Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand 9789814376631

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FOREWORD
Political Violence in the Muslim Province• of S o uthern Thai l and
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

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Politi cal Violen ce in the Muslim Provin ce• of So uthern Thai l and

by

M. Lad d Th omas

Occaai onal Paper No . 28 Inatitu te o f So utheas t Asian Stud ies Price:

S$4. 00

FOREWORD

Politi cal violenc e involv ing commu nist-led rebelli ons or sizeab le religio us, ethnic or lingui stic l ~i norities has been almost a way of life for severa three or two past the for parts of Southe ast Asi a Inde ed, some Southe ast Asian countr ies have decade s . had the invidio us dlst .i. n ction of havinc::r tHo or more quite distin ct di s s iden t Moveme nts wi thin t~eir borde r s at one and the saMe t1 Me . Tha iland, for i nst a n ce , has both a commun ist-led insurre c tion in it s northe rn a n d north easter n borde r areas and a ~1uslim-ba s ed politic al a gitatio n in the southe rn provi nce s adjoin ing Pen1ns ular Malays ia. In the paper that foll eto~s, Dr. •1. Ladd Thomas , curren tly conduc ting field-w ork in Thaila nd , a ttemot s to examin e t h e causes and manife station s of , as well as the governmen tal respo n s e t o , the pol1t1 cal unrest in the r1uslim r' r o v1n ces of southe rn Thaila nd. Let ' s h ope h is analys is w1ll s tiMula te furthe r though t on the p rob leM. In wishin g Dr. Ladd Tho~a s all the best, it is clearl y unders tood that respon sibilit y for facts and opin1o ns exp ressed i n t he 1-lork that f o llows re s t s exclus ively with Dr. Ladd Thomas , and his interp retat ion s d o not necess arily refle c t the views or policy of the Institu te itself or its suppor ters

17 Anr1.l 1975

Kernia l Singh Sandhu Direct or

Political violence involving sizeable minorities seems t o ~e commonplace today in countries •-1here these groups , however defined, are not politically integrated into the state i n wh ich they live and where they are located near borders \t~ ith other countries having majority populations simil a r to these Minorities . Su ch is the case, for instance, in northern Ireland , E ritre a, and the Sulu Islands. Certainly it is the case with respect to the five provinces immediately north of the Thailand-~alaysia fr o n tier , where the Thai '1uslims constitute a large minority in Songkhla and a large Majority 1n S~tun , Yala , Pattani a nd Like their ~alay neighbours next door, ~arathiwat . tusl ims but they also speak t~ese oeon l e are n ot on l y a local dialect of '\alav as their only or p rimary languaae .1 There h a s long been political unrest i n the Musli ~ of southe rn Thailand, but the past decade has \'litnessed a sham r ise i n political agitation and an outbreak of pol 1tical violence aimed against governMental author i ty. Th1s manuscript represent s a n effort , a lbe it l1mited i n scope and depth, to examine the causes and manifestat1 ons o f this phenomenon as ·..rell as to examine the governmental response. Thus it 1s first necessary to identify those determ1nants of the situation , for it is from such a matrix that local M usli~ discon tent emerges. ~ r ovinces

Geo~raphical

Co n siderations

Distance , hilly and forested terrain , and heavy ra1nfall soMewhat limit land transportation northward from this region t o one rail -line and o ne paved road; other roads leading north t~4ard Bangkok are unpaved ~or much of the way and t herefore are impassab l e for severa l months o f the year. Moreover there are no n atural harbours in these provinces with sufficien t ly deep water to accommodate freighters, and \·!hat regular shipping service to Bangkok does ex~st is restricted by the monsoon season and the need to of f-l oad on small

l

Host of the Thai Muslims in ~arathi\.1at. Pattani and ~ala speak Malay as thei r first or only language, whi le the majority in Satun and Songkhla communi cate either solely or largely in Thai.

