Politics and Conflict in Governance and Planning Theory and Practice 9780815369196, 9781351252881

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Book Title
Copyright
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Notes on Contributors
1 The Political in Governance and Planning
Introduction
Understanding Contemporary Times: How are the Political and the Post-Political Theorised?
Why Did Debates on the Political and the Post-Political Attract Attention in Explaining Planning and Governance in Contemporary Times?
Are the Recent Transformations in Planning and Governance Indicative of a Retreat from the Post-Political Condition or Not?
The Book
References
Part I
Existing and Emerging Paradigms on Spatial Planning and Governance: A Critical Evaluation.
2 Crisis in Planning Theory: Is the Political a Way Out of the Impasse in Planning?
Introduction: Planning Theory/Planning Theories
Planning in Different Regulatory Regimes: Compromise or Conflict?
Recent Debates and Criticisms of Contemporary Planning
Planning and the Political
The Way Out
References
3 Planning and Governance: Towards Radical Political Approaches
Introduction
Consensus Building or Agonist Prevention of Antagonism?
Planning as Politics: Approaches, Potentials and Limitations
Counter-Hegemonic Planning beyond Communicative and Agnostic Approaches
References
Part II
Conflict in Governance and Planning Practices: Problems of Post-Political Trends
4 Multilevel Power Relations and Planning Conflicts in a ‘Land of Exception’: The Case of the Sughereta di Niscemi Reserve in Sicily
Introduction
Power Relations in the Domain of Planning Laws: The Agambenian Approach
Being Exposed to International Military Interests: The Case of the ‘Sughereta di Niscemi’ Reserve in Sicily
Flexibility of Governance and Manipulation of Planning Procedures
Conclusions
Notes
References
5 Engaging in Politics of Participation: Managing Power through Action Research
Introduction
Democratic Participation and Power in Participatory Planning
Methodological Framework
Power is Not an Obstacle, but …
Concluding Remarks
Notes
References
6 Different Understandings of ‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict: Portuguese Spatial Planning and Practice
Introduction
Theoretical Interpretations of the Concept of Public Interest
The Public Interest in Portuguese Spatial Planning Policy
The Pursuit of the Public Interest in the Portuguese Planning Practice: The Troia-Melides Coast Case Study
Conclusions
Notes
References
7 The Conflict between Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies: Mexican Housing Policy
Introduction
Institutional Foundations of the Mexican Social Housing Policy
Outcomes of the Housing Policy in the Post-Political Era: Relevant Figures of the Housing Production
Different Group Roles and Reactions to the Housing Policies and New Social Housing Projects
Conclusions: The Political Aspects of Housing
Notes
References
Part III
New Attempts to Overcome the Post-Political Trends in Planning and Governance
8 Shifting Political Conditions for Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries
Introduction
The Political Conditions for Spatial Planning
Shifts in Nordic Spatial Planning
Similarities and Diverging Trajectories across the Four Nordic Countries
Conclusion: Can We Recognise Post-Political Tendencies in Nordic Spatial Planning?
References
9 Politicising the Regional Scale?: The Politics of Metropolitan Governance in Germany, Canada and Brazil
Introduction
Metropolitan Governance
Metropolitan Governance in Canada, Brazil and Germany
Conclusive Remarks: The Politics of Metropolitan Governance, Multilevel Governance or Lost in Federalism?
References
10 Local Welfare Governance and Social Innovation: The Ambivalence of the Political Dimension
Local Welfare Governance in Europe: Crisis, Rescaling and Depoliticisation
Social Innovation and its Ambivalence
Policy-Led Social Innovation in the City of Milan
Conclusion
Notes
References
11 Politicisation of Community Development: Universities as Boundary Objects
Introduction
Politicisation as a Good
University as a Boundary Object
Empirical Explorations: Urban Studies Forum and Liveable City Year
Conclusion: Specific and Universal Intellectuals, Discourse into Practice
Acknowledgements
Notes
References
12 A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less Power: Planners as Progressive Place-Based Leaders
Introduction
Planning in the Face of Place-Less Power
Framing the Power of Place
Understanding Leadership
Examples of Progressive Place-Based Leadership
Emerging Themes: Planning, Power and the Importance of Place-Based Leadership
Acknowledgements
Note
References
Part IV
Reflections and Conclusions
13 Scientific Knowledge and Decision-Makingin Planning: Understanding Emotional Aspects
Introduction
The Evolution of Planning Thought: Decision-Making Processes, Knowledge and Ethics
What Changes in the Development of Cognitive Science Can Bring Understanding to the Decision-Making Processes?
What Types of Change Does the Progress in Neurosciences Bring to Planning and Design?
Conclusion: Current Problems in Decision-Making and the Future of Planning
Notes
References
14 Afterword: I Am Realistic. I Expect Miracles
Contextualising Post-Political Conditions
Ambivalence as Strategy, or How the State Deals with Increasing Criticisms and Insurgencies
Collaboration for Repoliticisation: Not Less Politics but Different Politics
The Future
References
Index

Citation preview

Politics and Conflict in Governance and Planning

Politics and Conflict in Governance and Planning offers a critical evaluation of manifold ways in which the political dimension is reflected in contemporary planning and governance. While the theoretical debates on post-­politics and the wider frame of post-­ foundational political theory provide substantive explanations for the crisis in planning and governance, still there is a need for a better understanding of how the political is manifested in the planning contents, shaped by institutional arrangements and played out in the planning processes. This book undertakes a reassessment of the changing role of the political in contemporary planning and governance. Employing a wide range of empirical research conducted in several regions of the world, it draws a more complex and heterogeneous picture of the context-­specific depoliticisation and repoliticisation processes taking place in local and regional planning and governance. It shows not only the domination of market forces and the consequent suppression of the political but also how political conflicts and struggles are defined, tackled and transformed in view of the multifaceted rules and constraints recently imposed to local and regional planning. Switching the focus to how strategies and forms of depoliticised governance can be repoliticised through renewed planning mechanisms and socio-­political mobilisation, Politics and Conflict in Governance and Planning is a critical and much needed contribution to the planning literature and its incorporation of the post-­politics and post-­democracy debate. Ayda Eraydin is Professor in the City and Regional Planning Department at Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She is the Chair of the PhD Supervisory Committee and coordinator of the Postgraduate Programme in Regional Planning of the same department. She has initiated, coordinated and been involved in some large-­scale national and international research projects on various urban and regional issues since 1986. Her research interests are local economic development, socio-­spatial dynamics of cities and regions and planning theory and practice. She has published on various aspects of urban and regional development, including the socio-­spatial implications of economic restructuring on urban areas, resilience thinking in urban planning and recently on governing urban diversity. Klaus Frey is Professor of the Federal University of ABC, Brazil, in the Postgraduate Programmes in Territorial Planning and Management as well as in Public Policies. He coordinated the latter from 2013 to 2017. He was visiting Professor at the Master in Urban Management at University Unipiloto of Colombia, and at the Postgraduate Programme ‘Programming and Management of the Political and the Social Services’ at University Milano-­Bicocca. He is a researcher at the Brazilian National Research Council (CNPQ), working specifically on the following subjects: local and metropolitan governance, institutional analysis, policy networks, democracy and participation, public policy analysis, environmental governance and policy.

Routledge Research in Urban Politics and Policy

1 The Cultural Contradictions of Progressive Politics The Role of Cultural Change and the Global Economy in Local Policymaking Donald L. Rosdil 2 Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe Mary Manjikian 3 Local Politics and Mayoral Elections in 21st Century America The Keys to City Hall Sean D. Foreman and Marcia L. Godwin 4 The Risk of Regional Governance Cultural Theory and Interlocal Cooperation Thomas Skuzinski 5 Politics and Conflict in Governance and Planning Theory and Practice Edited by Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey

Politics and Conflict in Governance and Planning Theory and Practice

Edited by Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey

First published 2019 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Taylor & Francis The right of Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey to be identified as the authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-0-8153-6919-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-25288-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of Figures List of Tables Notes on Contributors

  1 The Political in Governance and Planning

viii ix x 1

A yda  E raydin and K laus  F rey

Part I

Existing and Emerging Paradigms on Spatial Planning and Governance: A Critical Evaluation

19

  2 Crisis in Planning Theory: Is the Political a Way Out of the Impasse in Planning?

21

A yda  E raydin and T una  T a ş an - K ok

  3 Planning and Governance: Towards Radical Political Approaches

38

R ainer  R andolph and K laus  F rey

Part II

Conflict in Governance and Planning Practices: Problems of Post-­Political Trends

57

  4 Multilevel Power Relations and Planning Conflicts in a ‘Land of Exception’: The Case of the Sughereta di Niscemi Reserve in Sicily

59

F rancesco  L o  P iccolo , F ilippo  S chilleci and V incen z o  T odaro

vi   Contents   5 Engaging in Politics of Participation: Managing Power through Action Research

75

A nlı  A ta ö v , G ü li z   B ilgin  A ltın ö z and N eriman Şahin  G ü ç han

  6 Different Understandings of ‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict: Portuguese Spatial Planning and Practice

93

J oana  A lmeida and F ernando  N unes  D a  S ilva

  7 The Conflict between Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies: Mexican Housing Policy

112

A lfonso I racheta

Part III

New Attempts to Overcome the Post-­Political Trends in Planning and Governance

131

  8 Shifting Political Conditions for Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries

133

P eter  S chmitt and L ukas  S mas

  9 Politicising the Regional Scale? The Politics of Metropolitan Governance in Germany, Canada and Brazil

151

K arsten Zimmermann

10 Local Welfare Governance and Social Innovation: The Ambivalence of the Political Dimension

169

L avinia  B ifulco and M aria  D odaro

11 Politicisation of Community Development: Universities as Boundary Objects

186

A nne T aufen

12 A Counter-­Movement to ‘Place-­Less’ Power: Planners as Progressive Place-­Based Leaders R obin H ambleton

204

Contents   vii Part IV

Reflections and Conclusions

225

13 Scientific Knowledge and Decision-­Making in Planning: Understanding Emotional Aspects

227

I lhan T ekeli

14 Afterword: I Am Realistic. I Expect Miracles

243

K laus  F rey and A yda  E raydin



Index

257

Figures

  5.1 A conceptual framework that overlaps theoretical discussions on democratic participation in planning and power relations   5.2 The Adıyaman and Bursa planning process   5.3 Theoretical framework of cooperation versus conflict with reference to democratic participation and power relations   6.1 Spatial Planning Framework (SPF )   6.2 Portuguese spatial planning process   7.1 Location of the country’s 36 social housing developments 11.1 New office space envisioned in the ‘urban development as downtown commercial space’ discourse 12.1 Framing the political space for place-­based governance 12.2 The realms of place-­based leadership 12.3 Place-­based leadership in context

80 82 83 98 100 120 193 207 212 213

Tables

6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 8.1

The public interest analysis matrix Interview statements and their objectives Interviewees’ rating of statements Mexico: federal social housing financing, 2000–2017 Overview of the main formal spatial planning instruments in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 2017

97 103 105 118 138

Contributors

Joana Almeida is Assistant Professor at Instituto Superior Técnico (IST), University of Lisbon, Portugal, where she teaches courses in Urban and Regional Planning; Property Development, Valuation and Management; Projects and Procurement; Strategic Planning and Urban Governance. She holds a PhD in Territorial Engineering (2013); her recent research project ‘PERCOM – Equity and efficiency in the urbanization process: a land readjustment execution model’, is funded by the Portuguese national funding agency for science, research and technology (FCT). Her research interests are negotiation and conflict management in spatial planning, tourism planning, territorial governance, tourism and urban regeneration, and financing and management models in urban regeneration. Güliz Bilgin Altınöz is Associate Professor in Cultural Heritage Conservation at the Middle East Technical University, Department of Architecture. She is also part-­time faculty at the University of Ankara Department of Real Estate Development. Her main academic and professional interest areas are conservation, management, and planning of urban, rural and archaeological sites; multilayered towns and urban archaeology; information management, decision support systems and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in heritage conservation. She conducted and took part in various national and international projects, and published articles and book chapters on these subjects. She also has experience in the conservation decision-­making process in Turkey as a member of the Regional Conservation Council of İzmir (2007–2010), as well as a member of the scientific advisory boards of different heritage places in Turkey. Anlı Ataöv is Professor in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She received her MA in strategic planning from the Ohio State University (OSU), Columbus, OH, US. She holds doctorate degrees in Environmental Aesthetics from the Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, US, and in action research from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway. She has worked as a planner, professor, researcher and a consultant for private, public, and national/international non-­governmental organisations and

Contributors   xi i­nstitutions in Turkey, the US, Norway, Denmark, and the UK. Her professional and academic interest mainly focuses on participatory planning, sustainability and social change. Lavinia Bifulco is Professor of Sociology and teaches Local Welfare Systems at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Milano-­ Bicocca. She is Coordinator of the URBEUR-­Urban Studies PhD course at the same department. Her research focuses mainly on social policies and local welfare; urban governance, participation and democracy; public administrations and institutional innovations. Her publications include: 2013, Citizen participation, agency and voice, European Journal of Social Theory; 2016, Citizenship and governance at a time of territorialisation, European, Urban and Regional Studies; 2017, Social Policy and Public Action, London, Routledge. Maria Dodaro is a PhD Candidate in Urban Studies at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Milano-­Bicocca, Italy. She holds a MA in Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Calabria, Italy, with a dissertation on social innovation processes in the context of integrated local development theories. Her doctoral research focuses on urban entrepreneurship policies and young recipients in Milan and Barcelona and it is carried out in cooperation with the research group on Creativity, Innovation and Urban Transformation (CRIT) of the University of Barcelona, Spain. Her research interests include activation policies, local welfare and socio-­ economic changes linked to digital technologies. Ayda Eraydin is Professor in the City and Regional Planning Department at Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She is the Chair of the PhD Supervisory Committee and coordinator of the Postgraduate Programme in Regional Planning of the same department. She has initiated, coordinated and been involved in some large-­scale national and international research projects on various urban and regional issues since 1986. Her research interests are local economic development, socio-­spatial dynamics of cities and regions, and planning theory and practice. She has published on various aspects of urban and regional development, including the socio-­spatial implications of economic restructuring on urban areas, resilience thinking in urban planning and recently on governing urban diversity. Klaus Frey is Professor of the Federal University of the ABC, Brazil, at the Postgraduate Programmes in Territorial Planning and Management as well as in Public Policies. The latter he coordinated from 2013 to 2017. He was visiting Professor at the Master in Urban Management at University Unipiloto of Colombia, and at the Postgraduate Programme ‘Programming and Management of the Political and the Social Services’ at University Milano-­Bicocca. He is a researcher at the Brazilian National Research Council (CNPQ), working specifically on the following subjects: local and metropolitan governance, institutional analysis, policy networks, democracy and participation, public policy analysis, environmental governance and policy.

xii   Contributors Neriman Şahin Güçhan is Professor and Coordinator of the Graduate Programme in Conservation of Cultural Heritage at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. She has been involved in many research and conservation projects since 1984 while acting as a practising architect. Her academic fields of interest include conservation and management of the cultural heritage, training/education on heritage conservation and timber buildings: she has been involved several projects, some of which are Nemrut Mount Tümülüs, Southern Anatolia Project, Ankara and Ancient Greek Settlements in Anatolia. She contributed to 25 books, edited seven books and published about 93 articles/papers. She presently is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board for sites and artefacts such as Ani, Mardin Castle and Milet İlyas Bey Complex. Robin Hambleton is Emeritus Professor of City Leadership at the University of the West of England (UWE), Bristol and Director of Urban Answers. He worked in local government in England for ten years before becoming an academic. He has been an Adviser to UK local government ministers, to Select Committees of the UK House of Parliament, and has worked on place-­based leadership with cities in many different countries. He has held professorial positions in City and Regional Planning at Cardiff University, in City Management at UWE, and in Urban Planning and Policy, and Public Administration at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He was the founding President of the European Research Association (EURA) and was the Dean of the College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Chicago (2002–2007). He has published 11 books and over 400 articles. Alfonso Iracheta is the founder of the Urban and Regional Studies School at UAEMex, Master Programme in Metropolitan Studies at UAM México City; CEO of Centro EURE, a consultant firm in Territorial Studies and Public Policy; President/Chairman at El Colegio Mexiquense, a Member of SNI-­ Mexico and of ten scientific journals editorial boards in five countries. He is a consultant to three tiers of Mexican government, UN-­Habitat, World Bank, LILP, Hewlett Foundation, IDB, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and ex-­member of the Advisory Board of Hs-­Net of UN-­HABITAT and the Advisory Board of the State of the World Cities Report; Coordinator of 140 studies and plans (urban/metropolitan/housing); and Principal Advisor of Mexico’s UN-­Habitat City Prosperity Index for 153 cities. He is the writer of six books and editor of 15 related to spatial issues. He has authored 145 papers, book chapters and articles, and has been a speaker at around 1,000 conferences in Mexico and 20 other countries. Francesco Lo Piccolo is Professor of Urban Planning and Coordinator of the BSc-­MSc Programmes of Urban, Regional and Environmental Planning, Department of Architecture, University of Palermo, Italy; he is the Deputy of the Rector for the PhD Programmes of the same University. A Fulbright Fellow and Marie Curie Training and Mobility Researchers (TMR) Fellow, his research is mostly directed to social exclusion, ethnicity and diversity,

Contributors   xiii conflicts and power relationships in planning, with specific interests in ethics and justice. He has published on these issues in International Planning Studies, Planning Practice and Research, European Spatial Research and Policy, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure & Events, International Journal of E-­Planning Research, Planning Theory and Practice, Town Planning Review and Planning Theory. He is the editor, with H. Thomas, of Ethics and Planning Research (Routledge, 2009) and member of the editorial board of Town Planning Review. He was the President of Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP) from 2014 to 2016. Rainer Randolph is Professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in Brazil; since 2006 Full Professor, teaching at the Graduate Programme in Urban and Regional Planning (Master + PhD) and since 2014 Visiting Professor at the University of Chapeçó (Santa Catarina) at the Graduate Programme in Social Politics and Regional Dynamics (Master). Between 2005 and 2014 he was national coordinator of the knowledge area Urban and Regional Planning & Demography at Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) and several times Director of the Urban and Regional Research and Planning Institute of UFRJ. His research and publications focus primordially on planning theory, public policy and regional development, federalism and cooperation between federal levels, and agendas, arenas and institutional arrangements of new forms of territorial governance. Filippo Schilleci is Professor of Urban Planning, with a PhD in Urban and Regional Planning, and Coordinator of the PhD Programme in Architecture, Arts and Planning of the Department of Architecture at the University of Palermo. He is Delegate to International Policies of the Polytechnic School and the Department of Architecture of the same university. His principal re­search interests revolve around the relationship between open spaces in urban areas and issues of ecological-­environmental continuity. Currently, he teaches a laboratory for the analysis of cities and regions. He has published articles and essays on the identity of places, participation and ecological planning. Peter Schmitt is Associate Professor at the Department of Human Geography at Stockholm University, where he acts as Director of the Master Programme in Urban and Regional Planning. He has been Senior Research Fellow at Nordregio (Stockholm, Sweden), a leading Nordic and European research centre for regional development and planning, established by the Nordic Council of Ministers, from 2006 to 2016. He holds a PhD degree in Spatial Planning from Dortmund University (DE, awarded in 2007) and a MA in Human Geography from the University of Münster (DE, awarded in 1998). His recent research is focused on territorial governance practices, comparative studies on spatial planning systems, EU cohesion policy and strategic spatial planning in metropolitan regions. He has been the principal investigator in some larger international research projects (e.g. within the ESPON 2013 and 2020 Programme, EU Horizon 2020 programme and JPI Urban Europe).

xiv   Contributors Fernando Nunes da Silva is Professor of Urban Planning and Transports at the Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon (since 2002). He has PhD (1992) and Post-­Doc (2000) in Civil Engineering from the former Technical University of Lisbon. Since January 2015, he is Head of the Department of Civil Engineering, Architecture and Georesources at the Instituto Superior Técnico. His main professional interests are related to urban strategies for sustainable mobility, urban planning and transportation planning. He has experience as an adviser and consultant in transport and urban planning studies and projects in several municipalities and regional bodies, as a researcher at Centre for Urban and Regional Systems (CESUR), as an invited professor in several foreign universities (Barcelona, S. Paulo, Porto Alegre and Lausanne), and as Councillor and Deputy Mayor for Mobility and Transport in Lisbon Municipality (2009–2013). Lukas Smas is a Senior Lecturer in Human Geography with a focus on Urban and Regional Planning at Stockholm University. He has been Senior Research Fellow at Nordregio, from 2012 to 2017, which is an applied research institute in the field of spatial planning and regional development established by the Nordic Council of Ministers. His research currently focuses on comparative planning research through, for example, his involvement in an ESPON project on Comparative Analysis of Territorial Governance and Spatial Planning Systems in Europe. He recently also finished a research project within the Joint Programming Initiative – Urban Europe, focusing on the co-­creation of attractive and sustainable urban areas and lifestyle, including explorations of new forms of inclusive urban governance and urban living labs. He has a PhD in Human Geography and MSc in Urban and Regional Planning from Stockholm University and is an International Urban Fellow at Johns Hopkins University. Tuna Taşan-Kok is Professor of Urban Governance and Planning at University of Amsterdam, Department of Human Geography, Urban Planning and International Development. She has initiated, coordinated and been involved in several large-­scale international research projects since 1996. She has been actively conducting and coordinating research at KULeuven (Belgium) (2005–2007) and TUDelft (2007–2015); and also coordinating the Human Geography teaching track of the University College Roosevelt, University of Utrecht (2010–2014). Currently, she is leading the FAPESP-­ESRC-NWO-­ funded PARCOUR (Public Accountability to Residents in Contractual Urban Redevelopment) Project. She published widely in the fields of urban planning and geography. Her latest book is an edited volume (co-­edited by Marc Oranje), From Student to Urban Planner: Young Practitioners’ Reflections on Contemporary Ethical Challenges (Routledge, 2017).  Anne Taufen is Associate Professor in the Urban Studies programme at the University of Washington Tacoma. Her research focuses on planning for sustainable urban development, with two main areas of interest. First, her

Contributors   xv t­heoretical work is concerned with narrative constructions of urban spatial policy, and the recursive relationship between planning discourse and pragmatic action. This includes questions of inclusivity and equity – whom governance serves, and with what outcomes; as well as questions of socio-­material change – how governing processes are held in place, influenced or transformed, with a focus on things, practices and technologies. The second main area of research is a subset of environmental justice: public access to urban waterways. This work considers the planning, politics, history and legality of how people use waterway spaces, and to what ends, an issue of increasing policy relevance as we face global climate change. Ilhan Tekeli is Emeritus Professor of the City and Regional Planning Department, Middle East Technical University. He was the founding member and President of the Turkish History Foundation, a member of Turkish Education Council (2004–2008) and Science Academy. He has published 105 books and 640 papers and conference proceedings mainly on planning theories, urban and regional development theories, Turkish economic history, spatial organisation theories and EU policies. His papers are collected in 25 books by History Foundation of Turkey. Vincenzo Todaro is an architect and holds a PhD in Urban and Regional Planning in co-­tutorship with the Polytechnic University of Madrid (Spain). He is a post-­doctoral Researcher in Urban Planning and teaches at the Department of Architecture of the University of Palermo (Italy). His research activity is mainly focused on the topics of environmental safeguard in planning, but also includes the analysis of local development processes in terms of urban and regional policies, strategic planning, and assessment of plans and projects. More recently he worked on the territorial impacts of migration flows from North Africa and Eastern Europe to Italy; in particular, he analysed the challenges, in spatial and social terms, for planning policies and procedures. He has published on these issues in national and international journals. Karsten Zimmermann is Professor at the Faculty of Spatial Planning at Technical University of Dortmund where he holds the Chair for European Planning Cultures. He is educated as a political scientist and dedicated most of his academic work to the study of cities and regions. Currently, he is the president of the European Urban Research Association (EURA) and Dean of the Faculty. His list of publications includes numerous articles and books on metropolitan governance, European urban policy, knowledge and planning and local climate policies.

1 The Political in Governance and Planning Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey

Introduction In the current era of presumably post-­democratic times marked by the dissemination of boredom, frustration and disillusion, the predominance of powerful minority groups in decision-­making processes, manipulating people’s demands by relying on publicity campaigns, instead of contentious political dispute, there seems something pretty wrong with the political in contemporary democracies (Crouch, 2004). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the role of the political or post-­political in governance and planning has become of increasing importance in recent academic debates following the crisis in planning and governance experienced in the past three decades. We believe that although the theorisation of post-­politics and the wider frame of post-­foundational political theory provides an explanation of the crisis in planning and governance, still there is a need for a better understanding how the political is manifested in the planning contents, shaped by institutional arrangements, and played out in the planning processes. In contrast to the somehow one-­sided assimilation of the post-­political discourse in planning theory in recent times, this book undertakes a reassessment of the changing role of the political in contemporary planning and governance. With the help of a wide range of empirical research conducted in several regions of the world, it tries to draw a more complex and heterogeneous picture of the context-­specific depoliticisation and repoliticisation processes taking place in local and regional planning and governance. The book aims to show not only the domination of market forces and the consequently suppression of the political, but also how political conflicts and struggles are defined, tackled and transformed in view of the multifaceted rules and constraints recently imposed to local and regional planning, even if we have no doubt that the structural changes in political, economic, social, cultural and technological conditions promoted worldwide by neoliberalisation caused far-­reaching implications for planning and governance. Referring to the post-­political framework, we are critical regarding early theories of planning and the technification of politically contentious issues, but we also suspect that depoliticising measures have always played an important role in governmental strategies (Metzger, 2018), although there are clear signs that

2   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey in the process of neoliberalisation depoliticisation had achieved a new dimension due to devious and detrimental attacks of market forces and the dissemination of authoritarian decision-­making patterns. In this book, we argue that the post-­political debate that invaded the planning and governance literature is still too wide-­ranging and vague and the concepts like the political, post-­political, depoliticisation too biased to understand what is currently going on in planning and governance. The label post-­politics does not provide a fine-­grained framework. It usually overlooks the internal dynamics and struggles behind it, leaving planning research ‘blind to the more subtle mechanisms at work in political power’ (Grange, 2014: p. 56). There is not only need for characterising post-­political conditions but also for case studies showing veiled policy patterns and planning practices that exemplify various types of depoliticisation techniques as well as new strategies of repoliticisation. Therefore, we focus mainly on concrete experiences in planning practices rather than generalised debates concerning post-­political conditions. Without losing the perspective of how enactments of post-­politics configure into broader patterns of development, in this book we try to identify and analyse spatio-­temporal specificities of planning in order to enhance knowledge about concrete planning practices in the context of post-­politics, the institutional arrangements and relations that uphold and reproduce them over time and space. The aim is to ‘crack open the black box of the post-­political condition’ as suggested by van Puymbroeck and Oosterlynck (2014: p. 103) and to discuss how we can deal with it in practical terms. We ask several questions, such as: Under the neoliberal rule, is there still sufficient room for manoeuvre to enact planning and governance practices in a political and democracy-­intense perspective? What are the different ways to introduce the political in planning and governance? In searching for answers to these questions, we have to keep in mind that demands towards the democratisation of planning are not easy to meet in contemporary times due to an intensified police order, the spreading of authoritarian practices and the rise of populism, hence, leaving little room for struggling against an increasingly repressive social and political order and to define viable alternatives. So, are we hopeless, seeing everywhere in society the rise of extreme populist movements and religious fundamentalism, the advancement of racist far-­right movements, and a general polarisation in terms of lifestyles, attitudes, belief systems and therewith increasing exclusionary attitudes in all fields? Although we are sympathetic to the ideas of Inch (2012), who claims that post-­political action might generate counter-­reactions that can be positively channelled and contribute to a revival of democratic engagement, and Raco (2014: p. 168), who contends that ‘the present obvious failure of post-­political governance arrangements sparks publics into being which may hopefully contribute towards reinvigo­rating democracy’, we observe from the studies introduced in this book manifold difficulties in introducing new types of politically intensive planning processes. Consequently, although some of the experiences introduced in this book show promising possibilities for desirable futures, we also have to recognise not less numerous obstacles, limits and intricacies in these attempts to renew

The Political in Governance and Planning   3 planning as a political endeavour. We believe that local struggles and social innovation are important and there are different ways out of the impasse in planning. There is still more to learn from the ongoing practices against and along with post-­political. Therefore, in this book, the aim is to understand the political in planning and governance, as well as new practices and struggles against post-­ political conditions, policies and practices.

Understanding Contemporary Times: How are the Political and the Post-­Political Theorised? The current debates emphasise the disappearance or ‘retreat of the political’ (Lacoue-­Labarthe and Nancy, 1997; Swyngedouw, 2011), which has for many been considered a direct consequence of ‘the rise of a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics and technocratic environmental management’ (Swyngedouw, 2009: p.  604), in other words the post-­political condition. The influential debates on the post-­political condition introduce the diverse ways of understanding the political, however, all share a general refusal of the ordinary understanding of politics (Marchart, 2010: p. 14). Relying on Carl Schmitt’s well-­known statement that ‘the specifical political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ (Schmitt, 1996: p. 26), Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005, 2014) defines the antagonistic dimension as constitutive of ‘the political’ and, insofar, can never totally be excluded. By contrast, politics indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organise human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual. Thus, in our post-­ political times, politics tends to colonise and suppress the political leading eventually to the explosion of violent confrontation (Metzger, 2018), unless these conflicts are provided with a ‘legitimate form of expression’ through the adoption of an agonistic perspective (Mouffe, 2005: p. 4). Consensuses, hence, always have to be envisaged as conflictive and temporary (Mouffe, 2014: p. 30). According to Rancière (1995, 1999, 2001), when the power to define the laws is concentrated in the hands of the most skilful, the strongest and richest in society, it means the end of politics (Rancière, 2012: p.  93). Rancière (1999) shares with Mouffe the criticism of the neoliberal consensus system that assumes that ‘the whole is all, nothing is nothing’ (p. 124), but overlooks the fundamental cause of inequality. According to him, the political struggle occurs when the excluded seek to establish their identity and strive to get their voices recognised as legitimate and heard and defines politics as a struggle between the established social order and its excluded ‘part which has no part’. For Slavoj Žižek, post-­ politics becomes manifest in the reduction of politics to the management of the local consequences of globalised capitalism and the policing of liberal multiculturalism, being identified ‘as a postmodern figure of disavowing politics’ and, thus, foreclosing it (Metzger et al., 2015: p. 12).

4   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey Although the arguments above are rather descriptive, the answer to the question how it is possible to challenge the post-­political condition and to introduce the political is embedded in these debates. What Mouffe (2005) proposes is the agonistic model of democracy that is built upon the distinction between antagonism between enemies and agonism between adversaries underlining that the aim of democratic politics should be to ‘tame’ or ‘sublimate’ antagonisms, without eliminating conflict and passion from the political realm. Rancière (1995) also rejects the Habermasian ideal of communicatively rationalised politics but is equally sceptical regarding the possibility of reforming liberal democracy within an agonistic perspective. According to Rancière, politics and democracy ‘only can flourish if emanating from the part which has no part’ (Metzger et al., 2015: p. 11); from those excluded from the whole. Therefore, ‘the only properly political moment … is when the existing police order is put into question by the “part of no part” in the name of equality’ (Metzger, 2018: p. 182). Finally, for Žižek the only possibility of reintroducing the fundamental social antagonism into the democratic field is by revolution, through the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Žižek, 2012: p.  127). Anything else would simply imply in nothing but the reinforcement of the neoliberal regime of domination and exploration. Žižek (2000) defines the political as raising the particular of those condemned to lead a ‘shadowy existence’ and ‘a spectral life outside the domain of the global order’ to the level of the universal, ‘the dimension of universality proper’, i.e. when ‘the radical, unconditional demand for égaliberté is manifested’ and ‘the presence of the truth-­event’ appears’ (Žižek, 1999: p.  236). Metzger (2018: p.  183) summarises the different views of these prominent scholars as follows: ‘Mouffe’s correlate project is to find ways to reconfigure the institutional order, Ranciérè’s to constantly disrupt the institutional order, and Žižek’s to once and for all overthrow the institutional order.’ These different views – either suggesting radical or moderate solutions – are important when we reflect on processes of depoliticisation and repoliticisation in planning and governance, but not sufficient.

Why Did Debates on the Political and the Post-­Political Attract Attention in Explaining Planning and Governance in Contemporary Times? The theoretical reflections on the political, post-­political conditions and its consequences for liberal democracy have been quite influential in the current debates on governance and planning, although the importance of politics entered the planning literature earlier. Already in the 1960s planners initially broached the issue of the political nature of their practice. It was in the 1970s and 1980s that the discussions on the role of politics gained importance and evolved together with the political strengthening of neoliberalism. Beginning from the 1990s onwards, from the perspective of the increasingly hegemonic neoliberalist agenda, a special effort has been made to uncover the political in planning and

The Political in Governance and Planning   5 defined neoliberalism as an attack on the established planning institutions (Allmendinger, 2009). The effects of neoliberalism concerning the erosion of the social welfare state, thereby generating unemployment, poverty and social deprivation, provoked growing reactions to the detrimental effects of neoliberal policies on cities. By countering, during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, the socio-­spatial implications of economic neoliberalisation, critical geography and planning scholars became ‘increasingly supportive of the view of planning as a political activity’ (Yamamoto, 2017: p.  385). In the 1990s, partly in reflection of this criticism, several planning scholars (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1993, 1996, 1997; Innes and Booher, 2010) developed a decisively normative theory for communicative or collaborative planning underlining the importance of communication, interpretation, negotiation and bargaining in planning practice. At the core of communicative planning efforts is a relational understanding of space and the vital importance of institutional design (Healey, 1992). New institutional governance arrangements and state spatial restructuring were presented to ensure the prevalence of stakeholder participation in consensus-­seeking democratic planning processes (Daly, 2016). Against the enthusiasm for consensus generation, critics of communicative planning called into question an exaggerated and uncritical obsession with ideas of partnership and participatory consensus building planning procedures. The failure of planning to act effectively against the conditions brought forward by the neoliberal agenda led to an increasing disappointment regarding previous expectations with planning as a potentially transformative tool. Several studies (Campbell and Marshall, 2002, 2005; Grange, 2017; McClymont, 2006; Miller and Rose, 2008; Purcell, 2007, 2009) argued that planning itself has contributed to the neoliberalisation of society and blamed planner’s reticence to act vigorously against the new order that led to increasing inequalities, democratic deficits and the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from decision-­making processes for the benefit of the hegemonic power elite. Metzger et al. (2015: p.  8) highlighted that planning ‘has increasingly become an instrument to displace the political rather than creating a space where political disagreement can play out’, whereas Grange (2017) underlined that ongoing changes in planning made planners loyal to the current neoliberal politics and threatened to silence planners. These kinds of concerns provoked several studies on planning and governance in post-­political conditions (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Metzger et al., 2015; Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). The post-­political condition is defined as conflict-­denying consensualist politics in ways that foreclose all but narrow debate and contestation around the neoliberal growth agenda (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Lemke, 2007, Raco, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2007). Following post-­structuralist scholars, these critics emphasised that post-­political planning by foreclosing radical disagreement tends to generate deadlocks. They (e.g. Allmendinger, 2009: p.  199) blamed the development of a set of depoliticising practices with a quasi-­ exclusive focus on economic rationality in urban development, which involved

6   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey the promotion of public-­private partnerships and the notion of non-­conflictivity between public and private interests. However, Allmendinger and Haughton (2012: p. 89) argued that in England ‘conflict has not been removed from planning, but it is instead more carefully choreographed and, in some cases, displaced or otherwise residualised’ with the help of vague objectives, concepts and processes which ‘minimise the potential for those with conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012: p. 92). Furthermore, several authors underlined the use of fuzzy concepts in order to conceal the real issues of planning (Gunder and Hillier, 2009; Kaika, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2007) and their role in the depoliticisation of planning and governance. According to Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw (2010), the new forms of governmentality have been assembled around a consensus on several concepts as the existing managerial-­technocratic apparatuses adopted. The post-­political analysis also depicts concerns on planning by exploring the role of doctrines (Alexander and Faludi, 1996; Coop and Thomas, 2007) and hegemonies (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2018; Hajer, 1989) in planning practice. With regard to the governance literature, we have first to recognise that in contrast to planning scholarship, governance is a relatively new theoretical concept, especially related to the public sector, having accompanied the process of neoliberalisation, being thus frequently identified with neoliberal austerity politics. Governance, therefore, is frequently equated with less government and interpreted as a strategy ‘to provide the acceptable face of spending cuts’ (Stoker, 1998: p.  18). Deregulation, contracting-­out of services, public-­private partnerships and the promotion of competition have been defended by the New Public Management (NPM) movement (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Stoker, 2005) and by the World Bank (WB) related to good governance as a normative concept guiding international development policies (Frey, 2008). In the first wave of more radical state reforms, above all in the 1980s, the centrality of market forces and the private sector for economic development was emphasised, whereas in the second, from the mid-­1990s onwards, in view of the disastrous effects of the initial neoliberal reforms, principally related to the worsening of poverty and general social well-­being indicators, a more important role was conceded to civil society and non-­governmental organisations (NGOs) in development and public policy-­making (Jessop, 2016; Levi-­Faur, 2014). Interestingly, from the side of political science and public administration there is no significant literature concerning governance related to depoliticisation and post-­politics, albeit the implications of the new governance arrangements, specifically policy and governance networks, on political decision-­making and democracy, in general, have been subject of empirical research (Bogason and Musso, 2006; Hirst, 2000; Schneider, 2002; Stoker, 2005; Wolf, 2002). Notwithstanding that a general consensus has emerged that the governance arrangements as multilevel governance become ‘less hierarchical, less centralised, and less directive’ (Jessop, 2016: p.  185), there are big differences in the governance literature related to the evaluation of their implication for politicisation and democracy. What prevails is a view that takes ‘the

The Political in Governance and Planning   7 new environment of non-­hierarchical, interlaced state-­society interactions’ as a matter of fact (Bevir, 2013: p.  11). The focus is, in fairly practical terms, on politics rather than on the political, and on how to overcome managerial and democratic dilemmas, identified in empirical studies. In accordance to Bevir (2013: p.  11), governance ‘is about activity, about how people act, and how they might act more effectively and more justly’. For these governance scholars, studying empirically the dynamics of daily governance institutions and practices, although they recognise dilemmas related to the democratic legitimacy of current governance arrangements, the discourses on the ‘decline of the state’ and the ‘end of politics’ are considered as ‘great exaggerations’ (Schneider, 2002: 261). Therefore, governance, envisaged as ‘flexible pattern of public decision-­making based on loose networks of individuals’ (John, 2001: p. 9) or institutions, is sometimes seen as a form of ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 1996), very often as a necessary adaptation to a more complex and uncertain environment (Jessop, 2016; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016), or yet as offering new opportunities for democratic, emancipatory and horizontal forms of public participation and self-­organising networks (Jessop, 2016; McLaverty, 2013). More rare governance studies stressed their reinforcing effects concerning exclusion and asymmetrical power relations as part of a neoliberal hegemonic project, by fostering ‘political quiescence and depoliticised discourse’ (Davies, 2011: p. 152). In view of these quite diverse perspectives on the political and the post-­ political in governance and planning, in the following section we’ll focus on to what extent we are currently already on the way out – if we’ve ever been in – of the post-­political condition.

Are the Recent Transformations in Planning and Governance Indicative of a Retreat from the Post-­Political Condition or Not? Against the strong evidence that we are currently living in post-­political times, in the recent decade several studies, which analysed political and ideological changes to planning and governance, indicated substantial transformations and reforms being experienced in different countries. Severe fiscal constraints, problems of governability and urban insurgent movements are defined among the main reasons stimulating changes in legislation, institutions and practice. Conflicts and insurgencies against existing forms of planning, governance and liberal democracy became more evident in recent years, in both the Global North and the Global South. Smouldering discontent turned into severe conflicts countering asymmetrical power relations, questioning elite-­dominated communication structures and the biased understanding of notions such as public good, equality and social well-­being. However, the aims and effects of the recent reforms and practices are not really clear and some scholars even underlined that some of these transformations, in fact, enhanced post-­political practices. The literature provides several insights on emerging policies and practices.

8   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey The first issue raised by the literature was the reuse of the state as a political project to reinforce the neoliberal market order (Hilgers, 2012; Peck, 2010; Wacquant, 2012). From this perspective, urban policies and practice are part of the legitimising strategy to expand neoliberal governance, leading to an ambidextrous relationship between the authoritarian and the assistential wings of the state (Peck, 2010). The initial literature on the changing role of the state in urban planning and governance was focused on the commodification of urban land in order to finance economic growth (Peck et al., 2009), the increasing influence of state entrepreneurialism on urban management (Harvey, 1989; MacLeod, 2002) and the engagement of the governance regime in promoting innovation, controlling and articulating the requirements of a global neoliberal market economy (Brenner et al., 2010; Hilgers, 2012; Mazzucato, 2015; Peck et al., 2009; Swyngedouw, 1996). According to several studies, the notion of ‘urban revanchism’ sums up the concerted effort to exclude marginal groups who might threaten the quality of life in traditional neighbourhoods and public places (MacLeod, 2002; Slater, 2010; Sugranyes and Mathivet, 2011). The second issue relates to the different forms of conflicts in planning and governance due to different power relations at play, against the fact that power dimension was missed in earlier planning related debates as underlined by Friedmann (1998: p. 252). Today, there appear several types of conflicts, especially as an outcome of the unequal and/or distorted power relations. Many western scholars still contend that politics and formal government decision-­making are the correct ways to address societal conflict (Innes, 2013). From this perspective, elected officials represent the public interest, bureaucracy even-­handedly implements laws and politics ensures conflict resolution and, hence, the planning objectives are achieved. However, as highlighted by the criticisms regarding the neoliberalisation of urban policies, market forces can steer both decision-­making processes and implementation practices and, at the end, the political outcome might be socially unacceptable and economically inefficient. Accordingly, in recent years, there is increasing the interest on power studies in planning studies (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1979; Fischler, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Harvey, 1978; Hillier, 2003; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Richardson, 1996). Most of these studies explored the role of power relations in processes of social transformation, concentrating on how power is exercised in planning practice and governance. Williams (2004: p. 557) argues that as participatory approaches have the ability to open up new spaces for political action, participation has to be repoliticised and in order to achieve this ‘empowerment must be re-­imagined as an open-­end and ongoing process of engagement with political struggles at different spatial scales’. Out of emerging tensions, it is possible to get new insights concerning the nature of conflicts and the possibilities to move forward. Forester (2009) points out the role of experienced facilitators, who try to manage, but not suppress, these conflicts and try to get participants to reflect on the sources of their differences. The increasing numbers of urban uprisings are not coincidental in conditions of growing conflicts. That said, the third issue raised in the literature relates to

The Political in Governance and Planning   9 dissent among different groups (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014) that are excluded from decision-­making mechanisms and democratic participation, some of which are directly related to the planning process. However, the outcomes of such movements are also negotiable. In fact, most of them did not reach a specific outcome in terms of structural change and some ended with the fragmentation of the urban movements or even with their dissolution (Özdemir and Eraydin, 2017). Moreover, in many instances the adoption of opportunistic behaviour could be observed; groups seeking for individual benefits in the form of particularistic local protests (Haughton et al., 2016; Özdemir and Eraydin, 2017). The fourth focus of the literature relates to the reactions of the state to increasing conflicts and contestations at the urban and regional levels. The rescaling of planning and governance and the corresponding legislative changes in order to enhance the efficiency of decision-­making very often show little sensitiveness regarding local concerns and the participation of local actors, therefore receiving many criticisms due to conflicts emerging among different stakeholders, including different governmental levels. At the urban level, urban entrepreneurial projects and policies, defined as ‘new post-­crisis political instruments’ that offer a new quality of life and new consumer habits are designed to suppress public reaction and pacify potential contesting reactions of urban movements (Zukin, 1995). This literature also emphasised a dramatic intensification of coercive and disciplinary forms of state intervention (Peck et al., 2009; Taşan-Kok, 2011) and reconfiguration of state-­market-citizen relations (MacLeod, 2002; van Eijk, 2010; Wacquant, 2012). The above-­mentioned discussions draw a pessimistic picture regarding the possibilities of political renewal. For Metzger (2018: p. 10) ‘this brings the risk of encouraging helplessness rather than action to the post-­political events’. However, considering the progressive mission of planning, there is without doubt much need for the improvement and democratisation of decision-­making mechanisms. Admittedly, this is not an easy task in view of both the market forces backing the economistic rationale and the traditional authoritarian practices still a permanent threat to democracy. Therefore, there is a need to search for successful examples, which mainly come from the local level. That said, this volume introduces several attempts that can be considered to be successful or thriving at the local level, although the context and the actors may change.

The Book The book aims to contribute to a better understanding of the political dimension of territorial governance and planning in the current context of post-­political conditions. It addresses existing problems of the currently dominant paradigms in planning and governance processes and, based on several case studies from different countries of different world regions, it seeks to verify how and how far thinking about the political can contribute to a better understanding of the political­theoretical underpinning of governance and planning and the potentialities and limits of innovative politically boosted governance and planning practices.

10   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey It is possible to highlight two main issues and guiding questions and, as we expect, relevant contributions of the book to the current academic discussion on planning and governance. First, it provides a critical evaluation of the existing debates on neoliberal governance and planning which ascertains an ongoing replacement of resentment, conflict and agonism by compromise, mutual understanding and consensus in post-­political times in the context of neoliberal spatial governance. Therefore our primary interest in conflicts leads to the following guiding question: As conflicts sharpen and inequalities grow in contemporary societies, and by the same token, new political forces arise, and frequently populist policies are put on the political agenda, do these concepts still work nowadays, if they ever had? Second, the book explores new approaches and practices focusing on new empirical attempts to overcome the post-­political trends in planning and governance. It aims to discuss the new institutional arrangements, policies, processes and practices, putting emphasis on their implications for the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of governance and planning. The main question addressed here is: Are there new planning and governance patterns emerging, adapted to the new context of presumably post-­liberal societies and to what extent do they open new perspectives for progressive, transformative planning and governance? This volume is organised into four sections. Part I aims to give a brief overview of planning and governance paradigms and practice. In Chapter 2 ‘Crisis in Planning Theory: Is the Political a Way Out of the Impasse in Planning?’ Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok introduce a brief evaluation of the existing paradigms and theories that are influential in the planning discipline and summarise the existing criticisms with respect to the loss of the political in planning. The authors claim that planning theories that offer solutions to the contemporary problems should redefine ‘principles, institutions and practices’ in a way that they defend democratic processes at the various levels of decision-­making. According to the authors, a heuristic approach that looks for the possible, instead of the ideal, is the way to identify alternatives that are open to planning and to overcome the impasse in planning. In Chapter 3 ‘Planning and Governance: Towards Radical Political Approaches’ Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey aim to identify emerging, radical political approaches to planning and governance in an agonistic or subversive perspective. The chapter focuses on planning and governance theory, resuming their respective evolutionary path towards radical political thinking concerning planning and governance, respectively. Starting from the assumption that ‘planning’ and ‘governing’ continues to be indispensable in the future, in order to ensure society’s capacity to cope with increased complexities and to curtail social inequality, it is argued that subversive action and agonistic pluralism have to be considered as crucial ingredients of planning and governance concepts keeping pace with the massive challenges ahead. Part II introduces four chapters on conflicts in planning and governance practices, all attempting to understand present conditions, conflicts and the outcomes of such conflicts. The first focus of this section is on power relations and conflicts in planning. In Chapter 4 ‘Multilevel Power Relations and Planning Conflicts in a

The Political in Governance and Planning   11 “Land of Exception”: The Case of the Sughereta di Niscemi Reserve in Sicily’ Francesco lo Piccolo, Filippo Schilleci and Vincenzo Todaro discuss power relations between international, national and local levels and show how these may lead to the ‘suspension of rules’ as a common practice. According to the authors, planning becomes a favoured field for the application of norm-­suspending mechanism and Sicily is defined as the product of this exceptional rationality: a ‘land of exception’, a frontier land with a hybrid, multiple and extraordinary sovereignty. The second issue raised with reference to conflicts is that they are inherent in participatory decision-­making processes. In Chapter 5 ‘Engaging in Politics of Participation: Managing Power through Action Research’ Anlı Ataöv, Güliz Bilgin Altınöz and Neriman Şahin Güçhan define conflicts in participation as driving forces of democratic decision-­making. Taking planning processes conducted in two Turkish provinces as examples, the authors stress the central role of communication in participatory processes and their reliance on people, on building connections and dialogue between stakeholders. It also argues in favour of the management of power relations in order to transform the dynamics of diverse opinions into agreements for liveable communities. The third source of conflicts in planning and governance emerges in different understandings of the public interest. In Chapter 6 ‘Different understandings of “Public Interest” as a Source of Conflict: Portuguese Spatial Planning and Practice’ Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva provide a comprehensive overview of the relationship between conflict management and public interest in spatial planning, addressing the conflicts in Portugal’s current planning system. The chapter analyses the characteristics of conflicts in spatial planning, resulting from divergent interests at stake, with the objective to understand how they can be transformed from being a ‘latent conflict’ to an ‘expressed conflict’. Regarding the pursuit of public interest, the chapter poses three assumptions; there is not only one public interest but several; there is a hierarchy of interests and the definition of public interest is built through a transparent process. This means that a negotiation process of all interests at stake, in a transparent and well-­founded way, is necessary in order to bring forward the public interest. The last issue raised in Part II relates to conflicts between market dynamics and social objectives of planning. Chapter 7 ‘The Conflict between Free-­Market Capitalism and Social Policies: Mexican Social Housing Policy’ by Alfonso Iracheta addresses two important challenges. First, it discusses the role of free-­ market oriented public policy where community needs, including the concept of ‘public’, are being overwhelmed by private capital accumulation. Second, it focuses on the role of technocratic intervention in market-­oriented urban policies. The focus is on the interrelations of different stakeholders and the reasons why planning housing development schemes have been ignorant of the needs of the beneficiaries and the environment, which entails a critical assessment of the Mexican urban planning and the social housing policy. Part III of this volume is devoted to understanding post-­political trends in planning and governance and new attempts to overcome the post-­political conditions.

12   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey Two of the chapters in this section emphasise the role of the political in the change of planning systems and the rescaling of planning and governance at the macro level. In Chapter 8 ‘Shifting Political Conditions for Spatial Planning in the Nordic countries’ Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas discuss recent shifts and trajectories of change in spatial planning within four Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and explore the political dynamics behind these shifts and the induced rescaling processes and modifications of spatial planning instruments. They argue that the recent trends define a more selective, flexible and output-­oriented approach to spatial planning, which inevitably also opens up avenues for depoliticisation, simply because spatial planning is being handled using a case-­by-case logic. According to the authors, there is little room for routines and for developing well-­understood procedures among the various stakeholders, making it difficult to gain an overview of insights into the factual processes, thus hindering the emergence of opportunities for contestations. In Chapter 9 ‘Politicising the Regional Scale? The Politics of Metropolitan Governance in Germany, Canada and Brazil’ Karsten Zimmermann also focuses on rescaling and the emergence of the metropolitan as a new and increasingly important scale of planning and governance in federal states. He argues that the metropolitan scale emerged as a contested political space for public policy-­ making. However, according to the author, the politics of metropolitan governance in all three states demonstrate a gap between the instrumental view of state agencies and the social complexity of the metropolitan regions. He highlights that upper-­tier governments seem to be trapped in institutional ideas that neglect complexities and social relations in metropolitan areas. The remaining three chapters provide interesting findings at the local level, pinpointing several opportunities of politicisation of planning and governance. In Chapter 10 ‘Local Welfare Governance and Social Innovation: The Ambivalence of the Political Dimension’ Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro argue that social innovation – conceived as a redefinition of governance deeply affecting relations between the state, the market and the society – doesn’t mean fewer politics but rather ‘a different kind of politics’. Resorting to the case of Milan, the authors claim that while the financialisation and the economic crisis in Europe, namely growth of vulnerability, worsening of inequality, growing social fragmentation, caused the strengthening of supranational and national control, local welfare systems have gained importance as fields of social innovation according to the perspective that sees cities as places of change in governance relations. In Chapter 11 ‘Politicisation of Community Development: Universities as Boundary Objects’ Anne Taufen focuses on politics of every day, indicating the value of non-­confrontational and non-­strategic, but politicised forms of dealing with post-­political conditions. According to the author, the university as a boundary object is more than a value-­neutral convener or agent of collaboration. It is a space of negotiation, where assumptions can be challenged, and reframed, and alternative paths forward are subjected to the creative uncertainty and possibility of experimentation. The author argues in favour of the ideational role

The Political in Governance and Planning   13 of community-­engaged universities in the politicisation of planning and governance, challenging and transforming both its discourse and its practice. Far from this being a purely cerebral, traditionally intellectual role, the active encounter of urban scholars with specific questions and challenges in metropolitan development and governance community networks means that they are in a position to influence the discursive political regime. In Chapter 12 ‘A Counter-­Movement to “Place-Less” Power: Planners as Progressive Place-­Based Leaders’ Robin Hambleton underlines the small everyday struggles against the powers and the planners’ role as place-­based leaders within this context. According to him, existing politicians, sympathetic to global capitalist interests, dislike strong states that have the power to regulate the private sector effectively. He says that global capital favours having weak local governments as well as weak nation states. This is because relatively feeble local authorities will tend to lack the political and legal authority to mount an effective opposition to the impositions of place-­less decision-­making. Referring to experiences of the cities of Melbourne (Australia), Freiburg (Germany) and Portland (USA) he demonstrates how planners can act as local leaders to advance progressive values in the modern city and be influential in building the future of cities. Part IV introduces new perspectives of planning and governance in the face of increasing democratic deficits. In Chapter 13 ‘Scientific Knowledge and Decision-­Making in Planning: Understanding Emotional Aspects’ Ilhan Tekeli underlines the increasing importance of emotions in decision-­making emphasising that contemporary politics is framed by emotions, whereas facts, ethics and scientific knowledge losing importance. According to him, recent evidence has shown that it is easier to appeal to people’s emotions and personal beliefs than to convince them with present facts and rational arguments. According to him, the only way out is to enhance communication platforms and to build ethical communication principles at the local level. Finally, in Chapter 14 ‘Afterword: I am Realistic. I Expect Miracles’ Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin summarise the debates stimulated by the findings of the research and debates introduced in the book.

References Alexander, E.R. and Faludi, A. (1996) Planning doctrine: Its uses and implications. Planning Theory, 16(10), 11–61. Allmendinger, P. (2009) Planning Theory, 2nd edition. London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G. (2012) Post-­political spatial planning in England: A crisis of consensus? Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(1), 89–103. Bevir, M. (2013) Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma. In: Bevir, M. (ed.) The SAGE Handbook of Governance. London, Sage, pp. 1–16. Bogason, P. and Musso, J.A. (2006) The democratic prospects of network governance. Amer­ican Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 3–18.

14   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2010) Variegated neoliberalization: Geographies, modalities, pathways. Global Networks, 10(2), 182–222. Campbell, H. and Marshall, R. (2005) Professionalism and planning in Britain. Town Planning Review, 76(2), 191–214. Coop, S. and Thomas, H. (2007) Planning doctrine as an element in planning history: The case of Cardiff. Planning Perspectives, 22(2), 167–193. Crouch, C. (2004) Post-­democracy. Cambridge, Polity Press. Daly, G. (2016) The neo-­liberalization of strategic spatial planning and the overproduction of development in Celtic Tiger Ireland. European Planning Studies, 24(9), 1643–1661. Davies, J.S. (2011) Challenging Governance Theory. From Networks to Hegemony. Bristol, The Policy Press. Eraydin, A. and Taşan-Kok, T. (2018) Instituting resilience in the making of Istanbul metropolis. In: Salet, W. (ed.) Handbook Institutions in Action. New York and London, Routledge. Eraydin, A. and Taşan-Kok, T. (2014) State response to contemporary urban movements in Turkey: A critical overview of state entrepreneurialism and authoritarian interventions. Antipode, 46(1), 110–129. Fainstein, N.I. and Fainstein, S.S. (1979) New debates in urban planning: The impact of Marxist theory within the United States. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 3(3), 381–403. Fischler, R. (2000) Communicative planning theory: A Foucauldian assessment. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(4), 358–368. Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Forester, J. (2009) Dealing with Differences: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Forester, J. (1989) Planning in the face of power. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 35(3), 67–80. Frey, K. (2008) Development, good governance, and local democracy. Brazilian Political Science Review, 2(2), 39–73. Friedmann (1998) Planning theory revisited. European Planning Studies, 6(3), 245–253. Grange, K. (2017) Planners – A silenced profession? The politicisation of planning and the need for fearless speech. Planning Theory, 16(3), 275 –295. Grange, K. (2014) In search of radical democracy: The ideological character of current political advocacies for culture change in planning. Environment and Planning A, 46(11), 2670–2685. Gunder, M. and Hillier, J. (2009) Planning in Ten Words or Less. Aldershot, Ashgate. Hajer, M. (1989) City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse. Aldershot, Gower. Harvey, D. (1989) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, 71(1), 3–17. Harvey, D. (1978) Planning the ideology of planning. In: Burchell, R. and Sternlieb, G. (eds) Planning Theory in the 1980s. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research, pp. 213–234. Haughton, G., Gilchrist, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (2016) Rise like lions after slumber: Dissent, protest and (post-)politics in Manchester. Territory, Politics, Governance, 4(4), 472–449. Healey, P. (1997) Collaborative Planning, Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies. London, Macmillan.

The Political in Governance and Planning   15 Healey, P. (1996) The communicative turn in planning theory and its implications for spatial strategy formation. Environment and Planning B, 23(2), 217–234. Healey, P. (1993) The communicative work of development plans. Environment and Planning B, 20(1), 83–104. Healey, P. (1992) Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning theory. Town Planning Review, 63(2), 143–162. Hilgers, M. (2012) The historicity of the neoliberal state. Social Anthropology, 20(1), 80–94. Hillier, J. (2003) Agonizing over consensus: Why Habermasian ideals cannot be ‘real’. Planning Theory, 2(1), 37–59. Hirst, P. (2000) Democracy and governance. In: Pierre, J. (ed.) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 13–35. Huxley, M. and Yiftachel, O. (2000) New paradigm or old myopia? Unsettling the communicative turn in planning theory. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(4), 333–342. Inch, A. (2012) Creating’a generation of NIMBYs’? Interpreting the role of the state in managing the politics of urban development. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30(3), 520–535. Innes, J. (2013) A turning point for planning theory? Overcoming dividing discourses, Working Paper 2013–2, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, Berkeley, University of California. Innes, J. and Booher, D. (2010) Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy. Abingdon, Routledge. Jessop, B. (2016) The State. Past, Present, Future. Cambridge, Polity Press. John, P. (2001) Local Governance in Western Europe. London, Sage. Kaika, M. (2017) ‘Don’t call me Resilient Again!’ The New Urban Agenda as Immunology … or what happens when communities refuse to be vaccinated with ‘smart cities’ and indicators. Environment and Urbanization, 29(1), 89–102. Klijn, E.H. and Koppenjan, J. (2016) Governance networks in the public sector. London, Routledge. Lacoue-­Labarthe, P. and Nancy, J.L. (1997) Retreating the Political. London, Routledge. Lemke, T. (2007) An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory. Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 8(2), 43–65. Levi-­Faur, D. (2014) From ‘big government’ to ‘big governance’? In: Levi-­Faur, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 4–18. MacLeod, G. (2002) From urban entrepreneurialism to a ‘revanchist city’? On the spatial injustices of Glasgow’s renaissance. Antipode, 34(3), 602–624. Marchart, O. (2010) Die politische Differenz. Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp. Mazzucato, M. (2015) The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. New York, Public Affairs. McClymont, K. (2006) Ideology, Legitimacy and Values in Practice: Reconceptualising Professionalism in Town Planning. Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Sheffield, University of Sheffield. McLaverty, P. (2013) Participation. In: Bevir, M. (ed.) The SAGE Handbook of Governance. London, Sage, pp. 402–418. Metzger, J. (2018) Post-­politics and planning. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. New York and London, Routledge, pp. 180–193.

16   Ayda Eraydin and Klaus Frey Metzger J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (2015) The contested terrain of European territorial governance: New perspectives on democratic deficits and political displacements. In: Metzger J, Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (eds) Planning Against the Political. Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance. New York and London, Routledge, pp. 1–28. Miller, P. and Rose, N. (2008) Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life. Cambridge, Polity Press. Mouffe, C. (2014) Agonistik. Die Welt politisch denken. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp. Mouffe, C. (2005) On the Political. London, Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London, Verso. Oosterlynck, S. and Swyngedouw, E. (2010) Noise reduction: The post-­political quandary of night flights in Brussels airport Environment and Planning A, 42(7), 1577–1594. Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1993) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York, Plume. Özdemir, E. and Eraydin, A. (2017) Fragmentation in urban movements: The role of urban planning processes. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 41(5), 727–748. Peck, J. (2010) Zombie neoliberalism and the ambidextrous state. Theoretical Criminology, 14(1), 104–110. Peck, J., Theodore, N. and Brenner, N. (2009) Neoliberal urbanism: Models, moments, mutations. SAIS Review, XXIX (1), 49–66. Purcell, M. (2009) Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or counter-­ hegemonic movements? Planning Theory, 8(2), 140–165. Purcell, M. (2007) City-­regions, neoliberal globalization and democracy: A research agenda. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 31(1), 197–206. Raco, M. (2014) Delivering flagship projects in an era of regulatory capitalism: State-­led privatization and the London Olympics 2012. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(1), 176–197. Raco, M. (2005) Sustainable development, rolled-­out neoliberalism and sustainable communities. Antipode, 37(2), 324–347. Rancière, J. (2012) Demokratien gegen die Demokratie. Jacques Rancière im Gespräch mit Eric Hazan. In: Agamben, G. and Badiou, A. (eds) Demokratie? Eine Debatte. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, pp. 90–95. Rancière, J. (2001) Ten theses on politics. Theory and Event, 5(3). Available from: www. colorado.edu/humanities/ferris/Courses/1968/Ranciere/Ten%20Theses/Ranciere_ Ten%20Theses%20on%20Politics_Theory%20and%20Event5.3_2001.pdf (accessed 12 January 2018). Rancière, J. (1999) Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis, MT and London, University of Minnesota Press. Rancière, J. (1995) On the Shores of Politics. Verso, London. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996) The new governance: Governing without government. Political Studies, 44(4), 652–667. Richardson, T. (1996) Foucauldian discourse: Power and truth in urban and regional policy making. European Planning Studies, 4(3), 279–292. Schmitt, C. (1996) The Concept of the Political. Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press. Schneider, V. (2002) Private actors in political governance: Regulating the information and communication sector. In: Grote, J.R. and Gbikpi, B. (eds) Participatory Governance. Political and Societal Implications. Opladen, Leske + Budrich, pp. 245–264.

The Political in Governance and Planning   17 Slater, T. (2010) Revanchist city. In: Hutchison, R. (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Urban Studies. Vol. I, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, pp. 665–667. Stoker, G. (2005) Public value management. A new narrative for networked governance? Amer­ican Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41–57. Stoker, G. (1998) Governance as theory: Five propositions. International Social Science Journal, 50(155), 17–28. Sugranyes, A. and Mathivet, C. (2011) Cities for All: Proposals and Experiences Towards the Right to the City, 2nd edition. Santiago, Habitat International Coalition (HIC). Swyngedouw, E. (2011) Interrogating post-­democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political spaces. Political Geography, 30(7), 370–380. Swyngedouw, E. (2009) The antinomies of the post-­political city: In search of a democratic politics of environmental production. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(3), 601–620. Swyngedouw, E. (2007) Impossible ‘sustainability’ and the post-­political condition’ In: Gibbs, D. and Krueger, R. (eds) The Sustainable Development Paradox. Guilford Press, New York, pp. 13–40. Swyngedouw, E. (1996) Reconstructing citizenship, the re-­scaling of the state, and the new authoritarianism: Closing the Belgian mines. Urban Studies, 33(8), 1499–1521. Taşan-­Kok, T. (2011) Introduction. In: T. Tasan-­Kok and G. Baeten (eds) Contradictions of Neoliberal Planning: Cities, Policies, and Politics. Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 1–20. van Eijk G (2010) Exclusionary policies are not just about the ‘neoliberal city’: A critique of theories of urban revanchism and the case of Rotterdam. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(4), 820–834. van Puymbroeck, N. and Oosterlynck, S. (2014) Opening up the post-­political condition: Multiculturalism and the matrix of depoliticisation. In: Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds) The Post-­political and its Discontents: Spaces of Depoliticization, Spectres of Radical Politics. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 87–108. Wacquant, L. (2012) Three steps to historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism. Social Anthropology, 20(1), 66–79. Williams, G. (2004) Evaluating participatory development: Tyranny, power and (re)politicisation. Third World Quarterly, 25(3) 557–578. Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (2014) Seeds of dystopia: Post-­politics and the return of the political. In: Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds) The Post-­political and its Discontents: Spaces of Depoliticization, Spectres of Radical Politics. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 1–22. Wolf, K.D. (2002) Contextualizing normative standards for legitimate governance beyond the state. In: Grote, J.R. and Gbikpi, B. (eds) Participatory Governance. Political and Societal Implications. Opladen, Leske + Budrich, pp. 36–50. Yamamoto, A.D. (2017) Why agonistic planning? Questioning Chantal Mouffe’s thesis of the ontological primacy of the political. Planning Theory, 16(4), 345–363. Žižek, S. (2012) Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London and New York, Verso. Žižek, S. (2000) Holding the place. In: Butler, J. (ed.) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London, Verso. Žižek, S. (1999) The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London, Verso. Zukin, S. (1995) The Cultures of Cities. Oxford, Blackwell.

Part I

Existing and Emerging Paradigms on Spatial Planning and Governance A Critical Evaluation

2 Crisis in Planning Theory Is the Political a Way Out of the Impasse in Planning? Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok

Introduction: Planning Theory/Planning Theories Actually, there is no single paradigm that defines the foundation of what can be referred to as planning theory, as many theories and paradigms exist that make planning a messy, contentious field (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996: p. 4). ‘Planning theory’, in fact, does not exist as a theory of its own right. Friedmann (2003) states that there is no consensus as to what constitutes planning theory, and takes the approach of differentiating between theories that are used ‘in’ planning; those that address the ‘commonalities’ and those that are ‘about’ planning, which is considered a more realistic approach. As Davidoff and Reiner (1962) claim, the world is too diverse for a precise theory of how planning operates, and under such conditions, as may be expected, a lack of agreement about planning priorities and planning ideologies is inevitable (Campbell and Fainstein, 1996: p.  5). This leads to different planning practices, and when different planning practices may exist, it follows that there can be no single planning theory (Alexander, 2016). Therefore, it is only possible to talk about schools of thought instead of planning theory. Alexander (2016), for instance, defines schools of thought in planning since the mid-­twentieth century as mainstream theories about generic practices. Having this clear positioning in mind, it is possible to categorise existing theories that have been used in planning based on their different aims, relational perspectives and the rationality upon which they are grounded, as has already been done by several researchers (Allmendiger, 2001; Alexander, 2000, 2017). First, it is possible to group existing theories with respect to their aims, procedures and the decision-­making systems in planning practice. The aims in planning practice, according to existing analytical theories, can have either pluralist (Weberian) or corporatist theoretical underpinnings, and these theories explain how ‘different political priorities may inhibit the implementation of plans by setting policies within the context of land use planning’ (Allmendiger, 2001: p. 26). Procedural theories are concerned with how planning should work to be more efficient. Since the 1940s onwards, different theoretical debates have been introduced to explain how planning works, including blueprint planning, rational comprehensive planning, incremental planning and decision-­centred planning.

22   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok Finally, the decision-­making system is one of the main concerns in planning theory, because planning is a specific form of intervention, and is itself a means of decision-­making (Moroni, 2018). These theories are concerned mainly with the actors, their roles and their relations in the decision-­making process. The second way of grouping existing planning theories is through the use of the relational perspective of social interaction, as the cornerstone of planning research, in which two conceptual orientations can be defined: the philosophy of pragmatism; and institutional thought. According to Salet (2018), while most planning theories follow a pragmatist approach, transactive, communicative and collaborative planning follows a more institutionalist path. Pragmatism dominated planning practice in the modernist period, given the importance of public action at the time (Hoch, 1984). Therefore, it is possible to say that pragmatism is rooted in the thought of public action, which is directly responsive to the problems of the public (Harper and Stein, 2006; Healey, 2009). More recently, it has been rediscovered as a source of inspiration (Forester, 2013), although there are also criticisms against the revival of pragmatism. Allmendinger (2001: p. 143), for instance, states ‘pragmatism provides a commitment to neoliberal policies with a rejection of foundational knowledge and a relativistic view of theory and opinion’. Institutional thought has also been influential in the different paradigms on planning: Salet (2018) identifies five institutional paradigms that have matured in social sciences and are becoming progressively more common in planning studies, namely path dependence analysis, public choice theory, urban regime analysis, critical political analysis/regulation theory, and cultural and legal institutional theories. These approaches all provide an institutional reflection on planning practice but in divergent ways. For example, a public choice analysis searches for ways of institutionalising norms that enable the efficiency of action and the conditions of self-­regulation; a path dependence analysis enables one to reflect on structuring of the historical conditions in the making of actual choices; regime and regulation studies reveal the power relations underlying the institutional norms in planning processes; and cultural and legal studies address institutional norms and their innovation. The third way of categorising the existing planning theories is to group them with respect to the rationality upon which they are based. It is widely accepted that the theories that were prevalent in the planning discipline up to the 1980s were based on instrumental rationality, given the ability to serve the aims and principles defined for a technocratic form of planning (Alexander, 2000). Besides modernist thinking and instrumental rationality, the Keynesian economic regime was the third pillar of comprehensive planning built upon instrumental rationality, and these three pillars defined the general characteristics and aims in planning. At the beginning of the 1990s, planning scholars began to show an interest in Habermasian communicative rationality leading to a communicative turn in the planning discipline (Healey, 1992, 2003) and communicative planning was presented as a new paradigm (Innes, 1995). The communicative rationality emphasised the role of language and undistorted communication in order to reach consensus and action. Indicating comprehensive

Crisis in Planning Theory   23 planning a technicist top-­down decision-­making mechanism, it endorsed a democratic context in which anyone could question the claims of anyone else. Communicative planning also claimed to contribute to the political democratisation of daily communication. These ideas attracted great interest in planning literature (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1992, 1997), defining planning as an interactive process and an arena of struggle in which problems and strategies are discussed, and conflicts are mediated. What was so attractive about communicative/collaborative planning? According to Allmendiger (2001), it found a favourable historical moment based on a number of reasons: the shift away from the individualistic attitudes of the 1980s towards the more inclusive attitudes of the 1990s; the increasing importance of bottom-­up processes; and the need to fill the vacuum of substantive theories in planning. What is more important, it provided planners with a theoretical justification in the shadow of the deregulatory approaches that became prevalent since the 1980s.

Planning in Different Regulatory Regimes: Compromise or Conflict? The brief summary of the planning theories that were prominent at different times reveals that although planning and planning practice are an integral part of the modes of regulation, because plans can, and usually do, provide legitimacy to the different vested interests of the groups in power and conflicting interests are reflected in the planning process and on planning outcomes, planning ­theories say little about the political and connections between planning and regulatory regimes (Baum, 1995). Therefore, there is a need to explore another strand of literature that focuses on the connections between planning and the political in different periods defined by distinct modes of regulation. While the first conscious efforts to plan cities occurred during the Renaissance, it is apparent that they often aimed to serve the main authority. Similarly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was difficult to define the political dimension of planning, in which the main interest was public areas, such as public centres, market areas, etc. The beginning of the twentieth century is interesting, being the period of utopian concepts in which the poor conditions of the disempowered groups were reflected on the Garden City movement, and their uprisings came to influence the rise of modernist planning. However, in the post-­war period of rational comprehensive planning, the political nature of planning became less visible and indirect. There are few studies charting the connections between planning regulation regimes, aside from those that discuss the negative outcomes of the manipulative power of politics. In this period, planning theories have served to define the aims, procedures and the decision-­making systems, giving reference mainly to the roles and responsibilities of central and local government, as well as the planning hierarchies that exist among them. Existing planning literature has, on the whole, sought to define the role of planning in serving the aims of the progressive economic policies of bureaucracy, usually policies of the Keynesian welfare state policies, that, it is believed, planning governs political decision-­makers.

