Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies (Routledge Islamic Studies Series) [1 ed.] 0415781825, 9780415781824

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Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies

Having survived the process of modernization and reasserted themselves in public life, religious traditions play an increasingly important public role in shaping and defining social institutions and interactions. This book examines Rawls’s theory of political liberalism in the context of Muslim societies, where religion wields a significant social and political influence. Contrasting a sociological analysis with a theoretical approach, the author explores the political questions brought up by religious individuals, organizations, and minorities, and examines fundamental notions such as neutrality of state, public/private distinction, and individual autonomy. Offering a rich set of conceptual and normative instruments, the author presents new ways to incorporate political liberalism into political discourses, advocating policy prescriptions for the advancement of democracy in Muslim societies. Independent of the focus on Muslim societies, this book makes a significant contribution to the political liberalism debate. As such, it will be of interest not only to students of Islam and the Middle East, but also to those with an interest in political philosophy, democracy, religion, and contemporary political theory. Fevzi Bilgin is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Mary’s College of Maryland. He received his doctorate from the University of Pittsburgh in 2004 and has since published a number of essays on political liberalism, constitutional politics, and religion and politics in Turkey and the Middle East.

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Routledge Islamic Studies Series

This broad-ranging series includes books on Islamic issues from all parts of the globe and is not simply confined to the Middle East. Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth-Century Egypt Contesting the nation Anthony Gorman The New Politics of Islam Pan-Islamic foreign policy in a world of states Naveed Shahzad Sheikh The Alevis in Turkey The emergence of a secular Islamic tradition David Shankland Medieval Islamic Economic Thought Filling the great gap in European economics S.M. Ghazanfar The West and Islam Western liberal democracy versus the system of Shura Mishal Fahm al-Sulami The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777–1814 Army and government of a North-African Eyâlet at the end of the eighteenth century Asma Moalla Islamic Insurance A modern approach to Islamic banking Aly Khorshid

The Small Players of the Great Game The settlement of Iran’s eastern borderlands and the creation of Afghanistan Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh Interest in Islamic Economics Understanding Riba Abdulkader Thomas Muslim Diaspora Gender, culture and identity Edited by Haideh Moghissi Human Conscience and Muslim–Christian Relations Modern Egyptian thinkers on al-d.am¯ır Oddbjørn Leirvik Islam in Nordic and Baltic Countries Göran Larsson Islam and Disability Perspectives in theology and jurisprudence Mohammed Ghaly Producing Islamic Knowledge Transmission and dissemination in Western Europe Edited by Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies Fevzi Bilgin

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Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies

Fevzi Bilgin

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First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business c 2011 Fevzi Bilgin  The right of Fevzi Bilgin to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Typeset in Sabon by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bilgin, Fevzi. Political liberalism in Muslim societies / Fevzi Bilgin. p. cm. - - (Routledge Islamic studies series ; 15) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Liberalism- -Islamic countries. 2. Islam and politics- -Islamic countries. 3. Islamic countries- -Politics and government. I. Title. JC574.2.I74B55 2011 320.510917 67- -dc22 2010034062 ISBN 978-0-415-78182-4 (hbk) ISBN 978-0-203-83084-0 (ebk)

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Contents

Acknowledgments

viii

1 Introduction

1

2 The idea of political liberalism

8

3 Political liberalism and Islam

32

4 Political liberalism in Muslim societies

46

5 Tolerating religion

67

6 Religion and the impartiality of the state

89

7 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

112 122 130 139

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Acknowledgments

This book reflects two of my lifelong intellectual preoccupations, religion and political theory. I am very fortunate to have had the opportunity to express these concerns in a work of this magnitude, which, I have to acknowledge, would never have come to fruition without the help and support I received during my research and writing. I am extremely grateful for the extensive feedback I have received from various friends and colleagues over the years, including Frederick G. Whelan, Michael Goodhart, Jonathan Scott, David Barker, Ahmet Davutoglu, Burhanettin Duran, Fred Dallmayr, David Thunder, and two anonymous reviewers for commenting on an entire draft of the book. I am delighted to thank audiences at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Association for Political Theory Meeting, Midwest Political Science Meeting, CURA Program on Religion and Globalization at Boston University, International Symposium on Rethinking the Classical, and National Endowment for the Humanities’ Summer Seminar on Philosophical Perspectives on Liberal Democracy and Global Ethics, and my colleagues at University Pittsburgh, Sakarya University, and St. Mary’s College of Maryland. I would also like to thank my editor at Routledge, Joe Whiting, and his editorial staff, especially Suzanne Richardson and the copyeditor Elizabeth Stone, for their support and assistance throughout the publication process. This book draws substantially upon some of my previously published work. Chapter 3 draws upon “Political Liberalism and Inclusion of Religion,” which appeared in Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion (2006). Chapter 4 draws upon “The Prospect of Political Liberalism in Non-Western Societies,” which appeared in Critical Review of International Political and Social Philosophy (2007). Chapters 5 and 6 draw upon “Classical Liberal Reflections on the Contemporary

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Acknowledgments

ix

Issues of Religion and Politics,” which appeared in Medeniyet ve Klasik, published by Klasik (Istanbul, 2007). I would like to thank these journals and presses for allowing me to use these works. Most importantly, I would like to express my gratitude to my friends and family members, especially my parents, to whom I dedicate this work, for their neverending support and encouragement from thousands of miles away; to Klara, whose care and companionship have sustained my work and my life; and to my boys Sander and Deniz for reminding me every day that I have to work for a better world no matter what.

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Introduction

This book investigates the possible application of John Rawls’s idea of political liberalism in Muslim societies. Two basic premises guide the analysis. The sociological premise is the recent resurgence of religious—especially Islamic—claims in public life. Contrary to common expectations in the past, religious traditions have survived the process of modernization and reasserted themselves in public life. Today, religious traditions throughout the world are refusing the marginal and privatized role predicted by theories of modernity and secularization and dictated by secular regimes.1 They play an increasingly important public role in shaping and redefining social institutions and interactions. The political questions raised by religious individuals, organizations, and minorities are among the most pressing and potent issues in the contemporary world of politics. These religious claims have posed serious theoretical challenges to the basic premises of contemporary liberal democracy. Fundamental notions such as the neutrality of the state, the public/private distinction, and individual autonomy have been called into question.2 The theoretical premise is the need to address this matter and to offer a normative framework for the proper place of religion in public life. Political philosophy has always had to confront the political challenges of religion. Among the major trends of thought, there have been ideas favoring the homogenization of diverse faiths through coercive imposition, the rationalization or trivialization of religion through secular institutionalization, and, finally, the forceful elimination of religious manifestations in public life.3 Liberalism has developed among these as a decisive alternative, a tradition stemming from the defense of toleration and peaceful coexistence. However, some variants of contemporary liberalism insist on viewing religion as merely a private matter, and thus overlook the public significance of religion. Rawls’s political liberalism, on the other hand, presents

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Introduction

an inclusive normative outlook that appeals to religious citizenry as much it does to other citizens. Before going further, let me clarify the way I use the term religion in this book. I have to submit that religion is a difficult term to define. However, for operational purposes, I employ the definition introduced by William P. Alston (1964: 88) and presented by Robert Audi (2000: 35) in a political theoretical context. According to this definition, religion is constituted mainly by the following features: a belief in the supernatural; a distinction between sacred and profane, and ritual acts based on this distinction; a moral code believed to be sanctioned by a divine authority; prayer and other communicative forms of conduct concerning the divinity; a divine cosmology; a more or less comprehensive organization of one’s life based on the above features; and a social organization bound together by all the above. Religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are paradigmatic examples that exhibit all these features. Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism exhibit almost all. Thus, broadly, a religion is constituted of a moral code and a social organization that are informed by a sacred doctrine or faith. In this book, the term religion generally refers to all these elements. In addition, I use the terms religious doctrines and religious views— such as Islamic doctrines and Islamic views in Muslim societies—to refer to the diverse understandings of a particular religious tradition— Islam. My focus is Muslim societies rather than Islam as a faith, which is not a monolith and has been subject to diverse interpretations over the course of fifteen centuries. Thus, an agreement among religious doctrines refers to an agreement among collectivities, namely members of society who espouse that particular doctrine, even if those doctrines pertain to the very same faith.

The appeal of political liberalism and its limitations in Muslim societies In Political Liberalism (1996), John Rawls addresses the question of justice and stability in a society of free and equal citizens who are divided by religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. He suggests that justice would hold if the basic structure of this society, namely its main social, economic, and political institutions,were regulated by a political conception of justice. In turn, the stability of this society would be secured if all citizens within it were to agree on a political conception of justice expressed in reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls thinks that doctrines are reasonable when

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Introduction

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they enable a consensus on a common political good. Therefore, religious as well as nonreligious doctrines could be deemed reasonable and accommodated into a broad public consensus. The objective of political liberalism is thus the accommodation of diverse religious and nonreligious views in a just and stable public order. Yet this objective can take place only under specific circumstances. According to Rawls, political liberalism is a feature of modern democratic societies, which are characterized not only by a simple pluralism but also a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This means that societies which have been through centuries of democratic progress could proceed to political liberalism, since they now enjoy a plurality of worldviews incompatible with each other yet reasonable enough to achieve consensus on the principles of political association. This view entails that Rawls’s political liberalism contains a sociological requirement comprising of two elements: first, a tradition of toleration that has grown out of religious wars, and second, a democratic society that comprises diverse and conflicting worldviews and lifestyles but one which has developed a consensual culture thanks to the practice of toleration over centuries. If this is the case, based on this distinction, we have to rule out every society but some Western, mostly Anglophone democracies. In fact, in some instances, only the case of the United States could possibly satisfy Rawls’s sociological requirement. But what if a society does lack the democratic culture political liberalism presupposes? Could political liberalism still hold as an ideal in the absence of a democratic culture? This book addresses these questions in the context of Muslim societies, using theoretical and practical perspectives, and advances novel ways to incorporate political liberalism into their political discourses. The overall rationale of the book is that, in the face of growing religious demands that are redefining public and political boundaries, relations, and interactions, political liberalism offers ample conceptual and normative resources in the advancement of democracy in Muslim societies. For reasons I explore in the book, political liberalism is distinguished from its counterparts as being a theory of liberal democracy that can appeal equally to the religious and the secular citizens in a society. First and foremost, political liberalism presents a radical shift from the legacy of the liberal thought that evolved since the nineteenth century, which necessitates the secularization of the public and political spheres and promotes a concomitant moral outlook. The sociological paradigm of secularization and its political counterpart, secularism, have greatly influenced all claims of a

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Introduction

political morality in our age. Resurgent religious claims have naturally targeted this outlook and challenged its foundations. Arguably, Rawls noticed the trend and the upcoming challenges, and with an idea such as political liberalism he attempted to provide a defense of democracy and democratic values and reconcile religious and secular demands within a workable scheme of political association. Consider the minimal, almost absent, representation of religion in his A Theory of Justice (1971). What led Rawls to reconsider and reformulate his pursuit of political justice and put the growing religious demands into the equation, to the dismay of some other liberal thinkers, cannot be anything other than religious resurgence. In his last published interview, Rawls articulated his apparent interest in religion in his later works as follows: I think the basic explanation is that I’m concerned about the survival, historically, of constitutional democracy [. . .] Religious faith is an important aspect of American culture and a fact of American political life. So the question is: in a constitutional democracy, how can religious and secular doctrines of all kinds get on together and cooperate in running a reasonably just and effective government? What assumptions would you have to make about religious and secular doctrines, and the political sphere, for these to work together? (Rawls 1999: 616) Notice Rawls’s reference to the survival of constitutional democracy. It is interesting to see that an issue (religion in public life) that was absent about three decades ago has now become a matter of survival for democracy. In fact, Rawls is not alone in making this assumption. Since the late 1980s, in parallel to social and political changes, there has been a resurgence of a particular type of literature in political theory, one that aims at or challenges the foundations of liberalism, and liberal democracy for that matter, in the name of religious demands and claims. This sort of literature did not exist three decades ago. Similarly, the literature in the sociology of religion, a sub-discipline that studies the social effects of religion, was replete with overly confident assertions declaring a gradual disappearance of religion. The recent turnaround in social and political conditions has led to grand theoretical revisions not only in political theory but also in sociology. Rawls’s significance in this context, unlike that of many other prominent liberals, is manifest in his ability and willingness to capture the new challenges raised by religious resurgence.

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Secondly, and equally important, Rawls has not only severed relations with secularist liberal reasoning but has also developed an outstanding perspective that rendered comprehensive secular conceptions equal among other moral and religious conceptions. This is an original and significant approach, since, previously, comprehensive secular conceptions have always been considered as the moral foundation of the liberal state, whether they are expressed in the manner of an official state ideology, civil religion, or a loose idealistic entity lingering over the political establishment. Rawls’s approach enabled him to overcome any serious difficulty of consensus and legitimacy issues faced by the citizens of faith with regard to democracy and its foundations. Rawls’s elaboration of the notion of the political conception of justice and overlapping consensus alludes to a wide-ranging agreement on the principles of political association. As we shall see, the internal dynamics of an overlapping consensus on the principles of political justice provides common ground that enables the plurality of doctrines to become involved in the process of the formation of political morality. The nature of the process is quite participatory and thus effective at both ends: a wide-ranging common ground provides a wide-ranging public recognition of political values and principles as well as recognition of doctrinal values in their public involvement in the consensual process. Given Rawls’s consideration of religious and secular doctrines as equal partners in this consensus, the process of overlapping consensus thus defines the distinctly inclusive character of political liberalism. Accordingly, in the face of the resurgence of religion and religious claims in public life, political liberalism introduces novel approaches to the issues of political morality, social consensus, and legitimacy, and presents a promising outlook with regard to religious and secular confrontations in democratic societies. Consider the problems in Muslim societies where religion wields significant social and political influence. Most of these societies have experienced a resurgence of religious claims much more seriously and dramatically than Western societies. In fact, Muslim societies have always had strong religious traditions that are active and prevalent in public life. Also unlike European countries, for the most part they have not experienced the divisive “wars of religion” that helped Western societies come up with the policies of reconciliation and toleration which, over time, translated into a wide-ranging conception of liberal democracy. Furthermore, most Muslim societies have also experienced prolonged periods of secularization, which produced public and social conditions

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Introduction

that are inimical to religious traditions.4 Contemporary understanding of democracy in the Muslim contexts, as a form of political regime imported without the cultural foundation and being strongly disposed to secularism, has failed to make headway and needs to be reconsidered in the face of growing tension between the religious and the secular segments in those societies. A new ground of consensus needs to be achieved. A reconsideration and revision of democracy and its principles requires, initially, a set of conceptual and normative resources. This is what makes Rawls’s political liberalism highly effective. On the other hand, despite its normative and theoretical potential in dealing with these divisive issues, political liberalism also requires a certain sociological condition. This requirement constitutes a structural impediment to political liberalism in societies that fall short of this sociological condition, and undermines the promise of the theory. I would like to argue, however, that this does not mean we cannot employ normative arguments of political liberalism independent of its sociological assumptions. I hold that the normative outlook of political liberalism might be considered as a moral and practical guideline to achieve a more stable and inclusive democratic prospect in societies where religion is influential and increasingly political. But this vision cannot be realized unless we reconstruct the relationship between the sociological assumptions and the normative principles of political liberalism. This would enable us to consider political liberalism in a wider scope without undermining its normative theoretical consistency. Approaches that can be so employed are the focus of this book.

The structure of the book The book is structured in line with the above discussion. The following two chapters discuss the theory of political liberalism. Chapter 2 presents the problems of comprehensive liberalism and then takes up the theory of political liberalism and analyzes in detail its major ideas such as the political conception of justice, overlapping consensus, reasonableness, and public reason. Chapter 3 discusses Rawls’s understanding of religion in his theory of political liberalism. It explains the inclusive nature of political liberalism and focuses on the idea of reasonable religion and its ramifications for contemporary understanding and interpretations of Islam. Chapter 4 presents a sociological analysis of religious resurgence and its implications for political liberalism, and discusses in detail why

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reasonable pluralism is a rare asset in the Muslim world. It reiterates the inclusive features of political liberalism while indicating the sociopolitical conditions in Muslim societies that fall short of satisfying the sociological requirement of political liberalism. It also explains why a literal interpretation of Rawls’s sociological assumptions implies that societies that enjoy robust religious manifestations will have to wait centuries to live up to the social and moral standards of political liberalism. It then specifies the difficulties of considering political liberalism in the Muslim contexts vis-à-vis the sociological assumptions drawn by Rawls, and emphasizes the need to construe normative arguments of political liberalism independent of its sociological basis. Finally, the chapter addresses the question of how to generate reasonable pluralism in those societies. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss two historical liberal proposals that I believe could generate reasonable pluralism in Muslim societies characterized by the religious–secular conflict, provided that they are embraced as a policy at state level. Chapter 5 presents the idea of political toleration that could be conducive to generating reasonableness among the doctrines in Rawls’s sense. This chapter surveys the concept of toleration and then focuses on its political aspects. It also assesses political toleration as a principle governing political practice and concentrates on one of its earliest and systematic representations in the theory of John Locke. Chapter 6 shifts the focus to Adam Smith’s notion of the impartiality of the state. Smith’s view is visionary in the sense that it captures psychological, sociological, and political aspects of religion and addresses the religious challenge both in moral and public senses. The chapter presents Smith’s view of moral religion and then turns to his views on impartiality and the so-called “free market of religion.” I believe both Locke and Smith’s views complement Rawls’s theory in that they provide insights into the institutionalization of public religion, which could be conducive to reasonable pluralism if adopted by the state. Finally, the concluding chapter presents an overall assessment of the discussion.

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The idea of political liberalism

A distinct feature of liberalism as a political philosophy is the primacy of individuals’ civil and political rights. The liberal principle of legitimacy is based on the notion that individual citizens are capable of judging what gives value to their own lives. Liberal thinkers have elected to consider religion as a matter of individual choice and sought the accommodation of diverse religious views within a stable scheme of public order. To this aim, in the classical tradition, liberalism focused on the idea of limited government, the rule of law, the avoidance of arbitrary power, and the sanctity of private property. Modern liberalism generally upholds the ideals of classical liberalism and promotes individual liberty, but also stresses the need to remove political as well as social and economic obstacles to liberty. Liberalism is committed to the idea that people in a political society must be equally free. Equality is manifested in the fact that human beings all possess reason and the moral capacity to judge their own conduct. From the notion of reasonable human beings, coupled with the idea of liberty and equality, it follows that the state must stay out of individuals’ construction of their own lifestyle choices, or broadly, their conceptions of the good life. Liberal theorists’ approach to religion has been guided by these basic tenets of liberalism, but different understandings of liberal principles have produced different normative outlooks. A significant division has emerged, especially in relation to the scope in which liberal principles ought to be implemented. This chapter begins with the illustration of this division in liberalism. First, it portrays the principal ideas of what is to be called “comprehensive liberalism.” It argues that this line of liberal thought presents inherent problems regarding the place of religion in social and public life because of its comprehensive outlook, and suggests that it may be rejected by the religious citizenry. On the other hand, the idea of political liberalism embraces a liberalism

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The idea of political liberalism 9 of narrow scope and might appeal to the religious citizenry more than its comprehensive variant. The rest of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical and normative structure of political liberalism and its major components, the political moral conception of justice, overlapping consensus, public reason, and reasonable pluralism.

Problems of comprehensive liberalism To a religious person, the idea of an individual as free, equal, and reasonable may appear more or less challenging depending on the extent of these notions. Accordingly, that form of liberalism whose normative claims extend to all of human life is called comprehensive liberalism. Comprehensive liberalism is often associated with the Enlightenment tradition: the liberation of human beings from externally imposed authorities, particularly from the authority of religion. Reason is thought to have replaced religion and tradition as the prime source of authority. The limits of state authority, or the principle of legitimacy that underlies this authority, is justified by reference to a particular view of morality, which emphasizes human autonomy and individualism. Two particular thinkers associated with this view are Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Kant introduced the idea of autonomy, which denotes sovereignty over oneself and self-governance, and claimed that moral principles that define how we should act originate in the exercise of reason. He asserted that rational agents are bound only by those self-given principles. Accordingly, constitutional principles should reflect this supreme value of human autonomy. Mill, on the other hand, emphasized the notion of individualism, which is a somewhat more radical treatment of the notion of human autonomy, if not its logical sequence. For Mill, the individual is more important than society, but not the individual as he is, rather the individual as he may become with proper education in a well-organized society. The only thing of ultimate value, Mill contended, is the happiness of individuals, and individuals can best achieve their happiness in a civilized society when they are left to pursue their own interests with their own talents. The basic principle of liberty requires that the government and the mass of the people refrain from interfering with the thought, expression, and action of any individual. This philosophy of individualism grants only a “contingent alliance” to any substantial view of a good life, and advocates an experimental attitude toward one’s own conception of the good life.

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The idea of political liberalism

The liberalisms of Kant and Mill, promoting the values of autonomy and individualism respectively, might require institutional arrangements to foster those values as ideals not only in political life but in many areas of social and individual life. In both schemes, the commitment to liberal state neutrality was justified by reference to a particular view of human nature. Thus, in comprehensive liberalism, the values of autonomy or individualism are not simply notions that ought to be promoted. Rather, the realization of such ideals is a necessary condition of well-ordered human life. Political arrangements must be made in accordance with these ideals for human beings to lead the best life of which they are capable. Therefore, comprehensive liberalism itself appears as a particular conception of the good life marked by a decisive moral view, whose influence spans the political and the individual spheres. These sorts of comprehensive liberal and often secular doctrines seem to fit modern society, as religion is said to be no longer dominant. For many religious believers, however, comprehensive liberalism is troubling. Religious faith treated under the ideals of autonomy and individualism tends to be seriously challenged as the state attempts to promote the ideals in ways detrimental to religion. If political and social life is to be designed in a comprehensively liberal fashion, religious believers might not be able to live according to their value system. Similarly, in some religious communities, certain kinds of hierarchical structures and associational practices among believers must be kept in order to ensure the faith is consistent and sustaining. Educational and social policies aiming to promote values of comprehensive liberalism may deeply threaten not only the consistency of such communities but also their very existence. Even if the ultimate authority of religion overall in society is accepted to be no longer dominant, the ideals of comprehensive liberalism still pose challenges to religious manifestations that have survived. This is quite a problematic outlook considering that liberalism stands for the protection of liberty and equality of individuals, and for securing favorable conditions in which individuals can make their own lifestyle choices as they see fit. The problem with comprehensive liberalism is not only in its emphasis on values like autonomy and individualism, which might be objected to by religious believers, but also in its comprehensiveness, whereby those values could be imposed on various spheres of life. In a sense, such values could be seen as the ultimate foundations of a certain view of morality, which itself could be subject to endless controversy. As a tradition stemming from the idea of toleration, this is the last thing to which liberalism should aspire. Works by Jürgen Habermas (1992, 1996) on the inevitability of the

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The idea of political liberalism 11 “post-metaphysical” condition are exemplary attempts manifesting how such value systems could be imposed during the formation of a democratic social consent. Habermas holds that our modern age represents a break from the past, where religious and metaphysical worldviews enjoyed society-wide authority. In the contemporary world, these worldviews have not only lost their authority but have become the sources of irresolvable disagreement and conflict. Moreover, they are no longer objects of rational belief. Reason, as it unfolds as finite, fallible, and procedural, must be the basis of intersubjective agreement. Thus, moral and legal systems must be constructed in a post-metaphysical fashion in light of reason and its norms, replacing the authority of religious and metaphysical worldviews. Habermas certainly does not argue against the fact that there still are individuals espousing religious and metaphysical doctrines. What he declares instead is that substantive elements of such doctrines have now lost their plausibility and are subject to disagreement. Thus, when moral and legal principles are to be determined through intersubjective agreement, this post-metaphysical condition ought to be the underlying framework. Habermas’s intention is indisputably liberal in essence: to develop a working conception of social consent for political association. The procedure he suggests to reach that consent, however, is highly controversial.1 In his view, post-metaphysical condition and reason precede intersubjective agreement. If post-metaphysical reason is considered as the ultimate arbiter among other reasons, then it inevitably attains the absoluteness that marks the religious and metaphysical doctrines it aims to replace. As Charles Larmore (1996a: 210–214) insightfully notes, this idea of post-metaphysical reason can, therefore, provoke controversies of the sort that liberalism intended to resolve in the first place. Comprehensive liberalism based on the inevitability of a postmetaphysical reason could, therefore, be at the center of controversies, which would seriously undermine the sustainability of the consent leading to political association. Although the post-metaphysical condition has a heuristic value in explaining the sociological transformation that has taken place in the modern age, it does not necessarily provide an unconditional and consensual basis for the moral foundation of society. Religion might have lost the authority it enjoyed in the past, but today many people continue to espouse religious or metaphysical worldviews to which they ascribe central importance in their life. Moreover, the rise of religion since the 1970s all over the world poses a direct challenge to conceptions such as the post-metaphysical condition, which invoke a progressive view of reason and morality, a legacy of Enlightenment thought. Thus, to ask religious believers to

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The idea of political liberalism

sacrifice their way of reasoning in favor of some philosophical and often secular conception of reason and morality that would impact all aspects of their life is a demand that is not only morally controversial but also impractical. Similarly, values such as autonomy and individualism might well be opposed by religious believers if they are considered categorically as the basis of a well-ordered life and so promoted by the educational and political institutions of the state.

Political liberalism: a liberalism of a narrow scope Liberalism emerged in the midst of religious wars and sought to respond to the conflict by devising political principles that could be affirmed on a nonsectarian basis. Today, the task of liberalism is no different from in the past: to formulate political principles that can be accepted as legitimate by all citizens. In order to implement this task, liberalism must continue to commit to the equality of persons as citizens, whether religious or nonreligious, and stay aloof from the substantive conceptions and doctrines that give value and meaning to their lives. The comprehensive strand of liberalism poses serious challenges to religion and is continuously challenged by a variety of religious views. Comprehensive liberalism’s view of religion works at the expense of religion and agitates religious believers. There is an alternative liberalism: a liberalism that invokes a moral doctrine of narrow scope. The value system of this version of liberalism applies only to political life and public political institutions. This liberalism still appeals to the liberal foundation of legitimacy: political life is viewed as a sphere of activity guided by a moral principle. But, in this case, it differs from comprehensive liberalism by virtue of its terms of political association, which are less comprehensive. Liberalism in this form makes no claim about the human good, and the political morality it subscribes to is more accommodating toward and compatible with a variety of philosophical and religious views. Accordingly, the political face of this alternative form of liberalism is detached from any particular comprehensive view of moral life. Thus, it is called political liberalism. Since political liberalism is less ambitious in a moral sense, religious citizens might find it more appealing than comprehensive liberalism. Indeed, a major strand of liberalism has always defended the view that individuals who value and practice different lifestyles may commit to sharing a public life defined by a commonly accepted moral norm. This broadminded view has been developed as a result of the irresolvable differences in people’s conceptions about what constructs

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The idea of political liberalism 13 a good life. This situation, as Larmore notes, is not only about religious views. Over the last four centuries, the nature of the good life has come to be a matter of disagreement. Even if individuals are reasonable, that is, “thinking and conversing in good faith and applying, as best one can, the general capacities of reason that belong to every domain of inquiry,” they tend to disagree in general (Larmore 1996a: 122). Today, the extent of reasonable disagreement about the nature of the good life ranges from conversations among believers and members of diverse religions and religious sects to discourses between religious and nonreligious groups and individuals. This disagreement persists and even deepens further when the question of truth is raised in relation to diverse conceptions of the good. In this case, insistence on the homogeneity of the conception of the good life would mean returning to past conflicts and violence. In search of a common ground where people with diverse beliefs, moral viewpoints, and lifestyles can live peacefully, liberal thinkers have tried to define a “minimal moral conception” as a basis for the common good of political association (Larmore 1996a: 123). Such a conception would eliminate the potentially oppressive use of state power in favor of a certain form of a comprehensive moral view. The origins of political liberalism can be traced back to the thought of John Locke, but its theoretical treatment in contemporary political theory is relatively recent. Some early applications emerged in the works of Bruce Ackerman (1980), Ronald Dworkin (1985), Charles Larmore (1987, 1990), Thomas Nagel (1987), Judith Shklar (1989), and Joshua Cohen (1989). But the popularity of the concept is mostly due to John Rawls. Rawls’s own reservations regarding his opus, A Theory of Justice (1971), led him to expand his theory of justice into a political conception, whose moral basis could be affirmed by citizens who espouse diverse comprehensive views. After publishing several essays on the idea (Rawls 1985, 1987, 1989), in his second major work, Political Liberalism (1996) and the subsequent essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997) Rawls propounded a sophisticated and elaborate version of the theory of political liberalism. The following sections focus on the basic ideas and principles of Rawls’s theory of political liberalism.

