Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confronts the Strong 9781400871933

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
Stylistic Conventions Used
1. Background to Negotiations
The Treaty of Rome
Winds of Change
2. Negotiating the Yaoundé Convention
Negotiations
Analysis
3. Negotiations with Commonwealth Africa
Nigeria
East Africa
Analysis
4. Negotiations with North Africa
Negotiations
Analysis
5. Negotiations in the Eurafrican Institutions
Negotiations
Analysis
6. Negotiations in General
Diplomacy and Bargaining
Alternatives
Convergence
Propositions
Weak and Strong
Appendix: Tables
Index

Citation preview

The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community The Weak Confront the Strong

Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Studies New York University A list of other Studies in Peaceful Change appears at the back of the book

The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community The Weak Confront the Strong

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

1971

Copyright © 1971 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

LC Card: 76-120765 ISBN: 0-691-05642-0

This book has been set in Linotype Times Roman Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

to Daniele, for the first ten and to the second

Contents Preface

ix

Stylistic Conventions Used

2

1. Background to Negotiations The Treaty of Rome Winds of Change

3 6 18

2. Negotiating the Yaounde Convention Negotiations Analysis

24 27 54

3. Negotiations with Commonwealth Africa Nigeria East Africa Analysis

77 80 93 107

4. Negotiations with North Africa Negotiations Analysis

116 120 148

5. Negotiations in the Eurafrican Institutions Negotiations Analysis

162 166 195

6. Negotiations in General Diplomacy and Bargaining Alternatives Convergence Propositions Weak and Strong

200 200 206 211 218 222

Appendix: Tables

231

Index

235

Preface WHILE working on studies of intra-African diplomacy,11 be­

came increasingly aware that another set of relations for African states concerned not simply cold-war, postcolonial, or UN relations, but the whole North-South dimension that might best be called relations between the "weak" (new, un­ derdeveloped, poor, colonized, etc. states) and the "strong" (old, developed, rich, colonial/imperial, etc. states). I be­ came intrigued by two aspects of the problem: How do the weak, negotiating with the strong, escape from their defini­ tional inferiority and obtain something? What is the nature of North-South diplomacy? In looking for a specific prob­ lem to study as a typical example, I became attracted, for many reasons, by the Association of African States with the Euro­ pean Economic Community. If, in my former framework of study,2 relations with neighbors and areas of identification turned out to be most important in some ways, postcolonial relations and the diplomacy of foreign aid are equally impor­ tant in other ways. African relations with the European Com­ munity provide a good example for study of both subjects. They also have the advantage of providing a number of sep­ arate, comparable cases within the general topic, so that com­ parisons concerning power, unity, alternatives, techniques, and other aspects of diplomacy can be made. Finally, rela­ tively little has been written on Association, and very little from the political point of view. The qualification is important: this is a political study of negotiations. I am concerned with the economics of Associa­ tion only to the extent that it provides the raw material for negotiations. I have tried, therefore, to give enough economic background to make the politics intelligible, without, I hope, offending any economists or trade experts who may be inter1 International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 2 "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," XXI International Organization 3:545-64 (Summer 1967); "Interven­ tion among Developing States," XXII Journal of International Affairs 2:188-97 (1968).

PREFACE

ested. But politics—the means (power) and ends (stakes) in influencing behavior—is my concern here. By the same token, this is not a study of the Associations per se, but of the way they came about through a process of negotiation. Nor is this a moral review of these Associations, or a judg­ ment on the rights and wrongs of postcolonial relations. It is easy to "prove" that rich Europeans are not giving enough, just as it is to "prove" that independent Africans have no claim on anything if they really want to stand on their own two feet. That is someone else's argument, and in those terms is a bit wearying. Its referents are moral, its effects political. I am interested in the effects. For however the debate may rage, what really matters is: Right or wrong, how is one side going to get or keep what the other side has or wants? As an inhabitant of a rich country with a falling foreign aid percent­ age and as a believer in a creed of mutual responsibility and neighborliness, I happen to think that there is an obligation for wealthy communities to share, and I also feel that there is a complementary obligation to provide a situation condu­ cive to self-help. But that is another matter, and not the analysis of the power confrontation here undertaken. In addition to other sources mentioned in the notes, two public periodicals were used extensively: the daily bulletin, Europe, Agence Europe, Brussels, and the British periodical, West Africa, London. Both, I have learned from checking on the spot, are highly accurate although not complete; the for­ mer is actually part of the European Community interaction, being used for leaks and communications; the latter was well represented during the Commonwealth negotiations. PubUc material has been supplemented with three special sources. I obtained access to the transcripts of interministerial nego­ tiating sessions for the Yaounde and Maghrebi sets of ne­ gotiations; they do not cover all formal negotiations, but they do permit a close analysis of tactics and process at a constant level. I have also been allowed by some negotiating African states to see reports of their own on several of the sets; they do not provide a constant level of comparison but they are useful in understanding the internal components of the group χ

PREFACE

negotiations. I also interviewed participants in all the group negotiations, including the Europeans, North Africans, and the Nigerians while crucial rounds were going on. Obviously, much of all this material cannot be cited directly or attrib­ uted. It has nevertheless been invaluable. I am therefore ex­ tremely grateful to innumerable individuals in the Commis­ sion, the Member and Associated delegations, the American mission, and in the civil and diplomatic services of Associates and aspirants for their time, their frankness, and their as­ sistance. I am also grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation which (through a grant to the New York University, Depart­ ment of Politics) made it possible to begin the study, to the Social Science Research Council for a grant to do research in Brussels, Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott, and Dakar, to the Center for International Studies of New York University for the facilities to write the study, and to the United States Gov­ ernment for a Fulbright-Hayes grant that allowed me, inci­ dentally, to follow the negotiations to their end. In addition, I have also received assistance, for which I am grateful, from Barbara Murphy and Ahmed Rhazzaoui on the North Afri­ can negotiations, from Warren Buhler on the Yaounde and Nigerian negotiations, from Lutapimwa Kato on the East African negotiations and the Yaounde institutions, and from Irma Mazelis on the tables. I am also grateful to the members of the Center for International Studies of New York Uni­ versity for their helpful comments on parts of the manuscript in the Center colloquiums, to the members of the Columbia University African Forum for their comments, and to Robert Hawkins, Robert Meagher, Patrick O'Cornesse, Noureddine Hasnaoui, and Piet-Hein Houben, for their thoughtful cor­ rections on the manuscript. The manuscript was prepared with precision by Elena Pellacani, who types faster than I can write, and better. Marjorie Putney has been a most efficiently helpful editor. Throughout it all, my wife kept me alive, en­ tertained the diplomats, processed the manuscript, and packed the suitcases. With all this help, all I can claim is responsi­ bility for the errors. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community The Weak Confront the Strong

STYLISTIC CONVENTIONS USED EEC: European Economic Community the Six: the European countries that are Members of the EEC (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) the Eighteen: the African countries with ties of Association to the EEC (all former colonies of the Six European countries) Europe: refers to the Six, not to the entire continent Africa: refers to the Eighteen, not to the entire continent Members: capitalized, refers to the European countries in the EEC Associates: capitalized, refers to the African countries with ties of Association to the EEC Congo: refers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with its capi­ tal at Kinshasa Congo-Brazzaville: refers to the Republic of the Congo with its capi­ tal at Brazzaville the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, the Committee of Permanent Representatives: institutions of the EEC the Association Council, the Association Committee, the Parliamen­ tary Conference, the Joint Committee: institutions of the Associa­ tion of the Eighteen Many abbreviations are used throughout the book; they are given in full the first time they appear in the text. For example, CAP refers to the Common Agricultural Policy; CET, to the Common External Tariff; FEDOM, to the European Overseas Development Fund; FED, to the European Development Fund; ECA, to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; GATT, to the General Agree­ ment on Tariffs and Trade; UNCTAD, to the United Nations Con­ ference on Trade and Development

1. Background to Negotiations OURS is an era of diffused power. Three major, dynamic characteristics of contemporary international relations are polycentrism, decolonization, and development. The first two refer to the breakdown of bloc systems of preserving order in international relations. Polycentrism implies that ideolog­ ical blocs are losing their polarized properties and that the scramble for allies has abated. While a great state still may have zones of influence, other great states can penetrate these zones and establish "good relations" with member states, who can then use these relations to open more options, gain greater freedom of action, and counterbalance the influence of the predominant state. Alliances have lost their certainty, both for the polar power and for its "satellites." Security tends to be sought—if not always found—in temporary sup­ port and mobile relations. This is possible because the direct military threat to security has diminished since nuclear weap­ ons have, thus far, effectively eliminated themselves from use through nuclear stalemate. Decolonization means that imperial blocs are also crum­ bling and that the former metropoles are losing their polar positions within them. The process is not limited to the for­ mal granting of independence; on the contrary, accession to sovereignty is only the first step that impels and allows new states to dilute bilateral ties and multilateralize relations. It is not clear whether the relations that can be diversified with the greatest speed or ease are economic or political; it is likely that there is no fixed pattern. The only constant is the general process, wherein each decolonizing step becomes the basis for the next. Postcolonial as well as post cold-war zones of influence remain; although it is still too soon after inde­ pendence in many areas to predict the pace at which influence in these zones will change, it is already clear that the police function in both domestic and international affairs is no longer fulfilled by the metropoles in most of their former colonies.

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

Development is the challenge of the age. But just as not all states are developed, so are not all states developing. Yet all states seek development, for some or all of their people, to the point where it has become a symbolic goal, in the same way that security was in some past periods. Particularly for the new states, threats to security do not come from the out­ side; rather, insecurity is endemic to the internal nature of the state while it is in an underdeveloped or developing condi­ tion. Epileptic dissidence and—perhaps to a greater extent that is only gradually being recognized—cataleptic apathy are the twin opposites of the dynamic stability that comes only through self-sustained economic growth, problem-solv­ ing political processes, and self-regenerating social mobility. But the same problems of development have also sapped the power of the greatest states at crucial moments in their his­ tories. Thus all states of all sizes are involved in essentially the same debate on the economic, social, and political strate­ gies of development, just as they were on the military aspects of security in the recent past. The two poles of the economic debate are autarkic selfreliance and open international cooperation. These poles are turned into the horns of a dilemma because, in economics as in security, no state is an island and because cooperation al­ ways poses the problem of domination. Thus, between an in­ dependence that is impossible and an interdependence that is dangerous, middle solutions have to be found. Selective in­ terdependence within zones of influence is one of the forms that postcolonial and postbipolar international relations take, but within the limits already noted. Other states seek to in­ crease their independence in all fields by moving outside influence zones, playing off against each other competing sources of power, lending support in terms of their own in­ terests, and sometimes even seeking to create their own zones of influence. Needless to say, all these characteristics of diffused power relations in the contemporary era do not eliminate differences in the levels of power held by various states. Whether eco­ nomic development, military might, or political influence is

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

considered the basis of power in a particular state, all states show tremendous disparities. Yet weak and strong states must continually deal with each other and this need poses a paradox: How can the weak confront the strong and "get something out of them," given the power imbalance? The problem is not new, of course, since weak and strong states have coexisted from the beginning of time,1 and natural se­ lection seems to operate less rigorously among states than among animals. Yet as states break away from blocs and em­ pires and seek to achieve their goals of development, they face the old paradox in a new context. The challenges and responses of past historical situations may repeat themselves, but always to some extent by choice of the actors, since every era—indeed every historical moment—must work out its own norms and procedures before it can select which of many historical precedents to follow. More than ever, in a diffused power age, it is again becoming obvious that the aggregate power position of a state cannot be directly translated into relevant and available power in any particular situation. Pow­ erful states may turn out to be weak in a given confronta­ tion with seemingly weaker states. Yet the notion of strong and weak states still has meaning, and the paradox still has validity. This book deals in depth with a multiple case study of that paradox, and in so doing probes into the three dynamic char­ acteristics of contemporary international relations. The im­ mediate problem is an analysis of the overlapping sets of negotiations that spanned the decade of the 1960's, and that had as their purpose the elaboration of postcolonial arrange­ ments that would govern relations between the new, inde­ pendent African states and the states that were gradually uniting in the European Community. The underlying proposi­ tion of this book, suggested both by logical deduction and by the preceding analysis, is that small states do in fact have a 1 Cf. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); George Liska, Alliances and Small States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

good deal of power over more powerful states, but that this power must be based outside the narrow range of elements commonly subsumed under the labels "strong" and "weak." In the course of making this analysis, some new insights into the future relations between strong and weak states will be sought, and a deeper understanding of the theory and prac­ tice of the negotiation process in general will be pursued.

The Treaty of Rome Late in the negotiations for the creation of a European Economic Community (EEC) among the Six (France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries) France brought up the colonial question, insisting that European economic integration would be possible only if it made provisions for the European colonies overseas. While it had not been possi­ ble seven years earlier to mix bloc and empire by including overseas territories (except Algeria, an integral part of France) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, eco­ nomic realities in 1957 were considered to be different from security questions. For France, and to a lesser extent Bel­ gium, the economies of their colonies were inseparably tied to the metropole by a system of preferential trade, budgetary and commercial subsidies, and/or expatriate personnel and investment, and the economic needs of their colonies had grown beyond the metropole's ability to handle them alone.2 Several solutions to the problem could have been en­ visaged. One would be simply to exclude overseas territories from European unity. The dependent, underdeveloped colo­ nial economies were in no position to bear the obligations or benefit from the rights of full membership in the economic treaty. Nor were they prepared, however, to assume the burdens and risks of economic independence. An interruption of economic ties with the metropole would deal a heavy blow to these economies, and would have been paradoxical in the absence of political independence. Another solution would be to adopt an openly reinforced multilateral colonial pact, 8See

1957.

Le Monde, 26-29 July 1956, 12 December 1956, 13 January

B A C K G R O U N D TO N E G O T I A T I O N S

and to formalize it through the creation of the long-dis­ cussed Eurafrica (since, with the exception of scattered French and Dutch islands and the Guianas, all territories in question were located in Africa). Such a solution would treat the colonies as simple tributaries of a continental metropole, and by the principle of comparative advantage would leave them to specialize in supplying raw materials and in consum­ ing European finished goods. Yet some of the Six, especially Germany, opposed a return to the economic and political burdens of becoming a colonial power in an era when colo­ nialism was a drain and a stigma, and some of the rising Afri­ can leaders spoke out against a reinforcement of colonial ties at the very time when such ties appeared to be relaxing. How­ ever, neither politically independent nor economically strong, the African territories could no more be handed back to the devil of the colonial pact than they could be let loose in the deep blue sea of economic independence. The intermediate solution at the juncture of comple­ mentary interest appears, in retrospect,3 as the natural, indeed 3 Actually, the broad lines of the compromise had been in the air for half a decade, in the form of the Strasbourg Plan that grew out of a Council of Europe and European Assembly recommendation; see U. W. Kitzinger, The Politics and Economics of European Inte­ gration (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 99-100. However, the com­ promise that France forced on Germany and its other partners in 1956 was the one it had rejected when presented by a German deputy in the European Assembly in 1952: the economic attachment of the overseas territories directly to the Community instead of indirectly through the metropole; see Henri Burgelin, "La decolonisation et Ies relations entre puissances occidentales," pp. 89-97 in J-B Duroselle and Jean Meyriat, eds., La Communaute internationale face aux jeunes etats (Paris: Colin, 1964). It should be remembered that if black African independence was not yet planned, the Venice meeting came just one month before the loi-cadre on the autonomy of the French African territories, over two months after Tunisian and Moroc­ can independence, and two years after the Geneva Conference on Indochina. There is no book on the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome comparable to Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Com­ munity, 1955-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). See also Pierre Moussa, Les chances economiques de la CommunautS franco-africaine (Paris: Colin, 1957). On Association, see Arnold

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

the only, compromise between the evils of the extremes. Pref­ erential colonial relations could gradually be multilateralized until a single free-trade area was created, with both the bur­ dens of aid and the benefits of protected trade and invest­ ment being shared by all the Six. In the process, the overseas Associates would enjoy greater trade and investment, and the increased quantity would presumably be reinforced by higher quality born of competition. In sum, the benefits of European unity—an enlarged duty-free market—would be offered to the Members' colonies and territories, without changing the colonial nature of the political and economic relationship. The principle of "associating" the overseas territories in the Common Market was practically imposed by France at the Venice conference of Foreign Ministers, in late May 1956, as an additional price for French adhesion to the Com­ munity. Implementation of the principle, however, was the last point of the Treaty to be settled and was not arranged until the eighth and last ministerial conference, nine months later and a month before signature. In the interim, France assiduously pursued "snowball" tactics, building up commit­ ments and winning over allies one by one until the Nether­ lands stood alone in its opposition. If the victory was French, however, the hero was Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister. He was the author of the draft treaty presented at Venice, and he made a special trip to the Netherlands in early February to advocate the Association idea. The growing commitments amassed by the government of Rivkin, Africa and the European Common Market, 2nd edn. (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1966); P.N.C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967); L'Association des Etats Africains et Malagache ά la Communaute Economique Europeenne (Paris: La Documentation franfaise, 15 October 1966, Note et Etude documentaire no. 3327); Pierre-Bernard Couste, L'Association des Pays d'Outre-Mer ά la Communautd Economique Europienne (Paris: Libraries techniques, 1959); J. G. van Benthem van den Bergh, De Associatie Van Afrikaanse Staten met de Europese Economische Gemeensehap (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1962); L. D. Ananiades, L'Association aux Communautes EuropSennes (Paris: Librairie generate de droit et de jurisprudence, 1967).

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

Guy Mollet resulted from debates on the question and votes of support for the French position in various French insti­ tutions—notably the Economic and Social Council in July 1956, and the National Assembly in January 1957. By the time of the final ministerial conferences in February 1957, it was clear that France would not renege on the European Economic Community as it had on the European Defense Community three years earlier, but that the government had won its domestic battles for support by promising, among other things, overseas association. The French effort to win support for their position began with Belgium, whose central African territories—despite their looser economic relationship with the metropole—gave it common interests with France. It was on the basis of a Franco-Belgian memorandum that accord was nearly reached at the sixth ministerial conference, at Val-Duchesse in late January 1957, as the Six moved slowly toward agreement on the last remaining areas of dispute.4 France's dual basic de­ mand for a free-trade area was accepted: the overseas As­ sociates opened themselves to imports from all of the Six on the same basis as imports from their metropole, and the Six reciprocated with preferential duty-free entry for imports from any Member's overseas territories. The stumbling block concerned the third major French point: participation of all Members in an Overseas Investment Fund. The principle of support for social (infrastructure) projects was, however, generally admitted. An additional obstacle, on which the memorandum did not take a stand, was agreement on the identification of overseas Associates, particularly in regard to Tunisia and Morocco (new and independent competitors of some Members), and Algeria (an integral part of France then in bloody rebellion). At the same time, Italy spoke of including among the Associates Somalia (its trust territory) and Libya (its former colony), and the Netherlands of in4 Le Monde, 29 January 1957. On the French position see ibid., 10 October 1956, 20 October 1957. France was operating under the influence of the 1956 Suez crisis, which made it apparent that the Entente Cordiale was too small and the Atlantic Alliance too fragile; ibid., 19 December 1956.

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

eluding its West Indies. Winning over German support was begun at the seventh ministerial conference, also at ValDuchesse, in early February.5 There appears to have been an underlying fear of making a commitment for the life of the treaty ("of unlimited duration," Rome 240)6 to provide funds for political entities that were such poor insurance risks as were the colonies. France therefore agreed to include only the principles of Association in the Treaty, leaving the details in an Annex that would cover the first five years. These pro­ visions were important points that would be the basis for much later negotiation. The Germans agreed to participate in an investment fund but refused to be assigned a specific percentage (the Franco-Belgian memorandum had proposed a fixed quota for Members' contributions for social projects, and a quota—presumably fluctuating—based on the value of each Member's exports to the Associates for economic projects, with the Associates' regional development plans to be submitted to an EEC body). Germany wanted economic projects discussed item by item, a process that France, in turn, felt would result in pro­ viding European funding for only the better projects and leaving the poorer projects to metropole. Furthermore the French proposal for providing preferential treatment for As­ sociates' exports—a high European tariff on tropical prod­ ucts imported from non-Associates—troubled Germany and the Netherlands, whose sources for these products were not among the Associates and whose prices would therefore rise (although they would also rise if they shifted to the higher5 Ibid., 5 February 1957, 6 February 1957, 7 February 1957, 15 February 1957. 6 Treaty articles when given in the text are preceded by the name of the relevant treaty: Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957 (EEC Docu­ ment 8012/1/VI/1963/5); Yaounde (I) Convention of Association, 20 July 1963 (EEC, unnumbered); Yaounde (II) Convention, 29 July 1969 (EEC, unnumbered); Lagos Agreement establishing an Associa­ tion, 16 July 1966 (EEC, unnumbered); Arusha Association Agree­ ment, 26 July 1968 (EEC, unnumbered); Tunis Agreement estab­ lishing an Association, 29 March 1969 (EEC, unnumbered); Rabat Agreement establishing an Association, 31 March 1969 (EEC, un­ numbered) .

B A C K G R O U N D TO N E G O T I A T I O N S

priced Associates as sources, as France and Belgium wanted). There was agreement, however, that a free-trade area between Members and Associates would be installed progressively; that while Algeria would have to be included it would be so only under circumscribing conditions (Rome 227), and that Tunisia and Morocco—and eventually quite a list of overseas non-Associates—would be assured the pos­ sibility of eventual Association through Declarations of In­ tentions appended to the Treaty (all matters for renewed discussion in the 1960's). During the first half of February 1957, it appeared certain that the treaty negotiations would have to be carried to the level of heads of state. While only a few details were left un­ settled, they were so important to some of the Six that the creation of a "Common Market" was threatened; the Nether­ lands, the most "Europeanist" of the Six but also the least protectionist, threatened to join a British-sponsored "counter"-Community, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),7 and France refused to sign the EEC Treaty unless it protected not only the Six but their colonies as well. The chances of France's winning its hand appeared small since it was the petitioner on two nonnegotiable points: Associa­ tion and a matter of ownership of fissionable materials under the Euratom Treaty (which was being negotiated at the same time). It was therefore as much surprise as relief that greeted the news that an agreement had been reached at the minis­ terial level during the eighth meeting in Paris in February 1957. The Overseas Fund, lasting five years, would dispense a sum including matched German and French contributions of $200 million each; Belgium, Italian, and Dutch territories would also be covered; and, in a Belgian compromise at the last minute, Germany would be allowed quotas for non-As­ sociated exports of tropical products and the common Euro­ pean tariff on tropical products would be applied progres­ sively so as not to harm non-Associated exports suddenly. The substance of the agreement had been proposed as 7

Le Monde, 3 Febraary 1957.

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

a package, with concessions possible only on the details: France offered to share the exclusiveness of her colonial market and investment area (thus gradually inviting compe­ tition) if the other Members would agree to help meet the Associates' market and capital needs that France could no longer handle. The result was Part IV of the Rome Treaty (comprising only 6 articles, Rome 131-136) and an ap­ pended Application Convention (of 17 articles), plus a num­ ber of lesser annexes, protocols, and Declarations of Inten­ tions, covering the three basic aspects of overseas Associa­ tion: trade, aid, and establishment. In the matter of trade, the same provisions for the pro­ gressive elimination of commercial restrictions—tariffs and quotas—and the establishment of a free-trade area that were to apply to trade among European Members were also to apply to trade between Europe and Africa (and other colo­ nial countries), and by the same token, to trade among colonial African Associates, whether French, Belgian, or Italian. The Treaty also provided for the progressive construction of a single tariff wall of even height—a common external tariff (CET)—around the Six at the same time that tariffs were being progressively eliminated among the Members and their colonial Associates; in this way, the CET was breached for imports from the Associates, thus giving them a prefer­ ence on the European market. However, unlike the Members, the Associates were not enclosed within the CET and were free to establish their own tariffs on imports from third parties. The important characteristic of this progressive ar­ rangement was multilateral reciprocity, whereby the colonial areas would lower their tariffs on the Members' exports (usually, on exports from five of the Six since the French colonies already granted duty-free entry to French goods) at the same time and the same rate as the Members (or, again, five of the Six) would remove their tariffs on imports from the colonies (Rome 133). Tariff reductions were to be carried out in three complex stages, the first two comprising three reductions each and the third to involve as many re-

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

ductions as necessary to achieve final elimination of customs (about the end of the 1960's). At the end of each of the three stages, a step was to be taken toward the establishment of the CET. In fact, the Six found that they were able to ac­ celerate the process, so that by the end of 1961 (the end of the first stage) additional percentage reductions of tariffs had already been accomplished and the first step toward a CET had already been in effect for a year. In order to favor the development of the colonies—one of the announced purposes of the Association (Rome 131)—a safeguard clause was included (Rome 133.3) permitting the maintenance of custom duties when necessary for develop­ ment or industrialization, and of fiscal duties for budgetary purposes. Fiscal duties are a nondiscriminating (erga omnes) surcharge on imports from all sources, whereas tariffs (cus­ toms duties) can differentiate among sources to give prefer­ ence to one or more suppliers. Since duties on imports pro­ vided much of the budgetary income of the colonies, the safeguard clause was important. In fact, when the Treaty of Rome went into effect, all the French African colonies relied on nondiscriminating fiscal duties to raise revenue; in addi­ tion, the territories of French West Africa (AOF) also applied tariffs to the goods of third parties. However, the trust territories of France (Cameroon, Togo), Italy (So­ malia), and Belgium (Ruanda-Urundi), as well as the Bel­ gian Congo and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) were limited to using nondiscriminatory fiscal duties as the result of "open-door" conventions attached to their trusteeship or colonial agreements. Such conventions prohibited discrimina­ tion (and hence preferences) on the basis of the country of origin of the imports. Madagascar also had erga omnes fiscal duties. These duties were excepted from the Rome Treaty tariff reduction, because of their nondiscriminatory nature. The coming into force of the Association, then, meant that AOF territories would be required to make progressive re­ ductions of tariffs on imports from the five Members of the Community other than France (a reduction that reached 30 percent by the beginning of the second stage in 1962), while

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

retaining their fiscal duties; Madagascar, which reestablished a tariff system in 1961, continued to grant customs-free entry to goods from all Members. At the beginning of the second stage, all the former French African colonies plus Cameroon continued to rely on fiscal duties for revenue as provided by the safeguard clause, whereas the remaining five "open-door" territories (Congo, Somalia, Togo, Rwanda, Burundi) continued to apply their customs duties, practic­ ing no discrimination among the Six but also granting them no preference over third-country imports. On the other hand, the safeguard clause was never specifically invoked to permit maintenance of customs duties for use in development or industrialization. Quantitative restrictions (quotas) are used to regulate im­ ports by quantity rather than by price and can be either uniform or discriminatory. The Treaty of Rome provided for a complicated schedule which would end with the total elim­ ination of quotas on Eurafrican trade and on trade among the Associates, as well as on trade among the Six. With cer­ tain exceptions (bananas to Germany and coffee to the Bene­ lux countries and Italy), the Six were to combine their quotas on imports from the Associates and to increase them 20 percent per year.8 Each Associate was to combine its quotas for all states other than its metropole into a single "global" quota that was to be open without discrimination to all Members (other than the metropole) at the end of the first year of the Treaty, and then was to increase by the same 20 percent figure each year thereafter; small quotas were to be raised to 7 percent of all imports as the first year's starting figure. The enlargement of quotas was of great importance to Members other than the metropole, since quantitative re­ strictions had been used to direct trade to the metropolitan state and to close it to competing outside states, against nat­ ural market tendencies. The gradual expansion of quotas was 8 The detailed provisions, more complex than reported here, are found in Rome 33 and Application Convention 10, 12. Provisions governing the Associates' action are found in Rome Application Con­ vention 11.

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

necessary to open Members and Associates to each others products, thus moving them from bilateral toward multi­ lateral trade. This effort was largely successful. The aim of these trade liberalization measures between Members and Associates of the Community was to increase trade gradually between the two groups of countries, as well as within each group. Elimination of tariffs and quotas was to take place gradually over the 12 to 15 years provided in the Treaty of Rome to set up the European Economic Com­ munity. Since the Treaty provisions for the Associates cov­ ered only the first five years of this transition period (and then were to be renegotiated), the full effects of the measures were not yet felt by 1962. Although purchases of the Associates' tropical products by the Six generally increased over the first five years of the Association, much of the increase was due simply to increased consumption and not to the fact that Eu­ ropean trade was diverted from third parties by the increas­ ingly preferential conditions for the Associates' exports. In fact, for most tropical products—coffee, cocoa, bananas, peanut and palm oil, cotton, and rubber—European trade with third-party suppliers also increased, usually more than with the Associates. The same pattern was generally evident in regard to the multilateralization of European exports to the Associates. Similarly, intra-African trade remained small and showed no striking increase. The strength of the provi­ sions remained in their promise for the future since more than five years were needed to show their effects. In regard to the rules covering expatriate personnel and investments—called rights of establishment—the Treaty pro­ vided in principle for equal conditions for nationals of all Members but details remained to be worked out. It took the Six nearly two years to negotiate these details, by which per­ sons and companies from the five Members would progres­ sively attain the same rights of establishment already enjoyed by the metropole in its colonial Associates. Even then, the elimination of discrimination did not cover all professions and employment. In any case, by the time the Community di­ rectives had been published, new conditions were imminent

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

in most of the Associates and application remained sus­ pended, except for the Belgian territories and Somalia where the "open-door" regime already covered rights of establish­ ment. This suspension had serious effects on the third cate­ gory of Association provisions—that of aid—since projects financed by the Community tended to be undertaken by com­ panies already operating in the Associates, i.e., by nationals of the metropole who had long enjoyed privileged conditions of establishment, even though the Treaty provided that equal rights of establishment were to apply immediately to all Members involved in aid projects. As the Treaty of Rome sought to multilateralize the bene­ fits of privileged trade and establishment relations that the metropole had formerly monopolized with its colonial terri­ tories, it also went far in multilateralizing the burdens of aid for the Six, and hence its benefits for the Associates. A Euro­ pean Overseas Development Fund (FEDOM) totaling $581.25 million was to be allocated among the individual As­ sociates by the EEC Commission on the basis of project re­ quests. The inputs into the allocation process were the contri­ butions of the Members and the proposals of the Associates (forwarded through the Member metropole), and the outputs were the funded projects, using the government services or the firms of Members or the nationals of Associates to under­ take work within the Associated countries. But the process itself was purely multilateral, with the dossier of the project request reviewed (and sometimes partially prepared) by the technical services of the FEDOM and with the decision on financing made by the Commission, acting alone on social de­ velopment projects and with the concurrence of the EEC Council of Ministers on economic development projects. There are many ways of portraying the FEDOM. Among the contributors, France and Germany each provided 34.4 percent ($200 million), Belgium and the Netherlands each provided 12.04 percent ($70 million), Italy provided 6.9 percent ($40 million), and Luxembourg .22 percent ($1.25 million). Among the recipients, 87.8 percent ($511.25 mil­ lion) was to be allocated to French Associates, 6.02 percent

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($35 million) to Dutch Associates, 5.16 percent ($30 mil­ lion) to Belgian Associates, and 1.02 percent ($5 million) to Italian Associates, although by the final distribution, slight adjustments brought the figures to $496.6 million, $35.2 mil­ lion, $26.8 million, and $2.9 million, with the remainder going to technical costs. Dutch colonials received about $35 per capita, French, $14, Italian, $5, and Belgian, $1.50. In a further breakdown, Madagascar and Cameroon each received more than $50 million (9 percent); Senegal, Mali, and the Ivory Coast each about $40 million (7 percent); Niger, Upper Volta, and Chad each about $30 million (5 percent); Algeria and the Congo-Brazzaville each over $23 million (4 percent); and Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Gabon, and the Congo each about $17 million (3 percent) by the time of the final allocations. Over the five-year period, allocation (and contribution) was to be progressive because of the time required to gen­ erate proposals; 10 percent ($58,125 million) was to be spentin 1958, 12.5 percent ($72,656 million) in 1959, 16.5 percent ($95,906 million) in 1960, 22.5 percent ($130,781 million) in 1961, and 38.5 percent ($223,782 million) in 1962. In fact, for the same reason, allocation was slower than scheduled; only 20 percent ($119 million) was allocated by the end of 1961 and an additional 40 percent ($234 million) in 1962. Final allocation of the total FEDOM was not com­ pleted until mid-1965, and even less than half the allocated funds were actually spent by that date; the remainder were not fully expended until 1968. Actual expenditure only be­ gan in 1960 with $4 million, followed by $16 million in 1961, $53 million in 1962, $65 million in 1963, and $83 million in 1964. This sort of delay is not unusual in aid allocation and expenditure, however, and actually proved to be helpful in the EEC case because of subsequent delays in renegotiat­ ing the Association. The FEDOM was also to be broken down into two com­ ponents: social and economic development. By the end of the five-year period, $154.6 million had been committed to social development projects and $264.9 million for economic de-

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

velopment. By the time the FEDOM was fully allocated in 1965, $212.7 million had been devoted to social projects and studies and $358.3 to economic development, with the re­ maining $15.25 million going to operating expenses. The first category included education (16 percent), health (8 per­ cent), water supply (6 percent), and urban construction (3 percent), while the second included transportation (40 per­ cent), agricultural production (17 percent), telecommunica­ tions (2 percent), and industrial production (1 percent). A number of these characteristics relating to aid can be summarized: The FEDOM represented the world's most gen­ erous multilateral commitment, spread in gradually increas­ ing outlays over time, supplementing the efforts of individual Members. Transportation, agriculture, education, health, and water supply (in descending order) were the overwhelming beneficiaries of FEDOM aid; aid to industrial production was less than 1 percent and even when agriculture is added, aid to production was less than 20 percent. The aid processes were slow and the French colonies were heavily favored, al­ though there were good reasons for both.

Winds of Change The Association as established in the Treaty of Rome was thus geared directly to increased, multilateralized trade and aid—two specific goals that could be considered under the larger framework of development. Awareness of economic, and possibly even political, change was most clearly seen in the Treaty's five-year limitation on the specific provisions of the "unlimited Association"; this limitation was one of the conditions that France's partners had imposed in exchange for including the colonies in the Treaty. But there is no evi­ dence that political change as basic as independence for most of the colonies or territories was foreseen. However, there were already some straws in the wind at the time of the Rome Treaty. The Ioi cadre of 1956 had al­ ready gone into effect, providing decentralization and in­ creased autonomy for the territories within France's colonial African federations. Italy's trusteeship agreement on Somalia

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specifically provided for independence in 1960. In neighbor­ ing African territories, the British Gold Coast had already become independent as Ghana, achieved sovereignty just nineteen days before the Rome Treaty was signed. In North Africa, the French Protectorates over Morocco and Tunisia had come to an end a full year earlier, and their special eco­ nomic relations with France were reflected in a Declaration of Intentions appended to the Treaty, providing for the pos­ sibility of association if and when desired. By the middle of the Treaty's first year of operation, events in Algeria had brought about the overthrow of the Fourth French Republic, followed by a constitutional referendum that inaugurated the Fifth Republic and gave rise to debates on independence within French Africa. At the end of the year, Guinea seized the option. All of these events, most of them unforeseen in their detailed effects, were to have their impact on the politics and the economics of the Association. Two events deserve special attention here. When Guinea became independent at the end of 1958, the Treaty had not been in effect for a full year. Some aid had been allocated, but not to all Associates; no agreement had yet been reached on rights of establishment; the first 10 percent reduction in tariffs on both sides of the Mediterranean and the combining of quotas were not to take place until the beginning of the following year. The Treaty provided that all of the Six should have the same preferential position as the metropole, but Guinea's relations with the metropole suddenly deteriorated: French aid was terminated, French trade was cut, French ex­ patriates were withdrawn. At the beginning of 1959, the Community took the first step in its trade liberalization schedule; Guinea did not put its scheduled measures into effect, nor did it press to take advantage of the Community's measures. The relationship had ended by common disaccord.9 9 Had Guinea raised the successor state question and wished to maintain its Associate status, the shoe would have been on the other foot: France doubtless would have led a bitter political fight against the legalities of association or reassociation, spokesmen for Guinea among the Six would have been hard to find, and the Europeans could

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

Ghana from the beginning was the most outspoken of the African critics of Association. As in other areas of policy, its full stand was not immediately apparent upon independence, but after the independence of Guinea and the "Union" of the two states late in 1958, Ghanaian opposition to ECC Associ­ ation was far outclassed in virulence by Sekou Toure. But already in December 1958, the All-African Peoples Confer­ ence, at its first meeting in Accra, denounced the "Imperial­ ists" and their "military and economic pacts such as NATO, European Common Market, Free Trade Area," and others.10 By 1960, Nkrumah's arguments against Association were well developed. He told a conference on Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa that Association hindered in­ dustrialization and the protection of infant industries, and brought cheap imports to Europe in exchange for expensive exports to Africa.11 Ghana also led the criticism of Associa­ tion in the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), whose report in 1960 expressed doubts over how much Afri­ can use of the safeguard clauses would be tolerated by the Six and how often the Africans would follow the more difficult path of industrialization under conditions of Association.12 have been accused of "expelling" Guinea. But the fact is that none of this occurred, including the first step: Guinea never sought to take advantage of its presumed "association." All this shows that Immanuel Wallerstein's exchange of correspondence with the EEC, published in Xl Africa Report 6:37 (June 1966), was uncomprehending as well as petty. For other reviews of the Guinean case, see Rivkin, op.cit., pp. 39-41, and L'Association des Etats Africains et Malagache a la Communaute Economique Europienne, op.cit., p. 11. 10 Resolution cited in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism 2nd edn. (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 247; cf. the 1961 AAPC resolution from Cairo, where the EEC is no longer cited by name, ibid., p. 273. 11 Speech of 7 April 1960, cited in Kwame Nkrumah, 1 Speak of Freedom (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 217-18. 12 "The Impact of Western European Integration on African Trade and Development," UN Document E/CN, 14/72, 7 December 1960. Cf. discussions in Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 137-38; Ali Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 89-90; Ali Mazrui, "African Attitudes toward the Euro-

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The following year Nkrumah joined Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in calling Association a European imperialist scheme, a hindrance to an independent neutral policy, an obstacle to intra-African economic ties, and a guarantee of cheap raw materials for imperialist powers.13 During these two years, Nkrumah developed another of his major thrusts of attack: the Rome Treaty was to neocolonialism what the Berlin Treaty of 1885 was to colonialism.14 Arguing that both brought about a form of indirect rule—one political and one economic—he saw effective sovereignty passing from impe­ rial conquerors to the people who paid the piper. Nkrumah's last publication before his overthrow continued his attack against Association as "collective neocolonialism" or "col­ lective imperialism," and he invoked a purportedly prophetic quotation from Hobson.15 Such criticisms had their effect. When taken up by the ECA and debated within the Commonwealth, they became influential ingredients in the attitudes of uncommitted but unassociated African states. The decision of the African Commonwealth states against Association in late 1962 is the most clear-cut case of Ghanaian influence; an attempt to ex­ clude discussion of Association at the pre-Organization of African Unity Foreign Ministers' meeting at Addis Ababa in pean Economic Community," in Lawrence B. Krause, ed., The Com­ mon Market: Progress and Controversy (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 126; and Osende Afana, L'Economie de L'Ouest Africain (Paris: Maspero, 1966), pp. 235-39. 13 Cited in Rivkin, op.cit., p. 41. l i C f . L e g u m , o p . c i t . , p . 1 2 0 , a n d Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana, op.cit., pp. 63, 75-76, 89. 15 Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism (New York: International Publishers, 1966), pp. 19, 43. The Ghanaian Foreign Ministry under Nkrumah appears never to have made a study of Association, prob­ ably because policy was firmly established without such a study. However, under the pressure of Associated states in various African meetings, the Foreign Ministry asked that the Economics Ministry prepare an economic study to enable it to answer the critics. Nkrumah agreed and the study was prepared in 1964, according to interviews in the Foreign Ministry.

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

1963 was less effective.16 But Ghanaian criticism had great impact. Both the Eighteen and the Six went to pains to show in speeches and to guarantee in text and practice that the charges of neocolonialism, unfair comparative advantage, cold-war commitment, and African division were all un­ founded. At worst, of course, such efforts could be limited to merely denying that there were any dangers in Associa­ tion, but at best the criticism could be constructively used as an indication of real or potential problems to be avoided. Lit­ tle of the criticism could be met during the first five years of the Rome Treaty; like the promises of the Treaty itself, the criticisms were for the most part predictive, based on an in­ terpretation of the way the parties would behave rather than on a simple economic analysis. Thus, the real time to meet the criticisms would come when the five-year provisions of the Treaty had run out, and new details would have to be negotiated. The conditions of Association as provided by the Treaty of Rome terminated at the end of 1962. The situation at the end of the first period was mildly positive. Sizable aid had been provided, although it had been slow in reaching the African countries. The first steps in trade liberalization within an evolving free-trade area had been taken by the Europeans more rapidly than had been foreseen and by the Africans more slowly than scheduled, but their effects were only grad­ ually being felt. Trade between Europe and Africa had in­ deed increased, but so had trade between Europe and com­ peting tropical third parties. The Associates appreciated their favored position, but they criticized the shortcomings of the Association. Among African non-Associates, however, criti­ cism of the Association was at its height, aimed against both the economic preferences enjoyed by the Associates and the neocolonial situation that the critics saw operating against African unity. The Community was making an effort to meet the outsiders' economic criticism by providing a place for i® See Legum, op.cit., p. 135. On criticism at the 1962 ECA meet­ ing, see Aaron Segal, "Africa Newly Divided?" π Journal of Modern African Studies 1:73-90 (1964), esp. p. 79.

BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

Commonwealth Africa within the framework of negotiations on Britain's first attempt to enter the Common Market.17 On their side, the Africans were seeking to bridge political dif­ ferences over African unity by bringing together the com­ peting groups of African states into a new "unity" organiza­ tion. It was in this context that negotiations took place over the form of the Association's second period. These and other related negotiations will be the subject of the rest of this book. The purpose here is not so much to de­ scribe the results, but to explain and analyze how they were reached. In each set of negotiations—with the original but newly enfranchised Eighteen on a new agreement and then within the new Association institutions on a renewal of that agreement, with the Commonwealth states of East and West Africa on parallel Associations, and with the North African states on their own form of relationship—the Six met one or more African states, each side using whatever type of power it had to defend its initial positions and to move the other side toward them. If "success" means "agreement," all these sets of negotiations were "successful." Since the subject of the negotiations was basically the same in each set, there is underlying similarity and comparability in the four cases. Since the aims, context, and power had their own special characteristics in each set, there is enough diversity to make comparisons fruitful. The chapters that fol­ low, then, are case studies in the future of the Eurafrican As­ sociation, in the analysis of negotiations, and in the dynamics of confrontation between the South and North, the weak and strong. « See Chap. 3, pp. 77-78, 80, 93-94.

2. Negotiating the Yaounde Convention FOUR pressures were operating on the EEC to revise its orig­ inal Association agreement with 25 overseas countries and territories. One was the expiration and promised renewal of the "Application Convention relative to the Association," which by the Rome Treaty (Rome 136) was to occur five years after the Convention's entry into force, i.e., the end of 1962. Another was the accession of 16 Associates to inde­ pendence during 1960 and two more before the expiration of the Convention. Guidelines for dealing with the first situa­ tion were provided by the same article that established the deadline, which stipulated that dispositions covering a new period of Association were to be established by the Council before the expiration of the old. Although the second situa­ tion was less clearly foreseen, two potentially applicable pro­ visions were contained in the Treaty: Declarations of Inten­ tion annexed to the Treaty proposed the negotiation of As­ sociation Conventions with independent countries belonging to the franc zone1 and with Somalia (whose independence in 1960 was prescribed by the Trusteeship Agreement, Art. 24); and the Treaty itself (Rome 238) permitted new As­ sociations "characterized by reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions, and special procedures," to be negotiated by the Commission (Rome 228) and concluded by unani­ mous action of the Council with the advice of the Assembly. To these two pressures of a formal type were added the Association's problems of functioning under the Rome Treaty, especially in two matters:2 the FEDOM and the 1

Drawn up with Indochina and the North African Protectorates in mind, however. 2 Cf. Francois Luchaire, "Le maintien et Ie renouvellement de !'Association des etats africains et malagache au Marche commun," Dxx Penant 686:184-99 (April-May 1961). There were also a num­ ber of lesser matters left unresolved from the Rome Treaty, such as the continuing elimination of quotas, the equalization of establish­ ment rights, the need for an adequate replacement for the French surprix, and so on. Here and on the following item, see also the Commission study VIII/COM (60) 120 rev. (21 September 1960).

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Common External Tariff (CET). By 1960, little FEDOM money had been allocated and less spent, and the cumbersomeness of its procedures had become most evident. The African states, on the verge of sovereignty, could surely begin to wonder if there actually was a European Fund for their de­ velopment, at the very moment when the uncertainties of independence loomed largest. There was therefore a need to review aid procedures. In May 1960, the Six decided to ac­ celerate their moves toward the CET, so that the first (30 percent) alignment of Members' tariffs took place at the be­ ginning of 1961, a year ahead of schedule. In the process, the margin of protection given by France, a high-tariff country, to its African territories, was also reduced at an accelerated rate. There was therefore also a need to review customs arrangements.3 The first two states to achieve independence—Cameroon on 1 January 1960 and Togo on 27 April 1960, both trustee­ ship territories—immediately opened the debate on the means of continuing the Association.4 Cameroon, within two weeks after independence, informed the Commission of its desire to maintain its Association with the Community. Togo, on the other hand, proposed that the existing arrangements be terminated and a new Association be negotiated on the basis of Article 238 of the Treaty. The Togolese solution was complex, however, although it attracted the sympathy of 3 See also the discussion in the Commission memorandum, VIII/ COM (61) 110 final (12 July 1961), pp. 9-12, 14-15. The problem was also discussed by the Africans at the OAMCE meeting with Euro­ peans in June 1961 in Ouagadougou. At one point in mid-1961 the Africans spoke of leaving the Association if they were not given greater CET protection on tropical woods; yet in the final Conven­ tion, all tariffs on wood were eliminated. Cf. Marches Tropicaux et Mediterranies, 22 July 1961, p. 1892 (hereafter referred to as MTM); Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 243. * See summary discussions in L'Association des Etats Africaines et Malagache a la Communaute Economique EuropSenne (Paris: La Documentation franfaise, 15 October 1966, Note et Etude documentaire no. 3327, pp. 12, 14; Pierre Drouin, L'Europe du Marchi Commun (Paris: Julliard, 1963), pp. 302, 311.

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some of the Six, notably the Netherlands; it would have meant the cessation of European aid, almost before it began, and the preparation of overlapping bilateral negotiations for each newly independent state, at a time when neither side was fully prepared for talks on a new Association. It was not without difficulty that the Council, meeting in mid-July, late September, and mid-October 1960, was able to issue a decision (in the vaguest of terms) covering the new independence of its Associates. Recognizing a common desire to maintain Association "until new arrangements" could be made, the Council agreed to handle aid proposals "by a new procedure to be determined," to accept representatives from the Associated states "according to conditions to be deter­ mined," and eventually to organize ad hoc meetings between them and the Members' permanent representatives, as well as among ministers of the Associated and Member states, in the presence of the Commission.5 Such equivocal terms, which registered agreement only in postponing it, were the only ones able to win acceptance among the Six. The Afri­ cans, however, were thinking in terms not only of direct pres­ entation of aid projects and accreditation of ambassadors to the EEC, as the Six had already granted, but of direct par­ ticipation in meetings of the Council of Ministers when their affairs were discussed (a position they had discussed in a meeting with France in early February 1961). Therefore the Ivory Coast, Congo-Brazzaville, and Dahomey requested the opening of talks in mid-January 1961 and a week later, France, which had a natural role as spokesman for its former colonies, proposed to the Council that negotiations be opened. In accordance with established practice among the Members, the Council in turn proposed6 that interministerial negotiations be preceded by preparatory meetings among permanent representatives of Member and Associated states, 5 See

the discussion of the legal bases of the Convention in Daniel Olivier, "La Convention d'Association," Revue du Marchi Commun, 480-87 (1963). 6 See Note Introductrice, preparatory to the first meeting of the permanent representatives, R/229/61 (PTOM 40) (27 April 1961);

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

with the Commission also present. The general framework for negotiations had been established.

Negotiations Once this step had been reached, the parties began to block out their positions, beginning the phase that Senegal's Abdoulaye Fofana was later to term "a series of monologues at all levels about principles, general and acceptable in their imprecision."7 In the view of Belgium and France, the As­ sociates should not be considered third states (as under Rome 238) but should continue to benefit from a preferential system (already lessened by the CET) without which their economies would undergo sudden and serious dislocations.8 On the other side, Germany and the Netherlands considered the goal to be economic independence rather than protection for the African states; the new agreement should enable Africa to reach a competitive position on the world market within the shortest period of time—about five years.9 Italy's MTM, 29 July 1961, p. 1925. There are a number of good works on the functioning of the EEC institutions. See Piet-Hein Houben, Les Conseils de Ministres des Communautis Europiennes (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1964); Constantin P. Economides, Le Pouvoir de Decision des Organisations Internationales Europeennes (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1964); Roberto Socini, Rapports et Conflits entre Organisations Europeennes (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1960); Werner Feld, The European Com­ mon Market and the World (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); F.A.M. Alting von Gensau, European Organizations and For­ eign Relations of States (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1964); Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stan­ ford: Stanford University Press, 1963); "The Politics of European Integration," special issue, υ Government and Opposition 3 (AprilJuly 1967). 7Interministerial Meeting, R/587/61 (EAMA 1), 16 December 1961. 8 Cf. VIII/COM (61) 100 final (12 July 1961), p. 10; MTM, 29 July 1961, p. 1925. 9 Cf. MTM, 9 September 1961, pp. 2216-18. A significant incident was the Allardt affair. In June 1960, the highest European civil servant in the General Direction for Overseas Territories, Director General Helmut Allardt, resigned over differences with his Commissioner, Robert Lemaignen, after a speech in Milan several months earlier in

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

position throughout the negotiations remained that of seeking to harmonize the interests of all parties—Members (of both persuasions), Associates, and non-Associates who were trad­ ing partners of both groups. An independent position was adopted by the EEC Com­ mission, which benefited from a good deal of technical ex­ perience and data; its initial leadership came from Robert Lemaignen,10 who was highly conscious of European obliga­ tions toward the developing economies of former colonies, and in addition many of its civil servants were former colonial technicians who had developed a feeling for the needs and problems of the African territories. The Commission report, presented to the Council in July 1961, was a far-reaching document.11 On many points it tried to bridge the gap between the two sides within the Six. It used both articles 136 and 238 as the basis for its legal argument; it sought both to stabilize the Community market for tropical products and to leave the door open for the free functioning of supply and demand; it looked to both the maintenance of a Eurafrican Association and the establishment of African economic groups; and it insisted on the necessity of indemni­ fying the African states for the loss of special French prices (surprix) that would result from existing Common Market agreements. To these ends it made a number of proposals. For tropical which AUardt stated that a distinction should not be made between those African states which were Associates and those which were not; see Drouin, op.cit., pp. 301-02. See also, in opposition to the Com­ mission memorandum, op.cit., the German aide-memoire to the Council of Ministers of 12 July 1961; also in "Synthese de considera­ tions," R/343/61 (PTOM 70) (19 July 1961). Lemaignen also reacted to the criticism with a campaign defending EEC relations with third African countries; cf. Agence France Presse 4333 (10 Decem­ ber 1960), (hereafter referred to as AFP). 10 See Robert Lemaignen, L'Europe au bergeau (Paris: Plon, 1964). 11VIII/COM (61) 110 final (12 July 1961). On the matter of articles 136 and 238, see p. 8. Also "Synthese de considerations," op.cit. On the ministerial debates preceding the Commission memo­ randum, see Europe 1003 (15 June 1961), 1005 (17 June 1961), 1009 (22 June 1961), 1013 (27 June 1961), 1017 (1 July 1961).