24   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok The shift from the Keynesian welfare regime to the neoliberal market economy, and the imposed planning practices such as projects of competitiveness, city branding and the subsequent changes in the 1980s, have been quite decisive in planning literature. While the instrumental logic of comprehensive planning came under pressure in the increasingly neoliberal political agenda, several researchers started to refer to these changes in planning practice as the post-­modernisation of planning (Allmendinger, 2001). The formerly cooperative nature of the planning and decision-­making mechanisms began to strain, and this was reflected in different ways in planning paradigms. As planning paradigms that focused on correcting market failures by distributing growth and economic development evenly across state territories and providing services for a reasonable quality of life for all left the scene, others either adapted themselves to the new conditions or merged with the other paradigms, bringing a form of eclecticism to planning. The 1980s have been defined as worldwide neoliberal strategy envisaging a comprehensive roll-­back against the economic policies of the post-­war period, in which planning lost its credibility. The frame of reference of planning, which was based on the principles of redistribution, equal opportunity, justice, public interest, etc., lost its appeal in the new economic regime. The neoliberal approach in planning underlined the challenges created by property-­led planning in cities (Taşan-Kok and Baeten, 2011) and the growing dominance of entrepreneurial urban management (Harvey, 1989). Instead of promoting equal development across the state territory, public investments were concentrated in major cities and urban regions, introducing new spatial strategies that were centred on major cities and urban regions as key sites of economic activity (Olesen, 2014). Planning had become increasingly market and project-­oriented, focusing especially on large-­scale urban development and infrastructure projects (Allmendinger, 2011; Healey et al., 1997; Taşan-Kok and Baeten, 2011). While the state’s role in planning was reduced, earlier planning tasks were increasingly transferred to the private sector or to various quasi-­public or public-­private organisations, and these policies of ‘roll-­back neoliberalism’ resulted in increasing scepticism in regard to planning. When roll-­back policies and a reduced state interest in planning were predominant, planning practices were defined by different aspirations of the different decision-­makers. Brindley et al. (1996) provide a definition of the different planning styles adopted as solutions to the problems caused by market mechanisms, or for correcting inefficiencies in the market process in the UK. Actually, what they describe can be considered a good example of how different styles of planning were adopted not only to meet current needs, but also to provide legitimacy to the different aspirations of major players in the real estate market. In the 1990s, substantial changes occurred in neoliberal ideology and practice (Brenner et al., 2012), giving way to the ‘roll-­on neoliberalism’, in which the state actively intervened in the market by generating public investments into infrastructure and urban development projects in a bid to support market logics and competition, and in some countries, this softer form of neoliberalism was

Crisis in Planning Theory   25 associated with centre-­left governments (Allmendinger, 2011; Haughton et al., 2010). Planning in this period has been redefined as ‘roll-­out neoliberalism’ (Peck, 2010), in which the state plays an active role in supporting market logic by putting policy objectives of economic growth and competitiveness at the centre of spatial policies (Albrechts, 2004; Healey, 1997, 2007). In this period, transactive, communicative and market-­centred (libertarian) planning defined the agenda. Although the rationale of communicative and collaborative planning proposes an entirely different form of democratic decision-­making, in many instances they are used legitimising the project-­based approach, shaped under the notion of competitiveness. In 1990s planning literature, it is possible to observe a renewed interest in strategic spatial planning. Strategic spatial planning practices, which were aimed increasingly at positioning cities and city regions within a global market (Albrechts et al., 2003: Healey et al., 1997) and promoting them as the nodes of the neoliberal economy, became a joint platform upon which the aspirations of the market actors and state could come together. Although, there are several criticisms by post-­structuralist scholars on the revival of strategic spatial planning, it is celebrated among some planning scholars (Albrechts, 2004; Salet and Faludi, 2000), who welcomed it as an opportunity to recover the ground lost to planning scepticism, and who saw it as a new way of transforming planning practices from the neoliberal project-­led planning approaches of the 1980s (Albrechts, 2004). In the 2000s, the increasing interest of the state in urban regulation, the commodification of urban land in order to finance economic growth (Peck et al., 2009), the increasing influence of state entrepreneurialism on urban management (MacLeod, 2002) and the controlling and articulating of the requirements of the global neoliberal market economy (Brenner et al., 2012; Hilgers, 2012; Wacquant, 2009) have become the basis of new urban policies and planning practice. In several countries, a form of state entrepreneurialism has emerged, which defined the direction of coercively obtained resources by the state towards processes of urban development, which would not be otherwise have taken place, to enhance their political support. State entrepreneurialism becomes evident when power battles between strong political actors shape the urban landscape with the help of a range of architectural forms and mega infrastructure projects, and in such cases, the enhancement of a city’s image is not compromised by the visible presence of those with less economic and political power (MacLeod, 2002), but rather by those with political power. Such a situation may even lead to authoritarian state entrepreneurialism when the power struggle involves the disempowerment of opposite groups (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2013), especially in societies wrought with deep divisions (Mady and Chettiparamb, 2017). According to Purcell (2009: p.  141) ‘the system introduced easily can turn to more authoritarian, although they (politicians) use democratic rhetoric and practice and use them to legitimate neoliberalism’. Another important feature of this period is the trend of declining democracy and the rise of authoritarian governance dynamics, and some have argued that neoliberalisation leads to significant democratic deficits in many countries

26   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014). Innes and Booher (2010: p. 29) claim ‘the problems of the current practices and institutions lead to disengagement and apathy of the society on democratic participation’. Participatory practices and new quasi-­public bodies have been lauded as important agents in increasing the levels of democracy since the 1980s, but the practice of participation is limited to certain parts of society (business or political elite, informed or active citizens, discontented residents, etc.). When democratic decision-­making mechanisms are overshadowed by political concerns and their symbols in the built environment, little room is left for democratic processes in planning. In many instances, planning has been restricted to the legitimisation of decisions related to urban areas that are defined by the concerns of market mechanisms, which are the main symptoms of the post-­political condition. It is worthy of note that conservative politicians have conspicuously instrumentalised economic crises and volatility in market conditions to fortify their positions and actions, even when the legitimacy of these manoeuvres are openly questioned (Peck et al., 2013). While local democracies are facing serious problems, it is possible to observe that new ideologies are backed by the support of powerful interest groups within the military, defence industries, and political class enhancing the securitarian ideology to dominate in many countries in the last decade (see Dikeç, 2013; Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014), accompanied by a rise in nationalistic concerns. The securitarian ideology is based on a particular regime of representation, in which the partition of the sensible is crucial (Rancière, 2004, cited by Dikeç, 2009). Through this particular regime of representation, it is possible to create prototypes and to categorise people and places. Furthermore, by means of ideology-­laden discourses, it is possible to create segmentation in the society, and this makes the achievement of consensus increasingly difficult among segregated groups. In France, for instance, Nicolas Sarkozy used a discourse that talked of ‘restoring the Republican order’ (Dikeç, 2009) to justify state interventions and to establish security in the banlieues. As the French example suggests, ideologies may enhance authoritarian practices, which are also manifested not only in governance but also in planning practices (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014).

Recent Debates and Criticisms of Contemporary Planning As the above section underlines, while the connections between planning and the regulatory regimes have changed considerably in time, the 2000s emerged as one of the most difficult periods for planning and planners. The most dominant criticisms raised by planning scholars revolve around discussions on the impact of neoliberalism on the practice of planning. It is possible to group the existing criticisms of contemporary planning theory and practice under four headings: critiques of the notion of consensus; communicative rationality and planning supporting the neoliberal agenda; methods used in contemporary planning practices being far from communication on an equal basis; and the fuzziness of the concepts used in planning and practice.

Crisis in Planning Theory   27 First, the post-­modern critique of consensus underlines that consensus excludes difference (Lyotard, 1984). Several criticisms of consensus generation have been made (Tewdwr-­Jones and Allmendinger, 1998), and a number of scholars have underlined that the decisions made within consensual frameworks are not guaranteed to be more just or inclusive than those in conflictual arenas (Baeten, 2009; Purcell, 2007, 2009). In fact, the growing hegemony of consensus has been seen damaging to real alternatives, especially in the post-­political debate (Bengs, 2005; Harris, 2002). The expectation or requirement for a win-­ win situation or consensus in collaborative spatial strategy-­making processes is defined as highly problematic in planning literature (Allmendinger and ­Haughton, 2012; Hillier, 2003; Innes, 2004; Innes and Booher, 2010; Purcell, 2009). Purcell (2009) claims that as all participants in a collaborative planning process aim to serve their own interests, win-­win situations cannot fundamentally transform existing power structures, but actually contribute to reinforcing them. Purcell goes on to claim that communicative planning practices may, unintentionally, legitimise the reinforcement of the status quo. Additionally, there is a great deal of scepticism about the non-­politicised processes promoted by consensus generation, and Flyvbjerg (1998: p.  209) also speaks of his ‘scepticism about the non-­politicised processes of mediation and building consensus’ that has been underlined in communicative approaches. According to many researchers, existing plans and planning practices lead to depoliticisation, and a focus on win-­win situations and consensus building suppresses conflicts and politics and depoliticises planning processes. Swyngedouw (2009: p.  609) claims ‘we are currently living in consensual times where a genuine political space of disagreement is eliminated’. Second, the communicative turn that has become the dominant rhetoric (Healey, 1992) in planning thought since the 1990s has been subjected to increasing criticism recently (Albrechts, 2010; Fainstein, 2000, 2005; Harris, 2002; Mouffe, 2000; Purcell, 2009; Young, 1996, 1999), concerning both its formulation and its practice. The criticisms referring to communicative action claim that in the long term it reinforces the current status quo and is ‘more likely to support the neoliberal agenda than to resist it’ (Purcell, 2009: p. 141). Moreover, it suppresses any radical and transformative edge in practice (Harris 2002: p.  155), in that it seeks to ‘resolve conflict, eliminate exclusion and neutralise power relations rather than to embrace them as the very terrain of social mobilisation’, and favours some social groups over others (Albrechts, 2010; Fainstein, 2000; Young, 1996, 1999). Parallel to these debates planning literature has also placed emphasis on the deepening segregation and exclusion processes in the city in which society is splintered into opposing social groups (Mele, 2013; Swilling, 2014; Watson, 2009). Mouffe’s work on agonistic pluralism (Mouffe, 2000, 2005) contemplates this discussion by bringing the necessity to comprehend disagreements in a democratic society from the point of view of ‘agonistic pluralism’, to accept and transform conflicts into the use of democratic society. Bond (2011) put these debates into a constructive framework by highlighting the polemic debate between the communicative turn and critical schools of thought,

28   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok arguing that there must be a place to accommodate contestations in planning especially outside the institutional channels of democratic action. The body of literature exploring the power dimension of planning theories also claims that current planning theories that are based on communicative rationality and an institutionalist approach fail to acknowledge the power relations and consequent inequalities in decision-­making processes. In such a situation, priority is given to processes and institutions, ignoring the power relations and the underlying causes of inequality, and this leads to a reinforcement of the status quo and the suppression of any radical or transformative edge in practice. Huxley (2000) points out the need for a greater acknowledgement of the relations of power and inequality in planning theory, criticising communicative planning theory for obscuring the problematic relationship of planning with the state. Actually, both Healey (1997) and Forester (1989) recognise the value-­ laden nature of planning practice and its ability to express values and carry power but argue that the power component of planning practice can be transformed through social processes and relations within particular local areas. Healy (1999) argues that it is possible to redesign institutions for collaborative learning and communicative rationality, thus creating an alternative to the existing power relations, although she accepts that the collaborative approach to placemaking is unlikely to flourish without some changes in political culture and institutional design. Third, the methods used in communicative planning have also been criticised, with Innes and Booher (2004: p. 419) claiming that such an approach often sets citizens against each other, as they feel compelled to speak of issues in polarising terms to get their points across. Actually, public participation is more complex than some advocates of collaborative practice present, and oppositional public involvement is not part of the positive paradigm of collaborative planning (Wolsink, 2006). Even governments have criticised participatory processes, emphasising mainly problems concerning power relations and their outcomes in practice. Planning practice has also faced a number of problems related to participation and the reflection of the concerns of different groups, with complex and lengthy consultation processes failing to engage citizens effectively. Moreover, the adversarial nature of the inquiry system for major infrastructure projects becomes intimidating, making it difficult for local governments, NGOs and members of the public to participate effectively (McClymont, 2011). Many researchers have also highlighted uncoordinated and even chaotic actions driven by fragmented public policies, programmes and projects, as well as plans, as problematic (Aalbers, 2013; Alexander, 2008; Baeten, 2012; Peck and Tickell, 2007; Taşan-Kok and Baeten, 2011). Furthermore, there is no answer which way to follow if it is not possible to reach a consensus. Fourth, the contexts of plans and planning practices have also raised criticisms. Existing spatial planning practices have led to discourses littered with such buzzwords as social justice, just city, environmental sustainability, public interest, community engagement, besides many others. Gunder and Hillier (2009: p.  4) argue that these terms are merely ‘empty signifiers that mean

Crisis in Planning Theory   29 everything and nothing’, and suggest that spatial and urban planning is currently based on the construction and deployment of claims of economic and ideological knowledge. Davoudi and Strange (2009) suggest that the abstract characteristics of plans and fuzzy maps play an important role in avoiding controversial or politically sensitive argumentations and provide a medium for depoliticisation, while Olesen (2014) addresses the same issue, saying that the representational vagueness of fuzzy spatial data becomes an effective means of camouflaging or blurring the strategies defined by private enterprises.

Planning and the Political As the above debates underline, there is increasing disappointment among planning scholars related to planning practice, in reference to the neoliberal agenda that led to increased inequality, democratic deficit and the exclusion of disadvantaged groups for the benefit of groups with power in the decision-­making mechanisms. The increasingly eclectic character of the existing planning systems, insincerity of the decision-­makers promoting their planning projects by using several popular concepts that want to appeal the interest of general public and participatory processes used to downgrade the reactions of the public have increased the discontent in planning practice. There has also been increasing opposition to planning process and plans in many countries, which has become a means of voicing disapproval to the ongoing changes in the cities, neoliberal urbanisation strategies, the large-­scale projects of both the central and local governments, as well as the current politics and ideologies that are shaped by existing governments. In such a context, different debates have been introduced that discuss planning with respect to the political, which gained importance during the latter part of the twentieth century, drawing on wider debates about the nature of political community and democratic life (Healey, 2016). This shift did not only emerged because of the democratic social change through dialogue and activism (Ganesh and Zoller, 2012) but also because of increased reliance on existing political bargaining processes (Klosterman, 1985). ‘The political’, therefore, is used in this chapter to refer to these dynamic processes of democratic action. In this section of the chapter, we try to summarise these different perspectives and efforts. What unites different perspectives is, first, increased interest in post-­political theory. The post-­political theory is grounded on a rejection of the liberal notions of consensus. Mouffe (1993, 2005) argues that to make democracy viable, there is a need for adversaries to be engaged in agonistic conflict. Agonism is defined as a disagreement over political meanings and actions, in which each party accepts the legitimacy of the other to have an opinion. This means that one can disagree but cannot deny the right of the other to hold their own opinion (McClymont, 2011). There is increased interest in agonistic conflict, especially those initiated by Mouffe (1993, 2005) and Rancière (1998, 2001) that brought new approaches within the framework of agonistic planning (Hillier, 2002, 2003; Ploger, 2004;

30   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok Purcell, 2007, 2016; Swyngedouw, 2009, 2010). The main idea behind the agonistic planning approach is that the post-­political era can create a need to re-­ establish political debate and more democratic processes, and for the institutionalisation of the political in planning. According to Hillier (2003: p. 42), the idea of agonistic debate offers a way out of the trap of consensus, in that agonistic discussions accept the legitimacy of an opposing view, unlike in consensus approaches where the aim is to dissolve differences of opinion. From this perspective, the political includes dissensus (Dikeç, 2013). Connected to this, there are increasing calls to institutionalise urbanised insurgencies and creative protests into the planning process, namely, urban social movements. Urbanised insurgencies, including especially those giving voice to the disempowered and discontented in regard to the existing urban change, become crucial when considering their potential role in the politicisation of the urban landscape in new ways (Davidson and Iveson, 2015; Dikeç and Swyngedouw, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2014). The communication of demands through creative protests requires new forms of connections between organisations and the public that are based on self-­organised actions. The urban insurgencies seen in the past few years are a symptom of the return of the political to work, and recent experiences in many cities have shown that the potential still exists to open up new spaces in any given order of planning procedure and within the mechanisms of decision-­making, with the help of institutionalised and non-­ institutionalised insurgencies (Özdemir and Eraydin, 2017). However, the response of the wider political authority – the state – to these movements may not always be accommodating and convivial (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014). In this regard, in political systems in which authoritarian acts overrule local democracy, there is a need for new manoeuvres among these detached sites of protest to forge an institutional transformation in planning. As we have elaborated elsewhere (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014), this can be very challenging when any opposition is suppressed by the political forces of power through physical action, although this form of suppression may create new potentials for learning how to reorganise social actions and mobilise opposition through different channels. Second, debates in planning theory increasingly highlight discussions of ethics, spatial justice and the just city (Fainstein, 2010; Marcuse et al., 2009). The building of shared values and principles is defined as critical in reducing antagonism and in the hegemony of power, although according to many scholars, there is no shared principle that can allow collective expectations to be formulated for the future, as any agreement will silence some and not others, and any decision will favour some over others (Hillier, 2002; McGuirk, 2001; Purcell, 2009; Tewdwr-­Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Watson (2009) argues that the current sources of moral philosophy in planning lack the depth to provide guidance on issues of ethical judgement in a context of increasing social inequality and market-­based rationality. As Dikeç and Swyngedouw (2017: p. 3) underline, there is an urgent need to rethink urban politics and urban political theory in ways that are much more sensitive to the consideration of the city as a site in which the nurturing of political

Crisis in Planning Theory   31 subjectification, the mediating of political encounters, the staging of interruptions and the experimental production of new forms of democratisation can be supported. According to them, the time has come to make a radical reconsideration of the relationship between the general public and the government, and planners should understand their options in affirmative action when seeking to bridge the deep divisions in society. All of the issues raised above underline the importance of highlighting ‘the political’ in new theoretical approaches in urban planning to reflect repoliticising of planning practice. The literature on politics and planning that dwells upon power structures and political combinations when explaining how decisions on the urban built environment come about, and by whom they are shaped (Savitch, 1998). However, none of these debates indicates how planning can be reinstitutionalised in the contemporary world, where neoliberalism has taken on a new agenda supported by post-­truth political discourses.

The Way Out Criticisms and evaluations of the current state of planning with respect to the political are essential. Political theorists such as Mouffe (2000: p. 101) define the political as ‘the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, an antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations’. This definition, introduced by political scientists, is useful for the assessment of the problems in contemporary planning practice and its outcomes but fails to aid in the search for new solutions and alternatives in planning. That said, there is need to define the political with respect to planning. We define the political ‘as channels that enable decisions to be reached related to the public infrastructure and services necessary for sustaining the viability of a society within legitimised processes’. Therefore, planning theories that can bring solutions to the problems outlined in the earlier sections should define the ‘principles, institutions and practices’ that defend democratic processes and that are sensitive to the inequalities and exclusions in a society. Obviously, this definition of political with respect to planning reflects a search for the possible, not ideal. We claim that if we can follow a heuristic approach and look for the possible instead of the ideal, then it may be possible to identify alternatives that are open to planning. In term of principles, justice can be defined as the basis in the search for new alternatives (Campbell, 2006). Justice in the context of urban planning addresses issues related to distributive justice, as well as Rawls’ theory based his conception of equality in primary, natural and social goods. Rawls’ (1971) principles are used to define ‘justice in planning’; equal rights and fairness. That said, recent planning literature on justice also underlines a shift from defining justice as the ‘distribution of spatial goods’ developed by Rawls, to the ‘capability approach’ developed by Sen (Basta, 2016). According to Basta (2016: p.  207), this shift means ‘from justice in planning towards planning for justice’. The capability approach requires a value to be assigned to what individuals are able to do (or

32   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok capable of ) as an alternative. This can suggest new ways of understanding the capabilities of urban society and allows justice to be viewed within a larger framework. Fainstein (2010) associates justice with concepts of diversity, democracy and equity, and defines them as a means of arriving at ‘just outcomes’. Second, there is need to discuss institutions and institutionalism. Instead of defining institutions as meta-­structures of regulatory regimes, a new perspective is needed in which institutions should be understood within a relational perspective. The sociological institutionalist approach, as defined by Healey (2018), emphasises a dynamic, relational view of institutional formation, stabilisation and destabilisation, and centres on understanding institutionalised practices ‘in action’. This indicates that a revitalisation of institutions of local democracy is possible and that there are opportunities at a local and community level for urbanites to become more active in urban issues and the outcomes of planning. This understanding is connected to the attempts at reinstitutionalisation when strengthening the capacities of self-­expression and self-­organisation in people who are excluded from urban decision-­making. Actually, in contemporary cities, there are several, especially disadvantaged, groups that take an active part in the self-­organisation of spaces through bottom-­up initiatives and other forms of social involvement. These groups do not necessarily have access to capital accumulation channels, nor are they able to benefit from the investment decisions of global capital formations or political power through entrepreneurial intentions, but what they do have is the capacity for self-­organisation, usually through fragmented channels of bottom-­up involvement and active citizenship. Self-­organising civil societies and self-­organisation are claimed to be instrumental in dealing with changes imposed in different forms (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2013). As Ostrom (1990) argues, building ‘self-­organisation capacity’ requires a shift in the value system and can be important in instituting self-­regulation potential with respect to planning. Transformative and self-­organisational capacities are also needed to reach the envisaged end state. obviously, political-­economic neoliberalism, which is based, on the whole, on opportunity-­led development, entrepreneurialism and financialisation, bringing with it unprecedented and unpredictable situations that are difficult both to foresee and control. The third issue to which planning theory has to refer is practice. Existing critiques on planning imply that it is possible to come up with a better alternative by changing the planning approach and its methods. Although acceptable, it is not fair to blame only the planning approach and methods for problems concerning the outcomes of planning. As stated by Özdemir and Taşan-Kok (2017), consensus in planning may indeed be very desirable, depending on certain issues and conditions, because it is a context-­dependent process, and planning and planners can facilitate consensus by taking an adaptive, proactive and more human stance (Taşan-Kok and Oranje, 2017) and clarifying the possible outcomes of different alternatives. Obviously, different (interest) groups can fight for alternative solutions since a politically legitimate decision can be made based on differentiated alternatives. This makes us think about ‘social innovation’, which can lead to the opening of platforms for negotiation from

Crisis in Planning Theory   33 where democratic politics can function. Unfortunately, this can only be achieved if those in power can be convinced, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to make room for social innovation in practice.

References Aalbers, M.B. (2013) Neoliberalism is dead … long live neoliberalism! International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(3), 1083–1090. Albrechts, L. (2010) More of the same is not enough! How could strategic spatial planning be instrumental in dealing with the challenges ahead? Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 37(6), 1115–1127. Albrechts, L. (2004) Strategic (spatial) planning re-­examined. Environment and Planning B, 31(5), 743–758. Albrechts, L., Healey, P. and Kuzmann, K. (2003) Strategic spatial planning and regional governance in Europe. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 69(2), 113–129. Alexander, E.R. (2017) Modernist magic: Not guilty; post-­postmodernist – Yes. Planning Theory, 16(2), 227–229. Alexander, E.R. (2016) There is no planning – only planning practices: notes for spatial planning theories. Planning Theory, 15(1), 91–103. Alexander, E. (2008) Between state and market: A third way of planning. International Planning Studies, 13(2), 119–132. Alexander, E. (2000) Rationality revisited: Planning paradigms in a post-­postmodernist perspective. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(3), 242–256. Allmendinger, P. (2011) New Labour and Planning: From New Right to New Left. Abingdon, Routledge. Allmendinger, P. (2001) Planning in Postmodern Times. London, Routledge. Allmendinger, P. and Haughton, G. (2012) Post-­political spatial planning in England: A crisis of consensus? Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(1), 89–103. Baeten, G. (2012) Neoliberal planning: Does it really exist? In Contradictions of Neoliberal Planning. Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 205–211. Basta, C. (2016) From justice in planning toward planning for justice: A capability approach. Planning Theory, 15(2), 190–212. Baum, H. (1995) Practising planning theory in a political world. In: Mandelbaum, S., Mazza, L. and Burcell, R. (eds) Explorations in Planning Theory. New Brunswick, NJ, Rudgers University Press, pp. 365–382. Bengs, C. (2005) Planning theory for the naive. European Journal of Spatial Development. Available from: http://archive.nordregio.se/Global/Publications/Publications%20 2017/Debate_Bengs(2005).pdf (accessed 20 February 2018). Bond, S. (2011) Negotiating a ‘democratic ethos’: Moving beyond the agonistic – communicative divide. Planning Theory, 10(2), 161–186. Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2012) Towards deep neoliberalisation? In: Künkel, J. and Mayer, M. (eds) Neoliberal Urbanism and its Contestations: Crossing Theoretical Boundaries. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 27–45. Brindley, T., Rydin, Y. and Stoker, G. (1996) Remaking Planning: The Politics of Urban Change. London, Routledge. Campbell, H. (2006) Just planning: The art of situated ethical judgement. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 26(1), 92–106.

34   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok Campbell, S. and Fainstein, S. (1996) Introduction: The structure and debates of planning theory. In: Campbell, S. and Fainstein, S. (eds) Reading in Planning Theory, 2nd edition. Hoboken, NJ, Wiley, pp. 1–16. Davidoff, P. and Reiner, T. (1962) A choice theory of planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Institute of Planners, 28(2), 103–115. Davidson, M. and Iveson, K. (2015) From the ‘post-­political city’ to a ‘method of equality’ for critical urban geography. Progress in Human Geography, 39(5), 543–559. Davoudi, S. and Strange, I. (2009) Conceptions of Space and Place in Strategic Spatial Planning. London, Routledge. Dikeç, M. (2013) Immigrants, banlieues, and dangerous things: Ideology as an aesthetic affair. Antipode, 45(1), 23–42. Dikeç, M. (2009) Space, politics and (in)justice. Justice Spatiale/Spatial Justice, No. 1 Available from: www.jssj.org/wp-­content/uploads/…/JSSJ1-6en1.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015). Dikeç, M. and Swyngedouw, E. (2017) Theorizing the politicizing city. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 41(1), 1–18. Eraydin, A. and Taşan-Kok, T. (2014) State response to contemporary urban movements in Turkey: A critical overview of state entrepreneurialism and authoritarian interventions. Antipode, 46(1), 110–129. Eraydin, A. and Taşan-Kok, T. (2013) Introduction: Resilience thinking in urban planning. In: Eraydin, A and Taşan-Kok, T. (eds) Resilience Thinking in Urban Planning. Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 17–37. Fainstein, S. (2010) The Just City. New York, Cornell University Press. Fainstein, S.S. (2005) Planning theory and the city. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 25(2), 121–130. Fainstein, S.S. (2000) New directions in planning theory. Urban Affairs Review, 35(4), 451–478. Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Forester, J. (2013) On the theory and practice of critical pragmatism: Deliberative practice and creative negotiations. Planning Theory, 12(1), 5–22. Forester, J. (1993) Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism. Albany, NY, SUNY Press. Forester, J. (1989) Planning in the Face of Power, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and London, University of California Press. Friedmann, J. (2003) Why do planning theory? Planning Theory, 2(1), 7–10. Ganesh, S. and Zoller, H.M. (2012) Dialogue, activism, and democratic social change. Communication Theory, 22(1), 66–91. Gunder, M. and Hillier, J. (2009) Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning. Abingdon, Routledge. Harper, T.L. and Stein, S.M. (2006) Dialogical Planning in a Fragmented Society: Critically Liberal, Pragmatic and Incremental. New Brunswick, NJ, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers. Harris, N. (2002) Collaborative planning. In: Allmendinger, P. and Tewdwr-­Jones, M. (eds) Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory. London, Routledge, pp. 21–43. Harvey, D. (1989) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, 71(1), 3–17.

Crisis in Planning Theory   35 Haughton, G., Allmendinger, P., Counsell, D. and Vigar, G. (2010) The New Spatial Planning: Territorial Management with Soft Spaces and Fuzzy Boundaries. Abingdon, Routledge. Healey, P. (2018) Developing a ‘sociological institutionalist’ approach to analysing institutional change in place governance. In: Salet, W. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Institutions and Planning in Action. Routledge, London. Healey, P. (2016) The planning project. In: Fainstein, S. and DeFillipis, J. (eds) Readings in Planning Theory. Malden, Oxford, John Wiley & Sons. Healey, P. (2009) The pragmatic tradition in planning thought. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 28(3), 277–292. Healey, P. (2007) Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a Relational Planning for Our Times. London and New York, Routledge. Healey, P. (2003) Collaborative planning in perspective. Planning Theory, 2(2), 101–123. Healey, P. (1999) Institutionalist analysis, communicative planning, and shaping places. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(Winter), 111–121. Healey, P. (1997) Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies. Basingstoke, Macmillan. Healey, P. (1992) Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning theory. The Town Planning Review, 63(2), 143–162. Healey, P., Khakee, A., Motte, A. and Needham, B. (1997) Making Strategic Spatial Plans: Innovation in Europe. London, UCL Press. Hilgers, M. (2012) The historicity of the neoliberal state. Social Anthropology, 20(1), 80–94. Hillier, J. (2003) Agonizing over consensus: Why Habermasian ideals cannot be ‘real’. Planning Theory, 2(1), 37–59. Hillier, J. (2002) Shadows of Power: An Allegory of Prudence in Land-­Use Planning. London, Routledge. Hoch, C. (1984) Pragmatism, planning, and power. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 4(2), 86–95. Huxley, M. (2000) The limits to communicative planning. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(4), 369–377. Innes, J. (2004) Consensus building: Clarification for the critics. Planning Theory, 3(1), 5–20. Innes, J.E. (1995) Planning theory’s emerging paradigm: Communicative action and interactive practice. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 14(3), 183–189. Innes, J.E. and Booher, D.E. (2010) Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy. Abingdon, Routledge. Innes, J. and Booher, D. (2004) Reframing public participation: Strategies for the 21st century. Planning Theory and Practice, 5(4), 419–436. Klosterman, R.E. (1985) Arguments for and against planning. The Town Planning Review, 56(1), 5–20. Lyotard, J.F (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis, MT, University of Minnesota. MacLeod, G. (2002) From urban entrepreneurialism to a ‘revanchist city’? On the spatial injustices of Glasgow’s renaissance. Antipode, 34(3), 602–624. Mady, C. and Chettiparamb, A. (2017) Planning in the face of ‘deep divisions’: A view from Beirut, Lebanon. Planning Theory, 16(3), 296–317. Marcuse, P., Connolly, J., Novy, J., Olivo, I., Potter, C. and Steil, J. (2009) Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban Theory and Practice. London, Routledge.

36   Ayda Eraydin and Tuna Taşan-Kok McClymont, K. (2011) Revitalising the political: Development control and agonism in planning practice. Planning Theory, 10(3), 201–212. McGuirk, P. (2001) Situating communicative planning theory: Context, power, and knowledge. Environment and Planning A, 33(2), 195–217. Mele, C. (2013) Neoliberalism, race and the redefining of urban redevelopment. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(2), 598–617. Moroni, S. (2018) Constitutions, laws and practices: Ethics of planning and ethics of planners. In: Salet, W. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Institutions and Planning in Action, New York and London, Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2005) On the Political. London, Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London, Verso. Mouffe, C. (1999) Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? Social Research, 66(3), 745–758. Mouffe, C. (1993) [2005 edition] The Return of the Political, London, Verso. Olesen, K. (2014) The neoliberalisation of strategic spatial planning. Planning Theory, 13(3), 288–303. Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Özdemir, E. and Eraydin, A. (2017) Fragmentation in urban movements: The role of urban planning processes. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 41(5), 727–748. Özdemir, E. and Taşan-Kok, T. (2017) Planners’ role in accommodating disagreements of citizens – the case of Dutch urban planning. Urban Studies, (Online) Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098017726738 (accessed 26 October 2017). Peck, J. (2010) Zombie neoliberalism and the ambidextrous state. Theoretical Criminology, 14(1), 104–110. Peck, J., Theodore, N. and Brenner, N. (2013) Neoliberal urbanism redux? International Urban and Regional Research, 37(3), 1091–1099. Peck, J., Theodore, N. and Brenner, N. (2009) Neoliberal urbanism: Models, moments, mutations. SAIS Review XXIX (1), 49–66. Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2007) Conceptualizing neoliberalism, thinking Thatcherism. In: Leitner, H., Peck, J. and Sheppard, E. (eds) Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, New York, Guilford Press, pp. 26–50. Ploger, J. (2004) Strife: Urban planning and agonism. Planning Theory, 3(1), 71–92. Purcell, M. (2016) For democracy: Planning and publics without the state. Planning Theory, 15(4), 386–401. Purcell, M. (2009) Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or counter-­ hegemonic movements? Planning Theory, 8(2), 140–165. Purcell, M. (2007) City-­Regions, neoliberal globalisation and democracy: A research agenda. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 31(1), 197–206. Rancière, J. (2004) The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. (translated by G. Rockhill). New York, Continuum Publishing Group. Rancière, J. (2001) Ten theses on politics, Theory and Event, 5(3), http://muse.jhu.edu/ journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.3ranciere.html (accessed 30 November 2017). Rancière, J. (1998) Disagreement. Minneapolis, MT, University of Minnesota Press. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Salet, W. (2018) Institutions in action: General introduction. The Routledge Handbook of Institutions and Planning in Action. London, Routledge.

Crisis in Planning Theory   37 Salet, W. and Faludi, A. (2000) The Revival of Strategic Spatial Planning. Amsterdam, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Savitch, H.V. (1998) Post-­industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris and London. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Swilling, M. (2014) Contesting inclusive urbanism in a divided city: The limits to the neoliberalisation of Cape Town’s energy system. Urban Studies, 51(15), 3180–3197. Swyngedouw, E. (2014) Where is the political? Insurgent mobilisations and the incipient ‘return of the political’. Space and Polity, 18(2), 122–136. Swyngedouw, E. (2010) Impossible sustainability and the post-­political condition. In: Cerreta, M., Concilio, G. and V. Monno, V. (eds) Making Strategies in Spatial Planning: Knowledge and Values. Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media B.V, pp. 185–205. Swyngedouw, E. (2009) The antinomies of the post-­political city: In search of a democratic politics of environmental production. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(3), 601–620. Taşan-Kok, T. and Baeten, G. (2011) Contradictions of Neoliberal Planning: Cities, Policies, and Politics. Dordrecht, Springer Science & Business Media. Taşan-Kok, T. and Oranje, M. (2017) From Planning Student to Urban Planner: Young practitioners’ Reflections on Contemporary Ethical Challenges. New York, Routledge. Tewdwr-­Jones, M. and Allmendinger, P. (1998) Deconstructing communicative rationality: A critique of Habermasian collaborative planning. Environment and Planning A, 30(11), 1975–1989. Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Insecurity. Durham, NC, Duke University Press. Watson, V. (2009) ‘The planned city sweeps the poor away …’: Urban planning and 21st century urbanisation. Progress in Planning, 72(3), 151–193. Wolsink, M, (2006) Invalid theory impedes our understanding: A critique on the persistence of the language of NIMBY. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 31(1), 85–91. Young, I. (1999) Difference as a resource for democratic communication. In: Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. (eds) Deliberative Democracy. Boston, MA, MIT Press, pp. 383–406. Young, I. (1996) Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy. In: Benhabib, S. (ed.) Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, pp. 120–136.

3 Planning and Governance Towards Radical Political Approaches Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey

Introduction Based on the evaluation of the currently prevailing planning paradigms discussed in the previous chapter, and in view of the limitations of integrative, consensus-­focused and pluralistic approaches, this chapter aims to identify emerging radical political approaches on planning and governance in agonistic and subversive perspectives. It raises the question about the future of planning and governance in a contradictory context characterised by enhanced societal diversity and technical complexity, an increasing loss of democratic legitimacy, the strengthening of ‘post-­truth’ populism, as well as an unreined advancement of market forces progressively undermining the political as the commonly assumed driving force of societal development. With this chapter, we expect to show the necessity and urgency to look out for, identify and develop radical approaches of planning and governance. We start from the assumption that consensualist approaches, guided by either an instrumental or a communicative logic, which dominated planning and governance theory and practice in the past, proved to be increasingly inadequate or at least insufficient to deal with contemporary challenges, characterised by growing conflictive tensions. With the latest emergence of authoritarian and managerialist governments in many countries and cities and associated therewith the revival of efficiency-­oriented instrumental and narrowly economistic governance approaches, need is growing, no matter how unfavourable the conditions may appear, for inclusive and, at the same time, contestatory political arenas and planning practices where the conflictive nature of governance and planning can be manifested, and where – resorting to Habermas’ terms – the logics and perceptions of the ‘lifeworld’, i.e. the social practice of daily life, can effectively contribute to question and transform hegemonic structures in the ‘system’, i.e. the realms of the state and economy. Thus, radical planning approaches aiming at transformative change will necessarily have to respond to questions of how to face the problems of antagonistic interests and worldviews and hegemonic expert knowledge in order to arrive at viable and acceptable decisions in a politically intensive process contributing to social justice and democracy.

Planning and Governance   39 As one form to characterise planning’s political dimensions, experiences around the world show that it is crucial to question the rationalities inherent in the different planning approaches and its eventual implications for participation, democracy and social justice. This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first section, the communicative approach of planning and governance is confronted, in a comparative perspective, with the agonistic perspective. Thereafter, in the following section, we explore both approaches regarding to what extent they might contribute to the identification and development of more radical planning perspectives. Finally, in the concluding remarks, we discuss some theoretical gaps for supporting an agonistic and subversive perspective on planning as well as new challenges arising for planners in a context of growing socio-­ political conflictivity and the emergence of new forms of social activism, including civil disobedience.

Consensus Building or Agonist Prevention of Antagonism? The plurality of theoretical and methodological perspectives is reflected in the coexistence of different ‘models’ of spatial planning. Notwithstanding other relevant controversies regarding the different planning and governance approaches, the focus of this chapter is specifically its ‘political dimension’. We put emphasis mainly on the following two perspectives as they are dominant in the contemporary critical planning literature discussing explicitly planning as a political process and that at a time of growing post-­political and post-­democratic tendencies. The first approach, communicative and collaborative planning, is based on Habermas’ communicative action theory (CAT). According to Bond (2011: p. 164), applying CAT to urban planning and governance, the focus of the theory is on ‘debate between all the relevant stakeholders oriented towards agreement [… as] the most appropriate and democratic means of decision-­making in planning and urban governance’. In a somewhat broader perspective, we can say that emphasis is placed on the necessity of democratic, inclusive procedures supporting a process of consensus-­seeking on the basis of idealised communicative decision-­making, aiming at democratic and just outcomes. In contrast, the second approach is based on Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic pluralism, which parts from the assumption that societies are profoundly antagonistic and that, therefore, ‘planning practice in a liberal democratic system, while fostering value pluralism, cannot equate all values in consensus building because decisions require some form of sorting values which prefers some values to the relative repression and/or exclusion of others’ (Hillier, 2003: p.  41). The essence of politics, therefore, consists in a conflictive struggle for hegemony in an agonistic perspective, being the challenge of planning to allow that this struggle can occur and minority positions be heard and effectively considered.

40   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey Planning Processes between Instrumental and Communicational Logics: The Collaborative Approach As can be observed through the oeuvres of the principal authors involved in the discussion and application of CAT to urban planning (Forester, 1993, 1999; Healey, 1993, 1997, 2003; Innes and Booher, 1999a, 1999b, 2010), there has taken place an evolution from ‘communicative’ to ‘collaborative’ planning. Contrasting Forester’s focus on communicative planning with Healey’s collaborative planning approach, Allmendinger and Tewdwr-­Jones (2002: p. 209) understand that the former ‘focuses more on agency and the mechanisms and direct outcomes of inter-­personal relations’, whereas the latter ‘is more concerned with the transformative influence upon existing structures (in the institutional sense)’. Acknowledging these conceptual differences we use both approaches here in general indistinctively (abbreviated to CT), as these concepts are overlapping, not contradictory, but rather complementary, and both are representative for the ‘communicative turn’ in planning, share expectations as regards the transformative potential of communicative action and rationality, and support from the planning perspective the concept of deliberative democracy as conceived by Elster (1998: p. 8): ‘collective decision making with the participation of all those who will be affected by the decision or their representatives’, what he calls the democratic part, and ‘decision making by arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality’, the deliberative part. Starting from the assumption that ‘communication is political’ (Sager, 2018: p. 94) we shall, in order to enhance the understanding of its political dimension, present a critical appreciation of the so-­called ‘communicative turn’ of planning which is based on Jürgen Habermas’ conception of consensus as the desired outcome of a decision-­finding process, for its part based on speech acts expressing a communicational logic of actions. This critical reading of the ‘communicative’ or ‘collaborative’ planning proposals (Healey, 1993, 1997, 2003; Randolph, 1999, Sager, 2018) has to be carried out in its distinctiveness with respect to other planning perspectives committed to instrumental rationalism, like the rational comprehensive and the incremental planning approach (Hudson, 1979). In contrast to these primarily result-­oriented instrumental planning practices, communicative planning has to be understood in its deeply ‘political’ bias, in as far as it advocates the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders and, hence, all relevant points of view, in a communicatively intense and fair consensus-­seeking process, demanding, consequently, the reformulation of state-­society relations in planning. In other words, from this perspective, it is necessary to investigate the planning process in its interface with democracy or democratic procedures in contemporary societies. Resorting to Forester (1993), Healey (1993, 1997, 2003) expounds a series of constitutive elements of a CT and governance. She argues that transformative planning should have a debate as its basic element; that is, it must accomplish what she calls the ‘communicative turn’. As early as the 1990s, Innes and

Planning and Governance   41 Booher (1999a) pointed out that planning as a consensus-­building process is not just about seeking agreement of those involved in planning – including the so-­ called stakeholders – but that it requires experimentation, learning, change and the production of shared meanings. The communicative mode of planning does not follow the traditional goal-­oriented logic and the evaluation of possible alternatives to achieve predefined objectives. It rather seeks to encourage the participants to produce new scenarios through ‘collaborative bricolage’. This means that participants seek to contribute to the dialogue with their own experiences, ideas and methods being gathered as a puzzle to give rise to an innovative strategy supported by all parts involved (Innes and Booher, 1999b). As one of its principal characteristics, CP is focused on conflict and interest mediation and, therefore, requires unrestricted information exchange and circulation, as well as a communicative process based on a discourse ethic which ensures that everyone deserves respect, everyone’s voice is being heard and every­one’s rights can freely be expressed. Therefore, for Sager (2018: p.  93), communication processes have ‘to be open, undistorted, truth-­seeking, and directed at mutual understanding’. The traditional objective-­means relation of planning is therefore abandoned and the state-­society relationship redefined in the sense of ‘a more democratic, de-­centred, flexible, and citizen-­driven model of planning’ (Beauregard, 2005: p. 31), being hence in line with the network model of governance. Whereas the comprehensive-­rational approach is based on the idea of ‘monolithic analyst and policymakers’, embedded in a hierarchical bureaucratic structure, ‘acting in the public interest’ (Beauregard 2005: p.  31), the communicative or collaborative approach requires necessarily a more horizontal network-­oriented governance practice. CAT seeks to overcome the harsh line that divides, according to Habermas (1981), society in two principal spheres of existence, which function on the basis of different, opposing rationalities: on the one hand, economic and bureaucratic systems with their strategic and instrumental rationalities, which have, throughout the history of capitalism, become hegemonic in detriment to social life; on the other, what Habermas calls the ‘lifeworld’, where the communicative rationality prevails and where ‘social reproduction’ is not subject exclusively, and not primarily, to the dictates of capitalism, but rather to mechanisms derived from tradition, socialisation as well as identity and personality forming processes. CAT attempts to bring this communicative logic of daily life’s social practices into planning and governance processes. Therefore, notwithstanding all doubts raised by the critical literature (Pløger, 2015; Purcell, 2009), the great merit of the communicative proposal is having opened paths for conflict mediation and indicating ways how ‘communicative power’ can be ‘accumulated’ by communities or social groups in their everyday life, building ‘social capital’, and therefore being increasingly able to influence decision-­making in specialised expert bodies and in the sphere of public authorities. Yet, communicative planning is not exclusively focused on the procedural aspects of planning, ensuring an inclusive, open and transparent process, but has

42   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey turned out to be, at least in its collaborative version, socially committed, to strive for fair outcomes and to aim at the improvement of the living conditions of the underprivileged and traditionally excluded, what demands measures to contain the influence of unequal power relations and to strengthen social capital (Sager, 2018: p. 93). Without going into more details about empirical experiences of CP, generally, they illustrate how the realisation of the collaborative proposal depends on the fulfilment of a series of conditions whose fruition seems difficult or perhaps impossible to achieve, at least in developing societies marked by extreme contradictions and conflicts between different social strata, by ‘fundamental divisions’ between the powerless citizens and the powerholder elite, as Arnstein (1969: p. 27) put it, by patrimonialist and clientelistic political structures and practices, and by structural limitations of resources and time for the full realisation of participation (Frey, 2008). In the words of Innes (2004: p.  5), ‘Consensus building is time-­ consuming and requires skill and training. It is only appropriate in situations of uncertainty and controversy where all stakeholders have incentives to come to the table and mutual reciprocity in their interests’, a condition fairly rare to encounter in unequal asymmetrical societies. That’s why collaborative approaches received criticism with regard to a supposed tendency of alignment with neoliberalism – if not intentionally then at least as a matter of fact – increasingly coming to terms with neoliberal forms of democracy and giving preference to technical over political forms of managing change and development (Metzger et al., 2015), serving as ‘alibi for elitist, private-­sector driven decisions, or as cheap compensation for state withdrawal from public and social services’ (Miraftab, 2018: p.  277). Consequently, critics expressed strong doubts with regard to expectations that CP could ‘succeed as an emancipatory and empowering project’ (Sager, 2018: p. 101), demanding more radical, contestatory and conflict-­oriented planning approaches as proposed in the agonistic planning approach. Planning in a Conflictive and Antagonistic World: The Agonistic Approach The restrictive conditions for CP, admitted even by their supporters, raise some important questions: how to contemplate and incorporate conflicts and antagonistic values in planning processes? What are, ‘really’, the key dynamics of contemporary (urban) planning (Pløger, 2004: p. 71)? How to reconcile – if at all – the recognition of a conflictive and antagonistic world with consensus and common good orientation? And finally, how to maintain and ensure the political ‘in times of confusion’, of increasing complexities, with a prevailing tendency of the political system to cede planning and decision-­making competences to the reign of experts (Willke, 2014: p. 64), at the same time, being engaged in not giving up the aspiration, inherent to the planning domain, to yield or impose certainty in an increasingly uncertain world (Hillier, 2018; Wildavsky, 2018)? Pløger (2004, 2015) focuses on those elements that, in his opinion, are missing in contemporary planning: conflict and strife, and how to work with

Planning and Governance   43 those in an inclusive way, avoiding ‘forced consensus and incremental practices’ (2015: p. 107). For him, even if planners perceive their daily work as marked by antagonisms and conflicts between irreconcilable views and interests, they usually ignore or deny conflict as a matter to deal with as planners, giving preference to solutions generated by legal action or formal political decisions. One of the main political thinkers of the agonistic approach is certainly Chantal Mouffe (2005: p. 3) who asserts ‘that the believe in the possibility of a universal rational consensus has put democratic thinking on the wrong track’. We should not delude ourselves with the idea of consensus without exclusion and better abandon all hope of a possible harmonious and reconciled society (Mouffe, 2014). In an earlier book with Ernesto Laclau, initially published in 1985, making reference to Foucault’s consideration about power as being always surrounded by resistance, Mouffe (2014) places emphasis on the distinctiveness of different forms of resistance, reserving the attribute of ‘the political’ exclusively to ‘struggles directed towards putting an end to relations of subordination as such’ (p.  136). Their focus, therefore, is not on the daily politics in the institutional realm of the state, but on ‘politics as a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations, … criss-­crossed with antagonism’ (p.  137). Adopting a historical perspective, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the decline of the political is associated with the incapacity of the proletarians to establish ‘a popular anti-­system pole’ against capitalists. Consequently, ‘the division of the social into two antagonistic camps … [, or] two opposing systems of equivalences’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014: p. 135), has gradually faded away. In opposition to ‘third way’ thinkers like Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, Mouffe doesn’t interpret the opening of new political spaces as a ‘reinvention of politics’ (Beck, 1997), but rather as part of a fragmentation and depoliticisation process, strengthening the managerial logic in detriment to the political, and as a consequence, favouring, as fundamental political conflicts and differences are suppressed, the reviving of past antagonisms or enmities (Metzger et al., 2015: p. 9). The agonistic approach ‘offers a fruitful alternative to rationalist liberalism’ (Mouffe, 1993: p.  144), which used to deny and wish away the antagonistic dimension of politics (Mouffe, 2014), to ‘ “abolish” or “sterilise” politics … and replace politics by rules or laws’ (Hillier, 2003: p. 41). The agonistic perspective is notable for bringing into play ‘the historical and contingent character of the discourses that construct our identities’ (Mouffe, 1993: p.  144), neglected in Habermas’ communicative theory where solely the strength of the argument should prevail in decision-­making.  According to Mouffe (1993, p.  145), any agreement arrived at by liberal democratic politics has to be understood as the result of the use of ‘our shared language of politics, … entangled with power’, reflecting existing hegemonic power relations, hence, contradicting the liberal notion of a ‘rational, universal solution to the problem of political order’. From that perspective, any such agreement is considered ‘the product of power politics or clever rhetoric rather than acknowledgement of common interests’ (Sager, 2018: p. 101).

44   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey As Hillier (2003) points out, it was Foucault who expressed the ‘idea of discursively articulated power as agonism’ (p. 42). For Foucault, agonism has to be understood as ‘a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-­to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation’ (Foucault, 1982: p.  222, emphasis added). Therefore, consensualist approaches in a context of severe and continuous antagonisms tend to establish a ‘reign of violence’ (Hillier, 2003: p.  42) as they hamper the active exercise of autonomy of the actors involved. In contrast, agonism is ‘a gymnastic relation characterised by a play of interpretations and anticipations’ (Foucault, 1994, cited by Hillier, 2003: p. 42). Yet, he ascertains that it is ‘a permanent political task inherent in all social existence … the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom’ (Foucault, 1982: p. 223). The expectation of agonistic thinkers like Foucault, Mouffe or Hillier is therefore not that of a relentless and obdurate fight of the underprivileged, the excluded, the ‘powerless’, against a hegemonic elitist power. But rather, assuming a general commitment to the maintenance of conditions of freedom, ‘the art of the game is not to dominate an opposing actor, but to anticipate and exploit its interventions, and thus to make one’s own intervention of (counter)-strategies’ (Foucault, 1994, cited by Hillier, 2003: p. 42). Planning isn’t about yielding final decisions but has to be envisaged as a ‘praxis of provisional agreements’ (Pløger, 2018: p.  266), subjected to permanent questioning and revision, to the continuous confrontation of hegemonic and counter-­hegemonic projects. For Mouffe (1996, 2005), the dilemma with the idea of reaching final consensual solutions for existing socio-­political conflicts consists in the proper nature of the collective identities, whose construction the consensualist approach necessarily demands. As the construction of a politically united ‘we’ requires unavoidably the implicit construction of an excluded ‘them’, the way is paved for the escalating of conflicts and antagonisms. As agreements, all always only partial, limited in time, necessarily excluding dissensus, other opinions, values and interests, planners should always be aware that even if they are seeking agreements, which inevitably has become one of their main endeavours in pluralist democratic societies, ‘they should recognise that some views will almost inevitably be suppressed and could resurface in conflict at a later date’ (Hillier, 2003: p. 42). Politically conceived planning processes have to transform antagonism in agonism; in other words, have to transform antagonist conflicts between ‘enemies’ in agonist conflicts between ‘adversaries’ (Mouffe, 2014: p. 28). Disagreements in planning processes cannot be handled in antagonistic terms because antagonistic conflicts, in view of its deliberative insolubility, can only be ‘resolved’ by power and legal means. Deliberative processes therefore have to ensure the coexistence of competition and cooperation in planning and governance, in order to reach Mouffe’s aspired ‘conflictive consensus’ accompanied by dissensus (Mouffe, 2014: p. 29).

Planning and Governance   45 According to Pløger (2004: p. 72), in a world of agonistic pluralism: agonism could be said to be the ethos of a democracy respecting the legitimacy of difference and interests through public participation. Public planning should ideally be a place for strife about legitimate opinions and meanings on the road towards reasonable and commonly agreed solutions or consensus-­building among mutual adversaries. As however the normative requirements – a consensus related to the basic institutions of liberal democracy, the recognition of ‘a shared adhesion to the ethico-­ political principles of democracy’ (Mouffe, 2000: p. 15, 2014: p. 29), that is, of equality and liberty – are not necessarily so much less demanding than those formulated by communicative planning, the question that has to be raised is ‘how deep-­seated the contrast between agonistic planning and critical CP is, especially when it comes to practice’ (Sager 2018: p.  102). In the following section, we analyse potentials and limitations of current transformation-­aspiring planning approaches able to shake, challenge and eventually overcome dominant hegemonic planning in contemporary society.

Planning as Politics: Approaches, Potentials and Limitations In the context of contemporary societies, characterised by neoliberal market-­ oriented depoliticising governance practices and, consequently, intensified antagonisms, we start from the assumption that a radical planning approach with transformative aspirations has to adopt an essentially counter-­hegemonic perspective, bringing the political back on the planning agenda. Eraydin and Frey (Chapter 1, this volume) indicated three possible paths to reintegrate the fundamental antagonism into democratic practice, resorting therefore to Mouffe, Rancière and Žižek. In accordance with Mouffe, this reintegration should be possible within the frame of liberal democracy, yet demanding renewed institutions and procedures, which necessarily are accepted by all, and which allow that antagonistic views and interests can be expressed in an agonistic manner and, consequently, produce conflictive consensus, without denying ever-­present dissensus. Rancière, for his part, is mainly concerned with the excluded ‘part which has no part’ and therefore recognises the political moment only insofar as the ‘part of no part’ is enabled to assume an active political role, challenging the established asymmetrical political order in the name of equality. While already in Rancière the necessity of a revolutionary form of politics becomes evident, for Žižek the only possible answer can be the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, understood as ‘the pressure, [exerted] by the mobilisation and self-­organisation of the people’ (Žižek, 2012: p. 127). In the following, we investigate to what extent the two theoretical strands discussed previously – collaborative and communicative planning, on the one hand, agonistic planning, on the other – meet the requirements laid down by these political theorists. Subsequently, we introduce counter-­hegemonic power concepts

46   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey based on insurgencies, or as Purcell (2009: p. 141) puts it ‘a democratic alternative not rooted in the liberal or deliberative tradition’, but rather rooted in the daily practice of popular resistance. As shown above, both perspectives, the communicative/collaborative and the agonistic, deny any possibility of the existence of a ‘common interest’, prior to the planning process. Therefore, giving up this traditional planning comprehension, opening itself to conflicts, opinions, uncertainty and, above all, preferences, planning loses its uniqueness: Consequently, by shortening time horizons (annual plans), by reducing the need for prediction (adaptive planning), and by limiting coercion (indicative plans, which merely point the way), planning becomes indistinguishable from whatever means of decision it was meant to supplant. (Wildavsky, 2018: p. 118) Thus, insofar as planning enters the field of politics, which is basically about people’s preferences, which are subjected to permanent change and reformulation, dealing with ‘ends or objectives [which are] held to be provisional–to be modified by experience or to accommodate others’, a field where ‘no one can impose a truth without opposition’ and where conflicts are the centrepiece of public action (Wildavsky, 2018: pp.  119–120), new fundamentally different challenges arise for planners. Therefore, it is not surprising that many planning scholars in recently published books, even if they start with debating planning, end up in the field of governance as a seemingly more indicated concept to describe current challenges faced by planners (cf. Healey, 2007; Innes and Booher, 2010). In view of growing complexity and heterogeneity planners cannot fail to recognise that they have to take into account in their daily work the ‘character of political relations themselves’, which equates to the essence of politics: ‘a struggle over who in fact is a party to politics, over who can speak and be heard in political debate, over what the stakes of politics are, and over who defines those stakes’ (Purcell, 2014: p. 117, referring to Rancière). Hence, from a neo-­ pragmatic perspective, a crucial question arises: ‘how can planning … work with strife, interests, conflicts and difference’ (Pløger, 2015: p. 109)? These concerns are already present in theorists on deliberative democracy like Dryzek (2010) who states that ‘apparently competing ideals of consensus and pluralism can be reconciled by the idea that the purpose of deliberation is not to secure consensus. Instead, the key goal of deliberation is to produce meta-­ consensus that structures continued dispute’ (Dryzek, 2010: p. 15). That sounds quite similar to Mouffe’s idea of the need to transfer adversarial in agonistic relations, which presupposes ‘that, while in conflict, they [the adversaries] see themselves belonging to the same political association, as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place’. Thus, deliberative and agonistic approaches share the conviction of necessary limits to conflicting agonism, namely when it is about the basic foundations of the political system.

Planning and Governance   47 ‘Not all kinds of antagonism or agonism are legitimate, particularly not those questioning or threatening democracy’ (Pløger, 2018: p.  266). This affirmation might become problematic in contexts where democracies are becoming increasingly illiberal as a result of governments restricting civil and political liberties and institutional control mechanisms, as happened recently in countries like Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Brazil or even in the USA, and where respect for the constitution and general laws is diminishing (Mounk, 2018). Regarding its practical implications, the differences between communicative and agonistic planning approaches seem therefore much more a question of emphasis, of a different weighting of more or less the same values and strategies. Considering conflict as productive and ongoing, giving ‘space to the challenge from critique, contestation and the incoming of new ideas’ (Pløger, 2018: p. 265) and promoting the ‘exchange of experiences and openness to new ideas’ (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010: p.  337) are all principles compatible with CP. The main difference, from a procedural and strategic perspective, is that whereas in CP consensus-­seeking is considered the principal challenge for deliberative practices, agonistic planning explicitly values conflict and strife as well as passion as driving forces of planning. Albeit CP shows concern for exclusion, for asymmetrical power relation and contestatory positions, for how to ensure and institutionalise an active role of minorities or politically marginalised and the ineradicable difference or dissensus in planning (Pløger, 2018), there are only a few indications of how to deal with these concerns in practice. From a teleo­ logical perspective, it is possible to affirm that the main difference is that the explicit aim of the agonistic perspective is ‘a profound transformation of the existing power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony’ (Mouffe, 2005: p. 52). Starting with the collaborative perspective we have first of all to recognise that there is a quite substantive literature adopting a sceptical view concerning the ability of CP to challenge globalisation and neoliberalisation (Bengs, 2005; Hillier, 2003; Pløger, 2015, 2018; Purcell, 2009). In analogy to Stoker (1998: p. 18), who described governance as ‘on occasions used to provide the acceptable face of spending cuts’, CP could be interpreted as a strategy used on occasions to provide neoliberal urbanism with the democratic spin necessary to ensure its own survival, or even as ‘a planning theory for the naïve’ (Bengs, 2005). Notwithstanding this critical stance against CP due to its assumed inadequateness to counter the neoliberal project as a whole, it remains suitable to investigate the CP approach with respect to its change potential. In contrast to these critics, authors like Patsy Healey, John Forester, Tore Sager, Judith Innes and David Booher indeed envisage in the collaborative and communicative approach a significant potential for change able to incorporate the communicative rationality in planning and decision-­making processes, contributing thereby to a significant improvement of the living conditions specially of the traditionally excluded, to better lead with the complexities of contemporary society and making communities and societies more resilient.

48   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey Within this theoretical approach, ‘the increasing control of capital over social life’ as a result of the neoliberal agenda (Purcell, 2009: p.  144) should not be considered an insurmountable impediment for democratic deepening, but on the contrary, expectations are raised that through the expansion of collaborative processes favouring communicative rationality ‘collaborative efforts are gradually transforming traditional institutional structures and norms’ (Innes and Booher, 2010: p. 9). Whereas in Purcell’s view, the structure or system, that is, the neoliberal global capitalism, turns out hegemonic in such a way that any kind of collaborative effort only plays into the hands of these hegemonic forces, providing them with the necessary democratic cloak to ensure the maintenance of the existing unequal power structure, communicative planning relies on expectations that broad participation and dialogical planning make ‘planning processes less vulnerable to manipulation and other repressive power strategies by revealing and counteracting communicative distortions’ (Sager, 2005: p. 2). For Dryzek (1990: p.  71) communicative action and rationalisation do contribute to enhance chances for reaching political compromises in the decision process, ‘based on mutual recognition of legitimate, if different, interests’. Moreover, it should be considered the most effective and rational form of tackling complex social problems, and it is potentially suitable to diminish unjustified privileges and social and political hierarchies. In contrast, from an agonistic perspective, ‘a project of ‘radical and plural democracy’ … will be more receptive to the multiplicity of voices that a pluralist society encompasses and to the complexity of the power structure that this network of differences implies’ (Mouffe, 1996: p. 11). For Mouffe, the idea of the ineradicability of power and antagonism is crucial to comprehend the limits of consensus-­ focused liberal rationalism, implying the undecidability of most political issues in view of difference and diversity. Thus, ‘undecidability is not a moment to be traversed or overcome and conflicts of duty are interminable’ and, referring to Derrida’s deconstructive approach, ‘every consensus appears as a stabilization of something essentially unstable and chaotic’ (Mouffe, 1996: p. 10). But how to advance to a modern pluralist democracy where that chaos and instability of continuous conflicts can be ensured and valued within an agonistic perspective, without sliding into inimical antagonism – the fate to be suffered by consensualist democracy as predicted by Mouffe? Indeed, Mouffe is not very concrete about possible practical steps towards an agonistic form of democracy. She talks about the necessity to make available ‘channels … through which conflicts could take an ‘agonistic’ form’ (Mouffe, 2005: p. 5) and to multiply and enhance ‘institutions that permit these aspects [oppression and violence] to be limited and contested’ (Mouffe, 1996: p. 11). As Hillier (2003) explains, it is necessary to understand and incorporate power and conflict into the planning framework, since attempts to establish a rational consensus may result either in a thin agreement at the lowest common denominator on the few issues about which parties can concur and/or be simply a ‘front’ for powerful interests to

Planning and Governance   49 maintain influence and capacity to get what they want while seeming to act more deliberatively. (p. 43) The ‘secret’ and challenge of agonistic planning is to do two things simultaneously: to provide channels of expression in which conflicts can be expressed, on the one hand, and limiting the use of abusively confrontational antagonistic behaviour, on the other, or in Mouffe’s words: ‘giving a form of expression that will not destroy the political association’ (Mouffe, 2005: p. 52). In this sense, in order to identify more radical planning proposals and their limits and potentialities it seems necessary to introduce them in an explicit historical and empirical context of social and political contradictions and antagonisms. Or in other words, the challenge consists in looking for a conceptual framework that permits comprehension of the threats planning is facing today as an outcome of the concrete hegemonic struggle between contradictory or antagonist forces, which essentially act in a political arena based on – at least formally – democratic rules and principles. Those threats may be seen as historical and empirical expressions of contradictions, antagonisms and hegemonic struggle of, basically, two phenomena: globalisation and neoliberalisation.

Counter-­Hegemonic Planning beyond Communicative and Agnostic Approaches ‘Moving beyond the agonistic – communicative divide’ (Bond, 2011) can basically be conceived in two different ways. First of all, as proposed by Bond, by bringing together the best of both concepts, starting from the assumption that ‘both positions have much to contribute to understanding what is democratic in planning’ (p.  180). For her, this requires the provision of ‘a means to balance both the value of a normative framing and power-­sensitive critique’ (p.  179). Thus, there is a need for a ‘democratic ethos’ as a normative framework that allows judging and evaluating participatory planning practices and, at the same time, sharpening awareness regarding unequal power relations. Critical reflexivity as regards the ‘hegemonized ways of knowing and acting’, which exclude those on the margins from taking part in decision-­making, Bond sees as crucial for a power-­transforming planning theory. In practical terms, this means construing agonistic spaces, on the one hand, by ‘rethinking how meetings are run, agendas are set and who takes part in the group’, and on the other, by recognising Mouffe’s concept of undecidability, opening up the planning process and ‘embracing dissensus and conflict as an opportunity to think in a different way’ (Bond, 2011: p. 179), paving the way for innovation and radical solutions. We might admit the suitability of this proposal to promote innovation and certain positive changes, but there is good reason to doubt that it is adequate to bring forth ‘radical solutions’ or even, as Bond expects, to ‘institute new counter-­hegemonic projects that carry opportunities to alter or transform power relations’ (Bond, 2011: p.  171), notably, albeit not exclusively, in strongly

50   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey heterogeneous societies as in the Global South. Purcell rejects the agonistic approach overall and questions its suitability ‘to directly challenge the foundations of the neoliberal project’ (Purcell, 2009: p. 141), because of its ‘ability to co-­opt and incorporate democratic resistance’. Therefore, he insists on the necessity to ‘pursue democratization that is unequivocally inimical to neoliberalization’ (Purcell, 2009: p. 147). From a Global South perspective, Purcell’s view sounds even quite optimistic when he states: ‘Neoliberalization is hegemonic, but it is not invincible. It is merely hegemonic now. Counter-­projects are possible; indeed they are inevitable’ (Purcell, 2009: p.  144). The question arises, how under quite adverse conditions of neoliberal colonisation of the lifeworld and the growing fragmentation of social struggles and organisation, contra-­hegemonic struggles are in fact possible? What forms of planning and governance are appropriate to support, promote or even encourage those struggles? Is there sufficient reason for the hope that change might come from planners themselves? Or are those simply trapped in the logic of the neoliberal project? Operating under the guise of liberal democracy and providing communicative and decentralised participatory opportunities for the presumably excluded, without being able to confront structural constraints, do we assist to nothing but the alienation of planners doing their job in favour of the system, the dominant neoliberal rule? Without calling into question the relevant role of planners in progressive planning processes, in mobilising citizens and community groups, it has to be recognised that traditional forms of planning and its official institutional framework have often proved to be a hindrance for the fight against neoliberalisation and globalisation. Even experiences with participatory democracy and planning showed, as in the case of Brazil, that neither governments nor planners were able to challenge more fundamentally the interests of urban capital interests (Frey and Duarte, 2005). Recognising these limits for planning-­induced radical transformative change, our focus necessarily has to be redirected to forces and movements acting outside the state, to insurgencies or subversions that might even find support by planners, but whose driving force has to be located in the realm of civil society and in people’s daily life (Holston, 2009; Randolph, 2014). As Sandercock underlines (1998), radical planning approaches as advocacy planning in favour of the poor or excluded have very much recognised that contestatory action has to be conducted from outside the bureaucracy, counting on the empowerment of local communities and social movements, albeit recognising the limits of such approaches: Taken separately, none of these struggles may seem at all system-­ threatening … but taken together they do constitute a challenge, because they have the potential for making people less depending on global capital, increasing their social power and experiencing their own political power. (p. 176)

Planning and Governance   51 In fact, historically, most experiences of radical insurgent or revolutionary movements used to originate from forces acting against the system, usually in the form of inimical hostile confrontation. Mouffe’s premise for agonistic dispute, the acceptance of basic institutional arrangements and ethical democratic principles, used to be abrogated by such movements because it is just these general structures that are identified as the principal causes of social unrest and subversive action. Consequently, in insurgent planning the focus is no longer on the professional planner, but rather on insurgent practices of citizens and local communities as particular forms of planning (Miraftab, 2018). ‘Insurgent planning practices as counter-­hegemonic, transgressive and imaginative’ (Miraftab, 2009: p. 32) is not only about re-­imagining and practicing new kinds of democratic action in an emancipatory and empowering perspective, but also, concretely, on questioning the omission of governments related to the provision of basic public services and infrastructure, as well as the hegemonic and dominant forms of spatial appropriation imposed to the daily life of ordinary citizens (Holston, 2009; Randolph, 2017). However, as these insurgent movements very often happen under highly adverse conditions marked by everyday violence by both criminals and police, as Holston (2009) observed for the case of the peripheries of São Paulo, at the same time it produces enhanced conflicts between centre and periphery fostering ‘incivility as a public idiom of resistance and insistence’ (Miraftab, 2018: p. 263). Regarding the loci of confrontation, Miraftab (2018) makes an important distinction between ‘invited spaces’, where citizens are invited by governmental authorities to take part in planning or governance processes – experiences of participatory democracy and planning used to occur in such explicitly organised spaces – and ‘invented spaces … as collective action by the poor that directly confront the authorities and challenge and destabilize the status quo’ (p.  279), frequently standing both types of spaces in an interactive relationship. Yet, insurgent practices move fluently across these different formal and informal arenas of participation, whereas the latter, we think of all the recent popular manifestation and occupations that overrun squares and avenues in so many capitals all around the world (Davidson and Iveson, 2014), tend to be criminalised by the hegemonic forces with the intent to contain and control spaces of citizen activism (Miraftab, 2018). Thus, ‘IP [insurgent planning] practices are counter-­hegemonic in that they destabilize normalized relations of dominance and insist on citizens’ rights to dissent, rebel, and determine their own terms of engagement and participation’ (p.  282). Miraftab summarises the potential of insurgency for human urbanism as follows: [It] lies in the normality that it disrupts and the new common sense that it helps to create; in assuming equality and solidarity as normality interrupted by structures of domination, not the other way around; and in its aspiration to recover an idealist imagination of a different, more just future. (p. 285)

52   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey A crucial limitation of insurgent planning, as Miraftab continues, seems to consist in the fact that it suits much better to mobilise action against present condition than to develop an alternative scenario of an imagined future to aspire and to seek for, and eventually putting them into practice. Many of the worldwide popular manifestations that started full of hope with the Arabian Spring, expanding to places like the US (Occupy Wall Street), Turkey, Syria, Spain, Greece or Brazil, generally ended up in frustration and even in the aggravation of the governing hegemonic regimes. In this sense, insurgent planning or actions can hardly be understood as ‘counter-­hegemonic’ as their main contribution is rather to call into question historically hegemonic structures in an insurgent, timely limited manner. We also have to be aware that what used to be summarised under the term insurgencies are very diverse movements, conducted by social actors from different social classes, with quite different motivations and objectives and definitely not all guided by idealist imagination having in mind a more just future. Herewith we come to our last contribution to radical political approaches in planning and governance, albeit we might not call it planning anymore, although it might require responses from part of planning. According to Žižek (2012) ‘there is … room for a magical passive revolution, which instead of directly facing power undermines it by digging like a mole in the ground and denying all its underlying everyday rituals and practices’ (p. 135). By this, Žižek alludes to Mahatma Gandhi’s movement of satyagraha which intended to put an end to the rule of the British colonial state in India as a radical, revolutionary form of civil disobedience. Gandhi, with his Non-­cooperation Movement, adopted a strategy of ‘passive resistance’ aimed at radical, revolutionary change (political independence) and avoiding the aggravation of hatred and violence in the Indian society (Gandhi, 2010; Parekh, 2001). That is to say, whereas the movement led to ‘a large body of voluntary institutions, greatly expanded civic space, and reduced the moral hold of the colonial state, … it failed in its basic objective of paralysing the colonial state by establishing an alternative one behind its back’ (Parekh, 2001: p. 18). Thus, we can conclude that all radical political approaches discussed in this chapter share the common dilemma of how to counter hegemonic projects without ending up in neither harsh antagonism, hatred and outbreak of violence, nor exhaustion and dissolution. If we dismiss Žižek’s radical solution of a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ as a desirable or viable goal, progressively oriented planners are confronted with a series of overlapping theories and concepts that range from rationalised and consensus-­oriented communicative or collaborative planning, to institutionally supported agonistic approaches, to theoretical and empirical concepts that count on externally generated counter-­ powers by means of insurgent planning or even passive resistance or civil disobedience. For socially engaged public planners and policy-­makers, this new complexity means that there is not any one-­fits-all solution to be learned in planning schools and to be applied indistinctively in any given planning context. Planners have to be open to change and to permanent learning through action and experience (Sandercock, 1998) in continuous interaction with the

Planning and Governance   53 addresses of their planning efforts. Considering context is crucial. Communicative planning, combined with the adoption of ‘fearless speech’ (Grange, 2017), might work reasonably well in an equalitarian and low-­conflict society like Sweden to give effectively voice to the less privileged in governance, but seems highly unrealistic in extremely unequal development countries of the Global South. The greater the conflicts and the deeper the historical roots of such conflicts, the more necessary it is to move towards more conflictual approaches, creating agonistic spaces where conflictive consensuses can be reached, supporting efforts of subjectification from part of citizens by insurgent action, or even engaging in passionate passive resistance in order to enhance public indignation. At the same time, however, as the provocations increase, the risks of violent outbreaks, from part of the movement or as reaction of the system, also increase. Therefore, planning is definitely not politically neutral and planners are more and more compelled to take positions in smouldering conflicts. Planning theories can give orientation, demonstrate dilemmas and opportunities, but it is in the daily planning and governance practice where the fate of cities and communities is decided.

References Allmendinger, P. and Tewdwr-­Jones, M. (2002) Conclusion: Communicative planning, collaborative planning and the post-­positivist planning theory landscape. In: Allmendinger, P. and Tewdwr-­Jones, M. (eds) Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory. London, Routledge, pp. 206–216. Arnstein, S.R. (1969) A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the Amer­ican Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224. Bäcklund, P. and Mäntysalo, R. (2010) Agonism and institutional ambiguity: Ideas on democracy and the participation in the development of planning theory and practice – the case of Finland. Planning Theory, 9(4), 333–350. Beauregard, R.A. (2005) Planning and the network city. Discursive correspondences. In: Albrechts, L. and Mandelbaum, S.J. (eds) The Network Society. A New Context of Planning. London, Routledge, pp. 24–33. Beck, U. (1997) The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Cambridge, Polity Press. Bengs, C. (2005) Planning theory for the naive? European Journal of Spatial Development. Available from: www.nordregio.se/EJSD/-ISSN 1650-9544, (accessed 24 February 2018), 1–12. Bond, S. (2011) Negotiating a ‘democratic ethos’: Moving beyond the agonistic – communicative divide. Planning Theory, 10(2), 161–186. Davidson, M. and Iveson, K. (2014) Occupations, mediations, subjectifications: Fabricating politics. Space and Polity, 18(2), 137–152. Dryzek. J.S. (2010) Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Dryzek. J.S. (1990) Discursive Democracy. Politics, Policy, and Political Science. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Elster, J. (1998) Introduction. In: Elster, J. (ed.) Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–18.

54   Rainer Randolph and Klaus Frey Forester, J. (1999) The Deliberative Practitioner. Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Forester, J. (1993) Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press. Foucault, M. (1982) The subject and power. In: Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (eds) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton, Harvester, pp. 214–232. Frey, K. (2008) Development, good governance, and local democracy. Brazilian Political Science Review, 2(2), 39–73. Frey, K. and Duarte, F. (2005) Démocratie participative et gouvernance interactive au Brésil, Santos, Porto Alegre et Curitiba. Espaces et Sociétés, 123(4), 99–112. Gandhi, M.K. (2010) The Story of my Experiments with Truth. An Autobiography. Mumbai, Wilco. Grange, K. (2017) Planners – A silenced profession? The politicization of planning and the need for fearless speech. Planning Theory, 16(3), 275–295. Habermas, J. (1981) Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Vol I e II, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp. Healey, P. (2007) Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies. Towards a Relational Planning for Our Times. London, New York, Routledge. Healey, P. (2003) Collaborative planning in perspective. Planning Theory, 2(2), 101–123. Healey, P. (1997) Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies. London, Macmillan. Healey, P. (1993) Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning theory. In: Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press. Hillier, J. (2018) Lines of becoming. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. New York, Routledge, pp. 337–350. Hillier, J. (2003) Agonizing over consensus: Why Habermasian ideals cannot be ‘real’. Planning Theory, 2(1), 37–59. Holston, J. (2009) Insurgent citizenship in an era of global urban peripheries. City and Society, 21(2), 245–267. Hudson, B.M. (1979) Comparison of current planning theories: Counterparts and contradictions. Amer­ican Planning Association Journal, 45(4), 387–398. Innes, J. (2004) Consensus building: Clarifications for the critics. Planning Theory, 3(1), 5–20. Innes, J. and Booher, D.E. (2010) Planning with Complexity. An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy. London, Routledge. Innes, J. and Booher, D.E. (1999a) Consensus building and complex adaptive systems. A framework for evaluating collaborative planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 65(4), 412–423. Innes, J. and Booher, D.E. (1999b) Consensus building as role playing and bricolage. Toward a theory of collaborative planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 65(1), 9–26. Metzger, J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (2015) The contested terrain of European territorial governance. In: Metzger, J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (eds) Planning Against the Political: Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance. New York, Routledge, pp. 1–27. Miraftab, F. (2018) Insurgent practices and decolonization of futures. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. New York, Routledge, pp. 276–288.

