Positive Peace in Theory and Practice : Strengthening the United Nations's Pre-Conflict Prevention Role [1 ed.] 9789004305618, 9789004305601

Citation preview

Positive Peace in Theory and Practice



Positive Peace in Theory and Practice Strengthening the United Nations’s Pre-Conflict Prevention Role

By

Tuba Turan

LEIDEN | BOSTON



This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. ISBN 978-90-04-30560-1 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-30561-8 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents Foreword ix Acknowledgements xi List of Abbreviations xii Abbreviations of Book Titles xiii Introduction 1 The Main Aim and Objectives of the Book 1 The Key Concepts of the Book 2 The Methodology of the Book 5 The Research Strategy and the Outline of the Book 7

PART 1 Peace in International Relations Theory and in the United Nations’s Practice 1 The Realist, Kantian and Neo-Kantian Conceptions of Peace 13 1 The Realist Conception of Peace 13 1.1 Basic Assumptions about War: The Role of Power 14 1.2 The Realists’ Vision for Change and Intra-State Peace 18 2 The Idealist Conception of Peace 21 2.1 Kantian Perpetual Peace: The Notion of Right 22 2.2 Disagreement on the Concept of Right: Justice or Peace? 29 2.3 Conclusion: Assessing Kantian Peace Vision 34 3 The Neo-Kantian Tradition: The Liberal Peace 35 3.1 The Liberal Traditions in IR: The Liberal/Democratic Peace Thesis 36 3.2 The Rawlsian System for Stable Peace 38 3.3 Conclusion: Assessing the Neo-Kantian/Rawlsian Peace Vision 46 2 The Concept and Practical Frameworks of Peace in the UN System 47 1 The UN’s Realist Peace Vision and Framework 48 1.1 The Influences of the Realist Tradition in the Foundation of the UN 48 1.2 The Influences of the Realist Tradition in the UN Charter Provisions 51

vi

Contents

2

The UN’s Idealist Peace Vision and Frameworks 58 2.1 The Influences of the Idealist Tradition in the Design of the UN and Charter Provisions 59 2.2 The Impacts of the UN’s Idealist Framework on Intra-State Peace: A Positive Peace Vision? 60 2.3 Developments towards Strengthening the UN’s Idealist Frameworks: A Human-Centric Ethos via Human Security and Responsibility to Protect? 66 3 The UN’s Liberal Peace Practice: The Pursuit of Intra-State Peace 73 3.1 A Broader Peace Notion in the Post-Cold War Era? 73 3.2 The Pursuit of Intra-State Peace through the SC: The Problem of the SC’s Selectivity and Extending the Application of Coercive Means 77 3.3 Assessing the Success of the UN Realist Frameworks in Light of Armed Conflict Trends 82 3.4 The Adverse Effects of Liberal Interventionism: The Impacts of Transitional Justice Provisions on Relapse Rates 89 4 Conclusion 96

PART 2 A New Positive Peace Paradigm 3 A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision and Framework 101 1 An Overview of the Intra-state Peace Visions of the Realist, Idealist and Neo-Kantian Traditions 101 2 A New Conception of Positive Peace 103 2.1 An Overview of the Proposed Positive Peace Framework 107 3 The New Positive Peace Concept vis-à-vis the Galtungian, Liberal and Local Positive Peace Conceptions 109 4 Fundamental Conflicts vs. Existing Explanations of Intra-State Armed Conflicts 115 4.1 Tackling Fundamental Conflicts vis-à-vis Other Root Causes 122 5 The Foundations of the DPP Mechanism 123 5.1 Tracing the DPP Mechanism’s Foundations in Habermas’s Discourse Theory and Rawls’s Original Position 124 5.2 The DPP Mechanism vis-à-vis Rawlsian and Habermassian Models 129 6 Conclusion: The Place of the PPF within the Liberal Tradition 131

CONTENTS

vii

4 The Operational Formula of Positive Peace 133 1 The Operational Definition of Positive Peace: Situations of Concern of the PPF 133 1.1 Identifying the Lack of Positive Peace: Objections to Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Systems 135 2 The Elements of the Operational Definition of Positive Peace 139 2.1 The Absence of Active Armed Conflict: Negative vs. Positive Peace 139 2.2 Encompassing Non-Gross Violations of Human Rights 142 2.3 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) under Element 2b: The Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Pursuit of Dignified Life 147 3 Further Criteria for Determining the Situations of Concern of the PPF 150 4 The Role of Human Rights within the PPF and International Pluralism 155 5 Conclusion 161

PART 3 The Operation of the New Positive Peace Paradigm 5 The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms vis-à-vis the New Positive Peace Approach 165 1 Structural and Operational Prevention 166 2 The Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council (HRC) 170 2.1 The Positive Peace Approach versus Human Rights-Based Approach 177 3 UN Mediation and Peacemaking 179 4 UN Peacebuilding versus Positive Peace Approach 182 5 The PPF’s Objective of Systemic Structural Prevention 187 6 Conclusion 189 6 The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism 190 1 The DPP’s Issues of Concern: Fundamental Conflicts/Identity Divisions and the Potential Application of the New Positive Peace Vision 191 1.1 Forms of Tackling Identity Divisions and Measuring Success 197 1.2 The Transformation of Fundamental Conflicts 201

viii

CONTENTS

2 The Actors of the DPP Mechanism: Justification for the PPF’s TrackOne-and-a-Half Level Systemic Early Engagement 204 3 Possible Objections to the PPF Idea: The Prospects for States’ Assent for its Operation 210 4 The Place of the UNPC within the UN System 217 5 Conclusion: Value Added by the Positive Peace Approach 220 Conclusion 223 Appendix 231 Bibliography 235 Index 266

Foreword This very impressive work puts the United Nations to the test: does the UN contribute to positive peace? The problems with negative peace, the absence of war in the case of states, are well known. How about positive peace? Depends on the conceptualization; here is mine. From I started talking about positive peace in 1958, inspired by positive health and the WHO definition of health, as “something more than absence of violence”, I frequently referred to cooperation and harmony. But only more recently, in A Theory of Peace, did I spell out five aspects of positive peace, sometimes as phases, stages: cooperation with equity; harmony with empathy; institutionalization for stability; fusion of parties: continuation in others. Example: European states cooperating, in solidarity, EEC-EC-EU CouncilCommission, emergence of “Europe”, inspiring other regions. Or a couple: friendship, love, marriage, growing into one, inspiring the offspring. Sometime it works, sometimes not. Let us try it out on the United Nations, with States as members. The point of departure was the worst possible: as a war-time alliance, aimed not at cooperation but victory. The structure is still in the UN veto powers; worse, however, in the alliance against those who do not live by the UN Charter: sometimes by military means. What would positive peace add? First, equitable cooperation, for instance as joint projects learning from each other: India learning lifting the bottom up from China and China federalism; USA learning health and green economies from Cuba and Cuba freedom and innovation. Always with a focus on the positive in all parties, linking positives. Second, empathy. Deep understanding, also of their glories and traumas of the past. Trying to understand nations across fault-lines as they see themselves, and take it from there, like for cooperation, again based on the positive aspects, and respect. Third, institutionalization. UN is that, with guidelines. Rule of Law implies that everybody is equal for the law, hence no veto. Democracy means one state, one vote, hence expansion of the Security Council, and more power to the General Assembly. Democracy also means one person one vote; hence a UN People’s Assembly with one directly elected representative for each million inhabitants. Human Rights are civil-political-social-economic-cultural; in a globalizing world they of course apply across borders, ruling out killing and exploitation.

x

Foreword

Fourth, fusion, read: of the states into one, the world; of the human beings into one nation, humanity. Problematic, but steps can be taken if compatible with the other aspects, like symmetric UN global networks for communication and transportation leaving out nobody. Fifth, continuation. There being no other worlds we know of, there is nobody to inspire? Well, first of all, as this little review shows the UN does not live up to simple aspects of positive peace. One reason is its built-in lack of equity and empathy, when the West in general, and Anglo-America in particular, see themselves as the models for others to emulate. Another reason is that others, less universal, are doing better: the regional organizations, in Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia particularly. There is negative learning from the UN: no veto, general assemblies, parliaments, not only NGOs. Referenda around the corners, taking Western ideas seriously, trying to avoid some states being (much) more equal than others. Could the continuation of the United Nations be not as a union of states, challenged by local authorities and nations from below and by TNCs and regions from above, but as a United Regions, with UN deficits removed? With all states rushing to get into some region – the USA in a North American MEXUSCAN? Israel in a Middle East Community? Well, time will show. In the meantime the best guide to the details of these concepts and realities is the book in your hands.  July 2015  Johan Galtung, Professor dr. hc. mult. Founding director, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway Founder, TRANSCEND, A Peace, Development and Environment Network

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the University of Essex, School of Law for hosting me as a PhD student and for providing me a scholarship which made the research of this book possible. I would like to thank my co-supervisors Sheldon Leader and Clara Sandoval, my external examiner Edward Newman, and my internal examiner Tom Cornford, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their valuable comments and contributions. Thanks to all my friends around the world, and my cousins for supporting and encouraging me during the preparation of the book. Finally, I would like to thank my mother Nimet, my father Omer Faruk, and my brother Alparslan for their endless support.

List of Abbreviations BCPR  Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme CAT The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment CEDAW Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs DPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs DPP Dialogical and Deliberative Peace Process mechanism ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council ESCR Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA United Nations General Assembly HIs Horizontal Inequalities HRC United Nations Human Rights Council HS Human Security IACtHR Inter- American Court of Human Rights ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICJ International Court of Justice ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IHRL International Human Rights Law LoN League of Nations OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OP Original Position (John Rawls’s deliberative device) OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PBC United Nations Peacebuilding Commission PPF Positive Peace Framework R2P Responsibility to Protect SC United Nations Security Council SG Secretary General TJ Transitional Justice UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UfP Uniting for Peace UPR Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNPC United Nations Peace Council

Abbreviations of Book Titles BFN GMEM LoP MEM PL PP TIO

Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant The Law of Peoples, John Rawls Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant Political Liberalism, John Rawls Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant The Inclusion of the Other, Jürgen Habermas

Introduction

The Main Aim and Objectives of the Book

As Immanuel Kant acknowledged in 1797, perpetual peace may not be “something real”, yet humankind “must work toward establishing perpetual peace” and the conditions “that seem…most conducive to it.”1 Given that there are still a significant number of ongoing intra-state armed conflicts and relapses each year, and that lasting peace and stability remain under threat in many parts of the world as the mass street protests, uprisings and the new onsets of armed conflicts since 2011 demonstrate, it is timely and important to explore how sustainable intra-state peace could be best elicited through the United Nations (UN) system. The present work does not enquire as to what the conditions of lasting/ sustainable peace are. There is no shortage in the literature, particularly in the liberal tradition since Kant’s Perpetual Peace, elucidating the conditions for lasting peace. Yet due to commitment to a broader understanding of international pluralism, there are limitations in the liberal tradition with respect to envisioning sustainable peace universally. In other words, there is a lacuna as regards theorising about lasting peace and the prevention of armed conflicts in societies that lack the requisite liberal institutions and culture. This is not to disregard that any theorisation requires enumerating and excluding non-ideal conditions. It would be also natural for the liberal tradition to exclude situations lacking liberal conditions when theorising on the liberal peace, and to conceptualise a liberal peace for liberal societies only. However, it would strengthen the liberal tradition, as well as peace studies and the UN policies to search how the liberal conditions of lasting peace could be effectively extended to societies intrinsically lacking such conditions. This book endeavours this. It examines an alternative to a broad pluralist approach, namely to the generic promotion of liberal values and institutions, and to a narrow pluralist approach, namely the reactive liberal interventionist approach. Both approaches are too limited for effectively preventing lapses and relapses into armed conflicts in non-liberal and conflict-prone societies. The present work maintains that the ultimate goal of sustainable intra-state peace could be best approached if positive peace, rather than negative peace, is considered as the primary objective of the UN system. It acknowledges that the depictions of the world from the perspective of the realist tradition would 1 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in (ed.) Mary Gregor, [6:354], p. 123.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_002

2

Introduction

render any claim for ensuring or securing positive peace unrealistic unless the realist features of the international system and the present economic and political conditions are transformed.2 Therefore, this book uses the terminology of approaching or eliciting rather than securing positive and lasting peace. Furthermore, this work limits its examination to the UN and does not consider regional organisations, as it seeks to underpin the quest for positive peace as a universal norm. Although in the current state-centric international system the responsibility for ensuring sustainable and/or positive intra-state peace primarily lies in each state, this book maintains that it is essential to render addressing the absence of positive peace as an international norm. This would allow the UN to assume responsibility and pro-actively offer measures for positive peacebuilding for the ultimate goal of approaching sustainable intra-state peace universally, in case the given states lack the necessary institutions and political will, which would obstruct intrinsic efforts for building and advancing positive peace. This book’s main objective is finding how sustainable and positive intrastate peace can best be approached in non-liberal and divided societies. While seeking to provide an answer to this main research question, the book will also engage with the following research questions. What are the foundational limitations in the existing conceptualisations of lasting and/or positive peace that hinder eliciting sustainable peace in practice, especially through the UN’s preventative measures? Would it be feasible in theory and in practice to extend liberal conditions and values, which are commonly acknowledged to lead to positive peace and have pacifying effects, to non-liberal and conflictprone regimes in the pre-conflict situations? How can this be done effectively without undermining international pluralism upon which the current international system is based?

The Key Concepts of the Book

Sustainable peace refers to a perpetual, namely a lasting state of non-violence. It may or may not be achieved through and imposed by force. This book, however, seeks a positive and sustainable peace which refers to an infinite state of 2 For Kant’s view on constraints on perpetual peace see ibid. For Adler’s views that depict positive peace as utopian and ontologically non-existent and his emphasis on peace as a process see, Emanuel Adler, “Condition(s) of Peace”, Review of International Studies 24/5 (1998), pp. 165–192, at 166.

Introduction

3

non-violence that is not imposed by force.3 Accordingly, it defines positive and sustainable intra-state peace as a lasting condition of non-violence within a state that is not imposed by force, but which is rather generated and maintained by the intrinsic dynamics of the given society. In other words, positive and sustainable intra-state peace signifies a society that is capable of ‘self-sustaining’ non-violence and the conditions of peace through its non-coercive internal dynamics and/or through the non-coercive engagements or facilitation efforts of external parties that would not contravene the self-determination of the given population.4 The present work will use the term intra-state armed conflict or violence to denote the contrast with intra-state peace, or negative peace, which may be imposed by force. The term intra-state armed conflict refers to the existence of “armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State.”5 Furthermore, The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battlerelated deaths.” If there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths, the UCDP refers to the situation as war.6 Intra-state violence in this study refers to any battlerelated deaths even if less than 25 in the context of the aforementioned definition of the UCDP. It will also refer to non-battle related casualties, namely at least 25 deaths within a year due to the use of excessive force by police forces against civilians, or due to the use of violent means by civilians against civilians or governmental actors in mass social incidents. On the other hand, positive peace refers to a situation which is not merely the absence of intra-state armed conflict or violence as defined above. Johan Galtung, 3 See also the discussion in Chapter 4 Section 2.1. 4 For a definition of “self-sustaining peace” see Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 91. For a stable (international) peace definition, that is equated with a very “small probability of war”, see also Kenneth E. Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 13. 5 This definition is drawn upon the definition of non-international conflict of the ICRC, which is itself derived from international humanitarian law (IHL), jurisprudence and prevailing legal opinions. It requires “protracted” armed confrontations to be considered under noninternational conflict category. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Opinion Paper, March 2008, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper -armed-conflict.pdf. (Last visited, 12.03.2013). 6 See, The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Definitions, available at http://www.pcr .uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/. (Last visited, 12.03.2013).

4

Introduction

the pioneer of positive peace, defines positive peace as the absence of structural violence – i.e. social injustices- in addition to the absence of manifest violence. This book draws upon this view and considers some situations as the absence of positive peace even if there is no intra-state armed conflict or manifest violence. It will refer to situations as lacking positive peace in which there are commonly accepted root causes of intra-state armed conflicts (particularly grievances, namely perceived or actual injustices, and discrimination and inequalities7), and/or if there is the absence of harmonious co-existence of the population in the given state or pervasive discourse to resort to armed means/violence. Efforts aimed at merely preventing intra-state armed conflicts cannot be expected to elicit sustainable peace. Rather, the lack of positive peace should be addressed proactively in order that comprehensive prevention of armed conflict and violence and that the foundations for lasting peace may be ensured. As the existing conceptualisations of positive peace and their practical frameworks do not provide effective and elaborate models, this book offers a new positive peace vision and framework that can be pursued through the UN system. It conceptualises positive peace as the absence of Fundamental Conflicts. In other words, positive peace refers to the absence of the root causes of nonflourishing of human rights and a democratic culture. This notion of positive peace is suggested to complement Galtungian and Neo-Kantian conceptualisations of positive peace which have been reflected in UN practice since the end of the Cold War. The UN peacebuilding practice, which draws upon Galtung’s positive peace notion and involves fostering the rule of law, human rights and political and economic liberalisation, illustrates that the liberal peace is based on the presence of the rule of law, human rights, political and economic liberal institutions and democracy.8 The concept of Fundamental Conflicts refers to identity faultlines or divisions. Specifically, “we” identity versus “they” identity based on any difference experienced by the respective groups. Identity differences are considered Funda­mental Conflicts only when they generate exclusionary and antagonistic relations and lead to significant tensions and polarisations or fragmentations which hold the potential to mobilise for armed political struggle. Fundamental Conflicts are hypothesised to generate further strategic (resources/tangible assets) and ideological (values/intangible assets) incompatibilities and constitute the 7 See Section 4 in Chapter 3. 8 For a critical account of the liberal peace concept and its “illiberal means and outcomes”, see Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P Richmond, “The Local Turn in Peace Building: a Critical Agenda for Peace”, Third World Quarterly 34/5 (2013), pp. 763–783, at 767–68. See also Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 8, 13.

Introduction

5

roots of social injustices, inequalities (i.e. “Horizontal Inequalities”9), discrimination and human rights violations in the given societies. They are regarded as negating positive peace and constituting a fertile ground for intra-state armed conflict. Fundamental Conflicts are presupposed to constitute the primary structural causes of intra-state armed conflicts, which occur when other factors (e.g. relevant international/neighbouring/internal actors are motivated by greed; change in the balance of power that facilitates access and resort to armed means) also exist.10 In considering Fundamental Conflicts, the positive peace vision of this study constitutes a more comprehensive approach because it aims to tackle the deeprooted causes of armed conflicts rather than merely the immediate causes which may lead to conflict. This vision differs from Galtungian positive peace vision by the addition of identity and relational dimensions and by specifying the objective of positive peace vision as being horizontal equalities across identity faultlines rather than being the absence of social injustices/structural violence. In particular, unlike Galtung’s assumption of conflict attitude across socioeconomic classes due to power discrepancy, this vision assumes conflict ­attitude across identity faultlines due to Fundamental Conflicts, which is ­constructed to link power discrepancies and horizontal inequalities in the political, economic, and social spheres to deliberate human action or neglect. Moreover, this positive peace paradigm would offer a more comprehensive approach under UN auspices in that it seeks to address Fundamental Conflicts via dialogue and deliberation between the significant state and non-state actors across the faultlines rather than focusing on mere institution-building.

The Methodology of the Book

It is often pointed out that at present “the international community is insufficiently organized and prepared”11 for the effective prevention of intra-state 9

10 11

As Stewart explains Horizontal Inequalities signify inequalities among identity groupings in (1) political participation; (2) economic aspects; (3) social aspects; and (4) cultural status dimension; and constitute a significant cause for group mobilisation and armed struggle. Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (NY: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 12–14. See Sections 2 and 4 of Chapter 3. For further elaboration of Fundamental Conflicts and other root causes of armed conflicts see Chapter 3 Section 4. See, Donald Rothchild, “Ethnicity, Negotiation, and Conflict Management”, in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 246–263, at 261.

6

Introduction

armed conflicts. This book aims to address this practical limitation of eliciting sustainable peace by offering a viable model for the pursuit of positive peace. As there is a lacuna in the literature and a practical need for solutions, it particularly focuses on how conflict prevention can be ensured in divided or heterogeneous conflict-prone societies systemically. This involves focusing on how sustainable and positive peace can be proactively built in such societies in the pre-conflict period. Sustainable peace is a comprehensive endeavour that requires a holistic approach. The present work maintains that practical limitations in the materialisation of sustainable positive peace are not independent from foundational limitations in conceptualising peace and the required means and frameworks. Therefore, it will involve both the theory and practice of peace, and pursue a more integrated approach across all the relevant disciplines. It will refer to the literature of political philosophy, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution/transformation, International Relations theory and political theory and particularly the deliberative democracy theory literature in order to investigate the foundational limitations in conceptualising positive and sustainable peace and better practical frameworks. Furthermore, to depict and assess the practice of the existing UN peace system, this book will also refer to international law, international human rights and humanitarian law, and the literature on the UN, with particular focus on the UN’s preventive system. This study pursues a qualitative, justificatory and theoretical approach, yet one that considers applicability and policy implications. It assesses existing approaches to peace from normative and practical perspectives to provide a justification for new preventive mechanisms and for a new comprehensive positive peace conceptualisation. It identifies the foundational limitations of the existing peace conceptualisations and frameworks with regard to eliciting sustainable peace. It also refers to existing empirical studies to illustrate the effects of peacebuilding and human rights machinery on eliciting positive and sustainable peace. It then offers a conceptual model for overcoming these limitations. Throughout, the book assesses whether the suggested new positive peace paradigm presents a theoretical and practical (realistic) possibility. Theory and norm setting are integral to practice.12 Endeavours to contribute to the UN system, or in general, policy suggestions for improving any institution, require developing visions and frameworks that are viable and of added 12

See also Bigo, Pouliot, Bourdieu and Navari’s accounts suggesting practice and policy guidance follow ideas and discourses, cited in Keith Krause, “Critical Perspectives on Human Security”, in (eds.) Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 76–94 at 82.

Introduction

7

value in theory. Claiming a theoretically viable paradigm presents also a practical or realistic possibility does not necessarily require demonstrating that a political will for materialising or institutionalising the suggested new paradigm already exists. Rather, it would suffice to illustrate that the suggested vision and objectives can reasonably be pursued via the existing instruments or by simply developing new policies and/or departments/mechanisms within the existing structures. In other words, if the expectation of actors’ (states) acceptance of the approach and measures of the new paradigm does not constitute “unrealistic optimism”13 (i.e. there are rational factors to support this expectation), the paradigm can be perceived as practically possible. In addition to increased practical needs, expressed aspirations, state practice or developments in the international sphere entailing objectives similar to the new paradigm’s can be regarded to provide rational bases for being optimistic about the paradigm’s chances of acceptance and application. The operationalisation of any concept or norm will be contingent on the actors’ will. Even if the political realities of the present time may not suggest a definite transformation in line with a new paradigm, yet drawing upon constructivist perspectives it can be still assumed that social changes are possible.14 Hence the suggested paradigm can be argued to be practically possible provided that there are no factors that rule out the paradigm being certainly unrealistic.

The Research Strategy and the Outline of the Book

Before highlighting the contents of each chapter, the research strategy of the book will first be set out. This book concludes with a suggestion of a new formulation of positive peace and an accompanying Positive Peace Framework (PPF) as the new preventative mechanism within the UN system as the answer of the main research question, namely one of the best possible ways to approach sustainable and positive intra-state peace. To reach this conclusion, the work is designed to examine the following three points: the need for a new positive peace formula and framework; the theoretical viability of this new positive peace paradigm, and its added value in the UN system. First, the book will examine whether the traditions that underlie the foundations of the UN system and the UN structures envisage addressing the absence of positive peace, both in theory and practice, with effective mechanisms and 13 14

Mark Jensen, “The Limits of Practical Possibility”, Journal of Political Philosophy 17/2 (2009), pp. 168–184, at 178. Ibid, p. 173.

8

Introduction

measures, which this book considers as conducive to sustainable intra-state peace. This will be done in the first two chapters. This analysis will ascertain the need, and ultimately the theoretical justification, for reconceptualising positive peace. Secondly, this work will consider whether the formula and framework for positive peace sketched in Chapter 3 would be viable in theory and practice. Acknowledging the central role of international pluralism in the existing statecentric international system, Chapter 4 will also assess the elements of the operational formula of positive peace and the criteria for triggering the PPF as to whether they would undermine international pluralism by constituting an absolute intrusion into the sovereignty/internal affairs of states. In light of this analysis it will ascertain whether the PPF presents a theoretical possibility. On the other hand, Chapter 6 will determine whether the suggested positive peace vision could be pursued in practice, i.e. whether the PPF presents a practical possibility. Thus it will outline the similarities or nuances of the envisaged functioning of the PPF vis-à-vis existing practices, and point out potential realworld examples that the positive peace concept can be employed. Thirdly, this book will investigate whether the measures and objectives of the PPF will add value to the UN’s preventive mechanisms for building positive and sustainable peace. Chapter 5 will pinpoint the distinct nature of the envisaged means and functions of the PPF vis-à-vis the means and functions of the UN’s preventive mechanisms, particularly its structural prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Chapter 6 will detail the functioning of the dialogical and deliberative peace process (DPP) mechanism pointing out its added value to the UN preventive system, and project the prospects for securing the necessary political will of given states for its execution. The book is divided into three parts. Part I (Chapters 1–2) looks at the main traditions’ positive peace conceptualisations, and the UN’s frameworks and practice for the pursuit of intra-state peace. Part II (Chapters 3–4) introduces the new positive peace formula and approach illustrating its distinct features and objectives from the existing positive peace conceptualisations. Part III (Chapters 5–6) concerns the projected operation of the positive peace framework, distinguishing it from the existing UN mechanisms, with a view to illustrating the PPF’s contribution to the UN system. Throughout this part, the potential real cases that the new positive peace vision and the PPF could be applied are discussed. Chapter 1 analyses the realist, idealist (Kantian) and neo-Kantian (Rawls’s/ liberal) peace concepts and their practical frameworks. It identifies whether these conceptions amount to positive peace and whether they can

Introduction

9

elicit positive and sustainable intra-state peace through their projected practical frameworks. Chapter 2 elucidates (a) how the UN Charter system construes peace; (b) the UN realist and idealist provisions and frameworks; and (c) whether these frameworks are efficient in eliciting positive and sustainable intra-state peace. It points out the significant role of the UN Security Council and its primarily reactive and coercive measures in the UN’s pursuit of peace despite the developments in the UN system towards strengthening the idealist features and mechanisms. Based on the relapse rates as well as the critical scholars’ assessment of the UN’s liberal peacebuilding practice, this chapter also discusses the limits and adverse effects of the pursuit of the liberal peace in a reactive or interventionist manner. In Part II, Chapter 3 introduces the new positive peace vision and its key concept, the Fundamental Conflicts, which this book proposes. It then pinpoints how this positive peace notion differs from Galtung’s pioneer positive peace conceptualisation, which constitutes the foundation of the UN’s postconflict liberal peacebuilding practice. Third, this chapter elaborates the theories on the causes of armed conflicts and juxtaposes the existing approaches of tackling root causes with the objective of tackling Fundamental Conflicts. It highlights that the suggested positive peace vision would be more conducive to comprehensive positive peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Lastly, it elaborates the Rawlsian and Habermassian deliberative and dialogical models and indicates the ways in which the PPF (positive peace framework) builds upon and further develops them for enabling the tackling of Fundamental Conflicts in non-liberal/­democratic or non-functioning democratic societies. Chapter 4 sets out the operational formula of positive peace and elaborates the elements of the formula. It outlines the conditions for the pursuit of positive peace under the UN system. It also discusses the implications of the procedural and substantive role attributed to human rights principles in the envisaged functioning of the PPF vis-à-vis international pluralism upon which the current international system is based. It makes a case that by targeting Fundamental Conflict through this operational formula it would be possible to address the less grave violations of human rights, and thus the PPF’s approach would complement the existing rights-based approach of human rights machinery. The two chapters of Part III weigh whether the PPF idea would be viable in practice. Chapter 5 gives an overview of the existing structural preventive mechanisms of the UN, and juxtaposes the PPF’s envisaged approach with the peacebuilding and structural conflict prevention practices of the UN. It illustrates the

10

Introduction

distinct objectives and the envisaged distinct practice of the PPF, and hence its contribution to the UN preventive system. Chapter 6 involves demonstrating the envisaged practice of the PPF and ultimately ascertaining whether the positive peace vision offered in this book can be pursued in practice. It sets out the functioning of the PPF, namely the timing, target societies and subject matters of its deliberative peace process (DPP) mechanism. It provides two scenarios for the location of the envisaged main body, the UN Peace Council (UNPC) within the UN system. The chapter pinpoints how the PPF and its DPP mechanism are expected to contribute to the UN system by juxtaposing the PPF’s envisaged measures with the responses of the existing UN mechanisms to the events during the Arab Spring. Finally, it weighs the possibilities of the operationalisation of the PPF concept considering the realities of the state-centric international system.

PART 1 Peace in International Relations Theory and in the United Nations’s Practice

∵

chapter 1

The Realist, Kantian and Neo-Kantian Conceptions of Peace The main objective of this book is to make a case for a conception of positive peace that has a greater prospect of eliciting sustainable intra-state peace. It is acknowledged that there is neither a definite formula nor only one particular way for safeguarding sustainable peace. However, the present work hypothesises that an immediate goal of eliciting a comprehensive positive peace through peaceful means would be conducive to approaching, or actually eliciting, sustainable intra-state peace. To be able to justify the need for an alternative vision of positive peace, it is necessary to show that the existing conceptions of peace fall short of providing a vision of peace conducive to approaching sustainable peace. In his analysis of the concepts of peace in International Relations (IR) theory, Richmond points out that the discipline of IR does not theorise about peace directly.1 However, for the purposes of this study it is important to explore the main IR theories as they underlie the foundations and practice of the UN peace system, which is the main organisation for maintaining peace since 1945. This chapter elaborates on the peace visions of the realist, idealist/ Kantian and liberal/neo-Kantian traditions. First, this chapter provides a brief account of the realist tradition in IR, with a view to its basic assumptions about war. It identifies the implications of realist assumptions for the prospect of sustainable peace in the intra-state domain. Second, it provides an account of the Kantian vision of perpetual peace. It discusses the Kantian positions on coercion in the state of nature; and on the right to revolution in order to identify whether Kantian peace amounts to a positive peace. Lastly, this chapter looks at the neo-Kantian/liberal tradition briefly. It elaborates the Rawlsian system of stable peace in his work, The Law of Peoples, as an exemplar of the neo-Kantian/liberal peace understanding. 1

The Realist Conception of Peace

The realist IR theory emerged as a reaction to idealism’s optimism about change and ‘progressive’ visions of peace.2 In the wake of the Second World 1 Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 8. 2 Ibid., pp. 8, 22. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_003

14

chapter 1

War (WWII), realists sought to explain ‘the reality as it is’3 in the international political sphere, rather than theorising about ‘what ought to be.’4 In other words, the realist IR theory concerns the problem of war in the international domain, and does not provide a comprehensive theorisation of peace.5 Nevertheless, for the present work it is important to overview the realist IR theory for the following three reasons. First, it is necessary to have an understanding of the realist assumptions about war because a comprehensive theorisation of peace can only be made once the assumptions about war are taken into account. Second, the illustration of the limited view of peace in the realist IR tradition would provide a justification for theorising a more comprehensive and positive notion of peace. Third, as realism is asserted to have had a great influence on the UN Charter, this section will also provide background information for a better understanding of the UN’s vision of peace, with which Chapter 2 will further engage. It is to be noted that the analysis of the realist IR theory will be less extensive compared to the analysis of the idealist IR theory, as in the realist tradition there is neither a comprehensive theorisation of peace, nor a positive peace vision, with which this study concerns. 1.1 Basic Assumptions about War: The Role of Power As Waltz points out, the purpose of theory is to identify and explain repetitions and law-like patterns, and thus give a picture of the world as it is rather than as it should be.6 Accordingly, realist IR theorists primarily seek to explain why war is “the most typical”7 activity in international relations.8 Classic realists link the permanency of war to a fixed negative depiction of human nature. Drawing upon the presuppositions of traditional realists Hobbes9 and 3 Kenneth N. Waltz (1990), “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” in Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 67–82, p. 71. For an account of the realist model of world order see, R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order (London : F. Pinter Publishers, 1986), pp. 71–90. 4 Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 47. 5 Ibid., p. 4. 6 Waltz (1990), op. cit., p. 77. 7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 25. On the contrary Wright rejects the depiction of war as “a constant factor.” See, Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn., 1965), p. 5. 8 Waltz (1990), op. cit., p. 71. 9 For Hobbes, the bad sides of human nature could be repressed by an absolute sovereign but could never be changed or eliminated totally. See, Jack Donnelly, Realism and International

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

15

Machiavelli,10 classic realists perceive human nature as belligerent and selfish.11 The realist IR theory regards politics and state behaviour in the international sphere as informed by these unchangeable traits of human nature.12 Similar to rational and self-centred human beings, states also pursue their interests. Therefore Morgenthau analyses that “temporary balancing of interest[s]”13 (i.e. modus vivendi)14 and power prevails in the international sphere rather than a durable peace.15 On the other hand, structural realism (neo-realism) explains the bellicose dynamics of international politics by the “anarchical”16 international structure. The realist conception of anarchy, or the international state of nature, refers to “an ordering principle” that lacks “a central authority above” states.17 In the anarchic international sphere, no matter how different their domestic structures are, states are assumed to be “black boxes”18 and to act in the same manner. The assumption of similar state action in the international sphere is linked to their ultimate aim of survival.19 States are in constant fear in an anarchical

Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 15. See also Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace, (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 146. 10 See, E.A. Rees, Political Thought From Machiavelli to Stalin: Revolutionary Machiavellism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 3. See also Donnelly (2000), op. cit., pp. 25, 72. 11 “…conflict and war are rooted in human nature.” Waltz, quoted in Donnelly (2000), op. cit., p. 11. 12 “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” See, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 7th edn, 2006), p. 4. 13 Ibid., pp. 3–4. See also Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999), op. cit., p. 222. 14 As Rawls perceives, modus vivendi is the opposite of durable peace. Section 3 will elaborate this subject further. 15 Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999), op. cit., p. 223. 16 Donnelly (2000), op. cit., pp. 11, 74. 17 John J. Mearsheimer (1994/95), “The False Promise of International Institutions,” in (eds.) Michael Brown et al., Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 329–383, p. 334. 18 The term ‘black box’ refers to disregarding the peculiarities and dynamics within states but regarding only states’ external relations. See Kenneth N. Waltz (1988), “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Kenneth N Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 56–66, p. 58. 19 Realism assumes “that the basic motive driving states is survival.” See Mearscheimer (1994/95), op. cit., p. 335. Mearscheimer (1990), op. cit., p. 44.

16

chapter 1

international order. For their survival, states as rational actors seek to maximise their relative power against other states.20 In the end, this creates an atmosphere of “constant security competition”21 and, as a consequence more fear, or the ‘security dilemma,’ emerges. Hence in the international sphere the risk of war is increased. Therefore, the realist tradition accepts “war [is] always in the background….[and] peace is not likely to break out.”22 It is to be noted that the realists’ basic assumptions about a fixed negative perception of human nature are contested by thinkers from within the realist tradition, such as Quincy Wright and Raymond Aron.23 They reject that there is a “war instinct”24 in human nature. Similarly, UNESCO’s Seville Statement on Violence of 1986 points out the assumption that human nature is to be blamed for violent behaviour is “scientifically incorrect.”25 In a nutshell, the combination of the anarchical nature of the international system and the basic motive of survival lead states to pursue power politics.26 For classic realists, the drive for power is inherent in human nature. Regardless of the existence of danger, human beings are taken to strive for power for “pride, lust, and the quest for glory”;27 in other words, power is perceived as an end itself. On the other hand, for neo-realists, power is a means to survival in an anarchic international structure.28

20

See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Relations, Principal Theories,” in Wolfrum, R. (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.1. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories _Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf. (Last visited 02.02.2013). 21 Mearsheimer (1994/95), op. cit., p. 337. 22 Ibid. 23 Raymond Aron, Peace & War: A Theory of International Relations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2003), p. 255–6. For a critique of realism’s assumption on fixed human nature and fixed state behaviour, see Donnelly(2000), op. cit., p. 51; and Jack Donnelly, in Scott Burchill [et al.], Theories of International Relations, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 4th edn., 2009), p. 43. See also Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice Belmont (CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2006), p. 198. 24 Wright (1965), op. cit., pp. 1200, 1198–1211. 25 UNESCO Seville Declaration on Violence, 1986, available at (last visited 04.11.2009). 26 For an analysis of the role of power in the realist tradition see Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations,” in (eds.) Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams, Power in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 43–63. 27 Waltz (1990), op. cit., p. 78. 28 Waltz (1988), op. cit., p. 56.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

17

Furthermore, Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt29 elaborate that the political sphere by its very nature generates power politics. The sphere of politics is characterized by conflicts rooted in “intense enmity.”30 For Schmitt, the concept of the political is distinguished from other spheres of life by a friendenemy distinction.31 Any disagreement in a non-political sphere, such as in the cultural, economic, moral or religious spheres, has the potential to “intensify [into a] political”32 conflict. In political contestations, rational actors are assumed to strive for power to guarantee their existence and/or dominance over their enemy. Similarly, for Morgenthau the concept of the political is equal to “a struggle for power.”33 Because “self preservation both for the individual and for societies is…a moral duty,”34 pursuing “balance of power” politics is a rational conduct and the sole reliable tool in the face of an international state of nature. For Schmitt, the absence of the possibility of conflict/disagreement would mean the “termination” of the concept of the political, namely the “political energy.”35 For him, this is, however, only possible when and if a world state emerges, which is itself not a likely possibility.36 The implication of this line of argument is that the pluralistic international sphere would always entail power struggles, tensions and possibilities for conflict. It is to be noted that the Schmittian conflict does not necessarily refer to violent/armed conflict, yet it would be wrong to assume that for realists these political struggles exclude the likelihood of resorting to armed means. Unlike the idealist tradition, the realist tradition is not founded on pacifist ideas and does not categorically refuse the use of force for certain political ends. Moreover, it is also important to note that the depiction of constant confrontation pertains to the international political sphere within the realist tradition. 29

30

31 32 33

34 35 36

Stephen Holmes depicts Schmitt as “anti-liberalist.” See, Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political, (trans.) George Schwab (London: The University of Chicago, expanded edition, 2007), p. xi at footnote 7. William E. Scheuerman “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond,” in (ed.) Michael C. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 62–92, at 63. Schmitt (2007), op. cit., pp. 26–27. Ibid., p. 36. In Donnelly (2000), op. cit., pp. 47–48. For an account of the similarities of the concept of political in the works of Morgenthau and Schmitt, see Scheuerman (2007), op. cit., pp. 62–92. Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999), op. cit., p. 227. Schmitt (2007), op. cit., p. 36. Ibid., pp. 36, 51.

18

chapter 1

As is the case in the idealist tradition, the realist tradition also acknowledges that the requirements of a social contract and the rule of law, and thus peace, would prevail in the intra-state political domain.37 Yet in non-ideal societies where the rule of law does not prevail, or in pluralistic/heterogeneous societies, it can be assumed that realists would expect constant power struggles as well. The realist view of the intra-state political domain and the prospects for change will be projected further below. 1.2 The Realists’ Vision for Change and Intra-State Peace For the purpose of establishing whether or not the realist tradition entails a sustainable peace vision, it is necessary to further elaborate on the classic and structural realists’ position on the possibilities of structural change in the anarchic international sphere through international cooperation. This analysis will help illustrate the basis upon which the realist IR theory rejects a vision for sustainable (and positive) peace. For classic realists, as opposed to idealists’ assumptions, international cooperation and institutions cannot be seen as the cure against power politics and “cause peace.”38 As Mearsheimer points out, international institutions are constructed by states with the aim of furthering national interests.39 Moreover, realist theorists believe that the pursuit of morality is a cause for conflict itself. According to a realist reading, the two world wars against Germany and the Cold War between the US and USSR were “not a struggle between good and evil…but [a struggle] of power with power.”40 Each party to a conflict was fighting for power, even if they had masked their intentions under moral claims. Because idealism pursues the imposition of its version of right and morality universally, idealism is, according to Morgenthau, “nationalistic universalism.”41 Therefore he depicts idealists as “nothing less than crusaders,” who theorise about “fighting for total wars” for the ultimate goal of peace.42 The Iraq war in 2003 has been depicted as such by many, and liberal interventionism and the liberal peace has attracted strong criticisms ever since. In sum, according to classic realists, international cooperation for certain sets of ideals and principles is not necessarily a guarantee for the absence of wars and structural change in the international sphere. 37 38

See Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 44, 46, 54 . Aron (2003), op. cit., p. 595. See John J. Mearsheimer (1995), “A Realist Reply,” in Michael Brown et al., Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 427–438, at 438. 39 Ibid., pp. 429, 430. 40 For Morgenthau “evil is equally present on each side of every human conflict.” Cited in Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999), op. cit., p. 227. 41 Ibid., p. 220. 42 Ibid., pp. 221–22.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

19

On the other hand, structural realists believe that “anarchy is more susceptible to amelioration than human nature.”43 However, for them change in the international structure is limited to the positioning of states in relation to the power spectrum and it does not entail a foundational transformation.44 Specifically, the international structure can be expected to be bipolar, unipolar or multipolar, but irrespective of the number of great powers, structural realists assume it will be anarchic in that it lacks global authority. The realist tradition’s vision of peace refers to “a version of victor’s peace” that suggests a stable balance of power safeguarded by hegemonic power(s).45 For structural realists the international political structure has constant dynamics, which are determined by anarchy. The focus of their analysis is on examining why states with different internal structures behave the same way in the anarchic international structure rather than how these dynamics of the system might be changed.46 Although structural realists envisage some changes in the international system, this does not extend to a world peace. Even if internal structures were to be changed and all states became democratic and peaceful, for structural realists, the pursuit of power would be constant in the international sphere.47 They regard change and possibly durable peace as conceivable only in the event that the anarchical system leading to self-help and power politics were to vanish under a world government.48 In other words, structural realists do not envision a durable peace. As mentioned earlier, the realist IR theory does not provide an analysis about the intra-state political domain, rather it assumes a “domestic peace.”49 However, realists’ vision of international peace, which relies on hegemonic power, can also be taken to be valid for the intra-state domain. This can be traced to Hobbes’ Leviathan, in which power and “terror of” coercion are given the role of keeping the “Peace at home.”50 For Hobbes “the Common Power” and its potential to keep the public “in awe” are required to ensure a lasting 43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50

In Donnelly (2000), op. cit., p. 11. “Changes of structure and hence of system occur with variations in the number of great powers.” See Waltz (1988), op. cit., p. 58. Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 55. Ibid., p. 58. Waltz (2000), op. cit., p. 200. Ibid., p. 223. See also, Waltz (2002),“The Continuity of International Politics,” in Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 246–250, at 248–50. Ibid. See also footnote 37 above. See, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in (ed.) Ian Shapiro (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), Chapter XVII, “The Generation of a Common-Wealth” and “The Definition of a Common-Wealth,” para. [88], p. 105.

20

chapter 1

social contract among society members, and thus peace in the intra-state dimension.51 As the purpose of the sovereign (i.e. the state organisation) is to keep peace and defend the subjects of the common wealth, the sovereign is empowered with all rights and means necessary to prevent civil discord and civil war.52 A similar line of argument is seen in Machiavelli, who urges the Prince to be powerful and feared rather than loved by his subjects to maintain order, or peace, in the intra-state dimension.53 A negative intra-state peace vision can also be traced in the modern realists’ attribution of high value to state security (the political and territorial integrity of states) as opposed to the security of the population of the given state. The notion of state sovereignty, which emerged in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, precludes the internal affairs of states, including the treatment of a population by its government, from becoming a concern of the realist theory.54 Accordingly, when Morgenthau’s work is compared with his contemporary Hannah Arendt’s, it is pointed out that crimes against humanity during WWII finds no place in the former’s works, while the latter centres her works on the suffering of populations.55 The state-centric analysis of the realist tradition, namely attributing more importance to states’ political integrity compared to the wellbeing of society members of the given states, renders it limited with regard to theorising a positive intra-state peace vision. Yet, this is not to disregard that contemporary realists consider human rights as part of their foreign policy analysis, even if human suffering in itself does not constitute the central part of their analysis. Given that the realist assumptions about the nature of politics in the international sphere lead to a negative vision of peace, it would not be wrong to assume that modern realists would also follow Hobbes and envisage a negative

51

Ibid, Chapter XVII, “Why Certain Creatures without Reason, Or Speech, Do Neverthelesse Live in Society, without Any Coercive Power,” para. [86], pp. 103–104. 52 Ibid, Chapter XVIII, “6. The Soveraigne Is Judge of What Is Necessary For The Peace and Defence of His Subjects,” para. [91] p. 108. For an account of the legitimate yet absolute rule, see Shapiro in ibid., pp. xii–xiv. 53 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, (trans.) Tim Parks (London: Penguin, 2011), Chapter XVII, “Concerning Cruelty and Clemency, And Whether It Is Better To Be Loved Than Feared.” 54 See Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), pp. 23–24. Richmond(2008), op. cit., p. 46. 55 See Douglas Klusmeyer, “Hannah Arendt’s Critical Realism: Power, Justice, and Responsibility,” in (eds.) Anthony F. Lang and John Williams, Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 113–178, at 120, 124.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

21

and hegemonic intra-state peace.56 If a society is heterogeneous or divided, it can be expected that realists would not necessarily envisage a peace based on the consent of all parties in the midst of intense political struggles. Rather, similar to their international peace visions, realists can be assumed to accept an intra-state peace provided by the powerful, i.e. an oppressive leader, as long as it can offer to safeguard stability within the state. Therefore, provided that the liberal tradition also fails to provide a comprehensive positive peace vision, the void of a positive and sustainable peace vision in the realist tradition presents a basis for the rationale of developing a new positive peace vision. 2

The Idealist Conception of Peace

The idealist tradition is regarded as the “the founding tradition of IR”.57 Idealism is often equated with pacifism, and traced to Wilson’s Fourteen Points,58 which constitute the foundations of the League of Nations after the First World War.59 The optimism of the idealist tradition has attracted criticism from the realist tradition given that the League of Nations failed to curb another world war.60 The idealist tradition in IR draws upon the works of liberal thinkers, particularly Kant’s perpetual peace vision, which provides a comprehensive liberal view on international order and a holistic theorisation of peace.61 This section therefore focuses on the Kantian premises for Perpetual Peace with a view to identifying the idealist vision of peace. It, first, provides a brief account of Kantian notions of morality and right as they establish the foundations of his perpetual peace vision, and delineates the Kantian notion of public right relating to political (intra-state), international and cosmopolitan domains. Second, it discusses the tension between justice and peace in Kantian thought in the context of the right to revolution and the Kantian concept of an unjust enemy to assess whether Kantian peace includes a positive peace vision 56

57 58 59 60 61

For an account in favour of a hegemonic peace in the international sphere, see Ian Clark, “How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?,” International Relations  23/3 (2009), pp. 464–480 at 470. Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 77. See, Wilson’s Fourteen Points, available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/ FourteenPoints. (Last visited, 08.11.2012). Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 21–22. See footnote 2. Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 23–24.

22

chapter 1

for the intra-state dimension as opposed to an enforced or imposed negative peace. 2.1 Kantian Perpetual Peace: The Notion of Right Kant was not the first philosopher who theorised about perpetual peace, but he is held to be the first one bringing forth “a systematic argument for perpetual peace.”62 Kantian perpetual peace refers to an “end of hostilities,” including “all existing reasons for a future war.”63 Yet, for Kant, the natural condition of the international sphere is, similar to the perception of realists, a condition of war.64 The main difference between the Kantian vision of peace and that of realists’ is the former’s reliance on international cooperation based on the rule of law65 rather than on power and coercion.66 As Williams argues both the providence (nature)67 and morality contribute to the cause of perpetual peace in Kantian theory. However, morality lies at the centre of the Kantian peace theory, as morality, and not providence, can be relied upon as the basis of a “regulated” order.68 Kant assumes “a good level of moral culture” would follow a good political order or constitution, and not vice versa.69 In other words, Kant directs his focus on the political and legal arrangements. Yet the Kantian notion of right (positive or external laws) and the rule of law are not independent from his theory of morality. This can be explained by his notion of the Categorical Imperative (CI), which lies at the core of Kantian duty-based (deontological) moral theory.70 Hence, this section first looks at the role of morality, and then at the Kantian notion of right and the rule of law in Kant’s political theory. 62

63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70

Louis P. Pojman, “Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 36 /1 (2005), pp. 62–71, at 62. For other perpetual peace philosophers and their writings, see F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Plymouth: CUP, 1963). Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in (ed.) H. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 1st Preliminary Article, p. 93. [hereinafter PP]. PP, First Supplement, p. 113. Charles Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 5. For a brief account on Kantian peace see, Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 10. Immanuel Kant, The Contest of Faculties, (ed.) H. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. 190. PP, First Supplement, pp. 108–114. See also, Leslie Arthur Mulholland, Kant’s System of Rights, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 359. Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1983), pp. 245, 253. PP, p. 113. For the differences between consequentalist and deontological moral theory see, Brian Orend, “Kant on International Law and Armed Conflict,” Canadian Journal of Law and

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

23

As Kant puts it, morality is “a collection of absolutely binding laws, by which our actions ought to be governed.”71 While hypothetical imperative is “conditional on desiring the end,” the CI is unconditional; it “mandates intentions and actions of intrinsic value.”72 Kant’s first formulation of CI, which is referred to as the Universal Law of Nature,73 urges persons to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” 74 The other three formulas that are derived from the CI also emphasise the universalizability aspect of the principles behind actions. They urge persons’ actions to be motivated by and directed toward reinforcing respect for human dignity and autonomy. The second formula is referred to as the formula of Humanity;75 the third as the formula of Autonomy;76 and the fourth as the formula of Kingdom of Ends.77 These formulas can be interpreted to suggest a positive peace, as they entail the treatment of each society member with dignity and as an end him/herself, who is governed only by laws she/ he has consented to and been part of drafting.

71 72 73

74

75 76 77

Jurisprudence 11 (1998), pp. 329–381 at 333. Richard Norman, The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn., 1998), p. 71. Jack Donnelly, “Ethics and International Human Rights,” in (eds.) Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, Ethics and International Affairs (United Nations University Press, 2001), p. 134. For a general overview on Kantian moral theory see, Robert Johnson, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), available at http:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/kant-moral. (Last visited, 12.09.2012). PP, Appendix I, p. 116. Orend (1998), op. cit., p. 331. See, Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in (ed. and trans.) Mary Gregor, op. cit., para. [6:225], p. 17. “So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.” Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, in (ed. and trans.) Allen W. Wood (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2002), [4:421], p. 38. [hereinafter GMEM]. GMEM, [4:421], p. 37. For Kant’s propositions on supreme principle of morality and categorical imperatives see Allan W Wood, “The Supreme Principle of Morality,” in (ed.) Paul Guyer, Kant and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), pp. 342–380. “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means.” GMEM, [4:429], pp. 46–47. “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.” GMEM, [4:432], pp. 50–51. “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” GMEM, [4:439], pp. 56–57. As Johnson puts it this formula of CI points out that “fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community.” Johnson (2009), op. cit., point 8.

24

chapter 1

Kantian morality determines right actions, or justice, according to these principles of the CI, and thereby transcends the abstract guidance of intrinsic moral law into practice. Through testing actions according to the formula of CI, the problems of judging whether actions are morally right and determining “who is right about what is right”78 are partly solved. Hence, the Kantian CI serves to provide guidance for commonly acceptable moral laws which will eventually regulate external actions.79 For Kant, the principles of morality ought to govern the political realm, and through it the realm of law. He describes morality “as a theoretical branch of right,” and politics “as an applied branch of right.”80 In other words, in Kantian theory external relations are regulated by coercive laws, but these are yet again based on the guidance of the CI and its four formulations. In sum, the idealist tradition assumes morality ought to and can prevail in the political domain. Having elaborated on the role of morality in Kantian political theory, the remainder of this section concerns Kant’s theory of right (positive law) as his perpetual peace rests on right in the political (intra-state), international and cosmopolitan domains as well as the rule of law.81 In Kantian terminology, right82 governs only “the external aspects of [actors’] actions,”83 which also allow external influences and restrictions upon them.84 As opposed to moral laws, right suggests “the authority to use coercion.”85 Therefore Kant deduces coercion and right are “one and the same thing.”86 However, it should be noted 78

David A. Welch, “Morality and ‘the National Interest’,” in (ed.) Andrew Valls, Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2000), p. 5. 79 Brian Orend, “Kant’s Just War Theory,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37(1999), pp. 323–353, at 327–8. 80 See Hans Reiss, in Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. 20. See, PP, Appendix I, p. 116. 81 Kant sees “the rule of law as the solution” for international peace. Hinsley (1963), op. cit., p. 70. 82 Ladd has translated the term ‘das Recht’ as justice, whereas Reiss translated as Right; das Recht is used by both translators as meaning the corpus of external laws – namely positive laws. See, Hans Reiss (ed.), p. 20. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, (trans.) John Ladd (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), Translator’s Introduction, p. xxii. 83 Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” in (ed.) H. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), Section E, p. 137. [Hereinafter MEM]. 84 Immanuel Kant, “Theory and Practice,” in (ed.) H. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), Section II, p. 73. [Hereinafter Theory and Practice]. 85 MEM, Section D, p. 135. 86 MEM, Section E, p. 135.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

25

that this meaning of right is not strictly upheld in the international sphere as will be elaborated below. Kant elaborates the political, international and cosmopolitan right under the definitive articles category in Perpetual Peace (1795), and under the notion of public right in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797).87 In Perpetual Peace the function of definitive articles is to secure international perpetual peace.88 However, through the three dimensions of right, Kantian theory sets out the premises for peace not only in the international sphere, but also in the intrastate and global domains. Kant emphasises the importance of the realisation of all three rights. The failure of one would trigger the failure of the others as well, and in the end the peace project would collapse.89 In Kantian terminology, public right refers to the body of laws, which transfers all prima facie freedoms by means of restrictions or coercion. The main function of right and the accompanying restrictions is to harmonise each individual’s freedoms “with the freedom of everyone else.”90 For Kant those laws are “require[d] to be made universally public in order to produce a state of right.”91 It is the test of publicity that links maxims (“subjective principle for action”),92 and eventually positive laws, with Kantian morality. If a maxim that is made public cannot pass the requirement of the CI of universalization and becomes self-contradictory or self-destructive, it then cannot meet the standard of Kantian right.93 Kant explains that if all members of a society were to make false promises to borrow money, the institution of promise itself would be undermined, and ultimately there would be no one to lend money. Such a maxim would be self-contradictory, and thus not pass the universalizability test.94 For Kant, if a maxim fails in the publicity test, then it lacks justice and cannot be made positive law since “right can only come from justice.”95 Kant remarks that the “innate right of freedom” lies at the core of moral and positive right. As “the sole original right,” freedom refers to “independence 87 88 89 90 91 92

93 94 95

MEM, Section 43, pp. 136–137. PP, p. 98. MEM, Section 43, p. 137. See also Hinsley (1963), op. cit., p. 70. Theory and Practice, pp. 73, 76. MEM, Section 43, p. 136. Maxims are determined by individuals’ conditions and inclinations; in contrast, positive law constitutes “objective principle for action” upon which individuals ought to act. See, GMEM, [4:421], p. 37. MEM, Section B, p. 132. See GMEM, [4:422], p. 39. PP, Appendix II, p. 125.

26

chapter 1

from coercive will of another.”96 Coercion, which is coupled with right, functions as the safeguard of this ultimate right of freedom. It should be noted that for Kant a political order that fails to safeguard the freedoms of its subjects would be contrary to the concept of right. He suggests linking freedom and the concept of right with politics, and considers them compatible and possible in practice.97 Kant regards peace as an outcome of “submitting to coercive laws.”98 In other words, the rule of external (positive) and internal (moral)99 laws, which suggests and protects the freedom and free will of individuals, establishes the condition of Kantian peace. This vision of peace may be seen prima facie of a more positive nature compared to the Hobbesian realist peace. The following analysis of the Kantian concept of right in the intra-state, international and cosmopolitan contexts will further help to determine whether Kantian peace amounts to an imposed peace or to a consent-based peace. The first definitive article, Political Right, urges that the “civil constitution of every state should be republican,” and in particular that the “government must have a representative form.”100 The Kantian republican state does not amount to a modern understanding of a democratic regime, but it still requires citizens’ consent before declaring a war. Assuming ordinary citizens would undergo the suffering and burden associated with wars, Kant points out that citizens would oppose waging wars. Hence representative rule would entail pacifying effects and contribute to perpetual peace. However, as Gallie points out, people also, and not only governments, are responsible for waging wars, and republican constitutions are no panacea for preventing wars.101 Although Kant promotes republican states, it is important to note that he does not envisage compelling states to adopt representative governance, even “despotic” regimes.102 For Kant, constitutions may not necessarily reflect 96

See Reiss’s note in MEM, p. 136. See also Kant, MEM, (ed.) Mary Gregor, [6:238], p. 30. Also Orend states “freedom is the ‘keystone’ of the entire structure of Kant’s political philosophy.” Orend (1998), op. cit., pp. 327. 97 PP, pp. 117–118. 98 PP, p. 113. 99 It should be clarified that internal rules refer to duties of morality. According to Kantian deontology, they are not coerced by external bodies but simply are duties/obligations that urge human reason to comply with. See MEM, Section D. 100 PP, pp. 100–101. 101 See W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge: CUP, 1978), pp. 29–34. The adverse effects of democratisation will be elaborated in Section 3.4 of Chapter 2. 102 PP, p. 118.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

27

people’s will from the outset103 as he does not derive political authority from the original contract, accepting instead that it may be obtained via might.104 Yet, he assumes subsequent laws may reflect people’s will, and thus comport with moral laws gradually. On the other hand, Kantian theory allows for compelling those individuals living in the state of nature to establish a constitutional (civil) state.105 For Kant, the state of nature is “devoid of justice,” namely there is no “competent judge to pronounce legally valid decisions.”106 Due to the indeterminacy of the side in which right resides, there would be a high risk of conflict. Political right suggests the monopolisation of the legitimate use of force so that all human beings’ right (freedoms) can coexist. Therefore, human beings can be secured from potential or actual violence only once they enter into a constitutional state and “submit to…public and lawful coercion.”107 In other words, Kant allows the resort to force in order to establish a civil state for hindering “a hindrance of freedom”108 of individuals. As mentioned above, the establishment of a civil state is essential for Kant, while the conditions of a civil state and a constitution can be perfected at a later point. As the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace suggests, the Kantian republican state is envisaged as providing its citizens “lawful freedom to obey no law other than to which he has given his consent.”109 Following this, it could be argued that the permission of enforcement of a civil state would not render Kantian theory contradictory or injurious to the innate right of freedom of the people as they would be entitled to have their say in the positive law-making in the new civil state, provided it will have a representative regime. However, as Kant does not rule out that a civil/constitutional state could be governed by a despotic regime and suggests a gradual perfection of the unjust order rather than its violent overthrow by revolution or other states’ involvement in imposing regime change, it can be concluded that the Kantian vision of intra-state peace does not necessarily correspond to a positive peace for non-ideal societies.110 103 For comparison of Kant’s original contract with the one of Hobbesian and Lockeian see, Kant, Theory and Practice, op. cit., p. 79. 104 Lewis W. Beck, “Kant and the Right of Revolution,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 32/3 (1971), pp. 411–422 at 415. 105 MEM, Section 44, pp. 137–8. 106 Ibid. 107 MEM, Section 44, p. 137. 108 MEM, Section D, p. 134. 109 MEM, Section 46, p. 139. 110 PP, p. 118. See the following section for further discussion.

28

chapter 1

The second definitive article, the International Right, deals with international law during and after war, which is enumerated as separate preliminary articles of Kant’s peace plan.111 Even though in MEM Kant states that the international right is “concerned partly with the right to make war,”112 in Perpetual Peace he rejects an interpretation of “the concept of international right…as a right to go to war.”113 For Kant, before a pacific federation is established, international relations of states are similar to those of individuals, namely “a condition devoid of right” and “one of war.”114 Therefore, states have the right “to demand”115 other states to enter the federation of states. However, Kant does not envisage compelling states into pacific federation.116 In unpublished drafts of Perpetual Peace, Kant justifies two differing positions relating to individuals and states abandoning the state of nature on the basis that the former does not possess public right, whereas the latter does. In other words, individuals do not have any right in the state of nature; therefore, they can be subjected to the coercion of states, which lawfully possess authority to use coercion. However, states stand before each other on an equal footing, precluding any legitimate coercion since they all have established public right.117 Yet, in Kantian international right there is an exceptional permission for resorting to coercion against “unjust enemies.”118 This exception can be regarded as provisional because Kant assumes that the pacific federation would extend “gradually to encompass all states.”119 Consequently, the reason for the prevalence of war in the state of nature, which Kant links to the lack of “legal proceedings,”120 would gradually vanish once international right becomes universal. In Kant’s view, regardless of the rightfulness of the underlying reasons for resorting to violence, violence is not acceptable before or after the emergence of a universal pacific federation. He holds that “supposedly good intentions 111 The first and fourth preliminary articles regulate rights after wars, and the sixth preliminary article concerns rights during wars. PP, pp. 93–97. 112 MEM, Section 54, p. 165. 113 PP, p. 105. 114 MEM, Section 54, p. 165. 115 PP, p. 102. 116 PP, p. 104. 117 See Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Theory of Peace,” in (ed.) Paul Guyer, Kant and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), p. 485. 118 This subject will be further discussed in the following section. 119 PP, p. 104. 120 MEM, Section 56, p. 167.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

29

cannot wash away the stain of injustice.”121 Both in PP and MEM, Kant concludes that war cannot be the means to determine right, and highlights that “lasting and universal peace” is the “ultimate purpose” of the theory of right.122 Furthermore, due to his concerns for both non-violence and prevention of anarchy within constitutional states, Kant precludes other states from demanding despotic regimes “to relinquish [their] constitution.” Rather, he urges other states to “delay the execution of the plans for political improvements” until when the danger of falling into anarchy no longer exists.123 It can thus be concluded that Kantian thoughts on international right do not suggest a strong pursuit of a positive intra-state peace. The third definitive article, Cosmopolitan Right, occupies less space in Kantian writings. It highlights hospitality and ‘universal laws’ that would treat individuals as “the world’s citizen.”124 Freedom from being treated as an enemy in foreign countries is an example of cosmopolitan right.125 For Kant, the existence of universal community and cosmopolitan right is proved by the fact that violations of rights are felt all around the world. It is cosmopolitan right that complements political and international rights in approaching perpetual peace. 2.2 Disagreement on the Concept of Right: Justice or Peace? As Waldron points out, “[e]ven if men were angels…they hold…conflicting views about justice for which they are prepared to fight.”126 This section analyses how Kantian theory envisages avoiding clashes on the relative concept of justice. First, it examines possible clashes arising from differing moral convictions (moral radicalism) in two contexts: in the state of nature as regards to pre-constitutional entities and in the international sphere. Second, it elucidates whether Kantian theory puts its preference on the side of justice or peace in situations when these notions could be taken as dichotomous. These analyses will serve to further clarify the features of Kantian peace conception as to whether it is a consent-based or an enforced peace, and as to whether it amounts to a positive or a negative peace. 121 MEM, Section  62, p. 173. This statement is put under the cosmopolitan right, and discussed in the context of colonialism and coercing natives for the supposedly best interests of the world’s development. 122 MEM, p. 174. 123 PP, Appendix I, p. 118. 124 MEM, Section 62, p. 172. 125 PP, pp. 105–108. 126 Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review 109/7 (1996), pp. 1535–1566, at 1547. On the existence of inevitable pluralism on what right and justice are, see, pp. 1551–1552.

30

chapter 1

2.2.1 Imposition of Right in the Pre-Constitutional and International State of Nature: The Unjust Enemy Category Kant assumes rational and free individuals are capable of having the sense of what is morally right.127 Therefore, Kant repudiates enforcing “one’s own rights with utmost rigour”128 as this would contravene individuals’ free will. Hence Kantian theory does not permit moral radicalism, namely imposition of one’s own moral views or notions of justice. As Waldron points out, Kantian theory regards established and existing positive laws as the solution for the inevitable disagreements between the concepts of right and justice.129 However, there are two instances in which Kant allows moral imposition, specifically coercion for imposing the premises of his own theory. First, as mentioned earlier, if there are no constitution and positive laws (civil state), Kantian theory allows their imposition via force. It permits enforcing the abandonment of the state of nature in order to replace the role of “strength” and violence with positive laws as the means for resolving disagreements on right.130 However, Kantian theory does not give states the same permission for resorting to coercion for the problem of unjust/despotic rule within a constitutional state.131 Here Kantian theory takes a state-centric stance,132 and neither envisages nor provides an elaborate framework for how to peacefully effect political improvements within constitutional, yet despotic, regimes. It can be argued this renders his second exception (against unjust enemies) a necessity. This is due to the assumption that mostly despotic regimes would fall under the unjust enemy category. As opposed to republican or representative states, despotic regimes are unlikely to be peaceful because they do not reflect peoples’ will and their likely inclination to peace, but rather they would be more prone to the executive/ruler’s inclination to war.133 Secondly, Kant permits coercive actions against “unjust enemy” states. Unjust enemy refers to states “whose publicly expressed will, whether expressed in 127 See Fernando R. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 4. See also William D. Casebeer, “Knowing Evil When You See It: Uses for the Rhetoric of Evil in International Relations,” International Relations 18/4 (2004), pp. 441–451, at 444. Orend (1998), op. cit., p. 332. 128 For Kant the saying “fiat iustitia, pereat mundus (i.e. let justice reign, even if all rouges in the world must perish)” is “a sound principle of right.” Nonetheless it does not permit the imposition of one’s rights, but obligates the governments to rule “in accordance with pure principles of right.” See, PP, p. 123. 129 Waldron (1996), op. cit., p. 1562. 130 See above footnote 105. 131 See PP, p. 104. 132 See analysis accompanying footnote 117. 133 See discussion at text accompanying footnote 123.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

31

word or in deed, displays a maxim which would make peace among nations impossible and would lead to a perpetual state of nature if it were made into a general rule.”134 Given that coercive measures against unjust enemies are permitted on the basis of their aggressive intentions and/or behaviour rather than the characteristics of their internal rule, it may be concluded that Kantian theory does not allow moral radicalism. The Kantian stance against an unjust enemy is on a similar basis against the individuals in the state of nature. Kant accepts waging war against ‘unjust enemies’ in order to cease the threat they pose to other (civil) states. The aim of the intervention is limited to compelling unjust enemies to change their constitution towards a more peaceful one.135 Alternatively, it is also possible to infer that Kantian theory entails thin pluralism given that it allows forceful intervention on the basis of mere judgement that the constitution of a state would compromise peaceful co-existence in the international sphere. The critics of the liberal/democratic peace thesis point out that an assumption indicating non-democratic regimes as belligerent “may create incentive for coercion to spread democracy.”136 Furthermore, it can be argued that the designation of certain regimes as unjust enemies would both “legitimize [and] require interventionary practices,”137 which could lead to “perpetual war for the sake of perpetual peace.”138 As these neoKantian peace theories draw upon and develop this particular exception of Kantian theory, it may be surmised that the application of Kantian theory renders moral radicalism possible. Hence, it is possible to conclude that Kantian theory is vulnerable to contradicting its own premise that free will shall not be compromised. For the purposes of the present work, it is important to underline that Kantian theory does not envisage an elaborate framework for a non-coercive engagement with unjust enemies.139 This can be linked to the fact that Kant does not foresee effectuating change in the politics and constitution of unjust enemies through peaceful means due to the non-existence of shared values and norms between the members of the pacific federation and unjust 134 MAM, Section 60, p. 170. 135 Ibid. See also Georg Cavallar, Kant and The Theory and Practice of International Right (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), pp. 109–110. 136 Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 90, 92. 137 Oliver P. Richmond, “UN Peace Operations and The Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus,” International Peacekeeping 11/1(2004), pp. 83–101, at 88. 138 See John M Owen, “International Law and The ‘Liberal Peace’,” in (eds.) Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 343–385, at 360, 381, 385. 139 This characteristic is also traced in Rawls’s international theory (see the following Section 3) and reflected in the UN system (see Chapter 2).

32

chapter 1

enemies. In the absence of a framework that would facilitate dialogue between unjust enemies and the member states of a pacific federation, it may be argued that Kantian theory inevitably entails an ideal – non-ideal theory division, and the possibility of conflict. Furthermore, this would allow for a separate peace, one applicable to ideal regimes on the one hand, and entailing an interventionist stance for building peace with non-ideal regimes, such as unjust enemy states, on the other hand. The latter would amount to an enforced international peace between the former unjust enemies and the ideal regimes. Therefore, the present work suggests there is a need to link the ideal and non-ideal Kantian theories through the engagement of UN mechanisms to overcome the conceptualisation of a separate peace and the consequent interventionist stance. 2.2.2 Kant’s Stance on Revolution In the event that the people have a disagreement with the ruler on the notion of right and justice, Kantian theory sides with the ruler, even if the executive reigns despotically and the established system is unjust.140 Although individuals’ freedom constitutes the core of Kantian theory, it does not acknowledge a right to rebel and to revoke the original contract. Here, the reasons why Kantian theory does not entail a right to revolution will be discussed as this would inform the assessment whether the Kantian theory envisions a positive or negative intra-state peace. First, Kant does not allow a right to revolution, because in his theory the executive power cannot be punished or coerced. In the ideal Kantian state no power shall infringe the other’s competence. If people were allowed to coerce the allegedly despotic ruler and punish him, they would be infringing the executive’s power by using its coercive power.141 According to Kant, “the right to judge the constitution”142 does not reside under the people’s competence. If there were a right to rebel, that would mean “people would set themselves up as judges of their own cause,”143 which is against the principles of the Kantian conception of right. For Kant, there is no authority to check whether right rests with the people arguing for revolution, since such an authority entitled to check the ruler would necessarily share the executive’s power, or even possess more power. This, according to Kantian theory, 140 Kant, Theory and Practice, op. cit., p. 81. Hans Reiss, Postscript, Kant: Political Writings, op. cit., pp. 265, 267. 141 MEM, Section 49, p. 142. 142 Kant, Theory and Practice, p. 81. 143 MEM, Section A, p. 145.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

33

would be contradictory.144 Therefore, Kant gives the head of state, who “controls the ultimate enforcement of the public law”, the privilege to decide.145 Yet, this can also be argued to render the ruler as the judge of his own cause in the face of disagreement with his subjects. Second, any constitution entailing a right to revolution would undermine itself. For Kant, such a constitution would annihilate the moral personality of the state.146 As Williams points out, Kant does not distinguish between a “permanent” right to revolution and a right to revolution as “the last resort” measure.147 Yet, Kantian opposition can be argued to be directed against a permanent right to revolution which would permanently undermine the commitment to non-violence. Third, for Kant the mere probability of violent rebellion and ensuing violence would jeopardise stability, the rule of law and all progress of civilisations.148 This would delay approaching the supreme good and ultimate purpose of Kantian theory, namely perpetual peace.149 Yet Kant argues that if the revolution were to bring progress, there shall be no counter-revolution that would reverse those developments.150 In light of Kantian thoughts about reforming despotic regimes, on unjust enemies and on revolution, it is possible to draw a conclusion that Kant prioritises negative peace over justice (ending unjust order) in order to avoid the risks of causing more violence and anarchy. This is not to ignore that Kant emphasises gradual perfection of the constitutions in despotic regimes151 (1) through peaceful means by the subjects of the given state and (2) through 144 MEM, Section A, p. 144. 145 Theory and Practice, p. 82. 146 The state as a moral person has perfect and imperfect duties just like individuals; “the perfect duty to maintain oneself and the imperfect duty to strive toward self-perfection.” See B. Sharon Byrd, “The State as a ‘Moral Person’,” in (ed.) Hoke Robinson, Proceedings of the Eight International Kant Congress (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 171–189, at 172. See Orend (1998), op. cit., pp. 338–339. 147 Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1983), p. 201. 148 MEM, p. 174. As Cavallar conveys, even if revolution would bring political progress sooner, it is still morally not right, since individuals “would be used as means to a higher end” and their freedoms would be violated. See, Cavallar(1999), op. cit., p. 65. Beck argues, Kant’s stance against revolution is related to his concern not to allow counter-revolutionists to undo the benefits of the French and American Revolutions. See Beck (1971), at 411–412, 415, 417. 149 MEM, p. 174. 150 PP, Appendix I, p. 118. 151 See also Hans Reiss on the right to revolution, Postscript, Kant: Political Writings, op. cit., p. 265.

