Political Ecologies of Landscape: Governing Urban Transformations in Penang 9781529214161

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Title page
Copyright information
Dedication
Table of contents
List of figures
List of abbreviations
Acknowledgments
Preface
1 Introduction: Governing Urban Transformations in Penang
Landscape political ecologies of urbanization
Positioning Penang: between heritage, infrastructure and development
(Grassroots) urban governance
Tracing the controversies: mobilizing a political ecology of landscape
Organization of the book
2 Towards a Landscape Political Ecology
Conceptualizing landscape through political ecologies
Political ecologies of urbanization
Towards a landscape political ecology
Discursive and material components
Landscape political ecology: beyond the city
Landscape political ecologies of heritage
Landscape political ecologies of infrastructure
Conclusion
3 Megapolitan Explosions: Reworking Urban and Regional Metabolisms
Situating the emergence of poly-centric urbanism in Malaysia
Designing poly-centric urbanism in Penang
Urban growth and governance challenges in Penang
The Seberang Perai renaissance
Conclusion
4 Competing Visions of Landscape Transformation in a Worlding City
Penang and the Transport Master Plan
Islands from the sea: financing the Penang Transport Master Plan
Transport solution or economic growth machine?
The post-political nature of infrastructure planning in Penang
Conclusion
5 The Forests in the City: Building Participatory Approaches to Urban-Environmental Governance
Landscape political ecology, resilience and environmental imaginaries
The cultural significance of Penang’s forested hillsides
Drowning in infrastructure development
Penang Hills Watch: a participatory approach to urban-environmental governance
Langur Project Penang: a citizen science outreach initiative
Conclusion
6 Integrating Cultural and Natural Heritage on Penang Hill
Integrating cultural and natural approaches to urban heritage conservation
The urban heritage of Penang Hill: reworking landscape, culture and nature
Penang Hill’s (re)development trajectories: from tourist resort to biosphere reserve
Conclusion
7 Artificial Islands and the Production of New Urban Spaces
Land from the sea: ongoing land reclamation in Penang and Malaysia
BiodiverCity and the Penang South Reclamation scheme
Gurney Wharf: worlding cities through land reclamation
BiodiverCity or BioDeadCity? Debating the environmental impact of large-scale land reclamation
Tomorrow Vision? The financial sustainability of land reclamation
‘Ocean grabbing’ and the socio-economic impacts of large-scale land reclamation
Socio-economic impacts on Penang’s fishing community
‘Tolak Reklamasi’: the potential for effective social movements against reclamation
Conclusion
8 Conclusion: An Island on an Urbanizing Frontier
Pulau Jerejak: a battleground for competing visions of Penang
Landscape political ecologies of a worlding city-region
References
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF L ANDSCAPE GOV ERNING U RBAN TR ANSFORM ATIONS IN PENANG CRE I G HTO N CO N N O LLY

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE Governing Urban Transformations in Penang Creighton Connolly

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1414-​7 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1415-​4 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1416-​1 ePdf The right of Creighton Connolly to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Liam Roberts Front cover image: Creighton Connolly Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

For the people and ecosystems of Penang, in the hopes that a more equitable, just and sustainable future is possible.

Contents List of Figures List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Preface

vi vii ix xi

1 2 3

1 20 38

4 5 6 7 8

Introduction: Governing Urban Transformations in Penang Towards a Landscape Political Ecology Megapolitan Explosions: Reworking Urban and Regional Metabolisms Competing Visions of Landscape Transformation in a Worlding City The Forests in the City: Building Participatory Approaches to Urban-​Environmental Governance Integrating Cultural and Natural Heritage on Penang Hill Artificial Islands and the Production of New Urban Spaces Conclusion: An Island on an Urbanizing Frontier

Notes References Index

57 77 96 114 135 145 148 185

v

List of Figures 1.1 1.2 2.1 4.1

5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 8.1

Map of Penang State View of KOMTAR from George Town Diagram illustrating the components and composition of the landscape political ecology framework Comparisons of different types of transport infrastructure used by the Penang Forum’s Better, Cheaper, Faster plan to illustrate the impact of LRT and monorail infrastructure on the surrounding landscape Summit of ‘Botak Hill’, Penang, which remained primary forest until the illegal clearing in 2013 A protest against the Penang Island Link Highway 1 (PIL1) in Penang on 9 August 2018 Penang Hills Watch logo, illustrating the participatory approach to monitoring Penang’s forested hillsides A view from Penang Hill Map of Penang Hill and surrounding area Artist’s impression of the BiodiverCity plan View of Gurney Wharf and STP2 reclamation works from Penang Hill Pulau Jerejak as seen from Penang Island

vi

6 8 28 69

83 86 90 101 102 118 120 137

List of Abbreviations ART BRT DAP DoE EIA GTCSS LPE LPP LRT MBPP MM2H MMSC NCER NGO NPP-​2 OUV PCCC PDP PCH PHBR PHT PHW PIC PIL1 PSP PSR PTMP RM SAM SRS

Autonomous Rail Transit Bus Rapid Transit Democratic Action Party Department of Environment (Malaysia) environmental impact assessment George Town Conurbation Spatial Strategy landscape political ecology Langur Project Penang light rail transit Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang (Penang Island City Council) Malaysia, My Second Home (foreign resident settlement scheme) Multimedia Super Corridor Northern Corridor Economic Region (Malaysia) non-​governmental organization Second National Physical Plan (Malaysia) outstanding universal value Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce Project Delivery Partner Penang Hill Corporation Penang Hill Biosphere Reserve Penang Heritage Trust Penang Hills Watch Penang Infrastructure Corporation Penang Island Link 1 (highway) Penang Structure Plan Penang South Reclamation (land reclamation scheme) Penang Transport Master Plan Ringgit Malaysia (equivalent to approx £0.17 or US$0.24 as of September 2021) Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth Malaysia) Southern Reclamation Scheme (Consortium) vii

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STP2 UNDP UNESCO UIM UPE

Sri Tanjung Pinang United Nations Development Program United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization urban integrated megaproject urban political ecology

viii

Acknowledgements This book would not have been possible without my postdoctoral fellowship at the Asia Research Institute (ARI), at the National University of Singapore (NUS), and an internal research grant which provided me with the requisite funding and research leave for the initial stages of the research. Mike Douglass and K.C. Ho, who were the leaders of the Asian Urbanisms cluster during my time there, were kind enough to support my intellectual curiosity in Penang, and even visited me there on one occasion. ARI also provided funding for two workshops that I organized during my time there, which allowed me to explore new areas of interdisciplinary research related to the issues addressed in this book, and to develop my intellectual networks in these areas. My former colleague Michelle Miller organized a workshop and subsequent special issue in 2017, which helped significantly to develop my ideas around the topic of resilience and urban governance that are central to Chapter 5. My colleagues at ARI and NUS more broadly provided a great source of friendship and intellectual support during my years in Singapore, including Sonia Lam-​Knott, Desmond Sham and Fiona Williamson. The Department of Geography at NUS was also kind enough to welcome me to their weekly research group meetings, specifically Politics, Economies and Space (PEAS) and Social and Cultural Geographies (SCG). I received feedback from colleagues in these groups on drafts of writing that would ultimately make it into this book in some form. The broader intellectual discussions were also central to making sense of what was happening in Penang and connecting these events to broader issues in geography and urban studies in relation to infrastructure, political economy, culture and governance. The book is dedicated to the people of Penang, and particularly those who were kind enough to take time to educate me on several pressing issues in the state, and to help develop my personal and professional networks there. This includes Khoo Salma, who provided significant support and engagement since my earlier days as a visiting PhD student from the University of Manchester; Rexy Chacko who introduced me to the forested hillsides of Penang on a walking interview and kindly provided the image for Figure 5.1; Mike Gibby who took me for two visits to Pulau Jerejak, and provided feedback on some of my subsequent written work; Gwynn Jenkins spent considerable ix

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time educating me about Penang’s in/​tangible cultural heritage, and her own book on George Town was also an inspiration; Anil Netto whose blog has been inspirational in shaping the direction of my research and providing a critical perspective on all things Penang; Andrew Han’s film and videos on Penang were also inspirational, and he was kind enough to introduce me to the fishermen at Sri Tanjung Pinang who were subsequently displaced by land reclamation; Matt Benson kindly provided the materials that made Chapter 3 possible; I had many conversations with Soon-​Tzu Speechley in Penang and Singapore that were extremely helpful in improving my knowledge of heritage issues in George Town. The Penang Forum kindly provided the image for Figure 5.3. There are many more that I regrettably cannot name here, but whose contributions were also extremely valuable. More broadly, I must thank those who have made my academic career possible, and without whom this book would have never materialized. This includes (in chronological order) Tim Bunnell whose undergraduate lectures and numerous writings on Malaysia inspired my own interest in the country; Josh Lepawsky who invited me to pursue my masters with him at Memorial University in St. John’s and provided the funding and training for my own initial research in Singapore; Maria Kaika and Erik Swyngedouw who spotted the potential in my PhD proposal on Malaysia, and provided me with an invaluable ENTITLE fellowship to support my initial research in Penang and other cities in the country. Rebecca Wilkinson and her family made Penang feel like home, and spent considerable time educating me about the politics, histories and particularities of the place. Roger Keil read my PhD thesis on Malaysia, and most of my subsequent work, and has been my primary intellectual supporter and collaborator on my interests in the intersections of landscape and urban political ecology. Thanks to my parents for introducing me to Asia at a young age and for being my number one supporters throughout my intellectual pursuits and putting up with my perpetual absences. I am forever grateful. Finally, thanks are also due to Emily Watt at Bristol University Press for seeing the potential in my proposal, and to three anonymous reviewers who also supported the proposal and offered useful suggestions. Earlier versions of the following chapters were initially published in the following journals, and thanks are due to the publishers for allowing reproduction of some of the text here: Chapter 4 was published in Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space as ‘Worlding cities through transportation infrastructure’ (2017); Chapter 5 was published in Urban Studies as ‘From resilience to multi-​species flourishing: (re)imagining urban-​environmental governance in Penang, Malaysia’ (2020); Chapter 6 was published in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers as ‘Urban political ecologies of heritage: integrating cultural and natural landscapes in Penang, Malaysia’ (2020).

x

Preface This book is about large-​scale urban redevelopment projects that have been developing in Penang, Malaysia, over the past decade, and the participatory governance initiatives that have been organized to challenge them. It examines, in particular, the discourses that have been mobilized in support of the state government’s development plans, as well as those used to contest them, and propose alternatives. Research for the book formally began at the National University of Singapore in 2016, when I began a postdoctoral fellowship at the Asia Research Institute. However, its seeds started germinating during my doctoral research in Penang on a separate research project on the controversies over the farming of edible birds’ nests in George Town and other Malaysian cities (2013–​14). While I was in Penang, I unwittingly developed research contacts that would become central to inspiring the research for this book. Although I was largely unaware of it at the time, the plans for the Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP) developed at this time, which soon took precedence over the ‘swiftlet farming’ controversy that I had been tracing for my PhD research. Many of the key figures that have been involved in contesting the state government’s plans for the PTMP and developing alternatives were also those involved in advocacy against the indiscriminate swiftlet farming in George Town. This included the former president of the Penang Forum, Khoo Salma, who was a key interlocutor in the development of the research presented here. Khoo subsequently introduced me to other members of the Penang Forum who had been involved in various social movements and advocacy work which helped enhance my understanding of a variety of issues in Penang that will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. The research documented in this book also required expanding my familiarity with Penang, beyond the confines of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site which I had been focused on until then. I therefore spent many days in the early part of 2017 exploring the forested hillsides, coastlines and neighbourhoods that are discussed at length in this book. It also required learning about a range of topics and debates that were erstwhile beyond my scholarly expertise and interests, including transportation infrastructure; xi

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‘natural’ hazards like flooding and landslides; and land reclamation. This took some time, and has added considerable breadth and interdisciplinarity to my research profile. However, some of the underlying themes from my doctoral research have remained central to this book project, namely: heritage; governance; planning; social justice; and activism. My research also spanned several political changes in Penang, and Malaysia more broadly. I initially interviewed Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow (who was then State Executive Officer for Local Government, Traffic Management and Flood Mitigation) for my swiftlet farming research, which introduced me first-​hand to the fraught relationship between government and civil society in Penang. I interviewed him again in 2017 for my research on the PTMP, when he explained the government’s vision of a ‘cleaner and greener’ Penang, which preceded the current ‘green and smart’ state agenda. The former Chief Minister, Lim Guan Eng, later went on to be Finance Minister of Malaysia in 2018 when the Pakatan Harapan Coalition took power at the federal level. This gave the state government much more power at the local level, but it was short-​lived due to the collapse of the government in 2019. This political context and its significance is discussed in more detail in the introduction. The idea to write a monograph on this research didn’t emerge until part way through my postdoctoral stint in Singapore. Unlike my PhD research, the processes, controversies and debates analysed here did not stop at the conclusion of my postdoctoral research. Therefore, I continued to follow developments in my ‘spare time’, after I returned to the UK to take up my first permanent academic position at the University of Lincoln. My delay in securing research funding for new projects helped. However, it became much more difficult to follow the changes occurring in Penang, as it was no longer an hour’s flight, or day-​long bus ride away. This was further challenged in 2020 due to the COVID-​19 pandemic, which made it impossible for me to return to Penang as planned while I was finishing the writing for this book. Therefore, the social media networks and chat groups that I had joined during my earlier visits to Penang became pivotal to completing this research. The conversion of what were formerly local seminars to live-​streamed events was also helpful. Nonetheless, while this book had a relatively firm deadline, the development projects and governance initiatives traced here do not, many of which will continue to evolve well beyond this book’s publication. Notwithstanding, the governance initiatives, political dynamics and landscape transformations discussed in the book, and the theoretical insights gleaned from them, should have continued relevance, and not only for Penang or Malaysia. Rather, as highlighted explicitly in Chapter 7, many of the processes identified in Penang have uncanny parallels in other parts of urbanizing Southeast Asia, and beyond. It is hoped that the book will therefore have relevance for like-​minded students and scholars in geography and urban studies, regardless of their empirical focus. xii

1

Introduction: Governing Urban Transformations in Penang In August 2018, Penang State Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow hosted a press conference to launch his vision for the future of Penang State, ‘Penang 2030: a family-​focused green and smart state that inspires the nation’ (Penang2030 Unit, 2019). This vision contained four main themes intended to guide Penang’s development over the coming decade: increase liveability to enhance quality of life; upgrade the economy to raise household incomes; empower people to strengthen civic participation, and; invest in the built environment to improve (societal) resilience. Chow’s approach to achieving this vision is said to be ‘people-​centric’, opening up urban governance and planning decisions to members of society, in addition to the government. It also aims to balance economic advancement with environmental well-​being in order to achieve sustainable development. These steps would allegedly help to work towards the Penang state government’s goal of becoming ‘an international, intelligent city that is clean, green, safe and healthy, brimming with energy, expertise and entrepreneurship’ (Lim, in Ng, 2016: np). The Penang 2030 agenda can be situated within the convergence towards urban and regional planning in in which governments have sought to establish their own sustainability initiatives in line with the UN Agenda 21 programme on sustainable development (Raco and Lin, 2012: 192–​193).1 For example, the plan also fits in with the 11th Malaysia Plan, which targets ‘green growth for sustainability and resilience, and places climate mitigation at the centre of the nation’s future economic growth’ (Jacobs, 2016b: S26). In doing so, it has sought to emulate forms of urban development from other leading world cities in Asia. For example, under Chow’s predecessor, Lim Guan Eng’s leadership, Penang sought to attract Singaporean capital in order to replicate the city-​state’s ‘development playbook’, and to promote a ‘clean, green, safe and healthy’ city (Ng, 2016: np). The Penang state government also sought to model Hong Kong’s approach to ‘embracing 1

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

change and being a regional hub’; and emulate ‘the Dubai model’ for attracting tourism and trade (Ng, 2016: np). The state government has likely chosen these cities as exemplars due to the fact that they are also small territories with little developable land or resources, and have thus pursued an outward growth trajectory. These objectives underpin Penang’s ambition to become a global city through balancing economic growth with environmental sustainability and social cohesion. However, civil society groups in Penang have highlighted numerous inconsistencies between the ‘Clean and Green State’ rhetoric that the state government has been using to promote itself and the numerous mega-​projects that it has been driving which are centred on the creation of new land for transportation infrastructure and (upmarket) housing. The changes are perceived to threaten the integrity of Penang’s physical landscapes, and the socio-​ecologies that they support, while also making Penang more vulnerable to global economic and environmental change. Though supportive of the need to achieve greater economic development and improve the state’s transportation infrastructure, civil society leaders have put forth fundamentally different visions of how Penang should accomplish this, resulting in the ongoing tensions and antagonisms that have emerged between the state government and civil society groups. This book grounds its analysis in the controversies that have emerged over the extensive urban redevelopment and regeneration projects that have emerged since 2012, mostly associated with the ambitious PTMP. This plan has been mobilized by the Penang state government as a means to modernize Penang’s transportation infrastructure, while also achieving further economic growth and development. As in other aspirational ‘worlding’ cities around the globe, such rhetoric is frequently used by city officials and planners to make them more ‘competitive’ in an era of increasing globalization and intercity competition (Roy and Ong, 2011). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the PTMP has been very controversial, given its alleged negative impacts on the city’s heritage landscapes and biophysical environment, thus threatening the socio-​environmental well-​being of Penangites. There is, therefore, a fundamental tension and incompatibility between the city’s ‘global city’ aspirations (and associated mega-​development projects), and the realities of its existing landscape, infrastructure and finances, which has become been a major source of concern for local residents and civil society activists. Many such projects are removed from their surrounding landscapes, which has generated considerable resistance from civil society groups based on the socio-​environmental consequences for the urban environment and ecosystems. Central here is the PTMP, and the associated Southern Reclamation Scheme (SRS), which involves a total of 3,178ha of land reclamation. Given that Penang does not have a rapidly growing population and already has a surplus of (upmarket) 2

Introduction

housing, there are numerous questions about why this is necessary, especially the implications that it poses for food security, sea level rise and financial stability. Penang is an example of mid-​sized, secondary cities which are now rapidly expanding into their hinterlands through the development of new infrastructure and high-​end residential development. The region thus provides an excellent case for examining these transformations, as they are currently unfolding in a highly visible manner, and are representative of the types of changes taking place in other rapidly urbanizing and developing cities across Southeast Asia and beyond. Political Ecologies of Landscape provides a dynamic account of the ways in which local residents and activists struggle to resist the socio-​natural transformation of their urban environment and propose alternative development strategies. In doing so, it responds to an empirical gap in understanding how place-​specific physical environments can act as facilitators for collective action in cities. This latter point captures the book’s focus on the political ecologies of landscape, which provides a framework for understanding the dramatic landscape transformations that are unfolding across much of Asia, and their socio-​ecological implications. The book thus seeks to understand the ways in which large-​scale urban redevelopment is transforming urban environments at the landscape –​or ‘megapolitan’ –​scale, as well as the lived experience of individual neighbourhoods (see Gustafson et al, 2014). This is done through situating landscape dynamics in Penang within broader transformations at the national and regional scale, which considers the role of transnational actors in financing the proliferation of mega-​developments and land reclamation projects in Malaysia and beyond. Moreover, the book takes up earlier calls in urban studies to move beyond urban research which focuses on primary, ‘global’ cities, to examine the lived experiences of urbanization in smaller, secondary cities which may also have globalizing ambitions (Bunnell and Maringanti, 2010; Roy and Ong, 2011; Goh and Bunnell, 2013). It also contributes to recent postcolonial urbanism approaches which have sought to reorient urban theory through situated perspectives on secondary cities in the Global South that have hitherto been left ‘off the map’ of dominant theoretical frameworks (Robinson, 2002). Such analyses are essential to understanding pathways towards a more socially just and empowering form of urban development, that is, one that returns the city and its environments back to its citizens. Finally, through participatory ethnographic research methods, the book considers how the everyday practices, experiences and ideologies of those experiencing and contesting change in Penang have shaped innovative approaches to urban governance that can act as fundamental forces in shaping collective visions for urban-​ environmental futures. This type of research is important for highlighting the ‘heterogeneous socio-​ecological textures of urban space’ that are often 3

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overlooked in research that is more global than local in methodology (see Gandy, 2018: 103).

Landscape political ecologies of urbanization In tracing the controversies over Penang’s redevelopment, this book contributes to recent research in urban studies which has sought to theorize emergent processes of extended urbanization and understand the urban governance strategies being forged to respond to such processes. In doing so, it develops the conceptual framework of landscape political ecology (LPE), which combines insights on landscape from cultural geography with those of urban political ecology (UPE). While landscape studies in cultural geography started with a predominant focus on Western societies like England, the literature has developed considerably since to analyse notions of landscape in postcolonial societies. Political Ecologies of Landscape contributes to this effort by illustrating how European understandings of landscape are visible in Penang given its history of colonialism, but also how the concept has evolved to take on local characteristics and meanings. Urban political ecology is known for illustrating the myriad connections between social and natural (or socio-​n atural) processes in urban environments. This book seeks to build on this literature by examining the interrelations between cultural and natural heritage in urban settings, and how their conservation can contribute to the development of more socially and environmentally just and sustainable cities. This is a significant gap in the field of UPE, and is an important one to address, as struggles over heritage in urban settings are ripe with uneven power relations, nature–​ culture relations, and other concerns that are central to the discipline. Similarly, a UPE approach can also offer considerable conceptual and policy-​relevant insights to critical heritage studies, and ongoing heritage conservation movements. I argue that the LPE framework enables new ways of understanding the role of urban form and discursive constructions of place in shaping urban landscapes. In other words, it allows us to understand the myriad ways in which urban nature is given meaning by urban residents. Landscape is also a hybrid concept that allows for moving beyond entrenched binaries between urban and rural, cultural and natural that have plagued thinking in urban studies and UPE in recent decades. A key contribution of the approach in this book is to thus demonstrate how natural and cultural landscapes (and heritages) are interlinked in urban landscapes. While this is a recognition that is gaining greater appreciation in the fields of heritage studies and conservation, this has largely not been applied to urban settings (see Connolly, 2020b).2 Nonetheless, conservation of green and open spaces in the city has acquired increasing importance for citizens of rapidly urbanizing cities 4

Introduction

seeking to foster a balance between development and the environment (Douglass et al, 2007: 3). For instance, one of the most influential modern theorists of urbanization is Henri Lefebvre, who predicted in the 1970s the ‘complete urbanization of society’ (Lefebvre, 2003). However, much of Lefebvre’s writing actually saw the urban as the antithesis of nature, which has led many UPE scholars to draw upon Marxian political economy instead, as it understands the metabolization of nature as integral to the process of urbanization (Loftus 2012; Connolly, 2019a: 65). Similarly, his contemporary Lewis Mumford also entrenched a false dichotomy between the urban and rural, conceptualizing them as spaces of society and nature, respectively. Yet, as more recent scholarship in UPE has shown, various forms of non-​human natures (for example water, plants, insects and biophysical processes) are inseparable from the process of urban expansion. The dynamic interaction between people and the environment is therefore central to understanding the politics of modern urban development (Vitz, 2018). As subsequent chapters in the book will illustrate, the transformation of Penang’s forested hillsides and coastlines for redevelopment has given rise to flooding, landslides and other socio-​ ecological harms that local actors have tried to resist through the enrolment of the natural environment.

Positioning Penang: between heritage, infrastructure and development Malaysia’s rapid urbanization gained some attention from urban geographers in the first part of the 21st century, with scholars like Tim Bunnell writing about the transformation of Kuala Lumpur and its surrounding region (Bunnell, 2004). Goh Beng Lan and Gwynn Jenkins also wrote about the transformation of Penang’s cityscape, focusing on the social and cultural impacts in specific neighbourhoods (Goh, 2002; Jenkins, 2008). However, since this time, there have not been many new book-​length studies on urban redevelopment in Malaysia within geography and cognate disciplines, save a recent update of Jenkins’ book (Jenkins, 2019). While some of the political-​economic aspects of these earlier studies are still relevant, this book brings fresh conceptual insights to controversies over urban redevelopment in Penang. Malaysian urban redevelopment is now arguably under-​examined given the dramatic landscape changes taking place. Moreover, it is now estimated that over 70 per cent of the nation’s population resides in urban areas (Benson and Johnson, 2013), and Penang is its most urbanized state. George Town is the capital of the Malaysian state of Penang, in the northwestern part of peninsular Malaysia. While typically referred to as a city, the name Penang actually refers to both the island and the state, which comprises of numerous cities, towns and villages that have grown into a 5

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

large metropolitan region (see Figure 1.1). The island has a population of approximately 700,000 people, with an additional 1 million people on the mainland side of the state (Seberang Perai). The level of urbanization in Penang is 90.8 per cent, which is among the highest in Malaysia, after Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Selangor (Mok, 2016a). Accordingly, Penang Island was officially designated city status by the federal government in 2015, ‘upgrading’ from its previous municipality status. The historic centre of Seberang Perai is Butterworth, but the population is much more evenly dispersed throughout the region, as opposed to Penang Island. While there has been the stated desire to coordinate development on both sides of Penang Strait, which will unite the adjacent towns of George Town and Butterworth, this has not in practice happened. Rather, George Town has been the focal point of most new flagship development projects for the state, despite having a lack of developable space and already over-​burdened Figure 1.1: Map of Penang State

Source: Base map from Google Earth, 2021.

6

Introduction

infrastructure. There is therefore the need to decentralize urban development and investment from George Town, in to achieve a more balanced form of development within the state (see Chapter 3). While Penang could have been labelled a world city in the early 19th century (if such labels existed), it was soon superseded by nearby Singapore, which became the premier entrepôt in the Southeast Asian region. However, that does not mean that the city ceased to have global connections, nor that the ambitions of local politicians have stopped imagining Penang as a world city. Indeed, George Town was designated a UNESCO World Heritage city, jointly listed with Malacca, Malaysia, in 2008, as part of the ‘Historic Settlements of the Straits of Malacca’ (see UNESCO, 2014). George Town received this designation for its ‘unique townscape dating back to the colonial era’, and the cluster of pre-​war shophouses in the centre, containing a plethora of traditional trades and food stalls (see UNESCO, 2014: np). The majority of Penang’s pre-​war shophouses were kept in tact due to the rent control act which was enacted by the federal government following independence in 1966 to prevent the exploitation of tenants in inner-​city areas (Jenkins and King, 2010: 49). This was later repealed in 1999, in order to encourage new development into inner-​city areas throughout Malaysia, and especially George Town, due to the perceived dilapidation of buildings in the area (Jenkins and King, 2010: 49). However, it also prompted the Penang Heritage Trust (PHT) to begin calling for World Heritage Listing in order to protect the social, cultural and economic life of the inner city. Nonetheless, many of the traditional residents and trades have been displaced since the UNESCO designation due to the influx of tourism and related businesses into the city centre, driving up rents. The city’s rich culture and history has also been critical to place-​making initiatives by the Penang state government. For instance, in 1996, the Town and Country Planning Act was amended, which was more favourable towards heritage conservation and planning aesthetics. The Penang Heritage Centre was also founded in 1996 to promote conservation as an alternative to demolition (Jenkins, 2008: 130). It is important to note, however, that these changes came in the wake of active (and successful) campaigning among heritage groups in the early 1990s, particularly the PHT, which was founded in 1986. Cheng and Ma (2015) have thus argued that Penang has remarkably managed to avoid the ‘development pressures’ which have transformed the fabric of many Asian cities. The Penang state government’s strategy has, since the late 1990s, been one of ‘balancing conservation with development’, which was listed as one of its primary objectives in the State Conservation Strategy (Jenkins, 2008: 128). Penang was subsequently promoted by the state government as a blend of the old (for example cultural heritage) with the new (infrastructure and modern infrastructure) (Goh, 2002: 153–​154). As Bunnell and Marolt (2014: 385) have 7

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

noted, culture is now seen by many governments as a comparative advantage in economic growth and minimizing the impacts of global integration on cultural diversity. This has intensified the focus on culturally sensitive approaches to development as a means for retaining some degree of local autonomy from globalizing forces. As such, the government has arguably sought to use Penang’s heritage to promote the city to attract development and investment, and in more recent years there has been little genuine effort on behalf of the state government to actively conserve this heritage. Indeed, Jenkins and King (2010: 46) have lamented that: ‘there appears to be confusion in the [City Council] as to what is meant by conservation as an integral part of development … just as there is a preoccupation with “the tallest, the biggest, the longest and the widest” ’. For instance, one of the first mega-​projects constructed in Penang was the Penang Bridge in the 1970s, which was the largest mega-​project in Asia at the time of its construction, and was fiercely (though unsuccessfully) resisted by civil society groups. The 1980s saw the construction of the 68-​storey KOMTAR building, which was then the tallest building in Asia and transformed the built environment and cultural landscape of the inner-​city area (see Figure 1.2). These projects originated with the founding of the Penang Development Corporation by former Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu in 1969. Infrastructure development is thus nothing new for Penang, but what has changed is the scale, intensity and density of those developments. Jenkins (2008: ix–​x) has thus suggested that this history of development in Penang gives an uncomfortable impression as to the discordant nature that George Town’s urban landscape is likely to take in the future. Figure 1.2: View of KOMTAR from George Town

Source: Photo by author, 2018.

8

Introduction

The development-​oriented approach of the state government perhaps stems from the Malaysian nation-​building project which has raced to develop material icons of ‘modernity’ like Putrajaya –​Malaysia’s planned administrative capital. Indeed, former Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng has proclaimed his desire is for Penang to be a ‘model state for the rest of Malaysia’ and to be ‘a showcase of modern Malaysia’ (Ng, 2016: np). As Jenkins and King (2010: 44) have argued, ‘urban architectural forms and landscapes provide potent and tangible symbols of group identity and ambition’. Indeed, large-​scale, capital-​intensive infrastructure projects have been framed by urban policy-​makers as catalysts of social and economic growth (Perrotti, 2020). Benglan Goh (2002), for instance, long ago noted how the drive for Malaysian modernity has created a ‘fetish’ or ‘national obsession’ for architectural icons of modernity, associated with the national development strategy of ‘Vision 2020’ (see also Bunnell, 1999; Yeoh, 2014). Known locally as Wawasan 2020, this economic development strategy was launched with the specific aim of reaching the status of a ‘fully developed country’ by the year 2020 (Bunnell, 1999: 4). This ‘quest for modernity’ has been focused on the transformation of urban landscapes throughout the country, which has seen the construction of new skyscrapers and high-​profile transportation infrastructure like airports and bridges (Jenkins and King, 2010: 45). Much like other emerging regions in the Global South, the Wawasan 2020 project was rooted in anxieties about ‘catching up’ to other countries in the Global North (see Ghertner, 2015: 8). Tellingly, the architect of Vision 2020, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, was quoted in a 2016 interview for the Penang Monthly magazine as saying: [I]‌n those days [1980s], when you wanted to go someplace different, you went to Penang. Penang was a developed town. But Penang has not changed that much. Some parts are very modern. The quay and all that, they are all still the same –​ramshackle buildings and all that, not very tidy, I must say. … This is a problem with democracy. When you want to do something that is good all round, there will be people who will object … I think they did a better job in KL. If you go to KL, you don’t see those ramshackle zinc sheds anymore. (Mahathir in Ooi, 2016: np) Yet, various scholars have noted that this mentality has strained federal resources and that physical, social and political fault lines are beginning to emerge (see Jenkins, 2008: 88). Indeed, the rapid pace of urban transformation in recent years, including gentrification of the inner-​city area (and associated displacement) has begun to raise concern among 9

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

George Town’s citizens that the city is losing its identity. Local heritage activists and organizations –​such as the PHT –​are quick to point out that despite the separation of the inner-​city from developments outside the World Heritage Site, the increasing intensive and extensive nature of the latter has been rapidly transforming the overall character of George Town (Speechley, 2014). As Speechley (2014: np) has astutely observed, ‘it now seems that heritage in George Town is a tale of two cities: one within the boundaries of the WHS [World Heritage Site] and one without’.3 There is thus a tension between the ‘old’ and new economy in George Town, which are seen as largely incompatible. Indeed, the KOMTAR building in George Town is symbolic of much new development in Penang, which is out of proportion with its surroundings, has not lived up to the developers’ ambitions, and has exacerbated existing issues with congestion in the city (see Jenkins and King, 2010). The urban landscape –​particularly as a form of property –​is a highly complex site of investment and speculation. But, because of the speculative nature of investment, there is no guarantee that capital invested into the landscape will ever show returns (see Mitchell, 2008). Moreover, as Hutchinson (2012: 17) has pointed out, many of the most pressing issues in Penang are not related to large-​scale infrastructure investments. Rather, they tend to do with everyday needs such as consistent supplies of high quality internet, water and electricity. There also needs to be effective and accessible government at the local level, which is more important than the construction of new mega-​projects. As Saravanamuttu and Hutchinson (2012: xvi) have argued, Penang is caught in a ‘middle-​income trap’, whereby rising wage levels and moderate rises in productivity have seen it losing out to other regions with either lower labour costs or higher skill levels. The state has thus sought to move beyond the manufacturing and electronics based economy that it has developed since the 1970s and to rival Kuala Lumpur for foreign investment, which will require it to offer a favourable urban environment and relatively unburdened infrastructure.

