Populism and Populist Discourse in North America 3031085213, 9783031085215

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1: Introduction
Introduction ‘What Is Populism?’
Margaret Canovan 1981
The Ideational Approach
Ernesto Laclau (2007)
Discourse Approaches to Populism
Greimasian Narrative
Chapters in this Book
2: The People’s Party
Jefferson and Jackson
People’s Party Platform: Preamble
1892 People’s Party Platform
1896 People’s Party Platform
James B. Weaver, A Call to Action
Conclusion
3: Prairie Populism
Introduction
The Farmers’ Platform, 1918
The Progressive Party
William Aberhart and Social Credit
William Aberhart’s Broadcasts
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland
Conclusion
4: Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada
Introduction
The Origins of the Reform Party
Constitutional Reform: “A Fair Shake for the West!”
Overt Populism
Conclusion
5: Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders
Donald Trump
Populism as Political Style
Wilmington Ohio, September 1, 2016 “I Am Your Voice”
Rupture
Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017 “Make America Safe Again”
Youngstown Speech, Part I
Youngstown Speech, Part 2
Youngstown Speech, Part 3. The Politics of Fear
January 6, 2021 Speech, ‘The Numbers Speech,’ Saving Democracy
Weak Republicans
The Voting System and The Numbers
Bernie Sanders, The Survivor
Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, Rural America
Part 1, Welcome to the Revolution
Part 2, Unmet Needs
Part 3, Rural America
Conclusion
6: Ford Nation
Introduction
Transportation: Subways, Subways, Subways
FordNation
New Subway Proposal Announcement
Doug Ford, 2018 Provincial Election, “A buck a beer”
Thunder Bay, May 2, 2018
Ford Nation Facebook Ontario Place
Final Debate Election 2018
Conclusion
Untitled
7: Conclusion
Prairie Populism
Preston Manning and The Reform Party
Resurgences of American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders
Ford Nation
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Populism and Populist Discourse in North America Marcia Macaulay

Populism and Populist Discourse in North America

Marcia Macaulay

Populism and Populist Discourse in North America

Marcia Macaulay York University Toronto, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-3-031-08521-5    ISBN 978-3-031-08522-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: lev radin / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To David and Nick, for their solidarity and support.

Contents

1 I ntroduction  1 2 T  he People’s Party 33 3 P  rairie Populism 57 4 Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 85 5 Modern  American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders117 6 F  ord Nation173 7 C  onclusion215 R  eferences253 I ndex261

vii

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

Capitalist Narrative Plain People’s Narrative The ‘People’s’ Narrative 1896 Weaver’s Narrative: A Call to Action The Farmers’ Platform 1918 Aberhart’s Proposal 1935 CCF Manifesto 1933 Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland The Blue Book 1988 Cover. (Source of this cover is from the University of Calgary Archives) The Blue Book 1991 Cover. (Cover taken from the University of Calgary Archives) The Blue Book 1988 The Blue Book 1991, 1996/1997 Wilmington Ohio Speech, 2016 Youngstown Ohio Speech, 2017 January 6, 2021 ‘Numbers Speech’ Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech Subway Announcement Speech, September 23, 2013, Rob Ford Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018, Doug Ford

40 41 43, 54 50, 54 62 71 76 79 91 104 113 114 127, 153 141, 153 153 167 190, 210 196, 211

ix

x 

List of Figures

Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 6.6

Ford at Exhibition Place, August 5, 2021 197 Facebook Announcement, Ontario Place, August 5, 2021 200 ‘Buck a Beer’ Twitter 206 Twitter Announcement, ‘Buck a Beer,’ Doug Ford 208, 212

List of Tables

Table 6.1 Speech Acts in Subway Announcements by Murray, Flaherty and Ford Table 6.2 Speech Acts, Doug Ford’s Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018

186 192

xi

1 Introduction

Introduction ‘What Is Populism?’ There have been numerous approaches to populism. The purpose of this Introduction is not to review the vast literature on the subject, but rather to provide an overview of key theories that have informed this central question. Ionescu and Gellner’s (1969) ground-breaking analysis of populism originated from a conference on populism held at the London School of Economics in 1967. Six different questions were examined through their volume: Is populism an ideology (or ideologies) or a movement (or movements) or both?; Is populism a “recurring mentality” seen in numerous “historical and geographical” contexts (p. 3); Is populism a “political psychology”?; Is populism reflective of a “peculiar negativism” towards a set of groups or objects?; Is populism a form of ‘people’ worship?; and lastly, Is populism porous, such that it can accommodate to “stronger ideologies or movements?” (p. 4). One contributor to this volume, Peter Worsley, noted that populism shows up across continents throughout the world but with different realizations. There is extensive participation from farmers in North America, but relatively little in Russia where an intelligentsia led a populist movement (the Narodniks) in support of peasant communes and self-governance. Worsley also noted that there appeared to be two basic precepts in populism, the notion of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_1

1

2 

M. Macaulay

“the will of the people,” and the “desirability of a ‘direct’ relationship between people and leadership, unmediated by institutions” (p.  244). These two aspects of populism are taken up again and again by those studying populism. Indeed, the theorists examined below take these precepts up specifically. We will begin with Margaret Canovan (1981).

Margaret Canovan 1981 In first looking at Margaret Canovan’s landmark 1981 work on populism, we need to look at Ernesto Laclau’s criticism of this work. Laclau’s principal objection to Canovan’s analysis of populism is that it provides a typology: The first thing to note is that this typology lacks any coherent criterion around which its distinctions are established. In what sense are agrarian populisms not political? And what is the relationship between the social and political aspects of the ‘political’ populisms which bring about a model of political mobilization that is different from the agrarian one? Everything happens as if Canovan had simply chosen the impressionistically more visible features of a series of movements taken at random, and moulded her distinctive types on their differences. (2007, p. 6)

Margaret Canovan does provide a typology of ‘populisms’; however, hers is one of the first major attempts to arrive at an understanding of what populism is. Canovan approaches populism empirically. As in this volume, she addresses the People’s Party, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the Social Credit Party. Most analyses of populism are studies of separate cases or instances of ‘populism’ often surrounding one area in the world: Latin America, Europe, Eastern Europe. North America etc. What Canovan attempts to do is to look at a particular locus of attention. We may not agree entirely with her typology but to suggest that her categories are incoherent is not a fair assessment. Canovan does not, in fact, claim that Agrarian populism is not ‘political’; however, she does see one type of populism as deriving from the rhetoric of politicians.

1 Introduction 

3

In this volume, there is one specific example of this in Preston Manning’s Reform Party. Canovan’s populist typology may not cover all instances of populist movements, but it certainly intersects with a good number. Paul Taggart states that “Margaret Canovan [1981] offers the most ambitious attempts to get to grips with populism. Her work gives a variegated approach differentiating between agrarian populism and political populism. This covers a range of populist movements through history and across the world. Detailed consideration of these means that she breaks down agrarian populism into the populism of farmers, of peasants and of intellectuals” (2002, p. 18). Canovan proposes seven types of populism:

Agrarian Populisms 1. Farmers’ radicalism (e.g. the U.S. People’s Party) 2. Peasant movements (e.g. the East European Green Rising) 3. Intellectual agrarian socialism (e.g. the narodniki)

Political Poulisms 4. Populist dictatorship (e.g. Peron) 5. Populist democracy (i.e., calls for referendums and “participation”) 6. Reactionary populism (e.g. George Wallace and his followers) 7. Politician’s populism (i.e., broad, nonideological coalition-building that draws on the unificatory appeal of “the people”) (1981, p. 13) From a North American perspective what is important is Canovan’s attention to Agrarian Populism. If we concentrate only on the United States, the social demands of farmers and workers in the 1890’s are carried over into the 2020’s. In particular, we see Bernie Sanders addressing the very same complaints of quasi-feudalism in agrarian work. Populism in Canada also begins through farmers’ alliances that developed into the CCF on the one hand and Social Credit on the other. In both countries populism is rooted in what Canovan terms “farmers’ radicalism” (p. 100). Although I do not wish to examine all the typic categories Canovan articulates, her construction of agrarian populism is important.

4 

M. Macaulay

Populism in the United States begins with farmers’ movements in Texas, leading to the development of a Farmers’ Alliance. For this group a very clear ideology developed, specifically a distinction between “producers,” and “non-producers” (1981, p. 26). The producers often became trapped in a cycle of debt by virtue of their need to buy fertilizer, farming equipment and general goods. This was known as the “crop lien” system. For small farmers, especially after the American Civil War, “the only source of credit available to them was the local storekeeper or ‘furnishing merchant,’ who would let them have implements, fertilizers and provisions on credit…This meant that the farmer could buy only from the merchant who held his lien on his crop, at whatever prices the merchant chose to ask” (1981, p. 21). The control over the farmer by the “furnishing merchant” was so great that the merchants themselves decided what crops could be grown. Usually, this was cotton since this product was consistently lucrative. Bernie Sanders in his Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech on March 7, 2019 provides much the same analysis of control over production, except that his target is not “furnishing merchants,” but Corporate Agriculture. To extricate themselves from this exploitative situation between producers and non-producers, the farmers of the South West set up Exchanges where cooperatively they could support their own needs for provisions and equipment and in turn choose to produce their own selected crops. But these exchanges failed in part due to opposition by merchants and in part because the farmers themselves could not collectively provide the needed capital to support long-term success. The failure of cooperative enterprise forced farmers and other workers into taking political action. The Farmers’ Alliance became the People’s Party. This amounted to a full-scale rejection of the two dominant parties: the Democrats and the Republicans. As Canovan notes, “The ‘people’ had emerged into politics” (1981, p. 34). The Party’s first nominating convention was held in Omaha in 1892 and elected James B.  Weaver as its Presidential candidate. The 1892 Omaha Convention asserted that “wealth belongs to him who creates it…The interests of rural and civic labor are the same; their enemies are identical” (quoted by Canovan, 1981, p. 37). The Convention also called for a safe and flexible currency of both gold and silver, and a means of storing grain collectively. The delegates at the Convention also called for a graduated income tax, postal

1 Introduction 

5

savings banks, and even state ownership of railroads, telegraphs and telephone systems. They also called for a secret ballot, direct election of Senators, shorter working hours and the use of referenda. This was a radical agenda, and a number of these initiatives became law. There is now a graduated income tax in the U.S. as well as direct election of Senators as well as state referenda. Canovan gives over much of her analysis of the People’s Party to its failure. Its failure comes about in two principal ways: differences between southern and northern elements of the party, and pragmatic absorption of the party into the Democratic Party. In the South, “For those radical and brave enough to come out for Populism below the Mason-Dixon line were engaged in a warfare with the Democratic Party that far surpassed ordinary politics in bitterness. Southern Populists like Tom Watson of Georgia represented a threat to the established Democratic oligarchy; worse still, they threatened the bastion of white supremacy” (1981, pp. 38–9). Beyond this bastion was another factor, that the Democratic Party “had stolen the Populists’ clothes” (1981, p. 44). The Democrats appropriated one of the main planks of the Populist Party, free exchangeable use of silver with gold. In 1896 the Populist Party endorsed a hybrid candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, a Democrat, for President, and Tom Watson, a Populist, for Vice-President. As Canovan comments, “in the event Bryan lost the election, so that the Populists discovered that they had destroyed their party for nothing” (1981, p. 46). Two forces, one racism and the other pragmatism, had destroyed the integrity of a movement and its political extension. The Canadian counterpart of the Farmers’ Alliance, which developed into the CCF and the Social Credit Party, did not encounter the first bastion of white supremacy. The CCF has been able to maintain its own integrity by redefining itself as the New Democratic Party. The Social Credit Party has died, but one could argue that there is a kind of rebirth through the Reform Party and eventually the modern Conservative Party. Canovan also looks at historical analyses of populism. She notes that ‘populism’ has been understood through different historical lenses. The first major treatment of populism in the United States was John D. Hicks’s The Populist Revolt (1931) written approximately 50 years after the formal creation of the People’s Party in 1892. Hicks provides a sympathetic view

6 

M. Macaulay

of populism, writing as he did only two years after the 1929 Crash. Hicks’s view was that the People’s Party “was a healthy political phenomenon, entitled to praise from the point of view of a more advanced age” (Canovan, 1981, p. 46). The major counter to Hicks’s beneficial analysis of populism was that of Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform (1955). In contrast to Hicks, Hofstadter presented an unflattering view of populism and the People’s Party as reactionary and proto-fascist. Hofstadter wrote in the 1950’s during which Joseph McCarthy engaged in a witch trial of communist party members and supporters. The masses, ‘the people,’ were seen as gullible and easily led by charismatic leaders. Populism in Hofstadter’s analysis was backward looking, failing to understand the new age of industrialization and so harkening back to a previous golden age. Canovan notes that more subsequent historians of populism such as Lawrence Goodwyn in Democratic Promise (1976) provided a more balanced view. Thus, Goodwyn states, “To describe the origins of Populism in one sentence, the cooperative movement recruited American farmers, and their subsequent experience within the cooperatives radically altered their political consciousness” (quoted in Canovan, 1981, p.  49). The debate over whether or not populism is a mass movement of simply gullible fools or a process by which citizens through cooperative action alter their own political consciousness and that of others continues to this day. Neo-populism or authoritarian populism is constructed negatively by historians, political and discourse analysts; equally a cooperative progressive populism can be viewed positively as a form of social good.

The Ideational Approach Another major approach to the study of populism has been that of Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Their position is best set out in Populism; A Very Short Introduction (2017). Very different from Canovan (1981) above, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser situate ‘populism’ within the ideological framework of liberal democracy: “Theoretically, populism is most fundamentally juxtaposed to liberal democracy rather than democracy per se or any other model of democracy” (2017, p. 2). They argue that the counterpoint to populism is liberal democracy in large part

1 Introduction 

7

because of the pluralism found in such a democratic state. They further maintain that there are certain core concepts that define populism: ‘the people,’ ‘the elite,’ and the notion of the ‘general will.’ The ‘people’ can be defined in three specific ways, as sovereign, as ‘the common people,’ and as a nation. This idea of the people as a nation is also taken up by Paul Taggart as a “heartland” (2002, p. 95). The ‘elite’ can be understood both as a political or economic elite. They note further that populist leaders while in power continue to position themselves as attacking the establishment. Populist figures such as Hugo Chávez who achieve power have continued to define themselves as being against the establishment by redefining the notion of ‘the elite.’ Donald Trump’s war on the press is one such redefinition. Donald Trump, in fact, defines mainstream media as “the enemy of the people.” In this way, he maintains his populist credentials. From Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser make a distinction between the general will (volonté générale) and the will of all (volonté de tous) (2017, p. 16): “While the former refers to the capacity of the people to join together into community and legislate to enforce their common interest, the latter denotes the simple sum of particular interests at a specific moment in time” (2017, p. 16). This is not dissimilar to the distinction Ernesto Laclau (2007) makes between a social demand and a popular demand. The general will of the people is recognized in a broad platform of the type we see presented by all major populist movements or leaders. It is a realization of the community itself and the capacity of the community to act. It is “the very idea that citizens are able to both make laws and execute them” (2017, p.  17). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser note thus the predisposition for direct democracy in most populist platforms. Hawkins et  al. (2019) extend this analysis of core features in their assertion that for populism to exist the three core features must co-occur. Thus, “The ideational definition of populism has three parts: a) a Manichean and moral cosmology; b) the proclamation of the ‘the people’ as a homogenous and virtuous community, and c) the depiction of the ‘the elite’ as a corrupt and self-serving entity” (2019, p. 3). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) note the presence of these features or markers but do not constrain all three to be present. In the analysis of Hawkins

8 

M. Macaulay

et al., the Manichean dichotomy set up within populism is its most essential feature. This logically incorporates ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’: “This means that populism is a moral discourse that not only exalts popular sovereignty but understands the political field as a cosmic struggle between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ (Hawkins et al., 2019, p. 3). Further it is largely because of this Manichean dichotomy that populism as an ideology can be integrated with other ideologies. This is what Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser refer to as a “thin-centered ideology” (2017, p.  6). According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, populism has a “restricted morphology.” It can attach to other ideologies. After Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Hawkins et  al. note the distinction between “exclusionary populism” that incorporates nationalism within its ideology and “inclusionary populism” that incorporates features of socialism (2019, p. 5). In the ideational approach the notion of an absolute ‘positive’ on one side and an absolute ‘negative’ on the other provides incorporation of other powerful ideologies to define these bookended features. There is no precise analysis, however, of how such a process of incorporation takes place.

Ernesto Laclau (2007) Ernesto Laclau’s theoretical approach to populism differs from both that of Canovan (1981) and the Ideational Approach set out by Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser, Hawkins, Carlin, and Littvay largely because it focusses on process. In Laclauan theory there is a progression from “unmet needs,” to “social demands” to “popular demands.” Laclau does not theorize a ‘people’ or even an ‘elite’ without a process whereby they arrive in a place of conflict. For this reason, Laclau speaks of populism as deriving from a “logic.” To understand Laclau, we must grapple with this logic. Laclau’s principal theory of populism is contained in On Populist Reason (2007). Understanding ‘populism’ as a discourse, Laclau asks what the “minimal unit” of populism would be. For Laclau the minimal unit is what he terms “the social demand”: “The smallest unit from which we will start corresponds to the ‘social demand’” (2007, p. 73). As Laclau points out, members of a community can begin to understand that they share a recognition of “unmet needs.” They in turn can start the process

1 Introduction 

9

of making social demands for change. Social demands that remain in isolation Laclau terms “democratic demands.” For example, a community might demand a new sports centre for its youth. Such a demand in isolation may or may not be met. However, if over time “there is an accumulation of unfulfilled demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them in a differential way [each in isolation from the others] and an equivalential relation is established between them,” then social demands can become popular demands. Laclau terms popular demands in the following way: “A plurality of demands, which through their equivalential articulation constitute a broader social subjectivity we will call popular demands” (p. 74). There are several factors that pertain. If we use a feature analysis, we can say that there is +time, +“institutional failure,” +accumulation of unmet needs and their expression into “equivalential relation.” Trump’s famous expression “Make America Great Again!” is a realization of a past time where American greatness was in evidence. For Americans experiencing job losses due to outsourcing of their jobs to factories outside the United States, there is a nostalgia for a former world where such jobs were plentiful. But the unmet need of a job can be further exasperated by the fear of losing jobs through immigration and even further the difficulties of day-to-day existence such as paying the rent or mortgage, buying food, heating one’s home etc. Populism, according to Laclau, does not require only one unmet need but the accumulation of such needs forming an overwhelming popular demand realized in the case of Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again!” as an “empty signifier.” In Trump’s slogan, as with other populist slogans, ‘greatness’ can be understood or read into in more than one way. Laclau’s notion of an “empty signifier” needs further attention because it is a key notion in his theory. Laclau states, “When we talk about ‘empty signifiers’, however, we mean something entirely different; we mean that there is a place, within the system of signification which is constitutively irrepresentable, in that sense it remains empty, but this is an emptiness which I can signify, because we are dealing with a void within signification” (2007, p. 105). This is very hard to understand without any concrete reference. Laclau provides the example of Juan Perón in exile. Given this exile in the 1960’s, Laclau states, “the very conditions of enunciation of Perón’s discourse from exile determined the peculiar nature of its

10 

M. Macaulay

[return] success” (p. 215). Perón in exile was “restricted to private letters, cassettes and private instructions, which were, however, of the utmost importance” (p. 216). As Laclau notes further, “Perón, from exile, could not have given precise directions to the actions of a proliferation of local groups engaged in resistance; even less could he have intervened in the disputes that arose…Thus his word had to operate as a signifier with only weak links to particular signifieds. This is not a major surprise: it is exactly what I have called empty signifiers” (p. 216). What Perón had created through his letters, cassettes and private instructions was “Peronism without Perón.” Peronism came to be understood not just as a demand that Perón return to exile but a demand that united disparate groups whose understanding of Peronism may have had no precise definition apart from the requirement of Perón’s return to power. Perón himself was an empty signifier. It is also important to note that Laclau’s analysis does not presume the existence of a people or an elite. These are constructed entities. These are realized in the process of social demands becoming popular demands. For a people to come into existence, there has to be a “rupture” or a break between elements within a given society. Such a “rupture” or what Laclau also refers to as an “antagonistic frontier” comes into existence through the feature of institutional failure. This failure can be constructed in moral terms, as one part of society failing to understand and address the demands of another part, or it can be understood as a kind of absence: One first dimension of the break is a that, at is root, there is experience of a lack, a gap which has emerged in the harmonious continuity of the social. There is a fullness of the community which is missing. This is decisive: the construction of the ‘people’ will be an attempt to give a name to that absent fullness. Without this initial breakdown of something in the social order— however minimal that something could be—there is no possibility of antagonism, frontier, or, ultimately, ‘people.’ (2007, p. 85)

This sense of a society not being whole or indeed broken gives rise to a construction of division and a reconstruction of ‘the people.’ Laclau makes a distinction between the populus and the plebs. Laclau asks, “What, however, is the meaning of the aspiration of a partiality to be seen

1 Introduction 

11

as the social totality?” (2007, p. 94). In Laclau’s analysis once there is “a moment of antagonistic break,” the possibility for social demands to be incorporated positively into a constructive future is lost. Under such circumstances, “the populus as the given—as the ensemble of social relations as they actually are—reveals itself as a false totality—as a partiality which is a source of oppression. On the other hand, the plebs, whose partial demands are inscribed in the horizon of a fully fledged totality—a just society which exists only ideally—can aspire to constitute a truly universal populus which the actually exiting situation negates” (p. 94). In such a situation the plebs asserts itself as the populus that Laclau represents as an “ideal totality.” Thus, when Marie Le Pen on Stephen Sackur’s HARDtalk (October 10, 2017) speaks of the French ‘people,’ she does so knowing that she speaks not for the totality of the French population but for a constructed subset that shares her particular sense of the violation of French borders and French culture. Her understanding is not that of a class within an existing class system but rather of a projected idealized part that aspires to representation of the whole. The notion of the ‘people’ is in this respect a kind of empty signifier where a plebs can signify a full populus rather than a marginalized group or class. The notion of a ‘people’ in populism can best be understood as an assertion rather than an actuality. It is most certainly not a given standing alongside another given, an ‘elite.’ In analysing populism as a ‘logic,’ Laclau’s most central awareness is that of time without which populism is incomprehensible as a phenomenon.

Discourse Approaches to Populism We can usefully examine two approaches to populism that focus on the particular style or discourse of its leaders: The Politics of Fear (2021) by Ruth Wodak and The Global Rise of Populism Performance, Political Style and Representation (2016) by Benjamin Moffitt. Wodak clearly brings attention to the use of fear by extreme far-right populist leaders and what she further refers to as the “normalization” of its use. Far-right populism in Wodak’s analysis exhibits four principal features: nationalism, native nationalism and anti-pluralism; anti-elitism; authoritarianism or

12 

M. Macaulay

hierarchical leadership, and historical mythologizing (2021, p. 34). These four key elements are grounded further in central discourse processes: the politics of exclusion, the language of identity, the language of denial and construction of “scapegoats,” as well as the language of charisma, gender and normalization. Wodak gives the example of Nigel Farage and his party UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party). Wodak notes that although Farage is from an upper-middle class background, has gone to a British public school and worked as a banker, “like other leaders of far-­ right populist parties, [he] is able to find the right register with which to convince voters that he is on their side and that he takes them seriously. That far-right populist politicians speak ‘our’ language and manage to address [us] ‘at eye level’ seems to be very important for their voters; they feel understood” (2021, pp.  161–2). Using Erving Goffman (1959), Wodak makes reference to specific areas of far-right leaders’ performance. One primary area is frontstage: “Frontstage is where the performance takes place; it is where the performers and the audience are present” (Goffman, 1959, p.  17 quoted by Wodak). Backstage, in contrast, leaves out the audience. The performers are able to remove their masks and reveal themselves as they are. However, even in backstage, the performer still puts on another mask, that of “loyal party member” within the political field and its “community of practice” (2021, p. 166). Wodak gives the example of Donald Trump, who was recorded in an infamous interview with Billy Bush for Access Hollywood (2005) (reported by The Washington Post [October 7, 2016]), bragging that because of his celebrity, he was able to physically hit on woman with ease: “I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything…Grab them by the pussy. You can do anything” (quoted by Wodak, p.  167). Wodak notes that Trump characterized such bragging as “locker-room talk.” Trump claimed that “This was locker room banter, a private conversation that took place many years ago” (Statement from Donald J.  Trump, Donald Trump Campaign Website, October 7, 2016). What is noteworthy is that such sexist language did not undermine Trump’s campaign. This backstage performance of machismo most certainly did not present him as a loyal party member within a “community of practice,” but Trump was nonetheless able to appeal to the stereotype of a male bragging about his sexual exploits and so generalize his behaviour and restrict it to a specific

1 Introduction 

13

register, that of ‘locker-room talk.’ During this same campaign, Trump also publicly stated frontstage that females who had abortions should be punished (Emily Crockett, Vox, March 30, 2016). Such an ultraconservative persona was designed to appeal to the religious right-wing who saw no contradiction between Trump’s sexual boast on the one hand and his epistemic stance about abortion on the other. This duality of personas was permitted within the context of speaking ‘our’ language. Through positioning of himself as a right-wing Christian, Trump was able to engage in what Wodak refers to as “branding.” As she notes, “An important part of frontstage performativity is the context-dependent construction of the politician’s identity” and specifically “the ways that individual politicians actually managed a positive and affiliative presentation of self ” (point attributed by Wodak to Sclafani [2015]). What is central to far-right populist politicians is their ‘authenticity.’ From the perspective of ‘authenticity,’ Trump’s locker-room talk is not inconsistent with his positioning of himself as a righteous Christian. Rather than a contradiction, it is a means of making the politician ‘one of us.’ As Wodak notes, Trump “is able to successfully convey that he is ‘one of us’, working for ‘the people’, and simultaneously, that he is ‘the best, the one in the know’ who can be trusted” (2021, p. 173). While trust is conveyed largely through co-identification, it is also a function of believing what a politician has to say. Wodak cites the examples of Nigel Farage who hangs out in pubs and denounces smoking bans, and Geert Wilders “joining the chanting of his followers and rages against Moroccans” (p. 174). Trust can be created through co-identification and the use of comparable language or the taking of comparable stances. Farage, the upper-middle class public school banker adopts the persona of a working man who likes his beer by being consistently photographed raising a glass in local pubs with a smile on his face. Wodak points out that charisma also participates in the creation of authenticity and trust. She does not claim that charisma is a function of personality but rather in keeping with authenticity and trust, “charisma in politics has to be linked to the ‘right’ set of social and cultural capital [habitus] within the ‘right’ context. Charisma is therefore socially constructed and has to be publicly recognized” (2021, p. 174). She identifies four principal features of social charisma: the leader as saviour, the leader

14 

M. Macaulay

as ‘ordinary,’ and personal ‘magnetism.’ Charismatic leaders also demonize their enemies. Presentation of oneself as a saviour applies to several populist leaders including Hugo Chávez, Donald Trump, and various right-wing leaders in Europe such as Victor Orban and Geert Wilders. Nigel Farage is clearly able to take on the persona of the ordinary bloke drinking in pubs. Female leaders such as Marine Le Pen (France), Sarah Palin (USA) and Pauline Hanson (Australia) can also be included as projected ‘saviours.’ Palin famously referred to herself as a “momma grizzly” (Momma Grizzly Speech, May 2010). In examining the normalization of the politics of fear, Wodak notes that “far-right populist parties have changed their look and performance—from radical right-wing ‘thugs’ to well-educated and well-­ dressed demagogues, typically overtly ‘soft’, caring and responsible politicians” (2021, p. 259). Thus, accompanying such a softening of the politics of fear is a politics of denial that pertains whereby extreme racism or antisemitism is refuted as being practised. Nonetheless, provocation is employed to generate antagonism of the ‘other.’ Marine Le Pen in an interview with Stephen Sackur maintains that Muslim women wearing Burkinis on French beaches are in fact “terrorists” who by wearing such attire attack French values (HARDtalk, October 10, 2017)). Le Pen is otherwise sophisticated and elegant in her appearance and behaviour. Wodak also notes the appropriation of social media by right-wing populists. There is perhaps no better example of this than Donald Trump’s use of twitter. Complementing Wodak’s analysis of right-wing populist discourse is that of Benjamin Moffitt’s The Global Rise of Populism Performance Political Style and Representation (2016). Moffitt’s central thesis is that populism IS a political style. Moffitt maintains the “The emphasis on performance shifts the focus from forms of representation to the actual mechanisms of representation—mediated enactments, televisual performances, rallies, speeches, riots, use of certain dress, vernacular and so forth—and in doing so, stresses the very important [and sometimes forgotten] role of presentation in re-presentation” (2016, p.  49). Moffitt identifies the features of populism as a Political Style as “Appeal to ‘the People’ versus ‘the Elite,’” what he terms ‘Bad Manners’ and the presence of a “Crisis, Breakdown, Threat.” With regard to the latter, Moffitt

1 Introduction 

15

speaks of a “performance of crisis.” Crisis as a notion is related to “the breakdown between citizens and their representatives, but can also be related to immigration, economic difficulties, perceived injustice, military threat, social change or other issues” (2016, p.  45). This in itself explains very little in terms of differentiation of populism with other political phenomena. Moffitt maintains that “Populism gets its impetus from the perception of crisis, breakdown or threat [Taggart 2000] and at the same time aims to induce crisis through dramatization and performance” (2016, p. 45). Moffitt’s idea of crisis as performative on the part of a populist leader distinguishes his approach from that of Canovan (1981), Laclau (2007) and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). What is also distinctive is his notion of ‘bad manners.’ Moffitt builds from Pierre Ostiguy’s (2009) distinction of a high and low style in political discourse. Ostiguy maintains that rather than a right-left dichotomy in political discourse, we should examine a ‘high-low’ dichotomy. This distinction between high and low has two spectra: socio-cultural and political-cultural. On the socio-cultural spectrum the politician employing the ‘high’ style shows composure, good manners and behaviour, ethical behaviour as well as rationality, and a rather stiff, boring or rigid persona. In contrast, the politician employing the ‘low’ style is more colourful and demonstrative, shows raw or popular tastes, and in language uses slang and swearing. Donald Trump’s right-wing Christian persona and his machismo persona cover both bases. On the political-cultural spectrum, the politician employing the ‘high’ style is impersonal, restrained, formal, rational or legalistic as well as rational. The politician employing the ‘low’ style on this spectrum is the opposite: close to the people, personalistic, immediate, decisive and leadership driven (2016, p.  59). There is little of the first style in a politician such as Trump or Sarah Palin, but a great deal of the second in these ‘characters’ or their personas. Sarah Palin speaks of herself as a “grizzly momma,” while Trump tells his audience in his Announcement Speech (2015) that it needs “a leader that wrote The Art of the Deal.” Using this dichotomy on the socio-cultural and politic cultural spectra, Moffitt references Hugo Chávez: “Hugo Chávez would often make crude and overly offensive remarks about his opponents. Marine Le Pen has accused political rivals of being paedophiles [Warren 2011]; while

16 

M. Macaulay

Beppo Grillo held ‘V-Day’ rallies against Italian politicians and the media—the V standing for Vaffancullo, an Italian expletive” (2016, p. 62). With respect to charisma, Moffitt notes that “The notion of ‘bad manners’ can act as a supplement to a concept that is often used and abused in the literature on populism in explaining populist leaders’ charisma” (2016, p. 62). Moffit maintains that charisma can both be and not be evidenced by populist leaders, but that the concept of ‘bad manners’ in itself can help us “understand how the flouting of ‘appropriate’ behaviour can appeal in very different contexts” (2016, p. 63). Moffitt makes a further distinction in the rhetoric of populist leaders. He maintains that populist leaders combine within themselves both ‘ordinariness’ and ‘extraordinariness.’ ‘Ordinariness’ can be performed, according to Moffitt, largely through what he calls ‘bad manners.’ This Moffitt also folds into ‘charisma.’ However, ‘ordinariness’ involves co-­ identification of the leader with ‘the people.’ Moffit notes that “‘bad manners’ can manifest in a number of different ways, including self-­ presentation, use of slang, political incorrectness, fashion or other displays of contempt for ‘usual’ practice of ‘respectable’ politics” (p. 58). For Donald Trump, being ordinary was performed by being ‘plain-spoken’ (low style) and using slang. The famous red MAGA baseball caps used in his campaign are also markers of co-identification with the ‘people.’ For Nigel Farage there is an entire change in persona from upper-middle class banker to working class pub goer. Hugo Chávez [2005] more accurately “presented himself as a ‘farm kid…from a very poor family’, and used a folksy and common language on his television show Allo Presidente” (2016, p. 57). Further, “Pauline Hanson [2007, 59-60] has made much of her regular nature as an owner of a takeaway fast food shop in suburban Queensland” (2016, p. 57). Such features of ‘ordinariness’ are either naturally come by or are acquired as part of a rhetoric or semiotic. ‘Extraordinariness’ is the contrastive marker to ‘ordinariness.’ The best example of this is Donald Trump’s assertion of himself as an ‘unmet need’ in his Announcement Speech (2015): “We need a leader that wrote The Art of the Deal.” Trump’s claim to the Presidency of the U.S. was his deal making ability as a businessman. Equally, Silvio Berlusconi of Italy claimed that he was “the Jesus Christ of politics” (quoted by Moffitt from BBC News 2008). Hugo Chávez claimed to be the “reincarnation of

1 Introduction 

17

Simon Bolivar” (2016, p.  63). The notion of being the saviour of the people is consistent with extraordinariness. This is most usually a feature of right-wing populists whose co-identification with ‘the people’ is so strong that action on the part of the leader correlates to action by ‘the people.’ Extraordinariness is also correlated to sexual prowess or extreme physical health. The leader is perceived as having super-powers. Moffitt maintains that it is his attention to dichotomy of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’ that distinguishes his work from other political discourse theorists. This distinction, however, is largely a common place since at least the work of Ionescu and Gellner (1969). The importance of Moffitt’s work on discourse is his application of Pierre Ostiguy’s (2009) analysis of ‘high’/‘low’ style to populist discourse itself. Although not in all cases such as Preston Manning in this volume, the complementarity of ‘ordinariness’ and ‘extraordinariness’ in populist leaders provides insight into populism as a style.

Greimasian Narrative This volume also employs Narrative Theory from Algirdas Julien Greimas (1966), specifically his Actantial Model. Greimas’ theory of narrative derives in large part from that of Vladimir Propp. In his Morphology of the Folktale (2003), Propp identified 31 functions within the Russian folktales he examined. The importance of these functions is that they were sequential, one following the other. A specific function could be left out in one tale, but those remaining in any given tale would observe a defined sequence. Propp also distinguished specific roles from actual characters in a story. One character could in fact perform more than one role. Propp distinguished 7 roles: the dispatcher, the hero, the false hero, the helper, the villain, the princess or prize, and the donor. Greimas adapted these roles into his Actantial Model or Square. Retaining the notion of a ‘quest’ upon which a narrative is based, Greimas identified the key actant as the sender. On the Axis of Knowledge, the sender ‘sends’ the subject or hero on his or her quest. The hero functions on an Axis of Desire to obtain an object. This object in turn is received by a receiver. The complication in Greimas’ Actantial Square is performed by the opponent who acts against

18 

M. Macaulay

the subject/hero on the Axis of Power. On this same Axis of Power, the subject/hero also has a helper who helps him or her to obtains the object. In a very simple tale, a king could send a prince or subject/hero to rescue a princess. If the princess is rescued by the prince or subject/hero, she could be received by the king. The ‘king’ as a character could function in two actantial roles, as both sender and receiver. If the prince marries the princess, he could also function as a receiver (of the princess). The complication or problem within the narrative is served by what Propp refers to as ‘villainy.’ Thus, the hero experiences opposition on the Axis of Power from an opponent that could be realized by a dragon or any other potential enemy. Greimas’ Actantial Model can have broad application. If we take the example of Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again!” that Laclau (2007) would understand as a popular demand, Donald Trump as a ‘character’ serves three actantial roles: he sends himself on a quest the object of which is to make America great again. He functions as his own helper by virtue of his expertise as a businessman. His opponent is a combined force of American corporate industry, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. The receiver in his quest is ‘America’ itself. Not all political discourse can be analysed through narrative or as narrative, but narrative analysis does allow us to see in a dynamic way the nature of the interactions between parties in the political realm and how they understand themselves and the roles they play in the political context of situation.

Chapters in this Book This book covers five different realizations of North American populism over time. It begins with an analysis of the People’s Party in 1892 and 1896. It then transfers in both time and country to the Prairie Populism of Canada in the 1920’s through to the 1960’s. Attention is then given to the populism of Preston Manning and the Reform Party in Canada from the 1980’s to the 1990’s. This is followed by a return to the United States and the contemporary and comparative populism of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. The book ends with an examination of the equally contemporary populism of the Ford brothers in Ontario, Canada. This book

1 Introduction 

19

makes no claim to being an historical examination of populism in North America; however, the specific realizations of populism are analysed in temporal sequence to provide an overview of the phenomenon of populism in time and in the two countries of the United States and Canada. The purpose of this book is to examine various expressions of populism in North America from the 1890’s until the present. The focus is on populism as a political discourse both in the rhetorical sense and in how such key notions as ‘the people,’ ‘the elite’ and ‘the will of the people,’ are constructed in such discourse. I do not presume these to be a priori notions but rather derived notions as an outcrop of human interaction in specific social contexts. I therefore understand these notions as dynamic rather than as stative. Chapter 2 in this book looks at the principal manifestos of the People’s Party, specifically the famous Preamble to the Party’s Omaha Convention in 1892, the two platforms of the People’s Party in 1892 and 1896 and finally the Preface to A Call to Arms (1892) written by James B. Weaver who ran successfully as leader of the party in 1892. In examining the discourse of the People’s Party, what is most apparent is the definition and redefinition of the concept of ‘the people.’ Ernesto Laclau’s main argument is that ‘the people’ is a constructed concept, rather than a given or a priori entity. Much of the focus on the discourse of the People’s Party is on who ‘the people’ are and what they are in comparison to their oppressors or enemies. A major transition takes place from ‘the people’ being defined as “the plain people” to “the patriotic people.” The “plain people” are defined by an absence of ‘decoration’ or class markers. Their opponents, who the Preamble, written by Ignatius Donnelly, refers to as “capitalists,” have deprived “the plain people” of their ability to simply maintain their livelihood and existence for themselves and their families. This is the break or rupture that Laclau refers to. A division is created between “trash” and “millionaires,” the latter of which concern themselves only with the worship of money. A major transition takes place when ‘the people’ are redefined as “the producing class.” As a “producing class,” those in the People’s Party envision themselves not as patients or objects of suffering but as subjects of their own present and future. In this reconception the People’s Party can look both backward Janus-like to the American Revolution of 1776 and forward to revolution in the 1890’s.

20 

M. Macaulay

A key redefinition of ‘the people’ is in James B. Weaver’s Preface to A Call to Arms (1892). Weaver redefines ‘the people’ as “the patriotic people.” “The patriotic people” complements definition of ‘the people’ as “the producing class.” As a ‘producing class’ the people claim status and legitimacy for themselves. They are agentive rather than suffering and passive. Producers can see themselves positively in contrast to non-­ producers. The People’s Party Platform of 1892 references the need for control of railroads for the specific reason that the railroads are the chief means by which what is produced can be brought to local and distant markets. This is a vision of identity that goes beyond being ‘plain,’ a worker, or labourer. This is a vision of identity as a producer within a social matrix. With this status comes the need to assert this status. In Weaver’s compelling Preface he constructs an argument for a “patriotic people.” Just as the Omaha Conference or First Conference of the People’s Party took place on July 4, 1892 with reference to the American Revolution, so Weaver in his reanalysis of the “plain people” into the “patriotic people” provides the same sort of agency to ‘the people.’ Weaver positions ‘the people’ as warriors who use the ballot as a weapon to overthrow an oppressor. An absolutely central concern for nineteenth-century populism in the United States is democracy. ‘Democracy’ can be understood as an “empty signifier” in Laclauan terms, but for Weaver writing in 1892 it was a means metaphorically whereby the ballot could act as a bullet and so bring about a second revolution and freedom, not from external enemies, but from those within and principally “an aggressive plutocracy” that had “usurped the Government.” Government is simultaneously a goal for Weaver but also a means to a goal, specifically economic independence. The People’s Party was an extension of this ballot-box bullet designed to reclaim livelihood, identity, status and real economic self-determination. The verbal process of ‘calling’ to action is simultaneously a verbal action of identification and thus a bringing into being of ‘the people.’ Chapter 3 examines “Prairie Populism” in Canada that in many ways is an extension of the earlier American Movements of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. A key focus for Canadian Prairie Populism was “the Protective Tariff.” Because of trade with Great Britain and with the United States, the Protective Tariff caused an increase in the cost of

1 Introduction 

21

farming equipment and everyday goods. The Farmers’ Platform 1918 argued for free trade and the implementation of “direct taxation.” Thus, rather than the government, either Conservative or Liberal, imposing protective tariffs on goods coming into the country to generate resources for the government while also protecting industries within the country, “direct taxation” would apply to all Canadians. This popular demand in Laclauan terms implied a citizenry of the country or otherwise a ‘people.’ Free trade as another popular demand also generated a notion of ‘the people’ since it served to aggregate the unmet needs and social demands made by a new citizenry that felt such extreme hardship that agriculture itself was under threat as the principal occupation of the country. Rather than a revolution, what The Farmers’ Platform demanded was “responsible government.” The idea of a “responsible government” presumes a ‘people’ to which the government must be responsible, that is, to which a government must respond. Demand was made for removal of punitive tariffs, and direct taxation but also such popular demands as the public ownership of “railway, water, and aerial transportation, telephone, telegraph and express systems…natural power and of coal mining.” Such popular demands echo those of the People’s Party. In the discourse of The Farmers’ Platform there is transformation of ‘the masses’ as an undistinguished whole to a Canadian people divorced from British culture and reconstructed as a ‘populus’ that asserts ownership of transportation, communication and resources. The Farmers’ Platform  serves as a blueprint for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation’s Regina Manifesto (July 1933). This Manifesto represents the elite as “a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists.” What it proposes in contrast is “responsible government.” The ‘the will of the people’ is realized through government planning. There is a “public interest” furthered by “public meetings” which bring about “public financing,” “public boards,” and even “public servants.” The ‘people’ are generated in this Manifesto by their unmet needs and social demands and in turn by their popular demands culminating in a desire for fair prices for goods and a direct taxation system. Direct taxation generates the means to remove slums and build hospitals, libraries, schools, community halls, parks, recreational projects along with reforestation and rural electrification. Such radical transformation of Canadian

22 

M. Macaulay

society requires the “socialization of all financial machinery” as well as “social ownership.” The “socialization of all financial machinery” is also proposed as a popular demand by William Aberhart who became the first Social Credit Premier of Alberta (1935–1943). Aberhart saw the “financiers” if not the “industrialists” as an elite undermining the Albertan farmer and worker. The American farmers who gave rise to the People’s Party suffered at the hands of the “crop lien” system. In such a system farmers became indebted to a “furnishing merchant,” who set up a credit system to provide for farm equipment, food and fertilizer. The farmer could become so indebted that the merchants could actually dictate what crops could be produced. Aberhart’s use of the hot medium of radio allowed for the quite literal broadcasting of the unmet needs of the Albertan farmers. He quotes from one young farmer: “[The bank manager] started abusing the farmers for not knowing how to farm….the farmers could make money even during these days if they wouldn’t try to get rich all at once. I tell you, these fellows can tell the farmer off, can’t they?” Aberhart himself responds with empathy: “I suppose some of these financiers would like you to crawl on your hands and knees to rake the field with your fingers” (William Aberhart Radio Broadcasts, [March 26, 1935]). Through his broadcasts Aberhart could give voice to the unmet needs and social demands of both farmers and workers during the Depression. The popular demand he is known for is “Social Credit,” a system by which the government would lend over a period of a year a given amount to all Albertans. Aberhart’s great rhetorical feat was to conceptually compare this system to the existing banking system when in fact the purpose of “Social Credit” was to replace the banker or financier as a non-producing ‘elite’ with a governmental loan assistance programme designed to allow the farmer and worker to borrow without losing livelihood and welfare. Aberhart’s scheme was in some ways as radical as that of the CCF but not as encompassing of government as a whole. The scheme that he proposed is not altogether different from Universal Basic Income now being proposed to sustain people living below the poverty line. In his allegory Mouseland, Tommy Douglas as leader of the CCF in Saskatchewan presents a clear populist division between mice as ‘the people’ and cats as ‘the elite.’ In Laclauan terms we are also presented with

1 Introduction 

23

unmet needs, specifically too large entrances for mice into their homes, and defined speeds for which they can walk and run. The conundrum taken up by Douglas is why these unmet needs are not taken up by the mice and recognized as such. Perversely, the mice keep voting for cats to represent them in parliament. Douglas’ concern goes back to the idea of “responsible government”; that is, a government responsible to the ‘people’ in this case, mice. Responsible government is the dominant theme of Canadian Prairie Populism, the idea that there should be concord between the ‘people’ and their government. There is no revolutionary past for Canadians to turn to; nonetheless, the issue of government is the central popular demand and ‘responsible government’ in Laclauan terms is the central realization of an equivalential chain of unmet needs. In Chapter 4, I focus on Preston Manning’s largely sole creation of the Reform Party. Manning is perhaps the best exemplification of what Canovan (1981) refers to as “politican’s populism” that relies on a politician’s skill to unify a ‘people.’ Manning’s populism represents a radical shift from agrarian populism to politician’s populism. We can also refer to it as constructed populism. Manning’s main achievement was not so much to unify a ‘people’ as to create a people. Manning was not gifted as an orator, but he was gifted as a political writer and organizer. Through use of the Reform Party’s Blue Books, which were small and were quite literally to hand inside or outside the home, he sets out an argument for regional disparity and unfairness. Rather than ‘Canadians,’ or ‘Albertans,’ or ‘Saskatchewanians,’ Manning constructs an argument for the existence of ‘The West.’ The unmet needs of the West are largely seen through the lens of privilege for ‘The East’ and specifically Quebec by means of the Meech Lake Accord1 and attempts to nationalize the oil industry. Rather than see Canada in terms of two “founding nations,” the English and the French, Manning constructs a new set of identities that in large part reflect a new economic reality with ‘The West’ as a primary source of energy production through oil production. What Manning achieves is a form of conflation of ‘The West’ with the oil industry and “common people” themselves. The oil industry, the common people and The West are one. He achieves this in his Blue Books with the use of popular  The Meech Lake Accord sought to provide Quebec with its own “distinct identity” within Canada.

1

24 

M. Macaulay

demands that in themselves implicate unmet needs on the part of ‘The West’: a triple-E Senate (elected, equal and effective) and direct democracy through referenda. Rhetorically, Manning achieves this conflation by creating through the Blue Books a congregation of believers. There is very little factual or logical analysis in the Blue Books. Significantly, two verbs are dominant in his discourse within these books: believe and reject. Before there is construction of a ‘West’ there are reformers who believe: “Reformers believe [my emphasis] that there is undeniable evidence of unfair treatment of resource-producing regions, especially in the treatment of Western Canada.” Manning constructs “reformers” as a congregation much as William Aberhart does for farmers and workers through radio in the 1930’s. Reformers are a set of believers. The Blue Books function therefore very much as written sermons that accompany a very particular evangelical belief in the need for personal connection to God rather than transformative action through good works. Manning exploits a standard populist position of enmity between ‘producers’ and ‘non-producers.’ ‘The West’ is seen as resource-producing while ‘The East’ is seen as exploitative and run by “bureaucrats, pressure groups and political Professionals.” As with other populist movements, a popular demand for major transformation in government is made. There is need for referenda so that ‘the people’ can directly choose legislative policy as well as a senate that is elected by the people and which can genuinely represent regional interests. A popular demand for democracy is central to a further overarching popular demand: “The West Wants In!” What Manning achieves through such constructed populism is ‘The West’ as a petrostate that achieves personhood that can express its will through direct democracy and a complementary senate. The personhood of ‘The West’ is the key means by which Manning through his Blue Books creates a ‘people’ and in so doing a recalibration of Canada itself. Chapter 5 in this volume returns to the United States to examine two principal populist leaders and movements, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. If we compare Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, it is not simply the case that we have an example of “right-wing populism” and “left-­ wing populism” in the early part of the twenty-first century. While we see consistency in the positioning of Bernie Sanders, we see variation in that

1 Introduction 

25

of Donald Trump. What won Trump the American Presidential election of 2016 was his embrace of the working class and his focus on job creation. Although xenophobic in part in his rhetoric, his focus on jobs and the loss of jobs to neo-liberal economic policies and the attention he gave to the popular demand “Make America Great Again!” drew crowds to him. I examine three speeches by Trump, one given in Wilmington, Ohio on September 1, 2016, one in Youngstown, Ohio on July 25, 2017 and a final speech given on January 6, 2021. We see three Donald Trumps in these three speeches. The first Trump represents or positions himself as being the voice of those in his Ohio audience: “I am your voice.” If we look as certain of his commissives, they resonate with the People’s Party of the 1890’s: “We are going to stop the product dumping, the unfair foreign subsidies, and the currency manipulation that is absolutely killing our companies. And by the way killing our jobs.” The elite “killing our jobs” is represented by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. In contrast to this economic elite manipulating currency, granting subsidies to foreign companies and failing to allow for competition in pricing are the “forgotten people” whom Trump addresses and voices. Trump also positions himself as a “jobs President.” In his Wilmington, Ohio Speech, we see classic populism with Trump as the voice of a forgotten people combatting an economic elite represented by Hillary Clinton and Obama. The loss of jobs is the key unmet need leading to the eventual popular demand of making America great again, which is to say the re-sourcing of jobs for American workers. Donald Trump’s Youngstown, Ohio Speech given on July 25, 2017 less than a year after his Wilmington, Ohio Speech represents a major shift in positioning and representation of the world. Trump devotes a part of this speech to epideixis or self-praise. In his self-praise Trump states, “But I think that with few exceptions no president has done anywhere near what we’ve done in his first six months. Not even close. But they don’t let you know. They don’t write about it. That unemployment last month hit a 16-year low. Since my election, we’ve added much more than 1 million jobs. Think of that.” Trump gives himself credit for an economic recovery that began under Barack Obama. The re-sourcing of manufacturing jobs remains aspirational. Trump’s overall focus, however, shifts dramatically. Rather than a voice of the people, Trump now positions himself as a

26 

M. Macaulay

sheriff bringing order to the streets of American cities. He employs two principal tropes, that of the ‘frontier’ and that of the ‘Wild West.’ With the latter Trump fully embraces what Wodak (2021) refers to as “The Politics of Fear.” In this politics of fear Trump attacks not just ‘the other’ theoretically invading and savaging American cities in a drug war, but fellow Americans who through “sanctuary cities” aid and abet such ‘aliens.’ There is both an enemy without, an ‘outsider,’ and an enemy within, complicit Americans who give succour to such aliens. We can say that this rhetoric of the homeland under attack is a key trope of rightwing populism, but it is not prominent in Trump’s earlier presidential campaign speeches that focus more extensively on an economic reality that disadvantages a “forgotten people.” The ‘people’ in Trump’s Youngstown Speech are on the frontier overtaken by hostile forces. Trump’s rhetoric focusses on liberation: “We are actually liberating town and cities. We are liberating—people screaming from their windows, thank you, thank you to the border patrol and to General Kelly’s great people that come in and grab the thugs and throw them the hell out. We are liberating our towns and we are liberating our cities. Can you believe we have to do that?” It is this language of liberation and Trump as a liberator that sets the stage three years prior to Trump’s January 6, 2021 Speech. Trump’s January 6, 2021 Speech, which I refer to as his ‘Numbers Speech,’ since numbers of one kind or another permeate this speech, could not have been given without there being a full three years on Trump’s part devoted to the politics of fear. It is the language of a very specific unmet need, safety, that culminates in the creation not of an American people, but a subset of this people who see themselves on the frontier under threat. Trump devotes a great deal of his time and energy in this speech to the notion of loss and particularly loss of democracy. His appeal like that of James B. Weaver is to a “patriotic people.” But while Weaver sees revolution being achieved through the ballot box, Trump envisions the entire mechanism of democracy in tatters. His key argument is that the Constitution is under attack. The Constitution itself is an unmet need. The social demand Trump makes in this speech is the reclamation of the American Constitution. What he proposes to his audience on the Ellipse in the Washington Capitol is a contradiction: reclamation of the Constitution through its violation, which is to say,

1 Introduction 

27

preventing the formal ratification of Joe Biden as the next President of the United States. By undermining this formal ratification, the Constitution itself is not undermined by rather upheld. ‘The people’ who Trump brings into being through such a social demand are equally as patriotic as those of Weaver in the 1890’s but they act out of fear and on distortion of the truth. In a very simple and also metaphorical sense, Trump’s numbers do not add up. Trump does not incite a mob to action. While Trump in all previous speeches functions as subject in a Greimasian narrative quest, Trump in his January 6, 2021 Speech transfers subjectivity to his audience on the Ellipse who see themselves as Americans preserving democracy and their own Constitution. In his 2019 Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech on March 7, 2019 Sanders refers to Donald Trump as “the most dangerous president in modern American history.” Trump himself represents the elite enemy within whom Sanders opposes. However, Sanders’ speech focusses on ‘justice’ itself as an unmet need. Sanders articulates three types of justice: “economic justice, social justice and environmental justice.” Sanders’ attention in this speech is on economic justice as it is in all his previous speeches. Very much like an Old Testament prophet Sanders represents the antithesis of such justice as an abstraction: “greed.” And very much in keeping with the People’s Party of the 1890’s he attends carefully to corporate greed surrounding the agricultural sector, in Sander’s time period, that of Big Agra or corporate agriculture. Sanders addresses corporate greed in the agricultural sector: “In Vermont, Iowa and all across rural America, we have seen family farmers go out of business as the prices they receive for their products decline rapidly and large agri-business corporations and factory farming take over agriculture…” Farmers are made to buy their seed and even livestock from Big Agra. Weak anti-trust laws have allowed Big Agra to take control over farming and farming communities in rural America. Sanders’ representation of Big Agra as an elite undermining the livelihoods and welfare of the ‘people’ of rural America echoes similar concerns on the part of Western and Southern farmers in the United States in the 1890’s and Canadian farmers in the 1920’s and 30’s. Sanders’ populism has very long roots. Sanders’ signature concerns of universal medicare and the 15 dollar an hour wage are also present in this speech as unmet needs and popular

28 

M. Macaulay

demands. He also brings attention to a new and all-encompassing unmet need of a “Green New Deal” with clear reference to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. Sanders at no time represents himself as a “voice” of the people or as a liberator. Consistent with the idea of ‘the people,’ Sanders represents himself as one of ‘the people,’ specifically as a “brother[].” Rather than employ the metaphor of the body as does Trump, Sanders employs the metaphor of family. Sanders is consistent in positioning of ‘the people’ as family members. Trump, however, varies in his representation, initially constructing ‘the people’ as working class in his construction of their unmet need for jobs; Trump after his election resorts to the politics of fear where ‘the people’ are represented as under siege from both an external and internal enemy. His last January 6, 2021 Speech focusses entirely on the enemy within. Chapter 6 in this volume examines Ford Nation, the ‘people’ associated with the Ford brothers, Rob Ford who was the mayor of Toronto from 2010 to 2014, and Doug Ford who became the Premier of Ontario, Canada in 2018. Very much like that of Donald Trump in his first presidential campaign, the Ford brothers take on government itself as an ‘elite.’ Such positioning of government goes back to the People’s Party, the Prairie populism of the 1930’s and certainly that of Preston Manning’s Reform Party. Bernie Sanders’ focus is far more on corporate greed rather than on government itself. The Ford brothers combine small ‘c’ conservatism with a populist focus on a wasteful elite. This elite is constructed by one Canadian icon, Don Cherry, as “latte drinkers.” In his campaign for Mayor of Toronto, Rob Ford positioned himself against the downtown Toronto effete elite that could afford 5-dollar designer coffees in favour of those in the suburbs of the city, specifically Ford Nation. Crucial to Rob and Doug Ford’s success as politicians is their construction of ‘the little guy’ and their co-identification with ‘the little guy.’ Both brothers were millionaires, co-owning Decca Labels created by their father, a businessman. They drove Cadillac Escalades. Nonetheless, they represented themselves, like Donald Trump, as a voice ‘of ’ the people and ‘for’ the people. In Moffitt’s (2016) terms, they were able to achieve or construct ‘ordinariness’ around themselves. For Rob Ford, this is perhaps his greatest political achievement. He was able to mirror the people he wished to serve.

