Mr. Chung also worked at the Permanent Delegation of Korea to the OECD, the World Bank Institute, and the KEDI. He graduated from Seoul Nation University with a BA in international relations, MA in political science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and his doctoral degree at the University of Hawaii at Manoa in social foundation of education. Jing Liu, currently, is Assistant Professor in Graduate School of International Development at Nagoya University, Japan. He graduated with a PhD in International Development in 2013 from Nagoya University. His research interests include sociology of education, ethnography of education, comparative education, policy analysis and development studies. Recently, he is conducting research on emerging donors’ philosophy and modalities in educational aid to developing countries, particularly on China as case study. He is also paying his efforts in study about dynamic practices in China’s rebalancing public education reform at compulsory education level. Changsong Niu is an associate research fellow at Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University. She got her PhD in Comparative Education from Zhejiang University. Dr. Niu has expertise in African higher education, Educational aid and China-Africa educational cooperation. She has been a foreign visiting research fellow at the Nagoya University and a visiting scholar at the University of Zimbabwe and the University of Stellenbosch. She has traveled to several African countries including Kenya, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa to do the field work. Dr. Niu has undertaken some funded projects about China’s educational engagement with Africa, including “20 + 20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Universities-China and Cameroon Cooperation in Economy, Education, Culture and Technology,” “China’s educational aid to Africa,” “The cultural influence of Confucius Institutes in Africa.” Her current research interests include African students in China, African Confucius Institutes and international education assistance to Africa. Leon Tikly is Professor of Education in the Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol. He is visiting Professor at the Centre for Education Rights and Transformations, University of Johannesburg and at the Centre for International Teacher Education, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa. Leon started his career as a science teacher

in London schools and at a school for South African refugees in Tanzania. He worked as a policy researcher in South Africa during the transition from apartheid to democracy before moving first to the University of Birmingham and then to the University of Bristol. Leon’s main research interests include the development of global education policy, the quality of education in Africa and the achievement of disadvantaged groups in the United Kingdom and Europe. Jandhyala B. G. Tilak is presently Professor and Vice-Chancellor at the National University of Educational Planning and Administration. Dr. Tilak was on the research and teaching faculty at University of Delhi, Indian Institute of Education, University of Virginia and the Hiroshima University (Japan), and is a Visiting Professor in Economics, Sri Sathya Sai Institute of Higher Learning. He was also on the research staff of the World Bank. Prof. Tilak has authored/edited dozen books and about 300 research papers in the area of economics of education and development studies, published in reputed journals. Recipient of Swami Pranavananda Saraswati National Award of the UGC for his outstanding scholarly research in Education (1999), Dr. Malcolm Adiseshiah Award for distinguished research contributions to development studies (2003), Inspirational Teacher of the Year Global Education Award 2012 and Devang Menta award for excellence in education (2015). Dr. Tilak had a privilege of delivering a keynote address to a meeting of the Noble laureates in Barcelona in 2005. Prof. Tilak is the Editor of Journal of Educational Planning and