(Grassroots) urban governance Place, Doreen Massey (2005) has argued, is always negotiated, fraught with antagonism and shaped through competing ideologies. If that is the case, she asks, what forms of dialogue may ensue in negotiating these different interests? One of the foremost issues has been the creation of effective partnerships between stakeholders from different backgrounds, including local communities, non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), business and various levels of government. As Douglass et al (2007: 15) previously observed: ‘the rapid urban change occurring in Pacific Asian cities, coupled 10

Introduction

with an emergent civil society, make the study of civic spaces … an important site for the analysis of global-​local interactions in the production of urban space’. Civil society can be defined as the collection of voluntary organizations which have significant autonomy from the state, and does not typically include for-​profit organizations (Douglass, 2007: 28). A Gramscian understanding of civil society further specifies the role of such organizations in struggling against dominant (hegemonic) power relations through engagements with –​and sometimes opposition to –​the state (Gramsci, 1971). As such, civil society is the ‘pivotal terrain from which social[ly] transformative and … politically innovative action emerges’, making it an ideal focus for this book (Swyngedouw, 2018: 11). The book’s focus on regional governance is also important owing to the decentralization of authority to urban and regional governments in the 1980s, and the rescaling of governance from the national to local scale (see Shatkin, 2011). Many of the ideological differences surrounding heritage often run along divisions between these stakeholders, and have at different times prompted grassroots actors to act independently from state agencies, while also providing opportunities for new cooperative relationships to emerge (see Jenkins and King, 2010: 44; Lam-​Knott, 2019). For instance, as Douglass et al (2007: 3) have observed, there have been ‘instances where the state has sided with civil society in preserving built heritage and green space when this has … increased its legitimacy and popular support’. Political Ecologies of Landscape highlights the tensions involved in developing and maintaining a ‘world-​class’ heritage landscape, while also considering the potential for democratic and socio-​ecologically sustainable forms of urban development to prevail in Penang. The book seeks to understand the political motivations that give rise to these divergent discourses, the governance practices that are used to enact them, and what is at stake for socially and environmentally just urban futures. Much work in urban studies –​and UPE in particular –​has identified the city as fertile ground for political activism (Swyngedouw, 2018; Lam-​Knott, 2019; Ho, 2020). However, there have yet been no full length books to focus on a (South)East Asian setting from a UPE perspective. Filling this gap will thus add to emerging literature on situated urban political ecologies, and help to diversify the empirical reach of UPE research (see Lawhon et al, 2014; Bartels et al, 2020). Some of the guiding questions underpinning the research in this book include: what kinds of governance innovations are emerging in Penang to prepare its rapidly urbanizing society for more environmentally just and equitable futures? To what extent can the sort of civic cultures existing in Penang help to move beyond mere resilience to environmental threats and promote more sustainable forms of development that are based on closer relationships with the natural environment and ecologies? This is an area of UPE research that has received relatively little attention, but is essential to 11

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

the imagining of radically different possible urban futures (see Swyngedouw, 2018: 118). In addressing these questions, the book builds on earlier work on grassroots governance which demonstrates how capacities for the organization of civil society tend to be an outcome of existing localized cultural institutions, environmental imaginaries and local histories (Bunnell and Marolt, 2014). The LPE framework additionally helps to make sense of how cultural tradition and geographical location can contribute to the formation of the social networks that intervene in processes of urban transformation. Indeed, much of the social movements emerging around Penang’s redevelopment in recent years can be seen as a defence of a cultural identity associated with the state that is very much tied to the natural environment. As urban environments in the Global South continue to undergo significant changes in the march towards ‘modernity’, we need to have a better sense of the new governance possibilities for contesting and refashioning the work of the state. The term governance has been identified by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as a primary means for the achievement of sustainable human development. In particular, the UNDP states that ‘good governance’ is that which is ‘participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable’ (UNDP, 1997: np). The emphasis here on the participatory nature of governance involves a research approach based on ‘a philosophy of praxis that begins from lived practices, always seeing them as bound up in conceptions of the world’ (Loftus, 2018: 94). As will become clear through the following chapters of this book, these key characteristics of governance have been central to the demands of civil society groups in Penang, and have shaped the arguments that the book advances. Penang is rather unique in Malaysia in that it has a relatively vibrant and successful civil society sector, and many international NGOs such as Friends of the Earth Malaysia and the Malaysian Nature Society have consequently set up headquarters there. George Town already has a reputation for developing bottom-​up approaches to heritage management (Khoo, 2012: 41), and this expertise has more recently extended to environmental governance, which will be one of the main foci of this book. This shift in focus emerged with a growing awareness among some local civil society groups of the importance of their urban heritage for socio-​ecological well-​being and sustainable development. As such, the book explains how urban activisms have been nurtured from the ground up in Penang, and draw strength from place-​based attachments and solidarities. The first landmark victory for civil society was the ‘Save Penang Hill’ campaign of 1990, which emerged in response to a project initiated by Lim Chong Eu to develop Penang Hill into an ‘international tourist resort’ 12

Introduction

(Khor, 1991). Critics claimed that this project would have fundamentally altered the ‘cultural and natural heritage characteristics’ of the hill, and ultimately led to Lim’s defeat in the 1990 general elections. Somewhat more recently was the proposed Penang Global City Centre (PGCC) development in 2007, which was to be built on the colonial-​era Penang Turf Club grounds. This was to include a monorail, residential properties, a large convention centre, iconic twin towers, an observatory tower, parking space and a public arena, among others (see Jenkins, 2008: 30; The Star, 2015). However, the project was stopped in the face of intense public opposition due to an undemocratic decision-​making process, no environmental assessment, and concerns about its impact on Penangites over the proposed 15-​year construction period. The PGCC controversy gave rise to the Penang Forum, which is a ‘loose coalition’ of NGOs in Penang, aiming to ‘promote participatory local democracy, sustainable planning and development, economic justice, affordable housing, environmental consciousness, sustainable transport, workers’ rights and heritage conservation’ (Penang Forum, 2012). The Penang Forum has a steering committee which plans events and campaigns, but is not dominated by one individual or group. The group gets its name from the regular public forums which are held to get input from concerned residents on local development and conservation issues. Many of the members communicate informally through various WhatsApp groups, which help to share information relevant to various social and environmental issues in Penang. However, it should be noted that most of these activities tend to function in English, which may exclude some members of lower classes who do not speak English fluently. While some campaign and advocacy materials are translated into Malay, this tends to be on a case by case issue, depending on the target audience. Members of Penang’s civil society sector, including the Penang Forum, have criticized the various government-​led mega-​projects that have emerged in Penang for prioritizing profits over people, and eroding the state’s rich cultural and natural heritage. These have emerged as the government –​as the traditional provider of major infrastructures –​have been ‘re-​scaled to fit into the new topographies of global capitalism’ (Keil and Young, 2009: 491). Local civil society groups have also become increasingly active in attempting to provide an alternative development trajectory for the island city that is more inclusive, as well as socially and environmentally sustainable. This speaks to the importance of community-​ led heritage movements, in which locals take seriously the value of their city’s existing natural resources and heritage. As Ho (2020: 41) recently observed, heritage is now assuming more importance in the cultural economy and built environment of the city, as urban middle-​class citizens are becoming increasingly attuned to its importance for place-making 13

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

initiatives. There is also a growing awareness of the danger of allowing developmental pressures to overwhelm the cultural and social significance associated with particular places. The differing positions on the balance between urban development and heritage conservation in Penang, and competing visions for the city’s future has therefore led to considerable conflicts between local authorities, developers, and local communities or civil society groups. For instance, in her study of urban transformations in Penang during the 1980s–​1990s, Goh Beng Lan suggests that the city ‘is not only an important locale where contests are played out, but also more importantly, the locus where emerging identity discourses and various cultural visions of modernity are actively reconstituting urban space’ (Goh, 2002: 185). This tension is a recurring theme in this book, which has manifested through ongoing controversies over the state government’s ongoing plans to develop the island. Throughout the Global South and beyond, much of the literature on civic governmentally focuses on ‘bourgeois environmentalism’, which documents how elites are able to depoliticize urban governance processes (see Swyngedouw, 2005; Ghertner, 2011; Ellis, 2012; Connolly, 2019b). This includes how scientists, environmental NGOs and the affluent have sought to beautify or ‘clean up’ urban spaces, wage environmental campaigns and create new spaces of consumption, while ultimately enhancing the city’s position in the world economy (McFarlane, 2008; Vitz, 2018: 233). While it is true that the middle classes in Penang and other parts of Asia exert a disproportionate influence in shaping the terms of public debate on environmental issues through their strong representation in the media, politics, scientific establishment, NGOs and environmental institutions (see Mawdsley, 2004: 81; Douglass, 2009: 67), the movements have been much more participatory than described in the literature on bourgeois environmentalism. In contrast, this book seeks to illustrate the various technologies of governance used by civil society actors in Penang to counter the types of developmental logics adopted by the state government. It has become increasingly apparent that large-​scale urban development in Penang has given rise to compounding flooding, landslides and other so-​called ‘natural disasters’ as the physical landscape has been transformed. This involves exploring the ways in which different people struggle to make sense of and resist the socio-​natural transformation of their urban spaces, in order to not just become more ‘resilient’, but rather, to fundamentally alter the prevailing logics of urban development (see Batterbury, 2001). The methods that local civil society groups have used to do this include various forms of knowledge production, public consultation and public campaigns that attempt to shift public opinion about development in Penang. 14

Introduction

Tracing the controversies: mobilizing a political ecology of landscape The LPE framing underlies the rationale for the participatory, ethnographic approach that I have employed to comprehend how the urban landscape in Penang is shaped, transformed and contested on an everyday basis by various local stakeholders. This requires attention to the everyday political and social practices that shape urban space and ‘inspire pursuits of sensory, spiritual and visual experiences of nature’ (Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan, 2017: 11). In this way, the book enables furthers understanding of the strategies that communities and other social actors employ in engaging with and resisting ‘elite’ aspirations for the restructuring of urban space, and identifying the factors contribute to their ability or inability to form a collective response. In explaining questions about why and for whom the built environment of Penang is being transformed in such a drastic manner, the book zooms in on the interaction among planners, local and national politics, and non-​ state actors and the associated antagonisms and power relationships. This approach follows Batterbury’s (2001: 440) insight that there is much insight to be gleaned from a ‘grounded’ view of landscapes, which are nested within power relations and regimes of governance, but also deeply embedded in the everyday experience of local people. The research is ethnographic in the sense that it is based on long-​term, horizontal research in Penang spanning over eight years, which has allowed for the development of close personal contacts and deep engagement with the issues being studied. It is participatory in the sense that it has allowed for local research participants, particularly members of the Penang Forum, to identify which topics are most significant for understanding Penang’s ongoing urban transformation. The approach therefore allows for evaluating the role of civil society actors in both resisting and actively co-​producing new developments in an attempt to build a more sustainable and culturally distinctive city. Specific on-​site research was conducted primarily from January through June 2017, though developments in Penang have been followed remotely via the internet and social media beyond this period. This includes WhatsApp groups discussing various issues in Penang with a range of stakeholders (for example ‘Sustainable Penang’), as well as blog posts and related online discussions. On-​site methods were based on mixed-​methods qualitative research, including participatory research with local civil society groups, in-​person interviews and discursive analysis of public statements from a range of different actors. In particular, I developed a mixed-​methods approach to ‘tracing the controversies’ over urban (re)development, which was designed to identify the primary issues surrounding redevelopment on the island, and how they were 15

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

problematized by local residents. This approach was adapted from previous work by Yaneva and Heaphy (2012), and involves three primary steps. The first step is to follow the controversy over time, including the relevant stakeholders, their arguments and differing positions. This involved approximately 22 semi-​structured and unstructured interviews with city planners, government representatives, city councillors, heritage activists and other civil society members in Penang. Some interviews made use of mobile methods, specifically walking or ‘go along’ interviews (Kusenbach, 2003; Anderson, 2004). These involve walking with informants through the spaces that are important to them, such as hiking routes through Penang’s hills, or specific neighbourhoods within George Town. As such, they are intended to capture the socio-​spatial character of lived experience in situ, that might not come out in traditional interview settings (Carpiano, 2009; Evans and Jones, 2011). The focus of the research in this book –​on the cultural and environmental imaginaries that influence social activism –​require building familiarity with the particularities of a place, which can only be derived from physical, multi-​sensory experiences in the field (Bunnell and Maringanti, 2010: 419). The walking interviews were thus a way of capturing ‘the everyday and unexceptional’, which may offer richer and more nuanced ways of understanding the significance of landscape, and the practices that constitute this meaning (see also Rose, 2002: 457; Bolaños, 2011). Walking interviews are are also highly suited to work with environmental activists, in that their focus on ‘praxis’ and ‘lived experience’ help with understanding concrete political struggles of various kinds (Anderson, 2004). The second step is to document the controversy, which involves involved collecting a variety of materials including press clippings, images, government documents and reports. This is especially important as the development projects being studied have been evolving over the period of research and beyond. Newspapers (and online news media) included were primarily English outlets in Malaysia, including The New Straits Times, Free Malaysia Today, Malaysiakini, The Star and The Sun. I also reviewed official city planning documents, planning materials from private companies, and alternative planning documents put forth by civil society groups. The planning documents are important to demonstrate, as Baker and Ruming (2015: 63) put it: ‘how strategic spatial planning documents are themselves sites of worlding, serving as expressions and agents of global urban imaginaries in their own right’, as well as the variety of actors and institutions involved in worlding cities. Additionally, internet based material was important to to analyse narratives expressed in blogs, social media forums, newspaper articles and online comments to such articles. These sources were important to understand how people represent and evaluate changes occurring within a particular 16

Introduction

place (Wiles et al, 2005).4 I have also been a part of Facebook and WhatsApp Groups dedicated to the discussion of (re)development, heritage and planning issues in Penang, initiated by civil society groups. These included individuals from a range of backgrounds, identities and official positions within Penang in order to foster discussion about current issues and how they might be resolved. One member of the WhatsApp discussion labelled this a ‘24/​7 Town Hall Meeting’, observing that: ‘if anyone wants to understand the concerns and hopes of any place, this is the kind of information which needs to be carefully consulted and reflected on … because we need to know what the citizens think and what they want’ (Eric, 29 May 2017). These chat groups share experiences from elsewhere, in seeking to identify best practices that might be applicable to Penang. As Castells (2015: 223) has observed, social movements in the internet age are both local-​territorial and global-​relational in that they are at once connected in situ and throughout the world, learning from and ‘inspired’ by experiences elsewhere. Indeed, recent research is recognizing that social movements –​while having their bases in particular cities –​are not tied to that city but draw energy from national and international connections (Bunnell and Marolt, 2014; Ho, 2020: 21). For this reason, digital forms of interaction are arguably more important to global civil society now than the typical localized civic spaces used for public debate, including public squares and parks. The third step is to map the controversies, which involves visualizing and analysing the spacial dynamics of the conflict, and indicating their implications for urban health and well-​being. This is done through the use of spatial documents for Penang (including maps), which illustrate the various new infrastructural developments being planned for the city. By tracing how developers and politicians seek to transform the built environment of the city, and the role of non-​state actors in contesting this change, we are able to ‘gain a more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which political power is exercised, reproduced and challenged’ (Vitz, 2018: 8). Such an approach is central to the creation of more socially just and sustainable urban societies. As Roderick Neumann (2005) thus rightly points out, participatory ethnographic research can play an important role in approaches to political ecology which seek to highlight the conflicting perspectives on different forms of socio-​environmental transformation. The approach to tracing the controversies as employed here was thus chosen as it can provide unique insights into ‘the processes and meanings that sustain and motivate social groups’ (Herbert, 2000: 550), as well as ‘a critical medium for exploring the dynamics of cultural politics which animate environmental conflicts’ (Moore, 1996: 126). Studying the ‘strategies and tactics’ employed by city residents, urban activists and researchers can therefore be useful for considering the emergent ‘elements of creative resistance’ to dominant power relations in society (de Certeau, 1984; Loftus, 2012). The book thus seeks to bring to 17

POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF LANDSCAPE

light ways in which different people work to challenge socio-​ecological injustices in urban development through everyday, place-​based practices. In doing so, it demonstrates not only how urban-​environmental policy is formulated ‘from above’ in rapidly developing and globalizing Asian cities, but also how alternative aspirations for the future are being pursued ‘from below’ through grassroots movements.

Organization of the book While the book is focused on a singular case study, the approach and many of the themes that the book aims to explore will be useful beyond the context of Penang and Malaysia. The chapters are thus organized in a thematic manner, each engaging with a different concept or debate within the urban studies and UPE literature. In doing so, the chapters combine various scales of analysis in linking changes within specific parts of Penang Island, to integrated development across both sides of Penang State and the wider Malaysian Peninsula, and to transformations taking place along the coastlines of Penang and Malaysia as a whole. As such, the book connects the fraught processes of urbanization and development within Penang to wider topics of interest to urban scholars, practitioners and activists more generally. The next chapter will explicate the LPE framework, as well as the attendant methodological approach developed alongside it. Chapter 3 analyses the spatial strategy for the George Town conurbation, which seeks to condense and centralize future urban development into the historic centres of George Town and Butterworth, on the mainland side of the state. The chapter adopts insights from ‘megapolitan’ political ecology approaches to examine the form of ‘regional urbanization’ envisioned in this plan, and in doing so, facilitates dialogue between UPE and ‘planetary urbanization’ approaches to studying the contemporary expansion of urbanization processes. Chapter 4 examines controversies over the extensive urban redevelopment projects that have emerged since 2012, with a specific focus on the PTMP. Through examining this case, the chapter highlights key technologies of governance that are being used to counter neoliberal ‘global-​city’ making strategies put forth by city managers which can have disastrous socio-​ecological consequences for cities and their inhabitants. Chapter 5 moves out to the hills of the city, to consider their distinct heritage value for urban residents, and how they have shaped broader resistances to development on the hills over the past three decades. In doing so, the chapter seeks to highlight the potential of urban heritage research in contributing to sustainable development initiatives through the integration and conservation of cultural and natural components of heritage landscapes. Building on this theme, Chapter 6 evaluates the potential of emergent urban environmental governance initiatives in Penang for achieving more 18

Introduction

socio-​ecologically just forms of urban development, particularly with regards to its forested hillsides. The chapter argues that it is important to move beyond concepts of resilience, which advocate the implementation of technology and engineering measures to adapt to, rather than resist, the environmental shocks associated with intensive urban development. Shifting focus to Penang’s coastlines, Chapter 7 considers the spate of large-​ scale land reclamation projects that are are now proliferating along Penang’s coastlines as a means of financing infrastructure projects for the state. The chapter relates these projects to wider reclamation that has been taking place across much of peninsular Malaysia in recent decades at increasingly greater scales, and questioning the socio-​environmental costs of such development. The concluding chapter uses the case of Jerejak Island, which is a small, uninhabited island off the southeastern coast of Penang, to reflect on the key themes discussed in the book. The island has been the subject of various competing plans –​either for development or conservation –​in recent years. While nothing has yet come of these, it is suspected that the island will be developed, which may be an omen for the future of Penang Island as a whole, despite the plethora of grassroots research and advocacy done to protect it. Nonetheless, the creativity of urban governance processes in Penang provide important lessons for urban practitioners and activists more broadly, in their search for integrative ways of managing and (re)shaping the built environment of their cities.

19

2

Towards a Landscape Political Ecology This book argues that a LPE framework can provide powerful insights into the ways in which particular landscapes can be seen as crucial sites in generating local resistance to processes of urbanization. Rather than viewing landscape as a passive arena for urbanization, I engage with landscape theory in order to demonstrate how landscapes actively shape and are shaped by the processes of urbanization. The term ‘landscape’ has been used in cultural geography to refer to the appearance or physical characteristics of a certain place, with particular reference to the social, cultural and political processes that shape it (Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988; Mitchell, 1996). Controversies over the form and function of the urban landscape are important to study from a political ecology perspective because they reflect uncertainties regarding the costs of particular instances of socio-​natural transformation on the built environment and are frequent symptoms of rapidly developing urban regions (Walker and Fortmann, 2003: 469). Indeed, Mitchell (2007: 316) has suggested that the central motivation in conflicts over the form of urban landscapes is to increase the ‘exchangeability’ of the urban landscape in a global economy marked by increasing competition for ‘footloose’ capital. The significance of landscape is therefore bound up with its function, which is a marker of social identity, a generator of profit or a space of everyday life (Matless, 1998: 12; Mitchell, 2008). Focusing on the contested transformation of landscapes, then, provides an analytical lens through which to understand how and by whom (and at the expense of whom) landscapes are positioned as sites of consumption and investment (Gezon, 2006: 11). While Brenda Yeoh (1996) has asserted that most urban landscapes can be investigated as terrains of quotidian conflict and negotiation, she maintains that this is particularly true of colonial cities given the divergence in perceptions of the urban environment. For instance, Penang’s colonial heritage, rich 20

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natural environment and situation within the modern Malaysian nation state, has created a society with divergent cultural and economic interests, and environmental subjectivities, which have resulted in the controversies analysed in this book (Harris, 2017: 90). The transformation of urban landscapes are therefore important to study from a landscape perspective, as it can bring to light the normative values and ideologies associated with the (re)production of particular urban forms. Much work in critical landscape studies has thus emphasized the ways in which landscape is experienced and embodied in everyday practice (see Cresswell, 2003; Mitchell, 2008; Bell et al, 2017). The remainder of this chapter is broken into six main sections. The first three provide the conceptual background underpinning the LPE framework developed in this book. The first of these discusses the conceptualization of landscape from a political ecology framework, before reviewing relevant literature on UPE and how it allows us to understand contemporary processes of urbanization. The third section identifies the commonalities between these approaches that create productive synergies when combined into an LPE framework. The subsequent three sections discuss how this approach is useful for understanding extended forms of urbanization, heritage and infrastructure, respectively, which are the primary themes running throughout the controversies being analysed in Penang.

Conceptualizing landscape through political ecologies Some of the most stimulating writings in recent years on landscape have come from a broadly Marxist standpoint, highlighting questions of power relations and geographical imaginaries built into the landscape (Kaika, 2006). For instance, Alex Loftus’ (2012) book Everyday environmentalism considered how practical experience can form the basis of everyday resistances to hegemonic power relations and unequal urban environments. This is often referred to through the concept of the urban environmental imaginary, which refers to ‘a shared set of assumptions about the relationship between the city and its environment’ (Vitz, 2018: 30). It also has a moral component, as it refers to ethical and moral judgements regarding different forms of social action which are ethically and morally right with regard to the natural environment (see Peet and Watts, 1996: 263; Connolly, 2020a: 1489). As Véron (2006: 2100) notes, ‘the same environment can have very different material and cultural significance for people of different classes, ethnicities, or genders’. As such, these differing imaginaries and cultural ideologies can become ‘prime sites of contestations between normative visions’ over the transformation of landscape form and function (Peet and Watts, 1996: 267). As we will see in the case of Penang, the natural environment and social identity of inhabitants are closely related. Aesthetically and environmentally 21

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offensive (ab)uses of Penang’s forested hillsides have strongly shaped attitudes and values regarding appropriate forms of urban development and relationships with the natural environment. This book therefore seeks to demonstrate how a focus on the everyday experience of urban transformation on behalf of local residents has shaped forms of resistance to the type of grand visions inherent in the state government’s modernizing agenda. As I will demonstrate, environmental imaginaries can thus be highly political, in that ‘aesthetically offensive uses of nature can spur political opposition to the hegemonic social order’ (Peet and Watts, 1996: 268). They have also had political effects by putting pressure on the government to create more accountability and transparency. This speaks to the value of the kind of grounded empirical and relational approach for which political ecology has come to be known in undermining certain narratives perpetuated by the state. One of the most dominant positions on landscape is the phenomenological perspective, which positioned people and the cultural context of the place at the centre of understanding lived experiences of landscape (Escalona Ulloa and Barton, 2020: 446). This promoted an understanding of landscape from the perspective of how people’s perceptions, senses, identities and worldviews can create connections between the material and immaterial components of landscape (Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988). For example, Tim Ingold (2002) developed the term ‘dwelling landscapes’ to highlight the act of experiencing the landscape through the senses. Consequently, landscape cannot be understood only in terms of its material characteristics, but also through its symbolic components which can shape the identities and ideologies of its inhabitants (Tuan, 1974). The opposite is also true, whereby the daily activities of people shape the material form of the landscape (Ingold, 2002). As such, cultural geographers have conceptualized landscape as a territory that is made, inhabited and transformed by human activities, through combining both its tangible and intangible elements (see Ishizawa, 2017: 325). The production of landscape is thus not unlike Neil Smith’s (1984) conceptualization of the ‘production of nature’, in that landscape is a largely mystified, socially constructed, and ideological entity ‘which seeks to erase the very facts of its (very social) production’ (Mitchell, 1996: 6). Despite important differences between the two terms, they both have origins in Marxist understandings of capitalist uses of nature. For instance, while not specifically mentioning the concept, Marx (1976: 173) recognized the dialectical relationship between landscape (shaped through human activity) and humans (influenced by their environment). Indeed, physical landscapes become defined over time by features such as buildings, terraces, irrigation channels, transport links, type and density of biodiversity, and so on. Carl Sauer, one of the pioneers of cultural geographical studies of landscape, understood this process as landscape morphology, by which he described 22

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landscape to be ‘fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group’ (in Mitchell, 2000: 102). However, landscapes are also political in that they emerge as a result of changes in the mode of governance over time, which produce visible outcomes for the land, water, flora and fauna that constitute them (Batterbury, 2001: 440). Landscape approaches within cultural geography have traditionally tended to divide landscapes into two broad categories: one of consumption, and one of production (see Williams, 1973). However, more recent landscape scholars have attempted to overcome this binary by demonstrating that landscapes often function as both. For instance, as Paul Robbins’ insightful book on the American lawnscape concluded, ‘production and consumption are enmeshed in the lawn and made difficult to distinguish’ (Robbins and Sharp, 2003: 444; see also Robbins, 2007). Similarly, Walker and Fortmann’s (2003) research on a case of rapid ‘exurban’ inmigration and gentrification in the rural Sierra Nevada region of the United States noted that landscapes often combine elements of production and consumption, making it difficult to distinguish between one or the other. Indeed, Penang’s urban landscape is at once being positioned by the state government within international flows of capital and investment (production), while also being promoted as a world class heritage city (consumption). Don Mitchell’s materialist analyses of the California landscape have sought to reinvigorate Marxist understandings of landscape not only in terms of production or consumption, but also to understand the ideologies built into landscapes, and to show how these are ‘essential for structuring social relations in particular places’ (1996: 3). Therefore, comprehending the landscape and political ecologies of a place first requires an understanding of how and why the landscape is made the way it is, why it functions the way it does and why it looks the way it does. As Erik Swyngedouw (2006: 107) has argued, the recognition of this political meaning of landscape and the natural environment is essential in order to achieve ‘a just and empowering urban development’ that returns the city and the city’s environment to its citizens. Landscape can therefore be seen as both a material form and a process, given that it is always constantly struggled over and in a process of reconstruction (Cartier, 1998; Bunnell, 2002; Rose, 2002; Scott, 2006). This challenges alternative (Marxist) understandings of landscape form as predetermined by certain powerful actors in society and which conceals processes of social exploitation. Social (that is, material/​discursive, economic/​political or cultural) power relations are thus highly important in (re)producing landscapes, given that such ‘power geometries’ often shape the particular social, environmental and political landscapes which we inhabit (Massey, 1993; Heynen et al, 2006). Returning to Don Mitchell, it is clear, then, that we need to understand that ‘while the landscape is always physically somewhere, it is also socially constituted both there and elsewhere’ (Mitchell, 23

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2003: 243). Landscapes emerge as a result of scaled processes that occur amidst ecologically complex environments (Batterbury, 2001: 439–​440; Rangan and Kull, 2009). As such, we need to understand ‘what it embodies, what it internalises –​and to locate the other places to which it is linked’ (Mitchell, 2003: 243). Landscape research accordingly focuses attention on the assemblage of things, processes, artefacts and representations that are embedded within the landscape, thereby constituting a ‘way of seeing’ (Bryant et al, 2011: 464). One of the key themes of landscape theory has been to reveal that landscapes are not only socially constructed, but also do work in reproducing the dominant normative ideologies and particular forms of economic activity in a particular place (Mitchell, 2000). As David Ley commented in his classic text: A social geography of the city (1983), the city is a ‘place of conflict’ and its changing material landscape is a result of the ‘negotiated outcome’ between different groups with asymmetrical power relations. For this reason, it is important to understand the material interventions and representational practices involved in making and maintaining the landscape (see Lippard, 1997; Cosgrove, 1998; Boland, 2008; Schein, 2009). In this way, struggles over the aesthetics of landscape are at the core of material struggles over the urban environment (Duncan and Duncan, 2004).1 This is because the question of landscape aesthetics is not only an environmental or economic issue, but also one of identity and representation (see Nash, 1999: 157). Indeed, it is now well documented that landscapes can build a sense of emotional attachment among their inhabitants, creating what Bryant et al (2011: 460) have termed ‘culture in place’ (see also Wylie, 2009). The range of cultural identities and positionalities within a community tend to be inscribed upon the landscape in different ways (Gezon, 2006: 66). In contrast to earlier writing on the social construction of landscape, this book adopts a more relational and discursive understanding, which focuses on the everyday practices, experiences and ideologies that have been enrolled in representing and (re)shaping the landscape in Malaysian cities. This is important to understand the governmentality of urban transitions, which focuses on the logics, rationalities and technologies of governance, with a particular focus on the mundane practices and discourses involved (Painter, 2006: 763).

Political ecologies of urbanization In one of his seminal texts on UPE, Erik Swyngedouw (2006) wrote that urbanization results in pushing the ecological frontier of a city outward as it expands. This is an urban political ecological process that produces a new urban and rural landscape, comprising of new socio-​natural relations. He argues that ‘the city’s growth, and the process of nature’s urbanisation are 24

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closely associated with successive waves of ecological transformation, socio-​ ecological organisation of metabolic processes … and the extension of urban socio-​ecological frontiers’ (Swyngedouw, 2006: 114–​115). Throughout this process, socio-​natural entities from a variety of scales (local, regional and national) are produced through political-​economic practices and discourses related to civil engineering, economics, land speculation, geo-​ political tensions and the circulation of capital. Swyngedouw writes that the process of metabolic circulation underpinning urbanization is therefore deeply embedded in the political-​ecology of the local and national state, international divisions of labour, and power relations at different scales. The process of urbanization is thus seen to bring about the destruction of ‘first nature’ through the simultaneous creation of new socio-​natural metabolisms, motivated through the process of capitalist exchange (see Lefebvre, 2003; Keil, 2020). The concept of metabolism refers to the process of material exchange and interaction between human beings and nature through which both entities are transformed (Foster, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2006). Properly applied, UPE therefore seeks to do away with unproductive dichotomies such as material/​social or urban/​nature, to produce a more vibrant analysis of ‘econonatural networks’ through which nature is transformed into resources, commodities and conditions of production (Bakker and Bridge, 2006). Such analyses draw upon a wide body of literature in science and technology studies and influenced by assemblage theory exploring the agency of non-​humans in shaping urban environments and the regulation of public space (see Rose, 1997; Braun, 2008; Jackson and Neely, 2015). This has been achieved through the use of analytical and heuristic concepts such as Haraway’s ‘cyborgs’ (Haraway, 1991) and Latour’s ‘quasi-​objects’ (Latour, 1993) –​terms that are now commonplace in the literature on UPE, and in the social sciences more broadly. For example, Gandy (2005) thus uses the term ‘cyborg’ as a spatial metaphor to explore different aspects of the relationship between the city, including its urban infrastructure, and human subjects. Gandy (2002) developed this metaphor through his earlier research on New York City, which involved a series of socio-​ecological transformations that were articulated through particular political, social and cultural discourses and framings of nature. The term ‘cyborg’ is especially useful for theorizing the landscapes discussed in this book, as it connects with work on ‘post-​humanism’ that will be discussed in Chapter 5. Writing on ‘cyborg urbanization’ has therefore had an important impact on the ontological and epistemological foundations of critical UPE in its conceptualization of the circulatory dynamics between bodies, nature and space in contemporary cities. Such socio-​natural flows into and out of urban areas is often referred to by urban political ecologists as ‘urban metabolism’, which includes biophysical, technical, social and economic exchanges (Gandy, 2004; Loftus, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2006). 25

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One of the central premises of UPE is that ‘any framework that seeks to separate nature and society into discrete realms is utterly disabling for a radical and liberatory politics’ (Loftus, 2012: 1). As Loftus (2012: 1) writes, such a view ‘cannot capture the myriad ways in which the nature we experience on a daily basis is actively constituted through non-​natural processes’. Indeed, as Heynen and colleagues previously noted: ‘natural or ecological conditions and processes do not operate separately from social processes’, and cities ‘are themselves inherently natural and social’ (Heynen et al, 2006: 3). Urban political ecologists have therefore been central to research demonstrating that cities are also profoundly natural spaces, adding empirical and conceptual substance to David Harvey’s (1996: 186) now famous observation that ‘there is nothing unnatural about New York City’ (emphasis in original). Urban political ecologists have therefore sought to develop a framework for understanding the historically and geographically specific ways through which nature is urbanized. This work has been successful in disrupting the idea of the city as the antithesis of nature and to direct attention instead to the processes through which the city is constituted as a socio-​natural assemblage (Loftus, 2012: 3). UPE is useful for examining such processes as it illustrates the multiple and unequal socio-​ecological processes and power relations operating at a variety of scales that feed processes of capitalist urbanization. In other words, it investigates how interventions in nature take place, with what consequences, and for whose benefit. As Kaika and Swyngedouw have argued, there are ‘a multitude of urban natures’ and of ‘existing, possible, or practicable socio​natural relations’ which are often struggled over within the urban arena (quoted in Newman, 2015: xxii). The crucial issue here is not just of blurring the boundary between ‘nature’ and ‘society’, but rather of taking responsibility for how social interventions in nature take place, with what consequences and for whose benefit (see also Desfor and Keil, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004; Loftus, 2006). Part of the analysis is to reveal how capital accumulation –​particularly through privatization –​involving different forms of state–​capital–​society–​nature interconnections results in the production of various forms of ‘socionature’ (Nevins and Peluso, 2008: 16). As such, Swyngedouw (2006: 118) has stressed that any ‘political visions are, therefore, necessarily also ecological visions; any political project must, of necessity, also be an environmental project (and vice versa)’. In examining urbanization processes, UPE analyses highlight political-​ economic and cultural factors, particularly expressed through through changing relationships between humans and physical environments (Heynen et al, 2006). Cities are seen as being both built in and with nature, while also producing nature (Keil, 2003). This interdependence of environmental and social transformation becomes most apparent on urban landscapes where the metabolic transformation of nature is concentrated both in its physical 26

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form and in the production of socio-​ecological consequences (Monstadt, 2009: 1933). Moreover, the dialectical relationship between city and countryside is also central to the conceptualization of cities within UPE. One of the foundational texts in this regard is Bill Cronon’s (1991: 384) book, Nature’s metropolis, which argues that ‘urban and rural landscapes … are not two places but one. They created each other, they transformed each other’s environments and economies, and they now depend on each other for survival’. The idea that the urban environment is socially produced and contested is a central theme in writings on UPE (Swyngedouw, 2004; Njeru, 2006; Cooke and Lewis, 2010). As Roderick Neumann (2005) has argued, the point is to emphasize the fact that the human transformation of natural ecosystems cannot be understood without considering the political-​ economic context in which such transformations are embedded. Such a framing thereby provides a productive lens through which to analyse the material transformations and controversies bound up with urbanization processes (Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Neumann, 2005, 2011; Hung, 2015). Moreover, the inability to control ‘nature’ (especially the increasing burden of so-​called ‘natural disasters’) has opened up space for the contestation of state power and legitimacy (Harris, 2017: 91). In this regard, Roger Keil (2003: 729) has observed that UPE is ultimately a question of democracy, governance and politics of everyday life in cities.

Towards a landscape political ecology As Neumann (2011: 843) has pointed out, critical landscape studies and political ecology share several key analytical foci, including struggles over representation and identity, contested processes of land use change, and the social production of nature under capitalism (see Figure 2.1). Morgan Robertson (2015) has also noted that political ecology can trace its roots back to site-​focused, Sauerian research on material cultural ecology, deepening this analysis with an attention to global political-​economic relations affecting the site. Urban political ecologists have also begun to look at the dialectical relationship between geographical imaginations, discourses and material practices in contemporary cities, which makes the field compatible with a landscape approach (Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Kaika, 2006; Neumann, 2011; Gabriel, 2014). The idea of landscape as ‘discursive, narrative and rhetorical’ therefore goes hand in hand with political ecological analysis and description of land use (see Batterbury, 2001; Kaika, 2006; Gandy, 2013; Instone and Sweeney, 2014). Indeed, political ecology is well suited to consider the driving forces of change involved in (re)producing and contesting landscape form. For scholars such as Don Mitchell, the 27

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Figure 2.1: Diagram illustrating the components and composition of the landscape political ecology framework Landscape

LPE

City as space of flows (socio-natural-material)

Discursive and material components Cultural, environmental, historical associations Holistic, non-binary ‘Sense of place’; place attachment

Urban Political Ecology

Socio-ecological justice Politics Power relations Materiality Conflict

Urbanization of nature Urban metabolism More-than-human relations

production of such landscapes is a matter of ongoing struggle and conflict between different social and economic groups, it thus typifies a contentious, compromised product of society (Mitchell, 1996; Zukin, 1991). The controversies over the new urban infrastructure being proposed for Penang are therefore important to study from a LPE perspective because they bring to light the normative values and ideologies associated with particular urban landscapes in the region.

