Political Islamists In Turkey And Gülen Movement 303029756X, 9783030297565, 9783030297572

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MIDDLE EAST TODAY

Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement Recep Dogan

Middle East Today Series Editors Fawaz A. Gerges Department of International Relations London School of Economics London, UK Nader Hashemi Center for Middle East Studies Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver Denver, CO, USA

The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the US invasion and occupation of Iraq have dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the contemporary Middle East. The Arab Spring uprisings have complicated this picture. This series puts forward a critical body of first-rate scholarship that reflects the current political and social realities of the region, focusing on original research about contentious politics and social movements; political institutions; the role played by non-governmental organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood; and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Other themes of interest include Iran and Turkey as emerging pre-eminent powers in the region, the former an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the latter an emerging democracy currently governed by a party with Islamic roots; the Gulf monarchies, their petrol economies and regional ambitions; potential problems of nuclear proliferation in the region; and the challenges confronting the United States, Europe, and the United Nations in the greater Middle East. The focus of the series is on general topics such as social turmoil, war and revolution, international relations, occupation, radicalism, democracy, human rights, and Islam as a political force in the context of the modern Middle East. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14803

Recep Dogan

Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement

Recep Dogan Wisdom College Brisbane, QLD, Australia

Middle East Today ISBN 978-3-030-29756-5 ISBN 978-3-030-29757-2  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Mikadun/shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

The Justice and Development Party (the AKP) and the Gülen movement (aka Hizmet Movement) are religious groups that aim to serve Islam and religious life. Both groups had a relationship for their mutual benefit for a long time. The main issue in common for both groups was the repression and restraining of the rigid secularists within the state institutions and the military. Following the elimination of the ultra-­secularists from the state apparatus, the positive relationship between the AKP and the movement has turned into a brutal fight, especially after the corruption investigation against the AKP government and the members of Erdogan’s family in 2013. This book aims to discuss the ideology of political Islamists and its effects on religion and social life. Moreover, it seeks to understand how and why the positive image of the Gülen movement has been changed from a faith-inspired community to a “terrorist organization” by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling party, the AKP. Due to the great polarization, hatred and enmity of the ruling Erdogan government against all members of the Gülen movement and its huge effect on society, it has become a necessity to analyze political Islam and its fight against the Gülen movement. After decades of rigid secularist rule which constantly threatened the Islamist parties as well as religious groups in Turkey, political power was finally transferred to the political Islamist AKP, the Justice and Development Party, in the 2002 general elections. Nevertheless, the AKP’s Kemalist and secularist rivals in the judiciary, military, and various parts of the state bureaucracy continued to challenge the party. v

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PREFACE

Thus, the Gülen Movement’s support was essential for the AKP to gain control over the state institutions. For the Gülen Movement, aligning with the ruling party was desirable too, because the success of political Islamists enabled the Islamic civil society organizations, including the movement, to grow rapidly with less interference from the secularist elites, particularly during the first two terms of the AKP government. Both groups cooperated in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) trials to neutralize the tutelary capacity of the secularist military caste. The strategic alliance peaked during the constitutional referendum of September 12, 2010. Although it was easy for both groups to put aside their differences in the ideologies when fighting the common enemy, it was not easy for both to maintain their strategic alliance when the Erdogan government exerted itself to bring all civil society organizations into subjection. The alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement thus began to fall apart in 2011; it dramatically collapsed in 2013 and finally evolved into an intense fight in the subsequent years. Although the clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement is usually described as a power struggle within the state, this does not give the full picture of the situation. The most powerful reason for the split of the two groups from each other is directly related to their understanding of Islam or, in other words, how each group interprets Islam in theory and practice. The split between them is, in reality, the difference between political Islam and civil Islam. While giving the history of relations between the AKP and the Gülen movement, the book aims to explore the reasons that caused a dramatic split between them. It also explains human rights violations, restrictions on the media and the destruction of democratic institutions in Erdogan’s “New Turkey” project. Moreover, in order to help readers to better understand the difference between Political Islam and civil Islam, the book explains the political theology of each group. In this respect, political theologies of the AKP and the Gülen movement are compared to each other in order to give a clear picture of the differences between them. The book concludes with how this fight would shape the future of Turkey as well as how it may direct Muslims’ understanding of Islam when they adopt the ideology of Political Islam or the ideology of civil Islam. Brisbane, Australia

Recep Dogan

Contents

1 Introduction 1 2 Political Islam 9 3 The Gülen Movement 41 4 From a Strategic Alliance to a Terrorist Organization: The History of the Relationship Between AKP and the Gülen Movement from 2001 to 2019 51 5 Turkey’s Future Direction Under Erdogan’s Regime 105 6 The Political Theology of Political Islamists of Turkey 141 7 The Political Theology of the Gülen Movement 177 8 Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Groups 215 Bibliography 229 Index 259

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Abbreviations

Aramco The Saudi-American oil company BDP Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party CHP The Republican People’s Party DP Democrat Party ECHR European Convention on Human Rights ETÖ Ergenekon Terror Organization EU European Union FETÖ Gülenist Terror Organization FP The Virtue Party FRA Freedom Research Association HSYK Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors IHH The Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief IMF The International Monetary Fund KCK The Kurdistan Communities Union MGK National Security Council MHP The Nationalist Movement Party MIT Turkish National Intelligence Agency MNP The National Order Party MSP The National Salvation Party MÜSIAD The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPR National Public Radio Oda TV Oda TV which was founded in 200 is an online news portal based in Turkey ix

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ABBREVIATIONS

OFAC The Office of Foreign Assets Control PEJ The Equality and Justice Party in France PKK The Kurdistan Workers’ Party RP The Welfare Party SP The Felicity Party The AKP Adalet and Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) The DENK Dutch for “think” and Turkish for “equality”, self-styled as DENK is a political party in The Netherlands that calls itself a “movement” The Diyanet Turkish Directory of Religious Affairs The NBZ The Freedom Party of Austria is a right-wing populist, national-conservative political party in Austria The UN The United Nations The YÖK Council for Higher Education TURGEV Youth Education and Service Foundation of Turkey Türksat Turkish Satellite Communications Company TUSKON The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1  Introduction Islam has been interpreted in various ways by individuals since its birth and Political Islam is one of its interpretations. Political Islam has a long history, and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party—the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi)—is a new face of it in the twenty-first century. The main goals of writing this book are to define political Islam, especially in the Turkish context with respect to the AKP, a political party which has been in power in Turkey since 2002, and to try to understand the nature of conflicts between the two Islamic groups: the AKP and the Gülen Movement, a transnational social movement emerging originally in Turkey in the early 1970s. The Justice and Development Party (the AKP) and the Gülen movement (aka Hizmet Movement) are religious groups that aim to serve Islam and religious life. Both groups had a relationship for their mutual benefit for a long time. The main issue in common for both groups was the repression and restraining of the rigid secularists within the state institutions and the military. Following the elimination of the ultra-secularists from the state apparatus, the positive relationship between the AKP and the movement has turned into a brutal fight, especially after the corruption investigation against the AKP government and the members of Erdogan’s family in 2013. This book aims to discuss the ideology of political Islamists and its effects on religion and social life. Moreover, it seeks to understand how and why the positive image © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_1

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of the Gülen movement has been changed from a faith-inspired community to a “terrorist organization” by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling party, the AKP. Although the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) has long benefitted greatly from the valuable support of Fethullah Gülen and his followers in the way of democratizing the state and its institutions, the two groups have clearly separated from each other since the 2013 corruption scandals or perhaps a little earlier.1 This separation has created a massive impact on practicing Muslims as well as on others. Due to the great polarization, hatred and enmity of the ruling Erdogan government against all members of the Gülen movement and its huge effect on society, it has become a necessity to analyze political Islam and its fight against the Gülen movement. Fethullah Gülen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have great influence on Turkish people. Both use Islamic concepts to revive Islamic life in Turkey and receive support from Muslims. Erdogan and AKP’s elite come from the late Necmettin Erbakan’s2 National Outlook Movement3 (Milli Görüş), the religiopolitical movement which seeks a religious revival through the ideology of political Islam, whereas Fethullah Gülen aims to promote civil Islam among different segments of society without seeking to establish an Islamic state. Gülen refrained from partisan politics and employed a gradualist approach focusing on a bottom-up spiritual progress of society. Thus, the Gülen movement has invested its capital and energy mostly in education and dialogue. In order to avoid confrontation with the secularist Turkish state, the movement stayed away from political Islamists, including the National Outlook. Looking back to its recent history, the National Outlook Movement pursued a political path of forming political parties that would ultimately establish an Islamic state much like the Muslim Brotherhood4 tried in Egypt. Erbakan adopted a discourse infused with anti-Western and antisecularist sentiments, thus experiencing military intervention several times. Avoiding the mistakes of the past, the reformists led by Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç, ultimately split from the National Outlook Movement and formed the AKP on August 14, 2001. After decades of rigid secularist rule which constantly threatened the Islamist parties as well as religious groups in Turkey, political power was finally transferred to the political Islamist AKP, the Justice and Development Party, in the 2002 general elections. The ruling AKP has increased its control over the government and consolidated its power

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further in the succeeding years. At the beginning of its rule, Erdogan’s AKP avoided direct confrontation with the secularist institutions. It claimed to have changed, and described itself as a representative of conservative democrats, rather than Islamists. Nevertheless, the AKP’s Kemalist5 and secularist rivals in the judiciary, military, and various parts of the state bureaucracy continued to challenge the party. Thus, the Gülen Movement’s support was essential for the AKP to gain control over the state institutions. For the Gülen Movement, aligning with the ruling party was desirable too, because the success of political Islamists enabled the Islamic civil society organizations, including the movement, to grow rapidly with less interference from the secularist elites, particularly during the first two terms of the AKP government. As a matter of fact, Gülen and his followers had been treated negatively and suppressed by the former secularist elites and the military caste, especially in the aftermath of the frequent military interventions and post-modern coups. They were subjected to many antidemocratic sanctions, accusations, and implementations by the secular state for decades. This harsh attitude toward the movement was eased during the AKP rule until 2012. During the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup,6 a video which leaked to the media showed that Gülen advised his sympathizers to cover their religious identities; otherwise, they would be sacked by the secularist state. In the lawsuit, opened in 2000 at the Ankara State Security Court, Gülen was accused of undermining the secular order. The lawsuit described the Gülen movement as the strongest and most effective Islamic group in Turkey which camouflages its methods with a democratic and moderate image. However, Gülen was cleared of all the accusations through the process of the Turkish judiciary system. The Ankara Criminal Court acquitted Fethullah Gülen of subverting the secular regime in 2006. Following the institution of European Union (EU)-oriented liberal changes to the Counterterrorism Law on May 5, 2006, Gülen and the movement he inspired were acquitted of the accusations. Similarly, the AKP survived the military’s indirect intervention on April 27, 2007 with the support of the Gülen Movement. Both groups cooperated in the Ergenekon7 and Sledgehammer (Balyoz)8 trials to neutralize the tutelary capacity of the secularist military caste. The strategic alliance peaked during the constitutional referendum of September 12, 2010. This referendum altered the composition of the judicial bodies and weakened the power of the ultra-secularists in the judiciary. Gülen publicly encouraged

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his sympathizers to cast affirmative votes in the referendum and in return, Erdogan offered his gratitude to Gülen and the movement. As a matter of fact, all three strongholds of the secular establishment in the presidency, military, and judiciary were neutralized in 2010. As a result, the movement was no longer an open target for the repression of the secularist elites during the AKP rule and a grand alliance was formed between them. After all the years of suffering from the suspicious, negative attitudes of the secularist and Kemalist elite, the movement enjoyed the restoration of its honor through the glorification of the AKP elite. Nevertheless, it did not last long. Indeed, it was a great opportunity for the victims of secular oppression to have more power in the state and public life. However, this was also the beginning of conflict between the two groups and termination of the strategic alliance. Although it was easy for both groups to put aside their differences in the ideologies when fighting the common enemy, it was not easy for both to maintain their strategic alliance when the Erdogan government exerted itself to bring all civil society organizations into subjection. The alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement thus began to fall apart in 2011; it dramatically collapsed in 2013 and finally evolved into an intense fight in the subsequent years.9 Each group attacked the other using the control they had gained over particular state functions in the preceding years. The AKP used its control over the executive and legislative branches to subjugate the movement; the sympathizers of the Gülen Movement contended against the AKP through their connections in the bureaucracy. It seems the AKP government neutralized the influence of the movement over the state apparatus during its fight against it. The differences in the ideology, worldview, and interpretation of Islam have eventually caused a dramatic split between the movement and the AKP. Familiarity breeds contempt: the dramatic differences in each group came to be known and the split between them became an inescapable result. This separation turned into one of the fiercest political battles in the history of Turkish politics.10 The conflict between these two groups has many roots. At the ideological level, the most important divergence is their approach to Islam for the AKP stems from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition or the ideology of political Islam while the Gülen Movement comes from a Sufi and Turkish brand of Islam which has disdained from the Arab world’s Muslim Brotherhood tradition.

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Political Islamists see Erdogan as the leader of the Muslim world; hence, they cannot tolerate Gülen sharing the same status with him. Secondly, Erdogan wants to be the president with unrestricted power, with no checks and balances. He is very ambitious to hold all power in his own hands. He perceived Gülen and the movement he inspired as rivals to his goal; thus, he declared them the arch enemy. Through controlling the executive and legislative power in the state, the AKP has been purging the followers of the movement from the state as well as from the public sphere. Although the clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement is usually described as a power struggle within the state, this does not give the full picture of the situation. The most powerful reason for the split of the two groups from each other is directly related to their understanding of Islam or, in other words, how each group interprets Islam in theory and practice. The split between them is, in reality, the difference between political Islam and civil Islam. While giving the history of relations between the AKP and the Gülen movement, the book aims to explore the reasons that caused a dramatic split between them. It also explains human rights violations, restrictions on the media and the destruction of democratic institutions in Erdogan’s “New Turkey” project. Moreover, in order to help readers to better understand the differences between Political Islam and Civil Islam, the book explains the political theology of each group. In this respect, political theologies of the AKP and the Gülen movement are compared to each other in order to give a clear picture of the differences between them. The book concludes with how this fight would shape the future of Turkey as well as how it may direct Muslims’ understanding of Islam when they adopt the ideology of Political Islam or the ideology of civil Islam.

Notes

1.  The 2004 National Security Council (MGK) document indicates that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) agreed to a planned crackdown on the movement. The MGK document asked the government to develop an action plan to follow the MGK’s recommendations and instructed the Prime Ministry’s Implementation and Monitoring Coordination Council (BUTKK) to coordinate the ministries and monitor whether the steps were being implemented. The MGK decision urged the Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry and National

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Intelligence Organization (MIT) to closely monitor and report on the activities of the Gülen movement at home and abroad. It advised the government to instruct the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Education to investigate and monitor schools affiliated with the Gülen movement and report their activities to the Information Technologies and Communications Authority (BTK). A termination plan on the Gülen movement, which was drafted back in 2004, has been in action since then. 2. Erbakan (29 October 1926–27 February 2011) was the founder of political Islam and National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş) in Turkey. He was the Prime Minister of Turkey from 1996 to 1997. He experienced military interventions a few times and was later banned from politics by the Constitutional Court of Turkey due to violating the separation of religion and state. On the basis of National Outlook ideology, Erbakan established several Islamic political parties in Turkey from the 1960s to the 2010s, namely the National Order Party (MNP), the National Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP), the Virtue Party (FP), and the Felicity Party (SP). He died on 27 February 2011. 3. It is a religio-political movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan and a series of Islamist parties inspired by its founder on the basis of the ideology of political Islam. 4.  It is s an Islamic organization that was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist religious, political, and social movement which aims implement Islamic sharia law into government based on an Islamic ethos of altruism and civic duty, in opposition to political and social injustice and to British imperial rule. 5. People who follow the ideology of Kemalism also known as Atatürkism. Kemalism was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey. Kemalism was a serious of reforms designed to separate the new Turkish state from its Ottoman past and implement a western lifestyle, including the establishment of democracy and secularism. 6. It refers to the decisions issued by the Turkish military leadership on a National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997 which initiated the process that precipitated the resignation of Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party, and the end of his coalition government. 7.  It is a mythical place located in the inaccessible valleys of the Altay Mountains. The name was given to an alleged clandestine, secularist ultra-nationalist organization in Turkey with possible ties to members of the country’s military and security forces. It was accused of terrorism in Turkey. It is believed to be a part of the deep state in Turkey which

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alleged members had been indicted on charges of plotting to foment unrest, by assassinating intellectuals, politicians, judges, military staff, and religious leaders, with the ultimate goal of toppling the incumbent government. 8. It is the name of an alleged Turkish secularist military coup plan dating back to 2003, in response to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gaining office. 9. Demiralp, Seda, “The Breaking Up of Turkey’s Islamic Alliance: The AkpGulen Conflict and Implications for Middle East Studies,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2016): 1–7. 10.  Gursel, Kadri, “AKP-Cemaat Savasinda Neyi Savunmalıyız?” (What Should We Defend in the AKP-Cemaat War?), Milliyet, December 8, 2013, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/kadri-gursel/akp-cemaatsavasinda-neyi-savunmaliyiz--1804154/.

CHAPTER 2

Political Islam

2.1  Definitions of Political Islam Islam is a religion which offers a number of general principles and guidelines to its followers in relation to individual, familial, social, and governmental life on the basis of the Qur’an and Sunnah (Prophetic Traditions). The interpretation of Islam by individuals, nations, and cultures is different than Islam itself for it can be interpreted in many different ways including in relation to systems of government.1 Islamism or political Islam is about political order and it is a powerful instance of the global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism.2 Hence, Political Islam is a particular approach to interpretation of Islam on the basis of certain doctrines, beliefs, and values as the foundation of a political structure. The supporters of this ideology use some key concepts from Islamic history such as Islamic State, Caliphate and the Sharia to constitute their doctrines. For Political Islamists, there is no distinction between religion and politics.3 The slogan “Islam is din and dawla” (religion and state) is common among them. Political Islamists aim to religionize politics for the promotion of a political order that is believed to emanate from the will of God and is not based on popular sovereignty.4 The interaction of Islam and politics continues to draw the attention of scholars and the concern of policy makers. Political Islamists have come to power through duly democratic processes in their respective countries and are eager to have a significant impact on world events.5 Their activities not only cover politics but also social, financial, economic, © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_2

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and educational spheres. This book aims to explain the relationship between Islam and politics in Turkey for it attracts the greatest attention from both Muslim societies and the international community. Islamism is often nurtured in local conditions that must be understood. There have been different kinds of Islam, at different moments, for different people, and in different settings.6 Interpretation of Islam by individuals and groups range from reformist political and social protest movements to ultraconservative movements focused on morality-related issues rather than economic redistribution.7 Some Islamists are strongly nationalist in orientation as seen in Turkey.8 Political Islam has many faces, as manifested by the diverse and divergent Islamist parties and movements operating in Muslim-majority states and beyond.9 It has cycles of success and failure, intertwined with hope and despair. The political reverting of formerly “moderate” Muslim-majority government (the AKP) in Turkey has disappointed many Muslims who hope for more democratic political reforms in the heartland of the Muslim world. Moreover, the bloody Egyptian military coup in 2013 and brutal civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq have destroyed the expectations and hope of many Muslims. Political Islamic ideology proposes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.10 Political Islam is an interpretation of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining future with the concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.11 It dictates political values to its followers and Muslim rulers such as the notion of justice for all citizens. But political Islam is not independent of particular social and political contexts in which Islamist groups and parties operate. Political Islamists aim to implement their vision of Islamic law in political sense; therefore, they are incapable of making political compromises or building coalitions with other political forces/parties. The mainstream ideology of political Islam is anti-democratic in its nature, because according to this ideology, the caliph, the head of Muslims, represents God’s sovereignty and everyone must obey him. Thus, mainstream political Islamists use democracy in an instrumentalist fashion to come to power. But, once in power they are likely to abandon the democratic system in order to give all power to one person.

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While Political Islamists have many goals, the ultimate one is establishing a worldwide caliphate and Islamic state.12 Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328),13 an influential Hanbali theologian argues that the essence of government is applying force to people so they live in obedience and their solidarity is not ruined. Thus, the ruler can demand obedience from his people, even if he is not just, because, an unjust ruler is better than strife and the dissolution of society.14 It is obvious that ibn Taymiyya advocates a particular political order that can operate against social harmony and basic political freedoms. This approach paved the way for the current Muslim political dictators across the Middle East and North Africa to justify their authoritarian rule. The politicization of religion and the induction of religion into politics are the unique characteristics of political Islamists. For example, Saudi Arabia is a hereditary monarchy legitimized in religious terms by the Wahhabi religious establishment.

2.2  A Brief History of Political Islam Political Islam has a long history and has appeared in various forms in different contexts.15 Since it is very difficult to cover all the history of political Islam and its various forms, we have mainly focused on the Political Islam that has emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century until present. The representatives of this ideology have primarily resorted to political aspect of Islam to illustrate the perceived threat of Westernization in the Muslim world to Muslims. Initially, Western colonialization and the evolving sociopolitical conditions in the Middle East caused some Muslim leaders/groups to conceptualize Political Islam as a response to the west and foreign ideologies. They advocated the notion of political power, caliphate, and unity of Muslims to protect Islam and Muslim world.16 It was a reaction to more powerful and more successful western state model. Moreover, many Muslims, including traditionally educated, reformist-minded Muslim scholars such as M. Abduh, started to question their own values with the feelings of inferiority against the west and its civilization. Western colonialization of Islamic lands has been interpreted by scholars in various ways. Some scholars identified it as the clash of two conflicting state models17 while others deemed it as the fight between the west and the east. Muslim scholars who live in a country occupied/ colonialized by the west have developed some responses including

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the ideology of Political Islam to protect Muslim identity and culture. However, in reality, the decline of Islamic civilization has a long history, starting from the tenth century when science was separated from religion and religious scholars did not produce any original work rather than repeating/imitating the previous ones. Thus, it is not accurate to blame the west and its colonial legacy as the only reason for the backwardness of the Muslim world. In the last three centuries in particular, the overall condition of the Muslim World has become worse for it could not keep up with the west in relevance to scientific, political freedom, economic and human rights developments and this resulted not only in the occupation of their lands but also to a great disparity between the West and the Muslim World in terms of the power of science, human development and knowledge. Instead of understanding the multitude of factors that have caused Muslims to be in this position today, various Muslim scholars have developed a number of different ideologies including political Islam. The interpretation of Islam that separates science from religion has been exerting a strict control over Islamic thought and hindering its development since long time. There could be many reasons for the stagnation of the Islamic world as well as its starting time. When we focus on the last three centuries, we notice that Muslims could not have succeeded in significant changes to their civilization. They strongly believed in the authenticity of their religion and God’s favor upon them, and this led them to be oblivious with regards to scientific developments and the power of knowledge. Moreover, Muslim elites felt that they could ignore the rest of the world18 for they do not need to learn/take anything from the infidels. Additionally, European expansionism in the last three centuries was traumatic and painful reality for Muslims, but it was too late to respond to it. There was a great need for Muslims to adjust their civilization with the modern world, but this could undermine the traditional structures that constituted the base of ruling class’ legitimacy. Nevertheless, some rulers such as Ottoman sultan Mahmud II (1785–1839) established a new military, bureaucratic, educational and judicial institutions based on the European model, but it was not sufficient, because, these attempts actualized modernization partially. Additionally, many people in the society were not happy with these changes, thus, the modernization efforts faced strong oppositions.

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Some scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) argued that Islam itself needed to be reformed in order to maintain its relevance to modern time and overcome the hegemony of the west. They criticized Muslim scholars who had closed the door of ijtihad (exerting juristic opinions) in the third century of Islam. Because, after closing the door of ijtihad scholars had been reduced to the role which only preserve and comment on the interpretations of the early scholars.19 They argued that modern scholars should return to original sources of Islam such as the Qur’an and Sunnah instead of commenting on the works of early scholars. They maintained that modern scholars should use their intellect and reason to interpret the primary sources of Islam when the circumstances demand as the pious early scholars did it during the first centuries of Islam. They also argued that the internal division and conflicts among Muslims, and the authoritarian rulers across the Islamic world made them too weak to confront the western challenge. Additionally, some ideas, practices, and institutions developed by the west which could be reconciled with the principles of Islam and its higher objectives were ignored by scholars and rulers instead of adopting them in Islamic world. For example, democracy could be understood by modern Muslims as “the shura” (the system of consultation) and it could be adopted in Muslim world as a ruling system.20 For Muhammad ‘Abduh, Islam is compatible with reason with the condition that if there appears to be any contradiction between them the human intellect is an authority to interpret the sources to overcome it in any way.21 He tried to interpret the Qur’an according the theories of modern science such as Darwin’s evolution and explained the creation accordingly. Obviously, this was a great challenge for Muslim scholars who felt inferiority against the west and its civilization. Because, when the theories of science are accepted as a final authority in relevance to interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, Islam can be reduced to the level of Christianity which has been locked into churches since long time. It seems, modernists such as ‘Abduh and Afghani aimed to restrict Islam and its appliance to morality and ethics only. Opposing to ‘Abduh and Afghani, Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949), a school teacher provided a radical interpretation of Islam by labeling all modernist scholars as enemies of religion and henchmen of the colonial powers.22 Shocked by the rapid westernization of Egyptian society Al-Banna developed a doctrine of Political Islam to protect Muslim

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identity. He was deeply affected when witnessing how Islamic values started to be melted by western attack equipped with all the destructive arms of wealth, ostentation, gratification, strength and means of propaganda.23 Thus, Banna and his followers struggled to protect Islamic values against the westernization for they believed that the European model of development was marred by ostentation and licentiousness. Banna founded the Muslim Brothers (Ikhwani Muslimin) in the late 1920s to actualize his ideology. He conceptualized his ideology under the influence of the conditions surrounding Egypt; British occupation, party corruption, and political violence. He advocated Islam as a comprehensive system which should regulate all aspects of life including people, government, power, justice, culture, science, economy, creed, and worship.24 He argued that Islam has a capacity to establish a system that allows the world to benefit from everything that is good and to avoid that is bad and evil. Banna was assassinated by the secret police in 1949 due to the suspicion that he and his followers might resort to violence. However, the Muslim Brothers accepted democracy and aimed to achieve power through peaceful means. They rejected the authoritarian regime like in Egypt and desired to have a Muslim version of a political party. Banna was succeeded by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) who systematized and developed the ideology of Political Islam. He redefined the concept of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic Arabia) as any society failing to submit to God’s ruling as revealed in the Qur’an, including Muslims who adhere to the capitalist or the communist systems.25 He believed that preaching alone would not be enough to establish an Islamic order, because, tyrants, dictators, and henchmen of the colonial powers would not give up power voluntarily. He argued that although there is no compulsion in religion,26 it is necessary to remove the obstacles between people and God. He deemed the tyrannical regimes as obstacles which prevent people from following the guidance of Islam. Thus, he encouraged Muslims to struggle against tyrannical regimes and to bring a just system that guarantees freedom to everyone and the whole of humanity.27 Political Islam encompasses several tendencies, yet all of these are similar with regards to the demand for the immediate implementation of sharia and the condemnation of their opponents as secularists and agents of the West. Usually, extremists among political Islamists reject democracy for they regard it as an illegitimate, man-made system of

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government which usurps God’s sovereignty. They aim to reach power through armed struggle and violence. Most of the terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and ISIS have been influenced by this extreme ideology.

2.3  Various Types of Political Islam Islam is a religion which encompasses every aspect of life,28 and it offers principles, guidelines, and rulings to its followers in order to provide them happiness in both worlds. The interpretation of Islam can be different according to time, culture and conditions. Political Islamists focus on political aspects of Islam with their own interpretation and understanding. They argue that Islam has views on politics in relevance to government and in order to practice Islam in its totality the sharia should be implemented in an Islamic State.29 Political Islam is not a single ideology that all political Islamists would agree on. In other words, it is impossible to accept a monolithic phenomenon with regards to political Islam, because, it is not independent of particular social and political contexts in which religious groups and parties operate. Occasionally, religion has been used by individuals, groups, or organizations to dictate political action in the state. Since the Prophet represented various roles in his unique personality such as being a head of state, a judge, a commander of army and a law maker, Muslims could not separate religion from the state. Islam is like an instrument for political Islamists to achieve their targets. They seek solutions for today’s societal challenges by referring to the foundations borrowed from Islamic tradition.30 Political activities in the name of Islam confuse Muslims. Because, although they are obsessed with implementing the sharia and enforcing God’s sovereignty in the state, they may easily contradict basic Islamic teachings in their daily life due to their extreme interpretation of Islam. More than 90% of Islam is related to personal practice and it can be applied without having an Islamic state. It is a great hypocrisy to advocate political aspect of Islam before practicing majority of it in daily life. In this regard, Australia, America, and European countries are much better in terms of allowing individuals to practice their faith. Opposing to this, Muslims countries do not give much freedom to citizens with regards to basic human rights. Even, political Islamists who suffered from the secular state apply the same oppression toward their opponents. The case of AKP, the ruling party in Turkey is a good example for this.

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Political Islamists do not believe democracy for they argue that it is against God’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, they do not hesitate to advocate democracy until attaining political power. By using Islam and its key concepts in politics the AKP has obtained a massive political power and justified its authoritarian and antidemocratic approaches in the state. Initially, the AKP represented a moderate version of Islam claiming that it changed its radical Islamic understanding. It avoided direct confrontation with secularists. Once, Political Islamists obtained the power they abandoned democratic system. They believe that every means in the way of obtaining political power is permissible. Thus, they use force, apply violence and practice antidemocratic implementations to achieve their objectives. They use religion and its key concepts to legitimize their actions. During the period of the Umayyad31 and Abbasid32 reigns, the religious and political spheres were not clearly separated. The state would impose its own understanding of Islam on society and punish scholars who opposed it. Although scholars (ulama) had religious authority on society in certain decree and the state generally recognized it they would be punished when they criticized the state. There was a peace between scholars and rulers when the formers accepted the legitimacy of rulers and the later recognized the religious authority of scholars. In order to prevent anarchy, political breakdown and divisions among Muslims, scholars recognized and justified rulers who were not just. They were extremely sensitive in protecting social fabric that could be torn asunder if they would engage in direct opposition to political authority. Nevertheless, some scholars did not hesitate to criticize unjust rulers and their wrongdoings. Unfortunately, some scholars developed the defense of the political status of rulers to the extent that they could not defend the rights of individuals. For example, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argues that a ruler whether just or unjust needs to be obeyed, because, it is better than strife and the dissolution of society.33 He believes that the state has authority to use force to bring solidarity in society. This approach supports dictatorship and injustices done by the state. Usually, rulers desire to control scholars to use religion for their own benefits. In many parts of the Islamic world, state controls scholars. Religion with its own doctrines and concepts do not shape politics rather politicians and state use religion to protect their power. The politicization of religion is not restricted to Islam only. Judaism and Christianity were/are politicized by some groups throughout

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history. So, nothing unique in the history of Islam that sets it apart from other religious traditions in terms of the relationship between religion and politics. Islam has been misinterpreted by politicians and rulers to the extent to cover up their corruption and justify their violence. They use religion for political purposes. For example, Saudi Arabia is a country ruled by a hereditary monarchy and it has been legitimized by the Wahhabi scholars. The state is governed by Saudi royal family and Wahhabi scholars. Saudi family administers the politics and Wahhabi scholars control religious affairs. Politicians and scholars support each other to run the state smoothly. Although oppression and persecution are not always inherent in political Islam the state may resort it to secure political power or cover up the corruption. For example, initially, the AKP advocated democracy and human rights but it started to abandon democratic values after obtaining the power. Political Islamists of Turkey applied oppression and persecution against opponents to establish monopoly in the state. Although it has come to power through democracy the AKP government has adopted antidemocratic practices since 2013 to destroy its opponents in Turkey and consolidate its own power. Political Islamists aim to destroy the far enemy, the United States and its allies in long term.

2.4  The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey Political Islam has been a very effective oppositional ideology in countries where Muslims are suffering due to their Islamic identity. The rise of political Islam in Turkey can be connected to the reforms undertaken in the late Ottoman period. Trying to modernize the state and its institutions the late Ottoman Sultans offered some reforms but it did not succeed much. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk implemented a revolution by military force to transform and westernize the state. He and a small military-bureaucratic elite imposed their secularist vision on a reluctant traditional society by overwhelming and intimidating any opposition without negotiating with the people.34 The secularist elite attempted a radical break with the Ottoman past by condemning and discarding everything related to it. They carried out a series of reforms such as abolishing the caliphate and introducing the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic one to cut Turkey’s ties to its Islamic past. They shut down religious institutions, banned traditional attires, and secularized the education system.

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After the collapse of Ottoman, a number of ideological movements struggled for power. Each had its unique approach to save the country and offered solutions to citizens. Political Islamists knew that Islam had major effect on population, thus, they aimed to obtain political power by using the power of religion on society. The secular elites and the Turkish nationalists perceived political Islamists as a major threat for the state, thus, they aimed to remove Islam from politics as well as from society. They advocated that the Sharia was incompatible with European ideals of modernity, thus, it caused Ottoman to collapse. Therefore, they tried to change the identity of Turkish people through the secular education and linguistic reforms. They removed religion from politics. Through these reforms, the secularists aimed to free Turkish-Muslims from the restrictions of traditional Islamic concepts and practices. They believed that by modernizing all aspects of state and society they could create a modern national state and a new type of free individuals. After the abolishment of the caliphate, religious groups in Turkey as well as in other parts of the Islamic world developed some strategies to restore Islamic life in society and politics. In this regard, some groups aimed to promote political Islam for they believed that Islam could only be practiced properly in a state governed by the sharia. They argued that if political power was achieved, they could shape religious identity by a top-down approach. It is very doubtful if Islam accepts an idea which imposes itself into society through using force but, political Islamist adopted a top-down logic to restore religious life. Although religion was banished from the public sphere and strictly supervised by the state it could not be completely suppressed or eliminated. Thus, the state aimed to control religious education and life through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) in Turkey. However, religious life in Turkey continued to have strong social roots with the past through religious-social movements. In spite the secular state excluded Muslims from the political sphere political Islamists established their own parties and movements to obtain power in the state. Indeed, when the secular elites tried to marginalize Muslims, this attitude caused them to develop a hidden Islamic identity within the Kemalist state.35 The state did not want autonomous groups to develop outside of its control for it regarded it as a potential threat to its ability to carry out its modernization effort and consolidate its political control. Thus, any opposition to regime’s ideology whether individual or social was quickly

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suppressed by the state. Trying to shape the society through force and oppression the state alienated the large majority of population.36 In response to antidemocratic practices of the state Political Islamists aimed to provide a political voice to the public. Over time, they developed goals and ideologies in the secular state. Realizing that it was not possible to remove religion from public life, the state aimed to control it starting in the second half of twentieth century. By controlling the religious understanding in society, the state desired to create a religious identity on the basis of Turkish nationalism. For this purpose, it established the Diyanet to supervise and regulate religious affairs according to the needs of modern Turkey. Moreover, the state closed the dervish lodges, prohibited religious cloaks in public, changed the alphabet into the Latin script, and adopted the Gregorian calendar. The secular state aimed to replace the integral role of Islam with the modern principle of nationalism. Thus, Turkish nationalism became the basis for politics, strategies, and philosophies in Turkey. The state established some institutions such as the Study of Turkish History to connect people to their national past. The institution tried to prove that Turks’ origins went back to central Asia. It also argued that Turks created many civilizations in all the lands they lived.37 In order to cut citizens’ connection with the Islamic past, the secular state aimed to develop a sense of national history. Secular elites thought that if the state could provide a sense of pride in their national history, Turkish people would not need to refer to their Islamic past. With the same mentality, non-Turkish words such as Arabic and Persian words were eliminated by the Turkish Language Society. To make Turkish citizens more conscious in regards to their pre-Islamic past, the new education system focused on the principles of the Turkish revolution.38 The establishment of a multi-party system in 1946 was an important turning point in the rise of political Islam in Turkey.39 The secular elites lost their monopoly on political power. Moreover, political parties in Turkey had to recognize Muslim identity in order to attract votes from the larger parts of the society. Although Political Islamists had gone into hibernation since 1923, they formed an anti-communist alliance with the state, thus gaining legitimacy and prestige within the state again around 1950. Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, the head of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1950s, stated that Islam absolutely rejects communism as well as every kind of ideology and practice

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related to it. Indeed, it is impossible for a true believer to reconcile himself to communist ideas and practices.40 The view of Akseki was tangible evidence of state-controlled Islam. The state used Islam and its values against communism. Hence, Islamist elites declared themselves as the Left’s sworn enemies. In 1948, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek urged the state to support “religious and spiritual tendencies” in the fight against communism.41 Sezai Karakoç took a leading role in mobilizing the masses against the Left and argued that the Qur’an describes rightists as the “community of God” and leftists as the “community of Satan.”42 The Nation Party (Millet Partisi), a 1950s Islamist party, enjoyed open support from Kısakürek and other Islamists, but it was shut down by the secular state in 1954 as a result of its religious activities. The ruling Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti—DP) allowed religious life and Islamic values to be successful in the political arena. Seeing the potential danger to its secular ideology, the Turkish military attempted a coup in 1960 and created the National Security Council (MGK) to impose its secular ideology on politicians. In order to counter the Soviets’ influence, the United States began a policy of supporting Islamism in the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, the military pressure was relieved in 1961 and religious groups had freedom again in Turkey. The works of prominent Islamists like Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, and Abul Ala Mawdudi began to be translated into Turkish. Turkey’s national intelligence service supported Islamist publications to prevent leftist movements from growing. During this time, political Islamists managed to form their own separate political party MSP (the National Salvation Party) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, a former professor of engineering who had studied in both Turkey and Germany. The United States and Saudi Arabia supported Islamic movements in the region. For this reason, in 1969 Bülent Ecevit, a general secretary of CHP (Republican Public Party) stated that Political Islamists pretended to be loyal to the ummah of Islam, but, in actual fact, they were loyal to the ummah of Aramco (the Saudi-American oil company).43 Erbakan’s party made considerable gains in the 1973 elections by receiving 11.8% of the vote. It became a key party in the formation of a coalition government in the Turkish Parliament.44 Between 1973 and 1980, the MSP (the National Salvation Party) formed coalition

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governments with the CHP (Republican Public Party) and later with the Nationalist Action Party and the Mainland Party. Erbakan was representative of political Islam in Turkey beginning in 1960s. He believed that Turkey was in moral decay due to the hegemony of western culture and influences, and that society should be purified from these effects. He wanted to gain control of the government gradually by establishing his own political party. However, the Turkish military often interfered with ruling parties and declared a memorandum demanding the formation of a democratic government in line with Ataturk’s secular vision. The fight between Political Islamists and the Turkish secular state began in 1960, and continued through the February 28, 1997 coup and its aftermath. The closure of Welfare and Virtue parties from the National Outlook background had significant influence over the development of the AKP in terms of organization and political strategy. Since 1970, Political Islamists have established six significant political parties: (1) the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi—MNP) (1970–1971); (2) the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi— MSP) (1972–1980); (3) the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP) (1983– 1998); (4) the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi—FP) (1997–2001); (5) the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi—SP) (2001–2019); and (6) the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) (2001–2019).45 The main reason that the ideology of political Islam grew in Turkey was that the secular state restricted and sometimes banned the religious rights for its citizens for a long time. Muslims who were persecuted by Kemalist rulers and secular elites due to their Islamic identity wanted to save themselves from the oppression. Thus, they established their own political parties on the basis of the ideology of political Islam. In 1970, Political Islam emerged as a political movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who founded the Milli Görüş (the National Outlook) movement. However, it was strongly scrutinized by the Kemalist authorities. In 1971, Turkey’s military authorities shut down the Party. Erbakan escaped to Germany but came back a year later and founded the MSP. By joining the coalition government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, Erbakan obtained partial political power. He had an opportunity to restore society to Islamic principles and religious life. He wanted to reach Turkish communities in Europe by calling them to identify themselves as Turkish-Muslims. He emphasized to “just order of society” meaning to apply Islamic principles in the state.

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During the 1970s, violence and political chaos were dominant in Turkey for political groups were in constant fights against each other. Thus, the Constitutional Court banned Erbakan’s MSP with the reason that it threatened national security and unity. Party members were prohibited from politics and they were sent to exile. Indeed, all Islamic parties were under pressure, and they were banned or closed down on several occasions. In spite of many negative experiences in the past, Political Islamists have re-emerged in various guises. The conflict between leftists and rightists in Turkey caused young people to commit violence in the name of their ideology, which eventually prompted the military to intervene in 1980 to restore order.46 In order to combat communism and leftist ideologies, the military supported Islamic education. Religious education became a compulsory subject in all schools with the permission of the Turkish military, for the state aimed to control the process of Islamization. The military hoped that by permitting religious education under state control, they could defeat leftist ideologies and Islamic radicalism. During this time, Erbakan established the Welfare party (Refah Partisi) in 1983 and returned to the political arena. The way to political power was cleared once again for Political Islamists. The ideology of Turkish Islam was used by the state as a key determinant of Turkish nationalism. Although the constitution defined Turkey as a secular state, religious groups continued to expand their ideology. Turkey enjoyed religious and economic freedom under the ruling of Prime Minister Turgut Özal.47 The reforms taken during his time allowed religious groups to finance the construction of private schools and universities in Turkey. This also opened up a political space for the followers of political Islam, who expanded their influence through media outlets and newspaper chains.48 Since 1970, Political Islamists under different names49 have been advocating a new economic and social order based on Islamic principles. They seek to return to traditional values and institutions. They regard secularism as the biggest threat to Islamic culture.50 They argue that the solution for Turkey’s problems is to return to Islamic principles and the Muslim way of life. They stress the need for greater social justice and equality. In the early 1990s, Political Islamists under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan achieved success in the political arena by winning 19% of the vote and the mayor’s office in 28 municipalities, including

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Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. They obtained political power by focusing on social issues rather than religious themes. When they came in first with 21.6% of the vote in the 1995 national elections, the secular elites and the military felt great unrest and anxiety, for they could not accept that the state would be run by an Islamist party. After his success in the political arena, Erbakan started to advocate the Sharia and criticized the secular system. He openly stated that the Sharia will be back, and the only question was whether the process would be bloody or not. Instead of reducing social tensions, political Islamists polarized Turkish society, leading the military and the MGK to present a list of recommendations to curb anti-secular activity on February 28, 1997.51 Eventually, Erbakan had to resign in 1997 due to a postmodern coup, and the Welfare Party was closed down in 1998. The military and secular elites imposed on society that religion could not be used to consolidate the nation. The postmodern coup indicated that religious movements or political Islamists could not succeed in the political arena by open agenda. This fact forced political Islamists to rethink their strategy through intense internal debate. After the debate, political Islamists were divided into two groups: the “traditionalists” (Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan, and “reformists” (Yenilikçiler) who chose Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the mayor of Istanbul, as their new leader.

2.5  A State-Controlled Political Islam in Turkey Religion has a great effect on society. Occasionally, Islam was used by the Turkish state to maintain cohesiveness at times of political and social instability and conflict. Turkey has witnessed many upheavals, conflicts, polarizations, and disputes among various groups. In general, although the secular state ignored Islam in politics, it did not hesitate to use it to suppress national, political and social instability. The emergence of Islamic movements in civil society created a need for them to be represented in the political arena. Thus, the state opened the way for Islamic parties under its own control. This approach paved the way for the success of the AKP in Turkish politics. The success of political Islamists in Turkey has proven that Islam is an important element in Turkish society, to the extent that they decide who will rule the country. Hence the AKP is an Islamic party it continuously wins elections.

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The main idea in a controlled-Islam is creating citizens who are Muslims in their private lives but secular in the public arena. The Turkish form of political Islam is controlled and disseminated by the state. It is understood that Islam cannot be removed from society, thus, the state aims to create the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the public area first and then in politics later. It is not surprising that the AKP has been ruling in Turkey since 2002, for the state paved the way for its gaining power in politics. During times of unrest, the state focuses on Islam as a means to unite the people of Turkey. By propagating its own version of Islam (Turkish Islam) through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the state aims to ignite nationalist-Islamic feelings. Currently, the AKP and Directorate of Religious Affairs are working together to design the interpretation of Islam in Turkey. In order to prevent radical groups or fanatic religious movements, the secular state allowed the study of Islam in the education system under its own control.52 By this strategy, the state hoped that Islam was not left to radical groups. However, the current situation in Turkey proves the opposite. The inclusion of religiously oriented parties into mainstream politics has caused the revival of radical groups in Turkish politics. Unfortunately, the secular state represented two extreme contradicting approaches: shutting down Islamic parties, or allowing, supporting, and propagating them as a state politics. Both approaches have failed. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Western leaders, and in particular the United States, eagerly sought a group which could represent moderate Islam, thus, the AKP became the main beneficiary of this realignment. This approach provided an opportunity to political Islamists to establish their own party and obtain continuous success in the political arena. However, the United States and the west made a mistake by deeming Erdogan and the AKP as representatives of moderate Islam. The current situations in Turkey and the great support of the AKP to ISIS terrorist group and other radical groups prove this mistake.53 Indeed, Political Islamists of Turkey are strongly related to radical groups all over the world. The AKP does not seem to be a counter-model to radical Islam in the Middle East for it becomes increasingly radical and authoritarian. Political Islamists of other countries fell prey to the misconception that they would attain power throughout the Middle East just as the AKP did in Turkey. The AKP differs from its Islamist counterparts

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in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, because Islamist parties in those countries have had little experience of even being allowed to run in elections. After 13 years in power, Turkey’s Political Islamists are performing a wholesale eradication of democratic values. The AKP’s main loyalties are its own business cronies, especially in the media, construction, and mining sectors. They believe that the silencing of every kind of political and social opposition is entirely legitimate.54

2.6  The AKP and Rise of Political Islam After being divided into two groups Political Islamists followed two leaders; the traditionalists continued to follow Erbakan while reformists chose a new leader for themselves Recep Tayyip Erdogan who was the mayor of Istanbul. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was born in 1954. His family was conservative and pious. Erdogan was sent to the Istanbul Imam Hatip School (religious school), which set him on course for a life of Islamic activism and politics, with an outlook marked by anti-semitism, nationalist pride, and hostility toward foreign, especially Western, influences.55 Erdogan’s conservative, pro-Islamic profile benefited from the ideological groundwork laid by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood party. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) was established by Erdogan from the ashes of the banned Welfare Party. In breaking away from the Virtue Party, the AKP was able to follow a populist style agenda that would serve the interests of the secular elite and the party’s religious population. Erdogan declared that the AKP would work to serve as a bridge between traditional and modernizing Turkey. He defined the party as a group of conservatives whose agenda propagated neoliberal economic policy and democratic reforms. Within this framework the AKP protected itself from military and Kemalist confrontation. The AKP emerged at a time when two previous political Islamist parties had been closed down by the Constitutional Court.56 The Kemalists and secularists displayed their determination to eliminate any Islamic party as well as their social and economic networks.57 Thus, the AKP realized that it needed the west and the values of democracy and the rule of law in order to defend itself against the Kemalist/secularist center.58 The adoption of a pragmatic strategy influenced the development and strategy of the AKP. With a pragmatic approach, the AKP was able to enter, survive, and prosper within the political sphere.

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The reformists argued that the ideology of political Islam needs to be changed in its approach, particularly toward democracy, human rights, and relations with the West. The new party or the new form of political Islamic ideology acted as if it was open to cooperation with the secular establishment and the west. Until obtaining a monopoly in power, the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) emphasized democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The party advocated membership in the EU (European Union) to reduce the influence of the military as well as to consolidate its own power. The AKP officially endorsed these democratic norms and the goal of EU accession through its support of the Copenhagen Criteria.59 But the secularists perceived it as making a ground for political Islamists to conquer the state. The AKP used the pro-EU position to broaden its domestic appeal and gain international approval. Without these tactics, the AKP would be vulnerable to sharing the same fate as Virtue and Welfare parties. There were a number of reasons for the AKP elites to place a strong emphasis on democracy and human rights as well as advocating EU membership. First of all, if the party did not respect secularism it would not have a chance of sustained and effective participation in the Turkish political system.60 Moreover, the AKP needed the west and democracy to defend itself against the radical secularists in the judiciary, at high levels of the state bureaucracy, in the mainstream media and especially in the military. In order to naturalize the power of the military in Turkish politics, the party regarded the EU as a natural ally.61 The possibility of military intervention and fear of closure by the Constitutional Court shaped the AKP’s strategies. Realizing the advantages of speaking the language of modernity and of integration with Europe, the AKP declared its priority as economic stability, EU membership, democracy and human rights. In reality, this was a tactical shift of political Islamists in their political strategy. In this regard, Erdogan and the AKP restrained Islamic slogans and stressed on common themes. They promised to continue Turkey’s cooperation with the IMF, advocated the centrality of NATO and partnership with the United States, they even declared Israel as an important partner to Turkey’s national security. Through their new approach and strategy, political Islamists increased their power with the emergence of new economic and social forces in Turkish society. They spread out their ideology in society through

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personal engagement with secular business leaders, intense media efforts and help for the poor. Furthermore, as a political strategy, Erdogan stayed in prison for three months in luxury conditions to convince society that he was persecuted due to his political opinions. He knew that Turkish society would always support oppressed ones. So, Erdogan made a good political investment by entering prison and acting as an oppressed one. The AKP’s conservative ideological position as a center-right position was not only as a means of political survival, but also to broaden its electoral bases. It continued to increase its vote share by winning 47% of the popular vote and 340 seats in parliament in 2007 and 48.9% of the popular vote and secured 327 seats in parliament in 2011. With its three consecutive electoral victories, the AKP consolidated its power and emerged as the dominant single party in the government. This changed the political agenda of the AKP. Since 2002 religion has been on the rise. Political Islam has become more and more visible in the political arena in Turkey.62 Religion encompasses people’s values, aspirations, and their concerns for what is right and wrong in this world.63 It has a direct relationship with culture, politics, economics, and social relationship. However, interpretations and implementations may create huge differences in the depiction of Islam. The AKP has been trying to combine Islam with its political ideology in order to give meaning to life. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) was originated from the National Outlook Movement which had been led by Necmettin Erbakan since 1970.64 It reflects the recognition of a group of politicians with pro-Islamic background. The National Outlook regards the west as the center of all evils. It argues that the west is corrupting, degenerating, and destroying the national identity and Islam.65 Political Islam is traditionally built in opposition to the west and its values. Although the AKP has Erbakan’s National Outlook origins, its leaders constantly denied any connection with Erbakan’s Islamic agenda, because it was illegal to form a party on the basis of religious ideas. Nevertheless, the ideology of political Islam is deeply effective in the AKP’s deep-seated philosophy. Previously, it functioned under the shadow of fear of the military and the state bureaucracy, but its suppressed identity has emerged after removing the secular and Kemalist threat. Despite the AKP’s claim of being a conservative democratic party, it has a political Islamist agenda and reconciled itself to operating

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within the framework of Turkish secularism. Initially, it gave priority to structural reforms and integration with the EU over a religious agenda, but it merely represents a tactical shift in its political strategy. The AKP realized the advantages of speaking the language of modernity and of integration with Europe. The emphasis on democracy and human rights enabled the AKP to protect itself against the secularists and Kemalists. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) is Turkey’s experiment with an Islam-based ruling party, which came to power in 2002 with an overwhelming electoral majority. It was the center of curiosity with regards to what an Islamic party would do when it has full governmental control in a democratic and secular system. The success of the AKP, the new representative of Political Islam in Turkey, in the last two decades demonstrates the growing strength of political Islam and its well-developed strategy. Islam is an integral part of Turkish society, so it is an important element in the political system. Knowing this fact, Political Islamists of Turkey used Islamic concepts and slogans in order to be successful in elections. Their rise to power did not occur against the secular state. Despite the restrictions and exclusions of Islam from politics, religion has played an important role in Turkish politics. Indeed, the complex relationship between Islam and the state has formed the unique nature of political Islam in Turkey. It is not wise to think that the AKP won elections and continues to maintain its political power even though the secular state opposes it strongly. The increasingly authoritarian ruling party seems to be a new project of the state which aims to design Turkish politics, economy, and social life. Political Islamists developed significant financial and organizational autonomy from the state but at the same time cultivated symbiotic relations with the state. Initially, they demonstrated considerable ability to cooperate with secular political actors, and so many scholars praised them for their ability to harmonize Islam with pluralism and democracy. However, in recent years, their exclusionary behavior and a tendency to compromise with authoritarian state structures blackened their democratic contributions. Since 2013, Turkey has been undergoing a drastic democratic reversal under the AKP government. It seems Political Islamists, under the leadership of Erdogan, conquered the state under the guise of democratizing it. Although the AKP initially defined itself as a “conservative democratic party,” not as an Islamist party, the ongoing success in elections

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and great public support has revealed its real agenda. It is crystal clear now that the AKP benefitted from democracy until gaining undisputable power in the state. Indeed, the AKP does not hide its anti-democratic ideology and practices anymore. Democracy or the democratic approach was a trick to deceive the secularists in the state, the west, and even Islamic movements of Turkey which supported the AKP, believing that it would democratize the state. For political Islamists, it is more important who governs the state, who controls it, and represents it rather than how to make the state more responsive and accountable. Indeed, democratizing the state is a continuous process of social and political-institutional changes; therefore, it cannot be actualized without having equal and democratic relationship between the state and its people on the basis of accountability mechanisms.66 After obtaining a monopoly in power, they covered up the corruption allegations by designing the state institutions according to their own benefits. It seems they do not wish to be accountable while governing the state. Turkey has been suffering long in its democracy journey, especially due to a democratic reversal in recent years when the AKP has become authoritarian through being singlehandedly run by Erdogan. The absence of effective civil society mediation has contributed to the government’ oppressiveness during and after the pro-secular Gezi protests in 2013.67 The AKP interpreted this homegrown reaction against its heavyhanded policies as a western-international conspiracy. Erdogan applied the same strategy when major corruption allegations against the government surfaced. Erdogan promotes the idea that Turkey needs a super-presidential system of government in order to make himself an untouchable sultan. The ambition of Erdogan to superpowerful presidency has increased the tension in Turkish society. After controlling the state institutions and obtaining a monopoly in power, Erdogan uses the power of the state against his opponents. He has created a tremendous fear in society, because whoever opposes him, he/she ends up in jail. Conquering the state from within as well as conquering its institutions are deeply desired goals of Erdogan and the AKP. To the present, they have achieved their targets in the state. A takeover of the state in the name of Islamization is no more than making it an authoritarian state in which the caliph exercises his superpower without being held accountable. Political Islamists focus on nationalist themes and use the

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notion of speaking for the nation to suppress the critics for their politics. Additionally, they support religious groups in Turkey as well as in other parts of the world to secure their power and maintain their political success in general elections. Although religious groups have been supported by political Islamists through being provided advantages within the state, they have lost their autonomy and freedom by developing symbiotic interdependencies with the state. This is the main strategy of Erdogan to declare himself as the caliph of all Muslims and guarantee their pledge of alliance to him. Apparently, he deemed the Gülen movement as just a religious community which could subordinate to his caliphate, but, when the movement did not accept his demands, he declared it as his biggest enemy. Thus, Erdogan waged a war against Gülen and his sympathizers to consolidate his power and secure the way toward the super-presidential system of government. In this regard, he periodically and methodically, has transferred and fired thousands of officials, taken on the movement’s educational institutions, usurped the wealth of businessmen who supported the movement and put thousands of people in jail including women with their little children and elder ones who are in their eighties. Currently, the witch hunt against the Gülen movement members is unprecedented. It is particularly puzzling that such a tragic situation followed the decade-long political alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement. Since 2013, the AKP has pursued a more aggressive form of political Islam. It is no secret now that the party has aimed to achieve full control of the executive and legislative branches of government. Political Islamists want to appoint their men to all important institutions in the state as they have a desire to change Turkish society with the Wahhabi form of Islam. Although the Turkish form of Islam is more moderate and pluralistic, the AKP and Erdogan chose the Wahhabi form of Islam because it suits them better in terms of their authoritarian tendencies. Although the EU agreement process validated the AKP’s presence in politics, it required Turkey to acknowledge politically sensitive issues such as cultural rights for the Kurds. Thus, the AKP chose not to actively pursue or implement EU driven reforms as it did in the past. After consolidating its power by increasing its vote share, the party was able to move away from EU reforms toward its own agenda. Turkey never succeeded in becoming a liberal democracy up to western standards.68 The EU’s unwillingness to accept Turkey as a full member strengthened negative feelings against the west among many Turks.