1 Introduction 

29

Rob Ford’s most effective means for mirroring ‘the people’ was to present the notion of a “gravy train” in local government. Both brothers created a YouTube channel, largely as a means of getting around regular media. In one episode ((Episode 3, Let them Eat Cake, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s), Rob Ford directly attacks the councillors of amalgamated Toronto as an elite serving themselves rather than their constituents: “Let me tell you what councillors get for free which I have never taken as a councillor. I’ve been down there 14 years. Every councillor gets a free zoo pass. Parking at the zoo—free admission. The average person has to pay 23 dollars. Free rides and not just for them for the whole family. And that’s just the zoo. They get a free metro pass. That’s equivalent to about 1500 dollars a year.” Ford exploits the lexeme free to implicate that city councillors are getting perks that they do not earn, while the “average person” does have to earn the money to pay for metro and zoo passes. Rob Ford very effectively sets up a contrast between those who gouge the system and those who have to live within it. Running for Premier of the Province of Ontario Doug Ford in 2018 sets up the same dichotomy regarding the CEO of HydroOne: “I tell ya he gave out, get ready for these figures, 14 million dollars of bonuses to all his executives, eight or ten top executives. So he’s giving out 14 million dollars of your money, my money, and it’s your money by the way, on top of it they are all making two three million dollars a year” (Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018). Corruption within government is largely represented not in terms of policy decisions but in terms of either bureaucrats or politicians milking the system to serve themselves and thus misspending taxpayers’ dollars. For the “average person” this is a violation or loss. The key unmet need is honest government that serves the interests of the people rather than exploiting them. The two brothers differ in terms of their ‘ordinariness’ and ‘extraordinariness.’ Rob Ford, who was a drug addict with well-publicized problems, consistently represented himself as a ‘family man.’ His problems with drugs and alcohol did not detract from this representation. Ford went to work, did a day’s work, came home and played with his kids just like every other average dad. He also represented himself as an agent on behalf of ‘the people’: “I have cleaned up Toronto Community housing. They’ve got my number. I go right in there. I don’t let them live with

30 

M. Macaulay

holes in their walls anymore. No windows or cockroaches or mice running around. Absolutely not. I stick up for the poor people of this city” (FordNation, YouTube, Episode 5, Looking out for Everyone, http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s). That his constituents have “got [his] number” is the principal factor in both Rob Ford’s ordinariness and his extraordinariness. Ford is both approachable and agentive. Unlike Donald Trump and more like Bernie Sanders, Rob Ford represents himself as one of the people themselves. Doug Ford appropriates much of the populist rhetoric of his brother, Rob. However, despite the ubiquitous use of folks as an appellation, Doug Ford positions himself to a far greater extent as an energy or force who gets things done. In this he parallels Donald Trump rather than Bernie Sanders. Nonetheless, like his brother, Doug Ford also effectively combines ordinariness and extraordinariness. A key unmet need represented by his campaign in 2018 was a “Buck a Beer.” This slogan, which Laclau terms an “empty signifier,” summed up Ford’s agency. This ad featured a regular beer can with the slogan “Buck a Beer” and the byline “Doug’s bringing it back” on the front of the can. Quite literally, Doug Ford was bringing back the cost of a beer at 1 dollar. While not as all-encompassing as the empty signifier “Make America Great Again!”, “Buck a Beer” represented an equivalent unmet need and popular demand for a better life like that lived in the past. “Buck a Beer” is more clearly focussed on the working class for whom it is a pleasure after a day’s work to come home, open the fridge and have a beer. The ‘beer’ signifies a way of life, largely under threat by a governmental elite who game the system. Both Fords combine a very powerful representation of an exploitative and ineffective elite with their own articulation of unmet needs on the part of Ford Nation that extends from a dollar can of beer to underground transportation to uncorrupt government. With the Fords, there is a more modest populism that reflects the unmet needs of working people in their day to day lives. The chapters in this volume examine populism in the North American social context over time from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first century. The populist notion of ‘the people’ is constructed and reconstructed through each realization of a populist movement in either the United States or Canada. We see strong parallels between the People’s

1 Introduction 

31

Party in the 1890’s and Prairie Populism in Canada from the teens to the sixties of the twentieth century. There is a consistent theme of failed government or bureaucracy and resultant hardship by ‘the people’ who define and redefine themselves. Significantly, while the People’s Party articulates ‘the people’ as “the plain people,” the Ford brothers in the teens of the twenty-first century see themselves as representing ‘the little guy.’ Donald Trump positions himself as the voice of “the forgotten people.” Bernie Sanders speaks of himself as a family member whose members lack “economic justice.” Preston Manning creates a new entity, the ‘West’ that “wants in!” Each movement articulates unmet needs that transform into social demands and ultimately popular demands and in so doing expresses a rupture between a given ‘people’ and a defined ‘elite.’

2 The People’s Party

Populism as a political force in North America originates with the creation of the People’s Party in the 1890’s in the United States. This populism evolves out of the complaints of western and southern farmers who appealed to a return to the values of the American Revolution and the Constitution. In the west, promise of access to vast land resources gave rise to a settler population that thrived until the 1880’s when drought and crop failure began to affect homesteads (McKenna, 1974, p. 85). Prior to the establishment of a People’s Party, the Farmers’ Alliance came into being to address western alienation from Eastern corporate interests, and particularly the Railway Barons. By 1892, a new People’s Party held its first national convention in Omaha, Nebraska on the 116th anniversary of the United States Declaration of Independence, July 4. This date was not happenstance. The People’s Party deliberately echoed the ideals of the original American Revolution, specifically that of independence from external rule or governance.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_2

33

34 

M. Macaulay

Jefferson and Jackson Both Thomas Jefferson, the 2nd President of the United States, and Andrew Jackson, the 7th President, serve as forerunners of American populism in the People’s Party. We see in their writings a clear and inspiring concept of ‘the people’ and specifically the American people. Informed by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Jefferson makes a primary assertion in the Declaration of Independence: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuits of Happiness—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving just powers from the consent of the governed—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government. (Declaration of Independence, taken from McKenna, 1974, pp. 8–9)

In the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson echoes Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of a people’s will, that Government cannot govern without the consent or will of the people. This is a central principle of democracy, but it is also a central principle of populism. Jefferson constructs for ‘the people’ a set of rights including life, liberty and happiness, but also and most significantly the right of the people “to alter or to abolish [government].” Jefferson’s ‘people’ is a political people, with an agenda of livelihood and well-being as well as good governance. The centralization of ‘the people’ in political governance inspires not just the People’s Party but also writers such as Susan B. Anthony who argued for women’s right to vote. Jefferson in a letter to Jean Nicolas de Meusnier, 1786, also sets out the clear divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’: “An industrious farmer occupies a more dignified place in the scale of beings, whether moral or political, than a lazy lounger, valuing himself on his family, too proud to work, and drawing out a miserable existence by eating on the surplus of other men’s labor, which is the sacred fund of the helpless poor” (quoted by McKenna, 1974, p. 14). In this letter to de Meusnier, Jefferson

2  The People’s Party 

35

anticipates the distinction made by the People’s Party between the producing class and the non-producing class. We see the same distinction made by the Chartists (Laclau, 2007, p. 90). Andrew Jackson’s early populism is most evident in his famous Veto Message, Washington, July 10, 1832, (taken from McKenna, 1974, pp. 74–84). Jackson’s principal concern is with monopoly. In opposing the establishment of the Second Bank of the United States, Jackson saw this bank as a vehicle both for the rich or an ‘elite’ and for foreign investors, a secondary elite. Jackson opposes the establishment of a second charter for the Bank of the United States by virtue of a deficit for the “American people”: “Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank must come directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American people” (McKenna, 1974, p.75). As well as financial injustice done to the American people, Jackson very clearly sets out an argument to governance: Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government … but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government. (McKenna, 1974, p. 82)

Jackson opposes not ‘distinctions’ within society, but “artificial distinctions.” Such artificial distinctions come about because one group within the society has the power to “secur[e] favors to themselves” while the other does not. Like Jefferson before him, Jackson grants “the humble members of society” the “right to complain of the injustice of their Government.” Jackson like Jefferson centralizes ‘the people’ within governance. In maintaining that the humble members have a right to complain, he articulates a right to a specifically verbal process, complaint, that can be registered through democratic practice. Jackson’s 1832 speech itself is one such complaint against an elite, both home-grown and

36 

M. Macaulay

foreign, that he represents as both literally impoverishing the people and equally depriving them “of the rights of the States or the liberties of the people” (McKenna, 1974, p. 77). Donald Trump hung a portrait of Jackson in the Oval Office to reference this distinction between an elitist native and foreign monopoly and the people, but Jackson’s more far-­ reaching concerns with the verbal process of complaint and governance more directly influences the People’s Party in the later period of the nineteenth century.

People’s Party Platform: Preamble In its 1892 People’s Party Platform, the People’s Party set out the key principles that formed its opposition to the two establishment parties, the Democrats and Republicans.1 It is important to note that this party understood itself not as revolutionary but as one of reform. It did not attempt to construct new ideological principles so much as return to a previously established ideology of freedom and responsibility. In this respect the People’s Party based itself on a romantic vision of an idealized Past: Assembled on the anniversary of the birthday of the nation, and filled with the Spirit of the grand general and chief who established our independence, we seek to restore the government of the Republic to the hands of “the plain people,” with which class it originated. (Preamble, People’s Party Platform, 1892)

The Preamble of the new People’s Party contextualizes its articulation of unmet needs in terms of a vision of loss—that of the Republic itself, and with this loss, concomitant loss of “independence.” The Preamble expresses nostalgia for this lost Republican past by “the plain people,” and further sets out the causes of this loss. These are represented as corruption in governance, intimidation in the voting process, control of newspapers and thus information, prostration of small businesses, mortgages,  The Preamble was written and read out by Ignatius Donnelly (Kazin, 2017, p. 28).

1

2  The People’s Party 

37

impoverishment of labour, and land impoverishment and its subsequent concentration in “the hands of capitalists.” The Preamble maintains that “The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few.” The upshot of this theft is that “we breed the two great classes—tramps and millionaires.” Use of the verb breed employs an agrarian metaphor that speaks of the creation or the bringing into being of two diverse classes, those ‘with’ and those ‘without.’ There is no representation of a thriving middle class. What is particularly significant in the Preamble is the negative positioning of the two major American parties, the Democrats and Republicans: We have witnessed for more than a quarter of a century the struggles of the two great political parties for power and plunder, while grievous wrongs have been inflicted upon the suffering people. We charge that the controlling influences dominating these parties have permitted the existing dreadful conditions to develop without serious effort to prevent or restrain them. Neither do they promise us any substantial reform. They have agreed together to ignore, in the coming campaign, every issue but one. They propose to drown the outcries of a plundered people with the uproar of a sham battle over tariff, so that capitalists, corporations, national banks, rings, trusts, watered stock, the demonetization of silver and the usurers may all be lost sight of. They propose to sacrifice our homes, lives, and children on the altar of mammon; to destroy the multitude in order to secure corruption funds from the millionaires. (Preamble, People’s Party Platform, 1892)

Using the verb witness, the Preamble presents what it understands as evidence and testament to a major failure on the part of the two major parties, Democrats and Republicans. They are negatively positioned as failing to govern and thus should not have the right to govern. Regarding the formulation of a populist position, Ernesto Laclau argues that “A notion of constitutive antagonism, of a radical frontier, requires, on the contrary, a broken space … One first dimension of the break is that, at its root, there is the experience of a lack, a gap which has emerged in the harmonious continuity of the social order. There is a fullness of the community which is missing” (2007, p. 85). It is precisely this lack or gap

38 

M. Macaulay

which the Preamble bears witness to. What has been lost is the power or capacity of the governing parties to govern rationally and fairly. The Preamble collectivizes the Democrats and Republicans into one entity or group that in turn is opposed by another, “the suffering people.” As Laclau states, “populism involves the division of the social scene into two camps. This division presupposes the presence of some privileged signifiers which condense in themselves the signification of a whole antagonistic camp [the ‘regime’, the ‘oligarchy’, the ‘dominant groups’, and so on, for the oppressed underdog—these signifiers acquire this articulating role according, obviously, to a contextual history]” (2007, p. 87). In this particular context, the “regime” is understood as a combination of the Democratic and Republican parties that ignores the suffering of the “plain people” to engage in a “sham battle over tariff.” This is the “break” that Laclau speaks of. Governance is separated from the governed. This break gives rise to a further division, that between “millionaires” and “tramps.” The latter divide arises from the “sacrifice [of ] our homes, lives, and children on the altar of mammon.” The Preamble deliberately employs the language of the Bible and specifically the New Testament: “No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon” (Matthew 6:24). A metaphor is employed whereby an abstraction ‘wealth,’ referencing the accumulation of money, is transformed into a god, “mammon,” that requires sacrifice. Making money is made metaphorical as the practising of a religion that requires sacrifice. Devotion to God is replaced by devotion to money. Further, what is sacrificed is the people themselves, specifically their homes, their lives and their children, thus both their present (lives, homes) and their future (children). The two existing political parties are negatively positioned as serving a false god whose worship entails both murder of the plain people and loss of the Republic. Capitalists and the two political parties are represented as heathen enemies of the Christian God and the Republic itself. The Republic in turn is understood as the realization of a Christian ideal of governance. Although church and state are separate, the idealized state is seen as both Christian and good.

2  The People’s Party 

39

At the heart of the break between governor and governed the Preamble puts forth a particular economic analysis that differs fundamentally from that of the heathen capitalists who sacrifice the people’s present and past: Our country finds itself confronted by conditions for which there is no precedent in the history of the world: our annual agricultural productions amount to billions of dollars in value, which must, within a few weeks or months, be exchanged for billions of dollars’ worth of commodities consumed in their production: the existing currency supply is wholly inadequate to make this exchange: the results are falling prices, the formation of combines and rings, the impoverishment of the producing class. We pledge ourselves that if given power we will labor to correct these evils by wise and reasonable legislation, in accordance with the terms of our platform. (Preamble, People’s Party Platform, 1892)

Rather than as “trash,” or as a sacrifice, the Preamble now constructs the ‘people’ as “the producing class.” This “producing class” can only be understood in terms of its unmet needs and what Laclau refers to as a “social demand.” The ‘people’ in populism arise conceptually out of their articulation of social demands: We can decide to take as our minimal unit the group as such, in which case we are going to see populism as the ideology or the type of mobilization of an already constituted group—that is the expression (the epiphenomenon) of a social reality different from itself; or we can see populism as one way of constituting the very unity of the group …‘the people’ is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents. It is, in other terms, one way of constituting the unity of the group. (2007, pp. 72–3)

The Preamble sets out a series of unmet social demands, specifically “falling prices,” “the formation of combines and rings,” and “the impoverishment of the producing class.” These coalesce into one overall social demand: the need for a new “currency supply” to bring about the transaction between agricultural production and those commodities needed for this production. Laclau refers to such coalescence as an “equivalential chain” wherein individual complaints lose solitary standing and resolve

40 

M. Macaulay

into one overall demand. At its commencement, the Preamble delineates several individual unmet needs including political corruption, silencing of public opinion, loss of business, loss of land, loss of wages, imposition of mortgages, stoppage of worker organization, and unlawful armies. This delineation of “social demands” transitions into “popular demands” since they are unmet, but also coalesces into a broader comprehensive representation of agricultural production requiring a fundamental change in the supply of currency. We can simplify this equivalence as ‘buying power.’ What constitutes “the producing class” or the ‘people’ is the need for buying power. The Preamble ends with an articulation of this equivalential demand: We believe that the power of government—in other words, of the people, should be expanded (as in the case of the postal service) as rapidly and as far as the good sense of an intelligent people and the teaching of experience shall justify, to the end that oppression, injustice, and poverty shall eventually cease in the land. (Preamble, People’s Party Platform, 1892)

The Preamble presents two divergent narratives about the social and subsequent popular demands that it delineates. Using Greimasian narrative analysis, we can represent the first narrative as the Capitalist Narrative (Fig. 2.1). Sender Capitalists →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Government

Object tariffs ↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ ←←←←← Subject Democrats/Republicans

Receiver Capitalists

Opponent “Trash”

Fig. 2.1  Capitalist Narrative

In this narrative Capitalists as actants are both the Sender and the Receiver. It is not the Democrats and Republicans who have knowledge of economic needs and goals, but rather Capitalists who seek to benefit themselves. It is Capitalists who send Democrats and Republicans on a

2  The People’s Party 

41

journey to bring protective tariffs about. They do so by means of Government which is the Helper or means by which tariffs can be imposed for the benefit of Capitalists. Those who oppose this ‘quest’ or transaction are termed Trash. They object because of a competing axis of desire. In contrast, the narrative of the Plain People can be analysed using Greimas in the following way (Fig. 2.2). Sender Preamble

Object ‘new’ Republic

→→→→→→ axis of knowledge

↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject Producing Class

axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Expanded Government

Receiver Plain People →→→→→

←←←←← Opponent Democrats/Republicans

Fig. 2.2  Plain People’s Narrative

In comparing these two narratives, what is transparently clear is that the Democrats/Republicans reverse their actant roles, transforming themselves from Helpers in the Capitalist Narrative to being Opponents in the Plain People’s Narrative. The Plain People are equally transformed from being Opponents in the Capitalist Narrative to being Subjects in the Plain People’s Narrative. This is the more important actant transformation, since in becoming Subjects the Plain People assume both agency and power in determining their own goals or Object. This narrative gives them identity and meaning, being positioned as “an intelligent people” possessing “good sense.” They become the subjects of their own story. There is a major reanalysis of the social order.

1892 People’s Party Platform In keeping with the social order that it constructs in its Preamble, the 1892 Platform of the People’s Party first sets out three major premises: (1) That there be a “permanent and perpetual” union of labour forces such that the Republic be saved and the spirit of all Mankind be uplifted; (2) That wealth “belongs to him who creates it,” and (3) That the ‘people’

42 

M. Macaulay

shall own the railroads. The first constructs all workers into a unified whole, the second allocates ‘wealth’ to those that produce it, and the third, expands government control over transportation, specifically railways. These three premises reconfigure the existing social order. Workers, their wealth due to production, and their needs in terms of transportation of production, are privileged over money-making as a sole enterprise or goal. This is consistent with the Preamble that positions “the producing class” as a subject in its own narrative. The Platform further sets out three subject areas relevant to these major premises: Finance, Transportation and Land. These all constitute popular demands in Laclauan terms. Thus, “we demand [my emphasis] a national currency, safe, sound and flexible, issued by the general government only, a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and that without the use of banking corporations, a just, equitable and efficient means of distribution direct to the people.” Further popular demands include “free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold,” “a graduated income tax,” “that all State and national revenues shall be limited to the necessary expenses of the government,” and the establishment of “postal savings banks.” Regarding land, the platform demands, “All lands now held by railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens should be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only.” For transportation, there should be government ownership of railroads, telegraph, telephones and the post-office, “in the interests of the people.”

1896 People’s Party Platform Although the 1896 People’s Party Platform is similar to that of 1892, its platform reflects a major change in the actants of its narrative. Rather than a collective, “capitalists,” the 1986 Platform positions or constructs these in terms of a class, specifically a “plutocracy,” based on the acquisition of money. More important in this platform is use of the term will of the people: “Executive power and patronage have been used to corrupt our legislatures and defeat the will of the people [my emphasis].” Mudde and

2  The People’s Party 

43

Rovira Kaltswasser (2017) identity the notion of a ‘will of the people’ as one of the key markers or features of populism as an ideology: By making use of this notion (general will), populist actors and constituencies allude to a particular conception of the political, which is closely linked with the famous philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Rousseau distinguished between the general will (volonté générale) and the will of all (volonté de tous). While the former refers to the capacity of the people to join together into a community and legislate to enforce their common interest, the latter denotes the simple sum of particular interests at a particular moment in time. Populism’s monist and moral distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite reinforces the idea that a general will exists. (2017, p.16)

The notion of a ‘general will’ or “will of the people” is entirely consistent with the notion of “the plain people,” or “producing class,” but most certainly not “trash.” The “plain people” have been reconstructed as a single and coherent entity possessed of a collective “will” “to enforce their common interest.” This is a true populist position. There is now a ‘people’; it has a ‘will’ and this ‘will’ is opposed by an elite or ruling class defined by its acquisition of money: the “plutocracy.” Thus, although the social demands of the producing class remain relevant, they coalesce into what Laclau terms an “empty signifier,” specifically the notion of ‘democracy.’ What we see in the 1896 People’s Party Platform is a much more developed concern with democratic governance and practises, rather than simply a concern for an extended government or governance (Fig. 2.3). Sender ‘Will’ of the People →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Public Ownership

Object ‘Democracy’ ↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject The ‘People’

Fig. 2.3a  The ‘People’s’ Narrative 1896

Receiver The ‘People’ →→→→→

←←←←←

Opponent Plutocracy

44 

M. Macaulay

Consistent with the notion of “the will of the people,” the 1896 Platform employs a verb of mental process to realise the Sender role: “We realise [my emphasis] that, while we have political independence, our financial and industrial independence is yet to be attained by restoring to our country the Constitutional Control and exercise of the functions necessary to the people’s government, which functions have been basely surrendered by our public servants to corporate monopolies.” It is this realisation that generates action on the part of the Subject to effect a new ‘democracy’ or a “people’s government” which will provide for “financial and industrial independence.” This is a full-fledged platform based on populist ideology reflecting American values of independence and good government. The 1896 Platform sets out 11 categories for attention in achieving the new ‘democracy’: The Finances, Railroads and Telegraphs, The Public Lands, The Referendum, Direct Election of the President and Senators by the People, The Territories, Public Salaries, Arbitrary Judicial Action, Pensions, A Fair Ballot, and The Financial Question “The Pressing Issue.” Although many of the popular demands under these 11 defined areas carry over from the 1982 Platform, specifically, “National Money,” “a graduated income tax,” “postal savings banks,” and ownership of railroads and roads, the issue of ‘democracy’ is paramount in this Platform. The Platform tackles the question of ‘democracy’ in three specific ways, through the notion of a referendum, direct election of both the President and Senators, and in its concern for “A Fair Ballot.” A Fair Ballot and a Referendum are concomitant concerns. Margaret Canovan examines the relationship between democracy and populism: “Populists see themselves as true democrats, voicing popular grievances and opinions systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the media. Many of them favour ‘direct democracy’ political decision making by referendum and popular initiative. Their professed aim is to cash in democracy’s promise of power to the people” (1999, p. 2). Canovan’s analysis of populism places it on the fulcrum between what she terms “redemptive democracy” and “pragmatic democracy.” She builds on the work of Oakeshott (1996) who characterises democracy in the United States as balancing between what he terms “the politics of faith” and the “politics of scepticism.” The politics of faith is

2  The People’s Party 

45

concerned with salvation for those in the world, while the politics of scepticism is concerned with maintaining existing order and the rule of law. Both styles are essential within a functioning democracy and create a necessary balance of one to the other. Canovan modifies Oakeshott’s styles by renaming them “redemptive” and “pragmatic.” For Canovan democracy is primarily a “redemptive vision” (1999, p. 10). However, this vision must be balanced by a clear system of law and order to cope with internal and external conflict. Equally, power must devolve to the ‘people’ in a democracy, but this too must be understood in pragmatic terms as a means of running government. This in turn requires institutional governance to render action effective. Anti-institutional response comes when power becomes corrupted or institutions fail in their goals: “Pragmatism without the redemptive impulse is a recipe for corruption” (1999, p. 11). When government institutions are seen to fail, then populists can appeal to the ‘will of the people’ by arguing for direct representation. Canovan after Oakeshott sees “redemptive democracy” largely as a corrective to “pragmatic democracy,” and thus as a means of achieving balance between idealistic aspiration and the need for concrete practical application in governance. Populism arises in the tension between these two styles of democracy. Democracy in the 1896 People’s Party Platform is clearly “redemptive” rather than “pragmatic” in Canovan’s terms. All three popular demands—fair ballots, direct election of Senators and the President, and the presence of referenda—have come to pass within the American political system. While counter-institutional in the 1890’s, these demands have now been institutionalised. Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of the relationship between populism and democracy differs from that of Canovan and Oakeshott. For Laclau, “democracy is grounded only on the existence of a democratic subject, whose emergence depends on the horizontal articulation between equivalential demands. An ensemble of equivalential demands articulated by an empty signifier is what constitutes a ‘people.’ The very possibility of democracy depends on the constitution of a democratic ‘people’” (2007, p. 171). For Laclau, the democratic ‘people’ is not a fixed entity, but rather an articulated entity which is realised through the representation of specific social and popular demands. The 1986 Platform of the People’s

46 

M. Macaulay

Party reconstructs the empty signifier ‘democracy’ to carve out a place within institutional democracy for direct representation, fair voting practices and direct election.

James B. Weaver, A Call to Action As Benjamin Moffitt notes, although there are differences in analysis of the role of a leader in any populist movement or campaign, “it is difficult to imagine contemporary populism without leadership at all” (2016, p. 55). Moffitt maintains that “The central point is that it is the populists’ performances—not just their policies, ideology, discourse or so-called content of their populism—that are disruptive to ‘mainstream’ politics” (2016, p. 51). Moffitt employs the notion of ‘bad manners’ to exemplify the style of the populist leader. In Moffitt’s view the populist leader balances ordinariness with extraordinariness. Ordinariness serves as a means of expressing the people’s voice, while extraordinariness serves an ideal of “strength and health.” Only through his writings can we determine to what extent James B. Weaver balanced ordinariness with extraordinariness. James B. Weaver abandoned the Republican Party in 1877 putting his natural rhetorical abilities behind the new Greenback-Labor Party. Weaver was then elected to Congress in 1878 supporting monetary reform. He was again elected to Congress in 1884 and 1886 campaigning on a platform of opening “Indian territory” to American settlers. Defeated in 1888, he focussed his attention on Agrarian reform. He became the Presidential nominee for the new People’s Party in 1892. Under Weaver, the People’s Party carried four states. He received “over a million popular and twenty-two electoral votes” (McKenna, 1974, p. 95). This was a remarkable breakthrough for the People’s Party and may have led to the establishment of a third party in the American political system. However, Weaver also became an advocate for fusion between the People’s Party and the Democratic Party in 1896, precisely when the People’s Party had developed its second platform that called for not only monetary reform but also a redefinition of ‘democracy.’ Weaver’s decision to advocate for fusion of the People’s Party with the Democratic Party indicates support for what Canovan (1999) refers to as “pragmatic democracy.” Weaver

2  The People’s Party 

47

believed that the reforms he advocated for could be better achieved through an established party with broader representation throughout the country. If we leap ahead approximately a hundred and thirty years we see much of the same pragmatism in Senator Bernie Sanders, who, although an ‘independent,’ chose to work within the Democratic Party and ran twice for the position of President under its banner. James B. Weaver’s Preface to A Call to Action written in 1892 exhibits what Moffitt refers to as “ordinariness” and “extraordinariness.” The title of Weaver’s book is itself noteworthy: A Call to Action. As a speech act, Weaver’s title functions as an indirect directive; he wants his readers to act on the concerns he sets out. Rhetorically, it serves as persuasion. And although written, Weaver’s title is oral: A Call to Action. Weaver’s Preface is presented as a speech given to an audience, rather than as written exposition on a given topic. We can imagine the effect this ‘speech’ would have on a real physical audience rather than the readerly audience of a book. Weaver commences the Preface to his book with highly emotive and evaluative language: “The author’s object in publishing this book is to call attention to some of the more serious evils, which now disturb the repose of American society and threaten the overthrow of free institutions” (Preface, A Call to Action). Weaver employs the lexeme evil not only in the singular, but also in the plural. In this he employs the language of religion and specifically Christianity. In doing so he references the broad culture of the ‘people,’ who were for the most part Protestant Christians. We see Christian reference to Matthew 6:24 in the Preamble to the 1892 Platform, but in Weaver’s language economic disharmony or injustice within American society is constructed as an ‘evil’ and thus something that violates Christian law and God. By framing his Preface in religious terms, Weaver appeals to the ‘people’ as a specifically Christian entity that shares a collective sense of values and thinks about political issues in religious terms. To quote Laclau again, “A notion of constitutive antagonism, of a radical frontier, requires, on the contrary, a broken space … One first dimension of the break is that, at its root, there is the experience of a lack, a gap which has emerged in the harmonious continuity of the social order. There is a fullness of the community which is missing” (2007, p. 85). The community in question is understood by Weaver as a Christian

48 

M. Macaulay

community, and “the broken space” or “lack” as an ‘evil’ and therefore as a violation of the community and its values. For Western and Southern farmers there could be no more significant violation. Weaver goes on to reanalyse the notion of ‘evil’ as a more neutral “crisis,” but he nonetheless colours this concept of “crisis” in religious apocalyptic terms: We are nearing a serious crisis. If the present strained relations between wealth owners and wealth producers continue much longer they will ripen into frightful disaster. The universal discontent must be quickly interpreted and its causes removed. It is the country’s imperative Call to Action, and cannot be longer disregarded with impunity. (Preface, A Call to Action)

Weaver distinguishes between two constituencies that he positions as “wealth owners” and “wealth producers.” Although written in 1892, this language is closer to the People’s Party Platform of 1896 that opposes wealth production to wealth ownership or a plutocracy. The ‘people’ are understood as wealth producers rather than wealth owners. He also references the ‘will of the people’ in articulating the concept of “universal discontent.” This discontent, a mental process experienced by ‘the people,’ must be complemented by a further mental process of interpretation on the part of ‘the people’ such that the causes of this discontent are addressed and removed. This argument to logos is based on an awareness of a fractious ‘break’ between the wealth producers and the wealth owners that could result in “frightful disaster.” Weaver evokes the language of Old Testament prophets who prophesize doom if action is not taken. In the religious register Weaver employs, it is not ‘the people’ who have strayed but the “owners of wealth.” Weaver then proceeds to set out the causes of this break that, if unresolved, would lead to “frightful disaster.” Wealth owners have facilitated “speculators,” “the legal profession,” and a “bold and aggressive plutocracy.” As a result, “sixty-three million people and their posterity” have lost their “sovereign right” to control their own economy. In keeping with Positioning Theory,2 the ‘people’ are  Positioning Theory argues that speakers in their discourse position themselves and others with regard to rights and obligations. Speakers and their co-respondents can be positioned both positively and negatively. 2

2  The People’s Party 

49

positioned as having a sovereign right to control their own economic destiny. It is they who are in the ‘right’ and so have the right to determine the economic future of their country. Further, “The brightest lights of the legal profession” have been “lured from their honorable relation to the people.” “An aggressive plutocracy” has “usurped the Government.” Weaver expands upon the ‘break’ between the two constituencies in terms of alienation of rights and the actual “usurp[ation]” of Government itself. Overlaid with the logical arguments Weaver supplies is a religious view of such actions as ‘evil’ and thus a violation of both a Christian and American society. These evils are compounded by “a few haughty millionaires” who have realigned themselves with England and thus betrayed the Revolution itself. Weaver’s positioning of this new plutocracy is malevolent. He represents this plutocracy is an active agent that has “stolen our commonwealth.” The term ‘commonwealth’ evokes the original colonies many of which were termed ‘commonwealths,’ but also asserts a different principal of wealth in that its ownership should be in ‘common’ rather than in the hands of one particular class. Weaver comes close to a socialist vision of society. He does not assert that ‘wealth’ is evil but rather that ‘wealth’ should be shared. There should therefore be no class of wealth owners. After spelling out causation for the ‘evils’ that he delineates, Weaver specifies the “action” or remedy for these evils. What he calls for is a “the second revolt of the colonies.” This is not the “frightful disaster” which may come, but the means of preventing such an apocalyptic end. Weaver looks back into the revolutionary past to postulate a revolutionary future. Weaver combines a Christian apocalyptic vision with revolutionary ideology. This is a powerful combination for the Western and Southern American farmer who we can imagine as being part of a physical audience in the context of a speech given by a political rabble-rouser. Weaver contextualizes his call to action in this way: It required seven years for our fathers to overthrow the outward manifestation of tyranny in colonial days. But our weapons now are not carnal, but mighty to the pulling down of strongholds. Their children can vanquish the American and British plutocracy combined in a single day—at the ballot box. They have resolved to do it. If this book can in the least aid in the mighty work, we shall be content. (Preface, A Call to Action)

50 

M. Macaulay

Consistent with the apocalyptic religious language that he employs, Weaver uses a war metaphor. The war he envisions is not waged in the field but at the ballot box through representative democracy. George Lakoff argues that metaphor represents a form of cross-domain mapping of one concept upon another (1993, p. 203). It is a way of thinking about one thing in terms of another. One domain is understood as a Source that can in turn be mapped onto another termed the Target. It is not too difficult to understand politics as a form of warfare, where ‘war’ is the Source domain and ‘politics’ is the Target, but conceiving of the ballot-­box within representative democracy as a ‘weapon’ is far more complex. If we extend the Source domain in this conceptual metaphor, the voter becomes a soldier and the ballot-box his or her weapon to achieve victory over an enemy, in this case “the American and British plutocracy.” Weaver metaphorically and rhetorically lays out the case for a bloodless civil war. The ballot-box becomes a means of devastating the plutocracy and in turn realising enhanced democracy itself. ‘Democracy’ becomes hyper-­ valorised as an instrument of class warfare. Theoretically, ‘democracy’ wages war with ‘plutocracy,’ that is, one class system against another. It is for this reason that the empty signifier ‘democracy’ becomes so significant in Weaver’s call to action and why we see the emphasis put on democracy in the 1896 People’s Party Platform. In this respect, The People’s Party becomes one less concerned for reform and more with revolution. Weaver calls for the overthrow of one class by another through metaphorical warfare at the ballot-box (Fig. 2.4). Sender Weaver →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ ballot box (democracy)

Object Second Revolt of the Colonies ↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject The Patriotic People

Fig. 2.4a  Weaver’s Narrative: A Call to Action

Receiver wealth producers

→→→→→

←←←←← Opponent Plutocracy

2  The People’s Party 

51

By positioning ‘plutocracy’ as both anti-Christian and anti-American, Weaver makes a direct appeal to the “patriotic people”: “We submit the work to the criticism of our contemporaries and the candid consideration of the patriotic people.” The evils that Weaver enunciates are seen to be unpatriotic acts that conflict with American values. Weaver does not represent himself in extraordinary terms as bringing this second revolution to the “patriotic people.” He represents himself as a sender rather than as a subject. He speaks for the ‘people’ but is not as a factotum of the ‘people.’

Conclusion In the documents examined above, the Preamble to the People’s Party Platform (1892), the 1892 Platform, the 1896 Platform and Weaver’s Preface to A Call to Action, what is most noticeable is the ongoing modification of the notion of ‘the people’ as well as ‘the elite.’ These notions are not fixed but evolve within a given discourse or over discourse from one text to another. With specific reference to what the people are, this suggests that this notion is actually being worked out in the process of articulating unmet needs and social demands. The Preamble to the 1892 People’s Party Platform positions ‘the people’ in the following ways: “the plain people,” “trash,” “the suffering people,” and “the producing class.” “The plain people,” “the suffering people,” and “the producing class” all represent the perspective of ‘the people’ themselves. “Trash” is how ‘the people’ are viewed by millionaires who have no regard for their labour or position and who accord them neither rights nor obligations but see them only as marginal entities. But ‘the people’ see themselves as suffering rather than as marginalized and diminished; they see themselves as “plain” and thus without accoutrements of status or class, and finally they see themselves as agentive, as a “producing class.” The idea of suffering represents what Laclau (2007) refers to as a ‘lack’ where a disruption or break occurs within society. The suffering people lack the means to alleviate their suffering. Rather than agents, they are patients. As a “producing class,” however, this perspective or positioning changes quite dramatically. To produce is to make or to create; it is active, positive and necessary. In positioning themselves as producers, ‘the people’ ascribe to themselves

52 

M. Macaulay

rights and obligations and a functioning role within society, the very antithesis of “trash.” The Preamble of 1892 provides a construction first of a lack resulting in a break and equally a reconstruction of “the intelligent people,” who as members of “the producing class” possess rights and privileges that serve as the basis of a set of social and popular demands set out in the 1892 Platform itself. The 1896 Platform further develops the notion of ‘the people’ as “the intelligent people” into the concept of “the will of the people.” This will, which we can understand as a collective or ‘general will’ in Rousseau’s articulation, clashes no longer with “millionaires,” but with an entire class of people, “the plutocracy.” This ‘will of the people’ or ‘general will’ realises itself in terms of a need for not just expanded government, but a new ‘democracy.’ Democracy is an empty signifier encompassing a desire for governmental processes that support “financial and economic independence,” and so direct democracy or referenda, direct election of both the President and Senators, and a “A Fair Ballot.” This popular demand is one where the will of the people can be articulated and expressed. Although written in 1892, Weaver’s Preface for A Call to Action reflects more the concern for democracy expressed in the People’s Party Platform of 1896. It anticipates this platform and clearly influences it. The principal break or fracture set out by Weaver is between what he terms “wealth producers” and “wealth owners.” What is presupposed by this dichotomy is a contradiction whereby those who produce “wealth” are not themselves wealthy. There is implicit injustice that Weaver constructs as an “evil[]).” In constructing unfair distribution of wealth as a form of evil, Weaver evokes a Christian sensibility where speculators, “the legal profession,” and a “bold and aggressive plutocracy” have actively stolen from “sixty-three million people” control over their economic destiny and thus their future. The concept of futurity is of enormous importance in Weaver’s analysis and points to the need of a better future for ‘the people’ where democracy enables wealth distribution rather than prevents it. Thus, Weaver reinvents ‘the people’ again as “the patriotic people.” Janus-­ like patriotic looks both backwards and forwards. Weaver is very clear about this: “It required seven years for our fathers to overthrow the outward manifestation of tyranny in colonial days. But our weapons now are not carnal, but mighty to the pulling down of strongholds. Their children

2  The People’s Party 

53

can vanquish the American and British plutocracy combined in a single day—at the ballot box.” Weaver conceives ‘evil’ as an “aggressive plutocracy.” He calls for a second revolution to end its “tyranny,” but his call is not a call to arms, but a call to action. Weaver sees ‘the people’ as extending their revolutionary past into the future through democracy itself, where ‘democracy’ as an empty signifier carries a meaning of warfare, where ‘the people’ are now ‘patriots’ going to battle not with weapons in their hands but with ballots as bullets to defeat the enemy, “an aggressive plutocracy.” It is through the ballot that ‘the people’ express their general will and supplant this with that of the plutocrats or “owners of wealth.” Over this discourse of the People’s Party of 1892 and 1896 as well as that of their Presidential candidate, Weaver, we have an interesting succession of terms: “the plain people,” “trash,” “the suffering people,” “the producing class,” “the intelligent people,” “wealth producers,” and “the patriotic people.” We have a transition from marginalization expressed by trash and suffering, and from classlessness expressed by plain to class expressed by producing, and agency expressed by wealth producer to high agency expressed by patriotic. In the process of definition and redefinition the clear idea of a rupture or break is formulated, even understood as an evil against ‘the people’ and society itself. Unmet needs are also reformulated into social demands and ultimately popular demands; however, the overwhelming popular demand that subsumes all others is for ‘democracy’ itself, democracy that can be understood in terms of fair ballots, direct election and direct voting, but is also understood as voting itself within a representational form where the ballot compares to a bullet and revolution is achieved within a day. The People’s Party within the America of the 1890’s provides a resurgence of agentive expression on the part of a redefined ‘people’ who find their identity and will through expression of their suffering and the means to combat this suffering through the popular demands they make and the expression of this will in the ballot box. The People’s Party of the 1890’s is and is not revolutionary. It does not advocate a new economic system of governance such as communism although Weaver does reference “commonwealth,” but it does advocate wealth redistribution and the means by which such distribution can take place. It also connects such redistribution to governance and with Weaver calls for a second revolution lead by “the patriotic people.” It is unclear

54 

M. Macaulay

what might have happened if Weaver had not abandoned this idea of second revolution in order to achieve specific popular demands through alignment of the People’s Party with the Democratic Party. If we compare the 1896 Platform of the People’s Party (Fig. 2.3) using Greimasian narrative and that of Weaver’s Call to Action (Fig. 2.4), we see a fundamental difference. Sender ‘Will’ of the People →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Public Ownership

Object ‘Democracy’ ↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject The ‘People’

Receiver The ‘People’ →→→→→

←←←←←

Opponent Plutocracy

Fig. 2.3b  The ‘People’s’ Narrative 1896

Sender Weaver →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ ballot box (democracy)

Object Second Revolt of the Colonies ↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject The Patriotic People

Receiver wealth producers

→→→→→

←←←←← Opponent Plutocracy

Fig. 2.4b  Weaver’s Narrative: A Call to Action

In the first narrative, the People’s Party Platform 1896, the sender is the abstract notion of ‘the will of the people.’ In Weaver’s Narrative, the sender is Weaver himself. The subject of the People’s Party Platform is ‘the people,’ while it is “The Patriotic People” in Weaver’s narrative. Further, the Opponent in the People’s Party Platform of 1896 is Plutocracy. This is much the same in Weaver’s Narrative. The Receiver in the People’s Party Platform is the ‘People,’ while it is ‘wealth producers’ in Weaver’s narrative. What principally differentiates the two narratives is the Object in the People’s Party Narrative and that in Weaver’s. For the People’s Party

2  The People’s Party 

55

Platform of 1896, the object is ‘Democracy’ itself. However, in Weaver’s narrative the Object is an actual Second Revolt of the Colonies. A fundamental modification takes place whereby ‘democracy’ transforms its actant function from that of Object in the People’s Party Platform to that of Helper in Weaver’s Narrative. Democracy itself is not the desired end but the desired means through which a genuine transformation of society can take place. This is not the idea of direct democracy through referenda, but rather the politicization of the people’s will through direct engagement with the political process. The ‘people’ are thus redefined as the “patriotic people” who bring about their own salvation by reembracing their own revolutionary past at the ballot box.

3 Prairie Populism

Introduction Although the People’s Party failed to secure a political presence as a third party apart from the Democrats and Republicans in the United States after the defeat of its candidate for President in 1896, populism did not disappear as a movement in North America. James B. Weaver’s decision to combine forces with the Democratic party by running the Democratic candidate for President, William Jennings Bryan, alongside a People’s Party candidate for Vice-President, Tom Watson, essentially doomed the People’s Party. Nonetheless many of its platform proposals or popular demands were realized including direct voting of the President and Senators as well as direct taxation. Agrarian populism also made its appearance in Canada if not in lockstep with that in the United States but certainly as a parallel development.

The Farmers’ Platform, 1918 The Farmers’ Platform first appeared in December 1916 from the Canadian Council of Agriculture. It was subsequently endorsed by the United Farmers of Ontario and the Manitoba Grain Growers’ Association, the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_3

57

58 

M. Macaulay

Saskatchewan Grain Growers’ Association and the United Farmers of Alberta. This Platform was revised in 1918 to accommodate changes to existing policy by the Federal Government (specifically Women’s Suffrage, Prohibition, and the Corporation Tax) as well as conditions arising out of the First World War. Revision to The Farmers’ Platform was made by the Council over 26–29 November 1918. The Farmers’ Platform subsequently served as the ideological basis of the Progressive Party in 1920 formed by a group of disaffected members of the Federal Parliament. The Progressive Party eventually devolved into two new parties, one a left-populist party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and the second a right-populist party, Social Credit. The Farmers’ Platform opens with support for a League of Nations as well as a reconception of the British Empire as a comparable ‘league of nations’ whereby Canada and other Dominions would be understood as “free and equal.” After the First World War, Canada began to see itself as an independent nation, if not separate from the British Empire, then not subject to it. The focus of the Platform, however, is on “The Tariff,” specifically what is referred to as “The Protective Tariff.” The Protective Tariff is seen in moral terms as a “corrupting influence” and “evil”: “the Protective Tariff has been and is the chief corrupting influence [my emphasis] in our national life because the protected interests [my emphasis], in order to maintain their unjust privileges, have contributed lavishly to political and campaign funds, thus encouraging both political parties to look to them for support, thereby lowering the standard of public morality.” The metaphorical construction of the Protective Tariff as a “corrupting influence” is consistent with that of the People’s Party Platform of 1892/1896 where corporatism is represented in moral terms as an “evil.” Further much the same analysis as that in the Preamble of the People’s Party Platform 1892 is provided whereby the existing parties are negatively positioned as collaborators with a set of “interests” within the society. The “protected interests” align themselves with the two main political parties, the Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party, to undermine “public morality.” The “protected interests” are positioned malignantly as destroyers of the existing social order and its moral basis. The two existing political parties are ancillary to this destruction. As with the

3  Prairie Populism 

59

People’s Party 1892/1896, there is a nostalgia for a pre-existing social order that exemplifies social good. The Farmers’ Platform diverges from the two Platforms of the American People’s Party in that, while it complements this moral analysis or representation, it also provides logical analysis that represents the world in terms of cause and effect. Apart from a “corrupting influence,” The Farmers’ Platform represents the world in which this influence is represented as an agent of social change bringing into existence a specific class system: And whereas the Protective Tariff is the most wasteful and costly method ever designed for raising national revenue, because for every dollar obtained thereby for the public treasury at least three dollars pass into the pockets of the protected interests, thereby building up a privileged class at the expense of the masses, thus making the rich richer and the poor poorer. (The Farmers’ Platform, 1918)

A clear distinction is made between “a privileged class” and “the masses.” The rupture in Laclauan terms is understood causatively as “making [my emphasis] the rich richer and the poor poorer.” The Protective Tariff is represented as a “costly method” or as an instrument by which a privileged class, the ‘elite,’ act at the expense of “the masses,” not to enhance their economic wellbeing but to diminish it. This instrumentality in turn is replaced by clear and explicit causation: And whereas Agriculture—the basic industry upon which the success of all other Industries primarily depends—is unduly handicapped throughout Canada as shown by the declining rural populations in both Eastern and Western Canada, due largely by the greatly increased costs of agricultural implements and machinery, clothing, boots and shoes, building material and practically everything the farmer has to buy, caused [my emphasis] by the Protective Tariff, so that it is becoming impossible for farmers generally, under normal conditions to carry on farming operations profitably. (The Farmers’ Platform, 1918)

Here the Protective Tariff is represented as a prime mobile ‘cause’ that has two principal effects, failure on the part of farmers to farm, and in

60 

M. Macaulay

turn failure of the Canadian economy. The “privileged class” acts in its own interests rather than that of farmers and Canadian society as a whole. There is a profound rupture or break in the Canadian social order just at the time when Canadian society is repositioning itself as separate and equal to its original British overlord within the British Empire. Causative analysis focusing on tariffs provides the Farmers’ Platform with agency and thus a means to repair this break or rupture: Therefore be it resolved that the Canadian Council of Agriculture, representing the organized farmer of Canada, urges that as a means of remedying these evils [my emphasis] and bringing about much needed social and economic reforms, our tariff laws should be amended. (The Farmers’ Platform, 1918)

Consistent with oral ‘debate,’ The Farmers’ Platform puts forth a motion that urges specific action, by means of “remedying these evils.” ‘To remedy’ is a verb of accomplishment with a specific telic goal ‘to make right or whole.’1 The agent with this verb engages in an ongoing practice or behaviour of making something right. This construction in The Farmers’ Platform combines moral perception, “these evils,” with logical analysis, “needed social and economic reforms.” The Protected Tariff is seen both as an ‘evil’ and as a ‘cause.’ The Platform in turn proposes reductions in “customs tariffs,” “reduction of customs duty on goods imported from Great Britain,” “complete Free Trade between Canada and Britain in five years,” continuation of “the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911” between Canada and the U.S., exemptions on “food stuffs” not already included in the 1911 Reciprocity Agreement, exemption of farming equipment to be placed on the “free list” of the Reciprocity Agreement, and “tariff concessions” to be provided to Britain that have been provided to other countries by Canada. The Farmers’ Platform also urges that those corporations currently protected by tariff “be obliged to publish” their contracts, and that “every claim for tariff protection by any industry should be heard publicly.” While the focus in large part is on trade between Great Britain and Canada, there is also articulation of the concept of responsibility or  Remedy from the Anglo-Norman, Middle English ‘re-medium,’ ‘re-mederi’ (‘to re-heal’).

1

3  Prairie Populism 

61

“responsible government” in that there be accountability for existing corporations enjoying tariffs and any further claims to tariff. Further to compensate for loss of revenue from tariffs, The Farmers’ Platform proposes “direct taxation.” Direct taxation would be applied to land resources, personal income, inheritance, and “a graduated tax on the profits of corporations.” It also proposes that public land (natural resources) not be sold but rather be leased so that “the interests of the public shall be properly safeguarded.” The Farmers’ Platform urges moreover that “railway, water, and aerial transportation, telephone, telegraph and express systems…natural power and of coal mining” be publicly owned. As with the 1896 American People’s Party Platform, democratic institutions would be subject to change or reform in order “to bring about a greater measure of democracy.” Again, we have telic or resultative analysis. The War Time Elections Act would be repealed, Canadians would no longer receive British titles, there would be abolition of “the patronage system,” a privileging of individual representatives at the expense of ‘big government,’ reform of Senate, removal of “press censorship,” publication of campaign expenditures, transparency in the ownership of newspapers and periodicals, “the opening of seats in parliament to women on the same terms as men,” and finally “proportional representation,” and “direct legislation through the initiative, referendum and recall.” While seeking greater economic independence from Great Britain, The Farmers’ Platform also seeks a very different sort of society. A key signifier of this is the “discontinuance of the practice of conferring titles upon citizens of Canada.” Although in 1918 Canada is still a member of the British Empire, The Farmers’ Platform proposes conceptual departure from this Empire by divorcing itself from the British class system. A new identity is proposed that is ‘Canadian’ rather than ‘British.’ To be a Canadian, one can no longer participate in British hierarchy. Within Canadian borders, The Farmers’ Platform puts in opposition “the masses” and a “privileged class,” but equally it does so within the British Empire as whole. In Laclauan terms, such opposition constructs a political notion of the ‘people’ along with one that is economic. The ‘people’ are equally constructed as members of the impoverished “masses” as well as being ‘Canadian.’ Using Greimasian narrative theory, the narrative represented by The Farmers’ Platform is as follows (Fig. 3.1):

62 

M. Macaulay

Sender Farmers’ Platform

Object Free Trade

→→→→→→ axis of knowledge

↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject “the masses”

axis of Power Helper →→→→→ ‘democracy’

Receiver ‘Canadians’ →→→→→

←←←←← Opponent “privileged class”

Fig. 3.1  The Farmers’ Platform 1918

In this narrative, a “privileged class” serves as enemy or opponent to the subject “the masses.” Through enhanced democracy and opposition to the “privileged class,” “the masses” can achieve free trade and become ‘Canadian.’ “Protected tariffs” are opposed as is a class system based on explicit hierarchy. Economic freedom brings about a new identity, that of being ‘Canadian.’ The Farmers’ Platform articulates a new nationalism and thus a new construction of ‘the people’ along with a new economic relationship with its former colonial overlord.

The Progressive Party The Farmers’ Platform becomes the basis of the New National Policy of the Progressive Party. In the 1921 Canadian Federal election, “The Progressives swept the prairies with a clean broom as regular party politicians ignominiously forfeited their deposits in one-sided contests. Not a single government candidate survived in the West, though R.  B. Bennett waged a desperate fight in Calgary West and lost by only 16 of the 16,181 votes cast” (Sharp, 1948, p. 151). However, much like the People’s Party of the 1890’s in the U.S., the Progressive Party did not sustain itself as a party. The party was divided over the question of class versus class (specifically over the issue of tariffs) and ultimately failed to “formulate a clear-cut labor policy” beyond that of only farmers’ concerns (Sharp, 1948, p. 140). However, Prairie populism itself does not die. Two divergent populist parties develop in the 1930’s, Social Credit and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Historians looking at the origins of these two parties have argued that what is fundamental to both is their

3  Prairie Populism 

63

common populism. Conway notes, “This [practical action] led to the astonishing but short-lived success of the Progressive party on the federal scene in 1921 and the victory of the UFA [United Farmers of Alberta] in the Alberta election of the same year. A year later the United Farmers of Manitoba won power there too. Suffice to say that the political groundwork was laid for the successful emergence of the CCF and Social Credit after the initial ineffectiveness of the various organized farmers’ rather unsuccessful early political adventures” (1978, p.  121). Sinclair argues that “both Social Credit and the Saskatchewan CCF developed as populist parties” (1975, p. 2). What historians struggle with is why what can be termed ‘right-populism’ and ‘left-populism’ developed in adjacent provinces with largely similar agrarian populations. According to Sinclair, “What is crucial to our understanding of why an authoritarian populist emerged in Alberta is that Social Credit sprouted from the failure of an earlier democratic populism, the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) to control the effect of the depression” (1975, p.  11). In contrast, “Saskatchewan history was such that the development of authoritarian populism was unlikely…The Liberals were returned to power in 1934 with a large majority over the new CCF” (1975, p. 13). Populism was not discredited in Saskatchewan for “the failure to control the effects of the depression” (1975, p. 13). Sinclair argues that ‘left-populism’ in Alberta was supplanted by a ‘right-populism’ given the effects of the depression, while in Saskatchewan ‘left-populism’ was sustained in opposition to conventional party politics, specifically liberalism. Thus, according to Sinclair, the factor of economic depression gives rise to two separate realizations of populism, one ‘right’ and one ‘left.’ Populism, as such, does not disappear, but adapts to specific social and economic circumstances.

William Aberhart and Social Credit William “Bible Bill” Aberhart was the Premier of Alberta from 1935 to 1943. He led the world’s first Social Credit government. Aberhart became a teacher in 1901; however, his real interest was in preaching. After being exposed to the Plymouth Brethren, an evangelical group, he began preaching on weekends in Brantford Ontario where he worked and lived.

64 

M. Macaulay

In 1910 he moved to Calgary Alberta. There he became part of a number of protestant denominations until he finally attached himself to the Westbourne Baptist Church. Within this church, he started the Calgary Prophetic Bible Conference. In 1925 he also began Sunday afternoon broadcasts over radio on CFCN. While first limiting his radio broadcasts to religious sermons, he began to use these sermons to promulgate the economic theories of Major Clifford Hugh Douglas. Douglas believed that capitalism was an economic system doomed to failure because it allowed for concentration of wealth. Douglas believed that because of such concentration, the purchasing power of individuals would become limited. Thus, from Douglas’ perspective it would be necessary for the state to intervene in order to provide a system of ‘social credit’ whereby individual citizens would be given a cash payment, termed the “National Dividend.” By putting money into the pockets of citizen/consumers, the economy as a whole could be stabilized and saved, particularly during the years of the Depression. This was often referred to a “funny money”2 since funding from the state would be directly injected into the economic system. We can compare this in modern terms to Basic Universal Income that is provided by government to allow those living below the poverty line to cover the costs of housing and basic needs. We can also compare this to the governmental work schemes brought in by Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Depression to generate income for those suffering from joblessness and extreme poverty. Aberhart modified Douglas’ proposal to argue for a monthly dividend of 25 dollars to allow Albertan citizens to cover the cost of basic necessities. In 1933, William Aberhart set out this economic theory in The Douglas System of Economics or what was termed the “Yellow Pamphlet.” Following Douglas’ theory, Aberhart argued for significant change in the means of managing money through the state. He advocated for the conversion of private bank accounts into provincial bonds which would expire upon their holder’s deaths. He also advocated for the removal of life insurance as well as inheritance. More significantly, he wanted to limit any one  1n 1937 the Alberta Social Credit government passed legislation to provide citizens with “prosperity certificates” which were termed “funny money” in popular parlance. These certificates were not identical to the reforms argued for by Douglas and Aberhart, but they were similarly designed as a means of economic stimulus. 2

3  Prairie Populism 

65

person’s maximum earnings. A credit system would replace monetary exchange. Actual money would only be employed between provincial governments. There would be extensive control over credit since any unused credit would need to be used or be transferred back into government bonds. All credit, in the form of dividends or earned wages, would have to be expended or converted into government bonds by the fiscal year’s end. Any money not used or transferred would be taken from a citizen/consumer. Aberhart also wanted to narrow the criteria for citizenship. He believed further that Albertans should “be taught profitable occupations” and governed in the use of leisure time. On August 22, 1935, Aberhart’s Alberta Social Credit Party won 56 of 63 seats in the Alberta legislature roundly defeating the United Farmers of Alberta. Aberhart was subsequently provided a safe seat since he himself had not run during the provincial election. If we look at the platform of the “Yellow Pamphlet” above, how Aberhart achieved such a victory is not transparent. He advocates almost complete control over the personal finances of each Albertan citizen. Interestingly, Douglas largely rejected Aberhart’s representation of his system. To understand Aberhart’s remarkable success in 1935, we have to examine his Sunday afternoon radio broadcasts. Like both Hitler and Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the 1930’s, Aberhart exploited the medium of radio very effectively. Radio, according to Marshall McLuhan, is a “hot medium,” which is to say that it is not interactive and presents saturated information: “A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in ‘high definition.’ High definition is the state of being well filled with data” (1964, p. 36). McLuhan comments specifically on the impact of radio on the listener: “The power of radio to retribalize mankind, its almost instant reversal of individualism into collectivism, Fascist or Marxist, has gone unnoticed” (1964, p.  265). Aberhart used radio to speak directly to the ‘people.’ He created a sense of direct personal address. He also mimics dialogism by reading out letters written to him. Although technically monologic, through his use of letters read aloud, Aberhart appears to be in dialogue with his listeners. In this, through radio, he creates the sense of an intimate social community or tribe as McLuhan puts it.