34

chapter 1

reform plans suggested by other states. Kant does not permit enforcing reforms when despotic regimes are weak – i.e. when they bear a risk of falling into anarchy. However, when despotic regimes are strong, it cannot be expected that aforementioned peaceful measures would have a great impact to change the political will of the despotic regime; as was the case in Iraq, Libya and Syria, among many other long-lived oppressive regimes. Furthermore, given that Kant maintains that in non-representative regimes “violence will [necessarily] result”,152 and given that there is no elaborate theorisation for effective engagement with these regimes, it can be concluded that in Kantian theory there is no strong vision for lasting and positive intra-state peace in non-ideal societies. 2.3 Conclusion: Assessing Kantian Peace Vision In theory, Kantian perpetual peace vision can rightly be depicted as amounting to a positive peace, as the perpetual peace projection not only promulgates the commitment to non-violence, but also the flourishing of the rule of law, morality, freedom and human agency as the basis of peace. However, if the ideal conditions are lacking, due to the commitment to non-intervention, Kantian theory does not provide a comprehensive theorisation for peaceful engagement with non-ideal societies. The Kantian theory’s emphasis is on the intrinsic compliance with the CI and principles of right, which would lead to perpetual peace. In other words, the Kantian conception of peace entails positive peace features only for societies which adhere to the ideal premises of Kantian theory intrinsically.153 On the other hand, if Kant’s ideas on the right to revolution are taken as the focal point, it can be argued that his theory entails also a vision for negative peace. Kant accepts an unjust, yet stable order (negative peace), over the possibility of unlawful overthrow of an unjust regime. As was also pointed out earlier, the Kantian international right does not allow an external party’s interference into despotic regimes for urging political reforms if that would risk the regime falling into anarchy. This also indicates the prioritisation of negative peace over the efforts of building a just order (positive peace), if this carries the risk of leading to violence and anarchy in despotic regimes. This section identified that Kantian theory does not develop frameworks for addressing potential threats to intra-state peace deriving from unjust orders. Kantian theory seeks security from the threat of violence by prohibiting a right to revolution. However, it addresses neither the violence that an 152 PP, p. 102. 153 For the separate peace concept, see Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80/4 (1986), pp. 1151–1169, at 1156.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

35

unjust ruler/order may inflict on its subjects, nor the possible violent reaction of citizens through unlawful revolution. Although Kantian theory urges gradual perfection of constitutions, including in despotic regimes, through the initiation of internal actors as well as through peaceful engagement of third party states, there is no elaborate theorisation for this. It is this lacuna that this book attempts to fill with a view to eliciting positive and sustainable intrastate peace. 3

The Neo-Kantian Tradition: The Liberal Peace

The idealist and liberal traditions in IR are parts of the same whole. At the core of both traditions lie the liberal thinkers’ work, particularly Kantian peace vision, which is based on the rule of law, internationalism, freedom and human dignity. The liberal peace thesis that regards democracy as the main pillar of both intra- and inter-state stable peace emerged in the wake of World War I and re-emerged in the post-Cold War era.154 The neo-Kantian tradition, which influences the UN liberal peacebuilding practice since the end of the Cold War, can be described as a hybrid consisting of the realist and idealist assumptions, in that it seeks to provide pragmatic solutions and frameworks for an attainable version of self-sustaining peace by deviating from the pacifist stance of the idealist/Kantian tradition.155 This section focuses on Rawls’s international theory because it develops the idea of “just society” as the basis of stable international peace. Rawls draws upon the “satisfied peoples”156 thesis of Aron, and presupposes that lasting peace depends on meeting the “basic needs” of society’s members.157 As the present work also regards the notion of satisfied peoples as a condition of positive peace, this section will elaborate the Rawlsian theory with a view to illustrating its limitations in conceptualising a comprehensive positive peace notion. First, it gives a brief account of the liberal tradition in IR. Second, 154 For an account of the liberal peace thesis see, Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 41, 40–51. 155 Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 14. For the interventionist views on “exporting” or promoting democracy, see also ibid., p. 44. 156 As Aron states, during the Cold War ‘peace by satisfaction’ materialized only in Western Europe while in the relations between the West and the East ‘peace by power’ prevailed. Aron (2003), op. cit., pp. 161–162. 157 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 47–48. [hereinafter LoP].

36

chapter 1

it delineates the thoughts of neo-Kantians, and particularly Rawls’s, the pioneer of political liberalism, on international and intra-state peace as developed in The Law of Peoples (LoP). 3.1 The Liberal Traditions in IR: The Liberal/Democratic Peace Thesis The liberal/democratic peace thesis assumes that liberal democratic regimes are peaceful in their international relations. They derive this assumption from Kant’s first definitive article in Perpetual Peace. As Doyle argues, the 200 yearslong absence of war among liberal states demonstrates “that liberals have indeed established a separate peace – but only among themselves.”158 The liberal tradition in IR bases its conception of peace on the premises of liberalism and assumes the existence of the following conditions would lead to and sustain peace: liberal democratic institutions; the protection of human agency, basic human rights and freedoms; social justice and equality.159 In the liberal tradition, there are three approaches for the pursuit of peace, namely “liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant’s internationalism.”160 Liberal pacifism can be taken to refer to a stricter commitment to non-interference than the other two approaches. Building upon the Kantian view of the pacifying role of trade and representative regimes, Schumpeter argues for liberal pacifism through democratic capitalism.161 On the other hand, liberal imperialism and liberal interventionism envisage expanding the boundaries of the democratic peace into the whole globe through democratisation and institution-building. For some neo-Kantians, the exceptions to the norm of non-violence in Kant’s theory give rise to liberal interventionism.162 From the perspective of liberal “interventionism,”163 the choice is between either the expansion of the 158 Doyle (1986), op. cit., p. 1156. (Emphasis added). 159 Cortright points out that Kantian peace theorisation left out the issue of “social equality.” See, David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), pp. 2–3. The question of social justice emerged with the development of human rights discourse and the liberal peace after the First World War. See, Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 9–11, 33. 160 Doyle (1986), op. cit., p. 1152. 161 Doyle traces liberal pacifism – i.e. democratic peace thesis- to Schumpeter. See, ibid., p. 1153. 162 Ibid. pp. 1154, 1160. 163 Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 10, 27. Gerry Simpson categorizes liberal interventionists as mild (Slaughter, Frank and Teson); and strong (Reisman) anti-pluralists. See, Gerry Simpson, “Two Liberalisms,” EJIL 12/3 (2001), pp. 537–572, at 559. For a brief account of the liberal/democratic peace see also, Susan Marks, “International Law, Democracy and

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

37

separate peace of liberal regimes to the whole world, or letting some societies suffer under oppression and also allowing these regimes to pose a threat to the existence of the democratic peace universally. Liberal interventionists describe non-liberal regimes as aggressive and incapable of cooperation, and argue “liberal and nonliberal societies cannot coexist peacefully.”164 Rawls, drawing upon Kant, also assumes a representative (democratic) regime would be conducive to international peace.165 Rawls assumes peoples in liberal/democratic societies are “satisfied with the status quo for the right reasons.”166 Like the liberal peace proponents, Rawls argues that the “fundamental interests [of peoples in democratic regimes] are fully compatible with those of other democratic peoples,”167 and therefore peace and stability prevails in the international relations of democratic peoples. However, for Rawls an internalised and lasting commitment to non-violence within and among liberal democracies is contingent upon the existence of a just society. He draws upon Raymond Aron’s idea of “‘peace by satisfaction’ as opposed to ‘imposed peace’ by power.”168 He explains historical records that suggest liberal democratic regimes also fought each other by the fact that these regimes were not based on an “internalized”169 sense of justice.170 Therefore, Rawls links stable peace with the existence of “satisfied peoples” and theorises about the conditions of just societies that would generate satisfied peoples. Rawls argues that the requirements for a just society are institutions guaranteeing (a) “fair equality of opportunity in education and training”; (b) “decent distribution of income and wealth…[to enable citizens] to take… effective advantage of their basic freedoms”; (c) “society as employer of last

the End of History,” in (eds.) Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 532–66. 164 Fernando R Teson, “The Rawlsian Theory of International Law,” Ethics & International Affairs 9/1 (1995), pp. 79–99 at 93. 165 LoP p .36. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid., p. 47. 169 As Audard points out Rawls’s “stability for good reasons” comes to being if citizens do internalize norms and principles that they adhere to. See, Catherine Audard “Peace or Justice? Some Remarks on Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Revue Internationale De Philosophie 60/237 (2006), pp. 301–326, at 313. 170 See, LoP, pp. 52–54. See also, Chris Brown, “The Construction of a ‘Realistic’ Utopia: John Rawls and International Political Theory,” Review of International Studies 28/1 (2002), pp. 5–21, at 12.

38

chapter 1

resort”; (d) “basic health care”; and (e) “public financing of elections and… availability of public information on matters of policy.”171 This book presupposes that inequalities in the enjoyment of elements a-d among the identity groups of a society can be attributed to the existence of Fundamental Conflicts, i.e. salient identity divisions.172 It suggests a positive peace approach that would tackle salient identity divisions as the underlying primary causes of the non-flourishing of the conditions of the liberal peace. Compared to the liberal peace, which primarily seeks liberal institutionbuilding without necessarily paying attention to the intrinsic reasons of their not flourishing in the first place, such a positive peace vision is more comprehensive and expected to be more sustainable. 3.2 The Rawlsian System for Stable Peace The main concern of Rawls in the Law of Peoples is to address “the great evils of human history,” such as “unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty,…genocide and mass murder.”173 According to Rawls, these evils derive from “political injustice,” and if injustices were to be eradicated through “establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear.”174 Rawls assumes a political conception of justice would be endorsed by all reasonable people, even if they hold differing convictions/doctrines, in the Original Position (a hypothetical model for deliberation).175 This conception of justice would be one which liberal democratic societies would endorse.176 In a nutshell, Rawls’s model claims to show that existing liberal principles carry features that render them universally acceptable. He assumes the flourishing of these principles would prevent political injustice, and thus the above noted evils in the world. The purpose of the present study is developing a new positive peace vision and framework relevant for divided conflict-prone societies governed by nonliberal/democratic regimes. Hence, this section will delineate Rawls’s system with particular attention to its vision for dealing with non-liberal regimes.

171 LoP, p. 50. 172 See Introduction and Chapter 3 and 4 for the elaboration of the notion of Fundamental Conflicts. 173 LoP, pp. 6–7. 174 Ibid. 175 Chapter 3 delineates Original Position further. 176 LoP, p. 31.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

39

3.2.1 Rawlsian Broad Pluralism: The Conditions for the Toleration of Non-Liberal Regimes In the Law of Peoples, Rawls develops the Kantian peace theory and engages with the question what the boundaries of toleration of a liberal foreign policy should be for safeguarding a stable international peace in a pluralistic international sphere.177 LoP makes a case for toleration towards non-liberal regimes, provided they do not pursue an aggressive foreign policy and comply with minimal human rights. Rawls includes “freedom from slavery; …liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience and security…from mass murder and genocide” amongst his basic (“urgent”)178 rights. He calls societies meeting these criteria as decent societies. Rawlsian toleration refers to the acceptance of the co-existence of non-liberal regimes, which are worthy of good-standing (i.e. friendly relations) in the Society of Peoples. This can be seen as the extension of the separate (liberal) peace by way of including decent societies.179 The Rawlsian notion of toleration in concrete terms means no intervention, whether in the form of “criticism”,180 diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in the form of military intervention.181 The UN or other international organisations of which liberal and non-liberal societies are members, “should not offer incentives for [decent societies] to become more liberal” as this would “lead to serious conflicts” between the societies.182 Becoming more liberal refers to respecting the full list of human rights and the principle of equality and non-discrimination, which constitutes the main difference between Rawls’s liberal and non-liberal societies. Rawls’s LoP can be seen as aiming to restrict liberal interventionism, which seeks to expand liberal separate peace by imposition and/or force. The commitment to pluralism in the international sphere is the backbone of Rawls’s theory. According to Rawls, “how peoples treat each other and how they treat 177 Ibid, p. 10. 178 Ibid, p. 79. Rawls regards Articles 3 to 18 of the UDHR as “human rights proper.” See LoP, footnote 23 at 80. 179 Ibid, pp.70, 78 and footnote 16 at p. 75. 180 Kok-Chor Tan points out, it also requires adherence of the principle of “noncriticism” by the “representatives of liberal peoples…in their official capacities.” See, Kok-Chor Tan, “The Problem of Decent Peoples,” in (eds.) Rex Martin and David A. Reidy, Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 76–94, at 81–3. For a critique of Rawlsian toleration equated to “silence” see also Henry Shue, “Rawls and the Outlaws,” Politics Philosophy Economics 1/3 (2002), pp. 307–323, at 320. 181 LoP, p. 84. 182 Ibid.

40

chapter 1

their own members are…two different things.”183 This book refers to this characteristic of Rawlsian theory as broad pluralism. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that Rawls’s toleration of decent societies is contingent on whether or not ‘urgent rights’ are upheld. This represents the threshold beyond which “how peoples treat their own members” becomes a matter of international concern, and will be elaborated in the following section where Rawls’s non-ideal theory is examined.184 It can be argued that the implication of Rawls’s broad pluralism is undermining a positive peace vision in the intra-state sphere. Rawls regards the denial of political rights, political exclusion (for higher rank governmental and judicial posts) and inequities towards minorities in the hypothetical case of the decent society Kazanistan as features that are not worthy of legitimate international concern.185 For Rawls, the non-violation of urgent human rights and the existence of a functioning consultation mechanism allowing dissident groups to voice their demands, are sufficient factors to categorise such societies as decent societies. Although decent societies do not represent fully just societies, Rawls points out they are not fully unjust either. Hence decent societies are to be regarded as worthy of international toleration.186 This stance can be regarded as a trade-off between international peace on the one hand, and positive/just intra-state peace on the other hand. According to the Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) thesis,187 which will be elaborated further in Chapter 3, inequalities among the groups in the political, cultural, economic and social status domains lead to grievances, which are themselves regarded as constituting one of the main root causes of intrastate armed conflicts. Rawlsian decent societies would likely bear HIs and grievances, as minorities undergo political exclusion and inequities in those non-liberal societies. Given that Rawlsian broad pluralism urges strict noninterference towards decent societies, it can be argued that the Rawlsian system would not be able to approach its initial aspiration for “satisfied peoples” and just societies flourishing universally. This stance can be further explained by the fact that the primary concern of the LoP is establishing stable international peace in the face of pluralism, 183 Ibid, p. 82. 184 Ibid., p.79. 185 Ibid., pp. 75–76. It is to be noted that Rawls’s decent society model draws upon the Ottoman Empire’s political and social structure – i.e. millet system- that has been regarded to establish a peaceful model for multi-cultural societies. See footnote 17 at p. 76. 186 LoP, pp. 77–78. 187 See footnote 9 in the Introduction.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

41

rather than endeavouring to foster a stable positive intra-state peace. This is not to reject that Rawls, like other liberal international theorists, “pay[s] more attention to domestic structures” compared to the realist tradition.188 Indeed, Rawls’s earlier work, Political Liberalism, provides an extensive theory for the conditions of liberal societies, such as justice as fairness, terms for cooperation and the principle of reciprocity.189 Furthermore, in LoP, Rawls argues a liberal society based on these principles is a ‘practicable possibility,’ i.e. a realistic utopia.190 Nonetheless, like Kant, Rawls also takes the liberal conditions and culture for granted and does not provide an elaborate explanation as to how intra-state positive peace can be built and maintained when these liberal conditions are intrinsically lacking.191 In sum, due to broad pluralism and toleration (i.e. non-engagement) of societies that fall short of positive peace, it is not possible to conclude that the Rawlsian peace system includes a comprehensive theorisation for positive intra-state peace. It can be argued Rawls seeks to safeguard stable international peace by minimizing the instances for a liberal interventionist approach. In other words, his international peace does not consist of the aggregation of positive intra-state peace(s). 3.2.2 Rawlsian Narrow Pluralism: The Neo-Kantian Just War Theory Rawls’s non-ideal theory establishes the limits of his broad pluralism elaborated in the previous section. The non-ideal theory of the LoP consists of outlaw states and burdened societies. The latter are failed states in which the basic state organisation that would allow the achievement of the aforementioned conditions (a-e) for building a just society and flourishing of a liberal/democratic regime do not exist.

188 On the other hand, Doyle points out the pursuit for democracy, liberty or peace is not necessarily a liberal pursuit and can also be on the realist agenda. Michael W. Doyle, “Peace, Liberty and Democracy: Realists and Liberals Contest a Legacy,” in (eds.) Micheal Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (New York: OUP, 2000), pp. 21–40, at 27, 29. See also David Kinsella and David L. Rousseau, “Democracy and Conflict Resolution,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 475–491, at 486. 189 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 11–17. 190 LoP, p. 11. 191 The following section will illustrate this argument further.

42

chapter 1

The outlaw state category refers to states which do not comply with the Law of Peoples, namely international law in the existing international system.192 Rawls emphasises the aggressive and “dangerous” features of outlaw states, and argues that “all peoples are safer if such states change, or are forced to change.”193 However, for Rawls states fall within the outlaw states category if they systematically “violate human rights of certain minorities” unless they do not “suffer from unfavourable conditions.”194 If there are such systematic violations, Rawls does not consider whether these states have aggressive foreign policy against other states when labelling them outlaw states. In brief, either “aggressiveness” or “violations of urgent rights” give rise to the legitimate use of force in Rawlsian theory.195 The addition of the latter condition marks the difference of outlaw states concept from the unjust enemy category of Kantian theory. Rawls does not envisage a stable peace with outlaw states as he does not presuppose outlaw states would endorse the just LoP (i.e. international law) on a permanent basis.196 He points out that given the existence of outlaw states, stable international peace could be achieved either through “the domination of one side or the peace of exhaustion.”197 It can be argued the prevalent liberal-outlaw state dichotomy in Rawlsian theory brings it closer to the realist tradition and its friend-enemy distinction. As Patrick Hayden points out Rawls’s theory does not create a basis for “peaceful coexistence domestically and internationally” due to its “realist view of international society and its emphasis on ‘power politics’ in an adversarial system of autonomous, sovereign states.”198 Rawls acknowledges there will always be occasions of ‘impasse’ and war. 192 Ibid., p. 5. For an account of the Rawlsian outlaw state category see also, Shue (2002), pp. 307–323. 193 LoP, p. 81, 48. 194 Ibid., footnote 1 at p. 90; and footnote 6 at p. 93. 195 See also Shue (2002), pp. 313, 314. 196 “Except as a basis of a modus vivendi, expansionist societies of whatever kind could not endorse it [the law of peoples].” LoP, p. 123. 197 LoP, p. 123. As Barry states Rawls never denied “that stability might be secured by Hobbesian means.” Nonetheless, he attributes Rawls’s rejection of Hobbesian solution for stability, i.e. modus vivendi, to pragmatic reasons. Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” in (ed.) Chandran Kukathas, John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2003, Vol. 4), pp. 341–379, at 347–348. 198 (emphasis mine) Patrick Hayden, “From Law of Peoples to Perpetual Peace,” International Journal on World Peace 17/2 (2000), pp. 47–62, at. 56–7. Fernando Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), p. 112.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

43

In contrast to his strict non-interference principle for decent societies, Rawls suggests measures for transforming outlaw states towards respecting human rights. Rawls’s suggestions include establishing a bloc of “wellordered” states, which would entail concerted acts for pressuring the outlaws. These measures are similar to the practice of the UN in the post-Cold War era. As Chapters 2 and 5 will elaborate, similar to Rawls’s suggestions, the UN bodies, the Security Council (SC), the General Assembly (GA), the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at the UN “expose oppressive and expansionist regimes to public view.”199 In addition to last resort measures in the form of “forceful intervention in the defense of human rights,”200 Rawls suggests first resorting to a second type of sanctions, specifically “the denial of economic assistance and membership to international organisations.”201 He advises excluding a society which practices slavery and “human sacrifice” as part of its cultural/religious ritual from the Society of Peoples or from trade relationships. Rawls thereby envisages pressuring outlaw states to change their practices and abide by international human rights norms.202 For the purposes of the present work, Rawlsian theorisation against aggressive states is not of importance as it does not provide an insight on positive peace. Hence the analysis in the remainder of this section will involve outlaw states that are systematic violators of human rights. It is important to note that Rawls’s non-ideal theory concerns situations that have already escalated and where urgent rights are violated, in particular those in which slavery, mass murder or genocide occur and/or where people are denied liberty of conscience. It is acknowledged that it may not be possible to argue with certainty that the inequalities in decent societies, towards which Rawls urges international toleration, would lead to violations of basic human rights that Rawls associates with outlaw states. However, as will be examined in Chapter 3 in detail, the theories on the causes of armed conflict point out grievances that stem from such inequalities as the primary causes of intra-state armed conflicts. It could therefore be argued, contrary to Rawls’s presupposition, that situations in decent societies would not amount to a positive peace given that the root causes of intra-state armed conflict would exist in those societies and pose a threat to stable peace. 199 200 201 202

LoP, p. 93. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 93. For the example of Aztecs, see, ibid., footnote 6 at pp. 93–94.

44

chapter 1

This can be further explained by looking at the situation in the Ottoman Empire as it refers to the only real case of a decent society that Rawls’s hypothetical decent society Kazanistan draws upon.203 The Ottoman Empire’s political, social and economic structures were organised in a way that favoured the predominant Muslim group. Although minorities enjoyed legal pluralism in civil law and were governed by their own religious and social rules, there were imposed inequalities in the economic, political and social status domains, similar to Kazanistan. Despite these less than “perfectly just”204 conditions, there had been no significant threat to the intra-state peace in the centuries prior to the Ottoman Empire’s decay in economic and political power.205 Yet, this does not necessarily suggest that for non-Muslim minorities there was an internalised acceptance of the basic governing principles, or that “stability for the right reasons”206 (a positive peace) existed. The situation could also be described as an enforced peace, or a peace of fear, considering the Empire possessed power vis-à-vis the minorities. Furthermore, during the demise of the Empire, even though the rulers introduced reforms to address inequalities, minorities in the centre of the Empire, as well as in the periphery, were influenced by nationalism, and eventually participated in uprisings. It is beyond the scope of this book to elaborate all the factors that may have influenced the change of the minorities’ behaviour in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the point here is to stress that the only real example of Rawlsian decent society was vulnerable to changes in the balance of power and incapable of safeguarding stability (negative peace), and engaged in activities that involved gross violations of human rights in the wake of WWI. Furthermore, the Arab Spring and ensuing violence in the Middle East and North Africa region can also be seen as a recent example of vulnerability of societies to instability when there are actual or perceived minority discrimination and horizontal inequalities in the social, economic and political spheres. Based on this, it can be argued that the Rawlsian system does not provide conditions for eliciting stable intra-state peace globally, but merely modus vivendi between liberal and some non-liberal (decent) societies. 203 Ibid., footnote 17 at p. 76. 204 Ibid, p. 78. 205 Kymlica points out this structure, namely the Millet System (“self-governing units”), as an illiberal model of religious tolerance and precedent of minority rights was “humane, tolerant of group differences, and remarkably stable.” See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1996), pp. 156–158. 206 LoP, pp. 12–13, 45.

The Realist, Kantian And Neo-kantian Conceptions Of Peace

45

3.2.3 An Overview of the Rawlsian Two-Phased Model: Broad and Narrow Pluralism Against this background, Rawls’s approach in relation to transforming decent societies and outlaw states can be argued to suggest the following two-phased model. This is also reflected in the UN system, albeit with some nuances, as will be elaborated in the next Chapter. In the first phase, due to the commitment to international tolerance, the model envisages only the general promotion of factors deemed to have pacifying and preventive effects, such as the promotion of human rights and democracy. However, as these measures are contingent on each state’s political will to cooperate, these generic measures cannot be construed as strong international engagement for transforming decent societies. Furthermore, given that Rawlsian theory prohibits any direct engagement for addressing pre-existing inequalities and “not perfectly just” conditions in decent societies, this study categorises the first phase of the Rawlsian model as the international inaction phase. In the second phase, Rawlsian theory draws upon democratic peace theory and projects international pressuring mechanisms, including military intervention, when there are systematic violations of ‘urgent’ human rights. This study categorises the second phase as reactive because the first phase of Rawlsian system does not envisage comprehensive international engagement for prevention, specifically effective engagement with decent societies for demanding reforms to tackle discrimination against minorities and Horizontal Inequalities. This is not to argue that all decent societies will certainly become outlaw states, or minority discrimination certainly leads to more egregious human rights violations. However, given discrimination against minority groups is one of the main reasons for the formation of grievances, and for the occurrence of armed conflicts and often accompanying egregious human rights violations, and given that Rawlsian system does not envisage tackling these root causes before they escalate, its coercive measures attain a reactive feature as they are only applicable at the later stages of a conflict cycle. In sum, it can be argued that neither Rawls nor democratic peace theorists suggest an elaborate framework for a viable systemic (universal) peaceful engagement with non-liberal regimes, including decent societies, as an intermediary approach. Such an intermediary approach can be located between a generic promotion of democracy and human rights (inaction phase) and enforcing peace and these conditions of liberal peace in the post-conflict situations (coercive/imposition-prone reaction phase). The present work argues it is necessary to take a thinner approach than Rawl­ sian broad pluralism towards decent/non-liberal societies so that inequalities and less grievous violations of human rights are not left unaddressed. It also regards it

46

chapter 1

as necessary to project less adversarial and dichotomous foundations than are present in the Rawlsian non-ideal theory (reactive phase) so that the facilitation for the transformation of non-ideal societies can become a practicable possibility before coercive reactive phase is invoked. These conditions are integral to the universal pursuit of sustainable positive peace. 3.3 Conclusion: Assessing the Neo-Kantian/Rawlsian Peace Vision The features of Kantian peace can also be argued to be valid for the conception of neo-Kantian peace as the latter draws upon the norms and principles of the Kantian tradition. The neo-Kantian tradition emphasises the promotion of liberal values, human rights and democracy as the basis of stable peace, and highlights human security and the protection of human beings as part of its intra-state peace understanding. Hence, this vision can be argued to refer to a positive peace. Similar to the Kantian tradition, the neo-Kantian tradition also has a separate, rather than a universal, positive peace vision. Both Rawls’s theory and the democratic peace thesis are underdeveloped in terms of theorising possible procedures for tackling human rights violations within non-liberal regimes before they develop into serious violations of basic rights and/or threats to the peace. This chapter analysed that the neo-Kantian tradition envisages either a negative peace in the first ‘inaction’ phase or an enforced peace in the second ‘reactive’ phase for non-ideal/non-liberal societies. In other words, the neoKantian peace vision for non-ideal (non-liberal/democratic) regimes are depicted as a negative peace, both before and after a forceful intervention. This can be explained by two factors. First, the potential root causes of violent conflicts are not of concern of the neo-Kantian theory in the inactive phase. Secondly, applied measures in the reactive phase involve “superficial” institutionbuilding, which do not seek and are not sufficient to tackle the deep-rooted causes of armed conflict necessary to safeguard stable intra-state peace. The reasons why the post-conflict preventive measures are regarded as insufficient will be elaborated further in the following chapter.207

207 See Section 3 in Chapter 2.

chapter 2

The Concept and Practical Frameworks of Peace in the UN System Having illustrated in the previous chapter that the mainstream IR theories do not entail a comprehensive conceptualisation of positive peace and that there is a need for reconceptualising positive peace, the present chapter aims to demonstrate that in practice also there is a need for conceptualising a new comprehensive positive peace vision and framework. Because the UN is the global inter-governmental organisation charged with maintaining peace, its objectives, frameworks and practice constitute the basis for this analysis. This chapter identifies (1) how the UN Charter system construes peace; (2) through which frameworks the UN pursues peace; and discusses (3) whether intra-state positive and sustainable peace can be elicited through these UN frameworks. The UN Charter does not include an explicit definition of peace. Therefore, the UN conception of peace will be deduced “from the content and context of the UN Charter.”1 From the content of the Charter, namely its provisions, one can derive a general understanding of the way the UN construes peace. From the context of the Charter, namely by looking at the preparatory plans and the visions expressed by the founding delegates when formulating the Charter, one can further elucidate the vision of peace the drafters intended. These will be elaborated throughout this chapter. Reflecting both the realist2 and idealist3 features, the UN system entails two notions of peace and two practical frameworks. However, the UN’s post-Cold War practice in the pursuit of intra-state peace reflects the features of the liberal interventionist approach in the neo-Kantian 1 Helmut Rumpf, “The Concepts of Peace and War in International Law,” German Yearbook of International Law 27 (1984), 431–443, at 437. 2 For arguments about the UN’s “realist spirit,” see, the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco [hereinafter UNCIO], Volume 1, p. 423. See also Evan Luard, The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 3. For the UN’s Kantian spirit see, Fernando R. Teson, “The Kantian Theory of International Law,” Columbia Law Review 92/53 (1992), pp. 52–102, at 55 note 11. See also, G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, c2001), p. 213. 3 Teson points out that the ideas underlying the establishment of the UN could be traced in Kant’s political thoughts. See, Fernando R. Teson, “The Kantian Theory of International Law,” Columbia Law Review 92/53 (1992), pp. 52–102, at 55 note 11.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_004

48

chapter 2

tradition. Accordingly, this chapter traces how the premises of the realist, idealist and neo-Kantian IR theory are reflected in Charter provisions, in the UN frameworks, and in the UN’s post-Cold War practice. 1

The UN’s Realist Peace Vision and Framework

1.1 The Influences of the Realist Tradition in the Foundation of the UN As pointed out in the previous chapter, the realist IR tradition emerged as a reaction to the failure of the League of Nations (LoN) and the underlying premises of the idealist tradition in preventing the Second World War. In a similar vein, the founders of the UN envisaged the UN as mainly a reaction to the LoN’s idealist premises. The four Great Powers, the US, the UK, the Soviet Union and China, prepared proposals on the principles of the UN at Dumbarton Oaks. These proposals were based on US President Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Policemen idea, which envisaged the maintenance of peace through the domination of these four great-powers.4 As Claude emphasises the founders “were cognizant of the problem of power.”5 Therefore, they sought an organization with “teeth”6 based on a Great Power-led collective security approach, and rejected any possible limitations on their essential role within the UN system.7 The LoN Covenant limited recourse to war by setting out a cooling off period and an appeasement policy, but did not completely prohibit it.8 Moreover, it did not provide for strong collective security to prevent wars.9 Motivated not to 4 For the Four Policeman notion see Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940–1945 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 450, 445–455. See also John Allphin Moore, Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, Encyclopedia of the United Nations, (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2nd edn, 2008), Volume 1, p. 69. For the history of the UN see http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/dumbarton_yalta.shtml. (Last visited, 01.02.2009). 5 For Claude “the management of power” is the rational choice. See Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York, Random House, 1962), pp. 156, 4–8. 6 South African representative Field Marshal Smut described the Charter’s peace notion as “a peace with teeth.” See, UNCIO Volume 11, p. 678. 7 Goodrich interprets Dumbarton Oaks proposals as “institutionalizing the dominant power position of” the Big-Five. See Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (London: Stevens, 1960), p. 107. 8 See Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and The Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Menasha, Wisconsin: Georg Banta Publishing, 1955), pp. 344–345, 426. 9 For White, LoN “failed to keep the peace because the idea of collective security was far too weak.” Nigel D. White, The United Nations System: Toward International Justice (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 143. See Goodrich (1960), op. cit., p. 27.

Peace in the UN System

49

repeat the mistakes of the LoN, the founders of the UN endorsed a Charter prohibiting all threats or actual uses of force for the first time.10 However, they did not follow the mere idealistic approach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which also completely renounced war, yet without specifying sanctions in the event of non-compliance.11 From the realist perspective, simply outlawing something as recurrent as war, which has its roots in immutable factors, cannot lead to its eradication.12 With this perspective, the founders attributed a central role to collective security and to the Great Powers within the Charter’s provisions. This is evident in the way that the UN’s principal organ, the Security Council, has been bestowed with “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”13 The SC consists of five permanent Great Powers – China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US – and ten non-permanent members that rotate.14 The SC is often referred to as a political organ because it makes its determinations as to whether international peace is threatened or has been breached, or whether an act of aggression has occurred, in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter through a predominantly political approach rather than a legal approach.15 On the assumption that the existence of enforceable sanctions is essential for any legal system to ensure 10

11

12

13 14 15

See UN Charter, Art 2(4). Thomas M. Frank depicts Article 2(4) as a “radical departure from 2000 years just war theories.” See, Thomas M. Franck, “The United Nations as Guarantor of Peace and Security: Past, Present, Future,” in (ed.) Christian Tomuschat, The United Nations at Age Fifty (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 26. For Kelsen’s analysis of the Kellog-Briand Pact or Paris Treaty of 1928, see Hans Kelsen, “Quincy Wright’s A Study of War and the Bellum Justum Theory,” Ethics 53/3 (1943), pp. 208–211 at 211. Randelzhofer points out, the lack of sanctions and moreover the wording of the prohibition referring merely to ‘war’ precluded the Pact to achieve its aims. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, “Art 2(4),” in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn., 2002), p. 116. For the status with regard to limiting war prior to the UN Charter era see also Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), pp. 9–11. As Aron puts it: “Anyone imagining he was guaranteeing peace by outlawing war was like a doctor imagining he was curing diseases by declaring them contrary to the aspirations of humanity.” See, Aron (2003), op. cit., p. 583. UN Charter, Art 24 (1). UN Charter, Art 23 (1). See Hans Kelsen, The Law of The United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (London: Stevens and Sons, 1950), pp. 294–295, 735–736. See also Kelsen “Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations,” AJIL 42/4 (Oct., 1948), pp. 783–796, at 789. Nigel D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United

50

chapter 2

the compliance of its subjects and the primacy of the rule of law,16 the SC is empowered with the power to impose sanctions under its Chapter VII powers.17 However, these sanctions depend primarily on the binding political decisions18 of the SC under Article 39. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, from the perspective of the realist tradition, the existence of an inter-governmental organisation presupposes its compliance with the interests of the Great Powers. Otherwise it would not have come into being in the first place.19 Indeed, the UN’s founding proposals at Dumbarton Oaks sought “to perpetuate the power balance that will exist as a result of [the Second World] war.”20 Accordingly, the sponsoring four Great Powers did not regard the UN preparatory conference (The UN Conference on the International Organization (UNCIO)) at San Francisco in June 1945 as a platform “for discussion.”21 As Conforti points out, the attempts to modify the Dumbarton Oaks proposals “rest[ed] largely on the will and agreement of the Great Powers.”22 Therefore, it can be argued the UN reflects the visions and aspirations of the Great Powers for the post-war period.23 In sum, the UN’s approach for safeguarding peace is based on the SC’s predominantly political determinations and the deterrence of its collective

16

17 18

19

20

21 22 23

Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 35–36. As Henkin conveys, at the domestic level citizens obey the law because of internal factors – political culture-as well as external factors such as the existence of enforcement and “availability of remedies.” For a culture of compliance see, Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 48–52. UN Charter, Art 24 (2). UN Charter, Art 25 and 48. For an account of when the decisions of the SC are binding, see David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under The Chapter VII of the UN Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 32. See, Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 736. John J. Mearscheimer (1995), “A Realist Reply,” in (eds.) Michael Brown et al., Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 427–438, at 429. See also Goodrich(1960), op. cit., pp. 104–105. {Italics mine} See, Time Magazine, “International: Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco,” 30 April 1945, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,797395,00 .html. (Last visited, 14.11.2009). As Russell conveys, this was the reason why France did not stand as the fifth sponsoring state of the conference. Russell(1958), op. cit., p. 626. See, UNCIO, Volume 1, p. 138. Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, 3rd edn.), pp. 4–5. See, Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 2004, 4th edn.), p. 4.

Peace in the UN System

51

actions. Based on the analysis of the limited and negative vision of peace within the realist tradition in Chapter 1, and based on the fact that the founders of the UN envisaged a peace based on the Great Powers’ or the SC’s deterrent power, prima facie it may be concluded that this realist UN peace vision does not refer to a self-sustaining or positive peace vision. The following section will further analyse this conclusion, and discuss whether the UN Charter provisions provide for and seek sustainable and positive intra-state peace. 1.2 The Influences of the Realist Tradition in the UN Charter Provisions The founders of the UN did not provide a specific definition of peace either at the UNCIO24 or the Dumbarton Oaks discussions. In order to trace the peace vision of the Charter, the present section looks at the UN Charter provisions that set out the purposes and principles of the organisation as well as that indicate the methods and means through which the UN peace system seeks to maintain this vision of “international peace and security.”25 The interpretation of the provisions will be predominantly based on Hans Kelsen’s work of 1950, The Law of the United Nations, in which he critically analyses the Charter’s provisions. Articles 1(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of Chapter I of the UN Charter can shed light on the possible meaning of the Charter’s envisaged peace, in particular its scope and negative/positive features. Article 1(1)26 of the UN Charter designates maintaining “international peace and security” as the primary purpose of the UN. In the UN Charter the term international “peace and security” is taken as “an indivisible concept.”27 The concept of security is often understood as the 24

25 26

27

UNCIO proceedings only illustrate that the usage of “‘peace or security’ [was] discarded [and the usage of the term] ‘the maintenance of peace and security’…was guided by context.” See UNCIO, Volume 17, p. 344. See also D.H.N. Johnson “The Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 4 (1955), pp. 445–468, at 455, 456, 458. UN Charter Art. 1(1). UN Charter Art. 1(1) reads: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;.” In the UN Charter the term ‘peace’ is used in many articles such as “in the Preamble and in Article 1 (1), 2 (8), 2 (6), 11 (1), 11 (2), 11 (3), 12 (2), 15 (1), 18 (2), 28 (1), 24, (1), 26, 83 (1), 34, 87 (2), 39, 42, 48 (1) (twice), 47 (1), 48 (1), 51 (twice), 52, 54, 78 (twice), 76, 84, 99 and 106.” See, D.H.N. Johnson (1955), op. cit., pp. 455, 456, 458.

52

chapter 2

absence of threat(s),28 or in the international context as the “safety from international uses of armed force.”29 Kelsen points out the ordinary meaning of international peace amounts to the “absence of force in the relations among states.”30 This interpretation can be supported with the wording of Articles 1(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter. Article 1 lays down the purposes of the UN, and Article 2 lays down the principles that the UN and its Member States shall abide by. Article 2(7) urges the UN not to interfere with the domestic affairs of states while undertaking its efforts to maintain international peace.31 On the other hand, Article 2(4) urges the Member States to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”32 Collectively, Articles 1(1), 2(7) and 2(4) can be taken to support the interpretation that the UN Charter peace vision is one of international peace amounting to the absence of the threat or use of force against any state’s territorial integrity and political independence by another state. Similarly, Goodrich, Hambro and Simons argue that the UN aims to maintain “international peace,” and only “on account of international implications” concerns itself with intra-state peace.33 However, as Kelsen points out the SC is conferred wide discretion under Article 39 and can determine any intra-state situation as a threat to international peace, and thereby it can seek intra-state peace.34 28

29 30 31

32

33 34

Buzan defines the concept of security as “freedom from threat.” Vetschera defines as “the relative absence of threat.” Moreover the concept of security has subjective and objective meanings; while the former reflects “perception” the latter reflects actual absence of threats. Quoted in Athanasia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 70–71. See, White (2002), op. cit., p. 49. Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 19. UN Charter, Article 2(7) reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” {Emphasis mine} UN Charter, Article 2(4) reads: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” See Leland M. Goodrich, and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston : World Peace Foundation, 1946, 1st edn.), p. 27. Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 19. The following sub-section will elaborate this subject further. The UN practice for the pursuit of intra-state peace in the post-Cold War era will be elaborated in Section 3 below.

Peace in the UN System

53

In light of this analysis, it is not possible to comment whether the UN Charter seeks a positive and sustainable intra-state peace as the aforementioned provisions are silent on the conditions for intra-state peace. Nevertheless, prima facie it may be possible to interpret that the Charter’s usage of the term “peace and security” indicates a stronger peace vision as it refers to the absence of threats to peace.35 But, given the absence of threats is understood to refer to the absence of the use of armed force or the absence of the likelihood of the use of armed force, this usage in itself cannot be taken to suggest that positive features are sought as qualifying peace. This is not to disregard that the rest of Article 1, as well as other UN provisions, indicate more idealist premises and conditions as the basis of the UN’s peace vision. The remainder of the present section is confined with examining the UN Charter’s provisions outlining collective security and the SC’s powers for the pursuit of international peace and security; while the following section will elaborate those provisions indicating idealist features. The idea of the UN emerged when the Allied states were still fighting in WWII. The primary concern for the founders was to accord due importance to a decisive and united reaction, as opposed to a pacifist stance, when peace is threatened.36 Accordingly, the very first Article of the Charter includes “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.” For Kelsen it is “highly significant” that collective security measures, which may include both peaceful and military enforcement measures as suggested by Articles 41–50, are mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter.37 He argues that collective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter “form the centre of the political system which is at the basis of the Charter.”38 In other words, collective security constitutes the core of the UN peace structure. The SC is conferred “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” under Article 24. Article 27(3) sets out the veto power39 of the permanent SC members.40 Due to the existence of veto 35 36 37 38 39

40

White points out the concept of security is “designed to protect the value of peace.” White (2002), op. cit., p. 49. Claude argues “excessive devotion to peace may…turn out to be self-defeating.” See, Claude (1962), op. cit., pp. 4–5. Kelsen, (1950), op. cit., pp. 13–14. Ibid., p. 13. Article 27(3) reads: “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” For detailed account on the voting system at the SC, see, Conforti(2005), op. cit., pp. 65–86. See UN Charter Article 23(1).

54

chapter 2

power, the SC is often referred as a realist device that perpetuates the status and power of its permanent members. Through the SC and the idea of “Four Policemen”41 the UN founders aimed to establish a deterrent factor against possible noncompliance of states with the UN’s purposes and principles. From the outset the idea of collective security was linked to the discretion of the SC, and to its veto powers in particular.42 On the other hand, despite its seemingly hegemonic effects, it can be argued that Article 27(3) also plays a limiting role. For the SC to take a Chapter VII decision, concurring votes of all five permanent members in addition to four non-permanent members are required. At the San Francisco conference, the Great Powers pointed this out to assure other states that domination or imposition by the Great Powers would be hindered by this voting system.43 Their insistence on veto power indicates that the Great Powers sought a voting system that would guarantee that the organisation would not act “against [their] own will.”44 Nevertheless, Article 27(3) can be also seen as having an innate limiting effect against the possibility of Great Power imposition. Owing to the prospect of a veto, the will of each permanent member is inevitably restrained and balanced against other permanent members’ will to successfully pass a SC resolution on substantive matters. The founders foresaw that the Great Powers would not always be in concert. “[A]s a possible way out of the dilemma,”45 Article 51 was introduced to allow the resort to force in self-defence. Article 51 “as a self-help”46 mechanism is a temporary exception to collective security to enable full protection of the territorial 41

42

43 44

45 46

See, Russell (1958), op. cit., pp. 43, 96–98. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 15. As Russell argues in case a great power “turns aggressive,” it would not matter whether collective enforcement would be taken “with or without Charter”; the result would in any case be an “all-out war.” See Russell (1968), op. cit., pp. 53, 209, 725–726; note 145. Claude (1962), op. cit., pp. 164–172. Ibid., pp. 717, 722. UNCIO, Volume 11, p. 322. For an account of the founders’ concerns with a view to convincing the electorates that the UN would not work against the interests of their own state see, Russell(1968), op. cit., pp. 725–726. Ibid., p. 56. Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 269. On the other hand, Kunz, distinguishes between self-help and self-defence systems. While the former denotes primitive legal systems, the latter presupposes advanced legal system and excludes any self-help mechanism. See, Josef L. Kunz, “Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,” AJIL 41/4 (1947), pp. 872–879, at 875–876.

Peace in the UN System

55

integrity and independence of states. Yet, while the SC’s primary position is maintained, legalising war as a response to a previous attack can be argued to bear similar characteristics with the Just War tradition.47 Although Article 51 in itself cannot be depicted as a purely realist provision since the idealist tradition also equally values the survival of state, its practical implication (keeping the idea of just war alive) and objectives (preserving states’ survival, territorial integrity and political independence) are indicative of realism’s imprint within the UN framework. In sum, Articles 24 and 27(3) ensure that the UN peace structure reinforces the primacy of power in the international sphere. Furthermore, these provisions also suggest that international peace and security can be maintained through the SC’s effective collective actions when the permanent members are in concert. As both the Cold War and post-Cold War period illustrate, the SC’s voting system may lead to a deadlock and preclude the SC from taking action.48 In the context of intra-state peace such a peace structure is likely to be less effective as it cannot reasonably be expected that the Great Powers would often agree on a solution for an intra-state situation, such as a civil war. The differing positions of veto powers over the situation in Syria, among many others, serves as a contemporary example.49 Additionally, as a result of the veto power and the political nature of the SC, UN actions will be selective, with some situations unable to attract the SC’s attention. Having elaborated the motivations behind the SC’s primacy and veto power, and their possible implications, now the particularities of the SC’s Chapter VII powers and its determinations under Article 39 for the execution of Chapter VII sanctions can be looked at. It is generally accepted that the textual interpretation of Article 3950 indicates that the meaning to the term “threat to peace” at a given moment depends upon the discretion of the SC. As Pasvolsky points out, the SC was intended to “have full authority to take whatever measures…deemed necessary” to discharge its functions “to maintain or restore 47

48 49 50

Robert points out Just War tradition is still valid even with some adaptations to the new conditions in the 21st century. See, Adam Roberts, “Just Peace: A Cause Worth Fighting For,” in (eds.) Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, What Is a Just Peace? (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp. 52–89, at 61. See, Uniting for Peace Resolution in Section 3.2, which was developed to overcome possible deadlocks due to veto power. Chapter 5 will discuss this matter further. UN Charter, Article 39 reads: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

56

chapter 2

peace.”51 During the Committee I/1 discussions at the UNCIO, the proposal for an amendment to add “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law” right after “to maintain international peace and security” in Article 1(1) was rejected on the basis that it would “tie the hands of the Security Council.”52 Furthermore, the fact that “threat to peace” is not defined in the Charter provisions is taken to indicate that the SC is conferred “flexibility” in its Article 39 determinations, with a view to accommodating “chang[ing] needs and circumstances of international life.”53 Unlike its actions under Chapter VI, which are bound by international law or justice when dealing with the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the SC has unlimited power with regard to its enforcement actions under Chapter VII according to Kelsen. The SC can undertake such actions that are not expressly stated in the Charter, including the creation of new law and obligations that bind member states.54 Indeed, SC practice shows that it has created “new obligations” through its political decisions in which the SC recognised new threats to international peace and security. This is evident in Resolution 748 on Libya (1992) and Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), in which the SC recognised international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and defined new duties for member states. These developments led to the general presumption that the SC has gradually attained legislative competence.55 At the same time, the SC’s wide discretion and legislative competence are restricted by the UN’s purposes and principles and by international law. In the 51

52 53 54

55

Quoted in Edward C. Luck, “A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today,” in Vaughan Lowe et al., The United Nations Security Council and War (New York: OUP, 2008), pp. 61–85, at 71–72. See also Report of Rapporteur PaulBoncour, UNCIO, Volume 11, at 16, 18. Martin Lailach, Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1998), pp. 161–162. Bernd Martenczuk, “The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?,” EJIL 10/3 (1999), pp. 517–547, at 540–542. Schweigman (2001), op. cit., pp. 34, 36. Goodrich and Hambro (1946), op. cit., p. 60. Bardo Fassbender “Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control,” EJIL 11/1 (2000), pp. 219–232, at 224. Kelsen(1950), pp. 294–295, 735–736. See also Kelsen(1948), p. 789. See also Rosalyn Higgins “The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council,” AJIL 64/1 (1970), pp. 1–18, at 16–17. For an account against the SC to attain legislative competence see, Michael Fremuth and Jörn Griebel, “On the Security Council as a Legislator: A Blessing or a Curse for the International Community?,” Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2007), pp. 339–361, at 343, 346, 352.

Peace in the UN System

57

Certain Expenses Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that even though the purposes of the UN are broad, “the powers conferred [to the SC] to effectuate them are [not] unlimited.”56 Likewise, the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also concluded that SC powers have bounds when undertaking its functions. The ICTY stated that although the SC has wide discretion, “it has to remain, at the very least, within the limits of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.”57 Furthermore, as the ICJ decision in the Genocide Case indicates, SC determinations are not to conflict with jus cogens norms since “even emergency cannot justify departure from certain non-derogable norms.”58 Within these bounds, the SC may deem any situation as a threat to the peace while making its determinations under Chapter VII. Because some “threats can emerge without resort to force of arms,”59 a link to Article 2(4) for an Article 39 determination may not always exist.60 Therefore, Chapter VII enforcement actions do not always fall under the legal meaning of the term “sanction.”61 This further reinforces the claim that the approach of the SC for its enforcement actions is of a political nature rather than a legal one. Due to both the political nature of Article 39 decisions and possible deadlocks in the SC on account of the veto power, the SC attention to situations and enforcement actions will inevitably be selective, and thus of lesser deterrence and impact on a global scale. 56

57

58

59 60 61

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/49/5259 .pdf (last visited 25.08.2013). Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction [Tadic case], para 29. For relevant Charter provisions and the Chamber’s decision that put legal limitations on the SC decisions, see Schweigman(2001), op. cit., pp. 165–169. UNCIO, Volume 11, p. 16. Schott cites from Elihu Lauterpacht in the Provisional Measures Stage of the Genocide case; See Jared Schott, “Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency,” Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 6/1 (2007), pp. 24–80, at 61. For an opposing view that the UN Charter law is not bound by general international law and jus cogens see Martenczuk(1999), op. cit., p. 546. Hanspeter Neuhold, “Threat to Peace,” in (dir.) Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992), p. 936. In practice there is no explicit invocation of Article 39 in many cases when Article 42 was exercised. This will be discussed further in Section 3 below. Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 735. For an account of ‘closed Charter system theorists,’ who see Article 39 determinations are to be linked with the violation of Article 2(4), see White(1993), op. cit., pp. 35–36.

58

chapter 2

Nevertheless, Article 39 requires “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression” for the SC to authorise non-coercive measures under Article 41, and coercive measures including the use of force under Article 42 in order “to maintain or restore international peace.” As Kelsen points out, by acting upon the existent threats to the peace, the SC attains a preventative character in addition to its reactive character when it acts upon breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Furthermore, Kelsen emphasises that because Article 39 looks for the existence of threats, and since these threats would already be present, the SC’s enforcement actions would logically no longer entail a preventative character for present threats, but would rather be reactive in nature for their tackling. The SC’s actions would only be preventative vis-à-vis averting the outbreak of an armed conflict by tackling these threats to the peace. They would not be preventive vis-à-vis the threats themselves.62 For the purposes of the present work, it is important to note that the enforcement actions of the SC are not envisaged to tackle possible threats to the peace before they have manifested themselves. As indicated above, the conventional Charter understanding of threats to the peace refers to the actual use of force or imminent risk of the use of force against a state’s territorial integrity and/or political independence. Furthermore, the SC’s enforcement actions for the pursuit of intra-state peace in the post-Cold War era are prima facie largely reactive in that they seek to prevent or stop armed conflicts rather than preventing the emergence of threats to the peace themselves.63 On the other hand, the positive peace vision suggested in this book refers to the absence of threats to the peace (the underlying causes of armed conflicts) along with the absence of armed conflicts. Hence this conception of positive peace requires preventative actions for threats to the peace as the Charter’s preventative frameworks under Chapter VI suggest. The existing preventative frameworks will be explored in the following section. In sum, Article 39 can be interpreted as paving the way for the SC’s political primacy in the field of peace and security. This book suggests that elevating the notion of positive peace as the norm of the UN could give rise for a concurrent framework that is independent of the political motives in the SC. 2

The UN’s Idealist Peace Vision and Frameworks

This section looks at the UN structures and Charter provisions influenced by the premises of the idealist tradition. It also discusses to what extent the UN’s 62 63

Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 14. Section 2.3 will elaborate this subject further.

Peace in the UN System

59

idealist frameworks have been strengthened since 1945 through incorporating Human Security (HS) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) notions as well as through subsequent institutional reforms establishing the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Human Rights Council and the latter’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism. However, a detailed account of UN institutions belonging to the idealist frameworks that provide preventative measures will be provided in Chapter 5, where they will be juxtaposed with the proposed new positive peace approach. The Influences of the Idealist Tradition in the Design of the UN and Charter Provisions In contrast to the realist tradition, which presupposes that states are merely seeking power and pursuing their own interests in the international sphere, the idealist tradition presupposes that states can also cooperate, pursue “normative positions”64 and abide by the rule of law in their international relations. First, in itself, the idea of establishing the UN as an international organisation responsible for keeping peace can be seen as the materialisation of Kantian ideas. Kantian theory envisages a free federation of states based on international law that would regulate their international relations, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace. Similarly, the UN aims to uphold international peace through international cooperation as the Preamble and Articles 1(3) and 55 of the UN Charter indicate. Second, the influence of the idealist tradition is evident in the Preamble where a number of idealist assumptions are mentioned. The Preamble indicates that the founders sought to prevent wars and to “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” through the UN. It illustrates the UN is not only a realist construct that seeks to keep the peace through the deterrent power of the SC recognising the permanency of wars, but that it is also an idealist construct founded upon the presupposition that social progress and the prevention of wars are achievable ends to which states should aspire. Third, the idea of pacific settlement of international disputes through negotiation, mediation and judicial settlement as enumerated in Article 33 of Chapter VI is reflective of the influence of the idealist tradition. Article 1(1) also illustrates that the UN, unlike the realist tradition, does not perceive war as inevitable, instead urges “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.” Article 2(3)65 directs states to “settle their 2.1

64 65

Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 21. Article 2(3) reads: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”

60

chapter 2

international disputes by peaceful means,” thereby setting out the corresponding obligations of the preventative framework of the UN Charter.66 Moreover, as Articles 1(3) and 55 delineate, the UN seeks the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and socio-economic progress as the basis for international cooperation and peace. Article 1(3) enumerates that one of the UN’s purposes is “[t]o achieve international co-operation…in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms…”67 In a similar vein, Article 55 instructs the UN to promote “respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”68 and “economic and social progress”69 as the “conditions of stability and well-being,” which are themselves regarded as the basis of “peaceful and friendly relations among states.”70 In light of the analysis in the previous and the present section so far, it can be argued that the UN has two different bases for pursuing international peace. First, it adopts a realist vision for international peace based on power and deterrence. Second, the UN simultaneously promotes an idealist (liberal) version of international peace based on international cooperation in promoting human rights and socio-economic progress as well as for solving international problems in the social, economic, health-related, cultural and educational domains. It is with the emphasis on human rights and social and economic progress that the idealist frameworks provide the UN the capacity to impact intra-state peace. The following section will explore to what extent the idealist vision of peace and the idealist frameworks of the UN bear upon intra-state peace. The Impacts of the UN’s Idealist Framework on Intra-State Peace: A Positive Peace Vision? This section examines whether the Charter usage of “threats to peace” in the context of Chapter VI on pacific settlement measures also encompasses threats to intra-state peace, and whether the terminology indicates a positive peace vision for the intra-state domain. It also discusses whether the Charter’s 2.2

66 67

68 69 70

Kelsen(1950), op. cit., pp. 15, 360–365. Article 1(3) reads: “To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Article 55 (a). Article 55 (c). See UN Charter Article 55. See also Introductory Note, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Art. 55, vol. III, United Nations Treaty Collection, p. 7. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art55/english/rep_orig_vol3-art55_e.pdf. (Last visited, 21.06.2013).

Peace in the UN System

61

emphasis on human rights and socio-economic progress designates intra-state peace as a concern of the UN. These analyses will provide a basis to ascertain the rationale of revisiting the concept of positive peace. According to the wording of Article 2(3) only international disputes are regarded as threats to the peace. Accordingly, the prevention of threats to the peace intended by Article 1(1) as a means to the maintenance of international peace and security refer to the prevention of international disputes. It may therefore be argued that intra-state disputes are not of concern to the preventative frameworks of the UN.71 However, as noted previously, the realist UN peace frameworks confer upon the SC the flexibility to determine the existence of any situation as a threat to the peace under Article 39, including intra-state situations. Article 34 also suggests that the SC “may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute…” This formulation can be construed as not precluding the SC from devoting attention to intra-state matters. The Section 3.2.1 below will further elaborate the SC’s practice with regard to bringing intra-state disputes to the attention of the SC under Chapter VI pacific settlements measures. In themselves the idealist premises of the UN peace vision and the Charter’s provisions on pacific settlement may be regarded as suggesting a positive international peace as they encourage international cooperation and “friendly relations” among nations. However, it is not possible to argue that they necessarily suggest a positive intra-state peace, which requires harmonious relations among society’s members, or existing communities and groups. The UN Charter provisions are silent on this matter. As mentioned in the Introduction and in the previous section, positive peace entails not merely the absence of armed conflict, but also the absence of the underlying causes of armed conflicts. In line with this, one may argue that the Charter’s usage of “threats to the peace” corresponds to the underlying causes of intra-state armed conflicts, although the extent of the root causes would vary according to the UN bodies making such a determination. However, this argument would not be sound as the usage of “threats to the peace” under idealist/ preventative frameworks of the UN Charter is understood as primarily referring to international disputes,72 particularly to contested claims between states.73 Additionally, Article 2(3) suggests that the UN Charter does not urge the prevention of disputes per se, but rather endeavours to find peaceful solutions to existing disputes. The wording of Article 1(1) links the prevention of threats to 71 72 73

Kelsen (1950),op. cit., p. 365. For detailed elaboration see Kelsen (1950), op. cit., pp. 360–365. Ibid., p. 360.

62

chapter 2

peace to the SC’s enforcement actions under Chapter VII,74 yet like Article 39, the wording in Chapter VI provisions, notably of Article 33, looks to the existence of disputes, “the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”75 In the international context this approach can be deemed to be preventative and adequate for the goal of keeping international peace. For example, a solution to a territorial dispute between two states through Chapter VI measures, such as negotiation or mediation, may be sufficient for keeping or building a more positive international peace between those states according to the above definition. Seeking to resolve the underlying issues of the particular dispute, such as a colonial legacy or past belligerent practices such as border incursions, may be necessary, but not essential, for keeping inter-state peace as long as the affected states agree on the solution and abide by the rules and conditions of the solution to the present dispute. In the intra-state context, as the following Chapter 3 will delineate, the underlying causes of armed conflicts are more complex and intertwined. It is essential to address those root causes to restore and sustain peace. Hence in the context of intra-state positive peace, the usage of threats to peace should indicate a more comprehensive concept than merely a manifest dispute. Yet, the aforementioned Charter provisions do not suggest such a comprehensive understanding of threats to peace in the intra-state domain. Nonetheless the Charter does not preclude a progressive interpretation establishing that the term “disputes” encompasses deeper incompatibilities that are likely to escalate into more tense and serious situations. It is the intention of this book to contribute to a wider interpretation of threats to peace, one that tackles the primary sources of conflicts (i.e. Fundamental Conflicts) as opposed to seeking to address only manifest and proximate causes.76 The remainder of this section analyses the linkages between human rights and peace in the UN Charter, with a view to identifying (a) the approach of the idealist UN frameworks for the pursuit of peace, and (b) whether these frameworks intend to achieve intra-state peace or have an impact on it. Furthermore, this section discusses the weight attributed to the idealist frameworks for the pursuit of peace vis-à-vis the weight attributed to the realist frameworks. This analysis will help to make a case for strengthening the idealist frameworks, while 74 75 76

See accompanying text at footnote 62. Article 33. See the notion of Fundamental Conflicts in the Introduction and Chapter 3, which this book conceptualises as deep-rooted threats to peace or deeply-rooted causes of armed conflicts, so that a more comprehensive positive peace notion can be constructed.

Peace in the UN System

63

also locating the gaps that a new positive peace framework could fill. The practical impacts of the idealist frameworks, specifically whether a sustainable intra-state peace can be achieved through these frameworks, will be discussed in the following section and Chapter 5. Articles 1(3) and 55 suggest member states to cooperate internationally to promote human rights. Due to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs enshrined in Article 2(7), the Charter does not set out member states’ human rights obligations vis-à-vis their subjects.77 Rather these provisions highlight the purposes and functions of the UN,78 and its obligation to “promote and encourage respect for human rights” in particular.79 Accordingly, from its inception the UN was a centre for the preparation of the International Bill of Human Rights.80 The General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Upon the request of the GA, the UN Commission on Human Rights prepared the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). A GA resolution adopted the Covenants in 1966. While the UDHR is not a legally binding document, the Covenants are legally binding for states that become party to them. They set out the legal content of the rights listed in the UDHR. The UN’s vision of promoting respect for human rights and the aforementioned developments in the field of human rights are suggestive of a more positive peace. However, Article 2(7) precludes the UN from imposing obligations on member states with regard to their internal affairs. Hence the UN does not have the power and competence to dictate that member states become parties to human rights treaties. Moreover, treaty ratification is not a guarantee that member states will comply with the corresponding international human rights standards, the realisation of which can be expected to give rise to the necessary conditions of positive peace. Therefore, it can only be argued that the UN may have an indirect contribution to fostering intra-state positive peace if the member states voluntarily follow the UN’s efforts and initiatives for the promotion of human rights. In other words, there is a need for strengthening 77

78 79 80

Kelsen (1950), op. cit., p. 29. See also Ed Bates, “History,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran, David Harris (eds.), International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 16–38, at 34. Kelsen (1950), ibid. UN Charter Article 1(3). See the Fact Sheet No 2, The International Bill of Human Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 1996, available at http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf. (Last visited, 26.08.2013).

64

chapter 2

the UN for a direct pursuit of positive intra-state peace. This does not, however, disregard that the UN is still an important actor for international peace and advancing human rights worldwide. Similarly, this does not disregard that states, irrespective of their ratification of human rights treaties, are still bound by human rights norms that have acquired the status of customary international law81 or the status of jus cogens,82 such as the prohibition of genocide and torture.83 There is a growing practice at the UN for taking reactive judicial or military enforcement actions under Article 39 when there are violations of jus cogens norms in relation to human rights principles.84 From the outset, the founders of the UN envisaged a role for the organisation in cases of grave violations of human rights.85 However, as this book concerns a positive peace conception conducive to the prevention of armed conflicts and violence, it is important to focus on the prevention of breaches of jus cogens norms, such as the prevention of genocide, by way of proactively addressing the underlying conditions, rather than addressing them reactively through enforcement actions.86 In light of the UN’s powers and competences in relation to human rights, it can be argued the UN system will have differing impacts on international and intra-state peace. Drawing upon the Kantian tradition, inter-state peace can be presumed to require advancing state-to-state relationships through cooperative networks and reliance on the creation of non-adversarial relationships. 81 Christine Chinkin, “Sources,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran, David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 103–123, at 110–112, 120. 82 Ibid., pp. 113–114, 122–123. 83 For ICJ’s decision on genocide see, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) ( Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), para 64 available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf. For ICJ’s decision on torture see, Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment ( Jul. 20, 2012), para 99, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/144/17064.pdf. (Last visited, 26.08.2013). 84 D’Moto argues the US’s military interventions in Panama, Grenada and Haiti “should be viewed as human rights interventions.” Anthony D’Amato, (2010), “Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms,” Faculty Working Papers, Paper 88, p. 90. Available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/ facultyworkingpapers/88. (Last visited, 26.08.2013)The recent R2P actions against Libya and Ivory Coast along with the earlier examples can be put under this category. This subject will be further elaborated in Section 3 in the context of the UN’s enforcement actions. 85 Kelsen (1950), op. cit., footnote 8, at pp. 29–30. 86 Chapter 5 will illustrate further the contrast between the existing practice of IHRL machinery and the suggested positive peace approach of this study.

Peace in the UN System

65

For the attainment of international peace, international cooperation in any area to foster interdependency and interaction amongst states, as enumerated in Article 1(3), may therefore be expected to produce positive impacts. States that have various ties and interact are less likely to resort to aggressive policies or force against each other. It can also be argued that international cooperation on human rights will provide a platform for improving the conditions of minorities through non-military measures, and thus will also prevent irredentist policies and minimise the likelihood and the need for military interventions for the protection of minorities. However, the UN’s current idealist frameworks cannot be depicted as having a direct impact on the elicitation of the intra-state peace. Preventing the onset of intra-state armed conflicts and violence requires more structured and proactive efforts than simply urging international cooperation for promoting human rights standards. Intra-state peace requires peaceful relations among the members/groups of society in addition to the governments’ determination and ability to provide an environment conducive to peaceful co-existence. Moreover, intra-state peace requires platforms that provide interaction and communication between groups/communities and the government, as well as amongst various groups/communities, so that resorting to violence would be rendered an unnecessary, and thus less likely option. In sum, international cooperation on human rights, as on any other subject matter, can be expected to improve ‘friendly relationships’ amongst states and minimise the possibility of inter-state wars. However, international cooperation on human rights per se cannot be expected to have a similarly significant effect on improving ‘friendly relationships’ between society members within states. Empirical studies do not show a clear positive correlation between treaty ratification and state compliance with human rights and/or changes in state behaviour in the intra-state context.87 The ratification of human rights treaties cannot be expected to always give rise to effective implementation of human rights standards by a government or their internalisation by the 87

See, Michael A. Elliott, “The Institutional Expansion of Human Rights, 1863–2003: A Comprehensive Dataset of International Instruments,” Journal of Peace Research 48/4 (2011), pp. 537–546, at 544. See also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and James Ron, “Human Rights Institutions: Rhetoric and Efficacy,” Journal of Peace Research 44/4 (2007), pp. 379–383, at 380. For a sceptic account on proliferation of human rights treaties see, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui ,“Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most,” Journal of Peace Research 44/4 (2007), pp. 407–425, at 411, 423. See also An-Na’im’s argument on the difficulties of internalization of human rights standards by merely legislative change, if customs and religions of the society contravene with them. See footnote 221 below.

66

chapter 2

general population (i.e. to effectuate friendly relationships among the intrastate actors). Therefore, the emphasis on human rights in the UN Charter as a basis for international peace does not indicate that the founders’ peace vision necessarily has a direct impact on ensuring intra-state positive peace. Furthermore, the discussions at the UNCIO illustrate that the founders did not conceptualise a just peace for the intra-state dimension resembling Rawlsian just society. During the discussions about the Article 1(1), nineteen delegates88 proposed amendments primarily “recommend[ing] reference to ‘justice’ or international law” because delegates feared without this reference the UN would “impose a peace of expediency rather than a peace based on justice.”89 In other words, they approached the matter from a perspective of international justice versus peace dichotomy, rather than social justice and intra-state peace correlation. In Commission I of the UNCIO, and particularly among small states, a strong concern about “a repetition of…‘appeasement policy’”90 prevailed. Small states equated justice with UN interference through peaceful and/or forceful measures to avoid aggression and appeasement policy in the name of pragmatic peace. Taking these concerns into consideration, in the end the founders incorporated a reference to human rights in the Preamble and Articles 1(3) and 55 with the aim of fostering a more positive international peace. Developments Towards Strengthening the UN’s Idealist Frameworks: A Human-Centric Ethos via Human Security and Responsibility to Protect? With the conjunctural changes since détente, the neo-Kantian tradition’s peace notion has gained weight in the UN’s system and understanding of peace, leading the UN’s peace notion to incorporate an intra-state peace dimension. In parallel with expanding the scope of the peace vision, the UN’s idealist frameworks have been strengthened through adoption of a less strict interpretation of Article 2(7). Matters perceived to fall within the internal affairs of states, and thus regarded as beyond the concern of the international community and the UN, have been restricted through state-building, human rights, democratisation, Human Security (HS) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) discourses.

2.3

88 89 90

19 out of 23 proposals for amendments were about adding justice in Article 1(1), which succeeded in the final Charter draft. See UNCIO, Volume 6, p. 23. See, UNCIO, Volume 6, p. 318. The President of Commission I stated that “delegations have repeatedly warned of the dangers of a repetition of the so-called ‘appeasement policy.’” See, UNCIO, Volume 3, p. 13.

Peace in the UN System

67

This section provides a brief account of the notions of HS and R2P, how they are pursued in the UN system, and the critical scholars’ views on the pursuit of HS in the context of UN peacebuilding. It explores whether the introduction of these concepts and the subsequent UN reforms have enabled the idealist UN framework to pursue intra-state peace effectively by strengthening preventative structures, and thus lessening the significance and inevitability of reactive measures of the UN realist frameworks. It also considers why the realist UN frameworks, despite reform, predominate in the pursuit of intra-state peace. This will ultimately inform the justification of this study’s quest to further strengthen the existing idealist frameworks of the UN system. The security of human beings is at the centre of both HS and R2P as opposed to state security. As each concerns the treatment of human beings within states, they inevitably bear upon the domestic affairs of states. The underlying rationale of these concepts can be traced to the Kantian CI of humanity, which suggests the primacy of human beings and thus the duty to always treat them with respect. In the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994, HS is conceptualised as conjoining human development and human rights, and corresponding to “freedom from fear”91 and “freedom from want.”92 The Independent Commission on Human Security93 provides a definition of HS, which mainly builds upon HDR’s conception, but also adds emphasis on both the empowerment and protection of human beings. The Commission construes HS as the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.” Although it does not define the content of HS, leaving such efforts up to each respective society, the Commission understands HS as “protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations…[and] creating

91

92 93

As Roosevelt pointed out in his four freedoms speech, it “means a world-wide reduction of armaments” so that “no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression.” See, the Excerpt from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Message to the US Congress on January 6, 1941, available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/ word_document/pres_roosevelts_address.txt. (Last visited, 11.03.2010). Freedom from want “means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life.” Ibid. It was launched by the initiative of the Japanese government in the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Odaka. See, The Commission on Human Security, Final Report: Human Security Now, 2003, pp. iii, iv. Available at http:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006A9353 -chs-security-may03.pdf. (Last visited, 11.03.2010).