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lighters at s uch po rts as Songkhla. 2 And commercia l air service fr om Bangko k is fairly recent and minimal , extendi ng only to the tow~of Hat . Yai and Pattani . I t has been for some time , and still is , easier for people living 1n this area to t r avel to ne arby For one thing , the distance Malaysia than to Bangkok. there a re two rail - lines re, Furthermo i s far less . one running through the Malays1a, and between Hat Yai and Narathiwa t while Pattani Songkhla, p r ov1nces of p art of Songkhla southern the the othe r pa sses through from Hat Yai to road paved a is province. Also there province) on Songkhla in are the town of Sadao (both road wh1ch paved the Malays1an border, and another and passes highway o turns off from the Hat Yai - Sada through Pattan1 p rovince - at which point one b r anch goes through Narathiwa t p rovince and ends at Sungei Golok town on the bo rder , while a second runs through Yala p r ovin ce and eventuall y reaches the Malaysian border ne ar the town of Betong. People living along the border 1n Narath1wa t, Yala and Songkhla provinces frequent ly cross over 1.nto Malaysia by the numerous footpaths or b y wading through shal low streams and r1 vers . Those peorle living on the lower coast of Narath 1wat and that of Satun travel as often as once o r tw1ce per week t o Malaysian ports by small boats with outboard motors. Land transport ati o n within the region, other than the ra11-l i nes and paved highways , is also affected by the terra1n and ra i nfall.3 Vil lage roads, that is those c o nnect1ng v1llages with each other and/or with highways , are very poor . They are generally narrow

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It is anti c ipated that harbour facili ties at Songkhla will s oon be impr o ved through dredgtng and through constru c tion of piers ex tend ing some distan ce out from land.

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ln additi on t o the pa ve d highways already noted , t here are t hree other paved highways in the regi on . One links the towns of Hat Yal and Songkhla . One conne ~a ~De ~ of Yala with the distri c t centre of Yala , as well as connecting W1th the h1ghway be tween Hat Yai and Pattani , And one links the t own of Satun w1 th the paved highway between Hat Ya1 and Bangkok , furthermo r e, another road with a hard surface is being constructed between Songkhla and Nakorn Sri Thammarat .

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tracks which can be used by bicycle s, motorbi kes, jeeps and sometim es small trucks in good weather only. Furtherm ore, there are many villages without roads, the villager s having to walk along footpath s.

d~rt

Historic al Perspec tive The inhabita nts of this region probablv were first converte d to Islam during the 13th centurv A. D. ToHard the end of that centurv , several small groups of Thai settlers had establis hed comrnun~t~es as far south as Songkhl a and the Thais had begun to exercise a locse polit1c al control over the tiny Malay kingdom s in that area. t~ule tempora rily stymied in their efforts to extend control further south because of competi tion fro~ the rtaJ apahi t Empire and, later from the Kingdom of ~-ialacca , the Tha1s '·J ere able to resume their historic drive in the 16th centu.-:-". Eventua lly they imposed tributor y status uoon other small nolitica l entities in '-that are nO\-t the '1uslim 9rovinc es and upon what are now the Malays1a n states of Kelantan , Trengga nu, Kedah and Perlis. One of the small princ~pal~ties in Pattani begun to expand during the last part of the 15th century , untl.l it dominate d much of its surroun dings. Knmat tan1 1·1as d1.v1ded 1.nto several pol1t1c al un1ts by the Thais and each unit was placed u.nder a differen t petty ruler. Even then, it was not unt1l 1 832 when a final revolt was crushed that the Tha1s could be said to hold unchalle nged sway over al l of what once been the Kingdom of Pattani . 4

4

The most compact, and perhaps the best English language treatment s of the Kingdom of Pattani and Thai political A. Teeuw and D. K. Wyatt, a~tivity 1n that area are:

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of the At the begi nnin g of the 20th c ent ury, all inted appo rally cent with loca l rule rs were repl aced m. From offi cial s from the Thai civi l serv ice syste in the rned gove been then ce o nwar d, the cegi o n has abou t the same fash ion as the rest o f Thai land .s At the with s ment same time , the Thai s sign ed a gree clai m t o Brit ish wher eby the form er reno unce d the~r the Brit ish ile wh lis Kela ntan , Tren ggan u, Keda h and Per of thes e reco gniz ed the s o vere ign ty of Thai land n o rth s for bas~ the d stat es. This agre emen t , then , f orme Tha iland . what is now the herd er betw een Ma lays i a and Syst em of Adm inist ratio n in the The syste m of gove rnme ntal adm inis trati on ly high five prov i nces , as thro ugho ut Tha ilan d, ~s l adm iniscen tral ize d with loca l gove r nme nts and loca cen tral trat ive unit s acti ng as exte nsio ns of the s are gove rnme nt base d in Bang kok. Loca l offi cial g the urin d and es istri min ral func tion arie s o f cent e in seve ral cour se of thei r c aree rs are like ly to serv ~s exer cise d prov ince s. T ight cont rol over thei r work perm itted from Bang kok , with litt le loca l discret~ o n e, wha teve r and with loca l in~tiative disc oura ged . Henc le in peop the for ded gove rnme n tal serv ices are p rovi esse nce ~n are they urba n area s and in the co untrys~de, are h wh~c of e cent ral serv ices , the natu re and scop by d tere in~s dete rmin ed in Bang kok and whic h are adrn cen tral offi cial s . is To faci lita te thes e ope r atio ns, each prov ince are divi ded into seve ral dist rict s, wh~ch in turn and then ges) villa of gs upin (gro divi ded into comm unes s and into vill ages . Also ther e are municipa l ~t~e area s with n urba are h whic sani tary dist rict s, both of

Mart inus , Siam Vella F. er Walt and Nijh off, 1970) , Vols. I and II; 1957 ), n, i st Augu J.J. : Y. Under Rama III (Lo~ust Valle y, N. pp. 59-77 .

liika yat ?ata ni - The Story of Pata ni (The Hague:

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justi ce. A The majo r exce ption is in the admi nist ratio n of advis es ms custo lfusli m verse d in the Koran and ·loca l Malay only ving invol cases Thai judge s on the diap ositl on of civil ce. ritan inhe and iage Thai Musli ms and only in matt ers of marr

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greatly restricted powers of self-government.6 Only a handful of the governmental bureaucrats stationed in the region are Muslims, none of whom are senior provincial- level officials. Nearly all of the Few speak bureaucrats, therefore, are Thai Buddhists . any Malay, even after having been stationed in the region for years . Moreover, many are not familiar with the local Malay cultuF~ and customs, so that they often (though inadvertently)\ offend Thai Muslims . And their perceptions of , and attitudes toward , Thai Muslims tend to be condescendi n g . ? The government of late has tried to recruit more Thai Muslims into the bureaucracy, and then assign them to work in the Musli~~ provinces . The main obstacle has bee n that relatively few ~h ai Muslims p ossess the requisite educational qualifications. Furthermore , a new Thai Muslim bureaucrat is subjected to considerable pressure by fellow Buddhist officials with respect to getting him to drink al c~h~ ~ :. and urgi ng him to take a Thai name for use with Thai . Buddhists. If the Muslim bureaucrat bows to this pressure, he loses the respect of other Thai Muslims in the reg ion , wh o accuse him of rejecting his culture . His effecti veness thereafter is greatly reduced. Social Integration Muslims in the region have not become socially integrated with the Thai Buddhists or with the Chinese. As already noted , Thai Muslims subscribe to the Islamic faith, most speak Malay , and all follow Malay customs. Even where the Muslims have a command of the Thai language , a wide social gulf exists between them on the one hand and the Chinese and Thai Buddhis ts on the other .

6

For a more detailed description of the system of public administration in Thailand , see H. Ladd Thomas , "Thai Public Administration, II The New Zealand elou:rnal of PubUo Administration~ (Vol. 25 , No . 1), September , 1962, pp. 1- 33.