Administration and is on the editorial board of several professional journals. Prof. Tilak served as Vice-President, and as President of the Comparative Education Society of India (2010–2012), and is on the Board of Directors of the Comparative Education Society of Asia. James H. Williams, Ed.D. is Chairholder of the UNESCO Chair in International Education and Development and Associate Professor of International Education and International Affairs at The George Washington University. Dr. Williams received his doctorate from Harvard University in international educational planning, administration, and policy. He has done extensive educational development work in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. He has worked at USAID in the Africa Bureau, taught at J.F. Oberlin University, Tokyo, and Ohio University, and currently serves as Director of GW’s International Education Program. He teaches classes in education and development. His research interests include education and conflict; education for marginalized and conflict-affected populations; decentralization and administrative reform; education and health, equity, and achievement in large cross-national data sets; and the internationalization of higher education. His recent research includes work in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia as well as Japan, and, several years ago, the Philippines and Bangladesh. Shoko Yamada is Professor of comparative education and educational policy studies at the Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Japan. She has conducted various researches on educational policy-making and implementation in Africa and Asia. One of her consistent research focuses is the discourse around global policies and agendas and the ways they are adapted at the national levels, from the colonial period to the present. Her

publications include “Educational Borrowing as Negotiation: Reexamining the influence of American black industrial education model on British colonial education in Africa,” published in Comparative Education (Vol. 44, No. 1, 2008); Multiple Conceptions of Education for All and EFA Development Goals: The Processes of Adopting a Global Agenda in the Policies of Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia (VDM Publisher, 2010); and “Making Sense of the EFA from a National Context: Its Implementation, and Impact on Households in Ethiopia,” in Education for All: Global Promises, National Challenges, edited by Baker and Wiseman (Elsevier Science Ltd., 2007). Kazuhiro Yoshida is Professor at Center for the Study of International Cooperation in Education, and Graduate School of International Development & Cooperation, Hiroshima University, Japan. He specializes in the research of education policy and reform in developing countries, education aid effectiveness, and skills development. He has recently served as covice chair, a regional representative of Asia and Pacific region, of Education for All Steering Committee which has led the process of formulating the post 2015 education agenda. He advises the government of Japan and JICA, an aid implementing agency, on the country’s aid policy and strategy in the education sector. He has an extensive experience in aid practices at the World Bank and JICA (former JBIC) with professional field experiences at more than 30 Asian, African and Latin American countries. He holds MPhil. in development studies, University of Sussex.

INDEX Actor, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16–27, 40, 41, 49, 70, 71, 72, 76, 87, 89–109, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 128, 135, 137, 145, 146, 147, 151, 155–181, 189, 191, 195, 199, 201, 216, 251, 258, 360, 361, 362, 363 Addis Ababa Conference on Financing for Development, 69, 77 Adult literacy, 47, 52, 92, 111, 112, 113, 117, 227, 345 Africa, 20, 156, 167, 169–170, 176, 226, 231, 244, 269–295, 303, 306, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 323n10, 331 African Union, 176, 274, 305, 313, 315, 316 Aid effectiveness, 3, 20, 40, 42, 56, 57, 58–60, 62, 146, 159, 