68

chapter 2

political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”94 Critical theorists point out that HS is a broad and value-laden concept, which lacks precise definition creating a gap between theory/discourse and practice, as well as entailing a risk to be used as a pretext for “hegemonic interests”95 given the need for prioritisation of the wide-ranging human security concerns.96 Critical security scholars underline the danger of securitisation of any phenomena as it inevitably “legitimises the use of force”97 and warn against securitisation of the broad understanding of human security.98 However, Krause argues the narrow human security concept, which is operationalised in the UN system and in its peace operations seeking to “secur[e] civilians from the threat of violence,”99 has made a difference in practice. The Responsibility to Protect100 doctrine can be seen as an attempt to realise HS understood narrowly, namely freedom from fear.101 The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and the Report of the Secretary General (SG) on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect note the importance of preventive 94

See, UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994, p. 24. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/ reports/global/hdr1994/. (Last visited, 11.03.2010) See also, The Commission on Human Security, Final Report: Human Security Now, 2003, op. cit., p. 4. 95 Antonio Franceschet, “The Politics of Global Legalism and Human Security,” Policy and Society 24/1 (2005), pp. 1–23, at 4. 96 For a brief account of four main critiques of HS and its limits in operationalisation in a state-centric international system see Keith Krause, “Critical Perspectives on Human Security,” in (eds.) Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 76–94, at 76, 87–89. See also, Roland Paris, “Still an Inscrutable Concept,” Security Dialogue 35/3 (2004), pp. 370–372. Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” Global Governance 7/3 (2001), pp. 231–236. 97 Mient Jan Faber and Martijn Dekker (2014), “Violent Conflict and the Individual Security Dilemma,” Routledge Handbook of Human Security, op. cit., pp. 125–138, at 126. 98 For an account of critical security studies (Copenhagen School), which regards securitisation as an extreme form of politisation (i.e. exclusion according to Schmittian friendenemy bifurcation) see, Karin M. Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 7, 13–15, 107–109. 99 Krause (2014), op.cit., p. 83. For how HS and R2P has “taken hold” rapidly, see, Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security in the R2P Era”, in (eds.) Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 149–158, at 157. 100 Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 139. 101 See also Taylor Owen and Mary Martin (2014), “Conclusion,” Routledge Handbook of Human Security, op. cit., p. 332.

Peace in the UN System

69

activities as a vital component of R2P.102 The R2P is composed of three pillars: the responsibility to (a) prevent, (b) react and (c) rebuild. The R2P Report of 2001 prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) highlights the importance of addressing root causes through both peaceful means and by way of direct prevention measures with forceful actions to protecting people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.103 The R2P report of 2001 emphasises the responsibilities of both the international community and individual states with regard to the pursuit of human security and protection. The report underlines that the obligation to take all necessary preventive measures for the protection of civilian populations and to undertake preventive activities in cooperation with international community rests primarily with states.104 Only when these fail to prevent the aforementioned acts will the international community be seen as responsible for taking measures (i.e. reacting), including coercive ones, to protect civilians. It is important to note that as depicted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the R2P doctrine concerns the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and “the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement.”105 This is to be distinguished from the endeavours of comprehensive prevention of armed conflict, in particular structural prevention agenda106 that this study is seeking to contribute. Furthermore, institutional reforms within the UN in 2005, which introduced the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Human Rights Council (HRC), can also be seen as part of an attempt to direct more attention to the intra-state dimension, particularly to the protection and security of human beings, as the central goal of the UN’s efforts.107 As mentioned above, the R2P doctrine entails 102 See, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677, 12 January 2009, point 12, p. 9. 103 See, The Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect,” 2001, para 3.21–3.24. Available http://responsibility toprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereafter R2P report]. (Last visited, 12.05.2013). 104 For an account of the “ICISS’ commitment to the ‘primacy of prevention’” see Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (London: Polity, 2009), p. 105. 105 Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 138. 106 For the distinction of R2P from structural prevention, see Bellamy (2009), op. cit., p. 105. 107 Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005. For  a brief  account on the analysis of the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which are described moving the UN to engage with intra-state affairs “to ensure their sustainability and commitment to human rights…”

70

chapter 2

the responsibility to prevent and rebuild. The functions of the PBC can be described directed at fulfilling these responsibilities through its post-conflict prevention and reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the HRC and its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism can be seen as contributing to the responsibility to prevent pillar of R2P by way of monitoring human rights situations universally. However, this is not to argue that HS and R2P notions as operationalised under these mechanisms necessarily give rise to sustainable and positive peace. While critical scholars point out the limits of peacebuilding practice, which operationalises HS and R2P concepts, others are optimistic that the PBC and peacebuilding measures will succeed in bringing about sustainable peace.108 Critical scholars also point out that the pursuit of HS is not only motivated by human-centric concerns, rather it is motivated by the West’s interests, and that it serves global capitalism and entrenches inequalities and western hegemony in the international sphere. The liberal peace pursuit (the international and UN peacebuilding practice) is regarded as “hijacked by neo-liberalism” and neoconservatism.109 As Turner, Cooper and Pugh indicate, UN peacebuilding efforts are directed to enhance human security, and narrowly focus on state-building or the promotion of liberal values, the rule of law, economic and political institutionbuilding, and security sector reform. They emphasise that human security and peacebuilding efforts, which are framed by neoliberal governance, serve the interests of the interveners and/or donors while overlooking local agency. Thus they argue human security has lost its initial emancipatory features and “original radical promise.”110 Similarly, other critical theorists, in particular Roberts111 and McCormack,112 argue that liberal interventionist approach in

108

109 110

111 112

see Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform,” AJIL Vol 99/3 (2005), pp. 619–631, at 622. For an optimistic account on PBC’s potential see Bellamy and others in Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity, 2011, 3rd edn.), p. 208. See the following Section 3, and footnote 113, for the limits of peacebuilding practice in eliciting sustainable peace. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011), op. cit., p. 223. Mandy Turner, Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, “Institutionalised and Co-Opted: Why Human Security Has Lost Its Way,” in (eds.) Nik Hynek and David Chandler, Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 85, 93. David Roberts (2011), “Human Security, Biopoverty and the Possibility for Emancipation,” Critical Perspectives on Human Security, op. cit., pp. 69–82, at 80. Tara McCormack (2011), “The Limits to Emancipation in the Human Security Framework,” Critical Perspectives on Human Security, op. cit., pp. 99–113, at 110.

Peace in the UN System

71

the pursuit of HS and liberal peacebuilding further entrenches global inequalities and hierarchical power relations. As Newman points out, peacebuilding through the promotion of liberal institutions serves international stability, yet often fails to address grievances and the local needs. He questions as to whether peacebuilding measures are “truly ‘liberal’” and effective in eliciting sustainable and positive peace given the disregard of local needs and welfare.113 Considering these critiques, Richmond proposes a post-liberal peace notion, and a postcolonial HS vision along with a bottom-up peacebuilding approach which take local needs and agency into account, rather than following blueprint promotion of liberal values and institutions.114 Although the emergence of HS and R2P can be seen as developments that underpin the idealist frameworks of the UN system, as critical theorists point out, these new notions have lost their initial emancipatory features and rather serve to reproduce the realist features of the current international system (i.e. the primacy of power). Moreover, as will be elaborated in the next section, the UN peacebuilding measures have adverse effects on sustainable peace and are not sufficient for eliciting positive peace. Therefore, this book suggests a positive peace approach distinct from the existing peacebuilding practice entailing distinct measures with the aim of strengthening the idealist frameworks of the UN system and evading the negative effects that critical scholars identify.115 A dedicated positive peace approach under the UN system can also be seen as an attempt to reinforce the responsibility to prevent pillar without contravening the consensus reached in 2005 World Summit.116 This is not to disregard critical theorists’ possible objections that the primacy of power in the international sphere, as well as in the intra-state political sphere, would also limit the realisation of a vision of positive peace despite its reliance on deliberation and human agency. Yet, the UN or any organisation functioning in the current state-centric international system can only manage, but not eliminate, power in both domains. As will be elaborated throughout the remainder of the book in detail, the proposed positive peace approach is expected to tame the problem of power in the intra-state domain by introducing a UN-facilitated 113 See, Edward Newman, “A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda,” Third World Quarterly 32/10 (2011), pp. 1737–1756, at 1745, 1742, 1739. See also, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013), op. cit., 468. See Höglund and Kovacs in footnote 199 below. The adverse effects of these measures will be elaborated in Section 3.4 below. 114 Oliver Richmond (2011), “Post-Colonial Hybridity and the Return of Human Security,” Critical Perspectives on Human Security, op. cit., pp. 43–55, at 44, 49. See Section  3 in Chapter 3 for Richmond’s post-liberal Everyday Peace conception. 115 See discussion accompanying from footnote 222 below. 116 See footnote 106 above.

72

chapter 2

inclusive deliberative tool that will seek to tackle exclusionary divisions by resorting to international human rights standards. Due to the emphasis on internal dialogue and attribution of a mere facilitation role to the UN, it is similarly expected that this positive peace approach would also limit possible impositions by international hegemonic powers in these processes. Given that the R2P doctrine also further reinforces the SC’s role, the SC and its forceful and predominantly reactive measures can be argued to remain the primary UN framework for the pursuit of peace. This claim may risk over-simplifying and undermining the idealist framework’s role and its long-term impacts. Nevertheless, due to the UN idealist framework’s lack of enforcement competences and powers, or due to its voluntary basis, it can be argued the realist framework of the UN enjoys greater significance in the pursuit of peace. This can be clarified as follows. Despite the movement towards a less strict conception of state sovereignty, international instruments and the UN are limited when it comes to the enforcement of human rights within states.117 Unless situations escalate into a breach of jus cogens norms, or amount to “grievous violations of human rights,”118 which would allow the SC’s involvement and potentially enforcement actions, the UN is limited to effectuate the prevention and cessation of violations through its consent-based measures. Therefore, it can be argued that the idealist framework is passive or inactive in nature. This is not to say that the objectives of the idealist framework such as the promotion of human rights cannot be proactively pursued before violations reach a grave level. Nevertheless, given that in the current system idealist framewoks are wholly contingent on states’ political will, it is difficult to claim they would have a significant impact in the short term unless states voluntarily cooperate. This feature was categorised earlier119 as the ‘inaction’ phase of the Kantian and Rawlsian theories towards states that do not voluntarily cooperate. In contrast, the UN’s realist framework has enforcement power. The SC, for example, can authorise military enforcement actions to restore or maintain peace. The coercive measures of the realist framework are inherently capable of exerting force and influencing the aspired change. Hence it could be concluded that the realist framework has a significant weight in the UN system for the pursuit of peace. This, however, is not to argue that the realist framework 117 For the difference of the nature of sanctions and the enforcement of IHRL vis-à-vis international law see, Frederic Megret, in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli et al., International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 124–149, at 127–128, 147–149. 118 Ibid. 119 See Section 3.3 in Chapter 1.

Peace in the UN System

73

necessarily has an equal impact on safeguarding international and intra-state peace. The following section will examine whether the pursuit of peace and/or its conditions and social progress by coercive and reactive means can be considered effective for safeguarding stable intra-state peace. 3

The UN’s Liberal Peace Practice: The Pursuit of Intra-State Peace

This section analyses the UN practice in relation to the pursuit of intra-state peace with the aim of illustrating why predominantly reactive and coercive measures are inefficient for eliciting sustainable intra-state peace. It ,thus, also aims to present the justification for this book’s claim that there is a need for a new positive peace framework specific for the intra-state dimension, rather than continued reliance on the prevailing realist UN framework that was established for international peace centred upon the SC’s power/primacy. This section focuses only on the SC’s actions in the post-Cold War era. The practice of other UN bodies and programmes that are part of the UN system’s preventative idealist pillars will be elaborated in Chapter 5, where they will be juxtaposed with the positive peace framework proposed in this study. First, this section discusses whether the SC actions in the post-Cold War era entail a concern for the intra-state peace dimension and a human-centred lens, or mainly for their implications on international or regional peace. Second, it concerns the negative impacts of seeking intra-state peace through the same structures and forceful measures developed for maintaining or restoring international peace. Third, it analyses the trends of armed conflict with a view to assessing the UN’s success at maintaining international and intra-state peace. Fourth, it provides an account of the adverse effects of the pursuit of the neo-Kantian/liberal peace vision, specifically through democratisation and the UN’s enforcement frameworks. 3.1 A Broader Peace Notion in the Post-Cold War Era? Previous sections highlighted that the UN founders’ peace notion is equated primarily to the absence of inter-state wars.120 Unlike Kelsen’s analysis of Article 39,121 Franck, drawing upon Articles 2(4) and 2(7), argues that the intention 120 See also Jost Delbruck, “A More Effective International Law or A New ‘World Law’? Some Aspects of The Development of International Law in a Changing International System,” Indiana Law Journal 68 (1993), pp. 705–735, at 708. Randelzhofer(2002), op. cit., p. 121, at para. 29. For an analysis of the SC resolutions where it expressed a breach of peace between 1945–1998, see, Lailach (1998), op. cit., pp. 51, 147. 121 See Section 1.2 in the present chapter.

74

chapter 2

of the UN founders would “forbid” any intervention into civil wars.122 Further­ more, the 1970 Friendly Relations resolution of the GA123 and the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment in 1986124 can be taken to support this view. Both the GA resolution and the ICJ’s decision recognised that encouraging or assisting internal armed strife and civil wars is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This interpretation broadens the scope of the prohibition on the use of force as well as the scope of what is considered intervention into domestic matters of other states under Article 2(7).125 It is to be noted that these decisions also reinforce states’ power to exert effective control of their territory “to quell a rebellion”126 within their borders. Yet, what is the role the founders foresaw for the UN when a state experiences intra-state armed violence or conflict, such as inter-ethnic or religious civil war, state repression, or undertakes forceful action against its population that causes civilian “sufferings”?127 From the UNCIO discussions it is not possible to identify the underlying motivations for the UN to seek international peace; whether it was to prevent human suffering or merely to maintain the state-centric status quo and stability. The Rapporteur of Committee I/1 stated that “it is war” and not “untold sorrows” that the UN Preamble refers as to the primary aim of the UN.128 On the contrary, the president of Commission I stressed that the founders of the UN are not “state worshippers” and have “in mind only what sufferings war is causing to humanity.”129 Also Charter provisions 1(3) and 55 that urge the promotion, observance, respect and encouragement of human rights can be taken as supporting this statement. According to Lailach, the Preamble addresses the prevention of war because it causes “untold suffering to mankind.”130 Therefore, he argues, international peace under Article 2(4) of the Charter is to be defined

122 Franck (2002), op. cit., p. 41. 123 GA Resolution, 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 124 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Judgment (27 June 1986), Merits, para. 191–192, p. 101. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf (Last visitied 25.08.2013). 125 Ibid. 126 See, Kenneth Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 199. 127 The delegates at the UNCIO distinguished the state-centric notion of state survival from human suffering. 128 UNCIO, Volume 6, p. 450. 129 Ibid., p. 14. 130 UN Charter, Preamble.

Peace in the UN System

75

both as “the absence of international armed conflicts and the absence of largescale, man-made human suffering.”131 The SC’s post-Cold War activism in pursuit of intra-state peace can be linked to the latter understanding. As many authors have observed, SC actions expanded gradually “from the protection of sovereigns to the protection of people”132 in practice. This trend can be traced to the understanding of human rights adopted by Committee I/1. While the delegates were discussing Article 1(3) phraseology, they emphasised if human rights are “grievously outraged…then they cease to be the sole concern of each state”,133 and the UN shall be attributed a role in such cases. Accordingly, as observed in the SC’s post-Cold War activism, the UN’s peace vision has been encompassing the intra-state dimension.134 It is important to establish whether this approach amounts to a concern for human suffering and the intra-state dimension per se or to a concern to international security and thus requires a connection to international/regional peace and security. Goodrich, Hambro and Simon interpreted the Charter provisions as allowing concern with the intra-state dimension when internal situations bear upon international peace. De Wet also points out that in practice the SC follows a “double strategy” and engages with internal situations when there are potential international implications.135 She maintains that even though numerous SC resolutions consider non-traditional elements as constituting threats to peace, such as the removal of democratic government through coup 131 Lailach (1998), op. cit., p. 301. For Fassbender’s account on Lailach’s argument; see, Fassbender(2000), op. cit., p. 222. 132 W.M. Reisman cited in Schweigman (2001), op. cit., p. 153. See also Neuhold (1992), op. cit., pp. 935–936. 133 As Russell conveys Committee I/1 discussed using “ ‘assure’ or ‘protect’ fundamental human rights” instead, but ultimately regarded such activity as “primarily” states’ internal matter. However, the above quoted understanding can be taken to suggest a responsibility for the UN. See, Russell (1958), op. cit., p. 780. See also Kelsen (1950), op. cit., pp. 29–30. 134 The SC’s Chapter VII actions increasingly involve “intervention in a State’s domestic affairs.” See Conforti (2005), op. cit., p. 171. 135 See text accompanying above footnote 33. De Wet lists instances when SC determined threat to peace by combining internal situations not necessarily amounting to armed conflict/ civil war–such as racial policies (S. Rhodesia, 1966), apartheid policy (S. Africa, 1977) or massive oppression and human rights violations (Iraq, 1991; Yugoslavia, 1993)–with their potential international impacts – such as negative effects in the neighbouring counties especially due to refugee flow. See Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford: Hart, 2004), pp. 150–155. For the linkage with regional peace see also Hikaru Yamashita, “Reading ‘Threats to International Peace and Security,’ 1946–2005,” Diplomacy &Statecraft 18/3 (2007), pp. 551–572, at 557–559, 567. Franck (2002), op. cit., p. 44.

76

chapter 2

d’état,136 humanitarian crisis,137 widespread human rights violations138 or international terrorism,139 the use of ‘double strategy’ in SC resolutions is the proof that the UN does not concern itself with internal situations unless there are serious international or regional consequences. However, in the cases of Somalia (1992),140 Angola (1993) and Rwanda (1994),141 and more recently in the cases of Ivory Coast (2011) and Libya (2011) this position has not been maintained, and the SC engaged with exclusively internal situations. The SC resolutions for Libya and for the Ivory Coast in 2011 are “the first express reference[s] to the concept of” R2P.142 This recent SC practice, in addition to the three aforementioned examples, are indicative of the evolution of the concept of peace from merely encompassing the absence of 136 For more information on SC resolution regarding the disruption to democracy by coup d’état in Haiti see, Schweigman (2001), op. cit., pp. 136–140. See also Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 151–155. De Wet (2004), op. cit., pp. 158–162. 137 With regard to situations in Somalia which was regarded as a failed state, the SC Resolution 794 (1992) determined that “the magnitude of the human tragedy” and “the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance” was creating a threat to international peace and security. See UN SC, Resolution 794, 3 December 1992, S/RES/794. For more information on the SC determinations on Somalia see, Schweigman (2001), op. cit., pp. 117–125. De Wet (2004), op. cit., pp. 155–158. 138 The SC determined situations of general civil war accompanied with widespread human rights violations and massive human suffering as threat to the peace when there is no effective authority. Situations in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan were regarded as such. See Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), pp. 95–96. 139 The SC determined international terrorism per se as a threat to peace and security (Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001). For bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the SC Resolution 1333 (19 December 2000) determined “providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists constituted a threat to international peace and security.” See, De Wet (2004), op. cit., pp. 167–172. 140 The Secretary-General stated that the UN action in Somalia “established a precedent… [by] interven[ing] militarily for strictly humanitarian purposes.” See Chesterman (2001), op. cit., pp. 140–143. 141 Lailach lists SC resolutions S/RES/794 (1992) on Somalia, S/RES/864 (1993) on Angola and S/RES/929 (1994) on Rwanda as examples of the acceptance of merely internal situations as the UN’s concern. See Lailach (1998), op. cit., pp. 135–140. 142 For Libya see S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011 and for Ivory Coast see S/RES/1975, 30 March 2011. As Stahn cites the “first express reference to the concept” is entailed in SC Resolution S/ RES/1674 (2006). For the brief account on the legal status of R2P see Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,” AJIL 101/1 (2007), pp. 99–120.

Peace in the UN System

77

inter-state armed conflict, as contemplated in the early Charter era, to also encompassing human suffering within states per se as a concern of the UN. Nevertheless, as there are few examples to date, and the same principles have since been not relied upon in other circumstances, such as for the situation in Syria, it is not possible to argue with certainty that human suffering alone is a concern of the SC-based peace system. The tendency to articulate potential international impacts, as Franck indicates, stems from the fact that international spillover effects are “more acceptable to many states”143 than a mere focus on the internal affairs of another state. One could also add that this allows the SC more room for selectivity, rather than responding with automatic action against all civilian sufferings in the world. Ultimately, at San Francisco, the UN founders rejected “automatic collective obligation,”144 opting instead to allow the SC discretion. In sum, despite the R2P doctrine and the SC’s invocation of R2P on two occasions in addition to responding to intra-state suffering in three earlier cases, it cannot be concluded that the current UN peace structures concern themselves with all human suffering in all situations. At the same time, it can neither be denied that the UN system has moved towards encompassing the intra-state peace dimension as amongst its concerns. This warrants providing further justification for this book’s suggested positive peace approach by way of illustrating that (1) the SC and its reactive and forceful means are limited in eliciting sustainable and positive intra-state peace; and (2) the suggested positive peace approach would not repeat the limitations or the methods, means and objectives of the existing realist UN frameworks. The remainder of the present chapter concerns these points. The Pursuit of Intra-State Peace through the SC: The Problem of the SC’s Selectivity and Extending the Application of Coercive Means As was elaborated earlier, the founders envisaged the UN Charter system having “teeth,” and regarded collective security as its core component. However, because the UN military force that Article 43 envisaged never materialised, the idea of collective security transformed into a “coalition of the willing.”145 In practice the SC’s authorisation of the use of force amounts to the delegation of the use of force to member states or regional organisations.146 The selectivity

3.2

143 Franck (2002), op. cit., p. 44. 144 Russell (1958), op. cit., p. 674. This was regarded as limiting SC’s and great-powers’ “action of freedom.” See, UNCIO, Volume 11, p. 16; Volume 12, p. 504. 145 Franck (2002), op. cit., p. 25. 146 Christine Gray, International Law and The Use of Force (Oxford: OUP, 2004, 2nd edn), p. 195. Conforti (2005), op. cit., pp. 197, 204–205. Franck (2002), op. cit., p. 25. For an account of the legality of delegation of military force see, Conforti (2005), p. 207.

78

chapter 2

of the SC’s attention to and action for intra-state situations can be explained by the fact that it is contingent on member states’ limited available resources, specifically as regards to dedicating military forces to serve under the auspices of the UN. The requirement of Great Power unanimity under Article 27(3) limits the SC’s actions and leads to the Council’s selectivity.147 The Uniting for Peace resolution148 was formulated to overcome the effects of frequent veto power usage during the Cold War. The UfP strengthened the GA’s role in maintaining peace and security, and bestowed the GA the power “to mak[e] appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures…” if the SC “fails to exercise its primary responsibility.”149 However, military intervention in Korea in 1951 stands as the only instance in which the GA acted through UfP “notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member.”150 The UfP resolution was primarily intended for inter-state rather than intra-state situations. Furthermore, the SC has increasingly resorted to peacekeeping operations to address intra-state armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era.151 Such peacekeeping operations largely entail military actions and require SC authorisation.152 Peacekeeping operations and SC authorised use of force are distinguishable in that the consent of the host country is sought in the former in order not to jeopardise the norm of non-intervention.153 Traditional peacekeeping operations 147 See text accompanying footnotes 43 and 144 above for the discussion that the SC’s selectivity was intended by the UN founders. 148 GA Resolution 377(V) of November 1950. For a brief background on the resolution see http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html. (Last visited, 10.05.2013). The UfP is referred as a formulation of the US and its Western allies to circumvent the Soviet vetoes. See Dominik Zaum, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution,” in (eds.) Vaughan Lowe et al., The United Nations Security Council and War (New York: OUP, 2008), pp. 154–174, at 155, 164, 166. 149 GA Resolution 377 (V) of November 1950, Section A, paragraph 1. 150 See the website on the GA Resolution 377(V) of November 1950 http://untreaty.un.org/ cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html. (Last visited, 10.05.2013). 151 For the mandate of peacekeeping operations and their legal basis see http://www.un.org/ en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml. For the history of peacekeeping see, Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000), Chapter 1. See also http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml. (Last visited, 10.05.2013). 152 Capstone Doctrine: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, UN DPKO, 18 January 2008, pp. 16, 21. [Hereinafter Capstone Doctrine]. Available at http://www .peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. (Last visited, 12.05.2013). 153 The differing legal basis of peacekeeping operations and authorisation of the use of force against aggressor states (such as Korea in 1951 and Iraq in 1991) see Conforti (2005), op. cit.,

Peace in the UN System

79

before the 1990s functioned “only to divide adversaries and help in re-establishing and maintaining conditions of peace and security”,154 principally “by observing cease-fires.”155 However, the distinctions between SC Chapter VII enforcement actions and “Chapter VI and a half” peacekeeping actions have been “blurred” in the post-Cold War period in that the principles of host state consent and impartiality upon which traditional peacekeeping relied are no longer adhered to.156 Contemporary peacekeeping operations are “multidimensional” and involve implementation of peace agreements, rather than mere maintenance of cease-fires. They may incorporate certain activities to “lay foundations for sustainable peace”,157 particularly pursuing peacebuilding through the measures such as the promotion of the rule of law and the respect for human rights, and facilitating political processes for reconciliation.158 These peacebuilding measures “are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict.”159 In other words, multidimensional peacekeeping does not entail a mandate for building positive peace in the pre-conflict situations unlike the proposed positive peace framework. In sum, despite these new instruments the UN remains inherently limited with respect to addressing all intra-state armed conflicts. Given that SC authorisation of any military action requires unanimity of the permanent members of the SC, the UN’s attention is fundamentally selective. The use of veto power by China and the Russian Federation against the draft SC resolutions on the situation in Syria, which is acknowledged as having escalated into a civil war, serves as an example.160 These practical limitations of the realist framework provide a sound basis for searching for other means and frameworks to address intra-state situations before they reach the escalation phase.

154 155 156

157 158 159 160

pp. 199–200. See, Gray (2004), op. cit., pp. 202–205, 210–211, 217, 250. See also the principle of consent in Capstone Doctrine, pp. 31–32. Conforti (2005), pp. 198–199. Capstone Doctrine, p. 20. The cases of Congo, former Yugoslavia and Somalia are often referred to as the first instances of the use of peace-enforcing forces. Gray (2004), op. cit., pp. 217, 250. For a brief account on the principles of peacekeeping see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ operations/principles.shtml. See footnote 153. Capstone Doctrine, p. 18. Ibid, pp. 22–24. Ibid, p. 22. UN Press Release, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan,” SC/10536, 4 February 2012 available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10536.doc.htm. (Last visited, 08.08.2013).

80

chapter 2

Furthermore, it can be argued that it is problematic to pursue intra-state peace through the SC’s coercive actions due to the contradictions that inhere in the pursuit of peace through enforcement actions. In the Atlantic Charter, the founders of the UN pointed out that “armed peace with the fear of war as the recurrent theme is not sufficient for the achievement of the purposes of the new Organization. Peace must be accompanied by a feeling of security, security from war in particular.”161 As elaborated above, collective security and deterrence by great powers in the SC, non-intervention into internal affairs under Article 2(7), and the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) were envisaged by the founders as limiting factors for the use of force, and ultimately for the provision of security to all states. Broadening the scope of the UN’s peace conception to encompass the intra-state dimension would further increase the dependency on the use of coercive measures if the UN continues to pursue peace by relying on collective security and the SC. Consequently, this can be expected to jeopardise “security from war” as rendering both interand intra-state dimensions concerns of the UN system would necessarily increase the discourse “on war as a recurring theme” and “the fear for war.”162 3.2.1 The SC’s Activities in the Context of Chapter VI Pacific Measures The UN’s Chapter VII and Chapter “VI and a half” measures are last resort measures. The frequent use of last resort measures can be seen as the result of the frequent occurrence of inter- or intra-state armed conflicts. Furthermore, frequent resort to these forceful measures can also be taken to indicate the failure of the UN to prevent armed conflicts in the first place. This section examines whether the SC fully exhausts Chapter VI peaceful settlement measures in considering intra-state situations.163 In recent years there have been efforts to strengthen the UN preventive pillars by bolstering the UN’s role in “the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes.”164 At the SC meeting on 21 April 2009, the delegates pointed out that Chapter VI measures are to be exhausted before resorting to Chapter VII 161 Atlantic Charter point 6, cited in Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 3rd edn.), p. 59. 162 Ibid. 163 For an account of the SC’s role in dispute settlement, see also Higgins (1970), op. cit. 164 See, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI), Supplement 2008–2009, p. 53. [hereinafter Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009] Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2008-2009/Part%20VI/08-09_PartVI. pdf (Last visited, 06.12.2012).

Peace in the UN System

81

measures.165 Furthermore, in 2011, the GA adopted a resolution on strengthening the UN’s use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.166 In 2014 the SC also adopted a resolution emphasising similar objectives.167 The materialisation of these visions is yet to be seen, however, the bulk of the SC practice to date demonstrates that the SC involvement primarily relates to conflict and post-conflict, rather than preconflict, situations. As discussed in the previous section,168 the UN’s Chapter VI measures were intended to engage with disputes between states. During the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath, certain situations were described as internal affairs in order to impede the SC’s involvement with the given situation.169 However, since the end of the Cold War, Chapter VI measures have been increasingly invoked for intra-state disputes.170 The internal affairs of states become a concern of the SC mostly in the context of post-conflict situations and in response to rising tensions, with a view to preventing relapses, re-starting peace processes or consolidating peace-agreements.171 The referral of the situation in Myanmar to the SC in September 2006 was objected to by four SC members who stated “only those questions that constitute threats to international peace and security…warrant discussion by the Security Council.”172 The draft resolution did not include a reference to coercive measures, and merely requested the Secretary-General to report to the SC on the situation in six months. It was vetoed by China and the Russian Federation. Objecting states emphasised that any involvement into the internal affairs by the SC may 165 Ibid. 166 GA Resolution 65/283, 28 July 2011. 167 SC Resolution 2171, 21 August 2014. For further discussion on the impacts of these resolutions see Chapter 4 Section 1.2. 168 See accompanying discussion from footnote 71. 169 Pakistan described the situation in Afghanistan as an internal situation to avoid SC attention into the situation (p. 838). The US described the downing of two Libyan aircraft as self-defence under Article 51, (p. 865). See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI), Supplement 1989–1992. Available at http:// www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/89-92_10.pdf. (Last visited, 07.12.2012). 170 See, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI), Supplement 1996–1999, p. 1087. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ repertoire/96-99/96-99_10.pdf#page=34. (Last visited, 07.12.2012). 171 See, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI), Supplement 2004–2007, pp. 35–71. Available http://www.un.org/en/sc/ repertoire/2004-2007/04-07_10.pdf. See also Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009, pp. 38–45. (Last visited, 07.12.2012). 172 See, Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007, p. 95.

82

chapter 2

obstruct future relationships between the UN and Myanmar, as well as affect the ongoing involvement of UN agencies and Secretary-General’s good offices.173 In sum, it can be argued that SC practice relating to the invocation of Chapter VI measures does not suggest that intra-state matters are given due attention before the escalation phase. Like Chapter VII enforcement actions, the SC’s Chapter VI actions are not of a preventative nature with regard to the intra-state dimension. The UN’s reliance on reactive measures, especially for the intra-state dimension, can be linked to the state-centric concept of sovereignty. Rigid interpretation of sovereignty stands as an obstacle to a systemic preventive approach that would necessarily involve engagement with intra-state affairs. Critics explain the violent nature of the international system by the lack of a comprehensive concept of justice that “transcends a stark concept of sovereignty.”174 In other words, it is the rigid concept of state sovereignty and the accompanying broad understanding of international pluralism that hinder stronger preventative structures under UN auspices, and thus render reactive and violent options as inevitable and necessary means. The interrelation between the UN’s idealist and realist frameworks is similar to the interrelation between the inaction and reaction phases of the Kantian and Rawlsian/neo-Kantian traditions, and thus similarly inefficient to elicit sustainable peace. Due to the fact that the UN’s Chapter VI framework does not function for addressing internal disputes before they reach the escalation phase (i.e. armed conflict), forceful Chapter VII and “VI and a half” measures initially envisaged as last resort measures become, in practice, the UN’s only means of action. However, due to inherent limitations that the veto power imposes upon the SC’s ability to act, even when using last resort measures it is by no means certain that the UN would be able to reactively engage with escalated intra-state situations. The following sections will further illustrate why reactive or forceful measures are not regarded as appropriate and sufficient for the pursuit of sustainable intra-state peace. Assessing the Success of the UN Realist Frameworks in Light of Armed Conflict Trends This section aims to demonstrate that the pursuit of intra-state peace through the SC peace enforcement actions and the importation of liberal peace conditions 3.3

173 See Security Council Press Release, “Security Council Fails To Adopt Draft Resolution On Myanmar, Owing To Negative Votes By China, Russian Federation,” SC/8939, 12 January 2007, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc.htm. 174 See, Necati Polat, “International Law, the Inherent Instability of the International System, and International Violence,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19/1 (1999), pp 51–70, at 53–54.

Peace in the UN System

83

cannot ensure sustainable intra-state peace. First, it looks at the armed conflict trends and discusses the success of the UN peace system in maintaining international and intra-state peace in the post-Cold War era. Second, it considers whether the UN’s realist framework can be deemed effective for bringing about sustainable intra-state peace, specifically for preventing lapses or relapses into intra-state armed conflicts. Considering the UN Charter system, inter-state or international peace can be described as the absence of aggression175 against the territorial integrity and political independence by other states during which international order and the status quo are preserved. In 2011, 2012 and 2014 only one inter-state armed conflict was recorded. In 2009, 2010, and 2013 there were none.176 Given that the frequency of aggression has decreased since 1945, particularly from the 1990s onwards, it can be argued that the UN peace framework has been successful in maintaining international peace.177 So far this study has argued that the UN primarily relies on the SC’s coercive measures, yet it would be incorrect to attribute the whole credit for the 175 The definition of aggression according to GA Resolution 3314 is as follows: “aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations…” See, General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. 176 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011,” Journal of Peace Research 49/4 (2012), pp. 565–575, at 566. See also Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2012,” Journal of Peace Research, (1 July 2013, online version), pp. 1–13. See also UCDP website for active armed conflicts in 2014 compared to 2013, at www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp and the UCDP Press Release on 17 June 2015, “Global Conflicts on the Rise” at http://www.uu.se/en/research/news/article/?id=4906&area=2% 2c6%2c10%2c16%2c25&typ=artikel&lang=en (Last visited, 20.06.2015). 177 Englehart and Kurzman emphasise the decrease in international conflict and argue that world peace has been achieved. See, Neil Englehart and Charles Kurzman, “Welcome to World Peace,” Social Forces, 84/4 (2006), pp 1957–1967. See also, Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, March 2007, available at (Last visited, 10.12.2012). Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (Dutton/Penguin: New York, 2011), p. 276. Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2010,” Journal of Peace Research 48/4 (2011), pp. 525–536, at 528, 525. For an account of the general decline of violence in the world, see also Steven Pinker and Andrew Mack (22 December 2014), “The World Is Not Falling Apart,” Slate Magazine, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/12/the _world_is_not_falling_apart_the_trend_lines_reveal_an_increasingly_peaceful.single .html (Last visited, 24.12.2014).

84

chapter 2

decrease in international armed conflicts solely to the realist framework. Each state’s military capacity, as well as the UN’s prohibition on the use of force and the threat of Chapter VII coercive measures, are deterrents against possible aggressions. However, the overall decrease in inter-state wars can also be attributed to the influence of the UN’s idealist frameworks and the increased interaction, cooperation and interdependency among states. In sum, it can be argued that both the realist and idealist features of the UN system have contributed to the long period of international peace. In contrast to the decrease in international armed conflict/war, there has been a steep increase in intra-state armed conflict since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.178 However, datasets on intra-state armed conflicts illustrate that there has been a general decline in active armed conflicts since the early 2000s. The lowest level of active intra-state armed conflict was recorded in 2010; with 21 intra-state and 9 internationalized armed conflicts.179 This trend reversed course in 2011 when there was an increase to 27 recorded intra-state armed conflicts.180 The figure dropped to 23 active intra-state armed conflicts in 2012, increased by two in 2013, and further increased to 26 in 2014.181 The number of active intra-state armed conflicts shows an upward trend since 2005 – albeit with fluctuations notably in 2010 and 2012.182 Similarly, the trends on the number of dyads, i.e. warring parties within one conflict situation, have been also volatile.183 2011 recorded the highest “trend of increasing fragmentation of conflicts.”184 This finding can be also taken to indicate that intra-state conflicts occur in highly fragmented societies, or alternatively that conflict-prone societies are experiencing a high level of fragmentation. Mirroring the decrease in intra-state armed conflict, there were ten fewer active 178 Stewart points out that ethnic conflicts have increased 60% between the years of 1953 and 2004. See, Frances Stewart (2010), “Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict: A Review of CRISE Findings,” p. 6. Available at http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/OV1.pdf. (Last visited, 10.12.2012) See also, for datasets in the years 1945–2005, Mack (2007), op. cit., p. 2. 179 See Themnér and Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 565. 180 Ibid. 181 Themnér and Wallensteen (July 2013), op. cit., p. 1. 182 See also the forthcoming article by Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace Research 53/4 (2015), which describes the data recorded by the UCDP in the last ten years showing “an uneven, yet clearly visible upward trend.” See, the UCDP Press Release on 17.06.2015, “Global Conflicts on the Rise” available at http://www.uu.se/en/research/news/article/?id=4906&area=2%2c6%2c10%2c16%2c2 5&typ=artikel&lang=en (Last visited, 20.06.2015). 183 Themnér and Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 566. 184 Ibid.

Peace in the UN System

85

dyads in 2012.185 Moreover, internationalized conflicts, or UN-authorised international interventions into an intra-state armed conflict, have been on the rise, with nine in 2010, 2011 and 2013, and 13 in 2014.186 Mack explains “there is less warfare today…because more wars are stopping,” rather than “fewer wars are starting.”187 Similarly, Harbom et al. point out that although the trends between 2004 and 2005 do not exhibit “major fluctuations in the number of conflicts”, there were indeed nine onsets of conflict in 2005. Furthermore, ten of the conflicts recorded in 2004 ceased within 2004 and thus not recorded for the 2005 dataset.188 Mack attributes the fact that conflicts frequently stop within a year to increased UN activism in the context of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-making and peacebuilding.189 Goldstein, on the other hand, underscores the role of military (humanitarian) interventions in the decline of armed conflict.190 The decline in the number of armed conflicts (compared to the high numbers in the 1990s) may be interpreted to indicate that the UN’s structures have become effective for stopping intra-state armed conflicts. Nevertheless, these trends do not necessarily provide a basis for arguing that UN measures are unequivocally effective for preventing new onsets of and/or relapses into intra-state armed conflicts and for building sustainable and positive peace.191 Armed conflicts recur in 60% of post-conflict societies.192 There are still high numbers of active armed confrontations, and their intensity is increasing.193 185 186 187 188 189 190

191 192

193

Themner and Wallensteen (2013), op. cit., p. 1. Ibid. See also Themnér and Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 565; and footnote 182 above. Mack (2007), op. cit., p. 4. Lotta Harbom, Stina Högbladh and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements,” Journal of Peace Research 43/5 (2006), pp. 617–631, at 619. Mack (2007), op. cit., p. 1. Goldstein (2011), op. cit, pp. 44, 100, 276. Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons From Somalia to Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90/6 (November/December 2011), pp. 48–59, at 49. See also Krain’s study, which finds that UN military operations are more successful in stopping or reducing the severity of genocide when they are directed against the perpetrators or when they aid the victims. Matthew Krain, “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides,” International Studies Quarterly 49/3 (2005), pp. 363–387. See also Newman (2011), op. cit., p. 1739. See Human Security Report 2012, p. 171 at http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/ HSR2012/HSRP2012_Chapter%206.pdf. (Last visited, 13.03.2014) See also Mack (2007), op. cit., p. 15. As Pettersson and Wallensteen point out there are five more wars – indicating more than 1000 battle related deaths–in 2014 compared to 2013. See footnote 182 above. Similarly, the Global Peace Index 2015 finds that “on avarage the world has become slightly less peaceful.”

86

chapter 2

As Wallensteen points out “the international community has not been able to reduce the prevalence of armed conflict further.”194 In addition, despite the general steady downward trend in the numbers of armed conflicts since the 1990s, given fluctuations which indicate an upward trend since 2005, it is not possible to predict upcoming years with certainty.195 It must be also noted that these datasets register situations in which there were at least 25 battle-related deaths, i.e. they only show situations in respect of negative peace, and not in respect of positive peace. Taking the rare onsets in inter-state wars as a benchmark, it can be construed that the UN peace structures are not as successful at maintaining intrastate peace. The relative failure vis-à-vis the intra-state dimension is attributable to the complexity of actors and causes of intra-state armed conflict, while relative success vis-à-vis international peace is attributable to the UN’s peaceful actions, specifically preventive diplomacy, as well as deterrent coercive actions and external factors such as globalisation. The remainder of this section problematizes the UN’s reactive and coercive approach from a pragmatic perspective, particularly in light of the relapse rates. It does not concern the normative question of whether it is necessary to resort to coercive or military measures when there is an active and/or protracted intra-state armed conflict. Rather, having illustrated the features of the UN system, which inevitably necessitate military intervention by not addressing intra-state situations under Chapter VI competences before they reach the escalation phase, this section aims to demonstrate the rationale for strengthening the UN’s preventative idealist frameworks. Scholars from both the realist196 and normative traditions point out that stable peace in the intra-state dimension cannot be achieved by military It  points out the rise in the numbers of deaths in intra-state armed conflicts/wars. See Global Peace Index 2015 Report, pp. 2, 21, available at http://static.visionofhumanity .org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf (Last visited, 20.06.2015). 194 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Press Release, 12 June 2014, see http://www .uu.se/en/media/news/article/?id=3514&area=2,6,10,16&typ=artikel&na=&lang=en# __utma=1.7416002.1372791743.1391005408.1422283128.4&__utmb=1.1.10.1422283128& __utmc=1&__utmx=-&__utmz=1.1422283128.4.1.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic) |utmcmd=organic|utmctr=(not%20provided)&__utmv=-&__utmk=168623009. (Last visited, 12.06.2014). 195 Themnér and Wallensteen (July 2012), op. cit., p. 565. 196 For problems of seeking a stable and democratic order through military intervention in light of the examples of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, see Michael Friedman (30.04.2013), “Redlines and the Problems of Intervention in Syria,” Stratfor. Available at http://www

Peace in the UN System

87

means, whether resorted to by international actors or by the given state.197 Although military measures may mostly be capable of halting ongoing violence, it cannot be argued that such measures would be sufficient for sustainable peace, specifically with regard to deterring/preventing new onsets or relapses into intra-state conflicts elsewhere.198 Höglund and Kovacs contend that resort to armed means during armed conflicts leads to the legitimisation of violence in the post-conflict period. They describe such situations as “Insecure Peace” in which violence becomes “an accepted mode of behaviour” and criminal violence becomes prevalent in the peace time. Such was the case in Guatemala, El Salvador, Afghanistan and South Africa.199 This reasoning may also be deduced from the empirical data showing relapses occur in more than the “half” of cases within 5 to 10 years after the initial conflicts.200 This is not to argue that there is a clear causal linkage between all relapses and UN-authorised use of force aiming to stop ongoing violence. Nevertheless, newly created grievances in the aftermath of enforced peace may be taken as

197

198

199

200

.stratfor.com/weekly/redlines-and-problems-intervention-syria?utm_source=freelist -f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20130430&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_content =readmore&elq=9206d211989542439592b3c97e17a55c (Last visited, 03.06.2013). See, Mukherjee (2006), cited in Paulina Pospieszna and Gerald Schneider, “Power Sharing Provisions and Long-Term Success of Mediation in Internal Conflicts,” APSA (American Political Science Association) 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, p. 6. See Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6/3 (1969), pp. 167–191, at 181, 172 see the discussion at footnote 214 below. Cortright points out for Mary Kaldor “the use of conventional military force is of little value” against the new wars, see David Cortright “New Wars, Old Strategies,” Peace Policy, 10 December 2012 available at http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2012/12/10/new-wars-old-strategies/ #more-1749. (Last visited, 11.12.2012) See also Mack (2007), op. cit., p. 4. Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010), pp. 367–390, at 381–382. See, Human Security Report 2012, op. cit., pp. 171, 172. Bell also points out that almost half of the peace agreements “broke down and…the rest entered a limbo of no war no peace…” See, Christine Bell (2006), “Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements,” Report of International Council on Human Rights Policy, Versoix, Switzerland, p. 12. Available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/22/128_report_en.pdf. In his 2007 study Mack concludes a 43% rate of relapse within 5 years, while Call and Cousens in their 2008 study conclude with a relapse rate of 20–33% in societies with a settled peace. Cited in Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (2010), op. cit., p. 7. Progress Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/891, 18 July 2006, para 84. See, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para 114. See, Capstone Doctrine, p. 22.

88

chapter 2

the possible causes of relapses. As Chapter 3 will delineate, theories on the causes of intra-state armed conflict and rebellion argue that grievances and previous violent actions cause violent reactions.201 It can be anticipated that the use of force to enforce intra-state peace will likely cultivate additional grievances among society members as military interventions inevitably entail “taking sides”202 and target particular groups with a view to stopping active fighting. Consequently, military interventions can be expected to risk creating and/or deepening the faultlines between the supporters of the intervention, and the opponents of and those groups disadvantaged by the intervention. This was evident in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where inter-group violence increased after military interventions.203 It can, therefore, be concluded that UN-authorised military interventions may trigger new grievances or intensify existing ones. This view would also be in line with the studies that indicate the intervention of external parties prolongs intra-state conflicts.204 Hence the rationale for strengthening the UN’s idealist frameworks to enable international community engagement before situations reach full escalation. On the other hand, like Mack and Goldstein,205 Themnér and Wallensteen link the downward trend in intra-state armed conflicts in 2010 with the increase in the internationalized armed conflict.206 The SC’s increased efforts in intrastate situations, namely its reactive and coercive approach for peacebuilding through multidimensional peacekeeping operations and/or through other UN agencies/mechanisms, such as the Peacebuilding Commission, seem to have influenced a decrease in intra-state armed conflict in 2010. Yet, the increase in the onset of intra-state armed conflict in 2011 in the wake of the Arab Spring, as  well as in 2013 and 2014, suggests that the positive impacts of the SC’s 201 Past grievances and history of war between the parties are commonly accepted causes of recurrence of conflicts. See Chapter 3 Section 4. See also Galtung (1969), op. cit., pp. 178, 184. 202 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press, c2004), pp. 33–34. 203 See Unresolved, Contested and Polarised Peace categories which denote that underlying issues – i.e. fundamental conflicts–have been not addressed and remain to prevail after the peace agreements. Höglund and Kovacs, op. cit., pp. 377, 382. 204 Cunningham argues interventions of other states with independent agendas prolong internal armed conflicts. See David E. Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 47/2 (2010), pp. 115–127, at 127. See also for concerns of increased internationalized conflicts due to their deadlier nature, HS Report 2012, p. 161. See also references cited in Pospieszna and Schneider(2011), op. cit p. 6. 205 See accompanying discussion at footnote 189 above. 206 See, Themnér and Wallensteen (2011), op. cit., p. 528. See also, Goldstein (2011), op. cit., p. 100; and Western and Goldstein (2011), op. cit., p. 49.

Peace in the UN System

89

(re)activism and internationalization of armed conflict on decreasing the trends of intra-state conflicts cannot be taken as definite. Even though the trend was reversed in 2012, it cannot be reasonably argued that the SC’s possible coercive measures, or put differently the prospect of international military support to one of the warring parties, would certainly deter a likely onset of intra-state armed conflict. A generic threat of international intervention may well increase, rather than dampen, the likelihood of resort to violent means by governments or rebel groups when they fear for their survival and experience security dilemma. Based on the high rate of relapses, and on the considerable number of active intra-state armed conflict and new onsets, it can be argued that the existing realist (reactive and coercive) UN framework is inadequate for eliciting sustainable peace in the intra-state context.207 Furthermore, it can also be concluded that it is necessary for the UN to engage effectively with conflict-prone societies in pre-conflict situations, rather than waiting until the situations escalate or until the post-conflict period, which prove to be prone to fragile or unstable peace. The Adverse Effects of Liberal Interventionism: The Impacts of Transitional Justice Provisions on Relapse Rates The Neo-Kantian tradition does not preclude pursuing positive (liberal) peace via coercive means or exertion of power (imposition).208 The existence of widely accepted conditions of the liberal peace (i.e. liberal institutions) in societies per se does not suggest a consented positive peace, as in theory these conditions may be enforced, yet they may not necessarily flourish in the given society. This section, first, provides an overview of the studies indicating the adverse effects of democratisation as a liberal peacebuilding measure. Second, it analyses the impacts of peacebuilding efforts, specifically human rights and transitional justice provisions in peace agreements, on preventing relapses. As will be further elaborated on in the following chapter, most of the risk factors of armed conflicts flourish in heterogeneous societies where respect for human rights and a democratic culture are lacking. Acknowledging this, UN practice has been to adopt the liberal interventionist approach of the neoKantian tradition in promoting democracy and human rights as a means to preventing armed conflicts and building the liberal peace. Although liberal 3.4

207 See also Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System (London: SAGE, 2012, 3rd edn.), pp. 22–23 for the analysis of datasets of Correlates of War project available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 208 Richmond (2008), op. cit., pp. 12–13.

90

chapter 2

institutions and the prevalence of human rights are integral to sustainable and positive peace, yet, the mere imposition of these measures as “blueprints”209 in post-conflict societies cannot be seen as a definitive and sufficient means to eliciting sustainable and positive peace. Critics argue that the “process of democratisation,”210 where majoritarian democratic practices are imposed externally, bears adverse effects. The practice of majoritarian democracy and elections in societies where a democratic culture is lacking has been established as one of the high risk factors for the onset of armed conflicts.211 For Paris, current peacebuilding strategy is “flawed” due to its reliance on rapid democratisation and market liberalisation, which reinforce the status quo that led to violence increasing the likelihood for relapses.212 Kinsella and Rousseau point out that “empirical evidence linking democratic peace to civil peace and conflict resolution is not as robust as international peace and democratic peace.”213 In 1969, Galtung pointed out that ending a tyrannical and violent regime by force does not necessarily mean abolishing the violent structure as it may be “imprinted on the minds of the 209 For an account that regards post-conflict peacebuilding as mere “conflict management” rather than structural cure due to entailing blueprint means consisting of liberal state/ institution-building, see Oliver Richmond, “Conclusion: Strategic Peacebuilding beyond the Liberal Peace,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 353–368, at 354. See also Richmond (2004), op. cit., pp. 90–94. 210 Kinsella and Rousseau (2009), op. cit, p. 480. 211 Global Report 2014 found that divided partial democracies (i.e. non-functioning democracies or hybrid regimes bearing features of both autocracy and democracy) are the most conflict-prone societies (i.e. compared to full autocracies and full democracies). See, Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility, Center for Systemic Peace, 23 July 2014, available at Polity IV Project website at www.systemicpeace.org, pp. 5–6, 24. (Last visited, 12.03.2015). See also Stewart (2010), op. cit., p. 4. Michael S. Lund, “Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 287–321, at 301. Errol Henderson, Democracy: The End of an Illusion? (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 16–17, 117–120. 212 Paris (2004), op. cit., pp. 6, 8, 45, 179, 185, 187. 213 Kinsella and Rousseau (2009), op. cit, p. 486. See also Henderson (2002), op. cit, pp. 117–120. In contrast, Hegre argues that empirical findings confirm the link between consolidated democracies and intra-state peace. Yet, he points out that it may be the pre-existing socio-economic conditions that cause both peace and democracy; i.e. the interlinkages between development, democracy and peace. See, Havard Hegre, “Democracy and Armed Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 51/2 (2014), pp. 159–172, at 160, 163, 168.

Peace in the UN System

91

new power-holders and…present…in latent form” after the transition.214 Similarly, many others note the destabilisation effects of democratisation in the context of UN peacekeeping often citing the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq.215 Lund attributes destabilisation in transitional societies to the effects of structural reforms (“political and economic liberalisation”) and points out increased instability when “shifting to more pluralistic structures” from autocracies.216 The study by Goldstone et al. establishes that it is “factionalism” (polarization and exclusive relationships among identity groups) that increases the risk of political instability in semi-democracies.217 As Wallensteen asserts, too early a transition may consolidate existing powers (“warlords”), and a transition delayed for too long may lead to their reactions (spoiling peace) and thereby risking destabilisation contrary to the initial intentions of the peacebuilders.218 Yet, Sambanis argues there is no scientifically proven formula that will determine when the transition to democracy and elections should take place to avoid instability.219 Stewart considers mere institution-building seeking to enable multiparty democratic elections as a superficial measure, and argues that such efforts do not present a conclusive cure for conflict prevention.220 The critics of liberal interventionism base their claim (that efforts in the post-conflict situations are insufficient and ineffective) on the fact that the essential infrastructures required for liberal democracies, such as the rule of law and the prevalence of the principle of equality and non-discrimination and a democratic culture, are not simply importable elements but require the conscious acceptance of the 214 Galtung (1969), op. cit., pp. 181, 172. 215 See Marten (2002), op. cit., pp. 155, 158–159. For other examples of negative outcomes of international interventions, see, Global Report 2014 by Marshall and Cole, op. cit., p. 25. 216 Lund (2009), op. cit., pp. 301, 302. See also Global Report 2014, pp. 29, 24. Höglund and Kovacs explain that “the civic and political rights accompanying democracy may be ‘misused as a vehicle for militant political mobilization. Höglund and Kovacs (2010), op. cit., p. 389. 217 Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54/1 (2010), pp. 190–208, at 197–198, 205. 218 Peter Wallensteen, “Strategic Peacebuilding: Concepts and Challenges,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 45–64, at 56. 219 Nicolas Sambanis, “How Strategic Is UN Peacebuilding?,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 141–168, at 155. 220 Stewart (2010), op. cit., p. 4. Global Index 2015 Report argues that measures aiming at positive peace would also have a violent conflict prevention function. See, Global Index 2015 Report, op. cit., p. 86.

92

chapter 2

people. An-Na’im argues along these lines, professing that change in religious or cultural practices cannot be accomplished in a short period of time by solely changing the legal and political structures of a state. Because immediate change by external imposition is not possible, he views the actual choice as being either internal dialogue for the transformation of the society or accepting state oppression.221 To critical theorists, the UN’s practice of promoting democracy, human rights and human security in the context of peacebuilding efforts have an imperialistic outlook.222 They stress that peacebuilding measures with a view to human security are often “enforced” after military interventions without regard of the needs and interests of the local populations, and therefore equate them with neo-imperialism.223 As mentioned earlier they point out that the pursuit of human security and liberal peacebuilding “runs the danger of becoming an instrument of hegemonic interests.”224 Although the present work does not contest these critiques indicating the problems that hegemonic power poses in the international sphere, nevertheless, it does not draw upon the critiques of neo-colonialism in suggesting an alternative positive peace framework.225 In other words, it reckons the limits of the UN in fulfilling its peacebuilding objectives without the influence of hegemonic interests, yet, it does not repudiate the UN’s role and efforts for peacebuilding, such as promoting democracy and power-sharing arrangements, and 221 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” in (ed.) Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in CrossCultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 19–43, at 21–22, 28, 37, 38. See also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “State Responsibility under the International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Law,” in (ed.) Rebecca Cook, Human Rights of Women (1994), p. 167, cited in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2000, 2nd edn.), pp. 426–427. 222 See Section 2.3 for the critical views on HS and peacebuilding. 223 For an account of Post-Structuralists’ (especially of Hardt and Negri’s) reading of the liberal peace as equalling to an imperialistic approach, see, Richmond (2008), op. cit, pp. 142–143. 224 Antonio Franceschet, “The Politics of Global Legalism and Human Security,” Policy and Society 24/1 (2005), pp. 1–23, at 4. See also Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 225 See also Paris for the elaboration of Critical Theorists’ points against liberal peacebuilding and his argument that these criticisms do not warrant abolishing of the liberal peace but merely its improvement. Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies, 36/2 (2010), pp 337–365 at 340.

Peace in the UN System

93

human rights per se.226 Rather, drawing upon the arguments on the adverse effects of institution-building and democratisation in non-liberal/democratic cultures, as well as on An-Na’im’s argument about the need for internal dialogue to transform societies, this study maintains it is necessary to explore other methods than the coercive and reactive ones for laying the foundations of sustainable peace. It suggests elevating positive peace amongst the objectives of UN’s idealist preventative frameworks and its pursuit in the pre-conflict settings. Thereby it seeks to strengthen the UN’s facilitation role in the processes of democratisation and to allow for greater emphasis on internal dialogue and local ownership.227 The remainder of this section looks at the impacts of the UN’s liberal peace pursuit in the context of peacemaking and peacebuilding in order to provide further justification for alternative frameworks aiming at positive peace in the pre-conflict situations. The UN regards transitional justice228 and human rights norms as guiding principles in peacemaking processes, with a view to fostering positive peace and preventing relapses.229 Democratic institution-building lies at the core of UN peacemaking efforts as well to realise human rights and to facilitate transition in post-conflict societies. Between the years of 2000 and 2009, peace-agreements or memoranda of understandings in 12 states included provisions for the protection and promotion of human rights, as well as aspects of transitional justice.230 Given the gravity of inter-communal violence and memories, generations would be required to properly assess the effectiveness of transitional justice and 226 For critical perspectives on the UN’s (peacebuilding) efforts with a view of Human Security see, David Chandler and Nik Hynek (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011). 227 This positive peace approach is expected to be conducive to the realisation of critical scholars’ objective of local ownership, emancipation and human agency. See also the discussion accompanying footnote 115 above. 228 Transitional justice processes and mechanisms aim to ensure that the given society “come[s] to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.” See, United Nations, The Rule of Law, Transitional Justice, http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=29. (Last visited, 11.05.2013) See also, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, The Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, paragraph 2. See also, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010. 229 For UN’s mainstreaming aspirations for transitional justice see ibid., p. 10, point 2. 230 Inventory of Human Rights and Transitional Justice Aspects of Recent Peace Agreements A/HRC/12/18/Add.1, 21 August 2009.

94

chapter 2

human rights provisions in bringing about reconciliation (understood as the transformation and rebuilding of relationships among previously warring parties) in post-conflict societies.231 It is, however, possible to evaluate these provisions in relation to establishing “self-sustaining” peace, which refers to preserving the absence of armed conflict/violence without the presence of external (i.e. peacekeeping) forces.232 Wallensteen asserts that, in general, only 21 percent of intra-state peace agreements last more than three years.233 Those peace agreements, which include transitional justice and human rights provisions, are no different in consolidating peace. Indeed in 7 cases, namely in Burundi, Congo, Ivory Coast, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, intra-state armed conflict234 resumed after the peace agreements were signed.235 Rothman attributes such relapses to unresolved identity problems.236 Only in 5 cases, namely in Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Nepal and Togo, (negative) peace have been maintained for more than three years. However, the fact 231 For the views of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs on the difficulties of reconciliation, see Janine Natalya Clark, “From Negative to Positive Peace: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Journal of Human Rights 8 (2009), pp. 360–384. For an account that rights-based TJ provisions have indirect impact on reconciliation see, Martina Fisher (2011), Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice, p. 414. Available www.berghof-foundation.org/…/ fischer_tj_and_rec_handbook.pdf. (Last visited, 02.12.2014) On the other hand, for an account that TJ measures combined have positive impacts on flourishing human rights and democracy see, Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice In Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010). 232 See, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 91. 233 Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 83, 79. 234 It is to be recalled that non-battle related conflicts and those that do not involve the government are not recorded as intra-state armed conflicts in major datasets and particularly UCDP datasets that the present study draws upon. 235 For the lists of active armed conflicts see UCDP datasets as well as the articles of Themner and Wallensteen (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). Burundi and Uganda were removed from ongoing armed conflicts list of the Ploughshares since 2011, yet both countries experienced armed conflict even after signing the peace agreements in 2006 and 2007. For the analyses of the conflicts see, http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/burundi-1988-2010/ and http:// ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/uganda-1987-2010/. For International Crisis Group’s reports on growing political tensions in Uganda see, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/187-uganda-no-resolution-to-growing-tensions .aspx. (Last visited 13.09.2013). 236 Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997), p. 290. This point will be explored further in Chapters 3 and 6.

Peace in the UN System

95

that some peace-agreements lasted more than three years, or even a decade in some instances, does not necessarily denote the existence of positive peace or self-sustaining peace nor signify that peace will continue to prevail. In fact, peacekeeping forces have been present in Liberia for 10 years.237 In Kenya inter-communal conflicts resumed after almost four years since the signing of the peace agreement in 2008.238 Furthermore, the Dayton Peace Agreement has been intact since 1995, yet the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is depicted as a negative peace. It is also considered the source of the 1999 conflict in Kosovo,239 in which negative peace was maintained with the presence of military forces separating the Kosovars and Serbs.240 Doyle and Sambanis surmise it is considerably more difficult to reach “participatory peace” and self-sustaining peace that does not rely on the military force of the external parties. Their dataset demonstrates that out of 121 cases of UN peace operations, only in 37 cases peace lasted more than two years after the war ended and peace missions left the given country. However, they note that negotiated settlements with or without UN peace operations lead to more successful outcomes with regard to stable peace. As regards negotiated settlements, 15 of 22 cases maintained peace for more than two years; for negotiated settlements with UN peace operations 11 of 14 cases succeeded.241 For the purposes of this study, the finding that negotiated peace settlements last is important as it supports the idea of inclusive dialogical and deliberative peace processes proposed herein as a means for sustainable and positive peace.242 237 In Liberia the peace-agreement was signed in 2003. For facts about UN peacekeepeing forces in Liberia between 2003 and 2013, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/unmil/facts.shtml. (Last visited 13.09.2013). 238 See, Crisis Watch No: 142 (1 June 2015), Crisis Group, available at http://www.crisisgroup .org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya.aspx. See also http://ploughshares.ca/pl _armedconflict/kenya-1991-first-combat-deaths/; and the reports of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for the years between 2012–2014 available at http:// reliefweb.int/map/kenya/kenya-2012-inter-communal-conflict-district-jan-2012-jan-2013; and http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-inter-communal-conflict-county-january -november-2014 (Last visited, 13.05.2015) See also “Kenya: Temporary Ceasefire or Lasting Peace?,” FCNL Policy Brief, 2009, pp. 4–5; available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ Kenya_Book_Web.pdf. 239 See Natalya Clark, (2009), op. cit, pp. 360–384. See Rothman (1997), op. cit., p. 290. 240 See, Doyle and Sambanis (2006), op. cit., p. 91. 241 Ibid., pp. 88–89. 242 See also Albin and Druckman’s study which shows a positive correlation between equality (specifically equal say and legitimacy in the peacemaking process and equal share in peace agreements) and durable peace. Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman, “Equality

96

chapter 2

It is not possible to conclude that transitional justice and human rights provisions in themselves are a panacea for lasting and positive peace, given 8 out of 12 peace agreements with transitional justice and human rights provisions failed to secure peace in the respective states.243 In light of this conundrum it would not be unreasonable to suggest a positive peace framework dedicated to promoting positive peace in all conflict-prone societies. Even if the UN peacemaking mechanism were able to safeguard lasting peace in all cases by ensuring the enforcement of peace agreements and all transitional justice and human rights provisions, unless these very pacifying measures of peace-making/ building are executed before armed conflicts occur and before human costs are paid, there would be no reason to abandon the aspirations and endeavours for strengthening the UN’s preventative frameworks and pursuit of positive peace in pre-conflict settings. 4 Conclusion This chapter illustrated that the current UN Charter system falls short of ensuring positive and sustainable peace in the intra-state domain. It showed that the premises of the realist and idealist traditions lie at the core of the UN’s institutional design and are reflected in the Charter’s provisions. The realist peace notion is reflected in Charter provisions establishing the SC-led power and collective security, and referring to the prohibition on the use of force in the international realm. Although the realist framework does not preclude a SC concern for the pursuit of intra-state peace, the wording of the Charter provisions indicates that the SC is responsible primarily for maintaining international peace. The idealist peace notion is reflected in Charter provisions which refer to international peace based on international cooperation in promoting human rights and socio-economic progress. Due to the emphasis on human rights, the idealist peace notion bears upon the intra-state peace dimension. The Charter’s provisions do not explicitly suggest a comprehensive regulation of the intrastate domain such that would necessarily require positive peace conditions, although they do not preclude it. Like the Kantian system, the UN’s idealist frameworks are voluntary based, and initially entail what this work calls an Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56/2 (2012), pp. 155−173. 243 Kenya is included in the calculation here, as inter-communal violence has erupted negating positive peace, even if it is not recorded as an intra-state armed conflict in the major datasets given the government was not involved in conflicts.

Peace in the UN System

97

inaction phase that involves merely the generic promotion of the conditions of the liberal peace. The UN’s post-Cold War practice illustrates that the UN has been increasingly engaging with the intra-state peace dimension. Yet, despite adoption of new norms and institutional reforms that strengthened the idealist UN frameworks, the UN’s pursuit of intra-state peace primarily relies on the SC’s enforcement actions. More than half of post-conflict societies experience relapses, and the situations on the ground are often described as being “polarised,” “contested,” “insecure,” “fearful” or “unjust” peace, implying that underlying causes, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes prevail irrespective of the conclusion of a peace agreement.244 Thus this chapter argued that while the UN’s coercive frameworks are more appropriate for the pursuit of negative peace (unstable cessation of violence), they are not conducive to eliciting sustainable positive peace. The analysis in the present chapter demonstrates the need for a new notion of positive peace and a new framework for its pursuit within the UN’s idealist frameworks. The next chapter introduces the new conception of positive peace and its practical framework, and pinpoints why they are not expected to replicate the limitations discussed in the present chapter with regard to eliciting sustainable peace.

244 Höglund and Kovacs (2010), op. cit, pp. 377, 382. For an account of UN peacemaking see also Chapter 5 Section 3.

PART 2 A New Positive Peace Paradigm

∵

The first part of this book looked at the theory and practice of peace. First, it analysed the realist, idealist and neo-Kantian traditions and pinpointed their foundational limitations in conceptualising sustainable and positive intrastate peace universally. It then traced these limitations in practice, namely in the UN’s pursuit of peace. By mapping the main IR theories and UN practice with regard to providing a universal positive peace vision and pursuit, Part I identified the need for reconceptualising positive peace and for rendering positive peace as the core objective of the UN. The second part of the book will introduce a new positive peace vision and framework, and illustrate its distinct features from Galtungian positive peace to further support the rationale of reconceptualising positive peace. It will also introduce the operational formula of the new positive peace vision to demonstrate that this vision could realistically be pursued under UN auspices. In other words, this part will show that the proposed positive peace paradigm presents a theoretical possibility.

chapter 3

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision and Framework This chapter introduces a new positive peace vision and framework. It provides a theoretical justification for the new positive peace paradigm. The present work maintains that a theoretical justification for a new concept of positive peace can be provided if it can be shown that (a) the suggested positive peace vision differs from the existing positive peace visions, and (b) the limitations of the UN system in eliciting sustainable intra-state peace can be overcome in theory via the new positive peace vision and framework. This chapter first provides a summary of the intra-state peace visions of the IR traditions elaborated in Chapter 1 before introducing this study’s notion of positive peace. It then outlines the proposed positive peace framework (PPF) and its dialogical and deliberative peace process (DPP) mechanism. Third, it discusses Galtung’s, neo-Kantians’ and other existing positive peace conceptualisations to highlight the distinction of the suggested positive peace vision and framework. Fourth, it juxtaposes tackling Fundamental Conflicts with the existing UN approach for tackling root causes. Lastly, it traces the foundations of the DPP mechanism in the deliberative models developed by Rawls and Habermas. 1

An Overview of the Intra-state Peace Visions of the Realist, Idealist and Neo-Kantian Traditions

The realist IR theory is concerned with the problem of international war and does not entail a comprehensive theorisation about peace. Furthermore, the realist IR theory does not provide a peace vision for the intra-state dimension as its state-centric level of analysis regards states as black boxes. However, drawing on Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’s works, and the realist tradition’s vision for a “victor’s peace”1 in the international sphere, its intra-state peace vision can be asserted to also rest on the threat of coercion, rather than on conditions that are capable of leading to self-sustaining peace. 1 Richmond (2008), op. cit., p. 56.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_005

102

chapter 3

The idealist IR tradition is similarly focused on the inter-state peace due to its assumption of domestic peace. However, the idealist tradition has more account on the intra-state peace. Kantian theory incorporates the intra-state dimension primarily as the basis for lasting international peace with the presupposition that citizens of the “republics” would be against inter-state wars and thus would ensure international peace. Nevertheless, the idealist tradition entails a separate, rather than a universal, positive peace vision. The Kantian intra-state peace vision can be elucidated by focusing on Kant’s arguments against a right to revolution. Due to commitment to non-violence and the rule of law, Kantian theory prioritises unjust order over a right to revolution. In Kantian theory there is no detailed account of ways for effective engagement with despotic regimes with a view to political reforms. Against this background, Chapter 1 argued Kantian theory does not provide for a positive and sustainable intra-state peace that universally relies on idealist premises. Rather, the Kantian peace vision corresponds to a positive peace only for societies already enjoying those conditions. However, for those societies that do not experience these ideal conditions, the Kantian peace corresponds to a negative or enforced peace. The Neo-Kantian tradition, on the other hand, specifically engages with the intra-state dimension. Neo-Kantians envisage a positive peace which is predicated on liberal premises such as basic freedoms and human rights, human agency, and democracy. To vindicate human rights and the liberal peace, neoKantians perceive (1) the use of force as legitimate when there are widespread and serious human rights violations, and (2) an interventionist stance as legitimate in post-conflict societies for fostering the liberal peace (through democratisation) to prevent relapses.2 Hence this Neo-Kantian peace vision refers to the absence of grave human rights violations, and thus entails a more human-centric outlook than the realist negative peace. On the international plane, the proponents argue that importing liberal institutions and democracy, as well as the promotion of human rights, would serve both “the global peace” and “the national security interests of the world’s leading democratic powers.”3 They assert that lasting peace in the international and intra-state dimensions will be possible when all regimes become democratic/liberal and share the same values. 2 Reisman, like Franck, argues that there is a right to democratic governance embedded in international law and HR mechanisms, and that if the rights are not permitted to be vindicated unilaterally, they cease to be rights at all. See, W. Michael Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” in (eds.) Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 239–258, at 254–255. 3 Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo, “Kant, Habermas and Democratic Peace,” Chicago Journal of International Law 10/2 (2010), pp. 437–473, at 440, 470.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

103

This work takes the Rawlsian system elucidated in The Law of Peoples as an exemplar of the neo-Kantian peace vision and system, which underlies the UN’s post-Cold War practice. The Rawlsian system, as well as the UN system, has two-phases. This suggests a separate positive peace for the pre-existing liberal societies that can be reinforced through generic promotion of human rights and norm setting, and a negative peace or an enforced positive peace for non-liberal societies. This separate peace vision is the outcome of Rawls’s understanding of international pluralism. The foundational limitations of the Kantian and neo-Kantian traditions in providing a universal positive peace vision can be linked to the following three fundamental factors. First, the liberal tradition takes liberal conditions for granted.4 They are seen as spontaneous products of the Western culture.5 Second, the broad conception of pluralism precludes pro-active engagement for inducing change in non-liberal regimes. Hence theorisation for the proactive generation of liberal conditions in non-Western/liberal contexts is underdeveloped. Lastly, the liberal tradition assumes a pre-existing liberal culture for the resolution and/or management of inevitable conflicts, and thus for positive peace.6 Consequently, the liberal tradition entails a non-ideal part envisioning a reactive and coercive extension of liberal conditions to non-liberal societies; in other words, liberal interventionism and a negative peace vision for non-liberal societies.7 This work’s objective of reconceptualising positive peace is an attempt to enable a pro-active pursuit of positive peace without jeopardising the principle of liberal pluralism and non-coercive (liberal) approach in non-liberal societies. 2

A New Conception of Positive Peace

This study’s positive peace concept builds upon the elements and conditions of the liberal peace and Galtungian positive peace. The neo-Kantian/liberal conditions of peace, namely liberal institutions, the rule of law, human rights 4 See also Paris who argues that the modern liberal tradition does not engage with the process of democratisation as it takes the effective functioning of liberal/democratic state for granted. Paris (2004), op. cit., pp. 50–51 5 See Jakob De Roover and S.N. Balagangadhara, “John Locke, Christian Liberty, and the Predica­ment of Liberal Toleration,” Political Theory 36/4, pp. 523–549, at 536. 6 For Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative models see Section 5 of the present chapter. 7 For an account of the inherent violent nature of the international system, see Polat (1999), op. cit., p. 53.