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products the Commission suggested the elimination of tariffs, quotas, and consumption taxes inside the Association and the accelerated establishment of the CET (to come into effect in 1965). Since the CET on tropical products from competing African non-Associates (cocoa, bananas, and green coffee) was to be lowered, compensation for lower preferences was to be offered to Associates in the form of direct aid to pro­ duction of $31.5 million. Safeguard clauses were to be main­ tained. A stabilization loan fund of $50 million and a com­ mon production fund of $25 million should be established. Most important, the new FED (European Development Fund) was to distribute $220 million for each of the five to seven years of the new Association, a sum roughly equal to the largest annual figure (1962) for grants scheduled by the FEDOM. Rights of establishment were to be accorded to citi­ zens of Member and Associate states on a reciprocal basis. New forms of public investment and guarantees for private investment should be examined, and technical cooperation programs of $25 million created. New institutions for the As­ sociation12 should include a council, committee, secretariat, and parliamentary assembly, along the lines of the Commu­ nity institutions. In their ensemble, the Commission's pro­ posals formed a framework for a new treaty. Other parties also began formulating their positions. In Africa, the heads of 12 Associated states met in mid-December 1960 at Brazzaville in the second of a series of confer­ ences setting up the African and Malagasy Union (UAM). They arrived with relatively little difficulty at an early iden­ tity of views, demanding more price-stabilization measures, generous and effective aid procedures, continued support prices and protection for tropical products, increased Euro­ pean consumption of their exports, joint management of aid, and participation in judging new applications from competi12 The institutions, and particularly the Council, appear to have been first publicly proposed by French deputy Alain Peyrefitte; see his "L'Afrique et son association a la Communaute europeenne," Communautes et Continents 9:27-32 (January-March 1961); MTM, 10 June 1961, p. 1540.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

tors for Association.13 When they met in Yaounde late in March 1961 to create an Economic Cooperation Organiza­ tion (OAMCE) for the UAM, they strongly reiterated their demands and asked that these matters be put on the agenda of the proposed meeting of permanent representatives which was to take place in June.14 Experts from all Associated states met in Paris late in April to prepare common positions, not only for the 12 states of the OAMCE but also, in most cases for the other Associates.15 Their demands concerned a voice in Community decisions concerning competing Afri­ can economies; a stabilization fund with guarantees covering loans; price, marketing, and antidumping provisions for fats and oils; and the establishment of a technical assistance pro­ gram for the Association. The whole series of positions de­ veloped over five months was rather comprehensive and helped the Associates present a united front in negotiation. The specific organization of 12 Associates into an AfroMalagasy Union gave them a concerted means of pressure. When the 12 met in Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, in early September 1961 to sign the UAM charter, for example, they also passed a few more resolutions on the Association, nota­ bly on price stabilization, technical assistance, and participa­ tion in all decisions affecting them, including quotas for ex­ ports from competing non-Associates.16 Meanwhile, in Europe, the EEC Parliamentary Assembly followed the matter closely, prodding the Commission and Member governments with questions and dispatching mis­ sions to them.17 In mid-November 1960, the Assembly had 13 The resolution is given in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism, 2nd rev. edn. (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 199-200. 14 For the Yaounde resolutions, see ibid. 15 See Europe 991 (1 June 1961). 16For the Tananarive resolutions, see AFP 4564, 4572 (13 and 22 September 1961). 17 In January 1960, for example, P-J Kapteyn (Soc., Netherlands) posed a written question to the Commission on what was being done about long-term policy toward new African third states; Roger Car­ cassonne (Soc., France) asked about application of the Association; Hellmut Kalbitzer (Soc., Germany) asked about the effects of

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

approved reports18 supporting the position of the African states in favor of continued Association, joint management, more rapid processing of aid requests, new institutions, ex­ tension of the new FED to include long-term loans, pricestabilization measures, and marketing and private-investment guarantees. At the end of March 1960, the Parliamentary As­ sembly had for the first time proposed a Eurafrican parlia­ mentary conference, to be held in mid-1961 in Strasbourg. The Council of Ministers regarded this move with concern, fearing a loss of its decision-making powers and an institu­ tionalization of domestic pressure on it by a legally irrespon­ sible body; it finally acquiesced only because it could not stop the move.19 In January, in Strasbourg and in Rome, and in May and June, in Bonn and Ouagadougou,20 European par­ liamentarians continued to discuss the conditions of extend­ ing the Association. The June interparliamentary conference in Strasbourg showed a remarkable identity of views.21 Only concerning rights of establishment was there enough divergence to pre­ vent a unanimous resolution. In addition to accepting the already noted positions of the African states, the conference specified more detailed areas of agreement: Members and Associates were to enjoy equality in principle and in negotia­ tions, and parity in their contributions to and control of the Cameroonian independence in the light of the Guinean experience; Julien Ramizason (Soc., Madagascar) asked about measures toward real bilateralization of Eurafrican relations. The socialist group was particularly active, and its liaison bureau published an article and a report by its president, Willi Birkelbach (Soc., Germany) on the fu­ ture of the Association in late March and early May 1960, respectively. isBy Mario Pedini (Chris. Dem., Italy), Alain Peyrefitte (UNR, France), and August de Block (Soc., Belgium). 19 Italy was most favorable to the Parliamentary initiative; France and the Netherlands opposed the independent Parliamentary action. The Commission favored the move, however, and helped prepare the Parliament studies to further its views; cf. Drouin, op.cit., p. 307. 20 See the Working Documents, Conference de !'Association Parlementaire avec Ies Parlements des Etats Africains et de Madagascar, Ouagadougou, 5 June 1961. 2i Journal Officiel, Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne 50:942950/1961.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

FED (which was to be renamed the Common Development Fund to symbolize this new parity). The Association was to take on new forms, including new criteria and new rubrics for allocating increased aid (grants, medium and long-term loans, loan and investment guarantees, price supports, and technical assistance) and new institutions for governing the Association (a parliamentary conference with commissions, a council with committees, a court of arbitration, and direct representation of the Associates in Brussels and of the Com­ munity in the African capitals). While certain commercial advantages, such as tariff preferences on the European mar­ ket, were to be maintained for the Africans after the estab­ lishment of the CET, consumer taxes on tropical products were to be eliminated and quotas were not to be opened for competing tropical exports from non-Associates. In addition, price stabilization, marketing guarantees, and price supports were all to be created, consolidated, and increased, although some of the European criticism of these measures was in­ cluded in the partially contradictory provision that they be degressive in order to prepare African products for free com­ petition in the world market. The Association was to be open to all black African states and was to "favor the interests of [their] inhabitants"; increased consumption of their produc­ tion "should by priority benefit the Associated states." Al­ though it appeared that all the Africans' demands had been accepted, in fact the formal negotiations had not even begun. They were, however, in their preparatory stages. The first meeting of permanent representatives was held in early June 1961 in Brussels.22 The Africans were nearly always the "askers," presenting their demands with common agreement. They requested the continuation of preferences despite ac­ celeration toward a CET, the creation of stabilization meas­ ures and better marketing conditions for tropical products, the right to establish protective measures, the opportunity to defend their economic interests in European decisions regard­ ing competing non-Associates, and the abolition of European 22 See Europe 992 (2 June 1961), 993 (3 June 1961), 994 (5 June 1961).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

consumption taxes on tropical products. Senegal presented the resolutions adopted by the Associates in April, and other countries provided supporting arguments. The Europeans, on the other hand, received the requests— usually merely by taking note of them—and were severely divided. In some discussions this division was open and ap­ parent. Germany and particularly the Netherlands looked to an expansion of the Community and, a fortiori, to an open and supple Association; when it came to preferences for the Associates, the two Members (who bought their tropical products outside the Association) wanted the decision placed within a larger framework that would include the interests of competing non-Associates as well as of Members and Associ­ ates. France defended a clear priority obligation to the Associates, most of whom were her former colonies. At one point, an OAMCE resolution appealed directly to France, "within the framework of the cooperation agreements con­ tracted with her," to "subordinate" compliance with Com­ munity decisions on the CET to prior agreements with the Associates. In other matters, the division among Members was appar­ ent but silent, dampening discussion and delaying decisions. The most important of these was the Africans' insistent de­ mand for joint management, which was simply too close to the prerogatives of full membership to be accepted by the Europeans. Yet many of the concrete proposals from the Africans came down to this single, egalitarian item. With in­ sufficient technical knowledge to propose substantive re­ forms, and with the recent acquisition of sovereign equality still fresh in their minds, the Associates demanded joint procedure. The second preparatory meeting of permanent representa­ tives in early November 1961 had been postponed several times because of the difficulties the Six encountered in achiev­ ing a common position.28 A more comprehensive list of posi23The following account is based on interviews with the parties concerned and from reports of the meeting, R/468/61 (PTOM 98), 9 November 1961; R/505/61 (PTOM 107), 28 November 1961; and

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

tions was drawn up. The Europeans were able to announce a number of points of agreement among themselves, some of them conciliatory toward the Africans' positions. Thus, the object of Association was defined as "the promotion of eco­ nomic and social development of the Associates . . . in order to reinforce their economic independence"; aid provisions and the treaty itself, "freely agreed to on the basis of com­ plete equality," were to contain "advantages at least equiva­ lent" to those of the Treaty of Rome for a period of five to seven years, although Association could be considered to be for an unlimited duration (Rome 240). The chairman of the permanent representatives' committee announced, "I am au­ thorized to tell you that henceforth the Members of the Com­ munity are disposed to take measures, in common, to facili­ tate marketing of tropical products"; this was a reassuring declaration in principle. The Six also agreed to include safe­ guard clauses and the principle of reciprocal consultation. In addition, they agreed to study and include measures to stabi­ lize export income, and to establish new forms of aid and technical cooperation, as well as ministerial, preparatory, and parliamentary institutions. However, on the key matter of trade and tariff details, continued divergences among the Members permitted only a statement that the interests of Members, Associates, and non-Associates, "who are both our friends and yours," would be kept in mind. R/506/61 (PTOM 108), 30 November 1961. The Council of Min­ isters meeting of 23-25 October was the crucial session for some basic agreements. It should be noted that, although much give and take actually occurred at the permanent representatives and ministerial sessions, much more took place before such meetings and was only announced at them. On the other hand, this practice was not abso­ lute, even when informal agreements were reached outside; on occa­ sion, they were called into question when announced—because parties changed their minds, or found they did not have the authority to make the agreements, or were rejected by other parties or considera­ tions in the interim—whereupon the debate would break out again or the meeting would be suspended for a brief palaver. For the vari­ ous delays under French, German, and African pressure, see Europe 1016 (30 June 1961), 1022 (7 July 1961); AFP 4526 (29 July 1961), 4577 (28 September 1961).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

The Africans were not completely satisfied. On many of the Europeans' points they insisted on greater precision. The objectives should mention industrialization as the means to social and economic development; the principles should in­ clude solid guarantees against the loss of protected markets; measures to facilitate marketing were absolutely necessary and should include market organization, export guarantees, agricultural price stabilization, long-term agreements, tariff protection, price-support funds, and a common commercial policy toward competing non-Associates. Decision-making should be institutionalized on the basis of parity, and aid should be jointly managed from beginning to end; technical assistance and institutions of the Association should be spelled out in detail, and a development institute created. On two additional points the demands were heavy: aid must be increased, not merely maintained, and should include private investment guarantees, a development bank, and a commer­ cial production fund; existing trade and tariff protection must be maintained against competitive imports from non-Associ­ ates in Africa that were either more developed than the Asso­ ciates or were members of other customs zones. For all its wordiness, however, the November meeting pro­ vided a realistic jumping-off place for negotiations since di­ vergences in African and European positions were clearly ap­ parent. When the Associates met to coordinate their position in early December, the day before formal negotiations opened, they hardened their stand against acceptance of a CET reduction so as to continue the existing level of tariff preferences,24 but they also spent a lot of time arguing about chairmanships of the working groups that would do commit­ tee work for the ministers. 24 A graphic example of hardening is found in one Associate's internal instructions, which originally read, "The basic position is not to accept reduction of the CET and to try to maintain preferences. . . . In case circumstances would make a lowering of the CET inevitable . . . [compensations should be required]"; an editing hand removed "basic" and "to try" in the first sentence, added "in con­ formity with the Rome Treaty," and eliminated the second phrase ("In case . . . inevitable") entirely.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

The first interministerial conference opened in Paris in early December 1961,25 and in many ways sounded as if no preliminary meetings had taken place. The president of the Council announced essentially the same concessions and di­ vergences that had opened the second meeting of permanent representatives. But the necessity for delegation heads to re­ state the arguments, each mustering greater eloquence in sup­ port of common positions, meant that the Europeans were barraged with a series of strong statements of demands and grievances. Many were uncomfortably telling. Paul Darboux of Dahomey pointed out that consumption taxes and quotas on bananas and coffee negated the principle of free trade. Marcel Douzima of Central Africa and Raphael Sailer of the Ivory Coast suggested that concern for competing non-As­ sociates was biting into the favored position of the Associ­ ates and calling into question the unlimited duration of the Association. Since these criticisms were directed primarily against Germany, and Ludwig Erhardt was equally out­ spoken in stating his position, a recess was necessary at one point for Georges Gorse of France and Paul Fayat of Bel­ gium to conciliate the Germans, Ivorians, and Malagasys. Other moments were spent debating essentially moot points. A discussion broke out among Africans on whether Association was political (Madagascar) or not (Somalia, Congo, the Ivory Coast). The legal basis of the negotiations in Article 238 (Togo, Mali, Congo, the Netherlands, Ger­ many) or Article 136 (France, Belgium, OAMCE) was again brought into question, giving rise to further doubts among the OAMCE group concerning the permanence of the 35

The following account is based on interviews with parties con­ cerned and on the report of the meeting, R/587/61 (EAMA 1), 16 December 1961. See also Rene Servoise, "L'Association des pays d'outre-mer," Cahiers de VISEA (series R, 6), 71-103 (1962); Bulletin de VAfrique Noire 214:4368 (13 December 1961) (hereafter referred to as BAN); "Nouvelles perspectives de !'Association avec Ies Etats africains et malagache," Revue du Marche Commun 47:189 (May 1962); Pierre Fontanges, "La Conference eur-africaine," xxxrx Europe-France Outremer 383:10-11 (October 1961).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

Association. The Congo broke ranks by asking for bilateral treaties of short duration, with Association actively open to other African states. Yet some points of agreement were es­ tablished. The Association was to remain unlimited, but the treaty giving it substance would be negotiated for five to seven years; the economic advantages of Association and its aid fund would be at least equivalent to those of the Rome Treaty and the FEDOM, the safeguard clauses for the As­ sociates would be maintained, and the new institutions would include a council, a committee, and a parliamentary assembly. On the conduct of the negotiations themselves, the proposals that the Associates had drawn up for an execu­ tive coordinating committee and three working groups—on institutions and administration, financial and technical co­ operation, and commerce and markets—were also accepted, and the first interministerial meeting gave way to the work of the smaller groups meeting during the first three months of 1962. The first stage of the negotiations had been con­ cerned with instructions to the working groups; the second was to fill in the flesh on these bones. At least four different nexuses of activity took place during this period. The Africans evaluated the first interministerial meeting positively, and the Brazzaville 12 were particularly satisfied with the leadership and cohesion shown by the OAMCE. The Organization's Secretary-General Razafinbahiny27 outlined three major points to be emphasized in the future Association: guarantees for accelerated economic de­ velopment and industrialization, maintenance of tariff pref26

26 In fact, the unlimited duration was never to reach the Conven­ tion text because of Dutch and German opposition, and important equivocalities—such as reference to "the principles of the Treaty of Rome," without specifying which ones—left each party to make his own interpretations. At the same session, the European chairman, Mueller-Armack, simply restated the Africans' interpretation (conti­ nuity of Rome 131-36) without indicating that it was accepted (as it was not). Understandably, such tactics avoided impasses but aroused suspicion among the Africans and uncertainty even among the Europeans. 2Γ Letter to OAMCE members on first interministerial meeting.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

erences, and improved marketing conditions for tropical products. To strengthen their stand, OAMCE experts met in mid-January 1962, calling on France to convince the other five Members of the need for more positive results at the next interministerial meeting, and then met with the French rep­ resentatives "in order to review all of these problems from the point of view of the franc zone."28 Many of the experts themselves were Frenchmen loaned to African governments as technical assistants, and they were highly conscientious in using their French-learned skills in the service of the African interests. Later in the month, the 12 met again alone, and then with the non-OAMCE Associates in early February to adopt three working principles:29 alternation of working group chairman­ ships between Europeans and Africans, rapid progress, and a united African front. These same principles were reiterated with insistence (but only after a good deal of prodding by Senegal) at the UAM heads of state meeting at Bangui late in March, and were further sharpened by four other points:30 Part IV of the Treaty (Rome 131-136) provided the only ac­ ceptable legal basis and list of principles for the new Associa­ tion; the existing preferences and advantages of Association were to be maintained, not as an end in themselves, but as a means to development, diversification, and competitiveness on the world market; an Association with its own institutions was the only means of reflecting both economic differences and state sovereignty; establishment of the CET would be the first sign of comprehension on the part of the Six and should precede the "application and even discussion" of tariff reduc­ tions, although at the same time aid should be increased at least to the point of compensating for cuts in the CET. The Bangui meeting also brought forth more details on certain African demands. It requested a formal Community price-stabilization mechanism for tropical products, along with marketing guarantees through Communitywide quotas 28

Internal report on 12 January 1962 meeting. BAN 221:4516 (7 February 1962). soibid., 230:4696-98 (11 April 1962). 29

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

no lower than existing guarantees on the French market. If consumption taxes could not be eliminated, their revenues should be used for compensation to the Africans. New forms of aid were again demanded, and annual credits from the new FED were to be equal to or greater than the FEDOM grants for the year 1962 (the highest). The demand for joint man­ agement of the FED was also reiterated. African demands also included repeated and detailed requests for technical co­ operation programs and for common institutions of Associa­ tion. The list was long, detailed, and frightfully demanding in view of the European divisions over the mere maintenance of the existing Association. In the two weeks between the Bangui meeting and the second interministerial meeting, Afri­ can ambassadors contacted the German, Dutch, and—be­ cause of their interest through GATT—American missions with the message, "Without preferences, there is neither Community nor Association."31 The Europeans also tried to reconcile their divergences.32 The Committee of Permanent Representatives met in late January and positions were clearly outlined. Germany fa­ vored the Commissions's proposals of an accelerated and re­ duced CET, along with a "special commercial regime" for the Associates' tropical products, in order to maintain the Association while encouraging trade with competing African non-Associates. The Netherlands concurred; it favored re­ placing preferences with annually decreasing aid to the As­ sociates and also a special unilateral dispensation for France to enable her to maintain special preferential ties with them. 31Internal report on Bangui and its consequences, 17 April 1962. The African activity appears to have been the result of only a few Associates' prodding. Initially the Bangui meeting wanted to treat "this vast and complex problem" in a one-page resolution, and even afterward there was rather heated discussion on whether to pursue the hard demands or be more conciliatory. This is not the place to document the concerted American opposition to the Association. On 12 February, the U.S. had sent a memorandum to the EEC asking for an end to preferences on tropical products. 82See Europe Service 201 (9 February 1962); Jacques H. Herbots, "Le Congo et Ie Marche Commun," vn Etudes Congolaises 9:27-42 (November 1964).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

It would not be opposed to a "special commercial regime" as a transitional measure, but it could not accept a freetrade area, which it felt would be at the expense of other African countries trading with Europe. France agreed with the proposal for an accelerated CET but was opposed to re­ ducing the CET unless full compensation was made to the satisfaction of the Associates. Continuing, nondegressive price supports were considered necessary by the French; only a free-trade area could give satisfaction to the Associates' needs. Belgium (and Luxembourg) also opposed a "special commercial regime" and favored a free-trade area, but fa­ vored an accelerated and reduced CET as well as the replace­ ment of preferences with compensation. Italy, although not yet ready to take a position, declared it favored acceleration and reduction of the CET and also a free-trade area. In the Council of Ministers meeting in March, these overlapping po­ sitions were drawn slightly closer together by the Nether­ lands' acceptance of a free-trade area for a limited time only, in exchange for France's agreement to reduce the CET on tropical products (thus reducing the Associates' advantage on the European market). It can be seen that the Six were talking in terms substan­ tially different from those of the Africans, and that the over­ lap in European positions facilitated an exchange of conces­ sions among the Six. Since the French position was in many ways the minimum acceptable to the Africans, any mutual concessions among the Europeans meant moving away from the African demands. While the Africans were asking for a continuation and strengthening of the Rome Treaty Associa­ tion and its advantages, the evolving European position worked toward a loosening of protection for exports from former French, Belgian, and Italian Africa on the European market and an opening of the floodgates of competition. This the Africans regarded with fear, since they felt that their economies had not yet been sufficiently prepared for the cold world of the open market, while the Europeans moved closer to a common feeling that the only way to learn to swim was

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

by being thrown into the water—with varying kinds of life jackets—and not by being paid to sit on the shore. As during the preliminary stage, the parliamentarians also sought to put public pressure on the negotiators. In Abidjan in early January, the Permanent Joint Commission created at Strasbourg held its first meeting of 16 African and 12 European members of parliaments.33 As might be expected, the mood was one of dissatisfaction. Compared with the Strasbourg meeting, which had registered much agreement and even some precision, the first interministerial meeting showed few results, and, in addition, the agreements ignored many of the parliamentarians' recommendations. The Perma­ nent Joint Commission particularly deplored the absence of agreement on the size of the FED, which it felt should have $220 million per year. It also deplored the vague language that was used to cover disagreement over the "special com­ mercial regime" vs. the free-trade area; and it pointed out the evasiveness of the formula, "at least equivalent advantages." Finally, it pointed out that a month after the interministerial meeting the working groups had not yet met; six weeks later when the European Parliament adopted the Permanent Joint Commission report, it too could note that the executive com­ mittee had finally met only at the beginning of February, and the first two working groups only in the middle of the month —two months after the interministerial meeting. But most of all the parliamentarians could deplore the fact that their own repeated protests were so ineffective. In the executive committee, the Africans found themselves in much the same position. Djime Momar Gueye, Senegalese Ambassador to the EEC and rapporteur for the committee, noting the slowness of proceedings, found the cause in "the difficulties that the negotiators have met because of the fact that the governments of the Community have not yet taken a position on certain basic questions."34 In fact, this indeci83 See

BAN 218:4454-56 (17 January 1962). NEAMA/199/62 (Min 9), 26 April 1962, Annex IV. The Six were also simply occupied with other things, notably their Common Agricultural Policy. si

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

sion could be ascribed directly to the divergent points of view among the Six, who would not take a stand in front of the Africans until it could be a common one. Thus the first meet­ ing of the executive committee gave directions for only two of the three working groups, and these were vague. In the first working group, the Africans still insisted on maintaining the commercial arrangements of the old Associa­ tion, with marketing guarantees and a sum of $113.3 million in annual commercial aid to support prices and standardize revenue; the Europeans still took no position on the pro­ posals. When the Africans repeated their demand for elimina­ tion of consumption taxes, the Europeans opposed. On the other hand, when the Europeans proposed a reduced and ac­ celerated CET, the Africans found this responded neither to their needs nor to their instructions. In general, it began to appear that, as the Associates sharpened the details of their plans in response to European opposition and indecision, the results became more and more unacceptable to them. Only in one area were new ideas shaping up: both sides began dis­ cussing categories of aid, divided for the purpose of economic diversification and increased production according to the needs of the receiver country. In regard to the second working group,35 the Africans re­ peated their demand for a FED composed of annual sums of $220 million to be allocated in grants and other forms as well, plus programs of technical aid. While the Europeans were sympathetic to the need for new forms of aid, there was no commitment to any of the African proposals (including the amount), except to the principle of loans and technical assistance. This inconclusive grappling was all the more dis­ appointing because of the expectation that the working groups and executive committee would be finished with their work in time to have a final treaty drawn up at the second interministerial meeting in early April and to have it signed by July. **Ibid. See also BAN 221:4516-17 (7 February 1962), 230:46984704 (11 April 1962), 231:4721-22 (18 April 1962).

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The ministers met as scheduled.36 The meeting opened with a series of speeches by the Associates similar to those delivered at the first interministerial conference; they dealt largely with broad concepts or the specific problems of one country, and were almost irrelevant since it was not yet known what the Members had been able to agree upon. Once France's Gorse, spokesman for the Six, took the floor, the tone changed and both substantive bargaining and negotiat­ ing tactics came into play. Gorse announced that the Six had agreed on a five-year treaty "and foresee a commercial re­ gime based on Part IV of the Treaty with several modifica­ tions [rows reserve de certains aminagements]." A free-trade area and a reduced, accelerated CET would be established; measures would be taken to increase cofiEee and banana im­ ports to the Community; and safeguard clauses were to be elaborated. Cameroon's Victor Kanga, speaking for the Afri­ cans, answered with a wordy reiteration of the Associates' demands, notably calling for a reinforcement of the Rome Treaty basis and the safeguard clauses, joint-determination of the CET, aid to production, and other points. Gorse re­ torted that no further mention was to be made of the Rome Treaty basis, warning that a "remarkable effort of compro­ mise" had already been made and one state [the Netherlands] would admit no additional discussion of the problem; safe­ guards and production aid had already been admitted. The session was then suspended to get across the point that the Six had already reached a painful compromise on certain matters. When the meeting reconvened, Gorse again requested the Associates not to push reference to the free-trade Associa­ tion beyond the delicate agreement and to drop their insist36 The following account is based on interviews with the parties concerned and on the report of the meeting, NEAMA/199/62 (Min 9), 26 April 1962. See also discussions in BAN 231:4719-20 (18 April 1962), 236:4824 (30 May 1962); interview with Jacques Rabemananjara, L'Economie 819:11-12 (26 April 1962); "Nouvelles per­ spectives de !'Association avec Ies Etats africains et malagache," Revue du Marche Commun 47:188-192 (May 1962).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

ence on joint-determination of the GET. Kanga bowed to the pleas on the Rome Treaty, but repeated demands on the CET. Gorse replied that the GET was a European matter, but that the matter could be "examined in the course of the negotiations." He then turned the discussion to the FED. The European position was to set a single sum and divide it there­ after as necessary. Because there was still no agreement on that sum among the Six, the best the Members could offer was a FED that would be "slightly greater than" the FEDOM. Sums put forward earlier for the five-year period by European Members varied from $1.2 billion (France) to $680 million (Germany, the Netherlands), with the Com­ mission's figure somewhat above France's. After Gorse spoke, the Associates requested suspension of the session, and then Mauritania's Mamadou Toure presented their demands. The Africans' request was for an annual sum of $220 million in grants, $20 million in loans, and $113.3 million in commer­ cial aid in the form of various support and stabilization funds, totaling nearly $1.8 billion over the five-year period. This sum, determined by adding up component aid figures, was to be specifically assigned to production and diversifica­ tion categories and allocated by country. The Members then requested suspension, and returned with a draft resolution. Debate continued between Members (Gorse) and Associates (Sailer) over the draft's promise to "take African interests into consideration" in the Community's Common Agricul­ tural Policy (CAP) and over the equal absence of explicitness on production and diversification aid. When the Nether­ lands and Italy protested that time was being wasted in hair­ splitting, the session was again suspended. The final resolution was essentially the European draft with some African rewording. By presenting a draft, which represented an already negotiated compromise among the Six, and by warning that major changes would endanger the whole delicately constructed edifice, the Six were able to maintain control of the terms. In addition to the points an­ nounced by Gorse at the beginning of the meeting, the reso-

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

lution agreed to take African needs into consideration re­ garding the CET and the CAP, and to include ways to in­ crease both private investments and European consumption of tropical products, as well as to improve conditions for marketing the products. Technical assistance and the use of grants and loans for production and diversification aid were spelled out in greater detail. On the basis of these points, the working groups and executive committee were to draw up a draft treaty for the next meeting in June. African demands for comanagement and full consultation, full compensation for reductions in the CET, price stabilization, special funds, marketing and private investment guarantees, and tripled aid all fell by the wayside. When the European and African parliamentarians looked at these results, they found them wanting. The Permanent Joint Commission, and thereafter, the European Parliament —meeting in Strasbourg in mid-May and late June, respec­ tively—could do little more than applaud the progress made and deplore the numerous cases where proposals of the Par­ liament and the Commission had been ignored.37 The parlia­ mentarians particularly regretted the absence of any action on consumption taxes, on compensation to the Africans for the CET, on marketing guarantees for oil products, on the size and allocation of the FED, and on the Common Devel­ opment Institute. They also were concerned about the modi­ fications in the commercial regime. The items singled out for regrets were well chosen, for they were the very points on which disagreement still reigned among the Six. The EEC Council of Ministers met early in June to con­ sider the Commission's draft treaty, which had been sub­ mitted ten days before, but was unable to resolve the points of divergence and adjourned in deadlock. It met again in two weeks, on the day the third interministerial meeting was to have been held, and arrived at a painful and partial agree­ ment.38 The FED was finally fixed for five years at $780 mil*7 See BAN 235:4803-04 (23 May 1962). ssSee Europe 1289 (14 June 1962), 1290 (15 June 1962), 1295

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lion (the figure mentioned at times by Belgium, Germany, and Italy), about halfway between the unchanged Dutch pro­ posal ($680 million) and the lowest French figure ($890 million), and almost $200 million above the FEDOM total of $581.25 million. Of this sum, $50 million was to be in long-term loans from the European Investment Bank (BEI) and $730 million was to constitute the FED itself, of which $50 million was to be for special low-interest loans for highrisk projects and the rest was to be given as grants (includ­ ing $200 million for production and diversification aid). Thus the demands for new forms of aid were met, but large as it was, the sum was disappointingly low in the eyes of the Africans, who looked for more than twice the amount. France and Germany, whose contributions were tied togeth­ er, absorbed more than $90 million of the increase and Italy, which had received the lion's share of the European Invest­ ment Bank's loans, more than doubled its contribution by an­ other $60 million. Belgium and the Netherlands remained about the same ($69 and $66 million, respectively, compared with $70 each to the FEDOM), thus compensating the Dutch for their agreement to an increased FED. Consultation and, a fortiori, joint-management for the Africans were left unspecified, and a compromise was reached on the CET on certain tropical products, coffee and cacao being included but not bananas and tropical woods. The Netherlands maintained its reservations on the free-trade area concept as limited to the Eighteen, and preferred either inclusion of all Africans or a lesser regime of tariff preferences with production and diversification aid gradually disappearing at the end of the five-year period. Belgium and Germany supported the idea of diminishing aid to prepare for free competition on the world market. The third interministerial session opened on 4 July (21 June 1962). For a closer look at the negotiation of the FED, see the second part of this chapter. For the experts' report to the meet­ ing see R/453/62 (EAMA 42), 20 June 1962.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

1962.39

Even though the date had been changed because of the European deadlock in the Council, the executive commit­ tee's draft agreement was not ready until a week before the meeting opened, and no one had sufficient time to study it. The text was incomplete, some of the provisions were vague, and even the Six, as we have seen, were not in complete agreement on others. Italy's Emilio Colombo summarized the agreed portions of the European position. He pointed out that the $780 million aid figure exceeded the old FEDOM total by the $200 million production and diversification aid, of which $170 was to be divided among the OAMCE states (thus meeting their request for specific allocation) and the rest given as diversification aid to the remaining four states with an open-door customs regime (Congo, Burundi, Rwan­ da, Somalia). The Six would make a unilateral declaration agreeing to review the provisions for aid at the end of three years. Technical assistance scholarships would be offered at the rate of 300 per year, paid by the Community. The commercial provisions would maintain a free-trade area between Europe and Africa, but the CET on some tropical products would be reduced, with undefined special provisions for bananas and tropical woods; the Associates agreed to accept these provisions.40 African states' quotas were to be progressively reduced and eliminated by the end of 1965, a proposal which the Associates accepted on condi­ tion of adequate compensation. On future commercial agree­ ments (including Association) with competing African nonAssociates, the Eighteen would be consulted and their inter­ ests protected. Divergences thus narrowed to the matter of aid. The remainder of the two-day session was a dialogue be­ tween Sailer, speaking for the Eighteen, and Colombo, chair39 The following account is based on interviews with the parties involved and on the report of the meeting, NEAMA/270/62 (Min 19), 25 July 1962; see also BAN 242:4941-43 (11 July 1962), and Raphael Sailer in Le Monde, 4 August 1962. 40 The CET and quotas on tropical products were set by a work­ ing group over the summer; Europe 1328 (30 July 1962).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

man of the Six. Since the two positions were irreconcilable in substance, the two sides had nothing to do but play their "most extreme card" procedurally. For the Members, this amounted to repeating that the proposals made up a single package, and that its provisions were both coherently inter­ related and painstakingly negotiated: "When the Community proposes an ensemble of financial, commercial, and institu­ tional dispositions, it intends to arrive at a Community solu­ tion of all problems by transferring them from the bilateral to the community level." For the Associates, the only thing to do was to reject the aid proposals as insufficient, and if the ensemble was inseparable, to reject the compensatory provisions as inadequate too. Their arithmetic was sound, even if not convincing to the Six: the Associates had received $580 million from the Com­ munity under the Rome Treaty plus $325 million in price supports from France41 or $905 million, whereas under the new proposals they would get only $780 million (and no price supports) or $125 million less—not the promised aid "equal to or greater than the FEDOM." Instead Sailer pro­ posed $230 million in diversification aid over and above the $580 million sum, or $810 million for the FED; in addition, price supports should be eliminated only gradually, and with compensation up to the $325 million figure. Colombo pointed out that there was no sense in removing the price supports if the compensation was to remain, but Sailer ob­ jected that at this crucial moment African economies could not stand a sudden fall in prices and still progress toward development. After the session was suspended three times to allow consultations among the two sides Gorse "in a personal capacity" announced that, although it was difficult to mix bi­ lateral and multilateral provisions, France itself would "doubtless" grant aid complementary to the supported prices for a certain period. The move was a skillful attempt to break the deadlock without contravening the ban on preferences, 41 Sixty

percent went to coffee and 20 percent to peanuts, an ele­ ment in the rivalry between the Ivory Coast (coffee) and Senegal (peanuts). See Europe 1310 (9 July 1962).

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but after another suspension the Associates declared that the package was inadequate and they would need to refer to their governments. The negotiations thus broke down, without even a final communique, and talks were suspended through­ out the summer. Since it was still unclear whether ratification of a final agreement by the Members' parliaments was a step that could be dispensed with, it was becoming less and less likely that a convention could be negotiated and put into effect before the old one ran out. The summer passed quietly, in the European tradition. The Africans reiterated their position. Senegal, for example, sent a memorandum to the Council in mid-September42 giving a resume of both sides' positions and repeating the Sailer pro­ posals of $810 million in aid plus price guarantees; the memorandum recalled that the principle of maintaining the Associates' export income, adopted in the first interministerial conference, no longer seemed to govern the negotia­ tions, and warned that the Eighteen could only join an As­ sociation that assured their income stability. However, they had nowhere else to go. At the same time, the OAMCE part­ ners, meeting in Libreville,43 repeated the seven principles which were to govern negotiations, pointing out that their proposed figure of $810 million was only a goodwill gesture toward reaching agreement, and that their real needs were actually much higher. The European and African parlia­ mentarians again met, in Tananarive44 in early October, and finding it useless to deplore, they limited themselves to re­ calling their previous stands and principles. The fourth interministerial meeting, scheduled for Septem­ ber, opened late the following month.45 By juggling some i2BAN

249:5086-87 (3 October 1962).

« i b i d . , 247:5032-35 (19 September 1962); 257:5255 (28 Novem­

ber 1962). " I b i d . , 251:5131-33 (17 October 1962); 257:5253-54 (28 Novem­ ber 1962). 45 The following account is based on interviews with the parties involved and on the report of the meeting, NEAMA/286/62 (Min 39), 28 November 1962. See also BAN 253:5173-75 (31 October

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

figures and increasing others, the Six were able to propose a FED total that had the appearance of meeting one African demand. The total was raised to $800 million, but $70 mil­ lion was set aside for territories not yet independent, sooth­ ing African sentiments. Of the $730 million, $620 million was to be granted in aid, $46 million in special loans (up to 40 years with low interest payments beginning 10 years from date of loan), and $64 million in BEI loans (up to 25 years at 5.75 percent interest with exemptions up to 3 percent de­ pending on market rates). It was also agreed that the grants would be applied to production aid, technical cooperation, and social and economic projects (although the distinction between the latter two categories existing under the FEDOM was abolished); both grants and loans would be used for eco­ nomic investments and diversification aid. In these matters, African wishes were met. In commercial matters, however, the two-year delay before the annual 20 percent reduction in price supports began was not granted. Instead, a staggered scale of dates was set up: five products (dried coconut, pepper, cotton, palm oil, gum arabic) were to be sold at world prices beginning in 1963, vegetable oils (except palm oil) no later than 1964-1965, coffee no later than 1967, and rice and sugar (products com­ peting directly with European production) when the Com­ mon Agricultural Policy would go into effect. The reduction was also made flexible—an annual rate of 15 to 35 percent. The non-OAMCE states, which previously had enjoyed an open-door policy, undertook to orient their commerce to­ ward the Community, despite the uncertainty of finding ade­ quate markets; in response, they were granted a three-year delay in effecting this conversion and were assured open entry into the Community on the same terms as the OAMCE members, despite the absence of reciprocity. Thus, as the negotiations moved toward a conclusion, the divergences be­ tween the two sides were narrowed by balanced compro1962); xv Bulletin de I'Association pour I'Etude des ProbUmes de I'Outre-mer 177:39-43 (December 1962).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

mises, but the convergence point was significantly closer to the initial European offer than to the African demands. Fur­ thermore, as the debates narrowed down to points that af­ fected Africans only, the early African unity broke down. The agreement on the FED had set aside $230 million for production and diversification (increased from $200 million offered during the third interministerial conference). The allocation of this sum among the Eighteen as production and diversification aid proved to be the new problem, bringing out some of the bitter rivalries that up to this point had been con­ fined to the Associates private negotiations. An agreement "in the corridors" before the session opened gave $32 million to the four non-OAMCE open-door states for diversification and $15 million to three smaller states (Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta) that agreed to begin selling at world prices in 1963; already opting for a competitive position, these states would not need production aid as compensation for diminish­ ing price supports. By the same agreement, the remaining $183 million was to be divided among the other eleven states, three-quarters ($137 million) under the title of production aid and onequarter as diversification aid. The production aid was in turn to be allocated among the beneficiaries on the basis of their past use of price supports over a period to be determined (three to five years). Already during the session, as during the preceding conference, the allocations to the open-door states raised some grumbling, aggravated by the fact that these represented the "minority," i.e., non-French, group among the ex-colonies and were supported by Belgium and Italy, their former metropoles. The open-door states finally acquiesced to the allocation, frequently citing reasons of Afri­ can unity and negotiating solidarity, but the OAMCE states were unable to agree on their shares or the criteria to deter­ mine them. Instead of holding up the meeting any further, it was decided to adjourn, leaving the Eighteen to work out their own shares. A draft, drawn up by the Six, was to be circu­ lated to the Associates by the beginning of November, with

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

final meetings to be held in mid-November and December to "dot Γs" and then to initial the treaty. The November meeting never was held. In mid-Novem­ ber and mid-December, the Coimcil held its last debates on final points of detail, usually small political matters. Re­ cessed since July the executive committee met weekly from mid-November to mid-December on the final draft.48 The Africans continued to discuss allocations of aid, without any settlement. In fact, the absence of solutions of old prob­ lems led to revived questions on old agreements: in late No­ vember, Gabon raised additional demands on matters previ­ ously decided (i.e., rejected), such as maintenance of in­ come, price and market guarantees, joint-management, and early payment of production aids. The Six declined these demands.47 As the date for the December negotiations ap­ proached, several points were still undecided concerning the rights of establishment, Dutch coffee and German banana im­ ports, and aid allocation.48 The bickering and maneuvering on the last item formed a coda of complexity to the whole negotiation process, involving the Six as well as the Eighteen. The fifth interministerial meeting on 19 December was able to settle the first matters, but it took a midnight intervention by Colombo to bring about a satisfactory agreement on allo­ cation of aid among the Africans. On the following day, the treaty was initialed, 10 days before the expiration of the old Association. But the negotiations were not over. Two factors were involved in the delay in signing the agreement: the Italian governmental crisis and the Dutch in­ sistence that the Association remain open to other African 46 There was no interministerial discussion of the institutions until the last minute (in the fall of 1962); problems were minor. Europe 1367 (25 September 1962), 1370 (27 September 1962), 1408 (12 November 1962), 1419 (25 November 1962), 1427 (4 December 1962), 1429 (6 December 1962). « Ibid.., 1419 (25 November 1962). 48 The account is based on interviews and also Europe 1405 (8 November 1962), 1411 (15 November 1962), 1414 (19 November 1962), 1438 (15 December 1962), 1439 (17 December 1962), 1441 (20 December 1962).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

states. Following a vote of no-confidence in the Italian As­ sembly, the Italians argued that their government was only a caretaker and therefore unable to sign international agree­ ments. The Dutch argument was more substantial: after the French veto of British (including Commonwealth African) entry into the EEC, in January 1963, the Dutch became adamant and simply refused to sign until a policy was pub­ licly adopted assuring that Association would be open to other countries.49 At the Council of Ministers meeting in late February 1963, the Dutch and Italian positions were brought forward during discussion of the signing date.50 Before the meeting, Congo­ lese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, who was visiting Europe, presented the Council with a memorandum on behalf of the Eighteen requesting signature in mid-March. However, the Council could not adopt a date, and thus decided upon a pro­ cedure suggested by the Commission: the permanent repre­ sentatives and the Commission would examine questions on internal affairs (a euphemism for the Dutch position) and interim measures to avoid discontinuity between the two con­ ventions; the permanent representatives would make the nec­ essary contacts with the Eighteen; and the Council of Min­ isters would study the interim measures at its early April meeting and would make a complete review of its Association policy. The Commission had the interim measures ready in midMarch and they were accepted at the Coimcil meeting a week later.51 The Declaration of Intentions covering three options 49At the Council of Ministers two days before the final interministerial meeting, the Six agreed that no Declaration of Intentions was necessary to make the Association open to other (specifically, Commonwealth) African states, but merely a commitment to keep the Eighteen informed on the progress of the Commonwealth nego­ tiations. When these were broken off by France, the Netherlands demanded more, and in writing. See Europe 1439 (17 December 1962). The Italian elections were in mid-April. 50See BAN 270:5516 (6 March 1963). The heads of state of the UAM again demanded rapid action in their mid-March meeting at Ouagadougou. si See ibid., 274:5593-94 (3 April 1963).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

to be offered to other African states passed the Council of Ministers at its 2 April meeting52 (although not announced), thereby meeting the Dutch condition for signature. During the Council meeting in early May the text of the agreement was approved, and at the end of the month the permanent representatives were instructed to set a date for the signing as soon as the Italian governmental crisis was over. The Commission felt secure enough to go ahead and discuss with the Eighteen the customs and quota reduction measures called for in the agreement for 1963. The Convention was signed in Yaounde on 20 July 1963. The European Parliament approved it on 16 September; the agreement came into effect on 1 June 1964, following the necessary ratifications. Analysis

From an analytical point of view, the Yaounde set of nego­ tiations was a very disorderly process. Decisions were contin­ ually being remade, nondecisions were solemnly announced, principles were frequently being reinterpreted, major ex­ cluded issues were constantly being reintroduced, important details were not decided until the last minute, and the actual duration53 and potential shape of the Association were changed after the text had been initialed. Yet the "success" of the negotiations—in the sense of a final agreement con­ tinuing the Association—had never been in doubt. Probably the most complicating factor was procedural. For in fact there were three and a half dimensions to the negotia­ tions all going on at the same time, and the negotiations kept flowing out of their framework into other, concurrent areas. The formal "vertical" or Eurafrican dimension took place be­ tween the Six plus the Commission and the Eighteen; the Commission's position was procedurally with the Europeans ibid., 277:5657-59 (2 May 1963). For a more detailed dis­ cussion of the Declaration of Intentions, see the beginning of Chap. 3, Negotiations with Commonwealth Africa. 53 I.e., instead of running to the end of 1967, as it would have if it had been ratified in time to succeed Rome IV immediately, the Con­ vention ended in mid-1969. 52See

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

but often substantively closer to the Africans.54 There were two "horizontal" dimensions: a formal negotiating process within the Community institutions among the Europeans (in­ cluding the Commission) and semiformal discussions among the Africans inside and beyond the UAM bodies. The "half" dimension refers to complementary "vertical" contacts of an informal nature between individual European and African states. Of these, the formal horizontal negotiations among the Six were most important and usually decisive. It is no caricature to say that the Africans were the askers and the Europeans the givers; the Europeans had all the alternatives and the only card in the Africans' hand was blank. From this, it fol­ lows that how the Africans got as much as they did is more interesting to analyze than why they got as little as they did. Also, more important than whether they won or lost is how they played the game. These points will be examined in turn. The Six started out with some very divergent opinions. While there was early agreement that the FED should be at least equal to the FEDOM, there was a gap as big as the FEDOM itself between the largest and smallest initial Euro­ pean position. A basic difference also separated those who wanted the new Association to be a free-trade area of the original adherents and those who wanted a special commer­ cial regime (in transition to an all-African or all-underdevel­ oped-countries' association), although the latter position was weakened by the absence of an easily perceived definition to 54 On occasion, the Commission had interests of its own to defend. For example, in the beginning, it was caught between defending article 136 as the legal basis of the renewed Association—in company with France and Africa—which left negotiations to the Council of Ministers, and using article 238—in company with the Netherlands and Germany—which allowed the Commission to carry out the nego­ tiations (Rome 228). At the very end, the Commission wanted to hold the presidency of the Association Committee, but the Six wanted it to alternate between an African and a European, which it does. Europe 1414 (19 November 1962). On this aspect of the institutions and the Association, see the good work of Gordon Adams, Ph.D. dissertation, 1970, Columbia University.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

apply to it. This difference was supported by the broader and equally fundamental disagreement between those who wanted to maintain a preferential regime for the Africans, presuma­ bly indefinitely, and those who wanted limited and degres­ sive measures to force them into world competition, although the former position was weakened by the difficulty of de­ creeing anything in perpetuity in a changing world. Underlying this debate, in turn, was a difference in inter­ ests between those who traded primarily with the former French territories and those who were far more concerned with the African non-Associates, competitors of those Afri­ can states with whom negotiations were being conducted. In between, Belgium and Italy had special interest in their own former African territories, interests that were similar to France's but located in different countries with different prob­ lems and different commercial regimes; and the Netherlands was concerned—not only with competing non-Associates— but also with its own non-African overseas territories. Re­ lated to these divergences were differing points of view on matters of purely European competence: acceleration and reduction of the CET, evolution of the CAP, and the question of the Commonwealth. The complexity of issues permitted a broad exchange of concessions as European positions converged, but it delayed agreement until late in the game as Members held out on one point in the hope of gaining a final agreement on another. Once the agreement among the Six was in place, the Euro­ peans could warn the Africans not to tamper with the edifice lest its delicate balance be disturbed and it fall into irrecon­ cilable pieces. With this warning, almost any African objec­ tions could be—and eventually were—stilled. All of the Six gained something in reaching the final con­ vergence point, although the balance sheet was not closed until after the Convention had been signed (with the Decla­ ration of Intentions and the opening of the Nigerian set of negotiations). France won a free-trade zone and a continued Title IV Association; the rest maintained the possibility of trade with outside suppliers, and gained an accelerated and

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

reduced CET on tropical products with little compensation for the Africans. On the basic issue of competitiveness vs. preferences, ambiguity was preserved. But "losses" and "gains" are hard to evaluate.55 The above concessions are measured against initial stands, which is as meaningful a criterion as any. Yet initial stands were often tactical only. Thus, France was less interested in opposing an accelerated and reduced CET than in gaining compensation for its Africans, and less hopeful of winning a high FED figure than in achieving some measure of Community re­ sponsibility for formerly purely bilateral obligations. Prefer­ ences and aid were a cost, by some measures, but were also presumably a gain for trade in economic terms and a gain in goodwill in political terms. It is hard to draw up a balance sheet between France's "cost" in picking up subsidies and bi­ lateral aid and its "gain" in political terms (or even in eco­ nomic terms of maintaining its preferred status in African countries). Because of these ambiguities, it seems much more meaningful to consider concessions from initial positions as a simple indicator of movement toward convergence,56 rather than taking them in literal terms or seeking some other finite measure of "cost" or "losses" and "gains." Change can be noted but "how much" cannot be measured or, a fortiori, compared. The second element in the European negotiations was unity about the final "horizontal" agreement. This unity was imposed by the EEC Treaty, was in the nature of the Com­ munity operations, and immeasurably strengthened the hand of the Six once their agreement was finally reached.57 Not 55 As illustrated by the fact that various readers have taken excep­ tion to the above paragraph in all its various, previous (and present) versions. "No satisfactory method of measurement of concessions has yet been evolved," Curzon, op.cit., p. 80. 56 Only if initial positions are considered all gain, would a move from them be considered less gain (and then not even loss). But initial positions include maintenance of status quo's, as well as moral obligations, political hopes, etc. 57 Two bilateral "trades" were noted. There was a Franco-Belgian "deal" on the Congolese aid sum, according to interviews. In the

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

only did it glue together the delicate edifice; it also cut off the informal vertical dimension of the negotiations, or at least ended its effectiveness. It was no longer worthwhile for the Africans "to work" on the Dutch if the Six had extracted the maximum concessions from them already. It was not even useful any longer "to work" on the Five through France, since beyond a certain point France was committed with the rest and this would only be counterproductive—being "too African." The African negotiators sensed this: During the Brussels negotiations and particularly in Octo­ ber and November 1962, the Associates could see that France was at least as constant as its European partners, and often more precise than they, in its willingness to elim­ inate from the Community the privileges for overseas sup­ pliers] organized through the isolation of the franc zone. "Overseas disengagement," said some. "Desire to act European rather than African," countered others. "Need to act loyally and maintain a real balance vis-a-vis the Eu­ ropeans as well as Africa," answered the French delega­ tion; "During the coming five years of the new convention, we can no longer accept the continual accusations and re­ flections that we heard over the five past years [accusing] the Association of maintaining and confirming the privi­ leges and artifices of the franc zone within the EEC."53 On the African side, there was more unity on principles at the beginning than on details at the end. That is merely to say that the fissures were always present, but that the plaster of African unity cracked before it could harden. Confronted with a European combination of indecision and commitment, Africans broke ranks along predetermined lines, both dis14 November 1962 Council of Ministers meeting, France opposed a detail on establishment which it announced it would waive if a cus­ toms detail on FED equipment were dropped (as it was); Europe 1414 (19 November 1962). 58 Internal report on the negotiations, 29 December 1962.