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Moreover, when the Arab uprisings occurred, Erdogan believed that Turkey would be a regional leader and even a global power. In this regard, he strengthened Turkey’s ties with Russia, as an alternative to the EU. He privatized state-owned enterprises and implemented massive public and private construction projects. In the middle of Ankara, he constructed his Palace, a 1100-room, $1 billion palace. During this time, the massive protests happened against Erdogan and his party, especially when he wanted to turn the Gezi Park in Istanbul’s Taksim Square into a mall. However, Erdogan made it clear that he was adamant to stay in power for good, using any means, including violence and oppression. Political Islamists have controlled the judiciary by appointing their loyalists to this institution. They destroyed separation of powers in the state by appointing their followers to all important positions in the state institutions. Instead of reviving democratic institutions and the notion of accountability, the AKP has grown increasingly authoritarian. It has oppressed the media, restricted freedoms, and grown intolerant of opposition. Contrary to the expectations of many, President Tayyip Erdogan made an authoritarian turn, for he has always lacked sufficient commitment to liberal principles.69 Until 2011, his ambitions to be a superpowerful president were prevented by the secularists and Kemalists. His authority was balanced by some of the AKP elites and the Gülen movement. However, after the 2011 electoral victory, Erdogan gradually eliminated these constraints and established a one-man rule based on populist Islamism.70 Naturally, the AKP has authoritarian tendency as part of its ideology. It has developed its own interpretation of Islam to legitimize its politics. It tries to recreate modern codes of urbanity, civility, and universalism, blending them with its own religious features. In order to create an Islamic bloc, Erdogan uses Islamist rhetoric. In 1996, as mayor of Istanbul, he named himself “a servant of Shariah” and the “imam of Istanbul.”71 The AKP’s efforts to Islamize the educational system and the judiciary, two strongholds of Turkish secularism, indicate their true ideology. The AKP argues that people should be able to express their Islamic identity in the state institutions. Their desire for more freedom in expression of religious identity has turned into a hidden pressure on nonreligious groups to act according to the party’s ideology. For example, the headscarf for women and beard for men are encouraged in Turkey now.

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In recent years, the Turkish political system has been colonized by political Islamists. They have reached a stage where they have been developing an alternative intellectual model in order to establish their hegemony. They have undermined the foundations of Turkey’s secular order; thus, the secularists often criticize them as the biggest threat to the secular and nationalist nature of the Turkish state. The usage of Islamic concepts such as sharia, ummah, caliphate, and Islamic state by the political Islamists indicate that they are neo-Ottomanists. For example, in order to increase his popularity among Muslims, Erdogan often uses two issues: the Israeli Palestinian conflict and anti-Zionism. The AKP’s politics are very much derived from Islamic lifestyles. The party leadership participates in religious activities and aims to increase its voter base by recognizing religious life in state and public life. Religious identities, institutions, and networks are important in the continuous success of the AKP. It can be argued that the AKP is a religious party established by political Islamists and seeks regime change by implementing its religious worldviews. Its main goal is Islamization of the state and society. Political Islamists interpret religion to create an Islamic state and Shariah to lead and rule society with a political understanding. Their ideology stands for an ideology derived from theology to shape politics and society according to the values and rules of Islam, even imposing them on the public.72 It is an attempt and specific way to rule and organize society according to the ideology. Islamic political thoughts are shaped and transformed by cultural factors, economic structures, and political institutions in which they operate.73 Political Islamists of Turkey seek to reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, educational, and economic spheres. Religious norms and issues have important place in its politics. The AKP pursues Islamic politics by acting in conformity with the religious demands and concerns of the people. It defines politics, the meaning of life, identity, and community through Islamic values. It aims to institute Islamic law in the political and social sphere and makes political claims on the basis of religion. It is deeply involved in Islamic social ethics and cultural norms, and stresses the religious values and interests of its pious electorate.74 Political Islamists have deep interest in religious rights in terms of defending the freedoms of those who care about issues such as the headscarf, the Imam Hatip schools and Quranic study courses for primary

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and high school students. They use Islamic language especially during the elections in order to convert Islamic sentiments into votes. Islamic identity plays a significant role in the worldview of many Turkish people and this is the main reason why the AKP has been in power since 2002.75 Political Islamists of Turkey have been enriching their power under the rule of AKP. Many opportunities in the state as well as in public sphere are opened for them. They have now reached the higher echelons of bureaucracy and become owners of large companies and media groups.76 They have benefited much from the opportunities created by the processes of globalization and integration with the EU in the last decades. They strive for the revitalization of Islamic civilization to cope with the west, and in this regard, they see Turkey as the center of the Muslim world.77 They have anti-western feelings due to the memories of the nineteenth-century Ottoman political experience, the First World War and the War of Independence. The AKP represents a political ideology for capturing power to shape and direct the state, the society, and individuals. It desires to restore the caliphate so it can unite Muslims under its banner. Erdogan’s leadership and his diplomatic style, as exemplified in the Gaza crisis in 2008 and in Davos in 2009, address Islamist aspirations and expectations to the extent that he emerges as the most influential leader in the eyes of the ordinary people in the Muslim world.78 Erdogan use religious concepts and Islamic slogans. He often begins his remarks with Quranic citations to attract votes from Muslim populations. For example, he showed the Qur’an at public rallies during the June 2015 electoral campaign. He does not hesitate to use religion as political tool. While he was the mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan stated that democracy is like a streetcar: you use it until you arrive at your destination, and then you step off. He even publicly criticized the statement that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the people. For him, sovereignty unconditionally belongs to God. He believes that a state cannot be secular and Islamic at the same time, it is either an Islamic or a secular. He stated that thank God, I am for Sharia, one cannot be a secularist and a Muslim at the same time, and for us, democracy is a means to an end.79 It seems the AKP is not different from the previous political Islamist parties in terms of ideology and worldview, but it is definitely better than them with regards to camouflaging its real agendas. Islam and religious communities have played an important role in Turkish politics since the Ottoman period. Sufi masters and other

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religious leaders formed congregations by their teachings. The AKP always had close relations with these groups and tried to control them. They know that without support of the religious groups they cannot maintain their political power. Additionally, without destroying all opponents, the AKP cannot change the political system in Turkey. Thus, Erdogan has close relations with religious groups, divinity schools, Directorate of Religious Affairs, and other effective elements in Turkish politics to secure his power and presidency. He has a strong desire to control religious groups and affairs in Turkey. In order to obtain his objectives, he has collaborated with religious scholars, community leaders, religious groups, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

Notes





1. Mandaville, Peter G., Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2012), 3. 2. Tibi, Bassam, Islamism and Islam (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 2. 3. Voll, John O., “Political Islam and the State,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56. 4. Tibi, Bassam, Islamism and Islam (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 1. 5.  Esposito, John L., and Emad El-Din Shahin, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1. 6. Said, Edward W., “Impossible Histories: Why the Many Islams Cannot Be Simplified,” Harper’s Magazine 35 (2002): 69. 7.  March, Andrew F., Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 7. 8.  Çınar, Menderes, “From Moderation to De-moderation: Democratic Backsliding of the AKP in Turkey,” in The Politics of Islamism Diverging Visions and Trajectories, ed. John L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim, and Naser Ghobadzeh (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2018), 127–153. 9.  Esposito, John L., Lily Zubaidah Rahim, and Naser Ghobadzadeh, “Introduction: Theological Contestations and Political CoalitionBuilding,” in The Politics of Islamism: Diverging Visions and Trajectories, ed. John L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim, and Naser Ghobadzeh (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2018), 1. 10. Fuller, Graham, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave, 2003), xi.

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11. Denoeux, Guilain, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy (June 2002): 61. 12.  Martin, C. Richard, and Abbas Barzegar, “Introduction: The Debate About Islamism in the Public Sphere,” in Islamism Contested Perspectives on Political Islam, ed. Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 4. 13. He was a controversial medieval Sunni Muslim theologian and a member of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal. He was a polarizing figure in his own lifetime due to his views on the veneration of saints and the visitation to their tomb-shrines. Ibn Taymiyya has become one of the most influential medieval writers in contemporary Islam. He has considerable influence on contemporary Wahhabism, Salafism, and Jihadism. 14. Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19. 15. It is a process whereby societies adopt Western culture. They are heavily influenced from the western culture with respect to industry, technology, law, politics, economics, lifestyle, language, religion and values. It has been a growing influence across the world in the last few centuries. 16. Adams, C. C., Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). 17. Laclau, Ernesto, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990). 18. Lewis, Bernard, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 168. 19. Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, “Insidad Bab al-Ijtihad” (Closing the Door of Ijtihad), in Sayyid Hadi Jusraw Shahi, Al-Athar al-Kamila. Al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Cairo, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Los Angeles: Maktab al-Shuruq al-Duwaliyya, 2002), 150–151. 20. Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, “Misr wa’l-misriyyin Al-hukm al-mutlaq wa’l-hukm al-‘adil. Al-hurriyya wa’l-istiqlal,” in Sayyid Hadi Jusraw Shahi, Al-Athar alKamila. Al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Cairo, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Los Angeles: Maktab al-Shuruq al-Duwaliyya, 2002), 84. 21. Abduh, Muhammad, Tafsir al-Manar, ed. Rashid Rida (Beirut: Dar al-ma’rifa li’l-taba’a wa’l-nashr, 1906–1935), 269. 22. Al-Banna, Hasan, “Ila al-Shabab wa-ila al-Talaba Khassatan,” in Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (Alexandria: Dar al-Da’wa, 1998), 93. 23. Al-Banna, Hasan, “Nahwa al-Nur,” in Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (Alexandria: Dar al-Da’wa, 1998), 82. 24.  Al-Banna, Hasan, “Risalat al-Ta’alim,” in Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (Alexandria: Dar al-Da’wa, 1998), 372.

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25. Qutb, Sayyid, Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq (Damascus: Dar Dimashq, 1964), 201. 26. Qur’an, 2:256. 27. Qutb, Sayyid, Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (Beirut and Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1982), 294–295. 28. Huntington, Samuel, Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996); Karatnycky, Adrian, “Muslim Countries and Democracy Gap,” Journal of Democracy, no. 13 (2002). 29. Fuller, Graham, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave, 2003), xi. 30. Denoeux, Guilain, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy (June 2002): 61. 31. It is the second Islamic dynasty after Prophet Muhammad and four caliphs of Islam which ruled Muslims between 661 and 750 and later of Islamic Spain between 750 and 1031. 32. It was the third Islamic dynasty to succeed the Umayyad. It ruled Muslims between 750 and 861. After that though lacking in political power, the dynasty continued to claim religious authority until after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517. 33. Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19. 34. Ergil, Doğu, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 53. 35.  Yavuz, Hakan, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 21–42. 36. Toprak, Binnaz, “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey,” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 119–136. 37. Çağaptay, S., “Race, Assimilation and Kemalism,” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (2004): 86–101. 38. Sahin, İsmet, and Yener Gülmez, “Social Sources of Failure in Education: The Case in East and Southeast Turkey,” Social Indicators Research 49, no. 1 (2000): 83–113. 39. Rabasa, Angel, and F. Stephen Larrabee, Political Islam in Turkey (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 57. 40. Ahmad, Feroz, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye (1945–1980) (The Turkish Experiment in Democracy) (İstanbul: HilYayın, 2007), 464. 41. Yılmaz, Murat, “Darbeler ve İslamcılık” (Coup d’états and Islamism), in İslamcılık (Islamism) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 632. 42. Karakoç, Sezai, Diriliş Neslinin Amentüsü (The Creed of the Reborn Generation) (İstanbul: Diriliş Yayınları, 1979), 13. 43. “Ecevit Kayseri İçin Konuştu” (Ecevit Spoke for Kayseri), Milliyet, last modified June 11, 1969.

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44.  Özkan, Behlül, “Turkey’s Islamists: From Power-Sharing to Political Incumbency,” Spring 14, no. 1 (2015): 78. 45.  Yilmaz, Ihsan, Greg Barton, and James Barry, “The Decline and Resurgence of Turkish Islamism: The Story of Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP,” Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies 1, no. 1 (2017): 48–62. 46. Birand, Mehmet Ali, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey (London: Brassey’s Defense Publishers, 1987). 47. Turgut Özal was the 8th President of Turkey from 1989 to 1993. He previously served as the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey from 1983 to 1989 as the leader of the Motherland Party. 48. Mardin, Şerif, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” Turkish Studies 6 (2005): 157. 49. National Order Party (MNP) in January 1970, The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) founded in October 1972, In 1983, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi). 50. Daği, Ihsan D., “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 1 (March 2005): 21–37. 51.  Gunay, Niyazi, “Implementing the ‘February 28’ Recommendations: A Scorecard,” Research Notes, no. 10, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2001. 52. Akın, E., and O. Karasapan, “The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis,” Middle East Report (1988): 19. 53. This is explained in detail in Chapter 7. 54.  Özkan, Behlül, “Turkey’s Islamists: From Power-Sharing to Political Incumbency,” Spring 14, no. 1 (2015): 83. 55. Cagaptay, Soner, The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017). 56.  Yavuz, M. Hakan, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” Comparative Politics 30 (1997): 63–82. 57. Önis, Ziya, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 743–766. 58. Dagi, Ihsan D., “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,” Turkish Studies 6 (2005): 21–37.

38  R. DOGAN 59. The Copenhagen Criteria are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union. The criteria require that a state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU. 60. Öniş, Ziya, “The Political Economy of Turkey’s AKP,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), 212. 61. Dağı, İhsan D., “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). 62. Jung, D., and C. Raudvere (Eds.), Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 63.  Fuller, Graham E., The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 14. 64. Yıldız, Ahmet, “Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook,” Muslim World 93 (2003): 187–210. 65. Dagi, Ihsan D., Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Dogu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Gelenegi (Identity, Discourse and Politics: Welfare Party Tradition at the Intersection of East and West) (Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1999). 66. Donker, Teije Hidde, “Re-emerging Islamism in Tunisia: Repositioning Religion in Politics and Society,” Mediterranean Politics 18, no. 2 (2013): 207–224. 67. Yörük, Erdem, and Murat Yüksel, “Class and Politics in Turkey’s Gezi Protests,” New Left Review 89 (September–October 2014): 103–123. 68.  Kuru, Ahmet T., and Alfred Stepan, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Analyzing the Failure,” The Montréal Review, December 2017, available online: http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-DemocracyIn-Turkey.php. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 71.  Demiralp, Seda, and Todd A. Eisenstadt, Prisoner Erdogan’s Dilemma and the Origins of Moderate Islam in Turkey (Washington, DC: American University, Department of Government), August 31, 2006. 72.  Hermann, Rainer, “Political Islam in Secular Turkey,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 14, no. 3 (2003): 265–276. 73. Cizre, U., and M. Cinar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2 (2003): 309–332.

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74. Yavuz, Hakan, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8. 75. Rabasa, Angel, and F. Stephen Larabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 1. 76.  Duran, Burhanettin, “The Experience of Turkish Islamism: Between Transformation and Impoverishment,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (2010): 1–22. 77.  Kuzmanovic, Daniella, “Civilization and EU–Turkey Relations,” in Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, ed. Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 53. 78.  Duran, Burhanettin, “The Experience of Turkish Islamism: Between Transformation and Impoverishment,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (2010): 1–22. 79. Yavuz, Hakan, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

CHAPTER 3

The Gülen Movement

3.1  Definition of Hizmet or Gülen Movement Many scholars and academics have produced works to define the Gülen movement. Some of these definitions are: it is a faith-based social movement,1 a market friendly religious education movement,2 a modern manifestation of Islam which builds bridges not only among religions but also between democracy and Islam,3 a non-political movement not outside of politics,4 and an Islamic-based movement which has sought to combine a modern interpretation of Islam with Turkish nationalism.5 The Gülen Movement has varied definitions due to its different functions.6 It is a religious movement for it focuses on individual transformation and religious practices. It is a social movement by its extensive outreach into various institutions such as education, health care, and media. It is a political movement due to its purported permeation of key government and military offices. Usually, the Gülen movement is described by academics as a civic, social and religious group that was initiated in Turkey and then spread all over the world. They are known for their educational institutions that have been quite successful. They advocate interfaith and intercultural dialogue to build bridges between different cultures and religions all over the world.7 They focus on education where secular curricula are taught by teachers who aspire to represent high values of humanity. Volunteer participants in the movement, consisting of students, academics, business owners, professionals, public officials, white-collar and © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_3

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blue-collar workers, farmers, men and women, young and old, contribute to multiple ways of service, which crystallize in tutoring centers, schools, colleges, hospitals, a major relief organization, publishing houses, and media institutions, both in Turkey and in more than a hundred countries of the world.8 Gülen was greatly influenced by historic figures such as Abu Ḫanīfa (d. 767),9 Ghazali (d. 1111),10 Imam Rabbani (d. 1624),11 Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273),12 Yunus Emre (d. 1320),13 and Said Nursi (d. 1960).14 Throughout his life he maintained his humble lifestyle and never confronted the state in the course of his service. He noticed that youth can be victims of extremism and radicalism if they are not educated properly. Through his preaching and writings, he struggled to draw youth away from extreme groups. He combated militant atheism and communism. He witnessed the erosion of traditional moral values among people which led youth into criminality, political, and societal conflict. These experiences effected his ideology, community leadership, and the Hizmet (service) movement. Gülen is regarded as the initiator of the social movement dedicated to a set of human values known as the Hizmet. He is considered by his sympathizers as the representative of higher values such as wisdom, faith, love, passion, respect, sincerity, piety, sensitivity, and service to humanity. He is among the most prominent intellectuals in the world according to a survey organized by the British magazine Prospect and Foreign Policy in July 2008. He has published more than seventy books and many of them have been translated into 40 different languages. As an Islamic scholar, Gülen’s main aim is to contribute to the development of a more civil society which is committed to the well-being of others. Despite the high regard that millions hold for him in considering him as a leader of Hizmet movement, Gülen only deems himself as one of the volunteers in the movement. His core idea is living for others. He emphasizes dialogue, empathic acceptance, and harmonious coexistence. His optimistic thought, with its emphasis on self-development of both heart and mind through education, can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalal al-Din Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers.15 However, today, Fethullah Gülen is a controversial religious personality in Turkey. The movement inspires certain moral and universal values such as love, respect for others, honesty, integrity, justice, equity, the rule of law, constitutional and participatory democracy, compassion, and human

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rights.16 Although he teaches Islamic values Gülen does not seek to establish an Islamic state as a political entity that would lead to a unified Muslim community.17 Gülen carefully maintained his distance from active politics and political parties.18 Nevertheless, students who are educated by followers of the Gülen movement have obtained positions in various state institutions, the movement has therefore been accused by both secular elites and the AKP of taking over the government secretly. The movement develops projects to eradicate ignorance, poverty, and disunity in order to prevent clashes among civilizations. It aims to avoid anarchy, religious, economic, and social turbulences in society. The movement strongly condemns radicalism, extremism, violence, and racism. Its teachings emphasize the importance of educating future generations to embrace the ideals of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding. The Gülen Movement exists as an informal, decentralized association that views Gülen as the role-model.19 Loyalty and trust to the great elders who control and run the operations of the movement is very important in the network. There are three circles in the network: the first is the core circle around Gülen, the second circle consists of those who work for the collective goals of the movement and the third circle consists of those who are sympathizers.20 The movement represents unity through the nature of its service project-based activism and standardization of the study of Islamic texts and the works of Gülen. Helen Rose Ebaugh21 explains the movement and its functions as: The Gülen movement is a loosely organized network of local organizations whose supporters interact through meeting in local circles. Within these circles, supporters read and discuss ideas gleaned from the Qur’an and Islamic scholars, especially Fethullah Gülen. In addition, the local group supports one another both emotionally and by material assistance when necessary. The group also selects Gülen-inspired projects such as schools, preparatory courses, dormitories, hospitals, and relief efforts which it decides to support through voluntary work and financial contributions. Involvement in the local circles, along with financial donations, generates the type of commitment to the movement that has resulted in its spread to over 100 countries on five continents.22 Gülen’s interpretation and analytical frames that elevated Islam above secular concerns resonated with the Turkish people, because the majority of Turks define as themselves Muslims first. Gülen preached a middle

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way for Turkish people between secularism and piety, and preached multicultural tolerance that was not only alluring in Turkey but also produced a large following in the West.23 Cultural forms present in Turkey facilitated the emergence and growth of the movement, and Gülen simply made use of the existing structures and the Turkish culture to expand his influence. Although the loose movement hierarchy precludes a definitive statement of the actual number of followers of the Gülen movement, estimates range from 400,000 in Turkey to almost 20 million globally.24 Regardless of the actual number, the movement comprises a substantial and significant group in Turkey and abroad. Gülen provides motivational framing by explaining that ideal people are people of service who wish to serve humanity and gain God’s pleasure in doing so.25 Another motivation to join the movement are the benefits related to the local circles. People establish networks among a community of like-minded individuals who dedicated to rigorous study and practice of essential Islamic beliefs.26 Thus, the followers receive benefit through activism and adherence to the ideals of the movement. The movement demonstrates widespread public participation including bureaucrats, academics, judges, security agencies, business associations, labor unions, teachers, and doctors.27 People from different backgrounds contribute to the ideals of the movement through their commitments to support the hundreds of Gülen schools and service projects around the globe. Islamic lectures and spiritual conversation gatherings (sohbet) are mechanisms to encourage greater spiritual reflection, increased knowledge of Islam, and building strong associational networks.

3.2  A Brief History of Fethullah Gülen and the Movement Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the Hizmet Movement, is a well-known Turkish-Muslim scholar, philosopher, author, poet, educational activist, and preacher emeritus.28 He was born in Erzurum a city in eastern Anatolia, Turkey in 1938. Known for his simple and rigorous lifestyle, Gülen received his first religious education from his mother. His mother Rafia Gülen taught him how to recite the Qur’an when he was four. He attended a public elementary school for three years but could not continue due to the appointment of his father to a village where there was no public school. He later obtained his diploma by self-studying and passing a comprehensive examination. His religious education consisted

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of studies in classical Islamic sciences such as Quranic Sciences, the life of the Prophet and Companions, Arabic language, Prophetic Tradition (hadith), and the spiritual tradition of Islam. Gülen completed his religious education and training under various prominent scholars and obtained the traditional Islamic license to teach. He also completed his secondary level education through external exams. He achieved state preacher license after passing an exam administered by the Turkish State’s Directorate of Religious Affairs. He first started to preach in Edirne a city in the northwestern of Turkey. During this time, he increased his knowledge in Islamic disciplines as well as in natural sciences, the western philosophical thought, physics, astronomy, chemistry, medicine, geometry, biology, geology, philosophy, history, literature, and other disciplines. Gülen completed his compulsory military service in Ankara and Iskenderun between 1961 and 1963. During this time, he was asked by his commanding officer to lecture soldiers on faith and morality. Indeed, Gülen always gave public lectures and talks to enlighten society and educate the youth. He did not take active part in politics, rather, he taught moral values and religious matters through his sermons and writings. In 1966, as a state preacher, Gülen was transferred to Izmir, a city on Turkey’s Aegean coast, where he held managerial responsibility for a mosque, a student study and boarding-hall, and for preaching in the Aegean region. He took no wages for his public services. During this time, he established the Hizmet (service) movement. His ideas spread out Turkey first, then to more than 100 countries in the world. He traveled from city to city to give sermons in mosques and speeches at gatherings in various places including theatres and coffee houses. His eloquent speeches attracted many people from different walks of life and were recorded on tape to distribute everywhere. The ideology of the Hizmet movement was shaped through his speeches and writings. Initially, his audience was people in Izmir from all walks of life and later expanded to citizens from very different backgrounds, including non-Muslims who share the humanistic aspects of his vision. In 1970, as a result of the March 12 coup in Turkey, Gülen was arrested and held in prison for six months without charge. Nevertheless, he continued to actualize his ideology. By the late 1970s, he attracted a great audience to his public sermons. The sympathizers were motivated by his oratory skills, passion, and wisdom. He encouraged them to establish student dormitories, summer camps,

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and afterschool programs in the largest cities of Turkey. His teachings were disseminated via audiocassettes, print publications, and video recordings. With his encouragement, ordinary people started to mobilize to counteract the effects of violent ideologies and of the ensuing social and political disorder on their own children and on youth in general. In 1974, the first university preparatory courses were established in the city of Manisa and then in other cities. Sizinti, the monthly journal which aimed to show science and religion compatible, began publication in 1979. Although in 1980 the third military coup took place in Turkey the sympathizers of Hizmet continued their activities and grew even more. The movement opened its first private school, Yamanlar Koleji in Izmir, in 1982. Later, in almost every city in Turkey, private schools were opened by the Hizmet movement. Launching in 1990, the sympathizers of the movement have opened schools firstly in Central Asia and then in other parts of the world. Beyond activities in the education, economic, and political sectors, participants in the Gülen movement created businesses, built schools, and published journals, all in an effort to accumulate religious and secular knowledge.29 Gülen appealed to the sources of economic strength needed to grow and sustain his movement. Thus, the movement relied on economic networks to develop market relations that promoted strategies to improve the economic welfare of the participants. After attained economic sources, Gülen provided ways in which his followers could express the generosity that is embedded in their culture and religion.30 The movement has established six hospitals and an international aid agency to reshape Islam into a more contemporary, pluralistic, and cosmopolitan version.31 It started as a small group of like‐minded individuals discussing Islamic faith in practice and now it has evolved into a $25 billion enterprise with a global reach that includes charter and private schools and a media empire of newspapers, book publishing, and TV stations.32 In 1991, Gülen ceased preaching to large mosque congregations for he feared that some bad intentioned people may manipulate or exploit these gatherings. In order to prevent clashes among the different segments of society in Turkey, Gülen initiated the interfaith and intercultural dialogues. With the inspiration of Gülen, the Foundation of Journalists and Writers organized a series of gatherings involving leaders of religious minorities in Turkey such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch,

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Armenian Orthodox Patriarch, Chief Rabbi of Turkey, Vatican’s Representative to Turkey and others. Similarly, with his encouragement, the Abant platform33 brought together leading intellectuals from all corners of the political spectrum, the leftists, the atheists, the nationalists, the religious conservatives, and the liberals, providing for the first time in recent Turkish history a place where such figures could debate freely about the common concerns of all citizens and pressing social problems. Moreover, in order to foster mutual understanding and boasting mutual respect, Gülen made himself available for comment and interview in the media. Unfortunately, the tension between the Turkish Military and Virtue Party (Erdogan was part of this party) eventually led to the so-called “February 28, 1997 postmodern military coup.” The coup forced the coalition government to resign and a new government to follow a harsh set of social engineering measures to be pursued under close military scrutiny. In March 1999, upon the recommendation of his doctors, Gülen moved to the United States to receive medical care for his cardiovascular condition. However, he was accused by the military of having long-term political ambitions in Turkey, but all these accusations were dismissed in 2008. He currently lives at a retreat facility in Pennsylvania together with a group of students.

Notes

1.  Gulay, Erol N., “The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey’s Rival Elite?” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 43. 2. Yavuz, M. Hakan, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19. 3. Balci, Tamer, “Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement by M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 125, no. 2 (2005): 331. 4. Balci, “Turkish Islam and the Secular State,” 331. 5. Yavuz, M. Hakan, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 4 (1999): 584–605. 6.  Fitzgerald, Scott T., “Conceptualizing and Understanding the Gülen Movement,” Sociology Compass 11, no. 3 (2017): 2–10. https://doi. org/10.1111/soc4.12461. 7. Hendrick, Joshua D., Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York: New York University Press, 2013).

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8.  Ebaugh, Helen R., The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam (New York: Springer, 2009); Esposito, J., and I. Yilmaz, Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives (Clifton, NJ: Blue Dome, 2010). 9. Numan bin Thabit, known as Abu Ḫanīfa is an 8th century Sunni Muslim theologian and jurist of Persian origin, who became the eponymous founder of the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence, which has remained the most widely practiced law school in the Sunni tradition. 10.  Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali known as Imam Ghazali is one of the most prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, and mystics of Sunni Islam. 11. Ahmad al-Farūqī al-Sirhindī known as Imam Rabbani is an Islamic scholar, a Hanafi jurist, and a prominent member of the Naqshbandī Sufi order during the Mughal period. He contributed to conservative trends in Indian Islam. 12. More popularly known as Rumi, he was a thirteenth century Persian poet, jurist, Islamic scholar, theologian, and Sufi mystic originally from Greater Khorasan. 13. Yunus Emre was a Turkish poet and Sufi mystic who greatly influenced Anatolian culture. 14. Known as Üstad Bediüzzaman (wonder of the age), he was a Kurdish Sunni Muslim theologian. He wrote the Risale-i Nur Collection, a body of Qur’anic commentary exceeding six thousand pages. 15. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Sidney Griffith, “Fethullah Gulen and the ‘People of the Book’: A Voice from Turkey for Interfaith Dialogue,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (July 2005): 329–358. 16.  Aslandogan, Y. A., The Gülen Movement [Video file], last modified October 14, 2009, http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-Gülen-movement. 17. Öktem, Kerem, Turkey Since 1989: Angry Nation (London: Zed Books, 2011), 128. 18. Yavuz, Hakan, and John L. Esposito (Eds.), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003). 19.  Gulay, Erol N., “The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey’s Rival Elite?” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 42. 20.  Yavuz, M. Hakan, as quoted in Jean-Francois Mayer, “Interview with Hakan Yavuz—The Gülen Movement: A Modern Expression of Turkish Islam,” http://religion.info/english/interviews/article_74.shtml. Accessed November 19, 2018.

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21.  Ebaugh, professor emerita of sociology at the University of Houston wrote a book about the movement “The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam.” 22. Ebaugh, The Gülen Movement, 113. 23. Hendrick, Joshua D., Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 20–22. 24. Ebaugh, The Gülen Movement, 4. 25. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 74. 26. Jager, Jeff, “Understanding the Gülen Movement, Small Wars Journal,” August 5, 2016, available online: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/ dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/ resources/docs/Small%20Wars%20Journal%20%20Understanding%20 the%20G%C3%BClen%20Movement.pdf. 27. Sharon-Krespin, “Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition,” 9. 28. Çetin, M., The Gülen Movement: Civic Service Without Borders (New York, NY: Blue Dome Press, 2010). 29. Gulay, “The Gülen Phenomenon,” 40. 30. Ebaugh, Helen Rose Fuchs, The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam (New York: Springer, 2010), 112. 31. Voll, John, “Fethullah Gülen: Transcending Modernity in the New Islamic Discourse,” in Turkish Islam and the Secular State, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 247. 32.  Wood, G., and T. Kesin, “Perspectives on the Gülen Movement,” Sociology of Islam 1 (2013): 127–130. 33. Abant Platform was established in 1998 by the Hizmet movement as an intellectual forum based in Istanbul.

CHAPTER 4

From a Strategic Alliance to a Terrorist Organization: The History of the Relationship Between AKP and the Gülen Movement from 2001 to 2019 4.1  Introduction Western modernization theory predicted that modernization would lead to a decline of religion. However, what happened in Turkey and many other places showed the opposite. As people became more literate, more urban, and more world-wise, their standards of piety rose. Upward social mobility correlated positively with both religious observance and the vibrancy of religious community. There is long history behind the Islamic revival ideology which inspires Erdogan, Gülen, and all global Islamic movements. The Ottoman Empire had conquered and ruled huge expanses of southeastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa from the fourteenth to the early twentieth century as the de facto leader of Sunni Islam. The Ottoman Sultans were the rulers of the global Muslim ummah (Muslim nation). However, after the defeat in World War I, the Ottoman lost its territories and reduced to the boundaries of today’s nation state of Turkey. Turkey was established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on the basis of strong secularist ideology. He tried to remove religion from society and state. He wanted to disconnect Turkey from its Islamic past and in this regard, he implemented a serious of prohibitions, restrictions, and changes. He applied a forcible program of modernization and secularization to transform Turkey. He secularized the education system, replaced © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_4

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the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, banned religious cloaks, restricted Islam to the mosques, along with many other civic, economic, legislative, political, and social reforms. More importantly, he abolished the caliphate in 1924. The Islamic resistance to Ataturk’s reforms inside Turkey began in homes and mosques across Anatolia. The secular regime’s persecution of Islamic parties and religious movements, particularly during the first decades of the Republic, led most of them to operate under the charity law or as Sufi movements. These laws were enacted during Adnan Menderes’s government following his 1950 election victory. Over time, the activities of religious movements started to seek a political role by creating alliances with political parties. Particularly during election times, these movements urged their members and sympathizers to vote for specific parties in return for benefits they would get once that party reached power. Among the most notable of these alliances was the one between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gülen movement. The AKP and Gülen movement have primarily addressed the same base in Turkey to restore Islamic life. Both groups opposed the secularization of Muslim society on the basis of strict prohibition of religious life. Gülen devoted much of his lifetime of preaching, teaching, and writing to restore what he liked to call an Anatolian Islam which cultivates a benign moderate image of Islam and respect for others. On the other side, the AKP aimed to change Turkish secular state and remove restrictions on Islam and Muslims. It wanted to restore Islamic life in Turkish society with the top-down method. Both groups were treated suspiciously by the old secular regime, thus, they had to establish a mutually beneficial relationship in the 2000s. The AKP reinforced the movement’s social and bureaucratic power and, in return, the movement supported the AKP in bureaucracy and politics. The strategic alliance delivered benefits for both actors: the AKP successfully eliminated the veto powers in the secular state, while the Gülen movement steered clear of the pressure of the secular establishment and accelerated its penetration of the state apparatus.1 The end of the tutelary regime in Turkey did not contribute to democratic consolidation. Instead, the two groups in the course of their alliance and their subsequent struggle for power undermined democratic politics, the rule of law, civil liberties, and governance capacity of the Turkish state. With the eradication of their common enemy, their alliance turned into a brutal fight. In this chapter, we will try to illustrate how

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and why the image of each group has changed according to the other, and in particular, how the movement has changed in the AKP’s projection of them from a faith-based community to a terrorist organization. Once Turkey was a promising Muslim country which could combine Islam and democracy and with this attitude would be a role model for the Middle East. However, the bitter fight between two Islamic groups overshadowed Turkey’s once-promising future. The coup attempt on July 15, 2016 and the ensuing crackdown represent the apex of this fight. The fight resulted in Erdogan’s former ally being designated as a terrorist organization. The Gülen movement passed through various stages in AKP’s description: a religious community between 2002 and 2010, a movement referred as Pennsylvania between 2010 and 2013, parallel state between 2013 and 2016, and finally Gülenist Terror Organization starting from 2016 and onwards. The ideology and interpretation of Islam determines each group’s strategy, worldviews, and goals. The Gülen movement and the AKP come from different religious backgrounds. The AKP’s founding elite are mostly from Necmettin Erbakan’s National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş), which has its origins in the Iskenderpasha Congregation, a Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi order.2 The Gülen movement is influenced by the teachings of Said Nursi who avoided political involvement, but struggled to reconcile science and faith. The National Outlook pursued a political path of forming political parties which would ultimately establish Islamic state ruled by the Shariah. The ideology of National Outlook alarmed the secular establishment and triggered military interventions on several occasions. Ultimately, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç split from the National Outlook and formed the AKP (Justice and Development Party) on August 14, 2001. The distinction between the National Outlook Movement and the Gülen Movement was the difference between political Islam and civil Islam. In the civil Islamic tradition, Islam is not concerned with politics per se but is focused on the spiritual development of individual Muslims and the promotion of human flourishing, which in the tradition’s view comes about via a robust civil society, ethics, social justice, and economic development.3 The sympathizers of the movement define themselves as apolitical and thus have distinguished themselves from political Islam. Contrary to political Islamists, Fethullah Gülen refrained from Islamization of the state but employed a gradualist approach to restore

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religious life in society. Thus, he encouraged his followers to invest their capital and energy in education. The movement therefore established schools in Turkey first, then abroad in over 100 countries. Through its network of schools in Turkey, the movement placed its students and followers into the ranks of Turkish business, judiciary, media, the national police, and much of the state bureaucracy. When they had become influential, powerful, and wealthy, they readily used their positions and wealth to fund and support the movement to achieve its goals. In the 1990s, the state and the media promoted the Gülen movement as a nationalist moderate group alternative to Necmettin Erbakan and his political Islam. Nevertheless, Gülen was also deeply affected from the 28 February military intervention when a leaked video showed him advising his pupils in the bureaucracy to lie low and cover their religious identities. He was accused of undermining the secular order by camouflaging his methods with a democratic and moderate image. However, before the video was leaked to the media, Gülen already moved to the United States for health reasons and remains there in self-imposed exile.

4.2  The Years of Strategic Alliance (2002–2010) Initially, various groups supported Justice and Development Party (the AKP) to democratize the state, to progress Turkey’s European Union candidacy and to increase the cultural, economic, and political influence of Turkey in the region and the world. The AKP and the Gülen movement shared the goal of transforming Turkey into a state of Turkish nationalism with a very strong, conservative religiosity at its core.4 They were partners in trying to assume power for decades. The leaders of both groups had strong opposition to Kemalist forces in Turkey for many years. Although the Gülen movement did not enter politics it supported the AKP. They had good relations until the followers of the movement in the police and judiciary became a little too independent. The past few decades have witnessed the rapid political and economic empowerment of two Muslim groups in Turkey. While the movement earned an international reputation for its scientifically oriented schools, the ambitious adaptation of its followers to the free-market economy also led to a striking accumulation of capital. The movement expanded beyond the Turkish border into the Turkic states of Central Asia, the United States, and Europe before the AKP was founded. On the basis of these

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networks, the movement came to be recognized as a non-confrontational and non-violent international player in world politics. The AKP was formed originally on the basis of respecting the secular state tradition in Turkey. The AKP has not directly challenged the secular basis of the Turkish state, but in virtually every other way, it has sought to expand room for authoritarian rule, undermining freedoms and rights. After the bitter experience of the National Outlook demise, the AKP was initially cautious enough not to trigger a second 28 February coup. Similarly, the Gülen movement stayed away from the AKP so as not to cause the secularist system to be worried. As part of being cautious, both groups maintained their distance from each other at the beginning. Gülen avoided aligning with new heirs of political Islam, likewise Erdogan stayed away from Gülen. Nevertheless, the National Security Council (MGK) mostly consisted of military officers, which included then Prime Minister Erdogan and select AKP cabinet members. It asked the AKP government to sign an advisory ruling on “measures needed to be taken to counter activities by the Fethullah Gülen group” and also asked the government to draw up an action plan. This was very frustrating for both groups, and hence they had to make a strategic alliance in pursuit of mutual benefits. The strategic alliance forced both groups to put aside their differences and made them establish mutually beneficial relations. Contrary to common perception, there was not an inherent partnership between the AKP and the Gülen movement in this period, rather it was a strategic alliance. As part of their mutual strategy, both groups refrained from criticizing secularists and their core values. They were very cautious with regards to secularist and Kemalist sensitivities. They refrained from antagonizing the state elite with challenges to secularism. They shared a pro-Western agenda that sought to promote Turkey’s European Union membership process and market liberalization. Both helped each other as a means of surviving the hostile secular environment. The educated youth by the Gülen movement found the opportunity to expand further across social, economic, and bureaucratic fields and the AKP benefitted from them in the state bureaucracy. The AKP renounced the ideas of its former leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and drew closer to the Gülen line of a long-term policy to rebuild state and society. On the other side, the movement displayed sympathy with the AKP, because the secularist military had planned a series of undercover actions designed to portray the movement as

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a terrorist organization. In the face of a lack of legal security, Muslim groups were left with no choice but to infiltrate the bureaucracy to protect themselves against secularist and Kemalists. In their dispute with the military, both groups established a strategic alliance for the purpose of undermining the power of the military within the state. For the AKP, the movement’s support was extremely important in the way of combatting its rivals and expanding its control to the bureaucracy as well as other state functions. This need forced the AKP to befriend the Gülen movement despite the fact it had a significantly different understanding of Islam. Both groups received support from each other to protect themselves against the rigid secular state. Despite their differences, the two groups formed a tactical alliance against military tutelage and the secular elite, which had victimized both groups. In order to curb the military’s role in politics and to rebuild state and society, the Gülen movement and its supporters within the Turkish bureaucracy, chiefly those in the police force and the judiciary, threw their support behind the AKP. Following the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002, Erdogan became Prime Minister, and Gülen and his movement supported him, marshaling their media outlets as well as an extensive following inside the Turkish judiciary and police. In the years between 2002 and 2004, some internet sites published reports regarding coup plans within the military.5 Pro-government journalists acknowledged the movement’s merits in the struggle against coup plans. Turkish bureaucracy has always been a hot debate between ideologically, religiously and party-politically organized groups as a result of the restrictions imposed on legal and public political debate by the Kemalist state ideology. Thus, conservative players have integrated themselves within the country’s political, economic, and cultural elite. This is the same reason why the Gülen cadres obtained key positions within the bureaucracy. They played a significant role in the fight of AKP against the secularists and Kemalists. The AKP had strong relations with the movement to integrate the country with the world market. The movement became the primary beneficiary of the AKP’s proactive foreign policies in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. On the other side, the movement’s transnational network of merchants, educators, journalists, and activists contributed to the AKP’s effort to redefine Turkish national identity and promote Turkey’s global image as a Muslim democracy.

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The AKP and Gülen movement shared a pro-Western agenda that sought to promote Turkey’s European Union membership process and market liberalization. In order to find a strong base against the secularists and Kemalists, both groups had to support the European Union membership. Moreover, the Gülen movement supported market liberalization to find a financial source for its swiftly expanding projects and activities in Turkey and abroad. For example, Abdullah Gul, when he was Turkey’s foreign minister, encouraged Turkish diplomats to attend events organized by the movement and help them. A key business arm of the Gülen movement was the Turkish Industrialists Confederation (TUSKON). It was formed in 2005 by seven business federations, comprising mostly small-to-medium sized businesses.6 TUSKON was favored by the AKP government as part of their strategic alliance. However, during the rift between the two groups trouble extended to TUSKON. It’s premier bank Bank Asia was taken over in mid-2015 by the Turkish state-run Savings Deposit Insurance Fund and hundreds of Turkish businessmen left the TUSKON confederation since it was targeted by the AKP.7 The AKP government ceased the activities of TUSKON, thus it no longer functions. Although the movement supported many political parties and stayed non-partisan, it provided solid support to the AKP between 2001 and 2010. The AKP provided the social and regulatory space within which the Gülen movement prospered and the movement in turn, through its support and engagement, enabled the security of Erdogan and his government. This caused many people to associate the movement with the AKP. In reality, the goal of holding political power in Turkey united the movement and the AKP in an alliance of convenience. The AKP and the Gülen movement were in a symbiotic coexistence. The AKP facilitated the appointment of the movement of members to key bureaucratic positions, as well as the sheltering of the movement’s institutions. It is alleged that the followers of the movement controlled the technologically apt intelligence branch of the police, as well as the strategic personnel and overseas relations departments. This challenged the movement’s claim to be a social, civil and spiritual organization. Critics and opponents of the movement feared that they were under surveillance by the movement through the Turkish police. The followers of the movement helped the AKP government to protect itself against the military of the Kemalists and secularists who had run a “deep state” within Turkey for many years. The secularist regime

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and the deep state had set the boundaries on what political reforms were acceptable. Occasionally, they overthrew civilian governments, particularly Islamic parties that failed to comply. Together, the movement and the AKP went a long way toward eliminating this threat. The AKP and the Gülen movement needed to combine their forces as a means of surviving the hostile secular environment, otherwise, both groups would be eliminated by the secular establishment. In this regard, the AKP greatly benefited from the movement in terms of using educated human resource in the state bureaucracy. The key positions in the state bureaucracy were occupied by the secularists and this was a serious threat for the AKP to run state administration and politics smoothly. In return for its support to the AKP, the Gülen movement had the opportunity to expand further across social, economic, and bureaucratic fields. During this term, it is claimed that the sympathizers of the movement occupied the important positions in the state bureaucracy, judiciary, media, and security forces. For example, in 2005 and 2007, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) gave two notices to the AKP government to investigate F-type Organization in the state (F referring to Gülen’s first name) but they were rejected by the government. The AKP deliberately ignored this allegation for both groups were working together against the common enemy. The secular Turkish system aimed to eliminate both groups through legal maneuvers. However due to the strategic alliance, they survived. The benefit of supporting the EU membership process yielded its fruit by changing the Counterterrorism Law on May 5, 2006 which enabled the Ankara Criminal Court to acquit Fethullah Gülen of overthrowing the secular regime. Similarly, the AKP survived the military’s indirect intervention on April 27, 2007. The secularist military published memorandum online which is known as the “e-memorandum”8 in 2007, but the movement supported the government against the military by referring to the EU norms and Turkey’s membership. Moreover, in 2008, the secularists aimed to close the AKP in the Constitutional Court, but they did not succeed. The Gülen-AKP alliance helped the AKP survive the Constitutional Court’s case9 in 2008 against it. Documents detailing an alleged planned coup to oust the AKP and undermine the Gülen movement were leaked to Gülenist newspapers and this led to the country’s landmark Ergenekon trials and the conviction of about 330 military officers. After surviving the attacks of the secularists, the AKP and the Gülen movement cooperated in the

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Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, which sent hundreds of retired and active military officers to jail and neutralized the tutelary capacity of the military. In other words, the alliance of Gülen and Erdogan was instrumental in that it curbed the military’s power through the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, which led to the imprisonment of dozens of military figures who were implicated in coup attempts against the government. The supporters of the Gülen movement were instrumental in prosecuting two wide-ranging investigations and trials, targeting “deep state” structures that were accused of planning to remove the AK party from power. Since its beginning, the Gülen movement had a tense relationship with the Turkish military. Despite its presence in the police forces and across the Turkish bureaucracy, it lacked representation in the Turkish armed forces. Since the Turkish military bi-annually reviews its staff, discharging personnel associated with Islamist groups, most notably the Gülen movement. This attitude led the followers of the movement to criticize the Kemalists within the military. Between 2007 and 2010, the pro-Gülen media attacked the Turkish military by featuring allegations against active duty military personnel in a coup plot against the AKP government. The AKP-Gülen alliance was established to end the military tutelage in particular and undermine the secular establishment in general, using all necessary means.10 A key instrument of this alliance was trialed by “special courts,” which targeted secularists and Kemalists within and outside of the state that could threaten the two groups. During the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) cases, several retired and on-duty members of the Turkish armed forces were accused of conspiring to overthrow the AKP government with the help of the media, universities, and civil society activists. In Oda TV trials11 in conjunction with the Ergenekon case, critical journalists were incriminated. In Devrimci Karargah (Revolutionary Headquarters)12 trials, members of a radical leftist organization along with a former police chief, members of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and journalists were charged with attempting to overthrow the government. The KCK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s urban network) trials prosecuted academics, civil society activists, unionists, journalists, politicians, students, and members of the MIT for association with the KCK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s urban network).13 These trials were criticized by some scholars with the argument that the judges and public prosecutors

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frequently violated the fundamental rights of the defendants. They argued that prolonged pretrial detention became the norm, and that prosecutors extensively relied on secret witness testimony, fabricated evidence, and frequently violated the due process.14 Through strategic alliance, special courts imposed a media blackout on these probes thus limiting public scrutiny over the case. A total number of 4091 investigations were launched against journalists, who reported on these probes, for breaches of the confidentiality of investigations.15 The conduct of the trials, together with mass arrests, prompted widespread concern about the government’s commitment to civil liberties and the rule of law. Even though the alliance between the two groups achieved success, mostly in the cases that target to liquidate the military tutelage, the most serious controversies had also been experienced due to the same processes. The disagreement that arose at times between the executive and judicial powers around the inclusion of some retired and some active top-ranked military officers into the interrogations, should be evaluated in this context. Although at the time, the trials were considered in Europe as a Turkish effort to reckon with its dark past, they were deeply controversial within Turkey. The strategic alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement peaked during the constitutional referendum of September 12, 2010. During this time, Fethullah Gülen personally encouraged his followers and other Turkish citizens to cast affirmative votes in the referendum. Gülen who traditionally denied any involvement in politics, publicly condoned the reform package that would restructure the higher courts and judicial councils. He suggested that even the dead should rise from their graves to vote in favor of the package. In return, Erdogan extended his gratitude to Gülen and the movement. This was to be the final instance of cooperation between the movement and the government. The movement’s backing paved the way for the AKP to call for a referendum in 2010 to amend the military-drafted 1982 constitution and to receive over 57% approval from Turkish voters. This referendum altered the composition of the judicial bodies and ultimately broke the secularist power in the judiciary. The AKP-Gülen alliance redesigned the judicial system. The constitutional reform package permitted the election of a new Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The HSYK has the authority to conduct the following procedures concerning the civil and administrative judiciary judges and prosecutors:

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Admission to the profession, appointment, transference, granting temporary authorization, promotion, allocation as first class, distributing cadres, making decisions about those who are not considered suitable to continue to perform their profession, rendering decisions about disciplinary punishments, suspension from office; and to issue circulars exclusively about the above mentioned subjects and the inspections, researches, examinations, and investigations regarding the judges and prosecutors.16 Prior to the elections, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice prepared and circulated a list of candidates and not surprisingly, every single name on the list was elected while no other candidate supported by other groups were elected to the council. Thus, after the referendum, the AKP and the Gülen movement secured their control over the supreme judicial council and several chambers of the higher courts in addition to the special courts. As a requirement of strategic alliance, the AKP government gave the control of the ministries of education, internal affairs, and judiciary to the Gülen movement.17 Erdogan implied this in the early stages of the conflict by stating that the movement was ungrateful to the AKP, despite that it was given whatever it asked for.18 In short, the AKPGülen alliance replaced merit with ideological and political criteria in bureaucratic appointments to replace the remnants of the secular establishment. In the course of the AKP-Gülen alliance, the pressure upon the media mounted, the number of incarcerated journalists increased, self-censorship soared, and Turkey’s rankings in media freedom indices rapidly deteriorated.19 However, the AKP government, in the meantime, publicly defended the detention of journalists in cases like KCK and Ergenekon.20 Through its coalition with the AKP, the Gülen movement achieved a firm position for itself within the Turkish bureaucracy and presented itself as civil and liberal form of Islam globally. The Gülen movement experienced its best term under the Erdogan government as it was given access to all sectors of the state, including those that were previously barred to its members, such as the ministries of education, interior, foreign affairs, and justice, as well as the directorates of security and intelligence. Erdogan even promoted the movement abroad by asking foreign leaders to allow the movement to establish schools and other projects in their countries. In exchange, the movement supported the party during elections. The AKP’s domestic and foreign achievements helped

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in strengthening this alliance between 2002 and 2010. However, after 2010, Turkey’s growing challenges, whether in terms of foreign policy or in terms of the domestic issues worsened the relations between the two groups. The AKP-Gülen alliance soon disintegrated as the two Islamic movements clashed over the distribution of power in the new Turkey.