104

chapter 3

and social justice are conducive to a positive and self-sustaining peace. As will be elaborated below, Galtungian positive peace relies on a similar formula, requiring the presence of cooperation, equity, equality and a culture of peace in the given society. However, the present work maintains that the UN’s practical limitations in eliciting positive peace are not independent of foundational limitations in conceptualising positive peace. A new formula of positive peace would set new conditions to be addressed as well as the required frameworks and means for the pursuit of this positive peace vision. In light of the limited success of the UN practice in eliciting both the conditions of the liberal peace and sustainable and positive peace in non-liberal and/or post-conflict socie­ ties, it can be concluded that the liberal peace formula is inadequate. The formula of the liberal peace can be deduced from the UN’s practice. As the UN’s liberal peacebuilding primarily seeks fostering and building democracy and liberal/democratic institutions, and the promotion and protection of human rights, the UN’s liberal peace concept can be inferred as amounting to the presence of the rule of law, liberal/democratic institutions, and the prevalence of human rights. Given that liberal peacebuilding through either generic hortatory or reactive coercive frameworks is not capable of addressing the underlying problems of conflict-prone heterogeneous and non-liberal socie­ ties to elicit positive and sustainable peace,8 this study regards a new conception of positive peace distinct from the UN’s liberal peace vision is warranted. The new formula of positive peace should include elements that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the liberal conditions of peace in non-liberal/ democratic societies. The formula should also enable peaceful and effective international engagement with those societies, and therefore, should entail and reinforce a new understanding of international pluralism that is between narrow and broad conceptualisation of neo-Kantian/Rawlsian international pluralism. Against this background, this book suggests a positive peace concept that refers to the absence of Fundamental Conflicts. Despite this negative definition, this formula differs from the formula of negative peace in that it inherently refers to a comprehensive positive situation. While the absence of violence/war does not necessarily refer to harmonious or inclusive social relations within the given society, the absence of Fundamental Conflicts is conceptualised as referring to a situation entailing harmonious social relations, a democratic and inclusive culture, horizontal equalities in pursuit of dignified lives, and resilient political structures capable of conflict transformation and prevention. In other words, defining peace as the absence of a deep-rooted 8 See Chapter 2, Section 3.4 for detailed analysis of the adverse effects of the pursuit of liberal peace conditions through the UN’s reactive frameworks.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

105

cause of armed conflict would not reduce the quality of positive peace or render it thinner than the existing positive peace conceptions.9 In this study, Fundamental Conflicts are conceptualised as the deep-rooted causes of social injustices, non-flourishing of commitment to human rights, fairness and reciprocity, and the lack of cooperation and toleration within societies.10 This terminology is developed as the contrast of the Rawlsian terminology of “fundamental interests”11 in order to emphasise exclusionary relationships, the deep rooted incompatibilities, disagreements, and the absence of a common good among society members. The term Fundamental Conflicts refers to primary incompatibilities, namely divisions or the lack of common grounds between “we” versus “they” identity groupings. The present study draws upon the constructivist explanations of identity formation12 and understands identity as a social construct of “felt differences in behaviour, customs, ideology or religion”13 or in any other salient basis. 9

10

11 12 13

This positive peace definition would not repeat the disadvantages that Klein, Goertz and Diehl emphasise by defining peace with what it is not. The suggested formulation is similar to the original positive peace definition of Galtung in that the absence of Fundamental Conflicts, like the absence of structural violence, refers to a more comprehensive and positive situation than merely denoting to the absence of (direct) violence. The quality of such positive peace cannot be depicted as thin as the definition of wealthy as “not poor” suggests. See also the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 1. See, Klein, Goertz and Diehl cited in Nils Petter Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle, Håvard Strand, “Peace Research – Just the Study of War?” Journal of Peace Research 51/2 (2014), pp. 145–158, at 149. For O’Flynn’s discussion on flourishing democracy and “political allegiance to the state” in  divided societies where “a common national identity” is absent, see, Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 33–36. See, LoP, op. cit., pp. 7, 32. See also footnote 167 in Chapter 1. Yet this is not to disregard that identity groups may chose to perceive their identity “along primordial lines.” See, O’Flynn (2006), op. cit., p. 32. See Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 7–10. Frances Stewart, “Hori­ zontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 105–138, at 107. In the literature the concept of identity and its formation do not have a common definition. See Patricia M. Thornton, in (eds.) James L. Peacock, Patricia M. Thornton, and Patrick B. Inman, Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 2–3. For identity theory and social groups see also, I. William Zartman and Mark Anstey, “The Problem: Preventing Identity Conflicts and Genocide,” in (eds.) Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts, I. William Zartman, The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 3–34, at 7, 10.

106

chapter 3

Fundamental Conflicts are not conceptualised here as merely identity differences. They refer to exclusionary and antagonistic relations across identity groups, with significant tensions14 and divisions, polarisations or fragmentations15 ensuing, potentially fomenting mobilisation for political struggle through armed means. For Galtung, polarisation mostly underlies violence and refers to “social/human distance” among classes due to “unequal power.”16 Similarly, Funda­ mental Conflicts denote distance and deep divisions, but between diverse identity groups on the grounds of ethnic, ideological, religious, sectarian, regional or any other encompassing distinguishing identity feature. Furthermore, the concept of Fundamental Conflicts does not refer to violent or armed conflicts; otherwise the approach of positive peace would also amount to a reactive rather than preventative approach. Yet, the existence of Fundamental Conflicts is taken to negate positive peace and to have the potential to trigger violence or armed conflict when other strategic conditions materialise (i.e. if the balance of power and/or the motivation of the relevant actors change, spectacular trigger events happen, etc.).17 Initially, Fundamental Conflicts may have been formed due to strategic incompatibilities, such as clashing claims over political power and/or resources, and/or due to ideological incompatibilities, such as clashes over political worldview, or religious or cultural values.18 Irrespective of the initial incompatibilities, this book assumes that Fundamental Conflicts cause (or reinforce) 14

15

16 17

18

Tension is understood as “a state of latent hostility or opposition between individuals or groups.” See, Merriam-Webster online dictionary 3b available at http://www.merriam -webster.com/dictionary/tension. Polarisation is understood as follows: “to break up into opposing factions or groupings,” and fragmentation refers to more than two groupings. See, Merriam-Webster dictionary, point 3, at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/polarize. Johan Galtung, in (eds.) Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 18. See the study of Fearon and Laitin (2003) discussed at footnote 75 in Chapter 6, indicating the relevance of other factors for predicting the outbreak of wars rather than merely grievance or identity/ethnicity cleavages. Burton describes ideological incompatibilities as ‘deep-rooted conflicts’ requiring more effort (i.e. conflict resolution) as opposed to ‘tangible interests’ which simply require dispute settlement methods. Cited in, Harold H. Saunders, “Dialogue as a Process for Trans­ forming Relationships,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles : SAGE, 2009), pp. 376–391, at 383. Wallensteen defines incompatibilities in terms of government and territory and further disentangles, what is referred as ‘strategic fundamental conflicts’ in this study. See Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 72–74. See Section 4 below for needs-based explanation of Fundamental Conflicts.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

107

incompatibilities over ideological (intangible) and strategic (tangible) assets, and that the ensuing incompatibilities lead to further social injustices in the form of Horizontal Inequalities,19 informal/formal discrimination and human rights violations and ultimately to grievance (i.e. perceived injustices). In concrete terms, Fundamental Conflicts can be differentiated from ordinary ideological and strategic incompatibilities, which are the natural components of pluralistic societies, based on the intensity of tensions and widening distance in inter-group relations. For example, an intense incompatibility regarding privatisation of services or abortion policies would not qualify as a Fundamental Conflict despite the existence of intense political debate and significant tensions among the parties. It is unlikely that opposing pro-life and prochoice groups in the abortion debate would be able to mobilise people across the faultlines, ultimately leading to widespread violence or armed conflict. Such ideological differences would not negate positive peace provided that social relations across the contesting groups are not affected. In a similar vein, unless a government’s privatisation policies are not perceived as targeting the livelihood and lifestyle of one’s group, which has a sense of belonging to a particular region as opposed to the country as a whole, intense political debates or protests over privatisation will not be taken to signify the existence of Fundamental Conflicts between the regional group and the central government. In sum, Fundamental Conflicts refer to “we-they” or friend-enemy divisions, and exclusionary social relationships among identity groups in a given society. A profound distance in inter-group relations is necessary to categorise intense political debates or tensions relating to divisive subjects, such as secular versus religious orientations or socio-economic arrangements, as a threat to positive peace. As the positive peace formula aiming to tackle Fundamental Conflicts would encompass divided, i.e. the most conflict-prone, societies, it would provide a more comprehensive preventive approach. 2.1 An Overview of the Proposed Positive Peace Framework Suggesting a different formula for positive peace requires a discussion on whether it can be pursued through the existing UN frameworks. Chapter 2 explained that the UN’s existing frameworks are limited with regard to eliciting sustainable and positive intra-state peace. This section provides an overview of the framework that this book suggests for the pursuit of the proposed positive peace notion. It also pinpoints ways in which this positive peace framework would be capable of addressing the practical limitations of the UN’s liberal peace frameworks. Ultimately, this chapter would provide a theoretical 19

See Stewart (2008), op. cit., pp. 12–14 at footnote 9 in the Introduction.

108

chapter 3

justification for the new positive peace conception and framework by demonstrating that it is possible to design the PPF differently than the UN’s idealist/ liberal frameworks entailing distinct means and objectives. As elaborated earlier, both Kant’s and Rawls’s neo-Kantian international theory place relatively less emphasis on engagement20 with non-republic/nonliberal regimes before situations escalate into manifest violence or threaten the peace/sovereignty of other states.21 This stance was labelled as ‘inaction’ and attributed to the commitment to a rigid reading of principles of non-interference and state-centrism in Kantian theory, and to the commitment to a broad understanding of pluralism22 in Rawlsian theory. It was also pointed out that reactive approaches become an inevitable option due to the lack of earlyengagement with deeply rooted causes of armed conflicts. Therefore, this study suggests a new positive peace approach with the aim of complementing wide pluralism leading to strict non-interference on the one hand, and narrow pluralism leading to a reactive interventionist approach, on the other. The PPF is conceptualised to entail a pro-active systemic approach and offer a deliberative and dialogical peace process (DPP) mechanism to all societies that lack positive peace. The DPP mechanism’s purpose is facilitating national (state and non-state) actors to tackle their Fundamental Conflicts – i.e. the deeply-rooted causes of existing threats to positive peace. Many scholars see deliberation as “a viable approach to conflict.”23 Taking note of the adverse effects of democratisation (i.e. procedural democracy) in divided societies, this study develops the PPF drawing upon deliberative democracy theory.24 20

21

22 23

24

Engagement “refers to strategies that require contact, consultation and dialogue” for the sake of constructive change in the given societies. See, John Paul Lederach, Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding, Life & Peace Institute Report, 2011, p. 7. Available at http://peacepolicy.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/somalia_book.pdf (last viewed 31.01.2012). More effective engagement through peaceful methods for flourishing liberal values often becomes an issue only in the post-intervention period. This will be further elaborated in Chapter 5. See, LoP, op. cit., pp. 84, 62. See Chapter 1, Section 1. Mark E. Warren, “Institutionalizing Deliberative Democracy,” in (ed.) Shawn W. Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 272–288, at 272, 274–275. O’Flynn argues deliberative democracy models can ensure both the success of peace processes and flourish democracy in divided societies by way of ensuring a “stronger sense of common national identity.” See O’Flynn (2006), op. cit., pp. 36, 4, 161–162. For an account of deliberation as a basis of just and legitimate decision-making, and self-determination see, Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 30, 32. See also Michael Barnett’s account of republican peace, cited in Paris (2010), op. cit., pp. 354–355.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

109

Would the suggested PPF contribute to the UN system? It is anticipated to strengthen the UN’s preventive pillars in two respects. First, if materialised, the PPF would complement post-conflict ad hoc prevention efforts by expan­ ding such efforts systematically to all societies exhibiting risk factors. Thus it will override the reactive nature of the current system by encompassing ­pre-conflict situations. Secondly, the PPF would expand the UN’s existing preventive efforts by targeting Fundamental Conflicts. Focusing the objective on tackling divisions and exclusionary/antagonistic social relationships, rather than on the possible outcomes of Fundamental Conflicts (such as grave human rights violations and grievances), presents a more comprehensive approach than the UN’s existing conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts entail. The next chapter will further elaborate the working principles of the PPF. 3

The New Positive Peace Concept vis-à-vis the Galtungian, Liberal and Local Positive Peace Conceptions

The categorisation of negative and positive peace was introduced by Johan Galtung into the peace research literature in the 1960s.25 Galtung differentiates these categories of peace based on the type of violence they seek to eliminate. Negative peace refers to the absence of personal (direct) violence, and positive peace refers to the absence of structural (indirect) violence that is built into the system.26 Galtung distinguishes personal and structural violence on the grounds of whether harms are caused by direct/manifest factors or indirect/latent factors. While the former refers to a conventional understanding of violence and denotes the existence of a human actor committing it, structural violence, which cannot be attributed to a human actor, refers to “avoidable” harm that the prevailing structures and ideologies in the given society generate. According to Galtung, structural violence is “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is.”27 For example, deaths from curable diseases or starvation are described as premature as they are caused by preventable circumstances. This indicates the existence of 25

26 27

For Galtung’s first definition of positive peace as human integration vis-à-vis negative peace as the absence of violence/war see Johan Galtung, “An Editorial,” Journal of Peace Research 1/1 (1964), pp. 1–4. See, Galtung (1969), op. cit., pp. 171–173. Ibid., p. 168 [Emphasis in original].

110

chapter 3

social injustices, or structural violence.28 For Galtung, social injustices and structural violence are the same phenomena.29 Galtung’s positive peace denotes the absence of structural violence/social injustices. His conception of positive peace refers to structures that provide “egalitarian distribution of power and resources”30 and enable the self-realisation of individuals. In other words, positive peace and (human) development are interlinked.31 However, Boulding points out that the Galtungian notion of egalitarianism in resource-sharing (i.e. vertical equality) has negative implications for liberty, and thus contradicts his theory’s core objective of eliminating oppression, which reinforces structural violence.32 In his later works, Galtung categorises peace as direct, structural or cultural peace. Positive peace is defined under these categories as the presence of cooperation; equity and equality; and a culture of peace and dialogue. Galtung delineates equal rights, dignity (i.e. fulfilment of basic needs), and the prevalence of the principle of reciprocity as “self-reinforcing” conditions or “virtuous cycles.”33 Galtung’s positive peace broadly amounts to social justice and entails addressing power disparities across faultlines by establishing egalitarian structures to foster equity and equality.34 UN post-conflict peacebuilding35 builds upon Galtung’s understanding of positive peace. Both emphasise the link between development and peace, and draw attention to the importance of dialogue and reconciliation among peoples.36

28

29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36

Ibid., pp. 171, 173. For a brief account on Galtung’s approach see also David P Barash and Charles P. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (London: SAGE Publications, 2009, 2nd edn), pp. 7–8. Galtung (1969), op. cit., p. 171. Galtung states that positive peace is also “a matter of ‘vertical development’” See, ibid., p. 183. Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (eds.), Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 31. Kenneth E. Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research 14/1 (1977), pp. 75–86 at 79–82. Rummel also criticises Galtung’s conception of positive peace, which is based on social justice and equality, due to its ‘socialist’ characteristic; instead he suggests a just peace framework based on ‘maximum freedom.’ See, Rudolph J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War (London: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 83–84. Webel and Galtung (2007), op. cit., pp. 30–31. Ibid., p. 28. See, Capstone Doctrine, p. 17. See footnote 30 above.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

111

The remainder of this section will further elucidate the nuances of the suggested positive peace conceptualisation from the Galtungian, Neo-Kantian/ liberal and post-liberal or local positive peace conceptualisations. By conceptualising positive peace as the absence of Fundamental Conflicts, and thus introducing identity and “relational”37 aspects, this study’s positive peace notion differs from those of Galtung and the liberal tradition. Furthermore, there are nuances in how social justice and equality are defined. Although all three positive peace visions quest for harmonious societies where social justice (fairness) and equality flourish, the suggested positive peace approach differs from the earlier positive peace theorisations in that it specifies and narrows the scope of social justice in such a way that it can be operationalised as an objective of the UN’s preventative frameworks. It refers to social justice as horizontal equality and non-discrimination across identity groups. The suggested positive peace and social justice notions require addressing divisions and discrepancies (discrimination) in the enjoyment of a dignified life, and this could be facilitated by the UN in the context of the suggested DPP mechanism. On the other hand, it would be hard to pursue Galtungian social justice through the UN as it is elusive and too comprehensive referring to the absence of systematic exclusion and inequalities that harm individuals’ wellbeing and obstruct them from reaching their potential capabilities.38 It is to be noted that the Galtungian positive peace approach also entails mending discrepancies in power across the “faultlines”, i.e. social divisions. However, Galtung’s notion of faultlines and this study’s notion of Fundamental Conflicts among identity groups have differences. Galtungian faultlines are based on “gender, generation, race, class – (political, economic, military, cultural).”39 His notion of faultlines stems from power relations, i.e. the dichotomy of dominance and subordination.40 On the other hand, in this book identity groups or faultlines are based on perceived or actual distinct features in ethnicity, race, values, ideology, world views, religion, customs or in any other salient factor.41 As opposed to the Galtungian egalitarian approach42 that seeks to correct imbalances of power embedded in aforementioned divisions, this study 37

See also Ryan for an account indicating Galtung’s concept of positive peace lacks “relational” or identity relations aspect, Stephen Ryan, “The Evolution of Peacebuilding,” in (ed.) Roger Mac Ginty, Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 25–35 at 32–33. 38 See, Webel and Galtung (2007), op. cit., p. 18. 39 Ibid., p. 28. 40 Ibid. 41 See text accompanying footnote 13. 42 Galtung recognises that “…the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power…” and “…resources.” See, Galtung (1969), op. cit., pp. 175, 183.

112

chapter 3

accepts that all systems will produce and reproduce classes or disparities of power and capabilities across genders and generations. The suggested positive peace approach, therefore, involves addressing the inequalities in capabilities and access to basic human needs on the grounds of the aforementioned identity differentiations, including the Galtungian race and cultural class categories, as in the present work they are considered as the outcome of deliberate actions or neglect. This is not to disregard that any political and economic system is a human construct and that power disparities in the ensuing political and economic classes can be linked to deeply-entrenched deliberate human action or intention. Yet, by focusing on horizontal inequalities across identity groups in the socio-economic, political and cultural status realms, rather than on vertical inequalities in power and resource distribution, deliberate human action and/ or neglect and required policies to address them could be more effectively identified.43 It is also acknowledged that the Galtungian egalitarian approach to addressing social injustices would anticipate formations of divisions and identity groupings. However, given the egalitarian approach seeking vertical equality is a very extensive objective, it would be hard to achieve, and thus would not be a viable method for conflict prevention under the UN system. In sum, this study’s notion of positive peace, as well as its PPF, has features similar to Galtung’s positive peace vision and his TRANSCEND model, which considers dialogue and conflict transformation as the means for the pursuit of positive peace.44 Similar to Galtung’s vision for transforming “conflict attitudes”,45 the PPF envisions tackling Fundamental Conflicts via dialogue. 43

44 45

The bottom and top segments of political, economic or cultural classes rarely, if ever, fight each other. For conflict-proneness of identity groups compared to class-based groups see, Vally Koubi and Tobias Böhmelt, “Grievances, Economic Wealth, and Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research (published online; 30 October 2013), p. 4. Galtung also argues that absolute poverty/deprivations may not cause direct violence, Galtung (1969), op. cit., pp. 181, 182. Empirical findings suggest that inequalities accross identity groups, rather than class-based or vertical inequalities, cause armed conflict; see Oskar N.T. Thoms and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?” Human Rights Quarterly 29/3 (2007), pp. 674–705, at 687, 690, 692–693. See also Stewart (2008), op. cit.; and the discussion at footnote 74 below. Webel and Galtung (2007), op. cit., p. 17. Building upon Galtung’s conflict triangle, namely conflict, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes, Höglund and Kovacs define ‘conflict attitudes’ as following: “capture[s] the ­psychological states or conditions – attitudes, emotions and perceptions – that develop between the parties in a conflict.” Höglund and Kovacs (2010), op. cit., p. 375. In this study this is understood as exclusionary attitudes, which constitute intensive tensions and lead to polarisation or fragmentation of the society along the divisive/identity lines. See also Miall, who reformulates Galtungian attitudes category as relational aspect of conflict for

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

113

Yet, the nuance of this study’s positive peace approach lies in that it conceptualises Fundamental Conflicts as the source of conflict attitudes across identity divisions. This is different from Galtung’s assumption of conflict attitude across classes due to power discrepancy, in that Fundamental Conflicts notion is intended to explain and link power discrepancies to deliberate human action or neglect. Furthermore, differing from Galtung’s positive peace definition it does not refer to a comprehensive understanding of social justice based on vertical equality or class/gender/generation-based equality. Rather, this study employs social justice narrowly as amounting to horizontal equality, specifically comparative equality and non-discrimination across existing identity groups in pursuit of a life in dignity. This conception excludes injustices that individuals may experience sporadically, and for which a causal link to armed conflict cannot reasonably be established, from the purview of the suggested positive peace approach.46 In International Relations and specifically in peace and conflict studies literature there are other positive peace conceptualisations such as the ‘civil peace’ or inclusive hybrid peace notions under the post-liberal peace category.47 The positive peace concept suggested in this book also strives for a civil peace among society members. Paine associates civil peace, which he defines as the absence of riots against governments, with economic welfare and the principle of equality.48 Similarly, The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) defines civil peace as “a condition of enduring social, economic, and political stability, such that the thought of taking up arms against one’s government becomes inconceivable.”49 With regard to safeguarding civil peace within states, PRIO emphasises power-sharing and fair resource distribution.50 For

46 47 48 49 50

a conflict transformation framework. Hugh Miall (2004), “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task,” in (eds.) Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook, pp. 8–10. Available at http:// www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/ miall_handbook.pdf (last visited, 22.05.2015). Both horizontal equality and dignified life will be elaborated in Chapter 4, Section 2. For another conceptualisation of positive peace, its measurement and relevant indicators see, Global Peace Index 2015 Report, op. cit., pp. 80–90. See, John W. Seaman, “Thomas Paine: Ransom, Civil Peace, and the Natural Right to Wel­ fare,” Political Theory, Vol. 16/1 (1988), pp. 120–142, at 135–136. See PRIO Civil Peace Working Group webpage available at http://www.prio.no/Working -Groups/Group/?x=8 (last visited 26.08.2013). See, Scott Gates and Kaare Strøm, “Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes,” PRIO Policy Brief, 2007, p. 1. Available at http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-471960041/ Theoretical_framework_report.pdf (last visited 31.01.2012).

114

chapter 3

safeguarding global civil peace, efforts to promote democracy and “economic well-being” are suggested.51 Positive peace as the absence of Fundamental Conflicts also implies good governance that safeguards a degree of egalitarian or fair distribution of power and welfare to ensure that there are no discrepancies in enjoying a life in dignity. Yet, it differs from these civil peace formulas in that it emphasises horizontal equality in pursuit of dignified life across identity faultlines. Furthermore, the positive peace notion presented in this study has similarities with the “Participatory,” “Everyday” and “Popular Peace” notions and their frameworks, which also aim for self-sustaining intra-state peace. “Everyday” and “Popular Peace” can be categorised under the post-liberal peace label as they are designed to address the limitations of the liberal peace pursuit (i.e. UN peacebuilding), which are seen as insensitive towards local ownership, emancipation, everyday needs and empowerment of the people in societies being “re-built”.52 In order to address these concerns, both conceptions suggest a framework that seeks a new “social contract” via dialogical processes. Moreover, they emphasise the inclusion of the local population in these processes to identify “everyday needs” and set out the terms of peacebuilding strategies. Similarly, from within the liberal peace tradition, Participatory Peace attempts to overcome the limitations of peacebuilding efforts to bring about sustainable peace by pursuing stronger participatory models and enhancing local ownership.53 This study’s suggested positive peace concept differs from these peace notions in that it is conceptualised as part of a more comprehensive approach encompassing also non-conflict situations in a systemic manner. In contrast, these existing peace concepts entail a narrow approach constituting merely a post-conflict and ad hoc peacebuilding strategy.

51

52

53

UN’s peacebuilding efforts are denoted as serving this purpose yet more democracy promotion is seen as necessary. See, Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Towards a Global Civil Peace,” PRIO Publications, 16 January 2004, p. 1. Oliver P. Richmond, “A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday,” Review of International Studies 35/03 (2009), pp. 557–580. See also, David Roberts, “Beyond the Metropolis? Popu­lar Peace and Post-conflict Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 37/5 (2011), pp. 2535–2556. Participatory peace underlines democratisation and transformation of the society to internalise democratic values, and reach “a path toward democratic civil peace.” Doyle and Sambanis (2006), op. cit., pp. 19.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

4

115

Fundamental Conflicts vs. Existing Explanations of Intra-State Armed Conflicts

This study refers to the generic term of intra-state armed conflict, which is understood to encompass political armed struggles involving non-state actors against other non-state actors within the given state or against the government/state. In conflict resolution literature, Gurr and Davies describe intrastate armed conflicts as “ethnopolitical conflicts”54 if the primary non-state actor(s) to the conflict display distinct “ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics.”55 Azar refers to such intra-state conflicts as “protracted social conflicts” if they last for a prolonged time.56 These conflicts can take the form of armed uprisings, revolutions, ethnic/religious/sectarian inter-communal armed conflicts, “ideological/secessionist challenges,” or if intensified as civil wars (i.e. non-international armed conflict in humanitarian law terms).57 Under international humanitarian law (IHL), “protracted armed confrontations” reaching a significant level of intensity between government forces and organised armed group(s) of non-state/government actors refer to non-international armed conflict.58 Because this study seeks to contribute to the prevention of the protracted conflicts, it is necessary for its positive peace 54

Ted Robert Gurr and John Davies, “Dynamics and Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts,” in (eds.) John L. Davies, Edward Kaufman, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 31–48, at 31. 55 Edward Azar (2002), “Protracted Social Conflicts and Second Track Diplomacy,” in Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 15–30, at 16. Gurr and Davies (2002), op. cit., p. 31. 56 See Azar (2002), ibid., pp. 15–16. 57 Caprioli defines internal conflict “as violence within state borders with citizens and their government as antagonists.” See, Mary Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), pp. 161–178, at 162. “[I]nternal conflicts and wars” may take the form of “ethnic, revolutionary, anti-colonial, post-colonial and possibly others.” See, Thoms and Ron (2007), op. cit., p. 683. See also, Michael Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, in (ed.) Michael E. Brown (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 1. For an account of the misnomer ethnic conflict, see Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, Responses (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p. 5. 58 See http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-inter national-armed-conflict.htm. See also, Sylvain Vite, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in Inter­ national Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations,” International Review of the Red Cross 91/873 (2009), pp. 69–94, at 81, 76–77, available at http://www.icrc.org/ eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf (last visited, 03.07.2013).

116

chapter 3

notion to encompass tackling of less intense violence that do not fall under the ambit of IHL. The main purpose of this study’s positive peace notion is not merely the prevention of high-intensity “all-out civil wars or genocide,”59 but also of lowintensity armed struggles (i.e. guerrilla warfare), inter-communal armed conflicts or violence (i.e. non-battle related conflicts), as well as pervasive discourses on resort to armed means for political matters. Ultimately, it is aimed to rule out the perception that armed means present a legitimate option for advancing basic human needs or political aspirations.60 Although violent organised crimes by armed gangs or mafia may threaten positive peace, in this book they are not perceived as falling under the definitions of intra-state conflict and violence. This stance is taken because violent organised crimes are not political struggles for legitimate causes such as advancing human needs, but rather they often follow such political armed conflicts to finance and sustain them.61 The remainder of this section provides an overview of the literature on the causes of armed conflict. The next sub-section will juxtapose tackling Fundamental Conflicts with the existing UN approach for tackling root causes, namely with UN’s peacebuilding measures. The causes of armed conflicts are divided into two categories: (1) underlying or structural; and (2) mobilising, trigger or proximate causes. Trigger/proximate events denote immediate causes of conflicts, such as the assassination of important opposition figures or an assault on sacred places. Structural causes refer to political, socio-economic and cultural structures that create a fertile environment for exclusionary and antagonistic relationships, and thus armed conflicts.62 59 60

61 62

See Brown (1996), op. cit., p. 1. As Webel points out, peace is about to “delegitimize political violence both from above (by the state) and from below (by non-state actors).” Charles Webel, “Introduction,” in (eds.) Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 8. For the debate of including organised crimes into the definition of intra-state conflict, see Bell (2006), op. cit., p. 12. See, Stewart (2002), op. cit., p. 111, 116. Gardner denotes “mobilising causes” as the private/ economic incentives of the leaders, which lead to mobilisation of their followers for armed violence. See, Anne-Marie Gardner, “Diagnosing Conflict: What We Know?” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 15–40, at 15–25. See also, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini and Victoria Stanski (2004), “Conflict Prevention,” in A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action Conflict Prevention, Resolution and

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

117

Studies on the causes of armed conflict do not claim to provide law-like formulas capable of explaining all armed conflicts. In general, these studies suggest each society has its own dynamics and numerous risk factors. They highlight that peace or armed conflict cannot be explained only by one factor. Nevertheless, the literature on the causes of armed conflict has reached a consensus on four risk factors.63 Grievance (long-term actual or perceived injustices and an accompanying sense of insecurity), greed (aspirations for economic/private gains), “social-political motivations”64 of the masses and the elites of the given society, and external factors (neighbouring countries’ or third parties’ motivations and influences) are accepted as the main causes of internal conflicts.65 These factors and intra-state armed conflicts are regarded as occurring primarily in heterogonous societies. Of these four risk factors, only grievance falls under the structural causes category as the other three do not refer to social arrangements and structures, but merely to human motivations. In general, grievance, understood as actual or perceived injustices in the form of formal or informal discrimination and the accompanying insecurities, is recognised as the main cause of armed conflicts.66 In the Prevention of Armed Conflict Report, Secretary-General Kofi

63

64 65

66

Reconstruction, Publication of Hunt Alternatives Fund and International Alert, available at http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/28_conflict_prevention.pdf (last visited, 03.03.2011). Despite difficulties for generalising the causes of armed conflicts, Gardner argues there is an ‘emerging consensus’ on the causes of intra-state armed conflicts. See, Gardner (2002), ibid., p. 17. The R2P report also enumerates “poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution of resources” as the root causes that attract “widespread recognition.” See, The Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect,” 2001, para 3.19. See, Cordell and Wolff (2010), op. cit., p. 5. Byman points four main causes of ethnic conflicts are “ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and the aspirations of elites.” Daniel L. Byman, Keeping the Peace (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 13–22. Cordell and Wolff point out in the literature there are four categories of conflict risk factors: “insecurity” (grievance and inequality); “greed” (economic ambitions); “social-psychological motivations” (individual perceptions of the group members); and lastly “external factors” (neighbouring states). See, Cordell and Wolff, ibid., pp. 25–43. Gurr explains rebellion with systemic discrimination rather than “merely [with] inequality or diversity.” For Murshed “…grievance…provides the motivation for a group to use violence…based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is treated.” Cited in Caprioli (2005), op. cit., p. 162. Stewart argues “group mobilization for violent actions is unlikely to occur in the absence of serious grievances at both leadership and mass level.” See, Stewart (2008), op. cit., p. 12. See, Brown (1996), op. cit., pp. 12–23.

118

chapter 3

Annan identifies inequity (unfairness) and inequality against “identity groups,” injustice (non-existence of the rule of law), and insecurity (human insecurity) as the sources of grievance.67 Azar’s theory of protracted social conflicts explains that unmet human needs, “such as security, identity, and development needs, and political access” are “the primary motivating factors” for both the formation of identity groups and the occurrences of intra-state armed conflicts.68 Gurr and Davies point out relative deprivations (inequality) and the sense of injustice as the risk factors for armed mobilisation.69 Likewise, both Stewart and Brown emphasise the role of grievance stemming from discrimination in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres in causing intra-state armed conflict.70 Stewart also builds on Azar’s needs-based explanation by emphasising actual or perceived relative/comparative inequalities in meeting human needs across identity groups in her Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) thesis.71 Similarly, following Azar, Rothman maintains that initially tangible needsbased conflicts (i.e. interest-based conflicts over resources) not addressed in a timely manner lead to protracted identity-based conflicts at the national or community level.72 Zartman explains that protracted conflicts are initially needs-based conflicts. When a group’s demands for basic needs are not addressed, it results in “creed” (i.e. the perception that they undergo “selective deprivation and discrimination based on”73 their identity) which then leads to “greed” (i.e. “ambitions for private gains”) in order to be self-sufficient and powerful in order to sustain their cause against the opponent.74 As Mitchell points 67

The report refers grievance as one of the “key structural risk factors that fuel violent conflict.” See, Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985-S/2001/574, para. 100 [hereinafter Prevention of Armed Conflict]. 68 Azar (2002), op. cit., pp. 18, 21–22. Azar denotes identity groups as the level of analysis of his conflict resolution approach, see also in Ramsbotham et al. (2011), op. cit., p. 100. 69 Davies and Gurr (2002), op. cit., pp. 32–33. For an account of the earlier literature linking inequality/grievances and intra-state armed conflicts, and for the literature that contests these works, see Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (New York: CUP, 2013), pp. 11–29. 70 See Brown (1996), op. cit., pp. 14–22. 71 For the study of the linkages with HIs and armed conflicts see, Stewart (2008), op. cit., p. 13. 72 Rothman (1997), op. cit., p. 146. 73 Cynthia J. Arnson, “The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate,” in (eds.) Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), pp. 1–22, at 11. 74 I. William Zartman, “Conflict Resolution and Negotiation,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 322–339 at 329. In contrast, Collier and Hoeffler’s study

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

119

out, protracted conflicts are prolonged not because of “the original goal incompatibility,” but because the parties follow a “pattern of…action-reaction sequence”75 which generates additional peripheral issues and further fuels the conflict. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Sierra Leone described the widely held explanation of the country’s conflict as “simplistic”76 because it merely linked the conflict to private ambition to control natural resources, particularly diamonds, and failed to consider the decay of the state or the deeper structural reasons that generated greed in the first place. The TRC stressed that state institutions had been a tool for advancing the private wealth of power holders which eventually led to the failure of the state.77 Similar to Zartman’s explanation, the TRC regarded greed as the consequence of wider political and structural conditions and viewed diamonds as the “indirect causes and fuelling elements of the war.”78 The concept of Fundamental Conflicts draws upon the identity-focused and grievance or needs-based explanations. This does not disregard that greed for private gains and/or struggles for political and economic power may have a significant role in causing and/or sustaining conflicts.79 On the contrary, identity-focused and needs-based explanations suggest that the deeply rooted causes of armed conflicts are initially found in tangible human needs. As Rothman points out, .

75

76 77

78 79

illustrates the impact of greed (opportunity and economic variables), rather than grievances, on causing armed conflict, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grie­ vance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), pp. 563–595. For an account of a new dataset that illustrates the validity of grievance-based explanations of ethnic civil wars and Stewart’s HIs thesis, see Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug (2013), op. cit. For a dataset testing HIs thesis in 55 countries, see also Gudrun Ostby, “Inequalities, The Political Environment and Civil Conflict: Evidence from 55 Developing Countries,” in Stewart (2008), op. cit, pp. 136–159. See, Christopher R. Mitchell (2011), “Conflict, Change and Conflict Resolution,” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, p. 77 available at http://www.berghof-handbook. net/documents/publications/mitchell_handbookII.pdf (last visited, 06.09.2013). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Sierra Leone, Volume 3B, para 8, p. 4. available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html (last visited, 06.09.2013). Ibid., para 4, p. 3 and para 14, p. 6. See also International Crisis Group, Report on Sierra Leone, N° 49, 15 Jul 2002 available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/ sierra-leone/049-sierra-leone-after-elections-politics-as-usual.aspx (last visited, 06.09.2013). Ibid., para 4, p. 3. As Pauline Kerr puts it there is a circular relationship between perceived root causes of violence (lack of human development such as poverty) and political violence itself; causes and consequences are mutually reinforced. See, Pauline Kerr, “Human Security,” in (ed.) Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p. 99.

120

chapter 3

latent identity divisions would become salient and require more complex conflict resolution methods if human needs are not addressed through participatory decision-making procedures.80 Drawing upon Rothman’s argument, this book hypothesises that the resolution of incompatibilities among society members could be less complex if addressed early. During the early stages interest-based techniques (i.e. compromise or bargaining) could be deployed to successfully resolve conflicts. Hence, the Fundamental Conflicts concept is set as the PPF’s objective with a view to capturing and addressing grievances as early as possible, ideally before they cause further polarisations or fragmentations in the society and trigger further root causes of armed conflicts. Differing from earlier identity-based explanations, the notion of Fundamental Conflicts is conceptualised to emphasise we-they divisions themselves as the subject matter to be addressed, rather than merely their outcomes, i.e. discrimination and inequality, and structural issues. The present work presupposes the following four-tiered relationship between Fundamental Conflicts and the widely acknowledged root causes of conflicts such as unmet human needs, grievances, HIs, formal/informal discrimination and human rights violations: (1) Once identity groups are formed due to unmet human needs and there are continued unmet human needs, Fundamental Conflicts (i.e. antagonistic “we-they” divisions) are presupposed to ensue. (2) Fundamental Conflicts would cause continued or further deliberate formal and informal discrimination and HIs in the social, economic and political spheres. It is assumed that it is the existence of identity divisions that causes deliberate deprivations and/or neglect of addressing discrimination and human rights violations. The deliberate continued violations are expected to entrench Fundamental Conflicts and polarisations or fragmentations. In this line of argument non-intentional/structural unmet human needs that play a role in the formations of identity and then Fundamental Conflicts are distinguished from deliberately unmet human needs of particular identity groups. The suggested PPF concerns the latter and thus its functioning would not be affected by possible diverse theories on the pedigree of identity and identity division formations.81 (3) Due to actual or perceived HIs and discrimination, the disadvantaged groups are expected to develop grievances (i.e. feelings of injustice). (4) Consequently, grievances are expected to deepen identity divisions. As grievances are acknowledged to often lead to armed conflicts when 80 81

Rothman (1997), op. cit., p. 146. Distinct conflict resolution methods for identity issues will be elaborated on in Chapter 6. For a similar view that considers identity formation before the occurrence of violent conflict (i.e. in the non-violent phases of conflict), rather than after violent conflicts, see Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013), op. cit., p. 23.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

121

the balance of power changes82 or trigger events occur, Fundamental Conflicts are taken to signify the deep-rooted causes of armed conflicts. In a nutshell, if there are identity differences within the society and basic human needs are not met, it is expected that these identity differences would turn into Fundamental Conflicts (i.e. deep identity divisions) that are accompanied with tensions and exclusionary and antagonistic behaviour. And once there are identity divisions, it is presupposed there would be further discrimination leading to visible HIs, and grievances would be formed, which would further entrench Fundamental Conflicts and lead to deeper divisions/polarisations. The theories on the causes of armed conflict are only general explanations. It may not be possible to establish a clear causal link between grievances, the formation of identity divisions and armed conflicts in each case as the causes of armed conflicts are often intertwined. Furthermore, it is also acknowledged that the aforementioned theories cannot be used as general predictors of escalation into armed conflict. As many critics point out, prevention is hard to prove. In other words, it may not be possible to demonstrate that an armed conflict has been prevented because grievances were tackled in a timely manner. While these general limitations on the prediction and prevention of armed conflicts are not repudiated, this study advocates tackling these general risk factors of armed conflicts as ends themselves since they pose threats to positive and sustainable peace.83 This stance can be supported on two grounds. First, Gurr’s Minorities at Risk project suggests that the five risk factors it identified helped to predict retrospectively the occurrence of armed conflicts correctly 75 percent of the time.84 Second, the limitations pertaining to the theoretical dimensions of prevention have not precluded tackling these widely recognised root causes as objectives of the UN peacebuilding and structural preventive mechanisms or preventive informal/second-track diplomacy.85 Hence, even if predictions for the escalation of disputes into armed conflict were to be incorrect at times, the outcome of this model would still strengthen the UN’s role in contributing to positive peace on the ground, and thus to sustainable peace and long-term prevention of armed conflicts. 82 83

84

85

Rothchild (2009), op. cit., p. 261. See also Stewart (2002), op. cit., p. 132, who argues that given the “heavy human costs… some action [against the threats of violence must be] taken on the basis of current knowledge” even if these bear some ambiguity. These risk factors are: group incentives; salience of group identity; group capacity; domestic and/or international opportunity factors for collective action. Gurr’s study of 2000 is cited in Gurr and Davies (2002), op. cit., pp. 31–34. Gurr and Davies, and Azar among others suggest informal/track-two diplomacy as a tool for prevention, this will be elaborated further in Chapter 6.

122

chapter 3

4.1 Tackling Fundamental Conflicts vis-à-vis Other Root Causes There are nuances between seeking to tackle Fundamental Conflicts and other perceived root causes of armed conflicts. In the neo-Kantian tradition, violations of human rights, and the lack of democracy and liberal institutions are regarded as the root causes of armed conflicts. Hence UN (liberal) peacebuilding measures involve institutional reform, democratisation, and the promotion and protection of human rights.86 Conversely, this book conceptualises Fundamental Conflicts to provide an explanation for the non-flourishing of human rights (i.e. formal and informal discrimination) and a democratic culture, and for the existence of Horizontal Inequalities and consequent grievances. As elaborated above, in light of Rothman’s identity formation explanation, Fundamental Conflicts, like identity formations, are held to result from unmet human needs and/or the initial incompatible tangible or intangible aspirations. These we-they distinctions are assumed to cause exclusionary and antagonistic relationships, and to exacerbate formal and informal discrimination and disparities in the enjoyment of basic human needs. It is to be acknowledged it may not be possible to verify in which sequence divisions and discrimination form, namely whether discrimination or divisions/Fundamental Conflicts occur first, even if further research is carried out. Even in the absence of valid answers, a model for tackling Fundamental Conflicts can be claimed as more conducive to giving rise to positive peace and cohesive societies. From an operational point of view, it is not necessary to determine at the outset whether exclusionary identity formations and fundamental incompatibilities occurred first or whether discriminatory structural arrangements led to their formation, as long as the DPP mechanism aims to (1) initiate dialogue across groups for normalising the identity differences that obstruct the full internalisation of human rights within a given society and (2) simultaneously initiate deliberations for institutional reform to eliminate formal and informal discrimination. Thereby the suggested positive peace approach would entail addressing both relational and structural risk factors of armed conflict and differ from prevailing root-cause tackling methods of the UN liberal peacebuilding. The UN peacebuilding measures seek to tackle formal discrimination and ensuing grievances as the root causes of conflicts through employing blueprints entailing the promotion of human rights and democracy and state/ 86

For a brief account of the UN’s root cause prevention methods, see R2P report paras 3.21–3.24. See also Prevention of Armed Conflict, para 19. SG argues for strengthening the respect for human rights as an antidote to armed conflicts, see Interim Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, para 18.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

123

institution-building. However, these blueprints are pointed out to be often “blind” to HIs and being not capable of addressing HIs and the root causes of armed conflicts in themselves.87 State apparatuses in divided societies are often not neutral to ensure full-fledged reforms and implementation of human rights standards to eliminate formal discrimination and effects of past discrimination. Furthermore, as the case of Sri Lanka illustrates, mere HIs reduction is not a panacea. Stewart points out the way past HIs were addressed by the previously disadvantaged Sinhalese majority group has generated new HIs against the Tamil minority group, led to new tensions, and ultimately “provoked” Tamils into resorting to armed means in Sri Lanka.88 The DPP mechanism is designed to engage with Fundamental Conflicts as a means to addressing existing HIs and grievances extensively, and preventing the development of new ones. Once divisions are mended or alleviated, it is anticipated inequalities can be addressed without giving rise to new conflicts. Hence a positive peace approach entailing to tackle Fundamental Conflicts via the DPP mechanism rather than efforts for the mere reduction of discrimination and/or HIs per se would be more conducive to tackling HIs and ultimately to sustainable peace. In sum, the positive peace approach suggested in this study promotes the idea of tackling Fundamental Conflicts as a means to comprehensively tackling grievances and HIs. It differs from the UN’s prevailing root-cause tackling approach by introducing identity and relational dimensions. The objective of tackling Fundamental Conflicts via deliberative processes in the DPP mechanism would broaden the existing root-cause tackling practice of UN postconflict peacebuilding and address its limitations with regard to local ownership and participatory approaches. 5

The Foundations of the DPP Mechanism

The notions and implications of dialogue and deliberation are distinct.89 Dialogue refers to “a way of communicating… [i.e.] talking and listening,”90 87 88 89

90

For the overview of policy suggestions on HIs reductions, see Stewart (2008), op. cit., p. 304. See also, Stewart (2002), op. cit., pp. 127–131. Ibid., pp. 123–125. Saunders (2009), op. cit, p. 377. See also Katherine Cramer Walsh, “The Democratic Potential of Civic Dialogue,” in (ed.) Shawn Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation, and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 45–63, at 46. Saunders (2009), ibid.

124

chapter 3

or put differently “sharing information about perspectives”91 with the goal of achieving understanding among the interacting parties, which can then be expanded to their wider grassroots. On the other hand, deliberation refers to collective decision-making following a debate, which involves “weighing the reasons.”92 The notion of deliberation is integral to the quest for democratic legitimacy and self-governance, which strive to bind people only with laws to which they have assented.93 Dialogue is seen as “an essential precursor to deliberation,”94 although the reverse is not necessarily the case. It is important that the parties relate to and understand each other in order to be ready to modify/transform their preexisting attitudes as well as positions on the given incompatibility. Zartman’s “ripeness” thesis stresses that conflicting parties eventually reach stages in which they are able to relate each other and agree to conflict resolution measures. This often occurs after exhausting their resources and energies in violent conflicts.95 This study suggests the PPF as an instrument for helping accelerate conflicting parties’ readiness to communicate “constructively”96 in the pre-conflict, rather than in post-conflict, contexts. Therefore, the DPP is envisaged as a standardised mechanism within the PPF to facilitate dialogue and deliberation among the state and non-state actors of the given society for tackling Fundamental Conflicts. The remainder of this section, first, briefly looks at Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative models, and then pinpoints the PPF’s similarities with and differences from these models. Tracing the DPP Mechanism’s Foundations in Habermas’s Discourse Theory and Rawls’s Original Position Rawls’s Original Position (OP) and Habermas’s Discourse Theory (DT) provide seminal ideas on deliberative and communicative methods,97 which explain

5.1

91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Walsh (2007), op. cit., p. 46. Ibid, p. 49. See also Joshua Cohen (2007), “Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberation, Partici­ pation, and Democracy, op. cit., pp. 219–236, at 219. See Manin, Cohen, Benhabib cited in John S Dryzek (2007), “Theory, Evidence, and Tasks of Deliberation,” Deliberation, Participation, and Democracy, op. cit., pp. 237–250, at 242. Walsh (2007), op. cit., p. 46. See text accompanying footnote 76 in Chapter 6. Saunders (2009), op. cit., p. 377. For an account of Rawls on the similarities of Habermas’s ideal discourse situation and his own original position as citizens’ representation devices see, John Rawls “Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92/3 (1995), pp. 132–180, at 139–140 [hereinafter “Reply to Habermas”]. See also, Dryzek (2007), op. cit., pp. 237–238.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

125

the ideal conditions for legitimate law- and decision-making in pre-existing democratic societies. Both involve aspects of conflict resolution acknowledging the inevitability of disagreements over political and legal matters due to underlying moral or ethical convictions, i.e. reasonable pluralism. Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative models rely on a pre-existing democratic culture and do not concern non-democratic/liberal societies.98 Habermas’s deliberative model of democracy, the Discourse Theory,99 empha­ sises linguistic/discursive communication, regarding it as the foundation of political deliberation, which is ultimately the basis of legitimate self-governance. In Habermas’s model, dialogical and deliberative communicative actions are pursued in separate venues. Public talk, or “subjectless communi­cations,”100 are pursued in “informal networks of public sphere”101 (i.e. civil society), and unlike deliberations they do not have a decision-making function, rather they serve public opinion/will formation. On the other hand, deliberation is pursued in the political sphere, primarily in “parliamentary bodies.” In Habermas’s democratic model, the distinct communicative processes in the public and political spheres are “inter-subjective.” Although public talks in civil society do not have any direct influence on political decisions, Habermas points out that opinion and will formation takes place in these informal spheres, and public opinion influences electoral behaviour and outcomes of elections. Public opinion also influences legislative decisions through elections as they provide input into parliamentary deliberative processes, and thus ultimately influence executive, or administrative, power.102 The method of deliberation can be traced to Rawls’s political theory. Rawls regards deliberative democracy as a feature of well-ordered constitutional societies. For Rawls deliberative democracy and public reasoning presuppose each other. Deliberative democracy requires public reasoning, and to realise 98

Bohman argues both Rawls’s and Habermas’s appeal to substantive/communicative public reason are insufficient to deal with deep – irreconcilable – moral conflicts. See, James Bohman, “Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral Conflict,” Political Theory 23/2 (1995), pp. 253–279, at 256–257. 99 He describes DT as “an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision making” as a third normative model of democracy consisting of features of both republican and liberal models of democracy. See, Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 296 [hereinafter BFN]. Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, (eds.) Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), p. 246 [hereinafter TIO]. 100 BFN, p. 299. 101 TIO, p. 248. 102 BFN, pp. 183–184, 299.

126

chapter 3

public reasoning, institutions and basic rights and liberties integral to constitutional deliberative democracy are required.103 Rawls stresses that the OP with its “four-stage sequence” is both a hypothetical construct and “an actual political process” valid in democratic societies.104 At its abstract level, the OP is an extension of the social contract tradition.105 It is a deliberative device in which citizens, who endorse different comprehensive doctrines, debate to identify common principles of political justice, namely the foundations of the basic political and legal structures.106 Rawlsian comprehensive doctrines consist of any set of values and convictions that are inherently exclusive.107 Rawls points out both in the OP and actual settings of deliberation an appeal to public reason is required to reach an ‘overlapping consensus’ – i.e. an agreement based on differing reasons. Deliberation involves providing justification to one’s positions by appealing to public reason,108 namely reasoning according to the criterion of reciprocity as opposed to one’s convictions dictated by their moral, religious, or political comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, Rawls introduces the substantive criterion of “the veil of ignorance,”109 namely nonappeal to and non-reflection of one’s doctrines and interests for successfully carrying out deliberations in the OP. The fact of pluralism of the comprehensive doctrines also necessitates an appeal to reasonableness, namely the pursuit of cooperative attitude, mutual respect and reciprocity.110 Rawlsian OP as an actual political process derives from the abstract OP, which sets out the principles of justice and the social contract of the given society. The actual political deliberations occur in the remaining three stages. In the second stage, the founding delegates design the constitution according to the principles of justice arrived at in the hypothetical first stage. In the third 103 Freeman points out that the idea of public reason is integral to deliberative democracy, which is “the primary forum that public reasoning takes place.” Samuel Richard Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 403–404. LoP, pp. 138–140. 104 Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” op. cit., p. 151. 105 Freeman (2007), op. cit., p. 13. 106 John Rawls, “Postscript,” in (eds.) James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Demo­ cracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1997), pp. 131–143, at 132 [hereinafter “Postscript”]. 107 Nussbaum points out that Rawls’s focus has been “on the issue of religious and secular pluralism” in his works preceding Political Liberalism. Martha Nussbaum, “Rawls’s Political Liberalism. A Reassessment,” Ratio Juris 24/1 (2011), pp. 1–24, at 3. 108 LoP, p. 133. 109 LoP, p. 31. 110 See, Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” p. 134. See, Rawls, “Postscript,” p. 132. Freeman (2007), op. cit., pp. 345–351.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

127

stage, “legislators enact laws [in line with] the constitution.” In the fourth and final stage, the judiciary “interprets the constitution and laws.”111 In sum, the initially abstract construct OP is revived in actual “public political”112 spheres whenever judges, legislators, executives and candidates for public offices appeal to public reason when addressing political disputes.113 Rawls, like Dworkin, regards deliberative authorities, e.g. the High Court, as the most appropriate democratic institution to resolve competing human rights claims. For example, the debate on abortion, which involves women’s rights on the one hand, and the right to life of the foetus on the other, is best handled in the High Court by resorting to public reason rather than to one’s convictions.114 In addition to the public political sphere, Rawls envisages civil society as another venue where public reason is to prevail. However, civil society involves “endless political discussions,”115 or in Habermassian terminology public talks, rather than deliberations with political decision-making functions. Yet, Rawls acknowledges citizens also have an indirect deliberative role. When they cast their votes, they exercise public reason and influence political deliberations by electing their legislators.116 In his Reply to Habermas, Rawls acknowledges that their understanding of civil society is similar and states his exclusion of an appeal to comprehensive doctrines in the civil political sphere is no longer valid.117 Nevertheless he stresses that the “idea of public reason” should prevail in the “public political” sphere, especially in high court judges’ decisions. Rawls accepts that there will be disagreements on the content of justice118 and public reason or deliberative devices (the High Court) would not often lead to “general agreements” in cases of conflicts deriving from “reasonable disagreements between reasonable and rational persons.”119 Conversely, he believes conflicts stemming from “irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines” can still be resolved in deliberative settings through an appeal to public reason 111 112 113 114

115 116 117 118 119

Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” pp. 151–152. Such as in legislative, executive and judicial branches of democratic regimes. See, LoP, p. 131. See, LoP, pp. 55–56, 131. See Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” footnote 13, at 140. See Ronald Dworkin, “The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise,” in (eds.) Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald C. Slye, Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights (London, New Haven: Yale University Press: 1999), pp. 81–115. For a contrary account defending the will of the citizens (i.e. majoritarianism) see Jeremy Waldron, “Deliberation, Disagreement, and Voting,” in ibid., pp. 210–226. Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” p. 140. LoP, p. 135. Rawls, “Postscript,” p. 135. LoP, pp. 131–132. “Reply to Habermas,” p. 140. Freeman (2007), op. cit., p. 379. LoP, p. 177.

128

chapter 3

and a political conception of justice.120 Rawls conceptualises overlapping consensus as a means “to address the problem of stability”121 and as an alternative to modus vivendi. The latter cannot lead to stability as it involves bargaining and reaching a solution in the middle that does not meet any party’s expectations. However, overlapping consensus refers to a type of agreement that entails all parties’ common interest and presents “the best solution” despite all different perspectives. For value-pluralists modus vivendi as the strategic acceptance of the other or “the legitimacy of other’s positions”122 is an acceptable solution in a pluralistic world. On the other hand, Habermas notes that the resolution of value-oriented incompatibilities is more challenging compared to interest-based incompatibilities. Unlike Rawls, Habermas believes it is not possible to resolve valueoriented conflicts based on differing reasons, namely overlapping consensus.123 He envisages consensus based on the same reasons as the goal for the resolution of value-oriented conflicts. Yet, this understanding of perfect consensus relies on the pre-existing value-consensus that guides the settlement.124 Hence this outcome cannot be expected in deeply-divided societies where commonly shared value grounds are often lacking. In contrast, Rawlsian overlapping (or imperfect) consensus based on differing reasons125 can be argued to present a more realistic goal for the deliberative mechanisms in divided societies. Furthermore, unlike Rawls’s stance against temporal bargaining and modus vivendi, Habermas views compromise/bargaining as a means to resolving conflicts over interests. According to Habermas, interests-based incompatibilities allow the pursuit of strategic/rational reasoning and agreements on different reasons. This nevertheless requires a common value system that the parties can trust, which will ensure reciprocal respect to the norms.126 120 Rawls, “Postscript,” p. 138. See, LoP, p. 177. 121 Freeman (2007), op. cit., pp. 366, 370–371. 122 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 134–135,136. Mouffee, cited in John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alterna­ tives to Agonism and Analgesia,” Political Theory 33/2 (2005), pp. 218–242, at 220. See also Ignatieff’s position in the context of recognition of the other as the requirement of reconciliation process at footnote 50 in Chapter 4. 123 BFN, pp. 139, 140, 166. 124 BFN, p. 140, 165. 125 Rawls defines overlapping consensus as: “a consensus in which the same political conception is endorsed by the opposing reasonable comprehensive doctrines that gain a significant body of adherents and endure from one generation to the next.” See, John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 184. 126 BFN, pp. 140, 166–167, 180.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

129

5.2 The DPP Mechanism vis-à-vis Rawlsian and Habermassian Models Unlike the deliberative models of Habermas and Rawls, the PPF is designed for dealing with non-democratic or semi-democratic, divided societies. The PPF is intended to fill the gap in the current UN system between wide pluralism (namely allowing such regimes to co-exist in the international system without envisaging effective engagement for political reforms) and narrow pluralism (namely pursuing coercive measures against these regimes as a last resort measure). The DPP mechanism is envisaged to substitute the functions of democratic platforms and national conflict resolution mechanisms that are absent in non-liberal societies. It is envisioned to externally generate and facilitate democratic procedures and culture to enable dialogue and deliberation. In other words, the PPF is designed with a view to extending the application of the Rawlsian and Habermassian deliberative methods into non-liberal societies. The DPP mechanism can be resembled to Habermas’s parliamentary deliberative body in which representatives reflect the “perspectives” of their grassroots and work towards mutual understanding and common will formation in the face of plural perspectives.127 However, there will be differences as the PPF is developed for non-democratic or non-functioning democratic conflictprone societies. In Habermas’s model, “a liberal political culture”128 and the elected legislators that reflect public opinion are necessary elements, which cannot be presupposed in societies for which the DPP is designed. The DPP mechanism is envisaged to fulfil the functions of Habermas’s democratic deliberative bodies and public sphere in a single forum that is likely to reconvene multiple times. This is necessary to bring about the behavioural and procedural conditions required for dialogue and deliberation among the opposing groups. The DPP mechanism differs from deliberative parliamentary bodies envisioned by Habermas in that the non-elected elites from both ruling and ruled segments are expected to participate to the DPP. This top-down approach is conceptualised as the initial phase, which is to trigger and be followed by wider national or grassroots dialogue in the given society. Furthermore, the DPP mechanism is designed as a deliberative platform for initiating structural reforms to tackle Fundamental Conflicts. In sum, the DPP mechanism will fulfil both dialogical and deliberative/ decision-making roles simultaneously, as opposed to Habermas’s two-level model.129 This elite-run device would be vulnerable to democratic deficit as 127 BFN, pp. 181–183. 128 BFN, p. 184. 129 Dryzek juxtaposes deliberation with politics of difference, and refers to deliberation as a mechanism aiming at “collective decision” through persuasion as opposed to the latter’s

130

chapter 3

non-elected elites across divisions cannot be expected to fully represent the grassroots population in non-liberal societies. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this does not lessen the potential contribution of the PPF for conflict prevention and transformation in non-democratic regimes given the absence of better, i.e. more representative and legitimate, alternatives.130 The central objective of this book can be also depicted as extending the scope of Rawls’s main objective in his seminal work Political Liberalism (PL). In PL, Rawls searches the possibilities of stable and just societies in the face of “conflicting and incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines”;131 yet merely in pre-existing democracies. This study, on the other hand, searches the possibilities for stability and positive peace in nondemocratic divided societies, in particular through a new positive peace frame­ work under UN auspices. Rawls uses the OP as a model of representation where the relations of the deliberators are modelled to illustrate his argument for the possibility of stability despite (the fact of) pluralism.132 Rawls’s model emphasises the importance of citizens’ intrinsic allegiance to the institutions of the society as opposed to a forced allegiance by the use of the state’s or third parties’ coercive power.133 The PPF also seeks to engender non-coerced allegiance by facilitating dialogue and deliberations at the DPP mechanism. However, for the pursuit of positive peace through the PPF, the premises are in contrast to those of Rawls’s ideal theory. The PPF is anticipated to deal with “unreasonable pluralism”134 that does not exclude “irrational…mad [or] aggressive”135 positions from dialogical and deliberative processes. Hence the DPP mechanism would have a more challenging task than the OP because the attitudes of the deliberators cannot be controlled, as opposed to the Rawlsian ideal model through the criterion of reasonableness. Reasonableness,

130

131 132 133

134 135

dialogical basis aiming at conversion of the former “enemies into mere adversaries…as a result of…democratic attitude.” Dryzek (2005), op. cit., pp. 220, 224. See discussion in Chapter 6, Section 2 which elaborates the necessity of engaging elite leaders (i.e. non-state actors) across divisions for a sound conflict resolution/transformation and peace process. See also the limitations section at the Conclusion. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 133 [hereinafter PL]. See also Nussbaum (2011), op. cit., p. 11. LoP, footnote 32, at 30. See, LoP, footnote 2, at 13. See also PL, p. 146. Nussbaum describes stability for the right reasons refers to citizens’ “full and free endorsement rather than the oppressive use of force.” Nussbaum (2011), op. cit, p.2. See also Greg Dinsmore using this terminology cited in Shue (2002), op. cit., p. 311. PL, p. 144.

A Theoretical Justification for a New Positive Peace Vision

131

specifically a conciliatory attitude, is expected to be engendered during deliberations with the help of the UN facilitators, not before they take place given the often antagonistic atmosphere in divided societies.136 The DPP mechanism will entail two equally important objectives: (a) transforming the relationships (i.e. the antagonistic attitudes along we-they divisions) among the elite representatives with a view to triggering widespread transformation of the relationships in the whole society; and (b) determining the principles for structural reforms in the social, economic, legal and political spheres to both enable the transformation of the status quo and ultimately the transformation of antagonistic relationships. In a nutshell, the objectives, circumstances and function of the DPP mechanism can be argued to differ from Rawls’s intra-state and international OPs.137 6

Conclusion: The Place of the PPF within the Liberal Tradition

This chapter provided a summary of the Kantian and realist peace notions and frameworks and pointed out they do not entail a general positive intra-state peace theorisation that transcends the pre-existing liberal/democratic societies. It also pinpointed that the liberal tradition’s understanding of pluralism and the consequent two-tier system consisting of the inaction–reaction phases reproduces the limitations with regard to a systemic approach to a non-antagonistic engagement with non-ideal societies for building positive peace and preventing armed conflicts. To complement this system, this book suggests that tackling Fundamental Conflicts, which are conceptualised as the primary causes of non-flourishing of a liberal political culture, conditions and practices, should be considered integral to the notion of positive peace. This chapter claimed that a positive peace notion envisaged as the absence of Fundamental Conflicts (i.e. identity divisions) would provide a more comprehensive vision for peace. It argued that the new understanding of positive peace could be pursued pro-actively through a UN-facilitated deliberative and dialogical mechanism and thus entails a potential to overcome the UN’s separate positive peace vision that is now primarily practicable for pre-existing liberal societies. The proposed PPF and its DPP mechanism under UN auspices are conceptualised to expand the deliberative theories of Rawls and Habermas into ­non-ideal 136 Dryzek emphasises the lack of these ‘moral psychology’ in divided societies that Rawls and Gutman and Thomson base their deliberative model. See, Dryzek (2005), op. cit., p. 219. Dryzek (2007), op. cit., p. 241. 137 For the international OP, see LoP, p. 32.

132

chapter 3

situations. In other words, the suggested PPF aims to present an alternative to Rawls’s non-ideal theory in The Law of Peoples, which endorses liberal interventionism. The DPP mechanism is designed to enable the application of Rawls’s deliberative theory, which has pacifying effects in multicultural liberal societies, within divided non-liberal or non-functioning democratic societies. This chapter analysed that all existing positive peace visions strive for cohesive societies with harmonious and fair relationships accompanied by just/ liberal political and social structures, which provide conditions for human dignity, equality, legitimate governance, toleration, and commitment to nonviolence. It pointed out that the differences between Galtung’s and this study’s positive peace lie in that the latter seeks to render the positive peace notion a viable pursuit under the UN’s prevention system by conceptualising social justice narrowly. The new positive peace vision emphasises horizontal equality among identity groups rather than Galtungian vertical equality among individuals who constitute socio-economic groups/classes, or across, gender and generations. It regards social injustices different from that of Galtung’s, which are perceived as the products of social systems that intrinsically generate social ranks and “an aggravation of inequalities.”138 Therefore, the chapter introduced the concept of Fundamental Conflicts to emphasise the role of human beings in generat­ing and sustaining social injustices due to their approval or acquiescence of ­we-they identity divisions. In sum, this chapter sets out that the proposed positive peace notion differs from the existing positive peace notions in that it can be pursued with a view to strengthening the UN’s pre-conflict preventative pillars rather than being relevant only as a post-conflict peacebuilding strategy. It thereby provides the theoretical justification for reconceptualising positive peace and its framework. The suggested positive peace approach that seeks to tackle Fundamental Conflicts as the root causes of grievances, HIs and non-flourishing of a democratic and human rights culture is anticipated to complement the UN’s peacebuilding efforts, which aim to tackle the root causes of armed conflicts through institutional reform, democratisation and the promotion of human rights. 138 Galtung (1969), op. cit., p. 177.

chapter 4

The Operational Formula of Positive Peace This chapter provides an operational definition of positive peace and sets out the criteria for determining the lack of, or threats to, positive peace. The suggested operational formula and the PPF are intended to serve the prevention of intra-state armed conflicts. The formula is envisaged to provide a general guideline for the UN to determine when to engage with situations for comprehensive peacebuilding.1 First, this chapter provides the formal definition of positive peace and the methodology for its pursuit. Second, it elaborates the elements of the operational definition of positive peace and pinpoints how the PPF would complement the existing UN practice. Third, it elucidates the additional criteria upon which the PPF will initiate its DPP mechanism to ensure that the PPF would not duplicate existing measures. Fourth, it weighs whether the role attributed to human rights within the PPF undermines international pluralism. Lastly, this chapter provides a formula for the absence of positive peace that the UN is suggested to act upon. 1

The Operational Definition of Positive Peace: Situations of Concern of the PPF

As this book attempts to conceptualise a positive peace that can be pursued universally and thus through the UN, its formulation must adhere to internationally recognised principles, as well as the UN’s objectives and purposes. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) provides a widely recognised framework that can be utilised for formulating the new positive peace concept amounting to the absence of exclusionary and antagonistic identity divisions. Hence, the operational formula of positive peace is defined as the absence of: 1 For a brief account of the earlier works on the levels of inter-state positive peace (such as cold, frozen, warm) and notably the peace scale of Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2008), see Reşat Bayer, “Peaceful Transitions and Democracy,” Journal of Peace Research 47/5 (2010), pp.  535–546, at 536–537. For an account of measuring intra-state positive peace and of positive peace indicators, see Global Peace Index 2015 Report, op. cit., pp. 79–96.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_006

134

chapter 4

(1) an active armed conflict;2 (2a) widespread violations of civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights3 of non-grave nature affecting the whole society; and/or (2b) “systemic discrimination”4 in the form of “Horizontal Inequalities”5 affecting certain identity groups on the grounds of divisions such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”;6 and (3) formal and informal discrimination across identity faultlines (i.e. Fundamental Conflicts). Some may argue that the above formulation refers to positive peace paradoxically in the negative. Yet, it connotes a positive condition. Galtung’s initial positive peace formulation also referred to the absence of structural violence rather than the presence of social justice. If the suggested positive peace concept were to be expressed in the positive, it would read as the presence of full respect for human rights, horizontal equality, and harmonious social relations among existing identity groups. A negative description of positive peace notion allows a better description of the conditions that the UN is envisaged to act upon, i.e. situations where positive peace is lacking. Nevertheless, for pragmatic reasons, namely to maintain the feasibility of the PPF given the limited financial and human sources of the UN, not all societies lacking positive peace according to the above formula will be of concern to the PPF. The PPF will only engage situations not currently addressed or not effectively addressed within the existing UN system in order to entail a distinct feature and not to duplicate existing UN practice. As will be elaborated in the following Chapter, the UN employs diverse mechanisms and programmes that already seek to foster positive peace or to 2 Parlevliet points out efforts such as institution-building and structural reforms required for flourishing positive peace requires ceasefire first. See, Michelle Parlevliet (2010), “Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective,” Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No 9, Human Rights and Conflict Transformation, p.11. Available at http://www.berghof -handbook.net/documents/publications/parlevliet_handbook.pdf. (Last visited, 27.04.2012). 3 See Section 2.2 below. 4 See, the Commission on ESCR, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2, para. 2 of the ICESCR), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, para 12. 5 See Stewart (2008), op. cit., pp. 12–14. For definition see also footnote 9 in the Introduction. 6 This is enshrined in Article 2 of UNDHR, Article 2 and 26 of ICCPR, Article 2(2) ICESCR; and CERD and CEDAW are treaties based on the principle of non-discrimination. See, CESCR General Comment No. 20, para 16, on the group membership. This subject will be elaborated in Section 2.3 below.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

135

address its absence. Although the notions of fostering positive peace and dealing with the lack of positive peace may ultimately seek the same objective, their pursuit requires distinct methodologies and measures. While the former often involves generic structural measures, such as promoting human rights and the rule of law, the latter oftens necessitates country-specific measures, such as the deployment of mediators to resolve/transform the causes of conflicts, addressing HIs and reforming discriminatory legislation. The PPF is designed to intervene in societies lacking positive peace and where the risk factors that could lead to armed conflict in the long term, rather than in the short term, exist. Relevant examples include the current situation in Bahrain, as well as the situation in Syria before it escalated into armed conflict or when the civil war ends, and Egypt in the run-up to and after the coup d’état in July 2013. For the PPF to distinguish the mere lack of positive peace, which would require generic structural measures,7 from situations that bear a risk of armed conflict or violence, which would require urgent assertive measures, additional criteria would be needed. These criteria must be capable of detecting the risk factors at their earliest possible stage so that the PPF can extend the UN efforts to pre-conflict situations in a systematic manner and can focus on tackling Fundamental Conflicts rather than being overwhelmed by various peripheral conflicts that they would trigger. The differences between the objectives and measures of the UN’s existing preventive mechanisms and the PPF will be elaborated in detail throughout the present and next chapter. Identifying the Lack of Positive Peace: Objections to Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Systems This section discusses how the lack of positive peace may be identified and whether the prevailing resistance against establishing a central early warning and conflict prevention system within the UN would also be valid for the suggested PPF. Existing UN instruments and mechanisms already provide early warning analyses or indices8 that could also contribute to identifying cases in which there is a lack of positive peace. The UN Department of Polit­ical Affairs 1.1

7 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the idealist and Neo-Kantian frameworks of the UN entail this approach. 8 For an overview of the existing UN early warning mechanisms see, Micah Zenko and Rebecca R. Friedman, “UN Early Warning for Preventing Conflict,” International Peacekeeping 18/1 (2011), pp. 21–37. See also, Tapio Kanninen and Chetan Kumar, “The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the United Nations System,” in (ed.) B.G. Ramcharan, Conflict Prevention in Practice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), pp. 45–70, at 46–48, 54–56.