66 

M. Macaulay

William Aberhart’s Broadcasts The University of Alberta Archives have a total of 151 radio talks over station CFCM during Aberhart’s regular sermon slot on Sunday afternoon prior to and after the provincial election on August 22, 1935. In some instances, there are only notes from Aberhart for his addresses. These provide a script upon which he expands his points during broadcast. In other cases, the University of Alberta Archives have transcribed his broadcasts so that there is a written record of the oral broadcast he gave on a particular day. One of his longest broadcasts, given on March 26, 1935, has been transcribed and extends to six pages. It exemplifies Aberhart’s radio style. Although as with almost all of Aberhart’s broadcasts during this period a primary focus is on definition and explanation of ‘social credit,’ what is characteristic of Aberhart is his engagement with his listeners or other speakers. One notable interlocutor in this March broadcast is the Alberta Premier himself. During his broadcast, Aberhart reads out a letter that he has written to the Premier. In it, Aberhart quotes Premier Reid who had responded to a letter written to him previously by Aberhart. In his response to Aberhart, Premier Read states, “maybe these answers are not as complete as you would wish.” Using this comment as a springboard, Aberhart reads aloud his own response to Reid’s comment: “I now understand quite clearly that you want a comprehensive, definite, fully detailed plan of Social Credit for the province.” Aberhart employs a mental process verb understand for himself and equally with the Premier, “you want [my emphasis].” He represents himself along with the Premier in a state of mutual understanding or recognition, and therefore not at odds or in disagreement. Put simply, he positions both himself and Reid as collaborators in a common aim. Aberhart in turn indicates his willingness to come up with a plan to implement social credit provided he is given access to sufficient data from the government. More significantly he asks the Premier, “Would it be possible to obtain for your Government, or failing this, from yourself, a statement that they, or you, are heartily in favour of the introduction of Social Credit in some form?” In this indirect request for information, Aberhart positions himself not as an adversary but as an evangelist seeking support for his economic ideas. In effect he brings ‘the good news’ to Premier Reid in bringing him a plan to

3  Prairie Populism 

67

implement social credit. By reading his letter to Reid aloud on radio he performs cooperativeness and responsibility. Reid is also put on the spot publicly to declare his support for social credit. This further serves to put political pressure on the Premier. Politically, this is a tour de force. Radio, as a hot medium, allows Aberhart to orchestrate fully his interaction with the Premier and gain control over the Premier’s reaction. Beyond such constructive persuasion, Aberhart also uses his broadcasts to organize locally: May I pause a moment to make a few announcements at this point. Hello Redlands, Mr. Price. We are sending birthday greetings today on your 74th birthday. We hope you are happy and having a good time. Hello, folks around Okotoka, the Okotoka High River Convention in Okotoka will be held Saturday, March 30th at 2:30. Evening at 8 p.m., at Blackie….. addressed by Mr. Andrews. Mrs…….is having three big meetings this week and next week at Macleod Convention, 2:30 Wednesday, and then a big public meeting at 8 p.m. in the evening. High River, Friday March 28th at 8:30 in the Town Hall. Then I am announcing ahead the Breton— meeting in Banff, April 3rd, Wednesday at 8 o’clock. (Aberhart Broadcasts [March 26, 1935])

At this point in his broadcast Aberhart announces several more meetings of this type. He notes, however, that he does not want funds to be generated by raffles and dances, but only through “voluntary contributions” collected during the ‘social credit’ meetings he has organized throughout the province. In this way, he maintains complete control over funds provided for his social credit “movement.” Aberhart’s skill as a political organizer is remarkable. Hannant notes that “Social Credit’s amazing conquest of the province of Alberta in just three years had discernably different stages. These developmental steps broadly corresponded with, first, the establishment of a base in Calgary, and, second, use of this base to complete the organization of virtually every section of the province” (1985, p.  104). Aberhart was first able to win over the working class of central, northeast, and southeast Calgary (Hannant, 1985, p. 105). Hannant quotes one worker: “he came to our plant and talked to us workers one noon hour…I thought Aberhart must have something on the ball, with so much goods in the world and no money

68 

M. Macaulay

to buy them…So then our shops formed a Social Credit group, and eventually our whole plant was organized into the …. Group for Social Credit….gangs of us workers would assemble to raise money to pay for Aberhart’s Social Credit broadcasts” (1985, p. 113). Aberhart used funding from Calgary workers to spread the word though his radio broadcasts to other citizens of Alberta. We see Aberhart doing precisely this in his March 26th, 1935 broadcast. Aberhart’s principal method is to engage his listeners throughout the province by answering readers’ questions posed in letters sent to him. Through such dialogism, he both connects with a broader audience and defines ‘social credit’: Hello, Grassy Lake, Mr…..You should have no trouble getting your name on the voter’s list. Every week we get several letters from some who are beginning to study the system for the first time, and the usual preliminary questions come through to us…First, where is the money coming from to finance this scheme? Second, what are the main points of the system? And third what is meant by “unearned increment”? (Aberhart Broadcasts [March 26, 1935])

Aberhart explains to his listeners that the banks already lend money and then points out “that in reality no money need be used at all if the borrower uses the credit and cheque system. The banks simply credit the account of the borrower with the figure loaned and instruct him to draw cheques on that account. When the cheques come in a bookkeeping entry is made. The borrower is debited and the other man is credited.” Through a comparison with the existing banking system, Aberhart makes ‘social credit’ known information that the listener is already familiar with, rather than ‘unknown’ information or content. He states further, “All the difference will be that we shall use non-negotiable certificates in the place of bank cheques. This credit from which we issue the basic dividends will be secured in much the same way and on the same basis as the governments bonds are today…The Government will issue the dividends on the credit of the country.” To make ‘social credit’ further comprehensible, he notes only one difference: “All the difference will be.” All is an inclusive quantifier. Aberhart uses all to rhetorically emphasize the paucity of

3  Prairie Populism 

69

difference between the existing banking system and what he himself proposes. Aberhart transforms ‘social credit’ into a known entity with only minimal difference between it and the current system used by his listeners. What William Aberhart also does by reading out letters from his listeners is to connect personally with their problems and concerns. He shows empathy. He reads a letter from a young farmer: I am a young farmer in this district trying in an honest way to meet my obligations. It is impossible even to be honest. If I did not once in a while charge these financiers unrighteously, they would squeeze the last drop of life blood out of me and my family. The other day I was in the Bank talking to the Manager. I put my needs before him, in order for him to give me advice. He started abusing the farmers for not knowing how to farm….the farmers could make money even during these days if they wouldn’t try to get rich all at once. I tell you, these fellows can tell the farmer off, can’t they? He says the likes of these should not be driving a car. I should not try to farm with tractors….. (Aberhart Broadcasts [March 26, 1935])

Aberhart comments in the following way: That’s right, bend down and crawl into a hole. I suppose some of these financiers would like you to crawl on your hands and knees to rake the field with your fingers. I’m telling you something and you had better listen to me. If you farmers don’t hit this thing hard during the next election, the time will come when you will have to do without cars—not only to live without cars and combines and tractors, but without meat or white bread, alas. (Aberhart Broadcasts [March 26, 1935])

Through the young farmer’s letter, Aberhart is able to present as direct experience what it is to live on the cusp of sustainability, not knowing if you can work and feed your family. The farmer admits to misrepresenting his finances to a banker in order to get a loan because “they would squeeze the life blood out of me and my family.” In responding to this young farmer, Aberhart is able to extend this metaphor of exploitation, by representing farmers ‘crawl[ing] on your hands and knees” in order to rake fields not with combines but with their fingers. Aberhart’s metaphor

70 

M. Macaulay

reduces the farmer to brute animality, devoid of humanity. He represents a possible future where farmers will be reduced not only to an animal state, but also to a state where they will have no food to sustain them— thus beyond exploitation, extinction. To combat this, Aberhart exhorts the farmers to “hit this thing hard during the next election.” Apart from alliteration of /h/, ‘hitting hard’ places the farmer in a fight that he can potentially win. Unlike “the financiers,” Aberhart does not dismiss the farmer’s “needs.” Through his broadcasts he is able to represent and recognize these previously unexpressed needs. The solution he provides, social credit, provides a comprehensible answer to the complaints made by the workers and farmers. The rupture in Laclauan terms between the banking system and the farmers and workers is fully realized and articulated in Aberhart’s broadcasts. To see William Aberhart as a right-wing populist would be a mistake. He compassionately articulates the grievances and complaints made by urban workers and rural farmers. He also provides them with a rational solution that will address their economic and indeed existential concerns. However, Aberhart remains an evangelist, someone with a vision and a cause. Although expressing empathy and understanding for the worker and the farmer, he does not represent himself as such as the primary source of a solution. As deeply authoritarian and controlling as the system is that Aberhart proposes, he positions himself as a Moses figure leading others out of the economic wilderness. He is not a Christ figure who will personally change the world for them. The principal speech act he performs in his narrative above is a directive, but it is a warning not an order: “If you farmers don’t hit this thing hard during the next election, the time will come when you will have to do without cars—not only to live without cars and combines and tractors, but without meat or white bread, alas.” Through sophisticated exploitation of the radio as a hot medium, and thereby a means of defining ‘social credit,’ effecting local political organization and engagement of both the powerful and the weak, Aberhart represents a populism that combines both progressive and authoritarian elements. Thus, its massive success. Using Greimas, we can represent Aberhart’s narrative as follows (Fig. 3.2):

3  Prairie Populism 

Sender Aberhart →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Social Credit

Object economic survival ↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ‘the people’

71

Receiver Workers and Farmers →→→→→

←←←←←Opponent Bankers and Financiers

Fig. 3.2  Aberhart’s Proposal 1935

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Like William Aberhart’s Social Credit, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation or CCF has its origins in the Great Depression. The CCF came into being in 1932 through a coalition of the United Farmers of Alberta, the League for Social Reconstruction, and a group of progressive Members of Parliament from Ottawa, known as the Ginger Group, which supported farmers and trade-unionists affected by the Depression. In 1933 this coalition met formally in Regina, Saskatchewan to choose James Shaver Woodsworth as its leader and to adopt the Regina Manifesto as the basis of its political vision and action. The Manifesto is a clear extension and inheritor of the People’s Party Platform (1896) and The Farmers’ Platform of 1918. We can also see some reflection of Aberhart’s Social Credit in certain of the fundamental proposals it makes. The Regina Manifesto represents both a continuation of progressive populism from the nineteenth century as well as the furtherance of a social vision that is present in the earlier Farmers’ Platform. We want to first note use of the term ‘manifesto’ since it derives from an accomplishment verb, manifest, with a telic goal. The purpose of a manifesto is to make something known publicly. In this it is comparable to a public declaration. The coalition meeting in Regina does not simply want to propose policy, but also to declare broadly to Canadians or ‘the people’ its aims or purposes. The Manifesto’s preamble explicitly declares: “We aim [my emphasis] to replace the present capitalist system with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will

72 

M. Macaulay

supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government based upon economic equality will be possible.” While the People’s Party of the 1890’s and the Farmers’ Platform of 1918 and Aberhart’s Social Credit (1935) sought to transform the economic system through improved democratic practices, removal of tariffs or through injection of monies into the system, the Regina Manifesto seeks to remove this system altogether and replace it with another system. It is by far the most radical of all the proposals upon which it builds its own platform. The Laclauan rupture that gives rise to this manifesto is comparable to that we see in the earlier platforms or proposals: The present order is marked by glaring inequalities of wealth and opportunity, by chaotic waste and instability; and in an age of plenty it condemns the great mass of the people to poverty and insecurity. Power has become more and more concentrated into the hands of a small irresponsible ­minority of financiers and industrialists and to their predatory interests the majority are habitually sacrificed. (The Regina Manifesto, 1933)

This assertion combines both ethical and logical analysis. What the “present order” affords is “glaring inequalities” where the elite few, “financiers and industrialists” cleave money and property to themselves. In so doing they render “the great mass of the people” impoverished and without stability. More significantly, these financiers and industrialists are “irresponsible.” To the extent that they are responsible, they have created not just ‘waste’ but “chaotic waste and instability,” and in this chaos have caused “the majority” to be “habitually sacrificed.” The claim being made is that while this “minority” of financiers and industrialists accrue money and power for itself, it is nonetheless incompetent and creates economic chaos. Further as a “minority,” it “sacrifice[s]” the “majority.” The language of religion rather than economics and logic is employed. In the chaos that is created by a self-serving few, the many or “the majority” not only suffer but are also “sacrificed.” ‘Sacrifice’ is the act of sacrificial murder. What is implicated in the use of the term ‘sacrifice’ is that “the majority” experience not just poverty but actual death at the hands of the “minority” who mishandle the economic system in order to serve its own

3  Prairie Populism 

73

interests. This is a very powerful articulation of ‘rupture’ between the ‘elite’ and ‘the people,’ largely because people’s ability to live is affected. In the absence of a social order that permits livelihood and for that matter living for “the great mass of the people,” the Regina Manifesto proposes a series of fundamental policies, some of which are present in earlier populist proposals, some of which reflect the temporally parallel Social Credit and some of which are entirely new and different. What is entirely new and consistent with the notion that the economy is in the hands of an irresponsible and uncaring few is the concept of “a planned, socialized economic order.” We can see the parallel with William Aberhart’s equally planned economic order. However, what Aberhart proposes is a means of injecting consumer wealth into the economy to make it function. The Regina Manifesto seeks far broader change. The new economic order would be both “planned” and “socialized.” The Regina Manifesto is not in any way a nostalgic proposal like that of the People’s Party (1896). The idea of planning for the future is central to the Regina Manifesto. A commission would be set up composed of economists, engineers and statisticians, a very different group from financiers and industrialists: “The task of the Commission will be to plan for the production, distribution and exchange of all goods and services necessary to the efficient functioning of the economy.” Government is therefore to be informed by those who understand the economy best. “Public servants” will act “in the public interest” and will be “responsible to the people as a whole.” In keeping with a system that reports to the ‘people,’ socialized health services are proposed given that “a healthy population has become a function for which every civilized community should undertake responsibility.” There would be furtherance of “both producers and consumers’ cooperative institutions.” This would ensure fair prices for those producing goods as well as fair prices for those requiring those goods. There would also be a new taxation policy. Rather than generating public monies through “customs duties and sales taxes” that disadvantage the masses, there would be extension of “income, corporation and inheritance taxes, steeply graduated according to ability to pay.” Focus then would not be on taxes for specific goods, but rather taxes from thriving corporations and those with incomes above the norm or

74 

M. Macaulay

those who have inherited their wealth. In keeping with a planned economy “we propose to provide work and purchasing power to those now unemployed by a far-reaching programme of public expenditure on housing, slum clearance, hospitals, libraries, schools, community halls, parks, recreational projects, reforestation, rural electrification, the elimination of grade crossings, and other similar projects in both town and country.” Such a programme would be paid for “by the issuance of credit based on the national wealth.” This would create employment, support social needs and bolster the national economy. What is proposed by the Manifesto is comparable to the New Deal offered by the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930’s which, based on Keynesian economics, brought large numbers of Americans out of poverty. It differs from Aberhart’s social credit in not providing direct wealth to permit the purchase of needed goods and services. In addition to these proposals, the Manifesto also puts forth two very radical proposals, one concerning the “socialization of all financial machinery,” and two, the concept of “social ownership.” For the latter, “socialization of transportation, communications, electric power and all other industries and services essential to social planning” would be brought about to ensure that “The welfare of the community must take supremacy over the claims of private wealth.” More than anything else, socialization of banking currency, credit and insurance complements the policy of social ownership, since it was through the “socialization of finance” that social ownership and indeed all the fundamental policies put forth by the Manifesto could be achieved. This was not a reform of an existing system but a drastic change to it. In keeping with a vision of responsible social planning, the Manifesto also proposed changes to the Labour Code to ensure “maximum income and leisure, insurance covering accident, old age, and unemployment, freedom of association and effective participation in the management of his industry or profession.” The latter is revolutionary since it would permit worker involvement in any industry or profession practised. Equally, the Manifesto sought to aid farmers. There would be “removal of tariff burden from the operations of agriculture,” as had been proposed by The Farmers’ Platform of 1918. There would be encouragement of

3  Prairie Populism 

75

cooperatives for both producers and consumers, as well as insurances against crop failure. The export trade of farm products would be facilitated through “a national plan of external trade through import and export boards.” Issues of Social Justice and Freedom would also be addressed. The Manifesto notes “an alarming growth of Fascist tendencies among all government authorities: ‘We stand for the full economic, political and religious liberty of all.’” Equally, issues of social justice are foregrounded such that the law is humanized “to bring it into harmony with the needs of the people [my emphasis].” The Manifesto further proposed the abolition of the Canadian Senate, since the Senate “has developed into a bulwark of capitalist interest, as is illustrated by the large number of company directorships held by its aged members…it is one of the most reactionary assemblies in the civilized world.” Lastly, the Manifesto proposes “international economic cooperation” on “disarmament and world peace”: “Canada must refuse to be entangled in any more wars fought to make the world safe for capitalism.” The concept of rational planning dominates the Regina Manifesto. This concept gives the Manifesto both coherence and cohesion. Equally the concept of the ‘people’ dominates. It is referenced repeatedly. The ‘people’ are referred to as “the great mass of the people,” “the majority,” “the people,” “the people as a whole,” “the Canadian people,” “producers,” “consumers,” “the masses in Canada,” “farmers,” “workers,” “civilized community,” “all residents of Canada,” “all,” and “the masses.” The adjective public is also used extensively: “public servants,” “public interest,” “publicly owned enterprises,” “Public Finance,” “public financing,” “public boards,” “public meetings.” Although the agenda of the Regina Manifesto is clearly socialist, it is also populist. There is a clearly defined rupture between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ that is defined both as an evil and as a “cancer.” The accrued grievances defined by Laclau as ‘lacks’ are clearly articulated into an equivalential chain that coalesces into the notion of a “Cooperative Commonwealth.” This reflects a similar vision to that of the People’s Party in the 1890’s, that the nation should function as a “commonwealth,” where wealth is shared and held in common (Fig. 3.3):

76 

M. Macaulay

Sender CCF →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Manifesto

Object Cooperative Commonwealth

Receiver Canadians

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←←Opponent “the great masses of the people” Financiers and Industrialists

Fig. 3.3  CCF Manifesto 1933

Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland Tommy Douglas became the first socialist Premier of Saskatchewan (and of Canada) in 1944. The Saskatchewan provincial election was held on June 15, 1944. The CCF won a resounding victory taking 47 or the 52 seats of the legislature. The previous election had been six years prior and won by the Liberals. Douglas remained as Premier of Saskatchewan until 1961 when he resigned as Premier and entered Federal politics. However, during the 1960 provincial election he introduced the notion of a “pre-­ paid medical care program.” He won the election and ‘Medicare’ was adopted on November 1961 to take effect formally in July 1962. This legislation was followed by its formal assent in the Federal Parliament (December 8, 1966) giving Canada along with such countries as Great Britain, France, and Germany a policy and programme of socialized medicine. In achieving Medicare for All, Douglas had achieved the most significant legislation of any Canadian politician.3 To understand how this achievement came about, we need first to understand Douglas as a populist politician. How did he win the historic 1944 Saskatchewan election? One key component of his success was his inclusion of a short fable or allegory called Mouseland in his campaign speeches. Mouseland tells the story of mice living in a world of cats. In Laclauan terms, Douglas  Tommy Douglas was acclaimed the “greatest Canadian” in a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation poll (November 30, 2004). 3

3  Prairie Populism 

77

articulates through this story the rupture between the ‘elites’ and ‘the people.’ What is important is that he constructs these elites politically. The argument he makes goes back to that in the American People’s Party of the 1890’s that understood the restrictions imposed on the ‘people’ by an exclusively two-party system. Douglas begins his story with an abstract: “This is the story of a place called Mouseland. Mouseland was a place where all the little mice lived and played, were born and died. And they lived much the same as you and I do.”4 A clear parallel is made between the “majority” in the Regina Manifesto and the mice in the story. The mice are humanized and made relatable by the actions of living and playing as well as being born and dying. What they experience is what most human beings experience. The mice therefore serve as symbolic representations of the average Saskatchewanian. Notably Douglas fable/allegory turns to the question of governance. The mice in Douglas’ tale are voting mice. They have a parliament just like Saskatchewanians and Canadians do. They vote every four years. Like many living on the Prairies: “Some of them even got a ride to the polls and got a ride for the next four years afterwards, too.” Douglas puns on the colloquial expression getting a ride to mean being taken advantage of. Through this pun, he implicates a connection between the agentive act of voting and the patient act of being abused. This is Douglas’ theme throughout his story, that voting is an illusionary act of agency: “And every time on election day all the little mice used to go to the ballot box, and they used to elect a government. A government made up of big, fat, black cats.” The “big, fat, black cats” represent the elite in government who run the province. Douglas provides external evaluation about this fact: “Now if you think it strange that mice should elect a government of cats, look at the history of Canada for the last 90 years and maybe you’ll see they weren’t any ‘stupider’ than us.” Douglas’ use of analogy or metaphor mitigates any negative positioning of his audience who are asked “maybe” to see “they weren’t any ‘stupider’ than  Analysis of this story is after Labov and Waletzky (1967).

4

78 

M. Macaulay

us.” The accusation of stupidity for mice who elect cats to govern them brings home the failure of Saskatchewan voters to elect those who represent their own interests. Douglas extends his conceit by pointing out that the cats “passed good laws—that is, laws that were good for cats.” He notes, “One of the laws said that mouse holes had to be big enough so a cat could get his paw in. Another law said that mice could only run at certain speeds—so a cat could get his breakfast without too much effort.” The conceit of mice electing cats humorously implicates the fact that cats kill mice, and so want to have larger mouse holes and slower mice. Therefore “All the laws were good laws—For cats. But, oh, they were hard on mice.” Douglas then employs irony in his narrative: “And when the mice couldn’t put up with it any more, they decided that something had to be done. So they went on masse to the polls. They voted the black cats out. They put in the white cats.” Douglas exploits this irony further. The white cats propose square mouse holes so that they can get not just one paw in but two thus increasing jeopardy for the mice. Douglas then addresses the futility of the democratic system itself: And when they couldn’t take that anymore, they voted the white cats out and black ones in again. Then they went back to white cats. Then to black cats. They even tried half black and half white cats. And they called that a coalition. They even got one government made up of cats with spots on them. They were cats that tried to make a noise like a mouse but ate like a cat.

For all the permutations of the cats, Douglas notes; “You see, my friends, the trouble wasn’t the colour of the cats. The trouble was that they were cats. And because they were cats, they naturally looked after cats instead of mice.” Through external evaluation, Douglas points out that the mice for a very long time had been missing the point: cats kill mice, regardless of their external markings. Douglas ends his narrative with the entrance of a key actor, “one little mouse who had an idea.” Through internal evaluation, Douglas presents this little mouse as an orator who speaks to his fellow mice: “Look

3  Prairie Populism 

79

fellows, why do we keep electing a government made up of cats? Why don’t we elect a government made up of mice?” This little mouse is put in jail for being a Bolshevik. Through evaluative action, Douglas makes the point that this is a radical idea. However, he ends his story of Mouseland with the coda: “But I want to remind you that you can lock up a mouse or a man but you can’t lock up an idea.” Douglas’ parable reveals the fallacy of voting for those who act not in your interests but in their own interests. It is a gentle, humorous and effective way of making Saskatchewan voters reflect on their own voting behaviour, their commitment to a voting system that only purports to be democratic but in fact facilitates the needs and interests of an elite few. This is also a key populist message that precipitates a major rupture between the “majority” and the “minority.” ‘Democracy’ through Douglas’ story also becomes what Laclau refers to as “empty signifier.” It accrues to itself all the wrongs done by the cats (Liberals and Conservatives) to the mice (Saskatchewanians). In supporting ‘democracy,’ Saskatchewan voters embrace the whole raft of needs that they experience as “unmet.” Populism cannot be more clearly articulated than this. In getting Saskatchewan voters to examine their own voting behaviour, Douglas provides a scenario for a new narrative where the mice vote for mice, and their unmet needs, rather than cats. If we expose the metaphor of mice as Saskatchewan voters, this is precisely what they did in July 1944 when the CCF captured 47 of 54 seats in the provincial legislature (Fig. 3.4). Sender Tommy Douglas

Object ‘democracy’

→→→→→→ axis of knowledge

↑ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ‘mice’

axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Fable of Mouseland

Fig. 3.4  Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland

Receiver Saskatchewanians →→→→→

←←←←←Opponent ‘cats’

80 

M. Macaulay

Conclusion Twentieth-century populism in Canada can be seen as an extension of the populism of the United States in the nineteenth century. Both originate out of what Canovan (1981) refers to agrarian populism. Farmers in both countries become dissatisfied with the existing means of bringing about change to their circumstances. What develops in both countries with both agrarian populations is a set of unmet needs whose failure to be addressed promotes political action or political organization. Both combine moralism and economic analysis in presenting a world order where through tariffs and specifically what in Canada was termed “The Protective Tariff” allowed for the exploitation and impoverishment of “the masses.” The Protective Tariff devised by “the privileged classes” attacked agriculture itself: “the basic industry upon which the success of all other Industries primarily depends” (The Farmers’ Platform, 1918). The Protective Tariff increased the “costs of agricultural implements and machinery, clothing, boots and shoes, building material and practically everything the farmer has to buy…so that it is becoming impossible for farmers generally, under normal conditions to carry on farming operations profitably” (The Farmers’ Platform, 1918). If agriculture itself cannot be sustained, then equally the country cannot be so. The Protective Tariff is seen as un-Canadian. Free trade and ‘Canadianness’ become interchangeable. ‘The people’ in Laclauan terms become defined through their impoverishment by the Canadian government (either by the Liberals or the Conservatives) in its trading policy with the British and Americans, but equally so they become defined as ‘Canadians’ whose existential needs and political identity are integrated into one equivalential chain in the popular demand for free trade. Through this process we also see a popular demand for “responsible government.” This demand for responsible government is developed and expanded over the first half of the century in the Canadian populist movements that succeed The Farmers’ Platform. Rather than tariffs on goods brought in from Great Britain or the United States, the Platform seeks “direct taxation.” It also seeks control over public land so that “the interests of the public shall be properly safeguarded” along with the

3  Prairie Populism 

81

public ownership of “railway, water, and aerial transportation, telephone, telegraph and express systems…natural power and of coal mining.” These demands echo those of the People’s Party. With a concept of ‘the people’ in place what follows is a notion of responsibility to the people and so the preservation of resources to be held in common. With the concept of ‘the people’ in place what equally follows in a desire for a stronger democratic process. In rejecting tariffs imposed by the British government, and supporting free trade, what can equally be rejected are British titles and thus a step forward to a new identity. Within Canada, the existing “patronage system” would also be reformed in order to open “seats in parliament to women on the same terms as men,” and provide “proportional representation, “and “direct legislation through the initiative, referendum and recall.” The Farmers’ Platform serves as a blueprint for the CCF Regina Manifesto. The key idea behind The Regina Manifesto is that the economy would be “planned” and “socialized.” The Regina Manifesto articulates a standard populist position of inequality between an elite and the people or “masses.” The elite are represented as “a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists.” Echoing the notion of “responsible government” in The Farmers’ Platform is the depiction of an elite as both “small” and “irresponsible.” The idea of ‘responsibility’ is central and cannot be articulated without there being a ‘people’ requiring representation of its needs and wants. Responsibility is achieved through planning that further evidences ‘the will of the people’ rather than irresponsible action on the part of the few or the elite. To be responsible to the people, a government must act in the public interest to ensure public welfare. The word public is pervasive in the Manifesto: “public servants,” “public interest,” “publicly owned enterprises,” “Public Finance,” “public financing,” “public boards,” “public meetings.” Behind the Manifesto is very much Abraham Lincoln’s assertion of a government of the people, by the people and for the people. In the Manifesto, responsibility is the glue that ensures such good government. We can refer to ‘responsibility’ in Laclauan terms as an “empty signifier” since such responsibility is realised broadly as the work of economists, engineers, and statisticians to study and plan for an economy that would be “in the public interest” and “responsible to the people as a whole.” This would in turn entail “public servants” who would

82 

M. Macaulay

establish fair prices for goods as well as appropriate taxes upon them. Further, “[The Manifesto] propose[s]to provide work and purchasing power to those now unemployed by a far-reaching programme of public expenditure on housing, slum clearance, hospitals, libraries, schools, community halls, parks, recreational projects, reforestation, rural electrification, the elimination of grade crossings, and other similar projects in both town and country.” To effect such radical change, there would also be the “socialization of all financial machinery” as well as “social ownership.” These last are the two principal faces of ‘responsibility.’ Governmental responsibility in the form of “socialization of all financial machinery” is also the theme of William Aberhart’s construction of “social credit.” While J.S. Woodsworth and the CCF proposed a planned economy to effect social and financial security for the people, Aberhart proposed a system of credit provided to ‘the people.’ Using radio as a medium of transmission of his message, Aberhart set out a comparison between the banks and the system of credit that he proposed. While the Regina Manifesto sought to change existing government into “responsible government,” Aberhart largely sought to change the banking system via the provincial government of Alberta. For Aberhart, the ‘elite’ were the “financiers” and bankers who refuse to provide credit to impoverished farmers. In a letter that Aberhart reads out in his March 26, 1935 broadcast, a young farmer confesses to lying to the manager of his bank in order to get a loan. The farmer comments, “He started abusing the farmers for not knowing how to farm….the farmers could make money even during these days if they wouldn’t try to get rich all at once. I tell you, these fellows can tell the farmer off, can’t they?” In the scheme Aberhart proposes to the people of Alberta, the government would replace the bank and would provide “social credit.” Rather than applying for a loan the farmers and other workers would be credited with a specific amount on a yearly basis against which they would make loans: “that in reality no money need be used at all if the borrower uses the credit and cheque system. The banks simply credit the account of the borrower with the figure loaned and instruct him to draw cheques on that account. When the cheques come in a bookkeeping entry is made. The borrower is debited and the other man is credited.” ‘Social credit,’ which is essentially a governmental lending scheme, provides a means for farmers and workers

3  Prairie Populism 

83

to sustain themselves at a time of extreme economic need. Elite bankers are replaced in such a system by the government itself as a lender. Aberhart’s ability to simplify and make accessible the idea of ‘social credit’ provides him a means of ending an abusive banking system seen as exploitative and cruel: “I suppose some of these financiers would like you to crawl on your hands and knees to rake the field with your fingers. I’m telling you something and you had better listen to me. If you farmers don’t hit this thing hard during the next election, the time will come when you will have to do without cars—not only to live without cars and combines and tractors, but without meat or white bread, alas” (Aberhart Broadcasts [March 26, 1935]). As a populist leader, Aberhart serves as a means by which farmers’ and workers’ unmet needs and social demands are voiced. The hot medium of radio allows Aberhart to do this forcefully by broadcasting his essentially monologic sermons to Albertans throughout Alberta. He is also able to preach his economic ‘good news.’ Aberhart’s broadcasts serve as a means by which the peoples’ unmet needs and social demands are recalibrated into the popular demand for “social credit.” The success of his economic sermons over the radio allowed the Social Credit government to be in power from 1935–1971. Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland returns to the theme of “responsible government.” Douglas presents an allegory of cats versus mice focussing on the conundrum of voting mice who elect cats. The joke of this allegory is that rather than electing mice to represent them, the mice persist in electing various permutations of cats, including cats that squeak like mice but nonetheless want to eat them. Douglas’ allegory in fact problematizes governance or the question of democracy. There is an obvious populist dynamic in evidence; the mice serve to represent ‘the people,’ while the cats represent ‘the elite.’ The unmet needs for the mice are equally clear; the laws passed by the cats allow for large holes so that the cats can get one or even two paws in the mouse homes within the walls of a house, and the mice must travel at specific speeds so as to make it easier for the cats to catch them. These unmet needs do not disappear no matter what colour or permutation of colours the elected cat is. In this allegory there is no ‘will of the people.’ Equally there is no ‘people.’ The mice keep electing cats of one stripe or another. Douglas’ allegory points to a need for a generative construction of a people, ‘mice.’ Douglas has no access to the

84 

M. Macaulay

concept of a “patriotic people” in James B. Weaver’s (1892) usage. There is no revolutionary past. Awareness of their identity as ‘mice’ and not cats comes from only one little mouse: “one little mouse who had an idea. Look fellows, why do we keep electing a government made up of cats? Why don’t we elect a government made up of mice?” The idea of a government made up of mice and not cats is the quintessence of responsible government, a government that responds to the needs of its ‘people’ whether it be smaller mouse holes, faster speeds of travel or removal of protective tariffs and the setting up of a general taxation scheme or of a banking scheme to give access to funds for struggling farmers and workers. The matrix of a ‘people’ versus an ‘elite’ is transcended in prairie populism by a broad demand for ‘responsible government’ where the people’s, human or rodent, unmet needs are expressed first through social demands and then overtly popular demands.

4 Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada

Introduction The Reform Party of Canada represents one of the most important achievements of political organization and action in twentieth-century Canada. The Reform Party, through its subsequent realization as the Alliance Party of Canada, succeeded in taking over the long existing Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, which by virtue of this take-over was renamed the Conservative Party of Canada. Under Stephen Harper, the Conservative Party of Canada governed Canada for nine years from January 2006 to October 2015. Before being the Leader of the Conservative Party, Harper had been a member of the Reform Party from 1993 to 1997. There is a succession of leaders from William Aberhart (Social Credit Premier of Alberta, 1935–1943) to Ernest Manning (Social Credit Premier of Alberta, 1943–1968), to Preston Manning (founder and Leader of the Reform Party 1987–2000) and finally to Stephen Harper (Prime Minister of Canada, 2006–2015). Aberhart represents the beginnings of right-wing populism in 1930’s Alberta and Canada. Aberhart married an economic theory of money distribution to a fundamentalist Christian view of the world. Ernest Manning subsequently took over the leadership of Social Credit in 1943 and ran the province for

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_4

85

86 

M. Macaulay

25 years. His son, Preston Manning, did not succeed him in this role, but instead became the first leader of a new federal party, the Reform Party. While Preston Manning did not become Prime Minister of Canada, his successor, Stephen Harper, under the new Conservative Party of Canada banner, did. Preston Manning is the glue holding these political movements and figures together. Under Preston Manning the dying Social Credit Party in Alberta is reinvented as a new party, the Reform Party. The Reform Party itself transforms into the Alliance Party which then overtakes the established Progressive Conservative Party of Canada to become the Conservative Party. Noticeably, the adjective progressive is removed from the title of the new Conservative Party. Preston Manning is the Pauline figure of right populism in Canada. He was able to bring the policies and principals of ‘reform’ into Canadian political discussion at the federal level. In examining Manning’s ideas and influence we need first to understand that the Alberta out of which he came was no longer an agrarianbased society. During the 40’s and the 50’s it developed into a petrostate, with big oil companies moving to Alberta and establishing headquarters in both Edmonton and especially Calgary. Approximately 19 major oil companies reside in Alberta, including Suncor and Husky. Revenues from oil generate 25.87% of the province’s tax base.1 The culture of the agrarian prairies, like that of the Mid-West in the U.S., no longer looked to its immediate east and south, but to the deep south of Texas with its concentration of oil production and refineries. We also see an ideological shift in religious belief albeit within a given type of Christian fundamentalism. Two principal concepts of Christianity dominated political discourse on the Prairies during the depression and into the 40’s and 50’s as well as the remaining decades of the twentieth century. The first can be referred to as “the theology of hope” (Smillie, 2006). This theology informed the development of the social democratic party of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (the CCF) represented by J.S. Woodsworth and Tommy Douglas. Douglas was a Baptist minister. For Douglas the theology of hope emphasized social justice for the politically marginalized. As we have seen in Chap. 3 in Douglas’  Source, Statista.com, October 22, 2021.

1

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

87

parable of Mouseland, there is a rupture or divide between the cats who governed Mouseland and the mice who live in conditions antithetical to their own wellbeing and happiness. From a populist perspective, the cats can be understood as the ‘elite’ and the mice as ‘the people.’ Douglas’ greatest achievement was the adoption of Universal Healthcare, termed ‘Medicare’ that provided healthcare first for Saskatchewanians and then, through passage in the federal parliament, all Canadians. This has been referred to as “socialized medicine.” Preston Manning’s political understanding also stems from a particular understanding of what Christianity is. This understanding is largely based on the fundamentalist views of his father, Ernest Manning. Banack (2014) distinguishes between two types of fundamentalist thinking in Canada in the early part of the twentieth century, what is termed a postmillennial outlook in contrast to a premillennial outlook. A postmillennial view saw the Kingdom of God built by citizens who had been reborn in Christ. In such a view there were two stages in the progress of human beings, first, one where the citizens of earth receive or accept Christ and his teachings, followed by a second where there is the building of a new world order by these reborn citizens. In a premillennial view, however, conversion did not anticipate nor was it necessary for a new world order; rather “the coming Kingdom would be ushered in by God alone and [they]were therefore most concerned with ensuring that individual citizens were granted the freedom necessary to build a personal relationship with God” (Banack, 2014, p. 72). Since the task of building the Kingdom of God on earth was reserved for God, Christians could focus exclusively on building and developing their relationship with their God. In a premillennial view, what was far more important was one’s direct relationship with God and living a Christian life. Finkel argues that Ernest Manning, Preston Manning’s father, “viewed humans as essentially alone in a struggle to achieve eternal salvation and believed that a collectivist state belittled that struggle and made individuals more vulnerable to behaviour that might lead to eternal salvation” (1989, p. 29). Focus on individual salvation as such rather than as a means to a better world largely denies to an individual Christian social agency. How then can such an individual enter politics or be politically aware? The struggle to achieve salvation and the struggle to participate significantly in the world would seem to be in

88 

M. Macaulay

opposition. The premillennial Christian view constructs itself less in terms of social activism and more in terms of opposition to that which would impede an individual’s rebirth in Christ. It is this view that Preston Manning adopts from his father and that is central theoretically to his creation of the Reform Party. In a Faith Today podcast, Politics and Faith: An Interview with Preston Manning (2018), Preston Manning argues for what he refers to as “an interface” between faith and politics. For Manning, such an interface is evident in the Hebrew scriptures that concern the development of law-­ making. These scriptures are therefore a guide for all law-makers including those in provincial and federal parliaments. With regard to the salient question of “reconciliation” between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, Manning argues for the approach taken by Jesus. According to Manning, Jesus served as a mediator between people of differing backgrounds by incorporating into himself an understanding of both positions taken and in turn attempting to mediate between the parties. Manning makes reference to his own history as a mediator in indigenous concerns. The mediation Manning refers to concerned the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA), the Métis Association of Alberta (MAA), the Federation of Métis Settlements, and the large oil companies in Alberta represented by Syncrude. Indigenous companies wanted access to the entrepreneurial process of oil extraction. For the most part Indigenous contractors were kept outside this profit-making enterprise. Manning was brought in to mediate between Syncrude and the indigenous groups. Manning brought about a mediation whereby two new companies were set up, Business Assistance for Native Albertans Corporation (BANAC) and Venture Capital Corporation (VCC). However, for BANAC, participation by indigenous groups within Alberta was limited to 25%, while for VCC, indigenous peoples were effectively removed from consideration by having to put up $100,000 to acquire voting shares (Dobbin, 1991, pp. 55–61). The effect of such mediation was to remove indigenous parties from participation in oil extraction while appearing to attend to their concerns. Such actions also divided the indigenous community. Manning’s representation of himself as a Christian mediator after Jesus through incorporation of an understanding of both sides in a conflict appears to be distorted given the ultimate outcome of these negotiations.

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

89

However, the idea of Christian mediation as a means of integrating Christianity into politics is consistent with the premillennial view that political action could derive from Christian or Christ-like behaviour rather than any specific goal of the transformation of the world.

The Origins of the Reform Party What then were the origins of the Reform Party? Why did Manning not simply attempt to take over the reins of the Social Credit Party after his father had resigned as Premier? Why create an entirely new party and why make this a federal rather than provincial party? The establishment of the Reform Party came in two stages. The first stage was the organization of a conference, “A Conference on the Economic and Political Future of Canada,” held in May 1987 in Vancouver. There were three principal organizers: Preston Manning, Stan Roberts and Francis Winspear (Dobbin, 1991, p. 76). Winspear put up $100,000 for the conference and its organization. Attendance was limited to 300 people with delegates from the four Western provinces, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. 60 delegates were chosen by the Steering Committee. The keynote address was given by Ted Byfield who argued that “A new federal party representing the West should have ‘room to grow’ into a truly national party” (quoted in Dobbin, p. 78). The conference delegates adopted the Reform Party’s key slogan “The West Wants In!”2 as well as a motion to form a federal party. The new party was constructed very much along the same lines as the Parti Québécois which, although being a federal party, was designed to represent the special interests of Quebec on the national stage. During that same year in Winnipeg, delegates at the first national convention voted Preston Manning as their leader.3 Manning had been one of the three principal organizers of the Vancouver conference. Laycock states, “the Reform Party made inroads into working class,  It has been maintained that this slogan originated with Stephen Harper.  Dobbin points out that one of the principal organizers of the new party, Stan Roberts, eventually withdrew from the race for leader. He accused Manning and others of being “right-wing Christian fanatics” (1991, p. 79). 2 3

90 

M. Macaulay

farmer, small business, and urban middle-class constituencies in Canada’s western provinces … Reform attracted many previous New Democratic Party supporters, including at least one-quarter of English Canadian trade unionists and roughly one-third of low income voters” (2012, p. 50). The question is why. The origins of the Reform Party lie with a business elite in the West who saw the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney fail to represent their interests and concerns. This business elite was largely concerned with the interests of Alberta as a petrostate, while others from other provinces wanted greater freedom over their own business and corporate interests. The rupture that constituted “the West” in opposition to Eastern elites, although more specifically the Progressive Conservative Government under Brian Mulroney, concerned the perceived privileging by the Progressive Conservatives of Eastern issues and particularly those of Quebec. The accrued grievances of the Reform Party can be summed up as opposition to “special interests.” Thus, the catch phrase “The West Wants In!” But how did ‘western alienation’ originating with business interests in the Western provinces of Canada generate involvement by working class groups including trade unionists? Clough (1994) argues that Manning’s ‘populism’ was entirely tactical, exemplifying what Margaret Canovan (1981) refers to as “politician’s populism.” If we examine William Aberhart, we see that radio was the chief means that he employed to get his particular monetary/social reform message across. Aberhart used radio to create a provincial congregation. Preston Manning also had access to radio and other media, but he was not a strong nor particularly inspiring speaker like Tommy Douglas who could generate a large crowd. Manning was a skilful organizer, but his most important tool for communication was the Blue Book. This ‘book’ had a distinctive blue cover, was compact and could easily be carried or put in a back pocket. It was quite literally ‘to hand.’ In this respect it was not dissimilar to the family Bible that was readily accessible in many people’s homes. It was physically present. It could be seen, touched, and placed anywhere within the home. Metonymically, the Blue Book was the Reform Party in one’s house if one were a member of the Party (Fig. 4.1).

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

91

Fig. 4.1  The Blue Book 1988 Cover. (Source of this cover is from the University of Calgary Archives)

The first Blue Book of the Reform Party had two principal concerns: one, to articulate a set of grievances that require ‘reform’ within the political process; and two, to create a constituency. Throughout the Blue Book, its author, Preston Manning, the elected leader of the Reform Party, consistently refers to his readers as “we reformers.” This collective entity of “reformers” is most often followed by the verb believe: “we reformers believe.” Of the 101 paragraphs in the Blue Book, 37 or 36% are introduced by the expression “Reformers/we believe.” The Blue Book is therefore seldom one where the facts speak for themselves; rather the collective entity of ‘reformers’ who ‘believe’ conjures up something like a religious congregation that is defined by its particular beliefs. To read Manning’s Blue Book is to participate in a form of readerly congregation and so become a member

92 

M. Macaulay

of that congregation. Reading becomes an act of co- and self-identification. Manning employs the Blue Book much as William Aberhart did radio, to create and maintain a congregation of believers who participate in the ideology he supports. Within the Blue Book, belief is also complemented by rejection, where there is a discarding of differing beliefs.4 5% of the verbs commencing Manning’s 101 paragraphs are verbs of rejection. This speech act of rejection is seen first in Preston Manning’s “The Leader’s Foreward: ‘The Next Canada.’” Manning initially appeals to the very Canadian concern with stability going back to the British North America Act of 1867. He refers to the need for stability going forward to the “next Canada” of the twenty-first century. He addresses the inadequacies for this task of going forward on the part of the three major political parties. There is nothing remarkable or exceptional about such rhetoric. It is what we would expect of any statement on the part of a new political party. What distinguishes Manning’s Foreward from any other political leader’s Foreward are his last four paragraphs. Rhetorically, Manning employs repetition. The last four paragraphs all begin with the same assertion: “We reject.” Reject is a mental process verb5 as is believe. In speech act terms, it is a very specific type of assertion: that is, to assert what one does not believe or support and so through such assertion implicate what one does believe. Lexically it is a type of indirect speech act. This is unusual in political platforms since these normally assert a set of positive beliefs or goals. Manning’s strategy is populist in that he constructs a clear dichotomy within Canadian political discourse between an established elite and “we reformers” who are in opposition to and thus reject this elite. Thus, Manning’s Foreward is constructed as a quasi-religious populist tract. In his first paragraph of rejection, Manning states that reformers reject “the old Conservative model of the Canadian economy.” Manning delineates a specific dichotomy between what he calls a “heartland/hinterland” economy where the “heartland” in Southern Ontario and Southern Quebec concentrates economic prosperity within itself and excludes “the rest of the country” from “protection and security.” In Manning’s  Source of this cover is from the University of Calgary Archives.  Reject as a verb derives from the Latin reiectare ‘to throw away.’ It can be both a verb of mental process and a material process verb if a physical action is referred to. 4 5

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

93

analysis, the first populist rupture is economic. Reformers reject such exclusion by “the rest of the country” from economic prosperity and security. One part of the country is secure while the other is precarious. This of course was far from the case since Alberta in particular was economically strong due to its revenues from big oil. Manning next sets out rejection of “the Liberal definition of Canada as a ‘meeting of two founding races, cultures, and languages.’” Reformers seek “a new definition of Canadian nationality.” Manning’s definition includes those “ordinary Canadians outside Upper and Lower Canada.” The two nations definition of Canada refers to French and English settler populations exclusive of indigenous populations and those from other immigrant communities. Manning’s own articulation of a “two nations” definition is regional. One ‘culture’ resides in Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec), while the other could broadly be termed ‘the east’ (Maritimes) and ‘the west’ (Prairie provinces and British Columbia). This particular dichotomy is highly original since the standard cultural/ regional division in Canada has always been between francophone Quebec and anglophone Canada represented by the remaining provinces and territories. Reform under Preston Manning also rejects the “social vision of the NDP.”6 He represents the NDP stance explicitly, “the concept that Mother Government and universal social programs run by bureaucracies are the best and only way to care for the sick, the poor, the old and the young.” He sets up a division between “the Welfare State” and “the people whom the Welfare State was supposed to serve.” In his rejection of the “welfare state,” Manning implicitly rejects a postmillennial view of Christianity where those who are saved bring about a new world order. At the same time, he implicitly asserts a premillennial view where government does not impede a given Christian’s progress in cultivating his or her relationship with God. Thus “Mother Government” should not impede the true welfare of “the people” which is to seek a stronger relationship with God. In this fundamentalist Christian perspective, the “people” must assert their own needs through a reanalysed economy that  The NDP is the acronym for the New Democratic Party, formed from the CCF.

6

94 

M. Macaulay

is not based in central Canada and more specifically in a regional definition of what it means to be ‘Canadian.’ Lastly reformers reject the political construct of a Right, Left and Centre. In rejecting this standard political construct of representative democracies, Manning argues for a new kind of politics suited to the “complex” and “multi-dimensional world that we live in today.” What is rejected by Preston Manning in his Foreward is a centralized economy within Canada, a definition of ‘Canada’ as founded by only two ‘nations,’ one ‘English’ and the other ‘French,’ as well as a Canada that deprives Canadians of mature individualism. What is rejected is also an old-style politics with a defined Right, Left and Centre. What Manning asserts indirectly is the need for a new type of politics for a modern and complex world with re-analysis of both the economy and the concept of being a ‘Canadian.’ Manning in turn set outs four clear “planks” for this new politics: “Constitutional Planks,” “Bread and Butter Planks,” “People Planks,” and “Green Planks.”

 onstitutional Reform: “A Fair Shake C for the West!” It is interesting that Manning begins his representation of a new party vision with issues of constitutionality, rather than “Bread and Butter” issues that one would normally expect of a populist platform. However, for Manning these issues are intricately interwoven: “Reformers believe [my emphasis] that there is undeniable evidence of unfair treatment of resource-producing regions, especially in the treatment of Western Canada.” He further asserts: “This injustice has occurred at different times in our history and from governments of different political stripes.” In the first two paragraphs of this plank, Manning employs the mental state verb believe four times to assert strong positioning. In the last use of believe, Manning states, “We believe that the interest of the underpopulated regions of Canada should be safeguarded by constitutional guarantees and parliamentary institutions which effectively balance representation by population with regional representation.” Manning’s proposals for

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

95

reform are based entirely on a set of beliefs, his own principally and that of “we reformers.” There is no articulation of a clear set of facts or events. Nonetheless, he maintains that there is a fundamental flaw in the make­up of Canada: “the resource-producing regions” have been denied full representation within its governance structures. Manning refers to this as “unfair treatment” that he then represents as “injustice.” He clearly positions Western interests in opposition to those of Central Canada. It is noticeable that he does not address an elite establishment within Canada such as the banking system, but rather the very regional make-up of Canada itself. What Manning argues for is rupture on the basis of regional interests. Thus, the main purpose of this plank is to construct a regional entity, the West, in opposition to Central Canada itself. There is virtually no concrete articulation of grievance in Manning’s representation of constitutional reform. The injustice which Manning speaks of has “occurred” at different times in the past on the part of different governments. Manning offers no specificity, but he does involve his readers in a strongly held belief that he repeatedly asserts. Repetition of this assertion conveys the implicature that it is true. Laclau would refer to Manning’s demand for Constitutional Reform as a “popular demand.” Such demands “at a very incipient level constitute the ‘people’ as a potential historical actor” (Laclau, 2007, p.  74). Although not explicitly so, Manning’s popular demand for constitutional reform is also closer to religious discourse than political discourse. He asks his readers to participate in believing that unfairness and injustice has taken place historically and that this requires immediate remedy. Manning’s plank is closer to being a sermon than an actual political tract, but for all that it is also a populist sermon. If the belief system proposed in the Blue Book is accepted by its readers, then Manning’s associated planks follow as “popular demands”: a “triple­E Senate,” “regional fairness tests,” “popular ratification of Constitutional Change,” “entrenchment of Property Rights,” and “Opposition to the Meech-Lake Accord.” This is the first set of popular demands that serve as an equivalential chain in Laclauan terms and in so doing “make the emergence of a people possible” (Laclau, 2007, p. 74). The Meech-Lake Accord was arrived at through intense negotiations under the Progressive Conservative Government of Brian Mulroney. Opposition to it is perhaps the key plank serving to define “reform” and

96 

M. Macaulay

“reformers.” As before, the Accord is rejected: “The enacting of amendments improving Quebec’s position [my emphasis] without concurrent amendments improving the position of the Western Provinces, the Atlantic Provinces and Northern Canada.” The main achievement of the Meech-Lake Accord was to provide Quebec status as a “distinct society” within Canada. This spoke to the historical division within Canada of two settler peoples, the ‘French’ and the ‘English.’ ‘French Canada’ became integrated into ‘Canada’ after the fall of the French in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (September 13, 1759). The British North American Act 1774 granted the French colonists within the new ‘Canada’ freedom of language and religion. However, the relationship between the two settler groups remained contentious particularly with the referendum by Quebec to secede from Canada (1995). This referendum was not successful, but the union of upper and lower Canada remained an issue of national concern due to the continuing possibility of separation. The Meech-Lake Accord was designed to heal the wounds between the anglophone and francophone worlds. In his rejection of the Meech-Lake accord, Manning equates the historical grievances of Quebec with those of Western and Eastern Canada as well as Northern Canada. Since there is no historical equivalence, he purposefully constructs ‘The West’ as disadvantaged in these negotiations rather than seeing ‘The West’ as part of the anglophone world within Canada. There is nothing comparable to the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in the ‘West.’ Settlement in the West came through expansion of both ‘French’ and ‘English’ settlers into the Prairies to farm. There was no cultural rupture between one group of settlers and another, although most certainly there was between settlers and indigenous populations and Métis. This does not prevent Manning from constructing such a rupture and indeed attempting to assert that in its own way ‘The West’ was also a “distinct society.” The argument to equivalence amongst Quebec, The West, the East and the North7 has no basis in historical reality, but it provides for Manning an oppositional stance whereby the West is deprived of advantages given to Quebec. He  It can be argued that ‘The North’ does constitute a distinct society within Canada due to its largely indigenous population. The disparity between ‘The North’ and ‘The South’ has been partially addressed by the creation of three distinct territories: The Yukon, The Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. 7

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

97

constructs a populist divide between Western and Eastern interests wherein the interests or needs of the West are not met. He provides a case for what Laclau refers to as “unmet needs.” The first corollary of such “unmet needs” are “Regional Fairness Tests.” In one of his few positive assertions Manning states, “Reform Party MPs will push for public analyses of the regional distribution of the expenditures and revenues of all federal government policies and contracts. These distributions would be analysed on both an East-West and North-South basis…” What is implicated is that the federal government has not allocated federal funding equitably to both ‘The West’ and to ‘The North.’ There is regional disparity of economic federal funding. Manning indicates this further in one of his few specific examples: “Reformers believe [my emphasis] that such radically discriminatory actions as the National Energy Program and CF-18 contract8 would never be passed through such a process.” Neither the National Energy Program nor the CF-18 contract constitutes a cultural rupture. What Manning represents as an East-West divide is a federal policy that attempted to provide energy self-sufficiency for Canada as a whole. It was opposed by the Big Oil companies who saw the National Energy Program as a threat to their profit-making ability.9 Manning has therefore equated the “unmet needs“of Big Oil to those of ‘The West’ in conflict with ‘The East.’ Big Oil could itself be seen as a type of elite or establishment as it is now seen by many environmentalist groups,10 but in Manning’s analysis Big Oil is the disguised face of a victimized ‘West’ preyed on by an Eastern establishment realized politically by either the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties. Again, Manning employs a mental state verb believe in conjunction with the collective noun “Reformers.” Rather than hard evidence, there is a belief system in which “reformers” participate. Within this belief system, Big Oil and “The West” are conflated. They become one. This is very much a constructed  In 1986 the Progressive Conservative Government of Brian Mulroney awarded to a Quebec firm, Bombardier, a contract to maintain newly acquired CF-18 fighter jets. 9  The National Energy Program was a principal project of the then Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau who wanted to nationalize oil production in Canada to provide control over its production and distribution. This clearly flew in the face of private oil companies whose principal interest was in sustaining profits for their owners and shareholders. 10  The Sierra Club, Extinction Rebellion, The Green Party of Canada. 8

98 

M. Macaulay

populism based on an ideological view of the world where major oil companies become subject to “discriminatory actions.” Such actions involve taxation and delimitation of profits. To participate in Preston Manning’s Blue Book as a “reformer,” one must accept the equivalences Manning makes. One must accept that the grievances of “The West” are economic and cultural deprivation in contrast to the economic security enjoyed by the East and specifically Quebec. Manning furthers this ethical and pathetic argument by demanding “Entrenchment of Property Rights”: “The Reform Party regrets [my emphasis] the failure of the PC and NDP Parties to agree to former Prime Minister Trudeau’s proposal to entrench property rights into the Constitutional Act of 1982.” He argues that the Canadian Charter of Rights “should recognize and declare the right of every person to the use and enjoyment of property, both real and personal, and the right to not be deprived thereof except by due process of law.” The standard distinction between “real” property and “personal property” where “real property” refers to real estate and what is integrated into real estate factors into the notion of a “person.” As noted by Dobbin, “a ‘person’ for the purpose of property rights, includes corporations” (1991, p.188). The language used by Manning, “the right of every person to the use and enjoyment of property” echoes Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence which speaks of the “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” In his use of the indefinite quantifier every Manning refers to individuated and specific persons. The idea of the corporation, however, is entirely unspecified as is the right to property that would apply to the functioning of corporations within society. What appears to enhance the rights of an individual person, a “reformer,” would equally enhance the rights and province of big corporations. This is only implicit in Manning’s declaration. Manning also proposes two process arguments regarding Constitutionality, one for a “Triple-E Senate” and one for “Popular Ratification of Constitutional Change.” The Triple E represents an “Elected,” “Equal,” and “Effective” Senate. The idea of an elected Senate would have broad popular support since the Senate in Canada is not an elected body. What is meant by “equal,” however, is related again to the notion of regional disparity which Manning constructs in the Blue Book. In 1988 members of Senate were appointments made by parties, largely

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

99

the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives. Their function was “sober second thought.” Thus, senators could refer legislation back to Parliament if deficiencies were perceived. Manning reconstructs Senate along regional lines thereby changing its principal function: “The Western representatives of the three federal parties have shown no inclination to make this a priority issue in their Central-Canadian-dominated caucuses.” The language employed by Manning, “The Western representatives of the three federal parties” presupposes that those senators coming from the Western Provinces should also represent the ‘The West.’ What Manning further implicates is that they have failed in their duty to do so because they participate in “Central-Canadian-dominated caucuses.” The caucuses Manning refers to were in large part either Liberal or Conservative Party caucuses. Manning, however, positions them as being “Central-Canadian-­ dominated.” He reiterates again an East/West divide that fails to serve the interests of ‘The West’ as he defines it. An elected Senate would remedy this rupture between East and West by making senators subject to the electoral process. He extends concern for electoral process with reference to populist direct democracy: “Popular Ratification of Constitutional Change.” Manning again employs the mental state verb believe: “Reformers believe [my emphasis] that the process of legitimate constitutional change to Canada has been seriously undermined by executive federalism.” A conflict is presented between “legitimate constitutional change” and “executive federalism.” What “executive federalism” is is not defined, but it does constitute a type of elite that has prevented direct voting on constitutional change, and thus the Triple-E Senate, to take place. Manning constructs both the need for a Triple-E Senate and direct democracy to bring about the Triple-E Senate as a “popular demand.” In this populist construction, a centralized power has prevented real democracy from taking place and thus has diminished freedom for ‘The West.’ In the section on Constitutional Reform subtitled “A Fair Shake for the West!” Manning promotes a vision of Canada divided into unequal regional camps. Those in Central Canada hold power and deprive those within other regions but specifically ‘The West’ from proper functioning of their own society. His principal task is to regionalize Canada into equal and unequal groups and participants in Federation. He does this through

100 

M. Macaulay

representation of Reformers “reject[ing]” the Meech-Lake Accord” because it privileges only one region, Quebec. He further regionalizes the Senate and demands Senate reform along with “regional fairness tests.” ‘The West’ itself is defined almost entirely in terms of what it is not, except for the one significant reference to Big Oil in Reformers’ rejection of the National Energy Program. The rights of ‘persons’ and thus ‘the people’ are seemingly supported through support for entrenchment of property rights that incorporate those of Big Oil.