4.3  Beginning of Confrontation (2010–2013) Turkish secularists speculated that the AKP and Gülen movement would naturally join forces in a unified Islamist camp against the secular Turkish state. Both groups were tagged as Islamist on the basis of their shared conservative lifestyle and nationalist sentiments. Moreover, although they came from different Islamic traditions, the two groups were on the same page in terms of major political issues during the AKP’s first term. They cooperated on political matters such as Turkey’s EU accession, they both respected the secularity of the state, and they adhered to the game rules of democracy. The relationship between the two groups started to deteriorate during the AKP’s second term. Especially, and after 2011 elections the two groups became increasingly adversarial when they began to confront each other publicly and politically. One of the logical explanations for the deterioration of the relations between these groups is that after controlling the governmental institutions and consolidating their power by continuous success in elections in Turkey, Political Islamists no longer needed the support of Gülen movement. On contrary, they started to deem the movement as a rival to themselves. Thus, the alliance between the AKP and the Gülen movement began to fall apart after 2011. Gülen once found common cause with Erdogan, supporting his conservative, Islamic-leaning Justice and Development (AK) party when it was founded on a pro-European and business-friendly platform in the wake of 1997 military intervention. They remained allies until differences between them could not be suppressed anymore. The relationship has steadily declined and both sides have accused each other of wanting to consolidate control. Gülen movement began to seek alliances with secular parties that opposed the AKP. As the movement did not like Erbakan and the National Outlook movement due to their approach to Islam, it also opposed the AKP when it started to promote the ideology of political Islam.

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Indeed, the disputes between the AKP and the Gülen movement have a much longer history, but, their strategic alliance concealed these differences.21 The AKP and Gülen movement collaboration was partial, conditional, and temporary. Their shared agendas were specific to certain projects at a particular time. Their cooperation toward democratizing the state was instrumental rather than principle. After the demise of the EU dream, the two movements evolved in different directions. The Gülen movement aimed to increase its networks internationally rather than staying local. On the other hand, the AKP’s economic and political reforms slowed and stagnated after the second term due to its policy of mixing religion with politics. Since the movement opposed the ideology of political Islam, it started to question its support to the AKP. The other reason for the conflict between the two groups was the conflicting views of world politics. The clash between the two former allies had important implications at a time when Turkey appeared increasingly vulnerable, with a war raging in Syria and the government facing fierce challenges from within.22 The conflict between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and preacher Fethullah Gülen’s Islamic movement started to be known from 2010. Initially, the two groups began to engage in a silent civil war, although much of their conflict remained somewhat hidden from public view. After years of cooperation, the Gülen movement and the AKP finished their strategic alliance. Gülen’s drastic change in stance toward his previous allies raises numerous questions. Did it signify that his movement had become so powerful that it no longer needed the alliance with the AKP, which opened the door for the Gülen movement? Did Gülen feel that Erdogan’s fortunes had started to wane, and that his chances to remain in power were diminishing due to the domestic and foreign difficulties he had been facing in the past several years? Had this pushed Gülen to start building bridges with those who would succeed the AKP? Gülen is well known for his ability to interpret international changes and was he thus attempting to repeat his experience with the AKP with other political factions? The movement’s activities inside and outside of Turkey provided international prestige for the AKP and Erdogan. The AKP government received support from the sympathizers of the movement for its fight against the tutelage of Turkish military. When the army subordinated to the civilian government, Erdogan started to see the Hizmet as a potential threat to his extraordinary powerful presidency. Once the

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common enemy, the secularists, and Kemalists in the military and in the bureaucracy were defeated, there was no need for the coalition between the AKP and the Gülen movement. Erdogan was worried that he was too dependent on the movement, especially, the movement’s sympathizers in the police and judiciary, who could deploy uncompromising tactics on him some day. The movement feared that Erdogan was becoming too powerful, that he was impossible to control. Erdogan knew that the secularist political opposition was too weak and so could not pose a serious threat to him. Moreover, the United States and Europe needed his support in Syria, regardless of his antidemocratic policies in Turkey. The only real danger which Erdogan expected was from the Gülen movement. By emphasizing Islamist symbols and working up antiwestern sentiments, Erdogan tried to combat the movement. After the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials as well as after the referendum, the secularist power in the state was eliminated. All three strongholds of the secular establishment—the presidency, military, and judiciary—were neutralized. The victims of the past were now able to hold the reins of power in the Turkish state. However, after removing the old power, the new problem emerged: who would be the new power in the state. This was the beginning of confrontation between the AKP and the Gülen movement. It appears that the AKP was reassured by the absence of a strong, cohesive political opposition, and the fact that the secular parties had failed and proven themselves unable to exploit Erdogan’s troubles, as the Taksim events (known as Gezi Park protests)23 had shown. The conflict between the Gülen movement and the AKP showed that Turkish people vote for a services-related agenda, rather than a political one. Thus, the AKP realized that the other parties would not be able to compete. Indeed, since 2002, no political party has been capable of competing with the AKP in local or parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the Gülen movement with its broad network of relations caused more damage to the ruling party than the combined forces of the secular opposition. The struggle against the secular establishment together with the AKP in Turkey caused the Gülen movement to be perceived as a political entity. After the Ergenekon trials, the Gülen movement became the usual suspect behind any conspiracy and it was accused as a hidden force engulfing the state apparatus in its entirety. Initially, the AKP started to criticize the movement cautiously without targeting Gülen. They claimed

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that Gülen was misled by his inner circle. The phrase “Gülen is good, but his inner circle is bad” was commonly used by the AKP elite at that time. There were a number of reasons for the termination of the strategic alliance between the two former allies. Firstly, after eliminating the common enemy, the AKP started to accuse the followers of the Gülen movement within the security forces, the judiciary and other branches of the bureaucratic system for lobbying for their own interests.24 Erdogan himself explicitly accused the special courts and the state prosecutors employed there of behaving like a “state within the State.25 Secondly, the political visions of the ruling party and the Gülen movement diverged over the Kurdish issue. Thirdly, the movement took a confrontational stance toward the government. After the elimination of the secularists’ power the strategic alliance between the two Islamic groups ended.26 The differences in ideology, strategy, goals, and worldviews started to surface between them. For example, while Erdogan wanted to be the leader or the caliph of the Muslim world which would disturb international powers, Gülen chose to avoid disturbing these powers. In order for the movement to operate safely in over 100 countries, it has to escape from the confrontation with the international powers. Gülen has made this crystal clear in 2010 Mavi Marmara Incident. The first seeds of dispute between the two groups were sown in 2010 when Israeli troops attacked a flotilla led by a Turkish aid agency carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza. The so-called Freedom Flotilla that departed Turkey with the aim of breaking the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza was organized mainly by the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH in Turkish). The movement deemed the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) as a radical religious organization because it derives from the Necmettin Erbakan’s National Outlook. Thus, Gülen spoke to American media outlets to accuse the AKP government of dragging this activist group into risk despite clear warnings from Israeli authorities. Nevertheless, the Mavi Marmara sailed to break the blockade of Gaza with the support of the AKP. However, this resulted in the killing of ten Turkish activists when Israeli forces attacked the flotilla. After the tragic incident, while the AKP condemned the attack, Gülen criticized this initiative as an unlawful and counterproductive breach of Israeli authority.27 Gülen shocked many people including some of his

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own followers when he stated that Prime Minister Erdogan was responsible for the Israeli attack against the Turkish ship. He criticized the AKP for jeopardizing the lives of civilians on behalf of a symbolic gesture with no practical purpose. Any trouble between Turkey and Israel may annoy the Israeli lobby and raise doubts about the Turkish government in the United States. The movement thought that the Mavi Marmara incident may reflect badly on them and limit their room for maneuvers abroad, since they were deemed a firm ally of the AKP at the time. The AKP government demanded an apology and compensation for the victims’ families and recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv.28 The dispute increased further when pro-Gülen media criticized Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The hidden conflict surfaced with this incident. The differences between the mentality of each group emerged: the AKP’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy clashed with the Gülen movement’s conflict-avoiding strategy. The movement was aware that regional and international powers did not allow its vast global network to operate safely if it confronted these powers. The Mavi Marmara incident highlighted Gülen’s opposition to Erdogan’s pro-Arab policies and his criticism of Israel. Unlike Erdogan, Gülen insisted on building good relations not only with the United States, but also with Israel. The dispute between the two groups over the flotilla incident puzzled Western audiences and also secular Turks, for both previously assumed that there was not much difference between the two groups. They could not understand Gülen’s conflict-avoiding strategy as well as the AKP’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy. Erdogan’s displays of temper, acts of aggression, and expressions of arrogance were not welcomed by the movement in connection to its conflict-avoiding strategy. The share of power between the two groups was another serious problem which caused conflict to emerge. The Gülen movement demanded a greater share of the power but Erdogan rejected it, for he wanted to centralize state power in his hands alone. In this regard, he even neutralized the influence of senior party members so they could not rival him. The Gülen movement continued to stack the judiciary and police forces with followers loyal to the movement. However, Erdogan was able to consolidate power, growing more powerful and popular as prime minister, and he tried to present himself as a leader in a troubled neighborhood. The diverging views of the AKP and the Gülen movement particularly came to a head in regard to the Kurdish question. Gülen had a

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nationalist approach to the Kurds issue. Erdogan’s pragmatic policy to negotiate with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)29 was criticized by the Gülen movement. While the AKP promoted the peace process to solve the Kurds issue the movement had the security-driven approach at this matter. It criticized the peace process of the AKP for the movement argued that it would only help the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) further strengthen its position in the region as well as its armed struggle against the Turkish state. The ultra-nationalist MHP (The Nationalist Movement Party) and the main opposition CHP (The Republican People’s Party) joined the Gülen movement in its reservations regarding the peace process. The opponents criticized the AKP’s Kurds policy so the PKK could not be able to strengthen its armed struggle against the Turkish state. In the 1990s, structural problems, weak coalition governments, and political instability hindered efforts to resolve the Kurds problem. In this regard, the AKP had better conditions to solve the problem. First of all, the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan30 sided with the government on the Gülen-Erdogan conflict. He adopted the government’s narrative and accused the movement as to preventing the peace process.31 Moreover, both the PKK’s senior leadership in Qandil in northern Iraq and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) signaled that the PKK would not do anything to harm the peace process. Although the movement presented itself as an apolitical civil society organization devoted to intercultural and interreligious dialogue and as a model of civil and liberal Islam, the movement’s power struggle with the government and its alleged infiltration of state structures shattered that image. The followers of the movement expanded its sphere of influence as they acquired positions in different branches of the state. They crossed and blurred the lines between civil society and the state when they obtained positions of power within the state bureaucracy and then used it against the AKP government. Thus, the movement was accused by conspiracy theories that it was taking over the state from within. State officials are expected to be primarily committed to the nation as a whole and to the state rather than to a particular movement or community. However, when the followers of the Gülen movement entered into the realm of the state this created deep tensions and competition between the movement’s appointed followers and the elected officials of the AKP. The tension increased when a crisis fueled further speculation of a power struggle between the government, the police, and the judiciary.

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The AKP claimed that the Gülen movement wanted to control the government by demanding that Erdogan put one hundred pro-Gülen candidates in the party list on the eve of the June 2011 general elections. Erdogan rejected it for he deemed it as taking over the party and power from his hands. This demand increased the tension between them further. After the 2011 elections, Erdogan had grown more and sustained his voter base. This meant that Erdogan no longer needed the movement’s allies. The leaking of the Oslo meeting32 was a new phase in Turkey’s policies regarding the Kurds for the AKP declared a peace process. During this time, the movement raised its concern about the nature of the peace process. It claimed that this process only contributes to the terrorist group but not the actual peace in the region. Nevertheless, the popularity of the peace process among various groups allowed the AKP to avoid substantial opposition for a time. The conflict between the AKP and the Gülen movement became definite with the so-called “MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Organization) Crisis” on February 7, 2012. The movement criticized Hakan Fidan’s secret talks with the PKK in Oslo. Fidan was the Undersecretary of the MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Organization) and Erdogan’s confidant. Sadreddin Sarıkaya, a public prosecutor who was alleged to be from the movement, subpoenaed Hakan Fidan to account for conducting secret talks with the PKK in Oslo. The Prosecutor tried to subpoena Fidan to respond to accusations of a “disclosure of information to the PKK” and “collaborations with the PKK for the establishment of a Kurdish state.” This was alarming for Erdogan for he thought that the Gülen movement was taking over the state from him. This was also a major event which reflected the presence of rival groups within the state apparatus and demonstrated the limits of the government’s power. The Gülen movement led a smear campaign against Hakan Fidan with various accusations ranging from him being sympathetic to Iran to espousing the ideology of Brotherhood in Egypt, the godfather of modern jihadist movements, to a nationalist-centered attack claiming he was promoting too many Kurds to positions of authority because of his own family heritage. Prime Minister Erdogan viewed the matter as a personal attack on him and suspected that the Gülen movement was behind the leaking of the voice recordings of the Oslo meetings.

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Erdogan deflected further investigations with two emergency measures that paved the way for a shake-up of the judges and prosecutors, which allowed the government to marginalize Gülen supporters within the judiciary. In order to prevent Fidan’s arrest, Erdogan protected him from further legal process through an immediate legislative change. Soon, the AKP government introduced a new bill requiring the Prime Minister’s permission for an investigation of intelligence officials. The bill was quickly approved by the parliament, thus, rescued Fidan from having to testify. Erdogan protected Fidan from further legal process through an immediate legislative maneuver. During this incident, Erdogan used the expression “a state within a state” implying that the followers of the movement in the judiciary and security were behind this event. He alleged that the followers of the movement were probably behind the leaking of footage showing MIT trucks that were carrying arms to rebels in Syria under the guise of humanitarian aid, in an effort to embarrass the agency’s chief. In his speech, he stated his commitment to preventing the dominance of appointed officials over elected ones, including himself. The dispute between the Gülen movement and the AKP moved into the public sphere after the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) crisis. Although the prosecutor’s only purpose was to interrogate the illegal activities of some MIT members who had infiltrated into KCK (The Kurdistan Communities Union),33 it was obvious that the interrogation of the MIT members was mainly to discuss in detail the government’s negotiation policies with the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and Abdullah Öcalan. This situation was perceived by the AKP government as a search for establishing a “judicial tutelage” over the government. Besides the political arena, there were also conflicts in business between the AKP and the Gülen movement. The followers and voters of the AKP complained that the movement became a capitalist enterprise that cared only about its own economic interests by forming a monopoly in certain sectors and excluding non-followers from participation and competition. Thus, AKP supporters in the business class argued that the AKP government did not need the movement’s support, collaboration, and votes. The tension between pro-AKP—the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association—(MÜSIAD) and proGülen movement—the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists—(TUSKON) indicated the conflict in business areas.

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In 2012, the former Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ was arrested for terror activities and this was perceived by the public as the power of the Gülen movement in the judiciary and security forces. Not long before this incident, Hakan Fidan, the Chief of Intelligence, was subpoenaed. The struggle against the secular establishment, together with the AKP, caused the movement to be politicized. The immense power of the movement in the state bureaucracy and security forces caused the movement to be perceived by the public as a political entity. During this time, allegations of evidence-fabrication, wiretapping, and blackmail made the movement seem very strong in public eyes. Public perception was that whoever criticized the movement they would be destroyed. They believed that the sympathizers of the movement engulfed the state apparatus in its entirety. This perception made the movement the default suspect behind any conspiracy. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) alleged that the movement had foreign ties and gradually, this gained currency among the AKP circles.34 Nevertheless, the AKP and Erdogan avoided targeting Gülen directly. Erdogan even attended the Turkish Olympiads in 2012 and invited Gülen back to Turkey, saying “We want this yearning to end.” The Arab spring hit Turkey with an environmental protest (Gezi Park protests) by a group of young individuals which turned into an opposition movement against the AKP. The massive protests aimed to bring a halt to Erdogan’s ever-expanding power. Erdogan’s government reacted to them harshly and this attitude escalated the protests which spread out throughout the nation. Erdogan refused to accept the protests as an expression of dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of large segments of Turkish society. Instead, he painted the protestors as hooligans and putschists who were making common cause with remnants of the old regime in order to topple him.35 Rather than conciliate, he polarized the nation further by employing Islamist concepts to fight against his opponents. He skillfully employed the Gezi challenge to create new enemies, since the old enemy, the secular establishment, was gone. This strategy worked well for Erdogan and the AKP. They defined the protests as an international plot to destroy the government and declared a second liberation war against the western imperialists and their collaborating traitors inside. Eventually, Gezi became a lifesaver for the AKP and Erdogan. The AKP’s reaction to the Gezi movement was a very aggressive effort to tighten its grip on power and combat its opponents.

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On the other side, the dispute between the government and the movement reached its apex when Gülen implicitly supported the protests that took place in Taksim Square in June 2013.36 He revealed his dislike of the AKP’s foreign policy in an interview shortly after the Gezi protests: “If Turkey is indeed able to develop good diplomatic relations in the region, I believe it will be in the interest of Europe, the United States and the world. But I don’t think Turkey is doing what it can toward this end at the moment.”37 Decline of rights and liberties in Turkey under the rule of AKP caused Gülen sympathizers to question their support to the AKP. During this difficult time, the AKP did not achieve its expectations from the Gülen movement and its media. The support of the movement to the AKP was minimal, thus, Erdogan included the movement in the Western conspiratorial framework. Indeed, pro-Gülen media harshly criticized Erdogan and the manner in which his government dealt with the protestors. Today’s Zaman (Hizmet-affiliated newspaper) assumed the role of tarnishing the AKP’s image in the international arena.

4.4  Explicit Confrontation (2013–2016) The Gülen movement lost its advantages with an increasingly authoritarian Erdogan/AKP regime. With a cut-off of government awarded contracts and the sudden denial of jobs and promotions for the many Gülen followers throughout the Turkish government bureaucracy, Erdogan revealed his enmity toward the movement. A long-developed enmity between the AKP and the Gülen movement became publicly known with the cram school quarrel. Tensions had escalated to the point that Erdogan moved against one of the Gülen Movement’s key sources of income and influence. In November 2013, the AKP government wanted to close down the cram schools for the university entrance examinations. The AKP government pursued a major attack on the movement by announcing its new education policy, which included the shutting down of all study centers that prepare students for university entrance exams.38 Erdogan wanted to weaken the movement with this move. This was perceived by the movement as a direct attack to its existence since the movement was operating a quarter of those cram schools and they were a financial source for the movement as well as channels for recruiting new members. So, when the AKP decided to close the movement’s preparation schools for university

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entrance exams, the economic interests of the two groups clashed. This attitude changed the relations between the two groups permanently. The Dershane (the cram school) conflict was the result of a long-lasting enmity between the two groups. The movement responded to the AKP’s attack by instigating a corruption investigation about Erdogan’s family members and some of his ministers in the cabinet. On December 17 and 25, 2013, the police arrested 52 people, including senior bureaucrats, businessmen, and sons of ministers on corruption charges in Turkey’s covert gold-for-oil trade with Iran that bypassed American sanctions to the latter.39 Erdogan’s family members and some of his ministers were summoned to give statements as suspects of a serious corruption accusation. The detention of the sons of cabinet ministers, under corruption charges and without informing the higher authorities, by police forces loyal to Gülen, escalated the conflict between the two parties. The objective was to embarrass the government by pressing charges of corruption against key cabinet members three months prior to the municipal elections, forcing Erdogan to fire the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Environment. The AKP blamed the Gülen movement for setting up a “parallel state” within the police force and the judiciary, to attempt to bring down the AKP government through the corruption probe. On the other side, the movement, in return, accused the government of corruption and obstructing the investigation. While Erdogan’s supporters insisted that the corruption investigations were an attempt to bring down the government, the movement’s followers said the investigators were simply doing their jobs, and could not have turned a deaf ear to increasingly flagrant corruption and nepotism in the bureaucracy. The corruption investigation was an important turning point. The government thought it was instigated by prosecutors and officers linked to the Gülen movement, but the important question was whether there was corruption or not. Nevertheless, the followers of the movement were accused by the AKP government of orchestrating various conspiracies and setting up terror networks. The conflict between the two Islamic groups suggests that Muslim participants compete and struggle over sources of political and economic power on the basis of the Islamic ideology they advocate. As a result, both groups politicized different branches of the state, particularly the police, the intelligence, the military, and the courts during and after the Ergenekon trials.

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4.5  The December 17–25, 2013 Corruption Investigation The 17–25 December incident refers to a criminal investigation that involved several key people in the Turkish government. General Prosecutor Zakaria Oz issued an arrest order for 52 Turkish officials, sons of ministers and businessmen targeting the AKP government due to the serious corruption allegations. The suspects in the scandal were accused of bribery to facilitate construction schemes and of the illegal transfer of gold to Iran through the state-owned bank Halkbank.40 On December 17, 2013, the police arrested 52 people who had close links with the government on charges of corruption, including the sons of four ministers and a number of businessmen linked to the AKP.41 Prosecutors accused Suleyman Aslan, the director of state-owned Halkbank, Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab, and several family members of cabinet ministers, of bribery, corruption, fraud, money laundering, and gold smuggling.42 The charges included accepting large bribes from Reza Zarrab, a businessman of Iranian origin, who acted as an agent in illegal financial transactions, bypassing the international sanctions imposed on Iran.43 The trader, Reza Zarrab, was on trial in New York for money laundering and circumventing Iran sanctions through illegal gold trading. According to official evidences, the suspicions that members of the government had been involved in corruption seem to be well-grounded. Suleyman Aslan who had $4.5 million cash stored in shoeboxes at his house, was accused of gas for a gold scheme with Iran and Zarrab. Zarrab was involved in about $9.6 billion of gold trading in 2012.44 The Turkish government, by violating the US sanctions against Iran, exported some $13 billion of gold to Iran and in return, it received Iranian natural gas and oil.45 The illegal transaction was made through the Turkish state-owned bank, Halkbank, as part of a strategy to bypass the US-led sanctions on Iran.46 Mustafa Demir, the mayor of the district municipality of Fatih in Istanbul, was detained on accusations of approving the construction license for a hotel near the route of the recently inaugurated Marmaray railway, despite warnings from Japanese engineers that the construction could put the tunnel at risk of collapsing.47 He was investigated for ordering the ministry report to be shelved in exchange for bribes. Egemen Bağış, the ex-Minister of European Union Affairs, was accused

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as a potential suspect of bribery related to Reza Zarrab who had business affiliations with Babak Zanjani.48 The police confiscated some $17.5 million of money used in bribery during the investigation. After the December 17 corruption investigation, the second wave came on December 25, 2013. Erdogan’s son and son-in-law, as well as the Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, were implicated in another investigation into the soliciting of businessmen to the Sabah newspaper. Dozens of recordings of private conversations between Erdogan and his family were leaked during this period, including private conversations with businessmen close to the government. According to newspapers reports, the second wave was possibly involving Erdogan’s sons, Bilal, and Burak, as well as certain al-Qaida affiliates from Saudi Arabia such as Sheikh Yaseen Al Qadi and Osama Khoutub.49 The effort to go after Erdogan’s family marked the beginning of a “civil war” between the AKP government and the Gülen movement. In order to stop the corruption investigation and protect his family members, Erdogan immediately changed the police officers in the Istanbul Security Directorate. At midnight on 7 January, Erdogan removed 350 police officers from their positions, including the chiefs of the units dealing with financial crimes, smuggling, and organized crime.50 As predicted, new police officers refused to carry out the orders of general persecutors. Moreover, the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions did not approve this new operation. Prosecutor Muammer Akkaş was dismissed on the same day.51 Although new police officers in the Istanbul Police Department did not take into consideration the second warrant, the list of figures to be taken into custody was leaked to opposition newspapers. Moreover, Muammer Akkaş, the previous prosecutor himself talked directly to the media in front of the courthouse. In response, Chief Prosecutor Turan Colakkadi criticized Akkas, pointing at irregularities in the investigation processes. He expressed his bewilderment at the fact that details of secret investigations were being leaked to the media, even before he was made aware.52 The AKP government then changed police regulations concerning judicial investigations, requiring the police to report to their superiors before they make any move. Telephone calls of the most senior state officials, including Muammer Guler, the ex-minister of internal affairs (who gave instructions to his son about what he had to state regarding the sources of cash found in his house, around $400,000), and above all the conversations of

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Prime Minister Erdogan with his son Bilal, were recorded using wiretapping and then made available to the general public online.53 In the fear that the police could search the houses of his family members, the prime minister instructed that all cash be taken away from his son’s house and the houses of his brother and son-in-law, and should be hidden elsewhere. After a whole day of intensive efforts to hide the money, Bilal Erdogan informed his father that only around 30 million euros in cash was left to be disposed of.54 The corruption allegations led to the resignation of several key figures in the AKP’s government, including Minister of Environment and Minister of Urban Planning Erdogan Bayraktar on December 25, 2013.55 After his resignation, Bayraktar declared to the press that if he was being asked to resign, then Erdogan should also be resigning, since he was involved in the same deals.56 Various opposition sources accused the government of trying to influence the judiciary system to cover up the corruption. However, Erdogan labeled the investigation as an international conspiracy. The corruption probe only helped Erdogan further to convince his electoral base about the scale of conspiracy against the government. He portrayed the investigations as another plot like the Gezi Protests and accused the Gülen movement of establishing a “parallel state” in the service of dark alliances. All of the prosecutors, police officers, and judges involved in the December 2013 corruption investigations were arrested and then charged with trying to overthrow the government. Former Chief Prosecutor Zekeriya Oz, who led the corruption investigation, fled the country in August 2015 just hours before the issue of arrest warrants, facing charges of attempting to overthrow the government forcefully and forming a criminal organization.57 In 2014, the AKP government started a massive attack on the sympathizers of Gülen. The police raided Samanyolu TV (Hizmet affiliated TV channel) and arrested General Manager Hidayet Karaca and Editorin-Chief Ekrem Dumanli. The two were accused of establishing and administrating an armed organization. Although Dumanli was released, Karaca was sent to jail. In October 2014, the government went after Gülen-affiliated financial institutions. It applied enormous pressure on Bank Asya and encouraged business owners to withdraw their money from the Bank. In 2015, the bank was seized by the Turkish state fund (TMSF) and a similar action was implemented toward major companies whose owners were known to be Gülen sympathizers. For example, Koza Holding and all of its subsidiaries such as Bugun TV, Kanalturk TV, and

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gold mines were seized by the AKP government. The seizure of media which could be considered anti-AKP caused great controversy among opposition groups who considered this as an effort to mute their voices during the election campaign. Although Erdogan and the AKP government successfully closed the corruption probe in Turkey, the case was reopened in the United States. On January 3, 2018, a Turkish banker closely connected to the highest levels of the Turkish government, was convicted in a New York District Court for his role in an Iran sanctions-busting scheme involving Turkish banks.58 The star witness in that case was Reza Zarrab, a wealthy gold trader. Zarrab, a confidant of Turkish President Erdogan, had pleaded guilty to an unspecified charge just prior to the second trial. His apparent plea deal indicates that he likely cooperated with Department of Justice prosecutors in a case that directly implicated the corrupt Turkish president in a plot to use the gold trade to help Iran evade sanctions.59 In retaliation to the corruption probe, the AKP government started a massive purge against the sympathizers of the movement across state institutions. Erdogan declared a “witch hunt” to show his determination. Several thousand police officers, judges, and public prosecutors who were alleged to be sympathetic to the Gülen movement were rotated or dismissed. The AKP’s changes in police regulations regarding judicial investigations, its dismissal of scores of police officers, and assignment of new prosecutors to corruption probes have been criticized for violating the rule of law and undermining the principles of a separation of powers.60 Eventually, the Gülen movement became a victim of political persecution by the Turkish government. Erdogan himself stated that “if it is called a witch hunt, then, yes, we will perform that witch-hunt.” Since the outbreak of the corruption scandal, the AKP government have been targeting the Gülen movement. According to security officials, around 200,000 individuals were dismissed, 150,000 detained, 76,000 sent to jail from all walks of life including businessmen, doctors, teachers, academics, police officers, philanthropists, and even housewives. A number of columnists suggested that Prime Minister Erdogan should trust the law and let the prosecutors do their job, even if he thought that he was the real target of the investigations. However, Erdogan argued that the situation at hand constituted a state of exception and, therefore, required extraordinary measures. Since the corruption probe, Turkey has been witnessing a political crisis and an escalation in conflict between the ruling Justice and Development Party

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(AKP) and the Gülen movement. Indeed, for months before the corruption cases surfaced, Turkish media had speculated about escalating tensions between the Gülen group and Erdogan’s AKP government. The pro-AKP media claimed that general prosecutors in the corruption probe and most of the policemen who executed the arrest orders were sympathizers of the Gülen movement. The bitter fight between the two Islamic groups was difficult to digest, because, at the base of both groups were conservative Muslims. Instead of reducing the tension, both groups used harsh rhetoric against each other. Gülen cursed the guilty ones saying: those who don’t see the thief but go after those trying to catch the thief… let God bring fire to their houses, ruin their homes, break their unities.61 In return, Erdogan called Gülen a “false prophet” and his sympathizers “parasites,” “grave robbers,” “blood-sucking vampires,” “pawns of Turkey’s foes,” and “sucking like leeches.”62 Some prominent figures in the AKP such as Cemil Cicek and Besir Atalay complained of the Gülen movement’s growing involvement in the decision-making processes.63 The conflict rapidly escalated. Thereupon, Erdogan cut the major sources of social capital and finance for the Gülen movement, curtailed its media power, and weakened the movement’s presence in the judiciary and security forces. In the course of fighting its former ally, the AKP government resorted to unconstitutional measures and bypassed the rule of law to eradicate the followers of the movement from the state. After securing around 52% of the vote in the first presidential election held in Turkey, Erdogan regained his confidence in the machinery of the party. The victory of the AKP government in the elections in spite of serious corruption allegations and antidemocratic practices indicates that the government was successful in suppressing the opposition of the movement. It seems the movement has gone low profile, just like the secularist opposition. The government then continued its assault on the Gülen community and launched an investigation into illegal wiretaps, purged Gülen sympathizers from the police, and arrested journalists working in Gülen affiliated media outlets.64 Meanwhile, the AKP appointed new prosecutors and with its majority in the Parliament most of the corruption charges dropped, without even revealing unsavory evidence of corruption. The newly appointed prosecutorial office acquitted fifty-three people investigated under the corruption probe. Parliament voted on January 20, 2015, against sending the cases of the

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four ex-ministers implicated in the probe to the Supreme Court. The AKP had escaped unscathed both from the ramifications of the corruption probe and from its split with the Gülen movement. Erdogan undertook a systematic campaign against the Gülen movement. He accused the movement as a parallel structuring within the state and vowed to destroy it saying “we will enter into your dens.” He described the movement as consisting of three layers; faith at the bottom, trade in the middle, and treason at the top. In order to make his anti-Gülenist campaign as state policy, he asked the MGK (National Security Institute) to issue an official statement referring to the movement as “illegal organizations under legal masks and the major threat to national security.” The MGK described the movement as an illegal organization on October 30, 2014 and eventually, it defined the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization on May 26, 2016. The power struggle between former allies further undermined civil liberties, independence of the judiciary, and the rule of law. The government banned Twitter and YouTube prior to the 2014 local elections; reshuffled thousands of police officers and prosecutors; passed new legislation to redesign the supreme judicial council; denied access to the satellite systems for pro-Gülen TV stations; seized the property of leading businessmen; and appointed trustees to companies, foundations, universities, and newspapers with links to the Gülen movement following the probe of December 2013.65 Democratic backsliding gained further momentum under the emergency law. In the meantime, the government shutdown 170 TV stations, newspapers, magazines, and news agencies, including pro-Kurdish, pro-secular and left-wing media. It also closed down 35 health care facilities, 934 schools, 109 dormitories, 104 foundations, 1125 associations, 15 universities, and 19 trade unions. The ministry of finance placed injunction on the property of more than 100,000 individuals. These measures seriously damaged the rule of law, civil liberties, and property rights. After shutting down all opponent media outlets and sending antiAKP journalists to jail, the AKP government passed a serious of legislations which destroyed human rights, revoked separation of powers and restricted freedoms in the guise of fighting the “parallel structure.” This was a major blow to pluralism, democracy, and human rights. The massive attack on the Gülen movement and deteriorating political climate in Turkey was clearly demonstrated in the annual report by the US

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Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2015.66 The worst was that people who were subject to injustices and wrong doings did not and still do not have the chance to stand a fair trial despite serious accusations leveled against them. Nevertheless, the followers of the movement preferred to protest against Erdogan and the AKP through non-violent methods. During his confrontation with the Gülen movement, Erdogan made a tactical alliance with his old enemy, the anti-Western Kemalists. He publicly criticized the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, and most of the jailed politicians, journalists, as well as active and retired military officers were released in 2014 and 2015. Ergenekon Terror Organization (ETÖ) was replaced with FETÖ (Gülenist Terror Organization/Parallel State Structuring).67 Turkish authorities considered Gülen as the leader of FETÖ/PYD on October 28, 2015 and thereby put him onto the list of most wanted terrorists.68 After the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, the acronym FETÖ gained wide currency. The term designated all followers and even sympathizers of Gülen as part of a terrorist organization. The 15 July coup attempt is projected as the founding moment of Erdogan’s “New Turkey.” Although the AKP-Gülen alliance successfully ended tutelary democracy guided by the secular establishment, it also eradicated all sources of potential checks and balances over the executive. The strategic alliance eventually led to the AKP’s political hegemony authoritarian rulership. Prosecutions of thousands of officers for membership of an alleged “Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization,” without having clear evidence to date that the Gülen movement has engaged in violence or other activities that could reasonably be described as terrorism,69 can be considered as the oppression of Political Islamists over their opponents. The lack of evidence did not stop the AKP from labeling the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization. They detained/jailed many individuals and seized their assets.70 They implemented antiterrorism laws against the Gülen sympathizers, and even considered nonprofits organizations as terrorist institutions. Moreover, they banned many individuals from leaving the country and seized their passports. In order to mute the voice of the followers of the movement, the AKP government took over the movement-affiliated media violently and illegally.71

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4.6  The July 15, 2016 Failed Coup Turkey witnessed a coup which was set to fail on July 15, 2016. A group named the Peace at Home Council from within the Turkish military attempted to take over the state institutions and the government.72 The coup was organized by a small group within the army.73 Over the course of a violent night, TV stations were raided by soldiers, explosions were heard in Istanbul and Ankara. Protesters were shot, the parliament and presidential buildings were fired upon, a military helicopter was shot down and the Turkish military chief was taken hostage.74 During the coup, over 300 people were killed and more than 2100 were injured.75 Some government buildings were bombed from the air. The AKP government alleged that the coup attempt was led by a Gülenist core supported by other military officers. Fethullah Gülen was accused in Turkey of leading a terrorist organization that has attempted to topple the government.76 A Turkish court has issued three arrest warrants for him. The AKP government blamed Fethullah Gülen.77 The government alleged that Adil Öksüz, a close confidant of Gülen and a professor of theology who was reportedly the Gülen movement’s civilian “imam” in charge of the air force, was present at Akincilar air base, in Ankara on the night of the coup. He was detained along with all the officers who were at the base that night, but was subsequently released by a judge within 15 minutes. According to the government, he is one of the key figures linking the coup attempt to Gülen himself. Öksüz stated that he was in the area to purchase a land. Since his release, he has been at large. The government claimed that many of the senior-level putschists had one-dollar bills with them, allegedly given by Gülen as a lucky charm. According to Turkish government sources, hundreds of officers and judges were discovered to have membership and passwords to a communication program called ByLock that Turkish intelligence claims is used by the followers of Gülen movement to avoid detection.78 It had 39,000 active members. Although there isn’t evidence implicating all 39,000 users in the coup, the Turkish government uses membership of ByLock as an indicator of membership in what is now referred to by Turkish law enforcement as the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETÖ).79 Turkish officials argued that the coup attempt happened when members of the military faction that backed the coup became aware that authorities were investigating them as part of a broader effort against

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Gülen sympathizers in the military. Erdogan said, “no tolerance or compassion will be shown to supporters of Fethullah Gülen’s terrorist group.”80 The Turkish public and many government officials believed that the United States was behind the coup effort due to Gülen’s residency there. Erdogan said on several occasions that the coup was the work of a “mastermind” using a reference to the United States. In the wake of the attempted coup, Erdogan has personally asked Washington to extradite Gülen to Turkey, both in conversations with US President Barack Obama by phone, and in face-to-face meetings at the G20 summit in China.81 US officials have told the Turkish government to provide evidence that would stand up in a US court of law, since extradition will be decided by independent judges. However, the AKP government could not provide convincing evidence which could be used as legal basis for the extradition. Gülen has rejected all accusations against himself, and suggested that the coup may have been staged by Erdogan himself to open his way toward extraordinary powerful presidency.82 In his comments to Politico, Gülen said: “If anybody who follows my works acts illegally or unethically, or if they disobey the lawful orders of their superiors, that is a betrayal of my teachings and I fully support their being investigated and facing the consequences.”83 Some of the followers of the movement argued that the putsch was likely orchestrated by secularist military officers who were unhappy with the flare-up of tensions with the Kurds and the instability on the border with Syria. According to Western media stories and widespread belief, the coup was orchestrated by the Turkish government in order for Erdogan to consolidate his power. As the dust settled on an attempted coup in Turkey, a crackdown ensued. Thousands of judges and soldiers have been detained and Erdogan vowed to cleanse the bureaucracy from the supporters of an exiled cleric, Fethullah Gülen, who were in positions of power. Since the coup, thousands of people have been fired from their positions. Erdogan’s crackdown on Gülen’s supporters will raise numerous concerns about the government’s efforts to consolidate its power. It is need to be investigated that why the plotters of the coup attempted to take over the control of some places in Ankara and Istanbul instead of capturing Erdogan, ministers and governors. It seems the coup was not designed to succeed; thus, it was defeated easily by forces loyal to the state. While the coup was continuing, Erdogan accused the Gülen movement on live media.

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Turkish lawmakers endorsed Erdogan with sweeping new powers that allow him to expand a crackdown in the wake of a failed coup. The 550-member parliament (TBMM) approved Erdogan’s request for a three-month state of emergency, with the majority of the chamber being occupied by members of his party.84 The article further noted that “under the Turkish Constitution, the emergency measures allow the government to suspend the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. The emergency allows the president and cabinet effectively to rule by decree, bypassing parliament when drafting new laws and able to restrict or suspend rights and freedoms.”85 After the coup attempt, Turkey witnessed mass arrests and tortures. 40,000 people were detained including at least 10,000 soldiers and 2745 judges. The licenses of 15,000 education staff were suspended and the licenses of 21,000 teachers working at private institutions were revoked.86 During the following years of the coup attempt, more than 100,000 people were arrested or fired from their jobs, on accusations of connections to the Gülen Movement.87 Three news agencies, 16 TV stations, 23 radio stations, 45 newspapers, 15 magazines, and 29 publishers were shut down.88 The AKP government has been taking a maximalist position in purges, going after people who have simply an affinity with or membership of the Gülen network, even for just having opened accounts in the Bank Asya. All these antidemocratic implementations raise questions about the future of Turkish democracy. According to German intelligence, Gülen was not behind the coup for they could not find any convincing evidence to prove it. Similarly, the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee argued that there is no hard evidence that Gülen masterminded the failed coup and there is no evidence to accept the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization.89 The massive crackdown on the followers of the Gülen movement since the coup has become a source of criticism for the United States and European governments. The failed coup attempt was a false flag orchestrated to create a pretext for a mass persecution of critics and opponents in a state of perpetual emergency.90 The coup was not like any other coups which Turkey has witnessed and it was very strange in every sense. Military mobilization was unusually limited in numbers and confined in few cities. Moreover, it was poorly managed. According to testimonials in court trials, private interviews, reviews of military expert opinions and other evidence collected by researchers, the coup attempt cannot even qualify as

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a coup bid in any sense. Thus, Erdogan named the coup attempt “a gift from God” for he secured his imperial presidency, consolidated his gains and stifled the opposition. According to a report published by Stockholm Center for Freedom, the plot was kicked off on July 11 with secret orders given by generals who corroborated with Erdogan’s defense and intelligence chiefs in disguising the plan as an unconventional action plan.91 Through the attempted coup Erdogan destroyed the last remnants of Turkish democracy and suspended the fundamental freedoms. It seems Erdogan is very eager to remain in power. The arguments that raise doubt about the coup attempt will be mentioned. There are huge differences between the government’s narratives on a coup bid and the testimonials from defendants. The conflicting public accounts by Erdogan regarding the chain of events on the day of the coup raise doubt about the coup. The antidemocratic measures taken in the aftermath of the July 15, the shutting down of thousands of institutions and the arrests of tens of thousands of civilians increases the level of doubt about the tragedy. Hakan Fidan, the head of the Turkish intelligence service, was informed about the coup in advance according to his own written statements sent to Parliament. However, he did not inform the Prime Minister or the President. There is no explanation for why the officials who are supposed to prevent the coup attempt against the elected government remained unreachable on the day of the coup and why they followed their daily routine even after they learned about the attempt.92 Hakan Fidan did not give testimony as a suspect or witness in any judicial investigation into the coup attempt. The head of Turkish Intelligence Service was not listened to learn the truth about the coup attempt. Despite the fact that Hakan Fidan was informed he would be detained by the military; he visited the General Staff’s headquarters on the coup attempt day and left safely. Hulusi Akar, the Chief of General Staff, gave conflicting explanations about the coup attempt. Additionally, testimonials by witnesses and defendants do not confirm his words. Although the coup bid could have been prevented easily by simple and quick measures, Akar did not take such measures. Although the top commanders of the military were informed about the coup attempt, they continued with their usual routine, even

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attending wedding ceremonies instead of taking necessary precautions and measures to prevent the event. According to the official account, 1.5% of the total military personnel in the Turkish Army was involved in the coup attempt and they were mostly military students, private conscripts, officers, and non-commissioned officers. However, 168 generals and thousands of officers are now being tried on the coup charges. This raises question whether the coup was staged to clean the army from all opponents. The AKP government could not provide convincing and solid evidence that Gülen masterminded the coup bid. The forced testimonials taken under heavy torture in custody were later refuted by defendants when they appeared in court for trial hearings. Gülen repeatedly called for an international commission to thoroughly investigate the coup but the AKP government failed to respond. Ballistic investigations on the weapons used in the murder of civilians and troops were not done. It remains secret, because the paramilitary groups which were given high-caliber weapons took part in clashes and it is unknown what they did. After the coup attempt, Turkey completely lost its democratic institutions and now it is no longer a country governed by the rule of law and democratic principles. The judiciary is under full control of the government. Freedom of press and expression are under hold. The parliamentary is no longer functioning, and opposition politicians are behind bars. The Turkish foreign ministry, law enforcement, and intelligence services are all tasked with fighting the Gülen movement in Turkey and abroad. In the United States, Europe, Africa, the Balkans, and Pacific countries where Gülen schools are numerous, the AKP government required its diplomats to convince their host governments to shut down schools and raise awareness about the dangers of the organization. The conflict between two Islamic groups burst onto the international scene with the dramatic attempt to overthrow the Turkish government on July 15, 2016. The government instantly blamed the Gülen movement and began a massive purge of the state apparatus. It removed tens of thousands from their jobs with no recourse to appeal, and loudly demanded Gülen’s extradition from the United States. The AKP government embarked on a huge crackdown, which not only targeted the sympathizers of Gülen, but also Kurds, liberals and all other opponents. Instead of applying the principle “suspects are innocent until proven to be guilty,” the AKP government deemed suspects guilty at the

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beginning. The huge number of arrests and dismissals in a short period of time implied that the coup, which Erdogan called “a gift from God,” was a pretext to purge the preexisting lists of profiled public employees. It seems the coup attempt on July 15 was planned long beforehand to create Erdogan’s New Turkey. The failed coup did not improve democracy in Turkey, rather, it helped President Erdogan’s quest for more power and greater authoritarian control over Turkish politics. Although he was elected through democratic methods, he has been clamping down on democratic values and civil liberties.

4.7   Gülen’s Responses to the Accusations of Masterminding the Coup While the coup attempt was still in effect, Erdogan rushed to blame Gülen and the movement for being behind this tragic event. He did not wait for juristic investigation. It appears he was in rush to benefit from the event in order to consolidate his power and destroy all of his opponents. Although Gülen has been living in Pennsylvania since 1999, Erdogan put him at the center of the coup attempt. As the media wanted to know what was going on, they interviewed Gülen on various occasions and asked every possible question that might come to their minds. While answering all of their questions, he rejected the accusation of directing the coup attempt. In this section, his answers to the interviewers will be analyzed. Interestingly, the Trump administration met its first foreign policy challenges with regards to a Turkish cleric living in the eastern Pennsylvania because Erdogan wanted Gülen to be extradited even though he was not been able to provide any convincing evidence. General Michael Flynn, a former Turkish lobbyist and Trump’s national security advisor, promised that this would be at the top of the agenda for the new foreign policy team. The Wall Street Journal has exposed how in September 2016, Turkish government officials discussed with retired Lieutenant General Michael Flynn the illegal removal from the United States of Turkish Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen and his extrajudicial return to Turkey, while Flynn was serving as an advisor to the Trump presidential campaign.93 James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, revealed the plan, thus, they could not actualize it.

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Fethullah Gülen, the Sunni scholar and community leader who is accused by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of masterminding the coup, spoke to NPR’s (National Public Radio) Robert Siegel on July 10 at his compound in the Pocono Mountains in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania.94 Gülen has steadfastly denied any responsibility for the coup, but Erdogan is demanding his extradition from the United States. The AKP government has engaged in sweeping purges, arresting tens of thousands and firing more than 100,000 people from their jobs, including civil servants, university professors, and soldiers.95 Gülen told Siegel who traveled to Gülen’s compound in Pennsylvania that he has always been against military interventions and all coups.96 He explained that “before I moved here, I always lived in Turkey and was subject to many difficult situations and targeted in the numerous military coups that happened over the years.”97 He continued saying he suffered during the military interventions of May 27, 1960, March 12, 1971, September 12, 1980, and February 28, 1997.98 He openly stated; I don’t know the people who attempted the July 15 coup. They might know me; they may have attended some lectures—I have no idea. Thousands of people have come here to the retreat to visit, among them 50 members of parliament, former President Abdullah Gul, former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. One other thing is I live here, thousands of miles away from Turkey. Some soldiers decided to do the coup, and despite the many questions and suspicions that remain of the government account of what transpired that night, if such claims are still taken to be credible, I shudder in astonishment. But if I were to humor that idea, if any one among those soldiers had called me and told me of their plan, I would tell them, you are committing murder. The perception that I control all of this… that I tell people to do things and that they are doing them… there is no such thing. If there is any suspicion of secrecy, they should conduct deep investigations and expose it…Erdogan thinks if he gets rid of me, he thinks ending me will end the movement. We are mortals, we will die one day. But this is a movement of love and dedication to humanity and God willing, the people who use their rationality and free will shall continue doing their great work.99 Gülen stated in the interview that if they ask him what his final wish was, he would say that Erdogan is the person who caused all this suffering. He oppressed thousands of innocents; thus, he wants to spit in his face. He is the oppressor.100 Gülen compared Erdogan to a dictator101 because of Erdogan’s antidemocratic practices to consolidate his power

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including the seizure of media outlets and putting all opponents in jail. He stated that Erdogan should be removed by the political opposition in Turkey through peaceful protest and elections, not through nondemocratic means. Gülen urged the United States and European governments to work hard to restore political freedoms in Turkey. In an interview with Matt Spetalnick and Julia Harte on July 11, 2017, Gülen stated that he has no plans to flee the United States and would accept extradition if Washington agrees to a request by Ankara to hand him over.102 He told Reuters that the rumors are not true at all, if the United States sees it appropriate to extradite him, he would leave (for Turkey). Although Erdogan is very eager to pursue the extradition demand, there is not much progress, because he could not provide convincing evidence to the US authorities despite the fact that more than two years have passed since the event. Testimonies taken under heavy torture, remain a matter of controversy. Human rights watchdogs pointed to torture during pretrial detention. Additionally, people who were alleged as coup plotters, rejected the testimonies on trial. The inconsistencies in the accounts of Erdogan in relevance to the coup attempt supports the claim voiced by the main opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu that Erdogan caught wind of the putsch to smoke out his enemies. Erdogan and his government have to provide compelling evidence proving that Gülen personally ordered the coup. But they have not done it so far. Nevertheless, Erdogan used the coup attempt as a cover to carry out massive purges in the security forces, the judiciary, assorted government ministries, and academia.103 From the theater to fertility clinics, baklava manufacturers and the media, no area of Turkish life has been left untouched by the crackdown. Over 150,000 state employees have been fired. 50,546 sympathizers of the Gülen movement are in prison including 150 journalists and thousands of Kurds. But Erdogan breezily claimed in an interview with the BBC that there are only two journalists in prison.104 Reuven Firestone, Regenstein Professor in Medieval Judaism and Islam at Hebrew Union College, met with Gülen on December 5, 2016 together with two colleagues, Rabbi Haim Beliak, who is a social activist in America and Poland, and religious studies professor Mark Juergensmeyer of the University of California in Santa Barbara, who researches terrorism. During the meeting, Gülen expressed his deep sorrow for the victims of Holocaust and stated that Muslims and Jews should be aware of each other’s pain. Firestone stated that although it

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took time and a significant chunk of his own money to fly across the country to meet Gülen, the effort was worthwhile, for he met a lovely man who exuded a deep kindness and warmth.105 He said that he saw the simple room in which Gülen lives, adjacent to the room in which we met: a mattress on the floor, a prayer rug, a few books, and a reading table. Everything I knew before the meeting was confirmed that hour: This man is not the kind of person who would (or even could) plan a coup.106 He continued his words: I have worked with Hizmet activists in Los Angeles, Houston, Denver, Atlanta, Cleveland, and New York, and also in Turkey, Singapore and Manila. I have traveled with movement members and stayed in their homes. I have had long discussions with them over meals in their homes and mine. I have attended academic conferences at which the movement was critiqued and dissected by sympathizers and opponents. I have read half a dozen books about Gülen and the movement he inspired. I recognize that what I’m about to say will seem hyperbolic, but the truth is that I have not met a single person inspired by Gülen whom I have not admired. This is not my experience alone. I know dozens of people, including rabbis, ministers, academics, lawyers, and other who have shared my experience. In America, the news media tend uncritically to report slanderous misinformation about Gülen and the projects that he has inspired. I’m not naïve. I have lived in Egypt and spent much time in Turkey and the Arab world. I still travel regularly to Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia. I have experienced plenty of anti-Semitism in the Muslim world, including in Turkey. Those inspired by Gülen are an antidote to the poison being spread around the Muslim world against Jews and other minority communities… We Jews know about what it means to be a scapegoat to distract from corruption and governmental failure. We should not allow ourselves to be manipulated into scapegoating another innocent community. We should, instead, be allies of this group that has for years put building interfaith relationships and understanding at the top of its agenda.107 Mark Juergensmeyer, a professor of Sociology and Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara met with Gülen in December 2016 to ask about the rumors about him. Three other scholars from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim backgrounds also attended the meeting. Although Gülen was dealing with the effects of diabetes and cardiovascular ailments, he tried to answer the questions of the visitors. They wanted to know whether he was in fact implicated

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in the coup attempt. Additionally, they tried to understand the extraordinary magnetism of Gülen who has inspired hundreds of thousands of people in Turkey and around the world. Juergensmeyer asked Gülen why Erdogan targeted him. After thinking a moment, Gülen stated that I often asked myself that question. He then explained that their approaches to religion are different for Erdogan represents political Islam which Gülen is against. Political Islam is autocratic in its nature; therefore, Erdogan cannot tolerate any form of organization that challenges him or that he could not control.108 Juergensmeyer states that, considering his relative isolation in his woodsy retreat with little or no apparent organizational structure around him, it seems hard to imagine him plotting an intricate coup attempt on the other side of the world.109 He even stated that indeed, the tens of thousands of teachers, journalists, lawyers, judges, businesspeople, and social service providers who have been imprisoned in Turkey since the coup attempt had anything to do with it.110 Before the attempted coup Erdogan already declared Gülen and the movement as the enemy, so what happened after the coup was part of Erdogan’s plan to purge the Hizmet. According to Juergensmeyer, Gülen teaches a notion of a modern Islam compatible with people who live in multicultural environments. With his moderate interpretation of Islam, Gülen inspired many people to establish hundreds of schools, newspapers, hospitals, social service projects, interfaith councils, and professional associations. Juergensmeyer argues that most of these projects are decentralized, created by the ingenuity of those inspired by Gülen’s teachings, and not orchestrated by a central command.111 Erdogan fears anything that he cannot control, then obviously, the Hizmet with its critical stance against his government is perceived as a threat. Thus, he closed down all of the schools, universities, newspapers, and service projects related to Gülen throughout Turkey. He even attempted to apply pressure to foreign governments elsewhere to do the same.112 However, Gülen argued that the history of religious traditions is rife with cases of perseverance in the face of oppression, thus, the persecutions could make the movements more resilient.113 Although Gülen repeatedly denied any involvement in the coup attempt, Erdogan continued to accuse him of orchestrating it from 5000 miles away. Interestingly, the day after the coup attempt, the AKP government produced lists of thousands of individuals whom they tied to Hizmet and began destroying their lives including numerous

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abductions, in addition to torture and deaths in detention. Strangely, the list included people who had been dead for months and people who had been serving at NATO’s European headquarters at the time. By destroying all opponents, Erdogan won a referendum amid allegations of serious fraud to form an “executive presidency” without checks and balances, enabling him to control all three branches of the government.114

4.8  The AKP’s Struggle to Destroy the Gülen Movement Abroad (2016–2019) The AKP and the Gülen movement worked together and assisted each other until 2012. Once Erdogan no longer needed the support of the movement, the two groups became competitors for international influence globally and for power in Turkey. After Erdogan’s mass purge and witch hunt, followers of the movement have gone low profile in Turkey. Many opponents of Erdogan including the followers of the movement behave as if they are Erdogan supporters while accusing others as FETÖ. This creates maximum confusion as Erdogan admitted when he said, “Horse and dog marks have been jumbled.” Each group opposes the other fiercely. The AKP does not hesitate to compete for power through direct and open confrontation. On the other hand, the Gülen movement rejects the caliphate of Erdogan and his ambition to superpowerful presidency. It seems, the competition for leadership and the differences between Political Islam and Civil Islam are undoubtedly the causes for direct confrontation between Erdogan and Gülen. The movement tries to show AKP’s strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood to convince the West that the AKP is not different in ideology from the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement claims that the AKP collaborates with the Muslim Brotherhood under the guise of state business. Following the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the Erdogan government hired a law firm, Amsterdam & Partners, LLP, to investigate the Gülen network of charter schools in the United States. The AKP government paid a huge amount of money to the law firm to make sure its enemy would not survive in any part of the world. In 2017, after an extensive research effort, the firm produced a massive 651-page report on the extensive nationwide network of the Gülen movement, charter schools, charter management corporations, educational foundations,

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real estate companies, school vendors, and cultural associations.115 The report documented the allegations. The law firm cooperated with the AKP to find mistakes of the movement and show them to Americans first and then to other people. The law firm alleged that through its cultural and dialogue centers the movement sponsored paid trips to Turkey to promote its own agenda. Local civic leaders, Catholic and Jewish faith community leaders, journalists, state legislators, and academics participated in these trips. The law firm alleged that the funding of trips involving members of the United States Congress was carefully concealed. The members rejected the accusation. They stated that they requested appropriate approvals for their trips to Turkey from the House Ethics Committee, which then approved the trips. Moreover, the law firm reported that more than 150 state legislators accepted trips to Turkey that were at least partially subsidized by the Gülen movement. On the basis of this report, some officials expressed their concerns with regards to the movement and its activities in the United States. They feared that the movement would have the same ideology as the Muslim Brotherhood. They were worried about the movement’s real agenda. They claimed that behind the carefully-cultivated façade of benign dedication to education, interfaith dialogue, peace, and tolerance lies a far more calculated agenda to promote Islam, jihad, and shariah worldwide.116 The basis of these allegations were some irregularities at the Gülen charter schools and the sponsored trips to Turkey. After the 9/11 tragic event, the Gülen movement introduced itself as a liberal, moderate, democratic force in an age of Islamic terror. The movement aimed to meet Americans’ longing for “interfaith” harmony. Obviously, the Gülen movement has become a formidable lobbying force in the United States. Their cultural centers organize receptions and ceremonies, handing out dialogue awards and honoraria to public officials. They organize academic conferences, asking university professors to speak at them, write about them, and produce books and journal articles about them. Both lobbying camps are trying to conceal the key part of the story: they were together in a strategic alliance for nearly a decade. When the AKP came to power, it heavily depended on the movement, for it lacked sophisticated, educated cadres with which to staff the Turkish bureaucracy. Thus, the movement worked with the AKP to destroy their common enemy, the secular regime. The movement and the AKP shared key

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goals such as promoting religion in Turkey and reducing the influence of military and secular institutions. They shared a vision of expanding Turkish influence abroad. For years, Turks watched the arrest and imprisonment of critics of the government. The AKP and the movement argued that this ongoing process is an effort to enhance democracy. Pro-Gülen newspaper, the Today’s Zaman, told concerned Westerners why they should be in favor of locking up journalists, civil society activists, military officers, heads of football clubs and prominent Kurds. However, the movement never thought that one day the AKP government would implement the same antidemocratic practices against its own followers. Until recently, the Gülen movement used its influence to promote and defend the AKP, in Turkey and abroad. This support facilitated Erdogan’s acquisition of near-complete control over the media, judiciary, and the military. It appears, Erdogan is a well-informed politician who knows better than anyone how extensive the movement’s power is and how to exploit it for his own benefit. The AKP is aware that it has suffered a tremendous loss of influence in the West. Thus, it has undertaken a frantic effort to replace Gülenist lobbyists with professional American lobbyists. Erdogan is paying for lawyers and lobbyists to discredit the movement in the United States and the West. There are two powerful lobbying narratives circulating in the West. The followers of the Gülen movement are now amply documenting Erdogan’s authoritarianism and as a counterattack, Erdogan’s lobby is warning Americans about the movement’s criminality, its growing US footprint, and its dangers. The Turkish government paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to Michael T. Flynn’ ex-business partner to persuade the United States to extradite Gülen to Turkey.117 Federal prosecutors unsealed an indictment, charging two business associates of Michael T. Flynn with acting as agents of the Turkish government.118 On December 17, 2018, two men involved in a lobbying campaign led by former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn were charged with conspiring to “covertly and unlawfully” influence US politicians in an effort to get Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic cleric living in the Poconos, extradited to Turkey.119 Flynn’s business partner Bijan Rafiekian took hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Turkish government to push for the extradition from the United States of dissident cleric Fethullah Gülen.120 Their efforts were directed by Kamil Ekim Alptekin, a Turkish businessman who has close ties with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Justice Department

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has resisted extraditing Gülen, because officials did not see convincing evidence that he had directed a coup in Turkey. Thus, law enforcement has repeatedly rejected Turkey’s efforts to force Gülen back to his home country despite intense pressure from Erdogan. Flynn, who was fired in February 2017 after lying about his contacts with the Russian government, has formally registered with the Justice Department as a “foreign agent” and admitted that he had lobbied on behalf of the Turkish government between August and November 2016.121 Flynn admitted this plot earlier but, he went on to serve as President Trump’s national security adviser.122 The deal was the culmination of a months-long public and private lobbying campaign for which the Turkish government agreed to pay Flynn’s firm $600,000. The money was funneled through a company run by Alptekin. He also arranged meetings and delivered guidance from Erdogan to obscure that the effort was directed by Turkey. Kian and Alptekin are charged with conspiracy and acting as agents of a foreign government. The goal was to build public pressure against Gülen inside the United States to create an incentive for the government to send him back to Turkey. The indictment alleges that Mr. Rafiekian and Mr. Alptekin made false statements about the project in filings to the Department of Justice in order to mask the involvement of the Turkish Government. They sought to discredit and delegitimize Fethullah Gülen in the eyes of politicians and the public, and ultimately to secure his extradition.123 In this regard, Flynn defended Erdogan from criticism of his crackdown on dissidents and labeled Gülen a radical Islamist. It is claimed that Gülen would be seized and flown by private jet to the Turkish prison island of Imrali.124 It was later revealed that his now-defunct Flynn Intel Group had been paid $530,000 by a Dutch-based company called Inovo BV, which in turn had ties to the Turkish government.125 Flynn admitted lying to the Justice Department, including falsely stating that the Flynn Intel Group did not know to what extent the Turkish government was involved in the project. The movement is now trying to persuade the West and Americans that they are the liberal alternative to Erdogan’s authoritarianism. On the other side, the AKP accuses the movement as a terrorist organization which aims to destroy Turkey’s democratic institutions. The AKP claims that the movement is very dangerous because it is strategic, hierarchical, internally authoritarian, and organized. Erdogan’s international lobbyists and lawyers allege that the movement has grown in the United States

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through charter schools. They allege that the movement’s activities in the United States are notably deceptive and frequently criminal. They argue that the movement’s efforts to gain influence in the US education system and bureaucracies is parallel to its behavior in Turkey. The rift between the AKP and the Gülen movement resulted in a bizarre and confusing competition of Turkish lobbying activities and narratives in the West. The former allies on the vision of liberalizing Turkey, the AKP and the movement now spend their energy and money denouncing one another and portraying themselves as the other’s victim. The West is thus now hearing two loud and distinct lobbying voices. One is the movement’s formal and informal lobbying machine and the other is Erdogan’s Western lawyers and professional lobbyists. Each is informing about the other in a very selective way.