The political conception of justice In his theory of political liberalism, Rawls invokes a political conception of justice that could be affirmed by citizens together, despite

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their differing moral views and conceptions of the good life. Any consensus on the terms of political association must be reached through “wholeheartedly”, and not as a modus vivendi. The political conception of justice is a “freestanding” conception that does not endorse any particular moral view; and it can be sustained only by a shared commitment of the people. What gives strength to the commitment is a common and effective motivation in people that leads them to seek a consensual basis for their political life. In sum, the idea of political liberalism is put as follows: Three conditions seems to be sufficient for society to be a fair and stable system of cooperation between free and equal citizens who are deeply divided by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines they affirm. First, the basic structure of society is regulated by a political conception of justice; second, this political conception is the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines; and third, public discussion, when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at stake, is conducted in terms of the political conception of justice. (Rawls 1996: 44) This passage illustrates the theoretical structure of political liberalism and its main ideas: (1) the political conception of justice, (2) overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and (3) public reason. What brings these concepts together is the need to define common ground among diverse and conflicting worldviews. The question of diversity and pluralism in a democracy is the main idea motivating Rawls’s enterprise. Rawls believes that a modern democratic society is characterized by the plurality of conceptions of the good life, religious and nonreligious, which are incompatible and conflicting yet reasonable enough to maintain the stability of the democratic regime. This pluralism and diversity emerges as a result of free institutions in a democratic society; moreover, this condition is a “permanent” feature of democratic culture and no one should expect it to wither away. These observations of democratic culture and society are not merely descriptive. In Rawls’s theory, these conditions together constitute the framework for the formation of the principles of political liberalism. Basic tenets of political liberalism are advanced in light of these a priori assumptions. Rawls presents these assumptions as the facts of democratic societies. Thus, he argues, the political culture of a democratic society is characterized by three “general facts” (Rawls 1996: 36). First, as

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The idea of political liberalism 15 mentioned above, modern democratic societies are characterized by a pluralism of comprehensive, religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines. These doctrines might be incompatible with one another and conflict in many aspects, but what distinguishes democratic societies from others is that these doctrines are generally reasonable. Thus, the pluralism of democratic societies is not mere pluralism, but reasonable pluralism. Rawls calls this “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” Second, in democratic societies, “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by oppressive use of state power” (Rawls 1996: 38). This condition is valid not only for religious doctrines, but for reasonable forms of utilitarianism or ethical liberalism. All these views require state support in order to enjoy monopoly in the public life. This fact is called “the fact of oppression.” Another general fact, related to the fact of reasonable pluralism, is that “an enduring and secure democratic regime, one not divided into contending doctrinal confessions and hostile social classes, must be willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active citizens” (Rawls 1996: 38). Rawls does not name this, but we might call it “the fact of majority” along the other “facts.” In political liberalism, these facts serve a justificatory role for the principles of political justice. They together provide the foundation for the idea of political justice. If they are denied, Rawls’s theory fails. On the other hand, given the state of contemporary democracy, these facts belong to the realm of common sense; they are not much contested as they allude to public understanding of basic liberties in democracies such as freedom of conscience and speech, and principles such as the rule of law and majority rule. Given these features of the public political culture of democracies, Rawls then considers the principal questions political liberalism aims to address. Although similar in content, these questions take different forms in different places: How is it possible that there may exist, over time, a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? (Rawls 1996: xx, 4) How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? (Rawls 1996: xx)

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The idea of political liberalism How is it possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious authority, for example, the Church and the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception that supports a just democratic regime? (Rawls 1996: xxxix) How is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society who endorse society’s intrinsic political ideals and values and do not simply acquiesce in the balance of political and social forces? (Rawls 1997: 780) How is it possible—or is it—for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline? (Rawls 1997: 781) In a constitutional democracy, how can religious and secular doctrines of all kinds get on together and cooperate in running a reasonably just and effective government? What assumptions would you have to make about religious and secular doctrines, and the political sphere, for these to work together? (Rawls 1999: 616)

The plurality of comprehensive doctrines is a result of democratic freedom, but democratic experience helps develop another attribute. That is, over time, doctrines achieve a reasonable character: they recognize other views and embrace the possibility of living together upon the principles agreeable to different worldviews. Thus, on the whole, the project of political liberalism focuses on a possibility of a peaceful, fair, stable, and sustainable political regime, whose principles would be agreeable to the various religious and secular worldviews commonly found in democratic societies. In formulating these principles, political liberalism aims to “narrow the range of disagreement” (Rawls 1996: 8), and reach a minimal moral conception that “a plurality of reasonable doctrines, religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues” (Rawls 1996: xl). The political conception of justice does not replace comprehensive doctrines, and it aspires to be acceptable to all. It is a “freestanding” conception: it is neither validated by any particular comprehensive doctrine nor does it validate anyone of them. The political conception

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The idea of political liberalism 17 of justice should not be understood as an outcome of doctrinal competition: it does not represent a balanced view among known comprehensive views nor does it stand for a compromise among the doctrines. Rather, it is a freestanding conception which has its own intrinsic moral political ideal, which derives from the political culture of a democratic society: In a democratic society there is a tradition of democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens generally. Society’s main institutions, and their accepted forms of interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles. (Rawls 1996: 14) The content of the political conception of justice is expressed in terms of this democratic public culture. This culture, Rawls maintains, comprises basic political institutions, their interpretation, and publicly known historical documents that define the contours of democratic life. Rawls’s emphasis on the political culture of democratic societies is important in two respects. First, it shows that political liberalism focuses merely on the regulation of the public domain; and, secondly, that the moral scope of political principles is limited in principle. The political conception of justice is applicable only to the political domain of basic political, social, and economic structures such as constitutions, forms of property, economic organization, and family structure. The limited moral scope of the political conception of justice, as such, marks the difference between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism: [A] political conception of justice differs from many moral doctrines, for these are widely regarded as general and comprehensive view [. . .]. A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, the ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole [. . .]. Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and comprehensive. (Rawls 1996: 13)

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The difference between political and comprehensive conceptions also derives from the cultural realm to which they belong. In Rawls’s scheme, the political conception belongs to the public political culture while religious, moral, and philosophical comprehensive doctrines reside in what Rawls calls “the background culture.” This is the culture of civil society and it is social in essence. Many elements of daily culture in democracies, such as churches, universities, clubs and teams, and various associations, with their internal life, enjoying the protection of law and basic liberties, reside in the background culture. Principles of political justice do not directly apply to the internal life of the associations in the background culture. This principle, Rawls maintains, also applies to the family. Above, we mentioned that the political conception of justice regulates the basic structure of society; and Rawls counts family as part of this structure. If family is part of the basic structure, then why do political principles not apply to it? This begs an explanation. This problem is worth pursuing, since many conflicts among comprehensive views center on the notion of family and family values. It appears that Rawls considers the family as a special case. The family is considered as part of the basic structure of political society, since that structure is meaningful only through the reproductive function of family. Political society, Rawls holds, is always considered to last forever; its conclusion or dissolution is foreign to its very idea. Thus, the family has a central role to play in reproducing society—not only by keeping up numbers but also raising, caring for, and nurturing citizens with values, virtues, and qualities necessary to support political and social institutions. On the other hand, the family is also an association. As a general rule in political liberalism, the principles of political justice do not directly apply to the internal structure of associations including the family. For example, political liberalism does not require ecclesiastical governance to be democratic. Religious leaders do not have to be elected, and benefits connected to hierarchical structures do not have to mirror principles of political justice. Similar rules apply to other associations such as universities, professional or scientific associations, business firms, labor unions, and so on. Yet the principles of political justice derive from democratic public political culture, defining a ground of consensus among free and equal citizens. These principles will impose certain constraints on the associations to protect individuals’ basic rights and liberties. For example, although the internal life of churches is excluded from the jurisdiction of political justice, since political liberalism holds that, churches “cannot practice effective intolerance, since, as the principles of justice

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The idea of political liberalism 19 require, public law does not recognize heresy and apostasy as crimes, and members of churches are always at liberty to leave their faith” (Rawls 1997: 789). For the purposes of political justice, persons who change their religious beliefs continue to be the persons they were before they changed beliefs. They continue to enjoy the freedom of religion in whatever faith now they belong to. In short, the imperatives of background culture cannot violate basic principles of political justice, which requires and protects the freedom and equality of citizens. Accordingly, although the family is considered as an association in the same fashion, the political conception of justice guarantees basic rights and liberties to all its members. Wives and husbands are equal citizens, with identical rights and liberties. On the other hand, the principles of political justice do not prescribe to families how they should raise their children or divide labor in the family. Political justice is out of place in these areas, while some other conceptions of justice may play a significant role in shaping such affairs. The separation of political and nonpolitical, public and background cultures is informed by political liberalism’s conception of the person. According to Rawls, in a fair society, individuals possess two moral powers. First, they have a sense of justice, which allows them to understand, apply, and act according to the political conception of justice. Second, they have a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good life. Thus, citizens are free to pursue their conceptions of the good and secure “higher-order” interests associated with their sense of justice. This means that they are rationally autonomous. But in political liberalism, the weight of rational autonomy must be decided only by citizens according to their comprehensive doctrines. On the other hand, political liberalism asserts the full autonomy of citizens in political life as a political value. This political autonomy is realized in public life by affirming principles of political justice and thereby enjoying the protection provided by the same principles. Unlike, the ethical values of autonomy and individuality, of Kant and Mill respectively, the political value of autonomy does not apply to the whole of life, but only to public life: In political philosophy one role of ideas about our nature has been to think people in a standard, canonical, fashion so that they might all accept the same kind of reasons. In political liberalism, however, we try to avoid natural or psychological views of this kind, as well as theological or secular doctrines. Accounts of human nature we put aside and rely on political conception of persons as citizens instead. (Rawls 1997: 800)

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Note that Rawls’s description of moral powers is connected to his definition of citizens, not to human nature in general. This point is also what distinguishes political liberalism from other forms of liberalisms, which invoke principles and justifications drawn upon a particular view of human nature.

Reasonable pluralism Rawls’s idea of political liberalism is built upon the idea of a political conception of justice. Rawls’s formulation requires that such a conception must have its own intrinsic normative and moral ideals. These ideals are based upon the reasonable pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The presence and participation of reasonable citizens create the possibility of achieving a reasonable public political conception of justice: Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms social cooperation (defined by principles and ideas) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept the terms. For these terms to be fair terms, to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them. (Rawls 1996: xliv) Reasonable citizens offer fair terms considering that other citizens who are offered them might also reasonably accept them. Rawls refers to this principle as the criterion of reciprocity (Rawls 1996: xliv). Note that Rawls is emphatic in distinguishing interest-based actions from reasonableness: people are reasonable when they agree on fair terms that might be against their own interest. By contrast, they are unreasonable when they give priority to their interests. That is because properties of the reasonable are distinct from those of the rational. The rational, for Rawls, applies to the judgmental capabilities of agents in pursuing their own ends and interests—though not always benefiting themselves. The degree of rationality in this respect is determined in terms of how these interests are adopted and prioritized, and also how these ends cohere with one another as part of a life plan. Although different from one another, the notions of reasonable and the rational complement each other: “Merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by

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The idea of political liberalism 21 fair cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the independent validity of the claims of others” (Rawls 1996: 52). In this formulation, reasonableness signifies a morally valuable form of interaction between free and equal citizens, free of domination or manipulation. People are unreasonable when they “plan to engage in cooperative schemes but are unwilling to honor, or even propose, except as a necessary public pretense, any general principles or standards for specifying fair terms of cooperation” (Rawls 1996: 50). Unreasonable people are those who are ready to violate those terms when it suits their interest. In Rawls’s account, reasonable persons acknowledge that other reasonable persons might affirm moral ideas different from their own. What makes this understanding possible is that reasonable persons recognize a set of epistemological obstacles that came into being as result of free institutions, which prevent ultimate agreement on moral matters. Rawls calls these burdens of judgment. Disagreement among reasonable people is substantiated by the complexity of issues, the inherent vagueness of moral and political concepts and their respective judgments, different experiences and normative considerations, and difficulties in setting priorities. With these burdens present, one would naturally expect differences of opinion and diversity (Rawls 1996: 54–58). These burdens set the limits of justification in reasonable pluralism. They denote a shared understanding of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. Thus, as Rawls maintains, it would be unreasonable to use power to suppress other reasonable views. Rawls’s notion of reasonableness is among the most discussed aspect of political liberalism.2 Most of this criticism can be attributed on Rawls’s insistence on using the term beyond its literal meaning. Take, for instance, the criticism raised by Robert Lipkin: What synonym, or alternative locution, can explain “reasonableness” for Rawls? Could his conception of justice be written without using the word “reasonable?” These are not rhetorical questions. The role of reasonableness plays in Rawls’s law of peoples and his conception of public reason deserves much more explanation than Rawls gives it. (Lipkin 1996: 295) Certainly, reasonableness plays a significant role in Rawls’s theory, but it is not clear whether it can be replaced with something else without undermining the overall theoretical logic. All in all, Rawls

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makes a solid attempt to define the notion in different settings such as reasonable people, reasonable doctrines, and reasonable pluralism. Interestingly, further in his essay, Lipkin states that the notion is simultaneously too broad and too narrow. Surely, the term is a thick one, underlying almost all the enterprise of political liberalism. Nevertheless, taking different approaches in establishing its meaning in different contexts is not impossible. For instance, David Estlund points out different ways of construing the notion. The reference of political liberalism to reasonable people, he suggests, could be understood “either to people when reasonable or to hypothetical people who are always reasonable” (Estlund 1998: 259). Another notable attempt to define the properties of reasonableness has been put forward by Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson (2001). The authors argue that reasonableness must be defined according to whether it carries philosophical or moral and political properties. Political reasonableness denotes more or less what Rawls specified, offering and honoring fair terms of cooperation that others can accept. They define philosophical reasonableness as having a liberal position. In this respect, not all philosophically unreasonable views should be discounted as politically unreasonable. Conversely, not all politically unreasonable views are philosophically unreasonable. A view can be politically reasonable but philosophically unreasonable, and vice versa.3 The implication of this approach is that when political justice is at stake, the boundaries of a social contract are drawn larger in the sense that the excluded unreasonable views would be merely the politically unreasonable ones. Persons who are not interested in actively participating in the democratic processes, because of their philosophically unreasonable views, could still be considered as politically reasonable as long as they honor fair terms of cooperation. The authors note that Rawls does not differentiate between philosophical and political properties as such, but, all in all, their approach appears to be in accord with the “spirit” of political liberalism. Rawls’s emphasis on the political as opposed to comprehensively moral properties should allow such a distinction to be made. In light of the argument put forward by Kelly and McPherson, I would like to argue that the notion of reasonableness in political liberalism should always be characterized as political in nature. Rawls’s notion has certainly less to do with the standard definition of reasonableness if it is understood as being agreeable to or in accord with reason, or logical, or not exceeding the limit prescribed by reason. These definitions refer to the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of reasonableness. To understand reasonableness in this

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The idea of political liberalism 23 form can lead to disputes about the concept of reason itself. Rawls’s notion, on the other hand, denotes a reciprocal attitude or a condition in which individuals act reciprocally with regard to important political issues. Therefore, to prevent misunderstandings and also to better express Rawls’s intentions, I propose that the notion should be understood—and used—in the form of a compound adjective as politically reasonable, political reasonableness, and politically reasonable pluralism. This usage would also fit with the political characteristic of political liberalism. The usage of reasonableness in this book should be considered as such. Another aspect of reasonableness that needs to be clarified is the relationship between a reasonable individual and a reasonable doctrine. Rawls uses these notions interchangeably in a sense that an agreement among reasonable individuals and among reasonable doctrines produces the same result. In general, Rawls assumes that reasonable people only affirm reasonable doctrines (Rawls 1996: 59). So, logically, the relationship among individuals or their doctrines is characteristically identical. On the other hand, doctrines are abstract notions and cannot interact with each other. Accordingly, when Rawls refers to doctrines as subjects he means collectives or groups of individuals that espouse particular doctrines. It is easier to build a political philosophy, such as political liberalism, based on group rather than individual identities. Therefore, when a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is said to recognize others as free and equal, this means that individuals whose conceptions of the good life informed by that particular doctrine do recognize other individuals as free and equal who espouse different doctrines. A consensus among doctrines, which is the focus of the next section, then, should be understood as pertaining to groups of individuals who belong to different doctrines.

Grounding consensus and stability Rawls formulates the principles of political association vis-à-vis a freestanding political conception of justice. Attractive as it seems as a noncontroversial notion from a doctrinal standpoint a freestanding conception also requires a level of support perhaps much stronger than any other conception that is based on a particular comprehensive doctrine. Moreover, a freestanding conception must also prove stable and provide stability for the political regime. Rawls tries to address these concerns by introducing another major idea of political liberalism, the idea of overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus is required because those with diverse comprehensive moral views

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must have a common ground for reaching consensus on the political conception of justice. Rawls argues that values implicit in democratic culture motivate individuals into accepting a political conception of justice that is not in conflict with each other’s comprehensive views. This means a political conception, one that is not controversial because it is acceptable to a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines in a democratic society, and it does not make any controversial claims about any reasonable comprehensive views. Therefore, if a political conception of justice emerges as the focus of an overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines as such, namely when “social unity is based on a consensus [. . .] and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements,” the stability of the political society should prove secure (Rawls 1996: 134). The idea of an overlapping consensus refers to a consensus merely on the principles applied in the political domain. A consensus on the political domain surely removes from the agenda various sorts of conflicts, which would appear within wider ranges of consensual pursuits, and, therefore, is possible. Indeed, Rawls argues, “the history of religion and philosophy shows that there are many reasonable ways in which the wider realm of values can be understood so as to be congruent with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, the values appropriate to the special domain of the political as specified by a political conception of justice” (Rawls 1996: 140). Rawls maintains that the history shows there have always been various worldviews reasonable enough to converge at a political conception of justice, if only that opportunity were available. Thus, an overlapping consensus is not only possible, because it requires fewer terms to agree, but also desirable, because it reduces the tension between political and other values. The idea of an overlapping consensus is consistent with the particular notion of stability invoked by Rawls. This notion of stability is, no doubt, a demanding one. First and foremost, it must arise for the right reasons. There are various ways of securing (regime) stability, but for the purposes of political liberalism, the way stability is achieved must be acceptable to citizens as reasonable, rational, free, and equal. Rawls emphatically distinguishes overlapping consensus from a modus vivendi, a somewhat forced way of reaching agreement on political principles. Modus vivendi stands for a contract when parties comply solely for their own interests. Such an agreement, however, is bereft of any principled basis. The parties may abandon the agreement and pursue their own self-interest whenever

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The idea of political liberalism 25 they see an opportunity that would make them better off. The idea of an overlapping consensus, on the other hand, has a moral value: the object of the consensus is a political conception of justice affirmed on moral grounds, not on group or self-interest. Citizens who affirm a political conception of justice reach that consensus by reasoning from within their own comprehensive views, drawing on their own religious, philosophical, and moral reasons (Rawls 1996: 147). To illustrate, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century politics of toleration were based on a modus vivendi between Catholics and Protestants. In that case, were either party to attain power, it would impose its faith over the other. A more striking example Rawls gives is a society regulated by a constitution resembling that of the United States. In this example, the constitution stands for a treaty of civil peace among diverse and divided religions; it protects religious liberty, leading religious sects to believe that under these circumstances they will be able to maintain their numbers in the future. Political problems are solved through political means. In this case, Rawls maintains, consensus serves only to guarantee the stability of a religiously divided society; it does not stand for, however, a true allegiance to the political ideals and values of a democratic society. Accordingly, stability is not achieved for the right reasons if in a democratic society citizens accept the political principles of a constitution and the liberties it provides but are not willing to see their religious or nonreligious doctrine decline under any circumstances. In this case, their allegiance to law can easily be undermined if they realize that their comprehensive doctrines are losing ground. Political liberalism does not expect people to put their religious or nonreligious doctrines in peril, but it does reject such interest-based allegiances. The aspirations of individuals and groups in political life must be consistent with the idea of free and equal citizens and their basic liberties (Rawls 1997: 781–782). There is a difference, however, between the types of consensus in the first and second examples. In both cases, the consensus is based on a modus vivendi, but in the second example, we have a constitutional consensus. For Rawls, consensus on a constitution might pave the way toward an overlapping consensus. A constitutional consensus emerges when certain political principles are accepted as a mere modus vivendi, such as the principle of toleration, and so incorporated into the political domain. These principles “meet the urgent requirement to fix, once and for all, the content of certain political rights and liberties, and to assign them special priority” (Rawls 1996: 161). By removing certain conflicting issues off the political agenda, these kinds of arrangements help delimit social interests and establish rules

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of political contest. Thus, at this stage, liberal principles are accepted reluctantly as a modus vivendi and incorporated into the constitution. Indeed, this is a process strong enough to shift doctrinal conceptions so that citizens are now ready to accept the liberal principles. Eventually, owing to the strengthening of liberal political values in the society, the simple pluralism of a modus vivendi transforms into a reasonable pluralism (Rawls 1996: 161–164). Constitutional consensus, on the other hand, is limited in scope. It regulates only democratic procedures, electoral processes, basic political rights, and liberties such as the right to vote and freedom of political speech. The consensus, Rawls maintains, does not go beyond that because parties that are involved in the constitutional consensus are in disagreement about the boundaries and contents of those rights and liberties: A constitutional consensus at the level of principles viewed apart from any underlying conception of society and citizen—each group has its own reasons—is a consensus taken literally. It lacks the conceptual resources to guide how the constitution should be amended or interpreted. (Rawls 1996: 165) But once a constitutional consensus is secured, political groups naturally campaign in the political arena, trying to gather a majority around their ideas. As they do that, they develop their own political conceptions through which they can explain and justify their ideas. Rawls cites the Reconstruction era following the American Civil War as an example of such a period of political conceptual development. Another form of conceptual development comes through judicial review. To review the constitutionality of executive or legislative decisions or to interpret articles of a constitution when needed, judges or officials need to develop a political conception of justice so as to fulfill those tasks. On the whole, these conceptions appear to be liberal, for the parties who bring them up aim to explain or justify their ideas to others, or in other words, they put them in a way that is agreeable to others. Consequently, if reasonable citizens can accept a particular political conception of justice on the basis of or from the view of their differing comprehensive doctrines, an overlapping consensus emerges. The political conception of justice, as mentioned in the previous section, is not a product of doctrinal balance or compromise. As Samuel Freeman notes, “overlapping consensus does not have to do

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The idea of political liberalism 27 with the argumentative bases of a political conception of justice [. . .] it draws rather from the ideas implicit in democratic culture” (Freeman 2003: 36). Those ideas altogether, such as toleration, basic rights and liberties, social welfare, and so on, which were “the common currencies” of the debates in the period following the constitutional consensus, develop into a fully articulated political conception of justice: Kantians may affirm a liberal conception for reasons of autonomy (as congruence suggests), reasonable utilitarians might affirm a liberal conception in they believe that it directly promotes overall utility; moreover reasonable Catholics may affirm the same political conception on the grounds that it expresses God’s natural laws, and pluralists can endorse it on grounds that the reasons it provides are sufficient for purposes of justification without the need to appeal to some more abstract comprehensive view. (Freeman 2003: 36) One may also add the notion of “free faith,” which can be found in John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration or other similar treatises that emphasize the significance of tolerance. Citizens who espouse such a faith would affirm the political conception of justice in accordance with their tolerant worldview. Thus, to repeat, each doctrine endorses the political conception for different reasons and in different ways. The acceptance of political conception is not a result of political compromise. Rather, an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice generates “a concordant fit between the political conception and the comprehensive views together with the public recognition of the great values of the political virtues” (Rawls 1996: 171).

Principles of public deliberation and reasoning Overlapping consensus is a convergence of the various opposing moral and religious views upon a political conception of justice. To illustrate how the public and political affairs of a society are to be regulated by that conception, Rawls introduces another essential idea of political liberalism: the idea of public reason. Public reason regulates political relations between the constitutional government and citizens, and among citizens themselves. If citizens, Rawls maintains, cannot reach an agreement or even come near a mutual understanding because of their irreconcilable comprehensive views, then, when

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political questions are at stake, they have to adopt a politically reasonable way of discussion, deliberation, and reasoning, namely public reason, which effectively replaces truth and right claims of comprehensive doctrines in the public realm. Public reason, as part of the general logic of political liberalism, does not take issue with comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious; it is neutral toward them. It represents a political consciousness upon which various comprehensive doctrines agree, and through which they communicate with one another about public issues. Public reason serves as a channel of communication between individuals who belong to diverse comprehensive views. Engaging other citizens in public affairs is to address them in a way that acknowledges their status as free and equal citizens and to express arguments in ways that they could reasonably accept them. Since the political conception of justice stands for a conceptual ground upon which reasonably comprehensive doctrines agree, then a citizen would be engaging public reason as she deliberates in terms of that conception: Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political conceptions of justice, and ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are the most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept. (Rawls 1997: 786) Accordingly, public reasoning is to deliberate on fundamental political issues in terms of the political conception of justice and the principles and values which give shape to that conception. In a society with a constitutional regime where citizens are free and equal, Rawls suggests, those political values would include general values such as justice, domestic peace, general welfare, and more specific ones such as equality of opportunity, ideals concerning income distribution, taxation, and so on (Rawls 1997: 775–777). Since the form and the content of public reason are given by the political conception of justice, the scope of public reason is limited to public political affairs. Rawls calls these “constitutional essentials.” They include the fundamental principles specifying the structure of government and the political process in the legislative, executive, and judiciary, and the basic rights and liberties of citizens. Thus,

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The idea of political liberalism 29 in a political liberal society, deliberations concerning constitutional essentials are to be held using public reason so the actions following such deliberations, such as legislation, can be deemed legitimate. Rawls is quite specific about this; he delimits an area for political discussion, which he calls “the public political forum.” The forum includes the discourses of judges, government officials, and candidates for public offices. The liberal principle of legitimacy requires public reason to be the common currency of discussions in such discourses. In constitutional regimes with judicial reviews, Rawls maintains, the constitutional courts are the exemplars of public reason. Public reason is the reason that should be employed by these courts. The justices must not invoke in their decisions their personal ideas of morality, nor those of other individuals, nor ideals found in other comprehensive worldviews. “Rather,” Rawls argues, “they must appeal to the political values they think belong to the most reasonable understanding of the public conception and its political values of justice and reason” (Rawls 1996: 236). Public reason has its own limitations. As a logical consequence of the separation of cultural realms into a public political and a background culture, which are shaped by the political conception of justice and other conceptions respectively, public reason, whose content is given by the political conception, need not be used by the elements in the background culture in deliberations and discussions even if they pertain to political issues. This means that public reason need not apply to personal or associational deliberations and reflections about political questions. Various religious or nonreligious considerations may shape those discussions.4 These are generally called “non-public reasons.” As the argument goes, it is clear that there can be many nonpublic reasons, but only one public reason. Churches, universities, and professional groups have their own nonpublic reasons in their own functions and deliberations. Here, nonpublic reason does not mean private reason. In fact, Rawls denies the possibility of a private reason. Those nonpublic reasons may be called social reasons, or domestic reasons in the case of families. Citizens invoke all these different reasons in different situations (Rawls 1996: n220). These many forms of nonpublic reasons are different in essence; for example, the nonpublic reasons of churches and universities. Then, the idea of public reason comes along to represent “a shareable public basis of justification for all citizens in society, giving justifications to particular persons and groups here and there” (Rawls 1997: 800). The distinction between the public and nonpublic reasons is not as sharp as it seems. In fact, Rawls’s theory has evolved into an inclusive

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view in this regard. In the earlier texts, Rawls defended what he calls “the exclusive view,” a view that prohibits the use of reasons given explicitly by comprehensive doctrines in public deliberations. Later he presented an alternative view he calls “the inclusive view,” which allows citizens to introduce reasons from their comprehensive doctrines in certain situations so as to strengthen the ideal of public reason itself (Rawls 1996: 247–250). This shift arose mainly in response to his critics. Admitting the fact that “people do not normally distinguish between comprehensive and public reasons,” Rawls maintained, they can still “be brought to recognize these distinctions in particular cases” (Rawls 1996: 251). Yet in an another attempt, catching his many critics off guard, Rawls declared that reasons based on the comprehensive doctrines can always be introduced into the public reason (Rawls 1996: lii). Hence, the final version of public reason, which he calls the “wide view of public political culture,” goes as follows: Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons—and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support. (Rawls 1997: 783–784) Rawls refers to this rule as the “proviso.” The conditions and details about how to satisfy the proviso should be established through practice, and will be determined by the nature of political culture. Yet, as the proviso indicates, the introduction of comprehensive views into the political discussion should not change the nature and content of public reason. Other than this, political liberalism puts no limitations to the introduction of religious and secular doctrines, nor does it require them to be expressed in certain ways. Rawls considers many benefits of the wide view: When these doctrines accept the proviso and only then come into the political debate, the commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested. Made aware of this commitment, government officials and citizens are more willing to honor the duty of civility, and their following the ideal of public reason helps foster the kind of society that ideal exemplifies. These [. . .] bring out a positive ground for introducing such doctrines, which is

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not merely a defensive ground, as if their intrusion into public discussion were inevitable in any case. (Rawls 1997: 785) In many pressing political issues, such as the question of public support for religious schools, Rawls argues that opposing parties doubt one another’s allegiance to basic political values. The wide view of public culture enables opposing parties to express their religious or secular reasons in terms of their comprehensive doctrines, but also urges them to explain to one another how their views support those basic political values. In the case of abolitionist and civil rights movements, Rawls argues, the proffered arguments had religious roots, but these arguments also supported basic political values; hence they satisfied the proviso (Rawls 1997: 785).

Conclusion The idea of political liberalism stands for a normative account of a fair and stable ground of political association for individuals who espouse diverse religious, moral, and philosophical worldviews. Today, moral struggles that take religious, philosophical, or ideological forms increasingly influence politics. The idea of political liberalism is valuable because it focuses on moral divisions and seeks a just political remedy. It is a significant idea because (1) it addresses many conceptions of the good life, now a commonplace characteristic of modern societies, and builds political legitimacy upon this pluralism; (2) it offers a notion of political justice that takes into account the diversity of worldviews and lifestyle choices; and (3) it invokes a stable system based on an extended notion of consensus on political principles. Furthermore, contrary to comprehensive liberal and non-liberal aspirations, the idea of political liberalism appeals to a minimal moral–political conception of justice, which centers on principles of public political life and steers clear of other spheres of social and individual lives. Taken together, these features of political liberalism present an indispensable normative and theoretical resource in dealing with the political problems faced by contemporary pluralist societies.

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This chapter discusses the relationship between Islam and political liberalism. More specifically, it focuses on the principal features of political liberalism and explains their significance in resolving the disputes between Islam and democratic ideals. Political liberalism presents an alternative liberal view to comprehensive or ethical liberalism. This difference in normative accounts between two forms of liberalism also translates into a difference in their ways of treating religious views in political and public settings. In the following, I argue that political liberalism presents an account of political morality that should be agreeable to most citizens of faith in Muslim societies. I present this argument in three parts. First, I discuss the inclusive potential of political liberalism vis-à-vis its basic principles presented in the previous chapter. I contend that Rawls’s reasoning behind the basic notions of the political conception of justice, overlapping consensus, and public reason enables citizens of faith to be extensively involved in the formation of political morality. This not only extends the scope of the recognition of political principles but also increases the public recognition of religious views. But this inclusive nature of political liberalism has its own limits. Political reasonableness is the criterion which defines the boundaries of the inclusion. In the second section I focus on the reasonableness of religious views in Muslim societies and discuss the implications and imperatives of Rawls’s assumption of reasonable pluralism for those views. Finally, in the third section, I contend that political liberalism presents a neutral rather than a secular normative outlook. The logic of political liberalism, I maintain, does not allow prioritization of secular views over religious views, or vice versa.

