Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute: Chinese and Southeast Asian Perspectives [1 ed.] 9789811914522, 9789811914539

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Contributions to International Relations

Nian Peng Chow-Bing Ngeow   Editors

Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute Chinese and Southeast Asian Perspectives

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16658

Nian Peng · Chow-Bing Ngeow Editors

Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute Chinese and Southeast Asian Perspectives

Editors Nian Peng Research Centre for SAARC States Hainan Normal University Haikou, China

Chow-Bing Ngeow Institute of China Studies University of Malaya Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Research Centre for Asian Studies Haikou, China

ISSN 2731-5061 ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-981-19-1452-2 ISBN 978-981-19-1453-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nian Peng

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Nationalism in China’s South China Sea Policy: Delicate Trade-Off Between Sovereignty Protection and Stability Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . Nian Peng

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When Populists Perform Foreign Policy: Duterte’s China Pivot and the South China Sea Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aries A. Arugay

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The Double-Edged Sword Effect of Vietnam’s Nationalistic South China Sea Policy—A Chinese Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Xiao Luo

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Malaysia’s Layered Nationalism and the South China Sea Dispute . . . . . Chow-Bing Ngeow and Nur Shahadah Jamil The Limits of Populism: SBY and Jokowi’s Strategies on the South China Sea Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Klaus Heinrich Raditio and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia

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Political Apathy, Soft Authoritarianism, and Singapore’s Perspectives on the South China Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Irene Chan Cambodia and the Politics of Populism and Nationalism in the South China Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Neak Chandarith and Sam Ath Sambath Sreysour

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Nian Peng is the Executive Director and Associate Fellow of Research Centre for SAARC States, Hainan Normal University, China, as well as the Director of Research Centre for Asian Studies, Haikou, China. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. His main research interests are in the areas of China-Southeast/South Asia relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and maritime security of the Indo-Pacific. He authored four books— Crossing the Himalayas: Buddhist Ties, Regional Integration and Great-Power Rivalry (Springer Nature, 2021), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the Covid-19 Pandemic (Springer Nature, 2021), International Pressures, Strategic Preference, and Myanmar’s China Policy since 1988 (Springer Nature, 2020) and Leng Zhan Hou Yin Mian Guan Xi Yan Jiu [A Study on Indo-Myanmar Relations after the Cold-War] (Shi Shi Chu Ban She [Current Affairs Press], 2017). His refereed articles have been notably published in Ocean Development and International Law, Pacific Focus, Asian Affairs, Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu [Southeast Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu [South Asian Studies] and Nan Ya Yan Jiu Ji Kan [South Asian Studies Quarterly]. He also contributes his perspectives to many think tanks and various local and international media outlets such as Asia Centre in France, East Asian Forum in Australia, The Diplomat in the USA, Bangkok Post in Thailand, Lian He Zao Bao in Singapore, South China Morning

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Editors and Contributors

Post in Hong Kong, Global Times and CGTN in China. e-mail: [email protected] Chow-Bing Ngeow is currently Director of the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. He received Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs from Northeastern University, the USA. His research has been published in journals such as Ocean Development and International Law, Asian Politics and Policy, China Report, China Review, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Contemporary Southeast Asia, East Asia: An International Quarterly, China: An International Journal, Problems of PostCommunism, Issues and Studies and others. In addition, he is the editor of Researching China in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2019) and co-editor of Southeast Asia and China: Exercise in Mutual Socialization (World Scientific, 2017). e-mail: [email protected]

Contributors Aries A. Arugay Department of Political Science, University of the PhilippinesDiliman, Quezon City, The Philippines Irene Chan S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore Neak Chandarith Royal University of Phnom Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia Nur Shahadah Jamil Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Xiao Luo School of International Studies, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China Chow-Bing Ngeow Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Nian Peng Research Centre for SAARC States(RCSS), Hainan Normal University, Haikou, China; Research Centre for Asian Studies, Haikou, China Klaus Heinrich Raditio Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

Editors and Contributors

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Sam Ath Sambath Sreysour Department of Politics and International Relations, University Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

Abbreviations

ADMM APEC ARF ASEAN BBB BRFIC CCTV CNOOC CNRP COC COE CPC CPF CPP CPV DAP DOC EDB EDCA EEZ ES EU FEP FICA FONOPs FPI FPTP GRC GST HDB HTI

ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Build! Build! Build! Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation China Central Television China National Offshore Oil Corporation Cambodia’s Nation Rescue Party Code of Conduct in the South China Sea Certificate of Entitlement Communist Party of China Central Provident Fund Cambodian People’s Party Communist Party of Vietnam Democratic Action Party Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea Economic Development Board Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Exclusive Economic Zone East Sea European Union Foreign Economic Policy Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act Freedom of Navigation Operations Islamic Defenders Front First-Past-The-Post Principle Group Representation Constituency Goods-and-Services Tax Housing and Development Board Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia xi

xii

IR IRIS ISMA ITLOS JTC MA63 MCA MCCC MIC MPs MUI NDR NMP NU PAN PAP PAS PCA PD PDA PDI-P PKB PKS PLA PLAAA POFMA PPP PRC PSA SBY SDP THAAD UK UMNO UN UNCLOS WP

Abbreviations

International Relations Interdisciplinary Research and International Strategy Institute Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Jurong Town Corporation Malaysia Agreement 1963 Malaysian Chinese Association Malaysia-China Chamber of Commerce Malaysian Indian Congress Members of Parliament Indonesian Ulema Council National Day Rally Nominated Member of Parliament Nahdlatul Ulama Partai Amanat Nasional People’s Action Party Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia Permanent Court on Arbitration Partai Demokrat Petroleum Development Act Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa Partai Keadilan Sejahtera People’s Liberal Army People’s Liberation Army Air Force Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act Partai Persatuan Pembangunan People’s Republic of China Port of Singapore Authority Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Singapore Democratic Party Terminal High Altitude Area Defense United Kingdom United Malays National Organization United Nations UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Workers’ Party

Introduction Nian Peng

Abstract This book analyzes two main trends of prevailing populism and nationalism in China and Southeast Asia and the rising tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) by Chinese and Southeast Asian experts. This is the first study which goes deep into the SCS dispute from the perspectives on populism and nationalism and thus highlighting its significance in Asian politics. The main body of this book is divided into eight parts, in which the first section briefly introduces the aims and scope of this book. The following seven parts look at the new development of populism and nationalism in China and ASEAN claimant states and some important non-claimant states mainly including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and its multiple effects on the SCS dispute. Keywords South China Sea dispute · Nationalism · Populism · China · ASEAN claimant states Rising populism and nationalism in China and Southeast Asian states have intensified the South China Sea (SCS) dispute in the past decade. Both Chinese and some Southeast Asian governments have manipulated the populism and nationalism to legitimize the disputed waters in the SCS and increase the costs of revising their policy toward the SCS issue. Consequently, their SCS policy has increasingly been tied up by the growing populism and nationalism at home. Given this, this book aims at examining the roots and evolution of the populism and nationalism in China and Southeast Asian nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states in particular, analyzing its multiple effects on the SCS dispute, and trying to find effective ways to reduce the negative impacts of populism and nationalism on the SCS issue. The volume is consisted of scholars from China and Southeast Asia to discuss this new topic from their perspectives. N. Peng (B) Research Centre for SAARC States(RCSS), Hainan Normal University, Haikou, China e-mail: [email protected] Research Centre for Asian Studies, Haikou, China

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_1

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This is the first study which goes deep into the SCS dispute from the perspectives on populism and nationalism and thus highlighting its significance in Asian politics. The broad approach adopted in the book with focus on all important countries expands the scope of readership beyond specific academic community. The book will interests academics, policy makers, journalists, general reader, and students of Asian politics. The main content of the book is divided into eight parts. In the first part, Nian Peng briefly introduced the main aim and content of this book. He also examines the different roles of nationalism in the maritime standoff between China and some ASEAN claimant states in the past decade from a Chinese perspective, and explores the main reasons behind China’s quite different tactics of manipulating the nationalism to legitimize and support its actions in the disputed waters of the SCS in Chap. 2. He points out that the nature of the dispute (territorial integrity or maritime interests) and Chinese leaders’ delicate trade-off between sovereignty protection and stability maintenance are the determining factors of China’s manipulation of nationalism in the SCS dispute. In order to verify this argument, he analyzes China’s use of nationalism in its three major standoff with the Philippines and Vietnam in the SCS in 2012, 2014, and 2019, respectively. He finally predicts that China’s response to the SCS dispute would continue to be influenced by the rising nationalism amid the Covid-19 pandemic. However, due to the high pressures on domestic development and the top priority of the stability maintenance in the SCS, China is more likely to restrain the nationalism in the SCS dispute. Aries A. Arugay uses the concept of performative populism to analyze Duterte’s foreign policy, particularly toward the SCS dispute in Chap. 3. He argues that as a specific political style of conducting foreign policy, populism can reorient established positions and biases but in turn generates uncertainty and erosion of credibility in the face of weak institutions and domestic distractions. He traces the changes that Duterte’s government instituted on the issue by embarking on more diplomatic and multi-faceted approach that includes trade, defense cooperation, joint development, infrastructure, and others. He also examines the prospects of Duterte’s foreign policy given existing strategic realities, bureaucratic politics, and domestic political stability. Xiao Luo investigates the double-edged sword effect of Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy in Chap. 4. He points out that the nationalism has become a powerful tool for assisting Vietnam in its fight against China, such as consolidating legitimacy of the government and enhancing mobilization of social resource, promoting the implementation of its SCS policy, as well as strengthening China’s concerns about Vietnam and enlisting the assistance of the USA and Japan. Nonetheless, Vietnam risks losing control of nationalism and incurring the cost of blind exclusion of China. The rising nationalism, as he said, severely limits Vietnam’s ability to reach necessary compromises on the SCS dispute and amplifies the negative impacts of a potential arbitration on the legitimacy of the Vietnamese regime. He finally concludes that the dilemma of Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy will be more obvious as the great-power rivalry in the SCS becomes more intense. Chow-Bing Ngeow and Nur Shahadah Jamil examine the three different layers of sub-national nationalism within Malaysia, including Malay nationalism, ethnic Chinese nationalism, and state nationalism in Sabah and Sarawak, and how these

Introduction

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different forms of sub-national nationalism react to the SCS dispute in Chap. 5. They conclude that nationalist sentiments in Malaysia have been so far much more restrained and moderate than other claimant states, and argue that Malaysian nationalism has been somewhat geared more inwardly toward nation-building rather than manifesting itself outwardly and territorially. Given this, Malaysian nationalism on the SCS dispute has been generally much less fierce. Klaus Heinrich Raditio and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia aim to demonstrate the limit of domestic populism in shaping Indonesia’s SCS policy in Chap. 6. They argue that although the SCS has experienced heightened tension in both eras of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jokowi, SBY tended to conceal the incidents from the public eye while Jokowi no longer conceal the incidents in the Natuna waters from the public eye. In practice, SBY dedicated his foreign policy to construct Indonesia’s role as regional leaders and honest broker in the SCS issue. But Jokowi has placated the public anxiety by showing a firm gesture in defending the country’s sovereign rights. They finally conclude that the public fuss around the Natuna waters incidents is deemed unnecessary since Jokowi government intends to secure the economic cooperation with China. Irene Chan examines Singapore’s perspectives on the SCS issue as a non-claimant country in Chap. 7. She deems that Singapore has not been affected by the wave of populist movements because of the resilience of authoritarian Singapore state. Further, she analyzes the main reasons that Singapore has not changed its longstanding perspectives on the SCS issue, despite the rise of global populism and pressure from the Sino-US strategic competition. She finally concludes that Singapore’s perspectives on the SCS issue will remain consistent for the foreseeable future as there is no serious impetus for a shift or major change in Singapore’s fundamental foreign policy principles. Neak Chandarith and Sam Ath Sambath Sreysour explore the domestic populist and nationalist sentiments in Cambodia, examine their implications on the SCS dispute, and suggest ways to reduce their negative effects in Chap. 8. They conclude that the non-claimant, small states are vulnerable to populist and nationalist politics in the SCS dispute. The more restrictive the domestic setting and the international environment, the harder it is for them to maneuver. Therefore, they suggest the claimant states, non-claimant states and regional powers make concerted effort to acknowledge and address the fundamental dichotomy behind populism and nationalism, and to orient their inspirations from nothing but the benefits of people beyond just groups and borders; promote the indiscriminate multilateralism and inclusive development through a complex system of interdependence among states; further generate arrangements to serve as platforms for socialization, interconnectedness, and confidence-building among the parties involved in the SCS issue. Finally, it should be highly noted that this book is a joint work of scholars from both China and Southeast Asia, the anonymous reviewers, as well as the editors at Springer Nature. It cannot be completed without their kindly cooperation and assistance. All the views on this book do not represent the affiliations of the editor and contributors, and all of shortcomings are responsible by authors. Last but not

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least, this work was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China under project number 20CGJ048.

Nian Peng is the Executive Director & Associate Fellow of Research Centre for SAARC States(RCSS), Hainan Normal University, China, as well as the Director of Research Centre for Asian Studies, Haikou, China. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. His main research interests are in the areas of ChinaSoutheast/South Asia relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and maritime security of the Indo-Pacific. He authored four books-Crossing the Himalayas: Buddhist Ties, Regional Integration and Great-Power Rivalry (Springer Nature, 2021), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the Covid-19 Pandemic (Springer Nature, 2021), International Pressures, Strategic Preference, and Myanmar’s China Policy since 1988 (Springer Nature, 2020), Leng Zhan Hou Yin Mian Guan Xi Yan Jiu [A Study on Indo-Myanmar Relations after the ColdWar] (Shi Shi Chu Ban She [Current Affairs Press], 2017). His refereed articles have been notably published in Ocean Development and International Law, Pacific Focus, Asian Affairs, Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu [Southeast Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu [South Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu Ji Kan [South Asian Studies Quarterly]. He also contributes his perspectives to many think tanks and various local and international media outlets such as Asia Centre in France, East Asian Forum in Australia, The Diplomat in the USA, Bangkok Post in Thailand, Lian He Zao Bao in Singapore, South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, and Global Times and CGTN in China.

Nationalism in China’s South China Sea Policy: Delicate Trade-Off Between Sovereignty Protection and Stability Maintenance Nian Peng

Abstract This chapter examines the different roles of nationalism in the maritime standoff between China and the Philippines and Vietnam in the past decade and explores the main reasons behind China’s quite different tactics of manipulating the nationalism to legitimize and support its actions in the disputes waters of the SCS. It points out that the nature of the dispute (territorial integrity or maritime interests) and Chinese leaders’ trade-off between sovereignty protection and stability maintenance are the determining factors of China’s manipulation of nationalism in the SCS dispute. In order to verify this argument, it analyzes China’s use of nationalism in its three major standoff with the Philippines and Vietnam in the SCS in 2012, 2014 and 2019, respectively. It finally predicts that China’s response to the SCS dispute would continue to be influenced by the rising nationalism amid the COVID-19 pandemic. However, due to the high pressures on domestic development and the top priority of the stability maintenance in the SCS, China is more likely to restrain the nationalism in the SCS dispute. Keywords China · Nationalism · South China Sea dispute · The Philippines · Vietnam

1 Introduction There has been intense debate over the growing nationalism and China’s assertive behaviour in the SCS since the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. 1 See Andrew Scobell (2018). The South China Sea and U.S.–China rivalry. Political Science Quarterly. 133(2), p. 201; Cheng Chwee Kuik (2017). Explaining the contradiction in China’s South China Sea policy: structural drivers and domestic imperatives. China: An International Journal. 15(1), p. 163.

N. Peng (B) Research Centre for SAARC States(RCSS), Hainan Normal University, Haikou, China e-mail: [email protected] Research Centre for Asian Studies, Haikou, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_2

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First of all, whether China has been assertive towards the SCS dispute in the past decade are debated intensively. In the Western narrative, China has transformed from a low-key, gradualist approach towards the SCS to increasingly muscular actions in the disputed waters since 2009.1 However, the reality is that China used military coercion in the 1990s, when it was weaker than in other periods, but chose not to use military coercion when it grew stronger.2 In some circumstance, China has actually exercised considerable self-restraint.3 In addition, from Chinese perspective, China has been forced to take coercive measures to react to the aggression from both the claimant states and external actors, the USA in particular, in the SCS. Second, whether nationalism contributes to China’s assertive behaviour in the SCS or not are controversial. Some scholars conclude that rising popular nationalism/state nationalism promotes China’s increasing assertiveness over the SCS dispute,4 while others argue that there is no evidence that the Chinese government would give in to the popular pressure when conducting its assertive policy in the SCS.5 This book chapter, therefore, conducts an in-depth case study of the complicated role of nationalism in China’s assertive SCS policy in the twenty-first century. Firstly, there are many manifestations of China’s assertive policy in the SCS, such as the military exercise, land reclamation, economic and diplomatic sanctions. But in essence, as Kuik concluded, if “status quo” means preserving rather than changing the extant situation, China’s growing assertive behaviour towards the territorial and maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas over the past few years has given rise to the impression that Beijing is becoming a “revisionist” rather than a “status quo” power.6 Given this, this book chapter points out that the maritime standoff between China and ASEAN claimant states represents the highest level of China’s assertiveness over the SCS dispute as either side or both want to change the “status quo” by employing coercion. Secondly, given the fact that the nationalist sentiment has grown so fast in China in the past decade, it is unsafe to deny the effects of nationalism on China’s diplomacy,7 the SCS dispute in particular. Meanwhile, the role of nationalism in China’s policy towards SCS cannot be overstated as the nationalism has been effectively 2

Ketian Zhang (2019). Cautious bully reputation, resolve, and Beijing’s use of coercion in the South China Sea. International Security. 44(1), p. 119. 3 See Zhou Fangyin (2016). Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy. International Affairs. 92(4), p. 870. 4 See Cheng Chwee Kuik (2017). Explaining the contradiction in China’s South China Sea policy: structural drivers and domestic imperatives. China: An International Journal. 15(1), pp. 175–177; Zhou Fangyin (2016). Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy. International Affairs. 92(4), p. 881. 5 See Richard Q. Turcsányi (2018). Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea: power sources, domestic politics, and reactive foreign policy. Berlin: Springer Nature, p. 161. 6 See Cheng Chwee Kuik (2017). Explaining the contradiction in China’s South China Sea policy: structural drivers and domestic imperatives. China: An International Journal. 15(1), pp. 163–165. 7 Numerous scholars have discussed the rising influence of nationalism on China’s foreign policy ever since the early 2000. See Suisheng Zhao (2000). Chinese nationalism and its international orientations. Political Science Quarterly. 115(1), pp. 1–33; Tianbiao Zhu (2001). Nationalism and Chinese foreign policy. China Review. 1(1), pp. 1–27.

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managed by Chinese government.8 In fact, although strong nationalist sentiment in the public put more constraints to decision-making in China’s foreign policy, it is hardly ever decisive as the Chinese government has a legion of resources and means to change public opinion to meet its policy needs.9 Hence, this book chapter holds that nationalism does have influence on China’s SCS policy in the Xi era, but it plays a contradictory role in the SCS dispute. Sometimes, the territorial disputes are aggravated by the popular nationalism in Chinese society, whereas in other circumstance the nationalism failed to escalate the tensions. Thirdly, nationalism would not automatically interfere in China’s SCS policy as it is state-centric.10 Instead, it has been manipulated by Chinese authority to sever its internal and external goals such as consolidating regime legitimacy, diverting public attention away from domestic problems and promoting the peaceful rise of China. Therefore, whether the nationalism functions in the SCS dispute depends on Chinese authority, which mainly refers to its trade-off between sovereignty and stability in the SCS. It is more likely that the nationalism would promote China’s assertive policy towards the SCS if protecting sovereignty become the top priority of the Chinese government. Otherwise, the effects of the nationalism would be minimal. Fourth, nationalism could be measured by various indicators such as military deterrence, protests against foreigners and provocative reports from media. In this study, I use the reports and commentaries from both Chinese official media such as People’s Daily and leading social media to indicate the nationalism sentiment in Chinese society. Given the above assumptions, this chapter conducts an empirical study by comparing the role of nationalism in two typical maritime standoff between China and the Philippines and Vietnam in 2012, 2014 and 2019, respectively. The main body is divided into five parts, in which the first part briefly introduces the major debates over the nationalism and China’s assertive policy towards the SCS and the research design of this study. Following the introduction, the two subsequent sections discuss the different effects of nationalism on the maritime standoff between China and the Philippines and China and Vietnam. Then, it analyzes the main reasons behind them, which refers to the nature of the dispute and Chinese leader’s delicate trade-off between sovereignty and stability in the SCS. In the conclusion, it summarizes the main findings and predicts the long-term influence of the rising nationalism in China’s SCS policy in the light of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. 8

According to Suisheng Zhao, the Chinese leaders have made use of nationalism to rally public support, but they realize that, if allowed to persist unrestrained, nationalist sentiments could jeopardize the overarching objectives of political stability and economic modernization on which the CCP’s legitimacy is ultimately based. See Suisheng Zhao (2005). China’s pragmatic nationalism: is it manageable? Washington Quarterly. 29(1), p. 132. 9 Frances Yaping Wang, Brantly Womack (2019). Jawing through crises: Chinese and Vietnamese media strategies in the South China Sea. Journal of Contemporary China. 28(119), p. 716; Kai Quek, Alastair Iain Johnston (2018). ‘Can China back down? Crisis de-escalation in the shadow of popular opposition’. International Security. 42(3), pp. 7–36. 10 See Suisheng Zhao (2005). China’s pragmatic nationalism: is it manageable? Washington Quarterly. 29(1).

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2 Nationalism and Maritime Standoff Between China and the Philippines Since the two military clashes with Vietnam in the SCS in 1974 and 1988, respectively,11 China has largely used non-militarized coercive tools to deal with the illegal activities made by ASEAN claimant states.12 The maritime standoff between the warships, law enforcement agencies, maritime militia and fishermen (includes the armed fisherman), therefore, became the highest level of tensions in the SCS. After the end of the Cold-War, there were three major maritime standoff between China and the Philippines and Vietnam. In April 2012, there was the most serious maritime standoff between China and the Philippines in the Huangyan Island (also called Scarborough Shoal by the Philippines), where is a major disputed water between the two states since the 1990s. During this maritime crisis, China utilized the media to instigate a mass nationalism and thus to enhance the legitimacy of its activities and force the Filipino government bend to its will.13 According to Chinese former Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Ying, the reports and photographs of Chinese fishermen who were abused by the Philippine soldiers in the Huangyan Island in the front page of Chinese newspapers and online media on 11 April, the day after the Philippine Navy gunboat harassed Chinese fishermen who were conducting normal fishing inside the lagoon of the Huangyan Island, caused a lot of angry reaction in Chinese society.14 For instance, China’s state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) released two videos of the maritime standoff between Chinese Marine Surveillance ships and the Philippines warship in the Huangyan Island on 11 April. In the first video, it showed that the Philippines warship Gregorio Del Pilar harassed the Chinese fishing boats and two Chinese Marine Surveillance ships came to rescue the Chinese fishermen. In the second video, it interviewed Chinese analyst who criticized the Philippines’ provocation against Chinese fisherman in the Huangyan Island.15 In the following 11

There are two naval battles between China and Vietnam in the SCS, one is the Yongle Island skirmish in 1974 in Xisha Islands and another one is the Chigua Reef skirmish in 1988 in Nansha Island. 12 According to Ketian Zhang, China engaged in military coercion in the SCS in the 1990s, refrained from coercion from 2000 to 2006, and resumed non-militarized coercion after 2007. See Ketian Zhang (2019). Cautious bully reputation, resolve, and Beijing’s use of coercion in the South China Sea. International Security. 44(1), p. 117. 13 François-Xavier Bonnet (2012, November). Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal. Irasec’s Discussion Papers (14), p. 5. 14 Fu Ying: wo ceng qin li Huangyan dao shi jian, you xie hua bi xu yao shuo [Fu Ying: I experienced the Huangyan island incident personally, I have to say some words]. Sina News. (2021, March 15). https://news.sina.cn/2021-03-15/detail-ikkntiam1745372.d.html. 15 Shi pin: zhong guo yu chuan zao fei lv bin jun jian xi rao: zhong guo hai jian fu Huangyan dao bao hu wo yu chuan yu min [Video: Chinese fishing boats was harassed by the Philippines warships: Chinese marine surveillance ships came to the Huangyan island to protect the Chinese fishermen. CCTV. (2012, April 11). http://news.cntv.cn/china/20120411/120233.shtml; Wo hai jian chuan yu fei lv bin jun jian nan hai dui zhi [Maritime standoff between Chinese maritime surveillance ships and the Philippines warships]. CCTV. (2012, April 11). http://news.cntv.cn/military/20120411/121 022.shtml.

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two days, both the national medias mainly including People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Guangming Daily and the local medias in Southern China such as Southern Urban Daily, and the mainstream online media–Sina, Sohu, Netease voiced support for government policy of sending another two fishery administration ships to the Huangyan Island to protect the Chinese fisherman and forcing the Philippine warship to withdraw from the island. The People’s Daily even sent a clear warning sign that China would not allow any further actions taken by the Philippines to violate China’s sovereignty in the SCS; otherwise, the Philippines would pay a heavy price on 13 April.16 But despite China’s tough stance on the standoff, the Philippines escalated the tensions by conducting military exercise with the USA in the SCS, sending more ships to the disputed water, and claiming to appeal the dispute to the international court. China, therefore, took a large range of actions to retaliate against the Philippines. One of them was the use of the national media and online media to spread rumours of preparation for war against the Philippines.17 Soon after the live-fire and landing attack training between the American and Philippine navy in the Palawan Island and the deployment of the Philippine warships and anti-submarine warfare aircraft in the Huangyan Island on 21 and 22 April, China’s Global Times, which is known for its frequently nationalistic tone, threatened to give the Philippines a lesson by preparing for a small sea war with the country.18 It is coincide with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie’s claims that any military action will be based on the needs of diplomacy and Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng’s statement that the armed forces have vowed to “fulfil their duty” to safeguard China’s territory in the SCS on 24 and 26 April, respectively.19 In the meantime, the Global Times claimed to make the Philippine President Benigno Simeon Aquino III look like a fool in front of everyone and give a lesson of failure to the Philippine society.20 Except the war warning to the Philippines, China’s People’s Daily also blamed the Philippines for escalating the tensions, warned the Philippines not to play fire by inviting the USA 16 Ren min ri bao: jie jue nan hai wen ti bu neng zhi kao yi zhi shou [People’s Daily: solving the SCS issue can not rely on one hand]. Global Times. (2012, April 13). https://world.huanqiu.com/ article/9CaKrnJuWF9. 17 In fact, the Chinese government also used other policy instruments. These include the economic punitive measures which is ranged from a stricter control on bananas exported by the Philippines to stopping Chinese tourists from traveling to the Philippines and the diplomatic influence and power on Cambodia (which is presiding over ASEAN in 2012) to block the production of an official communiqué (which would have mentioned the dispute over Scarborough Shoal) at the end of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh on July 16, 2012. See François-Xavier Bonnet (2012, November). Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal. Irasec’s Discussion Papers (14), p.5. 18 Ping lun cheng zhong guo yao gei fei lv bin yi jiao xun ling qi bei hou shi li ju sang [The commentary claims that China should give the Philippines a lesson and frustrate the forces behind the country]. Tencent News. (23 April 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120423/000799.htm. 19 Zhang Yunbi (27 April 2012). Military makes solemn vow on territory. China Daily. https://www. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/27/content_15154373.htm. 20 Huan qiu shi bao: wu rang fei lv bin kong zhi nan hai mo ca jie zou [Global Times: don’t let the Philippines lead the SCS dispute]. Global Times. (2012, April 25). https://world.huanqiu.com/art icle/9CaKrnJvbyj.

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to involve in the dispute and reminded the Philippines of the serious consequences of the tensions in the SCS such as the loss of control on the standoff.21 Despite the fact that the outcry against the Philippines from the Chinese society was reduced after the end of the Philippines–US military exercise on 27 April, the standoff between the two countries was re-escalated in May. On the one side, the Philippines not only renamed the Huangyan Island but cleaned the Chinese constructions in the island, resulting in a new wave of anger from China. Soon after the Philippine coast guard destroyed the sovereignty stela and other Chinese constructions in the Huangyan Island, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying met with Alex Chua, Charge D’affaires of the Philippine Embassy in Beijing on 7 May. She said China was not optimistic about the situation and that China was prepared to respond to any escalation.22 Later, China’s People’s Daily (including the overseas edition), Xinhua News Agency and CCTV published numerous articles and commentaries over the next two days reiterating China’s sovereignty over the Huangyan Island, condemning the Philippines’ illegal activities in the island, and warning the Philippines to stop provoking China. It is worth noting that China’s People’s Daily (overseas edition) vowed to safeguard the core Chinese national interests by using forces and appealed the government to prepare for a war against the military provocations from the Philippines.23 On the other side, the Philippines sent armed public service ships to the lagoon of the Huangyan Island to press the Chinese fisherman who returned to the Huangyan Island in 9 May to leave. This action caused a series concern over the safety of the fisherman from Chinese government as no Chinese ships protected the fisherman inside the lagoon. In order to force the Philippine ships to withdraw from the lagoon, China has not only promoted diplomatic consultation with the Philippine government but raised a new round of national resentment against the Philippines. The mouthpiece of People’s Liberal Army (PLA)-PLA Daily warned the Philippines not to take away half an inch of China’s territory on 10 May.24 China’s People’s Daily also cautioned the Philippines against making a wrong decision of further provoking

21

Ren min ri bao: fei lv bin dui nan hai sheng suo wang gu shi shi bu hui de cheng [People’s Daily: the Philippines ignore the facts of the SCS claims and can not get success]. Tencent News. ( 24 April 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120424/000184.htm; Nan hai wen ti guo ji hua shi zhan lue duan shi xuan bu fan zhong guo wai jiao da chuan [Internationalizing the SCS dispute is unwise and can not undermine China’s diplomacy]. Tencent News. (26 April 2012). https://news.qq.com/ a/20120426/000281.htm. 22 Stan Grant and Paul Armstrong (10 May 2012). Tensions over disputed island appear to ease. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/10/world/asia/china-philippines-dispute/index.html. 23 See Ren min ri bao ping Huangyan dao dui zhi: ren wu ke ren jiu wu xu zai ren [People’s Daily commented on the standoff in the Huangyan Island: zero tolerance for the Philippines if there is no compromise]. Tencen News. (8 May 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120508/000149.htm. 24 Jie fang jun bao fa biao shu ming wen zhang: xiu xiang qiang zou zhong guo ban cun ling tu [People’s Liberal Army Daily published article: can’t take away half an inch of China’s territory]. Tencent News. (10 May 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120510/000155.htm.

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China.25 Meanwhile, Major General Luo Yuan reminded the Philippines not to smash a stone with an egg when he interviewed by CCTV,26 which means that the Philippines would lost the war with China in a very high price. Li Jie, who is a research fellow at Chinese Naval Military Academic Research Institute analyzed that the recent military exercise conducted by the SCS fleet is a clear sign that China is preparing for the military conflicts with the Philippines.27 Eventually, the stalemate was eased in early June when the two countries withdrew their civilian vessels from the lagoon of the Huangyan Island. But China has still remained vessels outside the lagoon so as to protect Chinese fishing boats and safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights. On 12 June, Liu Cigui, Director of Chinese State Oceanic Administration, inspected the sea forces and ordered them to firmly safeguard Chinese sovereignty over the Huangyan Island until winning the final victory.28 Three days later, all the Philippine vessels were left on the pretext of the onset of the typhoon season, which indicates that the two months standoff between China and the Philippines on the Huangyan Island was temporarily ended. Nonetheless, China worries about the loss control of the Huangyan Island due to the Philippines’ continuing harassment (particularly with the USA) and the typhoon season in the SCS. In fact, although this island is, de facto, under the control of the China, the latter has actually not build any military facilities on the island and thus substantially enhancing its control over the island. Instead, the Chinese maritime surveillance vessels and fishery administration ships just blocked Philippines’ access to the Huangyan Island by constructing a chain barrier across the entrance of the lagoon after the standoff and moved maritime patrol boats into waters near the island.29 However, these Chinese vessels have to leave the island in the typhoon season, which could give an opportunity for the Philippines to occupy the island with the help of the USA. Given this, China were on high alert to guard against any retaliation from the Philippines targeting the Huangyan Island. Actually, China’s People’s Daily published two pieces of articles in early July in which the Philippines’ defence

25

Ren min ri bao: Huangyan dao shi jian chong fen xian shi zhong guo de kuan guang xiong huai [People’s Daily: Huangyan Island incident clearly reflects China’s great tolerance]. Tencen News. (9 May 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120510/000109.htm. 26 Luo yuan shao jiang: fei lv bin yu zhong guo dui kang shi yi luan ji shi [Major general Luo Yuan: the Philippines’ military confrontation with China is smashing a stone with an egg]. Tencen News. (9 May 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120509/000336.htm. 27 Zhuan jia cheng nan hai jian dui jin xing yan lian bu pai chu yu Huangyan dao ju shi you guan [Experts said that the military exercise conducted by the SCS fleet is related to the Huangyan Island crisis]. China News. (10 May 2012). http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/05-10/3877096.shtml. 28 Guo jia hai yang ju zhang: dui huang yan dao wei quan dou zheng yao jian ding bu yi [Director of State Oceanic Administration: firmly safeguard sovereignty on the Huangyan island]. China News. 12 June 2012). http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/06-12/3957665.shtml. 29 Renato Cruz De Castro (2015). Facing up to China’s realpolitik approach in the South China Sea dispute: the case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off and its aftermath. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. 3(2), p. 174.

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cooperation with the USA in the SCS and its efforts of internationalizing the SCS issue in ASEAN caused series concerns from China.30

3 Nationalism and Maritime Standoff Between China and Vietnam There are two major maritime standoff between China and Vietnam in the Xisha Islands since the military conflicts in the late 1990s. One is the HYSY (Hai Yang Shi You) 981 standoff in 2014, also known as the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis, another is the Wan’an Tan standoff (Vanguard Bank standoff) in 2019. All the two incidents represent the worst China–Vietnam tensions in the SCS since the Chigua Reef skirmish in 1988 and attached deep concerns from the nationalists of the two countries. The HYSY 981 standoff begun on 2 May 2014 when the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) moved its more advanced oil rig to the 17 nautical South of Zhongjian Island in the Xisha Islands (called by the Vietnamese as Paracel Islands) which is occupied by China but claimed by Vietnam. In order to disturb China’s oil exploration activities, Vietnam sent its coast guard vessels and diving frogman to the disputed waters on 4 May and started a confrontation with the Chinese vessels in the next day. In the following days, the standoff escalated to collisions between the vessels of the two countries. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry, there were as many as 63 Vietnamese vessels in the area at the peak, attempting to break through China’s cordon and ramming the Chinese government ships for a total of 1416 times from 2 May to 7 June.31 More seriously, Vietnam also condoned anti-China demonstrations at home from mid-May, which caused more than 300 Chinese casualties and heavy property losses.32 The stalemate has not ended until mid-July when Chinese oil rig finished the oil exploration works and moved to Hainan Island. In spite of the most serious confrontation between China and Vietnam in the SCS in the past three decades, the Chinese government effectively managed domestic nationalism on this dispute by using a manipulative tactic on media. First of all, compared with the strong anti-Philippines sentiments during the Huangyan Island standoff, there was less powerful anti-Vietnamese propaganda in China during the oil 30

See Ren min ri bao: jin ti fei jie dong meng wai zhang hui chao zuo nan hai wen ti [People’s Daily: remaining vigilant about the Philippines’ efforts of hyping the SCS issue in the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting]. Tencent News. (3 July 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120703/000159.htm; Ren min ri bao: mei duan qi nei wu li zai ya zhou fa dong dui zhong guo leng zhan [People’s Daily: the US could not initiate Cold-War against China in the Asia in the near future]. Tencent News. (10 July 2012). https://news.qq.com/a/20120706/000661.htm. 31 The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (8 June 2014). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_6 62805/t1163264.shtml. 32 Ibid.

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rig crisis. On one hand, the national media like People’s Daily published dozens of articles during the crisis, but none appeared in the front page. On the other hand, most of the reports were coping Foreign Ministry’s statements rather than the nationalist outcry of escalating the standoff into a small-scale war.33 It is obviously that the Chinese government delicately controlled the media reports in order to make the nationalists clam down and thus avoiding a strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment at home which could complicate the territorial dispute in the SCS. Second, there was a milder response to the nationwide anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam during the oil rig crisis. Almost ten days after the maritime standoff started in the SCS, a large-scale and violent anti-China protests spread from the southern Ho Chi Minh City to the central and northern provinces in Vietnam and caused more than hundreds Chinese casualties. In spite of this most intense anti-China protest in Vietnam since normalization in 1991, China actually made great efforts to cool down the nationalist fever rather than reviving the xenophobia towards the Vietnamese. One of the clear signs is that the CCTV News (Xin Wen Lian Bo), which is the most important programme showing the official activities of Chinese top leaders and major global events, did not mention about the anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam even two Chinese citizens were tortured and killed by the Vietnamese protestors on 14 May. At the same day, People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency also did not report the outrage against Chinese in Vietnam in 14 May, only the nationalists’ Global Times published an editorial condemning the Vietnamese rioters. It is not until the 15 May evening that China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi had an emergent call with Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh, during which Wang strongly condemned the serious violent incident against foreign-invested companies in Vietnam, lodged solemn representations, and urged the Vietnamese side to take resolute and effective measures to immediately stop all violence and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and property of Chinese companies in Vietnam.34 However, it is a moderate response as Wang neither talked about the Chinese casualties nor demanded of punishing the perpetrator. Five years later, another intense standoff between China and Vietnam was happened around the Wan’an Tan/Vanguard Bank in Nansha/ Spratly Islands, which is known as Wan’an Tan incident. It was started on 3 July 2019 when the Chinese Hai Yang Di Zhi 8 exploration ship was sent to survey the seabed to the northeast of Wan’an Tan. However, the Chinese ship was harassed by the Vietnamese coast guard vessels. Since then, the most severe standoff between China and Vietnam in the SCS

33

In fact, a total of 36 articles were published by People’s Daily during the 74 days of the crisis between 2 May and 15 July, none appeared in the front page and most copying the Foreign Ministry’s statements. See Frances Yaping Wang, Brantly Womack (2019). Jawing through crisis: Chinese and Vietnamese media strategies in the South China Sea. Journal of Contemporary China. 28(119), p. 713. 34 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on 16 May 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (16 May 2014). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/eng/fyrth/ t1156893.htm.

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since 2014 was begun and lasted for nearly four-months.35 Both sides had mobilized vast resources from government, military, party, and media to fight against each other. Nonetheless, the way Vietnam and China had managed the crisis is different from the previous one as both countries tried to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.36 In that case, both Vietnam and China had made conscious efforts to avoid an uncontrolled nationalism by either reducing public reports of the incident on the official and social medias or breaking up the protests.37 First of all, there is few news or comments about the maritime standoff between China and Vietnam in the SCS during the Wan’an Tan incident in Chinese society. In fact, the earliest reports of the Wan’an Tan incident published by Chinese official medias were not found until 18 September when both the CCTV and Global Times copied the statement released by Chinese Foreign Ministry. It was said that China required Vietnam to immediately stop its unilateral infringement activities while China would like to continue to work with the Vietnamese side to properly settle relevant issues through friendly consultations.38 In the next day, People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) published a commentary on how the Vietnamese unilateral oil and gas activities cause Wan’an Tan incident and why the bilateral negotiation is the only way to solve the issue and warning the external forces not to intervene, which

35

Actually, there are different narratives of the Wanan Bank incident from China and Vietnam. From Chinese source, the Vietnam should be blamed as it violated the DOC spirit (joint development) and conducted unilateral oil and gas activities in the disputed waters of the Wanan Bank. Moreover, the normal and legal geological exploration activities conducted by Chinese Haiyangdizhi 8 in the Wanan Bank was harassed by the Vietnamese coast guard vessels. But for the Vietnamese, Haiyangdizhi 8 illegally entered into the EEZ and continental shelf and the Chinese vessels operating in Block 06-01 to threaten Vietnam’s drilling operations there. See Wang Daozhen, Cao Yaxiong (2020). Wan an tan shi jian yu yue nan de nan hai zheng ce zou xiang [Wanan Bank incident and the prospects of Vietnam’s SCS policy]. Dong nan ya yan jiu [Southeast Asian Studies]. (4), pp. 21–22; Lye Liang Fook & Ha Hoang Hop (2019). The Vanguard Bank Incident: Developments and What Next? ISEAS Perspective. (69), pp. 2–3. 36 Lye Liang Fook & Ha Hoang Hop (2019). The Vanguard Bank Incident: Developments and What Next? ISEAS Perspective. (69), p. 6. 37 On Vietnam’s part, the police apparently took swift action to break up a small group of protestors calling themselves the “No-U” group (the name deliberately chosen to oppose China’s U-shaped nine-dash line map) that gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi on 6 August 2019.31 This demonstration took place more than a month after the standoff started on 3 July. In contrast to 2014, the waves of anti-China protests started only about ten days after the Oil Rig 891 moved near to Triton Island on 2 May 2014. See Lye Liang Fook & Ha Hoang Hop (2019). The Vanguard Bank Incident: Developments and What Next? ISEAS Perspective. (69), p. 6. 38 Sheng Yang. Yue fang ying ting zhi dan fang mian qing quan huo dong [The Vietnamese side should stop its unilateral infringement activities]. CCTV. (18 September 2014). http://military.cctv. com/2019/09/18/ARTIi3gdAx3QL5LVvV53fOC6190918.shtml; Zhang Hui. Wai jiao bu: zhong fang zai wan an tan you guan zuo ye wu ke fei yi, yuan yu yue fang xie shang chu li [Foreign Ministry: Chinese operations in waters of the Wanan Bank are lawful, China would like to work with the Vietnamese side to properly settle relevant issues through consultations]. Global Times. (18 September 2014). https://m.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKmTIi.

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coincides with the Foreign Ministry’s statement.39 Except these brief reports of the diplomatic rhetoric, no other articles can be found in Chinese official medias during the maritime disputes in Wan’an Tan. Second, even the social media was also censored by the Chinese government during the standoff between China and Vietnam in the SCS. For instance, the earliest reports of the Wan’an Tan incident appeared online was found on 23 July, almost 20 days after the beginning of the standoff. It first revealed that the standoff between the coast guard vessels of China and Vietnam in the waters of Wan’an Tan has lasted for more than one week.40 Two days later, another article was published by the nationalist on Sohu, one of the main search engines and news Websites in China. Different from the previous one, this article not only criticized the Vietnam for invading Chinese waters but described in detail of the beginning stage and the new development of the standoff by using both Chinese sources and analysis from the American think tank.41 Nearly one month later, a piece of article was appeared on Sohu, which concluded that no wars would be happened between China and Vietnam in the SCS and warned Russia not to cooperate with Vietnam in the oil and gas area.42 It is the first article that called on the peaceful resolution of the Wan’an Tan crisis among the Chinese nationalists. Since then, no other articles can be found on Chinese medias until 18 September when both the official media and social media reported the statement released by Chinese Foreign Ministry. Finally, China responded to the Vietnamese’s provocation in the Wan’an Tan in a soft manner, which is different from the previous tough stance on the 2014 standoff. On one hand, China exercised self-restraint in the standoff with Vietnam and prevented the situation from getting worse. In practice, no collisions and clashes were happened between the two vessels during the Wan’an Tan incident. On the other hand, China has attempted to play the dispute down from the very beginning of the standoff. Actually, China not only imposed censorship to the medias of reporting the incident but expressed the clear sign of addressing the dispute through friendly consultation.43 39

Lei Xiaolu. Zhe cai shi jie jue wan an tan shi jian de zui jia xuan ze [This is the best way to solve the Wan’an Tan incident]. People’s Daily Overseas Edition. (19 September 2014). https://bai jiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1645072300346971768&wfr=spider&for=pc. 40 Wan’an Tan: zhong yue hai jing yi dui zhi yi zhou, zhong guo zai zi ji de di pan cai you zi ji shuo le suan [Wan’an Tan: one week after the standoff between the coast guard vessels of China and Vietnam, China has the final word to the oil and gas activities in its own waters]. Sohu. (23 July 2014). https://www.sohu.com/a/328798968_100083679. 41 Zhong yue nan hai dui zhi: zhong guo wan dun hai jing chuan kai jin wan an tan, nan hai bei zhan dao jiao bi xu hui gui zhong guo [China-Vietnam standoff in the SCS: Chinese coast guard vessels arrived at Wan’an Tan, the occupied islands must be returned to China]. Sohu. ( 25 July 2014). https://www.sohu.com/a/329291675_100083679. 42 Wan’an tan zhe yang shou hui: zhong fang ru zhu bian yue nan du zi kai fa wei gong tong kai fa, zhu bu gan zou wai bu shi li [The return of Wan’an Tan: turning Vietnam’s unilateral development to joint development by both sides, gradually moving away foreign forces]. Sohu. (9 August 9 2019). https://m.sohu.com/a/332524587_100083679. 43 See the above two parts of the media reports of the Wan’an Tan incident and the statement released by Chinese Foreign Ministry. See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press

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4 China’s Trade-Off Between Sovereignty Protection and Stability Maintenance in the SCS As mentioned before, China’s very different tactic of using media to manage the nationalist sentiment to escalate/de-escalate the tensions in the SCS is first determined by the nature of the dispute. Generally speaking, the SCS dispute includes the territorial dispute which refers to the national sovereignty of the islands and reefs in the disputed waters of the SCS, and the conflicting maritime interests of these islands and reefs based on the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although both the territorial dispute and conflicting maritime interests are the main focuses of the SCS dispute and have long been claimed by China, maintaining territorial integrity is the first main business for the Chinese government. To be more specific, China has to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity when there is an intense dispute about territory in the SCS, so as to please the nationalists, enhance the legitimacy of the communist regime, and thus consolidating its rule at home. In practice, territory and sovereignty have always been the most sensitive issue and the top priority in China’s diplomacy ever since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. As the territorial disputes intensified in the East Sea (ES) and SCS since the late 2010s, Chinese leaders reaffirmed its firm determination to protect national sovereignty on various occasions. Chinese former President Hu Jintao vowed to maintain national territory and state sovereignty after the Japanese government illegally “purchase” the Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands in September 2012.44 Since Xi Jinping came to office, he has actually taken a tougher stance on the issues bearing on national territory and state sovereignty than his predecessors. Soon after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping warned the foreign states not to expect China to make a deal with them at the expense of core national interests, and not to except China to bear the consequence of any infringement on its sovereignty, security and development interest.45 It should be highly noted that the claims on sovereignty is much more important than security and development interest, which means that the significance of maintaining territorial integrity is much higher than protecting maritime interests. After all, no Chinese leaders could afford the serious consequences of losing even one small piece of territory, no matter land or sea, either through peaceful negotiation or military conflicts with foreign countries, the weak states in particular. Conference on September 18, 2019. Embassy of PRC in Malaysia. (September 18, 2019). https:// www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cede//det/fyrth/t1699416.htm. 44 See Hu Jin Tao jiu dang qian zhong ri guan xi he diao yu dao wen ti biao ming li chang [Hu Jintao made position on Sino-Japan relations and Diaoyu Dao issue]. Embassy of PRC in Japan. (9 September 2012). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cejp/chn/zt/dyd/zhongfanglichang/t969361.htm. 45 Xi Jinping: tong chou liang ge da ju, hang shi zou he ping fa zhan dao lu de ji chu [Xi Jinping: to coordinate China’s domestic and international efforts, consolidate the foundation of the path of the peaceful development]. The Central People’s Government of PRC. (29 January 2013). http:// www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-01/29/content_2321822.htm.