Notes







1. Gumuscu, Sebnem, “The Clash of Islamists: The Crisis of the Turkish State and Democracy,” Contemporary Turkish Politics Workshop at Rice University’s Baker Institute on October 14, 2016, available online: https://pomeps.org/2016/11/03/the-clash-of-islamists-thecrisis-of-the-turkish-state-and-democracy/. 2. Taş, Hakkı, “A History of Turkey’s AKP-Gülen Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics 23, no. 3 (2018): 395–402. 3. Shaheen, Kareem, “Erdoğan vs. the Gülenists: From Political Allies to Turkey’s Bitter Rivals,” The Guardian, July 20, 2016, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/thousandsdetained-as-turkey-vows-to-smoke-out-gulen-supporters. 4.  Middle East Eye, “Analysis: Dissecting Turkey’s Gulen–Erdogan Relationship,” July 26, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ analysis-dissecting-turkeys-gulen-erdogan-relationship-528239159. 5. Ali Bayramoğlu in the Taraf newspaper of October 4, 2010. 6. The Turkish language website of TUSKON may be found at: http:// www.tuskon.org/. 7.  “Businessmen Quit Gulen-Affiliated Organizations,” Daily Sabah, April 30, 2014, available at: http://www.dailysabah.com/economy/ 2014/05/01/businessmen-quit-gulenaffiliated-organizations. 8. E-memorandum is a controversial General Staff statement released on its website in 2007 weighing in the Turkish presidential elections in 2007. The Turkish Armed Forces published a statement regarding the Turkish presidential elections: The problem that emerged in the presidential

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election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. 9. The closure trial of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey was a court case in 2008 to close the party and ban its 71 leading members from politics for five years, based on the charge that the party violated the principle of separation of religion and state in Turkey. The closure request failed by one vote, as only 6 of the 11 judges ruled in favor, with 7 required; however, 10 out of 11 judges agreed that the AKP had become a center for anti-secular activities, leading to a loss of state funding for the party. 10.  Yavuz, Hakan M., Toward and Islamic Enlightenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 213. 11. Oda TV which was founded in 200 is an online news portal based in Turkey. Oda TV was harshly critical of the government, this in the early 2011, Oda TV case was initiated as part of the Ergenekon trials, with Oda TV accused of being the “media arm” of the Ergenekon organization. 12. It was a nominally Marxist–Leninist organization in Turkey. It first came to public attention in April 2009, when some of its members were involved in a six-hour gun battle with police in the Istanbul, leading to the death of a policeman, a bystander, and the organization’s leader. 20 of its members were arrested in September 2009. 13. Gumuscu, Sebnem, “The Clash of Islamists: The Crisis of the Turkish State and Democracy,” Contemporary Turkish Politics Workshop at Rice University’s Baker Institute on October 14, 2016, available online: https://pomeps.org/2016/11/03/the-clash-of-islamists-the-crisis-ofthe-turkish-state-and-democracy/#_edn4. 14. Doğan, Pınar, and Dani Rodrik, Yargı, Cemaat ve Bir Darbe Kurgusunun İcyüzü (Justice, the Movement and the Inner Face of Coup Attempt) (Istanbul: Destek Yayinevi, 2014). 15. European Commission Progress Report for Turkey, 2010. 16. http://www.hcjp.gov.tr/About.aspx. 17. Yavuz, M. Hakan, “cemaatciler savasi kaybetmis naziler gibi hocaya karsi isyan var” (The Religious Groups Like Nazis Who Lost the War, There Is Disobedience Against Hoca), available online: http://www.hurriyet. com.tr/prof-dr-hakan-yavuz-cemaatciler-savasi-kaybetmis-naziler-gibi-hocaya-karsi-isyan-var-40203038. 18.  Erdogan’s Speech available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m9NL8xz_Hw. 19. Gumuscu, Sebnem, “The Clash of Islamists: The Crisis of the Turkish State and Democracy,” Contemporary Turkish Politics Workshop at Rice University’s Baker Institute on October 14, 2016, available online:

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https://pomeps.org/2016/11/03/the-clash-of-islamists-the-crisis-ofthe-turkish-state-and-democracy/#_edn4. 20. Available at: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25222191/#storyContinued. 21. Özbudun, E., “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift,” South European Society and Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 155–167. 22. Middle East Institute, “The Clash of Former Allies: The AKP Versus the Gulen Movement,” Middle East Institute, March 7, 2014, available online: https://www.mei.edu/publications/clash-former-allies-akpversus-gulen-movement. 23. It was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey began on May 28, 2013. Initially it began to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park and later the protests were sparked by outrage at the violent eviction of a sit-in at the park protesting the plan. Subsequently, supporting protests and strikes took place across Turkey, protesting a wide range of concerns at the core of which were issues of freedom of the press, of expression, assembly, and the government’s encroachment on Turkey’s secularism. 24. Çandar, Cengiz, “Interview by the News Website,” T24, November 26, 2012, http://t24.com.tr/haber/cengiz-candar-ortadoguda-sinirlar-degisecek-turkiye-de-bunadahil/218234. 25. Ekşi Sözlük Discussion Platform, https://eksisozluk.com/receptayyip-erdoganin-yargi-elestirisi—3417404. 26. Özbudun, E., “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdogan’s Majoritarian Drift,” South European Society and Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 155–167. 27. Lauria, Joe, “Reclusive Turkish Imam Criticizes Gaza Flotilla,” The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2010, available online: http://online.wsj.com/ news/articles/SB10001424052748704025304575284721280274694. 28. “The Martyrs of the Mavi Marmara” (Turkish), Beyaz Gazete, April 4, 2013, available online: http://www.beyazgazete.com/video/anahaber/ trt-haber-67/2013/04/04/mavi-marmara-sehitleri-395487.html. 29. It is a Kurdish terrorist group and political organization based in Turkey and Iraq. It has been involved in armed struggle against the Turkish state since 1984 with the initial aim of achieving an independent Kurdish state. 30. He is a Kurdish leader and one of the founding members of the terrorist group PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey and Iraq. 31. Middle East Institute, “The Clash of Former Allies: The AKP Versus the Gulen Movement,” Middle East Institute, March 7, 2014, available online: https://www.mei.edu/publications/clash-former-alliesakp-versus-gulen-movement.

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32. The secret talks between the AKP and PKK that took place in Oslo, Norway between 2006 and 2011 influenced the path of official negotiations toward ending Turkey’s Kurdish conflict. 33. It is a Kurdish political organization which aims to implement Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology. 34. Küçük, C., “Cemaat’in bir kanadı iktidar ortağı mı?” (Is a Wing of the Gülenist Community Partner in the Government?), Yeni Şafak, June 21, 2012. 35. Rodrik, Dani, “The Wrath of Erdoğan,” Juncture 20, no. 2 (2013): 129. 36.  Assessment Report, “How Will the Conflict Between Erdogan and Gulen Affect the Turkish Political Scene?” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, January 20, 2014, available online: https://www. dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/How_will_the_Conflict_ between_Erdogan_and_Gulen_Affect_the_Turkish_Political_Scene. aspx#3. 37. Tarabay, Jamie, “A Rare Meeting with Reclusive Turkish Spiritual Leader Fethullah Gulen,” The Atlantic, August 14, 2013, available online: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/arare-meeting-with-reclusive-turkish-spiritual-leader-fethullah-gulen/278662/. 38. Demiralp, Seda, “The Breaking Up of Turkey’s Islamic Alliance: The AKP-Gülen Conflict and Implementations for Middle East Studies,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2016): 1–6. 39.  Istanbul, Hurriyet, Environment Minister Bayraktar Announces Resignation, Calls on PM Erdoğan to Quit, 2013. 40. “Turkey’s Massive Corruption Case Dropped by Prosecutor,” Hürriyet Daily News, last modified October 17, 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-massive-corruption-case-dropped-by-prosecutor. aspx?PageID=238&NID=73149&NewsCatID=338. 41.  Letsch, Constanze, “Turkish Ministers’ Sons Arrested in Corruption and Bribery Investigation,” last modified December 18, 2013, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministerssons-arrested-corruption-investigation. 42.  Orucoglu, Berivan, “Why Turkey’s Mother of All Corruption Scandals Refuses to Go Away,” last modified January 6, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-ofall-corruption-scandals-refuses-to-go-away/. 43.  Arango, Tim, “Corruption Scandal Is Edging Near Turkish Premier,” last modified December 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes. com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign. html.

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44. Kelley, Michael, “A 40-Second Guide to the Crisis in Turkey That Sent Markets Tanking and Put the Government in Its Weakest Position Yet,” last modified December 28, 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com. au/recap-of-corruption-scandal-in-turkey-2013-12?r=US&IR=T. 45. Orucoglu, Berivan, “Why Turkey’s Mother of All Corruption Scandals Refuses to Go Away,” last modified December 25, 2013, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-allcorruption-scandals-refuses-to-go-away/. 46. Ibid. 47.  “Turkish PM Erdoğan Says Those Who Target Him Through Graft Probe Will Not Succeed,” last modified December 26, 2013, http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-says-those-who-targethim-through-graft-probe-will-not-succeed. aspx?pageID=238&nID=60154&NewsCatID=338. 48.  “Three Facing Charges of Bribery,” last modified December 25, 2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/uc-bakana-rusvet-suclamasi-1166735/. 49. “Erdogan Remains Sons Were Taken from Prosecutors Investigating!” last modified December 26, 2013, http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/erdogan-oglunu-koruyor-sorusturma-savcidan-alindihaberi-84919. 50. “Turkish Corruption Probe Row Deepens,” last modified December 26, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25637710. 51.  “Prosecutor Removed from New Graft Probe Amid Concerns of Cover-Up,” last modified December 26, 2013, http://www. todayszaman.com/news-335036-prosecutor-removed-from-new-graftprobe-amid-concerns-of-cover-up.html. 52.  Hurriyet Daily News, “Prosecutor in Second Graft Investigation Says Case ‘Taken Out of His Hands’,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 26, 2013, available online: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/prosecutorin-second-graft-investigation-says-case-taken-out-of-his-hands-60187. 53. Kelley, Michael, “A 40-Second Guide to the Crisis in Turkey That Sent Markets Tanking and Put the Government in Its Weakest Position Yet,” last modified December 28, 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com. au/recap-of-corruption-scandal-in-turkey-2013-12?r=US&IR=T. 54.  “Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Dialog with His Son Bilal About Their Own Corruption,” last modified December 26, 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DQ84uIWYyg&feature=youtu.be&list= PLmH3I5hKwHWbXLGLueBfiziI4POvuKnhP. 55.  “Environment Minister Bayraktar Announces Resignation, Calls on PM Erdoğan to Quit,” Hürriyet Daily News, last modified December 25, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/environment-ministerbayraktar-announces-resignation-calls-on-pm-erdogan-to-quit. aspx?pageID=549&nID=60118&NewsCatID=338.

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56. “Environment Minister Bayraktar Announces Resignation, Calls on PM Erdoğan to Quit,” Hürriyet Daily News, last modified December 25, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/environment-minister-bayraktar-announces-resignation-calls-on-pm-erdogan-to-quit-60118. 57. Demiralp, Seda, “The Breaking Up of Turkey’s Islamic Alliance: The AKP-Gülen Conflict and Implementations for Middle East Studies,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2016): 1–6. 58. Weiser, Benjamin, and Carlotta Gall, “Banker from Turkey Is Convicted in U.S. Over Plot to Evade Iran Sanctions,” New York Times, January 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/world/europe/turkey-iran-sanctions-trial.html. 59.  Rubin, Michael, “Why the Reza Zarrab Guilty Plea Matters to Turkey and the World,” The Washington Examiner, November 28, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/whythe-reza-zarrabguilty-plea-matters-to-turkey-and-the-world/article/2641919. 60.  Aljazeera, “Thousands Protest Corruption in Turkey,” Aljazeera, January 12, 2014, available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/europe/2014/01/thousands-protest-corr uption-turkey2014111175846383900.html. 61.  Gulen, Fethullah, “Yolsuzluk” (Corruption), Herkul.org, December 20, 2013, available online: http://www.herkul.org/ herkul-nagme/401-nagme-yolsuzluk/. 62. Taş, Hakkı, “A History of Turkey’s AKP-Gülen Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics 23, no. 3 (2018): 395–402. 63.  Yavuz, M. Hakan, Toward and Islamic Enlightenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 218. 64.  Letsch, Constanze, “Turkish Police Arrest 23 in Raids on Opposition Media,” The Guardian, December 14, 2014, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/ turkish-police-raid-opposition-media. 65. Gumuscu, Sebnem, “The Clash of Islamists: The Crisis of the Turkish State and Democracy,” Contemporary Turkish Politics Workshop at Rice University’s Baker Institute on October 14, 2016, available online: https://pomeps.org/2016/11/03/the-clash-of-islamists-the-crisis-ofthe-turkish-state-and-democracy/#_edn4. 66. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (Turkey),” U.S. Department of State, last modified April 18, 2016, http://www.state. gov/documents/organization/253121.pdf. 67. Hurriyet Daily News, “Turkey to Add Gülen Movement to List of Terror Groups: President,” May 27, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/turkey-to-add-gulen-movement-to-list-of-terror-groups-president—99762.

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68.  US Department of State, “Country Report on Terrorism 2016,” Turkey, July 19, 2017, available at ecoi.net: http://www.ecoi.net/ local_link/344195/475203_en.html. 69. “World Report 2016,” Human Rights Watch, last modified 2016, p. 581. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/ wr2016_web.pdf. 70. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (Turkey), pp. 19–20. 71.  “European Parliament Resolution on the 2015 Report on Turkey,” European Parliament, last modified April 2016, http://www.europarl. europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BMOTION%2BB8-2016-0442%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN. 72.  BBC, “Turkey’s Coup Attempt: What You Need to Know,” July 17, 2016, available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-36816045. 73. Kinney, Drew H., “Civilian Actors in the Turkish Military Drama of July 2016,” Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note 10 (2016): 1–10. 74. “Turkey’s Coup Attempt: What You Need to Know,” BBC, last modified July 17, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36816045. 75. Kinney, Drew H., “Civilian Actors in the Turkish Military Drama of July 2016,” Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note 10 (2016): 1–10. 76. Al-Monitor, “Everything You’ve Ever Wanted to Know About Fethullah Gulen, Turkey’s Most Controversial Cleric,” April 19, 2016, https:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-fethullah-gulen-cleric-opposition-erdogan-akp.html. 77. BBC, “Turkey’s Coup Attempt: What You Need to Know,” July 17, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36816045. 78.  Yetkin, Murat, “Turkish Intelligence Unveils Secret Codes Used Before Coup Attempt,” Hurriyet Daily News, September 13, 2016, available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkishintelligence-unveils-secret-codes-used-before-coup-attempt. aspx?PageID=238&NID=103843&NewsCatID=409. 79. Parkinson, Joe, and Adam Entous, “Turkey’s Powerful Spy Network Failed to See Coup Coming,” The Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2016, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys-powerful-spy-networknever-saw-coup-coming-1469823062. 80.  Cookman, Liz, “I’m Frightened by the Nationalism That’s Been Unleashed in Turkey,” The Guardian, July 17, 2016, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/fethullahgulen-turkey-coup-erdogan.

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81. Srivastava, Mehul, “Turkey Submits Formal Request for US to Detain Fethullah Gülen,” Financial Times, September 13, 2016, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5205a128-799b-11e6-a0c639e2633162d5. 82. Fontanella-Khan, Amana, “Fethullah Gülen: Turkey Coup May Have Been ‘Staged’ by Erdoğan Regime,” The Guardian, July 17, 2016, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/ fethullah-gulen-turkey-coup-erdogan. 83. Toosi, Nahal, “Fethullah Gülen: I Don’t Have Any Regrets,” Politico, September 9, 2016, available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/ fethullah-gulen-full-interview-politicoturkey-coup-erdogan/. 84. Deutsche Welle, “Turkey Suspends European Convention on Human Rights,” last modified July 21, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/ turkey-suspends-european-convention-on-human-rights/a-19416857. 85.  “Turkey Purges 13,000 Police Officers Over Failed Coup,” BBC News, last modified October 4, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-37551889. 86. “Turkey to Release Tens of Thousands of Prisoners to Make Room for Coup Suspects,” The New York Times, last modified August 17, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/europe/turkey-prisoners-erdogan.html. 87.  “Turks See Purge as Witch Hunt of Medieval’ Darkness,” The New York Times, last modified September 16, 2016, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/09/17/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-gulen-purge.html. 88.  “Turkey Shakes Up Military, Closes Media After Coup Bid,” Guardian, last modified July 28, 2016, http://guardian.ng/news/ turkey-shakes-up-military-closes-media-after-coup-bid/. 89. “British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee: Gülen Not Responsible for the July 15 Coup Attempt,” Stockholm, last modified September 2, 2017, http://stockholmcf.org/british-parliaments-foreign-affairs-committee-gulen-not-responsible-for-the-july-15-coup-attempt/. 90. “A New Report in Sweden Reveals Erdoğan Orchestrated July 15 Coup in Turkey,” last modified September 2, 2017, http://stockholmcf.org/ a-new-report-in-sweden-reveals-erdogan-orchestrated-july-15-coup-inturkey/. 91. “One Year on, New Research Uncovers Turkey’s Coup Bid Staged by Erdoğan Himself,” last modified September 2, 2017, https://stockholmcf.org/on-year-on-a-new-research-uncovers-turkeys-coup-bidstaged-by-erdogan-himself/. 92. Ibid.

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93.  “Ex-CIA Director: Mike Flynn and Turkish Officials Discussed Removal of Erdoğan’s Foe from U.S.,” March 24, 2017, https:// www.wsj.com/ar ticles/ex-cia-dir ector-mike-flynn-and-turkish-officials-discussedremovalofErdoğanfoefromus1490380426? emailToken = JRr yd/FyZX6VhNU9bMwxxBgjb6BNB%2B6TS1j LK2qPP0nPuTnbpfOnweA8gdfyvX61Rkdh55UD4WA%2BTjzY hHEvUM6KkKNkilqoPmNQq5ba2AnOPUqekVSGeuUVsOzb% 2BSQs4LNcH01NJ8NWhB2p6UKl9owFRA%3D%3D. 94. “Gulen Denies Directing Coup, Calls Erdogan Oppressor,” Al-Monitor, last modified April 9, 2018, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/turkey-coup-anniversary-gulen-speaks.html. 95. Siegel, Robert, “Cleric Accused of Plotting Turkish Coup Attempt: ‘I Have Stood Against All Coups’,” NPR, last modified July 11, 2017, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/07/11/536011222/ cleric-accused-of-plotting-turkish-coup-attempt-i-have-stood-against-allcoups. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Ibid. 101.  Spetalnick, Matt, and Julia Harte, “Interview-Cleric Gulen Says He Would Not Flee U.S. to Avoid Extradition to Turkey,” Reuters, last modified July 12, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-gulen-usa/cleric-gulen-says-he-would-not-flee-u-s-toavoid-extradition-to-turkey-idUSKBN19W2VQ. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. “Gulen Denies Directing Coup, Calls Erdogan Oppressor,” Al-Monitor, last modified April 9, 2018, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/turkey-coup-anniversary-gulen-speaks.html. 105.  Firestone, Reuven, “My Meeting with Fethullah Gülen, the Man Accused of Plotting Turkey’s Coup,” Forward, last modified January 16, 2017, http://forward.com/opinion/world/360176/my-meetingwith-fethullah-gulen-the-man-accused-of-plotting-turkeys-coup/. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108.  Juergensmeyer, Mark, “Talking with the ‘Religious Terrorist’ That Turkey Wants Trump to Extradite,” Religion Dispatches, last modified January 12, 2017, http://religiondispatches.org/talking-with-the-religious-terrorist-that-turkey-wants-trump-to-extradite/. 109. Ibid.

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110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Amsterdam & Partners, LLP, “Empire of Deceit: An Investigation of the Gülen Charter School Network, Book 1,” http://empireofdeceit.com/ pdf/Empire_of_Deceit_final.pdf. 116.  Lopez, Clare M., “Gülen and Erdoğan: Partners on a Brotherhood Mission,” in Ally No More Erdoğan’s New Turkish Caliphate and the Rising Jihadist Threat to the West, Washington, DC, Center for Security Policy Press, securefreedom.org. 117. Weiner, Rachel, and Zapotosky Matt, “Michael Flynn’s Business Associates Charged with Illegally Lobbying for Turkey,” The Washington Post, December 18, 2018, available online: https://www.washingtonpost. com/local/legal-issues/michael-flynns-business-partner-charged-with-illegally-lobbying-for-turkey/2018/12/17/46fb3762-020a-11e9-912282e98f91ee6f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.109572405fa4. 118.  “Michael Flynn’s Former Associate Charged with Secret Lobbying for Turkey Against Fethullah Gulen,” ABC News, December 18, 2018, available online: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-18/ flynns-former-business-partner-charged/10630146. 119. Gambardello, Joseph A., “Who Is Fethullah Gulen, the Turkish Cleric Exiled in the Poconos at the Center of Charges Against Associates of Michael Flynn,” The Inquirer Daily News, December 18, 2018, available online: http://www.philly.com/news/nation-world/fethullah-gulen-michael-flynn-turkey-pennsylvania-20181218.html. 120. Kheel, Rebecca, “Turkey and Michael Flynn: Five Things to Know,” The Hill, December 17, 2018, available online: https://thehill.com/policy/ defense/421780-turkey-and-michael-flynn-five-things-to-know. 121.  Williams, Jennifer, “Disgraced Trump Adviser Mike Flynn Admits He Worked as a ‘Foreign Agent’ for the Turkish Government,” Vox Daily News, March 9, 2017, available online: https://www. vox.com/world/2017/3/9/14868680/trump-adviser-michaelflynn-foreign-agent-turkey-lobby. 122.  Nissenbaum, Dion, “In Plea Deal, Flynn Acknowledges Working for Turkish Government,” The Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2017, available online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-plea-deal-flynn-acknowledges-working-for-turkish-government-1512171830. 123.  “Michael Flynn’s Former Associate Charged with Secret Lobbying for Turkey Against Fethullah Gulen,” ABC News, December 18, 2018, available online: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-18/ flynns-former-business-partner-charged/10630146.

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124. Borger, Julian, “Ex-Trump Aide Flynn Investigated Over Plot to Kidnap Turkish Dissident—Report,” The Guardian, November 11, 2017, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/10/ michael-flynn-trump-turkish-dissident-cleric-plot. 125. Kheel, Rebecca, “Turkey and Michael Flynn: Five Things to Know,” The Hill, December 17, 2018, available online: https://thehill.com/policy/ defense/421780-turkey-and-michael-flynn-five-things-to-know.

CHAPTER 5

Turkey’s Future Direction Under Erdogan’s Regime

5.1  The Iron Law of Erdogan Political parties are one of the essential needs of a democratic society. If one calls himself as a democrat, he/she should respect for democracy at all levels. In order to prevent oligarchic tendencies which may develop over time all parties should stick to democracy at all levels. Iron law of oligarchy is a term used by Robert Michels to describe oligarchic tendencies in Germany’s Social Democratic Party in 1911.1 The effective solution to prevent oligarchy within a party is an intraparty democracy. This term refers to the use of transparent and open methods for intraparty decision-making. There are three elements which indicate if there is intraparty democracy in a party; inclusiveness, decentralization, and institutionalization. When intra-democracy erodes a party becomes oligarchic and, eventually, personalistic party rule. Three elements of democracy which are inclusiveness, decentralization, and institutionalization disappear. Democracy requires openness, inclusion, shared decision-making, transparency, and a culture of tolerance and debate within a party. It also demands bottom-up decision-making, involving all ranks of party members in these processes.2 Unfortunately, parties in Turkey never experienced intra-democracy in real sense. They always suffered from authoritarian leadership. Although the AKP started as a democrat party it gradually turned into a one man ruling party after winning elections continuously.

© The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_5

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Initially, the AKP wanted (or maybe acted in that way) to join the EU which requires democratization reforms. Under the Copenhagen Criteria for admission, it promised that Turkey no longer suppress ethnic minorities and military will not interrupt democracy. However, the amendments and revisions in the party bylaws have given Erdogan unrestrained powers. Erdogan has become increasingly intolerant of criticism and deaf to advice and debate inside or outside the party. Therefore, the AKP has become the cult of Erdogan’s persona. In recent years, the AKP has become oligarchy and then authoritarian party. When all checks and balances on Erdogan’s power has been eroded, he has become important decision maker in Turkish politics. Erdogan’s personality is described as power-hungry, aggressive, and forceful figure who thrives on confrontation. He does not like open-minded advisors. He prefers to merely make decisions himself which could be defined as snap judgments, emotional rhetoric, and idiosyncratic preferences.3 Erdogan often manipulate events and give meanings to political environment according to his own desires. His actions and rhetoric are mostly inflammatory and impulsive. No one is saved from his aggressive confrontations and threats. He verbally threatened Kurds, the IMF, the EU, the USA, the Gülen movement, and the World Economic Forum. He opened lawsuits against journalists who criticized him. He demands loyalty and obedience from everyone. He has tendencies toward narcissism.4 Erdogan is free to occupy himself with mere fancy rather than pragmatic policy making, because, there is no check and balance on him. He has neutralized internal opposition and consolidated his control over the party. Erdogan often resorts to a self-proclaimed victim-status. When he acquired significant amounts of power, he propagated the belief that AKP was being attacked from all sides, all the time. During December 2013 corruption scandal and the Gezi Park protests he propagated that Turkey was under attack by foreign forces. Although Erdogan found himself at the center of serious corruption allegations, he blamed a favorite enemy, Fethullah Gülen and Hizmet Movement, instead of confronting the allegations. One of the tools Erdogan uses to maintain his power is Turkey’s national intelligence organization (MIT). It is alleged that MIT is part of Turkish deep state controlling power. Erdogan and MIT together aim to destroy the Hizmet Movement. The AKP has used MIT intensively and made Turkey state of surveillance. The AKP has given legal immunity to

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intelligence officials. It prohibited moves against the MIT’s head without approval of the prime minister.5 Furthermore, it changed the law expanding the powers of the intelligence agency, allowing it to operate without any significant judicial oversight. MIT can now access archives and databases from any ministry and collect data on citizens without needing a court order. Clearly, Erdogan aims to consolidate his power by eliminating all actual or potential opponents. However, the irony is that he heavily relies on MIT, the old guard of the secular state to achieve his political targets in spite of the fact that once the deep state was an enemy of the AKP. Political Islamists effectively eliminated the independence of the judiciary in Turkey and used it as an instrument of political persecution. They created a new set of courts in which a single judge can have extraordinary power. Authorities applied anti-terror laws extensively to engage in arbitrary arrests and hold detainees for undefined periods.6 After the coup attempt, they adopted an emergency decree within the framework of the state of emergency which permitted prosecutors to restrict a detainee’s access to a lawyer for the first five days of police detention.7 The state of emergency paved the way for the Supreme Court members, judges, prosecutors, local administration personnel, and the higher education staff to be dismissed from profession without conducting a fair investigation. The decree clearly violated basic human rights, because the wording of the decree is unclear and open-ended. It permitted the firing of any public official conveniently alleged to be in contact with members of the Gülen movement but with no need for an investigation to offer any evidence in support of it. This can be used to target all opponents. The AKP government has applied the state of emergency decree against all opponents. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights raised its fear that unlimited administrative power would completely destroy core human rights and the rule of law.8 The International Commission of Jurists reported on September 19, 2016 that at least 3300 judges and prosecutors were dismissed or suspended, and hundreds were arrested, including members of the High Council for Judges and Prosecutors.9 One fifth of the judiciary was suspended, fired, or detained. The government issued decrees that undermined the foundations of the rule of law. The decrees opened the way to arbitrary conduct by officials and police.10 However, Erdogan ironically stated that the purge of Turkey’s judiciary would enhance the judiciary’s

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independence. Erdogan seized control of the judiciary, leaving many Turkish citizens deemed critical of the government at the mercy of an inherently biased court system. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights visited Turkey in September 2016 and observed that the series of emergency decrees adopted in Turkey since July 2016 created very far-reaching, almost unlimited discretionary powers for administrative authorities and the executive in many areas, by derogation from general principles of rule of law and human rights safeguards ordinarily applicable in a democratic society.11 The state of emergency allowed Erdogan’s government to exercise governmental power as it wished. With the emergency decree, the AKP government closed the private health institutions and establishments, private education institutions and establishments, private student dorms and guesthouses, foundations/associations and their commercial enterprises, foundation universities, syndicates, federations and confederations that were identified to be owned by, adhered or related to the Gülen movement.12 The decree stipulated that the government could seize any property with the accusation that it could have connection with the Gülen movement. The unlawful crackdowns on freedom of expression and freedom of the press show that there is no independent judiciary in Turkey. Serap Yazıcı, a professor of constitutional law at İstanbul Bilgi University, stated that Erdogan and the AKP government controlled the judiciary through legislations after December 2013 in order to cover up the biggest corruption probe in the history of the Turkish republic.13 After the attempted coup, many judges and prosecutors were prisoned unjustly. Some lawyers were asked to represent them but they refused due to the fear that they might be accused with a link to Gülen movement. Indeed, dozens of lawyers were detained for alleged association with the movement. Lawyers were arrested or placed under investigation. Their offices were raided by the police. This climate of intimidation discouraged lawyers representing their clients. Penal courts of peace were established in 2014 as a project by Erdogan to rule for the arrest of individuals who caused displeasure to him. Many Turkish citizens who criticized Erdogan were jailed by these courts. Criticism against Erdogan was regarded by these courts as an issue of national security. They deemed the slightest criticism against Erdogan as a crime, subsequently ruled for the arrest of people who criticized Erdogan. This was a violation of the right to freedom of expression

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and information, which is defined by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), of which Turkey is a signatory. Turkish citizens are fed up with the government’s use of the judiciary as its stick to punish dissenters. The pro-government police and judiciary repeatedly violated the basic rights. They raided hundreds of Hizmet Movement affiliated educational, humanitarian, and professional institutions, as well as private businesses. They detained and arrested thousands of people for being followers or supporters of the Hizmet movement. According to the Freedom House’s Report published in 2016, antiterrorism laws were widely employed to investigate and prosecute critics of the government.14 Erdogan’s approach is that you are either with us or against us. In a democratic state, there have to be three requirements to label individuals or organizations as terrorist: a legislative base that identifies certain acts as terrorism, evidence, and judicial due process. Terrorism is defined as “by using coercion and violence; by using either pressure, or fear, or intimidation, or suppression, or threat; altering attributes of the republic, and political, legal, social, secular, and economic order defined in the Constitution.”15 According to this definition there is no legal base to accuse the Gülen movement of being a terrorist organization. The movement did not resort to armed struggle against the government even when its members were prisoned and deprived of their most basic rights. There is no convincing evidence which indicates that the Gülen movement is an armed resistance group. The movement did not use violence and intimidation to achieve its goals. The pro-government judiciary, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies have been investigating the Gülen movement since 2013 but they have not provided a convincing evidence which could be used as a basis for terrorism charges against the movement. The AKP government, rooted in political Islam, has escalated its witch hunt to persecute critics abroad through government institutions. Abductions, physical attacks, profiling, discrimination, threats, and hate crimes have gone beyond Turkish borders. On November 2, 2016, Cem Küçük, a staunchly pro-government journalist who is known for his attacks on government critics on social media, said that the AKP established a special unit to bring Gülen followers who fled the country back to Turkey.16 Moreover, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) asked Turkish missions and religious representatives abroad to profile Gülen movement expatriates living in their respective foreign

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countries.17 The Diyanet has gathered intelligence via imams from 38 countries on the activities of followers of the movement. The AKP government has been trying all means to destroy the movement in Turkey and abroad. Erdogan’s fight against the Gülen movement has become an international problem. Abducting anyone from a foreign country is a violation of well-established principles of international law. Several Gülen sympathizers were kidnapped by the Turkish government operatives from foreign countries. The followers of the movement are subjected to threats of abductions, forcible removals, and detention on false charges. For example, Alattin Duman and Tamer Tıbık, who were whisked away from the street in Malaysia in the middle of the day by unknown armed people. They were taken to a remote area and tortured, and later turned over to Turkish officials to be taken back to Turkey. Turgay Karaman, a school principal, was kidnapped on May 2, 2017, by five unknown people in the parking lot of a high-rise building in Kuala Lumpur. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, openly revealed that their abductions were made with the personal agreement of the Malaysian Prime Minister. Erdogan publicly stated that no country or region around the world will ever be a safe haven for the Gülen movement followers.18 He repeatedly voiced threats against the sympathizers of the movement in public rallies broadcasting live and attended by tens of thousands of his fans. He vowed to hunt down the participants of the movement everywhere in the world. Turkish secret service officials kidnapped the sympathizers of the movement in some countries such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia. Erdogan asked people who live abroad and have links with the AKP to report Gülen sympathizers to their security agencies.19 Upon his call, the sympathizers of the movement have been subjected to many inhumane acts including being denied entry to mosques in Europe and other countries. Many incidents were reported involving threats against them. For example, a 28-year-old man of Turkish origin was handed down a prison sentence of eight months and a fine of 23,000 euros by a French court after he attacked several institutions affiliated with the Gülen movement in France.20

5.2  The Abuse of Power Following the corruption scandal, the AKP government quickly passed a series of laws that essentially revoked separation of powers, suspended the rule of law, and restricted the rights and freedoms of everyone.

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Thousands of Turkish citizens were imprisoned without having any evidence against them other than their opposition to the AKP and Erdogan. The prisoners were from all walks of life including businessmen, doctors, teachers, journalists, academics, philanthropists, and even housewives. Moreover, the AKP government shut down private high schools, colleges, and charity organizations. Many Turkish citizens had to flee the country to avoid persecution and torture. The Turkish Constitution states that the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state. Since 2013, the AKP government has been applying restrictions on human rights and civil liberties. Many public lands have been sold and privatized illegally through the secret system established by Erdogan. Because, economic revenue is very important to sustain Erdogan’s grip on power and achieve his political goals. In 2013, former minister Erdogan Bayraktar stated that a large part of the confirmed zoning plans that were in the corruption investigation file was made under the orders of Prime Minister Erdogan. The AKP government is able to extract resources from society. In addition to the regular government budget, Erdogan has two main resources; secretive, extrabudgetary discretionary fund which is under the prime minister commands without any oversight or accountability and sophisticated rent-seeking system reigns over public procurement bids, both at the local and central government levels. Political Islamists demand donations amounting usually range between 10 and 20% of the bid from citizens to be made to handpicked NGOs (Non-Governmental Organization) like TURGEV (Youth education and service foundation of Turkey), which is run by Erdogan’s son, Bilal Erdogan. Religious institutions in Turkey have given their pledge of alliance to Erdogan to support him in his caliphate struggle. They support him even if he obtains revenue through bribery and other illegal means. They call corruption and bribery as spoils of war. By controlling the state power and abusing it, the AKP government successfully suppressed any opposition toward itself. Distribution of various benefits, such as jobs, money, and other services have given enormous power to Erdogan to establish his own kingdom. Favoritism in the hiring practices of staff agencies and series of subsidies that benefit the lower classes made the AKP super powerful in the state. Through his own economic network Erdogan received unconditional support from the business group. Moreover, by controlling the media he is able to control the public opinion. For example, Ethem Sancak, businessman who has close ties to Erdogan, owns

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three newspapers which appear to be functioning as propaganda outlets for the AKP. He purchased newspapers and some other business companies for a small amount of money with the help of Erdogan. Another businessman Mehmet Cengiz obtained 52 billion worth of a company for a very small amount of money. According to Ayse Bugra, a professor at Bogazici University in Turkey, in 2012, more than 30% of all government contracts were handed without a bid. On the other side, the state levies excessive financial costs against business owners who chose not to be co-opted by AKP. For example, Aydin Dogan and the Koc family were fined a huge amount of money by the state officials. This is one of the possible answers for the question why there is very little reaction to widespread corruption. The media is under the excessive pressure of the government for all opposing journalists are being prosecuted and imprisoned. The AKP subjugated the judicial branch to the executive branch. Societal opposition is greatly intimidated by the state by internal security bill, which expands police powers to use deadly force against protesters. Despite the widespread incrimination efforts by the government officials and pro-government media no credible evidence has been brought so far against opponents of the AKP. Antiterrorism laws have been used to detain the followers of Gülen movement and seize their assets. Prosecutors, judges, and police officers who did not give pledge of alliance to Erdogan were jailed and charged with the accusation of plotting against the government. In the recent years, there has been a substantial decline in democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech.21 Freedom of expression has been increasingly restricted, especially, newspapers and the media who are communicating criticism toward the government are shut down and journalists are put in jail. Compering to the previous years, there are more journalists in prison in Turkey now.22 The violation of freedom of expression remains high in Turkey for the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code have both been used to prosecute journalists, writers, publishers, civil rights activists, lawyers, elected officials, and students for exercising their right to freedom of expression.23 Social media and other internet-based media have been suspended by the AKP government occasionally. There is too much pressure on social media for the government has made amendment to the Internet Law allowing the TIB to order the removal of content from websites

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without having first obtained a court order.24 Some media offices have been raided and broadcasting service providers have been discontinued. The state-owned Turkish Satellite Communications Company (Türksat) halted its broadcasting services to 13 TV and radio channels which are known to be critical of the AKP and Erdogan.25 On July 27, 2016, the AKP government adopted an emergency decree within the framework of the state of emergency. The decree allowed for the closure of media outlets which did not follow the instructions of the AKP government. 45 newspapers, 16 TV stations, 15 journals and magazines, 3 news agencies, 23 radio stations, and 29 publishing companies were closed.26 The Minister of Transportation was authorized to close any media company having an alleged relationship with an organization or a group threatening national security.27 All movables, real estate assets, receivables and rights, and all documents and papers of foundations that were closed down were seized and transferred to the General Directorate of Foundations. Although the Samanyolu media group ranked in the top 10 nationally, satellite, and cable carriers dropped these channels and made them un-watchable. Hundreds of people from the media sector lost their jobs. Dr. Hidayet Karaca, executive director of Samanyolu media group, has been in prison for four years. Many journalists and columnists have been sent to prison due to their opposition to the AKP government. Kaynak Holding, a publishing house and bookstore chain, was forcefully given to the control of a pro-AKP supervisor. Hundreds of people from this company lost their jobs. Since 2013, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies have been politicized more in Turkey. In 2015, the AKP government seized all the assets of Koza Holding including its own gold mines as well as two nationwide daily newspapers, two nationwide TV broadcasting channels and one nationwide radio station, and a digital news media by assigning pro-government trustees. The government assigned the AKP members as the heads of these companies and media outlets. The number of media-employees who lost their jobs due to the government pressure in last few years is more than several thousand. Haşim Kılıç, former President of the Constitutional Court, stated that the AKP government used law to silence critical voices. Speaking at a conference titled “Constitutional state in Turkey: Issues and conflict zones” organized by the Freedom Research Association (FRA), Kılıç argued that it was disgraceful and dreadful to see some so-called

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intellectuals hiding behind silence when they witnessed unlawful pressure on critical people. He argued that the constitutional state exists to protect the basic rights and freedoms of society. The general rule of a pluralist system is to protect dissident voices; however, anxiety in Turkish society, especially among those who are critical of the government, is increasing. In 2015, European Parliament almost unanimously voted condemning the Turkish government over its crackdown on media freedoms.28 The great majority of Representatives of the United States Congress signed a letter stating that there is an increasing oppression over freedoms in Turkey.29 Although Erdogan reached the pinnacle of political power through democracy, no one ever abused democracy and democratic institutions as much as he has done in modern Turkey. Currently, there are no checks and balances on Erdogan’s power. Frequently, even the innocent of criticisms is branded as treason by the AKP government and this attitude disconnected Turkey from the modern civilized world. Many elites are silent and blind to the state’s oppression of critical voices. Journalists who provide a civil service to society, are dismissed from their jobs because of their criticism of the government. Countless journalists have been jailed in recent years on charged of membership of a terrorist organization simply because of perceived similarities between their views and the positions espoused by the targeted group. This has happened to Kurdish journalists, Kemalist journalists, and the Gülen movement journalists. The extension of the crackdown to Kurdish, Alevi, and left-wing media suggests that the state of emergency was used for harassing individuals and groups that are merely inconvenient to the government in power, not threats to the democratic system. Many were detained and punished not due to a threat they posed to the Turkish government, or to their fellow citizens, but because they disagreed with the government’s actions or policy or are part of or sympathetic to a minority group.30 Erdogan is against the doctrine of separation of power. In recent years, he has been acting as a de facto President with limitless power and no accountability. He has been publicly violating the rule of law. A prominent journalist and the editor in chief of the Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper were imprisoned at the order of Erdogan due to a report about the gun flow to the Salafi jihadist terrorist groups in Syria. However, the Constitutional Court deemed it freedom of expressions. Upon this, Erdogan threatened the media reporters stating that the

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Constitutional Court may have reached such a verdict. “I would only remain silent. I will never accept it. I will not obey it nor do I respect it.”31 He even told that the lower court which freed the journalists upon the verdict of the Constitutional Court, that they should have refused to obey the verdict of the Constitutional Court. This was an open attempt at instructing the lower court to rearrest the journalists. On November 28, 2015, Mr. Tahir Elçi, President of the Bar Association in south-east Diyarbakir province, a prominent lawyer and human rights defender, was killed by unidentified gunmen.32 Worse than this, there was no crime scene investigation for several days, and insufficient steps were taken to secure the crime. The U.S. Department of State report in 2015 noted that human rights organizations and monitors as well as lawyers and doctors involved in documenting human rights violations occasionally faced detention, prosecution, intimidation, harassment, and closure orders for their activities.33 Official human rights mechanisms did not function consistently. They failed to address grave violations. Documenting and reporting of human rights violations have been made even more challenging for civil society organizations, lawyers, and international observers by the lack of access to places where violations have been committed. After the explosion in Suruç34 in 2015, internet service providers temporarily blocked access to Twitter due to national security concerns of the state.35 Similarly, following the October 2015 explosions in Ankara, the Prime Minister banned media coverage of the attack with the same reason and access to social media was blocked temporarily.36 In 2015, Gülen openly criticized the Turkish President and its Prime Minister in an article published in the New York Times.37 When mainstream media began to voice criticism of the AKP, Erdogan went on to publicly rebuke them. The country’s second-largest media group, Sabah/ATV, which was auctioned off in a single-bidder auction (financed by state banks and Qatari funds) to the Çalık energy company, whose media wing was run by Erdogan’s son-in-law, Berat Albayrak. Erdogan’s threat against journalists and media owners became commonplace, and, in turn, media owners and editors rapidly reverted to a form of self-censorship. Gradually, journalists who criticized Erdogan were fired. Numerous telephone conversations leaked on the internet clearly shows how Erdogan called leading editors to castigate negative coverage of various AKP initiatives. He then took on the media group, Doğan Media Group (DMG), after it ramped up its reporting on the

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Deniz Feneri case. The case alleged that huge amount of money from charities was used to fund pro-AKP media outlets in Turkey. Erdogan publicly urged his followers to boycott all Doğan Media owned newspapers and TV stations. Tax authorities then slammed DMG with fines totaling almost $3 billion. The AKP regime, the representative of political Islam in Turkey, uses excessive force via the security forces against all opponents and protestors resulting in the death of civilians. Sometimes, private forces cooperating with the state, have attacked protestors. Moreover, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees held in police custody are apparently still widespread.38 Since 2013, torture and ill-treatment practices have been increased and become more brutal and violent than in previous years resulting in severe physical injuries and psychological trauma. Strangely, often detainees have been tortured in places other than official detention places. Especially, during or following street protests, law enforcement officials applied torture and ill-treatment at outside of official places of detention besides excessive use of force by police officers against demonstrators.39 During the protests against the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park in May 2013, eight protestors were killed and more than 8000 people were injured.40 Turkey does not have a specific equality or anti-discrimination legislation. Discrimination against various groups has been enormously increased during the AKP government reign. Hate speech against non-Muslim minority groups or some sects in Islam such as Alevis and other minorities have become a daily routine. The hostile attitudes of the AKP toward non-Muslims and minority groups is strongly related to extreme ideology of the political Islamists. The level of violence against women is a serious human rights problem in Turkey for there are 28,000 reported cases of violence against women in 2013 alone.41 The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights expressed its concern about the violations of human rights against women, non-Muslims, and other minority groups. There is high number of cases against Turkey at the international level with regards to human rights violations. There are numerous structural problems that need to be addressed to solve the human rights violations, including the attitude and practices of security forces and the inadequacy of the legal framework governing their activities, ineffectiveness of procedural safeguards in police custody and the lack of sanctions in cases of abuse.42

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5.3  Erdogan’s New Turkey For last several decades, Turkey was a country which couldn’t be measured by western political standards due to the role that the army played in the state. Recognizing the need for democracy in Turkey Erdogan promised that he could bring liberal democracy, the UN standards and universal human rights to the state, thus, the AKP received a great support from the different segments of the society including the Gülen movement. Initially, the reforms launched by the AKP, offered Turkey social peace, political stability, growing prosperity, the development of democracy, and the rule of law. A significant democratization and normalization process were made by the AKP. The secular military was a serious problem for Erdogan and the AKP. They knew that the Turkish “deep state” had ability to orchestrate coups as linked to a deeper network of elites in the military, judiciary, and intelligence community. Gülen and his sympathizers publicly supported the AKP at the referendum on September 12, 2010, for this removed impunity for coup perpetrators. Through the reforms which were accepted in the referendum the military tutelage was neutralized. Erdogan and the AKP secured the popular and institutional support through this referendum to implement its political agenda. After 2011, by gaining confidence in its power base, the AKP shifted its orientation to authoritarian style. In particular, the AKP broke with three main tenets; market-driven economics, Kurdish recognition, and the EU standards. As the AKP and Erdogan gained more power in politics they started to reveal their real ideology. The state has been turned more into the personal rule of Erdogan. He has become increasingly oppressive to the state’s legal and political order. He has turned the state into a similar version of Iran which is intolerant, authoritarian, and antiwestern. This attitude is disappointment for all those who supported Erdogan and the AKP expecting that they would democratize the state. However, Erdogan’s authoritarian attitude greatly blemished the AKP’s previous achievements. The erosion of the state’s constitutional order changed Turkey into an authoritarian, unpredictable, and unreliable state. By looking at Turkey from today’s perspective, the state has a new face; an intolerant Islamic-conservative ideology and constituency. Now, a strong ideology of political Islam is shaping politics and public opinions in Turkey. With the election of Erdogan as president in 2018, the

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new Turkey project has commenced. This is a project which aims to conquer the Turkish state and establish the sovereignty of political Islamists. This is a restoration process that the glorious Ottoman Islamic sovereignty will be able to defeat the secular state. A new Turkey is an idea that under the rule of political Islamists and the caliph Erdogan, the entire Middle East will be guided out of the 100 years of western imperialist rule. Indeed, the AKP elites believe that the party is not just political entity, rather, it is a holy march that will endure forever.43 It has a holy cause which aims to conquer the state and Islamizes it. The historical cause (dava) is expressed by the AKP as holy march and a holy cause (kutlu bir dava) originally inaugurated centuries ago.44 There is no doubt that many Islamic groups that advocate the ideology of political Islam in Turkey perceive the AKP as their true representative, defending the Muslim cause in the country and around the world. However, Gülen movement opposed the AKP due to rejecting the idea of interpreting Islam in political sense. The core cadre of the AKP originated from within the ranks of the Refah (Welfare) Party led by Necmettin Erbakan.45 They saw themselves as being in close ideological proximity to the Muslim Brotherhood network and thus subscribed to a transnational notion of political Islam that the Gülen fervently opposed. Most members of the AKP were educated through religious Imam Hatip schools which to emphasize religious education. It seems the conflict between the Hizmet and the AKP goes back to Erbakan’s time who is founder of the ideology of political Islam in Turkey. The idea of uniting Muslims under the leadership of the caliph has been expressed by Erdogan himself and other high representatives of the party on many occasions. For example, once Erdogan said that we are the voice of the oppressed in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Myanmar, and Pattani, and we are the hope of the poor in Somalia.46 The missionary foreign policy approach is related to the new Turkey project. The AKP hopes that by building Islamic solidarity Turkey could be the leader of Muslims all over the world. In line with this paradigm, the AKP supports the Islamic political movements in the Middle East. For example, they actively supported the Ennahda Party47 in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria. However, the ideology which the AKP aims to build a Turkish hegemony is not welcomed by the rulers in the Middle East. With its ideology the AKP has made Turkey

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a part of conflict in the Middle East. Now, the foreign radical jihadist fighters are operating freely within Turkey’s territory. Under the leadership of Erdogan, Turkey has been drifting into authoritarianism. In spite of credible accusations of corruption Erdogan has won elections and this success made him more aggressive and intolerant against all opponents. In order to secure his political power, he uses excessive police violence against demonstrators, he restricts on freedom of the press and internet, and he interferes in the judiciary and purges all opponents in the bureaucracy. Since 2013, Turkey and its political system have been based on the will of a single man whose power is not limited nor questioned. On June 7, of 2015, the AKP failed to secure an electoral majority in national parliamentary elections. This election was particularly significant for Erdogan to approve changing the constitutional powers of the newly elected president from a purely ceremonial to a governing role. The reasons for the AKP’s defeat can be listed as the Gezi Protests in 2013 in response to unprecedented police brutality against urban activists; the ability of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) to attract a large array of minority and progressive political groups under its umbrella; and the corruption probe implicating top AKP officials.48 Despite the major corruption allegations about the AKP’s ministers and Erdogan’s family members, oppositional parties could not make much success in elections, because all major media outlets are under the control of Political Islamists. Turkish society could not get information adequately and objectively about the corruption allegations. Although Erdogan’s name surfaced during the investigation, as leaked wiretaps recorded calls between Erdogan and his son Bilal suggesting that they were hiding illegally obtained money, moreover, Bayraktar declared to the press that if he was being asked to resign, then Erdogan should also be resigning, since he was involved in the same deals, Erdogan successfully covered it up with the power of media and with the strict control of governmental institutions. Initially, the corruption scandal sent shockwaves through the AKP’s ranks but, Erdogan successfully directed the accusations toward the Gülen movement. He accused the police and prosecutors who coordinated the investigation and arrests as members of the Movement. He used a strategy “tutelage of foreign powers over the Turkish nation and its government” to present authoritarian moves against the opposition and interference in the judiciary as measures in defense of democracy.49

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He employed this strategy successfully in the municipal elections at the end of March 2014 and also in his latest campaign for the presidency. Erdogan alone is the keystone of the existing order and the central decision maker with regards to politics and state issues. He sees himself as the head of all governmental institutions like old fashion Ottoman sultans. He believes that he represents the will of the people in Turkey but this excludes half of the population who do not vote for him. He ignores cultural, religious, and political differences. He uses excessive force against all opponents. For him, either a person or a group supports him or enemy to him. So, he only accepts the supporters of the AKP as real citizens of Turkey. Others are labeled by him as betrayers, evils, viruses and foreign spies. Erdogan and Political Islamists continue to label opposition politicians as saboteurs, traitors, and foreign agents. The nationalist approach helped the AKP government to legitimize curtailing rights and liberties and it also secured political power for the AKP government. The current AKP ideology can be named as giving all the power to Erdogan and standing with him when establishing new Turkey. There is no room for consultation in the AKP government, because Erdogan’s vision is program of the state. After securing around 52% of the vote in the first presidential election held in 2018, Erdogan has established his authoritarian rule on strong foundations. Currently, Erdogan seems to be unchallengeable. Under his rule, Turkey has been witnessing deteriorating social sentiments, the escalating polarization of views, and increasing radicalism and violent incidents. Moreover, Turkey’s geographic proximity to Syria and its involvement in the conflict raise concerns about the new Turkey project. It is very difficult to predict the future of Turkey. The project bringing Turkey closer to the European Union will certainly not be achieved as long as Political Islamists remain in power. The old state model is gone and it is uncertain which model Political Islamists will establish in Turkey ultimately. It seems, they try to bring Turkey closer to countries like Russia and Saudi Arabia. Recent developments in Turkey indicate that, under Erdogan’s rule Turkey will move increasingly further away from the west. One of the possible answers for the question why Erdogan and the AKP have changed their democratic attitude toward authoritarian style is that the reforms conducted by the party from the very beginning were only instruments to be employed in the process of conquering the state.