Planning and Governance   55 Miraftab, F. (2009) Insurgent planning: Situating radical planning in the Global South. Planning Theory, 8(1), 32–50. Mouffe, C. (2014) Agonistik. Die Welt politisch denken. Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp. Mouffe, C. (2005) On the Political. London, Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2000) Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism. Institute for Advanced Studies (HIS). Vienna, Political Science Series, nº 72. Mouffe, C. (1996) Deconstruction, pragmatism and the politics of democracy. In: C. Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction and Pragmatism, London, Routledge, pp. 1–12. Mouffe, C. (1993) The Return of the Political. London, Verso. Mounk, Y. (2018) The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Parekh, B. (2001) Gandhi. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pløger, J. (2018) Conflict and agonism. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. New York, Routledge, pp. 264–275. Pløger, J. (2015) Impossible common ground. Planning and reconciliation. In: Metzger, J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (eds) Planning Against the Political: Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance. New York, Routledge, pp. 107–128. Pløger, J. (2004) Strife: Urban planning and agonism. Planning Theory, 3(1), 71–92. Purcell, M. (2014) For a politics we have yet to imagine. Space and Polity. 19(2), 117–121. Purcell, M. (2009) Resisting neoliberalisation: Communicative planning or counter-­ hegemonic movements? Planning Theory, 8(2), 140–165. Randolph, R. (2017) Subverting the present, planning the future: Proposing a counter-­ planning, Spaces of Dialogue for Places of Dignity, Paper presented at AESOP Annual Congress, Lisbon, Portugal. Available from: www.researchgate.net/publication/ 317314447_Subverting_the_Present_Planning_the_Future_Proposing_a_Counter-­ Planning) (accessed 31 January 2018). Randolph, R. (2014) Subversão e planejamento como práxis – uma reflexão sobre uma aparente impossibilidade. In: Limonad, E. and Castro, E. (eds). Um novo planejamento para um novo Brasil? Rio de Janeiro, Letra Capital Editora, pp. 40–57. Randolph, R. (1999) O planejamento comunicativo entre as perspectivas comunitarista e liberal: Há uma ‘terceira via’ de integração social? Cadernos IPPUR, 13(1), 83–108. Sager, T. (2018) Communicative planning. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. New York, Routledge, pp. 93–104. Sager, T. (2005) Communicative planners as naïve mandarins of the neo-­liberal state? Debate, European Journal of Spatial Development. Available from: www.nordregio. se/EJSD/-ISSN 1650-9544-Dec (accessed 15 March 2018). Sandercock, L. (1998) The death of modernist planning: Radical praxis for a postmodern age. In: Douglass, M. and Friedmann, J. (eds) Cities for Citizens. Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age. Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, pp. 163–184. Stoker, G. (1998) Governance as theory: Five propositions. International Social Science Journal, 50(155), 17–28. Wildavsky, A. (2018) The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan. Willke, H. (2014) Demokratie in Zeiten der Konfusion. Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp. Žižek, S. (2012) Das unendliche Urteil der Demokratie. In: Agamben, G., Badiou, A., Zizek, S., Rancière, J., Nancy, J.L., Brown, W., Bensaïd, D. and Ross, K. (eds) Demokratie? Eine Debatte. Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, pp. 116–136.

Part II

Conflict in Governance and Planning Practices Problems of Post-­Political Trends

4 Multilevel Power Relations and Planning Conflicts in a ‘Land of Exception’ The Case of the Sughereta Di Niscemi Reserve in Sicily Francesco Lo Piccolo, Filippo Schilleci and Vincenzo Todaro Introduction In a review of the role of planning practices in conflictive dimensions, neoliberals see conflict as a disruptive force that causes imbalances in a system of interrelated parties (Hayek, 1973; Sager, 2011; Sorensen, 1982), whereas radical and post-­Marxist theorists view conflict as a potentially positive force that can promote change, democracy and equity (Purcell, 2009; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), suggesting that innovation arises only in a situation of social conflict and insurgencies (Friedmann, 1992, 2011; Harvey, 2000; Mouffe, 1999). In more recent times, the analysis of (spatial) conflicts highlights a series of implications regarding the numerous crises of representation, resources and choices of development in complex and multilevel models of governance. The variety in nature and size of conflicts, in western democracies especially, gives back a general condition of fragmentation of the territorial subjects and the crisis of forms of representation (Castells, 2012). Moreover, there are themes and planning choices capable of opening conflicting arenas almost by definition: Among these, the localisation of new installations and the realisation of great infrastructure projects (such as highways and high-­speed railways) which have a high impact on land use, environment and health of citizens (Beard, 2003; De Leo and Lo Piccolo, 2015). In more general terms, deep conflicts mark contemporary cities and regions, due to the overlapping of multiple levels of sovereignty and governance. Subsequently, depending on the levels of community political awareness and empowerment, as well as the manipulating strength of dominant interests, planning may play different roles. As highlighted by Yiftachel (1998), ‘planning as oppression’ exists in a variety of settings and affects a range of social relations in space. Alternative interpretations of power in planning beyond the Marxist analytical framework have been undertaken more recently. The most comprehensive analysis was carried out by Flyvbjerg (1998) who analysed the dualistic

60   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. and asymmetrical opposition of rationality and power. This turn towards the dark side of planning theory – the domain of power – has been extensively explored by a large number of scholars, such as Yiftachel (1994, 1995), Flyvbjerg (1998), Sandercock (1998), Gunder and Mouat (2002), Hillier (2002) and Kamete (2012). In a variety of geopolitical and institutional contexts, these authors have investigated planning practices, where political powers use planning as a tool for oppressing weak groups, leading to subjugation, exclusion and social and environmental injustice. However, a further common practice for ‘using’ planning in the exercise of power and as an instrument of oppression of the weaker party is, paradoxically, linked to its ‘suspension’. In geographically marginal and (from the institutional standpoint) often precarious territorial contexts, such as certain areas of southern Italy, we observe the phenomenon of the so-­called ‘suspension of norms’, also regarding planning instruments and unanimously acknowledged regulations (Yiftachel, 2009a, 2009b; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2004), resulting from a perverse alliance between different power groups. This chapter shifts the focus from the relationship between urban planning and local power to the relationships between multilevel power imbalances, planning conflicts, land use, environmental protection and sovereignty. This complex and conflictive range of interactions is particularly evident in some areas with a strategic position and/or under the influence of multiple levels of power, where land use and the natural environment are transformed only according to the rationality of hegemonic power, rather than according to principles of justice and democracy, and where the economic/military/political powers produce subjugation, domination, exclusion and surveillance through land transformation (Lo Piccolo and Halawani, 2014). This chapter investigates how asymmetrical power relations can influence planning systems at local governance level, being the result of conflicting interests (such as those described in Forester, 2006; Lindblom, 1965; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987) between land transformation and the protection of natural interest sites. It also sows how this condition can generate severe forms of environmental and social injustice, through the ‘exceptional’ manipulation of norms and procedures. In order to explain by which mechanisms oppression and control actually occur, we will use Agamben’s (2005) concept of ‘the state of exception’ and its implications for planning, describing and analysing the planning process of case study of the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) of Niscemi, a military communications satellite system constructed by the US Navy. The chapter starts by reviewing some theories of power relations, starting with the work of Michel Foucault (1980, 2000) and then exploring the concept of the state of exception developed by Agamben (1998, 2005). These theoretical references provide a lens through which we can frame the manipulation of planning norms and procedures in Sicily, where it has been employed to serve military power, ignoring environmental concerns and values.

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   61

Power Relations in the Domain of Planning Laws: The Agambenian Approach Flyvbjerg (1998) dealt with power and oppression in planning practice in the light of Foucault’s theory of power. Intensively analysed by Hillier (2002), Michel Foucault’s (1980, 2000) theories on the relation between power and knowledge offer a comprehensive framework through which to criticise the role of knowledge that appears to be neutral. Although Foucault’s work is essential in understanding the relationships between power and knowledge, the instrumental and ambiguous use of ‘the law’ is another key element in the relations between planning and power. The exercise of power and oppression occurs in the domain of ‘the law’, although the law can be suspended, manipulated and unequally applied. This is what ‘exception’ means according to Agamben (1998, 2005), who conceptualises the notion of exception by connecting it with the suspension of laws, the circumvention of constitutional principles and the misuse of norms. According to Agamben (2005), the state of exception can be defined as the union of two elements: the suspension of the law and the ‘extension of military authority’s wartime powers into the civil sphere’ (Agamben, 2005: p. 5). The following considerations reorient this model from a mere political dimension to a spatial domain, demonstrating that the condition of exception is not confined to political a-­spatial arenas, but is also used to produce zones of exception, spaces of ‘lawlessness’ or manipulation of laws, which are rooted more subtly in the social and economic relations of a specific area. We agree with Gray and Porter (2014) regarding the fact that ‘exceptionality’ has been more widely analysed in war contexts (Armitage, 2002; Ek, 2006; Gregory, 2006); however, they argue that war provides only a ‘limited state of exception’ – ‘exceptionality’ cases also include ‘spectacular mega-­events’ (Marrero-­ Guillamón, 2012; Sánchez and Broudehoux, 2013; Shin, 2012) and special, great projects as regards the level of urban planning and governance (Baptista, 2013). On the basis of our research experience (Lo Piccolo, 2016; Lo Piccolo et al., 2017; Lo Piccolo and Todaro, 2015), we confirm that ‘the state of exception is extensively operative in everyday life’ (Gray and Porter, 2014: p. 381). While Schmitt (1985) considers the state of exception a temporary condition, Agamben (2005) highlights that the state of exception has become an ‘ordinary condition’ at the global level. In relation to modern liberal democracies, characterised by a permanent state of emergency, the state of exception, from a temporary suspension of law, has become a stable, generalised condition – ‘the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalisation of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government’ (Agamben, 2005: p. 14). Many authors (Gray and Porter, 2014; Hardt and Negri, 2005; Roy, 2005) have successfully pointed out that the widespread use and abuse of the ‘state of exception’ in contemporary western democracies demonstrates the progressive normalisation of the exceptionalism mechanism and the use of its logic. In this chapter, we agree with this position; furthermore, we transfer and broaden Agamben’s statements. The state of exception does not

62   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. affect only political regimes and individuals but also spaces in a multilevel and conflictive system of governance. According to Agamben (2005) any ‘state of exception’ originates as a ‘state of necessity’: Necessity is not the law, nor does it correspond to a suspension of the law; on the contrary, it functions as an ethical condition that releases a specific situation from application of the law. As explained by Gray and Porter (2014), when rereading Agamben, it is the ‘common good’, with its implication of necessity, which actually ensures that the exception has the force and right of law. Neither the necessity, nor acknowledgement of the ‘common good’ can objectively be determined, nor can they always be valid for everybody. In turn, necessity can be related to various conditions; in the political science literature, those linked to the state of emergency have been the subject of particular, in-­ depth examination (Gregory, 2006; Huysmans, 2006, 2008). These conditions are generally explained as a suspension of laws and norms for reasons of security or economic interest. Although in both cases this suspension is activated in the prevailing public interest, in reality it often conceals powerful interests. If the mandate of necessity becomes a source of law, the state can be such a superior power circumventing and suspending laws and norms. In this sense, power (the state) becomes the law and exception becomes the rule. According to Schmitt, ‘what characterises an exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes’ (Schmitt, 1985: p.  12). Then, the declaration of the state of exception is decided by a political regime: ‘Sovereign is who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt, 1985: p.  5). Agamben draws on Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign as the one who has the power to proclaim the state of exception or justitium, where law is indefinitely ‘suspended’ without being abrogated, to generate ‘an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law’ (Agamben: 2005: p. 39). Consequently, this chapter makes use of the Agambenian approach to understand the transformation of land and environment in Sicily and also to theorise the exercise of power in relation to these transformations. We emphasise the operation of the state of exception in reference to planning practices and multilevel governance, highlighting how this takes on different characteristics with respect to the asymmetrical power relationships that produce it. The case study of the ‘Sughereta di Niscemi’ helps us to explain the different modalities of suspension of norms and how planning, with its procedures, is at the same time the victim and itself an instrument of this manipulation mechanism.

Being Exposed to International Military Interests: The Case of the ‘Sughereta di Niscemi’ Reserve in Sicily The ‘Sughereta di Niscemi’ Reserve (in Caltanissetta, Sicily) is a natural protected area of the Sicilian Region,1 established in 1997. The cork forest2 (sughereta) of Niscemi (3,000 hectares) is the most important relic of the oak forests that once covered central-­southern Sicily (Rühl et al., 2005); moreover, the same

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   63 area is protected by landscape restrictions (regulated in Italy by Legislative Decree no. 42/2004). The reserve is a habitat of considerable natural importance, with over 500 species of plants and about 130 species of animals; as a result, the area is also protected at the European level. In fact, the territory of the reserve is part of a Site of Community Importance (SCI), included in the Natura 2000 European Ecological Network3 (Mazzeo, 2012). This site is regulated by a management plan completed in 2008 and approved in 2010 by the Sicilian Region, in order to protect natural habitats according to the above-­mentioned European directives. The ‘Sughereta di Niscemi’ Reserve is located in an area that has long been of international interest, given that the US Naval Air Station Sigonella is located 60 km from it. This makes the zone one of the most important and strategic military bases in the world, with all the consequences that this entails; these include some conflicts relating to territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty that emerge from time and undermine US–Italian diplomatic relations (Di Bella, 2015). This strategic role clearly emerges in the reconstruction of the intense process of militarisation of the Sicilian territory (Messina, 2017). The US militarisation of Sicily became a reality in 1954 when, with the signing of the US–Italy bilateral agreement after the end of the World War  II, the presence of US military bases in Italy was regulated.4 The Italian military defeat in the war led in fact to the stabilisation of US forces on Italian territory as a fundamental part of the negotiation of peace agreements. Over the following decades, the role of Sicily was raised to that of the strategic centre of the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, whereas the function of the US military in Sicily changed: between the 1950s and 1970s it was mainly a deterrent against Soviet counter-­power;5 in the following decades and due to its strategic position in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, Sicily became a platform for extra-­ territorial North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US operations in Europe in the war against international terrorist organisations (Di Bella, 2015; Mazzeo, 1991). However, starting from the end of the Cold War and with the change in strategic scenarios in the Middle East and the existence of new and different types of threats compared to the past, over the years the Sigonella base has changed its mission and related types of intervention, namely new military infrastructures. In particular, the most significant changes have been the closure of the HC-­4 helicopter squadron and the launch of the satellite telecommunications mission. In fact, the base originally chosen for the terminal of the new satellite system was that of Sigonella, the main naval station of the US Navy in the Mediterranean. Thereafter, the US Navy decided to move the terrestrial plant to nearby Niscemi station,6 which since 1991 had already been home to 46 antennas of the US Naval Radio Transmitter Facility (Mazzeo, 2012). Therefore, the same US Naval Radio Transmitter Facility station, located within the ‘Sughereta di Niscemi’ nature reserve, was chosen as the site for the MUOS ground station for satellite communications, on the basis of an international agreement (2001) between Berlusconi’s centre-­right Italian government and the US Navy, Department of Defense. According to this military strategic vision, the Naval Air

64   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. Station of Sigonella, which is 60 km from Niscemi and the MUOS ground station of the Niscemi project would have made southeastern Sicily a key area for US communications in the Mediterranean and the Middle East during the increasing tensions in Libya and the Arab region. The MUOS is the most sophisticated narrowband military communications satellite system, designed by the US Department of Defense to support US and NATO military operations around the world. It is considered a fundamental strategic tool for the Atlantic Alliance and is part of a constellation of four operational satellites; the other three MUOS ground stations are located in Western Australia, Southeast Virginia and Hawaii, each linked to a satellite (Rogers, 2013). The Sicilian ground station consists of three huge swivelling very high-­frequency satellite dishes and two UHF helical antennas, covering a field of half a hectare. While in America and Australia the MUOS were built in areas where they did not meet opposition from residents, in Italy the chosen location was the Sughereta Nature Reserve near Niscemi, a town of nearly 30,000 people, who did not like the idea of being exposed to the electromagnetic fields generated by the MUOS ground station. In relation to the location of the Sicilian ground station, MUOS construction was halted in 2013 by protesters concerned with health risks and environmental damage caused by radio waves. In this initial phase of the protest, concerns focused mainly on health and environmental risks. All this generated a contrast between technical rationalities. In fact, one scientific study entrusted the University of Turin (Zucchetti and Coraddu, 2011) by the Municipality of Niscemi in order to demonstrate the unsuitable localisation of the MUOS in densely populated areas, such as the one adjacent to the town of Niscemi, reported serious risks for human beings and the environment. Meanwhile, a so-­called independent assessment on exposure to risks was commissioned by the US not to an external evaluation, but to the project manager and lead system engineer for MUOS; not by chance, the conclusion of this report is that it is actually more dangerous to cook with a microwave or to use a mobile phone than to live near a MUOS ground station, because the electromagnetic emissions are much higher in those cases.7 In terms of environmental protection at the supranational level, the European Commission should have intervened to safeguard the ‘Bosco di Santo Pietro e Sughereta di Niscemi’ SCI, but the President of the European Parliament declared (December 2012) that the European Union (EU) does not have jurisdiction on environmental issues relating to military infrastructures (Di Bella, 2015). In terms of health protection and risks at the Regional level, on the base of residents’ protests and of opposing technical positions, the Sicilian Region – now (March 2013) with a centre-­left government (President Crocetta) – started a complex political and legal battle against the Italian Ministry of Defence (that had signed the agreement with the US Navy), in order to cancel authorisation (Messina, 2017). However, in July 2013, Sicilian Region, due to national and international political pressure, revoked the above block of authorisation.8 In this particular circumstance (2013), strong differences between opposing powers clearly emerged (Di Bella, 2015).

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   65 In the following phase, the conflictive arena was further fuelled and enlarged by a multi-­actor and multilevel counter-­hegemonic subject (Purcell, 2009), made up of citizens and a group of organisations (including the World Wildlife Fund) led by the No-­MUOS committee, now being supported by the Municipality of Niscemi. This multi-­actor and multilevel counter-­hegemonic subject opposed the MUOS on ethical grounds, ranging from environmental protection to safeguarding health (Chiarenza, 2013), feeding an identity vision of the territory and aiming at the re-­territorialisation of decision-­making (Di Bella, 2015). In this hostile context and conflictive arena, the No-­MUOS groups, which were already established in 2008, became radicalised in 2013 assuming a strongly antagonistic position with respect to all the institutional actors, namely US Department of Defense, Italian National Ministry of Defense and Sicilian Regional Government; at the beginning they opposed the fact that the MUOS project ignored the environmental, social and cultural complexity of the territory, and considered it just a disputed strategic space, based on the principle of territorial/ decisional sovereignty; later they were ideologically rooted in the opposition against all forms of violence, war, militarisation of the land and deprivation of human rights. The main tool for enforcing the protest used by No-­MUOS committees has been the internet and this has resulted in the spread throughout Italy of many local No-­MUOS committees, sharing the Sicilian struggle to defend the environment and their stance against war. In this way, many No-­MUOS groups have sprung up everywhere and even the protest has become multilevel, reaching a national audience and connecting to other Italian protest movements such as No-­ TAV, ‘No to the High Speed Train’, active in the early 1990s in the Susa Valley in Piedmont and against the creation of the new high-­speed railway line between Turin and Lyon in France, and No-­TRIV, ‘No drillings’ within 12 miles of the coast, active from 2012 and contrary to the exploitation of fossil sources. Therefore, the protest, maintaining an antagonistic position on ideological themes, registered a strong ‘scale shift’ (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005), passing from a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) position to a NOPE (Not On Planet Earth) position (della Porta and Piazza, 2016).9 However, residents and No-­MUOS groups did not take into consideration the non-­compliance of the MUOS project with the protection area management plan which was approved in 2010; in our view, it is remarkable that planning issues were not used as an instrument of protest. Moreover, the international literature on this case exclusively examines the diffident levels and types of conflict within the geopolitical disciplinary debate as well as the debate on protest movements (Di Bella, 2015), whereas the planning issues remain latent. Despite the controversy, Niscemi MUOS was completed; notwithstanding this and as a consequence of the 2013 and later 2015 legal battle,10 the Regional Administrative Court ordered the area to be seized for possible violations of environmental norms, threatening diplomatic relationships between US and Italy. After several years of legal battles, in May 2016 the Administrative Council of Justice declared the MUOS legitimate from an administrative point of view,11 thus

66   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. bringing to a close the long legal affair. Currently, a penal trial remains; it sees a manager of the Sicilian Region and some managers of the private companies charged and accused of illegal construction and non-­compliance with environmental norms for construction of the MUOS. This articulated and contradictory decision-­making process clarifies the social construction of the conflict, whose legal implications concern violation by the MUOS project of: • • • •

National constitutional principles in terms of the health of citizens and protection of landscape. Environmental laws at the European level, being the area one of the sites of community importance of Natura 2000. Environmental laws at the regional level, being the area a natural reserve. Ordinary procedural norms at regional and local levels related to the traditional approval of projects by democratic institutional bodies, as we will see later.

However, at the political and national/international level, the issue and the conflict, which was related to the will of ‘pleasing’ the United States while complying with Italian justice, was ‘solved’ by the decision of the courts. The decision of the courts represents a clear example of the ‘state of exception’ theory (Agamben, 2005), because it suspends every norm, including planning rules of the SCI management plan, being ‘inevitably’ under pressure from national and supranational powers. Judicial power, the decision of the courts influenced by political national and supranational powers, produces rationality, establishing a state of exception. This state of exception directly affects planning instruments by suspending their environmental protection contents, but at the same time planning at regional and local levels has relevant responsibilities concerning previous phases of this affair, as the section below shows. Moreover, the history of the No-­MUOS movements also calls into question the social dimension of planning practice in which local communities should play a crucial role. Rather, the effects created by hegemonic and global political decisions manipulate planning practices and governance, assigning them an ambiguous and problematic role that contributes to producing inequality and injustice.

Flexibility of Governance and Manipulation of Planning Procedures In this section we analyse responsibilities and role of planning, starting from a simple but fundamental question: How is it possible to realise a satellite system of the size of the MUOS within a nature reserve, protected at both the regional and European level? The issue directly affects planning for what concerns land use decisions, environmental protection, landscape issues, social aspects; all these planning issues can be analysed in terms of technical expertise and governance and, last but not least, in terms of values and sovereignty. In order to

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   67 describe this, we need to analyse in depth the decision-­making process during the first phase of the approval of the project. The first authorisation for the construction of the MUOS was given thanks to a ‘special’ approval by all the institutions present at a ‘conference of services’ (conferenza di servizi), regulated in Italy by the Law number 241 of 1990. The ‘conference of services’ was held in Palermo in September 2008, subject to a request by the US Navy Department; at the ‘conference of services’, the Regional Territorial and Environment Department, the Superintendence for Cultural and Environmental Heritage of Caltanissetta, the Caltanissetta Forest Inspectorate, the Municipality of Niscemi,12 the US Navy and the 41st Wing of Sigonella Air Force unanimously expressed a favourable opinion on the MUOS project. The governance system, founded by the 2008 ‘conference of services’, established the state of exception for planning. Accordingly, the state of exception assumes a technocratic dimension, suspending the management plan. In general terms, the ‘conference of services’ is a procedural model for administrative simplification and an instrument of coordination of all the public institutions, which are invited to express an opinion (negative or positive) about a specific project in a joint session. In this way, the decisions made by the ‘conference of services’ replace authorisations that should have been separately taken by the same single public institutions, in order to speed up the administrative procedures, especially when dealing with potential national or international funding or interests. This ‘conference of services’ is the pivotal point of the whole authorisation procedure and, at the same time, one of the principal causes of conflict. The authorisation of a specific project by the ‘conference of services’ represents not only the right to transform the land use but is also an instrument for ‘automatic variation’ of planning instruments in force, as laid down in the so-­called ‘urban planning variants’ (varianti urbanistiche) that the Italian planning system considers a possibility for amending approved plans, if obsolete, through zoning modifications. This state of affairs is further exacerbated because, in order to speed up administrative procedures for project approval with the ‘conference of services’, the required control through the democratic and supervisory organs, as laid down by ordinarily applicable norms for approving plans and projects, does not take place. In fact, with the ‘conference of services’, these steps are avoided and the procedure for approving the ‘urban planning variants’, from being technical-­ political, become exclusively technocratic on a formal level, suffering – at the same time – the substantial pressure of supranational political decisions. In this way, the level of sharing and participation of citizens, by having representatives elected to the city council, is consequently suspended, as it has been – on a wider scale and with different development aims – through other sped-­up planning procedures (Lo Piccolo and Schilleci, 2005), which local communities cannot share and/or agree. Therefore, the construction of the Sicilian ground station started in February 2008 without the required authorisations; the submitted Environmental Impact Assessment was incomplete and only after the start of the construction, in the

68   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. summer of the same year, the complete documentation was delivered. Consequently, the work was completed without respect for the natural heritage of the reserve and without compliance with local environment and landscape laws. All this was possible, formally justifying the new construction, through the existence in the same area of the previous analogous functions, namely antennas of the US Naval Radio Transmitter Facility; the quick authorisation of the project was undertaken through the technocratic ‘conference of services’ procedure. Describing this particular ‘flexibility’ of governance, and the consequent manipulation and distortion of planning procedures, we highlight how – according to the distinction between legality and legitimacy elaborated by Carl Schmitt (1985) – although the law establishes a legal order, this condition does not mean it constitutes a legitimate order. The decision of the ‘conference of services’ in September 2008, together with the sentence of the Administrative Council of Justice in May 2016, establishes a condition of legality with new rules that suspend or substitute ordinary norms, including planning rules and procedures. These mechanisms are instrumentally used in order to legalise what cannot be legal, in the name of necessity (Agamben, 2005). In other words, necessity becomes the source of law and is used as a legal principle in order to suspend existing norms. In this way, we will find answers to the initial question in the variation or suspension of planning instruments, procedures and consequent actions, all of them being strongly manipulated by the multilevel political (US Department of Defense, Italian government and Ministry of Defence, Sicilian Regional government), technocratic (experts that produce scientific studies on environmental impact, participants to the ‘conference of services’) and judicial (Sicilian Administrative Courts) powers, that hold presumed decisional/territorial sovereignty and manipulate planning under the pressure of military reasons. Consequently, in our case, the state of exception in terms of planning assumes a multilevel and multi-­type dimension: the first, established by the ‘conference of services’, is a technocratic state of exception; the second, established by the Administrative Courts sentence, is judicial, evoking/recalling phenomena of judicialisation of politics (Hirschl, 2008; Vallinder, 1994), in this case with consequences also on planning. In both, environmental and social issues call into question planning in terms of responsibilities.

Conclusions In our narrative of the case of the ‘Sughereta of Niscemi’, Agamben’s state of exception theory is used to analyse the suspension mechanism of norms and planning in a space that is characterised by a fluctuating sovereignty (Agnew, 2009; Connolly, 2004; Legrand and Yiftachel, 2014) within a multilevel system of overlapped powers. The exception mechanism is consequently an effective interpretative tool to analyse the spatial domain, in particular when different values and multiple interests establish conflictive relationships (Forester, 2006; Gray and Porter, 2014; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). In this perspective, the

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   69 issue concerning the role of planning in the production of ‘spaces of exception’ assumes a relevant weight. The description of the case study focuses on the cause-­effect relationship between unbalancements in an asymmetrical power relation system on one hand, and planning practices and governance at the local level on the other hand. The asymmetrical power relation system is at the same time national and international, multilevel and multi-­type. In the face of such a hegemonic power relation system, the bottom-­up protests and the resistance forms promoted by the No-­MUOS movement tried to undermine the complex system of international and national power relations, producing multiple levels of conflicts. First, between Italy and the United States, in the face of a system of military secrets and servitude charged with limiting national and popular sovereignty (Di Bella, 2015) and second, between the Italian national government and the Sicilian regional government, often conditioned by opposing political positions and intertwined with the judicial sphere of the courts. In this conflictive relations system, exacerbated by the No-­MUOS protests, regional (Sicilian Region) and local (Municipality of Niscemi) institutions change their position throughout the history of the construction of the MUOS. In the 2008 conference of services both institutions approve the project, but subsequently change their mind: The Municipality of Niscemi when doubts about health and environmental risks emerged (2011); the Sicilian Region when the centre-­left Crocetta government replaced the central-­right Lombardo government. However, due to national and international political pressure, in 2013 the Crocetta government position changed again in favour of the project, clearly showing the asymmetrical power positions. In this multilevel conflictive context, the No-­MUOS groups, which were set up in 2008 and radicalised in 2013, assumed a strongly antagonistic position with respect to all the institutional actors; they opposed both the geopolitical technocratic vision and the legal decision of administrative tribunals, challenging the process of militarisation and deterritorialisation. This complex, multilevel and multi-­type system of conflicts was only formally resolved through a multiple application of the mechanism of the ‘state of exception’: Technocratically in the ‘conference of services’ of 2008 and judicially in the decision of the Administrative Council of Justice of 2016, both invoked in the name of necessity. The formal resolution of these conflicts at the local level does not actually resolve the problem in terms of impacts on health and environment, still leaving challenges and responsibilities for planning. In fact, the penal trial regarding illegal construction and non-­compliance with environmental norms for MUOS is still ongoing. When military reasons at the supranational level do prevail over common interest at the local level, this is not just the consequence of political games and judicial processes; planning decisions, as the result of the ‘state of exception’ model in manipulating and bypassing planning procedures, are the preconditions for allowing supranational political reasons and hegemonic interests to prevail over common values and interests, such as environmental preservation. In this

70   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. way, planning becomes an extension of the ‘rules suspension’ mechanism and it is used as a weapon for control and manipulation, rather than as a safeguard or reform instrument. Moreover, planning not only suffers the effects of the state of exception but, on the contrary, in our case, is itself a state of exception, with its abbreviated administrative procedures, ‘conference of services’. In the contemporary world, western democracies included, many examples attest to the ‘suspension of rules’ as a common practice, which concerns in particular planning activities in order to rhetorically justify reasons of emergency or necessity. Indeed, planning becomes a favoured field of application for the mechanism of suspension of norms, besides suffering its effects on the other hand. The rhetoric of a context of necessity as a result of the slowness of ordinary planning tools and procedures, as well as a consequence of the weakness of local public institutions and officers, justifies manipulation of planning procedural systems by circumventing constitutional principles, namely the safeguard of landscape and environment, being the first explicitly mentioned in the Italian Constitution, and suspending the duty of taking into consideration ordinary planning norms and rules. Consequently, the Agambenian theory of the state of exception (2005) is useful for understanding the role of circumvention of laws and suspension of norms in the production and reproduction of spaces which are the result of a void of law or its manipulation, when hegemonic and counter-­hegemonic rationalities clash one against the other (Di Bella, 2015; Watson, 2003). Being the analysis of the mechanisms of exception, a clear effective approach to describe how hegemonic power produces rationality, but also territory and spaces (Flyvbjerg, 1998), Sicily – as many other lands in contemporary times – can be better understood as the product of this ‘exceptional’ rationality: a ‘land of exception’, a frontier land with hybrid, multiple and extraordinary sovereignty.

Notes   1 The path followed by the Sicilian Region to safeguard and protect its natural heritage began in the 1980s with the establishment of protected natural areas (reserves and parks). Consequently, Sicily’s system of protected areas now consists of five regional parks (Etna, Madonie, Nebrodi and Fluviale dell’Alcantara, Sicani) and 89 nature reserves covering a total of 279,000 hectares or just over 10 per cent of the regional territory. In particular, the Sughereta di Niscemi Reserve, like many other protected areas, is managed by a public body (in this case the Dipartimento Regionale Azienda Foreste Demaniali) that guarantees its protection through regulatory and planning tools.   2 In the cork oak wood of Niscemi, together with ilex tree and downy oaks, there are evergreen shrubs typical of Mediterranean scrub-­forests.   3 In addition to parks and reserves, the Sicilian Region has 233 Sites of Community Importance and Special Protection Zones, identified in the European Ecological Network, in application of the European Community’s Birds (79/409) and Habitat (92/43) Directives.   4 Of the several bilateral Italy–US agreements that regulate US military infrastructures in Sicily, the main ones are the Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement of 1954, the so-­ called ‘Shell Agreement’ of 1995, that affects all Amer­ican military bases in Italy,

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   71 and finally, the ‘Technical Arrangement between the Ministry of Defence of the Italian Republic and the Department of Defense of the United States of America regarding the installations/infrastructures in use by US Forces in Sigonella, Italy’ of 2006.   5 Comiso, about 40 km from Niscemi, also hosted a NATO missile base (cruise missiles) active from 1983 to 1991 during the Cold War.   6 The change in destination with respect to the Naval Air Station of Sigonella was dictated by the results of a study on the high impact of electromagnetic waves generated by the large antennas of the MUOS on the weapons, munitions, propellants and explosives systems hosted at the Sicilian aeronaval airport.   7 See: https://qz.com/662844/how-­the-us-­navys-most-­advanced-communications-­systemgot-­stuck-in-­a-kafkaesque-­circle-of-­italian-justice/ (accessed 13 January 2018).   8 For in-­depth analysis on the steps of the legal dispute between the public bodies involved in the case see Messina (2017).   9 For in-­depth analysis of the No-­MUOS movement, several studies are available: some produced by the activists themselves (Gurrieri, 2013), others framing the No-­MUOS protest in the geopolitical sphere, in that of the Geographies of Resistance (Di Bella, 2015; Messina, 2017), or in that of the new emerging social networks in Sicily (Lutri, 2016), or finally those that relate it to other Italian protest movements (such as No-­TAV (No-­Treno ad Alta Velocità, No-­High Speed Train) and No-­TRIV (No-­ Trivellazioni, No-­Drilling for Oil Extraction). 10 In 2013 the Regional Administrative Court, on appeal by the Italian Ministry of Defense against the decision of the Sicilian Region to suspend the MUOS construction, cancelled the appeal and stopped the construction work; in 2015 the same court, on appeal by the City Council of Niscemi against the decision of the Sicilian Region to revoke the suspension of the MUOS construction, stopped the work. 11 In Sicily, there are two levels of administrative justice: the first is the Regional Administrative Court – RAC (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale – TAR) and the second is the Administrative Council of Justice – ACJ (Consiglio di Giustizia Amministrativa – CGA); the latter is the second and last degree of administrative justice. 12 That was in favour of the project at the initial phase. As we saw in the previous paragraph, when doubts about health and environmental risks emerged (2011), the Municipality of Niscemi was against the construction of the MUOS.

References Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. Agnew, J. (2009) Globalization & Sovereignty. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield. Armitage, J. (2002) State of emergency. Theory, Culture and Society, 19(4), 27–38. Baptista, I. (2013) Practices of exception in urban governance: Reconfiguring power inside the state. Urban Studies, 50(1), 39–54. Beard, V.A. (2003) Learning radical planning: The power of collective action. Planning Theory, 2(1), 13–35. Castells, M. (2012) Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge, Malden, MA, Polity Press. Chiarenza, G. (2013) MUOS: I lavori continuano nonostante lo stop di Crocetta. Gaianews.it, 22 April 2013. Available at: http://gaianews.it/attualita/muos-­i-lavori-­ continuano-nonostante-­lo-stop-­di-crocetta-­39134.html#.WmSPLhih10s (accessed 12 December 2017).

72   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. Connolly, W. (2004) The complexity of sovereignty. In: Edkins, J., Shapiro, M.J. and Pin-­Fat, V. (eds) Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics. New York, Routledge. De Leo, D. and Lo Piccolo, F. (2015) Planning in the face of conflict in un-­democratic contexts: Lessons from two Sicilian municipalities. In: Gualini, E., Allegra, M. and Morais Mourato, J. (ed.) Conflict in the City. Contested Urban Spaces and Local Democracy. Berlin: Jovis Verlag GmbH, pp. 80–93. della Porta, D. and Piazza, G. (2016) Il cambiamento di scala del Movimento No MUOS: oltre la protesta contro l’inquinamento elettromagnetico. StrumentiRES – Rivista online della Fondazione RES, VIII, 2, 1–28. Available from: www.strumentires.com/attachments/ article/641/Della%20Porta-Piazza_SRes_2_16.pdf (accessed 10 October 2017). Di Bella, A. (2015) The Sicilian MUOS ground station conflict: On US geopolitics in the Mediterranean and geographies of resistance. Geopolitics, 20(2), 333–353. Ek, R. (2006) Giorgio Agamben and the spatialities of the camp. Geografiska Annaler B, 88(4), 363–386. Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Forester, J. (2006) Making participation work when interests conflict: From fostering dialogue and moderating debate to mediating disputes. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 72(4), 447–456. Foucault, M. (2000) Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Vol. 3. New York, New Press. Foucault, M. (1980) Truth and power. In: Gordon, C. (ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. Brighton, The Harvester Press, pp. 107–133. Friedmann, J. (2011) Insurgencies: Essays in Planning Theory. London: Routledge. Friedmann, J. (1992) Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development. London, Basil Blackwell. Gray, N. and Porter, L. (2014) By any means necessary: Urban regeneration and the ‘state of exception’ in Glasgow’s Commonwealth games 2014. Antipode, 47(2), 380–400. Gregory, D. (2006) The black flag: Guantánamo Bay and the space of exception. Geografiska Annaler B, 88(4), 405–427. Gunder, M. and Mouat, C. (2002) Symbolic violence and victimization in planning processes: A reconnoitre of the New Zealand Resource Management Act. Planning Theory, 1(2), 124–145. Gurrieri, P. (2013) No Muos Ora e Sempre. I Percorsi del Movimento. Ragusa, Sicilia Punto L. Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2005) Multitude. London, Penguin. Harvey, D. (2000) Spaces of Hope. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. Hayek, F.A. (1973) Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 3. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press; published in one volume with corrections and revised preface in 1982. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hillier, J. (2002) Shadows of Power. An Allegory of Prudence in Land-­Use Planning. London and New York, Routledge. Hirschl, R. (2008) The judicialization of mega-­politics and the rise of political courts. Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1), 93–118. Huysmans, J. (2008) The jargon of exception – on Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political society. International Political Sociology, 2(2), 165–183. Huysmans, J. (2006) International politics of exception: Competing visions of international political order between law and politics. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 31(2), 135–165.

Multilevel Power Relations and Conflicts   73 Kamete, A.Y. (2012) Interrogating planning’s power in an African city: Time for reorientation? Planning Theory, 11(1), 66–88. Legrand, O. and Yiftachel, O. (2014) Sovereignty, planning and gray space: Illegal construction of Sarajevo and Jerusalem. In: Chiodelli, F., Carli, B., Maddalena, F. and Scavuzzo, L. (eds) Cities to be Tamed? Cambridge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 215–237. Lindblom, C.E. (1965) The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment. New York, The Free Press. Lo Piccolo, F. (2016) Landing through informal blue infrastructures: The state of exception in planning. In: Moccia, F.D and Sepe, M. (eds) Reti e infrastrutture dei territori contemporanei. Networks and infrastructures of contemporary territories. Roma, INU edizioni, pp. 41–51. Lo Piccolo, F. and Halawani, A.R. (2014) The concept of exception: From politics to spatial domain. Planum, 2(29), 1–11. Lo Piccolo, F., Picone, M. and Todaro, V. (2017) South-­eastern Sicily: A counterfactual post-­metropolis. In: Balducci, A., Fedeli, V. and Curci, F. (eds) Post-­Metropolitan Territories. Looking for a New Urbanity. Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 183–204. Lo Piccolo, F. and Schilleci, F. (2005) Local development partnership programmes in Sicily: Planning cities without plans. Planning, Practice & Research, 20(1), 79–87. Lo Piccolo, F. and Todaro, V. (2015) Latent conflicts and planning ethical challenges in the South-­Eastern Sicily ‘Landscape of Exception’. In: Milan Macoun, K.M. (ed.) Book of Proceedings 29th Annual AESOP 2015 Congress Definite Space – Fuzzy Responsibility. Praga, České vysoké učení technické v Praze, pp. 2534–2544. Lutri, A. (2016) Contro le antenne MUOS: l’emergere di nuove reti e di nuove soggettività in Sicilia. Dialoghi Mediterranei, 18. Available from: www.istitutoeuroarabo.it/ DM/contro-­l e-antenne-­m uos-lemergere-­d i-nuove-­r eti-e-­d i-nuove-­s oggettivita-in-­ sicilia/ (accessed 7 October 2017). Marrero-­Guillamón, I. (2012) Olympic state of exception. In: Powell, H. and Marrero-­ Guillamón, I. (eds) The Art of Dissent: Adventures in London’s Olympic State. London, Marshgate Press, pp. 20–29. Mazzeo, A. (2012) Riserva naturale orientata Sughereta di Niscemi. La militarizzazione di un Sito di Interesse Comunitario (SIC), Paesaggi Sensibili. Paesaggi sensibili 2012. I Parchi, 1–6. Available from: www.italianostra.org/wp-­content/uploads/Riserva-­ Naturale-di-­Niscemi-Sicilia1.pdf (accessed 5 October 2017). Mazzeo, A. (1991) Sicilia Armata. Basi, Missili, Strategie Nell’isola Portaerei Della Nato. Messina: Armando Siciliano. Messina, M. (2017) Performance-­as-resistance and resistance-­as-performance in the NO MUOS Movement in Sicily. Muiraquitã, UFAC, 5(1), 50–94. Mouffe, C. (1999) Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? Social Research, 66(3), 745–758. Purcell, M. (2009) Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or counterhegemonic movements? Planning Theory, 8(2), 140–165. Rogers, M.S. (2013) MUOS Satellite Improves Communications for U.S. Forces on the Move. Available at: http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/07/18/muos-­satellite-improves-­ communications-for-­u-s-­forces-on-­the-move/ (accessed 10 December 2017). Roy, A. (2005) Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 71(2), 147–158. Rühl, J., Chiavetta, U., La Mantia, T., La Mela Veca, D.S. and Pasta, S. (2005) Land cover change in the Nature Reserve Sughereta di Niscemi (SE Sicily) in the 20th

74   Francesco Lo Piccolo et al. century. In: Erasmi, S., Cyffka, B. Kappas, M. (eds) Remote Sensing & GIS for Environmental Studies: Applications in Geography. Gottingen, University of Gottingen, pp. 54–62. Sager, T. (2011) Neo-­liberal planning urban policies: A literature survey 1990–2010. Progress in Planning, 76(4), 147–199. Sánchez, F. and Broudehoux, A.M. (2013) Mega-­events and urban regeneration in Rio de Janeiro: Planning in a state of emergency. International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development, 5(2), 132–155. Sandercock, L. (1998) Making the Invisible Visible: A Multicultural Planning History. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. Schmitt, C. (1985) Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Shin, H.B. (2012) Unequal cities of spectacle and mega-­events in China. City, 16(6), 728–744. Sorensen, A.D. (1982) Planning comes of age—a liberal perspective. The Planner, 68(6), 184–187. Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987) Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York, Basic Books. Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A. (2002) Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: Large-­scale urban development projects and the new urban policy. Antipode, 34(3), 542–577. Tarrow, S. and McAdam, D. (2005) Scale shift in transnational contention. In: della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. (eds) Transnational Protest and Global Activism. New York, Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 121–150. Vallinder, T. (1994) The judicialization of politics—A world-­wide phenomenon: Introduction. International Political Science Review, 15(2), 91–99. Watson, V. (2003) Conflicting rationalities: Implications for planning theory and ethics. Planning Theory and Practice, 4(4), 395–408. Yiftachel, O. (2009a) Theoretical notes on ‘gray cities’: The coming of urban apartheid. Planning Theory, 8(1), 87–99. Yiftachel, O. (2009b) Critical theory and ‘gray cities’ mobilitation of the colonized. City, 13(2–3), 240–256. Yiftachel, O. (1998) Planning and social control: Exploring the dark side. Journal of Planning Literature, 12(4), 395–406. Yiftachel, O. (1995) Planning as control: Policy and resistance in a deeply divided society. Progress in Planning, 44(2), 116–187. Yiftachel, O. (1994) The dark side of modernism: Planning as control of ethnic minority. In: Watson, S. and Gibson, K. (eds) Postmodern City and Spaces. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 261–242. Yiftachel, O. and Yacobi, H. (2004) Control, resistance and informality: Jews and Bedouin-­Arabs in the Beer-­Sheva region. In: Roy, A. and AlSayyad, N. (eds) Urban Informality in the Era of Globalization: A Transnational Perspective. Boulder, CO, Lexington Books, pp. 118–136. Zucchetti, M. and Coraddu, M. (2011) Analisi dei rischi del Mobile User Objective System presso il Naval Radio Transmitter Facility di Niscemi. Available from: http:// staff.polito.it/massimo.zucchetti/RelazionRischiAssociatiRealizzazioneMUOS1.pdf.

5 Engaging in Politics of Participation Managing Power through Action Research Anlı Ataöv, Güliz Bilgin Altınöz and Neriman Şahin Güçhan

Introduction Politics constitutes one of the substantial driving forces of democratic decision-­ making processes. Realistically, it is fair to state that different forms of power take place in any interaction, and the presence of dialogue alone is often insufficient to overcome asymmetrical power relations among groups. However, power relations that jeopardise democratic interaction can be facilitated through the application of dialogical means suitable to the participants’ level of empowerment and needs. Active citizenship as the citizens’ capacity for self-­organisation and their ability to take part in processes, which are likely to affect their future, is very important in this respect (Pateman, 1970; Stokes, 2002). Active citizenship and participation in decision-­making processes provide individuals with opportunities to find solutions for their own destiny (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). Indeed, lasting participation itself is a political activity, but power relations have to be managed to achieve effective participatory processes. Here, we do not argue the ineffectiveness of participatory methods in planning, but we assert that for these methods to work better, the position of participants as political actors, the conditions leading them to establish cooperative or conflictive relationships, and the politics conditioning those relations should be understood and be dealt with during the planning processes. Engaging in real-­life participatory planning processes as researchers provides opportunities to facilitate emerging politics in such a way that political action can evolve into a collective construction of future in the interest of all. This chapter explores the roles of active citizenship and power structures relating to participation in planning and argues that the capacity of people as political actors varies with respect to the level of active citizenship and the presence of enabling administrative mechanisms for participation. It aims to verify how power structure, when used as part of an inquiry, can help a democratic attempt into practice despite insufficient conditions of democratic participation. To do that, the chapter provides a closer look at two large-­scale participatory planning processes moderated in two Turkish provinces, Adıyaman and Bursa,

76   Anlı Ataöv et al. both of which are UNESCO World Heritage Sites. This study adopts ‘action research’ (AR) as a research strategy that places participatory planning within a holistic framework. It emphasises active engagement of researchers in real-­life processes by providing the opportunity to understand the power structure and mobilising relationships in order to ensure a democratic process and sounder outcomes and puts greater attention on understanding the politics of participation in different dimensions of democratic decision-­making. The study introduced in this chapter focuses on the actors, their relations and the conditions preparing the ground for participation and action in both cases. These two cases illustrate how politics can emerge differently with respect to varying historical and socio-­ cultural context. Adıyaman, situated in the eastern part of Turkey, is one of the nation’s least developed provinces, yet it features rich cultural heritage and natural sites; Bursa, located in the west within the most industrialised region of Turkey, holding rich environmental and cultural assets and fertile land, is under the pressure of intense development and growth. The chapter is organised into four sections. The first discusses the theoretical framework of the notion of power in participatory planning within a democratic participation framework. The second part introduces the methodological approach to assess power relations. In the third part, the outcomes of the power analysis are discussed. The last section highlights concluding remarks.

Democratic Participation and Power in Participatory Planning A number of scholars (Greenwood and Levin, 1998; Pateman, 1970; Warren, 2002) define democracy in its general terms as consisting of the equal distribution of power to make collective decisions as well as equal participation in collective judgements. The concept of ‘all should participate’ in this definition leads to a new social order of civil society, whose conditions differ from the ones of representative democracy. Several AR studies conducted in the last few decades in Turkey (Ataöv, 2008; Babüroğu and Ravn, 1998) show five salient conditions: active citizenship, an administrative mechanism for participation, the conduct of a well-­structured participatory process, equal participation and shared action that can ensure this definition of democracy. These conditions also represent particular focuses of existing democratic theories (He, 2002; Putnam, 1993; Stokes, 2002; Warren, 2002) including elitist, pluralist, participatory, liberal minimalism, civic republicanism, developmental and deliberative. Among these five conditions, the first two evolve through time, faster or slower depending on the contextual characteristics and the development of one condition in relative relation to the other. Previous participatory experiences help to establish the ground for these conditions. The last three come about as part of planning. Participatory planning, for example, can enhance these conditions by initiating a process of democratic dialogue, by fostering broad participation and by transforming ideas into action. Having said that, the degree of participation and action can rely on the conduct of the participatory process as well as on the level of the participants’

Engaging in Politics of Participation   77 activeness and the degree to which participation is allowed by existing organisational structures. Thus, even if the process is well structured, the other conditions may change the democratising result of planning. There may be many reasons for this, but we argue that power constitutes one of the fundamental reasons underlying the emergence and manifestation of democratic consequences in participatory processes. In line with Karlberg (2004), Boser (2006) provides an elaboration on possible collaborative attempts with different combinations of power balances and relations. She states that, for example, participant groups experiencing power imbalance, yet engaged in mutualistic relations, can construct cooperative sets of relations in which participants use their capacity to act together. On the other extreme, the participants’ adversarial interaction in a state of relatively balanced power may result in disconnection and conflict. A review of the literature reveals four ways in which power is seen in participatory processes. These ways also represent the bodies of research that take different views on power in such processes. While the first two groups tend to explain the meaning of power; the last two ways focus on the role of power. They are also closely connected to the conditions of democratic decision-­making processes that lead to either collaborative or conflicting consequence. The first studies, in a post-­Marxist tradition, argue that ‘power creates a fairness issue’ in decision-­making. It focuses on the importance of participatory devices in and for social struggles. This emerges as a response to conflicts between the winners and the deprived ones, where knowledge is only used as a source to inform others. One of the participatory devices most widely applied in the democratisation of politics is participatory budgeting (Abers, 2000; Avritzer, 2006). Participatory budgeting was first born in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre to carry out the government function more effectively with respect to the reallocation of resources in favour of the most disadvantaged people. The second group of studies takes an instrumental approach and uses participation in planning to overcome bureaucratic oppression through consultation processes, in which the rules of participation are more informal. Within the context of such participatory practice, power is discussed in terms of how to present it in setting the public agenda with those involved. Here also, the consequence is a change in decisions that may favour some stakeholders more than others. These first two groups of studies on power in participatory processes, one emphasising the fairness issue, the other, the change of decisions, place a similar focus on the notion of power, which is ‘dominance’. This also falls under Lukes’ (2005) description of power, who further claims dominance as a sub-­notion of capacity but who also favours theory and research on power as worth to be built upon the notion of dominance. These studies rely on the presence of asymmetrical patterns of power among participants that result in some sort of dominance of some groups over others. We see that these arguments emphasise the actors and the system, and thereby, are related to degrees of the participants’ activeness and the changing capacity of governance mechanisms enabling full participation in decision-­making.

78   Anlı Ataöv et al. According to the third group of studies, ‘power plays a role in shaping language’. Many philosophical discussions focus on discourse, discursive communities, and the qualities of interaction in relation to power in planning (Fischer, 1990; Mandelbaum, 1990). In pursuit of Habermas (1984), they base the validity of process outcomes on open and inclusive communication processes. Within this context, deliberation is defined as a decision-­making process where various actors take equal opportunity to talk over with other understandings on a particular issue (Beaumont and Nicholls, 2008; Cohen, 1999). On the one hand, this allows the exchange of different views; on the other hand, it provides the legitimacy of decisions taken. According to Habermas (1996), deliberation is constructed in two ways. In the first, individuals construct reality within their own consciousness through perception, moral reasoning and emotive feelings. This addresses the attributes that individuals introduce to the communicative setting. In the second, individuals, each embodying his/her own constructed experience and conception, construct reality through their interaction with each other. This renders apparent their different social forms that emerge through their interaction. The Habermasian argument relies on the normative and dialectic process to ensure ideal speech with a democratising intent in which relations are embedded and its qualities become important. This practice of discourse claims that in a well-­structured participatory process, better argument prevails (Flyvbjerg, 2004). Agreeing with the individual and social dynamics of interactive processes, it is however realistically inevitable to state that individuals with varying interests in a political setting may not respect each other’s concerns despite the provided ideal conditions for enduring open communication. Concerned about how Habermas’s theory is realistic, Mouffe (1998) sees that the conflictual nature of human beings is the very fundamental feature of human interaction and the driving force of politics. Karlberg (2004) sees power as a capacity and defines it as a notion that is neutral but present in two relational qualities including adversarial and mutualistic. The relational conditions, previously constructed or presently emerged, that prepare the direction of the conduct of a participatory process may qualify participation and action. In Karlberg’s terms, the Habermasian view argues for mutualistic relations once the process is well structured. However, it does not provide much explanation about what happens and why relations become adversarial, furthermore, what kinds of power balances, symmetrical or asymmetrical, are constructed and does not refer to their respective consequences. Several studies support that a well-­structured dialectic process and democratic intentions alone are insufficient because a power imbalance among participants conveys the potential for leading discourse to different dialectic consequences, shared or unshared (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001). Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) claim that participatory processes can even consolidate asymmetrical patterns of power. In the fourth group of studies, ‘power is seen as a part of the change’ and a constructive component of real-­life processes. This way of defining power expands the discussion of power beyond its meaning as a communicative issue

Engaging in Politics of Participation   79 and argues that understanding power requires the confrontation of local knowledge in real-­life processes (Alexander, 2001; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000). It focuses on practical judgement and the context in which planning is conducted. In line with Foucault (1972), these scholars recognise power as a necessary condition for constructing knowledge. Foucault does not deal with what power or the general system of power is, but he aims to establish an understanding of how power is used or functions in our society. Thus, he looks at the source of power, which, as he sees, is the action. He aims to understand the characteristics of power in our society, how they appear, and what rationale sustains them. Although this position advances these scholars further into real-­life situations, their studies have the problem of maintaining their empirical nature and retaining ‘meaning’ in the reality that Foucault himself constantly confronted. They do not become a part of reality, and thus, they do not use the inquiry process to change power relations. In response to that, another group of scholars treats future planning through participation as an inquiry process and argues the need for adaptation of societies to a desirable future state of the world (Emery and Trist, 1972). This future does not, however, come automatically; it requires deliberate efforts from the past (Babüroğlu and Ravn, 1992; Reardon, 1993), and participatory inquiries with an explicit social change agenda. This view suggests that power can exist in multidimensional ways among multiple actors through multiple roles in participatory planning, and a process of participating concerned with knowledge generation can constructively manipulate asymmetrical power relations. This is also another way of changing power relations in favour of democratic decision-­making and forming a shared power with participants of interest who shape the boundaries of what is possible for them through effective participation (Hayward, 1998). In this kind of work, the researcher, with the participants, is in charge of catalysing and moderating the change, being engaged in the process as co-­researcher, and finding ways to manage power imbalances that may occur during the process.

Methodological Framework Power theory (Cook and Emerson, 1978) provides the foundation for using power structures in two ways: asymmetrical and symmetrical. An asymmetrical structure can exist when there is an imbalance in the control mechanism and when some actors hold more authorised power than the others. In a symmetrical power structure, all actors share balanced used of authority. The existing theoretical arguments coming from different bodies of literature that focus on mainly democratic participation in planning and power relations in participation are rhetorically interconnected. The theoretical framework used in this research is based on this interaction as shown in Figure 5.1. Taking this theoretical framework into consideration, we pose two presuppositions that we intend to explore in more detail in this comparative analysis. These are: power is not an obstacle, and it can transform some inadequately developed conditions of democratic participation into a value, and power is not

80   Anlı Ataöv et al.

Figure 5.1 A conceptual framework that overlaps theoretical discussions on democratic participation in planning and power relations.

an obstacle when all conditions of democratic participation are fulfilled, therefore a planning intervention can lead to cooperation in participation and action. We take the view of ‘power as part of the change’ in the analysis of power relations in two contextually different Turkish cases. In both cases, planning was treated as a scientific participatory inquiry. This was done by using AR as an umbrella research strategy, which fits well with the collaborative and participatory face of socio-­scientific practice. This provided the opportunity to capture the most holistic view of what is really going on in practice and the chance to rebalance a situation when things did not go right in a process of change. AR engaged those whose lives are affected by the research issue directly into the research process. Through AR, they actively and collaboratively participated in research designing, data gathering and analysis, and interpreting and making sense of the findings. This blurred the distinction between researchers and the researched, and consequently, integrated tacit knowledge and multiple perspectives in the generation of new knowledge. Both inquiries are not a one-­shot event. The cases involved continuous processes, in which new experiences and arguments construct the contextually meaningful knowledge to eventually contribute to existing theoretical arguments as Greenwood and Levin (1998) have already suggested. This is also closely connected to why we chose these two cases and why we wanted to compare them with respect to the politics that emerged in participation and the contribution of these emerging politics to developing democratic planning processes. Although these two cases represented the same hierarchical scale territorially, included the issues of both development and conservation in their agendas, and were institutionally willing to allow participatory planning processes to achieve a better future, they significantly differed with respect to their level of development and existing motivations of change. These differences were

Engaging in Politics of Participation   81 important for the study because it drew the contextual ground upon which the dialectics about the future of the sites were constructed. Respectively, whereas Bursa rhetorically, and thus, practically engaged in a conflict between development and conservation, Adıyaman oriented its focus towards development through conservation. These two cases also represent different degrees of active citizenship (Bademli, 2001; Kudat and Bayram, 2000; Ökten, 2017), which is important to detect the role of active citizenship on politics in participation, and thereby, on the social consequences in democratic terms. By comparing these cases, the chapter aims to bring forth a contribution to the existing theory on democracy and participatory planning by testing if historically low levels of active citizenship are detrimental to democratic participation or if it could transform into constructive politics that can be helpful participation and shared action. The cases were conducted in a participatory manner under the leadership of universities yet under authorities that had differing mandates. In Adıyaman, it was the Middle East Technical University (METU) that led the conduct of the Commagene-­Nemrut Conservation Management Plan (CNCMP) under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism between 2005 and 2012 (Güçhan Şahin et al., 2017). In Bursa, it was a consortium between the Istanbul Technical University (ITU), the Uludağ University and METU that took the leadership responsibility of the participatory process and the Greater Metropolitan Municipality of Bursa (GMMB) and the Bursa Special Provincial Administration (BSPA) managed the planning process of the Bursa Provincial Environment Layout Plan (BPELP) at 1/100,000 scale between 2011 and 2013. Respectively, in terms of the citizens’ and institutional capacity for participation, Bursa had a long history of participation allowing hundreds of civil organisations to actively take part in urban decision-­making processes (Bademli, 2001; UCTEA, 2009). That is why local officials, including GMMB, which has been one of the most active participatory local authorities, declared during this study that they could not take any decisions without the involvement of the Bursa civil society. Consistently, this also allowed openness for running a full-­democratic process with no obstacle from the administrative side. On the contrary, Adıyaman had no history of participation. Its social culture was quite patriarchal, and communities belonged to a tribe system (Kudat and Bayram, 2000). However, The Ministry of Culture and Tourism was convinced that the province’s cultural assets for tourism development should be undertaken with a holistic approach integrating full participation of different stakeholders through a planning process. In both cases, the same research approach was used, yet planning processes were slightly different (see Figure 5.2). Both planning processes combined a spatial information management system and the use of participatory methods and techniques in a complementary manner. In both cases, it was composed of three sub-­processes that ran in parallel. These include the co-­generation of local knowledge, the production of scientific knowledge and the coordination and ­dissemination. The first process engaged representatives of central and local

82   Anlı Ataöv et al.

Figure 5.2  The Adıyaman and Bursa planning process.

authorities and the civil society. Although a similar participatory planning process was moderated in both cases, the contextual and procedural needs required the application of certain methods and techniques before or after one another. In the second process, a group of scientists provided information on the existing situation of the cases, while the third process included activities of coordination, follow-­up and process evaluation as well as knowledge dissemination.

Power is Not an Obstacle, but … This section takes a closer look at the findings of two planning processes by initially introducing the actors as discursive communities and by comparatively examining the interaction between them, which constitutes the analytical ground of power relations in democratic processes. Then, the analysis continues in two main parts: during planning and after-­planning. In the first, we discuss politics taking place in the actors’ participation in the planning process and observe its effect on the process of knowledge generation in general. In the second, we present the politics within shared action and its effects on the actors’ commitment. Figure 5.3 comparatively illustrates power structures, interaction and possible collaborative action among four basic groups (decision-­makers, planning team, interest groups and researchers) in two cases and their effects on participation and action. Legal and Administrative Framework of Actors and Interaction The legal process and legislations define the plans to be produced and the structure of the authority to implement those plans. Thus, introducing the legal and

Engaging in Politics of Participation   83

Figure 5.3 Theoretical framework of cooperation versus conflict with reference to democratic participation and power relations.

institutional framework of the cases is important because this, itself, directly contributes to forming the ground of the power structure and relations taking place in such attempts. In Adıyaman, for the Mount Nemrut Tumulus, UNESCO asked for the development of a conservation management plan in 1986, just after it was inscribed into the UNESCO World Heritage. However, it was not possible to develop such a plan only for the tumulus, because of the need to consider it within its cultural and natural context. Therefore, the conservation management area was expanded to include the whole province of Adıyaman. This, in turn, created an intricate legal and administrative setting consisting institutions with overlapping status and responsibilities due to cultural, historic and natural characteristics of the site.1 Within the existing legal framework, during the planning process of the conservation and development area, at the central level, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and at the local level, the Director of the Adıyaman Museum under the Governorship of Adıyaman were the authorities directly responsible for the Mount Nemrut Tumulus and the archaeological sites inside the National Park. In pursuit of the declaration of the Mount Nemrut as a National Park, the area became under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. However, there are other central and regional authorities that have regulatory rights and obligations in this area: According to Turkey’s planning legislation of that time, all plans at all scales were ratified by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement; the Southeast Anatolia Project Regional Development (GAP) Administration under the Prime Ministry of the Turkish Republic was responsible for regional planning and development in the GAP region of which the Adıyaman province was a part of; Şanlıurfa and Sivas Regional Councils for Conservation of Cultural and Natural Heritage were responsible for all interventions to the historic and cultural assets and projects for approval in the provinces

84   Anlı Ataöv et al. of Adıyaman and Malatya. At the local level, the Governorship of Adıyaman, through the Culture and Tourism Province Directorate, was the sole authority for the archaeological assets located within the Mount Nemrut National Park boundaries and the Natural Protection and National Parks Branch Office Directorate for the rest of Mount Nemrut National Park. Silk Road Development Agency located in Gaziantep was responsible for the regional development plans including Adıyaman. In such a complex institutional setting, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism signed an agreement with METU in 2006 to prepare the area management plan and to conduct the planning process. The start of the planning process automatically engaged all authorised central and local institutions, besides the representatives of other actors. It also included the multidisciplinary researcher team composed of about 50 academics from architecture, city planning, restoration, sociology, chemistry, civil engineering and geology at METU, other public offices at the provincial level including education, health and agriculture, and a few NGOs that were active in women empowerment, education and culture, village leaders including ‘mukhtars’2, teachers and imams. In the Bursa case, the GMMB, which had already developed the 1998 Bursa Environmental Layout Plan, was positioned as the main institution responsible for coordinating a large-­scale participatory planning process in the province. It conducted follow-­up studies to develop and implement conservation and local development plans in accordance with the existing environmental layout plan and moderated numerous studies about disaster, risk, earthquake and safe city planning. The second important stakeholder was the Bursa City Council, the former Local Agenda 21 Council, an influential body of the civil society composed of representatives of local civic associations. However, Bursa City Council was formed under the roof of GMMB, which made the council subject to any directives and instructions coming from the municipality. Previous planning experiences and the active participatory setting in Bursa formed a strong basis for local planners to engage the large-­scale participatory planning process that was concerned with the whole provincial territory. According to the existing legislation, GMMB had the right to prepare a plan for the province in coordination with the BSPA.3 Consequently, GMMB signed a protocol with BSPA with an emphasis on transparency and participatory principles and established a planning team composed of about 15 planners within the municipality. Later, GMMB signed agreements with ITU, METU and Uludağ University to receive scientific support in sectoral analyses, planning research and participatory planning facilitation. About 30 academics were involved in this process. Additionally, the representatives of all provincial offices of the central government including industry, energy, transportation, culture and tourism, environment, housing, education and health, all city municipalities within the provincial boundaries, hundreds of civil associations, numerous professional chambers such as planners, landscape architects, architects, engineers, biologists, and chemists, local media including TV and newspapers were also invited to the process.

Engaging in Politics of Participation   85 Discursive Communities and Interaction Despite their contextual, legislative and administrative differences, reaching a common ground on sound decisions was essential in both cases. However, each case formed different power structures, asymmetrical or symmetrical, and, thereby, constructed different forms of interaction, mutual or adversarial, manifesting themselves in diverse forms of relationships. The findings support the literature review in an earlier section that underlined that ‘there is not one type of relationship between the power structure and emerging interactions’. They also confirmed the view indicating ‘power as something that exists in multidimensional ways’ with respect to the actors’ capacity and that cannot be explained only by dominance (Boser, 2006; Christians, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Karlberg, 2004). Moreover, in line with Karlberg (2004), it is possible to claim that power as capacity, asymmetrical or symmetrical, gives rise to multiple potential sets of relations changeable over time. Actors participate within hidden context-­and-inquiry dependent boundaries that define the space of what is possible for them (Hayward, 1998). Some of these factors may include the need for acting pragmatically, previous experiences, the length of the intervention, and thereby, the change of bureaucrats in local and central authorities, multiple institutional structures, technical competences of knowledge management, respect and trust-­based relationships, and the formulation of a shared goal. In Bursa, the municipality, whose majority of administrators was composed of former planners of previous participatory planning processes, quickly completed the planning requirements within the administration period and took action in pursuit of plan decisions to ensure the sustainability of the plan. This stimulated all the involved decision-­making actors in the municipality from top to bottom towards acting with integrity. Despite the asymmetrical power structure actors were committed to this participatory process. The power structure of the planning team was balanced in the beginning, but relations evolved in a more complex manner. In the planning team of Bursa, in addition to three involved universities, several private consulting firms were hired to complete sectoral analysis. Moreover, there were also planners working for the GMMB, mainly engaged in managing loaded bid, supervision and coordination of all actors, rather than in the preparation of the plan. The large numbers of consulting institutions created two major problems. First, the sectoral analysis took longer than initially planned. There was a limited dialogue among the private consulting firms, which required an extra effort for data standardisation. Second, delays, discrepancies and discontentment among different stakeholders demotivated the professional planning staff of the GMMB, which has affected the whole group in a few months. The majority of stakeholders were less experienced in the planning process and felt quickly overwhelmed by the secretarial work. Therefore, a few training and dialogue workshops and seminars were organised to increase their capacity. However, as most members of the planning team had to periodically commute to Bursa from other cities, there was not enough time for building a dialogue with

86   Anlı Ataöv et al. planners working for the GMMB, which therefore gradually made them detached from the process, both emotionally and physically. Only a couple of planners who were involved in GIS analysis actively engaged in the planning activity and about three of them conducted institutional coordination activities. In Adıyaman, this was quite different. METU was the only body responsible for planning. This significantly facilitated the interaction and dialogue needed during the conduct of plan production. All involved experts from different disciplines were from the same institution, therefore no struggles related to the practical concerns were experienced. The collected data were easily integrated by using a GIS-­based decision support system developed and frequently used by the same institution. However, relations between the involved decision-­making actors were not smooth in the Adıyaman case. The legislative and administrative structure was balanced yet created antagonistic relations. Involved institutions had limited dialogue between them and were entitled to different legislation and procedures. This dispersion of authority and legislation created conflicts at the national level. Researchers had to simplify the complex and overlapping legal and institutional territories within which the planning could harmoniously proceed by providing space for all participants through dialogue and by putting in an effort to understand all involved authorities thoroughly. During the planning process in Adıyaman, which took almost six years, three ministers and five mayors changed. Each new political figure brought his own team and wanted to implement his projects while rejecting the ones developed by the previous. Moreover, some parliament members at that time favoured international expertise holding no faith for Turkish scientific and professional mastery. This manner of embracing inconsistent political positions was also witnessed at higher government-­level decision-­making processes. For instance, while the prime minister at that time showed efforts to develop constructive relations with the EU, a few years later, the same person adopted disruptive attitudes to a point of breaking the bonds constructed with the union throughout those years. Thus, a radical shift in approaching the same project at the ministry level was not surprising. Having said that, independent from the political parties in power, consistency in cultural heritage conservation policy-­making and implementation has never been fully achieved in the past in Turkey. Thus, this kind of instability and modifications in handling cultural heritage conservation cases has always been experienced. However, it did not only lead to conflict among top-­ level decision-­makers but also created a major legitimacy problem of the case at that level. To overcome these conflicts, researchers had to moderate the shift in the actors of the central government through dialogue and continuously looked for political reinforcement, both national and international, especially from powerful parliament members. Also, the scientific committee of the plan, composed of International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) members, representing an international authority, supported the planning team and declared that ‘such decisions could not be taken by politicians’. This political and scientific response by the respected international authority helped to fade out the dominance of the central government administration.

Engaging in Politics of Participation   87 Another domain of interaction that politically challenged participatory planning was among actors who were voluntarily participating in the planning process, which were expected to improve the democratic way of decision-­ making. The challenge in this interaction was to maintain everyone in a mutual effort of shaping the future and to achieve cooperation because staying connected to the planning process can significantly change the plan and policies for the future. Although disappointment had become indispensable most of the time, changing conditions created new opportunities for the existing actors. Both planning experiences were composed of both civil society and central and local government actors. Among these actors, power structures were asymmetrical. Within power structures, while mutual relations were constructed in Adıyaman, the ones in Bursa turned antagonistic. In Adıyaman, mutual relations were established by setting a priority goal for everyone. This goal pointed out the development of Adıyaman in general by conserving cultural, historic, environmental and agricultural assets and the opportunity of the transformation of them into an economic value. This was the shared meaning of ‘being an Adıyamanian’ constructed by involved actors beyond any individualised or institutionalised interests that will lead conflict among partners of the planning process. In Bursa, there was not previously defined a common goal, on the contrary, there were conflicting views favouring either economic development or environmental conservation, in particular, controversies on agricultural land to be used for industrial and/or housing development. In such an active socio-­political context, all involved actors were present with their institutional identity and perspectives on how the future of Bursa has to be shaped; defending these perspectives played a major role on the Bursa’s participatory planning experience. The researcher team conducted numerous focus groups and in-­depth interviews to mobilise and mentally prepare them for the collective planning process and to establish constructive relations. However, prominent professional chambers and some environmentalist NGOs opposed the current initiative, which created a significant negative impact on the process due to their historically gained and legitimised position in society. They had no trust in the central government, and thereby, neither in the municipality: They thought that public interests such as conservation of the environment or agricultural land remained under the shadow of political party interests; they argued that no matter what the new plan suggested, the central government would act against plan decisions. Therefore, they rejected any proposed cooperation with the municipality throughout the process and used every opportunity to voice their concerns. This, in turn, created the loss of sight in politics, weakened the political commitment to a shared goal and allowed the prejudices to prevent mutual dialogue. Power Relations in Participation Although the interaction within decision-­making and planning actors conditioned the overall moderation of participatory processes, the political dynamics

88   Anlı Ataöv et al. of community actors were significant in shaping the participatory action. We see that one of the underlying forces that changed the level of participation in the two cases was associated with the divergent levels of active citizenship in each case. Existing research (Pateman, 1970; Putnam, 1993; Stokes, 2002) indicates that active citizenship constitutes a salient condition for participatory democracy to happen, requiring community empowerment that historically evolves over a long period of time. However, the findings of the Bursa and Adıyaman cases show that this is not always the case. The lack of active citizenship may not always constitute a deteriorating effect on democratic planning, and constructive politics can foster participation. This comparative study revealed that Adıyaman, having a shorter history of participation, had a more constructive political participatory experience than Bursa. In Adıyaman citizens were economically deprived, and thus, they were too concerned with fulfilling their basic needs. A community may not be activated in a short period of time through one intervention (Ataöv, 2007), but Adıyaman used its economic disadvantage by centralising all involved and activated participants around this shared vision. During the participatory inquiry, using local assets that could contribute to the development of Adıyaman appeared as the essential need for the province. The province was so deprived that personal and/or institutional political interests were not the priority. Consequently, all involved actors representing both decision-­makers and community, ranging from parliament members at the national level to ‘mukhtars’ at the village level, were politically committed to this collective attempt. They did not inhibit the process in the political arena, nor did they want to be outside of it. In Bursa, the pressure for the transformation of the most fertile lands of the country and the conflict between agricultural and industrial sectors created tension among the prominent community actors. Although the community actors’ developed capacity for self-­organisation had established a ground for active participation, it also created a strongly politicised process that called for a sensitive moderation of all actors. Divergent political views and predictions about possible actions of the other actors did not allow any ground for mutuality. This set a conflicting situation from the beginning and allowed no room for dialogue. Although their claim was sound and fair, their uncollaborative attitude excluded local community actors from the process. This, in turn, interrupted the ongoing shared effort. Consequently, the planning process also lost the chance of developing solutions taking local concerns into account. Power Relations in Action The Environmental Layout Plan of Bursa and the Commagene-­Nemrut Conservation and Development Management Plan of Adıyaman are produced at the end of the participatory planning processes as described above. The approval and implementation of these plans, however, created several situations that manifested politics in the interaction of discursive communities in shared action. The contextual characteristics and experienced participatory processes conditioned

Engaging in Politics of Participation   89 these situations in different ways in Bursa and Adıyaman. Adıyaman, which started on a more disadvantageous ground in terms of democratic conditions than Bursa, has so far shown more relentless policy outcomes. This comparative study showed that leadership significantly affects the conduct of participatory processes in pursuit of determined democratic principles (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001; Stein and Heller, 1979; Vroom and Jago, 1988). It also showed that the relations of involved authorities moderated during the planning process can change the impact of power relations in action. In both cases, researchers were constructive, restless, motivating and had uniting manners. They were always flexible and engaging. Their authority, both as scientists and as professionals, was well respected by everyone. This was also supported by their managerial skills. However, while researchers in Adıyaman could continue to positively impact the action phase, in Bursa that was not the case. In Bursa, the Provincial Council approved the plan right after the plan was produced. Soon after, the authority to produce the provincial environment layout plans shifted from the local authorities to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. This change disempowered local authorities and local politicians that were not happy with the conservation approach of the approved plan and big capital holders looking for new industrial sites on existing agricultural areas forced the central government to open new land for industrial growth in the most fertile agricultural area of Bursa. This was what local professional chambers were afraid of, and this was why they did not actively support the planning process. However, their exclusion perhaps impaired the local collective strength, and thus, weakened the locally shared political commitment to participation. The question of whether the negative effects of their exclusion would also be transmitted to the formation of the political commitment in action or whether the politics of power relations at the central level would have suppressed the local commitment remains unanswered. In Adıyaman, delays in the approval process due to the multiple institutional structures and, thereby, the need for moderating across changing power structures and relations of bureaucrats were again the major challenges of the action phase. The lack of approval of the plan and adversarial attitudes towards it were commonly experienced consequences of this: the plan was completed and submitted to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2012; however, it was only approved and put into action three years later. The ambiguities in the legislation regarding who would manage the implementation process and where the funding would come from loosened the attachment of involved institutions to the shared commitment for the realisation of formulated projects. The local institutions that initiated the plan lost their motivation and took a rather ‘leave it to its own faith’ attitude when it came to taking action for change. Immature activeness, this time, became a disadvantage. At that point, the leadership quality of the researcher team changed the contextual-­political faith of the case by stimulating the local confidence in the process, the plan and the implementation of plan decisions. In the end, a respected person was appointed as a site manager and the allocation of the required financial resources was ensured by the central government.