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agreeing on tactics and trying to preserve their individual interests.59 Not blessed with a firm institutional commitment to unity as were the Six, the Africans wisely began to create one. The Yaounde negotiations were one of the reasons for the foun­ dation of the UAM and its economic organization, the OAMCE. Once the Brazzaville Twelve had agreed on their principles, they set about to line up the rest of the Eighteen. Even on basic principles the effort was not completely effec­ tive. Already at the first interministerial session, Congo broke ranks by calling for a short-term, open association, and others flailed at such moot questions as whether Association was political or not. Congo was primarily responsible for de­ feating the creation of a single free-trade zone among the 24. As some UAM members complained, "Often, out of a con­ cern for rapprochement [and] to avoid a split [with nonUAM Associates], we were led to go back on our [UAM] decisions and partially dilute our position."60 In an African coordinating meeting a week before the third interministerial round, the debate between UAM and nonUAM members turned to procedure. As part of a basic differ­ ence on the whole problem of negotiating tactics, Congo wanted to await the European draft text because the Africans were the askers, while Senegal vigorously opposed, saying that there were "no askers but a meeting of give and take."61 Congo won, but since the European proposals were late, vague, incomplete, and unacceptable, the third round broke down anyway. But divisions between UAM and non-UAM Associates (i.e., between French-preference and open-door states) were not the only strains on the unity of the Eighteen. An old po59 Sometimes African delegations were even split internally on whether to follow a tough defense of their interests or not. One member of a former French African delegation later told his minister that he had been "threatened" by the French representative when he tried to push his split delegation to a harder line; internal report on the second interministerial meeting. 60Internal report on 12 January 1962 meeting. 61 Notes from meeting of 27 June 1962.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

Ktical rivalry between Senegal and the Ivory Coast also was felt;62 there were also several economic problems, based on the difference between Senegal's vulnerable dependence on a single crop economy of peanuts (which also competed with European vegetable oil production to be organized through the CAP) and the Ivory Coast's more diversified position as an exporter of tropical woods, bananas, and coffee. Senegal wanted the market guarantees for peanuts to be linked to those for coffee and bananas, which would have been a drag on acceptance of the latter two. Senegal wanted greater FED compensation for its earlier alignment on world prices for peanuts (1964) than the Ivory Coast's alignment on world prices for coffee (1967). The Ivory Coast said that if the aid position is to be equalized Senegal must give up its price sup­ ports, which Senegal, while agreeing in principle, could not accept in economic fact. Senegal, which at first initialed the Convention only with reservations,63 wanted to push harder for just solutions to serious economic problems, while the others were tired (and slightly fearful) of delays and wanted "to get it over with." If Senegal won the rest to its firmer po­ sitions in the early days, it lost control in the third and fourth rounds, when Sailer carried the burden of the African argu­ ment. The French also undoubtedly pressed the Africans to accept what was given rather than pushing for more against the Europeans' firm commitment, and they came to Senegal's rescue by picking up the price supports again.64 62

Internal African documentation is eloquent on this point. Senegal signed, "ad referendum," because it was in internal crisis and in no position to lead a strong foreign policy offensive (Mamadou Dia's attempted coup having just taken place), and because its refusal would have blocked the entire Convention and would have led to a European withdrawal of all offers, as Colombo made known at the midnight December session. During the day of 20 December, Dakar reversed itself and instructed its ambassador to initial the agreement without reservations. Account from interviews and from internal report on the negotiations, 29 December 1962. ei In accordance with the promise given during the negotiations and through a liberal interpretation of the Convention (Yaounde 11), France extended its price supports for peanuts annually through 1967, es

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

These divisions can be added together or subsumed under a broader split that often allied some UAM states with nonUAM states.65 This split was between protectionist states and those that were closer to the position that favored the development of competitive nonprotected economies. In ad­ dition to the non-U AM states, this latter group included from time to time the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Togo, Cameroon, and others. Divisions within the UAM group on this basic issue also contributed to watering down and diffusing strong stands within the UAM and to further weakening them when non-UAM states were brought into the discussion. These African divisions were no greater than the Euro­ peans'. But when confronted with European unity, the Afri­ cans found that their strongest allies were on the European side and that their own unity would only lead to deadlock. That unity broke and, instead, individual Associates scram­ bled for separate, marginal advantages. When unity was finally restored, it was based on an attitude of "get it over with" and a position of alignment with the united Europeans' terms. Because of these characteristics in the horizontal dimen­ sions, convergence in the vertical dimension was not a simple, linear process. Nor was it, however, a direct, deductive proc­ ess proceeding from principles to details.66 Rather, there was a complex process of establishing commitments and obliga­ tions which went on concurrently with the process of fixing details and lasted until after the initialing of the Convention. and the EEC continued a lesser subsidy program through the period of the Convention. On the negotiations concerning the latter subsidy, see Chap. 5, Negotiations in the Eurafrican Institutions. On Senegal's peanuts, see "La commercialisation de l'arachide au Senegal," Banque centrale des etats de I'Afrique de l'Ouest, Notes d'information 123 (November 1965) and 149 (March 1968); The Africa and West Asia Agricultural Situation (U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERSForeign 221, 16 April 1968). 65 I am grateful to Herr Poensgen of the General Delegation for Overseas Development of the EEC for suggesting this point of analysis. 66 Cf. Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 215-16.

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Why such complexity? One reason is that there was such doubt about commitments and such a lack of clarity about reference points. It is perhaps paradoxical that this was the case in regard to the Eighteen and not to later negotiations with Nigeria. Yet Nigeria was to become a new Associate and commitment to its Association had already resulted from the Declaration of Intentions that followed the Yaoimde negotia­ tions. The Eighteen were old Associates in a new position of independence, and many, if not all, of the Six sought the oc­ casion of the negotiations to scrutinize carefully and to revise any commitments and principles of Association. As a result, the very question of maintaining the Associa­ tion in its extant form was under debate. The early answer to the question was a masterpiece (or a mire) of diplomatic ambiguity: by avoiding reference to Title IV and by admit­ ting "at least equivalent advantages," it gave an ostensible assurance of continuity while leaving "equivalence" open to interpretation, and it provided a commitment to success that strengthened the hand of the stronger. With this ambiguity and commitment established, the Six turned to working out details among themselves, thus letting the details determine the principles instead of the reverse. All sorts of principles were thus controverted. The Association was limited to the Eighteen but it was opened to African third states through the Declaration of Intentions. French price supports were abolished but they were maintained for Senegal. The FED was larger than the FEDOM but it was less than the com­ bined total of the FEDOM and the price supports. The Africans were aware of this ambiguity. Thus, another reason for the complexity of negotiations was the Eighteen's focus on principles while the Six had moved on to details. The Africans were more logical, if irrelevant: they wanted clear commitment on guidelines from which provisions would flow. But in the context of the negotiations, such logic was ineffective, since the Europeans were preparing their package, among themselves. During the preparation, the Africans had nothing to protest about; after the package was presented, they had little to bargain with. It was therefore

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

wise of them to accentuate heavily their problems (rather than solutions) and their procedural demands (rather than substantive ones). If the Six were going to dispose, then the Eighteen could best propose questions, not answers. If the Six were going to make the decisions, then the Eighteen were most interested in joint-management, not substantive details. Three other factors reinforced the accent on pro­ cedure: one was the Africans' weakness in the mastery of economic details, another was their division on substantive matters, and a third was their preoccupation with formal evi­ dence of their newly won sovereignty and legal equality. But whether they were fully prepared for participation or not, the Africans clearly understood that the way to better substantive terms was through better procedural terms. Because of the contextual relationship of donors and re­ ceivers (even in commercial matters), the situational imbal­ ance between commitments and needs, the procedural disjunction of principles and details, and the commercial pinch between past protection and impending competition which confronted the former French territories, the Africans were left with few arguments to enhance their cause. Their possibilities of threat were limited,67 since there were no al­ ternatives with which to threaten the Six: the Eighteen had 67 The Africans did threaten from time to time, but no one took them very seriously. Mali said it could only accept an agreement which explicitly stated that states could adapt it to their own eco­ nomic system. (Joint Parliamentary Committee, 10 January 1962); BAN 218:4456 (17 January 1962). Senegal told the Council of Min­ isters that the Eighteen could only join an Association that guaranteed their income stability (letter of 19 September 1962); BAN 249:5086 (3 October 1962). Somalia threatened not to sign if it did not get better treatment (at the end of 1961); Drouin, op.cit., p. 312. The Malagasy people seemed to be notable nonthreateners: Jules Razafimbahiny, OAMCE secretary-general, noted the "wisdom" of the Eighteen in not provoking a crisis over Rome IV, in a letter to OAMCE members on the first interministerial meeting; and Jacques Rabemananjara, the Malagasy delegate, told the second interminis­ terial conference, "Nor do I intend to enter into any kind of bargain­ ing concerning the maintenance of our adhesion, which is definitive," NEAMA/199/62 (Min 9), 26 April 1962. See also notes 3 and 61.

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nowhere (or no better place) to go than into renewed As­ sociation. Indeed, their protestations of fidelity to Associa­ tion—in the absence of alternatives—were a commitment on the part of the Eighteen that actually weakened their ability to refuse. Appeals to the Europeans' interest were little used, since the Six were already taking care of their own interests by assuring open and equal access to Africa for their goods, investments, and nationals: the Six had already taken, in their package, all that the Eighteen could give. It was thus only the corollaries to threat and commitment that were left open to the Africans. The Eighteen could warn, although even here the Six were often more sensitive to the dangers than were the Africans. The Associates warned of instability if their peoples' rising expectations were not satis­ fied. They warned of economic stagnation if their desires for development were not encouraged. The Eighteen could also attempt to build obligations. They repeatedly cited the European commitment to continue the Association, but added, "Without preferences there is no As­ sociation." They invoked French responsibility for having started the price-support system in the first place. They re­ called the richesse oblige inherent in being a developed state. Moreover, the Six were somewhat sensitive to this approach; it is, in addition, hard to see what other arguments were open to the Africans to procure the results they did. In sum, the Africans' greatest strength was their weakness. Their underdevelopment gave them the substance for appeals to the Six. It also gave them an excuse for not offering greater concessions. It was the source of their warnings. By putting their fate in the Europeans' hands (where, in the absence of procedural changes, it was anyhow), they maximized the chances of making the obligations stick, and of achieving greater results—no matter how limited—than if they had en­ gaged in a hard bargaining process with nothing to bargain with. These elements of analysis come to a head in the question of breakup, which was very real in Senegal's final reserva­ tions and came up at various times in African caucuses and

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Eurafrican negotiations. In fact, the third interministerial round in July 1962 did break up over disagreement on the FED. Having nothing to offer in bargaining, the Eighteen withheld their one positive card—their signature. But they were careful not to imply rejection of Association or rupture of negotiations. After a summer's reflection, the fourth ses­ sion moved on again toward agreement closer to the Afri­ cans' terms, now drastically reduced. In fact, the difference was so small that there was little danger of calling Associa­ tion itself into question. On larger issues and disappoint­ ments, the Africans' dilemma was well summarized between the lines of the OAMCE Secretary-General's letter to mem­ ber states after the first interministerial session: 1. On the eve of the meeting, the European Member states were not in agreement among themselves because of the specific position of Netherlands. 2. Nevertheless, the Europeans succeeded in presenting a truly united front before the Associates 4. Faced with the Dutch attitude, the African and Malagasy states could have compelled the Europeans to make a decision. If the Africans and Malagasys had maintained their decision to refer to Annex [sic] IV of the Treaty (point contested essentially by the Dutch), a crisis would have been inevitable. Some think that that crisis would have been necessary to escape the ambiguity. 5. Since it was not yet a matter of actual negotiations [sic], the Africans and Malagasies had the wisdom to avoid the crisis and accepted a final resolution which still safe­ guards their essential interests before the negotiations.68 The problem is that when the "actual negotiations" got to the matter, it was already decided—by agreement among the Six. On other matters, the same process left a number of African demands specifically outside the agreement. Even Senegalese Ambassador Gueye, who had one of the toughest procedural positions, has agreed that it was in the Africans' interest to 68 Letter to OAMCE members oil first interministerial meeting. On "understanding" as an outcome to this question, see Chap. 6, pp. 214-15.

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rupture.69

avoid Since France alone would have been unable to supply the same quantity of aid as the FED or to com­ pensate Africa for the elimination of bilateral supports under the CAP if the Association had not been continued, and since—as already noted—refusal of the Europeans' delicate edifice would have thrown the Members (particularly the Netherlands) back into totally irreconcilable positions, in­ cluding increased trade with competing non-Associates to the exclusion of the Eighteen, this judgment was doubtless cor­ rect. Economists may debate whether real alternatives (i.e., better conditions outside Association) exist, and policy­ makers may contend that the shock of total independence— economic as well as political—is the only effective pressure for national integrity and self-improvement. But the Eighteen proclaimed and believed that salvation depended on their act­ ing as "faithful daughters of the family," as one African Min­ ister phrased it. And their negotiating tactics not only were consistent with this evaluation of their situation but also maximized the strength of their weakness. The accents in this analysis of the negotiating process have been on the relative strength and weakness of the Europeans and Africans, the shifting of the convergence point away from the African position as the Europeans agreed among them­ selves, and the shortcomings of the final agreement when compared with African demands and needs. A few reflections are necessary to temper a possible impression of negativity. On the one hand, the Africans' needs—and hence their de­ mands—were unlimited, so that any agreement would appear "insufficient." On the other hand, the final agreement did pre­ sent an inequality of formal advantages in favor of the Eight­ een that did offset in some measure the inequality of eco­ nomic strengths. The Eighteen received aid, delays for elimi­ nating quotas and tariffs, exceptions to be invoked beyond the normal safeguard clauses, minimal assurances on the pro­ tection of their interests, the expansion of their markets by the Six, and exceptions for open-door states on reciprocal preferences—all advantages that did not appear on the Euro69 In

interviews.

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

pean side of the balance sheet. There were no cases of one­ sided advantages for the Six, unless their ability to make de­ cisions on CAP measures that affected African products could be so considered. In an atmosphere charged with criti­ cism of the insufficiency of the measures adopted, based on comparison with the past regime of the colonies or with the present needs of the new states, these treaty inequalities in favor of the Africans should not be overlooked. THE FED, A CASE ANALYSIS

A complex discussion of elements and processes has been necessary to treat a complex set of negotiations. A few of the items under discussion are susceptible of point-by-point analysis, if only to show in detail how the complexity operated. The best example is the FED, which lends itself to an analysis of convergence because of its quantitative nature. The debate on the FED immediately began on two distinct levels, and was so to continue like a three-dimensional chess game, until a decision on the final sum was reached. The basic study issued by the Commission in mid-July 1961 sug­ gested a $1,100 million FED (assuming a five-year dura­ tion) plus an annual Common Production Fund of $25 mil­ lion and an additional $50 million for stabilization loans for the duration of the Convention. The Commission's annual figure of $220 million was based on the 1962 FEDOM sched­ ule. On the same day, in response to advance statements by Lemaignen, Germany submitted a memorandum proposing a FED equal to the FEDOM ($581 million), with an addi­ tional $100 million compensation for CET reductions to be applied as aid to production. Between a figure of $1,275 mil­ lion and one limited to $681 million, there was a sizable dif­ ference, as there was also between the nature of their refer­ ence points—the highest annual FEDOM figure vs. the total FEDOM base figure. At the same time, most of the debate was focused on an­ other level, that of establishing principles and reference points. By the first interministerial round, the principle of a FED at least equivalent to the FEDOM was admitted, thus

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

establishing the FEDOM total of $581 million as a basic ref­ erence figure at the same time. But the Africans were looking for different reference points in "the sum of different forms of aid [including the highest annual FEDOM figure multi­ plied by years duration], each of which would have been the subject of separate and prior evaluations";70 they cited their growth in population, their loss of price supports, their need for CET compensation, and their general development needs as justification. The sum arrived at was $1,767 million. Gorse, speaking for the Six in the second interministerial round, did away with this attempt at establishing alternative reference points by saying that the Six had agreed that there would be no additional categories of aid and that the FED would be slightly greater than the FEDOM, but not three times greater. This threw out the proposed African and Com­ mission figures, as well as their criteria, and put the search back into the type of thinking started by the German memo. At this point (the second interministerial round), the posi­ tions of the Six were: France $1,200 million, Germany $680 to $780 million, the Netherlands $680 million. Now the problem was to find a criterion and a definite figure for the supplement above $581 million. The inability of the Six to agree on these two items held the matter in suspense, but it also had the paradoxical effect of depriving the Commission and the Eighteen of much in­ fluence in the final results. Among the Six, in 1962, the de­ bate again went on in EEC councils on two levels, but these levels were closer to each other than had been the original dual levels of 1961 because some of the approaches were now eliminated. On the level of total aid sums, the Netherlands held to its figure to the end, France slowly came down, and the rest gradually came together at about $780 million. By early June, France had dropped to $940 million and then $850 70Rabemananjara interview, L'Economie 819:11-12 (26 April 1962). References to the present analysis are found in the first part of this chapter and are not repeated; source material has been supple­ mented and verified through interviews.

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million in response to the tenacity of the other Five. In the middle of the month, France proposed $781 million but with a number of conditions involving additional loans. When this proposal was not accepted, it was withdrawn and France re­ turned to its figure of $851 million. However, the question of finding a total figure upon which agreement could be reached was not a matter of blind arithmetic, but a process of proposing a figure that would have sufficient justification to stand against the other states' positions. Thus, the search for a sum rejoined the second level of the debate—the search for criteria for the supplement over and above the $581 mil­ lion reference point. The French proposal of $850 million included a supple­ ment of $270 million. This figure was made up of a transi­ tional figure equal to two-thirds of the five-year price sup­ ports that Africa was to lose (two-thirds of $300 million, or $220 million) plus the Commission's figure of $50 million for stabilization. Germany chose a round total of $750 mil­ lion (the $580 million base plus $170 million supplement), in addition to the $50 million in normal loans from the BEI. Once this level of debate began, bargaining centered on the total supplementary figure, rather than on criteria for the components that gave that supplement meaning. Belgium and Luxembourg sought to reconcile the French and German proposals with a $200 million supplement (a round figure al­ most halfway between the figures proposed by the two states); to buttress the round reference point they subdivided it into $150 million for production aid to compensate for loss of price supports and $50 million for diversification aid. France at first agreed to this compromise but later withdrew its support. But withdrawal left some principles standing: $50 million in BEI loans for stabilization and a 75 to 25 per­ cent division of production and diversification aid. The other Members stood by; the Netherlands made it known that it could raise its total only in loans, and Italy— sensing the wind—merely declared that it did not want to go beyond doubling its own previous contribution. In this way, the bystanders helped shift the debate from a seemingly ir-

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

reconcilable discussion on criteria to a new approach con­ cerning the sources of the money. So, at the end of this round, the 1962 discussion shifted to a third level—the sources of aid—in an effort to find a total, but retained the basic $580 million reference point, the $50 million BEI loan, and the three to one division between production and diversi­ fication aid. Again, the search for sources had two components: Mem­ bers' contributions and the amount of the total to be devoted to loans. On the first item, the Members generally felt that Italy, which had received nearly half of the BEI loans up to this point, could contribute more to the FED than the 7 per­ cent it gave to the FEDOM. Suggestions for the Italian con­ tribution ran from the Netherlands' figure of almost 25 per­ cent ($163 million) of the Dutch total proposed FED to Germany's figure of 13.3 percent ($100 million) of the Ger­ man total proposal. There was general agreement that the French and German contributions should each amount to about a third of the total; only the German proposal did not carry over this feature from the FEDOM. There was also some agreement that contributions by Belgium and the Neth­ erlands should each amount to 10 percent or less of the total (as under the FEDOM), although, again, the German and Dutch proposals did not continue this feature. Of these three points of general consensus, only the third did not survive in the final settlement. The second subject of debate—closely related to the first —concerned the amount of the total to be devoted to loans (beyond the BEI $50 million). Germany wanted the supple­ ment to be limited to $200 million and to come entirely from loans, while France would only drop to the $200 million fig­ ure if loans were given in addition to that figure. An arith­ metical compromise would establish a supplement of $200 million with half of the sum in loans. Under the pressure of the impending third interministerial round (already post­ poned to the brink of the summer vacation), some agreement was necessary to avoid again coming before the Africans empty-handed. A compromise figure was reached at the Iog-

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

ical midpoint: a total of $780 million ($200 million over the FEDOM) was agreed upon at the June Council meeting, in eluding $50 million BEI loans and $50 million in loans from the FED itself. In the process, Italy's contribution was raised to $100 million, as in Germany's proposal for Italy (nearly double Italy's FEDOM percentage), and the Netherlands' contribution was raised to $66 million (but "uncoupled" from Belgium's slightly higher level). This package was then presented to the Africans. The Africans' refusal to accept this figure broke up the third interministerial session, and brought them back into the negotiations on the FED. The crucial point, however, is that these negotiations no longer focused on major sums, but on lesser adjustments within the package. The Africans entered the session with a total figure of $810 million, moving down from their last position of $890 million, the former French figure. They flatly refused to pass on to commercial matters until the aid question was settled, as Sailer declared. In re­ sponse, Colombo, speaking for the Six, made a distinction that had never attracted much thought previously but that completely altered the previous calculations: he pointed out that of the $780 million, $80 million was to go to stilldependent territories, leaving $700 million for the Eighteen or a supplement $120 million over the FEDOM base figure. During the session, the Eighteen were unable to come up with a new and convincing total figure or a criterion, but cited in­ stead their needs and especially the $325 million that they were losing in price supports. In the process, however, the Africans turned their efforts to salvaging their supplement, rather than trying to reestablish the base figure. Although the totals may come out the same, this point is important because it shifted attention to new reference figures and permitted agreement. The shift in focus was occasioned by another new level of details which came into play in the third interministerial meeting. The Six proposed, in their package, that of their $200 million supplement, $30 million was to go to the four non-UAM states as diversification aid (since they had no

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

price supports they needed no production aid as compensa­ tion for support loss) and $170 million to the UAM states. The UAM figure, in turn, was to be divided into $125 mil­ lion production aid (the original $25 million proposed by the Commission for the Common Production Fund multiplied by years of duration), and $45 million in diversification aid for those UAM states that had already decided to shift im­ mediately to world prices. However, when the Africans ar­ rived at their figure, they had cut the cake somewhat differ­ ently and allocated all of the $170 million to the seven states that stood to suffer most from loss of price supports. The additional $30 million which they requested would go for di­ versification aid to the remaining seven UAM states. Once details got down to the point where individual states began to see specific sums on the horizon, it became impossible to back down. Thus, the UAM meeting in Libreville before the fourth interministerial round reafl&rmed its demand for a $230 million supplement. Over the summer, the Six considered how far they could go to meet the Africans. In a late September Council meet­ ing, they adopted the African reference figure of $230 mil­ lion for the supplement but lowered the total base figure to $570 million, offering a round total of $800 million ($20 million above their previous offer). In the process, the base figure for aid to the Eighteen of $500 million was maintained and the dependent territories' share was reduced from $80 million to $70 million. Back went the debate to its former levels of discussion. Germany and the Netherlands wanted the additional $20 million to be in BEI loans, France wanted half to come from the BEI and half from increases in the Mem­ bers' contributions. Not only was the French position so pre­ sented that a midpoint was hard to find (unlike the earlier compromise), but the Europeans this time had already com­ mitted themselves to fixed sums (like the Africans' own com­ mitment). The German position won. In the fourth interministerial meeting, the Africans were offered their $230 million supplement, the increase to be "paid" by the dependent territories (i.e., by France and the

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

Netherlands) and by the BEI. The supplement was divided into $195.5 million and $34.5 million for UAM and nonUAM states, according to the same percentage set up for the original $200 million supplement. Again the Africans refused. Four of the seven UAM states that were to get the additional $30 million refused to let their special allocation slip through their fingers. A joint concilia­ tion committee had to be assigned to the matter, and it gave half the $30 million to three of the four intransigents, to be "paid" by a drop in the non-UAM states' share to $32 mil­ lion and in the remaining 11 UAM states' share to $183 mil­ lion. At this point the debate was becoming troublesome and annoyed many of the Africans, but more of the same was to come. Although the sum of the FED was now set at $800 million ($730 million to the Eighteen), the criteria for settling the final allocation of the $183 million are part of the same proc­ ess and are as instructive as the preceding episodes.71 It had already been established that production aid was to account for 75 percent of the sum ($137.5 million) and the alloca­ tion was to be based on the amount relinquished in price supports. This agreement still left open such questions on cri­ teria as: French or world reference prices? Preceding three or five-year reference period? French or world trade volume? The answers to these questions could mean a difference of several million dollars to individual African countries.72 The Commission made complex calculations that all arrived at roughly the same conclusion: a third of the sum was due to the Ivory Coast, a fifth each to Madagascar and Senegal, a twelfth to Cameroon, and the rest to as many other states as did not renounce production aid. This division was politically impossible in face of dissatisfaction from the smaller states and the Senegal-Ivory Coast rivalry. The Commission then 71 The last round explanation is based on interviews, and on inter­ nal documentation of African states. 72 The Congo suggested population (in which it excelled) but some­ what understandably no one accepted (although on that count, at least the Senegal-Ivory Coast parity would have been reflected).

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

concluded that any allocation had to begin with one rule: Dakar-Abidjan parity. As a result, the Senegalese and Ivorian percentages were added together and divided by two, each state receiving an equal sum of about four-fifteenths (half of one-third plus one-fifth) of the total. Cameroon then received a bit less than its twelfth and Madagascar exactly twice that figure. From there on, the remaining seven states whittled off similar slivers, each between 3 and 3.5 percent of the total. It was with this solution that the midnight session of the last negotiating round ended. An artificial attempt has been made here to separate the process of arriving at the FED figure from associated ques­ tions. It is easily (or painfully) apparent that negotiation was a complex process—shifting from level to level, chang­ ing focus from one category to another, and picking up refer­ ence points along the way (and sometimes even reviving them from the debris of past discussions). Suffice it to add for the sake of accuracy that other, mainly commercial, mat­ ters were continually involved, and they increased the com­ plexity of arriving at a FED figure. CONCLUSION

From the preceding material, it is possible to present a succinct summary of the Yaounde negotiating process. In the beginning enough principles were established for negotiations to proceed, but it was soon evident that continuing negotia­ tions on the level of principles would lead nowhere. The process then shifted to the details themselves. Rather than the deductive process of the Lagos negotiations, the Yaounde set took on an inductive form. Thus, rather than agreement on principles or compromise over differences, there was often only an understanding on details that included no reference —or even permitted conflicting reference—to the underlying principle. In the inductive process, criteria and reference points for arriving at the settlement of details were the crucial points of discussion. Once a figure or provision was estab­ lished as a reference point, it could be referred to without any further justification and hence took on a meaning of its own

THE YAOUNDE CONVENTION

within the negotiation context. The Six held on to the process of determining the major details of the Convention until they were ready to present interdependent clusters of details to the Eighteen in packages. Since the only alternative to accepting these packages would be the less desirable choice of "less" or no Association, the Africans could not reject the package. But they could try to pry the package apart and whittle away at some of its component parts by establishing new criteria for new reference points. The subject and level, however, were not open to change or challenge by the Africans. After it was all over, some African delegates were reported to have said that signing and executing a convention were two different things. There is no doubt that the Yaounde Con­ vention itself encouraged such feelings, for the most distin­ guishing characteristic of these complex negotiations is the fact that much was left unsettled (to be dealt with in continu­ ing negotiations).73 In one sense, the major accomplishment of the negotiations was to prolong the Association, thereby continuing institutions and timetables that would enable more negotiations to be carried out. No preferences were decreed for European products, but merely rules by which Africans should establish preferences (rules which many have not fol­ lowed). The whole aid matter was to be reviewed in three years (1967). The origins question was specifically post­ poned until no later than the end of 1964 (but was not set­ tled until 1966 and then not completely). The Six promised to take African interests into account in the future in setting up the CAP, and to seek ways of expanding the market for tropical products. The complex set of negotiations between two groups of states in transition, neither of which knew well the other's policies and capabilities, turned out to be more a beginning than an end. As a typical "Association man"—a Frenchman working for an African state—put it: The entry into force of the new Convention should now give rise to a real economic solidarity between the African 73

On all these points, see 5.

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states and the EEC, such as has not existed till now or has been expressed only through the former metropole. The functioning of the Association institutions will permit the Associates truly to interest the Europeans and the Com­ mon Market's supranational organs in the price and mar­ keting problems of the tropical producers. If this solidar­ ity and community of interests are really formed, they will be much more important than the formal dispositions of a Convention in which the Europeans have clearly ac­ cumulated means and precautions in order not to commit themselves to the tropical countries—beyond what they presently judge reasonable—because of their still limited knowledge of these countries' problems and of the evolu­ tions and orientations which these problems can support."74 74

Internal report on the negotiations, 29 December 1962.

3. Negotiations with Commonwealth Africa COMMONWEALTH AFRICA turned down Association with the European Common Market ("painfully"1 negotiated for it by Britain) at the September 1962 Commonwealth Confer­ ence in London. The key country in the decision was Nigeria; Ghana had been and was to remain steadfastly opposed to Association as "a new system of collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than all the evils we are striving to liquidate";2 and the East African leaders were di­ vided and undecided until the opening of the Conference. The other Commonwealth states of Africa were negligible elements in the decision. Commonwealth Africa's rejection came from a mixture of motives, but the heaviest weight against association was po­ litical. Nigerian and East African economic studies saw in Association short-term advantages for their countries' trade, balanced by fears of long-term inhibitions on industrialization and on trade with other African states.3 But the decisive con­ sideration was suspicion that Association meant political and military alignment with continental Europe and alienation 1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 212. Nye's Chapter VII is an excellent study of the initial East African rejection of Com­ mon Market Associate status, and is a fine background to this study. A good treatment of the Nigerian Association, written by Nigeria's chief negotiator, is P.N.C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), esp. Chaps. 5 and 6. Okigbo's study has little to say, however, about the negotiations themselves. 2Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in Nye, op.cit., p. 215. On East Afri­ can indecision at the Commonwealth conference, see ibid., pp. 222, 226. 3 On East African views, see ibid., pp. 212-13, 220-23, 225, 228. In Nigeria, expatriate economists were generally in favor and Nige­ rian economists against, another indication of political differences. Arthur D. Little, Inc. did a study for Nigeria and came to the general conclusion of "no economic disadvantages." See also statement of Chairman Sylvester Gates of the Bank of West Africa, West Africa 2400:610 (1 June 1963) (hereafter referred to as W A ) .

COMMONWEALTH AFRICA

from Africa in some inexplicable way that Commonwealth membership did not. "It is a measure of the misunderstand­ ing that existed on each side on this question of association that the EEC members expected that the offer of a voice in shaping Community policy on Africa would appeal to the English-speaking African states, whereas it proved to be one of the principal obstacles, being interpreted as a sinister plot to entangle African countries in European affairs."4 Barely a year after the London meetings, both great areas of Commonwealth Africa—Nigeria and East Africa—had reconsidered their decision and requested negotiations toward Association. Many things had changed. The British bid for membership had failed, the Yaounde Convention had been made public and signed, and it had become clear that some agreement protecting Commonwealth Africa's trade with the Community would be necessary. Prices for major Nigerian exports to Europe dropped during the period, competitive exports from the Yaounde Associates rose in volume, and the entry of the rest of Africa into Association began to appear as only a matter of time. In East Africa opinion varied on the economic consequences of rejection, although it was agreed that Tanganyika would suffer little and less than its neigh­ bors. The accent in both East and West Commonwealth Africa was now to maintain trade outlets against protected competition, and to obtain financing for development.5 Other elements contributed to this apparent change of heart. One was the text of the Yaounde Convention itself, which helped allay political fears, particularly through its safeguard clauses (Yaounde 13) and through its verbal encouragement of intra-African economic arrangements (Yaounde 9). Another was the end of Nigeria's isolation in 4 Douglas G. Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Eco­ nomic Alignment," π Journal of Modern African Studies 2:255 (1964). Ali Mazrui also brings out well the political "affront" of being "spoken for" by Britain, in "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community," in Lawrence B. Krause, ed., The Common Market: Progress and Controversy (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 133. 5 See Nigerian preliminary memorandum, European Parliament, Document de Seance 134 (28 November 1966).

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Africa and its growing contacts with French-speaking states in the various African groups.6 A third was the absence of European constraint on the foreign policies of the Associates, as shown by the ostentatious radicalism of Mali and CongoBrazzaville. But the most important was the Declaration of Intentions, issued in the Council meeting of April 1963 and distributed in mid-July,7 at the time of the signing of the Yaounde Convention. The January 1963 veto of British entry into the Common Market by France reinforced the determi­ nation of the other Five Members and the Commission not to have the Association limited primarily to former French colonies, and this desire was substantiated before the Dutch would agree to final ratification of the Convention. The Dec­ laration of Intentions offered three options—accession to the Yaounde Association, negotiation of a new reciprocal asso­ ciation agreement sui generis, negotiation of nondiscrimina­ tory commercial agreements—to third African countries. In addition, it provided explicitly, in the accompanying interpre­ tation, that "third countries" meant Commonwealth countries, particularly Nigeria and Tanganyika, and—of key importance —that the Six "agreed not to oppose the accession of these countries except if friendly relations do not exist between these countries and the member states of the Community or if problems regarding financial assistance have not been set­ tled."8 In this commitment and its proviso lay the story of Commonwealth African negotiations in a nutshell. 6 See Claude S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 116. 7 Publication was discreet. At the end of the year (Journal Officiel 181, 11 December 1963), written question 81 in the Parliament elicited the text and the answer that the Declaration was available to all interested parties; the text had been transmitted to EEC infor­ mation offices the previous month "in case recipients are not yet aware of it." Nigeria doubtless learned of it from sympathetic parties among the Six or the Commission. It is found in R/602 F/63 (EAMA 59) (Annex I) and was not appended to the public edition of the Convention. 8Council of Ministers' official interpretation (n.d.). The impor­ tance of this agreement does not imply that there were no negotia-

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After suitable—and political—delays, the Council granted mandates9 for both negotiations in mid-1964. The Nigerian negotiations proceeded evenly through two years of delicate diplomacy and European political obstruction, and finally reached agreement. East African negotiations were more er­ ratic; they stumbled for a while on the reciprocity issue, until the two sides finally agreed to talk about the same thing, after which agreement came rapidly. One major difference between the two sets of negotiations—Nigeria's status as a single, fed­ eral state compared with the three sovereign states seeking to recover their former confederal status in East Africa—was reflected in some procedural problems. However, one simi­ larity was crucial to the perceptions of the Commonwealth Africans and hence to the course of negotiations: the Com­ monwealth preferences which East Africa and Nigeria en­ joyed on the British market required no counterpart or reciprocity. How could they negotiate an agreement with the EEC that was "less" than the Yaounde Convention, and that did not offend Britain (or the United States), but that still would qualify as a free-trade area under GATT rules?

Nigeria Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, the member of the Ni­ gerian government most favorable to Association and the last to swing against it, told the 1962 Commonwealth Conference that Association had not solved any of the Associates' ecotions or that restoration of diplomatic relations with France was the only decision that mattered. But the precommitment is clear, not as a legal document (the Declaration of Intentions itself does not have the weight of a treaty commitment, for example) but as a moral engagement among the Six; when the Netherlands cited the Declara­ tion in April 1965, France answered with a higher obligation to the 1957 Declaration concerning the Maghreb; Europe 2101 (9 April 1965). 9 A mandate is a detailed document, equivalent to a draft treaty, containing instructions that the Commission is to follow in negotiat­ ing. There was no mandate in the Yaounde negotiations because the Members were negotiating alongside the Commission.

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nomic problems and was likely instead to increase their economic dependence.10 Nigeria saw no need to Associate in order to sell its products in fair competition on the European markets, and would have preferred open competition with all preferential tariffs and quotas on tropical products removed. However, when the Prime Minister announced his policy in the aftermath of the Commonwealth Conference, he said he would seek "a guarantee of access" to the European market and "a reasonable share" in the growth of trade in tropical products, while rejecting Association (as it was then con­ ceived).11 The Declaration of Intentions made this goal possi­ ble. When Nigeria first requested discussions with the Com­ munity, in mid-September 1963, it was in order to seek ways to remove the discrimination against its products that the Yaounde Convention had created. When the exploratory talks with the Commission began, in late November 1963, Nigeria was merely pursuing its announced policy of seeking to keep its European market, through special tariff arrange­ ments, especially for cocoa and vegetable oils; eventually it requested Association sui generis "different in certain essen­ tials" from the Yaounde agreement.12 The Commission made a report on this basis to the Council, in January 1964, seek­ ing a mandate for formal negotiations on a European-Ni­ gerian free-trade area, without aid or common institutions, guaranteeing duty-free entry for Nigeria's four main exports —cocoa, palm and peanut oils, and tropical woods ("the four products").13 10On

the earlier evolution, see Phillips, op.cit., pp. 59, 113-18. Ibid., p. 118. See also 1962 Nigeria trade report supporting idea that Nigeria needed trade, not aid, WA 2400:598 (1 June 1963). « WA 2434:105 (25 January 1964). 1 3 WA 2427:1369-70 (7 December 1963). Nigeria was first sup­ plier to the EEC of palm nuts, second for cacao, third for palm oil, and fourth for tropical woods. Woods were reputedly added to keep a regional balance, the four products being the exports of the Western, Eastern, Northern, and Midwestern regions, respectively. See rv Afrique-Express 66:23-26 (10 February 1964). The Six invited Nige­ ria to join in the Yaounde institutions, in the exploratory talks, and in the 1964 negotiations; "Nigeria refused but agreed to the inclusion 11

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The first formal discussions among the Six began in late January 1964 and continued in mid-April, and in early May and June. In these four Council meetings, the Members con­ sidered the formulation of a mandate based on the Nigerian proposals, as worked out with and presented by the Commis­ sion. The proposals had the strong support of the Nether­ lands and Germany, and at least the acquiescence of Belgium and Italy. During the April meeting,14 however, instead of agreeing to the mandate, France brought up three questions for the Commission and Nigeria to study: How was double membership in Commonwealth and Community preference systems to be handled? How were the interests of the Yaounde Eighteen to be protected? What advantages was Commonwealth Africa offering the Six in return for Association? France's motives were mixed and largely political ("eco­ nomic arguments acting instead in the opposite direction").15 It was hard to pretend that France had "friendly relations" with Nigeria (as the Declaration of Intentions interpretation required), since Nigeria had broken diplomatic relations with France early in 1961 in protest against French atomic tests in the Sahara. France was also simply uninterested—eco­ nomically as well as politically—in enlarging the Association and weakening the provisions and protection for its former colonies; it had made this point successfully throughout the course of the Yaounde negotiations and was not about to drop it, at least not as long as the Yaounde Convention had not yet been ratified. However, France was also annoyed by the fact that Ni­ geria, which had both criticized and rejected political associa­ tion, was now asking to enjoy economic benefits without of institutions in its own agreement" (unpublished paper of Bridget Bloom, Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, 25 August 1966, p. 16). 14On the discussions through April, see W A 2434:105 (25 Janu­ ary 1964), 2443:337, 339 (28 March 1964), 2447:469 (25 April 1964). 15 Le Monde, 16 April 1964.

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making a political commitment, and that Nigeria, which was currently in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) taking a strong stand against reciprocal tariff arrangements such as EEC Associa­ tion, was now asking to join and benefit from one. Indeed, the two countries had had a running battle on tariff policy since November 1961, when Nigeria proposed to GATT the immediate elimination of tariffs on tropical products, a pro­ posal that France opposed as a direct attack on Association.16 At the same time, Nigeria also openly challenged the legality of the Yaounde Convention's preferential arrangements when compared with GATT rules. Finally, as the Dutch and the Germans reacted to the 1963 veto of British membership with a determination to push the open nature of the Associa­ tion, so France in turn responded with proud resolution not to acquiesce automatically in the Dutch and German cam­ paign for their overseas candidate. In the May Council meetings France again asked a delay in order that Nigeria might give more precision to its inten­ tions. After the proposals had been restudied and negotia­ tions had been delayed for two months, France reduced its objections to two amendments appended to the mandate, and emphasized the need to take into account the Associates' in­ terests and Nigeria's Commonwealth preferences. The Coun­ cil granted an initial limited mandate at the beginning of June 1964.17 Although negotiations opened in mid-July for a three-day session, little was accomplished before the summer recess. It was therefore not until the second round, in mid-October, that real work was done on the details of an agreement.18 The main problem concerned the conditions under which Nigeria's "four products" would enter the Community. Both 16 See Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy (New York, Praeger, 1965), pp. 238f, 283. " W A 2453:639 (6 June 1964). 18 Europe 1895 (20 June 1964), 1966 (20 October 1964); WA 2457:743 (4 July 1964), 2458:762 (11 July 1964), 2472:1158 (17 October 1964), 2479:1185-86, 1204 (24 October 1964), 2474:121718 (31 October 1964).

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sides agreed that by the time the Common External Tariff (CET) went into operation, goods of both the Eighteen and Nigeria should enter Europe on an equal basis, but there was no agreement on interim procedures. Discussion centered on whether European tariffs would be eliminated immediately— as Nigeria wished—or reduced gradually to prolong protec­ tion of the Eighteen; it was agreed, however, that some dis­ tinction should be made between the products of Nigeria and those of the Eighteen until 1969. France proposed—and Nigeria refused—a "triple-column" tariff for all European tropical imports, with the Eighteen benefiting from the low­ est tariff schedule (first column), non-Associated states from the highest level (second column), and Nigeria from an in­ termediate position (third column). On its side, Nigeria offered to admit most European products duty free immedi­ ately on a most-favored-nation basis and to reduce its tariff on the rest at the same gradual rate that the Eighteen reduced their tariffs up to 1967. Although these questions remained undecided in the second round of negotiations there was agreement on other basic points: the agreement would run concurrently with the Yaounde Convention to permit a com­ mon association (if desired) beginning in 1969,19 and the safeguard clauses of the Yaounde Convention would be in­ cluded in the Nigerian agreement. The October negotiations recessed for further instructions after a week's discussion, and the Commission reported to the Council in mid-November that it hoped to have a new mandate at the end of the month which would authorize a concrete offer to Nigeria.20 At the same time, the Commission in Brussels and the Nigerians in the various African capitals made contact with the Eighteen in order to reassure them and to hear their views, and apparently were largely successful in calming their fears.21 In the Council, however, the events 19A

Dutch point, as seen in the Yaounde negotiations. 2»Europe 1979 (10 November 1964); WA 2474:1232 (31 October 1964). 2 1 WA 2491:223 (27 February 1965). Nigeria told the Commis­ sion that it would negotiate directly with the Eighteen on the four

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of the spring were repeated: France again asked for further study as the Six fought out their common cereal policy and their policy toward North Africa, the mandate was not granted until the Council meeting of early February 1965, and the negotiations lost two months. Decisions on details were made during the delay, however. With Nigerian refusal of a triple-column tariff, most Members were willing to al­ low the Commission to decide among alternative means (Eu­ ropean escape clauses, or quotas, or Nigerian self-limitation) of protecting the Eighteen on "the four products." But France disagreed with this latitude, and in mid-January finally decreed that only quotas would be acceptable.22 It also insisted—in answer to its own questions of April—that the Commission should give no assurance on treatment of Ni­ gerian exports that would compete with CAP products, and that Nigerian concessions to European exports should not be extended to Britain on a most-favored-nation basis. The second mandate, however, was little different from the November expectations.23 It offered Nigeria duty-free quotas on its "four products" based on the mean annual im­ ports of these products over the past three years and an an­ nual increase of 3 percent until 1969 (the duration of both the Nigerian and the Yaounde agreements), without preju­ dice to arrangements to be renegotiated thereafter. Excess imports of "the four products" over and above the quotas would enter Europe with normal tariffs. All other Nigerian products would enter the Community at the same rates as those of the Eighteen from the start of the Convention; this constituted a minor concession covering about 1 percent of Nigeria's European trade since "the four products" accounted for about 30 percent and the other products involved were products; Europe 1966 (24 October 1964). Nigerian internal prob­ lems at the turn of the year also caused delays; Europe 2046 (3 Feb­ ruary 1965). 22 See Europe 2004 (9 December 1964), 2031 (16 January 1965), 2046 (3 February 1965). 2 3 Ibid., 2042 (21 January 1965), 2046 (3 February 1965), 2056 (15 February 1965).

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allowed into the Community duty free from any source. There was no request for the abolition of Nigeria's Common­ wealth preferences since they protected the Eighteen by drawing competing Nigerian exports away from Europe. Ni­ gerian concessions on European exports were to be spelled out during the negotiations (without the Council's indicating, however, either an opening bid or an acceptable minimum). In addition, the Commission was to discuss with Nigeria some means of taking Nigerian interests into account when CAP provisions were being established, similar to the con­ sultative provision in the Yaounde agreements (Yaounde 11).

The third round of negotiations began a week after the Council approved the mandate. Nigeria countered on the question of "the four products" by asking for an annual quota increase of 6 percent to permit greater expansion of produc­ tion, for use of the best rather than the mean year between 1962 and 1964 as a base for this percentage, and for removal of plywood (a minor export compared to the other three) from the list of "four products."24 At the same time, Dr. Pius Okigbo, the Nigerian Ambassador, pleaded for an absence of reciprocity, recalling the Nigerian position in UNCTAD and the new GATT provision for nonreciprocal trade agree­ ments with developing countries (GATT 36:8). Since neither the Commission nor the French observer had any instructions on what degree of reciprocity was consid­ ered desirable, and the other Five did not seem to care, Ni­ geria was able to hold its position cleverly with only a sym­ bolic concession. Abolishing tariffs on 97 percent of its im­ ports but replacing them with equivalent nondiscriminating 24 Gabon wanted plywood dropped. Plywood had been included as a substitution for tropical woods which had been granted duty-free entry in 1963 as a result of the EEC-UK negotiations. See Okigbo, op.cit., pp. 110-11; Europe 2057 (16 February 1965); WA 2583:199 (30 January 1965), 2491:223 (27 February 1965); London Finan­ cial Times, 30 March 1965. A larger quota increase was an intelligent demand, since, as it turned out, exports of cacao and peanuts and perhaps palm oil exceeded their expanded quotas (Bloom, op.cit., esp. p. 20).

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fiscal duties, it would set up a double-column tariff on a small list of items ("the 26 products") of which Europe was already its main supplier, representing less than 2 percent of Nigeria's total imports but 6 to 8 percent of its imports from the Six.25 Small duties (2 to 10 percent) would be imposed on these items only when the imports came from other coun­ tries than the Six. Thus, Nigeria could maintain its source of development revenue (three-quarters of which came from import duties) through the fiscal charges, without contraven­ ing GATT regulations on free-trade areas, and could, at the same time, offer concessions to the Six in the name of re­ ciprocity without offending other important outlets for its trade (half of which was with Britain and the U.S.). Without objection from the Six observers present, the Commission agreed to recommend only small changes—if any—in the mandate to encompass this position. An agreeable position, compatible with the interests and commitments of both sides, had been reached on the major issue. At the Council meetings of late March and early April, however, France demanded further concessions. While not opposing continued negotiations, France demanded that Ni­ geria give "real commercial advantages" to the Six.26 The Netherlands and Germany, clearly annoyed by the delays, again emphasized the need for results as proof that the As­ sociation was truly open. Although it was clear that negotia­ tions were now in a purely political phase and that France alone was interested in delaying them, it was not clear how far French opposition would be carried nor just what the basic reasons behind the delay were. French spokesmen criti­ cized the increasing openness of Association as contradicting the underlying European policy of aiding and favoring cer­ tain developing nations, but this argument was weakened by 25 It is not possible to ascertain detailed reasons for the choice of the 26 out of some 40 products that met the general criteria (that Europe be the main supplier and that there be no major competing source in Great Britain, the United States, or the Commonwealth); see Okigbo, op.cit., p. 124. Percentages given here are for 1963-1964. 2 s Europe 2070 (4 March 1965); WA 2498:436 (17 April 1965).

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French sponsorship of other negotiations, notably with the Maghreb countries. Rather, the delays, while justified by ex­ plicit principles, were tied to progress in these other negotia­ tions in which France was more interested. In this case, delay was a weapon of only limited usefulness, since it could be turned against France if the Five decided to block North African negotiations in retaliation. On the other hand, the Yaounde Associates contributed to strengthening the French position by insisting—in the Association Council in early April—on full Nigerian reciprocity for the European tariff concessions.27 In the negotiating session of late April,28 Nigeria remained firm on the type of reciprocity offered while making further minor concessions on "the 26 products." The Commission asked for an increase in the number, rate, and size of pref­ erences on European exports. Okigbo offered to accelerate the tariff reductions which were to be applied gradually on some of these products ("the seven"), to improve prefer­ ences up to 5 percent on all of them, and to freeze duties on a number of other products of interest to the Community. He also repeated Nigeria's interest in improvements on "the four products," requested in February. No decision on these points was made at the negotiations, nor at the subsequent Council meeting in mid-May. However, agreement was reached on lesser points of Association, such as capital move­ ments, rights of establishment, and the founding of institu­ tions somewhat less formal than those provided for the Eighteen. A month later, in the Council meeting of mid-June 1965, France joined in approving a new mandate, withdrawing its demand for further concessions; at the same time, the first mandate for the Maghreb, in which France was interested, was approved.29 The other Members were growing disgusted 2 7 WA 2501:501 (8 May 1965); Europe 2099 (7 April 1965), 2100 (8 April 1965), 2107 (20 April 1965). See Chap. 5, pp. 168-69. 2 s WA 2501:503 (8 May 1965); Europe 2113 (26 April 1965), 2118 (4 May 1965), 2119 (5 May 1965). 29 See Chap. 4, pp. 127-28.

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with French stalling tactics, which had not brought substan­ tial concessions from Nigeria. Instead, the Five sought to im­ prove the terms of the agreement for both sides by offering some new, conditional concessions of their own, made up by pairing earlier offers and requests. The third mandate, there­ fore, offered Nigeria a choice: either the current expanding quotas (the 1962-1964 mean plus 3 percent) on "the four products" in return for the slightly (2 percent) increased preferences on some of "the 26 products"; or greater expand­ ing quotas (the 1962-1964 msan plus 6 percent) on three products (plywood to enter duty free along with the other Nigerian exports) as Nigeria had asked, but only if it would grant slightly greater preferences (5 percent more) on "the 26 products" and more rapid tariff reductions on "the seven products." The offer was interesting for several reasons: as the only "take it or leave it" offer in the Nigerian set of nego­ tiations, it—unlike similar offers in other sets—gave a choice, and it dealt only with a slight change of terms, not a funda­ mental item in the agreement; and—also unlike other "take it or leave it" offers—it included improvements already sug­ gested, by Nigeria in the April round or by the Six in the February mandate. At the end of the fifth round of negotiations, which began in late June, Nigeria turned down the slightly improved terms (the second choice) in an effort to mollify British and Ameri­ can criticism of the preferential agreements.30 The third mandate also authorized discussion of final touches, such as capital movements, rights of establishment, institutions, and effects of future agreements among the Six on vegetable oils and on the CAP. The Commission had a draft agreement in hand, based on past negotiations, from which to work. As in the case of the negotiations with the Eighteen, agreement was reached in a late night session, and 30 It is hard to evaluate the role of the U .K. in the negotiations, although it protested the negotiations in mid-1965 and threatened Nigeria with a loss of Commonwealth preferences. The impact appears to have been slight. See ν Afrique-Express 100:27-28 (10 September 1965); WA 2516:925 (21 August 1965), 2517:977 (28 August 1965).

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the resulting convention was identical to the Yaounde agree­ ment (Yaounde 3, 6, 31, 33, 35, 37) in many ways.31 The new institutions were modeled on but separate from the Yaounde bodies, and included an Association council meeting annually on the ministerial level and more frequent meetings among ambassadors, a joint secretariat and com­ mittee, and an ad hoc tribunal.82 On "the four products," tariff-free quotas enlarged by 3 percent per year would be based on the 1962-1964 mean but would be applied from 1965, so that the first quota would be 6 percent (covering 1965-1966); regular third-party tariffs would be applied on exports of these products over and above the quotas; other products would be on the same duty-free footing as those of the Eighteen. A double-column tariff of 2 to 18 percent would be set up by Nigeria for "the 26 products," which were carefully chosen to include items of interest to each of the Six but of little interest to outside parties (macaroni, cham­ pagne, vermouth, radios); on "the seven products," the pref­ erence was to be granted gradually. On all other products, Nigeria would abolish all tariffs and replace them with equiv­ alent fiscal charges. Concessions were exchanged concerning consultations over Nigerian use of safeguard clauses (looser procedural obliga­ tions for Nigeria than under the Yaounde Convention) and over the European CAP (looser procedural obligations in taking account of Nigerian interests than under the Yaounde Convention). Nigeria pledged not to impose new export con­ trols and the Six pledged not to add restrictions on private capital outflow. Equal rights of establishment were guar­ anteed for citizens of the Six in Nigeria; reciprocal establish­ ment rights in Europe could not be offered because of differ­ ing legislation among the Six, but the matter was not consid­ ered of importance by Nigeria. S1WA 2509:725-26 (3 July 1965), 2510:753 (10 July 1965); 2511:787 (17 July 1965), 2512-813-14, 829 (24 July 1965); Europe 2171 (8 July 1965); and interviews conducted during these negotia­ tions. 32 There were only to be parliamentary "contacts" (Lagos 26).