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Political liberalism and the inclusion of religion Political liberalism introduces a novel way of reasoning about issues such as political morality, political legitimacy, political consensus, and the public/private distinction. This, I believe, translates into a radical shift in liberalism in dealing with the issue of religion in public and political contexts. In general, and in contrast to non-liberal and comprehensive liberal alternatives, political liberalism provides a more inclusive outlook with regard to religious views. This inclusive aspect of political liberalism can be observed in three main areas. First, political liberalism presupposes equality of religious and secular doctrines in the formation of political morality. Since political liberalism aims to develop a political conception of justice that can be freely endorsed by various comprehensive doctrines, it is essential that it is an expression of liberal democracy that appeals equally to the religious and the secular. This means that religious comprehensive doctrines espoused by citizens of faith are not to be marginalized in the formation of political morality or disfranchised by their secular counterparts in public life. Rawls emphasizes that these doctrines must endorse the political conception “freely” without political manipulation and pressure, or use of force. Free endorsement of the political conception also implies that these doctrines possess a condition of equality within the process of political consensus. They are equally free in their participation and involvement in the determination and acknowledgment of common principles that will be applicable in the political domain, thus affecting all. Assuming that many citizens in Muslim societies value certain interpretations of Islamic tradition, the inclusion of these views in the political consensus will provide more legitimacy and stability to the political regime. Second, political liberalism offers a normative separation of the political and background culture domains. The political conception of justice regulates merely the political domain of basic political, social, and economic structures. It does not directly apply to the internal life of the elements in the background culture, namely civil society associations such as religious institutions, universities, clubs and teams, and various associations, and the family, as long as the basic rights and liberties of individuals are protected. A quick glance at contemporary politics in Muslim societies shows that most issues of religion emerge in relation to the background culture. This includes religious resistance to the secularization of social life, education, associational life, and limits to religious expression in those areas. Certainly, most conflicts emerge because the distinction between rules that apply to

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the political and the background elements are frequently violated, or they are considered as inseparable. Third, political liberalism proposes a wide-ranging common ground of consent. The stability of a political liberal regime is based on an overlapping consensus, namely a convergence of the various moral, philosophical, and religious views, each of which affirms the political conception of justice from within its own comprehensive view. The nature of this consensual process is quite participatory and thus effective at both ends. A wide-ranging consensus provides public recognition to political values and principles as well as to doctrines themselves. This gives a significant inclusive character to the consensual process. Consider a nonreligious philosophical doctrine that aims to extend the value of individual autonomy in social and public life. This value may, furthermore, be considered as an ideal or necessary condition of a well-ordered human life. Now consider a mainstream Islamic doctrine that espouses a certain conception of the good life defined by submission to God and a notion that every action and every aspect of life should become an act of witness to the creation of God. According to the basic tenets of political liberalism, these two doctrines can be involved in an overlapping consensus so long as they fall into the category of the reasonable. As we have seen, reasonableness is not an epistemological category; it is not about the content of the beliefs. Rather, it allows an intersubjective moral formation, that is, offering fair terms of cooperation that are acceptable to other free and equal citizens. Accordingly, a member of the philosophical doctrine may affirm a liberal political conception of justice for reasons of autonomy, and a member of the Islamic doctrine on the grounds that it expresses God’s intention of, say, peace and harmony on earth. An overlapping consensus enables these two distinct doctrines to converge on common political principles using different reasons. It is significant that this consensual logic of political liberalism indirectly provides these two distinct reasons with public recognition, since both participated in the consensus, agreed upon common terms that are fair to each party, and thus constituted the foundation of political morality. Now, each party can claim their part in this foundation and show allegiance to it. These features of political liberalism may appear to be quite ordinary since they can be expressed by other liberal theories: liberalism in general is committed to the idea of the equality of citizens; a notion of social contract or consent is frequently invoked, and some kind of a public/private distinction is commonplace. What makes political liberalism different, however, is its inclusion of diverse conceptions of

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the good that go beyond accommodation. Accommodation in a political context denotes a settlement or resolution, which is often regulated or promoted by a superior authority. Accommodation as such is a good thing; however, it is limited. It implies a (political, moral, philosophical) hierarchy between individuals, peoples, or ideas. Political liberalism, however, goes beyond accommodation. To better understand the inclusive potential of political liberalism, let us consider the three areas discussed above. I maintained that the idea of political liberalism might equally appeal to the religious and the secular, because in defining a common ground of consensus political liberalism does not devise a procedure that marginalizes or disfranchises religious views in favor of their secular counterparts. This feature of political liberalism might appear in line with the liberal tradition of freedom, equality, and the moral autonomy of individuals. However, equality of conceptions of the good has not always been the locus of liberal political practice. Since the Enlightenment, in liberal democracies a political conception of mostly secular orientation has been used to define political principles and relations. The horrors of religious wars still linger in the mind of the liberal; the concern to abate sectarian conflicts and to secure public order continues to characterize the liberal enterprise. Thus, one way to prevent further religious conflict is to establish a general constitutive liberal idea, frequently expressed through a civil religion, which accommodates, among other things, variety of religious expression and exercise through institutional arrangements that are carefully devised to keep religion in its place. Practical variations of this idea differ across modern Western democracies, from the United States, where the promotion of religion by the state is specifically prohibited, to many European countries, which continue to have established religions as a legacy of the Erastian tradition, but which are, at the same time, very sensitive to any sort of public political position invoked by religion or religious authorities. The idea underlying all these practices and policies is that religion ipso facto cannot define political authority, because when it did it undermined social harmony and public order. Therefore, political authority should be defined by a far-reaching secular conception, distant from religion but also tolerant of religious expressions as long as religion commands merely in its own domain. Needless to say, the boundaries of this very domain are to be defined by the secular conception. The equality of the conceptions of the good in the formation of political morality, then, is a significant shift from what we observe in the theory and practice of liberal democracy. It is an implicit rejection

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of the superiority of the secular to the religious and the religious to the secular in the political domain. The latter two features of political liberalism can be construed in the same fashion. For instance, the separation of the political and background culture domains is a notion similar to the public/private distinction, an idea frequently expressed in the liberal tradition. However, similarity between these notions does not go beyond their reasoning; their contents are substantially different. Rawls is quite emphatic about that. Let us focus here on the reasoning part. In the liberal tradition, distinctions such as those between public and private, political and personal, political and civil, and, finally, political culture and background culture, serve in defining the very basic idea or ideal of liberalism: protection of the civil and political liberties of individuals. Technically, the state is the promoter of these liberties through legislative, executive, and judicial powers, but at the same time, it is the very agent against the excesses of which these liberties need to be protected. But in practice, boundaries between these domains tend to shift in favor of the state. What then makes Rawls’s distinction between political and background culture special? As we have seen, Rawls is very specific about the domain to be regulated by the political conception of justice. This domain comprises basic political, social, and economic structures. Principles of political justice do not directly apply to the internal life of the elements in the background culture. In fact, the enterprise of political liberalism is defined by its “political” not “comprehensive” focus. If we imagine the political liberal polity as a political association that comes into being as a result of social cooperation between individuals of diverse comprehensive doctrines, then the background culture that lies beyond the political conception may be construed as the “life zone” of the doctrines along with their respective organizations, institutions, traditions, and expressions. Thus, the political/background distinction advanced by Rawls serves a dual purpose: it not only protects the liberties of the individuals but it also protects comprehensive religious and secular doctrines. Protection of comprehensive doctrines as such is an essential aspect of political liberalism, since the realization of the political liberal ideal depends on a consensus of those doctrines. This takes us to the third feature of political liberalism, namely the wide-ranging common ground of consent it presupposes. This consensus is wide-ranging in the sense that it is inclusive of diverse views of the good life, including religious views. This, however, has not always been the case. In many variants of liberal theory, religion is considered as a private thing; it may give meaning to the lives of individuals and guide their

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actions in their private undertakings but it is not expected to convey a public role. The public domain in this view is to be defined by a secular conception of comprehensive nature, which accommodates religious views within the framework of individual liberties, but is fundamentally different from or unrelated to any sort of religious identity. A political view, as such, can provide a large space for the exercise of religion, safeguard diversity of religion, and protect religion from the interference of the state. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally limited. Although it is accommodative, its appeal for particular religious views—especially those held by majorities—may be significantly limited. Moreover, because of its essentially secular identity, it does not necessarily invoke the consent of religious views. Consider a Muslim society where Islam is the faith embraced by the majority of the people. In light of Rawls’s reasoning, a view of secular nature, which is different from and unrelated to a religious identity, can be maintained only in two ways. Either it is formed as result of a modus vivendi, so that there is no better alternative as the basis for political morality, or it is maintained by the oppressive use of state power. In Rawls’s understanding, stability based on the first condition is fragile, and stability based on the latter is immoral and illegitimate. In most Muslim societies, the usual pattern has been an initial imposition of a secular doctrine followed by a modus vivendi that emerged as a result of relentless religious resistance.

Religious views in reasonable pluralism Since political liberalism is based upon the idea of a reasonable agreement among various and opposing comprehensive views, it can still be rejected by those who oppose engaging in a consensual agreement with others. The notion of reasonableness thus plays a constitutive role in political liberalism. In Rawls’s formulation, reasonableness signifies a morally valuable form of political interaction between free and equal citizens, free of domination or manipulation. Reasonable persons recognize that other reasonable persons might affirm moral ideas different from their own. They are ready to offer fair terms of cooperation that other reasonable people can agree upon. Political liberalism can be realized only if the great majority of a society is politically reasonable. Accordingly, individuals belonging to different reasonable moral and religious views constitute together the condition of reasonable pluralism. This is the sociological base of overlapping consensus and, thus, the political conception of justice in political liberalism.

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The criterion of reasonableness plays a major rule in defining the nature of religious inclusion in political liberalism. Actually, religion is the area whose reasonableness is discussed by Rawls more specifically than any other area. The issue at stake is whether religious views are politically reasonable enough to be involved in the consensual structure; or in other words, whether religious views are compatible with the idea of political liberalism. Rawls is emphatic about reasonableness, and excludes clearly unreasonable views from political liberalism: For them the political relation may be that of friend or foe, to those particular religious or secular community or those who are not or it may be a relentless struggle to win the world for the whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those who think this way. The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship. (Rawls 1997: 767) Rawls asserts that the political conception must be accepted unconditionally and for the right reasons. Religious doctrines and adherents must not accept liberal political conception as a modus vivendi. Political liberalism rejects such interest-based allegiances. The aspirations of individuals and groups in political life must be consistent with the idea of free and equal citizens and their basic liberties. Rawls, therefore, is emphatic about a “wholehearted” acceptance of the political conception of justice by religious doctrines. He argues that the extent to which a religious doctrine understands and recognizes the fact of pluralism determines where it stands with regard to public reason. If it is to ensure the liberty of its adherents it has no alternative but to recognize in reciprocity the liberties of other free and equal citizens. But can we assume that all religious doctrines and their adherents in Muslim societies might automatically realize this and further agree to sacrifice their reasons on behalf of public reason? It is hard to answer this question affirmatively. For instance, Patrick Neal (2000: 183) states that “the citizen of faith cannot accept the strong reading of the idea that her commitment to political liberalism must be wholehearted and firm.” This reading, he argues, would mean that principles of political conception should take priority over one’s religious views. This cannot happen without denying ultimate authority of God. Thus, citizens of faith must reject the idea that some other principle—like public reason—other than that which their religious

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views acknowledge, could claim authority in their affairs even if only those in political domain. The standard of (religious) truth is the ultimate arbiter in judging the legitimacy of such claims. This vein of criticism challenges not only political liberalism but any other political moral system of which principles derived from non-divine sources. In fact, basic rules of social and economic life could be denied in the same fashion. But it should be noted that political liberalism is a view perhaps most open to such claims. It would be absurd to argue that political liberalism asks religious citizens to deny the authority of God. Basic ideas of political liberalism such as overlapping consensus, public reason, and reasonable pluralism are formulated in order to provide a common ground of consensus among people without violating or endangering their conceptions of the good life. What political liberalism proposes is that people continue to value their religious, moral, and philosophical views, but they also engage in social cooperation defined by fair terms of cooperation acceptable to all. People might have different reasons to endorse those terms, but as long as they can do so in accordance with their religious views, this will only extend the stability of the public order. Interestingly, between the lines, Neal cannot resist stating this possibility: [T]his does not mean that the citizen of faith cannot commit herself to some of the values that Rawls characteristically describes as part and parcel of political liberalism. She may well believe that liberty of conscience and equality of citizenship are fundamental aspects of just political regime, and that she is bound to support such principles in practice. Insofar as she is committed to these practices, it will be because the conception of political justice yielded up by her comprehensive religious beliefs specifies them as just. (Neal 2000: 183) Rawls could not ask more! For political liberalism, the issue at stake is reaching a consensus among controversial and opposing comprehensive views. To achieve this aim, those moral views must be open to the idea of consensus in order to be accommodated within this political scheme. That is, in broad terms, an understanding of toleration—like that of Neal’s citizen of faith—ought to be involved in dealing with others who adhere to alternative moral views. In Rawls’s terms, one needs to be politically reasonable in one’s moral views to come to terms with public reason. This implies that

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the fact of reasonable pluralism in democratic societies, the notion which serves as the point of departure for Rawls, excludes those who oppose cooperating with others. Indeed, Rawls notes from the outset that political liberalism does not engage those who think of politics as a means to impose on others a particular way of life or moral view. Thus, in political liberalism, being reasonable appears to be a moral prerequisite to getting involved in cooperation, engaging in overlapping consensus, and participating in public reason. Being unreasonable in cooperation leads to a modus vivendi, an outcome deemed undesirable by political liberalism. The formulation of political liberalism in this way implies three forms of religious views to deal with: (i) If a religious doctrine is politically reasonable, that is, if it is ready to cooperate with others in order to reach fair terms of political conduct agreeable by every other free and equal citizen, then political liberalism is a suitable way for this doctrine to live by its tenets without fearing drawbacks; (ii) If a religious doctrine is politically unreasonable, that is, if it engages in cooperation but favors its own interest over the terms of cooperation, then the idea of public reason cannot be fully realized due to lack of overlapping consensus; this doctrine has to find a way to attain compatibility with political ideas and values of the political moral conception; (iii) If a religious doctrine is unwilling to cooperate at all, it will be opposed by political liberal order. In terms of political liberalism and its principles of political justice, the religious doctrines in the first form constitute compatible religion because they are reasonable. In most Muslim societies, mainstream majorities could be included in this category. The views in the third form are clearly unreasonable and thus incompatible. Such views are represented by marginal but vocal radical and militant groups, which are supported by a meager minority in the Muslim countries. The second form of religion constitutes the in-between category. This sort of view should be not opposed outright because it does initially get involved in cooperation, although not for right reasons. As long as it continues to uphold its interest-based position, it cannot be trusted and thus cannot be offered fair terms. This will undermine the consensus. But since it initially gets involved in the cooperation, there is a chance that it will change or eventually relinquish its interest-based position and embrace the political conception for the right reasons.

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One could envision a change in the socio-political position over time, as the consensual proceeds from a modus vivendi, to constitutional, and eventually to overlapping consensus. The best examples of such groups are numerous Islamist parties, which were initially radical but have since moderated their discourses so as to appeal to the mainstream majorities as they negotiate their participation in the political system.

Political liberalism: neutral not secularist Liberal theory goes hand in hand with a vision of state neutrality while mostly adopting a higher ground of justification, such as the ideal of autonomy. As the argument goes, the state provides a neutral framework to the individuals so as to enable them to choose their own lifestyles. This conception of neutrality has been attacked by critics of liberalism for being impracticable and unrealistic.1 I think what animates most of the criticism in this line is another, deeper problem. Neutrality is frequently charged with a secular bias. It is meant to refer to a ground of political justification impartial among diverse religions, which is characteristically defined as not only nonreligious but also secularist in nature. One of the widely accepted meanings of the church and state separation is drawn on this logic. This view holds that, in the wake of religious wars and conflicting religious doctrines, maintaining peace, order, and stability in society requires the state not to uphold any religion or pursue any religious goal. Accordingly, the state becomes secular, that is, nonreligious or not serving any religious purpose. But at times this logic is pushed further, and turned into an ideological instrument against religion. This is what I call a secularist position. Broadly, the difference between a secular state and a secularist state is that the former is nonreligious, impartial, and perhaps neutral, whereas the latter is antireligious or at least partially against religion in general. This nuance between the secular and secularist position is frequently disregarded as both are considered as expressions of secularism. Nonetheless, in the world of practical politics, the difference between these two positions translates into distinct institutional arrangements, policies, and laws, and thus effectively influences the role of religion in a society. I will take up this issue in detail in the next chapter. Here, I would like to mention that one great aspect of political liberalism in the hands of Rawls is to keep a distance to those views that infuse neutrality with secularism in the secularist sense.

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In this way, the neutrality of the state forms the essence of political liberalism. The political authority must strive to be neutral toward competing and controversial conceptions of the good life, religious and nonreligious. Political liberal neutrality as such expresses a moral commitment to reaching terms of political association on which all citizens can reasonably agree. It implies a kind of public morality formed by neutral principles, which is justified without assuming the validity of the controversial conceptions of the good. By providing the means for reaching generally accepted political principles, neutrality as such has a moral value. Neutrality may be understood in two ways. First is “neutrality of procedure,” that is, the simple idea of detachment, objectivity, or impartiality regarding the issues. This form of neutrality is well founded in liberal regimes where the state takes a neutral stance toward religions. But, for political liberalism, neutrality of procedure should also involve a “neutrality of aim” embedded in political principles, which requires the state not to favor any controversial view of the good life. Neutrality of aim denotes that the state is to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens to advance their conceptions of the good life. This is not, however, an open-ended proposition. Since political liberalism invokes a political moral conception that can be endorsed by all reasonable citizens, then neutrality can only be applied to the conceptions of the good life that would be willing to endorse that political conception of justice. Thus, in political liberalism, neutrality means that so long as such a political conception is endorsed and its principles are implemented in the public institutions, then the state must not favor or promote any particular comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 1996: 193). Doctrines, religious or secular, that would not support such a political conception of justice are considered unreasonable and hence they reside beyond the neutral stance of the state. Among those, Rawls considers, are “fundamentalist religious doctrines, the doctrine of the divine right of monarchs and the various forms of aristocracy, and not to be overlooked, the many instances of autocracy and dictatorship” (Rawls 1997: 801). The list is not, of course, exhaustive of all unreasonable doctrines. Clearly, Rawls provides merely a sketch of the unreasonable doctrines; in fact, he even misses the fact that the latter examples should be called regimes not doctrines. In any case, we should say, behind every unreasonable regime is an unreasonable doctrine. Autocratic and totalitarian ideologies are the obvious candidates. However, more importantly from a political liberal standpoint, there are less obvious candidates which can be equally disruptive

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as religious fundamentalism. These are what the critics like to call “exasperated laicism,” “lay fundamentalism,”2 and, last but not least, “secular fundamentalism.”3 On the whole, I would argue, in many Muslim countries there has been a current of secularism represented by various individuals, groups, and elites, in the form of an ideology or a comprehensive doctrine, which defended eliminating religion or religious manifestations not only in the political arena but also in the social arena. The best and most successful example is Turkey’s Kemalism, which is a secularist political ideology with statist, nationalist undertones. Other examples of secularist ideologies were nourished in the hands of one-party states across the Arab and Muslim world, which subsequently generated their own followers. When expressed in this way, it is not difficult to see the impossibility of a reciprocal understanding between such views and religious doctrines. As Rawls puts it, reasonableness occurs at both ends. Here, it is not even plausible to think that a secularist citizen would offer fair terms of cooperation thinking that other religious citizens might also reasonably accept. Therefore, political liberalism does not engage only theocrats but also secular fundamentalists. Rawls also distinguishes public reason from secular reason. He defines the latter as “reasoning in terms of comprehensive nonreligious doctrines” (Rawls 1997: 775). Secular doctrines and values, Rawls maintains, fall in the class of comprehensive doctrines, which include conceptions covering a wide range of human life and conduct, while public reason only serves the questions of constitutional essentials. Rawls also argues against the view which suggests the priority of secular arguments in the face of conflicting religious and sectarian doctrines. According to a proponent of this view, “one has a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support” (Audi 2000: 86). Secular reason in this case is defined as reason “whose normative force does not evidently depend on the existence of God (or on denying it) or on theological considerations, or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority” (Audi 2000: 89). In Rawls’s perspective, these sorts of notions are ambiguous; it is not clear whether they are animated by a comprehensive doctrine or a purely political conception. The idea of public reason does not necessarily focus on the reasons from the standpoint of their being religious or nonreligious, theological or not, but from their concord with the political conception of justice that is accepted by reasonable religious or nonreligious views. In this respect, if secular reason is expressed as such, it must also

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go though the criteria of public reason (Rawls 1997: n. 40). Even if secular arguments are considered as “reflective, and critical, publicly intelligible and rational” for political liberalism, they are not necessarily better or preferable to religious arguments. The bottom line is that such arguments do not in themselves provide public reasons.

Conclusion The idea of political liberalism presents an inclusive outlook when it comes to diverse worldviews that shape the lives of the citizens, and this inclusiveness is ever more present with regard to religious views. Rawls has shifted the focus of liberal thought from comprehensive liberalism—whose principles and values could be opposed by many who espouse religious views—to a liberalism of narrow scope, which effectively leaves many areas and issues off the political agenda. In this respect, Rawls defends a separation of political and background cultural realms, the latter representing the area of civil society where religious and nonreligious associations and organizations enjoy liberty in their internal affairs and protection. The principle of political justice that defines the political structure does not apply in the background area. This separation effectively draws the boundaries between the political and the social domains, and limits political interference in the affairs of civil society. In fact, a separation as such can significantly alleviate tensions between religious groups and the state, provided that it is properly practiced. Moreover, and equally important, political liberalism puts religious and secular doctrines on an equal footing in the formation of political morality. This is an important principle, because, since the Enlightenment, this has not been the case; there has always been some kind of a secular principle under which diverse religious views would peacefully live without violating one another’s liberty. Although there is a parallelism between a secular and a neutral state, in many instances the secular identity of the state is pushed further in favor of nonreligious ideological aspirations, where the secular becomes the secularist. A secular state could be neutral toward religion but a secularist is intrinsically antireligious. Another aspect of political liberalism that would appeal to the citizens of faith is the wide-ranging consent it requires over the political principles. According to Rawls, an overlapping consensus takes place when citizens converge upon common principles from within their own comprehensive doctrines using different reasons. This consensual procedure provides public recognition to every comprehensive

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doctrine that enables its members to give consent to those principles. Thus, religious doctrines, along with their nonreligious counterparts, participate in the consensus, agree upon terms, and constitute a foundation of political morality. They can now claim their part in this foundation and express allegiance to it. Overall, these features of political liberalism make it an idea that should be rather agreeable to most the citizens of faith in Muslim societies. The appeal of political liberalism in this respect is crucial in establishing it as the normative expression of the idea of liberal democracy in Muslim societies that are divided by religious, moral, and philosophical differences. Perhaps, more than anybody else, the citizen of faith is reassured by the inclusive outlook of political liberalism in achieving and maintaining the political consensus. Political liberal expression of liberal democracy aims to be inclusive and just. This gives us ample reason to consider political liberalism as a normative resource in dealing with ongoing disputes among religious and secular citizens and groups, and between religion and the state in general, which plague the politics in many Muslim societies.

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Political liberalism offers a moral framework for divided societies. But to what extent could it apply to contexts other than the democratic West? What sort of conceptual and normative resources does political liberalism offer for dealing with the extremely divisive issues surrounding Muslim societies? This chapter attempts to address these questions by assessing the utility and prospect of political liberalism in Muslim societies. To this end, first, it discusses the implications of resurgent religion for the whole political liberal enterprise. In the second section, it explains why religion turns political in Muslim societies. Finally, in the last part, it expounds the sociology of political liberalism and its implications for Muslim societies.

The resurgence of Islam and the political liberal prospect Rawls is hopeful about the prospect of religious believers to endorse a liberal political conception of justice; he argues all major religions in the world espouse principles that overlap with the notion of political justice expressed by political liberalism. But to what extent can we expect religious believers—including Muslims—around the world to possess the characteristics described by Rawls? Or, in other words, to what extent does Rawls’s account of religion mirror the real world? In the following I try to address these questions by surveying current debates in the sociology of religion. In the sociology of religion, and other interdisciplinary literature explaining the relationship between religion and modernity, secularization theory has long enjoyed a paradigmatic status. It has been asserted that modernity has had a corrosive impact on religion and religious manifestations, and produced irreversible consequences. Consequently, as one camp of the discussion has maintained, religion is in the process of fading out. The advocates of this camp

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of secularization theory have been around since the Enlightenment. Seminal figures of social thought such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, declared an unstoppable and unidirectional process of secularization and modernization as a global trend. “For nearly three centuries,” as Rodney Stark puts it, “social scientists and assorted western intellectuals have been promising the end of religion. Each generation has been confident that within another few decades, or possibly a bit longer, humans will ‘outgrow’ belief in the supernatural” (Stark 1999: 249). The second camp of secularization theory comprises more cautious theorists who argue that religion might remain alive, but, thanks to the privatized form of its social, political, and cultural manifestation, it tends to be much less significant than in the past. This approach is generally called “differentiation thesis,” which holds that “religion gets pushed out of social domains whilst remaining of some significance in private life” (Woodhead and Heelas 2000: 307). Recently, some other variants of secularization theory have toned down the disappearance thesis even more by claiming that secularization should be seen as a decline in the intensity of religious attributes due to the commercialization of culture (Bruce 1996). Secularization has also been understood as a phenomenon that takes place in particular circumstances, while religion maintains its vitality in other contexts (Martin 1990). The robustness and explanatory power of secularization theory has diminished in the second half of the twentieth century especially, paving the way for more cautious variants. This development was not coincidental. On a global scale, religion has continued to enjoy significance in social life and, indeed, has become even stronger since the 1970s. Disappearance of religion as a phenomenon is totally absent in non-Western contexts. On the other hand, the stubborn existence of religion in Western contexts, in the United States, Ireland, and southern Europe, for example, cast doubt on the unilinear vision of secularization thesis. For the proponents of the disappearance thesis the only valid case to hold on to remained that of Western and northern Europe, as they treated the American case and the rest of the world as exceptions. But recently, even the case of Europe has come under attack.1 Consequently, the secularization theory has been significantly discredited and has lost its paradigmatic position. Theorists have increasingly sought alternative approaches to understand and explain the phenomena that fall outside the auspices of secularization thesis. The alternative approaches to the secularization theory might be grouped under the banner of sacralization theory. In contrast to

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secularization theory, which maintains that the withering away of religion is a result of modernization, sacralization theory focuses attention on the rising significance of religion in the contemporary age. As opposed to the three sub-theses—disappearance, differentiation, deintensification—defended by the proponents of secularization theory, sacralization theorists emphasizes the reverse processes—growth, dedifferentiation, intensification—that are taking place in the world (Woodhead and Heelas 2000: 429). The most systematic presentation of sacralization theory so far has been offered by José Casanova in his groundbreaking work, Public Religions in the Modern World (1994). In this work, Casanova challenges the proponents of secularization theory, discredits the explanatory power of the theory case by case, and, most importantly, comes up with a systematic theory which he think should replace secularization theory. The strength of the work lies in the fact that, in illustrating his thesis, Casanova chose the harder and obviously more effective way, by focusing on Western cases, the contexts which had traditionally been considered as strongholds of secularization theory. Casanova’s point of departure is that we are witnessing a process of sacralization, which he dubs “the deprivatization of religion,” in the modern world. What I call the “deprivatization” of modern religion is the process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive legitimation, and redrawing of the boundaries. In the 1980s, religion throughout the world was in the forefront of various forms of public collective action, agonic as well as discursive, often on both sides of every contested issue, itself being both the subject and the object of contestation and debate. (Casanova 1994: 66) His principal argument is that the dominant sociological theories of religion and liberal or civic republican models of analyses are of little help when faced with this new phenomenon. According to Casanova, the differentiation of spheres of life into religious and secular, and the emancipation of many spheres from religion, persist as a general modern trend. But the decline of religious practices and beliefs is certainly not a modern trend and this is where secularization theory goes awry. Secondly, privatization, the other sub-thesis of secularization paradigm, is not a modern trend either. Casanova argues that

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there can be and are public religions in the modern world which are not arrested by the process of privatization, but which, at the same time, do not necessarily endanger modern differentiated structures. The cases he studies show that privatization “is not a modern structural trend but, rather, a historical option [. . .] it seems to be a modern ‘preferred option,’ but it is an option nonetheless” (Casanova 1994: 215). When privatization is “preferred,” this is done internally from within religion as a result not only of “modern processes of religious rationalization” but also of “general pietistic trends,” “processes of religious individuation,” and “the reflexive nature of modern religion” (Casanova 1994: 215). What are the implications of deprivatization for political liberalism? Could the Rawlsian model of religion survive deprivatization? Initially, in view of some of his remarks, one gets the impression that Rawls stipulates a privatized religion. For instance, he talks about religion as having lost the expansionist and salvationist agenda that had plagued Europe during the religious wars. If there ever are religious views that subscribe to such agendas, Rawls simply renounces them. Political liberalism, Rawls holds, does not engage those who think politics is a “relentless struggle to win the world for the whole truth” (Rawls 1997: 766). Moreover, when he talks about the political conception of justice and public reason, Rawls invokes principles of democratic culture upon which different religious and secular worldviews will consent. He does not specifically seek to justify those principles on religious grounds. More importantly, Rawls expects members of religious views to endorse the political conception of justice “wholeheartedly” without considering implicit gains. Many critics of Rawls conceded that this view of religion in political liberalism implicitly suggested a privatized religion, which is to be excluded from the public domain and is accommodated as long as it affirms political liberal principles. By the same token, religion in political liberalism appears to occupy a role larger than that which would be branded as private. The essential purpose of liberalism—to uncover principles of political justice that would be agreeable to diverse comprehensive doctrines—is largely animated by the significance religion enjoys in contemporary social life. Thus, Rawls pursues an idea of political justice without invoking a particular comprehensive liberal or secular doctrine. He is aware of the fact that significant portions of democratic societies espouse religious views that more or less shape their lives and define their conceptions of the good. Therefore, citizens of faith are not to be marginalized in the formation of political morality