Overt Populism To a very large extent what we see in the opening sections of Preston Manning’s Blue Book provides a largely implicit populism. Manning’s principal achievement is in constructing ‘The West’ as a ‘people’ who have experienced injustice at the hands of the East. Manning reanalyses Canada into an East/West divide. While he speaks of the Maritimes and The North as distinct regions, the East is largely positioned as an amalgamation of Quebec and Ontario, two very different provinces with two different histories. But for there to be a ‘West’ in opposition, there equally must be an ‘East’ where “executive federalism” resides. Against this backdrop of an East/West divide, however calculated or constructed, overt populism is also incorporated within the Blue Book in its attention to political processes. A more explicit populism is provided for in Manning’s section on “Political Reform: ‘A Great Vision for Canada.’” The opening lines of this section constitute a type of manifesto: “Reformers believe [my emphasis] that many of our most serious problems as a country can be traced to the apathy and non-involvement of Canadians in public affairs, and to decisions that too frequently ignore the popular will.” The notion of “the popular will” is one taken up by many theoreticians of populism. In their discussion of populism, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser make reference to ‘the general will’ of the people. They note that “populist actors usually support the implementation of direct democratic mechanisms, such as referenda and plebiscites” (2017, p.16). This is precisely what Manning does:

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

101

Governments today assume far too large a role in our lives for us to allow decisions to be made solely by bureaucrats, pressure groups, and political Professionals. The vast majority of citizens and taxpayers have a right to be involved. The system must provide the opportunity and the responsibility for us to do so. (Political Reform: ‘A Great Vision for Canada,’ The Blue Book 1988)

Manning portrays or positions “Governments” as playing a greater part in the lives of the everyday citizen than is warranted. He clearly sets out a rupture or divide between “governments” and ‘the people.’ Aids to ‘government’ are “bureaucrats, pressure groups and political Professionals.” The last group, of course, are elected representatives of political parties. These are constructed or positioned as “Professionals,” in other words, politicians who act only for themselves as part of a political class. Professional politicians as a political class are set up against ‘the people.’ Manning argues for the “right” of citizens and taxpayers to be “involved.” This is a clear rejection of representative democracy, and indeed the party system in Canada. In the next paragraph of this section Manning sets out his solution: “We believe that public policy in democratic societies should reflect the will of the majority of the citizens [my emphasis] as determined by free and fair elections, referenda and the decisions of legally constituted and representative Parliaments and Assemblies by the people.” The word that stands out in this further assertion of belief is referenda, in other words, ‘direct democracy.’ Such referenda are a means by which ‘the people’ can sidestep the actions of “bureaucrats, pressure groups and political Professionals.” Referenda allow the ‘will of the people’ to be explicitly expressed. This completely circumvents the complexity of parliamentary debate, and sober second thought in the Senate. What is constructed instead is the notion of a ‘people,’ that possesses a ‘will’ that in turn can be expressed. This ‘will’ is transparent in the Reform Party’s motto, “The West Wants In!” This motto combines very effectively two key populist notions, that of a ‘people,’ in this case ‘the West,’ that Manning devotes the first part of the Blue Book to creating, and the notion of a populist ‘will of the people,’ here expressed by the mental state verb want. We can also see this in speech act terms as an indirect directive in which the sincerity condition is invoked. In Laclauan terms,

102 

M. Macaulay

we also have quite literally a popular demand that serves to aggregate all the other demands made by Manning such as a Triple-E Senate, regional fairness texts, opposition to the Meech-Lake Accord, and “entrenchment of property rights.” To articulate what this ‘will’ is, Manning asserts the following belief: “We believe [my emphasis] in the common sense of the common people, their right to be consulted on public policy matters before major decisions are made, their right to choose their own leaders and to govern themselves through truly representative and responsible institutions, and their right to directly initiate legislation for which substantial public support is demonstrated.” Manning’s appeal is not to bureaucrats and professional politicians, but to “the common people.” He in turn posits the notion of “the common sense of the common people.” Rhetorically, he employs common twice. What is implicit in his use of the word common is a dichotomy between an educated elite and the general knowledge and good understanding of the common person. Thus, having constructed ‘the people’ as ‘the West,’ Manning now constructs ‘the people’ as the average person who has also been disenfranchised by their own political process. This is a powerful argument to working class people whom Manning is clearly speaking to through his Blue Book. There is no surprise that members of labour movements, the NDP etc. joined the Reform Party as Laycock (2012, p.  50) points out. Manning constructs a very different political process than that which existed in 1988 and which currently exists. Manning speaks of “the right to be consulted on public policy matters.” This ‘right’ could only be brought about if governments did not provide for political party representation within their legislatures. What Manning represents as ‘government’ is comparable to a business model where business managers must report to and be held accountable to their shareholders. What is implicit in Manning’s concept of government is a metaphor of government as a business, run by managers held accountable by shareholders. Such ‘consultation’ has little to do with ‘direct democracy.’ Manning’s next statement that ‘the people’ have “their right to choose

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

103

their own leaders and to govern themselves through truly representative and responsible institutions” posits nothing new in the Canadian political system. It is suggestive only for a need for a new party, specifically the Reform Party. What follows, however, is new since Manning states, “and their right to directly initiate legislation for which substantial public support is demonstrated.” Here is the notion of ‘referenda’ where direct democracy can be effected by the ‘people’ whose will can be expressed without mediation or interference. Manning in fact provides a melange of political systems. He provides for regular representative democracy as well as something akin to corporate governance, as well as direct democracy. Nonetheless, through his rhetorical repetition of the word right in three different manifestations, he positions ‘the people’ as being disenfranchised by its own political system and so needing to reassert itself through its general ‘will.’ There is nothing to explain how the three sub-types of governance could be integrated or made effective or how they could genuinely be made to realise the ‘will of the people.’ What Manning is successful in achieving is the notion of a ‘rupture’ between an elite Government and the ‘people,’ defined previously as ‘the West.’ In this respect Manning has articulated and positioned the Reform Party as a fully-fledged populist party representing not a business class and particularly that of Big Oil, but of a newly constructed ‘West’ positioned as a distinct and disenfranchised ‘people.’ This is a remarkable rhetorical feat that works only if those reading the Blue Book accept and participate in Manning’s new congregation. There is no overt expression of the interests of Big Oil and Big Business in the Blue Book; instead, Manning constructs a ‘Western’ identity in conflict with an ‘Eastern’ identity. Having constructed a ‘people’ in a regional sense, Manning also overtly constructs a ‘people’ in terms of governance. This ‘people’ is at odds with its own government, and so demands a new form of government that will reflect “the common sense of the common people.” This populist trope serves to mask Manning’s real intention which is to serve the interests of a new Western petrostate by creating co-identification of that state with ‘the common people’ and their will or want of good government.

104 

M. Macaulay

Fig. 4.2  The Blue Book 1991 Cover. (Cover taken from the University of Calgary Archives)

If we initially compare the cover of The Blue Book 1988 (Fig. 4.1) with that of The Blue Book 1991 (Fig. 4.2), we see a marked difference between the two. In the 1988 cover, reference to Canada is minimized, almost to being non-­discernable. In the party title, “REFORM PARTY of Canada,” use of the subjective genitive “of Canada” is provided with minimized script that is in fact barely noticeable on the cover. The fact that the Reform Party participates in the Canadian federal party system is visually insignificant. What is stylistically significant is the title of The Blue Book, “Platform and Statement of Principles,” which is presented in a full, bold and slightly slanted font that iconically symbolizes energy and forwardness. The party’s name is written in a different font in capitals and is also slightly slanted

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

105

forward equally representing energy and forwardness. The first letter of the party’s name, “R” is adorned with part of the Canadian Maple Leaf. But reference to ‘Canada’ is virtually non-existent. What is foregrounded in this cover is the Platform and ideological principals of this new party. While the blue of the 1988 cover can be said to symbolize stability and conservative values, the two fonts employed symbolize energy and what is new and bold. The cover of the 1991 Blue Book could not be more different. A different more muted blue is used for the cover. The word “Platform” disappears. In its place we have a simpler alliterative “PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES.” Above this title is the name of the party itself, “REFORM PARTY OF CANADA.” The font is full, bold and slightly slanted. The size of the word “REFORM” is double that of “PARTY OF CANADA,” but the wording “OF CANADA” is nonetheless clearly visible. That the Reform Party IS a federal party is no longer minimized but clearly acknowledged. We also see visibly represented beside the party’s name a clear logo of the party itself, a large bold “R” with a Canadian maple leaf inserted within the “R” in place of the space provided by the rounded top of the letter. ‘Canadianness’ is integrated within the ideological notion of ‘reform.’ Thus, to be ‘Canadian’ and to be a ‘Reformer’ are one and the same thing. This collapse of ideological meaning is further supported by the very top line of the 1991 Blue Book: “Building New Canada.” ‘Building’ in this usage is aspectually imperfective representing ongoing action. Build is also a material process verb indicating productive action on the part of the Reform Party. The Reform Party is a party of action, and this action is the building of a new Canada. In three years, the party has gone from minimizing and diminishing the idea of ‘Canada’ to foregrounding and privileging its importance. What has transpired for such a radical change to occur? Making reference to the 1989 Blue Book, Dobbin notes, “Though the party remained constitutionally and politically a western party after the 1989 Assembly, the policy book on that assembly was completely purged of any mention of ‘the West’” (1991, p. 84). According to Dobbin, “the stage was set for the next phase in Preston Manning’s plan to create a new conservative party” (p. 85). Thus, an extremely powerful populist message based on a newly constructed ‘people,’ ‘the West,’ is abandoned to reconstruct another ‘people’ which we can refer to as ‘Canadians.’ In his Leader’s Foreward, Preston Manning no longer refers to himself and other

106 

M. Macaulay

members of the Reform Party as “Reformers”; instead, he poses a rhetorical question, “Today, as the world rushes toward the 21st century, many Canadians are asking, ‘What’s happening to Canada?’” Canada as a whole is a patient in this sentence. Something is happening to it. However, Manning does not abandon a populist message. He adroitly sets up a conflict between what he terms “Old Canada” and “New Canada.” It is important to examine what Manning means by the “Old Canada,” which he believes is dying, and a “New Canada,” and to what extent he actually does abandon ‘The West’ as a new identity within this “New Canada.” In his 1991 Leader’s Foreward, Manning makes it very clear that the Reform Party abandons the construction of Canada, in Lord Durham’s articulation, as “two nations warring in the boson of a single state.”11 This references Canada’s two settler peoples, the ‘English,’ and the ‘French’: “The Old Canada that is dying defines itself as ‘an equal partnership’ between two founding races, languages and cultures.” Referring to the “Old Canada,” Manning makes references to a “New Quebec” that looks to separate from Canada itself. What then should be the “New Canada”? Manning employs the same congregational language as that in the 1988 Blue Book: “Reformers believe [my emphasis] that New Canada must be a federation of provinces, not a federation of founding races or ethnic groups.” What does Manning mean by “a federation of provinces,” since theoretically this is what Canada would already be, the unification of several provinces in 1867 being traditionally referred to a confederation? Manning defines this “federation of provinces” in the following way: New Canada should be a balanced, democratic federation of provinces, Distinguished by the conservation of its magnificent environment, the viability of its economy, acceptance of its social responsibilities, and recognition of the equality and uniqueness of all its provinces and citizens. (Leader’s Foreward, The Blue Book 1991)

Manning does not in any way abandon Western alienation. His construction of a “federation of provinces” is entirely consistent with the beliefs he sets forth in the 1988 Blue Book that portray the regions of  Lord Durham’s Report, 1839.

11

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

107

Canada in unequal relationship with Central Canada (Ontario and Quebec). What Manning argues for is regional representation within Canada, and thus a loose ‘federation’ of states where “the equality and uniqueness of all [Canada’s] provinces and citizens” are recognized. The regional populism associated with the West wanting in is reconstructed as a populist desire and need for “equality” and “uniqueness” for all provinces, given that Manning wishes to gain traction for his party across Canada. Manning is not so much changing his original message as modifying it so that it gains access to a broader audience, the “citizens” of Canada. However, in so doing Manning also radically reconstructs Canada not as a federal entity consolidating its 10 provinces and 3 territories, but rather as a collection of quasi-independent states that organize themselves under a single banner. This New Canada is thus “a balanced, democratic federation of provinces.” Balanced takes on a very particular meaning in that power between and amongst the provinces is now equalized such that no regional group has more power than another, specifically Ontario and Quebec. The language of ‘balance,’ ‘equality,’ and ‘uniqueness’ provides a means of addressing regional inequity without directly saying so. Manning’s language employs presupposition and entailment to convey the divide that he sees within the Canada of 1991. The need for ‘balance’ presupposes ‘imbalance,’ while further entailing its creation. The need for ‘equality’ presupposes ‘inequality’ while further entailing its creation. The need for ‘uniqueness’ presupposes its absence, while further entailing its acknowledgement. It is far from the case that Manning abandons Western alienation as a populist stance. What he does skilfully is to embed it within an entirely new construction of what ‘Canada’ is, effectively less a country “from sea to shining sea’ and more a collection of quasi-independent states that can pursue their own uniqueness and economic goals. A fully articulated representation of this particular notion of Canada as a ‘federation’ does not appear in the Blue Books until 1996–7. In 1997 the Reform Party gained parliamentary power as the Official Opposition, a major achievement in its less than ten-year existence. The 1996–1997 Blue Book sets out an entirely new section within these volumes.12 This  The University of Calgary Digital Records provides five of the Reform Party’s Blue Books, that for 1988, 1990, 1991, 1995 and that for 1997. 12

108 

M. Macaulay

new section is “National Unity,” which is presented in large bold and slightly slanted font. It has one sub-heading, “Decentralization and the Equality of Provinces.” The first paragraph of this section is as follows: A. The Reform Party commits itself to rebuilding our national home through the creation of a new and better Canada built on solid foundations that include equality for all provinces and citizens, renewed democracy in our political system, financial responsibility by governments, affordable social programs, an effective and accountable criminal justice system, conservation of our environment, respect for cultural diversity, and productive relations with other peoples of the world. We see in this language standard political discourse. Manning speaks of “commit[ing]” the Reform Party to a set of policies. The verb commit is a commissive speech act, committing the speaker to a future action. The verbs employed rebuild, build, create are semantically related and carry a meaning of making or remaking something or bringing it into existence.13 The Reform Party is one of agency with a focus on the telic goal of a better future for Canadians. There is very little that is controversial or to dispute. However, Manning also employs the wording of “equality for all provinces and citizens.” As in the 1991 Blue Book where Manning speaks of the equality and uniqueness of all its provinces and citizens, he again inserts a populist position that presupposes the inequality of Canada’s provinces and thus its citizens within those provinces. What is entailed is “a new and better Canada.” But while the message appears to be addressed to Canadians as a whole, it is really addressed to those disaffected within Canada setting up a rupture between privileged provinces and those that are not equal. Any sense of disaffection within any region is foregrounded and serves as the basis for support for the building, rebuilding and creating Manning sets out. Paragraph B within this section is less subtle and more reflective of the stance the Reform Party or “Reformers” have been taking since 1988:

 In Aksionsart terms, these are accomplishment verbs that entail a goal.

13

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

109

B. The Reform Party supports the renewal of the Canadian confederation as a more balanced federation, in which the arsenal of centralizing powers at the hands of the Federal Government and the over-concentration of powers in the hands of the executive and Cabinet are placed under reasonable restraints. Legislative authority should rest with the level of government able to govern most effectively in each area, with a bias towards decentralization in cases of uncertainty. In this paragraph, Manning takes an explicitly populist stance where the Federal Government, its executive and Cabinet is set up as an ‘elite’ in opposition to a ‘people,’ in this case “a more balanced federation.” Manning is actively remaking Canadian confederation as an assemblage of provincial governments that are able to impose “reasonable restraints” on the Federal Government with its “over-concentration of powers.” What the Reform Party of Canada supports is the redistribution of power within the Confederation of Canada such that the powers of the provinces are privileged over those of the federal government itself. This is a massive reconceptualization of Canada itself. In the conflict between Canada and the provinces it is also a populist reconceptualization. Manning sets out this reconceptualization and redistribution in the next two paragraphs of this section: C. The Reform Party supports equality for all provinces, special status for none, and a strong continuing role for the Federal Government to maintain a common economic space, eliminate internal trade barriers, and represent Canada effectively in international trade negotiations. D. The Reform Party supports the principles that the provinces should have exclusive jurisdiction over apprenticeship programs, culture, education, health, housing, language, manpower training, natural resources, sport fishing, sports & recreation, social assistance and tourism. Canada would field a single team at international sports competitions.

110 

M. Macaulay

In asserting support for his particular notion of ‘equality,’ Manning does much more than to rearrange the chairs on the deck. There is no support for special status for Quebec and thus the Meech-Lake Accord, a belief that goes back to the 1988 Blue Book. There is support for the “equality” of all provinces, and a delimited economic role for the Federal Government. In speaking of “internal trade barriers,” he represents the provinces as virtually independent states where the Federal Government intercedes only to remove “trade barriers.” The final role for the Federal Government is to negotiate “international trade.” In Laclauan terms ‘equality’ is an empty signifier. Equality suggests a positive state of independence and authority. What Manning means by ‘equality’ has less to do with the removal of ones’ chains and more to do with economic power and its distribution. In paragraph D, Manning articulates his notion of “equality” more explicitly. The 1967 Constitution Act sets out the powers of the Federal Government as being “aeronautics; radio; television; nuclear energy; responsibility for the national capital; offshore mineral rights; official language within the federal sphere; citizenship; foreign affairs; the control of drugs; and emergency powers in peace and war” as well as “taxation, currency, the postal service; census taking and statistics; national defence; the federal civil service; navigation, fisheries, banking, copyright; marriage and divorce; criminal law; prisons; and interprovincial works and undertakings” (from www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca). Provincial powers are as follows: “their internal constituencies, direct taxation for provincial purposes, municipalities, school boards, hospitals, property and civil rights, administration of civil and criminal justice, penalties for breaking provincial statutes, prisons, celebration of marriage, provincial civil service, local works, and corporations with provincial objectives” (www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca). Crossover powers include agriculture, immigration, old-age pensions and supplementary benefits (from www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca). Education is a provincial matter but subject to federal religious guidelines. What can we make then of Manning’s notion of the “equality” of provinces? What we note are the following jurisdictions set out for provinces by Manning: culture, health, language, social assistance and natural resources. In addressing “culture” and “language,” Manning is rejecting any federal provision that the province of Quebec could be granted status as a distinct society within

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

111

Canada. Ironically, he goes very far in granting such status to all provinces within Canadian federation. However, his real opposition is to French-language training and the advancement of French as a language within Canada. With regard to “health” and “social assistance,” he sets out opposition to Universal Healthcare that is federally mandated but administered by provinces. Social assistance is much the same. However, what stands out are “natural resources.” Here Manning opposes any federal programme for the maintenance of natural resources within Canada. Specifically, he opposes the National Energy Program of Pierre Elliott Trudeau.14 This is what he wishes to derail. The Reform Party of Canada’s support for “decentralization” or “equality” amongst provinces is largely a means of facilitating corporate control over resources within the provinces and more specifically within Alberta. This is explicitly set out in the 1996/1997 Blue Book under the section entitled “Energy.” In paragraph A of this section Manning indicates the following: A. The Reform Party supports an energy policy based on market mechanisms with the objective of meeting the demands of consumers for safe, secure supplies of energy at competitive prices. In this statement of support, we have the view that energy production should be subject to “market mechanisms” based on competition that in turn benefit “consumers.” A win for producers and a win for consumers. If Manning were to limit his statement of support to this notion of market competitiveness, there would be little to distinguish the Reform Party from any other pro-capitalist party within the country. However, paragraph B of this section integrates Manning’s empty signifier of ‘equality’ with opposition to a National Energy Program: B. The Reform Party has supported the elimination of the National Energy Program despite a period of low oil prices, and will oppose any new National Energy Program under any circumstances, by any polit-

14

 The National Energy Program of Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1980–1985).

112 

M. Macaulay

ical party as a fundamental attack on the economic rights of any province or territory and the political unity of this country. Manning employs an oxymoron in his representation of “the political unity of this country” as decentralization or what he terms the “equality” of the provinces. The empty signifier of ‘equality’ masks the fact that the decentralization of Canada that Manning envisions largely undermines the political unity of the country by constructing the provinces as quasi-­ independent states with their own “economic rights.” The “unity” of Canada is therefore dependent on its actual fragmentation and the transfer of “economic rights” from ‘Canada’ to its provinces. In privileging provincial identity over national identity, Manning seeks to deprive this national identity from providing a National Energy Program to its citizens across Canada. Thus while ‘Canada’ can facilitate trade between its provinces and between itself and other countries, it cannot act as its own entity with the goal of determining economic policies. The empty signifier of ‘equality’ serves a populist argument rendering ‘Canada’ as an elite and the provinces as ‘the people’ deprived by this elite of pursuing “economic rights.” If we look back on the cover of the 1988 Blue Book we see the visual diminishment of Canada as an entity. For all intents and purposes, it does not exist. While Canada reappears in the subsequent covers of the Blue Books, it is only as a rhetorical construct. In Manning’s analysis, “the unity of this country” is achieved through the facilitation of agency on the part of its separate provinces or territories. What Manning and the Reform Party are really in service of are “private-sector development of energy Mega-projects.” This he states quite explicitly in his next paragraph of this section: C. The Reform Party supports private-sector development of energy Mega-projects without Federal Government subsidies, grants, loan guaranties, or special tax treatment. The role of government with respect to Mega-projects is to provide the appropriate regulation, including environmental regulation, and to support appropriate infrastructure development.

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

113

The Federal Government in removed from any participation in energy development. This is the sole function of “private-sector development” that the Reform Party supports. And although granting to the Federal Government the possible role of “environmental regulation” in such development, paragraph E of the same section indicates quite clearly, “The Reform Party supports streamlining administrative and regulatory processes in the energy section to minimize unnecessary regulatory burden.” In other words, neither the Federal Government nor any Provincial government should impede “private-sector development of energy.”

Conclusion What Manning achieves through his Blue Books is in large part support for private-sector control and development of energy and specifically that associated with oil production. However. he does this in entirely constructed populist terms. In his first framing of this populism, he constructs a ‘West’ that wants In. This ‘West’ is composed of “common people” who have “common sense.” He seeks to give citizens of the Western provinces of Canada their own identity, integrity, and destiny through such means as the tripe-E Senate and direct democracy. What Manning does in his Blue Books of 1988, 1991, 1996–1997 is to construct a populism based on the notion of democratization, regardless of whether or not he creates a ‘West’ that wants in or provinces that want equality within Canada (Figs. 4.3 and 4.4). Sender Preston Manning

Object Full participation in ‘Canada’

→→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Platform, The Blue Book 1988 Fig. 4.3  The Blue Book 1988

Receiver ‘The West’

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←←Opponent Central Canada Reformers

114 

M. Macaulay

Receiver Canadian provinces and Territories

Sender Preston Manning

Object ‘Equality’

→→→→→→ axis of knowledge

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←←Opponent Government of Canada Canadians

axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Policies, The Blue Book

Fig. 4.4  The Blue Book 1991, 1996/1997

Both the construction of an alienated ‘West’ and unequal provinces in an old confederation dominated by the issues of two settler groups, ‘The English,’ and ‘The French’ present a vision of ‘Canada’ out of touch with the modern world, an “Old Canada” as Manning puts it. The new vision he puts forth is one of inclusivity and equal representation. He consistently employs the language of democratization. It is a positive new world where “unity” can be achieved through “decentralization” and “balance.” To achieve this goal, the Reform Party of Canada, “Reformers,” seeks a new type of government based on an elected Senate representing not the interests of professional politicians, but those of the individual provinces along with direct democracy to effect “the common sense of the common people.” A rupture is consistently represented between centralized Canadian bureaucratic control and the ‘West’ as a people or ‘the provinces’ as unequal partners in Confederation. The elite enemy is the Canadian state itself. The reality of what Manning advocated through his Blue Books is quite different. The rhetoric of “The West Wants In!” and the notion of unequal, unbalanced provinces masks the goal of independence not for the province of Alberta and other Western provinces, but for the independence of the oil industry in Alberta. By the 1950’s the oil industry in Alberta came to eclipse farm and beef production in Alberta making Alberta a petrostate. Although Preston Manning himself does not go on to become Prime Minister of Canada, his protégé, Stephen Harper, does. Harper represented the newly created Conservative Party that took over the old Progressive Conservative Party by means of a merger with The Alliance Party (formerly the Reform Party). Stephen Harper represented the

4  Constructed Populism: The Reform Party of Canada 

115

riding of Calgary Southwest in Alberta, but more crucially he represented the ideological populist view created by Preston Manning through the Reform Party and specifically that in the Blue Books. The populist language of Western alienation is now embedded in Canadian political culture. It has been employed by the Premier of Alberta, Jason Kenney, who threatened to take Alberta out of Confederation if the current Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, would not formally challenge the American President Joe Biden’s withdrawal of support for the Keystone Pipeline that would transfer Alberta crude oil to southern states. Saskatchewan is now governed by a right-wing Saskatchewan Party.15 Canada is a very different country because of Preston Manning and his Blue Books. Issues of economic and resource development have been reconfigured as issues of inclusion, democracy, and fairness. The empty signifier ‘equality’ has become a means by which resource development can be reimagined in populist terms. Preston Manning has created a very powerful populism that continues its impact until the present day.

 Manitoba continues to be represented by The Progressive Conservatives and the NDP. British Columbia is represented principally by the NDP, the Liberal Party and The Green Party. 15

5 Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders

In the United States after the economic crash of 2008, a number of movements such as Occupy1 responded to the dramatically changed economic and political landscape. Newly elected Barack Obama inherited a major American recession from the previous U.S. President George W. Bush. His response to this recession, largely due to the selling of sub-prime mortgages to those unable to make payments, set the stage for extreme discontent within the United States (and elsewhere throughout the world). Most famously, Obama in the early years of his Presidency invited the heads of numerous major banks to the White House to address the causes of the crisis. No bankers were ever charged with fraud or misdeeds. The banking system that was largely responsible for the 2008 crash got off with a warning but went largely scot-free. Obama did what he could to regenerate the economy and was largely successful, but during the recession of 2008 people lost their jobs, their homes, and in some cases their families. Obama’s failure to address the real causes of the 2008 crash created great anger within the country. It is in this context that populism as a response to this failure took hold. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser  The Occupy Movement took its inspiration from the activities of the Arab Spring in 2009. Occupy Wall Street was a specific protest that took place in Zuccotti Park within New York’s financial district. This protest gave rise to similar protests in the United States, in Canada and around the world. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_5

117

118 

M. Macaulay

note, populism is a “thin-centered ideology” (2017, p. 6). It can accommodate both right-wing and left-wing ideologies into its own particular ideology. Both right populism and left populism developed in the U.S. out of a political vacuum where deep fundamental causes of the 2008 recession were not addressed but were papered over. Apart from Obamacare, Obama offered little bold initiative to give the country the very thing he promised, a sense of purpose and a future. His message of “Yes we can!” dissipated. He earned a second term as President but had to contend with both a Republican Congress and Senate. Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders arose out of the political vacuum created by Obama. Both were outsiders, although they ran for the Republican and Democratic Parties respectively. Both were regarded as outsiders using the Republican or Democratic party platforms to springboard their own particular vision of the state of the nation. Both were populists who appealed to the broader ‘American people’ in their campaigning. Of course, Trump won the Presidency beating Hillary Clinton, while Bernie Sanders returned to his position as the independent Senator from Vermont. But Sanders was also able to run a second time for President, although ultimately being defeated by Joe Biden for the Democratic candidacy. Joe Biden in turn beat Donald Trump, which allowed Bernie Sanders to chair the most important committee of the Senate, the Budget Committee. Both have risen to become national figures, and both have become influential in determining the political mindset of their country.

Donald Trump Of the many populist figures that have emerged in recent years and in many countries throughout the world, Donald Trump is one of the most compelling and interesting. There have been a number of populist leaders in the United States over the twentieth century and into the 21st including Huey P. Long, Joseph McCarthy, George C. Wallace, and George McGovern, but none have attained the status of President of the United States. His rise to this position is remarkable because he did not serve in any other political positions before becoming President. This, in fact, was part of his appeal. He was an outsider. There were many who steered

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

119

Trump’s run for president, and his presidency, specifically Steve Bannon,2 but it was Trump’s capacity to engage and draw crowds that transformed him into a major contender for the position of president and then allowed him to maintain his position throughout his presidency. He remains a significant player in the theatre of American politics despite having lost the 2020 election. Many of his supporters still believe that the 2020 election was rigged, and that Donald Trump is the true President of the United States. More significantly, in order to hold on to his position as President of the United States, Donald Trump engaged his supporters in a major rally on January 6, 2021. This will be examined in this chapter.

Populism as Political Style In looking at Donald Trump, we can usefully examine Benjamin Moffitt’s account of populism as a “style.” Others such as Canovan (1981), Taguieff (2005) and Wodak (2021) have argued that populism, if not amounting to a style of politics, is nonetheless heavily influenced by the factor of a leader’s style. Moffitt (2016), however, goes much further. He concentrates on what he terms “performance, political style and representation.” We have to go back to Huey P. Long of Louisiana to see a political figure comparable to Donald Trump: “Long was pugnacious and comic. On any day he might delight the galleries with a discourse on the merits of Louisiana potlikker, or an outrageous slander on a political opponent of a self-deprecating comment about his own vulgarity, or any other choice specimen of Southern flimflammery” (McKenna, 1974, p. 180). Trump has no Southern charm or flimflammery, but he was certainly pugnacious and comic. Prior to going into politics, he was a real estate mogul, most famous for co-writing The Art of the Deal (1987). He was often perceived as a conman in his own area of expertise and was successful in being so.

 Steve Bannon is famously the strategist who coordinated Trump’s nomination within the Republican Party and later his run for the presidency. See Joshua Green, The Devil’s Bargain, Steve Bannon, Donald Trump and the Storming of the presidency, 2017. 2

120 

M. Macaulay

He was approached by operatives in the Republican Party to go into politics to represent what Steve Bannon refers to as “right populism.”3 Moffitt argues that “it is the leader who ultimately ‘performs’ populism, and thus should be seen as the key actor of populism” (2016, p. 55). Modifying a definition of political style from Hariman (1995), he provides this definition of political style: “the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of government to everyday life” (p. 38). Moffitt further modifies this general definition of political style to include populist style as a distinct political style. The key features of populism as a political style are (1) Appeal to ‘the People’ versus ‘the Elite,’ (2) Bad Manners, (3) Crisis, Breakdown, Threat. In Moffitt’s analysis the leader is “the performer of populism”: “the leader is the figure that performs and renders present ‘the people’ within populism” (2016, p. 52). The leader’s style thus defines populism. In looking at this style more specifically, Moffitt references Ostiguy’s (2009) “High-Low Spectrum” in political discourse. On the ‘high’ level, the political leader is “well behaved,” “well mannered,” “composed,” “rationalist,” “ethical,” and “stiff/rigid/boring.” On a Political-cultural level, they would be “impersonal, procedure-driven,” “formal, impersonal,” “legalistic/rational,” “institution-mediated,” and “restrained.” A politician such as Barack Obama would represent such a figure nicely. Conversely, on the ‘low’ spectrum the political leader is “demonstrative,” employs “slang/swearing,” has “raw/popular tastes” and is “more colourful.” On a Political-cultural level the leader is “personalistic,” shows “strong leadership,” is “closer to ‘the people’,” provides “decisive action,” and is “immediate” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 59). Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders fall roughly into this second category. They both exhibit “bad manners” although in somewhat different ways. Trump’s bad manners are on display far more than are those of Bernie Sanders.

 In 1987 Mike Dunbar, a Republican activist and strategist, first encouraged Trump to run for the Republican Party. Dunbar was impressed with Trump’s anti-establishment message, especially the idea that the system was “rigged” (Katie Reilly, Time, August 12, 2016). 3

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

121

This idea of a ‘high’ and ‘low’ style is nothing new. It goes back to Roman Rhetoric where three styles were taught to rhetoricians: the High Style or Grand Style (supra/magniloquens), the Middle Style (aequabile, mediocre), and the Low or Plain Style (infinum, humile). The High Style was designed to move or affect an audience emotionally; the Middle Style was designed to please an audience while the Low or Plain style was designed to teach. Plain Style was advocated for in eighteenth-century Rhetorics to facilitate transmission of information, specifically scientific information (Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990). What is termed ‘Plain Style’ is evident in both Donald Trump’s and Bernie Sanders’ speech. They give no attention to eloquence in their speechmaking, but rather choose to speak plainly and directly to their audiences. The idea of a style effecting ‘bad manners,’ however, is more evident with Donald Trump, to a large extent in his tweets but also in his personal and direct attacks on other politicians. He is famous for his put downs such as “Little Marco,” and “Crooked Hillary.” In both these ad hominem attacks there is verbal skill. In the first example, “Little Marco,” Trump employs little which in pronunciation is bookended with an alveolar liquid, /l/, the first a clear /l/ and the second dark. The /l/ sound can iconically indicate extension, but in this usage the two realizations of /l/ serve to close off expression. The phonetic transcription in North American English would be [lɪɾ+l]. The word in actual pronunciation iconically represents Marco Rubio’s small stature. Equally in calling Hillary Clinton “Crooked Hillary,” Trump employs crooked. We see again a sound beginning and ending a word: [kɹʌk]. This repetition of two velar plosives at the beginning and ending of the word is another iconic use of physical utterance to replicate meaning, in this case disgust. The North America pronunciation of the entire word would be [kɹʌkəd]. Along with a realization of ‘ordinariness,’ Moffitt maintains that the populist leader must also perform ‘extraordinariness’: “To truly rise above and represent ‘the people,’ populists must also prove their extraordinariness” (2016, p. 63). In so doing, populists represent themselves as “the voice of ‘the people’,” as a saviour of ‘the people’.” A populist leader “does not simply represent ‘the people’ but is actually seen as embodying ‘the people’” (2016, p. 64). Further a populist leader can present himself as strongly masculine in the case of male leaders, or as strongly female

122 

M. Macaulay

(maternal) in the case of female leaders. There is performance of health and strength to evidence the ability to perform on behalf of ‘the people.’ While this applies broadly to Donald Trump, such performance is not applicable to Bernie Sanders. I shall discuss Sanders subsequently. Donald Trump, however, does present himself as a type of saviour. In his Presidential Campaign Announcement speech to throw his hat into the ring to run for the Republican nomination he quite clearly distinguishes himself from other candidates, stating quick explicitly “Our country needs—our country needs a truly great leader, and we need a truly great leader now. We need a leader that wrote The Art of the Deal” (July 16, 2015). In this assertion, Trump presents himself as an “unmet need” (Macaulay, 2019, p. 177). He positions himself as the only candidate who can solve the problems of the United States and indeed as a type of saviour for the country. This construction of himself as the saviour of the U.S. is far and away the most significant reason his supporters continue to believe passionately that he is the real President of the U.S. and goes a long way to explain the attempt to take over the country’s Capital on January 6, 2021. I examine two of his speeches, one given while Donald Trump was running for President and one after, a year apart and in the same state. I shall also examine his speech on January 6, 2021 when his supporters attempted to undermine the process of ratifying a new President.

 ilmington Ohio, September 1, 2016 W “I Am Your Voice” Trump’s speeches in the Midwest during the Presidential campaign of 2016 were of tremendous importance for the success of his campaign. The Midwest was the “blue wall” that had traditionally voted for Democrats. Although Hillary Clinton did campaign in Ohio, often considered the “bell-weather” state since its vote often presaged that in the country overall, her campaign largely neglected the Rustbelt in states such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan (Ronald Brownstein, The Atlantic, November 10, 2016). Moffitt argues that the populist leader

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

123

creates a crisis to ‘perform.’ We could argue this, equally we could say that the populist leader exploits a rupture in Laclauan terms between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ Donald Trump’s September1, 2016 Wilmington Ohio Speech is an almost classic example of populism. It echoes the early-­ nineteenth-­century populism of the People’s Party in its attack on Eastern elites and specifically Wall Street. Many voters who were deprived of an opportunity to vote for Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Presidential election voted not for Hillary Clinton in the Democratic Party but for Donald Trump in the Republican Party. These have been referred to as “Sanders-­ Trump voters” (Jeff Stein, Vox, August 24, 2017). Trump’s attacks on ‘the elite’ were in many respects similar to those of Bernie Sanders. Trump’s populism was an appeal to working class Americans rather than to those in the middle class.

Rupture Ernesto Laclau (2007) argues that for a populist sensibility to arise there must be what he calls a ‘rupture’ between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ He makes the case that “populist rupture” occurs in both ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ discourse: “The concept of populist rupture does not necessarily imply a reference to a determinate political orientation of the discourse through which the rupture takes place. Populist rupture certainly took place in the case of fascism, but it also happened in the case of Maoism. There was populist rupture in both because both—in contrast to discourses which constitute themselves into pure systems of differences—were discourses of antagonism which tended to divide the ideological field into contradictory systems of equivalences” (Laclau, 1980, p. 93). Rupture or what Laclau also refers to as a “broken space” requires what he further refers to as “constitutive antagonism” (2007, p. 85). He explains this further: “One first dimension of the break is that, at its root, there is experience of a lack, a gap which has emerged in the harmonious continuity of the social … Without this initial breakdown of something in the social order—however minimal that something could initially be—there is no possibility of antagonism, therefore, frontier, or ultimately, ‘people’ (2007, p. 85). What follows in the creation of ‘the people’

124 

M. Macaulay

is “the emergence of an equivalential chain of unsatisfied demands” (p. 74). It is the merger of the unmet needs and social demands that results in the general expression of a populist view, right or left, and so the construction of ‘the people.’ When we examine Trump’s September 1, 2016 Wilmington Ohio Speech this is exactly what we see. Trump’s primary purpose is to articulate a series of unmet needs and social demands. We are going to win the White House and we are going to bring back your jobs, which we have to have them back, and we want them back soon. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

The demand for jobs is a social demand that reflects the departure of good jobs in the private sector. The verb of significance here is bring back. Trump is referring to the fact that good factory jobs had been exported oversees or to Mexico to achieve lower wages for employers. He also employs a modal construction of necessity, “we have to have them back.” Why? Why do these jobs need to return and do so “soon”? Clearly, Trump is referencing an economy that has failed working people. He goes on to make this explicit: We are going to negotiate fair trade deals that put American workers back to work, that put America first. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

It is important to note that Trump does not say ‘Americans first’; rather he says, “America first.” America in Laclauan terms is an “empty signifier.” It can encompass a multitude of meanings for a multitude of people. Here he uses America as being virtually equivalent to “American workers.” In this language he equates American workers, America and ‘the people.’ Trump further expands on this theme of jobs: We are going to stop the product dumping, the unfair foreign subsidies, and the currency manipulation that is absolutely killing our companies. And by the way killing our jobs. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

Trump sets out the notion that outside forces are metaphorically “killing our jobs.” While some politicians address the voters’ pocketbooks,

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

125

Trump addresses the existential welfare of his audience composed primarily of members of the working class. He addresses life or death issues that have been ignored by the middle class and the elite in the country. His language is blunt, direct and forceful. Addressing Ohioans, Trump is even more direct: Ohio has lost nearly one in three manufacturing jobs since NAFTA and nearly one in four manufacturing jobs since China entered the World Trade Organization. That’s really something. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

While Trump’s focus is on external factors in the loss or “killing” of jobs, he directs his attention to those within the country who have allowed this to happen: These are deals made at the top. We have no leadership … Our trade deficit in goods in the world is now $800 billion. Trade deficit. Can you imagine. This subtracts directly from our growth. Our economy grew only 1.1 percent in the last quarter. Total disaster … This is the legacy of Barack Obama. This is the legacy of Hillary Clinton. If you for any reason have a really bad day and its Hillary Clinton, it will be four more years of Obama, but worse. It will be four years of high taxes, four more years of ISIS growing all over the place, four more years of Obamacare going up 40, 50, 60 percent. Nobody can afford it. The deductibles are so high it doesn’t work anyway. You have to be hit by a truck and die slowly, very very slowly. You’ll never get to use it. That’s ok. Don’t get hit by a truck. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

Spring-boarding from jobs as a social demand, Trump extends his list of social demands to include leadership, trade deficits, the economy, ISIS, high taxes, and Obamacare. He further expands on these social demands to include school choice and removal of a Common Core in education, building a wall on the Mexican border to stop the trafficking of drugs that are “poisoning our children,” as well as immigration. But Trump does not simply attack poor management on the part of the Democrats and specifically Barack Obama, he attacks these in terms of control by an elite:

126 

M. Macaulay

Hillary Clinton is funded by Wall Street and hedge fund managers. My campaign is powered by my money and also by small-dollar donations from people working all across the country who want a better future for their children. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

In this very simple contrast Trump positions Hillary Clinton as an instrument of Wall Street. In contrast, he is “powered” by his own money and that of “people working all across the country.” In this respect Trump is a man of the people, but specifically working people, while Hillary Clinton is a vehicle of an unrepresentative elite, “Wall Street,” which has created the economic and social lacks that he sets out in this speech. He makes his identification with ‘the people’ more explicit by stating “We are going to protect our coal miners,” “We are going to protect our steel workers,” “We are going to protect our factories—how about factory workers.” Trump further co-identifies with the working class: “I am fighting for everyone who doesn’t have a voice. We are soon going to have a voice. I am fighting for the forgotten men and women of America. Forgotten—believe me forgotten. I am your voice.” At the end of his speech, Trump makes the rupture between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ as dynamic as possible: “It is the powerful protecting the powerful; insiders fighting for insiders. I am fighting for you, believe me … We will make America strong again. We will make America safe again. We will make America prosperous again. We will make America great again.” It is this speech and others like it that wins Donald Trump the Presidential election in 2016. It is a classically populist speech. In Laclauan terms Trump sets out an equivalential chain of social demands that are unmet. This is not a matter of differences in party platforms or politics, but rather the result of a fracture or broken space between an elite represented by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama and ‘the people.’ Trump’s job in this speech is to construct the people through expression of unmet needs and social demands. This sets out a chain of equivalential social demands. What is of extreme importance is that Trump represents these demands as unheeded, and ‘the people,’ the American

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

127

working class, as “forgotten.” This representation is at the very heart of Trump’s populism. In the most bizarre of ways Trump, who is a real estate mogul, is able to integrate his concerns for the general economy with those of the working class who want jobs, a good education and good health care. In his Announcement Speech (July 16, 2015), Trump represents himself as a ‘saviour’ for this ‘people.’ There is far greater grandiosity or extraordinariness in Moffitt’s terms. However, in his September 1, 2016 Wilmington Ohio Speech, Trump presents or positions himself very differently. In Dell Hymes’ Speaking Model (Hymes, 1974), he analyses participants in a speech event as a complex of types. He distinguishes between a speaker as source and a speaker as spokesperson or addressor. Trump, in representing himself as a “voice,” is making much the same distinction. He is not so much speaking for those who cannot speak for themselves; rather, he is the addressor for a given source, in this case ‘the people.’ He is therefore metonymically a part of the whole and a part which represents the whole. As a ‘voice’ he integrates himself into the ‘people’ who come into being through his articulation of unmet needs and their corresponding social demands. This is a far more modest representation of himself than in his Announcement Speech, but also far more effective since it creates Trump as part of ‘the people’ itself. The Plain Style, unlike the High Style of Barack Obama, is the only proper style for this mutual articulation. The narrative he constructs is set out in the Greimasian Narrative below (Fig. 5.1):

Sender Donald Trump →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→ → Fair Trade Deals

Object America First

Receiver Working-Class Americans

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ ←←←←← Opponent Subject Hillary Clinton/Wall Street Voice of the People

Fig. 5.1a  Wilmington Ohio Speech, 2016

128 

M. Macaulay

 oungstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017 Y “Make America Safe Again” Six months into his first term, Donald Trump returns to the rally format he employed during the 2016 election. The question of course is why. Why go back to campaigning after having won an election? Why not simply remain in Washington and work to enact legislation that was proposed during the 2016 campaign? This is not a particularly easy question to answer. A simple answer is that Trump missed the campaign trail, missed performing for ‘the people’ in large auditoria, that his ego needed the adulation his speeches provided. What we first note is the actual length of the Youngstown Ohio Speech (July 25, 2017). As a recorded speech, it is 58 minutes in length. It is difficult to count minutes precisely, but approximately 4 minutes are taken up in an introduction to her husband by Melania Trump and another 4 minutes taken up by a guest speaker, Gino Defabio, who was brought in to explain why, as a former Democrat, he voted for Trump in 2016 and why he would vote for him again. It is also notable that Trump himself starts and stops repeatedly. After making a particular assertion or commissive, he stops, pauses and turns to his audience which then plays its part by either holding up a sign or chanting. The main chants made during Trump’s speech are “USA,” “Build that Wall,” or “Drain the Swamp.” Trump is highly interactive with audience members sitting not just in front of him in a large auditorium (seating 12,000) but directly behind so that he can interact with them personally. The signs held by members of the audience are “Promises Made, Promises Kept,” “Make America Great Again,” and “Drain the Swamp.” These signs were not personally made but were provided to audience members as they came into the venue, Covelli Centre. Many male members of the audience wore MAGA hats which were striking in red. Trump and his audience were collectively putting on a show. Trump himself notes, “Is there any place that’s more fun, more exciting than a Trump rally?” (Transcript, Alana Abramson, Time, July 26, 2017). We can estimate that approximately 10–15 minutes are taken up by Trump’s deliberate pauses for effect and the accompanying audience participation through comment or chant, Trump’s actual speech is approximately 40–45 minutes in length. It was televised by both Fox News and

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

129

CNN, for whom, coming from different political perspectives, it was a ratings getter. If the 2016 election had already been won, what was this speech for and what was it about? In Aristotelian terms, Trump’s Youngstown Speech serves as an epideictic speech, which is to say a speech of praise. Aristotle notes that in speeches of praise qualities such as nobility, goodness, loyalty are set out for audience’s appreciation by the orator (The Art of Rhetoric, 1992) The orator, however, very seldom speaks about himself (or herself ). Yet this is exactly what Trump does. In 2017 in Youngstown, Ohio he comes to praise himself. We do not see a humbler Trump who envisions himself as the voice of the people. In Moffitt’s (2016) terms we see a man performing “extraordinariness.” However, to what extent is Trump’s speech populist? We can divide Trump’s speech into roughly three parts. In the first part Trump provides a definition of American society and values, in the second he sets out the importance and significance of his own accomplishments over his first six months as President, and in the third, which in combination with the first part, Trump sets out an almost apocalyptic vision of America under threat, not from within by elites, but from without. In this he constructs and positions himself as a liberator, who has come to the rescue of the American people. The first and third parts of his speech combine to create an extreme right-wing populist vision of the heartland under threat. Ruth Wodak (2021) refers to this as a “politics of fear.” While Trump references the need for “immigration reform” in his 2016 speech and makes reference to malicious gangs, there is nothing corresponding to the violent imagery that he employs approximately a year later, and which does much to belie the idea that a Trump rally is a lot of fun.

Youngstown Speech, Part I Donald Trump begins this section of his speech with explicit mention of the media: This has been a difficult week for the media because I forced them to travel with us all around the country and spend time with tens of thousands of

130 

M. Macaulay

proud Americans who believe in defending our values, our culture and our borders, our civilization, and our great American way of life. Everyone in this arena is united by their love, and you know that. Do we know that? Everyone. United by their love for this country and their loyalty to one another, their loyalty to its people. And we want people to come into our country who can love us and cherish us and be proud of America and the American flag. We believe that schools should teach our children to have pride in our history and respect for that great American flag. We all believe in the rule of law, and we support the incredible men and women of law enforcement. Thank you. Thank you for being here. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Throughout this segment of his speech, the audience frequently interrupts with cheers reinforcing the idea of unity which Trump thematizes in this passage. He speaks very much as if to a congregation of believers, twice using the mental state verb believe to express not political views but the views of his congregation as a “heartland.” In its first instantiation, Trump defines his audience as “proud Americans who believe,” while in its second instantiation he states, “We believe.” In these statements of belief, Trump articulates an American people who are “united” in their beliefs and by their beliefs. Even more remarkably for Trump in his rhetoric, he speaks of love, specifically “love for our country.” This love is complemented by “loyalty,” specifically “loyalty to one another, their loyalty to its people.” To those watching on CNN, Trump positions his audience as a congregation of believers, who are proud, strong and “American,” and in so doing defines his audience as a force that can confront “the media” that has been made to follow Trump when he travels around the country. He also directly engages his audience: “Do we know that? Everyone.” For Fox News, Trump’s speech is comforting and reaffirming since it participates in the same belief system or “values.” This speech of love and unity then has two purposes, to shore up Trump supporters throughout the country, and to defy those who oppose Trump, such as the majority of viewers of CNN. Trump continues to position his audience as a congregation of believers:

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

131

We believe in freedom, self-government, and individual rights. We cherish and defend—thank you, it looks like it’s in very good shape, our Second Amendment. Congratulations. Yes, our Second Amendment is very very sound again, that would have been a gonzo. It would have been gone, but I never had a doubt. We support the Constitution of the United States and believe that judges should interpret the Constitution as written and not make up new meaning for what they read. And finally, we believe that family and faith, not government and bureaucracy, are the foundation of our society. You’ve heard me say it before on the campaign trail and I’ll say it again tonight. In America we don’t worship government. We worship God … Day by day, week by week we are restoring our government’s allegiance to its people, to its citizens, to the people that we all love. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

The usage of such terms as “freedom” is defined by Laclau as an “empty signifier.” There are few Americans who do not believe in “freedom, self-­ government and individual rights.” However, freedom in Trump’s usage is completely open-ended. In referencing the Second Amendment, Trump refers to the Constitutional freedom to carry firearms, a long-standing “freedom” in the United States going back to the Revolutionary Period. Given the frequent and often extensive shootings and massacres that have occurred in the modern United States, this “freedom” has been challenged. Nonetheless, Trump supporters are adamant in their support of the Second Amendment, thus he positions them as having the “right to keep and bear arms” and characterizes this right in terms of a community-­ held belief. This is a popular demand. Trump also articulates belief, “we believe,” in socially conservative values such as “family and faith” in contrast to “government and bureaucracy.” In this perspective, it is “family and faith” that sustains ‘the people’ rather than social programmes. Trump signals support for fundamentalist Christian values rather than socialist values where the state can intervene in the welfare of its people. He reinforces the positioning of his audience both within the Covelli Centre and via the medium of television as a congregation by asserting, “We don’t worship government. We worship God.” In a country with strong Protestant roots, this is perhaps not an unusual thing to say, but Trump makes a very clear and direct appeal to the religious right or

132 

M. Macaulay

fundamentalist groups that support him. This contrast between worshipping government and worshipping God reflects the same premillennial Christian view espoused by Preston Manning. This view does not understand Christian behaviour in the creation of a better world through better government but in one’s relationship with God or Christ. Throughout the first part of his Youngstown, Ohio Speech, Trump defines and positions the audience he wishes to address. He does not construct ‘the people’ in populist terms; rather, he references a ‘people’ or ‘heartland’ that has already come into being during his earlier campaign. Importantly, he positions this audience within the Centre and without in the broader media as a congregation of believers who love one another, are loyal to one another, who believe in freedom as he defines it and who reject “government” for belief and “worship” of God. This audience is composed of and integrated in and “united” by the working class and a religious right, and it is this congregation that Trump defines as “American.”