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Although the draft agreement was protested by Britain and the United States as contravening rather than encouraging free trade, it was ready by early July for final drafting and presentation to the September meeting of the Council. (Ni­ geria, in fact, had brought its lawyers along for the June-July round, and was disappointed that drafting did not take place then.) Parliamentary ratification seemed to be necessary only in the case of Germany and Italy, and the convention could be in force by the target date of 1 January 1966. However, on 1 July 1965, France broke off discussions on the Common Agriculture Policy among the Six and attended no more Council meetings for the rest of the year. The Nigerian target date passed—again as in the case of the Yaounde Conven­ tion—and the agreement remained unsigned. In November 1965, experts of the Five discussed and ap­ proved the report of the Commission on the negotiations, and reviewed the draft agreement. When France returned, early in March 1966, the full Committee of Permanent Repre­ sentatives began to review the draft.33 The Commission invited Nigeria back to discuss the draft agreement in late April and early May. Two last-minute problems were taken care of before these talks took place, although contact was maintained with the Nigerians on an informal basis. Germany was worried about the possibility of Nigeria's recognizing East Germany.34 Since it would be indelicate to place a treaty restriction on Nigeria's foreign policy, it was decided to impress upon the Nigerians that the recognition of East Germany would be an unfriendly act, in­ compatible with a treaty which was to promote friendly rela­ tions. The French felt that letters should be exchanged concerning possible problems for a common energy policy s s Europe 2357 (4 March 1966), 2363 (11 March 1966). The draft was 1303/VIII/66-F/rev 1 (31 March 1966). 84 Or more precisely, Germany was worried about the possibility of Algeria's recognizing East Germany, and having failed in the Yaounde negotiations (see Chap. 5, p. 177), wanted the provision included in the Lagos agreement as a precedent for the North African negotiations (see Bloom, op.cit., p. 14).

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raised by Nigerian oil production, stipulating that treaty pro­ visions affecting petroleum were not a binding precedent for negotiations when the treaty expired. The Five argued that this would be an addition to the agreed draft that would re­ quire new negotiations, and that it was unnecessary for the present Convention. The petroleum issue was buried in midApril with an agreement to leave the matter to the minutes. At the same time, Nigeria and France effected an agreement made six months earlier to restore diplomatic relations, there­ by finally removing what was never an explicit obstacle but always an ambiguous shadow over the negotiations.35 With these diversions out of the way, the Convention was signed in Lagos on 16 July 1966, essentially in the same form agreed to a year before. Its subsequent history is anticlimactic, to say the least. In the last negotiating session, Okigbo at­ tempted to reopen the question of quotas on "the four prod­ ucts" in the light of the lost year. The Commission brushed the matter aside; Nigeria then suggested "transitional meas­ ures" or "application in anticipation," and it was assumed that the Convention would be at least partially applied im­ mediately, if only because of the possible length of ratifica­ tion procedures. When the Joint Interim Committee held its 35 This evaluation of the importance of recognition is based on interviews with the parties concerned, as well as various public state­ ments; see vii Federal Nigeria 5:15 (September 1965) in which the Nigerian Embassy in Washington calls the rupture of relations "a hurdle facing the agreement"; Okigbo, in London Financial Times, 30 March 1965, saying it "made negotiations more difficult"; Europe 1966 (24 October 1964) in which France denies posing conditions; AFP 28 October 1965, in which Okigbo and his government denied a West African Pilot story alleging a French veto; AFP, 5 November 1965 in which Bamali denied French opposition over diplomatic rela­ tions; see also Phillips, op.cit. One of the major problems was the inflexibility of President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa on which country would take the first step, a problem the first Nigerian coup solved by removing Tafawa Balewa. Frenchspeaking African countries put important pressure on both sides for renewal; see AFP, 5 November 1965; WA 2521:1092 (25 September 1965); I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 104.

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first meeting in mid-February 1967, it proceeded to an initial exchange of views on the unresolved questions on origins and the distribution of the "four products."36 But application of the Convention depended on ratification,37 which in turn de­ pended on Members' views on the Nigerian civil war. In early October 1968, a Belgian Socialist deputy in the European Parliament raised an oral question on the advisability of im­ plementing an agreement with a government that "violates the most basic humanitarian laws" and mentioned the possi­ bility that the Commission might block the Convention. Henri Rochereau, Commissioner for Overseas Development, gave a routine assurance that he would raise the problem within the Commission, which subsequently decided that it had no action to take and that the Members were free to act as they saw fit. In a huff, General Yakubu Gowon of Ni­ geria nearly denounced the Association.38 Relations were maintained but there was general disenchantment with Ni­ geria's "Association," under an agreement that was never ratified nor applied, and eventually expired. East Africa When Rashidi Kawawa, Tanganyikan vice-president and delegate of East Africa's only independent state at the 1962 Commonwealth Conference, startled his colleagues by joining in the Ghanaian and Nigerian rejection of Associate status, he did it mainly for political reasons. He saw Association as a commitment to a power bloc and a hindrance to African s6The Commission submitted a note on the allocation of quotas on 6 June 1966, but there was no hurry to discuss it or to go beyond ad-hoc arrangements; Europe 2717 (5 July 1967). 37 No longer having a parliament, Nigeria delivered executive rati­ fication in January 1968; Europe (NS) 10 (19 January 1968). At that point (and ever since), France and Luxembourg had not yet ratified, and Belgium and the Netherlands had ratified but not yet presented the instruments of ratification to the Council of Ministers. 3 s Europe (NS) 184 (2 October 1968), 186 (4 October 1968), 187 (7 October 1968), 190 (10 October 1968); Le Monde, 4 and 10 October 1968; WA 2680:1189 (12 October 1968). Dr. Okigbo, an Easterner, became Biafran representative in Paris and Brussels.

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unity. He also felt "strongly" that if any East African state "associated" with the EEC, "That will be the end of our [East African] Common Market."39 Kawawa announced five principles that he was mandated by the East African Com­ mon Services Organization (EACSO) Authority to express:40 1. "The East African Common Market should be pre­ served at all costs and consequently on the vital issue of the approach of the East African Governments to the im­ plication of Britain joining the EEC it is most important that the Governments should act together." 2. Export markets in Britain and the Community should be preserved. 3. The ability of East Africa to pursue independent for­ eign policies should not be compromised in any way. 4. The ability of East Africa to trade outside the EEC on an advantageous basis should be safeguarded. 5. "As a result the East African Governments should seek to negotiate a trade agreement between the East African Common Market and the EEC with a view to obtaining advantageous terms for the sale of commodities in the European Common Market." Attempts to coordinate an East African position on As­ sociation had not begun until several weeks before the Com­ monwealth Conference. Through the Central Legislative As­ sembly, where appointed parliamentarians from all three countries (Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda) sat, and through the EACSO Authority, composed of the three heads of government, very general guidelines close to Kawawa's points were proclaimed, although indecision was still strong enough to prevent a clear directive to reject. Even after Kawawa's speech, there was no immediate bandwagon effect. A commitment had been made, however; Tanganyika was 39

See Nye, op.cit., pp. 213, 230-37. East African Standard, 14 September 1962; see also Nye, op.cit., pp. 223, 226. 40

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under pressure to stand firm, whereas the other two coun­ tries had no position to defend and, if anything, were under pressure to conform. Two days later, in line with his pan-African feelings, Uganda's Prime Minister Milton Obote swung behind the Tanganyikan decision and the political interpretation under­ lying it.41 Three days later, Kawawa publicly reaffirmed his position, and on their return home, both he and Obote stressed the finality of their decision. Since there had also been a prior commitment to the principle of East African unity, the pressure was thrown on Kenya to acquiesce. Tan­ ganyika, acting essentially through one person, had made its decision, invoking African unity as both its own reason and the reason for others to follow, and the others were suscepti­ ble to the appeal. The pattern of a common stand in East African negotiations with the EEC was established. Para­ doxically, as this common front tightened in regard to Eu­ rope, it loosened in regard to East African economic inte­ gration, despite the fact that this integration was the referent value behind East African decisions on EEC association. It was therefore no diplomatic about-face that led the three states to send a memorandum and a joint delegation to the Commission in February and March 1963 to investigate pos­ sible arrangements.42 They found that some of their political fears of Association were not borne out by the text of the Yaounde Treaty, then in its last limbo between initialing and signature, and that it had been the Africans, not the Euro­ peans, who had requested political institutions of Association. They were also looking about for new markets, both to di­ versify and to expand their trade, and they saw a growing threat of competition from the favored Yaounde Eighteen. The visit of the East Africans to Brussels was welcomed par­ ticularly by the Netherlands and Germany, who were in the 41

Cf. Nye, op.cit., pp. 196-97, 226. A Tanganyikan source said that arrangements were to be con­ cluded between the EEC "and the East African Common Market," Le Monde, 23 January 1963. The delegation consulted with the British Government before going on to Brussels; WA 2381:81-83 (19 Janu­ ary 1963). 42

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process of extracting from the Council the Declaration of In­ tentions enumerating the three alternatives for other African states. As a result, in late September, East Africa, acting through EACSO, decided on a formal joint request (sent to the Commission in early November) for the establishment of a "formal economic relationship . . . between the European and East African common markets" that should not derogate in any way their "previously stated position."43 A week of exploratory talks between the East Africans and the Commission took place in mid-February 1964.44 The East African delegates, like the Nigerians, preferred the sec­ ond alternative of the Declaration of Intention—Association involving reciprocal trading rights and obligations—as a basis for their negotiations, looking to an agreement on a freetrade area similar to the Yaounde arrangements on trade and establishment only. They thus admitted full reciprocity but left its conditions, including fullest use of safeguards through protective tariffs, to further negotiation. There was prelimi­ nary agreement on institutions (a ministerial committee and an arbitration body). The Association was to run as long as the Yaounde and Lagos agreements, with the possibility for the East Africans to join in a new, common African Associa­ tion in 1969. The Commission's report on these talks, submitted a month later, was similar to the report on Nigeria, to which it made frequent reference, and the Commission asked for a similar mandate to negotiate.45 In the mid-April meeting of the Council, France posed its three questions: How to handle membership in two preference systems? How to protect the interests of the Eighteen? What reciprocal advantages was 43 East African Standard, 26 November 1963; V Afrique-Express 88:28 (10 February 1965). 4 4 I V Afrique-Express 66:22 (10 February 1964); European Com­ munity 69:4 (May 1964); νπ EEC Bulletin 1:22 (1964). 4 5 Europe 1797 (18 March 1964), 1811 (7 April 1964). It was also noted that Commonwealth Africans continued their political attacks on the EEC during the period, leading Europeans to suspect that their critics wanted merely to remove the unequal customs treatment between them and the Eighteen, rather than arrive at Association.

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Commonwealth Africa offering? These questions referred to East Africa as well as to Nigeria, and they were added to the permanent representatives' discussions. Once these objections had been reduced to formal amendments and the mandate granted for Nigeria, the way was open for a similar mandate for East Africa.46 Finally, after the summer vacation, in mid-October 1964, the Council gave a partial mandate to open negotiations with East Africa in order to set up a free-trade association with mutual rights and obligations. The delay was attributable to the same causes as affected Nigeria, but was worsened by the absence of any interested spokesman for East Africa among the Six. West Germany during the first four months of 1964 was busy making sure that Tanzania (the new union of Tan­ ganyika and Zanzibar) would not recognize East Germany, although patronage in the negotiations was not listed among Bonn's inducements. The Netherlands had wanted the East African and Nigerian negotiations to be conducted jointly, but neither the other Europeans nor the Africans (especially Tanzania) supported this position. The October mandate was identical to the June mandate for Nigeria, since the Council felt that different treatment for different English-speaking ap­ plicants for Association was unjustified.47 Negotiations were to start with general principles, with details of tariff liberal­ ization to be worked out later. But it was not until the Nigerian negotiations had achieved broad agreement on the general principles, four months later, that the first East Afri­ can round could actually begin. From late March until mid-June 1964, East Africans as well as Europeans had been involved in another series of trade discussions whose most immediate effect was to be felt in the Common Market negotiations. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), meet­ ing in Geneva, included in its final declaration the principle of nonreciprocity in trade concessions between developed and underdeveloped countries. The East African states strongly 4s Ibid., i Ubid.,

1944 (29 September 1964). 1953 (9 October 1964).

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favored the principle, although Uganda's position was some­ what more complex than was the direct support of Kenya and Tanzania.48 The UNCTAD resolution was important to the EEC negotiations, for it now provided East Africa with the same type of commitment to nonreciprocity that GATT and the Yaounde Treaty provided the Six in regard to the oppos­ ing principle. With its hands publicly tied, East Africa's po­ sition was strengthened in negotiations, although the chances of a final agreement were not thereby increased. The GATT decision, in November, to accept the UNCTAD position on reciprocity made the East Africans feel stronger, without however weakening the Europeans' commitment to protect the Yaounde Associates. The East Africans were not entirely happy with their man­ date in the light of their UNCTAD position. Unofficial talks with them showed the Europeans that they were having sec­ ond thoughts about nondiscrimination and reciprocity, which would mean a reversal of their open-door trade policy. A key reaction to the Council's offer is found in the Uganda Argusiia "One of the reasons for viewing the European offer of associate status with suspicion was that it had not been negotiated with East Africa but had been presented in a man­ ner which left no room for negotiation. . . . What East Africa is seeking, in effect, is reciprocity for the [nondiscriminatory] system already operated here—under which goods from Eu­ ropean countries are admitted on the same basis as those from elsewhere. . . . [Tjhere is no obvious hurry in Europe . . ." This is an accurate nutshell picture of the negotiation. During the first round of negotiations in the beginning of March 1965,50 the Commission offered to establish a modi­ fied free-trade area on lines similar to the Yaounde and Lagos Associations, removing tariffs from most products traded between the Six and the three East African countries, is Ibid.,

2011 (17 December 1964). Uganda Argus, 13 October 1964; Europe 1811 (7 April 1964). 50 East African Standard, 10 March 1965; Europe 2071 (6 March 1965), 2075 (10 March 1965); ν Afrique-Express 88:28 (10 Febru­ ary 1965); European Community 80:15 (April 1965). 49

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with safeguard clauses for budgetary, development, and in­ dustrial protection. The East Africans repeated their request for these safeguards. But they would now give no preferences to imports from the EEC. The UNCTAD resolution and the change in GATT were cited in support of the new positions, and the Commonwealth preference system was continually in mind. East Africa spoke of giving "advantages" to Europe, but without specifying their nature. The Commission insisted on the principle of reciprocal preferences by recalling that otherwise Europe would be discriminating against the orig­ inal Yaounde Associates who had given them preferences; it would also have undermined its own position in negotia­ tions with Nigeria, although the Commission was prepared to accept reciprocal preferences that were partial or even symbolic. Yet the East Africans apparently felt that the talks were successful in defining a context in which details could be negotiated, for Dr. Julius Kiano of Kenya declared, "This will recognize East Africa's adherence to the principles adopted by developing countries at the Geneva Conference and in the GATT. It will also recognize our cardinal policy— that we are nondiscriminatory in the determination and ad­ ministration of tariffs and that these tariffs are purely for budgetary purposes and to protect our young industries. With that understanding there may be advantages for us in Europe."51 Problems of detail in the commercial negotiations centered on concessions to be given to East African temperate prod­ ucts which were also produced in the Common Market coun­ tries (beef, dried vegetables, canned fish), and on restrictions on tropical products that competed with the exports of the Yaounde states. In regard to cloves, in the latter category, Tanzania was negotiating an agreement with the Malagasy Republic, the only competitor, which would control produc­ tion and allocate annual export quotas. For coffee, the other competing tropical product, the Community could establish tariff-free quotas (as it had for Nigeria's "four products"). The Commission reserved its position on East African prod5 1 East

African Standard, 11 March 1965.

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ucts coming under the CAP and on barter agreements be­ tween East Africa and Eastern Europe. There was agreement on guarantees of establishment, services, payments, capital, and general provisions, based on the model of the Yaounde Treaty. The East African states' view of the negotiations was seen in several comments. Kiano of Kenya stated that "while the Common Market had discriminated against East African states in granting privileges to the Eighteen Associates, East Africa still maintained its favorable treatment of the Six."52 The East African Standard53 reported that "East African del­ egates took the psychological initiative in making it clear that although they wanted to protect their trade, they were not coming cap in hand and could manage very well without any formal links if necessary." This recalled the view expressed by Kawawa in 1962 when he was asked about possible damage to its trade should East Africa reject Associate status: "We have something to offer. We are not barehanded. We produce goods which people want."54 The Commission sent the report on the negotiations to the Council in early May and requested new instructions. Faced with the East Africans' reversion to their old position against reciprocity, the Commission found that it could not continue negotiations on the basis of its mandate. The report men­ tioned four ways of trying to bridge the two positions on East African imports: nondiscriminatory tariff reductions on prod­ ucts of special interest to the Six, subpositions on specific products (such as Nigeria's double-column tariff on 26 items), general subpositions (such as Algeria's triple-column tariff), or a shift from ad valorem to specific duties. The second round of negotiations requested by the East Africans for June 1965 was not held.55 In fact, no negotia­ tions took place for more than 18 months after the first round. The East African states requested postponement in 52

54

Ibid.

M Ibid.

Uganda Argus, 18 September 1962. 55 Europe 2134 (22 May 1965), 2141 (2 June 1965); AFP 5694 (3 June 1965).

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order to have time to establish a joint diplomatic mission to the EEC as a more effective means of negotiating, but a joint mission was not authorized by the East African Authority and the Central Legislative Assembly until early August 1966. Consideration of joint representation certainly was in­ strumental in the long delay in the negotiations, but it was not the only—or even the main—reason. At the end of the first round of negotiations, the two parties did not even agree on the nature of the arrangement that they were discussing, let alone its details. Since 1962, East African leaders had been talking of tariff reductions and a commercial treaty with the Community and nothing more; what led them to enter into discussions under the Council's mandate of Association simi­ lar to Nigeria's was apparently a more optimistic view of their negotiating position than was realistic or justified. What is surprising is not that the negotiations were interrupted for so long after the first round but that they lasted as long as they did. The East African position was weakened by other causes for delay. One was the flare-up of troubles between Tanzania and West Germany over consular relations with East Ger­ many. In mid-February 1965, Germany cut off military aid to Tanzania, and at the end of the month President Julius Nyerere rejected all German aid but announced that he would not recognize East Germany. Another centered around the East African commitment (spelled out in the 1962 state­ ments) to their own Common Market on which they placed a higher value than Association. While the East African Common Market left behind by colonial rule was being weak­ ened by unilateral measures of the member countries,58 a new move was launched under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to form a larger regional common market in all of eastern Africa. Conferences in Lusaka in October 1965 and in Addis Ababa in May 1966 moved the project slowly forward, diverting East African 56 In 1963 there were restrictions on the movement of certain agri­ cultural products. In 1964 quotas were permitted on trade within East Africa. In 1966 Tanzania set up its own currency and banking.

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energies and attention from the European Common Market negotiations. Finally, the Europeans themselves were busy elsewhere. Until June 1965, when the second East African round was to begin, the EEC was occupied with the Nigerian negotia­ tions, which were moving slowly enough to demand full at­ tention but well enough to strengthen the hand of the Six when they turned to East Africa. Furthermore, in time and in trade, Nigeria had priority. After mid-1965, the EEC was paralyzed by the French walkout; when harmony was re­ stored, the Lagos Treaty had to be brought to final form be­ fore East African talks could be renewed. In June 1966, C. G. Kahama, Tanzanian Ambassador to Bonn and East African Ambassador to the EEC, called on the Commission to resume the second round before December. The following month, at the signing of the Lagos Convention, Common Market officials agreed that the time had come to turn atten­ tion to East Africa. When the October date came around for the reopening of negotiations, Tanzania again asked for a delay to permit "technical preparations." The second round then began a month later and lasted ten days (including a weekend of "re­ flection").57 Abdulrahman Babu, the Tanzanian Trade Min­ ister, was chosen to head the joint delegation since his coun­ try had been the first of the three countries to establish its independence and was the least interested in negotiations, and, therefore, would represent the toughest, minimal posi­ tion. The results quickly bore this out. The East African po­ sition was to grant no tariff preferences that were not ex­ tended on a nondiscriminatory most-favored-nation basis to all countries trading with East Africa; even a double-column tariff of symbolic proportions (such as that used in the Lagos negotiations) was rejected. The East African delegation had a list of European goods on which they were prepared to make nondiscriminatory reductions on a most-favored-nation basis. The East African approach seems to have been to hold 57

Le Monde, 19 July 1966, 17 August 1966, 17 November 1966, 19 November 1966; Radio Uganda, 21 November 1966.

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obdurately to an unyielding position in the hope that the Commission would bend, for it was felt that preferences were contrary to UNCTAD, contradictory to the Commonwealth system, incompatible with East African practice, and unjust to poorer countries, and that in any case East Africa simply could not afford to give preferential treatment. Hoping to open the negotiations with a more positive ap­ proach, the Commission suggested turning to a discussion of more detailed matters such as rights of establishment, capital payments and transfers, arbitration, and a termination date— all of which could be modeled on the Lagos Convention. The East Africans, however, countered that first a suspension, and then high-level talks, could find the way out of the dead­ lock. To the Europeans, however, the deadlock was rather solid. The East African position was clearly based on the third "commercial agreement option" of the Declaration of Intentions, not on the second. A one-way free-trade area would undercut the positions and agreements adopted with regard to the Eighteen and Nigeria; and it would require, in any case, a new mandate that—at the going pace of EEC procedures—would not be possible before the summer of 1967, if then. In mid-November 1966, the second round of negotiations broke down. Time took its toll. The following ten months were broken only by two communications from East Africa, but they were significant. In mid-February and mid-March 1967 the EASCO and East African Economic Community secretariesgeneral notified the Community that East Africa had dropped its opposition to reciprocity and was ready to resume negotia­ tions.58 With this response, the second round of negotiations was closed, and the Six were able to prepare for a new man­ date and a third round. Two questions predominated: At this point, was there any time left to conclude an agreement con5 s E u r o p e 2640 (13 March 1967), 2791 (2 November 1967) on written question 156. It appears that the East Africans gave in because they feared that an all-African convention would be negotiated in 1969 without them if they held out in 1967.

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sidering that it would come to an end in mid-May 1969? Now that reciprocity was admitted, what were to be its criteria? After initial review by the permanent representatives in late September 1967, the Council of Ministers debated the reciprocity question early the next month.59 France again proposed a maximum interpretation: a preference system for European products "analogous" to that found in the Yaounde agreement. Others accepted the notion only in the sense that "analogous" referred to preferences as such, and not to their magnitude, pointing out that the "magnitude" of both the East African Association (e.g., without aid) and East African trade with Europe was not of the same order as that of the Eighteen.60 The matter shuttled back and forth for the rest of the year between the ministers and the permanent representatives, dogged continually by the pressure of time.61 Having made the point that preferences from East Africa should be substantial rather than simply symbolic, as in the case of Nigeria, and wishing to begin creating a favorable climate for the negotiation of a new Yaounde Convention, France softened its stand in early 1968.62 It shifted from a demand for analogous concessions to a request for a detailed study listing possibilities that should be discussed in the third round of negotiations with the East Africans. The easing of demands proceeded only a step at a time however; in midFebruary, the experts again locked in disagreement over whether the proposed list should be definitive (France) or indicative (the Five plus the Commission).63 In addition, ™ Ibid., 2767 (28 September 1967), 2770 (3 October 1967), 2782 (19 October 1967); vn Afrique-Express 147:31-32 (25 October 1967). 60 At the October meeting, France admitted that it was not sure what the magnitude of the Yaounde preference was, or how to meas­ ure it, thus preparing to shift the argument to the level of a study (this occurred in February). One fact, however, was that the Eighteen traded four times as much (percentage of their total trade) with Europe as did the Three East African countries. 0I Europe 2782 (19 October 1967), 2816 (7 December 1967). e 2 Europe (NS) 27 (7 February 1968), 29 (9 February 1968); Le Monde, 13 and 27 February 1968. 63 JEurope (NS) 34 (16 February 1968), 42 (28 February 1968), 62 (26 March 1968), 78 (19 April 1968).

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each country wanted the list to indicate products in which it was particularly interested: for example, France, automobiles; Belgium, steel and chemical products; Germany, metal con­ struction materials and office equipment; Italy, items of grow­ ing demand such as electrical household equipment. At the end of the month, the ministers decided to submit a broad trial list; French opposition was worn down to the final step of disagreement—the degree of flexibility to be allowed in the East African response to the list. At this point, the new man­ date was finally granted, in late February 1968. In the step by step process of wearing the French position down to con­ vergence, the list of preferences had been reduced from 10 percent on three-quarters of the tariff items traded (com­ pared with 12 percent on nine-tenths of the items offered in the Yaounde Convention) to the same percentage on about half the total items (compared with 5 percent on a much smaller number of products in the Lagos Treaty). The third round of negotiations took place in two install­ ments during the last week of April 1968, and from the end of May through the first week of June.64 The bargaining con­ cerned two questions: the Ust of products and preferences to be granted by East Africa in a double-column tariff, and the size of the duty-free quotas that the Six could allow East African coffee, cloves, and pineapples (products that com­ pete with exports of the Eighteen). On other matters, agree­ ment was easily or already reached. Considering the Euro­ pean list of 40 products too large, the East Africans coun­ tered with a list of their own, covering 26 products; although the number was taken from the Nigerian agreement, it cov­ ered only 1 percent of all East African imports and 4 percent of their imports from the Six (compared with 2 percent and 8 percent for Nigeria), excluded automobiles (of which France, Germany, and Italy supplied 43 percent of East Afri­ can imports), and gave only a 2 percent margin of preferM Europe

(NS) 78 (19 April 1968), 80 (23 April 1968), 82 (25 April 1968), 86 (2 May 1968), 103 (28 May 1968), 105 (30 May 1968), 111 (10 June 1968); Le Monde, 9 June 1968; MTM 4 May 1968, p. 1210; vin Afrique-Express 160:26-27 (10 May 1968).

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ence.65

On coffee and cloves, the Six proposed another Ni­ gerian formula: a quota equal to the mean of the past three years' exports to Europe, augmented annually by 3 percent; on pineapples, the Six offered a similar formula (augmented by 5 percent instead of 3 percent) but allowing simply pro­ tective measures if the half-year imports should exceed this level. Here too East Africa was dissatisfied, especially in re­ gard to arrangements for coffee, pointing out that its kind of coffee was different from West Africa's and scarcely competi­ tive. The Commission raised the coffee quota by 3,000 tons (75 percent); the Three rejected it. The negotiations recessed. When they met again a month later, the Three had a list twice the size of their original list in hand, but they held firm on their demand for total liberalization of trade on coffee, as on all other items. Convergence was not far off. By the end of the week, a list of 59 products66 representing 15 percent of East Africa's imports from the Six was set up with a 2 per­ cent to 9 percent margin of preference, and the quotas on coffee were extended by another 500 tons per year. The rest of the agreement generally resembled the Lagos text. It was initialed on 7 June 1968, in Brussels and signed on 26 July in Arusha; if it was not exactly the nonreciprocal commercial agreement for which East Africa had held out for so long, it was at least concluded between the EEC and "the Partner States of the East African Community," as the Three had en­ visioned for the past five years. The Arusha agreement was approved by the European Parliament on 1 October 1968. Ironically, it was only a blueprint for a later edifice, for it ex­ pired on 31 May 1969, before it had a chance to go into effect. New brief negotiations were held in late June and early July 1969 for a new Arusha agreement, which, despite Euro­ pean premonitions of an East African request for aid, was essentially the same as the 1968 agreement. A few more products were added to the original 59; quotas for coffee, 65 There

was one exception, a 9 percent margin for tomato paste. Including certain automobile spare and assembly parts, but not automobiles themselves. 66

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cloves, and pineapples were slightly expanded. It was signed in Arusha on 24 September 1969, and runs, parallel to the second Yaounde agreement, until 31 January 1975.

Analysis For the purposes of the mandate, the Council and the Commission saw no reason for treating differently the various English-speaking countries who had asked for Association. In some important ways, this judgment was maintained throughout the negotiations. The Commonwealth applicants were all responding to the same 1963 Declaration of Inten­ tions, and chose the same option for separate Association offered by it. They were seeking ways around what they re­ garded as "discrimination" against them in the Yaounde agreements. France posed the same three questions to all Commonwealth applicants: the problem of membership in two preference systems, protection of the Yaounde Associ­ ates' interests, and reciprocal advantages. They had nondis­ criminatory tariff systems, and enjoyed nonreciprocal Com­ monwealth preferences. They were "outs" seeking an associa­ tion that they had formerly rejected for its presumed political implications; as such, they declined to apply for European aid, and the Six had no need to offer any, either as com­ pensation for reduced preferences and revised surprix or as continuation of previous aid obligations. Their negotiations, therefore, centered on the principle of commercial reci­ procity, and on certain side guarantees, safeguards, and procedures. Within this general framework of similarities, however, the interests of Commonwealth East and West Africa were ob­ viously different and the negotiations were at best parallel. Nigeria's task was simple and easy (paradoxical as this judg­ ment may appear to the negotiating teams who struggled un­ til three in the morning on 8 July 1965). Nigeria sought to get its products over the CET wall on terms as near those of its Yaounde competitors as possible and with as little change in its own nondiscriminatory tariff policy as possible—all of which it did. The maximum advantage it could obtain was

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limited by the terms of the Yaounde agreement, which it could not exceed. But Nigeria was practically assured of suc­ cess by a number of factors, provided only that it showed a bit of skill and suppleness in negotiating (which it also did). First, Nigeria served as a test case for the Declaration of Intentions; opponents (France) could delay but not defeat im­ plementation of the counterpart that the Dutch had demanded for the conclusion of the Yaounde agreement. Second, Ni­ geria's importance as Africa's largest state with 55 million potential consumers made it a valuable trading partner (in both directions) and site for investment, and current figures gave every indication that prospects for trade increases were good. And third, Nigeria was valuable as an Associate for purely symbolic or political reasons. Its new willingness to Associate undercut African criticism of Association and im­ proved the Community's image in Africa. The general im­ pression was that many other African states would follow in Nigeria's footsteps. Furthermore, as a moderate state of some importance, Nigeria was a welcome partner for most of the Yaounde Eighteen; their preference for a particular type of pan-Africanism coincided with an opportunity to show them­ selves good pan-Africans in general, and outweighed (with suitable assurances) their fears of economic competition. Thus, European Members and African Associates were caught by their political commitments, and could offer little resistance to the Nigerians' rather stiff economic demands. In this situation, there was relatively less need for persua­ sive arguments from one side to the other. Instead of seeking to convince the other side why it should agree, both parties during the negotiations spoke primarily to their own domestic audience and foreign critics to show why they were agreeing. Any communication across the table was largely designed to show why the speaker could not agree to quite the maxi­ mum demands of the other side and to encourage the search for slightly lower terms. It was not used to change general positions on either side. This situation differed strongly from the Maghreb negotiations, where pressure to renew talks quickly and to persuade the participants of the value of As-

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sociation were important activities of the African applicants, and from the Yaounde negotiations, where across-the-table communication was used to justify and question major changes in positions as well as lesser points of bargaining. The real maneuvering came about when discussions reached the point of detailed implementation within the nar­ row limits of the agreed principles. Within the framework of the modified free-trade area the problem was to find a way for Nigeria to grant as few preferences as possible and for Europe to protect the Eighteen as much as possible. The choice of "the four products" on which to focus was obvious; the selection of "the 26 products" (and "the seven products" among them) was inventive. The actual percentage quotas and preferences, if arbitrary, were natural enough to be an accept­ able focal point. Thereafter, negotiations centered on better­ ing the terms for each party, and on seeking other areas of concession (France's "real commercial advantages"). Changes were proposed in the number, rate, and size of pref­ erences on "the 26 products," both for all 26 and then for "the seven products" among them. Only changes in size were accepted by Nigeria. Changes were also proposed in the num­ ber, size, base, and nature (tariff differentials, quotas, escape clauses, self-limitations) of preferences on "the four prod­ ucts." Once France had seized on European indecision to opt for quotas, the line was held and only the initial percentage was slighly increased. France was dissuaded by the other Members from pushing its demand for more substantial—but unspecified—concessions, and the last two sessions of 1965 and 1966 were spent drawing up explicit answers to unre­ solved questions—on institutions, consultation, last-minute objections, protection of interests, etc. In this process, a distinct rhythm of negotiations is present. It began with the establishment of guiding principles within the various commitments of the two parties. These princi­ ples then posed questions of implementation (protection of the Eighteen, preferences for the Six) to which answers were immediately proposed—quotas for "the four" and prefer­ ences for "the 26 products." Once the nature of these an-

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swers was determined, no further shifting took place, and none of the attempts at modification changed anything but a few details. These attempts took a peculiar form: both sides brought up minor rectifications at different points of the proposed arrangements, which were then accepted or re­ jected, seriatim. At the same time that these modifications were being essayed, a few other new areas of arrangement were proposed, but these were not answers to questions posed within the framework of the principles; i.e., France's "real commercial advantages" were an answer to the problem of reciprocity, but reciprocity per se was not a question within the guidelines of the modified free-trade area. It had already been decided that reciprocity could be accepted, within the framework of the narrow questions. Because of the large amount of discussion about the sub­ ject of reciprocity, this point needs emphasis. The two ques­ tions of protection and preferences were aspects of reciproc­ ity, but the principle of reciprocity per se was already settied in the agreement on modified free trade, and when the French demand for "real" reciprocal advantages arose, no one was prepared to think along these lines. Thus, the negotiations deadlocked for a while until the situation could sink in. When they resumed in June 1965, the modifications had fallen by the wayside, the extraneous prob­ lem of "real" reciprocity had been disallowed, and agreement was registered where it originally had been found—in the an­ swers of February. In the process, the final dispositions agreed upon at the June session were relatively quickly dis­ posed of, despite the fact that (in the abstract, or in other contexts) they might have been just as important as the two major questions on which the negotiations hung. At some point—in this case, the February session—there was a "crest" to the negotiations, after which movement was down­ hill, and subsequent matters, whatever their intrinsic impor­ tance, became minor in the context of the negotiations. If we further refine this summary, we can see that the Nigerian negotiations were not a case of simple convergence, in the sense of two sides moving together from distant posi-

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tions. It was rather a case of joint "moves," in which all parties jumped from matters of one level of complexity to an­ other. At the first level of principles, convergence was found to exist between the commitments of the two parties; there was no need to seek it through an exchange of concessions. But at the next level or levels, an answer was proposed and accepted as a working hypothesis, and it was then tested by having modifications shot at it. It resisted, essentially in­ tact, and its integrity was apparently as much a result of its simple and initial existence as of its intrinsic merit. That is, if a 4 or 5 percent annual opening for "five products" or a 3 to 12 percent preferences on "22 or 28 products" had been proposed, these figures probably would have "stuck" too, al­ though any figures would, of course, have to be supported by some empirical reference. At the last level, the "downhill" momentum reinforced the commitment to agree, and there was a certain amount of exchanged or balanced concession, but little need for complex bargaining on individual points. A significant and unique characteristic of the Nigerian negotiations was the fact that Nigeria often proposed the working hypothesis. In the other sets, the Africans posed problems; in the Nigerian set, they proposed answers. This had the double advantage for the Nigerians of controlling the focal point for agreement about a first proposal, and of mak­ ing the Community accept or reject. Given the nature of the negotiating process—composed of "moves" and "levels"— rejection meant simply counterproposing minor modifica­ tions, certainly a position showing less control over the final outcome. How did Nigeria arrive at this position of advantage? Four answers suggest themselves. The Europeans are unanimous in recognizing that the Nigerians were able negotiators, more skillful than the Eighteen or East Africans. Their position of initiative, then, may have come about because of their tactical skill. However, without in any way diminishing the skill cred­ ited to the Nigerians, it is unlikely that they were more skillful than the practiced Europeans of the Commission and the Council, who had been through all this many times before

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with many different kinds of negotiators. Moreover, it is likely that there were other situational elements that the Ni­ gerians could show initiative and skill by seizing. A second answer, then, could be that Nigeria was acting alone, whereas all the other sets of negotiations were carried on in parallel or jointly by two, three, or eighteen states. While these states argued within their groups, Europe could seize the initiative. There is much to this reasoning, and it argues strongly for at least close and rapid coordination if prospective Associates must apply in groups. A third answer, however, suggests that in other sets of negotiations the initiative was in a sense already seized—a prior agreement or situation existed which could act as a ref­ erence point. The Eighteen were negotiating against the back­ ground of the Rome Treaty, the Maghreb states against the background of their preferential arrangements with France, and the East Africans were negotiating against the Lagos Treaty as a reference point. But this answer is only partially conclusive, for Nigeria too was negotiating within limits of commitment posed by the Yaounde Convention, and, per­ haps more vaguely and distantly, by the Commonwealth pref­ erence system, GATT, UNCTAD, and the Declaration of In­ tentions. The difference was only one of degree, and does not appear to explain the different results. Nor does the matter of initial agreement on principles offer an explanation: the Yaounde negotiations began with an agreement on the first level, the Maghreb negotiations hovered about that level, and the East African negotiations broke up over disagreement on the first level. Finally, Nigeria could seize initiative because it was stronger, in the context of the negotiations. As already noted, there was a strong political commitment, reinforced by eco­ nomic advantages, to arrive at an agreement, and—just as important—stiff as Nigeria's demands were, they were not so disruptive economically that they could justify strong op­ position. The most crucial difference between the Yaounde and Lagos negotiations was that the Eighteen were "in" and were fighting for their life to stay in, whereas Nigeria was

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"out" and would only want to come in if it gained more than it stood to lose. If very hard terms were offered by the Six, this would only serve to keep Nigeria out, which the Euro­ peans had already committed themselves not to do; accept­ ance of very hard terms by the Eighteen was better for them than the alternative of leaving. Thus, it was natural for the Six to hear what terms Nigeria "needed" to come in, and then try to whittle them down a bit. Unimpeded by partners and skillful in its tactics, Nigeria was able to take advantage of this situation. Before refining this analysis and posing a final set of theo­ retical questions, East Africa can be called on to testify. Its experience falls within the same model as the Nigerian set. The negotiations began on the level of principles after a man­ date identical to Nigeria's was issued. But none of the cir­ cumstances or commitments surrounding the Nigerian nego­ tiations were present for East Africa. It was neither econom­ ically nor politically important; it had no strong spokesmen; and it had no value as a test case once the Lagos negotiations were concluded. Even more important was the obvious fact that East Africa reverted to its original position between the preliminaries and the first round of negotiations, thus going back on the first-level agreement on principles. Instead of seeking answers to questions deriving from principles, East Africa sought to change the principles on the second level. It may have thought it was only trying to whittle down the Lagos reference point, but in doing so it was explicitly pro­ posing solutions based on another principle—a commercial treaty, under option three of the Declaration of Intentions— that was specifically excluded by the mandate. The East Africans simply did not understand the rules of the negotiations; as seen before, values and quantitative dif­ ferences (such as the ostensibly small gap separating their nondiscriminatory proposal from Nigeria's purely symbolic discrimination) derived their importance from the context of the negotiations—its principles, stages, levels, crests, etc.— rather than from intrinsic or empirical content. The Six tried to establish a favorable negotiating context (or work up to

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a crest) by talking nondiscrimination. If the Three were fol­ lowing any negotiating rules, it was their own cultural pattern of "talking until they agree,"67 on the assumption that the whole act and purpose of talking was to arrive at consensus. Reality was exactly the reverse: the basis of consensus— return to the initial principle—was reached when talking stopped. Although it is not specifically clear what induced the East Africans to reverse their position on reciprocity, a large number of factors is evident, such as the attraction of in­ creased trade, the fear of being closed out of an all-African Association in 1969, the realization of their own Economic Community, the advice of the Nigerians.68 Once the return took place, negotiations on the questions and answers of im­ plementation were in the Europeans' hands, and it was they who determined the "crest" of the talks. Having lost the ini­ tiative, the East Africans could only whittle. They could not even use the threat of a veto as a bargaining point, lest the Europeans take them at their word. Paradoxically, the 1969 deadline both imposed and removed all urgency, and the smallness of the East African market and trade reduced their power. Unlike the Nigerians, the East Africans had little hand in determining what they could take or leave. In the end, their only power was the power to sign, even the moral appeals of the Eighteen being largely denied them. Whatever the outcome, the Commonwealth negotiations represented a distinct type of negotiations. Agreement on the first level of principles was determined by separate prior com­ mitments of each group of parties. The way this agreement was conceived determined certain major questions, to which initial proposals served as focal points for second-level agree­ ment. Thereafter, on the third level, remaining problems lost their intrinsic importance and answers could be relatively easily exchanged. There was no irreversible or inevitable 87 Cf. Harvey Glickman, in A. A. Castagno and Norman Bennett, eds., Boston University Papers on Africa (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 209. 68 Nigerians advised the East Africans in the later stages.

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quality about this sequence, as the East African negotiations showed. But observance of the stages could lead to a mu­ tually satisfactory outcome growing out of understandable behavior by both sides, such as took place in the Lagos ne­ gotiations. Unfortunately, implementation was another matter.

4. Negotiations with North Africa THE Maghrebi set of negotiations is African only in the geo­ graphical location of its applicants and in the broad context of weak-strong or developing-developed trade problems. When it comes to the details and specific subjects which pro­ vide the meat for discussion and the bones of contention, the Maghreb negotiations are clearly Mediterranean, and hence touch on problems and products that are part of the southern flank of the Community itself.1 Except for edible fats, the Yaounde and Commonwealth negotiations did not involve 1 There have been a number of good studies of Maghreb-EEC rela­ tions during the period of negotiations. The basic study is Jacques d'Yvoire, Le Maghreb et la Communaute Economique Europeenne (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1965. Etude Maghrebine, no. 4), summarized as "Le Maghreb et Ie Marche Commun," Maghreb 3:45-54 (May 1964), and later updated in [Rodolphe Roussel], "Les conversations Maghreb-CEE," Maghreb 11:3-8 (November 1965); "Les Relations entre la CEE et Ie Maghreb," Maghreb 26:45-47 (March 1968); "Les Accords d'association entre la CEE, Ie Maroc et la Tunisie," Maghreb 33:9-12 (May 1969); "Marche Commun et Maghreb," Revue du Marche Commun 7:48588 (November 1964). See also the thoughtful annex to a detailed study, Amor Benyoussef, Populations du Maghreb et Communaute economique a Quatre (Paris: Sedes, 1967), pp. 532-40; Charles F. Gallagher, "From Carthage to Rome," xm American University Field Staff Reports 1 (February 1967); and Andre Tiano, Le Maghreb entre les mythes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 478-85. A detailed study of the Moroccan situation is Nor el-Ghorfi, Le Maroc a I'heure du Marche Commun (Rabat: Imprimerie FrancoMarocaine, 1967). Highly critical treatments of the subject are given by Fathallah Oualalou, L'assistance etrangere face au developpement Sconomique du Maroc (Casablanca: Editions maghrebines, 1969), pp. 207-24, and Joesph Muzikar, Les perspectives de Vintegration des pays maghrebins (Nancy: Centre europeen universitaire, 1968), pp. 55-66. For a brief discussion of the Algerian background, see Jean Raux, Les Relations Exterieures de la Communaute Economique Europeene (Paris: Cujas, 1966), 339-41. On other Mediterranean coun­ tries, see Werner Feld, The European Common Market and the World (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), and Rouhollah Ramazani, The Middle East and the European Common Market (Char­ lottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1964).

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major products that compete with European production; the North African negotiations, on the other hand, stepped di­ rectly on European economic toes. Since they dealt directly with the same products involved in Yugoslav (1970), Spanish (1970), Israeli (1964, 1970) and Lebanese (1965) trade agreements, Greek (1961) and Turkish (1963) Association, and Italian Membership, as well as with the northern Mem­ bers' concept of a balanced Community and the whole diffi­ cult problem of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), they were complex and directly related to European interests. The three former French territories in North Africa have had different relations to the European community. Algeria was still an integral part of France when the Treaty of Rome was signed. It thus enjoyed de facto membership in the Com­ munity, in that it benefited from all the economic provisions of the Treaty except those applying to the CAP (Rome 227 and Application Convention 16), although without any po­ litical participation. At the end of 1962, six months after in­ dependence, Algeria requested a temporary continuation of this status, promised to it by the Evian Accords, and the Community agreed six months later. However, Algeria's de facto status was slowly being eroded. Its customs regime was slightly modified by the estab­ lishment of a triple-column tariff in November 1964; the low­ est column applied to France (which continued to apply a zero tariff to Algerian products), a third column to mostfavored nations, and a second—the average of the first and third—to the EEC. In 1966, the Council decided to exclude Algeria from further intracommunity tariff decreases and various Members granted its products intermediate customs status—between intracommunity and Common External Tariff (CET) levels. The Council's acceptance of Algeria's continued "status" was not achieved without a good deal of grumbling and even abstention on the part of some of the Six, and the final com­ munique, underlining the provisional aspect, called for Al­ geria to make its intentions known. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all questioned the continued duty-free entry of

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Algerian goods into France; if they did not cancel all of these benefits on their own markets, Belgium and Germany at least considered Algerian workers to be outside of Community preferences. In May 1964, the Dutch government threatened to act unilaterally to end Algeria's de facto membership privileges by the end of the year, and members of the Com­ mission began to wonder if, in the light of its vague position, Algeria was not simply seeking to maintain its comfortable status indefinitely. Yet the Dutch threat was never realized, no Algerian talks took place for several years, no formal negotiations ever took place, and de facto membership continued. The sole explana­ tion for this situation lies with France, which had given high priority to protecting Algeria as part of its general policy to­ ward its former territory. Morocco and Tunisia had been independent from France for a year when the Rome Treaty was signed. Both were cov­ ered by a protocol maintaining the customs regimes currently in force with France (presumably until the CET was in operation), and by a Declaration of Intentions inviting them to negotiate association agreements with the Community in order to "maintain and intensify traditional currents of ex­ changes . . . and to contribute to [their] economic and social development." Morocco continued to enjoy duty-free entry for most of its exports to France. Tunisia's 1959 commercial treaty with France was gradually worn away, beginning with modifications made in 1962 as a result of French engage­ ments to the CAP and ending with French denunciation of the treaty in 1964 in reprisal for Tunisian nationalization of remaining colonial land. Deprived of its French preferences and guarantees, and locked out of Europe by the CET and CAP, Tunisia was gradually being excluded from its custo­ mary markets in Europe. Thus Tunisia was under great pres­ sure to reestablish a commercial regime with France, as well as with the rest of the Six, whereas pressure on Morocco only came, specifically, from the CAP and worsening terms of trade (despite a favorable trade balance) with Europe.2 2 See

Marc Pellerin, "La CEE et Ies etats du Maghreb," ι Le Mois

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However, Morocco has had an additional legal obstacle to EEC Association—the multilateral 1906 Algeciras Treaty which commits Morocco to a nondiscriminatory trade regime.3 Like Europe and Africa, the Maghreb has its unity goals too. Although the three countries have not been one for some 900 years, and even under the conquering Romans, Arabs, and French they enjoyed separate (and sometimes different) status, North African unity—like its continental counterparts —is seen by many as a past commonality of destiny, a pres­ ent condition of fraternity, and a future goal of integration. In reality, however, the North African experience has fol­ lowed the African, not the European, pattern, seeking an elu­ sive unity that in fact was not strong enough—either in its own right or as a sum of the three national interests—to out­ weigh the conflicting demands of those interests. Commer­ cially, there have been few intra-Maghreb exchanges and few efforts to encourage any. As far as EEC negotiations were concerned, the most important instances of division were, as seen, the separate independence dates, the different customs regimes, the divergent pressures for somewhat differing out­ comes, a recent history of shifting ideological and political conflicts, and, as a result, separate negotiations with the EEC. The most important pressures for unity in negotiation were the Commission's desire for joint talks on the model of those with the Eighteen or East Africa, and the North Africans' own sporadic realization that there is strength in unity—a realization that took on strategic perspectives in Moroccan and Tunisian eyes, but as far as the Algerians were concerned only produced an occasional joint tactical appeal. Never have the three states jointly decided or fully coordinated positions for even one round of EEC negotiations. en Afrique 9:56-71 (September 1966), iv Afrique-Express 66:22 (10 February 1964). A good summary of the changing tariff position of the three states was given by the Commission in answer to written question 104 on 3 January 1967. 3See Melvin M. Knight, Morocco as a French Economic Venture (New York: Appleton-Century, 1937).

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A year after independence, France proposed Associate status to Morocco.4 After 18 months of domestic political maneuvering and some study,5 Morocco concluded that As­ sociation offered it an unfavorable balance of advantages and disadvantages and therefore opted only for diplomatic rep­ resentation to the EEC. The following year, 1959, Tunisia sounded out the EEC on some sort of modified Association, but neither party was ready.6 Once the Algerian war was ended, in early 1962, Tunisia tried again because rising Eu­ ropean competition was threatening its markets. A little later in the year, liberal Moroccans in King Hassan's entou­ rage started their own soundings in Brussels; at the beginning of 1963, their election campaign called for "an association agreement with the EEC."7 Morocco's and Tunisia's initial position was to propose a simple extension of the quotas and preferences on the French market to all of the Members, a position which the Commission rejected as not taking Mem­ bers' interests and the CAP into account. In fact, the very competition which was making Association a pressing matter for the Maghreb was making it unattractive for some of the Six.

Negotiations The sporadic nature of the preparations, preliminaries, and negotiations that followed made them particularly susceptible to the impact of outside events, including other sets of nego4

Petit Marocain, 13 August 1958. Maurice Ruet, "Le Maroc devant Ie Marche Commun," Maroc-Documents 2:17-47 (Rabat: Foreign Ministry, July 1958), presenting, as "an opinion among others," his reasons for a careful and limited Association. 6 Tunisian parliamentarians at the Eurafrican colloquium at Bari were favorable to association but wanted to await results from the Greek and Turkish negotiations; Le Monde, 5 July 1961. The whole series of Mediterranean discussions with the EEC in 1961 and 1962 were an important factor in North African thinking. 7 Sejour ά Bruxelles de S.E. Ahmed Reda Guedira (Brussels: Moroccan Embassy, special number, Information Bulletin, JanuaryFebruary 1964), p. 8; Le Monde, 13 March 1963. 5 See

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tiations. The North African talks did not have enough mo­ mentum of their own to ride over such events, but rather were shaped by them. In the North African set of negotia­ tions, 1963 was the year of preparations, 1964 of prelimi­ nary talks, 1965 of the first round of partial negotiations, 1966 of stagnation, 1967 of revival, 1968 of the second round, and 1969 of limited agreement. In North Africa, 1963 began with an abortive move to­ ward coordination of negotiations policy.8 Emissaries of the three countries held talks in January and March; foreign min­ isters in February conducted what was to be the first (and turned out to be the only) in a series of bimonthly meetings and decided on a coordinated approach to the EEC; King Hassan visited Algiers in March; and Morocco and Algeria signed economic and other agreements in April. Rising ten­ sions between the two neighbors, however, climaxed by their border war in October, put an end to the spirit of cooperation. In Europe, an unhealthy mood was created by the French veto early in 1963 of the British application for membership in the EEC; this action provided a difficult atmosphere for the candidacy of formerly French North Africa, particularly because its products competed with those of every Member except Germany. Nevertheless, Algeria asked for the opening of talks on 1 July and then again on 18 December; Tunisia made its request on 8 October; and Morocco on 14 Decem­ ber. The first point to be clarified concerned the subject of the negotiations. "Association" in North Africa had unattrac­ tive political connotations, yet a commercial agreement alone was not considered sufficient, and North Africa attached as great an importance to aid as to commercial provisions. Tunisia was the first to engage in exploratory talks (in mid-December 1963 and mid-January 1964), asking for a free-trade agreement with the EEC, with no tariffs, either no quotas or very large ones, investment guarantees, and a high­ er (i.e., Community, not world level) purchasing price for 8 A good review, among others, of North African economic coop­ eration, is found in Maghreb 26:32-49 (March 1968).