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Given the Chinese top leaders’ hard-line stance on the sovereignty of the islands and reefs in the disputed waters of the SCS and their determination to preserve territorial integrity, China is unlikely to make compromise on the territorial dispute with the ASEAN claimant states. Instead, China is more likely to mobilize internal and external resources as possible as it can to support its claims and operations in the SCS, in which the nationalism is an useful instrument for the Chinese leaders to get support at home and pressure the claimant states to make concessions. That is why the Chinese government utilized nationalism through monopolizing medias to strengthen its claims on the sovereignty of the island and deter the Philippines from occupying the island during the Huangyan Island crisis. Eventually, China has de facto controlled the Huangyan Island by locking the entrance of the lagoon and initiating constant ship presence around the island, though the grounded Philippine warship has been there since the crisis. China’s assertive actions during the Huangyan Island standoff is perceived as a successful victory in the SCS dispute since the violent clashes with Vietnam in 1988, which was called the “Huangyan Island” model by Chinese scholars. This model, as Su Hao, who is an renowned expert in Chinese diplomacy at China Foreign Affairs University (directly affiliated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China) said, all parties must maintain the status quo and no parties are allowed to revise it easily. Otherwise, China has to crush the foreign invasion and strengthen control of the occupied islands and reefs.46 Despite the tough stance on the territorial dispute with ASEAN claimant states in the SCS, China has responded to the conflicts of maritime interests with the SCS countries relatively moderately. By investigating China’s media strategies and its moderate foreign policy during China–Vietnam oil rig crisis in 2014, Yaping Wang and Brantly Womack concluded that the Chinese nationalist sentiment on these standoff was calm and definitely less feverish than before the 2012 Sino–Philippines Huangyan Island standoff or the 2016 Sino–Philippines arbitration.47 They further analysed how the government manipulate the media and thus to offset the domestic nationalism when executing a moderate foreign policy during the maritime crisis with Vietnam in the SCS. In a similar vein, China has adopted a more moderate policy towards the Wan’an Tan standoff with Vietnam in 2019. One of the main reasons of China’s moderate policy during the maritime crisis is that these crisis are directly caused by the conflicts of maritime interests (such as the natural resource) rather than the lose and occupation of the islands and reefs in the disputed waters, though the roots of the crisis is the territorial dispute. In order words, China has to protect the maritime territory at first as it determines to the legitimacy of the regime. While it is unwise for China to take a same hard-line stance on the conflicts of oil and gas exploration and fishing and other natural resource in the disputed waters 46

Gao Yu. (28 August 2012). Zhuan jia: wo guo chu bu que li huang yan dao mo shi, nan hai bu shi ling he bo yi [Experts: China has established the Huangyan Island model, it is not a zero-sum game in the SCS]. CCTV. http://news.cntv.cn/special/zfjcnhhyddz/shouye/index.shtml. 47 According to them, despite the overall strong nationalism in China on the SCS dispute, the public held a relatively mild opinion towards this dispute with Vietnam. See Frances Yaping Wang, Brantly Womack (2019). Jawing through crisis: Chinese and Vietnamese media strategies in the South China Sea. Journal of Contemporary China. 28(119), p. 725.

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of the SCS because these conflicts are not necessarily endangered the Chinese regime or substantially revised the status quo in the SCS. Instead, China proposed the “Gong Tong Kai Fa [Joint Development]” with ASEAN claimant states in the SCS ever since the 1990s, so as to alleviate conflicts and maintain stability of the SCS. So, it is safe to say that there is a zero-sum game on the territorial sovereignty (“Zhu Quan Shu Wo [Sovereignty Belongs to Us]”) and a win–win cooperation on marine development (“Gong Tong Kai Fa [Joint Development]”) between China and ASEAN claimant states in the SCS. In that case, China has to mobilize internal and external resource to maintain the territorial integrity in which the domestic nationalism is included, while seeking joint development with ASEAN claimant states to maintain stability of the SCS. In fact, China has adopted a moderate and flexible policy to deal with the conflicts of maritime interests in the SCS such as de-escalating the tensions on the oil and gas exploration either conducted by Chinese enterprises or Vietnamese companies or the illegal fishing activities conducted by the Vietnamese fishing boats in the disputed waters. Another major factor affecting China’s manipulation of nationalism in its SCS policy is Chinese leaders’ trade-off between “Wei Quan [Sovereignty Protection]” and “Wei Wen [Stability Maintenance]” in the SCS. Kuik pointed out that the instrumentality of territorial issues in inter-elite politics and group interests may have further motivated the Communist Party of China (CPC) elites to continue finding an optimal point between sovereignty protection and stability maintenance.48 On one hand, China has to maintain its territorial integrity by using coercive means when there is an intense dispute over territory in the SCS. On the other hand, the assertiveness itself is neither the goal nor an inherent characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.49 It is also a departure from its earlier charm diplomacy in Southeast Asia between 1996 and 2007 which manifested cordial bilateral engagement, active participation in multilateral forums and constructive involvement in regional economic integration.50 Given this, China has also adopted some “soft” measures such as the pragmatic cooperation under the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) framework to ease tensions in the SCS. Usually, there is a top priority on stability maintenance after sovereignty protection so that the tensions could be mitigated. However, although China hopes to maintain peace and stability, the moderate approach or the policy of self-restraint may instead encourage some countries to be more demanding in their relations with China.51 Hence, China has turned to a more proactive and assertive approach with the aim of deterring other countries from further provocations and escalation.52 48

Cheng Chwee Kuik (2017). Explaining the contradiction in China’s South China Sea policy: structural drivers and domestic imperatives. China: An International Journal. 15(1), p. 168. 49 Zhou Fangyin (2016). Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy. International Affairs. 92(4), p. 877. 50 Cheng Chwee Kuik (2017). Explaining the contradiction in China’s South China Sea policy: structural drivers and domestic imperatives. China: An International Journal. 15(1), p. 165. 51 Zhou Fangyin (2016). Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy. International Affairs. 92(4), p. 877. 52 Ibid, p. 878.

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As discussed before, domestic nationalism was aroused by China to legitimize its provocative actions of forcing the Philippine vessels to depart from the nearby waters of the Huangyan Island and de fact controlling the island during the 2012 Huangyan Island standoff with the Philippines. Since 2012, China has demonstrated a high level of strategic patience, and its use of strategic measures in handling the SCS issue has become more flexible and effective.53 Even in the oil rig crisis with Vietnam between May and July 2014, China has cautiously used media in order to avoid the anti-Vietnamese sentiment to pour in and thus binding its SCS policy. One month after the end of the standoff with Vietnam, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi advocated the “dual-track” approach in resolving the SCS issue at a press conference after the China-ASEAN (10 + 1) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 9 August 2014. It means that any relevant dispute will be addressed by the countries directly concerned through friendly consultations and negotiations and in a peaceful way.54 It is an important indication of China’s preference for stability maintenance as well as its flexibility over the issues in the SCS. Thereafter, there is few big troubles between China and ASEAN claimant states in the SCS until the 2016 Arbitration. As the Arbitration seriously challenges China’s sovereignty in the SCS, China has strongly opposed it by embarking on a anti-Philippine and anti-American propaganda through medias. Nonetheless, the statement between China and the Philippines was broken after the convergence of China’s BRI and the “Build! Build! Build!” (BBB) Programme of the Duterte administration. Meanwhile, China pushes forward the COC consultation process since mid-2017 (the COC framework document was adopted in August 2017) with the aim to stabilize the SCS through establishing rule and order in the region. In the following years, the COC process has made some progress. In August 2018, the COC Single Draft Negotiating Text was formed55 ; in 2019, all parties completed the first reading of the COC SDNT ahead of the schedule and prepared for the second reading process.56 It is in this context that the Wan’an Tan standoff between China and Vietnam in 2019 not provoked an outcry from the nationalists in China. Instead, China tightened its control over the medias in order not to undermine the China–Vietnam relations as well as the COC process.

53

Ibid. Wang Yi: handle the South China Sea issue through the “dual-track” approach. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. (9 August 2014). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_6 63340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2747_663498/2749_663502/201408/t20140810_518825.html. 55 Carl Thayer. (3 August 2018). A closer look at the ASEAN-China single draft South China Sea code of conduct. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-chinasingle-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/. 56 The first reading of the single draft negotiating text of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea completed ahead of the schedule. (1 August2019). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/201908/t20190802_8523410.htm. 54

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5 Conclusion This book chapter examines the different roles of nationalism in China’s “assertive” SCS policy by investigating the three major maritime standoff between China and the Philippines, and China and Vietnam in 2012, 2014 and 2019, respectively. It finds that nationalism has not always functioned as a pushing factor in China’s SCS policy. Generally speaking, China has to protect its national sovereignty by provoking xenophobic actions when there is an intense dispute over territory in the SCS. It is also more likely for China to ramp up nationalism to support its SCS policy when sovereignty protection becomes the top priority. Otherwise, China is more likely to cool down the nationalist fever so as to reduce the conflicting maritime interests and thus to stabilize the SCS when stability maintenance becomes the top priority. In practice, China took a tougher stance on the Huangyan Island standoff with the Philippines than the oil rig crisis and the Wan’an Tan standoff with Vietnam. In general, nationalism served as a significant source of legitimacy of China’s SCS policy during these standoff and crisis, but it becomes more effective during the Huangyan Island standoff. As the top priority of China’s SCS policy has shifted from sovereignty protection to stability maintenance since the land reclamation in the SCS in early 2015, China is more likely to take a flexible and moderate position on the SCS dispute with ASEAN claimant states. Although the rise of nationalism during the COVID-19 pandemic has been witnessed, it is not necessary to intensify the tensions in the SCS. In addition, the Chinese government has faced with high pressures on the sustainable high economic growth amid/after the COVID-19 pandemic, hence, maintaining a peaceful external environment is the key to promote domestic development. Given this, China would be prudent in manipulating the nationalism to support its SCS policy in the context of the rising power rivalry between China and the USA in Southeast Asia under the Joe Biden administration.

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Fu Ying: wo ceng qin li Huangyan dao shi jian, you xie hua bi xu yao shuo [Fu Ying: I experienced the Huangyan island incident personally, I have to say some words]. Sina News. (2021, March 15). https://news.sina.cn/2021-03-15/detail-ikkntiam1745372.d.html Grant, S., & Armstrong, P. (2012, May 10). Tensions over disputed island appear to ease. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/10/world/asia/china-philippines-dispute/index.html Guo jia hai yang ju zhang: dui huang yan dao wei quan dou zheng yao jian ding bu yi [Director of State Oceanic Administration: Firmly safeguard sovereignty on the Huangyan island]. China News. (2012, June 12). http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/06-12/3957665.shtml Huan qiu shi bao: wu rang fei lv bin kong zhi nan hai mo ca jie zou [Global Times: Don’t let the Philippines lead the SCS dispute]. Global Times. (2012, April 25). https://world.huanqiu.com/art icle/9CaKrnJvbyj. Hu Jin Tao jiu dang qian zhong ri guan xi he diao yu dao wen ti biao ming li chang [Hu Jintao made position on Sino-Japan relations and Diaoyu Dao issue]. Embassy of PRC in Japan (2012, September 9). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cejp/chn/zt/dyd/zhongfanglichang/t969361.htm. Jie fang jun bao fa biao shu ming wen zhang: xiu xiang qiang zou zhong guo ban cun ling tu [People’s Liberal Army Daily published article: Can’t take away half an inch of China’s territory]. Tencent News. (2012, May 10). https://news.qq.com/a/20120510/000155.htm. Kuik, C. C. (2017). Explaining the contradiction in China’s South China Sea policy: Structural drivers and domestic imperatives. China: An International Journal, 15(1). Lei, X. (2014, September 19). Zhe cai shi jie jue wan an tan shi jian de zui jia xuan ze [This is the best way to solve the Wan’an Tan incident]. People’s Daily Overseas Edition. https://baijiahao. baidu.com/s?id=1645072300346971768&wfr=spider&for=pc Luo yuan shao jiang: fei lv bin yu zhong guo dui kang shi yi luan ji shi [Major general Luo Yuan: the Philippines’ military confrontation with China is smashing a stone with an egg]. Tencent News. (2012, May 9). https://news.qq.com/a/20120509/000336.htm Nan hai wen ti guo ji hua shi zhan lue duan shi xuan bu fan zhong guo wai jiao da chuan [Internationalizing the SCS dispute is unwise and can not undermine China’s diplomacy]. Tencen News. (2012, April 26). https://news.qq.com/a/20120426/000281.htm Ping lun cheng zhong guo yao gei fei lv bin yi jiao xun ling qi bei hou shi li ju sang [The commentary claims that China should give the Philippines a lesson and frustrate the forces behind the country]. Tencent News. (2012, April 23). https://news.qq.com/a/20120423/000799.htm Quek, K., & Johnston, A. I. (2018). Can China back down? Crisis de-escalation in the shadow of popular opposition. International Security, 42(3). Ren min ri bao: mei duan qi nei wu li zai ya zhou fa dong dui zhong guo leng zhan [People’s Daily: The US could not initiate Cold-War against China in the Asia in the near future]. Tencent News. (2012, July 10). https://news.qq.com/a/20120706/000661.htm Ren min ri bao ping Huangyan dao dui zhi: ren wu ke ren jiu wu xu zai ren [People’s Daily commented on the standoff in the Huangyan Island: Zero tolerance for the Philippines if there is no compromise]. Tencent News. (2012, May 8). https://news.qq.com/a/20120508/000149.htm Ren min ri bao: fei lv bin dui nan hai sheng suo wang gu shi shi bu hui de cheng [People’s Daily: the Philippines ignore the facts of the SCS claims and can not get success]. Tencent News. (2012, April 24). https://news.qq.com/a/20120424/000184.htm Ren min ri bao: Huangyan dao shi jian chong fen xian shi zhong guo de kuan guang xiong huai [People’s Daily: Huangyan Island incident clearly reflects China’s great tolerance]. Tencent News. (2012, May 9). https://news.qq.com/a/20120510/000109.htm Ren min ri bao: jie jue nan hai wen ti bu neng zhi kao yi zhi shou [People’s Daily: solving the SCS issue can not rely on one hand]. Global Times. (2012, April 13). https://world.huanqiu.com/art icle/9CaKrnJuWF9. Ren min ri bao: jin ti fei jie dong meng wai zhang hui chao zuo nan hai wen ti [People’s Daily: Remaining vigilant about the Philippines’ efforts of hyping the SCS issue in the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting]. Tencent News. (2012, July 3). https://news.qq.com/a/20120703/000159.htm Scobell, A. (2018). The South China Sea and U.S.-China rivalry. Political Science Quarterly, 133(2).

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Shi pin: zhong guo yu chuan zao fei lv bin jun jian xi rao: zhong guo hai jian fu Huangyan dao bao hu wo yu chuan yu min [Video: Chinese fishing boats was harassed by the Philippines warships: Chinese marine surveillance ships came to the Huangyan island to protect the Chinese fishermen. CCTV. (2012, April 11). http://news.cntv.cn/china/20120411/120233.shtml Thayer, C. (2018, August 3). A closer look at the ASEAN-China single draft South China Sea code of conduct. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-china-sin gle-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/ The first reading of the single draft negotiating text of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea completed ahead of the schedule. (2019, August 1). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/201908/t20190802_8523410.htm The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2014, June 8). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ t1163264.shtml Turcsányi, R. Q. (2018). Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea: Power sources, domestic politics, and reactive foreign policy. Springer Nature. Wan’an tan zhe yang shou hui: zhong fang ru zhu bian yue nan du zi kai fa wei gong tong kai fa, zhu bu gan zou wai bu shi li [The return of Wan’an Tan: Turning Vietnam’s unilateral development to joint development by both sides, gradually moving away foreign forces]. Sohu. (August 9, 2019). https://m.sohu.com/a/332524587_100083679 Wan’an Tan: zhong yue hai jing yi dui zhi yi zhou, zhong guo zai zi ji de di pan cai you zi ji shuo le suan [Wan’an Tan: One week after the standoff between the coast guard vessels of China and Vietnam, China has the final word to the oil and gas activities in its own waters]. Sohu. (July 23, 2014). https://www.sohu.com/a/328798968_100083679. Wang, D., & Cao, Y. (2020). Wan an tan shi jian yu yue nan de nan hai zheng ce zou xiang [Wanan Bank incident and the prospects of Vietnam’s SCS policy]. Dong nan ya yan jiu [Southeast Asian Studies] (4). Wang, F. Y., Womack, B. (2019). Jawing through crises: Chinese and Vietnamese media strategies in the South China Sea. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(119). Wang, I. Handle the South China Sea issue through the “dual-track” approach. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2014, August 9). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_6 63340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2747_663498/2749_663502/201408/t20140810_518825.html Wo hai jian chuan yu fei lv bin jun jian nan hai dui zhi [Maritime standoff between Chinese maritime surveillance ships and the Philippines warships]. CCTV. (2012, April 11). http://news.cntv.cn/ military/20120411/121022.shtml Xi Jinping: tong chou liang ge da ju, hang shi zou he ping fa zhan dao lu de ji chu [Xi Jinping: To coordinate China’s domestic and international efforts, consolidate the foundation of the path of the peaceful development]. The Central People’s Government of PRC. (2013, January 29). http:// www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-01/29/content_2321822.htm Yang, S. (2014, September 18). Yue fang ying ting zhi dan fang mian qing quan huo dong [The Vietnamese side should stop its unilateral infringement activities]. CCTV. http://military.cctv. com/2019/09/18/ARTIi3gdAx3QL5LVvV53fOC6190918.shtml Yu, G. (2012, August 28). Zhuan jia: wo guo chu bu que li huang yan dao mo shi, nan hai bu shi ling he bo yi [Experts: China has established the Huangyan Island model, it is not a zero-sum game in the SCS]. CCTV. http://news.cntv.cn/special/zfjcnhhyddz/shouye/index.shtml Yunbi, Z. (2012, April 27). Military makes solemn vow on territory. China Daily. https://www.chi nadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/27/content_15154373.htm Zhang, H. Wai jiao bu: zhong fang zai wan an tan you guan zuo ye wu ke fei yi, yuan yu yue fang xie shang chu li [Foreign Ministry: Chinese operations in waters of the Wanan Bank are lawful, China would like to work with the Vietnamese side to properly settle relevant issues through consultations]. Global Times. (2014, September 18). https://m.huanqiu.com/article/9Ca KrnKmTIi Zhang, K. (2019). Cautious bully reputation, resolve, and Beijing’s use of coercion in the South China Sea. International Security, 44(1).

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Zhao, S. (2000). Chinese nationalism and its international orientations. Political Science Quarterly, 115(1). Zhao, S. (2005). China’s pragmatic nationalism: Is it manageable? Washington Quarterly, 29(1). Zhong yue nan hai dui zhi: zhong guo wan dun hai jing chuan kai jin wan an tan, nan hai bei zhan dao jiao bi xu hui gui zhong guo [China-Vietnam standoff in the SCS: Chinese coast guard vessels arrived at Wan’an Tan, the occupied islands must be returned to China]. Sohu. (2014, July 25). https://www.sohu.com/a/329291675_100083679 Zhu, T. (2001). Nationalism and Chinese foreign policy. China Review, 1(1). Zhuan jia cheng nan hai jian dui jin xing yan lian bu pai chu yu Huangyan dao ju shi you guan [Experts said that the military exercise conducted by the SCS fleet is related to the Huangyan Island crisis]. China News. (2012, May 10). http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/05-10/3877096. shtml

Nian Peng is Executive Director and Associate Fellow of Research Centre for SAARC States(RCSS), Hainan Normal University, China, as well as Director of Research Centre for Asian Studies, Haikou, China. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. His main research interests are in the areas of China-Southeast/South Asia relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), maritime security of the Indo-Pacific. He authored four books-Crossing the Himalayas: Buddhist Ties, Regional Integration and GreatPower Rivalry (Springer Nature, 2021), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic (Springer Nature, 2021), International Pressures, Strategic Preference, and Myanmar’s China Policy since 1988 (Springer Nature, 2020), Leng Zhan Hou Yin Mian Guan Xi Yan Jiu[A Study on Indo-Myanmar Relations after the ColdWar] (Shi Shi Chu Ban She [Current Affairs Press], 2017). His refereed articles have been notably published in Ocean Development and International Law, Pacific Focus, Asian Affairs, Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu[Southeast Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu[South Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu Ji Kan [South Asian Studies Quarterly]. He also contributes his perspectives to many think tanks and various local and international media outlets such as Asia Centre in France, East Asian Forum in Australia, The Diplomat in the US, Bangkok Post in Thailand, Lian He Zao Bao in Singapore, South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, Global Times and CGTN in China.

When Populists Perform Foreign Policy: Duterte’s China Pivot and the South China Sea Dispute Aries A. Arugay

Abstract From the start of his administration, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared bold changes in the country’s formerly conservative and predictable foreign policy. The contempt for the West, admiration toward unlikely allies such as Russia and China, and indifference toward international law and norms were all essential departures from the nation’s previous positions. This chapter uses the concept of performative populism to analyze Duterte’s foreign policy, particularly toward the South China Sea dispute. It argues that as a specific political style of conducting foreign policy, populism can reorient established positions and biases but in turn generates uncertainty and erosion of credibility in the face of weak institutions and domestic distractions. It also traces the changes that Duterte’s government instituted on the issue by embarking on more diplomatic and multifaceted approach that includes trade, defense cooperation, joint development, infrastructure. In the end, the sustainability of populist performances on foreign policy depends on reconciling the tensions and overlaps between the populist’s multiple audiences and constituencies. By way of conclusion, this paper examines the prospects of Duterte’s foreign policy given existing strategic realities, bureaucratic politics, and domestic political stability. Keywords Populism · South China Sea · Performativity · Duterte · Philippines

1 Introduction Populism is so far becoming a political trend in the twenty-first century. It has led mainstream media and academics to raise alarm on democracy’s future around the 1 Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). Third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

A. A. Arugay (B) Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City, The Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_3

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globe. Just as a wave of democratization swept the world from the 1970s onwards,1 there seems to be a reverse wave of populism afflicting democracies old and new. From democracy’s bastion in Europe and North America to regions where it remains fragile and immature such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America, populism has attracted mass publics to the dismay and despair of democratic elites worldwide. And while populists achieved power in these countries mainly through the ballot box, most scholars and analysts have judged them as an existential threat to democracy. The term ‘populist’ provided the pejorative and insulting label to a myriad of political leaders as diverse as Trump, Erdogan, Morales, Wilders, Thaksin, and Chávez. Despite differences in style, ideology, and policy leanings, these populists are often depicted as detrimental to democracy, particularly its liberal-representative version.2 One can include Rodrigo Duterte among this new cohort of populist leaders. But while most of his counterparts focused on domestic policy, the Philippine president surprisingly started his term by making bold changes in the country’s formerly conservative and predictable foreign policy. Displaying a contempt for the West, an admiration toward Russia and China, and an indifference toward international law and norms were all seen as radical departures from the nation’s previous positions and manifestations of populism as applied internationally. Campaigning on a platform of change, Duterte’s new architecture of Philippine foreign policy aims to establish independence from any single major power as well as an openness to nurture deeper relations with new partner countries in its neighborhood. In his inaugural speech, the chief architect of foreign policy promised to reorient the county’s foreign relations toward the national interest in order to benefit ordinary Filipinos. While journalists and researchers have already spilled ink on the role of personality, charisma, political savvy, and skill of populists, political science scholarship has so far paid less attention to the role of agency and individuality in explaining populism’s allure to the electorate.3 This perspective requires seeing populism less as an ideology but more as a political style used by politicians to approach voters through a combination of fiery rhetoric, unorthodox manners, and controversial declarations.4 This chapter argues that the performative aspects of populism translate into electoral voter mobilization and sustained political support. When combined with some semblance of credible commitment through a substantive policy agenda that seeks to overturn the status quo, populists can affect different policy areas, even the most resistant to change such as foreign policy.

2 Diamond, Larry. (2016). Democracy after Trump. Foreign Affairs. (2016, November 14). https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-11-14/democracy-after-trump. 3 Samet, Robert. (2017). The denouncers: populism and the press in Venezuela.” Journal of Latin American Studies 49(1), pp. 1–27; Mouffe, Chantal. (2016). The populist moment. https://www. opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-moment. 4 Moffitt, Benjamin. (2016). The global rise of populism: performance, political style, and representation. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

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The Philippines is a good case to disaggregate the different aspects of populism viewed as a distinct political style. Despite being Asia’s oldest republic, its democratization process has been stalled by a ‘wild’ oligarchy that refuses to build more inclusive and responsive representative institutions.5 Instead, its electoral contests feature incessant and often violent contests between rival elite and dynastic factions propped by clientelistic ties with voters. From a socioeconomic standpoint, a majority of the citizens has suffered from poverty, inequality, criminality, and corruption. In other words, the Philippines is a young democracy where populism should have thrived for decades. The 2016 presidential elections featured candidates who represented variants of political styles of campaigning and representation including what we view as performative and substantive populism. This chapter argues that it was due to his skillful combination of performative and substantive populist campaigning. While other candidates used only one of these aspects or disregarded them both, Duterte carried the most resonant message of the day since it was backed with credible commitment and conducive to the political climate of a stagnating Philippine oligarchic regime with democratic trappings.6 Duterte’s populist pivots in foreign policy have far-reaching repercussions for the Philippines as well as the Asia-Pacific region. Questions arose from the ability of the state to credibly maintain its international commitments and its previous strong posturing against revisionist states and challenges to the rule-based order in the IndoPacific. It also added confusion when the firebrand president threatened to abrogate its defense agreements with longtime ally the US and a subsequent friendlier approach toward China amid the favorable ruling on the SCS rendered by the Permanent Court on Arbitration (PCA). Finally, the use of derogatory language to describe world leaders and international institutions was unprecedented and also in violation of diplomatic protocol. While this is unchartered terrain for Philippine diplomacy, Duterte is not the first populist leader in the world to implement a foreign policy embellished with populist performances. How does performative populism affect the ability of leaders to conduct foreign policy? This chapter argues that the elements of performative populism as a political style—appeal to the people, bad manners, and the presence of crisis, breakdown, and threat—have substantive impact on foreign policy.7 First, it can reorient foreign relations in ways that disrupt long-standing alliances with old partners but also explore new external relations. Second, it violates diplomatic norms of protocol and engagement but can popularize foreign policy issues to ordinary members of society. Finally, it can challenge extant institutional arrangements like international law, norms, and orders. This chapter construes populism as a particular political style that combines 5

Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. (2009). The Philippines: predatory regime, growing authoritarian features. Pacific Review 22(3), pp. 335–353; Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6 Arugay, Aries A. (2017). The Philippines in 2016: the electoral earthquake and its aftershocks. In Daljit Singh and Malcolm Cook (Eds.) Southeast Asia Affairs 2017. Singapore: ISEAS = Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 277–296. 7 Moffitt, Benjamin. (2016). The global rise of populism: performance, political style, and representation. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

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rhetorical and esthetic dimensions in performing policy which could be modified depending on whether such performances increase audience costs8 and/or improve constituency support. After a review of the scholarly literature on populism and foreign policy, this chapter discusses the performative aspects of Duterte’s rise as a populist leader in the Philippines. It then discusses his populist foreign policy through two cases that highlight certain performative elements: The SCS dispute emphasized the crisis, breakdown, and threat dimension, while the president’s denigration of US-Philippine relations represents the bad manners approach to foreign policy. The chapter also provides empirical data on the divergence between the populist-laden policy directions of Duterte with the perceptions and views of foreign and security policy experts in the Philippines. This ‘security community’ believed that Duterte’s accommodationist pivot to China is not the best option for the Philippines indicating that the populist leader’s performativity is not successfully persuading this important domestic audience. This chapter offers a tentative analysis on the likely direction of Philippine foreign policy under Duterte and beyond. The realization of the goal of a more independent Philippine foreign policy needs to be reconciled with existing strategic realities, bureaucratic politics, and domestic political stability. Moreover, the sustainability of populist performances on foreign policy depends on reconciling the tensions and overlaps between the audiences and constituencies of the president’s performances. Finally, any successful defense and promotion of the national interest will also be contingent on the ability of the foreign policy bureaucracy to implement the policy content of his performances.

2 Populism as a Performative Political Style9 Populism remains to be one of the most contested concepts in the study of politics despite its growing centrality in the contemporary political milieu. The variety of ways in which scholars have defined and explained populism simply underscores the term’s conceptual vagueness and operational malleability. The extant literature on populism can be divided into five main categories: (1) as a catch-all ideology that separates ‘the pure people’ from the ‘the corrupt elite’; (2) as the logic of ‘the people’; (3) as an anti-status quo discourse; (4) as the preferred organizational strategy of personalistic leaders; and (5) as a ‘political style’ that is performed and enacted by populist leaders. As revealed in the succeeding discussions, each definition highlights particular aspects of the phenomenon while simultaneously masking the other aspects. Mudde’s ideological conception of the term has been the most widely used 8

Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review 88(3), pp. 577–592. 9 This section heavily draws from Magcamit, Michael I. and Aries A. Arugay. (2017). Rodrigo Duterte and the making of a populist demigod. https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/03/17/rodrigo-duterteand-the-making-of-a-populist-demigod-part-1/ and https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/03/17/rodrigoduterte-and-the-making-of-a-populist-demigod-part-2/.

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definition of populism. Based on his formulation, populism is ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’.10 Given the narrow scope of ideas that fall under its command, as well as its relatively limited complexity and ambition when gaged against ‘full’ ideologies, Mudde claims that populism must be viewed as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology that cannot be grasped or understood in any pure form. Rather, the populist ideology is ‘always present in mixed iterations with other ideologies’.11 Other scholars who have adopted the thin-centered ideology thesis like Canovan,12 even went as far as suggesting that populism could be interpreted as the ideology democracy. However, this notion of ‘thin-centeredness’ has been criticized by several political and social theorists who question both the appropriateness and utility of labeling populism as an ideology. For example, Aslanidis argues that the incorrect genus used to categorize populism has ushered in ‘an unneeded amount of normative baggage into the study of populist phenomena, entrenching scholars behind ideological barricades and sharply impairing standards of objectivity in the literature’.13 Meanwhile, Laclau and Mouffe point to the misplaced emphasis being put by proponents of populist ideology on the concept’s ontic content, which according to them explains failure of the definitions that have emerged from this intellectual practice.14 They argue that the focus should be on securing populism’s ontological status by shifting away from the empirical political reality to the processes in which societies are established. That is, from the tangible matters of ‘politics’ to the abstract level of ‘the political’.15 Accordingly, Laclau claims that populism is best understood if viewed as structuring logic of political life or, more precisely, as the logic of ‘the people’.16 But as with the supporters of populist ideology, the proponents of populist logic have also faced major criticisms that pointed to the problem of conceptual slippage, to

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Mudde, Cas. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 23. 11 Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. (2011). Voices of the peoples: populism in Europe and Latin America compared. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, p. 5. 12 Margaret Canovan. (2002). The paradox of Hannah Arendt’s populism. Social Research: An International Quarterly 69(2), pp. 403–422. 13 Aslanidis, Paris. (2016). Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective. Political Studies 64(1), p. 101. 14 Laclau, Ernesto. (2005). On populist reason. London: Verso; Mouffe, Chantal. (2005). The ‘end of politics’ and the challenge of right-wing populism. In Francisco. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the mirror of democracy. London: Verso, pp. 50–71; Mouffe, Chantal. (2005). On the Political. London: Routledge. 15 Mouffe, Chantal. (2005). The ‘end of politics’ and the challenge of right-wing populism. In Francisco. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the mirror of democracy. London: Verso, pp. 8–9. 16 Laclau, Ernesto. (2005). On populist reason. London: Verso; Mouffe, Chantal, p. 47.

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the dilemmas presented by empirical counter-examples and methodological applicability.17 According to these critics, equating populism with the political makes the concept even more vague and slippery, thus, further undermining its theoretical and methodological value when analyzing concrete empirical cases.18 Nevertheless, not all experts share the same views regarding the perceived lack of practical application of Laclau’s earlier works on populism. For example, the members of the Essex School discourse analysis have drawn on the key elements of the Laclauian framework in putting forward their idea of populism as a discourse.19 The school’s key arguments are captured by Panizza’s definition of populism as ‘an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between the people (as the ‘underdogs’) and its other’.20 Other scholars have also experimented on the function of populist discourse by developing qualitative frameworks that measure the level of populism within specific sets of discursive texts21 and quantitative models that employ statistical software analyses of large sets of texts based on the appearance of certain key terms.22 However, similar to the ideological and logical interpretations of populism, the discursive view of populism also faces substantial criticisms. While some highlight the unreliability, irregularity, and bias of the discursive approach,23 others question the discursive method’s ability to provide a workable theoretical model as it merely validates the accuracy and applicability of the Laclauian framework it utilizes.24 Thus, despite the capacity of a discourse-centric strategy to contribute to the advancement of populism scholarship, it cannot be the primary theoretical tool for understanding the phenomenon.25 Another widely cited interpretation of populism that has been applied in a number of empirical studies is based on Weyland’s view of populism as ‘a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based 17

Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032, p. 384. 18 Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032, p. 384; Bonikowski, Bart, and Gidron, Noam. (2016). The populist style in American politics: presidential campaign discourse, 1952–1996. Social Forces 94(4), pp. 1593–1621. 19 See for example Stavrakakis (2004), Panizza (2005), Barros (2005), and Groppo (2009). 20 Panizza, Francisco. (2005). Introduction: populism and the mirror of democracy. In Francisco Panizza (Ed.) Populism and the mirror of democracy. London: Verso, p. 3. 21 Hawkins, Kirk A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and populism in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Jagers, J. and Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: an empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research 46(3), pp. 319–345. 22 Armony, Ariel C. and Armony, Victor. (2005). Indictments, myths, and citizen mobilization in Argentina: a discourse analysis. Latin American Politics & Society, 47(4), pp. 27–54. 23 Pauwels, Teun. (2011). Measuring populism: A quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 21(1), pp. 97–119. 24 Bonikowski, Bart, and Gidron, Noam. (2016). The populist style in American politics: presidential campaign discourse, 1952–1996. Social Forces 94(4), pp. 1593–1621. 25 Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032, p. 386.

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on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’.26 One of the major issues with Weyland’s formulation is its problematic tendency to categorize other modes of organization found across the political continuum as ‘populist’, including the various forms of social movements and community politics.27 Furthermore, as Moffitt and Tormey have pointed out, it is erroneous to suggest that populism only develops in political contexts in which the degree of institutionalism and organization is weak.28 The emergence of populist politics in places that have traditionally strong party discipline and organization (the US, France, and the Netherlands) and in regions where multi-class urban alliances are a commonplace (Latin America) disproves such myths. As Hawkins argues, the heavy emphasis being put on the material aspects of populism—coalitions, historical preconditions, and policies—can only mean that such accounts are lacking.29 Finally, Moffitt and Tormey have put forward a conception of populism as a political style, that is, ‘a repertoire of performative features which cuts across different political situations that are used to create political relations’.30 The underlying belief here is the centrality of performance in politics. For the proponents of performative populism, politics is performance and performance is politics. This view is particularly relevant within an increasingly mediatized and stylized milieu of modern politics, where esthetics and performative components of politics are being highlighted more. Moffit and Tormey identify three core elements of a populist performance, namely: (1) appeal to ‘the people’; (2) perception of crisis, breakdown, and threat; and (3) coarsening of political language or ‘bad manners’.31 Instead of purely relying on the content provided by a populist ideology, or the organizational structures generated by a populist logic, special attention is placed on the role of performative repertoires vis-à-vis the interactions between populist leaders and their supporters.32 It must be emphasized that these performative elements of populism do not exist in isolation from one another. As Moffitt and Tormey explained: Each element is not in itself populist...The model should thus be considered as the sum of its parts, not the parts themselves…Nearly every mainstream politician in the Western political

26 Weyland, Kurt. (1999). Neoliberal populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics 31(4), pp. 379–401. 27 Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo, p. 39. 28 Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032, p. 386. 29 Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo, p. 39. 30 Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032, p. 394. 31 Ibid, pp. 290–294. 32 Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032; Moffitt, Benjamin. (2016). The global rise of populism: performance, political style, and representation. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

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By conceptualizing populism as a political style, the performative dimensions are pushed at the center of the analysis, thus enabling this chapter to investigate and theorize on the intricate connections between style and content as applied to foreign policy.

3 Linkages Between Populism and Foreign Policy There are few debates on the impact of populism on foreign policy. International relations theory put a lot of stress on the ability of national interests and international systemic constraints to discipline foreign policy-making with little regard for the role of individuals.34 However, the literature on foreign policy analysis takes exception and has recognized the vital role of domestic sources of foreign policy.35 This is particularly relevant in the case of the Philippines where statecraft and foreign policy are largely determined in the personalized authority of the president as head of state. Its weak bureaucracy coupled with a dysfunctional and volatile party system makes foreign policies discontinuous and subject to the whims of a chief executive whose tenure is only for six years.36 Studies that link populism with foreign policy tend to be single case studies that examine its impact on foreign policy as a fringe aspect of a leader’s populist stance on politics.37 Since most populists tend to concentrate on domestic policy, foreign relations are often not discussed as a channel through which populism is analytically deciphered. Compounding this is the tradition that disallows foreign policy to be subject to much public scrutiny, its difficult and multifaceted nature, and the level of technical expertise that is often required from its formulators and implementers. Unlike other kinds of policy, those that pertain to foreign relations and issues of war and peace are often confined in a small policy circle of trusted advisers with its broad

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Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032, p. 391. 34 Waltz, Kenneth N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. 35 Rosenau, James N. (1971). Toward the study of national–international linkages. In James N. Rosenau (Ed.) Linkage politics: essays on the convergence of national and international systems. New York: Free Press. 36 Cibulka, Frank. (1999). The Philippine foreign policy of the Ramos administration: the quest for security of a weak state. Asian Journal of Political Science 7(1), pp. 108–134. 37 Clem, Ralph S. and Anthony P. Maingot (eds). (2011). Venezuela’s petro-diplomacy: Hugo Chávez’s foreign policy. Gainesville: University Press of Florida; Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and his foreign policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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contours set by the chief executive and carried out by government officials charged with diplomatic functions.38 It is only in the most recent wave of populism that foreign policy acquired some substantial interest. In Europe, populists tend not to touch traditional foreign and security issues until the crisis in 2015 exposed the vulnerabilities of the region by terrorism, refugee migration, and economic crises.39 The rise of the populist radical right featured a particular foreign dimension since its stalwarts reaped the deep-seated resentment of their respective electorates with multiculturalism and economic globalization. This right-wing populism espouses a disdain with the European Union’s (EU) enlargement, liberal migration policies, and the continued reliance of Europe with the US for its security. Their penchant for nativism and ethno-pluralism tends to support policies that single out foreigners, religious minorities, and immigrants as the sources of blame and troubles that threaten to undermine national sovereignty. All these pushes the populist radical right to advocate policies that revolve around ‘globalized nationalism’. This shared outlooks delimit immigration and focus on European autonomy from external powers and the assertion of a national identity based on ascriptive features. What is peculiar in the European context is the ability of these populist parties to cooperate with and assist one another given institutional platforms such as the European Parliament.40 Studies beyond Europe reinforce the revisionist tendencies of populist foreign policy. With the election of Donald Trump as US President, International Relations (IR) scholars have predicted that he will pursue foreign policies that are ‘off the equilibrium path’ given the unorthodox manner in which these bellicose populists have swept to power.41 The basic contours of this kind of foreign policy often run against the status quo. For example, the disdain with multilateral institutions is something populists share since they seek to challenge established institutional mechanisms often impose limits the powers of the states they govern. This was clearly seen in Chávez leadership in forming alternative regionalism projects in the Americas that ran against the Organization of American States42 influenced by a re-imagination of the democracy in the hemisphere from liberal-representative to more direct and participatory versions. Populist foreign policy is also fraught with risk. Given their often surprising and unexpected political victory in the electoral arena, populists often carry this risky 38 Carlsnaes, Walter. (1992). The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis. International Studies Quarterly 36(3), pp. 245–270. 39 Fieschi, Catherine. (2013). Introduction: the politics of uncertainty and anxiety: the age of populism. In Catherine Fieschi, Marley Morris, and Lila Caballero (eds). Populist fantasies: European revolts in context. London: Counterpoint. 40 Liang, Christina Schori. (2007). Europe for the Europeans: the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right. In Christina Schori Liang (ed.) Europe for the Europeans: the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right. London: Routledge. 41 Drezner, Daniel W. (2017). The angry populist as foreign policy leader: real change or just hot air. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 41(2), p. 24. 42 Chodor, Tom and Anthea McCarthy-Jones. (2013). Post-liberal regionalism in Latin America and the influence of Hugo Chávez. Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 19(2), pp. 211–223.

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strategy in the international domain. Risk tolerance is a mark of populist regimes, particularly relevant for personalist leaders. Populism emboldens leaders to carry out their political ambitions and use the world stage to further increase their leverage against their domestic enemies. Given their outside status, international recognition is something that populists crave so much and they carry out foreign policy less as the voice of the government that they lead but more as an idiosyncratic expression of their personality and charisma.43 In these cases, populist foreign policy often is not consistently carried out by the bureaucracy as it becomes prone to misinterpretation, errors, and conflicts emanating from rival institutions within the state.44 With the populist’s mastery of rhetoric, complex problems and issues arising from international relations get oversimplified. Distorted debates, oversimplified solutions, and intentions branded as authentic and pure are all trademarks of a populist foreign policy that intends to solve the country’s domestic problems arising out of a crises of legitimacy and democracy.45 Scholars have labeled this as ‘megaphone diplomacy’ since it is loud, often not grounded on evidence and research but able to significantly shape public opinion. In this regard, foreign policy is seen as a populist tool to realize the domestic agenda of the leader as the total embodiment of the people’s will. The burden of foreign relations is bearable for the populist until the strategic realities impose themselves to a point where pronouncements can no longer be taken at face value. The thin scholarly literature on populist foreign policy recommended that the first step to analyzing it is to distinguish what populists say and what they actually do. The European cases concluded that populists have little transformative ability in sustaining foreign policy changes as they tend to function more as a blocking force than a source of viable alternatives.46 There is prevailing skepticism on the ability of populism to sustainably determine foreign policies in a coherent and consistent manner. Empirical cases from different parts of the world show that the space for populists to frame diplomatic and international issues depends on their proximity to the public sentiment and popular mood which they are their critical points of vulnerability. The ability of populists to raise foreign issues to the attention of an often domestically distracted public is inevitably limited since the intricacies and complexities of this policy area are often beyond the people’s knowledge and imagination.47 This selected review of populism and foreign policy revealed the small body of scholarship that is a few decades old. As populism is often implemented in domestic politics, there scants scholarly attention given to its impact on international relations. Through the processes of globalization and its consequences as well as the erosion of 43

Drezner, Daniel W. (2017). The angry populist as foreign policy leader: real change or just hot air. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 41(2). 44 Saunders, Elizabeth N. (2017). No substitute for experience: presidents, advisers, and information in group decision making. International Organization 71(1), pp. 219–247. 45 Mudde, Cas. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 46 Balfour, Rosa (rapporteur). (2016). Europe’s troublemakers: the populist challenge to foreign policy. European Policy Centre, p. 49. 47 Ibid.

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state sovereignty, foreign policy has become more vulnerable to domestic political developments. The recent wave of populism is a phenomenon that reached even exclusionary and privileged policy arenas such as diplomacy and foreign relations. This chapter seeks to address this gap by investigating the ways in which populism affects foreign policy through the case of the Philippines under Populist President Duterte.

4 Performative Populism and Duterte’s Foreign Policy To say that Duterte is appealing will be a gross miscalculation of the kind of hallucinogenic power that his appeal does to ‘the people’ who come from various social and economic cleavages and represent diverging aspirations and interests. While a consensus over what and/or who should constitute ‘the people’ remains elusive among populism scholars and experts, nonetheless, in Duterte’s populism, ‘the people’ are comprised of ordinary Filipinos suffering from poverty, inequality, and injustice. A huge bulk of them are the urban precariat in Imperial Manila as well as the rural poor in the peripheral regions of archipelagic Philippines. In particular, Duterte’s constituency lies in the conflict-ridden, underdeveloped, and politically marginalized people of Mindanao. However, his base has since expanded as the incorporation of other groups such as the more affluent classes that wanted law and order as well as overseas Filipinos longing for their homeland to achieve a modicum of progress and stability. The larger-than-life chief executive has not descended from his campaign soapbox as he continued to lure Filipinos to rally behind him. Duterte has a hypnotic quality to it that induces ‘the people’ to willingly set aside their own principles and positions on various issues and replace them with the president’s preferred views and values, regardless of their contrasting backgrounds and circumstances. In the beginning of his presidency, Duterte caught global headlines mainly due to his anti-US rhetoric that went side-by-side with a generous appreciation of China and other powers such as Japan and Russia. Despite being a phenomenon in the country, he was still a political nobody abroad until he expressed a desire to embrace China while rejecting the country’s longtime ally. The often-neglected country was instantly pushed into the limelight given its new leader’s musings usually in the form of highly emotional rants. Pundits and policymakers, used to the idea that any Filipino president sets the contours of its foreign policy, found themselves in a tailspin by downplaying Duterte’s statements, carefully clarifying their meaning, or directly issuing contradictory opinions. Many did not expect that the new president will cause a political shockwave in the country’s once predictable foreign policy, especially since Duterte refused to see himself as a statesman. During the 2016 electoral campaign, the former Davao City mayor did not issue any major foreign policy positions. Though Duterte has expressed acerbic remarks against the US, the Catholic Pope, and the West, many thought that this was all within the ambit of political campaigning. A contributing factor is serendipitous events like the PCA ruling that gave legal victory to the Philippine in the case it filed against China over territorial and maritime disputes in the

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SCS. In addition, the Philippines is the chair of the ASEAN on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary. These provided opportunities for Duterte to project his extreme and unorthodox viewpoints on international relations. However, the firebrand leader also created his own opportunities to articulate Philippine foreign policy in international fora and state visits. This chapter examines his various rhetorical remarks and performances on his attempt to steer a new path through two important aspects of the country’s current foreign relations: the SCS dispute and the Philippines relationship with the US.