Youngstown Speech, Part 2 After a brief speech given by Gino Defabio who is brought onto the stage to testify as a former Democrat about his conversion to Republicanism through his embrace of Donald Trump, Trump focusses on his own epideictic speech, a speech of praise for himself. Within this section he references one American President, William McKinley, and the patriot Alexander Hamilton. He also references Mount Rushmore. His first reference is to Alexander Hamilton: We are going to have it so that Americans can once again speak the magnificent words of Alexander Hamilton, “here the people govern.” (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

In this language of ‘the people’ governing, Trump echoes his campaign speeches in which “the forgotten men and women” find their voice and are able to govern for themselves. Later in this section of his speech he states categorically, “We will no longer be the foolish people. We will no

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

133

longer be the stupid people that get taken care of so badly by our politicians that they don’t know what they’re doing.” As a President for ‘the people’ Trump commences his own epideixis or litany of praise: Your future is what I’m fighting for each and every day. Here is just a small sample of what we have accomplished in just our first six months in office. And I’ll say this and they always like to say, well, I don’t know. But I think that with few exceptions no president has done anywhere near what we’ve done in his first six months. Not even close. But they don’t let you know. They don’t write about it. That unemployment last month hit a 16-year low. Since my election, we’ve added much more than 1 million jobs. Think of that. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

In terms of the popular demand for jobs Trump made during his campaign, he first claims that jobs in America are now rebounding in numbers. He fails to note that they had been recovering under Obama after the 2008 recession. With manufacturing jobs, however, Trump remains aspirational: We have to protect our industry. And now we are going to start, we are reclaiming our heritage as a manufacturing nation … We are going to bring back our jobs, bring back our wealth, and we are going to bring back our dreams, and we are going to bring back, once again, our sovereignty as a nation. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

The modal construction going to bring back represents intentionality rather than accomplishment. It is also aspectually imperfective representing a process and thus not an end. He tells the story of the president of Harley-Davidson that manufactures motorcycles. William McKinley understood that when America protects our workers and our industries, we open up a higher and better destiny for our people. We don’t protect our people. We don’t protect. Trade comes in, goods come in. I was with Harley-Davidson, a great company from Wisconsin … They came to the White House and they said to me, “yeah, it’s tough going outside of the United States. We’re doing great in the United States but when we sell a motorcycle to certain countries, we have as much as a 100% tax

134 

M. Macaulay

to pay.” And I said, “tell me, when they sell back to us, meaning reciprocal, so when thy sell back to us, what tax do we charge them?” The answer is zero. Those days are going to be over very soon. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Trump references another American President, William McKinley, whose views on trade reflect his own, but his story of Harley-Davidson is about a hypothesized future, carrying a social demand of increased tariffs for foreign manufacturers trading with the United States. There is no accomplishment, only the promise of accomplishment. What then are Trump’s actual achievements in his first six months. He has few: To protect American jobs and workers, I withdrew the United States from both the Trans-Pacific Partnership potential disaster and the job-killing Paris Climate Accord. And if we don’t negotiate a great deal with Mexico and Canada, we will terminate NAFTA and we’ll start all over again … African Americans and teenagers are enjoying their lowest unemployment since just after the turn of the century. That’s pretty good, right? We’ve eliminated burdensome regulations at record speed and many, many more are coming off. And boy, have we put those coal miners and coal back on the map. You’ve seen that, haven’t you? And all other forms of energy. We’ve achieved a historic increase in defence spending to our troops the support they so richly deserve. We have signed new legislation to hold federal workers accountable for the care they provide to our great, great veterans. Veterans Accountability Act. They’ve been trying to get that done for many many many years, even decades … having to wait online for days and days and days and getting sicker and sicker and sicker, where you could be taken care of immediately. Now you go out and you get a doctor. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Trump praises himself for cancelling two trade deals, improving work availability for African Americans and teenagers, removing unspecified regulations, bringing back coal, increasing defence spending and bringing in legislation to ensure veterans of American overseas wars get better access to healthcare. To a very large extent what Trump has achieved is either consistent with Obama in reducing unemployment or is a reversal of Obama’s trade negotiations or climate action. Trump can claim no

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

135

major transformative change in his first six months of office. He ran in 2016 on bringing back manufacturing jobs. In his Youngstown speech this remains a social demand. In this section of his speech Trump uses the verb achieve to refer to military spending, something most American Presidents have supported or extended. He also encourages his audience to affirm his assertions: “That’s pretty good, right?” Thus, an evaluation is followed by a request for confirmation. He asks the audience’s affirmation for the praise he gives himself. However, Trump goes much further in his own evaluation of his achievements and his encouragement of the audience to affirm his success. He sets out a scenario whereby he could be placed on Mount Rushmore with other Presidents such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson: Now here’s what I do. I’d ask whether or not you think I will someday be on Mt. Rushmore, but, here’s the problems. If I did it joking, totally joking, having fun, the fake news media will say, ‘he believes he should be on Mt. Rushmore.’ So I won’t say it, okay? I won’t say it. But every ­president— they’ll say it anyway tomorrow. ‘Trump thinks he should be on Mt. Rushmore.’ Isn’t that terrible? What a group. What a dishonest group of people, I’ll tell you … Every president on Mt. Rushmore believed in protecting American industry. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Trump’s representation of Washington and Jefferson is incorrect. Neither Washington nor Jefferson had any commitment to American industry. They were both farmers owning large plantations and slaves. But Trump nonetheless sets up an argument whereby ‘All Presidents on Mt. Rushmore believed in protecting American industry. I am a President and I believe in protecting American industry. Therefore, I should also be on Mt. Rushmore.’ He further engages his audience in the mental process of believing that in the future he might be on Mt. Rushmore with other ‘great’ presidents. Through this hypothesis and his syllogism Trump suggests that the work he has done in six months parallels the greatness of men such as Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln. He places himself amongst the great and famous Presidents on Mt. Rushmore. Such a

136 

M. Macaulay

suggestion is in keeping with the notion of extraordinariness set out by Moffitt (2016). Trump presents himself as a great man.

 oungstown Speech, Part 3. Y The Politics of Fear In the last part of his Youngstown Speech, Trump turns to his accomplishment in preventing illegal immigration: “Since I took office we have cut back illegal immigration on our southern borders by record numbers … Nobody is coming anymore because they know they can’t get through our southern border.” While those in the audience in the Covelli Centre chant “Build that wall,” Trump then shifts topic to “criminal gangs that have brought illegal drugs, violence, horrible bloodshed to peaceful neighbourhoods all across the country. We are throwing the MS-134 out of here so fast.” While Trump relies extensively on short narratives such as that concerning Harley-Davidson coming to the White House to talk about foreign tariffs, he now falls back on an archetypal American narrative, the ‘Wild West’; however, he modernizes the cast of characters: We are actually liberating town and cities. We are liberating—people screaming from their windows, thank you, thank you to the border patrol and to General Kelly’s great people that come in and grab the thugs and throw them the hell out. We are liberating our towns and we are liberating our cities. Can you believe we have to do that? Earlier in the year and immigration and customs enforcement conducted the largest single raid in the history of our Country. We are dismantling and destroying the bloodthirsty criminal gangs and well, I will just tell you in, we’re not doing it in a politicly correct fashion. We’re doing it rough. Our guys are rougher than their guys. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

 The MS-13 is the Mara Salvatrucha gang that originated in Los Angeles, California. This gang originated in California to protect Salvadoran immigrants. However, it transformed into an international criminal organization. This gang has been responsible for a number of violent deaths in Central and South American countries. It is also known for attacking immigrants from Mexico on the southern border between the U.S. and Mexicao (Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, MS13 in the Americas, InSight Crime) 4

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

137

Trump transitions quickly from the issue of illegal immigration, largely that from South America, by those fleeing poverty and violence in their own societies, to a scenario where “criminal gangs [] brought in illegal drugs, violence, horrible bloodshed to peaceful neighbourhoods all across the country.” Trump employs the verb bring in that implicates that the “criminal gangs” he speaks of are foreign and have invaded “peaceful neighbourhoods” in the country. The only gang he references, however, MS-13, is actually an American gang originating in Los Angeles California. This gang is now international, but it is not as such a foreign gang for which barriers such as walls are of any import. Ironically this gang has been known to attack Mexican immigrants attempting to come into the U.S. Despite these facts, the narrative Trump constructs is of an invading criminal force entering and disrupting peaceful and law-abiding towns and cities. This is the scenario of the Wild West where the abiding trope is of ‘the frontier.’ The frontier is understood as a specific location between two principal locations. The boundary between Canada and the United States is seldom thought of as a ‘frontier,’ but that between the U.S. and Mexico has long been thought of as a frontier. Equally, as American settlement proceeded westward in the eighteenth century, ‘American’ settlements and indigenous territory were often perceived of as existing between a ‘frontier.’ The term is charged in the American trope of the Wild West because the ‘frontier’ entails hostility and violence between an incipient civilization on the one hand and an uncivilized one on the other. Trump invokes the American frontier in his narrative of liberation. General Kelly is the new sheriff in town, “throw[ing] them the hell out.” It is important to note that this narrative is not simply invoking law and order. Trump taps into the American settler identity and mentality, thus his explicit reference to the Second Amendment earlier in his speech, and the roughness of his approach: “We’re doing it rough. Our guys are rougher than their guys.” Out of international context, Trump could be talking about two street gangs, one which has ‘their guys’ and the other “our guys.” The use of guys informalizes the conflict bringing it into a local street level in “neighbourhoods” where the “guys” can brawl it out. In a significant way Trump personalizes and tribalizes the problem of drug trafficking in the United States.

138 

M. Macaulay

What is particularly striking is Trump’s construction and positioning of ‘the other’ in his invocation of a Wild West frontier narrative: One by one we are finding the illegal gang members, drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals, and killers. And we are sending them the hell back home where they came from. And once they are gone, we will never let them back in. Believe me. The predators and criminal aliens who poison our communities with drugs and prey on innocent young people, these beautiful, beautiful, innocent young people will, will find no safe haven anywhere in our country. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Trump employs the rhetorical device of copiousness favoured in Renaissance rhetoric. He expands and builds on “illegal gang members.” They are also “drug dealers,” and then “thieves,” and then “robbers,” and then “criminals,” and finally “killers.” He further expands on “killers,” but includes the notion of intention, thus they are also “predators.” Finally, they are “criminal aliens.” As “aliens,” they are alien to and different from Americans, specifically the American settlers that are defined by the presence of a border between the barbarians on the one side (drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals, killers and predators) and the civilized represented by the “beautiful, beautiful innocent young people.” The street fight Trump narrates is between illegal aliens who by definition are drug dealers, thieves, killers and predators and the civilized wanting to protect their beautiful children. It is notable that he represents the removal of the “criminal aliens” as incremental when he previously reported “customs enforcement conducted the largest single raid in the history of our Country.” Such a raid would not have been made on a single individual but on an entire operation bringing in illegal drugs where there would have been cooperation between American and international law enforcement. Having defined “criminal aliens” as the barbarians at the gate, Trump escalates his representation of all illegal aliens as violent killers and predators: And you’ve seen the stories about some of these animals. They don’t want to use guns, because it’s too fast and it’s not painful enough. So they’ll take

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

139

a young beautiful girl, 16, 15 and others and they slice and dice them with a knife because they want them to go through excruciating pain before they die. And these are the animals that we’ve been protecting. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

The factual reference here is most likely to Brenda Paz who had herself been a member of MS-13 before turning informant for the FBI. She was found stabbed to death near the Shenandoah River in Virginia (Michael E. Miller & Justin Jouvenal, ‘Heinous and violent’: MS-13’s appeal to girls grows as gang becomes ‘Americanized.’ The Washington Post, May 7, 2018). In terms of copiousness, in his final expansion of “illegal gang members,” Trump dehumanizes “criminal aliens” as “animals.” As ‘animals’ they have no concept of morality, although they do have intentionality. They are intentionally cruel. Rather than using guns to kill, they “slice and dice with a knife” thus treating “a young, beautiful girl” much as humans treat animals in killing them for food. Slice, dice, knife all rhyme internally, therefore Trump deliberately employs assonance to unify the image of the murder of a young person and make this image more powerful and memorable. One can imagine knife-wielding madmen. The scene he depicts is of utter barbarity. However, his audience shows no sign of disgust or dismay. Three elderly women directly behind Trump in the Corelli Centre applaud. Trump also significantly shifts his Wild West frontier narrative between the civilized and the uncivilized to the enemy within: “And these are the animals that we’ve been protecting.” The and employed by Trump in this last sentence is not an and of sequence but rather of new information. Trump’s new information is that the enemy without has been facilitated by an even more significant enemy, an enemy from within the community that serves to weaken and undermine the community: “we’ve been protecting.” It is this final message that is the real thrust and purpose of his speech, why he is in an 12,000-seat auditorium generating engagement from the audience within and ensuring broadcast to an television audience. The frightening dystopian world Trump creates through his updated frontier narrative is reinforced by the presence of an otherwise ‘legal alien,’ his fellow Americans. This is a very significant shift for Trump. In 2017 he goes back on the campaigning trail not to talk about job loss, the problems with Obamacare

140 

M. Macaulay

and illegal immigration, but to engage in a culture war between one set of Americans and another. In this speech and those that follow he actively divides Americans into two camps. In this he creates a new frontier within the United States of America. Well, they’re not being protected any longer, folks. And that is why my administration is launching a nationwide crackdown on sanctuary cities. American cities should be sanctuaries for law-abiding Americans, for people who look up to the law, for people who respect the law, not for criminals and gang members that we want the hell out of this country. Sanctuary cities legislation has passed the house … We’ve got to get it passed. The Trump administration has the back of our ICE5 Officers, our border patrol agents, and yes, our great police officers. And we have their backs 100%. We are also going to protect them, like they protect us. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Trump in this part of his speech turns the notion of ‘sanctuary’ on its head. Sanctuary originates from the concept of a sacred space. Since churches were sacred spaces, they became places of refuge for those needing a place of safety. A ‘sanctuary city’ in the U.S. became a place where immigrants already in or coming into the country were protected. The sanctuary city movement came about to protect those living in the U.S. illegally so as to prevent family break ups and stop deportation (especially for those who had residence for long periods). Under Trump’s presidency many were removed by ICE from their homes or places of work and taken from their families. In Trump’s reconstruction, however, there should be ‘sanctuary’ only for one group of people living in the United States: “law-abiding Americans.” Trump imposes the frontier trope onto ‘sanctuary’ as a concept. Rather than a place of safety for refugees and immigrants, it becomes a place of safety from refugees and immigrants. He invokes the trope of the frontier and the ‘Wild West’ where one population is ‘civilized’ and the other ‘uncivilized,’ and where  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

5

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

141

one needs protecting from the other. “Sanctuary cities” in Trump’s construction provide protection for “criminals and gang members.” By employing the extremely graphic imagery he does, Trump positions all illegal immigrants as “animals.” To use positioning theory, he quite literally denies them rights and responsibilities, and thus wants them removed from the country. Sanctuary must be provided only for “lawabiding Americans, people who look up to the law, for people who respect the law.” Trump delineates two principal types of Americans, those who “look up to the law,” and those who do not. He creates an America where one group of Americans is divided against and in conflict with another. This is far removed from the unifying call and popular demand to “Make America Great Again.” ‘America’ continues to be employed as an empty signifier. However, America is now likened to a city where the walls are fragile and those within it are divided between the law-abiding and the law-breaking. Trump lumps a sub-set of Americans in with the “illegal aliens,” who are “illegal gang members, drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals and killers … predators and criminal aliens … [and] animals.” Thus, he embraces a fully-fledged “politics of fear,” not only of the ‘other’ but also of ‘another,’ in this case another American. Three years before January 6, 2020 Trump sets the stage for an ‘America’ fearing for its own safety in the onslaught of an enemy within (Fig. 5.2). Sender Donald Trump →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→ → General Kelly, ICE

Object Safe Cities

Receiver law-abiding Americans

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←← Opponent Trump illegal aliens, Sanctuary Cites

Fig. 5.2a  Youngstown Ohio Speech, 2017

142 

M. Macaulay

J anuary 6, 2021 Speech, ‘The Numbers Speech,’ Saving Democracy Former President Donald Trump’s speech on January 6, 2021 is perhaps the most important of his career as a politician with the exception of his Announcement Speech in 2015. The nature of this speech as a speech act remains controversial. Trump was impeached a second time on January 13, 2021, making Trump the first American President to be impeached twice (Berenson, Time, January 13, 2021). The article of impeachment against Trump was “incitement of insurrection” (Berenson, Time, January 13, 2021). We know what the perlocutionary effect of Trump’s speech was. The U.S. Capitol Building itself was overtaken by a large mob entering the buildings attempting to disrupt the process of ratifying the election of Joseph Biden as the next American President. In the mayhem that occurred five people died, one a member of the Capitol Police. Two arguments were put to Congresspersons during Trump’s trial: that Trump did not incite insurrection and that he did. Trump’s lawyers noted that in his speech to supporters on that day he stated unequivocally that “I know that everyone here will soon be marching over to the Capitol building to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard.” Those arguing for cited another speech act, a commissive, “We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.” How do we square these seemingly inconsistent utterances? What were Donald Trump’s intentions on January 6, 2021? Did he intend to incite a riot or did he intend his supporters to march down to the Capitol Buildings and protest? Is this a case of Henry II’s utterance of “Will no one rid me of this troublesome priest” that resulted in the death of Thomas á Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, or is this a case of intentional manipulation of a mob to achieve a particular goal, in this case the forced re-examination of votes for President in several states. Henry II claimed that his words were misinterpreted and that he had no intention of having Becket murdered. Trump claims that his intentions were also innocent, that he was encouraging his supporters to fulfil their constitutional duty only.

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

143

We have to examine Trump’s speech as a whole. It is a speech dominated by a concern for numbers. Trump begins his speech by remarking on the size of the crowd present to hear him speak: “Media will not show the magnitude of this crowd. Even I, when I turned on today, I looked, and I saw thousands of people here. But you don’t see hundreds of thousands of people behind you because they don’t want to show that.” It is quite clear from Trump’s comment “when I turned on today” that he understands his speech as a media event, not a simple rally. The size of the crowd is what concerns him, and that a large portion of the crowd is not visible on camera. Television, according to McLuhan (1964), is a “cool medium”; that is, it involves the audience that participates in the experiential construction of an event. Although this may be less true today with high-definition television that provides clear and explicit visual information, nonetheless television draws the viewer in and requires that the viewer provide information. On a personal level, Trump clearly wanted affirmation of his importance, but on another level, he wanted “viewership” and engagement. He put his case not just to those in his immediate audience at the Ellipse but also the American public watching the spectacle on their home televisions. In very simple terms, he wanted to be “seen.” To further complement his theme of ‘numbers,” Trump immediately references the number that voted for him: You know, I say, sometimes jokingly, but there’s no joke about it. I’ve been in two elections. I won them both and the second one, I won much bigger than the first. OK. Almost 75 million people voted for our campaign, the most of any incumbent president by far in the history of our country, 12 million more people than four years ago … And by the way, does anybody believe that Joe had 80 million votes? Does anybody believe that? He had 80 million computer votes. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

Trump at this point, very early in his speech, begins to construct the narrative that he wishes to tell his audience in Washington and his ‘viewership’ over television who will be glued to their screens. The abstract is simple: “I’ve been in two elections.” We have only one narrative clause containing two narrative events: ‘I won the first and then I won the

144 

M. Macaulay

second.’ He then provides evaluation: “I won much bigger than the first. OK. Almost 75 million people voted for our campaign, the most of any incumbent president by far in the history of our country.”6 This is the cornerstone of Trump’s narrative, not that he lost the election, but that he won the 2020 Presidential election. Later in his speech Trump asserts that “we won it by a landslide. This was not a close election.” What concerns Trump is that he has gained 12 million votes, not that he has lost to Biden by 5 million. It is the first number that Trump wishes to impress on both his audiences, those at the Ellipse in Washington and those at-­ home. Support for him has increased rather than decreased. But how to explain the other number? Trump dismisses Biden’s achievement: “does anybody believe that Joe had 80 million votes?” What Trump must do in the remainder of his speech is to retell the story of the 2020 election as he does by asserting that he “won them both.” The new narrative he tells has a new cast that includes Mike Pence, “weak Republicans,” “corrupt Democrat-run cities,” “Democrat Party operatives,” “the radical left,” “Dominion Voting Machines,” and “we.” There are two principal antagonists in Trump’s retelling: “weak Republicans,” and “Democrat Party operatives.” This narrative is not about ‘making America great again,’ or ‘making America safe’; this narrative is ‘saving America, saving Democracy.’ Trump and Trump’s narrative functions as the Sender in keeping with Greimasian Narrative Theory, while the audience, physically present on the Ellipse and at home, function as the Subject or the Hero. The receiver is America itself which will be saved. The purpose of his speech is both to address his audience and to construct an audience as Subject/Hero,’ a “we.”

Weak Republicans Trump’s major concern in this narrative of Saving America is the behaviour of the group he refers to as “weak Republicans.” He positions these as potential adversaries who would be in opposition to his main goal which is to overturn the election of Joe Biden:  I am here employing Labovian narrative theory.

6

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

145

The weak Republicans, and that’s it. I really believe it. I think I’m going to use the term, the weak Republicans. You’ve got a lot of great ones. But you got a lot of weak ones. They’ve turned a blind eye, even as Democrats enacted policies that chipped away our jobs, weakened our military, threw open our borders and put America last. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

Trump characterizes or positions “weak Republicans” as quasi-­ Democrats, his principal enemy. As with all Trump monikers, his use of adjectives is important. These Republicans who go along with the Democrats are “weak.” They are unable to take strong principled stands on policies that would benefit the country. Trump makes the latter point more broadly: We’re gathered together in the heart of our nation’s capital for one very very basic and simple reason: to save our democracy … We want to go back and we want to get this right because we’re going to have somebody in there that should not be in there and our country will be destroyed and we’re not going to stand for that … For years, Democrats have gotten away with election fraud and weak Republicans. And that’s what they are. There’s so many weak Republicans. And we have great ones … The house guys are fighting. But it’s, it’s incredible … And you have to get your people to fight. And if they don’t fight, we have to primary the hell out of the ones that don’t fight. You primary them. We’re going to. We’re going to let you know who they are. I can already tell you, frankly. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

Trump first defines the purpose of the gathering on the Ellipse as “sav[ing] our democracy.” He then narrativizes a Biden presidency in terms of destruction of the country, but his focus is on those Republicans such as Mitt Romney who will not challenge the ratification process for the election of the new President. His concern again is with numbers: “There’s so many weak Republicans.” ‘Weak’ in Trump’s terms is not to challenge the election results, to not not ratify the incoming President. He then employs his first directive in this speech: “And you have to get your people to fight.” He imposes an obligation on his own audience. As Sender in a Greimasian narrative, Trump exhorts his own Washington audience

146 

M. Macaulay

and his viewership, to “get your people to fight.” Trump in not an agent in this utterance, except in exhorting his followers to act in such a way to get “the weak Republicans” to act. He then threatens these weak Republicans with non-compliance: “we have to primary the hell out of the ones that don’t fight.” To save ‘democracy,’ in this case an empty signifier to stand for his presidency, Trump as sender sends his audience on a quest to engender constructive action on the part of “weak Republicans” who may align themselves with Democrats. This is Trump’s principal move in this speech. It is not he who will save democracy but rather his audience who he sends on a quest to do so. Its job is to move “weak Republicans.”

The Voting System and The Numbers Apart from his characterization of “weak Republicans” and his designation of the audience as Subject/Hero, Trump’s main task in his January 6, 2021 Speech is to substantiate his argument for “saving democracy” for those he has sent to do this. He turns from ‘ethos’ to ‘logos.’ The focus of his logical argument is the voting system, from the machines that record votes to the actual participation of voters in the voting process. He argues that what has taken place in the 2020 Presidential election is “voter fraud.” In the early part of his speech Trump asks “And by the way, does anybody believe that Joe had 80 million votes? Does anybody believe that? He had 80 million computer votes.” We can query Trump’s fundamental logic. Trump challenges the legitimacy of Biden’s votes, but not of his own. These were properly tallied. To justify this discrepancy, Trump provides an analysis of swing states: In every single swing state, local officials, state officials, almost all Democrats, made illegal and unconstitutional changes to election procedures without the mandated approvals by the state legislatures. That these changes paved the way for fraud on a scale never seen before, I think we go a long way outside of our country when I say that. So just in a nutshell, you can’t make a change or voting for a federal election unless the state ­legislature approves it. No judge can do it. Nobody can do it. Only a legislature. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

147

Trump employs 6 assertives in sequence. He thus constructs an argument based on factual information, and so represents the world as he sees it. But he also constructs a conspiracy amongst “Local officials, state officials,” and “almost all Democrats.” With such a broad range of actors, what appears to be a factual account, is better understood as a narrative. Trump is therefore giving a narrative account of what he thinks happened. This narrative is also populist. Trump is here making a social demand for a free and fair election process. He compares what has happened in 2020 to what happens in third-world countries. He constructs an elite ‘they’ who have rigged the system against the people and specifically against him. Trump employs copiousness as he does in his Youngstown Speech; he delineates five ‘swing’ states, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Georgia, Arizona, and Michigan, where voter fraud occurred that has denied the presidency to him. We can examine Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, the Democrat secretary of state and the Democrat state Supreme court justices illegally abolished the signature verification requirement just 11 days prior to the election. So think of what they did. No longer is there signature verification. Oh, that’s OK. We want voter ID by the way. But no longer is there a signature verification. Eleven days before the election they say we don’t want it. You know why they don’t want to. Because they want to cheat. That’s the only reason. Who would even think of that? We don’t want to verify a signature? (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

Trump problematizes the voting process. He understands ‘voting’ as a behavioural process, where the participant must engage in specific actions to participate genuinely in the process. One part of the process of voting should be “signature verification.” This of course adds enormous complication to voting because a clerk at a given poll must take the time to check a signature against an already existing signature. There is a major time element. Equally, signatures can vary over time. They can be disputed easily. What then is the real purpose of signature verification? It extends the process, and it can call into question an individual’s signature. It can certainly be used to disallow a voter from participation in voting. One can understand its discontinuance in Pennsylvania by the Democrat Secretary of State and the Democrat state Supreme Court.

148 

M. Macaulay

However, in Trump’s narrative, non-use of signature verification amounts to a form of state-sponsored voter fraud. Not only is the Democratic Party a party of cheats, but also equally are those who can vote. This is the implicature from Trump’s complaint of non-compliance with signature verification. If signatures are not required, then voters can cheat. They can vote when they are not who they say they are, and they can participate in a Democrat conspiracy to vote against you. Trump continues to call into question the voting process in Pennsylvania: There were over 205,00 more ballots counted in Pennsylvania. Think of this, you had 205,000 more ballots than you had voters. That means you had two. Where did they come from? You know where they came from? Somebody’s imagination, whatever they needed. So in Pennsylvania you had 205,000 more votes than you had voters. And the number is actually much greater than that now. That was a week ago. And this is a mathematical impossibility unless you want to say it’s total fraud. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

The question of course is how this anomaly could be explained. Trump provides this answer: Twenty-five thousand ballots in Pennsylvania were requested by nursing home residents, all in a single giant batch, not legal, indicating an enormous, illegal ballot harvesting operation. You’re never allowed to do it, it’s against the law. The day before the election, the state of Pennsylvania reported the number of absentee ballots that had been sent out. Yet this number was suddenly and drastically increased by 400,000 people. It was increased, nobody knows where it came from, by 400,000 ballots, one day after the election … Four hundred thousand ballots appeared from nowhere right after the election. By the way, Pennsylvania has now seen all of this. They didn’t know because it was so quick. They had a vote. They voted. But now they see this stuff, it’s all come to light … They want to recertify their votes. They want to recertify. But the only way that can happened is if Mike Pence agrees to send it back. Mike Pence has to send it back. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

In arguing for voter fraud, Trump and his attorneys conflated voting numbers from the Primaries in June with those in the November election: “data from U.S. Election Project … show 3,087,524 mail ballots requested

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

149

of which 2,589,242 were returned” (Jude Joffe Block, Pennsylvania did not have hundreds of thousands of absentee ballots, AP News, November 30, 2020). To get a number exceeding 3,086,524, mail-­in ballots submitted for the state Primaries in June were added in: “There were not 700,000 ballots that appeared from nowhere” (AP News, November 30, 2020). In Trump’s narrative the numbers increased by 400,000 with the implicature that there was extreme voter fraud. In this narrative, Trump brings in another actor, Mike Pence who he says, “has to agree to send it back.” Trump employs a modal of obligation, has to, to express a dire need on the part of Pence. As a sender he is again sending a given subject/hero to act on the behalf of American democracy. His audience equally must serve as a subject/hero to ensure Pence’s desired action of restoring democracy. Given Trump’s rhetorical predisposition to copiousness, he simply expands and magnifies the fraud he identifies: So Pennsylvania was defrauded. Over 8,000 ballots in Pennsylvania were cast by people whose names and dates of birth match individuals who died in 2020 and prior to the election. Think of that. Dead people, lots of dead people, thousands. And some dead people actually requested an application. That bothers me even more … More than 10,000 votes in Pennsylvania were illegally counted, even though they were received after Election Day. In other words, they were received after Election Day. Let’s count them anyway. And what they did in many cases is, they did fraud … Think of that one. You got your ballot back. Let’s send the ballots. Oh, they’ve already been sent. But we got the ballot back before they were sent. That’s good, right? (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

If we catalogue the abuses, first there is the removal of a verified signature, then “ballot-harvesting,” then more people voting who were sent mail-in ballots, then dead people voting, then votes tallied after the election, then ballots received twice and voters voting twice. Trump creates a picture of massive voter chaos and fraud. In the section of his speech, Trump employs fraud twice, illegal three times, against the law once, and cheat once. These words are not used in collocation, but they are semantically related and used throughout this section on Pennsylvania to portray a system that is profoundly corrupt. He also provides a telic goal for such a corrupted state and system:

150 

M. Macaulay

You will have an illegitimate president. That’s what you’ll have. And we can’t let that happen. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

Trump reinforces the concept of illegality by referring to a future Joseph Biden as an “illegitimate president.” He also assigns the role of subject/hero to both himself and his audience: “we [my emphasis] can’t let that happen.” What exactly is entailed by “we can’t let that happen”? As a sender in this narrative what is he sending the “we” off to do? In what way can we not let this happen. This is an assertive functioning as an indirect directive. The goal is clear but the method is not. The immediate goal is for Mike Pence “to send it back,” that is, the ratification of votes for Biden from each state. Trump supports this proposition in the following way: And many people in Congress want it sent back. And think of what you’re doing. Let’s say you don’t do it. Somebody says, ‘Well, we have to obey the Constitution.’ And you are, because you’re protecting our country and you’re protecting the Constitution. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

In front of his audience on the Ellipse and at home watching television, Trump employs a complex cognitive reversal of logic. By not “obey[ing] the Constitution,” his audience will actually be protecting it: “you’re [my emphasis] protecting the Constitution.” By failing to observe the American Constitution, Trump maintains that one is in fact sustaining it. This is sophist slight of hand, but however illogical, Trump legitimizes the future actions of his audience by maintaining that “you” will be protecting the country and the Constitution. If his audience believes this, the storming of the Capitol is the next logical step. It follows or is entailed by the language of ‘protection’ of the state. The crisis at hand is the loss of a legitimate presidency and the wellbeing of the country itself. This is a call to action on Trump’s part whereby one protects the Constitution by violating it. Trump continues his speech by going on to Wisconsin, Georgia, Arizona, and Michigan. He repeats the same points as those from Pennsylvania:

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

151

If you signed your name as Santa Claus, it would go through. One hundred and seventy-four thousand ballots were counted without being tied to an actual registered voter. Nobody knows where they came from. Michigan suddenly reported 147,000 votes. The Dominion Voting Machines employed in Fulton County had an astronomical and astounding 93.67% error rate … There is clear evidence that tens of thousands of votes were switched from President Donald Trump to former Vice President Biden in several counties in Georgia. We won in a landslide. This was a landslide. That said it’s not American to challenge the election. This is the most corrupt election in the history, maybe of the world. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

Trump employs hyperbole in the last line of the last remark: “This is the most corrupt election in the history, maybe of the world.” Such hyperbole is characteristic of Trump’s speech in general, but in this context it is inflammatory. Trump genuinely wants his audience to believe that the 2020 Presidential election IS the “most corrupt election in the history … of the world.” For his audience, this is not hyperbole, this is fact. This is a true assertion. Trump follows up this assertion with another, “This is not just a matter of domestic politics—this is a matter of national security.” In this language, Trump returns to the language of safety and security that he exploits in his 2017 Youngstown Speech. We have a clear division between an ‘us’ and a ‘them.’ The ‘them’ in this speech are “weak Republicans,” “Democrats” and “the Democratic Party.” It is they as a whole who have put the country in jeopardy. Very significantly, Trump turns to the campaign trail: what he will do if he is returned as President: But we’re going forward. We’ll take care of going forward … With your help, We will finally pass powerful requirements for voter ID … We will also require proof of American citizenship in order to vote in American elections … We will ban ballot harvesting and prohibit the use of unsecured drop boxes to commit campaign fraud … We will stop the practice of universal unsolicited mail-in balloting … We will restore the vital civic tradition of in-person voting … Together, we will drain the Washington swamp and we will clear up the corruption in our nation’s capital. (‘The Numbers Speech,’ January 6, 2021)

152 

M. Macaulay

All of these utterances are commissives conveying what Trump will do once he is President again. This harkens back to Trump’s original Announcement Speech, but rather than being about jobs and bringing jobs back to American shores, the future Trump holds out to his audience, which he notes has now reached 250,000 people on the Ellipse, are free and fair elections: “I think one of our great achievements will be election security.” In his speech, “national security” and ‘election security’ are equated. The notion of ‘security,’ paramount in his speeches for over three years, also permeates this last speech. In this he even references the caravans at the border: “the caravans are forming again,” and so the frontier trope. Trump will bring back “election security,” but only because via the narrative he tells detailing massive election fraud, it has become an immediate imperative. It is at this point that he tells his audience of 250,000 “And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.” It is ambiguous whether or not Trump telling his audience of 250,000 to march on the Capitol and take it over, whether he is inciting a resurrection, but his utterance is an indirect directive to act, specifically to fight. He is sending his audience, “we,” to the Capitol to reverse the process of ratification, to put pressure on “weak Republicans” and Mike Pence. He has narrativized the 2020 Presidential election as “stolen,” and so the action meant to be taken by his audience is “to stop the steal”; “We are going to try and give them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country.” The nature of this “boldness” is unspecified, but the intention is clear: “to take back our country.” In Laclauan theory, a delineation of unmet needs, what Laclau refers to as an equivalential chain results in an all-encompassing popular demand. This is summarized in Trump’s January 6, 2001 Speech as “Stop the Steal.” Regardless of whether or not the ‘steal’ is accurate or legitimate, ‘democracy’ itself becomes an unmet need on the part of the people. Trump’s narrative of a stolen election, and an end to ‘democracy’ also constructs and creates a ‘people,’ those 250,000 at Washington and those at home watching television but more broadly an ‘American’ people whose voting rights have been trammelled on by a corrupt Democratic elite. The purpose of his speech is to create this people so that they can reclaim and recapture their basic rights as American citizens, understood as an unmet need. Using Greimasian theory, we can usefully compare the narratives Trump constructs in the three speeches examined above (Figs. 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3):

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

Sender Donald Trump →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→ → Fair Trade Deals

Object America First

153

Receiver Working-Class Americans

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ ←←←←← Opponent Subject Hillary Clinton/Wall Street Voice of the People

Fig. 5.1b  Wilmington Ohio Speech, 2016

Sender Donald Trump →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→ → General Kelly, ICE

Object Safe Cities

Receiver law-abiding Americans

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←← Opponent Trump illegal aliens, Sanctuary Cites

Fig. 5.2b  Youngstown Ohio Speech, 2017

Sender President Donald Trump →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Mike Pence

Object Save Democracy

Receiver America

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←←Opponent ‘We’ “weak Republicans,” “Democratic operatives’

Fig. 5.3  January 6, 2021 ‘Numbers Speech’

While Donald Trump remains the Sender in all these narrative accounts, he does not remain the Subject. As candidate for President, Trump is the Subject or ‘hero’ in his Wilmington Ohio speech, and as President he is the Subject or ‘hero’ in the Youngstown speech, but he remains only a Sender in this January 6, 2021 speech. Through an extensive and copious narrative of voter fraud Trump constructs an unmet need on the part of the ‘people.’ That unmet need is democracy itself,

154 

M. Macaulay

articulated illogically and in contradictory fashion as saving the Constitution by violating it. The idea of doing violence to the Constitution as a means of saving it is an illogical impossibility, but it is the principal means of incentivizing the ‘we,’ the American people, to save democracy. It is the ‘we’ to whom Trump gives power rather than to himself. His actions are very little like those of Henry II who in a fit of tempter called out, “Who will rid me of this meddlesome priest?” Trump’s January 6, 2021 Speech is a copious and calculated narrative of violence done to the country through election fraud in five swing states that engenders a ‘we’ who must fight or risk losing their democracy and their country. In this Trump builds on his Youngstown Speech where a divided country is articulated, one between the law-abiding and the law-breaking. In 2021, Trump builds on the politics of fear he constructs in 2017, but he also transfers power to the people to act on its own behalf. That that people in part formed itself into a mob and invaded the Capitol Buildings in a physical attempt to stop the steal comes as a consequence of Trump’s invocation of action on January 6, 2021.

Bernie Sanders, The Survivor Bernie Sanders can best be understood as a ‘left populist’ within the American political framework. Like Donald Trump he is an outsider. He functions outside the Democratic Party, although as a senator he caucuses with the Democrats. As the current head of one of the most important Senate committees, the Budget Committee, Sanders has achieved some status as an insider within the Democratic Party, but he continues to inspire not mainstream Democratic Policy but a progressive vision and set of policies, notably his concern for a 15-dollar minimum wage, a Green New Deal, and removal of Super PACs7 from political participation in elections. Sanders, in fact, is a throwback to the nineteenth-­ century People’s Party. With the People’s Party there is hostility towards  Super PACs are Political Action Committees that can be formed by corporations, unions or individuals. These PACs cannot interact with political parties as such but they can provide funding for the dissemination of information around any given political campaign and in so doing influence a campaign. 7

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

155

the Eastern elite, while Sanders speaks of Wall Street. Equally, the People’s Party railed against the Railroad Barons; Sanders rails against Big Corporations, including Big Agriculture and Big Pharma. There is equally a concern for democratic process with Sanders wanting to remove Super Delegates from the Democratic Party and to energize greater participation in the political process at the grassroots. Sanders’ real forebearers go back approximately 130 years to nineteenth-century populists in the Age of Opulence or the Gilded Age in the 1890’s when the Peoples’ Party was most influential. Sanders is also a survivor. In 2016 he did not win the Democratic Nomination for President. He was unable to defeat Hillary Clinton. However, he very successfully associated Hillary Clinton with Wall Street and big donors or Super PACs while himself organizing a campaign run through small donations, usually around 25 dollars per person. Nonetheless, he could not control the inner workings of the Democratic Party and the so-called Super Delegates selected directly by the Party who privileged the campaign for Clinton. Of course, Hillary Clinton lost to Donald Trump. Sanders ran a second time for the Democratic Nomination in 2019 but was again opposed by Democratic Party insiders, particularly Representative James E. Clyburn who threw his support behind Joe Biden in South Carolina thus bringing a large number of African American voters to Biden helping him to win the state (Donna M. Owens, Jim Clyburn changed everything for Joe Biden’s campaign, Washington Post, April 1, 2020). More notoriously former President Barack Obama tipped the scales by making now famous phone calls to others running for President, including Pete Buttigieg, encouraging them to drop out of the race (Carol E. Lee, Kristen Walker, Josh Lederman and Amanda Golden, Looking for Obama’s hidden hand in candidates coalescing around Biden, NBC News, March 2, 2020). While Sanders had modified the power of Super Delegates in the selection of President, he could not address the influence of powerful insiders such as Clyburn and Obama. Joe Biden won. However, Sanders survived. He survived both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and took on one of the most powerful political positions in Washington, Chair of the Budget Committee. He remains a significant player in Washington and a significant voice. He has also continued with his “political revolution.” The essence of this revolution

156 

M. Macaulay

can be seen in his Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech on March 7, 2019 where he returns to the place of his political emergence as a presidential candidate in 2015.

Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, Rural America Part 1, Welcome to the Revolution Bernie Sanders begins this speech to a rural audience on March 7, 2019 in Iowa where his campaign had erupted into political significance in 2015. Iowa was an important bell-weather state determining which candidates would emerge in the race for the Democratic presidential candidacy. This was an important state in 2015 and it was an important state in 2019, one which Sanders had to win. He begins his speech with an expressive by thanking his audience for coming: Thank you all very much for being here tonight and thank you for being part of a political revolution which will transform America. Thank you for being part of a part of a campaign which is not only going to win the Democratic nomination, which is not only going to defeat Donald Trump, the most dangerous president in modern American history, but with your help to transform this country and, finally create an economy and a government which works for all Americans, and not just the one percent. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

What we note first is Sanders’ inclusiveness. He identifies his audience as “being part of a political revolution,” “part of a campaign.” He does not construct or position his audience as a recipient of information to whom he addresses his views and policies. He positions his audience as part of a larger whole, both a revolution and a campaign. He thus gives status to his audience as a subject and ‘hero’ in the process of revolution he sets out to describe. This is a hallmark of his populism, not the perception of himself as a powerful leader but as a man of the people. In keeping with Benjamin Moffitt’s (2016) analysis, Sanders performs ‘ordinariness’

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

157

rather than ‘extraordinariness.’ His gruffness with reporters and others is not in evidence as he talks to his audience. What we also note is Sanders’ understanding of the process both he and his audience participate in. The word revolution is used once and transform twice. Transform literally means to ‘form across or beyond.’ It is not simply a synonym for change. There is complete metamorphosis. In this venue, we have a similar rural audience of largely farmers contemplating such change only if we go back over a hundred years to the People’s Party. We also see a clear articulation of the division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ In this campaign ‘the elite’ is clearly identified as the “one percent.” It is also exemplified by Donald Trump, “the most dangerous president in modern American history.” Trump in Sanders’ analysis is not a populist but is rather part of a corrupt elite. Sanders next sets out the foundational principles of the campaign: The principles of our government will be based on justice, economic justice, social justice and environmental justice. Tonight, I want to welcome you to a campaign which tells the powerful special interests who control so much of our economic and political life that we will no longer tolerate the greed of Wall Street, Corporate America, and the billionaire class—greed which has resulted in this country having more income and wealth inequality than any other country on earth. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

Sanders again employs an inclusive speech act, welcoming, with his audience. Using repetition (epistrophe), he identifies as an unmet need “economic justice, social justice and environmental justice.” Justice is delineated as economic, as social, and lastly as environmental. It is a broad umbrella term covering virtually all aspects of life. Virtually everything in the human world is touched by ‘justice.’ What opposes justice is human greed. While justice is a complex and abstract notion, greed is simple, and simple to grasp. Human greed is the enemy of economic, social and environmental justice. To illustrate this, Sanders again uses the rule of three: “the greed of Wall Street, Corporate America and the billionaire class.” We have contrapuntal forces aligned in opposition, a very

158 

M. Macaulay

clear articulation of what Laclau refers to as “rupture.’ And, although class war is not explicitly referenced, it is implicated. Sanders continues his speech with explicit reference to “a political revolution”: Together, we are going to create a political system which is based on the democratic principles of one person—one vote—and end a corrupt system which allows billionaires to buy elections. Yes, we are going to overturn Citizens United and move to public funding of elections. Today, we fight for a political revolution. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

The theme of inclusiveness continues in Sanders’ speech. He does not act alone but “Together” with his audience. He positions himself and his audience in conflict with billionaires who are able to buy elections. The move to “public funding of elections” would be transformative in the American political system. In this concern for democracy itself, Sanders hearkens back to the People’s Party of the 1890’s that also wanted major changes to the political system to effect a democratic political process. Having identified the key players in the revolution he wishes to bring about, Sanders reflects on what has already been achieved through the revolution so far: Raising the minimum wage to a living wage. Too radical. Guaranteeing health care to all as a right, not a privilege. Too radical. Creating up to 15 million jobs by rebuilding our crumbling infrastructure with a one trillion-­ dollar investment. Too radical. Aggressively combatting climate change. Too radical. Reforming our broken criminal justice and immigration systems. Too radical. Not taking money from super PACs and the rich. Too radical. Ending the power of super delegates at the Democratic Convention. Too radical. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

As in other speeches, Sanders creates a dialogue between himself and another speaker whose understanding is that the changes he proposes are “Too radical.” This speaker could be any of his political opponents in the

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

159

race for presidential candidacy. The repetitive refrain from this or these political opponents is ironic. In Gricean terms (1975), it violates the Maxim of Quality. In the terms of Sperber and Wilson (1995), we have a type of echo where ‘too radical’ echoes ‘not too radical.’ This knee-jerk refrain of “Too Radical” allows Sanders to mock the political speaker he has conjured up. And he makes this point very forcefully in his subsequent remarks: Well, a funny thing happened in Iowa over that year. On Caucus Night we didn’t win 3% of the vote, we won 50% of the vote and half of the pledged delegates. And that great start in Iowa led us to win victories in 22 states around the country, 13 million votes, over 1700 delegates at the convention and more votes from young people—black, white, Latino, Asian American and Native American—than Trump and Clinton combined. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

What makes “Too Radical” ironic is that the policies Sanders proposed in 2015 have broad support from the American people. Sanders continues: And, by the way, those ideas that we talked about 4 years ago that seemed so very radical at that time. Well, today virtually all of those ideas are supported by a majority of the American people and have overwhelming support from Democrats and independents. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

Sanders is able to position himself and his movement as being visionary albeit in alignment with the zeitgeist of the time. He does not offer mainstream politics to his audience, but a new way of thinking about the human role in American society. Sanders represents himself as an agent of change, and indeed as a kind of force, an energy. He has brought about change within the Democratic Party itself and amongst independents. This however is the extent of the epideictic oratory in his Iowa speech. To praise himself Sanders employs irony and mild mockery of his political opponents. He is forward-thinking while they are not.

160 

M. Macaulay

Part 2, Unmet Needs What follows in Sanders’ speech is a series of unmet needs and social demands in Laclauan terms. Sanders sets out a catalogue of social demands that need to be addressed: health care as a right, the pharmaceutical industry, Walmart’s exploitation of its workers, a federal minimum wage of 15 dollars an hour, artificial intelligence and robotics to “throw workers out on the street,” “our crumbling infrastructure,” “affordable childcare,” women’s rights to their own bodies, “tuition free” public colleges and universities, expansion of “social security,” “climate change,” “the prison-industrial complex,” “marijuana possession,” “humane border control,” and “tax breaks” for large profitable corporations. Of these unmet needs and social demands, I shall examine the most controversial of Sanders proposals since it directly challenged the Democratic Establishment itself: Today, as we launch our campaign here in Iowa, we say to the private health insurance companies, whether you like it or not, the United States will join every other major country on earth and guarantee healthcare to all people as a right. All Americans are entitled to go to the doctor when they’re sick and not go bankrupt after staying in the hospital. We will no longer accept the absurdity of paying almost twice as much per capita on health care, while we have a lower life expectancy and worse health care outcomes than many other countries. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

This is an issue Sanders shares with Donald Trump. Trump equally raged against Obamacare noting the extremely high premiums required to get access to medicine and medical care. However, Trump at no time tackles “the private health insurance companies.” At no time during his presidency did he offer a comprehensive healthcare programme. But equally during Trump’s time in the Oval Office, California, a state dominated by the Democratic Party, did not bring in a “single-payer program.” Even more recently, New York, another state dominated by the Democratic Party, balked at doing so, largely because of pressure brought to bear by the big insurance companies and by unions that had negotiated

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

161

favourable plans for their own members (Tim Murphy, Are Unions Holding New York Back from Having the Nation’s First Single-Payer Health Care? The Body, August 5, 2021). Sanders in his 2015 and 2019 campaigns stood alone in demanding a “single-payer program.” In every articulation of a social demand, Sanders begins his utterance with “Today.” He uses repetition, in this case anaphora, where the same word begins a clause, a sentence, lines or semantic groupings of words. What is the function of ‘today’? Clearly it is deictic, but its purpose in Sanders’ speech is to reflect the immediacy of unmet needs on the part of the American people. What is needed ‘today’ and not ‘tomorrow.’ Here is what we must demand to create justice in our society. Sanders commences with a bold prediction: “we say to the private health insurance companies, whether you like it or not, the Unites States will join every other major country on earth and guarantee health care to all people as a right.” Sanders again constructs a dialogic representation of ‘talk’ made to “the private health insurance companies.” The ‘we’ is not Sanders alone but includes his audience in Iowa and the American people as a whole. The private health care insurance companies are metaphorically given human wishes, and so “whether you like it or not,” we will bring radical change. In effect, Sanders is talking about the elimination of the private health insurance companies, but he represents them as individual people, “you,” who may not like something. His most important assertion is “guaranteed healthcare to all people is a right.” In keeping with his original theme of justice, Sanders articulates healthcare not as a service for those who can pay hefty premiums, but as a “right.” In a just society, humans have a ‘right’ to healthcare regardless of their ability to pay for it. If humans have a right to healthcare, then governments have an obligation to provide it. Sanders expands on the dichotomy between ‘greed’ and ‘justice’: “The goal of health care must be to provide quality care to all in a cost-effective way, not tens of billions in profits for the insurance companies and outrageous compensation packages for CEO’s.” Greed is exemplified by “billions in profits,” and “outrageous compensation packages for CEO’s.” The narrative Sanders tells is of a healthcare industry concerned not with ‘health’ but with profit. And the point of this observation is that this is what is occurring ‘today.’ It has direct impact not just on Sanders’ Iowa

162 

M. Macaulay

audience, but all Americans affected by the current system. It is largely his opposition to the healthcare industry that cost Sanders the presidency. Under Obamacare, the insurance industry participates and benefits. It thrives. During this campaign, Joe Biden appropriated Sanders’ language of “healthcare as a right,” but for Biden ‘healthcare’ meant Obamacare where the insurance industry participated and could make profit from medical suffering.8

Part 3, Rural America The third part of Sanders’ speech is devoted to the specific concerns of rural America. Bernie Sanders’ most famous advertisement during his 2015 campaign was America. This short advertisement depicted scenes of everyday Americans at work, fishing, at their computers, but most especially in scenes of rural life with farmers walking their fields, baling hay, and feeding their livestock. One child holds a small calf in his hands. These scenes are accompanied by Paul Simon singing, “They’ve all come to look for America.” It is a poignant ad about the grassroots, or the ‘heartland’ in populist terms. Bernie is shown amongst the people, not just speaking to but talking with and embracing those who have come to see him. He is presented as a warm and compassionate man of the people. It is an extremely powerful and effective ad which certainly aided in the 22 primary wins for Sanders in the 2015 campaign. In his 2019 Iowa speech Sanders builds on his identification and positioning as a ‘man of the people.’ But he is not their ‘voice’ as Donald Trump represented himself, he is rather their sibling. By addressing his audience as “brothers and sisters,” Sanders uses old union language of brotherhood and sisterhood to position himself as a member of the family, one of ‘you.’ This is a powerful appeal: Brothers and sisters: We are going to win this election not because we have a super PAC funded by billionaires. We’re going to win this election because

 According to Karl Evers-Hillstrom and Jessica Piper, OpenSecrets.org, July 19, 2019, Joe Biden received approximately $100,000 in donations from the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries. 8

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

163

we will put together the strongest grassroots coalition in the history of American politics. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

Speaking to his ‘family,’ Sanders articulates a classic populist contrast: “billionaires,” versus “the strongest grassroots coalition.” The elite versus the people. He further expands on the meaning of “grassroots coalition”: Donald Trump wants to divide us up by the color of our skin, our country of origin, our gender, our religion and our sexual orientation. We are going to do exactly the opposite. We are going to bring our people together— black, white, Latino, Native American, Asian American, gay and straight, young and old, men and women, native born and immigrant. We are going to bring our people together for an unprecedented grassroots effort, which, I am happy to tell you, already has over one million people signed up as volunteers. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

Sanders sets up a contrast between Donald Trump as another realization of the elite and “us.” Sanders employs extensive anaphora to represent ‘us.’ Our is employed six times; we is employed three times. He expands and delineates who ‘we’ are in terms of age, sex, sexual orientation, origin and community as well as “native born and immigrant.” He extends and reinforces the theme of inclusion that commences his speech. The use of anaphora linguistically creates cohesion in this short segment but it also iconically creates the unity between language and the political revolution Sanders wishes to create through “unprecedented grassroots effort.” Sanders importantly gives power not to himself but to his immediate audience and those in America like them. In Laclauan terms, ‘the people’ come into being through articulation of unmet needs and social demands. Sanders next references those that have particular importance for people such as himself who live in rural communities: Brothers and sisters: As someone who represents Vermont, one of the most rural states in the country, let me be very honest with you in saying that the Congress has, for too long, ignored the many crises facing rural America. In Iowa, in Vermont and all over this country, we have seen more and more young people leave small towns they grew up in and love, not because they

164 

M. Macaulay

don’t want to stay, but because there are fewer and fewer jobs that pay a living wage. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

What Sanders describes is an existential crisis. Through repetition of “We have seen,” he articulates a shared experience of loss, in particular loss of “churches and community centers,” “Main Streets,” “hospitals and nursing homes,” Sanders identifies a new elite that threaten the well-­ being of the ‘people’: In Vermont, Iowa and all across rural America, we have seen family farmers go out of business as the prices they receive for their products decline rapidly and large agri-business corporations and factory farming take over agriculture … Bothers and sisters. We need policies for rural America that represent the needs of working people and farmers, not agri-business and multi-national corporations. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

By using the mental process verb see, Sanders represents shared experience rather than abstraction. He speaks about what both he and his audience know as lived experience. We have plain style to address the loss of community and livelihood and the heartland itself. In this Sanders echoes the populists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries who also faced existential crisis. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries their principal opposition was the big banks and the railroad barons. The new elite, the new opposition, is now defined as a form of corporate agriculture. Sanders very explicitly refers to unmet needs, “the needs of working people and farmers.” In turn, he makes a specific social demand: “We need policies for rural America that represent the needs of working people, not agri-­ business and multi-national corporations.” What is absent from the current political spectrum are such policies, regardless of Democratic or Republican political concerns. Such policies lie outside the current political spectrum, and so in articulating their need Sanders brings into being “working people and farmers” as ‘the people’ within a populist frame. One major unmet need is that for anti-trust laws. Anti-trust laws are designed to protect consumers from monopoly and to ensure fair competition amongst producers of goods. In one of the few instances where Sanders speaks personally, he states,

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

165

It is not acceptable to me that the top four packing companies control more than 80 percent of the beef market, 63 percent of the pork market, and 53 percent of the chicken market … In many communities, there really is only one buyer, which means food producers are at their mercy. They must use that corporation’s feed and livestock, they must accept that corporation’s cost, and they must accept that corporations’ lower and lower payment rates. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

In keeping with the notion of immediate lived experience, Sanders states, “it is not acceptable to me.” He is personally affronted by the inequal relationship between Big Agra and the individual farmer. The “one buyer” can assert power over the process of food production by imposing control over product, “feed and livestock,” and in turn manipulate payment. This again echoes the earlier concerns of rural Americans over the “crop lien” system in the United States and those of rural Canadians over import taxes for goods needed for work in farming both of which threatened the actual existence of the farmer. The monopoly, the “one buyer,” has complete control over production and reimbursement. The farmer is reduced to being a cog in a wheel created by the big agricultural corporations. Given this extreme control, Sanders makes the point, With the federal government not enforcing antitrust laws, we have seen mergers like the Bayer-Monsanto approved, giving the two largest conglomerates 78 percent of the seed market … Instead of protecting family-­ owned farms, federal support for agriculture is skewed toward huge farms. The top 10 percent of farms currently receive 77 percent of all subsidies. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

This is what “is not acceptable to me.” This is why Sanders is running for President, but this is also his means of delineating the unmet needs of those, such as those in his audience, whose livelihoods need protecting from Big Agra. He ends this section of his speech by saying, “The time is long overdue for the U.S. government to stand with rural America, and that is exactly what I do.” Sanders again references his own personal behaviour, he “stand[s] with rural America.” In standing, he does not

166 

M. Macaulay

‘stand for’ rural America, but ‘stands with’ this people of the heartland. He represents himself as joined together with this ‘people’ in opposition to a new corporate body that threatens the continuing existence of “rural America.” What Sanders foregrounds is his ordinariness rather than any form of extraordinariness. He is of the people, and his articulation of unmet needs effects their creation. Sanders ends his speech with his typical use of repetition, “When we are in the White House.” He then sets out a series of commissives for a new future for the audience he addresses: We will enact a federal jobs guarantee … end the decline of rural America … attack the problem of urban gentrification and build affordable housing … move aggressively to end the epidemic of gun violence … address the disparities of wealth and income … end voter suppression … protect a woman’s right to control her own body. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, March 7, 2019)

In bringing these ends about, Sanders speaks of a struggle not simply to remove Donald Trump as a president, but much more significantly to remove “the incredibly powerful institutions that control the economic and political life of this country.” Trump is represented or positioned as a symptom of the power exerted by these institutions. Sanders explicitly counterbalances the power of these institutions with “something they don’t have: the power of the people.” It is this power that Sanders articulates in his delineation of unmet needs which in turn bring this people into being. Further he addresses what Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) term, “the will of the people.” But rather than “will,” Sanders uses the term ‘power.’ He deliberately counterbalances one kind of power with another and so gives agency or subjecthood to his audience. They not only have a will, but also they have a means. He ends finally by stating, “If we stand together, this country has an extraordinary future. Let’s make it happen.” Sanders ends with inclusiveness, just as he began with inclusiveness. His last directive references both his audience in Council Bluffs and himself (Fig. 5.4).