136

chapter 4

(DPA),9 the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),10 the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination are among the important early warning bodies that the PPF could draw upon. Moreover, the reports of reliable NGOs, non-profit independent research organisations (e.g. the International Crisis Group, and the Institute for Economics and Peace),11 UN country missions or UN Resident Coordinators, and the UNDESA’s social integration-focused analyses12 can also be utilised for identifying the lack of positive peace. The UN’s limitations pertaining to conflict prevention are often attributed to the lack of a “comprehensive and coordinated UN early warning and assessment system.”13 However, it is to be noted that the current limitations for conflict prevention are the result of “the resistance” of the states against the creation of a central early warning and assessment system within the UN.14 Zenko and Friedman assert that the underlying reason for states’ resistance to surveillance by a coordinated UN early warning authority stem from a concern that monitoring of internal affairs would legitimise further international intervention. This opposition originates from and is legitimised by a rigid realist 9

10

11

12

13

14

The DPA is under the Secretariat of the UN and responsible for “monitor[ing] global political developments and advis[ing] the United Nations Secretary-General on the prevention and management of crises.” See, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/ main/issues/peacemaking (Last visited, 01.08.2013). Zenko and Friedman point out the OHCHR’s early warning function has limitations in preventing armed conflicts and genocide due to the lack of ‘dedicated’ personnel for monitoring. See, Zenko and Friedman (2011), op. cit., p. 27. The indicators of the Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace could be used. Furthermore, it can be imagined that it could be filtered or further developed to include indicators that reflect the elements of the aforementioned operational formula. See http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index. (Last visited, 20.06.2015). See, “Developing a Strategic Framework for UNDESA’s Work on Peacebuilding: A Plan of Action,” Report of UNDESA Task Force on Peacebuilding and Development, 8 April 2008, numbers 3 and 6 at p. 20, pp. 15, 21. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/ UNDESAPoA8April.pdf. (Last visited, 01.08.2013) For UNDESA’s mandate, see GA’s Proposed Strategic Framework for the Period 2006–2007, UN Doc. A/59/6 (Prog. 7), 29 April 2004, para 7.3, page 3. Zenko and Friedman (2011), op. cit., p. 29. Annan points out the lack of integrated analysis as the obstacle for effectively preventing armed conflicts. See Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/985, 18 July 2006, p. 27, para. 95. Lund argues that the limitation of conflict prevention is caused by a “dispersion of wills” rather than a ‘lack of political will’ when fulfilling early warning. Lund (2009), op. cit., p.296.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

137

interpretation of state sovereignty. Additionally, states fear official identification of risk factors by the UN would become a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ leading to the deterioration of the situation or triggering violent pre-emptive reactions.15 Lastly, states are concerned that negative depiction of the situation in their country will drive away foreign investors, adversely affecting their economies.16 It may well be argued that these concerns would also be valid for the PPF since its proposed main body, the UN Peace Council (UNPC),17 is intended to function as a designated body for processing early warning reports and to identify the lack of positive peace. However, states’ resistance towards the PPF can be expected to be milder as the UNPC’s assessment of the lack of positive peace would not necessarily suggest an imminent or already existing crisis, violence or armed conflict. Rather, the UNPC will confirm the existence of risk factors, which are prone to escalate into violence or armed conflict in the medium or longer term and which already negate positive peace. Hence, the last two objections can be taken to be invalid in the context of the PPF and its UNPC. This claim can be further justified drawing upon Stewart’s HIs thesis that points out not all HIs lead to armed conflict. If there are HIs in different directions, for example where HIs in one domain are disadvantageous for a group and yet advantageous in the other domain for the same group, this group may be less inclined to mobilise for armed conflict.18 Furthermore, widespread violations of human rights affecting all groups do not necessarily lead to armed opposition. Hence, the existence of HIs as risk factors should not be taken to signify an imminent armed conflict. Given that monitoring of risk factors already exists19 and reports are publicly available in most instances,20 it can reasonably be argued there would 15 16 17 18 19 20

See also, Kanninen and Kumar (2005), op. cit., p. 57. Zenko and Friedman (2011), op. cit., p. 29–30. See Annex for an overview of the tasks and functions of the UNPC and DPP mechanism. Stewart (2008), op. cit., pp. 18–19. Otherwise the UN’s preventive actions such as preventive deployment, mediation or good offices could not be carried out at all. See, Zenko and Friedman (2011), op. cit., p. 34. The UNDP Human Development Index provides data relating to socio-economic situations in societies. See, http://hdr.undp.org/ en/statistics/understanding/indices/. NGOs also monitor societies and provide indices such as Global Peace Index and Human Security Index. See http://www.visionofhumanity.org/ wp-content/uploads/PDF/2011/2011%20GPI%20Results%20Report.pdf; and http://www .humansecurityindex.org/?page_id=2 (Last visited, 02.03.2012). Furthermore, the UN also provides analyses on the regional situations and the risk factors on an ad hoc basis. See, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/52/871, 13 April 1998. See also Arab

138

chapter 4

likely be no additional adverse effect if the UNPC signalled the existence of the same risk factors and officially confirmed the absence of positive peace. The state-centric foundations of the existing international system have undergone transformations in the post-Cold War era. The UN already carries out actions that inevitably intervene in the internal affairs of states. This can be taken to suggest that states’ first reason to resist conflict monitoring and prevention may not apply to the PPF. The emerging R2P doctrine,21 the work of the UN Human Rights Council and its Universal Periodic Review mechanism, the measures of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), UN peacekeeping operations and preventive deployments22 also unavoidably entail monitoring of the internal affairs of states. Moreover, the UN is undertaking further actions to enhance its conflict prevention role. In 2011, the GA adopted a resolution on strengthening the UN’s role of mediation in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.23 In 2014, the SC adopted a similar resolution on strengthening the UN’s role in conflict prevention and on the full utilization of Chapter VI measures of the Charter, such as mediation and negotiation.24 Furthermore, in 2012 the HRC adopted a resolution on the promotion of the right to peace and established a Working Group for the preparation of a UN declaration on the right to peace, which has been rejected by the Western Europe bloc over two decades.25 The adoption of these resolutions can be seen as an evidence that “the idea of prevention is gaining ground”26 in the international sphere. Furthermore, it can be argued that the rigid reading of non-intervention into internal affairs is

21 22

23 24 25

26

Human Development Report 2002, E.02.III.B.9. Cited in William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline Earle and Moira Shanahan, “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, pp. 38–40. Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 139. For a brief account of preventive deployment force see, Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity, 2010, 2nd edn), pp. 156–157. GA Resolution on Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, A/RES/65/283, 28 July 2011. See Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2171, 21 August 2014, paras, 6, 11 and 17. See United Nations Declaration on the Right to Peace, HRC Resolution, A/HRC/20/L.16, 29 June 2012. See also Press Release, available http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12324&LangID=E. (Last visited, 06.04.2013) See also HRC Resolution, Promotion of the Right to Peace, A/HRC/RES/23/16, 24 June 2013. Roche points out that the Western bloc impeded the developments on the right to peace, see Douglas Roche, The Human Right to Peace (Ottowa: Novalis, 2003) pp. 125, 129–131. That is the case within the UN, World Bank and OECD. See, Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 288.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

139

fading in state practice as well. In June 2012, the Action Group for Syria, which included representatives of the UN, the Arab League, the EU, and states that are allied with or opposing the Syrian regime, passed a final statement urging a transitional governing body recognising the participation of the opposition (i.e. non-state actors).27 In sum, developments in the international sphere and within the UN since 2000 can be interpreted to suggest that the political will of states is diverging from a strict application of Article 2(7) and moving towards accepting more international concern for internal affairs and additional strengthened preventive capabilities for the UN.28 Zenko and Friedman argue for strengthening the capacities of the existing separate early-warning instruments by integrating their reports under a reformed UN Secretariat. They hint that conflict prevention efforts could be more effective if the integrated reports were used within the DPA as the basis for initiating country programmes and the deployment of UN mediators.29 Similarly, the PPF is envisaged to entail the UNPC as a dedicated body for integrating the early warning reports as well as for acting upon them by initiating the DPP mechanism. However, the PPF is designed to merely facilitate internal dialogue via the DPP mechanism without threatening further intrusive measures and sanctions, which constitute the states’ stance against international intervention. The aforementioned developments can be taken to justify an optimistic view for expecting less resistance against the PPF’s preventative functions given that states already seem to accept increased international intervention into their internal affairs, and given that the PPF is not designed to employ intrusive measures. 2

The Elements of the Operational Definition of Positive Peace

2.1 The Absence of Active Armed Conflict: Negative vs. Positive Peace This section further clarifies the distinction between negative and positive peace and points out the threats to each. For positive peace to exist there must 27

28

29

Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué, 30.06.2012, available at http://www.un.org/ News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf. (Last visited, 04.07.2012). In the context of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts of the UN, as well as other international organisations such as NATO, states already “undertake extensive intrusions into the domestic affairs of other legally sovereign states.” See, Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), op. cit., p.  22. Moreover, this less stringent understanding of UN Charter Article 2(7) has been concretised by all states with the adoption of R2P at the World Summit 2005 and with the establishment of the PBC and UPR mechanism of the HRC. Zenko and Friedman (2011), op. cit., pp. 35, 32, 31.

140

chapter 4

also be a negative peace, namely no active armed conflict. However, the absence of armed conflict on its own is not sufficient to claim the existence of a positive peace. Like Kantian perpetual peace, positive peace requires the absence of all risks of armed conflict, or their existence at the minimal level. Some situations may not pass the threshold beyond which academic institutions or the general public defines a situation as an armed conflict.30 Yet, the absence of casualties should not automatically mean that the deep-seeded causes of armed conflict are non-existent or that positive peace exists. Hence, elements 2 and 3 of the operational formula of positive peace. Chapter 2 pointed out that under Article 39, the SC may take coercive actions in response to manifest threats to the peace, in addition to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.31 Crucially, the positive peace notion of this study requires that the non-violent state (i.e. negative peace) is not a consequence of deterrence, balance of power calculations or military actions, but rather intrinsically sustained based on the absence of reasons and will to resort to armed means. The distinction between negative and positive peace and the perceived threats to them can be further explained in light of the situations in Bahrain and Syria. The situation in Bahrain during the Arab Spring did not reach the scale of an armed conflict due to the power of the state and the weakness of the opposition groups. Unlike in Libya and Syria, the uprising groups in Bahrain did not receive logistical support which prevented the escalation of the situation. Nevertheless, the situation in Bahrain amounts to a negative peace as the risks of armed conflict do still exist even though they are controlled due to state power.32 This situation, however, cannot be referred to as positive peace. Even though there is no realistic likelihood of armed conflict, given that there are no negotiated political reforms that would de-escalate tensions, Bahraini society can be described as lacking positive peace. If the balance of power were to be changed in favour of the oppressed, it can be speculated that a risk of manifest violence and/or armed conflict would form. Therefore, this study’s positive peace measures would be applicable to the Bahraini situation due to the presence of

30 31 32

As mentioned in the Introduction, Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines situations as armed conflict when there are at least 25 battle-related deaths within a year. See the paragraphs accompanying footnotes 62 and 63 in Chapter 2. As an example of objections to any US support to opposition groups in Bahrain, see Morgan Roach (30 May 2012), “Treat Bahrain Like an Ally,” The New York Times, available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/29/nudging-bahrain-without-pushing -it-away/treat-bahrain-like-an-ally. (Last visited, 30.05.2012).

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

141

the root causes of armed conflicts.33 Similarly the Egyptian situation, which entailed mass protests and deep polarisations in the run-up to the coup d’état in July 2013, and since then violent clashes and oppressive rule, cannot be depicted as signifying the existence of positive peace.34 Due to the deep divisions and significant tensions, and the lack of inclusive political structures, the situation in Egypt would be also a potential candidate for the PPF’s engagement.35 It is also important to note that the notion of sustainable peace does not necessarily refer to positive peace. Sustainable peace is understood as referring to the infinite non-commencement of armed conflict within a society. In general it does not refer to the negative or positive character of stability. In theory, sustainable peace (1) could be achieved through forceful means, and would amount to merely a negative peace, or alternatively (2) it could be generated and maintained spontaneously through positive conditions and would amount to a positive peace. In other words, sustainable peace concerns the duration of a non-violent state, while positive peace focuses on the conditions that are conducive to bringing about a long lasting state of non-violence without resorting to force or imposition.36 The present situation in Bahrain can be seen falling under the first category, namely sustainable yet negative peace provided that the balance of power can be maintained for an infinite time. As category 2 suggests, positive peace can be seen as a means to sustainable peace. Positive features that the formal formula of positive peace indicates would be conducive to sustainable peace drawing upon Aron’s satisfied peoples’ thesis. However, it is to be acknowledged that sustainable peace cannot be safeguarded with certainty, as the threats to peace are complex and require curbing such challenges as realist influences, economic and/or private incentives, and the war economy.37 33

34 35 36 37

For another analysis depicting Bahrain as extremely “fragile” and other criteria for fragility, see Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Gregory F. Treverton, “The Calm Before the Storm: Why Volatility Signals Stability, and Vice Versa,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2015). For an account of the factors rendering Egypt fragile, see ibid. For further discussion on the application of this positive peace vision in real case situations see Section 1 of Chapter 6. For the conflict prevention role attributed to positive peace see also footnote 220 in Chapter 2 Section 3.4. The links with the trade of mineral resources and financing conflict and human rights abuses are concerns of the UN that it addresses with its systematic prevention efforts. For example The Kimberly Process is set up by the UN GA to prevent the trade of diamonds that would be used for funding of conflicts. For further details see, http://www.un.org/en/ga/62/ plenary/diamonds/bkg.shtml. See also http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/

142

chapter 4

2.2 Encompassing Non-Gross Violations of Human Rights The Working Paper on the Definition of Gross and Large-Scale Violations of Human Rights as an International Crime of 27 August 1992 of the Sub-Commission of the Commission on Human Rights, locates acts such as “genocide, slavery and slavery-like practices, summary or arbitrary executions, torture, disappearances, arbitrary and prolonged detention, and systematic discrimination”38 in the category of gross human rights violations. The Working Paper notes the prevalent presupposition that “large-scale violations are always gross in character.”39 In addition, the paper states that “the violation of economic, social and cultural rights, may also be gross and systematic in scope and nature.”40 The ICTY asserts that the usage of “widespread” connotes large “number(s) of victims” to distinguish isolated international crimes from systematic ones, regardless of their execution in the context of either armed conflicts or peacetime.41 The same rationale can be applied when defining widespread violations of human rights. There are no general rules or precise numbers with which to distinguish isolated and widespread cases. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Court has jurisdiction for four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. The first three international crimes entail certain acts that are also prohibited under IHRL and IHL. However, these international crimes do not automatically entail violations of human rights law. These acts need to be linked to a state party to claim that violations of IHRL also occurred.42 For the ICC, acts amounting to a crime against humanity conflict-minerals (Last visited, 12.01.2012). Business-oriented arms industry can be expected to have an impact on the onset of armed conflict, which is why the UN has been involved in the efforts of non-proliferation of certain types of arms and regulating arms trade. All these factors, which are not meant to be exhaustive, are denoted in this study as realist influences increasing the onset of armed conflicts and incentivising the mobilisation of masses. As long as these are not reduced or eliminated, stable peace cannot be expected with certainty. Hence there is a nuance between positive peace efforts and stable/perpetual peace efforts. 38 See, Definition of Gross and Large-Scale Violations of Human Rights as an International Crime, The Commission nn Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/10, 8 June 1999, para. 14. [hereinafter Definition of Gross and Large-Scale Violations of Human Rights]. 39 Ibid., para. 15. 40 Ibid., para. 14. 41 The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic -Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 – A, “Appeals Judgement,” 12 June 2002, paras 4 and 5. See also in Robert Cryer(2010), “International Criminal Law “, in (eds.) Moeckli et. al, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 540–558, at 547. 42 Robert Cryer (2010), op. cit., pp. 557, 546. See Article 7 of Rome Statute of ICC, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

143

are not confined to the possible violations of civil and political rights, but could also take place when deprivation of minimum standards of living occurs, such as when a group is exterminated through deprivation of food and water. The suggested positive peace approach entails addressing widespread violations of human rights that have not yet attained the scale of international crimes with a view to complementing the prevailing reactive approach of international criminal law. Therefore, the present work will not draw upon the prevalent presupposition equating widespread/large-scale violations as being gross in nature. Widespread violations are instead conceptualised separate from gross human rights violations, which connote escalated violent situations. For example, relative deprivations inflicted upon an entire society despite the availability of resources are categorised as large-scale, but non-gross violations of human rights standards. Fundamental Conflicts are presupposed to underlie deliberate relative deprivations, and by tackling them the PPF is intended to contribute to the prevention of gross human rights violations. Element 2a of the operational formula of positive peace does not require that the state in question to be legally bound by international human rights standards. A repressive non-democratic regime may not be a party to human rights instruments. Nevertheless, the PPF will rely on the existence of violations of human rights standards set out in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR to determine the existence of a threat to positive peace and initiate the DPP mechanism. This approach resembles the approach of the Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the HRC, in which the reviewing states suggest and advise on compliance with the existing universal standards and ratification of relevant treaties.43 Traditionally there has been less emphasis on the violations of ESCR within UN peace structures. This can be attributed to the fact that there is no clear-cut agreement on the nature of state obligation with regard to ESCR as the benchmarks are inherently context-specific. Moreover, it is often difficult to establish whether violations occur due to the inability or unwillingness of the state as the nature of state obligation under the ICESCR primarily depends on the available resources44 and good governance.45 On the other hand, determining 43 44

45

See Chapter 6 for the detailed account of the HRC. For the explanation of this perception and the underlying reason due to the Covenant’s usage of the term “progressive realisation” see Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, “The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 9/2 (1987), pp 157–229 at 159, 172, 174. Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause, and Allan Rosas(eds.), Economic Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Online: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, 2nd edn), p. 32. For a brief account on the views against depicting ESCR as ‘proper’ rights see, Amartya Sen “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32/4 (2004), pp. 314–356,

144

chapter 4

the violations of civil and political rights is relatively straightforward. The practical limitations for determining the violations of ESCR are contribute to the prioritisation of the negative peace concept, which looks for manifest violence, rather than regarding ESCR as the integral component of peace in the UN system. This, however, began changing in the 1990s, which saw greater focus on socio-economic root causes of armed conflicts and increased attention to the interlinks between development and peace.46 The UN bodies fulfilling functions for peacebuilding, development, capacity building and transitional justice stress more and more the importance of ESCR for the prevention of armed conflicts.47 Both elements 2a and 2b of the operational formula are set out to underpin the focus on the economic, social and cultural root causes of armed conflicts. The PPF’s objective of identifying and addressing widespread yet non-gross violations of ESCR, and HIs in the socio-economic and cultural spheres would reinforce the aspirations for developing human capabilities and fulfilled lives. The Committee on ESCR lists “basic necessities of work, food, housing, health care, education and culture”48 as the elements of a fulfilled, or a dignified, life. The Committee’s comment is binding only for the state parties to the ICESCR. However, regardless of the legal status of ESCR for a given state, the PPF is envisaged to use this conception of dignified life as the benchmark for identifying HIs under element 2b.49 The PPF’s objective of addressing horizontal inequalities in enjoying fulfilled lives can be further justified on normative grounds drawing upon the human capabilities approach. Amartya Sen highlights human needs (‘necessities’), as well as human freedom (and emancipation), for human beings to enjoy “happy” lives

46

47 48

49

at 346–348. For Sen the limitations with regard to institutions and resources for realising ESCR “suggest the need to work towards changing the prevailing circumstances” rather than repudiating them. For Arbour, the violations of ESCR trigger the violations of CPR, and thus establish root causes of armed conflict. See Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice For Societies In Transition,” International Law and Politics, 40/1(2007), pp. 1–27, at 8, 10. On the other hand, others argue that “…there is no universally accepted link between inequality [i.e. relative deprivation] and conflict …[and yet] economic differences do matter, especially in combination with other factors.” See, Thoms and Ron (2007), op. cit., pp. 691–692 {emphasis mine}. Guidance Note of The Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, 2010, para. 9 at p. 7. Cited in Jo M. Pasqualucci, “The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System,” Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 31/1 (2008), pp. 1–32, at 16. See the next section for further elaboration of HIs in pursuit of dignified lives.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

145

(i.e. dignified and fulfilled lives).50 For Nussbaum, basic capabilities is based on the same philosophy of human rights, and similarly are “very urgent items that should be secured” and regarded “as side-constraints.”51 Sen does not provide a precise list of capabilities. Similarly, Nussbaum’s list does not explicitly refer to capabilities that could justify the particular focus on ESCR per se. Nevertheless, it would be uncontroversial to regard the aforementioned core of ESCR as falling under the valuable capabilities that Sen and Nussbaum would deem necessary for human beings to function and to realise meaningful lives “worth living.”52 In sum, the normative grounds behind ESCR and the capabilities approach lie at the core of the suggested positive peace approach. Irrespective of the legal status of ESCR for a given state, and a definitive causal link to armed conflict in general, the elements of a fulfilled life described by the Committee on ESCR constitute the foundation of the elements 2a and 2b of the operational definition of positive peace. However, considering that many societies fall short of providing a dignified life to their citizens, it would be necessary to set out further criteria to trigger the DPP mechanism.53 The remainder of this section will provide examples of relative deprivations, or non-grave violations of ESCR and civil and political rights, that are of concern of the PPF. There are circumstances that the violations of ESCR, like the violations of personal integrity rights, can be described as falling under the category of gross violations. “Absolute deprivations”, particularly extermination or “violations of basic subsistence rights”,54 directed against a particular group or the whole population indiscriminately despite availability of resources would fall under this category. On the other hand, “relative deprivations” refer to comparative inequalities or discrimination inflicted upon particular identity groups in the realisation of their basic subsistence rights. Element 2b of the positive peace definition encompasses such situations. Secondly, relative deprivations may also signify non-progressive realisation of ESCR despite “available resources”,55 50

Sen (2004), op. cit., pp. 332–339. See also, David A. Clark, “Capability Approach,” in (ed.) David A. Clark, The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), p.1. available at http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/14051/1/gprg-wps-032.pdf. (Last visited, 10.01.2013). 51 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review 66 (1997–1998), pp. 273–300, at 300. 52 Ibid, p. 297. See also, David A. Clark (2006), op. cit., pp. 5–6. 53 For the elaboration of the additional criteria see Section 3 below. 54 For a brief account on absolute and relative deprivations see Thoms and Ron (2007), op. cit., pp. 686–687. 55 See, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties, Obligations (Art. 2(1) of the ICESCR), E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para 10.

146

chapter 4

which may affect large segments of the population indiscriminately. This situation may result if a small minority group is in power disadvantaging the large segments of the population and/or state organisation is decayed due to systematic corruption. Element 2a of the positive peace definition takes account of such situations. Absolute deprivations are not envisaged to fall under the PPF’s ambit.56 If large segments of a society were to indiscriminately lack basic subsistence rights and dignified life due to scarce resources, these problems would be best handled through the existing development strategies of the UN and international aid agencies rather than the PPF.57 The PPF is instead designed to target relative deprivations presupposing higher social discontent and motivation for armed mobilisation when there are available resources that are perceived as being unfairly distributed.58 Moreover, if large segments of society were to experience relative deprivations, namely enjoy basic necessities integral to dignified life below the potential standards they could have enjoyed59 due to lack of good governance or to corruption, this situation will be covered in the element 2a of the positive peace formula. Furthermore, if identity groups of significant size and/or power find themselves in a disadvantaged position with regard to the enjoyment of ESCR compared to the majority and/or ruling group, but enjoy ESCR above the level the of absolute deprivation, the DPP mechanism will be initiated under the element 2b of positive peace formula. In general, IHRL standards enumerated under the ICCPR, which do not refer to core personal integrity rights, are of concern of the suggested positive peace approach. These include: the freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18); the right to freedom of expression (Article 19); the right of 56 57

58 59

For empirical findings that absolute deprivation may not lead to direct violence see, Thoms and Ron, op. cit, pp. 687, 690, 704. The World Bank and the IMF, as well as individual donor states, provide loan/aid on the conditions of economic and/or political good governance, transparency and accountability. See Stephen P. Marks, “Poverty,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran, David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 602–621 at 618. The OECD’s The Fragile States Principles (FSPs) of 2007 also urge conflict-sensitive approaches in conflict-prone and fragile situations. See, http://www.oecd .org/dataoecd/35/13/47278529.pdf. Moreover, Busan Outcome Document of Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 1 December 2011, para 26 adopts these principles; available at http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/outcome_document_-_final_en_.pdf. (Last visited, 14.04.2013). See R2P report of 2001 cited in footnote 63 and Prevention of Armed Conflicts report of the SG cited in footnote 67 in Chapter 3. For Galtung’s structural violence definition, see Galtung, (1969), op. cit., p. 168.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

147

peaceful assembly (Article 21), and the rights in relation to political participation enumerated under Article 25. It is to be noted that the concern for these CPR distinguishes the suggested positive peace approach from Rawls’s system,60 which does not recognise all IHRL standards necessary for sustainable and just peace. In addition, sporadic violations of integrity rights (i.e. the right to life (Article 6), and freedom from torture (Article 17)) are also of importance to the PPF. Sporadic violent acts by the state or non-state actors against particular identity groups will be taken to indicate the existence of advanced Fundamental Conflicts. It is acknowledged that the window of opportunity for initiating and executing deliberative processes successfully may be narrow if the regime or opposition groups have already resorted to gross violations on a large scale. There is neither an exact formula for definitively concluding certain incidents would lead to further escalation, nor for predicting the time span of escalation. Nevertheless, initiating the DPP mechanism to tackle ambivalent or premature threats would not constitute a redundant endeavour as seeking to tackle such threats can be expected to improve situations in the given societies. In sum, this section illustrated the distinction between gross and non-gross violations of human rights. It argues that seeking to tackle non-gross violations of both CPR and ESCR within the PPF would complement the existing ex post facto approaches of international criminal law, and the UN’s transitional justice and peacebuilding measures, which primarily (re-)act upon grave violations of human rights. With its focus on relative deprivations or non-gross violations of human rights, the PPF is expected to capture violations that fall between widespread and isolated cases, and thus to fill the lacuna in the UN system. Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) under Element 2b: The Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Pursuit of Dignified Life The operational formula of positive peace draws upon the universal principle of equality and non-discrimination with a view to ensuring horizontal (relative) equality and non-discrimination between existing identity groups. It involves a comparison of the conditions experienced by identity group members as a whole vis-à-vis other groups; and not a comparison of the conditions enjoyed by individual members of a group vis-à-vis the conditions of individuals of other groups. The principle of equality and non-discrimination is the core principle of the international human rights system.61 The UN Charter (Articles 1(3), 55(c)

2.3

60 See also footnote 178 in Chapter 1. 61 See, Definition of gross and large-scale violations of human rights, para. 11. See also, Daniel Moeckli, “Equality and Non-discrimination,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah,

148

chapter 4

and 56) promulgates the promotion of equality and non-discrimination, and the UDHR (Articles 1, 2(1) and 7) gives meaning to this principle in the context of the rights it catalogues. On the other hand, all UN human rights instruments, including the ICCPR (Articles 2, 3 and 26) and the ICESCR (Articles 2(2) and 3), as well as the ICERD, which targets racial discrimination, entail provisions that seek to guarantee the principle equality and non-discrimination. The principle of equality and non-discrimination is cross-cutting principle inherent in all rights guaranteed by the ICCPR and ICESCR. Collectively all UN human rights instruments constitute the sources of the right to equality and non-discrimination in international law.62 These instruments aspire for and view the equality of human beings in relation to worth, “dignity and rights.”63 Article 26 of the ICCPR prescribes states to ensure “substantive” equality (i.e. equality of outcomes), rather than absolute equal treatment,64 which does not necessarily remedy past inequalities.65 In other words, states are required to take positive measures to address “systemic discrimination”66 and their effects, whether the sources of discrimination lie in the public/legal sphere or in the private sphere and cultural attitudes.

62

63 64

65

66

Sandesh Sivakumaran, David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 189–208, at 193. For an overview of all relevant instruments entailing the principle of equality and nondiscrimination and the case law, see OHCHR publication, “The Right to Equality and NonDiscrimination in the Administration of Justice”, in Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual On Human Rights For Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, 2003, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter13en.pdf. (Last visited, 17.02.2012). See, the UDHR Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” The principle cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing or aspiring for absolute equality; as it does not mean “identical treatment in every instance.” See, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 10 November 1989, para. 8. See also CESCR, General Comment No. 20, para. 13. See, Committee on ESCR, General Comment No. 20., para. 8. It is to be noted, as Moeckli explains, in these legal instruments the terms equality and non-discrimination are used interchangeably. For his account on substantive equality, see, Moeckli (2010), op. cit., p. 190, 192. As the Committee on ESCR points out systemic discrimination is “pervasive and persistent and deeply entrenched in social behaviour and organization, often involving unchallenged or indirect discrimination. Such systemic discrimination can be understood as legal rules, policies, practices or predominant cultural attitudes in either the public or private sector which create relative disadvantages for some groups, and privileges for other groups.” See, para. 12 of the CESCR General Comment No. 20.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

149

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights attributes jus cogens status to the principle of non-discrimination in general.67 In other contexts, however, the principle of non-discrimination is recognised as bearing jus cogens status on the basis of race.68 Yet, the UN Charter urges non-discrimination on the basis of “race, sex, language, or religion.”69 Hence it provides a sound basis for defining positive peace with reference to this principle. However, equality and non-­ discrimination is an enduring aspiration and allows a wide range of interpretations. Equality may be conceptualised as “simple equality” or the vertical equality of individuals; as “equality of outcomes”; or as “equality of subjective opportunity,” which seeks outcomes to one’s liking, for instance “subjective welfare/preference satisfaction.”70 The suggested PPF will not impose any of these interpretations of the principle of equality and non-discrimination; rather the DPP and national processes are seen as the appropriate venues in which given societies should determine the principle’s meaning and the direction of reforms. As mentioned earlier, element 2b of the operational formula will look for horizontal equalities in the pursuit of dignified lives across identity divisions. A life in dignity, contrary to a bare life or the mere fact of living,71 entails both contextspecific and universal elements that make the lives of human beings worth living. In addition to the basic necessities that the Committee on ESCR lists, freedom;72 67

68

69 70

71

72

The Court prohibits discrimination “owing to gender, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic situation, property, civil status, birth or any other status.” Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), No. 18 (2003), para. 101. See also Christine Chinkin, “The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post-Conflict”, p.  21. available http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/ women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase), I.C.J. Report 1970, pp.  3, 32. International Court of Justice Namibia Case 1971, para. 17. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 298. See UN Charter Articles 1(3) and 55. For the jus cogens status of principle of non-­discrimination based on sex and religion see also Moeckli (2010), op. cit., p. 194. See, Bayles and Pogge cited in Stefan Gosepath, “Equality,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford .edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/. Agamben analyses bare life/zoe (i.e. simple fact of living) versus ‘bios/qualified life’ (i.e. ‘a life with dignity’). See a brief account on Agamben’s work cited in Giorgio Shani (2011), op. cit., pp.  60–61. See, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 12. For the philosophical foundations and different meanings of freedom as self-perfection, self-realisation and self-determination/free will see V. J. McGill, “Conflicting Theories of Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20/4 (1960), pp. 437–452.

150

chapter 4

autonomy;73 enabling basic capabilities;74 and inclusion into every aspect of social life are at the core of a fulfilled life. The UNPC is envisaged to assess the level of fulfilment of dignified life across the different identity groups, taking the available resources of the given state in consideration. Determinations on the violation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination under element 2b will be made based on unequal access to and/or benefit from the available resources of the state that are integral to pursue a fulfilled life. This is not to disregard that the availability of resources determines the level of realisation of economic and social basic necessities and dignified lives to a considerable extent. Nonetheless, it is ultimately political will that governs the distribution of the available resources and thus the realisation of dignified lives. Therefore, inequalities in the realisation of fulfilled lives across identity faultlines can be linked to deliberate actions or negligence and thus to the existence of Fundamental Conflicts. The DPP mechanism is not envisaged to be executed if the given state is already undertaking measures to correct the effects of past discrimination, even if at the given time the effects of past formal and informal discrimination still prevail. 3

Further Criteria for Determining the Situations of Concern of the PPF

This book suggests the new positive peace approach to ensure that the UN encompasses situations that bear neither imminent nor too distant risks to armed conflict. This stance is pursued so that (1) there are no urgent issues and need for sequencing, which could impede addressing Fundamental Conflicts; and (2) the PPF has distinct functions from both the UN’s immediate (i.e. operational) and generic (structural) prevention mechanisms.75 However, the elements of the operational formula themselves would not be sufficient to identify situations entailing neither imminent nor too distant risks to armed conflict. 73

74

75

Schachter equates human dignity with the recognition of human autonomy. Human dignity is linked with legitimate rule, and the fulfilment of basic socio-economic and political needs that enable human autonomy. See, Oscar Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,” AJIL 77/4(1983), pp. 848–854, at 850–851. See also the Preamble of African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981; it entails a reference to dignity in the meaning of autonomy. For Sen’s account on freedom as a process (i.e. freely choosing, not being forced) and freedom as opportunity (i.e. possessing capabilities or “the means …to achieve what she values”, see Sen (2004), op. cit., pp. 331–332. Chapter 5 will discuss UN’s operational and structural prevention mechanisms in detail.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

151

Therefore, additional criteria are necessary to ensure that the PPF does not duplicate the existing UN practice or become redundant or overburdened jeopardising its efficiency. Hence, the PPF is envisaged to invoke its DPP mechanism if: A) (i) in the given society there are no communication channels ensuring that the basic needs and rights of identity groups are reflected in national laws and/or (ii) if the given society is transitioning from armed conflict or an authoritarian regime; B) in the given society there are tensions that indicate the entrenchment of Fundamental Conflicts or further polarisations/fragmentations, which can be reasonably depicted as exhibiting risks for armed conflict. Criterion A, namely the criterion of the absence of democracy, is set mostly for pragmatic reasons so as not to overburden the PPF. As the envisaged deliberative processes are designed to provide a setting for national dialogue, if there are already functioning frameworks to which the affected parties can resort to tackle their incompatibilities, the deliberative platform’s role would be redundant. Criterion A does not look for a particular model of democracy (e.g. direct, liberal or deliberative) or a particular power-sharing model (e.g. a majoritarian electoral system or one safeguarding minority representation, such as con­ sociationalism).76 Rather it looks for the existence of effective participatory communication platforms. There is a vast body of literature showing that participatory practices have a significant pacifying effect.77 There is also an increased emphasis on the minorities’ and indigenous peoples’ right to participation and to be consulted within international human rights instruments and 76 77

For the models of democracy see David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2006, 3rd edn). For different power-sharing models see Stewart (2008), op. cit., pp. 306–308. For an account of the risks that illiberal or facade democracies bear for violent conflict, see Lund (2009), op. cit., p. 301. See also text accompanying footnote 210 in Chapter 2 for conflict-proneness of partial democracies. However, Stewart argues addressing “sharp political HIs”, which lead to the perception that “violence is the only way to secure political power,” by measures such as “political cooption of the leadership of disadvantaged minorities by the dominant group is often sufficient to prevent conflict…” Stewart (2010), op. cit., p. 12 and Stewart (2008), op. cit., p 14. Similarly, Julian Burger argues the right to participation and consultation for minorities and indigenous people “contribute to conflict prevention.” See, Julian Burger “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: From Advocacy to Implementation,” in (eds.) Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki, Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Hart, 2011), pp. 41–60, at 49.

152

chapter 4

the UN.78 Similarly, the focus of criterion A is on minority participation and consultation in the decisions that affect their basic needs and rights. In practice, criterion A will preclude the existing and functioning democracies from falling under the PPF’s ambit. It is anticipated that established yet façade democracies,79 which do not live up to ideal democratic principles and practice, may fall outside the PPF’s ambit. Yet, criterion A will not withhold the envisaged UNPC from urging these regimes to initiate national dialogue, or if they ask for, to facilitate deliberative processes. Furthermore, criterion A is set to ensure that the PPF is involved with societies in transition, whether emerging from armed conflicts or authoritarian regimes. Societies emerging from conflict often experience “virtual peace”80 or stand “in limbo.”81 As elaborated in Chapter 2, they often experience relapses into armed conflict despite peacebuilding measures. Societies transitioning into democratic regimes also bear increased risks for armed conflict.82 Therefore, regardless of ongoing democratisation efforts of other UN peacebuilding apparatus, the PPF is also envisaged to engage those societies and seek tackling HIs and Fundamental Conflicts. Criterion B, namely the criterion of the existence of tensions, is set to ensure that the PPF engages situations that entail deep-rooted causes of armed conflicts and maintains a preventative function in the pre-conflict settings. It concerns widespread tensions stemming from structural causes such as socio-economic and political arrangements that signify entrenched polarisations/Fundamental Conflicts. Although the sources of tensions may be conflated, these tensions are to be distinguished from those stemming from trigger events, which are often too immediate to escalate. Examples of trigger events include assassination of important figures, assaults on sacred places of particular groups, enactment of controversial legislation 78

79 80 81 82

An Agenda for Democratization, A/51/761, 20 December 1996. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN GA Resolution, A/RES/47/135, 18 December 1992, Article 2(3). United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/61/295, 2 October 2007. ILO Convention No. 169: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 27 June 1989 available at http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/ index.htm. For all sources of international law on minority rights see, UN Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation, OHCHR Publication (2010), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf. (Last visited, 09.10.2011). Such as societies transitioning from democratic regimes toward authoritarian regimes. Richmond (2004), op. cit., pp. 83, 96. Bell (2006), op. cit., p. 12. See discussion accompanying footnote 211 in Chapter 2.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

153

and forceful/repressive reactions to peaceful civilian protests.83 These structural tensions can be identified through the UNDP’s human development indices, which provide data about social cohesion and human happiness (i.e. social discontent). Alternatively, they can also be observed in acts such as verbal statements, protests or civil disobedience. It is important to note that the aforementioned criteria are set to have different gravity on the invocation of the DPP mechanism. The non-materialisation of criterion A (i.e. the existence of communication channels) will be decisive in itself not to invoke the DPP mechanism, even if elements 2 and 3 of the positive peace formula and criterion B exist. Yet, the criterion B is not envisaged to have a fixed effect, taking account of some situations that render the expression of tensions impossible. In authoritarian regimes, tensions are often not manifest despite the lack of positive peace. Furthermore, repressed societies bear a high risk for violence due to accumulated grievances.84 Therefore, if one of the following three situations exists in addition to state repression, the DPP mechanism is envisaged to be invoked regardless of the non-materialisation of criterion B (i.e. the absence of manifest tensions): (1) The general population experiences systematic violations of human rights as element 2a of the positive peace definition suggests; (2) Identity groups of significant size and power experience HIs as element 2b of the positive peace definition suggests; (3) Previous manifest tensions (i.e. mass protests) were successfully suppressed and no reforms were undertaken by the state. In light of these exceptions, it may be argued that Criterion B would not bear a significant role within the PPF. This approach could also be depicted as prima facie reinforcing the liberal interventionist approach, which equates peace with democratisation. However, the rationale behind criterion B is to ensure that the PPF does not target non-democratic regimes per se, but rather targets only situations that display risks of armed conflicts. Given repressive regimes are the ones bearing high risk of violence, it is necessary to design the PPF to 83 84

For mobilising causes see also Gardner (2002), op. cit., pp. 15–25. See also, Anderlini and Stanski (2004), op. cit. Other “[e]arly indicators include widespread human rights abuses, increasingly brutal political oppression, inflammatory use of the media, the accumulation of arms, and sometimes, a rash of organized killings.” See, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive Summary (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), p 46. [hereinafter Carnegie Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict].

154

chapter 4

engage with such societies even if the tensions are latent. The objective of the DPP mechanism is to pre-empt the occurrence of widespread violent reactions to state coercion, as well as to preclude state repression from escalating into widespread grave human rights violations, such as mass killings, torture, persecution, imprisonment or other inhumane acts amounting to international crimes.85 Since the UN system has no functions and/or no effective measures for engaging with state repression,86 if the PPF were to have such a mandate, it would be capable to fully contribute to UN conflict prevention system. Other than the above exceptions, if tensions are not widespread or cannot be observed, the DPP mechanism is not envisaged to be invoked even if positive peace is lacking. For example, it is unlikely that HIs endured by a group of insignificant size and power would give rise to widespread tensions. In such cases, social discontent can be reasonably expected to be confined within the given weak/small identity group, and the risk of widespread armed conflict can be presupposed to be minimal.87 In addition, if the lack of positive peace is determined to stem from widespread violations of human rights (element 2a of positive peace formula) that are “deeply embedded in the character and attitudes of” the population88 and there are no manifest tensions, the initiation of the DPP mechanism is not envisioned. This is not to argue that these situations are not important. The question of culturally embedded human rights violations (such as gender discrimination or religious practices which contravene the principles and standards of IHRL), as well as violations of minority rights, are subject matters for the existing human rights mechanisms. The same issues will not be tackled via the PPF in order to not duplicate existing efforts and to maintain the PPF’s focus on cases that lack positive peace and generate risks of armed conflict. 85

86

87

88

Citing Rummel, Davenport points out that “repressive behavior is increased as those inside the ruling clique attempt to protect themselves from those that do not have any institutional means to influence government policy/practice.” Christian Davenport, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 44/4 (2007), pp. 485–504, at 486. See also Cryer (2010), op. cit., p. 546. Galtung pointed out in 1969 that international system is “literally immobilized in highly repressive societies” Galtung (1969), op. cit., p. 184. This study maintains that the situation is still valid. Stewart argues that the likelihood of armed conflict due to inequalities “depends on size and political [power] of the … group.” See Stewart (2002), op. cit., p. 118. On the other hand, Zartman and Anstey convey “a small number of groups… is most conflict prone… rather than just one or a large number.” Zartman and Anstey (2012), op. cit., p. 12. See, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Human Rights in the Muslim World,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 13/3 (1990), pp. 13–52, at 39.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

155

Leaving the problems of indigenous peoples, small minority groups and culturally embedded human rights violations beyond the ambit of the PPF prima facie resembles Rawlsian tolerance towards decent societies. As elaborated in Chapter 1, due to his understanding of international toleration and to preserve international peace, Rawls rejects even non-intrusive interference involving mere demands of cessation of human rights violations or discrimination against minorities in decent (non-liberal) societies.89 It may well be argued this resemblance would negate the premise of the suggested positive peace approach having implications distinct from the existing positive peace conceptualisations. These arguments can be refuted on grounds that the PPF does not entail an a priori rejection of engagement with non-liberal decent regimes, unlike in the Rawlsian system. The points of departure are different in these two approaches. The search for manifest tensions under criterion B is not intended to prioritise cultural relativism or make the suppression of minorities acceptable for the sake of maintaining international stability. Rather, criterion B of the existence of tensions is utilised as an indicator to assess whether the lack of positive peace can also be depicted as a high risk situation so that the DPP mechanism as an assertive international tool can be regarded as warranted. Moreover, with the emphasis on engagement with state repression, the PPF’s approach differs from Rawls’s wide pluralist stance. Rawls’s system does not recognise all IHRL standards as essential. The right to political participation, for example, is not among his “urgent rights”90 that warrants international concern. In sum, criterion B does not render the implications of the suggested positive peace approach similar to those of the Rawlsian system. Rather this criterion is expected to situate the PPF’s approach between broad Rawlsian pluralism, which compels toleration of repressive states (i.e. absolute non-intrusiveness), and reactive interventionist stance (i.e. absolute intrusiveness). 4

The Role of Human Rights within the PPF and International Pluralism

To claim that the proposed positive peace paradigm presents a realistic and viable approach in the state-centric international system, it is necessary to 89 90

See, LoP, p. 76. For Rawls urgent or genuinely universal human rights are “freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty of conscience [but with possible discriminations] and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.” These are enumerated under Article 3–18 of the UNDHR. See, LoP, footnote 23 at pp. 79, 80.

156

chapter 4

demonstrate that in theory this paradigm would not undermine international pluralism and would withstand critical theoretical objections as regards to involving tautology and liberal interventionist approach. This section, first, discusses whether the PPF is capable of maintaining the principle of international pluralism while pursuing positive peace universally via the UN system. Second, it evaluates the PPF’s pluralistic features in light of the role attributed to IHRL in the operational formula of positive peace and possible claims that the PPF idea constitutes tautology and entails interventionist stance. The principle of pluralism relating to regime types is the backbone of the UN and the international system. As the PPF is to be situated within the UN system, it is necessary that it upholds the commitment to pluralism. It can be assumed states’ assent to the materialisation of the PPF would depend on their perception that the PPF would not undermine international pluralism (i.e. their sovereignty), and in particular that the DPP mechanism would not present a great paradigm shift in terms of intrusiveness. Distinguishing non-interference from non-intrusiveness and introducing levels of intrusiveness can be expected to help build hypotheses about states’ stance towards the PPF, and in determining the PPF’s viability. In this study, the notion of absolute intrusiveness refers to the pursuit of policies disregarding self-determination of the given people such as regime change through exertion of coercion. Conversely, the notion of absolute nonintrusiveness amounts to a rigid understanding of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, which is enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. This can be expected to preclude the monitoring of the intra-state affairs and suggesting or taking proactive actions without states’ invitation. As discussed earlier, the current international system and the UN no longer pursue such a rigid understanding. On the other hand, an acceptable level of intrusiveness can be conceptualised as denoting engagement in the internal affairs of states that seeks to induce or facilitate social change, which does not, however, extend to imposing a change onto the existing social, cultural and political fabric of the society and its power dynamics (i.e. regime change). Existing UN mediation practice can be seen as entailing an acceptable level of intrusiveness into domestic affairs of states, as the UN mediation efforts rely on key principles such as impartiality, inclusivity and national ownership to ensure non-biased processes which do not reflect the interests of the mediator or external parties.91 91 See, UN Guidance For Effective Mediation of 2012, available at http://www.un.org/wcm/ webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20 Mediation.pdf. (Last visited, 12.06.2013).

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

157

Against this background, the suggested positive peace approach can be claimed as entailing an acceptable level of intrusiveness located between the extremes of absolute intrusiveness and absolute non-intrusiveness. The PPF would not comply with the strict reading of non-interference principle as it is envisaged to function as a conflict prevention mechanism that will not rely on the invitation of the given state. However, as per the definition above, the PPF cannot be depicted as an intrusive projection either. The DPP mechanism relies on the UN’s mediation and facilitation role and thus will lack any power to impose solutions on the respective societies. Given that the UN member states have reached a consensus on a GA resolution in 2011 which aims at strengthening the UN mediation role in conflict prevention and the SC endorsed these objectives in its resolution 2071 in August 2014, the PPF’s approach can be argued to bear an acceptable level of intrusiveness.92 The remainder of this section will discuss possible theoretical objections to the suggested positive peace approach. In particular, whether the PPF’s quest for mitigating Fundamental Conflicts, and ultimately for positive and sustainable peace, is tantamount to advancing human rights. If so, the suggested positive peace approach would also attract criticisms of presenting liberal interventionism as well as tautology, i.e. the rationale of the PPF would be redundant given human rights instruments, as well as UN peacebuilding apparatus, already pursue the promotion and protection of human rights.93 Therefore, whether or not the procedural and substantive role of the IHRL within the PPF would undermine international pluralism will be further elucidated here in light of possible theoretical objections. The PPF projection ultimately seeks to foster human rights, in particular dignified lives without discrimination, regarding them integral to positive peace vision. Yet, a claim of tautology can be ruled out both at the conceptual and practical levels. Although the prevalence of respect for human rights would contribute to low levels of Fundamental Conflicts, this book presupposes that it is the absence or low levels of identity divisions that would give rise to the 92 93

See GA Resolution 65/283, 28 July 2011 and the discussion accompanying footnote 23 above. For an account on the different methods for the promotion and protection of human rights, see, Mac Darrow and Louise Arbour, “The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the United Nations,” AJIL 103/3 (2009), pp. 446–501, at 476. The former refers to human rights frameworks’ proliferation and enlargement of signatory parties, as well as to human rights capacity building and education. The latter refers to security measures and includes coercive dimensions as articulated in the R2P context as well as ‘confrontational’ or more intrusive measures such as fact-finding, investigation of human rights violations.

158

chapter 4

prevalence and internalisation of human rights in the respective societies.94 Furthermore, the PPF adopts differing methods, objectives and measures from those of human rights instruments and UN peacebuilding apparatus by seeking primarily to address Fundamental Conflicts. Nevertheless, some may argue that the role attributed to human rights in the positive peace vision establishes a paradox or circularity in that it seems to require the pre-existence of human rights. The conceptualisation of Funda­ mental Conflicts, as elaborated in Chapter 3, bears the following assertions: (1) The flouri­shing of human rights requires the absence or minimum level of Funda­ mental Conflicts. (2) The absence or low levels of Fundamental Conflicts (i.e. their formation in the first place) necessitates the prevalence of human rights. (3) Mitigating existing Fundamental Conflicts and the ensuing violations of human rights are ultimately linked to the application of human rights principles and norms in the DPP mechanism. Presupposition 3 should not be interpreted to mean that pre-existing realisation of all liberal values and/or a perfect liberal regime are regarded as necessary pre-conditions for the functioning of the suggested PPF.95 On the contrary, this seeming foundational circularity can be refuted given the role attributed to human rights in the PPF is specified as primarily being a procedural role within the DPP mechanism. In particular, the principle of equality and nondiscrimination, with its procedural function, is expected to ensure the recognition of each party’s equal worth/existence during the deliberative processes.96 This can be externally imposed by the UN at the DPP platforms. Thus, the initial seemingly foundational circularity can be ruled out for the proposed PPF. Even if human rights principles are attributed a procedural role at the DPP mechanism, the fact that the PPF would impose them during the deliberations could be taken to undermine the aspirations of middle-path pluralism. As Audard points out, Habermas’s and Rawls’s search for the prevalence of secular laws (despite secularism’s neutral stance towards all available religious doctrines) still places the burden on the actors following certain religious comprehensive doctrines, and not on the secular or liberal actors.97 Similarly, 94 95 96

97

For the concept of Fundamental Conflicts see Chapter 3. Such an interpretation would undermine the objective of the new positive peace paradigm, which intends to resolve the non-liberal regimes problem. Human rights entail “process dimension” in that they “specify criteria for an acceptable process” during the peace talks. Inclusiveness during the peace processes amounts to the realisation of the core principles of human rights. See, Parlevliet (2009), op. cit., p. 10. Catherine Audard, “The Place of Religion in the Political Domain,” in (eds.) James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen, Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 224–246, at 235–236.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

159

demanding the prevalence of the principle of equality during the DPP would put the burden on non-liberal groups. Some may categorise this approach as narrow pluralism entailing the imposition of liberal values. However, the nature of the DPP, which is based on the premises of deliberative democracy, is presupposed to evade imposition and uphold the PPF’s envisaged middle path approach to pluralism. The principle of equality is universalizable as all parties to negotiations can be expected to prefer to be recognised, treated and have influence in the outcome equally. Thus even if the emphasis on equal consideration originates from the liberal tradition, imposing this principle during the DPP would not necessarily amount to imposing a particular outcome.98 First, the PPF’s approach can be justified by the UN Charter norms pertaining to human dignity, equality and non-discrimination.99 As any UN activity is to be in line with the principles of the Charter, the application of the principles aiming at the equal worth of human persons at a UN body should be seen as having an uncontroversial legitimate basis. Second, the PPF’s approach can be justified in that it is based on the principles of international law that are applied in the UN’s international dispute settlement activities. The principles of international law in the context of peaceful settlement between states aim to protect the existence of the parties through the principles of self-determination and non-interference which are centred on the notion of sovereign equality of states.100 These principles can be translated into the intra-state context where they would carry the meaning of inclusiveness in decision-making (i.e. recognition of the needs and rights of different identity groups without discrimination in the given society). Moreover, the PPF would place an equal burden on each deliberator, rather than unjustly overburdening one particular group, as all sides will be expected

98

Leader points out that the principles of toleration and democracy can be shared both by liberal and non-liberals. He demonstrates that cultural, religious or ethnic groups that follow any comprehensive doctrine would prefer to be let alone/tolerated by other groups to be able to live up to their own ideals. See, Sheldon Leader, “Toleration without Liberal Foundations,” Ratio Juris 10/2 (1997), pp.  139–164, at 147, 162. Shue also points out that states, groups or persons may demand equal treatment in their external relations irrespective of their inegalitarian domestic arrangements. Shue (2002), op. cit., p. 316. 99 The UN Charter Preamble states that the UN “reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women…” See also Article 55(c). 100 See, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, UN Publi­cation, 1992, OLA/COD/2394, pp. 4–7. Available at http://www.un.org/law/books/HandbookOnPSD .pdf (Last visited, 14.09.2013).

160

chapter 4

to recognise the existence of the other without questioning their legitimacy so that a genuine dialogue and deliberation can be initiated. In sum, the procedural role attributed to the principle of equality and nondiscrimination within the PPF is not anticipated to undermine pluralism. Rather as Chapter 3 pointed out,101 this principle is the backbone of the theory of deliberative democracy and a practical necessity for ensuring inclusiveness and meaningful deliberations during the DPP. This procedural principle, which can be externally imposed, is envisaged to replace the function that Rawls attributed to the spontaneous/intrinsic allegiance to public reason in the Original Position. Even though the PPF projection includes features that overlap with those of the liberal tradition, its premise for middle-path pluralism can nevertheless be upheld. Despite the imposition of the procedural principle of equality, the PPF’s stance would not amount to narrow pluralism, i.e. liberal interventionism. The inclusive DPP mechanism is neither conceptualised nor expected to allow imposition of any preferred solution.102 Therefore, the PPF is expected to entail less intrusive features than narrow pluralism. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the new positive peace paradigm entails a narrower understanding of pluralism compared to the Rawlsian wide international pluralism, because it concerns internal affairs of the states and its demand for procedural equality provides an intrusive stance. Yet, the imposition of procedural equality sets a necessary compromise for all the state and non-state deliberators to ensure that their exclusive stance (i.e. Fundamental Conflicts) can be overcome. This intrusion should be seen as a lesser evil given the prospect of absolute intrusion via military means and/or similar level of intrusion via UN peacebuilding apparatus in the post-conflict situations. On the other hand, the reference to human rights principles under element 2 of the operational formula of positive peace can give rise to the criticism that the PPF attributes a substantive role to human rights since they establish the basis for triggering the DPP mechanism. This may render the PPF susceptible to prima facie rejection by pluralists, relativists or the non-Western bloc due to their concerns that the PPF would be a tool for imposing liberal/Western values. By way of looking for the prevalence of human rights as the basis of its actions, the PPF could be claimed to have a pre-set worldview of the features that societies are universally expected to adopt. However, this potential criticism against the PPF can be refuted by drawing upon Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, which sets out one the UN’s purposes and 101 See Section 5. 102 See also UN Guidance for Effective Mediation of 2012, op. cit., p. 14, that precludes to impose solutions.

The Operational Formula Of Positive Peace

161

objectives as “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms.”103 Element 2 of the operational definition seeks to provide protection for the respect of human rights. It necessitates a general assessment of the human rights situation in a given society with a view to general welfare and horizontal equality among the existing identity groups in the pursuit of a dignified life. As elaborated earlier, the PPF will pursue this by way of comparing the disadvantaged groups with the advantaged groups, and considering the realities of the given state rather than assessing the situation of the given society according to ideal interpretations of universal IHRL. This screening will only be done provided that the tensions between groups pose a risk for armed mobilisation and disturb positive peace. The consequence of this assessment would merely be offering to facilitate internal dialogue and deliberation to mitigate these risks. Hence, the search for the respect for human rights under element 2 cannot be argued to amount to a full-fledged substantive criterion or imposition. Furthermore, the reference to human rights in the formal definition of positive peace is a practical necessity. The UNPC’s determinations are expected to be political and contextual due to the search for the existence of tensions (criterion B). To limit the politicisation of the PPF apparatus, it will be essential to anchor the UNPC’s determinations to a reference point that, to the greatest extent possible, is commonly shared among all UN member states. Attaching IHRL as a common reference point to the operational definition of positive peace and simultaneously allowing contextuality through Criterion B are expected to situate the PPF’s functioning and implications between the extremes of pluralism and universalism. 5 Conclusion This chapter provided an operational definition for positive peace, and elucidated its elements and the rationale and expected effects of additional criteria A and B. The following operational formula for the absence of positive peace summarises to which situations the positive peace approach of this book will apply. These situations involve when there are: (1a) widespread violations of human rights of non-grave nature that deprive the general population of basic necessities and freedoms despite the availability of resources; or (1b) Horizontal Inequalities that affect a salient identity 103 See also Markus Schmidt, “United Nations,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli et.al, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 391–432, at 392.

162

chapter 4

group of significant size/power or many identity groups despite the availability of resources; and (2) high degrees of tensions and polarisations constituting a risk of mobilisation for violence/armed conflict; and (3a) if the society lacks functioning communication channels that enable the equal consideration of basic necessities and freedoms of all society members; or (3b) if the society is in transition towards a democratic regime and/or emerging from armed conflict at the time points 1 and 2 are reported. These elements of the operational formula do not signify an escalated violent situation or an immediate risk of escalating into armed conflict. Rather they indicate the deep-rooted causes of armed conflicts. Hence the proposed positive peace approach aims at strengthening the UN for pre-conflict prevention. It is acknowledged that not all of societies, especially those which cannot be categorised as lacking positive peace according to the operational formula, can be described as experiencing positive peace. Neither is the PPF conceptualised to tackle all situations lacking positive peace. Indeed, the purpose of additional conditions (points 2 and 3) is to ensure the PPF leaves out some situations beyond its ambit so that it does not duplicate the objectives and efforts of the existing UN mechanisms. The PPF is designed to fill the limitations and lacuna in the UN system with regard to assisting societies for a peaceful transition from violence or a non-democratic/repressive regime towards a democratic one and building positive peace. Furthermore, if materialised, the mere existence of the PPF and its DPP mechanism within the UN system are expected to have a standard-setting impact and create an atmosphere conducive to the general promotion and flourishing of positive peace in all societies. For the PPF to present a viable theoretical projection as well as a practical possibility, namely likelihood of states’ acceptance of its materialising under the UN system, it is essential that it does not undermine international pluralism. This chapter demonstrated that, in theory, the PPF would be capable of pursuing a middle-path notion of pluralism. It also argued international pluralism cannot be deemed to be undermined if the measures of the PPF were to stand between absolute non-interference and absolute intrusiveness/intervention into internal affairs of states. Furthermore, this chapter analysed the procedural and substantive roles assigned to the IHRL in the functioning of the PPF. It asserted that the PPF’s resort to procedural equality at the DPP mechanism would not impose a more intrusive approach than the existing UN principles and practices in the context of international dispute settlement. It also argued that the substantive role attributed to IHRL in the operational formula of the positive peace would not present a more intrusive practice than the UN’s existing objectives and practices for human rights (i.e. promoting respect for human rights).

Part 3 The Operation of the New Positive Peace Paradigm

∵

The third part of this study concerns the operation of the suggested positive peace framework within the UN system. It provides a practical justification for the positive peace paradigm in light of examples which will show that there is a need to strengthen the preventative pillars of the UN as existing instruments either do not have a mandate or do not employ effective measures and methods for the prevention of intra-state armed conflict in the pre-conflict contexts. Chapter 5 points out the envisaged distinct approach of the PPF and its added value to the UN system. Chapter 6 provides the particularities of the functioning of the Deliberative Peace Process mechanism; and pinpoints the current situations where the new positive peace vision could be applied, and reflects on the chances of the PPF’s operation in the current state-centric international system.

chapter 5

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms vis-à-vis the New Positive Peace Approach Article 1(1) of the UN Charter enumerates that “the prevention of threats to the peace” is the primary purpose of the UN.1 The idea of conflict prevention started to gain importance and applicability during the détente period and again with the end of the Cold War.2 Although the powers of the UN’s preventive instruments remain contingent on state-invitation and consent, conflict prevention has been evolving towards encompassing more comprehensive structural and proactive features. Chapter 2 looked at the UN’s preventative idealist framework and pointed out the developments and UN institutional reform for strengthening them.3 This Chapter provides a more detailed account of the UN structural prevention mechanisms and their limits in order to illustrate the PPF’s expected contribution to the prevention pillars of the UN system. First, it elucidates the terminology pertaining to structural and direct conflict prevention, and the overlapping features of conflict resolution, peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Next, it looks at the UN instruments that provide structural generic or countryspecific measures and pinpoints the PPF’s potential added value. 1 See also Section 2 in Chapter 2. 2 See Wallenteen (2012), op. cit., p. 288. See, Christoph Mikulaschek and Paul Romita (rapporteurs), Conflict Prevention: Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies (New York: International Peace Institute, December 2011), p. 2. Available at http://www.operationspaix .net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6544~v~Conflict_Prevention__Toward_More_Effective_Multilateral _Strategies.pdf. For a brief account on the evolution of the meaning of conflict prevention in the history of the UN see, Peter Wallensteen, “Reassessing Recent Conflicts: Direct vs. Structural Prevention,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 213–228, at 214. For a review on the UN mechanisms and agencies executing preventive measures, see, Edward C. Luck (2002), “Prevention: Theory and Practice,” ibid., pp. 251–271, at 252–56. For a brief account on UN’s conflict prevention instruments and the Charter-based mandate; the UN resolutions and activities concerning conflict prevention until 1994, see Luise Drüke, “The United Nations in Conflict Prevention,” in (eds.). Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, The Art of Conflict Prevention (London, New York: Brasseys Atlantic Commentaries No. 7, 1994), pp.  22–71, at 27–30. Available at http://www.ipw .uni-hannover.de/fileadmin/politische_wissenschaft/Dateien/luise_druke/un_conflict _prevention.PDF. (Last visited, 07.06.2012). 3 See Section 2, Chapter 2. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_007

166 1

chapter 5

Structural and Operational Prevention

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict established in 1994 aimed to address “intergroup violence” and to “prevent and resolve [armed] conflicts.”4 Its final report of 1997 provides a definition of structural and operational (direct) prevention. As the Commission puts it, “structural prevention – or peace building – comprises strategies such as putting in place international legal systems, dispute resolution mechanisms, and cooperative arrangements; meeting people’s basic…needs; and rebuilding societies that have been shattered by war or other major crises.”5 In other words, structural prevention is a comprehensive endeavour as it aims to eliminate the reoccurrence of armed conflict by addressing underlying causes and seeking institutional reform and “attitudinal change.”6 It ideally entails the identification of causal linkages and the tackling of underlying causes, even when there is no immediate risk to armed conflict.7 Structural prevention can thus be described as a “reform program”,8 which aims to provide conditions for peaceful relations among the actors.9 It is important to note that the Commission’s formulation of structural prevention signifies measures in post-conflict situations that aim to prevent re-lapses. Yet 4 See the disclaimer of the Commission on its reports, p. 1. Available at http://carnegie.org/ fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Pathfinders%20for%20Peace.pdf. (Last visited 02.02.2012). 5 Carnegie Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict, p.  xxviii. For structural versus operational prevention see also, Tobi P.  Dress, Designing A Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (New York/Geneva: UN, 2005), pp.  14–16. Available at http://www.unngls.org/orf/Designing%20a%20peacebuilding%20 infrastructure.pdf (Last visited, 13.01.2015). 6 See, David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), p. 11–12. 7 As Wallensteen puts it “structural prevention is not immediately tied to the possibility of an armed conflict.” Wallensteen (2002), op. cit., p.  213. Kanninen and Kumar define it as “incountry capacity building” that primarily involves with “participatory and accountable” democratic governance-building as a pre-conflict prevention measure. 60% of the UNDP’s programming was directed to democratic governance. See Kanninen and Kumar (2005), op. cit., p. 61. Lund also links structural prevention with tackling “deeper societal conditions.” See Lund (2009), op. cit., pp. 289–90. 8 Wallensteen (2002), op. cit., p. 213. 9 In the context of prevention of international armed conflict, structural prevention refers to “creating conditions that foster peaceful relations among states” rather than solely avoiding “situations that can lead to war.” Marshall Plan and other political and economic initiatives – i.e. the Coal and Steel Community- are pointed out as structural preventative means. See, Foreword, in (eds.) David Cortright, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. xi.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

167

one may also describe structural prevention measures as pre-conflict preventive measures since they not only react to the existing conflicts, but also seek to build conditions of peace. Conversely, operational prevention refers to actions when “violence appears imminent.”10 It has a narrower scope in that it aims to prevent armed violence only after it becomes imminent, or to stop it after it occurs or intensifies. It concerns primarily addressing the symptoms, namely the violence itself, and not necessarily the “underlying causes.”11 Once violence and subsequent polarisation occur, the corollary dynamics often need to be addressed first. Due to the sequencing requirement, these actions often do not extend to root cause tackling.12 Structural preventive measures can be undertaken pro-actively (for latent factors before conflict/violence erupts) or ex post facto (after conflict/violence erupts). As Lund analyses both structural and direct measures could take generic (a priori) and country-specific (ad hoc) form. A priori prevention refers to “generic international principles agreed on by global and regional organizations as guideposts,” which function as preventive measures, even when “no signs of conflict have yet appeared.” Conversely, ad hoc prevention refers to “hands-on ways (either direct or structural) to respond to country specific risk factors.”13 The UN system, as well as other international and regional organisations and NGOs, entail numerous instruments that apply structural and operational conflict prevention measures. The UN’s policy documents emphasise the aspiration to strengthen structural prevention since the 1990s.14 Never­theless, direct/operational prevention can be argued to still stand as the more accepted method for conflict prevention, because, as Luck points out, UN member states resist further mainstreaming structural prevention policy within the UN system.15 10 11

12

13 14 15

Carnegie Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict, pp. 10, 3. The report available at www .janeliunas.lt/files/Preventing%20Deadly%20Conflict.doc (Last visited 02.02.2012). As Wallensteen puts it direct/operational preventive measures “reduce or eliminate violence, without necessarily eliminating the conflict or its underlying causes.” Wallensteen (2002), op. cit., p. 213. Wallensteen points out that direct operational prevention is applicable when “issues have crystallized.” Ibid., pp. 213–14. Lund explains once the conflict is manifest although limited “[t]he aim is both to prevent confrontations that escalate, hardening of positions and polarization…and to find bases for cooperation.” Lund (2009), op. cit., p. 303. Ibid., pp. 291, 299, 300. Lund argues that conflict prevention is currently “the official policy of the UN” and other regional and international organisations. See, ibid, p. 287. Edward Luck points out that the UN member states do not seem to be willing to support structural prevention to become the central policy of the UN, and argues for direct preventive

168

chapter 5

An Agenda for Peace of 1992, a report authored by UN Secretary-General Ghali, introduces the idea of comprehensive peacebuilding to complement direct/operational prevention, specifically preventive diplomacy and preventive military deployment.16 The report points out that human rights, development and lasting peace are interlinked, and that post-conflict peacebuilding efforts should include the “…protect[ion of] human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation…”17 to prevent relapses. The Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict of 2001 prepared by UN Secretary-General Annan also emphasises the long-term structural preventive effects of disarmament, developmental assistance, the promotion of human rights and humanitarian assistance. The report points out that these measures may be pursued in post-conflict situations in the context of generic or country-specific structural prevention.18 These reports stress that the quest for peace requires a holistic approach, highlighting that different tools are appropriate in different phases of violent conflict, i.e. before, during and after its eruption.19 They bear the underlying assumption that structural measures do not present a definite cure when tensions/conflicts escalate and emphasise the importance of operational prevention. Particularly, the role of UN mediation in the context of preventive diplomacy is highlighted as it functions “to ease tensions before they result in conflict – or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes.”20 Underlying causes in this context mostly signify trigger events, rather than structural and primary root causes as explained in Chapter 3.21 In case preventive diplomacy and preventive military deployment (preconflict peacekeeping) fail to prevent the eruption of conflict, the UN envisages peacemaking “to bring hostile parties to agreement.”22 UN peacekeeping also has a role in bringing an end to violence in addition to consolidating peace.23 methods as the central policy of the UN. Luck (2002), op. cit., pp. 256–61. See also Bellamy (2009) in footnote 106 in Chapter 2. 16 See, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters, The Report of the Secretary-General, A/RES/47/120, 18 December 1992, para 55, 57. [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace]. 17 Ibid. 18 See, Prevention of Armed Conflict, para. 9. 19 See also Lund (2009), op. cit., p. 292. 20 See, An Agenda for Peace, para. 23. 21 UN capacity-building efforts in Ivory Coast, Nepal and Haiti did not extend to involve mending deep rivalries. See, Kanninen and Kumar (2005), op. cit., pp. 61–62. 22 An Agenda for Peace, para. 20. 23 Ibid, paras. 20 and 46–54.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

169

In each stage of conflict, peaceful measures of Chapter VI, such as mediation, negotiation and good offices of the Secretary-General (i.e. conflict resolution tools) have a crucial role.24 Conflict resolution aims at an agreement among the parties to the conflict on the solution to their “central incompatibilities.”25 Yet, as Wallensteen notes, this does not necessarily suggest that the situation after conflict resolution would refer to a positive peace, rather than merely the absence of violence.26 Conflict transformation, on the other hand, is a broader concept than conflict resolution in that it envisages the attainment of “constructive social change”27 in social structures and human relationships that created the conflict in the first place.28 According to Lederach, conflict transformation is a viable approach for “strategic peacebuilding” which also seeks structural change and “justpeace”.29 Peacebuilding is “a form of prevention that seeks to pre-empt the relapse into conflict of countries that have emerged from war.”30 It involves comprehensive 24 25 26

27 28

29

30

As Zartman points out negotiation as a conflict resolution tool can function as preventing, managing, resolving or transforming the conflict. See, Zartman (2009), op. cit., p. 322. See Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 8. For the nuances and overlapping features of the conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation fields, see Miall (2004), pp. 3–4. For a comprehensive account of the definition and components of current conflict resolution understanding, which is placed between negative and positive peace, see ibid., pp. 10–11. See, John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (PA: Good Books, 2003), p. 28. Ibid., pp. 22, 27, 69. See also John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p.  84. For five types of transformations (context, structure, actor, issue, personal/elite) as a means to conflict transformation and prevention see also Miall (2004), op. cit., pp. 9–10. See John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 19–44, at 24. See also Lederach (2003), op. cit., p. 68. For the concept of recognitional just peace that emphasises reconciliation as a process involving forward-looking practices and acknowledgement of past injustices, as well as identity and culture, see Karin Aggestam, “Recognitional Just Peace,” in (eds.) Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl, Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 34–47. Progress Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, para 114. The concept of peacebuilding draws upon Galtung’s positive peace understanding. For a summary of the evolution of the concept and its differing meanings see, Peacebuilding Orientation Brochure, Publi­ cation of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, pp. 45–6. Available at http://www.un.org/ en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf. See also the UNPBC web­ site available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml. (Last visited 05.05.2012).