Discursive and material components However, some political ecological analyses of landscape change have been criticized for being overly focused on the human forces driving change, while ignoring the agency of non-​human factors (see Neumann, 2011; Gandy, 2013). As Batterbury (2001: 440) argues, ‘it is too easy to overlook biophysical agency as a backdrop to the interplay of politics and institutions’. One frequently cited example is Fairhead and Leach’s (1996) account of deforestation in West Africa which is centred on the Eurocentric visions of colonial officials there. Some scholars have thus begun to call attention to the conceptual synergies between landscape and political ecology, while falling short of developing LPE into a distinctive conceptual approach (Neumann, 2011). Moreover, much of the existing empirical work in this area has focused primarily on rural (or ‘exurban’) landscapes. While this work has provided much inspiration for the approach taken here, this book differs given the focus the networked relations connecting ‘the city’ with other ‘natural’ spaces on Penang’s metropolitan edge.2 Moreover, given the traditional focus of political ecology on the nexus of political economy and ecology, it has devoted less attention to the ways that 28

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both of these factors are always culturally embedded. For instance, as Neumann (2011: 848) notes, landscape in political ecology tends to be seen as ‘applications or expressions of power that have significant material consequences for people’s everyday lives’, including individual and collective livelihoods, and are ‘therefore subject to contestation and competing representations’ (see Fairhead and Leach, 1996). Yet, meanings, lived experiences and ideologies, which are both informed by and shape the landscape, are central in informing concerns regarding environmental change. This is where UPE can be best enhanced through a systematic incorporation of landscape. Some recent work in UPE has already begun to do this (e.g. Barua, 2014; Escalona Ulloa and Barton, 2019), but I argue that much can be gained from a systematic incorporation of the ideas of landscape and political ecology. Landscapes are understood as in flux and relational, created by interactions between both human and non-​human actors. As Batterbury (2001) has pointed out, landscapes are therefore well suited for political ecological analysis because they are simultaneously cultural and ‘natural’. For example, ‘more-​than-​human geography’ approaches have sought to re-​materialize and reanimate landscapes by paying close attention to the ecologies of human and non-​human actors through which a ‘vital topography’ emerges (Barua, 2014: 916; see also Lorimer, 2006; Johnston, 2008). Tzaninis et al (2020: 15) argue that focusing on the more-​than-​urban might therefore enable ‘new openings and possibilities for engagement between human and more-​than-​ human worlds’. The emphasis here is on landscapes as dwelt achievements of people and animals rather than as mere surfaces upon which human meanings are inscribed (Hinchliffe, 2002). In this way, Schmidt (2017) has argued that wilderness is and always has been integrated into our everyday (sub)urban landscapes. Landscapes can therefore be understood as hybrid objects which are both material and discursive, natural and cultural (Demeritt, 1994; Mitchell, 1996; Cosgrove, 1998; Matless, 1998). Landscape has thus been central to the understanding of society–​nature relations, and provides a useful approach to the study of human environmental perception (Olwig, 1996: 630). As Batterbury (2001: 439–​440) has pointed out, landscapes are well suited for political ecological analysis because they have both an environmental history and a nested political ecology –​they are simultaneously cultural and natural. The concept of landscape can also be central to understanding the interrelationships between environmental justice, equality and the natural environment, which has long been a primary area of concern in political ecology and human geography more broadly. For example, Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003: 901) have now famously argued that ‘there is no such thing as an unsustainable city in general, but rather there are a series of urban and environmental processes that negatively affect some social groups while benefiting others’. Investigating such injustices therefore requires asking 29

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questions about who gains and who loses from deeply unjust socio-​natural transformations bound up with the process of urbanization. In previous engagements with political ecologies, cultural geographers have been interested in intersections between place making and environmental health (Evered, 2014); nature, environment and landscape interrelations, and their mutually co-​constituted, socially constructed and contested nature (Bebbington and Batterbury, 2001; Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Evered, 2014). As Bebbington and Batterbury (2001: 370) observed, the eclecticism and diversity of political ecology makes the field ‘an important meeting point for work in ... environmental politics and cultural geography’. In examining controversies over urban and regional transformation, political ecologists have highlighted the material and discursive aspects of landscape from multiple angles. For example, Maria Kaika has studied the role of iconography and symbolism of dam constructions in reconfiguring the relationship between ‘nature’ and the city in Athens, Greece (Kaika, 2005). Similarly, Omaira Bolaños’ writing on land disputes and forest conflicts in the Amazon region illustrates how emerging socio-​cultural dynamics and power struggles between indigenous and non-​indigenous groups have reshaped the Central Amazonian landscape (Bolaños, 2011). Others have used a landscape lens to examine the interconnections between social and environmental systems across scales (Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Rangan and Kull, 2009). For example, Bruce Braun’s (2002) work on the production of British Columbia’s forested landscapes sought to move environmental studies away from the notion that landscapes can be understood as discrete, bounded places. By moving across different sites, and drawing on different histories and practices, he shows how nature and culture, place and identity are continuously (de)stabilized on Canada’s west coast. Landscapes can thus be seen as key moments in trans-​local networks that stretch across time and space, creating what Massey terms as a ‘progressive sense of place’ (Massey, 1993: 66; Schein, 1997: 662). This concurs with the emphasis in political ecology on the recognition that seemingly ‘local’ politics are shaped by broader economic, social and economic forces (Walker and Fortmann, 2003). LPE approaches therefore must consider interactions across a range of scales from the individual to community, state and region.3 Given that there have as yet been no sustained attempts to utilize an explicit LPE approach in empirical work, this research has also involved developing a compatible methodological approach for this framework. In generating such insights, many political ecologists and cultural geographers have used ethnographic methods to consider the importance of cultural context in shaping the perceptions of stakeholders to the issue at hand (Harper, 2004; Parizeau, 2015). As such, my approach loosely follows that set out by Yeoh (1996: 10), who suggests grappling with how the urban landscape is 30

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differentially perceived and utilized by various social groups, and to examine why controversies over the use of this space arise, and how they are resolved. The focus here, as in Yeoh’s work, is on ‘the practical nature of everyday life’, and aims to illustrate how landscape form affects the lived experience of the people who live and work within a given space. For example, Barau (2017) identified landscape aesthetics, contact with nature, accessibility to green and open spaces/​wilderness, and threats to wildlife to be some of the most important concerns to people and places experiencing possible landscape transformation in peri-​urban settings (see also Byrne and Wolch, 2009; Chapters 5–​6 in this volume). Such work speaks to Kaika and Swyngedouw’s (2011) earlier call to investigate how place-​ specific physical environments can act as facilitators for collective action. The conceptual lens of LPE is therefore important for its ability to integrate material and discursive elements of socio-​environmental controversies with their political-​economic dimensions. As Gabriel (2014) has noted, environmental discourses can have a significant effect on processes of collective imagining in cities, and the construction of particular types of landscapes, subjects and practices. LPE can therefore be further useful for considering how new urban forms are constructed out of the interactions between politics, nature-​environment and urban space (Neo and Pow, 2015). Indeed, Olwig (1996: 645) has argued that landscape research cannot focus solely on rural or urban areas, but ‘must incorporate the mutual definition and relations of both’. As such, LPE can enable moving beyond critiques of ‘methodological cityism’ that have been levelled at the UPE literature, which I will turn to in the next section (Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2015; Connolly, 2019a).

Landscape political ecology: beyond the city This book should be understood as a political ecology of urbanization –​ rather than merely a study of nature in the city. Urban geographers and urban political ecologists have repeatedly argued that research should not merely focus on cities, but rather on urbanization as a process, involving the material transformation of lived environments. Cities are not separate entities, but rather dynamically intertwined with larger urban regions connected through infrastructure, the metabolization of waste and resources, population flows, and other socio-​ecological flows (Vitz, 2018). As such, Swyngedouw (2006: 118) has argued that ‘the urban world is a cyborg world, part natural part social, part technical part cultural, but with no clear boundaries, centres, or margins’. In this way, Maya Ishizawa (2017: 324) views urbanization as a process which calls into question the distinctive categories of urban and rural, and sees processes of urban expansion as representative of a deeper shift in the relationship between communities and their environments. 31

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Swyngedouw (2006: 106) has also drawn attention to the flows of capital that fuels the multiple socio-​ecological processes feeding ‘the urbanisation process and turn[ing] the city into a metabolic socio-​environmental process that stretches from the immediate environment to the remotest corners of the globe’. This echoes Henri Lefebvre’s (2003) famous theory of ‘the complete urbanisation of society’ which predicts that over time the separation between urban and rural spaces will become less and less distinct. As such, urbanization is understood as ‘a process of continuous, but contested, socioecological change’, which unlocks new avenues for understanding the deeply localized social movements reacting to such change (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2011: 577). Expanding cities therefore present a challenge for sustainable development initiatives, ‘as the uneven proliferation of hybrid landscape types becomes a major feature of 21st century urbanisation’ (McKinnon et al, 2019: 353). Nonetheless, it has been argued that research on urban sustainability in both academic and popular literature tends to focus on the urban core, while ignoring spaces of extended urbanization, which may include suburbs, exurbs and informal settlements (Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2015; McKinnon et al, 2019: 353). For example, Erik Swyngedouw (2006: 116) argued over a decade ago that an urban political ecological perspective ‘opens new avenues for re-​centring the urban as the pivotal terrain for eco-​political action’. This is based on the assumption that the potential for ‘emancipatory urban politics reside[s]‌in acquiring the power to produce urban environments in line with the aspirations, needs, and desires of those inhabiting these spaces’. This is in line with the now dominant understanding of cities as being the centre of grassroots urban political movements, as we have seen in various mass protests and ‘occupy’ movements around the world, from Hong Kong, to Santiago and New York (see Swyngedouw, 2018). However, a new generation of research is emerging, which takes up issues of concern to political ecologists on the urban edge (Keil, 2018; Güney et al, 2019). These exurban or peri-​urban spaces have been conceptualized as in-​between spaces representing a meeting or overlapping of dynamics associated with the urban and the rural (Keil and Young, 2009; Taylor and Hurley, 2016; McKinnen et al, 2019). Similarly, Ranganathan and Balazs (2015: 404) use the term ‘urban fringe’ to capture the ‘hybrid, transitional areas on the outskirts of cities’, which avoids defining the fringe in binary ‘rural’ or ‘urban’ terms. They also use the term to denote areas that are spatially and politically marginal to an established (incorporated) city. Defined as such, they suggest that the ‘power relationship between the fringe and the city is of greater significance than descriptive “rural” and “urban” or “agricultural” and “non-​agricultural” characteristics’ (Ranganathan and Balazs, 2015: 407). McKinnon and colleagues (2019: 359) further argue that 32

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a focus on such spaces can allow for greater attention to issues including: the representation of nature, impacts of urbanization, and the role of local culture on the conservation of nature in urban areas. This research also tends to borrow more from cultural landscape studies, focusing on representations of nature and differing ideologies at the local scale, and how these are shaped by broader processes of exchange and circulation. Furthermore, Tzaninis and colleagues have also recently proposed a distinctive suburban political ecology lens which has considerable overlap with the perspective put forward here in my combined use of landscape and urban political ecologies (Tzaninis et al, 2020). By broadening the terrain through which we conduct our research and centre our analyses, we can go beyond a focus on cities as the focal point of our research agenda, to instead understand extended processes of urbanization as actively producing the urban, peri-​urban and ‘ruralized’ environments that we now inhabit (see Swyngedouw, 2006; Goh and Bunnell, 2013; Krause, 2013). An LPE framing thus helps us to capture the complex reality of socio-​spatial formations and relations that defies neat distinctions between urban and rural which should rather be seen as a continuum (see Krause 2013: 236). The concept of landscape is useful for studying processes of extended urbanization, given the hybrid nature of the term, which allows for blurring distinctions between the urban and rural (see Matless, 1998: 12–1​ 3; Hiner, 2014). This is one way in which LPE can move beyond critiques of ‘methodological cityism’ levelled at the UPE literature, by exploring socio-​ecological processes taking place along the urban periphery (compare Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2015; Connolly, 2019a). Landscapes may therefore be regarded as ‘quasi-​objects’, or entities that not only contain an inherent material reality, but also embody the social relations and struggles that go into their making (Latour, 1996). For Latour, quasi-​objects are thus impossible to place on either side of a dualism of nature and culture, in that they ‘shuttle’ between these two categories of reference (Latour, 1993). In this sense, landscapes can be understood as material and discursive, natural and cultural (Mitchell, 1996; Scott, 2006; Cater and Keeling, 2013). They therefore contain the potential to reconfigure the relationship between nature and society in urban settings, which is a central aim of the grassroots governance interventions examined in this book.

Landscape political ecologies of heritage Landscape is a particularly appropriate concept for understanding heritage, which is one of the key themes emerging in controversies over urban transformations in Penang. Baird and Shackel (2017: 4) define heritage landscapes to include: ‘urban, Indigenous, and post-​industrial landscapes, wildlife management and wilderness areas, archaeological sites, coastal and 33

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marine environments, community-​conserved areas, land-​trust preserves, and temple complexes’. As Jones and Cloke (2002: 186) have pointed out, landscapes represent areas where ‘history, aesthetics and local place characteristics are conjoined in various comings-​together as heritage’. Landscape is also a key concept used in international heritage legislation, such as the Burra Charter, which acknowledges the various associative values that contribute to the significance of place (Australia ICOMOS, 2013). Using a historic urban landscape approach, Caballero (2016: 8) has since widened the dimensions of urban heritage to include all geological formations, flora and fauna, water bodies, agricultural lands and human settlements within and along the periphery of a designated area that contribute to the essence of a specific landscape. The significance of such an approach is that heritage management thus becomes a central component of the sustainable development of urban areas. Moreover, heritage is increasingly recognized as ‘an emergent property of the dialogical relationship between human beings and a range of other human and non-​human actors and their environments’ (Harrison, 2013: 9). As Ishizawa (2014) has written, cultural landscapes have become categories of increasing use in the nominations to World Heritage designations, which assume an ontological division between nature and culture. In other words, the protection of built structures has been classified as ‘cultural heritage’, while what has been understood as belonging to the ‘natural’ environment, free from human intervention, has been classified as natural heritage. This makes it well suited to investigate from a political ecology framework, as a way of attending to the natural and cultural interactions which shape the urban landscape. Bandarin and van Oers (2012: 76) have therefore attributed the growing awareness of the vulnerability of the urban environment as a key issue shaping approaches to heritage conservation in recent decades. Political ecology and landscape studies also share an attention to the narratives used to represent history, and the articulation of identity, making LPE an ideal approach for the study of heritage landscapes. Landscape is a holistic concept which captures the web of cultural, environmental and historical associations which are integral components in the formation of place attachment (Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Neumann, 2011; Connolly, 2017). Landscape has thus been defined as ‘a way of seeing the world and imagining our relationship to nature’ (Wilson, 1991: 14). Similarly, Caballero (2016: 8) has noted that: ‘landscapes are products of harmony between nature, history and culture of a specific area’ (see also Ishizawa, 2017). This understanding draws on earlier writing on landscape in cultural geography, which has demonstrated how landscapes can influence environmental sensibilities of their inhabitants, and normative understandings of how the landscape should be used (Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988; Schein, 1997; Duncan and Duncan, 2001). 34

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However, Hinchliffe (2007: 208) has observed that some of this earlier writing suggests that the process of landscape formation has been treated as ‘the result of interactions between natural and cultural processes –​both of which tended to be portrayed as somehow definable in and through the absence of the other’. This indicates the value of the political ecology framing which can better conceptualize the hybrid, socio-​natural character of landscapes. UPE can thus provide a useful lens to examine controversies over urban heritage, by demonstrating how heritage landscapes ‘are produced through combined social and ecological processes that shape particular socio-​ geographical conditions and … transformations that shape everyday urban life’ (Swyngedouw, 2009: 603). Furthermore, it adds a specific focus on political economy which helps to illustrate how culture–​nature relations are shaped by capitalism, colonialism and conservation practices, among other factors, as will be demonstrated empirically in Chapter 6.

Landscape political ecologies of infrastructure As Jonathan Silver (2015: 984) has observed, ‘cities in the global South are often considered to be in the midst of infrastructural breakdown, and characterised as either lacking networked services or as suffering from ongoing disruption and sometimes failure’. This is indeed the case in Penang, which is increasingly notorious for its acute traffic congestion, adding hours to the commutes of many Penangites. This congestion is often linked to inadequate public transportation infrastructure and routes, which has sparked the plans to modernize these networks through the ambitious PTMP (see Chapter 4). It is thus vital to consider how flows of people, capital and goods shape the city and its networked infrastructure systems as well as to examine the ‘important structuring role these … play in connecting, composing, fragmenting, enlarging and renewing wider processes of urbanization across the city’ (Silver, 2015: 987). In other words, landscapes have been conceptualized as socio-​ ecological infrastructures for the provision of essential metabolic functions that underpin urban life, while infrastructure networks have themselves transformed urban landscapes and ecologies (Perrotti, 2020). Concepts from UPE provide a useful analytical framework for examining networked infrastructures by conceptualizing them as inherently socio-​ ecological systems (Monstadt, 2009: 1933). Carse and Lewis (2017: 13) define infrastructures as ‘discrete socio-​technical systems’, but note that the term can even include ‘seemingly natural landscapes like forests … through the active and inherently political work of investment, management, maintenance, and standardisation’. Research on the political ecology of infrastructure provision has produced interesting insights into the metabolism of cities as they have been reoriented to attract the market-​oriented, globalized flows of capital associated with neoliberalization (Keil and Young, 2009; Monstadt, 2009). 35

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UPE research has largely adopted a Marxist understanding of infrastructure, which sees states as the providers of infrastructure through which further rents can be extracted and, particularly through processes of privatization (Loftus, 2020: 143). Swyngedouw (2006: 35), for instance, sees the city as: ‘a metabolic circulatory process that materialises as an implosion of socio-​natural relations, a process which is organised through socially articulated networks and conduits [infrastructures] whose origin, movement and position is articulated through complex political, social, economic and cultural relations’. As discussed earlier in this chapter, he notes that these relations are invariably infused with myriad configurations of power that saturate the material, symbolic and imagined dimensions of infrastructure and its (often contested) development. However, most work on infrastructure from a UPE perspective to date has focused on ‘defetishizing’ the water, electricity and energy networks which are often hidden from public view (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000; Loftus, 2007; Silver, 2015). Comparatively less work has examined transportation infrastructure, which has been largely examined by research from transport geography and urban planning perspectives. This has largely focused on political-​economic issues of connectivity, competition in facilitating rapid and inexpensive economic exchange, while putting less emphasis on environmental and governance concerns (Carse and Lewis, 2017: 12). Nonetheless, transportation infrastructure is becoming increasingly central to critical urban research agendas given the socio-​environmental inequalities that they (re)produce, as well as their role in structuring mega-​ cities and ‘mega-​regions’ in an era of ‘planetary urbanisation’ (see Connolly, 2019a; Kanai and Schindler, 2019). The construction of urban infrastructure networks has typically been portrayed as a technological-​engineering problem, but, as Swyngedouw (2006: 118) has argued, it ‘is in fact as much part of the politics of life as any other social process’. Infrastructure has also been understood as a process underpinning the restructuring of urban space, particularly through speculative uncertainty and social contestation (Gandy, 2005). As Matthew Gandy (2005: 39) has written, ‘urban infrastructures are not only material manifestations of political power but they are also systems of representation that lend urban space its cultural meaning’. Moreover, Monstadt (2009: 1935) identified the need to address how infrastructure –​which often represents ‘materialised resonances from past political institutions, economic choices, technological standards, cultural values, etc’ –​can be involved in the shaping of urban (governance) processes. Recent research in political ecology has begun to examine connections between state-​making and power, particularly in relation to the contested nature of infrastructure development and associated landscape transformation (see Harris, 2017; Loftus, 2020). As Harris (2017: 91) has noted, material 36

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conditions –​including landscape topography and infrastructural formations –​ are being seen as crucial in tracing the shifting geographies of state power. James Scott’s (2008) book: Seeing like a state, has been highly influential in this regard through combining a focus on the connections between state power, various forms of expertise (planning, development, etc) and the management of nature. Scott argues that state officials have the tendency to override other forms of (grassroots) knowledges, which frequently results in the failure of development plans. This is a recurring theme throughout the empirical chapters of this book, which have set Penang up for current and future failures in environmental sustainability and transportation planning. Such a focus allows for understanding how infrastructures are central to the refashioning of state–​society relations, and how state power is bound up with attendant transformations of nature (Harris, 2017: 90). For example, research has traced the ways that uses, knowledges of and control over urban landscapes can serve to call into question the seeming fixity of state–​society boundaries (Mitchell, 1991; Harris, 2017: 91).

Conclusion As I have demonstrated in this chapter, writings on landscape within cultural geography and the UPE literatures share many common assumptions. While both sets of literature have diverse theoretical roots, including relational and post-​structural ontologies and epistemologies, both are also heavily influenced by Marxian political economy. They also share fundamental assumptions regarding the production and maintenance of urban environments. For instance, as Kenneth Olwig (2002) has argued, the landscape is a key site for the formation of socio-​political identity and community action, which are a main focus in recent work on UPE. Moreover, political ecology and cultural landscape studies both seek to understand key drivers of socio-​ecological change and the urban-​environmental governance dynamics that emerge to address concerns over this change (McKinnon et al, 2019: 355). Despite this, Neumann (2011) has lamented that there have been a series of significant but unacknowledged convergences in theorization between the landscape and political ecology literatures. This lack of engagement is problematic, he argues, because of the missed opportunities for cross-​ fertilization between the two, which would be mutually beneficial. I have thereby reviewed some of these convergences, which I hope will spark further development of the LPE approach. What LPE adds to the urban studies literature is the assertion that the landscape is a key site in which controversies over the environment are played out. As we will see in the following chapters, the landscape is the primary terrain over which the controversies over Penang’s future development have emerged, making LPE an important conceptual approach for examining them. 37

3

Megapolitan Explosions: Reworking Urban and Regional Metabolisms While we are often reminded that over 54 per cent of the world’s population now lives in cities, this figure varies significantly by continent, and tends to be much greater and faster growing in developing regions. For instance, the figure is expected to rise to 65 per cent in Asia, and 90 per cent in Latin America (Jacobs, 2016a: S6). In addition, Asia is projected to be home to 17 of the world’s projected 27 mega-​cities (Think City, 2013: 21). This trend is also highly evident in Malaysia, where over 76 per cent of the population lives in cities, compared with 25 per cent in 1957 (TheEdge, 2016: S4; Tan, L.I., 2019). More specifically, the rate of urbanization in Penang is over 90.8 per cent, which exceeds the capital of Kuala Lumpur (Mok, 2016a). Such rapid growth is related to strategies that sought to link urban and rural development in Malaysia since the 1950s. This included the development of new towns, aiming to urbanize rural areas in order to eradicate poverty (Rabe et al, 2012). Moreover, the majority of the urban population in nearly all Asian countries is in medium-​sized and smaller cities which are (on aggregate) growing at a much quicker rate than mega-​cities. One of the reasons for this growth is that peri-​urban areas and smaller, secondary cities tend to be the focus for manufacturing industries which generate economic and population growth (Yusuf, 2013: 62–​63). Furthermore, much of this urban growth will be in coastal cities like Penang, raising concerns such as how to cope with rising sea levels (Yusuf, 2013: 63). Penang is also the only state in Malaysia to be completely urban, with both of its constituent municipalities being designated as cities within the past five years (Trisha, 2019).1 Tew et al (2019: 2311) have shown that urban areas in Penang expanded from 379.20km2 to 453.06km2 from 2004 to 2018, which equates to an average expansion of 5.28km2 per year. Despite some pockets of urban development in the forested hills of Penang Island (discussed in Chapter 4), much of this growth has been in the central and southern regions 38

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of Seberang Perai, on the mainland side of Penang State (see Figure 1.1). The population in Penang has similarly increased by more than 40 per cent since 1970, and is one of the fastest growing cities in the world (Chee et al, 2017). As was the case with the expansion of Kuala Lumpur in the 1990s, much of this urban development has been at the expense of oil palm estates and other agricultural land (see King, 2008; Tew et al, 2019). Indeed, it has been reported that the west coast of Penang Island has experienced an 80 per cent increase in urbanized areas and a 23 per cent decrease in agricultural land between 1992 and 2002 (Chee et al, 2017). This has in turn resulted in illegal farming activities in the protected forest reserves on Penang’s central hills (see Chapter 4). In order to address the new challenges now presented by such rapid urbanization in Malaysia, the 10th Malaysia Plan (2011–​15) advocated concentrated urban development into five key conurbations, including Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, George Town, Kuantan and Kota Kinabalu. However, some of these cities, including George Town and Kota Kinabalu, cannot expand due to lack of land, which has required the distribution of development to other neighbouring areas. This has in turn raised the problem of infrastructure provision, and in particular public transit, which many Malaysian cities are now grappling with (Benson and Johnson, 2013; Lakshana, 2016). As Penang state government official Jagdeep Singh Deo remarked: ‘every inch of Penang is now a city. This has brought added responsibility and service delivery will need to be heightened as the people will have higher expectations’ (quoted in Trisha, 2019).2 Other challenges include pressures on heritage buildings and the natural environment, which will be addressed in several of this book’s chapters. This unprecedented scale of contemporary urbanization has been discussed by urban scholars under the paradigm of the ‘urban age’, which draws attention to the rural-​to-​urban demographic transition and the large-​scale territorial expansion of cities and peri-​urban areas (Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Derickson, 2015; Kanai and Schindler, 2019). As discussed in the previous chapter, this work emerges from Lefebvre’s (2003) original thesis on the inevitability of the complete urbanization of society and posits that a novel epistemology is required to understand how urban societies are constituted. This literature has thus sought to frame the urban as a process –​ rather than a spatially bound entity –​in order to disrupt assumed distinctions between urban and rural. However, critics like Schindler (2017) have argued that the discourse around planetary urbanization tends to overlook the multiple spatialities and lived experiences of urbanization, particularly in the Global South. As such, Alida Cantor (2020) has argued that UPE provides a more useful framework for addressing emergent urban–​rural relationships due to its grounding in empirics and everyday experience. For instance, Seth Gustafson 39

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and colleagues (2014: 667) developed the concept ‘megapolitan political ecology’ as a way of identifying similarities between urban processes in a range of cities, and for rethinking the urban–​rural relationships in poly-​centric urban regions. More specifically, they argue that scholars must consider the metabolic processes that connect urbanizing regions around the world in order to better understand the combined political and ecological implications of regional urbanization, particularly in secondary cities like Penang. Moreover, some writing on planetary urbanization has problematically sidelined Lefebvre’s concerns about the highly uneven and socially unjust nature of urban expansion (see Connolly, 2019a: 65). As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, the way that poly-​centric urbanism has been rolled out in Penang has been rather exclusionary in the type of ‘sustainable’, ‘green’ and ‘smart’ cities that it envisions.

Situating the emergence of poly-​centric urbanism in Malaysia Data from the World Bank demonstrates that there has been a global shift from the privatization of city-​based infrastructure in the 1990s to the current emphasis on inter-​city infrastructure (World Bank, 2019). As such, infrastructure has now emerged in the urban studies literature as ‘a critical object of analysis to think through the politics, ecology, social relations and everyday experiences of urban life’ (Addie, 2016: 273). More specifically, scholars have identified the emergence of mega-​regions as the new urban form of globalization, which have resulted in ‘trans-​metropolitan landscapes comprising networked urban centres and their surrounding areas’ (Harrison and Hoyler, quoted in Kanai and Schindler, 2019: 307). As various scholars have noted, these often take the form of new urban corridors, such as Malaysia’s Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER), of which Penang is a part (Olds, 1995; Bunnell, 2004; Kanai and Schindler, 2019).3 In the Penang case, the state government –​in partnership with local planning agency Think City –​have developed the George Town Conurbation Spatial Strategy (GTCSS) which has sought to facilitate a transition to a high income economy through the development of an appropriate spatial form. The GTCSS envisions a spatial form where development is concentrated into nodes, rather than allowed to continue to sprawl; land use and transport planning is coordinated and integrated (Think City, 2013). This shift is reflective of the broader trend towards the proliferation of peri-​urban nodes in contemporary urbanization processes, to the extend that peripheral development is now clearly part and parcel of the contemporary urban world (Kanai and Schindler, 2019; Wu and Keil, 2020: 1). Only recently, however, have studies begun to draw attention to large-​scale projects in peri-​urban areas (Barau, 2017; Rizzo, 2019), and the escalation of land values that 40

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accompanies rapid paced urbanization (Ong, 2011; Williams et al, 2020). Moreover, research on poly-​centric urbanism to date remains largely focused on the Global North, in addition to growing studies examining developments in East Asia (Shen and Wu, 2020; Wu and Keil, 2020). In analysing the type of poly-​centric development envisioned by the Penang state government, this chapter therefore responds to Kanai and Schindler’s (2019) call for research on the multiple drivers and modalities of poly-​centrism in the Global South. The planning of poly-​centric urban regions in Asia is a relatively new strategy –​emerging within the past ten years –​which has focused on the development of multifunctional new towns (Shen and Wu, 2020: 1011). This is in contrast to earlier exclusively industrial or residential developments, such as Penang’s free industrial zone in Bayan Lepas, or the residential suburbs like Tanjung Bungah. However, the need for decentralized urban development can be traced back to urbanists like Lewis Mumford who saw it as a primary way of setting limits on density. For example, too many people and activities being concentrated in one place would result in traffic congestion, reduce economic productivity and reduce quality of life. Mumford (1937) thus argued for a ‘poly-​nucleated city’ that is well-​planned, bounded and connected. More recently, cities have deployed ‘transit oriented’ forms of development, which seek to facilitate infrastructure funding through linking land and property development in peri-​urban areas and thereby promote their future growth (Wu and Keil, 2020: 5). While transit-​oriented development is often used in sprawling, suburban or poly-​centric urban regions, it is actually ‘a planning tool of recentralisation’, based on the integration of public transit with other urban land use (Shen and Wu, 2020: 1013). This is exemplified by high-​density suburbs that are designed around a central transit station, much like Penang Sentral in Butterworth, which will be discussed later in this chapter. As such, transit oriented developments are now an integral part of poly-​centric urban planning strategies to develop more sustainable and efficient forms of extended urbanization (Shen and Wu, 2020). Schindler and Kanai (2021: 1) further argue that the varying modalities of regional urbanization ‘constitute an emergent regime of infrastructure-​led development whose ultimate objective is to produce functional transnational territories that can be “plugged in” to global networks of production and trade’. Yet, this trend is not entirely new. As early as the 1990s, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir launched his goal to transform Kuala Lumpur into a global city-​region through the development of the ‘Multimedia Super Corridor’ (MMSC), connecting the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport to the Kuala Lumpur City Center via the new high-​tech ‘smart cities’ of Putrajaya and Cyberjaya (Bunnell, 2004). As such, Addie et al (2020) have argued that infrastructure investment and disinvestment is a primary mechanism shaping regional urbanization and urbanisms. However, 41

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as various urban scholars have noted, and as will be discussed later in this chapter, selectively articulated networked infrastructure practices can often enact flows and transfers across privileged nodes while creating ‘tunnelling’ effects to bypass peripheral territories that are not included in the spatial plans (Graham and Marvin, 2002; Kanai, 2014). The notion of ‘smart cities’ in Malaysia has served as a key component in the formulation of national, urban and regional planning policies (Tan, L.I., 2019: 5). Smart cities feature specifically in the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016–​ 20), which advocates smart city approaches as a means of handling issues of congestion, pollution and insufficient public transport systems nationwide. In addition to Penang and the MMSC, the federal government has also launched and endorsed smart city initiatives in the Iskandar region of Johor and Selangor state. In locations that are relatively less connected by transnational infrastructure networks, investments in ‘smart’ transportation infrastructure is designed to induce the development of externally oriented connectivity nodes, as stakeholders hope to capitalize on the opportunities created through greater connectivity (Bunnell, 2004; Kanai and Schindler, 2019). This is very much the case in Penang, as the Second National Physical Plan (NPP-​2) states: ‘the future development of urban centres and conurbations will be guided to and shaped into a compact poly-​nucleated urban structure where a cluster of urban centres are economically and functionally linked to each other, thus generating significant interdependencies and synergistic growth for mutual benefits’ (quoted in Benson and Johnson, 2013: 34). Think City has encouraged this urban-​centric approach as it sees cities –​ rather than nations –​at the forefront of competition between regions for economic investment (Think City, 2015: 3; see also Bunnell, 2004). The ultimate goal of the NPP-​2 scheme and associated urban redevelopment projects in Penang, as demonstrated by the discourses analysed in this chapter, is to attract foreign investment, foster industrial upgrading and export-​ oriented growth (see Schindler and Kanai, 2021: 2). The rationale behind this is that high-​density housing is now becoming the preferred residential development pattern in peri-​urban areas, particularly in the Asian region (Benson and Johnson, 2013: 57; Wu and Keil, 2020). However, this type of development needs to be accompanied by increased bus and tram networks which use approximately 20 times less space to move the same number of people as private transport modes (cars) (Benson and Johnson, 2013: 57). Moreover, the spreading of clusters throughout an urban region can ease traffic congestion that would otherwise result from a single city centre. The NPP-​2 provides a spatial framework for land use, development and conservation in peninsular Malaysia which will tie together economic and infrastructure dimensions at various geographic scales. The goal is to achieve ‘concentrated decentralisation’ by concentrating the nation’s resources into the four priority urban areas, which are seen to have the greatest growth 42

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potential for job creation, due to their situation along key economic corridors (MLIT, 2015). By concentrating urban development in this way, the plan also aims to protect the natural environment and agricultural areas. As Kanai and Schindler (2019: 316) point out, state-​led investments in urban restructuring projects have the potential to promote broader welfare gains if they are carried out in a democratic manner and with socially inclusive forms of connectivity. However, as in the case of Penang, state-​led restructuring initiatives often fail to reach this potential because they are carried out in partnership with large corporations and target the upper-​middle classes and transnational elites. Central to the NPP-​2 strategy is the development of transportation infrastructure, which has centred upon the Penang Second Bridge; a high-​speed rail line to Kuala Lumpur; a light rail transit (LRT) system; and improvements to the existing sea and airports. This infrastructure is intended to generate economic benefits from connecting Penang with the so-​called ‘infrastructure spine’ that connects Singapore to Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Eastern India (Benson and Johnson, 2013: 17). As such, efforts are being taken to connect Penang with these countries, and especially its closest neighbours, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Stakeholders such as Fundacion Metropoli and Think City therefore envisage future mega-​projects to connect the region, like China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Abdul Majeed, 2013). This strategy of targeting dispersed urban growth is being developed by Malaysian think tank Think City, which is looking beyond traditional city boundaries and developing new thinking about ‘strategic urban planning to influence the development of Malaysia’s key urban areas’ (Abdul Majeed, 2013: 69). Think City has set up offices in George Town, Butterworth, Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru, and aims to ‘catalyse sustainable urban regeneration and shape economically resilient, community-​centric cities’ (Think City, 2015: 2). It sees Penang as part of a larger urban system which includes greater Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru and even Singapore. While these cities are currently connected by the North-​South Highway in Malaysia, there are plans for a new high speed rail link which will increase connectivity in the urban corridor. This type of approach fits in with ideas on the new scale of urban planning, which spans territorial boundaries and is no longer confined by cities or states. It is also ‘linked to “smart growth” thinking, which focuses on building broad city-​based coalitions to address neglected city centres as well as other parts of the urban landscape’ (McFarlane, 2016: 637).