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agricultural goods, notably wheat. Since Tunisia's develop­ ment effort required increasing imports of finished goods and equipment, most of which had habitually come from Europe, Tunisia sought better trade terms for its largely agricultural exports to Europe in order to be able to buy European goods. In regard to the changes needed to achieve this goal, Tunisia emphasized the need for more rapid trade liberalization by Europe than by North Africa in setting up the free-trade area, and for comprehensive negotiations on a global agree­ ment that would include both technical and financial assist­ ance and commercial provisions. Morocco's position was similar. Opening the first round of preliminary talks at the end of January 1964, Foreign Minister Ahmed Reda Guedira asked for "the progressive establishment of a free-trade area . . . without excluding in any manner other international ties"9 and with interim pro­ tection possibilities, technical and financial aid through longterm loans and grants, and the protection of Moroccan labor in Europe. The free-trade area would include Moroccan in­ dustrial and agricultural goods within the Community price and customs area, with compensation for differences in price arising from the CAP. Morocco saw in the Rome Declaration of Intentions an engagement to expand North African com­ merce and support North African development, and it there­ fore looked to an Association of unlimited duration, without excluding other commercial agreements by either party as long as they did not conflict with the Association. To manage affairs within the free-trade area, Morocco asked for a joint commission to determine liberalization measures that would apply to specific products on a year-to-year basis, taking into account European progress in setting up its CAP. The nature of the subject under negotiation—a modified free-trade area, with technical and financial aid—was ac­ cepted by both parties in the second round of preliminary talks with Morocco in mid-June 1964.10 Two types of modi9 Sejour

. . . Guedira, p. 21. See Le Monde, 14 June 1964; Correspondance Europienne, 1 July 1964. 10

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fication were considered necessary by the Commission. On one hand, coordination was needed between the two parties' liberalization measures as they moved toward free trade. Al­ though Morocco desired a more rapid lowering of the Euro­ pean tariffs than it was willing to offer, the Six wanted some corresponding concessions by Morocco along the way, rather than a single Moroccan liberalization measure at the end of the transition period. On the other hand, the final free-trade area would still involve some European tariffs or their equiv­ alent (a "corrective coefficient"). Otherwise Morocco, which could not take part in the European harmonization of eco­ nomic policies, would end in a more favorable position than the Six, having the benefits of the Community regime without its obligations. Compensation for some of these modifications could be achieved through aid to North Africa. These consid­ erations showed the need both for negotiations on all aspects of Association in order to work out delicate concessions and compromises, and for careful consideration of the reciprocity matter that was troubling many "Association" negotiations. The Algerian preliminaries which opened in Brussels late in February 1964 were quite different. The Commission be­ gan by emphasizing the purely provisional nature of the re­ cently prolonged "status" of Algeria. Since Algeria limited itself to explaining its need for expanded European markets, and above all to requesting technical assistance, free move­ ment with improved conditions and training for Algerian workers in Europe, and financial aid through grants and loans, the Commission repeated that only Association under article 238, in the form of a customs union or a free-trade area, would be possible within the wishes of the Council and the limitations of GATT. A second round of preliminaries, scheduled for early April, was postponed until mid-May be­ cause of the FLN (National Liberation Front) Congress.11 Again Algeria requested improvements in its current status, but rejected a commercial treaty (too limited and nondis­ criminatory), a free-trade area (too limited), and Associa1 1 Europe

1842 (16 May 1964).

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tion (too political). It asked for the continuation of its pro­ visional status throughout the negotiation period. Again the Commission reminded Algeria of the impatience of some of the Six with its present status and pointed out that assistance from the FED and the free movement of Algerian workers within the Community had had to be terminated upon Al­ gerian accession to sovereignty. A working hypothesis which appeared conceivable to the Commission was the conversion of Algeria's current status into a free-trade Association over a fixed period of time, with a certain amount of aid to be made available separately from the FED.12 This framework was almost identical with that discussed by Morocco and Tunisia. A final round of pre­ liminaries took place in mid-December.13 A working hy­ pothesis of a modified free-trade area was agreed to, and eco­ nomic problems—notably Algerian workers and oranges— were discussed in greater detail. The Commission report on the Moroccan and Tunisian preliminaries,14 presented to the Council in mid-October 1964, looked to a modified free-trade area with economic and technical aid, indefinite in duration and periodically renegotiable. The "modifications" involved broad tariff and quota advantages for Maghrebi products in Europe—or pref­ erably, simple inclusion of North Africa within the EEC customs walls—teamed with progressive lowering of North African tariffs on European products. In detail, however, serious limitations were envisaged for North African agricultural products on the European market. Although this was necessary because of the gradual and dif12

Le Monde, 9 April 1964. Nine FED social and economic proj­ ects in Algeria were approved for completion on 30 September 1964, despite the end of the EEC legal obligation to do so and threats to follow the letter of that obligation. Italy and the Netherlands par­ ticularly opposed new aid obligations. i z Europe 2014 (21 December 1964); Le Monde, 22 December 1964. l i Europe 1958 (15 October 1964), 1972 (3 November 1964), 1973 (4 November 1964), 1988 (20 November 1964), 1989 (21 November 1964), 1993 (26 November 1964).

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ficult establishment of the CAP, it affected the bulk of North African exports and gravely reduced the encouragement that Association could provide to North African development. On the other hand, unless such limitations were provided, North Africa, neither willing nor eligible to join in determining the CAP, would not only benefit from it without undergoing the readjustments that it might impose, but would also be able to disrupt its effects on commonly produced products. The limitations envisaged by the Commission concerned primarily grain (which would be imported under a regime intermediary between intra-Community trade and imports from third countries) and fruits and vegetables (which would receive some preference, possibly as high as customs-free entry be­ fore the European season began). Some products (wine, olive oil, fish, preserves) would be subject to provisional measures—not spelled out—until the CAP covering them went into effect, and current preferences granted to North African products on the French market would be gradually reduced and brought into line with the free-trade regime. Algeria was the subject of an intermediary report by the Commission two weeks before the Morocco-Tunisian report and was also considered in the latter;15 a final resume could not be submitted, however, until February 1965 after the third round of Algerian preliminaries had been completed.16 These final talks permitted Algeria's inclusion in the general perspective of a modified free-trade area and allowed the considerations summarized above to cover all of North Africa.17 One of the stumbling blocks to an earlier submission of the Algerian report—and to more rapid progress in Maghreb negotiations in general—illustrates the complicated nature of North African Association. Algerian oranges were con­ tinuing to enter the Community in growing quantities under the same conditions as Members' oranges, a situation which ^Ibid., 1947 (2 October 1964); Le Monde, 8 October 1964. «Europe 2065 (25 March 1965), 2066 (26 March 1965). vibid., 2100 (8 April 1965), 2101 (9 April 1965).

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troubled Italy but which Algeria wished to maintain.18 How­ ever, if any agreement concerning oranges was made by the Community, Israel, under the terms of its commercial treaty with the Six, could request a mixed commission to take up the problem. The Commission could envisage various solu­ tions: exclude oranges from the Maghreb negotiations, re­ store quotas, or set up a Mediterranean producers' agree­ ment, among others. The third solution came closer to Ital­ ian wishes, but raised hotly debated problems, not only of bringing Arabs and Israelis together, but also of the treat­ ment of Members, Associates, and commercial partners. In fact, a Mediterranean proposal was submitted to the Council by the Commission with the Moroccan and Tunisian report in October 1964, and another in late May 1965.19 The second proposal discussed production limitations, tariff preferences (including the possibility of suspending tariffs be­ fore the European season began), reimbursement of tariffs to Associates, and maintenance of the countervailing charges system (charges to be applied when import prices fell below the European reference price, in order to avoid flooding of the market). At the same time, a proposal for fruits and vegetables was also submitted to the Council, along essen­ tially the same lines. Another question that was not solved was the relation of the three Maghreb states to each other. The Commission favored joint negotiations toward a single free-trade area; although it could have adopted a tactic of playing off each of the three against the others, it opted for a contrary policy, and it was the Maghreb countries themselves that jealously sought separate negotiations. The year of the preliminaries— 1964—was typical of the ups and downs of North African unity. After the Moroccan-Algerian war of October 1963 had 18 Ibid., 2018 (29 December 1964), 2138 (28 May 1965); [Roussel], op.cit., p. 5; ν Common Market 4:86 (May 1965). 19 See Europe 1958 (15 October 1964), 1973 (3 November 1964), 2018 (29 December 1964), 2082 (18 March 1965), 2093 (31 March 1965). In addition, FAO foresaw a citrus surplus by 1970, which made the pressure much more real.

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nullified the five-month-old Moroccan-Algerian agreements, Algeria turned to Tunisia to sign economic agreements, in­ cluding provision for the joint study of negotiations of the kind carried on with the EEC. The joint study commission was never constituted. However, President Bourguiba of Tunisia worked during the following year to bring the other two heads of state together again, and he finally succeeded at the second assembly of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo in July 1964, thus preparing the way for a minis­ terial conference on North African economic cooperation in Tunis late in September. At Tunis, the final communique only "recognized the necessity of defining new relations with the EEC,"20 without specifying what or how. A commission of experts designated to study Maghrebi-EEC relations never had any specific fol­ low-up in the subsequent meetings of the Economic Coordi­ nating Committee (which Morocco had insisted should be only consultative) at Tangiers in November 1964 or at Tripoli in May 1965. King Hassan's visit to Tunis in Decem­ ber 1964 resulted in the scheduling of regular meetings among the three ambassadors in Brussels; at the first (but only) one, Morocco suggested that all sessions between any Maghreb state and the EEC should be attended by an ob­ server from each of the other two states, but there was no re­ sponse to this suggestion from Timisia and Algeria. As time went on, the institutions of North African economic coopera­ tion met less frequently with less relevance to the EEC nego­ tiations, and the only coordination was carried out infor­ mally among the three countries' Brussels missions. From time to time, joint representations were made: against provi­ sions covering oranges in the Israeli-EEC agreements (March 1964); or against CAP regulations on fruits and vegetables (January 1965); or against CAP regulations concerning citrus fruit (September 1965). On the European side, unity on a mandate was arrived at only after long and difficult discussions, and then only par­ tially. It was not until the Council meeting of mid-June 1965 20

Le Monde, 3 October 1964.

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that a partial mandate to negotiate with Tunisia and Morocco was given, excluding fruits and vegetables, olive oil, and financial and technical aid—all the most important aspects of Association. Although the Commission also asked for a mandate to negotiate with Algeria, none was given. The sep­ aration of major commercial and all aid topics from minor commercial matters greatly reduced North Africa's ability to bargain, at least during the first round of negotiations. The Commission's proposals for an intermediary regime on grain and a provisional regime for other CAP products (wine, fish, preserves) were accepted as a basis for negotiation, and spe­ cial conditions were also attached to cork exports to Italy, a cork producer. However, Morocco had also added a new request, in a note to the EEC in April,21 for transitional measures for its exports until a final agreement could be reached. The gradual establishment of the CET was damaging Moroccan trade, re­ gardless of whether the previous European tariff had been higher or lower: thus, France's lowering her tariff toward the CET reduced Moroccan preferences on the French market and hence Moroccan advantages over competitors, while Germany's raising her tariff toward the CET raised Moroccan export prices and thus also hurt her trade. Grain and eggs were particularly hard hit. Acceptance of a transitional re­ gime would have strengthened Morocco's hand in negotia­ tions, since it would have established a Communitywide prec­ edent against which final arrangements could be compared. The Council did not grant the request. The limitations on the mandate, and the difficult process of agreeing to it, reflected a number of concerns among the Six. Politically, there was simply no great eagerness to favor countries that were considered candidates of France, particu­ larly as long as the Nigerian negotiations were not yet com­ pleted (the final Nigerian mandate was given in the same Council session as the partial North African mandate). Fur­ thermore, the tense atmosphere of the summer of 1965 over 21 Note verbale du gouvernement marocain, 5 April 1965. The mandate was dated 14 June 1965.

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establishment of the CAP did not favor negotiations with countries whose major exports were competing agricultural products (the eight months' French boycott over the failure to observe established agricultural timetables began two weeks after the Maghreb mandate was given). Economically, Italy was most wary of North African Association, for—fol­ lowing on the heels of agreements with Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and a renewed Spanish candidacy—the North African countries were adding to the pressure of competing Mediter­ ranean products. Thus, it was Italy that insisted on excluding fruit, vegetables, and olive oil from the negotiations until the CAP on these items had been decided, and it was Italy that required special treatment for cork. The problem of Mediterranean products, however, raised problems in a larger, twofold context. On the one hand, be­ ginning in February 1964, Italy had begun a sustained cam­ paign to delay—or at least question and scrutinize—addi­ tional commercial agreements on Mediterranean products un­ til a Mediterranean doctrine had been established.22 This attitude found sympathetic echoes among the Dutch, who were becoming concerned over "the shift in the center of gravity" of the Community toward the south, as overtures to "northern economies" (England, Scandinavia) broke down. Thus, for complementary reasons, both northern and south­ ern European Members of the Community feared loss of the community's original balance. On the other hand, there were also pressures from Italy and Belgium to delay new Associations until an Association doctrine had been established. Association, they felt, should lead to membership (as in the case of Greece and Turkey), and other nontropical relations should be covered by com­ mercial agreements. Since each Association was turning out to be "sui generis," there was some thought that the rela­ tionships of the Associates to the Community and its devel­ oping policies should be established before individual agree­ ments were signed, rather than resulting from them. 22 For

the Italian memorandum of May 1964, see d'Yvoire, op.cit., pp. 63-70.

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Partial though it was, the June 1965 mandate was acted upon with alacrity. Less than three weeks after the Council meeting, negotiations began with Tunisia, followed immedi­ ately by negotiations with Morocco in mid-July.23 In these discussions, the Commission negotiated for the Six, with five observers present, although France was kept informed by the other Members. These sessions were devoted largely to re­ stating previous positions—now within a negotiating context. Although there was no formal coordination on the part of the North Africans, their presentations were quite similar, and the first round ended at about the same point for the two countries. Both the Tunisians and Moroccans protested the partial mandate (that excluded the subjects most important to them). They emphasized that the negotiations were taking place on the basis of the 1957 Declaration of Intentions which assured them of special consideration. Both the inter­ mediary tariff on grain and the provisional nature of pro­ posed arrangements on wine, fish, and preserves brought forth questions. It was only on the minor matter of industrial goods that any negotiations could be carried out. In an effort to be sympathetic beyond its instructions, however, the Com­ mission indicated that it was willing to hear and transmit to the Council any proposals, even beyond the mandate, in order to prepare a broader base for negotiations later on. The parties accepted the establishment of modified free trade—immediate duty-free access for North African indus­ trial exports to Europe, and gradually decreasing tariffs for European industrial exports to the Maghreb, with infantindustry protection clauses. But how much of any particular item had to be made in North Africa for it to be considered a North African product (the "origins" question)? Europe was concerned about goods from transformation industries or assembly plants installed by third states in North Africa, 23 The following accounts are based largely on interviews with the participants in Brussels, Rabat, and Algiers during the negotiations; see also [Roussel], op.cit. In fact all Mediterranean Associations began with a partial mandate.

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and Morocco felt that the Yaounde definition of origins (then still in the process of being worked out)24 gave inadequate consideration to developing industry in the Maghreb coun­ tries. Reservations were also expressed on the European side concerning steel and petroleum exports which Tunisia ex­ pected to increase considerably. In regard to the rhythm of liberalization during the transition period, the Moroccan am­ bassador sought "a balance of mutual advantages in the de­ velopment of commercial exchanges rather than in a strict notion of reciprocity";25 three categories of transition periods up to 22 years in length were discussed, with a maximum of flexibility. Because it was outside the Council's wishes as ex­ pressed in the mandate and would thus require the same pro­ cedures as were being negotiated for a long-term agreement, an interim regime was unable to receive the Commission's agreement, as Morocco again requested. However, the Com­ mission also cited economic arguments—that Morocco ap­ peared to be moving toward consumption of its own agricul­ tural production (especially in grain) and that all egg exporters (including those among the Six) were being affected in equal measure by CAP regulations. The first round of negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco lasted less than a week, with a second round scheduled in September-October. Although details on quotas and origins could be discussed further, the main body of any Association agreement remained excluded by the partial mandate, and modification of that would require new Council discussions. Such a change was not possible, however, as long as CAP de­ tails were not established and—of more immediate import— as long as the French boycott continued. September and Oc­ tober passed, therefore, without any renewed negotiations, as did all of 1966. From time to time there were murmurs of renewed atten­ tion to the Maghreb. French delegates returned to full activ­ ity in the Community in February 1966; the Committee of Permanent Representatives immediately began study of the 24 See

Chap. 5, pp. 171-72. report, 25 September 1966.

28 Internal

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Maghreb dossier in hopes of renewing negotiations in March. The chairman of the Committee reported periodically to the Council and was instructed to continue his work. Late in July, agreement was finally reached on the CAP, thus clear­ ing the way in principle for a full mandate for North Africa and new negotiations.26 But there was no immediate move. With the Community focusing its attention on the Kennedy Round negotiations, and Italy continuing to oppose Mediter­ ranean Associations without prior protection for its own pro­ duction, the Maghreb continued to be pushed aside, although not rejected out of hand. During the negotiations, the Moroccan ambassador perspicaciously noted, "Despite any other considerations, the political will of the Six remains the single motivating factor in the final decision. And that political will has to be stimu­ lated by a vast and persevering diplomatic action."27 It was, however, Tunisia that implemented this observation most effectively. Seizing on the opportunity to revive the matter afforded by an international colloquium on "The EEC and the Third World," organized in Tunis by a private German foundation, Tunisia demanded a complete mandate for full negotiations on all subjects; Morocco supported the demand, as did the European representatives.28 In July, Bourguiba traveled through the European capitals (except Rome and Paris), drumming up support for revived negotiations; later, a Tunisian newspaper declared that the Members (except Italy) were favorable to renewed negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia.29 Tunisia appeared to be cultivating Germany as an informal sponsor, a wise move because of the weight of Germany in the Community and the absence of conflict­ ing interests with Tunisia. Even Italy in July 1966 felt obliged to announce that it too wished to have the "prob26At the same time (late July 1966), Italy also protested the Franco-Tunisian customs agreement and French preferences to the Maghreb. 27 Internal report, 25 September 1966. 28 Le Monde, 22 April 1966. Algeria was absent. 29 L'Action, 5 April 1967. On Bourguiba's trip, see Maghreb 17:24 (September 1966).

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lems" of the Tunisian negotiations "solved as soon as possible."30 At the turn of the year, the Commission told the Com­ munity that it had "finally come to the conclusion that the negotiations . .. could not be effectively renewed except with­ in the framework of global proposals concerning all the aspects of the projected agreement."31 It therefore sent a de­ tailed report to the Council, requesting a full mandate.32 At the same time, Tunisia and Morocco pressed the Council for speed in preparing a new mandate. For Moroccan and Tunisian exports to the Community, the Commission asked for admission of industrial products on the same duty-free basis as those of the Members (with some exceptions for petroleum and canned fruits and vegeta­ bles) and for preferences for agricultural products. These preferences would vary according to the status of the product under the new CAP. Products for which the market organiza­ tion system involved levies (grains, dairy products, rice, fats, sugar, pork) could benefit from either reduction or partial reimbursement of the levy, but there could be no harmoniza­ tion of production or guarantee of prices. Products for which the market organization system involved tariffs and reference prices (fruits and vegetables) would benefit from a partial reduction in the CET during the European growing season and duty-free entry out of season; quotas and minimum prices would be abolished; the countervailing charges system would be maintained to prevent dumping; and a three-year transition period would be set up for French tariffs on North African products to rise to the preferential level proposed. Products for which there was no market organization system 30

Pellerin, op.cit., p. 64. Commission answer to written question 104 in the European Parliament, 3 January 1967. 32 Commission Compte-rendu, 15 December 1966; Europe 2590 (30 December 1966); New York Times, 1 January 1967; LOpinion, 15 January 1967; MTM 14 January 1967, pp. 273-74; vi AfriqueExpress 130:28-30 (10 January 1967). See Le Monde, 26 January 1967, for speech of Ahmed ben Salah, Tunisian Secretary of State for Planning and Economy. 31

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were generally to receive gradual elimination of tariffs, al­ though provisional measures were spelled out for some prod­ ucts: wine and fish would be given different treatment by each of the Six until an organized European market was es­ tablished; canned fruits and vegetables were to be given a 50 percent preference with a three-year conversion period for France; cork was still up in the air. For European exports to North Africa, the Commission proposed long-term progressive elimination of Maghrebi tariffs over 10 to 12 years, with safeguard clauses (a state trading system such as Algeria's would be required to give firm purchasing commitments in the absence of tariff preferences). The other aspects of the Association would include, for Morocco and Tunisia, a five-year agreement on soft loans, grants for technical assistance, and coordination of Commu­ nity and bilateral aid programs. Social security systems ap­ plicable to Maghrebi workers in the Community would be harmonized and improved, although free movement and hir­ ing preferences could not be guaranteed. For the Six, the Commission proposed Moroccan and Tunisian guarantees on investments, payments, and rights of establishment. The Commission's proposal took into account the need— often emphasized by the North African states—for a global agreement and a full mandate; although it recognized the North Africans' refusal to negotiate as a bloc, it insisted on a single agreement with no special preferences for one Maghreb state or another. Some details differed from Maghrebi positions—such as the duration of the transition period—and others still bypassed problems that North Africa considered important—such as the definition of origins. But its most remarkable aspect was that, except for some new de­ tails on products whose transitional regime was previously not spelled out, the proposal was practically identical to that made more than two years before when the Commission asked for the first mandate. The Commission's two proposals, and the history of negotiations in between, indicated that the power to decide (and hence to delay) belonged to the Six.

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Community action on the proposal required another 10 months, for Europe's attention was elsewhere, watching the establishment of the CAP. Although the chairman of the Committee of Permanent Representatives reported to the Council twice before the 1967 summer recess, he could only cite three points of agreement and two Members' objec­ tions.33 In mid-July he was told to report back in two weeks in order for negotiations to begin in the fall. The points of agreement provided for negotiations first on trade and later on aid, leading to 10-year treaties (not necessarily a single one for all three North African states), all to end at the same time and to be renewable, with provision for the Maghreb states to return to the French preference system if they chose not to renew. The stumbling blocks—since France's special position had been preserved for the future—were still Italy, which insisted on marketing guarantees for its own Mediter­ ranean products within the Community before agreeing to any new Mediterranean Associations, and the Netherlands, which opposed both Italy's proposal of using the new CAP Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) for this purpose and also had reservations on the three "agreed" points, saying they should be kept for bargaining. The perma­ nent representatives were told to concentrate on products that could rally agreement among the Six, and to leave out controversial items, matters of financial and technical aid, and labor for the moment. When the Council resumed its meetings in September 1967, the Committee had prepared an exhaustive report84 on the formulas and machinery to be proposed to Morocco and Tunisia. Only statistical elements such as the level of cus­ tom preferences, the volume of quotas, and the duration of the agreement were left for the Ministers to specify. SS Europe 2721 (11 July 1967), 2725 (17 July 1967), 2730 (25 July 1967), 2733 (28 July 1967); Le Monde, 27 July 1967; VII Afrique-Express 143:27-28 (25 July 1967), 146:35 (10 October 1967). 34 Europe 2755 (12 September 1967), 2757 (14 September 1967), 2764 (25 September 1967), 2767 (28 September 1967).

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On their side, Tunisia and Morocco were actively mobi­ lizing support for their positions. Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., made an official visit to Italy to sign an agree­ ment to compensate Italian landowners whose Tunisian lands had been nationalized in 1964 and to extend economic and financial cooperation between the two countries, all as a background for Italian support in the forthcoming negotia­ tions.35 On the Moroccan side, Minister of Commerce Ahmed Alaoui visited Brussels for talks with the Commission in anticipation of reopening negotiations. The mandate of 24 October 1967 complemented the June 1965 mandate on industrial products, preparing for negotia­ tions to begin in mid-November with Tunisia and a week later with Morocco. For industrial products (13 percent of the two countries' exports to the EEC), the Six were prepared to offer the intra-Community system, with reservations on origins, processed agricultural products, and safeguards; while for petroleum products, the intra-Community system was extended for a limited quantity (100,000 tons for each country) (Rabat and Tunis Annex I 2). For olive oil (of major importance only to Tunisia), there were to be no quotas and a $5 reduction per 100 kilograms in the thirdcountry levies—if Tunisia would accept a minimum price (Rabat and Tunis Annex I 5). For citrus fruits (of major importance only to Morocco), an 80 percent reduction in the CET was offered provided that a minimum price was ob­ served—to prevent dumping (Rabat and Tunis Annex 1 4 ) . Fishing products (of some importance to Morocco and less for Tunisia) would be given the intra-Community system without limit by five states and within a quota by Italy. How­ ever, 40 percent of the two countries' trade, including wines,36 tomatoes, canned and other fruit and vegetables, and cork, was excluded from the mandate. 35

See Le Monde, 2 September 1967. 2770 (3 October 1967), 2779 (16 October 1967); Jeune Afrique 360:28-29 (3 December 1967). A Commission proposal in mid-1967 on a common wine market among the Six considered the Maghreb among the third countries with their wines excluded from any Association agreement; Le Monde, 27 June 1967. 36 Europe

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Despite the insistence of Morocco, Tunisia, and the Com­ mission that negotiations should be more comprehensive, covering not only all of their exports to the Community, but also technical and financial assistance and their migrant workers, the Ministers made it clear that they preferred a par­ tial agreement initially, which would be followed later by other negotiations.87 A global agreement would require much more time and involve the parties concerned in difficult ne­ gotiations because of the so-called sensitive products (wine, tomatoes, etc.) and because of the pressure put upon the EEC by other Mediterranean countries offering similar prod­ ucts and also asking for preferential treatment (Yugoslavia, Israel, Spain). But time was very important for Morocco and Tunisia, who were interested in getting at least some immedi­ ate results to try to boost their economies which were in trou­ ble. In a situation when negotiations could not be both global and rapid, the North Africans were expected to make the most of the EEC's limited offers, but they did insist on a re­ newed Declaration of Intentions providing for further nego­ tiations on full Association. Morocco also began to think that the price for partial agreement should be tougher terms. The mandate covered those products of importance to Morocco and Tunisia about which the Six felt strongly—but not too strongly, thus eliminating both the "sensitive" products (about which there could be no rapid concessions) and what might be called the "insensitive areas," such as social provi­ sions and assistance for North Africa (about which the coun­ tries other than France knew and cared little). Such a divi­ sion of subjects could lead the North Africans to get "the most" rapidly and the Europeans to protect "the most" at the same time. After a two and a half year interruption, the delegations of the EEC and Tunisia resumed negotiations in November 1967 under the new mandate. Tunisia accepted the favorable offers (industrial goods), protested the exclusions, and found the olive oil and citrus provisions "attractive," although the conditions for olive oil (Tunisia's major interest) could be 37

Europe 2793 (6 November 1967); Le Monde, 27 October 1967.

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improved by another 10 percent (i.e., another 50^ reduction in the levy [Rabat and Tunis Annex 15]). Moreover, it "sug­ gested the possibility of concluding a partial agreement to be completed by a possible subsequent overall agreement";38 until full and unlimited Association was reached, however, the privileges with France must remain unchanged for those products not included in the agreement. The Community asked for details on Tunisia's reciprocal offers. When the Moroccan delegation took its turn at the con­ ference table, its reaction to the Community offers was simi­ lar to that of Tunisia. While the proposals concerning petroleum and industrial products were considered satisfac­ tory, the rest of the mandate was found wanting. Morocco asked for full customs exemption on citrus fruit (instead of 80 percent), pointing out that it already benefited from (and would be losing) duty-free entry into France, which took nearly all its exports, and that competitors such as Spain and Israel had gotten an edge by devaluating their currencies. The Moroccan delegation also emphasized the importance of financial and technical assistance and cooperation on migrant labor. Like Tunisia, Morocco was in favor of a speedy con­ clusion of a partial agreement in anticipation of an Associa­ tion agreement to be concluded later on. However Moroccan Ambassador Bensalem Guessous emphasized that Morocco could not offer tariff concessions until the global agreement was concluded.39 The sudden hardening of Morocco's atti­ tude was ordered from Rabat in anticipation of a tougher European position; Morocco wanted something to bargain with but also something to fall back on. In early February 1968,40 the Commission declared its support for the proposals put forward by Morocco and 38Joint statement, 16 November 1967. See also Europe 2798 (13 November 1967), 2799 (14 November 1967), 2801 (16 November 1967), 2807 (24 November 1967). 39 Interview with Moroccan Press Agency, Feuille documentaire 135/1967. See also Europe 2803 (20 November 1967), 2807 (24 November 1967); Le Monde, 26 November 1967. 40 Commission Compte-rendu, 9 February 1968; Europe (NS) 32 (14 February 1968), 33 (15 February 1968).

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Tunisia on the speedy conclusion of partial agreements. The lengthy process of ratification by national parliaments would not be necessary for such agreements because trade problems came within the province of the Community (Rome 111, 238). But the Council should, according to the Commission, look into the requests for improvement of the offers on citrus fruit and olive oil. The Commission also justified the concern expressed by Morocco and Tunisia—but opposed by all but France—over their special relations with their former protec­ tor; a partial agreement should not end the privileged system of trade concerning products not covered by the agreement, which could be included in the agreement by adding a spe­ cial protocol. The permanent representatives spent much of the spring and the summer of 1968 studying the Community offers and the corresponding proposals of Morocco and Tunisia.41 Among the questions before the Committee were: Should the partial agreement include a declaration of intentions regard­ ing future developments? Is it to be of an evolutive nature? What would be its legal basis? What improvements could be made in the Commimity offers on citrus fruit and olive oil? What counterparts must be requested from Morocco and Tunisia? There was also a problem of origins of certain prod­ ucts and the question of the special trading system between France and the two North African countries. During these debates, Italy was a frequent dissenter when­ ever the other Members allowed some flexibility in their offers (for example, concerning the minimum price system which Morocco and Tunisia were to respect). Another major problem which made any progress difficult was the Nether­ lands' insistence, with some support from the others, that France give up all bilateral trade agreements with Morocco and Tunisia.42 Nevertheless, in the Council of Ministers at 41 Europe (NS) 88 (6 May 1968), 98 (20 May 1968), 105 (30 May 1968), 106 (31 May 1968), 110 (7 June 1968), 135 (11 July 1968). 42 The Netherlands has been more interested in the Association of Israel, among the Mediterranean applicants; see Jeune Afrique 354:21 (22 October 1967).

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the end of July, the Six gave a third mandate for negotiations to begin in October;43 their reciprocal demands were not spelled out until the end of September. As they approached the finish line, the North African negotiations, which had hobbled along in tandem for half a decade, began to take on the appearance of a three-legged sack race in which one runner had cramps. The Tunisians were ready to seize the mandate which was put into final shape in July 1968 and turn it into a commercial agreement now, leaving other aspects of Association to be worked out subsequently. The Tunisian round took place in early Oc­ tober; the atmosphere, as characterized by a statement at the end, was that it was "inconceivable, politically, that the ne­ gotiations might fail."44 The Six were able to improve their spring offers, including new products (durum wheat, refined olive oil, fish) in their duty-free imports and bettering their offers on olive oil and citrus fruits; they requested consolida­ tion of all Tunisia's quotas and a margin of preference to the Five equal to 70 percent of that currently granted to France. Tunisia claimed that the European offers were too low, then shifted its efforts to the counterpreference side and negoti­ ated a gradual approach to the 70 percent figure: 50 percent when the agreement entered into force, 60 percent after 18 months, and then 70 percent at the end of three years (Tunis Annex 3 List 1). The agreement (by a European decision in July that calmed fears and accelerated progress) was to run five years, but there was also a commitment to open negotia­ tions within three years on a complementary agreement on the excluded items, including technical and financial assist­ ance, rights of establishment, and personnel (Tirnis 14). Tunisia also won the right to limit or abolish counterpreferences for infant-industry protection on a specified number of products, after consultation with the Association Council «Europe (NS) 177 (23 September 1968), 186 (4 October 1968); Le Monde, 31 July and 1 August 1968. The mandate was dated 30 July 1968. i i Europe (NS) 191 (11 October 1968), also 188 (8 October 1968), 190 (10 October 1968); Le Monde, 22 October 1968.

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and as long as other counterprefercnces were granted "to keep the balance" (Tunis 7). Privileged entry to the French market and bilateral accords would continue for goods not covered by the agreement and would be restored at its ex­ piration (Tunis exchange of letters). The pattern of Tunisia's negotiations led it to trade a fullfledged Association agreement for time, thus achieving some­ thing that resembled a commercial agreement but one which nevertheless bore the name "Association" (Tunis 1). Once this decision had been made by both sides—i.e., after five years were spent, if not lost—problems about "sensitive" products and "insensitive areas" that could have caused in­ transigence on one side or the other were put aside. Since there remained enough products of interest to both sides to provide for the liberation of substantial trade (GATT 24), the crest was passed and slight ways of improving the offers soon shaped an acceptable free-trade agreement. At the very moment when Tunisia was arriving at conver­ gence with the Six, however, Morocco posed new problems. The Act of Algeciras which had been lurking in the back­ ground from the beginning suddenly took on importance when Morocco used it to justify refusal of "the limited clas­ sicism of tariff and quantitative concessions"45 and asked in­ stead for greater liberalization of trade through symbolic erga omnes tariff reductions only, denying the European request for significant tariff cuts and enlarged and combined quotas. Although Morocco promised to grant "a deliberately prefer­ ential tariff" and "envisage the abrogation of the [Algeciras] Treaty" when Exorope was ready to offer full-fledged Associa­ tion, in the context of the 1968 negotiations it was retreating to the same position that had long prevented East African agreement.40 In an effort to meet the Algeciras obstacles, the Six had worked on the final touches of its offer to Morocco until late in September, when an ingenious proposal was put 45 Ambassador Guessous. The following discussion (to the "Analy­ sis" section) is based on the minutes of the negotiations and support­ ing documents. 46 See Chap. 3, pp. 93-106.

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forward.47

For the concessions requested of Morocco, there would be three groups of products: one for which Morocco would grant a single consolidated quota equal to the past quotas of the Six increased by 25 percent, another for which Morocco would grant consolidated quotas and would reduce tariffs 30 percent erga omnes (but from which Europe would benefit since it was the principal supplier of the ten items involved), and the third for which only tariff reductions were asked (18 products of which Europe also supplied over 60 percent). But Morocco stuck tightly to its 60-year-old im­ perially imposed Algeciras obligations, feeling that they pro­ vided protection against possibly harmful reciprocity, guar­ anteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the coun­ try, and offered a bargaining item for later full Association (although they had already been contravened in Moroccan trade agreements with smaller countries).48 Despite a meeting of the minds on many lesser points, the mid-October negotia­ tions therefore deadlocked over reciprocal measures, and dis­ cussion was deferred to the level of experts in November, thus delaying the Tunisian agreement. The Moroccan and European delegations met, as sched­ uled, in late November to return to their discussion of the sin­ gle outstanding problem—reciprocal measures. Contacted by France in the meantime and realizing the difficulty of holding out, Morocco gave in on the principle of reciprocity through quotas. To implement its concession, it rearranged the prod­ ucts on the European lists of late September into three lists of its own and varied the figures slightly; the negotiations had passed their crest and were in the final stage of seeking slight ways of improving the offers. The Community's first two (quota) lists were divided into a first Moroccan list of prod­ ucts for which Europe would receive a given consolidated quota increased by 25 percent (Rabat Annex 3 List 4), a « Europe (NS) 182 (30 September 1968), 191 (11 October 1968). 48 Le Monde, 15 and 22 October 1968. Morocco has granted recip­ rocal tariff reductions to Algeria, Tunisia, and Senegal. However, GATT admitted the principle of preferential tariffs among develop­ ing countries on 14 November 1968.

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second list of products for which Europe would receive a fixed percentage of the annual import figure as a quota (Rabat Annex 3 List 5), and a third list of products in­ cluded in the current Five-Year Plan for which Europe would receive the same kind of quota as the second list (Rabat An­ nex 3 List 6) but only until local industry could handle Moroccan needs (Rabat 7). To the last item, the Commis­ sion proposed adding a small sliding percentage increase that would vary inversely with the size of the original quota (called the principle of least digression); the principle was drawn from the Tunisian negotiations, although the use of the Plan as a criterion for products receiving flexible quotas was a Moroccan invention. With some juggling of figures, Morocco accepted the arrangement. Morocco also became more flexible on the matter of tariff reductions, although the erga omnes obligation of the Act of Algeciras remained. The products on the second and third European lists of late September (tariff reductions) were ac­ cepted by Morocco in November; on some of these items a tariff reduction averaging 24 percent was proposed, but on others, the reduction was to be only about 6 percent to pro­ tect Morocco's industrialization (providing a total tariff cut of only about 13 percent compared with the Community re­ quest of 30 percent). Although the difference now concerned numbers rather than principles, the negotiations recessed for further instructions. The Council in early December asked for slight improvements, and the delegations met again in the middle of the month to examine the lists, alter some of the figures, and shift some of the items from one list to an­ other, but Morocco was able to hold on to the 13 percent tariff cut. By this time the Moroccans were finally at about the same stage in their negotiations as the Tunisians had been in October. The final round of the Moroccan and Tunisian negotiations took place throughout February 1969—Morocco in the be­ ginning and the middle of the month and Tunisia in between when the delegations went over the final drafts of their agree­ ments. The Lagos Convention and the commercial agreement

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with Lebanon served as precedents on some points, and the two North African delegations looked over each other's shoulder to make sure that their advantages were the same; exceptions for North African economic integration were care­ fully maintained (Rabat and Tunis 4). The two agreements were identical in their final form. The only differences ap­ peared in the annexes and lists appended to them (conform­ ing to the export needs and possibilities of the two coun­ tries): Morocco received a slight reduction on hard-wheat levies (Rabat Annex 18) and different fish quotas (Rabat Annex II 2, 3, 5; Tunis Annex II 1, 2, 4, 5). Both countries granted the Six the same three quota arrangements, but in tariff reductions, Morocco granted erga omnes liberalization whereas Tunisia granted progressive preferences on some items as well as tariff removal on others as negotiated. With some exceptions (cork products excluded, petroleum lim­ ited), Moroccan and Tunisian industrial products (40 and 55 percent of their exports to the Six) are to enter Europe without duties or quotas. With some more important limita­ tions (processed and preserved foods, wine, grains, toma­ toes), Moroccan and Timisian agricultural products (50 and 70 percent of their agricultural production) are to enter Eu­ rope under various conditions of advantage. Appended to the agreements was also a detailed protocol defining "origins," in which up to 50 to 60 percent "foreign matter" was per­ mitted. Each Association was provided with its own Associa­ tion council (the sole institution stipulated). The respective agreements were signed in Tunis on 28 March 1969 and in Rabat three days later, and they were both to run for five years. Since the conclusion of preliminary negotiations in early 1965, Algeria had been inactive. But between 1966 and 1968, the advantages of de facto status had been eroded to the point where some action became necessary. The Commis­ sion continually stressed that Algeria's status was legally in­ defensible. Italy repeatedly protested against the competition of Algerian wine in Germany and the Benelux countries, and applied the third-country system to Algerian exports begin-

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ning in 1968. Algeria's participation in the Middle Eastern war and her pledge to remain in a state of war with Israel helped to create an atmosphere of tension, particularly in re­ lations with Germany and the Netherlands. In a more eco­ nomic domain, the CET was scheduled to go into effect in mid-1968, with unpredictable effects on Algeria. All these factors impelled Algeria to seek an Association agreement. Thus, in mid-January 1968, an Algerian mission ap­ proached the Commission to express willingness to open negotiations.49 European experts first made a study of Al­ geria's tariff situation and found that Algerian exports en­ tered the EEC duty free or with widely varying preferences.50 France granted Algeria full exemption on industrial products, privileges for petroleum, and special conditions for agricul­ tural products. Of Algeria's exports to the Six in 1966, France took 80 percent, over three-fourths of which was crude oil (a figure that was increasing). Germany applied an 80 percent reduction in duty on industrial products, and 60 to 65 percent on agricultural products not under the CAP, while the Benelux regimes' reduction amounted to 10 percent less in both categories. Italy applied third-country tariffs. Thus the systems applied varied not only from country to country but also from product to product, presenting formid­ able obstacles to the conclusion of a single harmonious agree­ ment with Algeria. Despite these difficulties, five Members expressed willing­ ness to negotiate with Algeria as early as February. The Netherlands still reserved its position. At the same time, Al­ geria made a friendly gesture intended to show its goodwill when it informed the Commission in advance of establishing new triple-column tariffs. It also tried to influence the more difficult Members through diplomatic action. In February, i9Europe (NS) 9 (12 January 1968), 20 (29 January 1968), 30 (12 February 1968). On the Algerian position, see Aflakh Mameri, "L'adhesion de l'Algerie a la Communaute economique europeenne," ν Revue algerienne des sciences juridique, economique et politique 2:429-35 (July 1968). 50 Europe 35 (19 February 1968).

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Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani was invited to make an official visit to Algeria, and during this visit he as­ sured the government that Italy would do its utmost to fur­ ther Algerian cooperation with Italy and the EEC.51 But the atmosphere in Europe was not yet favorable. In early March, the Council was unable to resolve the difficulties raised by various Members.52 Italy remained opposed to negotiations with Mediterranean countries so long as the problem of enlarging the EEC to the North had not yet been resolved. The Netherlands would be ready to negotiate with Algeria only if the same decision were taken for Israel. But France was not ready to negotiate with Israel. Still, a solution to the Algerian question had to be found by 1 July 1968, the date set for the establishment of the CET. The only acceptable alternative to terminating Algeria's "status" was to prolong it, through a provisional system for Algerian imports until an Association agreement could be concluded.53 But a totally harmonized interim system was im­ possible, not only because of technical difficulties, but also because such a system would grant far greater preferences to Algeria than to Morocco and Tunisia, thus contravening the Community's determination not to discriminate among the three North African countries. In early May, the Commission proposed a unilateral transitional solution, as different as possible from the system currently being negotiated for Mo­ rocco and Tunisia, yet falling within the perspective of future negotiations with Algeria. Within the legal provisions of the Treaty, the solution was to authorize France to defer the in­ crease in her duties on Algerian products to the CET level (supplemented by a ban on reexportation) (Rome 26) and allow the other Members temporary and partial suspension of the CET on Algerian products (with individual quotas permitted) (Rome 28). Specifically, for the Five, about ten agricultural products subject to the CET would benefit from 51

Le Monde, 10 Febraary 1968. (NS) 41 (27 February 1968), 44 (1 March 1968), 45 (4 March 1968). M l b i d . , 89 (7 May 1968). 5 2 Europe

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a 50 percent tariff cut (wine, fruits, vegetables, oranges, tomatoes, canned products, olives, etc.), with wine quotas based on averaged imports since 1962.54 For nonagricultural products (except coal and steel), there would be a 70 percent cut in the CET. For France, most of these products would continue to receive duty-free entry. France would apply a minimum duty (one-eighth of the CET) to wine, and would maintain levies on olive oil and certain agricultural products. The Council referred the Commission proposals to the permanent representatives for further study, and by July, the Members had reached agreements on all but two main ques­ tions. The first concerned the legal basis of the transitional system. Third-country articles (Rome 111, 238) would be easiest to apply, but they entailed negotiations with Algeria. The Six expressed serious doubts about applying articles that enabled CET duties to be temporarily suspended (Rome 26, 28) as the Commission had proposed. The only alternative acceptable to all was to use the Council's power to take ac­ tion where the Treaty provides nothing else (Rome 235). The second problem was Italy's opposition to large wine quotas. During the time of these debates, Algerian wine con­ tinued to flow into the market, and its volume even increased in Belgium and the Netherlands. Italy threatened to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice and in fact set the procedure in motion (Rome 170). At the end of July55 the Council finally decided on a transitional system for Algerian wine imports applicable by August 15. Negotiating among themselves, they lowered the CET in some cases and raised quotas. Other products were given final, transitional solu­ tions in the fall. By 1970, Algeria had fallen back on Tu54 Germany has absorbed a huge and rising quantity of Algerian wine since independence (600 hi. in 1962-63 to 700,000 hi. in 196667), and even Belgium and the Netherlands increased their imports (to Italy's chagrin). Thus, an average would be considerably lower than the latest year's imports and demands. See Le Monde, 9 May 1968. There were no provisions for products subject to levies, since Algeria had enjoyed no preferences on them. 6 5 Ibid., 31 July and 1 August 1968; Europe (NS) 135 (11 July 1968), 149 (31 July 1968), 151 (2 August 1968).

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nisia's and Morocco's tactics of earlier years, sending minis­ ters to Brussels to press for negotiations. It is ironic that, of all countries, Algeria went through the "most colonialist" decision-making process by allowing the substance of its in­ herited advantages to be prolonged unilaterally, something the procedural-minded Commonwealth and Yaounde Africans had indignantly refused some years before.

Analysis Even though their products were different, the North Afri­ can negotiations were comparable to the other sets. The Moroccan and Tunisian negotiations began with a few basic commitments. The Six pledged special concern for the two countries' development and established trade currents in their 1957 Declaration of Intentions, thus rather explicitly com­ mitting themselves to the ultimate success of the negotiations, even if not to their rapid conclusion. Since eventual, rather than immediate, success was the extent of the commitment, Europe was acting within its limits when it let the pressures of deteriorating terms of trade and European economic inte­ gration act on the North African economies. Morocco and Tunisia made their initial commitment through reference to their nonaligned foreign policies, which precluded "Associa­ tion," at least in word. A free-trade area was therefore the only applicable framework. The Europeans' concern lest North Africa share in the benefits of the CAP without bearing its obligations, as well as the Maghrebis' concern over their own underdevelopment, led rapidly to adding the word "modified." Thereafter, an attempt to pin down the notion of a "modi­ fied free-trade area" led to two long rocky paths of debate: one concerned the rhythm of liberalization within the limits of inequality and reciprocity, the other concerned transition measures and final regimes for specific categories of produc­ tion, notably agricultural. Competition with Italy, crises with France, and frequent disinterest on the part of the rest made these paths first interminable, and then extremely narrow, as many products and measures were excluded.

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At this point, beginning in early 1966 when a new mandate became both evidently necessary and theoretically possible, the North Africans needed to shift their efforts and impart the urgency of negotiations, so that the process of limiting alternatives could continue. Tunisia made the most pub­ licly determined effort. The speeches of both Bourguibas, Hedi Nouira, Mohammed Masmoudi, Salaheddine al-Goulli, Ahmed ben Salah, Ali Zouaoui, and other Tunisian officials carried a multiple thrust.5® They promised Europe the advan­ tages of a united Maghreb which it would help create. They appealed to Europe's sense of obligation to develop North Africa. They warned of the dangers of leaving the three coun­ tries underdeveloped and divided, whatever might be the short-term temptations and advantages of a "politique de balance." President Bourguiba said, "It is in the interest of Italy, as well as France, to obtain a more favorable situation in Tunisia, to show a little comprehension."67 Morocco played a slightly harder line. "We have a hard time under­ standing why the countries of Maghreb must pay the costs of the internal differences of the EEC. . . . I launch an appeal to the Conscience of Europe."58 Guedira earlier also warned against "compromising the current of exports directed by the Community toward Morocco," and noted that "it is thus in the mutual interest of our economies . . . to consolidate our exchanges but, even more, to enlarge them constantly."59 There were more explicit appeals to various "interests" launched during the North African negotiations than in any other set. 56For some examples, see Pellerin, op.cit., pp. 57, 61, 67-69; Presi­ dent Bourguiba in La Presse, 26 January 1967, and Information Min­ istry brochure; Masmoudi in Maghreb 19:39-42 (January 1967); al-Goulli in d'Yvoire, op.cit., pp. 101-02; Zouaoui in APF 3963 (21 April 1966) and Tunisie-CEE Colloque international, Tunis 14-20 avril 1966 (Tunis: Editions du PSD, 1966). See also a strong Algerian voice, Revolution Africaine, 30 July 1965, 30 April 1966, 30 April 1970; Le Monde, 22 April 1966. 57 La Presse, 26 January 1967. 58 Cited in Pellerin, op.cit., p. 65. 59 Sejour . . . Guedira, p. 20.

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The effectiveness of the commitments, obligations, predic­ tions, promises, threats, and warnings was seen in the Com­ mission's second request for a mandate, which found negoti­ ations necessary for political and economic reasons: the impossibility of reorienting Maghrebi trade, political stabil­ ity, obligation to develop, need to eliminate current anoma­ lies, and commitment to the Declaration of Intentions. The limits in effectiveness were seen in the slowness of the Six in coming to the table. Yet when they finally did, in 1967, there was little preaching about the advantages of Association. Both sides agreed but, unable to overcome their own ob­ stacles, put the global problem aside and turned to an aug­ mented commercial agreement. The feeling was that it was better to save something now than hold out for the whole package. The threshold for Morocco and Tunisia was located at the point where the minimal offers or possibilities for them crossed the level of their needs. Tunisia's needs were more pressing, so it was more active in pressing for some agree­ ment. In addition, Timisia seemed to "believe in" Associa­ tion,60 a belief that did not contradict the country's realism, whereas Morocco simply found it necessary. Algeria's threshold was different: it was composed of the point where Algeria's "present" privileges began to descend below the level of Tunisia's and Morocco's. There is no pre­ cise way to calculate this point, since it had many com­ ponents (Six Members, innumerable products, a level of trade for each, growth rates and future priorities to weigh the past figures), but there were enough signs between 1966 (when the application of intra-Community reductions to Al­ geria was ended) and 1968 (when third-country treatment was given it by Italy) to make Algeria move. Once it re­ ceived its special unilaterally decreed status, it was under other pressures. Although its position vis-a-vis France was more favorable than that of its two neighbors, its preferences on the Five's markets were less. This was a situation that Al60 The point is discussed in Gallagher, op.cit. The role of the opposition is important in keeping Morocco from "believing in" Association, although many Moroccan officials did "believe."

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geria could live with as long as Europe permitted it and as long as its French advantages outweighed its other European disadvantages compared to Tunisia and Morocco—two con­ ditions which had governed its earlier de facto status. Algeria was also different from Morocco and Tunisia in that one Member of the Community needed it badly, whereas no one really needed Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria's power was roughly as great as its needs (in this context). In considering the North Africans' position, two other ele­ ments must be treated: opposition arguments, and problems of unity. Opposition to Association came primarily from within Morocco; in Tunisia, any opposition was either im­ potent outside the party-government or neutralized within. In Algeria, however, government tactics of "nonnegotiation" —relying on the very complicated nature of its situation and on conflicts among the Members to permit its ad hoc mem­ bership to continue—effectively disarmed any critics. In Morocco, the most coherent criticism came from the reform­ ist wing of the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)—• principally 'Abderrahim Bouabid and Mohammed Lahbabiei —while the Istiqlal, the Communist party, and the revolu­ tionary wing of the UNFP all added their critical interpre­ tations.62 The UNFP's opposition can be divided into two parts: positive alternatives and negative fears. The first included a domestic program of agricultural reconversion and agrarian reform, industrialization, trade diversification (particularly toward the Communist bloc), creation of a Maghreb com61 See Bouabid, speech before the seminar organized by the Gen­ eral Union of Tunisian Students, Tunis, 17 April 1962; speech before the seminar organized by the National Union of Moroccan Students, Algiers, January 1963, reprinted in Industrialisation au Maghreb (Paris: Maspero, 1963), pp. 241-60, followed by discussions by Lahbabi and Belial; Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1969; [Mohammed Lahbabi], Libiration (Rabat), 45:8 (15-21 July 1965). Also inter­ views by the author with Bouabid and Lahbabi. 62 Abdulaziz Belial, Le MarchS Commun Europeen est un Protectorat Deguise (Bureau de Documentation et d'Etudes, Rabat, 21 March 1962); La Nation Africaine (Rabat), 23 December 1963.