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or disfranchised by secularist undertakings. Consequently, religious views play a quintessential role in the process of overlapping consensus. The consent of religious doctrines is seen as crucial for the overall stability of a political liberal regime. All these provisions make it extremely hard to argue that Rawls stipulates a privatized religion and excludes religion from public life. Therefore, political liberalism does not espouse a privatized religion; rather, it acknowledges the social significance of religion and includes religious views in the public political domain. But at the same time, religion in political liberalism is politically reasonable: religious views allow members to cooperate with others so as to reach fair terms of political conduct agreeable to other free and equal citizens. Political reasonableness naturally forbids the political imposition of religious beliefs and values and prohibits discrimination based on religious identity. In a given Muslim society, the members of some religious views (such as Sufi doctrines) never impose because either their value systems do not require that or they lack the will or means to undertake such a conduct. Sometimes, even if the religious doctrine itself has an expansionist nature, subscribers to it might take an apolitical stand, for various reasons. What is important in our context is whether subscribers to religious views in Muslim societies will impose religious faith and values on others or politically disenfranchise extrareligious and nonreligious individuals. In order to understand what the implication of deprivatization of religion in this context could be, we should analyze different spheres of political life and assess the possibilities of “transgressions” by religion in terms of political liberalism and political reasonableness. The political domain is understood in various ways. Alfred Stephan (1988) has introduced an analytical approach that divides polity into three differentiated areas. Jeff Haynes (1998) followed this approach and applied it to religious politics. The model is instrumental in understanding the public impact of religion in modern politics, and can be delineated as follows: The state This area essentially refers to the apparatus of government that comprises extensive and interconnected administrative, bureaucratic, and legal systems, which serve to “structure relations between civil and public power and to structure many crucial relationships within civil and political society” (Stephan 1988: 3). This is where the interactions between “church” and state take place. Church and state relations

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may take different shapes and forms in different contexts. Haynes (1998: 9–12) identifies five common relationships between church and state in the contemporary world. First is the confessional church– state relationship in which the church has ecclesiastical authority over the secular power. This form of relation is rare in the contemporary world, including in the Muslim world, and is now seen only in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Second is a particular relationship between the state and the church in which a concept of civil religion is important in the state, but is not tied to any specific religious tradition. This form of relation has been observed in Indonesia where Pancasila served as an official ideology. The third form of relationship is observed not in Muslim societies but in the Scandinavian countries and Britain, the countries which have an officially established faith but are also socially highly secular. But the voices of the established churches in public policy issues have been marginalized over time. In the fourth form, the relation between the church and the state is one of distance, detachment, and separation. No religion is given official predominance. The best example of this form is the United States. In this form of relationship, sometimes the state has the upper hand and may use religion for its own ends. This kind of church–state relation is observed in countries such as France, Mexico, India, and Netherlands, among others. The best Muslim example is Turkey. Post-communist Muslim-majority countries should also be considered within this category. Finally, in a number of Marxist countries, we observe a Marxist secular model in which the public role of religion is abolished and religion is reduced to liturgical functions. Political society The arena “in which a polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus” (Haynes 1998: 7) is called political society. In the contemporary world of politics we observe a range of religion-based activities in this area of polity: “(a) resistance to the disestablishment and the differentiation of the religious from the secular sphere, that is, the goals of many so-called ‘fundamentalist’ religious groups; (b) parties against other religions or against secular movements and parties; (c) religious groups demanding the rule of law and legal protection of human and civil rights, protecting the mobilization of civil society and/or defending the institutionalization of democratic regimes” (Haynes 1998: 7). These sorts of politics are observed in variety of countries in different forms, such as the Christian mobilization in a number

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of African countries, and also in Poland, southern Europe, and Latin America, and Buddhist mobilization in Thailand. The Islamist mobilization in the form of Islamist as well as nascent “Muslim Democrat” parties2 in most Muslim societies are to be considered within this category. Civil society In civil society, groups, institutions, and movements are not explicitly political, nor are they involved in state activities. They do, however, exert significant political influence. The civil society arena is composed primarily of voluntary associations such as religious groups, neighborhood associations, interest groups, and cultural and intellectual circles and institutions. Religious groups and organizations of civil society may employ a variety of strategies to influence public policy without seeking political office: “(a) lobbying the executive apparatus of the state; (b) going to court; (c) building links with political parties; (d) forming alliances with like-minded groups; whether secular or from other religions; (e) mobilizing their followers to protest, and/or (g) seeing to sensitize public opinion through the mass media” (Haynes 1998: 8). In Muslim societies these sorts of activities exist side by side with political activities of religious groups and organizations. When it comes to assessing the prospect of political liberalism in Muslim societies, the sphere of political society appears to be the most important and decisive area. Religious groups, whether politically organized or not, appear to be very active in this area, resisting the secularization, founding parties against other religious or secular groups, and claiming various political demands (Mandaville 2007; Zubaida 2009; Lee 2010). To consider the activities in this area in terms of political liberalism, we should employ the Rawlsian discursive sphere of public political forum, which includes, besides the discourses of government officials, discourses of political parties and groups which aim at public offices. In this respect, as discussed earlier, Rawls (1997: 783–784) defends the “wide view of public political culture,” which allows the introduction of religious or nonreligious reasonable comprehensive doctrines into the political discussion provided that, in due course, proper political reasons are provided. Of course, the important point here is to introduce reasonable and not any comprehensive doctrine. Rawls believes that as long as the doctrines are politically reasonable they will not refuse to offer proper public reasons in due course.

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This line of action is not expected from a “fundamentalist” view, if fundamentalism here is understood as a political reference to a particular religious organization in the political domain. Fundamentalist groups, and parties resisting the differentiation of the religious sphere from the political sphere, create a problem for political liberalism, because political liberalism eventually and naturally demands this differentiation by subscribing to the idea of public reason. Accordingly, parties and groups that are explicitly aiming to eradicate other parties and groups or doctrines are also in conflict with the principle of freedom and equality in political liberalism, the very principles without which political reasonableness is not possible. The third form of action in political society, such as demanding the rule of law and legal protection of human and civil rights, is the ideal forms of action according to the wide view of public political culture, even if religious groups are politically organized in order to pursue these goals. Certainly, religious groups might and do invoke religious meanings while undertaking these actions, and this should be perfectly compatible with the general principles of political liberalism and public reason. The area of civil society in Stephan–Haynes model overlaps with the cultural domain of conduct dubbed as the “background culture” by Rawls (1997: 768). This cultural realm stands for the culture of civil society, which is composed of various voluntary organizations. The characteristic feature of the background culture in political liberalism is that the principles of political justice do not directly apply to the internal affairs of these organizations as long as the basic rights and liberties of individuals are protected. Moreover, public reason, whose content is given by the political conception, need not be used by the subjects in the background culture in deliberations and discussions even if those pertain to political issues. The strategies employed by various religious groups of civil society in Muslim societies such as raising awareness, founding educational institutions, forming alliances, mobilizing protests, and sensitizing public opinion through the mass media (Mandaville 2007; Heffner 2005; Kamrava 2005), appear to be sanctioned by the political system and justified in terms of basic rights and liberties.

Islam turns political In the contemporary world, religion continues to play an important role in all three arenas. But a closer look reveals that in the advanced democracies religious activities appear to concentrate in

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the civil society arena while in Muslim contexts religious views are active in both political and civil society arenas (Woodhead and Heelas 2000: 217). In the West, “public” religion in the political society arena emerged particularly after the French Revolution in the form of Catholic counterrevolutionary movements, the political mobilization of religious minorities reacting against other religious or secular movements, the system of Christian Democratic parties after World War II in Catholic and Lutheran countries, and the recent electoral mobilization of the Christian Right in the United States. But Casanova argues that the age of these kinds of reactive movements of “secular-religious and clerical-anticlerical cultural and political warfare” has come to an end, at least in Western Europe: Reactive organicism was the church’s response to the French Revolution as well as to the nineteenth century liberal revolutions, while Catholic action and Christian Democracy were the church’s response to the emergence of secularist and laicist, particularly socialist, mass parties at the turn of the century. Both were defensive reactions to what was rightly perceived as a hostile, modern, secular environment. If the church today no longer seeks to reenter the state through the mobilization of the laity in order to regain control over society, it is to a large extent due to the fact that they no longer feel threatened by a hostile secular state or by hostile social movements. The disappearance of anticlericalism from everyday politics in Catholic countries is perhaps the most telling indicator of this historical transformation. (Casanova 1994: 61–62) According to Casanova, as a result of the absence of threats, the Catholic Church has come to accept the constitutional church–state separation and religious freedoms. More importantly, by abandoning its policy of official Catholic parties, the church has ceased to advance politically ecclesiastical privileges and demands. Thus, “the church appears to have accepted not only disestablishment from the state but also disengagement from political society proper.” But this does not mean that the church has abandoned a public role or become privatized; it only shows that “the public locus of the church is no longer the state of political society but, rather, civil society” (Casanova 1994: 63). The situation in Muslim societies is rather different. The political scene in many such countries is marked with religious parties or organizations which resist the disestablishment and the differentiation

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of religion and seek to gain control over public power. In some cases, organizations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Taliban Afghanistan have succeeded in their pursuit of establishing religion at the state level. In other cases, there are religious political organizations which do not necessarily aim at a theocratic state but seek recognition and power in public life and also defend the religious “life zone” against secularist intrusion. Turkey presents an interesting case. The tension between the secularist establishment and increasingly popular religiously oriented parties has marked politics there since the late 1980s (Erdogan 1999; Yavuz 2000a). The case of Turkey is particularly important because it is the oldest constitutional democracy in the Muslim world, even though it has experienced a number of interruptions. But, in contrast to its Western democratic counterparts, Turkey is characterized by robust religious traditions and organizations that are highly manifest in public life. Most importantly, religion appears to be represented at the political society level by various groups, organizations, and parties.3 Religion that is active in political society does not necessarily translate into a threat to democracy. All Muslim countries present various political activities by religious groups and organizations. There are religious movements and political parties that serve to defend the rights of religious minorities—or, oftentimes, majorities— against the state establishment or other groups within the state, or to demand the rule of law and protection of civil rights for all. On the other hand, there are movements and organizations at the political society level that pursue the transformation of the secular political system into a confessional one.4 Last, there are religious organizations and parties that resist the secularist demands and dispositions of the political regime. This is the most popular representation of religion at the level of political society in most Muslim countries. This robust representation of religion in political society poses a significant challenge to the political liberal prospect. Certainly, political liberalism can accommodate public religion better than its comprehensive liberal and secularist counterparts. But political liberalism also has to take into consideration the issue of fairness and stability in a pluralist setting. Political liberalism cannot be an all-inclusive political regime; it requires political reasonableness from all parties involved in the political association. Political reasonableness is most important in the public political forum, which comprises the discourses of holders of and candidates for political offices. When the discourse of a political party is animated by a particular religious view or identity, it is hard, if not impossible, to secure the approbation of public reason.

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It is even more problematic in the case of this party coming into power. Political liberalism would be troubled by such a prospect. On the other hand, in view of the democratic political culture and reasonable pluralism, there should not be a motivation to establish political parties in order to pursue religious agendas. This does not mean that there cannot be such parties; however, in view of the prevalent political reasonableness in public life, there should not be any need for such mobilization. This is a factual case in many Western democracies where the rights and liberties of religious citizens are protected along with all other citizens, so that political parties cease to actively seek religious agendas. Accordingly, the Christian Democrat parties that were founded after World War II in Europe have lost their “religious” identity and are now engaged in broad-based conservative politics. Then, what explains the difference between public religions in Western and Muslim societies? Why is religious mobilization at the political society level now almost absent in Western democracies, and in contrast prevalent in Muslim societies, including constitutional democracies? In addressing these questions one can employ two different levels of analysis. The first is to consider the religious element, namely the normative content of public religion. In this type of analysis, the political position of religion is taken as granted. In our case, this analysis focuses on the differences between Western and Islamic religion. Proponents of this view would assert the incompatibility of Islam with democracy. As the argument goes, a great majority of Muslim countries are not electoral democracies because Islam is antithetical to democracy. However, the same argument was used for Catholicism in the early 1970s (Casanova 2001). Then, only a quarter of nominally Catholic-majority nations were electoral democracies. But today the numbers have been reversed: three-quarters of those countries are now electoral democracies.5 How to account for this change? Arguments that solely focus on the content of a given religion so as to establish its compatibility with democracy cannot explain this change. The second type of analysis, in contrast, focuses not on religion itself but rather on the characteristics of a political regime that defines the public manifestation of a given religion. In the case of Catholic democratization, this type of analysis emphasizes the change in the policies of political regimes rather than the change in religion itself in explaining this transformation. Recall Casanova’s account of change in the church–state relations in Catholic countries in the second half of the twentieth century. The withdrawal of the church from the political

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scene was a result of the change in political atmosphere, following the political developments that secured religious liberties and diminished threats against the existence of the church posed by hostile secular states and social movements. In view of the Catholic case we might conjecture that religion enters and exits the political scene with a good reason. Perhaps, like any other social entity, public religion reacts to the threat posed by other elements in society and acts accordingly. The contemporary history of the conflict between religion and state suggests that religion tends to react politically especially when the state assumes a secularist position. In contrast to secularization, which is a process, secularism is a determinate policy undertaken by political authorities. Simply put, secularism is a policy of secularization. Policies of secularization transform the empirical theories or historical trends of secularization into prescriptive policies defining how religion ought to behave in public life (Casanova 1994: 38). In modern periods, secularism has been put into practice mainly in two forms. First, it has been applied as a policy of removing the political dominance of a particular religion/faith/denomination so that others can also have a right to exist. This form, which might be called as liberal secularism, mostly fits the Anglo-Saxon experience where secularism had been introduced as part of the political solution to sectarian conflicts. In this form, religion is protected from state intervention and continues to enjoy a significant social influence. This form of secularism is essentially animated by the state neutrality toward diverse religious views. This policy of the state fits naturally in pluralist settings and is very protective of minority views. Usually, it is not objected to by religious citizens, except those who have more fundamentalist aspirations. Consequently, today, liberal secularism is not a major issue of contention between religion and the state. The second form of secularism, in contrast, is outright antireligious and seeks to eliminate the influence of religion in every sphere of social life. Casanova links this form to the “Enlightenment critique of religion,” which he asserts, “was not so much a theoretical statement or an empirical proposition as a practical political program.” In the cases where churches resisted the process of differentiation, this critique “was usually adopted by social movements and political parties, becoming in the process a self-fulfilling prophecy; that once in power those movements and parties tended to translate the theory into applied state policies, in extreme cases enforcing and administering through violent coercion the process of secularization from above” (Casanova 1994: 214). This model originated in France under the policy of laicism, a mode of secularism, which might be called as

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republican secularism, that has been a popular policy in many parts of the Muslim world, from North Africa to Indonesia. The spread of nationalism after the French Revolution evidently helped this form of secularism to prevail around the world. Laicism, often appealing to a comprehensive ideal of autonomy from religion, has substantial implications regarding the public manifestation of religion. Besides the institutional separation of church and state and a communitarian concern for civic unity, laicism also refers to “the promotion by the state of the value of secular autonomy, not only in public deliberation, but also in the conduct of good life” (Laborde 2002: 171). It stands for the forcible “liberation” of society and “emancipation” of the individual from traditional and particularly religious conceptions. Moreover, it attempts to replace those systems through a secular foundation of individual morality. A policy of education interpreted accordingly is seen as crucial to realizing this perfectionist aim. According to a morality handbook produced in the heyday of laicism in France,6 the school should first “educate men and women so that their resolute souls do not subordinate the idea of morality to religious beliefs and are capable of remaining moral without having been or after having ceased to be believers” (Bauberot 1998: 112). Of course, these sorts of explicitly antireligious state policies were not taken lightly by the Catholic Church and led to a religious outcry, the ramifications of which occupied French politics for some time to come. In his seminal essay “Modes of Secularism,” Charles Taylor argues that the logic of independent ethics espoused by republican sort of secularism “lead to the extrusion of religion altogether from the public domain” (Taylor 1998: 35). The state refrains from upholding any religion, pursuing any religious goal, or promoting any religious value. But contrary to the liberal cases, in the case of laicism the state adopts that position not to uphold religious toleration or liberty in order to protect diverse believers but to “emancipate” its citizens from religion. Interestingly, this aggressively secular understanding of “liberalism” was among the most favored political ideologies in non-Western contexts throughout the twentieth century. However, in those areas it was implemented in a totally different form. It was pursued, Taylor maintains, as “the imposition of one metaphysical view over others, and an alien one at that,” and only “in the form of authoritarian programme designed to diminish the hold of religion on the masses” (Taylor 1998: 46). Over time, these sorts of secularist policies have diminished the trust between the state establishment and citizens, and between the citizens of religious and secular inclination. In other words, secularism

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has become a “source of normative conflict” (Yavuz and Esposito 2003). Republican secularism emerged in the twentieth century as one major politically unreasonable doctrine in Muslim societies, and seriously impacted the public manifestation of religion. It has been employed as part of the modernization efforts managed by the Western-educated elite. Religion was seen as a major impediment to the modernization and homogenization of society and was continuously targeted by the political authorities in their attempt to emulate the West, despite the fact that their historical conditions and religious institutionalization were totally different. Secularism in the non-Western context, became a tool of state intrusion. Along the way, not only politics but also education, economy, family structure, dress codes, and so on, were subject to secularist regulations. Evidently, this aggressive form of secularism, even if it is executed in the name of “emancipation” and “liberation,” is problematic. It agitates religious believers and renders religion increasingly political, and thus unreasonable. The more religion is threatened by hostile secularist movements the more political religion becomes. It is a vicious circle: the aggressive secularist aims to extricate religion from public and social life, but over time this policy drags religion ever more into politics. In many Muslim societies where public presence of Islam has always been strong, the secularist worldview and its political agenda have emerged as major impediments to political reasonableness in society. The secularists relentlessly attacked religion, and in turn, religion relentlessly tried to protect itself, and in the process, both views embraced politically unreasonable positions.

The sociology of political liberalism and its implications In light of the foregoing discussion, we might conclude that reconciling conflicting religious and nonreligious comprehensive doctrines in Muslim societies, as would be envisioned by political liberalism, would require nurturing political reasonableness in those societies. Of course this is easier said than done. Such an objective would require an inquiry into the possibility of achieving political reasonableness and the conditions that presumably generate reasonable pluralism. How did reasonable pluralism come about in the West? Rawls’s narrative is sketchy but it emphasizes a few basic themes. The origins of political liberalism can be traced back to the Reformation and its aftermath. In early modern Europe, Christianity, which was of an authoritative, expansionist, and salvationist nature, divided into rival

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views, equally dogmatic and intolerant, in the hands of Luther and Calvin. The wars of religion followed suit. Resting on the conflicting authorities of the church and Bible, there was no possibility of resolution, as none of the warring parties were prepared to compromise their beliefs. This conflict could be moderated in two ways. One was by “circumstance and exhaustion,” which led to a modus vivendi. In the sixteenth century there was no overlapping consensus between Catholics and Protestants on the principle of toleration. Both faiths demanded that rulers should uphold their religious view and suppress others. If there was a practice of toleration, it was not a product of a consensus, but, rather, a circumstantial observance which could have broken down any time. Stability based on a modus vivendi was fragile. The second way was to establish equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. Rawls believes this way, as it was practiced in history, leads to a better possibility of constitutional and even overlapping consensus (Rawls 1996: xxxv, xli). Such liberal principles were first reluctantly incorporated into existing political institutions. They met the immediate necessity of providing and securing some basic rights and liberties. Initially, constitutional consensus was sort of a modus vivendi; it was the only way to end civil conflict. But securing certain rights and liberties takes “those guarantees off the political agenda and puts them beyond the calculus of social interests, thereby establishing clearly and firmly the rules of political contest” (Rawls 1996: 161). Over time, those rights and liberties settled in the political culture and transformed into deeply held values. In general, societies that went through centuries of liberal progress have moved toward political liberalism, since they now enjoy a plurality of worldviews incompatible with each other yet reasonable enough to achieve consensus on the principles of political association. Therefore, Rawls’s empirical thesis comprises two elements: first, it requires a tradition of toleration to grow out of the horrors of religious wars, and, second, a democratic society that comprises diverse and conflicting worldviews and lifestyles, but which had developed a consensual culture thanks to the practice of toleration over centuries. If this is the case, and based on this empirical distinction, we have to rule out every society but some Western and mostly Anglophone democracies. In fact, in some situations only the case of the United States could possibly justify Rawls’s empirical claims. All in all, one can argue that the theoretical structure of political liberalism, along with its normative derivations, cannot and should not fit other societies. Consider Rawls’s taxonomy of societies in his

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treatise The Law of Peoples (2001), his only work pertaining to international affairs. In this work, Rawls classifies societies according to their political cultures. The first type is liberal societies, which are well-ordered liberal democratic societies. The second type is hierarchical societies, which are often religious in nature and not marked by the separation of church and state. Rawls calls this type of society hierarchical because it has political institutions that specify a consultation hierarchy. But it can still be considered as well ordered and just, because, like its liberal counterparts, hierarchical societies are characterized by basic social institutions which represent a conception of justice that expresses a common good. To what extent Rawls’s classification fits the real world is a matter of debate. But the real problem is that The Law of Peoples lacked a vision of social and political transformation from a non-liberal hierarchical society to a liberal society. Rawls did not attempt to speculate on that issue; rather, he focused his interest on the prospect of just relations between the two types of societies. Under these stipulations of political liberalism, Rawls’s idea would hold well in the Western contexts or in the setting of advanced democracies,7 but it is inherently limited when it comes to other contexts. As Samuel Scheffler put it, political liberalism raises the threshold of democracy unfavorably against other societies: If, however, political liberalism appeals in this way to the public political culture of democratic societies, then the justification of liberal principles and institutions that it offers appears to presuppose a society in which liberal values are already well entrenched. It is not clear that political liberalism provides any reason for establishing liberal institutions in societies that do not have liberal traditions. Thus, to put it another way, it is not clear that political liberalism could ever provide the original justification for a society’s liberal institutions. Liberal traditions and institutions must, it seems, precede political liberalism: that is, they must already exist in order to create the conditions that make possible the sort of justification offered by political liberalism. (Scheffler 1994: 20) Scheffler raises a very important point. It appears that Rawls takes the political culture of democratic societies as a given in order to advance his theory. Moreover, as is obvious in Rawls’s historical narrative, that political particular culture appears to be contingent; it belongs to advanced Western democracies, particularly to the United States.

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This makes political liberalism irrelevant for not only non-liberal societies but also for liberalizing and democratizing societies and younger democracies. One line of argument about Political Liberalism is that the work itself should be taken as a description of the normative foundations of democratic culture found in a modern society such as the United States, rather than a moral theoretical endeavor. Therefore, one can argue, it is not plausible—it is even futile—to think of political liberalism in other contexts. However, here I would like to argue against such an all or nothing approach. In my opinion, it is possible to construe the theory of political liberalism so as to allow its normative principles in uncustomary contexts, such as in Muslim societies. One way to achieve this is to employ an analytical approach that would assess the utility of political liberalism vis-à-vis its major components. Accordingly, further examination reveals that Rawls’s enterprise comprises three main components. Historical component The historical narrative of political liberalism depicts the transformative processes of political consensus and political culture. This aspect of the theory emphasizes the presence of a tradition of toleration which grew out of the religious deadlocks and ensuing conflicts in the West. Sociological component This component is mainly marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism. This fact underlies the whole enterprise; it is the empirical core upon which political liberalism is built. Rawls envisions a democratic society which comprises diverse and conflicting worldviews, but one which has developed a consensual political culture. Normative component This part of the theory is a collection of principles of political association in view of reasonable pluralism. These principles, which regulate the political life, are drawn from the socio-political condition of reasonable pluralism. These components are more or less interdependent. The possibility of the normative component is absolutely based upon the existence and support of the sociological component. Political liberalism is not

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an open-ended pluralist liberal project. It has its own logical limits. These limits in turn are fundamentally determined by the fact of reasonable pluralism. In contrast, the connection between the historical and sociological component is much weaker. In Political Liberalism, Rawls’s historical observations do not always appear in relation to the development of democratic culture. They mostly serve to exemplify the success of various consensual attempts and validate some of the notions of political liberalism, especially with regard to the issue of stability. In the text, Rawls appears more straightforward on the characteristics of the political culture of democratic societies than on how that culture came about. For instance, at the outset, Rawls describes how the idea of political liberalism develops as a corollary to democratic culture. He argues that religious toleration is now accepted, and slavery rejected. Few people now defend religious persecution or promote slavery. Thus, Rawls maintains, the aim of the theory of political liberalism is to collect “such settled convictions as the belief in religious toleration and the rejection of slavery and try to organize the basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions into a coherent political conception of justice” (Rawls 1996: 8; emphasis mine). Evidently, Rawls uses “settled convictions” in democratic societies as a point of departure for political liberalism. But how do convictions become settled? Rawls does not elaborate on that process. From Rawls’s narrative it is not clear whether settled convictions generate reasonable pluralism or reasonable pluralism helps such convictions to become settled. Rawls’s account seems to suggest a somewhat equivocal relation between the historical and sociological component. Nevertheless, although sketchy, Rawls’s historical narrative still helps establish the origins of the democratic political culture, at least in the Western context. But does this make political liberalism historically contingent? The answer to this question depends on our view of political liberalism. We may see Rawls’s political liberalism as a political philosophy that uncovers normative principles defining liberal democracy as practiced today in certain pluralist democratic societies, especially in the United States. An interpretation of Rawls’s theory as such would not be wrong. Another way to look at it is to consider political liberalism as an ideal that could be achieved even without that contingent historical experience. The ideal of political liberalism in this case is about defining fair and stable common political principles under which individuals espousing diverse worldviews can live together. In this respect, the ideal of political liberalism is relevant for every society that is facing deep constitutional challenges

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due to moral divisions among the citizenry. Rawls’s theory of political liberalism certainly includes a historical component, but we cannot possibly expect every society to experience that very history in order to achieve political liberalism. Thus, to construe political liberalism in a wider scope, we have to leave the historical component of the theory aside, and focus instead on the other two components. The question at issue here is the degree to which the sociological component of democratic culture is realized in contemporary societies. We cannot plausibly expect every society defined nominally as democratic to sustain the characteristics described by Rawls. Moreover, even if some particular societies now do enjoy such characteristics, this does not guarantee that they will continue to do so. But, more importantly, Rawls’s description of the democratic culture is strongly informed by normative ideals and principles. The sociopolitical condition of reasonable pluralism, the fact of a majority of reasonable doctrines, and the fact of oppression, together denote a certain stage in the life of democratic societies. On the whole, only if those facts come full circle in a society can one speak of the possibility of a political moral conception of justice. An analytical perspective as such, which reconstructs the theory of political liberalism vis-à-vis historical, sociological, and normative components, can help us better assess the value and applicability of political liberalism in contexts other than the customary ones. On the whole, political liberalism represents a novel vision of democracy formed around a narrow-scoped freestanding notion of the political conception of justice, which is specifically designed for pluralist societies. This vision of political life requires a certain political culture which embraces pluralism of reasonable sort. The political moral conception of political liberalism can obtain only if the worldviews that shape the lives of citizens are reasonable in nature, that is, only if citizens see each other as free and equal and are ready to offer each other fair terms of political cooperation, despite the fact they do not agree with each other on every comprehensive moral matter which informs their conceptions of the good life. Thus, if the idea is to achieve a workable scheme of political order for free and equal citizens with different worldviews, reasonableness should be secured. Therefore, even if the politico-sociological condition in a given society falls short of reasonable pluralism, the normative ideal of political liberalism may still inform democratic pursuits and promote reasonable deliberation among individuals in settling their differences on constitutional issues.