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5.4  Toward Autocracy The continues successes in national elections gradually weakened the AKP government to carry out reforms toward achieving the UN standards. The political success encouraged the party to employ conservative and religious rhetoric. The street demonstrations initiated by the protests against the liquidation of Gezi Park in Istanbul and the corruption scandal in December 2013 marked a turning point for the AKP. These events served as catalyst for Erdogan to build his personal power. The new project proposed by the AKP is authoritarianism and Islamization of Turkish government. Erdogan has been promoting a presidential form of government without checks and balances, a system of one-man rule. He publicly stated that whether one accepts it or not, Turkey’s administrative system has changed. Now, what should be done is to update this de facto situation in the legal framework of the constitution.50 Erdogan’s personal ambitions played a key role in Turkish politics as well as in the ideology of political Islam. After 2011, he started to use a rhetoric bolder and more overbearing. He advertised himself to the Turkish society as vowing to raise pious generation. He often used the slogans “one nation, one flag, one religion, one state” and regarded himself as the embodiment of the national will.51 Erdogan’s ambitions, prejudices, and opinions are represented as those of the nation, regardless of whether or not the nation is aware of the fact. The monumental presidential palace (Ak Saray), which cost $615 million and has 1150 rooms, is an external symbol of Erdogan’s position in Turkey.52 Erdogan has enormous influence in the government party, the state apparatus, business, and the media. He aims to sanction his monocracy through the introduction of the presidential political system in Turkey. In this system, Erdogan wants people who are loyal to him personally. Therefore, he removed the AKP’s experienced and moderate politicians from the decision-making positions. He has successfully replaced them with new people who are completely obedient to him. The Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) is the most important state institution for Erdogan and his regime. A separate building is allocated to MIT as part of the presidential complex. Hakan Fidan, the head of MIT, is Erdogan’s closest aide and number two in the state. He has been in charge of the most critical issues. In building Erdogan’s monarchic system, the freedom of speech is restricted. The state apparatus and institutions are employed by Political

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Islamists to fight Erdogan’s political opponents. Any form of criticism expressed in the media, on the Internet or at a university against Erdogan is perceived as illicit behavior and then punished by the prosecution authorities. For example, during the Gezi protests, the doctors who offered medical aid to injured protestors in a mosque faced charges of criminals.53 Erdogan often emphasizes to imagined foreign foes to receive the support of Turkish society. He has been suppressing all the protest against himself with brutality on the pretext that they are foreign spies. For example, the Gezi Park protest was crushed with brutality on the pretext that protestors were funded by foreign powers. The accumulated frustration with Erdogan was increased by police brutality during the Gezi protests. In recent years, Turkey’s political system has undergone considerable change. Erdogan managed to break down democratic institutions to establish his own unrestricted presidential form of government without checks and balances. It seems, the erosion of the rule of law will continue as long as Erdogan is in office. The stunning break between AKP and the Hizmet movement made the problems worse. Turkey’s democratic progress reversed and declined. Unfortunately, there is no serious alternative for the AKP today. Restrictions on access to social networking services, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube are frequently observed in Turkey. By court orders the access to around 70,000 Internet URL addresses is permanently restricted.54 Erdogan wants to restrict access to any website that challenges his authority by using administrative procedures. He orders Internet providers to archive data concerning users’ activity and share it with the state authorities. Freedom House Foundation55 has classified Turkey as not free in terms of freedom of the press due to the AKP’s strict control over all media, newspapers, and TV stations in Turkey. Almost all news channels broadcast Erdogan’s speech simultaneously. The recordings of Erdogan’s telephone conversations leaked to the Internet revealed that he had personally instructed media editors what kind of opinions they should publish to meet his expectations.56 Under the rule of Erdogan, the Turkish government responds the mass protests with violence. Protesters are usually beaten and many are arrested. The governmental public security package of laws has given the police more extensive powers to use firearms, detain and search people and property, and tap telephones. Because of pressure and oppression in Turkey people no longer express their political views publicly.

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The AKP, Turkey’s long-time governing party, has an Islamicconservative ideology. Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamic scholar writing for the pro-government, stated that according to Islam, man has a free choice but in terms of legislation, giving guidance, and setting rules, there is no area that could be called non-religious.57 Although it is normal for Turkish people to have different views with regards to religion, morality, or philosophy the AKP labels all opponents as traitors. This approach is closely related with the notion of caliphate which all Muslims must obey the caliph. The idea that the contemporary Turkey could serve as a role model for Middle East in terms of democracy and human rights is not true anymore. Turkey has becoming more authoritarian and it is now painfully evident. The United States Congress regularly condemns Turkish government addressing human rights abuses. When the AKP lost its majority in Parliament on June 2015 elections Erdogan did not lose his extraordinary power. He did all necessary actions to ensure that no other political force was given a chance to govern the state. In order to secure the way toward absolute power Erdogan divided and polarized the Turkish people. After the 2015 elections, a wave of violence occurred. For example, on October 10, 2015, a suicide bombing targeted a peace rally by the HDP and leftist groups in Ankara, which killed over 100 people. Erdogan expressed no empathy for the victims. Moreover, the interior minister laughed off when he was asked if he should resign as a result of this security failure. The AKP has changed its course from liberal democracy to authoritarian governing style by its leader. In order to establish his authoritarian government style, Erdogan has addressed Islamic feelings of Turkish society. He has embarked on a gradual Islamization of Turkish society: beards and headscarves are required for public sector jobs or to land government contracts. His government has undertaken major reforms to Islamize every sector of Turkey’s education system. The AKP government increased the amount of compulsory religious education in schools. These are a few examples with regards to how Political Islamists used Islamic sensitivity in their politics to get more votes from Turkish people. In order to establish a centralized power, Erdogan sacrificed civil liberties and democratic principles. His personal ambitions, irritable disposition, blunt methods, and impetuousness ruined all the previous success which the AKP achieved. The basic institutions of democracy have increasingly been compromised in favor of Erdogan. The erosion of the rule of law and civil liberties cannot be rectified soon even if Erdogan

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loses his power. Because, after witnessing the extraordinary powerful presidency, anyone who possesses the same status, he/she not accept constrained authority. The AKP regime committed to the Islamization of the state with the ideology heavily infused with anti-Western and anti-Semitic concepts. The country’s religious affairs directorate is taking active role to support Erdogan’s political Islamic ideology. In the area of foreign affairs, Turkey has been escaping from the EU and the west. As the AKP’s domestic political power has increased, its foreign policy has become more antiwestern. With this attitude, the AKP appears to have more in common with the Muslim brotherhood. Political Islamists use public support as basis for their antidemocratic approach. The ideology of political Islam is not moderate. Turkey’s authoritarian direction is a direct result of the AKP’s approach and underlying ideology. Moreover, Erdogan’s ambitions for one-man rule destroyed a chance to show Islamic world an example in which Islam could be compatible with democracy. His desire to construct a presidential system devoid of checks and balances gives an idea about his view on democracy.

5.5  Extremists’ Theology Which Legitimizes Human Rights Violations Many leaders who are elected through democratic means have failed to uphold justice, democracy and human rights after winning elections successively. They have crashed the media, judiciary, and the bureaucracy. The AKP, Political Islamists of Turkey, have damaged democratic institutions, the justice system, and the media to achieve absolute power. They failed to show respect to values of democracy, individual rights and freedom. Turkey now stands for an authoritarian regime. Political Islamists follow a pragmatist approach with regards to obtaining the political power against their opponents. They use excessive power against the citizens who do not like the AKP regime. In recent years, Turkey has witnessed many antidemocratic practices in various fields. They believe that Erdogan is the leader of the Islamic world and in order to unite Muslims under his leadership, it is permissible to use any form of force against the opponents. According to their ideology, it is necessary to obey the leader (the caliph) without any reservation or condition. The AKP government is very adamant to suppress all opponents to protect the unity of Muslims. With this perspective, the Diyanet,

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pro-AKP Muslim scholars and pro-AKP Islamic groups justify force and pressure against the Gülen movement. Through their extreme form of Islamic understanding, they have legitimized the persecution against all opponents. Although Islam never allows any political or religious group to persecute others due to their differences in opinions, political Islamists have been applying pressure against their opponents. Since 2013, after the corruption investigation against the four ministers and Erdogan’s family members, the AKP government has increased its persecutions against the sympathizers of the Gülen movement. Erdogan publicly declared a “witch hunt” and ironically received great support from the society. The Diyanet, religious groups, Muslim scholars, and community leaders supported him in his fight against the movement. Erdogan has been using hate speech against the followers of the Gülen movement. He has used very strong words to demonize the movement and its sympathizers in the public eye such as parallel state, traitors, pawns of a dirty international blood lobby, viruses, tumors, blood-sucking leeches, terrorists, raving, and assassins. He described Fethullah Gülen as a spellbinder, a false prophet, a bogus scholar, and a gang-leader. In addition to hate speech, Erdogan often gave fear speech to intimidate anyone who has sympathy toward the movement. In this regard, he stated that he would enter the lairs/caves of the followers of the movement and would crush them, break them, vaporize them, split them into molecules and take over their schools. He declared Turkey’s second war of independence against the movement. Ali Inci, Mayor of Hendek, stated publicly that “we get rid of these people. From now on, not even a single member of this parallel group will be able to stay here. It is not possible for them to remain here, to live here, and to work here. I am a man of my word and will fulfill my promise. We first removed them from our hostels and the hostels that belong to our city. Our citizens will not let members of this group, of this organization enter their homes.” Ünsal İnal Tekin, head of the Turkish Aviation Board, wrote in one of his tweets about Gülen and his sympathizers that “don’t bite the hand that feeds you. It’s become clear that you are Hashashīn in the service of the devil. We will stone you, one and all.” Political Islamists of Turkey described the movement as a terrorist organization. Although Gülen condemned the coup attempt and rejected all the accusations, they announced the movement as the

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perpetrator of this tragic event. This attitude reveals that the ideology of political Islam is pragmatist which deems everything lawful to obtain the political power and destroy all the obstacles in this way. Turkish prosecutors have filed a 2527-page indictment against Gülen for his alleged involvement in the coup attempt that left 240 people dead. The prosecutors ask for Gülen to be given two life sentences and an additional 1900 years in prison for “attempting to destroy the constitutional order by force” and “forming and running an armed terrorist group.”58 The Turkish Justice Ministry officially requested the United States to arrest Gülen for ordering and leading the coup attempt.59 Political Islamists have extended their fight against all opponents. They have been purging the state from all opponents through unlawful means. Prosecutions of journalists, judges, prosecutors, polices, academics, medical doctors, and people from various segments of life for membership of an alleged “Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization” have been ongoing at a fast speed. Since the failed coup, the government has cracked down on any individual or group believed to have links to Gülen.60 The speed and scale of the dismissals make it clear that many of those affected by the purge are caught up in it not because there is clear evidence of their involvement in the coup, but merely because of their perceived opposition to Political Islamists. The erosion of rule of law and democracy has been dramatically increased after the December 2013 corruption investigation. Public perception is that Erdogan covered up this investigation as he was involved in the corruption and money laundering syndicate.61 He immediately commanded the state officials to remove the prosecutors and hundreds of police officers who took part in the investigation. Later, the officials who took part in the investigation, were discharged, arrested, and imprisoned. The AKP government suspended and seized educational, humanitarian, and professional institutions, as well as the private businesses affiliated with the movement.62 The newly designed penal courts of justice issued arrest warrants for thousands of Turkish citizens. They assigned trustees/guardians to the companies affiliated with the Gülen movement such as Ipek Holding with about 5000 employees, and Kaynak Holding with about 8000 employees, among hundreds of others. The trustees, with almost unlimited authority, have suspended, transferred, shut down, and sold assets of the companies, and fired the employees.

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Political Islamists of Turkey violated many basic rights in various fields in Turkey. The mass crackdowns in numbers since July 15, 2016 indicates that. 145,711 people got sacked, 124,257 were detained and 57,885 were arrested. Thousands of schools, dormitories, and universities were closed by the AKP government. 8573 academics lost their jobs. 4424 judges/prosecutors and 44,385 from the ministry of education were dismissed. 184 media outlets were shut down and 274 journalists were arrested.63 After designing the intelligence service, police force, judiciary, and the media, Political Islamists have produced an atmosphere of fear in Turkey. The media daily broadcasts allegations about the Gülen movement. The police organized hundreds of predawn raids and took thousands of people into custody. These people were accused of the crimes including espionage, overthrowing the government, establishing, and leading a terror organization, terrorism, attempting to subvert of the government, the coup, misleading the investigation, and creating false evidence. People from varies segments of life including journalists, teachers, scientists, academics, judges, prosecutors, students, housewives, and many more have experienced persecution at the hands political Islamists of Turkey. The attempted coup has given an opportunity to them to eliminate all opponents and consolidate their power. The ambition of Erdogan to gain absolute power has ruined the lives of many citizens. In Turkey, being an alleged sympathizer of the Gülen movement is grounds for becoming the subject of an investigation, detention, or even arrest since the movement is labeled as a terrorist organization. Even before the attempted coup, the Turkish authorities already seized Bank Asya. It took over and closed several media companies and detained businessmen on allegations of funding the Gülen movement.64 Erdogan vowed to choke off businesses linked to the movement and he promised that no mercy in rooting them out.65 On August 10, 2016, addressing a group of businesspeople in his palace, Erdogan stated that “we have to cleanse FETO from the business world, just as we are scraping them off from the armed forces, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy. Some from the West are offering counsel, saying they are worried about thousands of people being dismissed. … But we are going to do it, no matter whether the numbers reach 10,000, 50,000, 100,000, or 200,000.”66 On July 29, 2016, Erdogan’s government detained three top executives of Boydak Holding. The police raided 44 companies and the authorities ordered the detention of nearly 200 businessmen.

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They seized their assets. Among the businesses targeted by the AKP government were Aydinli Group and Eroglu Holding, which both run large retail chains.67 Detention warrants were issued for 187 people, owners or managers of companies belonging to the Gülen congregation’s business organization, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Confederation. Prosecutors ordered the seizure of all of their assets.68 Erdogan ordered prosecutors to clean out Gülen affiliated businessmen from the business world. The businesses seized by the AKP government are ranging from small proprietorships to large companies in various sectors, including Boydak (furniture), Koza Ipek (gold mining, tourism, media), Dumankaya (construction), Naksan (textiles and food), Akfa (tourism, construction, and textiles) Kaynak (publishing and logistics), and FI Yapi (construction). The government also seized private enterprises such as hospitals, publishing houses, hotels and even pastry shops and baklava makers.69 35 private health clinics and hospitals; 1043 private schools and student hostels; 1229 foundations and associations; 15 private universities; and 19 trade unions, federations, and confederations were closed by the AKP government. On 25 July, 2016, Turkey’s state-run Turkish Airlines fired 211 employees due to alleged supporting of the movement.70 Turkey’s soccer federation sacked 94 members of the association, including a number of referees.71 Anyone with any perceived link to the movement was targeted by the AKP government.72 Erdogan publicly and repeatedly called on everyone to report to prosecutors and security agencies the people who are sympathetic with the movement.73 The followers of AKP reported on anyone who had an alleged link with the Gülen movement and eventually those citizens have been suspended, detained, and arrested. The probe extended to a popular comedian and former soccer stars known to be close to Gülen’s congregation.74 On September 3, 2016, singer Atilla Taş was arrested in connection with the movement. A dancer was sacked by the national ballet for the same reason. In the wake of the failed coup attempt, a crackdown on the military has led to the detention of thousands of soldiers. Turkey has formally charged 99 military generals for their role in the failed coup attempt, which represents about a third of the country’s military top brass.75 Eighty-seven land army generals, 30 air force generals, and 32 admirals—a total of 149—were dishonorably discharged over their complicity in the 15 July putsch bid.76 Over 9000 people, mostly in the military,

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have been put under arrest in the aftermath of the attempted coup. With the initial dismissal of more than 1000 ranking officers, the state formally discharged nearly 44% of land force generals, 42% of air force generals, and 58% of navy admirals.77 The dismissal of a number of members of the Turkish armed forces resulted in a decrease by one-third of military personnel. There is credible evidence indicating that detainees in Turkey are being subjected to beatings and torture, including rape, in official, and unofficial detention centers in the country.78 People who have been released from detention reported many forms of human rights violations. They reported the police beating and punching, verbal abuse threatening them with rape, making them kneel for many hours while handcuffed from behind, depriving them of basic needs such as water, food, and sleep.79 After mass arrests, individuals have held in unofficial places of detention such as sports halls, and lawyers have often been barred from access to them. Turkey’s detention facilities are overcrowded and have poor living conditions. Approximately, a hundred death incident have occurred in custody. Mostly, they have occurred after torture and ill-treatment in prison.80 Some detainees have reported to their lawyers that they were forced to sign papers which they did not read. Human rights organizations have documented that the prison guards physically abused inmates due to their speaking against the government.81 Detainees in Ankara said that they witnessed senior military officers in detention being raped with a truncheon or digitally by police officers.82 They also mentioned that they saw a detainee with severe wounds and a large swelling on his head. The detainee could not stand up or focus his eyes and he eventually lost consciousness. Some detainees had visible bruises, cuts, or, broken bones such that they could not walk. The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims expressed its concern over the mass arrests and allegations of torture and ill-treatment of detainees.83 The media showed images that dozens of detainees huddled together naked and handcuffed on the floor. The detainees were subjected to torture and ill-treatment. Reports of abuse in detention are extremely alarming. Testimonies received from inmates and their lawyers suggest that, in the days and weeks following the failed coup, torture and other forms of ill-treatment were widespread. Law enforcement officials felt free to harass, torture, intimidate, and insult anyone they perceived as an opponent to the government.

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Women and children have been subjected to a variety of intimidation strategies, including rape, the threat of rape, harassment, and other forms of violence. Many women have reported experiencing psychological trauma. Moreover, many children have experienced a great trauma due to the oppression of political Islamists. This unprecedented onslaught is widely termed as a purge. Erdogan is willing to refashion the very fabric of society through oppression and violence. Political Islamists included new mothers and their babies, children, disabled people, and housewives among the soldiers who plotted to topple the state on July 15, 2016. It seems, Erdogan needed a brutal event to demonize the Gülen movement and all other opponents in the eyes of the nation. Thus, he named the coup “a gift of God” for he got public approval for the persecution of all opponents including women and children. There are thousands of kids who have been separated from their parents. Even little kids who needed medical assistance were denied. For example, a three-year-old child with high fever was denied treatment at a hospital since his father was arrested over alleged links to the Gülen movement.84 The wife of a former Ankara chief prosecutor wrote a letter to the government and asked help for her husband who was in prison while he had cancer and needed special treatment. She stated that it was unlikely that he could get any help in his current poor prison conditions.85 Her husband died in the prison due to poor conditions and the prevention of the medical treatment for him. Buket Büyükçelebi, a six-months-pregnant academic with a 13-month-old child, was kept in a 33-person holding cell in a Gaziantep prison for three months.86 She stayed with 33 other people in a holding cell in very poor conditions. The AKP government denied proper food for her baby. She fed her 13-month-old child with the same food everyone else ate. The cell was cold. She was pregnant but forced to sleep on a double bunk bed. She had to climb up to the second level every day. She was a research assistant and doing her Ph.D. at Kilis University, but now she is in prison and does not even know what crime she has supposedly committed. Political Islamists have negative attitudes toward women on the basis of their extreme Islamic understanding. Erdogan stated that women who have not chosen to bear at least three children are deficient and incomplete. Many women including feminists have noted an increase in attacks and harassment on the street. Journalist Pinar Ersoy explains that the AKP regime has been targeting women and women’s groups.

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Unfortunately, due to great pressure and oppression, women do not protest Erdogan and his antidemocratic regime. Women and children are the ones who are afflicted most severely from the persecution. They have been experiencing great difficulties such as poverty, displacement, insecurity, and sexual and domestic violence. Women from a variety of marginalized communities (Kurdish, Alevi, Hizmet-affiliated) have been particularly affected by violence, rape, and demeaning treatment, even during and after childbirth. Wives and children are jailed when the government could not find husbands. The AKP government jailed mothers with their newborn babies. Currently, over 600 children are being raised in jail by those mothers who are among the imprisoned. An estimated 16,000–20,000 women are currently held in prison: in some cases, they are being used as hostages to coerce their male relatives to return to Turkey, and as an intimidation technique intended to silence dissent among their families. Security forces raided Gülen affiliated schools including elementary schools and daycare centers with counterterrorism units equipped with heavy guns and armored vehicles while the kids were in schools. They did not even give any legal notice before raiding the schools and daycare centers. Many women in prison reported that they were subjected to systematic humiliation, including naked searches by male guards. Fatma, a forty-two-year-old housewife from Erzurum, was detained and interrogated about her husband’s movement-related activities. After her release, she has begun having problems with her mental health. Her daughter Hatice suffered from the stigma when her classmates found out about the allegations against her father, and they socially ostracized her. Education of many children is disrupted. Parents are either in jail or have fled from the country to avoid torture and prison. Many children are left without having their careers and guardians. They have been experiencing anxiety and depression besides their education is disrupted. Women and children are the unseen victims in Turkey. The effect of oppression on women and children will echo through Turkish society for decades. Thousands of women in jail are acutely vulnerable to physical (including sexual), emotional, and psychological abuse. Their children are either behind bars with their mothers or they are left behind to their own destiny. They have been experiencing anxiety, depression, and a severely disrupted education.

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Erdogan’s government has been leveraging Turkey’s important investments and economic influence in order to intensify its calls to close down Hizmet affiliated schools all over the world. The pressure has been growing as Turkey threatens to curtail its economic ties with these states.87 In recent years, Turkey has applied pressure to countries in the Western Balkans such as Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to convince them to shut down the movement’s schools. By closing these schools, the AKP government wants to diminish the influence of the movement abroad. In order to close the Hizmet affiliated schools all over the world the AKP government has mobilized its diplomats and National Intelligence Agency. The government sent official requests to the host countries and asked them to shot down the movement’s schools. Moreover, the AKP government organized official and unofficial visits to these countries to convince them to accept the movement as a terrorist organization. It spent enormous money on lawyers and lobbying companies to discredit the schools in the public eyes in these countries. The AKP government urged countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, America, and Pacific to shut down schools associated with the Gülen movement. The Turkish government established the Maarif Foundation to take over the movement affiliated schools abroad. Brad Sherman, a congressman of the United States wrote a letter to Education Institutions in the State stating “the law firm of Amsterdam & Partners of Washington DC” received $600,000 per year from the government of Turkish President Recep Erdogan to disparage the charter schools which were opened by Gülen sympathizers.88 The law firm publicly acknowledged that this lawsuit was part of a larger political campaign against the Hizmet. Sherman argued that Erdogan personally did tremendous damage to democracy in Turkey.

Notes





1. Caroline, Lancaster, “The Iron Law of Erdogan: The Decay from IntraParty Democracy to Personalistic Rule,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 9 (2014): 1672–1690. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Gorener, Aylin, and Meltem Ucal, “The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 3 (2011): 357–381.

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5. Soo Jung, Ahn, Turkey’s Unraveling Democracy, 52. 6.  U.S. State Department’s Annual report on human rights practices in Turkey For 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ humanrightsreport/#wrapper. 7.  “The Government Response to Turkey’s Coup Is an Affront to Democracy,” Human Rights Watch, last modified August 3, 2016, https://www.hr w.org/news/2016/08/03/government-responseturkeys-coup-affront-democracy. 8. “Measures Taken Under the State of Emergency in Turkey,” Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, last modified July 26, 2016, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/measures-taken-under-the-state-of-emergency-in-turkey?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcommissioner%2Fcountry-report%2Fturkey. 9.  “Rule of Law Crisis in Turkey: UN Statement,” International Commission of Jurists, last modified September 19, 2016, www.icj.org/ rule-of-law-crisis-in-turkey-un-statement/. 10.  Reporters Sans Frontières, “State of Emergency State of Arbitrary,” last modified September 25, 2016, www.ecoi.net/file_ upload/5228_1475070773_turquie-etatdurgence-eng-def.pdf. 11.  “Memorandum on the Human Rights Implications of the Measures Taken Under the State of Emergency in Turkey,” Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, last modified October 7, 2016, General approach of the state of emergency, para 11, p. 3, https:// wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraSer vlet?command=com.instranet. CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2945536&SecMode=1&DocId= 2388164&Usage=2. 12.  “Turkey: Rights Protections Missing From Emergency Decree” Orders to Purge Civil Servants, Judges; Close Groups Down, Human Rights Watch, last modified July 26, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2016/07/26/turkey-rights-protections-missing-emergency-decree. 13. Ibid. 14. “Freedom in the World: Turkey,” Freedom House, last modified 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/turkey. 15. The Article 1 of the Turkish Counter Terrorism Law. 16.  “Turkey Sets Up Special Unit to Abduct Gülen Followers Abroad, Pro-gov’t Journalist Claims,” Turkey Purge, November 2, 2016, https://turkeypurge.com/pro-govt-journalist-suggests-abductionof-gulen-followers-in-us-europe. 17. We request that you send a detailed report about all FETÖ/PDY networks, activities, educationalinstitutions [kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, faculties, dormitories, etc.] NGOs, aidorganizations, human resources, associations that host cultural activities,

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etc., [email protected] by September 27, 2016, https:// www.turkishminute.com/2016/12/13/turkey-asks-imams-abroadprofile-gulen-linked-expatriates/. 18. “Hiçbir ülke FETÖ için güvenli sığınak değildir” (No Country Is Safe for the Members of FETÖ), TRT Haber, last modified September 19, 2016, http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/hicbir-ulke-feto-icin-guvenli-siginak-degildir-272161.html. 19. “Turkey Asking Turks Abroad to Report Gulen Supporters Whereabouts: Swedish Radio,” Reuters, last modified July 22, 2016, www.reuters.com/ article/us-turkey-security-sweden-idUSKCN1021M8. 20.  “Turkey Asks Imams Abroad to Profile Gülen-Linked Expatriates,” Turkish Minute, last modified December 13, 2016, https://www. turkishminute.com/2016/12/13/turkey-asks-imams-abroad-profilegulen-linked-expatriates/. 21. Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 (February 19, 2010), paras 4, 20, 45, 53, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/G10/110/82/PDF/G1011082.pdf?OpenElement. 22.  Joint submission by ARTICLE 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, English PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International, para 12, available at: http://www.article19.org/ resources.php/resource/37658/en/article-19-joint-submission-tothe-un-universal-periodic-review-of-turkey. 23. “Turkish Police Raid Media Close to Cleric Rival Gülen, Detained 24,” Reuters, last modified December 14, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/12/14/us-turkey-media-idUSKBN0JS04V20141214. 24. UN Summary of Stakeholder submissions, 2015 Periodic Review, para 47. 25. “Critical TV Channels Stop Broadcast in Latest Blow to Media Freedom in Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, last modified November 15, 2015, http:// www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_critical-tv-channels-stop-broadcastin-latest-blow-to-media-freedom-in-turkey_404296.html. 26. “July 23–29, 2016 HRFT Daily Human Rights Report,” Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, last modified August 29, 2016, http://en.tihv. org.tr/23-29-july-2016-hrft-daily-human-rights-report/. 27.  Closed newspapers: Millet, Bugün, Meydan, Özgür Düşünce, Taraf, Yarına Bakış, Yeni Hayat, Zaman, Today’s Zaman, Adana haber, Adana medya, Akdeniz Türk, Şuhut’un Sesi, Kurtuluş, Lider, İscehisar Durum, Türkeli, Antalya, Yerel Bakış, Nazar, Batman, Batman Postası, Batman Doğuş, Bingöl Olay, İrade, İskenderun Olay, Ekonomi, Ege’de Son Söz, Demokrat Gebze, KocaeliManşet, Bizim Kocaeli, Haber Kütahya, Gediz, Zafer, Hisar, Turgutlu Havadis, Milas Feza, Türkiye’deYeni Yıldız, Hakikat, Urfa Haber Ajansı, Ajan11, Yeni Emek, Banaz Postası, Merkür Haber. Closed TV stations: Barış TV, Bugün TV, Can Erzincan TV,

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Dünya TV, Hira TV, Irmak TV, Kanal 124, Kanaltürk, Mc TV, Mehtap TV, Merkür TV, Samanyolu haber, Samanyolu TV, Srt Televizyonu, TunaShopping, Yumurcak TV. Closed journals and magazines: Sızıntı, Nokta, Aksiyon, Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Asya Pasifik, Bisiklet Çocuk, Diyalog Avrasya, Ekolife, Ekoloji, Fountain, Gonca, Gül Yaprağı, Yağmur, Yeni Ümit, Zirve. Closed news agencies: Cihan Haber Ajansı, Muhabir Haber Ajansı, Sem Haber Ajansı. Closed radio stations: Aksaray Mavi Radyo, Aktüel Radyo, Berfin FM, Burç FM, Cihan Radyo, DünyaRadyo, Esra Radyo, Haber Radyo Ege, Herkül FM, Jest FM, Kanaltürk Radyo, Radyo 59, Radyo AileRehberi, Radyo Bamteli, Radyo Cihan, Radyo Fıkıh, Radyo Küre, Radyo Mehtap, Radyo Nur, RadyoŞimşek, Samanyolu Haber Radyosu, Umut FM, Yağmur FM. Closed publishing companies: Altın Burç, Burak Basın Yayın, Define, Dolunay Eğitim, Giresun BasınYayın, Gonca, Gülyurdu, GYV, Işık Akademi, Işık Özel Eğitim, Işık, İklim Basım Yayın Pazarlama, Kaydırak, Kaynak, Kervan Basın, Kuşak, Muştu, Nil, Rehber, Sürat Basım Yayın Reklâmcılık, Sütun, Şahdamar, Ufuk Basın Yayın Haber Ajans Pazarlama, Ufuk Yayınları, Waşanxaneya Nil, Yay BasınDağıtım Paz. Reklâmcılık, Yeni Akademi, Yitik Hazine, Zambak Basım Yayın Eğitim Turizm. 28. “European Resolution Condemns Turkish Repressive Measures Against Journalists,” last modified January 29, 2015, http://europeanjournalists. org/blog/2015/01/29/european-parliament-voted-against-turkish-repressive-measures-against-the-media. 29. The copy of the letter with the signatures is available at: https://salmon. house.gov/sites/salmon.house.gov/files/150203%20Letter%20to%20 s.%20Kerry%20Regarding%20Turkey.pdf. 30.  “Turkey: Joint Letter Calling on Grand National Assembly to End the State of Emergency,” Article 19, last modified October 27, 2016, https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38532/en/turkey:joint-letter-calling-on-grand-national-assembly-to-end-the-state-of-emergency. 31. “Erdogan Says He Does Not Obey or Respect Top Court Ruling on Jailed Journalists,” last modified February 28, 2016, http://www. todayszaman.com/national_erdogan-says-he-does-not-obey-or-respecttop-court-ruling-on-jailed-journalists_413496.html. 32.  “Turkey: Killing of Mr. Tahir Elçi, President of the Bar Association in South-East Diyarbakir Province and Member of IHD,” World Organisation Against Torture, last modified December 1, 2015, http://www.omct.org/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/ turkey/2015/12/d23500/. 33. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, April 13, 2016, Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding

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International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252909. 34. It is a rural district and city of Şanlıurfa Province of Turkey, on a plain near the Syrian border 46 kilometres south-west of the city of Urfa. 35.  Toor, Amar, “Turkey Blocks Access to Twitter Following Deadly Bombing,” The Verge, last modified July 22, 2015, http:// w w w. t h e v e r g e . c o m / 2 0 1 5 / 7 / 2 2 / 9 0 1 3 2 6 9 / t u r k e y - b l o c k s twitter-suruc-bombing. 36.  Letsch, Constanze, and Nadia Khomami, “Turkey Terror Attack: Mourning After Scores Killed in Ankara Blasts,” Guardian, last modified October 11, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ oct/10/turkey-suicide-bomb-killed-in-ankara. 37. Gulen, Fethullah, “Turkey’s Eroding Democracy,” New York Times, last modified February 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/ opinion/fethullah-gulen-turkeys-eroding-democracy.html?_r=0. 38. Compilation of UN information, 2010 Periodic Review, para 32. 39.  “Amnesty International to the 2015 Periodic Review,” available at: http://amnesty.org/en/librar y/asset/EUR44/015/2014/en/ ec49ee04-e6d0-4a81-a97d-5c30bf9dd4a1/_Toc396313269. 40. UN Summary of Stakeholder submissions, 2015 Periodic Review, para 26. 41.  “The Equal Rights Trust to the 2015 UPR, paras 17–19,” available at: http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/ERT%20 Submission%20to%20the%20UPR%20of%20Turkey%20-%20Main%20 Submission.pdf. 42.  Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution, September 18, 2008, Actions of the security forces in Turkey. Progress achieved and outstanding problems, ResDH (2008) 69, available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1344121. 43. Davudoglu, Ahmet, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Sayın Davutoğlu’nun AK Parti 1. Olağüstü Büyük Kurultayı’nda yaptığı konuşmasi,” Star, last modified August 27, 2014, http://www.akparti.org. tr/site/haberler/sayin-davutoglunun-ak-parti-1.-olagustubuyuk-kurultayinda-yaptigi-konusman/66351%20-%201#1. 44. Ibid. 45.  El-Kazaz, Sarah, “The AKP and the Gülen: The End of a Historic Alliance,” Middle East Brief 94 (2015): 4. 46. “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Başbakan Erdoğan’ın 9 Temmuz Tarihli Tokat Mitingi Konuşmasının Tam Metni,” last modified July 9, 2016. http:// www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-9-temmuztarihli-tokatmitingikonusmasinin-tam-metni/64861%20-%201#1.

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47. It is also known as Renaissance Party Ennahdha party is a Muslim democratic political party in Tunisia which was founded as “The Movement of Islamic Tendency” in 1981. Rached Ghannouchi was the movement’s founder and remains its president. It was inspired by the Iranian revolution and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 48.  El-Kazaz, Sarah, “The AKP and the Gülen: The End of a Historic Alliance,” Middle East Brief 94 (2015): 1. 49.  Seufert, Günter, “Erdoğan’s New Turkey Restoring the Authoritarian State in the Name of Democracy,” SWP Comments (October 2014). 50. Akyol, Mustafa, “Now Erdogan Is Cooking Up a Coup to Overthrow Himself,” Al-Monitor, last modified August 18, 2015, http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-erdogan-is-blamedfor-coup-after-elections.html. 51. Jenkins, Gareth, “Erdogan’s Volatile Authoritarianism: Tactical Ploy or Strategic Vision?” Turkey Analyst 5 (December 2012). 52. Matusiak, Marek, “The Great Leap Turkey Under Erdogan,” Point of View 51 (2015): 31. 53.  “Erdogana Hakeretle Suclananlarin Davasi” (Trial of Those Who Are Accused of Insultation to Erdogan), last modified February 2, 2015, http://www.diken.com.tr/her-gun-yeni-bir-sorusturma-erdogana-hakaretle-suclananlarin-sayisi-67yi-buldu. 54.  “Turkey Blocks Charlie Hebdo’s Website, 48 Others,” last modified March 5, 2015, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID= 238&nID=79262&NewsCatID=339. 55. It is an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world. For more info please check, https://freedomhouse.org. 56. Matusiak, Marek, “The Great Leap Turkey Under Erdogan,” Point of View 51 (2015): 36. 57. Karaman, Hayrettin, “Din hayatın neresinde” (Where Is Religion in Life), Yeni Safak, last modified November 27, 2014, https://www.yenisafak. com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/musluman-siyaset-ve-parti-2006189. 58.  “Turkish Prosecutors Seek 2000-Year Term for Gülen,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, last modified August 16, 2016, https://www. rferl.org/a/turkey-gulen-2000-year-term-coup/27925807.html. 59. BAMF—Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany), Briefing Notes vom 19.09.2016, September 19, 2016, https://www.ecoi.net/ file_upload/4765_1474544205_deutschland-bundesamt-fuer-migrationund-fluechtlinge-briefing-notes-19-09-2016-englisch.pdf. 60. “Turkey Detains Brother of Fethullah Gülen in Coup Crackdown,” BBC News, last modified October 2, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-37535104.

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61. “Bilal Erdogan: Italy Names Turkish President’s Son in Money Laundering Investigation Allegedly Connected to Political Corruption,” last modified February 17, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ europe/bilal-erdogan-italy-investigates-turkish-presidents-son-over-money-laundering-allegedly-connected-to-a6879871.html. 62. Woolf, C. H., J. Jowell, E. Garnier, and S. Palin, “A Report on the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights in Turkey Since December 2013,” July 2015. http://www.onebrickcourt.com/files/REPORT_ON_THE_ RULE_OF_LAW_FINAL_FINAL_240815_27622.pdf. 63. UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Preliminary conclusions and observations by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression to his visit to Turkey November 14–18, 2016, last modified November 18, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=20891&LangID=E. 64. “Turkey’s Erdogan Vows to Cut Off Revenues of Gulen-Linked Businesses,” Reuters, last modified August 5, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ us-turkey-security-erdogan-business/turkeys-erdogan-vows-to-cut-off-revenues-of-gulen-linked-businesses-idUKKCN10F0YZ. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67.  “Turkey Seizes Assets as Post-coup Crackdown Turns to Business,” Reuters, last modified August 18, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ us-turkey-security-raids/turkey-seizes-assets-as-post-coup-crackdownturns-to-business-idUKKCN10T0HH. 68.  “Has Turkey’s Gulenist Witch Hunt Spiraled Out of Control?” Al-Monitor, last modified August 29, 2016, https://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-gulenist-purge-shows-hysteria-symptoms.html. 69.  “What’s Next for Hundreds of Companies Seized by Turkish Government?” Al-Monitor, last modified November 15, 2016, http:// fares.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/turkey-what-government-do-with-gulen-linked-companies.html. 70.  “Turkish Airlines Sacks 211 Employees After Failed Coup Attempt,” Reuters, last modified July 25, 2016, http://in.reuters.com/article/ turkey-security-thy-statement/turkish-airlines-sacks-211-employees-afterfailed-coup-attempt-idINKCN1051I8. 71.  “Turkish Soccer Federation Sacks 94 Staff, Including Referees,” The Washington Post, last modified August 2, 2016, https://www. washingtonpost.com/sports/dcunited/turkish-soccer-federationsacks-94-staff-including-referees/2016/08/02/f2ee8c88-58c8-11e6-8b480cb344221131_story.html?utm_term=.661fd171578c.

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72.  “Turkey’s Many Shades of Fear,” Amnesty International, last modified August 15, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ news/2016/08/turkeys-many-shades-of-fear/. 73.  “Turkey’s Anti-Gulen Clampdown Rages Out of Control,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, last modified August 18, 2016, https:// www.rferl.org/a/turkey-notebook-gulen-clampdown-out-of-control/27932142.html. 74.  “Has Turkey’s Gulenist Witch Hunt Spiraled Out of Control?” Al-Monitor, last modified August 29, 2016, https://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-gulenist-purge-shows-hysteria-symptoms.html. 75. “Turkey Formally Charges 99 Generals, Admirals For Coup Attempt,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, last modified July 20, 2016, https:// www.rferl.org/a/turkey-coup-99-generals-admirals-charged/27869722. html. 76. “Turkish Generals Resign as Government Prepares to Overhaul Armed Forces,” The Guardian, last modified July 28, 2016, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/turkey-purges-militar yleaders-in-wake-of-failed-coup. 77. How will the military shake-up affect Turkey’s future? Al Jazeera, last modified August 15, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/ military-shake-affect-turkey-future-160814031324825.html. 78. “Turkey: Independent Monitors Must Be Allowed to Access Detainees Amid Torture Allegations,” Amnesty International, last modified July 24, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/. 79. Ibid. 80.  UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns; Addendum; Follow-up to country recommendations: Turkey [A/HRC/29/37/Add.4], May 6, 2015, paragraphs 25 and 65, www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1434010686_ahrc-29-37-add-4-en.doc. 81.  U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, April 13, 2016, Section 1.c Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, https:// www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015humanrightsrepor t/index. htm?year=2015&dlid=252909#wrapper.

140  R. DOGAN 82. “Turkey: Independent Monitors Must Be Allowed to Access Detainees Amid Torture Allegations,” Amnesty International, last modified July 24, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/. 83. “International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, IRCT member in Turkey warns of torture in the aftermath of failed coup,” last modified July 21, 2016, http://irct.org/index.php/media-and-resources/ latest-news. 84. “3-Year-Old Child with Fever Denied Treatment as Father Under Arrest Over Gülen Links,” Turkey Purge, last modified December 8, 2016, https://turkeypurge.com/6-months-pregnant-woman-with-13-monthold-child-held-in-33-person-cell. 85.  “My Husband Has Cancer, and He Is Slowly Dying in Solitary Confinement, Says Wife of Former Ankara Chief Prosecutor,” Turkey Purge, last modified November 14, 2016, https://turkeypurge.com/ my-husband-has-cancer-and-he-is-slowly-dying-in-solitary-confinementsays-wife-of-former-ankara-chief-prosecutor. 86.  “6-Months Pregnant Woman with 13-Month-Old Child Held in 33-Person Cell,” Turkey Purge, last modified November 11, 2016, https://turkeypurge.com/6-months-pregnant-woman-with-13-monthold-child-held-in-33-person-cell. 87. The Jamestown Foundation, “Attack on Gülen Movement Increasingly a Cornerstone of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Balkans,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 141 (August 2016), https://jamestown.org/program/ attack-on-gulen-movement-increasingly-a-cornerstone-of-turkeys-foreign-policy-in-the-balkans/. 88. The copy of the letter with the signatures is available at: https://salmon. house.gov/sites/salmon.house.gov/files/150203%20Letter%20to%20 s.%20Kerry%20Regarding%20Turkey.pdf.

CHAPTER 6

The Political Theology of Political Islamists of Turkey

6.1  Introduction Religion has an important role in societies. Theological concepts about God, the sacred, the nature of human beings, meaning of life, and the purpose of creation are connected to religion and its interpretation. Religion influences human beings to understand their place in the world, thus, it directs their actions. It is not easy to separate religion from life. Individuals and groups base their identities and ethics on the set of beliefs and religious rules. However, religion and its interpretation are two different things which make a significant difference in people’s lives. One of the hot topics which people are curious about is Islam and its effect to the entire world. Since September 11, Islam has been a major topic of discussion. Around the globe, people are wondering if Islam supports terrorism and violence or not. This is because terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, Taliban, and ISIS are using Islamic concepts to justify their attacks innocent people. Using religious concepts, they try to legitimize extremism, violence, and acts of terror. For this reason, the United States and other western nations have waged war against Islamic extremism and radicalism. Today, Islamic movements that use violence in the pursuit of their political goals are closely monitored by the United States. Islam began in Arabian Peninsula and then spread out all over the world. Various Islamic dynasties and states have risen to power throughout Islamic history. In the late nineteenth century, pan-Islamism emerged as a reaction to western colonialism. The followers of this © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_6

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ideology argued that European colonial powers were occupying Islamic lands and aiming to change Muslims’ culture and belief. They used a religious concept “umma” to unite Muslims and fight the colonial powers. Neo pan-Islamists, such as the AKP and Erdoganists follow a similar ideology in regard to uniting the Muslim world and encouraging them to join the fight against the west. In contrast, majority of Muslims wish their countries are governed by a democratic political system. Indeed, recent studies report that 80% or more, interviewed in nationwide surveys believe that democracy is the best form of government for their country and that, despite its limitations, democracy is better than any other political system.1 However, democratizing a nation requires not only support for democracy among a significant proportion of a country’s population but also that its citizens possess norms and behavior patterns conducive to democracy.2 While there is a broad support for democracy among Muslims, there is also a dispute about to what extent Islam should play a role in political affairs. In order to understand the political theology of Political Islamists of Turkey, the opinions of Hayrettin Karaman, a professor of Islamic Law and long-standing supporter of the AKP Government, issuing his fatwas and interpretations of Islamic rules in accordance with the benefit of the AKP/Erdogan, need to be known.3 Karaman argues that in order to abolish the secular system and establish the Shariah in Turkey, Muslims should be patient and wait for an appropriate time of action.4 His logical reasoning for this argument is that if Muslims rush toward bringing Shariah to the state, they will cause more problems in society. Karaman supports the caliphate of Erdogan by presenting him as the leader of the Ummah (Muslim Community), because he argues that through creating a universal leader or a caliph, the goal of practicing the Shariah and establishing Islamic state can be actualized.5 6.1.1   Islam and Politics The relationship between Islam and politics is arguably the most important and hotly debated issue pertaining to governance in the present-day.6 Political Islam is a form of interpretation of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.7 Political Islam has many forms for

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it is strongly connected with socioeconomic conditions, local culture, and religious interpretations. This chapter analyzes the political Islam represented by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey. The AKP’s success in Turkish politics was a historic victory of periphery over center. The periphery is the cultural and political territory of the oppressed and marginalized majority while the center is the place of the state, the power of which was at the hand of a secular military-civil bureaucracy.8 For a long time, Turkish people were dominated and oppressed by secular and modernist (military-civil) elites, who were not only culturally alienated from the majority of the people but also resistant to the demands of the people and democracy.9 The major actors of the religious field in Turkey are Directory of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet), Divinity Faculties, and religious-track Imam Hatip schools. These religious apparatuses are official institutions fully financed and run by the state; therefore, they have been supporting the AKP in all elections. The AKP regime has made religious classes compulsory in primary and secondary schools to strength its voter base. Furthermore, religious schools have played a crucial role in the expansion of the social basis of political Islam and the AKP regime. In the last few decades, Turkey has witnessed the strong advancement of Islamist movements, especially the political Islam. The religious life has found more space for itself under the AKP rule. However, this freedom is only provided for those religious groups who have been supporting the AKP in absolute sense. Now, almost all religious groups except the Gülen movement, have their own religious and nonreligious establishments, including publishing houses, media outlets, private schools, medical centers, and firms in Turkey with the support of the AKP government.10 Since 2002, Turkey has been ruled by the AKP as a single-party government. During this time, the party has established itself as the dominant force in Turkish politics. In recent years, the AKP has become Erdogan’s party. He has been using his dominant political position to control the state resources with an objective to further strengthen his political power. Through his party, he has built a strong base of social support at municipal levels, social services, and charity networks. He has gained the control of all leading professional associations and syndicates. Especially, after the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, he has taken all governmental intuitions under his control. In today’s Turkey, no one challenges Erdogan’s authority.

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6.1.2  Democracy Political Islamists in Turkey failed to obtain political success in elections until 2002. Although they remained marginal for decades, they never abandoned their ambitions for political power. They changed their strategy a number of times to attract votes from the mainstream Turkish society. Accordingly, they presented themselves as Muslim democrats who combined liberal democracy with Islam. With this pragmatic approach the AKP achieved great success in Turkish politics. Wherever democratic elections are held in Muslim countries, large numbers of citizens vote for parties and politicians who advocate democracy, freedom, and economy. Political Islamists promise economic reform, eradication of corruption, and the adoption of modern liberal democracy. They expressed their desire to restore justice. However, in reality Erdogan was not pro-democracy for even when he was the mayor of Istanbul, he stated that democracy is like a train: you get on the train and when you reach your destination, you get off.11 Political actors in the contemporary Muslim world use Islam as an important basis for their political ideology. Without using Islamic concepts Political Islamists would have little or no popular support. When political Islamists of Turkey (the AKP) no longer needed liberal democracy after obtaining monopoly in political power they returned to their original ideology. Now, their real political theology demonstrates that democracy and its values are not internalized by the AKP. Because, for the AKP monopoly in political power is more important than anything else. For political Islamists, Islamic state and its unchallengeable leader (the caliph) are above the law which is exact opposite of liberal democracy. In order to protect the caliph and state from any kind of opposition they legitimize any form of oppression and violation.12 In other words, they sanctify Erdogan and the state. The ideology of Political Islam mixed with Turkish nationalism has been used by Political Islamists as a stick to beat their opponents. On the basis of their rigid understanding, Political Islamists have been attacking Muslims, especially scholars who do not agree with their ideology. They argue that these scholars contribute to societal decay by departing from the pristine model enjoined by Islamic teachings.13 They strongly emphasize key concepts such as Islamic state, shariah, caliphate, jihad, and ummah.14 If any Muslim or any Islamic group disagrees with them or criticizes their ideology, they are accused of heresy and apostasy. This

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approach is similar to the ideology of extreme terrorist groups who deem themselves as the only true Muslims and others as apostates.15 The followers of the AKP learned a lot from the Milli Görüş (National View) experience when rebranding the ideology of political Islam. Initially the AKP concealed its real identity by acting as if it was accepting the west, democracy, and modernity. By doing so, it aimed to receive support from the west against the secular state and its authoritarianism. The AKP’s apparent commitment to democratic reforms, EU membership, and the alliance with the United States deceived most people in Turkey and abroad. Although Political Islamists (the AKP) embraced the technical mechanics of electoral democracy, they never accepted its underlying values. It is alleged that they even changed the election results in their favor when they received lower votes. The political system which Erdogan is implementing now is distinctly illiberal and autocratic. The national elections seemingly are free but definitely not fair. Because, the AKP does not want to risk its political power by entering fair elections, rather, it aims to change the state from secularism to Islamism by staying in power for a long time. Many state institutions, from the judiciary to the police service, have established intricate relations with Erdogan. They serve and promote Political Islamists’ ideology. Erdogan uses the state apparatuses such as the police force, the military, the judiciary system, and the prisons to control the society. Moreover, he shapes public opinion and transforms society with the help of state apparatuses such as the education system, the media, and religious institutions. Erdogan’s regime is not accountable to the general public. Although people have been experiencing miserable conditions, severe poverty, and corruption, the AKP government is able to suppress all criticisms against the government with the manipulated power of religion.16 Turkey has become the world’s biggest prison for journalists. The media is filled with reports about arresting, repressing, dismissing, and torturing opponents of the AKP.17 In recent years, the AKP regime has detained, arrested, or fired over 200,000 Turkish citizens who are opponents of the AKP. In order to silence Europe against its violence and human rights violations, the AKP threatens to cause disorder in Europe by sending Syrian refugees there.