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mon market, and conclusion of a commercial agreement with the EEC. The latter would avoid long-term commitments to and controls by Europe, and would allow flexibility suited to annual needs. In this, the opposition position was compatible with that of the Italian and Dutch governments. But the UNFP was far from governmental power in Morocco. In many points, UNFP fears of "association or a freetrade zone" approximated the negotiating concerns of the Moroccan government. Bouabid noted the growing selfsufficiency of the EEC, and feared that a short-term Moroc­ can commitment to a continued colonial exchange would end abruptly with the Moroccan economy still unconverted for external competition and internal development. He foresaw early EEC membership for Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, who, along with Italy, would close out Moroccan agricultural products and migrant workers. He believed that protection for European settlers in the agricultural sector and European investments in the industrial sector was the only reason for Europe's interest in North Africa. He also believed that on the day when land and industry were nationalized, this interest would drop, and the expanding economy of the Community would be a greater attraction for new invest­ ments than underdeveloped North Africa. On the other hand, as long as Exiropean investments and commercial circuits dominated the Moroccan economy, pressures against invok­ ing any safeguard clauses would be irresistible. Aid, too, would mean control and indebtedness. Meanwhile, finished goods would flood the North African market as protective customs were removed. As Lahbabi said, "An association be­ tween a dominant economy . . . and an underdeveloped economy is made at the expense of the latter. In this curious system of international division of labor, we are in danger of continuing to specialize in underdevelopment."63 The force of the UNFP's criticisms was seriously weak­ ened by radical Algeria's de facto membership, more than radical Black African criticisms against Association were 63 [Lahbabi],

Liberation, op.cit.

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weakened by radical Mali's Associate status. But there was no undercutting the critics' reasoning, Paradoxically, the rele­ vance of Bouabid's criticisms worked in two ways to strength­ en the hand of the North African negotiators. It reminded the Moroccans of potential dangers to be avoided in their nego­ tiations, and it put pressure on the Europeans to create an Association that would prove the critics wrong. In general, Bouabid's criticisms were not outlandish; some of them could only be answered in the light of experience, with opinions on the future differing sharply in the meantime, while others brought into relief the problems of any relations—in or out of Association—between a developed, protectionist economy and an underdeveloped, protectionist one. A point on which critics and the governments agreed—in principle—was the necessity of integrating the Maghreb. The North African governments, however, were not ready to go to the point of joint negotiations, and hence appeared to be heading toward three parallel free-trade areas arising out of three nearly identical treaties. At the same time, the North African governments protested that they were working to­ ward and believed in Maghreb unity, but that it was the other fellow who was refusing to cooperate. The European experi­ ence—to cite an example at hand—shows that any integrat­ ing group is made up of "other fellows," each with his own interests to preserve. But the process of dealing with these in­ terests provides the substance of creative—even if sometimes painful—compromise and the partners committed to integra­ tion have made a basic option resting on belief in both the dominance of common interests and the applicability of com­ promise for handling conflicting ones.64 What was the balance sheet on common and conflicting interests for the Maghreb states in their EEC negotiations? Did they stand to gain individually from joint negotiations (as the Commission appeared to think) or from separate dis­ cussions (the method they followed)? There were many things that kept the Maghreb states 64 For

another treatment of the process, see Robert Penn Warren, Night Rider (New York: Random House, 1939).

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separate—suspicions, different regimes, territorial claims, subversions—but none of them except the vested interest of separate state structures could be called interests, particu­ larly as regards EEC negotiations. Each of the three states does have a special interest in certain exports—Tunisian olive oil, Moroccan fish—but even these are exported in small quantities by the others.65 More important are those products high on the lists of two of the three states—pe­ troleum for Algeria and Tunisia, fruits and vegetables for Morocco and Algeria. The third category of leading exports from the Maghreb to Europe includes products, such as wine, that are important to all three states. In this highly competitive situation, one of two strategies would seem rationally preferable: Association by one state with the Community to the exclusion of the others, or a com­ mon front. The first is impossible for the future, although it is the strategy inherited by Algeria with its de facto member­ ship and permitted to continue because the Community was unable to agree on a change. A modified first choice—nego­ tiating separate advantages within parallel Associations—was specifically excluded in the Commission's first negotiations and second report. Indeed, in the context of the negotiations this act of a European body was the most (only ?) favorable pan-Maghreb action taken by either side, and the Three have nothing comparable to offer. In fact, defensively, they let it 65 Products under analysis are those which represented more than $6 million or 3 percent of each state's exports to the EEC for that year. Figures taken from d'Yvoire, op.cit., pp. 80-85. Percentages are given in the following table:

Morocco Fruit 22 Vegetables 17 Phosphates* 16 Wine 8 Minerals 7 Fish 6 Olive oil 3 Vegetable products 3

Algeria Petroleum & products Wine Fruit Vegetables

* There is no EEC tariff on phosphates.

Tunisia 57 16

10 3

Petroleum Wine Olive oil Phosphates* Fruit Grain

34 15

14 7 5 4

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be known that unity was their own affair and any European attempt to impose it would be regarded as interference.68 Yet even if the EEC had decided to favor one country's ex­ ports of the same product over another's, joint negotiations and a common stand by the North Africans would have strengthened their negotiating position—provided they were able to agree among themselves beforehand. This conclusion may be broken down into component situations. Conceivably, a state with a small export of one item (for example, Algerian olive oil) negotiating alone might be able to win preferential treatment for that item which far exceeded anything the Six would be willing to grant a large exporter (in this case, Tunisia). Such treatment, how­ ever, seems both unlikely and unimportant. More important would be a similar case in which the small exporter's produc­ tion was far less than that of the larger but still relatively im­ portant to its trade; in the only such case among leading Maghrebi exports—Tunisia vs. Algeria, respectively, on petroleum—a special arrangement favoring Tunisia was pre­ dictably excluded, since neither country could come near to meeting European demand. Also theoretically possible is the reverse situation, where a major exporter negotiating alone is able to obtain a preferential arrangement assuring it the European market for its product to the exclusion of his Maghrebi competitors. Such cases are obviously important, particularly for Algerian petroleum and wine, Moroccan fish and vegetables, and Timisian olive oil; since several products are involved, a state could lose more than it would gain if each state cornered all its important markets. Therefore this kind of situation also favors the protection afforded by joint negotiations. A slight preference "edge" for one country over the others is also conceivable, although such an arrangement would involve a major departure from the guidelines the Six have set themselves in Maghrebi and other African negotia­ tions. Moreover, even in this case, joint negotiations would 66 Maghreb 26:46. There was also the feeling that a collective Maghrebi Association would constitute a more political engagement with the West than bilateral agreements would.

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give North Africa greater bargaining strength (again pro­ vided they had agreed among themselves beforehand) on the allocation of these "edges." As long as Europe decides to accord no special treatment to any one North African state over the others, joint negotia­ tions on commercial matters would appear to strengthen their individual positions. Some of this two of the Maghrebi states (Morocco and Tunisia) realized. Their negotiations, if sep­ arate, were parallel and they kept each other informed. They met together with the Commission informally. Tunisia negoti­ ated the olive oil provisions and Morocco the citrus provi­ sions of both treaties. It may be objected that, beyond that point, any closer Moroccan-Tunisian cooperation would have worked against Maghreb unity, in that it would have excluded Algeria; this was the reasoning that delayed Association until after 1962, but it was never mentioned by the North Africans in regard to the negotiations once they were under way. The real occasion for testing awareness of the benefits of joint negotiations has been postponed until the 1970's when the Treaty promises (Rabat and Tunis 14), Algerian needs, and the recent wave of North African cooperation (announced in the Algerian-Moroccan friendship treaty of January 1969) seem to coincide. In noncommercial matters, excluded in the 1960's but per­ tinent to full Association negotiations, similar considerations appear to indicate the value of joint diplomacy. In the matter of social provisions for North African labor in Europe, the interests of the Three are identical since only the harmoniza­ tion and improvement of social security systems are under discussion (preferences in hiring, where competing interests exist, are excluded). The final matter is that of aid; con­ ceivably, a single state negotiating alone could obtain a larger amount of aid than it would if all three states negotiated to­ gether, but only if negotiations took place at widely separate times and the Europeans did not, among themselves, assign a total figure to be subdivided. The practice of dividing a total aid figure among the applicants was followed in the Yaounde

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negotiations, and it is unlikely that it will change. In the Maghreb negotiations, there is no natural reference figure to serve the purpose that the FEDOM total did in the establish­ ment of the Yaounde FED. Reference to development in the 1957 Declaration of Intentions and in North African appeals suggest that the three states' development budgets will serve as one such reference point for their negotiations, with Eu­ rope assuming a certain percentage in development plans. But the other reference point will certainly be a sum that each of the Six feels ready to give, probably related to its present bilateral aid programs to North African countries. It is hard to see how separate negotiations can increase this figure. It might be asked then why separate negotiations were the practice in this case. Two reasons can be adduced, both more understandable than rational. One North African country's internal report states, "The need . . . to conclude an agree­ ment rapidly with the European Common Market has led to undertaking separate contacts. . . . In fact, the search for a complete Maghrebi agreement prior to these contacts has ap­ peared susceptible of pushing new economic and commercial relations with the Common Market to an indefinite date." Al­ though it may have been difficult to predict the pace of nego­ tiations in 1963 when the three states made their requests for talks at several months' intervals, by late 1966, when the re­ port was written, it was hard to imagine that the progress of negotiations could have been delayed any more than it was, and by causes essentially outside of North African control. The other reason for avoiding joint talks goes back to the general level of suspicion existing among the three states. Fear of unilateral leaks and deals behind their backs, lack of trust, and reluctance to engage in harmonizing development plans based on different political and economic philosophies have obscured the advantages of joint negotiations. Thus the condition of prior agreement necessary to make joint negotia­ tions advantageous in all cases has not been obtainable in reality. Yet joint negotiations would probably provide their own pressure for prior agreement.

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In the circumstances, however, although completely separate negotiations might favor some states as far as their most important products were concerned, the practice of con­ comitant negotiations and the policy of not favoring any one of the three states points to joint negotiations as the most fa­ vorable procedure for North Africa. Other considerations pointing in the same direction include the practice of using an informal "sponsor" in Association negotiations, for the European "spokesman's" efforts for one Maghreb state would pull the others along. Since the states' sponsors vary, the effect is strengthened; France strongly defends its inter­ est in Algeria, and Germany is thought to have been helping Tunisia. Morocco has no known "spokesman," a fact that should increase its interest in joint negotiations. By the same token, however, Algeria's advantage of a vigorous spokesman and its special status within the Community makes it the least favorable of the three states to joint negotiations. Another factor favoring joint negotiation is the veto power it would give any one state. Bloc negotiations are often rather cumbersome, but they strengthen the hand both of bloc part­ ners vis-a-vis each other and of the bloc vis-a-vis the other party. The Six have made striking use of the imperatives of binding unity in their negotiations with the Yaounde Associ­ ates, and the tactic can work to strengthen the North Afri­ cans' hand as well. Such a commitment is particularly useful in influencing convergence, once the general principles have been established and an agreement to agree is granted by both sides. Finally, this analysis would be incomplete if the effect that joint negotiations would have on North African unity—the goal proclaimed by each Maghreb state—were not men­ tioned. It would certainly be idealistic to pretend that the simple act of negotiating together would automatically bring about integration: the joint partners might well feel more an­ noyed, distrustful, or abusive toward each other than before. But the probability is that greater mutual acquaintance, shared experiences, common planning, and exchanged con-

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cessions would reinforce the effects of the more closely inte­ grated economic activity likely to come out of joint negotia­ tions, and would thus enhance the progress of Maghreb co­ operation. The need for the coordination of plans that prior agreement would require in preparing for joint negotiations would strengthen this effect. Optimally (in terms of the stated goal), it could easily give the impetus to a basic commitment to active integration. In relations with the EEC, North African unity has been at the mercy of the Six. If Europe continues to exclude in­ dividual advantages to any one of the three states and to treat them more or less as a group, a de facto imposed meas­ ure of North African unity is present. But if not, the "poli­ tique de balance" can easily keep North Africa cut up in its component pieces—in the absence of a firm change in Maghrebi tactics. This pattern of power is evident in most other aspects of the negotiations to come. Until 1968, there was little negotiation, in the strict sense of the term as bar­ gaining counterconcessions. The Maghreb states made known what they wanted, would accept, and considered important. With this information in hand, the Six then retired to discuss among themselves, taking North African wants, demands, and needs into account where possible in accordance with their own interests. In its second report, the Commission emphasized the need for a long-term agreement to stage out current tariffs and preferences, since North Africa might not agree if asked to act too rapidly without long-term guarantees. But such con­ cepts of a Maghreb "resistance point" concerned only broad principles, and even these were open to wide interpretations. In fact, rather than not agreeing, the North Africans saw wis­ dom in agreeing as fast as possible on less than the total goal, a tactic that was highly "Bourguibist," but not predictably so. One expert has this to say on the problem: Objective minimum positions . . . normally do not exist for three reasons. First, governments do not face two choices

NORTH AFRICA

only, agreement and no-agreement, that a minimum posi­ tion could separate like a watershed. . . . Second . . . gov­ ernments must be concerned with more than probable gains from further bargaining and the comparison of agree­ ment with no-agreement.... Third . . . all evaluations and expectations—and even goals—keep shifting. Instead of fixed minimum positions, each party can have only an anticipated minimum. . . . There is a further complication: the anticipated minimum is usually blurred.87 Instead, whether negotiating jointly or separately, the North Africans can only put their efforts into changing de­ tails on what they consider most important once the Six have reached their own convergence point. This position has been recognized by the negotiators themselves. A Tunisian negoti­ ator pointed out just before the first round of negotiations that Tunisia had made no proposals—it awaited an offer from the Commission.68 The Algerian ambassador made this statement during the preliminary talks, "The EEC has not asked us to take a position. Besides, taking a position means already having negotiated or, if you will, implies that negoti­ ation is going on, which is not the case."69 To say that this is the procedure whether negotiations are joint or separate does not imply that greater influence over the details cannot be achieved by a common front. It does mean that negotiating positions could be partially inverted if the North Africans' convergence point were in their own hands, rather than being at the mercy of agreement among the Six. It also means that the North Africans are obliged to deploy efforts not only to influence the convergence points— by strongly indicating which alternatives are unacceptable— but also to keep Europe aware of its commitment to an agree­ ment and at the same time to make the Six aware that the value to both sides of such a commitment is increased if the 87 Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 191-92. 68 Interview with member of Tunisian mission, Brussels, June 1965. 69 Le Monde, 17 October 1964.

NORTH AFRICA

agreement is reached early.70 Unlike the Yaounde Associates the Maghreb has not had a formal deadline pressing it, but it has had an informal and continuing one that weakens its position and limits its alternatives as Europe integrates with­ out—indeed, against—it. 70 Another

paradox is that the longer Europe makes North Africa wait, the more North Africa needs Association, but by the same token the weaker it is in bargaining for it.

5. Negotiations in the Eurafrican Institutions IT MIGHT be thought that once the Conventions had been signed, ratified, and put into operation, the signatories could then sit back and enjoy the effects of their Association. The fact that this was not possible for the Yaounde Associates testifies—at least in part—to the rapidly changing conditions affecting the developing world.1 Negotiations continued, for essentially four reasons: (1) a number of points swept under the rug of the Convention remained to be settled; (2) po­ litical relations between African and European states con­ tinued to evolve; (3) African economic terms of trade wors­ ened; (4) as 1969 approached, both sides began lining up their cases for negotiation of a new convention. The first and fourth matters formed the substance of negotiations in the institutions, but the second and third gave them their tone and background. The political changes were those of continuing decoloniza­ tion. As their independent life lengthened, the Associated states, who were young and rather timid when the Yaounde negotiations were being conducted, achieved greater experi­ ence and confidence in international relations and came to express their interests with more vigor. This became evident in the months immediately preceding the entry into operation of the Convention: the Associates participated in one of the remarkable phenomena of postwar international relations, an international conference (under the auspices of the United Nations) at which new, weak states, endowed with sovereign equality, formally proclaim long-term revisionist desiderata which the older, strong states oppose but are constrained to take into consideration, and even to observe. The occasion 1 The institutions of the Lagos and Arusha agreements were weaker and had no time to operate before 1969. There were also fewer points left over from the agreements to handle in the institutions, and there was less business to prepare for the negotiations of 1969. On the Association in general, see "Partnership in Africa: the Yaounde Con­ vention" (EEC Information Service, Community Topics, no. 26, December 1966).

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was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which met in Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964. Notable parts of the final act concerned com­ modity agreements to assure steady returns on the exports of developing countries, and measures to provide an expan­ sion of markets for these products.2 What was most remarkable was not that the conference was held or even that the great states attended, but that they felt obliged to justify their position and policies in the light of the resolution, and then to take it into account. In Novem­ ber 1964, just half a year after the UNCTAD conference, GATT Contracting Parties adopted a three-article chapter on trade and development, including the principle of nonreciprocity in trade liberalization between developed and un­ derdeveloped states.3 This success in turn raised hopes about the effectiveness of concerted political action, hopes that were also nourished by the increasing firmness of the UN resolu­ tions on decolonization. The change in political attitudes also occurred because the African states were becoming more aware of their interests, primarily in economic terms, and because—in turn—these interests were becoming more readily apparent as African terms of trade worsened.4 Thus, economic changes concerned the matter of development. Whereas African import and ex­ port prices were keeping pace with each other from 1962 to 1964, while the Yaounde negotiations and ratifications were 2

E/Conf/46/L.28. On UNCTAD I, see Kamal M. Hagras, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (New York: Praeger, 1965); Robert M. Stein, "Policies for Trade and Development," International Conciliation 548 (May 1964); Harry G. Johnson, Eco­ nomic Policy Toward Less Developed Countries (New York: Praeger, 1967). However, the GATT action had been begun before UNCTAD. 3 Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 247-48; New York Times, 27 November 1964. 4 There are many discussions of this problem. One EEC study is reported in Europe (NS) 92 (10 May 1968). See also vi AfriqueExpress 109:28-29 (25 January 1966), and 121:2, 29-30 (25 July 1966); xxiii MTM 1113:814-15 (11 March 1967). One country's problems are given in Le Marchi Ivoirien 6:5 (June 1967) and Realites Ivoiriennes 77:6-9 (September 1968).

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going on, in the following year export prices on 10 major tropical products fell from an index of 110 to 104 (1962= 100), while import prices on 22 major European products rose from 110 to 112. The year 1965 was catastrophic for coffee and cocao. Although 1966 was better, the improve­ ment in ores and some tropical products (e.g., coffee, cocoa, vanilla, and rubber) was not enough to overcome a drop in others (e.g., peanuts, oils, bananas, copra, rice, and sugar), and the fall in prices made revenue drop despite a rise in ex­ port volume. Industrial prices continued to rise. Increased political outspokenness about increasing eco­ nomic grievances was then heard in the continuing negotia­ tions in the institutions of the Association. Alongside expres­ sions of gratitude to the EEC, now less frequent and less broad, the Africans began to feel that they were not getting so much out of Association that they had to keep silent about their grievances. The paradox of their situation was that, eco­ nomically, things would admittedly have been and would con­ tinue to be much worse without Association; yet, compared with other parts of the developing world, things were not noticeably better with Association. If the effects of continuing decolonization were to stimulate freer speech and if trends in the field of development pro­ vided something to complain about, the impact of polycentrism was to work in a different direction. African states over the half decade of the Yaoxmde Convention came to find that the disintegration of cold-war pressures meant less a strength­ ening of an autonomous third-world pressure group than a reinforcement of vertical dependence on parts of the devel­ oped world. They also came to realize that there was less danger to Africa's own goals from the threat of American or Russian interference than from their warnings of nonsupport. Both American and Russian aid to Africa declined over the 1960's; Russian assistance to Nigeria fell far short of inter­ vention; American involvement in the Stanleyville airlift was an extractive operation; and neither of the two superpowers

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

exerted themselves very much either to liberate southern Africa or to develop the rest of the continent.5 In such a situation, African states were thrown back onto continued ties with Europe, which they found they could maintain without danger of being actively enrolled in the cold war. This discovery had removed the initial roadblock to Ni­ gerian and East African Association. It allowed such radical states as Mali and Congo-Brazzaville to remain Associates and, in the case of the former, to strengthen ties with the for­ mer metropole. In fact, if Russia criticized the Association for being neocolonial, the United States also implied the same thing, thus disclaiming any cold-war affiliation in the vertical ties. But in Europe the Africans found that polycentrism covered another phenomenon: the integration of Europe within itself. This effect was felt on both the industrial and the agricultural sides of economic relations. Africans were inter­ ested in industrializing what they could, which most realis­ tically meant processing agricultural goods. Yet as local proc­ essing advanced, the tariff barrier to the importation of these goods into Europe rose. They were also interested in selling agricultural goods to acquire capital for development. Yet as the Common Agricultural Policy came into effect, on 1 July 1967, certain major "similar and competitve" products (e.g., oils, sugar, tapioca, and manioc) also found tariff obstacles on the European market. The pressures of these changes all helped shape the discus5 A good interpretation of Africa's place in the cold war is Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 237-43. On Soviet aid, see Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967); Baard R. Stokke, Soviet and Eastern European Trade and Aid in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1967); "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Economic Aid and Trade" (U.S. State Department Research Memo­ randum, RSB-80, 21 July 1967). On Western aid, see Klaus-Dieter Osswald, Ulrich Kohler, Werner Ruf, Frankreichs Entwicklungshilfe (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1967); I.M.D. Little, Aid to Africa (New York: Macmillan, 1964); The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-Developed Countries, 1961-1965 (Paris: OECD, 1967); Teresa Hayter, French Aid (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1966).

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sions that went on over the five years of the existence of the Yaounde institutions. African states pressed harder for more concern for their trade problems from a "responsible" Eu­ rope. Initially these discussions focused on the matter of setting up the institutions, on fulfilling the obligations of the Convention, and on nailing down the loose ends left at the time of the signing. But as time went on, the Eighteen used the institutions as a forum for broader demands that they wanted to establish as the setting for the new negotiations, demands that essentially amounted to a guarantee of favora­ ble terms of trade. On the other hand, if there was any com­ mon element in the variant positions of the Six, it was a de­ sire on the part of each Member to assure for itself the most favorable markets and sources of supply in the world of indus­ trial consumers and tropical producers—whether these states were Associates or not. In the setting of such diverse goals, the neutral reference point for the new Association was the old one. In the end, the 1969 round of negotiations returned to making minor improvements on the Yaounde model, rather than to creating something that was as innovative—in its multilateral free-trade area aspect—as the original Yaounde Convention had been in comparison with the Treaty of Rome.

Negotiations The Yaounde Convention set up four institutions: Council, Committee, Parliamentary Conference, and Court of Arbitra­ tion. The first three were joint organizations,6 in which the Six and the Eighteen had equal weight despite the difference in their numbers. The ministerial Council was the decision6 The Court of Arbitration was established by the Convention (Yaounde 51) as a five-man body, with a president chosen by the Association Council and two judges chosen by the Council of Minis­ ters and two by the Associates; it decides by majority vote. A review of the Yaounde institutions is found in Werner Feld, "The Associa­ tion Agreements of the European Communities," xix International Organization 2:223-49 (1965), 241-43.

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

making body on all matters covered by the Convention, mak­ ing its binding decisions—as well as "resolutions, recom­ mendations, or opinions" (Yaounde 44)—by agreement be­ tween the two groups. Although the Coimcil of the Associa­ tion met only once a year (and at other times when neces­ sary) , it was analogous to the Community's Council of Min­ isters (which was the European part of the Association Council) and, in a sense, to the interministerial negotiating sessions. It could delegate powers to the Association Com­ mittee, which made its decisions in the same joint fashion, and which was analogous, in a sense, to the permanent rep­ resentatives meetings and negotiating sessions. The Parlia­ mentary Conference also continued its own joint Commis­ sion, roughly the parliamentary equivalent of the Committee of the Association.7 Procedural items to be settled at the outset of the new Association also provided the occasion for reviving matters supposedly buried in the Yaounde agreement. The first meet­ ing of the Association Council in Brussels, a week after the Convention went into effect, immediately plunged into discus­ sions of the old business of continuing negotiations.8 It passed its own rules of procedure for consultation on commercial policies, notably on third-party agreements likely to affect the interests of Members or Associates. The Convention (Yaounde 12) provided that such procedures should be de­ fined by the Association Council, which decided that consul­ tation must take place before any policy change. The im­ pending Nigerian negotiations made this decision of interest to the Africans (as it was to the Six). The principle of joint-management, which had been di­ luted and supposedly settled in the Yaounde negotiations, was also revived in the Association Council under the guise 7

During the interim between the Rome period and the entry into effect of the Yaounde Convention, Association matters were handled by a Eurafrican Interim Committee which met six times, the last time on 19 June 1964 when the Association Council was established. See iv Afrique-Express 70:24 (10 April 1964). 8 See BAN 334:6783f (16 July 1964); Europe 1982 (14 November 1964).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

of the secretariat's powers. "The duties of the Secretariat of the Association Council and the Association Committee" were to "be carried out on the basis of parity and in accord­ ance with the rules of procedure" (Yaounde 49). The Afri­ cans9 wanted to have a permanent, executive, policy-initiating secretariat (with two secretaries-general) capable of acting as an independent arbiter like the EEC Commission or the UN Secretary-General;10 whereas the Europeans wanted a smaller, weaker, administrative organ with a single administrative head. The matter was passed on to the Associ­ ation Committee to study after no agreement was reached in the Association Council. However, the two provisional secre­ taries who had been responsible for the administrative work of the temporary Interim Committee during the interregnum between the Rome Treaty and the Yaounde Convention were reappointed to continue their work for the Association Com­ mittee. It was not until the second Association Council meet­ ing nine months later that a compromise was reached:11 the Africans received the form and the Europeans the substance. The Six agreed to twin secretaries-general—thus making the secretariat a joint body like the other institutions—but in­ sisted on limiting their powers to merely administrative mat­ ters. The dual nature of the secretariat, and its limited budget, helped restrict its political powers. The demand for joint-management of African matters had been reduced to institutional consultation on new Associa­ tion agreements (Yaounde 58); the first such occasion arose 9 The Eighteen maintained their unity through the Associated States' Coordinating Council, their equivalent of the Permanent Representa­ tives Committee, which first met on 6 July 1964 in Brussels. See Jacques Rabemananjara, "L'organisation des dix-huit," Revue du Marche Commun 123:231-33 (May 1969). 10 The Africans had had their own argument over the same matter within OCAM when it was the UAM and again within the OAU. 11 It should rather be said that the compromise was "registered" at the Council, since the real agreement was worked out informally well before the meeting, as was much of the Association—and, indeed, Community—business; as early as 25 March 1965, an AFP dispatch 5638 reported such an agreement as "likely."

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

In the 1965 Association Council meeting in regard to the Lagos negotiations. While agreeing that the political principle of African unity precluded opposition to new African Associ­ ates, the Eighteen nevertheless tried again to bring in the principle of joint-management by requesting participation in determining Nigeria's quotas on "the four products" and con­ sultation on East African preferences, in order to protect their own interests; Gabon and the Ivory Coast expressed reserves about the Nigerian negotiations in regard to ply­ wood and cocoa, and all Eighteen questioned the possibility of Association without reciprocity.12 Asking how and by whom they would be compensated for damages to their inter­ ests arising out of the Commonwealth African Association, the Africans called on the Community to request Common­ wealth preferences for their products to counterbalance Com­ munity preferences for Nigeria. The Commission explained that Nigeria's continued preferences in the Commonwealth would keep it from exerting undue competition within the Community, but the Six were unable to give the guarantees that the Eighteen requested, except to assure them that some reciprocity would be required from East Africa. The Eighteen were kept informed on the Lagos negotiations—largely out­ side the institutions rather than within them, and more for the purpose of quieting their fears than of transmitting or imple­ menting their demands. The most important matter still undecided was the defini­ tion of "origins" (Yaounde Protocol 3), which the Conven­ tion left to the Association Council to settle by the end of the year. The problem was to determine the maximum amount (percentage) of the value of a processed product attributa­ ble to "foreign matter" above which the product's "origin" would be conferred to the raw material producing country (as opposed to the processing country). The question was of importance to both sides, for it concerned transformation industries and assembly plants set up in Africa, and the processing of African and competing countries' raw materials 12Europe 2107 (20 April 1965); AFP 5650 (8 April 1965). See Chap. 3, p. 88.

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in Europe. Since, except for the few cases of processing local products, the Africans' new industrialization depended on imported raw materials, however, struggling African indus­ tries would be producing goods for export which might not be considered to have "originated" in the producing country if the same percentage "opening" of minimum value added by processing were maintained for European as for African products. Alternate solutions could be either to adopt dif­ ferent origin quotients for African and European countries, as some Africans wanted, or to find a single percentage which would satisfy both groups. The Association Coimcil was unable to do either, and passed the problem on to the Association Committee. The origins question provided an immediate issue for renewed negotiations.13 The first step was a race between the two groups to reach a coordinated position within their group since such an intragroup commitment would constitute an element of negotiating strength for the first side to agree among themselves (as it had done for the Six in the Yaoimde negotiations). But the sides were unequal, for an interpreta­ tion of the Convention had provided the Europeans with a procedural upper hand. At a time when the powers of the Commission were being contested by some Members, the Six decided that a Commission proposal favorable to the Afri­ cans on the meaning of origins could not be sent to the As­ sociation Council without the prior agreement of the Council of Ministers. But it was not clear whether a procedural "agreement to forward" or a substantive "agreement on con­ tent" was intended: an interpretation of the interpretation was required! Initially, the Six took the harder fine, insisting on substantive agreement. During September and October 1964, the debate continued among the permanent representa­ tives, France insisting on a stricter interpretation on the 13See Europe 1897 (22 July 1964), 1932 (15 September 1964), 1950 (6 October 1964), 1957 (14 October 1964), 1962 (20 October 1964), 1966 (24 October 1964), 1970 (29 October 1964), 1975 (5 November 1964). On the "origins" question, see other discussions, p. 144.

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origins of petroleum (mining but not refining to confer origin), the Netherlands, on textiles (the usual maximum of 40 percent value from raw materials was considered too low), Belgium, on motor vehicles and chocolate, and the Netherlands on special arrangements for Surinam petroleum as well. In mid-October, when the Council of Ministers failed to agree on the Commission draft, the matter was returned to the permanent representatives. By the end of the month, however, the commitment to propose in time to meet the Convention deadline overrode the substantive interpretation: the Commission made a new compromise proposal at the end of October, and, to strengthen its hand, also prepared a draft proposal on the origins of third-party products before the end of the year.14 The year 1965 brought preparations for the second meet­ ing of the Association Council, but it also marked the pass­ ing of the deadline for an agreement on origins, with no deci­ sion in sight. Meetings of the Association Committee in mid-February and early April came closer to agreement, al­ though in between the two sessions the Eighteen achieved a common stand on new demands while the Six were divided by new requests by the Netherlands (again to protect its Caribbean territories) backed by Belgium. It was difficult to speak of negotiations as long as the parties—particularly the Europeans—staked out positions in such dispersed order, a clear indication of the need for intragroup agreement. Fur­ thermore, lack of unity among the Six encouraged the Eighteen to keep raising demands. The second meeting of the Association Council took place in Brussels early in April 1965, several months beyond the deadline on origins, but no agreement was forthcoming. In­ deed, the passing of the deadline, and the corollary treaty provision that 1962 definitions applied by each state remain in force until replaced, removed the apparent urgency for any 14III/VIII/COM

(64) 571 final (22 December 1964). See Europe 1978 (9 November 1964), 1984 (16 November 1964), 2017 (28 December 1964). The Commission also took the initiative in order to strengthen its powers, then being contested.

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

agreement. Instead, the parties came to Brussels with their points sharpened.15 The Eighteen wanted more items dis­ cussed, including processed fruits, edible oils, fish and meat preserves, and cocoa, rather than just the main products of petroleum, cloth, and tobacco, and asked for different figures for textiles of African and European origin (40 percent and 20 percent, respectively). The Eiyopean states (without the Netherlands, which now could not make a commitment be­ cause of a government crisis) agreed before the meeting to propose a 45 percent "opening" on textile manufactures, above which origin would be conferred by the source of the raw material. An ad hoc group of the Commission, which had met in December 1963, proposed another criterion whereby origin would change with customs nomenclature, adding also two lists of exceptions plus special transportation provisions. Because of the Dutch absence, however, the Six could not agree (as the treaty rules of procedure required) and no deci­ sion was possible, except to lengthen the list of products under consideration: one side's lack of unity opened bargain­ ing to the other's increased demands. It was possible, how­ ever, to separate those products on which there was no prob­ lem from the list of about 30 products which still escaped agreement. A new deadline was set: if by mid-July there were no agreements in the Association Committee (to whom the problem was returned) on the Commission draft, the Associ­ ation Council would be called into extraordinary session to decide. Although the Six had moved close to a common position on all but two products, all was undone by the French boy­ cott over the CAP that began in July; the Association Com­ mittee at its seventh session in the middle of the month could do nothing more than reaffirm the previous degree of agree­ ment (thus limiting the range of bargaining possibilities) and leave the remaining 30 products open. The partial agreement, 15See Correspondance Europienne, 7 and 8 April 1965; Lloyd Anverois, 7 April 1965; L'Echo de la Bourse, 8 April 1965; M-J Jacquinot, "Les aspects douaniers de !'association des pays d'outremer a la Communaute economique europeenne," DXXIV Penant 702: 340-43 (July 1964).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

which covered most products, went into effect on 1 Septem­ ber 1965. The French boycott that covered the latter half of 1965 prevented further meetings and progress. When in mid-March 1966, the Association Committee met again after nine months, it was again blocked by the Netherlands' refusal to move on the question of petroleum products. Further meet­ ings of the Association Committee followed in rapid succes­ sion in late April and early May, and the list of products under disagreement was cut in half. The new list was given final approval at the third Association Council meeting, at Tananarive in mid-May 1966, and was to go into effect on 1 July, as the Africans had asked; the formula used was the one proposed in 1963 whereby an industrial transformation of the raw material that changed its place on the customs nomenclature list would confer origin.16 But there was still no agreement on the remaining 15 products, and as the list shrank, it not only came to focus on the major items of dis­ agreement but it also reduced the items with which bargain­ ing could be accomplished. When the Six were still unable to reconcile their differences on the question at the regular 1966 Association Council meet­ ing, the Eighteen again demanded a special Association Council session in October in the hope of ending the twoyear deadlock.17 The holdout was again the Netherlands, which was now defending its interests in regard to textiles (it imported untreated and exported cheaply printed cloth) by withholding its agreement on other products until it obtained satisfaction. The provisional settlement reached in late Oc­ tober was hard-fought and scarcely pleasing to the Africans. On textiles, the Netherlands won its figure—50 percent of the value to come from raw materials, rather than the more usual 1 8 See AFP 5936 (19 March 1966), 5966 (24 April 1966), 5983 (14 May 1966), 5985 (17 May 1966), 5987 (20 May 1966); Vi Afrique-Express 114:35-36 (10 April 1966), 117:29-31 (25 May 1966), and 131:37-38 (25 January 1967). "AFP 6119 (25 October 1966), 6121 (27 October 1966), 6122 (28 October 1966), 6123 (29 October 1966).

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40 percent asked by France, Italy, and the Commission— although only for a two-year period. More serious for the Africans was the decision to grant margarine origin status by its place of processing, regardless of the source of its ingredi­ ents, rather than agreeing to the 30 percent limit on thirdcountry fats and oils proposed by France; the argument that control over the source of the ingredients is difficult was persuasive, even if not favorable to the Africans. However, skins and hides were granted origin in the raw state, not by processing, and a quantity of fish exported by African Associ­ ates (notably Mauritania) but caught by non-Africans (notably Canary Islanders) was granted African origin, two decisions that favored the Eighteen. No agreement was reached on petroleum. Negotiations on the origins question were nearly completed; if it is hard to say that the Africans came out well, it is also hard to speak of a European victory, considering the sharp differences among the Six. "We have accepted this compromise," said Dahomey's Foreign Minis­ ter, "in a spirit of cooperation and comprehension, hoping that in the negotiations two years hence . . . we will find more comprehension among our partners."18 In addition to loose ends specifically left to be settled in post-Yaounde negotiations, more general preoccupations concerning conflicts between intra-European and Eurafrican integration continued to arise in the institutions. One such problem involved the repercussions of European unification on a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). At the 1965 As­ sociation Council meeting the Africans had asked for clarifi­ cation on competing European agricultural production, nota­ bly in sugar, and fats and oils, and insisted that their interests be taken into account, as the Convention guaranteed (Yaounde 11). Another problem had been raised in the first Parliamentary Conference at Dakar, in mid-December 1964, and reiterated at the joint Parliamentary Commission meeting in Kisenyi, 18 Le Monde, 1 November 1966. The problem was not settled, how­ ever; for further debates on the technical details in dealing with "ori­ gins," notably in matters of parcel post, see p. 185.

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Rwanda, the following March.19 Here African delegates criti­ cized the slowness of FED appropriations—a point raised during the Yaounde negotiations when FEDOM aid was notably lagging—to which European parliamentarians re­ plied with a number of pertinent explanations: lack of tech­ nical preparation of projects, insufficient justification, pork barrel projects, lack of coordination among neighbors, absence of immediate need. Realistic and applicable as these answers were, they did not meet the grievance, and no more satisfactory answers were offered—or probably even possible —at subsequent Association Council meetings. The third problem raised by the Eighteen was the basic issue of guaranteed markets, which had been covered by a vague annex to the Convention. The Africans seized on An­ nex VIII, with its promise "to study ways and means to pro­ mote increased consumption of goods originating in the As­ sociated States," as a guarantee of increases in Community imports from the Eighteen at least equal to the increase from most-favored third states in the developing world. They pointed out that the Netherlands and Germany were buying the majority of their tropical products (particularly edible oils and bananas) outside the Association—often from Latin America. The Eighteen's memorandum was a detailed docu­ ment showing that Eurafrican exchanges were not developing as expected and that customs preferences alone were not sufficient to provide larger markets. The point was to be brought up repeatedly in the future (often concentrating on particular targets); at the second Association Council meet­ ing, in 1965, the Six merely agreed to give the matter further study, pointing out that the memorandum had been presented too late for them to be prepared to answer immediately. The European reply to renewed African pressure for mar19 Le Monde, 12 December 1964; L'Echo de la Bourse, 16 March 1965; Europe 2073 (8 March 1965). Little attention is given here to the Parliamentary Conference and Commission; the European Par­ liament and the Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference as institutional pressure groups have been discussed in the chapter on the Yaounde negotiations and were essentially the same as the joint parliamentary institutions under the Yaounde Convention.

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

ket guarantees under Annex VIII was to deny any obligation to increase consumption beyond that provided by the meas­ ures of the Convention,20 attempting to indicate that negotia­ tions on this matter had ended at Yaounde. Any additional measures were up to the individual members, and depended on improved African commercial, merchandizing, and ad­ vertising techniques. The first part of this argument helped channel African grievances toward particular states and specific practices, notably toward the old grievance of con­ sumption taxes, although the European states denied that these practices had any major impact on consumption habits. The general grievances were taken up again at a meeting of the joint Parliamentary Committee in early July 1965 in Berlin, and at the second Parliamentary Conference in Rome in early December.21 They were summarized sympathetically before the joint Committee in a report by the Italian rap­ porteur, Mario Pedini, who noted weaknesses in the Associa­ tion because of the absence of agreement on origins, the diminishing of preferences because of the simultaneous reduction in the CET for tropical products, the absence of preferences on goods for which the CET is zero, the imbal­ ance between immediate tariff reductions for tropical prod­ ucts and the slower reductions on manufactured goods, and increasingly damaging competition on the world market. The disappointing conclusion was that the Yaounde Association appeared to be less favorable to the Eighteen than its Rome predecessor. The arguments were repeated in the Parliamen­ tary Conference, notably by Chad, which decried delays in diversification and industrialization, and in Community action to further these goals. The specific grievances, encouraged by the nature of the European response, came to focus on German imports of bananas. It was natural, if not necessarily wise, to aim at the Federal Republic. During the Yaounde negotiations, Ger­ many, along with the Netherlands, had taken the hardest hne, and had shown itself more interested in competing nonMEurope 2162 (26 June 1965), 2175 (13 July 1965). 5721 (6 July 1965), 5723 (8 July 1965).

s l AFP

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

Associated African states—the 1963 Declaration of Inten­ tions and the Nigerian negotiations confirmed this—than in the former French, Italian, and Belgian territories. At the last minute, it had added a political note in the Yaounde nego­ tiations by bringing up the Hallstein doctrine, a matter which was also slowing down East African negotiations, and its in­ terest in the Yaounde agreements was interpreted as being partly an effort to keep any of the Eighteen from dealing with East Germany. Its high tax on coffee was viewed as a major reason for stagnation of coffee imports into the Community.22 Then the "banana affair" arose.23 In the Rome Treaty, a protocol had granted Germany a special tariff loophole for bananas from competing nonAssociates, although Germany had declared its readiness to encourage German merchants to import Associates' bananas and to begin talks in this regard as soon as possible. In the Yaounde Convention (Annex IX), Germany agreed to con­ sult the Associates on their ability to fill the German demands for bananas but only beyond the tariff quotas established by the previous protocol. Germany's banana imports had been considerable and were gradually rising, but until 1962, none came from the Associates. After a small purchase from the Associates of less than 2 percent of its total banana imports in 1962 and 1963, the previous trend continued: over 600,000 tons imported by Germany in 1966, for example, included no bananas from the Associates, although they de­ clared themselves ready to supply a sixth of this figure. Yet in early 1965, for example, Germany requested an additional tariff-free quota of bananas (as allowed by the Rome Treaty), which France succeeded in paring slightly but which the Africans acknowledged that they could not fill.24 The 22 For one country, see Le Marche Ivoirien 6:4 (June 1967), 12:7 (January 1968), 13:8 (February 1968). 23 For a good review of the banana affair, see Communaute Europeenne 105:25f (April 1967). See also Realties Ivoiriennes 65:5 (June 1967); Le Marche Ivoirien l:3f (January 1967), 11:5 (Decem­ ber 1967). 2i Europe 2048 (5 February 1965).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

African states suspected that the overwhelming source of sup­ ply in Latin America resulted as much from the close ties be­ tween German (and Benelux) firms and the United Fruit Company and the resultant near-dumping prices as from superior quality and packaging. In these conditions, even the preferences that were granted to African bananas were of no help in determining markets. The problem of the banana pro­ ducers among the Associates—Cameroon, both Congos, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Somalia—was not so much one of selling present production as of increasing their share in the European banana boom. The Eighteen wanted Europe to "Think Association" and "Buy African," and bananas were the place to start. The Eighteen thus demanded that Germany apply the same tariffs to competing non-Associates' bananas as France and Italy, that it implement its commitment (Yaounde An­ nex VIII) to increase consumption and its obligation (Yaounde Annex IX) to consult on banana quotas, and that it give substance to the general treaty purpose of "promoting an increase in trade." The German reply was the same as the general European reply to African pressures over Annex VIII: the problem was a matter for importers, not for the Community or Member states; Latin American bananas were cheaper, better packaged, and of higher quality; and no specific obligation to purchase is present in the general treaty clauses. After the second Parliamentary Conference, in De­ cember 1965, the German government had arranged a meet­ ing between Associated banana exporters and German im­ porters, but the arguments were repeated without results.25 Another meeting of four Associated producers, Germany, and the Commission the following month brought a small bid of 47,000 tons from Germany but also revealed the same problems of price, quality, and marketing. A group of experts set up by the Association Council joined the Commission in studying these problems in April 1966, but came up only 25 See also AFP 5892 (27 January 1966), 5965 (22 April 1966), 5988 (21 May 1966); Europe 2323 (24 January 1966), 2426 (24 May 1966).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

with the notion (covered in some detail) that price, quality, and marketing must be improved. The BEI did make a more concrete effort in June by granting producer states $1 million for improvements in packaging, and at the third meeting of the Association Council the previous month, Germany pro­ posed bilateral technical assistance to help the Africans pro­ duce a more marketable product. Although Germany thereby admitted the principle of responsibility, and such measures provided specific ways of meeting a concrete problem, this response was not what the Africans wanted. Such a response was long-term and technical; the Africans demanded an im­ mediate, political response.23 Finally, in an Association Committee meeting a year later, Germany agreed to pressure its importers to increase their purchases of African bananas, and three Associates offered 81,000 tons of the 1967 crop; results were to be reviewed in the institutions. But after the 1967 Association Council meet­ ing, bananas appear to have slipped from the agenda. In winning grudging German agreement, the Associates threat­ ened to take the problem to the Association's new Court of Arbitration for compulsory judgment (Yaounde 51.4), and also requested that no additional customs quotas be granted to Germany for competing non-Associates' banana exports. Although this first proposed recourse to the remaining institu­ tion of the Association was never implemented, the request appears not to have been heeded either.27 The year 1966—midway between the application of the Yaounde Convention and the opening of negotiations to establish its successor—marked the beginning of preparations for the new Association. For other matters beside bananas and origins, the third Association Council meeting at Tana­ narive in mid-May, was both a satisfactory exercise and a transition from "post-Yaounde" to the "pre-1969" meetings. The effects of the CAP and the Kennedy Round on tropical 26 For Ivory Coast marketing changes, see Le MarchS Ivoirien 3:1-2 (March 1967). 27 Europe (NS) 33 (15 February 1968).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

products were discussed, as well as the fact that African in­ terests were to be taken into account. Grievances over slow­ ness in the handling of FED aid were met through a "char­ ter" for the operation of the Fund, in which both African and European interests found their place. The Six were interested in the points already raised in response to the African com­ plaints: elimination of competing projects, encouragement of regional integration, avoidance of overproduction, con­ tinuing value of development projects, greater use of loans (which the Eighteen had asked for during the Yaounde negotiations), and sound financial management. The Eight­ een were interested in African participation in determining project priority, a greater role in preliminary studies, greater access to BEI credits, and simpler machinery for production aid and stabilization fund advances. They were divided, how­ ever, by the recurrence of another problem which had de­ stroyed African unity in the final Yaounde negotiating session, the problem of allocation of aid among themselves. Some of the Eighteen felt that current procedures and Euro­ pean sympathies favored awarding the lion's share of FED projects to the more rapidly developing states, rather than helping the weaker, poorer states by favoring equal develop­ ment. The 21-point "charter"28 included a number of princi­ ples designed to meet these criticisms, expanded definitions, and suggested procedures, and also drew attention to neg­ lected clauses in the Yaounde Convention. Two other "char­ ters" in subsequent years completed the aid regulations. At the same time, general African grievances were given particularly sharp expression. Following a major discussion of the Association by the OCAM states at a meeting in Tananarive in June 1966, President Hamani Diori of Niger presented a memorandum to the EEC on 25 October under­ lining, in his words, "First, bilateral aid to our countries is diminishing . . . two, we are undergoing a steady decrease in agricultural prices; third, industrial prices are increasing. In addition, several of the Six have instituted taxes on our ex28

Europe-Documents 379 (31 May 1966).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

ports to them."29 Noting that Associates' exports to the Com­ munity rose in value only 28 percent from 1958 to 1964, compared with Latin America's rise of 50 percent and an in­ crease of 44 percent for all developing areas, he listed the commonly cited reasons: consumer taxes of 60 percent to 250 percent on major tropical products, which lowered con­ sumption and annulled preferences; stagnation or decline in aid because of the shift in attention by the developed coun­ tries from overseas to their own domestic needs (Cartierism); leak-back through interest on loans, and a gap between FED appropriations and expenditures; and deterioration of the terms of trade (creating, for example, a reduction in profits during the years 1960 to 1965 on five major Ivory Coast exports that was equivalent to export income for an average year).30 Between 1963 and 1965, the Associates' ex­ ports to the Six rose 66 percent in volume but only 17 percent in value; industrial prices moved in the opposite direction in relation to the volume over the same period. Most painful for the majority of the Associates which were former French colonies was the loss of guarantees as they passed from colonial markets to Association preferences toward world competition; "The EEC has given us trade advantages largely concerned with questions of tariffs, whereas previous organ­ izations also included price and outlet guarantees."31 Diori's proposed remedy was that initially demanded and continually mentioned by the Eighteen during the Yaounde negotiations: organization of markets, similar to that prac­ ticed in Europe under the CAP. He pointed out, "While the Six are persuading us to sell them our products at world mar­ ket prices, between themselves they have absolutely no notion of world market prices, and even less of competitive prices."32 Later, he also added a demand for greater indus­ trialization measures through EEC support for studies and 29 Le Monde, 1 November 1966; Perspectives Nigiriennes 4:3f (January 1967). 3 0 Le Marche Ivoirien 1:7 (January 1967); Fraternite Matin, 24 January 1968. See also, Perspectives Nigeriennes 9:2 (June 1967). 3 1 Perspectives Nigeriennes 4:4 (January 1967). 3 2 Ibid.

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

research, aid to investors, closer cooperation with African de­ velopment banks, technical assistance to business, and man­ agement and vocational training.33 Diori chose the most sympathetic audiences among the Community and Association institutions: the Commission in Brussels in October and the third Parliamentary Conference in Abidjan in December 1966. In the latter, he also arranged a formal confrontation between Europeans and Africans to press home the Africans' grievances (on the suggestion of the OCAM group). Other speakers supported him and the Con­ ference did what it could; it sent study missions to prepare figures for the May meeting of its joint Commission and treaty changes for the next Parliamentary Conference, and it passed a resolution insisting on the need to meet the just grievances of the Africans. Like the European Parliament during the Yaounde negotiations, it could do no more. The EEC Commission, too, could make no decisions on the Afri­ cans' grievances and, for the moment, it chose to make no recommendations; at best, its members could only make speeches like Diori's.34 The grievances therefore were repeated at the fourth meet­ ing of the Association Council, early in June 1967 in Brus­ sels, in an atmosphere that was becoming charged with con­ notations and underlying considerations. The Africans con­ tinued to be unhappy with the slow trade increase and lack of price stabilization, but they were also touchy about actions the Six did take because of the precedents that these deci­ sions might imply for a future Association. At the same time, the Six were moving ahead with their own economic unifi­ cation, trying to find a place in their growing self-sufficiency for their African protectorates: what the Europeans viewed as careful consideration of African interests, the Africans considered to be only temporary exceptions to new principles that were closing in on them. Furthermore, the Europeans 33 Diori speech, 24 September 1968, Europe-Documents 494 (28 September 1968). 34 Cf. Rochereau speech, Communauti Europienne 105 (April 1967); MTM (27 May 1967), p. 1491.