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

167

Sender Bernie Sanders →→→→→→ axis of knowledge

Object Receiver Justice American people ↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire axis of Power ↑ Helper →→→→→ Subject ←←←← Opponent Power of the people/ Brothers and Sisters Greed “the strongest grassroots coalition.” Fig. 5.4  Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech

Conclusion If we compare Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, the terms “right populism” and “left populism” pose problems. Sanders in his 2019 Iowa speech refers to Trump as “the most dangerous president in modern American history.” Yet if we look at Trump’s Wilmington Ohio Speech on September 1, 2016 in comparison with that of Bernie Sanders in Council Bluffs, Iowa in 2019, these speeches share many expressions of what Laclau (2007) refers to as “unmet needs.” Although Trump does not articulate it as such, his focus is on neo-liberal economic policies that have outsourced good jobs for the working class. Trump concentrates on “trade deals” and specifically NAFTA. As he points out, “Ohio has lost nearly one in three manufacturing jobs since NAFTA and nearly one in four manufacturing jobs since China entered the World Trade Organization.” Trump also attacks Wall Street and hedge funds correlating these with Hillary Clinton as principal exemplifications of the ‘elite.’ He positions himself as the “voice” of the people, who he represents as “forgotten.” Despite being a real estate developer, he voices the unmet needs for the working class and so integrates himself within this class. Bernie Sanders’ focus in his Council Bluffs 2019 Iowa Speech is on justice, but especially “economic justice” which he contrasts with “greed.” While Trump wants to bring back good manufacturing jobs and thus “Make America Great Again,” Sanders addresses corporate greed in the agricultural sector. What he describes is almost a return to feudalism where big agricultural corporations force “family farmers” to buy their

168 

M. Macaulay

seed and livestock and in turn control pricing for their agricultural product. Sanders is concerned with weak anti-trust laws that have taken control over farming and farming communities if not removing them entirely from their farms. In their respective speeches, both Sanders and Trump focus on an existential crisis for the working class. For Trump poor trade deals have removed jobs for this class, while for Sanders corporate greed has threatened the livelihoods of those in rural America. In both instances, America is under threat. Both identify Wall Street as part of this problem, and both identify Obamacare as needing replacement with a better programme. Sanders defines healthcare as “a human right.” He thus incorporates healthcare, along with a woman’s right to control her own body, into the sphere of basic human rights for all American citizens. The most salient difference between Trump and Sanders regarding these two speeches is in their response to immigration. Trump represents immigrants as potential threats to American society and jobs, while Sanders includes immigrants in his overall concern for the welfare of all Americans regardless of their race, religion, gender, or origin. His theme is consistently one of inclusiveness, whereas Trump constructs an ‘other’ outside the country’s borders or overseas. The high degree of overlap in the representation of unmet needs and social demands between Trump in 2016 and Sanders in 2019 explains why many Sanders’ supporters in the Democratic Party chose Trump over Hillary Clinton who was widely seen as a figurehead of the Wall Street elite. Whether Sanders would have won in 2016 had he won the Democratic nomination is an interesting question. Both he and Trump appealed to a forgotten or marginalized working class. If we compare Trump and Sanders with regard to Trump’s two later speeches in 2017 and in 2021 and Sanders’ speech in 2019 there is marked difference. Sanders is an excellent rhetorician. His use of repetition to bring home a point and as a mnemonic device as in “justice, economic justice, social justice, environmental justice” is very effective. He has complete command over anaphora and repetition. Trump, however, relies primarily on narrative. He engages his audiences both in situ and on television with the stories he tells. The story he tells in 2017 only six months after his own election is of a nation under threat. He invokes

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

169

the trope of the American frontier where there is a clash of civilizations or where the barbarians are at the gate. He constructs a scenario where he acts as a liberator of American cities under threat from alien enemies who bring terror to its streets: “We are liberating—people screaming from their windows, thank you, thank you to the border patrol and to General Kelly’s great people that come in and grab the thugs and throw them the hell out.” He depicts an America under siege from “illegal gang members, drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals and killers.” His focus is less on bad trade deals, outsourced jobs and overpriced healthcare insurance, but on a combined enemy, the collection of “illegal aliens,” and those within the United States that aid and abet them through Sanctuary Cities. The new sheriff in town whom Trump has appointed is there to keep civilized Americans safe. Although Trump identifies a very particular American narrative, that of the Wild West, his construction of the ‘other’ as a violent animal is entirely in keeping with the politics of fear seen in right-­ wing populism throughout the world. Brexit originates out of fear of immigration. Equally in Australia the right-wing populist party of One Nation led by Pauline Hanson advocated for a halt on immigration into Australia so that Australians could have Australia for themselves. And the same sensibility is seen in France with Marine Le Pen explaining in one interview with Stephen Sackur that Muslim women are terrorists because they wear burkinis rather than bikinis when they go swimming.9 Right-­ wing populism throughout the world is characterized by an extreme fear of the ‘other.’ Trump participates in this politics, but he Americanizes it through his representation of General Kelly as the new sheriff in town. He thus localizes this threat and personalizes it through his narrative of a beautiful young woman being “sliced” and “diced.” The image is graphic and quite literally frightening. It could happen to anyone’s daughter or child. Within an approximately six-month period Trump rejects a largely left-wing populism for that of neo-populism or extreme right-wing populism. Importantly he also locates an enemy within. His concern is not to make America great again but to make America safe again. It is an overt appeal to fear. In this respect he does create a crisis and exploits it to show  Interview with Marine Le Pen by Stephan Sackur, HARDtalk, October 10, 2016.

9

170 

M. Macaulay

his extraordinariness and strength as Moffitt (2016) argues. Trump is no longer wanting to be the voice of the people; he is wanting to be its super-­ sheriff and so perform his own strength and importance. That he also contemplates being on Mount Rushmore in this speech is consistent with his desire for importance. What this speech shows is a high degree of insecurity on Trump’s part in the role of President. It is an expansive act of positioning, where an insecure Trump concerned to hold onto his base positions himself not as weak but as strong. For this to work, his supporters must accept his up-dated version of the Wild West. Trump’s narrative skill is also seen in his last major speech given on January 6, 2021 that inspired an attack on the Capitol itself. Here the story he tells is that of loss, but not the loss of the election for President, but rather the loss of democracy. He clearly builds on the civilized/uncivilized dichotomy he creates in 2017 where the enemy resides not just without but also within. He expands this notion of the enemy within from Sanctuary Cities to the Democratic Party itself and potentially “weak Republicans.” The story Trump tells is of an election stolen by the Democratic Party. The theme of numbers dominates. Trump is concerned about the numbers who have come to his rally on the Ellipse as he is concerned about the numbers who voted in the 2020 election. He gained 12 million more votes in the 2020 election from that in 2016. He then poses the key question in this speech: “And by the way, does anybody believe that Joe had 80 million votes? Does anybody believe that? He had 80 million computer votes.” We could view this as a simple rhetorical question. But the purpose of this question is provocative. It rests on the notion of belief. What do we believe? What can we believe? What are our belief systems? Ostensibly Trump goes on to construct a logical argument based on factual evidence. He queries voter registration numbers, false signatures, improper distribution of mail-in ballots and even outright theft of outdoor ballot boxes. He constructs a narrative where the Democrats have rigged the system. The Democrats are thus constructed as an enemy rather than a political party. This is not new. Trump does much the same with the free press, representing it as “fake news” and “the enemy of the people.” The metaphor he invokes goes beyond that of the Wild West and becomes that of a war with a clearly defined enemy, the Democratic Party itself. Thus, who could believe that Joe Biden won? No

5  Modern American Populism: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders 

171

right-minded American. Trump represents Biden as an “illegitimate President,” and thus implicates that he is the legitimate President. But what is really at stake is a war on democracy itself. Democracy becomes an empty signifier for Trump’s resurrection as President. This is his goal, and he uses his narrative skill not to position himself as a subject/hero but to position his audience as an active force to take back democracy by “walking peacefully to the Capitol.” Trump does in fact tell his followers, those 250,000 at his rally to “walk[] peacefully,” but he also tells them to “fight like hell.” The dominant metaphor within this speech is that of war, and the dominant message is that democracy is lost without a war. For the Americans in his physical audience and that via television, Trump engenders the ultimate fear of the enemy within and the incipient loss of democracy itself. In the insurrection that ensued on January 6, 2021, what was noticeable was the omni-presence of the American flag. Those attacking the Capitol Buildings believed the narrative Donald Trump told them. They believed they were saving democracy. Donald Trump, unlike Bernie Sanders, shifts from a message of unmet economic needs and social demands to a message of safety as an unmet need and social demand, but not only from an enemy without, an ‘other,’ but also from an enemy within, ‘another.’ He shifts from attacking an economic elite embodied by Hillary Clinton, to a fear-based attack on other Americans who threaten the heartland or who threaten democracy itself. This shift to a politics of fear dominates Trump’s presidency. Were it not for Trump’s inability to deal with the Covid pandemic, he would most likely have won the 2020 election for President of the United States of America. His real legacy is a country where 18 states have passed legislation that would prohibit ease of voting and voter registration, particularly that of mail-in voting (Reid Wilson, One-third of states have passed restrictive voting laws this year, The Hill, July 27, 2021). These are the votes in Trump’s January speech that suddenly “appeared.” We can ask whether democracy in the U.S. is saved or served by such legislation and by such a legacy.

6 Ford Nation

Introduction The Ford brothers, Rob and Doug Ford, became a major political force first in the city of Toronto and then in the province of Ontario, Canada. In 2010 Rob Ford was elected mayor of Toronto running on a platform of fiscal conservatism and expansion of the existing subway system. He campaigned on the slogans “Stop the Gravy Train” and “Subways, Subways, Subways.” Rob Ford and his brother Doug Ford, who took over Rob Ford’s previous councillor position in the city, presided over a raucous four years of political governorship of the city. Rob Ford gained international notoriety and even made an appearance on the American Late Night Jimmy Kimmel Show because of this. His behaviour was increasingly erratic with evidence of both alcohol and drug abuse. His brother Doug was a stabilizing influence during this period. When Rob Ford was diagnosed with cancer in 2014, the brothers decided to switch roles with Doug Ford running for mayor and Rob returning to his original position as councillor for the City of Toronto constituency of Ward 2 North Etobicoke. Rob Ford was successful in returning to his role as councillor, but he passed away on March 22, 2016. His brother Doug was not successful in running for mayor in 2014; however, he later

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_6

173

174 

M. Macaulay

emerged as a candidate for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario and led this party to victory in 2018. In the Ontario Legislature, he represents the riding of Etobicoke North and, as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, is also the Premier of Ontario. ‘Ford Nation’ came into being largely through the direct advocacy of Rob Ford in his own riding of Ward 2 North Etobicoke. This ‘nation’ originated in the City of Toronto ward of Etobicoke largely because of Rob Ford’s highly responsive engagement with his constituents. He would famously respond to any complaint within hours of being called by a constituent. He created very strong personal relationships within this community. Every summer the Ford family would host a barbecue where residents of Etobicoke were welcome to come, eat the food and enjoy their own as well as the company of the extended Ford family. In this way, Rob Ford built a political base that elected him repeatedly as councillor for Ward 2, North Etobicoke from 2000 to 2010. This allowed him to springboard into the mayorship with his brother Doug in turn becoming the Councillor for Ward 2 North Etobicoke. However, having Ford Nation alone does not fully explain how first Rob Ford became mayor of the amalgamated city of Toronto and his brother Doug Ford later became Premier of Ontario. How did two politicians from the suburbs of Toronto become respectively Mayor of Toronto and then Premier of the province? How did Ford Nation become something other than the ardent expression of constituents from one ward in the greater city of Toronto?

Transportation: Subways, Subways, Subways Rob Ford had two rallying cries in his 2010 election, “Stop the Gravy Train,” and “Subways, Subways, Subways.” These were very simple clear messages. What were they about? For approximately 10 years in the amalgamated City of Toronto there has been intense discussion of transit as an issue. Amalgamated Toronto had at the time a population of 2,791,140. It is considered the fourth largest metropolis in North America. Prior to amalgamation, ‘Old Toronto’ participated in a loose confederation of neighbouring municipalities termed Metropolitan Toronto. All

6  Ford Nation 

175

municipalities had their own city councils and addressed their own specific interests. However, they shared common concerns such as water and sewage, policing, and public transit. In 1998 Premier Mike Harris, over the objections of the metropolitan populace, dissolved this existing confederation and imposed amalgamation onto several of these municipalities with ‘Old Toronto.’ In this way, concerns such as policing, water and sewage as well as public transit became not shared but integrated for the new amalgamated city. However, this also created problems of regional differentiation within this new city. Different areas of the city viewed public transportation and public transit from very different perspectives giving rise to equally different agendas and ideologies about transportation. Rob Ford rose to prominence by championing the concerns and values of the outer or non-‘downtown’ wards of the new amalgamated Toronto. He championed the car and ‘car culture,’ and he championed the building of subways over LRT’s or Light Rapid Transit. Cars were seen as an expression of individual freedom as well as providing ease of transportation. Ford himself drove a Cadillac Escalade. In keeping with a ‘car culture,’ Ford campaigned on building subways rather than Light Rapid Transit to ease problems of public transit throughout the new amalgamated city. Light Rapid Transit is above ground and is seen as being competitive with cars for road space along with bicycles. Subways are below ground and so do not compete for road space. A division between suburbanites and downtowners can be plainly seen in the comments of Don Cherry, a Canadian hockey icon, who appeared weekly on Coaches Corner as part of the televised broadcast of Hockey Night in Canada. Cherry was tasked with putting the chain of office around Rob Ford’s neck after Ford won the election for Mayor of Greater Toronto. He made the now famous comment: “I’m wearing pink for all the pinkos out there that ride bicycles and everything…I say he’s going to be the greatest major this city has ever, ever seen, as far as I’m concerned—and put that in your pipe, you left-wing pinkos” (quoted by Doolittle, 2014, p. 110). By referencing the pinkos that ride bicycles, Cherry was articulating the divide between the so-called ‘progressives’ in Old Toronto or Downtown Toronto and those like himself living in the outer or suburban areas of the city that viewed bicycle riding as effete. Cherry also famously referred to this group as “latte-drinkers.” These were the upper-middle class who

176 

M. Macaulay

lived downtown and could afford 5-dollar lattes. Ford Nation, conversely, was working class. For this group the car was the preferred means of transportation within the amalgamated city. Subways were valued because they did not impede car travel. They also offered shelter from cold weather. This geographical divide corresponded with an economic divide, especially in suburbs such as Etobicoke and Scarborough. They had no time to ride bicycles, relax on patios and drink expensive designer coffees. These were hard-working people. Rob Ford tapped into this constituency by addressing a major unmet need: transportation. The existing subway system in Old Toronto is extremely efficient. There is an East-West line and a North-South line. These have recently been extended. But although the East-West line extends to Etobicoke at one end and to Scarborough on the other, this line does not extend fully into these two suburban areas. During Ford’s tenure as mayor, he completely reversed an existing plan for transit expansion into Scarborough. Indeed, this is what he campaigned on and what in large part won him his election. Rob Ford’s campaign in 2010 was about ‘the little guy.’ Quite ironically both Rob Ford and his brother Doug were millionaires, co-owners in Decca Labels, a company founded by their father. However, to campaign on the one hand for ‘the little guy’ and to campaign on the other for expensive subways over less expensive LRT’s, both Rob and Doug Ford constructed and positioned themselves as men of the people. Often highly criticized in the national newspaper, The Globe and Mail,1 and in the local newspaper The Toronto Star as well as on television news media, the Ford brothers decided that to maintain and extend their base they needed to create their own news outlet that they referred to as Ford Nation on YouTube. Ford Nation allowed them to interview themselves as well as callers who could call in to this YouTube interview show.

 Ford was famous for “the Big Freeze”; that is, freezing out reporters from The Globe and Mail (Doolittle, 2014, p. 104). 1

6  Ford Nation 

177

FordNation Conflict over Light Rapid Transit and Subways became particularly heated when Ford, after being elected, cancelled millions of dollars in provincial commitments to Light Rapid Transit and brought the issue of subways back to Toronto City Council. These commitments would have extended rapid transit to a part of the city known as Scarborough. The Light Rapid Transit proposal cancelled by Ford was cheaper than that for subways and also permitted more actual stops. Since Ford’s election in 2010, transit in Toronto had become a very controversial topic. Those in Old or Downtown Toronto wanted Light Rapid Transit for Scarborough with further funding to relieve major transit congestion in the downtown core. Those in Scarborough wanted subways, despite the cost. This created a major ‘urban/suburban’ conflict within the amalgamated city as well as a very significant politics surrounding public transit. By 2013 Rob Ford had become an international celebrity for his frequent problems with drugs and alcohol. He was exposed by the journalist Robyn Doolittle for being photographed with two crack dealers outside a known crack house in the suburb of Etobicoke. More significantly a video became available of Rob Ford smoking crack cocaine.2 City Council also became raucous and in one case an older female Councillor Pam McConnell was knocked down in a brouhaha by Ford’s elder brother Doug Ford (Doolittle, 2014, p. 302). Rob Ford’s powers as major were reassigned by Council to the Deputy Major Doug Holyday. Ford was limited to largely ceremonial duties. Such “bad manners,” to use Moffitt’s (2016) terms, would derail most politicians. Both Fords were unrepentant. Getting very bad press, they decided to create their own YouTube programme entitled FordNation (2014). This composed 9 video segments. To resurrect their political careers, the brothers recreated a talk show format. FordNation exemplifies the “resentment” of suburban voters within the amalgamated City of Toronto. All segments were shot prior to the release of a video showing Rob Ford smoking crack cocaine in his sister’s basement and a second audio recording of Ford verbally abusing city and provincial politicians. Shortly after the release of the video and audio  Robyn Doolittle. 2014. Crazy Town, Penguin Group, pp. 80–81.

2

178 

M. Macaulay

recording, Ford sought professional help at a recovery centre in Bala, Ontario. Ford’s intention was to get treatment and return to his campaign for re-election. However, he was diagnosed with abdominal cancer in September 2014 and had to abandon his campaign. His brother Doug ran in his stead and lost. It is not clear that had Rob Ford been able to continue his run for re-election, despite the chaos of his personal life and the circus created at city hall, he would not have won and become mayor for a second term. The 9 videos I examine form part of Ford’s political strategy in running for re-election in 2014 prior to his substance abuse treatment and his treatment for cancer. We see in this talk show the construction of what Moffitt (2016) refers to as ‘ordinariness’ in a populist leader. In populist movements, the leader needs to reflect the people he or she wishes to serve. The ‘people’ need to see a mirror image of themselves. The construction of a mirror image is Rob Ford’s principal achievement as a politician. One of the simplest means of such representation is through the ubiquitous appellation folks addressed to the YouTube audience. While other politicians often call their audience friends, the Ford brothers almost always use the term folks. The term folks is an informal address form. Its Old English origin is folc meaning ‘common people.’ By using this term, the Fords mark themselves as members of the ‘folk’ or common people rather than the middle-class or upper middle-class. The term is clearly a solidarity marker, but also one that conveys equivalence of status between the speaker and the hearer. The term also clearly indicates the Ford’s construction of their own audience. The use of YouTube as a means of conveying their message is also egalitarian. Anyone with a computer can set up a YouTube account and run his or her own programme videos. The Fords, however, taped their segments on a set that replicates that of their former radio show (The City, Newstalk 1010). They also appropriate other features of institutional discourse3 by using a programme brand or logo, FordNation, before each segment. Within several of the segments they also attempt to replicate television or radio interviews by asking each other set questions. However, they employ the most characteristic feature  See Cornelia Ilie, 2001, Semi-institutional discourse: The case of talk shows. Journal of Pragmatics 33 (2), 209–254. 3

6  Ford Nation 

179

of YouTube discourse by directly facing and addressing their audience. Further, in keeping with their former radio show, they read and respond to questions sent to them by their audience. On the surface we have an interactional or ‘cool’ medium which reinforces the idea of equality between speakers and hearers, and which supports inclusion in the discourse by folks or audience members. The Ford brothers use of YouTube is largely equivalent to William Aberhart’s use of radio, which, although a hot medium, also allowed his audience to call in to his Sunday programme. Equally, it is a means of creating community or a congregation. Folks is the binding term used by the Ford brothers. The 9 videos run between 2 and 4 minutes in length. The total number of speech acts in all is 646. I have not differentiated between the brothers but counted their speech acts together. Of the 646, 510 or 79% are assertives; 69 or 11% are directives; 41 or 6% are commissives; 25 or 4% are expressives. The Fords’ discourse is overwhelmingly characterised by the use of assertives, which they use approximately 80% of the time. This is not inconsistent with the Fords’ own explicit assertion of their purpose in these videos: Doug Ford: Well the reason we’re doing this folks is for the YouTube. We have a biased media. We’ve talked to media all over the world and they’ve never seen such a biased media against the Mayor against myself against our family anywhere in the world. And they tell me it is unprecedented. But the difference is, folks, the people out there are smarter than the media. The media will try to twist it angle it every which way they can to make sure they put their little spin on it. Media, but guess what the people are too smart; they see right through all your shenanigans and we we’re straight shooters and we’re going to tell you the way it is. (Part 2, Episode 1, FordNation Begins, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK 1Zg&t=0m58s)

The last utterance in this statement of political purpose is a commissive, but the propositional content of this commissive is an assertive speech act: “to tell you the way it is.” According to Watson (2004, p. 68), what is asserted in an assertion is not the truth or accuracy of a proposition, but its defensibility. In Searlian (1969) terms, for an assertive speech

180 

M. Macaulay

act to be fully composed it must include an essential condition such that the speaker has reasons for the proposition he or she asserts. For Watson, “A consequence of this is that the speaker is obligated to defend the assertion if challenged” (2004, p. 70). In the utterance above, the one ‘reason’ Doug Ford gives for believability is provided through another assertion: “we have a biased media…The media will try to twist it angle it every which way they can to make sure they put their little spin on it.” In contrast, Doug Ford asserts that he and his brother, Rob Ford, are “straightshooters.” A straightshooter was someone who shot you in the front rather than the back; as a result, the term became synonymous with ‘honesty.’ The ‘reasons’ Doug provides for believability and defensibility are that the media covering them are ‘biased’ in favour of an establishment and that he and his brother are intrinsically sincere and ‘honest’ speakers. This assertive stance on the part of the Ford brothers, which we can term ‘quasi-assertion,’ allows the brothers to construct a counter-reality in which they are anti-establishment heroes, and also where the narrative of the little guy versus the big (David versus Goliath) can be provided. A further quasi-assertion is “guess what the people are too smart; they see right through all your shenanigans and we we’re straight shooters and we’re going to tell you the way it is.” This utterance is interesting because Doug Ford speaks through the camera directly to the media itself, “your [my emphasis] shenanigans.” He personally calls out the media for their “shenanigans,” implicating that the media engages in foolish unserious behaviour. Moreover, “the people are too smart.” While using the medium of YouTube to connect with his audience, “folks,” he simultaneously diminishes the importance of media while enhancing that of “the people” for whom the Fords are “going to tell it the way it is.” The Fords then seek to replace the media with their own truth-telling for a ‘people’ who they construct as smart-enough to see through the media’s lies. Donald Trump employs very much the same argument in terms of the media, in that it is “fake news,” but he does not position his audience as “smart,” able to differentiate between truth and falsity. The mirror image for the Fords is far too important. Rob Ford’s principal quasi-assertion is that he is an Everyman:

6  Ford Nation 

181

Number one, folks, I am not an international celebrity. I am an average hard-working guy that goes to work every day and comes home to their family takes my kids out supports my wife and family and does whatever I can. That’s what normal fathers do. And that’s what I do as a father and I spend time with my family and try to do as many events as possible. (Episode 6, Ready for Late Night?, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56 QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s)

Ford represents himself as “an average hard-working guy.” Ford embodies ‘ordinariness.’ He describes himself very much like a factory worker or an office worker who has a nine to five job. More significantly he describes himself as a family man, who plays with his kids after work and supports his wife. As he says, “That’s what normal fathers do.” Ford positions himself not only as a family man with a wife and kids, but also as a “normal” father. He represents himself and his family as if within a 1950’s poster. He is utterly conventional. He is no different from anyone watching the YouTube video, despite the fact that he and his brother are ‘stars’ of their own show that is constructed entirely in keeping with a standard television interview programme with a desk, a logo and tables and chairs. The believability of his utterance is also belied by the fact Rob Ford and his brother Doug are both millionaire businessmen who, like Donald Trump, grew up with wealth. The police were also called in more than once to deal with violence in Rob Ford’s home; he also had a long history of substance abuse. His attendance record at work was poor; as a mayor he provided no daily schedule of events. Nonetheless, Ford presents himself as a ‘regular’ guy, a “normal” family man to hold up the mirror to himself and see FordNation reflected back. Rob Ford also presents himself in a somewhat different guise, that of a ‘saviour.’ This is a quasi-assertion of not ‘ordinariness’ but its opposite ‘extraordinariness’: You know what, folks, just come with me to any Toronto housing project. Let’s go to Malvern, let’s go to Jamestown, to Finch. Let’s go to some of the toughest areas in the city and see what Rob Ford has done. I have cleaned up Toronto Community housing. They’ve got my number. I go right in there. I don’t let them live with holes in their walls anymore. No windows

182 

M. Macaulay

or cockroaches or mice running around. Absolutely not. I stick up for the poor people of this city. And these people do not deserve to live how they are living. And I’m the one who’s clearing it up. Go talk to the people at Community Housing (Episode 5, Looking out for Everyone, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s)

Ford combines a role of saviour with that of an unmet need. Very much as Trump asserts in his Announcement Speech, “We need a leader that wrote The Art of the Deal,” Ford presents himself as the saviour of the downtrodden. The Finch area of north Toronto that Ford references is notorious for its problems with drugs and gangs. Ford describes Toronto Community Housing as unlivable: “I don’t let them live with holes in their walls anymore. No windows or cockroaches or mice running around.” Ford positions himself very much as a social worker whose job is to help those in need. He states emphatically, “I stick up for the poor people of this city.” As a Robin Hood he acts on their behalf, “And I’m the one who’s clearing it up.” More importantly, Ford employs an assertive that implicates his own empathy, “And these people do not deserve to live how they are living.” He does not assert a standard conservative line, that the poor deserve to be poor because they are lazy or stupid. He employs the deictic these to refer to the poor, but he positions them as undeserving of living in unlivable conditions. William Aberhart in Alberta in the 1930’s shows this same degree of empathy for those living in diminished circumstances. While this does not promote a mirror image, it does promote an image of compassion. We do not see such compassion shown to Ford’s fellow councillors at City Hall. In his positioning of these councillors, we have classic exemplification of ‘the elite’ versus ‘the people.’ We also get a clear delineation of the major unmet need on the part of ‘the people,’ “the gravy train.” Let me tell you what councillors get for free which I have never taken as a councillor. I’ve been down there 14 years. Every councillor gets a free zoo pass. Parking at the zoo—free admission. The average person has to pay 23 dollars. Free rides and not just for them for the whole family. And that’s just the zoo. They get a free metro pass. That’s equivalent to about 1500 dollars a year. A free metro pass when the average hard-working person has

6  Ford Nation 

183

to pay for their metro pass. These councillors get them for free…I tried to eliminate it. They said ‘no.’ (Episode 3, Let them Eat Cake, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s)

During Ford’s time as Major of Toronto he changed many things. He removed the land transfer tax brought in by his predecessor, David Miller, made the Toronto Transit Commission an essential service and privatised waste removal in the eastern part of the city. He also hired a private firm at the cost of three million dollars to search for efficiencies in the city budget (Doolittle, 2014, p. 125). Apart from positioning himself as one of ‘the people’ or ‘folk,’ or a social worker/Robin Hood, Ford also positioned himself as a conservative penny-pincher. He won his mayorship only two years after the major economic recession of 2008. This recession hurt Canada less so than it did the United States and the rest of the world, largely because Canada has a stable and independent banking system. Nonetheless there were significant impacts on people’s lives in terms of their job security. Canada had to climb out of this recession as other countries had to. Ford’s message of “Stop the Gravy Train” resonated for the middle and lower middle-class, many of whom lost their jobs or had their pensions reduced. Ford in particular attacked waste at City Hall and especially amongst those of his fellow councillors. Ford in this utterance cleverly pits the councillors at City Hall against “the average person.” Councillors, unlike the average person, get free zoo passes, free parking at the zoo, free rides for the whole family, free metro passes. Ford employs free to indicate that his fellow councillors at City Hall do not pay out of pocket for these privileges. They can take themselves and their entire family to the zoo for free because they are councillors. More importantly they get free metro passes that Ford estimates costs the taxpayer $1500 at year. Ford represents the concerns of ‘the little-guy’ who does have to pay out of pocket for such expenses. Such councillors are therefore a type of ‘elite’ who in effect rob their own constituents. Ford constructs the unmet needs of those who have to live on a fixed budget assigned to rent/mortgage, food, clothing, transportation to and from work, and family outings. Money in Ford’s representation is not abstract, but very concrete: “The average person has to pay 23 dollars”; “A free metro pass when the average hard-working person has to pay for their metro pass.” He employs

184 

M. Macaulay

the language of “The average person,” and expands on this as “the average hard-working person.” The conflict is between those who work hard for their money and those who get things free because of a given position. Ford the Scottish penny-pincher aligns with Ford the Robin Hood/Social Worker and Ford the man of ‘the people’ or folk. Ford provides a complete and coherent persona for his YouTube audience. YouTube permits semi-institutional discourse which for the most part is monologic. It is not ‘cool’ but ‘hot.’ In this medium the Fords employ quasi-assertions extensively to facilitate their own David and Goliath narrative where they are the heroes and Toronto city councillors are villains. The very high percentage, 79%, of such assertions in their discourse also contributes to defensibility in Watson’s (2004) terms—that what they say can be defended and is therefore true. Rather than the sheer repetition of an assertion to implicate its truthfulness, the fact that the Fords employ assertive speech acts almost exclusively in FordNation implicates defensibility—that what they say is impregnable and cannot be challenged. There is, therefore, no need for defense. Through quasi-assertion, combined discoursally into narrative, the Fords are able to construct or position themselves as members of the ‘folk,’ and importantly as defenders of the ‘folk.’ It is they and not established politicians who understand the unmet needs of ‘the people’ and can rearticulate these into social demands, the two principal demands being ‘Subways, subways, subways,” and “Stop the Gravy Train.” The latter functions in Laclauan (2007) terms as an empty signifier. The ‘gravy train’ is certainly not rides at the Toronto Zoo or metro passes; it is a means of representing dissatisfaction with ruling elites as well as resentment of those elites. Therefore, in voting for Rob or Doug Ford, the ‘folk’ are able to vote for a mirror image of themselves.

New Subway Proposal Announcement We can see how this mirror-image representation plays out if we compare Ford’s announcement of the new subway proposal of a Scarborough Line with that of another politician, the Provincial Minister for Transportation Glen Murray. On September 23, 2013 both made combined

6  Ford Nation 

185

announcements regarding funding and a different route for the controversial Scarborough subway that Ford had managed to get approved by the Toronto City Council. Murray spoke first after which came an announcement from the Federal Finance Minister, Jim Flaherty. Flaherty did not announce a new route for a subway extension, but he did provide federal funding of $660 million towards costs for the overall project.4 Once the Provincial and Federal Ministers spoke, Rob Ford as Major of Toronto was also accorded time for his announcement. These announcements were not neutral complementary statements of commitment on the part of these respective politicians. The provincial liberals were facing a by-election in the provincial riding of Scarborough and wanted to use support for subways to get votes. The federal conservatives wanted to support their own counterparts in the provincial riding and also, more importantly, to support the current mayor in his eventual bid for re-­ election the following year. All the announcements from the three levels of government exploit commissives heavily. This is not surprising since commissives as a speech act articulate the speaker’s commitment to a future action which will benefit the hearer. After Searle (1969, 1991), commissives as a speech act compose a preparatory condition, a propositional content condition, a sincerity condition and an essential condition. Indirect commissives can be effected through invocation of any one of these conditions. A speaker can invoke the propositional content condition for commissives through reference to a future act on their part: I shall come at five. The preparatory condition can be invoked in one of two ways: by referencing the speaker’s ability to perform an action that they would not do in the normal course of events: I can work after five; or by referencing the interlocutor’s wish or desire that the action be done: Would you like me to work after five? A speaker can invoke the sincerity condition through reference of their intention to perform an action: I plan to work after five. The essential condition can be invoked by reference to reasons or results: It would be best if I came after five. The Speech Act profiles of the politicians are as follows (Table 6.1):  See Toronto subway extension to get $660M from Ottawa, CBCNews, September 23, 2013.

4

186 

M. Macaulay

Table 6.1  Speech Acts in Subway Announcements by Murray, Flaherty and Ford Murray: 24 Speech Acts  Indirect Commissives: 24  Invocation of Propositional Content Condition: 3  Invocation of Preparatory Condition: 11  Invocation of Sincerity Condition: 6  Invocation of Essential Condition: 4 Flaherty: 11 Speech Acts Expressives: 3 Commissives: Direct: 2  Indirect: 5  Invocation of Propositional Content: 1  Invocation of Preparatory Condition: 2  Invocation of Sincerity Condition: 2 Directives: 1 Ford: 27 Speech Acts Assertives: 3 Indirect Commissives: 20  Invocation of Propositional Content Condition: 4  Invocation of Preparatory Condition: 7  Invocation of Sincerity Condition: 7  Invocation of Essential Condition: 6 Expressives: 4

Both Murray and Ford employ roughly the same number of speech acts. Murray employs 24, composed entirely of indirect commissives. Ford employs 27, composed of assertives, indirect commissives, and expressives. What most differentiates Murry and Ford is their use of indirect commissives invoking both the preparatory condition and the sincerity condition. Murray invokes the preparatory condition most frequently in his own discourse and more often than does Ford. Virtually all of his indirect commissives invoking the preparatory condition articulate the provincial government’s ability to build a subway with a new route: So we started discussions with Metrolinx. We made presentations last week to Joe Penachetti and Andy Byford of the TTC and said ‘How do we actually get this going? How do we get this going quickly?’...So 1.4 billion dollars…With all these investments we’ll also be looking at optimizing the stops with connectivity but with 1.4 billion we can get to the Scarborough town centre…So if we change the alignment as you can see here we not

6  Ford Nation 

187

only do we get a curve radius well within the standards of the TTC, we can build our new subway station while we still have the other station operating reducing friction and saving money. (Subway Announcement, September 23, 2013)

To complement his use of the preparatory condition referencing ability to “get this going quickly,” he also invokes the sincerity condition. However, he does this by attacking the sincerity of the federal and city governments: So yesterday I spoke with Lisa Raitt again and the perfect hat trick she cancelled the meeting at the last minute. So from the federal government we haven’t had a cheque we haven’t got a commitment we got a busy signal…I think it’s very clear that the federal government is again not being a partner in rapid transit. (Subway Announcement, September 23, 2013)

He further expands this negative evaluation of others’ sincerity into an overarching generalization: “We don’t have a track record of the federal government being a significant partner in any of our major projects.” Through negative evaluation, “We got a busy signal,” Murray positions the provincial government as the only player that is sincere about building a subway. Through indirect commissives referencing funding and thus the provincial government’s financial ability to build subways as well as its ability get talks started and work out a new route, Murray constructs the provincial government as a powerful agent. In his announcement, Flaherty employs an expressive with an embedded indirect commissive: “The government of Prime Minister Harper is pleased to announce that it will support subway expansion here in Toronto.” He further employs a direct commissive that references a corresponding directive from Mayor Rob Ford: “We are committing to the Mayor’s request … $660 million for the subway expansion in Scarborough.” Although this last utterance is a direct commissive, it presupposes one type of preparatory condition for commissives: an action wanted (and indeed requested) by the interlocutor, in this case Rob Ford.

188 

M. Macaulay

Ford in his follow up announcement to Flaherty’s also privileges invocation of this particular type of preparatory condition. Ford employs seven indirect commissives invoking the preparatory condition. I said we would need the Federal government at the table to build the Scarborough subway. Folks, today we have that commitment. I also want to thank the many thousands and thousands of residents in the city of Toronto who have spoken loud and clear on this subject. They have said from day one ‘We want subways, subways and more subways.’ Even when it looked like Scarborough would be stuck with LRT’s they told me ‘Rob, keep fighting. Do not give up. We do not want LRT’s. We want subways. And if we are gunna get LRT’s we don’t wanem.’ (Subway Announcement, September 23, 2013)

Rob Ford first asserts that all levels of government need to be involved in the decision to build a subway to Scarborough. He implicates an indirect commissive invoking the preparatory condition, in this case an assertion of what was needed to get subways built. He then asserts that this requirement to get the job done has been achieved: “we have that commitment.” Ford’s first achievement has been to bring all parties together to realise the goal of building subways. However, after making these two positive assertions, Ford shifts to an expressive thanking “the many thousands and thousands of residents in the city of Toronto who have spoken loud and clear on this subject.” This expressive shifts in turn to an indirect directive from these thousands and thousands of residents to himself: “They have said from day one ‘We want subways, subways and more subways.’” Ford incorporates these residents into his Subway Announcement as speakers, thus giving them agency: “So folks I did exactly what the taxpayers asked [my emphasis] me to do. And that’s fight, fight, and don’t give up.” Ford employs the speech act verb, ask, in this utterance as a direct directive. He has done what his constituents have asked him to do and thus in turn he has kept a promise on his part: “Cause I promised when I was elected mayor to build subways. And folks that’s another promise made and another promise kept.” He also represents this achievement as part of a process he has been engaged in as a ‘fight’ or struggle at the behest of his constituents: “Even when it looked like Scarborough

6  Ford Nation 

189

would be stuck with LRT’s they told me “Rob, keep fighting. Do not give up. We do not want LRT’s. We want subways.” Ford in his Subway Announcement constructs a narrative where he as a happy warrior has fought on behalf of the residents of Toronto but more importantly at the behest of these residents. He is their servant or in Greimasian terms, their ‘subject’ who has been sent on their ‘quest.’ Ford, unlike Murray, does not privilege his own ability, but rather the wishes of his constituents. Ford’s “political self ” is constructed both in terms of agency and empathy: ‘I know what you want, I am attuned to your wishes.’ Further, in his invocation of the sincerity condition in that he will “fight, fight, and [w]on’t give up,” he does not merely indicate his intention to build subways in the future but actually constructs subways as a wish he has already fulfilled, thus Ford positions himself as a man who keeps his promises, one who is sincere, one who can be trusted and equally one who should be re-elected. Ford employs an equal number of indirect commissives invoking the sincerity condition to those invoking the preparatory condition. In this respect he creates a strong political identity having to do with ‘genuineness’ as a person. This is further supported by his use of inclusive language in selecting the pronoun ‘we’ in his use of terms of address and in his use of “folks.” The principal difference between Ford and Murray, which is key to their effectiveness, is that Murray foregrounds his own agency and that of the provincial government but equally foregrounds himself and the province as ‘other.’ He has power and he is logical, but he is also distant. Ford, however, invokes the preparatory condition with reference to voters’ wants and desires, especially those in Scarborough. In articulating their wishes, Ford positions himself as attuned, connected, and representative. Through his frequent invocation of the sincerity condition, he is also able to construct a political self which is ‘genuine.’ He is one of ‘us’ rather than one of ‘them.’ The key unmet need in this narrative is that of subways rather than LRT’s. Ford also explicitly represents these as a popular demand from ‘the people’ who are the thousands and thousands of residents in Toronto. Ford does not represent or position himself as a ‘voice’ or as a ‘saviour’ but rather as a fighter or soldier who acts on the direction of people or in Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2017) terms, “the will of the people.’ In this regard Ford himself is a vehicle for the will of the people (Fig. 6.1).

190 

M. Macaulay

Sender Object Thousands of Toronto residents Subways →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Jim Flaherty, Federal Govt.

Receiver Scarbarians & people of Toronto

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←← Opponent Rob Ford supporters of LRT’s

Fig. 6.1a  Subway Announcement Speech, September 23, 2013, Rob Ford

 oug Ford, 2018 Provincial Election, D “A buck a beer” Doug Ford did not win the majorship of the amalgamated city of Toronto in 2014. He nonetheless decided to run for Major a second time four years later in 2017 stating, “This one’s for you Robbie” (Kayla Goodfield, Ford Nation is back: Doug Ford to run for mayor of Toronto in 2018, CTV News, September 8, 2017). But unforeseen events occurred in that year. The then leader of the Progressive Conservative Party was accused of sexual harassment by two female workers within the party and was forced to resign by the Party’s establishment (Rachel Alello, Patrick Brown denies sexual misconduct allegations from two women, resigns as Ontario PC leader, CTV News, January 24, 2018). An opening in the candidacy for Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party occurred allowing Doug Ford to switch gears from running for the majorship of Toronto to being the potential Premier of Ontario if the Progressive Conservatives won the upcoming general election. For Doug Ford this was a golden opportunity. Ford was able to gain a victory in the rushed leadership race: Ford’s victory came as a result of the complex election system used by the PC’s which combines preferential ballots with equally weighted ridings…This formula helped Ford to victory as he was able to take a larger share of electoral points in ridings that he won versus the share taken in ridings won by [Christine] Eliot. (Budd, 2020, p. 175)

6  Ford Nation 

191

After winning the election for leader of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives, Ford then faced his next challenge, a general election. There was a great deal of speculation as to whether the Progressive Conservatives so soon after the election of a new leader could organize themselves into election mode to beat the Liberals, who had been in power for 15 years. What we see in Doug Ford’s approach to campaigning provincially is in large part a carry-over of the populism of his brother Rob Ford, although with some differences. Doug Ford continued with the use of name recognition with the use of FordNation as the logo of his Facebook page where he could post references to his peripatetic campaign travels and ongoing announcements. Through Facebook, the Ford election campaign could keep supporters and potential voters informed of his whereabouts at all times. They could in effect go on the campaign journey with Ford. As a cool interactive medium, the Facebook page was a means of perpetually updating and briefing anyone interested in his campaign about what Ford was up to. Ford was reliably expected to win in the suburban areas of Toronto, the ‘905,’ but he needed also to court voters in the North as well as rural voters. I shall look at one of FordNation’s Facebook entries. What are also important are the constituency speeches he gave travelling North and in rural communities. Equally important were the leaders’ debates during the campaign.

Thunder Bay, May 2, 2018 On May 2, 2018 Doug Ford came to the DaVinci Centre in Thunder Bay to deliver a short 19 minute speech to a group of Progressive Conservative supporters, a group of approximately 300 individuals. This was clearly a stock speech where Ford listed off a set of developed points for his Northern audience. The speech act breakdown for this Thunder Bay speech is as follows (Table 6.2):

192 

M. Macaulay

Table 6.2  Speech Acts, Doug Ford’s Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018

Expressives: Assertives: Directives: Commissives: Total

5 49 7 24 85

6% 58% 8% 28% 100%

The dominant speech act in Doug Ford’s Thunder Bay Speech is the assertive, followed by the commissive. The commissive speech acts are what one would expect in a campaign speech, an indication of what future acts will be done on behalf of the electors listening. Ford begins his speech with reference to revenue sharing and a commitment to bringing back the Northlander, a fast train service from Northern Ontario to the South. He represents both as unmet needs on the part of his audience. His reference to revenue provides a populist appeal: I tell ya we made some announcements for the North. So many communities, not just Thunder Bay but so many other communities in the North. Friends, today we announce that we are going to do revenue sharing. This is something that the Liberal government, a lot of governments, have never done. And what do I mean by revenue sharing? Any of the taxes that are coming out from mining or forestry they’re gunna stay here. We’re gunna let the people of the North and the communities decide what they want to do with their own revenue. I can tell you nothing’s more frustrating that when the government Queen’s Park goes to communities in Thunder Bay, Timmins or Kenora and says ‘here’s some money, by the way it’s your money, and we’re going to dictate the way you’re going to spend it. By the way if you don’t spend it the way we want to spend it then you’re not getting it.’ Now that’s not the philosophy. I believe in giving the community the money, and who knows better how to spend their own money than the community, be it infrastructure, fixing roads, whatever you want to do that’s going to be up to the community in the North. (Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018)

Ford’s commitment to revenue sharing allows him to do two things: to articulate an unmet need and in turn articulate a social demand and equally through these to create a specific ‘people,’ “the people of the North.” What Ford proposes is a redistribution of revenue from corporate taxation back to communities in the North. There is nothing

6  Ford Nation 

193

remarkable about a government using monies from taxes to pay for infrastructure or roads. What differentiates Ford’s scheme is that tax revenues as such will be redistributed to specific communities in the North that will then themselves decide how to use this money. What Ford proposes is a scheme based on community grants. Such schemes already exist. Ford in fact notes this in one of his few expressives, “nothing’s more frustrating than when the government Queen’s Park goes to the communities…and says ‘here’s some money...and we are going to dictate the way you’re going to spend it.’” What differentiates Ford’s scheme from a formal application of grants is the idea of agency which he provides to ‘the people of the North.’ He articulates a philosophy: “I believe in giving the community the money, and who knows better how to spend their own money than the community.” Through this assertion Ford empowers ‘the people of the North.’ In positioning the Liberal government as paternalistic, Ford equally positions a “people of the North” who will be given the authority to make decisions for themselves, since “who knows better how to spend their own money than the community?” Ford does not represent himself as a saviour or voice of ‘the people,’ but he does represent himself as a liberator. In redistributing tax revenues, Ford proposes to also redistribute power from elite politicians to Northern communities. In his Thunder Bay Speech Ford also takes on Hydro One. Hydro One is the primary utility for distribution of electricity in Ontario. Although principally owned by the Province of Ontario, public shares in the corporation became available on the Toronto Stock Exchange under Premier Kathleen Wynne as a means of generating monies to address the Province’s deficit. This was a highly controversial action that most likely cost Wynne the 2018 election. Critics on both the left and the right believed this was a dangerous selling off of the Province’s resources. As of now, the Province outright owns 47.4% of Hydro One, while also holding 48.9% of common shares. Another crown corporation, Ontario Power Generation, holds 1.5% (Hydro One, Wikipedia). Approximately 50 % of the common shares are held privately making Hydro One a hybrid of public/ private ownership. This was a weak spot for the Liberals who had put part of Hydro One up for sale in order to balance its budget as well as pay for

194 

M. Macaulay

infrastructure and social programmes. Ford’s concern, however, is less with such a sell-off and more with what he considered to be waste within the corporation: Friends, I’ll tell you, Hydro is probably one of the single most important issues. Automatically health is. Health. Without health we have nothing. But next to health, Hydro is the number one issue. We’ve been getting gouged. We’ve been getting gouged by Hydro One. I’ve talked to businesses and the people and this is real. This is real. They come up to you and say ‘I can’t afford my rent. I can’t afford to put food on my table. I have a choice between heating and eating.’ This is unacceptable. We have the highest Hydro rates in North America. Think of that. North America. Then we have a head of Hydro. I remember speaking to folks not too long ago. The head of Hydro is paying himself six million dollars a year. He’s the highest paid public servant anywhere in any part of the country. When you do your comparators, anyone else whether BC Hydro or out in Quebec, the max a CEO is making is 550,000 hundred. So he’s making over ten times the amount. That’s staggering. Then you find out. This story just keeps getting worse. But what it shows you is a sense of arrogance. A sense of arrogance. The top people of Hydro looking down at the people of Ontario and saying ‘I really don’t give two hoots about the people of Ontario. I just care about lining my pockets, lining my buddies’ pockets.’ I tell ya he gave out, get ready for these figures, 14 million dollars of bonuses to all his executives, eight or ten top executives. So he’s giving out 14 million dollars of your money, my money, and it’s your money by the way, on top of it they are all making two three million dollars a year. And they wonder why, they wonder why our Hydro rates, and that doesn’t affect the Hydro rates directly, but it’s the arrogance. It symbolizes that they don’t’ care about the people. We won’t have this problem on June the 8th because the CEO is done. The Board is done. We’re going to get responsible people in. (Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018)

Ford’s concern in this segment of his speech is not with the public/ private partnership Premier Wynne has created, but rather with the pay given to the CEO of Hydro, which he constructs as an exorbitant sum. This is entirely reflective of Rob Ford’s argument surrounding “the gravy

6  Ford Nation 

195

train.” The purpose of such an analysis is to verbally bring an ‘elite’ into existence as opposed to ‘the people.’ This is a clear populist strategy. In the narrative Ford tells, the CEO is paid ten times the amount other comparable CEO’s are paid in other provinces. Further, this specific CEO doles out money to other executives, who Ford terms ‘buddies.’ What he presents to his audience is a corrupt elite working at a public institution greedily taking money for himself and further distributing money for his executive “buddies.” Buddy implicates a relationship between friends rather than fellow workers. The CEO gets an inflated salary and pays others an inflated salary. For Ford this symbolizes “that they don’t care about the people.” The implicature, therefore, is that Ford does. He cares about ‘the people’ whom he references as not being able to pay their Hydro bills and having to choose between “heating and eating.” Ford does not position ‘the people of Ontario” who speak to him as middle-class but as working class having to make hard pocket-book choices between food and heating their homes. Ford’s narrative commences with hard-working Ontarians coming up to him to tell him that they are being “gouged” and so are unable to pay their Hydro bills because they must put food on their table. Two clear unmet needs for the people of Ontario are being able to feed their families and heat their homes. Ford asserts, “We have the highest hydro rates in North American. Think of that. In North America.” He then employs parallel syntax, “We have a head of Hydro [my emphasis]. I remember speaking to folks not too long ago.” We have functions not as a possessive in this usage but as a deictic. Ford is literally pointing to this executive and causing his audience to direct its attention equally. This allows him to delineate a third unmet need, the need for responsible administration of Hydro One, not as a “gravy train” for arrogant executives, but as a properly run public corporation. Ford makes the point, “So he’s giving out 14 million dollars of your money, my money, and it’s your money by the way, on top of it they are all making two three million dollars a year.” Ford attempts to link these two unmet needs into one social demand but reverses himself: “And they wonder why, they wonder why our Hydro rates, and that doesn’t affect the Hydro rates directly, but it’s the arrogance.” Arrogance for

196 

M. Macaulay

Doug Ford replaces Rob Ford’s “gravy train” as an empty signifier. He is not able to connect logically high Hydro rates with greed on the part of Hydro’s CEO and his executives, but he is able to compound the unmet need of high rates with greed into a general attitudinal stance of “arrogance,” a belief in superiority to ‘the people’ coupled with disregard. He sums this up very succinctly, “It symbolizes that they don’t’ care about the people.” In the commissive that follows Ford represents himself as a saviour of the people: “We won’t have this problem on June the 8th because the CEO is done. The Board is done. We’re going to get responsible people in.” In this utterance Ford implicates that the Progressive Conservatives will win the election on June 2018 and in so doing “this problem” will be solved, because “the CEO is done.” Ford employs perfective aspect for the verb do, used informally to indicate that a process is complete. In this case the process is the CEO himself. His journey will come to an end. Ford will defeat this enemy on behalf of “the people of Ontario.” In sequence an unmet need becomes a social demand that in turn is further represented as an accomplishment on July 8, 2018 (Fig. 6.2). Sender “businesses and people”

Object removal of CEO of Hydro One

Receiver Businesses and people

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire axis of Power ↑ Helper →→→→→ Subject ←←←← ← Opponent Progressive Conservative Party Doug Ford Arrogance →→→→→→ axis of knowledge

Fig. 6.2a  Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018, Doug Ford

Ford Nation Facebook Ontario Place As well as giving stock speeches, Doug Ford also used Facebook as a means of connecting with a broad audience in the 2018 election and afterwards. Facebook for Ford is comparable to William Aberhart’s use of radio. Aberhart used radio to create a community or congregation as Preston Manning in turn used the Blue Book. Doug Ford’s Facebook posts

6  Ford Nation 

197

are made up largely of announcements on his part. For the most part we see head shots of Ford indicating what has he has said or done or what will be done for FordNation. The advantage of such postings is that Ford speaks directly to the camera. We see Ford face to face where the Facebook community can look on him directly thus giving the viewer the illusion that they are physically in his presence. Facebook for Doug Ford is a visual medium where he can be seen either speaking directly to his audience or in physical action (Fig. 6.3).

Fig. 6.3  Ford at Exhibition Place, August 5, 2021

198 

M. Macaulay

The Facebook entry above is not from the 2018 election but is from Fords’ first period as Premier of Ontario. This post exemplifies many of the stylistic features of Ford’s announcements that he presents through Facebook. Foregrounded in this posting is a picture of Ford with other team members striding across one of the erected bridges at Ontario Place that hosts the yearly Provincial Exhibition as well as open air concerts and other live entertainment. We do not see Ford in situ but rather in the physical process of walking across a bridge. Ford is positioned and seen as a man of action who is vital and purposeful. This representation is consistent with Moffitt’s (2016) notion of the populist leader as extraordinary, as strong and virile. The first written statement of the posting indicates what this action is all about: As we mark the 50th anniversary of #OntarioPlace, there is no better time to bring this destination back to life. (FordNation, Facebook, August 5, 2021)

While we literally see Ford and his team moving forward and towards us in this picture, such movement parallels the immediate temporality of reviving Ontario Place, bringing is back to life. The energy of the photo is consistent with the energy needed to transform this “destination” from one which is dead to one which will be reborn. The metaphor here is obvious. Ontario Place is being compared to a living thing that needs an infusion of oxygen. The next written text from this post indicates how such resuscitation will be achieved: We’re working with world class developers, the City of Toronto & indigenous communities to deliver year-round entertainment for all ages and interests. (FordNation, Facebook, August 5, 2021)

This Facebook post employs the verb work which is a dynamic verb where energy is implicit. But it also employs imperfective aspect, thus we see the action in process rather than as a habit or behaviour. The use of work in imperfective aspect provides parallelism with the ongoing movement we see in the central picture where Ford has one foot in front of the

6  Ford Nation 

199

other in the process of walking. Here ‘walking’ and ‘working’ are conflated as both are in process. The important idea is that there is movement or motion. Ford epitomizes the idea of a strong male figure in charge. He’s going somewhere. He has a purpose and a ‘destination.’ He is bringing together developers, the City of Toronto, AND indigenous leaders to orchestrate a new vision for Ontario Place. The third and last written text in this post is foregrounded as is the picture of Ford striding across a bridge. The font remains the same, but is made larger and coloured in white to contrast with the blue background from the floor of the bridge: We have to keep Ontario Place affordable for all families to come and share the experience. (FordNation, Facebook, August 5, 2021)

The post employs a deontic modal have to indicating necessity. What is necessitated is affordability, and specifically affordability for families. There is no indication of how this will be achieved, especially if “world-­ class developers” are being employed, but this message is explicitly populist. What is implicated is the unmet need for affordable entertainment on the part of the people, and specifically those with families. The post also transforms Ontario Place from being a “destination” into an “experience.” By making this experience “affordable,” the post with Doug Ford as the central actor provides working class ‘folk’ with something they did not know they needed into something that they do now need and will in the future have access to. What is implicated is a major improvement not just for Ontario Place but for the people themselves with Ford at the heart of this new unmet need and its eventual achievement. The last written text that one sees in this post is “Contact us” with a letter icon beside it. The viewer/reader is invited to contact FordNation. The announcement in this August 5, 2021 post functions very much like an advertisement. Its purpose is to implicitly laud the dynamic actions of the leader, Doug Ford, and to draw the viewer/reader into FordNation as a community, not just of voters, but also of members with shared values, such as the need for affordable entertainment for the

200 

M. Macaulay

family, and family values themselves. In this respect FordNation is constructed or positioned as a family where family members act on behalf of other family members. The purpose of this post is to touch the viewer/ reader rather than simply inform. Thus, Ontario Place will no longer function as a destination, a physical place to go as with the yearly Exhibition, but as an “experience” where the viewer/reader will directly experience the renewed event forum. What is not stated explicitly in this dynamic announcement of revitalization of Ontario Place is who specifically will bring this about. The announcement speaks of “world-class developers.” Those that have been announced are a Quebec company, Écorécréo, which specializes in outdoor equipment, and the Therme Group from Austria, which specializes in “well-being resorts.” There is no clear overall vision for the renewed waterfront space. More seriously, as reported by Now Magazine (July 26, 2021), “Community groups say they’ve been shut out of the process. There have been no public consultations.” While the installation of outdoor equipment might be “affordable” for those wishing to use it, it is difficult to imagine “well-being resorts” being so for working class families. The Facebook announcement, however, presents Doug Ford as an agentive party whose purpose is to revive a key waterfront destination in Toronto and make this ‘for the people’ rather than for international tourists. The populism that is conveyed in this Facebook announcement is largely a selling tool to engage ‘the folk’ in believing that a new major project is meeting an unmet need they may not yet have been aware of (Fig. 6.4). Sender Facebook, FordNation →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Developers, City of Toronto, Indigenous Communities.