90   Anlı Ataöv et al.

Concluding Remarks Participatory planning, by its nature and principles, can only be moderated within a real-­life social process. This directly puts the planning activity in the centre of life, which operates through the interaction of multiple dimensions in all directions. The major players are individuals representing different interests. This triggers a political process in which each individual tries to place his/her interest in a larger system. AR aims at creating a setting to help everyone to remain in that system, and, eventually, democratising the expressions of community of interest through planning for future. This requires expanding existing boundaries and accepting newcomers, and thereby, finding a shared ground to live together. In line with many scientists (Babüroğlu and Ravn, 1992; Emery, 1982; Emery and Trist, 1972), we see that constructing future knowledge through dialogue and participation and changing the current situation through shared action constitute the fundamental elements to achieve democratisation of a society. However, numerous factors change the conduct of the process, and power relations are one of them. By comparing these cases, the research introduced in this chapter has interesting findings that bring forth a contribution to the existing debates on democratic aspects of participatory planning. First, we see that power relations in participatory planning, are inevitable, and they should not be rejected but accepted as a contributing factor to the process, and they should be managed throughout the process. Second, the two cases presented here showed that when active citizenship cannot transform asymmetrical power structures but enhances rhetorically adversarial arguments, it becomes difficult to achieve mutuality in participation and action. Therefore, the findings of the comparative study show that active citizenship does not always guarantee the fulfilment of democratic attempts, contrary to the debates introduced by Pateman (1970), Stokes (2002) and Greenwood and Levin (1998). Third, when a higher interest is not shared, authorities, either centrally delegated or socially constructed, may conduct politics in a way that eliminates the potential value of participation, which could, otherwise, contribute to a democratic effort. On the other hand, newly born activeness, when associated with political commitment to a shared future and when supported by sustained leadership, may enhance participation. This may be called constructive politics that, if well defined, serves to balance the insufficient political engagement and unequal conditions. Nevertheless, the findings showed that lasting participation itself is a political activity, which is very valuable for the democratisation of planning, but there is a need for finding ways to manage power imbalances that may occur during the process.

Notes 1 The 1st Degree Archeological Site; the UNESCO Cultural Heritage Site; the Mount Nemrut National Park) defined by different laws (the National Park Law No. 2873; the Conservation Law No. 2863; the law amended by the Act No. 5226) and authorised different public authorities: Ministry of Culture and Tourism; implementing different

Engaging in Politics of Participation   91 plans: the Southeast Anatolian Regional Tourism Inventory and Development Plan; the Conservation of Cultural Heritage and Tourism Development Plan; the Ministry of Environment and Forest; the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement; the Southeast Anatolia Region (GAP) Administrative Presidency; Silk Road Development Agency; Şanlıurfa and Sivas Regional Councils for Conservation of Cultural and Natural Heritage the Governorship of Adıyaman. 2 The elected head of a village or a neighbourhood. 3 Because GMMB’s boundaries were overlapping with the ones of the province, according to the Special Provincial Administration Law No. 5302.

References Abers, R. N. (2000) Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil. London, Lynne Rienner. Alexander, E.R. (2001) The planner-­prince: Interdependence, rationalities and post-­ communicative practice. Planning Theory and Practice, 2(3), 311–324. Ataöv, A. (2008) Constructing co-­generative processes: Participatory urban planning/ making urban plans actionable. European Planning Studies, 16(6), 829–851. Ataöv, A. (2007) Democracy to become reality: Participatory planning through action research. Habitat International, 31(3–4), 333–344. Avritzer, L. (2006) New public spheres in Brazil: Local democracy and deliberative politics. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(3), 623–637. Babüroğlu, O. and Ravn, I. (1992) Normative action research. Organization Studies, 13(1), 19–34. Bademli, R. (2001) ‘Raci Bademli ile söyleşi’: Bursa il planı deneyimi. Planlama, 1–2, 12–21. Beaumont, J. and Nicholls, W. (2008) Plural governance, participation and democracy in cities. International Journal of Urban and Rural Research, 32(1), 87–94. Boser, S. (2006) Ethics and power in community-­campus partnerships for research. Action Research, 4(1), 9–21. Christians, C.G. (2000) Ethics and politics in qualitative research. In: Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, pp. 133–155. Cohen, J. (1999) Democracy and liberty. In: Elster, J. (ed.) Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge University, pp. 185–231. Cook, K.S. and Emerson, R.M. (1978), Power, equity, and commitment in exchange networks. Amer­ican Sociological Review, 43(10), 721–739. Emery, F.E. and Trist, E.L. (1972) Towards a Social Ecology. London, Plenum. Emery, M. (1982) Searching – for New Direction – in New Ways – for New Times. Canberra, Centre for Continuing Education, Australian National University. Fischer, F. (1990) Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise. London, Sage. Flyvbjerg, B. (2004) Phronetic planning research: Theoretical and methodological reflections. Planning Theory and Practice, 5(3), 283–306. Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. London, Tavistock. Gaventa, J. and Cornwall, A. (2001) Power and knowledge. In: Reason, P. and Bradbury, H. (eds) Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice. Sage, pp. 70–80. Greenwood, D.J. and Levin, M. (1998) Introduction to Action Research: Social Research for Social Change. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.

92   Anlı Ataöv et al. Güçhan Şahin, N., Bilgin Altınöz, G. and Ataöv, A. (2017) Kommagene Nemrut Yönetim Planı Ana Çerçevesi ve Yöntemi. In: Güçhan Şahin, N. (ed.) Kommagene Nemrut Yönetim Planı. Adıyaman, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, pp. 13–34. Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1. London, Heinemann. Hayward, C.R. (1998) De-­facing power. Polity, 31(1), 1–22. He, B. (2002) Civil society and democracy. In: Carter, A. and Stokes, G. (eds) Democratic Theory of Today. Cambridge, Polity, pp. 201–227. Huxley, M. and Yiftachel, O. (2000) New paradigm or old myopia? Unsetting the communicative turn in planning theory. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(4), 333–342. Karlberg, M. (2004) Beyond the Culture of Contest. Oxford, George Ronald. Kudat, A. and Bayram, M. (2000) Şanlıurfa-Harran plains on-­farm and village development project. In: Kudat, A., Peabody, S. and Keyder, C. (eds) Social Assessment and Agricultural Reform in Central Asia and Turkey. Washington, DC, The World Bank, pp. 255–302. Lukes, S. (2005) Power: A Radical View. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. Mandelbaum, S. (1990) Reading plans. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 56(3), 350–356. Mouffe, C. (1998) The radical centre: A politics without adversary. Soundings, 9, 11–23. Available from: http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/soundings/09_11.pdf, (accessed date 13 January 2016). Ökten, Ş. (2017) Environmental justice, dams and displacement in Southeastern Anatolia Region, Turkey. The Journal of International Social Research, 10(50), 414–419. Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University. Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University. Reardon, K. (1993) Participatory action research from the inside: Community development practice in East St. Louis. The Amer­ican Sociologist, 24(10), 81–91. Stein, R.T. and Heller, T. (1979) An empirical analysis of the correlations between leadership status and participation rates reported in the literature. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11), 1993–2002. Stokes, G. (2002) Democracy and citizenship. In: Carter, A. and Stokes, G. (eds) Democratic Theory of Today. Cambridge, Polity, pp. 23–51. UCTEA (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) (2009) Bursa Kent Raporu. Bursa, TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası. Vroom, V.H. and Jago, A.G. (1988) The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-­Hall. Warren, M.E. (2002) What can democratic participation mean today? Political Theory, 30(5), 677–701.

6 Different Understandings of ‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict Portuguese Spatial Planning and Practice Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva Introduction One of the sources of conflicts in planning and governance is due to different understandings of public interest. Conflicts and clashes can be between on what is desirable, valuable, good and so on, as they reflect fundamental disagreements over ‘how to compose the good common world’. Moreover, as Méthot (2003) argues, public interest serves as the fundamental criterion for establishing the legitimation of power. While no definitive consensus has yet been reached on what the concept of public interest is, acknowledgement of its importance is indisputable. Public interest is mentioned in the planning theory as a criterion for planning assessment (Alexander, 2002; Moroni, 2004), as a concept for justifying planning activity (Campbell and Marshall, 2002; Healey, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2010; Lennon, 2016; Mattila, 2016; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955), and as a relevant concept for professional planners (i.e. the role of the professional planner in identifying the public interest) (Lennon, 2016; Tait, 2011). Public interest is also referred to in the context of public administration (Grant, 2005; Wheeler, 2006) and tourism planning and tourism development conflicts (Dredge, 2010; Dredge and Jamal, 2015; Dredge and Thomas, 2009), in the development of methods and tools for improving the decision-­making process (Pal and Maxwell, 2004; Wells, 2007), and even to justify the importance of spatial planning as a public policy (Ferrão, 2011). In all these different takes on the concept of public interest, the reference given to the involvement of competing interests is a common feature. Considering that, whenever the parties involved become aware of the existence of these competing objectives and interests, conflict will arise (Wilmot and Hocker, 2010), and considering that spatial planning is an activity that involves a high number of agents that have incompatible objectives and interests, including conflicts between public/private, central/local government, economy/environment, spatial planning faces the task of having to manage conflicts that are particularly difficult to resolve (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Head and Alford, 2008;

94   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva Putnam and Wondolleck, 2003). In other words, spatial planning faces the task of ensuring the pursuit of public interest. Typically, this entails establishing a solution that could accommodate the different perspectives of the stakeholders, while respecting the legal framework, environmental constraints and the pursuit of the well-­being of the resident communities. In this context, and in the knowledge that the concept of public interest goes beyond managing competing interests in the context of spatial planning (Grant, 2005), the aim of this chapter is to analyse how public interest is framed within Spatial Planning Policy and Spatial Planning Practice in Portugal. To specifically address the public interest concerns in planning policy, the Portuguese Spatial Planning Framework (SPF ) is analysed, namely the Land and Spatial Planning Policy of 2014 and the Legal System for Territorial Management Instruments of 2015. In order to address the public interest concerns in planning practice, we selected for a case study the Troia-­Melides Coast (Alentejo Coast, Portugal). This coastal area was chosen because it is subject to strong urban/tourist development pressures and, simultaneously, is of a high natural value, partially integrated into the Natura 2000 network, and therefore conducive to the emergence of conflicts. According to Ferrão (2005: p. 14), ‘The coastal area is, more than any other area, a complex territory. Conflicts between the safeguard perspective and the development perspective are concentrated there.’ The analysis of the public interest pursuit in Portuguese planning practice is based on an interview study that explored the perceptions of 26 stakeholders with regard to a number of public interest-­related issues and focused on harmonisation between tourism development and natural asset preservation, types of tourism products, the number of tourist beds or access to beaches (Almeida et al., 2017). The 26 interviewees, responsible for policies and interventions that have an impact on the Alentejo coastline, include public administration entities on natural and cultural heritage, tourism and spatial planning, environmental non-­governmental organisations (ENGOs) and tourist industry developers. The chapter is organised into six sections. The following section will present the different theoretical approaches to the concept of public interest, including a discussion on how to analyse the pursuit of the public interest in spatial planning policy and practice: a public interest analysis matrix. This is followed by a discussion of the public interest in the Portuguese SPF. The case study and data collection method are described in the methodology section, which is followed by the presentation and interpretation of the findings. The chapter closes with a summary of the main findings and some recommendations for improvement of the pursuit of the public interest in Portuguese planning law and planning practice.

Theoretical Interpretations of the Concept of Public Interest The perspectives on the concept of public interest are systematised within the framework of planning theory (Alexander, 2002; Campbell and Marshall, 2002; Grant, 2005; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Wells, 2007) and public administration

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   95 (Pal and Maxwell, 2004; Wheeler, 2006), as it is considered that, based on this perspective, pursuit of the public interest normally encompasses different approaches. The focus of the different approaches to the concept of public interest is either on the results or on the planning process, and the nature of the interest may be individual or collective. Five types of approaches are taken into consideration: the majority opinion expressed by voting; the utilitarian, and the modified utilitarian, which seeks to balance the various individual interests; the unitary, which confirms the existence of one collective interest, meaning that there is a number of interests shared by all, namely common interests, which go beyond the individual interests and wishes; the deontological, which is simultaneously focused on results, specifically emphasising everyone should be considered equally and fairly, and on processes underlining the need to comply with a set of principles of equality and fairness which ensure adequate transparency and accountability; and finally, the dialogical approach, which values the processes of communication. The first three approaches, namely the majority opinion, the utilitarian and the unitary approach, focused on results achievement, represent a more pragmatic view of the application of the concept of public interest, even though they may give rise to less clear processes and ill-­suited results. For this reason, the deontological approach, which allows for a focus on priorities, and the dialogical approach, which encourages the unfolding of transparent processes, albeit of difficult application, are widely used as essential references of ethical values in the planning process. However, the definition of public interest in these five approaches is not mutually exclusive. Therefore, in the study introduced in this chapter, instead of following a specific approach, we used all of them, because we believed that they are complementary, being applicable in varying degrees, depending on the specifics of the situation, namely on the complexity and conflicting levels and the stage of the decision-­making process. Based on the theoretical approaches to the concept of public interest presented above, it is possible to identify four features of public interest that can help to detect public interest in a specific planning process. First, ‘public interest is not an established value; it is something that is built and changes over time’ (Grant, 2005: pp. 48–49). Therefore, the public interest must always be discussed as the dialogical approach to the concept of public interest suggests and weighted over time and in each specific situation, according to the utilitarian approach. Second, ‘there is not just one kind of public interest, but several’ (Alexander, 2002; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Wells, 2007), meaning that public interest can comprise a range of interests, such as collective, sectoral and private (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Pax and Maxwell, 2004; Wells, 2007). Although the unitary approach claims the existence of interests shared by all, the utilitarian approach to public interest, where the preferences of all individuals are taken into account, is evidenced. Third, ‘public interest is defined by a hierarchy of interests’ (Alexander, 2002; Pal and Maxwell, 2004; Wells, 2007; Wheeler, 2006). This perspective is based on the

96   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva assumption that there are interests whose relevance is unquestionable and non-­ negotiable, whereas others that are open for discussion. As Alexander (2002: p. 238) argues, the well-­being of the population is emphasised as an indisputable interest. Similarly, the precautionary principles in the pursuit of the public interest are widely mentioned in the literature in relation to the environment and also highlighted to prevent likely adverse effects caused by actions. In this context, Pal and Maxwell (2004) stress the need to assess the risk whenever the different interests at stake are subjective. As far as achieving basic needs is concerned, it is important to acknowledge what the public interests considered by the majority are, namely majority opinion. However, what the population wishes is not necessarily the best solution; sometimes the public’s opinion expresses immediate and short-­term interests, which may be based on unsound and incomplete information and the lack of a broad perspective on the different aspects of the problem (Wheeler, 2006: pp.  19–20). It is also important to know whether there are relevant minority interests to be considered (Davidoff, 1965), as well as interests shared by all, as the unitary approach suggests. Finally, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition is the assurance that the definition of ‘the public interest is reached through a transparent process’, where all the relevant interests and their stakeholders can express their points of view and have the necessary capacity to understand the other ones in order to promote possible compromise (Campbell and Marshall, 2002; Dredge, 2010; Grant, 2005: Pal and Maxwell, 2004). This feature of the public benefit underlies the development of a deontological approach to the public interest, which assumes that there is a specific stance that should be adopted, and a dialogical approach, which assumes that transparency entails the participation of the stakeholders in the decision-­making process and in information access and sharing as well. Defining this last feature as ‘necessary, but not sufficient’ is the source of the critiques as defined by Lennon (2016) and Mattila (2016) on collaborative-­oriented approaches to the pursuit of the public interest in planning (Dredge, 2010; Healey, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2010). The dialogical approach only considers those stakeholders’ arguments that are in line with their interests. Another shortcoming is that the deliberative democracy models are overly optimistic, and, as in modern societies characterised by a diversity of interests, it is highly unlikely that consensus can be built through dialogue alone. As it is clear from the discussion above, a search of the public interest requires a process of negotiation of the different interests at stake, which must be transparent and well founded, and organised into two broad phases. The first phase involves the identification and assessment of the various stakeholders’ viewpoints and interests, such as collective, sectoral, private. In this phase, the deontological and the dialogical approaches will prevail, i.e. the transparent and fair process of sharing of views. Due to the intractable nature of some planning conflicts, consensus is not always possible, and the application of consensus building processes is quite difficult to achieve. The second phase is selecting the relevant public interests with the help of different approaches: the unitary approach, seeking the common interests shared by all; the utilitarian approach,

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   97 Table 6.1  The public interest analysis matrix Key features of public interest

Key questions

1. There is not one public interest, but several

1.1. Who are the representatives of the different public interests? 1.2.  What are their specific interests? 1.3. How are the different competing interests weighted? 2.1. Are certain viewpoints more important than others? 2.2. Are there strong minority group viewpoints? 2.3.  What are the common interests? 3.1. Is the process transparent and well founded? 3.2. Have all the relevant stakeholders and perspectives been adequately considered?

2.  There is a hierarchy of interests

3. The process is transparent and wellfounded

comparing the relative weight of the interests at stake; and the majority opinion approach based on the outcomes of the voting process. With the aim of analysing the pursuit of the public interest in spatial planning policy and practice, it is possible to make a comprehensive overview of the public interest concept with the help of a public interest analysis matrix (Table 6.1) This matrix is built on three main features of public interest and introduces a framework of analyses for the pursuit of public interest in a spatial plan and policy. In order to reveal ‘the public interest of a spatial plan and policy’, we ask the following questions: Who are the representatives of the different perspectives on public interest? What are their interests? How are the different competing interests weighted? What are the trade-­offs? Furthermore, three more questions can be helpful to understand ‘the hierarchy of interests’, using the framework developed by Almeida et al. (2017), Moore (2003) and Pal and Maxwell (2004): Are there major viewpoints? Are there strong minority group viewpoints? What are the common interests? Lastly, to explore whether ‘the public interest is reached through a transparent and well-­founded process or not’, two key questions are useful: Is the process transparent and well founded? Have all the relevant stakeholders and perspectives been adequately considered? This matrix was used for evaluating the Portuguese SPF and, specifically, in the Troia-­Melides coastline, where tourism versus territory conflicts are very evident.

The Public Interest in Portuguese Spatial Planning Policy The Portuguese Spatial Planning Framework (SPF ) The Portuguese SPF1 defines the coordination among the various planning instruments and the relationships between the public administration and private

98   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva entities. This spatial planning system is structured into a set of programmes and plans that interact through coordination, both vertically with four territorial scopes: national, regional, inter-­municipal and municipal and horizontally, namely sectoral and special plans of the central government (Figure 6.1). The shared task of planning and managing the territory is highly complex and demanding. The difficulty to coordinate the main public and private stakeholders responsible for policies and interventions that have an impact on the territory (MAOTDR, 2007) remains one of the main issues of the existing SPF. The lack of transparency and the excessive bureaucratisation, in conjunction with the lack of coordination within the central administration, are also factors that undermine the credibility of and trust in the SPF (Ferreira, 2007; Pereira, 2009). Part of the responsibility for this lack of coordination among stakeholders can also be attributed to the non-­existence of a coordinating/arbitrating authority with the decision-­making powers and negotiation capacity to manage conflicts among the various entities. One example of the current inefficacy is the Regional Coordination and Development Commissions (CCDR). They are responsible for drawing up the regional spatial programmes (PROT) and managing EU funds (see Figure 6.1) but lack the powers to coordinate the sectoral interventions of other government entities or impose binding guidelines at the local level (Pereira, 2009).

Figure 6.1  Spatial Planning Framework (SPF). Source: elaborated by the authors, based on the Portuguese SPF.

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   99 Another weakness of the territorial management system defined in the SPF, and how it gives rise to conflicts, has to do with sectoral planning. Due to a failure to create coordination platforms between sectoral interventions and policies and land use management options, situations of conflict are frequent, with maladjustment and even incompatibilities among the various sectoral policies. It is common to witness ministries with territorial powers (Environment, Agriculture, Tourism, Public Works and Transport) defining sectoral policies that are not coordinated, thus increasing the possibility of inter-­institutional conflicts (Almeida et al., 2017). The Portuguese planning system, similar to many countries (Alexander, 2002: p. 231), follows the unitary approach. In fact, a hierarchy of interests is established: ‘national defence, safety, public health and civil protection, the pursuit of which has priority over other public interests’.2 The SPF establishes special and sectoral programmes that automatically prevail over other interests (Figure 6.1). Consequently, projects with economic interest are given priority; for example, according to the 2005 law on the Potential National Interest Projects (PIN), such projects were not obliged to comply with all environmental regulations. This exemption was highly criticised by the public opinion, because, as explained by Machado (2009), the state was openly favouring large private organisations. The criticisms were based on the lack of objective criteria and the dominance of economic interests over environmental ones. This is an example of the negative application of the unitary approach, where the government defines such economic projects as being of ‘national interest’, using that classification as moral justification for certain solutions that would likely fail to meet legal planning standards applied elsewhere. This is a very good example of what Agamben (2005) defines ‘the state of exception’. According to him any ‘state of exception’ originates as a ‘state of necessity’: Necessity functions as an ethical condition that releases a specific situation from the application of the existing legislation and the suspension of laws, the circumvention of principles. When one reads in the Portuguese planning law the terms ‘weighting’, ‘hierarchising’ and ‘reconciling’, one could conclude that the Law sought to guide the realisation of the public interest based on the utilitarian and the deontological public interest approaches. But the application of the Law is very unclear and ambiguous. For example, regarding the weighting of the different interests, this ambiguity is evident when the Law states that where ‘… public interests […] are incompatible, priority shall be given to those whose pursuit determines the most suitable use of the land …’ (article 9.1). How to determine the ‘most suitable use of land’? Whereas it is understood that it is not the purpose of the law to regulate the ‘appropriate’ method for the weighting of interests, some guidelines should nonetheless be provided. These could include, as argued by Ansell and Gash (2008: p. 8): principles on collaborative processes, namely those related to trust-­building, commitment to process, shared understanding and intermediate results (small gains, strategic plans, joint fact-­finding), principles concerning

100   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva i­nstitutional design, such as participatory inclusiveness, clear ground rules, process transparency, and also those concerning facilitative leadership. The Portuguese Spatial Planning Process and the Public Interest In Portugal, the planning process is structured in three main phases: elaboration, execution and monitoring and the plan elaboration that includes analysis, objective definition, assessment of alternatives and plan proposals (Figure 6.2). Public participation enters the planning process both before the planning and during the preparation of planning proposals. In the course of this process, three situations that foment conflict development can be identified: First, the exclusion of certain relevant interests from the planning process is a source of conflict. The conciliation process phase (Figure 6.2), conducted mainly by the members of the public administration, namely the Mixed Coordination Committees (CMCs), results in the exclusion of relevant interests of civil society and private sector actors. Second, the lack of concern with conflict management, from the initial plan elaboration phase onwards, can so easily generate conflicts. Although two public hearing moments are mandated by law, an initial public hearing aimed to hear general civil society concerns about the future development of the study area, and another for civil society to comment on the proposed plan, it is clear that these two specific moments are not enough. In practice, conflicts usually emerge in the course of the planning process. For example, when the monitoring and coordination among the public authorities do not lead to a consensual solution, the discordant bodies use the public participation phase as an opportunity to express their disagreement once more, whereas reconciliation of interests could, and should, have occurred during, and not after, the definition of the plan. Another negative consequence of not integrating conflict management from the initial stage onwards is that disagreement between the representatives of public and private interests reaches such a level that impasses can block or hold up the planning process. Specifically, in this case study, the conflict has escalated to an ‘expressive conflict’ level, resulting in legal actions filed in court and in the

Figure 6.2  Portuguese spatial planning process. Source: elaborated by the authors based on the SPF.

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   101 European Commission against the state by two Portuguese ENGOs. Negotiation in these open conflict situations becomes much more difficult, if not impossible (Almeida et al., 2017). And finally, the fact that the meetings for a reconciliation of interests among public entities (the public administration conferences) have become a mere legal formality. This means that, although the Portuguese SPF defines the rules for the operation of the Public Administration Conferences, the negotiations are often not successful because the appointed representatives of some public agencies do not attend them or have not been granted decision-­making powers by their superiors (DGOTDU, 2011). Given this situation, one can conclude that the ‘public sector’ by no means plays the role of clarifying how their sectoral perspectives can contribute to a more integrated definition of public interest, and what process should be developed to incorporate other sectoral perspectives. That said, the answer to the question defined in the public interest matrix ‘Was the process transparent and well-­founded?’ is ‘no’, even though some opportunities for participation and reconciliation of interests are provided for in the legal framework.

The Pursuit of the Public Interest in the Portuguese Planning Practice: The Troia-­Melides Coast Case Study A sub-­regional scale is an appropriate scale to evaluate the problems and conflicts between tourist developer perspectives and the spatial planning guidelines and legal framework. On the one hand, tourist projects are of local importance, expressed at the municipal level; but, on the other, their impact and the public strategy regarding tourism and environment – expressed in Sectoral and Special Programmes – is defined on the regional level. Therefore, in order to examine the concerns regarding the public interest in planning practice, a specific coastal area was chosen as the object of analysis. Troia-­Melides is a coastal strip of some 40 km in length and 5 km wide, subject to strong urban/tourist development pressure. It is also a territory where conservation and improvement of the natural assets are needed, because of its special assets, namely the dune system, being predominantly covered by forest, particularly by Pinus pinea and Pinus pinaster woodland. Given its natural value, the area was integrated into the Natura 2000 network. It presents a homogenous tourist offer based on the demarcation of large areas for high-­quality tourist development. The total number of existing and projected accommodation units for tourists in the area is approximately 30,000. The major tourism projects have been classified as ‘projects of national interest’ (PIN), therefore exempted from an evaluation process with respect to environmental concerns, which gave rise to conflicts among stakeholders in the Troia-­Melides Coast. The conflicts do tend to focus on the following topics: tourism development versus conservation and enhancement of the natural heritage; tourist resort development in nature reserves, protected areas and Natura 2000 zones; tourism strategy incompatible with heritage conservation; developer interests versus planning regulations, such as urban/tourist occupation on the

102   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva coastline (a 2 km-­wide strip), development of golf and residential tourism in rural areas and the high numbers of accommodation (Almeida et al., 2017). There are two main interest groups involved, representing different value systems related to spatial planning expectations: on one hand, ‘environmental’ sector stakeholders, including the ENGOs and the natural and cultural heritage authorities (H), which are primarily concerned with the preservation of natural assets; on the other hand, ‘economic’ sector representatives both public and private, which include the tourism public authorities and tourist developers, which are concerned with process efficiency and efficacy. Methodology and Data Collection In order to understand the tourism vs. territory conflicts, first a documentary research method was used, focusing on the following points: (1) Framing the Portuguese context in which the tourism vs. territory conflict occurs; (2) Identifying the players involved, their interests, their relationships and the sources of conflict; and (3) Understanding the tourism vs. territory conflict history in the Troia-­Melides coastline since the 1970s. Moreover, semi-­structured interviews were conducted to achieve insight into the tourism vs. territory problems. The 26 interviewees were selected among key players, from the public and private sectors, with responsibilities for policies and interventions that impact the Troia-­Melides coastline, requesting their participation in an interview conducted by the researcher. Only those who have had an active role in the planning process were included in the interview study. Beyond the issue of the public interest in planning, interviews incorporated other research topics such as the causes of conflict (Almeida et al., 2017) and leadership in conflict management (Almeida, 2017). With specific regard to the pursuit of the public interest in planning practice, the respondents were asked to score the statements presented in Table 6.2 on the Likert scale: 1 strongly disagree; 2 disagree; 3 neither agree nor disagree; 4 agree; 5 strongly agree and 9 don’t know/didn’t answer. The statements were designed to highlight the existence of overriding interests (S1 to S5) and the transparency and reasoning in the decision-­making process (S6 to S8). As the interview was conducted face-­toface, there was scope for the respondents to comment on their answers. Before the interview phase, four experts from the fields of Spatial Planning, Environment and Tourism were asked to revise the interview form. Minor, materially insignificant changes were made to the form. A total of 26 face-­to-face interviews were held with public and private sector key stakeholders from the following institutions: •

• •

Eighteeen public administration bodies: natural and cultural heritage (7), tourism (4) and spatial planning, with responsibilities at the national, regional and local levels (7), a total of nine were from the central government, five were regional and eight were local level bodies. Three environmental NGOs. Five tourist development companies.

Table 6.2  Interview statements and their objectives Public interest matrix: topic/key question

Statements to be rated

Objectives

2. There is a hierarchy of interests/2.1. Are some viewpoints more important than others?

S1. The nature conservation interest should prevail over the economic interest S2. The socioeconomic interest should prevail over the nature conservation interest S3. The planned tourism projects are compatible with the nature conservation objectives S4. The planned tourism projects improve the quality of life of residents S5. The planned tourism projects contribute positively to the region’s economy S6. The urban and tourist development project for Troia-Melides Coast is the result of a well-founded decision-making process S7. The nature conservation strategy for TroiaMelides Coast is the result of a wellfounded decision-making process S8. The interest monitoring and coordination process that takes place in the context of the spatial and land use plans is appropriate for managing the conflicts between tourism development and nature and biodiversity conservation

To identify prevailing interests concerning nature conservation, improvement of the quality of life and economic development

3. The process is transparent and well founded/3.1. Was the process transparent and well founded?

3.2. Have all the relevant stakeholders and perspectives been adequately considered?

To analyse if the decision-making process was well founded

104   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva Results and Discussion The analysis and discussion of the results are presented in the three following subsections, focusing on the interviewees’ perception as to the existence of overriding interests and the transparency and well foundedness of the decision-­ making process (Table 6.3). Hierarchy of Interests First, the interests of the different stakeholders are assessed through questions S1 and S2 that aimed to compare the interests on nature conservation with economic ones. Following up on these two questions, it is possible to say that the majority of the stakeholders, approximately three-­quarters of them were indifferent to the weight of economic and environmental issues. They indicated that nature conservation and economic interests should be weighted, just as other interests are. The others stressed the ‘need to introduce financial tools that contribute to the conservation of heritage assets and, simultaneously, to economic development’. Of the 26 respondents, approximately one-­quarter responded that the nature conservation interest should prevail. The same interviewees – two from natural and cultural heritage entities, two from spatial planning organisations and two tourism organisations – disagreed with the statement that ‘the socio-­economic interest should prevail over the nature conservation interest’. These interviewees indicated that ‘if the interest in nature conservation fades way, the economic one also come to an end’, ‘the economic interest depends on the nature conservation interest’ and ‘the economic interest cannot survive without the nature conservation interest: Take the bad example of the Algarve’. Rather than criticising the overlapping of economic interests with those of nature conservation, these comments reflect the concern as to the interdependence of the two types of interests not being adequately addressed in the planning process. Curiously enough, the interviewees that hold this view are not from, neither exclusively nor predominantly, the environmental field. Second, one-­fifth of the interviewees disagree with, and one-­third of the interviewees are indifferent regarding the affirmation that ‘the planned tourism projects are compatible with the nature conservation objectives’: These interviewees belong to environmental NGOs (1), natural and cultural heritage entities (4) and spatial planning organisations (5). As expected, those who agree or totally agree with the statement ‘the socio-­economic interest should prevail over the nature conservation interest are mainly from the tourism sector’. Third, approximately one-­quarter of the stakeholders doubt that the planned tourist projects improve the quality of life of local residents and contribute positively to the economy of the region. These stakeholders, mainly from the local level, revealed a distrust with respect to some of the planned projects, which is claimed to compromise environmental and economic interests in the pursuit of the public interest. Regarding the existence of overriding interests, it can be concluded that there is indeed a hierarchy of interests. One should also point out that the different

Table 6.3  Interviewees’ rating of statements Statements to be rated

1: strongly disagree (%)

2: disagree (%)

3: neither agree nor disagree (%)

4: agree (%)

5: strongly agree (%)

9: don’t know/ didn’t answer (%)

S1. The nature conservation interest should prevail over the economic interest S2. The socioeconomic interest should prevail over the nature conservation interest S3. The planned tourism projects are compatible with the nature conservation objectives S4. The planned tourism projects improve the quality of life of residents S5. The planned tourism projects contribute positively to the region’s economy S6. The urban and tourist development project for Troia-Melides Coast is the result of a well-founded decision-making process S7. The nature conservation strategy for TroiaMelides Coast is the result of a wellfounded decision-making process S8. The interest monitoring and coordination process that takes place in the context of the spatial and land use plans is appropriate for managing the conflicts between tourism development and nature and biodiversity conservation

0

0

73

19

8

0

12

12

77

0

0

0

4

15

38

19

15

8

0

15

8

46

23

8

4

4

23

27

42

0

19

23

15

23

12

8

8

46

23

15

8

8

27

42

15

15

0

0

106   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva stakeholder groups have different viewpoints regarding the relevant interests to be protected. This means that there will be always stakeholders groups who, considering their own interests and value systems, will be constantly dissatisfied with the ‘pursuit of the public interest’. Finally, another finding was that, in addition to the conflicts between the business sector and the environmental sector, there are also opposing viewpoints between local and central government stakeholder groups, with the more local groups, and the ENGOs, being much more concerned with the conservation of landscape and natural assets. This study highlights the importance of taking local interests into consideration. Process Transparency and its Rationale Analysis of the responses to process transparency (see responses to questions S6 and S7, Table 6.3) shows that over one-­half of the interviewees are dissatisfied with the rationale behind the decision-­making process, both for urban and tourist development and the nature conservation strategy for Troia-­Melides Coast. Those interviewees made extremely disparaging comments about both processes. With regard to the decision-­making process on urban/tourist development, the respondents highlighted the following issues: lack of an integrated vision; excessive tourist accommodation offer; the final solution did not comply with the well-­founded studies of the Regional Spatial Plan; sufficient study was not carried out for the solution; the political option was hardly transparent; economic interests prevailed; there was no Strategic Environmental Assessment for this coastal strip in the Alentejo region; too many unwise rules and generation of capital gains without any benefits to the population. The more critical interviewees are from natural and cultural heritage entities group. With regard to the nature conservation strategy, the interviewees mentioned the following decision-­making process issues: no strategy; the strategy of including such large areas in Natura 2000 network; non-­transparency of the process; inadequate reconciliation; lack of rigour in defining essential environmental protections and the Portuguese Nature Conservation Institute does not have enough powers. That is why the spatial planning entities are somewhat alarmed by the way that the Natura 2000 network has been managed; according to some stakeholders, it is an insurmountable obstacle to the region’s development that is not what the European directive set out to achieve. One can conclude that there is a predominant perception that the decisions taken were not well founded, both from the perspective of the urban/tourist development solutions and the nature conservation strategy. In addition to the lack of transparency in the decision-­making process and insufficient technical justification for decisions, the lack of information is defined as a major issue. Such situations lead to an increase in mistrust and conflict among the stakeholders, making it difficult to reach the compromises that allow for tourism development without jeopardising the essential preservation of natural assets. With specific regard to the prevalence of economic interests, which was raised by a number of interviewees in their comments, it is our understanding

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   107 that when the public interest focuses on an area of strong tourist potential, the private investors should be involved in the planning process as key stakeholders, because the development of the area needs private investment (Araujo and Bramwell, 1999), and that it is much preferable that those private investments be discussed, approved and implemented in a transparent and proactive fashion. However, there is also a perceived risk of the public interest succumbing to ‘neoliberal’ viewpoints, with the public interest being defined in accordance with strictly economic criteria based on competition, employment and investment, or to ‘special interests’, where the public interest serves elites or dominant interests, as argued by Dredge (2010). In the case study that is introduced in this chapter, the state often justifies the pursuit of the public interest with arguments such as the competitiveness of the tourist destinations, approving major tourist projects without involving local interests in the debate and favouring tourist developers’ interests. Finally, related to the statement ‘The nature conservation strategy for Troia-­ Melides Coast is the result of a well-­founded decision-­making process’, the vast majority of stakeholders (85 per cent) identified problems related to the monitoring process and reconciliation of interests (Table 6.3). Among the ones, who are indifferent to this statement (15 per cent of the total), there is one interviewee from natural and cultural heritage institutions and three from spatial planning organisations. Those who think that the decision-­making process was positive include stakeholders of natural and cultural heritage institutions (2) and tourism companies (2). An analysis of the comments made by the interviewees underlines five types of issues: the spatial planning and tourism interests were not openly discussed; the absence of post-­plan approval monitoring; failure to comply with agreements between public and private entities and lack of field work monitoring; inexistence of an institution with the competencies and powers to coordinate the negotiations, because the domain of action of the regional entity (CCDR) is only related to the environment and spatial planning fields; excess of public institutions, which often act beyond their own remit and the lack of human resources, particularly those specialising in environmental matters, making the entities incapable of providing adequate responses to all planning process requests. These comments confirm the problems previously identified in the context of the Portuguese SPF, related to a lack of coordination within the state administration and the inexistence of a coordinating/arbitrating authority (Almeida et al., 2017; Ferreira, 2007; Pereira, 2009). The most dissatisfied stakeholders concerning the decision-­making process are from ENGOs and tourism companies. Their comments reveal that their discontent is mostly due to exclusion from the planning process. The literature also underlines the limited involvement of the private tourism sector and ENGOs in planning processes, as demonstrated by Araujo and Bramwell (1999) and Wong et al. (2011). These authors highlight the importance of integrating these stakeholders, particularly from the private sector, in the planning process, given the all-­important role they play in investment and, consequently, for regional development. In contrast, some authors (Bramwell, 2011;

108   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva Dredge, 2010; Dredge and Jamal, 2015; Hall, 1999) downplay the importance of including the private sector in the planning process, arguing that the private interests would override the public ones. With regard to the ENGOs, Bramwell (2004) highlights the protest, lobbying and educational activities of this group, considering them political agents with a high degree of influence on environmental policies. The main points of criticism of these environmental pressure groups centres on the fact that they often take a very simplistic approach and are represented by individuals that do not live in the area in question or know it very well. For these reasons, their right to influence the development of that area is often questioned (Swarbrooke, 1999). Similarly, Lovelock (2002) also thinks that ENGOs should not be considered on the same level as the tourism industry and governmental organisations. ENGOs have completely different interests, and consequently, they have different perspectives that are incompatible with that of other stakeholders. Lovelock (2002) also makes the point that ENGOs contribute more when they are excluded from the planning process, arguing that whereas conflict emerges when they are excluded, conflict is both constructive in the planning process and for the achievement of sustainable tourism. From our perspective, taking into account that tourist developers, those who make investments that contribute to the further development of a region, are strongly affected by the decisions taken, they should be involved in the decision-­ making processes. As previous research has shown (Almeida et al., 2017), the ENGOs have considerable veto powers, so there is a clear benefit to involving ENGOs in the process from the early stages.

Conclusions To analyse the public interest concerns in the Portuguese planning practice a specific empirical study was chosen: tourist development on a coastal area in Portugal, where the emergence of competing interests is evident. It must be said that the research method, based on the perceptions of 26 key stakeholders, obtained through face-­to-face interviews, is subject to some limitations. The stakeholders are not necessarily neutral or impartial vis-­à-vis the issue under analysis, making it very difficult to confirm the reliability of some of the information gathered. Additional information sources were used to mitigate this constraint. As a general conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the limited consideration of the dialogical approach to the public interest, which values the processes of communication, in the Portuguese SPF and planning practice. Although special importance is given to environmental special and sectoral plans in the spatial planning system in Portugal, when there are important economic interests to be protected, the central government readily created a specific legislation classified as of ‘National Interest’, creating a ‘state of exception’ with respect to concerns and principles of the existing planning framework and defining priority of economic interests over others. Unfortunately, existing mechanisms of participation in the planning process do not permit the reconciliation of different

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   109 interests. Whereas the Portuguese SPF has established two specific public participation periods and a period for the reconciliation of interests among public entities, as the opinions of the respondents of the Troia-­Melides case study show, they are far from being satisfactory. Several problems related to the participatory process have been identified: a lack of strategic vision, lack of interest reconciliation processes and a lack of technical knowledge and information that can help to reconcile adverse interests and finding acceptable compromises. The empirical study also showed that stakeholder perceptions vary depending on their interests. There are differences of interests not only with respect to economic and environmental values but also connected to the positions of stakeholders, specifically those of local and central government bodies. Both the local and regional public entities and the ENGOs are much more concerned with preserving the landscape and natural assets than the central public entities and the tourism companies. Yet, these stakeholder groups have commented that no interest reconciliation processes were implemented and so the final proposal has reflected much more the interests of central government entities and tourism companies than local concerns. Although a majority of the stakeholders were highly critical of the bureaucratic intervention of the public planning agencies, specifically the excessive number of institutions involved, the lack of coordination mechanisms, and the lack of effective leadership, how to manage the existing conflicts remained unanswered. In conclusion, and from our point of view, the possibility of reaching a clear and publicly recognised definition of what the public interest in a specific situation is can only be guaranteed in the spatial planning domain if a certain number of conditions are fulfilled, in order to ensure a more efficient and fair process in conflict resolution. First, sound and necessary information should be provided in a timely manner and in an understandable form to all stakeholders in the planning process, with regard to the existing situation concerning stakeholders’ interests and objectives. This can form the basis for a transparent and well-­founded decision-­making process, where all the stakeholders feel comfortable and where their opinions are taken into account. There is need to define a public entity responsible for undertaking the leadership role and/or acting as a mediator in the reconciliation process. Indeed, our analysis of how the pursuit of the public interest is incorporated into the Portuguese SPF and planning practice underlines the real need to improve territorial governance, giving local authorities and the sectoral entities of the central government the technical and negotiation skills and powers required for conflict management and improving coordination among the public administration entities.

Notes 1 Law 31/2014 of 30 May, and Decree-­Law 80/2015 of 14 May. 2 Article 9.2 of Decree-­Law 80/2015 of 14 May.

110   Joana Almeida and Fernando Nunes da Silva

References Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Alexander, E.R. (2002) The public interest in planning: from legitimation to substantive plan evaluation. Planning Theory, 1(3), 226–249. Almeida, J. (2017) Leadership in conflict management. The case of tourism versus territory conflict. Finisterra. LII (104), 25–37. Almeida, J., Costa, C. and Nunes da Silva, F. (2017) A framework for conflict analysis in spatial planning for tourism. Tourism Management Perspectives, 24(10), 94–106. Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008) Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571. Araujo, L.M. de and Bramwell, B. (1999) Stakeholder assessment and collaborative tourism planning: The case of Brazil’s Costa Dourada project. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 7(3–4), 356–378. Bramwell, B. (2011) Governance, the state and sustainable tourism: A political economy approach. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 19(4–5), 459–477. Bramwell, B. (2004) The policy context for tourism and sustainability in Southern Europe’s coastal regions. In: Bramwell, B. (ed.) Coastal Mass Tourism: Diversification and Sustainable Development in Southern Europe. Clevedon, Channel View Publications, pp. 32–47. Campbell, H. and Marshall, R. (2002) Utilitarianism’s bad breath? A re-­evaluation of the public interest justification for planning. Planning Theory, 1(2), 163–187. Davidoff, P. (1965) Advocacy and pluralism in planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Institute of Planners, 31(4), 331–338. DGOTDU – Direção Geral do Ordenamento do Território e Desenvolvimento Urbano (ed.) (2011) Relatório Final da Avaliação das alterações ao RJIGT (Documento Técnico DGOTDU 10/2011). Available from: www.dgotdu.pt/channel.aspx?channelID =CC32434A-4A2C-480E-9641-DD808C273B10 (accessed 5 December 2011). Dredge, D. (2010) Place change and tourism development conflict: Evaluating public interest. Tourism Management, 31(1), 104–112. Dredge, D. and Jamal, T. (2015) Progress in tourism planning and policy: A post-­ structural perspective on knowledge production. Tourism Management, 51(October), 285–297. Dredge, D. and Thomas, P. (2009) Mongrel management, public interest and protected area management in the Victorian Alps, Australia. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 17(2), 249–267. Ferrão, J. (2011) O Ordenamento do Território como Política Pública. Lisboa, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Ferrão, J. (2005) Entrevista: João Ferrão. Revista LVT(3), pp. 8–15. Ferreira, A.F. (2007) Gestão Estratégica de Cidades e Regiões. 2a. Lisboa, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Flyvbjerg, B. and Richardson, T. (2002) Planning and Foucault: In search of the dark side of planning theory. In: Allmendinger, P. and Tewdwr-­Jones, P. (eds). Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory. London, Routledge, pp. 44–62. Grant, J. (2005) Rethinking the public interest as a planning concept. Plan, Summer/Été, pp. 48–50. Hall, C.M. (1999) Rethinking collaboration and partnership: A public policy perspective. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 7(3–4), 274–289.

‘Public Interest’ as a Source of Conflict   111 Head, B. and Alford, J. (2008) Wicked Problems: Implications for Policy and Management. Available from: http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:197696 (accessed 29 January 2012). Healey, P. (2003) Collaborative planning in perspective. Planning Theory, 2(2), 101–123. Innes, J.E. and Booher, D.E. (2010) Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy, 1st edition. London and New York, Routledge. Lennon, M. (2016) On ‘the subject’ of planning’s public interest. Planning Theory, 16(2), 150–168. Lovelock, B. (2002) Why it’s good to be bad: the role of conflict in contributing towards sustainable tourism in protected areas. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 10(1), 5–30. Machado, V.M.R. (2009) Direito, turismo e poder: os territórios turísticos, Tese de Doutoramento. Aveiro, Universidade de Aveiro. Available from: http://biblioteca.sinbad. ua.pt/teses/2009001044 (accessed: 1 March 2012). MAOTDR – Ministério do ambiente, do Ordenamento do Território e do Desenvolvimento Regional (ed.) (2007) PNPOT – Programa Nacional da Política de Ordenamento do Território. Mattila, H. (2016) Can collaborative planning go beyond locally focused notions of the ‘public interest’? The potential of Habermas’ concept of ‘generalizable interest’ in pluralist and trans-­scalar planning discourses. Planning Theory, 15(4), 344–365. Méthot, J.F. (2003) How to define public interest?, Paper presented at EPAC Roundtable San Paul University. Available from: https://ustpaul.ca/upload-­files/EthicsCenter/ activities-­how_to_Define_Public _Interest. pdf (accessed 13 December 2017). Meyerson, M. and Banfield, E.C. (1955) Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing of Chicago. New York, Free Press. Moore, C.W. (2003) The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. San Francisco, CA, Jossey-­Bass. Moroni, S. (2004) Towards a reconstruction of the public interest criterion. Planning Theory, 3(2), 151–171. Pal, L.A. and Maxwell, J. (2004) Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A Framework. Available from: www.rcrpp.org (accessed 23 February 2009). Pereira, M. (2009) Cultura de Planeamento e Governação: contributos para a coesão territorial. In: Redes e Desenvolvimento Regional. 1.o Congresso de Desenvolvimento Regional de Cabo Verde. 15.o Congresso da Associação Portuguesa de Desenvolvimento Regional (APDR). 2009 Cabo Verde. pp. 816–838. Available from: www.apdr. pt/congresso/2009/actas/9.html (accessed: 2 February 2011). Putnam, L.L. and Wondolleck, J.M. (2003) Intractability: Definitions, dimensions, and distinctions. In: Lewicki, R.J., Gray, B. and Elliott, M. (eds) Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts: Frames and Cases. Washington, DC, Island Press. pp. 35–63. Swarbrooke, J. (1999) Sustainable Tourism Management. Wallingford, CABI Publishing. Tait, M. (2011) Trust and the public interest in the micropolitics of planning practice. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 31(2), 157–171. Wells, C. (2007) A Public Interest Framework for Public Policy Development: A Property and Urban Planning Perspective, Monash University. Available from: http://arts. monash.edu.au/psi/news-­a nd-events/apsa/refereed-­p apers/public-­p olicy/wells.pdf (accessed: 20 November 2011). Wheeler, C. (2006) The public interest we know it’s important, but do we know what it means. AIAL Forum. 48, 12–25. Wilmot, W.W. and Hocker, J. (2010) Interpersonal Conflict. New York, McGraw-­Hill. Wong, E., Mistilis, N. and Dwyer, L. (2011) A framework for analyzing intergovernmental collaboration – the case of ASEAN tourism. Tourism Management, 32(2), 367–376.

7 The Conflict between Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies Mexican Housing Policy Alfonso Iracheta Introduction Post-­politics understood as a ‘non-­political’ global configuration based on the consensus that the capitalist market is the main organisational support of modern society and the liberal state is the ‘administrative’ branch, has deeply influenced Mexican public policies since the early 1980s. The clear contradiction between urban housing practices and policies provides evidence of a post-­political and depoliticised pattern of public policy in Mexico. The free market, both formal and informal, urban development and housing practices have shown that the conditions of the present urban disorder, unsustainability and unfairness require that the organisation of urban life be transformed (Swyngedouw, 2009). Urban and housing policies assumingly working towards an equal society and more sustainable cities have demonstrated contradictory effects indicating that city and housing are political matters characterised by socio-­spatial conflicts, disputes and antagonisms. This chapter addresses questions regarding a public policy that has profoundly impacted the urban spatial structure, the environment and the quality of life of millions of Mexicans. To what extent has the Mexican state been the real decision-­maker on housing policies or has it ceded crucial decisions to private entities, moving Mexico into a post-­political era of state-­enabled ‘entrepreneurialism’? What are the implications of the housing policies adopted since the 1980s and the related socio-­spatial impacts? Who are the stakeholders, what is their role and response to the policy and the housing projects? Are there participatory approaches in favour of the usually excluded social groups to strengthen their role in urban and housing policies? This chapter challenges the political conditions that have driven the Mexican government to adopt a free-­market oriented public policy; where the community needs, including the public concept, are overwhelmed by private capital accumulation, causing a general socio-­spatial failure of the national social housing policy. It postulates a critical assessment of Mexican urban planning and social housing policies that are the consequence of a post-­political spatial governance practice and opens the discussion to the political aspects of housing, readdressing the Mexican urban social housing planning and governance. The hypothesis

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   113 is that since the 1980s, and especially after the year 2000, Mexican politics faced a turning point, reducing state intervention in the economy and its role and responsibility in the ‘welfare state’. From a political standpoint, it has been a well-­designed project carried out by right-­wing political parties and federal administrations since the late 1980s, which is based on agreements with the national and international elites and geared towards increasing the role of market forces in strategic public policy decisions; adapting Mexican politics to the dominant post-­political era. From the point of view of social policies and programmes, the chapter claims that they have fallen short in creating better living conditions for the middle-­low and the lowest-­income population, as it also occurs with the social housing policy. In order to provide empirical evidence to such arguments, this chapter analyses the Mexican Social Housing Policy using national data (2000–2017) and empirical data based on research (2014–2015) conducted in 36 of the country’s lowest-­ranked social housing developments.1 In addition, it analyses the role of the housing policy in transforming the ejido (common land) into private ownership, being one of the main outcomes of the Mexican Agrarian Revolution (1910–1919). The ejido was formally delivered in a social tenure scheme, not as private property, and the ejidatarios (common landowners) were obliged not to sell it to others consistent with the principle that ‘the land is for those who work it’. However, the new 1992 Agrarian Law opened the door to social land tenures becoming private property; allowing ejidatarios to participate in urban real estate markets. Both the ejidos and the ejidatarios have had a significant impact on the Mexican Social Housing Policy.

Institutional Foundations of the Mexican Social Housing Policy The Mexican system of social housing production acquired national relevance during the 1970s with the creation of the housing saving funds institutes for the private and public sector workers, namely Infonavit and Fovissste and the Popular Housing Fund (Fonhapo) for low-­income populations and without a savings fund affiliation. In addition, in 1976, the federal government created a new Secretariat for human settlements as a response to the United Nations First Human Settlements Conference (Habitat-­I) and the two legislative chambers passed the Human Settlements General Law. The Secretariat underwent different transformations until 2012 when it evolved into the present-­day Secretary of Human Settlements and Urban Development (Secretaría de Asentamientos Humanos Ordenamiento Territorial y Desarrollo Urbano – SEDATU), which coordinates the housing policy and ensures its alignment with the general urban and territorial policies. Such transformations strengthened the regulatory and planning frameworks within the three tiers of government. Although the housing policy has been conducted by the federal government, article 115 of the Constitution (1917) grants urban development regulation and land use planning to municipal governments, who in turn are responsible for approving housing developments.

114   Alfonso Iracheta From State Policy to Private Real Estate Business: A Critical Interpretation Even though this system was based on a model of state intervention, since the year 2000, the institutional approach to urban social housing has been deeply transformed by the adoption of a model that, instead of the government guiding the policy, focuses on managing mortgages and ceding the operation from governmental entities to the private sector (Centro EURE, 2013: p. 106). This was indicative of the adoption of the post-­political global consensus related to depoliticisation that transformed the state’s intervention of the intricate urban housing issue into a private market that commercialises the human right to housing, turning it into a commodity. The state thus delegated and yielded important decisions to the private sector regarding city land use as well as the design, distribution, management and sale of social housing. The motives were mainly ideological and political. Ideologically, the turning point in Mexican politics occurred in the 1980s, when the 1910–1919 Mexican Agrarian Revolution ideals were abandoned, and international policies not only proposed but imposed by the ‘Washington Consensus’ were adopted. Almost all the macroeconomic policies and even social policies proposed by the WB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF ), the Inter-­Amer­ican Development Bank (IDB) and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have been strictly applied by the last five federal Mexican government administrations. From a political standpoint, informal and non-­public agreements have been made and updated by each federal administration among the right-­wing political parties (Partido Revolucionario Institucional – PRI and Partido Acción Nacional – PAN), the federal government and the socio-­economic national elite, more specifically by the biggest firms and enterprises, through their chambers of commerce, mass media companies, the wealthiest families and other private sector organisations, industrialists, bankers and the like. These agreements resulted in specific policies and actions that have been carried out since the 1980s. Noteworthy are: the almost complete opening of the Mexican economy to the global economy, government abandonment of economic activities and privatisation of public enterprises, including strategic ones (banking, airlines, main freeways, airports, railroads, electricity, oil, etc.) and the ceding of city land use decisions to the market forces, including social housing. The latter implied the dissolution of the government’s constitutional obligation to provide social housing to the low-­income population, evident in view of the 1992–1993 national housing funds (Infonavit and Fovissste) law reforms (Ramírez, 2013: p. 24) and the less than 1 per cent of the federal annual budget granted to social housing. The decrease of politically regulated development (Swyngedouw, 2009) has severely reduced the legitimacy of political parties and the government and has empowered the private sector to such an extent that many governors, mayors, civil servants and ‘traditional’ politicians have become private sector entrepreneurs by involving themselves and/or their family members in the real estate business.

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   115 Starting in the 1990s and more so after the year 2000, due to the private sector’s efficiency, productivity, job creation and the need for massive amounts of housing, the Mexican state adjusted the public housing and city policies to increase within the city and housing planning and decision-­making the presence of capital fractions that were before considered urban: such as private financing, real estate and the construction industry. As a consequence, the Mexican government’s urban social housing policy has barely met the needs of the formally employed workers with incomes that are five times the minimum wage or less.2 Thus, year after year, urban social housing has become a more unaffordable asset for the workers. Inner space of houses built has been reduced despite subsidies, credits and tax incentives. Additionally, the almost exclusively profit-­ oriented housing production has been separated from the urban planning policy, contributing little to the quality of life of its beneficiaries or to the sustainability of Mexican cities. Today the public housing policy not only faces the problem of social exclusion of low-­income groups, but it is also largely responsible for the current urban disorder and unsustainability. In addition, the national housing policy has failed to build a socially oriented vision when it was restructured in 2000, fundamentally becoming a financial and commercial homebuilding strategy, a sellers’ dominated market with almost no consideration of buyers’ needs, neglecting the improvements of conditions for building integrated communities. ‘Bipolarity’ of Mexican Politics As the housing policy consolidated in most Mexican cities, it won national and international recognition from private sector organisations and international multilateral institutions. The Mexican government, with private developers as main housing policy decision-­makers, attracted billions of dollars from abroad mainly from the WB, global investors, big foundations and Wall Street firms (Marosi, 2017). Paradoxically, alerts were raised by social sector organisations, academic institutions, urban planning advocates and planners, NGOs and some government policy-­makers, regarding the excesses committed by these policy decision-­makers. Alerts rang not only because the policy failed in its social commitment to looking after formal workers and the lowest-­income social groups housing interests and needs, as dictated by the Federal Housing Law and in government plans and programmes, but also because it was affecting the spatial and environmental patterns of many cities, and it didn’t comply with legal provisions. As Ramírez (2013) has stated, in Mexico, public housing policies and government programmes that are clearly defined in different laws have been distorted in the everyday decision-­making process. Within this context, after years of advocacy, debate and mediation by NGOs, city planners and the academia, with some members of Congress and policy-­ makers, in June 2006, the two National Legislative Chambers unanimously passed the new Housing Law that repealed the previous Federal Housing Law of 1984. The key issues of the new Law were geared towards enforcing the right to

116   Alfonso Iracheta decent and ‘adequate’3 housing for all Mexicans,4 and included the idea of ‘social production of housing’. Therefore, housing was not only recognised as a physical object but also as a system with several territorial, economic, political and socio-­cultural dimensions. The dimensions are all related, including the housing units, their immediate environments such as neighbourhoods, settlements, apartment blocks and the larger urban context. Furthermore, in November 2016, both Chambers of Congress passed the new Human Settlements and Urban Development General Law after ten years of national debate, mainly promoted by members of the academia and NGOs with members of the legislative chambers. The Law addressed most of the socially advocated urban and housing concepts and ideals. It also advocated for the alignment of the three socio-­spatial planning systems: urban, housing and environmental. How were the new progressive urban planning and governance legislation passed in the dominant post-­political context? An interpretation could be associated with evidence of some sort of ‘bipolarity’ of Mexican politics and the public policy decision-­making processes. On the one hand, the three tiers of Mexican governments have shown scarce concern for the needs of marginalised social groups and have done little during the last three decades to provide proper solutions for urban and social housing inequality and poverty. Almost nothing has been done for the sustainability of cities, although every politician and civil servant has endorsed legal commitments, socio-­spatial plans and programmes, and even international agreements. On the other hand, the Mexican government has become a leader of progressive legislation and programmes, although many of them are weak or not enforced, and are infringed and disobeyed. As Ramírez (2013: p. 2) has stated, in Mexico, legislation is not respected, and laws are violated every day in regard to the housing policy. The Mexican Constitution and related legislation are merely political references because usually, they don’t apply legal or political sanctions for their transgression and violation. Theoretically, even though in the early eighties the Mexican establishment endorsed the neoliberal and post-­political consensus of the capitalist paradigm as the main organiser of society, the language of the national legislation that politicians use has paradoxically had a progressive social orientation. Consequently, successive federal administrations have performed a twofold role: to facilitate capital accumulation and to design social policies, such as housing, in order to address the needs of the lower-­income groups and to support at the same time the construction industry which has become a leading economic sector for development, keeping the wealth accumulation of the private and political sectors at bay.

Outcomes of the Housing Policy in the Post-­Political Era: Relevant Figures of the Housing Production The Mexican population evolved between 2000 and 2015 from 97.5 million inhabitants to 119.5 at an annual rate of 1.38 per cent, whereas urban population grew at an annual rate of 1.83 per cent showing a national trend towards urban

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   117 population’s concentration being the trigger for the dramatic evolution of housing production throughout the country. The Mexican Social Housing Policy was consolidated in the first decade of the twenty-­first century. In practice, the public policy focused on the production of new housing purchased from private developers by beneficiaries.5 It focused on new housing constructions in gated communities for middle-­low and lower-­income salaried workers from the private and public formal sectors. During 2000–2017, there were slightly more than 10.65 million mortgages for a similar number of houses (50.4 per cent of total housing actions, including construction of new dwellings, home improvements and minor adaptations during the period), plus mortgages for used housings reaching 1.42 million in the same period, which is 6.72 per cent of total housing actions. The policy has also emphasised housing improvements and rehabilitation, almost reaching 8.74 million actions, equalling 41.35 per cent of the total housing actions. Housing improvements represented four of every ten housing actions during this period. The social housing endeavour, financially and constructively, is at the highest in more than 40 years of social housing in Mexico and, as Marosi (2017: p.  1) has stated, ‘this was the largest residential construction boom in Latin Amer­ican history’. If other financial initiatives for housing are added, the grand total of housing actions promoted by the federal government during these 17 years is 21.13 million, with an average of 1.24 million per year (Table­7.1). As the limitations of housing developments appeared in many cities throughout the country, the demand for used houses rapidly increased as an affordable alternative, mainly because of their location within the city boundaries. Government documents stated that 73 per cent of public financial resources in social housing supported the population with an income below 2.6 times the minimum wage (2012); however, a detailed analysis by the National Housing Commission (CONAVI, 2017 – National Housing Commission) reveals that only 34 per cent of such resources was invested. This means that small financial and constructive actions were provided for housing improvements, such as new bedrooms and/or kitchens, bathrooms, roof repairs, etc. In addition, 52 per cent of the total federal financial actions corresponded to subsidies for low-­income families, but only represented 5 per cent of the total amount of financial resources for housing (Centro EURE, 2013: p. 115). Faced with evidence that proved the lack of supply of new housing for lower-­income social groups, along with pressure by social and academic advocates and the media, the federal government promoted, under the same market-­oriented model, the creation of a new housing scheme, called ‘economic housing’, to address the needs of formal workers with incomes below three times the minimum wage. The scheme was characterised by a Fordist production, industrialised mass production of small houses with similar urban and architectural designs (325 sq. ft) for the poorest of the formal workers. The number of houses was small in relation to the dominant production of new housing targeted at workers with a middle-­low and low incomes, and lacked, as all social

Table 7.1  Mexico: federal social housing financing, 2000–2017 Programme/subprogramme 2000–2005 Financed housing COMPLETE HOUSING2 New (housing units) Used (housing units)

2,771,574 2,771,293 281

2006–2011 % 68.93 68.92 0.01

PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENT (extension/rehabilitation) (Housing actions) 1,178,828 29.32 OTHERS 70,337 1.75 TOTAL 4,020,739 100 ANNUAL AVERAGE 670,123 –

Financed housing

2012–2017 %

Financed housing

TOTAL 2000–20171 %

Financed housing

%

5,163,813 4,802,220 361,593

54.22 50.42 3.8

4,131,368 3,073,864 1,057,504

54.46 40.52 13.94

12,066,755 10,647,377 1,419,378

57.10 50.39 6.72

4,290,936 69,743 9,524,492 1,587,415

45.05 0.73 100 –

3,268,478 186,366 7,586,212 1,264,369

43.08 2.46 100 –

8,738,242 326,446 21,131,443 1,173,969

41.35 1.54 100 –

Source: CONAVIS, 2017, Reporte General de Financiamientos, 7 August 2017, obtained from: http://sniiv.CONAVIS.gob.mx/Financiamientos/reportes_bas.aspx. Notes 1 2017 figures are preliminary because they correspond to the second quarter. 2 Includes INITIAL HOUSING (basic housing structure and self-construction).

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   119 housing developments do, a lot of social amenities for the settled population. Moreover, as Marosi (2017: p. 1) has stressed in regard to these houses:  living rooms double as bedrooms; dining tables are shoved against walls to make room for bunk beds; couples sleep in nooks meant for washing machines; children stand or take turns at tiny tables; dog and chickens scamper across rooftops cluttered with the toys; tools and cleaning products that don’t fit indoors. That scheme ended in 2008 due to generalised criticism from social and academic analysts and because of the reluctance of many workers to buy these houses. The housing scheme was replaced by a programme that had larger homes with at least two bedrooms. Evaluation of the Housing Projects: Some Relevant Cases In 2014–2015 a social housing development assessment study was performed throughout the country. For this study, the housing developments were chosen by Infonavit because they held some of the worst overall conditions. The study allowed us to measure and analyse the impact of the national policy through the Housing Deterioration Index (InDH) that was developed for Infonavit by the EURE Center (Iracheta, 2015). The analysis was detailed in three dimensions: I: Housing habitability, II: Housing development conditions and urban context, and, III: Social relationships within the housing developments. As can be seen in Figure­ 7.1, the housing developments analysed are located in 14 Mexican states and in 25 cities varying in size. They were built between 2002 and 2010 and vary in regards to total area and number of dwellings and dwellers. While the largest occupies 500 hectares with 22,621 houses, the smallest has around 15 hectares and 1,322 dwellings. The average density of the developments is 115.74 inhabitants/ha, well over the national urban density of 57 inhabitants/ha. If analysed by dwellings, its average density is 54.26 dwellings per hectare (dpHa), the highest being 88 dpHa among the existing housing developments: The average national density in cities is 23 dpHa, the highest being 36 dpHa in cities above one million inhabitants and the lowest 19 dpHa in cities of 50,000–100,000 inhabitants (Cidoc/Shf, 2008, 2010). A fundamental feature of social housing developments in Mexico is their location in relation to the urban centre of greater influence that provides fundamental social services and amenities for the community and personal development, such as higher education, healthcare, culture, tertiary services, etc. Many of the communities, particularly those built after the year 2000, are located in city outskirts, averaging between nine and 14 km distance from the city centres (Eibenschutz and Goya, 2009). According to the analysis of the distance between the 36 social housing developments, their nearest city centre varies between 1.4 and 45 km. The main reason for the distant locations cited by developers and

120   Alfonso Iracheta

Figure 7.1  Location of the country’s 36 social housing developments. Source: Iracheta, 2015. Scale: 1 : 13,200,000.

generally accepted by local governments is that the cost of urban land within city boundaries is so high that it doesn’t meet the financial requirements of social housing developments, pushing social houses to low-­priced land located far from city centres. The policy has four important consequences: The first is that the location leads to the construction of rural properties neighbouring the housing developments, increasing landowners’ and ejidatarios’ expectations of selling their plots of land at higher prices or developing urban projects on their own. Consequently, it pressured the transformation of rural lands (agriculture, forests, mangroves, jungle, etc.) into urban ones, affecting the rural economies and environmental conditions. The second is that the homeowners’ household income was affected due to the location of their homes. When assessing the 36 social housing developments (Iracheta, 2015), more than 38 per cent of the inhabitants declared they required at least one hour of daily commuting, and in average, spent 18.7 per cent of their monthly income on transportation. Although it can be assumed that the parameter is within the maximum considered by the WB of 30 per cent of the personal monthly income designated to transport (Carruthers et al., 2005), if the cost of the rest of the family members is added, with on average three family members per household analysed (3.9 is the national average), the amount could triple, representing more than half of the nuclear family income. If the mortgage

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   121 monthly payment is added, representing a fixed household cost, the burden could force several families to abandon their homes. In order to confront the problem, an objective of the 2012–2018 National Development Plan was oriented towards controlling urban expansion through the housing policy. For that purpose, three urban expansion belts were surrounded by the CONAVI in many cities, concentrating social housing loans and subsidies in the inner-­city belts. However, there were two shortcomings: strategy design limitations that lacked alignment linking the belts to the local plans and programmes defining urban land use; and before 2012, the purchase of rural land reserves by developers that made them reluctant to sell them. Consequently, many of those land reserves stayed located outside of the belts and have been developed as they were before the urban expansion belts strategy. The third consequence is that most social housing developments require extraordinary and disproportionate investments by local authorities to provide infrastructure, social facilities, and municipal services for the settled population; this is because even though most housing developments must provide some infrastructure (roads, water, sewage) between the outskirts of cities to their location, they do not concern for their maintenance nor for the provision of other services such as public transport. The responsibility for delivering public services is transferred to the municipal authorities once the sale/delivery stage is concluded. When housing developments have been organised as condominiums, settlers themselves have to assume that responsibility. In both cases, the financial and other resources the municipal authorities have to spend to maintain the housing developments are disproportionately high in relation to the property taxes paid by both the housing developers and the inhabitants. Moreover, local politicians and civil servants are generally reluctant to collect property tax because many landlords have become politicians, or they are regular financial donors in municipal mayoral election campaigns. So, if we consider that around 80–85 per cent of municipal income comes from federal government transfers, there have been not many incentives for local authorities to seek an increase in property tax. Finally, the amount of population of many housing developments tended to be greater than that already settled in the municipality’s urban area, causing socio-­cultural, public service provision and local government management problems. In a short period of less than ten years, the pre-­existing population has more than doubled in many areas. The problem worsens with the physical-­spatial configurations of the developments that don’t meet a formal predefined norm or pattern. Housing projects were simply adapted to the fickle shape of the land plots; many times, resulting in amorphous and dis-­functional physical structures that don’t adapt to the surrounding landscape. As stated before, the InDH allowed three dimensions to be measured in each of the 36 social housing developments; comprised of 14 compounds and 51 single indicators. The research concluded that the compound indicators with the lowest measurements are in Dimension I ‘Housing habitability’: ‘dwellers satisfaction inside their dwelling’ and ‘housing spaces and uses’. There are various reasons for the low evaluation, of which at least two are underlined. The first

122   Alfonso Iracheta being that the reduced inner house space cannot accommodate all the nuclear family activities, thus moving some activities to the outside, affecting the urban image of the dwellings and the housing development. The second being the limited privacy within the dwellings, due to the size of houses and their low acoustic insulation. In Dimension II ‘Housing development conditions and urban context’, the worst evaluated indicators are ‘accessibility to public transport’, ‘social satisfaction inside the housing development’ and ‘accessibility to development activities’. The evaluation derives directly from the peripheral location of the social housing developments in relation to the urban areas, as well as from the lack of employment opportunities within and near the developments. Also, there are severe limitations on the existence, coverage and/or quality of social amenities and infrastructures within each housing development. Even though most housing developments do have public lighting, sidewalks and paved streets, incomplete coverage, low-­quality materials and limited operation services are tangible problems. It is noted that none of the housing developments’ infrastructure functions properly. Regarding social amenities, there is an emphasis on the lack of secondary schools, higher education, cultural facilities, health care services and community centres, public markets and particularly severe infrastructure limitations of public open leisure spaces for social gathering (green areas, parks, gardens and playgrounds). When available, the facilities show degrees of deterioration, dereliction and a lack of urban equipment and furniture. They are therefore scarcely used by the local population, pushing dwellers to meet those needs outside their area. Finally, in Dimension III ‘Social relationships’, the worst evaluated indicator was ‘community life’. It is the worst compound indicator of all indicators and the one that best represents the lack of the National Housing Policy’s social sense in Mexico. The research findings reveal how social objectives tend to be neglected when the main purpose of each housing development is to provide mortgage lending, building houses and having a profitable real estate business. Housing beneficiaries are mainly seen as individual customers, so the policy is devoid of any effort that promotes any clear responsibilities, either on the developers’ nor the beneficiaries’ side, to build up community organisations, maintain infrastructures and promote social cohesion. The study revealed that 64 per cent of the inhabitants do not participate in public spaces maintenance and more than 60 per cent seldom or never use them. The rest of the compound indicators of the InDH have a middle-­low to middle evaluation, with some values relatively high, such as ‘road connectivity’ and ‘infrastructure surrounding the housing development’. While the first one refers to the existence of roads to access and leave the housing developments, the second indicator refers to the public and private service supply which is obtained outside the housing developments in the immediate surroundings or in the nearer urban centres.