5 Crisis, Breakdown, and Threat: Duterte’s Pivot to China The PCA handed its unanimous award in the arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China concerning the SCS on July 12, 2016. Though the Tribunal’s decision did not include aspects related to sovereignty and boundary delimitation between the parties, it rendered final and binding judgments in favor of the Philippines on a host of critical issues. It ruled that there is ‘no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line”. Second, it also stated that certain sea areas in the SCS fall within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines and none of the features in the Spratly Islands could generate its own EEZ. Third, it observed that China has caused serious damage to the marine environment through its ‘large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands’ and ‘violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems’.48 The arbitral case was the previous administrations major foreign policy thrust with significant US prodding but without regional consultation with other SCS claimants and ASEAN members. Instead of immediately doing the groundwork for its enforcement, the Duterte administration chose to put the ruling aside. The president described the ruling as one that ‘fell on his lap’, but he swore that he will deal with the ruling in due time.49 For the time being, his government has expressed a desire to smooth bilateral relations with China. Duterte was widely criticized by some for his inaction toward the favorable arbitral ruling the country received against China. The populist president sought to delay action on the award and instead seek common ground with its big neighbor. This led to pledges of economic and security cooperation, taking advantage of China’s economic largesse and military might, benefits already partaken by other states that have existing territorial disputes with China. Opinions are divided whether this was a sound move, but many believe that it temporarily de-escalated tensions in the SCS. 48

PCA press release: the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China). (2016). https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release-the-southchina-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. 49 Viray, Patricia Lourdes. (2016, August 29). Duterte wants to set aside arbitral ruling-for now. Philippine Star. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/08/29/1618421/duterte-wants-set-asidearbitral-ruling-now.

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Both countries are now ready to embark on a ‘new beginning’ after years of hostile relations including when the Philippines’ previous president likened China to Hitler. Though Duterte officially visited Indonesia, Brunei, and Vietnam, it was his visit to China that caught global attention. Chinese President Xi Jinping described Duterte’s visit as springtime after years of mutual discontent. Both leaders pledged to continue stalled cooperative ventures and embark on new ones ranging from intelligence sharing to combat illegal drugs to public infrastructure, agriculture, and peopleto-people exchange.50 The Philippine president left China with reportedly US$24 billion worth of deals, loans, and aid.51 As expected, Duterte’s fiery rhetoric trumped the economic outcome of the trip. He praised China’s generosity, identified with its ideological slant, and promised to pursue a joint alliance with other countries. In that same vein, however, he announced his economic and military ‘separation’ from the US. Some fear that the president will abandon Scarborough Shoal in exchange for economic deals or reinstated fishing rights for Filipinos.52 After the trip, it was reported that China’s coast guard granted Filipino fishermen access to the disputed shoal. During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Lima, Peru, the Philippines government announced that the internal lagoon within the shoal is a no-fishing zone in order to preserve marine life in the area. China did not seriously reject the idea of a marine sanctuary and has even hinted the possibility of a fishing deal with the Philippines.53 Yet, the underlying logic behind Duterte’s simple and direct answers to some of the most divisive national issues that he has faced thus far is neither ‘simple’ nor ‘direct’. His willingness to disregard the principle of human rights is based on what critics view as biased and selective application of the concept by powerful countries in states where they wish to intervene to pursue their own interests. His aversion toward multilateral treaties intended to combat the effects of climate change is grounded on what critics view as an attempt by the core countries to prevent the global south from developing by kicking away the very same ladder that they used to industrialize their economies. His desire to revive the Philippines’ tumultuous relations with China is influenced by Thucydides’ realist outlook of international relations in which the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. His confusing relations with the Marcoses could be an indication of his subscription to a postmodernist view that there are as many stories as storytellers. But given Duterte’s gripping portrayal 50

Blanchard, Ben. (2016, October 20). Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS. 51 Calonzo, Andreo and Cecilia Yap. (2016, October 21). China visit helps Duterte reap funding deals worth $24 billion. Bloomberg. https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/china-visit-helpsduterte-reap-funding-deals-worth-24-billion. 52 Rauhala, Emily. (2016, October 20). Duterte renounces U.S., declares Philippines will embrace China. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/philippines-duterte-saysgo odbye-washington-and-helloto-beijing/2016/10/20/865f3cd0-9571-11e6-9cae-2a3574e296a6_ story.html. 53 Ives, Mike. (2016, November 21). Philippines to declare marine sanctuary in South China Sea. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-sca rborough-shoal-china.html.

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of a crisis, coupled with the sheer magnitude of his popularity, the president may not even have to dig deep into his intellectual faculties to secure the approval and support of ‘the people’. As one of the oldest US allies in the region, China was open to deepening relations with the Philippines under Duterte. This chapter argues that Duterte’s anti-US rhetoric carried out in his performances seen in media and transmitted to the Filipino public provided some credibility to his more cordial approach to China. In this case, the audience of Duterte’s performance was China and not the US. He was signaling to China that even the Philippines under his leadership can have the ability to distance itself from its colonial power.

6 Bad Manners: Duterte’s Rift with the US A significant part of Duterte’s hypnotic appeal to ‘the people’ comes from his explicit disdain for ‘appropriate’, ‘decent’, and ‘civilized’ language that is favored by traditional politicians and technocrats. When performing his populist brand of politics, Duterte adds a ‘tabloidal’ flavor to his political discourse by embellishing his speeches with colorful slang and swearing or lacing his anecdotes with exaggerated political incorrectness. In many ways, Duterte has become the personification of ‘bad manners’ in Philippine politics. But instead of becoming a liability, Duterte’s ‘bad boy’ image has provided him with huge electoral advantage over his more affluent, more composed, and more diplomatic rivals. Rather than questioning Duterte’s aggressive rhetoric and boorish behavior, ‘the people’ think of creative ways to put these words and actions within more palatable contexts to mitigate the negative reactions from the opposition and non-supporters. Even as a candidate, Duterte’s bad manners were already focused on the US. When Duterte called the former US Ambassador to the Philippines, Philip Goldberg a ‘gay son of a whore’, they praised him and underscored his courage for standing up against American imperialism. He also exposed the conspiracy behind the undue extraction of the US government of an American national that he detained when he was city mayor on allegations of planting bombs intentionally to conjure mayhem and chaos in Southern Philippines. This occurred right after the US launched its Global War on Terror. Influenced by anti-imperial thinking, Duterte did not spare the US his blows during the electoral campaign, accusing it of intervening in the sovereign jurisdiction of the Philippine government. A clear manifestation of Duterte’s performative populism as president is his overall views about US-Philippine relations. He articulated this, often in the form of spontaneous outbursts, during his first participation in the ASEAN Summit with regional and global leaders in Vientiane, Laos. Apart from Pope Francis, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, the president cursed US President Barack Obama over US

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criticism on his war on drugs.54 This led Obama to skip a planned bilateral meeting with the Philippine president. Duterte shrugged the snub and went on a tirade about US colonial atrocities in Mindanao and its consistent hypocrisy in dealing with small states like the Philippines. Many observers were caught by surprise, while other governments became worried given the fact that the Philippines will be ASEAN’s Chair on the occasion of its 50th anniversary next year. Although the act of cursing the ‘leader of the free world’ by the Filipino president was unprecedented in itself, however, what was even extraordinary was the response that came from ‘the people’. Rather than criticizing Duterte, his throngs of supporters took the extraordinary measure of setting aside their personal moral beliefs and convictions in order to defend, justify, and rationalize the president’s behavior. The anti-US remarks shook the Philippine foreign policy and security community to the core given the intimate relations between the two countries. Duterte’s stance is a combination of his knowledge about America’s colonial sins, a bad experience dealing with the US government, and the US criticism on his war on drugs. Duterte feels the US rebuke is both a personal attack and a disrespect of Philippine sovereignty, something he thinks he has the burden to uphold. In his off-the-cuff and inflammatory statements, he threatened to abrogate a long-standing military alliance, invalidate the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), and sever diplomatic ties. As his cabinet attempted to creatively interpret them without success, these se provocative tirades of the nation’s chief architect of foreign policy grabbed worldwide attention. Although when Duterte announced that he was cutting the country’s military and economic ties with the US during his state visit to China in October 2016, many of his supporters quickly went on his defense by expressing their personal distastes and grievances toward Washington. Prior to the scathing remarks that he made regarding US hypocrisy and interventionist tendencies (specifically in the contexts of human rights and climate change issues), it will be fair to say that most of his supporters were hopeful that Washington would help protect the Philippines’ interests in the SCS by at least providing a counter-balancing power in the region. Yet since, Duterte’s series of tirades against former US President Barrack Obama started in September of this year. In this foreign policy performances, the Philippine president generously puts a lot of the blame over China’s increasing assertiveness on the SCS as a failure of US deterrence and capacity to restrain China. The president’s pivot to China did not mean an abandonment of US relations. Duterte was among the first leaders to congratulate president-elect Donald Trump after the US elections and has even appointed Trump’s Filipino business partner as a US trade envoy.55 The election of US President Trump portrayed by many observers as the Filipino president’s kindred spirit might actually work in both countries’ favor. 54

Duterte later apologized for the remarks and if they were construed as a personal attack. See Hu, Elise. (2016, September 6). Philippine President expresses ‘regret’ for cursing Obama. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/06/492778889/philippines-president-exp resses-regret-for-cursing-obama. 55 Arugay, Aries A. (2016). Engagements and disengagements. ASEAN Focus, Issue 7, p. 6.

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Duterte’s insistence led to changes in joint military exercises between the two countries. It is now reformatted to fit Philippine priorities such as disaster response and terrorism. Both populist leaders will also spend less attention toward intruding into each other’s domestic affairs and more on bilateral economic cooperation and mutually address security threats like criminality and terrorism. A recent domestic survey already revealed that Filipinos are taking Duterte’s lead and are positively evaluating China, while US approval is diminishing. The expression of bad manners can be interpreted as the unmasking of the authentic behavior of Filipino political leaders. With notable exceptions, the Filipino people know that politicians do not express their true personas in the public gaze. But while the imperatives of statecraft and diplomatic protocol demand decent demeanor, Duterte’s authenticity combined with a perception of good intentions shielded the leader from suffering audience costs associated with unorthodox foreign policy-making. Duterte’s preference toward these ‘common sense’ solutions for resolving complex national threats and issues (whether uttered reflectively or hyperbolically) is supposed to demonstrate his unyielding and uncompromising love for the nation and its people. To compensate for the obvious substantive deficits of his preferred strategies, Duterte does what he does best: endearing ‘the people’ to himself and his cause by acting like a reluctant leader who never wanted the presidency, but nevertheless, is willing to sacrifice his own life to protect them from the enemies. Thanks to Duterte’s intoxicating appeal, such declarations are enough assurances for his supporters to cast away their doubts and ignore the dictates of their ‘common sense’—ironically. Regardless of whether or not these ‘bad manners’ reflect Duterte’s true nature and character, the point is that they are a vital component to his political performance as a populist actor. By deliberately coarsening his expressions and demeanors, Duterte is able to demonstrate not only his attachment to the grassroots, but more importantly, his detachment from the political establishment. His explicit disregard for rigid hierarchies and corrupt traditions that have defined the contours of Philippine politics for decades allows him to frame his populist acts as a way of giving politics back to ‘the people’. Rather than struggling to acquire the élan and finesse of high-ranking politicians from rich family backgrounds, Duterte has further emphasized his ‘otherness’ by speaking the words and adopting the expressions which are commonly associated with the ‘uncouth’ and the ‘unlearned’ to add more credibility to his performance as a populist leader.

7 Domestic Audience: Views from the Filipino Security Community Despite the Duterte administration’s desire to forge new security partnerships with countries like China and Russia, among others, the strategic policy experts tend to

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disagree and preferred to remain with the republic’s old allies. The results indicate an apparent deep loyalty with traditional security partners: Japan (91.10%), the US (85.20%), and Australia (80.20%)—the latter two of which have respective visiting or status of forces agreements in the country. The Philippines and Japan has an existing strategic partnership prior to Duterte’s tenure as president. China is the least preferred partner with Russia not far behind (Fig. 1). This survey was conducted from October to November 2020 through an online survey disseminated to academics, public sector employees, and particularly the graduate classes of key defense learning institutions such as the National Defense College of the Philippines and the Philippine Public Safety College, which is a good representative sample of emerging leaders of the security sector given entrance qualifications and requisite recommendations from their respective of educational and training institutions. The survey was able to collect data from 663 respondents using an online non-random survey of Filipino members of the country’s strategic community, comprised of two sectors: (1) (2)

Civilian Sector: members of the (a) academe, (b) government agencies outside the security sector, (c) civilian personnel in the security forces; Security Sector: military and uniformed personnel in the security forces;

Fig. 1 Preferred security partner countries of the Philippines. Source Amador et al. (2020)

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Fig. 2 Views on the invocation of the Philippines’ UN arbitral award. Source Amador et al. (2020)

Military and uniformed personnel that comprise 60% (N = 398) of the persons surveyed were mostly sampled from key security officials, while the civilian sector is represented by 40% of the sample (N = 265) (Fig. 2).56 While the Duterte administration seems to downplay the arbitral award in the beginning of its term, it has recently invoked the award as seen in the speech of the President Duterte in the September 2020 meeting of the UN General Assembly. According to the survey, respondents uniformly positively receive the invocation of the PCA award in international fora such as the UN and ASEAN’s utility in advancing Philippine national interests. It seems like that the security community, whether civilian or uniformed respondents, clearly espouses a strategy that confronts the SCS issue using international law and prefers a strategy to use multilateral institutions, a key component of Filipino strategic culture. The views of the Filipino security community composed of academics, security sector officials, and civilian bureaucrats reveal two important findings with respect to Duterte’s populist performances on the SCS dispute. The first is that its accommodationist policy toward China has not resulted in the ‘buy-in’ of the foreign and security policy establishment as well as intellectuals. While this is not hardly surprising, this possibly indicates the fleeting nature of the populist pivot toward China by Duterte. By not convincing a critical domestic audience—whether those more involved in the SCS dispute or the public at large, this highly suggests that this populist policy will likely change again once Duterte is replaced by a president with more conventional foreign policy views. The second is that the security community will likely stay within their positions and institutions after the tenure of Duterte as president. Thus, the Philippines could rapidly change its stance on the SCS dispute, and Duterte’s foreign policy legacy can be quickly discontinued with relative ease.

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Amador, J., Arugay A., Misalucha-Willoughby, C. and Baquisal, J. K. (2020). National security priorities and agenda in the Philippines: perceptions from the Filipino security community. Quezon City: Amador Research Services, Inc.

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8 Conclusion: The Foreign Policy Payoffs and Trade-Offs of Performative Populism The term ‘populist’ has commonly been used both by academic scholars and media practitioners to refer to politicians whom they find rather unpleasant and disagreeable. But as revealed by Duterte’s repertoire of populist performances and tropes, populism can also be employed as an effective political style. If understood properly and used adeptly, the performative elements of the concept can yield significant political capital for anyone who dares to harness their powers. Duterte’s gamble with populism has rewarded him with legions of devoted fans and supporters who have bestowed the qualities of invincibility and infallibility upon him. His potent combination of enthralling charisma, gripping portrayal of crisis, and alluring display of political incorrectness have catapulted him into a demigod status, commanding absolute trust and demanding unquestionable faith from ‘the people’. This chapter focuses on three elements of performative populism in the case of Duterte: appeal to the people; the invocation of crisis, breakdown, and threat; and bad manners. By valorizing the most common forms of ‘bad manners’ of ‘the people’, Duterte is able to successfully project himself as an outsider who has grown tired of the cold attitude and ineffective ‘politics as usual’ approach of the wellmanicured politicians. And while bad manners have certainly no place in schools, Duterte’s public display of ‘bad manners’ has captivated and enamored both members of the privileged and marginalized classes of Philippine society. He has exhibited an astonishing variety of tirades: going as low as ‘joking’ about a rape victim to bring him closer to his ‘unthinking’ supporters and as high as providing empirical contexts to the hypocrisies underpinning American foreign policies to satisfy the intellectual requirements of his ‘intelligent’ followers. Duterte’s rise from political obscurity to a force to be reckoned with in Filipino politics is a familiar development in many democracies facing a populist challenge. Widespread discontent caused by predatory elites too lazy to build responsive institutions coupled with the inability of previous governments to address inequality and exclusion provided fertile ground for the rise of populists like Duterte. But, these popular sentiments and state failures need to be harnessed, politicized, and projected by performative populists into platforms of change and renewal. The country’s structural conditions made possible the entry of Duterte to the national political arena, but it was his performance style and rhetoric that clinched him the presidency. Whether or not, his brand of populism that can be translated to concrete and positive changes for Philippine democracy will depend on Duterte’s ability to combine his performativity to sustainable and institutionalized policies that would benefit Philippine society. Considering the specific populist configuration of Duterte’s leadership is to do conceptual justice to the much abused usage of populism that has been loosely labeled to anything that undermines the current liberal order. But apart from being analytically precise, there are policy implications to determining the different facets of any populist. This requires recognizing when populists merely perform and when they

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mean what they say through concrete policies. In the foreign policy front, Duterte’s ability to remain true and follow through on his perplexing rhetoric depends on to what extend he can get away with domestic audience costs and the level of regime stability in the Philippines. In other words, populists like Duterte could afford to undertake bold adventures abroad only until their legitimacy is challenged by powerful political blocs or if the ramifications of their postures begin to critically harm the interests of those they vowed to protect. If their political survival becomes at stake, leaders like Duterte can shed their populist skin resorting to previous foreign policies, rally the public against a common external as a diversionary tactic, or worse, concentrate political power. The Philippine president’s singlehanded approach to re-crafting foreign policy is risky and could take a toll on the ability of the Philippines to make credible commitments abroad. Foreign policy requires a level of consistency that reduces significant risks and a shared strategic playbook influenced by expertise and long-term planning. Duterte’s policy approach implies a careful distinction between impulsive pronouncements and actual implementation with a keen eye on the latter. However, his future antics on foreign policy might not be given the same amount of patience by elites and masses alike especially if it threatens the country’s national interest. Duterte must also be wary of members of his government who might not share his strategic playbook and use his hedging strategy as a way to promote their own personal political ambitions. As for now, the jury is still out there whether a populist-guided foreign policy can accomplish the goals set by the Duterte administration to generate beneficial outcomes for ordinary Filipinos. One necessary condition for this is that the president as chief architect of foreign policy sets the basic design that is faithfully followed by engineers and other workers belonging to the bureaucracy as well as appreciated by those who have thrown their political support. As for the bigger picture, Duterte has an era-defining choice to make: to exploit the populist will of ‘the people’ in order to clear the road toward authoritarianism. Or, he can to harness this populist will in order to emancipate ‘the people’ from all the ills and shackles of its low-intensity democracy.

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Magcamit, M. I., & Arugay, A. A. (2017, March 17). Rodrigo Duterte and the making of a populist demigod. Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham. https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/ 03/17/rodrigo-duterte-and-the-making-of-a-populist-demigod-part-1/ Moffitt, B. (2016). The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford University Press. Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2013). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatization and political style. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032 Mouffe, C. (2005). On the political. Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2005). The ‘end of politics’ and the challenge of right-wing populism. In: F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the mirror of democracy. Verso. Mouffe, C. (2016, November 21). The populist moment. Open Democracy. https://www.opende mocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-moment Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2011). Voices of the peoples: Populism in Europe and Latin America compared. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. Panizza, F. (2005). Introduction: Populism and the mirror of democracy. In F. Panizza (Ed.), Populism and the mirror of democracy. Verso. Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring populism: A quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 21(1). PCA Press Release: the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China). (2016). https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-seaarbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ Quimpo, N. G. (2009). The Philippines: Predatory regime, growing authoritarian features. Pacific Review, 22(3). Rauhala, E. (2016, October 20). Duterte renounces U.S., declares Philippines will embrace China. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/philippines-duterte-saysgoodbye-was hington-and-helloto-beijing/2016/10/20/865f3cd0-9571-11e6-9cae-2a3574e296a6_story.html Rosenau, J. N. (1971). Toward the study of national-international linkages. In J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), Linkage politics: Essays on the convergence of national and international systems. Free Press. Samet, R. (2017). The denouncers: Populism and the press in Venezuela. Journal of Latin American Studies, 49(1). Sanahuja, J. A. (2011). Multilateralismo y Regionalismo en Clave Suramericana: El Caso de Unasur. Pensamiento Propio, 33. Saunders, E. N. (2017). No substitute for experience: Presidents, advisers, and information in group decision making. International Organization, 71(1). Viray, P. L. (2016, August 29). Duterte wants to set aside arbitral ruling-for now. Philippine Star. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/08/29/1618421/duterte-wants-set-aside-arbitralruling-now Waltz, K. N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. Columbia University Press. Weyland, K. (1999). Neoliberal populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics, 31(4). Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press.

Aries A. Arugay is Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, the Philippines. He is also Editor-in-Chief of Asian Politics & Policy, a journal published by WileyBlackwell and the Policy Studies Organization. He has conducted research on comparative democratization, civil-military relations, electoral politics, foreign policy, and ASEAN regionalism.

The Double-Edged Sword Effect of Vietnam’s Nationalistic South China Sea Policy—A Chinese Perspective Xiao Luo

Abstract One of the most distinguishing features of Vietnam’s South China Sea policy is nationalism, which has a significant double-edged sword effect in that it efficiently leverages Vietnam’s asymmetric advantages and reaps various benefits while also posing potentially significant risks. On the one hand, it has become a powerful tool for assisting Vietnam in its fight against China, such as consolidating legitimacy of the government and enhancing the ability of social mobilization, as well as strengthening China’s policy qualm and enlisting the assistance of the USA and Japan. On the other hand, Vietnam risks losing control of nationalism and incurring the cost of blind exclusion of China. Moreover, the rising nationalism severely limits Vietnam’s ability to reach necessary compromises on the South China Sea dispute, amplifies the negative impacts of a potential arbitration, which is concerning islands and reefs’ sovereignty in the South China Sea initiated by China, on the legitimacy of the Vietnamese regime. As the power rivalry in the South China Sea becomes more intense, the dilemma of Vietnam’s nationalistic South China Sea policy will be more obvious. Keywords Vietnam · South China Sea dispute · Nationalism · China · USA

1 Introduction Nationalism is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Vietnam’s South China Sea (SCS) policy, which has turned the SCS dispute into the core issue of Vietnam1 as well as the top priority of Vietnam’s diplomacy. Nationalism, as an useful narrative that assisting the fight against external threats, will become a double-edged sword once it is excessively used by the small states to compete with the major 1 International Crisis Group. (2016). Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): oil in troubled waters. Asia Report (275), p. 20.

X. Luo (B) School of International Studies, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_4

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powers. In practice, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy has a significant doubleedged sword effect, which effectively plays the asymmetry advantages of Vietnam, and also produces prominent risks. Therefore, Vietnam is likely to pay for a costly opportunity costs due to its nationalistic SCS policy.

2 Vietnam’s Nationalistic SCS Policy Vietnam’s SCS policy has grown intensely nationalistic in the past decades. It has established a comprehensive, multi-level, and three-dimensional publicity and mobilization system on the SCS dispute, in which the SCS dispute has evolved into a dominant and prominent problem in Vietnam’s relations with China, as well as a strategic consensus for Vietnam to resist China, either directly or indirectly. Specifically, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy is reflected in the following aspects. To begin with, the SCS dispute is a central theme in Vietnam’s patriotic and national defense education systems. Vietnam has adopted all kinds of methods to raise public awareness of the “territoriality” of the islands and reefs in the SCS. These mainly include history textbooks, mandatory courses of national defense education, curriculum design, graduation exams, knowledge contests, and photo exhibitions. Meanwhile, the government donates and builds island monuments for schools, honours war and history heroes, consoles relatives of martyrs in the armed conflicts in the SCS, and organizes journalists, writers, cadres, teachers, and students to visit the islands in order to strengthen people’s feelings of “safeguarding” the islands and reefs in the SCS. In recent years, Vietnam’s official commemoration of the Battle of Xisha/Nansha Qun Dao (Paracels/Spratlys Islands) is far more high-profile than China’s. For example, when commemorating the Battle of the Nansha Qun Dao in 2021, Vietnam claimed that “We respect the soldiers’ sacrifice and contribution to the nation’s unity and territorial integrity.”2 Scholars in Vietnam’s think tanks, universities, and research institutions have intensified their research on the SCS dispute, in which a large number of works with nationalism were published.3 The government raises the Vietnamese fishermen who often fish in the Xisha/Nansha Qun Dao waters to the height of “living boundary tablets” at sea, and “insisting on making a living on the sea is a way for fishermen to contribute to safeguarding the sovereignty of the sacred islands”.4 At the same time, the government praises the patriotism and pride in protecting national territorial integrity as a spirit that is shared by all abroad Vietnamese.5 2

Gac Ma soldiers-immortal monument in Vietnamese people’s hearts. VNA. (2021, May 13). https:// zh.vietnamplus.vn/GacMasoldiers-immortalmonumentinVietnamesepeople’shearts/139286.vnp. 3 Li Chunxia. (2014) Nan hai wen ti zhong de yue nan min zu zhu yi [The South China Sea dispute and Vietnamese nationalism]. Tai Ping Yang Xue Bao [Pacific Journal] (7), pp. 43–44. 4《黄沙长沙海域上的 “活界碑”》 , Vietnam+. (2020, July 5). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/黄沙长沙 海域上的活界碑/119543.vnp. 5《旅外越侨心系祖国》 , Vietnam+. (2018, December 16). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/旅外越侨心 系祖国/89741.vnp.

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Secondly, the SCS dispute received extensive coverage in Vietnamese media. In Vietnam, where the privatization of news media is outlawed, the official media remains highly sensitive about the SCS dispute. The multi-dimensional information dissemination in the forms of texts, pictures, radio, and videos has become routine, and major media’s SCS columns will be updated on a regular basis.6 The Vietnamese media are not only enthusiastic in reporting on the SCS dispute, but taking a onesided and extremely hostile tone and even failing to be factual and exaggerating China’s “isolation and helplessness” on the SCS dispute. It is mainly reflected in the following four aspects. Firstly, Vietnam has set up a large number of websites on the SCS dispute and Vietnam’s “sovereignty” in the SCS. In addition to the websites such as http://www.biendong.net and http://www.nghiencuubiendong.vn financed by the Vietnamese government, Vietnam’s national media such as Vietnam News Agency, Báo Nhân Dân, The Voice of Vietnam has also set up columns on the SCS dispute. Secondly, the number of reports about the SCS dispute has remained high all year round, and China’s activities in the SCS are dynamically watched. When there is a crisis in the SCS, the relevant reports are more intensive. Third, Vietnam has been harshly accusing China of being “aggressive”, “violating” international law, making “illegal” claims, and “unilaterally escalating” tensions. Fourth, Vietnam regularly selects the standpoints of foreign experts from the USA, Japan, the EU, the UK, Australia, the Philippines, and others, to highlight the international community’s opposition to China’s “illegal” claims and actions in the SCS, as well as to establish Vietnam’s “legitimacy” and “victim status”. The next is the frequent and generally tough speeches released by Vietnamese top leaders on the SCS dispute. Since the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Vietnam in 2011, when it was clearly stated that “We should strengthen education on the protection of national territorial sovereignty and make all people aware of the challenges to national security in the new situation,”7 the Vietnamese leaders have made strong public statements from time to time to reinforce the importance of the SCS dispute among the people. For example, former Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated in November 2011 that Vietnam firmly defends its national sovereignty over the Beibu Wan/Gulf of Tonkin estuary and the “Xisha/Paracel Islands”, claiming for the first time that China occupied the Xisha Qun Dao by force in 1974. In December of the following year, Vietnam declared that it was and would do everything possible to defend the islands and national sovereignty.8 During the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig crisis in 2014, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung accused China of responding to Vietnam’s goodwill and maximum restraint on the SCS dispute with expanding threats and violation and blaming Vietnam, and he 6

Lan Yao (2018). Yue nan nan hai wen ti de dui wai xuan chuan lu jing ji qi ying xiang tan xi [Vietnam’s propaganda on the South China Sea issue and its impacts]. Tai Ping Yang Xue Bao [Pacific Journal] (9), p. 87. 7 Liu Xinghong (2019). Yue nan zai nan hai wen ti shang de yu lun xuan chuan [Vietnam’s propaganda on the South China Sea issue]. Guo Ji Yan Jiu Can Kao [International Studies Reference] (4), p. 35. 8 Li Chunxia (2014). Nan hai wen ti zhong de yue nan min zu zhu yi [The South China Sea dispute and Vietnamese nationalism]. Tai Ping Yang Xue Bao [Pacific Journal] (7), p. 42.

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also underscored that Vietnam would resolutely defend its sovereignty and legitimate interests.9 During the crisis, the then president of Vietnam, Truong Tan Sang, also quoted the contents of “How can we easily give up our motherland? If you let an inch of your ancestors’ land fall into the hands of the invaders, you will be beheaded!” from the Ða.i Viê.t su, kí toàn thu, to express Vietnam’s resolve. Finally, Vietnamese officials has used, condoned, and even incited people to demonstrate against China. The Vietnamese government has strong control over domestic demonstrations, including those against foreign governments. The repeated outbreaks of large-scale demonstrations against China’s SCS policy in Vietnam since 2007 are largely due to the Vietnamese government’s tacit approval, connivance, and even incitement. For example, the “ship collision” in 2011 triggered a surge of nationalist sentiment in Vietnam. When people held demonstrations against China, the Vietnamese government not only failed to stop it in time, but also reported it in the media in a way that did not match the facts, effectively playing a role of connivance and incitement.10 During the 2014 oil rig crisis between China and Vietnam in the SCS, the Vietnamese government further blurred the lines between right and wrong by taking various actions, so as to stimulate the domestic public to carry out large-scale anti-China marches. These mainly include releasing an online video of “Chinese big ships rammed Vietnamese small boats with malicious intent”, mobilizing foreign journalists to film the scene, denying that Chinese companies have been conducting exploration activities in the relevant waters for ten years, and denying that Vietnam deployed a large number of vessels (including armed vessels) and frogmen. In fact, “an organized large-scale riot like the Xinyue Industrial Park in Pingyang province will not happen in the absence of significant anti-government forces in Vietnam, without the acquiescence, encouragement of the Vietnamese government.”11 ij

3 Multiple Benefits of Vietnam’s Nationalistic SCS Policy The nationalistic SCS policy has effectively played Vietnam’s asymmetric advantages. First of all, aggravating Vietnamese people’s hostile perception of China derived from the historical war memories and the deep-rooted “China threat”. Consolidating the government’s legitimacy through the nationalistic SCS policy is the primary consideration for Vietnamese leaders. In fact, Vietnam’s domestic politics have been relatively decentralized since the twenty-first century, resulted in intense faction competition within the Communist 9

PM Nguyen Tan Dung in Manila: Vietnam to defend sovereignty. Embassy of Vietnam in the US. (2014, May 22). http://vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/2014/05/pm-nguyen-tan-dung-manilavietnam-defend-sovereignty. 10 Li Chunxia. (2014). Nan hai wen ti zhong de yue nan min zu zhu yi [The South China Sea dispute and Vietnamese nationalism]. Tai Ping Yang Xue Bao [Pacific Journal] (7), pp. 43–44. 11 Zeng Yong. (2016). Nan hai ‘981’ zuan jing ping tai chong tu zhe she de yue nan nan hai zheng ce [Vietnam’s SCS policy reflected by the ‘981’ oil rig crisis in the SCS]. Dang Dai Ya Tai [Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies] (1), p. 133.

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Party of Vietnam (CPV). On the one hand, the democrats have gradually increased their influence in democratic reform. On the other hand, the opposition and dissidents within the CPV have a clear motive to use nationalism to accuse the CPV of failing to defend its territory in the SCS.12 By implementing a nationalistic SCS policy and thus projecting a high-profile image of a staunch defender of territorial integrity, the Vietnamese top leaders could fend off these two groups’ challenge to its governing rule at home. A nationalistic SCS policy could also help Vietnam alleviate the crisis of its communist regime and become an important tool for its top brass to strengthen their personal power. Actually, the concerns about the collapse of the communist regime and the crisis of the governing rule at home among the top leaders in Vietnam have been remained ever since the CPV united the country four decades ago. Therefore, one of the most efficient ways for the ruling CPV to seek and preserve a socialist state is to raise the flag of nationalism.13 A nationalistic SCS policy, in particular, could not only effectively pacify the domestic nationalists but offset the criticism from the abroad Vietnamese who has attempted to utilize the SCS dispute to shame CPV. According to the Vietnam News Agency, the CPV has long considered abroad Vietnamese as an indivisible part of Vietnam. Abroad Vietnamese has always united to protect their motherland when Vietnam’s independence and sovereignty are challenged. Therefore, the CPV should provide overseas Vietnamese with information on the SCS dispute, Vietnam’s position, and Vietnam’s tireless efforts in defending the sovereignty of the islands in the SCS.14 In addition, since the Battle of the Xisha Islands between Vietnam and China, taking a relatively friendly posture toward China on the SCS dispute is risky and politically incorrect for the Vietnamese leaders. Instead, being tough with China is precisely conducive to strengthening Vietnamese leaders’ personal power. The Vietnamese government also attempts to divert domestic discontent through the nationalistic SCS policy when its authority is challenged. In 2011, when the CPV was unable to “fight corruption” and the economy was stuck in a quagmire, the Vietnamese government successfully transferred the accumulated grievances of the people into being angry with China on the SCS dispute so as to avoid carrying out the “radical political reform” and shock therapy which is more likely to cause further deterioration of the domestic situation.15

12

Li Dalu. (2020). Min zu zhu yi, guo nei zheng zhi quan li jie gou bian qian yu nan hai zheng duan guo dui hua dui chong cha yi [Nationalism, changes in domestic political power structure and differences in ASEAN claimant states’ hedging strategy towards China]. Dang Dai Ya Tai [Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies] (2), pp. 118–120. 13 Zhang Mingliang. (2017). “Nan hai wen ti hua” de yue nan wai jiao [Vietnam’s foreign policy based on the South China Sea issue]. Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu [Southeast Asian Studies] (1), p. 28. 14《旅外越侨心系祖国》 , Vietnam+. (2018, December 16). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/旅外越侨心 系祖国/89741.vnp. 15 Wai mei: nan hai tiao shi yuan yu yue nan gong chan dang zhuan yi guo nei mao dun [Foreign media: the tensions in the SCS because of the CPV turned domestic disputes]. Ta Kung Pao (2014, May 15). http://news.takungpao.com/world/exclusive/2014-05/2478161.html; Dee Woo. (2011,

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Second, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy has considerably strengthened the capability of social mobilizing to resist China in the SCS. Vietnamese government has further strengthened people’s threat perception and preference for confrontation with China by adopting a nationalistic SCS policy. Therefore, it provides the Vietnamese government with a potent public opinion and resource absorption ability to strengthen arms construction and deepen military cooperation with major powers such as the USA and Japan. Moreover, the Vietnamese government has obtained considerable public support for its strong will against China. For example, as a key element of the “gray zone” tactic in the SCS, Vietnam constructed the “fishing boat-militia” system in which the Vietnamese fishing boats can carry out a variety of “missions” in the SCS, including claiming “sovereignty”, conducting maritime operations, detecting intelligence, and capturing economic benefits. Besides, Vietnamese fishing boats are increasingly common in the undisputed waters (including internal waters and territorial seas) of Hainan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces of China. A large number of fishing boats are also unduly concentrated near some of China’s navy and aviation forces’ important access routes to and from the ocean, and they are even within sight range of Chinese military sites in Guangdong and Hainan provinces.16 Thirdly, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy has enhanced the cost of China’s tough position and confrontation with Vietnam in the SCS. China cherishes Vietnam as its “good neighbor, good friend, good comrades good partner”, and don’t wish Vietnam to be thrown into political turmoil or even regime change due to the escalation of the SCS dispute.17 As a result of it, China highly worries about the rise of antiChina sentiment in Vietnam, which could jeopardize China–Vietnam relations and the political stability in Vietnam. Finally, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy has effectively persuaded the USA and Japan to assist Vietnam in confronting China. In practice, when strong antiChinese nationalism develops, it could become Vietnam’s general predisposition for confrontation and thus exerting continuous and consistent pressure on Vietnam’s China policy. The asymmetrical power between the two sides in the context of China’s rise has actually further exacerbated Vietnam’s excessive anxiety about China. It will not only solidify Vietnam’s preventive strategy against China (including actively bringing in other major powers to balance China), but also may stimulate its potential overreaction. Moreover, in the event of a conflict with China, Vietnam will also firmly July 21). Why a war between China and Vietnam is inevitable. Insider. http://www.businessinsider. com/sino-vietnamese-south-china-sea-warblood-oil-and-american-interest-the-inevitable-2011-7. 16 2 yue, 311 sou yue nan yu chuan qin ru zhong guo da lu ji hai nan dao hai yu-yue nan yu chuanhai nan fei fa huo dong qing kuang bao gao (2) [February, 311 Vietnamese fishing boats illegally entered into the waters of mainland China and Hainan Island-report of Vietnamese fishing boats’ illegal activity]. Nan hai zhan lue tai shi gan zhi [South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative]. (2020, March 2). http://www.scspi.org/zh/dtfx/1583116222. 17 Vietnam has a tendency to align itself militarily with the United States over territorial disputes, and if there is political turmoil, a pro-U.S. regime may emerge as a result. And its sphere of influence radiates to Laos and Cambodia in the South Central Peninsula, which will raise the uncertainty of the situation around China. See Gao Cheng. (2014, May 26). Nan hai wei ji bei hou de zhong guo hai yang zheng ce tiao zheng [Adjustment of China’s marine policy in the context of the SCS crisis]. FT Chinese. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001056398?page=full.

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pursue a policy of confrontation in order to avoid damaging its self-esteem and honor as a “resister”. In fact, it is Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy that has shaped its determination to balance China resolutely and durably. Compared to the preference for economic cooperation with China of the Philippines, Malaysia, and other ASEAN claimants, Vietnam is highly aware of the strategic intentions of Chinese economic programs and thus rejecting deep cooperation with China. In that case, Vietnam has become a main partner for USA and Japan’s containment strategy toward China, which has injected Vietnam with the necessary strength and confidence to confront China in the SCS. For instance, the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig crisis demonstrated the high importance of international backing, particularly from strong partners such as the USA, for Vietnam to promote its “alliance politics” and pressure China to de-escalate tensions in the SCS.18

4 The Self-Inflicted Effect of Vietnam’s Nationalistic SCS Policy While the nationalistic SCS policy benefits Vietnam in many ways, it also has a selfinflicted effect, particularly in terms of putting Vietnam at risk of losing control of nationalism and incurring the cost of blindly excluding China. The nationalistic SCS policy also greatly reduces the space for Vietnam to make necessary compromise on the SCS dispute and amplifies the negative impacts of a potential arbitration, which is concerning islands and reefs’ sovereignty in the SCS initiated by China, on the legitimacy of the Vietnamese regime. Unfortunately, the public will further demand more identity and dignity after economic aspirations are achieved, thereby increasing the influence of nationalism. At the same time, national strength has enhanced from the economic growth, which makes it not only necessary but also feasible to adhere to a tough position on the territorial dispute.19 So Vietnam’s nationalism has got a stronger momentum with its impressive economic performance in recent years. To be more specific, Vietnam faces the risk of uncontrolled nationalism and the increasing cost of blindly excluding China. The anti-China riots during the oil rig crisis in 2014 truly reflect the vulnerability of Vietnam’s political and economic system as the riots have evolved into an attack on the ruling position of the CPV.20 So political instability and even regime collapse in Vietnam caused by its anti-China nationalism is not unimaginable. According to Vietnamese source, a direct economic loss of 1 billion USD to 1.5 billion USD, which is equivalent to 0.7% of GDP, was 18

Le Hong Hiep. (2015). Vietnam’s alliance politics in the South China Sea. Trends in Southeast Asia (6), p. 9. 19 Li Dalu. (2020). Min zu zhu yi, guo nei zheng zhi quan li jie gou bian qian yu nan hai zheng duan guo dui hua dui chong cha yi [Nationalism, changes in domestic political power structure and differences in ASEAN claimant states’ hedging strategy towards China]. Dang Dai Ya Tai [Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies] (2), p. 113. 20 Jason Morris-Jung. (2014, July 30). Reflections on the oil rig crisis: Vietnam’s domestic opposition grows. ISEAS Perspective (43).

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caused during the crisis.21 Simultaneously, Vietnam’s determination to prevent its excessive economic dependence on China22 has severely hampered its ability to absorb the dividends of BRI.23 In fact, even the Law on Special Economic Zones, which is to be considered by the Vietnamese National Assembly in 2018 to attract foreign investment without mentioning China, has still triggered large-scale antiChina demonstrations and riots in many parts of Vietnam. Secondly, it has narrowed the window of opportunity for Vietnam to reach the necessary compromise on the SCS dispute. As Thomas C. Schelling said, “If his pain were our greatest delight and our satisfaction were his greatest woe, all would just proceed to hurt and to frustrate each other. Effective coercion requires finding a bargain.”24 And for the weak states, “inopportune acts, flawed policies, and unreasonable moves may have fatal results.”25 Vietnamese nationalists are known for their uncompromising position on the SCS dispute, ruling out any chance of cooperation with China to jointly develop oil and gas in the SCS disputer areas, and refusing to dialogue and address disagreements with China. At the same time, their desire to profit from catering to extra-regional countries aimed at containing China’s influence in the SCS is so obvious.26 However, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy is doomed to fail in pressuring China to make compromise on the SCS dispute. First of all, there is great asymmetric power between Vietnam and China, vulnerability of Vietnam’s political and economic system, its high economic dependence on China in particular, and historical lessons of the serious consequences of allying with great power.27 Although Vietnam has attempted to balance China by approaching the USA and Japan, it has actually got limited substantial assistance from the two countries. Finally, China has to squelch Vietnam’s nationalistic position on the SCS dispute in order to prevent other ASEAN claimants from following Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy, please the nationalists at home and weaken USA’s hegemonic prestige. In a word, if Vietnam still refuses to compromise, it is likely to miss out on a good win–win opportunity with China and even fall into the dilemma of having nothing. ˜ Ðu´,c Thành: Giàn khoan Haij i Du,o,ng 981 làm Kinh Doanh. (2014, July 28). TS Nguyên ´ 0.7% GDP. DANTRI. https://dantri.com.vn/kinh-doanh/ts-nguyen-duc-thanh-gian-khoan-haimât duong-981-lam-mat-07-gdp-1407084629.htm. 22 Phuong Hoang. (2019). Domestic protests and foreign policy: An examination of anti-China protests in Vietnam and Vietnamese policy towards China regarding the South China Sea. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 6(1), pp. 17–20. 23 Le Hong Hiep. (2018, March 29). The belt and road initiative in Vietnam: Challenges and prospects. ISEAS Perspective (18); Jessica C. Liao and Ngoc-Tram Dang. (2020). The nexus of security and economic Hedging: Vietnam’s strategic response to Japan–China infrastructure financing competition. The Pacific Review 33(3), 669–696. 24 Thomas C. Schelling, translated by Mao Ruipeng. (2017). Arms and Influence. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 4. 25 Kenneth N. Waltz, translated by Xin Qiang and proofread by Su Changhe. (2017). Theory of International Politics. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, p. 210. 26 Cheng Hanping. (2012). Yue nan hai yang fa zhan yu an quan zhan lue [Vietnam’s maritime development and security strategy]. Beijing: Yi Wen Publishing Military, p. 205. 27 Thuy T Do. (2017). ‘Firm in principles, flexible in strategy and tactics’: Understanding the logic of Vietnam’s China policy. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 2(1), 27–29. 21

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Finally, Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy will magnify the negative impacts of a potential arbitration initiated by China on Vietnamese regime’s legitimacy. The core logic of Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy has convinced the Vietnamese people that Vietnam has “sufficient legal basis and historical evidences” over the “undisputed sovereignty” of the Paracels and Spratlys.28 However, from Chinese perspective, this “legitimacy” is largely premised on the violation of the principle of estoppel, by denying the international legal obligations of China’s sovereignty over the Xisha/Nansha Islands under the “Pham Van Dong official letter”, Yong Van Khiem and Le Loc talks, and by repositioning and legitimizing the historical juridical status of the Saigon regime. This regime has long been regarded by current Vietnamese government as a “puppet regime” or “pseudo regime”. Consequently, a shocking conclusion that the established Socialist Republic of Vietnam annexed and destroyed another legitimate state by force can be drew. At the same time, in order to prove its “innocence”, to set up China’s “guilty conscience” and to counterbalance China, Vietnam has threatened to initiate an international arbitration29 against China from time to time as “a classic deterrence in action”,30 and nominated four conciliators and four arbitrators, respectively, under Annex V and Annex VII of the UNCLOS in May 2020.31 Despite China refuses to participate in international arbitration initiated unilaterally by the ASEAN claimant (such as the SCS Arbitration initiated by the Philippines), it doesn’t mean that the principle of estoppel, a China’s powerful tool, will not be put on hold indefinitely. In particular, as the COC consultations enter into substantial phase, China is likely to initiate an international arbitration on the sovereignty of the islands and reefs in the SCS when the consultations remains deadlocked. It is not only a new bargaining chip for China to deal with Vietnam’s judicial blackmail, but also a critical chance to make up for the shortcomings of China’s deterrence system at sea and to pose a huge challenge to the core logic of Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy.

5 Conclusion As a crucial component of Vietnam’s SCS policy, nationalism provides the country with various benefits and risks. Through the maritime standoff in 2014, Vietnam has largely recognized the double-edged sword effect of its nationalistic SCS policy and 28《越南希望各国维护东海和平、稳定、安全环境,

恪守法律至上原则》 , Vietnam+. (2021, April 29). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/越南希望各国维护东海和平稳定安全环境恪守法律至上 原则/138726.vnp. 29 William Choong. (2021, May 4). Vietnam and the great powers: Agency amid amity and enmity. ISEAS Perspective (62), p. 7. 30 Lye Liang Fook and Ha Hoang Hop. (2018, August 31). Vietnam’s responses to China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. ISEAS Perspective (50), p. 7. 31 Vietnam: Nomination of Arbitrators and Conciliators under Annexes V and VII of the Convention. UN. (2020, May 15). https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2020/CN.168.2020-Eng.pdf.