Object Revitalization of Ontario Place

Receiver families

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←← Opponent Doug Ford

Community groups

Fig. 6.4  Facebook Announcement, Ontario Place, August 5, 2021

6  Ford Nation 

201

Final Debate Election 2018 During the election of 2018, there were three debates between the leaders of the three major parties, the Liberals, the Progressive Conservatives, and the New Democratic Party. I will examine a segment of the last debate held on May 27, 2018. In this debate the two leaders of the other major parties, Kathleen Wynne of the Liberals and Andrea Horvath of the New Democratic Party, largely focussed their attacks on Doug Ford who stood between them in the centre of the stage. Ford himself largely focussed on the New Democrats because through the process of the campaign it was the New Democrats that became his principal opposition. Ford won the election, while the New Democrats became the Loyal Opposition. We need first to examine Ford’s actual platform in this election. Ford’s key planks were as follows: 1. Jobs and Economic Growth: Cut regulations and reduce business tax rates. 2. Energy and Electricity: Lower electricity prices and scrap the Green Energy Act. 3. Government Accountability: Audit government spending and plan for a balanced budget. 4. Health Care: Invest in mental health, dental care for seniors, and beds in both hospitals and long-term care facilities. 5. Transportation and Infrastructure: Implement substantial spending on transportation, including subways, GO service and highways. 6. Housing: Preserve rent control for existing tenants and increase supply of affordable housing in the GTA. 7. Environment: End the cap and trade system and challenge any attempt by the federal government to impose a carbon tax. (Ontario PC Party Platform 2018, Ontario Chambre of Commerce website, occ.ca) If we examine this proposed platform, we see evidence of unmet needs and social demands in Laclauan terms. The platform was subtitled For the People as an overarching popular demand. What we see ‘For the People’ are lower electricity prices, investment in mental health, dental care, expanded hospital and long-term care facilities, improved infrastructure

202 

M. Macaulay

and specifically subways, rent control and increase in affordable housing. Lower electricity rates, improvements in health care, especially for seniors, rent control and affordable housing all represent unmet needs on the part of ‘the little guy’ or working class. In large part these are carry-overs from Rob Ford’s platform as Mayor of Toronto, specifically rent control and subways. But other aspects of Ford’s platform speak to a very different group of voters, those in small businesses much like Ford himself. Ford proposes to cut “business tax rates,” “scrap the Green Energy Act,” “Audit government spending,” and end the “carbon tax.” The carbon tax is a tax on those corporations that produce carbon emissions. While the intention to audit government spending, a reference to Rob Ford’s “gravy train,” would theoretically reduce government expenditures if redundancies could be found, scrapping the Green Energy Act would eliminate alternate energy sources from the infrastructure economy and would also diminish the Province’s tax revenues. Revenues from the carbon tax would also no longer be available. Apart from general taxation, what remains to fund the populist proposals in Ford’s platform are cuts resulting from a forensic audit of government spending. One economist, Professor Mike Moffatt of the Ivey Business School at Western University, examined Ford’s platform with respect to costing: Based on the information Ford has made public, Moffatt predicts the PCs would run the steepest deficits by their third and fourth year in office [in comparison to the other two parties]: “The promises add to about $7 billion a year in tax cuts and Spending. And it’s not clear where that $7 billion is going to come from,” Moffatt…told CTV on Wednesday. (CTV News, May 30, 2018)

This concern over costing of Ford’s platform became a major focus of the last of the party leaders’ debates on May 27, 2018. About mid-way through this debate Andrea Horvath asked a “leader to leader question”: Mr. Ford here we are, the polls opened yesterday and you haven’t told people what your six billion dollars in cuts is going to look like. You say that you respect the voters, that you respect Ontarians. The people started, the people started going to the polls today, they haven’t got any idea what your cuts are going to look like. What sort of cuts are going to happen in

6  Ford Nation 

203

hospitals? How many nurses are going to be laid off? How many public services are going to be cut to the bone? How many more people are going to be in hallways due to your 6 billion dollars in cuts? How many teachers are going to be laid off? How many more people are going to be in hallways? Why don’t you think it’s important to be honest and show people your platform? (Third Party Leader Debate, Provincial Election 2018)

Doug Ford answers in the following way: Well, it’s pretty clear. Every single day I’ve been putting out announcements. Our announcements provide a dollar figure beside it. And our announcements are about putting more money in people’s pockets. We’re going to reduce the hydro rates, which is the number one issue across this province with people and companies. We’re going to reduce that 12%. We’re going to reduce the cost of gas by 10 cents a litre. That is absolutely huge to every single person. I know that the NDP thinks driving’s a luxury but it’s essential today in our daily lives. We’re going to make sure we reduce taxes. We’re going to be the only government that actually reduces taxes by 20%. We’ve had a plan and we’re rolling it out every single day with costing. The difference is you made a 7-billion-dollar mistake in your platform. 1.5 billion a year times 5 you’re right up by 7 billion dollars. That’s the difference between having a plan and having no plan whatsoever. I’m seeing 30 40 million dollars; I still don’t know where you’re getting your money from. I know where they are going to get it from my friends at home. They’re getting it from YOU. They’re getting it from the taxpayers. You’re going to be paying the bill. But I can tell you one thing. When our government comes into power the day will dawn a day of prosperity, a day of opportunity, a day of growth the likes of which this province has never seen before. We will blaze a new trail for every single person in this great province and give them opportunity and put money back into their pocket instead of the government’s pocket. That’s our plan. (Third Party Leader Debate, Provincial Election 2018)

Andrea Horvath’s question to Doug Ford is a very complex and skilled question or in speech act terms, a request for information. Her last request for information is the following: “Why don’t you think it’s important to be honest and show people your platform?” She does not ask Doug Ford why he isn’t being honest with the people of Ontario in not showing the costing of his platform, she asks “Why don’t you think [my emphasis] it’s

204 

M. Macaulay

important to be honest and show people your platform.” A question such as ‘Don’t you think….’ would be a standard ‘yes/no’ question and would serve to put Doug Ford on the spot. The answer would be either ‘no I don’t’ or ‘yes I do.’ But Horvath employs a complex request for information which does more than simply put Ford on the spot. In asking “Why don’t you think…” she first generates a presupposition that Ford does not believe it is necessary to be honest with the people of Ontario. She then frames this presupposition in terms of an invocation of the essential condition for requests for information, “Why [my emphasis] don’t you think…”. This is a very complex request for information functioning as a request for action, that Ford show the costing of his platform. By asking why he does not believe he has to show the costing of his platform, Horvath also invokes the sincerity condition for commissives (intentionality) or in Grice’s terms the Maxim of Quality.5 Horvath implicates two things, that Ford cannot reveal his costing because he does not know what it is or that he does not reveal his costing because he does know what it is but does not want to reveal this to the public. The latter implicature is the stronger because of the list of possible cuts Horvath sets out: cuts to hospitals, public services, teachers, and nurses, all resulting in severe reductions on social services for the average person. Doug Ford’s answer to this ‘tough question’ from Andrea Horvath is revealing. We can look at his answer in two parts. In the first part, Ford attempts to respond to Horwath’s indirect request for action that he provide costing for his programmes. He states, “Well, it’s pretty clear. Every single day I’ve been putting out announcements. Our announcements provide a dollar figure beside it… We’ve had a plan and we’re rolling it out every single day with costing.” At the end of Ford’s response to her request for information, Horwath comments quite directly, “I guess it’s kind of shocking to me, Mr. Ford, that you believe that announcements with a dollar figure beside them equals a platform. And equals a costed platform. That’s not how it works.” To Ford’s notion that a series of announcements, which would be put on his Facebook page as part of FordNation, Horwath responds with an expressive, that she is shocked. She is shocked that Doug Ford believes “that announcements with a dollar figure beside  Grice’s Maxim of Quality (truth) requires that one be truthful, but specifically “Do not say that which you believe to be false,” and “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” 5

6  Ford Nation 

205

them equals a platform.” The use of incremental announcements to be posted on Facebook is what Ford and his team have employed as a political strategy. When Horvath asserts, “That’s not how it works,” she fails to understand that Ford intentionally employs a media strategy that permits individual and instantaneous messaging of the type we see in Ford’s Ontario Place announcement rather than a well thought through overall platform. The articulation of specific announcements over time gives the impression of an extensive agenda while also fragmenting that agenda into ‘bits’ or elements that do not permit examination as a the whole. Attention is only given to one specific and individual concern at a time. The ‘big picture,’ such that it is, can only be provided by Ford’s readership in FordNation that functions largely as a collection of believers. Ford’s Ontario Place announcement shows him in ongoing action, doing something that would have positive impact on the people, especially those with families. This fragmentation of agenda items is also evidenced in Ford’s subsequent assertions about the announcements he has made: And our announcements are about putting more money in people’s pockets. We’re going to reduce the hydro rates, which is the number one issue across this province with people and companies. We’re going to reduce that 12%. We’re going to reduce the cost of gas by 10 cents a litre that is absolutely huge to every single person. I know that the NDP thinks driving’s a luxury but it’s essential today in our daily lives. We’re going to make sure we reduce taxes. We’re going to be the only government that actually reduces taxes by 20%. (Third Party Leader Debate, Provincial Election 2018)

Having introduced the topic of announcements, Ford begins his enumeration with an ‘and of new information.’ He also provides a thematic statement: “our announcements are about [my emphasis] putting more money in people’s pockets.” Through this assertion, Ford completely changes topic from that of costing and cuts to that of “putting money in people’s pockets.” This is the essence of Ford’s platform and why he succeeded in becoming Premier. Ford presents a populist vision focussing on people’s daily lives and daily costs rather than the big picture of healthcare in the Province and the education of its young. He employs simple alliteration, “people’s pockets.” Each incremental announcement focusses on people’s expenditures on a daily basis. In succession he employ’s three

206 

M. Macaulay

commissives, “We’re going to reduce hydro rates…We’re going to reduce that 12%...We’re going to reduce the cost of gas by 10 cents a litre…We’re going to make sure we reduce taxes…We’re going to be the only government that actually reduces taxes by 20%.” Ford focusses on the pocketbook issues of the individual voter, their individual unmet needs, and points out with regard to the cost of gas, “that is absolutely huge to every single person [my emphasis].” While we have the idea of a ‘nation’ in FordNation, this ‘nation’ is largely composed of members of the working class who struggle with everyday bills and payments. Ford ignores the broader social issues of welfare, healthcare, and the environment to articulate a set of sequenced commissives that directly affect ‘the little guy.’ This is best evidenced in his announcement in March 2018 during the election of a ‘Buck a Beer’ for Ontarians (Fig. 6.5):

Fig. 6.5  ‘Buck a Beer’ Twitter

6  Ford Nation 

207

In this tweet from the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, we have one individual commissive, ‘Doug Ford will bring back a buck a beer.” There is an image of a beer can with ‘Buck a Beer’ in large capitalized blue print on its front, rather than the logo of a major beer company such as Labatt’s, along with the campaign slogan “Doug Ford for the People.” We also see the use of imperfective aspect, “Doug’s bringing it back.” Ford’s first name is employed referencing him as an intimate, someone you would have a beer with, and we again get the idea of ongoing action through the use of the imperfective, the idea of Doug Ford as someone who is agentive and purposeful, someone in the process of making things good again. A ‘buck a beer’ is another very direct and specific pocketbook issue that affected average working-class Ontarian voters and certainly not the latte drinkers of the major cities. The message in this announcement on twitter is simple: Far too long beer consumers have been forced to pay inflated prices for beer in order to increase the profits of big corporations. Doug Ford will bring back a buck a beer. (Buck a Beer, Twitter, Progressive Conservative Party, May 26, 2018)

This is a nostalgic appeal to an earlier time when the consumer paid less than a dollar for a can of beer. But it is also a populist appeal. In the simple narrative employed in the text above, the beer drinker as consumer is at the mercy of the “big corporations,” an elite, who overcharge for beer. According to Statistics Canada, Canadians drink “about 79 litres of beer a year” (A quick look at beer drinking in Canada and other industry trends, The Canadian Press, March 21, 2017). The appeal to cheap beer is an appeal to the pocketbook of the average Ontarian representing in Laclauan terms an unmet need for those who drink beer as part of their normal social interaction with others. According to the CTV, search for Ford’s ‘buck a beer’ announcement was the second most searched item on the web for Ontarian voters during the election (‘Doug Ford buck a beer’: Top Ontario election searches online, CTV News, May 31, 2018).

208 

M. Macaulay

In his response to Andrea Horwath, Doug Ford is able to itemize very specific proposals as social demands such as cuts to hydro bills, lower gas prices and lower taxes, which in Laclauan terms aggregate into what he terms an equivalential chain. “Buck a Beer” becomes the empty signifier for this aggregate. Ford will bring this back, just as Donald Trump will “Make America Great Again.” “Buck a Beer” is not literally about cheap booze, but about bringing back an affordable lifestyle previously enjoyed by the average person in the province. It is nostalgic, looking backward, but it represents the unmet need for a better world on the part of the average person. As with his brother Rob Ford’s concept of “the gravy train” that exploits ‘the people’ within government, on a local social level this ‘gravy train’ is exemplified by big breweries gouging ‘the little guy’ in the simple consumption of beer. The other two parties, the Liberals and the New Democrats, could not penetrate this populist logic in the 2018 Ontario election. A well thought through costed election platform was irrelevant to ‘the little guy’ or consumer. What mattered was where they hurt personally and the simple aspiration of a ‘buck a beer’ summed up this pain nicely. The ‘buck a beer’ was lower taxes, lower hydro rates and lower gas prices. These itemized unmet needs could effectively be conveyed through Facebook and Twitter, but the simple request for a ‘buck a beer’ in itself symbolized the entirety of these needs and demands in one clear overriding popular demand (Fig. 6.6). Sender Twitter, Ontario PC Party Consumers →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of power Helper →→→→→ ‘breweries’

Object A ‘Buck a Beer’

Receiver ‘The little guy’

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←← Opponent Big Corporations Doug Ford

Fig. 6.6a  Twitter Announcement, ‘Buck a Beer,’ Doug Ford

6  Ford Nation 

209

Conclusion Both Ford brothers provide a populist message to their specific community, Ford Nation. If we speak of them as having a political ideology, it is small ‘c’ conservatism. Although Doug Ford wishes to be engaged in major projects such as the renovation of Ontario Place, and references being competitive in international trade, his concern like that of his brother Rob Ford is with the economics of small businesses and the economics of ‘the little guy’ or working class. They are both ‘localists’ focussing on immediate day to day concerns. With the Fords, we see a major focus on wasteful spending in government. This was a key concern in Rob Ford’s 2010 campaign for major of Toronto, and what he termed “The Gravy Train.” The same complaint is taken up by Doug Ford in his 2018 campaign for Premier of Ontario. He referenced the CEO of Hydro One as “the six-million dollar man.” While Rob Ford positions the city councillors of Toronto as undeserving scam artists for getting free zoo passes or free transit passes, Doug Ford references the CEO of Hydro One doling out big salaries to his “buddies.” The idea of the gravy train is the idea of a bloated government that does not serve the interests of the people but rather of those in government. At its very simplest it is a hostility to authority, but at its more complex it is an expression of resentment and a feeling of abandonment by government felt by the average person. Both brothers tapped into this resentment and articulated it as an unmet need and subsequent social demand. This concern for poor government parallels the Ford brothers’ populist representation of themselves as being ‘for the people.’ This was the actual slogan of Doug Ford’s campaign in 2018, “For the People.” Both were ‘for the people’ is their articulation of numerous unmet needs including resource sharing and the resurrection of the Northlander from Doug Ford campaigning in the North in 2018, his revitalization of Ontario Place while Premier, affordable social housing, better health care for the elderly, better transportation services especially the building of subways, as well as direct representation by being on call for their constituents. Rob Ford gave out this home phone number to his constituents in Etobicoke North. He was also called directly by constituents in other

210 

M. Macaulay

wards because of his reputation for personal involvement in people’s problems and difficulties. What distinguishes the two brothers is their differing representation of themselves vis a vis ‘the folk.’ We can see this is their narratives (Figs. 6.1, 6.2, and 6.6 below): Sender Object Thousands of Toronto residents Subways →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of Power Helper →→→→→ Jim Flaherty, Federal Govt.

Receiver Scarbarians & people of Toronto

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←← Opponent Rob Ford supporters of LRT’s

Fig. 6.1b  Subway Announcement Speech, September 23, 2013, Rob Ford

In his Subway Announcement Speech of September 23, 2013 Rob Ford represents himself as a subject or the ‘hero’ of his particular Greimasian narrative (Fig. 6.1), but he does not represent himself as the ‘sender.’ This role is taken up by “thousands of Toronto residents.” Ford represents these residents as speaking to him and telling him to “fight, fight fight.” It is ‘the people’ who send Ford on his quest to bring subways to Scarborough. We see Rob Ford’s close relationship to ‘the people’ when he makes an assertion implicating anger, “These people don’t deserve to live like this.” Apart from what appears to be genuine empathy for ‘the people’ of Etobicoke North, Ford also foregrounds his own ‘ordinariness’ in being a normal family man just like those he serves in the ward. Ford’s drug use turned him into an international celebrity, but Ford nonetheless positioned himself as an average guy who came home from work every day to play with his kids. His championing of subways is also indicative of his connection to ‘the people.’ Subways provide underground transportation allowing roadways and highways to be free for cars. They also provided better protection than LRT’s do from the elements, a key concern in a province where winter often lasts for five months. Ford’s campaign slogan of “Subways, Subways, Subways’ signified a concern for suburban residents who needed their cars to get to work. Ford himself

6  Ford Nation 

211

drove a Cadillac Escalade but his willingness to fight for subways enabled him to co-identify with the average hard working family person who would have to commute daily to get to work. It was Rob Ford’s understanding and sympathy for the unmet needs of the working class that were then translated into two major popular demands, “Stop the Gravy Train,” and “Subways, Subways, Subways,” that allowed Ford to achieve success as a politician. Rob Ford did not so much speak for ‘the little guy’ as he was ‘the little guy.’ Doug Ford represents a different brand of populism. Like his brother he went after what he termed the “arrogance” of governmental administrators specifically the overpaid CEO of Hydro One whom he called “the six-million-dollar man.” We see this in his narrative concerning Hydro One (Fig. 6.2). Sender “businesses and people”

Object removal of CEO of Hydro One

Receiver Businesses and people

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire axis of Power ↑ Helper →→→→→ Subject ←←←← ← Opponent Progressive Conservative Party Doug Ford Arrogance →→→→→→ axis of knowledge

Fig. 6.2b  Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018, Doug Ford

As with his brother Rob Ford, Doug Ford does not position himself as a sender in this Greimasian narrative. But his representation of the sender is somewhat different. Doug Ford speaks of “businesses and people” telling him of their concerns about Hydro One. These concerns are the rates for hydro service that Ford argues are the highest in North America. These rates affect both ‘the people’ and those running small businesses. His ‘object’ however becomes deflected onto removal of the CEO of Hydro One not because the rates are high but because of insider corporate greed. Ford exploits his brother’s theme of government waste, the ‘gravy train,’ in order to convey a populist message about a corrupt elite. This CEO will not be removed because of incompetence in the running of Hydro One resulting in increased rates for “businesses and people,”

212 

M. Macaulay

but because he is running the province’s electricity corporation as a kleptocracy. The lack of coherence in his message reveals the extent to which Doug Ford simply borrows his populism from his own brother. Also, significantly, Doug Ford does not present himself as the mirror image of the average man. Doug Ford positions himself as an agentive doer who will bring about change FOR ‘the little guy’ but not AS ‘the little guy.’ We can see this in his popular expression of a previously unrecognized unmet need on the part of the average person: a “Buck a Beer” (Fig. 6.6): Sender Twitter, Ontario PC Party Consumers →→→→→→ axis of knowledge axis of power Helper →→→→→ ‘breweries’

Object A ‘Buck a Beer’

Receiver ‘The little guy’

↑ →→→→→ ↑ ↑ axis of desire ↑ Subject ←←←←← Opponent Big Corporations Doug Ford

Fig. 6.6b  Twitter Announcement, ‘Buck a Beer,’ Doug Ford

As with his Facebook FordNation announcement of revitalization of Ontario Place, the sender is not ‘the people,’ but the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party. Unlike “Subways, Subways, Subways,” there was no crying out by ‘the people’ for a buck a beer. The people did not send Doug Ford on a quest to lower beer prices. Nonetheless this slogan tapped into an unmet need on the part of people. “Buck a beer” became an empty signifier for a nostalgic past where life was more affordable and simple for the average person. Doug Ford is again positioned in this Greimasian narrative as a subject who will bring back a ‘buck a beer’ for ‘the people.’ This aggregates with lowering taxes, lower hydro rates, affordable housing, and better healthcare for the elderly. The unmet need is not transportation so that one can get to work or removal of freeloading politicians, but a way of life where one can live affordably and enjoy small pleasures such as cheap beer. Doug Ford can present no significant infrastructure change as did his brother; the populism he provides is a vision of a past existence of affordability and comfort. While far less

6  Ford Nation 

213

ambitious than that of his brother Rob, Doug Ford nonetheless positions himself as agentive, strong and extraordinary. In the Ontario PC’s twitter announcement for a buck a beer, on the very beer can it reads, “Doug Ford will bring back a buck a beer.” Equally Doug Ford will revive Ontario Place. He will also remove the corrupt CEO of Hydro One. And he will lower taxes. Doug Ford is not positioned as a family guy that comes home to his kids after work, by as a dynamic person who is the hero of his own as well as the narratives told by the Progressive Conservative Party. Doug Ford is positioned as a kind of superman FOR ‘the people,’ whereas his brother Rob Ford is seen as an average person who is one of them and so who can go to bat on their behalf. To a very large extent Doug Ford parrots his brother’s populism, but never quite achieves a true populist stance. Bringing back a buck a beer and building “Subways, Subways, Subways” represents two different types of aspirations. Doug Ford’s populism is based on a nostalgic past, whereas Rob Ford’s is built on a working-class future and thus its prosperity. Contrastingly, one brother positions himself in his ordinariness as “the little guy,” while the other positions himself as a dynamic agent who will “bring[] back” a better time.

7 Conclusion

In this volume, I have examined an historical sequence of populist parties and movements, from the People’s Party in 1890’s America to Ford Nation in Canada during the 2010’s and 20’s. This is by no means a comprehensive study, but rather a study of selected realizations of populism in North America over a period of approximately 130 years. When we look at these parties and movements, we have to ask to what extent there is consistency or inconsistency in the expression of populism and in turn if this sheds any light on what populism is. Can we understand populism as an internally consistent phenomenon or is it simply a convenient usage to tag onto several quite distinct movements? Is there such a thing as ‘populism’ and if so how and when is it realized? Although this volume has exploited several theories of populism, the primary theoretical approach to populism has come from Laclau (2007). This is Ernesto Laclau’s principal discussion or exploration of populism where he sets out a quite explicit theory. Laclau defines populism not as an ideology in terms of a set of features but as a process. His 2007 book is entitled On Populist Reason. Laclau understood populism as a kind of logic wherein a break or rupture occurred within a society or community expressed initially by unmet needs on the part of that community and where in turn a response to these demands initially engendered what he termed social demands which in turn could become popular demands. Through the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2_7

215

216 

M. Macaulay

expression of such demands a ‘people’ came into being. Foremost in Laclau’s theory, the notion of the people is not a priori but results out of the identification of unmet needs and the articulation of response in terms of first social demands and then subsequently popular demands. These demands coalesce into what he terms an equivalential chain ultimately expressed through what he also terms an empty signifier. Such an empty signifier could be “Make America Great Again!” or ‘democracy’ or “The West Wants In!” or “Buck a Beer.” Laclau provides few extended examples of populism in On Populist Reason. However, one example he uses is the Chartist Movement of the 1830’s in Great Britain. He examines this movement to show how the process of populism can dissipate under a set of specific circumstances. Laclau’s first observation taken from Gareth Stedman Jones (1983) is that the Chartist Movement was not a social movement in response to the Industrial Revolution but rather a continuation of the discourse of British Radicalism. As Laclau states, This tradition, which has its roots in the eighteenth-century Tory opposition to Whig oligarchy, was given a radical turn at the time of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Its dominant leitmotiv is to situate the evils of society not in something that is inherent in the economic system, but quite the opposite: in the abuse of power by parasitic and speculative groups which have control of political power—‘old corruptions’, in Cobbett’s words: ‘If the land could be socialised, the national debt liquidated, and the banker’s monopoly control over the supply of money abolished, it was because all the forms of property shared the common characteristic of not being the product of labour. It was for this reason that the feature most strongly picked out in the ruling class was its idleness and parasitism.’ (Laclau, 2007, p. 90)

What is key in this analysis is that we do not simply have an ‘elite’ in contrast to ‘the people,’ but rather an elite characterised as parasitic and corrupt. A ‘parasite’ is something or someone who thrives off the body or the work of others. It has no independent means of survival but must survive through others. This characterization of the ‘elite’ is at the very heart of Laclau’s conception of populism and the primum mobile that

7 Conclusion 

217

generates a logical process of identification of unmet needs and social and then popular demands. He also locates populism in a tradition of radicalism that dates back to the eighteenth century. Regarding the discourse of the Chartist Movement, Laclau notes further, What is, anyway, characteristic of that discourse is that it was not a sectional discourse of the working class but a popular discourse addressed in principal to all the producers against the ‘idlers’; ‘The discourse was not primarily between ruling and exploited classes in an economic sense, but rather between the beneficiaries and the victims of corruption and monopoly political power.’ The juxtaposition was in the first instance moral and political, and dividing lines could be drawn as much within classes as between them. (Laclau, 2007, p. 90)

For the reasons expressed here, a populist could be a member of the working class as such, but could also be, like Thomas Jefferson in the United States, a member of the landholding class. What is significant is the moral outrage combined with a recognition of parasitic corruption and exploitation. How does and to what extent does Laclau’s analysis after Stedman Jones (1983) apply to the populist parties and movements that are examined in this book? If we look at the first formal expression of populism in the United States and the sequence of movements leading up to the creation of Social Credit and the CCF (Canadian Commonwealth Federation), we see very clear application. What is essential in understanding the People’s Party is that it is Janus-like looking both backward and forward at the same time. This is not the case with its Canadian counterpart in The Farmers’ Platform, the Progressive Party, the Social Credit or the CCF. Although an extension of the populism of the late nineteenth century in the United States, these movements/parties are more concerned to break with the past rather than view it nostalgically. The People’s Party functions out of nostalgia and is clearly an extension, like the Chartist Movement of Enlightenment, of eighteenth-century radicalism. In its Preamble, written by Ignatius Donnelly, the People’s Party of 1892 seeks reconnection with its revolutionary past:

218 

M. Macaulay

Assembled on the anniversary of the birthday of the nation, and filled with the Spirit of the grand general and chief who established our independence, we seek to restore the government of the Republic to the hands of “the plain people,” with which class it originated. (Preamble, People’s Party Platform, 1892)

The “grand general and chief ” in question is George Washington, who is first the leader of the Revolutionary Army and then the first President of the United States. The People’s Party sees itself as a legitimate continuation of the enlightenment principles that inspired Jefferson to seek happiness for all and not only for a privileged segment of society. From the period of the inception of the new republic in the 1770’s to the 1890’s a new rupture was created: “The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few” (Preamble). As Laclau points out, it is not so much that the capitalist system as such is at fault; rather, what is at fault is theft by “a few” from “the toil of millions.” The conflict is between the ‘idlers’ and “the plain people.” Over the Preamble, its writer, Ignatius Donnelly, defines and redefines the notion of ‘the people’; first defined as “the plain people,” this group is redefined as “trash,” “the suffering people,” and then finally as “the producing class.” In this last designation, this group sees itself as an agentive ‘class.’ It has agency as a producer, a body that creates or produces. Conversely, the ‘idlers’ are also redefined. Originally designated as a ‘ruling’ class through a combination of Democrats and Republicans, they become more broadly characterised as “millionaires,” who “sacrifice [of ] our homes, lives, and children on the altar of mammon.” The ‘idlers’ in question worship money over people and are thus termed “capitalists.” A very profound and Christian moral outrage is expressed over the behaviour of the heathen capitalists. The producing class has the fruits of its labour stolen from it by a heathen capitalist class that privileges money-making over good society. Both the 1892 and 1896 Platforms of the People’s Party set out a series of demands that we can term social demands: “we demand [my emphasis] a national currency,” “free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold,” “a graduated income tax,” “that all State and national revenues shall be limited to the necessary expenses of the government,” “postal savings banks,”

7 Conclusion 

219

that “All lands now held by railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens should be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only,” as well as government ownership of railroads, telegraph, telephones and the post-office “in the interests of the people.” What accompanies these demands in the 1896 platform is a further reconfiguration of the relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ The ‘elite’ are redefined from being heathen capitalists into being ‘plutocrats.’ The focus in the 1896 Platform is on a plutocracy that has corrupted democratic government itself: “Executive power and patronage have been used to corrupt our legislatures and defeat the will of the people [my emphasis].” With the language of plutocracy and patronage, the Platform of the 1896 People’s Party goes to the heart of governance itself. Money is not simply worshipped for itself; it is used to retain the corrupt power of the plutocrats themselves. They continue to concentrate their efforts on making money as an end in itself and also through patronage; they have devised a means of continuing to own wealth. Thus, they thwart what this Platform now constructs as “the will of the people.” Having a ‘will,’ being “the intelligent people,” ‘the people’ are no longer a producing class but are also an intellectual body which can discern for itself its own wants, its own needs and its own means of attaining these. For this reason, the concern for governance takes priority in the second People’s Platform (1896). ‘Democracy’ coalesces the social demands into one equivalential chain also further becoming an empty signifier that represents a desire for a nostalgic past and a desire for a future where work guarantees livelihood for oneself and one’s children. In his Preface to A Call to Action (1892), James B. Weaver, who was the presidential candidate for the People’s Party in 1892, also focusses his attention on the notion of ‘evil.’ He sees evil in a society where “wealth producers” and “wealth owners” are distinct entities. He speaks of ‘evil’ in society in general terms: The author’s object in publishing this book is to call attention to some of the more serious evils, which now disturb the repose of American society and threaten the overthrow of free institutions. (Preface, A Call to Action)

220 

M. Macaulay

The evils that Weaver speaks of do not only impoverish ‘the people,’ but also “threaten the overthrow of free institutions.” As in the 1896 Platform of the People’s Party, evil resides in the creation of “an aggressive plutocracy” that has “usurped the Government.” Using the language of ‘theft,’ Weaver argues that this plutocracy has “stolen our commonwealth.” The term ‘commonwealth’ is of importance because it implies that wealth should belong to all and not be hoarded or concentrated in the hands of the rich or plutocrats. It is this concentration of wealth in the hands of a very few that has “threaten[ed] the overthrow of free institutions.” Very much like the Chartists, Weaver saw correction of this evil of concentrated wealth ownership through the ballot box itself. We will see this theme of ‘democracy’ in the discourse of populism in its numerous realizations, but what is striking in Weaver’s construction of democracy is the parallel he draws in its practice with that of revolutionary action. Voting becomes an act of revolutionary zeal with the ‘ballot’ becoming metaphorically a ‘bullet’ to charge the bastion of plutocracy that has corrupted the American nation: It required seven years for our fathers to overthrow the outward manifestation of tyranny in colonial days. But our weapons now are not carnal, but mighty to the pulling down of strongholds. Their children can vanquish the American and British plutocracy combined in a single day—at the ballot box. They have resolved to do it. If this book can in the least aid in the mighty work, we shall be content. (Preface, A Call to Action)

Weaver’s call to action is “the second revolt of the colonies.” Weaver’s marked redefinition of ‘the people’ is as “the patriotic people.” It is “the patriotic people” who redeem “the commonwealth” for all and so defeat the plutocracy that steals wealth from the wealth producers. Although socialist in certain aspects of its expression, the focus in Weaver’s Call to Action and in the Preamble and Platforms of the People’s Party is on populism as a process of redemption, and equally a logical process. The American populists of the nineteenth century do not attempt to alter the economic means of production—the majority are farmers—but they do attempt through an ongoing redefinition of themselves and their opponents, ‘the elite,’ to articulate their own needs and wants along with a

7 Conclusion 

221

romanticized return to an equitable society where there is ‘commonwealth’ rather than a marked distinction between wealth producers and wealth owners.

Prairie Populism The Canadian counterparts of the American People’s Party in the 1890’s some 20 years later struggle with much the same dynamic. However, a romanticized past does not figure prominently in their efforts and attempts to make society whole again. The Farmers’ Platforms of 1916 and 1918 initiate a form of post-war awareness on the part of Canadians, but specifically those in the breadbasket of Canada, the Prairies and Central Canada. Their radicalism or awareness, however, is expressed in a desire to break with a colonial past, something achieved by their American counterparts well over a hundred years earlier. While the earlier American populists functionally distinguished between “wealth producers” and “wealth owners,” The Farmers’ Platform focusses on “The Protective Tariff” as a “corrupting influence” and as an “evil.” Behind this “evil” was a collaboration of “protected interests” aligned with the two major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. This combined interest through “The Protective Tariff” undermined the social order and “public morality.” The elite and in this case an explicitly political elite are seen in moral terms as destroying the society in which they function: And whereas the Protective Tariff is the most wasteful and costly method ever designed for raising national revenue, because for every dollar obtained thereby for the public treasury at least three dollars pass into the pockets of the protected interests, thereby building up a privileged class at the expense of the masses, thus making the rich richer and the poor poorer. (The Farmers’ Platform)

This is a continuation of moral outrage against a privileged class of plutocrats and ‘idlers,’ to use Chartist terminology, who have devised a taxation system that puts money into their own pockets while diminishing the wealth of “the poor.” What is at stake for farmers in the East and

222 

M. Macaulay

West is “the greatly increased costs of agricultural implements and machinery, clothing, boots and shoes, building material and practically everything the farmer has to buy, caused [my emphasis] by the Protective Tariff” (The Farmers’ Platform). The tariff becomes an existential threat to the farmer’s way of life. The social demands that arise out of this awareness of the ‘evil’ of a protective tariff are free trade, “direct taxation,” “proportional representation,” and significantly a clear break with British colonialization. Direct taxation more than any other social demand argues for wealth to be generated through taxes from personal income, inheritance, land ownership and the profits made by big corporations. The ownership of wealth, therefore, is to be redistributed rather than concentrated in the hands of “protected interests.” Public lands will be kept in the interests of the public and “railway, water, and aerial transportation, telephone, telegraph and express systems…natural power and of coal mining” would be publicly owned. This is comparable to the social demands of the People’s Platform of 1896, but it is also a proactively protective measure to ensure that “a privileged class” not appropriate such resources for their own use. The break with Great Britain is not as pronounced as that concerning the eastern plutocrats articulated in the People’s Party Platforms of 1892 and 1896 nor as explicitly revolutionary as that proposed by James Weaver in his enunciation of a “patriotic people” engaging in a second revolutionary war, but it is nonetheless significant. The Farmers’ Platform provides for the renunciation of British titles on the part of Canadian citizens. Although this practice continued and mostly famously with the Canadian newspaper baron Lord Beaverbrook in the 1940’s who was closely allied with Winston Churchill as Prime Minister of Great Britain, the idea of discontinuing the use of British titles symbolized a rejection of the British class system itself. The King or Queen of Great Britain remained the King or Queen of Canada, but Canada would no longer participate in the essentially feudal peerage system. Canadians would go on to establish their own merit system, but without the necessity of

7 Conclusion 

223

kneeling to the Attorney General1 or receiving a sword tap on the shoulder. With both William Aberhart and with the CCF in the 30’s and 40’s in Canada we see expression of populist rupture between elites and “the people” through economic proposals attempting respectively to address capitalism. I will examine these economic systems after I address the populist core of their messages that provides a continuation of the Chartist distinction between the ‘idlers’ and “the people.” Both Aberhart and J.S. Woodsworth of the CCF responded to the Great Depression of the 1930’s. What did this mean for the farmers of Eastern and specifically Western Canada and what did it mean for workers generally? Using his considerable organization skill, Aberhart originally brought this skill to the shop floors of workers in Calgary who formed “Social Credit groups.” Through money raised by urban workers, he was able to expand his message over radio broadly into rural Alberta. Over three years he created a movement. With Aberhart as with James Weaver we see a populist leader tapping into genuine distress, what Laclau refers to as “unmet needs.” For the farmer, the most significant of these needs is to be able to continue running their farm. The conflict between the “wealth owners” and the “wealth producers” is best seen in Aberhart’s reading of a farmer’s letter during his March 26, 1935 broadcast on CFCN in Alberta: I am a young farmer in this district trying in an honest way to meet my obligations. It is impossible even to be honest. If I did not once in a while charge these financiers unrighteously, they would squeeze the last drop of life blood out of me and my family. The other day I was in the Bank talking to the Manager. I put my needs before him, in order for him to give me advice. He started abusing the farmers for not knowing how to farm….the farmers could make money even during these days if they wouldn’t try to get rich all at once. I tell you, these fellows can tell the farmer off, can’t they? He says the likes of these should not be driving a car. I should not try to farm with tractors… (William Aberhart’s Radio Broadcasts, iw-­glen-­1985, Alberta on Record, [March 26, 1935])

 The Attorney General in Canada serves to represent the King or Queen while he or she is not present in the country. 1

224 

M. Macaulay

In this letter read out by Aberhart, the “young farmer” attempts to express his “needs” which he puts before the banker or the financier. During the depression this farmer is asking for money to buy the goods and implements needed to run his farm. What is most telling from the point of view of agonism between the wealth producer and the wealth owner is the farmer’s admittance of lying to the banker: “If I did not once in a while charge these financiers unrighteously, they would squeeze the last drop of life blood out of me and my family.” The image created is not just that of a pack of ‘idlers’ but of vultures who would take everything, and thus “squeeze the life’s blood out of me and my family”—someone who is poor would be made only poorer still to the point of failure to thrive. Aberhart’s response is remarkably telling: That’s right, bend down and crawl into a hole. I suppose some of these financiers would like you to crawl on your hands and knees to rake the field with your fingers. I’m telling you something and you had better listen to me. If you farmers don’t hit this thing hard during the next election, the time will come when you will have to do without cars—not only to live without cars and combines and tractors, but without meat or white bread, alas. (William Aberhart’s Radio Broadcasts, iw-glen-1985, Alberta  on Record, [March 26, 1935])

Aberhart expands on the farmer’s imagery: “I suppose some of these financiers would like you to crawl on your hands and knees to rake the field with your fingers…the time will come when you will have to do without cars—not only to live without cars and combines and tractors, but without meat or white bread.” From the metaphor of squeezing “life’s blood,” Aberhart represents the farmer as being on his hands and knees using his fingers to rake the fields, attempting to ‘farm’ without having any implements except those of his own arms and digits. This is a vision of reduced humanity because the banking system would not afford the farmer the means to live and survive. The ‘elite’ represented here is beyond that of being idle; it does not comprehend ‘work’ at all. It may own wealth but has no understanding of its production. The ‘elite’ presented in Aberhart’s discourse is cognitively incapable of grasping the experience or needs of others. It is an elite divorced from ‘the people’ who suffer to work in society. The rupture or divide in Laclauan terms is so great that

7 Conclusion 

225

the needs expressed by the farmers have no response, or rather a response devoid of logic or reason. Aberhart therefore tells the farmers, as does James B. Weaver in 1892, to “hit this thing hard during the next election.” ‘Hitting this thing hard’ is equivalent in many ways to patriotically using the ballot box as a weapon. The overarching popular demand Aberhart constructs is for “social credit” that aggregates the need for basic survival, tools for work and bread on the table. Social credit, which Aberhart facilely compares to the existing banking system, addresses unmet needs and the social demand of “credit” to meet those needs during a depression. The notion of “social credit” is not altogether different from that of a basic income proposed today, although more intricate in terms of exchanges of credit in a credit system. But through ‘social credit’ Aberhart effectively proposes the replacement of the existing banking system and thus “financiers” themselves with an altogether different system where an ‘elite’ does not exist. ‘Wealth’ becomes a social construct and is realized through social means. We can compare William Aberhart’s use of the young farmer’s narrative to Tommy Douglas’ allegory of Mouseland. Douglas told the story of Mouseland during his campaigns to get elected as the Premier of Saskatchewan. It is his equivalent of “hitting it hard” in Aberhart’s terms, if not quite identical to Weaver’s patriotic voting. The allegory of Mouseland is significant because it articulates the rupture between the ‘elite’ represented metaphorically by cats, and ‘the people’ represented metaphorically by mice. The conundrum or contradiction in Douglas’ story is that within the narrative world he creates, the mice are voting mice and more significantly mice who vote for cats. The basic and most prominent unmet need on the part of the mice is to be represented by one of their own. What Douglas’ story reveals is a failure on the part of the mice to both recognize and articulate their own needs and in turn their own will. The rupture is there, but it is not recognized. So the mice keep electing cats, sometimes black, sometimes white, sometime multi-­ coloured and sometimes with spots, but always cats. Douglas’ purpose is to foreground the simple fact that the cats, as an elite, act in their own interests. But more than this in acting in their own interests the cats act against the interests of the mice, and so they make the mouseholes bigger and the mice run slower and so easier to catch: “All the laws were good

226 

M. Macaulay

laws—For cats. But, oh, they were hard on mice.” In his extended metaphor of the mice and the cats, Douglas exemplifies the ‘elite’ as predatory, not simply uncomprehending as in Aberhart’s farmer’s story. The mice vote for cats that wish to kill them. However gentle the humour in Douglas’ story, at the heart of his message is the predatory behaviour of the “big, fat” cats. It is for this reason that one lone little mouse asks “Look fellows, why do we keep electing a government made up of cats? Why don’t we elect a government made up of mice?” The Regina Manifesto of 1933 sets out the kind of government that would benefit the mice who metaphorically represent Saskatchewanians. The Regina Manifesto is far more revolutionary than William Aberhart’s popular demand for ‘social credit.’ Although Aberhart intends to remove the bankers and the financiers, the Manifesto seeks a much broader scope. We aim [my emphasis] to replace the present capitalist system with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government based upon economic equality will be possible. (Preamble, The Regina Manifesto)

The key concept throughout the Manifesto is the notion of ‘planning.’ What triggers this planning, which in essence is the principal social demand of this manifesto, is behaviour by an elite that is characterised as in Douglas’ Mouseland as “predatory”: Power has become more and more concentrated into the hands of a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists and to their predatory interests the majority are habitually sacrificed. (The Regina Manifesto)

We again see the language of ‘sacrifice’ that we see in the Preamble to the People’s Party in 1892. The need and the social demand are for a system where the cats cannot insert their paws into the mouseholes and further make the mice slow down in the process of chase. To counteract “a minority of financiers and industrialists,” the Manifesto seeks ‘commonwealth.’ The most radical notion in the Manifesto is that of social

7 Conclusion 

227

ownership, not unlike that proposed by The Farmers’ Platform. There would be “socialization of transportation, communications, electric power and all other industries and services essential to social planning” to ensure that “The welfare of the community must take supremacy over the claims of private wealth” (The Regina Manifesto). Such social demands articulated as a ‘manifesto’ or public expression of a people’s will coalesce with a recognition of a profound rupture between private wealth as a “cancer” and the people’s unmet needs, in this case the people of Saskatchewan. Ultimately, under Tommy Douglas, socialization was brought to medicine and resulted in a state-run health service, termed ‘Medicare,’ which further became established as law in Canada as a whole.

Preston Manning and The Reform Party Preston Manning’s creation of the Reform Party had an equally great impact on Canadian politics as did the creation of the Social Credit Party of William Aberhart and the CCF by J.S.  Woodsworth and Tommy Douglas. Manning’s populism is a radical departure from that of the People’s Party and the Prairie Populism that went before. Manning’s populism is largely constructed but nonetheless immensely influential. If we view the Chartist Movement as a type of template, Manning’s Reform Party bears only superficial relationship. As Dobbin (1991) points out, it was necessary for Manning to select the right moment when he could launch his own movement or party. There had been many nationalistic right-wing parties that had attempted to break through in Western Canada but had essentially died after a brief public exposure. Manning’s time came in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in the wake of nationalism within Quebec with its desire for separation from Canada. Dobbin notes, But what the free trade deal did for Brian Mulroney’s Conservatives was quickly undone by Meech Lake and the GST. More than any other province, these issues touched the rawest of nerves in Alberta. Mulroney’s perceived “kow-towing” to Quebec with Meech Lake was reaffirmed in spades, and his back room dealing and “roll the dice” approach reinforced the feeling that they had no voice in Ottawa. (1991, p. 117)

228 

M. Macaulay

To address the resurgent nationalism of Quebec, federal and provincial leaders under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney reached what was termed the Meech-Lake Accord. “Opposition to the Meech-Lake Accord” is one of the main planks of the 1988 Leader’s Foreward to the Blue Book written by Manning. Throughout his Foreward, Manning rejects the dominant hegemony of an ’English’/’French’ split in terms of Canadian identity but more significantly rejects the Meech-Lake Accord that would serve to keep Quebec in Canada. Manning and “we reformers” rejected “The enacting of amendments improving Quebec’s position [my emphasis] without concurrent amendments improving the position of the Western Provinces, the Atlantic Provinces and Northern Canada.” Through the Meech-Lake Accord Quebec would achieve status as a “distinct society” within Canada. What became Lower Canada populated largely by francophone speakers was united with Upper Canada after the fall of the French in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (September 13, 1759). The British North American Act 1774 granted the French colonists within the new ‘Canada’ freedom of language and religion. Given these rights, further granting Quebec status as a ‘distinct society’ should not have been controversial. However, Manning’s perception of the Meech-Lake accord was that Quebec was gaining priority within Canadian confederation. He saw and represented the Accord not as granting Quebec a longstanding cultural identity but rather as depriving other provinces and specifically what he termed ‘the West’ from equivalent advantages. Manning thus constructs ‘the West’ as a people out of the perception that this ‘people’ were deprived of cultural and economic rights in a new reconfiguration of Canada through Meech Lake. Manning constructed a rupture between what he now terms ‘The West’ and the rest of Canada. He integrated a marked regionalism into the already fraught discourse surrounding the notion of ‘Canada’ as a country and as a society. Manning’s populism is regional based on the idea that there is a ‘West’ the needs of which have been ignored by a dominant elite in the ‘East,’ which has acted to further privilege the needs of one particular group, those in Quebec. Thus, “The West Wants In!” A very significant idea that does connect Preston Manning’s populism to that of earlier realizations and does go back to the Chartists is the idea that Alberta and ‘the West’ are the wealth producers of Canada. Manning

7 Conclusion 

229

refers to ‘the West’ as “the resource-producing regions.” The term ‘resource’ refers to oil production rather than wheat or grain production. In the scenario Manning provides, the “resource-producing regions” have no representation in the federal government. This he refers to as “unfair treatment” and “injustice.” This primary “unmet need,” failure of representation on the part of ‘the West,’ results in the five social demands Manning makes in his 1988 Blue Book: “‘triple-E Senate,’ ‘regional fairness tests,’ ‘popular ratification of Constitutional Change,’ ‘entrenchment of Property Rights,’ and ‘Opposition to the Meech-Lake Accord.’” Opposition to the Meech-Lake Accord is perhaps foremost because it represents opposition to a society where Quebec and the ‘East’ are privileged. The others follow: a Senate where interests are represented in regional terms rather than political party terms; “regional fairness tests” to determine fairness in taxation amongst the regions but especially the “resource producing regions”; “property rights” for corporations involved in “resource produc[tion]”; and a form of ‘direct democracy’ in “popular ratification of Constitutional Change.” Concomitant with the social demand of “popular ratification of Constitutional Change,” Preston Manning further articulates a ‘people’ beyond that of ‘the West’: “We believe [my emphasis] in the common sense of the common people, their right to be consulted on public policy matters before major decisions are made, their right to choose their own leaders and to govern themselves through truly representative and responsible institutions, and their right to directly initiate legislation for which substantial public support is demonstrated.” This is a direct appeal to a “common people,” but equally to “the common sense of the common people.” While Tommy Douglas might have pointed out that this was another means for mice to vote for cats (oil producers), Manning appeals first to regional identity and within that regional identity to a notion of personal enfranchisement. The ‘will of the people’ would be realised through direct democratic means. In the later Blue Books where Manning seeks to represent the Reform Party as a federal party, he nonetheless continues to articulate a hyperregionalized vision of Canada. Rather than arguing that “The West Wants In!” he argues for what he terms a ‘New Canada’ as “a balanced, democratic federation of provinces.” Thus, there is no longer a Canadian

230 

M. Macaulay

Confederation of Provinces [my emphasis], but rather a “balanced, democratic federation [my emphasis].” The model proposed is the American model of quasi-independent states in a loose federation. Manning thus promotes the “equality” of provinces in a decentralized Canada. This is a radical reconfiguration of Canada as a nation state. To justify such decentralization Manning must construct an ‘elite.’ This elite is not the ‘idlers’ of the Chartist Movement or the Robber Barons of 1890’s America, or the vested interests, bankers and financiers of Prairie Populism, it is rather the idea of Central Canada itself: The Reform Party supports the renewal of the Canadian confederation as a more balanced federation, in which the arsenal of centralizing powers at the hands of the Federal Government and the over-concentration of powers in the hands of the executive and Cabinet are placed under reasonable restraints. Legislative authority should rest with the level of government able to govern most effectively in each area, with a bias towards decentralization in cases of uncertainty. (The Blue Book, 1997)

Balanced federalism is contrasted to “the arsenal of centralizing powers at the hands of the Federal Government and the over-concentration of powers in the hands of the executive and Cabinet.” Manning employs the metaphor of weaponry. The Federal Government is not only weaponized with an arsenal, but also in the conceit he employs the Federal Government makes war upon its own citizens by having in its “hands” an “arsenal of centralizing powers’ and “the executive and Cabinet.” This is a populist construction of government as overpowerful and implicitly corrupt. We see the same representation of government in the language of the People’s Party and in that of Prairie populists. The closest metaphorically to what Manning provides is James B. Weaver’s appeal to a “patriotic people” who use the ballot box as a weapon to bring about a second American Revolution. In Manning’s metaphor, the central government of Canada is weaponized against its own population thus requiring through the ballot box what he terms a “federation” of equal provinces. Conceptualizing ‘Canada’ in populist terms gives Manning and those that support and follow him a powerful means of challenging the status quo and so asserting the rights and privileges of a new type of citizenry, less ‘Canadian’ and

7 Conclusion 

231

more regional. But ultimately Manning’s argument to regional identity opposed by a centralized government serves the interests of one group within the principal region of Manning’s focus, the “resource producers.”

 esurgences of American Populism: Donald R Trump and Bernie Sanders In looking at the resurgence of American Populism in the teens and twenties of the twenty-first century with Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, we see a parallel response to the eruptions of social problems and issues stemming from the Recession of 2008. I examine one speech from Bernie Sanders given in Council Bluffs Iowa; Sanders presents a consistent representation of the world over his two political campaigns for President, one in 2015/2016 and the other in 2019/2020. Sander’s populism over this period is entirely consistent with that of the Chartist Movement. But equally so is that of Donald Trump in his campaign for President in 2015/2016. There are marked differences between the two figures in 2015/2016 but there are also marked similarities. There is a reason numerous Sanders’ supporters voted for Donald Trump in 2016 rather than the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton. Both Sanders and Trump during this period exhibited what we could term ‘left populism.’ Trump’s xenophobia regarding the world beyond The United States complemented his hostility to the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and so provides a major contrast between him and Sanders during the 2015/2016 campaign period, nonetheless, his focus on jobs put Trump squarely in the same territory of “unmet needs” as that of Bernie Sanders who equally attacked the outsourcing of jobs, Wall Street and the 1%. But while Sanders remains consistent in his populist message Trump does not. Within a year of gaining the Presidency he shifted to an explicitly right-­ wing or neo-populist message expanding on his earlier xenophobia and developing it into hostility not just to the ‘other’ but to an American ‘other.’

232 

M. Macaulay

We need to first look at Trump in 2016 and Sanders in 2019. They equally share contempt for the ‘idlers’ defined by the Chartist Movement. For Trump in 2016 it is quite clear who the ‘idlers’ are: We are going to stop the product dumping, the unfair foreign subsidies, and the currency manipulation that is absolutely killing our companies. And by the way killing our jobs… Ohio has lost nearly one in three manufacturing jobs since NAFTA and nearly one in four manufacturing jobs since China entered the World Trade Organization. That’s really something. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

Trump focusses on the metaphorical ‘killing’ of “our companies” and “our jobs.” He sees massive trade imbalance and subsequent jobs loss for Americans. He then focusses attention on those who have caused this situation to occur: These are deals made at the top. We have no leadership…Our trade deficit in goods in the world is now $800 billion. Trade deficit. Can you imagine. This subtracts directly from our growth. Our economy grew only 1.1 percent in the last quarter. Total disaster…This is the legacy of Barack Obama. This is the legacy of Hillary Clinton. If you for any reason have a really bad day and its Hillary Clinton, it will be four more years of Obama, but worse. It will be four years of high taxes, four more years of ISIS growing all over the place, four more years of Obamacare going up 40, 50, 60 percent. Nobody can afford it. The deductibles are so high it doesn’t work anyway. You have to be hit by a truck and die slowly, very very slowly. You’ll never get to use it. That’s ok. Don’t get hit by a truck. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

As in other populist analyses, Trump’s focus is on a particular elite who he represents as incompetent in absolute terms: “total disaster.” This elite is represented by the current president of The United States, Barack Obama, and his potential successor, Hillary Clinton. The economy is not simply dying but is being killed. With Obamacare the deductibles are so high that having been hit by a truck one has to die slowly in order to gain access to any coverage. Trump presents an image of a profoundly

7 Conclusion 

233

dystopian world. He also links Hillary Clinton with Wall Street, what Bernie Sanders refers to as the 1%: Hillary Clinton is funded by Wall Street and hedge fund managers. My campaign is powered by my money and also by small-dollar donations from people working all across the country who want a better future for their children. (Wilmington Ohio Speech, September 1, 2016a)

We have a clear divide between Hillary Clinton, Wall Street and hedge fund managers and Trump himself whose campaign is funded by his own money and that of ‘the people,’ who can only make small contributions. Reference to “hedge fund managers” is a clear reference to those who manipulate money within the stock market, a modern day version of the Chartist’s idlers. Trump aligns himself with “the people” and further represents himself as their “voice”: “I am fighting for everyone who doesn’t have a voice. We are soon going to have a voice. I am fighting for the forgotten men and women of America. Forgotten—believe me forgotten. I am your voice.” In such an analysis Trump actually embodies himself within that of the American people. We have both metonymy, the ‘voice’ as representative of the whole, and metaphor since Trump himself enters into the body of the American people to become its voice. As such he can thus give voice to the will of the people who have been “forgotten.” Overall Trump presents a picture of not a dying America but an America being killed just like the person who needs to die slowly to be able to afford the deductibles on their Obamacare. There is obvious rupture between the ‘elite’ represented by Hillary Clinton and ‘the people’ represented by Donald Trump: “It is the powerful protecting the powerful; insiders fighting for insiders. I am fighting for you, believe me…We will make America strong again. We will make America safe again. We will make America prosperous again. We will make America great again.” The battles between “the powerful” and “the powerful” and “insiders” and “insiders” creates a forgotten people who require someone to express their unmet needs and social demands. Trump supporters as a ‘people’ are created through Trump’s articulation of their unmet needs, but importantly he does this as part of the people itself.

234 

M. Macaulay

While Trump incorporates himself as part of the America people, Bernie Sanders aligns himself with the American people. Rather than the metaphor of the ‘body,’ he employs the metaphor of the ‘family.’ He speaks to his “brothers and sisters.” In Sanders 2019 Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, he sets out a very clear definition of the ‘elite’: The principles of our government will be based on justice, economic justice. social justice and environmental justice. Tonight, I want to welcome you to a campaign which tells the powerful special interests who control so much of our economic and political life that we will no longer tolerate the greed of Wall Street, Corporate America and the billionaire class—greed which has resulted in this country having more income and wealth inequality than any other country on earth. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, 2019)

Much like Trump, Sanders goes after Wall Street, but unlike Trump he also includes “Corporate America and the billionaire class.” Very much like the founders of the People’s Party Sanders focusses his attention on plutocracy, and thus the contrast between the wealth owners and the wealth producers. Further, reminiscent of the two platforms of the People’s Party and James B. Weaver’s A Call to Action (1892), Sanders identifies a key lack in the American political system: “we are going to create a political system which is based on the democratic principles of one person—one vote—and end a corrupt system which allows billionaires to buy elections” (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, 2019). A major lack in the current American political system, as was the case 130 years previously, was ‘democracy’ itself. Sanders focusses his attention on the Super PACs that independently support specific social or political positions and can in turn influence political campaigns significantly. Sanders’ famous request in his speeches was to ask how much individual contributors provided to his campaign. The answer was always $27. Trump too claimed that he was supported by individual donations unlike Hillary Clinton who was supported by Wall Street. However, Sanders’ attack on “billionaires” is more direct and forceful. The word billionaire itself implicates excess wealth echoing the Chartists terminology of ‘idlers.’ In his 2019 Iowa speech Sanders identifies two other members of the ‘elite’: Donald Trump himself and Agri-business.