Designing poly-​centric urbanism in Penang Penang is well suited to a poly-​centric urban form as –​like many large cities –​ it has actually emerged from the amalgamation of several dispersed town 43

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centres (for example George Town, Butterworth and Bukit Mertajam). As with other cities, the growth of peripheral communities in Penang was due to the growth of automobile-​centred planning and development in the late 20th century which led to the hollowing out of George Town’s diverse and compact urban centre, compounded by the growth of commercial centres (shopping malls) and middle-​class identities associated with the residential suburbs (see Jenkins, 2019). For such reasons, Kanai and Kutz (2013) have identified a broader trend towards the emergence of new ‘city centre’ urban development initiatives in formerly peripheral neighbourhoods, much like parts of Bukit Mertajam and Seberang Perai in Penang. For example, as will be discussed later in this chapter, some of the most rapid urbanization in Penang since 2014 has been in the Batu Kawan region, which is strategically located near the Penang Second Bridge (Sultan Abdul Halim Muadzam Shah Bridge) connecting the southern parts of Penang Island and Seberang Perai (Tew et al, 2019: 2311). This indicates the vital relationship between infrastructure and poly-​centric urban development. Think City and the Penang state government have formed the George Town Conservation and Development Corporation, which aims to ‘create a new, seamless, city core between Butterworth and George Town’ (Think City, 2015). This is being done through the proposed Penang Bay project, incorporating Gurney Wharf (see Chapter 7), the north and east coasts of George Town and Butterworth’s waterfront. The Penang Bay project also seeks to ‘re-​imagine’ Penang’s water-​based assets which involves cleaning up the Penang Strait, in addition the major rivers in the state, including Sungai Perai and Sungai Penang (Tan, 2020). The project is expected to take 10–​20 years to complete, and cost approximately US$4 billion. However, as is typical with most proposed redevelopment projects in Penang, the state government does not have sufficient funding to complete it, and has hence have recently launched an ‘international ideas competition’ to lure in foreign investors to finance the project (Tan, 2020). Another project related to the state’s vision for a multi-​nodal urban model is the 8km-​long ‘Linear Waterfront’, which will stretch from the Queensway roundabout, on southeast Penang Island, up to the Second Bridge. The project is so named as it will have four oblong-​shaped strips of reclaimed land occupying approximately 60 hectares attached to the coast of Penang Island. The project will have a gross development value of RM1 billion, and is envisioned to extend the Free Industrial Zone at Bayan Baru. Also typical of new developments in Penang, the Linear Waterfront project will boast a waterfront resort encompassing hotels, restaurants, medical, commercial and mixed development in striving to create ‘a new world-​class township’ (Nambiar, 2020a). More importantly, the project will further extend the state government’s land bank, which is needed to generate revenue, as the state has no remaining developable land on the island. Such reclamation 44

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projects are also designed to ‘reverse the forced rural-​urban migration’ in Penang, by reducing the need for people to travel into the city and thereby contributing to congestion and air pollution (Mok, 2019d). It would also encourage urban–​rural development by incentivising residents in central Penang to move out to less populated areas. However, given the many other concurrent reclamation plans, such as the 1,620ha Penang South Reclamation project, the Linear City proposal has been met with criticism by NGOs, for reasons that will be discussed further in Chapter 7. For instance, Baljit Singh –​vice-​president of opposition political party Gerakan –​has suggested that the project ‘could turn out to be just another ruse to allow developers to take over land banks in the state through reclamation’ (Basyir, 2020). As Singh said, land reclamation projects in the state seems to be more in the interest of developers undertaking the reclamation than the Penang people. Moreover, the plans tend to envision a future city which has little in common with the local landscape, and –​ as will be discussed later in this ­chapter –​the new developments tend to be poorly integrated with their surrounding areas. For this reason, urban infrastructures have emerged as highly ‘contested, power laden elements of the urban fabric’, which raise questions related to social justice and who the city is for (Addie, 2016: 273; see also McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008: 366). Further to these developments is the the RM1 billion Eastern Seafront Development project, including the elevated ‘Promenade Walk’ stretching from Swettenham Pier in Esplanade up to the abandoned Tanjung City Marina, designed to give locals and tourists better access to the waterfront in George Town. As state government official Jagdeep Singh explained, ‘connecting the coastline’ is an important aspect of Penang’s future development. However, Tanjung Bungah and Batu Ferringhi on the north coast of Penang Island are currently only connected by a busy, narrow road, which presents a challenge to the government’s goal of connecting these communities.4 This challenge has resulted in numerous infrastructure proposals by the state government, including the notorious cable car project, envisioned to connect Tanjung Bungah to George Town via Penang Hill.5 The most recent proposal is a so-​called ‘eco-​deck’, or bicycle lane and pedestrian walkway –​12.5km in length –​to be built on a platform along the beach between the two communities. This will be part of 200km of bicycle lanes across the island proposed planned under the Penang Bicycle Route Master Plan by the Penang Island City Council (MBPP) under the Penang Green Connectors project.6 Alongside these are plans to connect Gurney Wharf (currently being reclaimed) to the northern seafront in Padang Kota (George Town) through boardwalks and coastal embankments. The Master Plan also includes 65km of ‘blue connectors’ which will be constructed alongside rivers flowing towards the coastal parks like Gurney Wharf and Padang Kota. The development 45

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of such waterfront amenities and park networks is part of the Penang 2030 Agenda’s vision to turn Penang into ‘Asia’s greenest’ and most liveable city (PropertyGuru, 2019). As Jagdeep Singh claimed, the network would significantly increase waterfront recreational amenities for Penangites, and therefore ‘improve liveability and attract additional talent, skills and investment to the state, with environmental benefits such as the creation of ecological corridors and cooling effects from additional greenery to mitigate climate change’ (PropertyGuru, 2019). In this way, such ‘green infrastructure’ is now heralded around the world as: ‘the lifeblood of prosperity and economic confidence in the 21st century’ (Miller, quoted in Addie, 2016: 273). Such pedestrian-​oriented development plans are also associated with ‘smart growth’ strategies which seek to design well-​connected, integrated and mixed-​use neighbourhoods that are walkable and reduce the need for cars (McFarlane, 2016: 638). Although this type of urban planning initially emerged to address problems associated with suburbanization in US cities, they are also increasingly recognized as an opportunity to achieve sustainable development in developing countries that are experiencing rapid urbanization (Shen and Wu, 2020). Moreover, developing regions like Penang have arguably developed similar problems as US cities in terms of car dependency and lack of walkability.

Urban growth and governance challenges in Penang Kanai and Schindler (2019: 308) have observed that new forms of territory-​ based governance are now starting to reshape cities and regions in the Global South. Transit-​oriented and poly-​nucleated models of development involve complex negotiations between developers and municipal governments due to the varied interests and interdependencies involved. As Schindler et al (2019: 2) have argued, the diffused authority, action, and responsibility achieved by the inclusion of non-​state actors allows for mega-​projects of unprecedented scale and scope to be envisioned and undertaken, which have significant implications for the local landscape and environment. As with the PTMP, transit-​oriented development often serves as a financing instrument, reflecting a state-​supported, transit-​led model of (sub)urbanization. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this has raised concerns among civil society members in Penang about the high cost of the PTMP, as it is unclear whether the cost of the proposed infrastructure has been inflated to justify the large amount of land reclamation to be sold to developers, or vice versa. Urban restructuring projects being implemented in Penang are thus typical of poly-​centric urban redevelopment in the Global South, which are controlled by special agencies in collaboration with higher levels of government. Such projects therefore often have little input from local jurisdictions, and tend to invoke broad-​based state or national development 46

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objectives (see Kanai and Schindler, 2019: 311). However, because the government has little of the required expertise, external actors such as Think City and developers are brought onboard to provide the type of specialized planning, entrepreneurial and technical expertise needed. This integrated approach to planning reflects the contemporary nature of mega-​projects, which are often pursued by a range of stakeholders from governments as well as the private sector (Schindler et al, 2019). There is also broader transnational interest in such plans, which is reflected in the UN Habitat’s New Urban Agenda, which seeks to ‘reinvigorat[e]‌long-​term and integrated urban and territorial planning and design’ (UN Habitat, 2016: sec 15.iii). The UN Habitat also envisions such planning as generating greater connectivity between cities, peri-​urban and rural areas through sustainable transport infrastructure, which should ‘maximize the potential … for enhanced productivity, social, economic and territorial cohesion’ (UN Habitat, 2016: sec 50). Transit oriented forms of development therefore aim to integrate social and environmental goals through the provision of alternative transportation infrastructure (Shen and Wu, 2020: 1014). The future growth of Penang faces various challenges, including haphazard urban planning resulting in connectivity declines, as well as the hollowing-​ out of George Town’s inner city (except for tourism-​oriented activities). Past infrastructure development in the city has not tended to consider the consequences of such development, nor have they been well coordinated between different jurisdictions. This includes, for example, the enthusiastic approval of residential development proposals, without considering implementation of bike lanes or green spaces that would be needed to compensate for the added population density (Lakshana, 2016: S24). One example is the building of a luxury high-​end residential community in Batu Ferringhi bay from 2011, which led to considerable deforestation and added congestion in the area (Tew et al, 2019: 2312). This type of development was associated with the promotion of Malaysia’s ‘Malaysia, My Second Home’ (MM2H) campaign which sought to attract wealthy foreigners to settle in the country for retirement (Moser, 2018). Moreover, Penang’s rise as a property haven (for wealthy Malaysians and expatriates) has caused tensions between the needs of the public on the one hand, and developers on the other –​not to mention the state government which often profits from such development. This experience of planning and development in the city thus indicates some significant questions about the feasibility of the type of hyper-​connected future envisioned for Penang, as was outlined in the previous section. The lack of an effective regional-​level governance structure has been highly problematic for Penang’s urban development to date (Benson and Johnson, 2013: 41). As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the relationship between the community and governing bodies needs to be consistently 47

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open and transparent in order to make decisions about development, which is not always the case in Penang. As many civil society members in Penang have argued, governance processes need to be based on sound evidence, incorporate local knowledge and expertise, rather than rely on top-​down decisions, which has too often been the case. This is typical of many state-​ led mega-​development projects which rely on ambitious physical planning, with masterplans epitomizing elite, internationally oriented objectives that neglect local needs and trigger displacement (for example through inadequate provision of affordable housing) (see Olds, 1995; Bunnell, 2004; Kanai and Schindler, 2019). As Dr Anwar Fazal explained, the abolishment of local government elections has resulted in civil servants making urban policy decisions despite being ‘completely disconnected from the reality on the ground’ (quoted in Think City, 2013: 21). One of the problems in this regard is the lack of autonomy among local councils, as the Malaysian bureaucratic structure is heavily concentrated at the federal level, generating weaknesses in infrastructure planning. As Anwar Fazal has stated, Malaysian cities are at ‘the bottom of the totem pole of good governance’ (quoted in Think City, 2013: 21). An example is the local councils’ inability to gazette public transport corridors for future public transport projects (Lakshana, 2016: S24). Moreover, the rapid urban development and growth in Penang in recent years has resulted in a 40 per cent rise in property prices since the year 2000, which has made the city increasingly unaffordable. This has also had the effect of encouraging the development of high-​density residential buildings in several neighbourhoods on the northern coast of Penang Island, without the accompanying transportation infrastructure, resulting in heavy traffic congestion. The state government therefore recognizes that transport is currently one of the most fundamental planning issues for Penang. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the state government has adopted an ambitious goal of reducing the reliance on private vehicles (89 per cent modal-​share as of 2013), by encouraging increased use of public transport. This involves better integration between transport systems and development planning, while also, curiously, investing in new highway schemes, including an undersea tunnel between George Town and Butterworth (Benson and Johnson, 2013: 38).

The Seberang Perai renaissance Because land is scarce on Penang Island (which is compounded by the UNESCO World Heritage Site designation which limits development in central George Town), the state government and other stakeholders are planning to modernize neighbouring Butterworth to complement (rather than compete with) it. As former Chief Minister of Penang, Lim Guan Eng explained in 2015: ‘Penang Island has now reached its capacity in terms of 48

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land development. To make Penang a liveable city, Seberang Perai needs to become a viable alternative to the island’ (quoted in Think City, 2015: 37). In doing so, a number of redevelopment projects have been initiated since 2014, not only focused on Butterworth –​the historic centre of Seberang Perai –​but also on the southern part of the metropolitan region. This section will discuss the various trajectories planned for Seberang Perai’s future development, and the challenges that have been faced in doing so. Murali Ramakrishnan –​Butterworth programme director for the regional urban policy agency Think City7 –​stated: ‘In the long run, say ten years from now, we are looking at an environment where Butterworth is the central business district (CBD) and George Town is the heritage district’ (in TheEdge, 2016: S18). Think City sees the relationship between Butterworth and George Town like that of Hong Kong and Kowloon, and therefore seeks to replicate the poly-​centric approach developed there by enhancing links between both cities (Think City, 2015: 21). For example, Kowloon is starting to encourage the development of arts and cultural heritage (for example the West Kowloon Cultural District), while adjacent Hong Kong is very much a financial centre. One Penangite suggested that Seberang Perai could even develop itself like Shenzen, China which initially developed due to its proximity to Hong Kong, but has since become a major international city in its own right (comment on Chow Kon Yeow Facebook post, 27 January 2020). Indeed, Seberang Perai City Council’s slogan is ‘Seberang Perai Aspiring City of Tomorrow’ (MBSP, 2020). It is now the largest metropolitan district in the country, covering an administrative area of 747.8km2, with a population of 946,200 (Trisha, 2019). As one local resident suggested, Seberang Perai has reached the potential to evolve as a major development centre to ‘make Penang State a completely developed State’ (Seeni Kadir, quoted in Chow, 2020). Indeed, research has shown that ‘contemporary urban peripheries are vital components of the current metamorphosis of urban regions’ (de Falco et al, 2019: 219). Penang civil society members are also in favour of developing Seberang Perai as ‘more Penangites live there’, as Penang Forum member Khoo Salma explained (quoted in Chow, 2020). Indeed, Malaysian developer Amos Ng said that ‘there is so much potential to Butterworth that I am certain it will see positive development once the local plan is in place’ (quoted in Mok, 2017a). As Kanai and Schindler (2019) have observed many poly-​centric urban redevelopment projects tend to spearhead varying trajectories of territorial transformation in erstwhile-​stagnant urban peripheries. However, they also noted that poly-​centric urban redevelopment projects are often superimposed on ‘inherited landscapes of local infrastructure deficits and vastly unmet social needs’ in peri-​urban areas (Kanai and Schindler, 2019: 303). Indeed, while Butterworth used to be a thriving centre for commercial activity in Seberang Perai (mainland Penang State), it went into decline from the mid-​1980s and 49

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has now significantly hollowed out, with commercial and administrative centres moving to nearby suburbs like Kepala Batas and Seberang Jaya. The population around Butterworth also became more dispersed, and focused largely on agricultural and industrial activities. This was due to the annexation of the town’s coastline for a highway project (which was once an important centre for activity and recreation), in addition to other haphazard and poorly planned infrastructure developments which reduced Butterworth’s regional significance. As a result, Penang Island became the main political and economic hub for the state (centred around George Town), despite having a lower population than Seberang Perai. Subsequently, Seberang Perai became a marginalized site of sprawling urbanity on the periphery of Penang Island. The development of Seberang Perai is part of the Penang 2030 agenda, which stresses that ‘the future of Penang is in Seberang Perai’ (Loone, 2019). In this regard, Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow stated that ‘the state government is committed to transforming Seberang Perai into an international city and the destination of choice for investors, tourists and locals’ and will therefore put more effort in to developing the mainland side of Penang (quoted in Chow, 2020). By 2014, Butterworth was largely a brownfield site with a significant amount of post-​industrial land, which could be replaced. One way of doing this is through the transformation of the Sungai Perai (Perai River, which runs through Butterworth) into a ‘valuable asset’ for the city by encouraging river and waterfront development, including recreational spaces (Think City, 2015: 21). This is being restored as the pilot project for future river restoration projects in Penang. Furthermore, the coastal landscape in north Butterworth is being transformed through the construction of a 7km-​long new waterfront, which is designed to compensate for the loss of Butterworth’s original coastline to the Butterworth Outer Ring Road there. As de Falco et al (2019: 219) have noted, spaces along the urban periphery contain ‘significant potential to serve as real-​life laboratories to foster urban resilience, and to support the flexible management of contemporary urban sustainability’ (de Falco et al, 2019: 219). As such, the transformation of waterfront amenities in Butterworth contributes to Penang’s emphasis on ‘green and sustainable development’ under the Penang 2030 agenda (Penang2030 Unit, 2019). The reclamation is also linked to the proposed construction of an undersea tunnel which will link Butterworth with the Gurney Drive area on Penang Island (Malay Mail, 2018). The proposed reclamation will consist of 650 hectares (reclaimed at a cost of RM2 billion), and will be used as a mixed development project, expected to boost the economy of mainland Penang, and attract investment back to Butterworth (Dermawan, 2018a).8 It will also add to the state government’s land bank for revenue purposes. However, the 50

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state government has also proposed that the development should contain affordable housing, which would allow locals to settle in the area. Another way of enhancing connectivity between Buttterworth, George Town and the surrounding northern region is through the Penang Sentral project, completed in 2017, which is an integrated (commercial and residential) transport hub located in Butterworth, and is the largest such hub in the NCER. However, it is important that Butterworth does not become just a transit hub, so Think City is also redeveloping Butterworth’s old town by conserving historic buildings, creating public spaces and improving urban amenities. In this way, poly-​centric urban planning offers the potential to (re)integrate ‘peripheral’ communities into the fabric of the wider urban region, though not always in progressive ways (de Falco et al, 2019: 208). Another rejuvenation strategy was the inclusion of Butterworth into the annual George Town Festival as a fringe event, which targeted cultural regeneration of the city. As Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow explained: ‘We envision a vibrant Seberang Perai –​a place to live, work and play’ (Chow, 2020). As Kanai and Schindler (2019: 304) have noted, such projects are important to understand the possible benefits of peri-​urban development as they exist on the ground, rather than merely on paper. Furthermore, Butterworth is seen as ‘an extension of the George Town UNESCO World Heritage Site’, and the Seberang Perai Municipal Council seeks to capitalize on this characteristic in transforming the municipality into ‘Malaysia’s own Bilbao’ (Maimunah Shariff, quoted in Think City, 2015: 35). This reference refers to the transformation of Bilbao, Spain, from a heavily industrialized city in the 19th and 20th centuries into a ‘city of culture’, led by ongoing social, economic and aesthetic revitalization processes and infrastructure investments. However, Jenkins (2019: 353) has been critical of these so-​called ‘place-​making’ initiatives in Penang, as they tend to be premised upon the displacement of traditional communities and practices from the historic inner-​cities of George Town (and Butterworth), therefore preferring the term ‘space-​making’. In a similar vein, Simone (2004: 240) has observed that the instruments through which people can be ‘attached to’ particular places and spaces –​as well as the creation of place-​based identities –​seem to be waning. Furthermore, as Khoo (2020) has pointed out, there seems to be a contradiction in the state government’s emphasis on developing Seberang Perai, given that it has invested so much money on developing Penang Island, particularly areas being planned for reclamation. For instance, rather than expanding the existing Free Industrial Zone at Bayan Baru on Penang Island, Khoo suggests that the state government could instead develop one on the mainland, which would complement the new airport being planned in Kulim, Kedah, approximately 30km (19 miles) southeast of Butterworth. As Khoo further notes, most of the transportation infrastructure being planned for the PTMP serves Penang Island, especially the new townships being 51

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planned on reclaimed land. One of the islands associated with the massive Southern Reclamation Scheme in the south of Penang (see Chapter 4) features an island dedicated to industrial use, which Khoo has argued could instead be developed in Seberang Perai (Yeoh, 2020). As with many forms of urban restructuring in the Global South, it remains unclear whether broader constituencies will benefit beyond the elite investors into Penang’s expanding urban fabric (see Kanai and Schindler, 2019: 316). As such, Khoo insisted that Seberang Perai should be developed as an alternative to the large scale reclamation projects underway in Penang, such as the Penang South Reclamation scheme (see Chapter 7), which are predicted to have severe environmental consequences. However, as Kanai and Schindler (2019) have observed, project-​led examples of poly-​centrism –​such as the type of development being pursued by the Penang State –​do not actually arise from territorially decentralized governance arrangements (they are directed by the state government), and may therefore deepen peri-​urban exclusion. In this view, peripheral urban areas are deemed to lack the resources to sustain their own growth over time and, as a result, their potential for development is largely dependent upon urbanization processes driven by, and centred within, the traditional city core (de Falco et al, 2019: 207). Indeed, Forum Seberang Perai –​a coalition of development interest groups on the mainland side of Penang –​ has recently accused the Penang government of ‘ignoring’ the development needs of the mainland (NST Online, 2019). This is because of the focus of the state government up until recently with the major infrastructure and reclamation projects on Penang Island associated with the PTMP (discussed in Chapter 4), which has used up most of the state’s resources. In this regard, Forum Seberang Perai’s president claimed that ‘the mainland is suffering from a lack of development plans, as well as political will for it to be fully utilised’ (NST Online, 2019). This accords with the Penang Forum’s view that the apparent need for land reclamation on Penang Island is actually a result of bad planning which has underdeveloped infrastructure in Seberang Perai (Khoo, 2020). As has been widely lamented, Penang State is still without gazetted Local Plans for either Penang Island or Seberang Perai, which have been on hold since 2008 and 2014, respectively due to ‘various technical reasons’ (The Star, 2019). This is despite the fact that a RM5 million budget has been allocated to developing a ‘masterplan’ for the yet to be reclaimed ‘Penang South Islands’ (Khoo, 2020). Indeed, the so-​called ‘technical reasons’ are that the Penang Structure Plan for 2020–​30 needed to be approved first, which required finalizing plans for all the new reclamation projects proposed and underway in Penang State, in addition to new associated infrastructure projects like the Penang Undersea tunnel. But in fact, as Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow admitted, Penang Island has actually never had a local plan, which has allowed for the discordant form of 52

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development that has proliferated in recent decades (Jenkins, 2008; Nambiar, 2019). Even a local developer has lamented that the absence of a local plan for Seberang Perai is hampering development in the region (Mok, 2017a). Moreover, Khoo cautions that the state could miss out on the opportunity to develop a prosperous Seberang Perai given the rapidly increasing indebtedness of the MBPP, due to the Council undertaking a number of large infrastructure projects which it cannot not realistically afford. As former councillor Lim Ma Hui has explained, these projects have been taken at the direction of the state government, but paid for by MBPP, which is creating a burden for existing tax payers in Penang who are not likely to benefit from the proposed projects for at least ten years (Nambiar, 2018b; Khoo, 2020). This so-​called ‘infrastructure trap’ has been identified in countries other than Malaysia, as the vast investment in infrastructure projects worldwide has resulted in a rapid increase in local government debt (Shen and Wu, 2020: 1028). While the government has claimed that the PTMP and related developments in Penang will help to increase employment, a recent study in Tokyo has shown that mass transit-​oriented peri-​urban development did not actually have this effect as promised (Shen and Wu, 2020: 1014). This process of peripheralization has been explained by urban geographers through the conjoined logics of capital accumulation and its simultaneous need for ‘spatial fixes’ that (re)structure urban space in deeply unequal fashion, generating multiple socio-​spatial marginalizations and exclusions in the process (see Kanai, 2014). Indeed, as various scholars have shown, access to infrastructure, the benefits it provides, and the experiences of its failures tends to be highly uneven (Graham, 2010; Addie, 2016). In this regard, Kanai and Schindler (2019: 304) caution that investment into the built environment of secondary cities ‘may do little to redress inherited peri-​urban peripherality and infrastructure deficits’: rather, these projects may paradoxically ‘exacerbate uneven geographical development and socio-​ spatial fragmentation’, while also introducing new displacement pressures on vulnerable groups. Graham and Marvin (2002) have described this process through the concept of ‘splintering urbanism’, whereby the provision of infrastructure differentiates and ‘splinters’ cities and urban spaces. However, as Kanai and Schindler (2019: 306) have argued, this concept has yet to be sufficiently scaled up to address the planetary proliferation of infrastructure space and related consequences. Indeed, as Schindler and Kanai (2019: 47) further argue, the grand visions and rhetoric surrounding large-​scale infrastructure and urban restructuring projects tend to overshadow their lived realities of construction and connectivity, resulting in a mere patchwork of selective connectivity within urban regions. Accordingly, planning interventions designed to strengthen poly-​centric urban nodes may inevitably produce unintended though significant impacts on surrounding areas (Kanai, 2014: 1074). Furthermore, as Carse and Kneas 53

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(2019) have demonstrated, many mega-​projects never actually materialize, even after years of planning. Or in some cases, as with the Melaka Gateway project in southwestern Malaysia, they may break ground, only to have construction stalled and never completed (see Chapter 7). This can nonetheless be of great significance, because urban restructuring can often result in the reshaping of local politics, landscapes and social well-​being, even if not completed. As Carse and Kneas argue, this is an area that requires further investigation, as unfinished mega-​projects have to date not been sufficiently incorporated into academic discussions of why and how infrastructure matters. However, Butterworth is not the first community in Seberang Perai to be developed by the state government. For instance, a new ‘satellite town’ was created at Batu Kawan in 2014 with the construction of more than 10,000 units of affordable housing, the Batu Kawan Industrial Park and an education hub (Khoo, 2016). This was launched with the establishment of the NCER through the transfer of a 6,000 acre oil palm estate from Batu Kawan Bhd to the Penang Development Cooperation (Tew et al, 2019: 2312). The Batu Kawan Industrial Park has attracted several major multinational corporations, including Honda and Hewlett-​Packard, which have created job opportunities in the area. This is because the location by the Penang Second Bridge and the national North-​South Highway is ideal for the establishment of manufacturing and related industries. The state-​led development of satellite towns on the mainland of Penang is not a new initiative. Batu Kawan is actually the third satellite town for Penang after Bayan Baru and Seberang Jaya, both of which are already fully developed. Seberang Jaya, for instance, was the first satellite township on Penang mainland developed from the 1980s during former Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu’s tenure. A number of integrated developments have been planned for Batu Kawan under the Batu Kawan Master Plan, which is estimated to take approximately 20 years to complete, based on the time it took Seberang Jaya to mature (Khoo, 2016). While Batu Kawan contains some affordable housing as mandated by the government, it has also been the site of several new high-​end property developments, such as the 300-​acre Eco Horizon, Eco Bloom and Eco Meadows, developed by Eco World Development Group. Condos and bungalows at Eco Bloom and Eco Meadows range from 504,000 up to RM1.3 million. The Eco World developments will be complemented by the RM10 billion Aspen Vision City, which will contain the first IKEA furniture store in the northern Malaysia as well as the upscale Design Village Mall on a site of 99ha, in addition to further high-​end housing developments, hotels, office towers, a financial hub, medical centre and international school. According to the developers, Aspen Vision City is a ‘vision to create an intelligent and self-​sustaining metropolis designed for living in the future, today’, which will reverse the associations of Batu Kawan as a ‘hinterland’, 54

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‘quiet backwater’ or ‘plantation country’ (Aspen Group, 2019). In ‘redefining’ the Batu Kawan area, it embraces the ‘Smart State’ model pursued by the Penang state government through the development of ‘smart city infrastructure that is unmatched by any other development in the country’, in partnership with Telekom Malaysia (Aspen Group, 2019). As such, given Aspen Group’s goal of developing Batu Kawan ‘into an iconic hub of the Northern region of Malaysia’ (Aspen Group, 2019), such ‘satellite towns’ do not only seek to contribute to the development of the central city (Penang), but can also have aspirations in their own right.

Conclusion This chapter has asserted that cities are not discrete entities, but rather deeply interconnected to surrounding metropolitan environments through large-​ scale infrastructure networks, which are in turn promoted through state-​and nation-​making schemes. This trend has triggered a shift within the urban studies literature from a preoccupation with ‘global cities’ (for example Sassen, 2001) to city-​regions. The latter recognized that ‘the city-​region heralds a new phase of capitalist territorial development and is thus the key space of accumulation, competition, and governance’ (Roy, 2009: 821). However drawing on the experiences of cities of the Global South, scholars like Roy (2009: 828) have gone further to argue that ‘exurban’ geographies now exceed the scale of city-​regions and are deeply implicated in the making of the nation-​state. Southeast Asia, in particular, has seen the growth of ‘mega urban regions’ that are not only conurbations of city and countryside, but also spaces of transnational accumulation and development (Laquian, 2005). Yet, the geographies of such urban regions are not entirely new. For example, Penang State is a palimpsest of infrastructures, urban design, physical transformation and settlement patterns that have evolved since its establishment in the late 18th century (see Yeoh, 2009). What is new, however, is the motivations and deliberate planning behind such growth. One main objective of the chapter has therefore been to highlight the discursive frameworks that have sought to develop new infrastructures, settlements, property markets and planning strategies to integrate –​but also differentiate –​ communities within Penang’s wider urban fabric. As Matthew Vitz (2018) has argued, such hybrid urban landscapes are important to study in order to identify possibilities for urban sustainability in an era of extended, or ‘planetary’, urbanization. The role of international policy-​making is important as well, in terms of the influence that it has had on shaping the ideologies of local politicians in Penang. Andrew Newman (2015: 132) has demonstrated how since at least the Agenda 21 action plan on sustainable development (1992), ‘sustainability discourse has often provided a way for urban policy makers to reimagine 55

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scale in ways that are advantageous for interurban competition’. As schemes such as Penang’s 2030 agenda illustrate, the ‘green turn’ in urban planning and policy has merged with neoliberal, market-​oriented visions of the ‘global’, interconnected city, which are rooted in ideologies of interurban competition, networks of cities and city branding (Newman, 2015: 133). In this regard, there is the danger that the pathway to urban sustainability may just be one for the world’s elites. However, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, and as hinted at in this one, there is the potential for sustainable urban development strategies to break with the environmental destruction associated with dominant (capitalist) approaches to urbanization. One of the underlying themes of poly-​centric urban planning in Malaysia –​which is particularly visible in Penang –​is that the links between globalization, metropolitanization and sustainability have become taken-​ for-​g ranted components of the multiple ongoing urban infrastructure and development projects. This is seen, on one hand, in the large-​scale infrastructure projects that seek to connect Penang Island with Seberang Perai, the northern region of Malaysia, and the long urban corridor stretching from Singapore to Thailand via Kuala Lumpur; but also in the small-​scale infrastructure at the community level which seek to make neighbourhoods like George Town, Butterworth and Tanjung Bungah more accessible and pedestrian friendly. As such, the parallels between ideologies of ‘green cities’ that are ‘integrated with nature’ and international, hyper-​connected ‘gateway cities’ become increasingly apparent and tangible. The next chapter will now turn to an analysis of Penang’s controversial ‘Transport Master Plan’, which will analyse the controversies that have emerged surrounding Penang’s plans to become a ‘smart’ and ‘international’ city through large-​ scale infrastructure development.

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4

Competing Visions of Landscape Transformation in a Worlding City We want to become an international, intelligent city that is clean, green, safe and healthy, brimming with energy, expertise and entrepreneurship. … If we have that, we will be the model state for the rest of Malaysia. (Former Penang Chief Minister, Lim Guan Eng, in Ng, 2016: np) In the opening epigraph former Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng expressed his vision of transforming Penang into a ‘world-​class international city’ by 2021 (Ng, 2016). To do that, his government embarked upon a US$6.3 billion upgrade of transport infrastructure in the island-​city, known as the PTMP, which would consist of new highways, LRT and monorail lines, cable cars, new buses and a 2km undersea tunnel linking Penang Island to the Malaysian mainland. If given full approval by the federal government, Lim suggested that Penang could be ‘a showcase of modern Malaysia’, and ‘be well on its way to being a global city that could rival Singapore’ (Ng, 2016: np). This is consistent with broader urban redevelopment strategies which focus on modernization of infrastructure as a means to achieving economic growth and investment, while also meeting the demands of rapid urbanization (see Bunnell, 2004; Colven, 2017; Connolly, 2019b). Eng’s statement can also be seen as a precursor of the Penang ‘Smart State’ ideology –​discussed in Chapter 3 –​which connects with broader global discourse promoted by aspirational city managers. Yet, as Hutchinson (2012: 15) has cautioned, ‘the desire to pursue world-​ class competitiveness in a wide range of areas needs to be tempered with a real appreciation of the scale, resources and time required to attain this’. Similarly, Douglass (1998) has warned that calculated attempts at world or global city formation can have devastating consequences for most people 57

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in the city. In the case of Penang, there is a fundamental tension and incompatibility between the state government’s ‘global city’ aspirations (and associated mega-​development projects), and the realities of its existing landscape, infrastructure and finances, which has become been a major source of concern for local residents and civil society activists. In this regard, the Penang Forum, a coalition of local NGOs, has been heavily critical of the PTMP, and has pushed the state government to develop cheaper and more sustainable modes of transport that are quicker to build. This would involve less capital intensive infrastructure and more accessible modes of transit, oriented around bus and tram systems that would address Penang’s transportation needs in a style suitable for its population size and hilly, flood-​ prone, ‘heritage’ landscape. Nonetheless, the state government has pushed forward with the capital-​intensive plan, which has raised questions about the underlying motivations for the PTMP. As such, Loftus and March (2016) have argued that understanding the trend towards big infrastructure projects requires attention to the ‘financial and political networks’ that underpin them, as I will examine in this chapter. In doing so, I will first provide an overview of the PTMP’s emergence and evolution over time, and how the often fraught politics and governance relations have played out. This is done through the use of official planning documents for the PTMP, and various statistical and spatial analyses that have been conducted by local civil society members. In this way, the chapter demonstrates how participatory approaches to urban planning can identify and put forth alternative models of urban development that are more socially and environmentally just than the standard global city strategies often favoured by city leaders. As I will show, the competing visions for Penang’s future rely on competing understandings and imaginaries of the landscape and reflect the ways in which citizens of the Global South are resisting the aspirational and hegemonic visions of their future imposed by city leaders (see, for example, Roy, 2011). The chapter thereby highlights key technologies of governance that are being used to counter neoliberal ‘global-​city’ making strategies put forth by city managers which can have disastrous socio-​ecological consequences for cities and their inhabitants. Such approaches are urgently needed, as Robinson (2002) noted long ago that the dearth of alternative vocabularies and strategies severely limits imaginations of possible futures for urban policy-​makers.