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   123

Different Group Roles and Reactions to the Housing Policies and New Social Housing Projects The Government and Housing Developers as Main Stakeholders of the Housing Policy The main housing policy stakeholders have been the federal government through its National Housing Commission, housing institutes and the housing developers. Additionally, there are the municipalities representing the local government tier, landowners, ‘ejidatarios’ and, last but not least, the social groups that are meant to be the beneficiaries of the housing policy and the informal housing settlements that have been neglected within the policy. The importance given to the housing sector by the federal government was evidenced between 2000 and 2006 when all relevant social housing decisions were made directly by the Office of the President, together with the National Housing Bodies and Institutes (ONAVIS) and the private sector representatives; without the participation of the local authorities, even though by law they are responsible for urban and housing planning. The National Housing Board (NHB) was created in 2000 and it was legally formalised by the 2006 Housing Law as a public advisory board between private, social and academic stakeholders, to advise the National Housing Commission and the ONAVISs to develop the national housing policy. When defining the policy within the mentioned board, tensions arose between the academia, the social organisations and the NGO members, and members representing the real estate and housing enterprises. Because they had a substantially different understanding of what the policy should be, unfortunately, the features advocated by the latter ended up defining the policy, which in turn drove the social housing policy to a critical stage and led to the Board’s stagnation starting in 2006 when President ­Calderon took office. To fulfil their established goals, politicians and developers merged through ‘policy networks’ allowing the modernisation of the mortgage lending system, increasing accessibility to most formal workers from the private and public sectors, promoting deregulation and mass production of housing by private developers and providing widespread support for housing developers by the three tiers of government. This resulted in a steady increase in mortgages, new housing production and the implementation of housing improvement actions (CONAVIS, 2012: p.  114) (Table­ 7.1). The networks permitted the housing planning development schemes to favour real estate, construction businesses and mortgage banking, and to ignore other city and environmental needs, particularly those of the workers and their families who are the formal beneficiaries of the housing policy. Housing developers have been empowered by becoming relevant decision-­makers on urban and housing policies. Such strengthening is seen in that, in many states of Mexico, developers are required to guarantee, through a bond, the adequate delivery of the dwellings under the stated conditions of the housing developments, protecting buyers from hidden vices of all sorts or delays

124   Alfonso Iracheta to the scheduled delivery dates. However, reports from journalists as well as from civil servants responsible for these processes show that those bonds are not used to compensate the aforementioned housing development deficiencies. Developers’ political influence is also felt by the number of modifications they are granted for local urban land uses. This happens when they make sure their rural plots will have urban housing permits, by offering to prepare or update local urban plans and programmes. It also happens when they buy rural land, mainly ‘ejido’ land, at lower prices, without urban land use permits. Then, they request the corresponding land use modifications from the municipal authorities and are usually granted the land use permits. The final step is the construction of the housing project and the sale of homes at higher land prices, with an extraordinary profit. In addition to the low price of the former ejidal land, there is a surplus value gained by developers that come from ONAVISs and the local governments that facilitate the construction of housing developments. For the private developers, buying low-­cost rural land far from urban centres is a good business decision. As the cost developers pay for land plots is determined by the ONAVISs through the financial structure of the housing projects, it leaves a narrow margin for rural landowners or ‘ejidatarios’ to push up land prices, making the developers justification subjective. Therefore, as Ramírez has stated (2013: p. 23), the 1992 Agrarian Reform has allowed the massive transfer of ejidal land to private firms at a very low cost. Homeowners: Housing Policy Beneficiaries Homeowners are the most important social actors of the housing policy because supposedly they are direct beneficiaries. As formal workers, over the years, add earnings to their housing fund, they are entitled to purchase a house through the national housing institute. They first obtain a certificate from their respective ONAVIS, and it allows them to purchase a house with the mortgage-­backed by the ONAVIS. The home supply is limited to housing developments approved by ONAVIS and local governments. Once the worker decides to purchase a home, he pays the mortgage loan for a period of up to 30 years. As previously explained, the housing projects have been mass produced; they have almost no urban and architectural design differences, are located far away from city boundaries and are built with similar materials, whether they are in tropical cities or in northern desert cities. ‘Meanwhile, the factory workers, small-­business owners, retirees and civil servants who bought the homes got stuck with complex loans featuring mortgage payments that rose even as their neighbourhoods deteriorated into slums’ (Marosi, 2017: p. 1). As found in the aforementioned research (Iracheta, 2015), 33.9 per cent of the inhabitants had the intention of moving out of their present dwelling and 35.4 per cent intended moving to a dwelling in a different area. This presents a sort of paradox. As a result of all the housing development shortcomings, it is surprising that there aren’t more abandonments; although it is thought that the analysed developments haven’t been built long enough to really give the inhabitants time

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   125 to decide what they want to do or that they lack the economic resources to do so. The population in these social housing developments generally comes from social strata of lower socio-­economic living conditions, and due to their lower income, they tend to have lower expectations. Most of them feel that the highest value comes with the opportunity to have a house of their own, although it may not fulfil their aspirations in regard to having larger inner house space and home location. The Informal Workers and Poorest Population The existing housing policy includes only civil servants and private sector workers, excluding almost all informal workers, who represent 60 per cent of the urban workers, and the lowest income groups, representing almost half of the Mexican urban population. The consequence of the exclusionary design has been the expansion of informal settlements. In Mexican cities, six out of ten dwellings originated from informal or irregular processes of occupation, or from informal land purchases (Cidoc/Shf, 2011). Because there is no housing plot or home supply for the poorest urban population, the social housing policy has also been responsible for an increase in informal settlements in most Mexican cities. It is estimated that, yearly, around 90,000 new households settle in informal settlements, facing land tenure uncertainty, shortcomings in almost all basic services and social facilities, and some are located in areas with hazardous risks and in environmentally protected areas (Centro EURE, 2013: p. 123). These social groups are not included in the housing policy, so their ‘participation in urban and housing policies’ occurs mainly through the social production process, based on individual self-­production and self-­financed modes, because informal or illegal land tenure conditions cannot allow formal financing mechanisms to operate. It is because of these precarious and informal conditions, lacking infrastructure and basic services, that the housing construction process is slow and gradual, allowing households and neighbourhoods to consolidate in a long-­term process (Centro EURE, 2013: p. 125). Since the year 2000, there have been poor results from land tenure regularisation policies, as well as a complete absence of well-­located and serviced housing plots in cities directed towards the lowest-­income families, who don’t have access to the housing funds and programmes mentioned above, and who are thus cornered into informality. Historically, political parties, particularly the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional – PRI), politicians and civil servants have had an electoral ‘reserve army’ in informal settlements, so in every political campaign some informal settlers receive something from the government, be it a regularised property titles or some basic service infrastructure improvement, in order to ensure the electoral vote from those social groups. Even though informal settlements are increasing in many cities, as evidenced in city plans and academic research, it is notable that none of the three tiers of the Mexican government has a strategy to cope with the problem. Informal housing is clearly

126   Alfonso Iracheta detected in the rise and fall of the National Sustainable Land Institute (INSUS). It was created in 2013 to surpass the urban land tenure regularisation policies and was responsible for a strategic ‘urban housing plot program’6 for the lowest-­ income population (Centro EURE, 2015). After four years, INSUS has no federal budget, has not developed any specific project to get basic informal settlement data, nor has it developed housing plot projects. The Role of ‘Ejido’ Land The ejidatarios has become a major social factor in the housing policy. Around two-­thirds of the peripheral urban land in Mexican cities are ejidos, so many housing projects must be located in this type of land tenure. When cities reached their neighbouring ejidos, making agricultural activities unprofitable, the ejidatarios became ‘informal real estate entrepreneurs’, selling their plots to the poorest urban population who were unable to buy legal housing plots within the urban fabric, expanding informal settlements. As an outcome of the 1992 approval of a new Agrarian Law, ejidatarios are allowed to privatise their plots so they try to sell them within the formal real estate market reducing urban land supply for the poorest urban population who have no choice but to informally settle far away from city centres.

Conclusions: The Political Aspects of Housing From a political standpoint, the social housing production model in Mexico has been characterised, especially since the year 2000, by several major political processes. First, the federal government’s role as a facilitator has allowed private developers to take full responsibility for the construction of social housing. This decision has implied taking away much of the government’s power over the control and guidance of the National Housing Policy in compliance with the post-­political configuration assumed by Mexican elites. Therefore, it has given developers the ability to make all relevant production and distribution decisions in the social housing developments. An important socio-­political consequence of the latter is on the housing market. The strategy of the government has been its progressive withdrawal from urban development management and guidance. The different amendments to the 1917 Mexican Constitution grant municipal control over land use planning and administration, housing developments, gated communities, and housing construction permits and authorisations. However, it was done without creating urban development and participatory housing planning and the proper technical and institutional conditions. Municipalities are the weakest tier of government and are bribe-­prone, and susceptible to pressure from developers and investors. Proof of the latter is that many of the housing developments lacked urban land use plans, but municipal authorities granted developers land use changes skipping the existing legal processes. Second, there are urban development and land management instruments, strategies within Mexican legislation and federal programmes, that encourage

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   127 urban periphery land plot location. Sadly, few have been put into practice because of the government agencies’ neglect and the developers’ reluctance. Third, millions of workers with the right to obtain a mortgage from their affiliated institute or who are beneficiaries of public institution of savings, credits or subsidies, depend upon the supply generated by developers, without participating in decisions on housing location and planning, or mortgage lending conditions (Centro EURE, 2013: p. 110). Those workers with social benefits represent 35 per cent of the total social housing demand, whereas the remaining 65 per cent have met their housing needs with housing overcrowding or informal human settlements (Centro EURE, 2013: p. 110). Fourth, the 1992 Constitutional Agrarian Reform allowed the privatisation of ejidos in favour of individuals and private enterprises at a low cost, and with minimal federal government intervention; leading to the privatisation of most of land plus-­value and reducing the land access for low-­income housing projects. Fifth, the institutional separation between housing, urban development, environmental and public transport policies has proven to be a serious political error. The process gave way to the consolidation of three different and non-­aligned planning and legal systems: the urban, environmental and housing planning, almost without any coordination between them, provoking policy differences and contradictions in their plans and programmes. When contradictions appear before a Court of Justice there is a tendency for developers to be favoured by the judges. The federal government’s priority of housing actions over the fulfilment of urban development and environmental plans has given rise to an evident laissez-­faire approach in the housing sector, marginalising housing locations in the urban and environmental regulations and causing far-­reaching adverse impacts on city dwellers and local finances. Sixth, the national housing strategy has promoted land speculation in the urban periphery, expanding urbanisation borders in most cities and increasing the vacant land area between housing developments and the city limits. These problems could have been addressed in article 73 of the Housing Law, which establishes a set of guidelines for the proper urban location and design of housing developments. Regrettably, such guidelines, which should have been enforced since 2010, have not been approved and officially published, due to a strong lobby of housing developers. Finally, the housing production model focused on new housing construction for workers who represent around one-­ third of the general social housing demand. In contrast, few actions have been implemented to meet the backlog, the impacts of the demographic change, housing inequality and poverty persistence, and mainly neglecting housing supply for the poorest households constituting 24 per cent of the national population. It is clear that the Mexican state is not the principal decision-­maker on the housing policy and that Mexico is moving to a post-­political era of ‘entrepreneurialism’. Actually, the social housing policy in Mexico represents the post-­ political consensus between the political authorities and the private sector. The housing policy leans towards political populist gestures rather than on proper

128   Alfonso Iracheta politics (Swyngedouw, 2009); for that reason, it cannot be considered a ‘social policy’ because social, spatial and environmental problems have increased in most cities where housing developments were built. Furthermore, it cannot be considered a social policy because it has no support for social housing production and for the housing of the poorest social groups that have become ‘electoral army’ for some political parties and to the three tiers of government. Therefore, it is evident that Mexico needs a transformation of its social housing policies. Such a transformation has to pursue grassroots stakeholders and social actors fighting for political alternatives to the neoliberal capitalist economy, avoiding what Zizek (2006) has alerted to when stating that popular frustration with the confines of consensual politics inevitably gives way to alternatives that, faced with the depoliticising strategies of the consensual order, often take a populist form.

Notes 1 The research survey included almost 10,000 questionnaires (around 250 per housing development), and an average of five local stakeholders’ interviews (developers, community organisations and local government representatives) per development, as well as participative observations of the research team, in addition to a GIS analysis. 2 To contextualise the figures, about 70 per cent of Mexican families have an income of five times the minimum wage or less, equivalent to a monthly income of MX$12,006 or less, with the maximum income being between US$600 and 700, depending on the exchange rate. Considering the OECD’s 2016 purchase power parity (PPP) factor for Mexico, which is 8.869, the amount roughly doubles, i.e. the income would be close to US$1,350. 3 ARTICLE 2. – Proper, decent housing is considered to be in compliance with applicable legal provisions with regard to human settlements and construction, habitability, health, basic services, and the provision of legal certainty for its dwellers whether they are owners or in legitimate possession. It should also ensure conditions for disaster prevention and physical protection of its dwellers against potentially dangerous natural elements. ARTICLE 3. – The provisions of this Law must be implemented under principles of equity and social inclusion so each person, regardless of their ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disability, social, economic, or health conditions, religion, opinions, preferences, or marital status may exercise their constitutional right to housing (translated from Spanish). 4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right to an adequate standard of living, including housing that, according to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, means more than just a roof over one’s head. It should at least meet the following criteria to be considered adequate: – Security of tenure: housing is not adequate if its dwellers do not have certain tenure security. It protects people against arbitrary eviction, harassment and other threats. – Availability of services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure: housing cannot be adequate if its dwellers lack drinking water, adequate sanitary facilities, an energy source for cooking, heating and lighting and food preservation or waste disposal. – Affordability: housing is not adequate if its cost threatens or compromises the dwellers’ attainment and satisfaction of other human rights. – Habitability: housing is not adequate if it does not guarantee physical security or ensure adequate space and protection against the cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, or structural hazards. – Accessibility: housing is not adequate if the basic needs of disadvantaged or marginalised groups are not taken into consideration. – Location: housing is not adequate if it does not offer

Free Market Capitalism and Social Policies   129 access to employment, health care services, schools, childcare centres, and other social services and facilities, or if it is located in polluted or dangerous areas. – Cultural adequacy: housing is not adequate if the expression of cultural identity is not considered and respected. These criteria have been listed in the World Charter on the Right to the City. It was accepted by a large number of institutions and social organisations and by various governments since the first World Social Forum. 5 It has to be taken into account that beneficiaries are formal workers in private companies and government offices that during their working life contribute a percentage of their salary to ONAVISs, among which two can be highlighted: The National Workers’ Housing Fund Institute (Infonavit by its Spanish acronym), for the private sector; and the Housing Fund of the Institute of Security and Social Services for Government Workers (Fovissste by its Spanish acronym), only for governmental employees, among other institutions. These contributions give them the right to access mortgage lending to acquire housing or improve the house they already have. 6 Provision of sites and services.

References Carruthers, R., Dick, M. and Saukar, A (2005) Affordability of public transport in developing countries, Transport Papers series, no. TP-­3. Available from: https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/handle/10986/17408 (accessed 12 September 2017). Centro EURE SC (2015) Facultades y funciones del INSUS (Como base de la Política Nacional de Suelo, Mexico City, Centro Eure SC (restricted document)). Centro EURE SC (2013) Documento ampliado del Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y Ordenamiento Territorial 2013–2018 (first version), made for CONAVIS, Mexico City, (restricted document). Cidoc/Shf (2008, 2010 and 2011) Estado actual de la vivienda en México. Mexico City, Cidoc/Shf. CONAVI (2012, 2017) Reporte General de Financiamientos. Available from: http://sniiv. CONAVI.gob.mx/Financiamientos/reportes_bas.aspx (accessed 7 August 2017). Eibenschutz, R. and Goya, C. (2009) Estudio de la Integración Urbana y Social en la Expansión Reciente de las Ciudades en México, 1996–2006. Dimensión, Características Y Soluciones. Mexico City, H. Cámara de Diputados, LX legislatura; SEDESOL; Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana – Unidad Xochimilco; Miguel Ángel Porrúa. Iracheta, A. (2015) Índice de deterioro habitacional (INDH). Reporte general del diagnóstico de 36 conjuntos habitacionales con altos niveles de vivienda abandonada en México, CDMX, Infonavit (made by Centro EURE SC). Marosi, R. (2017) Mexico’s housing debacle. Los Angeles Times. Available from www. latimes.com/search/dispatcher.front?Query=Richard+Marosi&target=all&spell=on (accessed 26 November 2017). Ramírez, V. (2013) La ilegalidad de las políticas habitacionales. De los dichos a los hechos, paper presented at Congreso Nacional de Vivienda, UNAM, CDMX, 12 March. Swyngedouw, E. (2009) The antinomies of the postpolitical city: In search of a democratic politics of environmental production. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(3), 601–620. Zizek, S. (2006) Against the populist temptation. Critical Enquiry, 32(3), 551–574.

Part III

New Attempts to Overcome the Post-Political Trends in Planning and Governance

8 Shifting Political Conditions for Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas

Introduction Traditionally the northern European spatial planning approach is based on a strong democratically constituted state, which is considered responsible for the success of the provision of social welfare services and the balanced spatial distribution of socio-­economic activities. Contemporary literature notes, however, that spatial planning has become increasingly influenced by neoliberal policy agendas across the Nordic countries in recent years, which is motivated by notions of effectiveness and selectivity instead of comprehensiveness and the involvement of new actor networks (Bäcklund et al., 2017; Fredricsson and Smas, 2013; Galland, 2012; Mäntysalo et al., 2015). One explanation for this move is certainly the changing majorities in the respective governments. The corresponding social-­democratic parties have been powerful in shaping the policy agenda over a number of election periods in the twentieth century. However, from the 1990s onwards we have seen shifting coalitions across the entire political spectrum, which has implied what Baeten (2018) calls a normalisation of neoliberalism in general and the proliferation of neoliberal policies in particular. For instance, concerning the practice of spatial planning in these four Nordic countries, we can distinguish a tension between on the one hand the aim to make planning processes more transparent, inclusive and democratic in order to safeguard input legitimacy, and the introduction of new forms of market-­ oriented planning to effectuate and shorten such processes for improving the output efficiency of spatial planning through deregulation and more growth orientation (Mäntysalo et al., 2011, 2015), on the other hand. In this chapter, we try to contextualise these observed changes in the Nordic countries into the current ‘flurry of discussions about post-­politics or the post-­ political condition’ (Metzger, 2018: p.  180). In our view these discussions basically remind us to be sensitive regarding the various side-­effects, either intended or non-­intended, that these shifts may imply in regard to deficits of the democratic legitimacy and accountability of planning by creating channels to bypass important stakeholders or by weakening public institutions of policy and decision-­making, for instance, which otherwise may be overlooked. We argue that these shifts and the related practices indeed create a ‘seemingly’ post-­political condition that is

134   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas engineered through neoliberal modes of territorial governance (Metzger et al., 2014) within spatial planning, but which is not as dramatic or advanced as in many other countries. This can be traced back to a different starting point in the Nordic countries. Nonetheless, we can identify a number of alterations in regard to spatial planning and particularly the national spatial planning systems and the more or less post-­political directions of change that these changes have induced in recent years across these four Nordic countries, which will be investigated further within this chapter. This chapter focuses on the spatial planning systems and instruments. It provides an empirically informed overview regarding the extent to which the ‘national spatial planning systems’ have been adapted to or stabilised against some of the recent political shifts across four Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Here, we define a spatial planning system as ‘a collection of institutions that mediate competition over the use of land and property and regulate land use change and development to promote a preferred spatial and urban form’ (Nadin et al., 2017: p. 7). In a European context, the Nordic planning systems are often denoted as ‘comprehensive-­integrated’ (Nadin and Stead, 2008). This ideal type is characterised by an understanding of spatial planning that is rooted in a systematic and formal hierarchy of plans from national to local level and a coordination of public sector activities across different sectors. In contrast to the regional economic planning approach, this arrangement ‘focuses specifically on spatial coordination rather than on economic development’ (Silva and Acheampong, 2015: p. 17). However, we intend to question the notion of a Nordic spatial planning family (Böhme, 2002) by understanding the conditions that trigger some of the changes in recent years, in order to identify the extent to which the national trajectories diverge or converge among the four Nordic countries under consideration here, countries which are traditionally associated with similar welfare models and political cultures.

The Political Conditions for Spatial Planning In recent years, the Nordic welfare model has received significant attention as a middle way approach, being a compromise between neoliberalism and socialism. It encompasses ‘tax financed public responsibility and legislated, collective, and universalistic solutions that respect employment interests yet aim at welfare and equity goals’ (Kautto, 2010: p.  24). The attention has particularly focused on how this model has been transformed and adapted against the background of increased market liberalisation and globalisation and the economic crises in the 1990s that hit particularly countries such as Sweden and Finland, prompting them to move towards a remodelled neoliberal welfare system (Smas and Schmitt, 2015). As Kautto and Kvist (2002: p. 192) noted,  the steady economic growth and high, if not full, employment that were generally seen as cornerstones of the model suddenly appeared to belong to

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   135 the past. The consequent fiscal problems placed policy-­makers in a new situation: Instead of policy reforms to guarantee more and better ‘social rights’, cuts and other balancing measures were considered, and an emphasis on ‘social duties’ in the form of increased taxes and social contributions as well as tougher work obligations and moral responsibilities became more prevalent.  As a side-­effect, this remodelled neoliberal welfare system has repositioned and weakened some of the traditional strong stakeholders, such as labour organisations and public agencies, at the expense of strengthening those that represent the private sector. However, we concur with Jessop (2010) who describes the Nordic transformations as ‘neoliberal policy adjustments’ that follow a rather pragmatic tradition in contrast to the neoliberal system transformations that took place in Russia and eastern Europe or neoliberal regime shifts as in the US and the UK, for instance. This pragmatic tradition is underpinned by a large degree of political consensus, both from left and right-­wing parties (Kautto and Kvist, 2002). On closer inspection, a couple of differences exist in regard to the reforms of the political-­ administrative organisation. The reform traditions in Sweden and Finland are described as being rather similar in their incremental approach of seeking consensus by adopting a top-­down approach with a low degree of politicisation, whereas Norway and Denmark are categorised as having more of a bottom-­up reform tradition with a high degree of politicisation (Neubauer et al., 2007). In regard to spatial planning, one can say that a comprehensive-­integrative approach including not only land use planning but also regional development and social welfare policies and, increasingly, sustainability issues has been a vital component in the development of the Nordic welfare states. However, there are a few fundamental differences that are worth mentioning here. These relate to the relationships between ministries and state agencies and the interactions between the national, the sub-­national, for example regional, and the local levels. In the Nordic countries, we can distinguish between two main traditions with regard to the central administrative system. Denmark and Norway and also Iceland have a ministerial tradition whereas Sweden and Finland have a more technocratic tradition (Aalbu et al., 2008: p. 13). The latter two have rather small ministries with limited mandates and no executive power, but otherwise, a number of autonomous government agencies exist in Sweden and Finland, which for instance make sure that governmental interests are secured in spatial planning. These are statutory public organisations with some degree of autonomy from the structurally separated ministry or department to which they are related (Pollitt et al., 2005). This politico-­administrative model of ‘agentification’ is not as evident in Norway and Denmark, which have integrated ministries with executive power that can develop for instance national planning guidelines and even regulatory planning instruments. Nonetheless, in Finland, the agency model was significantly restructured in the 1990s. The agencies were reduced in size and in their number and reoriented away from detailed regulation to supporting the ministries (Pollitt et al., 2005; Temmes, 2008). However, ‘the role of civil

136   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas s­ ervants as guardians of neutral and objective decision-­making’ still has a strong tradition in the Nordic countries, even if new public management models have been implemented to various extents in all countries (Temmes, 2008: p. 236). In regard to the spatial planning systems and the question of to what extent these four Nordic countries can be considered as one family, we can echo Böhme (2002) who asserted more than 15 years ago that; a key characteristic of this planning family is the strong local self-­ government, which forms a cornerstone of Nordic constitutions and is supported by far-­reaching decentralisation trends; spatial planning at the national level is reduced to a minimum and regional planning only weakly represented. Unitary governments counterbalance the strong local level. These common constitutional factors are embedded in political and cultural ties between the Nordic countries. The Nordic political systems, for instance, invoke the same approach to conflict resolution: In all Nordic countries, we can identify a decision-­making culture bringing together all the interest groups involved under official auspices to try to forge a policy consensus. Thus, policy-­making is characterised by dispassionate assessments of the situation, committee discussions and reports, and cooperation, invoking a common neo-­corporatist penchant towards consensus. This is accompanied by a preference for framework control or framework legislation. (p. 214) This long quote deserves some further comments. The effort for consensus building and inclusiveness might be interpreted as a strategy to politicise issues by mobilising stakeholder participation. On the other hand, the consensus-­ seeking culture might run the risk of toning down contestation as the issues at stake need to be aligned to the prevailing structures of political power. Also, this quote is somewhat outdated as will be discussed in the next section, because we can observe some changes in the distribution of power at the various policy levels in recent years. Additionally, we want to remark that apart from describing the Nordic countries as ‘unitary states with planning powers substantially devolved to the municipalities’ (Balchin et al., 1999), a closer look at the operation and organisation of their administrative systems shows a number of differences (Airaksinen et al., 2014) in particular in regard to the regional level (Røiseland et al., 2015). Denmark, Norway and Sweden have a three-­tiered political system; directly elected assemblies at the national, regional and local levels. Finland does not have a directly elected regional level yet, but there are ongoing discussions about introducing one. Nonetheless, in Finland as well as in Norway and Sweden significant relations exist between the central national government and specific state-­run agencies at the regional level. For this, Sweden and Norway, for instance, have state-­run authorities, the so-­called county administrative board in Sweden (länsstyrelse) and the county governor in Norway (fylkesman), which have a supervising and coordinating function in regard to

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   137 spatial planning in order to safeguard national interests and to guarantee conformity with the legal planning frameworks.

Shifts in Nordic Spatial Planning Spatial planning in the Nordic countries is primarily considered as a ‘municipal affair’ that is regulated by a national legal framework and, although to varying extents, a rather weak regional planning approach compared to countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium or Switzerland. However, one needs to keep in mind that most of the Nordic municipalities cover comparatively large areas, which are actually of the size of planning regions in some of the aforementioned other countries. In this section, we consider a number of spatial planning instruments, which are defined here as plans and other tools that are used to mediate and regulate spatial development. We do this because spatial planning instruments are the main means through which state-­led spatial planning objectives are defined and pursued. Hence the instruments listed in Table 8.1 contain formal statutory plans and other tools used to mediate and regulate spatial development and competition over the use of land and property, to promote preferred spatial and urban forms, and to define and pursue (other) spatial planning objectives. That said, Table 8.1 does not include planning acts, regional development strategies, or legal and policy instruments that are only concerned with guiding EU cohesion policy. In other words, it excludes integrated territorial investment plans; sector plans, including for example transport and river basin management plans; and instruments that regulate the quality of building construction. It does not include either the numerous informal instruments such as urban visions, strategic plans or similar policy documents that are produced and applied in various forms in a number of municipalities, or even in some regions across the four Nordic countries. These inevitably follow a different logic in regard to plan-­making procedures and implementation. Against this background and definition, we identify the main spatial planning instruments outlined in Table 8.1 within the four Nordic countries at three policy levels. In order to assign a spatial planning instrument at either the national, sub-­national or local level, it has been considered at which of these levels the instrument under consideration is being approved. All four Nordic countries have a similar array of local spatial planning instruments that complement each other in various ways. Strong differences can be identified instead at national and in particular at the regional level and in the related interactions between these policy levels. In addition, it should be noted that in recent years the Nordic spatial planning systems have been under review, which has led to various organisational shifts and changes, also in regard to these main instruments and responsibilities. The underlying dynamics and reasons will be discussed in the following subsections.

Table 8.1  Overview of the main formal spatial planning instruments in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 2017

National

Denmark

Finland

Norway

Sweden

National planning reports Summary of national interests National planning directives National planning directive for Greater Copenhagen

National land use guidelines

National expectations with regard to regional and municipal planning Central government planning provisions Central government planning guidelines Central government land use plan Regional planning strategy Regional plan Regional planning provisions Municipal planning strategy Municipal master plan Zoning plans

Areas of national interest for conservation and development

Regional Local

Regional land use plan Strategy for planning Local authority plan Local plan

Source: own compilation.

Local master plan Land policy programme Local detailed plan

Regional development plan Comprehensive municipal plan Detailed development plan Area regulations

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   139 Denmark – Comparatively Radical Changes Denmark’s spatial planning system has been significantly reformed during the last decade. Since the early 2000s, spatial planning has been given a more strategic role in development and growth that has been followed by changes in deregulation and decentralisation (Damsgaard, 2014; Galland, 2012). In 2007, a territorial reform was implemented with the result that Denmark reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98, and the former counties (amt) were replaced by five new administrative regions. The overall aim of this reform was to create larger and more efficient administrative units. As Damsgaard (2014: pp. 30–31) notes, there was remarkably little public debate. One reason was that the whole process was pushed ahead relatively fast, within three years, starting with a commissioned report to the government in 2004, because the required political majorities had been co-­opted beforehand. However, the reform also included significant legal and administrative changes of the planning system, most notably by weakening the regional level through the gradual abolition of regional planning authorities with the effect that, currently, land use planning is only carried out at the national and local levels. Within this process of rescaling induced by the state, most of the regional tasks have been transferred to the local level, in regard to the urban form and land use planning, and a few tasks such as coastal zone management or the management of the Natura 2000 network of protected areas for rare and threatened species are now the responsibility of national authorities (Damsgaard, 2014: p. 30). This has resulted in a more or less reversed relationship between the regional and the local level, because ‘many consider this to be a change from ‘the municipalities of the region’, e.g. the county as an authority above municipalities, towards ‘the region of the municipalities’, in which the region is [just] seen as a [weakened] tool for municipalities’ (Hansen, 2009: p. 9). In fact, the elected regional bodies were maintained as regional councils, but they can no longer collect their own taxes as the counties did before. Instead, they are dependent on national funding. As a result of the revisions of the Planning Act in 2007 and several further ones in 2014, the regional land use planning instruments and regulatory guidelines were transferred, in a modified form, to the new and larger municipalities, which has given them more autonomy to plan and guide their future development (Tait and Hansen, 2013: p.  298). Another example of the immense rescaling of the Danish spatial planning system is the abolition of the Greater Copenhagen Authority responsible for metropolitan planning as part of the territorial and structural reform, which is now executed by the Minister of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs through a national planning directive for the Greater Copenhagen, or the so-­called ‘Finger Plan’. The ministry , through the Danish Business Authority, also produces national planning reports to inform municipalities of national interests that need to be considered in local planning and can develop regulatory national directives (see Table 8.1). In 2017, the Planning Act was revised again, which further underlined the strategic and growth-­oriented focus that has been promoted since the early

140   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas 2000s, in which planning should not be an obstacle for development; rather, it has facilitated economic growth since the financial crisis of 2008/2009, although Denmark, as well as Sweden and Norway, was rather modestly impacted from a European perspective. In addition, spatial planning has been stigmatised in the public debate as a barrier to rural development (Olesen and Carter, 2017). Another change that symbolises the move towards growth and economic development is the shift of national responsibility for planning from the Ministry of Environment to the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs. Additional symbolic shift took place a year before, when the ‘regional development plans’, introduced in 2007, a sort of strategic, but rather powerless document to coordinate municipal development plans, were removed from the Planning Act and were merged with regional business development strategies to form what are called now ‘regional growth and development strategies’ as the only instrument at the regional level. The first generation of these strategies is about to be produced at the moment. They can be construed as a strong reversal from a regional planning approach that ‘rested on principles of equal development in distributing welfare services’ (Hansen, 2018: p.  110) towards one that is ‘increasingly embracing business and growth-­oriented activities’ (p. 117). Finland – Minor Procedural Changes Towards ‘More’ Output Efficiency The Finish spatial planning system has been in principle rather stable since 2000 but there are ongoing discussions about amendments and about reforming the municipal and regional structure. One basic line of argumentation is similar to the Danish discussion more than ten years ago. Planning is slow and overly bureaucratic, producing unpredictable outcomes and as such hindering economic growth potential, as articulated by a number of actors such as the influential Finnish Business and Policy Forum, a national think tank called EVA (Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta), and the Finnish Chamber of Commerce (Mattila, 2018). As a response to this, in recent years a few procedural changes have been introduced to strengthen the strategic character of spatial planning (Hirvonen-­Kantola and Mäntysalo, 2014) as well as to decentralise responsibilities and to accentuate a more growth-­oriented land use policy. For instance, until 2016, regional land use plans and municipalities shared local master plans, which had to be confirmed by the Ministry of the Environment. But from 2016 onwards, state-­level confirmation is no longer needed. The Finnish government decided to implement this change in order to increase the autonomy of the regions and to shorten the planning processes. However, the legislation still stipulates that when regional land use plans are prepared, a few specific national public agencies and the responsible Ministry of the Environment have to prove the extent to which these plans conform to national objectives and the national land use guidelines. In addition, the Ministry of the Environment is about to prepare changes to the Land Use and Building Act in order to reduce the possibilities of national public agencies appealing against local level plans. This would imply further decentralisation and

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   141 an increased autonomy for the municipalities on the one hand and would transform the role of the national level more towards guiding instead of steering land use development on the other. An important novelty in regard to regional planning is the introduction of an informal city regional planning level that is not included in the Land Use and Building Act. This has been encouraged by the state in the form of inter-­ municipal agreements on land use, housing and transport between the state and the municipalities in a city region, where the municipalities together with the state develop and agree on common goals that are formalised through so-­called ‘Letters of Intent’. Related to this are the redefined general objectives of land use in the Land Use and Building Act in 2015, which explicate that land use shall promote the preconditions for businesses and promote the development of well-­ functioning competition and that municipalities shall be active in promoting land for economic development. Norway – A Seemingly Expanding Regional Planning Approach to Meet National Interests and Market-­Based Planning Requirements at the Local Level In Norway, there have not been any substantial changes in the distribution of competences among planning authorities thus far, despite the fact that a new Planning Act was adopted in 2009. This act emphasises the strategic orientation within planning and the synchronisation and coordination between the national, regional and municipal levels. According to the new act, regions must develop strategic and regional plans, whereas municipalities need to develop strategic and comprehensive plans. At first sight, the system seems to be rather well integrated, but there are no strict juridical hierarchies. Instead, the Norwegian system can be regarded as a ‘power-­positioning system’, where the regional level has the right to intervene, but the local municipalities have still the power to decide (Harvold and Nordahl, 2012). However, there have been parliamentary debates regarding municipal and regional reforms during recent years that have resulted in a voluntary municipal and regional reform bill that was passed by the Norwegian parliament in 2014. In Norway, the ministry responsible for spatial planning sets national guidelines but also has a number of regulatory planning instruments at its disposal, such as producing local land use plans and regulatory national provisions. In addition, there has been a shift towards a more market-­based and project-­oriented planning system (Falleth and Nordahl, 2018; Falleth and Saglie, 2011), which means in practice that private actors have the possibility to produce proposals for regulatory development plans, which constitute the vast majority of the plans that have been produced in recent years (Fredricsson and Smas, 2013). A symbolic change in this respect was that the responsibility for the Building and Planning Act and related planning competences was transferred to the new Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation from the former Ministry of Environment (now merged into the Ministry of Climate and Environment) in 2013.

142   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas What is striking compared to the other Nordic countries is the high number of regional planning instruments, such as regional planning strategies, regional planning forum, regional planning provisions and regional plans. The first three mentioned here were all introduced in 2008. The regional planning strategies are supposed to give an account of important regional development trends and challenges and determine which issues are to be addressed through further regional planning. This mandatory instrument should be applied in cooperation with municipalities, government agencies, organisations and institutions affected by the planning work at least once in each parliamentary term. The regional planning strategies must contain an overview of how to follow up the priority plans and the plan for participation in the planning work, whereas within the regional planning forums municipal land use plans are discussed with the central government and regional authorities. The regional planning provisions are expected to form a basis for government agencies, regional authorities and municipalities when they engage in planning according to the planning and building act. The instrument ‘regional plans’ was only slightly revised in 2008 but contributes to the comparatively high political attention of spatial planning at the regional level in Norway in recent years. One reason for this expanding focus in regional planning in Norway compared to the other three Nordic countries is that the nation-­state wants to give more responsibility to this policy level to safeguard national interests and to guarantee better inter-­ municipal coordination in terms of the number of infrastructural, social welfare and structural challenges in a country with a relatively fast-­growing population, similar to Sweden. Sweden – Largely Business as Usual, but Huge Potential for Future Contestation Although in 2011, the Swedish planning and building act was revised there have been no substantial changes to the spatial planning system in terms of new planning instruments or planning authorities since 1987. The factual changes include new provisions to take greater account of environmental and climate aspects within the planning process. In addition, the strategic function of comprehensive plans is expected to be strengthened by requiring assessment of the topicality of the plans within each term of office. Otherwise, the structure and orientation of the Swedish planning system has been very robust during the twentieth century and even until today (Karlbro et al., 2012). It is also noteworthy that a regional reform has been discussed in various waves since the late 1950s, but for the latest one, which suggested a sort of radical decrease and thus amalgamation of regions from the existing 21 counties to six to nine regions, no substantial political majority could be mobilised, so this process was put on ice in 2017. The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) is responsible for coordinating ‘the areas of national interest for conservation and development’ as formulated in the Environmental Code, but in Sweden, no coherent national land use strategy or guidelines exist. Instead, it is the responsibility of

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   143 the state-­run regional authorities to supervise and guarantee that national interests are considered in local and regional planning. However, the only mature form of regional planning is being practised in Stockholm, where it is obligatory and governed by a separate law. The responsible regional planning agency is currently developing, together with the 26 municipalities in the Stockholm region, its seventh regional plan since 1958. The latest regional development plan for Stockholm from 2010 with a perspective until the year 2030, includes the regional development strategies governed through the so-­called Regional Growth Ordinance, for which the County Administrative Board of Stockholm is responsible. In the other larger metropolitan areas, outside Stockholm, there is increasing awareness of the need to plan beyond the traditional municipal administrative boundaries and to consider a more expansive city region that includes urban, suburban and rural linkages. This is also argued in a report by a national committee for housing (SOU, 2015). In this report, the committee, consisting of parliamentary politicians representing different parties, civil servants and other experts, proposes a law for mandatory regional land use planning in Sweden to be introduced in 2019, which has thus far not been seriously discussed in the respective political groups within the government. The underlying rationale of this proposal is to better respond to the current housing crisis by guaranteeing better inter-­municipal coordination, and eventually to even make use of some sticks to force municipalities to increase the supply of housing. This is being politically contested because it would reduce the strong self-­governmental status of Swedish municipalities. At the same time, we can note examples of the production of non-­statutory informal regional strategies such as in the Region Skåne in the very south of Sweden, which developed strategies for the polycentric Skåne in 2013 based on a voluntary collaboration between the municipalities and the region. Another example of inter-­municipal cooperation can be found in the Västra Götaland region, which is around the second largest Swedish city of Gothenburg, where a similar policy document was produced in 2005. In the fourth largest city region of Sweden, the two core cities of Linköping and Norrköping have developed a joint municipal plan, and the recently formed Region Östergötland, in which this city region is embedded, is about to develop a similar strategic policy document as in Skåne. These developments indicate that there is a greater need for spatial policy coordination at the inter-­municipal level, due to a number of increasing socio-­economic challenges. The rationale behind these activities is not only directed towards coordination downwards, such as coordination between municipalities, but also to make explicit to the national government the growing need for the infrastructural endowment. On a general note, within the political debate in Sweden, spatial planning is currently seen as both a solution and a problem for sustainable urban and regional development. The planning system is perceived as crucial for tackling problems such as urban sprawl and climate change, and also for creating attractive and competitive cities (Lundström et al., 2013). However, the planning system is also accused of being overly bureaucratic and inflexible, as well as

144   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas inefficient, in particular in combatting the shortage of affordable housing (SOU, 2013: p. 34). This is, however, an argument that is brought forward in the other three Nordic countries, too. In addition, the inefficiency of the housing production is to a large degree dependent on issues outside the formal planning process, namely issues around land policy, the financial system and of course the functioning of the property market. Nonetheless, this topic has been more and more politicised in recent years and will probably, together with related issues, such as the modernisation of the transport infrastructure, become even more contested due to the increasing media attention and protests by a number of civic groups.

Similarities and Diverging Trajectories across the Four Nordic Countries With regard to the regional scale, we can identify significant changes and also differences between the four countries. Regional planning in Denmark has been more or less completely abolished, whereas in Finland there are discussions on introducing directly elected regional councils. In Norway, the regional reform discussions are ongoing, but it is the country with the most extensive regional planning approach. In Sweden, the last approach towards a regional reform failed, but there are ongoing discussions to install firmer modes of coordination of spatially relevant policies at the regional level. Otherwise, the situation is similar to Denmark with the only formal regional planning approach for the capital region. In addition, we can recognise that all Nordic states have comprehensive municipal plans, which are only non-­binding in Sweden, but their legal status varies, as does the involvement of the regional and national levels in local planning issues. When comparing the available local spatial planning instruments only, we can see a somewhat similar repertoire of instruments among the four countries, because the aforementioned comprehensive municipal plans are complemented by more detailed zoning plans. We can detect more differences at the national level, where in Denmark and Norway a broad repertoire of spatial planning instruments is available, whereas in Finland and Sweden only one single formal instrument is at the direct disposal of the nation-­state (see Table 8.1). The observed shift towards more strategic spatial planning that can be observed, although to various extents, in all four countries under consideration here, also implies a stronger focus on the implementation of plans and policies (Albrechts, 2006; Healey, 2007) and the introduction of other types of planning instruments that are outside the more formal spatial planning system as discussed above. Therefore, it is not surprising that a number of other institutional arrangements have emerged in Finland, Norway and Sweden in recent years that are often initiated by the national ministries and agencies and contain investment-­ oriented agreement-­based policies, e.g. place-­based infrastructures, and that have a direct effect on the relations between the national and the local level. This also induces a rescaling of responsibilities between institutions and opens up spaces for experimentation and new modes of issue-­based governance practices that can

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   145 be rather easily installed to complement (or even bypass) the existing institutional structures but can also be taken away once they become obsolete. One example is the coordination and integration of transport and land use and housing planning projects, which has been developed into an important policy to promote sustainable development, particularly in Finland, Sweden and Norway. For implementing this policy different types of multilevel agreements and coordination schemes between national authorities, regional bodies and local municipalities have emerged that might be conceptualised as urban contractual policies that ‘encompass the new types of deals, agreements and contracts emerging in some planning domains’ (Raco, 2013; Smas, 2017: p.  8). These urban contractual policies can be seen as an expression of new ‘contractualism’ or contractual governance, which should not be conflated with legally based contracts in a traditional sense. Rather they have emerged through neoliberalism and the resulting changing relations between the state and citizens more broadly, to identify new avenues for institutionalising agreements between several actors (Jayasuriya, 2002; Vincent-­Jones, 2007). In Finland, for instance, the ‘Letters of Intent’ has been developed as a sort of contractual policy in recent years to create integrated, efficient and competitive urban city regions via cooperation between the state and municipalities. These new contractual arrangements also create new spatial scales, namely city regions. This has been further promoted by the state, taking an increased city-­regional perspective, particularly in order to integrate housing and transport projects during the last two decades (Kanninen and Akkila, 2015; Mäntysalo et al., 2014). During 2015, so-­called urban environment agreements were introduced in Sweden. A tram project in Lund was the first to receive state-­financed support through this new multilevel agreement scheme. One year earlier, in 2014, the Swedish government appointed through a governmental directive a specific negotiator to investigate the financing for a high-­speed rail service between Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö and to develop a strategy for its implementation. This directive has been transformed and institutionalised into the so-­ called National Negotiation on Housing and Infrastructure, which is expected to increase public transport, improve accessibility and increase housing construction. Its overall aim is to resolve larger urban challenges, specifically effective and faster completion of high-­speed railway lines, to increase the construction of housing and to improve accessibility within larger cities. Prior to the national negotiations, there have been specific ones for the Stockholm region. The government appointed negotiators to lead the negotiation between different actors and sectors. This is not necessarily unusual in Sweden; rather, it follows a certain tradition of pragmatic consensus-­seeking and is especially evident in larger urban regions such as Stockholm and Gothenburg. Often these negotiations have been on a regional scale, focusing on the integration of land use, transport and housing. In Norway, urban contractual policies of this type are also used, and finance-­ oriented agreements are evident too. In recent years, different organisational

146   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas s­ et-­ups of the contract have been investigated and debated; however, Norway has a long tradition of contractual processes concerning transport infrastructure packages particularly for the Oslo region. The urban contractual policy in Norway can be seen as a national policy response to manage specific challenges in larger urban regions. The arguments for introducing so-­called urban environment contracts and urban development agreements are to increase pressure to manage land use planning and transport at the city-­region scale, and to coordinate interests between the state, the regions and the municipalities.

Conclusion: Can We Recognise Post-­Political Tendencies in Nordic Spatial Planning? To start with we want to assert that spatial planning is still rather political but the conditions facing politics, governance and ‘the everyday decision-­making and management of public affairs of the state’ (Metzger et al. 2014: p. 9) across the Nordic countries have changed through shifts within and outside the formal spatial planning systems. Jessop (2010) has described these shifts in general as ‘neoliberal policy adjustments’ that have permeated various policy areas across the Nordic countries, such as spatial planning, albeit to a lesser extent and with a certain time-­lag compared to many other countries in the Global North. One overarching pragmatic shift is certainly the one towards a more market-­oriented planning regime where spatial planning is expected to facilitate economic growth and create attractive areas through fast and efficient processes. On the other hand, we can observe that this shift needs to be continuously reconciled with two other normative discursive pillars that characterise Nordic spatial planning, namely seeking increased input legitimacy by making planning more inclusive and transparent on the one hand, and the overall effort towards ‘sustainability’ on the other. It goes without saying that the conjunction of these main directions of planning creates goal conflicts. However, to agonise and eventually reconcile these conflicts by coordinating the inherent different rationalities within the contested issues at hand is unavoidable and one of the major challenges of spatial planning (cf. Pløger, 2018). Here we can certainly refer to the consensual style of politics across the Nordic countries, which apparently helps to resolve potential conflicts (cf. Goldsmith and Larsen, 2004). On the other hand, Özdemir and Tasan-­Kok (2017) have recently argued that consensus-­seeking planning might also include spaces for disagreement. We concur with this statement in general; however, the current shifts within Nordic spatial planning, with its primary focus on strategies and output efficiency through contractual instruments, allow rather limited opportunities for articulating disagreement. As argued in this chapter, the ‘strategic’ elements in spatial planning have become increasingly emphasised in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden during the last decade. This implies a more selective, flexible and output-­oriented approach to spatial planning, which inevitably also opens up avenues for depoliticisation, simply because spatial planning is being handled using a case-­by-case logic. As a consequence, this offers less room for routines and for developing

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   147 well-­understood procedures among the various stakeholders, which makes it even more difficult to gain an overview of or even insights into the factual processes, and thus impede opportunities for contestations. However, at the same time, there are (still) regulatory spatial planning instruments at the various policy levels in the four Nordic countries, except for the regional level in Denmark and Sweden, which have statutory procedures that guarantee especially at the local policy level, at least in theory, a certain degree of input legitimacy and transparency. On the other hand, the visionary elements within the Nordic statutory planning instruments are limited, which may have significant potential effects for politics because the intersection between ‘spatial visioning and spatial intervention’ is a key political moment (Metzger et al. 2014: p.  13). The increased strategic elements within spatial planning might therefore take precedence over the political, perhaps as much as corporatist and consensus-­seeking policy-­ making traditionally does within the so-­called Nordic welfare model. Even more important are the new and different forms of both bottom-­up and top-­down initiatives outside the statutory planning systems, which imply that opportunities for seeking input legitimacy are rather limited. The various state-­ driven urban contractual policies and agreement-­based instruments aim at coordinating different sectors, specifically land use, transport and housing, which are thus aligned with the comprehensive welfare planning tradition of the Nordic countries across different policy levels, namely state-­local, but bypassing the regional level. It is interesting to note that state-­initiated and investment-­oriented contractual arrangements are evident in Finland, Norway and Sweden, but not in Denmark, which has seen otherwise the most radical reform of the planning system, which has resulted in abolishing spatial planning that is governed at the regional level. In Norway, contractual arrangements are clearly integrated within the planning system and the planning instruments, whereas these relations are fuzzier in the Swedish and Finish contexts (Smas, 2017). These differences must also be understood in relation to the different political-­administrative systems, with ministerial traditions in Norway and Denmark and more technocratic ones in Sweden and Finland. In Norway and Denmark, politicians at the national level can directly engage in spatial planning procedures, whereas politicians at the national level in Finland and Sweden cannot and are instead dependent on national agencies and bureaucratic arrangements such as letters of intent or appointed negotiators. On the other hand, the regional bottom-­up initiatives are primarily evident in Sweden, which reveals that the absence of statutory planning instruments creates opportunities for parallel structures and bottom-­up initiatives. However, until now it has been unclear whether these non-­statutory parallel, top­down/bottom-­up instruments create more or fewer opportunities for repoliticisation in comparison with statutory planning instruments that follow rather clear procedures. Certainly, this is dependent on the instrument itself and the degree of openness and transparency of the planning process; however, we are rather sceptical about whether these new instruments can guarantee better conditions for input legitimacy and thus for opening up avenues for repoliticisation.

148   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas

References Aalbu, H., Böhme, K. and Uhlin, Å. (2008) Administrative Reform: Arguments and Values. Nordregio. Nordic Research Programme 2005–2008 Report 6. Airaksinen, J., Härkönen, H. and Haveri, A. (2014) Perceptions of legitimacy in Nordic regional development networks. Public Organization Review, 14(4), 457–476. Albrechts, L. (2006) Bridge the gap: From spatial planning to strategic projects. European Planning Studies, 14(10), 1487–1500. Baeten, G. (2018) Neoliberal planning. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. New York, Routledge, pp. 105–117. Balchin, P.N., Sykora, L. and Bull, G. H. (1999) Regional Policy and Planning in Europe. London and New York, Routledge. Bäcklund, P., Häikiö, L., Leino, H. and Kanninen, V. (2017) Bypassing publicity for getting things done: Between informal and formal planning practices in Finland. Planning Practice & Research, DOI: 10.1080/02697459.2017.1378978. Böhme, K. (2002) Nordic Echoes of European Spatial Planning: Discursive Integration in Practice. Nordregio Report 2002:8. Damsgaard, O. (2014) The Danish planning system 1990–2010. In: Reimer, M., Getimis, P. and Blotevogel, H. (eds) Spatial Planning Systems and Practices in Europe: A Comparative Perspective on Continuity and Changes. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 21–41. Falleth, E. and Nordahl, B. (2018) The planning system and practice in Norway. In: Kristjánsdóttir, S. (ed.) Nordic Experiences of Sustainable Planning. Policy and Practice. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 87–104. Falleth, E. and Saglie, I.-L. (2011) Democracy or efficiency: Contradictory national guidelines in urban planning in Norway, Urban Research & Practice, 4(1), 58–71. Fredricsson, C. and Smas, L. (2013) En Granskning av Norges Planeringssystem: Skandinavisk Detaljplanering I Ett Internationellt Perspektiv. Nordregio Report 2013:1. Galland, D. (2012) Understanding the reorientations and roles of spatial planning: The case of national planning policy in Denmark. European Planning Studies, 20(8), 1359–1392. Goldsmith, M. and Larsen, H. (2004) Local political leadership: Nordic style. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(1), 121–133. Hansen, C.J. (2018) The new DNA of Danish spatial planning culture. The case of regional planning. In: Kristjánsdóttir, S. (ed.) Nordic Experiences of Sustainable Planning. Policy and Practice. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 105–126. Hansen, C.J. (2009) Regional Development Planning. The Creation of Ownership: The case of North Jutland. Institut for Samfundsudvikling og Planlægning, Aalborg Universitet. DDP-­Publication Series No. 2009–8. Harvold, K. and Nordahl, B. (2012) Planning in rurbania: Rural policy and the planning system in Norway. Town Planning Review, 83(2), 213–232. Healey, P. (2007) Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a Relational Planning for Our Times. London and New York, Routledge. Hirvonen-­Kantola, S. and Mäntysalo, R. (2014) The recent development of Finnish planning system. In: Reimer, M., Getimis, P. and Blotevogel, H. (eds) Spatial Planning Systems and Practices in Europe: A Comparative Perspective on Continuity and Changes. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 42–66. Jayasuriya, K. (2002) The new contractualism: Neo-­liberal or democratic? The Political Quarterly, 73(3), 309–320.

Spatial Planning in the Nordic Countries   149 Jessop, B. (2010) From hegemony to crisis? The continuing ecological dominance of neoliberalism. In: Birch, K. and Mykhnenko, V. (eds) The Rise and Fall of Neo-­ Liberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order. London, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 171–187. Kanninen, V. and Akkila, I. (2015) Kaupunkiseutujen strateginen suunnittelu – mitä opittavaa Suomella? Tarkastelussa Ruotsi, Norja, Tanska, Hollanti ja Englanti. Ympäristöministeriön raportteja 24/2015. Available from https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/156626/YMra_24_2015.pdf?sequence=3 (accessed 16 October 2015). Karlbro, T., Lindgren, E. and Paulsson, J. (2012) Detaljplaner i praktiken. Är plan- och bygglagen i takt med tiden? KTH Royal Institute of Technology. TRITA-­FOB Rapport 2012:1. Kautto, M. (2010) The Nordic countries. In: F.G. Castles, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger and C. Pierson (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kautto, M. and Kvist, J. (2002) Parallel trends, persistent diversity: Nordic welfare states in the European and global context. Global Social Policy, 2(2), 189–208. Lundström, M., Fredriksson, C. and Witzell, J. (2013) Planning and Sustainable Urban Development in Sweden. Stockholm, Swedish Society for Town & Country Planning. Mattila, H. (2018) Balancing between efficiency and sustainability: Discourse on the Finnish land-­use planning system. In: Kristjánsdóttir, S. (ed.) Nordic Experiences of Sustainable Planning. Policy and Practice. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 156–174. Mäntysalo, R., Jarenko, K., Nilsson, K.L. and Saglie, I.L. (2015) Legitimacy of informal strategic urban planning: Observations from Finland, Sweden and Norway. European Planning Studies, 23(2), 349–366. Mäntysalo, R., Kangasoja, J.K. and Kanninen, V. (2014) Rakennemallit kaupunkiseutujen suunnittelussa – Strategisen maankäytön suunnittelun paradoksi, Ympäristöministeriön raportteja 18/2014. Available from: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/ handle/10138/135729/YMra_18_2014.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 16 October 2015). Mäntysalo, R., Saglie, I. and Cars, G. (2011) Between input legitimacy and output efficiency: Defensive routines and agonistic reflectivity in Nordic land-­use planning. European Planning Studies, 19(12), 2109–2126. Metzger, J. (2018) Postpolitics and planning. In: Gunder, M., Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 180–193. Metzger, J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (2014) The contested terrain of European territorial governance: New perspectives on democratic deficits and political displacements. In: Metzger, J., Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (eds) Planning Against the Political: Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance. New York, Routledge, pp. 1–28. Nadin, V. and Stead, D. (2008) European spatial planning systems, social models and learning. disP – The Planning Review, 44(172), 35–47. Nadin, V., Smas, L., Schmitt, P. and Cotella, G. (2017) COMPASS – Comparative Analysis of Territorial Governance and Spatial Planning Systems in Europe – Interim report. ESPON: Luxembourg. Neubauer, J., Dubois, A., Hanell, T., Lähteenmäki-Smith, K., Pettersson, K., Roto, J. and Moxnes Steineke, J. (2007) Regional Development in the Nordic Countries 2007. Nordregio Report 2007:1.

150   Peter Schmitt and Lukas Smas Olesen, K. and Carter, H. (2017) Planning as a barrier for growth: Analysing storylines on the reform of the Danish Planning Act, Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space. First Published 12 July 2017. Available from https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654417719285 (accessed: 11 January 2018). Özdemir, E. and Tasan-­Kok, T. (2017) Planners’ role in accommodating citizen disagreement: The case of Dutch urban planning. Urban Studies. Article first published online: 25 October 2017. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098017726738 (accessed: 11 January 2018). Pløger, J. (2018) Conflict and agonism. In: Gunder, M. Madanipour, A. and Watson, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Planning Theory. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 264–263. Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, J. and Smullen, A. (2005) Agencies. London, Palgrave Macmillan. Raco, M. (2013) The new contractualism, the privatization of the welfare state, and the barriers to open source planning. Planning Practice & Research, 28(1), 45–64. Røiseland, A., Hofstad, H., Lidström, A. and Sørensen, E. (2015) Taking stock of regional governance in Nordic countries. Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration, 19(4), 3–6. Silva, E. and Acheampong, R. (2015) Developing an inventory and typology of land-­use planning systems and policy instruments in OECD countries, OECD Environment Working Papers No. 94. Smas, L. (ed.) (2017) Urban Contractual Policies in Northern Europe. Nordregio Report 2017:3. Smas, L. and Schmitt, P. (2015) Brave new ‘megaregional worlds’? Reflections from a North European perspective. In: Harrison, J. and Hoyler, M. (eds) Megaregions: Globalization’s New Urban Form? Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp. 146–174. SOU (2015) En ny regional planering – ökad samordning och bättre bostadsförsörjning. No: 59, Stockholm, Swedish Government Official Reports. SOU (2013) En effektivare plan och bygglovsprocess. Betänkande av Plangenomförandeutredningen. No: 34, Stockholm, Swedish Government Official Reports. Tait, M. and Hansen, C. (2013) Trust and governance in regional planning. Town Planning Review, 84(3), 283–312. Temmes, M. (2008) Civil servants at the ‘summit’ – a comparison between the Nordic countries. In: Connaughton, B. Sootla, G. and Peters, G. (eds) Politico-­Administrative Relations at the Centre – Actors, Structures and Processes supporting the Core Executive, NISPAcee Press, pp. 225–243. Vincent-­Jones, P. (2007) The new public contracting: Public versus private ordering? Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 14(2), 259–278.

9 Politicising the Regional Scale? The Politics of Metropolitan Governance in Germany, Canada and Brazil Karsten Zimmermann

Introduction This chapter presents a comparison of the politics of metropolitan governance in the three federal states of Brazil, Germany and Canada. Metropolitan areas became focal points for inter-­governmental relations within federal states and as a result of local, sub-­national or national initiatives, the metropolitan scale emerged as a contested political space for public policy-­making. This includes spatial planning, economic development, coordination of public services, but affects also the fiscal system and public financing. At least in Europe, metropolitan regions are seen as strategic sites for economic development and experience a significant level of attention from national governments (Brenner, 2004; Salet and Thornley, 2007; Zimmermann and Getimis, 2017). However, as can be seen in states such as Italy and France, where recent national laws and programmes are implemented in order to support the creation and consolidation of metropolitan governments, the outcomes are mixed (Fedeli, 2017; Geppert, 2017). Whereas in other states the strong position of central government leaves only limited room for metropolitan politics – the intriguing case being the UK (Shaw and Tewdwr-­Jones, 2017). One reason is the resistance of municipalities in conjunction with low acceptance of new metropolitan governments by citizens. In this contribution, I argue that inter-­governmental relations within states are as relevant to the success of metropolitan governance as local politics. In particular, in federal states, where national governments compete with sub-­national governments with regard to urban and regional policies, the institutional design of multilevel governance relationships is crucial for the success of metropolitan governance as multilevel governance seeks to combine the political mobilisation of regional actors with mechanisms for binding collective decision-­making (Piattoni, 2009). In federal states, national governments usually play a limited role with regard to local and regional politics. Hence, strategies for metropolitan regions are less explicit and more diverse. At the same time, federal states are considered to be innovative laboratories as they usually allow for a high degree of sub-­national and local variation. However, as we will see in particular in the cases of Canada and

152   Karsten Zimmermann Brazil, the dual logic of decentralisation, such as empowering municipalities and regional integration, specifically creating metropolitan governance at the expense of local power, that is inherent in metropolitan governance, creates tensions between local governments and the state. Balancing the seemingly incompatible logics of decentralisation and regional integration seems to be a major problem for the creation of metropolitan governance. As a result, the creation of metropolitan governance arrangements is highly contested and even disbanded because of diverging interests of different levels of government and various interest groups. As I argue in the remainder of this chapter, these struggles are partly the result of the inability of upper-­level governments to recognise the socio-­spatial complexity of metropolitan regions. In fact, scholars describe city regions as a highly contested political space but see the rise of a post-­political consensus (Deas, 2014). Deas (2014) describes post-­politics as a depoliticised, technical or managerial pattern of policy-­making that is dominated by small groups of political elites and stakeholders whereas broader involvement of citizens is impeded. A cross-­national comparison of metropolitan governance reveals different trajectories of change and a considerable degree of policy experimentation that opens arenas for politicisation. Still, prospects for the emergence of city regions as fully politicised governmental levels are vague for two reasons: (a) the creation of city regions as quasi-­jurisdictions remains an internal issue of the state, but governments often lack clear and comprehensive ideas of how to institutionalise successful metropolitan governance; (b) the difficulty to organise diverse interest groups in a city-­regional context. The next section gives a brief introduction into the academic debate on metropolitan governance. The subsequent three sections describe the developments with regard to the creation of metropolitan regions in the three states of Canada, Brazil and Germany. These three states are federal states but represent different strategies with regard to decentralisation and metropolitan governance. The three sections are based on a literature review: Germany being an exception as the author has done empirical work in Germany in recent years. I will conclude the chapter with an outlook on the common and distinctive patterns of the three states.

Metropolitan Governance Although practice differs from country to country and region to region, we can say that metropolitan governance includes the management and coordination of public services, such as public transport, waste management and planning functions, specifically land use planning, infrastructure planning, environmental planning, transport planning in fragmented institutional environments (Kübler and Lefèvre, 2017). In recent years, economic development has been added to this portfolio of tasks, together with new forms of governance such as networks, public-­private-partnerships or voluntary associations, often giving the impression that some form of regional self-­government might emerge. In fact, metropolitan governance describes the capacity for collective action on the level of the city regions. The debate focuses on the need for coordination of municipalities

Politicising the Regional Scale?   153 due to the spatial expansion of cities and growing functional interdependencies between these cities. The result, however, usually is institutional fragmentation and policy failure in fields such as land use planning or management of public transport. Institutional fragmentation is caused by a high number of municipalities and counties, second tier of local governments, as well as other governmental agencies with overlapping competencies. Given the fact that many sectoral policies such as housing and transport are state responsibilities and, therefore, based on shared financing mechanisms, metropolitan governance is usually part of inter-­governmental relationships between different levels of government. Most authors agree that governance solutions found for metropolitan regions are volatile and often suboptimal (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005; Keil et al., 2017; Zimmermann and Getimis, 2017). The debate on metropolitan governance in political science is characterised by an institutional perspective and concentrates on the normative dimensions of equity, efficiency and democracy (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005). Many publications focus on case studies but give only limited attention to upper-­level governments. From a state perspective, the debate on metropolitan governance gets a slightly different tune as it is more instrumental and functionalist. Aspects of decentralisation, regionalisation as well as democratisation are categories that are in use in the debate about territorial and functional reforms of the state (Baldersheim and Rose, 2010). The territorial reorganisation of local governments and decentralisation are largely triggered by cost savings and efficiency arguments. Kübler and Lefèvre (2017), in addition, claim that metropolitan areas are of strategic relevance for central government and therefore under control because major tax revenues are produced in these areas and they are important centres of societal and economic power. Seen from the perspective of some European states, the fiscal crisis, austerity policies and the competitiveness discourse are currently the driving forces putting metropolitan regions on the political agenda again (Fedeli, 2017; Geppert, 2017). Hence, governance strategies for metropolitan regions are considered to be crucial for national economic development by governments. The various levels and agencies of the state can take the role of an enabler of metropolitan governance, but state spatial strategies are not very clear and contingent upon political controversies as states, federal states in particular, are composite actors. Sub-­national levels such as the German Länder, the states in Brazil or the Canadian provinces have different institutional ideas for metropolitan regions than local governments or central government have. As I will argue in this chapter, this inability of upper-­level governments to recognise the socio-­ spatial complexity of metropolitan regions as well as the selective and limited prospects for the politicisation of metropolitan governance explains why the success of metropolitan governance is often limited. The following three sections illustrate how the states of Canada, Brazil and Germany implement metropolitan regions and which territorial choices have been made and which kind of struggles emerged in recent years.

154   Karsten Zimmermann

Metropolitan Governance in Canada, Brazil and Germany Metropolitan Governance in Canada Hodge and Robinson (2002: p.  231) stated that Canada is a world leader in metropolitan planning and governance. In fact, city regions such as Toronto and Winnipeg had arrangements for regional planning and governance mechanisms for public services in place since the 1950s. However, the more recent developments in the Toronto and Montréal metropolitan areas illustrate that the creation of effective metropolitan governance is a troublesome endeavour due to diverging interests of the provinces and local governments and conflicts between suburban communities and the core city. In both regions, the emergence of wealthy suburban communities in growing regions and symptoms of an economic downturn in the city centre in the 1990s resulted in changes of the existing metropolitan governance arrangements. In both cases, the provincial governments (Quebec and Ontario) were very influential. In Canada, the provinces are fully responsible for legislation on local governments (Young, 2012). The creation of metropolitan governments, functional and territorial reforms, such as amalgamation of municipalities, are provincial tasks. Municipalities are considered to be agents of the provinces with limited autonomy (Young, 2012). The influence of national government is limited although from time to time national governments in ‘Canada invented national urban policies, such as the New Deal for cities in 2003’ (Boudreau et al., 2006: 39). Diversity in policies and politics with regard to local government and metropolitan governance is high between the provinces (Keil et al., 2017). However, as we will see, some common trends in Toronto and Montréal are observable. The two provincial governments preferred amalgamation as an imposed solution for the problems of urban growth and economic competitiveness, and in both cases, provinces met the strong opposition from suburban communities. Toronto – The Global City Region Greater Toronto used to have a well-­designed metropolitan government since 1953. The two-­tier metropolitan association (called Metro Toronto, officially Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto) of 13 municipalities was responsible for a variety of services and regional planning. Metro Toronto worked well in preserving the function of downtown Toronto as ‘an attractive place to live in’ (Hodge and Robinson, 2002: p. 247). The character of a mixed-­use high-­density area with good transport infrastructure was kept, but Metro Toronto did not succeed in controlling suburban growth outside the boundaries and the so-­called Greater Toronto Area (GTA) a situation described as ‘a Vienna, Austria, surrounded by a Phoenix, Arizona, (…) a dense, urbanised core with a sprawling aurora of suburbs’ (Boudreau et al., 2006: p.  32). One reason for this was a change in the governance of regional planning in the 1970s. Initially, another 13 municipalities of the area beyond the boundary of Metro Toronto were under the

Politicising the Regional Scale?   155 planning jurisdiction of the Metro Toronto Planning Board because provincial government expected Metro Toronto to grow and to expand into this area. This extended regional planning competence of Metro Toronto came to an end in the first half of the 1970s when regional planning was restricted to the Metro Toronto area (Hodge and Robinson, 2002: p. 265). The result was uncontrolled growth in suburban areas in the following years. The next step in the evolution of metropolitan governance in the Toronto region was the dissolution of the two-­tier arrangement in 1997–1998. Metro Toronto was abolished and replaced by the newly amalgamated city of Toronto, i.e. a merger of the municipalities formerly being the constituent jurisdictions of the association of Metro Toronto (Boudreau et al., 2006: p. 36). The reform was a reaction to the economic crisis of the early 1990s. The provincial government wanted Toronto to grow again and expectations were high that a strong city in terms of size and political power would be more competitive. In fact, Toronto is considered to be the Canadian Global City (Keil and Addie, 2017). When the amalgamation was discussed, efficiency measures to be implemented in the public sector were also influential (Boudreau et al., 2006: p.  36). One of the strategies to reduce public expenditure was false decentralisation: The creation of the new city of Toronto was accompanied by a transfer of funding responsibilities for several public functions to local governments without appropriate financing (OECD, 2009: p.  153). As a consequence, local governments faced budget problems. Administrative decentralisation with appropriate financing was requested by mayors but without success. However, Toronto was an exception as the City of Toronto Act of 2006, which included the competence to levy some minor fees (Boudreau et al., 2006: p. 41). This result of the reform from 1998 is interesting as the conservative provincial government of Ontario followed a neoliberal and lean state ideology but created a strong government instead of a flexible governance solution as has been discussed under the umbrella term New Regionalism in the late 1990s (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005). Like in Montréal (see below) the set of institutional ideas framing the reform was limited from the beginning. It is hard to find alternative reflections on the role of boroughs, voluntary associations and agencies (Boudreau et al., 2006). Obviously, the goal was to support a growing global city with at that time 2.3 million inhabitants as a strong core, whereas the wider metropolitan region was left nearly blank in terms of metropolitan governance. This agenda found the support from the business community that was strong and well coordinated. They were concerned about the competitiveness and quality of life in the city and thematised poverty, quality of schools, infrastructure, as well as the urban design, such as waterfront development, in public debates. It needs to be mentioned that the Toronto reform is one of the few cases where a metropolitan reform mobilised considerable resistance of inner-­city social movements advocating for social justice and local democracy on the regional scale (Boudreau et al., 2006: pp.  36–37). While Citizens for Local Democracy (C4LD) mobilised against amalgamation based on an agenda of disregarded local democracy (Boudreau, 2003), the Metro Network for Social

156   Karsten Zimmermann Justice had a broader anti-­neoliberal agenda and represented, among others, interests of unemployed and homeless people. However, due to the unsuccessful coalition building, the impact of these social movements on the politics of metropolitan governance remained weak (Boudreau et al., 2006: p. 36). An arrangement for the GTA was not immediately found in 1998. The GTA encompasses a large territory with more than five million inhabitants but displays weak and fragmented governance relationships for transport policy and economic development (Boudreau et al., 2006). Functional bodies such as the Greater Toronto Service Board remained an episode with limited impact. The Service Board was created in 1998 to provide services for the GTA but repealed in 2001 (Boudreau et al., 2006: p. 36). However, recent developments show that provincial government has taken initiative to establish the GTA as another scale of governance in the fields of transport and anti-­sprawl policies (Keil and Addie, 2017; OECD, 2009). In 2006, Metrolinx, a regional transportation agency of the provincial government responsible for the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area, was established. The goal was to extend the public transport network and increase the quality of services to raise the attractiveness of public transport. Metrolinx operates on the basis of a transportation plan and investment in infrastructure made by the province support the implementation of this plan. In addition, the Greenbelt Act from 2005 and the Places-­to-Grow Act from 2006 established new regulation and goals for the coordination of land use and settlement development in the region. Still, the GTA is until today no self-­governing unit but the subject to provincial regional plans as described. Montréal The city region of Montréal experienced a series of institutional changes between 2000 and 2006 with two major reforms between 2000–2002 and 2004–2006, the latter one being a reaction to the first one (Boudreau et al., 2006; Hamel, 2017; Tomàs, 2012). The process began in the mid-­1990s when an economic and budgetary crisis triggered a debate about the future institutional form of Metropolitan Montréal. Like the province of Ontario, ‘the provincial government of Quebec favoured mergers of municipalities to reduce costs and governmental fragmentation’ (Boudreau et al., 2006: p.  24). The dominant idea was ‘the creation of strong institutions through amalgamations or two-­tier metropolitan associations’ instead of more flexible and voluntary forms of cooperation (Tomàs, 2012: p. 563). Still, the reform agenda was mixed as the provincial government brought forward also ideas of fiscal equity and tax harmonisation because of disparities, and anti-­ sprawl policies but also economic competitiveness (Tomàs, 2012). In the end, provincial government enforced the amalgamation to achieve higher effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector whereas measures to enhance competitiveness were less central because the business interests were less influential. Provincial and local actors followed different agendas with regard to metropolitan reform, though arguing on first sight with the same arguments. At stake were issues of equity, identity and local democracy, but also a core city in crisis. The reform brought

Politicising the Regional Scale?   157 forward by the province met the strong resistance of suburban mayors who feared a loss of political and budgetary autonomy. Hence, conflicts arose between suburban mayors and the mayor of the core city and between the provincial government and the suburban mayors. Strong suburbanisation with middle-­class households leaving the city, such as Island of Montréal, and moving to the periphery resulted in an impoverished inner city. Suburban municipalities formed a sectionist movement arguing that amalgamations violate the principle of local self-­government and pleading for a lean public sector (Tomàs, 2012: p. 560). The mayor of Montréal welcomed the reform due to the prospected mechanisms of burden sharing (Hamel, 2017). The result of the first reform was the creation of three urban poles (Montréal, Longueuil, Laval) through mergers of municipalities and the formation of the Montréal Metropolitan Community (MMC) as an inter-­municipal association and service provider for the wider metropolitan area. What followed the reform was an ongoing controversy between the mayors of suburban municipalities organised in different fractions, claiming for the autonomy of democratic local-­ self-government and the provincial government that insisted on amalgamation. As a result, a sort of counter-­reform was accomplished with the creation of 27 boroughs in Montréal and Longueuil in 2006 (Hamel, 2017; Tomàs, 2012: p.  558) and the deamalgamation of another 14 municipalities on the Island of Montréal, which were former boroughs that regained autonomy. The creation of the boroughs was a compromise between the provincial government and the former municipalities. It is an administrative and political decentralisation that was supposed to bring decision-­making closer to the people and strengthen the sense of community in particular for the English-­speaking communities (Tomàs, 2012: p.  561). The boroughs have become responsible for the management of some local services and the result in 2006 being a three-­tier model: 27 boroughs (including Longueuil), the city of Montréal (as a result of amalgamation of the municipalities of the Island with 1.8 million inhabitants) and the MMC responsible for the wider metropolitan area with 3.4 million inhabitants. That reform shows that the MMC is a service provider, but not a real metropolitan government. It replaced the Communauté Urbaine de Montréal (CUM) that has been created in 1969 and abolished in 2000. The CUM was a planning and coordination unit for public services with limited effectiveness. One reason was the dominance of the city of Montréal in the council of CUM until 1982 that provoked resistance of suburban municipalities. In addition, the whole arrangement came into trouble in the 1990s due to budgetary and economic problems. The provincial government became active because government experts thought that the region was in need of one government to provide for more equity and balanced development, efficiency and less sprawl. It is possible to say that this was a governmental agenda of simplification and stronger institutional coherence. The reform also invented a metropolitan fund for social and affordable housing imposed from above by the province. Against all existing plans at the beginning of the 2000s, the result since 2007 has been institutional fragmentation (Boudreau et al., 2006: p. 31; Hamel, 2017).