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thus attempted to resume the “cooperating and struggling” strategy in the SCS.32 Simultaneously, as the increasing power centralization by diminishing the National Assembly’s restriction on the top leaders’ power, Vietnam is also actively appeasing the nationalists, suppressing online nationalism, and trying to restrain the hostility on the SCS dispute from kidnapping the relations with China. For example, at a meeting with voters after the 11th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the CPV in October 2019, CPV’s General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong said, “In safeguarding national and ethnic interests, Vietnam will not make any unreasonable concessions. And while firmly maintaining our independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, Vietnam will also maintain a peaceful environment conducive to national development……We have never had such a stable environment in history, so we should maintain it well…….We should handle all kinds of relations harmoniously, dialectically and comprehensively from a strategic perspective, and safeguard national independence and sovereignty while maintaining the peaceful environment.”33 However, due to the durable influence of Vietnam’s nationalistic SCS policy, both matigating the SCS dispute and the consultations on COC will face severe challenges from Vietnamese nationalists.34

References 《旅外越侨心系祖国》 , Vietnam+. (2018, December 16). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/旅外越侨心 系祖国/89741.vnp 《黄沙长沙海域上的“活界碑”》 , Vietnam+. (2020, July 5). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/黄沙长沙 海域上的活界碑/119543.vnp 《越南希望各国维护东海和平、稳定、安全环境, 恪守法律至上原则》 , Vietnam+. (2021, April 29). https://zh.vietnamplus.vn/越南希望各国维护东海和平稳定安全环境恪守法律至 上原则/138726.vnp Cheng, G. (2014, May 26). Nan hai wei ji bei hou de zhong guo hai yang zheng ce tiao zheng [Adjustment of China’s marine policy in the context of the SCS crisis]. FT Chinese. http://www. ftchinese.com/story/001056398?page=full Choong, W. (2021, May 4). Vietnam and the great powers: agency amid amity and enmity. ISEAS Perspective. (62). ˜ Ðu´,c Thành: Giàn khoan Haij i Du,o,ng 981 làm mât ´ 0.7% Doanh, K. (2014, July 28). TS Nguyên GDP. DANTRI. https://dantri.com.vn/kinh-doanh/ts-nguyen-duc-thanh-gian-khoan-hai-duong981-lam-mat-07-gdp-1407084629.htm Fook, L. L., & Hop, H. H. (2018, August 31). Vietnam’s responses to China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. ISEAS Perspective (50). Gac Ma soldiers-immortal monument in Vietnamese people’s hearts. VNA. (2021, May 13). https:// zh.vietnamplus.vn/GacMasoldiers-immortalmonumentinVietnamesepeople’shearts/139286.vnp 32

Carlyle A. Thayer. (2016). Vietnam’s strategy of ‘cooperating and struggling with China over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2), pp. 200–220. 33 Zhao Weihua. (2020). Yue nan zai nan hai xin dong xiang yu zhong yue guan xi zou shi [New trends of Vietnam’s activity in the SCS and Sino-Vietnam relations]. Bian Jie Yu Hai Yang Yan Jiu [Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies] (1), p. 107. 34 Le Hong Hiep. (2019, April 8). Vietnam’s position on the South China Sea code of conduct. ISEAS Perspective (22).

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Yong, Z. (2016). Nan hai ‘981’ zuan jin ping tai chong tu zhe she de yue nan nan hai zheng ce [Vietnam’s SCS policy reflected by the ‘981’ oil rig crisis in the SCS]. Dang Dai Ya Tai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies]. (1). Zhang, M. (2017). “Nan hai wen ti hua” de yue nan wai jiao [Vietnam’s foreign policy based on the South China Sea issue]. Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu [Southeast Asian Studies] (1). Zhao, W. (2020). Yue nan zai nan hai xin dong xiang yu zhong yue guan xi zou shi [New trends of Vietnam’s activity in the SCS and Sino-Vietnam relations]. Bian Jie Yu Hai Yang Yan Jiu [Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies] (1).

Xiao Luo is an Associate Researcher at the School of International Studies, Sichuan University, China. His area of expertise is the South China Sea dispute, China-ASEAN relations. His selected publications are Zhan Lue Yu Qi Yu Xiao Guo Tiao Zhan Zhou Bian Da Guo De Ce Lue Xuan Ze-Yi Fei Yue Liang Guo Nan Hai Zhi Hua Zheng Ce (2009–2019) Wei Li [Strategic Expectations and Balance Strategies under which Small States Challenge Their Peripheral Power: The Cases of Philippines and Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategies, 2009–2019]. (2020). Dang Dai Ya Tai [The Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies]. (2); Nan Hai Yu Zhong Guo De He Xin Li Yi: Zheng Lun, Hui Gui Ji Chao Yue [The South China Sea and China’s Core Interests: Debate, Review, Transcend]. (2018). Dang Dai Ya Tai [The Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies] (2). Email: [email protected].

Malaysia’s Layered Nationalism and the South China Sea Dispute Chow-Bing Ngeow and Nur Shahadah Jamil

Abstract Compared with other countries involved in the South China Sea dispute, nationalist sentiments in Malaysia have been so far much more restrained and moderate. This chapter argues that Malaysian nationalism has been somewhat geared more inwardly toward nation-building rather than manifesting itself outwardly and territorially. This is to a large extent reflective of the nature of its multi-ethnic society. It examines the different layers of sub-national nationalism within Malaysia, including Malay nationalism, ethnic Chinese nationalism, and state nationalism in Sabah and Sarawak, and how these different forms of sub-national nationalism react to the South China Sea dispute. It argues that the existence of these different layers of nationalism is one of the factors that counts against a stronger mobilization of nationalism by the Malaysian government. Keywords Malaysia · South China Sea dispute · Malay nationalism · Ethnic · Chinese nationalism · State nationalism

1 Introduction In the modern, Westphalian state-based order, territorial integrity is considered an essential and constitutive aspect of national sovereignty. In most cases, territorial disputes evoke emotional, nationalistic responses from the public, which governments and politicians could mobilize, manipulate and leverage on. But at the same time, nationalistic public opinion could also constrain and even threaten sitting leaders and officials. Popular nationalist sentiments have always been a double-edged sword for any government.

C.-B. Ngeow (B) · N. S. Jamil Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] N. S. Jamil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_5

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Curiously, however, Malaysian nationalist sentiments have been so far much more restrained on issues related to territorial and/or maritime disputes with its neighbors. In the middle of 2000s, Malaysia and Indonesia had tense relations due to territorial/maritime disputes in the Celebus Sea.1 While there were passionate Indonesian demonstrations against Malaysia outside of the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta and Consulates in other cities, Malaysians did no such action. In 2008, Malaysia lost its claim over Pulau Putih/Pedra Branca, a maritime feature just eight nautical miles off Malaysian coast. The sovereignty over Pulau Putih was determined by the International Court of Justice to belong to Singapore, which is geographically far removed from it. Most Malaysians followed the Pulau Putih case rather disinterestedly, and the loss of sovereignty over this piece of territory did not evoke strong nationalist reactions. In late 2018 and early 2019, Malaysia and Singapore were embroiled in a series of airspace/maritime disputes. A more nationalistic public would have been stirred up by such kind of dispute, but again, most Malaysians generally disregarded this episode. The Malaysian media reports on these issues also stayed away from hyperbolic headlines and sensationalist reporting. Similarly, in the SCS dispute, Malaysians have been notably less passionate about the issue compared to their counterparts in Vietnam and the Philippines. Many Vietnamese and Filipinos follow developments in the SCS closely and intensely. Occasionally they have gone to the street to demonstrate, to express their strong anger and disapproval of China, but such episodes have been very rare in Malaysia. This is not to deny that the saliency of the SCS issue among the Malaysian public has been increasing in recent years. Public apprehensions against Chinese actions in the SCS have certainly gone up. But relatively speaking, Malaysian nationalism on matters related to territorial/maritime disputes has been generally much less fierce. Some scholars attribute this mild form of nationalism on territorial/maritime issues in Malaysia to the “top-down, elitist nature of Malaysia key foreign and security policy processes, and in part to the deliberate efforts of successive Malaysian authorities to curtail public awareness and visibility of such nationalistic issues via media control.”2 A study of the Malaysian media coverage of the SCS issue during June and July 2016 (the period leading up to and immediately after the SCS arbitration case brought by the Philippines against China) shows that among Malaysian mainstream newspapers, the Malay language daily Utusan Melayu had only very limited coverage (only 5 articles) of the arbitration, compared to the English language daily The Star (124 articles) and Chinese language daily Sinchew Daily (74 articles), while the online news portal Malaysiakini carried 10 articles.3 Given that Utusan Melayu was closely controlled by then ruling party United Malays National Organisation 1

Lai, Y. M. & Y. Chrisnanti (2015). Nationalism, power politics and maritime-territorial sovereignty in Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia: the Celebus Sea/Ambalat dispute. Journal of Public Security and Safety, 3(1), pp. 53–88. 2 Lai, Y. M. & Kuik, C. C. (2021). Structural sources of Malaysia’s South China Sea policy: Power uncertainties and small-state hedging. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 75(3), p. 284. 3 Yang, L. F., R. Ponnan, A.D. Rycker. (2020). Different countries, different perspectives: A comparative analysis of the South China Sea disputes coverage by Malaysian and Chinese newspapers. China Report, 56(1), pp. 39–59.

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(UMNO), the very limited coverage could indeed lend credence to the argument that the Malaysian authorities sought to “curtail public awareness and visibility of such nationalistic issues via media control.” However, The Star was (and still is) actually also owned by another then ruling party Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), which reported the issue extensively. It seemed that if there were any “media control” by the government over how much the public should be exposed to the information related to the South China Sea dispute, it was a differentiated control, depending on what language the media used. Regardless of what impact of the government’s top-down control over the media may have had, it is argued in this chapter here that the nature of Malaysian nationalism needs to be better understood. Perhaps reflective of Malaysia’s very own multi-ethnic character, nationalism in Malaysia has been somewhat geared more inwardly toward nation-building rather than manifesting itself outwardly and territorially. Malaysia is a country of 32 million people with a heterogeneous society, consisting of around 68% Bumiputra, 23% Chinese, 7% Indians and 1% others. Bumiputra is a Malay term that literally means “sons of the soil,” which consists of the Malays, consisting around 55% of the total population, and other indigenous groups such as the Dayak, Bidayuh, Kadazan-Dusun, Bajau, Murut at 14%. Most of non-Malay Bumiputra are native peoples in the Borneon states of Sabah and Sarawak. Another important factor is the conspicuous geography of Malaysia, consisting of two entities: Peninsular Malaysia and Borneo Malaysia. Political power and economic resources are mostly concentrated in Peninsular Malaysia, with roughly 80% of the total population of Malaysia. The two Borneon states of Sabah and Sarawak are together geographically much larger than Peninsular Malaysia, but with a much smaller population. The usual image of Malaysia as a nation of three major ethnic groups (Malay, Chinese, Indian) is more applicable in Peninsular Malaysia rather than in Sabah and Sarawak. The political dynamics of Sabah and Sarawak have always been distinct from Peninsular Malaysia, with their own local features and characters. Incidentally, it is these two Borneon states that directly face the disputed areas in the SCS. Forging from such a diverse society a common national identity has always been challenging. After more than 60 years of independent statehood and after many efforts to integrate these different ethnic groups into a whole, a genuine Malaysian national identity today does exist. Unlike in other multi-ethnic societies, fortunately interethnic communal violence has always been very rare in Malaysia. However, the nature of this national identity of Malaysia is still very much contested as different ethnic groups/communities understand the Malaysian identity—and the nationalism that builds upon this identity—not entirely the same with each other. Some communities also harbor a kind of narrower nationalism that is at odds with the national identity of Malaysia. In understanding the relations between Malaysian nationalism and the SCS dispute, therefore, it is necessary to first unpack these different layers of nationalism in Malaysia.

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2 Malay Nationalism There are two strands of Malay nationalism that always have had a strong foothold not only in Malay politics, but also in Malaysian politics as a whole. The two strands are ethno-nationalism and religious nationalism. Ethno-nationalism in Malaysia began to emerge when in 1946, the British colonial authorities proposed the establishment of a Malayan Union, in preparing for its colonial possession Peninsular Malaysia (called Malaya), to gain independence eventually. The Union was a confederation of Malay states, and it proposed for equal citizenship rights to be given to the non-Malays (Chinese and Indians) who had settled down in Malaya. This British proposal sparked the rise of nationalism among the Malays for several reasons. First, the call for equal citizenship terms for the nonMalays would also mean putting an end to Malay special or inherent rights. Another reason would be the abolishment of the status or power of the Malay rulers. There were also fears that equal citizenship would eventually lead to non-Malay, especially Chinese, domination in both political and economic spheres. Distrust toward the ethnic Chinese also stemmed partly from the attempts by Communist Party of Malaya (with vast majority of the members being ethnic Chinese) to take over Malaya after the Japanese withdrew in 1945. This strand of Malay nationalism is represented most prominently by the political party UMNO. UMNO emerged to oppose the Malayan Union and managed to convince the British to scrap that idea. A new arrangement, Federation of Malaya, that would provide greater protection to the special rights of the Malays and guarantee Malay political supremacy, was put in place instead. It was UMNO that played the leading role in negotiating with the British that gained the country its independence in 1957. Together with other parties, UMNO had ruled Malaysia as the dominant and leading party for more than 60 years. It has always defined itself as the champion of an ethnonationalist ideology called Ketuanan Melayu (Malay Supremacy), which can be defined as “the passion for anything related to the Malay race, such as political rights, language, cultural heritage and custom, as well as homeland.”4 Meanwhile, as Islam serves as a major symbol of Malay identity or “Malayness,”5 it has become inseparable from Malay ethno-cultural heritage. This is stated clearly in Article 3(1) of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution that stipulates “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.” However, since independence, there has always been a movement to make the country more “Islamized,” if not actually to establish Malaysia as an Islamic State. In Malaysian politics, religious nationalism is best represented by the Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). PAS calls for the establishment of an Islamic State where Islamic principles would be adopted by the Malays and applied in the life of individuals, society and the state as a whole. Religious nationalism was 4

Liow, J. C. (2015, January 5). Ketuanan Melayu: What’s in a name? The Straits Times. https:// www.straitstimes.com/opinion/ketuanan-melayu-whats-in-a-name. 5 In Malaysia, by law, all Malays are Muslims. Together with the non-Malay Muslims, total number of Muslim population in Malaysia amounts to about 60%.

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relatively marginal compared to ethno-nationalism in the early years of the country, but heightened religious consciousness was on the rise since the 1970s, brought by the global phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. At the same time, as Malaysia sent more and more students to be educated in the universities in the Middle East, a more favorable environment for the cultivation of an increasing religiously conscious society was created. Entering the new century, the “Islamic” consciousness has been further heightened in the society. Partly as a result of the weakening of UMNO as a political force, Islam has not only supplemented the traditional ethnonationalist markers (such as language and culture) for the Malay race, but itself has become a stronger and more acute marker distinguishing the Malays from the non-Malays. Today, Malay public figures—be it politicians, artists, athletes, or influencers, have to be mindful of their public images lest they be criticized for not upholding the values of Islam in their way of life. There have also been many instances in which Malay political elites are criticized for giving in to the demand of the non-Malays that are perceived to be against or not in line with the teachings of Islam. The element of Islam also influences how Malays view the world events happening at the international front. The US and the West, in general, are often intensely condemned for their strong support of Israel. India sometimes received criticism for the way it suppresses Kashmir’s Muslims. Recently, China has been condemned by growing Muslim voices in Malaysia, for the way it rules the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang. Traditionally, the ethnonationalist strand of UMNO was seen as more “moderate” due to the confidence UMNO had as a dominant party and the close relationship it formed with the non-Malay coalitional partners such as MCA and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). UMNO lost power after the general elections in 2018. Although it has since come back into power in 2020, the party has been much weakened. The weakened UMNO has partnered with PAS, and both parties have wanted to present a common front to defend the Malay identity and political power, despite their continued differences. These two strands of Malay nationalism have, therefore, been converging in recent years, and it has the potential to become more potent and exclusivist, presenting challenges to the nation-building of Malaysia. In this context, Malay nationalism toward the issue of territory was mainly about securing their homeland vis-à-vis other ethnic communities, and not so much about external threats toward the nation’s territorial integrity or sovereignty. Their threat perception is largely dominated by the fear of losing control over their territory/homeland to other ethnic groups, especially the Chinese Malaysians. The Chinese are often seen as having a dominant economic position in the society while refusing to be “assimilated” in Malaysia. The Chinese community in Malaysia has sternly preserved and maintained its cultural and educational institutions such as Chinese language schools, which irks the Malay nationalists. Unlike Chinese or Indian Malaysians, the Malays feel that they have no other homeland or origin country where they can “go home,” and Malaysia is the only homeland of the Malays, so the dominant position of the Malays must be defended. This is fundamentally the psychological basis of the ideology Ketuanan Melayu.

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Such fear can be reflected through periodic anti-ethnic Chinese remarks made by some Malay politicians such as “Cina balik China” (Chinese go back to China) or labeling the Chinese as “communists.”

3 Ethnic Chinese Nationalism The ethnic Chinese community in Malaysia was formed mainly during the British colonial period, when the British imported a large number of Chinese laborers into Malaya. Chinese nationalism was introduced before and during the 1911 Republican Revolution in China, when the anti-Manchu revolutionaries sought to mobilize the overseas Chinese communities to support their cause. Throughout the Republican era and especially during the Sino-Japanese War, there was strong support provided by the ethnic Chinese communities to the various causes and struggles in China.6 After the Communist Party of China won the civil war in China in 1949, most ethnic Chinese in Malaya, and in other parts of Southeast Asia, had to adjust to the new realities and adopt the countries of their residence as their new homelands. In Malaysia, unlike in most other Southeast Asian countries, the ethnic Chinese community has maintained a strong cultural identity, especially through the communityfunded Chinese language schools and media. In the face of Malay ethno-nationalism and the Ketuanan Melayu ideology, the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia also developed their own forms of nationalism, which also can be roughly categorized into two strands. The first strand calls for Malaysian Malaysia, a civic nationalist ideal based on equality of all ethnicities and races. The second strand is more culturalist, which is somewhat more inward oriented toward the community itself, and was formed with a highly vigilant attitude against any government’s attempt to erode the preservation of Chinese language and culture. Both strands overlap in certain ways and do not see their ideals as contradicting a Malaysian national identity. While the Malaysian Malaysia followers tend to deemphasize the ethnic identities for all ethnic groups (but not denying their legitimacy) and strive for a common, civic-based nationhood, the culturalists subscribe to a more multiculturalist, rather than civic, version of Malaysian nationhood. For them, a Malaysian national identity and a Chinese cultural identity are not incompatible, and their coexistence is perfectly normal in a multi-cultural society. In politics, both strands have been the main forces sustaining the political opposition to UMNO for decades, especially the Democratic Action Party (DAP). The inherent tensions among these two strands of ethnic Chinese nationalism, however, have never been satisfactorily resolved. Most Malaysian Chinese language media tend to expound a somewhat moderate version of the culturalist strand. The most influential Chinese language media, Sinchew Daily, for example, defines itself as a member of a cosmopolitan “wenhua Zhongguo” (Cultural China), where a cultural community transcends over 6

Wang, G. (1981). Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese. Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, pp. 142–158.

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national and political boundaries. Critics have pointed out, however, that while ostensibly apolitical, this kind of cultural appeal could easily lead to, nurture, and reinforce a China-centric, ethno-based nationalist sentiments among the Chinese in Malaysia.7 Like their counterpart the Malay nationalism, both strands of ethnic Chinese nationalism are not concerned much with territorial issues and are geared toward the issues of how to proceed with national building in a multi-ethnic society. They were largely local oriented until the rise of China. Among the two, the culturalists resonate the most with China’s rise, with a rekindled emotional connection. They associate the suffering and misfortunate of the various ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, many of which did experience massacres and forced assimilation, as the direct result of the weakness of China. For them, the decades of sacrifices and struggle for the preservation of Chinese language and culture have finally been vindicated by the rise of a prosperous, strong, technologically advanced and influential China. The Malaysian government nowadays has come to recognize the importance of the Chinese language and culture, and no longer applies strong assmilationist pressures toward the ethnic Chinese community. However, maintaining a clear boundary between cultural and political identities is not always easy and straightforward. The culturalists have a tendency to become more and more identified with China. While not all of the culturalists have become so, a portion of them have developed an ethnonationalist view toward China, conflating cultural identity with political identity, stressing the ethnic solidarity with China, and strongly supportive and defensive of the political stands taken by Beijing. In recent years, on many controversial issues pertaining to China, from the human rights situations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang to geopolitical issues such as USChina rivalry, these ethnonationalist-oriented Chinese Malaysians have vigorously defended China, especially on social media platforms.8 This was particularly the case since the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong in 2019, which quickly became a bitterly debated topic in Chinese Malaysian social media. The fierce and emotionally charged mutual denigrations often seen between the “blue camp” and “yellow camp” in Hong Kong politics were very much reproduced in the Chinese Malaysian social media scene.

4 State Nationalism: Sabah and Sarawak Unlike Malay nationalism and ethnic Chinese nationalism, which originated from inter-ethnic relations, nationalisms in Sabah and Sarawak are more central-periphery 7

Chang, T.P. (2013). Xugou de wenhua baquan kangzheng: Malaixiya Xinzhou Ribao de daodewenhua xingxiao celue pipan, 1988–2010 [Constructed resistance against cultural hegemony: a critique of the moral-cultural marketing strategy of Malaysia’s Sinchew Daily]. Xin Wen Xue Yan Jiu [Studies in Journalism] (115), pp. 51–91. 8 Lim, W. T. (2019, August 6). Lun Malaixiya huaren da Zhonghua minzu zhuyi de liancheng (On the formation of the grand Chinese nationalism among the Chinese Malaysians). The News Lens. https://www.thenewslens.com/article/123092.

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oriented. In order to gain a full perspective on the issue of state nationalism in Sabah and Sarawak, one must first understand the historical process of how these two Borneon states joined Malaya in forming Federation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, through the signing of Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). After the independence of Malaya (Peninsular Malaysia), Sabah and Sarawak were both the last vestiges of the British colonial empire in Southeast Asia. Instead of being granted their own independence, these two territories were enjoined with Malaya and Singapore to form Malaysia in 1963 (Singapore left Malaysia two years later). In convincing the Sabahans and Sarawakians to become newly constituent states in a Malaysian federation, promises were made by Kuala Lumpur that the autonomy of the two states would be kept and respected. In addition, the two states were given promises that they would benefit economically from being parts of a larger nation state (of Malaysia) and being closer to the economically more developed Peninsular Malaysia. By and large, however, after five decades of since joining the Federation of Malaysia, most Sabahans and Sarawakians would agree that the Peninsular-based central government has failed to deliver these promises.9 Although secessionist movements (especially in Sabah) were never absent in the years since 1963, in general, these movements were politically quite marginal. They never developed a mass following. However, decades of accumulated grievances and dissatisfactions toward the central government and Peninsular-based political elite have fueled growing centrifugal tendencies and state nationalism in both Sabah and Sarawak. For the people in Sabah and Sarawak, the central government has consistently striped way local autonomy, exploited the natural resources of Sabah and Sarawak to benefit Peninsular Malaysia, and tried to impose the Peninsular’s kind of divisive racial and religious politics onto the two states. Both Sabah and Sarawak today still count among the least developed states in Malaysia. Infrastructure is deplorably underdeveloped, with many areas of Sabah and Sarawak still lacking roads, electricity, clean water and Internet access. Many schools and health facilities are also of poor quality and dilapidated. Sabah and Sarawak possess abundant natural resources, especially in oil and gas deposits in the SCS, but the Petroleum Development Act (PDA) of 1974 stipulates that all oil and gas resources found in Sabah and Sarawak belong to the whole Federation and, hence, under central government’s sole control. While Peninsular Malaysia enjoyed economic growth, partly fueled by the oil and gas resources, both Sabah and Sarawak were left behind. Society-wise, Sabah and Sarawak are also more ethnically and religiously diverse. Many Sabahans and Sarawakians see the ethnic/religious relations/tensions among the Malays, Chinese and Indians in Peninsular Malaysia as unhealthy, if not toxic. Hence, instead of inter-ethnic or inter-religious rivalry, the kind of nationalism that has developed in Sabah and Sarawak has become distinctly central-periphery. During the era of the political hegemony of UMNO, political elite in Sabah and Sarawak was induced/manipulated/coerced/cowed into forming political alliance 9

Chin, J. (2020, September 25). Is Malaysia heading for ‘BorneoExit’? Why some in East Malaysia are advocating for secession. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/is-malaysia-headingfor-borneoexit-why-some-in-east-malaysia-are-advocating-for-secession-146208.

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with UMNO as members of the ruling coalition of the federal government. But, the weakening of UMNO also has opened up the political space for Sabah and Sarawak to increase demand and negotiate their status. Since the downfall of UMNO in 2018, each of the three succeeding federal coalitional governments had to make some concessions to Sabah and Sarawak. Cabinet committees were formed and ministers appointed to look into the grievances of Sabah and Sarawak. In April 2021, a symbolic concession was made whereby Sabah and Sarawak were designated as “wilayah” (regions) instead of “states,” indicating their special and elevated status compared to the states of Peninsular Malaysia. But, these symbolic gestures have failed to quell the more and more outspoken anti-Peninsular, state-based nationalist voices that have become more prominent. Various state-based nationalistic NGOs or even explicitly secessionist groups have sprung up in the past few years. Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have allowed these groups, such as Sarawak for Sarawakians, Sarawak Association for People’s Aspiration, Sabah Sarawak Keluar Malaysia (Sabah Sarawak Exiting Malaysia), among others, to actively nurture, magnify, amplify, connect and mobilize the grassroots nationalist sentiments in Sabah and Sarawak against the ideal of a Malaysian national identity. State nationalist political parties also exist and compete for votes, such as Parti Bumi Kenyalang and Parti Aspirasi in Sarawak. Politically, while the present ruling parties of both Sabah and Sarawak have formed convenient alliances with the ruling coalition in Putrajaya, almost all of these parties jealously guard state-level autonomy and manipulate their state-based nationalist sentiments to gain concessions from the federal government.

5 Nationalism in the South China Sea Dispute The above discussions serve to illustrate the complexity and the multi-layered nature of Malaysian nationalism. Each kind of sub-national nationalism sees and understands territorial/maritime disputes such as the SCS dispute differently.

5.1 Malay Nationalism and the South China Sea Dispute As mentioned earlier, Malay nationalism has been more an inward-oriented kind of ethno-nationalism that aims to assert Malay Supremacy. Foreign policy issues, and/or issues related to territorial/maritime disputes, have not been its main concern. Malay political elite, whether they are from UMNO or other Malay-based political parties, generally has pursued a China-friendly foreign policy since the 1990s, seeing China more in terms of economic opportunities rather than strategic threats. The SCS dispute, although not completely unnoticed, for decades has been mostly an indifferent issue to the Malay nationalists.

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Having said that, it should be mentioned that there has always been a latent fear of and distrust toward China among the Malay community, especially among the more conservative segments, due to the memory of the insurgency of the Communist Party of Malaya that only formally ended in 1989. The term “communism” is still highly sensitive in Malaysia even the Cold War has ended for more than three decades already. China, despite its market-oriented reforms that have upended its “communist” image, after all, is still a country ruled by the Communist Party of China (CPC). This latent fear and distrust are sometimes mobilized to instill hostility toward China. “Anti-China” (not just “anti-[Malaysian] Chinese”) Malay nationalism became more notable in the 2010s. The factors were complex, involving both domestic and external fronts. In terms of domestic politics, the Prime Minister from 2009 to 2018, Najib Abdul Razak, was unable to reverse the declining fortune of UMNO, at the same time being seriously tainted with corruption allegations. His popularity among the Malay masses also dropped due to unpopular economic policies and the perceptions that he conceded too much to the ethnic Chinese interests. Externally, Najib formed a very good relationship with China. At the same time, China became more heavily invested in the economy of Malaysia, while also became more assertive in the SCS issue. Right-wing Malay nationalism emerged in this context where the narrative was the fear of losing the domestic Malay political power to the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia was coupled with the fear of being dominated externally by a rising China, enabled by an incompetent and corrupt Najib. The SCS dispute was essentially not just a specific dispute over territory and maritime zones between Malaysia and China, but formed part of the narrative of an upcoming China’s/Chinese domination of Malaysia and the region. One of the then opposition parties, the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (or popularly known as Bersatu in Malaysia), exploited this sentiment against Najib in the run up to the general elections in 2018. A very good example of this kind of worldview/narratives is the research on China done by a Malay nationalist think tank called Interdisciplinary Research and International Strategy (IRIS) Institute. Founded in 2015, IRIS envisions itself to be a think tank focusing on conflicts and crises in the Islamic world, but with primary emphasis on issues related to Malaysia. It adopts a very hostile view toward both the ethnic Chinese community in Malaysia and China. Its writings regarding China are published in their online magazine Fokus and Landskap, monthly brief Kompas and in a book with a highly provocative title PenChinaan Malaysia: Tergadaikah Tanah Kedaulatan Bangsa? (China-izing Malaysia: Mortgaging National Sovereignty?) (IRIS Institute, 2018). The book was endorsed by many influential Malay nationalist individuals and groups such as Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA), one of the most vocal Malay nationalist NGOs. The book also won the Anugerah Buku Negara (National Book Award) in 2019. In PenChinaan Malaysia, China is described as a country historically and at present under the strong influence of the global Jewish Diaspora.10 This theme certainly exploits the Malay masses’ intense dislike of the Jews and links this emotion with China. China, in turn, is also depicted as a manipulative, expansionist power bent 10

Ibid., pp. 23–64.

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on global domination, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the overseas ethnic Chinese communities. With this kind of narrative, every exchanges China has had with Malaysia, whether in terms of culture, media, business, education, and so forth, is portrayed as having ulterior intention and influence. The role of the overseas Chinese was mentioned frequently in their writings, especially on how they assist China in achieving its goals by providing the rising power with all the strategic information it needs, implying that the ethnic Chinese are willing intelligence agents working for the interests of China. In many writings, IRIS insists that China has an intelligence unit called Qiaowu (Overseas Chinese Affairs), and it was established in Malaysia. Its members consist of influential Malaysian Chinese from diverse background, such as business chambers or associations, banking sector, education sector, political elites and others who swear loyalty to China.11 On its Facebook page, there are also many posts on how ethnic Chinese tycoons or “capitalist tycoons” dominate and manipulate megaprojects under the framework of the BRI in Malaysia. From time to time, IRIS writers also refer to China as “China komunis” (the communist China). It is worth noting that the usage of the term “communist” does not solely reflects ideological differences, but more to exploit Malays’ threat perception toward the Chinese (be it Malaysian Chinese or Chinese citizens from mainland China). With this kind of narrative, it is unsurprising that China is the “aggressor” or “perpetrator” of conflict in the SCS. China is said to be regularly conducting “provocative” activities and military exercises and behaving coercively toward other claimants through various forms of harassment and intrusion. Echoing how foreign analysts describe China, Beijing’s SCS strategy is also described as salami—slicing strategy— which aims to force others claimants to retreat from the disputed waters slowly without causing a war. Essentially, because of China’s aggressive tendency, IRIS analysts contend that the possibilities of peaceful resolution of the SCS dispute are slim, while possibilities that the dispute eventually escalate into war are strong.12 In addition, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, IRIS analysts argue that China has been exploiting the pandemic to strengthen its claims in the SCS through enhanced control and increasing presence in the waters, while other claimants and the US are struggling to control and manage the devastating impact from the pandemic. In an earlier article written in 2016, Syed Ahmad Israa’ Syed Ibrahim, the CEO of IRIS Institute, warned that Malaysia would be embroiled in a great power conflict between the US and China in a SCS conflict. In a passage, he called into question the political loyalty of the Chinese Malaysians in a SCS scenario. He wrote that the Malays and Islam would be most implicated by an armed conflict in the SCS because of their allegiance to this homeland, unlike “other races” like the “Chinese” who have a history of allegiance to “the political power of their own.” He also 11

IRIS Institute. 2018. PenChinaan Malaysia: Tergadaikah tanah kedaulatan bangsa? [Chinaizing Malaysia: Mortgaging National Sovereignty?]. Bangi: IRIS Institute, pp. 222–268; Asyraf, F. (2019). Malaysia sebagai pusat operasi risikan asing (Malaysia as a center of foreign intelligence operation). In Asyraf F. (Ed.) Kompas Edisi 3 (pp. 31–52). Bangi: IRIS Institute, pp. 44–45. 12 Syed Ahmad Israa’, S. I. (2019). Konflik Laut China Selatan: Ancaman perang serantau [South China Sea crisis: threat of a regional war]. In Asyraf F. (Ed.) Kompas Edisi 3 (pp. 7–30). Bangi: IRIS Institute.

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alleged that certain political parties in Malaysia were working for the interests of foreign powers such as the US and China rather than for the interests of Malaysia.13

5.2 Ethnic Chinese Nationalism and the South China Sea Dispute The different strands of ethnic Chinese nationalism in Malaysia respond to the SCS issue differently. The Malaysian Malaysia, civic nationalist followers generally are the more critical of China on the SCS dispute, seeing China’s claims as inconsistent with international law and/or Malaysia’s national interests. For the culturalists, the SCS dispute is an uncomfortable issue given their generally pro-China sentiments, but still, on the basis of identification with a “cultural China” not “political China,” they could take a critical stand toward China if and when necessary. But, it is for a subgroup of the culturalists—the ethnonationalists, which the SCS dispute posts the greatest discomfort, where their close identification with China comes into direct tension with their identification with Malaysia. On matters not directly impacting Malaysia’s sovereignty or interest, such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan or US-China rivalry, the vocal Chinese ethnonationalists in Malaysia could take a stand supporting China’s various positions on the merit of how they understand those controversial issues, without having to have their political loyalty toward Malaysia being explicitly questioned or tested. However, in terms of the territorial and maritime disputes between Malaysia and China in the SCS, they do face an uncomfortable dilemma. Therefore, with the exception of the most determined supporters of China, the majority of the Chinese ethnonationlists prefer to wage their battles on other issues and stay away or maintain silence on the SCS dispute. When they do support China on this matter, their views often are expressed only in social media postings rather than openly. Regardless of these differences, the mainstream ethnic Chinese community (which are mostly a mixture of Malaysian Malaysia and culturalists) in general does not wish that the dispute to be escalated, is comfortable with the Malaysian government’s low-profile approach to the dispute, and maintains a somewhat distance. No ethnic Chinese community leaders or organizations have taken an openly endorsing position on China’s claims in the SCS. An exception was in July 2017, in the aftermath of the Philippines-China Arbitration Award, when Malaysia-China Chamber of Commerce (MCCC) issued a statement denouncing the Award.14 However, as the Arbitration concerned only China and the Philippines (at least on paper) and, therefore, not 13

Syed Ahmad Israa’, S. I. (2016, April 1). Masa depan Malaysia dalam krisis Laut Cina Selatan [Prospects of Malaysia in a South China Sea crisis]. Fokus. https://fokus.my/masa-depan-malaysiadalam-krisis-laut-cina-selatan/. 14 MCCC (Malaysia-China Chamber of Commerce). (2017, July 13). Nanhai keti (On the South China Sea Issue). https://www.mccc.my/index.php/cn/latest-announcements-cn/353-south-chinasea-topic-july-2016.

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directly affecting Malaysia, MCCC could still take an openly China-supportive stand. It was also not necessarily endorsing China’s claims in the SCS but only its position on the Arbitration. But with Malaysia-China tensions in the SCS also began to emerge in recent years, most community organizations and leaders have made no statements on the dispute anymore, preferring to keep a distance and silence. However, the mainstream ethnic Chinese community is also sometimes criticized exactly for this silence because it is seen as not being nationalist or patriotic enough to come out to defend Malaysia’s claims unequivocally and to condemn China. These criticisms have come not necessarily only from among the Malay nationalists, but also from certain circles of the Chinese community, especially the liberal-inclined younger generation. In short, the SCS issue is an awkward, unpleasant and uncomfortable issue for most of the ethnic Chinese communities in Malaysia.

5.3 State Nationalism in Sabah and Sarawak and the South China Sea Dispute Sabah and Sarawak are actually the frontline states facing the disputed waters and maritime features in the SCS. However, both Sabah and Sarawak governments are legally disempowered from actually being directly involved in the SCS. First, the 1974 Petroleum Development Act (PDA), as mentioned earlier, ensured that the federal government has sole control over the oil and gas resources found in the SCS. Second, Malaysia’s claimed features in the SCS have always been strictly controlled by the federal government, depriving, again, Sabah and Sarawak from having any unauthorized access to those features. Third, since 1985, the local fishing communities were barred from venturing to the waters around the disputed maritime features, particularly around the five occupied features off the coast of Sabah.15 Fourth, by law, the maritime jurisdiction of state governments is limited. The 2012 Territorial Sea Act reduced the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of state governments to three nautical miles. Despite clear unhappiness from Sabah and Sarawak over the 2012 Territorial Sea Act, the federal government still forced through and prevailed over their objections. Henceforth, for Sabah and Sarawak, state nationalism on the SCS issue, ironically, is directed not necessarily against China or China only but also against the federal government of Malaysia. In 2015, Sarawak government declared the Luconia Shoals and the surrounding maritime area (where China maintains a coast guard presence almost constantly since 2014 and where Malaysian national oil company Petronas has operations nearby) a national marine national park. This action by the state government was actually legally unclear, as it challenged the federal jurisdiction. Regardless, in justifying the move, the Chief Minister of Sarawak appealed not to Malaysian nationalism but to Sarawak nationalism—that the rights to the concerned area belong to “Anak Sarawak” (descendants of Sarawak). He went on to assert that 15

Interview with a Sabah-based international relations scholar, 27 June 2021.

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the marine national park “will be out of bounds to oil and gas explorations” and told members of the press to “read between the lines,” when asked “whether it was foreign powers or Petronas/federal government he was talking about.”16 Any foreign observer would be startled that the leader of a sub-national government in Malaysia would be so ambiguous about a matter concerning national sovereignty and sovereign rights, but this would not surprise anyone familiar with the complicated relations the federal government of Malaysia has with Sabah and Sarawak. On the ground, sentiments against China can also be easily diverted against the federal government. In a small (and rare) protest organized by a group of Sarawakian nationalists against China’s “violation of our [Sarawak’s] sovereignty and our territorial dignity” in the South China Sea, the organizer of the protest actually said that “we are talking about Sarawak’s territory (italicized by the authors). The federation should keep Sarawak safe and secure, the federal government should take more affirmative actions [but failed to do so].”17 On the other hand, however, exactly because of the federal government’s sole control over oil and gas resources, the maritime features, and the waters in the “disputed” SCS area, ironically, this also removes a potential barrier for both Sabah and Sarawak to pursue stronger engagement with China. The dispute has essentially become a matter to be handled by Putrajaya and Beijing, while Sabah and Sarawak are free to pursue strong economic engagement with China without necessarily being bogged down by the dispute. Ironically enough also, the strong economic engagement with China by Sabah and Sarawak is also pursued, at least partly, for the purpose of making themselves less economically dependent on Peninsular Malaysia.18 Throughout the 2010s, both Sabah and Sarawak state governments have been active in courting economic opportunities from China, and exactly, the result is that China has increased its economic presence in Sabah and Sarawak substantially through investment, trade and tourist arrivals.19 In 2015, China opened its consulate office in Kota Kinabalu (the state capital of Sabah), in addition to its consulate in Kuching (the state capital of Sarawak), making China only of the two non-ASEAN countries (the other being Australia) to have consular presence in both Sabah and Sarawak. Finally, state nationalism can also be directed against neighboring countries other than China. Resentment by the local fishing communities over foreign fishing vessels poaching the fisheries resources in the SCS waters off the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak 16

Luconia Shoals declared a marine national park. Dayak Daily. (2018, September 18). https://day akdaily.com/luconia-shoals-declared-a-marine-national-park/. 17 Activists protest against China’s intrusion into Sarawak waters. The Edge. (2015, December). https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/activists-protest-against-china%E2%80%99s-intrusionsarawak-waters. 18 Interview with a Sabah-based international relations scholar, June 27, 2021. 19 Wong, J. (2019, June 11). China firm plans RM 21bil investment in Sarawak. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2019/06/11/china-firm-plans-rm21bilinvestment-in-sarawak/; Lee, S. (2020, December 20). Sabah wants closer ties with China as state recovers post-Covid-19. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/12/20/ sabah-wants-closer-ties-with-china-as-state-recovers-post-covid-19.

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coasts is not actually targeted specifically toward China (as many foreign media or think tanks tend to presume), but also toward neighboring countries, especially Vietnam. Anti-Filipino nationalist sentiments are also strong and notable in Sabah, fueled by resentment against both the ongoing Philippines’ claim over Sabah and the social-economic problems posted by the growing (and never-ending) stateless and illegal migrants from the Philippines.

6 Toward a Malaysian Nationalism on the South China Sea Dispute? The SCS dispute has become much more salient in public discussions in Malaysia in recent years. Two incidents, in particular, have raised a lot of public attention. First was the West Capella episode in April 2020, where a Chinese survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 was reported to be in a “standoff” with West Capella, a British drilling ship contracted by Malaysia’s national oil company Petronas. The incident received high-profile international media coverage, especially when the US Navy dispatched two warships to sail near Haiyang Dizhi 8 and West Capella as a signal of Washington’s disapproval of China’s actions. Malaysia, however, had a cautious and restrained official response, reflecting its long-standing preference to manage the dispute via “behind the scene” diplomacy. The second incident received even more attention and aroused more concerns and anxiety in Malaysia. On May 31, 2021, 16 military transport aircrafts belonging to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) reportedly entered the airspace above Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone in the SCS, prompting the Royal Air Force of Malaysia to dispatch a group of fighter jets to warn them away. Although the PLAAF aircrafts technically did not violate international law, the move was seen as unfriendly and undermining Malaysia’s security. Both the Royal Air Force and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia issued strongly worded statements condemning China’s actions. China’s ambassador to Malaysia was also summoned by Putrajaya to provide an explanation. Both incidents garnered a lot more public attention and discussions on MalaysiaChina dispute in the SCS than before and have resulted in a surge of Malaysian nationalist sentiments. In social media such as Facebook, many Malaysians condemned China’s actions. The political party Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), often seen as one of the most China-friendly political parties in Malaysia, released a statement criticizing China over the aircraft incident. Malaysian Chinese language newspapers, including the influential Sinchew Daily, published several commentaries very critical of China after the aircraft incident. Both Sabah and Sarawak governments joined the federal government in regarding the incident as a serious threat to the national security. The Deputy Chief Minister of Sabah, Jeffrey Kitingan (also the leader of Homeland Solidarity Party, a Sabah nationalism party), expressed outrage

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at Beijing’s hostile posturing and urged the Foreign Minister of the federal government to take stern action in accordance with international law regarding the aircraft incident, although he phrased it with a localist twist: “Malaysia must now be serious about protecting Sabah’s (italicization by the authors) sovereignty over the SCS and ownership of its resources therein.”20 Similarly, Sarawak government also expressed full support for the federal government and released a statement saying that “it is pertinent that serious action be taken by the Federal Government to ensure such incidents do not recur in the future to protect and uphold the sovereignty, dignity and integrity of the country.”21 There have also been suggestions for more symbolic actions to heighten Malaysian nationalist sentiments and to assert Malaysia’s sovereignty in the SCS. A Malay scholar suggested, for example, that the name of SCS be changed into “Laut Malaysia Raya” (Malaysia Sea), which was meant to give signals to both Malaysians and international community that China will never be allowed to challenge the territorial integrity of Malaysia.22 Following the West Capella episode, the same scholar proposed celebrating the “Malaysian Heroes in the SCS,” including Petronas, the Royal Malaysian Navy and Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency, for their dedication, for completing their missions without fear and for their willingness to confront China’s vessels.23

7 Conclusion Conventional wisdom often suggests that mobilizing domestic nationalist opinions could rally public support for a sitting government and its leaders. Especially in situations of deep domestic divide, a government may be tempted to call for a nationalistic response against a foreign adversary that is violating the country’s “sacred” sovereignty and territorial integrity, wishing that this would provide a unifying effect to the body politic while also bolster its own political support. But in Malaysia, there is actually wariness among most government leaders and officials that the public might get too emotional and passionate about territorial and maritime issues. In general, the Malaysian government has welcomed the recent 20

Anjumin, E. (2021, June 2). Sabah govt condemns Chinese military jet intrusion. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/695298/sabah-govt-condemnschinese-military-jet-Intrusion. 21 Ling, S. (2021, June 3). Sarawak govt concerned over China military aircraft near Malaysian airspace. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/03/sarawak-govt-concernedover-china-military-aircraft-near-malaysian-airspace. 22 Abdul Muein, A. (2017, July 24). Syor Laut Malaysia Raya nama samudera kita (Suggesting a name change to Malaysia Sea to reflect our ocean), Berita Harian Online. https://www.bharian. com.my/rencana/komentar/2017/07/305319/syor-laut-malaysia-raya-nama-samudera-kita. 23 Abdul Muein, A. (2020, May 7). Wira kita di Laut China Selatan (Our heroes in the South China Sea). Sinar Harian. https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/82316/KOLUMNIS/Wira-kitadi-Laut-China-Selatan.

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relatively heightening of nationalist sentiments on the SCS issue, but only up to a certain extent. Regardless of which ruling party in Putrajaya, the government of Malaysia is still not entirely comfortable with the greater public scrutiny over every government’s statement and action on the SCS issue; fundamentally speaking, it prefers its SCS policy to still be elite-driven and insulated from nationalistic public pressures. Several factors count against the greater influence of nationalism in Malaysia’s handling of the SCS dispute, especially when it comes to China. Economic ties with China and the strategic anxiety of being drawn into a major power conflict are often cited as among the major reasons. This chapter analyzes an often-overlooked factor, and that is the complexity of the different layers of nationalism in this country. On their own, all these different layers of sub-national nationalisms are mostly domestic oriented; they channel most of the energies, emotions and passions internally toward different visions of the very essence of what is Malaysia rather than externally toward a foreign “other.” This at least partly explains the generally nonnationalistic responses from Malaysia toward all kinds of territorial issues, not only the SCS dispute. Moreover, the existence of these different layers of nationalism also suggests that a confrontational approach toward China, driven and sustained by a mobilized and passionate nationalism, instead of having a unifying effect, may actually be counterproductive, divisive and dangerous to the social fabric and body politic of Malaysia. This is not to suggest that a genuinely Malaysian nationalism has failed to emerge in Malaysia. But, any government of Malaysia will be careful in mobilizing this nationalism in the SCS dispute. Rather, the government prefers to control, regulate and limit it. The government will find the nationalist support useful when it decides to take a more vocal or assertive approach, but it will prefer the nationalist voices to quiet down when necessary. It still prefers to deal with the SCS dispute in a firm but low-profile manner, calculative rather than emotional, supported but not hijacked by nationalist sentiments.