7

The author of this manuscript has made a study of Thai bureaucratic attitudes towards Thai Muslims, and his da ta re f lect this conclusion . SeeM. Ladd Thomas, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behaviour as Obstacles to Political Integra t ion of Thai Muslims," Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly~ (Vol. 3, No . 1) , Winter, 1974.

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In many parts of the region , the Muslims are more or less isolated from regular contact with members from the other b.'lo population groups . In other parts , where they may comprise a minority , the Muslims either live in their own villages or at the opposite end of a mixed village; still, they do little more than exchange greetings wi th their Thai Buddhis t neighbours when meeting on the village road or in the nearest market- place . And the situation is hardly different with respect to communal interaction in urban areas.s The lack of social intercourse between Muslims and the other two groups is essentially explained by the religious beliefs and practices of Thai Muslims which , among other things, prohibit the consumption of alcohol"; · prevent them from attendi~a those functions involvin~ any kind of non-Muslim r eliqious ceremony o r otherwise having religious (non-Muslim) overtones; inhibit them from eating food prepared by non-Muslims, un l ess they are certain that the meat is from animals slaughtered in the approved Islamic manner, .. that pork grease was not used in cooking the food , a2d that 6ooking utensils used for the meal have never been exposed to pork grease; and require Thai Buddhists and Chinese who marry Thai Muslims to be converted to the Islamic fai th . Participation in the Economy The Chinese , who probably account for no more than five percent of the population in the five provinces , are located primarily in the towns where they own and operate most of the business concerns. In some towns, such as Hat Yai and Betong , they constitute a majority of the population and are therefore also found doing much of the work as clerks and manual labourers. One or two Chinese families are sometimes foJind living in a fis h i.na village (where the rest of the population is Malqy); thes e Chinese usually own some of the fishing boats , ~any of

8

In contrast , Chinese and Thai Buddhists do interact . socially. This is partly because the Chinese have learned the Thai language and partly because of the pragmatic nature of both the Chinese and Thai religious beliefs.

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the coconut trees along the beach, and some of the rice lands.9 In two of the districts , Sadao and Betong, there are also many Chinese engaged in rubber cultivation and rice farming. Not only are most government officials and their families Thai Buddhists, but so too are some of the merchants and other businessmen in the region. The great majority live in the towns and district centres, of course . Thai Buddhists , as \'Jell as Chinese, own most o f the tin mines and the larger rubber plantations. A small but increasing number own rubber small-holdings or \>Tork as tappers on plantations, though largely in Songkhla . And some Thai Buddhists serve as crew members on large commercial fishing boats \"hich sail out of Songkhla. As far as the Thai !'1uslims are concerned , only a very fe \-T are government officials and they live in the tm..,ns and district centres. Some , though not many , of the ~1uslims ~1ost proprietors of small shops o~..,n fairly large businesses . in rural areas and the smaller tmms , other than in Songkhla p rovince , are Muslims . Finally , the vast majority of the rubber small- holders and share tappers , nearly all of the village fishermen , and most of the farmers (excluding those in Songkhla} are Thai Huslims . Thus it is possible to conclude that Thai Muslims in Satun , Yala , Pattani , Narathiwat and parts of Songkhla , control most of the smaller business, are engaged in most of the rubber cultivation and rice farming as well as in other agricultural activities , and do most of the smallscale fishing . This leaves nearly all of the middle and large-scale economic activities in the hands of the Chinese and , to a lesser extent of , the Thai Buddhists. Accordingly , much of the wealth in this region i s in other than Thai Muslim hands. Deteriorating Economic Conditions Whereas once economic conditions in the five provinces \•Jere better than in most other parts of rural Thailand , and

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They may also function as fish merchants, buying the catch f rom fishermen and then selling it in the nearest town.