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Conclusion Recent literature on the resurgence of religion in the world indicates that, although religious views are increasingly taking public forms, not all public manifestations of religion are inimical to a democratic regime. This is certainly the case for reasonable religious views in Rawls’s sense, which could even strengthen the stability and bolster the legitimacy of the regime by engaging citizens of the faith in the political consensual processes. To assess the role religion plays in the public political arena, I have used a model that divides a polity into three differentiated areas: state, political society, and civil society. I have argued that observing religion at the state level is not very instructive; rather, we should focus especially on the level of political society, since this is the very sphere where contestations to gain control over public power and state apparatus take place. Moreover, actions at the political society level are also important in view of political liberalism, because reasonable political expressions, whether held by religious or nonreligious individuals, groups, and organizations, would eventually have to be in line with public reason. A survey of the relationship between religion and politics shows that in the Muslim contexts, religion is expressed more at the political society level, whereas in the Western and advanced democratic societies the situation is rather different: religion is mostly active at the civil society level, the arena which is not explicitly political and thus poses less of a challenge to political liberalism. The major factor that has produced this difference has been the character of the political regime. In most Muslim societies, where religion is now robust and politicized, the political establishment has adapted secularist policies that aimed to transform the moral structure of the society, eliminate religious institutions, diminish the social and public influence of religion, and often replace religion with a nonreligious and secular creed. Religious citizens naturally reacted to those policies and carried their struggle into the political stage. This was also the case in some Western societies, but after the state abandoned secularist policies and secured religious liberties, religion withdrew from the political scene. Consequently, in those countries, political culture has taken a form that might be branded as reasonable pluralism by Rawls. Therefore, I conclude, if the political establishment in Muslim societies acts in a similar fashion, a comparable result might ensue. This is the stage where the idea of political liberalism becomes highly relevant for Muslim societies. Inclusive normative outlook of

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political liberalism might prove enormously valuable in addressing the constitutional and political issues of the societies that are plagued by religious–secular confrontation. The idea of political liberalism might inform the scope and content of political actions to be taken in those societies in the pursuit of a fair and stable democratic order and reasonable pluralism. Paradoxically, however, this is the area where Rawls is least explicit. The theoretical structure of political liberalism is based on the possibility of reasonable pluralism. Without reasonable pluralism, Rawls’s idea fails. Rawls presents historical reasons to explain how reasonable pluralism had become a fact of democratic culture in Western societies. But the historical experience of Muslim societies was rather different. We cannot possibly expect those societies to repeat Western historical experience so as to achieve reasonable pluralism. Therefore, given that the normative outlook of political liberalism is appealing but the historical account presented by Rawls is contingent, we have no choice but to reconsider the sociological component of the theory. Since the socio-political condition of reasonable pluralism underlies the normative foundation of political liberalism, we need to address the question of generating reasonable pluralism in those societies. Accordingly, the following chapters will focus on two historical liberal proposals in particular, the political toleration of religion and the impartiality of the state toward religious views, which, I believe, are not only instructive in dealing with issues regarding religion and politics but also conducive to reasonable pluralism provided that they are embraced at the state level. By putting these policies into action, societies that have not gone through the historical experiences of their Western counterparts might presumably still achieve reasonable pluralism, and, eventually, political liberalism.

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Tolerating religion

This chapter presents a view of political toleration conducive to generating political reasonableness in Muslim societies that are subject to religious–secular confrontation. Toleration is a multifaceted concept and should be treated accordingly in order to make sense of it in political contexts. To this aim, the chapter first surveys the concept of toleration as it is understood in political theory, assesses its role in overcoming moral conflicts, and analyzes conditions that facilitate toleration. Second, it focuses on the political value of toleration. Here, it mainly argues that the distinct nature of toleration and the trust it requires among individuals and groups eventually necessitate the involvement of political authority. In many cases, toleration can be embraced by conflicting groups only if the state provides a helping hand. Toleration, in this respect, refers to a principle governing political practice—hence the notion of political toleration. This understanding of political toleration has marked the liberal tradition and it continues to do so. Later, the chapter focuses on one of the earliest and most systematic expressions of political toleration in the history of political thought: John Locke’s theory of toleration. It presents an analysis of Locke’s major ideas and the justifications he put forward for political toleration. Finally, in the last section, the chapter assesses Locke’s ideas vis-à-vis political liberalism, and conjectures upon the utility of Locke’s political toleration in addressing the question of political reasonableness in contemporary Muslim societies.

Aspects of toleration The idea of toleration has a long history. It has been embraced by various traditions and expressed in various forms. In political philosophy, it is the liberal tradition that has been particularly associated with the notion of toleration. Since the seventeenth century, the notion served

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as one of the major political concepts that helped the liberal tradition guarantee certain liberties to individual members of society. Earlier, in the wake of religious wars, the idea served mainly as a framework for the protection of minority religious views. Later, it evolved into a more comprehensive concept, addressing various issues of liberty and promoting a more permissive attitude toward different lifestyles, not only in religious life but in other areas of public and social life. Toleration is a multifaceted concept. As part of ethics, toleration is perceived as a virtue. The term “tolerance” is usually employed to signify the ethical aspect of toleration. In this sense, tolerance refers to the virtue of permitting disapproved practices.1 The need for toleration arises when an individual or group sees certain practices or beliefs of other individuals and groups as “blasphemously, disastrously, obscenely wrong” (Williams 1986: 18). The potential of conflict obtains significance when the group that despises others is in the majority or is more powerful. In most cases, toleration involves a power relationship and the powerful is expected to restrain its opposition to the practices and beliefs of the weak, if not wholeheartedly accepting them. Thus, toleration entails that even if individuals or groups disagree and disapprove of each other’s practices and beliefs, they continue to recognize each other’s full membership in a given social system (Scanlon 1996). But toleration as such is an “elusive” virtue (Heyd 1996). Individuals, although they share certain common principles, such as the respect for persons, have different reasons and motivations for toleration, and these differences usually define the practice and scope of toleration. For instance, toleration would have a different significance for a religious and a secular person. The value of tolerance for the former derives from a divine command, while the latter embraces tolerance for secular reasons (Horton 1996). Technically, one is not counted as tolerant of something that one approves of or is indifferent toward. Toleration has to involve a negative judgment of the tolerated conduct, which shows as an inclination to prohibit an act (Valdes 1997: 127). Succinctly put, “indifference is not toleration, because it makes no sense to speak of tolerating things one has no view about;” similarly, “skepticism is not toleration, because it makes no sense to speak of tolerating things that one does not think can convincingly be shown to be wrong;” and, “broadmindedness is not toleration, because, it makes no sense to speak of tolerating things that one thinks are all right” (Vernon 1997: 71).2 Accordingly, toleration or a tolerant attitude implies that one has the power to prohibit or interfere with a certain type of conduct but chooses not to do so.

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Tolerating religion 69 Toleration as such is different from enduring or suffering. It requires an ability to prohibit an act. In religious cases, “we may be said to tolerate only in circumstances where, although we disapprove of the heterodox religion, and although we have the power to persecute, we nevertheless refrain” (Mendus 1989: 9). However, not all cases of restraint are instances of toleration. The restraint in question has to be motivated by an appropriate reason. On the other hand, since permissiveness or broadmindedness is not considered to be toleration, toleration might involve some degree of interference. For instance, one can merely attempt to dissuade a person from engaging in the disapproved conduct by using reasonable arguments. This sort of behavior is consistent with the idea of toleration. Conversely, the attempt to prohibit the conduct or prevent the agent from engaging that conduct using physical coercion is utterly against the idea of toleration. Thus, a tolerant attitude is a matter of degree (of interference) depending on the circumstances and also the intent. Society might employ various disincentives to deter disapproved conducts; in these cases the degree and intent of disincentives determine whether toleration is involved or not (Horton 1998). Thus far I have been discussing the virtue of toleration as a personal or group attitude. Few would deny the value of toleration and its role in generating and sustaining social harmony and unity. The burning question is, of course, how to achieve toleration. In the modern diverse societies of our age, it is impossible to prevent moral tensions and conflicts,3 although advising toleration to individuals and groups may have a certain effect. The success of this depends on the power and authority of the advising agent. In addition, the elusiveness of toleration—for the limits and scope of toleration are subject to the reasons held by the tolerating agents—always limits toleration overall. These limits to toleration on individual and group level do not mean that toleration is unattainable. In fact, under the right circumstances and for the right reasons toleration can overcome moral boundaries and barriers. Therefore, one way, and perhaps the most effective way, to achieve toleration is to create the circumstances that would reasonably generate incentives for it. A quick reflective exercise on the nature of toleration may show us which incentives could work. Toleration, as described above, involves restraining the inclination to prohibit disapproved beliefs and acts. For a person X to be tolerant, there should be good reasons to inhibit that inclination. The first thing that comes to mind is the very existence of the subject. If X’s existence is threatened by the act or belief in question, it is not reasonable to expect toleration from X. Second, even if the disapproved acts and beliefs do not

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threaten the very existence of X, they might still deprive X of certain rights or privileges. In this case, it very likely that X would object to those acts and beliefs merely out of a rational impulse.4 Since toleration is a social practice, it also involves mutual feelings between subjects. In most cases, X’s practice of toleration would very much depend on Y’s response. Initially X’s toleration of Y’s acts and beliefs would not threaten or deprive X, but later they could. Then, for X to embrace toleration, he should be assured of a balanced response from Y. Therefore, rational calculations in the practice of toleration eventually raise the problem of trust among parties: Toleration surely requires at least a minimal level of trust. Since toleration makes us vulnerable to others, “we” have to trust “them” not to take advantage of our willingness to cooperate. If the two sides cannot trust each other at all, then they cannot form even the distant relationship that mere tolerance demands [. . .] Trust, however, is rational only if we can reasonably expect to gain something from it—or at least, if we do not have to sacrifice too much for it. (Dees 1998: 83) Trust between parties is a decisive condition in the practice of toleration. However, it is not only defined by convictions of the subjects. It is also a product of permissive social conditions which help it flourish between the subjects. Thus, the cost-benefit calculus of X would always be influenced by X’s conviction on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the social system which distributes rights and privileges.5 Accordingly, if the system can secure a fair and just distribution of rights and privileges, then trust to the system would lead to an increase in toleration. Toleration among groups involves similar dynamics. The big difference between individual-level and group-level issues is that in the latter the toleration stakes are naturally much higher. While the tension among individuals could be resolved within the group, the tensions among groups tend to spread and become exacerbated, and they are extremely difficult to settle. In group-level conflicts, an outside authority, such as the state, is usually expected to intervene in the conflict and adjudicate between the groups. Here, as in individuallevel conflicts, the degree of toleration among groups depends on the groups’ level of trust in each other. If the groups do not trust each other, the likelihood of toleration will be low. Again, as in individuallevel conflicts, trust in a supra-group authority, such as the state, may

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Tolerating religion 71 compensate for the lack of intragroup trust. Where such trust exists, the groups may accept the mediating power of the state—if they can— and resort to toleration since they now feel assured that they would not be disadvantaged or compromised. Questions of toleration arise whenever an individual or a group attempts to interfere with or suppress the behavior and practices of other people considered objectionable or disapprovable. Conversely, questions of toleration also break out when individuals or groups resist other people’s interference with and control over their own behavior. Such questions acquire a political dimension when the standoff between the two contrasting parties cannot find a spontaneous accommodation within society, whether via tolerance or via repression. If neither party gives in, then the political authority is called in, in order to resolve the conflict. Questions of toleration are directly political when the interfering party is the government itself or a political agent (Galeotti 1997: 224). Then, in the final analysis, tolerance eventually requires a hand from the state. In other words, toleration sooner or later assumes a political nature. We cannot totally rule out the possibility of toleration among individuals and groups even if the state does not particularly promote toleration. Individuals and groups might value and practice toleration as a moral or religious duty without appealing to the mediating power of the state. Certainly, in modern societies where the values and principles of democracy are well established, toleration often becomes a natural reflex or habit, thanks to generations of the practice of toleration and the high level of trust it generated among people. However, this culture of toleration did not come about without pain. In the West, toleration emerged after a period of religious wars, regime changes, prolonged group conflicts, and a brutal phase of negotiation and bargaining between political and religious institutions. The transformation of state policies of religion and faith played a quintessential role in securing toleration throughout Western society. In other exemplary periods of toleration, such as the period of the early Islamic states, and particularly the Ottoman “millet system,”6 the state played a crucial role in establishing the foundation of interreligious toleration which lasted over generations—later, mostly without active state involvement. If the political system is not considered as legitimate, efficient, or fair, or representing these characteristics altogether, then it is unlikely for groups to resort to toleration so as to resolve a conflict. The position held by the state may further aggravate the situation, dragging the conflict into the dangerous territory of social disorder and eventually

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civil war. This is exactly what happened during the bloody religious wars in Europe, and many other conflicts in modern history. In these cases, society was divided into opposing camps that would never consider compromise or reconciliation, and that would always invoke political power to suppress their opponents in the name of some creed, ideology, or ethnic claim. The more the state was involved as a party in a conflict, the more brutal the conflict became. In Western political thought, the fact that political power becomes a catalyst for prolonged conflict led political thinkers of liberal orientation to devise ways to limit state involvement in such conflicts. The policy of toleration was among the earliest and most popular expression of this new wave of thinking. What signifies this conception of toleration is its political characteristic. Tolerance had been accepted as a moral virtue, but if the masses do not or cannot practice toleration then what is its use? If toleration is formulated rather as a policy to be upheld by the state, the early proponents argued, this would exclude state power from the political calculus of religious conflicts, neutralize the biggest obstacle—the state, and, indirectly, the state-sponsored church—and boost tolerance throughout the society. Toleration, in this respect, referred to a principle governing political practice and involved more “vertical” rather than “horizontal” toleration.7 In its initial stage, political toleration took the form of religious toleration, which was “a governmental response to religious dissent or diversity in society, a response that eschews coercion and extends legal protections to adherents of non-mainstream religious groups” (Murphy 2001: x). This understanding of political toleration marked the liberal tradition and it continues to do so.

Lockean politics of toleration Liberal political philosophy owes John Locke (1632–1704) a great deal since Locke systematically, and for the first time, introduced the major ideas and principles of liberal public order. Locke rejected absolute authority and established political legitimacy as to be essentially based on the consent of the governed. Locke is also among the foremost theorists of political toleration. Throughout his intellectual career, Locke employed a plethora of arguments in favor of political toleration, ranging from the pragmatic to theological, and continued to be part of toleration debates until his death. In his first important work on political toleration, An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), Locke proffered an ambiguous line of justification for toleration. In this essay, he amalgamated theological and secular ideas,

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Tolerating religion 73 and authoritarian and libertarian traits (Wootton 2003). The text is generally accepted as a representation of Locke’s early thought and was overshadowed by his mature works. Later in his life, deeply involved in the political conflicts of the time and subsequently exiled for a while, Locke went through a dramatic intellectual transformation and presented his reformed ideas on political legitimacy in his anonymously published Treatises of Government (1689), and political toleration in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Locke later followed up the issue of toleration with three more letters (the last unfinished), aiming to rebut his critic Jonas Proast. Since then the Letter8 (2003 [1689]) has been considered among the principal works on toleration in the history of political thought, and it continues to inspire heated theoretical debates today.9 Locke wrote the Letter at a tumultuous time in the history of England, which was marked with memories of the English Revolution and struggles of the Restoration, incessant contestations between religion and the political authority, and a power struggle between parliament—more precisely, the House of Commons—and the Crown. The period was characterized by serious worries about the regime and political authority, shared by Locke and other likeminded thinkers and politicians (Scott 2000: ch. 7). First among these was the “fear of popery,” namely the fear of counterreformation, which was a constant worry in seventeenth-century England. Because of the particular royal, foreign, and domestic policies pursued throughout the 1670s, this fear turned into a fear for Protestantism in England. Consequently, anti-Catholicism emerged as a powerful ideology influencing all sorts of intellectual and political agendas. This fear was aggravated by the prospect of having a Catholic monarch after Charles II, that is, James II. Linked to these worries were the “fear for parliaments,” or in other words, fear of arbitrary government. For the intellectuals of the period, absolutism and Catholicism were part of the same dreadful predicament. These sentiments against Catholicism and absolutism, and the worries about Protestantism and the parliament, had underlain the foundations of Locke’s Letter. In the Letter, Locke combined a distinct political philosophy of the liberal origin with a well-illustrated sociology and psychology of religion and the religious mind, along with some theological arguments in the background. With one such theological argument Locke starts the Letter: “I esteem that toleration to be chief characteristic mark of the true Church” (Locke 2003: 390). His justification of this thesis was quite a radical and controversial take on the issue of religion at the time: “everyone is orthodox to himself.” If this assertion is

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accepted, then it is deduced that striving for power in the name of faith or the orthodoxy of the faith just does not sensibly serve the point, since, at the end, everyone still remains orthodox to himself. Thus, for a religious person who is cognizant of this fact, toleration in the affairs of religion appears to be a logical choice. But Locke also argues that toleration of those that differ in religion and faith is in accordance with the gospels and the “genuine reason of mankind” (Locke 2003: 393). Those who cannot acknowledge this value of toleration are “destitute of charity, meekness, and good-will in general towards all mankind,” Locke asserts. Accordingly, the “true church,” in this respect, is not about acquiring external power or ecclesiastical dominion, or applying compulsive force, but about regulating the lives of individuals “according to the rules of virtue and piety” (Locke 2003: 390). These ideas put forward by Locke at the outset constitute the heart of his theory of political toleration. The power of his arguments in the rest of the Letter is essentially based on the assertions he begins with in the Letter. Here Locke defines his view of true religion using ideas that could be considered quite unconventional at the time. First is the subjectivity of orthodoxy in faith. Locke holds that it is impossible to assert absolute orthodoxy on the matters of faith because there is no way to confirm this through human means. Locke’s view in this respect is not about religious skepticism.10 Rather, he takes issue with ecclesiastical institutions that claim a monopoly on the orthodoxy of faith. One can argue, based on his other writings, that Locke would not go that far—as far as being blamed for skepticism—if those very institutions that determine orthodoxy did not use compulsion and force or strive for power in order to prove their position. Locke seems to be more concerned with the extreme form of religion in the hands of powerful individuals and institutions than orthodoxy of faith. The latter, in the form of the subjectivity of orthodoxy, is employed to prohibit the former. For Locke the true religion should not involve power, compulsion, and force. Rather, religion is about virtue, piety, and toleration. Locke’s view of political toleration is based on these initial assumptions. Locke presents his arguments in such a way that only if these characteristics of true religion are embraced can his theory be persuasive and practical. This brings us to the question of the extent to which Locke’s ideas are in accord with the conventional understandings of Christianity. In his influential work on Locke, John Dunn (1969) claimed that Locke’s thought depends heavily on Christian assumptions that were commonplace in Locke’s era. That is why Locke’s idea

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Tolerating religion 75 of toleration extended only to religious toleration but not beyond. Thus, Dunn claims, once we see how these assumptions are integrated in Locke’s thought, we see how difficult it is to establish their relevancy for contemporary problems.11 Jeremy Waldron also makes a similar point in his recent work (2002), in which he claims Locke embedded Christian ideas in his works using different concepts in different contexts. The Christian characteristic of Locke’s Letter cannot be denied, and to that extent I agree with these authors. As Andrew Murphy mentions, “both sides in seventeenth-century toleration debates saw themselves as Christians, and scriptural ‘bombs’ were dropped equally vigorously by both sides” (Murphy 2001: 210). However, I believe the idea that Locke’s Letter is overwhelmingly based on Christian assumptions is misleading. When we put Locke’s ideas into context, it is hard to see how an assertion such as “everyone is orthodox to himself” was Christian. Certainly Locke employed many ideas from the gospels, but mainly to prove his point. He argued that toleration is not only agreeable to the gospels but also to the “genuine reason of mankind.” Reason in this context is no different to that which Locke uses in the Second Treatise as the law of nature, which governs the nature of human relations. The origin of reason goes back to God, but its application is to everyone regardless of their faith (Locke 2003: 263).12 Moreover, the orthodoxy of Locke’s Christian ideas is also dubious. As John Coffey maintains, Locke’s rejection of the Augustinian justification of political control of religion and his conception of the state are decisive and revolutionary (Coffey 2000: 55). The radical position that Locke held was also reflected in his ideas about religion in general. All in all, in the face of ongoing religious and political conflicts in his era, Locke envisioned a form of political order under which diverse and conflicting views could live together without bringing social chaos and threatening the overall stability. Accordingly, he developed an account of religion which is compatible with this view, but not always in accord with the religious views of the time. His vision of political toleration presented a set of political actions and institutionalization which would help realize that political order. Locke’s view of political toleration brings about a separation of church and state affairs. It is necessary, Locke argues, “to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other” in order to put an end to controversies surrounding religion and state (Locke 2003: 393). The premise of this argument is that there are particular

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duties and functions to be exercised by proper institutions but this has not been done as such, hence the ongoing controversies. In this case, care for the souls must be in the interest of individuals and care for the commonwealth in the interest of the government. According to Locke, the commonwealth, or in modern terms, the polity, is constituted, visà-vis the Second Treatise, on the basis of “procuring, preserving, and advancing” the civil interests of the citizens. These interests include life and liberty, and property. The duty of the government in this respect is to observe this very foundation of its constitution and ensure by the execution of the law that the civil interests of the subjects are protected. The jurisdiction of the political authority is set as such, and the power of the political authority is confined to the promotion of these interests and nothing beyond these “civil concernments” (Locke 2003: 394). A church, on the other hand, is a voluntary society joined by individuals as they see fit with their understanding of religion and conception of salvation. A church is a free and voluntary society13 in the sense that nobody is born a member of a church, and so nobody is naturally bound to any particular church. The end of a religious society organized around these voluntary churches “is the public worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life” (Locke 2003: 394). Accordingly, the business of the religious institutions is to focus on salvation but not on worldly and civil matters, be it worldly power, force, goods, property, and so on. The latter areas, Locke asserts, belong to the authority of the state. It is important to see why Locke proposes a radical separation of state and religious affairs in order to achieve his vision of true religion. If the problem was a deviation from the true religion, could he not suggest moderation in the public manifestation of religion even if political and religious authorities were intertwined? To understand why Lockean toleration took the form of the separation principle we should look at the context that informed Locke’s views. At the time Locke had been streamlining his thought on toleration, namely, roughly the period from his authoring An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667) to A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), the debate on toleration was fully unfolded. The case for intolerance at the time rested on the claim that toleration as a policy would bring disorder to political and social life. A corollary to this argument was that religion has to be under the control of political authority for the sake of keeping the faith (Anglican/Protestant) intact against the attack by Dissenters and more importantly by the Catholic Church in Rome. Accordingly, the Anglican Church, which was the state church and the king its leader, took a strongly anti-tolerationist stance on this basis. This “ecclesiastical” strand of intolerance was articulated by

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Tolerating religion 77 Samuel Parker in his infamous pamphlet, entitled A Discourse in the Ecclesiastical Polity (1669), in which he took a Hobbesian position and argued that as the demand for religious conscience “poses a clear source of challenge to the Sovereign, maintaining political stability required the Sovereign to have absolute authority, including ecclesiastical power to impose religious doctrines” (Chen 1998: 173–174). Locke took a critical stand against this “ecclesiastical argument” as early as it appeared, in one of his early commentaries on Parker’s work (1670) where he exclaimed “How far is this short of Mr. Hobbes’s doctrine?” (Locke 1997: 214). By adopting the separation principle in the Letter, Locke both responds to concerns laid in the intolerance argument and presents a systematic objection to it. A major concern expressed by Parker was that so long as religious sects compete for political power in order to advance their respective doctrines, instability will be caused by such attempts. To maintain stability in such a situation, diversity has to be rooted out and homogeneity imposed by force. This solution, however, carries great risk, as Selina Chen points out, because it would “not only mean the loss of freedom, but also give the magistrate carte blanche to use his powers for any purpose without penalty” (Chen 1998: 181). Locke’s proposal of separating political power from religious authority, on the other hand, “contains the potential that religious conflict has for political disruption without, at the same time, suppressing religious freedom,” and thus defines the boundaries of legitimate religious belief in a way which renders it harmless to civil concerns (Chen 1998: 181). Thus, “under Locke’s solution, the diversity of religious belief is no longer a barrier to peace indeed the attempt to impose conformity by forceful means where diversity exists is not apt to destroy the public peace and the legitimacy of political authority” (Chen 1998: 181–182). In the Letter, Locke is very emphatic about the faults of intertwining political power and religious authority. His concerns are expressed as above in his attempt to rebut Parker’s argument of intolerance: namely the danger of political power going beyond its mandate for the sake of imposing a particular understanding of religion. This side of the argument clearly arises out of the concern that political authority might use religion for its own ends. The flipside of the argument arises out of the concern of the possibility of the defenders of a particular religion using political power for their own ends: [I]t is worthy to be observed and lamented that the most violent of these defenders of the truth, the opposers of errors, the exclaimers against schism do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God, with

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Tolerating religion which they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the civil magistrate on their side. But so soon as ever court favour has given them the better end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves the stronger, then presently peace and charity are to be laid aside. Otherwise they are religiously to be observed. (Locke 2003: 402–403)

When religious zeal is coupled with political power, this not only influences the public manifestation of a given faith and renders it farther from the true meaning of religion, but also makes it dangerous for others who do not share that faith. Consequently, conflicts that initially carry a religious characteristic turn into something more political, and thus become more pervasive. Locke is equally concerned with deviation from the proper conduct by both political and religious authorities, for political and religious ends. For Locke, then, the use of political power by political authority for religious ends and religious authority for political ends produce the same predicament: obstructing the possibility of toleration, and thus inhibiting manifestation of the true nature of religion in society. Therefore, Locke holds, separation of political and religious authority is the key to securing political stability and social peace in his society. In view of his account of true religion, Locke devises the principle of separation in a way that defines the legitimate boundaries of conduct for both political authority and religious institutions. His justification for political power remaining separate from religious affairs consists of three ideas. First, Locke argues, “the care of souls,” which is the raison d’être of religion, cannot belong to the jurisdiction of a political authority more than any other person. Locke presents one theological and one secular argument to prove this point. According to the former, we do not have evidence that God has given any such authority to any person over another to impose a religion, including political authority. According to the latter, nobody would ever consent to give such an authority to the state, because “no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of any other, whether prince of subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace” (Locke 2003: 394). This is an expression of the consent theory, a recurring theme in the political writings of Locke. Locke articulates this theory in his Second Treatise, as the foundation of a political society: “Men being, as has been said, by nature free, equal, and independent, no one can be out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent” (Locke 2003: 309). The premise of natural equality that defines the theory of

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Tolerating religion 79 consent prohibits people, including the political authority, from interfering with the salvation of another person. Therefore, the political authority’s use of force to impose a religion is illegitimate, because no one had consented, and would ever consent, to such treatment. The second reason Locke presents for the need for political authority to refrain from the care of souls is that true religion involves “the inward and full persuasion of the mind” while political power can “consist in only in outward force” (Locke 2003: 395). According to Locke, outward force is not capable of penetrating the realm of the inward; thus, no manifestation of political power can possibly secure the salvation of the soul. Moreover, and as a third reason, even if the political authority tries to convince minds by use of force and penalties, Locke maintains that this will not help bring salvation. This argument of Locke has been at the center of a recent debate. Jeremy Waldron insists that, by using this argument, Locke provides a rationalist and pragmatist justification and disregards the moral aspect of toleration. “The argument,” Waldron contends, “is about the irrationality of coercive persecution and it entails nothing that sort of activity ought not to be undertaken. Nothing is entailed about the positive value of religious or moral diversity” (Waldron 1988: 76). Waldron also maintains that outward force might sometimes compel individuals to believe in a particular faith. But, he continues, Locke is only playing at being rational and is not so much interested in the fate of the persecuted. “If only we can show,” Waldron concludes, “that toleration is irrational we may be excused from the messy business of indication why it is wrong” (Waldron 1988: 86). Waldron’s arguments have stirred a controversy and generated several responses.14 The central claim of these, with which I agree, is that Waldron overly focuses on the rationality of Locke’s argument and ignores the larger point behind it. It is sufficient to quote Locke’s words to summarize his larger theory of toleration and respond to Waldron: It is not diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion. (Locke 2003: 431) Here, Locke is primarily trying to establish good reasons for the state not to interfere in religious affairs. He presents his case around the

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notion of salvation and shows that it is by nature out of the political realm. It is important to note that the first argument he presents is the consent theory. For Locke, it is incomprehensible for someone to put his salvation in absolute manner into somebody else’s hands, be it a neighbor or a king. Following this consent argument, he draws attention to the inwardness of belief and outwardness of force, and the contradiction between them. The prevalent tone of the argument here is again prescriptive, invoking the legitimate boundaries between natural liberties and political authority. Locke asserts that “the magistrate’s power extends not to establishing any articles of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force without penalties, and penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind” (Locke 2003: 395; emphasis mine). Locke is aware of the fact that “the rigour of laws and the force of penalties” can eventually convince and change people’s minds, but he firmly believes that their use toward this aim is improper. He simply does not believe that true religion and salvation can be reached if people “quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own consciences, and blindly resign themselves up to the will of their governors” (Locke 2003: 396). Having stated that salvation is not a business of political authority, Locke continues to further illustrate the idea of separation and presents a set of principles which should define the boundaries between church and state. The emphasis of Locke’s arguments is again mostly on the conduct of the state. He has good reasons for this position: “To speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the Church (if a convention of clergymen, making canons, must be called by that name) is for the most part apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by the Church” (Locke 2003: 409). Moreover, Locke argues, political power is the same everywhere, despite the fact that there are multiple sovereigns in the world. If every sovereign claims power over religion, this will invite endless conflicts not only over the boundaries, but also within the boundaries, because “every prince is orthodox to himself”, and so the claim of orthodoxy in this sense does not make a logical sense. On the matters of religion and salvation, the state has no legitimate power to interfere, because the state “once permitted to introduce anything into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds to it” (Locke 2003: 416). Thus, the burden of toleration mostly falls on the political authority. In this respect, Locke advocates that the state ought to tolerate religious societies, because the business of these associations is no more than the care for the soul. Accordingly, the state has no say in the regulation of religious rites

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Tolerating religion 81 or ceremonies, or preaching and profession that could be branded as “speculative opinions,” because these are to be considered as internal affairs of religion and not as matters of civil interest. Similarly, the state is in no position to judge whether a religious doctrine is orthodox or not. Locke also envisions a form of tolerant religion that would correspond to his vision of political order and political toleration. The principle of separation of political and religious affairs Locke subscribes to provides religious institutions and movements with a greater amount of freedom and autonomy by prohibiting state interference. By the same token, the very principle also requires the church to stay out of political affairs and resist the temptation of political power. In a religious institution “nothing ought nor can be transacted [. . .] relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods,” Locke exclaims. Churches must not use force or compulsion, because these sorts of things are not suitable to the nature of religion; they should be armed rather by “exhortations, admonitions, and advices” (Locke 2003: 399). The church has authority on matters of faith, so it may form its own membership around the principles it espouses, and determine the limits of conduct in its own sphere. But the church’s authority has no say in the matters of citizenship. One may belong to a church or not, but the value of citizenship is independent from one’s religious membership. By the same token, individuals’ religiosity is equally independent of political membership. Finally come the limits to political toleration. Locke asserts that “no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate” (Locke 2003: 425). If this point is juxtaposed with Locke’s maxim that “the public good is the rule and measure of all law-making” (Locke 2003: 411), it is clear that Locke is aiming to protect the good of political society no matter what, since, vis-à-vis the Second Treatise, one cannot think of enjoying religious liberty, or for that matter any liberty, without securing the foundation of political society. In this respect, one may argue that Locke is “only willing to tolerate politically acceptable religions” (Tuckness 2002: n. 3). But one must not also forget that in most of the Letter Locke is trying to define and delimit the jurisdiction of political power with regard to religion and religious affairs. Second, Locke does not grant toleration to those who “deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince,” and to atheists for their lack of moral integrity. The former group constitutes especially the Catholics of the time and Locke’s conviction in

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this respect reflects the prevalent anti-Catholic sentiment in his era. The case for the latter group reflects the sentiment against disbelievers at a time when their existence was somewhat incomprehensible. It is strange to deny toleration15 as such when one can utter “if we may openly speak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion” (Locke 2003: 431). Perhaps, as Rawls put it once in one of his early essays, Locke advocated a limited toleration on the basis of what he supposed “were clear and evident consequences for the security of public order,” but more experience would have changed his mind (Rawls 1999: 92).