References Abdul Muein, A. (2017, July 24). Syor Laut Malaysia Raya nama samudera kita (Suggesting a name change to Malaysia Sea to reflect our ocean). Berita Harian Online. https://www.bharian. com.my/rencana/komentar/2017/07/305319/syor-laut-malaysia-raya-nama-samudera-kita Abdul Muein, A. (2020, May 7). Wira kita di Laut China Selatan (Our heroes in the South China Sea). Sinar Harian. https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/82316/KOLUMNIS/Wira-kita-diLaut-China-Selatan Activists protest against China’s intrusion into Sarawak waters. The Edge. (2015, December 18). https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/activists-protest-against-china%E2%80%99s-int rusion-sarawak-waters

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Anjumin, E. (2021, June 2). Sabah Govt. condemns Chinese military jet intrusion. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/695298/sabah-govt-condemns-chi nese-military-jet-intrusion Asyraf, F. (Ed.) (2019). Malaysia sebagai pusat operasi risikan asing (Malaysia as a center of foreign intelligence operation). In: Kompas Edisi 3 (pp. 31–52). IRIS Institute. Chang, T. P. (2013). Xugou de wenhua baquan kangzheng: Malaixiya Xinzhou Ribao de daodewenhua xingxiao celue pipan, 1988–2010 [Constructed resistance against cultural hegemony: A critique of the moral-cultural marketing strategy of Malaysia’s Sinchew Daily]. Xinenxue yanjiu [Studies in Journalism] (115). Chin, J. (2020, September 25). Is Malaysia heading for ‘BorneoExit’? Why some in East Malaysia are advocating for secession. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/is-malaysia-hea ding-for-borneoexit-why-some-in-east-malaysia-are-advocating-for-secession-146208 IRIS (Interdisciplinary Research and International Strategy) Institute. (2018). PenChinaan Malaysia: Tergadaikah tanah kedaulatan bangsa? [China-izing Malaysia: Mortgaging National Sovereignty?]. IRIS Institute. Lai, Y. M., & Chrisnanti, Y. (2015). Nationalism, power politics and maritime-territorial sovereignty in Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia: The Celebus Sea/Ambalat dispute. Journal of Public Security and Safety, 3(1). Lai, Y. M., & Kuik, C. C. (2021). Structural sources of Malaysia’s South China Sea policy: Power uncertainties and small-state hedging. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 75(3). Lee, S. (2020, December 20). Sabah wants closer ties with China as state recovers postCovid-19. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/12/20/sabah-wants-closerties-with-china-as-state-recovers-post-covid-19 Lim, W. T. (2019, August 6). Lun Malaixiya huaren da Zhonghua minzu zhuyi de liancheng [On the formation of the grand Chinese nationalism among the Chinese Malaysians]. The News Lens. https://www.thenewslens.com/article/123092 Ling, S. (2021, June 3). Sarawak govt concerned over China military aircraft near Malaysian airspace. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/03/sarawak-govt-concer ned-over-china-military-aircraft-near-malaysian-airspace Liow, J. C. (2015, January 5). Ketuanan Melayu: What’s in a Name? The Straits Times. https:// www.straitstimes.com/opinion/ketuanan-melayu-whats-in-a-name Luconia Shoals declared a marine national park. Dayak Daily. (2018, September 18). https://day akdaily.com/luconia-shoals-declared-a-marine-national-park/ MCCC (Malaysia-China Chamber of Commerce). (2017, July 13). Nanhai keti (On the South China Sea Issue). https://www.mccc.my/index.php/cn/latest-announcements-cn/353-south-china-seatopic-july-2016. Syed Ahmad Israa’, S. I. (2016, April 1). Masa depan Malaysia dalam krisis Laut Cina Selatan [Prospects of Malaysia in a South China Sea crisis]. Fokus. https://fokus.my/masa-depan-mal aysia-dalam-krisis-laut-cina-selatan/ Syed Ahmad Israa’, S. I. (2019). Konflik Laut China Selatan: Ancaman perang serantau (South China Sea crisis: Threat of a regional war). In: Asyraf, F. (Ed.), Kompas Edisi 3. IRIS Institute. Wang, G. (1981). Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese. Heinemann Educational Books. Wong, J. (2019, June 11). China firm plans RM 21bil investment in Sarawak. The Star. https://www. thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2019/06/11/china-firm-plans-rm21bil-investment-insarawak/ Yang, L. F., Ponnan, R., & Rycker, A. D. (2020). Different countries, different perspectives: A comparative analysis of the South China Sea disputes coverage by Malaysian and Chinese newspapers. China Report, 56(1).

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Chow-Bing Ngeow is currently Director of the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. He received Ph.D. in Public and International Affairs from Northeastern University, USA. His research has been published in journals such as Ocean Development and International Law, Asian Politics and Policy, China Report, China Review, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Contemporary Southeast Asia, East Asia: An International Quarterly, China: An International Journal, Problems of Post-Communism, Issues and Studies and others. In addition, he is the editor of Researching China in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2019) and co-editor of Southeast Asia and China: Exercise in Mutual Socialization(World Scientific, 2017). Email: [email protected]. Nur Shahadah Jamil is a Senior Lecturer at the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. She obtained her Ph.D. in Strategic and Security Analysis from National University of Malaysia (UKM). Her research interests include East Asian security, China’s foreign policy, South China Sea dispute, regional multilateralism and Malaysia’s external policy. She is also a Research Fellow at the East Asian International Relations (EAIR) Caucus, UKM-a research platform for exchange, engagement and empowerment among foreign affairs professionals in Malaysia. Email: [email protected].

The Limits of Populism: SBY and Jokowi’s Strategies on the South China Sea Issue Klaus Heinrich Raditio and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia

Abstract This chapter aims at demonstrating the limit of domestic populism in shaping Jakarta’s South China Sea (SCS) policy. In both eras of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jokowi, the SCS has experienced heightened tension. China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights in the Natuna waters took place during the two administrations. Nevertheless, SBY tended to conceal the incidents from the public eye. Having enjoyed the popular support from majority of the country’s political elements—including that of the Islamist hardliners—SBY had more room in managing Indonesia’s relations with Beijing. In particular, SBY dedicated his foreign policy to construct Indonesia’s role as regional leaders and honest broker in the SCS issue. Jokowi, on the other hand, excludes the hardliners from his administration which makes the management of the relations with Beijing more delicate. While Jokowi can no longer conceal the incidents in the Natuna waters from the public eye, he takes two measures. First, placating the public anxiety by showing a firm gesture in defending the country’s sovereign rights. Second, substantiating Jakarta’s maritime entitlement in the Natuna waters in diplomatic and defence realms. Since Jokowi government intends to secure the economic cooperation with China, the public fuss around the Natuna waters incidents is deemed unnecessary. In the current administration’s judgement, patriotic expression, must be steered by the governmentnot mass-driven-to ensure its focus and effectiveness. Keywords South China Sea · Indonesia · Natuna · UNCLOS · Populism · Nationalism

K. H. Raditio · A. E. Yeremia (B) Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] K. H. Raditio e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_6

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1 Introduction Nationalism has long inspired Indonesian foreign policy. In international affairs, the country remains strongly committed to the bebas-aktif (free and active) principle, which is best understood as an expression of nationalist sentiment in the post-colonial context.1 In post-authoritarian Indonesia, expressions of nationalism no longer fall under the exclusive domain of the ruling regime. Competing political actors have mobilized nationalist sentiments to promote their own interests as they struggle for power within the country. In this regard, nationalism is not so much about “constraining effects” but about “limit[ing] the range of foreign policy choices and course of actions available to the government, making the process of policy making and the conduct of diplomacy more complex”.2 Scholars and observers argue that calls for nationalism in democratic Indonesia have been demonstrably louder under President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi.3 According to Aspinall, the current wave of nationalism exploits the Indonesian people’s profound distrust of foreign powers and their preoccupation with presenting a strong, dignified stance as a nation.4 Reid postulates that the insecurity and anxiety behind Indonesians’ nationalistic feelings are due to their realization that Indonesia is not catching up with its neighbours despite its major transformation into an important international actor.5 Indonesia’s territorial integrity is the issue that appeals to the people’s nationalistic sentiments the most.6 For the nationalists, threats against Indonesia’s territorial integrity come not only from separatist groups within the country but also from forces external to it. They are convinced that “Indonesia’s maritime regions and

1

Sukma, Rizal. (2012). Domestic politics and international posture: constraints and possibilities. In Indonesia rising: the repositioning of Asia’s third giant. Anthony Reid (eds), Singapore: ISEASYusof Ishak House, pp. 77–92. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814380416-011. 2 Ibid., p. 88. 3 Eddyono, Suzanna. (2020). Competing nationalisms in post-new order Indonesia. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 26(4), pp. 421–439. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2020.1843775; Patunru, Arianto, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri. (2018). Challenges for Indonesia in the new world. In Indonesia in the new world: globalisation, nationalism and sovereignty. Arianto Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri (eds). Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 1–16. https://doi. org/10.1355/9789814818230-006. 4 Aspinall, Edward. (2018). The new nationalism in Indonesia. In Indonesia in the new world: globalisation, nationalism and sovereignty. Arianto Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri (eds). Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 35–51. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814818230-008. 5 Reid, Anthony. (2012). Indonesia’s new prominence in the World. In Indonesia rising: the repositioning of Asia’s third giant. Anthony Reid(eds). Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814380416-007. 6 Aspinall, Edward. (2018). The new nationalism in Indonesia. In Indonesia in the new world: globalisation, nationalism and sovereignty. Arianto Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri (eds). Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 35–51. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814818230-008.

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outlying islands are vulnerable to predation”.7 Foreign powers are perceived to be eyeing Indonesia’s outlying islands not only for additional maritime territory but also because they wish to exploit the abundant natural resources contained within them. In light of this fear in regard to foreign nations, Sukma argues that Indonesia has an “acute sensitivity to the question of territorial integrity” to the point where its foreign policy expresses a “most striking nationalism”.8 Anti-foreign rhetoric can also be found in the discourses of the populists. Some populists extend their anti-establishment appeals by drawing the people’s attention to the corrupt elites who have betrayed their trust as well as to the foreign powers which have backed those elites. For these populists, the elites have sold out Indonesia to the foreigners as they have come to dominate the country’s national economy.9 In their opinion, foreign domination of Indonesia’s national economy has resulted in the country’s loss of independence and dignity, and translates into the Indonesian people’s failure to retain ownership of their own country. The Islamic populists have adopted this mindset to portray the ordinary, devout Indonesian Muslims as the ones who are the most marginalized. They cite the perceived collusion between the elites and the non-Muslim countries as the reason why faithful Indonesian Muslims are held back from advancing economically and dominating politically, and prevented from taking their rightful place in the Muslim-majority country of Indonesia.10 The rise of populism in Indonesia stems from its leaders and politicians playing up the insecurities and anxieties of the people. This, in turn, has added more complexities to Indonesia’s foreign policy as it resulted in populist leaders and politicians frequently using foreign countries as scapegoats to the nation’s troubles. Amid the increased employment of nationalist sentiment and more frequent use of the populist narrative in Indonesia, the country’s policy-making and policyimplementation processes vis-à-vis its maritime interests in the South China Sea (SCS) and its relations with China have become more complex. In recent years, Indonesians have grown more aware of violations against Indonesia’s sovereign rights in the maritime zones off the Natuna Islands committed by foreign ships, including ones from China. Since such acts by China are mainly perceived as part of its efforts to undermine Indonesia’s maritime territorial integrity, the events that challenge Indonesia’s sovereign rights around the Natuna Islands are increasingly used as means to mobilize nationalist sentiment and antagonism towards China.11

7

Ibid., p. 39. Sukma, Rizal. (2012). Domestic politics and international posture: constraints and possibilities. In Indonesia rising: the repositioning of Asia’s third giant. Anthony Reid (eds), Singapore: ISEASYusof Ishak House, p. 88. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814380416-011. 9 Aspinall, Edward. (2015). Oligarchic populism: Prabowo Subianto’s challenge to Indonesian democracy. Indonesia (99), pp. 1–28. https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.99.0001. 10 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populists and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), pp. 420–438. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426. 11 Aspinall, Edward. (2018). The new nationalism in Indonesia. In Indonesia in the new world: globalisation, nationalism and sovereignty. Arianto Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri 8

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In addition, the significant expansion of Indonesia’s relations with China, particularly during Jokowi’s presidency, has made China the target of Indonesian populists’ condemnation. China’s rising economic power has been perceived as looting and being in control of Indonesia’s national economy, with the help of ChineseIndonesian tycoons.12 The Islamic populists have used this situation to stir up the Indonesian Muslim masses into feeling excluded and left behind.13 In the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta and Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election, these nationalist-populist narratives were used to criticise Jokowi’s regime. It was portrayed as siding with the economic interests of China and the Chinese-Indonesian businessmen at the expense of the economic needs of the ordinary Indonesians, primarily those who are Muslims.14 This study examines the role of populism and nationalism in Indonesia, particularly on the SCS issue. It begins by highlighting Indonesia’s position on the SCS, which has remained consistent under the different administrations. It then discusses the different strategies adopted by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY hereafter) and the Jokowi administration against the SCS issue, and is followed by an examination of the two administrations’ different political constellations. The analysis section elaborates the link between the different strategies, the different governments’ political constellations, as well as their use of nationalism and populism in regard to China’s maritime rights violation in the Natuna waters. Finally, a conclusion wraps up the findings of the study.

2 Indonesia’s Position in the SCS As can be seen in Indonesia’s Diplomatic Note to the United Nations (UN) SecretaryGeneral No. 480/POL-703/VII/10, dated 8 July 2010, the country regards itself as a non-claimant state in the SCS because Jakarta is not a party in the sovereignty dispute in the SCS.15 Indonesia’s reiteration of its status as a non-party to the territorial dispute in SCS is always the first point raised in its diplomatic notes to the UN. (eds). Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 35–51. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814818230-008. 12 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populists and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), pp. 420–438. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426. 13 Warburton, Eve. (2018). Inequality, nationalism and electoral politics in Indonesia. In Malcolm Cook and Daljit Singh (eds). Southeast Asian Affairs 2018. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 135–152. 14 Bourchier, David M. (2019). Two decades of ideological contestation in Indonesia: from democratic cosmopolitanism to religious nationalism. Journal of Contemporary Asia 49(5), pp. 713–733. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620. 15 Nguyen, Hong Thao. (2020, June 26). Indonesian awakening: no South China Sea negotiation with China. Maritime Issues. http://www.maritimeissues.com/politics/indonesian-awakening-nosouth-china-sea-negotiation-with-china.html.

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This shows that its stance as a non-claimant state is a central element of Jakarta’s position vis-à-vis the SCS issue. This position is not dependent on China’s reluctance to clarify its infamous claims over major parts of the SCS within the nine-dash line. It is unclear whether China’s nine-dash line is meant to include only the land features in the SCS or if it demarcates the waters within the line, either as territorial waters or historic waters. Even if Beijing officially clarifies its claims in regard to the ninedash line, Indonesia’s non-claimant position in the SCS will remain unchanged for two reasons. First, Indonesia does not claim any disputed land feature in the SCS. Indonesia’s Natuna Islands at the southern tip of the SCS have never been disputed by any party. Second, Indonesian’s legal maritime rights over the undisputed Natuna Islands are based on international law, specifically the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which China and the SCS littoral states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are parties. In other words, the 1982 UNCLOS is the final and strongest rationale for Indonesia’s maritime rights in the Natuna waters. Since 2020, Jakarta has officially acknowledged and adopted the 2016 International Tribunal ruling that invalidates China’s nine-dash line claim, as stated in Indonesia’s diplomatic note to the UN Secretary-General No. 126/POL-703/V/20 dated 26 May 2020 and No. 148/POL-703/VI/20 dated 12 June 2020. For Jakarta, the 2016 International Tribunal ruling confirmed that “no maritime features are entitled to an EEZ or a Continental Shelf of its own”. In other words, Jakarta based its dismissal of Beijing’s claims of historic rights to the SCS on the 2016 International Tribunal ruling. Jakarta cannot acknowledge China’s claims in the SCS because they contravene the 1982 UNCLOS. As Beijing’s nine-dash line claim has been definitively ruled invalid by the 2016 UNCLOS Tribunal, Jakarta has no dispute whatsoever with China over territorial or maritime rights in the SCS. At the heart of China’s claims over the SCS is the political rivalry between China on the one hand and the USA and its allies on the other. Their use of the SCS as a site for their rivalry, in turn, makes the region volatile. Indonesia’s political stance in the SCS is tightly linked to its leadership role in ASEAN, an institutional body overseeing the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Since Indonesia is not a claimant state and does not have alliances with any rival powers—unlike the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand that maintain security alliances with the USA—Jakarta is best placed to serve as the leader of ASEAN. Through the Managing Potential Conflicts in the SCS Workshop that has been held annually in Indonesia since 1990, Jakarta consistently demonstrated its dedication to avoiding conflict in the SCS, developing cooperation in the SCS, and upholding the 1982 UNCLOS as a means of resolving disputes in the SCS.16 These workshops paved the way to the signing of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS. Hence, Indonesia’s role is one of a kind. It must maintain balance between rival powers and advocate compliance with the 1982 UNCLOS. Jakarta can neither be 16

Djalal, Hasjim. (2001). Indonesia and the South China Sea initiative. Ocean Development and International Law 32(2), pp. 97–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320151100226.

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Table 1 Summary of tensions in the SCS during the SBY administration 2007 • In December, China’s National People’s Congress passed new legislation entrusting the administration of the Paracels and Spratlys to Sansha City in Hainan Province, provoking nation-wide protests in Vietnam 2009 • In March, five Chinese ships harassed US naval ship Impeccable’s surveillance activities in international waters 75 miles south of Hainan Island • In May, China submitted a map with the nine-dash line to the UN, making its territorial claims in the SCS internationally known for the first time 2010 • In July, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the East Asian Summit and stated that the US has an interest in the SCS 2011 • On May, Chinese fishing boats cut the cables of Vietnamese seismic survey ship Bin Minh 02 2012 • In April, China and the Philippines entered into a standoff over the Scarborough Shoal. This resulted in several months of tensions whereby China maintained its military presence at the shoal, effectively signalling Beijing’s control over it • In July, Cambodia demonstrated its support for China by blocking any reference to the SCS in the ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting (AMM), causing a fracture within ASEAN 2013 • In January, the Philippines used Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS to bring its case against China’s nine-dash line claims to territories in the SCS • Starting in December, China began building artificial islands on seven coral reefs in the Spratlys. These artificial islands eventually covered a total area of close to 3000 acres Source Extracted from Raditio17

involved in great-power rivalries nor take the side of any claimant in the SCS disputes. Jakarta must, therefore, play the role of honest broker who builds confidence among all relevant parties in the SCS.

3 SBY: A Million Friends, Zero Enemies SBY governed Indonesia from 2004 to 2014. During his tenure as President, disputes in the SCS became highly contentious owing to the intensification of great-power rivalries. Table 1 shows the escalation of tensions in the SCS since 2007. China’s aggressive claims in the SCS were made clear in April 2012 through its tense standoff with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. The Scarborough Shoal is located 119 nautical miles from Luzon Island. The incident ended with China’s occupation over the Scarborough Shoal, which prompted Manila to file a case against Beijing at the UNCLOS Tribunal in January 2013. 17

Raditio, Klaus Heinrich. (2019). Understanding China’s behaviour in the South China Sea: a defensive realist perspective. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 134–135, 168.

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As Indonesia is a country in Southeast Asia, which has many SCS littoral states vis-à-vis China, it is affected by any escalation of tensions within the region. Given that China’s nine-dash line claims in the SCS are in violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters, the area around the Natuna Islands have become hotspots of incidents between two countries. The SBY administration primarily engages with China on the SCS issue through diplomacy via ASEAN or bilateral negotiations.18 China officially made its SCS claims to international community through circular note no. CML/17/2009 to the UN Secretary-General on 7 May 2009. This diplomatic note was Beijing’s reaction to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. To bolster its claims over the territories in the SCS, China included a map depicting the nine-dash line map in its diplomatic note. Since the nine-dash line in the map violates Indonesia’s EEZ, Jakarta responded by submitting diplomatic note no. 480/POL-703/VII/10 to the UN Secretary-General on 8 July 2010, stating that China’s nine-dash line map “lacks legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982”.19 Indonesia responded to the SCS issue again at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh on 8–13 July 2012. The meeting was held at the height of tensions between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. At the meeting, the Philippines and Vietnam urged Cambodia, as the ASEAN Chair for 2012, to accommodate their concerns in a joint communique with regard to China’s action at the Scarborough Shoal, which they deemed “challenged ASEAN centrality, leadership and solidarity”.20 However, Cambodia insisted that no specific reference to the SCS was needed since “claimant states will deal directly with China”.21 Through Cambodia’s blocking any mention of the dispute and the Philippines and Vietnam’s dogged concerns over the Scarborough Shoal issue, the ASEAN member states were unable to reach a consensus. As a result, ASEAN’s foreign ministers did not issue a joint communiqué for the first time in its 45-year history. By taking Beijing’s side in the Scarborough Shoal standoff, Cambodia put ASEAN’s unity at risk. An unnamed diplomat cited an article by Chinese state-run news agency Xinhua in which Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi thanked the Cambodian Prime Minister for supporting China’s “core interests”.22 18

Kompas. (2014, June 25). Pilih Langkah Diplomasi: Marty Jelaskan Posisi Indonesia di Laut Tiongkok Selatan” [Choosing diplomatic means: Marty explains Indonesia’s position in the South China Sea]. http://home.kompas.co.id/litbang/tarkfast/detail4.cfm?item=12&startrow=26&style= advanced&navigation=&session=1621918114324. 19 Asmara, Tia. (2020, June 5). Indonesia rejects Beijing’s offer for South China Sea talks. Benar News. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/no-negotiation-060520 20155450.html. 20 Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012). ASEAN’s code of conduct in the South China Sea: a litmus test for community building?. The Asia Pacific Journal 34(4), p. 7. https://apjjf.org/-Carlyle-A--Thayer/ 3813/article.pdf. 21 Ibid., p. 3. 22 Perlez, Jane. (2012, July 12). Asian leaders at regional meeting fail to resolve disputes over South China Sea. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/asian-lea ders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-on-south-china-sea-during-asean-summit.html.

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To prevent further discord within ASEAN, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa toured five ASEAN member states’ capitals (Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, Singapore, and Phnom Penh) in 18–19 July to gather consensus on the SCS issue. Through this use of shuttle diplomacy, Indonesia demonstrated not only its dedication to ASEAN unity but also its role as the true leader of ASEAN.23 On 20 July 2012, Cambodian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hor Namhong, officially released ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the SCS in which the ASEAN states reaffirmed their commitment to, among others, full respect of the universally recognized principle of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.24 Beijing demonstrated its approval of this statement by dispatching Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Indonesia to meet his counterpart. Yang further endorsed ASEAN’s Six Principles on the SCS by stating that China was willing to cooperate with ASEAN to implement the Declaration of Conduct of parties in the SCS and work towards the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct in the SCS “on the basis of consensus”.25 Even though China and Indonesia have always maintained amicable diplomatic relations over the SCS issue, Indonesia was beginning to chafe under China’s repeated violation of its EEZ in Natuna waters. Table 2 outlines Chinese fishing vessels’ violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters during the SBY administration in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2013. Despite China’s violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters, SBY adopted a non-confrontational stance towards Beijing so as to prevent these incidents from causing public uproar and harming Sino-Indonesian bilateral relations. Of the four major incidents of Chinese infringement of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters during the SBY administration, one (2010) was reported by foreign media and one (2013) was reported by a military blog. The other two (2008 and 2009) were reported by national media as instances of illegal fishing, and Jakarta did not demand a response from Chinese diplomatic representatives. The Chinese vessels captured by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries were often released after behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations between Jakarta and Beijing.26 In March 2014, Commodore Fahru Zaini, a high-ranking official at the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security, publicly stated that “China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters. This unilateral claim is related to 23

Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012). ASEAN’s code of conduct in the South China Sea: a litmus test for community building?. The Asia Pacific Journal 34(4), pp. 1–22. https://apjjf.org/-Carlyle-A--Tha yer/3813/article.pdf. 24 Emmerson, Donald K. (2012, July 29). Beyond the six points: how far will Indonesia go? East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/beyond-the-six-points-how-far-willindonesia-go/; Thayer, Carlyle A. (2013, October 9). New commitment to a code of conduct in the South China. Sea? National Bureau of Asian Research (9). https://www.nbr.org/publication/newcommitment-to-a-code-of-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/. 25 ASEAN. (2012, July 20). Statement of the ASEAN foreign ministers on ASEAN’s six-point principles on the South China Sea. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. https://www.asean.org/wp-content/upl oads/images/AFMs%20Statement%20on%206%20Principles%20on%20SCS.pdf. 26 Suryadinata, Leo. (2020, February 19). Recent Chinese moves in the Natuna riles Indonesia. Perspective (10). https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspe ctive_2020_10.pdf.

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Table 2 Incidents in Natuna waters involving Chinese fishing vessels and China’s Coast Guard 2008 • On 17 April, the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) arrested six Chinese fishing vessels with their 58 crew members 2009 • On 23 June, KKP arrested 8 Chinese fishing vessels with a total of 77 crew members for illegally fishing in the Natuna EEZ 2010 • In May and June, Chinese vessels off Natuna Island threatened an Indonesian ship at gunpoint for arresting Chinese fishermen 2013 • On 26 March, Indonesian Maritime Patrol vessel KP Hiu Macan 001 arrested a Chinese vessel for illegally fishing in Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters, and China’s coast guards responded by forcibly rescuing the ship Source Kompas. (2008, April 17). Pencurian Ikan: Kapal Asing yang Tertangkap Ternyata Gunakan ‘Trawl’ dan Alat Modern” [Fishery theft: foreign ship caught using ‘trawls’ and modern tools]; Kompas. (2009, June 23). Kilas Ekonomi: Kapal Pukat Harimau China Ditangkap [Economic news: the arrest of Chinese trawlers]; Hellendorff, Bruno and Thierry Kellner. (2014, July 9). Indonesia: a bigger role in the South Sea China?. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/indonesiaa-bigger-role-in-the-south-china-sea/; Garuda Militer. (2013, March 26). Kisah Gesekan di Laut Natuna [Details of the friction in the Natuna Sea]. Garuda Militer (blog). https://garudamiliter.blo gspot.com/2013/09/kisah-gesekan-di-laut-natuna.html; Halim, Haeril, Anggi M. Lubis and Stefani Ribka. (2016, March 21). RI confronts China on fishing. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakart apost.com/news/2016/03/21/ri-confronts-china-fishing.html.

the dispute in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. This dispute will have great impact on the security of Natuna waters”.27 Zaini also suggested that Indonesia must foster its defence capability in its frontiers, including the Natuna Islands. In an apparent move to downplay the issue, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa contradicted Fahru Zaini’s statement by asserting that “there is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China”, and emphasizing Sino-Indonesian bilateral maritime cooperation and China’s investment in Natuna’s fish processing and canning industries.28 All in all, the SBY administration dealt with the SCS issue diplomatically through ASEAN. However, Indonesia’s diplomatic role in ASEAN is rather elitist and is carried out exclusively by government officials and intellectuals. According to a survey in 2014, only 12% of Indonesians were aware of the disputes and tensions in the SCS,29 let alone the government’s role in dealing with the issue in ASEAN. SBY-famous for being a “foreign policy President”-intended Indonesia to play the role of honest broker in the region, as evinced by Indonesia’s shuttle diplomacy on the 27

China klaim wilayah Natuna [China claims Natuna territory]. Antara News. (2014, March 12). https://www.antaranews.com/berita/423685/china-klaim-wilayah-natuna. 28 Suryadinata, Leo. (2014, April 24). South China Sea: is Jakarta no longer neutral?. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/south-china-sea-is-jakarta-no-longer-neutral. 29 Soebagjo, Natalia and Rene Pattiradjawane. (2014). Jajak Pendapat Umum 2014: Persepsi Masyarakat Indonesia terhadap RRC [2014 Public Opinion Poll: Perception of Indonesian society towards the People’s Republic of China]. Jakarta: University of Indonesia’s Center for Chinese Studies.

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SCS issue. Indeed, Indonesia cannot be the honest broker of the region if it becomes a party to the SCS disputes or adopts an excessively harsh attitude towards China.

4 Jokowi: Defending Rights, Securing Cooperation The Jokowi administration (2014–2024) has adopted a different approach vis-à-vis the SCS, issue, particularly in dealing with China’s violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters. The first high-profile case took place on 19 March 2016, whereby Chinese fishing vessel Kway Fey 10078 entered Indonesia’s EEZ and continental shelf, and conducted illegal fishing in Natuna waters. The vessel was apprehended by Indonesian law enforcement vessel KP Hiu 11, and 8 crew members of Kway Fey 10078 were detained. When the Kway Fey 10078 was about to be apprehended, Chinese coast guard vessels suddenly arrived and deliberately crashed the Kway Fey 10078 to obstruct KP Hiu 11’s arrest attempt. Hours after internal reports on the incident, a top Chinese diplomat called an Indonesian senior official to prevent news of the occurrence from leaking to the media but Jakarta turned a deaf ear to this plea.30 This incident was widely broadcasted on Indonesia’s media outlets and sparked public outrage. Indonesian government officials responded differently to the incident. The fiercest response came from the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti. In response to the China Coast Guard’s obstruction of KP Hiu 11’s surveillance and patrol duties, Pudjiastuti held a press conference in which she lamented China’s arrogance, expressed regret at China’s lack of respect for Indonesia’s sovereignty, and voiced disapproval at China’s tendency to protect its citizens when they conducted illegal fishing activities.31 Furthermore, Pudjiastuti stated that she would bring the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea if China insisted on claiming Natuna waters as its “traditional fishing ground”.32 During her tenure as Minister of the KKP, Pudjiastuti claimed Indonesia had sunk 556 boats that were illegally in Indonesian waters; of these, 321 were Vietnamese, 91 were Filipino, 87 were Malaysian, 24 were Thai, and 3 were Chinese.33

30

Brummitt, Chris. (2016, March 23). Frantic phone call failed to halt China-Indonesia sea spat. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-22/frantic-phone-call-failedto-contain-china-indonesia-sea-spat. 31 Himawan, Adhitya and Dian Kusumo Hapsari. (2016, March 20). Menteri Susi Kesal Cina Arogan di Laut Indonesia [Minister Susi laments China’s arrogance in Indonesian waters]. Suara https:// www.suara.com/bisnis/2016/03/20/171046/menteri-susi-kesal-cina-arogan-di-laut-indonesia. 32 Gumilang, Prima. (2016, March 22). Menteri Susi Ancam Seret China ke Pengadilan Internasional [Minister Susi dares to take China to the International Tribunal]. CNN Indonesia. https:// www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20160321194856-92-118876/menteri-susi-ancam-seret-chinake-pengadilan-internasional. 33 Indonesia has sunk 556 illegal boats: Pudjiastuti. Antara News. (2019, October 7). https://en.ant aranews.com/news/134238/indonesia-has-sunk-556-illegal-boats-pudjiastuti.

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On the other hand, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi demonstrated Indonesia’s dissatisfaction by summoning China’s Chargé d’Affaires Sun Weide and officially lodging diplomatic notes of protests. First, it protested China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights in its EEZ and continental shelf; second, Indonesia protested the China Coast Guard’s obstruction of law enforcement within its EEZ and continental shelf; third, Indonesia protested the violation of sovereignty in its territorial waters by China’s Coast Guard.34 Additionally, Marsudi emphasized Indonesia’s status as a non-claimant state in the SCS dispute and highlighted the need for both China and Indonesia to respect international law, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS. On 13 April 2016, Beijing responded to the public outcry in Indonesia over the incident by sending the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, Song Tao, to Jakarta where he met with President Jokowi. After the meeting, the Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung stated that the Kway Fey 10078 incident was a “misunderstanding” and the issue was considered settled.35 That Beijing bypassed normal diplomatic channels (i.e. negotiations between Foreign Ministers) is significant. It was indicative of both China’s impatience to resolve the issue and its desire to restrain the growing controversy. Jakarta seemly agreed with Beijing’s decision to put an end to the prolonged furore over the incident, as the bilateral economic cooperation between the two countries continued to deepen.36 In mid-June 2016 or three months after the Kway Fey 10078 incident, Chinese fishing vessel Han Tan Cou was caught fishing illegally in Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters.37 This time, the naval warship KRI Imam Bonjol 383 shot the vessel and Beijing reacted by vehemently protesting. On 23 June 2016, an Indonesian President visited Natuna waters for the first time to inspect the spot where the incident took place. President Jokowi and senior officials boarded the warship that shot the Chinese fishermen and held a closed meeting on board. The photograph of the President on the warship in Natuna waters made headlines in Indonesia’s mass media. The Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs, Luhut B. Pandjaitan—who is Jokowi’s confidante—stated that Indonesia wanted to maintain amicable relations with China and did not seek to confront any party.

34

Ninditya, Fransiska. (2016, March 21). Indonesia protes Tiongkok terkait masuknya KM Kway Fey ke Natuna. [Indonesia issued a protest to China because of the KM Kway Fey’s intrusion in Natuna waters]. Antara News. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/551120/indonesia-protes-tio ngkok-terkait-masuknya-km-kway-fey-ke-natuna. 35 Kusumawati, Utami Diah. (2016, April 13). Pemerintah Anggap Konfilk RI-China di Natuna Selesai [The Indonesian government considers the Indonesia-China spat in Natuna settled], CNN. Indonesia. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20160413190126-106-123769/pem erintah-anggap-konflik-ri-china-di-natuna-selesai. 36 Suryadinata, Leo and Mustafa Izzuddin. 2017. The Natunas: Territorial Integrity in the Forefront of Indonesia-China Relations. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/ima ges/pdf/TRS5_17.pdf. 37 Tiba di Natuna, Jokowi gelar rapat di KRI yang tembak kapal Cina [Upon his arrival in Natuna, Jokowi held a meeting on the warship that shot the Chinese vessel]. BBC Indonesia. (2016, June 23). https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/06/160623_indonesia_jokowi_natuna.

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On 19 December 2019, 63 Chinese fishing boats in the company of three China Coast Guard vessels violated Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters.38 As with the previous episode involving the Kway Fey 10078, this incident sparked nationwide anxiety. In contrast to the vociferous protests expressed by various Indonesian government officials during the Kway Fey 10078 incident in 2016, the Jokowi administration adopted a different approach. All Jokowi’s aides were in one accord making conciliatory statements. No senior official from Beijing was dispatched to clarify the incident since Jakarta’s senior officials had come forward to curb public outcry. Nevertheless, Indonesia did respond to the incident by deploying eight warships and four jet fighters to the area.39 Meanwhile, Indonesia summoned the Chinese ambassador in Jakarta to lodge a strong diplomatic protest against China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights.40 The Indonesian Foreign Ministry publicly issued a statement on 30 December 2019, and for the first time, Indonesia invoked the 2016 UNCLOS Tribunal ruling that invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim in the SCS.41 This statement made Indonesia the first non-disputant ASEAN state to do so. Furthermore, Jakarta also sent diplomatic notes to the UN Secretary-General in May and June 2020 invoking the 2016 Tribunal ruling. On 8 January 2020, President Jokowi and senior officials visited the Natuna Islands. In addition to distributing land certificates to the locals to emphasize Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands, Jokowi stated that Natuna had always been part of Indonesia and there would be no room for compromise on this fact. Moreover, he also inspected two naval warships—KRI Usman Harun 359 and KRI Karel Satsuit Tubun 356—and instructed the Navy and the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) to protect Indonesia’s sovereign and maritime rights.42 Jakarta also sought to engage Japan in maritime cooperation. In January 2020, President Jokowi invited more Japanese investment in energy and fisheries in

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Valencia, Mark J. (2020, January 24). China-Indonesia South China Sea incident likely a blip in a long-term trend of mutual adjustment. ASEAN Today. https://www.aseantoday.com/2020/01/chinaindonesia-south-china-sea-incident-likely-a-blip-in-a-long-term-trend-of-mutual-adjustment/. 39 Siregar, Kiki. (2020, January 9). Chinese vessels leaving Natuna after days of stand-off with Indonesia. Channel News Asia. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/natuna-china-indone sia-standoff-vessels-leave-1224 7302. 40 Fadli. (2019, December 31). Indonesia issues protest to Beijing over Chinese vessel trespassing in Natuna. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/12/31/indonesia-issuesprotest-to-beijing-over-chinese-vessel-trespassing-in-natuna.html. 41 Indonesia Protes Pelanggaran RRT di ZEE Indonesia” [Indonesia protests China’s violation of its EEZ]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. (2019, December 30). https:// kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/931/siaran_pers/indonesia-protes-pelanggaran-rrt-di-zee-indonesia. 42 Rachmawati. (2020, January 8). Jokowi Datangi 2 KRI di Selat Lampa Natuna: Penegakan Hukum atas Hak Berdaulat [Jokowi visited two naval warships in the Lampa Strait, Natuna, to ensure legal enforcement over Indonesia’s sovereign rights]. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/01/08/183 80001/jokowi-datangi-2-kri-di-selat-lampa-natuna-saya-pastikan-penegakan-hukum.

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the Natuna Islands.43 During Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s visit to Jakarta in October 2020, both sides expressed their commitment to enhancing bilateral military and defence cooperation.44 Suga promised to assist Indonesian patrol vessels in combating illegal fishing.45 Japan echoed Indonesia’s stance in the SCS disputes, as Suga appealed to all relevant parties in the SCS to peacefully resolve dispute in compliance with the 1982 UNCLOS. In general, the Jokowi administration avoided inciting public outrage vis-à-vis incidents in Natuna waters and the SCS issue. It was aware that publicly courting controversy over these issues would add to bilateral tensions. Indeed, any widespread public outcry against China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights provoked negative sentiments towards China and jeopardized Chinese investments in Indonesia. Even though the Jokowi administration kept public displays of discontent to a minimum, it took substantial diplomatic and defensive measures against China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights. All in all, SBY and Jokowi faced the fraught tensions in the SCS and China’s intrusions into its EEZ in Natuna waters to an almost equal degree. Even though they both maintained Indonesia’s non-claimant stance in the SCS issue, both administrations adopted different strategies in regard to China. The SBY administration attempted to suppress reports of Chinese fishing and Coast Guard’s violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters to avoid causing a riff with Beijing and maintain its leadership role in ASEAN. Jokowi, however, chose to water down these incidents instead of hiding them from the public. In so doing, he intended to secure China’s economic cooperation. The Jokowi administration’s publicly conciliatory approach in regard to China did not mean that it was not standing up to Beijing’s violations of Indonesia’s maritime rights. It chose instead to take assertive diplomatic measures in bilateral and multilateral fora, and foster defence cooperation with China’s rivals.

5 Indonesia’s Domestic Politics During the SBY and Jokowi Presidencies SBY is arguably the Indonesian President who assumed office with higher domestic political legitimacy than any of his predecessors in the country’s post-authoritarian

43

Indonesia asks Japan to invest in Natuna islands following stand-off with China. Reuters. (2020, January 10). https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-asks-japan-to-invest-in-nat una-south-china-sea-783856. 44 Asmara, Tia. (2020, October 20). Jepang-Indonesia Tingkatkan Kejasama Militer di Tengah Ketegangan Laut China Selatan [Japan and Indonesia upgrade their military cooperation amid tensions in the South China Sea]. Berita Benar. https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/jep ang-indonesia-lcs-10202020174504.html. 45 Asmara, Tia. (2020, October 21). Jepang Janji Bantu ASEAN Perkuat Kemanan Maritim [Japan promises to help ASEAN foster maritime security]. Berita Benar. https://www.benarnews.org/ind onesian/berita/jepang-asean-maritim-10212020152812.html.

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era.46 He is the country’s first directly elected president. He also won the ticket to a two-term presidency (2004–2014), after securing landslide victories in two free and competitive presidential elections. Although he was up against two other presidential candidates in the 2009 election, SBY was not required to compete in the second round of the election because he had already won 60.8% of the vote in the first round.47 This strong popular support did not seem to shape SBY’s strategy to retain his hold on power. Due to the constitutional reforms of 1999–2002, SBY was no longer compelled to secure a parliamentary majority to stay in the office of president, unlike his two predecessors. As a consequence, SBY was less concerned with securing power through state institutions like parliament,48 and more concerned with following in his immediate predecessors’ footsteps by forming a highly inclusive and oversized ruling coalition.49 This so-called rainbow coalition comprised political parties with different support bases and ideological orientations, such as the secular-nationalists, the Islamists, and the Muslim-based parties. As a result of this large coalition, the only parliamentary opposition during SBY’s first presidential term was the secularnationalist Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle or PDI-P.50 In the second half of SBY’s one-decade-long presidency, only PDI-P and the other two secular-nationalist parties, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) and the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), stood outside the governing coalition.51 SBY formed such a large coalition because he was reportedly preoccupied by fears that he would be impeached in the same way that President Abdurrahman Wahid had been in 2001.52 To that end, he concentrated his efforts on overcoming any domestic contestation to his power by the political elite, while undermining the quality of the country’s democracy.53 46

He, Kai. (2008). Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: international pressure, democratization, and policy change. International Relations of the Asia Pacific 8(1), pp. 47–72. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/irap/lcm021. 47 Mietzner, Marcus. (2010). Indonesia in 2009: electoral contestation and economic resilience. Asian Survey 50(1), pp. 185–194. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.1.185. 48 Sherlock, Stephen. (2015). A balancing act: relations between state institutions under Yudhyono. In Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Dirk Tomsa (eds).The Yudhoyono presidency: Indonesia’s decade of stability and stagnation. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 93–113. ttps://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620727–009. 49 Slater, Dan. (2004). Indonesia’s accountability trap: party cartels and presidential power after democratic transition. Indonesia (78), pp. 61–92; Slater, Dan and Erica Simmons. (2013). Coping by colluding: political uncertainty and promiscuous powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia. Comparative Political Studies 46(11), pp. 1366–1393. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453447. 50 Liddle, R. William and Saiful Mujani. (2006). Indonesia in 2005: a new multiparty presidential democracy. Asian Survey 46(1), pp. 132–139. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.1.132. 51 Kimura, Ehito. (2011). Indonesia in 2010: a leading democracy disappoints on reform. Asian Survey 51(1), pp. 186–195. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.186. 52 Sherlock, Stephen. (2015). A balancing act: relations between state institutions under Yudhyono. In Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Dirk Tomsa (eds).The Yudhoyono presidency: Indonesia’s decade of stability and stagnation. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 97–98. 10.1355/9789814620727-009. 53 Fealy, Greg. (2011). Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 47(3), pp. 333–353. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00074918.2011.619050; Hamid, Sandra. (2012). Indonesian politics in 2012: coalitions, accountability and the future of democracy. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 48(3), pp. 325–345.

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It should also be noted that during SBY’s presidency, Islamic political forces gained a level of power and legitimacy that was unprecedented in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian politics.54 Noticeably, Islamist hardliner parties like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) gained significant political support. SBY never openly expressed support for these Islamic parties and had instead criticized the FPI and threatened to shut it down. The FPI, however, conducted acts of religious violence with impunity during the SBY presidency.55 This was so much so that Bush argues the FPI “must have had support from key elements of the [SBY] administration”.56 Indeed, some high-ranking officials in the SBY administration not only voiced their support for the FPI, claiming that it could contribute to the country; they also recommend the country’s leaders to embrace, empower, and work with the FPI.57 The regime’s accommodation of the Islamists also facilitated the rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an offshoot of the transnational Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Party of Liberation, to political prominence. Unlike the FPI, HTI is committed to nonviolent means to achieve its goal of reviving the Islamic Caliphate in Indonesia.58 Thus, the expansion of HTI only presents a direct challenge to the existence of Pancasila as the state ideology. In 2006, the SBY administration recognized HTI’s legal status by issuing a permit for it to operate as a mass organization. From then on, the HTI experienced next to no restriction in conducting its activities and promoting its ideology.59 In 2007, for example, the HTI successfully hosted the International Caliphate Conference, in which around 100,000 of its sympathizers called for the return of the Caliphate. To complete its accommodationist approach towards the Islamists, the SBY administration did not prevent some HTI personalities as well as some FPI leaders from joining the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), effectively

https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2012.728631; Tomsa, Dirk. (2010). Indonesian politics in 2010: the perils of stagnation. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 46(3), pp. 309–328. https://doi. org/10.1080/00074918.2010.522501. 54 Bourchier, David M. (2019). Two decades of ideological contestation in Indonesia: from democratic cosmopolitanism to religious nationalism. Journal of Contemporary Asia 49(5), pp 713–733. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620. 55 Kine, Phelim. (2014, August 25). President Yudhoyono’s blind side: religious violence in. Indonesia. The Jakarta Globe. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/25/president-yudhoyonos-blindside-religious-violence-indonesia. 56 Bush, Robin. (2015). Religious politics and minority rights during the Yudhoyono presidency. In Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Dirk Tomsa (eds). The Yudhoyono presidency: Indonesia’s decade of stability and stagnation. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, p. 248. https://doi.org/ 10.1355/9789814620727-016. 57 Ibid. 58 Mohamed Osman, Mohamed Nawab. (2010). Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s mobilization strategy and its impact in Indonesia. Terrorism and Political Violence 22(4), pp. 601–622. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.496317. 59 Nuraniyah, Nava. (2020). Divided Muslims: militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding. In Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds). Democracy in Indonesia: from stagnation to regression. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 81–100. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981488 1524-010.