170

chapter 5

measures, which seek to mitigate conditions that lead to armed conflict and to cultivate conditions to elicit and sustain peace. According to the Peacebuilding Support Office, the UN’s mandate suggests peacebuilding as the primary activity.31 The concepts of structural prevention, peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict transformation have overlapping features and objectives. Mediation/ negotiation as a conflict resolution method has an overarching and necessary role in conflict prevention, conflict transformation and peacebuilding as, in essence, all need to address the present or past incompatibilities in one way or another.32 Likewise, peacebuilding can also be referred to as an overarching activity. Conflict prevention and conflict transformation efforts include peacebuilding measures as well as they also must address the root causes of potential/ actual armed conflict and foster conditions for sustaining peace. Furthermore, country-specific or hands-on structural prevention can be depicted as peacebuilding. These four concepts are interlinked.33 The suggested new positive peace paradigm draws upon the objectives and assumptions of conflict transformation and seeks to contribute to conflict prevention by way of aiming at a comprehensive positive peace. However, this positive peace approach is construed more broadly than a post-conflict peacebuilding strategy. Different from existing approaches, the PPF is envisaged to address identity divisions as the primary sources of social conflicts, and seeks the transformation of Fundamental Conflicts. It is conceptualised as a preconflict structural prevention instrument to reinforce the UN mediation and conflict resolution role. 2

The Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council (HRC)

This section examines the UN Charter-based human rights machinery to explore whether their activities can be deemed as sufficient for eliciting positive peace as well as for effective conflict prevention.34 31 32 33 34

Peacebuilding Orientation Brochure, p. 8. See, Introduction, in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 3, 10. Peacebuilding Orientation Brochure, p. 8. For the map of the UN system’s “core prevention activities,” see Annex of the Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, pp.  35–54. See also, “The UN Mapping of Exercise on Activities of UN Entities in Conflict Situations,” as of November 2004

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

171

The post of the OHCHR was created through a GA Resolution in compliance with the Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 199335 to promote and protect human rights. In addition to generic measures for the promotion and protection of human rights, its mandate also includes country-specific measures, such as technical assistance and capacity building efforts. The OHCHR’s activities include “monitoring, standard-setting, supporting the work of experts for special procedures and for treaty bodies’ monitoring missions, as well as assisting governments for implementation, capacity-building, training and education for human rights.”36 It can be argued that the OHCHR’s generic structural measures would contribute to positive peace in the long-term.37 If all human rights enshrined under the UN’s core human right treaties, particularly the ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD (International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination), CAT (The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) and CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child) were to be realised without discrimination, and if the full realisation of the rights of minorities38 were to be achieved in all societies, there would be fewer reasons for tensions and formations for identity groups and divisions/polarisations, HIs and grievances; and ultimately the conditions would be more conducive to the flourishing of positive peace according to the definition provided in the present work. Moreover, the OHCHR’s country-specific measures through its “field presences” (i.e. its country, stand-alone and regional offices) are also important structural prevention measures that could contribute to fostering and/or building positive peace. The OHCHR’s field work requires an agreement with the available at http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/map-UN-system.pdf. (Last visited, 10.04.2010). 35 For the mandate see, UN GA Resolution, A/RES/48/141, 20 December 1993. For Vienna Declaration and World Conference on Human Rights, 14 – 25 June 1993, see http://www .ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx. (Last visited, 10.01.2013) For a detailed account on UN-based human rights machinery, see Bertrand G. Ramcharan, “Norms and Machinery,” in (eds.) Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 439–462. 36 See, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx. (Last visited, 10.01.2013) See also Peck’s brief account on invitation-based technical/constitutional assistance of OHCHR, Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), pp. 91–2. 37 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Section 2. 38 In line with the GA Declaration on Minorities of 1992.

172

chapter 5

host country. Alternatively, OHCHR’s work can also be integrated into the existing UN Peacekeeping Missions or Political Missions undertaken by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the given state. The mandates of the OHCHR’s field work depend on negotiation with the host country, but often include raising human rights awareness of both governmental and nongovernmental actors, and “designing effective remedies” to provide better protection on the ground.39 The activities of OHCHR field presences include seeking non-repetition of human rights violations through judicial processes as well as constitutional/ legislative reforms and non-judicial means, such as human rights education and capacity-building. Field missions mostly work against impunity, and monitor and support Transitional Justice (TJ) processes, which seek truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence through judicial and non-judicial processes.40 The OHCHR field missions are particularly concerned with the judicial aspects of TJ processes, namely holding perpetrators of past human rights violations accountable, providing remedies to the victims, and realising institutional reforms for reinforcing international human rights standards and ensuring non-recurrence.41 As of 2011, the OHCHR estimated that most of its country or regional offices have experienced challenges with regard to their efforts against impunity. Despite the work of the OHCHR, as well as of those of the other Charterand treaty-based human rights machinery, the existence of long-standing human rights violations in Syria, Libya, and Bahrain, among many other states, 39 See, OHCHR’s Approach to Field Work, OHCHR Report, 2011, available at http://www2 .ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/allegati/­ downloads/5_OHCHR_in_the_field.pdf, pp. 205–206. [hereinafter OHCHR 2011 Report on Field Work]. See also the OHCHR’s Work in the Field at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ Countries/Pages/WorkInField.aspx. (Last visited, 26.04.2013). 40 See the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on TJ] available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Mandate.aspx. (Last visited, 26.04.2013). 41 See the activities of the field presences in Guinea and Togo among all other field missions that support judicial aspects of Transitional Justice processes, in OHCHR 2011 Report on Field Work, pp. 211, 213. For the OHCHR work within the UN’s Peace Missions for supporting TJ processes in Libya see, pp. 373, 375. Human rights groups contested the mandate of the Guinean Provisional Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was mandated predominantly with reconciliation; they sought the inclusion of a rights-based approach against impunity. See “World Report Chapter: Guinea,” Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011, available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-chapter -guinea. (Last visited, 26.08.2013).

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

173

is attributable to the constraints stemming from the state-centric system imposed upon human rights enforcement. The political will of states is crucial for the effective enforcement and full implementation of human rights. Yet, the limitations for stopping and preventing violations of human rights can also be attributed to the fact that the mandate of the OHCHR does not extend to tackling underlying relational and socio-economic structural reasons that lead to and/or reinforce violations in divided societies. Contrary to the assumption of the liberal tradition, states, and particularly those of divided societies, are rarely neutral to expect full implementation of human rights42 through the existing methods of the human rights machinery – i.e. by the mere promotion or protection work without resolving relational reasons. It is important to note that both TJ processes and OHCHR field work entail “victim-centred”43 perspectives, and the notion of reconciliation in these contexts primarily indicates the restoration of the status of the victims and their inclusion into social life. Like TJ processes, the impetus for establishing OHCHR field presences often follow widespread and gross human rights violations or conflict/post-conflict situations. This can be also attributed to the state-centric stance, which maintains that the UN and international concern are legitimately warranted when grave violations occur, and to the perception that states would only be inclined to accept an international presence under such circumstances. In other words, potentially more effective interventions of the human rights machinery take place when violent situations have already escalated. To provide a comprehensive approach, the PPF seeks to tackle Fundamental Conflicts as both the root causes of salient human rights violations and of intra-state armed conflicts.44 As elaborated earlier, the operational formula is designed to enable the PPF to capture Fundamental Conflicts at their earlier stages when lesser serious human rights violations indicate their existence. The PPF is expected to contribute to effective human rights protection and structural prevention in that it entails stronger emphasis on reconciliation across divisions of the given society. For further strengthening of the UN human rights machinery, the HRC was created in 2006 to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights. The HRC

42

43 44

See O’Flynn, op. cit., pp. 161–162. Galtung did not base his social justice concept on human rights precisely because of his scepticism that states would distribute ultimate power. See, note 18 in Galtung (1969), op. cit., p. 188. See Article (k) of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on TJ. See Chapter 3 and 4.

174

chapter 5

mandate includes “strengthening”45 the promotion and protection of human rights, “mainstreaming human rights within the UN system” and addressing violations of human rights.46 The HRC can be described as providing generic and country-specific structural prevention. Under its Special Procedures comprising of Special Rapporteurs, Representatives, Independent Experts and Working Groups, the HRC appoints independent experts to undertake thematic or country-specific “protection functions.”47 They examine human rights situations and report with the aim of developing better policies for advancing human rights situations with regard to thematic issues and/or in the respective countries.48 It can be argued that the mandates of the Special Procedures constitute both generic and country-specific promotion and standard setting of human rights. In order to overcome the limitations of the human rights machinery with regards to implementation, the UPR mechanism was developed for ensuring a “results-oriented approach.”49 As an inter-governmental body, the HRC engages states at the track-one diplomacy level, specifically with the top representatives of the state, and in a dialogical setting to ensure a non-controversial and cooperative environment whilst the review takes place.50 The UPR mechanism monitors human rights situations of all UN member states and provides recommendations for each country to stop and prevent violations. This often takes the form of requests for constitutional and legislative reforms in line with IHRL and in light of the given state’s treaty obligations. It also calls for acceding to international human rights instruments. These measures of the UPR mechanism can be categorised under country-specific structural prevention measures. It is too early to conclude whether the recommendations of the UPR Working Group were fully implemented by all states under review as this will be assessed at the end of the second cycle between 2012 and 2016. However, 45

Background Information on the Human Rights Council, available at http://www.ohchr .org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx. See General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of on 15 March 2006, which created the HRC and its UPR mechanism. 46 Article 2 of the GA Resolution 60/251. 47 Kevin Boyle, New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 37. 48 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. (Last visited, 27.10.2011). 49 See, Article 12 of the UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. See also Factsheet: Work and Structure of The Human Rights Council, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/hrcouncil/docs/FACTSHEET_OUTCOMES_FINAL.pdf (Last visited, 26.12.2012). 50 Chapter 6 will elaborate different recipients of the UN mediation/facilitation activities – i.e. track-one/two/three diplomacy.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

175

there are concerns relating to the lack of satisfactory follow up on implementation in the second cycle. Furthermore, to date no decision has been made with respect to the HRC’s mandate for persistent non-compliance. These factors give rise to concerns about the UPR becoming another rhetorical inter-governmental platform.51 Libya and Ivory Coast are examples that indicate that the UPR mechanism does not have a preventive effect. The UPR meetings of each state took place before the situation in their countries reached escalation into armed conflict. The review for Libya was held in November 2010, and for Ivory Coast in December 2009. Although Libya accepted some of the recommendations, it refused the recommendations concerning the abolition of penal codes and provisions that allowed repressive practices.52 In the end, the long-term grievances on the ground could not be addressed, and an intra-state armed conflict occurred. Ivory Coast accepted recommendations, including ones pertaining to the esta­blishment of a stable electoral system, maintenance of reconciliation policies and implementation of the peace agreement. In spite of this, tensions within the society could not be mitigated. They ultimately triggered post-­election ­violence.53 Both situations were addressed through UN authorised military interventions. This is not to argue that the UPR mechanism is an ineffective measure for monitoring and the generic promotion and protection of human rights. It is not denied that the UPR provides a sound results-oriented approach and better monitoring, which could potentially have positive impacts on positive 51

52

53

Article 36 of HRC Resolution 5/1, 18 June 2007. The NGO UPR Info, estimates only 10% of the total recommendations were fully implemented by the mid-term, and argue that the recommending states failed to follow up implementation in a ‘satisfactory manner’ risking the UPR become a rhetorical platform. See, http://www.upr-info.org/+Few-States-follow -up-their-1st+.html. http://www.upr-info.org/+UPR-Info-regrets-lack-of-focus-on+.html. UPR Watch report of September 2010, points out that there is no reliable system for assessing the level implementation of UPR recommendations. See, p. 4. Available http://upr-epu .com/ENG/medias/implementation_the_UPR_s_imprecise_finality.pdf. The second cycle of UPR starting in 2012 involves the assessment of the level of implementation. For the review reports until 22nd session see, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/ UPRSessions.aspx (Last visited 15.06.2015). For Libya’s UPR recommendations see, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, A/HRC/16/15, 12 November 2010. See also http:// upr-epu.com/ENG/country.php?id=190. (Last visited, 15.09.2013). For UPR recommendations accepted by Ivory Coast see, http://upr-epu.com/ENG/country .php?id=140. For the background on the post-election conflict, see http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml. (Last visited, 15.09.2013).

176

chapter 5

peace in the longer term. However, these examples illustrate that the UPR mechanism in itself is not a sufficient measure for tackling existing tensions and violations of human rights effectively, and thus neither for providing effective prevention of armed conflict. It is neither claimed that the failure to prevent armed conflicts in these two examples should be attributed solely to the UPR mechanism as it does not entail a mandate for conflict prevention. Rather, it is to be acknowledged that the UPR mechanism, as well as other UN mechanisms, is vulnerable to constraints due to the lack of political will of the respective states. Therefore, the PPF is proposed to entail a non-selective (universal) approach to initiate the DPP mechanism with a view to tackling the lack of political will of respective states more assertively. The HRC also involves country-specific operational prevention measures. It may exert international pressure via “verbal attentions”54 (statements) and resolutions on the given states in escalated conflict situations. The HRC is mandated to urge respective governments to cease violating human rights and to end violence against opposition groups.55 In the cases of Syria and Bahrain, the UPR review meetings were scheduled after violent state reactions occurred, and the UPR platform was used to urge both structural prevention measures and peaceful direct prevention measures to end the tensions.56 Yet the implementation and effective realisation of these recommendations have not taken place. Institutionalised universal monitoring through the UPR mechanism can be depicted as a development that reinforces generic, as well as country-specific, positive peace building. However, the UPR mechanism does not entail a mandate for conflict prevention, and as the examples of Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Ivory Coast illustrate, its measures do not have clear impacts on both addressing the risk of violence and effectuating the elimination of grievances in divided societies. In a nutshell, because the PPF is conceptualised to entail a direct mandate for structural prevention, and particularly for tackling Fundamental Conflicts, differing from the HRC, it can be expected to add value to the existing UN system. 54

55 56

“Verbal attention and facilitation characterizes UN preventive efforts across the globe.” See, the Typology of Operational Conflict Prevention Measures section in Magnus Öberg, Frida Möller and Peter Wallensteen, “Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises, 1990–98: A New Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26/1 (2009), pp. 67–91, at 72, 79. The HRC put Syrian government’s reactions on its agenda and issued a resolution after the uprisings started. See, HRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, 29 April 2011. See, Articles 100.1. and 100.2. of the Report of the Working Group on UPR for Syria, A/HRC/19/11, 11 October 2011.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

177

2.1 The Positive Peace Approach versus Human Rights-Based Approach The primary aim of the proposed positive peace approach is to mitigate social divisions/Fundamental Conflicts to a level that will allow intrinsic respect for human rights – i.e. which will eliminate both informal and formal discrimination. Therefore, the PPF is concerned with general social welfare, horizontal equality and harmonious relationships among differing identity groups, rather than occupied with isolated cases of human rights violations and with the improvement of the quality of life of each individual or of persons belonging to vulnerable groups.57 In other words, it does not have merely a ‘victim-­ centred’ perspective, but a more holistic vision concerning the elimination of relational and structural factors giving rise to systematic violations.58 The PPF is not envisioned as an enforcement body that pursues a legalistic approach in order to ensure that states fulfil their legal obligations towards individual citizens. On the other hand, the rights-based approach mainly seeks legislative or constitutional changes to remove formal violations and discrimination (i.e. the end results), and to provide reparations for the affected individuals or groups, drawing upon the given state’s obligations under international treaties to which it is a party. In other words, the methods for the protection of human rights (i.e. investigation, redress, or punishment of violations59) do not directly address identity issues and HIs because human rights instruments recognise individuals, and not identity groups, as the rights-holders.60 This is not to argue that rights-based approach may not have an impact on identity groups. On the contrary, provided that the political will exists, legislative/constitutional reforms for anti-discrimination as well as ‘affirmative actions’ would remedy

57

58

59 60

“[L]ower-income groups, women, indigenous and tribal peoples, occupied populations, asylum seekers, refugees and internally displaced persons, minorities, the elderly, children, landless peasants, persons with disabilities and the homeless” are defined as vulnerable groups according to The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, January 22–26, 1997. See also Pasqualucci (2008), op. cit., pp. 17–8. Marks points out the difference between human rights and social justice approaches in the context of poverty; the former “tends to focus on claims of individuals anchored in binding law” while the latter aims “redressing broader injustices and concern for the welfare of the poor.” Poor is to be read general population in our context. See, Marks (2010), op. cit., p. 606. For distinctive methods of human rights protection and promotion, see Darrow & Arbour (2009), op. cit, p. 476. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013, 3rd edn.), p.29.

178

chapter 5

the effects of systematic discrimination against particular groups as well.61 However, the PPF is designed to directly address horizontal inequalities and discrimination. In addition to rights-based approach, the human rights machinery also seeks social change through non-juridical means, such as human rights education, international reporting and monitoring, and public statements (i.e. naming and shaming). The PPF draws upon the philosophy of human rights and is envisaged to pursue non-juridical means through its DPP mechanism. This is seen necessary to ensure that the PPF’s actions are globally applicable without duplicating existing rights-based practices. The PPF will consider any discrimination or restriction against sizable groups as its subject matter, regardless of politically or legally justifiable reasons, if tensions (i.e. criterion B) have been established. An example of such a situation would be the imposition of formal discrimination in access to public services and public sector jobs, including running for elections, against identity group members who are perceived to pursue anti-pluralist doctrines and threaten the survival of pluralist co-existence in the given society. In such situations Fundamental Conflicts could be assumed to lie underneath the discriminatory attitude. Even though such discrimination may be politically rationalised or justifiable according to IHRL (i.e. to protect democratic/pluralist features of society), the existence of incompatibilities is of relevance to the PPF, not with which party the right lies. The situation in Egypt with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood would be a potential case for the PPF. As much as the threats perceived from this group may be real or their exclusion from the political sphere may be rationalised with a reference to IHRL and democratic values, the situation entrenches grievances and nullifies positive peace, and thus would present a potential case for the application of the DPP mechanism. Furthermore, the PPF is envisaged to also consider positive discrimination or favourable HIs as its subject matters if they cause tensions. In Sri Lanka, affirmative action by the state, which was intended to remedy past discrimination, is argued to have caused new tensions due to the grievances of the newly disadvantaged group (Tamils) who lost its past privileges.62 Differing from the rights-based approach, the PPF will engage with discrimination, even if it is on “acceptable grounds.”63 This approach would arguably create a pitfall as regards positive discrimination, which aims to remedy past injustices for the sake of achieving substantive equality. It is not the aim of the proposed positive peace approach to annul positive discrimination. However, if the circumstances 61 62 63

Ibid., p. 47. Stewart (2002), op. cit., pp. 124–25. For a brief account see Moeckli (2010), op. cit., p. 196.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

179

prove that there are high risks for armed conflict, the DPP mechanism would be useful to facilitate mutual understanding among the parties. In theory, some parties that are against these positive measures may incite tensions with the hope of reversing the circumstances during the DPP. Thus, from a rightsbased perspective, the role of the UNPC could be interpreted as regressive. However, if the indicators are able to capture widespread tensions, irrespective of the underlying self-interested motives, the tensions are to be considered to threaten positive peace. This stance can be expected to rightly attract criticism that the PPF will jeopardise universal application of IHRL and progressive change. This claim can be countered given that the PPF is not envisaged as an alternative to the rights-based approach and human rights machinery. The PPF’s primary aim is to mitigate the risk factors of armed conflicts, and to affect better social relationships to ease perceived security dilemmas among identity groups, which would ultimately contribute to the flourishing of grounds conducive to the prevalence of human rights. In sum, the suggested positive peace approach entails nuances from and complementary features to the human rights-based approach in that it does not seek to address violations of human rights, but to tackle the potential factors of the non-prevalence of human rights, namely Fundamental Conflicts. It is concerned with the deficit of respect for human rights towards the general public and existing identity groups that indicate the existence of divisions. The PPF aims to secure both private and public actors’ will and consent to effectuate the required social change to mitigate Fundamental Conflicts and thus the non-repetition of ensuing human rights violations.64 3

UN Mediation and Peacemaking

The UN mediation role can take place at different stages of a conflict cycle. It can be deployed (1) in pre-conflict situations, (2) in situations where conflict becomes imminent or during conflict, and (3) in post-ceasefire or post-conflict situations. The first role corresponds to the aim of the PPF. The second corresponds to operational/direct prevention, namely preventive diplomacy. The third role amounts to peacemaking efforts, which may also incorporate structural 64

As Steiner and Alston point out, the change that human rights advocates strive to bring about is not against public state actors, rather against private actors. For social change, as much as the authority of the state, the consent and will of private actors are important. See Steiner and Alston (2000), op. cit., pp. 424–25.

180

chapter 5

preventive measures (i.e. peacebuilding measures) after ceasefire. This section involves the third category and juxtaposes structural prevention efforts in the context of peacemaking with the PPF’s structural prevention objective. Because preventive diplomacy often does not include the application of structural preventive measures, it will not be discussed here. There is no UN mechanism that provides jointly pre-conflict mediation and structural prevention in a systematic manner as the PPF’s is envisaged to function. Yet the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) undertakes facilitation (mediation) role with a view to implementing structural prevention measures in pre-conflict settings, and thus could be argued to fall under category 1. However, the BCPR does not entail systemic mediation and structural prevention mandate, rather its efforts are ad hoc following other organisations’ or the UN’s diplomatic efforts – and often quiet diplomacy.65 As noted in Chapter 2, the UN mediation role primarily applies in the context of operational/direct prevention rather than pre-conflict prevention. The SC is often reluctant to invoke Chapter VI measures for intra-state matters since those measures were initially developed to engage with international disputes.66 This reluctance accounts for why 70% of the UN mediation efforts took place when intra-state conflicts reach highly escalated phases, such as when there were more than 100,000 casualties.67 The new positive peace approach through the PPF seeks to contribute to aspirations aimed at enhancing the existing mediation role of the UN, in particular the DPA’s and SecretaryGeneral’s good offices, in the pre-conflict settings.68 However, it is to be noted that the present work’s objective of developing the PPF as a pre-conflict preventative tool does not necessarily rule out the 65 66

67

68

BCPR’s methods and measures will be further elaborated and juxtaposed with the PPF’s in the following chapter. For a detailed account see Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 2. On the other hand, the Chilean representative at the 4980th SC meeting points out the limitations of the whole system in terms of early warning and underlines that only imminent threats are brought to the attention of the SC and thus leaving no room for preventive actions. See, Repertoire Supplement 2004–2007, pp. 95, 99. For an account of the selectivity of the SC agendasetting and that some protracted intra-state conflicts do not get the attention of the SC at all, see Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 251–53. Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), p. 68. For existing quiet diplomacy and preventive diplomacy efforts of the UN SG and the DPA, see Report of the Secretary-General, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, S/2011/552, 26 August 2011, paras. 13, 16–17.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

181

potential for application of the new positive peace concept in the context of UN’s ongoing preventive diplomacy or peacemaking efforts. A prospect for an inclusive and dialogical positive peace amounting to the absence of divisions could contribute to the UN’s peacemaking efforts, i.e. may accelerate bringing parties to peace processes and lead to more comprehensive peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts. Put differently, while the situations of active civil wars (such as in Ukraine or Iraq) would not fall under the envisaged ambit of the PPF, still the positive peace concept could be employed as the objective of the UN mediation and thus to these situations.69 As many scholars point out, the UN’s peacemaking efforts in the intra-state context mostly involve addressing immediate (“peripheral”) causes rather than the root causes (“core issues”) of the conflict.70 These efforts focus on powersharing and institution-building (i.e. democratisation) through an interest-based conflict resolution approach. Due to the need for sequencing (i.e. prioritisation of subject matters), peacemaking efforts rarely deal with “underlying issues,” such as grievances and psychological aspects (i.e. conflict dynamics), which necessarily require needs-based and identity-based approaches and reconciliation techniques.71 However, during an inter-active meeting in 2011 as part of the UN’s initiative to strengthen its mediation role, some panellists emphasised the need to address the root causes of conflicts and not merely seek the “cessation of violence” during UN-mediated peace processes.72 The UN-led peacemaking efforts increasingly promote the inclusion of Transitional Justice measures and the protection of human rights in peace agreements.73 While their contribution to the flourishing of a human rights culture is not denied, the same cannot be said for eliciting positive and sustainable peace. The frequent relapses into armed conflict in spite of peace-agreements that entail such provisions amplify this view.74 Moreover, due to their victim-centred 69 70 71 72

73 74

See the first section of Chapter 6 for further discussion. See, Ramsbotham et al. (2011), op. cit., p.  184. See also Kanninen and Kumar (2005) at above footnote 21; and Wallensteen (2012), pp. 10–11 at above footnote 26. Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., p. 144. Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 149. The Summary of the Informal Discussion on United Nations Mediation: Experiences and Reflections from the Field, 9 November 2011, p. 2. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/ president/66/Letters/PDF/Mediation%20Summary%20-%2023%20November%202011 .pdf. (Last visited 15.09.2013). For UN’s mainstreaming aspirations of transitional justice see Guidance Note of The Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010, p. 10, point 2. See Chapter 2 Section 3.4. See also Gready and Robins, who argue that TJ measures aim at the liberal peace and thus suggest for conceptualising transformational justice to elicit positive peace. Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative

182

chapter 5

nature TJ measures cannot be regarded as sufficient for building positive peace, since remedying past grievances in themselves does not necessarily lead to reconciliation. As the aforementioned example of Sri Lanka illustrates, mere victim-centred corrective measures for the past discrimination and HIs may trigger new armed violence. Therefore, the PPF is proposed to fill the need for focusing on reconciliation75 (i.e. mending divisions and improving inter-group relations), and to complement the TJ and human rights approach of the UN system through reinforcing the UN’s mediation role in the envisaged DPP mechanism. Because structural preventive measures in the context of peacemaking happen in postconflict situations, and because they have proven to be limited to bringing positive and sustainable peace, the envisaged positive peace approach that aims at encompassing the pre-conflict situations is warranted to complement UN mechanisms and measures. 4

UN Peacebuilding versus Positive Peace Approach

In order to address the fact that most post-conflict societies relapse into armed conflict “within five years”76 the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in December 2005. It is mandated “to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources”77 for consolidating peace after peace agreements are concluded. The PBC’s measures include institutionbuilding; constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms including

75

76 77

Justice: A New Agenda for Practice,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (2014), pp. 339–361. For the current reconciliation practices and their limits in providing identity transformation focussed approaches, see, USIP Fall Insights Newsletter 2014, available at http://www .usip.org/publications/fall-2014-insights-newsletter-reconciliation. See also for a reconciliation approach as the basis (ethic) of peacebuilding, Daniel Philpot (2010), “Reconciliation: An Ethic for Peacebuilding,” in (eds.) Philpot and Powers, op. cit., pp. 91– 118. For a comprehensive reconciliation approach that envisages the transformation of both perpetrators’ and victims’ identity perceptions and definitions, see Herbert C. Kelman, “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Ending Violent Conflict Between Identity Groups,” Landscapes of Violence 1/1 (2010). Available at http://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol1/iss1/5. This issue will be further discussed in Section 1.1 of Chapter 6. Progress Report, para 84. See also footnote 200 in Chapter 2. Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission, available at http://www.un.org/en/­peacebuilding/ mandate.shtml.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

183

power-sharing formulas; development assistance; post-conflict recovery; and reconstruction.78 The PBC is not the only instrument of the UN peacebuilding apparatus. The UN Department of Political Affairs and the UN Development Programme instruments also encompass peacebuilding dimensions while fulfilling peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict prevention and recovery missions.79 As mentioned earlier,80 UN peacemaking efforts also include peacebuilding measures, such as institution-building, the promotion and protection of human rights, the promotion of power-sharing, the rule of law and democratisation/inclusive governance.81 Likewise, peacekeeping forces in the field also undertake peacebuilding measures, particularly institution-building, and the protection and promotion of human rights, security sector reform and the reinforcement of the rule of law.82 Structural prevention measures in the form of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts are no doubt conducive to sustainable and positive peace. However, as was pointed out earlier, the UN system is limited with regard to effective prevention and eliciting sustainable peace because of either reactive or overly generic nature of its structural prevention measures. Yet, there is a thin line between reactive-proactive preventive actions to distinguish pre-conflict measures from post-conflict preventive measures. Given conflict-prone societies are often the ones which have previously experienced armed conflict, postconflict peacebuilding actions can be depicted as proactive since they seek the prevention of likely relapses.83 Furthermore, the distinction between the suggested proactive feature of the PPF and existing UN post-conflict peacebuilding practice may be argued to become even thinner given the PBC included a non-conflict situation on its agenda.84 78 79 80 81 82

83

84

See, GA Resolution, A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005, para 2(b). For further information on the activities of PBC see, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/index.asp. For an analysis of UN Framework programme, Joint DPA-UNDP Programme see Kanninen and Kumar (2005), op. cit., pp. 63–67. See text accompanying footnote 39 above. See also Chapter 2 Section 3. See, Bell (2006), op. cit., pp. 15–18. For Peacekeeping forces’ peacebuilding activities see, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping /issues/ruleoflaw/. DPA also is mandated with peacebuilding, see, http://www.un.org/wcm/ content/site/undpa/main/about/field_operations. (Last visited 18.09.2013). See Peacebuilding Orientation Brochure, op. cit., p.  48. Doyle and Sambanis describe peacebuilding as “the front line of preventive action.” See, Doyle and Sambanis (2006), op. cit., p.23. See the request of the Guinean government in PBC document, PBC/5/GUI/2, 23 September 2011, paragraph 12. See also Mikulaschek and Romita (2011), op. cit., p. 3.

184

chapter 5

Given the similar objectives and measures with the UN’s extensive peacebuilding practice, to be able to argue that the suggested positive peace app­ roach would be a practical rather than merely a normative contribution, it is necessary to illustrate that the functioning of the PPF and the PBC would differ. The remainder of this section will pinpoint the distinct features of the PPF in relation to the PBC’s mandate, institutional design and measures. The first distinction pertains to the mandates, institutional design and functions of the two bodies. As the SG points out, the PBC “does not have a preventive mandate.”85 The PBC is mandated to include states on its agenda upon the request of the SC, the ECOSOC or the GA (provided the state in question consents), the state itself or the SG. The PBC engages with post-conflict societies which have emerged from a recent armed conflict, provided they give consent.86 Even if the PBC were, in time, to frequently take pre-conflict societies under its consideration, given that the PBC lacks a mandate for universal (systemic) and proactive or pre-conflict prevention, the PPF would still contribute to the UN system. The PBC’s ambit is not systemic, as the PBC’s consideration of states is not automatic upon the fulfilment of certain criteria, but left to the discretion of the aforementioned bodies to request the PBC’s attention. Furthermore, the request and consent of the given state is required for the PBC to encompass pre-conflict situations as the sole Guinean example illustrates. In the current system it cannot reasonably be expected that all conflict-prone states would be willing to voluntarily request the PBC’s consideration. Accordingly, it is difficult to maintain that the PBC will evolve into a systemic proactive instrument. In contrast to the PBC, the PPF is envisaged as a proactive conflict prevention mechanism, which will be mandated to function systemically (i.e. on a nonselective basis) to trigger its DPP mechanism for any society, provided the risk factors of the formal formula of the lack of positive peace are present. Therefore, the existence of the PBC would not present a reason to invalidate the practical rationale of the suggested PPF as a dedicated instrument for structural prevention. The second distinction between the PBC and the PPF pertains to the focus of the measures. The PBC’s measures are targeted at reconstruction of the states 85 86

Progress Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, para 84. As the PBC website points out: “The Commission is likely to deal only with countries emerging from conflict, once a peace accord has been concluded and a minimum degree of security exists… A referral against the wish of the Government is unlikely to take place.” http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/countryconfig.shtml. (Last visited, 28.08.2013) [emphasis added].

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

185

through structural economic and political reforms. To that end, it coordinates the efforts of various development and funding agencies.87 The government under consideration and the PBC identify and agree on priority areas for peacebuilding actions. Overall, the UN peacebuilding seeks to address the root causes of armed conflicts through the framework of the liberal peace vision, primarily through institution-building, democratisation and promoting respect for human rights. Seeking to address Fundamental Conflicts, namely exclusionary and antagonistic inter-group relations, is conceptually more comprehensive than seeking to address the consequent grievances, specifically formal and informal discrimination, by way of constitutional and legislative reforms. The PPF’s envisaged ambit would therefore be more extensive than the peacebuilding measures and visions of the PBC and other UN peacebuilding apparatus. The PBC seeks reconciliation and national ownership.  The documents of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding for all six countries under PBC consideration (as of mid-2015) include provisions for holding national dialogue in order to contribute to national reconciliation and for reaching consensus within the societies about the execution of the measures agreed between the PBC and the governments.88 Richmond resembles ‘peacebuilding consensus’

87

88

These peacebuilding efforts build upon the understanding of interrelation between peace, security and development. See, SG’s Statement, in Security Council Report, 6479th SC Meeting, S/PV.6479, 11 February 2011, p. 3. See, Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, 22 June 2007, PBC/1/BDI/4, para 54 (a). For Sierra Leone, the Framework document does not expressly urge national dialogue yet para 25(q) can be taken to entail the spirit with a functioning democracy: “participation and greater information-sharing between the Government and the people.” See, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, 3 December 2007, PBC/2/SLE/1. In case of Central African Republic, inclusive political dialogue was urged by the PBC and it took place after the three priority areas of the Framework were determined. See Strategic Framework For peacebuilding in the Central African Republic, PBC/3/CAF/7, 9 June 2009, paras 9–14. Similarly, Guinean Strategic Framework urges inter-communal as well as political dialogue among political actors and holding democratic elections as a measure for reconciliation, see Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea, PBC/5/GUI/2, 23 September 2011, paras, 14–16; 41 (e, g). Likewise Liberian government commits itself to PBC to hold inclusive national dialogue for reconciliation. See, Draft Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia, PBC/4/LBR/L.1, 29 October 2010, para 30(c). On the other hand, Guinea-Bissau Framework encourage civil society to “engage in constructive dialogue with all national actors…and educational campaigns aimed at enhancing political dialogue, democratic participation…” rather than urging the government to committing itself for political dialogue and facilitating the

186

chapter 5

between the given state and the PBC that often follow military peace interventions to neo-colonial imposition.89 Acknowledging mere institution-building or structural reforms in the context of peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts lead to “virtual peace”90 rather than positive peace,91 the suggested positive peace approach also lays a strong focus on reconciliation and local ownership. Yet, the suggested positive peace approach can be expected to eschew the criticism of neo-colonialism given it is not envisaged to follow coercive measures. The PPF is conceptualised as a systemic apparatus extending the efforts for national reconciliation and dialogue to all societies, which bear Fundamental Conflicts, based on the Chapter VI peaceful settlement of conflicts objective of the UN Charter. This is not to dispute that various UN instruments such as the DPA, the UNDP (including BCPR), the UN Peacebuilding Fund,92 the Human Security Trust Fund and UNESCO support projects for promoting inter-group reconciliation.93 These efforts may contribute to addressing Fundamental Conflicts as well. However, by way of its envisaged systemic pre-conflict preventative nature, the DPP mechanism is expected to complement such efforts. This will be further elucidated in the next chapter.

89

90 91

92 93

settings. See, Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, PBC/3/GNB/3, 31 July 2008, para 56(c). See, Richmond (2004), op. cit., pp. 85, 91–93. Critical Theorists and Critical Peace Theorists argue against “civilising” implications of liberal peacebuilding. See text accompanying footnote 109 in Chapter 2. See also Wolfgang Sützl, “The Weak Subject: Peace and Nihilism Reconsidered,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 29/4 (2003), pp. 407–425. As an answer to these critics, see Matti Jutila, Samu Pehkonen and Tarja Väyrynen, “Resuscitating a Discipline: An Agenda for Critical Peace Research” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 36/3 (2008), pp. 623–640 at 638–39. See, Richmond (2004), op. cit., pp. 83, 96. See the discussion in Section 3 of Chapter 2. Clark’s case study on Bosnia casts doubts on arguments that consider peacebuilding measures, which focus on elites and institution-building, as successful. Her study illustrates the limits of these measures in eliciting reconciliation on the ground, and therefore, she argues for a bottom-up peacebuilding approach. See, Janine Natalya Clark, “Bosnia’s Success Story? Brčko District and the ‘View from Below’,” International Peacekeeping 17/1 (2010), pp. 67–79. For information on the funding areas of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, see http://www .unpbf.org/what-we-fund/. For an extensive account on post-conflict reconciliation efforts see, The IDEA Handbook Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 2003 available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict-A-Handbook-Full-English-PDF.pdf. (Last visited, 11.01.2015).

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

5

187

The PPF’s Objective of Systemic Structural Prevention

In the literature, and among the UN member states, despite aspirations for fostering a culture of prevention at the UN system, a full acceptance for incorporating more comprehensive structural preventive measures into the UN structures is yet to be seen.94 The biggest challenge to strengthening the UN’s preventive pillar and allocation of resources remains the difficulty in proving the occurrence of prevention and whether it happened due to the preventive measures applied. Wallensteen argues this stance stems from the fact that it is easier to demonstrate the failure of preventive activities than their success.95 However, as Lund maintains the UN’s preventive actions are “prima facie empirical evidence” that they bear fruit in preventing conflicts.96 The efforts to strengthen prevention can be built upon analogies with road safety regulations or medical treatments for preventing the likelihood of fatal incidents.97 In 2002, Luck argued that existing diverse programmes were already fulfilling the objectives that structural prevention is expected to accomplish, and opposed efforts to elevate structural prevention into the UN’s core policy. He pointed out that integrating vast instruments and programmes would create extra unnecessary expenses for the UN, which already suffers from scarce resources, especially given that there are no precise lists, or “programmatic content”, for structural prevention.98 Nevertheless, Luck suggests “tailored political processes”,99 rather than a universal approach, would be more viable for the pursuit of prevention policies. The fundamental criticism against structural prevention is that it is aspirational and amounts to a utopia of “turning bad actors into good” ones.100 Such criticisms could prima facie be extended to the PPF projection as it envisages the structural prevention idea as its backbone and ultimately seeks transformation of Fundamental Conflicts and targets harmonious/cohesive societies, and this without providing pre-set precise programmatic content. However, this study maintains it is possible to view structural prevention 94 95 96

See footnote 15 above. See, Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 283–84. Michael S. Lund, “Conflict Prevention Is Happening,” in (eds.) David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, Volume 1 (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 289–304, at 291. 97 See Ramsbotham et. al. (2011), op. cit., p. 125. 98 For Luck, the lack of the “programmatic content” of structural prevention renders its global pursuance through the UN nothing beyond than “a slogan.” See, Luck (2002), op. cit., pp. 259–60. 99 Ibid., p. 261. 100 Ibid., p. 260.

188

chapter 5

measures as ad hoc or country-specific, yet still systemically pursue the application of these measures at the UN level. Such an approach would be similar to the existing approach of the UN Charter system. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the SC is conferred the power to determine threats to international peace on a caseby-case basis, even though its mandate is universal.101 Similarly, the UNPC is envisaged to have the discretion to consider particularities of a given state through the search for criterion B (i.e. the existence of tensions). The added value of the PPF projection to the existing UN structural preventive mechanisms lies in its systemic (universal) approach for structural prevention at the UN level.102 The functioning of numerous UN instruments and programmes that provide structural prevention remain primarily invitation-based. In contrast, the PPF is envisaged to entail a mandate similar to the UPR mechanism of the HRC. Specifically, it is designed to function universally on a non-selective basis, and proactively invite states to hold a DPP when the situation is deemed to lack positive peace. Although the initiation of a DPP will ultimately depend on state consent, if materialised, the PPF would also have standard-setting effects creating conducive environments for increased state cooperation with UN mediation in different stages of a conflict cycle.103 101 See, Article 39 of the UN Charter. 102 Tobi P. Dress and Gay Rosenblum-Kumar also suggest a “systems approach,” which attributes a greater role for the UN in structural prevention and involves mainstreaming conflict prevention in all UN system activities. Differing from the PPF, their suggested system is based on state invitation/request for the UN’s assistance for “building conflict management capacity”; this can be traced to the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s approach. The second main difference lies in that they confer the respective states to monitor and “undertake…assessments” of “structural” and “relational” issues such as “resource equity, identity, and interethnic tensions.” The same structural and relational issues are encompassed in the formal formula of the present work’s positive peace concept, but these elements are envisaged to be monitored and assessed by the UNPC taking account of the risks that states’ apparatus may not objectively carry out the monitoring and assessment in divided societies. See Tobi P.  Dress and Gay Rosenblum-Kumar “Deconstructing Prevention: A  Systems Approach to Mitigating Violent Conflict,” in (eds.) Hampson and Malone (2002), op. cit., pp. 229–250, pp. 241, 233, 237, 243, 245–46. See also Dress (2005), op. cit., pp. 22–26. Mani also analyses UN conflict prevention machinery and points out neither the SC nor the GA, but the member states themselves are “ideally suited” for peaceful dispute settlement and conflict prevention. See, Rama Mani, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention,” in (eds.) Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 300–322, at 317–318. 103 For a similar view that the UN’s increased structural prevention efforts may be welcome by member states, see Dress (2005), ibid., p. 24. This point will be further discussed in the following chapter.

The UN’s Structural Prevention Mechanisms

189

6 Conclusion This chapter presented an overview of the objectives and scope of the UN structural prevention apparatus pointing out that they fall short of providing effective conflict prevention needed for approaching sustainable and positive intra-state peace. It argued that the suggested positive peace approach would complement the UN’s peacebuilding and human rights practices by way of its objective of tackling Fundamental Conflicts through deliberative settings as a means to pre-conflict prevention. Earlier chapters of the book demonstrated that there is a need for strengthening the UN’s (structural) prevention pillars, and this chapter argued that the PPF would present an appropriate tool for filling this lacuna and would reinforce the UN’s peaceful settlement tools enumerated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

chapter 6

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism So far this book provided the rationale for the new positive peace vision and framework, and argued that the suggested positive peace approach is viable in theory in that the PPF would not duplicate existing efforts of the UN nor undermine international pluralism. To argue that the suggested positive peace approach would also be viable in practice, this chapter will illustrate that the PPF’s objectives and measures, specifically the execution of the DPP, can reasonably be pursued in the existing international system without requiring a major paradigm shift. This chapter details how the PPF and its DPP mechanism will be based on existing norms and aspirations yet at the same time would strengthen the UN system for both dampening the risk of intra-state armed conflicts and eliciting positive peace. It looks at the situations that exhibit Fundamental Conflicts (i.e. Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine) and where the suggested positive peace approach could potentially be employed. Ultimately, this chapter aims to show that the PPF is not only theoretically feasible and of added value, but would also be a practical possibility; namely, the PPF could realistically and effectively pursue the positive peace formula despite the state-centric limitations of the international system, if it were materialised. In this chapter, the prospects of the success of the DPP mechanism, and ultimately the viability of the PPF, will be projected based on similar actual practices and conflict resolution theories. Constraints that the UN faces in preventing armed conflicts are often the result of the lack of political will of the given states. The present chapter, however, will pinpoint that the PPF could evade some of existing limitations that obstruct effective structural prevention in that the PPF’s approach will differ from the similar practices of UN apparatus seeking reconciliation, social integration and social cohesion. First, this chapter outlines the functioning of the DPP in order to establish whether the PPF presents a practical possibility. It elaborates the DPP mechanism’s subject matter, actors, timing and systematic approach. It is beyond the scope of this book, and a more appropriate subject for further research, to elaborate the particularities of the deliberators (i.e. numbers, gender, and composition) and the rules pertaining to the selection of non-state actor deliberators, voting, and decision-making. These aspects would likely be subject of the member states’ decision at the institutionalisation phase of the PPF, if they

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_008

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

191

were to accept such a UN reform. Second, this chapter assesses the likelihood of the operation of the PPF and its DPP mechanism in practice considering the state-centric features of the international system. Third, it projects the possible location of the UNPC within the UN structure and provides two scenarios. 1

The DPP’s Issues of Concern: Fundamental Conflicts/Identity Divisions and the Potential Application of the New Positive Peace Vision

The common forms of incompatibilities in divided societies are identified as being over access to education, legal, security, administrative and political systems; distribution of economic and natural resources; recognition of language or religious practices; the basic tenets of the constitution; realisation of basic liberties and human rights and their differing and mutually exclusive interpretations.1 Incompatibilities over the tenets of a state’s constitution may involve questions on presidential-parliamentarian and/or civilian-military features, and/or on religious versus secular orientations.2 Wallensteen points out “early action for accommodation…[by] responsive government” and seeking negotiated solutions through inclusive processes, rather than “imposition”, are essential for achieving sustainable, and one can add legitimate, outcomes.3 However, efforts for resolution of such incompatibilities are often not directed to identity issues, although they lie at the core of such incompatibilities.4 This book proposes directing the focus on the identity divisions (i.e. exclusionary inter-group relations) rather than the ensuing incompatibilities, i.e. proximate causes, at the DPP. It presupposes once there are divisions, incompatibilities on tangible needs/interests (such as access to and benefits from natural resources) and intangible needs/interests (such as recognition of language and ways of life) constitute high risks of armed conflicts. In some cases incompatibilities between governments and regional populations on the access to natural resources may constitute a potential risk for armed conflict, even in the absence of a salient ethnic, religious or one of the conventional identity 1 See Table 7.2 in Wallersteen (2012), op. cit., p. 182. 2 For possible incompatibilities over political power see, Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), pp. 19–20. 3 See Wallersteen (2012), op. cit., p. 181. 4 See Zartman, I. William and Mark Anstey, “Lessons for Practice”, in (eds.) Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts, I. William Zartman, The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 376–390, at 376.

192

chapter 6

differentiations. Yet, if a regional group entails a will and potential for mobilisation against the central government, this should also be taken to signify that there is an identity division based on regional identity vis-à-vis the central government. Hence, such divisions will be considered under the ambit of the PPF. The PFF considers HIs, in addition to widespread but non-grave violations of human rights, so that the formation, as well as the escalation of, Fundamental Conflicts could potentially be prevented. This is pursued to overcome the failures of traditional international mediation, which often overlook identity issues as a focus point, as was the case in Liberia, the Balkans, Angola, Kenya, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and Ivory Coast, among others, which experienced relapses.5 How can identity issues be addressed? What are the examples for such identity-focused conflict resolution in practice that the PPF can build upon? What are the situations that the concept of Fundamental Conflicts can be applied and the suggested positive peace approach can be employed? In conflict resolution literature, Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR), dialogical, and problem-solving methods have been developed to respond to identity disputes.6 This is the basis of UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)’s “action research” approach.7 Action research seeks to identify both the causes and possible solutions for incompatibilities by engaging academics, civil society and “influential” individuals from the groups in dispute in a dialogical setting.8 A similar approach is pursued by the UN Development Programme’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. BCPR carries out capacity-building activities through dialogue processes in both pre-conflict and post-conflict situations.9 5 6 7 8

See Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., p. 139. Ibid., p. 140. For DESA see footnote 12 in Chapter 4. Ronald J. Fisher, “Historical Mapping of the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution”, in (eds.) John L. Davies, Edward Kaufman, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 61–78, at 70. See, UN Mapping Exercise on UN Activities in Conflict Situations, as of November 2004, http://www .un.org/esa/peacebuilding/map-UN-system.pdf, p. 3. See Jay Rothman, and Marie L. Olson, “From Interest to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution”, Journal of Peace Research 38/3(2001), pp. 289–305, at 290, 295. 9 The UN Mapping of Exercise on Activities of UN Entities in Conflict Situations, pp. 15–16. For the mandate and activity areas of the UNDP BCPR, see also its website available at http://www.undp. org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/overview.html. For other conflict prevention activities of the UNDP BCPR see 2011 Annual Report, p. 17 available at http:// www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/BCPRAR2011_final.pdf.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

193

Since the 1990s, such inter-active methods have been increasingly resorted to as an answer to the limitations of the UN’s state-centric mediation methods for intra-state conflicts. They are carried out at the track-two (unofficial) diplomacy level. They target psychological roots of conflict, specifically perceptions, fears and prejudices of the parties. These dialogical processes are relied on to build trust among middle-level leaders, and ultimately to influence top leaders for formal negotiations, as well as to influence all segments of the society to consolidate/build trust and peace.10 The Oslo Accords for the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and Oslo peace processes for Colombia-FARC, Turkey-PKK, for Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Israel-Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan are examples of ICR.11 In sum, the identity-focused dialogical approach at the track-two diplomacy level can function to prepare the environment for formal negotiations for peacemaking and peacebuilding in both inter- and intra-state contexts. Building upon this interactive approach, Rothman suggests the ARIA frame that takes identity issues rather than interest and power incompatibilities as the focal point. This frame consists of four phases. The first phase includes an interest-based interactive method, in which parties are expected to define tangible incompatibilities in an “Adversarial/Antagonistic” manner. In the second phase, they are expected to focus on the root causes, namely “identity needs” in a “Reflexive” manner. In the third phase, they are expected to follow a problem-solving approach, redefine both tangible and intangible incompatibilities that stem primarily from identity disputes in order to arrive at creative “Inventions”. Lastly, they are expected to agree on “Action” plans to consolidate transformations both by structural changes and continued dialogues.12 An example of the institutionalised identity-focused approach in the context of early conflict prevention includes the work of OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities.13 The Commissioner engages both with governments (track-one/formal diplomacy), providing recommendations for legislative reforms, and with the affected minorities and relevant mid-level public officials (informal track-two/three diplomacy), initiating projects that “seek to promote 10

11 12 13

Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., p. 140. McDonald points out track-two/three diplomacy influenced a change of course in Northern Ireland, and US foreign policy towards PLO. See, John W. McDonald (2002), “The Need for Multi-Track Diplomacy”, Second Track/ Citizens’ Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 49–60, at 52–54. Fisher (2002), op. cit., p. 70. See Rothman and Olson (2001), op. cit., pp. 299–301. Ibid., pp. 297–298. Rothman (1993), pp. 19–20. See OSCE Factsheet of August 2008, available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/33317? download=true. (Last seen, 14.09.2012). See Peck (1998), op. cit., p. 20. For the case of Estonia as a success story of conflict prevention through the interventions of the Commissioner see, Miall (2004), op. cit., p. 13.

194

chapter 6

dialogue, confidence and co-operation” between the majority and minority groups.14 Within the UN, the DPA’s Resident Coordinators, the UNDP-DPA Joint Programmes’ Peace and Development Advisors can be seen as fulfilling similar role to that of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in terms of monitoring and providing early warnings to the DPA and Secretary-General. On the other hand, the UNDP BCPR, DPA, UNDP, HS Unit15 and UNESCO have community projects that seek both institution and human capacity-building and peace education with a view to reinforcing democratic governance and inter-group reconciliation.16 These dialogical and interactive projects can be seen conducive to transforming mistrust and prejudices among the parties of dispute, and ultimately affect positive social relationships. Moreover, the UNESCO also funds projects to foster non-violence through peace education activities, as well as for healing and reconciling post-conflict communities through projects that aim to advance “understanding, tolerance and solidarity”.17 While the aforementioned UN actions and projects can be expected to contribute to rebuilding inter-group relations (i.e. reconciliation) at the grassroots and mid-leadership levels, it nevertheless needs to be noted that unlike the visions of the OSCE High Commissioner and the ARIA frame, they do not have a direct focus on engaging and resolving identity issues in a holistic manner; rather they bear indirect impact on reconciliation through community projects. Hence, the DPP mechanism entails the objective of tackling Fundamental Conflicts through a systemic approach rather than merely at the community level. DPP mechanism’s approach would not duplicate the UN’s existing efforts for reconciliation given the PPF entails track-one level engagement (of the UN) for fostering positive peace as opposed to these activities at the level of tracktwo/three diplomacy. Thereby, the PPF is expected to elevate the practice of reconciliation based on conflict transformation approach18 within the UN system. 14 Ibid. 15 See https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Background%20on%20the%20UNTFHS.pdf. (Last visited, 05.06.2013) 16 The UN Mapping of Exercise on Activities of UN Entities in Conflict Situations, as of November 2004, op. cit., pp. 2, 7, 16. 17 See, Reference Documents on the Culture of Peace available at http://www3.unesco.org/ iycp/uk/uk_sum_refdoc.htm. (Last visited, 17.09.2013) UNESCO’s education projects, such as in Sri Lanka, Philippines and Cambodia target the young generations to promote a culture of peace. For an account on UNESCO’s principles and activities for fostering a ­culture of peace, see Roche (2003), op. cit., pp. 107–109. 18 The PPF’s objective of Fundamental Conflicts transformation can be traced in Lederach’s relational transformation (aiming at mutual understanding and rebuilding non-­functioning

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

195

What are the real world examples of Fundamental Conflicts, where the potential for the application of the suggested positive peace vision exists? The situations in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, among many others, are examples where the suggested positive peace vision would apply if it were to be rendered the UN’s objective instead of, or in addition to, a negative peace or the liberal peace. In all these cases, the respective societies entail deep and multiple identity divisions, which constitute the actual examples of Fundamental Conflicts. The below analysis will simplify the divisions highlighting the more dominant grounds of identity markers, yet, the proposed positive peace approach is envisaged to tackle all existing grounds of identity divisions within the given societies. In the case of Bahrain, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, the divisions in respective societies are primarily on the grounds of sectarian identities.19 In the case of Egypt, Ukraine and partly in Libya divisions are on ideological grounds. In Egypt, tensions stem from secular versus religious, and military versus democratic orientations in running the country. In Ukraine, the situation may be resembled to a proxy war, which was prevalent during the Cold War era exporting the great powers’ clashing geopolitical interests into the intra-state dimension of the respective state. However, the divisions in Ukraine can also be formulated as ideological identity divisions on the grounds of Western (the EU and NATO) versus Eastern (Russia) orientations in shaping the foreign and trade policies of the country. After the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, there are divisions on the grounds of religious versus secular orientations manifested in the existence of two parliaments in Tobruk and in Tripoli.

19

relationships) and structural transformation (aiming at political structures conducive to meeting basic needs of all equally) conceptualisations; and Miall’s structural transformation (aiming at changes in relationships and power distribution within society) and actor transformation (aiming at changes in actor’s goals and general attitudes) conceptualisations which are part of their comprehensive conflict transformation approach developed primarily for post-conflict settings. See, Lederach (1997), op. cit., pp. 83–84. Miall (2004), op. cit., pp. 9–10. See also footnote 28 in Chapter 5. It is to be acknowledged in these cases there may be other multiple identity markers such as ideology or ethnicity in addition to sectarian divides that played a role in mobilising disadvantaged/repressed groups on the ground. Notably in Syria and Iraq sectarian faultlines became more significant after, rather than before, the outbreak of civil war. See, Fotini Christia, “What Can Civil War Scholars Tell Us About the Syrian Conflict”, in The Political Science of Syria’s War, POMEPS Studies 5, 18 December 2013, p. 8. See also ibid, pp. 41, 49, 54–57. Available at http://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/POMEPS _Studies5_PoliSciSyria.pdf. (Last visited, 14.09.2014).

196

chapter 6

In Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine there are active armed conflicts/civil wars as of the beginning of 2015. UN political field missions such as UNSMIL in Libya and UNAMI in Iraq, as well as the UN special representative for the situation in Syria, seek preventive diplomacy and/or national dialogue for peaceful co-existence, specifically dialogue among conflicting state and non-state actors. Therefore, among the aforementioned situations only Bahrain and Egypt at present stand as the mere cases that would fall under the envisaged ambit of the PPF. As elaborated in Chapter 3 and 4, this book conceptualised the PPF as a pre-conflict preventive and peacebuilding tool and envisaged invoking the DPP mechanism when there are no active conflicts to safeguard successful outcomes, and not to duplicate existing UN efforts and resources.20 However, this is not to argue that the positive peace vision cannot be employed outside the suggested PPF. It can be imagined that UN mediation efforts in the context of peacemaking could direct their goal to positive peace rather than negative peace. This would contribute to the existing peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, since they rarely involve tackling identity divisions and laying conditions for sustainable and positive peace as elaborated earlier. The UNSMIL, which was established in 2011 by the SC resolution, like UNAMI in Iraq since 2003, provides another example supporting this view.21 Despite its mission of assisting the transitional government in Libya, it was unable to prevent political crises and ultimately the occurrence of intense fighting among the rebels and the elected government since the summer of 2014. Therefore, the application of the new positive peace vision (i.e. focusing on tackling Fundamental divisions and HIs, and eliciting cohesive societies) rather than the liberal peace (i.e. focusing on merely power-sharing and institution/ democracy-building) or negative peace can be anticipated to entail more chances of bringing about more sustainable peace agreements. Furthermore, as the cases of Ukraine and Syria illustrate, the UN’s existing mechanisms are not fully employed or committed due to divergent interests of the veto powers. Given its envisaged universal mandate for building positive peace (similar to the universal mandate of the HRC’s UPR mechanism), the PPF is not anticipated to be vulnerable to selectivity based on geopolitical or great power interests. Due to non-selectivity, and thus less credibility deficit, its efforts may be expected to receive more cooperation by the affected parties 20 21

For the possible objections to its materialisation see Chapter 4 Section  1.2 and also Section 3 below. For background information on the establishment of UN Support Mission in Libya, see http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3545&language=en-US (Last visited, 15.01.2015).

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

197

than the traditional UN mediation receives.22 Therefore, if materialised, the PPF may be imagined to expand its mandate in time, in addition to the mandate portrayed in the present work, allowing it to engage acute cases in divided societies such as in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Ukraine, which the UN’s other mechanisms fail to address effectively. In sum, the situations in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, among others, provide actual examples of the existence of Fundamental Conflicts, and exhibit the potential for application of this study’s positive peace vision. If materialised, the PPF would operate only for Bahrain and Egypt, as the rest of the aforementioned cases endure intra-state armed conflict or war at present. However, the PPF and its DPP mechanism could also be designed to have a further mandate to function in parallel to UN mediation efforts during active conflicts (i.e. preventive diplomacy and peacemaking), as its measures for positive peacebuilding may help generate fertile grounds for, and thus accelerate, peacemaking processes. Nevertheless, the PPF’s potential role for direct prevention is beyond the scope of the present work. Further research is necessary to elaborate the conditions and implications of conceptualising the positive peace framework as entailing a mandate for ongoing crisis and conflict situations in parallel to existing UN preventive diplomacy. 1.1 Forms of Tackling Identity Divisions and Measuring Success The PPF is conceptualised to engage with societies that presently have identity issues, whether or not they have already experienced an outbreak of armed conflict. Therefore, the DPP mechanism’s target societies will largely be the same societies that the UN’s existing instruments already target and engage with to apply structural prevention measures. The methods and objectives of the DPP mechanism are envisaged to be similar to those of the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which seeks dialogical processes to improve inter-group relationships or to advance a democratic culture in the given societies. In Tunisia, the Bureau provided transition assistance to enable peaceful transition from autocracy. In Fiji, it similarly provided assistance during the national constitutional reform processes. In Kyrgyzstan, in the face of rising tensions, it provided pre-election conflict mitigation assistance to the interim government. The BCPR’s efforts reduced the risks of armed conflict in these conflict-prone societies.23 22 23

See the following Section 2 for further discussion on the limitations of UN mediation due to credibility/selectivity of the UN. For UNDP BCPR’s activities in the context of Technical Support, see “Report on Supporting Democratic Transition In Tunisia”, UNDP, July 2011, available at http://www.undp.org/­ content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/DG%20Fast%20Facts/Fast%20

198

chapter 6

These are the types of activities and objectives that the PPF is envisaged to pursue. However, the BCPR’s efforts for assisting dialogical processes complement existing diplomatic efforts of the UN or member states.24 Differing from the BCPR’s ad hoc practice, the DPP mechanism is envisaged as a standardised mechanism for tackling Fundamental Conflicts. Specifically, the DPP mechanism is intended to ensure inclusive dialogical processes are initiated in all societies that lack positive peace according to the operational formula. Furthermore, it will involve formal diplomacy with state and non-state actors with a view to ensuring national efforts are directed towards tackling the impacts and consequences of Fundamental Conflicts rather than merely avoiding imminent crises. The methods of addressing Fundamental Conflicts are envisaged to entail the following four stages and activities:25 1)

24 25

26

The UN’s facilitator(s) at the DPP mechanism will engage the parties into dialogue so that they identify strategic and ideological aspects of divisions and exclusionary perceptions about the “other” group(s) with the aim of mending these divisions. As the ARIA framework suggests, in this phase the leaders are expected to talk about their experiences and perceptions with a view to raising other parties’ understanding about their tangible and intangible needs, which they believe are required to be fulfilled for pursuing a dignified life. The UN facilitators are expected to share best practices and advise on universal IHRL standards as the basis for addressing discrimination and accompanying HIs in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres, and for building inclusive societies with fewer risks for tensions.26

Facts%20UNDP%20Tunisia.pdf. See also an overview of 2011 activities of UNDP BCPR in Fiji and Kyrgyzstan at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/img/crisis%20 ­prevention/covers/BCPRAR2011RESULTSMAP.pdf. See also “Preventing Crisis Enabling Recovery”, Annual Report 2011, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, pp. 6, 16, 17.  Available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/ BCPRAR2011_final.pdf. See discussion at text accompanying footnote 65 in Chapter 5 and the BCPR website cited at footnote 16 above. This carries similarities with Saunder’s five-stages of sustainable dialogue notion, see Saunders (2009), op. cit., p. 386. For five-phases of informal diplomacy see also, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., p. 141. See Azar’s needs-based approach to conflict resolution cited in Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 39.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

2)

3)

4)

199

The DPP facilitator(s) will direct and facilitate the parties to “reframe”27 their identities28 and fundamental incompatibilities; in particular not to define one’s identity at the expense or exclusion of the other(s), and to translate and express their demands and interests through a needs language. Facilitators will also help them to agree on policy strategies for addressing exclusionary behaviour and tensions, and for generating common grounds for co-existence. At the DPP, parties are expected to initiate further efforts to transform their social relationships, particularly conflict attitudes,29 and to deliberate on strategies for consolidating and expanding the elite-level agreements at the grassroots level. The UN facilitators will also encourage parties to achieve agreements on: not abusing identity differences in their democratic political struggles by avoiding extremist agendas that have bolstered the existing divisions; normalising the differences; and promoting peaceful diversity at the grassroots level. The parties are expected to deliberate and arrive at principles for reforming/building political and legal structures that will address all parties’ needs and ensure lives of dignity for all. By way of elite commitment to reforms, it is expected that the de-escalation phase (i.e. mitigating tensions and risks) could be fused at the grassroots level. It will be essential that they set an agenda and commit themselves to further national dialogue processes.

Track-two diplomacy involves similar steps to those above. Notably, the fivephased “sustained dialogue”30 seeks to break the cycle of “destructive relationship[s]” and “transform” them with a view to preparing the environment for negotiations/mediations, which aim at “a formal agreement”.31 Yet, the PPF is designed as a hybrid mechanism, incorporating these long-term measures and activities of the track-two level diplomacy to ensure dialogue and reconciliation, and short-term operational preventive measures of the track-one level diplomacy. In short, the DPP mechanism will pursue a topdown approach to encourage and mobilise elites to engage in strategies for building positive peace. The transformations are not expected to be completed

27 28 29 30 31

The next section elaborates reframing approach to conflict resolution. Kelman (2010), op. cit., see footnote 75 in Chapter 5. Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 35–37. Saunders (2009), op. cit., pp. 377, 387–388. Ibid., p. 378.

200

chapter 6

during the short period of the DPP meetings.32 Rather, the DPP is expected to be taken over by broader national processes. Arriving at a particular type of agreement33 as the result of the DPP would be contingent on the nature and intensity of the Fundamental Conflicts, peripheral issues, the structural and infrastructural/relational dynamics of the society and on deliberators’ attitudes,34 which are partly formed by the local social realities of the given society as well as international norms, trends and discourses. Therefore, a single type of outcome cannot be set as a benchmark for the success35 of the DPP mechanism due to the uniqueness of each conflict, society and the circumstances of the time. The PPF can be judged as successful if the DPP were to lead to one of the situations, in which (1) tensions are contained/controlled (i.e. protests, or other forms of expression of tensions, do not become violent); (2) tensions are mitigated (i.e. a visible decrease in the number of the protesters accompanied with the signs of consolidated dialogue 32

33

34

35

See Lederach for the need of several sustained processes in Foreword, Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation, 2011, p.  8. Available at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/ documents/publications/foreword_handbookII.pdf. (Last visited, 12.07.2012) Eriksen perceives “consensus” – i.e. reaching agreement for ‘identical reasons’- not attainable in “real-world” circumstances and suggests seeking “workable agreements” that are based on different reasons for accepting the terms of agreement as legitimate outcomes of deliberations. Cited in John S. Dryzek, “Discursive Democracy vs. Liberal Constitutionalism”, in (ed.) Michael Saward, Democracy: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume III (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.  295–308, at 302. For an account of empirical studies that illustrate deliberations do not deliver “rational, reasonable, or critically reflective” outcomes that deliberative democrats seek, see Shawn W. Rosenberg (ed.), Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 2007), pp. 18, 157. For the contrary, see Warren (2007), op. cit., pp. 274– 276. For a brief account how decision rules, gender composition and group dynamic can affect the outcomes of deliberations see, Tali Mendelberg and Christopher Karpowitz, “How People Deliberate about Justice: Groups, Gender, and Decision Rules”, in (ed.) Shawn W. Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 101–129, at 105–106. As Gutmann and Thomson point out deliberation requires particular attitudes to prevail such as commitment to reciprocity and “openness to persuasion.” Cited in Dryzek (2005), op. cit., p. 219. Möller and Wallensteen argue “the effects of preventive measures have to be seen as a continuum of several levels of success…” where success is measured with “no [record] of further crisis…immediate avoidance of escalation to major armed conflict (minimum success) and no additional serious dispute among the parties (for at least five years…).” Peter Wallensteen and Frida Möller (2003), “Conflict Prevention: Methodology For Knowing The Unknown”, pp. 8, 10–11. Available at http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18589 _UPRP_No_7.pdf. (Last visited, 21.09.2013)

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

201

among the elites); (3) divisions/Fundamental Conflicts are mended (i.e. visible easing of exclusionary behaviour, and observed structural reforms and equal rates of social mobility in each group). 1.2 The Transformation of Fundamental Conflicts The four-phases for transforming Fundamental Conflicts within the DPP mechanism would not entail the elimination of diversity (identity differences) nor merely the ensuing incompatibilities per se. Rather the DPP mechanism seeks to transform the divisions and the underlying antagonistic inter-group relations, and dampen tensions. This section focuses on the theory of conflict transformation, and particularly on ‘the reframing approach’, for illustrating the chances of transformation of Fundamental Conflicts. Conflict transformation is closely linked with conflict resolution and refers to “the deepest level of conflict resolution”,36 which requires “reconceptuali[sation of] the conflict with a view to finding creative, win-win outcomes”37 for sustainable solutions. The objective of transforming exclusionary and antagonistic relationships through the DPP mechanism builds upon the aspirations and premises of “problem-solving”38 methodology of conflict resolution. Acknowledging the challenges stemming from identity divisions and the ensuing complex incompatibilities, the expected outcome of the DPP is moderate as follows: (a) the deliberators’ understanding of each other’s basic needs, and their acceptance of the necessity of fostering a dignified life for all as a prerequisite for sustainably peaceful co-existence;39 and (b) the deliberators’ recognition that co-existence presents the mere rational option.40 Given the principles of Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative models are not realisable in the face of deep conflicts, Bohman suggests “moral compromise” (“willingness to continue to cooperate”)41 and “deliberative toleration”,42 specifically the inclusion of the conflicting parties to the deliberations, should be set as the substantive principles for deliberations over deep conflicts. He 36 37 38

39 40 41 42

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011), op. cit., p. 28. Ibid., p. 29. See also discussion accompanying footnote 27 in Chapter 5. For an account of problem-solving approach, see Tamra Pearson d’Estree, “ProblemSolving Approaches”, in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 143–171. See also Allen and Keller’s conception of thick recognition, which involves the recognition of identity, culture and history, cited in Aggestam (2013), op. cit., p. 41. See also Valerie Rosoux, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits”, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 543–563, at 550. Bohman (1995), op. cit., p. 263. James Bohman, “Deliberative Toleration”, Political Theory 31/6 (2003), pp. 757–779, at 762.