From political toleration to political liberalism Problems of political toleration arise when the circumstances of toleration involve the state as one among the principal agents. Accordingly, when the political authority “is faced with the question as to whether certain kinds of practices or behavior are entitled to noninterference or protection by the state” (Galeotti 1993: 586), the issue of political toleration takes center stage. A state is said to embrace the political virtue of toleration when the political arrangements and institutional design embody toleration, which would effectively prescribe legitimate public actions and prohibit state interference in certain social areas. Thus, as a definitive state policy, toleration emerges as a standard of conduct, defining the nature of political relations and affairs, and shaping political culture. Political toleration might even come to define the constitution of a state. Rawls’s political liberalism in this respect is an embodiment of the idea of political toleration expressed through the notion of neutrality, which prescribes the state not to take part in the religious, moral, or cultural differences that divide its citizens. Political liberalism locates the differences in private, social, and domestic spheres and maintains equal treatment of the citizens in the public political sphere. Accordingly, the state should neither favor nor disfavor comprehensive doctrines of the good embraced by its citizens, and it should not give positive or negative preferences to institutions, persons, or groups simply because of the conceptions of the good life they represent or espouse. There are obvious differences and similarities on the view of political toleration between the early and contemporary liberal theories as such, but here I do not intend to present a comparative analysis. Rather, I would like to think of these two lines of thought as

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Tolerating religion 83 complementing each other. Compared with the early liberal expressions of political toleration, the neutral outlook subscribed to by contemporary political liberalism goes beyond the conventional understanding of toleration. As Steven Lukes put it, “one could say that for classical liberalism the problem of toleration was how to live with those who sincerely lived by what it took to be erroneous conceptions of the good and true; while for contemporary liberalism the problem is how to live with an irreconcilable plurality of such conceptions, none of which can be shown to be uniquely rational” (Lukes 1997: 215). Thus, the idea of political liberalism is more comprehensive, but also more demanding. The understanding of political morality invoked by political liberalism presents a two-pronged challenge: it requires toleration both by the state and its citizens. The state has to represent a neutral policy toward conflicting moral worldviews and be in accord with a political conception of justice that emerges out of an overlapping consensus. But for this system to work in the first place, the citizens have to embrace toleration to the extent that they can attain political reasonableness. In contrast to political liberalism, the classical liberal outlook of political toleration, such as Locke’s, puts the burden primarily on the political authority. The early liberal thinkers had to prioritize political solutions over others because of the pressing needs of social and public order in the face of imminent threats of social dissolution, chaos, and violence. In this respect, the state in the early liberal expressions of toleration is less than neutral. The state adopts a “libertarian” principle of political toleration where it permits the practice of various comprehensive doctrines—more precisely religions, mainstream or not. This policy of the state does not indicate approval or disapproval of any particular religion; it simply recognizes the freedom of its citizens, and prohibits the state from interfering with this freedom. By the same token, the state can also restrict this freedom on the basis of the very recognition of this freedom, but the burden of proof is on the state wherever it would restrict individual liberties (Audi 2000: 32–33). Therefore, the form of political toleration in the early liberal thought is a sort of proto-neutrality, while the contemporary expression of political toleration in political liberalism has achieved a rather sophisticated form along with the consensual foundation of political morality that would define all the contours of public and political life. While there is a difference of scope and depth between two forms of toleration as such, there is also a theoretical and practical relationship between the two strands. This relationship is most obvious regarding the notion of political reasonableness, which is of

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central importance in political liberalism. A politically reasonable person is already tolerant, because she recognizes others’ freedom and equality. Reasonable persons acknowledge that other persons might affirm moral ideas different from their own. Thus, they are ready to offer fair terms of cooperation upon which other reasonable persons can agree. As we have seen above, Rawls takes the pluralism of reasonable people as a fact of democratic political culture and establishes his theory upon this fact. Thus, theoretically, Rawls does not have to deal with the question of how doctrines become politically reasonable as he is convinced that majority of those doctrines in liberal democratic societies have already achieved political reasonableness. But, he also mentions the historical and intellectual achievements of the past few centuries which created those very circumstances that would allow political liberalism. Undoubtedly, the practice of political toleration played a paramount role in generating this liberal political culture. Thus, one can reasonably surmise a causal relationship between political toleration and political reasonableness. The existence of political reasonableness in this respect denotes prior practices of political toleration. Any attempt to establish toleration within a society should naturally lead to political reasonableness. Achieving toleration in a society, on the other hand, eventually requires a hand from the state. The state has to be active either in creating the circumstances of toleration or in directly adopting the policy of toleration. Therefore, political toleration practically precedes political liberalism. This practical relationship between political toleration and political liberalism also extends to the problem I have pointed at the end of the previous chapter. There I argued that secularist policies undertaken by political authorities in many Muslim societies have transformed Islam over time into a matter of political contention. This has not only stripped Islam of its true character and rendered it overly political, but also diminished the likelihood of democracy and a common ground of political consensus between now hostile secular and religious fronts. In some Western nations, similar policies produced similar reactions from religious individuals, groups, and organizations, but upon the abandonment of such policies and provision of religious liberty by the state, religion withdrew from the arena of political contestation. Therefore, a similar outcome might be expected in Muslim societies where religion is robust and now political, if the state retreats from those secularist policies and instead moves in a more inclusive direction.

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Tolerating religion 85 Locke’s logic of political toleration of religion may apply to contemporary contexts in various ways.16 First, a similar concern is present as religion wields significant social and public influence—indeed, more than that which the political establishment could afford. We have the political authority which has embraced a secularist identity and put into effect concomitant policies that were overtly hostile to religion and religious institutions, aiming to eliminate influence of religion, or undermine it by introducing alternative institutions, creeds, and so on. Over time, the religious community, citizens, organizations, and parties, have reacted to this secularist disposition of the state so as to protect religion, and have eventually extended their struggle into the political arena. This religious–secular confrontation has eventually become a constitutional matter, undermining the regime and challenging the political unity. Thus, as in Locke’s case, such a society is in need of a set of principles of political association under which diverse and conflicting views can live together. But before formulating those principles, Locke would assert, the political establishment has to recall that the legitimacy of political authority derives only from the consent of the free and equal citizens. In contrast to Locke’s time, this principle is not controversial today and it is inscribed in almost every constitution. However, in practice, it is frequently ignored or distorted in favor of an ideology or civil creed. A Lockean view would suggest that as long as the state does not abandon policies overtly hostile to religion, it can claim the consent of its citizens of faith neither in theory nor in practice. Hence, there can be no end to controversies. Therefore, before any attempt to resolve the disputes between religious and secular forces and form political principles that would enable both parties to live together is made, the state must primarily recognize the need to garner the consent of all citizens regardless of their religiosity. Locke’s proposition for a society characterized by religious conflicts was a separation of political and religious affairs. We should recall, however, that in his formulation of the church and state separation, Locke was more emphatic about separating political power from religious affairs than separating religion from political affairs. It may sound inept to suggest a similar logic today in view of the political challenges religion poses in many countries. Nevertheless, I believe that the paradoxical nature of secularist policies, which aim, more than anything, to separate religion from the state and political society but eventually lead to a more politicized religion, presents us with

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ample reasons to appeal to the Lockean understanding of separation, in which the burden mostly falls onto the state. The Lockean logic suggests that state interference with religion only helps religion deviate from its “natural” course. It ceases to be a moral, peaceful, “true” religion, and its tenets become instruments of politics. If the goal is to achieve an understanding of religion that is not politically disruptive, Locke would claim, the political authority has to abandon policies against religion. These are not only improper, illegitimate, and unsanctioned in the eyes of the faithful, but also self-destructive. Locke’s separation argument also requires abstinence by religious institutions from political aspirations and power. As a result, Locke expected that religion would achieve its “true” nature. This understanding of religion has certain metaphysical connotations, which are beyond the scope of this work. But in the way Locke put it, it refers to a religion that is “peaceful” and “civil,” exhibiting and promoting tolerance in public manifestations. A nonpolitical position naturally cancels out the possibility of forceful imposition of the faith over others by using political means, and this would very likely promote moderation among the religious community. Thus, these public features of Lockean true religion may conjure up a conception of religion that is also politically reasonable. Lockean logic of political toleration connects state noninterference to the presence of true religion, but the burden essentially falls on the state. Therefore, a Lockean view of political toleration of religion might be conducive to generate political reasonable religious views provided that the state embraces the principle of separation in a way in which the boundaries of authorities are to be observed, more than any other institution, by the state itself. This understanding of church and state separation radically differs from the secularist model that primarily places religion out of public domain, and that sees the state as unconstrained with regard to religious matters.

Conclusion Toleration was foremost among the principal notions that laid the foundation of liberalism. Rawls’s political liberalism may be considered as an expression of toleration; but the normative outlook of political liberalism—neutrality, the reciprocal content of political reasonableness, and political morality based on an overlapping consensus—is beyond the conventional understanding of toleration. Moreover, toleration refers to permission of disapproved beliefs or practices, and in this respect, it involves an agent who is able to

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Tolerating religion 87 prohibit such beliefs and practices but, instead, chooses self-restraint. In political settings, this agent would be the state. The idea of political liberalism, in contrast, offers an inclusive vision, in which it endows actors with more than the position of being tolerated. On the other hand, toleration might be a step forward toward political liberalism, especially when embraced by the state as a policy. One of the best and earliest examples of the idea of political toleration of religion was presented by Locke. In his theory, Locke offered an account of principles of political association under which diverse and conflicting views can live together. This account frequently contradicted aspirations of given religious views. Accordingly, Locke envisioned a political order whose legitimacy was based on the consent of the governed, which consisted of free and equal individuals of various faiths. To pursue this idea Locke invoked an idea of religion that was compatible with this scheme. Locke’s “true religion” denotes a peaceful, civil, and primarily moral understanding of religion, free of worldly temptations, especially political power. However, merely presenting a compatible view of religion would not generate such effects on religion. Thus, he also presented a necessary course of political action and institutionalization which aimed to reorganize religion. In consequence, Locke proposed a separation between political and religious affairs. According to this view, the state would remain detatched from all sorts of religious affairs, including attempts to determine the orthodoxy of faith, regulate internal affairs of religious institutions, and moderate religious debates. In turn, religious institutions would not seek political power or interfere with political processes. Locke devised this solution to achieve both public peace and a true manifestation of religion. Locke’s view of political toleration of religion could be conducive to political reasonableness. There is a theoretical and practical relationship between political toleration of religion and political liberalism. First, historically, the practice of political toleration of religion contributed to the conditions in which reasonable pluralism flourished. Since reasonable pluralism is the sociological foundation of political liberalism, this practical input of political toleration also presents itself as a theoretical precedent to political liberalism. Second, Locke’s vision is also instructive in dealing with the religious–secular confrontation in Muslim societies where religion is overly political. The separation argument employed by Locke, when applied to contemporary cases, prohibits the state from interfering with religious affairs. The Lockean logic presupposes that the state’s meddling with religion provides incentives for religion to become political; thus, if

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those policies were abandoned, the incentives would also disappear. A historical example of the latter case unfolded in postwar Europe: when the state eschewed secularist policies and provided religious liberties, the church effectively withdrew from the political arena. All in all, political toleration of religion may be employed in this fashion as a policy and institutional arrangement toward achieving politically reasonable religious views.

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This chapter presents another cornerstone idea of the liberal tradition—the impartiality of the state—as conducive to generating political reasonableness and thus political liberalism. The focus of the discussion here is Adam Smith (1723–1790). I review Smith’s liberal agenda concerning the public role of religion and seek potential linkages between Smith’s theory and contemporary issues. Smith laid down his view on public religion in the fifth book of The Wealth of Nations (1776) where he proposed his account of the so-called “freemarket” of religion. His arguments on the moral challenge of religion are found in his moral treatise, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Along with many scholars, I presume a strong connection between these two works, even though they pertain to distinct subject matters. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith informed the reader that he “should in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions which they had undergone in the different ages and the periods of society; not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law” (Smith 1976a: 356). In the “Advertisement” to the sixth edition of the Theory, he added, “in the Enquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise.” It appears Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations with his moral theory in hand. Thus, it is very likely that Smith’s arguments in The Wealth of Nations are more or less rooted in his moral philosophy. This likelihood is expected to be much greater in an area such as religion. Consequently, in my analysis, I use both Smith’s perspectives on religion, moral and political. Further in the chapter, I discuss this link between Smith’s ideas, which address the moral and political challenges of religion, and look at their significance and relevancy for political liberalism in Muslim societies.

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The moral challenge of religion “How selfish so ever man may be supposed,” Smith asserts at the outset of The Theory of Moral Sentiments,1 “there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith 1976a: 9). Smith calls this “fellow-feeling”, “sympathy,” and the person who acquires this feeling as a result of his observation of others a “spectator.” With these words, at the very beginning, Smith builds the sentimental foundation of his moral philosophy. For Smith, the selfish nature of human beings does not prevent them from associating themselves with the affections of others, and judging their propriety or impropriety by their own affections. “When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect accord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator,” Smith maintains, “they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them” (Smith 1976a: 16). Accordingly, first, we judge the propriety of the happiness, laughter, sorrow, and grief of others by contrasting their emotions to ours in similar circumstances. Second, we judge people in terms of the subjects affected by their behavior. In Smith’s moral philosophy, the way we judge people by the effect of their behavior to others constitutes the basis of propriety, justice, and virtue. The “spectatorship” as he calls it is a notion that refers to a character within a social context. Smith’s conception of morals has strong social and psychological characteristics to the extent that individuals are able to connect with both active and passive others in a given context. This ability of connection is a result of the social nature of human beings: Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety of demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which he can present them to his view. Bring him into society and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. (Smith 1976a: 110)

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Smith thinks of human beings as having a natural drive to judge others and to be judged by others. Judgment is the “mirror” that facilitates the smooth progress of social relations. In such a “mirrored” environment human beings not only satisfy their natural social instincts but also reach better emotional balance than they do in solitude. “Society and conversation,” Smith argues, “are the most powerful remedies for restoring the mind to its tranquility [. . .] as well as the best preservatives of that equal and happy temper, which is necessary to self satisfaction and enjoyment” (Smith 1976a: 23). Some individuals may like to isolate themselves, and they may have superior personal qualities for their own good, but they will definitely be deprived of the emotional balance that makes their life easy and joyful in a society. In the “mirrored” social context, propriety of behavior is based upon the perspective of spectators. To make a moral judgment, Smith argues, “the spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy founded” (Smith 1976a: 21). In order to determine whether an action is proper or not, the spectator must employ his sympathetic feelings to the full extent, and thus understand what the person subject to the action undergoes. But this striving is imaginary in nature and cannot fully account for the real feelings of the concerned person. A person cannot feel totally what others feel. Smith admits this shortcoming. “After all,” he says, “the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall short of violence of what is felt by the sufferer.” Human beings naturally possess the fellow-feeling, or sympathy, toward others, but this feeling is no more than a device that lets us put ourselves in the place of others through our imagination. Moreover, Smith maintains, this “imaginary change of situation” is momentary. The concerns of their own situation prevent individuals from fully devoting their imagination into the state of another individual. But this shortcoming of imagination does not mean that individuals cannot develop a sense of moral behavior. Moral judgment in Smith’s understanding is not a “sort of perception;” rather it is a mental account of approval and disapproval that eventually leads to “rule-following” behavior (Fleischaker 1999: 32). Thus, although individuals cannot always put themselves in the other’s place to the fullest extent, they can still develop a sense of commonality as result of their experience: “[G]eneral rules of morality [. . .] are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our

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natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of” (Smith 1976a: 159). For Smith, moral sentimental accord among individuals is the key to social concord. He describes this harmony as generated by the aggregate attempts of individuals to limit the reign of their natural selfish passions.2 Human beings have two natural drives, selfish and sympathetic, in constant struggle with each other. The balance between the two determines the quality of an individual’s moral character: [T]hat to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us. (Smith 1976a: 25) This argument has profound structural implications for the social formation of morality. All in all, Smith builds an intersubjective foundation of morality, where the accord between the sentimental drives of individuals leads to a mutual understanding. Smith’s premise—love yourself as much as your neighbor can love you—surely illustrates his intention of building a moral character based on the fullest possible mutual understanding among individuals based on their sympathetic nature. As Joseph Cropsey argues, “by exercise of two subrational capacities, sympathy and imagination, each man is by his nature led or compelled to transcend his very self and, without indeed being able to feel other man’s feeling, is able and is driven to imagine himself in the place of that other and to participate, how vicariously is a matter of indifference, in the feelings which are fundamental phenomena of the other’s existence” (Cropsey 1975: 135). In Smith’s sense, the “natural sociality” of human beings denotes to the fact that we form our moral character out of social interaction. By honoring others’ feelings about us, we learn how to act in a morally proper manner and learn to avoid social disapprobation. Thus our “moral behavior is dependent on social sanctions, not in the cynical or deterministic sense that we are incapable of acting well except as a sort of performance to win approval, but in a heuristic sense: in the sense that we learn to turn inwards only from society”

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(Fleischaker 1999: 50). That is the basis of virtuous behavior. Accordingly, Smith rejects the holistic notion of social character that bases the social nature of human beings not on their mutual understanding and judgment of each other, but on straightforward natural instincts of their love for society. According to this view, human beings tend to praise order and progress in society, and worry about what disorder and confusion could bring. They believe their interest is connected to the prosperity of society. Hence, they are concerned with any event and factor that could have a detrimental impact on the peaceful development of and the justice in society, and hence they would favor the use of every means to stop it. For Smith, in contrast, human beings support the punishment of crimes and injustice not for the preservation of society per se, but for more individual reasons: “The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness of individuals does not, in common cases, arise from that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society . . . [Our] regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for different individuals of which it is composed” (Smith 1976a: 89–90). According to Smith, human beings who naturally possess that fellow-feeling are also endowed “with an original desire to please, an original aversion to offend his brethren.” This natural drive makes Smith’s “spectator” argument all the more meaningful. If the propriety of a certain act is determined by the sentimental accord between a spectator and the subject of the act, then the actor is expected to honor the spectator’s feelings about his/her act so as to justify himself/herself in that particular circumstance. For Smith, a person naturally feels pleasure as others favor his/her act, and pain when they disapprove of it. This natural feeling of a person makes others’ “approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive” (Smith 1976a: 116). Hence, because of their very social character, human beings aspire to praise of others and to avoid their disapproval. For Smith, however, this natural feeling would not be sufficient by itself to constitute the higher moral virtue. It is virtuous to act with the desire of being approved of, but it is even more virtuous to act “with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or being what he himself approves of in other men,” in other words, with a desire of approbation by the “impartial spectator,” Smith’s famous character of moral personality: But though man has [. . .] been rendered the immediate judge of mankind, he has been rendered so only in the first instance; and an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the

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Religion and the impartiality of the state tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct [. . .] The jurisdiction of the man without, is founded altogether in the desire of actual praise, and in the aversion to actual blame. The jurisdiction of the man within, is founded altogether in the desire of praiseworthiness, and in the aversion to blame-worthiness; in the desire of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we love and admire in other people; and in the dread of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people. (Smith 1976a: 130–131)

The natural desire of human beings to have their acts approved gives spectators the opportunity to judge actors by putting themselves, through imagination, in the place of the “person principally concerned” in a certain act. In Smith’s setting, every human being is a spectator because of his/her natural sympathetic feelings. For Smith, an ideal condition would be that everybody cares not only for the immediate judgment of others, but also activates his/her natural capacity of foreseeing the judgment of spectators by rendering himself or herself the spectator of his/her own judgment.3 In other words, individuals would restrain their natural egoism by “awareness of an external standard, the standard which we use to judge our actions if we were a spectator who was biased neither toward ourselves nor toward those affected by our actions” (Muller 1993: 102). That is, to listen to his/her conscience, the “higher tribunal” for the propriety of immediate judgment. In this fashion, Smith maintains, human beings will perfectly respond to their nature, by desiring “praise-worthiness” instead of mere praise, and averting “blame-worthiness” instead of mere blame. That is how the impartial spectator takes the moral worth of individuals one step forward by ascending from “moral conformity to moral autonomy” (Muller 1993: 100).4 There is another factor that raises the moral worth of an individual in Smith’s moral philosophy, and that is religion. In a celebrated passage, Smith elucidates how religion reinforces the moral fabric of society: [R]eligion enforces the natural sense of duty: and hence it is, that mankind are generally disposed to place great confidence in the probity of those who seem deeply impressed with religious sentiments. Such persons, they imagine, act under an additional

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tie, besides those which regulate the conduct of other men. The regard to the propriety of action, as well as reputation, the regard to applause of his own breast, as well as to that of others, are motives which they suppose have the same influence over the religious man, as over the man of the world. But the former lies under another restraint, and never acts deliberately but as in the presence of that Great Superior who is finally to recompense him according to his deeds. A greater trust is reposed, upon this account, in the regularity and exactness of his conduct. And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal; wherever the first duty which it requires, is to fulfill all the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous observances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by sacrifices, and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this respect, and justly places a double confidence in the rectitude of the religious man’s behaviour. (Smith 1976a: 170) Religion thus plays an important role in moral formation of individuals as it commands their behavior to be in line with the immediate judgment of the spectators, and ideally, honor the command of the impartial spectator within their consciences. “The fact religion expresses this insight,” Jerry Z. Muller comments, “not in terms of reward and punishments of conscience but in terms of rewards and punishments in the afterlife makes it all the more useful” (Muller 1993: 154) According to Smith, however, for religion to acquire this sort of moral position it must be free of corruption and fanaticism. That is to say that the social manifestation of religion must correspond to the sympathetic nature of human beings, that is, their desire for approbation and aversion to disapprobation. Because “justice and beneficence” in Smith’s view of morality can be realized only through the mutual respect of individuals for each other’s judgment. “A sacred and religious regard,” Smith argues, “not to hurt and disturb in any respect the happiness of our neighbour, even in those cases where no law can protect him, constitutes the character of the perfectly innocent and just man; a character which, when carried to a certain delicacy of attention, is always highly respectable and even venerable for its own sake, and can scarce ever fail to be accompanied with many other virtues, with great feeling for other people, with great humanity and

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great benevolence” (Smith 1976a: 218). A conception of religion that accounts for morality as a secondary issue has nothing but a destructive impact on the moral formation of individuals. A person, even if he is a religious one, who does not value the life and liberty of others has potential malice and vice so long as he can justify his behavior and actions by “bargaining” with God. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith pays particular attention to certain potentials of religiosity that are corrosive to the moral structure of society. For Smith, religion that enforces natural sense of duty is also “capable of distorting our ideas of [rules of duty] in any considerable degree.” What concerns him most is the “false notions of religion” that can have a detrimental impact on the moral sentiments of individuals. Despite his concerned tone on religion, however, Smith carefully distinguishes religious discourses that inflict harmful effects on public peace from those that strengthen the social fabric. He refers to different interpretations of the religious tenets, and suggests tolerance in dealing with the deviated interpretations that lead to fanaticism and sometimes violence. The tone Smith uses when discussing this particular issue indicates the fact that he has reservations for particular religious practices rather than religion in general: “[A] good man will always punish [crimes] with reluctance, when they evidently proceed from false notions of religious duty. He will never feel against those who commit them indignation which he feels against other criminals, but will rather regret, and sometimes even admire their unfortunate firmness and magnanimity, at the very time he punishes their crime” (Smith 1976a: 176–177). Smith sympathizes with the religious causes so long as the religious individuals act within the limits of law, sanctifying the life, liberty, and happiness of citizens altogether. What concerns Smith most is the fact that when religion indulges in “absurdity” and “fanaticism,” and thus ceases to perform its crucial role for the moral progress of the society, it turns out to be a grave threat against the social harmony established by a culture of mutual respect based on the sympathetic feelings of individuals. In fact, domestic hostilities altogether, whether they were incited by political or religious struggle, will have a similar detrimental impact on the survival and maintenance of that harmony. Religious contentions, however, differ in nature, since people who fight for religious causes do not recognize any standard of justice and propriety other than that which they attribute to the divine authority. In this case, technically, the imperatives of social disapproval have a meaningful influence on neither the rationalization nor the performance of their actions. This, in turn, not only substantially decreases

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the likelihood of meaningful moral judgment by religious fanatics, but also endangers the existence of impartiality itself, the very foundation of justice in society, by suppressing the freedom of judgment. In Smith’s system of morality, the sympathetic nature of human beings produces a culture of moral conformity, which leads to social harmony of mutual feeling and respect.5 Only by the proper use of their fellow-feeling can individuals transcend their selfish passions and understand the impact of their actions on others through the eyes of an imagined spectator. The notion of the impartial spectator symbolizes a higher level of moral character, through which individuals feel on their shoulders the constant presence of a judge, or an external standard, or a higher tribunal, which is the embodiment of social norms and morals. For an individual to reach such a moral character he must possess a mental and emotional fitness that enables him to judge others’ actions and realize the judgment of others on his action. He must be open to social approval or disapproval and have the capacity to comprehend its content and imperatives, the ability to internalize social norms so as to use the capacity of judgment, and the willingness to abstract himself from his own feelings so as to evaluate a particular situation through the eyes of an impartial spectator. A religious fanatic is a person who lacks that mental and emotional fitness. He is not open to social judgment of any kind; he challenges the social mechanisms of conformity, he wants to be approved only by God. Since he totally defies the social and intersubjective formation of morality, he never tries to internalize social norms, thus, his judgments do not reflect social wisdom and common sense. Similarly, he lacks the willingness to judge himself through the eyes of others, since his judge, God, is superior to all judges. What makes a religious fanatic different from, say, a religious mystic, who might also defy moral conformity, is the fact that the fanatic is a person who does not only possess those convictions but also imposes them on others. In Smith’s understanding, religion enforces the sense of duty if it is taught and performed properly. There is not a proper way for a fanatic to share his convictions with others. Since he despises social mechanisms of approbation and disapprobation, and refuses to judge himself from the standpoint of others, he does not have a particular concern and respect for others and their judgments. His stubborn convictions and his imposing character lead him to express himself only through a zealous and hostile attitude, and perhaps violence. For Smith, the potential of this fanatic inclination is aggravated when religion is not taught properly. Smith always taught that religion is primarily about the moral education of people, and this aspect

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of religion must never be subordinate to another aspiration. Smith’s ideas about the moral function of religion underlay the foundations of the political theory he later presented in the Wealth of Nations. In the next section, we shall see that Smith’s political solution to incessant religious conflicts is essentially defined by his worry for the proper moral education of the people.