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were not signi fican tly worse than in neigh bourin g areas of Malay sia, such a case is no longe r true. The econo mic well-b aing of villag ers in the region began to declin e by the rid-19 50's and this proce ss was accel erated in the 1960' s and the first four years of In other words , their real incom e has the 197n '~.J ; droppe n p r ecipit ously during the past two decad es. The main reason s for this are as follow s: First , the natur al rate of popul ation increa se (abou t three perce nt combi ned with a flow of immig rants from other sectio ns of the count ry has resul te d in press ure on land suitab le for agric ulture , so that the amoun t of land per family Secon d, the world marke t price for has decreaRc~)l locall y produ ced rubbe r has been quite low since the end of t~2 Korea n Confl ict, excep t for one or two brief Third , there has been a marke d decre ase in perio ds. the fish catch (parti cular ly macke rel) of villag ers opera ting a short distan ce off the coast s of Songk hla , 1?dt t~ ri.i , and Narat hiwat over the past two decad es. It is

10

Early indica tions of the deterio rating econom ic situati on were noted in Kamol Janlek ha, SociaL and Economic Conditions of th~ SOkthsrn Community DeveLopment Area (Bangkok: Departm ent of Community Develo pment, Minist ry of Interio r, 1967).

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In 1966- 67 , the author of this manusc ript gathere d hard data on land holdin gs of those Thai Muslim familie s cultiv ating only rice, and found chat the averag e landho lding for such familie a vas about 2.4 acres. Older members of these familie s claimed that their holdin gs had averag ed at least 10 acres per family in the 1940's , though not all of these holdin gs were registe red with the author lties .

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The world market price for first grade natura l rubber dropped from a high of US$0.50 / lb in the 1950's to a low of IJS $0.16 / lb in 1967-6 8, stabili zed for a few years at about l'S$0.2 2/lb, rose quickly but tempor arily to nearly US$0 . 75/lb in 1973, and then decline d in late 1974 to about US$0.3 5/lb. Howeve r, most of the Thai Muslim small- holder s produc e only third and fourth grade rubber due to the age and poor quality of the trees and to the inferio r method s of coagul ating the latex as well as rolling and smoking the sheets ; therefo re, their rubber commands much lower prices .

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attrib utabl e in part to a change in wind and drift curre nts which cause plank ton, on which schoo ls of macke rel feed, to be furthe r out at sea · beyon d the safe limits for But, in the main, it is due to s~all fishin g boats . the large com~ercial-type fishin g vesse ls dragg ing huge nets behina ·theri\, 13 Nhich sweep the water s of all fish. Fourth and finall y, the cost of living has risen in the region just as in other pafts of Thaila nd - though perhap s So, most Thai Muslim s have more so in terms of rice.l been caugh t betwe en a reduc tion in family incom e and rising costs . They have been able to surviv e, but only at a lower stand ard of living . The Thai Gover nment has n ot bee n unawa re of the deter iorati ng eco n omic condi tions in the region . Howev er, it initia lly did not compr ehend the dimen sions of the proble m o r its impli cation s for Thai Muslim s. Hence , the few econom ic develo pment prog ramme s which were first under taken in respon se to the situa tion prove d inadeq uate . This failur e of the govern ment to take promp t and effec tive remed ial action s left many Thai Muslim s with the impre ssion that they were being ignore d by Thai autho rities . When viewed in absolu te terms , their pligh t seemed seriou s enough . But they consid ered it to be even less ac cepta ble, given the fact that their situa tion repres ented a retrog ressio n from earlie r times . More objec tionab le still , at least in the eyes of the Thai Muslim s, was what they perce ived as a lower ing of their

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Offici als do not have concre te sta tistics on the fish catch of villag ers. But the author of this manusc ript int e rviewed fisherm en from eight village s l ocated on the coasts of Songkh la, P~ttan1, and Narath iwat in 1966-6 7, 1970 and 1975. These respon dents estima ted that their fish catch had decline d by at least two thirds since the late 1950's .

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This impose s a partic ular strain on those Thai Muslim s engaged in fishing or rubber cultiva tion, since they seldom grow enough rice (if at all) to meet family consum ption needs and therefo re, have to buy ri ce on the market - and the price of rice is now higher than that fifteen years ago. Moreove r, the local price of certain ot he r food items (such as sugar) have also sky-ro cketed ; see Bangkok Post, Februa ry 21 , 1975, p . 7.