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allowing these organizations to be on equal footing with the country’s two largest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.60 In the final years of SBY’s presidency, Indonesia saw the rise of two populist figures: Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto, who later became the presidential candidates in the 2014 general election. Both men mobilized support from the electorate through use of populist narratives, but with varying degrees of intensity. Jokowi was described as a “polite populist” seeking to realize “the lighter version of populist renewal”, while Prabowo was a “confrontational populist” who promoted narratives that were “close to the high-end of the populism scale”.61 Their different populist approaches were reflected in the ways in which they referenced foreign forces in their election campaign rhetoric.62 Promoting his brand of “chauvinistic populism”, Prabowo openly attacked foreign powers for looting the country’s wealth and painted them as scapegoats for the people’s economic hardships.63 On the other hand, Jokowi generally avoided narratives that might endorse anti-foreign sentiments. While Jokowi showed he was amenable to the idea of linking the economic interests of foreign countries and companies to those of local entrepreneurs, Prabowo called for restrictions on foreign capital and advancement of the people’s economy or ekonomi kerakyatan.64 In 2014, Jokowi’s populism-lite style secured him a win in the presidential election. His narrow victory over Prabowo, nevertheless, indicates that the ultra-nationalist populist narratives espoused by the latter did appeal to a considerable number of the electorate. In order to ensure his political survival, Jokowi followed the lead of his three immediate predecessors and pursued a parliamentary majority. In his first term, he assumed office with only 37% of seats in parliament from the PDI-P, the secularnationalist Nasdem and Hanura, as well as the Muslim-based Partai Kebangkitan 60

Scott, Margaret. (2016, May 26). Indonesia: the battle over Islam. The New York Review of Books. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/05/26/indonesia-battle-over-islam/. 61 Mietzner, Marcus. (2014). Indonesia’s 2014 elections: how Jokowi won and democracy survived. Journal of Democracy 25(4), pp. 111–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0073; Mietzner, Marcus. (2015). Indonesia in 2014: Jokowi and the repolarization of post-Soeharto politics. In Daljit Singh (eds). Southeast Asian Affairs 2015. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 119– 138. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620598-010; Mietzner, Marcus. (2015). Reinventing Asian populism: Jokowi’s rise, democracy, and political contestation in Indonesia. Honolulu: East–West Center; Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), pp. 420–438. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426. 62 Mietzner, Marcus. (2015). Indonesia in 2014: Jokowi and the repolarization of post-Soeharto politics. In Daljit Singh (eds). Southeast Asian Affairs 2015. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 119–138. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620598-010; Mietzner, Marcus. (2015). Reinventing Asian populism: Jokowi’s rise, democracy, and political contestation in Indonesia. Honolulu: East– West Center. 63 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), pp. 420–438. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426. 64 Aspinall, Edward. (2015). Oligarchic populism: Prabowo Subianto’s challenge to Indonesian democracy. Indonesia 99, pp. 1–28. https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.99.0001.

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Bangsa (PKB). It took 19 months for Jokowi to turn this minority support in parliament into a 69% majority after successfully coercing three more political parties—the secular-nationalist Partai Golkar, the Islamist Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and the Muslim-based Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)—to abandon the opposition and join him.65 Despite the addition of these three parties, Jokowi’s ruling coalition remained the smallest formed after the 1999 democratic election. When he reassumed office for his second term in 2019, however, he led an expansive ruling coalition that held 74% of parliamentary seats. During his presidency, Jokowi’s coalition consistently excluded the secular-nationalist Partai Demokrat (PD) and the Islamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Most noticeably, the positions of Gerindra and PAN vis-à-vis the ruling coalition changed during Jokowi’s second term. Despite losing to Jokowi in the presidential election, Prabowo Subianto brought his party, the secularnationalist Gerindra, into the Jokowi’s coalition. Conversely, the Muslim-based PAN left Jokowi’s coalition. Jokowi’s method of dealing with Islamist extra-parliamentary forces differed greatly from the inclusivist approach of his immediate predecessor. The Jokowi administration reportedly harboured strong suspicions against these Islamists.66 In this regard, his policies were in stark contrast to SBY’s. Whereas SBY had facilitated, albeit indirectly, these Islamists to gain more institutional, financial, and political prominence, Jokowi denied them access to government patronage ever since he was the Governor of Jakarta.67 Jokowi’s reluctance to accommodate these Islamist hardliners had partly prompted them to challenge his rule.68 In late 2016, they mobilized Indonesian Muslims in large-scale gatherings in Jakarta, one of which was arguably the largest mass protest in Indonesian history.69 During this series of events, “the phenomenon of Islamic populism [in Indonesia] found most dramatic expression”.70 65

Mietzner, Marcus. (2016). Coercing loyalty: coalitional presidentialism and party politics in Jokowi’s Indonesia. Contemporary Southeast Asia 38(2), pp. 209–232. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/ cs38-2b; Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. (2015). Jokowi’s first year: a weak president caught between reform and oligarchic politics. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 51(3), pp. 349–368. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2015.1110684. 66 Nuraniyah, Nava. (2020). Divided Muslims: militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding. In Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds). Democracy in Indonesia: from stagnation to regression. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 81–100. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981488 1524-010. 67 Mudhoffir, Abdil Mughis, Diatyka Widya Permata Yasih, and Luqman-nul Hakim. (2017). Populisme Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi di Indonesia. Jurnal Prisma 36(3), pp. 48–59. https://www.academia.edu/35719669/Populisme_Islam_dan_Tantangan_Demokrasi_ di_Indonesia_Jurnal_Prisma_36_3_pdf. 68 Mietzner, Marcus and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. (2018). Explaining the 2016 Islamist mobilisation in Indonesia: religious intolerance, militant groups and the politics of accommodation. Asian Studies Review 42(3), pp. 479–497. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335. 69 Fealy, Greg. (2016, December 7). Bigger than Ahok: explaining the 2 December mass rally. Indonesia at Melbourne, University of Melbourne (Australia). https://indonesiaatmelbourne.uni melb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/. 70 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), p. 118. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426.

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The Islamist groups led by the FPI took advantage of the heated domestic political climate to pose a challenge to Jokowi during the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta. They seized upon a remark that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), Jokowi’s favoured candidate in the election, made about a verse in the Quran in the course of a campaign speech and accused him of blasphemy.71 To the Muslims in Indonesia, an ethnic Chinese-Christian (like Ahok), who allegedly insulted Islam, was the perfect embodiment of the enemy of the ummah (community of believers). The non-Muslims as well as the secular-nationalists and the ethnic Chinese have been traditionally perceived as seeking to push Indonesian Muslims to the margins of national political and economic life.72 The idea that the Muslim majority in Indonesia has been politically and economically sidelined by minority groups is one of the key narratives of Islamist populism. Using such rhetoric, the Islamists were able to stir up widespread Muslim anger at Jokowi. They accused him of protecting Ahok and taking the side of groups that sought to marginalize Muslims.73 Jokowi further antagonized the Islamists by attacking them for their anti-Pancasila views and dissolving their organizations. The HTI, which had been accorded legal status as a mass organization under the SBY administration, was the first and only target of the Jokowi administration so far. In July 2017, Jokowi signed a regulation that allowed the government to ban the HTI without judicial process.74 While the FPI was spared from overt government crackdowns, it was subjected to other forms of repression as the government started to tactically use law enforcement agencies to attack the Islamic credentials of the organization. In May 2017, the national police filed a case against Rizieq Shihab, the head of the FPI, for insulting Pancasila and launched an investigation into his alleged involvement in a pornography case.75 He consequently fled to Saudi Arabia where he lived for three years in exile. 71

Hadiz, Vedi R. (2017). Indonesia’s year of democratic setbacks: towards a new phase of deepening illiberalism?. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 53(3), pp. 261–278. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00074918.2017.1410311. 72 Mudhoffir, Abdil Mughis, Diatyka Widya Permata Yasih, and Luqman-nul Hakim. (2017). Populisme Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi di Indonesia. Jurnal Prisma 36(3), pp. 48–59. https://www.academia.edu/35719669/Populisme_Islam_dan_Tantangan_Demokrasi_ di_Indonesia_Jurnal_Prisma_36_3_pdf. 73 Warburton, Eve. (2018). Inequality, nationalism and electoral politics in Indonesia. In Malcolm Cook and Daljit Singh (eds). Southeast Asian Affairs 2018. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 135–152. 74 Hadiz, Vedi R. (2017). Indonesia’s year of democratic setbacks: towards a new phase of deepening illiberalism?. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 53(3), pp. 261–278. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00074918.2017.1410311. 75 Dipa, Arya. (2017, January 30). Police declare FPI leader Rizieq Shihab suspect for alleged Pancasila defamation. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/ 30/police-declare-fpi-leader-rizieq-shihab-suspect-for-alleged-pancasila-defamation.html; Wijaya, Callistasia Anggun. (2017, January 15). Police to screen FPI leader’s Pancasila defamation case. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/15/police-to-screen-fpi-lea ders-pancasila-defamation-case.html; Yulisman, Linda. (2020, November 20). Controversial cleric Rizieq, a ‘moral’ guardian with contradictions. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/ asia/se-asia/controversial-cleric-rizieq-a-moral-guardian-with-contradictions.

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In response to the challenge posed to his presidency by the 2016 mass Islamist mobilization, Jokowi entered into closer collaboration with the moderate Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This Islamic organization emerged as Jokowi’s natural ally not only because it is the biggest of its kind in the country, but also because it has an acrimonious relationship with the Islamist hardliners. As Nuraniyah noted, state patronage from 2017 onwards was channelled to NU and accompanied by Jokowi’s accommodation of the aspirations of the organization’s elites and supporter base.76 This has been particularly apparent in the rise of Ma’ruf Amin, one of senior NU religious leaders, to national political prominence. As the chair of MUI, he let the council issue a statement declaring that Ahok’s remarks were indeed blasphemous. Seen in this light, Amin’s role in mobilizing the Muslim masses in anti-Ahok protests is anything but minor. Despite this, Jokowi recruited him for a new presidential religious council (Majelis Zikir Hubbul Wathon), put him in charge of one of the boards of the Agency for the Implementation of the State Ideology of Pancasila (Badan Pembinaan Ideology Pancasila), and ultimately selected him as his vice-presidential candidate in the 2019 election.77 The 2019 presidential election only heightened the tensions between Jokowi and his Islamist adversaries, who threw their support behind Prabowo in the same way they had done in 2014. Seeking to benefit from the Islamist support, Prabowo pragmatically incorporated the rhetoric of Islamist populism into his own brand of hardline and chauvinistic populism.78 As a result, the Islamists redoubled their efforts that they had applied in the 2016 anti-Ahok mass protest by merging religious and nationalist conservatism “to produce a new brand of religious nationalism”.79 To meet this challenge, Jokowi strengthened the nationalist dimension of his light populism by showing more assertiveness on the question of the country’s territorial integrity.80 He also relied primarily on the credentials of his running mate as a respected religious leader to boost his own reputation, enabling him to portray himself as more Islamic than his rival. Even though Jokowi won the election, he could not broaden his appeal in areas with strong traditions of Islamic politics. In Aceh and West Sumatra, 76

Nuraniyah, Nava. (2020). Divided Muslims: militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding. In Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds). Democracy in Indonesia: from stagnation to regression. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 81–100. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981488 1524-010. 77 Nuraniyah, Nava. (2020). Divided Muslims: militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding. In Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds). Democracy in Indonesia: from stagnation to regression. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 81–100. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981488 1524-010. 78 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), p. 118. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426. 79 Bourchier, David M. (2019). Two decades of ideological contestation in Indonesia: from democratic cosmopolitanism to religious nationalism. Journal of Contemporary Asia 49(5), pp. 713–733. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620. 80 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), p. 118. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426.

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Prabowo increased the size of his winning margin from 10 to 72 percentage points and from 54 to 72 percentage points, respectively.81 As Mietzner argues, Prabowo’s losses in the 2014 and 2019 elections should not be inferred as the failure of chauvinistic and Islamist populism as an effective tool of political mobilization.82 The use of such populist narratives in competitive elections has doubtlessly given birth to a new political dynamic in which religious nationalism is gaining ground.83 This is a domestic political development from which Jokowi could not escape. In the early years of his second presidential term, Jokowi continued to conduct his anti-Islamist campaign.84 He, nevertheless, further strengthened his relations with NU, providing it with state patronage so as to prevent himself from becoming the easy target of the Islamist populists.85 This suggests that political elites are able to play the nationalism and Islam cards to appeal to the people as they struggle against one another for power. This section has presented some important events that shaped the country’s internal politics during the SBY and Jokowi administrations. The different ways in which both administrations deal with the challenges presented by populist forces have apparently informed Indonesia’s policies towards its external environment to some extent. The next section will show how the dynamics of domestic politics and populism, as described above, have shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy responses towards China and the SCS issue.

6 Populism and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Responses to the South China Sea Issue Both SBY and Jokowi employ different strategies to ensure their political survival. The former took a more inclusivist approach in dealing with various internal political forces, leaving only a very narrow space for opposing elites to launch political manoeuvres. In contrast, the latter has been reluctant to accommodate some 81

Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner. (2019). Indonesia’s democratic paradox: competitive elections amidst rising illiberalism. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 55(3), pp. 295–317. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2019.1690412. 82 Mietzner, Marcus. (2020). Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats. Australian Journal of International Affairs 74(4), p. 118. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426. 83 Bourchier, David M. (2019). Two decades of ideological contestation in Indonesia: from democratic cosmopolitanism to religious nationalism. Journal of Contemporary Asia 49(5), pp. 713–733. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620. 84 Fealy, Greg. (2020). Jokowi in the Covid-19 era: repressive pluralism, dynasticism and the overbearing state. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 56(3), pp. 301–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00074918.2020.1846482. 85 Nuraniyah, Nava. (2020). Divided Muslims: militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding. In Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds). Democracy in Indonesia: from stagnation to regression. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, pp. 81–100. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981488 1524-010.

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major political parties within his ruling coalition. Unlike his immediate predecessor, he denied Islamist hardliners access to government patronage. In so doing, Jokowi provided opposing elites with the opportunity to form a significant extraparliamentary coalition to challenge his rule. As a result, there is a more competitive inter-elite struggle in Jokowi’s Indonesia than during SBY’s presidency. Within this political context in Indonesia, the use of anti-foreign rhetoric as a tool for populist mobilization has grown so pervasive that it became one of the predominant features of Indonesia’s national politics, particularly during Jokowi’s first presidential term. The mobilization of popular nationalist sentiment continued in the run-up to the 2014 general election. The perception among the citizenry that SBY avoided direct confrontation with foreign powers paved the way for two populist presidential candidates—Prabowo and Jokowi—to use nationalistic rhetoric to mobilize electoral support in the 2014 election. SBY had emphasized that he was strongly committed to upholding the country’s territorial integrity. The way in which SBY had conducted Indonesia’s foreign relations, however, partly aroused an expectation in members of the public that his successor should respond to foreign powers more assertively while defending the country’s national interests. As Mietzner noted, Indonesians criticized SBY’s “A Million Friends, Zero Enemies” foreign policy dictum, by questioning: “why are nations who steal our [fish] considered our friends?”.86 During the election campaign, Prabowo attacked Jokowi’s nationalist credentials and presented himself as a leader who was antithetical to SBY by openly condemning foreign forces for extracting the country’s natural resources.87 In one of the presidential debates, Prabowo questioned Jokowi on his policy if a foreign nation were to make claims on and then occupy Indonesian territory.88 In response, Jokowi said: “If it concerns our sovereignty, yeah, we’ll make trouble [kita buat ramai]. Don’t think I can’t be tough”.89 The SCS issue was even brought up in the debate, after Prabowo challenged Jokowi to share his views on the matter. Prabowo explicitly stated, without naming any specific country: “A part of our maritime territory was

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Mietzner, Marcus. (2015). Indonesia in 2014: Jokowi and the repolarization of post-Soeharto politics. In Daljit Singh (eds). Southeast Asian Affairs 2015, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, p. 131. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620598-010. 87 Aspinall, Edward. (2015). Oligarchic populism: Prabowo Subianto’s challenge to Indonesian democracy. Indonesia 99, pp. 1–28. https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.99.0001. 88 MetroTvNews. (2014, June 22). [Debat Capres 2014] Politik Internasional dan Ketahanan Nasional (4). Indonesian Presidential Debate. YouTube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=fglIVJnrh4A&t=1s. 89 Aspinall, Edward. (2018). The new nationalism in Indonesia. In Arianto Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri (eds). Indonesia in the new world: globalisation, nationalism and sovereignty. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House, p. 38. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981 4818230-008; Waskita, Ferdinand. (2014, June 22). Jokowi: Kedaulatan Diklaim Negara Lain, Kita Akan Buat Ramai [Jokowi: We will react strongly when other countries infringe upon our sovereignty]. Tribun News. https://www.tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/06/22/jokowi-kedaul atan-diklaim-negara-lain-kita-akan-buat-ramai.

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among the ones claimed by one of the [claimant] countries”.90 Jokowi’s responded by highlighting Indonesia’s status as a non-claimant state and expressing his concerns over the prospect of Indonesia getting involved in a conflict that would result in the deterioration of its relations with China. In an extremely competitive post-election inter-elite struggle, Jokowi did not hesitate to use of nationalistic policies to bolster his legitimacy. He rejected the pleas for clemency made by two Australian citizens convicted of drug offences, despite Canberra’s temporary withdrawal of the Australian ambassador to Indonesia in protest.91 His firm position on the execution of convicted drug dealers in April 2015 was arguably informed by his wish to prevent opposition parties from portraying him as an inadequately nationalistic leader.92 Jokowi’s regime has also embraced economic nationalism. For example, it has strengthened regulations that prohibit the export of unprocessed minerals on the one hand and compelled mining companies to build local smelters on the other.93 In addition, Jokowi endorsed the policy pursued by then Indonesian Minister for Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, of destroying foreign vessels caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters. This policy apparently won public support. According to a 2017 survey by the Populi Center, the public looks on Pudjiastuti as the minister who had achieved the most while in office.94 In another survey conducted by Gadjah Mada University in 2019, Pudjiastuti is shown to enjoy the highest popularity among ministers as she has more than nine hundred thousand Twitter followers and more than two million Instagram followers.95 While nationalistic expressions might garner strong popular support, it could also impose constraints on the foreign policy process. This is because the opposing elites could also attempt to mobilize the popular anti-foreign sentiment for their own 90

MetroTvNews. (2014, June 22). [Debat Capres 2014] Politik Internasional dan Ketahanan Nasional (5). Indonesian Presidential Debate. YouTube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=1vOIirkpdfQ&t=892s. 91 McRae, Dave and Diane Zhang. (2015, May 4). Death penalty: we must go beyond symbolic protests. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-04/mcrae-death-penalty-we-must-gobeyond-symbolic-protests/6443276. 92 Lindsey, Tim. (2015, February 16). Indonesia’s policy on death penalty is incoherent. Indonesia at Melbourne, University of Melbourne (Australia). https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/ indonesias-policy-on-death-penalty-is-incoherent/; Sundaryani, Fedina S. (2015, March 9). Jokowi ‘overcompensating’ with firm stance on death penalty. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakart apost.com/news/2015/03/09/jokowi-overcompensating-with-firm-stance-death-penalty.html. 93 Negara, Siwage Dharma. (2015). Rising economic nationalism in Indonesia: will this time be different?. ISEAS Perspective 2015 (59), pp. 1–12. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_ Perspective_2015_59.pdf; Warburton, Eve. (2017). Resource nationalism in Indonesia: ownership structures and sectoral variation in mining and palm oil. Journal of East Asian Studies 17(3), pp. 285–312. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2017.13. 94 Movanita, Ambaranie Nadia Kemala. (2019, July 13). Mereka Menteri yang Populer di Kabinet Jokowi [Popular ministers in Jokowi’s cabinet]. Kompas https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/ 07/13/07000061/mereka-menteri-yang-populer-di-kabinet-jokowi?page=all. 95 Gloria. (2019, July 1). Susi Pudjiastuti Menteri Paling Populer di Media Sosial. [Susi Pudjiastuti is the most popular minister on social media]. Gadjah Mada University News. https://www.ugm. ac.id/id/berita/18035-susi-pudjiastuti-menteri-paling-populer-di-media-sosial.

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domestic political gain. Should they do so, they will create a situation in which the governing elites would have to provide extreme nationalistic responses to foreign policy issues to cater to the public’s expectations. This is particularly true when dealing with China. Jokowi had no option but to react boldly and resolutely when Indonesia’s maritime rights in Natuna waters were repeatedly violated. Jokowi’s inspection trips to the incident sites in 2016 and 2019 took place on naval warships. These visits made the national headlines in Indonesia and several foreign media outlets and sent a strong message that the Indonesian government was determined to protect its sovereign rights. Jokowi’s trips to the Natuna Islands not only temporarily deterred China from further violation; they conveyed to the Indonesian public that the Jokowi administration was dedicated to defending national integrity, even against a powerful country like China. Jokowi’s trips to the Natuna Islands also exploited public criticisms against the previous government by making it clear that the current administration had a “no more Mr Nice Guy” stance and would not tolerate foreign infringement on Indonesian sovereignty for the sake of gaining regional or international stature. Second, it demonstrated to the opposition that Jokowi is not a pawn of Beijing. Indeed, such a designation is harmful to the President’s reputation. The government had to debunk the opposition’s frequent allegations that deepening economic cooperation with China will compromise Indonesia’s sovereign rights. The symbolic gesture of boarding a naval warship to Natuna waters was a necessary move to maintain the government’s patriotic credentials before the public. Following the incidents in Natuna waters, the Islamist hardliners changed the narrative from “China is threatening Indonesia’s territorial integrity” to “China is seeking to take control over the country”. They took advantage of the anti-Ahok campaign to put China at the centre of the Islamic populist discourse, claiming that the Chinese-Indonesian politician who insulted Islam would promote China’s economic interests in Indonesia so as to entrench Chinese national domination in Jakarta and thence the whole country. To emphasize the extent to which such a situation would marginalize the interests of ordinary devout Muslims, the Islamists portrayed Ahok as the enemy of the ummah. Additionally, they combined this narrative with nationalistic rhetoric, claiming that Ahok would surrender Indonesia’s independence to China when he became Governor of Jakarta because he is an ethnic Chinese and would “naturally” only serve the interests of China. This Islamist populist narrative presented direct challenges to both Jokowi’s Islamic and nationalist credentials. If Jokowi were to protect and defend his ally, he would only depict himself as a Muslim who failed to stand up to the enemy of Islam and a national leader who allowed foreign forces to undermine his country’s dignity. Furthermore, if Jokowi were not to behave assertively vis-à-vis China and China-related issues, he would be perceived as bowing to pressure from Beijing. This would further feed the Islamist populist narrative, allowing these Islamists to maximize their political gain at the expense of Jokowi’s. Due to the inter-elite struggle his administration was facing, he could not risk losing political support. Thus, he used nationalistic rhetoric and took assertive actions in regard to China’s maritime rights violation in Natuna waters. In this way, populist mobilization exacerbated the

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competitive political climate by adding more complexities to Indonesia’s responses vis-à-vis China and the SCS issue. Jokowi also learnt during his second term in office that public outcry could backfire economically on his administration and the country. This is because public outrage against China blackened its reputation in the eyes of Indonesians to the point where any investment from China was unwelcome. As the Jokowi administration focused on economic development and attracting more Chinese investors, any expression of nationalism in regard to the SCS issue would harm the country’s investment climate. Therefore, Jokowi attempted to water down the incidents in Natuna waters to appease Beijing while simultaneously adopting tough gestures, such as visiting the incident site on a warship, invoking the 2016 Tribunal ruling in Indonesia’s diplomatic notes to the UN and fostering defence cooperation with China’s rival, Japan.

7 Conclusion This study focuses on the role of populism in Indonesia when SCS tensions in the region rose from 2007 onwards. Therefore, populism in regard to the SCS issue is discussed within the contexts of the SBY administration (2004–2014) and the Jokowi administration (2014–2024). First, it must be noted that Indonesia’s position on the SCS issue has remained the same since the Soeharto era. Indonesia continues to maintain that it is a non-claimant in the SCS territorial disputes. The Natuna Islands, which lies on the southern tip of the SCS, is part of Indonesian sovereign territory and has never been disputed by any party. In accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS, Indonesia has maritime rights over the Natuna Islands. Since 2020, Jakarta has firmly upheld the 2016 UNCLOS Tribunal ruling that invalidates China’s infamous ninedash line claim. This is in response to China’s repeated violations of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters. Even though Indonesia is a non-claimant in the SCS territorial disputes, it is deeply involved in conflict management in the SCS on account of its role as the natural leader of ASEAN. Though Indonesia’s non-claimant position remains unchanged, the SBY and Jokowi administrations have adopted different strategies in regard to the SCS issue, particularly towards China. In general, the SBY administration tended to conceal the incidents of China’s repeated maritime rights violations (in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2013) in Natuna waters from the public eye. It primarily used diplomacy via ASEAN to resolve disputes over the SCS issue. The Jokowi administration, in contrast, adopted a tougher stance towards China’s violations of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters in 2016 and 2019, while curbing public uproar vis-à-vis the reported incidents. The different political constellations of the two governments have resulted in their different strategies towards China’s violation of Indonesia’s maritime rights. SBY was the first popularly elected president of Indonesia. He secured landslide victories against his opponents in two consecutive elections, and parliament was dominated by his supporters. SBY engaged with all elements of society in his government,

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including the hardliners. His administration thus possessed a wider scope when it came to making political decisions, inclusive of issues related to China. Despite SBY’s attempt to include various factions in his government, he could not escape public criticisms of his indecisiveness and elitism. The Jokowi administration, on the hand, distanced itself from the hardliners. While Jokowi attempted to engage with all elements of society, including Islamic political parties and Islamic moderates, the hardliners were excluded from his government. As a result, the hardliners became the fiercest opponents of his administration and they continually attacked him for his lack of Islamic credentials. They portrayed Jokowi as anti-Islamic foreign pawn who was a puppet of Beijing. Through use of nationalist rhetoric and populism, they were able to harm the reputation of his government. As a result, Jokowi responded by adopting tough measures in regard to China’s violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters. During his first term in office, he capitalized on nationalist rhetoric in his handling of the 2016 incident. By boarding a naval warship during his inspection trip to the incident site, he sent a strong message that his government would not tolerate any violation to its maritime rights. In so doing, he showed that, unlike his predecessor, he was willing to be seen as a defender of Indonesia’s national interests. His stance initially garnered popular support. However, as public uproar over the incidents reached fever pitch and Beijing dispatched an official to meet with Jokowi, the matter was suddenly declared to be settled. Beijing’s opinion apparently mattered a great deal to Jakarta as both sides sought to deepen their economic cooperation. During his second term, Jokowi’s handling of China’s maritime rights violation in Natuna waters was considerably muted. After the 2019 incident, the Jokowi administration attempted to downplay the incident. As Jakarta had already curbed public outcry over the issue, Beijing did not have to send a senior official to deal with the matter. By keeping a lid on public uproar, Jokowi was able to secure the inflows of Chinese investment into the country. However, the Jokowi administration also presented a tough message to its domestic audience by visiting the Natuna Islands and asserting Indonesia’s sovereignty over them. Jakarta also showed its willingness to protect its own maritime rights by invoking the 2016 UNLCOS Tribunal ruling that invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim and enhancing its defence cooperation with Japan, a rival of China. Jokowi’s stance towards China in his second term was influenced by the increased intensity of inter-elite struggle within Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia’s response to the SCS issue during this period, particularly in regard to China’s violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna waters, shows the limited effect of populism on Jakarta’s SCS policy. In other words, populism may spur the government to adopt tough or even anti-foreign measures without overturning Indonesia’s position on the SCS issue. Populism visà-vis Indonesia’s strategies towards China and the SCS issue only works to a certain degree as the government needs to consider other aspects affecting national interests, such as foreign investments. Jakarta tends to believe that tough strategies should be carried out by the government, rather than mass-driven, to ensure they remain controlled and effective.

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Ninditya, F. (2016, March 21). Indonesia protes Tiongkok terkait masuknya KM Kway Fey ke Natuna. [Indonesia issued a protest to China because of the KM Kway Fey’s intrusion in Natuna waters]. Antara News. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/551120/indonesia-protes-tio ngkok-terkait-masuknya-km-kway-fey-ke-natuna Nuraniyah, N. (2020). Divided Muslims: Militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding. In T. Power & E. Warburton (Eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: From stagnation to regression. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814881524-010 Mohamed Osman, M. N. (2010). Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s mobilization strategy and its impact in Indonesia. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(4). https:// doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.496317 Patunru, A., Pangestu, M., & Chatib Basri, M. (2018). Challenges for Indonesia in the new world. In A. Patunru, M. Pangestu, & M. Chatib Basri (Eds.), Indonesia in the new world: Globalisation, nationalism and sovereignty. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981481823 0-006 Perlez, J. (2012, July 12). Asian leaders at regional meeting fail to resolve disputes over South China Sea. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/asian-leadersfail-to-resolve-disputes-on-south-china-sea-during-asean-summit.html Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations. (2009, May 7). Circular note to the UN Secretary General No. CML/17/2009. https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/sub missions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations. (2010, July 8). Diplomatic note to the UN Secretary General No. 480/POL-703/VII/10. https://www.un.org/depts/los/ clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations. (2020a, May 26). Diplomatic note to the UN Secretary General No. 126/POL-703/V/20. https://www.un.org/Depts/los/ clcs_new/submissions_files/mys_12_12_2019/2020_05_26_IDN_NV_UN_001_English.pdf Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations. (2020b, June 12). Diplomatic note to the UN Secretary General No. No. 148/POL-703/VI/20. https://www.un.org/Depts/los/ clcs_new/submissions_files/mys_12_12_2019/2020_06_12_IDN_NV_UN_002_ENG.pdf Pilih Langkah Diplomasi: Marty Jelaskan Posisi Indonesia di Laut Tiongkok Selatan [Choosing diplomatic means: Marty explains Indonesia’s position in the South China Sea] (2014, June 25). Kompas.. http://home.kompas.co.id/litbang/tarkfast/detail4.cfm?item=12&startrow= 26&style=advanced&navigation=&session=1621918114324 Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and Indonesia’s democratic decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918 Rachmawati. (2020, January 8). Jokowi Datangi 2 KRI di Selat Lampa Natuna: Penegakan Hukum atas Hak Berdaulat [Jokowi visited two naval warships in the Lampa Strait, Natuna, to ensure legal enforcement over Indonesia’s sovereign rights]. Kompas. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/ 01/08/18380001/jokowi-datangi-2-kri-di-selat-lampa-natuna--saya-pastikan-penegakan-hukum Raditio, K. H. (2019). Understanding China’s behaviour in the South China Sea: A defensive realist perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. Reid, A. (2012). Indonesia’s new prominence in the world. In A. Reid (Ed.), Indonesia rising: The repositioning of Asia’s third giant. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/978981 4380416-007 Scott, M. (2016, May 26). Indonesia: the battle over Islam. The New York Review of Books. https:// www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/05/26/indonesia-battle-over-islam/ Sherlock, S. (2015). A balancing act: Relations between state institutions under Yudhyono. In E. Aspinall, M. Mietzner, & D. Tomsa (Eds.), The Yudhoyono presidency: Indonesia’s decade of stability and stagnation. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814620727-009 Siregar, K. (2020, January 9). Chinese vessels leaving Natuna after days of stand-off with Indonesia. Channel NewsAsia. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/natuna-china-ind onesia-standoff-vessels-leave-12247302

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Slater, D., & Simmons, E. (2013). Coping by colluding: Political uncertainty and promiscuous power sharing in Indonesia and Bolivia. Comparative Political Studies, 46(11). https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0010414012453447 Slater, D. (2004). Indonesia’s accountability trap: Party cartels and presidential power after democratic transition. Indonesia (78). Soebagjo, N., & Pattiradjawane, R. (2014). Jajak Pendapat Umum 2014: Persepsi Masyarakat Indonesia terhadap RRC [2014 public opinion poll: Perception of Indonesian society towards the People’s Republic of China]. University of Indonesia’s Center for Chinese Studies. Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. ASEAN. (2012, July 20). https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/AFMs%20S tatement%20on%206%20Principles%20on%20SCS.pdf Sukma, R. (2012). Domestic politics and international posture: Constraints and possibilities. In A. Reid (Ed.), Indonesia rising: The repositioning of Asia’s third giant. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814380416-011 Sundaryani, F. S. (2015, March 9). Jokowi ‘overcompensating’ with firm stance on death penalty. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/09/jokowi-overcompensatingwith-firm-stance-death-penalty.html Suryadinata, L., & Izzuddin, M. (2017). The Natunas: Territorial integrity in the forefront of Indonesia-China relations. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ TRS5_17.pdf Suryadinata, L. (2014, April 24). South China Sea: Is Jakarta no longer neutral? The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/south-china-sea-is-jakarta-no-longer-neutral Suryadinata, L. (2020, February 19). Recent Chinese moves in the Natuna Riles Indonesia. Perspective (10). https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_10.pdf Tarra, Q. (2012, August 11). China willing to ease tensions, says top envoy. Inquirer.net. https://glo balnation.inquirer.net/46909/china-willing-to-ease-tensions-says-top-envoy Thayer, C. A. (2012). ASEAN’s code of conduct in the South China Sea: A litmus test for community building? The Asia Pacific Journal, 34(4). https://apjjf.org/-Carlyle-A--Thayer/3813/article.pdf Thayer, C. A. (2013, October 9). New commitment to a code of conduct in the South China Sea? National Bureau of Asian Research. https://www.nbr.org/publication/new-commitment-toa-code-of-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/ Tomsa, D. (2010). Indonesian politics in 2010: The perils of stagnation. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 46(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2010.522501 Valencia, M. J. (2020, January 24). China-Indonesia South China Sea incident likely a blip in a longterm trend of mutual adjustment. ASEAN Today. https://www.aseantoday.com/2020/01/china-ind onesia-south-china-sea-incident-likely-a-blip-in-a-long-term-trend-of-mutual-adjustment/ Warburton, E. (2017). Resource nationalism in Indonesia: Ownership structures and sectoral variation in mining and palm oil. Journal of East Asian Studies, 17(3). https://doi.org/10.1017/jea. 2017.13 Warburton, E. (2018). Inequality, nationalism and electoral politics in Indonesia. In M. Cook & D. Singh (Eds.), Southeast Asian Affairs 2018. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak House Waskita, F. (2014, June 22). Jokowi: Kedaulatan Diklaim Negara Lain, Kita Akan Buat Ramai [Jokowi: We will react strongly when other countries infringe upon our sovereignty]. Tribun News. https://www.tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/06/22/jokowi-ked aulatan-diklaim-negara-lain-kita-akan-buat-ramai Wijaya, C. A. (2017, January 15). Police to screen FPI leader’s Pancasila defamation case. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/15/police-to-screen-fpi-leaders-pan casila-defamation-case.html Yeremia, A. E. (2021). Explaining Indonesia’s constrained engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative: Balancing developmentalism against nationalism and Islamism. Asian Perspective, 45(2). https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0003

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Yulisman, L. (2020, November 20). Controversial cleric Rizieq, a ‘moral’ guardian with contradictions. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/controversial-cleric-rizieq-amoral-guardian-with-contradictions

Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Jakarta-based independent researcher. He received his Master from Tsinghua University, China, and Ph.D. from the Department of Government and International Relations at University of Sydney, Australia. He is the author of Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Apart from his research, he teaches Chinese contemporary political thought at Driyarkara School of Philosophy’s Graduate Program. His main interests are Chines politics and foreign policy, IndonesiaChina relations. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia. He received his Ph.D. from the School of International Relations, Research School of Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University, China. His research interests include China’s foreign policy, China-Southeast Asia relations, and Indonesia-China people-to-people exchanges. He has published in The Pacific Review, International Journal of China Studies, Asian Perspective, and other journals.

Political Apathy, Soft Authoritarianism, and Singapore’s Perspectives on the South China Sea Irene Chan

Abstract This chapter examines Singapore’s perspectives on the South China Sea as a non-claimant country. It focuses on why Singapore has not changed its longstanding perspectives, despite the rise of global populism and pressure from major power competition between China and the USA between 2016 and 2019. By examining the structure of Singapore’s domestic political economy, the chapter makes three arguments: (1) Singapore’s perspectives on the South China Sea are driven by its national interests set by the state, which has firm control over foreign policy; (2) there is bipartisan support for the state’s foreign policy. Singaporeans will generally support the country’s foreign policy but pay little attention to it because of their disinterest in politics and lack of knowledge of international affairs; (3) Singapore has not been affected by the wave of populist movements because of the resilience of Singapore state. It concludes that Singapore’s perspectives on the South China Sea will remain consistent for the foreseeable future as there is no serious impetus for a shift or major change in Singapore’s fundamental foreign policy principles. Keywords South China Sea · Singapore · Authoritarianism · Populism · Foreign policy

1 Introduction Singapore has deep economic and strategic ties with major powers, particularly China, and the USA—the two rivalling major players in East Asia - as part of its hedging strategy to keep their options open and to cultivate the maximum level of protection possible to offset risks. However, as Kuik points out, both major powers find this strategy distasteful and have often pressured small states to send clear

I. Chan (B) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_7

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and consistent signals.1 Therefore, having close ties with both China and the USA inevitably means Singapore faces pressure to take sides, particularly during times of heightened tensions. It was unsurprising that Singapore’s warm ties with China entered an unprecedentedly long period of tensions between 2016 and 2017 over disagreements on strategic issues. Tensions between China and the USA ran high in 2016 due to the latter’s joint agreement with South Korea to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defence system in South Korea to counter the increasing missile threat from North Korea.2 Washington also increased the frequency of the US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the SCS in the same year.3 Analysts have largely attributed the catalyst for this downslide in relations to the latter’s displeasure of Singapore’s position on the SCS in the months leading up to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the Philippines v. China case in July 2016.4 In April 2016, Beijing sought clarification from Singapore following an accusation levelled by two of its senior diplomats against China for splitting ASEAN.5 This came after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reached a four-point consensus with three ASEAN states-Brunei, Cambodia and Laos-on the SCS issue. Two months later, Singapore, the country coordinator for ASEAN-China dialogue relationship (2015–2018), was criticized for not doing enough to forge a consensus on the SCS issue at a special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. ASEAN and China cancelled a scheduled joint press conference customarily used to report on the meeting’s deliberations at the end of the summit. The foreign ministries of Singapore and China later released contrasting press statements on the summit proceedings. Then, in September 2016, Beijing accused Singapore of pushing for the PCA ruling to be mentioned in the final document of the Non-Aligned Movement summit held in Venezuela. The eventful year ended with the Hong Kong customs’ impounding of

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Kuik, C. C. (2021). Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective. China International Strategy Review. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00089-5. 2 Meick, E.&Salidjanova, N. (2017, July). China’s response to U.S.-South Korean missile defense system deployment and its implications. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-response-us-south-korean-missile-def ense-system-deployment-and-its-implications. 3 The US Navy FONOPs in the South China Sea started in 2013 under the Obama administration. Between 2013–2016, Washington authorised a total of six FONOPS-half of which were deployed in 2016 alone. See Colin, S. (2016). China, the US, and the law of the sea. China Perspectives (2), pp. 57–62. https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.6994. 4 Lye, L. F. (2016, December 8). Singapore-China relations hit another snag. Policy Forum. https:// www.policyforum.net/singapore-china-relations-hit-another-snag/; Tai, M. (2016, December 15). Singapore’s China conundrum. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/singapores-chinaconundrum/; Chong, J. I. (2017, April 26). Diverging paths? Singapore-China relations and the East Asian maritime domain. The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). https://www.nbr.org/pub lication/diverging-paths-singapore-china-relations-and-the-east-asian-maritime-domain/. 5 Ng, E. (2016, April 28). China’s actions lent themselves to misunderstanding: Bilahari. TODAY. https://www.todayonline.com/world/chinas-actions-lent-themselves-misunderstanding-bilahari.

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nine Singapore Armed Forces Terrex armoured vehicles in transit from Taiwan after a tip-off from mainland Chinese law enforcement organizations in November 2016.6 Singapore also faced pressure from the USA on its position on the SCS. Starting from the Obama and Trump administrations to the Biden administration, Washington has made numerous attempts to elicit support from Singapore. For instance, during the August 2016 press conference with then-US President Barack Obama marking the 50th anniversary of Singapore–USA relations, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong carefully avoided a question on Singapore’s role in the context of USA being a significant part of peace and stability in Asia and refrained from mentioning the SCS. However, Obama remarked that both countries “reaffirmed [their] shared commitment to building a regional order where all nations play by the same rules and disputes are resolved peacefully including in the South China Sea”.7 In August 2020, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo denounced China’s claims in the SCS as illegal and sought support from Indonesia and Singapore. Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakhrisnan reiterated the city-state’s neutral position as a nonclaimant in a call with Pompeo.8 Most recently, in August 2021, US Vice-President Kamala Harris made her first visit to Singapore where she delivered a sharp rebuke of China for “intimidation” and “coercion” in the South China Sea in a speech to sailors aboard a US combat ship at the Changi naval base.9 However, there was no mention about the SCS in the official statement of her visit issue by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs.10 Thus far, Singapore seems to have successfully resisted pressure from both major powers over how it conducts its foreign policy and to change its position to take sides on the SCS. It also seems successful in its attempts to assure the domestic audience that keeping on the current path is the best choice. I argue that Singapore’s perspectives on the SCS have remained consistent over the past three decades due to the structure of its domestic political system, the high level of political apathy and the lack of knowledge on international relations and foreign policy-making among its citizens. The citizens have shown their dissatisfaction of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) at the ballot box over the years, but they have kept ruling party in power since 1959 with strong mandates ranging between 60 and 70% of popular votes. 6

Today. (2016, November 26). Seizure of SAF armoured vehicles in HK began with Chinese law enforcement tip off: Factwire. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/seizure-saf-armoured-veh icles-hk-began-chinese-law-enforcement-tip-factwire. 7 The White House. (2016, August 2). Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee of Singapore in joint press conference [Press release]. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2016/08/02/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-lee-singapore-joint-press. 8 Sim, D. (2020, August 5). Indonesia, Singapore steer clear of US-China dispute in Pompeo’s South China Sea outreach. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/ article/3096033/indonesia-singapore-stay-neutral-us-china-dispute-despite. 9 Harris rebukes China in major speech on Indo-Pacific relations. Politico. (2021, August 24). https:// www.politico.com/news/2021/08/24/kamala-harris-china-singapore-pacific-506675. 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore. (2021, August 23). Official Visit of Vice President of the United States of America Kamala D. Harris, 22 to 24 August 2021 [Press release]. https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Pho tos/2021/08/20210823-US-VP-Visit-Post-JPC.

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The lack of political opposition is underscored by the high level of autonomy which the dominant party enjoys over the country’s economic planning and foreign policymaking, among other aspects of governance. Although there has been a rise in the level of public discourse on political issues on social media platforms over the past decade, there is insufficient evidence that the level of political activism will build up into full-blown populism to affect Singapore’s current set of foreign policy principles. This chapter attempts to unpack the factors behind Singapore’s long-standing position on the SCS by examining the city-state’s political system, the making of its foreign policy and the political apathy among its electorate. It proceeds in three sections. The first section outlines Singapore’s official position on the SCS dispute over the past three decades from 1991 to 2020. It also examines the reasons informing its decision to adopt such a stance. The second section looks at the city-state’s political structure and the autonomy of the ruling PAP government in formulating and pursuing policies to explain the dominant rhetoric of vulnerability and the origins of the citizens’ political apathy in the country. The third section examines the impact of ethnic identity and state-driven nationalism on policy-making, followed by a conclusion.

2 The Importance of the South China Sea and Singapore’s Position Before I begin my assessment of the structure and impact of domestic politics on Singapore’s perspectives on the SCS, it is helpful to understand the importance of the semi-enclosed sea to Singapore’s economy, Singapore’s close relations with both China and the USA, and its official position on the disputes over the past three decades. Here, I analyse official press releases by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the debates concerning the SCS dispute among the members of parliament (MPs) from the Singapore Hansard between 1989 and 2020.11 This timeline is taken based on the earliest point in which the SCS dispute were recorded in parliament debates in the Hansard. A critical part of Singapore’s survival strategy is to develop and sustain robust relations with both competing great powers to ensure maximum protection against uncertainty and keep its options open. The city-state took pains to establish its ties with the USA. The late Singaporean statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, was the architect of Singapore’s foreign policy and had cultivated Singapore’s role as the indispensable middleman between the USA and China during the 1960s.12 He had close relationships with US presidents, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, as well as Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former US secretaries of state. To mark the 50th anniversary of Singapore–US diplomatic relations in 2016, US president Barack Obama hosted a state dinner for Singapore prime minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 11

The Hansard refers to the official published report of debates in the parliament of a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, including Singapore. 12 Lee was the father of Singapore’s third (and current) prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong.

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White House. This was considered as the highest diplomatic honours Washington can give to mark strong ties between the USA and a small Southeast Asian country.13 The USA is Singapore’s largest foreign investor, while the latter was the first Asian country to have signed a free-trade agreement with the USA in 2003. On the strategic front, their strong defence ties are underpinned by milestone bilateral agreements including the 2015 enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which saw the first rotational deployment of US Navy P-8A Poisedon maritime surveillance aircraft to Singapore in December 2015.14 On the other hand, Singapore has deep economic relations with China. That are augmented by multi-faceted cooperation, frequent high-level exchanges, and robust people-to-people exchanges. Lee Kuan Yew, who paid 33 visits to China between 1976 and 2015, also had close ties with the Chinese Communist Party leadership. While China is Singapore’s largest trading partner, the city-state has been China’s largest investor since 2013. The Singapore government has also established eight provincial business and economic councils with the provincial governments in Guangdong, Jiangsu Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. During what was known as the period of “Singapore fever” in China in the 1990s, more than 50,000 officials visited Singapore for study visits and training programmes.15 It should be noted that as Singapore is the only Chinese-majority sovereign state outside of greater China, Beijing has some expectations of the citystate to better understand and support the Chinese perspectives, as well as to do its part in keeping ASEAN calm over the SCS issue.16 Suffice to say, the SCS dispute has shaped the dynamics of great power relations in Southeast Asia more drastically over the past decade. The greater level of uncertainty and volatility in the SCS is inevitably affecting Singapore’s hedging strategy in its asymmetric relations with China and the USA. It is an understatement to say that the SCS is important to Singapore. There are three main drivers for the island state’s interests in the SCS:international law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and a cohesive ASEAN. Singapore sits on the narrowest point of the Straits of Malacca—a key Asian trade route and vital energy corridor for East Asian economies. Since the island’s founding in 1819, seaborne trade has been the lifeblood of its economy. It is an international financial, trading

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Au Yong, J. (2016, August 4). Official visit a sign of US emphasis on Asia, not just Singapore: PM Lee Hsien Loong. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/official-visit-asign-of-us-emphasis-on-asia-not-just-singapore-pm-lee-hsien-loong. 14 US P-8 spy plane deployed to Singapore. BBC News. (2015, December 8). https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-35036220. 15 Yang, K. & Ortmann, S. (2020). The origins of the “Singapore fever” in China: 1978–92. In S. Ortmann & M. R. Thompson (eds.), China’s ‘Singapore model’ and authoritarian learning (London: Routledge), pp. 21–37. 16 Torode, G. (2017, August 9). China leaning on Singapore to keep ASEAN calm over South China Sea: sources. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-china-singapore-analysis-idUSKB N1AO17D.