7 Conclusion 

235

Where Trump focusses much of his attention on the outsourcing of jobs by Multi-National Corporations, an issue raised by Sanders also, Sanders in his 2019 Iowa speech looks much more closely at the unmet needs of individual farmers who own their own land. What he describes is almost feudal given the increasing control Big Agra exerts over family farms: In Vermont, Iowa and all across rural America, we have seen family farmers go out of business as the prices they receive for their products decline rapidly and large agri-business corporations and factory farming take over agriculture… brothers and sisters. We need policies for rural America that represent the needs of working people and farmers, not agri-business and multi-national corporations. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, 2019)

Making a cohesive link between “family farmers” and himself through the appellation of “brothers and sisters,” Sanders creates strong co-­ identification between himself and “working people and farmers.” What binds them together is the recognition of a clear unmet need: It is not acceptable to me that the top four packing companies control more than 80 percent of the beef market, 63 percent of the pork market, and 53 percent of the chicken market…In many communities, there really is only one buyer, which means food producers are at their mercy. They must use that corporation’s feed and livestock, they must accept that corporation’s cost, and they must accept that corporations’ lower and lower payment rates. (Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, 2019)

While the Canadian Farmers’ Platform complained of export and import taxes as did Donald Trump in his 2015/2016 campaign, Sanders complains of the lack of Anti-Trust laws that prevent what can be described as a quasi-feudal system where “food producers” must sell to one company and equally buy feed and livestock from that company and “must accept that corporation’s costs.” What he describes is a system of entrapment that pushes family farmers out of their own farms and establishes the dominance of Agri-Business as a power. The refrain of big business as an ‘elite,’ in opposition to the ‘people’ goes back over a hundred

236 

M. Macaulay

years. What is marked here however is the complete elimination of the family farm through take-over by Agri-Businesses. In the controlled system Sanders describes ‘the people’ are losing or have lost their livelihoods. Just as Trump wishes to bring back manufacturing jobs so Sanders, speaking to farmers in Iowa, wants to bring back and protect the family farm. At the beginning of his 2019 Iowa speech Sanders references three types of justice: “economic justice. social justice and environmental justice.” He contrasts these with “greed.” While Trump does address economic justice in wanting to return industrial jobs back to Americans, and social justice in opposing the high cost of Obamacare, he has little to say about environmental justice supporting to a very large extent coal production, Sanders conversely set outs these three types of justice as clear unmet needs the absence of which has produced rupture in the American state. Moreover, like his predecessors in the People’s Party and their Canadian counterparts of The Farmers’ Platform and the CCF, he identifies plutocracy or greed or “wealth owners” as the essence of ‘the elite’ in opposition to the people. The ‘people,’ his family or movement, comes into existence through identification of unmet needs and accompanying social demands as well as a clear identification of the wealth owners or “billionaire class.” If we return to Donald Trump’s as a populist leader, his Youngstown Speech and his January 6, 2021 ‘Numbers’ Speech differ dramatically from that made by Trump in 2016 and Sanders in 2019. These latter speeches are consistent with classic populism. Both Trump and Sanders devote a great deal of their speechmaking to the notion of an ‘elite.’ Both in fact target Wall Street and big corporations, Trump focussing on global corporations that have outsourced jobs and Sanders focussing on “billionaires” and Big Agra that have eliminated family farms. However, Trump’s Youngstown Speech and his Numbers Speech take a radically different turn. In Trump’s Youngstown Speech there is only implicit reference to an ‘elite’: We have to protect our industry. And now we are going to start, we are reclaiming our heritage as a manufacturing nation…We are going to bring back our jobs, bring back our wealth, and we are going to bring back our

7 Conclusion 

237

dreams, and we are going to bring back, once again, our sovereignty as a nation. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

In stating “We are going to bring back our jobs, bring back our wealth,” Trump implicates that corporations within the United States as well as government has failed in creating both jobs and wealth. There is no absolute divide between ‘wealth producers’ and ‘wealth owners,’ although there is implicit recognition that the American worker has been deprived of livelihood by manufacturing and governmental incompetence. However, in his Youngstown Speech given only six months after Trump achieved his presidency, Trump’s focus is not on jobs but on a cultural divide within the United States itself. We can see this speech as answering three questions: ‘who are the American people?’; ‘what has Trump done?’; ‘who are the enemies of the American people?’. Trump’s concern in this epideictic speech is to represent himself as the Saviour of the American People who is no longer ‘making America great’ but making America safe. The great unmet need on the part of the American people is safety rather than jobs per se. The xenophobia that one sees in Trump’s earlier campaign speeches is magnified and thematized as the primary subject matter. If we can speak of an ‘elite’ in this speech, it is an implicit elite that has allowed ‘America’ to be threatened by invading aliens supported by internal enemies who have facilitated such jeopardy for its citizens. Exploiting a Wild West trope Trump states, We are actually liberating towns and cities. We are liberating—people screaming from their windows, thank you, thank you to the border patrol and to General Kelly’s great people that come in and grab the thugs and throw them the hell out. We are liberating our towns and we are liberating our cities. Can you believe we have to do that? (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Trump’s rhetorical question, “Can you believe we have to do that?” implicates incompetence on the part of Obama’s administration. This situation of illegal immigration is so dire that “We are actually liberating towns and cities.” Quite literally as a ‘liberator’ Trump positions and represents himself as a saviour of his people. Trump appropriates a Wild

238 

M. Macaulay

West narrative where there is a frontier between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized.’ What is important in his construction of the uncivilized whom Trump defines as “illegal gang members, drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals and killers…predators and criminal aliens” is that this grouping is complemented by Americans who support them through sanctuary cities. In examining the notion of ‘sanctuary,’ Trump demands sanctuary FROM rather than FOR “criminal aliens.” He further describes such aliens as animals who have “sliced and diced” a beautiful young woman. By invoking slasher films Trump invokes a horror scene, further extending this state of horror to the United States itself. Transparently Trump’s purpose is to create fear, but equally a vision of himself and his administration as saviours of the true American people. This true American people are defined early in his speech as “believers”: Everyone in this arena is united by their love, and you know that. Do we know that? Everyone. United by their love for this country and their loyalty to one another, their loyalty to its people. And we want people to come into our country who can love us and cherish us and be proud of America and the American flag. We believe that schools should teach our children to have pride in our history and respect for that great American flag. We all believe in the rule of law, and we support the incredible men and women of law enforcement. (Youngstown, Ohio Speech, July 25, 2017)

Like Preston Manning, Trump positions his audience in the Covelli Centre as being part of a congregation who are “United by their love for this country and their loyalty to one another, their loyalty to its people.” Trump’s Youngstown Speech is populist in its construction of a ‘people’ through the unmet need of safety and political security. Thus, “We all believe in the rule of law, and we support the incredible men and women of law enforcement.” In their valuation of law and order, and their “loyalty to its people,’ this ‘people’ contrast with ‘another’ American people who do not share such values and who support illegal immigration and violation of America’s borders. We do not have an ‘elite’ in populist terms; we have instead an alien and disloyal ‘other’ American. In his Youngstown Speech, Trump’s vision of ‘America’ is profoundly diminished and narrow. Given only seven months after his inauguration as President, this speech

7 Conclusion 

239

has hallmarks of proto-fascism as well as populism. Umberto Eco (1995) delineates 14 features of fascism. Of these we see three in Trump’s Youngstown Speech: disagreement as treason, the presence of an enemy that is both too strong and too weak as well as selective populism. Trump emphasizes loyalty, the violence of outside uncivilized forces and his power to counter and overthrow these forces as well as a cohesive ‘people’ that shares a belief system that enshrines loyalty and law and order. In Donald Trump’s January 6, 2021 Speech, his most important along with his Presidential Announcement Speech in 2015, Trump returns to a constant populist theme, that of democracy itself and the saving of democracy. These concerns go back to the People’s Party’s concern with democratic process, James B. Weaver’s articulation of a “patriotic people,” Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland, Preston Manning’s concern for “direct democracy,” and Bernie Sanders’ concern for direct democracy through direct contributions to political campaigns. The idea of ‘democracy’ is almost sacrosanct in the American political system as is the idea of voting as a citizen’s right if not obligation. Along with other populists, Trump’s concern with democratic process is strong and marked. In his January 6, 2021 Speech, Trump alleges voter fraud: In every single swing state, local officials, state officials, almost all Democrats, made illegal and unconstitutional changes to election procedures without the mandated approvals by the state legislatures. That these changes paved the way for fraud on a scale never seen before, I think we go a long way outside of our country when I say that. (January 6, 2021 Speech)

While Bernie Sanders alleges that a billionaire class buys votes and elected representatives, Trump alleges that voter fraud was carried out in “every single swing state” by “local officials, state officials, almost all Democrats.” The ‘elite’ in Trump’s January 6, 2021 speech were not vested interests, bankers, millionaires or billionaires but officials from one political party that rigged a campaign in order to regain power at the federal level. Trump makes the claim that there was “ballot-harvesting,” oversubscription of mail-in ballots, the dead voting, votes tallied after the election, and ballots given more than once allowing voters to vote twice. Trump repeatedly narrates a flawed election, using fraud twice, illegal

240 

M. Macaulay

three times, against the law once, and cheat once. He also projects a catastrophic future: You will have an illegitimate president. That’s what you’ll have. And we can’t let that happen. (January 6, 2021 Speech)

Trump’s use of “we” here is very important. He has set out a case for unmet needs, specifically the unmet need for democratic process. This places him in a long tradition of populist leaders or spokespersons. He does not advocate for direct democracy but for a reform of democratic election practice. But he also invokes a directive: “we can’t let that happen.” Technically this is an indirect directive invoking the preparatory condition but coming from Trump as then President it functions much as an order. And who are the “we”? The ‘we’ are the 250,000 followers in the immediate area of the Ellipse, those watching at home on tv and those whom broadly Trump would call, like James B. Weaver, ‘patriots.’ In an extraordinary act of argumentation Trump maintains that by ignoring or violating the American Constitution, the “we” will actually save it: And many people in Congress want it sent back. And think of what you’re doing. Let’s say you don’t do it. Somebody says, ‘Well, we have to obey the Constitution.’ And you are, because you’re protecting our country and you’re protecting the Constitution. (January 6, 2021 Speech)

In a remarkable act of convoluted reasoning Trump maintains that “protecting our country” equates with “protecting the Constitution” even if it means failing to observe this very Constitution. In this reasoning we have an inverted notion of law and order, in that by defying law and order we actually uphold it. This is a fundamental contradiction in logic. Nonetheless the idea of violating the Constitution is represented by Trump as a patriotic act, thus appealing to an American revolutionary tradition that goes back to 1776. A patriotic people is created through this representation of ‘democracy’ as an unmet need. What we have in such action is not right-wing or left-wing populism but a form of inverted populism. As with Preston Manning, populist argument has been constructed on the basis of unmet needs that have

7 Conclusion 

241

dubious grounds. However, for most Americans the empty signifier of ‘democracy’ carries enormous symbolic weight. It is this weight that Trump brings to bear in his January 6, 2021 Speech. This speech has also been informed by the proto-fascist/populist speeches that Trump gives after his inauguration such as his Youngstown speech where he constructs a divided America between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized.’

Ford Nation The Ford brothers, Rob and Doug, like Donald Trump, also represent a blended populism. Behind their populism there is a small ‘c’ conservative ideology concerned with the cost of government and the spending power of citizens as individuals. But along with this small ‘c’ conservative ideology there is also expression of deep empathy for and interest in ‘the little guy.’ We can look first at Rob Ford, who, despite being a millionaire who co-owned with his brother a labels company, constructs and positions himself as an average guy up against an elite composed of latte-drinking downtown Torontonians, exploitative Toronto city councillors and landlords. While Donald Trump represents himself as the ‘voice’ and as a saviour of the working class, Rob Ford’s major rhetorical feat is to represent and position himself as one of the people. In this he parallels Bernie Sanders and earlier populist forerunners. He does not speak for ‘the people’; he is ‘the people.’ Rob Ford embraced what Moffitt (2016) refers to as “ordinariness.” Although this may have been a persona, Ford, warts and all, showed himself to be a genuine human being who talked and acted like a ‘regular guy.’ While on the Jimmy Kimmel Late Night Show (NBC Network) the following exchange takes place between Kimmel and Ford: Kimmel: Ford: Kimmel:

Why are you here? What good can come of it? Have you ever seen this show? I had some crazy guy call me on my cell phone and say “This is Jimmy Kimmel. I want you to come on my show.” It’s your own fault because you give your phone number out to everybody and I got a hold of it and imagine my shock

242 

Ford: Kimmel: Ford: Kimmel:

Ford:

M. Macaulay

when you actually answered the phone and said ‘Yeh OK, I’ll come out there.’ Absolutely. It’s all about customer service. Yeh, and I’m not even a customer. Everyone’s a customer you know. You give your phone number out to everyone. I picked you up at the airport—I don’t even pick my mother up at the airport—and you give your phone number out to people. I imagine you’ve probably been doing that the whole time. (Ford takes a card out from his pocket putting it on Kimmel’s desk) Is that a good idea? Why not? (Mayor Ford on Jimmy Kimmel, Part One, Breakfast Television, March 14, 2014)

In this exchange, Kimmel registers his disbelief that the mayor of a major North American city would give his phone number out to anyone he encounters. Ford’s simple response is “Why not?” Ford positions himself as a politician who is available and responsive. People can contact him, talk to him and he will help them. He is simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary. He believes in “customer service,” but he is also one with the customer. Above all, Ford is not part of an ‘elite.’ He represents himself as a servant of ‘the people.’ Apart from being just an ordinary guy as well as a servant, Rob Ford does represent himself as a saviour: You know what, folks, just come with me to any Toronto housing project. Let’s go to Malvern, let’s go to Jamestown, to Finch. Let’s go to some of the toughest areas in the city and see what Rob Ford has done. I have cleaned up Toronto Community housing. They’ve got my number. I go right in there. I don’t let them live with holes in their walls anymore. No windows or cockroaches or mice running around. Absolutely not. I stick up for the poor people of this city. And these people do not deserve to live how they are living. And I’m the one who’s clearing it up. Go talk to the people at Community Housing (FordNation, Episode 5, Looking out for Everyone, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s)

7 Conclusion 

243

In the narrative from an episode of FordNation on YouTube, Ford provides a narrative of going to city-owned housing projects for lower-­ income families; Ford creates a role for himself that is beyond that of a social worker. He positions himself as an agent for immediate change in the lives of “the poor people”: “They’ve got my number. I go right in there.” Rob Ford’s populism is grounded in his activism. Significantly, he not only has direct knowledge of these projects and can name them (Malvern, Jamestown, Finch), but also he can express sympathy and empathy for those living in these housing projects: “I stick up for the poor people of this city. And these people do not deserve to live how they are living.” This reflects a consistent populist reflection of the diminished living conditions of ‘the people’ going back to the People’s Party. This is a very clear unmet need: To live decently in a state of cleanliness and warmth. On the one hand Rob Ford positions himself as an average guy, “I am an average hard-working guy that goes to work every day and comes home to their family takes my kids out supports my wife and family and does whatever I can” (FordNation, Episode 6, Ready for Late Night?, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s)); on the other he is a kind of superman who attends individually to needs of the poor throughout the city of Toronto. Rob Ford’s capacity to blend ordinariness and extraordinariness is the hallmark of his populism. Donald Trump never succeeds in such representation; Sanders never tries. Nor do we see this in Prairie Populism or the earlier populism of the People’s Party. Preston Manning creates a Reformer congregation of believers, but never personally manages ‘ordinariness.’ It is perhaps only evident in one other populist figure, William Aberhart, whose compassionate activism is complemented by his status as the leader of an Alberta-based congregation. Rob Ford’s connection to the people through his ubiquitous use of the term folks, his ‘little-guy’ persona along with his activism on the part of ‘the people’ creates for Ford and in Ford a mirror image of the people. When suburbanite and poor citizens of Toronto looked at Rob Ford, they saw themselves. He reflected back to them their concerns, unmet needs, wishes and desires. Ford makes this absolutely explicit in a political announcement concerning the funding for a subway to Scarborough:

244 

M. Macaulay

I said we would need the Federal government at the table to build the Scarborough subway. Folks, today we have that commitment. I also want to thank the many thousands and thousands of residents in the city of Toronto who have spoken loud and clear on this subject. They have said from day one ‘We want subways, subways and more subways.’ Even when it looked like Scarborough would be stuck with LRT’s they told me ‘Rob, keep fighting. Do not give up. We do not want LRT’s. We want subways. And if we are gunna get LRT’s we don’t wanem.’ (Subway Announcement, September 23, 2013)

What is important in this particular announcement is Ford’s invocation of the ‘people’ speaking. Rob Ford does not represent himself in this announcement as the voice of the people; rather he represents the people speaking for themselves: “I also want to thank the many thousands and thousands of residents in the city of Toronto who have spoken loud and clear on the subject.” Ford sees himself as a receiver of information not as a speaker or as a vehicle for a speaker. He simply articulates their expressed unmet needs and their will: “They have said from day one ‘We want subways, subways and more subways.’” The people’s agency in this announcement is further reinforced, “they told me ‘Rob, keep fighting. Do not give up. We do not want LRT’s. We want subways.’” Rob Ford’s close proximity to the people is clearly in evidence: “they told me.” Ford is in direct communication with them. The people assign him the role of agent that he then takes on. In Greimasian terms, while Ford is the hero or subject, it is the people themselves who send Ford on his quest. Who then in Ford’s construction of himself and the ‘people’ is the elite in Ford’s populism? The elite very much like the Chartist ‘idlers’ are the downtown population of Toronto and the councillors that represent them. Ford attacks them mercilessly: Let me tell you what councillors get for free which I have never taken as a councillor. I’ve been down there 14 years. Every councillor gets a free zoo pass. Parking at the zoo—free admission. The average person has to pay 23 dollars. Free rides and not just for them for the whole family. And that’s just the zoo. They get a free metro pass. That’s equivalent to about 1500 dollars a year. A free metro pass when the average hard-working person has to pay for their metro pass. These councillors get them for free…I tried to

7 Conclusion 

245

eliminate it. They said ‘no.’ (Episode 3, Let them Eat Cake, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=56QjlTDK1Zg&t=0m58s)

The elite for Rob Ford are city councillors benefitting from what he famously termed ‘the gravy train.” The key word for Ford is free. Toronto city councillors do not pay to get into the zoo, park at the zoo or take public transit: “A free metro pass when the average hard-working person has to pay for their metro pass.” There is a clear division between a free-­ loading elite and “the average hard-working person.” With regard to transportation, the fact that subways cost more than the far less expensive LRTs (Light Rapid Transit) is ignored in Rob Ford’s positioning of the elite. Rob Ford’s populism rests on his skill and capacity to mirror ‘the people’ so that in seeing him they see themselves. It is a remarkable achievement that few populist leaders achieve. His very selective positioning of Toronto councillors as ‘idlers’ exploiting the people of Greater Toronto complicates a narrative where they intend to save money for its citizens by building cheaper transit, but is not derailed because they get zoo passes, zoo parking and metro passes  that regular citizens do not. Their private greed obscures their public service. Rob Ford’s populism is built on his own capacity to create a mirror image of himself as ‘the people,’ while also been seen to serve and save the ‘people’ and in turn combat a self-interested and self-serving elite that serves its own needs and interests and ignores the unmet needs of the people. Doug Ford builds on his brother’s blended populism of small ‘c’ conservatism and the notion of the public good and measures to ensure the public good. Like his brother he goes after the ‘idlers’ in government service. This is evident in his 2018 speech made at the DaVinci Centre in Thunder Bay: Friends, I ‘ll tell you, Hydro is probably one of the single most important issues. Automatically health is. Health. Without health we have nothing. But next to health, Hydro is the number one issue. We’ve been getting gouged. We’ve been getting gouged by Hydro One. I’ve talked to businesses and the people. And this is real. This is real. They come up to you and say ‘I can’t afford my rent. I can’t afford to put food on my table. I have a choice between heating and eating.’ This is unacceptable. We have the

246 

M. Macaulay

highest Hydro rates in North America. Think of that. North America. Then we have a head of Hydro. I remember speaking to folks not too long ago. The head of Hydro is paying himself six million dollars a year. He’s the highest paid public servant anywhere in any part of the country. When you do your comparators, anyone else whether BC Hydro or out in Quebec, the max a CEO is making is 550,000 hundred. So he’s making over ten times the amount. That’s staggering. Then you find out. This story just keeps getting worse. But what it shows you is a sense of arrogance. A sense of arrogance. The top people of Hydro looking down at the people of Ontario and saying ‘I really don’t give two hoots about the people of Ontario. I just care about lining my pockets, lining my buddies’ pockets.’ I tell ya he gave out, get ready for these figures, 14 million dollars of bonuses to all his executives, eight or ten top executives. So he’s giving out 14 million dollars of your money, my money, and it’s your money by the way, on top of it they are all making two three million dollars a year. And they wonder why, they wonder why our Hydro rates, and that doesn’t affect the Hydro rates directly, but it’s the arrogance. It symbolizes that they don’t’ care about the people. We won’t have this problem on June the 8th because the CEO is done. The Board is done. We’re going to get responsible people in. (Thunder Bay Speech, May 2, 2018)

Although this speech does not pit the wealth producers and the wealth owners against one another, it does pit public ownership and its costs against efficient private ownership. Doug Ford goes after Ontario Hydro responsible for the lighting and heating of people’s homes. Rising costs for heat and light mean that the average person needs to make a choice between eating and heating. As with his brother, we have the theme of the “gravy train.” Ford focusses his attack on the salary of the CEO of Ontario Hydro who makes 6 million a year, well over that of comparable CEO’s in British Columbia and Quebec. Moreover, over and above their salaries, “I tell ya he gave out, get ready for these figures, 14 million dollars of bonuses to all his executives, eight or ten top executives. So he’s giving out 14 million dollars of your money, my money, and it’s your money by the way, on top of it they are all making two three million dollars a year.” Doug Ford narrates a story of corporate greed in the public sector. In contrast to the needs of deprived citizens we have “a sense of arrogance.” The people’s money is being misspent by ‘idlers’ in a major

7 Conclusion 

247

provincial company “who don’t’ care about the people.” In charge of the people’s money, they misspend it “’lining my buddies’ pockets.’” Doug Ford correlates high Hydro taxes with this misuse and misspending of the people’s money. He thus articulates a major unmet need, fair rates for heat and light, that will be met by himself and his government if elected. Although Doug Ford’s idlers are positioned within government as were his brother Rob’s, the conflict remains between the greed of a given elite and the people who need to meet their own needs. This concern for the people’s needs is highlighted in one of Ford’s Facebook posts representing Ford crossing a bridge at Ontario Place, a major Toronto destination for public entertainment such as the Royal Agricultural Winter Fair. The headline in this Facebook post is “We have to keep Ontario affordable.” It is this messaging that won Ford the 2018 Provincial election. And it is also the use of such media outlets as Facebook and Twitter. In one election debate with the leader of the Liberal Party, Kathleen Wynne, and the leader of the NDP, Andrea Horvath, Ford is made to respond to a question by Horvath, The people started, the people started going to the polls today, they haven’t got any idea what your cuts are going to look like. What sort of cuts are going to happen in hospitals? How many nurses are going to be laid off? How many public services are going to be cut to the bone? How many more people are going to be in hallways due to your 6 billion dollars in cuts? How many teachers are going to be laid off? How many more people are going to be in hallways? Why don’t you think it’s important to be honest and show people your platform? (Third Party Leader Debate, Provincial Election 2018)

Ford’s response to the absence of a clear costed platform is very simple: Well, it’s pretty clear. Every single day I’ve been putting out announcements. Our announcements provide a dollar figure beside it. And our announcements are about putting more money in people’s pockets. We’re going to reduce the hydro rates, which is the number one issue across this province with people and companies. We’re going to reduce that 12%. We’re going to reduce the cost of gas by 10 cents a litre, that is absolutely huge to every single person. I know that the NDP thinks driving’s a luxury

248 

M. Macaulay

but it’s essential today in our daily lives. We’re going to make sure we reduce taxes. We’re going to be the only government that actually reduces taxes by 20%. We’ve had a plan and we’re rolling it out every single day with costing. (Third Party Leader Debate, Provincial Election 2018)

Ford does not have a costed plan, but he does provide announcements. And he provides announcements on Facebook, Twitter and other social media like that above, “We have to keep Ontario affordable.” Ford in fact runs his campaign not through standard political means but through social media. Through both Facebook and Twitter, Ford announced one of his most popular planks: “Buck a Beer.” The twitter post shows a regular can of beer with the label “Buck a Beer.” Below the label in parentheses is the language “Doug’s bringing it back.” While this is not as powerful a statement as “Make America Great Again!” it carries the same nostalgic message of better days and a better past, lost and needing return. “Buck a Beer” like “Make American Great Again!” is in Laclauan terms an empty signifier. While it is not a promise of jobs to sustain a decent living, it is an articulation of the unmet need for a simpler more affordable life permitted in a time of high costs in living expenses such as heat, electricity and even entertainment. It is a desire for the better days of the past, not the future. We see the same messaging in U.S.  Presidential candidate Joseph Biden’s “Build Back Better.” The unmet need presented to the Ontarian people by Doug Ford is a way of life enjoyed in the past, rather than a new future. This notion of better days in the past is presented in clear populist terms: Far too long beer consumers have been forced to pay inflated prices for beer in order to increase the profits of big corporations. Doug Ford will bring back a buck a beer. (Buck a Beer, Twitter, Progressive Conservative Party, May 26, 2018)

The elite is not presented in this messaging as arrogant public servants feeding off the government trough but in keeping with the messaging of other populists, specifically Bernie Sanders, “big corporations.” The theme again is of the little guy versus “big corporations.” Using imperfective aspect, the subtitle on the beer can states, “Doug’s bringing it back.”

7 Conclusion 

249

We have the intimacy of first name use, the product itself being consumed by the average person, as well as the agency of Doug Ford himself who will not just bring back inexpensive beer, but a way of life enjoyed before the 2008 economic downturn and before increased costs in housing, heating and electricity. While Doug Ford never evidences the compassion shown by his own brother and that of other populists in their representation of ‘the people,’ he nonetheless tackles the ‘idlers’ who exploit them in and outside government. He fails to mirror the people as does his brother, but he succeeds in positioning himself as an agent for a nostalgic return to a better past and life for them. Both Ford brothers are successful is wedding small ‘c’ conservative values to a populism committed to ‘bringing back’ what was formerly good and has been lost. They participate in both the blended populism of Donald Trump and the left populism of Bernie Sanders.

Conclusion If we return to Erneso Laclau’s (2007) analysis of Chartism, it is important to note the distinction Laclau makes regarding causal analysis. Any realization of what we can term ‘populism’ can express both socialist or ‘conservative’ ideologies as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) argue. However, they also function out of a tradition that “situate[s] the evils of society not in something that is inherent in the economic system, but quite the opposite: in the abuse of power by parasitic and speculative groups which have control of political power—‘old corruptions’, in Cobbett’s words…‘the feature most strongly picked out in the ruling class was its idleness and parasitism’” (Laclau, 2007, p.  90). This tradition focussing on the ‘old corruption’ continues in the movements examined in this book. The idea of ‘idleness and parasitism’ as causal to the unmet needs of ‘the people’ and so their social and popular demands run through the various movements whether we term them ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing.’ What is perhaps most consistent is the distinction made between ‘wealth producers’ and ‘wealth owners.’ ‘Wealth producers’ are consistently represented as ‘the people,’ whereas ‘wealth owners’ are represented as in the 1892 Preamble of The People’s Party as “capitalists.” They are not referred

250 

M. Macaulay

to as such out of an analysis of the capitalist system, although Karl Marx had published Das Kapital in 1867, but rather as being those who worship money and gold, and thus a type of ‘heathen.’ 130 years after the rise of the People’s Party, Bernie Sanders talks similarly of “billionaires.” Out of equally moral outrage he contrasts greed with three forms of justice: social, economic, and environmental. He does not challenge the capitalist system as such, but those within it who exploit the 99%; that is, the 1%, whose greed has monopolized wealth ownership creating rupture within society as a whole. In keeping with the idea of “control of political power” along with economic power, a concern with democratic practice pervades all the movements examined here. Democratic practice is seen as the principal counter to the political control exerted by the ‘idlers’ and the parasites. In A Call to Action (1892), James B. Weaver implores ‘the patriotic people’ to use the ballot as a weapon to demand fairer representation such as direct election of the president, direct election of senators and the creation of a taxation system. William Aberhart warns his Albertan congregation that if they don’t “hit this thing hard” then the bankers that deprive farmers of making a living will continue to do so. Tommy Douglas in Mouseland advocates for a system where the mice vote for mice rather than cats who use the existing democratic system to make things “hard for the mice.” Preston Manning advocates for direct election of members of the Canadian Senate so that regional Western interests can be represented rather than the interests of Eastern Canada and the two dominant parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Ford brothers want to make government smaller but also more immediate and direct, with Rob Ford constructing ‘the people’ as “customers” and himself not just as their representative but as one of them. Bernie Sanders challenges big PAC’s by taking in individual contributions of 27 dollars for his campaigns. Donald Trump makes the same claim, and like the Fords engages in direct appeal to ‘the people’ through Twitter, Facebook and most importantly his political rallies. He makes the claim to be ‘the voice’ of a ‘forgotten people’ in the expression of their demands for an end to the outsourcing of industrial jobs. What is also significant is the parity amongst the social and popular demands made by the people. In 1892 and 1896, the People’s Party demanded the following: “a national currency,” “free and unlimited

7 Conclusion 

251

coinage of silver and gold,” “a graduated income tax,” “that all State and national revenues shall be limited to the necessary expenses of the government,” “postal savings banks,” that “All lands now held by railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens should be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only,” as well as government ownership of railroads, telegraph, telephones and the post-office “in the interests of the people.” We can usefully compare these demands to those later expressed in Canada by The Farmers’ Platforms of 1916 and 1918 where the following demands were made: “direct taxation,” “proportional representation,” and significantly a clear break with British colonialization. Further, if we compare The Regina Manifesto, we see more extensive similarities. The Regina Manifesto explicitly advocates on behalf of “socialization of transportation, communications, electric power and all other industries and services essential to social planning” to ensure “The welfare of the community must take supremacy over the claims of private wealth.” The idea of ‘commonwealth’ is counterposed to that of “private wealth.” We see again the fundamental distinction between ‘wealth producers’ and ‘wealth owners.’ These populist movements seek to reassert the people’s will in ensuring that economic and political control is not concentrated at the expense of farmers and working people. They consistently seek a rebalancing of wealth within society in contrast to a ruptured state of exploitation and idleness on the one hand and deprivation on the other. William Aberhart’s demand for social credit is an attempt to rebalance the system. Preston Manning’s appeal of ‘The West Wants In!’ equally seeks both political and economic rebalance. Donald Trump’s focus on ‘making America great again!’ is another appeal to reconfiguration between wealth producers and wealth owners. The Ford’s attack on “the gravy train” evokes as well as anything the notion of idlers exploiting ‘the people.’ A “Buck a Beer” is a simple notion, but behind it is the idea of affordable living for ‘the little guy.’ While the populist movements examined in this book cannot be said to be revolutionary in that they do not propose entirely new societal economic systems, they are all reformist in one way or another, some looking back nostalgically to a better past such as the People’s Party, Donald Trump, and Doug Ford, and others looking to a better and different future as with The Farmers’ Platform, the CCF and Tommy Douglas, Preston Manning, Rob Ford and Bernie Sanders.

References

Aberhart, W. (1933). The Douglas System of Economics. (Pamphlet, self-published). Aberhart, W. (1935). Item iw-glen-186—William Aberhart’s Radio Broadcasts. Glenbow Museum & Archives. albertaonrecord.ca. Aberhart, W. (1938). Item iw-glen-185. William Aberhart’s Radio Broadcasts. Glenbow Museum & Archives. Retrieved from albertaonrecord.ca. Abramson, A. (2017, July 26). Transcript: Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Youngstown, Ohio. Time. time.com. Alello, R. (2018, January 24). Patrick Brown Denies Sexual Misconduct Allegations from Two Women, Resigns as Ontario PC Leader. CTV News. ctvnews.ca Aristotle. (1992). The Art of Rhetoric (H.  Lawson-Tancred, Trans.). Penguin Random House Canada. Banack, C. (2014). Evangelical Christianity and Political Thought in Alberta. Journal of Canadian Studies, 48(2), 70–99. University of Toronto Press. Berenson, T. (2021, January 13). Donald Trump Impeached a Second Time in Historic House Vote. Time. time.com. Bizzell, P., & Herzberg, B. (1990). The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2

253

254 References

Breakfast Television. (2014, March 14). Mayor Ford on Jimmy Kimmel, Part One. breakfasttelevision.ca Brownstein, R. (2016, November 10). How the Rustbelt Paved Trump’s Road to Victory. The Atlantic. theatlantic.com. Budd, B. (2020). The People’s Champ: Doug Ford and Neoliberal Right-Wing Populism in the 2018 Ontario Provincial Election. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 171–181. Canadian Council of Agriculture. (1918). The Farmers’ Platform: A New National Policy for Canada. openhistoryseminar.com. Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. Junction. Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16. CBC News. (2013, September 23). Toronto Subway Extension to get $660M from Ottawa. cbc.ca. CBC News. (2018). Final Ontario Leaders’ Debate. youtube.com. Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University. (2018, February 16). MS13 in the Americas. InSight Crime. insightcrime.org. Chávez, H. (2005, September 16). Transcript: Hugo Chávez Interview. Nightline. Clough, D. (1994). Populism and the Reform Party (PhD Thesis). Vancouver: University of British Columbia. open.library.ubc.ca. Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. (1933). Regina Manifesto. Saskatchewan Archives, S-GS-1933.6, CCF Pamphlets. Conway, J. F. (1978). Populism in the United States, Russia and Canada: Exlploring the Roots of Canada’s Third Parties. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 11(1), 99–124. Crockett, E. (2016, March 30). Donald Trump: ‘There has to be some form of punishment’ for Women Who Have Abortions. Vox. vox.com. CTV News. (2018, May 30). Mike Moffatt of the Ivey Business School at Western University. ctvnews.ca. Dimatteo, E. (2021, July 26). What Are the Chances Doug Ford Will Eff Up Ontario Place? Now. nowtoronto.com. Dobbin, M. (1991). Preston Manning and the Reform Party. James Lorimer & Company. Doolittle, R. (2014). Crazy Town. Penguin Canada Books. Douglas, T. (2016, October 11) [1944]. Mouseland. YouTube. youtube.com. Eco, U. (1995, June 22). Ur-Fascism, The New York Review of Books. nybooks.com.

 References 

255

Evers-Hillstrom, K., & Piper, J. (2019, July 19). Which 2020 Democrats Are Taking Money from the Healthcare Industry? opensecrets.org. Fahrenthold, D.  A. (2016, October 7). Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About Women in 2005. The Washington Post. ­washingtonpost.com. Finkel, A. (1989). The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta. University of Toronto Press. Ford, D. (2018). Doug Ford Event: May 2, 2018 Ford Speech Thunder Bay. youtube.com. FordNation. (2014). FordNation. Facebook. youtube.com. FordNation. (2021, August 5). 50th Anniversary of Exhibition Place. facebook.com. Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Anchor. Goodfield, K. (2017, September 8). Ford Nation Is Back: Doug Ford to Run for Mayor of Toronto in 2018. CTV News. ctvnews.ca. Goodwyn, L. (1976). Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America. Oxford University Press. Government of Canada. (1982). The Constitution Act. www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca Green, J. (2017). The Devil’s Bargain, Steve Bannon, Donald Trump and the Storming of the Presidency. Penguin Press. Greimas, A. J. (1966). Sémantique structural: recherché de méthode. Larousse. Grice, P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). Academic Press. Hannant, L. (1985). The Calgary Working Class and the Social Credit Movement in Alberta, 1932–1935. Labour, 16(Fall), 97–116. Hanson, P. (2007). Untamed and Unashamed. Jojo. Hariman, T. (1995). Political Style: The Artistry of Power. University of Chicago Press. Harré, R., & van Langenhove, L. (1999). Positioning Theory. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Hawkins, K.A., Carlin, R.A., Littvay, L., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2019). The Ideational Approach to Populism Concept, Theory, and Analysis. Routledge Hicks, J. D. (1931). The Populist Revolt. University of Minnesota Press. Hofstadter, R. (1955). The Age of Reform. Knopf. Hymes, D. (1974). Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach. University of Pennsylvania Press.

256 References

Ilie, C. (2001). Semi-institutional Discourse: The Case of Talk Shows. Journal of Pragmatics, 33(2), 209–254. Ionescu, G., & Gellner, E. (Eds.). (1969). Populism Its Meaning and National Characteristics. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Jackson, A. (1974). Veto Message. In G.  McKenna (Ed.), American Populism (pp. 74–84). G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Jefferson, T. (1974). Declaration of Independence. In G.  McKenna (Ed.), American Populism (pp. 8–9). G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Joffe Block, J. (2020, November 30). Pennsylvania Did Not Have Hundreds of Thousands of Phantom Absentee Ballots. AP News. apnews.com. Kazin, M. (2017). The Populist Persuasion. Cornell University Press. Labov, W., & Waletzky, J. (1967). Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience. In J. Helm (Ed.), Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts: Proceedings of the 1966 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society (pp. 12–44). University of Washington Press. Laclau, E. (1980). Populist Rupture and Discourse. Screen Education (34). dokumen.pub. Laclau, E. (2007) [2005]. On Populist Reason. Verso. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1993). Metaphors We Live By. The University of Chicago Press. Lambton, J. G. (Lord Durham). (1839). Report on the Affairs of British North America, from the Earl of Durham, Her Majesty’s High Commissioner. London. primarydocuments.ca. Laycock, D. (2012). Populism and Democracy in Canada’s Reform Party. In C. Mudde, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, & C. (Eds.), Populism in Europe and the Americas (pp. 46–67). Cambridge University Press. Lee, C. E., Walker, K., Lederman, J., & Golden, A. (2020, March 2). Looking for Obama’s Hidden Hand in Candidates Coalescing Around Biden. NBC News. nbcnews.com. Macaulay, M. (2013, September 23). Transcript: Subway Announcement from Provincial Transportation Minister Glen Murray, Toronto City Mayor Rob Ford, Federal Finance Minister, Jim Flaherty. CP24 News. cp24.com. Macaulay, M. (2019). Bernie and the Donald: A Comparison of Left- and Right-Wing Populist Discourse. In M.  Macaulay (Ed.), Populist Discourse International Perspectives (pp. 165–196). Palgrave Macmillan. Manning, P. (1989–1997). Blue Book, The Reform Party of Canada Fonds. Archive Society of Alberta. albertaonrecord.ca

 References 

257

Manning, P. (2018). Politics and Faith: An Interview with Preston Manning. The Faith Today Podcast. https://m.soundcloud.com. Marx, K. (1990) [1867]. Capital, Volume 1. (B. Fowkes, Trans.). Penguin Books. McKenna, G. (Ed.). (1974). American Populism. G.P. Putnam’s Sons. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. McGraw Hill. Miller, M. E., & Jouvenal, J. (2018, May 7). ‘Heinous and violent’: MS-13’s Appeal to Girls Grows as Gang Becomes ‘Americanized.’ The Washington Post. washingtonpost.com. Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation. Stanford University Press. Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Murphy, T. (2021, August 5). Are Unions Holding New York Back from Having the Nation’s First Single-Payer Health Care? The Body. thebody.com. Noone, S., & Russo, E. (2021, January 12). Full Transcript of Donald Trump’s January 6, 2021 Speech. NewsNation Now. newsnationnow.com. Oakeshott, M. (1996). The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism. Yale University Press. Ontario Chambre of Commerce. (2018). Ontario PC Party Platform 2018. occ.ca. Ontario Progressive Conservative Party. (2018, May 26). Buck A Beer. Twitter. @OntarioPCParty Ostiguy, P. (2009, November). The High-Low Political Divide: Rethinking Populism and Anti-Populism. Political Concepts: Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series, 35, 1–65. Owens, D. M. (2020, April 1). Jim Clyburn Changed Everything for Joe Biden’s Campaign. Washington Post. washingtonpost.com. Palin, S. (2010, May 14). Momma Grizzly Speech. youtube.com. Populist Party Platform, 1892. (1892). (Published originally July 5, 1892, Omaha Morning World-Herald). wwnorton.com. Populist Party Platform, 1896. (1896). college.cengage.com. Propp, V. (2003). Morphology of the Folktale (L. Scott, Trans.). Austin: University of Texas Press. Reilly, K. (2016, August 12). Meet the Man Who Encouraged Donald Trump to Run for President in 1987. Time. news.yahoo.com. Sackur, S. (2017, October 10) Interview with Marine Le Pen, HARD talk. BBC World News. bbc.com. Sanders, B. (2019, March 7). Bernie Sanders Rally in Council Bluffs Iowa. youtube.com.

258 References

Sclafani, J. (2015). Family as a Framing Resource in Political Identity Construction: Introduction Sequences in Presidential Primary Debates. Language in Society, 44(4), 369–399. Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. (1991). Indirect Speech Acts. In S. Davis (Ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader (pp. 265–277). Oxford University Press. Sharp, P. F. (1948). The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada: A Survey Showing American Parallels. Octagon Books. Sinclair, P. R. (1975). Class Structure and Populist Protest: The Case of Western Canada. The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 1(1), 1–17. Smillie, B. G. (Ed.). (2006). Political Theology in the Canadian Context. Wilfrid Laurier Press. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Oxford University Press. Stedman Jones, G. (1983). Rethinking Chartism. Language and Class: Studies in Working Class History 1832–190. Cambridge University Press. Stein J. (2017, August 24) The Bernie Voters Who Defected to Trump, Explained by a Political Scientist. Vox. vox.com. Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Open University Press. Taggart, P. (2002). Populism. Viva Books. Taguieff, P.-A. (2005). Populist Movements in Europe. In L.  B. Larsen, C.  Ricupero, & N.  Schafhausen (Eds.), The Populism Reader (pp.  47–62). Lukas & Sternberg. Trump, D. (2015, June 16). Presidential Announcement Speech. youtube.com. Trump, D. (2016a, September 1). Donald Trump’s full speech in Wilmington, Ohio. youtube.com. Trump, D. (2016b, October 7). Statement from Donald Trump Campaign Website. www.4president.us. Trump, D. (2017, July 25). President Trump Rally in Youngstown, Ohio. C-SPAN3. c-span.org. Trump, D. (2021, February 7). Trump’s Full Speech at DC Rally on Jan. 6. Wall Street Journal. wsj.com. Trump, D., & Schwartz, T. (1987). The Art of the Deal. Ballantine Books. Warren, M. (2011, March 16). Le Pen Taunts Rival with ‘Paedophile’ Slur. The Local: France’s News in English. Watson, G. (2004). Asserting and Promising. Philosophical Studies, 117, 57–77. Weaver, J. B. (1974). Preface to A Call to Arms. In G. Mckenna (Ed.), American Populism (pp. 94–117). G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Wikipedia. (2021). Hydro One. en.m.wikipedia.org.

 References 

259

Wilson, R. (2021, July 27). One-third of States Have Passed Restrictive Voting Laws this Year. The Hill. thehill.com. Wodak, R. (2021). The Politics of Fear. Sage. Worsley, P. (1969). The Concept of Populism. In G.  Ionescu & E.  Gellner (Eds.), Populism Its Meaning and National Characteristics (pp.  212–250). Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Index

A

Aberhart, W. (Bible Bill), 22, 63, 69–71, 82, 90, 92, 182, 223, 243, 250, 251 A Call to Action, 47, 52, 219, 234, 250 A Call to Arms, 19 Access Hollywood, 12 Actantial Model, 17, 18 The Age of Reform, 6 Agrarian populism, 3, 80 Agri-business, 234, 235 Agri-business corporations, 164 Alliance Party of Canada, 85 America, 141, 162, 168 The American Constitution, 26, 150 The American frontier, 169 American people, 35 Anaphora, 168

Announcement Speech, 15, 16, 127, 142, 152, 182, 239 Antagonistic frontier, 10 Anthony, S. B., 34 Anti-trust laws, 164, 235 Aristotle, 129 Arrogance, 195, 211, 246 The Art of the Deal, 119 Authenticity, 13 The average person, 183 B

Backstage, 12 Bad manners, 14, 16, 46, 120, 177 The ballot box, 220 Bannon, S., 119, 120 Basic Universal Income, 64 Berlusconi, S., 16 Bible, 38

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Macaulay, Populism and Populist Discourse in North America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08522-2

261

262 Index

Biden, J., 118, 142, 144, 150, 155, 162, 170, 248 Big Agra, 235 Billionaire class, 236, 239 Billionaires, 163, 234, 250 Blended populism, 249 Blue Book, 23, 90, 91, 95, 98, 196, 228, 229 Branding, 13 The broken space, 48 Bryan, W. J., 5, 57 Buck a Beer, 30, 206–208, 212, 216, 248, 251 Build Back Better, 248 Bush, G. W., 117 Business Assistance for Native Albertans Corporation (BANAC), 88 Buttigieg, P., 155 Buying power, 40 Byfield, T., 89 C

Canada, 94, 107, 112, 134, 228, 230 Canadian Charter of Rights, 98 Canadianness, 105 Canadians, 105 Canadian Senate, 75 Canovan, M., 6, 8, 23, 90 Capitalists, 19, 37, 38, 218, 249 Car culture, 175 Carlin, R. A., 7 CCF Regina Manifesto, 81 CF-18 contract, 97 Charisma, 13, 16 Chartism, 249 Chartist Movement, 216, 227, 231

Chartists, 35, 220 Chávez, H., 7, 14–16 Cherry, D., 175 City of Toronto, 173 Clinton, H., 18, 118, 121, 122, 125, 126, 155, 167, 168, 171, 231 The common people, 102, 113 The common sense of the common people, 229 Commonwealth, 49, 53, 220, 221, 226 Commonwealth Federation, 71 Conservative Party, 5, 58, 114 Conservative Party of Canada, 85 Conservatives, 221 Constructed populism, 97–98 Conway, 63 Cooperative Commonwealth, 75 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), 2, 5, 58, 62, 71, 82, 86, 217, 223, 227, 236, 251 Copiousness, 138, 147 Corporate Agriculture, 4 Council Bluffs, 4 Council Bluffs, Iowa Speech, 27, 156, 234, 235 Council Bluffs 2019 Iowa Speech, 167 Criminal gangs, 137 Crisis, 14 Crop lien system, 4, 22, 165 D

Das Kapital, 250 David and Goliath narrative, 184 Declaration of Independence, 34, 98

 Index 

Democracy, 20, 34, 43, 44, 50, 53, 79, 83, 146, 152, 170, 216, 219, 220, 234, 239 Democratic demands, 9 Democratic elite, 152 Democratic Establishment, 160 Democratic Party, 5, 154, 170 Democratic Promise (1976), 6 Democrat Party operatives, 144 Democrats, 4, 37, 218 Depression, 64 Direct democracy, 7, 44, 114, 239 Direct taxation, 80 Distinct society, 228 Donnelly, I., 19 Doolittle, R., 177 Douglas, C. H., 64 Douglas, T., 22, 76, 77, 83, 86, 90, 225, 227, 229, 239, 250, 251 Durham, Lord, 106 E

Eco, U., 239 Economic justice, 167 Elite, 7, 17, 19, 34, 59, 73, 77, 82, 87, 109, 120, 123, 126, 157, 163, 167, 182, 195, 207, 219, 220, 225, 226, 230, 234, 235, 239, 244, 248 Empty signifier, 9, 43, 81, 112, 124, 131, 141, 146, 171, 184, 196, 208, 212, 219, 241, 248 The enemy of the people, 7, 170 Epideictic oratory, 159 Epideictic speech, 129 Exclusionary populism, 8 Extraordinariness, 16, 29, 30, 46, 243

263

F

Facebook, 196, 205, 212, 247, 250 Factory farming, 164 Faith Today, 88 Fake news, 170, 180 Farage, N., 12, 13, 16 Farmers, 3, 4, 22, 33, 59, 69, 74, 82, 157, 164, 167, 221, 235, 250, 251 Farmer’s Alliance, 4, 5, 33 The Farmers’ Platform, 21, 57–62, 71, 72, 74, 80, 217, 221, 235, 236, 251 “Farmers’ radicalism,” 3 Financiers, 225 Financiers and industrialists, 226 Folks, 178, 184, 243, 246 The foolish people, 132 Ford brothers, 18 Ford, D., 28, 173, 177, 190, 191, 200, 204, 209, 212, 245, 251 Ford Nation, 28, 174, 176, 177, 181, 184, 191, 197, 199, 204, 209, 212, 215, 243 Ford, R., 28, 173, 174, 176, 180, 188, 202, 209, 210, 213, 241, 243, 250, 251 Forgotten people, 25 For the People, 201, 209 Freedom, 131 The frontier, 137 Frontier trope, 152 Frontstage, 12 Furnishing merchant, 4 G

Gellner, E., 1, 17 General Kelly, 136, 169 General will, 7

264 Index

Ginger Group, 71 The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 11, 14 Goffman, E., 12 Goodwyn, L., 6 The Gravy Train, 29, 182, 194–195, 202, 208, 209, 211, 245, 246, 251 Great Depression, 71, 223 Greed, 167, 236, 250 Green New Deal, 28 Greimas, A. J., 17 Grice, P., 204 Grillo, B., 16 H

Hamilton, A., 132 Hanson, P., 14, 16 HARDtalk, 11 Hariman, T., 120 Harley-Davidson, 133 Harper, S., 85, 114 Harris, M., 175 Hawkins, K. A., 7 Heartland, 130, 132, 162 Hicks, J. D., 5 High Style, 121, 127 Hitler, A., 65 Hofstadter, R., 6 Horvath, A., 201, 202, 247 Horwath, A., 208 Hydro One, 245 Hymes, D., 127

I

ICE, 140 ICE Officers, 140 Idlers, 233, 234, 244, 247, 249 Illegal immigration, 137 Inclusionary populism, 8 Indian Association of Alberta (IAA), 88 Ionescu, G., 1, 17 Iowa Speech, 4 J

Jackson, A., 34 January 6, 2001 Speech, 152 January 6, 2021 Speech, 26, 142–144, 146, 154, 239, 241 Jefferson, T., 34 Jimmy Kimmel Late Night Show, 241 Jones, S., 217 Justice, 157, 236, 250 K

Kaltwasser, R., 7 Kenney, J., 115 L

Labour Code, 74 Laclau, E., 2, 7, 8, 18, 167, 215 Laclau, M., 8, 9 Late Night Jimmy Kimmel Show, 173 Le Pen, Marie, 11 Le Pen, Marine, 14, 15, 169

 Index 

League of Nations, 58 Left populism, 231, 249 Left-wing populism, 24 Liberal democracy, 6 Liberal Party of Canada, 58 Liberals, 221 Lincoln, A., 81 The little guy, 176, 180, 183, 202, 208, 209, 211–213, 241, 251 Littvay, L., 7 Locker-room talk, 13 Logic, 8, 11 Long, H. P., 118

265

Métis Association of Alberta (MAA), 88 Metonymy, 233 Mexico, 134 Millionaires, 218 Moffitt, B., 11, 14, 28, 46, 119, 129, 156, 177, 178 Morphology of the Folktale (2003), 17 Mouseland, 22, 76–79, 83, 87, 225, 239, 250 Mudde, C., 6, 7 Mulroney, B., 90, 95 N

M

MAGA baseball caps, 16 MAGA hats, 128 Make America Great Again!, 167, 208, 216, 248 Man of the people, 162 Manning, E., 85 Manning, P., 3, 17, 18, 23, 85, 88, 91, 93, 105, 114, 132, 196, 227, 229, 238, 239, 243, 250, 251 Marx, K., 250 The masses, 59 McCarthy, J., 118 McGovern, G., 118 McKenna, G., 33 McKinley, W., 132, 133 Medicare, 87, 227 Medicare for All, 76 Meech Lake Accord, 23, 95, 110, 228 Metaphor, 233

NAFTA, 134 Narodniks, 1 Narrative, 168 National Energy Program, 97, 111 NDP, 93, 247 New Canada, 107 New Deal, 74 New Democratic Party, 5 New Testament, 38 Non-producers, 4, 24 Non-producing class, 35 O

Oakeshott, M., 44 Obama, B., 18, 117, 120, 125–127, 155, 232 Obamacare, 125, 160, 162, 168, 232 Omaha Conference, 20 Omaha Convention, 4 One Nation, 169

266 Index

The 1%/The one percent, 157, 233, 250 On Populist Reason (2007), 8 Orban, V., 14 Ordinariness, 16, 28, 30, 46, 210, 213, 241, 243 Ostiguy, P., 15, 17 The other, 138, 169 P

Palin, S., 14, 15 Paris Climate Accord, 134 Parti Québécois, 89 The patriotic people, 51, 52, 84, 220, 239, 250 Paz, B., 139 Pence, M., 144, 149 The people, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 27–30, 34, 39, 45, 48, 53, 62, 72, 73, 75, 77, 81, 87, 101, 109, 120, 122–124, 126–128, 132, 152, 153, 156, 157, 163, 182, 184, 195, 208, 210, 212, 213, 216, 219, 220, 223, 225, 233, 235, 238, 241–245, 249, 250 The people of Ontario, 195 The people of the North, 192 The People’s Party, 2, 4, 5, 18, 19, 25, 27, 28, 33, 36, 46, 57, 62, 72, 73, 75, 77, 81, 123, 154, 157, 158, 215, 217, 221, 226, 227, 230, 239, 243, 250, 251 People’s Party Platform, 20, 36, 42–46, 52, 58, 61, 71 People’s Platform, 219 Perón, J., 9

Petrostate, 86, 103, 114 The plain people, 19 Plain Style, 121, 127, 164 Planning, 226 Platform of the People’s Party, 41 Pluralism, 7 Plutocracy, 42, 43 Plutocrats, 219 Political poulisms, 3 Political revolution, 156 Political Style, 14 Politician’s populism, 23, 90 The Politics of Fear, 11, 26, 129, 169 The poor people, 243 Popular demand, 7 The popular will, 100 Populism, 1, 6, 9, 19, 27, 34, 63, 70, 79, 80, 113, 117, 120, 127, 156, 200, 211, 212, 220, 228, 243, 245, 249 Populism; A Very Short Introduction (2017), 6 The Populist Revolt, 5 Populist rupture, 93, 123 Positioning, 13 Positioning Theory, 48 Pragmatic democracy, 44, 46 Prairie Populism, 18, 20, 227, 243 Preamble, People’s Party Platform, 37 Premier Reid, 66 Premillennial Christian view, 132 Private-sector development, 113 Private wealth, 227 Producers, 4, 24 The producing class, 19, 35, 39, 42 Progressive Conservative Government, 95

 Index 

Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 85 Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, 174 Progressive Party, 58, 62, 217 Propp, V., 17 Protected interests, 221 Protected Tariff, 60 The Protective Tariff, 20, 59, 80, 221 Proto-fascism, 239 Public expenditure, 74 Public servants, 73 Q

Quasi-assertion, 180 Quebec, 228 R

Radicalism, 3 Recession of 2008, 117 Redemptive democracy, 44 Referenda, 101, 103 Reform Party, 3, 5, 18, 23, 28, 88–90, 101–103, 105–107 Reform Party of Canada, 85 Regional populism, 107 The Regina Manifesto, 21, 71, 73, 77, 82, 226, 251 Repetition, 157, 168 Republicans, 4, 37, 218 Responsible government, 21, 23, 83 Right-wing populism, 24 Roberts, S., 89 Roman Rhetoric, 121 Romney, M., 145 Roosevelt, F. D., 28, 64, 65, 74

267

Rousseau, J.-J., 7, 34 Rovira Kaltwasser, C., 6, 7 Rupture, 10, 95, 103, 225, 227, 228, 250 Rural America, 166 Rushmore, M., 132, 135, 170 S

Sackur, S., 11, 14, 169 Sanctuary, 238 Sanctuary Cities, 140, 169, 170 Sanders, B., 3, 4, 18, 24, 118, 154, 162, 167, 231, 234, 239, 241, 249–251 Sanders-Trump voters, 123 Saviour, 196, 237 Sclafani, J., 13 Searle, J., 185 Second Amendment, 131 Simon, P., 162 Sinclair, P. R., 63 Single-payer program, 161 Social Credit, 22, 58, 62, 64, 68, 70–72, 74, 82, 217, 225, 251 Social Credit Party, 2, 5, 89, 227 The social demand, 7, 8, 126, 164, 168, 218 Socialism, 8 Socialization of finance, 74 Stop the Gravy Train, 174, 184, 211 Subway Announcement, 187, 244 Subways, Subways, Subways, 174, 184, 210, 211 Syncrude, 88

268 Index T

W

Taggart, P., 3, 7 Thin-centered ideology, 8 Third Party Leader Debate, 247 Thunder Bay Speech, 192, 246 Trans-Pacific Partnership, 134 Transportation, 176, 210 Triple-E Senate, 98 Trudeau, P. E., 111 Trump, D., 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, 24, 118, 129, 130, 137, 153, 154, 157, 160, 163, 166, 167, 180, 181, 208, 231, 234, 235, 239, 241, 243, 249–251 Trump, M., 128 Twitter, 247, 250

Wall Street, 126, 155, 168 Wallace, G. C., 118 Watson, T., 5, 57 Weak Republicans, 144, 170 Wealth owners, 48, 219, 249, 251 Wealth producers, 48, 219, 249, 251 Weaver, J. B., 19, 26, 46, 57, 84, 219, 223, 225, 230, 234, 239, 250 Welfare state, 93 The West, 23, 24, 89, 95, 96, 99, 113, 228 The West Wants In!, 216, 228, 251 The Wild West, 136, 139, 169, 237 Wilders, G., 13, 14 The will of all, 7 The will of the people, 2, 19, 21, 34, 42, 45, 81, 83, 101, 166, 219, 229 Wilmington Ohio Speech, 25, 124, 127, 167, 232 Winspear, F., 89 Wodak, R., 11, 26, 129 Woodsworth, J. S., 71, 82, 86, 223, 227 The working class, 168 Working people, 251 Worsley, P., 1 Wynne, K. (Premier), 193, 201, 247

U

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 12 Universal Basic Income, 22 Universal Healthcare, 111 University of Alberta Archives, 66 Unmet needs, 8, 126, 153, 164, 183, 189, 195, 200, 206, 207, 209, 212, 229, 231, 236, 237, 240, 243, 247, 249 V

Venture Capital Corporation (VCC), 88 Veterans Accountability Act, 134 Veto Message, Washington, July 10, 1832, 35 Voter fraud, 146

Y

Yellow Pamphlet, 64 Youngstown Ohio Speech, 25, 128, 132, 237 Youngstown Speech, 151, 154 YouTube, 178, 184, 243