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of living below that in many other parts of Furthermore, they were prone to compare Thailand. their lot with that of nearby Malaysian villagers which (until the recent recession) was rapidly improving.

~tandard

Sense of Alienation The forego~ng, then, are the major factors underly~n g the current oolitical unrest in the Muslim provinces. Geography and the transportation network i n the region link Thai t1,Ic:;l ims more closely with Malaysia than with Bangkok. Als o , poor or non-extant village roads hinder visits of Thai Muslims to urban areas where they at least would be superficially exposed to the larger society. There is an h1storical legacy of conflict between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims. A system of 90v~r~eptal administrat ion was imposed on Thai t1uslims and e veri today it is not someth1ng that they feel comfortable with or fully understand. Moreover, very few Thai Muslims are found among the bureaucrats stationed in the region. Accordingly, the administrative system is viewed by many Thai Muslims as representing only the interests of Bangkok and Thai Buddhists. Religious, linguistic a nd. r• other cultural differences make meaningful social ·. intercourse between Thai Muslims and other population groups very difficult. While they constitute the largest population group in the region, the Thai Muslims do not have a proportionately larger stake in the economy. And deteriorating economic conditions of late have made it difficult for many Thai Muslims to do more than barely "eke out" an existence, in contrast to an increase in the standard of l1ving in Malaysian villages. All o f these factors combine to give many Thai Muslims t he feeling that the i r interests are not being well served by the Thai g o vernment . Consequently , many Thai Muslims simply do not identify with the Thai nation-state . This understandably leads to frustration on the part of such Thai Muslims, which, in turn, generates political violence in the region. The remainder of this 111anusciipt is addressed primarily to an examination of the said political violence . However, it is necessary to look at common band1try, or non-political violence by organized gro ups, in order to d1stinguish between such and more politically oriented violence. Newspaper accounts and official statements unfortunately often fail to do so, thereby contributing to an exaggerated impression of aAn~~~riar

arrannrh .

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Common Bandi try Common bandi try and other forma of non-p olitic al · violen ce are endem ic to the southe rnmos t provin ces of Thaila nd. Howev er, there has been a marked upsurg e in such activ ity during the past decad e, and partic ularly within the last year or ao. In part, this probab ly stems from the declin e in econom ic condi tions within these provin ces and from the greate r availa bility o f weapo ns; and in part, is attrib utabl e to the sanct i oning of the use of force again st Thai Buddh ists by the separ atists . But more signif icantl y, there have always been negati ve Thai Muslim attitu des toward s govern menta l autho rity in gener al and co-op eratio n with the Thai police in partic ular. Furthe rmore , the Thai police have never been able to provid e adequ ate protec tion for people living in the area. As previo usly seen, most rural Thai Muslim villag ers are inclin ed to view the Thai govern ment as being somew hat alien. And proble ma of langua ge and cultu ral differ en ces make it diffic ult for Thai Muslim s to commu nicate with and relate to Thai Buddh ist govern ment offic ials who are statio ned in the Muslim provin ces . Conse quentl y , these Thai Muslim s prefe r to avoid direc t conta ct with govern menta l offic ials. Thus, instea d of direc tly paying their taxes to, or, obtain i ng variou s permi ts from govern ment burea ucrats , many Thai Muslim s do these things throug h the villag e or commu ne headm en . Such headm en usuall y are Thai Muslim s who can speak some Thai, and who are accep table to the local distri ct office rs. In this conte xt, it is perhap s worth noting that many Thai Muslim villag ers are not unhapp y about having villag e and commu ne headm en who are person a grata , select ed to be distri ct office rs. This is becau se it is popul arly believ ed that such headm en are able to act effec tively as middle men in ne c essary transa ctions betwee n vi llager s and o ffi cials - in other wo rds, the headm en pay taxes and It is also believ ed obtain permi ts for the villag ers. that such headm en serve as a usefu l filter , strain ing out all but the most essen tial deman ds and reque sts from Thai autho rities which are made upon villag ers. As stated earlie r, this reacti on to govern menta l auth o rity in gener al pertai ns to the police in partic ular . Indeed , Thai Muslim s manif est a speci al lack of enthus iasm for coope ration with the police . This is becau se Thai Muslim s are reluct ant to get involv ed in the Thai legal system , which they do not under stand; becau se they fear