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and logistics hub with a trade to GDP ratio of 319.15%.17 A study by the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that, in 2016 alone, Singapore had the third highest share of the overall SCS trade at 5.97%, after China and South Korea, at 21.9% and 6.28%, respectively.18 The maritime industry contributes seven per cent of Singapore’s GDP.19 Therefore, it should not be surprising why freedom of navigation and overflight is critical for Singapore’s economic prosperity and strategic survival as an island state. The second critical part of Singapore’s survival strategy is to ensure its sovereign rights are recognized and protected from arbitrariness by the UN-based international legal framework that holds all states accountable.20 Singapore’s rapid economic development bears testament to the regional and systemic stability brought about by the liberal international order established by the USA after World War II. Logically speaking, the city-state has little motivation to initiate or support the transformation of an order from which it profits. Singapore is more inclined to maintain the laws, norms, and practices that are integral to the existing international and regional order, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS. The rights and obligations of the coastal and user states laid out in the UNCLOS provide the basis for maintaining stability and predictability in the maritime Southeast Asia. More importantly, this regime preserves the freedom of navigation and overflights upon which Singapore is dependent as an island state. It is essentially in Singapore’s interest to ensure that such a regime be interpreted by and applied consistently on all parties, especially the major powers. For the past three decades, Singapore has held a neutral position on the maritime disputes in the SCS. To further enhance its position as a neutral party, it signed an agreement to provide a neutral venue for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to preside over maritime disputes in 2020. The city-state is the first external country where the ITLOS or its chambers may sit and exercise its functions.21 So, what explains Singapore’s decision to remain neutral? An official statement issued by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016 states that the city-state decided not take sides on the competing territorial claims stems because it values its long-standing and friendly relations with all parties, both bilaterally and

17 World Integrated Trade Solutions. (n.d.). Singapore Trade Indicators 2019. World Bank. https:// wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SGP/Year/LTST/. 18 Schrag, J. (2017, August 2). How much trade transits the South China Sea? China Power Project of CSIS. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. 19 Enterprise Singapore. (2018, December 18). Sea transport industry profile. https://www.enterp risesg.gov.sg/industries/type/sea-transport/industry-profile. 20 Ministry of Law Singapore. (2018, February 8). Speech by Ms Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Law and Finance, at the ‘International Law Year in Review’ Conference [Press release]. https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/speeches/speech-by-sms-indranee-rajah-at-internationallaw-year-in-review. 21 Law of the Sea disputes can now be heard in Singapore. CNA. (2020, June 11). https://www.cha nnelnewsasia.com/singapore/law-sea-disputes-can-now-be-heard-singapore-723801.

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in the context of ASEAN.22 But with four out of ten ASEAN member states having competing claims in the SCS, the disputes have inevitably affected intra-ASEAN relations and ASEAN’s relations with extra-regional powers. This is an issue of concern for Singapore, which regards a cohesive ASEAN and the maintenance of its centrality within the ASEAN-led multilateral framework as vital for regional stability. The various regional security and economic mechanism helmed by ASEAN such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), the ADMM-Plus, and the East Asia Summit, are inclusive platforms for member states to engage extra-regional powers in the Indo-Pacific, thereby engendering deep mutual understanding and fostering predictable behaviour. However, ASEAN is only credible and useful if (and when) its processes effectively advance common interests for all its member states. This requires a high degree of cooperation and integration among its member states, but competing national interests make it hard for them to take a common stand on the SCS issue. Like its fellow ASEAN member states, the city-state views the SCS issue through the lens of its own interests. The SCS issue and its impact on the country’s external relations and security as well as ASEAN’s cohesiveness and its role in ensuring regional stability have been discussed in as many as 60 parliament sittings between 1989 and 2021 (Table 1). The official records in the Singapore Hansard between 1989 and 2020 show that the city-state’s perspectives on the SCS remains consistent despite the pressure it faces from major extra-regional powers. It urges the peaceful resolution of the disputes through legal and diplomatic processes in accordance with international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. The city-state also continuously stresses on the importance of ensuring regional stability and the freedom of navigation in the SCS through the maintenance of a rules-based order that upholds and protects the rights and privileges of all states. Of the parliamentary sittings discussing the SCS dispute, more than two-thirds took place during the 12th and 13th Parliaments (October 2011–June 2020). Tensions in the SCS had soared during this eventful decade. Some notable discussions during the 12th Parliament include the impact of international disputes on relations between groups of foreigners residing in Singapore (15 October 2012); impact of China’s air defence identification zone on Singapore and its interests (20 January 2014; 17 February 2014); and China’s building of airstrip on Spratly Islands in SCS (11 May 2015). During a sitting of the 13th Parliament, MP Zaqy Mohamad raised a question to foreign minister Balakrishnan on how Singapore can continue to balance its existing trade and foreign relations interests with strong expectations from China to align with its One China policy and claims over the SCS (9 January 2017). It bears highlighting that there were very few questions from the opposition MPs relating to the state’s foreign policy and its handling of the SCS issue in the parliaments prior to 2011. One of the plausible reasons is that there were less than five 22

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. (2016, July 12). MFA Spokesmans Comments on the ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Philippines v China case under [Press release]. https://www. mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2016/07/MFA-SpokesmansComments-on-the-ruling-of-the-Arbitral-Tribunal-in-the-Philippines-v-China-case-under.

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Table 1 Number of parliament sittings involving discussions on the SCS dispute, 1989–2020 Parliament

Period of sessions

Number of parliament sittings involving discussions on the South China Sea disputes

7th

9 January 1989–13 August 1991

1

8th

6 January 1992–15 December 1996

3

9th

26 May 1997–17 October 2001

7

10th

25 March 2002–20 April 2006

2

11th

2 November 2006–19 April 2011

3

12th

10 October 2011–15 August 2015

20

13th

15 January 2016–23 June 2020

21

14th

24 August 2020–Present

3

Source Compiled by author from the Singapore Hansard

opposition MPs during each parliament before 2011, except for the first parliament which had 14 opposition party MPs.23 This underscores the extent of autonomy that the ruling PAP has over Singapore’s foreign policy. Opposition party MPs such as Low Thia Kiang, Sylvia Lim, Pritam Singh, and Dennis Tan from the leading opposition Workers’ Party (WP) began to ask foreign policy questions and give their views on the SCS issue after the WP won a group representation constituency (GRC) and expanded the opposition base in parliament in 2011.24 As the WP is the dominant opposition party with the greatest number of parliamentary seats, its support for the state’s existing foreign policy principles is significant. The most notable WP MP speeches on the SCS dispute and Singapore’s foreign policy were made by Low in a parliament debate on the foreign ministry’s budget for 2017; as well as Pritam, in his maiden speech as the official Leader of the Opposition in the 14th Parliament, in 31 August 2020. In the 2017 foreign ministry budget debate, Low noted the changing strategic landscape and the impact on Singapore’s foreign policy and asked how the government of the day can protect and advance Singapore’s interests as a multi-racial country. His short speech won praises from the ruling party elites for putting national interests above partisan politics. Pritam’s speech in 2020 cemented the dominant opposition party’s foreign policy position: The Workers’ Party supports the Government’s positions on defence and foreign policy. These must continue as they are…We support the Government’s efforts in working with our neighbours to bolster ASEAN. We believe that a successful ASEAN boosts regional security through economic, political and security cooperation. In particular, we support Singapore’s efforts to work with ASEAN and other countries to finalise the South China Sea 23

Parliament of Singapore. (2017). List of MPs By Parliament. https://www.parliament.gov.sg/his tory/list-of-mps-by-parliament. 24 The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) is a multi-member (up to a maximum of five members) electoral constituency that is unique to the Singapore political system. Each GRC must consist of a candidate or MP from a minority race to ensure fair representation.

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Code of Conduct. As a small maritime nation and separately, a trading nation, the sanctity of international agreements and adherence to the rule of law is necessary to discouragearbitrary behaviour by more powerful states.25

There is also no evidence in the Hansard or in the media to suggest that there are major objections from the other smaller opposition parties to the state’s long-standing foreign policy towards China26 or its perspectives on the SCS. Therefore, I argue that the strong bipartisan support for PAP state’s fundamental foreign policy principles is a key reason why its policies towards the SCS and China will ensure remain unchanged for the foreseeable future.

3 Structure of Singapore’s Political Economy and State Autonomy The state’s autonomy over foreign policy is the product of Singapore’s domestic political structure. In general, state autonomy is understood as the capacity which a strong state possesses to operate without influence and pressure from social forces, particularly capital-owning classes. It also refers to the state’s capacity to organize social forces according to its own criteria.27 This section briefly outlines the history of the PAP state’s autonomy. The city-state’s political scene has been dominated by the PAP-one of the world’s longest ruling parties-since the country’s independence in 1965. Singapore’s rapid transformation from a developing country to a modern industrial economy is often credited to its government under the PAP.28 The existing literature on the PAP’s dominance generally agree that the core of the PAP’s political legitimacy lies in the state’s continuous good economic performance; and its capacity to manage its unique vulnerabilities as a small and resource-poor country while punching above its featherweight class in the international arena.29 While consolidating its authority, the 25

Full text of workers’ party chief Pritam Singh’s maiden speech as leader of the opposition. Mothership. (2020, September 1). https://mothership.sg/2020/09/pritam-singh-leader-oppositionfull-speech/. 26 Chan, I. (2019). Reversing China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative-Singapore’s response to the BRI and its quest for relevance. East Asia. 36(3), pp. 185–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-019-09317-7. 27 Chalmers, I. (1992). Loosening state control in Singapore: the emergence of local capital as a political force. Asian Journal of Social Science. 20(1), pp. 57–84. https://doi.org/10.1163/080382 492x00130. 28 Asher, M. G. (1994). Some aspects of role of state in Singapore. Economic and Political Weekly. 29(14), pp. 795–804. 29 Leifer, M. (2000). Singapore’s foreign policy: coping with vulnerability. (London: Routledge); Wong, B. & Huang, X. (2010). Political legitimacy in Singapore. Politics & Policy. 38(3), pp. 523– 543. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00248.x; Tan, K. P. (2011). The people’s action party and political liberalization in Singapore. In L. F. Lye & W. Hofmeister (eds). Political parties, party systems and democratization in East Asia (Singapore: World Scientific), pp. 107–131); Morgenbesser, L. (2016). The autocratic mandate: elections, legitimacy and regime stability in

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PAP government built up extensive governmental structures, staffed by an efficient technocratic bureaucracy. Owing to the weak opposition forces in parliament, the PAP-led government has had little obstacles in protecting and advancing its own interests, sometimes at the expense of public interests. Some examples include the putting of civil society on a tight rein, as well as the limiting of the freedom of the press and free speech. Tan and Wong note that “Singapore’s leaders have always been deeply convinced of their strong mandate to govern and their right to be obeyed, especially when they had to make unpopular decisions that they considered to be necessary”.30 The ruling party has also made a series of constitutional amendments to the inherited electoral system from Singapore’s colonial past. Such amendments have been widely criticized as efforts by the PAP to shape voting preferences to its advantage, which, in turn, ensures predictability of election outcomes, and facilitate the preservation of the current political status quo.31 The first example of constitutional amendment to the electoral system is the GRC scheme, a form of party bloc voting, which was introduced in 1989 to ensure minority representation.32 The GRCs were dominated by the ruling PAP until 2011, when the WP won its first GRC and captured its second in the 2020 General Elections. Rodan points out that the GRC scheme stretches the already weak opposition parties’ limited resources and allows weak PAP candidates to be shielded through team membership.33 It is not uncommon for new PAP candidates to be “parachuted” into parliament after being paired with strong, seasoned candidates under the GRC scheme. For instance, MacPherson MP Tin Pei Ling, became one of PAP’s youngest elected MP in the controversial 2011 general elections after she contested under then Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong’s Marine Parade GRC team.34

Singapore. The Pacific Review. 30(2), pp. 205–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.120 1134; Meredith L. Weiss. (2020). The roots of resilience: party machines and grassroots politics in Singapore and Malaysia. (New York: Cornell University Press), p. 155. 30 Tan, K. P. & Wong, B. (2016). East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy In J. Chan, D. C. Shin, M. S. Williams & T. Sin. (eds). East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy: bridging the empirical-normative divide. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 31 Yeo, L. H. (2002). Electoral politics in Singapore. In A. Croissant (ed). Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia (Berlin&Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Siftung), pp. 203–232. http://library.fes. de/fulltext/iez/01361inf.htm; Tey, T. H. (2008). Singapore’s electoral system: government by the people?. Legal Studies. 28(4), pp. 610–628. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2008.00106.x. 32 Tan, N. & Grofman, B. (2018). Electoral rules and manufacturing legislative super-majority: evidence from Singapore. Commonwealth&Comparative Politics. 56(3), pp. 273–297. https://doi. org/10.1080/14662043.2018.1468238. 33 Yeo, L. H. (2002). Electoral politics in Singapore. In A. Croissant (ed). Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia (Berlin&Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Siftung), pp. 203–232. http://library.fes. de/fulltext/iez/01361inf.htm. 34 Goh served as Singapore’s second Prime Minister from 1990–2004. He was succeeded by Lee. See Tan, S. (2020, November 2). Lunch With Sumiko: what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger, says MP Tin Pei Ling. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/lunchwithsumikowhat-doesnt-kill-you-makes-you-stronger.

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Other examples include the 1984 Non-Constituency Member of Parliament and the 1991 Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) schemes, which were introduced as a form of quasi-opposition to assuage the electorate’s concerns of the ruling party’s free rein in parliament.35 NCMPs are the losing opposition candidates with the highest percentage of votes, at least 15% of votes cast-secured during an election. However, the opposition is still vastly outnumbered in parliament due to Singapore’s first-past-the-post principle (FPTP) electoral system.36 On the other hand, the 1991 NMP scheme allows for the appointment of up to nine NMPs for a term of two years. NMPs are selected by a Special Select Committee chaired by the speaker who, unsurprisingly, is from the ruling party. On the economic front, it is no secret that Singapore is a developmental state that practices state capitalism. At the time of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in August 1965, the newly independent PAP government was faced with an underdeveloped and weak domestic economy, as well as hostile neighbours. In confronting the fundamental challenge of ensuring political and economic survival, Lee Kuan Yew and his fellow PAP leaders saw the need for state-guided development. The PAP state is not just the strategist. Aided by an elite technocratic bureaucracy, it is also the planner, regulator, manager, employer, social engineer, and entrepreneur that participates directly in both foreign and domestic economic activities. A critical component of Singapore’s foreign policy is its foreign economic policy (FEP). The city-state is passionate in its promotion of the free-trade cause in its bilateral and multilateral economic relations. Proponents of the state’s FEP strive to promote a stable balance of power between major economies in regional and global contexts. Therefore, the city-state assumes the role of a catalytic alliance builder with not just other states, but also with foreign multinational enterprises in their international operations. Because of the state’s strong internationalist outlook, many of Singapore’s domestic economic policies are closely linked with its FEP. Thus, the ruling party’s autonomy over Singapore’s FEP underscores the control and influence it has of the entire government. The PAP state exercises economic power through state-owned enterprises, which controls a wide variety of assets in Singapore and contribute a significant portion to the country’s GDP. It also owns two world-famous sovereign wealth funds, Temasek Holdings Ltd-established in 1974 to oversee the government’s domestic investments, other holding companies, ministries, and statutory boards-and the GIC Private Limited (formerly known as the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation), established in 1981 to manage Singapore’s foreign reserves. Since the 1960s, government agencies such as the Central Provident Fund (CPF), Economic Development Board (EDB), Housing and Development Board (HDB), Jurong Town Corporation 35

Lee, T. (2005). Gestural politics: civil society in “New” Singapore. Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia. 20(2), pp. 132–154. https://doi.org/10.1355/sj20-2b; Rodan, G. (2009). New modes of political participation and Singapore’s nominated members of parliament. Government and Opposition. 44(4), pp. 438–462. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01297.x. 36 In the FPTP electoral system, the candidate (or candidates, in the case of a GRC) with the greatest number of votes will become the elected MP(s). Therefore, the PAP wins a disproportionately large number of seats in parliament every election because they win the most number of GRCs.

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(JTC), and Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) were also created to manage the local economy and the citizens’ income, as well as to solve Singapore’s labour and housing problems. Drawing on the abundant resources from its control of the state and the economy, the ruling PAP has been able to devise a variety of co-optation measures to ensure compliance from its citizens.37 The PAP state developed a transactional process in exchange for the people’s mandate during elections by providing pre-/postelection goodies for citizens. These perks range from housing and facilities upgrading services, healthcare initiatives for the elderly to the distribution of cash such as Goods-and-Services Tax (GST) Vouchers and the 2019 Bicentennial Bonus. The cooptation also extends to the local talent pool of elites from the cultural, industrial and commercial scenes, as well as from the civil society. For instance, Yeo (2002) points to the NMP scheme as a form of co-optation by appointing primarily people who have excelled or professionals who have special expertise in a wide variety of fields.38 The PAP state also co-opts small- and medium-sized private firms through a network of professional associations such as the Singapore Business Federation, and Business China Singapore.39 For instance, the PAP political elites often lead business delegations to China and facilitates exchanges and business opportunities through its network of the business and economic councils with eight Chinese provincial governments. Barr points out that the ample business opportunities provided by the Singapore state induces the local business elites to stay loyal and refrain from associating with opposition parties for fear of jeopardising their economic futures and professional statuses.40 Given that the PAP’s firm control of the state, it is not hard to understand why the ruling party has much autonomy in deciding Singapore’s foreign policy. I argue that this is but one aspect that explains why the state’s perspectives on the SCS goes unchallenged by Singaporean citizens. In the next section, I will examine how political apathy and conservatism resulting from micromanagement of the society has further enhanced the consistency of the Singapore state’s SCS policy.

37

Morgenbesser, L. (2016). The autocratic mandate: elections, legitimacy and regime stability in Singapore. The Pacific Review. 30(2), pp. 205–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.120 1134; Oliver, S. & Ostwald, K. (2018). Explaining elections in Singapore: dominant party resilience and valence politics. Journal of East Asian Studies. 18(2), pp. 129–156. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea. 2018.15. 38 Yeo, L. H. (2002). Electoral politics in Singapore. In A. Croissant (ed). Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia (Berlin&Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Siftung), pp. 203–232. http://library.fes. de/fulltext/iez/01361inf.htm. 39 Chan, I. (2021). Singapore’s forward engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative: coping with asymmetry, consolidating authority. Asian Perspective. 45(4), pp. 709–733. https://doi.org/10. 1353/apr.2021.0039. 40 Barr, M. D. (2014). The ruling elite of Singapore: networks of power and influence. (London: I. B. Tauris).

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4 Political Apathy, Singapore’s Foreign Policy and the South China Sea The Singapore government also has the reputation as a nanny state due to the strong government hand in almost all aspects of social life including even the citizens’ retirement savings.41 In his speech for the 1986 National Day Rally, the late Lee Kuan Yew frankly admitted to the state’s micromanagement of citizens: And I say without the slightest remorse, that we wouldn’t be here, we would not have made economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters-who your neighbor is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what is right.42

As the narrative goes, the ruling party knows what is best for the country. Singaporeans are often urged to subordinate personal and sectional interests to the common good. This micromanagement of the local population created widespread political apathy and over-reliance on the government and MPs to solve major and minor socioeconomic issues.43 Weiss notes that as the PAP brought about a subtle and systemic depoliticization in Singapore as it consolidated its rule and created a technocratic administrative state.44 This is supported by evidence from a survey on Singaporean values involving some 2000 Singaporean residents in 2020, which revealed that politics is not popular conversation topic among Singaporeans. 37.9% of the respondents indicated that they do not talk about politics at all.45 However, this is not a new phenomenon in Singapore. In fact, the political apathy that is reflected in the recent surveys of the local population has been discussed since the early 1980s.46 41

Kurlantzick, J. (2000). Love my nanny: Singapore’s tongue-tied populace. World Policy Journal. 17(4), pp. 69–74. https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-2001-1011; Mauzy, D. K. & Milne, R. S. (2002). Singapore politics under the People’s Action Party (UK: Routledge), p. 35; Grant, J. (2015, March 22). Lee Kuan Yew: Patriarch’s paternalism symbolised by gum ban. Financial Times. https:// www.ft.com/content/e42ff1f6-ce03-11e4-9712-00144feab7de. 42 Mediacorp Pte Ltd. (1986, August 17). 1986 National Day Rally (2) [Video]. National Archives of Singapore. https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/audiovisual_records/record-details/ 48aabfb1-1164-11e3-83d5-0050568939ad. 43 Chong, T. (2009). Singapore in 2008: negotiating domestic issues, confrontations and global challenges. Southeast Asian Affairs.(1), pp. 289–304. https://doi.org/10.1355/seaa09o; Mathew, M., Teo, K. K., Tay, M. & Wang, A. (2021, February). Our Singaporean values: key findings from the world values survey (16). Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https:// lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-16.pdf. 44 Meredith L. Weiss. (2020). The roots of resilience: party machines and grassroots politics in Singapore and Malaysia. (New York: Cornell University Press), p. 162. 45 Mathew, M., Teo, K. K., Tay, M. & Wang, A. (2021, March). Attitudes towards institutions, politics, and policies: key findings from the world values survey (17). Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchangeseries-17.pdf. 46 Teo, K. K. (2021, April 8). Are Singaporeans really politically apathetic?. Institute of Policy Studies. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/publications/details/are-singaporeans-really-politi cally-apathetic.

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Another interesting point is that although Singaporeans are politically apathetic, they tend to be highly protective over their hard-earned material gains. In turn, this protectiveness produced a sense of political conservatism that dovetails with the government’s emphasis on the need to maintain social and political stability. This conservatism is underscored by findings from the 2020 Singapore instalment of World Values Survey on Singaporeans’ attitudes towards institutions, politics, and policies, which revealed relatively high levels of trust for state institutions, such as the government, parliament, courts, the law enforcement, the military, and the civil service as the vanguards of Singapore’s socio-economic transformation after independence.47 Singaporeans’ political conservatism also explains why they are remain reluctant to rock the boat by putting a new ruling party in government, even though they took to the ballot boxes to show their dissatisfaction of the incumbent’s policies and management of the country in the general elections between 1984– 1997, 2011 and 2020.48 Even though the WP managed to capture its first GRC in 2011 and its second in 2020, the ruling party continues to maintain a parliamentary supermajority. Teo observes that although Singaporeans profess a marked disinterest in politics, they are very aware of government policies and local current affairs.49 Singaporeans have and do express detailed opinions of unpopular policies (which they have accepted grudgingly) such as the immigration policy, high ministerial salaries, GST hikes, and the reduction of certificates for car ownership (better known as the Certificate of Entitlement, COE). However, Singaporeans tend to define politics narrowly in terms of elections and political ideology.50 They display higher levels of political interest during the general elections every four or five years but lose interest quickly after the results are announced. In my interviews of fellow Singaporeans on the topic of politics, I found many instances demonstrating narrow and naive notions that people study political science to become politicians and that people study international relations either to become diplomats or to do business overseas. Former Singapore foreign minister, S. Jayakumar, lamented Singaporeans’ lack of interest in foreign policy, saying: All Singaporeans should be interested in Singapore’s foreign policy interests and concerns. It should be in the consciousness of all Singaporeans. However, like most countries, this is not in the natural order of things. Our general public, young and old, have their day-to-day 47

Mathew, M., Teo, K. K., Tay, M. & Wang, A. (2021, February). Our Singaporean values: key findings from the world values survey (16). Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-16.pdf. 48 In the three general elections between 1972 and 1980, the PAP won an average of more than 70% of popular votes, with the highest being the 77.66% vote share in the 1980 general elections. But since the re-entry of opposition MPs beginning in 1984, PAP’s vote share fell to an average of 63.5% between 1984 and 1997. It rose to a high of 75.3% in the 2001 general elections before dipping back into the 60th percentile in the years afterwards. 49 Teo, K. K. (2021, April 8). Are Singaporeans really politically apathetic? Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/publications/details/aresingaporeans-really-politically-apathetic. 50 Ibid.

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lives occupied with many other demands. Hence those having knowledge of Singapore’s foreign affairs have been, traditionally, the professionals and academics who have to deal with it.51

Another sign of Singaporeans’ lack of interest in foreign affairs is in their attitudes towards ASEAN. As mentioned earlier, the state views ASEAN is the cornerstone of its foreign policy and sees the region as important for its future development. Having developed rapidly over the past two decades, the region now presents more economic opportunities than ever for Singapore. However, a study conducted on Singaporean college students in 2006 showed that most young Singaporeans identified with either the West or Northeast Asian countries rather than with their immediate neighbours in the region.52 The respondents were unsure of Singapore’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries which they often deem as being backward. This sentiment was again reflected in a 2018 report on young Singaporean’s attitudes towards Southeast Asian countries. A majority did not know much about countries in the region and often looked down on them for being backward and for having poor infrastructure. Over time, some Southeast Asian countries have come to see Singapore as an arrogant country.53 During a Foreign Ministry budget debate in 2019, opposition MP Low Thia Khiang urged the government to step up efforts to correct misperceptions between Singaporeans and ASEAN neighbours by deepening Singapore’s regional engagement. He also urged the government to ensure ASEAN stays united.54 His speech on Singapore’s soft power diplomacy drew praises from Foreign Minister Balakrishnan and reaffirms the bipartisanship on the state’s long-standing foreign policy. One possible reason for the lack of knowledge on the SCS is that reports of the SCS dispute in Singapore’s mainstream media is generally scant. The count of SCS-related reports is far lesser than reports on domestic issues of lesser concern such as education and transportation. For instance, the city-state’s top mainstream English newspaper—The Straits Times—published some 5,800 news articles on the SCS dispute, while the Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore’s top mainstream Chinese paper,

51

Remarks by professor S. Jayakumar, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, at the RSIS distinguished book launch of “Singapore is not an island: views on Singapore foreign policy”. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. (2017, June 21). https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-speeches-article/rsis/remarks-by-professor-s-jayakumar-fac ulty-of-law-national-university-of-singapore-at-the-rsis-distinguished-book-launch-of-singaporeis-not-an-island-views-on-singapore-foreign-policy/#.XNKu944zY2w. 52 Thompson, E. C. (2006). Singaporean exceptionalism and its implications for ASEAN regionalism. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 28(2), pp. 183–206. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs28-2a. 53 Chong, T. (2014). Johor survey: attitudes towards governance and economy, Iskandar Malaysia, and Singapore. Trends in Southeast Asia (8); ASEAN is divided because of Cambodia? Says who?. Khmer Times. (2022, February 11). https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501004557/asean-is-dividedbecause-of-cambodia-says-who/. 54 Lai, L. (2019, March 4). Parliament: Singapore should step up its engagement with Asean neighbours, says Low Thia Khiang. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/spore-sho uld-step-up-its-engagement-with-asean-neighbours-low.

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published merely 67 articles between 1989 and 2020.55 On the other hand, both news outlets published more than 10,000 articles for each topic on Singapore’s education and transport systems, during the same period.56 Based on this evidence, we can surmise that Singaporeans are not getting sufficient information on the SCS from the local mainstream media. There is also little evidence of public debates on Singapore’s perspectives on the SCS dispute among Singaporeans on normal days or during the general election period over the past three decades. Hence, it is unsurprising that Singaporeans are neither bothered by the disputes nor have strong opinions on the state’s existing policies on the SCS. In 2017, former Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani wrote an ST op-ed on the lessons that Singapore could take from the Qatar diplomatic crisis and the subsequent blockade by neighbouring Middle Eastern countries. He inadvertently questioned the current PAP leadership’s capabilities with his comment that Singapore should change its behaviour significantly and stop voicing its opinion on sensitive geopolitical issues in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era as it “will probably never again have another globally respected statesman like Mr Lee”. Mahbubani’s ST op-ed was published during the unprecedentedly long period of tensions between Singapore and China in 2016–2017, and therefore, it ignited a rare public debate on Singapore’s foreign policy in July 2017, a year after the PCA results were announced.57 Although the article was not directly related to the SCS dispute, Singapore’s existing perspectives on the issue and its China policy were raised during the debate. The debate on pacification of major powers and Singapore’s independent foreign policy was particularly heated among Mahbubani’s retired diplomatic peers and the local academics. Balakrishnan addressed the issue during a 2017 Foreign Ministry Townhall, saying that: Our diplomacy is only credible, if we are able to maintain a domestic consensus on Singapore’s core interests and our foreign policy priorities. And if our politics does not become fractious, or our society divided. We have safeguarded our international position by building a successful economy and a cohesive society; making clear that we always act in Singapore’s interests, and not at the behest or the bidding of other states.58 55

Based on the author’s search using the Nexis Uni database-a web-based research service. See https://advance.lexis.com.remotexs.ntu.edu.sg/api/permalink/760c0b22-5938-46839d5e-cf92a66e9ab5/?context=1516831; https://advance.lexis.com.remotexs.ntu.edu.sg/api/permal ink/22f0f29a-0186-448f-a5e0-25f403fcdf67/?context=1516831. 56 Ibid. 57 Loh, M. (2017, July 4). In defence of Singapore’s chief naysayer Kishore Mahbubani. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/in-defence-of-singapores-chief-naysayer-kis hore-mahbubani; Mohamad Salleh, N. A. & Chew, H. M. (2017, July 3). Minister Shanmugam, diplomats Bilahari and Ong Keng Yong say Prof Mahbubani’s view on Singapore’s foreign policy ‘flawed’. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/prof-kishore-mahbub anis-view-on-singapores-foreign-policy-deeply-flawed-ambassador-at; Teo, J. J. (2017, July 3). S’pore can’t waver on need for rules-based order. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/ forum/letters-in-print/spore-cant-waver-on-need-for-rules-based-order. 58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore. (2017, July 17). Transcript of remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan at the MFA Townhall on [Press release]. https://www.mfa. gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2017/07/Transcript-of-Remarks-byMinister-for-Foreign-Affairs-Dr-Vivian-Balakrishnan-at-the-MFA-Townhall-on.

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The second possible explanation for this lack of knowledge and public discussion on the SCS is the infrequency and top-down nature of foreign policy communication by the PAP state to the public in general. Apart from brief reports and press releases in the mainstream media, concerned citizens would have to refer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website or the Hansard for details on the political elites’ debates and perspectives on foreign policy and the SCS. The other opportunity for the top-down communication of state policies is the annual National Day Rally (NDR), which has been held since 1966. The prime minister uses the NDR to highlight socioeconomic achievements of the past year; to address the nation on its key challenges; and announce major policy changes and plans for the coming year. Key NDR topics are mostly related to domestic socio-economic issues such as welfare, GDP, education, and employment. Foreign policy issues such as relations with neighbouring countries and regional economic development and security trends, are generally secondary topics. A quick review of archived NDR recordings and speeches between 1966 and 2019 shows that there have been several instances when foreign policy (or foreign economic policy) becomes the limelight of the NDR, with the most notable one concerning the South China Sea being the 2016 NDR.59 In his speech, Lee Hsien Loong gave Singaporeans a succinct explanation on the complexity of the SCS dispute, the Philippines v. China arbitration case, and Singapore’s foreign policy tenets. He also provided his rationale for broaching on the topic during the NDR: I tell you this so that you will understand why we do what we do and why we have to stand up for Singapore’s position. Sometimes, if you read the foreign media, including the PRC media, you will find articles criticizing Singapore for not siding more with them and I know some Singaporeans are concerned about these criticisms because they have foreign friends.60

Lee’s 2016 NDR speech underscored the ruling party’s awareness of the potential issues that can arise from the average Singaporean’s lack of knowledge in foreign affairs and geopolitical realities. The issue of an uncertain external environment and the need for a strong government to guide the country through the geopolitics was raised during the PAP’s biannual party conventions in 2017 and 2019, with Lee stressing that the state must have strong support from Singaporeans, particularly when dealing with foreign policy. The PAP state is also highly concerned that the above mentioned weak links may be exploited by malign actors to destabilize Singapore. A 2019 study on Singaporean’s susceptibility to false information found that 51.2% of more than 2,000 respondents said that “they had sometimes, often, or very often believed false information relating to international or foreign issues”.61 The 59

National Archives of Singapore. (2018, August 7). National day rally speeches. archives online. https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/NationalDayRally/. 60 Lee, H. L. (2016, August 21). National day rally 2016 [Press release]. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/ Newsroom/national-day-rally-2016. 61 Soon, C. & Sim, J. L. (2021, May). Citizen engagement in Singapore: applications of the citizens’ panel. Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-report-on-citizen-engagement-insingapore-applications-of-the-citizens-panel.pdf.

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PAP state has passed two laws to safeguard the country against disinformation and foreign interference-a fake news law known as Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), and the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act (FICA)-in 2019 and 2021, respectively.

5 Populism, Singaporean Identity, and Singapore’s South China Sea Perspectives In this section, I will examine why the global rise of populism has not affected Singapore and its foreign policy. I will also examine why despite having a large population of ethnic Chinese, Singapore does not align itself with China’s perspectives on the SCS and other geopolitical issues. Firstly, I argue that the PAP government has been effective in managing the threat of populism in Singapore since the 2011 general elections (GE2011). It has also been effective in assuaging the local population’s concerns of Singapore’s relations with China after bilateral tensions in 2016–2017. Therefore, there is little reason and pressure for the ruling party to shift its perspectives on the SCS. Secondly, I argue that while the country has a predominantly ethnic Chinese population, Singaporeans generally do not identify with the Chinese national identity and thus may not be able to completely support Chinese foreign policy perspectives as they have a supra-ethnic sense of Singaporean national identity that is expressed linguistically through the Singapore English (or Singlish) medium. GE2011 was a watershed in PAP’s electoral history. It was the ruling party’s worst performing election since the country’s independence in 1965. GE2011 was a drastic blow to the PAP and particularly to Lee, whose leadership had declining support in two successive elections (GE2006 and GE2011) since he took power in August 2004. During GE2011, there was widespread dissatisfaction towards the PAP among voters who saw its policies as inadequate in addressing Singaporeans’ everyday needs and concerns.62 The major issues that the ruling party faced were rising prices and shortage of public housing; frequent breakdowns in the public transport system; and the influx of foreigners from the government’s liberal immigration and foreign worker policy.63 There were also several high-profile lapses by the government such as the escape of a local terrorist, Mas Selamat, from a high-security detention facility in 2008 and the flooding of Orchard Road, Singapore’s renowned shopping street, in 2010. The pressure prompted Lee to issue a public apology for his government’s policy missteps during a campaign rally in 2011.64 62

Tan, E. K. B. (2012). Transitioning to a “new normal” in a post-Lee Kuan Yew era. Southeast Asian Affairs (12), pp. 265–282. https://doi.org/10.1355/aa12-1q. 63 Tay, K. (2015, August 3). Whither the hot-button issues of the previous general election? The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-general-election/ whither-the-hot-button-issues-of-the-previous-general. 64 Gopalakrishnan, R. & Lim, K. (2011, May 4). Singapore PM makes rare apology as election campaign heats up. U.S. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-56766220110504.

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In response to the humbling experience in GE2011, the PAP government adopted a conciliatory approach to the electorate’s concerns. It swiftly moderated and corrected unpopular policies. Apart from tightening its liberal immigration policy and placing stricter requirements for foreign labour, it also implemented a series of inclusive policies between 2012 and 2015, which included an increased supply of public housing apartments; more affordable housing prices with property market cooling measures; and the increased spending on welfare initiatives for ageing citizens.65 The PAP candidates also set out to fight criticisms of elitism and arrogance by walking the ground and being seen as caring representatives who listen to the people. Ultimately, the ruling party was rewarded by a strong mandate of 69.9% in the 2015 general elections (GE2015), well above the 60.1% in GE2011.66 Such measures were also relatively effective in stemming the threat of populism to the Singapore political system. Why has Singapore’s existing system remained resilient in face of the wave of populist movements around the world between 2015 and 2020? As mentioned earlier, a key reason is the voters’ political conservatism. Singaporeans keep re-electing the PAP based on its strong performance legitimacy. The PAP state has a proven track record in guiding the country out of multiple major economic recessions since the country’s independence. The series of surveys conducted in 2020 by the Institute of Policy Studies show that Singaporeans are still confident of the PAP state and its institutions, with 52.5 per cent being proud or very proud of Singapore’s style of democracy, 46.8 per cent being proud or very proud about having the same ruling party for a long time, and 44.2 per cent being proud or very proud about the government’s level of autonomy.67 The surveys also found that, despite the worldwide backlash against the openness of economies and the mass movement of people around the globe, Singaporeans still have a positive view of globalization, with 83 per cent of the people polled recognizing its benefits.68 Driven by its quest for performance legitimation, the PAP state has also delivered positive outcomes in foreign policy after the tense period in 2016–2017. Despite the heated debates on Singapore’s foreign policy in 2017, the PAP leadership’s highprofile meetings with their Chinese counterparts in both China and Singapore in 2018–2019 have largely reassured electorate of the state’s ability to manage relations 65

Tay, K. (2015, August 3). Whither the hot-button issues of the previous general election?. The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-generalelection/whither-the-hot-button-issues-of-the-previous-general. 66 Other reasons for PAP’s strong performance in the 2015 general elections include the jubilee celebration of Singapore’s fiftieth year of independence, and Lee Kuan Yew’s passing in March 2015. 67 Mathew, M., Teo, K. K., Tay, M. & Wang, A. (2021, March). Attitudes towards institutions, politics, and policies: key findings from the world values survey (17). Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchangeseries-17.pdf. 68 Mathew, M., Teo, K. K., Tay, M., & Wang, A. (2021, February). Our Singaporean values: key findings from the world values survey (16). Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-16.pdf.

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with China despite disagreements over sensitive issues such as the SCS dispute. Singapore took steps to mend fences with China by showing greater enthusiasm participating in Beijing’s BRI. Apart from signing 16 memoranda of agreement with China on a wide range of BRI projects, the PAP elites also went on an international public relations campaign to rally support for the BRI between 2018 and 2019.69 On the other hand, China showed that it still values relations with Singapore and tampered bilateral tensions in time for Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship year in 2018. It was observed that apart from Lee’s high-profile state visit and meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2017, the number of ministerial meetings also increased.70 Although Singapore made the international headlines for Lee’s noshow at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRFIC) in May 2017, Beijing made up for its snub by inviting Lee as a keynote speaker at the opening plenary of the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2018 and to the second BRFIC in April the following year. Another key reason that Oliver and Ostwald, as well as Chua posit is that the productivity of the PAP’s socio-economic policies and the ruling party’s ability to use state resources to continuously reshape voter preferences in its favour.71 Key policies that have the greatest impact on Singaporeans such as housing, education, and economic development, are continuously tweaked and adjusted to maintain a high level of productivity. As a result, even the WP and other smaller opposition parties, let alone a populist challenger, cannot provide sound alternative policies to convince the conservative middle-ground voters that a new non-PAP government can do better. For instance, housing was a major bone of contention for Singaporeans in GE2011. The ruling party was able to satisfy Singaporeans’ housing demand by allocating resources to build 100,000 public housing apartments between 2012 and 2015. Therefore, opposition parties were unsuccessful in challenging PAP’s ironclad housing policy in that election as well as later elections in 2015 and 2020. The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) has attempted to challenge the PAP’s housing policy during the 2020 general elections by publishing a 38-page housing policy proposal with detailed plans on slashing and controlling housing prices, but it was still unable to convince the voters into giving SDP candidates a seat in parliament. Another set of productive national policies which the PAP state has instituted is meritocracy and multiculturalism. This section will not dwell on whether these critical national policies are effective in eliminating systemic racism and inequality, but 69

Chan, I. (2021). Singapore’s forward engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative: coping with asymmetry, consolidating authority. Asian Perspective. 45(4), pp. 709–733. https://doi.org/10. 1353/apr.2021.0039. 70 Li, X. R. (2017, December 15). China-Singapore relations in 2017: better than ‘normal.’. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-singapore-relations-in-2017-better-than-nor mal/. 71 Oliver, S. & Ostwald, K. (2018). Explaining elections in Singapore: dominant party resilience and valence politics. Journal of East Asian Studies. 18(2), pp. 129–156. https://doi.org/10.1017/ jea.2018.15; Koay, A. [MothershipSG]. (2020, January 19). Singaporean sociologist Chua Beng Huat explains why 70% voted for this [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jD X3Zbc6cs&feature=youtu.be.

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it will briefly examine their effectiveness on merit or talent-based resource allocation and the creation of a Singaporean identity. As mentioned in the second section, the ruling party runs a capitalist state that acts as an employer, social engineer, and entrepreneur supported by an army of highly educated technocrats. Meritocracy, as the backbone of the ruling party’s co-optation strategy, which is highly efficient in shaping voter preferences. One of the main ways which the Singapore government recognizes and rewards talented individuals of diverse background is to place the “best and brightest” in the civil service. The Singapore Public Service employs about 154,000 public servants in total, of which 86,000 are civil servants who are deployed across 16 government ministries and organs of the state.72 The PAP state’s policy of meritocracy has defined Singaporean society without much challenge in the past five decades. The meritocratic Singapore system has allowed enabled older generations of Singaporeans to significantly improve their lives and give their children a better life. However, it came under fierce criticism for being inadequate in combating the rising inequality and elitism in the country in 2018 and 2019. The big debate on poverty and inequality in Singapore during 2018–2019 was played out in letters to news editors, social media, and the Parliament. It was sparked partly by a book entitled “This Is What Inequality Looks Like”, written by Teo You Yenn, a sociologist from the Singapore Nanyang Technological University. Meritocracy is one of the structural aspects of the Singapore system that the book examines as a contributing factor for entrenching inequality and poverty in the country.73 The PAP state has been actively defending this policy and taking steps to address the inequality issue starting with reforms in the education system and increasing support underperforming students from disadvantaged families.74 Moving onto Singapore’s policy of multiculturalism, I argue that the policy has had a significant impact on Singapore’s national identity. Owing to its colonial origins, a multicultural society existed on the island long before it became a modern nation-state. However, fears of being seen as the fifth column for China by its immediate Malay neighbours drove the PAP state to enshrine multiculturalism into Singapore’s constitution upon its independence in 1965. The ruling party sought create a national identity distinct from China and inculcated patriotism to the country by entrenching multiculturalism in the society through multiple sources-the education system, government-influenced mass media and national day parades. Although Malay is Singapore’s national language, the PAP state made English the lingua franca for Singaporeans and kept Chinese and Tamil as official languages. The bilingual 72

Careers@Gov. (2021). The public service. https://www.careers.gov.sg/who-we-are/the-public-. Teo, Y. Y. (2018). This is what inequality looks like: essays by Teo You Yenn. (Singapore; Ethos Books), pp. 26–33. 74 Baker, J. A. (2019, July 18). Meritocracy not to blame; Indranee spells out 4G team’s approach to tackle inequality. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/singapore-soc ial-service-inequality-indranee-rajah-nus-872566; Heng, M. (2019, October 22). Meritocracy still key principle for recognising individuals in Singapore, says Ong Ye Kung. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/meritocracy-still-key-principle-for-recognising-ind ividuals-in-singapore-says-ong-ye-kung. 73

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policy in Singapore, which requires students in public schools to learn English as the first language and a “Mother Tongue Language” (or ethnic language) as the second language, had a significant impact on Singapore’s national identity. It also severed the cultural and linguistic identity that would tie Singaporeans emotionally to China. As mentioned earlier in the introduction, China has some expectations of Singapore to be more understanding and willing to align itself to Chinese perspectives and positions on regional geopolitics and the SCS because of its predominantly Chinese demography. However, Beijing has been frustrated many times by Singapore’s refusal to take its side on certain issues over the course of their 32-year bilateral relations. For instance, although Singapore has close economic ties with China, it still looks to the USA as the regional security provider. The country continues to provide logistical support for the rotational deployment of US navy vessels in the Southeast Asia. Even though Singapore adheres to the “One China” policy, it still sends its troops for military training in Taiwan under Project Starlight, a military cooperation plan that was set up in 1975. Prior to Lee assuming office as prime minister in August 2004, he made a personal visit to Taiwan, much to Beijing’s chagrin. Thus, the country’s insistence on its own foreign policy principles and its disagreement with China over the SCS should hardly be surprising.

6 Conclusion This chapter has endeavoured to explain why the Singapore state has been able to maintain its unchanging perspectives on the SCS for the past three decades. In the first two sections, I examined Singapore’s non-claimant position and perspectives, as well as the impacts that the ruling party’s control over the state and the resultant political apathy have on Singapore’s foreign policy and its perspectives on the SCS. I also showed that the parliamentarians from both the PAP and opposition parties share bipartisan views towards the SCS. In sum, Singapore’s system remains resilient as the PAP state is alert to the threat posed by the rise of populism. It has been able to respond nimbly by changing unpopular policies and adjusting existing policies to better meet the basic needs of the people. Having shown that there is currently no urgent push from the electorate for the ruling party to shift or significantly reconsider its foreign policy tenets, I conclude that Singapore’s perspectives on the SCS will remain consistent for the foreseeable future.

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Ministry of Defence Singapore. (2018, April 19). Fact sheet: Safeguarding Singapore’s maritime trade and industry. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/lat est-releases/article-detail/2018/april/19apr18_fs/. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore. (2018, December 13). MFA spokesperson’s comments in response to media queries on Singapore’s declaration of 12 December 2018 under Article 298 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [press release]. https://www.mfa.gov. sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2018/12/Spokespersons-UNCLOS. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore. (2021, August 23). Official visit of Vice President of the United States of America Kamala D. Harris, 22 to 24 August 2021 [Press release]. https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/08/ 20210823-US-VP-Visit-Post-JPC. Ministry of Law Singapore. (2018, February 8). Speech by Ms Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Law and Finance, at the ‘International Law Year in Review’ Conference [press release]. https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/speeches/speech-by-sms-indranee-rajah-atinternational-law-year-in-review. Morgenbesser, L. (2016). The autocratic mandate: Elections, legitimacy and regime stability in Singapore. The Pacific Review, 30(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1201134. National Archives of Singapore. (2018, August 7). National day rally speeches. Archives Online. https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/NationalDayRally/. Ng, E. (2016, April 28). China’s actions lent themselves to misunderstanding: Bilahari. TODAY. https://www.todayonline.com/world/chinas-actions-lent-themselves-misunderstanding-bilahari. Oliver, S., & Ostwald, K. (2018). Explaining elections in Singapore: Dominant party resilience and valence politics. Journal of East Asian Studies, 18(2). https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.15. Parliament of Singapore. (2017). List of MPs by Parliament. https://www.parliament.gov.sg/his tory/list-of-mps-by-parliament. Rodan, G. (2009). New modes of political participation and Singapore’s nominated members of parliament. Government and Opposition, 44(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.012 97.x. Schrag, J. (2017, August 2). How much trade transits the South China Sea? China Power Project, CSIS. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. Sim, F. (2019, May 8). Workers’ Party opposes online falsehoods bill, says Pritam Singh. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/online-falsehoods-workers-party-opp oses-bill-pritam-singh-876811. Sim, D. (2020, August 5). Indonesia, Singapore steer clear of US-China dispute in Pompeo’s South China Sea outreach. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/art icle/3096033/indonesia-singapore-stay-neutral-us-china-dispute-despite. Slater, D. (2015, September 14). Singapore’s final authoritarian election. East Asia Forum. https:// www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/14/singapores-final-authoritarian-election/. Soon, C., & Sim, J. L. (2021, May). Citizen engagement in Singapore: Applications of the citizens’ panel. Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-report-on-citizen-engagement-in-sin gapore-applications-of-the-citizens-panel.pdf. Tai, M. (2016, December 15). Singapore’s China conundrum. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat. com/2016/12/singapores-china-conundrum/. Tan, N. & Grofman, B. (2018). Electoral rules and manufacturing legislative supermajority: Evidence from Singapore. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 56(3). https://doi.org/10. 1080/14662043.2018.1468238. Tan, K. P. & Wong, B. (2016). East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy. In J. Chan, D. C. Shin, M. S. Williams, & T. Sin. (Eds.), East Asian perspectives on political legitimacy: Bridging the empirical-normative divide. Cambridge University Press. Tan, K. P. (2011). The People’s Action Party and political liberalization in Singapore. In L. F. Lye & W. Hofmeister (Eds.), Political parties, party systems and democratization in East Asia. World Scientific.