162, 164, 166, 178, 214, 226, 227–228, 232, 248, 249, 254, 256, 257, 333, 350, 356n7 Aid for education, 3, 171 Alliance for Progress, 331 Anarchy, 13, 14 Asian model for aid, 247 Asianism, 147, 148–155, 189, 196, 197, 198, 201 Asianness, 8, 23, 155, 195–198, 200, 202, 363 Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference (APREC), 72, 145, 190, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202 ASPBAE (Asia South Pacific Basic and Adult Education), 93, 147, 181, 186–189, 190–193, 199 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 146, 148, 177–179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 198, 202, 203, 313 Bangkok Statement, 145, 190, 198, 199, 200 Basic education, 11, 28, 29n3, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 54, 56, 83, 94, 98, 99, 111, 112, 128, 146, 153, 162, 163, 183, 186, 187, 188, 195, 215, 222, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 236, 247, 260, 261, 262, 279, 292, 295n12, 333, 341, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351 Bilateral ODA, 19, 160, 161, 179, 180, 215, 228, 229 BRICS, 18, 70, 87, 150, 197, 293, 304, 321, 334, 361 Broad-based participation, 7, 105–107, 127, 136, 362 Budgetary support, 335, 350 Bureaucracy, 102, 152, 154, 172, 194, 215, 222, 223, 226, 355n2 CCNGO (Collective Consultation of NGOs), 70, 87, 91, 99 China, 19, 20, 22, 25, 145, 150, 157, 164, 165–168, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 178, 193, 194, 195, 197, 203n1, 203n2, 203n3, 223, 269–295, 303, 304, 318 China’s experience, 275, 278–280 Chinese follow-up Action Committee (CFAC), 283, 284–286

Chinese government scholarship, 274, 289 Chinese language teaching, 195, 274 Chinese model, 22, 167, 171, 172, 197, 203n1 Cluster; cluster analysis, 130–134 Cognitive skills, 111 Colombo Plan, 217, 222, 303, 305, 306, 312, 314, 322n1 Conditionalities, 40, 43, 59, 61, 175, 272, 281, 319 Conflict, 85, 111, 150, 162, 171, 184, 253, 257, 258, 333, 350, 352, 352–353 Confucian, 24, 150, 152, 153, 172, 277, 278 Confucianism, 24, 149, 151, 152, 153, 167, 275, 276, 278 Confucius Institute, 171, 285, 290 Constructivist, Constructivism, 13, 14, 15, 39, 193, 216, 217, 236 Country process, 101, 109, 126–129, 132, 137, 144 CRS (Creditor Reporting System), 337 CSO (Civil Society Organization), 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, 71, 72, 76, 83, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 118, 120, 122, 126, 127, 128, 133, 135, 136, 145, 147, 164, 176, 181, 186–189, 198, 199, 200, 251, 359, 360, 362, 364 Dakar Framework for Action, 50–53, 96 DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), 97 Development assistance, 20, 28, 30n4, 58, 173, 174, 175, 224, 246, 248, 301–323, 328, 333, 334, 335–344, 352, 355n6 Development cooperation, 28, 49, 127, 155, 156, 159, 161, 166, 167, 174, 181, 193, 197, 217–223, 305–311, 319, 321, 362 Development Cooperation Charter, 28, 233, 236 Diplomacy (Development, Defense and), 328, 354 Discourse analysis, 9, 16, 137, 216 ECCE (early childhood care and education), 46, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117 Education for All (EFA), 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9–11, 18, 24, 27, 37–62, 70, 80, 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 104, 113, 134, 183, 227–228, 232, 345, 359 Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), 72, 115, 117, 123, 124, 164, 182, 195, 351 “Education Indicators Technical Advisory Group (TAG)” or “Technical Advisory Group”, 86, 100 Education International, 16, 52, 86, 93, 95, 100, 104, 138, 187 Education strategy, 348–350 Education subgovernment, 228, 235 EFA Global Monitoring Report, 3, 50, 85