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(sometimes with justification) that the police will misunderstand and arrest the wrong people due to language difficulties ; because of a penchant for protecting their own - that is, Thai Muslims are inclined to protect fellm'' villagers from the Thai police who are viewed as outsiders ; and because it is customary for Thai Muslim village rs to punish wrong- doers from their own villages.15 Consequently , crimes committed by one villager against fellow villagers are seldom reported to the police. The one exception to this general rule concerns cases of murder, which cannot be hidden from the authorities. Normally , ho'l..vever, the village elders will banish the culprit immediately from the village and allow him to get a head start of several hours before reporting the murder to police authorities. The situation changes \ror>er respon s P. trom the ~overnrnent. Governmental Response The use of force by the police, and more re c ently by military elements as wel l, is one form of governr. '"' ntal response to separatism. This has already been discussed, but it is here worth noting that Thai authorities interpret the use of force differently. Some officials are convinced that enough force can destroy, or at least reduce to tolerable proportions, the separatist threat. However, the majority of the officials, including the more influential o nes, appear persuaded that force alone will not do the job. They view the application of force as merely a stop-gap measure, designed to provide the necessary conditions of law and order which would make possible the implementation of other measures. Perhaps the most "~at are these other measures? significant is an effort to extend educational opportun ities to all Thai Muslims and to improve educational standards in the region. The government believes that secular education is directly central to political integretion of a minority, connoting a common language and functional literacy vital to more meaningful inter-communal communication and thus shared national sentiment. Therefore, it is understandable why the gove rnment accords high priority to educational programmes.39 Until rather recently, public educational facilities in the region were confined almost exclusively to municipalities and the larger district centres. Today , as a consequence of a mass i ve effort to construct and staff new schoo ls, there is a primary school containing the first four grades in most villages and soon there will be one in every village with a sufficiv nt school-age a primary school with grades four to seven popul ation ;

The government's seeming determination to undertake a c rash programme to improve education in the Muslim provinces was reported in The Voioe of the Nation, August 12, 1974.

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ia .:.ncreasingly found in one village of every commune: 40 all provincial capitals and many district centres have each a secondary school with grades eight to ten, and before long there will be one in every district; and while there are no plans to build additional secondary schools containing grades eleven to twelve or additional ·ocational schools (there is at least one of each in every provincial capital), existing facilities are being expanded and polytechnical schools are being planned for Narathiwat and Pattani. The government is also considering the further expansion of the two And the re~ional teacher colleges in Songkhla and Yala . ~ first Ann only university in the region, Prince of ·~ongkhla University, is rapidly expanding its facilities at the Pattani and Songkhla campuses. Furthermore , the government has indicated a willingness to accept a recent offer of the United Arab Emirates to provide Thailand with a f ully developed (at an estimated cost US$4 million) educational system including primary schools, secondary schools, and another u :-. ~ . ·re rsi ty all to be located in the Muslim provinces;. t: ~ The government recently announced plans to improve the quality of public education, especially in primary schools, through such pro~rammes as revising the text-books and providing free copies of these for all primary school students in the region. 2 Also the Region II Education Center is now experimenting with kindergarten and pre-kindergarten classes for Muslim children in order to ascertain whether an earlier exposure to the Thai language would imorove the capacity of these children to later cope more effectively with reading ~aterials a.nd classroom instruction. It should also be noted that the government is in the process of converting pondoks (rural Islamic religious schools) into private schools regulated by the government and which teach the Thai language, matr.ematics and social studies as well as the Islamic religion. The government

40

Of course, the last three grades can accommodate only a fraction of those children who complete the first four grades in primary schools located in other villages of the commune.

41

See Bangkok

42

See The Voiae of the

Post~

January 4, 1975, p. 1. Nation~

August 12, 1974.