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6.1.3  Nationalism Political Islamists of Turkey have been using the notion of Turkish nationalism in their ideology and this strategy has played a decisive role in their rise. This approach comes from National View (Milli Görüş) which combined nationalist elements with religious concepts. There is no fundamental difference between the AKP and National View. The National View (Milli Görüş) movement is the backbone of political Islamists in Turkey. It has developed an ideology that puts great emphasis on Turkey’s Ottoman past. Milli Görüş and the AKP both have an undying opposition to Europe and the West. This is because opposition to the west lies in the very heart of their Islamists’ ideology.18 Their main goal is to sever Turkey’s connections with the West. The AKP and political Islamists argue that Islam is the only precondition to be a Turk and to remain a Turk and to become the natural leader of the Islamic world.19 Thus, the political theology which the AKP advocates is “Turkish nationalism blended with neo-Ottomanism.” Political Islamists noticed that Muslims in Turkey had strong ties with the Ottoman history, Anatolian traditionalism, cosmopolitan pluralism, and rural social conservatism.20 In this regard, the AKP presented itself as the representative of Anatolia, the supposed home of authentic, humble, and uncorrupted Turkish-Muslim people.21 The party utilized the constant historical struggle between society (the periphery) and the state (the center) well in its political success. 6.1.4   From Ambition to Absolute Power Erdogan has autocratic whims to consolidate his power and destroy all real or possible opponents. The Gülen movement opposed Erdogan and stood against him, thus, they have become the main target of the AKP government. They have experienced the most severe persecution and demonization by the AKP regime. According to Political Islamists, everything is permissible in the way of achieving the desired target. In order to obtain absolute power, they justify any form of injustice and persecution. The political Islamists deem it permissible to throw the gravest possible slanders against their opponents to get public approval for their injustices and persecutions. They believe that they can rightfully loot the properties of their enemies and take their wives as concubines on the basis of their distorted interpretation of Islam. This ideology is a

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nihilist in nature which is closer to Machiavellianism rather than Islamic values. Many Muslim scholars, the Diyanet and religious groups in Turkey have supported Erdogan and the AKP in their fight against the Gülen movement. Although, Islam never allows anyone to victimize innocent people including mothers and children political Islamists of Turkey have abused the true message of Islam due to their hunger for power. Since 2013, the AKP regime under the rule of Erdogan has ruined the lives of more than 530,000 Turkish citizens, Kurds, Alevis, secularists, leftists, journalists, academics, and participants of Hizmet.22 The government tried to legitimize abduction, torture, and death in detention based on its extreme ideology. Justice, equality, and freedom are some of the basic principles of Islam which can be provided by the balancing state powers with individual rights, the separation of powers, judicial independence, and press freedom. In order to secure human rights for all, extremism, polarization, discrimination, politicization of religion, and veneration of any leader must be avoided. However, Political Islamists polarized the Turkish citizens and demonized their opponents including the Gülen movement. They violated basic human rights to obtain executive presidency without checks and balances. Currently, Erdogan is the executive president who controls all governmental, judicial, and legislative powers like an Ottoman Sultan. 6.1.5  Caliphate The advent of the twenty-first century has seen the establishment of many varied initiatives, all in attempt to reestablish the concept of a caliphate, however many of these have been short-lived and have received little support. Gradually, with the declining influence of terrorist organizations, the debate has almost lost its significance. This was until more recently, when the political Islamists of Turkey reignited the discussion through their claims of leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the rightful caliph of Muslims, inviting all Muslims to give him their pledge of allegiance. According to the Arabic lexicon, khilāfa (caliphate) literally means taking the position of others in order to perform the legal and religious rights behalf on them.23 In the Qur’an it is also used in the meaning of being a vicegerent on earth.24 According to the Qur’an, every person

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on Earth is a caliph of God. In order to honor humankind, God made human beings vicegerent on Earth. The word caliph is used in the meaning of successor in the Qur’an.25 According to this definition each generation is khalif (caliph, successor) of the previous one. The word ikhtilāf literally means dispute or disagreement is derived from the same word as khilāfa (caliphate). This word alludes that each person is different than others in regards to thoughts, emotions, characters, and worldviews. The first ruler for Muslims in Islamic history was Prophet Muhammad. During the first 13 years of revelation, he carried out the mission of Messengership by inviting people to Islamic belief in Makkah. In the second part of revelation which covers 10 years in Medina, Prophet Muhammad took the responsibilities of a political leader as he became the head of the state for a cosmopolitan society. The community of Jews, pagan Arabs, and Muslims accepted him as their leader and ruler. During the Medina period, Prophet Muhammad performed two missions: receiving revelation from God and teaching it to his followers and ruling the people of Medina.26 In short, he had religious and political positions during 10 years in Medina. In Islam, Prophet Muhammad is the Seal of the Prophets27 and no one can take the place of the Prophet in his position as the Messenger of God. However, his position as a ruler can be represented by other Muslims. The rulers of Muslims who came after the Prophet represented the Prophet in his status as a ruler but not as a religious authority. Some western scholars assume that the caliph possessed Prophet Muhammad’s authority28 but, this is not true. First of all, caliphs or any other person do not have access to divine revelation, thus, they don’t have the authority which requires absolute obedience. Moreover, there is no evidence in the Qur’an or in Sunnah that caliphs can be regarded as the representors of the Prophet. Caliphs were the rulers who came after the Prophet to govern the Muslim societies. Islam does not require the religious leader (imam) to be also a political ruler. It does not have a specific legal system; rather it has general principles, higher objectives, and guidelines. They are interpreted and applied according to the needs of Muslims. In the Qur’an and Sunnah, the statements that regulate the legal aspect of Islam are very limited. This fact indicates that God made human beings His vicegerent and gave them authority to interpret the religious texts (including Sunnah). Therefore, Muslim jurists are required to interpret the primary Islamic sources in line with universal values and human rights. Indeed, Islamic

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Civilization can be defined as a civilization of fiqh (jurisprudence) which law overrides all that precedes it, making fiqh a highly autonomous body of knowledge. Jurists and Muslim scholars give a religious legitimacy to political power. Muslims in the time of the Prophet would check the two sources namely the Qur’an and Sunnah for their questions and they would be satisfied by them. However, after the death of the Prophet Muslims faced many religious and political problems. Islamic sources give enough guidance to individuals including rulers to be just and to provide justice among all citizens. However, they have very little to say on matters of government and the state. Thus, the form of government, the status of rulers and governmental institutions are the problems that Muslims have been struggling to solve throughout their history. Indeed, the first serious problem among Muslims was the politics which led to the eventual division into Sunnis, Kharijites, Shi’is, and other sects.29 Initially, the expanding conquests and the imposition of poll taxes (jizya) on the non-Muslims of the conquered lands had provided financial incomes and military/administrative positions for the Muslims. However, during the time of ‘Umar, the influx of Muslims from Arabia to the conquered lands had become so rapid and so extensive that not all new Muslims could be put on the register (diwan) for regular payment.30 Thus, frustrated groups such as the Kharijites were to form the first religiopolitical opposition movement against the state. It was the social and political exclusion of such communities that eventually led to the emergence of the second major religiopolitical opposition movement against the State, that of the Shi’as.31 Interestingly, the Kharijites and the Shia attempted to use religious arguments to shed doubt on the legitimacy of the government and the rulers.32 Thereupon, Muslim scholars developed the idea of Islamic state and the caliph which all citizens must obey as a counterargument. In other words, jurists and Muslim scholars produced writings with the intention of conferring religious legitimacy on the political rulers. It was a response to a growing political and financial crisis of the state. The notion of tawhid (oneness of God) is important in caliphate. According to this doctrine, all sovereignty belongs to God alone. However, there is a difference between the real authority and the enforcing authority. The enforcing authority is recognized by the consensus of the Muslim community and the ruler or governor practice his/ her authority according to Islamic principles such as justice and equality.

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However, over time the religious concept tawhid (oneness, monotheism) was gradually transformed into a concept of unique, supreme, and absolute power of the ruler. In other words, religious authority is eventually transposed into political authority in which the ruler possessed unrestricted power. The ruler or Sultan owns everything, is capable of everything, and there can be no questioning of his decisions and orders. After continuous success in elections the AKP evolved from a broad coalition into one-man rule. Erdogan is the only leader who could exercise any real power in the party as well as in the state. To ensure his extraordinary power he worked with key figures in the media, in politics, and trade. He consolidated his caliphate through technocrats whose loyalties were not to the party, but to Erdogan directly and personally. Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies have surfaced by abandoning the reform processes in line with European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Union (EU) norms. He blocked the legal and legislative steps which were necessary concerning the state’s transparency and accountability. Erdogan has strong desire to be the caliph of Muslims. In order to convince all Muslims, he often uses religious concepts in his political recourse. With his leadership skills Erdogan has started to unite religious groups under his political authority. He aims to destroy all religious groups who do not support his caliphate. He wants to make sure no one challenges his authority. In this regard, the AKP regime has put tens of thousands of people in prison to intimidate all opponents. The establishment of caliphate by Political Islamists of Turkey has been shaped around Erdogan by using key words to define him as “master”, “leader”, “strong will”, “tall man”, “chief”, and “the president of the people”, “commander in chief”, “leader of the Muslim World” and “the hope of the ummah.”33 Erdogan is driven by the authoritarian logic of a top-down imposition of power. He understands caliphate as extraordinary power which is uncontrolled, unrestricted, unquestioned, and unchallenged. He promotes his authoritarian tendency as the Muslim world needs a superpowerful caliphate that can unite Muslims under his banner and protect Muslims against the west and the United States. There has been an intensifying force of hostility in the policies of AKP, both domestic and foreign, toward America and the west. Obviously, Erdogan has attracted many Muslims into his ranks, because, colonization and occupation of Muslim lands have caused people to expect a leader who can save them. Consequently, Erdogan simply offered himself as the savior of Muslims.

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Political Islamists use some Quranic arguments to support Erdogan’s caliphate such as, “O you who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those from among you who are invested with authority…”34 The Arabic word ulu’l amr translates to those who are invested with authority, is understood by political Islamists as the ruler whom all Muslims must obey. Contrasting their interpretations on the matter, the Qur’an states that all public duties and positions are given to those who are qualified, but not to those who are corrupt and oppressive. 6.1.6   Muslim Nation (Umma) Political Islamists give a primary importance to the idea of united umma (nation). They believe that they are the only heir of the Ottoman Empire, thus, Turkey has the capacity to unite all Muslim countries under the leadership of Erdogan. They promote Erdogan as the only caliph of Muslims who can unite them all under his leadership. The first step toward the declaration of caliphate in Erdogan’s person is obtaining absolute power in Turkey. Thus, they advocate a powerful presidency system. Indeed, they have achieved their goal by winning the presidential referendum in 2018 in Turkey. Earlier, the shift to emergency rule under the outspoken president after the mysterious coup attempt in 2016 afforded Erdogan the extraordinary powers.35 Since the last three years, Erdogan has been acting as an Ottoman Sultan who has extraordinary powers which cannot be unquestioned. Political Islamists of Turkey (the AKP) champions the idea that Muslims must be united politically under the leadership of Erdogan. They argue that when united under the banner of AKP, Muslims can establish an Islamic government which is governed by the Sharia. They promote the idea that Muslims all together should constantly work for the interests of the umma because, Muslim community (umma) has been facing severe opposition from the west and other non-Muslims. Political Islamists blame all other Muslims as blind imitators of the West while they alone stand for the truth. They claim that they convey the true message of God while other Muslims serve for the interest of the west. They even believe that it is a religious obligation to support the AKP in public elections. Erdogan often calls Muslims to be united against the United States, Israel, and Western powers to prevent their heinous plan of destroying the Islamic world.36 At this point, he suggests himself as the leader who

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can achieve this and therefore Muslims should be united around him. Within the climate of “us vs. them” dichotomy, Erdogan simply offers himself as the savior of Muslims. Political Islamists support Erdogan by stating that in order to stop all of the injustices of the superpowers against Muslims, it is a religious duty to listen to Erdogan and be united under his authority.37 Before the referendum on the amendment of Turkey’s Constitution held on April 16, 2017, which opened the way for Erdogan to become a superpowerful president, Political Islamists publicly stated that a “yes vote is an Islamic obligation.”38 The radical approach of Erdogan in his politics and leadership has been affecting Muslims negatively all over the world. Under the leadership of Erdogan, Political Islamists have been supporting Muslims in Europe in establishing their own political parties. Across Europe, Muslims who have been inspired by Erdogan have established their own political parties such as the DENK party in the Netherlands, the Equality and Justice Party (PEJ) in France, and the NBZ Party in Austria.39 Erdogan is able to influence Europe through controlling and leading its Muslim population. For example, the Equality and Justice Party (PEJ) is Erdogan’s long arm in France, the NBZ Party, which gives Turks a voice in politics across Austria, supports Erdogan publicly and the Netherland’s DENK party has been accused of being a mouthpiece of Erdogan.40 Political Islamists invite all Muslims to work for the interests of the ummah (Muslim Nation) because it has been facing severe opposition from the west and non-Muslims.41 Outside of the Arabian Peninsula, the ideas of political Islam have made their way and are targeting Muslims in countries where they constitute as minorities. Such is the case in India, where the Hindu identity is moving toward being the national identity, leaving the Muslim population more susceptible to accepting ideas of pan-Islamism. The technological advancement of the modern era further accelerates this expansion of support, allowing those not near the Middle Eastern region to connect to and appreciate the notion of a global caliphate by submitting with a virtual following. This particularly has an impact when vulnerable youth in Western countries, disconnected from the general population, find refuge in the idea of being part of a state that cements their religious identity and joins them with other individuals, diasporic or otherwise, in furthering the cause of political Islam.

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6.1.7   Islamic State and the Shariah Political Islamists argue that Islam has a specific theory on politics and the state. They invoke the religious texts and certain historical precedents of Islamic government to prove the idea of establishing Islamic state. Moreover, they want to preserve the close link between religion and politics in which the traditional jurisprudence had developed. They maintain that religion and politics cannot be separated for together, they create the notion of Islamic state. The ideology of political Islam aims to establish a real link between politics and religion. Although Political Islamists argue that politics is subservient to religion, they often use religion for their political agendas. In other words, religion and its concepts are used by them to achieve their political targets. Islam is indeed a religion which provides guidelines, principles, and good manners for all people. However, there is very little in the Qur’an and Sunnah on how to form the state, run the government, and manage the state institutions. The Qur’an does not stipulate a specific form for the government, nor does the Sunnah. Indeed, Islam emerged in a tribal society where the Prophet established the multi-faith and multicultural state in Medina. All citizens were accepted as one body which would act collectively in enforcing social order and security, and in confronting enemies in times of war and peace. The Prophet did not exclude non-Muslims and multiple religious communities from the state. Many governments in Muslim countries are badly in need of reform. Especially, in the Middle East dictatorships and monarchies have failed to bring peace to citizens and recognize their rights. Political Islamists try to articulate their ideology in response to society’s current political, economic, and cultural problems. They argue that Islam is a divine system which can be used anywhere and anytime. It is superior to other political systems with its ability that responds to all human problems. However, interpreting Islam and its sources according to time and conditions require a group of scholars (mujtahids) who can produce realistic solutions. Otherwise, this claim remains as a political slogan used to attract votes from Muslim society. Establishing an Islamic state is mixed with a call for a return to the Shariah. Many extreme groups use the concept Shariah to convince Muslims in their cause. Moreover, the ideal of the Shariah invokes the core idea of law in terms that resonate deeply with the Islamic past. Thus,

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Islamic state is preeminently the Shariah state, defined by its commitment to a vision of legal order.42 However, the very word Shariah conjures images of social control through severe criminal punishment and because of this image, majority of Muslims do not support extreme groups. The call for an Islamic state is the call for the establishment of Islamic law. Many people in the Muslim world are attracted to Islamic politics for they see that power, not law, is structuring political, economic, and social relations. In the collective memory of the Muslim world, Islamic law seems to be a solution for Muslims. However, the law which they refer to is related to the time of Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims. Today, Muslims have new problems and challenges. It is very difficult to answer the question that in the modern world how an old law brings solution for contemporary Muslims. Nevertheless, extremists and Political Islamists advocate the idea of Islamic state as a solution for the problems of Muslims. But they do not clearly explain how their understanding of Islam could offer solutions for deep problems of political dysfunction and economic stagnation. The idea of establishing an Islamic state looks attractive today to Muslims who have been persecuted by internal tyrannical regimes and by the west. The hope for a better future in terms of religious freedom, expression of Muslim identity, and other human rights are used by extreme groups and politicians in their political agendas. They get support from laymen by promising more freedom and unrestricted Islamic life. But, in reality, the idea of establishing an Islamic state is baseless argument. Because, in the Qur’an and Sunnah it is ordered that the state must be just. Moreover, the Prophet ruled in the cosmopolitan state where Muslims and non-Muslims enjoyed equal treatment. So, Political Islamists have been exploiting religious concepts to recruit new members for their cause. Indeed, when political Islamists call for the establishment of an Islamic state, they refer to a restrict ruling system in which the caliph is oppressing citizens and violating their rights.

6.2  The Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey) Although the Turkish government is secular, religion and state are not separated from each other clearly. The Turkish state has made control of religious affairs a priority. It controls religion through state institutions.

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The mechanism for the monitoring of religion in the state is similar to the Ottoman office of Sheikh al-Islam. The Turkish state controls religious affairs through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanliği). The state institution reports to the prime minister and it has a budget larger than that of most ministries. Thus, Turkey has never experienced the “separation of religion and state” in an Anglo-Saxon sense. There are approximately 80,000 mosques in Turkey and through administering them, the Diyanet delivers religious knowledge to people. All imams in Turkey are appointed by the Diyanet. Religious Affairs High Board members are selected from professors of theology, muftis, and heads of the department within Diyanet. They issue high-level decisions and fatwas. In order to organize Turks abroad and meet their religious needs, the Diyanet sends imams to Europe, the United States, Australia, and other countries (overall in 34 countries) where Turkish mosques are present. Under the AKP rule, the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) has grown significantly. In less than a decade its budget has enormously increased amounting to more than $2 billion. The institution employs over 120,000 people. This makes it one of Turkey’s largest state institutions. The Diyanet is increasingly staffed by graduates of Imam Hatip (religious high school) schools and the divinity faculties. The Diyanet supervises the muftis (clergy) and religious scholars who give legal opinions (fatwa). All muftis and imams who are educated in the Imam Hatip schools, state religious education institutions, and theology faculties are state employees. The Diyanet determines the content of Islamic preaching and Friday sermons by organizing monthly meetings with muftis, imams, and preachers. Imams read written Friday sermons which are prepared by the Diyanet. Religious life and faith groups in Turkey are diverse, despite the common Islamist slogan of a 99% Muslim country. There are approximately 15 million of Alevis, the Jafar’i (Twelver) Shi’a, the Nusayri, and Kurds who follow the Shāfi’ī (one of the major Sunni sects). Near 40% of the population in Turkey is not Hanafi Sunni Muslims, yet the Diyanet acts as if Turkey has a homogenous Sunni Hanafi Islam. Ironically, the Diyanet sends imams to places where people do not practice the Hanafi version of Islam. Hence, they call for prayers but no one goes to Mosques. There is not a dedicated branch of government for other Islamic sects or different faith groups. The institution has no responsibility for services to the country’s religious minorities.

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The AKP has been using the Diyanet as its religious base. Most of its investments have been made in this institution. For example, Erdogan himself appointed Mehmet Görmez, the ex-head of Diyanet, and in return, he publicly supported the AKP, especially during election times. For the ongoing success of AKP in elections, the Diyanet has an enormous role to play for it urges people to vote for this party as a religious requirement. Shortly before the local elections in April 2014, Imams gave open support to the party and its policies. In Friday sermons cabled out to thousands of mosques across Turkey, imams provided implicit support for the Twitter and YouTube bans that the AKP imposed.43 In early 2015, they criticized anti-government tweets in their sermons.44 On June 6, 2015, the day before the parliamentary election, imams in a number of mosques across Turkey urged their community not to vote for “certain parties” but for “Muslims.” The role of Diyanet in Turkey is considerably big. Hence, the state is under the control of political Islam the Diyanet has become a handy tool for the propagation of its ideology. It has been supporting the AKP and its policies. This has contributed to the radicalization process of Turkish youth. It is no surprise that 15% of Turkish-Muslims now have sympathy toward extreme terrorist groups. Mehmet Gormez, the ex-head of Diyanet, contributed to this process by his extreme talks. For example, he called the pope “immoral” over his stance on the Armenian genocide,45 he stated Hagia Sophia is not a church, not a museum, but the sanctuary of Mehmet the Conqueror and all Muslims46 and he also called for the “liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque from Israel.”47 In recent years, imams functioned as the party members. They encouraged people by using religious concepts and arguments to vote for Erdogan. They declared opponents as infidels, agents of the west or the ones who betrayed their country. Indeed, Erdogan has taken the Diyanet under his direct control through the Foundation of Youth and Education in Turkey, which is run by his son Bilal. This foundation accepts donations on a voluntary basis which includes a $99 million donation from a Saudi source. Moreover, the foundation openly requests businessmen to give donations. Political Islam is now the official Islam in Turkey under the rule of AKP. By controlling religious affairs and the education system from the mosque to the classroom, Erdogan and the AKP intend to shape religious life and opinion in Turkey. If radical Islam, extremism, and support for ISIS terrorist group have recently increased in Turkey, Political

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Islamists have played a significant role in that. The anti-West and the anti-American slogans have increased significantly. The Diyanet takes an active part in spreading the ideology of AKP among Muslims. 6.2.1   The Diyanet’s Support for the Extreme Ideology of AKP The Diyanet functions as an institution which aims to protect the state and society from undesirable faith-based ideologies. It works to achieve national solidarity and integrity. It propagates the TurkishIslamic Synthesis in Turkey and abroad, especially in countries with high Turkish immigrant populations. Since the early 1980s, the Diyanet has sent imams to the United States, Europe, Australia, and the Balkans to avoid the influence of radical Islamic movements on Turkish-Muslims, and to keep them loyal to the Turkish state. Although the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) is supposed to provide management of religion free from any political preference it has become a fundamental state apparatus which serve in the best interest of Erdogan who is the leader of Political Islamists. It has lost its freedom by giving fatwas (religious verdicts) in line with the political aims of the AKP instead of following Islamic principles and objectives. It has taken the responsibility of enforcing the ruling party’s particular ideology, both at home and abroad. The Diyanet has budget over $2 billion, and it employs almost 120,000 people, making it one of Turkey’s largest state agencies. The Institution has its own TV channel which broadcasts programs mostly impose the AKP’s policies. Since 2012, it has been producing fatwas on demand with a free telephone hotline service on everyday matters. The Diyanet has involved in daily life practices by answering ordinary questions. It openly supports Erdogan and the AKP by utilizing Friday sermons. For example, before the June 2015 parliamentary election, a number of imams urged people to vote for Muslims which they were directly referring to the AKP. The Diyanet has evolved into a state apparatus which regulate and shape public opinions according to the AKP’s ideology and its daily politics. It is in this context, the Diyanet has become one of the most politicized and disputed ideological tools of the state. Its ideology and interpretation of religion have become increasingly synchronized with the ideology of Erdogan and the AKP. The AKP regime has been controlling the Diyanet as its own ideological state apparatus and political

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imposer in a wide range of social and political spheres.48 The Diyanet now takes active role in public discussions in Turkey on all matters of political and social nature. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez, the ex-Chairman of Diyanet frequently addressed the media about a great variety of issues according to the ideology of Political Islamists. The Diyanet, the highest authority on religion, supplies social and religious legislation for the AKP. There is conformity between the ruling party’s daily agenda and the Diyanet’s discourses. On May 28, 2012, Erdogan addressed the women’s branches of his party and told them that he was against abortion. However, this statement was not simply about explaining his opinion on this matter rather it was about diverting the political debate to another topic. The reason for this was during that time, Turkish Air Force bombed a village called Uludere on the Iraqi border, which killed 34 civilians49 and this caused protests all around the country. In this difficult position, Erdogan aimed to change public attention and the Diyanet helped him on this matter. In this regard, Görmez told the country that a mother should never give any decision about abortion, which is absolutely an assassination, because a mother is only a carrier.50 By his statement, Görmez, the ex-chairman of Diyanet, diverted attention from politically contentious issues to an empty debate that would otherwise occupy very little media space. The Diyanet often supported Erdogan’s controversial statements on gender-related issues and women rights. In a speech on May 24, 2014, Erdogan said that our religion granted women the position of motherhood. But you cannot express this to the feminists who deny motherhood.51 The Diyanet supported Erdogan by stating that feminism is indecency and it contradicts our religion.52 When 120 workers were fired because of their membership to an industrial union they shouted slogans targeting Erdogan. Thereupon, the Diyanet said that striking is a sin.53 It has become a routine to find the Diyanet in a supportive position of the AKP and Political Islamists during controversial issues. Not only the headquarters of the Diyanet supports the AKP’s policies, but local branches give normative support as well. During the conflict between Political Islamists (the AKP) and the Gülen movement, the Diyanet publicly supported Erdogan. Especially, after the December 17–25, 2013, corruption investigation, the Diyanet publicly supported the AKP regime. During the investigation, Erdogan

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argued that the movement tried to carry out a civil coup against the AKP government through judicial investigation. Moreover, he blamed the Gülen movement as an illegal movement working against the elected government and the state. In May 2015, Görmez stated that the Hizmet movement desired to manipulate not only in the state’s structure, but also Islamic teachings. Thus, one of the main roles of the Diyanet is to act together with our nation, our government, and our state, and without any doubt it will play its role.54 Obviously, the Diyanet took side with Political Islamists in their fight against the movement and utilized its religious authority to support them. After the Gezi Protests and the corruption investigations in 2013, Erdogan perceived the social media as one of the biggest enemies of his political power. In this context, he blocked dozens of websites and social media including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. He vowed to eradicate Twitter. At this point, the Diyanet supported Erdogan by holding forum entitled “Social Media and the Family in the Context of Privacy.” In this forum, Görmez stated that every kind of lies, imposture, defamation, humiliation, and gossip in social media damage humanity and thus they should be restricted. This was a significant example of ideological harmony between the Diyanet and Political Islamists. During the coup attempt, the Diyanet played a role more significant than any other state institution. First, Görmez issued an order to all imams of the Turkish Republic to stay in their mosques and call people to streets by specific words named sala. Imams periodically called the sala and made announcements to the public informing them where to assemble and encouraged them to be courageous. Second, Diyanet declared that none of the imams provide Islamic funeral services to coup suspects. Third, Görmez, the ex-head of Diyanet, declared Fethullah Gülen as the head of terrorist organization as Erdogan dictated him. When we analyze the behavior of the Diyanet, we come to the conclusion that using its religious authority, it supports and legitimizes the discourses and actions of Political Islamists under the rule of Erdogan. It diverts the public discussion when Erdogan and the AKP experience pressure and difficult conditions. By doing so, the Diyanet relieves Political Islamists from public pressure. It suppresses all opposition and protests against the AKP regime; simply because the Diyanet has aligned itself with the ideology of Erdogan, as the de facto ruler of the country.

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6.3  Excommunication (Takfir) Against Opponents Extremism and radicalism are destructive diseases and chronic illnesses. If a person is affected with these diseases, they isolate themselves. They are inclined to violence and terrorism. Openness is an effective way to reduce the extremism of individual selfishness. Through discussions and listening other opinions individuals notice their extreme sides. They learn higher values that open up debate, discussion, compromise, and relationships. Self-criticism and control pave the way for healthy thinking. Excommunication of others is related to the artificial literal reading of the Quranic verses and sunnah. Extremists are lack of understanding of the true indications, meanings, and aims of Islamic sources. The erroneous interpretation of the religious texts is basis of extremism for political Islamists. Moreover, so-called scholars who support politicians for worldly benefits make the extremism of political Islamists worse. Because, by their extreme fatwas they deem violence in all of its forms against opponents are acceptable. Excommunication used by extremists has been accompanied by aggression toward other people. The concept is often used by terrorist groups who consider themselves guardians of religion. There are many reasons such as political, social, economic, cultural, educational, and psychological which cause the excommunication to be used by extremists. The excommunicated groups are excluded from the rest of the community and discriminated against desired opportunities like jobs, schools, and other social places.55 The Diyanet, a religious institution which is supposed to speak according to criteria of the Qur’an and Sunnah, has become the political tool of Erdogan and Political Islamists. Muslims are required to arrange their words, acts, and lives according to essential principles of Islam. One of the basic principles of Islam is that it is not permissible to declare a Muslim group as a deviated sect. Moreover, it is strongly prohibited to declare any Muslim as apostate or infidel. Although people from Gülen movement have never resorted to violence or terror, even when they were persecuted by Political Islamists so heavily, Erdogan declared Gülen and his sympathizers a terrorist group. In order to support his extreme opinion, Mehmet Gormez, the ex-head of Diyanet, declared the Gülen Movement as deviated sect and millions of its followers as apostates and infidels.56 There is a strong similarity between the terrorist groups such as ISIS and the Diyanet with regards to labeling other Muslims as infidels and

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then legitimizing all kinds of injustices against them. Under the rule of Political Islamists, the Diyanet has become more radical and extreme. By interpreting the Islamic sources according to demands of Political Islamists, the Diyanet only contributes the radicalization process of Turkish people and worsens the problem. Currently, too much polarization, hatred, enmity, and divisions among people in Turkey and there seems no solution for it in the near future. At this stage, the Diyanet takes active part to spread enmity among the different segments of Turkish society by misinterpreting the religious sources and supporting violence by their extreme fatwas. In order to evaluate the issue from main principles of Islam some concepts will be discussed here. The Arabic word “kufr” refers to disbelief and “takfir” refers to excommunication of a person or a group by labeling them with disbelief.57 If a person rejects or denies the articles of the Islamic faith altogether or just one of them, he or she becomes “kāfir” (disbeliever).58 However, if he/she does not carry out his or her religious obligations this does not make him/her unbeliever.59 In the Qur’an, “īmān” (faith) and “‘amal” (practice) are used together to emphasize the notion that a person can only be a perfect believer by having both parts in his or her daily life.60 Nevertheless, the Qur’an does not label Muslims who do not practice Islamic rulings as “unbelievers”; rather, it calls them sinners.61 This indicates that a person remains as a Muslim as long as he or she does not deny or reject any article of the Islamic faith even if he or she does not practice the Islamic rulings.62 Indeed, Prophet Muhammad warned Muslims with a strong emphasis by saying that whoever attributes kufr (disbelief) to a Muslim, he is like his murderer.63 He also stated that no one accuses another Muslim of being a kāfir, but it reflects back to him if the other is not a disbeliever as he called him.64 In Islamic history, the Kharijite, the extreme sect which emerged in the time of Ali ibn Abi Tālib, the fourth caliph of Islam (656–61) declared Caliph Ali and other Muslims with disbelief and then killed them brutally.65 According to their extreme mentality, kufr (disbelief) is a crime for which bloodshed is its due punishment. It can be said that the usage of excommunication is strongly related to extremism and there have been many extremists who have used it to justify their violence. In order to evaluate any movement objectively it is necessary to know such movement’s words, actions, and ideology from past to present. The books, speeches, and acts of the people from this movement must be taken into consideration as a whole before declaring them as infidels

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or a deviated sect. It is not objective to judge a movement on the basis of political views. Especially, when it is done by the head of Directorate of Religious Affairs it is worse for it leads ignorant masses to violence against the movement. If such accusation is directed to the movement which has millions of followers it becomes more dangerous because by excommunicating the Gülen movement the Diyanet has made millions of people victims of violence. Followers of the Gülen movement have been known as moderate Muslims for many decades. They have been serving in 170 countries to promote peace, harmony, and mutual understanding. They worked very hard to raise a generation of moderate Muslims in Turkey. And they succeeded in producing a new generation who were well educated and refrained from all forms of radicalism and extremism. Gülen has produced more than 70 books in his native Turkish and most of them are translated into many world languages, including English.66 Many academics have been working on his books and ideas and the Hizmet movement in general.67 Some universities in various places in the world have opened chairs dedicated to his name. Although there was not any convincing evidence to prove that the followers of the movement were disbelievers Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) accused them with heresy based on political motives. Opposing Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate, many Muslim scholars from all over the world described Gülen movement and its followers as moderate Muslims. For instance, Prof. Abd al-Razzaq Gassum, the head of Scholars’ Union in Algeria, professors Muhammad Nur Khalid and Ahmad Muqri from Nigeria, Prof. Fathi Hijazi from Egypt, Tahir Fal from Senegal, Prof. Osman Garib from Iraq and Cubak Calilov, the mufti of Kirgizstan, they all put their emphasis on one point: the Hizmet Movement is a moderate Islamic group which promotes peace, love, mercy, respect, and universal human values; thus, it is a grave sin to accuse this movement with heresy.68 Indeed, one of Gülen’s books, “Essentials of Islamic Faith” is alone enough of an evidence to prove his sound Islamic belief and to show him as a moderate Sunni scholar. When examining his books, articles, and speeches it is clearly seen that he is a Sunni Muslim who advocates a moderate way which is far from any form of extremism. He follows the path of Ahli Sunna when answering questions related to Islamic belief, worship, practice, and social relations. The primary sources which shape his worldview are the Qur’an, Sunnah, and opinions of moderate Sunni scholars.

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In his talks, books, and articles he explains the necessity of practicing Islam as the Prophet and the Companions practiced to protect Muslims from extreme views and ideologies. In this regard, Gülen always takes a clear opposition against violence and terror. He argues that Muslims never approve of any terrorist activity, and that terror has no place in a quest to achieve independence or salvation as it takes the lives of innocent people.69 Gülen has repeatedly stated that “a real Muslim who understood Islam in every aspect could not be a terrorist.”70 He stressed on the fact that terrorism must be condemned without any excuses. He even labeled the suicide bombers as the companions of hellfire. Gülen sees radical groups as a real threat for the entire world, and therefore openly rejects their claims on the basis of primary Islamic sources. Gülen explained his views about ISIS and it was published in New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times on August 22, 2014: I deplore the brutal atrocities being committed by the ISIS terrorist group hiding behind a false religious rhetoric and join the people of conscience from around the world in calling for these perpetrators to immediately cease their cruel and inhuman acts. Any form of attack, suppression or persecution of minorities or innocent civilians is an act that contradicts the principles of the Qur’an and the tradition of our Prophet upon whom be peace and blessings. ISIS members are either completely ignorant of the spirit of Islam and its blessed messenger, or their actions are designed to serve their individual interests or those of their political masters. Regardless, their actions represent those of a terrorist group and they should be labeled as such and be brought to justice.71

Gülen published a strong condemnation message when the September 11 terror attack happened in the United States. He deemed the terror attack as the most bloody, condemnable one, and an assault against world peace as well as against universal democratic and humanistic values.72 He stated that those who perpetrated this atrocity can only be considered as being the most brutal people in the world.73 He argues that killing a human is an act that is equal in gravity to not believing in God, therefore no one can give a fatwa (a legal pronouncement in Islam, issued by a religious law specialist, concerning a specific issue) in this matter. In his view, Islam has always respected different ideas but some religious leaders have misinterpreted Islam and misled ignorant people.

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He stresses upon the true methods to attain faith and he states that, just as a goal must be legitimate, so must be all the means employed to reach that goal. He holds that one cannot achieve heaven by murdering another person. Gülen believes that life is a sacred trust and it is necessary to protect all living beings. His view on life and its value can be understood better from his following statements: In my lifetime, I have never deliberately and knowingly stepped on even an ant. I did not see or speak to a friend of mine for months, for breaking the backbone of a snake. I have believed in the rights of every living being, that all of them have a place in the ecosystem. I have stated that we have no right or authority to harm a living being. It is a fact that the most honorable and most sacred of all creatures is the human being. I have repeatedly stated that those who murder under these pretexts or intentions cannot enter Paradise, and cannot be considered Muslims. This is not my personal opinion. It is the voice, expression, and breath of the ethos of Islam; this belief is part of our nature.74

Gülen concludes that considering the life of humankind is the most honorable, Islam regulated many rulings to protect it against any kind of violence and harm. In order to support his view, he brings the statement of the famous Quranic exegete ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbas; for him, the repentance of those who kill a believer purposefully will be denied, and they will be doomed to eternal Hell.75 Although the AKP and Erdogan accused Gülen with the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, he strongly rejected such accusation on many platforms. Indeed, when Political Islamists usurped the most essential rights of the followers of the movement, they did not resort to armed struggle even they realized that there was no hope to gain their rights through lawful means. This is mainly related to their understanding of Islam; it is not permissible to revolt against the ruler even if he is oppressor, tyrant, and wrongdoer, because, armed struggle against the state causes more injustice, wrongdoings, corruption, and turmoil in society.76 Political Islamists of Turkey distorted Islam by their extreme interpretation. The wrongness in their ideology has revealed itself in their practice. They have applied all kind of persecution, torture, and human right violations against their opponents on the basis of their extreme ideology. In order to legitimize their violence against their opponents in the eyes of general public they have been using “takfir” (excommunication)

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against Muslims who do not recognize Erdogan as the caliph of Muslims. Political Islamists claim that by disobeying Erdogan, the caliph of Muslims, the followers of Hizmet have abandoned the fold of Islam. This mentality is not different than the extreme ideology of ISIS, al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Indeed, the ideology of political Islam is much more dangerous, because, it finds more supporters all around the globe. I predict that the world will have to fight against the extreme mentality of political Islamists in near future. Fethullah Gülen and the movement have started their fight against Political Islamists early, thus, they have been persecuted, tortured, and deprived from their most basic human rights.

6.4  Education System One of the biggest problems that Islamic world has been facing is unhealthy education system. Education has a pivotal role to fight extremism. The adoption of radicalism and extremism are strongly related to the education type which individuals have been raised. If the culture is rigid due to the education system there is no doubt it will lead people to exclusion and extremism. These people will see themselves as the only ones who possess absolute truth and others as deviated and unbelievers. Thus, moderate Islamic education is a must to fight extremism and prevent individuals from labeling others as unbelievers and apostates. In this education, people are equipped with a moderate understanding of the Islamic teachings. In order to keep Muslims away from extremism and terrorism the education system should include good values such as compassion, tolerance, love of others, observance of the rights of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, peace, cooperation, and mercy. It should also teach its members to avoid injustice and aggression, to observe objectivity while in power, and others that support and reinforce security and justice in communities. These virtues and values must be taught from the very primary levels of education through to university levels. The AKP government has dismantled the education reforms of the late 1990s and introduced new reforms to Islamize Turkey’s education system. The reforms turned religious schools from a selective option to a central institution in the education system. All students who do not qualify for other schools would have no choice but to enroll in religious schools. Erdogan’s son Bilal is responsible for the Türgev foundation

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that is in charge of the expansion of the Imam Hatip schools. The Imam Hatip schools which provide training for imams and preachers in Turkey’s mosques have become the voter base for political Islamists. The AKP regime has undertaken major reforms to Islamize every sector of Turkey’s education system. The amount of compulsory religious education in schools has been increased. The AKP government has supported Imam Hatip schools where students are educated by the ideology of political Islam. The number of students enrolled in these schools was 65,000 in 2002, but in recent years this number is over one million. The students in these schools have strong relations with the Foundation of Youth and Education run by Bilal (son of Erdogan), thus, they actively support the AKP. Political Islamists support Imam Hatip schools in order to diminish the influence of the Hizmet movement on Turkish society. Because, students who are educated by Gülen schools are not supportive of the ideology of political Islam. The education system which political Islamists has regulated is lack of moderate Islamic understanding. It does not train people on the applicable behaviors in social circumstances of psychological anger, rage, and resistance to extremism. In recent years, the support for terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida have been increased among Turkish citizens due to the education style which the AKP government applying. A rigid form of Islam in education system has led individuals to be exclusive and inclined toward extremism.

6.5  Terrorism, Extremism, and Radicalism Political Islamists believe that jihad is incumbent on all Muslims to defend the caliph, Islamic lands, and religious values. They publicly blame Christianity and Judaism for corrupting the world and straying from the true path. Moreover, they label Muslims who oppose their ideology as foreign spies, betrayers, enemies, and apostates. There are strong allegations that Erdogan supports Salafi radical terrorist organizations. It is argued that terrorist groups such as IS or ISIS, al-Qaida, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab are buying weapons from Turkey. It is not secret that Turkey opens its borders to terrorist organizations for recruitment, flow of gun, treatment of militants, logistics, and IS’s petroleum. This is a serious threat to the global peace. The AKP government supported radical terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq by smuggling IS oil to Turkey, arming jihadi groups, allowing

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IS’s recruitment and training activities in the country.77 IS or ISIS militants used Turkish border to enter Syria. The US Senator Richard Black argued that Turkey supported terrorists in Syria, not only by sending thousands of trucks loaded with weapons, but also by providing logistical, financial, and intelligence support for them.78 He also stated that Turkey supported terrorists from diverse nationalities coming from different parts of the world on the basis of the notion of jihad. Turkish Airlines smuggled weapons to non-state actors in Nigeria where Boko Haram, a radical terrorist organization is the major rebel group.79 On November 24, 2015, Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian bomber aircraft during its mission to strike IS targets in northern Syria close to the Turkish border. It was a radical attempt of Turkey to thwart the fight against IS for Turkey acted as if it was an IS ally, not a member of the NATO.80 Russian President Putin stated that Turkey shot down the Russian aircraft because it was bombing the trucks smuggling IS oil into Turkey.81 Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov stated that they had strong evidence indicating that Erdogan and his family were linked to IS oil trade. He also argued that Erdogan and his family received revenues from oil deals with IS. Turkish newspapers Sozcu and Cumhuriyet published maps of the IS oil route.82 Moreover, Russian Sputnik News revealed evidence including satellite images, photographs, and some documents about Turkey’s involvement in IS’s oil smuggling.83 Erdogan’s business with IS was also stated by the US top officials. For example, Obama, and Adam Szubin, director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the US Department of Treasury stated that IS’s oil is smuggled into Turkey.84 The US Secretary stated that they destroyed more than 161 trucks in the last few days.85 Erdogan’s relation with ISIS was not limited to oil business only. Logistical support and arms delivery to IS were also primary support of Erdogan government to the terrorist organization. The government authorities allowed electricity supply from Turkey to Tel-Abyad city controlled by IS in Syria besides cross border trade amounting about 7–13 million dollars per day. Medical supplies and explosives were provided by Erdogan’s government to IS.86 Another activity of IS in Turkey was the slavery business. The German ARD documented that IS had slavery selling bureau in Turkey. They sold children and women who were captivated during IS invasion of Syria and Iraq. In 2014, a prosecutor in Adana ordered the search of three trucks carrying weapons to jihadist groups in Syria in company of Turkish

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National Intelligence Agency (MIT). The order was fulfilled by the security forces, just before it was promptly intervened directly by Erdogan to stop the execution of the order. Erdogan punished the prosecutors who issued the order, their supervisors, Deputy Chief Prosecutor and Chief Prosecutor of Adana province, and the security staff who executed the prosecutor’s order. The prosecutors were arrested for their search order on charges of “attempting to topple or incapacitate the Turkish government through the use of force or coercion and exposing information regarding the security and political activities of the state.” The arrested prosecutors stated in their trial that some intelligence officers had unlawful relations with the IS terrorists. Moreover, they showed some evidence regarding the Turkish Intelligence Service’s involvement in several bomb attacks such as the one in Reyhanli which caused 53 fatalities, and at Nigde which caused 14 fatalities. They stated that the car used by the Turkish Intelligence Service officers for escorting the truck loaded with weapons was registered to the name of ­al-Qaida member A. Demir. They argued that Turkish Intelligence Service did not have authority of carrying weapons within Turkey and delivering to foreign nations according to the law.87 However, Erdogan immediately amended the law regulating activities of the National Intelligence Agency saved the Turkish Intelligence Service members from the legal punishment. The daily Cumhuriyet published an article with photos of the weapons carried by MIT (the National Intelligence Agency) trucks to the terrorist groups in Syria, but Erdogan sued the editor in chief Can Dundar and journalist Erdem Gul for the article, photos, and the video footage which they published. Soon after, they were arrested. The prosecutor asked for two life sentences for the two journalists on the account of “obtaining confidential information for the purpose of political and military espionage, making confidential information public for the purpose of political and military espionage to subvert the Republic of Turkey and/or obstruct full or partial functioning of the state by using coercion and violence, and aid a terrorist organization [the Gulen movement].”88 This decision, indeed, confirmed that Erdogan-controlled government was delivering weapons to the terrorist groups. Political Islamists speak openly of engaging in “jihad” and a revival of the Ottoman Empire under the institution of a caliphate. Berat Albayrak, Minister of Finance and Treasury in the AKP cabinet, stated that the army was doing jihad in Afrin against Syrian Kurds and “we (political

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Islamists) are preparing for the jihad in election of 2019, may God bless our jihad.”89 The Turkish military has interfered with the battle in Syria and seized territory from Kurdish militias. In January 2018, Ismail Kahraman, the Speaker of Turkey’s National Assembly, called Muslims to jihad against Syrian Kurds saying that there can be no progress without jihad.90 Political Islamists always had strong relations with radical groups. When Mohamed Morsi won general elections in 2012, Erdogan visited Egypt swiftly and advised him not to move too quickly on imposing a full implementation of Shariah. This is because he sees himself first and foremost as a Muslim leader or the caliph of Muslims who should therefore give advice to all Muslims when necessary. When the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017, Erdogan threatened to break relations with the United States and Israel, claiming that Jerusalem is a “red-line” for all Muslims.91 Thereupon, Muslims in America protested against Trump shouting “Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the true leader of the Ummah.”92

Notes

1. Jamal, Amaney, and Mark Tessler, “Dimensions of Democratic Support in the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008): 97–110. 2. Huntington, Samuel, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 13. 3. Yilmaz, I., and G. Bashirov, “The AKP After 15 Years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 9 (2018): 1812–1830. 4. Karaman, H., Anayasa ve laiklik tartışmaları (2), available online: https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/anayasa-ve-laiklik-tartimalari-2-2028889. Retrieved May 8, 2016. 5. Karaman, H., Neyi oyluyoruz? Available online: https://www.yenisafak. com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/neyi-oyluyoruz-2037309. Retrieved April 13, 2017. 6. Tessler, Mark, “Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys,” Middle East Law and Governance 2, no. 1 (2010): 221–252. 7. Denoeux, Guilain, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 61.

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8. Cizre, Ümit, and Menderes Çınar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2/3 (2003): 309–332. 9. Şen, Mustafa, “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party,” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 59–84. 10. Dogan, Recep, “Political Islam (The Justice and Development Party in Turkey) Versus the Gülen Movement,” Journal of Social Science Studies 5, no. 2 (2018): 84–101. 11. “Erdoğan, Demokrasi Amaç Değil Araçtır,” https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=GdBAUNQ5b2w. 12. Dogan, Recep, “The Usage of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Ideology of Justice and Development Party (the AKP), Political Islamists of Turkey,” Issues in Social Science 6, no. 2 (2018): 54–65. 13. Dogan, Recep, “Political Islam (The Justice and Development Party in Turkey) Versus the Gülen Movement,” Journal of Social Science Studies 5, no. 2 (2018): 84–101. 14. Dogan, Recep, “The Usage of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Ideology of Justice and Development Party (the AKP), Political Islamists of Turkey,” Issues in Social Science 6, no. 2 (2018): 54–65. 15. Dogan, Recep, Terrorism and Violence in Islamic History and Theological Responses to the Arguments of Terrorists (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2018), 40. 16. Dogan, Recep, “The Usage of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Ideology of Justice and Development Party (the AKP), Political Islamists of Turkey,” Issues in Social Science 6, no. 2 (2018): 54–68. 17. Bulut, U., In Turkey, the Victims Change but the Regime Remains the Same. Philos Project, available online: https://philosproject.org/turkey-victims-change-regime-remains/. Retrieved April 18, 2017. 18. Dağı, Ihsan, Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği (Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1998). 19. Dursun, Çiler, “Türk-Islam Sentezi Ideolojisi ve Öznesi” (Ideology and Subject of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis), Dogu Batı 7, no. 25 (2003): 67. 20. Yilmaz, Ihsan, et al., “The Decline and Resurgence of Turkish Islamism: The Story of Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP,” Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies 1, no. 1 (2017): 48–62. 21. Dogan, Recep, “Political Islam (The Justice and Development Party in Turkey) Versus the Gülen Movement,” Journal of Social Science Studies 5, no. 2 (2018): 84–101. 22. Gülen, Fethullah, “The Turkey I No Longer Know,” in What Went Wrong with Turkey, Fountain Special Issue, 2017, 10. Originally published in Washington Post, May 15, 2017.

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23. Al-Isfahānī, Rāghib, Mu’jam Mufradāt Alfāz al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1997), 175. 24. Qur’an, 2:30. 25. Qur’an, 6:165. 26. Dogan, Recep, “Discussion over Theological and Political Foundations of Caliphate in Islam,” Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture 6, no. 2 (2018): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.15640/jisc.v6n2a1. 27. Qur’an, 33:40. 28. Feldman, Noah, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 23. 29. Dogan, Recep, Terrorism and Violence in Islamic History and Theological Responses to the Arguments of Terrorists (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2018), 155. 30. Ayubi, Nazih, Political Islam Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 14. 31. Ibid. 32. Dogan, Terrorism and Violence in Islamic History, 153. 33. Gürsel, Kadri, “The Cult of Erdoğan,” Al-Monitor, last modified August 6, 2014, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/gurselturkey-social-peace-Erdoğan-cult-polarization-akp.html. 34. Qur’an, 4:59. 35. Yilmaz, Ihsan, et al., “The Decline and Resurgence of Turkish Islamism: The Story of Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP,” Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies 1, no. 1 (2017): 48–62. 36. Karaman, H., Bu ittifak niçin? Available online: https://www.yenisafak. com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/bu-ittifak-nicin-2029126. Retrieved May 19, 2016. 37. Karaman, H., Gözyaşlarımız aynı, available online: https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/gozyaslarimiz-ayni-2040255. Retrieved September 22, 2017. 38. Karaman, H., Neyi oyluyoruz? Available online: https://www.yenisafak. com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/neyi-oyluyoruz-2037309. Retrieved April 13, 2017. 39. Joffe, A. H., Europe’s Red-Green Alliance: A Dystopian Scenario (Middle East Forum, 2017), available online: http://www.meforum.org/7037/ europes-redgreen-alliance. Retrieved November 26, 2017. 40. Mansfield, K., “Trouble Brewing in Netherlands as Erdoğan Supporters win First Seats in Dutch Election,” Express (UK) (2017), available online: https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/779891/dutch-election-turkishdutch-partydenk-win-first-seats-netherlands-parliament. Retrieved March 16, 2017.

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41. Karaman, H., Birlik ve huzur düşmanları (2015), available online: https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/birlik-ve-huzurdumanlari-2-2021818. Retrieved April 13, 2015. 42. Brown, Nathan, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 11. 43.  “Diyanet’ten AK Parti’ye hutbe desteği,” haberler.com, last modified March 28, 2014. http://www.haberler.com/diyanet-ten-skandal-cuma-hutbesi-5839105-haberi/; “Cuma Hutbesinde Twitter ve Youtube Yasağını Savundular,” Aktif Haber, last modified March 28, 2014, http://www.aktifhaber.com/cuma-hutbesinde-twitter-ve-youtube-yasagini-savundular-957411h.htm. 44. “Cuma hutbesinde ‘iktidarı eleştiren tweet atmayın’ vaazı,” t24.com, last modified January 2, 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/cuma-hutbesindeiktidari-elestiren-tweet-atmayin-vaazi,282404. 45.  Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez: Papa’nın Açıklaması Ahlak Dışı,” Diyanet TV, last modified April 24, 2015, http://www.diyanet.tv/prof-drmehmet-gormez-papanin-aciklamasi-ahlak-disi. 46. “Ayasofya ne müze ne kilisedir Müslümanların mabedidir,” Risale haber, last modified September 11, 2014, http://www.risalehaber.com/ayasofya-ne-muze-ne-kilisedir-muslumanlarin-mabedidir-218719h.htm. 47. “Mehmet Görmez: Israil ile ISID arasında fark yok,” Akşam, last modified December 14, 2014, http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/mehmetgormez-israil-ile-isid-arasinda-fark-yok/haber-360695. 48.  Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi, “Turkey’s Diyanet Under AKP Rule: From Protector to Imposer of State Ideology?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no. 4 (2016): 10, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1468385 7.2016.1233663. 49.  “Massacre at Uludere,” The Economist, last modified June 9, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21556616. 50.  “Kürtaj sınırlamasına Diyanet desteği,” Aljazeera Turk, last modified June 4, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/kurtaj-sinirlamasinadiyanet-destegi. 51.  “Erdogan Says; Man and Woman Are Not Equal,” The Guardian, last modified November 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/nov/24/turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdoganwomen-not-equal-men. 52. “Diyanet, feministleri kızdırdı,” Hurriyet, last modified March 13, 2008, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/diyanet-feministleri-kizdirdi-8434696. 53. “Müftülük hutbe okuttu: Grev caiz değil!” Haber Sol, last modified May 19, 2011, http://haber.sol.org.tr/sonuncu-kavga/muftuluk-hutbe-okuttu-grevcaiz-degil-haberi-42663.