158   Karsten Zimmermann The case of Montréal demonstrates how many lines of conflict have an impact on the creation of metropolitan governance in a reform that was imposed from above and provoked substantial resistance. The conflict of the central city of Montréal with suburban communities overlaps with a cultural dimension of anglophone and francophone as well as mixed communities (Boudreau, 2003; Hamel, 2017; Tomàs, 2012). The institutional idea of the provincial government, namely amalgamation or big government, was in conflict with the frame of local democracy and cultural diversity. Julie-­Anne Boudreau (2003: p. 801) describes the effect of amalgamation on local identities eloquently: The central element of all legal challenges was to prove that Anglophones constituted a distinct community within Quebec and that taking away their local institutions constituted a cultural and political prejudice and a violation of the rights of minorities and the right to self-­determination of Anglophones as people. Metropolitan Governance in Brazil The evolution of metropolitan governance in Brazil is usually separated into three periods: the period of the military regime where metropolitan regions became the focus of state-­led development ambitions, the period of localism that started with the new constitution in 1988 and the more recent period of negotiated integration where metropolitan regions regained interest in a devolved federal setting (2010). The authoritarian military government established a limited number of metropolitan areas in 1973 as part of a nationally imposed development policy with very limited local participation and inspired by the idea of integrated planning (Araújo et al., 2016). With this heavy legacy of authoritarian and state-­led development policy, the period following the post-­regime federal constitution was characterised by strong localism. Although the 26 states as parts of the federation have the legal option to create and institutionalise regions as territorial forms of governance below the state, metropolitan governance was rarely considered as a solution for the problems of the fast-­growing city regions in Brazil. The enabling legal framework for the creation of metropolitan governance was left blank by state governments for several reasons. One of the problems was the fact that the possibility to define metropolitan regions was not consistent with the new status of municipalities as constituent parts of the federal state in the new constitution. This gave municipalities a strong legal status and made it difficult to establish inter-­municipal layers of planning and policy-­making (De Queiroz Ribeiro and Braule Pinto, 2009). The whole context in the post-­regime decade was influenced by decentralisation and redemocratisation of the state and the local level in particular (Rolnik, 2011). Decentralization and democratization implied increasing (tax) resources and responsibilities for local governments, and the emergence of newly elected

Politicising the Regional Scale?   159 mayors and social movements that all demanded real spaces of representation and an institutionalised progressive urban-­social reform. (Klink, 2014: p. 637) Municipalities took over more competencies for public policies and services and at least, in the beginning, received adequate financing taking the form of transfers from the states (Araújo et al., 2016). In general, municipalities were not inclined to share the newly gained powers and financial resources with metropolitan authorities (Klink, 2013: p. 1172). However, in most cases financing was not enough to meet the needs of local governments as cities were growing rapidly. A second problem was the lack of stable forms of inter-­governmental cooperation supporting inter-­municipal cooperation. Different from Canada, responsibilities for local and regional policies are not neatly separated between the levels of government. The new competence of the states to create metropolitan areas was accompanied by discontinuous support from the states and the federal government for relevant urban policies such as housing, urban development and transport (Klink, 2013). The City Statute of 2001 that introduced participatory master planning on the local level is a case in point as the statute did only make minor prescriptions for metropolitan areas (Araújo et al., 2016). Hence, the incentives provided for mayors to cooperate and create inter-­ municipal associations were not very strong. Until 2004 federal government did not give much emphasis or support for metropolitan governance in terms of political support or financing. This situation changed during the period of 2004–2010 when the so-­called statute of the Metropolis was discussed in the national Congress as an initiative of the federal government (Klink, 2014: p. 639). Following the shortcomings of the City Statute from 2001, the idea was a federal framework law that should give some guidance and incentives for metropolitan governance. As the first step in 2005, a federal framework law defined legal conditions for the creation of voluntary associations of municipalities, in the form of public consortia (Klink, 2013). For the first time, municipalities had an instrument at hand in a field that was left as a vacuum in 1988. The Metropolis Statute came into force only in 2015 after long debates in Congress on the status of municipalities and the division of competences between the states and federal government for policies such as water and sanitation (Araújo et al., 2016; Klink, 2014: p.  643). Since then, inter-­municipal cooperation usually takes the form of inter-­municipal consortia that are responsible for waste management, sewage or public transport (De Queiroz Ribeiro and Braule Pinto, 2009). Difficulties resulted also from the unsolved question of delimitation of metropolitan areas. In fact, all metropolitan areas grew in terms of the number of municipalities, but still, there are no clear criteria for the definition of a metropolitan area as a functional urban region. We can conclude that the institutional framework allows the states to act in a comprehensive manner, but due to the sporadic provision of funding mechanisms and metropolitan policy programmes

160   Karsten Zimmermann and the prevailing agenda of localist growth of many mayors, the creation and success of metropolitan areas are contingent upon effective support from states and the federal government. Klink convincingly called this ‘stop and go support’ (Klink, 2013: p. 1172). One case that has been discussed extensively in the literature is the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte. In 2000, a new metropolitan governance solution was established and in the period from 2006 onwards the Metropolitan Area of Belo Horizonte was considered to be an innovation because of the participatory mechanism in the council of the region and the institutional arrangement that the state government of Minas Gerais introduced in the state constitution already in 1989 (Faria and Machado, 2011: pp.  126–127). In fact, the state tried to solve the dilemma of the dual logic of decentralisation and regional integration. The Belo Horizonte MA has the competence for a regional participatory master plan (that was compulsory so far only at the local level) and for the coordination of several services. However, the arrangement came into trouble quite soon for two reasons: (a) the institutional arrangement and the incentives given by the state government were not strong enough to overcome rivalries of municipalities, particularly between the strong core city and smaller towns; (b) the state of Minas Gerais intervened in the daily operations, trying to keep control of metropolitan politics. Not only with regard to the case of Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Area it is questionable whether the state governments or the federal government ever really wanted to support the managerial and institutional capacities of the metropolitan regions (Faria and Machado, 2011: pp.  129–130). It is likely that state governments keep metropolitan regions pending which points to the incapacity to organise effective inter-­governmental coordination or multilevel governance in the sense of Piattoni (2009). The metropolitan region of Curitiba in the state of Paraná confirms this (Klink and Denaldi, 2012). The state government had ‘considerable influence through an agency with strong operational links with the state administration’ (Frey and Barcellos, 2012: p. 11). In fact, the agency was part of the state administration whereas mayors as representatives of the citizens were only part of the arrangement through an association of municipalities of the metropolitan region. The so-­called ABC region, a sub-­region in the south of Greater Sao Paulo, may be an exception. An inter-­municipal consortium has been created in the 1990s as a reaction to the economic crisis of this industrial region (Klink, 2014; Rodriguez-­Pose et al., 2001). The municipalities created an inter-­municipal consortium and a regional development agency. This makes the ABC region an interesting case as it demonstrates the capacity to establish a form of voluntary self-­governance in an industrial region that was hit by an economic crisis in the 1990s. We can conclude that some institutional arrangements are in place, but success and stability are far from being self-­evident. Klink (2013) confirms that the politics of metropolitan governance in Brazil is based on opportunistic behaviour and therefore selective. On the one hand, the number and size of

Politicising the Regional Scale?   161 metropolitan areas in Brazil have grown over the years. In 2014, there were 39 metropolitan areas (Klink, 2014: p.  643) and in 2015 according to a national report, there were 71 (Observatório das Metrópoles, 2015). On the other hand, metropolitan governance is a very fragile phenomenon. Only in a few cases, metropolitan areas constitute forms of regional self-­governance. In other cases, the metropolitan areas are a territorial framework for sectoral policies of the states or federal policies. A clear state-­driven strategy being absent, metropolitan regions are considered to be arenas where opportunistic alliances of public and private actors are struggling for contested projects and state funds (Klink, 2014). It is not the result of an inter-­governmental institutional design based on rational reflection of criteria of size and efficiency. Metropolitan Governance in Germany Compared to the recent reforms in Canada, Brazil and other European states such as Italy and France, where new layers of metropolitan policy-­making and planning have been introduced due to national legislation, the politics of metropolitan governance in Germany is less prone to substantial changes. In the context of German federalism, we observe a pattern of incremental change and adaptation of existing legal frameworks. Like most federal states and similar to Canada and Brazil, in Germany, the Länder or states as the sub-­national level of government have the major competencies and exclusive legislative powers with regard to local government and metropolitan governance. Despite some national framework laws in fields such as planning and inter-­governmental fiscal relationships, the states benefit from a high degree of freedom with regard to local government. The institutions of local self-­government are the municipalities and the counties as the second tier of local self-­government. The basic law guarantees the autonomy of local self-­government. However, during the expansion of the German welfare state in the post-­war period many national financial aid programmes for urban development assistance and housing, besides several framework laws have been introduced. As a consequence, the interdependencies between the different levels of government increased in fields such as housing, urban regeneration and transport policies. Regions do exist in Germany, from a strict formal perspective, only as planning regions and as districts (Regierungsbezirke), the latter being agencies of the state governments. In some states such as Hesse or Northrhine-­Westfalia, these agencies are, besides many other tasks, responsible for statutory regional planning in the districts. Other states created mono-­functional inter-­municipal associations responsible for statutory regional planning. While in some metropolitan regions the statutory planning region overlaps more or less with the functional urban region, no particular institutional format for metropolitan governance exists, nor is it compulsory for municipalities to cooperate or create metropolitan institutions (Fürst, 2005; Heinelt et al., 2011). However, in most of the metropolitan areas, municipalities established voluntary inter-­municipal associations for various tasks such as waste management, public transport, marketing, tourism

162   Karsten Zimmermann or planning. Metropolitan governance is considered to be an issue of local governments cooperating on a voluntary basis. State governments encourage inter-­ municipal cooperation for reasons of efficiency by giving incentives, whereas imposed reforms are uncommon as they found the strong resistance from local politicians and citizens in the past. Institutional forms, portfolios of tasks and size differ a lot. We can find jurisdictions, such as in Region Hannover and City-­ Region Aachen, as a result of amalgamations but the most common solutions are regional planning associations or multi-­purpose associations where municipalities are the constituent members and very influential. In the following paragraphs, the regions of Stuttgart, Hanover and the Ruhr are described in more detail. The three cases stand for different institutional solutions: Stuttgart is considered to be an innovative governance model, whereas Hanover represents a truly regional city as a result of amalgamation. In the Ruhr, we find an inter-­municipal planning association with extended competencies that competes with other agencies for leadership in this polycentric region. What these cases have in common is a directly elected regional assembly: in the Ruhr starting with the next municipal elections in 2020. Stuttgart stands for the changes that the 1990s brought up in the academic debate as well as in the practice of metropolitan governance in Germany. The need for the inclusion of private actors from the business sector came up and new formats for the cooperation of public and private actors were implemented in quite a few regions. Although this period epitomised the idea of ‘New Regionalism’ in the German context, only in a few exceptional cases major reforms took place. The creation of new governance arrangements in Stuttgart in 1994 and Rhine-­Neckar in 2005 are cases in point. In the two regions, regional development agencies in the form of public-­private-partnerships have been created as a new form of governance and in both regions the business sector (in part presented by the local chambers of commerce) influenced the result of the reform – or made it even possible. In addition, in both regions civic associations or networks were created as a sort of platform for strategic discourses about regional development. The combination of a statutory planning association with a directly elected assembly and a regional development agency based on the principle of public-­private-partnership is still considered to be a prototype of inclusive metropolitan governance (Zimmermann, 2014). Still, we can say that accessibility of these networks for new actors or the civil society is limited: In fact, the creation of regions has been described as projects of a technocratic elite, striving for more efficiency in the public sector or more competitiveness (Fürst, 2005). However, once created, public transport and land use policy turned out to be the dominant issues in the daily work of the planning association. The reform of metropolitan governance in the region of Hanover in the year 2000 resulted in the amalgamation of the former regional planning association and the former county of Hanover. In addition, a relevant number of tasks and responsibilities have been shifted from the city of Hanover to the new regional jurisdiction. The portfolio of tasks is broad and includes regional planning, environmental planning, transport planning and management, public hospitals,

Politicising the Regional Scale?   163 waste management, tourism and regional economic development. Besides the regional assembly, the president of the region is directly elected by the citizens. The weak spot of this government-­like organisation is the low accessibility of the regional administration for the private sector and the lack of unconventional means of participation (i.e. networks or platforms). As it is written elsewhere, ‘In this way, openness and accessibility of the metropolitan-­governance arrangement in Hanover give a way typical for representative democracy focused on binding decision-­making by representative bodies and an implementation of this decision mainly by public administration’ (Heinelt et al., 2011: p. 310). The planning association Ruhr was established in 1920 as a pioneering institution in the period of high industrialisation when the Ruhr area was rapidly urbanising. Settlement development, protection of green spaces and infrastructure planning were the issues at stake in this period and an inter-­municipal planning association was expected to be the appropriate institutional answer. However, in the 1970s competences were restricted and the association became a mere service provider for the municipalities. The competence for statutory regional planning was given back to the association only in 2009. The reason for this step was the fact that, although the Ruhr is a functional urban area, statutory regional planning was territorially divided between three government districts. In 2016, the new law about the regional association Metropole Ruhr introduced the direct election of the council of the association with the next local elections in 2020 and assigned also more functions. Although these steps clearly indicate a path towards regional integration, the constituent municipalities are still very influential. The introduction of the direct election of the regional assemblies changed the situation in these three metropolitan regions. As the direct election in the Ruhr area will come into effect only in 2020, only the impacts in Stuttgart and Hanover can be evaluated (see Heinelt et al., 2011: p. 309). The directly elected regional assemblies in Hanover and Stuttgart are an important political backup of the planning administration as they allow for more autonomy based on direct legitimacy and majority votes when confronting municipalities and inter-­ municipal conflicts. The eventual weakness of regional assemblies is the composition of the members of the assembly. As local councillors and even mayors are members of the assemblies we may ask whether they truly represent a metropolitan community or, in contrast, follow a defensive localism (Kübler, 2012). However, empirical studies have shown that in Stuttgart and Hanover a consensual pattern of decision-­making emerged in the regional assemblies that balances localism (Heinelt et al., 2011). Still, the directly elected regional assemblies suffer from the weaknesses of representational democracies. These are the limited accessibility for citizens due to the dominance of highly professionalised political parties and the limited role of the citizen as a voter for every five years. The potential for a politicisation of the region beyond the regional elites remains therefore low. To conclude, we see in the German case a preference for flexible and context-­ sensitive institutional solutions but no nationwide strategy (Fürst, 2005;

164   Karsten Zimmermann ­ immermann and Heinelt, 2016). The main reason for this is federalism and Z autonomy of local government that is protected by the constitution. A recent joint initiative of the 16 states and the federal government is an exception (Blotevogel and Schmitt, 2006). The so-­called Initiative European Metropolitan Regions in Germany (EMR) came into life in the early 2000s and is a network of the 11 largest German metropolitan regions. The initiative was launched under the supervision of the Standing Conference of Federal and State Ministers responsible for spatial planning and found recognition in national spatial planning guidance and several state plans (BMVI 2016). However, without granting any substantial legal responsibilities or subsidies to metropolitan organisations it did not change the institutional framework. Inter-­municipal cooperation under this scheme is voluntary and only limited incentives are given. Most of the EMR regions are very big in size and stretch far beyond the planning associations in city regions such as Stuttgart, the Ruhr or Hanover. The introduction of the EMR fostered not only a focus on economic development but at least in some regions a limited upscaling as a new arena for multilateral cooperation between municipalities, counties, private actors, universities and state agencies has been opened. Still, the process is characterised by an ambivalent relationship of cooperation and competition between suburban municipalities and core cities. In terms of functions, the new and larger regions did not come at the expense of smaller scales. The new multi-­scaled arrangements in German metropolitan regions are not the product of careful institutional design. They are contingent upon actor constellations and incentives provided by other governmental layers. This implies that the arrangements are unstable and may disappear which confirms the German approach of voluntary cooperation. Seen from this perspective, this rescaling opens up arenas for politicisation but, as functions and competencies are unclear, the interest is limited. As metropolitan governance on smaller scales is institutionalised stronger (see cases of Stuttgart, Hanover and the Ruhr) and the portfolio of relevant tasks such as regional planning or transport planning is broader, the likelihood of conflicts and politicisation is higher on the lower scale. However, a majority vote in the regional assemblies of Stuttgart and Hanover, and in the future also in the Ruhr, is a procedure for ultimate conflict resolution. The German approach allows for local initiatives, usually local governments, to solve problems of metropolitan development or not. The effectiveness of metropolitan governance understood here as enhanced and stable coordination of municipalities as well as private actors depends on the institutional solution found in each region and the policies addressed. Considerable differences exist even in the same region between metropolitan governance of public transport, regional planning and economic development. The influence of the state governments is crucial in this regard. Incremental changes in most of the metropolitan regions in Germany resulted in a diversity of metropolitan governance arrangements that are based on a strong idea of local self-­government. Regional actors, public and private, are expected to form governance arrangements on the basis of voluntary self-­coordination. While the variety of forms of governance is an

Politicising the Regional Scale?   165 advantage, the disadvantage of the absence of nationally coordinated metropolitan policies may be seen in the fact that in the majority of German metropolitan regions institutional misfit, lack of cooperation or fragmentation is observable (Heinelt et al., 2011). Not in all metropolitan regions actors find a consensus and only in a few regions such as Hanover and Stuttgart comprehensive solutions have been found (Zimmermann, 2017).

Conclusive Remarks: The Politics of Metropolitan Governance, Multilevel Governance or Lost in Federalism? The duality of decentralisation and regional integration is a pending issue in Canada, Brazil and Germany. In all three states, the creation of metropolitan regions is in the regulatory interest of different levels of government, but in fact no vital strengthening of metropolitan regions as a real political scale is wanted as this would weaken sub-­national governments. Hence, I refrain from calling metropolitan governance arrangements as ‘new state spaces of metropolitan regions’ as new layers of policy-­making are volatile and under control of sub-­ national governments. In particular, in Brazil and Canada, the shifts of responsibilities from provincial or state governments to the metropolitan regions are limited. The situation is a little bit different in Germany as we can find cases with directly elected regional assemblies but also here the strengthening of the metropolitan scale largely happens through inter-­municipal cooperation. The politics of metropolitan governance in all three states demonstrates that there is a gap between the instrumental view of the state and the social complexity of the metropolitan regions with Montréal probably being the most illustrative case. The narrow institutional agenda of the reform is surprising, what Sancton (2000) and Tomás (2012) called merger mania. This shows that the provincial government had an instrumental view and functionalist institutional ideas, concentrated on efficiency criteria whereas local actors struggled with issues of local identity, culture and autonomy. Upper-­tier governments seem to be trapped in institutional ideas that neglect complexities and social relations in metropolitan areas (Tomás, 2012). This is against the expectation as, at least in theory, federal states allow for more variation in a pluralist and decentralised political settings. At least in the case of Germany, we can observe the potential of this variational pattern. However, federal states are only in advantage if appropriate mechanisms for coordinating federal and sub-­national initiatives exist. In the German case, this is provided by the Standing Conference of Federal and State Ministers responsible for spatial planning and a national working group of planners from planning associations in metropolitan areas. Still, in Germany, this mechanism for the coupling of governmental levels is weak as quite often the lowest common denominator prevails (Zimmermann and Heinelt, 2016). Nevertheless, a minimum of coherence and exchange of practical knowledge is secured. The mature federal states of Germany and Canada show more success with regard to inter-­municipal cooperation and the establishment of planning regions,

166   Karsten Zimmermann even if they are controlled by the provincial governments in the case of Canada. Whereas there is a lack of leverage in Brazil. Trials to establish metropolitan regions as quasi-­jurisdictions usually caused conflicts between state governments and municipalities, between core cities and suburban towns and between social groups, as Montréal and Toronto cases exemplify. However, as the exemplary cases described in this chapter show, the emergence of metropolitan regions as accepted arenas for metropolitan politics or regional self-­government is hampered by the lack of means of political articulation of metropolitan communities, if existent.

References Araújo, S., Araújo, A. and Denilson, B. (2016) Does metropolitan area management matter in Brazil? disP – The Planning Review, 52(2), 17–25. Baldersheim, H. and Rose, L. (2010) Territorial Choice. The Ppolitics of Boundaries and Borders. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. Blotevogel, H. and P. Schmitt (2006) ‘European Metropolitan Regions’ as a new discursive frame in strategic spatial planning and policies in Germany. Die Erde, 137(1–2), 55–74. Boudreau, J.A. (2003) Questioning the use of ‘local democracy’ as discursive strategy for political mobilization in Los Angeles, Montreal and Toronto. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(4), 793–810. Boudreau, J.A., Hamel, P., Jouve, B. and Keil, R. (2006) Comparing metropolitan governance: The cases of Montreal and Toronto. Progress in Planning, 66(1), 7–59. Brenner, N. (2004) Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in western Europe, 1960–2000. Review of International Political Economy, 11(3), 447–488. Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur/BMVI (2016) Berlin, Leitbilder und Handlungsstrategien für die Raumentwicklung in Deutschland. Deas, I. (2014) The search for territorial fixes in subnational governance: City-­regions and the disputed emergence of post-­political consensus in Manchester, England. Urban Studies, 51(11), 2285–2314. De Queiroz Ribeiro, L.C. and Braule Pinto, S.G. (2009) Brazil. In: Steytler, N. (ed.) Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-­Queen’s University Press, pp. 75–105. Faria, C. and Machado, G. (2011) Policies of space and the space of politics: The ‘negotiated expansion’ of the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Area. Brazilian Political Science Review, 5(2), 117–145. Fedeli, V. (2017) Metropolitan governance and metropolitan cities in Italy: outdated solutions for processes of urban regionalisation? Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 75(3), 265–274. Frey, K. and Barcellos, Z. (2012) The struggle for institutional arrangements in Latin Amer­ican Metropolitan Areas. The cases of Brazil and Colombia, paper presented at the IPSA Worldcongress 2012. Available from: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/ view/13476 (accessed 2 September 2017). Fürst, D. (2005) Metropolitan governance in Germany. In: H. Heinelt and D. Kübler (eds) Metropolitan Governance, Capacity, Democracy and the Dynamics of Place. London, Routledge, pp. 151–168. Geppert, A. (2017) Vae Victis! Spatial Planning in the Rescaled Metropolitan Governance in France. Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 75(3), 275–289.

Politicising the Regional Scale?   167 Hamel, P. (2017) Shortcomings and promises of governing city-­regions in the Canadian federalist context: The example of Montreal. In: R. Keil; P. Hamel; J.-A. Boudreau and S. Kipfer (eds) Governing Cities through Regions. Canadian and European Perspectives. Waterloo, WLU Press, pp. 173–196. Heinelt, H. and Kübler, D. (eds) (2005) Metropolitan Governance. Capacity, Democracy and the Dynamics of Place. Oxford, Routledge. Heinelt, H. Razin, E. and Zimmermann, K. (2011) Metropolitan Governance. Different Paths in Contrasting Contexts: Germany and Israel. Campus: Frankfurt am Main/ Chicago University Press. Hodge, G. and Robinson, I. M. (2002) Planning Canadian Regions. Vancouver, UBC Press. Keil, R. and Addie, J.-P.D. (2017) Internalized globalization and regional governance in the Toronto Region. In: Keil, R., Hamel, P., Boudreau, J.A. and Kipfer, S. (eds) Governing Cities through Regions. Canadian and European Perspectives. Waterloo, WLU Press. pp. 101–120. Keil, R., P. Hamel, J.-A. Boudreau, and S. Kipfer (eds) (2017) Governing Cities through Regions. Canadian and European Perspectives. Waterloo, WLU Press. Klink, J. (2014) The hollowing out of Brazilian Metropolitan Governance as we know it: restructuring and rescaling the developmental state in metropolitan space. Antipode, 46(3), 629–649. Klink, J. (2013) Development regimes, scales and state spatial restructuring: Change and continuity in the production of urban space in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro. Brazil, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(4), 1168–1187. Klink, J. and Denaldi, R. (2012) Metropolitan fragmentation and neolocalism in the periphery: Revisiting the Case of Curitiba. Urban Studies, 49(3), 543–561. Kübler, D. (2012) Governing the metropolis: Towards kinder, gentler democracies. European Political Science, 11(3), 430–445. Kübler, D. and Lefèvre, C. (2017) Megacity governance and the state. Urban Research & Practice. Available from: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17535069.2017.1347 810 (accessed 6 July 2017). Observatório das Metrópoles (2015) Unidades Territoriais Urbanas no Brasil. Available from: www.observatoriodasmetropoles.net/images/abook_file/relatorio_unidadesurba nas2015.pdf (accessed 7 September 2017). OECD (2009) Territorial Reviews. Toronto, Canada. Paris, OECD. Piattoni, S. (2009) The Theory of Multi-­Level Governance. Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Rodriguez-­Pose, A., Tomaney, J. and Klink, J. (2001) Local empowerment through economic restructuring in Brazil: The case of the greater ABC region. Geoforum, 32(4), 459–469. Rolnik, R. (2011) Democracy on the edge: Limits and possibilities in the implementation of an urban reform agenda in Brazil. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(2), 239–255. Salet, W. and Thornley, A. (2007) Institutional influences on the integration of multilevel governance and spatial policy in European city-­regions. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 27(2), 188–198. Sancton, A. (2000) Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government. Montreal and Kingston, McGill-­Queens University Press. Shaw, K. and Tewdwr-­Jones, M. (2017) ‘Disorganised devolution’: Reshaping metropolitan governance in England in a period of austerity. Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 75(3), 211–224.

168   Karsten Zimmermann Tomàs, M. (2012) Exploring the metropolitan trap: The case of Montreal. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 36(3), 554–567. Young, R. (2012) Introduction: Multilevel governance and its central research questions in Canadian cities. In: Horak, M. and Young, R. (eds) Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-­Queen’s University Press, pp. 3–25. Zimmermann, K. (2017) Re-­scaling of metropolitan governance in Germany. Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 75(3), 253–263. Zimmermann, K. (2014) Democratic metropolitan governance: Experiences in five German Metropolitan Regions. Urban Research and Practice, 7(2), 182–199. Zimmermann, K. and Getimis, P. (2017) Rescaling of metropolitan governance and spatial planning in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 75(3), 203–209. Zimmermann, K. and Heinelt, H. (2016) German metropolitan policies. In: Cole, A. and Payre, R. (eds) Cities as Political Objects. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp. 156–174.

10 Local Welfare Governance and Social Innovation The Ambivalence of the Political Dimension Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro Local Welfare Governance in Europe: Crisis, Rescaling and Depoliticisation The social aftershocks of the 2007/2008 crisis – now known as the Great Recession – have been drastic in all European countries and have affected mainly the most vulnerable social groups, especially young and low-­skilled people (Bieling, 2012). The recent and slight economic recovery does not seem to have reversed the upward trend in income inequalities and social vulnerability (OECD, 2017). At the same time, most European countries have cut spending on welfare policies and have undertaken reforms, mainly in the sectors of unemployment benefits, labour market flexibility and pensions (van Kersbergen et al., 2014). In this shared context of growing constraints and problems, the countries of northern and central Europe have managed to preserve the nucleus of their own welfare systems though with cuts in social spending. By contrast, as a result of the combined effects of the crisis and austerity measures, welfare expenditure in southern and eastern Europe, whose level was already low, has been further and severely reduced. Thus, the differences and fault lines between countries are becoming more marked and dynamics of dualization are emerging ‘between resilient and falling countries’ (Saraceno, 2013: p. 350). The roots of dualisation are to be found in the period preceding the crisis and are linked to structural differences that have been exasperated by the fiscal austerity measures adopted as a strategy for economic recovery (Palier et al., 2015). Asymmetries between political economies are crucial variables (Hall, 2014). The export-­led growth models of northern and central European countries have been able to take advantage of the monetary union far more than the demand-­led growth models of southern countries. Several scholars place the emphasis on historical conditions as well as political and institutional factors (Greve, 2014). According to Shahidi (2015), the fiscal crisis – ‘whether real or imagined’ – is a powerful factor in determining the change in welfare states. Where the problem of fiscal instability of the state has dominated the public agenda, the legitimacy of welfare has been eroded and strategies of recommodification of social protection have been adopted. The social expenditure is thus under pressure but not everywhere in the same way. Between 2010 and 2012, in Denmark, there were

170   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro cuts in education and child benefits but the ceiling on social assistance was abolished and there were increases in interventions for health and the education of vulnerable members of the community and in the same period, Germany upped the ceiling for child-­related tax allowances, invested 12 billion in education and research and increased allowances for university students from low-­income families (Vis et al., 2011). Instead, dynamics of re-­ commodification are quite evident in the UK, where the strategy for dealing with the crisis has been to cut taxes and spending on welfare and local government lost 27 per cent of its central support over four years since 2007 (Taylor-­ Gooby, 2012). Regarding the Mediterranean area, countries with a traditionally familistic welfare have witnessed weakening of both the family and care policies (León and Pavolini, 2014). As far as the institutional welfare infrastructure is concerned, the context just outlined implies that both social problems and budgetary constraints have increased. This concerns primarily the local governance scale over which, during the last decades, many expectations have risen. Two lines of public action change need to be addressed in this regard: the territorialisation and the development of collaborative models of policy-­making. Implicit and explicit forms of territorialisation and decentralisation of social policies have taken place in almost all European countries over the last 30 years, although the timing and ways vary according to the contexts (Kazepov, 2008). Indeed, the rhetoric of subsidiarity, the orientation to personalise social services and the demand to boost active labour market policies have encouraged a redistribution of regulatory powers towards the sub-­national levels. According to Keating (1997), the territory as a whole since the 1990s is in the throes of reinvention. The process of regionalisation is a crucial aspect of this reorganisation. Yet the Europe of the Regions has been swiftly flanked by a Europe of the Cities. By exploiting opportunities like structural funds offered by the EU, cities have become political actors searching for legitimisation and representative roles (Le Galès, 2002). Polycentric governance indicates this new space of power, which is the field of conflicts and dynamics of changing and redistributing power (Le Galès, 2002). Brenner (2004) has pointed out how this resetting of political space, which radically transforms the state scalar organisation, involves dismantling the regulatory formation of spatial Keynesianism across the western European state system. The territorialisation and localisation of public action have been closely associated with a participatory shift in approaches to governance. Indeed, the term ‘new governance’ emphasises characteristics such as interdependence between institutions and society, co-­steering, shared goals, citizen participation. This shift is to be found in many countries and different institutional contexts in Europe (Beaumont and Nicholls, 2008; Geddes, 2010; Silver et al., 2010). Over time the framework hinging on local governance and participation has become an authentic convention in policy agendas and a repertoire of tools and procedures – partly supported by European funding lines – has been consolidated in theory aiming at including subjects that are normally weak and marginal in the local networks.

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   171 Despite its success, participatory governance has long been the subject of strong criticism. A very controversial point is its actual democratic dimension. Inclusive decision-­making processes should involve a redistribution of power through innovative forms of citizenship in local and urban contexts (Blakeley, 2010). Yet practices of participatory governance can conceal unequal conditions of access to decisions or different power positions of actors and may neutralise conflicting viewpoints on issues at stakes (Eizaguirre et al., 2013). Besides, governance encounters well-­known problems of legitimacy and accountability. First, it is not clear what legitimacy is associated with decision-­making processes not subject to the forms of control that usually regulate the relationship between representatives and represented (Papadopoulos, 2000). Second, in ‘disorganised’ governance networks, characterised by a redundancy of levels of action, the question ‘who is accountable?’ sometimes goes unanswered (Newman, 2005). The relationship between governance and power, as we see, is a crucial issue. Logic and tools of power can change without the latter necessarily being relinquished or redistributed. Therefore, within the governance arenas, the reconfiguration of responsibilities between governments and citizens can take place ‘not as a transfer of power but as a transformation of power’ (Blakeley, 2010: p. 132). Concepts such as soft governance, post-­political governance and technocratic governance (Garsten and Jacobsson, 2013; Raco, 2014) refer in different ways to a tangle of deep transformations in which technocratic mechanisms and consensual procedures tend to prevail in public action to the detriment of ‘the political understood as a space of contestation and agonistic engagement’ (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014: p. 6). ‘In post-­politics, political contradictions are reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and legitimated through participatory processes in which the scope of possible outcome is narrowly defined in advance’ (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014: p. 6). The neutralisation of conflicts and the spread of ‘subtle forms of steering and control’ (Garsten and Jacobsson, 2013: p. 422) are some of the key features of these forms of governance that go hand in hand with the grip of what Brenner and Schmid (2015) define ‘technoscientific urbanism’; discourses and approaches about urban reality ‘in which information technology organisations are aggressively marketing new modes of spatial monitoring, information processing and data visualisation to embattled municipal and metropolitan governments around the world as a technical ‘fix’ for intractable governance problems’ (p. 157). From this point of view, governance can feed very powerful depoliticisation mechanisms. We have to underline that such mechanisms do not imply a lack of politics but a specific way of doing politics: ‘depoliticisation is not about less politics, but about displaced and submerged politics’ (Hay, 2014: p. 302). Local welfare is a crucial field of depoliticisation. A well-­known mechanism implies the displacement of an issue from the public (not necessarily state) sphere to the private: so that it becomes a matter of private choice (Hay, 2007; Wood and Flinders, 2014). Policies dealing with the issue of unemployment as though it was a matter of individual responsibility (Hay, 2007) or care as though it were a private, family problem are examples of this mode, which reveal overlapping

172   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro between the removal of the social dimension of the issues and the neutralisation of their political scope. Another way, as we will see better in our case study, is linked to business-­oriented policy strategies. Right in the context of local welfare systems, it is evident that the crisis also affects the controversial political dimension of governance. Due to the politics of austerity, national and supranational powers of control of the expenditure are increased, giving rise to mechanisms of recentralisation that are particularly restrictive in some countries. This strengthens a typical problem of local welfare: the logic of the ‘devolution of penury’ (Meny and Wright, 1985), that means that greater freedom of action is thwarted by the scarcity of resources. In other words, more responsibility with less autonomy. Growing constraints and diminishing resources, therefore, matter for the weakening of the political in local welfare governance. But the latter is a two-­ faced reality and, despite the problems it has to deal with, a certain number of initiatives have confirmed its innovatory value as arena of new forms of social inclusion, or, in other words, as a laboratory of social innovation (Evers et al., 2014; Gerometta et al., 2005). As we shall see immediately, this is another theme imbued with ambivalence. On the one hand, social innovation seems able to nourish not only the social dimension but also the political one of governance. On the other hand, the picture emerging from the empirical field of social innovation is far from univocal outcomes in terms of both social inclusion and redistribution of powers and political capacities (Mingione and Vicari Haddock, 2015). Besides, the concept in itself has a double soul: a reformist one, which emphasises co-­production and co-­distribution of goods and services without questioning the social organisation, and a radical one, that aims at a structural change (Barbera and Parisi, 2017).

Social Innovation and its Ambivalence The concept of social innovation has become a keyword in the European political agenda since 2010, the launch date of the Innovation Union, promoted within the Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative. From then onwards, it found a breeding ground among other levels of government, the private sector and several civil society actors such as banking foundations, NGOs, social enterprises or cooperatives, associations as well as informal groups of citizens. The heterogeneity of involved actors, as well as its diffusion in the political other than scientific debate, have clearly contributed to blur the meaning of a concept that promised to be controversial since its emergence (Caulier-­Grice et al., 2012; Pirone, 2012; Pol and Ville, 2009; Sharra and Nyssens, 2009). The European Commission itself (2013) acknowledges its uncertain meaning, by describing social innovation as a quasi-­concept: ‘simultaneously characterised by an indeterminate quality that makes it adaptable to a variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twist and turns of policy that everyday politics sometimes make necessary’ (p. 15). As a matter of fact, it is often presented in very general terms. The Bureau of European Policy Advisers, for instance, defines social

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   173 innovation as new products, services or models able to address unsolved social needs by relying upon the development of new collaborations and social relationships (BEPA, 2010). However, it seems to be precisely this indeterminate quality, together with its depoliticised and deterritorialised appearance, that has contributed most to its success (Mingione and Vicari Haddock, 2015). A politically neutral approach, indeed, has been taken as a key feature of social innovation which, according to Hämäläinen and Heiskala (2007), is ‘an ethically and politically neutral concept’ (p. 71). This assumed neutrality relies mainly on the way the social itself is conceived, which seems to be assimilated to human or collaborative relationships in general (Rueede and Lurtz, 2012), by leaving aside any reference to power structures and social differences. Nevertheless, as reflected by the debated meaning of social innovation, its very conception is not neutral, but rather it brings with it diverging political values. Several research streams and perspectives, developed especially before it became such a popular label, emphasise the ‘political dimension’ of social innovation. The scholar Frank Moulaert, for instance, was one of the first to draw attention to this concept in the early 2000s, applying it to alternative and inclusive local development models (Nussbaumer and Moulaert, 2004). In this research field, social innovation is mainly referred to as collective actions resting on three pillars: the satisfaction of human needs, the development of new social ties and the enhancement of socio-­political empowerment, notably referring to marginalised groups. This line of thought conceives social innovation as a reaction against the technocratic and technological interpretation of innovation and as a view of development focused on improving the quality of life among local communities starting from their direct engagement (Moulaert et al., 2009; Vicari Haddock and Moulaert, 2009). In other words, social innovations have been viewed as people-­centred and as non-­market-based forms of development (Oosterlynck et al., 2015). The forging of new social ties, in particular, has long been interpreted as a crucial point of socially innovative practices (Cloutier, 2003). The emphasis has been placed here on the reconstruction of the social fabric, increasingly fragmented mainly as a consequence of the deinstitutionalisation processes (affecting welfare states, the family and economic structures) and the consequent crisis of social supports (Castel, 2011). Thus, social innovation may occur in order to ‘reassemble’ the multidimensional aspects of this fragmentation affecting ‘not only socio-­economic activity but also the living environment, civil society and political life’ (Nussbaumer and Moulaert, 2004: p. 253). That is the reason why great relevance has been attached to the enhancement of networks of actors and resources at the local level. This perspective, indeed, ties in with those approaches aiming at showing the persistent relevance of community relations, no more as elements of backwardness but as renovate forms of solidarity. In this respect, Mingione (2014) interpreted social innovation as part of a counter-­ movement, in the words of Polanyi, trying to alter the impact of current commodification processes, such as in the case of local exchange trading systems, time banks, new kinds of ethical and socially responsible finance and so on.

174   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro Another strand of research, within the repoliticisation approach, investigates social innovation in the light of social and post-­political movements (Donolo and Fichera, 1988; Fung and Wright, 2003; Moulaert et al., 2013). From this perspective, social innovation is a way to represent social changes led by new forms of grassroots activism, participatory democracy and political innovation. In this regard, the innovation consists in shifting the attention from more traditional forms of political participation, such as political parties, unions, to new social movements. Social innovation also embraces depoliticising perspectives that, of course, do not suggest the absence of the political. As Burnham states (2014), depoliticisation conceals practices of governing and politics, although not immediately visible. In this respect, the critical scholar Swyngedouw (2005) describes social innovation through the metaphor of the Trojan horse: a well-­masked neoliberal device to expand and consolidate market principles to the social sphere. A high market orientation, or entrepreneurial view, can be observed especially in the European normative approach. It is worth noting that, although social innovation is something cross-­cutting different sectors and priorities, it receives funds mainly in the area Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) programme EaSI. Social innovation is also a key element of the Start-­Up and Scale-­Up Initiative, presented ‘as a way to sustainable growth’ thanks to the development of social start-­ups (European Commission, 2016). More generally, social innovation comes in the context of public budgetary constraints and it is called upon to help find sustainable solutions to unsolved social problems within a ‘win-­win model’. By promoting social innovation, indeed, policy-­makers would be able to pursue a ‘triple triumph’: for people accessing higher-­quality services, for governments budgets and, finally, for companies benefiting from new business opportunities (BEPA, 2010). The chance to make the response to social problems economically sustainable is, in fact, a core part of its mission: In the past, societal challenges such as the ageing of Europe, migration waves, social exclusion or sustainability were primarily perceived as problems that constrained the behaviour of economic actors. Individuals wishing to tackle them turned to traditional non-­profit models as the vehicle through which to channel their energies. These activities have often been highly dependent on government subsidies or private donations and faced the difficulty of realising a long-­lasting, sustainable difference. Today, societal trends are increasingly perceived as opportunities for innovation. (European Commission 2013: p. 9) The European policy discourse on social innovation has been critically analysed by Fougère, Segercrantz and Seeck (2017), who pointed out: how it shares the same assumptions of the neoliberal discourse about the necessity to cut public expenditure, how it takes social needs for granted without discussing their causes and, moreover, how it is able to combine seemingly politically neutral solutions with a political project which refers to ‘a new type of society in which the

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   175 p­ rovision of social welfare is less the responsibility of the state and more a matter of enterprising individuals and organisations’ (Fougère et al., 2017: p. 3). In this respect, according to Alonso and Fernandez Rodríguez (2011), social innovation has undergone a real semantic change since the 1980s: from the socialisation of individually experienced problems essentially through the claim of social rights, as it was during the twentieth century, to entrepreneurial subjects and experiences. Frank Moulaert and his colleagues also highlighted the risk of an opportunistic use of the concept by what they called the ‘caring liberalism’, aiming to hidden ‘the rationalisation of the welfare state and the commodification of sociocultural wellbeing’ (Moulaert et al., 2013: p. 13). From this point of view, it becomes clear that the European discourse on innovation is a powerful source of legitimacy for the cuts in social spending implemented by local governments. To conclude, political implications of social innovation can vary from case to case. If some approaches are based on collective subjects and actions, others rely mainly on the Schumpeterian entrepreneur and its creativity. If, in some cases, innovations aim to redistribute powers and resources, trying to challenge the rationale of capitalism, in other cases the logic of the market and its power structures are reinforced. Finally, a more complex and political vision of the social itself is opposed to economistic and depoliticised approaches to it. The next section deals with the social innovation strategy of the Municipality of Milan that, according to the research centre of the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) is one of the major pioneer cities in the field of social innovation in Italy. The only one which is the owner of an ‘incubator’ exclusively dedicated to social innovation. This case study analysis aims to describe core aspects of the social innovation strategy of the Municipality as well as to examine its implications in social and political terms. The study is based on (a) the review of official documents and press reports published between 2012 and 2016 (period of the ‘shift’ to a socially innovative approach, as discussed below); and (b) 13 semi-­structured interviews conducted between January and May 2017 with public and private actors involved in the municipal strategy (4), key informants (2) and beneficiaries of services provided by the municipal social innovation incubator (7). By focusing on policies, actors and practices, we try to understand how social innovation affects the political dimension of governance. Therefore, our analytical perspective does not assume that the neoliberal paradigms set the rules nor does it share the Swyngedouw’s interpretation of social innovation as a neoliberal Trojan horse. The intention is, rather, to highlight how social innovation relates to ‘the political’, in contrast to the hypothesis of a politically neutral social innovation, and the role politics plays in shaping its political content in a context of strong ambivalence.

Policy-­Led Social Innovation in the City of Milan The economic and financial capital of Italy, Milan has been recently described by Costa, Cucca and Torri (2016) as ‘a city lost in the transition from the growth machine paradigm towards a social innovation approach’ (p. 125). As summarised

176   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro by these three scholars, in the aftermath of World War II, the city has experienced a kind of golden era of local welfare that fostered the development of peculiar local social supports. What was then called welfare ambrosiano, by the name of the patron saint of the city, has been characterised by a virtuous relationship between the local government and the organised civil society (Polizzi and Vitale, 2010), as well as by a substantial intervention of local government in the provision of welfare resources. The tradition of reformism and political pragmatism, as well as the propensity to mediation, are its main characteristics, only partially influenced by changes in the local political cycle. More to the point, local welfare in Milan has been strictly tied to labour and close to the principles of social investment. Employment and training have always been, in fact, the cornerstone of municipal intervention in the socio-­economic field whereas, as highlighted by Mingione, Oberti and Pereirinha (2004: p. 44), ‘at least since the 1970s, the municipality has taken a residual role in social assistance, leaving space for charitable institutions such as Caritas and San Vincenzo’. This occurred in line with historical features of the Italian welfare state, in which public entities have usually had a limited role in the provision of social assistance, by delegating it to families and third sector organisations. However, the last decades have seen a progressive deterioration of local welfare and greater emphasis on residual social policies and delegation, accompanied by a shift to market-­oriented approaches in urban policies in general (Costa et al., 2016) and increasing inequalities (Cucca and Ranci, 2017; D’Ovidio and Ranci, 2014). In this context, the victory of a centre-­left coalition in the 2011 municipal election boosted the transition to social innovation policies. This city government, of which the current one represents the continuation, and in particular the Department for Urban Economy and Employment, has actively encouraged social innovation within the broader plan for Milan as a smart city: The Municipality of Milan has chosen to promote social innovation as one of the aspects of the smart city since the latter is not only a city that manages to keep up with new technologies but also one that succeeds in exploiting innovation with a view to developing new methods of tackling socially relevant problems. In this sense, smart cities are those ones that create governmental, infrastructural, and technological conditions for producing social innovation. (Milan Municipality and Giacomo Brodolini Foundation, 2016: p. 2) The Milan White Paper on Social Innovation (2016) is the result of a research conducted by the Municipality of Milan and the Giacomo Brodolini Foundation (hereafter GBF ) within the frame of the European project URBACT Boosting Social Innovation. In this document is explained that: Social innovation represents a set of strategies and tools to support new businesses able to meet social needs (education, employment, mobility, etc.) and, at the same time, to create social and economic value for the city. (Milan Municipality and GBF, 2016: p. 9)

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   177 As pointed out in the same publication, the municipal social innovation strategy is consistent with the principles of the Europe 2020 strategy and shared within international networks of cities, such as the just mentioned Boosting Social Innovation. This network aims to support local administrators in becoming facilitators of social innovation processes and it has as a reference priority axis the promotion of a sustainable and integrated urban development. In the case of Milan, the main general objective is to promote an inclusive growth by relying upon the active involvement of citizens: We must reconsider the relationships between wellbeing and development as well as between social value generation and production of economic wealth, focusing on people and their capability to improve their own condition. If we want to reconsider our development model – that is what this is all about – we need to find out solutions to successfully tie together inclusion and innovation. (Milan Municipality and GBF, 2016: p. 9) In addition to this, it should be emphasised that in several social domains, such as fight against exclusion, care for children and the elderly, services for families, a significant role is played by Cariplo, a banking foundation that in recent years has launched and financed programmes for social housing, for community welfare, for the peripheries. Therefore, while the municipality mobilises many resources in order to increase the inclusive effects of market-­oriented initiatives, it is a private actor who invests – and decides – to a considerable extent on social protection interventions. Against that background, municipal-­led practices of social innovation are (a) the support to the set-­up of several business incubators; (b) the promotion of collaborative spaces (i.e. co-­working spaces and fab labs); (c) the active endorsement of bottom-­up and participatory experiences (Milan Municipality and GBF, 2016). As far as the support to incubators is concerned, the set-­up of Fabriq deserves a special mention. Fabriq is the social innovation incubator of the city of Milan and it is located in the peripheral area of Quarto Oggiaro for the purpose of contributing to revitalising this neighbourhood, regarded as one of the most marginalised urban areas. The municipality is the only owner, but Fabriq is operated by a temporary association of companies made by the already mentioned GBF and Impact Hub Milan, a node of an international network of co-­working and innovation labs. Fabriq works with a view to support the birth or the first phases of social start-­ups, principally providing financial support, such as seed money, and a period of incubation, namely training, tutorship and networking. It is accessible in three ways: directly by paying for its services, applying to special programmes1 or to its annual calls funded by the municipality. Moreover, Fabriq has carried out several educational projects, in schools and in the neighbourhood where it is located, to encourage young people’s entrepreneurship. It is interesting to note that the terms used by the project manager of the incubator to explain the relevance of supporting socially innovative start-­ups

178   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro are closely similar to those ones used by the European Commission and previously quoted: There is the need to support socially innovative start-­ups more than those ones operating in other fields, like in the purely technological one. On one hand, due to the voluntary legacy characterizing the social which is, thus, less entrepreneurial: who has an idea related to the social does not think, immediately, to the possibility to create an enterprise, but he thinks, on the contrary, to create an association or something similar. The enterprise is not the first thing that he comes up with. Obviously, things are changing a little at a time. On the other hand, it is harder for them to intercept the classic funds for start-­ups, because they see in social start-­ups a lower return. (Fabriq project manager, 30 January 2017) Socially innovative start-­ups supported via Fabriq calls, financed by the municipality, number 32 up to 2016.2 In this group can be found the material production of innovative goods, like a device for swimmers in training, or the provision of services, from platforms in the care sector to business advice. However, about two-­thirds are operating in the digital economy, which is often considered intrinsic bringer of social value: Prevailing explanations cast digital economic circulations as horizontal, networked exchange relations between users which are new and different because of their disintermediated, collaborative, and even democratising qualities. (Langley and Leyshon, 2016: p. 3) A strong emphasis, in fact, is placed on changes in the product cycle, specifically production and transport, which, increasingly based on social cooperation, are therefore regarded as social innovations. This explains why, among projects supported by Fabriq, it is possible to find platforms connecting owners of sports equipment with people looking for it (sharing economy) or concerning second-­hand automotive components (e-­commerce). The same interviewed participants tended to focus attention on the product instead of its social purposes as well as the reduction of ‘social innovation’ to changes in the way of connecting people. What’s more, these digital innovations seem to embed civic and political participation in their rhetoric of change. In this respect, a national expert and current contractor of the municipality described the narrative mobilised within the world of innovators and start-­ups as a promise to join a process of social change and build one’s career at once: What is the most spread message? Isn’t it: Wonderful, who are you? What would you like to do in this world? What’s the idea? Try harder, because maybe you can be, let’s say, the main character of an autonomy and transformative process, isn’t it? By feeding you and changing the context you are in. (Project manager and expert, 20 March 2017)

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   179 This aspect is stressed by an entrepreneur supported by Fabriq as well, who explained his job as follows: I’m destroying the world. To be precise, I’m an entrepreneur, and I’m trying to do it with a certain philosophy and an innovative view of things (…) I know we must wait for ages to change everything, I have no such assumption, but I know I’m doing a step towards something, at least we hope. I believe it’s a step towards something better (…) it’s important to know that what you’re doing in your life will have an impact on the long run, on the life of people in the future. (Entrepreneur, 36 years old, 4 February 2017) The second line of action has been the support for co-­working spaces and fab labs, among the symbols of new jobs, ways of working and economies, namely smart working and digital manufacturing. Co-­working, indeed, is not just a physical shared workplace, where everyone has its desk, but a practice rooted in the knowledge work, mostly made by freelancer (Gandini, 2015) and linked to emergent needs of these new workers (i.e. avoid isolation, build networks). Fab labs (fabrication laboratories) are workshops for the digital fabrication of products combining traditional artisanal methods and advanced technologies (Chiappini and D’Ovidio, 2017). Currently, they are part of the broader and more recent strategy ‘Milano Manifattura’, aimed at promoting digital manufacturing within the city. Finally, the municipality has been supporting several bottom-­up initiatives ‘promoted by both single citizens and new organisations that try to update the distinguishing elements of the third sector’ (Milan Municipality and GBF, 2016: p. 15). Social Streets, for instance, is regarded as an important vehicle of social innovation. This phenomenon is about the creation of Facebook groups aiming at enhancing social relationships and exchanges among residents of a street or neighbourhood. Currently, Milan counts more than 60 social streets and the municipality has recently launched a call to list them to boost cooperation. Other projects have been developed with a ‘bottom-­linked’ approach. One is the participatory budgeting, the second edition of which has been recently launched, although with a budget reduced by half. It is an instrument of direct engagement of citizens in managing part of government’s budget, implemented with a view to foster civic participation and active democracy. In more detail, the government decided to manage 9 million euro from its budget through a participatory approach. The project kicked off in July 2015 and around 60 meetings were organised throughout the city with the aim of collecting suggestions and proposals from citizens. In harness with the municipality’s technical staff, citizens screened all proposals and identified 40 projects, nine of which will be fully funded, whereas the other six will receive partial funding (Milan Municipality and GBF, 2016). Most of the financed projects are still underway and concern small urban renewal projects, related mostly to accessibility, green areas, school buildings and so on. Another initiative undertaken is the civic crowdfunding, a

180   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro practice of funding non-­profit or for-­profit initiatives that take place on digital platforms connecting project promoters with a ‘crowd’ of possible donators or investors. The aim was to stress the need to look at alternative and private funding arrangements as well as to strengthen public-­private relationships to support civil society projects. Through this initiative, the municipality has financed 50 per cent of the budget of those projects, which, once through a preliminary selection process, have been able to collect the remaining 50 per cent through crowdfunding: We have decided to undertake this initiative with a series of purposes: make known an innovative method of financing, it was for traditional actors operating in the social field aware of an instrument that normally they didn’t use, but also make start-­ups familiar with this new way of financing. And then, we’ve created a broad range of participants who, then, have spontaneously flowed, nearly half, in the area ‘entrepreneurship’ and, a half, in the area ‘associationism’. (Head of Economic Planning Unit, 27 April 2017) From a consensus perspective, the social innovation strategy is built on a solid model of governance. More to the point, the strengths of this model are the ability to engage a plurality of actors as well as to negotiate, by taking also a supporting and facilitating role, albeit selective, towards bottom-­up projects and practices. The whole work carried out has been made visible another Milan, another city. It has been (…) the valorisation of what exists, the promotion of networks of dialogues and roundtable discussions. It’s the presence of a direction that, in my opinion, matters, beyond all single actions (…). My feeling, very personal, is that in the last five years the huge work we have been made is about cultural elements (…) through the dialogue with all stakeholders, shared activities, creation of opportunities and, finally, also of intellectual and cultural dynamism. (Manager, Dep. Urban Economy and Employment, 13 March 2017) This pluralism, as has been shown, is resulting in heterogeneous experiences. These allowed, in some cases, to aggregate actors who are new to the Milanese political scenario: individual citizens, as well as formal and informal organisations, gain new opportunities for participation. On the other hand, the social innovation overlaps with innovation tout court (social start-­ups, co-­working spaces and so on), thus reinforcing economistic and desocialised approaches to social innovation and contributing to legitimise those actions that continue to be meaningfully inspired by market principles.

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   181

Conclusion Social innovation in the city of Milan translates into a series of measures aiming at encouraging the development of social start-­ups, at supporting people working in emergent urban economies, at bringing local government closer to existing bottom-­up initiatives and boosting the emergence of new ones. As we have seen, this strategy shows a significant market-­oriented component, whereas fostering some room for experimentation beyond the perimeter of market rules, that is the main difference among projects. The use of urban spaces is paradigmatic: on the one hand, incubators, co-­working and entrepreneurial projects reinforce the idea of the city as a space of/for production, on the other hand experiences promoting the public use of urban areas and the public interest for the city, such as urban gardens and participatory budgeting, contribute to share another meaning and experience of the urban context. This ambivalence is the fruit of the encounter between two main factors: the solidity of the local reformist tradition, which includes a strong propensity for pragmatism, the aggregation and negotiation of interests, and the pluralism; the pervasiveness of economic competitiveness as a reference for urban development models. In the current phase, that entails a tendency to govern through a compromise among economic interests, social demands and participation requests confronting each other in the city. Social innovation, from this point of view, is a powerful reservoir of legitimation from which the local government draws abundantly to consolidate otherwise unstable coalitions and aggregations. From the data in our possession, both the grip and the outcomes of this compromise show a present full of lights and shadows and an uncertain future. Moreover, the analysis of the case enlightens some aspects of general relevance, first of all regarding the relationship between local community and institutions. As other researchers confirm, social innovations appeal to self-­organisation capacities but do not equate to self-­organisation. The literature has shown that initiatives have different origins (Bifulco, 2017; Moulaert et al., 2007). They may arise spontaneously or be the fruit of intentional planning by the political-­ administrative actors or, again, they may coincide with variable mixes of social self-­organisation and institutional investments. In any case, even the most formalised initiatives, recognised as part of a strict institutional context, exist, thanks to local capacity for action and mobilisation. In this sense, overcoming increasing inequalities and social problems affecting cities depends on the local capacity to put them high on the local government agenda as well as to discuss methods and instruments for addressing them. Second, our study confirms that we need to focus on how political actors promoting or guiding innovation relate to – activate, feed, deny, devalue – the political understood as ‘the realm of the possible’, that is ‘the possibility that society can be constituted differently’ (Wood and Flinders, 2014: p. 162). Therefore, the relationship between politics and the political is crucial to understand how social innovation affects the political dimension of governance. In some cases, this relationship is more evident. It is the case of the participatory budgeting, where

182   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro the detachment felt by citizens about public and political life is one of the crucial issues at stake accompanied with the need to foster participatory democracy and empower citizens, by giving them resources and, thus, voice. Regardless of their concrete results, these experiences contribute to repoliticise the agendas of urban governance. In other cases, the scenario reveals a process of depoliticisation, as in the case of those experiences strongly shaped by market orientation. To conclude, we argue that social innovation – conceived as a redefinition of the relations between state, market and society – means not less politics but a different politics.

Notes 1 Even being the result of a common reflection between the two authors, this chapter is organised as follows: paragraphs 1 and 4 were written by Lavinia Bifulco, paragraphs 2 and 3 by Maria Dodaro. As for the recent Fabriq Acceleration Programme, co-­ financed by the EaSI programme. 2 Data provided by the Municipality of Milan and related to three municipal calls: Fabriq I (2014), Fabriq II (2015), Start up in rate (2016).

References Alonso, L. and Fernández Rodriguez, C. (2011) La inovación Social y el Nuevo discurso del Management: Limitaciones y alternativas. ARBOR: Ciencia, Pensamento y Cultura, 187(752) 1133–1145. Barbera, F. and Parisi, T. (2017) L’innovazione sociale radicale. In: Quarta, A. and Spanò, M. (eds) Rispondere alla crisi. Verona, Ombre Corte, pp. 55–66. Beaumont, J. and Nicholls, W. (2008) Plural governance, participation and democracy in cities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(1), 87–94. BEPA (2010) Empowering People Driving Change: Social Innovation in the European Union. Luxemburg, Publication Office of the European Union. Bieling, H.J. (2012) EU facing the crisis: Social and employment policies in times of tight budgets. Transfer, 18(3), 255–271. Bifulco, L. (2017) Social Policies and Public Action. London, Routledge. Blakeley, G. (2010) Governing ourselves: Citizen participation and governance in Barcelona and Manchester. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(1), 130–145. Brenner, N. (2004) Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in western Europe, 1960–2000. Review of International Political Economy, 11(3), 447–488. Brenner, N and Schmid, C. (2015) Towards a new epistemology of the urban? City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 19(2–3), 151–182. Burnham, P. (2014) Depoliticisation: Economic crisis and political management. Policy and Politics, 42(2), 189–206. Castel, R. (2011) L’insicurezza sociale. Che significa essere protetti? Torino, Einaudi. Caulier-­Grice, J., Davies, A., Patrick, R. and Norman, W. (2012) Defining Social Innovation. A deliverable of the project: ‘The theoretical, empirical and policy foundations for building social innovation in Europe’ (TEPSIE), European Commission – 7th Framework Programme, Brussels, European Commission, DG Research. Chiappini, L. and D’Ovidio, M. (2017), Il potenziale dei makers: tra innovazione economica e coesione sociale. In: Bidussa, D. and Polizzi, E. (eds) Agenda Milano.

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   183 Ricerche e pratiche per una città inclusiva. Milano, Fondazione Giacomo Feltrinelli, pp. 33–41. Cloutier, J. (2003) Qu’est-ce que l’innovation sociale?, Cahier du CRISES Collection Études théoriques – no ET0314. Costa, G., Cucca, R. and Torri, S. (2016) Milan: A city lost in the transition from the Growth Machine paradigm towards a Social Innovation approach. In: Brandsen, A., Cottacin, T., Evers, S. and Zimmer, A. (eds) Social Innovation in the Urban Context. New York, Springer, pp. 125–142. Cucca, R. and Ranci, C. (2017) Unequal Cities: The Challenge of Post-­Industrial Transition in Times of Austerity. New York, Routledge. D’Ovidio, M. and Ranci, C. (2014) Social cohesion and global competitiveness: Clustering cities. In: Ranci, C., Brandsen, T. and Sabatinelli, S., (eds) Social Vulnerability in European Cities. The Role of Local Welfare in Times of Crisis. London, Palgrave, pp. 31–63. Donolo, C. and Fichera, F. (1988) Le vie dell’innovazione. Forme e limiti della razionalità politica. Milano, Feltrinelli. Eizaguirre, S., Pradel, M., Terrones, A., Martinez-­Celorrio, X. and García, M., (2013) Multilevel governance and social cohesion. Urban Studies, 4(9), 1999–2016. European Commission (2016) Europe’s Next Leaders: The Start-­up and Scale-­up Initiative. COM(2016) 733. European Commission (2013) Social Innovation Research in the European Union. Approach, Findings and Future Directions. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union. Evers, A., Ewert. B. and Brandsen, T. (eds) (2014) Social Innovations for Social Cohesion. Transnational Patterns and Approaches from 20 European Cities. Liege, EMES European Research Network, WILCO Project. Fougère, M., Segercrantz, B. and Seeck, H. (2017) A critical reading of the European Union’s social innovation policy discourse: (Re)legitimizing neoliberalism. Organization, 1(25), 1–25. Fung, A. and Wright, O. (2003) Deepening Democracy. Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. London, Verso. Gandini, A. (2015) The rise of coworking spaces: A literature review. Ephemera. Theory & Politics in Organization, 15(1), 193–205. Garsten, C. and Jacobsson, K. (2013) Soft power and post-­political visions in global governance. Critical Sociology, 39(3), 421–437. Geddes, M. (2010) Building and contesting neoliberalism at the local level. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(1), 163–173. Gerometta, J., Hussermann, H. and Longo, G. (2005) Social innovation and civil society in urban governance: Strategies for an inclusive city. Urban Studies, 42(11), 2007–2021. Greve, B. (2014) Introduction: Small European welfare states – impact of the fiscal crisis. Social Policy & Administration, 48(4), 391–393. Hall, P.A. (2014) Varieties of capitalism and the Euro crisis. West European Politics, 37(6), 1223–1243. Hämäläinen, T.J. and Heiskala, R. (2007) Social Innovations, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar. Hay, C. (2014) Depoliticisation as process, governance as practice: What did the ‘first wave’ get wrong and do we need a ‘second wave’ to put it right? Policy & Politics, 42(2), 293–311.

184   Lavinia Bifulco and Maria Dodaro Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge, Polity. Kazepov, Y. (2008) The subsidiarisation of social policies: Actors, Processes and Impacts. Some reflections on the Italian case from a European perspective. European Societies, 10(2), 247–273. Keating, M. (1997) The invention of regions: Political restructuring and territorial government in Western Europe. Environment and Planning, 15(4), 383–398. Langley, P. and Leyshon, A. (2016) Platform capitalism: The intermediation and capitalisation of digital economic circulation. Finance and Society, 2(1), 1–21. Le Galès, P. (2002) European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance. Oxford, Oxford University Press. León, M. and Pavolini, E. (2014) Social investment or back to familism: The impact of the economic crisis on family and care policies in Italy and Spain. South European Society and Politics, 19(3), 353–269. Meny, Y. and Wright, V. (1985) General introduction. In: Meny, Y. and Wright, W. (eds) Centre-­Periphery Relations in Western Europe. London, George Allen and Unwin, pp. 1–9. Milan Municipality and Giacomo Brodolini Foundation (2016) Milan White Paper on Social Innovation. Accelerating Milan’s Local Ecosystem for Social Innovation. Available from: http://urbact.eu/sites/default/files/media/white_paper_mi_social_innovation. pdf (accessed 13 January 2018). Mingione, E. (2014) Le dinamiche del capitalismo, la mercificazione globale e la crisi economica: quali prospettive per il welfare delle società industriali avanzate. Rivista delle Politiche Sociali, 1(2), 205–220. Mingione, E., Oberti, M. and Pereirinha, A. (2004) Le città come sistemi locali. In: Saraceno, C. (ed.) Le dinamiche assistenziali in Europa. Sistemi nazionali e locali di contrasto alla povertà. Bologna, il Mulino, pp. 47–65. Mingione, E. and Vicari Haddock, S. (2015) Politiche urbane e innovazione sociale. In: Calafati, A. (ed.) Città Tra Sviluppo e Declino. Un’agenda Urbana per l’Italia. Roma, Donzelli Editore, pp. 97–108. Moulaert, F., MacCallum, D., Hillier, J. and Vicari, S. (2009) Social Innovation and Territorial Development. Farnham, Ashgate. Moulaert, F., MacCallum, D., Mehmood, A. and Hamdouch, A. (2013) The International Handbook on Social Innovation: Collective Action, Social Learning and Transdisciplinary Research. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar. Moulaert, F., Martinelli, F. and González, S. (2007) Social Innovation and governance in European Cities: Urban developments between the path dependency and radical innovation. European Urban and Regional Studies, 14(3), 195–209. Newman, J. (ed.) (2005) Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics and the Public Sphere. Bristol, Policy Press. Nussbaumer, J. and Moulaert, F. (2004) Integrated area development and social innovation in European cities. City, 8(2), 249–257. OECD (2017) Understanding the Socio-­economic Divide in Europe. OECD Centre for Opportunity and Equality. Oosterlynck, S., Kazepov, Y., Novy, A., Cools, P., Sarius, T. and Wukovitsch, F. (2015) Local social innovation and welfare state restructuring: Analysing their relationship. ImPRovE Working Paper (15)15. Palier, B., Rovny, A.E. and Rovny, J. (2015) The dualization of Europe, paper presented at the Conference Party Competition and Voter Alignments in Times of Welfare State Transformation, European University Institute, Florence.

Welfare Governance and Social Innovation   185 Papadopoulos, Y. (2000) Governance, coordination and legitimacy in public policies. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(1) 210–223. Pirone, F. (2012) Innovazione sociale: l’estensione semantica di un concetto in ascesa politica. La Rivista Delle Politiche Sociali, (4), 137–150. Pol, E. and Ville, S. (2009) Social innovation: Buzzword or enduring term? The Journal of Socio-­Economics, 38(6), 137–150. Polizzi, E. and Vitale, T. (2010) Il tempo dellasussidiarie a perduta. Interrogativi su governo locale e innovazione sociale a Milano. Animazione Sociale, 40(244), 23–33. Raco, M. (2014) The post-­politics of sustainability planning: Privatisation and the demise of democratic government. In: Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds) The Post-­Political and Its Discontents. Spaces of Depoliticisation. Spectres of Radical politics. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 25–47. Rueede, D. and Lurtz, K. (2012) Mapping the various meanings of Social Innovation: Towards a differentiated understanding of an emerging concept, EBS Business School Research Paper No. 12–03. Saraceno, C. (2013) Three concurrent crises in welfare states in an increasingly asymmetrical European Union. Stato e Mercato, 33(3), 339–358. Shahidi, F.V. (2015) Welfare capitalism in crisis. Journal of Social Policy, 44(4), 659–686. Sharra, R. and Nyssens, M. (2009) Social innovation: An interdisciplinary and critical review of the concept. Université Catholique de Louvain Belgium, pp. 1–15. Available from: http://farm.tudor.lu/fr/node/308 (accessed 13 January 2018). Silver, H., Scott, A. and Kazepov, Y. (2010) Participation in urban contention and deliberation. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(3), 453–477. Swyngedouw, E. (2005) Governance innovation and the citizen: The Janus face of governance-­beyond-the-­State. Urban Studies, 42(11), 1991–2006. Taylor-­Gooby, P. (2012) Beveridge overboard? How the UK government is using the crisis to permanently restructure the Welfare State. Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, 47(4), 224–229. Van Kersbergen, K., Vis, B. and Hemerijck, A. (2014) The Great Recession and Welfare State reform: Is retrenchment really the only game left in town? Social Policy and Administration, 48(7), 883–904. Vicari Haddock, S. and Moulaert, F. (eds) (2009) Rigenerare la Città. Pratiched di Innovazione Sociale Nelle Città Europee. Bologna, il Mulino. Vis, B., van Kersbergen, K. and Hylands, T. (2011) To what extent did the financial crisis intensify the pressure to reform the Welfare State? Social Policy and Administration, 45(4), 338–353. Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (2014) Seeds of dystopia: Post-­politics and the return of the political. In: Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds) The Post-­Political and Its Discontents. Spaces of depoliticisation. Spectres of radical politics. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 1–24. Wood, M. and Flinders, M. (2014) Rethinking depoliticisation: Beyond the governmental. Policy & Politics, 2(2), 151–170.

11 Politicisation of Community Development Universities as Boundary Objects Anne Taufen

Introduction One of the challenges facing urban regions in a time of pronounced political conflict and spatial inequality is how alternative paths forward might be imagined and pursued. This is a question of discourse; how governance actors think and talk about the problems at hand, and how do they talk to each other, and it is also a question of practice: what habits and governance structures are available for action, and how can they be arranged, engaged and adjusted to better serve the people and places of increasingly global cities. On both of these dimensions, urban universities offer important potential for the mobilisation and politicisation of community development. Politicisation is a necessary and useful characteristic of successful urban planning and governance. Without it, urban decision-­making veers from the truly democratic to more predictable mechanisms of collaboration: existing forms of political power and economic wealth are reinforced as the primary means of consensus building and planning action. This chapter looks specifically at the necessity and benefits of politicisation for local community development and argues that the university is ideally positioned to perform this role. It characterises the university consciously engaged in community development as a ‘boundary object’, a term drawn from science and technology studies, and argues that such venues are essential for a critical re-­ imagining and performance of multiparty initiatives in local urban development. For while politicisation is needed, it remains complicated and counter-­intuitive as a planning and governance strategy; there is, as ever the possibility of fracture, impasse, waste, polarisation, inaction and other ills that arise from highly politicised endeavours. The university, and in particular faculty and programmes attuned to the myriad challenges of equitable urban planning and governance, can be a unique and powerful space for generating and transitioning between discourses of community development – talking about and characterising what ought to be done and practices of resource allocation, implementation, and institutionalisation, that is, actually doing it. Universities are unique spaces of negotiation, where increasingly planning faculty among others recognise that being critical and political in our research

Politicisation of Community Development   187 and writing is not enough and sometimes even counterproductive, for our students and community partners; that in order to affect the way that things are done, we must politicise practice, exploring opportunities to bring a critical, pragmatic and deeply practical approach to the work being done in community and government settings. The following analysis focuses on two examples of community engagement by university scholars at the University of Washington (UW) and demonstrates how the university’s boundary-­spanning role has the potential to enable research, teaching and service to reach beyond the walls of the academy, into the fabric of the surrounding city and region. The first example, an annual university-­community event organised by urban scholars at the University of Washington, Tacoma (UW Tacoma), attempts to bring researchers, practitioners and community members into conversation about a specific community development issue. The issue is chosen each year by faculty who study urban planning and governance, in consultation with community leaders and activists who wish to increase local interest and practical action. In the first example, university faculty have a good deal of discretion to frame and politicise the discourse that shapes the event, however, the links to practice and the potential to implement alternative approaches in networks of planning and governance are less certain. The second example, a year-­long partnership between the university and a local government, seeks to engage students, faculty and public professionals on projects that are identified by the public partner and used as course-­based learning experiences by participating university faculty. In the second example, university faculty have less discretion to directly frame and politicise the spoken and textual discourses of planning and governance, however there may be significant potential to influence practice, through project-­based means of experimentation and institutionalisation, an indirect politicisation that may be less outwardly argumentative and oppositional, and more lasting than an approach that relies on intellectual and representational discourse. Analysis of these examples enlists a Foucauldian approach to discursive regimes, where the shared understandings that constitute a ‘regime of truth’ are created and maintained through embodied practices, in addition to texts, speech, and images (Foucault, 1984). For university scholars wishing to politicise the aims and outcomes of community development, this points to technological, project-­based and applied interventions as important possible entry points for the institutionalisation of alternative discourses of planning and governance.

Politicisation as a Good Much of the literature in multiparty urban policy and community development over the last several decades has encouraged a depoliticisation of planning and governance. The political conflict created by different worldviews, organisational imperatives, normative commitments and ways of knowing has been treated as a problem to solve, where for instance reflection and reframing enables the forging of a metanarrative (Schon and Rein, 1995) or various discourses are

188   Anne Taufen brought together into a coalition of shared interests (Hajer, 1995). The underlying rationale remains ‘getting to yes’ (Fisher and Ury, 1981, 1991), lest time, resources and opportunity slip away in the face of argument and disagreement. There has been a criticism of this orientation in planning, including concerns with consensus, communicative reason and participatory process as their own good, too often papering over real differences and power differentials between individuals and groups, to the disadvantage of those with fewer resources and less power (Fainstein, 2010; Purcell, 2009). While this criticism of the literature and practice of collaborative planning is warranted, it raises the question of viable alternatives. If consensus depoliticises and this undermines the rights and interests of those who are structurally disempowered, how can repoliticisation take place, without undermining the capacity for public action? Various scholars explore the importance and characteristics of repoliticising planning and governance and reviving democratic process and outcomes through more, not less, deep deliberation, debate and experimentation (Bond, 2011; Healey, 2012; Inch, 2015). The conflict, uncertainty and argumentation that can attend such negotiated practices are often messy, emotional, and on the face of it, inefficient, however, democracy understood as a pedagogical and pragmatic process requires – and rewards – such investments (Dewey, 1927, 2016; Young, 2000). Moreover, as a response to the profound inequity embedded in urban socio-­spatial development patterns, politicisation is a deeply necessary response (Lake, 2017; Zanotto, 2016). In engendering such a praxis of ideation, multi-­sector engagement, deliberation, programme and policy design, and implementation, such activities must be developed and sustained. What institutional design (Fung, 2003) enables constructive politicisation without blindly reproducing existing power differentials or eliminating the possibility of effective action? What public actor has the capacity to convene and knit together various publics, navigating their differences and interests, while nurturing a critical sense of the common good, and experimenting with new avenues of planning and governance intervention? Put another way, how can different discourses of planning and development be brought into productive tension with one another, yielding not a new metanarrative, or a winner-­take-all resolution in favour of one or another discursive orientation, but rather a new and conditional on-­the-ground construction – an effort at empirical and practice-­based reformulation – where technical and programmatic elements, community members, civic leaders and project managers become mutually-­engaged actors in creating pathways forward?

University as a Boundary Object The university can potentially be such a space. As a boundary object, the university can engage and accommodate a variety of different perspectives. Urban universities, in particular, can be deeply embedded, spatially, politically, economically and otherwise, with the adjacent communities of their geographic location – they occupy a space of conjuncture, potentially, for various publics,

Politicisation of Community Development   189 sectors, discourses and professional interests. Furthermore, a university’s research and teaching capacities puts it in a unique position to contribute critically and productively to the project of politicisation in planning and governance. Its boundary condition is normative, as a site of knowledge production, as well as being practical and opportune. The value and necessity of ‘boundary spanning’ – common in subfields of sociology, organisational management, and science and technology studies (STS) – is familiar to many scholars who study urban complexity, environmental networks, and collaborative governance. For instance, Jane Jacobs long ago pointed out the lynchpin role of neighbourhood leaders and gathering places that serve to connect individuals, share news and organise across different city blocks, activity sectors, and urban scales (Jacobs, 1961). Environmental policy scholars note that different ways of knowing across groups and sectors often impede action on pressing problems, and that boundary spanning through narrative and other means is essential to build common understanding and collaboration (Lejano and Ingram, 2009). And in public management, where organisational boundaries are recognised as a key stumbling block to effective network governance (Kettl, 2006), boundary work – ‘the dynamic negotiation of sites of difference’ (Quick and Feldman, 2014) – can be an opportunity to ‘cope with novel problems, system disruptions, and resource constraints’ (Quick and Feldman, 2014). The boundary-­spanning role of community-­engaged research universities (Weerts and Sandmann, 2010) enables them to pursue the collaboration agenda set forth for higher education (Boyer, 1996), including ‘the mutually beneficial exchange of knowledge and resources in a context of partnership and reciprocity’ between institutions of higher education and their local, regional, state, national, and global communities.1 In their in-­depth study of six institutions, Weerts and Sandman identify four boundary-­spanning roles for the community-­ engaged university: community-­based problem solver, technical expert, internal engagement advocate and engagement champion (Weerts and Sandmann, 2010). However, following other typological studies of boundary-­spanning roles in administration and management (Friedman and Polodny, 1992), they note that ‘boundary spanning is not confined to an individual job description, but applied to broader institutional strategies to engage with external partners’ (Weerts and Sandmann, 2010: p. 721), so that such strategies become the organising frame in how the work gets done. In such arrangements, community-­based problem solvers ‘may face difficulties in remaining neutral’, and technical experts ‘may face conflicts due to lack of experience or sensitivity with community partners … and incompatibility of the role with traditional academic culture’ (Weerts and Sandmann, 2010: p.  722). Such role conflicts are treated as a problem in this literature, however, they do not necessarily need to be. By taking a more critical, post-­structural perspective on the boundary-­ spanning role of community-­engaged universities and exploring the university as a ‘boundary object’ with explicitly normative dimensions and responsibilities, the nature of such conflicts as nodes of opportunity in a wider project of

190   Anne Taufen c­ onstructive politicisation comes to the fore. What is needed, on this reading of boundary spanning at community-­engaged universities, is a willingness to claim an intellectual mission of building cultural and political discourse and technical and programmatic interventions, where ‘the university [is] engaged in civic advancement, the city [is] engaged in intellectual advancement, and the two [are] joined’ (Boyer, 1996: p. 25). Discourse is thus not simply an esoteric means of textual or verbal analysis, a pre-­existing approach to public policy or something out in the ether that others in positions of power determine and create, but the evolving understandings of members of the university and associated communities, engaged in an ongoing refinement of their shared interpretation of social and environmental conditions. Indeed, Ernest Boyer leads his famous address calling for a scholarship of engagement, given to the Carnegie Foundation in 1995, not with a plea for universities to become service providers – although he does champion their practical and technical potential, as potential community partners – but rather with the identification of colleges and universities as ‘the greatest sources of hope for intellectual and civic progress’ (Boyer, 1996: p.  18). Boyer does not shy from including civic and moral problems with the economic and social ones plaguing the US, clearly intending that university scholars take on normative questions in their interaction with community partners. A central target of his call for community engagement is the ‘impoverished cultural discourse’ where ‘the nation’s most pressing social, economic, and civil issues are endlessly discussed primarily by politicians and self-­proclaimed pundits, while university scholars rarely are invited to join the conversation’ (Boyer, 1996: pp. 24–25). The university as a ‘boundary object’ in networks of urban development and governance – a node of spanning and connecting, or of ‘translating, aligning, and decentering’ (Quick and Feldman, 2014) among different discourses – opens a space for politicisation. In the sections that follow, these claims will be developed in more detail, including an empirical exposition of constructive politicisation through intentional intervention in a prevalent discourse of urban development at a UW Tacoma community event in early 2015; as well as a discussion of a large-­scale, interdisciplinary community-­engaged learning partnership, between the university and a local jurisdiction. The first example shows how mobilising empirical research findings and illustrating those findings through technologies of representation and communication, can implicitly call into question a dominant discourse of development, allowing a more accurate and intentionally politicised discourse of development to be articulated and promulgated. The second example shows how directly engaging with project managers and public administrators in a year-­long project forges an opportunity for students, faculty and the project leaders themselves to experiment with and learn from each others’ perspectives, commitments and constraints. This provides an opportunity for university researchers and students to politicise the work of planning and governance actors, and at least as importantly, educates the researchers and students as to the pragmatic constraints on doing so, through an extended exercise in learning-­by-doing.