Penang and the Transport Master Plan The PTMP was actually an idea proposed by Penang civil society groups to the state government in 2009 in order to reduce congestion and increase the use of public transport in the city. However, as Penang Forum member 58

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Khoo Salma has explained, it has since ‘mysteriously morphed into a coastal reclamation scheme consisting of three islands totalling 4,500 acres –​bigger than Johor’s Forest City’ (Khoo, 2020). She further explained how the primary focus of the PTMP has shifted over time, from ‘moving people’ in 2013, to ‘moving cars’, and finally to a massive coastal reclamation project known as the Penang South Reclamation scheme (PSR) (Khoo, 2020). In explaining how this transformation occurred, this section will provide an overview of the PTMP’s evolution to date, which will reveal the political-​ economic rationale for the numerous shifts in focus. In May 2011, the Penang state government hired transport consultants Halcrow to develop a plan for the PTMP with the stated objective of ‘adopting a balanced approach for public transport and highway improvements’ (Penang state government, 2016: np). Halcrow is an international consultancy with recognized credentials and a long track record in the fields of transportation infrastructure development and analysis. However, in April 2011, one month before Halcrow was appointed for this proposal, the state government signed a memorandum of understanding with the the Zenith-​BUCG Consortium which stated that the consortium would build three new highways on the island, and one undersea tunnel, costing RM6.3 billion.1 In May 2013, Halcrow completed its detailed study of Penang’s transport needs and produced its final report and proposal, which was adopted by the state government at a cost of RM3.2 million. Subsequently, the Penang state government sought a Project Delivery Partner (PDP) which would be responsible for implementing the Halcrow Plan for the PTMP. Six proposals were received, and the SRS Consortium won the bid,2 but with a different proposal which had little resemblance to the original Halcrow proposal. Indeed, despite endorsing the Halcrow plan, the state government put out a Request for Proposal, instead of an open tender based on detailed specifications based on the Halcrow report. Both the SRS and Zenith consortiums specialize in property development and construction, and not surprisingly developed very capital-​intensive transport models in their proposals.3 Consequently, within a few months of signing with SRS Consortium, the cost of the PTMP swelled from RM27 billion to RM46 billion (Khoo, 2020). As various critics have pointed out, the problem with the PDP model is that there is incentive for project managers to inflate the cost of the project, because they are contractually entitled to 6 per cent of the total cost of the project. Moreover, there is an ‘allowed contingency’ which allows for a variance of 15 per cent of the final project cost without penalty (Khoo, 2020). Additionally, if the state government were to withdraw from the project at a later date, this would require a large amount of compensation to be paid to the consortium. Given that the state government has a very limited state revenue of about RM600 million per year, Khoo Salma has argued that it is ‘highly irresponsible of the chief 59

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minister to burden the people of Penang with such a multi-​billion ringgit risk’ (Penang Forum, 2020). The SRS Consortium proposal for the PTMP consists of seven different components. This includes various public transport systems, including a LRT line, three monorail lines and a ‘tourist tram’ to operate within the George Town World Heritage Site. Despite the high cost for the PTMP, the state government argued that it would actually be ‘free’, as the infrastructure projects would be financed through the reclamation of more than 1,820ha from Penang’s southern and northern coasts (Khoo, 2020). The largest of these schemes is known as the SRS, which is a self-​contained urban district, consisting of residential, commercial, industrial and office space spread across three connected islands off Penang’s southern coast. Such ‘land-​for-​infrastructure’ deals are an increasingly popular means of plugging aspirational ‘world cities’ into global capital flows. They involve the ‘swap’ of reclaimable or existing land in exchange for needed infrastructure development, between a government and private developer (hereafter land-​ swaps). They are also one of the common ways through which urban and regional governments seek to achieve development goals with limited state resources (Shatkin, 2011). Land-​swap deals have been used for previous highway construction in Penang, namely for the Jelutong, or Lim Chong Eu Expressway along the east coast of Penang Island. This was the first such arrangement for highway development in Malaysia, and is uncommon elsewhere in the world. The advantages of this approach are that the public does not have to pay for the construction through tolls, which is a more common financing method elsewhere (Abdul-​Aziz and How, 2012). It is also consistent with the objectives of the Penang Structure Plan (PSP) to meet housing demand (albeit high-​end seafront real estate), and create opportunities for finance and industry. This is because Penang’s scarcity of land has resulted in high property values, which has in turn resulted in land and property sales being the state’s primary revenue stream. However, civil society members in Penang have raised concerns about the affordability of the PTMP, and the environmental damage that will be caused, particularly if the projects are not completed. A similar issue occurred with the construction of the Bukit Kukus highway project in Paya Terubong, where works were interrupted in October 2018 after a landslide resulted in nine workers’ deaths (see Chapter 5). Initially, private developers who had committed to build part of the road were not able to deliver when they failed to sell their associated property development due to poor market conditions (Netto, 2020a). The highway is still incomplete at the time of writing, with the incident costing the municipal council additional millions of ringgit. This relates to the point made in the previous chapter about the social, environmental and financial costs incurred when infrastructure projects fail, often leaving ‘white elephants’ in their place (see Kanai and Schindler, 2019). 60

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The Halcrow plan was therefore viewed more favourably by civil society groups, given that it put forward a ‘holistic approach’ which aimed to improve (but reduce) private transport and increase public transport, as well as funding pedestrian and cycling infrastructure. It has been argued that such forms of pedestrian-​oriented mobility could form a new ‘culture of movement’ within cities, particularly with more people working from home in the post-​ COVID-​19 era (Shamsuddin, 2020). More specifically, the Halcrow plan would: move towards a modal share of 40 per cent public transport usage; make roads safer and more accessible for all social groups; and implement measures to reduce vehicular traffic in urban centres (Penang Forum, 2016a). This would result in reduced need for large public car parks, which would free up considerable urban space for other uses (Shamsuddin, 2020). Penang Forum members have argued that Penang could achieve such a mobility shift by improving its existing bus and ferry services, which would make more efficient use of existing roads and enable people to travel more easily without a car (Yeoh, 2020). The Halcrow plan would therefore abide by the stated objective of ‘moving people, not cars’, promoted by civil society groups. Moreover, it would cost less than RM10 billion, which is less than a quarter of the cost of the SRS proposal for PTMP (Lim and Hilmy, 2019). The Penang Forum therefore put forward an alternative plan for the PTMP –​constructed through the professional expertise of its members –​in 2016, which they called ‘Better, Cheaper, Faster: Penang Transport Master Plan’ (Penang Forum, 2016a). The proposal has been branded as such to try to mobilize greater support for the plan, and to educate the broader population about the benefits that it would have for Penang. This was done through the creation of a website (www.bettercheaperfaster.my), YouTube videos, online petitions and other social media campaigns (for example Facebook). Such media can be seen as another technology of governance employed by the Penang Forum in attempting to enlist a greater numbers of people to resist the state government’s plans for the PTMP. According to the Penang Forum, their plan is better because it is more accessible for all users; has a smaller carbon footprint (more environmentally friendly); is quieter and produces less vibrations (less of a nuisance); and it is flexible and hence much easier to expand in the future. It is cheaper, at half the price to build, cheaper to expand in the future, and two to three times cheaper to operate and maintain than the proposed LRT and monorail systems. Finally, it is faster as modern tram and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems are twice as fast to construct (Penang Forum, 2016a). In making these arguments, the Penang Forum made reference to many other cities around the world –​particularly those in Asia and other parts of the Global South –​that were adopting similar transit solutions. They noted how Rio de Janeiro, for example, has both BRT and tram systems which were each built over three-​year periods, costing about four times 61

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less than the proposed LRT and monorail system in Penang, while serving a much larger urban area and population. Other cities with successful tram systems referred to are Kaohsiung, and Suzhou, China and Casablanca, Morocco (Penang Forum, 2016a). The President of the Malaysian Urban Design Association similarly argued that cities like Bogota in Colombia and Santiago, Chile reclaimed space from their streets to accommodate cycling and walking during the COVID-​19 pandemic, which he argued Penang could do more of (Shamsuddin, 2020). Nonetheless, the state government pressed ahead with the SRS Consortium’s proposal for the PTMP, and the Penang Forum subsequently shifted its focus to debating specific components of the PTMP, such as the pan-​island highways, SRS and LRT from 2018.4

Islands from the sea: financing the Penang Transport Master Plan The state government argued that the Halcrow plan was only a ‘conceptual plan’, serving only as a guideline for possible implementation (Penang Forum, 2016a: 4). As Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow commented, in clear reference to the Penang Forum’s ‘Better, Cheaper, Faster’ alternative to the PTMP: ‘such planning should not only be cheaper and faster but more importantly, needs to be more sustainable, competitive and practical’ (Chow, 2019; emphasis added). In this regard, the SRS Consortium argued that it was ‘aspirational but not realistic’, as it did not provide any recommendations on how to finance the proposal, which would cost RM27 billion (SRS Consortium, 2015: 2). Of this, RM3 billion was slated to come from the state government, with the federal government and private sector making up the remaining RM24 billion. This was seen as unfeasible, given that Penang was at the time controlled by the federal opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), and therefore only received limited financial support from the federal government.5 Therefore, the SRS and Zenith-​BUCG proposals sought more entrepreneurial means of funding the infrastructure projects, while also aiming to boost economic growth. The PSR scheme is central to this plan to achieve economic growth, which is conceived of as a self-​contained urban district, consisting of residential, commercial, industrial and office space spread across the three islands. The state government claimed that, in addition to financing the infrastructure for the PTMP, the islands would also ‘address the shortage of developable land, namely for affordable housing’ (Penang state government, 2019a). However, in the SRS Consortium’s proposal for the PTMP, the streets of the three islands were pictured lined with luxury cars, shopfronts boasting stores such as Gucci and Prada, and residential developments consisting of high-​end seafront condos. 62

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The PSR scheme is what Shatkin (2011) has referred to as an urban integrated megaproject (UIM), which are large-​scale, for-​profit development projects often proposed and constructed by a single developer. Like many profit-​oriented UIMs, this project represents ‘a vision for the transformation of the urban experience through the wholesale commodification of the urban fabric’ –​certainly not an inclusive vision of the future, nor one that will solve Penang’s lack of affordable housing (Shatkin, 2011: 77). There is also a large piece of land (131 acres) currently being reclaimed along the northern coast of Penang Island –​known as Sri Tanjung Pinang –​which was allotted to Zenith Consortium as payment in kind for the feasibility study, design and construction of the RM6.3 billion undersea tunnel and new highway developments envisioned by the SRS Scheme for the PTMP (see Chapter 7). Zenith applied for planning permission to develop the first phase of the RM800 million ‘City of Dreams’ project on the site, consisting of two 38-​storey serviced apartment blocks (including two seven-​storey car parks). This is a high-​end luxury apartment complex developed in collaboration with local property developer Ewein, which was completed by the end of 2019. In addition to the environmental concerns regarding the reclamation, there are also concerns about the density of the project, which is 156 units per acre, despite the zoning of the land for low-​density residential development in the area. This will add considerable congestion to an area that is already struggling with congestion issues due to the car dependency of the area. Local residents thus appealed the building permission that was granted for the project, but since it was tied to the highways and tunnel required for the PTMP, the project was ultimately allowed to proceed. As the chair of the local Tanjung Bungah Residents’ Association argued, ‘no one in TBRA is against development, provided it is well thought out’, but just hope that the authorities and developers ensure that issues like the environment, accessibility and the need for public open spaces are taken into account (quoted in Filmer, 2017).6 Another problem of the PTMP’s funding model is that the high-​end property market in Penang –​and Malaysia as a whole –​has slowed considerably over the last few years, resulting in a glut of high-​end properties in the state (Azhar, 2020). Over the past decade, Malaysia has targeted foreign buyers for domestic properties as a source of foreign investment. This can be seen in the federal government’s MM2H scheme launched in 2002, which provides long-​term visas to foreigners buying properties valued over a certain threshold in the country. The programme has arguably given rise to developments like Johor’s Forest City, which was almost exclusively targeted at Chinese buyers. However, Forest City has not yet been completed as demand has not kept up with the supply of houses, partly due to the Chinese government’s restrictions on capital outflow in 2017 (Vasagar and Wildau, 2017). This 63

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oversupply has been amplified by the economic recession caused by COVID-​ 19 and the rise of travel restrictions, resulting in the indefinite suspension of the MM2H programme (MOTAC, 2020). In this regard, the planned use of Island C of the PSR Scheme as a tourist resort also seems doubtful. In sum, the funding model for the PTMP has been upended, as the prices that the state government had hoped to obtain for the sales of reclaimed land to developers will be reduced. However, the 4,500-​acre SRS scheme is supposed to house over 446,000 people, most of them in expensive homes. As Netto (2020b) has noted, many of these would be targeted at foreign buyers, and many of them from China. Yet, there are already 3,000 unsold housing units in Penang, worth about RM2.6 billion. In order to solve this problem, the state government has instead reduced the value of ‘affordable’ homes in Malaysia by 10 per cent, and also reduced the threshold value for property sales to foreigners by 20–​40 per cent for apartments and landed properties, respectively (Nambiar, 2020b). This is a clear sign that the forecasted selling prices of homes on the proposed three islands will no longer be sustainable under current market conditions, which are expected to persist for years to come (Netto, 2020b). Nonetheless, the state government is still planning to sell 180,000 units by 2030, raising questions about how it plans to do so, especially as many young people in Penang are now unemployed, and foreigners are selling off properties they hold in Malaysia at a loss (Kumar, 2020).

Transport solution or economic growth machine? One reason why urban and regional governments may seek to develop such capital-​intensive and automobile-​focused transit systems is due to the perceived need to provide attractive environments for property-​led developments in order to foster international competitiveness and economic development (Raco and Lin, 2012: 204; Deas, 2014). As increasingly documented in the urban studies literature, attempts to achieve a ‘world-​ class aesthetic’ have typically produced a mode of urbanization characterized by high levels of investment in visible, ‘modern’ infrastructure projects (Ghertner, 2015; Colven, 2017). For instance, the SRS proposal claimed that the PSR project would serve an additional economic purpose as the shortage of developable land in Penang is currently holding back economic growth. In this view, Penang would become economically un-​competitive without any land reclamation, putting it in a precarious position in an era of increasing inter-​city competition As such, infrastructure projects such as the PTMP do not just provide for the transportation of people, goods and cars throughout the city, but, as Kaika and Swyngedouw (2000: 130) put it, also embody the idea of progress, and ‘aestheticised dreams of tomorrow’s utopia’ (see also Olds, 1995; Wade, 64

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2018). For example, Penang City Councillor Joshua Woo has argued that ‘the whole idea of having a transport master plan is never just about alleviating traffic congestion, but to develop the state for the people, for the future’ (Woo, 2018). This refers to the fact that the PTMP is envisioned by the Penang state government not only as a transport plan, but rather a master plan that will ‘maintain [Penang’s] competitiveness, and to remain relevant in the future’ (Tye, 2018). In other words, given that large-​scale infrastructure projects and high-​end real estate development are currently being pursued by neighbouring cities like Singapore and Jakarta, Penang’s politicians feel that they must follow suit. The PTMP has thus received considerable support from business groups in Penang, including the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce (PCCC), and the Penang Chapter of the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (Tye, 2018). The PCCC, for instance, claimed that the PTMP should be viewed from a ‘positive and constructive perspective’ as ‘if the infrastructure falls behind time and development, then our economy will also be adversely affected’ (PCCC, 2018). Some local residents seem to have also bought into the government’s plan for the PTMP. One Tanjung Bungah resident working on the mainland side of Penang State reportedly claimed that ‘a lot of us here are practical and are just trying to make a living, so I’m in support of alternatives and new roads’ (quoted in Filmer, 2017). For him, the main priority is that local authorities need to ensure that developers who embark on new housing projects equally prioritize the mandatory upgrading of surrounding roads to limit traffic congestion. Similarly, a member of the Tanjung Bungah Residents’ Association reportedly claimed that campaigns to limit development in the suburb are ‘not fair’, because Malaysia is ‘a developing country, so there must be housing and development for the people here’ (quoted in Filmer, 2017). Since late 2019, the PTMP has been linked to the Penang 2030 agenda, with the new Chief Minister of Penang, Chow Kon Yeow, claiming that it ‘is the future of Penang’ (Chow, 2019). The Penang 2030 vision has four main themes, with the fourth being investment in public infrastructure to develop a holistic transport network. This is seen as ‘a major step in transforming the landscape of Penang into a modern and smart state’ and providing better quality of life (Chow, 2019). Chow claimed that ‘[e]‌conomic growth with environmental sustainability would be an ideal situation rather than sacrificing the environment for the sake of development’ (quoted in Schneider, 2018). However, he also claimed that if the state was not proactive in developing ‘sophisticated facilities’, the state of Penang would be ‘marginalised in modernisation’ (Chow, 2019). As Deas (2014) has observed, such logic is based on pro-​market policy making and seeks to construct consensus among the populace that agglomerative urban growth is central to the future stability and prosperity of the urban region. It is also tied to anxieties on 65

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behalf of city leaders about competing with other Asian cities to attract and retain international investors and corporations (Raco and Lin, 2012: 204). Furthermore, such rhetoric has also arguably been intended to secure votes to ensure that the government remains in power in coming elections. As various urban scholars have observed, such infrastructural projects arise from the shift in governance from the national scale towards subnational scales, making entrepreneurial urban governance more prevalent and important (see Brenner, 1999; Baker and Ruming, 2015). In other words, urban governance has become characterized by an emphasis on economic growth and inter-​urban competitiveness (see Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Moreover, Barau (2017) has noted, this has been particularly pronounced in small and medium cities which have become primary targets for economic growth and massive landscape transformation. As noted in previous studies on mega-​projects, politicians prefer such ‘modern’ urban spaces to be orientated around the needs of the automobile (Olds, 1995). Penang is no exception, and highway development can be seen as the backbone of the PTMP, evidenced by the new highways and undersea tunnel to be developed by Zenith Consortium –​plus additional road widening and upgrading on Penang Island. Indeed, the state government has prioritized the Pan Island Link (PIL) highways, and the Bayan Lepas LRT lines which will serve the Penang South Reclamation project, and these are the only three PTMP related infrastructure projects that have yet to receive approval. The remaining public transport infrastructure, such as the BRT and tram lines have been pushed to Phase 2 of the PTMP, and could take up to ten years to be implemented. As such, Khoo Salma has raised the question as to whether the SRS proposal was actually a plan for creating a new township off the south coast of Penang and necessary connecting infrastructure, rather than a transport plan for Penang (Khoo, 2020). Related to this point, there has been considerable debate around the projected ridership for the LRT, which would only be financially viable with high daily ridership and population density. Originally predicted (in 2015) to be 42 million riders per year (or 116,000 per day), the projected Bayan Lepas LRT ridership has since been revised to a more modest 29.565 million per year (or 81,000 per day). However, the population catchment along the LRT corridor is only 200,000, meaning that approximately 80 per cent would need to take the LRT twice per day.7 According to the ‘facts and figures’ published on the official website for the PTMP, the Bayan Lepas LRT is actually designed to serve a catchment population of 600,000, which would mean that an additional 400,000 riders would need to come from the PSR site (cited in Khoo, 2019). Moreover, given the size of the reclaimed islands this would require a population density of more than 20,000 people per km2 (roughly equivalent to central Paris, London or New York) within 14 years (see Khoo, 2019). Yet, there is understandable scepticism about this, as 66

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activist Anil Netto pointed out: ‘Penang island itself took about 200 years to arrive at the current population of about 800,000’ (quoted in Azhar, 2020). Moreover, the state government’s discursive strategies for promoting the PTMP have shifted over time. Upon originally proposing the PTMP, civil society members in Penang adopted the slogan ‘move people, not cars’, in order to raise awareness about the need to decrease Penang’s over-​reliance on cars, which was at the time well over 90 per cent (interview, 11 August 2016). The state government then co-​opted this slogan, using the phrase ‘move people, not vehicles’, as seen on their official website for the PTMP in 2016 (Penang state government, 2016). This was arguably done to promote the capital-​intensive public transport components proposed for the PTMP, and to appease civil society groups, who were increasingly critical of the government’s proposal. This is an important point, because public opposition to previous proposed mega-​projects in Penang has caused the Chief Minister to be voted out of office, as in the case of Lim Chong Eu in 1990 (see Chapter 5). The government has also conceded that the PTMP will no longer be free, because the PSR project is intended to pay for the Bayan Lepas LRT line. However, since the PSR will take six to seven years to complete, it is not possible to wait for it to be completed before starting work on the LRT. Moreover, the depot for the LRT is to be located on one of the three reclaimed islands, meaning that the islands must be complete before the LRT can begin operation (Khoo, 2019). The cost of the reclamation also needs to be paid up front, which will be split by the state government and the PDP (Buletin Mutiara, 2020). Therefore, the government has sought bank loans, in addition to funding from the federal government to pay for the LRT (Amarthalingam, 2016; Kaur, 2019; Khoo, 2020). However, the sum required for the LRT comes to RM10 billion, which has yet to be approved by the federal government at time of writing (Basyir, 2019c). As the original SRS proposal for the PTMP included RM2 billion in ‘bridging finance’, questions have been raised as to how this multiplied into a sum that is 12 times the state government’s annual budget (Netto, 2020b). Moreover, the final design for the PSR was announced in August, 2020, which shows a fanciful ‘urban lily pad’ design, which is completely different from what was submitted in the approved environmental impact assessment (EIA) (The Vibes, 2020). This raised questions about whether the Department of Environment (DoE) would be alerted to this, and if the submission of a new EIA would be required (Yeoh, 2020).8 Nonetheless, the state government is preparing to go ahead with the PSR project due to its contractual obligations, which seems to confirm Khoo Salma’s suspicion that the PSR was actually the main objective all along, rather than the PTMP. This represents the problem with land-​for-​infrastructure deals such as the PTMP, as the public infrastructure is dependent upon completion of large 67

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mega-​projects which have lengthy approval and construction periods. Critics have argued though that with the recent changes of power at the federal level in early 2020 and mid-​2021, the Penang state government may find it difficult to secure such a large loan, as Penang’s ruling DAP is no longer part of the ruling coalition at the federal level. In addition to these financing issues, the Penang Form has argued that the PTMP is fundamentally incompatible with the form of sustainable development envisioned in Chow’s Penang 2030 vision. Among the numerous areas of concern, particular issues are related to the proposed LRT system, which would pose both aesthetic and physical threats to the heritage landscape of George Town, and ‘forever alter the nature of [Penang’s] built environment’ (Penang Forum, 2016a: 31). Instead, the Penang Forum has argued for an ART (Autonomous Rail Transit) system, which would be more flexible as routes can be added and changed, as opposed to fixed tracks for the LRT. A hybrid between a train, a bus and a tram, ART is a passenger transport system that uses carriages with rubber tyres running on roads rather than tracks. Like BRT systems, it uses existing road space like a tram without wasting space or requiring large amounts of money to build a track (Augustin, 2020). The Penang Forum has argued that an ART would be more suitable for Penang’s hilly landscape as it can climb steeper slopes (up to 13 degrees), unlike the LRT (Basyir, 2019c). It would also be cheaper to operate and maintain and ‘is eminently suited for Penang’s heritage landscape and more environmentally-​friendly’ compared to the LRT, which the Penang Forum has represented as ‘bulky and ugly’ (Dermawan, 2019b; Figure 4.1). Trackless trams can further avoid the worst features of light rail –​disruption and cost. The Penang Forum has noted that it can take years to lay rail tracks, causing major disruption to local economies, as has happened in other cities around the world (Penang Forum, 2016a). As Newman (2018) has observed, LRT systems in Sydney and the Gold Coast cost over $120 million per kilometre, versus $6–​8 million for ART systems. The Penang Forum has also pointed out that the elevated LRT structures would take up significantly more space in the built environment, ‘requiring greater land acquisition and much greater tree loss’, relating to a broader concern with the impact of infrastructure development on the natural environment, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 (Penang Forum, 2016a: 31). Civil society members have recently pointed to Kuching’s decision to adopt an ART instead of LRT system to enhance connectivity in the Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo) capital. Transport consultant Rosli Azad Khan noted that the ART is ‘a much cheaper system’, which will serve the same purpose (quoted in Augustin, 2020). According to the Sarawak Chief Minister, the ART costs a third of what an LRT system would have cost for the city. Much like Penang, Kuching also has a relatively low ridership demand over a wide area (less than 5,000 passengers per direction per hour), making the 68

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Figure 4.1: Comparisons of different types of transport infrastructure used by the Penang Forum’s Better, Cheaper, Faster plan to illustrate the impact of LRT and monorail infrastructure on the surrounding landscape

Source: Penang Forum (2016a).

ART a more appropriate option than the LRT. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Kuching government has also considered the development of transit-​oriented development around each of the stations in order to increase its ridership and provide for commercial opportunities promoting economic growth (Augustin, 2020). The proposed undersea tunnel linking Penang Island with the mainland, and the substantial land reclamation required to finance the project, have posed further environmental concerns about the PTMP. As the Penang Forum has argued, the ‘car-​centric TMP imperils Penang’s heritage and fragile ecology, increasing our carbon emissions without a thought for future generations’ (Penang Forum, 2016a: np). As such, opposition party Gerakan organized an online petition to oppose the undersea tunnel in 2020, arguing that it would not benefit the public, but rather the company undertaking the project (Dermawan, 2020a). Moreover, Penang’s former Chief Minister, Lim Guan Eng, was originally against the type of infrastructure proposed in 69

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the PTMP in 2013, citing its ‘inappropriate[ness] for a World Heritage city like Penang’, which would ‘cause George Town to lose its UNESCO World Heritage city status’ (Netto, 2013b: np).9 Nonetheless, the state government has not been willing to adapt any of the Penang Forum’s recommendations since appointing SRS Consortium as PDP, and have even treated them with considerable hostility on occasion. Moreover, the 2019 federal budget included abolishing tolls on Penang Bridge, which the Penang Forum has argued could have been used to subsidize public transport development on the island. As member Rexy Prakash Chacko pointed out, ‘abolishing tolls for motorcycles on the Penang Bridge would only result in more people using privately-​owned motorcycles on the bridge to access Penang’ (quoted in Mok, 2018b). He added that the government should have instead focused on allocations to improve the efficiency of public transport as well as public transport infrastructure, such as BRT lanes not just in Kuala Lumpur but also Penang which is the most congested city in the country. While this could be seen as a politically motivated decision to obtain more public support in Penang leading up to the 2018 federal election, the move actually contradicts Penang’s mission to be a ‘green and smart’ state by 2030, including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Dermawan, 2018b). As such, a major concern of the Penang Forum is the change in the state government’s attitudes towards civil society groups and their transparency regarding the implementation of the PTMP since the Halcrow report was commissioned. Another indirect consequence of this move to abolish tolls was seen at the end of 2020, while I was finishing the first draft of this book. The federal government announced that the Penang ferry service, which carried both passengers and cars, would be closed, and replaced by passenger speedboats, with only one ferry remaining to carry motorcycles and bicycles. As Penang-​ based journalist Mustafa Anuar reflected: Since their launch 126 years ago, the ferries that ply between the island and the mainland have become an icon to both the people of Penang and foreign and domestic visitors alike. Apart from its heritage value, the ferries have served a useful function of connecting people on both ends of the route, particularly workers who live on the mainland and work on the island. This is especially so for those working in George Town who cannot afford the high-​priced properties on the island. In other words, for people travelling from Butterworth to the city centre, the ferry is a more convenient and faster link to the island than the longer route via the first Penang bridge. (Anuar, 2021) While this decision was made based on declining vehicle numbers using the ferry service (200,000/​year) compared to its 1.2 million passengers, this is

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arguably due to a lack of investment in the ferry service in recent decades, resulting in ageing ferries. As Anuar noted, there has been suspicion in Penang that there has been an under-​investment in the ferry service in order to encourage more people to use the two Penang bridges, to justify their existence (Anuar, 2021). This suspicion is particularly salient given the PTMP’s objective to construct an undersea tunnel. Much like the new highways being constructed for the PTMP, the lack of public transport connectivity will ultimately lead to increased congestion on the bridges, which could be avoided with improvements to the ferry service. In addition to these points, Anuar (2021) also lamented that a significant part of Penang’s heritage will be lost with the closure of the ferry service. This combination of financial, aesthetic and heritage concerns encapsulates much of the arguments against the PTMP and its projected impacts on Penang’s cultural and physical landscape.

The post-​political nature of infrastructure planning in Penang While Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow has been seen to ‘welcome constant open engagement with civil societies’ despite ‘intense pressure put on him by developers and various other individuals and parties’, other members of his party have not held the same attitude (Free Malaysia Today, 2019). For instance, State Councillor Daniel Gooi asserted in a 2019 statement that ‘lies and misleading statements were often used by this group of individuals to tarnish the state government and our effort to provide a holistic traffic solution for the people of Penang’ (Lim, 2019). He also went on claim that the Penang Forum wanted to ‘see Penang fail as a state’ (Free Malaysia Today, 2019). As seen in these comments, the state government in Penang has become quite complacent given its long incumbent status in the state. Penang is a stronghold of the ruling DAP government, and this is not projected to change due to voter disillusionment with the incumbent coalition United Malays National Organisation which –​until 2018 –​ held power at the federal level for over 60 years since independence. Nonetheless, as state lawmaker Daniel Gooi stated: ‘we are answerable to the present and future needs of Penangites especially in developing a feasible and lasting transport infrastructure, or risk being voted out in the coming general elections’ (Lim, 2019). As another DAP politician claimed in response to criticisms of the roll-​out of the PTMP, ‘we are a reflection of what society wants … never forget that we are dealing with real people and real emotions who wish to see Penang become an economic powerhouse’ (Sustainable Penang WhatsApp Group, 24 August 2018).

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Some business organizations in Penang, including the PCCC, have also been critical of civil society organizations, claiming that they ‘waste resources and time and … hinder government’s efforts [sic] to promote economic development … the ultimate victims are the innocent civilians’ (PCCC, 2018). In contrast, they are forthcoming in their support for past and present politicians in Penang, praising their ‘foresight’ and ‘courage’ (PCCC, 2018). Such discourse is illustrative of post-​politicization in which substantive disagreement is deemed unacceptable and unhelpful and therefore off-​limits (Deas, 2014). For example, in a Facebook comment on a Penang Property Talk post, one Penangite charged that the ‘NGOs’ selfishness might cause the career opportunities of young generations [to be] at stake’ (Penang Property Talk, 2018). The post suggested (based on a survey of their Facebook followers), that 85 per cent of Penangites support Penang Island Link 1 (PIL1), and ‘we should work together to make this happen, not criticise for the sake of criticising’ (Penang Property Talk, 27 August 2018). As Zizek has argued, such discourses are common in post-​political regimes, whereby ‘politics proper is progressively replaced by expert social administration’, and thereby precludes the realization of alternative urban futures (cited in Swyngedouw, 2009: 610). For instance, the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers collected over one thousand signatures from factory workers in southern Penang who were concerned that the PTMP would be cancelled, negatively impacting their travel time to work (Mok, 2018a). One PTMP supporter further argued that rejecting the government’s proposal for the PTMP would increase congestion, eventually resulting in businesses relocating, taking jobs with them (Tye, 2018). The logic here is that internal connectivity is deemed as a necessary step towards fostering productivity and supporting a city’s economic growth. This is not only in terms of the movement of people, but also goods and logistics, which is often ‘the main driving factor for business elites and decision-​makers’ (Keil and Addie, 2015: 898). Local politicians thus claimed that their responsibility is job creation. As one Penang MP claimed, ‘one cannot forget that people choose governments to ensure that there are opportunities to make a living instead of looking at one side of the spectrum’ (Sustainable Penang WhatsApp group, 2018). This argument, however, conflates efficient transport with job creation and economic growth, while ignoring the fact that alternative proposals, such as the Halcrow plan, which would have reduced congestion in a much shorter time frame. As such, the Penang forum has expressed concern about how the Penang state government has informed the public about the PTMP. For instance, a 2019 survey found that 97 per cent of over 16,000 respondents had indicated support for the proposed LRT, based on a questionnaire distributed around the state (Khoo, 2019). Yet, as the Penang Forum has argued, this survey was based on ‘laughably ludicrous and leading questions’ that sought to 72

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trick people into answering positively (Penang Forum, 2019). The three questions were: 1. Do you support the PTMP as a means of reducing traffic congestion in Penang Island? 2. The priority public transport to be built under PTMP is the Bayan Lepas LRT. Will you be using it upon completion? 3. Do you support/​agree that Penangites should look at public transport as a greener and cheaper way of getting around? These questions were based on information displayed about the PTMP that were based upon primarily ‘technical drawings, artists’ impressions and proposed alignments’ (Khoo, 2019). However, the questions were framed in a way that would elicit a positive response from most people. As the Penang Forum pointed out: ‘of course, everyone would support a Penang transport masterplan if they were told it would reduce congestion’ (Penang Forum, 2019). Furthermore, the information provided omitted critical information, such as the fact that the LRT would take nine years to commence operations; and that there are cheaper alternatives available that could be built in less time, such as the ART, modern trams, or BRT systems that have been proposed. There were no questions about the non-​transport related components of the PTMP, such as the extensive land reclamation required to finance the LRT, or if respondents would support an additional 400,000 residents in the south of Penang, required to make the reclamation financially viable (Khoo, 2019). Questions about the Pan-​Island Link (PIL) highways were also omitted. Given the projected LRT cost of RM5.5 per trip –​which is relatively expensive by Malaysian standards –​the Penang Forum asked whether Penangites would not prefer to use this new highway (for the few years before it gets congested) instead of taking the LRT?’ (Penang Forum, 2019). Question 2 asked respondents whether they would use the LRT, but were not informed which areas it serves, so how could they know whether or not it would be useful on a day-​to-​day basis.As one user commented on the ‘Support Penang Transport Master Plan’ Facebook page, ‘I was all supportive of LRT, thinking that I could at last enjoy this public transportation, going to work. Until I found out that the LRT would be going by Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah (which is surrounded by landed properties) and not Jalan Bukit Gambir (which is a road surrounded by flats and middle-​income earners). Now I am sad’ (Oon in Penang state government, 2019b). As this comment indicates, the PTMP is framed as a way of reducing traffic congestion in Penang and increasing sustainability of the state, but can actually be seen as serving interests of the wealthy investors in the southern islands reclamation scheme. Question 3 implies that the PTMP is a ‘greener and cheaper’ way of getting around, without allowing respondents to make this decision for themselves. 73

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The Penang Forum (2019) has thus argued that the survey is representative of the Penang government’s approach to public briefings and consultation sessions, in that people were not provided with real alternatives to the SRS proposal for the PTMP. The phrasing of the three questions in such a way is also a prime example of how governments tend to construct consensus around socially normative objectives such as ‘sustainability’, ‘economic competitiveness’ or ‘quality of life’ that are deemed to be in the public interest (Swyngedouw, 2009; Deas, 2014: 2302; Keil and Addie, 2015). Furthermore, the 20-​volume proposal and EIA for the PTMP were not made freely available to the public until 2019, which civil society groups argued contradicted the state government’s own slogan of ‘competent, accountable and transparent’. When prompted for the reason why the documents were not made available, the Penang state government stated that the issues are ‘too complex for the [lay person], so should not be made public’ (Sustainable Penang WhatsApp group, 2018). Marzuki (2009) has argued that this limitation of public participation in the EIA process in Malaysia is a prime weakness of the DoE’s procedural guidelines, which makes it vulnerable to abuse by the government and developers. As such, Marzuki (2009: 134) has suggested that the purpose of EIAs in Malaysia is ‘only to inform the public’, as local decision-​makers are still wary of the aforementioned previous cases where large development projects were overturned due to public objection.This is an issue that has been heavily criticized by the Penang Forum, which has organized numerous public forums to solicit feedback on the various plans for the PTMP. The government cited the confidentiality of the SRS proposal documents as a reason why copies or electronic files could not be made. According to Hui and Au (2016: 228), this is one specific condition of post-​politics, whereby transparency and accountability ‘become conditional and are mediated by organisational principles such as confidentiality’. These are some of the ways in which meaningful citizen involvement in the planning making process is rendered tokenistic at best, creating an ‘unchallenged ascendancy amongst elite actors of neoliberal ideas about economic development’ (Deas, 2014: 2302; see also Hezri, 2016; Legacy, 2016). It also includes the use of expert-​led decision-​making and policy processes that preclude public scrutiny and critique. Finally, as noted in the previous chapter, Penang still lacks a gazetted local plan at the time of writing, which means that planning decisions are made on an ad hoc basis by the State Planning Committee (Tan, 2013; Abu Bakar, 2017). This means that density in certain parts of the city can be increased without the accompanying infrastructure, or considering the carrying capacities of the land. Moreover, the absence of gazetted local plan means that the public does not get a sufficient chance to review proposed developments, and are subsequently forced to appeal planning decisions 74

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that are made on a case-​by-​case basis, making democratic politics merely reactionary and less powerful (Hezri, 2016: 136). As Malaysian planning lawyer Derek Fernandez has argued, in the absence of gazetted, agreed upon plans, well-​connected developers are able to push their interests, which makes every project ‘negotiable’ (quoted in Abu Bakar, 2017).

Conclusion In reviewing the competing plans over the PTMP, this chapter has illustrated the social, economic and ecological implications of ‘world-​class’ city making strategies embarked upon by city managers, and identified alternative strategies that can be pursued to achieve more inclusive and socio-​ecologically just forms of development. As Penang activist Anil Netto (2020b) has argued, if the state government really believes in a ‘green agenda’, it should abandon the expensive and overly-​ambitious SRS proposal for the PTMP and use the original Halcrow proposal to develop a truly sustainable mobility plan that does not focus on highways and reclamation schemes. Rather than being economically unfeasible, such investment in sustainable transport infrastructure would also have the potential to create many new jobs for Penangites, while also improving the quality of life. The chapter has also discussed the post-​political tendencies of the Penang government, as can be seen through their engagements with civil society groups in recent years. While most Asian countries cannot be truly classified as ‘post’ political, given that there has not a long period of what Swyngedouw (2009) has termed the ‘properly political’, that is not to say that there are not traces of the post-​political in Asian politics. This is especially the case in cities like Penang, Taipei and Hong Kong, which have developed vibrant civil societies and more mature democratic societies. As the case of Penang demonstrates, the rolling-​out of a post-​political agenda is part of the state government’s attempts to ‘internationalise’, which it is seeking to do through expensive infrastructure and real-​estate development. As such, I posit that the Penang case reflects what Clarke and Cochrane (2013: 16) have termed ‘anti-​politics’, which refers to an active strategy of de-​politicization, rather than a passive condition of voter disillusionment. For example, the chapter has illustrated that while there has been considerable effort to involve business interests in urban governance, there has been little genuine effort to foster popular, participatory involvement. Civil society groups, even those that contain more expertise than urban governments and private developers, have thus been represented by the authorities as an ‘irrational obstacle to progress’ which must be overcome (see Turner, 2006: 254).10 Nonetheless, Penang civil society groups are not going anywhere, and continue to contest projects associated with the PTMP even after they have been approved. For this reason, Ruming (2018: 183) argues that ‘the 75

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implementation stage is likely to emerge as the most controversial’, as residents become aware of the impacts of such development. While the PTMP has been in the planning stage for eight years (at the time of writing), few of the associated projects have yet to break ground. Furthermore, the often binary antagonisms created between the Penang state government’s attempts at post-​politicization and the political and public advocacy and campaigning led by the Penang Forum can ‘paradoxically acts to redemocratize and politicize urban transport planning’ (Legacy, 2016: 3111). This underscores the political imperative to challenge dominant world city models and move to alternative worlding pathways for the construction of more democratic and inclusive urban futures. Therefore, post-​political consensus is far from secure, and can be challenged by progressive social movements (Ruming, 2018: 183). In this regard, while this chapter may portray a bleak vision of Penang’s future, the strong presence of civil society groups in the state do indicate some potential for urban governance to promote social and environmental justice by actively questioning the need for costly mega-​ projects like the PTMP.