Public challenge of religion In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,6 Adam Smith discusses religion and its public manifestations in the section entitled “Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Instruction of People of All Ages” (Smith 1976b: 309). The title itself denotes the place of religion in Smith’s agenda as it is considered among the main sources of moral instruction. It also shows that Smith considers religion as a social phenomenon of primary importance to be addressed in the context of the proper design of social and political institutions. Considering the subject of the previous section in The Wealth of Nations, the instruction of youth, Smith’s account of religion as a means of instruction of all ages should be taken as an indication of his recognition of the significance of religion for society as a whole. For Smith, despite the fact that the object of religious instruction is to “not so much render the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in a life to come” (Smith 1976b: 309), the public manifestation of religion and religious instruction must be subject to proper institutional arrangements. In this section, Smith is not interested in theological content of religious doctrines. Smith as a political and social thinker avoids disputing the nature of religion itself, but instead dedicates his work to the discussion of proper arrangement of public institutions. As a liberal philosopher, he valued the principle of religious toleration and challenged any kind of religious monopoly. Smith’s discussion in The Wealth of Nations begins with a somewhat economic assessment of religious institutions. First of all, despite the otherworldly character of religion, for Smith, the “teachers” of religion are subject to the rules of economics like all the others. Basically, they need economic resources to maintain their lives. The issue here at hand is the source of financial funds for the religious instructors. Principally, their funding might be either private, based on voluntary contributions from their followers and students, or public, from the government in the form of a salary or other means. Drawing on the virtues of market economics, when funded privately, Smith

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says, “their [religious instructors’] exertion, their zeal and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in the latter.” Smith also advances his concerns on the vices of religion when funded by public authorities. First, he argues, the clergy of “wellendowed” religion turn out to acquire high education and elegance, possess “all the virtues of gentlemen,” and thus keep themselves distant to and beyond the material and intellectual reach of the lower classes, and “seldom give themselves any trouble about the instruction of the people” (Smith 1976b: 310). Their popularity wanes in favor of religious dissenters who derive their dynamism from social rather than public forces.7 This generates a more serious problem. The clergy that alienated themselves from the masses can turn out to be weak and defenseless when challenged by dissenting religious “enthusiasts.” In such cases, a publicly funded clergy “have commonly no other resource than to call upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their adversaries, as disturbers of public peace,” a religious call which, Smith holds, serves anything but the public peace. On the whole, the argument here might be taken in favor of religion so long as it operates under private and market circumstances, even though the advocates of such a religion might be “popular and bold” and sometimes “stupid and ignorant” (Smith 1976b: 310). The second argument in the section against government-sponsored religion is developed as an alternative to David Hume’s proposal in History of England, namely the state-controlled religion, quoted at length in The Wealth of Nations. Hume suggests that the government should regulate religion so as to suppress its excessive and radical manifestations, which pose challenges to the social order and public peace. Hume argues that most of arts and professions benefit both their performers and society. It is a kind of a market dynamics that the demand of customers for the products of those arts and professions lead artisans to produce as much as they can, this, in turn, helps to increase their “industry and vigilance.” Some other professions, on the other hand, are of use and interest to state and society but not to their professionals per se, such as public finance, defense, and so on. Naturally, Hume suggests, religious professions should be considered as the former type of professions, which benefit both providers and receivers by the increase in the amount and quality of supply—spiritual ministry and assistance. However, for some reason every religion (“except the true”) has a “natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion.” Because of this nature of religion, public policies aiming at its regulation produce unintended consequences.8 For instance, like Smith, Hume asserts that

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persecution of religious opposition by public and ecclesiastical authorities bolsters the contending voices and their challenge to public order. On the other hand, the “liberality” of individuals and professionals in religion also produces, contrary to other professions, violence, and the deception and manipulation of the masses. Hume does not explain how these vices are naturally associated with religion, but, confident in his observation, he suggests that the government should control religion through a fixed establishment by bribing the “indolence” of clergy with stated salaries, so as to make it “superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely prevent their flock from straying in quest of new pastures” (Smith 1976b: 313). In his reply to Hume, Adam Smith accounts for religious vices in conjunction with other external factors, rather than a certain natural inclination in religion: “[W]hatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision of clergy; it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any view to those effects. Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of equally violent political faction” (Smith 1976b: 313). Smith simply identifies the vicious connection between religious and political authorities as a reason for violence. His observation proceeds as follows. At the time of political turbulence, the competing groups choose to ally with one of the contending religious sects. As one political party triumphs over others, the particular religious sect that allied with that party also triumphs over the other contending sects. The authority of the clergy over the great body of people let them greatly influence and manipulate the actions of their triumphant political allies. In this event, the first demand of the clergy from the political leaders would be to “silence and subdue all their [religious] adversaries.” By virtue of their alliance with particular clergy, the political leaders eventually succumb to their demand and resort to suppressing the voice of the contending religious sects and persecuting their followers. Smith’s way of approaching the problem of religious conflict is extremely important in the sense that he attempts to incorporate into his analysis the explanatory variable of political faction. In his analysis, Smith implicitly suggests that insofar as the opponents in the political arena do not build alliances with religious sects, the religious violence will not reach to the point that it would otherwise do so with political support. This means, even if the sectarian dispute might produce violent conflict, the extent of violence will be much lower than in a situation in which contending religious sects have the opportunity of supplementing their resources with the material and military capabilities of political power. Keeping this strong correlation between

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political and religious violence in mind, one might even suggest that religious violence gains a political character when supported by conflicting political parties. Accordingly, Smith’s position in this matter is radically different from Hume’s somewhat cynical approach to religion. Instead of blaming religions and ecclesiastical authorities for all the vices, and accordingly, proposing economic and political control over their affairs, Smith chooses to uncover the factors that aggravate, if not create, religious vices and violence. Against Hume’s idea of religious establishment, Smith proposes the absolute disestablishment of religion. He believes his solution promotes peace both in society and across religions: But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when it had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially with all the different sects, and have allowed every man to chuse his own priest and his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this case, no doubt, have been a great multitude of religious sects. Almost every different congregation might probably have made a little sect by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher would no doubt have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of using every art both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great. The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquility (Smith 1976b: 314) This formula of Smith serves two related purposes. First, political groups shall not build alliances with religious sects, so when they eventually triumph, they will not be obliged to the clergy’s ferocious demands to destroy other religious sects. As a result, the likelihood of violent religious upsurges would be greatly reduced. Second, when

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political authorities totally withdraw their support from a particular religion or religious sect, the natural outcome would be the fragmentation of religion. Overall, the formula is a straightforward argument in favor of the disestablishment of religion and the protection of religious liberty for the sake of public good and peace. Despite the fact that Smith makes the necessary argument answering Hume’s concern of the vices inherent in the “independent provision of the clergy,” he appears to assume the disintegration of religion as a natural development following the withdrawal of political support. Smith’s argument echoes that of Hume insofar as he tries to develop a certain institutional arrangement in order to respond to the challenge posed by religion against “publick tranquility.” Smith differs, however, in his account of liberal society where properly ordered religion plays an important role in the moral formation of citizens. In this respect, as Smith’s formula suggests, the initial fragmentation of religion also serves the religions as they all benefit in an environment of religious pluralism marked by mutual respect and moderation: The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore see nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, and fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see established. (Smith 1976b: 315) Smith firmly believes that the separation of political and religious authority will endow religion with “candour and moderation.” In this passage, he clearly asserts his hope of transforming religion of his time into a subtle moral force that would contribute to the moral “instruction of people of all ages.” This transformation is to take place through the process of religious competition. The competition among the sects is the key factor toward generating temperance and mutual deference. In Smith’s setting, such a competition would help

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the religious instructors of each sect to develop mutual understanding as they operate in the common environment and address the common spiritual need of people. This would lead to some sort of religious cooperation whereby religious instructors would all agree to modify their discourses and employ more peaceful and reasonable messages that would, presumably, better attract people. At the same time, they would be aware of their common situation, namely as laborers of faith and spirituality sponsored by not public but private support on the basis of fair play. This “plan of [n]o ecclesiastical government,” Smith says, would produce “the most philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort of religious principle” (Smith 1976b: 315) and substantially reduce the excessive “zeal” of religions and religiosity, remove its threat to public peace, and thoroughly transform its public manifestation.9 The competitive structure Smith refers to is a natural process whereby, over time, religious “fanaticism” and “absurdity” would be replaced by more moderate and reasonable religious discourse. In this respect, Smith argues that even the “excessive zeal” of some sects would generate good effects as their fanaticism would lead to further subdivision due to the competitive environment. As long as the government decides to let small sects “alone, and oblige them all to let alone one another,” Smith maintains, “there is little danger that they would not of their own accord subdivide themselves fast enough, so as soon to become sufficiently numerous.” Thus, as the state withdraws its support from religion and provides religious liberty, religion would partition into many sects, and even further division is expected due to the “excessive zeal” of small sects that are yet to moderate their discourse. This is a unique process: the more zealous the religious sects, the more fragmentation takes place among them. In this case, even if the competition might increase zeal, excessive zeal would work against zealots themselves. Smith also adds further safeguards to secure the proper functioning of his system, such as science education, “the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition,” and public diversions such as poetry, music, painting, and so on, which “would easily dissipate [. . .] that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and enthusiasm” (Smith 1976b: 318). Smith frequently refers to the remedial impact of these arrangements on “superstition” and “enthusiasm.” But, as Hume argues in his essay, “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,” (Hume 1987 [1741]) these two types of religious deviation, or “false religion,” are of different nature. Superstition is associated with “absurd” and “frivolous” ceremonies, sacrifices, and mortifications. Superstition

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is spread and fortified by “priestly” power, which gradually prevails over individuals, and renders them “tame and submissive.” For Hume, the Roman Catholic Church is the institutional example of superstition in Europe. Enthusiasm, on the other hand, is associated with the rejection of reason and morality, and blind spiritual frenzy. Enthusiasm is characterized by its contempt of priestly power and its manifestations such as ceremonies and traditions. It is a movement, one might say, of independence from the “yoke of ecclesiastics.” Hume exemplifies enthusiasm in the fanatic Protestant sectarian movements of Europe. Overall, Smith is in agreement with Hume on the characteristics of those false religions, although he does not clearly distinguish those concepts from one another, and usually treats them altogether as false religion. But Smith differs from Hume, however, in handling these issues from a public policy perspective. He is aware of the violent potential of religious deviants, namely persecution of dissidents by ecclesiastical authorities and “extreme resolutions” resorted by enthusiasts. He believes that absolute disestablishment would cure the publicly challenging manifestations of religious deviation, without resorting to the controlled establishment proposed by Hume, which carries its own risks and might generate potential perverse effects, such as the state suppression of religious forces. Smith’s solution broadly addresses both problems. As a result of disestablishment the authority of ecclesiastical authorities would be significantly diminished, and so would their persecution as they would be placed equally with their contenders in the religion market. Accordingly, religious competition would shape not only the relationship between priestly powers and their religious opponents but also that among “enthusiast” groups. Society overall would benefit from disestablishment in the sense that the neutrality of state would rule out the possibility of state-backed religious violence and oppression, and provide safeguards against the extremism that might emerge as a result of market failure. In Smith’s setting, competition appears as a remedy for both religious fanaticism and violence, and as a source of religious vibrancy. It is not surprising to conclude that Smith’s essential idea, the virtues of market liberty, which dominates the previous four books of The Wealth of Nations, should be employed in the religious structure as well. If the conviction that competitive market is an efficient mechanism to promote a larger social good, and hence overall prosperity, then why should the competition of religious sects not produce, say, a larger religious good? All in all, as Frederick Whelan argues, the economic analysis of social structure was a common feature of scholarship in Smith’s time:

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The economic analysis of the virtues of market liberty and competition came to constitute a central paradigm of liberal thought that could readily be extended to other areas—to the political system, but also intellectual and cultural life in general, including religion [. . .] Under conditions of free competition, superior ideas, including religious doctrines, dominate inferior ones over time, as “customers” choose from the variety offered by specialized producers either by simply adopting the particular ideas, in which case “market success” is measured by the spread of the ideas through society, or by purchasing cultural products and patronizing their authors and disseminators. Meanwhile, competition and its rewards stimulate intellectual innovation and discovery, which is the motor of cultural progress [. . .] The greatest impediment to progress is posed by entrenched and privileged intellectual establishments, such as established churches, which accordingly may be condemned as “monopolies” analogous to the economic versions. (Whelan 1990: 175) Smith subscribes to the idea of competitive religion, because a competitive structure would force religious “enthusiasts” to moderate their discourses in order to make their messages more appealing to the general public. They would provide more reasonable messages that engage people’s spiritual needs. This, in turn, would lead to an aggregate effort by religious sects to proffer certain religious discourse that opens the way to “pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, and fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see established” (Smith 1976b: 315).

Impartiality of the state and reasonable religion When The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations are considered together, it is clear that Smith aimed to define a particular framework suitable for the public presence of religion or a public religion. Smith’s frequent references to “true,” “pure,” and “rational” religion indicate his intention to achieve a particular form of religion of which the public manifestation is morally acceptable. Having said that, one should note that Smith did not attempt to conceptualize an “ideal” religion. He was not interested in the theological aspects of religious conflicts. As Knud Hakoonssen put it, “[w]hen Smith talks about religion, he is not concerned with the divinity but human imagination about the divine” (Haakonssen 1998: xvi). Consequently, in

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his moral and political philosophy, Smith implicitly defined the essential characteristics of a publicly reasonable religion. His concerns on the corrosive impact of “false religion” on moral behavior, religious fanaticism, and violence led him to develop a liberal agenda that would help reveal the moral potential of religion which enforces a sense of duty and generates good temper. That religion can function properly, or in other words, that moral potential of religion can outweigh other publicly challenging religious manifestations, only when it is kept out of political power and exposed to the moderating force of social sanctions. These preconditions together draw up the boundaries of public religion in Smith’s liberal polity. When the conditions are met, moral instruction of “people of all ages” will be all the more possible and beneficial for society. The significance of Adam Smith’s stance on religion derives from his ability to see the connection between liberal policymaking and the public character of religion. For Smith the moral philosopher, religion was a crucial institution in the moral formation of society. He repeatedly emphasized the significance of the moral function of religion in a society. He also pointed to the ominous consequences of religious deviation or “false religion” over individual morality. Religious deviation corrupts the moral sentiments of individuals, distorts their judgmental capacity, and thus leads to religious fanaticism—a grave threat to public order. In order to overcome this peril and return religion to its essential moral function, Smith formulated an institutional arrangement that would serve both civil order and religion. Accordingly, he argued that once the government takes an impartial stance toward religions, contending religious sects would naturally acquire a moderate position in their public involvement. Thus, properly ordered religion would promote the moral education of people and support civic virtues. Smith was well aware of the fact that once liberal policies were implemented, they would impact not only the scope of liberties, but also the way in which social institutions form and function. For that reason, in Smith’s view, reasonable public religion would be an intended consequence of church and state separation and religious liberty. Smith’s solution to extreme manifestations of religion is perfectly in line with his wider political theory. He recognized the moral and psychological need of religion, and addressed the religion problem within a liberal perspective through proper institutional design. Smith had doubts on the effectiveness of government interference in many areas, including religion. He asserted that the ecclesiastical authorities that are publicly sponsored do not perform their duty in accordance

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with the moral and religious needs of the general public. Moreover, as they face the challenge of dynamic religious groups that spontaneously emerge, they tend to demand that political authorities subdue those contending voices. In this respect, Smith’s proposal of church and state separation can be accounted as a remedy for the inefficient operation of publicly sponsored religion. In consequence, a religion that draws its resources—material, human, and social—from private individuals and their voluntary contributions is expected to be much more vibrant and efficient.10 Furthermore, private religious groups can play a vital social role by providing their members with status and recognition in society.11 Smith’s view of the impartiality of the state presents an account of church–state separation that is one step ahead of the principle of political toleration. In the politics of toleration, such as that defended by Locke, the state assumes a libertarian position toward religion. The state permits the practice of religion but also sets limits on its public manifestations. But in this case, the state is free to decide when to restrict religious liberty. In the politics of impartiality, however, the state not only tolerates religious practices but also assumes an impartial position toward all religions. Smith formulated this view based on his observations of religion becoming part of political aspirations due to declining efficiency in its moral function in the hands of state-supported churches and independent but extreme religious sects. In this fashion, Smith attempted to put religious disputes off the political agenda, and thus foreshadowed Rawls’s ideas about the politics of neutrality toward public religion. Arguably, Smith’s ideas also influenced the formation of the American constitutional conception of public religion—where his ideas were best realized—which also subsequently provided the foundation for Rawls’s notion of reasonable religion.12 This brings us to the theoretical and practical junction between Smith’s impartiality of the state and Rawls’s political liberalism. Smith’s proposal exemplifies a public policy that helped generate the historical circumstances of reasonable pluralism in the West. The case of the United States is its most proximate outcome. Thus, theoretically the policy of impartiality toward religion fills the content of the historical component in Rawls’s theory, along with political toleration of religion. Accordingly, we observe a progressive mode of reasoning in the liberal theory with respect to public religion and the political domain: a libertarian position in Locke’s idea of political toleration, an impartial position in Smith, and a neutral position in Rawls’s political liberalism. These normative positions also define the content and

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boundaries of the notion of church and state separation that persists across the theories. Another connection appears with respect to contemporary contexts of religious–secular confrontation. Smith’s idea of state impartiality, like Locke’s idea of political toleration, might also prove valuable in generating circumstances of reasonable pluralism in the contemporary contexts, provided that it is embraced by the state as a policy. Smith’s view of religion that he expects to emerge as a result of state impartiality features the characteristics of a reasonable religion. Mainly, it is a religion that enforces a sense of duty and generates good temper. It is highly likely that a member of such a religious view would have a positive attitude toward public arrangements, recognize others as free and equal, and offer fair terms of cooperation for political purposes. In other words, he would be politically reasonable. As Smith’s idea is applied to contemporary cases, however, we have to note the differences in the context. While Smith had offered state impartiality toward different religions and religious sects, now we have, in addition to religious pluralism, numerous nonreligious conceptions of the good life which exert significant influence on the citizenry. In contemporary cases, secular doctrines or ideologies embraced or promoted by the political establishment brew hostility and grievances as severe as that which the state-sponsored church did at the time of Smith. In Smith’s narrative, we observe an established church, which is not properly performing its duty of the moral education, but at the same time, is quick to appeal to political power to help suppress dissenting or alternative voices that burgeon as result of its inefficiency. Moreover, when political parties collaborate with the established church they also partake in suppression. This predicament is most apparent in countries where the state established a certain view of religion as the official creed. Among Muslim societies, the best examples are Saudi Arabia and Iran where any form of religious opposition to the official version is considered a public and political threat. By the same token, one might treat an official secular doctrine or ideology like an established (nonreligious) faith. This is a more common predicament in the rest of the Muslim world. Those doctrines and ideologies do not float freely; over time, political regimes, like those of Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia, Egypt, and Syria, raised their own generations loyal to those creeds and established respective organizations to spread their influence throughout society. They become something of an organized religion with their respective doctrines and moral codes, educational institutions, and civic associations. If these kinds of secular establishments are hostile to

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religious traditions or attempt to replace religious creeds, or eliminate them altogether, the religious community will react, as it did in numerous cases. In such cases, religious voices are to the secular establishment what dissenters were to an established church. There would be attempts to subdue them. When needed, there would be appeals to the state power. Thus, every established creed, religious or nonreligious, is inclined to assume that dangerous disposition Smith was so apprehensive about. Therefore, his view of impartiality might as well be applied to secular doctrines and conceptions, so that not only religious but also secular challenges to “publick tranquility” are effectively removed. Considering that both religious and secular conceptions could be politically unreasonable and thus contribute to the prospect of unreasonable pluralism, state impartiality has to apply not only to religious but also secular views so as to be conducive toward reasonable pluralism. This means, in the light of Smith’s reasoning, that the state has to abandon its secularist identity (because a secularist state cannot be impartial toward religion), nor should it have a religious identity, and uphold impartiality when it comes to conflicting conceptions of the good life. This way, parties cannot resort to political power, nor can they demand that the state apparatus collaborates with their cause. To preserve and increase their numbers they have no place to appeal but society itself. In the ensuing competition which would occur between and across religious and secular views, moderation would prevail over time. In this case, we might expect “the most philosophical good temper and moderation” to endure in both the religious and secular citizenry.

Conclusion Adam Smith’s idea of state impartiality is similar to Locke’s toleration in many aspects, but in Smith reasonable religion arises as a result of the impartial stance of the state. Smith recognized the moral and psychological need for religion, and tried to address the religion problem within a liberal polity through the use of proper institutional design. He repeatedly emphasized that religion is a moral force that strengthens the social structure, but at times could be diverted into a fanatical and intolerant force. Religion which deviates from its “true” nature directly affects the moral fitness of individuals, distorts their sentiments, alters their judgments, and, thus, deprives them of the ability to achieve virtuous and just behavior. This moral corrosion caused by “false” religion is detrimental to justice, social harmony, and public

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peace. Accordingly, Smith proposed a competitive religious market to overcome the public challenge of religion. He thought that his scheme would be a remedy for the disagreeable qualities of private religious sects, and a liberal alternative to the vicious consequences of a possible alliance between political and religious authorities. He believed that such a competitive structure would oblige religious leaders to moderate their discourses. As the competing sects subordinated themselves to the forces of the religious market, a religion free of fanaticism and that had a wider social appeal would eventually flourish. Smith’s idea of state impartiality can be applied to contemporary contexts and embraced as a state policy toward achieving reasonable pluralism. In this case, however, it has to address not only religious conflict but also the conflict between the religious and the secular views. Similar to Smith’s sociological observation, where the conflict between an established church and dissenting religious voices was endangering social unity, many Muslim societies today face a confrontation between an established secularist creed or ideology and dissenting religious voices. The dynamics of the clash, the challenge it poses for the society, and the ways the state is involved are similar in both contexts. According to the Smithean logic, today the state can have neither a secularist nor a religious position, because this would ipso facto violate impartiality. Rather, the state must remain impartial toward religious and secular doctrines, so that the dynamics of social competition engender political reasonableness in those doctrines. Consequently, Smith’s view of the state impartiality, as construed this way, presents a policy that is one step ahead of political toleration of religion. The former prohibits the state to interfere with religious affairs and urges it to tolerate public manifestations of religion. It also requires religious authorities not to resort to political aspirations for their own interests. The internal logic of the idea of political toleration, as presented by Locke, which is expressed in the idea of the separation of church and state, puts the burden primarily on the state. The state has to recognize those limits first if it expects the same from religious authorities. In contemporary contexts, this policy is applied to the secularist states, and its practice at the state level might significantly diminish the tension between the state and religious communities, and prevent religion from becoming politicized. But this policy does not reveal much about secular doctrines, groups, and movements. The state can tolerate religion, but the secular views might remain politically unreasonable. Political toleration of religion does not necessarily put religious and the secular views on an equal footing. The policy of state impartiality, on the other hand, takes

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the issue further and addresses all potentially politically unreasonable conceptions, religious and secular, and effectively leaves them off the political calculus by remaining impartial to all. Therefore, it presents a more comprehensive treatment of unreasonableness in both religious and secular doctrines, and is thus more conducive toward achieving reasonable pluralism.

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This work has aimed to assess the prospects of Rawls’s political liberalism in Muslim societies. Two basic premises guided the analysis: the recent resurgence of religious claims in public life and the need to normatively address this matter. Rawls put up a defense of democracy and democratic values, reconciling religious and secular demands through a just and stable public order. His theory generally presents a radical shift from the legacy of liberal theory of a secular disposition. Rawls introduced certain assumptions about diverse moral doctrines embraced by citizens in a society and formulated a theory of liberal democracy that would equally appeal both to the religious and the secular citizens. Notwithstanding its inclusive outlook, I have argued that the theory of political liberalism also bears a set of structural limitations, which undermines its appeal in the Muslim contexts. Consequently, I attempted to reconstruct the theoretical structure of political liberalism, and sought to integrate certain ideas that would help broaden its prospect in Muslim societies. One major idea defended in this work is that contrary to the assertions of secularization theory, religion continues to enjoy significance in social life and indeed has got even stronger in last decades, particularly in public areas where it had previously been effectively prohibited. Analysts have increasingly sought alternative approaches to explain phenomena which defy assumptions of secularization theory. These approaches, which are collectively called the sacralization theory, have shifted the focus of analysis from diminishing religion to the rising significance of religion in the contemporary world. According to the proponents of sacralization, modern religion is in the process of “deprivatization,” whereby it abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and becomes increasingly involved in the public sphere. Also, some religious traditions have never been arrested by the process of privatization.

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Therefore, today, any political theory that focuses on political morality has to take this religious phenomenon into consideration. Considering the global nature of the deprivatization, the viability and appeal of political liberalism, too, depends on the way in which it responds to these prevalent social currents. I believe that political liberalism emerges as a significant theoretical normative resource in dealing with the challenges faced by Muslim societies in view of religious resurgence. I argue that, in general, political liberalism introduces a unique way of reasoning about issues such as political morality, political legitimacy, social consensus, and public/private distinction, which altogether translates into a radical position in dealing with the issue of religion in public and political contexts. In contrast to its non-liberal and comprehensively liberal alternatives, political liberalism presents a very inclusive outlook. First, political liberalism proposes equality of religious and secular doctrines in the formation of political morality. Political liberalism proffers a common ground of consensus over commonly acknowledged principles of public and political life upon which a variety of religious and secular doctrines may converge. This means that citizens of faith are not to be marginalized or disfranchised by their secular counterparts. Accordingly, religious and secular comprehensive doctrines are on an equal footing during the process of determining the common political principles. Second, Rawls proposes a separation between political and civil society domains regarding the application of political principles. The principles of political justice do not directly apply to the internal life of the elements in civil society, such as churches, universities, associations, and families. This is an important distinction because most religious tensions today surface as a response to the state, which overextends its power to areas beyond its legitimate authority. Third, political liberalism proposes a wide-ranging common ground of consensus among various religious and secular views. The nature of the consensual process put forth by Rawls is quite participatory, and thus it provides public recognition both to consented political values and principles, and to the doctrines that come to agree on those principles. By these features, the perspective introduced by Rawls goes beyond accommodation and purports to include diverse conceptions of the good in a society. One of the most inclusive features of political liberalism is the notion of neutrality it advances. According to Rawls, the political liberal order must strive to be neutral toward conflicting conceptions of the good life, religious or nonreligious. The view of political morality invoked by Rawls is formed by neutral principles that are

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justified without assuming the validity of any conception of good. So long as a political conception of justice is endorsed and its principles implemented in public institutions, the state must not favor or promote any particular comprehensive doctrine. This way, political liberalism offers a neutral rather than a secularist vision for political society. Rawls is emphatic about this difference, and he several times mentions in his works that the view of political morality and its expression, namely public reason, are to be distinguished from secular morality or secular reason. The latter notions, Rawls maintains, are types of reasoning which belong to certain comprehensive nonreligious doctrines, and they should be treated accordingly along with their religious counterparts. Rawls also argues against the priority of secular arguments in view of sectarian conflicts. He points out the ambiguity of secular notions, since it is not clear whether they are animated by a comprehensive doctrine or a purely political conception. Rawls emphasizes that in the face of conflicting religious and nonreligious comprehensive doctrines, we should embrace neutrality rather than secularism as the overriding principle in dealing with constitutional issues. In political liberalism, the principle of neutrality applies to the conceptions of good that would be willing to endorse a political conception of justice agreeable to consenting parties. Accordingly, the inclusive character of political liberalism that is expressed by neutrality has its own logical limits. The participatory process is not wide open to all kinds of comprehensive views regardless of their normative contents and claims. Rather, comprehensive views should be reasonable in order to be a part of the consensual process. The notion of reasonableness plays a constitutive role in political liberalism. In Rawls’s formulation, reasonableness signifies a morally valuable form of political interaction between free and equal citizens, free of domination and manipulation. It stands for a particular socio-political condition in persons and doctrines, which might allow them to engage politically with others through fair terms of cooperation. A reasonable person is one who can offer fair terms which are agreeable to other reasonable persons. Political liberalism can only be realized if the majority of a society is reasonable. Accordingly, individuals espousing various reasonable religious and nonreligious views altogether constitute the discursive foundation of a modern democratic society, which Rawls calls reasonable pluralism. This is the sociological background underlying the consensual processes of political liberalism. Reasonableness as such occupies a primary position in defining the nature of religious inclusion in political liberalism. The issue at stake

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is whether religious views are reasonable enough to be involved in the consensual processes, or whether they are compatible with the idea of political liberalism as such. Rawls stipulates an unreserved commitment by religious doctrines to consented political principles. Political liberalism rejects interest-based allegiances to the political conception. Religions, Rawls contends, have to recognize the liberties of all other free and equal citizens. Citizens of faith should continue to value their religious worldviews, but they should also be able engage in political cooperation defined by fair terms acceptable to all. Accordingly, political liberalism does not engage those who think of politics as means to impose on others a particular way of life or particular moral views. If religious doctrines are politically unreasonable, that is, they either engage in political cooperation but favor their own interest over the terms of cooperation, or they are unwilling to cooperate at all, then they will be opposed by the political liberal order. In view of these arguments, Rawls’s view of reasonable religion may seem to restrict and limit the public presence of religion. Many critics of Rawls have conceded that, for Rawls, religion is good as long as it affirms political liberal principles, and his view of religion is essentially exclusive of religion in the public domain. These concerns, I believe, are misguided on at least two counts. First, those who criticize political liberalism for being restrictive largely ignore the overall inclusive nature of political liberalism. Rawls saw the consent of religious doctrines as crucial for the overall stability of a political liberal regime. Rawls’s theory of political liberalism is essentially animated by the social significance of religion in contemporary society. Rawls was aware of the fact that significant portions of individuals in democratic societies espouse certain religious views that more or less influence their lives. Thus, a major aspiration of Rawls was to come up with an idea of political justice without invoking a particular comprehensive liberal or secular doctrine. As a result of this scheme, citizens of faith are not to be marginalized or disfranchised by secular views in the formation of political morality. They will benefit from public recognition in a due consensual process, and they will continue to enjoy and practice their religious views under the protection of the state. Moreover, they may engage in public political discussion by employing religious arguments so long as they provide proper political reasons in due course. In this regard, it is hard to claim that political liberalism excludes religion. Second, critics of Rawls tend to ascribe some kind of a metaphysical flavor to the notion of reasonableness. To establish reasonableness in this fashion may naturally offend citizens of faith. Nonetheless, this is something that Rawls

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always tried to avoid. Reasonableness denotes an attitude or a condition in which individuals act reciprocally regarding important political issues. A certain belief may be philosophically unreasonable but politically reasonable. In political liberalism, the social contract excludes only those that are politically unreasonable. Therefore, the notion of reasonableness is essentially political, and thus, this is how it should be applied to religious views. Political liberalism thus presents an inclusive outlook so long as religious views that are to participate in the political process are politically reasonable. It is important to note that, however, in Rawls’s theory the notion of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is not an expression of a hopeful expectation or an abstract ideal. Rather, reasonableness is a fact of modern democratic political culture. Rawls believes that thanks to particular historical experiences in modern democratic societies there emerged a pluralism of diverse religious and secular worldviews that are politically reasonable. Upon this conviction of reasonable pluralism Rawls initiates his theory, so as to uncover the principles of a public basis of justification on fundamental political questions. The fact of reasonable pluralism as such might be a valid assumption for advanced democratic societies. In most countries that have had a long democratic experience, religion is not even a significant social force anymore. On the other hand, in some Catholic democracies and in the United States religion still plays an important social and political role but mostly through politically reasonable expressions. Consequently, one can argue that political liberalism is mainly addressed to established democracies and has no relevancy in other contexts. This work primarily argued that political liberalism need not be confined to the societies of particular historical experiences. I have developed an analytical model that would help us assess the value of political liberalism for uncustomary contexts such as Muslim societies. According to that model, Rawls’s theory of political liberalism should be considered as having three main components. First is the historical component, where Rawls depicts the transformative processes in the nature of political consensus and culture in the Western history of liberal democracy. Rawls contends that the tradition of toleration that grew out of religious conflicts helped ease political tensions among groups and generated reasonable pluralism over time. Second, as a sociological component of the theory, Rawls stipulates the presence of reasonable pluralism in a society as a foundation of political liberalism. And third, as a normative component, Rawls presents a set of political principles that are formulated in view of

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that very culture of reasonable pluralism. Among these, the first component is historically conditional; it can apply only to certain societies. The sociological component, on the other hand, is again applicable to certain societies, but it is not as fixed as the historical experience. It can be regenerated without the historical baggage. The ideals of liberal democracy reflected in the political conception of justice require the existence of a political culture of reasonable pluralism. This point is essential to realize the promise of political liberalism in uncustomary contexts. The inclusive liberal democratic vision of political liberalism can only be put into practice when reasonable pluralism is in place: political reasonableness must prevail over the political calculus of citizens. Therefore, the normative ideals of political liberalism may still inform democratic pursuits in Muslim societies even if their sociological condition falls short of reasonable pluralism. That said, for political liberalism to serve as a normative source for democratic pursuits in societies where political reasonableness is lacking, we have to address the question of how to generate or promote political reasonableness. Unfortunately, this is the area where Rawls is least explicit. Rawls theorizes over societies that are already characterized by reasonable pluralism and is largely silent about how other societies can also achieve this character. This situation does not necessarily undermine the theoretical consistency of political liberalism, but it confines its normative scope only to certain societies and thus significantly limits its appeal in the rest of the world. I aimed to overcome this shortcoming by introducing two major theoretical attempts from the liberal tradition that can help us understand how political reasonableness can be generated and promoted in contemporary Muslim societies, where religion wields significant social and political influence. The first of these is the theory and practice of political toleration. Questions of political toleration arise when individuals or groups attempt to suppress the behaviors and actions of others that are considered objectionable. These kinds of conflicts acquire a political dimension when groups cannot find a way to resolve the problem without the help of political authority. But for this scheme to work, the political authority must be trusted by the contrasting parties. They should know that they cannot have a political backing for their respective causes. In the history of political thought, the fact that political power turns into a catalyst for prolonged conflicts led liberal thinkers to devise a policy of toleration without compromising the legitimacy and stability of the political system.