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

expressed their concern that the Africans were not making the fullest use of the Association's aid and investment pos­ sibilities and were not living up to their commitments in implementing the Convention, which the Africans saw as the beginning of a list of particulars that would be used to justify a reduced Association in the future. In sum, the future cast its shadow on the present, instead of the present throwing light on the future. Thus the Association Council discussed three groups of topics: European measures showing consideration for Afri­ cans, African measures pursuant to the Convention, and common measures to meet African grievances.35 The last were slim, comprising primarily a second, hard-debated set of guidelines on financial and technical cooperation to facili­ tate the effective use of FED aid,36 and a second report by experts surveying the problems of a common African trade organization that did lead to one concrete measure of joint support—African participation in trade fairs.37 On the Afri­ can side, measures were to be reported and examined in the implementation of the establishment agreements and in re­ gard to European exports to the five states giving no prefer­ ences (Somalia, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Togo). All of the five reported moving toward a preferential regime, and all of the Eighteen reported that equal rights of establishment were in force for all European nationals, although the Six had doubts and continued to press for a precise answer over the rest of the year.38 The most significant (and lengthily debated) problems, however, were those arising out of the Europeans' own inte­ gration measures: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fats and Oils Market. The Eighteen claimed that their processed agricultural products were indus­ trial products and should enter Europe duty free, and that the 3 SEurope 2696 (6 June 1967), 2697 (7 June 1967), 2698 (8 June 1967). 36 Europe-Documents 429 (14 June 1967). 57Europe 2718 (6 July 1967), (NS) 137 (15 July 1968). 88 Europe 2797 (10 November 1967), 2800 (15 November 1967).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

levies applied on processed goods as a result of the CAP were a contradiction of the Convention. The Six claimed that such products were still agricultural products and could be granted a status between intra-Community and third-party products, benefiting from a disappearing fixed protection (protecting the processing industries) like European products, but under­ going a variable protection levy (on the agricultural base product) like third-state products. However, the Six pro­ posed to apply the African demands to the two processed agricultural products that they imported, tapioca and choco­ late.89 The Eighteen were not satisfied, for their stand was one of principle: claiming the intra-Community regime on all such products, they charged that Europe by adhering to its stand could kill the African food processing industry whenever it expanded, and broke up the meeting. The Euro­ pean decision stuck: while it met the specific practical de­ mand of the Africans, it did not meet their stand on "princi­ ple," and left them with doubts about their future. Similarly, in setting up their single market for fats and oils (on 1 July 1967), the Europeans promised the Associates aid (supports) if world prices fell, but could not yet agree on figures. The Africans (and the Commission) demanded a high reference price (where the supports would come into effect) and a high total aid fund. Yet there was nothing that the Eighteen could do but emphasize the importance of the matter (as Senegal and Niger, the peanut states, did), for it was a European decision, and one which the Europeans were not yet ready to make. Three weeks after the Association Council meeting, the Six finally agreed, but, as might be ex­ pected, they met almost none of the African figures:40 they would cover 80 percent of the price gap (the Africans wanted 95 percent) to a total of $14 million (the Africans wanted $21 million) with a reference price on peanuts of $186 per ton (the Africans wanted $196) for the duration of the Con­ vention (as the Africans wanted); other oils and oilseeds were also covered. It is, of course, hard to tell how much the sa Ibid., 2696, 2697, 2698. *o Ibid., 2696, 2697, 2712 (28 June 1967), 2722 (12 July 1967).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

African figures were affected by normal inflationary "bar­ gaining" considerations (although their total fund figure was supported by the more neutral Commission). Nor is it to be denied that the Six lived up to their commitment to take the Africans' interests into special account. But in the context of the fervent, and unanswered, African demands for price stabilization guarantees and increased trade, nothing was enough. Worse yet, the agreement was not ratified.41 In their last two years, the Yaounde institutions operated routinely, but in the opposite direction from African con­ cerns: as African demands continued to grow, the institu­ tions turned their attention to increasingly smaller points, symbolic measures, and implementary details. This was in the nature both of the situation, which saw the Africans prepar­ ing for negotiations on a new convention, and of the institu­ tions, whose job was to dot the last i's of the old one. Thus the agenda of the several Association Committee meetings that followed the 1967 meeting of the Association Council, and of the next Association Council meeting in Kinshasa late in July 1968 as well, was essentially the same, containing items that were discussed and postponed from meeting to meeting. Some of these were matters that concerned African implementation of the Yaounde schedules, such as the con­ solidation of quotas or the elimination of discrimination in establishment rights, on which European insistence gradually elicited African responses and compliance. Others involved negotiating the final details of earlier agreements, such as the matter of limiting the value of postal parcels accepted as "originating" in the sending country without verification, or of extending the quota on fish "originating" in Mauritania.42 The parcel post question dragged on over the year, during which the Africans rejected a proposal ($600) midway be­ tween their position ($400) and the Europeans' ($800), and the question was sent by the Association Council back to the Association Committee. The fate of Mauritanian fish (a 50 «1 Europe (NS) 113 (12 June 1968). i i Ibid., 107 (4 June 1968); vn Afrique-Express 165:31-32 (10 September 1968).

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

percent cut in the unused quota was protested as a prejudg­ ment of Mauritania's expansion capabilities) remained undecided. On still other questions, the action of the Association Committee and Council was nearly symbolic. The East Afri­ can Association agreement was submitted to the Association Council three days before it was signed—an action that was a rather perfunctory fulfillment of the hard-fought right of consultation.43 The Six completed their three-year evaluation of the aid program, a full year late, and reported that they found no problems in its operation—a rather surreptitious burial of a concession that the Africans had extracted with difficulty in the Yaounde negotiations.44 Less than the stipu­ lated year before the end of the Yaounde Convention, the Association Council held its regular 1968 meeting to discover that it was unable to begin discussions of the new Conven­ tion because the Six had not yet achieved a common stand.45 There is no need to raise complaints that were not in the air nor charge "malperformance" of functions that were not assigned to the institutions. It was indeed proper that the in­ stitutions deal with the dangling details that were not settled during the Yaounde negotiations. It was also to the institu­ tions that the Africans brought their specific problems, ex­ ceptions, and protests. Both the Six and the Eighteen, review­ ing the functioning of the institutions at the 1968 Association Coimcil meeting, declared themselves satisfied. Even Presi­ dent Diori, who made a second return tour of European capi­ tals in September and October of 1968 on behalf of the Eighteen, declared that financial and technical cooperation within the Association was a success. On some issues, there were even continuing negotiations on narrow, unresolved points. Furthermore, many of the successful operations of the Association never had to be discussed in the institutions, in­ cluding the elimination of European tariffs on African prod­ ucts on 1 July 1968. « Europe (NS) 144 (24 July 1968). «Ibid.., 107 (4 June 1968). « Ibid., 142 (22 July 1968).

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But for the most part, there was a divergence between broadening African demands in public and narrowing items of discussion in the institutions. On one hand, for example, President Leopold Senghor of Senegal told his Sixth Party Congress in January 1968 of the steady decline in the Associ­ ates' terms of trade, which he blamed on "new spirit" of "neocapitalism" in the rich countries and spoke of the moral obligation that colonialism had given the rich states to aid the developing countries. On the other hand, the need to focus attention on the details of implementation and operation helped turn the Africans' efforts from global demands to a narrower range of possibilities and bring the Africans' expec­ tations for the new Association more closely in line with the Europeans' inclinations. A greater sense of the reality of restricted alternatives was being imposed on the underlying reality of highly divergent needs. At the same time, however, there were other arenas which contributed in their diverse ways to influencing this feeling. Four international meetings at the end of 1967 and the be­ ginning of 1968 gave the Eighteen a forum for which their diplomacy was best suited, particularly when pressing de­ mands. In mid-October, the developing states met in Algiers in preparation for UNCTAD II and, late in the night of 24 October, adopted the Algiers Charter.46 The document emphasized the grievances that the Eighteen had been study­ ing, notably comparing the purposes of UNCTAD I, with the results obtained. The Charter, like the entire meeting, was marked with skirmishes and compromises between the Latin Americans, who attacked preferential systems, and the Afri­ cans, who defended their Association with the Common Market. In the beginning of December, the annual Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference was held in Strasbourg. The Con­ ference, and the two previous meetings of the joint Parlia­ mentary Commission in Venice in June and in Bamako in 40 Charter of Algiers, UN Document MM.77/I/20, 30 October 1967 and addendum, UN Document TD/38/ADD1, 7 November 1967.

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

October,47

were the only institutions of the Association which began in 1967 to press openly for renewal of the Convention. The parliamentarians were, as always, a sympathetic audi­ ence for the Africans' demands: they adopted reports on the promotion of markets and stable prices for African products, and on the continuation of the Association.48 Perhaps more usefully they tried out their arguments in preparation for the coming UNCTADII in New Delhi. In mid-January, representatives of the Eighteen met during the conference of OCAM heads of state (and the Council of the Entente) at Niamey. They also issued a call for a renewal of the Yaounde Convention, but were again unable to agree on tactics to be adopted.49 They commissioned President Diori to make another trip to Brussels—his presentations of autumn 1966 and spring 1967 never having received an offi­ cial response—and press again for price stabilization and market organization.50 Diori in response, told OCAM that nonrenewal of the Association would be "inadmissible," al­ though that was scarcely the point. Finally, throughout February and March 1968 the second UNCTAD met in New Delhi. Here, as at Algiers, the Associ­ ates were thrown on the defensive and required to justify their vertical Association, while at the same time attacking 47

VIl Afrique-Express 147:2-3, 33-37 (25 October 1967). See Report . . . on Ways of Promoting the Marketing of Prod­ ucts . . . , Parliamentary Conference, Document 20 (20 November 1967); Europe (NS) 16 (23 January 1968). 49 OCAM's position was strengthened as a spokesman for all Eighteen, including OCAM nonmembers. Each of the Eighteen was to set up a national committee to prepare its dossier, and was then to report to the secretariat of the Associated States' Coordinating Council; Europe (NS) 10 (15 January 1968). The Coordinating Coun­ cil began studies in May 1968; Le Monde, 9 May 1968; Europe (NS) 90 (8 May 1968). 50See Le Monde, 19-23 January 1968; Europe (NS) 5 (8 January 1968), 15 (22 January 1968); Perspectives Nigeriennes 9:1 (19 June 1967); for speeches and reactions on the 1968 trip, see Towards an Improved Associationship (Niger Information Office, Paris, 1968); for an interview with Diori after his trip, see Jeune Afrique 408:28-34 (28 October 1968). 48

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

its inadequacies. Although some of the Six helped them, others—notably the Netherlands—were attracted by global arguments which gave the Associates no special guarantees over other, competing developing countries. More uncom­ fortable for the Associates than their dual role of defense and prosecutor was the general failure of the Conference. Di­ visions among the underdeveloped, obduracy among the rich states, and lack of leadership by the UNCTAD secretariat sent the Africans home with no feeling of having epate Ies bourgeois internationaux (one they had experienced in 1964). Both the alternatives to Association and the augurs for revising Association itself were absent. The first substantial step in preparing for the new negotia­ tions was taken by the Commission, and, considering its po­ sition closer to the Africans in the Yaounde round, reflected the narrowing of options. In a communication to the Council of Ministers in April 1968,51 the Commission foresaw a new Association that was so similar to the old that there was rela­ tively little to negotiate. The communication recommended a continuation of reciprocal preferences, separate Associa­ tions for the Yaounde and Commonwealth states, aid, insti­ tutions, and the free-trade area (except for competing products)—all items on which major changes could have been conceivable. The most important improvement sug­ gested was an "agreed price" to serve as a basis for guar­ antees and subsidies for "similar and competing products" affecting the CAP (oils, sugar, tapioca, manioc) and proc­ essed agricultural goods. The broadest problem raised by the impending negotiations was whether to continue vertical (Eurafrican) preferential arrangements or work for global improvement of developing countries' terms of trade. But the problem was at best a philosophical one since UNCTAD II had shown the absence of universal agreement on global solutions and the Commission declared that the two were not 61 "Problemes du renouvellement de la Convention de Yaounde," COM (68) 230, 3 April 1968, reprinted in part in Europe-Documents 474 (29 April 1968) and summarized in Europe (NS) 69 (4 April 1968), 75 (16 April 1968), 76 (17 April 1968), 77 (18 April 1968).

THE EUEAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

incompatible. The day before the deadline to begin negotia­ tions, the Council told the Africans that it was ready to start, in principle, but must first coordinate its position. With the summer closing in, the Council promised, at the end of July, to begin negotiating before the end of the year. Other groups also prepared for the new negotiations. The permanent representatives of the Six first met on the prob­ lem in mid-September 1968,52 and, for the most part, raised questions that were merely an extension of the Yaounde status quo: Should establishment rights be limited to non­ discrimination among Members' nationals, or positively stipu­ lated? Should the new FED be simply a renewal of the old, or more precisely allocated beforehand? Would matters such as competing non-Associates' interests, "similar" agricultural products, and consumer tax limits be handled through general assurances or specific provisions? Again, the broadest ques­ tion was one of universal vs. regional preferences and guar­ antees, with the Netherlands opting for the former and France for the latter.53 In October the European Parliament also debated its posi­ tion, which showed less divergence from the permanent representatives' and Commission's positions than it had shown during the Yaounde negotiations. Following the lead of Gaston Thorn, the rapporteur,54 the Parliament called for a seven-year agreement, with an aid level of $200 million per year, a more liberal system on processed and competitive agricultural products, price guarantees and supports, and compensation for consumer taxes. But it also recognized that spot modifications rather than complete renegotiations were required, that separate agreements for Commonwealth and Yaounde Associates were called for, and that global and vertical approaches each had their merits and were compatible. 52Ibid.,

177 (23 September 1968), 186 (4 October 1968). In the absence, however, of a global price guarantee which French policy prefers. * * I b i d . , 184 (2 October 1968), 187 (7 October 1968). See the Parliamentary report on the Association, issued as Document 50 (December 1968) by the EEC Information Service. 53

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Crowding their already postponed deadline, the Six and the Eighteen met in their first ministerial negotiating session just before the 1968 Christmas holidays to register their agreement on the subject of negotiations: the Association and the FED would be renewed. The decision was the first in the gradual convergence of the two major points of view that had been carried over from 1962 and updated by UNCTAD II. One side, with the Netherlands in the lead and Germany fol­ lowing, wanted the new Convention to be the transition to a worldwide opening of preferences for developing countries, with no special treatment for the Eighteen, as discussed at UNCTAD II at New Delhi. The other side, led by France and representing the minimum position of the Eighteen, worked for the continuation of a Eurafrican free-trade area in the absence of worldwide agreement on general nonreciprocal preferences for the developing areas. The differ­ ence of opinion was by no means settled in December, how­ ever, and—as in all previous negotiations—had to be re­ solved by further discussions of details on the European level before the Six could talk effectively with the Eighteen. The December session also set up rules of procedure for the ex­ perts' and ambassadors' meetings that were to begin in mid-February and to follow between ministerial sessions; the ministers then adjourned, to allow the Six to work out their "package," while the Africans urged them on from the side­ lines. The Africans' positive efforts at negotiation and their frequent "expressions of vive deception" had only a selective effect on the final results.55 A busy month of work by the experts and ambassadors led to a second ministerial meeting, at the end of March, that was inconclusive and disquieting.56 The Six were able to present agreement on one point: an emergency reserve fund to cushion against a drop in world prices or a natural calamity 55 The fifth meeting of the Parliamentary Conference, at Tanana­ rive in mid-January 1969, was unimportant to the negotiation process; see Le Monde, 9 January 1968, 16 January 1969, 17 January 1969. «· See ibid., 25 March 1969, 26 March 1969, 27 March 1969, 28 March 1969.

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(II Yaounde 20). (On a related point, the experts had al­ ready agreed to a Belgian proposal to meet the Africans' concern over CAP products by pledging that "similar and competitive" products from the Eighteen would be granted better terms of entry than from competing non-Associates [II Yaounde Protocol 1].) However, rather than a price or market guarantee, the cushion was an exceptional replace­ ment for the production aid provisions in the previous Con­ vention, now to be discontinued. The decision was indicative of the attitude among the Six that caused uneasiness among the Africans; as in the 1962 negotiations, when the two poles among the Six—France and the Netherlands—came to­ gether, the common position moved farther away from the African hopes. The other principal points discussed in late March were marked by the same spirit. One was the Dutch and German insistence on the elimination of reciprocal preferences, in re­ sponse to the UNCTAD call and GATT permission. While on the surface the position did not appear to disfavor the Africans, they were wary of it because it removed the con­ tractual element and the reciprocal obligation. Another Dutch-German demand was for the reduction of the CET on certain tropical products so that Latin American, non-Associ­ ated African, and Indonesian suppliers would have easier ac­ cess to the Community. The result would be a diminution in preferences (on coffee, cocao, and palm oil) for the Eight­ een. A third problem was the amount of the new aid fund; the Eighteen asked the FED to be doubled, with a sum of $1.5 billion, but the Six were nowhere near a figure of their own (or of the Africans): France spoke of $1.1 billion but the Dutch and Germans merely wanted to maintain the $800 million figure of the FED. When the third interministerial meeting was held, two months later, there was still no agreement among the Six on the same three outstanding points.57 The Africans were bitter. 57See ibid., 29 May 1969, 31 May 1969; F. de Schacht, "Le contexte politique de !'Association," Revue du Marche Commun 123: 234-37 (May 1969); the whole issue is devoted to the Association.

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President Diori presented a protesting statement in the name of the Eighteen in which he pointed out that Association was a political commitment in the eyes of the Africans but the Europeans were treating it as a simple economic and com­ mercial arrangement. The efforts of Henri Rochereau, Com­ missioner for Overseas Association, were unable to bring together the different points of view on the eve of the meet­ ing with the Eighteen. It was only through the diligence of Gaston Thorn, now Foreign Minister of the least of the Six— Luxembourg—and current president of the Council, that agreement was reached at the end of the first day of the interministerial session, largely on the positions that Rochereau had presented in the name of the Commission. In the matter of reverse preferences, the Africans were sovereign over their own policy and a free-trade area required trade liberal­ ization on both sides; the Netherlands would be awarded only an appended declaration stating that Association does not preclude general worldwide preferences at a later date (II Yaounde Protocol 4). In the matter of the CET on imports from non-Associated competitors, a reduction was allowed on coffee and cocoa (already reduced in the 1962 negotia­ tions) and on palm oil as well. In the matter of the new FED, the limits of disagreement were narrowed to $900 million vs. $1 billion, to include the emergency fund (the Commission proposed a substantial rise in Italy's percentage and a small drop in France's and Germany's). None of the three points of compromise met the Africans' demands, and the principle of phasing out the Association was ensconced in the Proto­ cols on the first two points. At the end of the meeting, the first Yaounde Convention expired. The final interministerial meeting, a month later, involved a tight negotiating session among the Six, followed by an allday session between the two groups' spokesmen—Thorn (whose presidency expired in two days, at the end of the month) and the Ivory Coast Economic Minister Konan Bedie —and then a return to a plenary session lasting (by estabSee also the interview with Konan Bedie in Remarques Africaines, 5 April 1969.

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lished precedent) until four in the morning.68 One major point to be settled concerned the total and component contri­ butions of the new FED. Italy refused to raise its figure, the Netherlands refused the exceptional price support fund, and the Africans warned that they would not sign any convention offering less than $1 billion. The process of breaking the deadlock was as complicated as the process of establishing the first FED. France and Germany declared that their con­ tributions could be increased by 20 to 25 percent but would have to be less than $300 million each; a figure of $298.5 million (33.16 percent of the total) was advanced. They then challenged the rest to match the effort. Italy declared that it would make a supreme political gesture to meet the percentage of 16 percent proposed by the Commission, but since its contribution would exceed half that of France and of Germany it would expect a higher percentage of FED con­ tracts in return; a figure of $140.6 million (15.62 percent) was established. Luxembourg agreed to raise its figure to $2.4 million (.28 percent)—prisidence oblige59 giving rise to the odd decimals in other contributions and percentages. As a re­ sult, Belgium and the Netherlands could be assigned equal round figures of $80 million each (8.89 percent), thus re­ establishing their parity which had existed under the Rome Treaty. A $100 million loan allotment from the European Investment Bank (BEI) completed the $1 billion. As in 1962, however, the matter was not settled. At the last minute, the Africans demanded that the Treaty duration of five years begin with the expiration of Yaounde I, rather than allowing the aid money to be stretched out over the ex­ tended time it took to ratify (thus reducing the annual sum available to exactly the same figure, $200 million, as the first FED). The Netherlands refused; it had in fact counted on a longer time over which to spread its contribution. France 68 The following account (to the "Analysis" section) is based on interviews in Brussels and Paris with participants in the negotiations. See also Le Monde, 28 June 1969, 29 June 1969; ix Afrique-Express 185:2-4 (25 July 1969) and supplement. 59 Phrase of Philippe Decraene, Le Monde, 29 June 1969.

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proposed termination at the end of 1974 rather than on 31 May 1974, but this did not solve the Netherlands' prob­ lem. A date such as 1 January or 15 January would have been too transparently artificial, so the Convention was set to run to 31 January 1975, regardless of the ratification date (a legal innovation), in order to allow the Dutch parliament to allocate some of its contribution from the 1975 budget. On the African side the practice of allocating aid to projects that were good risks and investments worried the poorer states with vulnerable exports (oilseeds and cotton) such as Senegal, Chad, Dahomey, and Niger. The emergency reserve fund was therefore raised to a maximum of $80 mil­ lion, some of which was to be taken from any year's unspent FED funds. Nearly half of the new Convention's articles came from the old. As was foreseeable ever since the Commission's report in April 1968, there were no concrete new departures. The details of operation were facilitated and some new elements of flexibility opened. Any new directions—no matter how im­ portant they might turn out to be in the light of future events —were included only as possibilities, intentions, and objec­ tives. These included promotion of regional cooperation among Africans, possibilities for greater local initiative among the Associates, and—probably most important—ac­ ceptance of the principle of general nonreciprocal preferences when the world economic conferences could put them into effect. From the point of view of negotiations even more than content, Yaounde II showed the same characteristics as its predecessors: decision-making in the hands of the Six, slight possibilities for adjustment by the Eighteen once the Six had agreed among themselves, moral pressure used by the Eight­ een to affect the convergence point of the Six rather than to impose a convergence point of their own. The new Conven­ tion, so negotiated, was signed in Yaounde on 29 July 1969.

Analysis Trade restructuring, like disarmament and decolonization, is one of the great revisionist demands in postwar interna-

THE EURAFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

tional relations. The insurmountable problem is not the at­ tractiveness of the goal, but how to get there short of the granting of a "magic wish" that would suddenly create the new situation without any of the dangerous imbalances in­ herent in the transitional process. The tempting tendency has frequently been to ignore the transition and to implement the "magic wish" through the institutions of the United Nations —such as the General Assembly's Resolutions 1514 and 1541 on decolonization or UNCTAD's final acts on trade re­ structuring. The aim of these exercises is not merely to create new norms for international relations, but to create new situa­ tions by fiat. Faith in fiat has been reinforced—or indeed proven—by its effectiveness in the decolonizations of the fifties, when national independence, often considered the highest collective political value, was won through political action, with little social change or human sacrifice. In the case of trade restructuring, confidence in the possibility of in­ stantaneous change is further strengthened by the wondrous effects of development and technology, which multiply human progress at an exponential rate. In such a situation, dreams, development, and disillusion­ ment are often indistinguishable at a distance. Successful domestic and foreign policy for the long-run (or the middlerun, if the long-run is literally inconceivable) is no longer a matter of catching up with today's problems but of mixing human constants and unknown mutations in a formula ade­ quate for the compounded challenges of tomorrow. Politi­ cians and diplomats, then, must be imaginative without being dreamers, the difference being not that only the dreamers dream but that only the imaginative dream right and pos­ sible things. "Realistic dreams," however, is a strange, if necessary, phrase; immediate, revisionist demands often crumble in the hands of the expert in detail, the politician of process, the negotiator of compromise. The most important theme that crisscrosses the preceding selective depiction of the negotiations on the new Yaounde Convention is the continuing clash between detail and de­ mand. The negotiations were—in their finer moments—like

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a passacaglia, with a constant theme throbbing slowly throughout a light and active interplay of motion, moving to­ ward a harmonious conclusion. Such finer moments were rare. More frequently, there was little relation—let alone harmony—between the theme of trade restructuring and the prolonged sparring on post-Yaounde details. Instead of com­ ing together at the end, the two aspects diverged. Leftover details from the first Convention were nailed down, usually late (although most deadlines appeared to have only pro­ cedural and not substantive meaning), and the new Conven­ tion took on the shape of the old one with the details smoothed out. Yet the revisionist demands for trade restruc­ turing remained as persistent as ever. The great possibilities opened up—in concept at least—by the Yaounde Convention remained only concepts: neither a vertical integration, nor a Commonwealth-Yaounde African Association, nor a conti­ nental or subcontinental free-trade zone, nor an effective price and market guarantee, nor a working marketing organ­ ization, nor even a successful preferential area grew out of Yaounde. There is no doubt that in the process of focusing on detail, the institutional negotiations became part of the learning process for African diplomacy, the essential ingredient of de­ veloping foreign policy.80 The other side of the same coin is that the concentration on near, small objects helped little in developing farsighted answers to the broad demands. The demands themselves were realistic, in that they accurately reflected real needs, but the post-Yaounde negotiations gave no training in developing adequate, realistic responses to them. The power relations had not changed. The banana affair is a good example. It is hard here to speak of a negotiating process where two sides converge on a codifiable result. The two sides grappled over the problem but on different terrain: the Africans seized on the problem as a particularly striking exception to the political commit­ ment behind Association, whereas the Germans presented a eo See I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 143-49.

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technical problem of packaging, shipping, marketing, perish­ ability, quality, taste, etc., in which the only commitment was one made to them by the rest of the Six in the Rome Treaty protocol. An "answer" was found in details of technical improvement incumbent on the Africans, a pragmatic re­ sponse but a long-term one and a far cry from the Africans' desires. Again, as in the Yaounde negotiations but even more clearly, the Africans were arguing "principle" and the Euro­ pean was talking of implementary technicalities. The question of origins, including the matter of parcel post, was another example of the same process. When the Africans pressed the question of principle as applied to the numerous ramifications of the joint-manage­ ment matter, they won at most the form but not the sub­ stance. Indeed, in the application of this principle to the Commonwealth African negotiations, they found themselves in conflict with the principle of African unity, and thus were forced to demand only "form." For this reason they could not oppose the Association of Nigeria and East Africa; in addition they were interested in involving the four coun­ tries in the "camp" of the moderate OCAM countries. At most they could ask only for formal consultation, and this took place in a perfunctory manner. In these matters, as in their general evaluation of their own Association, the Africans were short of alternatives, which again reduced their role to formalism. The hope of equivalent advantages from the Commonwealth, like the hope of some other, more advantageous Association, was illusory, and the dichotomy between dreams and details did nothing to provide any more real alternatives. Yet without alternatives, negotia­ tion cannot take place. Aid was one aspect of Association with which the Africans were generally satisfied, and on which discussions in the insti­ tutions produced even more satisfying refinement of details. While it is not possible to speak of negotiations on the three FED "charters," since sides, alternatives, and convergence were not involved, it is nevertheless worthwhile mentioning the matter as an important aspect of Association that was uni-

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versally acclaimed. Yet it is also worth noting—with no in­ tended deprecation of European efforts—that the FED was simply not big enough to provide through a change of struc­ tures the major solution that "aid to diversification" im­ plied.61 Nor was it significantly increased in Yaounde II, where the Africans had essentially no effect on the magni­ tude of the results. It would be a Procrustean judgment to evaluate the work­ ing of the Yaounde institutions by some criterion of negotia­ tions. It has been seen in detail and in analysis that little negotiation was involved. Yet the institutions worked well, in that they accomplished their purposes: they were the locus of an effective discussion about loose ends and current operations during the period of the Convention, and they helped set the stage for negotiations on the new agreement. In doing so, they insured that the next convention would be a refinement of Yaounde, rather than a quantum jump into development. That was one form of realism, whatever the price. 61 On Africa's need for trade and aid, see I. G. Stewart and H. W. Ord, eds., African Primary Products of International Trade (Edin­ burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965).

6. Negotiations in General CONSIDERING the length of time that states have bargained with each other, it is surprising that there has been so little analysis of the process of negotiation. Lately, however, there has been a sudden flurry of interest. Yet most of the new ma­ terial is either a continuation of or an overreaction to old ways of looking at diplomacy. Assuming that purposefulness is as characteristic of students as of practitioners of diplo­ macy, the inadequacy of most current writing suggests that the subject is highly resistant to systematic study. The tend­ ency of some writers to continue in the same old vein might also be taken to suggest that the traditional study of diplo­ macy fills a need, even if it does not satisfy the equally important necessity for analysis of negotiations. On the other hand, some current reactions to the old diplomatic studies do attempt to provide systematic negotiations analysis, but they seem to be one of current political science's "huge missteps in the right direction."1

Diplomacy and Bargaining Any attempt at a systematic study begins with precise use of terms. A distinction has been implied between "study of diplomacy" and "analysis of negotiations," even though in the past "diplomacy" and "negotiations" were often used synonymously and without too much confusion. Yet, it is important to make a distinction. Diplomacy is an art or a skill, and the term will be used here to mean the pursuit of national policy goals through international communication. The study of diplomacy is essentially a prescriptive study. The great writers on diplomacy—Thucydides, Machiavelli, de Felice, de Callieres, Pecquet, Nicolson2—amassed sug1 The phrase of Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in Inter­ national Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960). This chapter was presented in an earlier form before the 1969 meet­ ing of the American Political Science Association. 2 Thucydides, The Peloponesian Wars; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince·, Fortune-Barthelemy de Felice, "Des negotiations ou l'Art de

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

gestions for effective behavior on the part of diplomats. The diplomatic historians attempted to describe the application of these principles in specific cases. Neither tried to analyze the dynamics of a negotiation process in any abstract or rigorously comparative sense. What is more significant is that the contemporary students of diplomacy—Morgenthau, Aron, LaIl, Ikle, Fisher3—have also sought to establish, or to confirm by new methods, prescriptive principles for suc­ cessful diplomacy. They may have brought new wisdom, benefited from new methodology on detailed aspects, or un­ covered new situations and characteristics in the world of the cold war and the United Nations, but they are still studying diplomacy and its principles. Such studies are helpful, and they move far toward the limits of what is realistically possible. Particularly if the analysis starts from behavioral principles, it can at best con­ clude that these principles were unevenly observed and that success or failure is attributable to tactical ploys or mistakes of varying degrees. If the analysis is made from the basis of power principles, success or failure is prima facie evidence of observance or disregard of the proper relation between ends and means. Behavioral principles may go no further than Dale Carnegie in pinstripe; yet, admittedly, as long as de Calheres and Nicolson are not applied with perfection, admonitions to do so can be very useful to a state's diplo­ matic agents. Power principles can also be useful, by renegocier," in Karl von Martens, Le Guide Diplomatique, Vol. 1 (Paris: Gavelot, 1851); Frangois de Callieres, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963); Antoine Pecquet, De I'Art de Nigocier avec Ies souverains (The Hague: van Duren, 1738); Harold Nicolson, Diplo­ macy (New York: Oxford, 1963). 3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 3rd edn. (New York: Random House, 1959); Raymond Aron, Peace and War (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Arthur Lall, Modern International Nego­ tiation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Roger Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners (New York: Har­ per and Row, 1969).

NEGOTIATIONS I N GENERAL

minding states to keep their bank balances big enough to cover their shopping lists. If both types of principles approach lead to circular or at least commonplace conclusions—the one that failure results from lack of skill, and the other that failure results from lack of capability—it is because analysis on this level can only go so far. The behavioral principles approach per­ mits detection of national styles and perhaps a balance sheet of skills and weaknesses, but it does not permit analysis of confrontations or negotiating processes. The power princi­ ples approach would lose some of its tautology if notions of power, capability, means, and influence were further analyzed to show how outcomes were brought about. The first ap­ proach does not even permit this, for it is dealing not with unifying concepts but with noncomparable principles—as sound as the Book of Proverbs but often as contradictory. If there is a criterion for analysis in either form of the principles approach, it is that of success or failure. Yet it is illusory as a central concept, for it provides no help in mak­ ing fine analytical distinctions. Analyzing diplomacy on the basis of success or failure is as insightful as analyzing coali­ tion or legislative behavior on the basis of bills passed. The referents are so relative, the participants so fluid, and the relevant area of analysis so much larger than the terrain chosen for study that only a little is learned. In sum, the principles approach to the study of diplomacy provides useful lessons for diplomats, but little in the way of analysis of the negotiating process (how outcomes are attained). The implication is that negotiation analysis offers some­ thing different. Analysis is systematic, comparative, and at least somewhat replicable, even if not fully "scientific." Nego­ tiation is the process of combining divergent viewpoints to produce a common agreement, a definition that must differ from de Callieres' classic phrase if the negotiations process is to be analyzed usefully.4 While more precise than "diplo4 "The secret of negotiation is to harmonize the interests of the parties concerned," de Callieres, op.cit., p. 110. Our definition assumes that agreement is a goal, but not the only goal.

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macy," it is broader than "bargaining," and therein lies the problem of approach. In reaction to the inadequacies of the diplomatic principles approach, there has been a recent spurt of effort to analyze bargaining through the use of game theory and matrix methodology.8 To the extent that this type of analysis deals with strategies for chosing precisely quantifi­ able alternatives, it is valuable. Some analysts have found it to be applicable to labor-management negotiations over wage increases,6 even if such important corollaries as strike costs and fringe benefits are recognized to be quantifiable but less easily relatable. To the extent that game theory allows the formulation of hypotheses and principles that can then be essayed in negotiations analysis, it is also useful. But for the most part, matrical analysis cannot be directly applied to international negotiations. Where the study of diplomatic principles was too broad and too fluid to answer questions of "how" and "why," game theory, by its very precision, is too narrow. This judgment can be examined in greater detail by review­ ing the assumptions of the approach. One is that quantitative utilities can be assigned to alternative positions or outcomes. In fact, many positions in most negotiations cannot be ex­ pressed either as a single quantifiable item or as several quan­ tifiable and relatable items; as long as one of a complex of subjects under negotiation cannot be reduced to quantifiable, relatable form, it is hard to see how the whole process of choice can be matrically expressed, let alone determined. 6 There is much of relevance in Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, I960), but more useful for understanding negotiations is Anatol Rapoport, TwoPerson Game Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966). An insightful takeoff from game theory is Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). See Knut Midgaard, "Some Comments on the Meaning and Use of Game Theory," πι Cooperation and Conflict 2:108-30 (1968). 6 The most useful book is Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). See also S. Siegel and L. E. Fouraker, Bargain­ ing and Group Decision-Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

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Furthermore, even if at some point alternatives could be de­ scribed as utilities, the process of reaching that point—as much or more a part of negotiations than the rest—is ex­ cluded from the analysis.7 Since the process of nailing down general principles is usually a major problem in negotiations, and since even quantifiable utilities are often finally recon­ ciled on the basis of midpoint, other reference points, or criteria that have a contextual significance other than their innate utility, quantitative analysis is of limited value. In this situation, it seems difficult to reduce a negotiations set to a succession of matrices, let alone a single matrix. Game theory is useful in analyzing the choice of whether to negotiate or not; once negotiations have started, it is not directly applica­ ble to an analysis of the process—even idealized—of arriv­ ing at an agreement.8 A second assumption also runs up against the "process nature" of negotiations. Game theory strategies are often based on noncommunicative negotiation, or alternatively, on an assumption that when communication is present the major problem is one of trust. It is perhaps paradoxical that "Pris­ oners' Dilemmas" are more common in diplomacy, as de­ fined, than in negotiations. Although motives may be suspect, information incomplete, secrecy broken, and leaks and indi­ rect outside pressures part of the negotiations process—all indicating that communication may be only partial and al­ ways open to interpretation and evaluation—communication is an essential part of negotiation. But the problems it poses 7 Even if nonquantitative priorities are used, they are often diffi­ cult to establish. There is more usefulness in matrical reasoning for deciding whether to negotiate or not than in analyzing outcomes, despite the obvious relation between the two. See Rapoport, TwoPerson Game Theory, p. 130. Since Ikle and our own theorems, below, suggest that negotiations pose a continual choice between agreement and no agreement, however, this may be a worthwhile time to attempt a more direct application of the game theory, although this would seem to lead to an unmanageable number of plays that would not clarify the process. 8 Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, has gone far in seeking out other "rationalities," an important step.

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in most negotiations primarily concern interpretation, not trust.9 A third assumption is that of rationality and conservatism. There is no intent here to reopen the roving debate on the meaning and reality of rationality. If the term refers to a log­ ical, purposeful, and informed decision, the point can quickly be made that, even if purposeful, negotiators' decisions are not always logical or informed and that purposes vary and even combine. There is no guarantee that a negotiator can prefer a single outcome over all others, that he can choose such an outcome in any but a tautological way, or that his ability to do so is a necessary assumption for the analysis of negotiations. In other words, negotiators often do not—even unconsciously—make a matrix for themselves and systemati­ cally line up their alternatives. To the extent that this is true, game theory strategies are an element of prescriptive, not descriptive, analysis and thus are not helpful for analyzing what actually happened or will happen. Nor even what should happen, for not all negotiators are willing or able to choose a single fixed strategy, or to replay the game often enough to choose a mixed strategy. In fact, a negotiator may well gamble: He can gamble that the other side will or does not see the matrix as he does, that he can change his alterna­ tives and even reverse his choices at a later moment, or sim­ ply that irrational elements—such as an ideologically "pre­ dictable" wave of history or an eventual change in situational realities or the rules of the game—will save him from the un­ favorable portions of his chosen outcome. Idealized situations of pure strategy can produce indirect insights of great value, but their very idealization (or theoretical nature) removes the element that makes them directly applicable to negotiations. Mainly because of these problems, the systematic tools that are being developed for the analysis of games of pure strategy have not found useful application in the direct 9 Thus the following analysis may not be adequate for disarmament or security negotiations, which may need their own special type of approach.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

analysis of real cases of negotiations. To repeat, however, this does not mean that such analysis is useless; its value is simply limited. The main question to answer in a comprehensive analysis of negotiation, it seems, should be: How are divergent view­ points combined to produce a common agreement?10 If Lasswell's definition of politics applied to "negotiation" is set up as an equation to be solved for an unknown, X marks the "how." "Who" refers to the parties negotiating, "what" refers to the outcome, and "when" refers to the end of the process. "Who?", "What?" and "When?" are simple factual questions that can be answered in any set of negotiations. Finding the answer to "How?" depends on a further breakdown of ana­ lytical questions, and leads to an investigation of power in the context of negotiation, since the combining of divergent view­ points is an exercise in "the process of affecting the policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) . . . depriva­ tions [or gratifications] for non-conformity," i.e., power.11 Several schematic answers can be essayed, to suggest an approach.

Alternatives The first answer to the question "How?" suggests that divergent positions are combined by limiting alternatives. Negotiation is a process of defining and reducing alternative positions until a unique combination is reached that is accept­ able to all parties; it is a collective decision-making process with discrete "sides," since a decision is "a choice among al10 There have been two significant, if incomplete, attempts to grap­ ple with this question: Ikle, op.cit., and Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiations in International Relations," in Herbert Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 466-520. 11 The quotation is from Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 76, although their entire conceptualization is not followed here. An equally useful discussion (although flawed on the matter of "actual or threatened" sanctions) is Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

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ternative modes of action."12 The value of this conceptual ap­ proach is that it focuses on choices and the means of arriving at a result, thus approximating the real process pursued by the participants. Its limitation is that it does not indicate any dynamic in the process of negotiation; although this approach answers "How," it does not tell why one particular means of limiting alternatives is chosen over another (except in some form of the commonplace observation that one means seems to be "most applicable"). There are four ways of limiting alternatives. One is to make one alternative appear more attractive than others, either by promising additional side effects or by predicting benefits inherent in the favored alternative. A second is to make one alternative appear less attractive than others, either by threatening sanctions if it is chosen or by warning of in­ herent or associated deprivations.13 The third is by making one alternative appear to be already chosen, through the use of commitments and obligations. The last is by making some alternatives appear to be already eliminated, either by fait accompli or by simple incapacity. The first pair of means for limiting alternatives is promise and prediction.14 Both involve future gratification, but prom­ ise refers to a volitional adjunct to agreement whereas pre­ diction provides gratification through the agreement itself. The terms are used here in a more precise sense than com­ monly understood, so that analytical distinctions may be pre­ sented. Although the Six made greater use of promises than the Africans (since they had more to promise), each Associa­ tion Convention concluded with a number of ancillary engagements or promises from both sides: the Africans promised not to recognize East Germany, the Six promised the Eighteen to study means of increasing consumption of 12 Peter Rossi, "Community Decision-Making," in Roland Young, ed., Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 364. 13A point that Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory, p. 129, dis­ cusses as "sanctions." 14There is some discussion of promise in Sawyer and Guetzkow, op.cit., pp. 480, 483-84; Schelling, op.cit., pp. 43-46.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

tropical products, and the French promised to continue sup­ ports and supplement aid on a bilateral basis when possible. In negotiations with Libya and Spain for military bases, the United States has used promises of aid to make the rest of its terms acceptable to the other side. The North African states have continually predicted outcomes in the interest of the Six by showing how the development and unification of the Maghreb would follow EEC Association. The second pair is threat and warning.15 Both involve future deprivations, but a threat is volitional whereas a warning refers to future consequences beyond the Warner's control. In both Yaounde negotiations, the African states fre­ quently warned of the political instability that would occur if Europe did not aid their economic development; they threatened not to enter a new Association that did not satisfy their demands, but the threat was not convincing. Indeed, even when talks temporarily broke down—in the Yaounde, Maghreb, and East African sets—the parties were at pains to state that they were not threatening rupture, i.e., that break up was not a real alternative. Africa, including the Maghreb and Commonwealth countries, used warnings more frequently than threats in dealing with the Six, since their signature was just about the only item of value that they could voluntarily withhold. The Europeans made crucial use of threats (in the guise of warning) when they told the Eighteen that rejection of European packages would weaken the position of the Africans' friends among the Six and result in a worse offer. The third pair consists of commitment and obligation.16 Both involve publicly tying the hands of one party: a com­ mitted party ties its own hands whereas an obligated party has his hands tied by another. Both constitute a presumed preselection imposed on the chooser. The process of negotia­ tions itself builds up a structure of commitments and obliga15 See discussions in Ikle, op.cit., pp. 62ff; Schelling, op.cit., pp. 3543, 103ff, 123ff; Rapoport, op.cit., pp. 93, 125; Sawyer and Guetzkow, op.cit., pp. 480, 483-84. 18 See discussions in Ikle, op.cit., pp. 65-68, 175 on countertactics; Schelling, op.cit., passim.

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tions as it goes along. Some of the commitments in the Eurafrican negotiations were arrived at before the negotia­ tions ever began, by far the most important being the Euro­ peans' commitment to unity. The Rome Treaty and the 1957 (North Africa) and 1963 (Commonwealth) Declarations of Intentions implicitly or explicitly committed the Six to "success" (i.e., an agreement) once negotiations had started. GATT and UNCTAD also served as commitments, although their precise nature remained open to interpretation. Again, the terms of the Yaounde agreement acted as a commitment for the Six in the Lagos and second Yaounde negotiations since Europe could not give Nigeria better terms than it had given the Eighteen, nor could it let the Eighteen's terms fall substantially. Obligation is a subtler matter. While the Six had com­ mitted themselves to some sort of agreement with various African groups, the Africans tried to turn this general com­ mitment into an obligation to a particular agreement by say­ ing that anything less would not satisfy the terms of the original commitment. They also tried to create an obligation out of their inherited economic situation—the ex-French colonies tried to pin the obligation for maintaining their price support system on the metropole which had begun it, and the Commonwealth and other nondiscriminatory states tried to oblige the Six not to ask more concession than their former metropoles had sought. Richesse oblige was little in­ voked during the Yaounde negotiations but rose in impor­ tance in the institutional interim between the 1962 and 1968 negotiations. The final pair of means for limiting alternatives is fait accompli and simple incapacity.17 Unlike the previous pair, these means impose their preselection on the object. Both re­ move the possibility of accomplishing alternatives, the first by eliminating them directly (things that cannot be undone) and the second indirectly by showing that they are unfeasible (things that cannot be done). When the Six gradually re17 See Sawyer and Guetzkow, op.cit., p. 485 on fait accompli, and Schelling, op.cit., p. 37, on coercive deficiency.

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duced the benefits of Algeria's de facto status they were in fact narrowing the status quo which Algeria could eventually seek to restore by finally deciding to negotiate a de jure rela­ tion. In its bilateral postcolonial relations Algeria is an ex­ treme but typical case of the use of nationalization as a fait accompli. When the French agreed to eliminate subsidies as a part of the EEC internal agreement, the Eighteen found that a fait accompli had eliminated one alternative that they might have preferred. A fait accompli can also be imposed by outside forces rather than deliberate state action, the only element of the latter being the decision to sit back and await the outcome. Thus, by waiting, the EEC allowed the chang­ ing commercial situation to alter attitudes in Nigeria and East Africa toward Association. It is therefore possible to divide faits accomplis into those accomplished deliberately by a party, those accomplished by a third party, and those result­ ing from outside forces, but the effect is the same—alterna­ tives are eliminated. Simple incapacity also achieves the same effect. The Six let Africa know that they "could not" give a billion dollars in aid in 1962 (although they "could" in 1969), and the Africans let Europe know that they "could not" do without aid. For economic and administrative reasons, the Africans "could not" immediately align their tariffs and give preferences. For economic and political reasons, the Six "could not" offer aid to Commonwealth countries. The distinction between "could not" and "would not" is thin; like many of the other means of limiting alternatives, simple incapacity depends to a large extent upon one party's ability to convince the other of its weakness. Each of these "four pairs" relates in some way to inter­ ests and may be termed substantive criteria for decisions. Frequently, at some moment in the negotiations, enough points of agreement have been reached and enough alterna­ tives eliminated so that remaining differences no longer in­ volve interests, substantive criteria, and various forms of power. Instead, procedural or mechanical justifications of choice are used, such as midpoints, initial offers, round fig-

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

ures, previous agreements, and other rejerence points18 whose justification lies in their existence rather than in their innate content or value. (Sometimes, commitments and obligations can serve as reference points, when there is agreement, not on their merits, but simply on their presence and the need to respect them.) There were many reference points in the Eurafrican negotiations: midpoints and round figures (focal points) were used in the FED negotiations, initial offers (despite the absence of round figures) served to limit alterna­ tives in the Nigerian negotiations, previous agreements on the FEDOM figure and the price support figure were used in the FED negotiations, and round figures (both as attainable and as unattainable ceilings) played the most important role in the second FED negotiations. Procedural reference points are usually called into play only after substantive criteria have narrowed alternatives to the point where the difference can be "split" but where such criteria themselves have been in­ effective in eliminating the final gap. Theoretically, negotiations begin with an infinite field of alternatives open for the choosing. In fact, the "terrain" of the negotiations is first defined, that is, the choice of subjects and a broad span of possibilities, followed by a number of key questions and principles which help narrow the choice of subjects. Thereafter, the process of limiting alternatives begins, as outlined, through the communication of future deprivations and gratifications, and present possibilities, until any remaining differences can be split by procedural means. Each side tries to show that its possibilities plus associated gratifications are more beneficial to the other side than their proposals (which are either impossible or associated with deprivations), and are surely more beneficial than no agree­ ment at all.

Convergence The second approach to the question of reconciling di­ vergent viewpoints is structural, through the convergence of positions. Instead of focusing on an unlimited field of sub13

See Ikle, op.cit., pp. 212-13.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

stantive alternatives and analyzing how they are reduced to a unique combination, the second approach takes the initial positions as a starting point and asks how they are brought into convergence. Instead of a vast contracting field, an ana­ lytical model would show broken lines drawn from the initial points to the point of convergence, and then investigate what brought these lines closer and closer to final coincidence. The advantages of this conceptual approach lie in its ability to show which side gave in most or moved furthest from its original position and to indicate clearly the relationship of one party's moves to those of the other. This approach does not deal as much with the substance of the debate as with the tactical process, which the previous approach has already shown to be important. The disadvantages of this approach lie in part in the ob­ verse of the advantages. Convergence analysis can be com­ bined with an analysis of alternative limitation to bring out substantive and power considerations; alone, however, con­ vergence analysis plays down the substantive arguments in order to bring out procedure and so may give a false impres­ sion of the negotiation process. There is another operational disadvantage, however. The analysis of the FED negotiations—where, if anywhere, this approach should be most clearly applicable—has shown that even monetary matters are in fact not simply reducible to quantitative terms. The FED negotiations—even when iso­ lated somewhat arbitrarily from other considerations—began on a split level of quantitative and nonquantitative positions, where principles and figures were mixed. Once bargaining got down to purely mathematical components, there was con­ tinual shifting back and forth between reference figures and nonmathematical criteria, and even on the level of figures, there were important shifts of attention from one component to another. A simple analysis that dealt only with total figures would never provide genuine insight into the real determi­ nants. These problems will be taken into account, following a discussion of the mechanics of the procedural model. There are five ways of arriving at convergence from initial

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

positions; as follows from the original notion, distinctions essentially concern the relation of moves to each other. The first may be called simple coincidence of initial positions, and it takes place most frequently at the beginning and the end of negotiations. A proposal from one party may be accepted by the other (someone, after all, must be the first to voice the position), or both parties may discover that their initial pro­ posals (brought with them to the negotiating table or perhaps previously discussed in the press, parliament, or other public forums) are identical. The Yaounde agreement on advan­ tages "at least equivalent" to the Rome Treaty or the Lagos agreement not to include aid are cases in point, as are some of the concluding provisions to both Conventions that were arrived at after the "crest" of the negotiations had been concluded. A second way of arriving at convergence can be called concession because one party gives in to the other.19 Al­ though the history of negotiation may provide more examples of partial concession, where one party moves unilaterally to­ ward the position of the other without actually reaching it, there are also cases of full concession. The Eighteen con­ ceded to the Six on the principles of market guarantees and comanagement, while at another time the Six conceded that reciprocal preferences would not be required from the non­ discriminatory states among the Eighteen. Concessions are often coupled with a third category, counterconcessions, in which the party that has received a con­ cession explicitly makes one of its own in return, but on another matter. Thus, in negotiating with North Africa, the Europeans in principle conceded Tunisian and Moroccan de­ mands for industrial preferences (the inter-Community re­ gime). In turn, they asked for and received some kind of interim preference for their industrial goods on the North African market before a full free-trade area would go into effect toward the end of the agreement; this exchange of concession and counterconcession is likely to be repeated in negotiations on agricultural goods. In intra-European nego19 On

concessions and compromises, see ibid., pp. 104, 206-07.