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The Forests in the City: Building Participatory Approaches to Urban-​Environmental Governance Penang’s urban area is growing at twice Malaysia’s national average, at 3.29 per cent per year (Masum et al, 2017). To put this in perspective, in 1960, the island’s urbanized area totalled 29.5km2, almost all of it in and immediately surrounding George Town. In 2015, the urban area had spread across 112km2 and replaced the mangroves, rubber plantations, rice paddies and fishing villages along the island’s northern and eastern coasts (Schneider, 2018). This rapid and intensive urban transition has put considerable pressure on the natural environment, and has had serious socio-​ecological effects, including landslides and severe flooding events in 2016 and 2017. This is due to the concentration of development on the island, which is constrained by its relatively small size (293km2) and lack of developable space given that its central area consists of steep, forested hills. As such, flooding in Penang can be seen as a consequence of both the physical characteristics of the landscape and rampant urban development. For instance, Penang’s hills contain important water catchments and forest reserves which serve to mitigate flood risk, but these are nonetheless coming under increasing threat of encroaching development. This includes both legal and illegal deforestation for housing and infrastructure developments which have been combined with inadequate mitigation measures. The threat of flooding has thus been exacerbated by land use change (urbanization), which has resulted in a lack of porous surfaces to absorb excess rainfall. Penang was therefore identified as one of the deforestation hotspots in Peninsular Malaysia in 2013 (Masum et al, 2017). However, this is not only an issue in Penang, as Malaysia as a whole has experienced an average of 143 floods per year since 2001, of which more than 90 per cent are flash floods (D’Ayala et al, 2020). Consequently, Malaysia 77

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had the highest number of people as a percentage of the total population exposed to flooding (63) among all Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states, from 2012 to 2019 (CFE-​DMHA, 2019). As D’Ayala et al (2020) note, such frequently occurring floods cause a high level of threat to the personal safety of Malaysians, while also inflicting considerable damage on the country’s infrastructure. This latter point seems particularly concerning given Malaysia’s emphasis on infrastructure development, while also posing a paradox: additional development threatens that very infrastructure due to the increased potential for flooding and landslides. This chapter thereby documents the growing development pressures on Penang’s hills, which have been increasingly threatened by new development projects associated with the PTMP (discussed in Chapter 4), including the PIL1 highway, which would cut straight through Penang Hill. It also points out the contradictions in Penang’s vision of becoming a ‘green and smart state’, by illustrating how this has acted as a facade to veil the continued degradation of the broader urban ecosystem through development. To date, the state government’s response to the compounding effects of hillside development has been largely premised on the implementation of mitigation measures to allow further development. However, these have proven difficult to implement, particularly in historic cities like Penang, as structural mitigation measures may affect the heritage value of the surrounding landscape, while also not providing sufficient protection in these areas (D’Ayala et al, 2020). This has created a strong need for new forms of urban environmental governance in Penang, which I will analyse in this chapter. Through discursive analysis, I argue that the state government seems to adhere to a form of urban exceptionalism, which sees urban development as operating outside of the physical constraints of the natural environment. This mode of thought, which is common in modern resilience thinking and urban planning, attributes so-​called ‘natural hazard’ events like flooding and landslides to climatic or geophysical events that are outside of human control (see Folke et al, 2005). Accordingly, the emphasis is placed on measures to mitigate future incidences of such hazards through natural resource management or civil engineering approaches (for example drainage canals and slope stabilization). However, human activities have a significant and well documented role in generating flooding and landslide events and serve to reinforce our dependencies on non-​human species and broader ecological systems (Miller et al, 2020). Following Cook and Swyngedouw’s (2012) provocation to analyse how the urbanization of nature shapes socio-​ecological relations, this chapter revisits the concept of environmental imaginaries –​originally developed in the political ecology literature –​to examine how communities understand, interact and engage with the broader urban ecosystem, and how they have 78

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been incorporated into processes of urban governance. As previous research has established, good governance is not only a worthwhile goal in itself, but is also essential for effective social and economic development to occur (Bennett et al, 2015). For instance, as Miller et al (2020) note, fairness, transparency and accountability in processes of public decision-​making, in addition to the sharing of environmental risks, are important to expanding social justice and urban resilience. Moreover, by developing a concept of environmental governance that is shaped by both humans and non-​humans, we can begin to identify pathways to alternative forms of urban development that can help to produce more environmentally sustainable urban spaces (see Miller et al, 2020). Indeed, as Rademacher (in Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan, 2017: 11) has argued, the making of nature and ‘meaningful life’ in the city involves the construction of new ‘environmental affinities’ that can foster socio-​ ecological cohesion. These affinities include identity struggles, governance approaches and the ‘moral purposes of city living’, which involve the ‘constant renegotiation of the places of nature in the city’ (Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan, 2017: 11). Following a brief review of the literature on resilience and environmental imaginaries, the chapter begins with a particular controversy that emerged in 2013, following the clearing of Bukit Relau, now known as Botak (Bald) Hill. This event is significant in revealing the environmental sensitivities of Penangites, which link the degradation of the natural environment to their social and physical well-​being. Subsequently, it turns to an analysis of the environmental impacts (especially flooding) associated with hillside development in Penang. Finally the chapter discusses two recent participatory governance initiatives: Penang Hills Watch (PHW) and Langur Project Penang (LPP), which has sought to create broader awareness of the fragility of Penang’s landscapes, flora and fauna, and enrol more people into protecting them. This has also had political effects by putting more pressure on the state government to monitor and enforce development restrictions in forested areas. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the effectiveness of the type of participatory governance initiatives that have been developed to inhibit the current pace of deforestation in Penang and how the LPE framework can help to reimagine a different form of ‘resilient’ and ‘sustainable’ cities, which are not simply based on ‘adding’ nature or technological measures to offset further development and socio-​ecological injustices.

Landscape political ecology, resilience and environmental imaginaries González-​Hidalgo et al (2014) argue that modern approaches to resilience thinking are fundamentally flawed due to the fact that societal responses to 79

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(or learning from) socio-​ecological shocks are often curtailed by politics which prevent the formulation of alternative visions of development that are more socio-​environmentally just (see also Swyngedouw, 2010). Urban political ecologists have therefore stressed the importance of non-​human agency in shaping human–​environment interactions (see Armitage, 2008; Barua, 2014; Gabriel, 2014). This would involve reframing resilience by considering the well-​being of entire ecosystems, rather than just humans, which would ultimately reduce the risk of disasters associated with the transformation of the environment. Flora and fauna are both important subsets of non-​human actors, which Houston and colleagues (2018) have argued can be equally important to the life and spirit of urban regions. Similarly, Lorimer (2012), drawing on Bruno Latour, has put forward the idea of a ‘multinatural’ biogeography, which refers to the multiple trajectories along which any ecology might evolve and the various ways in which they can be sensed, valued and contested. Recognizing the importance of urban natures (in its various forms), and asking how communities understand, interact, and engage with their broader urban ecosystem can hold considerable political opportunities for the development of more sustainable and socio-​ecologically just urban futures (see Braun, 2005; Hinchliffe and Whatmore, 2006; Francis et al, 2012). Or, as Kaika and Swyngedouw (2011) have put it, the multiple of existing, possible or practical socio-​natural relations need to be identified and explored. This in turn involves analysing how the physical environment of particular places can facilitate (or limit) environmental movements, which has to date been poorly studied and understood. One way that urban political ecologists have done this is through the concept of urban metabolism, which has been useful in understanding the processes through which nature is urbanized, and with what effects (for example Loftus, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2006; Gabriel, 2014). Another useful concept is that of environmental imaginaries, which has been used by political ecologists examining social and ecological conflicts (for example Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001; Walker and Fortmann, 2003; Gabriel, 2014). Its value lies in the recognition of local landscapes as place-​specific crystallizations made up of both discursive and material elements (see Kaika, 2006). For example, in their classical political ecological study Liberation ecologies, Peet and Watts (1996: 263) coined the concept of the ‘environmental imaginary’, as ‘a way of imagining nature, including visions of those forms of social and individual practice which are ethically proper and morally right with regard to nature’. They are rooted in particular places (and their environmental histories), and often serve as the primary source of contestations between alternative visions for those places. However, the use of this concept has been rather anthropocentric through its neglect of 80

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non-​human agency in shaping such imaginary work (see Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001; McGregor, 2004; Harris, 2014). As we will see in this and the following chapters, Penang’s natural environment has had a significant influence on the social identity of many of its inhabitants. Therefore, aesthetically and environmentally offensive (ab) uses of Penang’s forested hillsides have strongly shaped attitudes and values regarding appropriate forms of urban development and relationships with the natural environment. For example, the Penang Forum launched the PHW movement in 2016 in response to previous cases of environmental injustices in Penang, which has since grown in size and influence. The movement has also had political effects by putting pressure on the government, and generating political opposition. For instance, a controversial proposed development project on Penang Hill in 1989/​90 led to the ousting of then Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu, who had been in power for 21 years (see Chapter 6). Environmental imaginaries can thus be highly political, in that ‘aesthetically offensive uses of nature can spur political opposition to the hegemonic social order’ (Peet and Watts, 1996: 268). As Maria Kaika (2017: 99) suggests, ‘emerging imaginaries of people and environments being and working in common’ could offer more efficient and effective ways of creating more socio-​environmentally just cities than traditional conceptions of resilience are able to. It is therefore important to move towards a new understanding of resilience, which goes beyond common approaches to the insertion of nature or technologies into communities to make them more tolerant to increasing levels of degradation (see Huber et al, 2017). Keil and Macdonald (2016: 1519), for example, quoting Buxton, position resilience ‘in terms of socio-​ecological systems’ and ‘dynamic interactions between socio-​economic and biophysical systems’ that operate across multiple scales. As Houston et al. (2018: 194), drawing on Tsing (2015) suggest, this allows us to move beyond conceptions of ‘human exceptionalism’, which ‘ “blinds us” to the worlds we co-​inhabit with a multitude of earthly creatures and nonhuman agents’ from bacteria to animals and even pollutants. Yet, this also involves deconstructing the discourses put forth by urban managers, who seek to frame new capital-​intensive forms of urban development as being environmentally ‘efficient’ or ‘green’. As Houston et al (2018: 194) point out, such modes of ‘sustainable’ urban design seek to ‘minimise impacts on the economic and social functioning of cities’, and paradoxically, on the same institutional structures that undermine the development of truly sustainable and environmentally just cities.

The cultural significance of Penang’s forested hillsides In clearing ground, you should be cautious of not falling into a common error, in felling countries over-​run with woods, which is that 81

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of causing every tree to be cut down without previously ascertaining whether they might not prove of great convenience and pleasure to the inhabitants. (John MacPherson in Gardner et al, 2011: 1) It has been rightly argued that the relationship of people with the local landscape and environment in Malaysia has taken a back seat to the country’s race to become a ‘fully developed’ nation by 2020. Accordingly, Hezri (2016) has argued that this focus on socio-​economic development has resulted in many Malaysians becoming detached from the natural environment and local landscape. However, this attitude has been quite different in Penang, which has a long history of environmental activism (see Cheng and Ma, 2015). Penang’s flora and fauna are an integral part of Penang’s environmental history, and have played as important a role as any human in shaping the city and its region (see Barnard, 2014: ch.1). This is not only in a biophysical sense, but also in terms of the environmental imaginaries and values of Penangites, which have been a crucial factor influencing the environmental movements and urban governance initiatives documented in this chapter (see also Chapter 6). Indeed, the epigraph at the start of this section, which is an instruction from the Acting Governor General of India to Francis Light –​credited as the ‘founder’ of George Town (Penang), Malaysia –​ illustrates how forests are a significant factor that should be considered by local governments in carrying out or authorizing development plans. The quotation alludes to how conflicting views on the use of natural resources can create considerable tension in society, and even act as a threat to the ruling political party. On the surface, Penang has strong legal protections for its forested hillsides. This includes the Land Conservation Act that designated much of Penang Island’s mountain forests off-​limits to development, due to concerns over possible landslides. Furthermore, Penang has clearly demarcated forest reserves and the PSP, gazetted in 2007, disallows development on slopes steeper than a 25 per cent gradient and/​or on land higher than 75 metres. This restriction is more stringent than the federal guidelines for hillside construction, which demonstrates the strong environmental protection laws in Penang. Yet, it excludes ‘special projects’ which may be permitted by the state government if they are low-​density developments and have strong mitigation measures in place to protect the integrity of the slopes. Property speculation, due to increasing land values, and the development-​friendly government have resulted in this exception being frequently invoked, leading to a marked increase in both the ‘extensive and intensive nature of hillside development’ in Penang in the past decade (Kam, 2016).1 Indeed, given that 40 per cent of Penang Island falls with a slope gradient of higher than 25 degrees and only 7.4 per cent of forested land remains in Penang, the PSP has clearly been seen by the government as a mere suggestion, rather than 82

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actual law. Another problem is the lack of a gazetted Local Plan, which creates considerable ambiguity over what type of development is permissible on Penang’s hillsides and allows for developers to exploit loopholes in existing policies (Mok, 2016c). Moreover, 70 per cent of forested areas in Penang are under private ownership, making it difficult for the government to control (Masum et al, 2017).2 One of the most infamous (illegal) hillside developments to occur in recent years was the sudden and illegal clearing of a large swath of forested land on Bukit Relau in early 2013 to make way for a large (unpaved) road (see Figure 5.1). As one interviewee noted, Bukit Relau was hitherto largely taken for granted by Penangites, as it is a secondary peak on the island, and not as well known –​or as accessible –​as the highest peak Penang Hill (Bukit Bendera). However, the clearing was a key incident which has sparked renewed awareness about the increasing vulnerability of Penang’s natural environment. The hill was quickly given the nickname Botak (Bald) Hill, to reflect the very visible scar on its peak following the deforestation. Moreover, given that the land was rezoned from forest reserve into a housing development zone the year before, there was suspicion that further development would follow. Despite this speculation, the Penang state government announced that there had been no applications for development on the hill, and no projects planned, but that the road was built by the land owner merely to ‘monitor’ the site (Amarthalingam, 2013).3 They further claimed that since it was cleared in the lead up to the federal election between April and May 2013, Figure 5.1: Summit of ‘Botak Hill’, Penang, which remained primary forest until the illegal clearing in 2013

Source: Photo by Rexy Chacko, January 2017.

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the government was too preoccupied with the campaign and did not notice that it had happened (Loh, 2018). This is a typical strategy of landowners in Penang who will use public holidays to conduct demolitions of protected heritage buildings or illegal land clearings (Jenkins, 2019). Subsequently, the Botak Hill developer was ordered to carry out ‘mitigation works’ to restore the hill back to its original state, and fined RM30,000. Interestingly, the developer claimed at the time of the verdict that he was ‘willing to pay’ the requisite sum to ensure the land ‘returns to normal’, and had reportedly invested RM50 million in the mitigation works (Amarthalingam, 2013). Nonetheless, mitigation works actually resulted in the construction of a wider paved road –​despite Lim Guan Eng’s promise that the hill would be ‘completely green’ by the end of 2016 (quoted in Mok, 2015). Even if the required mitigation work were to be done, it would take a generation for the flora and fauna on top of the hill to return to its original state. This speaks to the importance of resistance to local development, rather than merely resilience which often advocates the implementation of ‘mitigation’ and ‘restoration’ techniques to carry out further development in a ‘sustainable’ way. Many critics therefore charged at the time of the clearing that the penalty to the developer was not strict enough. For instance, the late Karpal Singh, who was a member of parliament at the time, argued that this was a significant crime to Penangites –​not just the hills –​and should be punished accordingly. As he put it: ‘hills are the heart and soul of Penangites that ought not to be touched by anyone … General Accomplishment [the developer] has assaulted and brought massive destruction on natural state assets’ (Singh in Shankar, 2014). Subsequently, the ruling was amended to the maximum penalty of RM50,000 (US$11,800) in the Court of Appeal (or a one-​year jail term in case of default) (The Sun Daily, 2014). As the presiding judge explained: ‘now everyone is conscious about the environment, especially in Penang, the forests are shrinking’ (Hishamudin in The Sun Daily, 2014). Through these statements, we can see how the intrinsic value of Penang’s forested hillsides are central to the identity and well-​being of many local people and have generated wider awareness about the need for greater environmental protection to avoid the compounding effects of such socio-​natural transformations. However, the Botak Hill saga continued into 2020, as –​rather than being reforested –​more land has been cleared for a durian plantation just south of Botak Hill on Bukit Gambir. Despite orders for the landowners to stop work between March and July, the landowners further cleared the hill 150m downwards from the summit towards a public park near the base of the hill, with the paved road widened to allow two lanes, and durian and other fruit tree saplings planted along the hill contours. Further clearing only ceased after MBPP council officers were put on 24-​hour duty to protect the site from 24 August, 2020 (Nambiar, 2020a). The total area of land cleared has now (at 84

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the time of writing) increased tenfold to 16 hectares (equivalent to 15 football fields). Although durian farms are permitted on hill land (76m above sea level) under the PSP, the clearing of the land was illegal as the landowners did not have planning permission from the council, and only belatedly sent a request for planning permission in September 2020 (Nambiar, 2020a). As of 2021, the road up the hill was made available to hikers, and the hill was renamed Iconic Hill – after the company name of the land owner (Liew, 2021). Controversially, the Penang state government in 2018 announced plans for one of two pan-​island expressways, which would connect the north coast of Penang Island to the airport in the south in 15 minutes, known as PIL1. The six-​lane PIL1 highway consists of 7.6km of elevated roads and 10.1km of roads which will be tunnelled through the Penang Hill range through a ‘drill and blast’ method (Nambiar, 2019a). The RM7.6 billion highway connects Gurney Drive in the northeast to the airport in the southeast and will reduce the trip by approximately 15 minutes. In 2019, the plan was conditionally approved with 56 conditions by the Malaysian DoE. Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow subsequently stated that this approval was ‘a big win for the “silent majority” who wanted highways to alleviate the worsening traffic on the island’ (Nambiar, 2019a). However, as noted in the previous chapter, Penang Forum members have repeatedly argued that highways are not sustainable in the long run as they incentivize the use of cars instead of public transport. When built on hill land, they also trigger landslides, fragment natural habitats, and act as a precursor to further development, as will be discussed in the penultimate section of this chapter. PIL1 has thus received significant public resistance for its potential impacts on the environment of Penang, its flora and fauna, and the health and safety of its human residents (see Connolly, 2020a). For instance, Figure 5.2 shows protesters in Penang holding up a banner which reads ‘Selamatkan Bukit-​ Bukau Pulau Pinang’ (save the hills of Penang Island). The banner pictures an anthropomorphized illustration of Penang Island with stitches on the side of its face, representing the proposed highway and a gash where 717kg of dynamite would be used to construct a tunnel through the hills. The photo is thus an apt illustration of the LPE concept, which stresses that the well-​ being of the environment (Penang Island) is tied to the flora and fauna (the monkey and birds clinging on to its sides) and humans (the girl comforting it). In addition to the cultural significance of the hills, they also function as important water catchments to provide water supply, prevent soil erosion and landslides. For instance, Penang Forum member Sharon Ahmat pointed out that: ‘these hills are fragile and easily degraded when disrupted by human activities [such as] hillside developments’ (Ahmat in Dermawan, 2016). They further host a rich diversity of plant and animal species, and act as ‘green lungs’ for CO2 buffering, nature appreciation and outdoor recreation activities –​which also significantly influences the well-​being of urban 85

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Figure 5.2: A protest against the Penang Island Link Highway 1 (PIL1) in Penang on 9 August 2018

Source: Photo by Dave Lim.

dwellers (Dwyer et al, 1992; Penang Forum, 2016b). PHW thus urged the state government to review the PIL1 project as it could result in numerous negative impacts, including landslides which have been increasingly prevalent in Penang (Muzamir, 2018). The next section will move on to discuss the PHW initiative that has been launched by local civil society actors to cultivate a stronger civic culture centred on raising awareness of the harms associated with unscrupulous hillside developments.

Drowning in infrastructure development In addition to high-​profile cases of illegal forest clearing, there are also many examples of legal hillside development and forest clearing that are evident in many parts of Penang Island, such as the PIL1 project. The increase in approved high-​rise development and indiscriminate cutting of steep hill slopes is now causing serious environmental and safety problems that are faced by various resident communities at the foothills. One only needs to witness the proliferation of large blue tarps strewn across the development scarred hillsides outside of George Town (intended to prevent landslides damaging nearby roads and apartment buildings), which are a distinct signal of ecological distress. Between 2008 and 2015, the MBPP granted 56 approvals on land above 75m, many of which are high-​r ise, high-​density projects, along with a geometric rise in illegal hill clearing cases from 2012 to 2015 (Kam, 2016). There is also a large area of land outside of forest 86

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reserves which is not gazetted and can be a target for illegal land clearing. As such, Penang is progressively developing at the expense of the environment, with a deforestation rate of 1.5 per cent per annum (Masum et al, 2017). Residents living near the hillsides –​and environmentally conscious citizens of Penang –​thus feel that development is getting ‘uncomfortably close’ (Kam, 2016). The Consumers Association of Penang has also expressed concern over the rate that trees are being sacrificed for development. As the Botak Hill case has shown, there are laws to control this, even possible jail terms, but observers have lamented that there is often no political will to enforce them. As Jenkins (2008: 23) astutely observed, there seems to be ‘little comprehension of the possible implications of mismanagement or the consequences of “redefining” the planning and building laws’ among officials in Penang. A direct consequence of the extensive hillside development and deforestation in Penang has been repeated severe flooding every year since 2016. That year, there was a series of three flash floods that devastated large parts of the island during the Hindu festival week of Deepavali. These were the largest floods to hit the island since the 1990s, which surprised many residents who thought that such severe flooding was a thing of the past. In November 2017, Penang experienced the worst floods in its history, which killed seven people (Teoh, 2017; Schneider, 2018). This followed severe flash flooding in several areas in September of that year, which were also the worst on record in several parts of the island (The Sun Daily, 2017). The annual incidence of flash flooding is increasing in Penang, from 22 in 2013 to 30 in 2016, with a total of 119 between 2013 and 2017 (Schneider, 2018). Many of these floods caused landslides across the central part of the island, one of which resulted in the death of 11 workers on a 50-​storey affordable housing block in Tanjung Bungah in 2017 (The Sun Daily, 2017). About a mile away from the landslide in Tanjung Bungah, a retaining wall supporting a new road and housing development collapsed during the flooding, causing damage to the property. The possibility of landslides at hill projects in Paya Terubong was twice highlighted to the state government by PHW in January and May 2018, requesting the authorities to halt the projects due to the fear of landslides. Nonetheless, in October 2018, another landslide occurred at a road construction site near Paya Terubong, one of Penang Island’s densest neighbourhoods, which killed nine foreign workers (Keeton-​Olsen, 2019). Following the Paya Terubong landslide in 2018, PHW released a statement requesting the local authorities to ‘stop approving new hillslope or hillside projects and take the blame, without pointing fingers at weather conditions or other factors’ (quoted in Muzamir, 2018). They further noted that the Paya Terubong tragedy could have been avoided if the authorities had reacted to the two reports about the Tanjung Bungah development, submitted by PHW in 2018, by adequately monitoring the project site and adding extra 87

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precautionary measures. The Penang Forum and PHW thus argued that the landslide incident ‘highlights the need for more public awareness about slope safety and the need for landowners to know their responsibilities in maintaining slopes as well as alerting the authorities when tell-​tale signs of slope instability and erosion appear’ (Mok, 2019c). These flooding and landslide events began to raise questions about whether the island’s growth has posed a threat to its liveability (Schneider, 2018). However, the Penang state government strongly rejected claims that extensive development was the cause of the floods. The state executive for flood mitigation claimed that they were due to inadequate flood mitigation measures, blaming this on the Barisan Nasional government for denying ‘many critical flood mitigation projects’ while they were in power at the federal level (Teoh, 2017; The Sun Daily, 2017). Furthermore, the state’s Drainage and Irrigation Department concluded that the flash floods in George Town were due to ‘unsystematic drainage system and continues [sic] heavy rain’ (The Rakyat Post, 2016). Yet, flooding is nothing new to Penang. As early as the mid-​1990s, Penang Island was plagued by constant flooding and environmental damage caused by irresponsible developers, with new suburban townships springing up from former agricultural or forested areas ‘almost overnight’ (see Jenkins, 2008: x). Unfortunately, as Rawther and Rawther (2017) lamented, Penang’s politicians ‘seem to forget that we cannot survive on Earth without a balanced ecosystem’. Thus, after the recent flooding episode, one resident, Mohamad, complained: I am tired of hearing repeated excuses from the state government, attributing the flash floods to the so-​called ‘King’ Tide and tidal change pattern. Nothing has been done to mitigate the flash floods for far too long, I am saddened that the analysis and much-​politicized flood mitigation schemes have come to nothing. (Quoted in Phuah, 2016) Climate change has undoubtedly contributed to the frequency and severity of floods in recent years, as annual rainfall in Penang has risen six-​fold since the 1990s (Johari, 2019). However, Universiti Sains Malaysia (Science University of Malaysia) Professor Chan Ngai Weng, pointed out that ‘it is unwise to dismiss rapid development and hillslope cutting as the cause of the flash floods’ (Phuah, 2016). Indeed, most of Penang’s current hotspots for flooding are concentrated in the northeastern part of the island, which is also the most built up area. As Malaysian soil scientist Dr Kam Suan Pheng explained, building on steep slopes and replacing water-​absorbing forest and farmland with roads and buildings means that ‘the excess rainwater gets less absorbed into the ground and comes off as flash floods’. She further added that ‘the flood situation is bound to worsen if climate change brings 88

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more rain and more intense rainfall’ (quoted in Schneider, 2018). This view is supported by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–​2030, which identifies both climate change and rapid urbanization as disaster risk drivers (UNDRR, 2015). Indeed, two Penang residents wrote in a letter to the Malaysiakini newspaper: ‘the flash floods and the landslide in Penang are proof that we have drastically underestimated the impact of manmade changes to the island and its ecology, and its ability to mitigate natural disasters’ (quoted in Rawther and Rawther, 2017). Accordingly, Masum et al (2017) have recommended an immediate ban on hill-​land development to ensure overall environmental safety in Penang. Penang activist Gurmit Singh similarly argued that new mega infrastructure development should not be approved as it ‘is unsustainable and exceeds the carrying capacity of the island’ (quoted in Schneider, 2018). Yet, in attempting to mitigate against future flooding, the government has not announced any plans to slow down development on the island –​even in forested hillside areas –​but has simply stated that it will focus on upgrading drainage systems in every neighbourhood (The Rakyat Post, 2016). For instance, a tender was carried out in 2018 to appoint a consultant for a RM150 million flood mitigation project, due to start construction by early 2021 (Basyir, 2019a). In other words –​the solution to Penang’s flooding is yet more development. In this regard, the state government is planning to begin seven flood mitigation projects in 2020, worth a total of RM6.7 million, in addition to 11 projects launched in 2019, worth nearly RM19 million (Mok, 2016b). Between 2013 and 2019, the City Council, State and federal governments allocated approximately RM550 million for flood mitigation projects in Penang across approximately 400 projects (Basyir, 2019a). Most of these funds for flood mitigation works are derived from the Drainage Contribution Fund, a mandatory charge that is imposed on property developments in Penang (Johari, 2019). However, the 2019 federal budget left out allocations to protect at-​risk environmental areas like Penang’s hillsides. As Penang Forum member Rexy Prakash Chacko pointed out, ‘these areas need more allocation for monitoring and law enforcement so that disasters like the Bukit Kukus [Paya Terubong] landslide do not happen’ (quoted in Mok, 2018b). He further noted that much of Malaysia’s urban infrastructure is not adapted to face the effects of climate change, and that there should have been a substantial allocation for climate change adaptation as well.

Penang Hills Watch: a participatory approach to urban-​environmental governance In October, 2016, a citizen’s initiative called PHW was launched which is designed to monitor incidences of hill clearing in Penang, and galvanize 89

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support for safeguarding what is left of the state’s forests. PHW allows local residents to report cases of suspected illegal hill clearing from their mobile phones, which are then posted to an interactive map (including photos and details of each case) allowing for the identification of patterns of hillside development in Penang (https://​hillc​lear ​ingi​npen​ang.ushah​idi.io/​views/​ map). The data is then collated by members of the Penang Forum and forwarded to the state government to help provide a comprehensive picture to the authorities of the number of hill-​clearing events taking place and their effects. The group uses the ‘Penang Hills Watch’ WhatsApp group to communicate informally with each other and interested members of the public, and to share information on hill clearings in Penang and the associated socio-​ecological impacts (see Figure 5.3). The platform thus provides quantifiable evidence of the increasing degradation of the local environment in Penang and creates awareness of this among both the government and the wider public. This is one of the key merits of the project, in that it allows for the various relationships and dependencies of Penangites with their broader environment to be recognized, explored and acted upon.4 The initiative also involves the active participation of the state government, who are requested to respond to quarterly reports from PHW to provide clarification on the nature of the activity, including: the development’s legality; its purpose; the site’s land use status; and, action to be taken by the City Council or state government. Figure 5.3: Penang Hills Watch logo, illustrating the participatory approach to monitoring Penang’s forested hillsides

Source: Penang Forum.

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Upon submission of the first quarterly report, there were 126 cases of hillside clearing, including 86 from government records, and 40 from the public. Of these, approximately 89 were illegal clearings, 26 were approved developments, six were under investigation and one was a natural slope failure (Penang Forum, 2017).5 The PHW project is consistent with one of the central tactics of NGOs in Malaysia, which involves the provision of expertise and development of in/​formal contacts with government officials in order to develop a more effective and trust-​based working relationship (see Cheng and Ma, 2015; Hezri, 2016). It is also an important urban governance initiative because the state government and City Council largely lack the resources (and political will) to do such monitoring itself –​but also provides transparency to the public regarding the protection of Penang’s natural environment. As Masum et al (2017) have suggested, such co-​management and enforcement of environmental laws can help to ensure a more sustainable future for Penang. PHW can thus be seen as a key type of initiative that can help to cultivate a multi-​species sensibility more widely among members of a community. For instance, in 2019, it partnered with the national SlopeWatch organization, to create a workshop aimed at empowering communities to understand concepts regarding slope stability, identifying signs of slope failure, and how to look out for signs of possible landslides, which attracted 40 local residents living near hill slopes (Penang Hills Watch, 2018). In this way, PHW encourages citizens to interact with, observe and be involved in the well-​ being of their local environment through activities such as hikes or simply by looking through one’s window. It is also a bottom-​up approach, which came about through increasing public concern over the increasing encroachment of human activities on Penang’s hillsides, reducing the extent and integrity of remaining natural habitat. Through galvanizing wider awareness and stewardship of the natural environment, the PHW movement –​and others like it –​can act as key stimulus to sustain the urban landscape and the socio-​ ecologies that it supports. As local scientist and activist, and founding member of PHW, Kam Suan Peng pointed out, mitigation measures only tackle the symptoms, and but not the root causes (Khor, 2017). Rather, what is needed is proper land-​ use planning and development control, including environmental, drainage, transportation and social impact assessments regarding the impacts of development plans as a whole, beyond individual projects. There also needs to be stringent monitoring of development projects, which the PHW has already started, but which requires further protection and enforcement on behalf of the City Council and state government. Finally, Kam argued that there needs to be more greening of urban spaces, including a network of urban parks, which is something that has been promised, but not yet fully realized, by the state government (in Khor, 2017). 91

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As such, it is clear that Penang needs to move towards building a more reciprocal relationship with the natural environment, which would largely alleviate the need for the mitigation measures that the state government has been prioritizing. This would involve, for example, limiting hillside developments which could result in a degradation of the natural environment, as advised by the PSP. PHW members have also raised concern about the downstream impacts of upstream development and the inequity between public and private costs stemming from these projects. Such concerns raise classical questions in political ecology, such as development for whom? Who are the beneficiaries and who pays the social and environmental costs of such development. They also raise the need to move beyond urban exceptionalism frames which view human societies as being able to operate outside of ecological consequences. For instance, while development in Penang –​either for housing or infrastructure (road) construction –​is often framed as beneficial for all Penangites (through job creation and economic growth), the sustainability and desirability of such development is often forgotten. This refers not only to potential impacts like floods and landslides (which also incur significant social and economic costs), but also the loss of flora and fauna, which have been shown to be vital to quality of life, well-​being and overall social and environmental health (Bell et al, 2017).

Langur Project Penang: a citizen science outreach initiative Another citizen’s initiative, the LPP, has created the first urban canopy bridge in Malaysia over a busy road in Teluk Bahang, on the northern coast of Penang Island in order to both prevent the incidence of roadkill involving endangered mammals, and to protect road users. Since its founding in January 2016, LPP recorded seven incidents of roadkill involving endangered Dusky Langurs (Trachypithecus obscurus) and Sunda slow loris (Nycticebus coucang) along a 1km stretch of road in Teluk Bahang, in addition to several roadkill incidents of other arboreal wildlife across Peninsular Malaysia, such as plantain squirrels and long-​tailed macaques (Langur Project Penang, 2020). These incidents are due to habitat fragmentation caused by road construction, which are expected to increase as infrastructure development continues to expand in Penang and across the nation. The bridge was completed using recycled fire hose in February 2019, which has since seen more than 500 arboreal wildlife crossings (recorded using a camera trap) and no recorded roadkill incidents around that co-ordinate since (at the time of writing). LPP also engages in community outreach and education projects to promote awareness on primate conservation, and seeks to be the ‘voice of the wildlife residents of Penang’ (Langur Project Penang, 2020). Like the PHW initiative, LPP uses social media sites like Facebook for community 92

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engagement and outreach initiatives, and to share information from community members and between organizations. Also similar to PHW, LPP is currently calling for citizens to collect wildlife sightings data in urban areas across Malaysia. This long-​term data collection is part of a research project to investigate human–​wildlife interface, which seeks to predict roadkill hotspots in cities, which can then be the focus of mitigation strategies, such as the development of a canopy bridge. In this way, LPP intends to popularize the use of urban canopy bridges across the country, including in some residential areas where monkeys are frequently observed walking on the rooftops of houses and cable wires (Langur Project Penang, 2020). Such initiatives are further illustrative of the types of grassroots initiatives in Penang developed to enhance multi-​species flourishing in Penang, and promote alternatives to the current development trajectory that the state government is currently pursuing. However, as the LPP points out, measures such as installing wildlife canopy bridges cannot be seen as solutions to forest fragmentation, as no canopy bridge can completely offset the damage of fragmentation, nor replace a natural corridor between habitats (Langur Project Penang, 2020). As such, there needs to be greater awareness that more urban development in protected forests will only further fragment wildlife habitats, and more enforcement measures to prevent this.