Politicisation of Community Development   191

Empirical Explorations: Urban Studies Forum and Liveable City Year The boundary object role of the university can be enacted at the level of individual units and departments, and at the level of the institution as a whole. Below are two examples – an annual community development event hosted by the Urban Studies Program at UW Tacoma, an urban-­serving campus; and a year-­ long experiential learning partnership between the UW and a local jurisdiction, that involves disciplines and campuses across the university. Urban Studies Forum The city of Tacoma, Washington (population 203,446 in 2013) has a well-­ staffed, progressive and active planning department. Nevertheless, in a familiar story, aspects of Tacoma’s carefully crafted, long-­range planning are regularly ignored, unknown or avoided, due to widespread lack of public support, involvement and understanding of formal development goals, and a poorly empowered state planning function in the US. While the city’s comprehensive plan explicitly calls for ‘the availability of affordable housing to all economic segments of the population’, including a ‘variety of residential densities and housing types’ (City of Tacoma, 2002), private housing development is inordinately focused on high-­ end, high-­return projects. When a thriving neighbourhood district long identified as one of the city’s ‘growth centres’ through extensive participatory process, was faced with plans for multistorey residential and retail development, residents baulked and resisted (Gillie, 2014). In Tacoma as in other cities, urban development and governance must reconcile the best intentions and carefully generated justifications of planning, with existing habits and prevalent discourses that frequently seem to have invisible and persistent traction. The presence of the University of Washington, Tacoma (UWT) is possibly one that can help this discursive negotiation. For example, since 2010 the Urban Studies Program has been convening and hosting an annual urban forum, where a topic of interest and importance for the region is framed and explored by local and invited scholars, practising professionals, and community leaders (Wessells, 2014). Over the course of 8 years, the urban forum has convened regional conversations on waterfront redevelopment, urban universities, industrial development, transportation and the economy, urban branding, alternative visions of liveability and immigrant labour. The event is free and open to the public, and since 2014 has been linked to a series of talks related to the forum topic, hosted at the university over the course of the academic year. In 2015, the topic was ‘The Question of Development: Jobs and Housing in the South Sound’,2 with faculty intent on interrogating and populating specific, widespread understandings of Tacoma’s urban development: • •

Why are civic leaders relentlessly focused on downtown? What is the global and regional context of Tacoma’s economic development?

192   Anne Taufen • •

What is the range and quantity of different forms of housing in the city? How does Tacoma’s housing stock align with the rest of the metropolitan region?

In response to an existing, prevalent discourse of urban development in Tacoma, engaged university scholars in consultation with local non-­profits, civic leaders and government agencies, have sought to unsettle and complement these understandings with different data, analysis, and normative interpretation. Dominant Discourse – Urban Development as Downtown Commercial Space Tacoma is fixated on downtown development, as are most US cities in competition for the tax revenue generated by high-­value real estate, tourism, commercial, and retail uses (Peterson, 1981). Tacoma is fixated on downtown development. Over the last three decades, this has led to the restoration of the historic train station; new art, glass, state history, children’s and car museums; a new convention centre; multiple hotels; a waterfront esplanade; and a new university campus. The downtown development fixation is now focused on office space. The dominant discourse asserts that a city’s fiscal health and community development is created by and relies upon a thriving downtown business district. High-­rent, high revenue-­generating land uses and spatial functions are elevated as visible and essential elements in a city’s identity; a centrally located business and retail district that attracts sources of mobile capital (for instance tourists, second-­home or new arrival condominium owners, international business firms, and highly educated workers with disposable income) is tacitly endorsed as the most important possible goal of a city’s community and economic development. This dominant discourse is held in place not only by the things people say: I’ve spent my adult life here, raised my kids here, I just want to see our downtown with some buildings going up, some life breathed back into it! (University board member, attorney, at 2015 pre-­forum dinner) But also, importantly, by the disciplining technologies of things and representations that make the discourse salient: (exasperated) I just want to see some damn cranes! Go to Seattle, you can’t even see the skyline, there’s so many cranes – what’s going on, that we don’t have more of those cranes, here? I just want some cranes in Tacoma! (Ibid.) What this civic leader wants is commercial office space development, tall buildings, white-­collar jobs, and a return to and improvement on the bustling downtown that defined Tacoma’s early twentieth-­century heyday. In this view, the

Politicisation of Community Development   193 city was prosperous because the downtown was thriving as an employment and retail centre for people with means. While there are counter-­arguments to this view, many of the city’s economic elites seem to take for granted the idea that downtown development is the single most important purpose of planning. Business owners and civic leaders bemoan the loss of their ‘vibrant downtown – where people gathered’ (Roberts, 2015). The plan for an International Financial Services Area, created in 1998 and updated in 2008 to relax zoning regulations and increase tax subsidies in an attempt to retain a large international financial services headquarters, namely IFSA Resolution, is illustrative of a deep-­seated belief in big downtown buildings as the sine qua non of urban development. This vision is held in place by images such as the 3-D district model in Figure 11.1. Despite dwarfing nearby semi-­occupied buildings by a factor of up to ten, the plan image was reproduced as hopeful, bold, and necessary in the local news media. And despite Tacoma’s persistent actual economic employment base in the military, government, and healthcare (Williams and Pendras, 2013), the discourse of urban development as downtown commercial space remains strikingly entrenched and depoliticised. Scholars in the Urban Studies programme at UW Tacoma have continually sought to problematise these simplistic assumptions about the purpose and function of urban planning and governance in Tacoma,

Figure 11.1 New office space envisioned in the ‘urban development as downtown commercial space’ discourse. Source: City of Tacoma Comprehensive Plan, Downtown Element, 2008, p. DT-51.

194   Anne Taufen for instance through classroom experiments inviting civic leaders into conversation with students (Pendras and Dierwechter, 2012). Politicising Discourse – Urban Development as Affordable Housing An alternative, complementary discourse of development was introduced through the 2015 forum, based on research and analysis conducted through the Urban Studies Unit. This additional discourse intentionally sought to shift the focus of discussion and understanding to the opportunities and challenges posed by the provision of affordable housing in Tacoma. As with the downtown development discourse, this line of thinking was not carried forth solely by the words spoken and ideas put forth by its proponents; it was represented and promulgated by its own discrete elements of disciplinary technology, meant to counter and dislodge the prevalence of the cranes-­and-tall-­buildings assumption described above. This effort at constructive politicisation was approached in two ways. First, speakers were identified and invited who could contextualise urban development conditions beyond downtown, in Tacoma and elsewhere. These speakers included, for instance, an urban studies and planning scholar from nearby Portland, OR (Ethan Seltzer, Portland State University); an experienced regional elected leader, and federal housing and urban development official (Ron Sims, former King County Executive/Deputy Secretary of US Housing and Urban Development); and an iconoclastic writer and commentator who focuses on prevalent trends and patterns in urban development, for popular media (Joel Kotkin, Daily Beast and forbes.com). Faculty organisers sought to build a case for analysing and playing to Tacoma’s development strengths, in the context of regional labour and housing markets – and intentionally enlisted well-­known, effective speakers to draw attention to the city’s advantages in terms of cost of living, planned transit-­oriented development, and relatively affordable housing stock. Second, and important from the perspective of representing and circulating this alternative discourse, is the generation of empirical analysis that illustrates the market for affordable housing in Tacoma as a development opportunity. Director of Urban Studies, Ali Modarres based his opening and closing remarks on his recently completed study, ‘Context for Development: Demography, Economy, and Regional Dynamics’ (Modarres, 2015). Of 26 maps, charts and figures in the 33-page report, one was displayed and reproduced repeatedly, at the forum, online and through social media, showing the presence of large numbers of commuters working in King County (where Seattle, Bellevue, Redmond and other employment hubs are located) and living in adjacent counties (where Tacoma is located). The message: many people live in Tacoma, but work in greater Seattle. Rather than bemoan this reality, as the discourse of urban development as downtown commercial space implicitly does (‘Why can’t those companies just move to our downtown?’ – ‘See how many tall buildings we can build?’), creating a discourse of urban development as affordable housing strives to highlight

Politicisation of Community Development   195 and build upon a different interpretation of empirical conditions, as well as a specific normative stance on what it means to be a liveable, just city. As a popular local blog summarised the day-­long forum, posting the commuting map described above: There’s no getting around the fact that Seattle dominates the economy in the region … more jobs, more companies, higher incomes … homes are worth more … and the percentage of workers commuting to jobs outside King County is tiny.… So Seattle has all that. What do Tacoma and Pierce County have? Well, we have affordability … and the conditions that may actually be what people are looking for. (exit133.com, ‘Jobs and Housing: Finding the Sweet Spot for Affordable Quality of Life,’ 5 March 2015) Moreover, the normative stance of a discourse of urban development as affordable housing moves beyond the market preferences of commuters who work in Seattle. While real estate developers tend to justify the creation of new, high-­cost housing in Tacoma with the claim that the city is already suffused with affordable, market-­rate homes, this is simply not the case for residents who do not have secure, high-­wage jobs. Michael Mirra, Executive Director of the Tacoma Housing Authority (THA) and a regular partner with UWT on collaborative projects, student internships, and applied research, was one of the final speakers at the 2015 forum. While part of his presentation involved describing THA initiatives, he closed by highlighting the significant unmet need for low-­ income housing in Tacoma and reading from letters submitted by hopeful applicants. The frustration and desperation of these letters refuted the notion that Tacoma has sufficient affordable housing for all who need it, or that those who need it do not work, or strive or deserve shelter. By providing a platform for this perspective, with evidence surfaced and personalised for the hundreds of attendees gathered at the event, the university serves as a live ideational space that is not only intellectual and scholarly, but also moral and normative. By deliberately complicating a planning and development discourse that privileges downtown and real estate interests over the needs of existing residents, university actors use their research expertise and teaching skills to repoliticise the aims of planning and governance. Liveable City Year The Puget Sound region is one of the fastest-­growing urban areas in the US. The Seattle-­Tacoma-Bellevue metropolitan statistical area (MSA), with the population increasing from approximately three to 3.8 million between 2000 and 2016, the growth of 26.7 per cent or about 1.7 per cent per year (www.census.gov). As a heavily urbanised region, where marked inequality characterises patterns of capital investment, job creation, and property valuation (Dierwechter and

196   Anne Taufen Wessells, 2013), the region faces profound challenges in its efforts to improve sustainability and liveability for people and communities in its cities and suburbs. Recognising this challenge, the UW recently joined a network of institutions across the country participating in the Educational Partnerships for Innovation in Communities Network (EPIC-­N) (epicn.org). More specifically, UW has adopted a partnership model originated at the University of Oregon, Sustainable City Year, that matches faculty and courses across the university with a single city or jurisdiction looking to improve its sustainability impact for residents and communities. UW renamed their model ‘Liveable City Year’, to reflect the political distaste in many US communities for the term ‘sustainability’ – in effect depoliticising the name of the programme (for who can be against liveability?), in order to constructively politicise its projects, pedagogy and partnership. Liveable City Year is a series of projects identified by the partnering government, such as an open space survey, development site feasibility study, community asset map, business market analysis, data tracking tool or any number of other requests, where they are in need of expertise, recommendations and labour. The projects are paired with university faculty who conduct research and train students in related disciplines – for instance, land use planning, urban design, civil engineering, marketing, law and so on – and that faculty member’s course becomes a learning laboratory for students who engage with the jurisdiction to deliver work products for the use and benefit of the city, that also further the goals of liveability. The partnering government enters into a contract with the university for the year, paying a per-­project amount that goes towards university staff time to coordinate the programme, as well as providing a small stipend to participating faculty for any course-­related costs associated with the project, for instance, student transportation, materials for meetings, supplies for conducting surveys or field research. While this is not explicitly stated, liveability promises a higher quality of life for more residents through more just and equitable programme delivery and community development. Thus, the projects as defined and the partnership as enacted, provide an opportunity, through dozens of different classes and hundreds of different students, to explore negotiated practices of experimentation and implementation. For instance, a city may request a market study to understand economic conditions and development feasibility of different retail uses in a particular neighbourhood or district. Because the university faculty and students bring a research perspective, in addition to the practical skills that enable them to execute the project, they can consider and operationalise broader questions of liveability – e.g. What are the risks of gentrification and displacement? What kinds of uses might be profitable and support a diversity of social and community development targets? What are the trends, risks, rewards and probable outcomes in similar cities pursuing retail development? And so on. By engaging the partnership in this way – not just delivering on a contractual model, as a for-­profit consultant might do, and at a lower cost, but also, deliberately incorporating the insights borne of sustained study in a particular field, and its

Politicisation of Community Development   197 hallmarks of comparative and longitudinal knowledge – the faculty and students have an opportunity to politicise practices of planning and governance, by constructing complementary and less-­common pathways forward. Not all aspects of the partnership and its component projects are actively politicised – by design. The university as a boundary object is engaged in the primary tasks of bringing together the different parties, establishing the final scope of projects proposed by the government partner, and delivering to students the discipline-­specific learning outcomes of participating faculty. Through these commitments, however, the emergent opportunities for constructive politicisation through individual projects, intentional pedagogy and ongoing partnership can be especially effective. Projects The projects identified by the government partner, defined and negotiated by the city lead and the course faculty, and executed by both parties through the cooperation of the students, create multiple opportunities for politicisation, however typically not by directly engaging community members, or seeking and amplifying oppositional discourses. Rather, politicisation is attempted through engagement with, and navigation of the city’s existing practices, with an eye towards changing, complementing, challenging, or redirecting established ways of doing things – sometimes creative and productive, and sometimes uncomfortable. At the most functional level, projects match a need identified by individual managers and planners at the city hall/government, with a research and professional expertise, and set of student learning outcomes that exist at the university. City governments applying each year to partner with the university have their own internal process for defining, prioritising and proposing projects, which they include as a preliminary list in their application. The university, in turn, considers the feasibility and potential impact of these projects, as they select a partner. It is perhaps predictable that, on the face of it, the city is motivated to obtain a particular work product, for instance a site plan, an economic analysis, a health impact assessment, and to pay less for it than they would to a consultant. Similarly, faculty and students are often pleased to have real-­time cases and work opportunities through which to practice the competencies of their field, and execution of the project task(s) during the course term is a skills-­based exercise that in and of itself, meets the needs of many academic units and degree programmes. However, the opportunity for politicisation subsists in the broad goal of ‘liveability’, in the public responsibility of the local government to optimally serve its various residents and communities, and in the civic mission of the university and the normative dimension of knowledge production as a professional endeavour. The projects themselves become sites of negotiation as they are defined, scopes of work determined, and students engaged in their delivery. The city might opt to subtly politicise the way a planning or governance topic is approached, through their project definitions – perhaps they are a particularly

198   Anne Taufen progressive jurisdiction, and/or they have the discretion to experiment with ambitious or alternative project briefs, with less pressure on the encumbered funds, since the per-­project cost is dramatically lower than it would be, to hire and contract with multiple, market-­rate consultants. Additionally, faculty and students can be asked to think creatively and deliver forms of analysis that are not necessarily produced by more typical government consultants. Even if the city is not particularly ambitious or intentional about defining projects that explore and operationalise concepts of liveability and sustainability, the university faculty involved can use the project deliverables to do so, both in setting the scope of work and in guiding students to execute it. For instance, if a city identifies an important project as assessing possible alignments for a new transit stop, and a civil engineering class takes this on, the faculty and the students might be in a position to supplement their physical analysis – site grade, materials and design choices, demolition and construction costs – with emerging social and ecological concerns, possibly more common among engineering researchers than private engineering firms. What are the social implications of displacing existing conditions? What are the environmental impacts of adjacencies to other land uses? Can such questions be characterised and estimated, and included in the analysis? These are the kind of politicisations that can be enabled by project work where the university serves as a boundary object. The work required by the city partner is provided and delivered, however, the capacity to add value through empirical awareness, additional analysis, and an expanded notion of the common good, is increased. It is by no means guaranteed that this will happen, and in fact, there are established patterns that will make it difficult, as described by the dominant discourse in the first example, drawn from the same city. However, the potential for new understandings to emerge and be enacted through project work carries with it the added possibility of lasting institutional change. Pedagogy as Practice The approach to experiential learning and to course design and skills development in Liveable City Year also lends itself to practice-­based politicisation. The first and classic politicisation is between theory and practice. Whereas faculty researchers traditionally enjoy the distance of scholarship and classroom, the Liveable City Year model forces their ways of knowing, received disciplinary concerns and conceptual models into direct engagement with the realities of practice. This praxis means that alternative and critical discourses of planning and governance, including those related to community development, which are so common and justified in scholarly research and theorisation, must contend with the challenges of what to do in the organisational settings where plans are made, people and places are governed, and resources are allocated. This politicisation of planning and governance can be challenging for everyone involved: habituated rituals of professional practice are laid bare to interpretation and attempts at reconfiguration by university faculty, theoretical models and

Politicisation of Community Development   199 p­ rofessional practice settings rarely align neatly and predictably, and the expertise of university faculty is shown and experienced as a contingent, sometimes incomplete and evolving competency. Thus, the relationship between faculty and students is also being politicised, where the faculty’s sole authority in delivering course content is decentred, in favour of students learning-­by-doing, and learning from practising professionals about the constraints, opportunities and demands of their field. Faculty frame and guide the process, however by empowering their students to translate and put into practice the epistemological and normative bases of their course content, students become agents in their own educational and professional development, learning not only to comprehend and reiterate the orienting maxims of their field but more powerful, politically, to attempt to act in line with imperatives raised by empirical research. For instance, a student trained in critical urban geography will undoubtedly develop a concern for the power of capital in regimes of accumulation and the tendency for urban elites to hoard resources, shape urban space to their demands, and invite only competition that enriches already-­privileged communities and residents – all of which pose serious concerns for urban liveability and sustainability. A pedagogy that requires those students to make sense of such concerns in the venues where such decisions are taken and reproduced, mitigates against the too-­common tendency for such critical discourses to remain exactly where they originated – within the confines of the university. The project outcomes may not be perfect, but at the very least that budding critical theorist has been offered an avenue to act upon and engage, rather than merely vilify, the forces of planning and governance so beholden to acquisitive capital. Partnership Finally, the very partnership model embodied by Liveable City Year enables politicisation through the process of building trust and demonstrating mutual benefits between city, faculty, and students. The city is paying for specific project outcomes, however, they are spending far less than they would for private consultants providing similar services, and gaining the possibility of more original, context-­driven and research-­based recommendations, as opposed to purely market-­driven products, which can be driven by the need for city-­bycity replication and efficiency. As the partnership is developed over the course of the year, and projects are successfully completed and work products delivered, relationships between city staff and faculty researchers have a chance to establish and strengthen. When such partnerships are generative, they develop the capacity to weather conflict, friction, and disagreement. At the start of the year, a university researcher walking into a city’s office of economic development (for instance) may not receive a particularly favourable response by putting forth their various rationales for the city’s need to house its homeless and cede more land use zones to mixed-­use and affordable housing. Even if the research is immaculate and well argued, and the findings show social decline and long-­term economic polarisation from an over-­reliance on high-­end

200   Anne Taufen residential and retail development; the likely outcome is that the researcher and the economic development official will remain ensconced in their disparate discourses and likely stew in irritation at the other’s lack of understanding and practical judgement. ‘How can she use public resources to enrich developers and investors, when so many residents go un-­housed and unemployed, ultimately a far greater threat to this city’s economic viability?’ – ‘How can he expect me to ignore market realities, when property and business taxes are the basis of the city’s revenue, and city council expects an optimal return on investment for any use of public funds?’ Through extended partnership models such as Liveable City Year, where such actors can engage and begin to appreciate the other’s discourse through the practice of framing and executing a shared project, politicisation can be less a war of words and ideas, and more an exercise in working out actual tasks, policy recommendations, and planning and governance possibilities. Because the university scholars leading the courses where the work is produced usually do not labour under the same market constraints or path dependencies of the government host or its typical consultants, they may be in a position to create a partnership that is less asymmetrical, utilitarian and consensus-­oriented than those criticised in the collaboration literature. The university as a boundary object has the potential to shift some of the power imbalances inherent in stakeholder-­based collaborative process, not necessarily to a purely or always equal footing, but to a more organic model of partnership where faculty are not necessarily beholden in the same ways to the habituated expectations of the city as a client or a more powerful actor. In each of these areas – projects, pedagogy, partnership – the university’s boundary object role provides the space and capacity to bring faculty, city staff, and students together, however it also draws on the research expertise and civic mission of the institution to orient shared practices with the potential to make cities more just and sustainable – and thus liveable.

Conclusion: Specific and Universal Intellectuals, Discourse into Practice The university as a ‘boundary object’ embedded in network processes of planning and governance opens a more radical critique of such processes from a post-­ structural perspective, with a deeply empirical, practice-­based assessment of how discourses of urban development actually intersect and shift. Foucault, who in addition to providing and animating the language of discursive regimes with foundational questions of power, had plenty to say about the role of the scholar when ‘a new mode of the ‘connection between theory and practice’ has been established’ (Foucault, 1984: pp. 68–69)– namely, that ‘even as the writer tends to disappear as a figurehead, the university and the academic emerge, if not as principal elements, at least as “exchangers,” privileged points of intersection’. If the university and the academic are central in maintaining a discursive regime, deliberately or not in their role as ‘anchor institutions’ (Harkavy, 2009),

Politicisation of Community Development   201 then they can also help to challenge and/or reconstitute those regimes through the very work that they do (Foucault, 1984: p. 73). In the specificity of conducting and presenting urban research, for instance, scholars who study planning, development and governance and who engage with community partners in intentional boundary-­spanning practices of gathering, communicating, representing, discussing, debating and listening, are able to directly encounter and influence the perpetuation of discourses that frame subsequent understandings and action. Moreover, this is not just in our collective heads – discourse, for Foucault, is embodied, technological, material; we are formed and silently disciplined in our discursive habits and assumptions by representations, things, images. For Foucault (1984: pp.  69–75), the ‘universal’ role of the intellectual had been undermined and downgraded to that of ‘specific’ tasks and expertise, in response to the immediate political and economic context, as early as the 1970s. Rather than lamenting this, Foucault asserts that ‘the role of the specific intellectual must become more and more important in proportion to the political responsibilities which he [sic] is obliged willy-­nilly to accept’; that is, the specificity of the professional work of the modern academic ‘is linked, in a society like ours, to the general functioning of an apparatus of truth’ (Foucault, 1984: pp. 72–73). The specificity, for Foucault, is the leverage point through which the academic can challenge the operative regime of truth, and thus approach the more general level of understanding and impact for which they have been trained. ‘The essential political problem for the intellectual … is that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people’s consciousness – or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth’ (p. 74). The first example above – the Urban Studies Forum – shows how mobilising empirical research findings and illustrating those findings through technologies of representation and communication, can implicitly call into question a dominant discourse of development, allowing a more accurate, and thus politicised discourse of development to be articulated and promulgated. The second example – the Liveable City Year model – shows how engaging practice with research-­based ideas and students’ professional training, can enable the politicisation of all three, allowing planning and governance officials, university faculty, and students in a variety of classes and programmes to contend with each others’ existing discourses and both educational and professional expectations, yielding project outcomes with the potential to alter community development, in intentionally politicised yet deeply practical ways. In both examples, the university’s boundary object role enables scholars to explore and even mobilise conflict, rather than ignoring or ‘fixing’ it. While these efforts are not always or fully successful, they are important pathways for trying to infiltrate dominant discourses and established practices of planning and governance that currently perpetuate conditions of profound inequity. Politicisation is essential in order to create more just, sustainable and liveable cities and regions. This chapter argues for the ideational role of community-­ engaged universities in building this politicisation into planning and governance, challenging and transforming both its discourse and its practice. Far from this

202   Anne Taufen being a purely cerebral, traditionally intellectual role, the active encounter of urban scholars with specific questions and challenges in metropolitan development and governance community networks means that they are in a position to influence the discursive regime of that region’s ‘politics of truth’ (Foucault, 1984: pp. 73–74). The university as a boundary object is more than a value-­neutral convener or agent of collaboration. It is a space of negotiation, where assumptions can be challenged and reframed, and alternative paths forward are subjected to the creative uncertainty and possibility of experimentation. Through such politicisations, scholars have the opportunity to draw on their research and teaching capacities, to more effectively impact the cities and regions where they live and work.

Acknowledgements Versions of this chapter (‘Universities as Boundary Objects’) were presented and circulated at the 2015 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning conference, Houston, TX, USA; and at the 2016 World Planning Schools Congress, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The author gratefully acknowledges feedback on these drafts from Victoria Lowerson Bredow, Crystal Legacy, Raul Lejano, Mark Pendras, and Juliana Zanotto.

Notes 1 See Carnegie Community Engagement Classification, http://engagement.fiu.edu/about­us/carnegie-­community-engagement/index.html. 2 www.tacoma.uw.edu/events/content/2015-urban-­studies-forum-­question-development-­ jobs-housing-­south-sound.

References Bond, S. (2011) Negotiating a democratic ethos: Moving beyond the agonistic-­ communicative divide. Planning Theory, 10(2), 161–186. Boyer, E.L. (1996) The scholarship of engagement. Bulletin of the Amer­ican Academy of Arts and Sciences, 49(7), 18–33. City of Tacoma (2002) Introduction – City of Tacoma Comprehensive Plan. Tacoma WA, City of Tacoma. Dewey, J. (1927, 2016) The Public and its Problems. Columbus, OH, Ohio University Press. Dierwechter, Y. and Wessells, A.T. (2013) The uneven localisation of climate action in metropolitan Seattle. Urban Studies, 50(7), 1368–1385. Fainstein, S.S. (2010) The Just City. Ithaca, NY and London, Cornell University Press. Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981, 1991) Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. New York, Penguin Books. Foucault, M. (1984) Truth and power, from power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings. In: Rabinow, P. (ed.) The Foucault Reader. New York, Pantheon. Friedman, R.A. and Polodny, J. (1992) Differentiation of boundary spanning roles: Labor negotiation and implications for role conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(1), 28–47.

Politicisation of Community Development   203 Fung, A. (2003) Recipes for public spheres: Eight institutional design choices and their consequences. Journal of Political Philosophy, 11(3), 338–367. Gillie, J. (2014, 26 June 2014) Construction on a five-­story, 154-unit apartment in Proctor Business District beginning soon. Tacoma News Tribune. Hajer, M.A. (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Harkavy, I. (2009) Anchor institutions as partners in building successful communities and local economies, In: Retooling HUD for a Catalytic Federal Government: A Report to Secretary Shaun Donovan. Philadelphia, PA, Penn Institute for Urban Research, University of Pennsylvania. Healey, P. (2012) Re-­enchanting democracy as a mode of governance. Critical Policy Studies, 6(1), 19–39. Inch, A. (2015) Ordinary citizens and the political cultures of planning: In search of the subject of a new democratic ethos. Planning Theory, 14(4), 404–424. Jacobs, J. (1961) The Death and Life of Great Amer­ican Cities. New York: Random House. Kettl, D.F. (2006) Managing boundaries in Amer­ican administration: The collaboration imperative. Public Administration Review, 66(1a), 10–19. Lake, R. (2017) On poetry, pragmatism and the urban possibility of creative democracy. Urban Geography, 38(4), 479–494. Lejano, R. and Ingram, H. (2009) Collaborative networks and new ways of knowing. Environmental Science and Policy, 12(6), 653–662. Modarres, A. (2015) Context for Development: Demography, Economy, and Regional Dynamics. Available from https://issuu.com/uwtacoma/docs/sociodemographic-­ economic-landscape (accessed 24 October 2015). Pendras, M. and Dierwechter, Y. (2012) The problematic potential of universities to advance critical urban politics. Journal of Geography in Higher Education, 36(2), 307–321. Peterson, P.E. (1981) City Limits. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Purcell, M. (2009) Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or counter-­ hegemonic movements? Planning Theory, 8(2), 140–165. Quick, K. and Feldman, M. (2014) Boundaries as junctures: Collaborative boundary work for building efficient resilience. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 24(3), 673–695. Roberts, C.R. (2015, 10 October) One store’s vow to stay in downtown Tacoma. Tacoma News Tribune. Schon, D.A. and Rein, M. (1995) Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies. New York, Basic Books. Weerts, D.J. and Sandmann, L.R. (2010) Community engagement and boundary-­spanning roles at research universities. Journal of Higher Education, 81(6), 702–727. Wessells, A. (2014) Dear Prudence: Power, campus-­community collaborations, and constructive disruption, paper presented at the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Philadelphia, PA. Williams, C. and Pendras, M. (2013) Urban stasis and the politics of alternative development in the United States. Urban Geography, 34(3), 289–304. Young, I.M. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zanotto, J.M. (2016) The making of global suburbs: Globalization, neoliberalism, and planning practices. Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in Planning, Policy, and Design, University of California.

12 A Counter-­Movement to ‘Place-­Less’ Power Planners as Progressive Place-­Based Leaders Robin Hambleton Introduction Planning has always been a political activity, not least because it has always had distributional consequences. While recognising that planning legislation varies across countries and that the role of professional planners in different societies is varied and is always evolving in response to changing political pressures and expectations, it is clear that city and regional planning will, inevitably, continue to shape who gains and who loses in the modern city. It follows that, as explained almost 50 years ago by the Amer­ican sociologist, Herbert Gans, the central question for those concerned to critically examine the nature of city or spatial planning is: ‘Who plans with what ends and means for which interest groups?’ (Gans, 1972: p. 71). This chapter offers a fresh take on this fundamental question. Many critical urban scholars have shown how planning policies, intentionally or not, often serve the interests of the powerful at the expense of the poor (Davies and Imbroscio, 2010; Brenner et al., 2012). These studies are vital to our understanding of modern city planning. A central aim of this chapter is to suggest that, while recognising and valuing the many solid critiques of the practice of urban and regional planning in particular settings in different countries, it would advance the field if planning scholars paid more attention to researching and explaining ‘successful’ planning efforts. By ‘successful’ I mean efforts that strive not just to advance the cause of socio-­economic justice in the city (Fainstein, 2010), but also the furtherance of environmental justice (Boone and Modarres, 2006). More specifically, the argument presented here is that much planning theory is weak because it has neglected leadership theory and, more specifically, the role of place-­based leadership in modern systems of urban governance. This is a remarkable oversight given that planning practitioners often refer to the importance of leadership in bringing about successful planning interventions. The opening section of this chapter explains how it is helpful to distinguish between place-­less and place-­based power. A second section outlines a conceptual framework for understanding the power of place. The third section introduces a discussion of modern conceptions of leadership, and the claim is made that the literature on leadership offers many valuable insights for planning

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   205 scholarship. In particular, leadership theory can throw new light on how planners can join with others to oppose narrow, market-­driven thinking in public policy-­ making. The discussion introduces a new way of conceptualising place-­based leadership – New Civic Leadership (NCL). This suggests that, in most cities, there are likely to be five overlapping realms of civic leadership. The areas of overlap, I describe these as innovation zones, can provide opportunities for the co-­creation of new solutions and possibilities. This discussion of concepts relating to place-­based power and place-­based leadership provides the platform for a presentation of several successful examples of city planners providing progressive place-­based leadership in specific cities. These include a look back to the pioneering efforts at equity planning pursued by Norman Krumholz, Director of Planning in Cleveland, Ohio in the 1970s, and come right up to date with cameos of the imaginative place-­based leadership being shown today by city planners in three progressive cities – Malmö, Sweden, Freiburg, Germany, and Portland, Oregon, USA. The chapter concludes with a discussion of emerging themes relating to planning, power and place-­based leadership.

Planning in the Face of Place-­Less Power John Forester (1989), in his book, Planning in the Face of Power, rightly argued that to be effective, planners need organisational skills and knowledge as well as technical competence. He argued that by deploying their professional skills, particularly negotiation skills, planners could act as mediators in local conflicts and secure more equitable outcomes in the local political process than would otherwise be the case. Over the years research on planning practice has suggested that this mediating role is challenging – see, for example, a recent book examining the experience of student planners reflecting on their experience of planning practice (Taşan-­Kok and Oranje, 2018). Here I want to suggest that greater attention now needs to be given to the interplay between local efforts to plan cities in an inclusive, wise and purposeful way and the global economic forces that now place significant constraints on the exercise of democratic governance by locally elected leaders. It is incontestable that, what I call, place-­less power has grown dramatically in the period since Forester provided his influential analysis. By place-­less power, I mean the exercise of power by decision-­makers who are unconcerned about the impact of their decisions on communities living in particular places. The forces of economic globalisation, which have resulted in a remarkable growth in the number of multinational companies operating on a global basis, have provided the engine for this expansion in place-­less policy-­ making, and the consequences for social and economic justice have been dire (Stiglitz, 2006). Michael Sandel (2012), in his acclaimed book, What Money Can’t Buy, shows how the global economic crisis of 2008/2009 did more than cast doubts on the ability of markets to allocate risk efficiently. The crisis and the global economic convulsions that have followed in recent years have prompted a deeper sense of

206   Robin Hambleton unease, a feeling that markets have become detached from morals and a broader sense of public purpose. Sandel notes that, for many, the solution is to rein in greed, insist on higher standards of probity in the banking industry, and to enact sensible regulations that will prevent irresponsible financial practices in the future. His major insight, however, is to recognise that such an approach is insufficient. Sandel argues that, while excessive greed played a major role in the financial crash, something more troubling was actually happening: The most fateful change that unfolded during the past three decades was not an increase in greed. It was the expansion of markets, and market values, into spheres of life where they don’t belong.… We need a public debate about what it means to keep markets in their place. To have this debate, we need to think through the moral limits of markets. We need to ask whether there are some things money should not buy. (Sandel, 2012: p. 7) In a recent book on inclusive city leadership (Hambleton, 2015), I build on Sandel’s critique of modern society and argue that city leaders, and I include here city planners, can play an important role in highlighting the moral limits of markets and can draw attention to the importance of advancing other important values, for example, altruism, solidarity, generosity and civic spirit. From this point of view, planning in the face of place-­less power can be seen as part of a wider effort to bring back moral judgement into public policy-­making. It involves acting to advance progressive values against narrow neoliberal conceptions of how to improve society. In this chapter, the word ‘progressive’ is used to mean the creation and implementation of policies and practices designed to move away from the exploitation of people and the planet. In contrast to neoliberal politicians, and those exercising place-­less power, progressive civic leaders strive for just results while caring for the natural environment on which we all depend.

Framing the Power of Place As already mentioned place-­based leaders are not free agents able to do exactly as they choose. On the contrary, various powerful forces shape the context within which civic leaders, including city planners, operate. These forces do not erase the possibilities for local leadership. Rather they place limits on what urban leaders may be able to accomplish in particular places and at particular moments in time. Figure 12.1 provides a simplified picture of the four sets of forces that shape the world of place-­based governance in any given locality. At the bottom of the diagram are, what I take to be, the non-­negotiable environmental limits. The scientific evidence on climate change suggests that ignoring the fact that cities are part of the natural ecosystem is irresponsible, and failure to pay attention to environmental limits will store up unmanageable problems for future generations (Bulkeley, 2013; Girardet, 2008; Jackson, 2009).

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   207

Figure 12.1  Framing the political space for place-based governance. Source: Hambleton (2015: p. 114).

This side of the square is drawn with a solid line because, unlike the other sides of the square, these environmental limits are non-­negotiable. On the left-­hand side of the diagram are socio-­cultural forces – these comprise a mix of people (as actors) and cultural values (that people may hold). Here we find the rich variety of voices found in any city – including the claims of activists, businesses, artists, entrepreneurs, trade unionists, religious organisations, community-­based groups, citizens who vote, citizens who don’t vote, children, newly arrived immigrants, anarchists and so on. The people of the city will have different views about the kind of city they wish to live in, and they will have differential capacities to make these views known. Some, maybe many, will claim a right to the city (Brenner et al., 2012; Lefebvre, 1967). We can assume that, in democratic societies at least, elected leaders who pay little or no attention to these political pressures should not expect to stay in office for too long. Expression of

208   Robin Hambleton citizen’s voice, to use Hirschman’s term (1970), will see them dismissed at the ballot box. On the right-­hand side of the diagram are the horizontal economic forces that arise from the need for localities to compete, to some degree at least, in the wider marketplace – for inward investment and to attract talented people. Some writers argue that owing to local resource deficits and the need to maintain a competitive position, cities have become dependent on higher levels of government and private investment for survival (Peterson, 1981). On this analysis urban dependency increases as the world becomes more global. Labour and capital are mobile, people follow jobs, and industry opts to move to more distant locations where the cost of land and labour is lower. A central claim of this neoliberal logic is that cities should conceive of themselves as business corporations – as efficiency-­maximising organisations, which must strive to enhance economic productivity as determined by the needs of capital. However, various studies have shown that, contrary to neoliberal dogma, it is possible for civic leaders to bargain with business (Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Recognising the power of economic forces, including the growth in global competition between localities, does not require civic leaders to become mere servants of private capital. For example, a detailed study of the governance of London, New York, Paris and Tokyo concluded that: Global forces are not making the politics of place less important. Globalism and local governance are not mutually exclusive but are deeply entwined … important differences remain in the ways particular world city-­regions are mediating international forces. (Kantor et al., 2012: p. 241) On the top of Figure 12.1, we find the legal and policy framework imposed by higher levels of government. In some countries, this governmental framing will include legal obligations decreed by supranational organisations. For example, local authorities in countries that are members of the EU are required to comply with EU laws and regulations, and to take note of EU policy guidance. Individual nation states determine the legal status, fiscal powers, planning powers and functions of local authorities within their boundaries. These relationships are subject to negotiation and renegotiation over time. It is clear that the figure simplifies a much more complex reality. This is what conceptual frameworks do. In reality, the four sets of forces framing local action do not necessarily carry equal weight, and the situation in any given city is, to some extent, fluid and changing. For example, Richard Flanagan in his analysis of Amer­ican mayoral leadership stresses the importance of timing (Flanagan, 2004, pp. 13–16). The space available for a local agency is always shifting, and a key task of local leaders is to be alert to the opportunities for advancing the power of their place within the context of the framing forces prevailing on their area at the time. Figure 12.1 also indicates that place-­based governance, shown at the centre, is porous. Successful civic leaders are constantly learning from the

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   209 environment in which they find themselves in order to discover new insights, co-­ create new solutions and advance their political objectives. Note that the four forces are not joined up at the corners to create a rigid prison within which civic leadership has to be exercised. On the contrary, the boundaries of the overall arena are, themselves, malleable. Depending on the culture and context, imaginative civic leaders may be able to disrupt the pre-­existing governmental frame and bring about an expansion in place-­based power.

Understanding Leadership There is no agreed definition of what leadership means. Understandings of leadership have shifted over time and they remain contested (Bolden et al., 2016; Grint, 2005). This does not mean, however, that leadership does not exist, nor that it is a concept that planning theorists should ignore. Rather, the contested nature of the term implies a need for discussions of leadership to be sensitive to the context in which leadership is exercised, to the nature of the leadership task under consideration and to the moral purpose of leadership in that particular context. In an effort to spark fresh thinking in relation to strengthening the role of leadership in planning theory I would like to caricature two contrasting ways of thinking about leadership. A long-­established view of leadership, one that still prevails in much public discourse, is that leadership is a top-­down process, one in which senior people ‘at the top’ issue instructions and/or guidance to their subordinates. This perspective on leadership is, at root, built around the claim that: ‘A leader is someone who has followers’. This conceptualisation tends to picture leaders as heroic figures, often with charismatic personalities, who have a vision and are well placed to tell their followers what to do (Adair, 2002). We can contrast this traditional top-­down view of leadership with one that some describe as facilitative leadership (Svara, 1994), and others refer to as adaptive leadership (Heifetz et al., 2009). A facilitative, or adaptive, approach to leadership emphasises the importance of leaders listening to diverse views and putting significant effort into coalition building. This is not a top-­down view of leadership. It resonates with recent work on ‘living’ leadership: Leadership is not, then about knowing the answers and inspiring others to follow. It is the capacity to release the collective intelligence and insights of groups and organisations. It is helping people to find their own answers. (Binney et al., 2012: pp. 10–11) Two risks with this juxtaposition of two contrasting perspectives on the nature and meaning of leadership are, first, that it simplifies too much and, second, that it might be read as implying that leadership emphasising top-­down command and control is, somehow, always suspect, whereas facilitative or adaptive leadership is, on the whole, rather good. This is not my intention. The point that needs to be highlighted is that leadership style needs to be context and task-­sensitive.

210   Robin Hambleton For example, in an emergency, it is essential for leaders in positions of authority to take swift decisions on the basis of limited information and to exercise firm command and control (Bungay, 2011). However, most leadership and certainly most place-­based leadership exercised by planners is provided in situations that are not emergencies. Taking account of these various debates, and my experience of working with community and city leaders in a number of different countries, it is possible to define leadership as: ‘Shaping emotions and behaviour to achieve common goals’ (Hambleton, 2007: p. 174). Possible strengths of this definition are that it draws attention to how people feel, and it emphasises the collective construction of common purpose. It prizes respect for the feelings and attitudes of others as well as a strong commitment to collaboration. If exercised wisely it is imaginative, values risk-­taking and involves ‘being able to put yourself in the situation of someone else’ (Keohane, 2010: p. 89). We will consider examples of city planners acting, with others, as effective, facilitative leaders shortly. But, at this point, I wish to highlight three insights from the leadership literature for planning theory and practice. First, successful leaders make an emotional connection. Daniel Goleman and his colleagues deserve credit for drawing attention, not only to the importance of emotional intelligence in management theory and practice but also to the vital role of feelings in leadership (Goleman et al., 2002). Second, as planning educators refine and develop the professional skills and competencies of the students they teach they could, perhaps, enhance their educational offer by providing insights from leadership theory. This would not, necessarily, require disruptive change. By listening to planning practitioners, planning educators are already recognising that the development of leadership skills could well be central to the future of planning education (Forester, 2013). Third, the role of leadership as a distinctive force in discussions of city and regional governance should receive more attention. In making this point I concur with the argument made by Markku Sotarauta, one that is based on detailed analysis of regional development strategies in Finland: leadership is a hidden form of agency, shadowed by such visible forms of influence as structures and formal institutions, as well as development programs and plans.… There is indeed a need to fill the gap between the misleading heroic leadership discourse and the actual, but shadowed, influence in order to better understand how regional development processes are led. (Sotarauta, 2016: p. 46) His analysis suggests that leaders who do not have a formal position relating to regional development can, in practice, be very influential. These leaders do not do what they are supposed to do, but what they feel needs to be done.

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   211 The New Civic Leadership In the 1980s New Public Management (NPM), which involves the use of private sector management practices in the public sector, gained popularity in many countries (Christensen and Laegried, 2007; Hoggett, 1991). In essence, the approach stems from the belief that government should be run like a private business. However, the introduction of NPM techniques has often done great damage to the public service ethos, and the evidence suggests that treating citizens as self-­interested consumers is a peculiarly narrow way of thinking about public service reform (Hambleton, 2015: pp. 61–63). I suggest that those interested in progressive public policy-­making might find a notion that I describe as New Civic Leadership (NCL) to be more relevant and useful. This concept, which draws insights from advances in participatory planning (Wainwright, 2003), collaborative governance (Margerum, 2011) and radical critiques of current global power structures (Monbiot, 2017), can, perhaps, replace New Public Management as a guiding philosophy for public service reform. NCL involves strong, place-­based leadership acting to co-­create new solutions to public problems by drawing on the complementary strengths of civil society, the market and the state. If we are to understand effective, place-­based leadership, we need a conceptual framework that highlights the role of local leaders in facilitating public service innovation. Here Figure 12.2 provides a sketch of a possible framework and suggests that in any given locality there are likely to be five realms of place-­based leadership reflecting different sources of legitimacy: • •

• • •

Political leadership – referring to the work of those people elected to leadership positions by the citizenry. Public managerial/professional leadership – referring to the work of public servants, including planners, appointed by local authorities, governments and third sector organisations to plan and manage public services, and promote community well-­being. Community leadership – referring to the many civic-­minded people who give their time and energy to local leadership activities in a wide variety of ways. Business leadership – referring to the contribution made by local business leaders and social entrepreneurs, who have a clear stake in the long-­term prosperity of the locality. Trade union leadership – referring to the efforts of trade union leaders striving to improve the pay and working conditions of employees.

These roles are all important in cultivating and encouraging public service innovation and, crucially, they overlap. It is possible to describe the areas of overlap as innovation zones – areas providing many opportunities for inventive behaviour. This is because different perspectives are brought together in these zones and this can enable active questioning of established approaches. This idea of ‘innovation zones’ resonates with recent research by planning scholars that

212   Robin Hambleton

Figure 12.2  The realms of place-based leadership. Source: Hambleton (2015: p. 127).

s­ uggests that planning can be conceived as a ‘trading zone’ (Balducci and Mäntysalo, 2013). It is fair to say that the areas of overlap in Figure 12.2 are often experienced as ‘conflict zones’, rather than innovation zones. Leaders from the different realms can bring different perspectives and leadership styles to the task of local governance. Clearly, these spaces provide settings for major power struggles between competing interests and values. Moreover, power is unequally distributed within these settings. This is precisely why place-­based leadership matters. The evidence from studies of urban governance in different countries is that civic leadership is critical in ensuring that the innovation zones – sometimes referred to as the ‘soft spaces’ of planning (Illsley et al., 2010) or ‘space for dialogue’ (Oliver and Pitt, 2013: pp. 198–199) – are orchestrated in a way that promotes a culture of listening that can, in turn, lead to innovation (Kahane, 2004). Civic leaders are, of course, not just ‘those at the top’. All kinds of people can exercise civic leadership and they may be inside or outside the state. It is important to state clearly that the NCL model, as outlined here, does not provide a way of reconciling all interests. Rather the claim is made that an inclusive approach to place-­based leadership can establish a widely held consensus relating to enhancing the local quality of life, one that many, if not all, local stakeholders can back. Having explained the five realms of place-­based leadership it is possible to advance the presentation by locating the five realms within the broader context outlined earlier (see Figure 12.3).

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   213

Figure 12.3  Place-based leadership in context. Source: Hambleton (2015: p. 128).

Examples of Progressive Place-­Based Leadership Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that planning theory has neglected the possibilities for planners to act as place-­based leaders in delivering an improved quality of life for residents. But there is an important exception. In 1990 an influential Amer­ican book on equity planning, co-­authored by a city planning director, Norman Krumholz, and an academic, John Forester, drew attention to the importance of public leadership in delivering effective planning policies in Cleveland, Ohio (Krumholz and Forester, 1990). Following the election of President Donald Trump in the USA in 2016, there has been renewed interest in equity planning in Amer­ican cities. Revisiting the progressive planning efforts pursued in Cleveland in the 1970s reveals an early documented example of the potential for professional planners to act as progressive civic leaders. According to Krumholz and Forester equity planning means, ‘planning efforts that pay particular attention to the needs of poor and vulnerable populations, populations also likely to suffer the burdens of racial and sexual discrimination, both institutional and personal’ (Krumholz and Forester, 1990: p. 210).

214   Robin Hambleton The practice of equity planning in the USA is, of course, constantly being updated to suit changing circumstances, but the core values of equity planning remain unchanged from earlier times (Doussard, 2015; Schrock et al., 2015). What insights for modern approaches to city planning leadership can we discover from the Cleveland experience of equity planning? First, planning leadership in Cleveland was not top-­down in the traditional sense described above. Krumholz, Director of City Planning in the city from 1969–1979, rejects any suggestion that achievements in city planning in Cleveland during this period stemmed from his special qualities as the individual planning director. This is not just testimony to modesty but a wise recognition that the planners had an impact, not as charismatic individuals, but as members of a team. The book shows how successful planning practice depends on the committed and cooperative efforts of many people. Second, Krumholz was particularly good at protecting his staff from outside interference. In the hurly-­burly of Cleveland city politics, Krumholz would often ‘take the heat’ rather than stifle his staff ’s work. Krumholz understood the important role senior leaders have in ‘holding the risk’ on behalf of others, and this leads to a third leadership insight: Emotional intelligence matters. Long before Daniel Goleman and colleagues (2002) advocated that a central task of leaders is to prime good feelings in those they lead Krumholz was nurturing talent in his city planning staff. He recruited and cultivated a competent, hard-­working and idealistic staff, who then supported one another practically and emotionally. This case study of city planning in Cleveland provides other important insights on the role of leadership in planning. In particular, it highlights the importance of planning leaders developing a shrewd understanding of the local political power structure. We now turn to consider three current examples of planners exercising progressive place-­based leadership. Cameos of planning leadership in three cities are presented below: The City of Malmö, Sweden; the City of Freiburg, Germany; and the City of Portland, Oregon, USA. These cities have been chosen because they all have a recognised track record of progressive policy-­making and they all have well-­developed arrangements for including community voices in decision-­making. Moreover, these cities all have relatively strong city planning departments, and the senior planners who lead these departments are highly respected figures within the professional world of city planning within their respective countries. The research methods used to construct the three cameos were a combination of analysis of published and unpublished reports coupled with interviews with key actors.1 Progressive Planning in Malmö, Sweden In 1994 civic leaders in the City of Malmö – population 320,000 – were faced with a formidable challenge. The traditional industries of the city, like shipbuilding, were in steep decline and, in effect, the long-­established economic structure of their city was in a state of collapse. The elected leaders, with the support of their officers, responded with great imagination to the difficulties they faced.

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   215 Under the leadership of Ilmar Reepalu, then Mayor of the City, a new vision for the future of Malmö was developed, one that imagined a thoroughly modern, environmentally aware city. Elected politicians worked closely with their officers, particularly their planning officers, to develop this new vision. Initially, the emphasis was on responding to climate change, and a major programme to regenerate the old industrial area with far-­sighted eco-­friendly policies and practices was introduced (Hall, 2014: pp. 238–244). The city not only created entirely new eco-­friendly neighbourhoods, for example, the Western Harbour, but also transformed existing, municipal housing areas, like Augustenborg, from neglected neighbourhoods into model estates. Over time, given the increase in new residents arriving in the city, a strong commitment to social sustainability and inclusion has been developed to sit alongside the long-­standing efforts to promote environmental sustainability (Nylund, 2014). City planners play a major role in the governance of Malmö at the citywide and at the neighbourhood level. Christer Larsson, Director of City Planning, put it this way: ‘The structure of the city is crucial to our approach to climate change. Through careful planning designed to ensure mixed-­use developments close to railway stations we can reduce the need for car travel enormously and, at the same time, improve access for residents to job opportunities.’ A sophisticated Comprehensive Plan for Malmö was adopted in 2000 and this was updated in 2014. The plan is designed to grow the city, but with the smallest possible environmental impact by emphasising ‘inward expansion’. High-­quality development is concentrated around public transport nodes, and the plan aims to create an appealing city that is socially, environmentally and economically sustainable. Larsson believes that planners can make a valuable contribution to civic leadership: ‘Good planning involves facilitating a process where different views, opinions and interests are integrated into a balanced result creating new buildings, public spaces and living environments for all.’ At the UK National Planning Convention held in London in 2017, Larsson identified himself as a strong believer in planning as a vehicle for building trust with inhabitants. For him planning is clearly not just a technical exercise, rather it makes an emotional connection to key values. In an interesting remark, he indicated that: ‘The vision that we are producing now is not as project-­oriented as the old one. It’s more value-­based and I think this is something crucial for planning – planning can improve society by advancing social cohesion and social connectivity.’ Going Green in Freiburg, Germany Dynamic municipal leadership has established Freiburg, a university city in southern Germany, as a world leader in relation to sustainable urban development. The city – population of 230,000 – has been successful in promoting a culture that combines a very strong commitment to green values and respect for nature, with a buoyant economy built around, among other things, renewable energy. The city has won numerous prizes for its high-­quality city planning and

216   Robin Hambleton urban design. Peter Hall went so far as to title a chapter in his book on modern urbanism ‘Freiburg: The city that did it all’ (Hall, 2014: pp. 248–273). Wulf Daseking, Director of Planning and Building in Freiburg from 1984–2012, played an important civic leadership role in advancing the cause of sound city planning. When asked for his views on civic leadership Daseking said: ‘We discussed the objectives of the city with the inhabitants – very intensively. We create a culture of discussions. Leadership in a city means to integrate and moderate different opinions.’ The population at large has a strong commitment to environmentalism and many young people are now choosing to live in Freiburg, not just because it has a well-­respected university, but also because of the strong, green values it stands for. The leadership provided by successive directly elected mayors has had a significant impact on the quality of life in the city. Special praise should go to Dr Rolph Bohme, a Social Democrat who served as Mayor of Freiburg from 1982–2002. Daseking and Bohme formed a particularly effective working relationship, and this marrying of political and professional perspectives has been a striking feature of civic leadership of Freiburg. The Green Party has deep roots in Freiburg, indeed local citizens played a key role in creating the party in the 1970s, and in 2002 Freiburg became the first major German city to elect a green mayor. Dieter Salomon won a decisive victory and emulated his predecessor in forming a close working relationship with Daseking. The community activism in the neighbourhoods of Freiburg is, arguably, the key driving force in the politics of the city, and the commitment to green values and collective purpose is highly developed. Daseking believes that planners need to come up with a clear vision for the city and with excellent ideas for progressing the vision, but to always remember that someone might have better ideas: ‘You have to be open and demonstrate that you are listening. People must have trust in you!’ Daseking also believes that planners should develop a strong emotional commitment to the place they are working in. He believes planners should ‘stay put’ in a given place for a reasonable length of time because it can take years to bring ideas to fruition. He suggests that: Planners have to be long distance runners … continuity, sensibility and a tireless dedication are very important qualities for planners to have … but there is still one point to be mentioned … to be successful planners need to have the courage to work with local political leaders to take the longer view. Equity Planning in Portland, Oregon, USA Portland, Oregon, USA has acquired an international reputation for progressive city planning. A city of 610,000 in a metropolitan area of 2.4 million, Portland has a long-­established commitment to sustainable urban development (Ozawa, 2004). Susan Anderson, Director of the Portland Bureau of Planning and Sustainability, notes that: ‘Over the past eight years, Portland has shifted its

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   217 focus to not only advance traditional planning and sustainability but also to more fully understand issues related to equity, displacement and social justice.’ Anderson and her team worked closely with, then Mayor, Sam Adams and other stakeholders to create the Portland Plan, an impressive citywide strategic plan adopted by the City Council in 2012. This bold and innovative document puts advancing equity at the heart of the strategy. The Plan provides a framework for recent housing, economic development, environmental and transportation plans and projects. For example, the City’s commitment to social equity was embodied in the development of Portland’s recently adopted 2035 Comprehensive Plan, and the Climate Action Plan, originally adopted in 2009 and updated in 2015 with a bold focus on equity. It is important to record that the adoption of an equity goal for the City of Portland emerged from a process that included collaborative capacity-­building efforts by city planners and community advocates (Bates, 2017). Lisa Bates, a planning scholar based at Portland State University, is actively involved in working with under-­represented groups in the City of Portland. Her AR on equity planning in the City suggests that outreach activities by City Hall are helping community organisations build their capacity to speak the technical language of planning and advance the cause of social justice in the City. Ted Wheeler, the recently elected Mayor of Portland, is building on the work of his predecessors and, given the progressive values of the city, it is not surprising he is now playing an important role in the network of Amer­ican cities that are opposed to the racist and divisive policies being proposed by President Trump. For example, shortly after taking up office in January 2017, he reaffirmed the importance of Portland’s role in the Sanctuary Cities movement: ‘Under my leadership as Mayor, the City of Portland will remain a welcoming, safe place for all people regardless of immigration status.’ Anderson works closely with the mayor and other leaders in the public, private and voluntary sectors and takes the view that planning can play an important role in advancing social and environmental justice in the city and the region. When asked for her views on civic leadership, Anderson said: Effective leaders are able to share their vision, engage people meaningfully, mobilise resources and work to empower people from throughout their community to reach shared objectives. Navigating the political, neighbourhood and business forces is essential, along with collaborating with public and private sector champions. Reflections on Place-­Based Leadership in Malmö, Freiburg and Portland The three cities featured in this section are located in different countries and the socio-­political contexts within which local leadership is exercised vary significantly. It follows that we should guard against generalising too freely. Context matters. However, the evidence suggests that professional planners in these three

218   Robin Hambleton cities have, for a good number of years, been influential actors in the place-­based leadership of their cities. Moreover, the achievements of city planners in these cities in promoting sustainable and equitable development are widely recognised. No city is perfect and professional planners in Malmö, Freiburg and Portland are keen to point to areas where improvements are needed. But it would be difficult to deny the argument that planners have played a productive and important leadership role in advancing progressive planning ideals in these cities. Without embarking on an extended discussion, we can, by referring to the conceptual frameworks presented earlier in this chapter, highlight several important insights relating to place, power, leadership and governance that stem from these examples. First, we can note that the elected local governments in these three cities are relatively powerful when compared with local authorities in some other countries. The political space available to local leaders is, then, relatively large (see Figure 12.1). Thus, in both Sweden and Germany elected local governments enjoy constitutional protection and this guarantees them considerable freedom to do things differently. In the USA local governments are creatures of the states and, in the Portland case, Oregon chooses to delegate significant powers to the City of Portland and a metropolitan-­wide organisation known as the Metro Council. So, again, as with Malmö and Freiburg, local leaders have a significant amount of political space within which they can innovate. In all three cases, the elected political leaders are, of course, answerable to their electorates. But, and this is a critical advantage, they enjoy significant financial and planning powers that enable them to advance progressive policies. Turning to the New Civic Leadership framework presented in Figure 12.2 we can note that all three cities benefit from a relatively high level of civic activism. Neighbourhood associations and community groups provide drive and energy for public policy-­making and, as an aside, it should be noted that university students are active in community politics in all three cities. Put another way, in all three cases the community realm of leadership shown in the diagram is valued within the local political culture, and elected politicians and their public servants engage actively in the innovation zones overlapping with community-­based interests. The professional planners in all three cities work closely with community organisations and the public at large and, as well as building legitimacy for planning decisions, the consultation processes all three cities use are valuable in generating new ideas and suggestions. In summary, planners in all three cities are active in operating in the innovation zones shown in Figure 12.2. The elected councillors and political leaders – directly elected mayors in the cases of Freiburg and Portland – have been active in promoting progressive values for many years. In all three cities, the senior planners work closely with their political leaders. This is not to say that politicians and their officers will always agree on key decisions. Sometimes there will, inevitably, be tensions between the shorter time horizons of politicians and the longer time horizons of planners. But it seems clear that the importance of having really effective communication in the innovation zone linking public managerial and professional

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   219 staff with elected members is well understood in all three cities. In some cases, the working relationship between the most senior planner and the political leader has been very close indeed. For example, the working relationship in Freiburg between Mayor Rolph Bohme and Wulf Daseking was particularly strong and effective.

Emerging Themes: Planning, Power and the Importance of Place-­Based Leadership The anti-­globalisation backlash of recent years reflects, in large measure, the fact that a growing number of people feel relatively powerless to influence decisions that have a direct impact, sometimes a devastating one, on their lives. In this chapter, it has been suggested that we can advance our understanding of this growth in anger at distant, unaccountable decision-­makers if we reflect more critically on the shifting balance of influence between, what I have called, place-­ less power and place-­based power. By building on the analysis of market failures provided by Sandel (2012), I have suggested that, in the last 30 years or so, there has been a spectacular increase in the power of place-­less decision-­makers, meaning people who make decisions without taking account of the impact of these decisions on communities living in particular places, at the direct expense of place-­based decision-­makers, meaning people who are directly accountable to people living in local communities. If this analysis is broadly correct it follows that a major challenge now facing planning scholars and planning practitioners is to consider how to bring about a ‘significant expansion of place-­based power’. It is well known that neoliberal politicians, sympathetic to global capitalist interests, dislike strong states that have the power to regulate the private sector effectively in order to advance social and environmental objectives. The overarching argument I am presenting here is that global capital also favours having weak ‘local’ governments as well as weak nation states. This is because relatively feeble local authorities will tend to lack the political and legal authority to mount an effective opposition to the impositions of place-­less decision-­making. Having emphasised the importance of place in public policy-­making, and highlighted the way that place-­based identity and passion can provide the political energy to underpin progressive planning, what themes emerge from the experience of progressive city leadership presented in this chapter for both planning practice and planning scholarship? First, values in planning matter. Spatial planning, if it means anything, is about serving the public interest ahead of serving the interests of global capital. At a time when authoritarian forces appear to be gathering, the importance of planners standing up for progressive thinking relating to social, environmental and economic justice is more important than ever. It is encouraging to be able to document and recognise the professional leadership being shown by city planners in Malmö, Freiburg and Portland. The many planners in these three cities, not just those in senior positions, bring a strong commitment to progressive values in the work they do with and for the people in the cities they serve. They

220   Robin Hambleton demonstrate an emotional commitment, not just an intellectual commitment, to the planning project and their practice can be inspiring for planners in cities and localities elsewhere. And they are not alone. Second, leadership matters. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that, when planners see themselves as place-­based leaders, they can, depending on the local context, have a significant and lasting impact on the trajectory of public policy for the city where they work. The discussion of civic leadership presented here has attempted to puncture the commonly held view that leadership is, somehow, a top-­down affair, one in which senior charismatic figures have the answers and tell their subordinates what to do. On the contrary, wise modern leadership in both the public and the private sectors emphasises listening to diverse views, bringing people together and releasing the collective intelligence and insights of groups and organisations. Modern, effective city planners rightly see themselves as civic leaders. This idea of planners as civic leaders should be encouraged, and planning scholars should be supported to enhance their understanding of leadership theories and place-­based leadership in their ongoing studies. As explained in the introduction, planning theory has, and this is difficult to understand, given very little attention to the importance of leadership in planning. This is disappointing. Very few planning theory books even mention leadership, and fewer still offer an extended analysis of the role of planners as local leaders. This is despite the fact that planning practitioners are quick to highlight the importance of leadership when they comment on successful planning efforts. Third, innovation zones matter. A conceptual framework, described as New Civic Leadership, has been presented in an attempt to throw new light on the nature of modern city planning and the possibilities for co-­creating new solutions to pressing public problems. The framework (Figure 12.3), suggests that there are likely to be five overlapping realms of place-­based leadership in any given locality and that these realms reflect different sources of legitimacy. The areas of overlap between these realms are described as innovation zones – areas providing many opportunities for inventive behaviour. This is because different perspectives are brought together within these zones and this can enable active questioning of established approaches. Fourth, the analysis presented in this chapter suggests that place matters. Professional planners have a relatively high level of spatial awareness and a good understanding of the significance of place in modern life. This spatial awareness – this concern for the place and for the consideration of place-­based outcomes for different communities and groups – remains relatively unusual in public policy. Even now many national policy advisers focus narrowly on overall rather than spatially disaggregated societal impacts. Given the diversity of needs in different localities, it seems clear that the power of spatial understanding in public policy needs to be reasserted. In many countries current public policy is ineffective in addressing current public policy challenges precisely because central government departments tend to pursue narrow functional, rather than place-­based, objectives.

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   221 The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that planners can act effectively as place-­based leaders, asserting progressive values in the face of place-­ less power. The examples presented here, of progressive planning in Malmö, Freiburg and Portland may not be perfect, but they should inspire all those who believe that planning for prosperous, inclusive cities is not just possible, but worth fighting for. This takes us back to the question raised by Gans that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: ‘Who plans with what ends and means for which interest groups?’ (Gans, 1972: p. 71). His analysis of power dynamics remains pertinent today. Still in short supply, however, are critical studies examining how specific planning efforts in particular places have made significant steps forward in the creation of just and sustainable cities and city regions. It follows that an important question to add to the planning field of inquiry, one that focuses on lesson drawing from successful progressive planning innovations, is: ‘How did they do it?’ Scholars addressing this question will, in my view, soon find that they are advancing our understanding of place-­based leadership. The analysis presented in this chapter confirms that planning is, inevitably, a political activity. It plays a part, sometimes an important part, in deciding who wins and who loses in a given urban and regional system. Given the growth of inequality in many societies and, unsurprisingly the rise of angry populism in response to growing social and economic injustice, it is clear that renewed efforts to develop and strengthen new forms of progressive place-­based leadership are overdue. This chapter reminds us that professional planners working in particular localities can, by exercising outgoing place-­based leadership, contribute to the development of imaginative progressive policies that societies desperately need.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the officials and stakeholders in the cities discussed in this chapter for their time and assistance. Special thanks go to the following planning directors for sharing their thoughts and ideas on planners as place-­based leaders: Susan Anderson (City of Portland), Wulf Daseking (City of Freiburg), Norman Krumholz (City of Cleveland) and Christer Larsson (City of Malmö).

Note 1 Longer profiles of place-­based leadership in these three cities appear as Innovation Stories in Hambleton (2015). The short profiles presented in this chapter are updated to take account of more recent developments and focus on the way planners are active in the civic leadership of these cities. Unless otherwise indicated the quotes in this section were given to the author directly and are published in the professional magazine for planners in the UK – see Hambleton (2017).

222   Robin Hambleton

References Adair, J. (2002) Inspiring Leadership. Learning from Great Leaders. London, Thorogood Publishing. Balducci, A. and Mäntysalo, R. (2013) Urban Planning as a Trading Zone. New York, Springer. Bates, L.K. (2017) Making the equity turn in Portland, again, paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Urban Affairs Association, Minneapolis, 19–22 April. Binney, G., Wilke, G. and Williams, C. (2012) Living Leadership. A Practical Guide for Ordinary Heroes. Harlow, Pearson Education. Bolden, R., Witzel, M. and Linacre, N. (eds) (2016) Leadership Paradoxes. Rethinking Leadership for an Uncertain World. London, Routledge. Boone, C.G. and Modarres, A. (2006) City and Environment. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press. Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. and Mayer, M. (2012) Cities for People, Not for Profit. Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City. Abingdon, Routledge. Bulkeley, H. (2013) Cities and Climate Change. London, Routledge. Bungay, S. (2011) The Art of Action. How Leaders Close the Gaps Between Plans, Actions and Results. London, Nicholas Brealey Publishing. Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (2007) The whole-­of-government approach to public sector reform. Public Administration Review, 67(6), 1059–1066. Davies, J.S. and Imbroscio, D.L. (eds) (2010) Critical Urban Studies. New Directions. Albany, NY, State University of New York. Doussard, M. (2015) Equity planning outside city hall: Rescaling advocacy to confront the sources of urban problems. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 35(3), 296–306. Fainstein, S.S. (2010) The Just City. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Flanagan, R.M. (2004) Mayors and the Challenges of Urban Leadership. Lanham, MD, University Press of America. Forester, J. (2013) Planning in the Face of Conflict. The Surprising Possibilities of Facilitative Leadership. Chicago, IL, The Amer­ican Planning Association. Forester, J. (1989) Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. Gans, H.J. (1972) People and Plans. Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books. Girardet, H. (2008) Cities, People, Planet. Urban Development and Climate Change, 2nd edition. Chichester, John Wiley. Goleman, D., Boyatzis, R. and McKee, A. (2002) Primal Leadership. Learning to Lead with Emotional Intelligence. Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Press. Grint, K. (2005) Leadership: Limits and Possibilities. Basingstoke, Palgrave. Hall, P. (2014) Good Cities, Better Lives. How Europe Discovered the Lost Art of Urbanism. Abingdon, Routledge. Hambleton, R. (2017) Place principals, The Planner, 26–29 May. Hambleton, R. (2015) Leading the Inclusive City. Place-­Based Innovation for a Bounded Planet. Bristol, Policy Press. Hambleton, R. (2007) New leadership for democratic urban space. In: Hambleton, R. and Gross, J.S. (eds) Governing Cities in a Global Era. Urban Innovation, Competition and Democratic Reform. Basingstoke, Palgrave, pp. 163–176. Heifetz, R., Grashow, A. and Linsky, M. (2009) The Practice of Adaptive Leadership. Boston, MA, Harvard Business Press.

A Counter-Movement to ‘Place-Less’ Power   223 Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Hoggett, P. (1991) A new management in the public sector? Policy and Politics 19(4), 243–256. Illsley, B., Jackson, T., Curry, J. and Rapaport, E. (2010) Community involvement in the soft spaces of planning, International Planning Studies, 15(4), 303–319. Jackson, T. (2009) Prosperity without Growth. Economics for a Finite Planet. London, Earthscan. Kahane, A. (2004) Solving Tough Problems: An Open Way of Talking, Listening and Creating New Realities. San Francisco, CA, Berrett-­Koehler. Kantor, P., Lefevre, C., Saito, A., Savitch, H.V. and Thornley, A. (2012) Struggling Giants. City-­region Governance in London, New York, Paris and Tokyo. Minneapolis, MT, University of Minnesota Press. Keohane, N.O. (2010) Thinking About Leadership. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Krumholz, N. and Forester, J. (1990) Making Equity Planning Work. Leadership and the Public Sector. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press. Lefebvre, H. (1967) The right to the city. In: Kofman, E. and Lebas, E. (eds) (1996) Writings on Cities. London, Blackwell, pp. 63–184. Margerum, R. D. (2011) Beyond Consensus. Improving Collaborative Planning and Management. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. Monbiot, G. (2017) Out of the Wreckage. A New Politics for an Age of Crisis. London, Verso. Nylund, K. (2014) Conceptions of justice in the planning of the new urban landscape – recent changes in the comprehensive planning discourse in Malmö, Sweden. Planning Theory and Practice, 15(1), 41–61. Oliver, B. and Pitt, B. (2013) Engaging Communities and Service Users. Context, Themes and Methods. Basingstoke, Palgrave. Ozawa, C.P. (2004) The Portland Edge: Challenges and Successes in Growing Communities. Washington, DC, Island Press. Peterson, P.E. (1981) City Limits. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Sandel, M. (2012) What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. London, Allen Lane. Savitch, H.V. and Kantor, P. (2002) Cities in the International Marketplace. The political economy of urban development in North America and Western Europe. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Schrock, G., Bassett, E.M. and Green, J. (2015) Pursuing equity and justice in a changing climate: Assessing equity in local climate and sustainability plans in US cities. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 35(3), 282–295. Sotarauta, M. (2016) Place leadership, governance and power, Administration, 64(3/4), 45–58. Stiglitz, J.E. (2006) Making Globalization Work. London, Allen Lane. Svara, J.H. (ed.) (1994) Facilitative Leadership in Local Government: Lessons from Successful Mayors and Chairpersons. San Francisco, CA, Jossey-­Bass. Taşan-Kok, T. and Oranje, M. (eds) (2018) From Student to Urban Planner: Young Practitioners’ Reflections on Contemporary Ethical Challenges. London, Routledge. Wainwright, H. (2003) Reclaim the State: Experiments in Popular Democracy. London, Verso.

Part IV

Reflections and Conclusions

13 Scientific Knowledge and Decision-­Making in Planning Understanding Emotional Aspects Ilhan Tekeli

Introduction In recent years, relations between emotions and political discourses have become more evident, as exemplified in post-­truth politics. Emotions are defined as being ‘in contrast to cognition and rational thought’ (Edwards, 1999: p. 271), whereas post-­truth politics are framed on appeals to emotion, where facts, ethics and scientific knowledge have less importance and are sometimes based on ‘fake news’. In post-­truth politics, politics becomes an instrument for winning elections, and political leaders try to manipulate the feelings of the people and increase their loyalty to political parties while forgetting that democracy is about allowing people to live with dignity. Ackland (2017: p. 1) defines post-­truth as ‘a scenario where public opinion is solicited by appealing to people’s emotions and personal beliefs rather than by the presentation of evidence-­based facts’. According to her, post-­truth politics produces alternative facts, where people select appropriate information for the promotion of their case, regardless of whether or not it is true. Recent evidence from different elections, especially Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential elections, has shown that objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion. That said, recent experiences in politics and decision-­making necessitate a reassessment of the role of scientific knowledge in decision-­making processes and the importance of emotions in policy-­ making and planning. What is scientific information, and how do we decide and act? What is the role of emotion in decision-­making? These questions have particularly important implications for planning, in which the decision-­making process is believed to focus on public benefit. What kind of planning processes planners have to follow, and what kind of plans they can produce to ensure public benefit in the presence of a huge amount of information that is not supported by facts. If there is a significant difference between knowledge and fact, what kind of knowledge should planners rely on in the contemporary era? This chapter discusses and evaluates the possible implications of the evolution of cognitive and neurosciences for planning by focusing on the relations between scientific knowledge, planning and connected ethics, taking into consideration also the recent trends towards depoliticisation, repoliticisation and the

228   Ilhan Tekeli progressive loss of legitimacy of modern liberal democracies. In order to achieve this, the first section introduces the type of knowledge referred by the different theoretical debates of planning and the way knowledge has been used in decision-­making processes and ethics in planning practice in different periods. The second section focuses on the possible impacts of the research into knowledge generation that have been introduced recently in neurosciences. The concluding section explores the changes that have accompanied the advances in neurosciences and the implication of planning and design. The chapter culminates with concluding remarks.