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subsidizes this secular component of the curriculum, and is now engaged in trying to upgrade such by improving the teaching, instructional materials, and course content. This is critical because a large number of Muslim youths attend only pon doks after c ompleting the first four years of public school . A second measure, constituting part of the governmental response, is to promote economic development in the region so as to raise the income and standard of living of Muslims, thereby giving them a tangible stake in the Thai nationstate. The government has announced that priority will be given to the southern provinces of Thailand in terms of economic development attendant upon the Fourth FiveYear Development Plan which now is being drafted by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB}. This Plan will take into account development plans for each province which are being drawn up at the Southern Regional Develo pment Cente r in conjunction with key provincial officials . 43 In terms of industriali zation, the NESDB is reported to be c o nsidering the establishment of an industrial estate in the Hat Yin-SGngkhla area in order to boost ' industrial development in the region .. encouraging sta te enterprises to establish industrial plants in or near Hat Yai and Songkhla, possibly in the industrial estate; establishing an export processing zone in the region; developing the port of Songkhla; and recommending that government agencies such as the Industrial Finance Corporation set up a regional office or offices.44 Of mo re immediate importance for rural Muslims are the on-go ing programme and plans with respect to agricultural development.45 The rubber replanting programme, which was making little or no headway, was recently accelerated and t h e government has just indicated that it intends to give rubber replanting t o p pri ority.

43

Ibid, August 20, 1974, p . 9 .

44

Ibid, October 9, 1974, Section 11 .

45

For a brief discussion of plans for agricultural development, see Ibid, December 4, 1974, Section 11 .

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At the same time, an effort will be made to diversify agriculture so as to free the region from being too dependent on rubber cultivation; in particular, coconut and palm o il plantatio ns will be promoted as will livestock breeding.46 Still an o ther measure consists of government agencies for the first time varying their standard mode of operations in o rder to accommodate the special cultural needs of Muslims in the regi on . This is in the hope that the Muslims will come to accept the idea that they can practise their religion and customs as freely and easily in Thailand as in a Muslim state. Heretofore most government agencies refused to give way on this matter, but very recently, several have announced that their policy in this regard has changed . For instance, the Ministry of Education has agreed to provide appropriate places for Mus lim students in public schools to pray. 4 7 Or , as another example, the Public Health Ministry has declared a special policy for health centres and hospitals in the Muslim provinces: health officials have been requested to learn the local traditions, customs and way of life of the local Muslim population; food and cooking facilities in government hospitals will be separated for non-Muslim and Muslim patients, and each hospital will and a place will be provided in employ a Muslim cook ; each hospital for Muslim patients and visitors to pray . Conclusions Geographical propinquity, historical heritage, local unfamiliarity with the administrati ve system and resentment o f bureaucrat~c att itudes and behaviou r, absence of meaningf ul s ocial intercourse between the Muslim and Buddhist communities, concentration of wealth in the hands of non - Muslims, deteriorating eco nomic conditions, and failure of authorit ies to provide protection for the local people have all contirbuted to a sense of alienation on the part of Muslims in the region, as well to a belief

46

The IP dustrial Finance Corporation of Thailand, in cooperation with the Department of Public Wel fa re, plans to set up an economy-size pilot plant to pro cess palm oil in Satun ; see ibid~ November 1, 1974, Section 11 .

47

Ibid~

August 12, 1974 .

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that they are treated as second class citizens.48 in turn, contributes to political unrest.

This,

Th e Thai Government was slow in perceiving the seriousness of the problem, but now is respondin g . Its response consists of the use of police-military forces improving the educational t o maintain law and order; system: economic development programmes aimed at ameliorating the depressed economic conditions and, as quickly as possible, raising the local standard of living and demonstrating the governrrrent ' s to an acceptable level; Muslim religious practices. accommodate to l1ngness wil Whether this response will succeed depends on whether the government empJ.oys the right "mix " of force with other measures, whether the economic development programmes · will he well planned, adequately funded and properly admin istered,