Conclusion This chapter has outlined the increasing development pressures on Penang’s forested hill-​slopes and has detailed the significant environmental and socio-​ cultural implications associated with this activity. In tracing local responses to these developments, the chapter has analysed how the importance of socio-​ ecological connectivities have been mobilized by local actors in developing a more sustainable future for Penang. Political ecology approaches emphasize that floods, landslides and related disasters are largely human-​induced and political in nature (see Padawangi and Douglass, 2015). However, the response of the Penang state government has been to depoliticize these disasters by treating them as acts of nature that require technical management. As this chapter has demonstrated, such approaches see urban development as separate from ecological systems, and thus often rely on the implementation of technology and civil engineering measures to mitigate against future environmental shocks. On the contrary, the chapter has shown how urban development and environmental harms such as landslides and flooding events are actually closely connected, thus requiring a fundamentally different approach to urban planning. In his book Concrete and clay, Matthew Gandy (2002: 11) has argued that ‘if we want to incorporate the independent agency of nature into our analysis, we need to be sensitive to the way in which biophysical processes 93

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are mediated through human cultures’. This chapter has attempted to do just that, through illustrating the environmental imaginaries of Penangites and their reactions to events such as the Botak Hill clearing which are largely based on experiences in and with the natural environment. The Botak Hill case has sought to demonstrate how such aesthetically and environmentally offensive (ab)uses of nature have created greater recognition of the fragility of Penang’s ecosystems, and the need for new structures of urban governance. This has been encapsulated in the PHW initiative, which has sought to mobilize even more people into generating collective response to the harms of capital-​intensive development. The LPP has had a positive influence on the conservation of endangered species in Penang –​particularly its dusky langurs –​and public awareness of how to co-​exist with other mammals. Such social movements are vital to fashioning a model of urban development that is socially and ecologically sustainable in the context of intensifying transformations of nature associated with Asia’s urban transition. However, these outcomes still cannot completely address the root of the problem, which is grounded in forest fragmentation, particularly the encroachment of urban development into forested spaces. Despite the transformative approach of the PHW, some critics have argued that, because it is focused on information sharing, the initiative may not actually have that much impact due to the the numerous ‘special cases’ of approved works on forested or hillside sites, discussed earlier in this chapter. These demonstrate that the government is already aware of and has approved many of the hill-​clearing projects, thus inviting speculation that the developers and local authorities are somehow complicit in these events. Moreover, as the ‘Botak Hill’ case clearly shows, the enforcement action taken by the government often has no teeth, as mitigation and restoration works are never fully enforced. The stop work orders issued to illegal developers often achieve just that –​they stop work, leaving bald patches of exposed hillside which are subject to further erosion and landslides. Nonetheless, the collaborative approach with the government can also serve to remind officials of the importance of protecting the hillsides. Given that a goal of the PHW is also to enhance public awareness about hill-​clearing issues and impacts, it could act as a catalyst for putting pressure on Penang’s politicians to begin taking the integrity of the environment seriously. Yet, as Miller et al (2020) argued, this would require a crucial change in political culture away from a culture of adversarial relations between government and civil society towards more productive engagements which can help to identify and resolve issues of socioecological justice in practice. In sum, insights from the LPE framework mobilized in this chapter suggest that by focusing on the various existing and potential socio-​ecological relationships in a particular place, we might develop solutions for them to be reworked in a more equitable manner. As I have argued, this can help 94

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to reimagine a different form of ‘resilient’ and ‘sustainable’ cities, which are not simply based on ‘adding’ nature or technological measures to offset further development and socio-​ecological injustices. Without such a shift in approach, rapidly urbanizing cities like Penang will continue to be impacted in compounding ways by the unregulated interventions into nature that are currently increasing in both frequency and severity. The next chapter will now turn to a discussion of how the types of urban ecological knowledge production identified in the chapter have started to influence land-​use practices within and around Penang’s forested hillsides.

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6

Integrating Cultural and Natural Heritage on Penang Hill As noted in the previous chapter, Penang’s rapid and intensive urban transition has put considerable pressure on the natural environment, including its forested hills. It is largely this development pressure which has caused many Penangites to become increasingly alarmed by the loss of these valuable heritage assets, creating the impetus to push for enhanced protection of Penang’s hills and associated flora and fauna (Dermawan, 2016, 2017b; Looi, 2017). This chapter builds on these concerns to demonstrate how the heritage values associated with Penang’s hills have shaped broader resistances to development on the island over the past three decades. It also illustrates how invocations of Penang’s rich natural heritage are often framed alongside urban and cultural heritage in local resistance to ongoing development projects on the island. This speaks to the importance of community-​led heritage movements, in which locals take seriously the value of their city’s existing natural resources and heritage. In particular, the chapter focuses on Penang Hill, which is the most well known of Penang’s hills, and is a symbol of the island’s history, heritage and identity. In some narratives, it is clear that the colonial history and heritage of Penang Hill has shaped ideas about how the hill should be used today, in contradistinction to contemporary ideologies related to urban development. In analysing the case of Penang Hill, the chapter argues that it is only by looking at both the natural and cultural components of the island that we begin to develop a holistic picture of the specific heritage landscape. The chapter thus seeks to highlight the potential of urban heritage research in contributing to sustainable development initiatives through the integration and conservation of cultural and natural components of heritage landscapes. It also seeks to highlight the integration of cultural and natural forms of heritage and landscape as an important focus for UPE scholarship, which was identified in Chapter 2. One of the questions that is frequently asked in Penang is how many changes the city’s cultural and natural landscapes can bear if they are still to 96

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be considered as heritage. This is also an important consideration in terms of creating socio-​ecologically just urban landscapes, as heritage conservation has been shown to be central to achieving goals of sustainable development initiatives (Connolly, 2020b). Heritage landscapes are intricately bound up with the identity of the people that inhabit them, while also shaping regional and (trans)national identities (Bender, 1998: 25). For instance, George Town’s UNESCO-​listed World Heritage Site was initially considered to be shared with Melaka and Singapore, which would have made it the first transnational World Heritage Site.1 Furthermore, as Krauss (2016: 426) has argued, heritage can be conceptualized as a process, involving the active participation of local communities. It is therefore important to understand how heritage is constructed, and how this is based on the relationships between humans and non-​humans. Much of the material presented in section three of this chapter is based on documentary analysis, in particular a book compiled by a number of local scientists, professionals and activists, titled Penang Hill: the need to save our natural heritage (Khor, 1991). This allowed for understanding the discursive attachment of Penangites to the hill, in addition to the history of development and conservation initiatives. This was supplemented by the other methods outlined in the introduction to this book, including interviews with civil society activists, scholars, urban planners and local residents in Penang to document more recent development plans and conservation initiatives for Penang Hill. Together, these methods allowed for interrogating the ways in which the heritage of Penang Hill is constructed, understood and challenged by various stakeholders. Following a brief critique of existing academic and conservation approaches pertaining to cultural and natural heritage management to date, the chapter turns to a ‘reading’ of Penang Hill and its centrality to Penang’s cultural and spatial identity. In doing so, the chapter considers alternative visions for Penang Hill, and how future development might be done in a way that complements the cultural and ecological attributes of the hill and respects its carrying capacity. It concludes by considering the implications of this case for wider questions of the role of heritage conservation in urban sustainability and environmental management. As such, it aims to spark a new generation of research into the political ecologies of urban heritage, which can offer important political and conceptual insights into the role of heritage in controversies over urban (re)development.

Integrating cultural and natural approaches to urban heritage conservation Gardner et al (2011: 2) define heritage as ‘the accumulated riches of the past which have been entrusted to us, so that we may pass them on intact to future generations’. However, as various scholars have documented, 97

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the term ‘heritage’ is a malleable and relational concept that has different meanings to different people (Jenkins, 2008: 149; Winter and Daly, 2012; Barber, 2013). David Lowenthal (1998), for instance, points out that heritage is always associated with conflicting views regarding what constitutes heritage, whether to conserve it, and what to do with it. Such conflicts also tend to be at the nexus of the global and the local, as heritage is often understood as being under threat by ‘global forces’ such as property speculation, development and investment (Krauss, 2016: 424). Moreover, Ishizawa (2017: 326) has observed how the landscape can be composed of aesthetic, cultural and ‘natural’ elements (or resources) that can be exploited for profit, such as attracting tourists. This tension between the global and local has been conceptualized by Tsing (2005: 5–​6) through the concept of ‘friction’, in order to assess how these conflicting interests and forces can result in slowing down processes of landscape change. Landscape change and notions of cultural heritage have been shown to be inextricably linked (Barber, 2013; Ishizawa, 2017). Such studies have demonstrated how social struggles over (in)tangible cultural heritage can provide valuable insights into societal responses to changing urban environments, with notions, discourses and representations of the past being crucial to our understanding of the present.2 Moreover, these understandings are often used in constructions and imaginations of anticipated and desired futures, politicized interpretations of the natural environment and the importance of community and national cultures (Cartier, 1998). However, little attention has been paid to critical intersections between urban heritage and landscape change. Considering these intersections then, allows us to examine landscape change as it is experienced and lived in everyday ways (Loftus, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 1, this involves understanding the ‘metabolic’ relationships between society and nature, including the mutually transformative relationships between humans and ‘natural’ landscape features (Braun, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2006; Connolly, 2020b). In recent years, research has thus focused on the power relations present in struggles over cultural and natural heritage management particularly in the context of rapidly developing and urbanizing regions (Cartier, 1998; Logan, 2002; Jenkins and King, 2010; Bandarin and van Oers, 2012; Barber, 2013). Yet, discussions related to cultural and natural heritage management, both in academia and conservation practice, have largely tended to separate the two (for exceptions see Daly and Winter, 2012; Ishizawa, 2017). Indeed, even as place and urban identities are often forged by the coalescence of both their cultural as well as natural constituents (Daniels, 1994; Nesbitt and Weiner, 2001); it is clear that considerations over the development and management of one have often been at the expense of the other, without much attempt towards integration (see Daly and Winter, 2012).

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This divide can be seen in the way in which heritage is currently managed both at local and international scales. As Head and Muir (2006: 506) have noted, ‘natural and cultural heritage are frequently managed by different agencies, or different parts of a single agency, although they may be part of the same landscape’. For instance, UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites are divided into ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ heritage sites, with the vast majority of these being in the cultural category.3 There is also a smaller ‘mixed’ category, but, at time of writing, this only constitutes 39 out of 1,154 total sites. This division between cultural and natural forms of heritage is especially apparent in Penang where tangible cultural heritage in the historic centre of George Town is protected through its designation as a UNESCO (Cultural) World Heritage Site. However, Penang’s considerable natural heritage outside of George Town does not have such protection, even though it is fundamentally intertwined with the cultural significance of the island as a whole. Therefore, local NGOs have become more vocal about the need to limit the encroachment of urbanization into the hillsides (Dermawan, 2016; Penang Forum, 2017; Connolly, 2019a). In these movements, invocations of Penang’s rich natural heritage are often framed alongside urban and cultural heritage in contesting ongoing development projects on the island. As the World Commission on Culture and Development has argued, ‘cultures cannot survive if the environment on which they depend is laid to waste or impoverished’, stressing the interdependencies between these categories, particularly in urban areas (cited in Bandarin and van Oers, 2012: 84). Walker and Fortmann (2003) support this claim by cogently demonstrating that ideas of differing landscape aesthetics are integral to social and political conflicts over land use. For instance, their study of landscape politics in rural California found that the ‘uneasy crossroads’ between landscape aesthetics and natural resource-​based production are at the heart of social and political conflict surrounding new development. Relatedly, Walker and Fortmann (2003: 469) assert that the significance of such issues is that questions of who ‘owns’ the landscape or decides how it ‘should’ be designed, ‘become a pivotal node in the shifting human-​environment dialectic’. This, they argue, is especially contentious due to the fact that the ‘ownership’ of landscape aesthetics are often ambiguous (see also Stobbelaar and Pedroli, 2011). Moreover, the question of landscape ownership is not only an economic issue, but also one of identity, that is, ‘this landscape is our national heritage’ (Nash, 1999: 157). Although not examining the integration of cultural and natural heritage, geographers have been central to the task of illustrating the ways in which wilderness or nature more generally is saturated with culture (Braun and Castree, 1998; Cloke and Jones, 2001; Jones and Cloke, 2002; Head and Muir, 2006). UPE research in particular has been at the forefront

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of investigating the interrelations between nature and culture in urban contexts, especially as the rapid spatial expansion of many cities around the world is eroding the traditional dichotomies of city versus countryside and of cultural versus natural (Arboleda, 2016; Keil, 2018; Connolly, 2019a). In doing so, UPE has problematized earlier conceptions of the city as being purely social spaces devoid of nature (see Byrne and Wolch, 2009). On the other hand, this conceptual divide has also founded the basis of dominant conservation thinking, which sought to create natural spaces that were devoid of human interference (see Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Hecht, 2004). Therefore, as David C. Harvey (2003) has argued, there is a need for more sophisticated theorizations of heritage both in theory and practice, which can help to identify the culture of urban natures, and vice versa (see Wilson, 1991). Referring to Penang, Jenkins and King (2010: 48) have observed: ‘recently there has been an emergence of conservation awareness and the realisation among some local groups of the importance of their urban heritage for the general well-​being of their environment’. Matthew Gandy (2018: 101) has further pointed out that urban ecosystems around the world are now being recast as ‘experimental zones to produce new constellations of ecological knowledge’. As the case of Penang Hill indicates, the protection of cultural and natural heritage can be integrated with other concerns such as improving sustainability and socio-​ecological well-​being. This underscores the need to connect these two aspects of heritage not only to improve heritage conservation outcomes, but more importantly, to foster more sustainable forms of urban development. Through such a holistic understanding, this chapter seeks to highlight the potential of urban heritage research in contributing to sustainable development initiatives through the integration and conservation of cultural and natural components of heritage landscapes.4,5

The urban heritage of Penang Hill: reworking landscape, culture and nature Despite its name, Penang Hill (or Bukit Bendera) does not actually refer to a single hill, but rather an agglomeration of hills within the north-​ central part of Penang Island. These hills are connected by a ridge (with a paved road) which is the area commonly referred to as Penang Hill (see Figure 6.2). The primary peaks encompassed in this area are Government Hill, Tiger Hill, Flagstaff Hill and Western Hill, which is the highest peak on the island (830m). The hill is famous for its swaths of primary tropical rainforest, the wide variety of flora and fauna found within the area, the jungle trails and funicular tram leading up the hill, as well as its historic bungalows reflecting the island’s colonial history (see Figure 6.1). Due to its accessibility and visibility from George Town, many Penangites have a 100

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Figure 6.1: A view from Penang Hill

Source: Photo by author, 2017.

strong cultural attachment to the hill, related to childhoods spent visiting its peaks, or merely the aesthetic charm that it offers (Khor, 1991; Chan, 2017). Penang Hill is thus understood by many Penangites to be central to the ‘unique atmosphere, heritage and cultural value’ of Penang (Khor, 1991: 36), and a symbol of the island’s identity (Gibby, 2017: 203). In 1990, a memorandum of understanding was signed by the Penang state government, announcing its intention to develop Penang Hill into an ‘international tourist resort’, which caused unprecedented public controversy (Khor, 1991). The memorandum of understanding was signed with the Berjaya Corporation –​a Malaysian property developer specializing in leisure developments –​based on a concept plan that they proposed. This plan would have not only affected Penang Hill itself, but also the Municipal Youth Park and the Botanic Gardens at its foothills. The Youth Park was to be developed into a ‘water world complex’, while a cable-​car would be constructed to link Penang Hill with the Botanic Gardens (Gibby, 2017). On the hill itself, the plan included an ‘Acropolis’ complex (consisting of a dome, planetarium, theatre, shopping and sports centre); two large hotels; a condominium; forest lodge (with 300 units); and an ‘Adventure Park’ on Tiger Hill (consisting of a golf course, ‘moon walk’, ‘space shuttle’, ‘haunted mansion’ and ‘shipwreck’) (Khor, 1991). Following the memorandum of understanding, the developer then had a year to come up with a detailed plan for the prospective developments, which would cover nearly the entire developable surface of the hill (Khor, 1991). Given that Penang Island was completely forested upon the arrival of European settlers in 1786; two-​ thirds forested by 1900, and one-​fifth forested in 1991, the Berjaya Plan 101

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Figure 6.2: Map of Penang Hill and surrounding area N Botanic Gardens o

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was, as Mike Gibby (2017: 183) has remarked, ‘the next logical step towards deforesting the Hill completely’.6 Despite the proposed development plans on Penang Hill, it is specifically mentioned in the Structure Plan for Penang Island, which was approved by the (then) Municipal Council (Majlis Perbendaran Pulau Pinang) in 1988. The section notes that ‘Penang Hill should be designated as an area of special characteristics. Its natural vegetation, topography and character as a hill resort must be maintained and conserved and any development shall conform to, and not destroy these special characteristics’ (in Khor, 1991: 19). It goes on to note that the hill may be ‘enhanced’ by improving and increasing the various look-​out points and the provision and maintenance of additional walkways, gardens and ‘other facilities’. Moreover, a Local Plan for Penang Hill was gazetted in 1991, which seeks to promote the hill as a ‘green, heritage destination’ for ‘nature and heritage tourism’, while taking into account the carrying capacity of the site, and development constraints (Netto, 2013a). However, the Local Plan and Structure Plan certainly do not allow for the type of large-​scale development project envisioned by the Berjaya Plan for Penang Hill, described earlier in this chapter. Such contradictions are also discernible among local residents, as one interviewee living near the base of Penang Hill, remarked: “Penang Hill is so beautiful, they should develop it like The Peak in Hong Kong, so that more people can enjoy it … but then, it will probably not be as beautiful anymore” (interview, January 2017). While Penang civil society members and many residents are not against development, they maintain that any future development on the should be done in a sensitive manner which compliments the natural and cultural attributes of the hill, rather than the elaborate form of development envisioned by the Berjaya Plan (Mok, 2016d; Gibby, 2017). Indeed, as another resident observed much earlier, ‘just imagine how monstrous this beautiful hill will become with a 200-​room luxury hotel, a 350-​unit condominium … a shopping centre … night clubs and discos [and so on]’ (quoted in Khor, 1991: 42–​43). Various criticisms of the Berjaya Plan argued that it would ‘fundamentally alter the tranquil, natural atmosphere of the Hill, result in serious ecological impacts on the island and damage the hill’s historic and heritage value’ (Khor, 1991: 17). This led to the development of the ‘Friends of Penang Hill’ network, and a subsequent campaign to ‘Save Penang Hill’ –​which was ultimately successful due to the unprecedented levels of public engagement and support that it attracted (nearly 30,000 signatures). The network consisted of various civil society groups and NGOs, including the Consumers’ Association of Penang; Malayan Nature Society; Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth Malaysia) (SAM); Aliran and many others, including the PHT, which pledged solidarity with the movement. The campaign was ultimately successful, and even resulted in the then Chief 103

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Minister of Penang Dr Lim Chong Eu losing his seat in the 1990 general elections, which he had held for 21 years (Dermawan, 2017b; Loh et al, 2019). This illustrates how unsavoury developments like the Berjaya Plan can serve as facilitators to collective action, and how forms of place-​attachment can shape grassroots approaches to heritage conservation. The historical significance of Penang Hill relates to its history as the first hill station built in Asia during the British colonial period, which is the origin of many of the heritage buildings remaining on the hill today (Aiken, 1987). Therefore, while Penang Hill is very much a ‘natural’ space, it is also one that was socially ‘constructed’ (see Rademacher and Sivamakrishnan, 2017: 10). As Aiken (1987: 439) notes, ‘Penang Hill was a sociocultural product of the dominant European colonial community in an alien and distant milieu’. While Penang Hill invoked a sense of nostalgia for the distant homelands of the (British) civil servants, planters, military and other personnel who used the hill in the colonial era, it similarly provides a sense of nostalgia for current residents of Penang for the rainforest landscapes that were abundant when Penang Island was less urbanized. Nature also had both ornamental and civilizing roles in urban areas, and illustrates that cities have always integrated aspects of nature and culture (Rademacher and Sivamakrishnan, 2017: 10). ‘Natural’ landscapes like Penang Hill thus embody past and present social relations, which is a point that been made by a plethora of work in the literature on landscape in cultural geography (Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988; Demeritt, 1994; Mitchell, 1996, 2008).7 However, the colonial use of Penang Hill is not like other experiences with nature conservation whereby European ideas and institutions sought to create a landscape devoid of humans (see Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Hecht, 2004); but rather a ‘landscape of inhabitation’, based on the maintenance of interrelations between humans and non-​human landscapes, producing changes to both parties (Hinchliffe, 2002: 215; see also Ishizawa, 2017). What Khor (1991) find most significant about the built landscape of the hill is the sensitive manner in which it was developed over the years. This refers not only to the limited number of bungalows and hotels on the hill, but also the way in which these buildings were designed to blend in with the natural landscape as much as possible, and the absence of vehicular traffic (see Gibby, 2017). This sensitive and slow pace of development over the years has been recognized by locals as one of the major attractions of George Town as a whole –​in that ‘it has not really changed over the decades. Much of the city is still discernible from old photographs and if the tourist wanted to see modern urban development, he could always go to Singapore instead’ (Mason in Khor, 1991: 45). Yet, as pointed out in previous chapters, this valorization of slow-​paced development is not shared by local politicians for whom ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ are integral to the Malaysian 104

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nation-​building project (Goh, 2002; Bunnell, 2004; Lepawsky, 2009).This will also be seen in the following section, whereby the state government has continued to promote large development projects on Penang Hill, despite seeking to promote its cultural and natural heritage attributes. Another important feature of the hill is related to the natural environment, especially the cooler temperature on the hill, which ‘furnishes a cool refuge’ from the ‘sweltering heat-​glazed plains’ below (Khor in Khor, 1991: 37). As Margaret Khor put it, the ‘raw’ and ‘bracing’ air on Penang Hill also has a tranquil effect which restores the spirit, nerves and enables one to ‘resume the battle for existence in the city’ during the week (Khor in Khor, 1991: 37). The phenomenological qualities of the hill are posited to be central to its charm, with the ‘rainbow-​coloured birds and butterflies’, foliage, as well as the ‘rushing sounds’ made by the little waterfalls and streams (Khor in Khor, 1991: 37). These qualities are amplified by the ‘wonderful panorama’ below, with the ‘pulsing blue waters’ of the Straits of Penang, and the ‘dark haze’ of Kedah Peak (Khor in Khor, 1991: 37). Such comments pertaining to the biophysical environment of Penang Hill are illustrative of the imagined relationship of Penangites to the natural environment, and account for much of the cultural significance of the hill. The various architectural, historical, cultural and biophysical qualities of the hill correspond to many of the ten selection criteria, or ‘outstanding universal values’ (OUVs) used by UNESCO in evaluating and designating World Heritage Sites (UNESCO, 2005). For example, criterion (ii) specifically refers to the ‘interchange of human values over a span of time within a cultural area of the world on developments in architecture, town-​ planning or landscape design’ (UNESCO, 2017). Others include criterion (v): ‘an outstanding example of traditional human settlement … which is representative of … human interaction with the environment’; (vii): ‘areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance’; and (x): ‘significant natural habitats for in-​situ conservation of biological diversity’ (UNESCO, 2005). Two of these OUVs (ii and v) correspond to the criteria for cultural sites, while two relate to those for natural sites (vii and x). Since 1992, UNESCO has recognized sites that exhibit ‘significant interactions between people and the natural environment’ as cultural landscapes (UNESCO, 2005). However, Penang does not feature on this list of cultural landscapes, which is largely due to the strict definition of the existing World Heritage Site to the inner-​city area of George Town. This is a significant omission, as one resident put it, ‘the hill to me is not only a part of the land but more a part of my being … it is a place to commune with nature’ (in Khor, 1991: 42). This quotation underscores the importance of developing more progressive forms of inhabitation of urban landscapes that are central to building more socio-​ecologically just societies (Hinchliffe, 2002; DeSilvey, 2017). 105

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Yet, development projects in Penang are often planned without ‘seemingly any regard for the local community or the ecology of the island’ (in Khor, 1991: 43). As Ishizawa (2014: 34) has lamented, even in efforts of nature conservation, the strategies employed have often been premised on a ‘utilitarian vision of resources and nature, bringing human needs to the front while leaving other aspects of nature and ecosystems in second place’. Therefore, Rodney Harrison (2013: 9) has proposed that we need to understand ‘heritage as an emergent property of the dialogical relationships between human beings and a range of other human and non-​human actors and their environments’ (see also Hinchliffe, 2002). To this end, in order for Penang Hill to be sustainable in the long term, the community will have to work with and not against nature.

Penang Hill’s (re)development trajectories: from tourist resort to biosphere reserve Mitchell (2007: 316) has suggested that the central motivation in landscape transformation is to increase the ‘exchangeability’ of the urban landscape in a global economy marked by increasing competition for ‘footloose’ capital. In this regard, Penang Hill is touted by the Penang state government as a ‘green, heritage destination’, and the recommended tourism theme for the hill as ‘nature and heritage tourism’ (Netto, 2013a). As will be demonstrated in this chapter, Penang Hill has become central to the Penang 2030 agenda in promoting Penang as a ‘green and smart’ state (Dermawan, 2021). The hill is managed by Penang Hill Corporation (PHC), which is a state-​owned corporation formed in 2009 and directed by the Chief Minister of Penang. While the PHC has actively promoted conservation initiatives on the hill, it has also pursued large-​scale development projects that seemingly threaten the cultural and ecological integrity of the area. For instance, despite increased awareness of Penang Hill’s socio-​ecological value, Penang Hill is still frequently targeted by the state government for large-​scale development projects. One example is a cable car that was proposed to connect Penang Hill with the adjacent Youth Park and Botanic Gardens as a way of improving the efficiency of transport on the island. This was incorporated into the Bukit Bendera Draft Local Plan, produced by the state government in 1993 and gazetted in 1997. While this plan was dismissed as ‘unnecessary’ in a 2001 World Wildlife Fund report commissioned for the Prime Minister’s Office, the plan again re-​emerged in 2013 with an additional connection to the northwestern tip of Penang Island (WWF Malaysia, 2001).8 The cable car was declared by the Malaysia Tourism and Culture Minister as ‘not only a top priority in Penang but also for the country’, and was included in the 11th Malaysia Plan (Hilmy, 2015). 106

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In February 2017, the state government raised the idea again, in a bid to increase tourism revenues and improve transportation on the island. In response to this announcement, Friends of Penang Hill representatives announced that they would embark on a ‘Save Penang Hill 2.0’ campaign if the state government continued to push the project (Dermawan, 2017b). The group has consistently rejected the proposal due to its incompatibility with the hill’s natural environment, and limited carrying capacity. For instance, the Penang advisor for the Malaysian Nature Society, Dr Kanda Kumar, argued that the construction of additional infrastructure on the hill would be unfeasible in light of the numerous landslides that occurred in 2017 (Loh et al, 2019). The project was then shelved, only to re-​emerge again in 2019, with RM100m of funding awarded by then national Finance Minister (and former Chief Minister of Penang) Lim Guan Eng, which was later cancelled in early 2020. Nonetheless, in June 2020 a new plan for a RM300 million cable car line connecting Penang Hill to Teluk Bahang on Penang’s northwest coast was proposed. The project has been pursued by the Singapore listed resort developer Sim Leisure Group, which has been involved in discussions with the state government since 2015. The CEO of Sim Leisure, Sim Choo Kheng, argued that Penang needed to enhance its international tourism appeal in order to compete with Bali and Phuket, which it was seen as losing out to (Loh, 2020). Sim further claimed that his firm is against further development on the hill, and suggested that the hill could thrive as an attraction without the need for additional infrastructure. He implied that this is because the main selling point of the cable car ride would be ‘the sense of riding through the air over untouched forests’ (Loh, 2020). However, the project would involve the construction of two cable car stations, 20 pylons and a 10km-​long maintenance road –​all of which would have significant impacts on the hill’s forest ecology. Regardless of Sim’s claim that ‘the footprints of the pylons will be unbelievably small’, and that they would carefully preserve the forest floor, PHW argued that the project would inevitably fragment the forest and lead to soil erosion due to excavation and terracing (Penang Hills Watch, 2020b). This risk is particularly high given the steep terrain over which the cable car route would be constructed. Moreover, the Penang Forum pointed out that the route would pass through two forest reserves and three important water catchments for Penang Island, threatening their ability to ensure sustained water yields. They also questioned the wisdom of pursuing the cable car at a time of reduced tourism numbers and uncertainty about the future prospects of mass international tourism. Finally, Penang civil society groups also asked for more public consultation in the planning procedures for the hill, rather than simply announcing plans after contracts have been signed with developers (Netto, 2013a; Tan, 2013). For instance, when the 107

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Botanic Gardens–​Penang Hill cable car plan was announced in June 2019, the budget allocation was provided by the federal government before a full technical and feasibility study was completed (Loh et al, 2019). Despite this pushback against the cable car project and the repeated challenges in funding it, the state government has proceeded to pursue the idea. For instance, in October 2020, the state government released data from a survey which claimed that 95 per cent of 2,000 respondents ‘fully supported’ the cable car project (Mok, 2020b). State Executive Council member Jagdeep Singh Deo expressed some frustration in the ‘simplistic politics’ delaying the launch of the project, noting that it had taken years to plan. This is similar to the strategy used in justifying the PTMP based on public survey results, as discussed in Chapter 4. In order to fund the cable car, the state government allocated RM14 million in its 2021 budget for Penang Hill development, and issued a request for proposals in March 2021 for private firms to finance and develop the project (Mok, 2020c).9 In addition to the cable car, the PHC in 2018 announced plans for two new hotels to be built on Penang Hill, claiming that these would ‘blend in well with the environment’, and ‘be compatible with the history and heritage of Penang Hill’ (Tan, 2018). This announcement, however, was heavily criticized by NGOs, pointing out that the largest hotel on Penang Hill has only 12 rooms, while one of the proposed hotels will contain 200 (Tan, 2018). This would mean an additional 500–​600 overnight guests (an increase of roughly 60 per cent) of its current population, which would immensely strain the hill’s already stretched resources. Consequently, an online petition to protest against the state government’s proposed hotel projects on Penang Hill surpassed 22,000 signatures within just six days of its launch (Mok, 2018b). While the Penang Forum would support the idea of refurbishing and repurposing some of the old government bungalows on Penang Hill, they stressed that the construction of new hotels there would ‘mar the historic cultural landscape and turn Penang Hill into a warmer, over-​developed and overcrowded resort’ (Mok, 2018b). Subsequently, the state government shelved the hotel idea, in order to achieve ‘sustainable development’ on the hill, and to preserve the hill as ‘the state’s iconic heritage’ (Mok, 2020b). However, it is hard to see how this vision for the hill is reconciled with the simultaneous push to construct the cable car project. Most alternative visions for Penang Hill are supportive of its use –​in part –​as a tourist resort, but argue that it should focus on natural tourism (Khor, 1991; Gibby, 2017). It is posited that the hill and its flora and fauna could play an increasingly important role in recreation, nature tourism, conservation, scientific research and education, many of which are functions that it has always served. They used this line of reasoning to counter the state government’s emphasis on supporting increased numbers of visitors, by arguing that the hill could cater to specialist groups of tourists who are 108

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willing to pay higher sums of money to experience the hill’s unique assets. Given the ongoing impacts of the COVID-​19 pandemic on visitor numbers in Penang and elsewhere, such an approach seems to be a more feasible model for the foreseeable future. Various stakeholders have noted that this would also be a more sustainable form of development, whereby ‘sustainable economic activities facilitate conservation efforts, and vice versa’ while also requiring minimal capital investment (Khor, 1991; Chan, 2017; Gibby, 2017). One example would be extending the Botanic Gardens at the base to encompass part of the hill, which could educate visitors about the flowering hill shrubs and plants not found in lowland areas. Similarly, the Tropical Spice Garden in Teluk Bahang has adopted a similar approach in the wake of the COVID-​19 pandemic, in seeking to build a community around the gardens, rather than primarily being a tourist attraction. This has been done by developing a membership base, rather than individual ticket sales, which caters to those seeking to develop a deeper connection with the gardens and the natural environment. As the owner, Katharine Chua stated, the Spice Garden ‘isn’t just a jungle, the Garden is where nature meets culture’ (Yeang, 2021). The Garden also hosts programmes like nature storytelling for children, which are important to educating Penang’s future generation about the value of the natural environment. In order to better protect and promote the natural and cultural heritage of Penang Hill, the Penang state government announced in October 2016 that it would seek UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Reserve designation for Penang Hill, which would grant the same level of protection as the George Town UNESCO site (Ngui, 2016; The Star, 2016). Man and the Biosphere Reserves are described by UNESCO (2017) as ‘learning sites for sustainable development’, which ‘promote solutions reconciling the conservation of biodiversity with its sustainable use’. In this way, Biosphere Reserves recognize the coexistence and even interdependencies of rich biodiversity and distinct social landscapes (Cockrell and Cockrell, 2021). The Biosphere Reserve nomination was a joint effort initiated by the private sector and local biodiversity researchers, but also involved the PHC, State and federal governments. Some of the main characteristics of Biosphere Reserves include the integration of conservation and development, focusing on a multi-​stakeholder approach that emphasizes the involvement of local communities. Importantly, they also seek to integrate cultural and biological diversity through sound sustainable development practices and policies and acting as sites of excellence for education and training. Just as the final revisions were being made on this book, Penang Hill was awarded UNESCO Biosphere Reserve status on 15 September 2021, becoming the third site in Malaysia to receive the designation. In addition to Penang Hill, the Biosphere Reserve also encompasses the Botanic Gardens and Penang National Park to the northeast and northwest, respectively. 109

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Together, the area spans 12,481ha, with 7,285ha of this inland, and 5,196 ha marine (Lim, 2021). The site is divided into three zones: a core, buffer and transition zone, and three ecosystems: forest, coastal and marine. The core zone measures 5,757ha, which consists of permanent forest reserves and water catchment areas and is where biodiversity conservation works, research and educational activities are carried out. The buffer zone covers 2,176ha and the transition zone spans 4,548ha (Habitat Foundation, 2018). The designation is expected to promote and support biodiversity research to be conducted on the hill, which will help to document and conserve the hill’s unique flora and fauna. Penang Hill is an ideal site for a Biosphere Reserve, because the area integrates cultural and biological diversity at the landscape scale, and has the potential to develop and promote sustainable development practices and policies through the involvement of local communities, education and training. The Penang Hill Biosphere Reserve (PHBR) will seek to instil a deeper sense of appreciation to Penang’s natural environment and to generate awareness of the importance of conserving it (Lim, 2021). An example of this is a hilltop heritage trail which will pass by ten heritage structures and include interpretive signs and QR codes providing information about the hill’s biodiversity (Chacko, 2021). As Penang Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow stated, the aim is for the reserve to ‘become a world-​class learning site to explore and illustrate methods of conservation and sustainable development’ (Lim, 2021). This is part of the ‘innovative and green approaches’ that the state government is using to achieve the Penang 2030 vision, in order to balance conservation with sustainable economic development (Lim, 2021). This will also help Penang in its long-​term goal to become an international centre for research on sustainability, biodiversity and conservation (Free Malaysia Today, 2021). One of the key stakeholders involved in initiating and securing the Biosphere designation is the Habitat at Penang Hill, which is a private sector, eco-​tourism based operation located near the hill’s Upper Station. The Habitat opened in 2016, and is involved in sustainable tourism, research, conservation and education, promoting the exploration of the hill’s intrinsic identity, unique features and attributes. The Habitat features a wide walking path, canopy walkway and zip line, which allow visitors to experience the natural environment of the summit area. It is also working with the state government to restore some of the heritage bungalows on the hill for community and scientific use. As such, the Habitat Foundation director Allen Tan noted, the Biosphere Reserve could create a new economic sector for the state, rather than concentrating on tourism and property investment. He also noted that the state government could also organize more scientific conferences and research programmes to help attract scientists to Penang (Mok, 2020a). As Head and Muir (2016) have noted, such forms of 110

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community action help to identify possibilities for transformative potential with regards to sustainable urban development. In particular, the Biosphere Reserve can help to promote a more sustainable development model based on the conservation of cultural and natural heritage rather than infrastructure and property development. However, civil society groups are cautiously optimistic, noting the challenges that George Town has faced in managing rampant gentrification and development following the UNESCO World Heritage designation in 2008, and the degradation of the Tasik Chini Biosphere Reserve in Pahang, Malaysia (Yeoh, 2021). There is also the threat posed by the cable car project, which –​at the time of writing –​is still likely to go ahead. For instance, after submitting the nomination dossier for the PHBR, the state government announced in January 2020 that it would proceed with the cable car project, noting that ‘many nature reserves and even UNESCO World Heritage Sites’ had successfully implemented them, labelling it an ‘environmentally sustainable transport’ system (Dermawan, 2021). This is seen to be integral to redistributing traffic during peak seasons and facilitating increased tourism on the hill. Indeed, the Penang Hill Special Area Plan (2020) targets an increased capacity for Penang Hill of more than three times the average number of visitors at any one time recorded in 2019. Furthermore, the state government proposed in the 2020 Special Area Plan for Penang Hill to redevelop the summit area of the hill, with a pedestrian bridge over the summit road, a new four-​storey hillside café, and a large concrete helipad jutting off the side of the cliff, all of which would harm the ambiance and ‘heritage views’ of the summit area (Penang Forum, 2021). Of even more concern is the PIL1 highway project planned as part of the PTMP, which would tunnel through 10km of Penang’s hills, with the addition of a bridge over the Penang Hill Railway. As a former senior UNESCO advisor familiar with Penang has claimed, this would be ‘clearly incompatible’ with the Biosphere designation, and ‘in fact, seemed purposely designed to undermine and scuttle this conservation initiative’ (quoted in Netto, 2018). Yet, it is unclear whether the cable car or PIL1 projects were included in the nomination documents for the PHBR or how these were viewed by UNESCO. As such, while the state government has played an important role in securing the Biosphere Reserve nomination, it can be argued that this is being done largely for the purposes of promoting Penang and Penang Hill internationally, and enhancing the state’s ‘green and smart’ agenda. For instance, the general manager of PHC was quoted as saying that the Biosphere Reserve project would help to attract up to 13,000 people up to Penang Hill simultaneously, which is far beyond the 4,000 deemed feasible by the WWF Report on Penang Hill and the 6,463 stated in the Penang Hill Special Area Plan (Chern, 2018). As such, PHC’s promotion of Penang 111

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Hill as a ‘green, heritage designation’, and a place where visitors can ‘see the nature, feel the history’ is largely a green-​washing strategy intended to promote eco-tourism and perhaps appease civil society groups (PHC, 2019).