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John Locke is the foremost political philosopher on the subject of political toleration. Locke envisioned a political order whose legitimacy is based on the consent of the governed, which is comprised of free and equal individuals of various faiths. In his theory, Locke conjured up a distinct liberal political philosophy along with a wellillustrated account of sociological and psychological factors that dislodge the public manifestation of religion from its proper course. Locke espoused an idea of true religion that is about virtue, piety, and tolerance, and he proposed a form of political institutionalization that would help religion achieve this character. To this aim, Locke claimed the subjectivity of the orthodoxy in faith, an idea which both undermines the ecclesiastical monopoly over faith and prohibits the state from interfering with religious affairs. Locke believed that it is not the religious competition but the competition for power that disrupts the social and public order. Moreover, political aspirations of religious groups only help religion forgo its true character. Accordingly, Locke proposed a separation of state and religious affairs in order to achieve this vision of true religion. Locke believed that keeping religion out of politics is only one part of the solution. He also asserted, even more emphatically, that the state must stay out of religion. The burden of political toleration falls, more than any other agent, on the state. Therefore, for Locke, a tolerant religion, which might be characterized as politically reasonable in Rawls’s terms, can only come forth if the state is tolerant of religion in the first place. The state has to be active in creating the circumstances of toleration. In this regard, the policy and practice of political toleration might be considered as one of the possible ways of policy and institutionalization helping to bolster political reasonableness in a society. I also presented a second liberal attempt, Adam Smith’s idea of impartiality of the state as conducive to generating circumstances of political reasonableness. In Smith’s understanding, religion enforces a sense of duty if it is taught and performed properly. Smith observed that the ecclesiastical institution sponsored by the state lagged behind in its duties, and that this produced alternative religious social movements that could be fanatical and disruptive. The state church tried to subdue those movements with the help of the state, but this only produced even more sects to challenge the authority of the church. Smith thought that even if the sectarian dispute might sometimes produce violence, the level of violence would be much lower and limited if neither of the contending parties could appeal to the political authority for their cause. Smith also pointed out how religious disputes were manipulated by political players. To resolve the problem at both ends, Smith proposed state impartiality toward religion.

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The logical consequence of Smith’s proposal would be the disestablishment of religion, but his proposal carries more emphasis on the impartiality as a state policy. Smith thought that his proposal would generate a fair competition of religious views and thus endow public religion with candor and moderation over time. In Smith’s setting, competition is regarded both as a remedy for religious fanaticism and violence and a source of religious vibrancy in society. In this fashion, Smith’s view of public religion, as a crucial institution of moral education that enforces a sense of duty and promotes moderation, is practically what Rawls would expect from a politically reasonable religion. But in contrast to Rawls, Smith not only presented an account of religion resembling that of Rawls’s reasonable religion, but also envisioned a necessary course of action and institutionalization that aimed at affecting religion with the principles of public order. Consequently, Smith attempted to put religious disputes off the political agenda and thus foreshadowed Rawls’s politics of neutrality toward religious and secular worldviews. When it comes to the idea and ideal of political liberalism, reasonableness of religious doctrines is only one part of the story. In political liberalism the idea of a reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines means that both religious and secular doctrines support a political conception of justice which would define the constitutional democratic society. Doctrines and worldviews which cannot support such a conception are deemed politically unreasonable. In modern societies where secularist doctrines, views, and ideologies abound, it is very important to require political reasonableness on the secular side, too, if a common ground of consensus needs to be achieved. In many Muslim societies, there is a current of secularism represented by various individuals, groups, or elites, which are solely devoted to undermining religion in social and public domains. These ideas and movements are what critics call “secular fundamentalism.” For those secular fundamentalists it is impossible to engage in a reciprocal relationship with citizens of faith. In view of their conviction, it is not even plausible to think that a radically secularist citizen would offer fair terms of cooperation that other religious citizens might reasonably accept. Therefore, in view of political liberalism, those secular fundamentalists are as politically unreasonable as those who aspire to a theocracy. The significance of unreasonable secular views arises when they constitute the ideological basis of political establishment or are favored by the state over religious views. When this happens, especially in the Muslim countries where religion has a strong popular support, it is almost impossible to achieve a common ground of consensus

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over the principles of political order. In this book, I presented the sociological and political implications of such a predicament. To better illustrate this conviction, I provided a model of polity which is composed of three distinct spheres. First is the state, which refers to the apparatus of government. Second is political society, the arena in which political contestation to gain control over public power and the state occurs. And third is civil society, the sphere where institutions and movements are not explicitly political but can exert political influence. According to many observers, the public presence of religion in the West is mostly manifest in civil society whereas in Muslim societies it is manifest both civil and political society. This difference is accounted for by the transformation of politics in the West, where religious actors largely abandoned their political aspirations thanks to the policies that secured religious liberties and diminished threats against public religion posed by hostile secular ideologies and movements. On the other hand, many Muslim societies experienced prolonged periods of secularism, which was undertaken as a determinate policy by the state establishments. In those societies, public religion has reacted to these challenges and shifted its contestation to political society. The more religion was threatened by hostile secularist movements, the more political religion has become. In the end, both views, secular and religious, have embraced politically unreasonable positions which undermine the advancement of democracy in these societies. Therefore, if the idea is to achieve a workable scheme of political order of free and equal citizens belonging to diverse worldviews, as political liberalism envisions, political reasonableness has to prevail not only in the religious but also in the secular sector of Muslim societies. Fortunately, the liberal proposals of Locke and Smith might prove useful in this area. It is possible to read both views into contemporary situations. Locke’s notion of political toleration stands for religious liberty whether the political authority represents a particular religious or secular view. In both cases, Locke’s rationale for prohibiting the state from interfering into religious affairs would be sustained. Locke argued that faith is an inward category, and force is not a rational and proper means to impose—or in the secularist case, dispose of—faith. A Lockean observation of the contemporary predicament would indicate that commonplace secularist practices, such as homogenization of diverse faiths by coercive imposition or trivialization of religion through secular institutionalization, would only help dislodge religion from its proper course and transform it into something else. Such practices give rise to alternative religious social movements that purport to fill the void left by the mainstream religion. Eventually,

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religion gets more and more politicized, and this merely exacerbates the situation. A Lockean state today would rather leave religion alone except in the cases of socially disruptive actions. Locke provided us with the insight that reasonable, moral, tolerant religion would arise only through an inward persuasion of the mind and not an outward political force. Smith’s idea of state impartiality takes Locke’s position a step further. Initially, at times of fierce religious conflicts, Smith formulated his theory in the form of a church and state separation, or more precisely, disestablishment of religion. Today, at a time of secular fundamentalism, we need to slightly modify the theory so as to encompass challenges from both disruptive religious and secular views. But, essentially, conflicts between religious and secularist views pose similar challenges. In the final analysis, a secularist view is no different than a dissenting voice at the presence of a state religion. Conversely, when a secularist view dominates the political establishment, religion is in the dissenting position. In light of Smith’s account, the state should take an impartial position toward both religious and secularist views. It is very unlikely that religious individuals and groups would remain quiet forever as secularist views dominate the political arena and relentlessly attack their very conceptions of the good life. Such a situation would only give rise to more aggression and politicization. Alternatively, if the state takes an impartial position on these issues, this would eliminate the political calculus of the conflict and put religious and secular views on an equal footing. In due course, the power of social sanctions would assume the task. To conclude, Smith’s view construed this way, along with the Lockean view of political toleration, might be constructive for the institutionalization of political reasonableness in contemporary Muslim societies.

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Notes

Chapter 1 1 See Juergensmeyer (1993), Casanova (1994), Haynes (1998), Berger (1999), Stark (1999). These authors noted that such religious developments are more obvious in some traditions, but that the overall public salience of religion is increasing in the world. By the 1980s, Jose Casanova noted that the “widespread and simultaneous character of the refusal to be restricted to the private sphere of religious traditions was commonplace in traditions as different as Judaism and Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, and Hinduism and Buddhism” (Casanova 1994: 6). A new wave of religiosity following the fall of communism should also be noted. 2 Among the notable works in this vein are Neuhaus (1986), Greenawalt (1988, 1995) Carter (1993), Thiemann (1996), Perry (1997), Weithman (1997), Connolly (1999), Audi (2000), Rosenblum (2000), Spinner-Halev (2000), W. Galston (2002). 3 These ideas can be traced back to Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Marx, respectively. 4 I say “most” because some Muslim societies are run by confessional regimes, which are subject to different sets of issues. The most obvious ones are those of Saudi Arabia and Iran (after 1979). Notwithstanding their differences, the idea of political liberalism may still inspire those citizens of these countries who reject or are troubled by the official interpretation of Islam promoted by the state. Chapter 2 1 Rawls criticized Habermas for that point: “Habermas often criticizes religious and metaphysical views without taking much time to argue against them in detail; rather, he lays them aside—or occasionally dismisses them—as unusable and without credible independent merit in light of his philosophical analysis of the presuppositions of rational discourse and communicative action” (Rawls 1996: 376–377). 2 Among the notable works on the subject are M. Galston (1994), Wenar (1995), Lipkin (1996), Estlund (1998), Gaus (1998), Owen (2001), Kelly and McPherson (2001), and Freeman (2003).

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3 For example, an individual who subscribes to racist and sexist ideas could very well be seen as politically reasonable as long as he/she does not attempt to impose these views on others. The same reasoning holds for non-liberal religious views (Kelly and McPherson 2001: 46–48). 4 Rawls adds, however, that “the ideal of public reason does hold for citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum, and thus for members of political parties and for candidates in their campaigns and for other groups who support them” (Rawls 1996: 215). Chapter 3 1 That debate is beyond the scope of this work. For more on the debate see especially Sandel (1982) and MacIntyre (1984). 2 These terms were used by the Vatican as a reaction to a European parliament resolution which asserted that “women’s legal rights cannot be restricted or breached on the pretext of religion” (Griffin 2003: 1,641). 3 Campos (1994) used this term, quite unfairly, to describe Rawls’s vision of liberalism. Campos directed his criticism particularly to the concept of public reason, which at the time were not as inclusive as Rawls put it in his later writings. Though, even in its latest form, political liberalism might not live up to aspirations of the fundamentalist evangelical standpoint which Campos claimed to represent. Chapter 4 1 “Although the American case continues to offer a devastating challenge to the secularization doctrine, it fails in Europe too. First, there has been no demonstrable long-term decline in European religious participation! Granted, participation probably varied from time to time in response to profound social dislocations such as wars and revolutions, but the far more important point is that religious participation was very low in northern and western Europe many centuries before the onset of modernization” (Stark 1999: 254). 2 For the difference between these two types of parties see Nasr (2005). 3 This situation is somewhat puzzling for Western analysts who are not accustomed to see religious political parties in their own society and who do not necessarily associate those religious parties with the ideas of democracy and liberalism. Hence, a plethora of works has categorized all sorts of religious political activities under the banner of fundamentalism and declared their incompatibility with democracy. In fact, some native authors from these countries are among the most adamant advocates of this sentiment. This results from the indiscriminate approaches that are very common in the context of Islam and politics. For example, in some Muslim countries, “regimes have consciously used the tactics of branding political opponents ‘fundamentalists’ and depicting them as serious threats in order to gain support from the West and soften criticism of their own authoritarian and repressive rule” (Hallencreutz and Westerlund 1996: 5). 4 Although they are only a part of religious political activism, these so-called “fundamentalist” movements have attracted most attention in sociological

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and political scientific circles. Consider the grand Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences that has produced five volumes on fundamentalisms on social, political, and cultural levels (Martin and Appleby 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995). 5 This transformation corresponds to the earlier phase of the third wave of democratization in the world. See Huntington (1993) for the waves of democratization. 6 This period corresponds to late nineteenth-century France, when the dominant political elite were in favor of secularist policies; this period culminated in the promulgation of the law of separation of church and state in 1905. See Bauberot (1998) for a detailed account of the period, and of the debates between secularist and religious forces. 7 Rawls’s historical narrative, even if it holds for the West, does not go uncontested. “A more accurate map would show that,” Weithman argues, “while early liberals were concerned to find a lasting peaceful settlement to the wars of religion, they were concerned to show the illegitimacy of the absolute rule as well [. . .] At important periods of American history, religious political activism favored liberal causes like abolition and civil rights. And American liberalism has a complex history even in this century, with some strands according far less importance to individual rights than what now passes for liberalism in the United States” (Weithman 1997: 4). For a fascinating rebuttal of Rawls’s historical narrative, see Murphy (2001: part 1). Chapter 5 1 Andrew R. Murphy argued against the tendency to use the terms toleration and tolerance interchangeably. He held that we can improve our understanding of the liberal legacy “by defining ‘toleration’ as a set of social or political practices and ‘tolerance’ as a set of attitudes,” and documented the use of the terms as such throughout the early liberal tradition (Murphy 1997: 593). Such an approach would allow us to see that, Murphy maintains, “while toleration is integrally and necessarily linked with the liberal tradition, tolerance is not” (Murphy 1997: 594). 2 Richard Dees agreed with this definition of toleration with a reservation: “Toleration is not complicated, however, by the alleged paradoxes found by many writers, who claim that toleration exists in a no man’s land between indifference and intolerance [. . .] These paradoxes arise only if we think toleration must entail the disapproval of an activity. So these writers think that toleration would disappear in a truly pluralistic society in which everyone accepts everyone else’s choices. On my view, however, if I accept a form of life that is different from my own, then I tolerate it, no matter whether I approve if that lifestyle or not. So, on my view, we do not cease to tolerate a form of life once we see it as intrinsically valuable. Only ‘mere tolerance’ implies disapproval” (Dees 1998: n. 7). 3 For Rawls, even among reasonable people disagreement is sometimes inevitable due to epistemological obstacles that came into being as result of having free institutions. These “burdens” of judgment, resulting from the complexity of issues, the inherent vagueness of moral and

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political concepts and their respective judgments, different experiences, and normative considerations create difficulties in setting the priorities (Rawls 1996: 54–58). We should not rule out an altruistic impulse where X would just let it go. However, these sorts of outcomes are rare, and also it is difficult to build a principled order of moral system based on altruistic behavior. When everybody acts in favor of each other, there is nothing to settle or decide. In fact, in the cases of toleration, it is required that some negative judgments have to be involved about certain acts or beliefs. If there is no judgment, then there is no issue of toleration. Compare this to Rawls’s discussion of benevolence in the context of justice as fairness (Rawls 1971: 183–195). This is a result of an inherent problem facing the rationality of toleration decisions. As Dees argues “We certainly cannot rely on the rationality of the parties to see the intrinsic goodness of toleration; their view of the world will often not allow them to see toleration as anything less than a betrayal of faith, their freedom, or their identity. And even if, after series of change in themselves, they can eventually accept toleration as a rational choice, we should make no presumptions that such changes will always occur or even that they will remain stable over time. We can only hope that the successful examples of toleration they see in the world will inspire their efforts” (Dees 1998: 94). See Kymlicka (1996) for a comparison between Ottoman and modern democratic models of toleration. For a detailed analysis of the millet system, see Karpat (1972). I borrow these terms from Valdes’s fine analytical essay on the nature of toleration. He also goes on to distinguish public and private forms of vertical and horizontal toleration. If toleration emerges among individuals out of asymmetrical relationships then we talk about private vertical toleration; conversely, if toleration emerges out of symmetrical relationships, then we talk of private horizontal toleration. Public toleration takes the form of vertical toleration, if the political authority is the tolerating agent. The best example of this idea was presented in Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. Horizontal public toleration emerges in the cases of social contract, such as the foundation of the Swiss Confederation in 1315 (Valdes 1997: 129–130). Page numbers refer to John Locke (2003), “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” in D. Wootton (ed.) Political Writings, Indianapolis: Hackett. Over the last decade or so, the criticism of Locke’s idea of toleration in particular, put forth by John Dunn (1990) in his essay “What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke?” and Jeremy Waldron (1988) in the essay “Locke: Toleration and Rationality of Persecution,” generated a plethora of works in Locke’s defense. Among the notable works are the volumes that came out of the Morrell Toleration Project hosted by York University (Mendus 1989, 2000; Horton and Mendus 1991), Alex Tuckness’s analyses (2000, 2002a, 2002b) of the legislative view he claims Locke defended, Ingrid Creppel’s review of Locke’s theory (1994), and Richard Vernon’s (1997) defense of Locke against Jonas Proast and Waldron. Waldron continued to defend some of his early views with a theological emphasis in his recent book (2002). Arguably the

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rising interest in toleration and particularly Locke’s theory of toleration is a result of the increasing salience of religion in politics and political theory. Since Locke presented the earliest, most systematic form of religious liberty in the form of political toleration, his thought carries significant relevance for the problems today. Accordingly, many such works intend to reestablish some of Locke’s ideas or test their relevancy in the contemporary context. Another reason is the ever-influential political liberalism, the roots of which trace back to Locke. Disappointment or disagreement with Rawls’s formulation of political toleration also generated interest in early liberal thought. A good example of this line of work is Murphy (2001). Thus he would later deny toleration to atheists. Locke’s comprehensive religious writings in which he ardently defended the reasonableness of Christianity (2002 [1695]) defy the claim that he was a skeptic. Dunn still held similar ideas but de-emphasized some of his criticism in his later essay (1991). Selina Chen describes this difference between religion and natural law in Locke’s thought in her fine essay, as follows: “Although the premise of a belief in God fundamental to natural law was viewed as a certain truth reachable through reason, natural law is the law of reason and not specifically Christian in content. Religion taken as a whole encompasses revealed religion and natural law in the sense that they embody God’s commands. While people reasonably differ in matters of revealed religion, natural law, by contrast, is a universal body of moral doctrines accessible by reason alone, and takes precedence over revealed religion because of its epistemic superiority” (Chen 1998: 182). Although it is not very clear whether Locke suggests a dichotomy between a state and a church, as their being related to outward and inward realms, respectively, one might argue that if the church is a free and a voluntary society, then the state is opposite of that, namely not a voluntary association. Individuals do not enter the political society in the fashion that they enter a church. This way, Locke established the priority of the political society to any other association which exists within the society. In this respect, this account of political society in Locke foreshadowed Rawls’s view. Political society, according to Rawls, is “to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the purposes of human life. It also closed [. . .] in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death. We have no prior identity before being in society [. . .] Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into society where we will lead a complete life” (Rawls 1996: 40–41). See especially Mendus (1989: 30), Wootton (2003: 102–104), and Tuckness (2002a). For the justification of these limits vis-à-vis the Locke, see Wootton (2003), Tuckness (2002a), Creppel (1994), and Chen (1998). Here I do not assume any parallelism between the historical context of Locke and the contemporary context. I consider broad notions in Locke’s theory of political toleration and the logic he employed heuristically so as to reflect upon the contemporary problems, in a Lockean sense.

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Chapter 6 1 Page numbers refer to the Oxford edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976), ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2 This does not, however, prevent the spectator from sympathizing with an actor’s selfish passions. As Griswold argues, “Smith’s theory of sympathy allows that one could ‘sympathize’ with an agent’s selfish passions, recognize that one’s own passions would under similar circumstances resemble those of the agent (a recognition that would require one to ‘sympathize’ with oneself), and then condemn both the agent and (hypothetically, as it were) oneself for having inappropriately self-centered passions” (Griswold 1999: 85). 3 Although the social character of the impartial spectator is clearly shown in the passage quoted, Smith made some several attempts to transcend this meaning. D. D. Raphael comments, “on the one hand Smith wanted to retain the traditional view that the voice of conscience represents the voice of God and is superior to popular opinion. On the other hand he believed that conscience is initially an effect of social approval or disapproval” (Raphael 1975: 91). Fitzgibbons makes a similar point: “Smith referred to the spectator as ‘a great demi-god’, and ‘the representative of mankind, and substitute of Deity’ meaning that although the spectator was formed in a society, he was ultimately independent of it” (Fitzgibbons 1995: 65). 4 The impartial spectator should not be taken, however, as an embodiment of a pure philosophical standard of morality and justice that applies to infinite situations: “The impartial spectator has a critical perspective and estimates the degree of approbation due. This spectating critic is not a philosopher; he or she does not deliberate about first principles, or (at least initially) speculate about the utility of this or that action or character in the context of a general system of morality or nature. The object of evaluation is a particular—this or that performance or person, this or that situation, as ‘sympathetically’ judged in light of a reasonable standard (extrapolated from thoughtful observations) governing how individuals may be expected to behave or respond in just this or that sort of situation” (Griswold 1999: 136). 5 If the sympathetic nature of human beings generates comprehensive morality large enough to create social harmony why do we need the moral support of religion? This is a question that must be taken very seriously in order to reach a better understanding of the connection between religion and liberalism. The relationship between religion and morality is a vast topic and its analysis is beyond the scope of this work. It is suffice to say that Smith’s sentimental morality has enormous potential on this matter and it should be studied more thoroughly. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith treats religion in relation to the moral formation of society. He does not involve himself in theological questions, and simply implies that religion beyond the moral issues is irrelevant for moral theory. In other words, if there is a religion, Smith’s interest is in its moral dimension. That is to say, from his perspective, religion which does not fit to the sympathetic nature of human beings is a worrying matter, and conversely, religion which supplements that nature should be welcome. One

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might question, however, the extent to which the sympathetic nature of an individual is independent of an individual’s belief system. In my understanding, Smith does not treat these categories as independent. In fact, he sees quite a connection between the two, as in the corrosive impact of religious belief on the sentimental nature of human beings. Thus, the “rational religion” that Smith refers to might be interpreted as a belief system that does not conflict with the sentimental nature of human beings. Page numbers refer to the Chicago edition of The Wealth of Nations, vol. 2 (1976b), ed. Edwin Cannan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. It is a question whether the emergence of religious dissent should require toleration by public and religious authorities in the first place. At this level of analysis, Smith seems to suggest that religious dissent grows as a reaction to the clergy’s alienation from the masses. Thus, one might speak of a void in religious instruction and formation, which provides dissenting voices with opportunities to grow and spread, rather than the toleration of diverse ideas by the higher authorities. Unintended consequences of public policies and individual actions is a theme frequently referred to and illustrated by the Scottish Enlightenment tradition. For a comprehensive review of Hume and Smith’s works in light of the concept, see Whelan (2001). Whether “rational religion,” which Smith adores and expects to emerge under his plan is in concordance with the traditional conceptions of religion is a controversial issue that I do want to take up here. For more insights into the view of religion advocated by Smith versus Christianity, see Minowitz (1993). As I mentioned above, in The Wealth of Nations, and, to a large extent, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith undertakes the task of employing the moral force of religion within a larger social context. He is chiefly concerned with certain public manifestations of religion, such as religious violence and fanaticism, and his idea of religious disestablishment is an attempt to formulate a proper institutional arrangement of religion that would prevent religious conflicts, bring forth moderation to religious discourse, and thus incorporate religion into the moral fabric of society. Accordingly, Smith does not engage in theological debates. This fact by itself may be accounted as the reason why some authors suggested that Smith was antireligious. In light of the cited passages of Smith, together with his Theory, it is not reasonable to assert that Smith was against religion. Laurence R. Iannaccone has published several articles showing that the modern data on religious participation across countries support this conviction. See Iannaccone (1990, 1991, 1992; Iannaccone and Stark 1994). “A man of low condition [. . .] is far from being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice. He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much attention of any

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respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his conduct, and if he gives occasion to any scandal, if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always require of one another, to punish him by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no civil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect” (Smith 1976b: 317). 12 In a recent essay, Samuel Fleischaker (2002a) presents enormous evidence of Smith’s influence on America’s founding fathers. Fleischaker argues that the Wealth of Nations was very well received in America, even better than in England, and read by many political leaders before 1786, including Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and Adams, and that it influenced American political debates throughout the 1780s. He mentions at least two explicit references to Smith in debates in the constitutional convention. Fleischaker also holds that the arguments used by James Madison in favor of the separation of church and state in the amendment to the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, and later in his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, were exactly those of Smith. Moreover, the conceptual framework employed by Madison about factions in Federalist 10, Fleischaker maintains, mimics Smith’s account of religious sects.

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Index

Accommodation and civil religion, 35 and political liberalism, 35 of nonreligious views, 2 of religious views, 2 Ackerman, Bruce, 13 Afghanistan, 55 Algeria, 108 Alston, William, 2 Anglophone democracies, 60 Audi, Robert, 2 Autonomy, 9 Background culture, 18 in Muslim societies, 33 Casanova, José, 48 Catholic Church, 54, 56–58 Chen, Selina, 77 Christian Democratic parties, 54 Christian Right, 54 Church and state relations, 51 separation of, 75 Civil society in Muslim societies, 52 Coffey, John, 75 Cohen, Joshua, 13 Comprehensive liberalism, 8–12 Constitutional consensus, 26 Constitutional essentials, 28 Cropsey, Joseph, 92

David Hume, 99–100, 104 Democracy and Islam, 32, 56 in Anglophone societies, 60 in Muslim societies, 3, 5 in Western societies, 35 Deprivatization of religion, 48, 112 Doctrines Comprehensive, 3 Islamic, 34 Reasonable, 3 Religious, 2, 33, 40 Secular, 33 Dunn, John, 74–75 Dworkin, Ronald, 13 Egypt, 108 Erastian tradition, 35 Fundamentalism, 53, 123 n.4 lay, 53 Habermas, Jürgen, 10–11 and post-metaphysical condition, 11 Hakoonssen, Knud, 105 Haynes, Jeff, 50 Impartiality of the State, 107, 118–20 Individualism, 9 Indonesia, 51, 108 Iran, 51, 55, 108, 122 Islam and democracy, 32, 56 Islamist parties, 41, 52

140

Index

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Kant, Immanuel, 9 Kelly Erin, 22 Kemalism, 43 Laicism, 57–58 exasperated, 43 Larmore, Charles, 11, 13 Liberalism comprehensive, 9–12 legitimacy in, 8 political, see Political Liberalism of Kant, 10 of Smith, 10 Locke, John, 13, 27, 72–82, 118 Lukes, Steven, 83 McPherson, Lionel, 22 Mill, John Stuart, 9 Millet system, 71 Muller, Jerry Z., 95 Murphy, Andrew, 75, 124 n.1 Muslim democrat parties, 52 Muslim societies background culture in, 33, 52 civil society in, 52 democracy in, 3, 5 politics in, 54–56 secularization, 5, 58–59, 108 Nagel, Thomas, 13 Neal, Patrick, 38–9 Neutrality, 41–42 Overlapping consensus, 5, 23–27 Parker, Samuel, 77 Political conception of justice, 5, 13–20 Political culture, 17 Political liberalism and family, 18 and impartiality of the state, 107–109 and Islamic doctrines, 34 and political toleration, 82–86 civil society, 18–19 components of, 62 definition of, 12–13 of John Rawls, 13

religious doctrines, 39–41 sociology of, 59–64 Political toleration, 72 Politics in Muslim societies, 54–56, 123 n.3 Post-metaphysical condition, 11 Public political forum, 29 Public reason, 27–31 vs. secular reason, 43 Rawls, John and A Theory of Justice, 4 and Political Liberalism, 13 Reasonable citizens, 20 pluralism, 20–23, 114 religion, 37–41 Reasonableness political, 22–23 Religion competitive, 105 definition of, 2 deprivatization of, 48, 112 disappearance of, 47 doctrines in political liberalism, 40 false, 106 in reasonable pluralism, 37–41 private, 49 rational, 128 n.9 resurgence of, 1, 4, 5, 11, 112 Religious doctrines, 2, 33, 40 Sacralization theory, 47, 112 Saudi Arabia, 51, 108, 122 Scheffler, Samuel, 61 Secular conceptions, 5 doctrines, 33 fundamentalism, 43 reason, 43 state, 41 Secularism, 3, 57 in the Muslim world, 58, 108 liberal, 57 republican, 58 Secularist, 41 policies in France, 124 n.6 reasoning, 5 state, 41 Secularization theory, 46, 112

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Index Secularization, 3, 5 Shklar, Judith, 13 Smith, Adam and America’s founding fathers, 129 n.12 and moral challenge of religion, 90–98 and public religion, 98–105 and religious fanaticism, 96–97 Stark, Rodney, 47 Stepan, Alfred, 50 Syria, 108

141

Taylor, Charles, 58 Toleration and trust, 70 aspects of, 67–69 between groups, 70 Tunisia, 108 Turkey, 51, 55, 108 United States of America, 35, 51, 60, 63, 107 Waldron, Jeremy, 75, 79 Whelan, Frederick, 104