EFA Review, 52, 106, 109–113, 125, 137 EFA Steering Committee, 70, 81, 85, 90, 91, 97, 100, 105, 107, 122, 128 Emerging donor, 5, 18, 20, 21, 25, 28, 118, 177, 178, 189, 303, 304, 320 Equity, 8, 49, 55, 93, 94, 97, 98, 117, 123, 127, 132, 198, 200, 262, 264n14, 283, 348, 351, 353 EXIM (Export Import Bank of Korea), 163, 164, 264n9 EXIM Bank, 264n9, 285, 306, 308, 309, 322n4 Fast track initiative, 3, 42, 55–58, 98, 346 Financing, 69, 85, 97, 101, 126–129, 137, 188, 200, 251, 306, 341, 364 Foreign aid, 29, 155, 167, 168, 177, 217, 225, 235, 242, 271, 272, 273, 274–282, 283, 284, 285, 291, 293, 294n1, 304, 311, 322n4, 328–344, 349, 354, 355n1 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 169, 170, 171, 270, 273, 274, 276, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285, 289, 295 Fourth High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4), 158, 159, 164, 166, 249, 263 Framework Act on International Development Cooperation, 250 Framework for Action, 46, 47, 48, 70, 85, 87, 122, 128, 359 Friendship, 275, 276–277, 282, 292, 319 Global Campaign for Education, 16, 52, 57, 90, 98, 186, 187, 199 Global Citizenship Education (GCE), 83, 123, 125, 146, 164, 184, 195 Global consultation; online consultation; consultation process, 6, 7, 68, 80, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 104, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 135, 136, 163, 190, 198, 200, 202, 360, 363 Global Education First Initiative, 79, 83 Global EFA Meeting (GEM), 78, 86 Global EFA Meeting in Muscat (GEM-Muscat), 198 Global governance; global governance structure; global structure, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 52, 59, 60, 62, 70, 71, 80, 81, 82, 85, 89, 99, 101–109, 127, 135, 137, 201, 202, 360, 361, 362 Global north, 7, 43, 80, 91, 92, 108, 119, 127, 321, 362, 364 Global Partnership for Education, 3, 86, 98–99, 137, 187, 199, 346, 350 Global south, 7, 15, 58, 91, 92, 108, 127, 138n2, 147, 187, 362, 364 Global Thematic Consultation on Education, 77, 83 Grant, 145, 156, 157, 161, 162, 173, 175, 218, 226, 227, 229, 230, 242, 243, 251, 272, 289, 290, 305, 307, 308, 311, 313, 317, 318, 321, 323n10, 335, 337, 345 Harmonization, 2, 164, 227, 256, 333, 350 Harmony, 151, 152, 153, 154, 193, 194, 275–276, 277, 292, 328 Hegemony, 14, 44, 51, 165–172, 176, 196, 197, 220 Higher education, 28, 47, 54, 93, 94, 146, 162, 164, 171, 182, 183, 195, 220, 232, 258, 279,

285, 286, 287, 288–290, 292, 294, 315, 344, 347 “High-Level Panel” or “High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda”, 81, 83, 97 Hitozukuri, 156, 218–221, 234, 235, 236 Horizontal; horizontal network, 6, 7, 15, 16, 24, 56, 171, 181–189, 202, 216, 236, 360, 362 Human resource development, 26, 156, 161, 163, 167, 170–172, 181, 214, 215, 217–218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 231, 233, 280, 285, 290–292, 293 Human resources training, 273, 291 Humanitarian, 29, 162, 181, 183, 188, 233, 248, 249, 252, 253, 313, 323n13, 329, 330, 333, 339, 341, 342, 354 IAU (International Association of Universities), 94 Idealist, Idealism, 13, 14, 15, 216, 236, 253, 254, 330, 364 Incheon Statement, 91 Inclusive education, 92, 351 India, 20, 28, 29, 121, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 155, 156, 172–177, 193, 195, 216, 247, 301–323, 343, 354 India Development Initiative, 308 Indicator, 10, 59, 69, 80, 83, 86, 95, 99, 100, 103, 110, 112, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132, 134, 136, 256, 257 International Relations (IR), 6, 8, 9, 13–16, 23–24, 26, 38, 39, 40, 41, 102, 215, 216–217, 235, 236, 359, 360 International Task Force on Teachers for EFA, 100 IPAL (International Platform for Assessing Learning), 99 ITEC (Indian Technical Economic Cooperation), 306, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 221, 237n1 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 10, 218, 219, 230, 237n1 Japan, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 93, 124, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 172, 177, 178, 188, 193, 195, 196, 197, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237n3, 237n4, 242, 247, 248, 263n3, 280, 303, 336, 350, 362 Japanese model, 156, 160, 161, 191, 214, 217, 221, 224, 232 Jomtien Declaration, 47 Jomtien; World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA), 2, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 85, 88, 90, 96, 97, 101, 134, 222–223, 227, 345 Karachi Plan, 222