202

chapter 6

argues ‘reframing’, i.e. redefining the incompatibilities/frameworks, should be the only moral compromise that the parties undergo during the deliberation process noting that reframing would be less onerous than seeking to converge or reconcile the contested interpretations by consensus.43 Reframing involves “modify[ing] contested interpretations” during the deliberations, and reaching less antagonistic plural interpretations and frameworks, which can then be fused into a new single foundation. The transformation of deeply conflicted convictions (i.e. ideological incompatibilities) can happen when modification of all existing frameworks happens.44 The objective of transforming deep divisions based on the reframing approach may be perceived as a utopian idea from a realist perspective at a time when ethnic, religious or sectarian divides are inflammatory in all parts of the world.45 Nevertheless, given the realist paradigm failed to capture the potential for change and the end of the Cold War, the constructivist theory, which is better in explaining social change, can be taken as a reference point for a conflict transformation approach. Following the constructivist perspective, it can be argued that tangible or intangible incompatibilities and Fundamental Conflicts are all social constructs that are amenable to change. They can be deconstructed through deliberate action of the relevant significant actors.46 Indeed, there are notable examples of mitigation of antagonistic relationships between long-term adversaries, such as in the cases of France-Germany, South African, the US-USSR, Northern Ireland,47 and Turkey-Greece. These indicate that the incompatibilities themselves, or the perceptions of the incompatibilities, and the resulting antagonistic behaviour can be transformed to a level in which co-existence without the threat of armed conflict can be comprehended. These successful transformations can be drawn upon as a sound basis for expecting the DPP mechanism to bear fruits. Moreover, because the DPP platform is designed to take place at the earliest possible stages of 43 44

45 46

47

See Catherine Audard’s argument in footnote 97 in Chapter 4. Bohman (1995), op. cit., pp. 268–270. Lederach also argues for a forward-looking reconciliation approach, which involves “new lenses for dealing with the past” as well as for creating new perceptions, and ultimately for building a new common future. See, Lederach (1997), op. cit., pp. 30–31. For an account on present conflicts see, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup .org/. See Richard Jackson for constructivist account of conflict, which is regarded as the “… social construct …of individuals or groups.” See, Richard Jackson, “Constructivism and Conflict Resolution”, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 172–190, at 180, 187. See, Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 53. Rosoux (2009), op. cit., p. 543.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

203

conflict cycle and tensions, the parties can reasonably be expected to be more open to communication and taking of conciliatory attitude during the deliberative processes, and ultimately transform their hostile perceptions.48 Wallensteen points out that it is possible to have the incompatibilities unresolved, but still find a framework “to live [peacefully] with the incompatibility”.49 The incompatibilities, which presently cause hostility, may cease to generate hostility if the parties “accept the [situation] as it is”,50 and perceive coexistence as “an absolute necessity”.51 The transformation of the Greece–Turkey relationship, among many others, serves as an example of living with incompatibility, yet transforming the antagonistic relationships, ultimately leading to de-escalation of tensions. Since 1999, with the initiation of the foreign ministers’ rapprochement policy, military confrontation has become unimaginable even though there was still no settlement over the disputed Aegean Sea delimitation. It is acknowledged that the DPP mechanism’s objective of transforming antagonistic identity perceptions is a more challenging objective than interstate rapprochement. While it carries a potential for comprehensively addressing the root causes of armed conflict in the given society, it also poses a risk of essentialising or deepening the differences and opening the Pandora’s box, and inflaming the incompatibilities further as identity groups often have “clashing narratives”52 about the past and clashing perceptions about the present. However, in order to help mitigate the divisions and tensions, facilitators could direct parties towards “strategic reframing”53 and “forward-looking attitudes”.54 Furthermore, the UN can use financial/development aid to incentivize parties to pursue national deliberative processes or accept UN facilitation and the required conciliatory approaches/attitudes. It is acknowledged that any act of 48 49 50 51 52 53

54

Horrowitz argues “[i]n addition to accommodative arrangements… timing must be taken into account.” Cited in Peck (1998), op. cit., p. 53. Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., p. 53. For reconciliation Ignatieff argues parties should “accept the world as it is”, see cited in Rosoux (2009), op. cit., p. 549. Ibid., p. 550. Mitchell (2011), op. cit., p. 93. Ibid. See Zartman (2009), p. 332. See also, Bohman (2003), op. cit., pp. 771, 775. d’Estree points out Blake and Mouton (1984) focused on “reframing” for transforming the perceptions of the situation into “win-win” instead of “zero-sum”. See, d’Estree(2009), op. cit., p. 158. See also the second and third phases of ARIA frame, in Rothman (1997), op. cit. Zartman points out “forward-looking negotiations look for mechanisms to prevent future violence…by resolving its underlying causes.” See, Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman (2009), op. cit., p. 3. See also cited in Rosoux (2009), op. cit., p. 550.

204

chapter 6

incentivizing would potentially undermine genuine internal self-determination and the will of the parties, yet the UN is responsible for maintaining and restoring peace, and such efforts cannot be seen as contravening its powers and principles. Universally outlawed slavery, duelling, or the sovereign right to resort to the use of force in international relations in the pre-Kellogg-Briand period are examples that expecting widely practiced cultural attitudes and perceived rights can be transformed or changed is not unsound or highly optimistic. The mere existence of the DPP mechanism under the UN system could generate a self-fulfilling norm for transforming divisions and conflict attitudes. It is, however, also acknowledged social tensions are likely to reoccur in post-conflict societies and/or in repressive regimes as divisions cannot be immediately and completely mended. The potential for new tensions is not grounds to abandon the DPP mechanism; rather constant risk of social tensions is to be taken to justify the objectives and methods of the DPP mechanism. In sum, despite constraints on transformation of conflicts and divisions, and the potential of emergence of new threats to positive peace, there are no better methods than dialogue and deliberative processes for safeguarding basic freedoms, basic needs/rights, reconciliation, inclusiveness and peace simultaneously. The alternative of enforcing these values would inevitably cause reactions, undermine stability and positive peace. Hence, the PPF is proposed as a tool for reinforcing UN’s aspirations for social integration and reconciliation.55 2

The Actors of the DPP Mechanism: Justification for the PPF’s Track-One-and-a-Half Level Systemic Early Engagement

Inaugurating efforts for transforming antagonisms requires a breakthrough. This can be enabled by the firm commitment of significant state and non-state actors, so that the political sphere can first be “stabilis[ed]”.56 Hence the DPP mechanism is suggested to involve (a) the state leadership and (b) the identity groups’ elites. This section aims to provide justification for involving track-one

55

56

See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), The Division for Social Policy and Development, http://social.un.org/index/SocialIntegration/Definition.aspx. (Last visited, 20.09.2013). Crisis management in Kenya and elsewhere often involved political stabilisation first, see in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, (2011), op. cit., p. 142.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

205

and half diplomacy,57 or a top-down approach, at the DPP mechanism although it is envisaged to pursue similar objectives and aspirations (i.e. reconciliation) that the existing UN track-two diplomacy and practice already seeks. The previous chapter juxtaposed UN instruments that undertake structural prevention with the envisaged PPF in terms of their institutional design, mandate and objectives. This section, on the other hand, concerns the effects of the different levels of diplomacy in UN practice. It discusses why the DPP mechanism’s top-down approach is suggested despite that the same objectives are pursued within the UN system at the track-two diplomacy level. It illustrates which lacuna within the UN system the PPF is designed to fill. Track-one diplomacy refers to official diplomacy with high-level state officials. Track-two diplomacy entails unofficial engagement of unofficial or official international actors with NGOs, community leaders, academics or any other influential actors, with a view to effectuating dialogue among the conflicting parties from a mid-level, namely below the high state officials, but above the grassroots level. Track 1.5 diplomacy refers to international engagements for ensuring dialogue between state officials and mid-level non-state actors. Track-three diplomacy involves efforts of non-official actors for effectuating community/grassroots dialogue, or empowerment by raising awareness on inter alia human rights and peace.58 Bercovitch and Jackson highlight the limitations of track-two diplomacy. First, track-two diplomacy may be used by states, as well as the international community, as a shield for their lack of political will to address a situation.59 Second, dialogical processes may “persuade rebel groups” to take a non-violent course or promote inter-communal communication. Yet, this process may not necessarily safeguard the state party’s commitment to take genuine action to eliminate the “structural violence” that gave rise to revolt in the first place.60 Third, they point out that these activities often involve collaboration and leadership of the religious figures to be successful. However, this cannot be an appropriate strategy for societies in which religion shapes the divisions.61 Due to these challenges, the DPP mechanism is conceptualised to involve both state and non-state actors. The rationale for envisioning deliberations between the state and identity group elites is based on the premise that equal 57

For a brief definition see United States Institute of Peace, Glossary, available at http:// glossary.usip.org/resource/tracks-diplomacy. (Last visited, 30.01.2013) 58 Ibid. 59 Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., p. 148. 60 Ibid., p. 147. 61 Ibid., pp. 146, 148.

206

chapter 6

consideration of all groups’ needs and demands would be conducive to political stabilisation. Scholars argue combined track-one and track-two activities, namely track 1.5 level diplomacy, rather than separate activities, are more successful in bringing social change and conflict transformation.62 Moreover, track 1.5 diplomacy can be seen as an appropriate tool for accelerating the processes that seek grassroots as well as top level commitment for cooperation and reconciliation. It is to be noted that the PPF is not envisaged to assume the responsibility for executing all multi-track activities by itself.63 Rather, its DPP mechanism is expected to encourage the deliberators to set out their agenda for further national dialogue at the grassroots level. As elaborated in previous chapters, UN activities involving track-one diplomacy face limits in safeguarding positive and sustainable peace due to the selectivity and timing of the activities. The current state-centric system leads the international community to assume responsibility for prevention when crises escalate; as states themselves are primarily responsible for preventing intra-state armed conflicts within their borders. In light of the Arab Spring events, the governments of Morocco, Oman and the Gulf states chose to place greater value on “public opinion” as preventive measures.64 However, in Libya, Syria and Bahrain this was not the case. The situation in Libya escalated into an internationalized, and in Syria into an intra-state armed conflict. In Bahrain, it led to a controlled, yet volatile situation. The events of the Arab Spring show that trigger events may leave a very narrow window of opportunity for the given states to react and for the international community to engage. The UN’s quiet and public mediation offers to facilitate reforms and assist peaceful transition failed to get the assent of the Libyan and Syrian regimes.65 This failure can be explained by the fact of escalated security dilemma negating trust in the UN’s efforts. It is to be underlined that both Libyan and Syrian regimes made reform commitments, which failed

62 63 64 65

Böhmelt (2010) cited in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011), op. cit., p. 182. See also Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., p. 150. Diamond and McDonald’s vision for their NGO’s “social peacebuilding” pursuit takes a holistic multi-track approach, see McDonald (2002), op. cit., p. 56. Robert D. Kaplan, “Good Mideast Dictators”, Stratfor, 25 July 2012, http://www.stratfor .com/weekly/good-mideast-dictators. The statement of the GA President, the International Istanbul Conference, “Enhancing Peace Through Mediation: New Actors, Fresh Approaches, Bold Initiatives”, New York, 25 February 2012, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/statements/istanbul 250212.shtml.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

207

to secure the trust and cooperation of opposing groups.66 Yet, the long history of repressive rule and aggregated grievances often lead repressed parties to a strong urge for regime change, secession and/or conflict attitude instead of a conciliatory (“integrative”67) attitude. The vicious cycle of the lack of trust and the lack of cooperation illustrates the need for the engagement of the international community to enable and monitor communication between the state and non-state actors.68 Envisioning the PPF as a systemic UN mediation tool can be further justified in light of the Bahraini example. Regional organisations, powerful states, and particularly neighbouring states carry geostrategic interests when evaluating world affairs and determining foreign policies. This can be traced in the international community’s differing stance towards the similar situations in Bahrain and Syria. In Bahrain, although the Sunni minority rulers exerted repression, in contrast to what happened in Syria, the ruling elite, rather than the oppressed group, received external support. Only 16 months after the harsh government response to the uprisings did 28 members of the Human Rights Council jointly condemn the ongoing violence. The UK, the US and seven EU member states were among the 19 members which did not support the declaration.69 To increase the chances that situations in states which are allies with great powers, such as Bahrain, receive the UN’s attention, it is essential that the UN mediation apparatus entails a systemic approach to tackle the lack of positive peace. A universal approach is crucial to address both the perceptions of and the actual selectivity in the UN’s efforts for dispute settlement/mediation, and thus to increase the credibility of the UN. The credibility deficit is one of the main reasons for states’ negative responses to the UN’s track-one mediation 66 67 68

69

This is not to argue that these regimes’ reform commitments were genuine or credible, rather it is to stress the lack of trust in divided or repressive societies. Wallersteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 202, 203. Rothchild argues in divided societies “if balance of power shifts between groups, it may trigger violent encounters. By default it falls to international actors … to prevent the point of no-return.” Rothchild (2009), op. cit., p. 261. See, HRW News Report on the Response of the HRC to the Bahraini situation, http://www .hrw.org/news/2012/06/28/un-human-rights-council-strong-message-bahrain-abuses. See also HRC UPR outcome report, in which other states urge political reforms through dialogue with the opposition to end the violence. See Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Bahrain, A/HRC/21/6/Add.1, 13 September 2012. For an account on the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry see, http:// www.bici.org.bh/. For an analysis of Bahraini situation from the foreign policy perspective of the US, see Kenneth Katzman (13 September 2013), “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy” available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf.

208

chapter 6

offers as they believe involvement carries political interests of some powerful member states rather than their interest for peace.70 The perception in the fairness and non-selectivity of the procedures to invoke the DPP mechanism is expected to play a significant role in states’ accepting the execution of UN-facilitated deliberative processes. Furthermore, in addition to a systemic approach, early engagement for intra-state disputes is particularly important due to both normative and practical reasons. Intra-state armed conflicts tend to last longer; and the longer they last, the longer and more difficult reconciliation in the post-conflict situation will be, increasing the risk of relapse.71 Therefore, given that the causes of armed conflict72 have reached common knowledge status in conflict resolution literature, and the UN also recognises them, the positive peace approach proposed in this book argues for striving to address these root causes by targeting Fundamental Conflicts in the pre-conflict settings. As Peck notes, the expression of grievances “initially [happens] through nonviolent protest [and] leav[es] ample time for problem solving.”73 Gurr argues high risk situations are predictable “with reasonable accuracy”.74 Building upon these arguments the elements and criteria of the operational formula of positive peace can be expected to be looked for without jeopardising the vision for early-engagement, and thus prevention, function of the PPF.75 Yet, the interpretation of certain events as the existence of tensions that indicates underlying grievances and Fundamental Conflicts may be wrong at times. Nevertheless, 70 71 72 73

74

75

Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), op. cit., pp. 73–74. See, Lickleider’s arguments cited in Peck (1998), op. cit., pp. 63–64. See Chapter 3, Section 3. Peck (1998), op. cit., p. 215. In light of the mass protests in Turkey, Brazil, and Egypt in the summer of 2013, one can argue that even before peaceful protests become widespread, there is “ample time” to accommodate the concerns and needs of the people often expressed via other means. Ted Robert Gurr, “Containing Internal War in the Twenty-First Century”, in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 41–62, at 58. Fearon and Laitin reject that the existence of identity/ethnicity cleavages and grievances can alone explain civil wars, rather they emphasise the role of political opportunity and insurgency theory in explaining and predicting the outbreak of civil wars. Yet, this would also suggest that addressing grievances and identity issues would be part of earlyprevention activities. See, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review 97/ 1 (2003), pp. 75–90. However, their recent study of 2011 leaves more room to the role of grievance in explaining the outbreak of civil war although it still prioritises the aforementioned factors’ role. Cited in Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013), op. cit., p. 17.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

209

given the fact that grievances likely lead to escalated tensions and ultimately to violence is not contested in the literature and in the reports of the UN SecretaryGeneral, in cases where commonly acknowledged sources of grievances are identified, it can be assumed that tensions will ensue and thus certain events can be determined as tensions indicating Fundamental Conflicts. According to Zartman all conflicts are bound to lead to their own resolution by reaching “ripe” moments that would enable negotiations/mediations. As he points out “ripeness occurs when the parties feel that they can no longer expect to win the conflict through escalation …and that there is a possibility of a jointly acceptable solution.”76 This can be understood that ultimately it is conflicting parties’ political will and decision to pursue escalation or de-escalation based on their constructed perspectives and cost-benefit calculations. In his recent works, Zartman points out that it is possible to imagine that the perception of ripeness can occur before any human costs are paid.77 Similarly, Peck maintains that the literature suggests early involvement in disputes is as likely to be responded to positively as when the conflicts have reached stalemate/ ripeness.78 Therefore, she suggests the institutionalisation of “problem-solving methodology as a normative practice” as part of an early engagement approach.79 In light of Zartman’s and Peck’s arguments, the DPP mechanism can be seen as an embodiment of the quest for accelerating ‘ripeness’ perceptions. In sum, the DPP mechanism is envisaged to involve both state and non-state actors (i.e. 1.5 track diplomacy) to stabilise the political sphere and prepare the environment for further efforts to improve inter-group relations and build positive peace. In societies where civil society and democratic culture is weak or absent, external support is essential for breaking the cycle of conflict attitude (i.e. mistrust) between the people and state leadership, and for enabling direct or overt communication and deliberations at the top-leadership level. Annan’s Syria Peace Plan of 27 March 2012, as well as both Geneva Talks, can be 76 77 78

79

See, Zartman (2009), op. cit., pp. 335, 329. See also Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997), p. 178. See Zartman and Anstey (2012), op. cit. See also, Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities, S/2009/189, 8 April 2009, para. 13. Connie Peck, The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 263. Similarly, the SG Annan pointed out that “the earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified and effectively addressed, the more likely it is that the parties to a conflict will be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, address the actual grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and refrain from the use of force to achieve their aims.” Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001), para. 167. Peck (1998), op. cit., p. 215.

210

chapter 6

seen as a sign of a paradigm shift among the states towards recognising nonstate actors as parties to international mediation/facilitation efforts for settling disputes through dialogical processes.80 In the context of the UN peacemaking, it is also not unusual to recognise non-state actors so that a lasting ceasefire and peace agreement can be reached. Furthermore, there are many examples of negotiations with non-state actors in the Oslo processes, even if at the earlier stages these involve quiet diplomacy. These practices can be taken as a precedent for the rationale of the PPF and its DPP mechanism and for application in the pre-conflict settings. Therefore, it can be argued that the PPF would not require a major paradigm shift, rather underpin existing practices and aspirations that seek “early engagement on potentially violent tensions.”81 3

Possible Objections to the PPF Idea: The Prospects for States’ Assent for its Operation

This section examines whether the envisaged functioning of the PPF presents a realistic endeavour. To be able to argue that the PPF idea and its DPP measure are practical possibility rather than mere theoretical possibility, there must be reasonable likelihood for overcoming states’ reluctance for a stronger UN conflict prevention role. This could be asserted by illustrating (a) actual changes in state behaviour; (b) the differing foundations of the PPF that will rule out the reasons for states’ past or ongoing reluctance and/or; (c) that the PPF presents a rational option for expecting states’ cooperation. These points will be discussed in reverse order. This analysis would not necessarily suggest that the PPF has great chances for materialisation under the UN system, as the actual materialisation will depend on the Zeitgeist and UN member states’ political will. This section argues that the very state-centric features of the international system and the realist assumptions on state behaviour, which are regarded to have been blocking a strengthened UN conflict prevention apparatus, may be taken to indicate the practical possibility of the PPF projection.

80

81

The Syrian government conveyed its willingness for a negotiated end to the violence and its willingness for fresh initiatives for dialogue with the opposition groups after Annan’s resignation. They also conveyed their readiness for discussing Assad’s possible resignation during talks. See, BBC Report, “Syria Envoy Says Assad Resignation Is Up for Discussion”, 22 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19329637. UN DPA, Strengthening National Capacities for Conflict Prevention http://www.un.org/ wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking/conflict_prevention.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

211

The PPF is suggested to better equip the UN to deal with the lack of political will of states and to enable implementation of preventive actions. Given that it is often those states that are unable or unwilling to address the grievances and Fundamental Conflicts that experience violent conflicts, this study suggests it is necessary that the UN expands its role in prevention assistance from an invitation-based approach into a systemic proactive approach. As the initiation of a DPP will nevertheless depend on state consent, it is necessary to further discuss why the PPF’s both systemic and early engagement features are expected to increase the chances for states’ acceptance of the UN involvement. The leading UN mediators observe that the involvement of the UN “brings hope”82 on the ground. This hope can also be seen as a trigger for change, namely for transforming non-cooperative and conflict behaviour. Mitchell points out that the discourse on the possibility for change is itself a “self-fulfilling prophecy” and may spontaneously lead to conciliatory behaviour, and thus cultivate the conditions for actual change.83 Similarly, the mere existence of a standardised, rather than an ad hoc, UN early engagement through the PPF can be anticipated to stimulate peace dynamic and increase the chances of states’ cooperation with the UN mediation. In the aftermath of his resignation from his mediator role for Syria, Annan pointed out the difficulties of finding a solution when parties are already within a violent conflict spiral.84 When tensions, and thus security dilemma, have not escalated, the parties would be more amenable to negotiations. Therefore, an early engagement vision would be a crucial feature for aspirations of extending the UN’s mediation/facilitation role into repressive nondemocratic or non-functioning democratic regimes. It is expected that the envisaged non-ad hoc early involvement of the PPF would provide good conditions for UN mediation, and the DPP mechanism, to first initiate them and then to resolve disputes and reduce the risk of violence. As mentioned in the previous section,85 non-selective UN involvement may be a factor to overcome state reluctance to external actors’ intervention, which 82 See, Peck’s interview with Vendrell, in Connie Peck, “United Nations Mediation Experience: Practical Lessons for Conflict Resolution”, in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 413–433, at 417. 83 Mitchell (2011), op. cit., p. 93. 84 See, Kofi Annan, “My Departing Advice on How to Save Syria”, 2 August 2012, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b00b6ed4-dbc9-11e1-8d78-00144feab49a.html#axzz22TzdejDz. 85 See text accompanying footnote 70 above.

212

chapter 6

they presume to be motivated by the intervening actors’ own interest. This is not to disregard the possibility that the PPF may also be vulnerable to reflecting powerful states’ interests, if it were institutionalised under the UN. Despite the pre-set criteria for invoking the DPP mechanism, powerful states may influence and/or limit the PPF’s functioning for advancing their interests. Yet, this limitation is inevitably true for any mechanism that is operating under the state-centric international system. The limitations pertaining to state-centric international system should not be taken as a reason for abandoning the PPF endeavour that primarily aims to ensure internal self-determination while pursuing positive peace. The fact that the DPP mechanism will be facilitating national ownership, and thus to a greater extent circumvent outside interests, might increase states’ willingness to accept the suggested PPF. As elaborated in Chapter 1, in the realist paradigm, states are presumed to be rational actors that pursue their interests and power politics in the international sphere for preserving state sovereignty, i.e. territorial and political independence. Similarly, national political actors can also be assumed to pursue their interests and power in the intra-state domain to preserve or further their positions and interests. Therefore, from a realist perspective, the PPF idea can be categorised as unrealistic assuming the present power holders and their grassroots would oppose the DPP mechanism which would likely jeopardise their dominant and advantageous status and political, economic, and cultural position. On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that the DPP may seem a reasonable option to states based on realistic concerns and cost–benefit calculations. The DPP mechanism is essentially designed to provide the conditions for “integrative solutions”,86 which would also be beneficial for the current power holders. Through the win-win problem-solving approach, a regime may ensure controlled transition (and may still sustain its power even if it is altered), and more importantly, it may ensure the survival of its grassroots. As Annan points out, preventative measures “contribute significantly to strengthening the national sovereignty of Member States”.87 Owing to its preventive role states may regard the PPF to strengthen their national sovereignty. Primarily, responsive governments that consider public opinion and enhance democratic governance would be the utmost preventative factor in societies. Given the DPP mechanism is designed to facilitate the governments to initiate national dialogue seeking to increase their responsiveness rather than isolating or disempowering them, it can reasonably be expected that states may be willing to 86 87

Wallersteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 202, 203. Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001), p. 3 and also paras. 167, 168.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

213

initiate the DPP if it were made an established practice under the UN system. On the other hand, critical theorists may oppose the idea of such PPF pointing out that it would bear a statist stance which reinforces the power of state actors. While the validity of such potential critiques is to be acknowledged, they can, nonetheless, be partly refuted, given that the envisaged DPP mechanism would also ensure that non-state actors take part in deliberations with state actors on an equal footing and have a chance to affect social change.88 Furthermore, it can also be argued that states may accept the UN mediation/facilitation offer to hold a DPP to pre-empt the possibility of more coercive or “unwelcome outside interferences”.89 As elaborated earlier, in the current UN system, external actors get involved when situations escalate into state-inflicted violence and/or intra-state armed conflict or war. In such cases, the international community perceives regimes resorting to armed force against its own people as illegitimate, and increasingly pursues coercive UN Chapter VII measures and/or regime change.90 As external parties’ intervention at the later stages of conflict would inevitably be intrusive, it would be more rational for states to accept the DPP mechanism, especially given that it will merely seek to facilitate internal actors’ dialogue and deliberation.91 Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the initiation of the DPP mechanism will be limited at times, as the respective government and its grassroots supporters might perceive the DPP mechanism as a threat to maintaining and/or furthering their interests and power.92 Yet, the recent uprisings in many parts of the world, and in particular during the Arab Spring, have shown increased threats to stability (negative peace) and human security when governments take non-compromising positions towards grievances. Therefore, governments 88

89

90 91 92

Furthermore, this statist approach may also be seen as a hindrance to potential power vacuum and weak state problem which are associated with instability that coercive regime change such as in Iraq and Libya often involves. Prevention of Armed Conflict, p.3., para 6, 167, 168. SG Annan’s idea can be traced in the analysis of Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar (2002), op. cit., p. 243. Building upon Annan’s argument in the context of ‘unwelcomed’ R2P operations, Lund argues the fact that R2P operations become a norm would lead to increased states’ acceptance of peaceful conflict prevention. “The more that late and possibly non-consensual armed interventions are justified and necessary to halt atrocities, the more acceptable earlier and consensual preventive engagement may become as an alternative.” See Lund (2009), opt.cit., at 295. See Sections 2 and 3 in Chapter 2. See Section 4, Chapter 4 for the discussion of the levels of intrusiveness that could be considered as acceptable intervention. For an account on realistically expecting cooperative behaviour and social change and progress see Jensen (2009), op. cit., pp. 173, 180.

214

chapter 6

may be expected to embrace integrative solutions for their survival taking into consideration possible escalation of conflict and likely unwelcome interventions. The conciliatory steps that Gulf Sheikhdoms have taken toward more consideration of public opinion during the Arab Spring can be given as an example to this.93 On the other hand, as was also mentioned earlier, non-state actors may be unwilling to cooperate with the existing power structures or governments.94 Past grievances or violent incidents may lead to their resistance to cooperate with the government; instead they may ultimately seek a total regime change. Furthermore, they may regard the DPP mechanism as a tool to reinforce the existing governments and power structures. Yet, similar to the above arguments presented for the likelihood of states’ cooperative action, it is also possible to argue that it would be rational and in the interests of the grassroots population, as well as the elites of identity groups, to cooperate with the state under the DPP mechanism for the pursuit of their needs and rights rather than taking a non-conciliatory attitude. Non-cooperation may lead to deterioration of the situation and ultimately threaten the survival of these groups and the well-being of the whole society due to the escalation of conflict.95 Furthermore, some critics may assert that the role of the PPF and its DPP mechanism would be minimal in reality. If the state offered to undertake the UN’s facilitated DPP were willing and/or capable of taking rational cooperative actions, it would have done so without the DPP mechanism as the example of Gulf Sheikhdoms has shown. If it has not seized the opportunity spontaneously, there is a high possibility that such regimes would also reject invoking the DPP, no matter how early its involvement. This argument points out the limits for actually executing the DPP due to expecting ideal rational behaviour to prevail in practice. However, it is expected that the DPP mechanism would nevertheless be of relevance and added value as it would fill the void of credible conflict resolution mechanisms in most of non-democratic and divided societies. If the 93 94

95

See text accompanying footnote 64 above. The position of the Syrian opposition to the Geneva II peace conference can be given as an example for this line of argument. However, the situations under the ambit of the PPF would be different in that they target pre-conflict situations. See Michael R. Gordon, “Syrian Opposition to Sit out Any Talks Unless Arms Are Sent, General Says”, The New York Times, 8 June 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/middleeast/syria-opposition -wont-attend-talks-unless-rebels-get-arms-commander-says.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Zartman and Anstey highlight that it falls under the responsibility of the mediators in the pre-crisis dialogue stage to make the parties realise that “the alternative to reconciliation is costly”. See, Zartman and Anstey (2012), op. cit., pp. 24, 25.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

215

security dilemma is high and/or the state is weak and the society is deeply divided, even if the regime may be genuinely willing to take a rational stance and resolve disputes, it may still not be in the position to start reform and/or dialogue processes. It is not only the lack of political will, but also the lack of trust between state and non-state actors that may obstruct undertaking reforms. The PPF is precisely designed to enable the UN to tackle such torturous situations, and to enable communication between the opposing segments of the divided societies. In sum, it can be argued that for states it would be a rational, pragmatic, and normative choice to execute the DPP mechanism given the negative consequences in human costs and the prospect for destruction of social integration for generations, given the likelihood for ruling elites to lose power without having a chance for a negotiated end, and more importantly, given the prospect of weakening state sovereignty with the possibility of additional intrusive interference, such as post-conflict reconstruction by the terms of stronger external parties. Similarly, it would be a rational choice for non-state actors to further their cause through the DPP mechanism. Some may depict the above reasoning as too optimistic drawing upon the realist tradition’s assumptions of the permanency of friend–enemy distinctions and the struggle of power in the political sphere due to selfish and belligerent human nature. Yet, the realist tradition also presupposes that balancing of power/interests is the most typical rational behaviour of states in the international sphere, which often entails cooperation on the one hand, and deterrence, on the other hand. In other words, the realist perspective does not necessarily exclude cooperation. The UN and other international organisations are constructed upon states’ cost–benefit calculations with regard to furthering their interests and power. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War96 can be taken to illustrate the possibility of more conciliatory approach when states regard conflict behaviour no longer sustainable or beneficial. Hence, it can be argued that the PPF idea, which is based on the presumption that states would rationally chose cooperation if there are risks when not doing so, would not present an unrealistic project even if it would be limited at times. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the PPF would neither be vulnerable to states’ reasons for objecting effective conflict prevention. States’ resistance to UN 96

Kriesberg points out that the proliferation of NGO’s, which helped the grassroots communication between opposing parties, pave the way for the end of the Cold War. Louis Kriesberg, “The State of the Art in Conflict Transformation”, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Trans­formation, pp.  49–73, at 59. Available at http://www.berghof-handbook .net/documents/publications/kriesberg_handbook.pdf.

216

chapter 6

early warning mechanisms were pointed out to stem from their fear that the identification of risk factors by the UN would (1) lead to further international intervention and possibly military ones; or (2) become a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to the deterioration of the situation including adversely affecting their economies and/or triggering violence. By putting positive peace, rather than negative peace, at the core of preventive efforts, the PPF will fundamentally differ from the traditional conflict prevention apparatus as regards to the ethos and implications. As the elements of the operational formula for positive peace will not signify imminent risk of violence, the states’ aforementioned main reasons for opposing preventive systems would not be valid for the PPF’s functions. Many states under UPR assessment are found to entail factors such as discrimination and inequalities that can also be interpreted as signifying the lack of positive peace. However, it would be difficult to argue that the identification of discrimination in those states during UPR led to worsen the situation, to violence or to further coercive international intervention. Furthermore, even if such identifications were found to have negative impacts on the economy of the given states, it can be argued the PPF’s function would not cause more adverse effects than the existing UPR practice causes. Lastly, the materialisation of the PPF under the UN system will depend on the consent of all member states but especially on the consent of the powerful states. It is beyond the scope of this book to analyse the possible reactions of each state to a UN institutional reform entailing the PPF. In general, however, it is possible to argue that states that are not likely to be the target states of the PPF would not object to its materialisation. Similarly, given that the states that are likely to be the target states of the PPF have been championing the works on the right to peace, and have consented to the developments such as the R2P norm, and the establishment of the PBC and UPR mechanism, they cannot be certainly assumed to object to the PPF’s materialisation.97 Moreover, it can also be argued that most of the states, which have supported peacebuilding activities in the weak or failed states as a means to international security,98 may also support the PPF’s institutionalisation, since the PPF’s efforts for fostering positive peace would also similarly serve international security. On the other hand, this is not to disregard that some powerful states, particularly China and Russia, have often vetoed draft SC resolutions emphasising the norm of non-interference and the inviolability of state sovereignty. This state practice presents a major challenge against the likelihood of the establishment 97 98

See discussion accompanying footnote 102 below. Edward Newman, “Peacebuilding as Security in ‘Failing’ and Conflict-Prone States”, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4/3 (2010), pp. 305–322, at 307–309.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

217

of the PPF. However, given these states have supported the diplomatic efforts in Geneva II Conference on Syria which also included the non-state actors, as well as the R2P doctrine in 2005 World Summit, and the UN GA and SC resolutions in 2011 and 2014 on enhancing the UN mediation role in conflict prevention, it can be argued this challenge against the actualisation of the PPF idea is not necessarily absolute. In light of the analysis in this section, the likelihood of states’ acceptance of the actualisation of the PPF idea and the execution of the DPP cannot be argued to be unrealistic. This book maintains that the pursuit of the positive peace vision through the suggested PPF is thus practically possible. In other words, it has an optimistic view for the pursuit of the suggested positive peace vision, and asserts that this “ideal can be achieved, provided that the relevant parties act to bring it about.”99 Like any reform agenda, the PPF would need a momentum to be institutionalised. This momentum may be expected to emerge in an era that has shown the limits of the pursuit of negative peace in maintaining peace and stability. The increase in the new onsets of intra-state armed conflict in the world, specifically in the MENA region and Ukraine, can be taken as illustrative of the timely aspirations for a new positive peace approach and to expect the emergence of a political will for the pursuit of new structural prevention measures. 4

The Place of the UNPC within the UN System

This section will suggest two possible locations where the UNPC (Peace Council), the envisaged main body of the PPF, could be situated, and considers the complications and challenges either choice might present. The objectives and functions of the UNPC could be realised (1) under a dedicated inter-governmental body with a structure similar to that of the HRC or the PBC, or (2) under a new department within the UN Secretariat or a new section/unit within the DPA. In the first scenario, the UNPC could be envisaged as a subsidiary body under the GA, or (1b) as a novel UN Principal Organ. In option 2, the UNPC would be a bureaucratic body directly linked to the SecretaryGeneral elevating the suggested positive peace vision amongst the UN core values. This book elaborated the PPF with a tendency towards the first option, so that the positive peace vision can attract more significance, and its pursuit can be mainstreamed. It is presupposed that the existence of a dedicated body for 99

Jensen (2009), op. cit., p. 170.

218

chapter 6

the pursuit of positive peace that represents a proactive soft power, as opposed to the SC’s selective hard power, may in itself be conducive to transforming international community and sphere for fostering positive peace conditions. This assumption can be supported with the fact that after the establishment of the UN the international sphere has been transformed according to the UN founders’ aspirations as regards to international human rights standards and international peace. However, it is acknowledged that option 1b, namely establishing the UNPC as a principal organ would require amendment to the UN Charter, which is less likely compared to an institutional reform that option 1a and 2 would require. On the other hand, if institutionalised as an intergovernmental body, the UNPC may be vulnerable to politicisation, and may risk being another rhetorical platform, which cannot fulfil its functions due to a potential credibility deficit. To overcome such challenges, the UNPC is suggested to entail a standardised DPP mechanism that will be invoked upon the fixed operational formula. As Zartman points out, the issue of recognition of rebels via formal negotiations has been one of the main obstacles to the UN’s mediation role for intrastate conflicts.100 Although UN peacemaking inevitably involves mediation between warring non-state actors and the given state, nevertheless, from a rigid state-centric perspective, it may seem too utopian to envisage the UNPC as a principal organ with a mandate to facilitate the alleviation of identity divisions. However, the UNPC as a subsidiary body may have more chances to be materialised. As a subsidiary body the UNPC would correspond to the equivalent of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which promotes national dialogue processes for reconciliation. Differently the UNPC is envisaged to operate in the pre-conflict settings for initiating national peace processes with a view to mending conflict-prone identity divisions. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall argue the idea of a culture of prevention has passed the “awareness raising and advocacy” phase within the UN, and now reaches towards the “acceptance and institutionalization” phase.101 Moreover, as Roche argues, the South, where many of the PPF’s target societies are located, has been supporting the efforts to promote a human right to peace that envisages assigning stronger obligations to states for addressing the underlying conditions of armed conflicts.102 The fact that the South has been supporting these efforts, and the fact that the GA unanimously accepted the Resolutions on the 100 Zartman (2009), op. cit., pp. 334–335. 101 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011), op. cit., p. 141. 102 See Roche (2003), op. cit., pp. 125, 129–131.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

219

Prevention of Armed Conflict in 2003 and on enhancing the UN mediation role in conflict prevention in 2011, can be taken as supporting bases to argue for establishing the UNPC as a subsidiary intergovernmental body (option 1a). As long as a realist paradigm and ethos prevails in the international sphere, it may be necessary for the DPP to be executed through quiet diplomacy, particularly given that states may be reluctant to cooperate when the invocation of the DPP is made public. To address this possible challenge in individual cases, the DPP invoking procedures can be adjusted to entail a two-tiered method. In the first tier, the UNPC could make its determinations in a non-public setting and offer the DPP mechanism through quiet diplomacy channels of UN mediators. Once the DPP achieves its objectives and/or upon the given government’s discretion during any phase of the DPP, the activities of the DPP mechanism can be made public. It would be still important for the government to announce that national dialogue and deliberation processes took place among the elites of all existing identity groups. This would be necessary to extend the expected positive effects of the DPP at the track-one level to the grassroots so that nationwide transformations of Fundamental Conflicts could be anticipated. The second tier would function in cases where the given state does not accept the UNPC’s non-public offer to execute the DPP. In such situations, the UNPC could adopt a resolution that would formally and publicly offer the execution of the DPP mechanism. This way it is expected to exert international pressure on the given government, and draw the attention of the international community. It is, however, to be acknowledged that if the state is unwilling to take the offers in the first tier, the likelihood of its acceptance in the second tier will also be low. In sum, it is suggested, with or without a two-tier system, the PPF can be expected to contribute to addressing the lack of positive peace if materialised as a subsidiary body under the UN system. Moreover, quiet diplomacy procedures for the invocation and execution of the DPP mechanism may render the PPF less utopian and more realisable. The second scenario envisages the UNPC under the UN Secretariat and directly linked to the Secretary-General. In this scenario, quiet diplomacy procedures would likely prevail. The determination for the invocation of the DPP mechanism would be a bureaucratic matter, necessitating the approval of the Secretary-General. This option would render positive peace pursuit less robust, and presumably more likely to be materialised. It is projected that the envisaged systemic positive peace approach through the UN Secretariat would not be vulnerable to the same limits of the present UN

220

chapter 6

mediation efforts.103 Given the rules and criteria for offering UN facilitation/ mediation for a DPP will be standardised operating on a non-selective basis linked to the materialisation of the elements of the suggested operational formula of positive peace as opposed to being ad hoc, states may perceive the UN involvement as neutral and impartial. This book argues for elevating the suggested comprehensive positive peace vision as an objective of the UN and for pursuing this vision through either a subsidiary body (i.e. option 1a) or through rendering this positive peace vision and operational formula as the working principle of the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat (i.e. option 2). The latter could be materialised by establishing a new department within the UN Secretariat or a new section within its DPA focusing on structural conflict prevention in pre-conflict settings. It is acknowledged that any UN institutional reform will highly depend on the cost-effectiveness of the preferred option. Further research would be needed to calculate the cost of each option. 5

Conclusion: Value Added by the Positive Peace Approach

The events in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring are fresh evidence of the timely manner of suggesting the inclusion of positive peace approach in the UN peace system. First, these events demonstrate that societies with salient divisions and lacking positive peace conditions are prone to civil uprisings that can turn into violence and/or armed conflict. Second, they point out societies lacking positive peace elements including a democratic culture and practice require international assistance for peaceful transition. Widespread protests such as in Turkey and Egypt in the summer of 2013 can be interpreted as demonstrating that majoritarian or procedural democracy is not sufficient for ensuring positive peace in divided societies. Third, these incidents illustrate that the current UN system is not sufficiently equipped with mechanisms and measures to provide assistance for peaceful transitions and fostering positive peace in pre-conflict settings. The outbreak of violence in Ukraine and Egypt amplify these three arguments. This is not to disregard that it is primarily the lack of respective states’ political will that constitutes an obstacle for realising existing UN measures. Yet, as elaborated in Chapters 2 and 5 and in the present chapter, this study maintains there is a 103 See text accompanying footnote 70 above.

The Functioning of the PPF and the DPP Mechanism

221

room for strengthening the UN’s early prevention pillars, and the suggested PPF can be seen as an appropriate tool for it. 104 The increasing global trend of widespread social movements demanding freedoms, basic needs and more consideration of grassroots concerns in ­decision-making, namely for social justice and dignified life, can be regarded to reveal that the human rights machinery has achieved its objective of raising awareness for human rights worldwide. Due to the prospect of increased tensions, instability and violence in divided societies in the face of quick mass mobilisation with the enabling role of fast communication (i.e. social media) it can be argued that there is a growing need to bolster positive peace building in both non-democratic and majoritarian/procedural façade democratic regimes. Combined efforts for positive peace based on social justice (i.e. horizontal equality and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of a life in dignity that encompasses basic freedoms and human needs) and for negative peace (i.e. non-violence and stability) are necessary so as to not jeopardising either, and to enable their simultaneous realisation. This chapter argued that if operationalised, the DPP mechanism would enable a strengthened pursuit of the UN’s objectives of promoting democracy, human rights, and social cohesion/integration as the basis of peace and prevention of armed conflicts. As elaborated in Chapter 3, the DPP mechanism draws upon Rawls’s and Habermas’s pioneering ideas on deliberative democracy that emphasise dialogue and deliberative processes as means of conflict resolution in multicultural liberal democratic societies. The DPP tool is designed to complement a victim-centred rights-based approach since in divided societies it can be expected that competing human rights would also give rise to (more) tensions across communities. In divided societies or on divisive subjects, as Bohman points out, “civil law could never be recognized as a culturally neutral, public arbiter.”105 However, fair elections (i.e. procedural/majoritarian democracy) and deliberative authorities, whether at the parliament or High Court, are regarded as the underpinnings for reduced risk of violence in liberal democratic regimes.106 Therefore, the idea of PPF and its DPP mechanism is developed to enable similar 104 Hampson argues preventive diplomacy is to be linked to structural preventive measures of all UN mechanisms to reinforce a culture of prevention. Hampson (2002), op.  cit., pp. 148, 153. See also Lund (2004), op. cit., p. 300. 105 For the Rushdie affair as an example to deep value conflicts see Bohman (1995), op. cit., p. 268. The controversies over abortion in many states, or controversies over headscarf in Turkey are among those deep conflicts that cannot be easily resolved by national laws only. 106 Wallensteen points out the existence of conflict resolution mechanisms such as “courts, democratic procedures and elections” ensure the democratic peace in fully-functioning democracies. Wallensteen (2012), op. cit., pp. 38, 143.

222

chapter 6

functions for semi-democratic regimes or non-democratic divided societies by engaging with state actors to facilitate their dialogue and deliberations with non-state actors.107 Controversial issues in divided non-democratic societies may be more existential, and thus be more inflammatory, if not settled. Yet, one can argue that, unlike the case with deep value conflicts such as abortion, the existential incompatibilities may be less challenging to settle by resorting to universal standards of IHRL as they primarily pertain to the recognition of equal human worth and the safeguards for protecting human dignity in the political, social, economic and cultural domains. There­fore, it can be expected that parties could achieve acceptable grounds according to these safeguards through widespread dialogical and deliberative settings and increase their understanding of the needs across divisions. The failure to influence the Libyan and Syrian regimes to pursue political reforms for peaceful transition before the situations escalated into violent conflict can be attributed to several factors. However, the absence of effective neutral mechanisms within the UN system, specifically non-intrusive in the sense that it would not allow third parties’ interests to influence the outcomes, such as toppling the regime, can be depicted to be one of the main factors. Hence, the PPF is suggested to strengthen the UN peace system. The PPF’s objectives are built upon the UN’s ideals of promoting inclusive and integrated societies and cross-cultural understanding,108 and foremost its primary objective of preventing threats to peace and maintaining peace effectively. The conceptualisation of a new positive peace notion and its pursuit through the PPF under the UN system presents a plausible, necessary and timely endeavour. The PPF would not be an unrealistic project even if reaching the member states’ consensus on UN institutional reform may prove to be difficult.109 The new positive peace approach would not require a major paradigm shift (i.e. it rests on already existing practice and normative developments) for operationalisation, and thus it can reasonably be argued that the suggested positive peace paradigm does not present a merely theoretical and/or utopian project. 107 Cohen points out there is a need for external mechanisms if the instrumental political autonomy and enabling democratic institutions are absent to further protect human rights. This study builds upon this argument in developing the DPP mechanism. Joshua Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy”, in (eds.) James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 407–437, at 410. 108 See, UN Alliance of Civilizations initiative, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/ Letters/PDF/Alliance%20of%20Civilizations%20Thank%20You%20-%20MS.pdf, p. 1. 109 For the challenges in reaching consensus on R2P doctrine before and during the 2005 World Summit see, Bellamy (2009), op. cit., pp. 67–97.

Conclusion This study examined how sustainable intra-state peace could best be elicited through the UN system. It approached this main question by exploring what a peace vision needs to entail to be able to prevent the occurrence of intra-state violence/conflict in non-liberal/democratic and divided societies and to foster conditions that will sustain the absence of intra-state armed conflict/violence. It refers to intra-state violence or conflict when there are armed clashes between government and non-governmental actors, or clashes between nongovernmental actors. The book maintains that sustainable intra-state peace is an ultimate aspiration of humanity that could be best approached through a positive peace vision, which would seek to address the primary underlying causes of armed conflict, and not merely the absence of armed conflict/violence. The present work argued that there is a need for reconceptualising positive peace and for a comprehensive positive peace framework under UN auspices, and to further reinforce positive peace as an international norm. Ongoing deliberate relative deprivations and discrimination, and the non-enjoyment of a life in dignity in many parts of the world; the growing role of social media in enabling widespread civil protests for basic freedoms and rights; and the accompanying risks of escalated tensions due to unresponsive governments and the lack of a democratic culture in heterogeneous societies further reinforce this conclusion. To justify the endeavour of reconceptualising positive peace, the first two chapters analysed existing conceptions of peace in International Relations theory and in the UN system, with a view to illustrating their foundational and practical limitations for eliciting sustainable and positive intra-state peace globally. It looked only at the peace conceptions of the realist, idealist/Kantian and neoKantian traditions, as these peace visions underlie the UN Charter frameworks and the UN practice. Subsequently, Chapter 3 introduced a new positive peace vision (as the absence of we-they divisions/Fundamental Conflicts) and a new framework. The suggested positive peace paradigm goes beyond the existing peace conceptualisations in that it (a) concerns specifically with fostering positive peace in non-liberal/democratic and divided societies; (b) deepens the positive peace understanding by seeking to tackle Funda­mental Conflicts (identity divisions) rather than Fundamental Conflicts’ presupposed outcomes, namely the non-prevalence of liberal conditions, such as human rights, equality and non-discrimination, and a democratic culture; and (c) suggests a systemic preconflict preventive mechanism under UN auspices for a more effective and peaceful engagement with non-liberal and divided societies. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_009

224

Conclusion

Chapter 4 provided an operational formula for the new positive peace vision and set out additional criteria for the pursuit of positive peace within the UN system. Presupposing international pluralism is essential for claiming the practicability of the new positive peace vision and the PPF under the UN system, it weighed the conceptual viability of the new positive peace notion and the PPF by considering both the procedural and substantive roles attributed to human rights in the operational positive peace definition and framework against upholding international pluralism. Part III of the book set out the envisaged functioning and features of the PPF and projected the practice of the DPP mechanism pinpointing their contribution to the UN system. Chapter 5 illustrated that the objectives and functions of the PPF are distinct from those of the UN’s existing structural preventive mechanisms, and that the suggested positive peace approach would conceptually contribute to the UN preventive pillars. Chapter 6 projected the practice of the PPF and its DPP mechanism to show it would complement the UN practice for peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict prevention by incorporating a more comprehensive positive peace vision involving a realistic conflict transformation approach.

The Main Arguments and Findings

The realist tradition does not provide a positive peace vision or a sustainable peace vision that does not rely on coercive power in the intra-state sphere. This foundational limitation stems from the realist assumption that wars and armed conflicts are a constant reality both in the international and intra-state political spheres. On the other hand, both the Kantian and neo-Kantian liberal traditions have a positive and/or sustainable peace vision. However, the Kantian and neo-Kantian positive peace visions are not universal, namely they constitute an exclusive (‘separate’) positive peace vision for pre-existing ­liberal/ democratic societies, and a negative peace vision for non-ideal societies, which do not enjoy a liberal/democratic culture. The analysis of Kantian thoughts on the right to revolution established that Kantian theory accepts unjust yet stable order, namely a negative peace, over the possibility of a violent overthrow of an unjust regime due to the anarchy and violence it would possibly cause. The analysis on the Kantian peace vision found that this commitment to non-violence consequently led Kantian theory to be underdeveloped in respect to violence that an unjust ruler/order may inflict upon the people, which in turn would increase the risks of violent reactions or rebellion. The Kantian theory urges gradual perfection of constitutions and

Conclusion

225

despotic regimes through the initiation of the internal and/or third party actors. Yet, it does not provide an elaborate theorisation and framework for effectuating the perfection of unjust/despotic regimes to comprehensively avoid the risk of violence and build positive peace universally. With a view to filling this lacuna in the Kantian theory, as well as in the UN practice, the suggested new positive peace approach focuses on the engagement with non-­ liberal/democratic and unjust/repressive regimes. Furthermore, the section on Rawls’s international theory pointed out that the Rawlsian system is also limited in respect to providing a universal vision and framework for positive peace. This book attributed this limitation to the fact that Rawls’s ideal theory includes a broad understanding of international pluralism and toleration, which prohibits even peaceful engagement with non-liberal/ democratic regimes to cultivate positive peace. Consequently, this approach renders the interventionist measures of the Rawlsian non-ideal theory and the ensuing narrow pluralism/toleration inevitable and more practicable. The new conception of positive peace and the PPF offered in this study would contribute to the Rawlsian system by presenting an intermediate understanding of international pluralism/toleration. Thereby, both in theory and in practice, non-liberal/democratic regimes can be engaged with peaceful measures, and the reactive interventionist stance can be avoided. This understanding of international pluralism involves an acceptable level of peaceful intrusiveness into the internal affairs of states. It would also contribute to state sovereignty by addressing the underlying causes of intra-state armed conflicts and rendering more intrusive measures redundant. It was pointed out that the Kantian tradition underlies the UN Charter system. The Rawlsian system was identified as an exemplar of the neo-Kantian tradition that both explains and influences the UN system and its practice in the post-Cold War era. The Charter system was examined, and deemed to comprise a preventive voluntary-based (i.e. inactive) idealist framework, and a coercive and reactive realist framework for maintaining international peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the neo-Kantian influences have been increasingly prevalent in directing the UN’s efforts for intra-state peace. Therefore, the aforementioned contributions to the liberal tradition are also expected to contribute to the practical sphere via the UN system. In light of the trends on lapses and relapses into armed conflict, as well as on normative grounds, the book concludes that it is necessary to introduce a new notion of positive peace that entails a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. This work attributed the practical limitations of neo-Kantian measures in eliciting sustainable intra-state peace to its positive peace conceptualisation. As it amounts to the existence of liberal conditions, the UN thus pursues

226

Conclusion

liberal institution-building and legislative reforms, and primarily in postconflict situations. However, this book argues that if a positive peace notion were to be conceptualised as the absence of the root causes (i.e. Fundamental Conflicts) that lead to the non-flourishing of liberal conditions, such positive peace approach would provide a better and more comprehensive protection to human beings from the occurrence of intra-state armed conflict. The analysis of Galtung’s positive peace pointed out that the suggested positive peace concept involving the transformation of relationships (Fundamental Conflicts) across identity divisions differs from the Galtungian positive peace vision. Galtung assumes divisions/polarisations (human distance) and conflict attitude across race, class, gender and generation due to power discrepancy. However, this book introduces the notion of Fundamental Conflicts to explain and link power discrepancies to deliberate human action or neglect. Furthermore, differing from Galtung’s positive peace definition, the suggested positive peace concept does not entail a comprehensive understanding of social justice based on vertical equality. It rather draws upon Frances Stewart’s Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) thesis, which explains that political armed struggle occurs within states when identity group members across the identity divisions experience comparative inequalities in the political, social, economic, and social status dimensions of life. For Stewart, the inequalities in the political sphere, particularly the lack of representation in decision-making, are significant factors causing armed mobilisation and conflict. Drawing upon this, Chapter 4 proposed an operational formula for positive peace notion which entails ensuring comparative equality in the enjoyment of dignified life, i.e. basic needs, freedoms and rights, across all divisions. It set out that when political will is lacking and/or there are no democratic ways to pursue required change to mitigate horizontal inequalities and to meet demands for basic human needs, freedoms and rights, and when there are indications of tensions across divisions, the PPF is envisaged to engage with those divided non-democratic, or new and/or non-functioning democratic states at the earliest stage to prevent further escalation of tensions. However, the objective of the PPF and its deliberative peace process mechanism is not merely tackling these HIs through power-sharing, democratisation and liberalisation reform packages that existing peacebuilding measures already cover. Rather, the PPF’s main aim is alleviating Fundamental Conflicts as the sources of HIs. Chapter 4 also analysed that the pursuit of the operational formula of positive peace through the UN system would not undermine international pluralism given the existing UN practice and measures that entail similar level of intrusiveness. It also asserted that the PPF projection will not be intrusive

Conclusion

227

despite the substantive and procedural role attributed to human rights principles and norms, because it will not be able to impose certain standards, but rather it will only have a facilitative role during the envisaged deliberative peace processes. In other words, the suggested positive peace approach would withstand possible critical theoretical objections of presenting another liberal interventionist stance. Chapter 5 argued the suggested positive peace approach entails distinct features from the structural prevention approach pursued by the UN’s existing mechanisms. It demonstrated that the PPF would complement human-rights based and post-conflict (liberal) peacebuilding approaches. Chapter 6 illustrated the novel features of the PPF while projecting the DPP mechanism’s envisioned operation, and pointed out the real world situations that the positive peace notion would apply. It concluded that the DPP mechanism’s focus on identity issues at the 1.5 track level diplomacy would not present a great paradigm shift given there are state practice and increased acceptance in the international system for similar practices.

Key Contributions and Limitations: The Application of the New Positive Peace Paradigm

This book developed the conceptual category of Fundamental Conflicts to explain why liberal conditions (a democratic culture and internalisation of human rights principles) do not flourish, and why Horizontal Inequalities across identity faultlines exist in some societies. The liberal conditions for peace require, at their core, the primacy of toleration among society’s members. It is hypothesised that when there are Fundamental Conflicts, i.e. deep divisions within a society, reciprocal toleration required for the prevalence of liberal conditions would not flourish within that society. Fundamental Conflicts are conceptualised as essentially “we-they” divisions involving widespread exclusionary and antagonistic behaviour in the political, economic, cultural and social spheres. Fundamental Conflicts are distinguished from inevitable social and political disagreements in pluralistic societies in that they concern divisions based on identities rather than subject matters, and generate significant levels of tensions that are potentially capable of mobilising members of the groups across divisions for armed struggle. Like identity formations, Fundamental Conflicts are presupposed to be the outcome of unmet basic human needs (both tangible/strategic and intangible/ value-based) and restricted freedoms. Once there are Fundamental Conflicts, it is assumed there will be continued deliberate violations of human rights,

228

Conclusion

and HIs and grievances will be formed increasing the risk of violence. This study emphasises the importance of UN involvement for facilitating dialogue and deliberation to tackle Fundamental Conflicts when necessary democratic structures and/or a democratic culture are lacking in societies, i.e. when there is a vicious cycle of lack of credible structures and lack of trust among actors that obstructs initiation of national conflict resolution processes. The objective of mitigating Fundamental Conflicts is intended to transform societies with a view to establishing the fundamental conditions for positive and sustainable peace. In light of the relapse rates, neo-Kantian (i.e. liberal peacebuilding) measures such as promoting human rights and democracy and liberal institution-building per se are pointed out by many scholars as ‘superficial’ measures. This study also regards these measures as insufficient for building sustainable and positive peace in divided non-liberal/democratic societies, and thus suggests tackling Fundamental Conflicts as integral to the quest of positive peace. Drawing upon the UN’s growing emphasis on the principle of national ownership in the context of peacebuilding, and on strengthening the UN’s mediation role in conflict prevention and resolution, this book’s conceptualisation of a novel positive peace framework entailing UN-facilitated deliberative and dialogical measures for tackling tensions and Fundamental Conflicts can be seen as a timely endeavour. However, it is acknowledged that there is a need for further research, both conceptual and empirical, to develop the concept of Fundamental Conflicts and their possible resolution or transformation. In other words, there is a need for comprehensive research into the underlying causes of the non-prevalence of liberal conditions of peace (i.e. human rights, in particular the principle of equality and non-discrimination) in divided and conflict-prone societies. Such in-depth knowledge would contribute to comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The envisaged deliberative and dialogical peace process mechanism for tackling Fundamental Conflicts is drawn upon Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative and dialogical models that are developed as conflict resolution mechanisms in pluralistic liberal societies. Through the facilitating role of the UN, the present work envisaged to extend the application of these deliberative conflict resolution models into divided non-liberal societies, where a liberal/democratic culture and such mechanisms are lacking. The PPF is anticipated to contribute to conflict resolution in pre-conflict situations, and thus to comprehensive prevention. It is acknowledged that this study’s PPF idea is susceptible to limitations due the inherent practical limitations of undertaking deliberative processes in nondemocratic/liberal societies. Ensuring democratic representation of the grassroots across all divisions poses a challenge to the DPP mechanism and reaching

Conclusion

229

legitimate outcomes. Identification of the representatives of existing groups as the deliberators at the DPP mechanism also constitutes a challenge if the respective society, as well as the groups, is intensely fragmented. Not all diverse opinions within a particular group may be represented given the practical constraints. The selection process of deliberators may not correspond to a perfectly legitimate process in the absence of democratic elections. Yet, until better means of enhancing democracy and mitigating democratic deficit in representation are found, particularly in repressive and non-liberal/democratic regimes, the PPF and its DPP mechanism can nevertheless be seen as a contribution and intermediary solution, despite their limits in respect to representation. Furthermore, prima facie the DPP mechanism would attract critical theoretical objections due to its top-down approach, and thus due to presumably not challenging the issue of power within societies. This may also be seen as a misrepresentation of the Habermassian and Rawlsian deliberative models which attribute great importance to the role of civil society. Hence, it may be argued this positive peace approach is contradicting the recent trend of dialogical peace creation in the literature. Yet, due to the inherent limitations of non-liberal divided societies, the PPF projection cannot presuppose the existence of civil society in those societies. As elaborated in Chapter 6, the DPP mechanism is envisaged as an elite-run device as the suggested positive peace approach seeks the stabilisation of the political sphere first. This was justified due to the limitations of public diplomacy in influencing the political sphere in a short period of time and the urgency of pre-conflict prevention. Although the involvement of the UN at the DPP mechanism reflects a top-down approach, the DPP mechanism is not envisaged as the final phase of the suggested positive peace approach. Rather, it is seen as the initial deliberative and dialogical platform among elites to disperse dialogue into the grassroots via further widespread national dialogue processes. These continued widespread grassroots dialogical (and deliberative) processes are seen as a balancing factor to the inevitable problem of power ensuing from elite-run models. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that the possible criticisms of critical theorists cannot be fully addressed given that there are very limited options, if at all, for taming or managing power both within states and in the international sphere due to the nature of politics and the political sphere. The PPF and its DPP mechanism, like any international apparatus, would thus be vulnerable to the influences of power to some extent. It is also recognised that deliberative processes and mediation/facilitation efforts do not provide definite guarantees for successful outcomes (i.e. transformation of Fundamental Conflicts and antagonistic attitudes), nor can they ensure that the outcomes would not contravene the principles of international

230

Conclusion

human rights law. Furthermore, the PPF’s vision of tackling Fundamental Conflicts in such settings would present additional limitations due to the fundamental nature of long-term and deep incompatibilities accompanying the divisions. However, the guidance of human rights and universal standards and the facilitative role of UN mediators during deliberations are anticipated to help reach a common ground among the parties. If the deliberators and their grassroots could acknowledge basic human needs and freedoms and a dignified life to all equally as a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence, then sustainable cooperation among the parties can be expected. Yet, there are no guarantees for ensuring conciliatory attitudes as it requires the intrinsic will of actors, regardless of effective mediation/facilitation techniques. Hence, it is to be reckoned that the DPP would be limited at times. The situations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, among many other current crisis situations, are real-world situations, where the concept of Fundamental Conflicts exists and the suggested new positive peace vision could be pursued. This book conceptualised the PPF as a pre-conflict prevention tool, and therefore active armed conflict or civil war situations such as in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and Libya do not present cases for the application of positive peace vision through the PPF. Although the suggested positive peace paradigm can be imagined to have relevance in direct prevention (i.e. peacemaking) and postconflict peacebuilding efforts as well, it is beyond the scope of this book and appropriate for further research to thoroughly elaborate the conditions and implications of such a role for the positive peace concept and the PPF. However, the fact that the PPF would not apply to most of the current crisis situations in the world does not necessarily diminish the potential for its relevance in the future. Any new law-making follows practical needs and identification of lacunas in the respective system, and new instruments and measures only apply for the future cases. Given the lacuna and practical need in the UN system pointed out in this book, the PPF idea is expected to carry a great potential for pre-conflict prevention and positive peace building. In a nutshell, this book contributes to the quests of sustainable peace by way of developing a comprehensive conception and framework of positive peace. While sustainable and positive peace is a challenging objective to attain, it is a necessary aspiration to strive for. A comprehensive conceptualisation of positive peace that ultimately seeks reconciliation in divided/pluralistic societies is also a very extensive and challenging aspiration, particularly given that there is no definite cure for reconciliation and no fixed recipe for building positive peace. Nevertheless, sustainable peace could be better approached, if the UN were to pursue the suggested positive peace, mainstream it in all of its activities, and facilitate states for tackling Fundamental Conflicts.

Appendix The Objectives, Functions and Working Principles of the Positive Peace Frame­ work: The UN Peace Council and the Deliberative Peace Process Mechanism. I

The UNPC

This section provides a brief account of the UNPC’s main objectives, its rela­ tionship with the DPP mechanism, and the DPP mechanism’s principles. 1)

The UNPC’s main objectives will be: i)

To address the absence of positive peace and to advance positive peace globally ii) To focus its efforts on transforming the underlying causes of con­ flicts (i.e. identity divisions/Fundamental Conflicts) with a view to promoting social relationships among the existing salient ethnic, religious, cultural, ideological identity group members, and with a view to improving each group members’ life in dignity; iii) To complement human rights implementation efforts of the UN Charter-based human rights machinery and the existing peace­ building efforts of UN agencies by focusing on mitigating divisions in both pre- and post-conflict situations; iv) To complement the ongoing efforts to secure the right to peace, and if implemented, to be part of its implementation mechanism by providing i-iii. 2)

The present book envisions the UNPC as fulfilling the following functions: i)

Monitoring: Monitoring and analysing situations upon credible early warning reports, such as of the DPA and the UPR, and assess­ ing the extent of the realisation of positive peace in each UN mem­ ber state, and where needed, making recommendations; ii) Determination: Determination of the critical levels of the absence of positive peace and invocation of the DPP mechanism; iii) Country-specific structural prevention: Invocation of the DPP mech­ anism for the purposes of preventing the resort to violence from being perceived as the only option for parties to pursue their needs/ demands to enjoying lives of dignity. This platform will not only be © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004305618_010

232

Appendix

discursive but also deliberative, where the parties are expected to arrive at basic principles of their society’s political and legal structures; iv) Preventive diplomacy: Pre-negotiations with the state party to reach agreement for initiating the DPP, and after the execution of the DPP, following up the implementation of the DPP outcome; v) Mediation/Facilitation: Providing UN mediators to the DPP mecha­ nism with the mandate of facilitating dialogue and deliberations, and proposing possible solutions in case of stand-offs. 3) The following substantive principles of the UNPC are necessary to uphold the PPF’s viability requirements. They are also the basis of the DPP mechanism’s procedural principles: i)

Pluralism with its international and intra-state dimensions: – deliberative toleration and inclusiveness in the form of a coop­ erative and conciliatory approach, rather than an adversarial/ confrontational approach, such as naming and shaming; – national ownership understood as self-determination of the society comprising all existing groups in divided societies, rather than merely the majority or powerful;

ii)

II

Transparency and objectivity: to ensure non-politicisation and nonselectivity prevail in the pursuit of the above functions. The DPP Mechanism’s Objectives, Working Principles and Functions

The DPP mechanism will be the implementation tool of the UNPC to fulfil the function enumerated under 2iii, namely country-specific structural prevention efforts that involve tackling Fundamental Conflicts and ensuring structural reforms. Therefore, the DPP mechanism’s functions and proce­dural principles will primarily be dictated by the UNPC’s objectives and functions. 4)

The DPP’s action-oriented objectives, derived from the UNPC objectives, are as follows: i)

To start and facilitate a process of national dialogue and delibera­ tion among the top leaders of both state and non-state actors under the UNPC without jeopardising the principle of national ownership, with a view to:

233

Appendix

– transforming antagonistic and exclusionary attitudes that Fundamental Conflicts and the ensuing ideological and strategic incompatibilities cause; – mitigating identity divisions/disputes; – arriving at collective decisions on the principles of legal and political institutions; – triggering further grassroots dialogical processes in order to extend and consolidate de-escalation of tensions and agree­ ments among the elites into the middle and grassroots levels. 5)

The DPP Mechanism’s procedural principles1 are as follows: i)

Inclusiveness: seeking representation of the widest spectrum of existing perspectives; ii) Procedural equality: all deliberators have one vote and are equal; iii) Forward looking problem-solving approach:2 seeking redefinition/ reframing of problems/frameworks and establishing mechanisms for transforming relationships in the longer term, with a view to prevent future tensions/risks of escalations: iv) Transparency of procedures and publicity: (optional upon the agree­ ment with the given state and non-state actors) providing informa­ tion on the participants, their pre-existing positions and partly of the proceedings of negotiations during the DPP to the public so that the DPP will be perceived as a credible mechanism, and so that the repre­ sentatives and the represented can be kept apprised of decisions to ensure that representatives can be influenced by the represented. 6)

Substantive principles: i)

ii)

1 2 3 4 5

Equal consideration and reciprocity: This is what Rawls calls duty of civility to appeal to public reason, and what Cohen calls “deliberative inclusion,”3 which not only requires equal consideration of all of the deliberators’ views, but also giving “reasons acceptable to others”;4 Orientation towards the common good,5 namely peaceful co-existence: arriving at acceptable decisions by and for all deliberators, with a

See also, Cohen (1997), op. cit., pp. 415–420. Zartman (2009), op. cit., p. 336. Cohen (1997), op. cit., p. 417. Ibid., p. 415. Ibid., p. 420.

234

Appendix

view to protecting and realising the right to life in dignity of all without discrimination to the greatest extent possible. 7) Functions: The DPP mechanism is envisaged as a facilitative device for conflict transfor­ mation in societies in which a democratic culture, practice and institutions are lacking. The DPP is the UNPC’s instrument serving as a mechanism to both foster positive peace and reduce the risk of armed conflict by addressing iden­ tity divisions. It will fulfil the following functions: i)

armed conflict prevention device: by seeking to stabilise the political sphere by instigating a peace dynamic and creating the appropriate ‘ripe’ environment for addressing disputes among the disputing elites; ii) initial device for a new social contract: by facilitating parties to determine new legitimate foundations/principles for their political and legal structures in order to enable life in dignity for all segments; and identifying reform and action plans for building structural aspects of positive peace; iii) conflict transformation device: by instigating processes to address antagonistic and exclusionary relationships and ensuing incompat­ ibilities and, structural issues. It will seek to arrive at an agreement that will entail action plans for widespread reconciliation and structural transformation processes at the grassroots level.

Bibliography

Primary Sources



Books and Articles

Åkermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997). Adler, Emanuel, “Condition(s) of Peace,” Review of International Studies 24/5 (1998), pp. 165–192. Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1998). Aggestam, Karin, “Recognitional Just Peace,” in (eds.) Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl, Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 34–47. Albin, Cecilia and Daniel Druckman, “Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56/2 (2012), pp. 155–173. Alston, Philip and Gerard Quinn, “The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 9/2 (1987), pp. 157–229. Alvarez, José E., “International Organizations: Then and Now,” AJIL 100/2 (2006), pp. 324–347. Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi and Victoria Stanski, “Conflict Prevention,” in A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconstruction (Pub­ lication of Hunt Alternatives Fund and International Alert, 2004). Available at http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/28_conflict_prevention.pdf. An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed, “Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” in (ed.) Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 19–43. Arbour, Louise, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,” International Law and Politics 40/1 (2007), pp. 1–27. Arbour, Louise, “Next Year’s Wars: Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2012,” Foreign Policy, 27  December 2011. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/ next_years_wars?page=full. Arnson, Cynthia J., “The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate,” in (eds.) Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, c2005), pp. 1–22.

236

Bibliography

Aron, Raymond, Peace & War: A Theory of International Relations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2003). Audard, Catherine, “Peace or Justice? Some Remarks on Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Revue Internationale De Philosophie 60/237 (2006), pp. 301–326. Audard, Catherine, “The Place of Religion in the Political Domain,” in (eds.) James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen, Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 224–246. Axworthy, Lloyd, “Human Security in the R2P Era,” in (eds.) Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 149–158. Azar, Edward, “Protracted Social Conflicts and Second Track Diplomacy,” in (eds.) John L. Davies and Edward Kaufman, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 15–30. Barash, David P.  and Charles P.  Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (London: SAGE Publications, 2009, 2nd edn.). Barry, Brian, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” in (ed.) Chandran Kukathas, John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2003, Volume 4), pp. 341–379. Bates, Ed, “History,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 16–38. Bayer, Reşat, “Peaceful Transitions and Democracy,” Journal of Peace Research 47/5 (2010), pp. 535–546. Bayles, Michael D., Principles of Law: A Normative Analysis (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987). Beck, Lewis W., “Kant and the Right of Revolution,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 32/3 (1971), pp. 411–422. Bell, Christine (2006), Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements (Report of International Council on Human Rights Policy, Versoix, Switzerland. Available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/22/128_report_en.pdf. Bellamy, Alex J., Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (London: Polity, 2009). Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity, 2010, 2nd edn). Bercovitch, Jacob and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). Bohman, James, “Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral Conflict,” Political Theory 23/2 (1995), pp. 253–279. Bohman, James, “Deliberative Toleration,” Political Theory 31/6 (2003), pp. 757–779. Booth, Ken, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). Boulding, Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research 14/1 (1977), pp. 75–86.