The Evolution of Planning Thought: Decision-­Making Processes, Knowledge and Ethics Planning activities lead to the introduction of new planning procedures, methods and planning paradigms parallel to the changes in society and its cultural aspects, given the strong societal references. The major dynamics underlying such changes in planning paradigms can be linked to changes in the understanding of scientific knowledge. According to Karl Mannheim (1961), whereas people define their activities by way of trial and error, they begin to plan their actions only after they are able to reach a certain level of knowledge through their relations with their environment. John Friedmann (1998), based on his long experience in planning, claims that planning is contingent to the knowledge held by the people, meaning that it is not possible to have a single planning definition that can be accepted by everyone, nor to develop such a general planning theory. However, he argues that there has been growing consensus on the main characteristics of planning. According to him, this consensus assumes that planning should be focused on the future, that it should be based on scientific knowledge, that it is to be connected to society. That said, the way scientific knowledge is defined has passed through three distinct phases over the last 60 years, influencing the scientific approaches and theories shaping planning: scientific approach leading to instrumental rationality; post-­modernism leading to communicative rationality; and cognitive knowledge leading to new implications in planning. It is possible to give broad discussions on the basis of knowledge in planning during different periods as follows: Instrumental Rationality, Scientific Knowledge and Progressive Ethics in Modernist Planning In the 1960s, scientific knowledge was based on the representation of the external world and developed within the neo-­positivist paradigm asserted to be objective and universal. Planning formulated on such scientific knowledge became evident through the use of instrumental rationality that aimed both to explore and substantiate the future. Technicist and modernist ethics lay at the heart of this approach. The 1960’s instrumental rationality suggests that there are knowable truths dominating all fields of social science. This assumption found

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   229 its meaning in Choice Theory, in which it is believed that in the planning process it is possible to reach rational outcomes following a three-­stage process. In the first stage, planners define the objectives to be reached and the main criteria to be used; in the second stage, planners are expected to come up with an optimal solution for evaluating all the alternatives and forecasting the outcomes of each alternative under the given conditions in order to attain the objectives previously set; and in the third stage, the aim is to implement the selected alternative (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962; Simon, 1955). It is possible to define this approach as a heuristic process and to evaluate it as a reasonable means of reaching a rational choice/alternative. However, for those who are looking for a rigorous rationality, there is a need to define the objectives and measures in detail. In general, the objectives are subjective, but in order to talk about rational planning, the goals should be set in an objective way and should be exogenous. How a goal can be achieved, or in other words, how the relationship between the goal and means can be formed, defines the rationality claim of a plan. In building these relations two different roles are attributed to a planner. The first of these is to widen the umbrella of alternatives that can allow the goals of a plan to be achieved, and among these alternatives, the one with minimum cost or with the highest performance should be selected. Second, during the creation of alternatives and the definition of the outcomes of the alternatives, planners utilise a neo-­positivist knowledge that depends on objective representations of the external world and thus can serve for the public benefit (Reichenbach, 1968). For the success of such a planning approach, there is a need for the human reason that is able to reach the truths that can free mankind from ignorance, dogma and autocracy. As Rasmussen (2011: p. 77) highlighted, in the Enlightenment, it was believed that ‘reason alone could or should rule the world’, with the assertion that it is possible to rebuild the social and political world on a foundation of universal truths, which can enhance the deliberations of people. In this regard, ethics were developed based on the values of a secular society in which democracy and human rights are respected, and in which human beings are taken as the core. John Friedmann’s definition of planning (1987: p. 38) as ‘a form of technical reason that links scientific and technical knowledge to social processes of societal guidance and social transformation’ is fully consistent with modernist ethics. However, later years’ technical reasoning limited the freedoms of people and made them face the threat of reification due to the rationalisation of the development process. While the planning bureaucracy was designing a rational path of development, they were simultaneously determining strict roles for each member of society and leaving people with limited freedom. As a result, the meaning of life came to be questioned extensively. This crisis of meaning became evident following the rise of student movements in 1968, which became widespread all over the world. It also led the social science to gain multi-­ paradigmatic and pluralist character (Tekeli, 2010). Allowing planning to be active in implementation processes is defined as an administration problem (Simon, 1956), however, the practice has shown that

230   Ilhan Tekeli actual outcomes can be quite different to expected results. There are various reasons for this inconsistency, one of which is the changes made by administrators, either consciously or unconsciously. This is not only a result of techniques used in planning but also the lack of sensitivity in implementation processes. A second problem is the inefficiencies of the scientific approaches that are used to estimate the outcomes of the chosen instruments. In practice, there are several disappointments that arise out of a number of different and unexpected issues, such as the increasing importance of issues not being taken into consideration by the theories in social sciences, and the use of contingent theories as deterministic theories in social sciences. In such a situation, therefore, a need arises for the reformulation of goals and instruments through the modifications of plans and changes made in processes that should legitimise planning by adopting a more flexible attitude. A planning approach that is modified during the implementation phase loses its assertion on instrumental rationality. This is not the only criticism of instrumental rationality, as the way goals are defined is also subjected to substantial criticism. One of the ways in which goals are defined depends on the planner’s decisions on the future of society and his/her evaluation of the existing values of the society. Even if this approach seems reasonable, it provides a substantial power to planners in the setting of objectives. That is why politicians insulted planners having access to tools that make social engineering easier (Dykman, 1961). In order to avoid this, it is possible to reduce the flexibility of planners in decision-­making processes by using data collected through interview studies involving the people who will be affected by the plans. Communicative Rationality, Intersubjective Knowledge and Consensus Generation in Collaborative/Communicative Planning In the 1980s, a new social ontology and epistemology began to develop, influenced by the shift from modernist to post-­modernist thinking. In this period, planning was influenced substantially by the communicative rationality introduced by Habermas (1984), who claimed that communicative actions are led by practice and important thoughts are disseminated by language, which has a communal character. Actually, communicative rationality does not rely on the possession of particular knowledge, but on ‘how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge’ (Habermas, 1984: p.  8). In this regard, language becomes a medium for the generation of communication and consensus. Similar to the experience of people, communication among them is realised in the lifeworld,1 which refers to the world that is experienced or lived. It is claimed that, in theory, any consensus generated in a lifeworld can enhance communication in societies. However, this way of thinking also claims that today, communication is distorted due to the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy that is colonised by market forces and the capacity of people for self-­deception. In this regard, for a claim to be made that communicative rationality has been achieved, there is a need for an ideal speech situation.2

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   231 Communicative rationality is based on the phenomenological science approach. From this perspective, the world gains objectivity if the different subjective groups with different language and action capacity accept it as one and the same world. When instrumental rationality is materialised upon reaching its telos,3 the materialisation of communicative rationality may be possible by reaching consensus. The necessary condition for agreement between communicative subjectivities on what should be done in the world is the development of an abstract concept of the world. The communicative rationality introduced by Habermas brought intersubjective knowledge, which refers to the knowledge accumulated by the psychological relationship between people, a scientific status (Habermas, 1987). To mention the existence of a society is only possible when it has the capacity to create intersubjectivity, and if this capacity does not exist, socialisation is not possible. The consensus on shared cognition, values and actions that produces meaning in social life defines not only our thoughts but also our planning approach. Communicative rationality offers a way forward through a different conception of human reason. As Healey (1993: p. 237) notes:  Habermas argued that far from giving up on reason as an informing principle for contemporary societies, we should shift perspective from an individualised, subject-­object conception of reason to reasoning formed within intersubjective communication. Such reasoning is required where ‘living together but differently’ in shared space and time drives us to search for ways of finding agreement on how to address our collective concerns.  Habermasian CAT led to the development of the notion of deliberative democracy in the 1990s (Benhabib, 1996), but whereas deliberation is a necessary precondition for the legitimacy of democratic political decisions, it falls short of being able to widen the content and scope of democracy. This has led several political scientists to criticise the approach, underlining that it is closed to agonistic positions, and consequently, lacks the ability to include groups segmented from pluralist societies (Kazancı, 2014). In planning theory, communicative rationality brought a revolutionary change. According to John Friedmann (1973), who is one of the forerunners of this change, the ‘transactive planning theory’ refers to the future, which is open to the choices and experiences of people on the basis of their moral judgements. He underlined the importance of participatory processes in the preparation of plans, the need to extend the areas of action of NGOs against the hegemony of bureaucracy, and the preparation of plans that are based on mutual learning and the interaction of different stakeholders. However, at the time when he was developing his ideas, CAT had not yet been disseminated, and his proposals did not receive the necessary attention. Later, following the Habermasian CAT, this new understanding reflected itself in John Forester’s (1999) book, Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Process and Patsy Healey’s book Collaborative Planning:

232   Ilhan Tekeli Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (1992 and 1997). Forester (1999) defined planning as a deliberative practice, claiming that the environmental changes that urban planning tries to shape and regulate diverse groups with has different, and often conflicting, values and interests. This led Forester to focus on the dialogues raised in an intellectual milieu and communicative practices and to claim that the stakeholders in planning are likely to learn more in practice than from scientific experiments and can use this knowledge for action. He underlined the political opportunities offered by communicative and even transformative participatory action, although he was aware of the problems of such an approach, such as the manipulative actions of certain groups. On the other hand, for Healey (1993), the meaning of planning is the conscious intervention of collective actors. Collaborative planning aims to ‘find ways of reasoning among the competing claims for action they generate, without dismissing or devaluing anyone until it has been explored’ (Healy, 1993: p. 235). According to her, it has the potential to change and to transform material conditions and the established power relations through the creation of well-­grounded arguments and the active construction of new understandings. Obviously, an interactive process assumes the pre-­existence of individuals who are engaged with others, in other words, intersubjectivities. In the planning approaches of Friedmann, Forrester and Healey, rationality and freedom are not independent concepts. The practices of freedom become a means of searching for rationality (Sen, 2002) and a way of preventing the elites from making plans for ordinary people. Moreover, a planning process gains its legitimacy not from political authority, but from the consensus generated among civil society actors. The ethics of the planning process that is based on communicative rationality was developed within the post-­modernist framework, and this development is carried out in parallel to the shift from government to governance. The goals of such plans are not external but are created as a result of the endogenous processes in communicative action. Accordingly, its success cannot be interpreted externally by the use of instrumental rationality, as it must be evaluated rather with respect to the satisfaction provided by participatory processes. Moreover, political ethics should be consistent with the objective of the communicative rationality. In societies, where political power is grasped by the majority of votes and politics is based on defining others, it is not possible to generate intersubjectivities. Emmanuel Levinas put forward ways of escaping from such a situation. As Bergo (2015: p. 1) argues, Levinas constructed his ethics on ‘the experience of the encounter with the Other’. According to him, the responsibility for the other is rooted in our subjective constitution, and our responsibility for the other is not a derivative feature of our subjectivity. Instead, responsibility for the other gives our subjective being-­in-the-­ world a meaningful direction and orientation. In this way of defining ethics, authority becomes something that is built over and over again by the consensus generated between subjectivities. In building nourishing participation among different groups, there is a need for the ethics and language of the public realm to stay away from the confrontative nature of the representative democracy.

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   233

What Changes in the Development of Cognitive Science Can Bring Understanding to the Decision-­Making Processes? It is possible to summarise that the enlargement of scientific knowledge by complementing constructivist knowledge with neo-­positivist knowledge paved the way for the transformation from elitist planning to democratic planning. However, today, several theoretical and empirical studies have shown that communicative planning is far from meeting its objectives related to democratic decision-­making. Accordingly, there is a primary need for thinking over planning in an era in which communication does not lead to the making of decisions for the public good or consensus. Moreover, the new knowledge in cognitive sciences has shown that in efforts to comprehend the socialisation processes, merely understanding the interactive mechanisms is not enough, as there is a need to define the unconscious comprehension mechanisms of the brain. Both of these perspectives have pointed to a need to understand the evolution of the relations between subjects, and to better comprehend the decision-­making behaviours of human beings. Therefore, in recent years there has been growing interest in research into the neural mechanisms in the perceiving and understanding of social interactions, and there have been numerous studies looking to define decision-­making processes. Besides, there has been a surge of proposals claiming that emotions (as bodily states) play an essential role in decision-­making (Bechara et al., 2000; Strle, 2016). The issues that are particularly helpful in understanding how knowledge is created and used in decision-­making are outlined below. The Importance of Emotions All philosophers, from Platon to Descartes, agreed that rationality is one of the characteristics of human beings, and the making of right decisions is defined as a victory of reason over sensation. What is expected from rationality is the removal of sensation from the decision-­making process. This way of thinking changed after the surgery of Eliot, who was a company manager, by neurologist Antonio Damasio (Lehler, 2016). Following the diagnosis of a tumour in the orbitofrontal cortex of Eliot, the tumour was removed through surgery; however, while the patient recovered from the operation, in an unexpected outcome, he lost all decision-­making capabilities. Research that followed this case showed that the patient lost his emotional capacity, and it was found that human beings who lose emotional capacity also lose their decision-­making abilities. These findings show that the people who lose the emotion circuits are unable to make decisions, which means that emotions, and not just reasoning, are required in the making of decisions, denoting that our decision-­making processes are not only logical but also emotional. Damasio developed a hypothesis related to decision-­ making, claiming that somatical markers are the feeling symptoms in the body that are developed by emotions (Damasio et al., 1996). Somatic markers hypothesis has already started to influence the field of economics, and a new way of

234   Ilhan Tekeli explanation is developing that goes beyond the deductive logic in the field of economics through the use of this hypothesis (Martins, 2011). According to LeDoux (1996), the importance of emotional brain circuits is their role in steering a certain way of thinking that provides time for understanding and reasoning. This function is realised in the prefrontal cortex. The most important aspect of the human brain is its ability to think over its actions and to control itself. Therefore, the prefrontal cortex enables emotions to lead actions in the first instance, but they are not sufficient enough to go on the action; emotional brain circuits, which can be defined as mind circuits, should be used. While the ideas are forming, the neurons in the prefrontal cortex create new networks that were not previously available. In this way, when a view is reached, the prefrontal cortex realises it. In fact, the prefrontal cortex has a perfect design for coming up with solutions that enable people to have sparks of insight and make the right decisions. The theories of emotional experience point to a common mechanism – ‘an evaluative system that determines whether a given situation is potentially harmful or beneficial to an individual. Since these evaluations are precursors to conscious emotional experiences, they must, by definition, be unconscious processes’ (Fellous et al., 2002: p. 1). The Role of Emotions and Scarcity of Time when People Depart from Rationality In parallel to the progress in neurosciences, Kahneman (2011) developed a cognitive decision-­making theory. In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2011) declared an interest in ideas about decision-­making. His theory made possible the shift of normative emphasis on decision-­making theories to behavioural analysis. Kahneman (2011) classifies the decision-­making processes of human beings into two groups: System 1 and System 2. These are ‘useful fictions’ in that they help to explain the quirks of the human mind. While System 1 represents the brain’s fast, instinctive, frequent, emotional and unconscious decisions, System 2 represents the brain’s slower, more infrequent, analytical and conscious part of human decisions. System 1 is a heuristic mental short cut based on the imprecise representation of reality. In our daily life, a major proportion of the decisions we make are governed by this system, with only a small part of our daily decisions steered by System 2, which tries to achieve explicit beliefs and reasoned choices. According to Kahneman, intuitive information processing has typically been considered irrational, but System 1’s fast thinking is often useful, saves the time and effort. However, despite being conscious and deliberate, in some cases System 2 can bring poor and irrational results, the main reason for which is the limited capacity of the prefrontal cortex, which can only process a certain amount of knowledge. If one overloads that part of the brain with too many variables, several problems may emerge, and the rational circuits may become incapable of finding solutions to problems. Dijksterhuis, a behavioural psychologist, showed that more than four variables loaded into the prefrontal cortex at the

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   235 same time can bring several problems, whereas some neuroscientists put this number at nine (Lehler, 2016). Kahneman’s behavioural analysis of decision-­ making processes has also contributed to the understanding of planning fallacy that stems from ‘optimism bias’ and the ‘illusion of control’. When the mind circuits become insufficient, and there is need to use emotions and intuition, the studies on chaotic cognition can be helpful (Finke and Bettie, 1996). In this research, Finke and Bettie emphasise that two different ontological assumptions can be made to understand today’s world, leading to two different ways of thought and decision-­making mechanisms. The first assumption defines today’s world as a well-­structured and regular organisation, in which it is possible to have regular/consistent ways of thinking, forecasting and planning. The second ontological assumption is the chaotic structure of contemporary societies, which assumes that societies are becoming more complex and face frequent crisis conditions while undergoing fast and irregular changes. In such a situation, it becomes difficult to forecast the future, and so chaotic thinking and chaotic decision-­making can become predominant. According to several research findings, chaotic thinking takes place in the brain regions that govern moral sensitivity and emotional control, and people that use these areas act in more reactive, spontaneous, creative and innovative ways when faced with unexpected conditions and problems. Recent studies have explored the related questions of reasoning in the social world. Schaefer et al. (2013) found that some brain areas (temporal pole, precuneus and superior temporal sulcus (STS)) become more active when engaging in communicative reasoning than in strategic thinking and control. In contrast, strategic rationality is associated with less activation in areas known to be related to moral sensitivity, emotional processing and language control (Schaefer et al., 2013: p.  1). These results suggest that strategic reasoning is associated with reduced social and emotional cognition, and may use different language-­related networks. Communication and the Formation of Intersubjectivities Prior to the recent studies on neurosciences, communication between human beings through the use of language and the creation of intersubjectivities was defined as the basis of socialisation, which brings meaning to the lives of people. Intersubjectivities were explained by social relations, although new findings in neurosciences showed that the formation of intersubjectivities relies not only on social, but also neural factors (Rose and Abi-­Rached, 2013). Several authors point to recent researchers suggesting that, rather than supporting the thesis of the rational and self-­interested individual, the human brain is actually intrinsically social and made to function in society rather than in isolation. The human brain has the capacity for social cognition. Leslie Brothers defines social cognition as the processing of all knowledge that can facilitate the perception of nature and the intentions of other people (Rose and Abi-­Rached, 2013). However, there is a need for a brain theory that takes into account what others

236   Ilhan Tekeli are thinking about. In this context, the most important step was taken in 1996 when a group of neuroscientists at the University of Parma, led by Giacomo Rizzolatti, discovered mirror neurons. Rizzolatti was able to show that when a person observes the movement of another person, the neurons in the brain of the person who has made the movement activate the neurons of the observer, and if this person wants to make the same movement, he/she is able to do so with the help of the same neurons. Their discovery defined the neural mechanism of learning by imitation, in which it is possible to synchronise the brain activities of individuals. Moreover, it shows that a mirror neuron is activated not only by seeing but also by hearing (Iacoboni, 2011). Ramachandran (2011) continued the work of Rizzolatti on mirror neurons to deal with evolutionary questions, claiming that mirror neurons are the driving force behind the great leap forward in human evolution. In an article entitled ‘It’s all done with mirrors’, Ramachandran and Rogers-­Ramachandran (2007) even speculated that mirror neurons played a role in introspection and ‘self-­ consciousness’, and asserted that such neurons might function as the brain’s ‘internal mirror’ (Guenter, 2016: p.  354; www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC4904333/-fnr62). Mirror neurons reveal the intimate relationship that exists between the self and the other. One’s mirror neurons are activated by observing others but they do not turn into emotions or spontaneous activities due to blockers in the frontal cortex. If they do not block the interactions, then it is not possible to talk about the free will of people. Studies have shown the importance of socialisation in brain activities and actions, with socialisation being defined as removing all the borders between a person and others. According to Marsh (2010), when a person collaborates with a partner, and when they want to define a common reality, communication shapes the mind and knowledge of people. Moreover, a jointly experienced past brings the minds closer. Having common experiences in the past helps in the activation of common memories and strengthens relations between groups. Building socialisation at a higher level, on the other hand, requires focusing on practical dialogues, cultural factors and common endogenous dynamics. In the lives of people, besides the material world, there is also an imagined world, and even if these images have no material basis, it does not mean that they have no place in the minds of people. Non-­material things also leave imprints on the brain, and so each thought changes the structure of the brain at a microscopic level. From the neurosciences point of view, there are no differences between actions and imagined actions. In fact, in an experiment conducted by neuroscientists, a group of people took part in an exercise programme to strengthen their muscles, whereas people in a second group were required to make the same exercises in their minds at the same time. When the experiment was over, it was found that the muscles of both groups had strengthened at the same levels, which shows that the outputs of the imagination do not remain only in the brain.

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   237

What Types of Change Does the Progress in Neurosciences Bring to Planning and Design? It is possible to summarise the implications that the development of neuroscience can bring to planning in several fields including emotions in the planning process and decision-­making; communication among stakeholders; forecasting and imaging the future; innovativeness, creativity, and ethical judgements. Emotions in the Planning Process and Decision-­Making In planning, one question that is often raised regarding the distinction between relationality and emotions is when we should rely on our instincts, and when we should insist upon our strategic decisions. The answer put forward by neuroscientists on this issue is that it is necessary to depend on strategic reasoning when faced with problems with small numbers of variables, in which detailed analysis is possible, but to use our instincts as well for more complex problems in which there are multiple determinants (Gladwell, 2016). Planning is, without doubt, an outcome of the mind’s slower, analytical mode, where reason dominates (System 2, in Kahneman’s words). When speaking about planning decisions, we should underline the need for conscious interventions and not only those that are based on emotions and instincts. However, any conscious action by a person requires a feeling of being capable of doing. The person should be aware of his/her existence and must have self-­respect, as this will enable him/her to understand the world in which she/he lives and to imagine the future (Akarsu, 1987). Although the share of conscious activities in total activities is not so high, many people think that their activities are deliberate, because unconscious behaviours are not registered in people’s memories. Communication among Stakeholders According to Habermas, communication is achieved through language, which helps to form consensus among the intersubjectivities, making social resolutions possible by providing an element of betweenness among subjectivities. The contribution made by neurosciences to this relationship is its assertion that communication is not only a product of the relationships between subjectivities but also a spontaneous interconnection between the brains of people. Such connections between brains are unconscious and cannot be stored in the mind; however, communication through language has a certain direction and can be registered in the memory. The contribution of a planner to the relationships among stakeholders can only be through participatory processes: that said, they may have a limited effect of communication that aims at taking conscious control of the planning process because there may be unconscious responses that are important in planning processes. In order to achieve communication, interpersonal self should be formed, and a person should introduce him/herself with respect to which group he/she belongs to.

238   Ilhan Tekeli Forecasting and Imaging the Future In order to accept a decision as a planning decision or a conscious decision, it must be headed to the future. Findings in neurosciences have shown that the future is not something that is forecasted externally by experts, but also something that is endogenised by brain functions. As discussed earlier, human beings imagine the future in both their minds and their emotion circuits, and the struggle between these circuits defines the nature of the orientation to the future. The same counts for planners. The struggle in the human brain is not restricted to intelligence and emotions, as it can also be found between the current and the future. When planners have to make a decision, like any human brain, their brain makes a simulation of alternative solutions and defines a model for the future. However, the conservative control mechanisms of the brain act as a barrier in the way of human beings gaining the necessary power to put their imaginations of the future into practice. The future is overshadowed by the dominance of the present, and the responsibility to get rid of such shadows is taken by the consciousness of the planner. Innovativeness and Creativity Facing the future necessitates openness to innovation and creativity. The source of creativity in the brain is the prefrontal cortex, and the way of increasing the innovativeness of the brain, is not to increase its capacity but to remove the obstacles that reduce its innovativeness and creativity. The removal of cognitive barriers can enable planners to see the possible options that are open to him/her, therefore the strategy to be followed when seeking to increase options. Ethical Judgements A planning decision should have a commitment to the future of society, and this condition is a sign of the existence of planning ethics. If a society can enable intersubjectivities in order to solve a problem and be able to institute it as a planning decision, it can be expected that this decision will become a commitment of a society following the internalisation of such a solution. Neurosciences facilitate our understanding of value judgements (Lehler, 2016), and moral judgements are similar to aesthetic judgements. While we understand immediately whether or not we like a picture, our brain creates an unconscious sentimental reaction when we come across an action in society. We immediately know what is right or wrong, and the source of such judgements is the networks of sentiments. Ethical judgements are interrelated with the emotion circuits, and ethics requires intersubjectivities in emotional fields. In the procurement of such conditions, the imitations of neurons prevail. The deductive reasoning circuits are motivated immediately after ethical judgements are made, and enable the justification and materialisation of actions.

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   239 The evolution of ethics in planning has necessitated a new type of decision-­ making. The mind of a planner should develop several frames that can impede a person from doing harm to others. This would be possible only by way of ethics that enable the consideration of others. The discovery of mirror neurons, empathy and the interconnections between the brains of different people can be put forward as the basis of secular ethics, which has been framed in different ways by Kant and other philosophers. This can be defined as the revolution initiated by mirror neurons, which underlines the shift from the individual to society, and from competition to cooperation. In this regard, an ethical judgement cannot be selfish; it should consider others. The implication of secular ethics on planning defines the context and commitment to a plan.

Conclusion: Current Problems in Decision-­Making and the Future of Planning The implications of new findings on decision-­making processes are important for explaining why decision-­making based on emotions has recently become more important than facts. In the modernist era, facts were the basis of the decision-­making processes in planning and governance, and in general, instrumental rationality was the basis of the main decision-­making mechanisms. It can be said that the decisions that were taken and the programmes and policies that were adopted reflected an elitist approach. The social interactions within the decision-­making systems were between people with similar thoughts and objectives. Although this decision-­making approach was criticised as having a populist tendency, the resulting decisions are justified by several arguments, such as social justice, equality, etc. The 1980s witnessed a substantial change. In social sciences, the perspective of constructivism has come to dominate in the generation of a new type of scientific knowledge, although for analytical issues, objective knowledge is still at the forefront. In the post-­modernist era, communication replaced decision-­ making based on instrumental rationality, and processes replaced programmes. Decision-­making processes were affected significantly by the values held by the stakeholders that took part in the planning process. Consensus generation is important, but required mechanisms of democratic participation, symmetrical relations and an equal distribution of knowledge. In practice, however, the mechanisms lacked the ability to come up with a system that would allow different stakeholders to express their views and interact with each other on the way to reaching consensus. What happens if the rules of participation are not well defined? What if the decisions are based on emotions? What has been observed recently in different fields of decision-­making and planning is a substantial erosion of earlier principles that are based on facts as in the existing political arena decision-­making can be based on emotions rather than facts. Recent evidence, such as the effects of social media on Amer­ican electorates, has shown that it is easier to appeal to people’s emotions and personal beliefs than to convince them to present facts.

240   Ilhan Tekeli Today, evidence-­based facts are unable to make people agree on certain issues, whereas it is possible to manipulate their decisions by drawing upon their emotions; this is post-­truth based decision-­making. According to Ackland (2017), there are a number of explanations for the popularity of post-­truth. First, due to the huge amount of information available to the public, anyone can publicly express their opinions and have them perceived as facts, which means that unsubstantiated opinions and prejudices can be conveyed as facts. Second, there are many complex issues that cannot be easily understood by a person with little expert knowledge, which can make people misinterpret existing data. Third, people want to see things that are unusual, which cannot be generalised. Fourth, objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than emotions and personal beliefs. As explained in neuro­sciences, in decision-­making, emotions are as important as the rational decision-­making. The new findings in neurosciences have limited implications on planning that has been shaped by instrumental rationality because instrumental rationality is based on logic rather than behaviour. That said, the implications of neurosciences might be more influential on planning that is centred on communicative rationality. In such types of planning, there is a search for behavioural rationality and consensus generation. New developments in neurosciences have shown that unconscious brain activities are important in developing intersubjectivity, while in the 1980s it was believed that consensus could be reached through conscious communicative actions. Studies using visualisation techniques in neurosciences have allowed us to understand that the relationships formed with other people during one’s lifetimes and their mutations can enhance the sensitive adaptive mechanisms, leading to social interaction. The knowledge on how brain functions shows that human beings do not accept monotonous, isolated and unsocial creatures. Rather, being conscious means being open to new developments. Especially in the light of new studies on neuroscience, it is possible to say that human beings are not living creatures that seek to maximise their benefits. That said, policies and planning should also consider enhancing the positive feelings of individuals to each other, and politicising them for the good of all.

Notes 1 Habermas defines lifeworld as ‘background resources, contexts, and dimensions of social action that enable actors to cooperate on the basis of mutual understanding: shared cultural systems of meaning, institutional orders hat stabilise patterns of action, and personality structures acquired in family, church, neighborhood, and school’ (J. Bohman and W. Rehg, ‘Habermas’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, web entry, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/). 2 See for details: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas. 3 Aristotelian way of defining an end or purpose.

Scientific Knowledge in Planning   241

References Ackland, L. (2017) Post-­truth and the rejection of science, Australasian Science, M/June Available from: www.australasianscience.com.au/article/issue-­mayjune-2017/post-­ truth-and-­rejection-science.html (accessed 15 October 2017). Akarsu, B. (1987) Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü. Ankara, Savaş Yayınları. Bechara, A., Damasio, H. and Damasio, A.R. (2000) Emotion, decision making and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 295–307. Benhabib, S. (1996) Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy, In: Benhabib, S. (ed.) Democracy and Difference. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Bergo, B. (2015) Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/levinas/ (accessed 17 February 2017). Damasio, A.R., Everitt, B.J. and Bishop, D. (1996) The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of prefrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B, Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 1403–1420. Davidoff, P. and Reiner, T. (1962) A choice theory of planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Institute of Planners, 28(2), 103–115. Dykman, J. (1961) Planning and decision theory. Journal of the Amer­ican Institute of Planners, 27(4), 335–345. Edwards, D. (1999) Emotion discourse. Culture and Psychology, 5(3), 271–291. Fellous, J.M., Armony, J.L. and LeDoux, J.E (2002) Emotional circuits and computational neuroscience, In: Arbib, M.A. (ed.) The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks, 2nd edition, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. Finke, R.A. and Bettie, J. (1996) Chaotic Cognition. Mahway, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Forester, J. (1999) The Deliberative Practioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. Friedmann, J. (1998) Planning theory revisited. European Planning Studies, 6(3), 245–253. Friedmann, J. (1987) Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Friedmann, J. (1973) Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning. Garden City, MY, Anchor Press/Doubleday. Gladwell, M. (2016) Blink. Düşünmeden Düşünebilmenin Gücü. Istanbul, MediaCat. Guenter, K. (2016) ‘It’s all done with mirrors’: V.S. Ramachandran and the material culture of phantom limb research. Medical History, 60(3), 342–358. Habermas, J. (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II: Lifeworld and System. Boston, MA, ,Beacon. Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston, MA, Beacon. Healey, P. (1997) Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies, 1st edition. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Healey, P. (1993) The communicative work of development plans. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 20(1), 83–104. Iacoboni, M. (2011) Mirroring as a key neural mechanism of sociality, In: Semin, G.R. and Echterhoff, G. (eds) Grounding Sociality. New York and London, Psychology Press, pp. 13–26. Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. London-­New York, Penguin Books. Kazancı, M. (2014) Against Habermasian de(a)liberation. Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilgiler Dergisi, 18(3), 173–188.

242   Ilhan Tekeli LeDoux, J. (1996) The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinning of Emotional Life. New York, Simon & Schuster. Lehler, J. (2016) Karar Anı. Istanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, pp. 23–43. Mannheim, K. (1961) From trial and error to planning. In: Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D. and Chin, R. (eds) The Planning of Change. New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, pp. 34–38. Marsh, K.L. (2010) Sociality from an ecological dynamical perspective. In: Semin, G.R. and Echterhoff, G. (eds) Grounding Sociality. New York and London, Psychology Press, pp. 43–71. Martins, N. (2011) Can neuroscience inform economics? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35(2), 251–267. Ramachandran, V.S. (2011) The Tell-­Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human. New York, Norton. Ramachandran, V.S. and Rogers-­Ramachandran, D. (2007) It’s all done with mirrors: Reflections on the familiar and yet deeply enigmatic nature of the looking glass. Scientific Amer­ican Mind, 18(4), 16–18. Rasmussen, D.C. (2011) Burning laws and strangling kings? Voltaire and Diderot on the perils of rationalism in politics. The Review of Politics, 73(1), 77–104. Reichenbach, H. (1968) The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press. Rose, N. and Abi-­Rached, J.M. (2013) Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Schaefer, M., Heinze, H.J., Rotte, M. and Denke, C. (2013) Communicative versus strategic rationality: Habermas theory of communicative action and the social brain, PLoS One. 2013; 8(5): e65111. Available from: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/ article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0065111 (Accessed 17 September 2017). Sen, A. (2002) Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Simon, H.A. (1956) Administrative Behavior. New York, Macmillan. Simon, H.A. (1955) A behavioural model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99–118. Strle, T. (2016) Embodied, enacted and experienced decision-­making. Phainomena, 25 (98–99), 83–107. Tekeli, I. (2010) Mekansal ve Toplumsal Olanın Bilgi Bilimi Yazıları. Istanbul. Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

14 Afterword I Am Realistic. I Expect Miracles Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin

Today’s most of the planner’s position can be summarised with the Dyer’s quote that is ‘I am realistic. I expect miracles’ (Dyer, 2001). Most of the authors of the chapters of this volume think this way; their feelings can be summarised with this wording. Most of them seem slightly discouraged in view of the manifold pressures related to the advancement of neoliberalisation and globalisation hampering effective public planning. Facing conditions of growing conflicts and antagonisms in cities and regions, and at the same time, the diffusion of governmental strategies of depoliticised managerialism, they are all, albeit to different extents, convinced of the necessity to strengthen the political in planning and governance in a more agonistic perspective. Therefore, they share expectations that something can be done to revert this process by rethinking planning, implementation and decision-­making processes. That being said, whereas several chapters of this volume provide examples that show that a growing number of people feel relatively powerless to influence decisions that have a direct impact, sometimes a devastating one, on their lives, there are others that exemplify attempts at the local and regional level to strengthen place-­based power and to politicise decision-­making, planning and governance. These chapters, specifically, concentrate on the importance of the local and the regional scale. This final chapter tries to summarise the issues raised by the different chapters of this volume, which provides valuable insights regarding the contemporary conditions of planning and governance. The points raised below offer a critical evaluation of manifold ways in which the political dimension is reflected in contemporary planning and governance, besides the promising examples achieved at the local and regional level.

Contextualising Post-­Political Conditions Several chapters of this volume contextualise discussions about post-­politics or the post-­political condition and focus on the sources of this growing discontent (Chapter 4 by Lo Piccolo et al., Chapter 6 by Almeida and da Silva, Chapter 7 by Iracheta). As exemplified in these chapters the infuriation stems from the pressures exercised by coalitions of global and local political and economic elites, favouring attitudes of central and local governments imposing policies

244   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin and projects frequently against the interests of the local stakeholders, especially of those excluded from the decision-­making processes. Consequently, these policies favour certain powerful groups while marginalising and excluding the disadvantaged or powerless, or distributing some crumbles from the lion’s share and prioritising economic concerns over social demands and ecological resilience. All these chapters define post-­political conditions, though stressing case-­ specific features: the domination of a coalition between international-­national and business elites, between the central government, local governments and real estate developers and between the federal government and private real estate entrepreneurs. That said, these cases demonstrate that there is need to pay attention to the definition of post-­political in different contexts. These experiences reveal worrying deficits of democratic legitimacy and accountability of current planning and governance practices, excluding marginal groups from decision-­making in favour of those with economic and political powers, bypassing important stakeholders such as NGOs, implying a loss of power and effectivity of public institutions in decision-­making processes. As the above studies showed, the post-­political conditions, without doubt, engineered by the neoliberal policies, diminished the role of opposition, political parties, NGOs and voluntary governance practices in creating alternative development paths and democratic governance practices (Dean, 2014). These studies displayed that the prevailing governance practices are unable to acknowledge and to value the agonistic dimension of politics inherent to pluralistic societies. Based on the evidence we concur with Forester (2018), who says that agonistic accounts are right (political conflict is unavoidable and ineradicable) and yet not right enough because they remain too silent about qualities and pragmatics of democratic interactions. The three initial chapters that focus on planning and governance under the post-­political condition try to challenge this condition, though they recognise the difficulties of political renewal as the system does not provide much room for expressing resistance and tends to close channels of democratic decision-­making in view of existing antagonisms and unavoidable conflicts; therefore the distrust regarding consensualist approaches and the concentration on agonistics and insurgencies as potential transformative paths. It is curious to note that whereas there is an increasing literature on spreading populism and authoritarianism, there is much less on exploring opportunities of conflict-­driven agonistic confrontations and how these could render transformative solutions. That’s why in the first three chapters the theoretical considerations centre on chances to change the conditions imposed by the contemporary neoliberal agenda and related politics with their often-­devastating effects on city development. After the first chapter on ‘The political in governance and planning’, where the editors of this book, besides presenting its overall structure, examined contributions of the current theoretical debates on the political for evaluating the possibilities and limits of planning and governance to change the post-­political condition, Eraydin and Taşan-Kok (Chapter 2) claimed that there is need to define the political with respect to planning, considering channels that enable decisions to be reached

Afterword   245 related to the public infrastructure and services necessary for sustaining the viability of a society within legitimised processes. They argue that this definition of the political with respect to planning reflects a search for the possible, not the ‘ideal’ and, thus, a heuristic approach that looks for identifying alternative approaches to planning. Randolph and Frey (Chapter 3) analysed different theoretical planning and governance approaches – communicative/collaborative, agonistic and subversive – concerning their potential to effectively counter the currently hegemonic depoliticising planning practice underpinned by neoliberalism and globalisation, concluding that context matters. Whereas the communicative or collaborative approach might work well in developed countries with consolidated democracies like Sweden, introducing marginal interests and values into deliberative processes in a sustainable manner, this hardly works out well in developing, highly unequal and polarised countries, where only agonistic, or rather subversive practices, or even based on civil disobedience, might provide any vague hope and expectation of real change. In order to discuss alternatives, we need a quick review of the dominant characteristics of planning and policy-­making that contextualise the post-­political planning practice, taking into consideration the different examples introduced in this volume. Contractual Agreements First, it is possible to say that contractual agreements are still dominating the planning field, although the practice varies according to the differences in existing planning cultures; in other words, planning culture matters. Schmitt and Smas exemplify various state-­driven urban contractual policies and agreement-­ based instruments aiming at coordinating different sectors, such as land use, transport and housing (Chapter 8). In this chapter, the authors underline that state-­initiated and investment-­oriented contractual arrangements are evident in Finland, Norway and Sweden. According to their findings in Norway, contractual arrangements are clearly integrated within the planning system and the planning instruments, while these relations are fuzzier in the Swedish and Finish contexts, which is explained by the differences in the political-­administrative systems among these countries. Similarly, Iracheta shows how contractual agreements are operated by explaining how the federal government transmuted from the main policy-­maker into a mere facilitator allowing private developers to dictate housing policy to the government and to take full responsibility for the construction of social housing (Chapter 7). The two cases are emblematic for the differences between consolidated and fledgling democracies, as in the Nordic case the state, supported by a consolidated institutional structure, maintains its leading role in establishing contractual agreements, whereas in developing countries all too often the governments succumb to the power of private money renouncing their primordial role in policy-­making. In general, the studies show that the dominance of elite-­state coalitions has been still revigorated through neoliberal reforms. Institutional changes and new

246   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin planning instruments like contractual agreements contribute to depoliticising managerialism even in the Nordic countries, which are believed to still have strong aspirations related to welfare issues. On the other hand, Mexico is a good example of neoliberal policies adopted in many developing countries and clearly shows how market-­oriented policies are enforced by authoritarian and populist practices and attitudes aiming to pacify the urban poor (cf. Eraydin and TaşanKok, 2014 for Turkey). State of Exception and Public Interest for Justifying Neoliberal Policies and Planning Another issue that exemplifies present conditions of planning is the growing significance of the state of exception in both legislation and planning practice. Lo Piccolo et al. (Chapter 4) discuss the state of exemption created under the pressure of international relations. They emphasise what Agamben (2005) highlights: the state of exception becoming an ‘ordinary condition’ at the global level. They also claim that it became extensively operative in everyday life and also in the field of planning. The main problem with the state of exception is its tendency of normalising exceptionalism and therewith inhibiting people to react to the threats restricting and eroding individual civil rights and general human rights (Gray and Porter, 2014; Roy, 2005). In the contemporary world, western democracies included, many examples attest to the ‘suspension of rules’ as a common practice. Indeed, planning becomes a favoured field for applying mechanisms that suspend or circumvent norms and principles and their underlying value systems. The main rhetoric used to justify such exemptions invokes the slowness of ordinary planning tools and procedures, the weakness of local public institutions and a general ‘state of necessity’. The emphasis on the state of necessity can be based on international relations and agreements as defined in the Sugrete di Niscemi case (Chapter 4 by Lo Piccolo et al.) or justified by economic development concerns, as it is underlined by the need for tourism development in the Portugal case (see Chapter 6 by Almeida and da Silva). The study introduced in this chapter on ‘the Troia-­Melides Coast’ shows how a so-­called necessity is transformed into a state of emergency and by defining certain areas as ‘common good’, used for the suspension of laws, that is, justified as an ethical condition that allows to release this specific situation from the application of the law. Also, the debates introduced presented the different understandings of public interest and fundamental disagreements over ‘how to compose the good common world’, in the end, they were used to justify decisions that served the interests of the private sector. Although public interest has always been one of the key notions in planning and a criterion for planning assessment (Campbell and Marshall, 2002; Moroni, 2004), it became widely manipulated in recent years, frequently used to suppress public debate and impose particular interests and worldviews.

Afterword   247 Power Structures The third issue raised by most of the studies introduced in this volume is concerned with power, power structures, asymmetrical power relations and legitimation of power. The different examples introduced in several chapters define different problems related to power imbalances. Differentiated power structure as a problem in the participatory planning process is raised by Ataöv et al. (Chapter 5). They analyse how asymmetrical power relations and imbalances between the different parties involved in planning can become the sources of conflict. The findings of their AR on two participatory planning processes conducted in two Turkish provinces, namely Adıyaman and Bursa, show significant differences in terms of outcomes depending on whether the participatory decision-­making process is conducted under conditions of asymmetrical power structures or in the context of equal or horizontal power relations associated with political commitment to a shared future. Interestingly, the authors found out that in the case of Bursa with a tradition of active citizenship, the highly politicised planning processes hindered the conduct of a ‘productive’ participation process and, thus, implying in negative outcomes, whereas in the Adıyaman case the asymmetry of the power structure was identified as facilitating participation and, consequently, to reach a consensual decision. However, the asymmetrical power relations are not only a reality of the local level; in the case of the Sughereta di Niscemi Reserve of Chapter 4, the system of asymmetrical power relations refer to a multilevel structure, involving local, national and also international interferences; first, between Italy and the United States, and second, between the Italian national government and the Sicilian regional government. We see that power in political planning processes is an inevitable reality, and there is a need for managing power relations throughout the process. Having said that, the two cases that are presented in Chapter 5 showed that when active citizenship is strongly politicised, politics in asymmetrical power structures emerges in association with rhetorically adversarial arguments, which hinder mutuality in participation and therefore the chance for effective solutions. Moreover, several manipulative tactics are used by dominant powers to push through particular interests. Chapter 6 exemplifies the use of ‘public interest’ as part of a political discursive battle serving basically the politico-­economic elite to dismantle the arguments of their opponents.

Ambivalence as Strategy, or How the State Deals with Increasing Criticisms and Insurgencies The post-­political practices that favour those in power, in detriment of the marginal or weakly organised interests, have received increasing critical reactions, although most of them either lost their momentum during the contestatory processes or were pacified by governmental means and actions, both centrally and locally. More important than that, the studies introduced in this volume show

248   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin first ambidextrous strategies and second, as a consequence, ambivalences related to policies, statements of goals, legislation and institutionalisation. The analytical findings confirm the debate on the characteristics of the late neoliberal conjuncture introduced by Peck (2010) and the earlier arguments of Bourdieu (1998) and Wacquant (2009). Peck (2010: p.  105) defines the state apparatus as taking the form of ‘an asymmetrical contest between those left-­arm “spending ministries”—the “trace, within the state, of the social struggles of the past” and those right-­arm agents of austerity, privatization, deregulation, and marketization’. The coexistence of these two apparently contradictory policies adopted by the state is defined also by Wacquant (2009: p.  302) as an ‘ambidextrous relationship between the authoritarian and the assistential wings of the state’. The ambidexterity in different policy fields is well documented in several chapters of this volume. For example, in Chapter 7 Alfonso Iracheta asks an important question: How were the new progressive urban planning and governance legislation passed within the dominant post-­political context? His answer is: through some sort of ‘bipolarity’ that characterises Mexican politics and public policy decision-­making. According to him, the three tiers of the Mexican government have shown scarce concern for the needs of marginalised social groups and have done little during the last three decades to provide proper solutions for urban and social housing and the struggle against inequality and poverty, whereas, on the other hand, the Mexican government has become a leader in progressive legislation and programmes, although many of them turned out weak, not enforced, or infringed and disobeyed. Similarly, Peter Schmitt and Lucas Smas (Chapter 8 of this volume), in their study of spatial planning practices in four Nordic countries, distinguish ambidextrous attitudes concerning planning practice: on the one hand central and local states aim to make planning processes more transparent, inclusive and democratic in order to safeguard input legitimacy, on the other hand, they introduce new forms of market-­oriented planning restricting participatory processes in favour of output efficiency of spatial planning through deregulation and growth orientation. These strategic ambivalences in planning and politics reveal insincere attitudes of central and local governments (Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 2014) and efforts to manipulate the social groups marginalised or excluded from the decision-­making processes. Based on the evidence presented in several studies, it is even possible to underline the deliberate exploitation of ambivalence to meet political ends of those in power by, for instance, formulating statements of conflicting goals and creating contradictory institutions. Ambivalence becomes a strategic political resource in the daily political struggle. One of these strategies is to resort to popular terms which can be defined as empty signifiers (Gunder and Hillier, 2009). For example, as depicted by Almeida and da Silva (Chapter 6), ‘sustainable development’ is defined as the main strategy in the planning of Troia-­Melides Coast in Portugal because the goals of sustainable development are not clearly defined, it is ambivalent, difficult to disagree and hard to specify. Therefore, in the name of sustainable development, a type of contractual

Afterword   249 p­ lanning was initiated, being an example for the adoption of ambivalent concepts and policies as a way to obscure the political dimension involved in such decisions, as Walker and Shove (2007) suggested. Moderate progressive approaches used to count on inclusive institutional arrangements in order to enhance political institutionalised activism. However, recent experiences also reveal ambivalences ‘invented’ by legislation and by introducing new institutional set ups. Irrespective of the significant differences between the four Nordic countries, Schmitt and Smas in their study of recent changes in their national planning systems, identify an increasing market orientation in planning placing emphasis on strategies, output efficiency and contractual relations, limiting opportunities for contestatory participation, coming therefore necessarily into conflict with their traditional high appreciation of input legitimacy as well as inclusiveness and transparency in planning (Chapter 8). This results in conflicts that are not easy to reconcile; however, the traditional consensual style that characterises politics across the Nordic countries seems an important asset contributing to diminishing the level of conflict in urban planning allowing reach, in many cases, inclusive solutions able to counterbalance at least to a certain degree the advancement of neoliberal market-­orientation. In Chapter 9, which summarises institutional changes related to metropolitan governance in three federal states – Canada, Brazil and Germany – Zimmerman questions the aim of institutionalisation at the metropolitan level. He argues that the existing ambivalent situation of the city regions in these federal countries is partly the result of the inability of upper-­level governments to recognise the socio-­spatial complexity of metropolitan regions entering into conflict with the local actors’ struggle for preserving local identity and culture as well as their political autonomy. The overall lack of clear and comprehensive ideas of how to institutionalise successful metropolitan governance contrasts however with a certain institutional variability, which at least in the German case involves democratically promising institutional solutions as the directly elected regional assemblies in some metropolitan areas. We can say that in both studies on the transformation of the Nordic planning systems as well as on the metropolitan governance regimes in federal states, despite the predominance of critical interpretations highlighting critically interpreted depoliticisation and marketisation processes, the authors visualise new possibilities of political renewal by institutional design of political arenas prone to intermediate conflictive political configurations. This kind of contradiction also becomes clearly evident in Bifulco’s and Dodaro’s study on the ambivalence of the political dimension in local welfare governance and social innovation in the city of Milan (Chapter 10), where social innovation as a compromise among economic interests, social demands and participation is considered at the same time as both an example for the ‘pervasiveness of economic competitiveness’ and a pragmatic reformist approach and, consequently, a means to enhance democratic legitimacy, revealing ‘a present full of lights and shadows and an uncertain future’. Whereas some of the experiences of social innovation examined in the research indicate more depoliticising

250   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin effects, in general when market orientation prevails, others like participatory budgeting reveal important chances for repoliticisation. The different examples show how forces of depoliticisation and repoliticisation interact constantly in accordance with the different political power struggles occurring in society. In the following, we place emphasis on the initiatives in terms of political renewal or repoliticisation.

Collaboration for Repoliticisation: Not Less Politics but Different Politics In the literature, there is a general scepticism about repoliticisation. However, as said earlier in this volume, several chapters have presented successful attempts of political renewal, although they did not result in changes in planning regimes but rather in daily planning practices. After a long silence by planning scholarship on the strategies against post-­political conditions on planning practice, these experiences from different countries indicate possibilities to make a difference regarding democratic planning and governance practices, albeit the evident limits of these experiences in the overall neoliberal context cannot be denied. Bottom-­Up Initiatives and Rescaling In making a difference in planning practice, bottom-­up initiatives are important. As the experiences of Sweden introduced in Chapter 8 reveal, the increasing numbers of regional bottom-­up initiatives demonstrate that the absence of statutory planning instruments creates opportunities for parallel structures and bottom-­up initiatives, although it is unclear whether these non-­statutory parallel, top-­down/bottom-­up arrangements made on a voluntary basis create more or fewer opportunities for repoliticisation in comparison with statutory planning instruments that follow rather clearly defined procedures. Whereas it is possible to say that rescaling indeed opens up chances for bottom-­up initiatives and therefore opportunities for politicisation, particularly on the regional scale, at the same time it very often represents rather an attempt of supra-­municipal governments, driven by dominant economic interest, to rationalise regional cooperation in a managerial perspective in view of a general reluctance from part of mayors in fear of losing power. The rescaling efforts undertaken in different federal countries summarised by Zimmerman (Chapter 9) show the importance of avoiding technocratic solutions, but instead providing participatory and democratic arenas and instruments like in the case of Germany with the directly elected regional assemblies or in Belo Horizonte/Brazil with the regional council of the Metropolis that counts on the participation of members from civil society and the participatory masterplan providing opportunities for all citizens to take part in regional planning.

Afterword   251 Social Innovation Another way of politicisation can be through social innovation, providing bottom-­up processes that can contribute to the political renewal of society. However, there are contrary perspectives on social innovation. Swyngedouw (2005) elucidates his critical view on social innovation by resorting to the metaphor of the Trojan horse: a well-­masked neoliberal device to expand and consolidate market principles to the social sphere. This argument is in line with our previous argument regarding the use of ambivalence as an explicit governmental strategy. Similarly, Moulaert et al. (2017: p. 19) highlighted the risk of an opportunistic use of the concept of social innovation and discussed whether social innovation is an instrument of ‘caring liberalism’ or a trigger of new governance. As Bifulco and Dodaro summarised (Chapter 10), the social innovation concept has undergone a real semantic change since the 1980s, from the socialisation of individually experienced problems essentially through the claim of social rights to entrepreneurial subjects and experiences. The authors also suggest that political implications of social innovation can vary from case to case; some approaches are based on collective subjects and actions, others rely mainly on the Schumpeterian entrepreneur and its creativity. In their Milanese experience, the authors found a composite strategy of the city of Milan revealing the ambivalence of the social innovation policy: social innovation as a policy reduced to private economic innovations that reinforces depoliticisation processes versus social innovation as an inclusive strategy to aggregate actors, including individual citizens, as well as formal and informal organisations, in socio-­political dynamics providing new opportunities for participation. As this study concludes, social innovation, conceived as a redefinition of the relations between state, market and society, means not less politics but a different politics and the need to focus on how political actors promote and guide social innovation within the context of the political, understood here as ‘the realm of the possible’. New Local Actors, Initiatives and Leadership for Collaborative Practices One of the main claims posed in the introduction of this volume is the necessity and benefits of politicisation for local community development. However, Anne Taufen claims that while politicisation is needed, it remains complicated and counter-­intuitive as a planning and governance strategy; there is, as ever, the possibility of fracture, impasse, waste, polarisation, inaction and other ills that arise from highly politicised endeavours (Chapter 11 in this volume). Instead, according to her, there may be some collaborative practices that can help to repoliticise decision-­making: The two examples she has introduced highlight the powerful role that can be played by universities in collaborative practices, generating and transitioning between discourses of community development, promoting

252   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin partnerships that can help to politicise community development in constructive and practical ways. By that, urban universities can assume an important leadership role in the enactment and cultivation of community development initiatives. The examples given can be evaluated as quite modest, such as an annual university-­community event organised by urban scholars at the UWT, attempts to bring researchers, practitioners, and community members into conversation about a specific community development issue, a year-­long partnership between the university and a local government engaging students, faculty, and public professionals in projects identified by the public partner. However, the above examples show that universities can help to repoliticise planning and governance and to revive democratic processes by exercising a leading role in collaborative practices, contributing with what is universities’ proper business: knowledge generation and dissemination. Universities can help to overcome nocive argumentative disputes that are often messy and emotional and the resulting conflicts among the different stakeholders by sustaining informationally and moderating such quarrels in decision-­making processes. Many critical urban scholars have shown how planning policies, intentionally or not, often serve the interests of the powerful at the expense of the poor (cf. Brenner et al., 2012), which are contextualised in many chapters of the book. Yet, aren’t there possibilities of those in power working in favour of the disadvantaged and/or the well-­being of the people? Hambleton (Chapter 12) claims that the role of place-­based leadership in modern systems of urban governance can be decisive to bring about successful planning interventions in favour of better urban living conditions. He argues that city leaders, including city planners, can play an important role in highlighting the moral limits of markets and draw attention to the importance of advancing other important values, for example, altruism, solidarity, generosity and civic spirit. In order to achieve this, he poses four central issues: according to him, in the first place, values matter: an emotional, not just an intellectual commitment to the planning project and practice can be inspiring for planners in cities and localities elsewhere. Second, leadership matters: when planners see themselves as place-­based leaders, they can, depending on the local context, have a significant and lasting impact on the trajectory of public policy for the city where they work. Third, innovation zones matter, those are the fields of action which provide opportunities for inventive behaviour. Fourth, place matters: spatial awareness and a specific concern for the place are essential for planners considering the place-­based outcomes for different communities and groups. Besides this chapter, two more chapters of this volume underline the importance of leadership, especially the role of local stakeholders, including planners. In Chapter 6 Almeida and da Silva point to the need to define which public entity would undertake the leadership role or act as a mediator in the reconciliation process, which is an integral part of the planning process. According to the authors, in order to improve territorial governance, there is need to widen the existing narrow functional, rather than place-­based, objectives, that obviously necessitates effective leadership. The authors of Chapter 5, Ataöv et al., share

Afterword   253 this view and highlight the need to democratise communities of interest through future planning, which could be managed by expanding existing boundaries and accepting newcomers and, thereby, finding a shared ground for living together in harmony and mutual respect. According to them, it is a crucial leadership role to generate knowledge through dialogue and participation and to change the current situation through shared action, constituting fundamental elements to achieve democratisation of a society.

The Future In discussing the future of planning, an important question arises. This question is whether we seek for systemic change and may end up saying that none can be achieved under the contemporary conditions or following a heuristic approach to seek for what is possible. The answer to this question by social scientists vary. First of all, radical political philosophers are mainly concerned with possibilities to push forward counter-­hegemonic projects and thus call into question the current institutional order. Whereas Mouffe counts on the reconfiguration of the existing institutional order, Ranciére advocates its constant disruption; only for Žižek is there is a need for a radical overthrow. With respect to planning, progressively oriented approaches similarly focus on institutional transformation, communicative or collaborative planning by providing procedural changes that favour consensus building, agonistic planning by enacting conflictual governance arenas, as well as concepts that emphasise externally generated counter-­powers by means of insurgent planning or even passive resistance or civil disobedience. All of them take the non-­egalitarian capitalism as a matter of fact and argue that neoliberalism, with its diverse governmentality measures, has contributed to a process of depoliticisation. That being said, we concur with Dean, who claims ‘post-­politics, depoliticisation and de-­democratisation are conceptually inadequate’ in order to deal with the fact that capitalism is producing a non-­ egalitarian world (Dean, 2014: p. 263). That is why bottom-­up experiences and learning through action and experience that can lead to not less politics, but different politics, are important as the different chapters of the book suggest. First and foremost, we have to recognise that none of the introduced cases in this volume are aspiring revolutionary changes as conceived by Rancière or even Žižek, and thus are definitely not system threatening (Randolph and Frey, in this volume). If at all, there are expectations that through the reconfiguration of the institutional order, through more inclusive governmental strategies, or yet, through the appearance of leadership exercising organisations or personalities, outstanding politicians or planners, an intensified political dynamic can be triggered, leading gradually to the politicisation of local and regional governance and, consequently, the empowerment of the local people, making those eventually ‘less depending on global capital, increasing their social power and experiencing their own political power’ (Sandercock, 1998: p. 176). From this general perception, the case studies in our book tend more to Mouffe’s agonistic

254   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin p­ erspective, highlighting the importance of conflict and strive for change, or to collaborative planning theory with its major focus on communicative rationality, dialogical, deliberative practices, and the promotion of mutuality and solidarity in order to trigger significant political change. That makes us rethink the heuristic approach and search for what else is going on and what seems possible at the local level. As underlined by Innes (2013), today collaborative processes are less influential and less used in practice, but nevertheless more needed than ever. Mouffe might be right that politics always involves conflict, but it also involves collaboration and mutuality, whereas collaboration always requires politics. Consensus-­seeking has necessarily to include spaces for disagreement, which have to be moderated and informationally supported by government and planning. Here we have to rely not only on the existing knowledge but have to consider the importance of emotional interaction as Ilhan Tekeli suggests in Chapter 13 of this volume. We have to rely on current scientific knowledge, but also have to consider the knowledge received by the interaction of the different stakeholders and explore how we make decisions and how we open up planning for visionary elements, practices and approaches. Visionary elements are important because the intersection between ‘spatial visioning and spatial intervention’ is a key political moment (Metzger et al., 2015: p. 13). In practice, the increased strategic elements within spatial planning might, very often, take precedence over the political. Therefore, efforts for transformation have to actively incorporate grassroots stakeholders and social actors fighting for political alternatives, avoiding what Žižek (2006) has alerted to when stating that popular frustration with the confines of consensual politics inevitably gives way to alternatives that, faced with the depoliticising strategies of the consensual order, often take a populist form. In view of all the threats that afflict cities and regions nowadays, above all, but not exclusively, in the Global South, reaching from systemic urban violence, increasing inequality and poverty to the environmental crisis, Žižek’s alert may make us think that the aforementioned question opposing systemic change to a pragmatic search for what is possible, might not be the only option at hand. Maybe in our pragmatic search, we at least have to include ‘the apparently impossible’ and try to go beyond what is in our reach under the current structural conditions. Herewith we come back to Ranciére’s point of the necessity for constant disruption of the institutional order. It is perhaps not by chance that all more promising and optimistic experiences of political renewal presented in Part III of this volume stem from the developed countries and consolidated democracies. As Randolph and Frey argue in Chapter 3 of this volume, the given institutional order might become itself an impediment maybe not to seek for what is possible, but for what is necessary to make cities resilient and able to deal with the undecidable conflicts and systemic risks they are increasingly facing. From that perspective, a political regime increasingly self-­absorbed, paralysed and entrapped by a set of interdependent and contradictory interests and aspirations, might eventually only be disrupted with help from outside the system, by insurgencies and civil obedience; and this despite its obvious structural limitations pointed out in this chapter.

Afterword   255 The contributions in this book display a mixed and ambiguous picture of the political in planning and governance in the current context of neoliberalisation and globalisation. Scholars from the Global South seem more sceptical as regards the possibilities of political renewal, possibly because neoliberal reforms in these countries have been more radical and civil society and social organisations less developed and consolidated in order to effectively oppose the ongoing mercantilisation of cities and the weakening of public and democratic institutions accompanying economic neoliberalisation. However, as we have seen (Schmitt and Smas, Chapter 8), even in the traditional northern welfare states these transformations have been strongly perceived and affected possibilities of local planning – albeit to a lesser extent – to resist to the advancement of depoliticising urban neoliberalism. Nonetheless, the experiences discussed also demonstrate potentialities of reviving the political through renewed planning mechanisms and socio-­ political mobilisation and, hence, give us cause to be a little more positive about possibilities to overcome the current post-­political condition, furthering governance and planning practices in the perspective of a vital local democracy, concerned about inclusion and the common good. This, however, will definitely not be enough to structurally confront or even overthrow the current neoliberal hegemonic order in favour of a new model of democratic development, based on values such as solidarity, fairness, mutuality and equity. Nevertheless, and without doubt, inasmuch as all these promising planning experiences narrated in this volume reveal their limits in structural terms and the devastating effects of neoliberalism on human cohabitation, human security and the natural environment continue expanding, opportunities will grow for insurgent, counter-­hegemonic movements, which, if connected on a global scale, might eventually develop forces able to effectively challenge the current condition.

References Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Bourdieu, P. (1998) The left hand and the right hand of the state. In: Bourdieu, P. (ed.) Acts of Resistance. Cambridge, Polity, pp. 1–10. Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. and Mayer, M. (eds) (2012) Cities for People, Not for Profit. Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City. Abingdon, Routledge. Campbell, H. and Marshall, R. (2002) Utilitarianism’s bad breath? A re-­evaluation of the public interest justification for planning. Planning Theory, 1(2), 163–187. Dean, J. (2014) After post-­politics: Occupation and the return of communism, In: Wilson, J. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds) Post-­political and Its Discontents. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, pp. 261–278 Dyer, W. (2001) You’ll See It When You Believe It: The Way to Your Personal Transformation. New York, HarperCollins. Eraydin, A. and Taşan-Kok, T. (2014) State response to contemporary urban movements in Turkey: A critical overview of state entrepreneurialism and authoritarian interventions. Antipode, 46(1), 110–129. Forester, J. (2018) From garbage in the streets to organizers’ opportunities: Exploring the institutional pragmatics of democratic inter-­subjectivity. In: Salet, W.G.M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook Institutions and Planning in Action. New York, Routledge.

256   Klaus Frey and Ayda Eraydin Gray, N. and Porter, L. (2014) By any means necessary: Urban regeneration and the ‘state of exception’ in Glasgow’s Commonwealth Games. Antipode, 47(2), 380–400. Gunder, M. and Hillier, J. (2009) Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning. Abingdon, Routledge. Innes, J. (2013) A turning point for planning theory? Overcoming dividing discourses, Working Paper 2013–2, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, Berkeley, University of California. Metzger, J., Allmendinger, S. and Oosterlynck, S. (2015) The contested terrain of European territorial governance: New perspectives on democratic deficits and political displacements. In: Metzger, J. Allmendinger, P. and Oosterlynck, S. (eds) Planning Against the Political: Democratic Deficits in European Territorial Governance. New York, Routledge, pp. 2–27. Moroni, S. (2004) Towards a reconstruction of the public interest criterion. Planning Theory, 3(2), 151–171. Moulaert, F., Mehmood, A., MacCallum, D. and Leubolt, B. (2017) Social Innovation as a Trigger for Transformations: The Role of Research. Luxembourg, European Commission. Peck, J. (2010) Zombie neoliberalism and the ambidextrous state. Theoretical Criminology, 14(1), 104–110. Roy, A. (2005) Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning. Journal of the Amer­ican Planning Association, 71(2), 147–158. Sandercock, L. (1998) The death of modernist planning: Radical praxis for a postmodern age. In: Douglass, M. and Friedmann, J. (eds) Cities for Citizens. Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 163–184. Swyngedouw, E. (2005) Governance innovation and the citizen: The Janus face of governance-­beyond-the-­State. Urban Studies, 42(11), 1991–2006. Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Insecurity. Durham, NC, Duke University Press. Walker, G. and Shove, E. (2007) Department of Sociology, Lancaster University , Lancaster, UK Governance for sustainable development: Coping with ambivalence, uncertainty and distributed power – Ambivalence, Sustainability and the Governance of Socio-­Technical Transitions. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 9(3–4), 213–225 Žižek, S. (2006) Against the populist temptation. Critical Enquiry, 32(3), 551–574.

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italic denote figures. Ackland, L. 227, 240 action research 11, 75–76 active citizenship 32, 75–76, 81, 88–90, 247 affordable housing 144, 157, 191, 194–195, 199 Agamben, G. 60–62, 68, 99, 246 Agambenian approach 61–62 agonistic model of democracy 4 agonistic planning 30, 42, 45, 47, 49, 235 agonistic pluralism 10, 27, 39, 45 Alexander, E.R. 21, 96 Allmendinger, P. 6, 22, 40 Alonso, L. 175 Ansell, C. 99 antagonism 30–31, 45–49, 52, 112, 244; conflicts 44, 243; prevention 39; social 4 Araujo, L.M. 107 asymmetrical power relations 7, 60, 62, 75, 79, 247 austerity measures 169 Baeten, G. 133 Basta, C. 31 Binney, G. 209 bio-diversity 103, 105 bipolarity 248 Bond, S. 39, 49 Booher, D. 26, 28, 41, 47 Boser, S. 77 bottom-up initiatives 32, 147, 179, 181, 250 boundary spanning 189–190 Bramwell, B. 107–108 Brindley, T. 24 Burnham, P. 174

city leadership 206, 219 cognitive and neurosciences 227 collaboration 12, 173, 189, 202, 210, 254; agents 12; mechanisms 186; for repoliticisation 250; voluntary 143 collaborative planning 22, 27, 40, 52, 188, 231–232; communicative and 5, 22, 25, 39, 52, 253; paradigm of 28; practice 188 Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies 231 Commagene-Nemrut Conservation Management Plan 81, 98 common interests 43, 95–96, 97, 43 communicative action theory 39; CAT 40–41, 231 communicative rationality: description 23, 28, 41, 48, 228, 240, 254; ethics 232; ideal speech situation 230; intersubjective knowledge 231; planning 26, 47 communicative turn 22, 27, 40 community development 191–192, 196–198, 201; discourses 186, 251; politicisation 186, 252; urban policies 187 community-engaged university 13, 189–190, 201 competing interests 92–93, 97, 108, 212 competitiveness 24–25, 107, 162, 249; economic 154–156, 181 comprehensive integrated approach 134–135 comprehensive municipal plans 144 comprehensive plans 141–142, 191, 193, 215, 217 comprehensive-rational approach 41 concept of public interest 93–95 consensualist politics 5 consensus building 27, 39, 42, 136, 253; means 186; planning 5; processes 97

258   Index constructive politics 81, 88, 90 contractual agreements 245–246 counter-hegemonic planning 49 cultural diversity 158 Damasio, Antonio 233 Davidoff, P. 21 Davoudi, S. 29 decentralisation 136, 140, 153, 158, 165; administrative 155; deregulation 139; false 155; logic 152, 160; political 157; territorialisation 170 decision-making processes: actors 1, 5, 22, 81, 86, 96, 230, 244; democratic 75, 77; emotions 235–236, 239; inclusive 171; participatory 11, 75, 103, 105, 247–248; planning and 47, 243; power relations 8, 28, 66, 93, 95; public institutions in 244; scientific knowledge 227–228, 233, 235; transparency 106–109 decision-making systems 23, 239 deliberative democracy 40, 46, 96, 231 Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Process 231 delimitation of metropolitan areas 159 democratic deficits 5, 13, 25 democratic legitimacy 7, 10, 38, 133, 244, 249 democratic participation 26, 80, 81, 83, 239; conditions 75, 76, 79–80; mechanisms 9, 239 depoliticisation: governance 6, 114, 171, 174, 182, 249, 251; planning 6, 27, 29, 187, 227; process 2, 4, 43, 146, 182, 253; repoliticisation 1, 4, 250 depoliticised discourse 7 dialogical approach 95–96, 108 dictatorship of the proletariat 4, 45, 52 different understandings of public interest 93, 246 Dikeç, M. 26, 30 discursive communities 78, 82, 85, 88 discursive regimes 187, 200 diversity 48, 164, 196, 220; concepts of 32; interests 96; policies 154; societal 38 Dryzek, J.S. 46, 48 economic crisis 12, 155, 160, 205 ejidatarios 113, 120, 123–124, 126 ejido 113, 124, 126–127 emotions 13, 210, 227, 233–240 end of politics 3, 7 entrepreneurialism 8, 25, 32, 112, 127

environmental NGOs 104; ENGOs 104, 106–109, 123 equity planning 205, 213–214, 216–217 ethical judgements 237–238 ethics 13, 30, 227–229, 232, 238–239 exchangers 200 Fabriq 177–179, 182n1, 182n2 federal states 151–153, 161, 165, 249 Fernandez Rodríguez, C. 175 Flanagan, Richard 208 fluctuating sovereignty 68 Flyvbjerg, B. 27, 59, 61 Forester, John 40, 205 formal statutory plans 137 Foucault, Michel 43–44, 60–61, 79, 187, 200–202 free-market oriented public policy 11 Friedmann, J. 8, 21, 213, 228–229, 231–232 Gans, Herbert 204, 221 Gash, A. 99 Giacomo Brodolini Foundation 176; GBF 177, 179 Giddens, Antony 43 Greenwood, D.J. 80, 90 Gunder, M. 28, 60 Habermas 38, 40–41, 78, 237, 240n1 Habermasian communicative rationality 4, 22 Habermasian communicative action theory 39, 43, 230–231 Healy, Patsy 28, 32, 40, 47, 231, 232 hierarchy of interests 11, 95, 97, 97, 99, 103, 104 Hilier, J. 28, 30, 44, 48, 60, 61 Holston, J. 51 housing deterioration index 119 Huxley, M. 28 inclusiveness 100, 136, 249 informal workers 125 Innes, Judith 26, 28, 40, 42, 47, 254 institutional changes 156, 245, 249 institutional fragmentation 153, 157 institutional order 4, 240n1, 253, 254 institutionalism 32 institutions: anchor institutions 200; basic 45; charitable 176; consulting 85; contradictory 248; democracy 26, 45, 255; formal 210; governance 7, 26, 28, 32, 142–144, 170, 189; heritage 107; local institutions 69, 83–84, 89, 158,

Index   259 181; metropolitan 161; multilateral 115, 134, 196; planning 5, 10, 109, 134; politics 3, 32, 45, 48; processes and 28; public 7, 67, 70, 107, 133, 244, 246, 248, 255; voluntary 52 instrumental approach 77 instrumental rationality 22, 228, 230–232, 239–240 insurgent planning 51–52, 253 inter-municipal cooperation 143, 159, 162, 164–165 intersubjectivities 232, 235, 237–238 Kahneman, D. 234–235, 237 Karlberg, M. 77 Kautto, M. 134 Keating, M. 170 Keynesian welfare state policies 23 Klink, J. 159–160 Krumholz, Norman 205, 214 Kübler, D. 153 Kvist, J. 134 Laclau, Ernesto 43 land of exception 11, 59, 70 leadership theory 204–205, 210 LeDoux, J. 234 Lefèvre, C. 152–153 Lennon, M. 96 Levin, M 80, 90 lifeworld 38, 41, 50, 230, 240n1 Liveable City Year 191, 195, 196, 198–201 local community development 186, 251 local self-government 136, 157, 161, 164 local welfare governance 12, 169, 172, 249 Lovelock, B. 108 Machado, V.M.R. 99 majority opinion 95–97 Mannheim, Karl 228 Mattila, H. 96 Maxwell, J. 96–97 metropolitan governance: description 152, 154, 155, 161, 165, 249: Brazil 158–161; Canada 154; Germany 161–164; the Toronto region 155 Metzger, J. 5, 9 Mexican Agrarian Revolution 113–114 Mexican Housing Policy 11, 112, 123–125, 245 Middle East Technical University 81; METU 84, 86 Milan White Paper on Social Innovation 176

Milano Manifattura 179 Mingione, E. 173, 176 mirror neurons 236, 239 modernist planning 23, 228 Moore, C.V. 97 Mouffe, Chantal: agonistic approach 3–4, 45, 253–254; agonistic pluralism 27, 39, 48; agonistic conflict and dispute 29, 51, 78; agonistic planning 49; antagonism 31; antagonistic dimension of politics 43; conflicting consensus 44; power relations 47 Moulaert, F. 173, 175, 251 Mount Nemrut Tumulus 83 National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) 175 national interests 137, 138, 139, 141–143 Nature 2000 66 neoliberal austerity politics 6 neoliberal market order 8 neoliberal policy adjustments 135, 146 New Civic Leadership 205, 211, 218, 220 New Public Management 6, 136, 211 New Regionalism 156, 162 Nicolas Sarkozy 26 No-MUOS groups 65, 69 non-statutory informal regional strategies 143 Nordic countries 133–137, 146–147, 248–249; Denmark 139; Finland 140; Norway 141; shifts in Nordic planning 137; Sweden 142 Nordic welfare model 137, 147 Oosterlynck, S. 2, 6 Ostrom, E. 32 output efficiency 13, 146, 248–249 Özdemir, E. 32 Pal, L.A. 96–97 participatory governance 171 participatory planning 49, 82, 85, 87–88, 90, 211; advances in 211; large-scale 75, 84; multiple roles in 79; power in 76; process 247, 231 partnerships 6, 152, 162, 196, 199, 252 Pateman, C. 90 Peck, J. 248 place-based leadership 212, 213 place-based power 204, 209, 219, 243 place-less power 205–206, 219, 221 planning priorities 21 plural democracy 48

260   Index pluralism 10, 27, 39, 45–46, 180–181 policy-led social innovation 175 political renewal 9, 244, 249–251, 254–255 politicisation of metropolitan governance 153 politics of metropolitan governance 151 Portuguese Spatial Planning Framework 94, 97 post-modernisation of planning post-democracy 1 post-political 112–117, 126, 127 post-political context 248 post-structuralist scholars 5, 25 post-truth 31, 227, 240 power of place 204, 206, 219 power structures 27, 31, 79, 82, 85, 173–195; active citizenship and 75; asymmetrical 87, 90, 247; changing 89 pragmatism 22, 176, 181 procedural theories 21 process transparency 100, 106 progressive ethics 228 progressive planning 50, 213–214, 218–219, 221 projects of national interest 101 Purcell, M. 25, 27, 46, 50 quality of life 8–9, 24, 155, 195, 216; higher 212; improving the 103, 104, 105, 173, 213; local 196 radical political approaches 38, 52 radical: democracy; planning 38–39, 45, 49–50; political philosophers 253; political thinking 10 Ramachandran, V.S. 236 Ramirez, V. 115–116, 124 Rancière, J. 3–4, 26, 29, 45–46, 253 Rasmussen, D.C. 229 rational choice 229 rational comprehensive planning 21–24, 40 Rawls’ theory 31 recentralisation 172 reformist tradition 181 regional assemblies 163–165, 249–250 Reiner, T. 21 relational perspective 21, 32 repoliticisation 1, 2, 4, 147, 174, 188, 250 repoliticising planning 188 rescaling 9, 12, 139, 144, 164, 169, 250 revival of pragmatism 22 roll-back neoliberalism 25

roll-on neoliberalism 24 Sager, Tore 41, 47 Salet, W. 22 Sandel, Michael 205 Sandercock, L. 50, 60 scientific knowledge 227–228, 233, 254 self-government 157 Shahidi, F.V. 169 Shove, E. 209 social innovation incubator 175, 177 social innovation strategy 175, 177, 180 social investment 176 social rights 135, 175, 251 social start-ups 174, 177–178, 180–181 social welfare services 133 Sotarauta, Markku 210 spaces of ‘lawlessness’ 61 spatial planning instruments 12, 137, 138, 144, 147 state entrepreneurialism 8, 25 state of exception 60–62, 66–70, 99, 108, 246 state of necessity 62, 99, 246 Stokes, G. 90 Strange, I. 29 strategic spatial planning 25, 144 suburban communities 154, 158 Sughereta di Niscemi Reserve 11, 59, 70n1, 247 suspension of rules 11, 70, 246 Swyngedouw, E. 6, 27, 30, 174, 175, 251 territorial governance 109, 134, 252 territorial reorganisation of local governments 153 territorialisation and localisation of public action 170 Tewdwr-Jones, M. 30, 40 Troia-Melides Coast 103, 105 unequal power relations 42, 49 UNESCO World Heritage 76, 83 university-community event 187–252 urban contractual policies 145, 147, 150, 245 Urban Studies Forum 191, 201 Wacquant, L. 25, 248 Walker, G. 209 Yiftachel, O. 59–60 Žižek, Slavoj 3–4, 45, 52, 128, 253–254