KDI (Korean Development Institute), 252, 254, 263n4 KEDI (Korean Educational Development Institute), 248, 249, 252, 259 Knowledge sharing, 85, 181, 182, 191, 192, 254, 255, 256, 258, 260 KOICA (Korean International Cooperation Agency), 251, 263n1, 264n9 Korean Model of ODA, 28, 30n4, 241–264 Korean model, 160, 162, 191, 247 KSP (Knowledge Sharing Program), 163, 243, 252 Learning Metrics Task Force (LMTF), 77, 99, 117, 123, 129 Learning outcomes, 5, 11, 52, 99, 100, 111, 112, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 144, 347, 352 Lifelong learning, 11, 114, 135, 188, 192, 198, 200 Loan, 156, 157, 160, 161, 173, 191, 218, 222, 226, 227, 230, 232, 294n3, 306, 308, 311, 317, 318, 321, 335 Marshall Plan, 330 MDG Summit, 81 Means of implementation, 68, 69, 82, 113, 115, 118, 119, 125, 361 Member states, 68, 70, 72, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 90, 101, 107, 109, 118, 119, 120, 125, 126, 127, 134, 136, 148, 173, 182, 190, 200, 202, 204n6, 359 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 3, 40, 53, 182, 227, 334, 345 Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (MITI), 221, 224 Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (MESC); Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), 221, 231 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 158, 161, 178, 194, 215, 219, 251, 283, 293, 295n7 Monitoring, 16, 17, 50, 70, 83, 85, 90, 109, 112, 117, 121, 122, 128, 162, 202, 295n11, 307 Multilateral ODA, 159, 177, 178, 243 Multilateralism, 3, 4, 12, 13, 23, 25, 134, 360, 361 Muscat Agreement, 72, 87, 88, 91, 105, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 125, 190, 198, 200 Mutual benefit, 161, 162, 168, 272, 275, 277, 281, 287, 289, 292, 319 National interest, 14, 28, 91, 102, 104, 162, 165, 170, 176, 177, 189, 190, 194, 199, 201, 202, 233, 234, 236, 359, 360, 361 Nation-state, 6, 13, 102, 172, 196, 223, 360, 362 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 172, 173, 191, 193, 303 Nonalignment, 156, 172, 174, 176 Noncognitive skills, 111 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 335 Noninterference, nonintervention, 173, 235, 319

Nonstate actor; Nonstate channel, 6, 7, 13, 15, 16, 23, 25, 189 Nontraditional donor, 6, 8, 19, 21, 135, 157, 164, 165, 193, 197, 223, 302, 363 Norm, 28, 88, 97, 151, 329 Numeracy, 46, 52, 99, 110, 114, 115, 117, 121, 122, 123, 347, 351 ODA Charter, 225, 226, 233, 234, 235 ODA subgovernment, 222, 228, 231, 235 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 12, 147, 227, 242, 264n14 OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee), 223 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 16, 150, 243, 306, 329, 336, 338 Open Working Group (United Nations Open Working Group), 77, 81, 82, 199 OPM(Office of Prime Minister), 250 Oslo Summit on Education for Development, 69, 77 Ownership, 58, 59, 60, 86, 147, 164, 227, 231, 232, 319, 333 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 3, 320 Partnership, 49, 57, 85, 178, 179, 182, 193, 226, 232, 288, 289, 319, 355 Philosophy, 5, 8, 151, 152, 154, 168, 169, 172, 174, 175, 177, 180, 194, 195, 214, 215, 218, 220, 225, 232, 234, 235, 271, 272, 294 PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), 94, 112, 258, 259 Post-2015, 4, 8, 15, 38, 61, 69, 71, 83, 134, 146, 185, 189, 232, 281, 292, 293, 350, 359, 360 Post-EFA Process, 70, 84, 88, 96, 102, 127, 137 Post-EFA, 4, 8, 70, 71, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89, 96, 97, 103, 105, 111, 127, 130, 134, 137, 361 Post-Washington consensus, 42, 43, 44 Power in global governance, 40, 41 President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 342 Quality of education, 5, 11, 46, 83, 110, 111, 112, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 130, 131, 133, 134, 232, 352, 368 Reading, 16, 122, 123, 259, 349 Region, regionality, 26, 147, 181, 189–200, 201, 363 Reparational, war compensation, 218 Request-base, request-based approach, 220, 225, 235, 236 Rights-based approach, 9, 43, 97, 119, 162, 189, 199 Rio + 20, 73 Scholarship, 25, 28, 39, 118, 119, 164, 177, 179, 222, 223, 258, 260, 288, 312 School construction, 274, 286, 287, 292