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Tan, E. K. B. (2012). Transitioning to a “new normal” in a post-Lee Kuan Yew era. Southeast Asian Affairs, (12). https://doi.org/10.1355/aa12-1q. Tan, W. Z. (2016, October 10). S’pore businesses quizzed by Chinese counterparts over stand on South China Sea. Today. https://www.todayonline.com/business/spore-businesses-quizzedchinese-counterparts-over-their-stand-south-china-sea-issue. Tan, S. (2020, November 2). Lunch With Sumiko: What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger, says MP Tin Pei Ling. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/lunchwithsum iko-what-doesnt-kill-you-makes-you-stronger. Tay, K. (2015, August 3). Whither the hot-button issues of the previous general election? The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-general-ele ction/whither-the-hot-button-issues-of-the-previous-general. Teo, J. J. (2017, July 3). S’pore can’t waver on need for rules-based order. The Straits Times. https:// www.straitstimes.com/forum/letters-in-print/spore-cant-waver-on-need-for-rules-based-order. Teo, Y. Y. (2018). This is what inequality looks like: Essays by Teo You Yenn. (Singapore; Ethos Books). Teo, K. K. (2021, April 8). Are Singaporeans really politically apathetic? Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/publications/details/are-singap oreans-really-politically-apathetic. Tey, T. H. (2008). Singapore’s electoral system: Government by the people? Legal Studies. 28(4). The White House. (2016, August 2). Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee of Singapore in Joint Press Conference [press release]. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/08/02/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-lee-singapore-joint-press. The Workers’ Party of Singapore. (2019, May 8). Protection from online falsehoods and manipulation bill- speech by Sylvia Lim [press release]. https://www2.wp.sg/protection-from-online-fal sehoods-and-manipulation-bill-speech-by-sylvia-lim/. The Workers’ Party of Singapore. (2020, January 28). POFMA: A shield, not a sword-speech by Pritam Singh [press release]. https://www2.wp.sg/pofma-a-shield-not-a-sword-speech-by-pri tam-singh/. The Workers’ Party of Singapore. (2021a, October 6). Foreign interference countermeasures act (FICA)-speech by Gerald Giam [press release]. https://www.wp.sg/foreign-interference-counte rmeasures-act-fica-speech-by-gerald-giam/. The Workers’ Party of Singapore. (2021b, October 6). Foreign interference countermeasures act (FICA)-speech by Leon Perera [press release]. https://www.wp.sg/foreign-interference-counte rmeasures-act-fica-speech-by-leon-perera/. The Workers’ Party of Singapore. (2021c, October 6). Foreign interference countermeasures act (FICA)-speech by LO Pritam Singh [press release]. https://www.wp.sg/foreign-interference-cou ntermeasures-act-fica-speech-by-lo-pritam-singh/. Thompson, E. C. (2006). Singaporean exceptionalism and its implications for ASEAN regionalism. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28(2). https://doi.org/10.1355/cs28-2a. Torode, G. (2017, August 9). China leaning on Singapore to keep ASEAN calm over South China Sea: Sources. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-china-singapore-analysis-idU SKBN1AO17D. US P-8 spy plane deployed to Singapore. BBC News. (2015, December 8). https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-35036220. Wong, B., & Huang, X. (2010). Political legitimacy in Singapore. Politics & Policy, 38(3). https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00248.x. World Integrated Trade Solutions. (n.d.). Singapore trade indicators 2019. World Bank. https:// wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SGP/Year/LTST/. Yang, K., & Ortmann, S. (2020). The origins of the “Singapore fever” in China: 1978–92. In S. Ortmann & M. R. Thompson (Eds.), China’s ‘Singapore model’ and authoritarian learning. London. Yap, K. W. (2017, July 3). Nothing “flawed” or “dangerous” in Kishore’s article. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/nothing-flawed-or-dangerous-in-kishores-article.

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Yeo, L. H. (2002). Electoral politics in Singapore. In A. Croissant (Ed.), Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia. Friedrich Ebert Siftung. http://library.fes.de/fulltext/iez/01361inf.htm.

Irene Chan is Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She researches on regional security, Chinese foreign policy, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s relations with Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore-–China relations. She has published in peer reviewed journals and edited volumes. She has also written commentaries and given interviews for international media outlets. Her work on China’s legal reform and counter-terrorism was published in Boyle, M.J.(ed.), Non-Western Responses to Terrorism (Manchester University Press, 2019)

Cambodia and the Politics of Populism and Nationalism in the South China Sea Neak Chandarith and Sam Ath Sambath Sreysour

Abstract Recurrently as a by-product of combined domestic politics, nationalism, and populism, the increasingly politicized and securitized South China Sea disputes have with themselves political and strategic utilities that are, at times, desirable to various main and off-stage actors of the South China Sea but, however, are, at all time, invaluable to positive peace and states vulnerable to external and internal shocks. This chapter, thus, seeks to situate Cambodia in the South China Sea and in these waves of populism and nationalism, further explore its domestic populist and nationalist sentiments, examine implications and scenarios of this securitization of the South China Sea disputes, and suggest ways to reduce the negative effects of these politically constructed senses of “people” and “nation.” As agents of populism and nationalism vary and could be leaders, parties, or movements, this chapter will begin with putting Cambodia outside a black box and giving an anatomy of this non-claimant state in order to pave way for a more robust discussion on the politics of populism and nationalism in subsequent sections. Keywords South China Sea · Cambodia · Nationalism · Populism

1 Anatomy and Contextualization of Cambodia in the South China Sea Abundant in natural resources and sitting at a significant geostrategic location, the South China Sea (SCS) is the home to complex unresolved territorial contestation and disputes especially over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. The disputes involve not only overlapping maritime, territorial, and fishing rights but

N. Chandarith (B) Royal University of Phnom Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia e-mail: [email protected] S. A. S. Sreysour Department of Politics and International Relations, University Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 N. Peng and C.-B. Ngeow (eds.), Populism, Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1453-9_8

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also an asymmetric power relation between China (along with Taiwan) and Southeast Asian disputants: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia. For decades, these disputes have flared; however, different from traditional understandings, this chapter asserts that tension in the SCS dispute is cyclical and should not be viewed as linear and static. While there should not be mono-casual explanations, the rise of tension in the SCS is often seen as an expansion of controversial domestic politics and of political construction of populism and nationalism. When traditional identities and historical memories of claimant states are hijacked by populist and nationalist agendas, the SCS suddenly enters the political mainstream, emerges as an eminent threat, and becomes a center of clashes and militarization. In this context, while the disputes can affect both diplomatic relations of states and domestic situations within states, domestic situations can also affect intensity and scope of the disputes. Non-claimant, small states like Cambodia, which are already facing dual pressures from its post-conflict nation building and the predetermined international systemic stimuli, are, unfortunately, put into a position to cast voice over the disputes of much bigger and more powerful states. As a relatively small, lower-middle incomed country, Cambodia is a post-war, developing country with its national interests specific to peace, stability, growth, and prosperity. This sequencing and heavy emphasis on peace and stability mirrors the country’s bitter historical experiences of not only internal strife and unfavorable foreign policy choices but also foreign occupations and civil wars. A closer look at this country posit at least three facts about the country’s conditions. First, like its neighbors in the Southeast Asia, Cambodia shares a post-colonial identity and legacies of troubled border demarcation. The country has been experiencing land and/or maritime border demarcation issues with Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and unregistered immigrant issues, all of which could be easily used by domestic actors to provoke nationalist and populist sentiments. Additionally, the fact that its neighbors including the SCS claimant states similarly inherit unfavorable colonial legacies indicates that Cambodia is situated in an immediate neighborhood that is prone to nationalist and populist movements and in a predetermined structural setting that is generally more restrictive than permissive. Secondly, an effort to understand Cambodia needs to start with viewing this country as a post-war country. This postconflict Cambodia needs to be further understood within the state-building context amid inter-elite contestation.1 Notwithstanding the fact that the last thirty years have been transformative for the country, Cambodia has continued to face issues common to other developing countries in their state-building stage. These issues are ranged from development disparities to inequality to injustice. Statistically, around 80% of Cambodians live in rural areas, and 65% of them still depend their livelihood on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry.2 Even though this country has been known as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world with an average growth rate of 7.7% 1

Chheang, V. (2021). Cambodia’s embrace of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: managing asymmetries, maximizing authority. Asian Perspective 45(2), pp. 375–396. 2 Agriculture and food security. USAID. (2021, March 4). https://www.usaid.gov/cambodia/agricu lture-and-food-security.

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between 1998 and 2019,3 its economic vulnerability index at 34.8 signals that it is still highly vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, in its post-conflict reconstruction politics, Cambodia has been facing political dynamics with three contending political parties/groups which have their own distinctive imaginings of Cambodia as a nation and have competed to represent the country.4 The three groups are Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the Royalists, and the democrats symbolized by Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha. The “democrats” is commonly referred to as the opposition locally. A closer examination of this country outside a black box pitches varying degrees of factionalism within each party. According to Peou, Cambodian politics has featured both interparty and intraparty factionalism with the ruling party having the least factionalism.5 As this country has been under the same political leadership since 1998, if not 1985, modernizing the country while addressing all of these socio-economic and political issues has become increasingly crucial to winning domestic support and achieving performance-based legitimacy for the government. As such, unsurprisingly, these structural domestic conditions in the country also make Cambodia no less conductive to the breed of populist movements. Thirdly, due to its bitter historical experiences of civil wars and inspirations in peace and development, Cambodia has, in its constitution, set its foreign policy principle around the concept of neutrality even though, in reality and as in any other countries, neutrality often comes with flexibility. Over the past few decades, this country is seen to have pursued multilateralism and internationalism as its main guiding approaches and has sought to diversify its foreign relations with many countries while it tries to avoid great powers’ rivalries. To this once-war torn country with powerful neighboring disputants at its doorsteps, forging good bilateral and multilateral relations with external partners has been the key to the country’s trade, investment, tourism, development, and even security. As such, it is unsurprising that small states like Cambodia has attempted to pursue a hedging strategy as an insurance to give itself a freedom of maneuverability while, arguably, its hedging strategy comes with strong reservations. Nevertheless, the last thirteen years have been quite transformative for the country’s foreign policy. From peacekeepers receiving country to peacekeepers sending country and from an ASEAN observer to a rotated chair of ASEAN and related meetings, Cambodia is seen to gradually rebrand its international image as the country becomes gradually more mature in the international community engagement. However, the SCS dispute has become a test for Cambodia even though this country did not take any of their entrance exams in order to enroll in any of the dispute courses. Different from the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, Cambodia is not a disputant in the SCS dispute. Its approach to the SCS dispute 3

The World Bank in Cambodia: overview. World Bank. (2021, April 14). https://www.worldbank. org/en/country/cambodia/overview. 4 Norén-Nilsson, A. (2017). Cambodia’s second Kingdom: nation, imagination, and democracy. Cornell Southeast Asia Program/ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 5 Peou, S. (2020). Interparty and intraparty factionalism in Cambodian politics. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39(1), pp. 17–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420906023.

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centers on neutrality, non-interference in domestic affairs, dialogue and consultation among the claimant states, and peaceful settlements of the disputes in accordance with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the international law. Even though Cambodia is not a claimant state, this country has interests in peace and stability in the SCS. Evidently, it is Cambodia that was the chair of ASEAN in 2002 which adopted the DOC. To this small state, the underlying logic is that a fair stability in the SCS means continuous guarantee of the country’s partnership with external partners for its growth and development. Additionally, its choices in bilateral dialogue and consultation among only the claimant states or parties directly concerned reflects its desire to stay away from these disputes and not to involve in any politics of the bigger states. This, to the rationale of small states in the Third World like Cambodia, enables the country to focus on just dealing with the depressing domestic politics and issues at home. However, Cambodia’s geographical location, regional membership in ASEAN, and the needs for multilateralism means this non-claimant state is in a position to inevitably touch upon the issues of the SCS dispute. As a small state, Cambodia views international platforms such as ASEAN and the UN as a guarantee for its equal status to much bigger states, a safeguard for its sovereignty, and as a bridge to its international engagement. Being a member and a rotated chair of ASEAN and related ASEAN-led regional forums automatically necessitates Cambodia to mind more than just politics at its home. To underscore, from discussing to voting in a consensus-based platform, Cambodia is eventually walked to have a say in the dispute which have not only been securitized but also internationalized. As a matter of fact, populism and nationalism have been powerful in politicizing and securitizing the SCS. Countries have resorted to the promises of safeguarding sovereignty, protecting national dignity, and building prosperous economy in order to win domestic support, overshadow social instability and public discontent, unite the public, and divert their frustrations outward away from home. According to Kim, China’s muscle-flexing foreign policy approach including in the SCS is a “diversionary maneuver to preserve domestic cohesion and unity as well as regime legitimacy.”6 While assertiveness shows strength, any flexibility shows disgraceful appeasement and weakness at home. Likewise, from the Philippines to Vietnam to Malaysia to the least contending Indonesia, there have been growing populist and nationalist sentiments, feeding the growing tension at the sea. Due to the power asymmetry between China and these Southeast Asian claimant states, the small states have had no other option but to internationalize the disputes.7 Thus, while Southeast Asian claimant states want to international the disputes, China wishes to de-international the disputes. This internationalization has been coincided 6

Kim, J. (2015). Territorial disputes in the South China Sea: implications for security in Asia and beyond. Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 112. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/doc uments/Volume-09_Issue-2/kim.pdf. 7 Kraus, F. (2017). Border disputes in Southeast Asia and their impact on the regional integration process. In A. Gerstl & M. Strašáková (eds.), Unresolved border, land and maritime disputes in Southeast Asia: bi-and multilateral conflict resolution approaches and ASEAN’s centrality, Brill, pp. 46–82. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004312180_004.

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with US’s rebalancing strategy to Asia amid the growing power and influence of China in the region. The disputes have been further complicated since when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in 2010 that the USA has a national interest in the SCS. To quote, “The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea”.8 This increasingly high degree of intensity and complication of the SCS dispute as the results of populist and nationalist politics and of great powers’ politics and competition in the Asia Pacific makes the SCS dispute a major flashpoint and, potentially, a ground for a neo-Cold War. Cambodia has been, unfortunately, caught up in these politics regardless of how much it wishes to stay away from the disputes. On one hand, there are neighboring claimant states and the ASEAN which are important to the country’s international legitimacy and exposure, and on the other hand, there is China which provide the country a strong and alternative economic-social, and political shelter, if taken under the framework of Theory of Shelter. Its heavy emphasis on bilateral dialogue between and among only the parties concerned has made this post-war country a center of criticisms following the failure of ASEAN to issue a joint communiqué in ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012 and following another deadlock in the 2016 in Vientiane, Laos. How to not upset all of these key development partners and to sustain the relationship for the country’s development remain a major test for this non-claimant state. This examination of the country’s conditions and contexts in the SCS illustrates this small state’s external and internal challenges, which are a reflection of structural constraints, populist and nationalist politics of external actors, and competition between great powers. The proceeding section will, thus, turn to discuss populist and nationalist politics in Cambodia before exploring how it may generate implications back to the politics of these SCS dispute.

2 States like Cambodia-Deciphering Its Populism and Nationalism Following the above discussion on Cambodia’s contexts and conditions, this section will discuss populism and nationalism in Cambodia by, firstly, clarifying its conceptual approaches to populism and nationalism. Inspired by an analysis of a state as a non-black box, this chapter will examine the sentiments pursued by the government and the opposition. For decades, populism and nationalism have been making headlines. In many countries from Europe to America to Asia, populism and nationalism have been growing against the backdrop of growing discontent and frustration with the existing establishments, be it political establishment or globalization side effects. However, 8

Remarks by Secretary Clinton. U.S. Department of State. (2010, July 23). https://2009-2017.state. gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.

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there has been a high degree of contestability over what populism and nationalism mean or refer to. Populism is often viewed as an ideology, a political style, a strategy, a discourse, a political logic, a political instrument, or even a communication style. While scholars remain divided on how to define populism, a consensus is on the key reference of populism, which is the people. Remarkably, the fundamental dichotomy of this populism is between “us” the people and “them” the elite.9 Populists generally claim to speak in the name of the “people” often in direct confrontation with whatever “elite” they identify as the enemy.10 Thus, instead of choosing which form populism should take shape, this chapter would instead attach importance to this fundamental dichotomy and use populism to refer to all those organized efforts that reflect this fundamental dichotomy between “us” the people and “them” the elite. In this context, being populist, however, does not necessarily equal to being patriotic. Not different from populism, nationalism is also a highly contested concept and often closely related to populism. Nationalism is frequently described as a movement, an instrument of politics, a form of politics, a political process, a rhetoric, an ideology, a national identity, a political resource, or even an everyday practice.11 Similar to populism, nationalism stems from the binary categories of “us” and “them” and a manifestation of in-group and out-group thinking. What these nationalism and populism have in common are their focus on an in-group: the nation in case nationalism and the people in the case of populism. What differentiate them, however, are their main point of reference. While populism pits the people against the elites, nationalism pits the in-group against the out-group12 ; thus, for nationalism to work, it is important to construct a strong imagined “nation,” and in order to construct such a nation, a state would need to construct those outside of their own. This chapter, thus, bases its discussion on this fundamental dichotomy of nationalism and uses nationalism to refer to all those efforts that are used to promote or defend the in-group and to, directly or indirectly and implicitly or explicitly, work or compete against the out-group. While this nationalism is commonly categorized into elite nationalism that is made by elites and popular nationalism that is by ordinary people, this chapter would use nationalism to mainly refer to the top-down, elite nationalism. This nationalism, however, does not necessarily always carry negative connotation. While nationalism has often been a force for exclusion, discrimination, and confrontation, a proper handle of nationalism also helps produce a collective identity, solidarity, and commitment toward a shared common good. In this global resurgence of populism and nationalism, Cambodia has not been spared from this trend. The degree of nationalism and populism in the country are, 9

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39 (4), pp. 541–563. Bonikowski, B., Halikiopoulou, D., Kaufmann, E., and Rooduijn, M. (2018). Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange. Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 1–24. 11 Ngoun, K. (2017). The Politics of nationalism in Cambodia’s Preah Vihear conflict with Thailand. PhD Dissertation at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. 12 Bonikowski, B., Halikiopoulou, D., Kaufmann, E., and Rooduijn, M. (2018). Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange. Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 1–24. 10

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however, generally lower if compared to those direct sentiments of the claimant states of the SCS dispute and also if compared to sentiments found in previous Cambodia’s political eras including the anti-colonial nationalist sentiments during the late French colony. According to Ngoun, nation and nationalism are quite recent concepts in Cambodia.13 They emerged during the French colony, which ruled the country from 1863 to 1953.14 As the past was unfolded, a large nationalist movement took place under the leadership Cambodia’s late King Norodom Sihanouk in order to demand independence from France. In this context, nationalist sentiment was constructed along the concepts of “us”—Cambodia and the in-group against “them”—France and the out-group. Likewise, in the Preah Vihear dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodia used Preah Vihear and the conflict to build political prestige, nationalism, and anti-Thai sentiments.15 Different from Cambodia–Thailand’s and Cambodia–Laos’s conflicts in which Cambodia is a claimant state and has cultivated territorial nationalism to achieve territorial integrity and political popularity, the SCS dispute do not involve Cambodia. While many SCS disputants have tried to manipulate populism and nationalism in the SCS dispute for their political ends, this non-claimant state’s move in the SCS dispute is largely an optimal calculation of costs and benefits of the international systemic pressures and domestic constraints, which are leading causes of domestic populist and nationalist movements in the country. According to Kenny, a populist movement has two main characteristics.16 First, the authority within a populist movement is concentrated in the leader, who utilizes followers to mobilize support, and second, populism is known to be a mobilization of masses toward political ends. In Cambodia, following the creation of the second Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993, the general election result in 2013 was a major turning point in state–society relations as the result sparks a deep reflection on disparities, rich–poor and elite–ordinary dichotomies, and surprisingly growing negative sentiments of the general public toward the political establishment and governance system. According to Chheang, the election illustrated a serious setback and decreasing popular support for the ruling party.17 This election is followed by political infighting between the ruling party and the opposition, giving rise to “a

13

Ngoun, K. (2011). The role of media in promoting nationalism: the case of Cambodia. In Cambodia communication 2011. Department of Media & Communication, Cambodia Communication Institute, Royal University of Phnom Penh. https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_ file?uuid=83f14ad2-3ac5-ab54-bad5-0248417e7c62&groupId=264850. 14 Ibid. 15 Rattanasengchanh, P. M. (2017). The role of Preah Vihear in Hun Sen’s nationalism politics, 2008–2013. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36(3), pp. 63–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 186810341703600303. 16 Kenny, P. D. (2018). Populism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1017/9781108563772. 17 Chheang, V. (2021). Cambodia’s embrace of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: managing asymmetries, maximizing authority. Asian Perspective 45(2), pp. 375–396.

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reaction against elite politics and the birth of an agenda to promote grass-roots leadership”.18 Notably, the opposition in Cambodia has repeatedly pursued anti-elite populist sentiments as a tool to antagonize the common ground against elites and to gain political popularity. In theory, one of the preconditions of populism is “the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier separating the “people” from power”.19 By framing the state as being oppressive and pro-elite, the opposition have tried to cultivate their images as an accessible pro-people leader. To secure approval and support of the ordinary, they have also portrayed themselves as relatable to the public and gathered the mass through campaigns and demonstrations. An examination of their populist campaigns suggests that the opposition has used emotional appeals and a rhetorical language with people-oriented, anti-elite, and anti-status quo discourses to inspire “hope,” anxiety and panic in followers and to attract the attention of media and the international community to portray Cambodia’s negative images in human rights and development disparities. The primary questions then stand from the ability of the state to credibly maintain growth and benefit the ordinary mass. Cambodia’s demography shows the pyramid is broad at base, implying that the country is largely dominated by young working age population between 15 and 34. This Cambodia’s youthful population is a key factor that shapes state–society relations and that is significantly responsible for a decline in the popularity of the ruling party.20 This new generation is different from the previous; they have lived through an era of impressive economic growth resulting in rapid social change.21 This situation generates a nagging question: how to then better satisfy this new generation and better win the domestic support? According to Chheang, in order to stay in power, the CPP needs to maintain high economic growth and obtain more jobs.22 Following the 2013 elections, the government has moved to adopt a more people-centered reforms and policies to better appeal to the public, counter domestic critics, and boost its political, performance-based legitimacy. According to Ngoun, Prime Minister Hun Sen has reconstructed his image as “a softer, simpler, and accessible leader.”23 From conducting policy reforms to using social media and online engagement to taking selfies with garment factory workers, this Cambodia’s most important political figure has undertaken a variety of actions in order to respond

18

Norén-Nilsson, A. and Bourdier, F. (2019). Introduction: social movements in Cambodia. Journal of Current Southeast Asia Affairs 38 (1), p. 4. 19 Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. London: Verso, p. 74. 20 Eng, N. and Hughes, C. (2017). Coming of age in peace, prosperity, and connectivity: Cambodia’s young electorate and its impact on the ruling party’s political strategies. Critical Asian Studies 49 (3), pp. 396–410. 21 Ibid, p. 397. 22 Chheang, V. (2021). Cambodia’s embrace of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: managing asymmetries, maximizing authority. Asian Perspective 45(2), pp. 375–396. 23 Ngoun, K. (2020). Adaptive authoritarian resilience: Cambodian strongman’s quest for legitimacy. Journal of Contemporary Asia, pp. 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2020.183 2241.

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to popular demands and compete for populist supremacy. Remarkably, the government’s Rectangular Strategies Phase III 2013 and Phrase IV 2018 have all included more comprehensive and in-depth reform policies, ranging from reform on public administration to reform on public financial management. In addition, cases in point of his populist move are the increase of minimum wage of factory workers, a halt to road tool fees, a waiver of road tax fees for motorcycle owners, and promised public market vendors ownership and transfer entitlements.24 More recently, he has also created, “Samdech Techo Sen’s Voluntary Lawyers Group,” which is a sign implying that he aims to stand by “people” against any abuses or unfairly treatment often by “the powerful.” According to World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2020, Cambodia is scored 0.33 against 1 (1 is the strongest adherence to the rule of law) and ranked only 127 globally,25 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 shows Cambodia is scored 21 out 100 and placed 160 out of 180.26 As such, Prime Minister’s increasing public engagement including through social media is a tool for him to not only gather popular support but also to monitor his national and local officials’ performance and to improve the government’s effectiveness.27 It is, thus, unsurprising that the government needs to achieve national progress and inspires to upgrade itself from lower-middle incomed country to upper-middled incomed country by 2030 in order to meet the increasing popular demand and sustain the performance-based legitimacy of the government. As Cambodia is a small, developing country in its state-building stage, securing reliable external partnership is important to realizing this inspiration. To the government, the SCS’s biggest claimant state has appeared to be a top, if not the top, reliable partner. Evidently, in May 2021, the Prime Minister of Cambodia stated, “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on? If I don’t ask China, who am I to ask?”.28 This strengthening of relations with China in recent decade has been used to fuel nationalism framing of anti-Chinese in the country, aside from the traditional anti-Vietnamese construction. More particularly, along this rise of populist moves has come a series of nationalist sentiments pursued by the government and the opposition. While populist movements emerge along strong discontent against “the elite” or the political establishment, nationalism arrives with strong imagined communities. In the case of Cambodia, the government has observably pursued nationalist sentiments toward a more integrated community while the now-banned opposition has increasingly pursued not only anti-Vietnamese sentiments but also anti-Chinese sentiments. According to 24

Ibid. Rule of law index 2020. World Justice Project (2020). https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/def ault/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf. 26 Corruption perceptions index 2020. Transparency International (2021). https://images.transpare ncycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802-WEB-1_2021-02-08-103053.pdf. 27 Ngoun, K. (2020). Adaptive authoritarian resilience: Cambodian strongman’s quest for legitimacy. Journal of Contemporary Asia, pp. 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2020.183 2241. 28 Cambodia’s Hun Sen: ‘If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?’. Nikkei Asia. (2021, May 20). https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia/The-Future-of-Asia-2021/Cambodia-sHun-Sen-If-I-don-t-rely-on-China-who-will-I-rely-on. 25

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Norén-Nilsson, Cambodia’s political parties have used nationalist imaginings as strategies to “attract popular support, electoral victories, and moral legitimacy.”29 Arguably, Cambodia’s nationalism can be categorized as Third-World nationalism. According to Norbu, “Third World nationalism may then be defined as a politicized social consciousness centered upon a common national identity rooted in a shared tradition, and the ideological belief in the structure of the modern nationstate as the most efficacious instrument of national unity, national independence and national interest.”30 Nationalism consists of two powerful elements: traditional data such as race, territoriality, and tradition, and egalitarian ideology such as freedom, equality, and fraternity. While traditional nationalism mainly included traditional data, contemporary nationalism in the Third World subscribes to both components.31 According to Norbu: The essence of any cotemporary nationalism in the Third World is the fusion of modern and traditional components which typically manifest as: (a) Societal consciousness about national identity that provides the necessary dynamics of national unity; (b) an all-encompassing value system to guide and motivate political action; (c) a pan-ethnic movement to generate social power that is utilized to achieve national unity and independence; (d) a foreign policy centered upon the concept of national interest.32

Following almost thirty years after Cambodia’s first general election supported by UN, the government is seen to have increasingly pursued politically and culturally politicized social consciousness about Cambodia as a full sovereign state and Cambodia as a unified community. Politically, the government has increasingly instilled social consciousness about Cambodia as a full sovereign state with a need for a full respect of its autonomy, independence, and freedom. The government’s nationalism is increasingly geared on egalitarian or modern ideology on top of the existing traditional components of territoriality and traditions. This growing instill of political social consciousness is seen as an instrument to counter foreign habitual insult and mistreat of this developing country, to reject allegedly hostile intentions harbored by foreign countries, and to raise this small state’s dignity as an equal sovereign, which means any resort to domestic interference cannot be tolerated. In this essence, the in-group is Cambodia, while the out-group is any external actors which attempt to disrupt its strongly imaged sovereign state. The most-commonly known primary audience of this sentiment is perhaps the West, which has increasingly pressurized the government following the dissolution of Cambodia’s Nation Rescue Party (CNRP) and following the growing allegation of Cambodia being China’s patron client. “Okun Sontepheap” or, in English, “Thank You, Peace” is, for instance, the most publicized slogan throughout the country, which intends not only to build pride in the ruling 29

Norén-Nilsson, A. (2017). Cambodia’s second Kingdom: nation, imagination, and democracy. Cornell Southeast Asia Program/ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 30 Norbu, D. (1992). Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism. New York: Routledge, p. 26. 31 Ibid. 32 Norbu, D. (1992). Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–2.

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party’s liberation of the Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge regime and its leadership in the country’s development but also to serve as a reminder that foreign interference in Cambodia’s domestic affairs had led to tragic results and are not welcomed. Culturally, the government has increasingly concretized collective social consciousness about the society and pursued a solidification of Khmer identity in order to unite and hold the society together, boost pride, build solidarity, and promote confidence in the government’s leadership of the country. While not being a government-led campaign, “Go Go Cambodia”, for instance, can unite the new generation that is generally known to be more rebellious, increase cohesion and confidence among the public, and, in turn, inspire pride and promote stability in the government. These growing sentiments can be the results of two factors: 1. Domestic dynamics and 2. Systemic constraints. Domestically, this Third-World country has changed from wartorn country to a better-groomed country as it has made considerable development progress and gradually become more mature and confident in its post-conflict global reintegration and engagement. As the country enters a new stage of development and nation building, the country generally strives to re-construct its identity. Additionally, as the country is still encountering Third-World socio-economic and political issues, its high degree of social incohesion along with inter- and intra-political fragmentation makes non-interference in domestic affairs and unification among people not only desirable but necessary. Secondly, its nationalist moves are against the backdrop of not only growing political tension at home but also the increasing pressures from the West and the great-power rivalry between the USA and China. The dissolution of the CNRP and detention of activists have been taken by the West as a political act and, together with USA’s containment policy of China, have resulted in an ongoing long series of sour relations between Cambodia and the West including the USA and the EU. From a partial withdrawal of “the Everything but Arms” initiative by the European Union to a reconsideration on “the Generalized System of Preference” by the USA, Cambodia has been facing growing pressures to give political freedom to the opposition, and this is called by the local as an interference into domestic affairs of Cambodia as a sovereign state. Different from nationalist sentiments pursued by the government, the now-banned opposition has explicitly pursued anti-Vietnamese and anti-Chinese movements in the country. The opposition has deployed anti-Vietnamese and anti-Chinese sentiments to antagonize the common grounds against the political establishment and to excuse the government of being submissive to foreign countries. Their attempts are to call on the public to rise against these ethnics and to challenge the government’s domestic and foreign policy decisions in what are taken as a defense of Cambodia’s impartiality and neutrality. The opposition has used rhetorical language with antiethnic discourses, emotional appeals, and debates with simplified solutions to portray negative images of Cambodia–Vietnam and Cambodia–China relations and, thus, of its approaches in the SCS dispute. This sought anti-Vietnamese nationalism in the country is not a new issue. It is driven by border dispute with Vietnam and Vietnamese

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immigrant issues (Hyma & Kry, 2018).33 The stereotypes and contemporary nationalism framing of ethnic Vietnamese as “the other” is the result of “longstanding issues with deep historical layers and victimization, narratives of grievances, and challenges perceived as threats to the survival of Khmer identity”. The discourse “Yuon,” for instance, has been commonly used to refer to the Vietnamese in the opposition’s political campaign. Such anti-Vietnamese movement has been targeted to weaken the ruling party34 since the party is claimed to be a “puppet” of Vietnam.35 In addition to the anti-Vietnamese sentiments, there has also seen a surge in antiChinese sentiments. The increasingly strong relation between Cambodia and China in the past decade has brought an increase in investors, tourists, and Chinese in the country. In order to gain political support, the opposition is seen to have sought and cultivated nationalist sentiments against the Chinese and China as it has taken the government as being a patron client to China. Without political transparency, understanding, and participation, citizens could be easily vulnerable to these populist and nationalist policy agendas.36 What do these populist and nationalist sentiments and movements suggest? They are, indeed, a reflection of the country’s underlying structural issues of political and social polarization. The country has been sandwiched by both populist and nationalist politics in the SCS and by its own politics at home. Its existing position on encouraging dialogues between mainly parties directly concerned in the SCS dispute along with the emerging framing from its local have exposed the country even further in the SCS politics. A traditional wisdom suggests a state cannot transcend the international system, however, a Third-World post-war country like Cambodia cannot transcend neither the international system nor its domestic system.

3 Implications and Effects of the Politics of Representing the “People” and “Nation” in the South China Sea As Cambodia is not a claimant state, this section will discuss implications rather than direct impacts of its domestic populist and nationalist sentiments. Additionally, the subsequent paragraphs will present four scenarios in order to examine negative consequences of the politicization and securitization of the SCS dispute. An examination of Cambodia’s populist and nationalist forces and sentiments may suggest three main implications about Cambodia and its approaches to the SCS 33

Hyma, R. & Kry, S. (2018). Beyond nationalism: finding common ground in Cambodian communities. Perspectives (7), pp. 29–32. 34 Vu, T. (2013). Southeast Asia’s new nationalism: causes and significance. Trans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia 1(2), pp. 259–270. 35 Verver, M., & Wieczorek, J. (2017). Politics and society in contemporary Cambodia. Newsletter (78). https://www.iias.asia/sites/default/files/theNewsletter/2019-06/IIAS_NL78_FULL.pdf. 36 Chheang, V. (2015, October 16). How Cambodian nationalism is driving border disputes with Vietnam. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/16/how-cambodian-nat ionalism-is-driving-border-disputes-with-vietnam/.

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dispute. First, the nationalist and populist sentiments reflect the country’s underlying domestic issues, political and social polarization, and the needs for the country to maintain stability, growth, and progress. To meet domestic needs and remain in power, the government would need to craft its foreign policy practices in a way that does not jeopardize its nation-building efforts. This small state would, thus, continue to give priority to its relations with states/institutions that could respect its domestic challenges, values, and national interests. In this context, domestic politics would continue to have great influence onto Cambodia’s foreign policy decisions and directions. Secondly, contextualizing Cambodia in these politics exposes its struggle to strike a delicate balance in its external relations with claimant states in the SCS. How to remain on good terms with Vietnam, China, and other claimant states while they are in conflict is a tough question. Worthy of notice, the key disputants of the SCS dispute, ASEAN, and even the USA are all important to the country’s growth even though the degrees of significance may vary. As Table 1 shows, China tops the list as the largest source of aid, FDI and tourism, while Vietnam is Cambodia’s second largest ASEAN import partner, and the USA is Cambodia’s largest export partner. Meanwhile, the total intra-ASEAN trade to Cambodia only slightly exceeds that of China as one single country. Statistics on tourism also show pretty similar figures on the numbers of tourists from China and ASEAN countries. Nonetheless, these actors are among top and key partners for Cambodia’s trade, FDI, ODA, and/or tourism. Out of the major claimants of the SCS, Vietnam is known as Cambodia’s traditional close friend who does not only share sensitive border demarcation issues with Cambodia but also has its large share in the collapse of the Khmer Rouge Regime in the late 1970s. Additionally, while being the biggest claimant of this resource-rich SCS, China has become Cambodia’s modern-day ironclad friend. Under the framework of Table 1 Cambodia’s trade, FDI, aid, and tourism statistics Trade (2020) (in million)

FDI flow (2019)

Official development assistance (2019)

Tourism (2019)

496.2 million

2,361,849

Export

Import

China

1086.26 million

7031.81 million

3.7 billion

ASEAN

3722.76 million

7607.26 million

Unavailable data Unavailable data

2228,380

Vietnam

385.79 million

2633.81 million

65 Million

Unavailable data

908,803

The US

5258.88 million

250.73 million

187 Million in 59.6 million 2018 (FDI stock)

248,863

Sources Trade statistics from Ministry of Commerce (2021), FDI flow statistics from Council for the Development of Cambodia’s Investment Trend (n.d.) and FDI stock statistics for the USA from Office of the United States Trade Representative (n.d), ODA statistics from Council for the Development of Cambodia’s Development Cooperation and Partnerships Report (2020), and tourism statistics from Ministry of Tourism’s Tourism Statistics Report (2020)

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Theory of Shelter, China is seen to provide this small state and the government their much-needed economic, political/security, and societal shelters, which are alternative to string-attached assistance by the West and to the non-materialized ASEAN, which could hardly provide Cambodia its much-needed confidence for a security shelter as in the case of Cambodia–Thailand dispute. Notably, while the ASEAN claimant states want to internationalize the disputes and the rising dragon wants to de-internationalize the issues, Cambodia as a non-claimant state can hardly craft an ideal position in these politics. Thirdly, Cambodia’s given structural conditions and domestic needs and, thus, its constructed high values in non-interference and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity would continue to condition Cambodia’s roles in the SCS dispute management as both a country and as a member/chair of ASEAN. Cambodia would continue to see the dispute as bilateral affairs of claimant states (not between China and ASEAN) in order to prevent itself from involving in the rivalries of bigger state and to give itself space to address domestic challenges with political, economic, and military support from the likeminded states. When the SCS setting becomes extremely restrictive and Cambodia is forced to choose, Cambodia’s foreign policy practices in the SCS may be guided by the logics of consequences rather than the logics of appropriateness. In this sense, the internalization of ASEAN’s norms should be understood as a nonlinear but usual process for a Third-World, post-war country in a state-building stage amid inter-elite contestation. To unite, divide, and generate or degenerate support from the inside, this chapter believes populism and nationalism will persist and continue to be a desirable instrument that is easier and more readily available at disposal for many actors. From the historical evolution of the SCS dispute, it may not be too early to suggest that the dispute will continue to be tense regardless of tenses. Thus, instead of taking that tension at the sea would disappear, this section builds on its understanding that tension would continue, though at varying degrees, and will discuss consequences of populism and nationalism in the SCS by using its four main scenarios: “Habitually Restrictive” scenario, “Permissive” scenario, “Doubly Restrictive” scenario, and “Hobbesian” scenario. The first scenario is named, “Habitually Restrictive” scenario. It can be read as a continuation of strong populist and nationalist forces but under a rule-based order, though imperfect, and socialization pressures. States including China are continued to be guided by both logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness in its interaction with the external environment; however, to offset public discontent and maintain their regime legitimacy, states need to push for nationalist forces to divert the public frustrations outward and preserve their perceived national achievements. In this case, populism and nationalism will be used as justification for confrontational stance and assertiveness in the SCS dispute. Tension will continue to be cyclical. It will be sometimes high and some other time low, but it will not leave the SCS as the tension itself has political utilities. In this scenario, small clashes in the sea can be expected as a habitual demonstration of national pride and protection of national interests. Regional peace and stability are challenged but not severely eroded. There can expect to be a reduction of prospects for deep multilateral cooperation, growing

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pressure on diplomatic relations, and growing fragmentation among states. However, optimism can still remain because claimant states could continue to be guided by the logic of consequences and the logics of appropriateness as there is no imminent threat to the domestic political establishment that requires states to take unprecedented actions in the SCS. Thus, tensions in the SCS could still be well contained though continuous. The second scenario reflects more relaxed domestic setting within states and is named, “Permissive” scenario. It could be read as a combination of decreased, not absent, populist and nationalist sentiments under a rule-based order, though imperfect, and socialization pressures. In this case, there could be a presence of intervening variables in the causal relationship between the domestic populism and nationalism and the assertiveness in the SCS. The variables could be global issues that demand and call for joint actions or domestic dynamics that bring about cohesion and alternative imaging of “people” and “nation.” Generally, problems of dispute settlements lie mainly in domestic political situations. On the occasion that nationalistic sentiments are more relaxed, there could expect to be a better level playing field for claimant states in the SCS dispute, fewer clashes, and more cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally. Under socialization pressures through, i.e. ASEAN, states under more relaxed nationalistic sentiments could interact and respond to the dispute in a way that is increasingly led by the logics of appropriateness in addition to the logics of consequences. In this ideal scenario, there could expect prospects for cooperation, though not permanent, between and among claimant states and expect also a large diplomatic space, though not permanent, for small states to maneuver. The third scenario is named, “Doubly Restrictive” scenario. This scenario can be read as a combination of extreme populist and nationalist forces under an uncertain, dangerous international environment. In this scenario, both the domestic and international environments are restrictive. Internationally, while there is not an absence of global and regional leadership, there are clear challenges to the effectiveness of international and regional establishments and clear changes to power trend and global order, giving rise to materialized and non-materialized conflicts in the international system. Domestically, there also presents a rise of extremist movements that are exclusionary, violent, and confrontational. While regular populist forces could be top-down, these extreme populist forces could be bottom-up and are the result of strong disapproval and distrust of a political establishment. In this context, there is a clear and imminent threat to the domestic political establishment. Thus, in order to divide the forces and then unite the country together, countries may choose to pursue an unprecedented provocation and assertiveness in the sea in order to sustain stability and prevent frangibility at home. When such provocation and assertiveness take place in the already restrictive international environment, there could expect to be major prolonged clashes, if not wars, erosion of respect for regional institutions and logical reasons, and erosion of regional peace and stability. In this case, diplomatic and defense services could be both more defensive and more offensive. To protect themselves, claimant states will look to bandwagon or balance against or with great powers in question. Small states will have to give up its neutrality and

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choose side. Optimism is slim and may take place when domestic situations are under control and sought populist or nationalist sentiments subside. The last scenario is Hobbesian scenario, which is the worst-case scenario. According to Hoadley, Hobbesian scenario is “a scenario of the absence of world leadership, institution or order, a modern manifestation of the state of nature” portrayed by Thomas Hobbes which the law of tooth and claw reigns and life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”37 In this scenario, the UN and ASEAN-led regional forums have failed to provide international and regional order, rule-based orders, and socialization pressures. In this context, the prospect for wars in the SCS dispute and elsewhere is looming large and deem inevitable. In all of these scenarios, the real victims are smaller states. They are left vulnerable to populist and nationalist politics in the SCS dispute. The casual relationship between populism and nationalism and tension in the SCS can be conceptualized as interactive. The more restrictive the domestic setting and the international environment, the harder it is for non-claimant, small state to maneuver. Probably, in this context, it is helpful to bring out the popular African proverb: “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”

4 Change the Equation: More “People” and Less “Ism” One of the greatest puzzles in the contemporary practice of international politics is probably how to achieve peace and security in the SCS. But who does this security? Who and what are really the subject of this security? What are the relations between belonging, unbelonging, territorialization, and deterritorialization in the SCS? An ideal-case scenario ones can expect might be that there is a decrease of populist and nationalist sentiments under a rule-based order. First, there requires willingness and concerted efforts from claimant states, regional actors, and relevant parties to exercise policies and/or practices that are ultimately a reflection of an alternative interpretation of “people” and “nation.” To address the issues, it is essential to have a concerted effort to acknowledge and address the fundamental dichotomy behind populism and nationalism, to distance from the binary categories, and to orient their inspirations from nothing but the benefits of people beyond just groups and borders. Does the inside of a group/state be able to exist only in a stark contrast to the outside? Both material and non-material cooperation and policies need to follow a new equation of having more people’s benefits as their inspirations and decreasing, if not dropping, the “ism(s).” Secondly, states actors and institutions need to push for indiscriminate multilateralism and inclusive development through a complex system of interdependence among states. State actors need to acknowledge given structural conditions each 37

Hoadley, S. (2017). New Zealand’s strategic context: one or many scenarios?. New Zealand International Review 42(6), pp. 14–17. https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.217514064 503689.

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state faces and understand hard choices faced those states at their particular phase. Indiscriminate multilateralism among states, regardless of political systems or ideologies, would generate a reconciliation of mis-perceptions about levels of threats. In addition, there needs to be an increase in cooperation and interdependence in lowpolitics issues such as trade and investment. Interdependence in low-politics issues could yield spill-over effects on high-politics issues and generate economic and social modernization much needed by the public. The development or modernization, however, needs to be inclusive; or it would generate greater risk for populist movements. Thirdly, while a strong rule-based order is desirable, it may not be feasible because of the given structural conditions of states especially in the Southeast Asian region. The nature of post-colonial identities of the Southeast Asian countries makes it a hard case for a more legalized and institutionalized regional order. Thus, it is important to increase socialization process between ASEAN and the claimant states and make ASEAN a neo-normative power, distinctive from the EU. In this case, regional groupings need to further generate arrangements to serve as platforms for socialization, interconnectedness, and confidence-building. The platforms need to be inclusive of actors and aim include actors in Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 and even the general public because final audience of populist and nationalist movements and politicization of the SCS involves beyond just policy makers at offices.

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Chandarith Neak is currently Dean of Institute for International Studies and Public Policy at the Royal University of Phnom Penh. He is also the founding Director of Cambodia 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Research Centre at the same institution, Royal University of Phnom Penh. His research interests center on BRI, Mekong-Lancang Mechanism and state–society relations in Southeast Asia. He is the author of Educational Linkages in ASEAN: Cementing a Foundation for Peace and Development. In Pich Charadine (ed.). Cambodia’s Chairmanship of ASEAN: Challenging Perceptions, Concretizing Consolidations (CICP and Asia Foundation, 2021); Cambodia’s Response to Covid-19 and Its Impacts on Cambodia-China Relations. In N. Peng(ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of Covid-19 Pandemic (Springer Nature, 2021); ASEAN’s External Cooperation in a Global Pandemic: An Expansion of the Concept of National Security. In Pich Charadine, and Robert Hor (eds.). The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic: National and Regional Implications (CICP and KAS, 2020). Sam Ath Sambath Sreysour is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Department of Politics and International Relations at the University Auckland and a member of New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. She is a former research and project coordinator and lecturer of International Relations and a holder of M.A in International Politics from the University of Manchester. Her doctoral research lies within Foreign Policy Analysis as a sub-discipline of International Relations with a primary focus on Cambodia’s foreign policy to the USA and China. Her recent publications are within the areas of foreign policy, international relations viewed from traditional and critical theories, and regionalism.