Bibliography

237

Boulding, Kenneth E., Stable Peace (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978). Boyle, Kevin, New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford: OUP, 2009). Brown, Chris, “The Construction of a ‘Realistic’ Utopia: John Rawls and International Political Theory,” Review of International Studies 28/1 (2002), pp. 5–21. Brown, David, “Ethnic Conflict and Civic Nationalism,” in (eds.) James L. Peacock, Patricia M. Thornton and Patrick B. Inman, Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). Brown, Michael, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, in (ed.) Michael E. Brown (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996). Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). Burger, Julian, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: From Advocacy to Implementation,” in (eds.) Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki, Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Hart, 2011), pp. 41–60. Byman, Daniel L., Keeping the Peace (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). Byrd, B. Sharon, “The State as a ‘Moral Person’,” in (ed.) Hoke Robinson, Proceedings of the Eight International Kant Congress (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 171–189. Caprioli, Mary, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), pp. 161–178. Carment, David and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003). Casebeer, William D., “Knowing Evil When You See It: Uses for the Rhetoric of Evil in International Relations,” International Relations 18/4 (2004), pp. 441–451. Casper, Gretchen and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, c1996). Cavallar, Georg, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999). Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (New York: CUP, 2013). Chandler, David and Nik Hynek (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011). Chesterman, Simon, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and Interna­ tional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001). Chinkin, Christine, “The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights PostConflict”, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper _Protection_ESCR.pdf. Chinkin, Christine, “Sources,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 103–123.

238

Bibliography

Christia, Fotini, “What Can Civil War Scholars Tell Us about the Syrian Conflict,” POMEPS Studies 5: The Political Science of Syria’s War, 18 December 2013. Available at http://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/POMEPS_Studies5_PoliSciSyria .pdf. Clark, David A., “Capability Approach,” in (ed.) David A. Clark, The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006). Available at http:// economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/14051/1/gprg-wps-032.pdf. Clark, Ian, “How Hierarchical Can International Society be?” International Relations 23/3 (2009), pp. 464–480. Clark, Janine Natalya, “From Negative to Positive Peace: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Journal of Human Rights 8 (2009), pp. 360–384. Clark, Janine Natalya, “Bosnia’s Success Story? Brčko District and the ‘View from Below’,” International Peacekeeping 17/1 (2010), pp. 67–79. Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Cohen, Joshua, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” in (eds.) James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (London: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 407–437. Cohen, Joshua, “Deliberative Democracy,” in (ed.) Shawn Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 2007), pp. 219–236. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefflerr, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), pp. 563–595. Conforti, Benedetto, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, 3rd edn). Cordell, Karl and Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, Responses (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). Cortright, David (ed.), The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). Cortright, David, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). Cortright, David, “New Wars, Old Strategies,” Peace Policy, 10 December 2012. Available at http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2012/12/10/new-wars-old-strategies/#more-1749. Covell, Charles, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998). Cryer, Robert “International Criminal Law,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 540–558. Cunningham, David E., “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 47/2 (2010), pp. 115–127. D’Amato, Anthony (2010), “Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A  Plea for Change of Paradigms,” Faculty Working Papers, Paper 88. Available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/88.

Bibliography

239

D’Estree, Tamra Pearson, “Problem-Solving Approaches,” in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 143–171. Darrow, Mac and Louise Arbour, “The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the United Nations,” American Journal of International Law 103/3 (2009), pp. 446–501. Davenport, Christian, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 44/4 (2007), pp. 485–504. De Roover, Jakob and S.N. Balagangadhara, “John Locke, Christian Liberty, and the Predicament of Liberal Toleration,” Political Theory 36/4, pp. 523–549. De Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford: Hart, 2004). Delahunty, Robert J. and John Yoo, “Kant, Habermas and Democratic Peace,” Chicago Journal of International Law 10/2(2010), pp. 437–473. Delbruck, Jost, “A More Effective International Law or A New “World Law”? Some Aspects of The Development of International Law in A Changing International System,” Indiana Law Journal 68 (1993), pp. 705–735. Donnelly, Jack, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Donnelly, Jack, “Ethics and International Human Rights,” in (eds.) Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, Ethics and International Affairs: Extent and Limits (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 128–161. Donnelly, Jack, in (eds.) Scott Burchill et al, Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 4th edn, 2009). Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013, 3rd edn.). Doyle, Michael W., “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80/4 (1986), pp. 1151–1169. Doyle, Michael W., “Peace, Liberty and Democracy: Realists and Liberals Contest a Legacy,” in (eds.) Micheal Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (New York: OUP, 2000), pp. 21–40. Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Dress, Tobi P., Designing A Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (New York/Geneva: UN, 2005). Available at http://www.unngls.org/orf/Designing%20a%20peacebuilding%20infrastructure .pdf. Dress, Tobi P.  and Gay Rosenblum-Kumar “Deconstructing Prevention: A Systems Approach to Mitigating Violent Conflict,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M.  Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 229–250.

240

Bibliography

Drüke, Luise, “The United Nations in Conflict Prevention,” in (eds.). Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, The Art of Conflict Prevention (London, New York: Brasseys Atlantic Commentaries No. 7, 1994), pp.  22–71. Available at http://www.ipw .uni-hannover.de/fileadmin/politische_wissenschaft/Dateien/luise_druke/un_conflict _prevention.PDF. Dryzek, John S., “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” Political Theory 33/2 (2005), pp. 218–242. Dryzek, John S., “Theory, Evidence, and Tasks of Deliberation,” in (ed.) Shawn Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation, and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007a), pp. 237–250. Dryzek, John S., “Discursive Democracy vs. Liberal Constitutionalism,” in (ed.) Michael Saward, Democracy: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume III (London: Routledge, 2007b), pp. 295–308. Durch, William J., Victoria K. Holt, Caroline Earle and Moira Shanahan, “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003. Dworkin, Ronald, “The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise,” in (eds.) Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald Slye, Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights (London, New Haven: Yale University Press: 1999), pp. 81–115. Eide, Asbjorn, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds.), Economic Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Online: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, 2nd edn.). Elliott, Michael A, “The Institutional Expansion of Human Rights, 1863–2003: A Comprehensive Dataset of International Instruments,” Journal of Peace Research 48/4 (2011), pp. 537–546. Englehart, Neil and Charles Kurzman, “Welcome to World Peace,” Social Forces, 84/4 (2006), pp. 1957–67. Errol, Henderson A., Democracy: The End of an Illusion? (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). Farrall, Jeremy Matam, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). Fassbender, Bardo, “Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control,” European Journal of International Law 11/1 (2000), pp. 219–232. Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97/ 1 (2003), pp. 75–90. Fierke, Karin M., Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). Fisher, Ronald J., Interactive Conflict Resolution (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997). Fisher, Ronald J., “Historical Mapping of the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution,” in (eds.) John L. Davies and Edward Kaufman, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 61–78.

Bibliography

241

Foong Khong, Yuen, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?” Global Governance 7/3 (2001), pp. 231–236. Franceschet, Antonio, “The Politics of Global Legalism and Human Security,” Policy and Society 24/1 (2005), pp. 1–23. Franck, Thomas M., “The United Nations as Guarantor of Peace and Security: Past, Present, Future,” in (ed.) Christian Tomuschat, The United Nations at Age Fifty (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995), pp. 25–38. Franck, Thomas M., Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). Freeman, Samuel Richard, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007). Fremuth, Michael and Jörn Griebel, “On the Security Council as a Legislator: A Blessing or a Curse for the International Community?” Nordic Journal of International Law 76 (2007), 339–361. Gallie, W.B., Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge: CUP, 1978). Galtung, Johan, “An Editorial,” Journal of Peace Research 1/1 (1964), pp. 1–4. Galtung, Johan, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6/3 (1969), pp. 167–191. Gardner, Anne-Marie, “Diagnosing Conflict: What We Know?” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 15–40. Gates, Scott and Kaare Strøm, “Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes,” PRIO Policy Brief, 2007. Available at http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-471960041/ Theoretical_framework_report.pdf. Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Towards a Global Civil Peace,” PRIO Publications, 16 January 2004. Available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital -Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng =en&id=38065. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Jonas Nordkvelle and Håvard Strand, “Peace Research – Just the Study of War?” Journal of Peace Research 51/2 (2014), pp. 145–158. Goldstein, Joshua S., Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (Dutton/Penguin: New York, 2011). Goldstone, Jack A. et al, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54/1 (2010), pp. 190–208. Goodrich, Leland M. and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946, 1st edn.). Goodrich, Leland M., The United Nations (London: Stevens, 1960). Goodrich, Leland M., Edvard Hambro and Anne P.  Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 3rd edn.).

242

Bibliography

Goodrich, Leland M. and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and The Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Menasha, Wisconsin: Georg Banta Publishing, 1955). Gosepath, Stefan, “Equality,” in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2011/entries/equality/. Gray, Christine D., International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: OUP, 2004, 2nd edn.). Gray, John, Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). Gready, Paul and Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (2014), pp. 339–361. Gurr, Ted Robert and John Davies, “Dynamics and Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts,” in (eds.) John L. Davies and Edward Kaufman, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 31–48. Gurr, Ted Robert, “Containing Internal War in the Twenty-First Century,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Oppor­ tunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 41–62. Habermas, Jürgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). Habermas, Jürgen, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, (eds.) Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and James Ron, “Human Rights Institutions: Rhetoric and Efficacy,” Journal of Peace Research 44/4 (2007), pp. 379–383. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most,” Journal of Peace Research 44/4 (2007), pp. 407–425. Harbom, Lotta, Stina Högbladh and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements,” Journal of Peace Research 43/5 (2006), pp. 617–631. Hayden, Patrick, “From Law of Peoples to Perpetual Peace,” International Journal on World Peace 17/2 (2000), pp. 47–62. Hegre, Havard, “Democracy and Armed Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 51/2 (2014), pp. 159–172. Held, David, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2006, 3rd edn.). Henkin, Louis, International Law: Politics and Values (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). Higgins, Rosalyn, “The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council,” American Journal of International Law 64/1 (1970), pp. 1–18. Hilderbrand, Robert C., Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

Bibliography

243

Hinsley, F.H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Plymouth: CUP, 1963). Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, in (ed.) Ian Shapiro (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). Höglund, Kristine and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010), pp. 367–390. Ikenberry, G. John, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Jabri, Vivienne, War and the Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Jackson, Richard, “Constructivism and Conflict Resolution,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 172–190. Jensen, Mark, “The Limits of Practical Possibility,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17/2 (2009), pp. 168–184. Jett, Dennis C., Why Peacekeeping Fails (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000). Johnson, D.H.N., “The Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 4 (1955), pp. 445–468. Johnson, Robert, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition). Available at http://plato.stanford .edu/archives/win2009/entries/kant-moral/. Jutila, Matti, Samu Pehkonen and Tarja Väyrynen, “Resuscitating a Discipline: An Agenda for Critical Peace Research,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 36/3 (2008), pp. 623–640. Kanninen, Tapio and Chetan Kumar, “The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the United Nations System,” in (ed.) B.G. Ramcharan, Conflict Prevention in Practice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), pp. 45–70. Kant, Immanuel, in (trans.) John Ladd, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965). Kant, Immanuel, “The Contest of Faculties,” in (ed.) Hans Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991). Kant, Immanuel, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in (ed.) H. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991). Kant, Immanuel, “Metaphysics of Morals,” in (ed.) H. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991). Kant, Immanuel, in (ed.) Mary Gregor Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

244

Bibliography

Kant, Immanuel, in (ed. and trans.) Allen W. Wood, Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2002). Kelman, Herbert C., “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Ending Violent Conflict Between Identity Groups,” Landscapes of Violence 1/1 (2010), pp.  1–9. Available at http://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol1/ iss1/5. Kelsen, Hans, “Quincy Wright’s A Study of War and the Bellum Justum Theory,” Ethics 53/3 (1943), pp. 208–211. Kelsen, Hans, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1944). Kelsen, Hans, “The Old and the New League: The Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,” American Journal of International Law 39/1 (1945), pp. 45–83. Kelsen, Hans, “Collective Security and Collective Self-defense under the Charter of the United Nations,” American Journal of International Law 42/4 (Oct., 1948), pp. 783–796. Kelsen, Hans, The Law of The United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (London: Stevens and Sons, 1950). Kerr, Pauline, “Human Security,” in (ed.) Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 91–108. Kinsella David and Rousseau, David L., “Democracy and Conflict Resolution,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 475–491. Kleingeld, Pauline, “Kant’s Theory of Peace,” in Paul Guyer (ed.) Kant and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2006). Klusmeyer, Douglas, “Hannah Arendt’s Critical Realism: Power, Justice, and Responsibility,” in (eds.) Anthony F. Lang Jr. and John Williams, Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 113–178. Koubi, Vally and Tobias Böhmelt, “Grievances, Economic Wealth, and Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research (Online version, 30 October 2013). Kratochwil, Friedrich V., Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in international Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: CUP, 1989). Krain, Matthew, “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides,” International Studies Quarterly 49/3 (2005), pp. 363–387. Krause, Keith, “Critical Perspectives on Human Security,” in (eds.) Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 76–94. Kriesberg, Louis (2011), “The State of the Art in Conflict Transformation,” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, pp. 49–73. Available at http://www.berghof -handbook.net/documents/publications/kriesberg_handbook.pdf.

Bibliography

245

Kunz, Josef L., “Individual and Collective Self-defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,” American Journal of International Law 41/4 (1947), pp. 872–879. Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1996). Lailach, Martin, Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1998). Leader, Sheldon, “Toleration without Liberal Foundations,” Ratio Juris 10/2 (1997), pp. 139–164. Lederach, John Paul, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997). Lederach, John Paul, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (PA: Good Books, 2003). Lederach, John Paul, “Foreword,” Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation, 2011a. Available at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/foreword _handbookII.pdf. Lederach, John Paul, Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding, Life & Peace Institute Report, 2011b. Available at http://peacepolicy.files.wordpress .com/2012/01/somalia_book.pdf. Lederach, John Paul and R. Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 19–44. Luard, Evan, The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does (London: Macmillan, 1979). Luck, Edward C., “Prevention: Theory and Practice,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 251–271. Luck, Edward C., “A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today,” in (eds.) Vaughan Lowe et al, The United Nations Security Council and War (New York: OUP, 2008), pp. 61–85. Lund, Michael S., “Conflict Prevention is Happening,” in (eds.) David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel, Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, c2004), Volume 1, pp. 289–304. Lund, Michael S., “Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 287–321. Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver P Richmond, “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace,” Third World Quarterly 34/5 (2013), 763–783. Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, (trans.) Tim Parks (London: Penguin, 2011). Mack, Andrew, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, March 2007.

246

Bibliography

Available at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/cwc_working_paper _political_violence_am.pdf. Mani, Rama, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention,” in (eds.) Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 300–322. Manusama, Kenneth, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006). Marks, Stephen P., “Poverty,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 602–621. Marks, Susan, “International Law, Democracy and the End of History,” in (eds.) Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 532–566. Marshall, Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility, Center for Systemic Peace, 23 July 2014. Available at www .systemicpeace.org. Marten, Kimberly Zisk, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Martenczuk, Bernd, “The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?” European Journal of International Law 10/3 (1999), pp. 517–547. McCormack, Tara, “The Limits to Emancipation in the Human Security Framework,” in (eds.) Nik Hynek and David Chandler, Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 99–113. McDonald, John W., “The Need for Multi-track Diplomacy,” in (eds.) John L. Davies and Edward Kaufman, Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 49–60. McGill, V.J., “Conflicting Theories of Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20/4 (1960), pp. 437–452. McKinlay, R.D. and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order (London: F. Pinter Publishers, 1986). Mearsheimer, John J. (1990), “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” in (eds.) Michael Brown et al, Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 3–54. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95), “The False Promise of International Institutions,” in (eds.) Michael Brown et al, Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 329–383. Mearsheimer, John J. (1995), “A Realist Reply,” in (eds.) Michael Brown et al, Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 427–438.

Bibliography

247

Megret, Frederic, in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 124–149. Mendelberg, Tali and Christopher Karpowitz, “How People Deliberate about Justice: Groups, Gender, and Decision Rules,” in (ed.) Shawn W. Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 101–129. Miall, Hugh (2004), “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-dimensional Task,” in (eds.) Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook. Available at http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/ redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/miall_handbook.pdf. Mitchell, Christopher R. (2011), “Conflict, Change and Conflict Resolution,” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Available at http://www.berghof-handbook .net/documents/publications/mitchell_handbookII.pdf. Mikulaschek, Christoph and Paul Romita (rapporteurs), Conflict Prevention: Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies (New York: International Peace Institute, December 2011). Available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/ 6544~v~Conflict_Prevention__Toward_More_Effective_Multilateral_Strategies.pdf. Moeckli, Daniel, “Equality and Non-discrimination,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 189–208. Moore, John Allphin Jr. and Jerry Pubantz, Encyclopedia of the United Nations, Volume 1 (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2nd edn., 2008). Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 7th edn., 2006). Mulholland, Leslie Arthur, Kant’s System of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Neuhold, Hanspeter, “Threat to Peace,” in (dir.) Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992). Newman, Edward, “Peacebuilding as Security in ‘Failing’ and Conflict-Prone States,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4/3 (2010), pp. 305–322. Newman, Edward, “A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda,” Third World Quarterly 32/10 (2011), pp. 1737–1756. Norman, Richard, The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn., 1998). Nussbaum, Martha C., “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review 66 (1997–1998), pp. 273–300. Nussbaum, Martha C., “Rawls’s Political Liberalism. A Reassessment,” Ratio Juris 24/1 (2011), pp. 1–24. O’Flynn, Ian, Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).

248

Bibliography

Öberg, Magnus, Frida Möller and Peter Wallensteen, “Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises, 1990–98: A New Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26/1(2009), pp. 67–91. Orend, Brian, “Kant on International Law and Armed Conflict,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 11 (1998), pp. 329–381. Orend, Brian, “Kant’s Just War Theory,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37(1999a), pp. 323–353. Orend, Brian, “Terminating Wars and Establishing Global Governance,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 12 (1999b), pp. 253–295. Ostby, Gudrun, “Inequalities, the Political Environment and Civil Conflict: Evidence from 55 Developing Countries,” in (ed.) Frances Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (NY: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 136–159. Owen, John M., “International Law and the ‘Liberal Peace’,” in (eds.) Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). Pangle, Thomas L. and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1999). Paris, Roland, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP, 2004a). Paris, Roland “Still an Inscrutable Concept,” Security Dialogue 35/3 (2004b), pp. 370–372. Paris, Roland, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies, 36/2 (2010), pp. 337–365. Parlevliet, Michelle (2010), “Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective,” Berghof Handbook for Dialogue No. 9. Available at http://www.berghof -handbook.net/documents/publications/parlevliet_handbook.pdf. Pasqualucci, Jo M., “The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 31/1 (2008), pp. 1–32. Peacock, James L., Patricia M. Thornton and Patrick B. Inman (eds.), Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). Peck, Connie, The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996). Peck, Connie, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998). Peck, Connie, “United Nations Mediation Experience: Practical Lessons for Conflict Resolution,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 413–433.

Bibliography

249

Philpott, Daniel, “Reconciliation: An Ethic for Peacebuilding,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 91–118. Pojman, Louis P., “Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 36 /1 (Spring 2005), pp. 62–71. Polat, Necati, “International Law, the Inherent Instability of the International System, and International Violence,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19/1 (1999), pp. 51–70. Pospieszna, Paulina and Gerald Schneider, “Power Sharing Provisions and Long-Term Success of Mediation in Internal Conflicts,” APSA, 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Ramcharan, Bertrand G., “Norms and Machinery,” in (eds.) Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 439–462. Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolu­ tion: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity, 2011, 3rd edn.). Randelzhofer, Albrecht, “Purposes and Principles of the UN,” in (ed.) Rüdiger Wolfrum, United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Volume 2, 1995). Randelzhofer, Albrecht, “Art 2(4),” in (ed.) Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn., 2002). Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Rawls, John, “Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy 92/3 (1995), pp. 132–180. Rawls, John, “Postscript,” in (eds.) James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1997), pp. 131–143. Rawls, John, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). Rawls, John, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001). Rees, E.A., Political Thought from Machiavelli to Stalin: Revolutionary Machiavellism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Reisman, W. Michael, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” in (eds.) Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and Inter­ national Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 239–258. Richmond, Oliver, “Conclusion: Strategic Peacebuilding beyond the Liberal Peace,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 353–368. Richmond, Oliver, “Post-colonial Hybridity and the Return of Human Security,” in (eds.) Nik Hynek and David Chandler, Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 43–55.

250

Bibliography

Richmond, Oliver P., “UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus,” International Peacekeeping 11/1 (2004), pp. 83–101. Richmond, Oliver P., Peace in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008). Richmond, Oliver P., “A Post-liberal Peace: Eirenism and The Everyday,” Review of International Studies 35/03 (2009), pp. 557–580. Roberts, Adam, “Just Peace: A Cause Worth Fighting For,” in (eds.) Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, What is a Just Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 52–89. Roberts, David, “Post-conflict Statebuilding and State Legitimacy: From Negative to Positive Peace?” Development and Change 39/4 (2008), pp. 537–555. Roberts, David, “Human Security, Biopoverty and the Possibility for Emancipation,” in (eds.) Nik Hynek and David Chandler, Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011a), pp. 69–82. Roberts, David, “Beyond the Metropolis? Popular Peace and Post-conflict Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 37/5 (2011b), pp. 2535–2556. Roche, Douglas, The Human Right to Peace (Ottowa: Novalis, 2003). Rosenberg, Shawn W. (ed.), Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). Rosoux, Valerie, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 543–563. Rothchild, Donald, “Ethnicity, Negotiation, and Conflict Management,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 246–263. Rothman, Jay, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997). Rothman, Jay and Marie L. Olson, “From Interest to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research 38/3 (2001), pp. 289–305. Rummel, Rudolph J., Understanding Conflict and War (London: Sage Publications, 1981). Rumpf, Helmut, “The Concepts of Peace and War in International Law,” The German Yearbook of International Law 27 (1984), pp. 431–443. Russell, Ruth B., A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940–1945 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958). Russell, Ruth B., The United Nations and United States Security Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968). Russett, Bruce, Starr, Harvey and Kinsella David, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2006). Ryan, Stephen, “The Evolution of Peacebuilding,” in (ed.) Roger Mac Ginty, Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 25–35.

Bibliography

251

Sambanis, Nicolas, “How Strategic Is UN Peacebuilding?” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 141–168. Saunders, Harold H., “Dialogue as a Process for Transforming Relationships,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 376–391. Schachter, Oscar, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,” AJIL 77/4(1983), pp. 848–854. Scheuerman, William E., “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond,” in (ed.) Michael C. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 62–92. Schmidt, Brian C., “Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations,” in (eds.) Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams, Power in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2007), 43–63. Schmidt, Markus, “United Nations,” in (eds.) Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran and David Harris, International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 391–432. Schmitt, Carl, in (trans.) George Schwab, The Concept of the Political (London: The University of Chicago, expanded edn., 2007). Schott, Jared, “Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency,” Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 6/1 (2007), pp. 24–80. Schweigman, David, The Authority of the Security Council under The Chapter VII of the UN Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). Seaman, John W., “Thomas Paine: Ransom, Civil Peace, and the Natural Right to Welfare,” Political Theory, 16/1 (1988), pp. 120–142. Sen, Amartya “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32/4 (2004), pp. 314–356. Shani, Giorgio, “Securitizing ‘bare life’: Critical Perspectives on Human Security Discourse,” in (eds.) David Chandler and Nik Hynek, Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 56–69. Shue, Henry, “Rawls and the Outlaws,” Politics Philosophy Economics 1/3 (2002), pp. 307–323. Simpson, Gerry, “Two Liberalisms,” EJIL 12/3 (2001), pp. 537–572. Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform,” AJIL 99/3 (2005), pp. 619–631. Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “International Relations, Principal Theories,” in (ed.) R. Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011). Stahn, Carsten, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” AJIL 101/1 (2007), pp. 99–120.

252

Bibliography

Steiner, Henry J. and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2000, 2nd edn.). Stewart, Frances, “Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 105–138. Stewart, Frances (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (NY: Palgrave, 2008). Stewart, Frances (2010), “Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict: A Review of CRISE Findings.” Available at http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/OV1.pdf. Sützl, Wolfgang, “The Weak Subject: Peace and Nihilism Reconsidered,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 29/4 (2003), pp. 407–425. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas and Gregory F. Treverton, “The Calm before the Storm: Why Volatility Signals Stability, and Vice Versa,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2015). Tan, Kok-Chor, “The Problem of Decent Peoples,” in (eds.) Rex Martin and David A. Reidy, Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 76–94. Teson, Fernando R., “The Kantian Theory of International Law,” Columbia Law Review 92/53 (1992), pp. 52–102. Teson, Fernando R., “The Rawlsian Theory of International Law,” Ethics & International Affairs 9/1 (1995), pp. 79–99. Teson, Fernando R., A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). Themnér, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2010,” Journal of Peace Research 48/4 (July 2011), pp. 525–536. Themnér, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011,” Journal of Peace Research 49/4 (July 2012), pp. 565–575. Themnér, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2012,” Journal of Peace Research, Online version (1 July 2013), pp. 1–13. Thoms, Oskar N.T. and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?” Human Rights Quarterly 29/3 (2007), pp. 674–705. The United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco [UNCIO], Volumes 1, 3, 6, 11, 17. Turner, Mandy, Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, “Institutionalised and Co-Opted: Why Human Security Has Lost Its Way,” in (eds.) Nik Hynek and David Chandler, Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 85, 93. Vite, Sylvain, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations,” International Review of the Red Cross 91/873 (2009), pp. 69–94. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf. Waldron, Jeremy, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review 109/7 (1996), pp. 1535–1566.

Bibliography

253

Waldron, Jeremy, “Deliberation, Disagreement, and Voting,” in (eds.) Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald C. Slye, Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights (London, New Haven: Yale University Press: 1999), pp. 210–226. Wallensteen, Peter, “Reassessing Recent Conflicts: Direct vs. Structural Prevention,” in (eds.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 213–228. Wallensteen, Peter, “Strategic Peacebuilding: Concepts and Challenges,” in (eds.) Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers, Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 45–64. Wallensteen, Peter, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System (London: SAGE, 2012, 3rd edn.). Wallensteen, Peter and Frida Möller (2003), “Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown.” Available at http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18589_ UPRP_No_7.pdf. Walsh, Katherine Cramer, “The Democratic Potential of Civic Dialogue” in (ed.) Shawn Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation, and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 2007), pp. 45–63. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1988), “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in (ed.) Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 56–66. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1990), “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” in (ed.) Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 67–82. Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000), “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” in (ed.) Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 197–229. Waltz, Kenneth N. (2002), “The Continuity of International Politics,” in (ed.) Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 246–250. Warren, Mark E., “Institutionalizing Deliberative Democracy,” in (ed.) Shawn Rosenberg, Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 2007), pp. 272–288. Webel, Charles and Johan Galtung, Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London: Routledge, 2007). Weiss, Thomas G., David P.  Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2004, 4th edn.). Welch, David A., “Morality and ‘the National Interest’,” in (ed.) Andrew Valls, Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2000). Western, Jon and Joshua S. Goldstein, “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons from Somalia to Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90/6 (November/December 2011), pp. 48–59.

254

Bibliography

White, Nigel D., Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). White, Nigel D., The United Nations System: Toward International Justice (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). Williams, Howard, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1983). Wood, Allan W., “The Supreme Principle of Morality,” in (ed.) Paul Guyer, Kant and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), pp. 342–380. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn., 1965). Yamashita, Hikaru, “Reading ‘Threats to International Peace and Security’, 1946–2005,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 18/3 (2007), pp. 551–572. Young, Iris Marion, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2000). Zartman, I. William, “Conflict Resolution and Negotiation,” in (eds.) Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), pp. 322–339. Zartman, I. William and Mark Anstey, “The Problem: Preventing Identity Conflicts and Genocide,” in (eds.) Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts and I. William Zartman, The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder (Oxford: OUP, 2012a), pp. 3–34. Zartman, I. William and Mark Anstey, “Lessons for Practice,” in (eds.) Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts and I. William Zartman, The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder (Oxford: OUP, 2012b), pp. 377–390. Zaum, Dominik, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution,” in (eds.) Vaughan Lowe et al, The United Nations Security Council and War (New York: OUP, 2008), pp. 154–174. Zenko, Micah and Rebecca R. Friedman, “UN Early Warning for Preventing Conflict,” International Peacekeeping 18/1 (2011), pp. 21–37.



Documents of the United Nations and Other International Organisations

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters, The Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992. Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué, 30 June 2012. Available at http://www.un .org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf. Capstone Doctrine: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, UN DPKO, 18 January 2008. Available at http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices .unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2(1) of the ICESCR), E/1991/23, 14 December 1990. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: Nondiscrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2, para. 2 of the ICESCR), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009.

Bibliography

255

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/47/135, 18 December 1992. “Developing a Strategic Framework for UNDESA’s Work on Peacebuilding: A Plan of Action,” Report of UNDESA Task Force on Peacebuilding and Development, 8 April 2008. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/UNDESAPoA8April.pdf. Draft Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia, PBC/4/LBR/L.1, 29 October 2010 Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2009/189, 8 April 2009. Fact Sheet No 2, The International Bill of Human Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 1996. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf. Factsheet, Work and Structure of the Human Rights Council. Available at http://www2 .ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/FACTSHEET_OUTCOMES_FINAL.pdf. Guidance Note of The Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010. Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, UN Publication, 1992, OLA/COD/2394. Available at http://www.un.org/law/books/HandbookOnPSD.pdf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 06: The Right to Life (Art. 6), 30 April 1982. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, HRI/GEN/1/ Rev.1, 10 November 1989. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677, 12 January 2009. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Opinion Paper, March 2008. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed -­conflict.pdf. International Labour Organisation, ILO Convention No. 169: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 27 June 1989. Inventory of Human Rights and Transitional Justice Aspects of Recent Peace Agreements, A/HRC/12/18/Add.1, 21 August 2009. OSCE, Factsheet, August 2008, Available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/33317? download=true. “OHCHR’s Approach to Field Work,” OHCHR Report, 2011. Available at http://www2 .ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/allegati/ downloads/5_OHCHR_in_the_field.pdf. Peacebuilding Orientation Brochure, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf.

256

Bibliography

“Preventing Crisis Enabling Recovery,” Annual Report 2011, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/ library/crisis%20prevention/BCPRAR2011_final.pdf. Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive Summary (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997). Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/985-S/ 2001/574, 7 June 2001. Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2011/552, 26 August 2011. Progress Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/60/891, 18 July 2006. Promotion of the Right to Peace, Human Rights Council Resolution, UN Doc. A/HRC/ RES/23/16, 24 June 2013. Proposed Strategic Framework for the Period 2006–2007, UN Doc. A/59/6 (Prog. 7), 29 April 2004. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of the Disputes (Chapter VI), 1989–1992. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/ 89-92_10.pdf. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of the Disputes (Chapter VI), 1996–1999. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/96-99/ 96-99_10.pdf#page=34. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of Disputes (Chapter VI), Supplement 2004–2007. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/­ repertoire/2004-2007/04-07_10.pdf. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Pacific Settlements of the Disputes (Chapter VI), 2008–2009. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2008-2009/ Part%20VI/08-09_PartVI.pdf. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Art. 55, vol. III, United Nations Treaty Collection. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art55/english/rep _orig_vol3-art55_e.pdf. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review for Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc. A/HRC/16/15, 12 November 2010. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review for Syria, UN Doc. A/ HRC/19/11, 11 October 2011. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review for Bahrain, UN Doc. A/ HRC/21/6/Add.1, 13 September 2012. Report on Supporting Democratic Transition In Tunisia, UNDP, July 2011. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/ DG%20Fast%20Facts/Fast%20Facts%20UNDP%20Tunisia.pdf.

Bibliography

257

Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004. Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, 3 December 2007, PBC/2/SLE/1. Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea between the Govern­ ment of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission, PBC/5/GUI/2, 23 September 2011. Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, PBC/1/BDI/4, 22 June 2007. Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, PBC/3/GNB/3, 31 July 2008. Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic, PBC/3/CAF/7, 9 June 2009. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871, 13 April 1998. “The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination in the Administration of Justice,” in Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual On Human Rights For Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, OHCHR Publication, 2003. Available at http:// www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter13en.pdf. The Statement of the GA President, the International Istanbul Conference on “Enhancing Peace Through Mediation: New Actors, Fresh Approaches, Bold Initiatives,” New York, 25 February 2012. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/ president/66/statements/istanbul250212.shtml. The Summary of the Informal Discussion on “United Nations Mediation: Experiences and Reflections from the Field,” 9 November 2011. Available at http://www.un.org/ en/ga/president/66/Letters/PDF/Mediation%20Summary%20-%2023%20 November%202011.pdf. The Summary Report of “Fostering Cross-Cultural Understanding for Building Peaceful and Inclusive Societies,” event by the GA President in collaboration with the UN Alliance of Civilizations, on 22 March 2012. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/ president/66/Letters/PDF/Alliance%20of%20Civilizations%20Thank%20You%20 -%20MS.pdf. “The UN Mapping of Exercise on Activities of UN Entities in Conflict Situations,” November 2004. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/map-UN-system .pdf. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/ reports/global/hdr1994/. UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2011 Annual Report. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/ BCPRAR2011_final.pdf. UNESCO Seville Declaration on Violence, 1986. Available at http://www.unesco.org/ cpp/uk/declarations/seville.pdf.

258

Bibliography

UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V), Uniting for Peace, 3 November 1950. UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970. UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, 14 December 1974. UN General Assembly Resolution 48/141, High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, 20 December 1993. UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 September 2000. UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005, 24 October 2005. UN General Assembly Resolution 60/180, The Peacebuilding Commission, 30 December 2005. UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251, Human Rights Council, 15 March 2006. UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007. UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, 28 July 2011. UN Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, Institution-Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 18 June 2007. UN Human Rights Council Resolution, A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, The Current Human Rights Situation in The Syrian Arab Republic in the Context of Recent Events, 29 April 2011. UN Human Rights Council Resolution, A/HRC/20/L.16, United Nations Declaration on the Right to Peace, 29 June 2012. UN Security Council Press Release, “Security Council Fails To Adopt Draft Resolution On Myanmar, Owing To Negative Votes By China, Russian Federation,” SC/8939, 12 January 2007. Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc .htm. UN Security Council Press Release, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan,” SC/10536, 4 February 2012. Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2012/sc10536.doc.htm. UN Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation, OHCHR Publication (2010). Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ MinorityRights_en.pdf. UN Security Council, Resolution 794, UN Doc. S/RES/794, 3 December 1992. UN Security Council, Resolution 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011. UN Security Council, Resolution 1975, UN Doc. S/RES/1975, 30 March 2011. UN Security Council, Resolution 2171, UN Doc. S/RES/2171, 21 August 2014. UN Security Council Report, 6479th SC Meeting, S/PV.6479, 11 February 2011.

Bibliography



International Cases and Decisions



International Instruments

259

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) ( Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006). Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports 1970. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Judgment (27 June 1986), Merits. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/49/5259 .pdf. Indigenous Community Yakye Axa Case vs. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), No. 18 (2003). Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment (Jul. 20, 2012). Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064 .pdf. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic – Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 – A, “Appeals Judgement,” 12 June 2002. Available at http:// www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp34-e/kunarac.htm. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction [Tadic case]. Villagrin-Morales et al. Case (The “Street Children” Case) vs. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, at 144 (Nov. 19, 1999), (Cancado Trindade and Abreu Burelli, concurring at 4).

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted by Organisation of African Unity on 27 June 1981 and entered into force 21 October 1986). Charter of the UN (Adopted by the World Health Assembly on 22 July 1946 and entered into force on 7 April 1948). ILO Convention No. 169: Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 27 June 1989. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976) [ICCPR]. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]. The Geneva Conventions of 1949. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm.

260

Bibliography

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Available at http:// untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948.



Online Sources and Websites

Annan, Kofi, “My Departing Advice on How to Save Syria,” Financial Times, 2 August 2012. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b00b6ed4-dbc9-11e1-8d78-00144feab49a .html#axzz22TzdejDz. Background Information on the Human Rights Council, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx. BBC Report, “Syria Envoy Says Assad Resignation Is Up for Discussion,” 22 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19329637. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Available at http://www.berghof -handbook.net/dialogue-series/. Bowen, Jeremy (13 December 2012), “Bahrain Tensions a Trigger for Gulf turmoil.” Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20606069. Busan Outcome Document of Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 1 December 2011. Available at http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/outcome_documen t_-_final_en_.pdf. Correlates of War Project. Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Friedman, Michael, “Redlines and the Problems of Intervention in Syria,” Stratfor, 30 April 2013. Available at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/redlines-and-problems -intervention-syria?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm _campaign=20130430&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=9206d2 11989542439592b3c97e17a55c. Global Witness, Information on Conflict Minerals. Available at http://www.globalwitness .org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-minerals. Gordon, Michael R., “Syrian Opposition to Sit Out Any Talks Unless Arms Are Sent, General Says,” The New York Times, 8 June 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes .com/2013/06/09/world/middleeast/syria-opposition-wont-attend-talks-unless -rebels-get-arms-commander-says.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. HRW News Report on the Response of the HRC to the Bahraini situation, http://www .hrw.org/news/2012/06/28/un-human-rights-council-strong-message-bahrain-abuses. Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review recommendations accepted by Ivory Coast. Available at http://upr-epu.com/ENG/country.php?id=140. Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review recommendations accepted by Libya. Available at http://upr-epu.com/ENG/country.php?id=190. “International: Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco,” Time Magazine, 30 April 1945. Available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,797395,00 .html.

Bibliography

261

International Crisis Group, Report on Sierra Leone, No. 49, 15 Jul 2002. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/049-sierra -leone-after-elections-politics-as-usual.aspx. International Crisis Group, Report on Uganda, No. 187, April 2012. Available at http:// www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/187-uganda-no -resolution-to-growing-tensions.aspx. Kaplan, Robert D. (25 July 2012), “Good Mideast Dictators,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor .com/weekly/good-mideast-dictators. Katzman, Kenneth (13 September 2013), “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy.” Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf. Pinker, Steven and Andrew Mack (22 December 2014), “The World Is Not Falling Apart,” Slate Magazine. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ foreigners/2014/12/the_world_is_not_falling_apart_the_trend_lines_reveal_an _increasingly_peaceful.single.html. PRIO (The Peace Research Institute Oslo), Civil Peace Working Group webpage. Available at http://www.prio.no/Working-Groups/Group/?x=8. Ploughshares, Program on Armed Conflicts. Available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/. Reference Documents on the Culture of Peace. Available at http://www3.unesco.org/ iycp/uk/uk_sum_refdoc.htm. Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, http://www.bici.org.bh/. For a brief account see also, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/world/middleeast/report -details-excessive-force-used-against-bahrain-protests.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. Roach, Morgan, “Treat Bahrain Like an Ally,” The New York Times, 30 May 2012. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/29/nudging-bahrain-without -pushing-it-away/treat-bahrain-like-an-ally. The Center for Systemic Peace. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/index.html; The Polity IV Project. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. The Commission on Human Security, Final Report: Human Security Now, 2003. Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C 6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf. The Excerpt from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Message to the US Congress on January 6, 1941. Available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/ word_document/pres_roosevelts_address.txt. The Fragile States Principles (FSPs), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop­ ment (OECD), 2007. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/13/47278529 .pdf. The IDEA Handbook Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 2003. Available at http:// www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Reconciliation-After-Violent-Conflict-A -Handbook-Full-English-PDF.pdf. The International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/.

262

Bibliography

The Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Repara­ tion and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Mandate.aspx. The Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates and Activities, http:// www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx. The Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Work in the Field, http://www .ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/WorkInField.aspx. The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict, UN General Assembly website. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/62/plenary/diamonds/bkg.shtml. The Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect,” 2001. Available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ ICISS%20Report.pdf. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Definitions. Available at http://www.pcr .uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Press Release, 17.06.2015, “Global Conflicts on the Rise.” Available at http://www.uu.se/en/research/news/article/?id=4906&ar ea=2%2c6%2c10%2c16%2c25&typ=artikel&lang=en. The US President Obama’s speech at the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 2011. Available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/ gastatements/66/US_en.pdf, and also http://gadebate.un.org/66/united-states-america. Tomuschat, Christian, The United Nations General Assembly Resolution for United for Peace. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), The Division for Social Policy and Development, http://social.un.org/index/SocialIntegration/ Definition.aspx. United Nations, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), http://www.un.org/wcm/content/ site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking. UNDP (UN Development Program), Human Development Indices, http://hdr.undp .org/en/statistics/understanding/indices/. UNDP Human Development Report, Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ihdi/. United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/ pbso/pbun.shtml. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/. United Nations, Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/ pkmandates.shtml. United Nations, Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/­ principles.shtml. United Nations, Peacekeeping Missions, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ unmil/facts.shtml.

Bibliography

263

United Nations, The Rule of Law, Transitional Justice, http://www.unrol.org/article .aspx?article_id=29. United States Institute of Peace, Glossary, http://glossary.usip.org/resource/ tracks-diplomacy. United States Institute of Peace, Insights Newsletter, 25 November 2014. Available at www.usip.org/publications/fall-2014-insights-newsletter-reconciliation. UPR Info website, http://www.upr-info.org/. Vision of Humanity, The Global Peace Index,The Institute for Economics and Peace http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index. Wilson’s Fourteen Points http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/FourteenPoints. “World Report Chapter: Guinea,” Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011. Available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-chapter-guinea. World Conference on Human Rights, 14–25 June 1993 and Vienna Declaration, http:// www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx.



Limited List of Secondary Sources

Adler, Mortimer J., How to Think about War and Peace (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1944 [c1996]). Allott, Philip, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Archibugi, Daniele, “Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace,” EJIL 1/4 (1995), pp. 429–456. Archibugi, Daniele, “So What If Democracies Don’t Fight Each Other,” Peace Review 9/3 (1997), pp. 379–384. Archibugi, Daniele and Raffaele Marchetti, “Democratic Ethics and UN Reform,” in (ed.) Franceschet Antonio, The Ethics of Global Governance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 51–66. Arendt, Hannah, On Violence (London: Allen Lane, 1970). Baldwin, Clive, Chris Chapman and Zoë Gray (17 May 2007), “Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention.” Available at http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=1198. Bay, Christian, “Positive Peace and Rational Human Rights Priorities,” Security Dialogue 10/2 (1979), pp. 160–171. Beck, Lewis W., “Kant and the Right of Revolution,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 32/3 (1971), pp. 411–422. Beetham, David, Democracy: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005). Brown, Garrett Wallace and David Held, Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). Burchill, Scott et al, Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 4th edn., 2009).

264

Bibliography

Çandar, Cengiz (July 2011), “Dağdan İniş-PKK Nasıl Silah Bırakır: Kürt Sorunu’nun Şiddetten Arındırılması,” TESEV Yayınları. Available at http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/ Publication/674c1f00-fc7f-4f91-b2e4-2ef8d91f1815/11452%20SilahsizlandirmaWEB .pdf. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Perspectives on Peace 1910–1960 (London, Stevens, 1960). Chambers, Simone, Deliberative Democratic Theory, Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003), pp. 307–326. Cozette, Murielle, “Realistic Realism? American Political Realism, Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on the Problem of Means and Ends in International Politics,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 27/3 (2004), pp. 428–453. Dahl, Robert A., Democracy, Liberty, and Equality (London: Norwegian University Press, 1986). Delsol, Chantal, Unjust Justice: Against the Tyranny of International Law, (trans.) with an introduction by Paul Seaton (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2008). Donohue, William A., “The Identity Trap: Managing Paradox in Crisis Bargaining,” in (eds.) Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts and I. William Zartman, The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 55–71. Dower, Nigel, The Ethics of War and Peace (Cambridge: Polity, 2009). Forsythe, David P., Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993). Forsythe, David P., “Peace and Human Rights,” in (ed.) David P. Forsythe, Encyclopedia of Human Rights (e-reference edition: OUP, 2009). Fung, Archon “Deliberation before The Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” Political Theory 33/2 (2005), pp. 397–419. Galtung, Johan, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage, 1996). Galtung, Johan “Local Authorities as Peace Factors/Actors/Workers,” Journal of WorldSystems Research 4/3 (2000), pp. 860–872. Habermas, Jürgen, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight,” in (eds.) James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Perpet­ ual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (London: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 113–155. Held, David and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), Global Governance and Public Accountability (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005). Hobson, Christopher, “Towards a Critical Theory of Democratic Peace,” Review of International Studies 37/4(2011), pp. 1903–1922. Höffe, Otfried, Political Justice: Foundations for a Critical Philosophy of Law and the State, (trans.) Jeffrey C. Cohen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

Bibliography

265

Johnston, David, The Idea of a Liberal Theory: A Critique and Reconstruction (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). Kennedy, David “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002), pp. 101–125. KingMartin Luther Jr., 1967, Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). Klabbers, Jan, “Reflections on the Politics of Institutional Reform,” in (eds.) Peter Danchin and Horst Fisher, United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), pp. 76–93. Kreide, Regina, “Preventing Military Humanitarian Intervention? John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on a Just Global Order,” German Law Journal 10 (2009), pp. 93–114. Available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1079. Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). Owen, Taylor, “Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security,” Disarmament Forum 3(2004), pp.  15–24. Available at http://www.unidir .org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2138.pdf. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, original edn.). Rodin, David, War and Self-defense (Oxford: OUP, 2002). Rostbøll, Christian F., “Emancipation or Accommodation? Habermasian vs. Rawlsian Deliberative Democracy,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 34/7 (2008), pp. 707–736. Saner, Hans, Kant’s Political Thought: Its Origins and Development (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973). Saward, Michael, Democracy: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume IV (London: Routledge, 2007). Schwelb, Egon, “The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter,” AJIL 66 (1972), pp. 337–351. Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009). Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.), The Quest for Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War among Societies, Cultures and States (London: Sage, 1987). Wallerstein, Immanuel, “Cultures in Conflict? Who are We? Who are the Others?” Journal of the Interdisciplinary Crossroads 1/3 (December, 2004), pp. 505–521. Westphal, Kenneth R., “Kant on the State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged ‘Anti-revolutionary’ Writings,” Journal of Philosophical Research 17 (1992), pp. 383–426.

Index Afghanistan 86n196, 87, 88, 91 Agenda for Peace 168 anarchy realist conception of 15, 16, 19 Angola 76, 192 An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed 65n87, 92, 93 Arab Spring 44, 88, 140, 206, 213, 220 Arendt, Hannah 20 appeasement policy 48, 66 armed conflict/violence 3, 115 causes of (See also causes of armed conflicts) 5, 88, 116, 117 civil war 74, 115 inter-communal 115, 116 international 83n177, 84 internationalized 85, 88 intra-state 3, 84, 115 low/high-intensity 116 non-international 3n5, 115 prevention 87, 121 protracted 115, 119 and relapses 87, 182 trends 84 uprising/revolution 115 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 3 Aron, Raymond 16, 35, 37, 141 Atlantic Charter 80 Azar, Edward 115, 118 human needs 118 protracted social conflicts 115, 118 Bahrain 135, 140, 141, 172, 176, 195–197, 206–207, 230 Bercovitch, Jacob 205, 218 Brown, Michael 118 Bohman, James 201, 221 Bosnia and Herzegovina 88, 95 Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) 95 bottom-up approach 71, 186n91 Burundi 94, 185n88, 192 Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (bcpr) 180, 186, 192, 194, 197–198 versus dpp 198 Categorical Imperative See Kant

causes of armed conflict 5, 88, 116, 117, 117n65, 119, 121 and Fundamental Conflicts 121, 122, 208 greed 117, 118, 119 grievance 117, 118 See Horizontal Inequalities proximate/trigger/immediate/ peripheral 116, 121, 152–153, 181 root 119, 120–121, 122, 123, 140, 181, 203 structural/underlying 116, 117, 223 Charter of United Nations Chapter vi 56, 59, 62, 79, 80–82, 138, 169 Chapter vii 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 79, 82 non-discrimination 147–148 non-intervention/interference 52, 63, 80, 138–139 Preamble 59, 66, 74, 159n99 territorial integrity or political independence 58, 80 threat to peace 55, 58, 76n, use of force 49, 52, 58, 74, 77, 80, 96 See also United Nations; Security Council China 48, 49, 79, 81, 216 civil peace 113–114 Paine, Thomas 113 prio 113–114 conflict attitude 5, 112n45, 199 identity-based/focused 118, 119 internal See intra-state armed conflict international See armed conflict needs-based 118, 119 prevention See conflict prevention transformation 112, 112n45, 169, 170, 201 See also armed conflict; conflict resolution conflict prevention 58, 60, 61, 62, 72, 121, 136, 137–138, 187 Carnegie Commission 166 country-specific/hands-on or ad hoc 109, 167 direct/operational/immediate 150, 167, 168, 180 and early warning 135 generic or a priori 150 and peacebuilding 168, 169, 183

Index post-conflict 81, 166, 170, 183; See also peacebuilding and ppf 109, 162, 189, 230 pre-conflict 109, 167, 180, 189 and preventive diplomacy 85, 168, 181, 196, 221n104 structural 150, 166, 167, 170, 183, 187 See also United Nations; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; mediation conflict resolution 169, 170 forward-looking 203, 203n54 and identity-focused/issues 192 193 interactive 192–193 osce High Commissioner on National Minorities 193–194 Oslo Accords/Peace Processes 193 problem-solving method, of 192, 201 and ripeness thesis 124, 209 and reframing approach 199, 202, 203 and track-one diplomacy 193 and track-two/three diplomacy 193 conflict transformation 112, 169, 170, 201 and identity 182n75 and relationships 131, 169, 199 and status quo/structures 131 See also conflict resolution and problem-solving Congo, Democratic Republic 79n156, 94, 192 Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc) 171 coup d’état 76, 76n136, 141 Davies, John 115, 118 Dayton Peace Agreement 95 decent society 39, 40, 44 deliberation 108, 108n24, 123–127 and conflict resolution 124 versus dialogue 123–124 and the dpp 122, 124, 129–131 Habermas 124, 125, Original Position 38, 126–127 Rawls 124, 125 Deliberative and Dialogical Peace Process Mechanism (dpp) 108, 122, 123, 129–131, 132, 205, 209 versus Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 198 criteria for invocation of 151–155

267 and dialogue 198–199 and early engagement 208 and Fundamental Conflicts 123, 129, 194, 198, 201 and grievances 123, 185 and Horizontal Inequalities 123, 226 and non-state actors 108, 205–206, 209 and strengthening un mediation role 182 and structural reforms 129, 131, 199 and un facilitation 131, 198–199 democracy and armed conflict 90 deliberative 108n24, 125–126 democratisation 36, 90–91, 102, 181, 183 majoritarian 90, 220 non/semi-democratic regimes 31, 90n211, 91, 125, 129–130 deprivation 120, 143 absolute 112n43, 145, 146 relative 118, 143, 144n46, 145, 146, 147 détente 66, 165 deterrence 50, 60, 80, 215 development 67, 90n213, 110, 144, 168 dialogue 92, 112, 123–124 and conflict transformation 92, 112, 124 versus deliberation 124 and dpp 198, 199 Galtung 112 internal 92, 93 and ppf 112, 200 dignified/fulfilled life 144, 149–150 and bare life 149 and Horizontal Equalities 149 diplomacy preventive See United Nations; conflict prevention; Positive Peace Framework quiet 210, 219 track-one 205 track-one and half diplomacy 205, 206 track-two diplomacy 205 See also conflict resolution; dpp discrimination 117, 118, 123, 145 positive 178 and Fundamental Conflicts 106–107, 120–121 systemic 142, 148, 148n66, See also equality and non-discrimination Doyle, Michael 36, 95

268

Index

dpa See United Nations Dworkin, Ronald 127

See also dpp; ppf fundamental interests 37, 105

early warning mechanisms See conflict prevention; ppf; United Nations economic, social and cultural rights (escr) See human rights Egypt 135, 141, 178, 190, 193, 195, 196, 197, 220, 230 El Salvador 87 engagement 45, 102, 103, 108n20, 156 early 108, 211, 208, 210 non-engagement 41 See also dpp; ppf; Rawls and toleration; broad pluralism equality 148, 149, 159 and non-discrimination 111, 113, 147–149, 158 and operational formula of positive peace 147, 150 See also inequality; discrimination

Galtung, Johan Foreword 3–4, 109–112, 226 conflict attitude 5 conflict transformation 112 egalitarianism (vertical equality) 110, 111, 112, 226 faultlines (social divisions) 111 negative peace personal (direct) violence 109 positive peace 110 social justice 110 structural (indirect) violence 4, 109, 110 Goldstein, Joshua 85, 88 Goldstone, Jack 91 Great Powers 48, 49, 50, 54, 54n42, 55 Four Policemen 48n4, 54 grievance 4, 40, 45, 87–88, 106n17, 107, 117, 118, 121 and Fundamental Conflicts 107, 109, 119–121 See also causes of armed conflict Guatemala 87 Gurr, Ted Robert 115, 118, 121, 208

Fiji 197 France 49, 50n21 Franck, Thomas 73, 77 Friedman, Rebecca 136, 139 friend-enemy distinction 17, 42, 107, 215 Friendly Relations Resolution 74 force peace by 39 prohibition on the use of 49, 52, 74, 84, 96 use of 49, 52 74, 77 See also Charter of the un Fundamental Conflicts 4–5, 104–107, 109, 119–122, 123, 131, 173, 209 absence of 4, 104, 105n4, 111, 114 and discrimination 106–107, 120–121, 178 and divisions 105, 106, 107, 113, 120 and identity differences 4, 122, 201 and grievance 107, 120, 185, 209 and Horizontal Inequalities 107, 120, 122, 192, 226 and human needs 119–121, 122 and human rights 105, 120, 122, 157–158, 173, 178, 179, 227 ideological and strategic incompatibilities  106, 106n18, 107, 201 real world examples of 195, 197 and tensions 106, 106n14, 107, 151, 152–155, 178, 209 and social injustice 105, 106

Habermas, Jürgen 9, 124–125, 128, 129, 158, 201, 221 Discourse Theory 124–125 Hobbes 14, 19 human nature 14–15 intra-state war and peace 19, 21 Leviathan 19 Horizontal Inequalities 5n9, 40, 118, 123 and Fundamental Conflicts 120 in pursuit of dignified life 149 roots of conflict 118 See also Fundamental Conflicts Höglund, Kristine 87 human capabilities 144–145 Nussbaum, Martha 145 Sen, Amartya 144, 145 human dignity 23, 35, 132, 150n73, 159, 222 See also dignified/fulfilled life human nature 15, 16 unesco Seville Statement 16 human needs 112, 116, 118, 119, 144 human rights 63, 65, 66, 74, 75 approach versus positive peace approach/ framework 177–179

Index economic, social and cultural rights (escr) 143–144 See Fundamental Conflicts gross/grave violations of 64, 72 machinery See ohchr; Human Rights Council large-scale/widespread violations of 76, 137, 142–143, non-gross violations of 142–143 Rawlsian urgent rights 39, 43, 155 See un Universal Declaration of Human Rights 63, 148 See also Positive Peace Framework; un Human Rights Council (hrc) 69, 70, 138, 173–176 and structural prevention 174 Universal Periodic Review (upr) 70, 174 verbal attention/statement 176 human security 67, 69 Critical Theorists 68, 70–71, 92 Independent Commission on 67 and peacebuilding 70 Human Security Report 85n192 Human Security Trust Fund 186 idealism/idealist tradition 18, 21, 59 and liberalism 21 influences of, in the un system 47, 59 Wilson’s Fourteen Points 21 peace 60, 96 See also Kant; United Nations identity 4, 111, 191 based conflict 118 divisions or faultlines 4, 5, 120, 195 and grievances 120–121 versus incompatibilities 191 issues/problems 94, 192 incompatibility 3, 62, 105, 106, 106n18, 128, 169, 191, 202, 203 France-Germany; Northern Ireland; South Africa; Turkey-Greece; us-ussr 202 Indonesia 94 inequality See relative deprivation horizontal See Horizontal Inequalities vertical See Galtung inter-group 88, 107, 182, 186, 194 reconciliation 186 relations 107, 182, 197, 201, 209

269 violence 88 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (icerd)  148, 171 international cooperation 18, 22, 59, 60, 65, 96 International Court of Justice (icj) 57, 74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) 63, 143, 146, 148, 171 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (icescr) 63, 143, 144, 171 international crimes See International Criminal Court (icc) International Criminal Court (icc) 142 crimes against humanity 143 and international crimes 142, 143, 152, 154 Rome Statute 142 international disputes See un disputes International Human Rights Law (ihrl) 72n117, 133, 142 International Humanitarian Law (ihl) 3n5, 115 international intervention See intervention international law 64, 159 customary 64 jus cogens 64, 149 and peaceful settlement 159 International Relations theory constructivism 202 Critical Theorists 68, 70, 92 See idealism See neo-Kantian tradition; liberal peace See realism international system 16, 71, 82, 138, 210 See anarchy and management of power 71 realist features 2, 71 state-centric 71, 138, 212 violent 82 intervention 74 forceful/military 43, 45, 64n84, 85, 86n196 humanitarian 85 internal affairs 74 international 85, 89, 136 See also liberal interventionism intra-state armed conflict See armed conflict intra-state peace See peace; positive peace

270 intrusiveness 156, 157, 160, 162, 213 acceptable level versus non-interference 156 absolute 156 non-intrusiveness 155, 222 versus self-determination 156 Iraq 18, 34, 88, 91, 181, 190, 195, 196, 197 Ivory Coast 64n84, 76, 94, 175, 176, 192 Jackson, Richard 205 jus cogens 57, 64, 72, 149 Kant, Immanuel 21 Categorical Imperative 22–24, 25, 67 coercion 24, 26, 28, 30 Cosmopolitan Rights 29 despotic regimes 30, 34 freedom/free will 25, 26, 27, 30 ideal and non-ideal theory division 32 International Right 28–29 justice 24, 25, 27 morality 22–23, 22n70, 24 negative peace 33, 34, 224 peace 22, 33, 34–35, 102, 224 political right 26–27 political improvement (or reform or gradual perfection) 30, 33–34, 35 politics 24 right to revolution 32–33 right (positive law) 24, 25, 32 separate peace 32, 36 state of nature 27, 28, 30 test of publicity 25 unjust enemy 28, 30–32 violence 28 Kellogg-Briand Pact 49, 204 Kelsen, Hans 51, 52, 53, 56, 58 Kenya 94, 95, 192 Kinsella, David 90 Kosovo 88, 95 Kovacs, Mimmi Söderberg 87 Kyrgyzstan 197 lasting peace See sustainable peace League of Nations 21, 48, 48n9, 49 Lederach, John Paul 169 liberal interventionism 1, 36, 37, 39, 41, 70–71, 89 critics 91

Index See also Rawlsian narrow pluralism; peacebuilding; and Neo-Kantian tradition liberal pacifism 36 liberal peace 1, 36, 89, 102, 104 and democratisation 90, 122 and human rights promotion 36, 89, 122 and institution-building 38, 91, 122 and social justice 36 See also peacebuilding; Rawls; liberal interventionism; democracy/ democratisation liberal peacebuilding See peacebuilding liberal tradition See Rawls; Neo-Kantian tradition; liberal peace Liberia 94, 95 Libya 172, 175, 176, 190, 195, 196, 197, 206, 213n88, 222, 230 local ownership See peacebuilding Lund, Michael 91, 167, 187 Machiavelli 15, 20 Mack, Andrew 85, 88 Mearsheimer, John 18 mediation 59, 80, 156, 168, 169, 170, 179, 196 Chapter vi (Article 33) 59 and dpp’s function 157, 182, 197 un resolutions for strengthening 81, 138, 157 Miall, Hugh 218 Middle East and North Africa (mena) region 44, 215, 220 minorities 65, 151 Minorities at Risk Project 121 mobilisation 5n9, 106, 116n62, 118, 146, 221 modus vivendi 15, 44, 128 Morgenthau 15 Rawls 15n14, 128 Morgenthau, Hans 17, 18, 20 the concept of the political 17 and Hannah Arendt 20 Myanmar 81, 82, 192 negotiation See mediation neo-Kantian tradition 35, 46, 89 conditions of peace 103–104 democracy 89, 102 human rights 89 non-liberal regimes 39–44 peace 31, 46, 66, 89, 102

Index positive peace 89 un practice 103 See also Rawls; liberal peace; liberal interventionism; un Nepal 94 Nicaragua 74 non-gross violations of human rights See human rights non-interference or non-intervention 52, 78, 108, 138–139 and Article 2(7) of un Charter 52, 52n31, 63, 139, 156 non-state actors See dpp; track-two diplomacy ohchr 136, 171–173 field presences 172 and structural prevention 171 victim-centred perspective 173 Vienna Declaration 171 Oslo Accords 193 peace processes 193, 210 Ottoman Empire 44 Kazanistan 44 overlapping consensus 126, 128, 128n125 Paine, Thomas 113 Paris, Roland 90 participatory peace 95 peace civil 113–114 and conflict studies 6, 113 democratic 36, 37, 45, 90, 221n106; See liberal peace everyday 114 idealist (liberal) vision of 60, 96 international 65, 83 intra-state 65 lasting/stable 1, 35, 37, 102, 168 (See also self-sustaining/sustainable peace) negative 1, 3, 86, 95, 97, 109, 140, 144, 213 participatory 95, 114 post-liberal 113, 114 realist vision of 14, 16, 19, 20–21, 60, 96, 101 self-sustaining/sustainable 2, 3n4, 13, 93, 94, 95, 141, 223 separate 32, 36, 46, 39, 103 See also positive peace; Galtung; liberal peace; Kant; Rawls; United Nations

271 Perpetual Peace 1 peacebuilding 4, 35, 79, 166, 168, 169, 170 apparatus of un 183 Critical Theorists 70–71, 90, 92 and economic, social and cultural rights (escr) 143–144 Galtung 4, 110 and human security 70 local/national ownership 185 measures 79, 168, 183 versus positive peace approach/ framework 184–186 promotion of democracy 92, 168 promotion of human rights 92, 168 Strategic Framework for 185, 185n88 Support Office (un) 170 un Peacebuilding Commission 59, 69–70, 138, 184 and peacekeeping 79 See also conflict prevention; ppf peacekeeping 78–79, 138, 168 forces 94, 95 and peacebuilding 79 pre-conflict 168 peacemaking 93, 168 and democratisation/power-sharing 181 and human rights 93 and transitional justice 93, 93n228, 96, 181 See also ppf Peck, Connie 208, 209 Philippines 94, 194n17 pluralism 156 broad conception/understanding, of 1, 82, 129 broad Rawlsian pluralism 40–41, 108, 155, 225 narrow conception/understanding, of 1, 129 narrow Rawlsian 41, 225 and ppf 8, 108, 129, 157–158, 160, 226 unreasonable 130 polarisation 106, 226 Polity iv project Global Report (of 2014) 90n211 positive peace 3, 61, 63, 93, 104, 112–114, 134, 140, 162, 230 absence/lack of 2, 4, 108, 161–162 and Fundamental Conflicts 104, 113, 114 Galtungian 4, 110, 134 versus Galtungian 5, 111–113, 132, 226

272 positive peace (cont.) and horizontal equality and non-discrimination 113, 114 versus negative peace 104–105, 139–141, 216 negation of 96n243, 106, 137 operational formula/definition of  133–134, 161–162 and social injustice 113 and sustainable peace See peace versus sustainable peace 141 threat to 121 See also peace; ppf; dpp; Fundamental Conflicts; Galtung; Rawls; Kant Positive Peace Framework (ppf) 108, 120, 129, 131, 135, 179, 188n102 aim, of 179 assessment/determination of lack of/ threat to positive peace 137, 143 and conflict transformation 170 and criteria of success 200–201 and deliberative democracy theory 160 dialogue 112, 186 and early warning 137 early engagement or involvement of 141, 208, 211 Fundamental Conflicts 109, 112, 120, 124, 173, 192 and conflict prevention 109, 170 and Horizontal Inequalities 192, 198, 226 and human rights 143, 147, 153, 157–161, 173, 192 versus human rights-based approach 177–179 and non-democratic/liberal societies 129–130, 153, 162 versus peacebuilding 184–186 and peacemaking 181, 186, 197 and pluralism 160, 161, 162 and positive discrimination 178 and preventive diplomacy 181, 197 proactive approach 108, 131 and procedural role of ihrl 158, 160 versus Rawlsian tolerance/system 155 and reconciliation 182, 186, 194, 204 and relative deprivations 146–147 and structural prevention 184, 187, 188, 227 and substantive role of ihrl 160

Index systemic approach/apparatus 108, 186, 188 un Peace Council 137–138, 217–220 See also Fundamental Conflicts; dpp; mediation power 48, 51, 55, 71, 89, 92, 111–112, 214 balance/role of power 44, 106, 121, 140, 207n68; See also realism and hegemonic/international actors 92, 212 and internal/state actors 212, 213, 215 practical/realistic possibility 7, 162, 190, 210, 217 and/versus theoretical feasibility/ viability 7, 100, 162, 190, 210, 222 and unrealistic optimism 7 prio 113 Ramsbotham, Oliver 218 Rawls, John 35–46, 124, 125–127, 130, 158, 201 basic/urgent (human) rights 39, 43, 155 decent societies 39, 40, 43, 44, 155 inaction phase 45, 46, 72 just society 35, 37–38 justice 38 fundamental interests 37 Law of Peoples 42 modus vivendi 15n14, 128 negative peace 46, 103, 224 non-liberal regimes 39–44 Original Position 38, 126–127, 130 outlaw states 42, 43 overlapping consensus 126, 128 peace 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 positive peace 103 pluralism 40–41, 108 reaction phase 45, 46 See separate peace 39 toleration (non-engagement) 39, 41, 108 war 42 realism 13–14, 18, 21, 59 anarchy 15, 19 balance of power 17, 19, 121 balancing of interests 15 (See modus vivendi) black box 15, 15n18 classic realists 14, 18 friend-enemy distinction 17, 42 human nature 15, 16

Index human rights 20 influences in the un system 47, 48, 54, 55 international sphere or system 16, 19 national interest 18 peace 14, 16, 19, 20–21, 60, 96, 101 power 14–16, 19, 59 power politics 16, 17, 18, 19, 42, 212 security dilemma 16 state-centric or state security/survival 20, 55 structural/neo-realism 15, 19 the nature of political sphere 17 and un foundations view of structural change 18–19 war 14, 16, 18 rebellion 32–35, 74, 88, 117n66 See also Kant and revolution reconciliation 94, 110, 194 Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone 119 reframing approach See conflict resolution relative deprivation 143, 145, 146 repression/repressive regime 117n63, 153, 154–155, 162 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 68–70, 76, 77, 138 Richmond, Oliver 13 right to peace 138 Rothman, Jay 94, 118, 119–120, 122 aria frame 193 Rousseau, David 90 Russian Federation 49, 79, 81, 195, 216 Rwanda 76 Sambanis, Nicolas 91 satisfied peoples 35, 37, 40, 141 See also Aron Schmitt, Carl 17 See friend-enemy distinction and the concept of the political 17 security dilemma 16, 206, 211 self-determination 3, 156, 159, 204 and deliberative democracy 108n24 and ppf 212 self-sustaining peace See peace Sen, Amartya 144 separate peace 32, 36, 39, 46, 103 See also Kant; peace Security Council and 49–50, 53–57, 72, 76

273 activism 75 Chapter vi measures 81, 82 Chapter vii measures 50, 53, 82 collective security 49, 50, 53, 54 discretion 55, 56, 57, 77 international security 75 intra-state dimension 75, 76 intra-state disputes 81, 82 threat to peace 57 veto power(s) (See also Great Powers) 54, 55, 82 social cohesion/integration 204, 221 social injustice 4–5, 110, 111, 118 See also Galtung social justice 110, 111, See also positive peace Somalia 76, 94 sovereignty 20, 82, 212 and prevention 82 Treaty of Westphalia 20 Sri Lanka 123, 178, 182, 193 state of nature 15 Kantian 27, 28, 30 Stewart, Frances 91, 118, 123, 137, 226 structural causes See causes of armed conflicts structural prevention See conflict prevention; United Nations; Positive Peace Framework Sudan 94 sustainable peace See peace; positive peace Syria 34, 55, 77, 79, 135, 140, 172, 176, 190, 195, 196, 197, 206, 207, 217, 222, 230 Action Group for Syria 139 Annan’s Peace Plan 209 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (cat) 171 tensions See Fundamental Conflicts and tensions theoretical viability 7 See also practical/realistic possibility tolerance See Rawls and toleration Togo 94 transitional justice 93, 93n228, 96, 172–173 and peace agreements 94 victim-centred perspective 173 trust 193, 206, 207, 215

274 Tunisia 197 Turkey 193, 202, 208n73, 220 ucdp (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) 3 Ukraine 181, 190, 195, 196, 197, 217, 220, 230 uncio 47n2, 50, 51, 56, 66, 74 undesa 136 undp 67, 136, 194 DPA Joint Programme 194 unesco 16, 186, 194 Seville Statement on Violence 16 un Human Security Unit (hs Unit) 194 United Kingdom 48, 49 United Nations collective security 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 77 See conflict prevention disputes 56, 59, 61, 62, 81, 180 Chapter vi measures 82, 138 Chapter vii measures 84 dpa 136, 172, 180, 186, 194, 217, 220 early warning 135–136, 194 General Assembly 81 See Great Powers human rights 60, 63, 93 human suffering 74–75, 77 idealist frameworks 59, 66, 71, 72, 82, 96 See peace and idealist (liberal) vision of peace international peace 51, 74–75 intra-state armed conflict 79 intra-state peace 52, 53, 66, 77, 80, 89 mediation role 80, 156, 168, 180, 207 neo-Kantian influences 4, 35, 225 peace concept 51–53, 60 peaceful (pacific) settlement 59, 80 positive peace 61, 66 preventive diplomacy 168 preventive frameworks/pillars 109, 111, 221 realist framework 51–58, 61, 72, 79, 82, 89 See peace and realist vision of peace Resident Coordinators 136, 194 Secretariat 139

Index security 51–52, 80 See Security Council selectivity 55, 57, 79, 207 self-defence 54 structural prevention 167 threat to peace 57, 58, 61, 62 undesa 136 undp 136 See also Charter of United Nations; mediation; conflict prevention; peacebuilding United States of America (us) 18, 48, 49 Uniting for Peace (UfP) 78 un Peace Council See Positive Peace Framework un Peacebuilding Commission See peacebuilding un Peacebuilding Fund 186 use of force See Charter of United Nations violence 3, 27–28, 34, 64, 87, 137, 153, 213 and Arab Spring 44 direct/manifest See Galtung inter-group/communal 88, 96n243 intra-state 3, 223 and polarisation 106, 167 structural See Galtung Waldron, Jeremy 29, 30 Wallensteen, Peter 91, 94 Waltz, Kenneth 14 Williams, Howard 33 Woodhouse, Tom 219 Wright, Quincy 16 war 3 See also realism Yemen 195, 230 Zartman, William 118, 119, 209 Zenko, Micah 136, 139