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54. “Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Görmez’den Paralel Yapıya ilişkin önemli açıklamalar,” YouTube, last modified May 5, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=k67JL_BJv0w. 55. Dogan, Recep, “The Usage of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Ideology of Justice and Development Party (the AKP), Political Islamists of Turkey,” Issues in Social Science 6, no. 2 (2018): 54–68. 56.  “Diyanet Feto Raporu,” Diyanet.gov.tr, last modified July 26, 2017, https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/din-isleri-yuksek-kurulu-baskanligitarafindan-hazirlanan-dini-istismar-hareketi-fetopdy-raporu/39153? getEnglish. 57. Ibn Manzūr, Muhammad, Lisān al-Arab (Beirut: Dar Turath al-Arabi, 1999), 5/3987. 58. Zabīdī, M., Tāj al-Arūs (Riyadh: Dar al-Fikr, 1990), 14/50. 59. Yazır, Hamdi, Hak Dini Kur’an Dili (Istanbul: Azim Dagıtım, 2007), 1/173. 60. Gölcük, Ş., and S. Toprak, Kelam (Konya: Tekin Dağıtım 2001), 12. 61. Taftazānī, S., Sharh al-Aqā’id (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1991), 276. 62. Māturīdī, M., Kitab al-Tawhid (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2006), 511. 63. Tirmidhī, M., Sunan Tirmidhī (Medina: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyah, 1967), 2/213. 64. Bukhari, M., Sahih Bukhari (Riyadh: Darussalam Pub. & Distr., 1997), Adab, 44. 65. Shahristānī, M., al-Milal Wa’n-Nihal (Beirut: Dar al-Ma’rifa 1993), 1/132. 66.  For details see, Esposito, John L., and Ihsan Yilmaz, Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2010). 67. For details see, Çetin, M., The Gülen Movement: Civic Service Without Borders (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2010). 68. Dogan, Recep, “The Usage of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Ideology of Justice and Development Party (the AKP), Political Islamists of Turkey,” Issues in Social Science 6, no. 2 (2018): 54–68. 69. Gülen, Fethullah, Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance (Somerset, NJ: The Light, 2006), 57. 70.  Saritoprak, Zeki, “Fethullah Gülen’s Thoughts on State, Democracy, Politics, Terrorism,” The Muslim World 95 (2005): 325–471. 71. Gülen, Fethullah, “ISIS Cruelty Deserves Our Strongest Condemnation,” Herkul.org, last modified February 24, 2015, http://www.fethullah-gulen.org/news/gulen-isis.html, accessed February 24, 2015. 72. Gülen, Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, 73. 73. Ibid.

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74. Ergil, Doğu, Fethullah Gülen and The Gülen Movement in 100 Questions (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2012), 93–95. 75. Al-Tabarī, Ibn Jarir. Jami al-Bayan an Ta’wil Ay al-Qur’an (Egypt: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1954), 4/295. 76. Dogan, Recep, “The Usage of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Ideology of Justice and Development Party (the AKP), Political Islamists of Turkey,” Issues in Social Science 6, no. 2 (2018): 54–68. 77.  MacIntyre, Sara, “Turkey’s Informal ISIS Support,” Toronto Sun, last modified November 19, 2015, http://www.torontosun. com/2015/11/19/turkeys-informal-isis-suppor t?token=ad143d170c5bd60bc2eae4873106234d. 78.  Black, Senatör Richard, “Turkey Supports Terror,” last modified November 23, 2015, http://odatv.com/turkiye-terore-destek-veriyor2311151200.html. 79.  Christie-Miller, Alexander, “Turkey Shipped Arms to Nigeria, Leaked Tape Claims,” The Times, last modified March 20, 2014, http://www. thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4038738.ece. 80. Zeman, Miloş, “Turkey Should Not Be Taken to UN,” Sozcu, last modified December 10, 2015, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/ cek-lider-turkiye-abye-alinmasin-1005379. 81. “Putin: Turkey Protects ISIS’ Petrol Traffic,” last modified December 30, 2015, http://odatv.com/erdoganla-gorusmedik…-3011151200.html. 82. “ISIS’s Petrol Is Being Sold to Israel Through Turkey,” last modified November 30, 2015, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/isidinpetrolu-turkiye-uzerinden-israile-satildigi-belgelendi-998134/?utm_ source=sm_tw&utm_medium=free&utm_campaign=dunya. 83.  “Lavrov: Turkey Has Long Supported Daesh Oil Trade, Terrorists’ Efforts,” last modified December 9, 2015, http://sputniknews.com/russia/20151209/1031500422/lavrov-turkey-evidence.html. 84. “ISIL Oil Is Going to Assad, Some to Turkey, US Official Says,” last modified November 13, 2015, http://www.aktifhaber.com/obama-isidturkiye-sinirindan-savasci-geciriyor-petrol-satiyor-1268140h.htm. 85. “Kerry: We Will Prevent ISIS’s Petrol Traffic,” last modified November 19, 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/kerry-isidin-turkiye-ve-irak-uzerinden-petrol-kacakciligini-onleyecegiz,317266. 86. “Fertilizer, Also Suited for Bombs, Flows to ISIS Territory From Turkey,” last modified May 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/ world/europe/fertilizer-also-suited-for-bombs-flows-to-isis-territoryfrom-turkey.html?ref=world. 87. “Prosecutor Ozcan Şişman Claims Two Shocking Statements in Court,” last modified June 18, 2015, http://www.aktifhaber.com/savci-ozcansisman-mahkemedeki-ifadesindeki-iki-sok-iddiada-bulundu-1188434h. htm.

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88. “Full Text of Can Dündar and Erdem Gul Indictments,” last modified January 27, 2016, http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-can-dundar-ve-erdem-gul-iddianamesinin-tam-metni-milyonlarin-okudugu-haberler-ve-yazilar-casusluk-delili-sayildi,325826. 89. Diken, Gazanız mübarek olsun: Bakan Albayrak’a göre AKP teşkilatı seçim savaşına hazırlanıyor, available online: http://www.diken.com.tr/gazaniz-mubarek-olsun-bakan-albayrak-teskilatimiz-secim-savasina-hazirlaniyor/. Retrieved April 15, 2018. 90. Hayward, J., Speaker of Turkish National Assembly Declares ‘Jihad’ Against Kurds (2018), available online: http://www.breitbart.com/nationalsecurity/2018/01/29/speaker-turkish-national-assembly-declares-jihad-kurds/. Retrieved January 29, 2018. 91. Aljazeera, Erdogan: Jerusalem Status a Red Line for Muslims (2017), available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/erdogan-jerusalem-status-red-line-muslims-171205070449352.html, December 5, 2017. Retrieved December 12, 2017. 92. Allahverdi, S., Thousands in Washington Protest US Jerusalem Decision (2017), available online: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/thousands-in-washington-protest-us-jerusalem-decision/1007136, Retrieved December 17, 2017.

CHAPTER 7

The Political Theology of the Gülen Movement

7.1  Introduction After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic was established in 1923. The secular elites aimed to protect the state from religious movements through new laws based on French style laicism. They abolished the caliphate; annulled the institution of the Islamic scholars; abandoned Islamic law and adopted a modified version of the Swiss Civil Code; closed lodges of religious groups; changed the alphabet to Latin and established state monopoly over education.1 Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, and the secularists desired to remove religion from the political and social life. There was no longer any place for religion in the Turkish Republic. They wanted to restrict religion to the conscience of individuals, which could not go beyond personal practice. They tried to reduce the effect of religion to being a matter of merely an individual faith and prayer. Thus, Islam became a personal issue, which could not have any voice in the state politics or social order. The secularist elites strongly rejected religion and adopted laicism as a new way for the state.2 Their purpose was not only to secularize the state but also the society. They declared that all ties with the Ottoman past were now discontinued. They advocated westernized modern civilization over old Islamic way of life by referring to the western values. However, they failed to remove religion from the public sphere, therefore the secular and the religious concepts remained to exist side-by-side in Turkish © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_7

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society. Each side deemed the other as hostile to its own values, and as a result, they adopted an equally uncompromising attitude toward each other.3 The tension between political Islamists and secular elites provided an opportunity for a civic movement to represent Islam on a moderate basis. In this regard, the Gülen (Hizmet) movement emerged as representatives of moderate Islam against the rise of radicalism and religious extremism. The movement stayed away from politics. It rather focused on social and religious issues. Gülen refused the idea of forming or being part of a political party. He disagreed with the idea of mixing religion with politics unlike some other contemporary Muslim scholars did, such as Abu Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. He strongly believed that religion should capture hearts and minds through education, socialization, and spiritual cultivation. In order to understand the political theology of Gülen movement some concepts such as democracy, secularism, the relations with the west, the relations with non-Muslims, nationalism, umma (Muslims world), caliphate, shariah, and extremism will be discussed from the perspectives of the Gülen movement. 7.1.1  Nationalism During the collapse of Ottoman state and the formation of the Turkish Republic three competing ideologies emerged: Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism.4 Turkish nationalism became more dominant as Ottomanism lost its relevance by the demise of Ottoman state.5 Nevertheless, Islamism persisted despite its subordination to Turkish Nationalism. Turkish nationalism was guardian nationalism which claimed to be sacred for the followers of this ideology. They believed that if the Turks had not existed, Islam would not have been prevailed.6 The popular idea that Turks accepted Islam without any resistance hints the nature of Turkish Nationalism. The concept of hizmet (service) emerges as a point of interpenetration between Islamism and Turkish nationalism because, the military interventions in Turkey created an atmosphere where the Gülen movement tended to move toward nationalist discourses. Gülen had to protect his position with respect to the nationalist/secularist Turkish state for a long time, thus, he positioned his identity at place between nationalism and Islamism and this approach shaped his public discourse as well. Gülen shows a great respect and reverence to the Turkish culture mixed with its Islamic past.

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The Gülen movement constructs its identity at the point of intersection between state discourse of Turkish national identity and Islamic discourse of Turkish national identity.7 Many scholars and academics have produced works that define the Gülen movement. One of these definitions is that it is an Islamic-based movement which has sought to combine a modern interpretation of Islam with Turkish nationalism.8 Gülen’s notion of national identity is inspired from the Ottoman-Islamic legacy. He promotes an inclusive concept of nationalism which is not based on race or blood but rather it is on shared political realities and historical experiences.9 The worldview of Gülen creates a fusion between religion and science, and between modernity and tradition.10 He aims to restore the society by reminding its past rather than disconnecting from it. He invites people to rediscover themselves with their Islamic past. The aim is to reconstruct the nation’s political identity as Muslim, neo-Ottomanist, and Turkish simultaneously.11 The Gülen movement has been accused by both political Islamists and secularists of conspiracy theorists: political Islamists argue that Gülen is the United States funded spy in the religious establishment, trying to disrupt the ranks of political Islam from the within. The secularists claim that he is a scheming crypto-Mullah, plotting to turn Turkey into a sharia-based Islamic state little different to Iran. Gülen has professed a belief in an open, inclusive, democratic society. He has advocated a conservative Islamic lifestyle mixed with Turkish-nationalism and he has a pro-Western democratic worldview. The Gülen movement was established with the goal of fighting communism and raising a Golden generation that would be pious, hardworking, and well educated with a strong sense of solidarity and military-like discipline.12 The financial basis of the movement is Anatolian people who are citizens of Turkey. For Gülen, Anatolia refers to the nationalist-religious spirit of its population. Gülen described Anatolia as “the final guard” against the corrupt mentality of the crusaders, the Jesuits and also against the poison of lust, alcohol and Western philosophies and ideologies.13 In his writings Gülen refers to his followers as “recruits,” as “soldiers not in shape, but in spirit,” and as “cavalry of light” that will metaphorically fight against the darkness.14 For Gülen, the transition from the Ottoman state to Republican Turkey has created very little erosion in the sacred attributes of the Turkish state.15 He makes frequent reference to the two key personalities

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in Turkish Islamic discourse: Mehmet Akif (the poet who wrote the Turkish national anthem) and Fatih Sultan Mehmet (Sultan Mehmet II the Conqueror). The Gülen community can be considered a realization of the ideals that Mehmet Akif developed in his poetry.16 Gülen preaches about a project of “Golden Generation” (Altın Nesil) which can be described as a mission of making Turkey a powerful country in the Muslim world reminiscence of its glorious past. Three important turning points can be identified in the transformation of the movement toward Islamic-Turkish nationalism. The first one was the collapse of the communist bloc and the emergence of Central Asian Turkic republics. The second turning point was the growing overlap between the religious mission of the community and the policies of the Turkish state in the early 1990s. Within this period of time, the Turkish state and the Gülen community became a legitimate part of the communal identity. The third significant turning point was the February 28, 1997, the Turkish military intervention process. During this period, the movement was persecuted by the secularist military and Gulen was accused by Kemalists with a conspiracy theory that he wanted to destroy secular system of Turkish Republic. Thus, Gulen and his followers emphasized to universal human rights values rather Islamic-Turkish nationalism. The fight between the AKP, Political Islamists of Turkey and the Gülen movement has huge effect on the movement. During this fight, thousands of the followers of the movement were subject to human rights violations. Therefore, after the persecution of the AKP, the movement has begun to draw more upon the global discourses of human rights, freedom, the rule of law, and democracy. In other words, the Gülen movement wants to abandon its Islamic-Turkish nationalism. Currently, the movement wants to be more global by emphasizing to universal values such as justice, democracy, and the rule of law. No longer the movement sees Turkey as its main base and Anatolia as the final guard of the Islamic world. 7.1.2  Secularism Secularism has been understood and practiced differently in the different parts of the world. In the American society, secularism means decline in religious beliefs and practices while it is understood as assertive secularism.17 With the diffusion of modern life forms, including urbanization, industrialization, rationalization, and pluralization, the social relevance of religion and church would decrease, and religious worldviews would gradually be replaced by a scientific, rationalized, and secular interpretation of the

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world.18 Secularism as a political doctrine has two characteristics: one, legal and judicial processes are out of institutional religious control; and two, state constitutionally lack official religions.19 Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito criticized Turkish secularism as being based on a radical Jacobin laicism that aimed to transform society through the power of the state and to eliminate religion from the public sphere.20 In this regard, Gülen movement aimed to balance the Kemalist political system of Turkey with the Islamic values.21 During its years of formation and expansion, the Gülen movement’s abstinence from party politics helped the movement to engage with secular states, both in Turkey and in the Western democracies. Its engagement played a pivotal role in the Turkish state’s increasing capacity to accommodate pious Muslim citizens among its ranks. At the same time, the engagement facilitated the integration of Muslim political actors into the state, electoral system, and the expanding market economy. The movement encountered very few obstacles in its massive expansion for it mostly just focused on universal human values. Gülen’s interpretation and analytical frames that elevated Islam above secular concerns resonated with the Turkish people, because the majority of Turks define themselves Muslims first. Gülen preached a middle ground for Turkish people between secularism and piety, and preached multicultural tolerance that was not only alluring in Turkey but also produced a large following in the West.22 Gülen does not see secularism as the opposite of religion. He wants to break the barriers of mosque and state through the pursuit of science.23 He states that human being is the vicegerent of God on the Earth, the essence and substance of existence in its entirety and the brightest mirror of the Creator. God has given human beings the right and ability to discover the mysteries imbedded in the soul of the universe, to use everything to its purpose, and to be the representatives of characteristics that belong to Him, such as will of knowledge and might.24 The Gülen movement does not aspire for the creation of an Islamic state but the movement believes that religion should be part of public life and not be limited to the private sphere of the individual.25 He does not want to reform the state into an Islamic one but wants the state to ensure that it does not interfere in the free exercise of religion.26 Gülen movement can be regarded as a communitarian movement rooted in Turk-Islamic tradition, which has reconciled itself with both secularism and democracy without being completely secular or democratic.27 Gülen calls for a complete separation of the state and religion in the Muslim world. Indeed, The Gülen movement was the first modern

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Islamic movement to accept the secular form of state while only asking for religious freedom under it. Gülen movement espouses a secular state that would stand at the same distance from all beliefs and philosophies. The state would be neutral to faiths, beliefs, and society. 7.1.3  Democracy In the 1980s, it was quite an unusual thing for a Muslim scholar to state that Islam was compatible with democracy. Gülen argued that Islam and democracy are fully compatible with each other and Islam does not support arbitrary or authoritarian forms of government at all. He believes that the spirit of Islam is consultative and even the Prophet who was directly guided by God used to get consultation from his companions on social and political issues and took their opinions and perspectives into account. Because of his thoughts, Political Islamists accused Gülen of a being an infidel, but he continued to advocate democracy on every occasion. In his article which was published by La Monde on February 2019, Gülen criticized political Islamists of Turkey and the AKP, the ruling party in Turley since 2002. He stated that although Turkey was hailed as an example for a modern Muslim democracy during the early 2000s the democratic reforms were short lived.28 Following his third election victory, President Erdogan has made a complete U-turn toward authoritarianism and made Turkey no longer an example for other Muslimmajority countries to aspire to. Gülen argued that Islam is compatible with democracy in spite the negative example that Turkey presents under the AKP government. For him, Political Islamists (the AKP) represent a complete betrayal of core Islamic values for they do not respect the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. The AKP government does not accept accountability for the rulers and the preservation of inalienable rights and freedoms of every citizen. The recent setback in the Turkish democratic experience is not because of adherence to these Islamic values, but rather because of the betrayal of Political Islamists to core values of Islam. For Gülen, participatory or democratic form of governance where no group, majority, or minority, dominates the others is the only viable form of governance for diverse population.29 However, in Islamic world authoritarian rulers have exploited the differences within the society to polarize various groups against each other to maintain their stronghold

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in power. Gülen invites citizens to come together around universal human rights and freedoms. He encourages them to be able to democratically oppose those who violate these rights. Gülen argued that in the past those who studied or spoke about the Islamic perspective of politics made three errors. First, they confused the historical experiences of Muslims with the foundational sources of Islamic tradition, the Qur’an and the authentic sayings and practices of the Prophet. Historical experiences of Muslims and the verdicts of the jurists under these circumstances should be analyzed with a critical eye, and cannot be given the same status as the authentic sources of religion. Secondly, some cherry-picked verses of the Qur’an or the sayings of the Prophet to legitimize their perspective and pursued to impose that perspective upon people. The spirit of the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition (Sunnah) can only be understood with a holistic view and with a sincere intention to seek out the will of God. Third, some wrongfully concluded that democracy is fundamentally against Islam because Islam declares God as the only sovereign whereas democracy is based upon the sovereignty of the people. No believer doubts that God is the sovereign of the universe, but this does not mean that human agency, including thought, inclinations, and willpower do not exist or are excluded from God’s greater plan for humanity. Giving sovereignty to the people does not mean usurping it from God, but rather taking the right and duty to govern, which is endowed to humans by God, from a dictator or an oligarchy and giving it back to the people.30 In the ideology of Gülen, no group has domination over the others. The principle of equal citizenship is in alignment with acknowledging the dignity of every human being and respecting them as a work of art that was created by God. Participatory form of governance, whether it is called a democracy or republic, is much more in resonance with the Islamic spirit than other forms of government, including monarchies and oligarchies. Despite the fact that democratic governance has been an ideal of Turkish Republic, democratic values have never been systematically ingrained into the Turkish society. Obedience to a strong leader and the state have always been a strong theme in educational curricula. Citizens forgot that the state existed for the people and not vice versa. It can be argued that Political Islamists of Turkey took advantage of this collective psyche. In order to bring Turkey back to democracy Gülen has made some recommendations:

184  R. DOGAN The school curricula should be reevaluated. Topics such as equal rights for all citizens and fundamental human rights and freedoms should be taught to students in the first years of school so that they can be guardians of these rights when they grow up. Secondly, there is a need for a constitution that does not allow for either the minority or the majority’s domination and protects in every situation the fundamental human rights referred to in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Civil society and free press should be protected by the constitution to flourish and be part of the checks and balances against the state power. Thirdly, opinion leaders should emphasize democratic values in their rhetoric and action.31

Gülen states that Islam is a divine religion while democracy is a form of government developed by human beings and it has many forms such as social, liberal, Christian, and radical.32 Gülen maintains that Islam is both a religion and a political system, as it addresses all facets of life, including the individual, family, social, economical, and political spheres.33 Islam and democracy are not opposite to each other as long as the values of later are universal and not opposite to Islamic principles. Gülen thinks that it would be much better to introduce Islam as a complement to democracy so the Muslim world can develop their own democracy, which reconcile the relationship between the spiritual and material world in a balanced way.34 He also states that Islam would enrich democracy in answering the deep needs of humans.35 He argues that Muslims witnessed the application of this norm of democracy during time of RightlyGuided Caliphs.36 Gülen criticized the notion Islam and democracy cannot be reconciled, because, due to fact that, Islam is based on the rule of God, while democracy is based on the view of humans. He argues that “sovereignty belongs to the nation unconditionally” does not mean that sovereignty has been taken from God and given to humans, rather, it means that sovereignty has been taken from individual oppressors and dictators and given to the community members.37 Cosmologically speaking, there is no doubt that God is the sovereign of everything in the universe, however, this does not mean that human beings have no will, inclination, or choice. Humans are free to make choices in their personal lives and also free to make choices with regard to their social and political actions.38

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7.1.4  Education Gülen believes that founding a school is better than building a mosque, thus, his sympathizers opened schools, universities, and other educational institutions all over the world. The first project of the Gülen movement was the setting up of dormitories throughout the Aegean region. These dormitories provided a good study environment to students and sheltered them against ills of society such as drug use. They also safeguarded them against involvement in the extremist politics of the time. In the early 1970s, the movement founded institutions, which prepared students for the entrance examination of universities to help the middle-class citizens to get admission into universities. In 1982, the movement opened its first two schools, one in Istanbul and the other in Izmir, and then hundreds of schools were opened initially in Turkey, central Asia, the Balkans, and the West and later in the rest of world except a few countries. The success of the movement relies on the commitment of volunteers and teachers who rather view their work as religious service. Many Muslims including political Islamists oppose the western style of education that Gülen advocates. However, he believes that there is no reason to fear from science and the western style of education. He argues that Muslims should be equipped with modern sciences and Islamic ethics. With this education, Muslims will be able to interpret Islam better and in a more compatible way to the needs of contemporary Muslims. Through education, the sympathizers of the movement aim to represent the ethical message of Islam all over the world. Thus, serving humanity by means of education is the main goal of the movement. The global expansion and the increase in economic power allowed the movement to establish over 1000 “Turkish schools” spread across 170 countries from the United States to Bangladesh to Uganda. Wherever Muslims lived, Gülen schools existed with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iran, which were never allowed in these countries. They were like modern-day version of Protestant missionaries who heeded a call for public duty to spread the movement’s power and Turkey’s influence simultaneously. Gülen-movement-affiliated schools can be considered as ambassadors of their country and mediators of Turkish culture, which exhibit Sunni Muslim characteristics along with strong Turkish national traits. While the schools take local cultures into account and adhere to a secular, modern curriculum, their goal is elevating the young generations to

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universal values of humanity.39 According to Gülen, a nation’s durability depends on the education of young generations. Thus, the movement provides scholarships, dormitories, and university preparatory courses to help youth to obtain education. The movement wants to show the positive side of Islam and to make non-Muslims to sympathize with Islam.40 In this regard, the movement provided thousands of all-living-expensespaid trips to Turkey for academics, journalists, politicians, and other public officials for a better awareness.41 In Gülen-inspired schools, religious education is not given for it may upset secular sensibilities. In places linked to the movement’s activities—from schools to dormitories, to administrative centers of foundations—no sign of Muslim faith is present.42 The school curriculum reflects an approach of combining modern sciences with Islamic ethics, for the followers of this movement believe that education is a bridge between local and global groups, and a basis for interfaith dialogue. Contrary to a common preconception, the schools follow a secular education in conformity with host country authorities, rather than Islamic education or preaching the ideas of Gülen. They offer a modern, multilingual education that responds to the need for openness. Scientific disciplines are privileged in these schools. Without imposing their ideology on others, teachers try to apply good manners as role models in their personal lives. They try to educate children in these schools as new elites who can contribute to world peace, social harmony and interfaith dialogue. Gülen stated that ignorance is defeated through education; poverty through hard work; and the possession of capital and internal schism and separatism through unity, dialogue, and tolerance.43 With this perspective they want to avoid so-called clash of the civilizations. Gülen preaches a distinctly Turkish brand of Islam that condemns terrorism, promotes interfaith dialogue and cross-cultural understanding, and can function in tandem with secular democratic mechanisms and modern economic and technological modes of living.44 The ideology, motivations, and goals of the movement are conceptualized by Gülen. He has written voluminously over the years on a variety of topics. Fethullah Gülen’s official website features many dozens of his essays on topics ranging from Thought, Faith, and Sufism, to Love and Tolerance.45 In the ideology of Gülen, enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is an important Islamic principle. It is related to compassion which is all about extending empathy, sympathy, feelings of care,

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concern, and mercy toward another human being. He extracts this principle from the Quranic verse; “Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining good and forbidding evil. And it is they who are the successful” (3:104). Another verse; “You are the best of peoples ever raised up for mankind; you enjoin good and forbid evil” (3:110). Gülen argues that God does not approve wrongdoing and disorder. He wills that human beings should live in peace and, accordingly, that justice should prevail among them. It is therefore incumbent upon those who believe in One God and worship Him faithfully to secure justice in the world. Islam calls this responsibility jihad (struggle).46 So, the movement has been doing jihad through its investments in education and by raising educated elites. 7.1.5   Sharia and Islamic Law Gülen has two primary sources in his Islamic understanding: the Qur’an and Sunnah. For Gülen, these sources represent perfection, justice, freedom, virtue, piety, morality, and equality.47 Gülen seeks to restore Islam’s primary place in society and aims to bring it to the public sphere.48 His philosophy represents a theology of action that seeks to contribute the world with meaning through Islamic service. He wishes to shape the future of Turkey toward a more Islamic conception, while emphasizing the Turkish traditions of Islamic practice. Criticizers of the movement interpret this as Gülen’s attempts to govern every aspect of life in the country and conquer the state.49 The word shariah, in a certain way a synonym of religion (din), indicates a religious life supported by God’s commands, the Prophet’s sayings and practices, and the consensus of the Muslim community.50 Gülen opposes scholars who think that shariah rule would necessitate a state system based on religious rules. Because, he argues that in Islam, the principles that are related to the state administration are only 5% and the remaining 95% is related to the articles of faith, the pillars of Islam, and the moral principles of religion.51 Gülen emphasize the fact that Islam aims to promote and secure human rights. If these rights are preserved by democratic system Islam never opposes democracy.52 Human beings are social and civilized beings that need to live together. Society is like an organism that the parts are interrelated to each other. For Gülen, Islam, while asking individuals to be free and independent from anything except for God, it also requires them to

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be responsible individuals as members of society and nation.53 Gülen opposes absolute freedom for this may leave the individuals alone on their own in the desert of existence. He argues that Islam does not restrict itself to just metaphysical considerations such as spiritual perfection of the individual, religious rituals, prayer, devotions, and contemplation, rather, it also sets out rules that order human individual, social, political, economical, moral, and legal life.54 For him, restricting the divine religion to only belief and individual religious rituals means compartmentalizing it and shaping it contrary to God’s will.55 He states that Prophet Muhammad has been sent to provide principles for life for this world and the afterlife, with the promise of eternal happiness for its followers. This perspective is strongly connected with his sharia understanding as well as with Islamic law. In his view, worship, rituals, belief, and social and governmental issues are all facets of one unit. The primary sources of sharia and Islamic law are the Qur’an and Sunnah (prophetic traditions). Gülen argues that the historical experiences of Muslims concerning the practice of shariah are different than shariah itself.56 Especially, the Islamic perspective of state and politics on the basis of shariah refer to historical interpretation of Muslims in their times. The fact that such an independent reasoning is not authoritative on others, thus, it cannot be considered as the shariah. Gülen believes that interpretations that are not originating from the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet are not valid. Thus, for him, the need of today’s people is ijtihad (reasoned solutions) responded to through a reference to the main sources of religion which is in line with the main principles of Islam (Sharia). The word Ijtihad, independent reasoning, literally means to use all your power and effort in order to bring some hard and difficult works into existence. In Islamic terminology, the word means “to use all your power to deduct some hypothetical judicial decisions from the clear sources of Islamic law.”57 Gülen argues that there are two conditions for Ijtihad: First, one must know the sources of Islamic law related to legal judgments and second, the Ijtihad should be done by those who are able to penetrate into the spirit of the sources through their intelligence and the logic of religious law.58 He states that: Ijtihad can be done through analogy as well as through the indications, clues, and the hints of the legal texts. It is also possible to deduce legal judgments from the linguistic aspects of the Qur’an and the Sunnah,

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including Arabic rhetoric dealing with metaphorical language and literary figures. Islam, being the last and universal religion, is the epitome of solutions to the problems of humans for all time and for all locations. These solutions are based on the limited texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which address the unlimited problems of humans. This blessed activity started in the era of the Prophet and developed in the third and fourth centuries under the names of ijtihad, ra’y (subjective legal opinion), istidlal (inference), qiyas (analogy), and istinbat (deduction). It has remained alive within the practice of the dynamic systems of Islam and has been highly fruitful.59

Reason and a diversity of interpretations of Islam are integral to the development of Islamic law and tradition.60 The very diversity of reading found in the schools and manuals of Islamic law reflect the influence of reason, differing cultural contexts, and changes in the history of the community.61 In Islam, the legislative and executive institutions have always been allowed to make laws.62 These are based on the needs and betterment of society and within the frame of general norms of law (the Shariah). Muslims have always developed laws on issues related to economy, politics, cultural relations and other areas. Gülen states that he has no objection to undertaking ijtihad (independent reasoning), istinbat (deductive reasoning), and istikhraj (derivation) in the interpretation of shariah principles.63 Gülen emphasized on higher objectives of Islam (maqāsid sharia) from different perspectives to show their importance for contemporary Muslims. For him, Islam provides rulings that are most suitable for human nature and it can be understood better through higher objectives of Islam (maqāsid al-sharia). Thus, he proposes that in order to meet the needs of modern people, Muslims jurists are required to understand the general principles of Islam and its higher objectives.64 He believes that this aim can be achieved in two steps; first, all previous works that Muslim scholars have produced so far must be examined thoroughly from the perspective of maqāsid sharia regardless of which legal school they are affiliated with due to reasoning that every legal school has share in truth regarding its juristic opinions, and modern jurists should benefit from all.65 Second step; issuing fatwa or ijtihād should be done by a committee that consists of scholars who are experts in every Islamic discipline, as well as in social and modern sciences.66 Because, he argues that the problems that modernity has introduced are very complex which

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a single jurist, cannot answer, therefore Muslim jurists and scholars from different fields should address them collectively.67 Islamic Law and its rulings can be studied under the three main categories; ḏaruriyyāt (essentials), ḫājiyyāt (necessities), and taḫsiniyyāt (the embellishments).68 According to level of importance all Islamic rulings can be evaluated through one of these categories. If the rulings are related to the protection of religion, life, lineage, intellect, and property they are considered in the category of ḏaruriyyāt (essentials). The rulings that are established to complete and strengthen ḏaruriyyāt can be considered in the category of ḫājiyyāt (necessities). The rest is related to taḫsiniyyāt (the embellishments), which seeks to improve the conditions of human life to attain perfection for people at all levels. For Gülen, uṣūl al-din (pillars of Islamic belief) is the highest objective in Islam and before establishing it in the minds of Muslims, Islamic Law cannot be applied properly. Even the validity and acceptability of ijtihāds depends on the soundness and firmness of uṣūl al-din in the hearts of Muslims. Gülen believes that there is a strong relationship between the Qur’an and Sirah (biography of the Prophet) for the latter instructs Muslims how to understand the former.69 Sirah is a source in Quranic exegesis, as the Prophet presented the best example with his words, deeds and tacit approvals with regards to understanding the Qur’an and applying it in the lives of Muslims.70 Gülen points out that the events that took place during the lifetime of the Prophet contains some hints, allusions, or clear messages for all cases that will happen until the end of times in spite they are specific and historical.71 There are many topics in the Qur’an and in the sayings of the Prophet whose relevance to human experiences continues to come to light as time passes.72 The divine commands and prophetic suggestions about politics, the state/governance, and ruling the community have been interpreted in diverse ways, resulting in different manifestations and various forms throughout history.73 It is not true to say that politics is a vital principle of religion. While undeniably some Quranic verses are related to politics, the structure of the state, and the forms of ruling, people who have attributed the importance of the Quranic message with such issues may have caused a misunderstanding. Thus, Gülen emphasizes on understanding the religion in its totality. He states that some people living in Islamic countries are not moderate Muslims with a balanced way of thinking and sufficient knowledge of their own sources. He argues that if one lacks sound

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knowledge along with bravery, the bravery can lead these ignorant people to such insanity and terrorist acts that it will not be possible to rectify the mistakes they make by the rest of Muslim community. 7.1.6   Islamic State Gülen staunchly rejects political Islam and all attempts toward making an Islamic political system. He argues that Islam does not propose the idea of a certain unchangeable political system. For him, reducing Islam to a political ideology is a great injustice to the religion.74 He argues that Islam is not a political ideology but it is a religion, and it does have some principles that pertain to governance, but these account for, merely, 5% of all Islamic principles.75 To reduce Islam to a political ideology is the greatest crime against its ethos. Gülen advocates a total separation between religion and the state and opposes religiously based political parties which espouse religious identity politics. In the view of Gülen, the “state” is a system formed by human beings in order to protect their basic rights and freedoms and maintain justice and peace.76 A state is a result of a contract among humans and therefore it can neither be “Islamic” nor “holy.” Gülen argues that rule does not belong to holy and infallible spiritual leaders, as in theocracies, nor to any religious institutions under their supervision, nor to any other religious institution organized in any other way.77 In Islam, ruling means a mutual contract between the ruler and the subject and it takes its legitimacy from the rule of law, and from the principle of the superiority of the law.78 The law is above the ruler and the subject. Rulers and governors have to obey the law like ordinary people. Islam does not approve any kind of dictatorship, thus, an administration based on tyranny is illegitimate.79 The “state” is not a goal by itself, but rather an agency that helps people pursue happiness in this world and in the afterworld.80 The alignment of the state with a set of principles and values is a sum of the alignment of the individuals who make up the system with those principles and values. Therefore, the phrase “Islamic state” is a contradictory term, and it is an oxymoron. Similarly, since there is no clergy class in Islam, theocracy is alien to the spirit of Islam. Gülen rejected the dichotomous ideology propagated by the radical Islamists that Turkey could either be a “country of Islam” governed by Muslims, or a “country of war,” in which Muslims were repressed.

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He described Turkey as a “country of service” (dar al-hizmet), in which Muslims were required to work for people and contribute to an increase in Muslim morality.81 Political Islamists’ ultimate goal is the conquest of the state and the modification of its institutions to make Islam the dominating societal force. In Gülen’s eyes, Islam is at the heart of a future society whose norms and moral concepts are prescribed by religion, in the name of which those with the requisite authority advocate benevolence and prevent malevolence.82 According to this approach, the moral community controls the individual, and the individual achieves divine salvation via his or her active dedication to the other members of the same community. Gülen advocates fundamental human rights, especially the freedom of speech. He states that expressing yourself against oppression is a democratic right, a civic duty, and also a religious duty for believers. Living according to your beliefs or worldview with the condition that it does no harm to others, and exercising fundamental human freedoms, especially freedom of speech, makes a person truly a human.83 Liberty is a right given by the Compassionate God, and no one—and no leader—can take that away. A person deprived of his or her basic rights and freedoms cannot be said to live a true human life. Gülen emphasized educating elites with the intellectual capacity to govern the state and survive in the face of Western competition. The followers of the movement represented a combination of national-religious sentiment and socio-moral conservatism. They were committed to the creation of a strong state, while simultaneously opposing the partypolitical organization of political Islam. The followers of the movement advocate liberal democracy and the compatibility of Islam with it.84 They stand out compared to most religious communities in Turkey for many reasons: They do not oppose the west,85 rather they believe that if any civilization produced any common value for humanity, Muslims should benefit from it. They support the EU, human rights, democratic values, and the western style education.86 Some senior US officials defined the Gülen movement as the face of moderate Islam. In 2007, Senator Hillary Clinton spoke at a Friendship Dinner organized by the movement and appreciated the activities of the movement.87 Graham Fuller, a former CIA officer and the author of several books on Islam, said admiringly that Gülen is leading “one of the most important movements in the Muslim world today.”88 Opposing this, the German weekly Der Spiegel, published a pair of highly critical

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articles which describe the movement as an ultraconservative secret society and Gülen as an ideologue who tolerates no dissent and the one who has dreams of a new age in which Islam will dominate the West.89 The reason for the criticism of Der Spiegel is that it finds the movement’s finances not transparent. It argues that wealthy donors contribute millions to the movement, yet the movement has no headquarters, no address is registered anywhere, and there is no central bank account.90 Moreover, the German weekly Der Spiegel described Gülen as The Preacher Who Could Topple Erdogan after the coup attempt in 2016.91 The movement wanted to raise pious people who could take responsibility in the state bureaucracy. Some scholars argued that the movement’s ultimate goal is to become a political and cultural bridge between the state and the conservative middle class and that by gradually penetrating the state to transform its Kemalist and antireligious foundation and render impossible any repeat of the Jacobin assault on Islam that Mustafa Kemal and his coterie carried out.92 Those scholars use the following excerpt from one of Gülen’s taped sermons in the 1990s which reveals the movement’s intentions of penetrating to the state as well as its gradualist and non-confrontational strategy: You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers … until the conditions are ripe, they [the followers] must continue like this. If they do something prematurely, the world will crush our heads, and Muslims will suffer everywhere, like in the tragedies in Algeria, like in 1982 [in] Syria … like in the yearly disasters and tragedies in Egypt. The time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it … You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey … Until that time, any step taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The work to be done is [in] confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all—in confidence … trusting your loyalty and secrecy. I know that when you leave here—[just] as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must discard the thoughts and the feelings that I expressed here.93

Although the movement claimed to be non-political, it has deep roots in Turkish politics, state institutions, military, intelligence agencies, and

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judiciary. Thus, Gülen has long been accused with conspiracy in Turkey as infiltrating Turkey’s civilian and military bureaucracies to Islamize the secular state. During the military coup in 1971, he was charged with the crime of leading a secret religious community that threatened the secular nature of the state, but he was released after staying in prison several months. In 1980, the Turkish military led a coup and Gülen was detained and questioned about the activities of the movement. After almost 20 years, he faced more serious charges about the aims and goals of the movement. However, in 1999 he had already moved to the United States and so he was prosecuted in absentia. The main piece of evidence used for the case against Gülen was a leaked video wherein he instructed his followers to be patient until reaching all power centers and obtaining the control of constitutional institutions. However, Gülen denied all the accusations by stating that the conversations in the video were edited and intentionally misquoted in written articles. In 2006, Gülen was acquitted of conspiracy charges by the court and it was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in June 2008. Over the years, it has become usual to accuse Gülen and the movement with conspiracy, thus, they developed a sophisticated system of refutation and denial. In conclusion, it is safe to say that in Gülen’s understanding, establishing an Islamic state is not a religious duty for Muslim individuals. In his view, civil society can independently practice Islam even where Muslims are not in the majority as long as democratic standards and conditions are met and satisfied.94 7.1.7  Caliphate The institution of the Caliphate in Islam has an honorable place among Muslims therefore it has been discussed by many scholars throughout Islamic history. Muslim scholars have conducted investigations into the institution of Caliphate to find out whether it is based on religious or political grounds and its significance for Muslim nations while Western scholars deemed it as politic authority hence constituted their views accordingly.95 When the Caliphate was abolished by the secular Turkish government in 1924, various views have been articulated to understand if a religious institution can be abolished by any state. There are three views among Muslim scholars regarding the Caliphate; the first view: Caliphate is a sacred institution, it is universal and necessary for all Muslims; the second view: it is a political institution and was established

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according to the needs of Muslims; the third view: there is no such institution in Islam nor is there a need for it.96 When the Prophet died, he did not mention anything about his successor to his Companions. In fact, even in the Qur’an there is no verse about it. Gülen mentions the opinions of Mehmed Seyyid Bey (1873–1925) a member of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey between 1923, 1925 about the caliphate.97 Seyyid emphasizes the importance of consultation and obedience to the rulers which are related to administration and politics and argues that caliphate came to an end after the fourth caliph in Islamic history, in the thirtieth year of the Islamic calendar.98 He supported the abolishment of caliphate for the rulers who came after the first four righteous caliphs were not legitimate rulers. He endorsed the statement of Turkish parliament: “the institution of caliphate is abolished since the meaning and the context of this institution has been absorbed into the government and the republic.”99 After giving the opinions of Seyyid about the caliphate, Gülen states that some Muslims believe that there is no need for a caliphate due to the establishment of nation states and the development of ideas of independence. For them, caliphate has lost its relevance. Gülen also mentions other Muslims who believe in the dynamics of caliphate since it is a means of unity among Muslims and facilitates cooperation between Muslim nations through exchanging their skills and opportunities.100 After mentioning various views of Muslims about the caliphate Gülen states that the revival of the Caliphate would be very difficult and making Muslims accept such a revived caliphate would be impossible.101 7.1.8   Muslim Nation (Umma) Gülen does not perceive the world in political terms and as a result he does not divide the world by employing mutually exclusive concepts of dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar-al Islam (abode of Islam).102 Gülen stresses that wherever a Muslim is, even outside a Muslim polity, he or she must obey the law of the land, respect others’ rights and behave justly. He advises Muslims to abandon the concept, which divides the world as dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar al-Islam (abode of Islam).103 In Gülen’s understanding, ummah is a transnational socio-cultural entity, not a Utopian politico-legal one.104 Gülen argues that loving one’s nation also encompasses loving God, Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an too.105 Showing respect to these

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values is the foundation of Muslims’ nationality. He believes that Muslim nations’ continuity depends on cherishing these values. He states that Muslim nation can gain a place in the balance of powers and take the lead in representing human virtues by keeping this composition of values. Indeed, we believe that the right and lawful will find their true meanings, blood and tears will come to an end, justice will take place, and humanity will regain peace in safe hands. Why should a person who believes this ideal not try to proclaim this composition of values to the entire world?106 If you really believe that your values are of Divine origin and you see them as having the utmost importance and vitality with respect to their extending to eternity toward the past and future, then you cannot contain yourself from sharing them with all of humanity. The people you address may not accept all of them, but at least they appreciate you and your true identity and inner beauty. In this way, you will have formed friendly circles around you and will be saved from confining yourself to isolation in a shrinking World.107 7.1.9   Relations with Non-Muslims Starting in the early 1990s, Gülen was the first Islamic scholar and religious leader who expressed his views on the necessity of interfaith dialogue. In order to remove socio-political polarization and to establish a new social consensus in Turkey, he encouraged people from different segments of the society to come together at dialogue platforms. Gülen stated that religion is a system of belief embracing all races and all beliefs, regardless of how their adherents implement their faith in their daily lives; they all accept noble values such as love, respect, tolerance, forgiveness, mercy, human rights, peace, brotherhood, and freedom.108 Gülen sympathizers established the Journalists and Writers Foundation in 1994 to promote dialogue and respect among all strata of the society in Turkey and elsewhere. In the context of the Intercultural and interfaith dialogue platform, Gülen came together with faith and community leaders such as Pope John Paul II, Greek Eucumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos, and Sepharadic Chief Rabbi of Israel Eliyahu Bakshi Doron. The Gülen movement’s motto is a dialogue between civilizations. The movement aims to avoid conflict and to expand its educational activities across the globe rather than

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on Turkish soil. The movement advocates freedom of religion among other civic and human liberties. The movement aims to bring together scholars and intellectuals regardless of their ethnic, ideological, religious, and cultural backgrounds in seeking solutions for the problems of Turkey and the world. Gülen’s dialogue and peaceful coexistence discourse has been also adopted outside of Turkey by groups such as the Dialogue Society established in 1999 in London and the Rumi Forum established in 2000 in Washington, DC. There are now hundreds of dialogue associations and humanitarian aid organizations all over the world founded by the movement’s Muslim and non-Muslim volunteers said to be motivated by Gülen’s teachings.109 The volunteers initiate and engage in interfaith and intercultural dialogue with people of different faiths, backgrounds, and cultures to promote peace and mutual understanding. Because of his thoughts on interfaith dialogue, democracy, human rights and respect for the sacred, Gülen has been strongly criticized by political Islamists. They even labeled him as apostate. They argued that Gülen humiliated Islam and Muslims by visiting Pope John Paul II. They also speculated that some Muslims may lose their faith when engaging in interfaith dialogue with people from other faiths.110 However, Gülen rejected all these accusations and stated that the Qur’an calls to interfaith dialogue for it is a purpose of life. People can get to know each other better and promote peace among themselves through interfaith and intercultural dialogues. 7.1.10   Relations with the West The extreme form of secularism and Kemalism prevented the integration of middle-class Turkish-Muslims into the political, social, and economic life. The authoritarian system previously by the secularists and now by the AKP, prevented the pluralization and interpenetration of identities and democratization of the country. The Gülen movement has tried to reintegrate Muslims with the rest of the world. It has succeeded in initiating interfaith and intercultural dialogue among Turkey’s diverse ethnic, political, and religious groups. Although political Islamists of Turkey hesitated between confrontation and accommodation in its relationship with the secular regime and the West, the Gülen movement chose appeasement and accommodation and avoided outright confrontation with the secular establishment and the non-Muslim world.111

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Gülen wants to create bridges between the West and the East. He interprets Islam in a way which enables Muslims to engage with the world through education, science, social sciences, technology, and philosophy.112 He stresses on Muslims to be a part of globalization and calls upon them to engage with different people throughout the world.113 He argues that Islam demands and justifies knowledge acquisition. Muslims should use their knowledge and skills as means of social advancement. He believes that there is a huge diversity of races, religions, cultures, and traditions and the desire for all humanity to be similar is nothing more than wishing for the impossible.114 Therefore, peace of the world lies in respecting these differences, considering these differences to be part of our nature and ensuring that people appreciate these differences. Gülen has a self-confident positive view of the world. He does not turn his face away from the West. Indeed, he regards integration with Europe as a necessity. He believes that unification with the West in one way or another is important as it will bring much benefit to Muslims.115 Thus, he always encouraged Turkish foreign-policy decision makers to remain fully to be on track with the EU membership.116 He was one of the first Islamic leaders to embrace the idea of EU membership at a time when Islamists in general regarded it as a threat to Turkish security and its Islamic culture.117 While some Muslim groups encourage followers to emphasize their Islamic identity, Gülen encourages Muslims to work with and within the majority society. Therefore, Gülen’s followers in Europe and in other parts of the world frequently have been trying to build partnerships with non-Muslim businesses, universities and other secular institutions to sponsor conferences and similar activities. Gülen argues that the Eastern and the Western civilizations have existed as separated from each other. He believes that each civilization can contribute to each other, because, the East lacks rational thought and science while the West is missing spirituality, metaphysics, and eternal values.118 Due to the separation between the East and the West, humanity has experienced disasters. In order to avoid the predicted “clash of civilizations,”119 both civilizations should work together. The entire world can benefit from the unity and cohesion of the East and West greatly.

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7.2   Hierarchy Within the Movement and Operations The followers of the movement are convinced that they are fulfilling a divine mandate made manifest. They refer to the hadith of the Prophet (hadith): “My sincere believers are not here with me. They are the ones who will come when Islam is under attack from within and without; they will come forward and secure the message of God with moral virtue and exemplary behavior. They are the longed-for ones.”120 Gülen is regarded by his followers as the anticipated mujaddid (renewer of faith), and many consider his knowledge and preaching as an expression of divine inspiration. The movement supervised its activities through its senior members who are called imam. They coordinated donations, schools, outreach activities, and newspaper sales, and regularly reported back to Gülen. Countries, continents, various industries and institutions also had their own imams. As the followers of the movement amassed more and more power in state institutions, each and every institution acquired an appointed “imam” from either inside or outside the institution. The imam was supposed to be the superior of all the followers in that organization. The movement’s inner workings and hierarchy are highly secretive to outsiders. The movement has various circles of loyalty: the outermost circles are being the more loosely defined allies, supporters, and recruits. Sympathizers make up the outermost circles. It consists of people who attend weekly discussion sessions held in homes. Members make up the middle circle who donate to the movement and support the outer circle sympathizers’ activities. The inner circle is the more operational core that defines a course of action for the movement. These include teachers in particular, but also journalists, lobbyists, and scholars at think tanks, staff at business groups, and others. They are sometimes called Altin Nesil (Golden Generation). The three groups interact extensively. Students from the movement used to gather regularly to pray and listen to recordings of Gülen’s sermons led by a mentor who would help the students with their school works/studies, as well as, in finding housing or jobs, in establishing a business, or even in finding a suitable wife. Due to the pressure of the secular system, the movement demanded strict obedience and secrecy from its followers. Students were encouraged to obtain positions in the police force, the judiciary, and the military. Their daily routine is characterized by the strict performance of

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ritual prayers, repetitive remembrance of God, reading the Qur’an and studying Gülen’s writings. These activities are complemented by social control mechanisms designed to influence the follower’s behavior, such as group discussions and the imperative regarding the mutual assumption of responsibility for the actions of the residential community’s other members. All this results in a stabilization of intellectual, emotional, and behavioral tendencies which generate the aforementioned habitus.121 Weekly house gatherings and informal discussion groups helped solidify the grassroots discipline and inform the followers of the direction of the movement. It is claimed that in 2012, the Gülen network was the single most cohesive force within the Turkish bureaucracy, judiciary, and law enforcement, providing many of the human resources in key institutions, ranging from the tax authority to the Banking Board or the High Committee of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). Because of this, the movement was accused of being a covert organization within the state with the aim of establishing bureaucratic control over the state.122

7.3  Terror, Violence and Radicalism Gülen argues that Muslims have a unique responsibility to fight against terrorism. Moreover, Muslim communities need to strengthen their immune system against violent extremism. After the deadly attacks in London and Manchester on innocent civilians, he wrote an article which was published at Politico Europe on June 8, 2017 to invite Muslims to fight terrorism all together.123 He labeled so-called Islamic State as the world’s most inhuman criminal network. He believes that Muslims should help intelligence and security communities to prevent future terror attacks. Despite its name, dress, flags, and slogans, ISIS represents a perversion of Islam and an abhorrent betrayal of its spirit. Gülen argued in his article that ISIS, and other groups like it, recruit alienated Muslim youth by offering them a false sense of purpose and belonging in the service of a totalitarian ideology. He invited Muslim parents, teachers, community leaders, and imams, to help Muslim youth to protect themselves from extremism and radicalism. Muslims need to strengthen their immune system against violent extremism. Gülen stated:

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A common fallacy of violent extremist ideologues is to decontextualize the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet and misinterpret them to serve their pre-determined goals. These ideologues turn snapshots from his or his companions’ lives into instruments to justify a criminal act. The antidote is a religious education program that teaches the tradition in a holistic and contextualized way. To be able to resist the deceits of radical ideologues, young Muslims must understand the spirit of their scripture and the overarching principles of their Prophet’s life.124

He identifies the causes of radicalization among Muslims and provides prescriptions for preventing it.125 He provides a religious condemnation of terrorism stating that terrorism cannot be justified in Islam, whatever the situation or circumstance, because it completely contradicts to the spirit of Islam. He stated on many occasions that a person cannot remain a true Muslim while committing an act of terrorism. Gülen rejects suicide attacks categorically and also any other form of violence. The dignity of every person as a unique creation of God has a pivotal role in a holistic religious education. If the Qur’an described taking the life of even one innocent person as a crime against all humanity126 all humanity is honored by God, thus, one cannot enter paradise by killing others. Gülen stated that now, Muslims have the freedom to practice their religion in democratic countries and the values of governments align with core Muslim ideals of social justice, the rule of law, collective decision-making, and equality.127 He believes that if the youth are encouraged to volunteer in humanitarian relief projects to help victims of disasters and violent conflicts they will be satisfied in respect to their social needs. This way, they will be kept away from extremism. The movement has founded more than 1000 modern secular schools, free tutoring centers, colleges, hospitals, and humanitarian relief organizations in more than 150 countries to serve all humanity and prevent the youth from extremism and terrorism. Gülen argued that it is easy to proclaim a certain identity in the abstract, with words and symbols, but the sincerity and truthfulness of a person can only be measured by comparing his/her actions with core values of a faith. He stated that the true test for belief is not slogans or dressing up in a certain way; the true test of our beliefs is in living up to core principles shared by all major world faiths such as upholding the sanctity of life and respecting the dignity of all humans.128 He categorically condemned the ideology that terrorists propagate.