SDG Process, 69, 81, 86, 88, 97, 102, 103, 105, 118, 119, 127 SDG Summit, 4, 73, 200, 359 SDG4 (Sustainable Development Goal 4), 5, 117, 359, 361, 364 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), 68, 82, 145, 350, 361 Self-help, 157, 161, 220, 235 Self-reliance, 22, 154, 161, 162, 168, 278, 280, 319 Skills, 85, 98, 111, 112, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 131, 132, 136, 164, 200, 313, 364 Soft power, 164, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 203n1, 319, 320 Solidarity, 20, 22, 28, 173, 174, 177, 193, 196, 274, 275, 292, 294, 318, 319 South Asia, 51, 74, 148, 149, 156, 179, 226, 314, 317, 318, 323n10, 338 South Korea, 7, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 68, 79, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168, 169, 172, 174, 177, 188, 193, 195, 197, 243, 247, 362 Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), 145, 147, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 190, 192, 202, 203 South-South Cooperation, 6, 20, 28, 164, 165, 167, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 191, 271, 274, 280, 281, 282, 287, 292, 293, 294, 301–323 Structuralist, Structuralism, 13, 216, 217 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 4, 68, 82, 145, 350–351, 361 Teacher, 10, 93, 94, 100, 109, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 120, 125, 126, 130, 132, 133, 138n3, 288, 290, 291, 295n12, 295n13, 312, 362, 363 Technical cooperation and development, 20 Technical Cooperation, 20, 156, 161, 175, 176, 218, 219, 221, 222, 226, 229, 230, 231, 280, 303, 310, 311, 313, 318, 319, 321 Text analysis, 16, 71, 76, 80, 126, 130, 131 Thailand International Cooperation Agency (TICA), 177, 179, 180 Thailand, 2, 7, 19, 20, 22, 88, 145, 147, 149, 155, 156, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 190, 193, 194, 197, 198, 223, 227, 345 the elite-led ODA model, 252 The post-2015 agenda, 14, 70, 80, 89, 95, 97, 99, 129, 134, 144, 201, 202, 236, 270, 271, 282, 292–294, 359, 362, 363 Traditional donor, 21, 22, 27, 28, 95, 156, 213–237, 319 Training and development, 311 Triangular cooperation, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 192, 193 TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training), 28, 47, 93, 113, 117, 124, 128, 146, 163, 195, 223, 232, 246, 248, 260, 286, 292 UNDP, 50, 70, 81, 83, 88, 96, 97, 178, 317, 341

UNESCO, 3, 10, 29n2, 29n3, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 62n1, 68, 71, 72, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 94, 96, 97, 99, 102, 106, 109, 112, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 138n1, 138n3, 145, 148, 149, 158, 163, 164, 171, 187, 190, 198, 199, 200, 222, 228, 233, 235, 290, 341, 346, 351, 355n4, 360, 361, 362 UNFPA, 50, 70, 81, 83, 88, 96, 97, 178 UNICEF, 10, 47, 48, 50, 51, 56, 61, 70, 81, 83, 86, 88, 96, 97, 123, 149, 178, 341 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 123, 328, 329, 331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 339, 340, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 355n2, 355n3 United States Department of State, 328, 337 Universal Primary Education (UPE), 3, 4, 10, 26, 44, 49, 54, 55 Vertical relationship; vertical structure; vertical mechanism, 6, 7, 12, 152, 171, 202, 362 Washington consensus, 42, 43, 44, 166 WB (World Bank), 3, 10, 11, 27, 29n1, 38, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 60, 70, 81, 83, 86, 88, 96, 97, 98, 123, 124, 129, 145, 148, 149, 176, 225, 232, 243, 258, 259, 263n4, 264n10, 264n11, 264n12, 264n15, 279, 303, 309, 317, 321, 331, 341, 344, 345, 346 WEF-Dakar (World Education Forum 2000 in Dakar), 6, 16, 85, 90, 102, 121, 134, 137 WEF-Incheon (World Education Forum 2015 in Incheon), 68, 69, 70, 79, 87, 89, 94, 103, 106, 107, 109, 134, 165, 200, 359, 361 Win-Win cooperation, 165, 191, 193, 277 Working Group on EFA, 78 World Culturalist; World culture, 11 World system theory; world system, 12 Youth, 11, 46, 84, 92, 98, 100, 113, 114, 115, 117, 121, 232, 261, 312, 350, 352