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tiations, France agreed to the Nigerian mandate at the price of an agreement to the Maghreb mandate (albeit partial) from the rest of the Six. A fourth way of arriving at convergence is through com­ promise, whereby both parties give some ground to arrive at a point somewhere between both of their initial (or latest) positions. Final convergence on the FED figure appears to be an example of compromise, for Africans and Europeans moved from their latest positions of $810 million and $780 million respectively to compromise on a round figure of $800 million. When the process is analyzed, however, it shows up clearly as one of concession and counterconcession, for the Six accepted the African figure of $230 million for the sup­ plement but required an African concession on the figure of $570 million for the base. Thus, a better example of com­ promise is the Europeans' earlier convergence on the supple­ mental (and round) figure of $200 million and on the total of $780 million. In general, however, reference points lend themselves best to use in compromises. The final way of arriving at convergence is, paradoxically, to avoid it, in a process which may be termed understand­ ing.20 In this process, explicit convergence is bypassed and the debate goes on to implement an ambiguity. A few illus­ trations should clarify this artifice. Before the Yaounde nego­ tiations began, France and the Netherlands disagreed over the legal basis of the continued Association, France holding that the new Association was a continuation of the old as provided under Rome IV and the Netherlands maintaining that the new Association was indeed a new chapter to be ne­ gotiated under Article 238. The communique announced that the Association would continue "jusqu'a nouvel ordre," a phrase which meant that it would continue as long as it would continue, with no reference to the legal basis. Later, when negotiations began, the problem arose again, and again the communique (and the new Convention's text) provided for this continuation "in conformity with the principles of the Treaty," without reference to the Article. Both parties could 20 Cf.

ibid., pp. 15-22.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

claim victory before their respective parliaments, and the negotiations and subsequent Association could proceed be­ cause an understanding had been reached. Many such under­ standings took place over principles in the Yaounde nego­ tiations, permitting principles to flow from details, rather than the reverse procedure used in the Lagos negotiations. Under­ standing was also used to begin negotiations between the United States and Panama over a new Canal Zone Treaty when, on 3 April 1964, a joint declaration provided for "pro­ cedures" but never mentioned "canal," "negotiations," or "treaty." Similarly, the Security Council resolution on Pales­ tine in November 1967 used "secure frontiers" and "agree­ ment" as an understanding for "pre-June boundaries" and "direct negotiations," although the understanding came un­ done under duress. These five means of achieving convergence can also be used to evaluate Eurafrican negotiations. The Eighteen con­ ceded much in the early stages of the Yaounde negotiations, and only entered into the process of counterconcession and compromise at the end. The apparently complex nature of the negotiations was also a result of the frequent use of co­ incidence, understanding, and the induction of principles from details. In the Lagos negotiations, concessions and counterconcessions were more equally balanced, coincidence more frequent, the need for compromise arose less often, and the negotiations were basically deductive in nature. The final convergence points in the Yaounde set were closer to the Europeans' initial positions than to the Africans', whereas in the Lagos set convergence was not far from the Nigerians' position and not far from the Europeans' either; in the sec­ ond case, however, the range of positions was narrower than in the first. In a word, the Eighteen gave in more but also got more, while the Nigerians gave in less and got less. This paradox raises an important warning about the use of the convergence approach. Convergence covers the process of negotiations, but not the value of the final accord. Although the Nigerians did better in terms of departures from their original posi-

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

tions, their final package—which contained no aid and only limited preferences—was smaller than the Eighteen's. Per­ haps the Nigerians were able to strike a harder bargain (i.e., move less from their original positions) because they were asking for so Uttle in comparison with the Eighteen. Tenta­ tive as this conclusion must be, it is significant because it sug­ gests the reverse of the commonly held notion that a party which starts from an extreme position has more influence in shaping a favorable outcome. Many of the Eighteen's extreme demands (extreme in comparison with the result, not with their needs) were simply irrelevant to the negotiating process, since the package resulted from a decisive convergence among the Six. The 1967 Panama Canal Zone Treaty closely resembled the initial American position of 1964-1965 (with implementing details added) rather than Panama's total de­ mands, although these demands were necessary to bring about negotiations, and hence the American position. The de­ gree and mechanics of movement from initial points to con­ vergence tells much more about the negotiating process than a simple evaluation of final results. On the other hand, it would be dangerous to take move­ ment toward convergence too mathematically. To begin with, initial positions are tactical stands, whether played close or wild, and do not necessarily represent the intrinsic value that their content may suggest. Nigeria played close, moved little, and its inability to concede acted as a commitment and an in­ capacity that could not be shaken. The Eighteen played wild and were probably less committed to their initial stand; their position increased in value to them as they moved toward convergence. Values (utilities) change with movement, al­ though this does not imply that they increase at some fixed rate as they approach convergence. In addition, there is simply no way of ascribing finite—let alone comparative—value to positions, either initial or subse­ quent. The problem of combining quantitative and nonquantitative positions has already been noted; but even quantita­ tive positions are only indices, not fixed utilities. This is true

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

even in the case of a "purely quantitative" matter such as the FED, where monetary sums have a utility not only in terms of their exchange rate but also in terms of a particular state's ability to pay its share, in terms of its previous outlays, and in terms of its expected—but at least partially unquantifiable —results, and probably other considerations as well. This is especially true of commercial matters. "A precise apprecia­ tion of tariff cuts is, however, very difficult. No satisfactory method of measurement of concessions has yet been evolved. . . . Indeed, [GATT has] decided after careful investigation that quantitative estimates of concessions are practically im­ possible."21 Convergence analysis permits greater under­ standing of a process, but not measurement of gains and losses. With all these caveats—and with the problem of the shift­ ing levels of analysis mentioned earlier—taken into consid­ eration, what value is left in the convergence approach? The value it seems lies in isolating those points where changes in positions occurred and in bringing out the important shifts— both for tactics and for analysis—on the way to convergence. The approach tells what to look for and where to look, and it flags the important procedural element of the negotiations process. It recognizes the "process" nature of negotiations, rather than focusing on single-session confrontations or sim­ ply on final results. Thus there are many "hows." "How" can mean "in what way?" or "by what means?" It can refer, then, to either pro­ cedural or substantive factors. The implication is that the two approaches should be combined for a more complete analysis of the negotiations process. In fact, the two approaches fit to­ gether quite well. When convergence analysis has indicated at what point a change in positions has occurred, the limita21 Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 80. See, however, Peter Robson, "Africa and EEC: A Quantitative Note on Trade Benefits," XXVII Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics 4:299-303 (November 1965), and Bridget Bloom, unpublished paper, NISER, 25 August 1966.

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tions approach can be utilized to investigate what uses of power accomplished the result.

Propositions The preceding discussion has centered on an analytical approach to the process of negotiation. Can this approach be carried a step further toward the development of a theory of negotiations? Theory has many meanings. For present pur­ poses, it will be used rather precisely for an explanatory hy­ pothesis that contains a dynamic or projective element. A theory should be able to indicate that under certain condi­ tions, a certain outcome is likely to occur for certain reasons. Using the limitation and convergence approaches, a theory should indicate that a particular convergence point would re­ sult under identifiable conditions, including the application of particular uses of power (ability to use certain criteria decisively) at specific junctures. At the present stage, attempts at theorizing based on the outlined systematic approaches appear to be inconclusive, despite their value for analysis, for reasons to be explained. One potential formula—inherent in the principles approach discussed at the beginning of this chapter—hangs on the word "successful." Thus (1), "the side which most success­ fully brings applicable uses of power to bear on the conver­ gence process will swing the convergence point closer to its initial position," which is an accurate summary of the Ya­ ounde negotiations. Or (la), "A convergence process which is successfully played through to the end will produce agree­ ment, and one where one party has not been successful in eliminating the other's conflicting alternatives will not pro­ duce agreement," which is an accurate but definitional description of the two sets of Commonwealth African nego­ tiations. Or (lb), "when there is prior commitment to agreement the party that can hold out the longest will bring convergence closest to its initial point," which is an accurate portrayal of the Arusha and Maghrebi negotiations, but a terrible tautology. Whether the word "successful" is used or implied, this type of statement is only a commonplace, for it

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

equates the conditional and the predictive parts of the "theory." Such statements, however, do have illustrative value. As one seeks to sharpen them by pinning down the conditions, it becomes evident that much depends on the effective use of tactics, or the willingness to compromise, or the ability to make one's inflexible stand credible and acceptable to the other party. All of these elements of "success" lead back to the principles of skillful negotiation and to the fact that ne­ gotiators are human beings with greater or lesser skills and with fortuitous elements aiding or hindering them. The inabil­ ity to theorize on this level reinforces the continuing—if limited—usefulness of the principles approach. These statements, however, can be pursued one step fur­ ther. A key phrase in the first formula is "applicable uses of power," suggesting that each party must identify the supports for the other's stand in order to weaken them. In the Ya­ ounde set, the Europeans' strength lay largely in their com­ mitment to unity and in their control over such items as disposable financial aid and market guarantees. The Africans were unable to shake the Europeans' position significantly on these matters, that is, they were unable to muster the kind of power that would eliminate the Europeans' alternatives. Iso­ lating these elements in a particular set of negotiations tells something about the process and its outcome. It also tells negotiators where to aim their guns, and possibly even what kinds of ammunition to use, as the arguments in the subse­ quent institutional debate show. However, isolating these elements does not help much in building a theory of negotiations. Another aspect brought out by the convergence and limita­ tion approach might be stated as proposition (2): "Negotia­ tion is a process of limiting alternatives until convergence is reached on a single position; the process continues as long as there is hope of convergence at a point acceptable to both sides. Acceptability is a function, not of parties' initial posi­ tions, but of their estimate of cost and gain applied at any moment to the foreseeable convergence point as compared

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to no agreement." For all its accuracy as a summary, this statement recalls a number of interpretive limitations men­ tioned earlier. Such notions as cost and gain estimates cannot be taken strictly or quantitatively, for there is little evidence that parties actually do add up a mathematical balance sheet and much more evidence that such a balance sheet, involv­ ing many nonquantitative and noncomparable items, cannot be precisely drawn. For this reason, among others, a general description of the negotiation process is preferable to such strictly quantitative notions as contract curves and contract areas. In addition, it must be remembered that different parties will generally ascribe different estimates (utilities) to the same points and positions, and that those estimates may vary during the negotiations—either because of changing evaluations or changing conditions—to the point where it is usually meaningless to think in terms of fixed minimum points or resistance points. Changing estimates can readily be seen in the various sets of Eurafrican negotiations: the shifting economic situation of the Maghreb and the declining advantages of Algeria's "status," the reestimates made by East Africa of its goal and of its cost/gain, the extremely fluid desiderata of the Yaounde Eighteen, their evaluation of advantages in and out of Association and their decision not to break off negotiations. In sum, the second proposition re­ places the "soft" terms of the first formula—"success" and "applicable"—with slightly "harder" terms—"acceptability" and "estimate"—that refer to perception. There is a dynamic element to this type of theoretical statement, but not a predictable element, for the blanks cannot be filled in in advance. In most of the sets of negotiations under analysis, the question was less one of "success" (i.e., final agreement at some point) than of where the convergence point would be. The theoretical statement above focuses mainly on final agreement; can it be reformulated to explain where the agree­ ment will lie? Or, in other words, is there a theoretical state-

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

ment that can be made about the use of power during nego­ tiations that will tell how convergence will be shaped? The completed sets of EEC-African negotiations that have been analyzed are of two types: those that covered a narrow range of alternatives and whose convergence point fell some­ where in between the positions of the two sides (Lagos), and those that covered a broad range of alternatives and whose convergence point was distinctly closer to the initial position of one party than that of the other (Yaounde I and II, Ma­ ghreb, Arusha). Perhaps the negotiations among the Euro­ peans in all the Eurafrican sets should be considered as well, in which case it would form a third category where the range of alternatives can vary but where the final balance sheet of convergence points is somewhere in between the initial posi­ tions. These cases, then, suggest that mere diversity in the range of alternatives is not relevant in determining the con­ vergence point, but that two convergence patterns can be dis­ cerned: a symmetrical one, where concessions come from all sides, and an asymmetrical one, where one party gives in noticeably more than the other. Obviously, these two arche­ types represent poles of a continuum, with mixed cases of varying degrees in the middle. From what has been said, then, a further proposition can be advanced (3): "Convergence will be asymmetrical toward one party's position if it is considered preferable to no agree­ ment by the other party, and if the one party shows that his real alternatives are worse for the other party. There will be no convergence if one party holds to positions not considered by the other party to be preferable to no agreement. Con­ vergence will tend to be symmetrical if the two parties' posi­ tions are coincident, complementary, or if both parties prefer an agreement to holding out on unacceptable positions." Another proposition will add (4): "The closer one party holds to its own positions, the greater the risk of rupture but the greater the chance of gain. The party can aim for con­ vergence asymmetrical to its side when the risk of rupture is small, that is, when the other side values an agreement more

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than a particular position, or when the value of agreement as compared with no agreement is slight." As a result in negotiations it seems to be less important to sell one's own position than to eliminate alternatives, either by showing why the other party's positions are unacceptable or why one's own only real alternatives are worse than its current positions—in other words, by showing that better al­ ternatives are impossible and possible alternatives are worse for the other party. Commitments and obligations, promises and predictions, faits accomplis and incapabilities are evoked to indicate what is possible; threats and warnings are used to show what is less favorable. It has been possible to advance a few propositions by using the concepts, "alternatives," "convergence," and "symmetry/ asymmetry." Clearly, these have not led far toward a compre­ hensive theory of negotiations, but, hopefully, they have opened a path of some usefulness and greater promise. These propositions are still close to the notion of "success," and hence recall the need for paying attention to the "principles" school of diplomacy. Just as advances in the physical study of impact on objects and the biochemical study of muscles have not outmoded lessons on how to play tennis, so the principles approach in negotiations will continue to be impor­ tant for the foreseeable future even though a systematic theory of negotiations may be constructed. But hopefully the alternative/convergence approach to the study of negotia­ tions and the theoretical propositions derived from it can be used to understand better the confrontation of diplomatic skills.

Weak and Strong The original question was: How can the weak negotiate with the strong, considering that the weak are both weak and needy and the strong are both strong and rich.22 To this ques22 The following discussion includes other comparable cases studied by the author and others. See I. William Zartman, "The MoroccanAmerican Base Negotiations," XVIII Middle East Journal 1:27-40 (Winter 1964) and in expanded form in Problems of New Power

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tion was added the suggestion that the weak in fact do have ways of finding strength in negotiations, or at least, have ways of turning their weakness to their advantage. The results of their negotiations, as reviewed here, confirm that the weak can win a good deal, not necessarily in comparison with their endless growing needs, but in more relevant comparisons— with what other rich states were doing, or with what the weak states had before, or with various initial points in the negotia­ tions. A review of these negotiations has also suggested ways of analyzing negotiations in general, which can then be played back and reapplied to give some answers to the orig­ inal question. Even at this point, however, the analysis brings out some caveats. "Strong" and "weak" are of course caricatures, as are the other pairs of words used to describe the two sides: "old"-"new," "developed"-"underdeveloped," "large""small," "colonial"-"anticolonial," "rich"-"poor." Better would be a mammoth matrix combining all these variables and checking their coincidence with various types of be­ havior.23 But even this would not give a proper answer on power, since power is relative and situational, leaving the re­ lation and the situation to be defined. The cases studied here are both similar and different enough to be comparative; yet they are not typical of all weak/strong confrontations in ne­ gotiations. The relations between the sides were friendly; (New York: Atherton, 1964); I. William Zartman, "Les relations entre la France et TAIgerie," xiv Revue Frangaise de Science Politique 6:1087-1113 (December 1964); Joseph L. Nogee, "Propaganda and Negotiation: The Case of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Commis­ sion," VH Journal of Conflict Resolution 3:510-21 (September 1963); Edward McWhinney, "The 'New' Countries and the 'New' Inter­ national Law," Dx American Journal of International Law 1:1-34 (1966); Piet-Hein Houben, "Principles of International Law Con­ cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States," DXI American Journal of International Law 3:703-36 (July 1967); Rob­ ert L. Friedheim, "The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law," xvni World Politics 1:20-41 (October 1965). 23 Cf. James Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Comparative Foreign and Domestic Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

the stakes were mostly positive-sum and hence the negotia­ tions were of the extension-innovation type;24 there was a commitment to success (but not time limit); there was no military pressure behind the negotiations; there was scarcely any "East-West" ingredient. On the other hand, the negotia­ tions were typical of a large span of postcolonial and devel­ opmental relations; the issues were political as well as eco­ nomic, and were strongly "North-South" in nature. The eight paired ways of limiting alternatives line up rather neatly into strong and weak state columns, with only one surprise. Strong states tended to make more use of volitional means of gratifying and depriving—promise and threat— whereas weak states relied on nonvolitional means—predic­ tion and warning. The reason is obvious, almost circular: strong states had the goods to deliver, whereas weak states could only point to new gratifications created by the agree­ ment itself or deprivations that would be the dire conse­ quences of force majeur. Similarly, the strong states used commitments more frequently and more successfully, while the weak states invested more successful energies into obligat­ ing others than in committing themselves. This use was dictated more by the direction of demands than by the bal­ ance of strength: as givers, the strong states could both afford and hide behind commitments, while the weak states were askers and were more interested in tying down the others. The surprise comes with the last pair. It might first be ex­ pected that the weak states would plead simple incapacity and the strong states use fait accompli, by their very natures. On the contrary, the strong states frequently tried to plead simple incapacity, since they were the ones being asked to make an effort for the others, while the weak both practiced fait accompli—a sign of new sovereignty that it would have been impolitic to contest—and suffered from it (usually at 24 The term is Ikle's and has some usefulness; Walton and McKersie's "distributive" and "integrative" seem to be inseparable in real cases, since negotiations are always a matter of restructuring percep­ tion (unless the case involves pure constraint).

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

the hands of time, as they waited for the strong to make up their minds). A bit fuller description will put some of these means into more recognizable garb. The obligations that the weak states attempted to impose on the strong were moral in nature, and evidenced moral power.25 How much power, of course, de­ pends on the standard of comparison: perhaps the strong states "should" do more, but at least they do do something. France was able to make a commitment to inaction that re­ pelled any attempt at obligation in regard to Guinea, but such a case is unique. While it is true that one never knows if moral obligations are "real" motivations, since man has a habit of couching his motivations in moral terms in order to hide crasser reasons, such behavior is by the same token no proof that crasser reasons are "real" either and that soulsaving is not the "realest" reason of all. A sounder level of analysis indicates that weak states in fact tried to pin moral obligations on the strong (not having any other kind), and the strong repeated the same reasoning when acting. Similarly, the threats that the strong used took the form of the take-it-or-leave-it packages with which the weak were presented. The strong states certainly had no intention of handing ultimatums to the weak;26 the package came out of the dynamics of the three-dimensional negotiations, in which the strong had to agree among themselves before facing the weak. A Senegalese is supposed to have said (and in any case a Nigerian quoted): "When Europe is divided, Africa pays; when it is united as now, Africa also pays."27 African unity was under terrible strains, including those of newness, pov­ erty, competitiveness, and the pressure to unite initially 25 See

testimony in Werner Feld, "External Relations of the Com­ mon Market and Group Leadership Attitudes in the Member States," χ Orbis 2:564-87 (Summer 1966), p. 580. 28 On the related matter of last-minute negotiations, see the excel­ lent analysis of Richard Witkin, "The Straphangers' Cliff-Hanger," New York Times, 31 December 1969. 27 P.N.C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 132, quoting Djime Momar Gueye.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

around "more" (since they were generally the askers) while the strong states were coming together about "less" (since they were the givers and since their viability, stability, and de­ velopment were not at stake). Thus, the weak were con­ stantly forced to reverse and water down, as they were drawn toward the convergence point of the strong, who were bound to unanimity. The strong's commitment backed the threat that accompanied their promise. Unity was also related to alternatives, in a curious way. It is no coincidence that the single weak state had the greatest freedom of choice and the largest group had the fewest al­ ternatives. Unity reduces alternatives, even though it can strengthen commitment to a single choice. Any one weak state could find security for itself in the wake of some other strong state. But no strong state could take on a new respon­ sibility for a whole group, which would bring more needs than assets. The rule appears to be almost mathematical from the four cases: the two groups of three states had consid­ erably (sixfold?) more latitude than the Eighteen and (a third?) less than the one; one of the groups of three main­ tained a high degree of latitude through disunity, and the other lost flexibility and time through the need to agree among themselves. In the process of convergence, understandings and coinci­ dence both came into use, but the typical pattern of agree­ ment involved mostly concessions and counterconcessions. This pattern generally began with a weak state demand, which was met by a strong state offer involving some con­ cession from the publicly announced initial points of the component members. The weak states then made a counterconcession, involving an acceptance of the offer under protest or after several rejections; the strong state move was then a slight improvement of the offer without changing the basic terms of reference. The alternative pattern was a series of coincidences, in which both weak and strong whittled at the common position, although in the case where this occurred, weak and strong were more nearly equal since the weak side needed agreement less than the strong side felt it did. During

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

this process, negotiations also move through different levels, normally from principles through questions and answers to details. In this change of levels, the strong states also had control. If there was no coincidence or convergence on the principles, they reversed the order and turned to details until the principles fell into place.28 The weak states could always break off talks, although that was a rather minimal exercise of power if it did not force the other side to give in (as it did not). Not only were the weak unable to bend the strong sig­ nificantly by walking out; in addition, it was actually the weak that felt the pressure of passing time more painfully than did the strong. Thus, rather than being able to boycott tactically, the weak had to press for procedural speed as well as sub­ stantive benefits, adding to the burden of their demands. Where then does the power of weak states lie? In three areas, all of them procedural, and in one context. The con­ text is the positive-sum negotiation. When there is a fixed pie to be redistributed, the weak are bound to lose. It is al­ ways in their interest to seek a non-zero-sum terrain for negotiations, where even if they get less than they think they deserve, they at least get something more than they had in the beginning. The three areas of strength suggest that the weak states do have the power to choose their terrain, the choice being a procedural matter. First, weak states can provoke an encounter. By their mere existence and membership in the world community and its organizations, they can influence agendas. Whether the ques­ tion is independence and decolonization, or fair-trade prac­ tices, or the negotiation of an agreement, they can raise the point. Second, they can put forward their needs, with all the self-generating pressures that such demands arouse in a world convinced of its problem-solving role. Needs tend to have an almost self-negotiating power; they become a challenge, a moral pang of practical dimensions that is quite different 28

Note that this is what the Six tried to do with East Africa in 1965—bypass the deadlock on principle by creating a crest on details that would make balking on principle either unthinkable or at least anticlimactic.

NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL

from the humanitarian heartburn of the past century. Such a characteristic must not be exaggerated, of course, but it contains an essential truth. Third, weak states have the power to agree, which means the power to gratify both in the psy­ chological sense and the sense of bringing into being the newly allocated pie. Without their signature, neither the problem-solving satisfactions nor the material benefits can be achieved. Toward strong states, which feel they have a role as well as an opportunity and which have made initial com­ mitments to success, such power is real. It represents, after all, the only expenditure that the weak states made in the negotiations studied. They gave no aid, lost no income, and probably even lost no real opportunities for industrial de­ velopment. For the price of a diplomatic staff in Brussels,29 they provoked an encounter, made their demands, and ac­ cepted what was offered to them, removing any tinge of men­ dacity by seriously proclaiming it was not enough, figures in hand. That is a respectable exercise of power by the weak over the strong. 29However, on the Nigerian negotiations, Bridget Bloom, op.cit., pp. 18, 25, estimates that the value of the EEC concessions to Nigeria was "hardly enough to cover the cost of sending the successive Nige­ rian delegations to Brussels," whereas the value of the reciprocal con­ cessions was "probably somewhat in excess of the Community's expenditure on its negotiating team in Brussels"; respective figures are £50,000 and £175,000, but do not count nonmonetary values. Despite the limitations inherent in the last phrase, this evaluation does help explain the ease both of agreement and of expiration.

Appendix and Index

APPENDIX TABLE 1 Eurafrican Trade, 1960, 1964, 1968 direction

EEC -» 18

ί" million

% of exporters' total exports

% of importers' total imports

year

1003

1.7 1.7 1.6

51.0 58.0 59.0

60 64 68

18 -» EEC

491 698 ηa

45.0 54.0 ηa

1.6 1.7 ηa

60 64 68

EEC —> Nigeria

118 167

0.4 0.5 0.2

19.0 23.0 26.0

60 64 68

30.0 41.0 29.0

0.4 0.5 0.3

60 64 68

124

0.3 0.1 0.2

18.0 17.0 19.0

60 64 68

92 108 ηa

23.0 19.0 ηa

0.3 0.1 ηa

60 64 68

365 366 395

1.2 0.8 0.6

62.0 52.0 51.0

60 64 68

257 345 391

54.0 62.0 64.0

0.8 0.8 0.6

60 64 68

560 773

143

Nigeria —» EEC

144 245 168

EEC -> E. Africa

E. Africa —*· EEC

EEC —» Morocco & Tunisia

Morocco & Tunisia —» EEC

71 77

SOURCE: United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics NOTE: Rwanda and Burundi (a small figure) excluded from the 18's statistics, and Algeria (a large figure) excluded from North Africa's statistics, because of only sporadic availability; η a indicates that figures are not available.

APPENDIX

TABLE 2 European Aid Contributors (in $ millions and percentages) Treaty of Rome—FEDOM Yaounde I—FED Yaounde Il—FED 2 $200 $200 $ 40 $ 70 $ 70 $ 1.25 $581.25 0 $581.25

$246.5 $246.5 $100. $ 69 $ 66. $ 2. $730. $ 70. $800.

34.41% 34.41% 6.88% 12.04% 12.04% .22% O O

France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg Subtotal BEI loans Total

33.75% 33.75% 13.70% 9.45% 9.05% .30% 100. %

$298.5 33.16% $298.5 33.16% 15.62% $140.6 8.89% $ 80. 8.89% $ 80. $ 2.4 .28% $900. 100. % $100. $1000.

TABLE 3 African Aid Receivers (in $ millions and percentages) Treaty of Rome—FEDOM

Cameroon CAR Chad Congo-B Dahomey Gabon Ivory Coast Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo Upper Volta Burundi Rwanda Congo-K Somalia

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

52.8 18.2 27.7 25.0 20.8 17.8 39.6 56.3 42.0 15.4 31.3 43.8 15.9 28.4 4.9 4.9 19.6 10.1

Subtotal Dependencies Undifferen­ tiated Total

$474.6 $ 95.8 $10. 8 $581.25

Yaounde I—FED

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

allocation by treaty 15.8 (incl. $ 11.850*) 6.8 (incl. $ 5.100*) 5.7 (incl. $ 4.275*) 6.4 (incl. $ 4.800*) 5.5 (incl. $ 4.125*) 4.0 46.7 (incl. $ 35.025*) 31.6 (incl. $ 23.700*) 5.6 (incl. $ 4.200*) _ 5.0 6.5 (incl. $ 4.875*) 46.7 (incl. $ 35.025*) 5.7 (incl. $ 4.275*) — 6.0 _ 5.25 _ 5.25 15.0 6.5 -

$230.0

$230.0

(incl. $137,250*)

allocation by 1 Jan. 1970 $ 53.2 $ 25.8 $ 33.7 $ 20.7 $ 22.8 $ 20.4 $ 57.2 $ 70.2 $ 33.1 $ 18.3 $ 30.1 $ 60.4 $ 19.3 $ 29.8 $ 20.0 $ 18.4 $ 74.4 $ 27.0 $634.7 $ 53.8 $ 11.9 $700.4

* For production aid; the rest is minimum for diversification aid; col. 2 (minimum country allocation) and col. 3 (project allocation by 1 Jan. 1970) may overlap. BEI loans not included.

APPENDIX

TABLE 4 Nationality of Aid Project Contractors (in $ millions and percentages, 1 Jan. 1970) Treaty of Rome —FEDOM

$197.6 $ 62.2 $ 29.2 $ 22.8 $ 17.3 $ 1.4 $122.9 $ .4 $453.8

43.6% 13.7% 6.4% 5.0% 3.8% 0.3% 27.0% 0.1% O O

France Italy Germany Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Associates Others Total

YaoundS I-—FED

$116.6 $ 34.1 $ 74.4 $ 10.2 $ 28.2 $ 1.2 $ 52.4 $ .5 $317.6

36.7 % 10.7% 23.5% 3.2% 8.9% 0.4% 16.4% 0.1% 100 %

Index Adoula, Cyrille, 53 aid, 81, 106, 122-24, 128, 134-35, 137-38, 140, 152, 156-57, 18082, 184, 186, 213. See also FED I, FED II, FEDOM Alawi, Moulay Ahmed, 136 AlgecirasTreaty (1906), 119, 141-43 Algeria, 6, 9,11, 17, 19,88,91, 100, 116-21, 123-29, 132, 142, 144, 148-52, 210, 220 Allardt, Helmut, 27-28 ambassadorial accreditation to EEC, 26, 32, 101, 128 Arusha Agreements, 106, 162, 186, 198,218, 221,227 Associated States Coordinating Council, 168, 188. See also OAMCE, OCAM, UAM Association Committee (Yaounde) 29, 32, 34, 37, 39, 52, 55, 16668,170-73, 179, 185-86; (Lagos) 90, 92, 162; (Arusha) 96, 162 Association Council (Yaounde) 29, 32, 34, 37, 39, 52, 88, 16670; Brussels (8 July 1964) 16768, 170; Brussels (7-8 April 1965) 169, 171-72, 174-75, 178; Tananarive (18 May 1966) 173, 179; Brussels (29 October 1966) 173-74; Brussels (7 July 1967) 179, 182-83, 185; Kinshasa (23-24 July 1968) 185-86; (Lagos) 81, 88-90, 162; (Tunis) 140 Association Court (Yaounde) 32, 166, 179 Association Interim Committee (Yaounde) 167; (Lagos) 92-93 Association Parliamentary

Commission, 166-67, 174-76, 182, 187-88 Association Parliamentary Conference (Yaounde) 29-30, 34, 37, 39, 41, 45, 49, 52, 16667, 175-76; Strasbourg (19 June 1961) 31-32, 41; Dakar (10 December 1964) 174; Rome (6-8 December 1965) 176, 178; Abidjan (10-14 December 1966) 182; Strasbourg (8 December 1967) 187-88; (Tunis) 120 Association Secretariat, 29, 32, 52, 166-68 Babu, Abdulrahman, 102 bananas, 14-15, 29, 43, 46-47, 52, 60, 164, 175-78, 197-98 bargaining, 203-05. See also negotiations Bedie Konan, 193 BEI (European Investment Bank), 46, 50, 69-73, 179-80, 194 Belgium, 6, 8-11, 13-14, 16-17, 27,36, 40, 46,51,56-57, 69-71, 82, 93, 105, 118, 129, 132, 144-45, 147, 171, 178, 192, 194, 232-33 ben Salah, Ahmed, 149 Bouabid, 'Abderrahim, 151-53 Bourguiba, Habib, 127, 132, 149, 159 Bourguiba, Habib, Jr., 136, 149 Brezhnev, Leonid, 21 Burundi, 13-14, 16-17, 47, 183, 232. See also open-door states Cameroon, 13-14, 17, 25, 31, 43, 61,73-74, 178,232 CAP (Common Agriculture Policy), 41, 44-45, 56, 60, 66-

INDEX

67, 73,85-86, 89-91,99, 11718, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128-29, 131-35, 145, 148, 152, 165, 172, 174, 179-81, 183-84, 189, 192 Cartierism, 181 Central African Republic (CAR), 13, 17, 36, 232 CET (Common External Tariff), 12-13, 25, 27, 29, 32-33, 35, 38-40, 42-47, 56-57, 67-68, 84, 107, 117-18, 124, 128, 133, 145-47, 176, 192-93 Chad, 13, 17, 176, 195, 232 chocolate, 171, 184 citrus, 124-27, 136-40, 147, 156 cloves, 99, 105-07 cocoa, 15, 29, 46, 81, 86, 164, 169, 172, 192-93 coconuts, 50 coffee, 14-15, 29, 43, 46, 48, 50, 52, 60, 99, 105-06, 164, 177, 192-93 Colombo, Emilio, 47-48, 52, 60, 71 Commission, 16, 24-26, 28-29, 39, 44-45, 53, 55, 67-69, 72-73, 7982, 84, 87, 93, 95-96, 98-100, 104, 106, 111, 119-20, 123-24, 126, 130-31, 133-34, 136-39, 144-45, 147, 150, 156, 168, 170-71, 174, 178, 182, 186, 189-90, 193-94 commitments and obligations, 7-9, 34, 62-64, 66, 80, 87, 9495, 98, 112-13, 140, 142, 14849, 153, 160-63, 166, 170-71, 175, 178, 183, 187-88, 192-93, 195, 197-98, 208-10, 222, 224225. See also Declarations of Intentions, GATT, UNCTAD Commonwealth, 53, 56, 72-73, 85, 103 Commonwealth Conference

(1962),21,77-78, 80, 93-94, 148 Commonwealth preferences, 82, 86, 96, 99, 107, 112, 169, 198, 209 Communist Party of Morocco, 151 competing African nonAssociates, 28-29, 32-36, 39-40, 47, 56-57, 78-79, 81-84, 86, 9596, 99, 107, 176-78, 192-93 competing temperate products, 99, 120, 129, 165, 174, 189-90, 192. See also CAP, fruits and vegetables compromise, 11, 214 concessions, 40, 56-57, 88-90, 159, 172-73, 213-14, 226 Congo, 13-14, 16-17, 36-37, 47, 53, 57, 59, 73, 178, 183, 232. See also open-door states Congo-Brazzaville, 13, 17, 26, 79, 165, 178, 232 convergence, 40, 50-51, 56, 61, 66, 106, 110, 193-95, 197, 211-22

cork, 128-29, 133, 136, 144 cotton, 15, 50, 195 Council, 24, 26, 28, 30, 34, 40, 45, 47, 49, 52-55, 58, 63, 72, 79-84, 87-88, 91, 93, 97, 100, 104, 111, 117, 123-24, 126, 128, 130-32, 135, 137, 139, 146-47,166-67, 170-71, 189-90, 193 Council of Europe, 7 crest, 87, 105-06, 109-11, 11314, 137-38, 141,213,227 criticism of Association, 20-22, 66, 77-78, 80-81, 93-96, 108, 150-53, 164-66,168-69, 174-78, 181-89, 191, 193,209 Dahomey, 13, 17, 26, 36, 174, 195, 232

INDEX

Darboux, Paul, 36 Declaration of Intentions (1957), 19,24,118, 122, 130,137,148, 150, 157, 209; (1963),53-54, 56, 62, 79-82, 96, 103, 107-08, 112-13, 177, 209 decolonization, 3, 6-8, 18-19, 21, 27, 32, 34, 38, 40-41, 46, 48, 56-57, 63, 77, 82, 137, 139, 148, 152, 162-65, 189, 196, 209 development, 3-4, 32, 34-35, 38, 48, 63-64, 66, 68, 74, 131,152, 163, 165, 181, 187, 196-97, 208, 223-24 Dia, Mamadou, 60 Diori, Hamani, 180-82,186, 188, 193 diplomacy, defined, 200-02 Douzima, Marcel, 36 duration, 10, 18, 34, 37, 45, 47, 54, 72, 84, 96, 103-04, 107, 122, 131, 134-35, 137-41, 144, 150, 160-61, 184, 190, 194-95 EACSO (East African Common Services Organization), 94, 96, 101, 104 East Africa, see Arusha Agreements, Kenya, Tanganyika, Tanzania, Uganda East African Central Legislative Assembly, 94,101 East African Common Market, 94-96, 101, 103, 106, 113 Eastern Europe, 100, 151 ECA (Economic Commission for Africa), 20-21, 101 economic independence, see decolonization EDC (European Defense Community), 9, 101 EFTA (European Free Trade Area), 11, 20 eggs, 128,131,133

Entente, 188 Erhardt, Ludwig, 36 establishment, 15-16,19,24,29, 31,52, 58, 88-90, 103,140, 183, 185, 190 Euratom (European Atomic Community), 11 European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), 135 European Assembly, 7, 24, 30-31, 40, 45, 54,79, 93, 106, 182, 190 European Court of Justice, 147 European Development Funds, see FED, FEDOM European Investment Bank, see BEI EvianAccords (1962), 117 expatriates, 27, 38, 59, 73, 234 fait accompli and incapacity, 43, 103, 117, 144-45, 148, 209-10, 224-25 Fanfani, Amintore, 146 fats and oils, 30, 116, 133,165, 172, 174-75, 183-84, 189. See also CAP, oil (olive), oil (palm and peanut) Fayat, Paul, 36 FED (European Development Fund), 29, 31-32, 35, 37, 39, 41-42, 44-52, 55, 57, 60, 62, 65-74, 124, 157, 175, 180-81, 183, 186, 192, 198-99, 210-12, 214, 216, 232-33 FED II (second European Development Fund), 190-95, 198,211,232 FEDOM (European Overseas Development Fund), 9-11, 1618, 24-25, 29, 37, 39, 44, 46-48, 55, 62, 67-68, 70-71, 157, 175, 211,232-33 fiscal duties, 13-14, 87, 90

INDEX

fish, 125, 128, 130, 140, 144, 15455, 172, 174,185-86 Fofana, Abdoulaye, 27 France, 6-13, 16-19, 25-27, 33-34, 36, 38-40, 44, 46, 53, 55-60, 64, 66, 68-72, 79, 82-89, 91-93, 96, 102, 104-05, 107-10, 117-18, 120, 128-32, 135, 137, 139, 142, 144-50, 157, 172, 174, 177-78, 190-95, 207, 210, 214, 225, 232-33 free trade area, 8, 12, 29, 35-39, 47, 55-56, 59,81,97, 103, 10910, 118, 122-25, 130, 141, 144, 148, 152-53, 166, 186, 189, 191,193, 213 fruits, 125-29, 133-34, 136, 147, 154, 172. See also citrus, vegetables Gabon, 13, 17, 51-52, 86, 169, 233 GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), 39, 80, 83, 86-87, 98-99, 112, 123, 141, 163, 192, 209,216 Germany (East), 91, 97, 101, 177, 207 Germany (West), 6-7, 10-11, 14, 16, 27, 33-34, 36-37, 39, 44, 46, 52, 55, 67-72, 82-83, 87, 91,95, 97, 101, 105, 117-18, 121, 128, 132, 144-45, 147, 157, 175-79, 191-94, 197, 23233 Ghana, 19-22, 77, 93 Gorse, Georges, 36, 43-44, 48, 68 Goulli, Salaheddine el-, 149 Gowon, Yakubu, 93 grain, 122, 125, 128, 130-31, 133, 140, 144, 154 Great Britain, 9, 23, 53, 77-80, 83, 86-87, 89, 91, 94-95, 129 Greece, 117, 120, 129, 152 Guedira, Ahmed Reda, 122, 129

Guessous, ben Salem, 138 Gueye, Djime Momar, 41, 65, 225 Guinea, 19-20, 31, 225 gum arabic, 50 Hassan II, 120-21, 127 Indonesia, 192 industrial goods, 130, 133, 13638, 144-45, 147, 164-65, 171, 180-81, 183-84, 189,213 industries, transformation (processing), 130, 136, 165, 169-70, 183-84, 189 initial positions, 6-7, 27-30, 55. 57, 81-82, 94-96, 120, 122-25, 148, 189,212,219, 223 interests, 9-10, 27-28, 32, 34, 42, 44, 56, 59-61, 65, 67-68, 77-78, 81-82, 94, 107, 120, 142, 14950, 152-61, 163-64, 166, 169, 174, 180, 182, 185, 208 Iran, 129 Israel, 117,126-27, 129, 137-38, 145-46 Istiqlal party, 151 Italy, 6, 9, 11, 13-14, 16-18, 27, 40, 44, 46-47, 51-54, 56, 69, 71, 82, 91, 105, 117, 124-26, 128-29, 132, 135-36, 139, 14449, 152, 174, 178, 193-94, 23233 Ivory Coast, 13, 17, 26, 36, 48, 60-61, 73, 169, 178, 181, 232 joint determination, 26, 29-31, 32-35, 39, 43, 45, 52, 63, 66, 167-69, 186, 198, 213 Kahama, CG, 102 Kanga, Victor, 43-44 Kawawa, Rachidi, 93-95, 100 Kennedy Round, 132, 179-80

INDEX

Kenya, 77, 94-107, 113-14, 165, 169 Kiano, Julius, 99-100 Lagos Agreement, 90-92, 96, 98, 102-03, 106, 143-44, 162, 213-

migrant workers, 124,134-35, 137-38, 152, 156 Mollet, Guy, 9 Morocco, 7, 9, 11, 19, 85, 88, 108-09, 116-44, 148-61,21314, 220, 231

16,218,221

Lahbabi, Mohammed, 151-52 Latin America, 175, 178, 180, 187, 192 leather, 174 Lebanon, 117, 144 Lemaignen, Robert, 27-28, 67 Libya, 9, 208 loans, 32, 42, 44-46, 50, 69-72, 134, 180-81. See also BEI Luxembourg, 6, 14, 16, 40, 69, 93, 144-45, 193, 232-33 Madagascar, 13, 17, 36, 61, 63, 73-74, 99, 178, 232 Mali, 13, 17, 63, 79, 153, 165, 232 mandates, Nigeria (2 June 1964), 80, 83; Nigeria (2 February 1965), 85; Nigeria (14 June 1965), 88-89, 128, 214; East Africa (13 October 1964), 80, 96-98, 100, 113; East Africa (29 February 1968), 105; Morocco and Tunisia (14 June 1965), 88, 127-30, 131, 134, 214; Morocco and Tunisia (24 October 1967), 132, 136-38, 149-50; Morocco and Tunisia (30 July 1968), 140 manioc, 165, 189 margarine, 174 Masmoudi, Mohammed, 149 Mauritania, 13, 17, 51, 174, 18586, 232 meat, 133, 172 Mediterranean commercial area, 116,120, 125-26, 129-30, 132, 135, 137, 146, 152

nationalizations, 118, 136, 152, 210 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 6, 9, 20 negotiations, defined, 159, 197-98, 202, 206-07, 219-20 negotiations, Treaty of Rome, fifth ministerial session, Venice (29 May 1956), 8; sixth ministerial session, VaIDuchesse (17-24 January 1957), 9; seventh ministerial session, Val-Duchesse (4 February 1957), 10; eighth ministerial session, Paris (1820 February 1957), 11; Yaounde Convention, first ambassadorial session (1-3 June 1961), 32-33; second ambassadorial session (8 November 1961), 33-35; first ministerial session (6 December 1961),36-37, 40, 49, 65, 67-68; second ministerial session (9 April 1962), 43-45, 67; third ministerial session (4-5 July 1962), 47-49, 59-60, 65, 70-72; fourth ministerial session (23 October 1962), 49-51, 60, 65, 72-73; fifth ministerial session (19-20 December 1962), 52, 60; Lagos Convention, first ministerial session (14-19 July 1964), 83; second ministerial session (19-22 October 1964), 83-84; third ministerial session (9-12 February 1965), 86-87, 110; fourth ministerial session

INDEX

(26 April-4 May 1965), 88-89, 110; fifth ministerial session (29 June-8 July 1965), 89, 110; sixth ministerial session (7 May 1966), 91-92; Arusha Conventions, first ministerial session (1-8 March 1965), 98100, 113; second ministerial session (7-17 November 1966), 102-103; third ministerial session (22 April-2 May, 27 May-7 June 1968), 105-06; renewed ministerial session (30 June-9 July 1969), 106-07; Rabat Convention, first ministerial session (12-14 July 1965) 130-32; second ministerial session (22-24 November 1967), 136, 150; third ministerial session (14-19 October, 25-26 November 1968), 140-43; fourth ministerial session (20 February 1969), 143-44; Tunis Convention, first ministerial session (6-8 July 1965), 13032; second ministerial session (14-15 November 1967), 13637, 150; third ministerial session (7-9 October 1968), 140-41; fourth ministerial session (17-18 February 1969), 143-44; II Yaounde Convention, first ministerial session (19-20 December 1968), 191; second ministerial session (26 March 1969), 19192; third ministerial session (29 May 1969), 192-93; fourth ministerial session (26-28 June 1969), 193-94 neocolonialism, 21,152 Netherlands, 6-11, 14, 25, 27, 33, 36-37, 39-40, 43-44, 46,

52-55, 58, 65, 68-73, 82-84, 87, 93, 95, 97, 108, 117-18, 124, 129, 135, 139, 144-47, 152, 171-73, 175-76, 178, 189-95, 214, 232-33 Niger, 13,17,180, 184, 195, 232 Nigeria, 56, 62, 77-93, 96-97, 99115, 165, 167-69,177, 198, 209,211,213-16, 228, 231 Nkrumah, Kwame, 20-21 nonalignment, 36, 77-79, 93-95, 121, 124, 148, 164-65 Nouira, Hedi, 149 Nyerere, Julius, 101 OAMCE (African and Malagasy Organization for Economic Cooperation), 25, 30, 33, 3638, 47, 49-51, 59, 63, 65 OAU (Organization of African Unity), 21, 23, 127, 168 Obote, Milton, 95 OCAM (African and Malagasy Common Organization), 168, 180-82, 188, 198 oils (olive), 125, 128-29, 136-37, 139-40, 147, 154-56; (peanut and palm), 15, 50, 60, 81, 86, 89, 164, 184, 192-93, 195 Okigbo, Pius, 86, 88, 92-93, 225 open Association, 33, 52-55, 59, 62, 114, 166, 169, 189-91, 197. See also Declaration of Intentions (1963) open-door states, 13-14, 47, 5051, 59, 61, 66, 71-72, 183, 209, 213; East Africa, 80, 89; Nigeria, 107; Morocco, 119. See also Algeciras Treaty origins, 75, 130-31, 134, 136, 139, 144, 169-74, 176, 185, 198 overseas dependencies, 7, 9-11, 50, 71-72, 171, 174, 232 Palestine, 145,215

INDEX

Panama, 215-16 patterns of negotiation, 27, 33, 61-64, 73-76, 98, 107, 109-15, 159-60, 183-88, 192, 195-99, 207,211-12,215-16,218-22, 224-28 peanuts, 48, 164. See also oils (peanut and palm) Pedini, Mario, 176 pepper, 50 permanent representatives, 26, 32, 34,39, 53-54, 97, 104, 131-32, 135, 147, 167-68, 170-71, 190 persuasion, 63-64, 108, 149 petroleum, 131, 133, 136, 138, 144-45, 154-55, 171-74 pineapples, 105-07 political action, 132, 162-63, 179, 196 polycentrism, see decolonization Portugal, 152 power, 3-6, 33, 64, 66, 134, 151, 159, 197,201-02, 206-07, 21719, 222-28. See also veto power preferences, see tariffs price and market guarantees, 2930, 32, 34-35, 37-40, 42, 44-45, 52, 60, 63, 66, 121,166, 17576, 181-82, 184-85, 188, 19092, 197, 213 products, "four," 81, 83-86, 8890, 92, 109, 169; "seven," 8889, 109; "twenty-six," 87-90, 100, 109 promise and prediction, 22, 34, 44, 149-50, 207-08, 224 protection, 153, 160-61, 165, 182. See also tariffs, safeguards, unity quotas, 14, 24, 29-30, 32, 38, 47, 54, 185-86; German, 11, 14, 52, 177-79, 198; Belgian, 14, 52; Nigerian, 85-86, 89-90, 93,

109, 169; East African, 99, 101,105-06; North African, 120-21, 131, 133, 135, 140-44, 146 Rabat Convention, 136-38, 140, 142-44, 156, 218, 221 Rabemananjara, Jacques, 43, 63 raised demands, East African, 99, 102-03, 113; Moroccan, 138, 141-43; origins, 171-72 ratification, Yaounde, 49, 54, Yaounde II, 195; Lagos, 91, 93, 185; Rabat and Tunis, 139 Razafinbahiny, Jules, 37, 63, 65 reciprocity, 12, 24, 29, 50, 66, 80, 83, 86-88, 90, 96-104, 106-07, 110, 113-14, 122-23, 131, 13942, 148, 163, 169, 183, 189, 191-93, 195,213,220 reference points, 62, 68-75, 11 Ι­ Ο, 157, 184-85, 192, 210-12, 214 resistance points, 47-49, 99, 10203, 150, 159-60 reverse preferences, see reciprocity revisionism, 162-63, 195-97 rice, 50, 133, 164 Rochereau, Henri, 93, 193 Rome Treaty, 8-16, 18-19, 21-22, 24-25, 34-38, 40, 42-43, 5557, 63, 65, 112, 117, 123-24, 139, 144, 146-47, 151, 166, 176-77, 194, 198, 209-10, 21314, 220 rubber, 15 Rwanda, 13, 16-17, 47, 183, 232 safeguards, 13-14, 29, 34, 37, 43, 84, 90, 99,107,130, 135, 140, 152 Sailer, Raphael, 36, 44, 47-48, 71 Scandinavia, 129

INDEX

Senegal, 13, 17, 33, 38, 48-49, 59-60, 62-65, 73-74, 142, 184, 195, 232 Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 187 Somalia, 9, 13-14, 16, 17-18, 24, 36, 47, 63, 178, 183, 232 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 8 Spain, 117, 129, 137-39, 152, 174,

208 sponsors, 38, 54, 58, 60, 66, 97, 113, 118, 132, 135-36, 139, 151, 158 steel, 131, 147 success, 23, 54, 140, 218-20 sugar, 50, 164-65, 174, 189 surprix, 6, 24, 28, 48-51, 57, 60, 62, 64, 107, 181,209-11 Tafawa Balewa, 80, 92 Tanganyika, 77-79, 93-96 Tanzania, 97-107, 113-14, 165, 169 tapioca, 165, 189 tariffs, 6-7, 9-11, 12-15, 19, 22, 25, 27, 29, 32, 35, 37-41, 43, 45-47, 50, 54-55, 57, 64, 68, 81, 84, 86-88, 90, 96, 98-100, 105, 109, 117-18, 120-21, 12324, 126, 128, 130, 133-35, 138, 140-45, 152, 165, 169, 175-76, 178, 183,186, 192. See also CET taxes on consumption, 29, 32, 38, 42, 45, 176-77, 180-81, 190 technical assistance, 30, 32, 3435, 39, 42, 45, 47, 50, 122, 134, 137-38, 140, 179, 181, 183, 186, 198 terms of trade, 162-64, 166, 181 textiles, 171-74 Thorn, Gaston, 190, 193-94 threats and warnings, 39, 43-44, 63-64, 149-50, 208, 222-25 tobacco, 172

Togo, 13-14, 17, 25, 39, 61, 183, 232 Toure, Mamadou, 44 Toure, Sekou, 20 Tunis Agreements, 136-38, 140-41, 144, 156, 218, 221 Tunisia, 9, 11, 19, 85, 88, 108-09, 116-44, 148-51, 153-61,213-14, 220, 231 Turkey, 117, 120, 129, 152 UAM (African and Malagasy Union), 29-30, 38-39, 53,5556, 59, 61, 72-73, 168 Uganda, 77-78, 94-107, 113-14, 165, 169 understandings, 62, 214-15, 226 UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) I, 83,97-99, 103, 112, 162-63, 187, 209; II, 187-92, 196, 209 UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces), 151-52 United Nations, 163, 168, 196. See also ECA, UNCTAD United States, 39, 80, 87, 89, 91, 164-65, 208,215 unity, African, 29-30, 38, 51, 55, 58-61, 63, 65, 79, 92-93, 95, 101, 108, 119-20, 126-27, 134, 140, 143-44,146, 149, 151-61, 168-72, 180, 184, 195, 197-98, 225; European, 6-7, 33, 42-44, 48, 56-58, 61-66, 70, 145, 149, 153, 157, 160-61, 165, 170-72, 174, 185-86, 19092, 209,219, 221,225 USSR, 164-65 Upper Volta, 13, 17,51,232 vegetables, 125-29, 133-34, 136-37, 147, 154-55 veto power, 10, 53, 64-66, 71, 88, 113, 120, 134, 138, 15759, 184, 208, 225

INDEX

weak and strong, see power wine, 125, 128, 130, 134, 136-37, 147, 154-55 woods, 25, 46-47, 60, 81, 86, 89, 169 working groups (Yaounde), 35, 37-38, 41-42, 47

74, 78-79,81-86, 88, 90-91, 95-96, 98-99, 104, 112, 131, 148, 162, 164, 166-71, 174-87, 193-94, 197, 207, 209, 213-19, 231; II Yaounde Convention, 188, 191-95,221,231 Yugoslavia, 117,137

Yaounde Convention, 54, 66,

Zouaoui, Ali, 149

New York University CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Studies in Peaceful Change Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism, Thomas M. Franck, Gisbert H. Flanz, Herbert J. Spiro and Frank N. Trager (New York: New York University Press), 1968 A Free Trade Association, Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, eds. (New York: New York University Press), 1968 Comparative Constitutional Process, Thomas M. Franck (New York: Praeger; London: Sweet and Maxwell), 1968 The Structure of Impartiality, Thomas M. Franck (New York: Macmillan), 1968 Agents of Change: A Close Look at the Peace Corps, David Hapgood and Meridan Bennett (Boston: Little, Brown), 1968 Law, Reason and Justice: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Graham B. Hughes (New York: New York University Press), 1969 Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact, I. William Zartman, ed. (New York: New York University Press), 1970 Sierra Leone: An Experiment in Democracy in an African Nation, Gershon Collier (New York: New York University Press), 1970 Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories, Stanley A. de Smith (New York: New York University Press), 1970 International Business Negotiations: A Study in India, Ashok Kapoor (New York: New York University Press), 1970 Foreign Capital for Economic Development: A Korean Case Study, Seung Hee Kim (New York: Praeger), 1970