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For him, people’s common humanity comes first before their ethnic, national or religious identity. Victims of terror all over the world are first and foremost human beings and all people should feel their sufferings equally. He urged Muslims to organize community-wide efforts to address all factors that aid terrorist recruitment. He argued that it is necessary for Muslims to work with their communities to set up the necessary framework for identifying at-risk youth, preventing them from seeking self-destructive paths, assisting families with counseling and other support services.129

7.4  A Victim Needs Self-Criticism Gülen has been living in the Poconos, in rural Pennsylvania, since he left Turkey in 1998. Turkey’s leading businessmen, journalists, bureaucrats, media tycoons, and even several government ministers visited Gülen in his complex. Ahmet Davutoğlu when he was foreign minister visited Gülen secretly in 2013 while attending the UN General Assembly in New York. Gülen remains a mysterious personality for a number of reasons: he believes in modernity but is traditional; supports secularism but imparts a greater role for religion in society; preaches universal Islam but adherers to a Turkish-Ottoman concept of “National Islam”; and finally, claims to be “non-political” but is actively involved in politics behind the scenes.130 Previously, many people from different backgrounds of Turkish society gave credit to the Gülen movement. Especially, its contributions to education and interfaith and intercultural dialogue in Turkey and abroad received a great support from many intellectuals. Although the movement made good success with regards to intercultural dialogue, Muslims’ better relations with Western countries, opening schools with secular curricula and criticizing radical terrorist groups, yet it has remained to be too traditionalist on certain issues. The movement remains traditional on issues such as gender-relations, the meaning of religious authority, the tension between critical thinking and religious dogmatism, Sunni-Shia division, the illiberal aspects of Islamic law, and Islam-state relations.131 The Gülen movement made mistakes by allying the AKP and then engaging in a zero-sum struggle against it. It has been criticized by some intellectuals in its relations with the military and police officers and judicial bureaucrats. Especially, the movement was heavily criticized by some intellectuals when these officers engaged in a power struggle

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against the secularists together with the AKP during the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials. The movement’s relations with politics and bureaucracy during the Ergenekon operations caused the movement to be blamed for cooperating with the AKP government. Although the followers of the movement are victims of an ongoing witch-hunt, they have not received the sympathy they have expected from the Turkish society. One of the possible reasons for it is that Turkish society is too polarized to show sympathy to each other. They do not care about the ongoing persecution of thousands of innocent individuals. The other reason for the lack of sympathy to the movement is related to its mistakes that led to its current alienation. The strategy of staying indifferent to the unjust treatment the other Islamic structures made the movement lonely. Common perception is that the movement deemed itself superior to all other groups in Turkey. It dominated almost all of the spheres of life such as religious education, politics, bureaucracy, media, banking, and charity. It did not abide by the principles of meritocracy. It attempted to function in almost every aspect of life. Especially, the unprecedented success the movement has displayed in education led to a decrease in the impact of other Islamic communities. By becoming a center of attraction in the field of education, the movement got the lion’s share in financial aid from the religious rich families. The intelligent children of these families were attended in their schools. Thus, the movement gained enemies from almost all other religious, political, and social groups in Turkey. Although Gülen movement is a social, civic, and religious movement it was active in the political sphere of Turkey too. Prior to the 2013 split between Erdogan and Gülen, the movement was accused by many as involving in politics extensively. The movement does not advocate for the formation of an Islamic state but it wants the state accepts Islamic values and principles.132 The alleged link between the movement and the security forces in Turkey supports this claim.133 For example, the police and prosecutors who coordinated the corruption investigation were alleged as long-time members of the movement.134 The most important matter of debate, criticism, and accusation directed at the Gülen community not only in Turkey but also throughout the world can be summed up as a set-up in the state. The followers of the movement obtained important positions particularly in the key ministries with a large number of staffs, such as the Interior, Justice, Education ministries, and the security forces. Gülen himself responded to accusations of the set-up within the state:

204  R. DOGAN First and above all, I am essentially a child of Anatolia. It cannot be called infiltration when somebody encourages the individuals from his own nation to take office in some establishments in his own country. Both those individuals and establishments belong to this country. What is implied with the infiltration was already done by those outside of this nation at a certain time. Yes, an individual of a nation does not infiltrate into the establishments, which exist for his own nation; it is his right, he goes in there; he goes into civil service, to the court of law, to the intelligence service, or to the foreign affairs. It should be noted that those who bring forth such allegations of setting up, infiltration, proliferation, and who try to intimidate dutiful people are the kind who have almost at all times infiltrated, set up and proliferated on behalf of their own philosophies by hiding behind their slander and misdirecting.135

There is nothing to reject the responses of Gülen, because, in a democratic society, government cadres should be open to people from all walks of life, on the basis of merit. However, the movement is accused for placing these individuals in the bureaucracy as part of a strategy as well as being a secretive hierarchical organization within the community and manipulation of the state’s opportunities for the community’s interests. Beginning in 2002, the AKP government appointed key figures from the followers of Gülen movement in the police intelligence, narcotics, antiterrorism, and surveillance units. Later, they led Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and other investigations. Those who were arrested in these trials and in subsequent probes were secularists and Kemalists who had criticized or attacked the Gülen movement over the years. The movement’s effort against the deep state was strongly backed by Erdogan. He proudly said “I am the prosecutor of these probes.” He sent his personal armored vehicle to the prosecutor, Zekeriya Öz, as a goodwill gesture. Ironically, the prosecutor is today considered as an enemy of the state by the AKP government thus, has fled Turkey. During those years, dozens of trials were launched against the secularists and Kemalists. Hundreds of military officers, generals, journalists, writers, and bureaucrats were imprisoned. The wide-scale use of wiretappings to humiliate or discredit the suspects had a frightening effect on the public for they were in awe of the movement’s power within law enforcement and security forces. During all these, Turkey’s Minister of Justice, Sadullah Ergin, announced that 113,000 citizens’ phones had been tapped by the centralized Directorate of Telecommunications.

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There was investigation after investigation attributed to the followers of the movement within the police intelligence and antiterrorism units on issues ranging from a probe into Fenerbahçe soccer team for match fixing, to one about television rating agencies.136 In the eyes of many Turkish citizens, Gülen’s followers seemed to be able to tap the phones of even the most powerful people in Turkey and launch investigations and prosecutions against them. The secularists and Kemalists argued that the movement’s concentration in the judiciary, police, and intelligence, as well as in the technology and national surveillance departments, presented a national security threat.137 The Gülen movement had influence in the Turkish judiciary and intelligence services and used it during the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials. The prosecutors, often claimed to be from the Gülen movement, had warrants issued for the arrests of people who appeared hostile to the movement, not only military officers but also journalists, academics, civil society activists, and bureaucrats. The politicization of these trials earned the Gülen movement international criticism. The AKP claimed that the Gülen movement wanted a say in the state without forming a political party, having a program or being held accountable to the people and public opinion. It argued that the movement desired to remove Erdogan in order to achieve its political goals. The movement denied its involvement in politics and its desire to permeate the Turkish state. The followers of the movement argued that they reached any official or political posts as a result of their capabilities. It seems there is inconsistency between the movement’s statement and its participation in politics. Although the movement stated that it distanced itself from politics it pursued representation in the state apparatus and this attitude was understood by the AKP as seeking a political role in the state. Some observers criticized the movement as preserving its opaque, hierarchical, and mystical decision-making structure.138 Obviously, this perception caused many to suspect about the true nature and goals of the movement, despite its great efforts in education, interfaith and intercultural dialogue. If the Gülen movement self-critically reflects on these mistakes, it can make some positive contributions to Turkey as well as to other countries where it functions as civil society actor.139 Although the movement’s lack of transparency and the weakness of its internal democracy and capacity for self-criticism are unsettling, this does not necessarily render the movement an extremist phenomenon.140

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Overall, the Gülen movement is a success story but, of course, it has failures in its history as well. The movement should become transparent as soon as possible. Although Gülen has been taking his steps cautiously from the very first day and personally monitoring each of his students closely, undoubtedly, there have been some people in this ever-growing structure who have been engaged in serious mistakes, and such people may still be doing so.

Notes



1. Zurcher, Erik J., Turkey: A Modern History (London, New York, and Istanbul: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 194. 2.  Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, “Soylev ve Demecler” (Speeches and statements), in The Grand National Assembly and Republican People’s Party General Meetings: 1919–1938 (Istanbul: Meclis Yayinlari, 1945). 3. Heper, Metin, “Review of ‘Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam’s Revival’,” The Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001): 150–151. 4. Please see for details Akcura, Yusuf, Uc Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Types of Politics) (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1976). 5.  Bilici, Mucahit, “The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey,” The Muslim World 96 (2006): 1–20. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8.  M. Hakan Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 4 (1999): 584–605. 9. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6 (2018): 182–192. 10. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6, no. 1 (2018): 182–192. 11. Dorroll, Philip, “The Turkish Understanding of Religion: Rethinking Tradition and Modernity in Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82, no. 4 (2014): 1–37. 12. Yavuz, M. Hakan, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 189. 13. Gülen, Fethullah, “The Final Guard” (Turkish), Sızıntı, October 1980, available online: http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/son-karakol.html. 14. Koçak, Kıvanç, “Gülen and Totalitarianism: Authoritarianism, Military Order and Discipline,” Birikim 282 (2012): 5.

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15.  Bilici, Mucahit, “The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey,” The Muslim World 96 (2006): 1–20. 16. Ibid. 17.  Eijaz, Abida, “Reconceptualizing Secularism in the Backdrop of Fethullah Gulen Movement: The Case of Pakistan,” New Media and Mass Communication 8 (2012): 12–17. 18. Ibid. 19. Kuru, Ahmet T., “Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gulen Movement and the AK Party,” in Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), 141. 20.  Yavuz, Hakan, M., and Jon L. Esposito, “Introduction,” in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito (Syracuse and New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 16. 21. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6 (2018): 182–192. 22. Hendrick, Joshua D., Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 20–22. 23. Gülen, Fethullah, Towards a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance (Somerset, NJ: The Light, 2004), 122. 24. Ibid. 25. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6 (2018): 182–192. 26. Ibid. 27. Adaman, Fikret, and Murat Arsel, “The European Union and Turkey: Who Defines Environmental Progress?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 4 (2008): 541–543. 28. Gülen, Fethullah, “L’échec de l’expérience démocratique turque n’est pas dû à l’adhésion aux valeurs islamiques mais à leur trahison” (Islam is Compatible with Democracy, Despite Turkey’s Recent Example), La Monde, February 25, 2019, available online: https://www.lemonde.fr/ idees/article/2019/02/25/fethullah-gulen-l-echec-de-l-experiencedemocratique-turque-n-est-pas-du-a-l-adhesion-aux-valeurs-islamiquesmais-a-leur-trahison_5427773_3232.html. Retrieved March 11, 2019. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 33. Ibid.

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34. Gülen, Fethullah, Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance (Somerset, NJ: Light, 2006), 219–224. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 38. Ibid. 39. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 33. 40.  Saul, Stephanie, “Charter Schools Tied to Turkey Grow in Texas,” New York Times, June 6, 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes. com/2011/06/07/education/07charter.html. 41. The list of accounts about trips to Turkey sponsored and paid for by a host of various Gülen affiliates, see “Accounts of Gulenist Turkey trips,” available here: http://turkishinvitations.weebly.com/gulenistturkey-tripaccounts.html. 42. Gözaydın, İştar B., “The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?” Democratization 16, no. 6 (2009): 1214–1236. 43. “Educational Services Spreading Throughout the World,” fgulen.com, last modified September 20, 2016, http://en.fgulen.com/content/ view/778/16/[0]. 44. Zanotti, Jim, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress R41368 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 27 April 2012), 9. 45. Fethullah Gülen, http://www.fgulen.com/en/. 46. Gülen, Fethullah, Messenger of God: Muhammad (NJ: Light, 2005), 20. 47. Gülen, Fethullah, Pearls of Wisdom (Fairfax, VA: The Fountain, 2000), 1–4. 48. Sharon-Krespin, Rachel, “Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition,” Middle East Quarterly 16, no. 1 (2009): 12. 49. Sharon-Krespin, “Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition,” 12. 50. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53.  Saritoprak, Zeki, “Fethullah Gülen’s Thoughts on State, Democracy, Politics, Terrorism,” The Muslim World 95 (2005): 325–471. 54. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid.

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58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Esposito, John L., and İhsan Yılmaz, Islam and Peacebuilding: Gulen Movement Initiatives (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2012), 28. 61.  Esposito, John L., Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 248. 62.  Saritoprak, Zeki, “Fethullah Gülen’s Thoughts on State, Democracy, Politics, Terrorism,” The Muslim World 95 (2005): 325–471. 63. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 64. Gülen, Fethullah, Fasildan Fasila (From Session to Session) (Istanbul: Nil Yayinlari, 2008), 1/288. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazālī, al-Muṣtaṣfā min ‘Ilm Uṣūl (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijariyya, 1937), 1/287. 69. Fethullah Gulen, Yenilenme Cehdi/Kırık Testi 12 (Endeavor for Renewal/Broken Jug 12) (Izmir: Nil Yayinlari, 2012), 131. 70. Gulen, Yenilenme Cehdi (Endeavor for Renewal), 131. 71. Ibid., 132. 72. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 73. Ibid. 74. Gulen, Yenilenme Cehdi (Endeavor for Renewal), 132. 75. Ibid. 76.  Saritoprak, Zeki, “Fethullah Gülen’s Thoughts on State, Democracy, Politics, Terrorism,” The Muslim World 95 (2005): 325–471. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79.  Saritoprak, Zeki, “Fethullah Gülen’s Thoughts on State, Democracy, Politics, Terrorism,” The Muslim World 95 (2005): 325–471. 80. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 81.  Agai, Bekim, “Between Network and Discourse: The Educational Network Surrounding Fethullah Gülen: The Flexible Implementation of Modern Islamic Thought,” Bonner Islam-studien, vol. 2 (Schenefeld: EB Verlaq, 2004), 140. 82. Çobanoğlu, Yavuz, The Goal of a Golden Generation: Society, State, Morality and Authority According to Fethullah Gülen (Turkish) (Istanbul, 2012), 72.

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83. Gülen, Fethullah, “L’échec de l’expérience démocratique turque n’est pas dû à l’adhésion aux valeurs islamiques mais à leur trahison” (Islam is Compatible with Democracy, Despite Turkey’s Recent Example), La Monde, February 25, 2019, available online: https://www.lemonde.fr/ idees/article/2019/02/25/fethullah-gulen-l-echec-de-l-experiencedemocratique-turque-n-est-pas-du-a-l-adhesion-aux-valeurs-islamiquesmais-a-leur-trahison_5427773_3232.html. Retrieved March 11, 2019. 84. Yilmaz, Ihsan, “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 400. 85. Kuru, Ahmet, “Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases,” Political Science Quarterly 120, no. 2 (2005): 265. 86.  Bilici, Mucahit, “The Fethullah Gulen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey,” The Muslim World 96, no. 1 (2006): 17–18. 87.  “Hillary Clinton Participated Friendship Dinner in NY,” YouTube, uploaded September 20, 2007, available at: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=8xnLTYGWo-o. 88. Hansen, Suzy, “The Global Imam,” The New Republic, November 10, 2010, available at: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/ magazine/79062/global-turkey-imam-fethullah-gulen. 89.  Popp, Maximilian, “The Shadowy World of the Islamic Gulen Movement,” Der Spiegel, August 8, 2012, available online at: http:// www.spiegel.de/international/germany/guelen-movement-accused-ofbeing-asect-a-848763-druck.html. 90. Ibid. 91. Popp, Maximilian, “A Brother’s Vengeance: The Preacher Who Could Topple Erdogan,” Der Spiegel, September 1, 2014, available at: http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkey-erdogan-sees-power-threatenedby-muslim-cleric-guelen-a-942296-druck.html. 92. Yavuz, M. Hakan, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 199–202. 93. Sharon-Krespin, Rachel, “Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2009): 55–66. 94. Esposito, Islam and Peacebuilding: Gulen Movement Initiatives, 35. 95. Dogan, Recep, “Discussion over Theological and Political Foundations of Caliphate in Islam,” Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture 6, no. 2 (2018): 1–8. 96. Dogan, Recep, “Discussion over Theological and Political Foundations of Caliphate in Islam,” Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture 6, no. 2 (2018): 1–8. 97. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 98. Ibid.

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99. Ibid. 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid. 102. Yilmaz, Ihsan, “Social Innovation for Peaceful Coexistence: Intercultural Activism from Rumi to Gülen,” in Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s Initiatives in the Modern World, ed. İhsan Yılmaz et al. (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), 35. 103. Yılmaz, İhsan, “Ijtihad and Tajdid by Conduct: The Gülen Movement,” in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, ed. M. H. Yavuz and J. L. Esposito (Syracuse and New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 235. 104. Ibid. 105. Gülen, Endeavor for Renewal, 252. 106. Ibid. 107. Gülen, Endeavor for Renewal, 254. 108. “Fethullah Gülen’s Speeches and Interviews on Interfaith Dialogue,” fgulen.com, last modified June 9, 2017, http://en.fgulen.com/ content/view/1334/11/. 109. Gözaydın, İştar B., “The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?” Democratization 16, no. 6 (2009): 1214–1236. 110. Eygi, Mehmet Sevket, “Papalikla Gizli Anlasma” [Secret Agreement with Papacy], Milli Gazete (National Gazette), May 26, 2000. 111.  Yavuz, M. Hakan, Toward and Islamic Enlightenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 112. Ebaugh, H. R., The Gulen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam (New York: Springer, 2009). 113. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6 (2018): 182–192. 114. Ibid. 115. Sevindi, Nevval, Contemporary Islamic Conversations: M. Fethullah Gülen on Turkey, Islam, and the West. Edited by Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi`. Tr. Abdullah T. Antepli (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), 45. 116. Esposito, John L., and İhsan Yılmaz, Islam and Peacebuilding: Gulen Movement Initiatives (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2012), 26. 117.  Kösebalaban, Hasan, “The Making of Enemy and Friend: Fethullah Gülen’s National-Security Identity,” in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 176. 118. Sevindi, Contemporary Islamic Conversations, 85. 119. For details please see Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997).

212  R. DOGAN 120.  Yavuz, M. Hakan, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (Oxford, 2013), 71. 121. Dohrn, Kristina, Ethics and Practice in Communes Operated by the Gülen Movement (Berlin: Weißensee-Verlag, 2014). 122.  Middle East Eye, “Analysis: Dissecting Turkey’s Gulen-Erdogan Relationship,” July 26, 2016, available online: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-dissecting-turkeys-gulen-erdoganrelationship-528239159. 123. Gülen, Fethullah, “Muslims’ Unique Responsibility to Fight Terror,” Politico, last modified June 12, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/ muslims-unique-responsibility-in-fighting-terror-london-attack-fethullah-gulen/. 124. Ibid. 125. “Muslims, We Have to Critically Review Our Understanding of Islam,” Huffington Post, last modified December 17, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emre-celik/fethullah-gulen-muslims-w_b_8848718. html. 126. Qur’an 5:32. 127. Gülen, Fethullah, “Muslims’ Unique Responsibility to Fight Terror,” Politico, last modified June 12, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/ muslims-unique-responsibility-in-fighting-terror-london-attack-fethullah-gulen/. 128.  Gülen, Fethullah, “Muslims, We Have to Critically Review Our Understanding of Islam,” Le Monde, last modified December 27, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/12/17/musulmans-procedons-a-un-examencritique-de-notre-comprehension-de-la-foi_4834205_ 3232.html. 129. Ibid. 130. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6, no. 1 (2018): 182–192. 131.  Kuru, Ahmet T., and Alfred Stepan, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Analyzing the Failure,” The Montréal Review, December 2017, available online: http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-DemocracyIn-Turkey.php. 132. Sharon-Krespin, “Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition,” 12. 133. Ibid., 5. 134. Silverman, Reuben, “The Shoebox Is on the Other Foot: Turkey’s Year of Retaliation,” Jadaliyya, December 21, 2014. 135.  https://tr.boell.org/de/2014/06/16/near-future-turkey-axis-akpguelen-movement.

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136. Aydintasbas, Asli, “The Good, the Bad, and the Gülenists: The Role of the Gülen Movement in Turkey’s Coup Attempt,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2016. 137.  Jenkins, H., “Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation,” Silk Road Studies, August 2009, available at: http:// www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2009_08_ SRP_Jenkins_Turkey-Ergenekon.pdf. 138. Kuru, Ahmet T., and Alfred Stepan, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Analyzing the Failure,” The Montréal Review, December 2017, available online: http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-AndDemocracy-In-Turkey.php. 139.  Kuru, Ahmet T., and Alfred Stepan, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Analyzing the Failure,” The Montréal Review, December 2017, available online: http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-DemocracyIn-Turkey.php. 140. Park, Bill, “The Fethullah Gülen Movement,” MERIA Journal 12, no. 4 (2008): 1–14.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Groups

8.1  Introduction Religion is very effective tool with regards to shaping people’s mind and ideology. The interpretation of religion by individuals, cultures, and nations may be different from the religion itself. Throughout human history there have been extremists who have interpreted their faith traditions in extreme ways. They have legitimized violence and terrorism by their extreme mentality. In order to cover up their crimes, they often use religious concepts because by misinterpreting religion, they have attempted to show their violence and terrorism as “promoting good and preventing evil.” In Islamic history, extremists often use religious concepts and interpret Islam according to their ideology. They commit violence in the name of religion and legitimize their evil acts by this “sacred” cause. They are terrorists but they call themselves as “true” Muslims. Their violence is nothing but terrorism, and yet they name it as jihad to deceive ignorant masses. Political Islam is a new form of religious extremism in the twenty-first century. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (the AKP) which has been in power since 2002 represents political Islam. It is very rigid, exclusive, and authoritarian. Under the leadership of Erdogan, Justice, and Development Party aims to make Turkey Islamist state and implement the sharia in its rigid form. Therefore, Erdogan wants a presidential form of government with no checks and balances and a system of © The Author(s) 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2_8

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one-man rule. He has replaced his authoritarian regime in the place of the previous tutelage of the military caste. After imposing his own regime on the state, he clearly declared that whether one accepts it or not, Turkey’s administrative system has changed. According to Political Islamists, Erdogan is the caliph of Muslims, thus every Muslim must obey him. If anyone opposes his caliphate, it becomes permissible to apply force, oppression, and violence against him or her. The differences in the ideology, worldview, and interpretation of Islam have eventually caused the dramatic split between the Gülen movement and the ruling Political Islam (AKP) in Turkey. The conflict between these two groups has many roots. At the ideological level, the most important divergence is their approach to Islam for the AKP stems from the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the clash between the AKP and the Gülen Movement is described as power struggle within the state, it does not give the full picture of it. The most effective cause that split the two groups from each other is directly related to their understanding of Islam, or in other words, how each group interprets Islam in theory and practice. The split between them is, in reality, the difference between political Islam and the civil Islam. Indeed, the AKP and the Gülen Movement originated and developed from different religious communities. The AKP is a political Islamist movement which is far more radical than it is commonly assumed. The origins of this movement go back to Milli Görüş (National View) led by the late Erbakan, which aimed to bring the shariah rule to the Turkish state. Political Islamists of Turkey got inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Being strongly committed to the Islamization of the state, they are heavily against the West and are full with anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. The leading figures of political Islamists in Turkey are all antiimperialist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western. Erbakan and Erdogan have important influence on the formation of the ideology of political Islam in Turkey. Both are strongly against the West for they argue that the Islamic world is being exploited by the West. Both aim to establish Islamic union where they could be the “natural” leader. Both have radical and extreme Islamist views. They do not accept any other source of justice or truth other than their own Islamist interpretation. For instance, they believe that women’s true happiness lies only in Islam, seeing them as mothers only. Both leaders are heavily influenced by Islamist writers like Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb. They have cordial ties with

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the Muslim Brotherhood developed over a long period of time. Their views of the West, Jews, and the state are similar to the views of Muslim Brotherhood on these issues. They have Salafi/Wahhabi tendency in their interpretation of Islam. They both have this nostalgia to the mighty Ottomans and an ensuing sense of Turkish superiority. Particularly, the extreme ideology of the AKP is more visible in its foreign policy with its clear affinities with authoritarian regimes and movements across the Middle East. In this sense, the 2011 Arab upheavals accelerated the AKP to return to its ideological roots. On the other side, Gülen movement is a civic community organized around service to humanity through education and dialogue between religions and cultures. People in the movement are inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gülen, who emerged from within a network of Sufi traditions and inspired by the teachings of Bediüzzaman Said-i-Nursi (d. 1960). He advocated intercultural and interfaith dialogue to promote peace in the world. Although he teaches Islamic values, he does not seek to establish Islamic state as a political entity. Inspired by the ideology of Gülen, businessmen, education professionals, and dedicated youth immigrated to countries all over the world. Volunteer participants in the movement contribute to the voluntary services in multiple ways, crystallizing in tutoring centers, schools, colleges, hospitals, a major relief organization, publishing houses, and media institutions, both in Turkey and in more than a hundred countries of the world. Although the movement claimed to be non-political, it has deep roots in Turkish politics, state institutions, military, intelligence agencies, and judiciary. The followers of the movement obtained important positions particularly in the key state institutions with a large number of staffs. Thus, Gülen has long been accused with the conspiracy in Turkey as infiltrating Turkey’s civilian and military bureaucracies to Islamize the secular state. The movement wants to have a say in the state without forming a political party by being held accountable to the people and public opinion. The movement admits that it made mistakes by allying with the AKP and then engaging in a zero-sum struggle against it. It has been criticized by some intellectuals in its relations with the military and police officers and judicial bureaucrats, especially when these officers engaged in a power struggle against the secularists and the Kemalists together with the AKP during the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials. The politicization of these trials earned the Gülen Movement criticism within and without Turkey. The operations through the strategic alliance

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handled in the triangle of police-prosecutor-judge gradually turned into an image of a new sort of social engineering. The movement became a scapegoat and accused as the one attempting to interfere with every aspect of life.

8.2  Comparison of the Two Groups Political Islamists pursue political objectives to find political responses to today’s societal challenges by concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.1 Political Islam is about political order2 and it is a particular form of interpretation of Islam on the basis of certain doctrines, beliefs, and values as the foundation of a political structure. For them, there is no distinction between religion and politics.3 By the slogan “Islam is din and dawla” (religion and state) they aim to religionize politics for the promotion of a political order to make God’s sovereignty dominant in the state. Gülen (or Hizmet) Movement is described by academics as a civic, social, and religious group that was initiated in Turkey and then spread all over the world. They are known for their educational institutions that have been quite successful. They advocate interfaith and intercultural dialogue to build bridges between different cultures and religions all over the world.4 The Gülen Movement has varied definitions due to its different functions.5 It is a religious movement for it focuses on individual transformation and religious practices. It is a social movement by its extensive outreach into various institutions such as education, health care, and media. It is a political movement due to its purported permeation of key government and military offices. In order for readers to better understand the differences between the Gülen movement and Political Islamists of Turkey (the AKP), their views on key concepts such as democracy, secularism, the relations with the west, the relations with non-Muslims, nationalism, umma (Muslims Nation), caliphate, shariah, and extremism will be discussed and compared.

8.3  Democracy Since they came to power in 2002 up to 2019 Political Islamists in Turkey have obtained continuous success in general and municipal elections. This victory is connected to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s personality;

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thus, the AKP has evolved from a broad coalition into one-man rule. Currently, Erdogan is the only leader who could exercise any real power in the party as well as the state. During the course of AKP rule, Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies have escalated. Indeed, while he was the mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan stated that democracy is like a train: you get on the train and when you reach your destination, you get off.6 The AKP regime has abandoned the reform processes in line with European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Union (EU) norms. It has blocked the legal and legislative steps which are necessary concerning the state’s transparency and accountability. Although Political Islamists have been using the technical mechanics of electoral democracy, they never accepted its underlying values. The political system which Erdogan is implementing now is distinctly illiberal and autocratic. The national elections are seemingly free but definitely not fair. Opposing to Erdogan, Gülen argued that Islam and democracy are fully compatible with each other for Islam does not support arbitrary or authoritarian forms of government at all. In his view, no group has domination over the others and democratic form of governance where no group, majority, or minority, dominates the others is the best form of governance for diverse population. He argues that participatory form of governance (democracy) is much more in resonance with the Islamic spirit than other forms of government, including monarchies and oligarchies. He wants to introduce Islam as a complement to democracy so the Muslim world can develop their own democracy which reconcile the relationship between the spiritual and material world in a balanced way.7 Gülen does not accept the argument that Islam is based on the rule of God, while democracy is based on the view of humans and, therefore, Islam and democracy cannot be reconciled. According to his opinion, “sovereignty belongs to the nation unconditionally” does not mean that sovereignty has been taken from God and given to humans; rather, it means that sovereignty has been taken from individual oppressors and dictators and given to the community members.8

8.4  Nationalism Political Islamists of Turkey have been using the notion of Turkish nationalism in their ideology. They often put their emphasis on Turkey’s Ottoman past. They believe that Islam is the only precondition to be a Turk and to remain a Turk and to become the natural leader of the

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Islamic world.9 Political Islamists promote the Turkish nationalism which is blended with neo-Ottomanism. They present themselves as the representatives of Anatolia, the supposed home of authentic, humble, and uncorrupted Turkish-Muslim people.10 They have an undying opposition to Europe and the West for this opposition is in the very heart of their ideology.11 Parallel to Political Islamists, the concept of hizmet (service) emerges as a point of interpenetration between Islam and Turkish nationalism. The military interventions in Turkey created an atmosphere where the Gülen movement tended to move toward nationalist discourses. For this reason, one of the definitions of the movement is that it is an Islamicbased movement which has sought to combine a modern interpretation of Islam with Turkish nationalism.12 Gülen movement positioned its identity at place between nationalism and Islam to protect itself against the nationalist/secularist Turkish state. Although Gülen’s notion of national identity is inspired from the Ottoman-Islamic legacy his concept of nationalism is not based on race or blood but rather it is on shared political realities and historical experiences.13

8.5  Caliphate Political Islamists of Turkey deem their leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the rightful caliph of Muslims and invite all Muslims to give him their pledge of alliance. The establishment of caliphate has been shaped around Erdogan by using some key words. Political Islamists define Erdogan as “commander in chief,” “leader of the Muslim World” and “the hope of the ummah”14 to establish his caliphate in the minds of Muslims. Erdogan has a burning desire to be the caliph of Muslims because he understands caliphate as having extraordinary power which is uncontrolled, unrestricted, unquestioned, and unchallenged. With his leadership skills and by using religious concepts in his political discourse Erdogan has started to unite religious groups under his authority. He presents his caliphate as such an important issue that Muslim world needs a super powerful caliph who can unite Muslims under his banner and protect them against the West and the United States. During the last three years, Erdogan has been acting like an Ottoman Sultan having extraordinary power that cannot be unquestioned. With regards to caliphate, Gülen only provides opinions from scholars such as Seyyid Bey, Mustafa Sabri, and Ibn Khaldun, but he does not

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say much as his own personal opinion on this matter. He also states that some Muslims believe that there is no need for a caliphate due to the establishment of nation states while others believe in the dynamics of caliphate since it is a means of unity among Muslims and it also facilitates cooperation between Muslim nations through exchanging their skills and opportunities.15 Gülen personally believes that the revival of the caliphate would be very difficult and that making Muslims accept such a revived caliphate would be impossible.16

8.6  Muslim Nation (Umma) Political Islamists emphasize the idea of united umma (Muslim Nation) and see themselves as the only heir of the Ottoman Empire who has the capacity to unite all Muslim countries under the leadership of Erdogan. They propagate the idea that Muslims all together should constantly work for the interests of umma because Muslim Nation (umma) has been facing severe opposition from the West and the United States. In this regard, Erdogan often calls Muslims to be united against the United States, Israel, and Western powers to prevent their heinous plan of destroying the Islamic world.17 Within the climate of a “us vs them” dichotomy, Erdogan simply offers himself as the savior of Muslims. Opposing to Political Islamists, Gülen does not perceive the world in political terms. Unlike them, he does not divide the world by employing mutually exclusive concepts of dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar-al Islam (abode of Islam).18 He stresses that wherever a Muslim is, even outside a Muslim polity, he or she must obey the law of the land, respect others’ rights and behave justly. He advises Muslims to abandon the concepts of dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar al-Islam (abode of Islam). In Gülen’s understanding, ummah is a transnational socio-cultural entity, not a Utopian politico-legal one.19

8.7  The Shariah According to the ideology of Political Islam, Islam is a divine system which can be practiced anywhere and anytime because it is superior to other political systems with its ability that responds to all human problems. The ideal of the shariah invokes the core idea of law that resonates deeply with the Islamic past. However, the very word Shariah conjures

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images of social control in their eyes through severe criminal punishment. Political Islamists believe that in order to abolish the secular system and establish the Shariah in Turkey, Muslims should be patient and wait for an appropriate time for action.20 They argue that through creating a universal leader or a caliph, the goal of practising the shariah and establishing Islamic state can be actualized.21 Gülen opposes Political Islamists who think that Shariah rule would necessitate an Islamic state. He argues that the principles that are related to the state administration in Islam are only 5% and the remaining 95% are related to the articles of faith, the pillars of Islam, and the moral principles of religion.22 Gülen emphasizes the fact that Islam aims to promote and secure human rights. If these rights are preserved by the democratic system, then Islam never opposes democracy.23

8.8  Islamic State An Islamic state is preeminently the Shariah state, defined by its commitment to a vision of legal order.24 Political Islamists believe Islam has a specific theory on politics and the state and they resort to the religious texts and certain historical precedents of Islamic government to prove the idea of establishing an Islamic state. They want to preserve the close link between religion and politics in which the traditional jurisprudence had developed. They seek to create the notion of Islamic state on the basis of the mixture of religion and politics. Gülen rejects political Islam and all attempts toward making an Islamic political system. He argues that Islam does not propose the idea of a certain unchangeable political system. For him, reducing Islam to a political ideology is a great injustice to the religion.25 Gülen Movement does not desire the creation of an Islamic state but it wants the state respect religion and its values. The followers of the movement believe that religion should be part of the public life and not just be limited to the private sphere of the individual.26 The state should ensure that it does not interfere with the free exercise of religion. In this regard, the movement is the first Islamic group which accepted living under the secular form of state while asking for religious freedom. The movement advocates a secular state that would stand at the same distance from all beliefs and philosophies, imposing no ideology on individual lives.

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8.9  Education Under the rule of the AKP regime, Political Islamists have undertaken major reforms to Islamize every sector of Turkey’s education system. They increased the amount of compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools. They have supported and opened increasingly more and more religious schools. The students of these state-funded religious schools (imam-hatip schools) have strong links with the Foundation of Youth and Education which is run by Bilal Erdogan, son of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Political Islamists dismantled the education reforms of the late 1990s and introduced new reforms to Islamize Turkey’s education system. The AKP reforms have changed these religious schools from the position of optional education institutions to the central ones in the education system. All students who do not qualify for other kind of schools would have no choice but to enroll in these religious schools. The education system that Political Islamists advocate is now lack of moderate Islamic understanding for it does not train people on the applicable behaviors in social circumstances of psychological anger, rage and resistance to extremism. In recent years, the support for terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaida, has increased among Turkish citizens due to the education system implemented by the AKP government. While Political Islamists oppose the western style of education, Gülen Movement practices it in its schools. Contrary to a common preconception, the schools follow a secular education curriculum in conformity with the host country authorities, rather than Islamic education or preaching the ideas of Gülen. While the schools take into account local cultures and adhere to a secular, modern curriculum, their goal is elevating the young generations to universal values of humanity.27 In places linked to the movement’s activities—from schools to dormitories, to administrative centers of foundations—no sign of Muslim faith is present.28 Scientific disciplines are privileged in these schools. Without imposing their ideology on others, teachers try to apply good character and manners in their personal lives. They try to educate children in the schools as new intellectuals who can contribute to world peace, social harmony, and interfaith dialogue. Gülen believes that there is no reason to fear from science. He argues that Muslims should be equipped with both modern sciences and Islamic ethics. With this education, they will be able to interpret Islam better and in a more compatible way to the

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needs of contemporary Muslims. Gülen believes that founding a school is better than building a mosque; thus, his sympathizers opened schools, universities and other educational institutions all over the world.

8.10  Extremism, Terrorism, and Jihad Political Islamists have extreme tendency with regards to interpreting religion. They easily declare Muslims as apostates who do not agree with their ideology. In this regard, Erdogan declared Gülen and his sympathizers as a terrorist group and then Mehmet Gormez, the ex-head of Diyanet, declared the Gülen Movement as a deviated sect and millions of its followers as apostates and infidels.29 There is a strong similarity between the terrorist groups and Political Islamists of Turkey with regards to labeling other Muslims as disbelievers and then legitimizing all kinds of injustices against them. Political Islamists believe that jihad is incumbent on all Muslims to defend the caliph, Islamic lands, and religious values. They speak openly of engaging in “jihad” and a revival of the Ottoman Empire under the institution of a caliphate. They publicly blame Christianity and Judaism for corrupting the world and straying from the true path. As a result, it is not surprising that Political Islamists support Salafi radical terrorist organizations.30 The US officials clearly stated that terrorist groups such as IS or ISIS, al-Qaida, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are buying weapons from Turkey.31 Even Russian President Putin stated that Turkey shot down the Russian aircraft because it was bombing the trucks smuggling IS oil into Turkey.32 Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov stated that they had strong evidence indicating that Erdogan and his family were linked to IS oil trade.33 Contrary to Political Islamists, Gülen invites Muslims to strive against terror and strengthen their immune system against violent extremism. He advises all Muslims to help intelligence and security communities to prevent terror attacks and eliminate the terrorists. He called Muslim parents, teachers, community leaders, and imams, to help Muslim youth to protect themselves from extremism and radicalism. He stated that a person cannot remain a true Muslim while committing an act of terrorism. For him, every person is a unique creation of God. He clearly states that one cannot enter paradise by killing civilians considering the fact that the Qur’an describes taking the life of even one innocent person as a crime against all humanity.34 For him, people’s common humanity comes first

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before their ethnic, national or religious identity. Victims of terror all over the world are first and foremost human beings and all people should feel their sufferings equally.

8.11  Conclusion In conclusion, the AKP and the Gülen Movement have primarily addressed the same segments of society in Turkey to restore Islamic life. Both groups opposed the secularization of Muslim society on the basis of strict prohibition of religious life. Both groups were subject to the negative treatment of the old ultra-secular regime; thus, they had to establish a mutually beneficial relationship in 2000s. The AKP policies reinforced the movement’s social and bureaucratic power and in return the movement supported the AKP in its democratic reforms passed during the first three terms of power. The strategic alliance delivered benefits for both actors; the AKP successfully eliminated the veto powers in the secular state while the Gülen Movement steered clear of the pressure of the secular establishment and accelerated its presence in the state institutions. Unfortunately, the approaching end of the tutelary regime in Turkey did not contribute to democratic consolidation; instead, the two groups in the course of their alliance and their subsequent struggle for power undermined democratic politics, the rule of law, civil liberties, and governance capacity of the Turkish state. With the eradication of their common enemy, their alliance turned into a brutal fight. Political Islamists implemented antiterrorism laws against the Gülen sympathizers. They even considered the nonprofit organizations as terrorist institutions. They banned many individuals from leaving the country and seized the passports of people who returned from abroad. In order to suppress the voice of the oppressed ones the AKP regime took over the movement-affiliated media violently and illegally. After closing all opponent media outlets, sending all nonconforming “dissident” AKP journalists to jail and controlling all the media, the AKP government passed a series of legislations which destroyed human rights, revoked separation of powers and restricted freedoms of everyone in the guise of fighting the “parallel structure,” a derogatory term the AKP coined to refer to the movement. The future of Turkey is strongly related with the result of the struggle between the two groups. If political Islamists win their crusade against the Gülen movement, Turkey will become a paradise for all radical and extreme groups in the Middle East. If the movement succeeds in its

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struggle against the political Islamists and Erdogan, there is a possibility that Turkey can be a role model for all Muslim countries with regards to combining Islam with liberal democracy with the condition that the movement learn from its mistakes and address all the criticisms directed toward itself.

Notes

1. Denoeux, Guilain, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 61. 2. Tibi, Bassam, Islamism and Islam (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), 2. 3. Voll, John O., “Political Islam and the State,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56. 4. Hendrick, Joshua D., Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York: New York University Press, 2013). 5.  Fitzgerald, Scott T., “Conceptualizing and Understanding the Gülen Movement,” Sociology Compass 11, no. 3 (2017): 2–10, https://doi. org/10.1111/soc4.12461. 6. “Erdoğan, Demokrasi Amaç Değil Araçtır” (Erdogan: Democracy Is a Means, Not an End), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= GdBAUNQ5b2w. 7. Gülen, Fethullah, Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance (Clifton, NJ: Light, 2006), 219–224. 8. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 9. Dursun, Çiler, “Türk-Islam Sentezi Ideolojisi ve Öznesi” (Ideology and Subject of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis), Dogu Batı 7, no. 25 (2003): 67. 10. Dogan, Recep, “Political Islam (The Justice and Development Party in Turkey) Versus the Gülen Movement,” Journal of Social Science Studies 5, no. 2 (2018): 84–101. 11. Dağı, Ihsan, Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği (Identity, Discourse and Politics: Welfare Party Tradition at the Intersection of East and West) (Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1998). 12. Hakan Yavuz, M., “Towards an Islamic Liberalism: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 4 (1999): 584–605. 13. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6 (2018): 182–192. 14. Gürsel, Kadri, “The Cult of Erdoğan,” Al-Monitor, last modified August 6, 2014, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/gurselturkey-social-peace-Erdoğan-cult-polarization-akp.html.

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15. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 16. Ibid. 17. Karaman, H., Bu ittifak niçin? (Why Is This Unity For?), available online: https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/bu-ittifak-nicin-2029126. Retrieved May 19, 2016. 18. Yilmaz, Ihsan, “Social Innovation for Peaceful Coexistence: Intercultural Activism from Rumi to Gülen,” in Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s Initiatives in the Modern World, ed. Ihsan Yılmaz et al. (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), 35. 19. Yilmaz, Ihsan, “Ijtihad and Tajdid by Conduct: The Gülen Movement,” in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, ed. M. H. Yavuz and J. L. Esposito (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 235. 20. Karaman, H., Anayasa ve laiklik tartışmaları (2) (Constitution and Laicism Discussions), available online: https://www.yenisafak.com/ yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/anayasa-ve-laiklik-tartimalari-2-2028889. Retrieved May 8, 2016. 21. Karaman, H., Neyi oyluyoruz? (What Do We Vote For?), available online: https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/neyi-oyluyoruz-2037309. April 13, 2017. 22. Saritoprak, Zeki, and Ali Unal, “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 465–467. 23. Ibid. 24. Brown, Nathan, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 11. 25. Gulen, Yenilenme Cehdi (Endeavor for Renewal), 132. 26. Khan, Waseem, “The Gulen Movement: The Blending of Religion and Rationality,” Journal of Research in Social Sciences 6 (2018): 182–192. 27. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 33. 28.  Gozaydin, Istar B., “The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?” Democratization 16, no. 6 (2009): 1214–1236. 29.  “Diyanet Feto Raporu” (The Diyanet’s Report About Feto) Diyanet. gov.tr, last modified July 26, 2017, https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/ icerik/din-isleri-yuksek-kurulu-baskanligi-tarafindan-hazirlanan-dini-istismar-hareketi-fetopdy-raporu/39153?getEnglish. 30. “Kerry: We Will Prevent ISIS’s Petrol Traffic,” last modified November 19, 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/kerry-isidin-turkiye-ve-irak-uzerinden-petrol-kacakciligini-onleyecegiz,317266.

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31. MacIntyre, Sara, “Turkey’s Informal ISIS Support,” Toronto Sun, last modified November 19, 2015, http://www.torontosun.com/2015/11/19/ turkeys-infor mal-isis-suppor t?token= ad143d170c5bd60bc2eae4873106234d. 32. “Putin: Turkey Protects ISIS’ Petrol Traffic,” last modified December 30, 2015, http://odatv.com/erdoganla-gorusmedik…-3011151200.html. 33. Ibid. 34. Qur’an 5:32.

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© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2

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Index

A Abductions of Gülen movement followers, 110 Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), 1, 2, 7, 21, 25, 27, 28, 52–54, 63, 76, 95, 143, 215 The AKP, 1–5, 10, 16, 17, 21, 23–34, 43, 52–82, 84, 86, 89–97, 105– 128, 130–132, 136, 142–147, 150, 151, 155–159, 164–166, 168, 170, 173, 174, 180, 182, 197, 202–205, 215–219, 223, 225 Al-Banna, Hasan, 6, 13, 20, 35, 216 Albayrak, Berat, 115, 168 al-Qaida, 15, 74, 141, 165, 166, 223, 224 al-Shabaab, 35, 166, 224 Anatolia, 44, 52, 146, 179, 180, 204, 220 Anatolian people, 179 Authoritarian rule, 11, 55, 120 Autocracy, 121

B Balyoz, 3, 59 Bank Asya, 75, 82, 127 BDP (Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party), 67 The blockade of Gaza, 65 Boko Haram, 166, 167, 224 Boydak Holding, 127 C Caliphate, 9, 11, 17, 18, 30, 32, 33, 52, 103, 111, 123, 142, 144, 147–152, 168, 171, 177, 178, 194, 195, 210, 216, 218, 220, 221, 224 Caliph Erdogan, 90, 118, 142, 165, 216, 220 Cavalry of light, 179 The colonial powers, 13, 14, 142 Conflicts between the AKP and Gülen movement, 1 Confrontation of the AKP and Gülen movement, 3, 64, 79, 197

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 R. Dogan, Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29757-2

259

260  Index The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 107, 108, 133 Crackdowns on the Media in Turkey, 127 The crusaders, 179 Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper, 114 D The December 17–25, 2013, Corruption Investigation, 158 Democracy, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 25, 26, 28–30, 33, 41, 42, 53, 56, 62, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85, 92, 94, 95, 99, 105, 106, 114, 117, 119, 123, 124, 126, 132, 142–145, 178, 180–184, 187, 192, 197, 205, 209, 210, 212, 218, 219, 222, 226 Din and dawla (religion and state), 9, 218 The Diyanet, 18, 19, 109, 124, 125, 143, 147, 155–162, 227 Dundar, Can, 168 E Education, 2, 17–19, 22, 24, 41, 42, 44–46, 51, 54, 61, 71, 82, 91, 94, 107, 108, 111, 118, 123, 127, 131, 145, 156, 165, 166, 177, 178, 185–187, 192, 198, 201–203, 205, 217, 218, 223 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 2–5, 25–34, 47, 53, 55, 57, 59–72, 74–79, 81–83, 85–87, 89, 90, 92–94, 106–108, 110–117, 119–127, 130–132, 143–147, 150–152, 156–160, 164–169, 182, 203, 215, 216, 218–221, 223, 224, 226 Erdogan’s New Turkey, 5, 79, 85, 117, 137

Ergenekon, 3, 58, 59, 61, 64, 72, 79, 95, 203–205, 217 EU (European Union), 3, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 54, 55, 57, 58, 63, 73, 106, 120, 124, 145, 150, 192, 198, 219 European expansionism, 12 European Parliament, 100, 114 European Union (EU), 38, 207 The EU standards, 117 Excommunication, 160, 161, 164, 170, 173, 174 Extremism and radicalism, 42, 141, 160, 200, 224 F The 28 February 1997 post-modern coup, 3 Freedom House Foundation, 122 The final guard, 179, 180, 206 G Gezi Park protests, 64, 70, 106, 122 God’s sovereignty, 10, 15, 16, 218 Golden generation, 179, 180, 199 Gülen, Fethullah, 2–5, 30, 42–44, 47, 49, 53, 55, 58, 60, 80, 81, 85, 86, 92, 93, 101, 102, 106, 125, 137, 159, 165, 170, 173, 182, 183, 186–188, 191, 192, 194–198, 200–202, 204, 205, 207–210, 212, 217, 219, 226 Gülen movement, 1–6, 30, 31, 41, 43, 44, 46, 49, 51–59, 61–72, 74–82, 84, 87, 90–92, 94, 99, 106–110, 112, 117–119, 125–128, 130, 132, 143, 146, 147, 158, 160, 162, 178–181, 185, 192, 196, 202–206, 216–218, 220, 222–225

Index

  261

H Hagia Sophia, 156 Hizmet, 1, 42, 45, 46, 49, 63, 75, 88, 89, 106, 109, 118, 122, 132, 147, 159, 162, 165, 166, 178, 218, 220 Holy cause, 118 Holy march, 118 Holy war, 191 HSYK (Turkish Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors), 60 Human Rights Violations in Turkey, 5, 116, 129, 145, 180

Islamic groups, 1, 3, 53, 65, 72, 77, 84, 118, 125, 144, 162, 222 Islamic law, 10, 32, 142, 154, 177, 188–190, 202 Islamic party, 23, 25, 28 Islamic state, 2, 9, 11, 15, 32, 43, 53, 142, 144, 149, 153, 154, 171, 179, 181, 191, 194, 200, 203, 217, 222 Islamism, 9, 10, 20, 31, 34–36, 38, 39, 145, 170, 171, 178, 207, 226 Israeli, 32, 65, 66 IS’s oil smuggling, 167

I The ideology of political Islam, 2, 4–6, 12, 14, 21, 26, 27, 62, 63, 118, 121, 124, 126, 144, 145, 153, 165, 166, 216, 221 Ijtihad, 13, 35, 188, 189, 211, 227 Imam Hatip Schools, 25, 118 Interfaith dialogue, 48, 91, 186, 196, 197, 211, 217, 223 The International Commission of Jurists, 107 Ipek Holding, 126 The iron law of Erdogan, 105 IS, 15, 24, 141, 156, 160, 163, 165–168, 200, 223, 224 ISIS, 15, 24, 141, 156, 160, 163, 165–167, 200, 223, 224 Islam, 1, 4, 5, 9–11, 13–20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30–33, 35, 38, 41, 43–46, 48, 52, 53, 56, 61, 62, 67, 87, 89, 91, 116, 118, 123–125, 141, 142, 144, 146–148, 153–156, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 171, 177–179, 181–195, 197–199, 201, 202, 207, 215–223, 226 Islam and politics, 9, 10, 34, 142, 226

J Jerusalem, 169, 175 The July 15, 2016 Coup, 79, 143 The Justice and Development Party, 1, 2, 21, 26 Just system, 14 K Karaman, Hayrettin, 123, 137, 142, 169, 171, 172, 227 Kaynak Holding, 113, 126 Kemalism, 6, 36, 38, 170, 197 KJK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s urban network), 59 Koza holding, 75, 113 Koza Ipek, 128 M Masjid Al-Aqsa, 156 Mavi Marmara (Freedom Flotilla), 65 The Middle East, 11, 20, 24, 53, 56, 118, 153, 217, 225 Milli Görüş, 2, 6, 21, 53, 145, 146, 216 MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Organization), 68, 167, 168

262  Index The Muslim Brotherhood, 2, 4, 6, 90, 91, 118, 124, 216, 217 Muslim nation, 51, 152, 194–196, 221 Muslim ruler, 10 Muslim world, 5, 10–13, 33, 38, 48, 65, 88, 142, 144, 150, 154, 173, 180, 181, 184, 192, 197, 206–210, 219, 220, 226, 227 N Nationalism, 19, 22, 41, 54, 100, 144, 146, 178–180, 218–220 National Outlook Movement, 2, 6, 27, 53, 62 National View, 145, 146, 216 Neo Ottoman Sultan, 146, 220 O Obama, Barack, 81, 167 P PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), 67, 69, 96 Political Islam, 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–15, 17–19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, 35–38, 53–55, 89, 90, 109, 116, 117, 142, 143, 152, 156, 169–171, 179, 191, 192, 215, 216, 218, 222, 226 Political Islamists of Turkey, 17, 24, 28, 32, 33, 124, 125, 127, 144, 146, 147, 150, 151, 164, 170, 173, 174, 182, 183, 197, 216, 218–220, 224 Political theology of Gülen movement, 178 Political theology of Political Islamists of Turkey, 142

Politicization of religion, 11, 16, 147 Presidential system, 124 Q Qutb, Sayyid, 14, 20, 36, 178, 216 R Relations with non-Muslims, 178, 218 Relations with the West, 26, 28, 178, 218 Religious extremism, 178, 215 Religious groups, 1, 2, 15, 18, 20, 22, 30, 31, 34, 41, 95, 125, 143, 147, 150, 177, 197, 218, 220 S Samanyolu media group, 113 Secularism in Turkey, 207 Secularists of Turkey, 2, 57, 177, 220 September 11 terror attack, 163 Shariah, 31, 32, 53, 91, 142, 144, 153, 154, 169, 178, 187–189, 216, 218, 221, 222 Sheikh al-Islam, 155 Sledgehammer, 3, 59, 64, 79, 203–205, 217 Spoils of war, 111 The state of emergency, 107, 108, 113, 114, 133, 135 Strategic Alliance of the AKP and Gülen movement, 4, 52, 60 Syrian refugees, 145 T Takfir, 160, 161, 164, 170, 173, 174 Taksim protests, 64, 71, 116 Taliban, 141 Taymiyya, Ibn, 11, 16, 35

Index

Terrorism, 6, 79, 87, 109, 127, 131, 133, 141, 160, 163, 165, 170, 171, 173, 186, 200, 201, 208, 209, 215, 224 Türgev (Youth education and service foundation of Turkey), 165 Turkish Constitutional Court, 22, 26 Turkish deep state, 106 Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, 18, 19, 24, 34, 45, 109, 155, 157, 162 Turkish government, 66, 71, 73, 76, 80, 81, 84, 85, 92, 93, 103, 110, 114, 121–123, 132, 138, 154, 168, 194 Turkish Islam, 22, 24, 47–49, 207, 211, 227 Turkish military, 6, 20–22, 47, 59, 63, 80, 100, 169, 180, 194

  263

U Umma, 142, 151, 178, 218, 221 Ummah, 20, 32, 51, 142, 144, 150, 152, 169, 195, 220, 221 The UN, 117, 121, 138 The UN General Assembly, 202 The United State congress, 91, 114, 123 W Western colonialization, 11 Westernization, 11, 13, 14, 37 Z Zaman newspaper, 71, 92 Zekeriya Öz, 75, 204