Conclusion The controversies over the development of Penang Hill documented in this chapter have shed light on the challenges –​but also the potentials –​at stake in the conservation of urban heritage. While heritage conservation in the past has been hampered by rigid binaries of cultural/​natural, tangible/​intangible and urban/​rural, the case of Penang illustrates how such binaries might be overcome. This is seen in the way in which heritage NGOs and activists in Penang have become increasingly concerned with emerging threats to the natural environment, and how these are negatively impacting Penang’s rich heritage assets, which are seen as central to Penangites’ sense of place and well-​being. The representations of Penang Hill by locals as illustrated in this chapter demonstrates how city residents have valorized past experiences associated with the urban environment, rather than seeking to eliminate them. Indeed, as Matthew Gandy (2018: 104) has observed, ‘if the future of the biosphere is to be deliberated over in an increasingly urban context the question of what is worth protecting, on what grounds, and over what scale …will be an inescapable dimension to public culture’. In conceptualizing the relationship between cultural and natural heritage, insights from writing on the political ecology of landscape have been instrumental, through its recognition of the integration of cultural and natural values embedded in the landscape and holistic view of the urban and rural. While the concept of landscape has influenced both the academic literature on heritage and conservation approaches, I argue that insights from LPE are also vital to better grasp the nature–​culture dialectic at play in many urban landscapes. Acknowledging this relationship is especially important in order to develop and maintain landscapes that foster progressive relations with the natural world, which cannot be done through nature parks alone (see Wilson, 1991; DeSilvey, 2017). Indeed, the recent Penang Hill Biosphere Reserve designation can lead the way for the transformation of urban space into a kind of multi-​sited public research station for urban ecologies (see also Gandy, 2018). The chapter has also paved the way for what might be termed a LPE of heritage. While the more rural strand of political ecology has examined nature and biodiversity conservation issues (see Vaccaro et al, 2013 for a review), UPE has not to date engaged with heritage issues. This constitutes a considerable lacunae given the often unequal power relationships and struggles over land and resources that are often embedded within heritage controversies. Nonetheless, in addition to its conceptual tools for 112

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deconstructing binaries, I argue that LPE also provides a critical framework through which to examine controversies over the conservation of urban heritage landscapes. As Wilson (1991: 16) has argued, constructing forms of urban heritage conservation that are able to connect cultural and natural aspects of the landscape ‘must begin with understanding the process of contemporary land development’ and everyday experiences of it. This links back to the importance of the concept of multi-​species flourishing discussed in the previous chapter, as a way of fostering more socially and environmentally just relationships with the natural environment. In this way, as Matthew Gandy (2018: 102) has observed, cities can play a dual role in the protection of bio-​diversity: ‘first, through the provision of a kind of ecological sanctuary for flora and fauna; and second, by enabling the exploration of different socio-​ecological interactions that might ultimately be “scaled up” towards new forms of global environmental politics’. The chapter has also pointed to the importance of bottom-​up approaches in creating and conserving integrated cultural/​natural heritage landscapes, which adds to the academic literature on (urban) heritage governance. As Bandarin and van Oers (2012) have put it: ‘local communities integrate natural and cultural components of any given locale through their daily practices and behavior … into a singular experience’, which is often not fully appreciated by urban governments. As such, Kaika and Swyngedouw (2011: 101) have argued that there is a need to ‘move away from “resistance” to a demand for transformation’. A transformation of dominant approaches to heritage conservation and urban development –​‘which can produce more equitable socio-​ecological conditions, and imagine possible alternative urban natures’ Kaika and Swyngedouw (2011: 101). This will require new governance mechanisms that can move beyond human-​centred approaches to conservation and development planning, such as those outlined in this and the previous chapter. It will also require a more sustainable approach to urban development in Penang that respects the conjoined natural and cultural heritages of Penang Hill and surrounding landscapes, which the Biosphere Reserve designation should help to achieve.

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Artificial Islands and the Production of New Urban Spaces Our ocean is in serious trouble and the deterioration is increasingly posing a danger to people’s lives, livelihoods and well-​being. The carrying capacity of our ocean has reached its limit. The state of our ocean is worrying. (Wu, quoted in SAM, 2019: 3) The intensifying privatization and marketization of maritime spaces is transforming seascapes across Pacific Asia and much of the world. In particular, large-​scale land reclamation projects are now proliferating across the region at increasingly larger scales, and often being privatized through development of self-​contained urban enclaves (Shatkin, 2011). For example, cities on China’s coast reclaimed an average of 700km2 of land (about the size of Singapore) from the sea every year from 2006 to 2010 for new houses, industrial zones and ports (Shepard, 2020). China is also financing reclamation projects in other parts of Asia as well, including Cambodia, as well as the controversial Forest City project located across from Singapore in southern Johor state (Malaysia); the Philippines is reclaiming 1,010 acres from the sea for its New Manila Bay (dubbed ‘City of Pearl’); Dubai is already world famous for its elaborate reclamation projects (such as the Palm), while Sri Lanka is building a new financial district on reclaimed land called Colombo International Financial City. Furthermore, land reclamation has been essential to the construction of modern Singapore, around a quarter of which was open ocean upon the city-​state gained its independence in 1965 (see Connolly and Muzaini, 2021). Despite this, as Grydehøj (2015: 99) has lamented, ‘land reclamation is rarely subject to social science urban development inquiries’, and its implications 114

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for public space are rarely discussed. Indeed, despite a proliferation of work on water in the UPE literature, there is very little on land reclamation. This is despite the fact that reclamation illustrates perfectly concepts of ‘urban metabolism’ and ‘planetary urbanisation’ which have been central issues in the UPE and urban studies literatures. As illustrated in the opening epigraph of a statement by Wu Hongbo –​the Under-​Secretary-​General of United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) –​healthy oceans are critical to social, environmental and economic sustainability. However, they are increasingly being threatened by extensive land reclamation, which is now becoming a global sustainable development issue due to the expansion of cities into the sea, and the attendant social and ecological damages that this poses. The expansion of cities through reclamation thus provides an ideal empirical topic to understand emerging concerns in the UPE literature, including the nuanced dynamics of urbanization outside of the city proper and the socio-​ ecological and political-​economic dimensions associated with it. In doing so, this chapter examines the central role that land reclamation has played in providing the foundation for the infrastructure and development projects discussed in previous chapters. As explained in Chapter 4, the Penang state government has used a number of ‘land-​swap deals’ to fund the expensive transport infrastructure –​including the new highways, LRT and undersea tunnel –​being developed through the PTMP. Land reclamation is an increasingly common trend worldwide, as selling reclaimed land can be extremely profitable for governments, earning profits of approximately 10-​ to 100-​times the cost of producing it (China Daily, 2011). Land reclamation also avoids the challenges associated with land acquisition, high land prices, and a perceived lack of space for urban development (Shatkin, 2017: 213). This makes it particularly attractive for countries and city-​regions like Penang which are perceived to have a scarce supply of developable land, and where land has become increasingly expensive due to an overheated property market. From this perspective, reclamation offers a means to create new land, free from the complexities of the existing and ‘messy’ city (Colven, 2017: 258; Toland, 2017). In Malaysia, reclaimed land is often used for luxury property developments, which do not meet the housing needs of the lower and middle classes. In fact, many are sold to second-​home buyers or investors from other parts of Malaysia and beyond (see Moser, 2018). Reclamation projects have also been problematic for their significant impacts on the quality of biodiversity and natural habitats along its coastlines. Furthermore, land reclamation in Penang and other parts of Malaysia is reorganizing the local land and seascapes in a way which is increasing the precarity of already socially and economically marginalized fishing communities. For this reason, local stakeholders have argued that land reclamation must stop in order to ensure sustainable urban development and to protect the interests of those who depend on the sea for their livelihoods. 115

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While compensation has been offered to offset the livelihood impacts on fisherfolk, the social exclusion of the fishing communities from decision-​ making processes has resulted in mass protests in Penang and other parts of the region. In contextualizing these transformations and their proliferating scale of development, the chapter will also make reference to large-​scale Chinese-​ funded land reclamation schemes taking place in other parts of Malaysia and East Asia more broadly, while questioning the sustainability and feasibility of these projects (see Moser, 2018). As such, though the chapter is focused on Penang, the analysis will have relevance for other rapidly urbanizing and developing cities in the Asian region and beyond. The chapter concludes by returning to the theoretical concerns discussed in Chapter 2, related to the power relations and unjust socio-​ecological consequences bound up with processes of extended urbanization in Malaysia.

Land from the sea: ongoing land reclamation in Penang and Malaysia Continuous land reclamation, or artificial construction and transformation of land at the coastal waterfront has been referred to as ‘ocean sprawl’, as marine and coastal environments that are increasingly dominated by artificial (engineered) structures (Bishop et al, 2017). This accords with writing on the topic of planetary, or ‘extended’ urbanization, in that there has been a growing realization that the effects of ocean sprawl may extend far beyond the sites of the structures themselves. For instance, the sand for the reclamation work is being sourced from Perak state in northern Malaysia which will have adverse impacts on the marine environment in the area, but is not accounted for in the EIA for the PSR project.1 Land reclamation in Malaysia has been expanding rapidly since the 1990s with at least 31 land reclamation projects approved nationwide between 1988 and 2016 (Chee et al, 2017). In Penang, reclamation began in the 1800s when the settlement was founded, but has increased in scale since the mid-​1980s as the island has grown both economically and physically through new urban development projects. Although the 2010 National Coastal Zone Physical Plan of Malaysia states that coastal reclamation for tourism and urban purposes is discouraged, this has been largely ignored not only in Penang but across Malaysia more broadly (Teh, 2019). The purpose of land reclamation in Penang has also evolved with the passage of time: from the initial use of providing land for ports and the manufacturing industry (both of which have been central to Penang’s history and economic development) to luxury real estate development for wealthy Malaysians and foreign investors. Land reclamation also now serves a vital source of revenue and infrastructure financing for the state government, as it 116

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has run out of existing land to sell, which has comprised most of its revenue stream in recent decades. As such, much like the flagship infrastructure projects discussed in Chapter 4, large-​scale urban redevelopment on reclaimed land also contributes to realizing the world-​class city aspirations of politicians (see Colven, 2017). However, former SAM president Mohammad Idris argued that there is ‘no need for Penang to rival Singapore and create its own Marina Bay’ –​referring to the high-​profile reclaimed area in central Singapore (Mok, 2019a). The following sub-​sections will discuss the two primary reclamation schemes associated with the PTMP, namely, the PSR scheme, and the Sri Tanjung Pinang (STP2) Phase 2 reclamation. Subsequently, I will discuss the environmental, social and economic implications of the land reclamation projects, particularly the impact on fishermen in Penang and the marine ecologies on which their livelihood depends. Finally, the chapter will consider reclamation schemes either proposed or underway in other parts of the East and Southeast Asian region, and the potential for effective grassroots environmental governance initiatives to contest these. The conclusion will highlight the importance of land reclamation as a major empirical focus for future work in UPE, as well as new research on processes of planetary urbanization.

BiodiverCity and the Penang South Reclamation scheme The largest and most controversial land reclamation scheme currently proposed in Penang is the PSR scheme, planned off the southern coast of Penang Island. An estimated 189 million cubic metres of sand and rock will be imported from Perak and Selangor states to make three artificial islands measuring 9.3, 4.45 and 3.23km2, respectively (Shepard, 2018b). The reclamation work will proceed in stages beginning with the first island, known as Island A, which will take approximately three years to build, and nine years for the island to be fully developed. However, reclamation of the remaining two islands (B and C) will only begin once the state can raise sufficient funds from the sale of land on Island A (Tan, D., 2019). Island A would allow for the extension of Penang’s Bayan Lepas industrial zone, while Island B would entail a waterfront resort encompassing hotels, restaurants, medical, commercial and mixed development, and Island C would be for mixed development (Tan, D., 2019; Nambiar, 2020a; Figure 4.1). The reclamation works are being completed by Penang Infrastructure Corporation (PIC), which is the special purpose vehicle –​incorporated in 2020 –​that will be leading the implementation of the mega projects under the PTMP (Penang Property Talk, 2020). They expect to be able to start selling the land by the fourth year. The reclamation will need to begin by 117

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the middle of 2021, as the EIA report for the PSR was approved by the Malaysian Department of Environment on 25 June 2019, which has a two-​ year validity period.2 However, the final design for the PSR was announced in August 2020 which reflects a fanciful ‘urban lily pad’ design, which is completely different from the original design submitted in the EIA (Yeoh, 2020; Figure 7.1). The scheme proposed naming the three islands as BiodiverCity, with the vision of creating a ‘global destination’ that can ‘facilitate sustainable economic and cultural growth of Penang Island, while protecting the biodiversity of its coastal zones and natural habitats’ (Crook, 2020). In line with the ‘green and smart’ agenda of the Penang state government, buildings throughout BiodiverCity will largely be constructed using a combination of bamboo, local Malaysian timber and sustainable concrete that uses recycled materials as aggregate. The islands would also be connected through a futuristic water, air and land-​based autonomous transit system that prioritizes cyclists and pedestrians. Furthermore, the architect (Bjarke Ingels) proposed a web of ecological corridors called buffers, ranging between 50 and 100 metres, which would be used as nature reserves to support biodiversity (Crook, 2020). As Cugurullo (2017) has pointed out, such iconic architecture is one of the key traits that such ‘eco-​city’ projects in Asia have in common, used as a means to differentiate themselves from other cities in the region.3 As cultural geographers have theorized, such iconic architecture does not only have an aesthetic dimension, but is also shaped by the symbolic meanings attached to it or, what the specific architectures are meant to represent. For instance, the BiodiverCity project was reportedly selected by the state Figure 7.1: Artist’s impression of the BiodiverCity plan

Source: Bjarke Ingels Group.

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government for its emphasis on ‘coexistence with nature’ (Crook, 2020). Indeed, despite the negative social and environmental impacts posed by large-​scale reclamation projects, BiodiverCity is representative of a new generation of such plans which claim to herald a ‘better, smarter, and more sustainable form of urbanism framed as an infrastructure of urban resilience and sustainability with broad societal benefits’ (Shatkin, 2017: 213). This is the case with much of the other urban development plans envisioned by the state government as part of its ‘green and smart’ Penang 2030 agenda. State government official Phee Boon Poh claimed the development of the three islands are part of Penang’s poly-​centric urban development plan and would serve to ‘reverse the forced rural-​urban migration that made malls, offices, restaurants and hotels centre in the city’ (Mok, 2019f). He said such centralization increased congestion and carbon emissions, and that the PSR project would therefore reduce the carbon footprint in Penang. Phee added that: [I]‌f we develop the three islands, the rural area there will be developed, people will stay there and work there and we will have less people on the road travelling into the city and this reduces carbon footprint. … If we don’t do anything, we will get an urban slum in the city; people come here to work, people will sleep on the road and this forces people into [a] poor living condition. (Mok, 2019f) The PSR is also aimed to reverse the ‘northern-​centric’ development in Penang that has resulted in socio-​economic inequalities between the northern and southern parts of Penang Island (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​5). The PSR project is proclaimed to have significant social and economic benefits for the city, from attracting investments, creating new jobs and meeting the housing demands of the enlarging middle-​class society (Teh, 2019). Economically, the state government therefore sees the PSR as crucial for Penang’s future, as it is envisioned to support more than 300,000 jobs, provide business opportunities to 24,000 small-​medium-​enterprises, and generate RM70 billion for the economic development of Penang over the next three decades (Woo, 2020: 8). The state government has also claimed that the islands will provide affordable houses for the bottom 40 percentile of Penangites, while providing them with new employment opportunities that would create additional social mobility for the islands’ residents. This is important given the waiting list for affordable public housing in Penang had over 2,000 applicants in 2017 and is projected to increase by the time the islands are completed (Ngui, 2017c). Furthermore, the state government believes that the additional land mass will help to control the ‘haphazard developments’ that are now threatening both the ‘heritage charm and well-​ loved green hills of Penang ’ (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES6). 119

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Gurney Wharf: worlding cities through land reclamation Other reclamation projects in Penang include the Sri Tanjung Pinang Phase 2 project (STP2) measuring 307ha on the northeast of the island, of which 53ha are for the Gurney Wharf project off Gurney Drive (Nambiar, 2020a). The latter is a large ‘recreational waterfront’ project, known as ‘Park on the Sea’, which would include a seaside food and beverage area, water gardens, beach and coastal groves spanning some 1.5km of shoreline (Sekaran, 2016). The naming and design of the Gurney Wharf site was chosen to resemble San Francisco’s Fisherman’s Wharf or London’s Canary Wharf, which is further illustrative of Penang’s ‘global city’ aspirations. It has been promoted as containing ‘lush gardens, ponds and wetlands … [and] landscaped water gardens’, modelled after Singapore’s Gardens on the Bay (Tanjung Pinang Development, 2021). The Penang state government has described Gurney Wharf as ‘inspired by the world’s best spaces and places’, to ‘make Penang known’, but ‘with its own distinctive Penang character’ (Lim, 2016; Tanjung Pinang Development, 2021; Figure 7.2). It would also feature an eight-​lane expressway, as well as a portal to the undersea tunnel as part of the PTMP (Penang Property Talk, 2020). As one supporter of the project argued on his blog: ‘On the whole, the Gurney Drive area badly needs a major facelift to bring it on par with other international waterfront destinations. In a highly competitive world, we cannot afford to lose out’ (Tye, 2019). This is reminiscent of the language that has been used in justifying the PTMP as a whole, as was discussed in Chapter 4.

Figure 7.2: View of Gurney Wharf and STP2 reclamation works from Penang Hill

Source: Photo by author, 2017.

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However, as with the rest of the PTMP, the project has run into considerable delays. Upon commencement of the project in February 2016, the former Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng stated that: ‘it is hoped that the park area can be delivered by mid-​2018. The second phase encompassing the seafront retail and food outlets is likely to be completed by 2020’ (Sekaran, 2016). Yet, at time of writing, the reclamation has still not been completed. While the state government and developers have claimed that local residents can still ‘enjoy the view and breeze along Gurney Drive through the mesh fencing’ while the reclamation work is ongoing, the view has been of reclamation work, which has created an unpleasant smell (Lim, 2016; Khoo, 2020). Penangites have also criticized the iron fencing along Gurney Drive, acting as a barrier for the reclamation works along the shoreline, as an ‘eye-​sore’ (Loone, 2017a). As discussed in Chapter 4, Gurney Drive is iconic to residents and visitors alike, and has even been proposed as a ‘heritage site’ despite the road only being constructed in its current form in the 1950s (Loone, 2017a). Nonetheless, it is a popular site for recreation and seaside dining, both of which have been affected by the current reclamation works. Residents in condos along Gurney Drive have also complained about the constant noise from the reclamation works in the area (Looi, 2016b). Reclamation work also impacts air quality at the site, due to the generation of dust and particulate matter by bulldozers and excavators. This has been shown to pose negative mental and physical health impacts to residents in the area, particularly respiratory ailments among children and senior citizens (SAM, 2019: 16). These impacts are especially severe when the projects span over a long time period of development, as with the reclamation projects in Penang. The reclamation works for STP2 will cost RM1 billion, which is being financed by local property developer Eastern & Oriental, in exchange for unspecified ‘in kind’ payment from the Penang state government (Penang Property Talk, 2016; Sekaran 2016). However, the landscaping and design elements of the ‘Park on the Sea’ project are being financed by the state government, which is expected to cost ‘hundreds of million ringgit’ (Penang Property Talk, 2016). This is therefore likely to result in considerable financial burdens on nearby residents through taxes. As such, even a supporter of the PTMP cautioned that ‘Gurney Drive is Penang’s most important promenade. It is near and dear to the hearts of the people. There is no room for error, no second chance. If the state government screws this up, it can kiss itself goodbye’ (Tye, 2019). Given that the STP site is only 1/​50th the size of the PSR project, the slow rate of completion has led to concerns about the ultimate fate of the PSR and the PTMP (Kah, 2020). Moreover, the fact that the ‘City of Dreams’ luxury housing development constructed on the site has been completed (see Chapter 4) highlights how the lucrative commercial aspects of the PTMP 121

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have been prioritized over the public components of the project, generating considerable resentment among civil society groups. The Penang Forum thus criticized such land-​swap deals, as they compromise the regulatory processes that should be central to proposed development projects by presenting the land reclamation or property developments as done deals. While the state government did launch a public exhibition about the Gurney Wharf project in February, 2016, it was ‘a bit thin on information’ and largely consisted of promotional material (Tye, 2019).

BiodiverCity or BioDeadCity? Debating the environmental impact of large-​scale land reclamation The waters surrounding Penang have been shown to contain important feeding and breeding grounds for a diverse array of marine organisms, including fan shells, sea cucumbers, razor clams, sponges, sea anemones, octopuses, cockles and horseshoe crabs, some of which are considered vulnerable species on the IUCN Red List (Chee et al, 2017). It was pointed out that the PSR project would result in the permanent destruction of these breeding grounds including turtle landing sites, in addition to the residual impact of the mud flood ecosystem (Povera and Yunus, 2020). As Chee et al argue, this valuable ecosystem –​together with Penang’s remaining mangroves and protected forests –​‘not only conserve the biodiversity of flora and fauna of Penang but also provide for the local community, encourage tourism, and educational value’. This highlights the importance of sustainable development strategies based on a philosophy of multi-​species flourishing that can develop appropriate solutions to maintain these coastal ecosystems’ functions and services while also fostering economic growth (Connolly, 2020a). However, the state government officer for infrastructure, Zairil Khir Johari, reassured Penangites that the project would be environmentally sustainable, while also ensuring a ‘bountiful catch’ for fishermen (Yeoh, 2020). This would be accomplished through plans to install artificial reefs based on advice from the Fisheries Department, and is supported by research by researchers based at Universiti Sains Malaysia (Chee et al, 2017). The ecology offset programme seeks to create new marine habitats through the re-​planting of mangroves, installing fish-​aggregating devices, eco-​shoreline engineering, the release of fish and prawn fry, and funding for marine ecology, fisheries, turtles and coral reef research (Yeoh, 2020). In fact, the planting of artificial corals to sustain the marine ecosystem around the islands and sourcing the sand for the reclamation from ‘legitimate sites’ was one of the conditions for the approval of the reclamation scheme (Tan, D., 2019). As Chee and colleagues argue, the construction of new islands in Penang serves as a unique opportunity to trial large-​scale ecological engineering works. They note that artificial reefs in Singapore and Brunei Darussalam have in fact reported 122

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fish yields higher than those on natural reefs and can prevent damage to the seabed caused by human activities. Nonetheless, local activist Khoo Salma was skeptical of this plan, arguing that the government did not rehabilitate the sea north of Gurney Drive and in Tanjung Tokong after the first phase of the STP2 development. As a result, studies have found that species richness and diversity was the lowest in that area out of all coastal areas in Penang, presumably due to the impact of the reclamation works there (SAM, 2019: 11). The formerly sandy beaches have also been transformed into mud flats. Even in cases where artificial reefs have been used, Chee and colleagues (2017) caution that they require long-​term management in order to be effective, which has resulted in a majority of projects either failing or having limited success (see Baine, 2001). Moreover, Penang fisherfolk claimed that the artificial reefs would be damaged by illegal trawling carried out in the area, defeating their purpose of fish and prawn spawning (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​47). As a user commented on an article describing the new BiodiverCity design: stable, bio-​diverse ecosystems are an emergent phenomenon. You can’t build them from scratch in one go. When you cut down a rainforest or bleach a coral reef they don’t grow back, because it took the right conditions and millions of years for these ecosystems to emerge in the first place. (Quoted in Crook, 2020) As such, Khoo claimed that the government ‘should prove that the marine ecosystem can be rehabilitated before destroying a new area’ (quoted in Yeoh, 2020). As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, while developers charged with illegal destruction of Penang’s forested hillsides were ordered to carry out restoration works, this has (at the time of writing) not been done. It is for this reason that I have argued that development based on mitigation strategies designed to achieve ‘resilient’ environments are often ineffective. Reports on the environmental monitoring and rehabilitation of areas affected by land-​reclamation projects in Asia argue that these efforts have tended to lack sufficient enforcement of the recommendations in EIAs and have therefore largely failed to protect marine ecosystems (China Daily, 2011; Shepard, 2018a). Among the most immediate consequences of this include the loss of wetlands, mangrove forests and reefs as they are covered by sand and artificial sediment. This has the potential to affect entire populations of native plant and fish species, and increase the area’s vulnerability to pollution and flooding. In this regard, former SAM president Mohammad Idris likened the widespread reclamation and forest clearing works nationwide to ‘committing suicide’, adding that ‘we need our nature and environment for our future generation, without all these, we are only destroying their future’ (Mok, 123

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2019a). An article describing the BiodiverCity plan for the PSR received numerous criticisms in the comments section, with one reader calling it an ‘utterly irresponsible mega-​development green-​washed as “sustainable” and “eco-​friendly” … nearshore environments are a valuable habitat and filling in islands with tens of thousands of people hardly constitutes responsible development’ (quoted in Crook, 2020). As activist Khoo Salma pointed out in response to the same article, the ‘BioDeadCity’ project will actually generate considerable carbon emissions through its construction and upset local and regional ecosystems. Moreover, scholars have pointed out that the extent of ecosystem damage caused by excessive land reclamation can be quite ‘gradual, accumulative and imperceptible’ in the short term, but is irreversible in the long term, particularly to do with sea level rise (China Daily, 2011). In this regard, the Malaysian Centre for Governance and Political Studies warned that Penang may already be sinking, and that the proposed PSR project ‘must take the fact of climate change into consideration’ as the reclaimed islands could sink with the city in future. However, Penang state government official Jagdeep Singh asserted that they would increase the level of the islands so it will not be affected by rising sea levels (Mok, 2019f). In fact, he asserted that the reclamation of the three islands is actually being done to combat climate change, as states ‘all over the world … are reclaiming land around the periphery of islands to increase the land level so as to protect the existing island from being flooded’ (quoted in Mok, 2019e). One example of this is the Great Garuda Sea Wall project in Jakarta Bay, which has been promoted as an ‘integrated’ coastal defence and urban development project (Colven, 2017). Yet, as Emma Colven (2017: 257) has argued in relation to the Great Garuda Sea Wall project, it has been pursued by local politicians ‘not only because it would protect the city from flooding, but also because it promises to showcase Jakarta as a “world class” metropolis through the construction of new waterfront city, complete with a central business district, residential, commercial, and green space, and transportation infrastructure on reclaimed land’. Indeed, recent literature in UPE has observed that a ‘profound motivation’ for expensive infrastructure projects such as the PSR ‘seems to be the need for new infrastructural forms within which to ensure speculative gains’ (Loftus and March, 2016: 174). Authors such as Colven (2017) have therefore suggested that such projects tend to be developed at the expense of more mundane climate change and flood mitigation strategies. This claim supports critiques of the PTMP outlined in Chapter 4 in relation to why the state government is unwilling to redirect the immense resources invested into the PTMP by improving existing development and infrastructure in the state instead. For instance, Khoo suggested for the state to invest in more sustainable development focusing on improving the environment and people’s 124

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well-​being. This included building more parks, channelling more funds into the agricultural sector, and landing investments in the manufacturing sector that would create more jobs (Kwan, 2020)

Tomorrow Vision? The financial sustainability of land reclamation Critics of the PSR scheme have pointed to Hong Kong’s similarly controversial plans to build a new housing and business hub on four artificial islands off of Lantau Island called ‘Lantau Tomorrow Vision’ which has been projected to deplete Hong Kong’s fiscal reserves within seven to ten years. Also like the PSR scheme, the reclamation project is a signature policy of Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, and will be used to construct an entirely new transportation network. The islands are expected to provide up to 400,000 flats, 70 per cent of which would be affordable public housing, which would house over one million people and help to alleviate Hong Kong’s lack of developable land and growing population pressure. However, the project is estimated to cost at least HK$624 billion (£60 billion), and will involve creating 1,000 hectares of land (Low, 2020). To put this in context, it will be the most expensive infrastructure project in Hong Kong’s history, surpassing the combined cost of the Hong Kong-​Zhuhai-​ Macau Bridge, the third airport runway and the high speed rail link from Hong Kong to Guangzhou. As economist Andy Kwan Cheuk-​chiu (who was commissioned by Greenpeace to study the economic impact of the reclamation scheme) warned: ‘the city is already facing financial decline. Lantau Tomorrow Vision will only accelerate it and push us into massive debt’ (Low, 2020). In addition to concerns about its cost effectiveness, the project is also projected to destroy the marine ecosystem in the area. As such, local environmental activists in Hong Kong have urged the government to withdraw the project, and have suggested that a similar amount of housing could be developed on former brownfield sites in the New Territories instead. Furthermore, as has been pointed out in the case of Penang’s PSR, the Lantau reclamation project will not meet short-​term housing needs since it will be at least 12 years before residents can move in, soon after which the territory’s population is expected to begin decreasing. Yet, it has also nearly doubled in size from approximately 1,000 hectares when it was first proposed in 2014, to 1,700 hectares in its more recent launch (Low, 2020). The Hong Kong government has also been accused of pushing through with the project without allowing a rigorous due diligence analysis conducted by an independent professional body, much like the PTMP. As Hong Kong activist Tom Yam has argued, this gives the impression that the government is trying to ‘fool the people’ over the necessity of the project (Yam, 2020). 125

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Penang activists have also pointed to various reclamation schemes in Dubai which were planned to feature luxury properties on individual islands. However, many of the projects were affected and left incomplete due to the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. There were also mounting environmental concerns, including the impacts on marine ecology, rising sea levels, and the challenges posed by siltation and water stagnation within the complexes. As such, critics of Penang’s ambitious reclamation plans have warned that the COVID-​19 crisis and slumping demand for luxury property in Malaysia could result in the projects being left incomplete (Netto, 2020a). Moreover, the numerous channels between the islands and Penang Island will need to be perpetually maintained at public expense in order to prevent the same type of siltation from occurring (Khoo, 2018).

‘Ocean grabbing’ and the socio-​economic impacts of large-​scale land reclamation Socio-​economic impacts on Penang’s fishing community The SRS project has been highly divisive in Penang as many welcomed the project for the sake of ‘progress’, better public transit and traffic conditions; yet, fishermen fear the environmental impact on the sea would ruin their livelihoods. Former Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak thus initially said that the federal government would not approve the proposed reclamation project if it was not environmentally friendly and would bring about a negative impact on the people. Referring to the 1,500 fishermen who would be affected, he said that the development would ‘throw sand into people’s rice bowls’ and should not be implemented, in favour of other cheaper alternatives (Dermawan, 2017b; Ngui, 2017b). Indeed, the first EIA submitted by the state government for the PSR project was rejected in 2018 as conditions were not met with regards to the Fisheries Impact Assessment (Mok, 2019b). This assessment found that there was a total of 2,757 licensed fishermen operating within the affected area (SAM, 2019: 7). Subsequently, the fishing community successfully won an appeal against the DoE’s approval of the EIA for the PSR, putting the future of the project in question (Dermawan, 2021). As Mageswari Sangaralingam, a Penang-​based research officer for SAM, explained: ‘In terms of impacts to the local community, it has affected the local fishermen the most, the reclamation projects have resulted in loss of fishing ground and project activities will adversely impact marine life, the fisheries sector, and thus the livelihood of the fisher community’ (quoted in Shepard, 2018b). Mohamed Idris added that ‘Thousands of hectares of fishing grounds and marine habitat have disappeared due to the craze for reclamation’ (in Mok, 2019b). Moreover, it is not only the fishing communities in Penang that are being affected, but also those in Perak State where the sand is being sourced from. 126

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Urban land reclamation therefore can be conceptualized as a form of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, D., 2003) in which coastal development and reclamation projects have deprived fishermen and communities of use and access to coastal and marine resources. This process has also been discussed through the term ‘ocean grabbing’, which is used to ‘describe actions, policies or initiatives that deprive small-​scale fishers of resources, dispossess vulnerable populations of coastal lands, and/​or undermine historical access to areas of the sea’ (Bennett et al, 2015: 62). This refers primarily to the rights and livelihoods of small-​scale fisherfolk and other vulnerable coastal people (for example indigenous communities). The term expands on a growing body of literature on ‘land grabbing’, which similarly analyses the expropriation of land by (trans)national corporations, governments or individuals for a variety of purposes (see Li, 2009; McMichael, 2012). Moreover, Penang activist Anil Netto asserted that the sea is a common good, which belongs to all members of a society, and should not be owned privately (Netto, 2016a). Opposition politician Oh Teong Keong similarly stated that: ‘We wish to remind the [Chief Minister] that land here (in Penang) is not his, they do not belong to him, or his father, every plot of land belongs to the people of Penang’ (Loone, 2017a). Nonetheless, the Penang state government is privatizing the sea for developers to gain significant profits while the social, economic and environmental losses are borne by the majority of Penangites (Netto, 2016a). In general, the exploitation of the commons through reclamation has therefore been attributed to lower living standards and the weakening of solidarity, sharing and community ties (Teh, 2019). Illustrative of this point, the EIA for the PSR project noted that many locals supported the project due to the ‘likely benefits’ that it would generate, but were wary that the benefits may not be justly distributed among the population (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​45). Indeed, a critic of the BiodiverCity plan asked, ‘who is making the most money if this goes ahead? That is the question that needs to be asked. Is it indeed for the sake of the environment?’ (Chia in Crook, 2020). However, a Penang government official claimed that one of the PSR’s aims is in fact to ‘bring economic opportunities that will uplift the income of fisherfolk and provide high-​paying jobs for the community in the area, thus closing the income gap between them and the average Penangite’ (Woo, 2020). Speaking about the impact of the PSR project on the fisherfolk of the Balik Pulau area, former Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng claimed: ‘Here, we are creating man-​made islands. So, in terms of access to the sea, the fishermen can still go to sea from their existing location. It is just that there will be man-​made islands in front of them’ (Dermawan, 2017b). In this regard, the chairman for the PIC claimed that the fishing community would not be ‘directly’ affected by the reclamation, as the reclamation works would allow 127

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for a 250m wide channel between the shore and each of the islands for the fisherfolk to operate (Penang Property Talk, 2020). A government report also claimed that only 20 per cent of the fishing vessels operate in the area affected by the PSR (Woo, 2020: 3) and that only 30 per cent of the fish were found to be in the area covered by the project (quoted in Shepard, 2018b). Even if this statistic is true, it is misleading. For instance, Penang fisherfolk pointed out that the proposed site for Island A is an important prawn spawning area, and that 99 per cent of fishermen in the affected areas are involved in prawning (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​46). They also noted that prawns do not thrive in deep water –​such as that beyond the proposed reclaimed islands. Moreover, a 30 per cent reduction in catch is significant, as the initial EIA for the PSR project found that the wholesale value of fish landed at the study area was estimated at RM42 million (SAM, 2019: 7). The requirement for fisherfolk to travel further out to sea for their catch would also incur additional costs, equipment and time. Fishing in open waters is also more dangerous given the higher waves and traffic from cargo ships which have resulted in some deaths already (Shepard, 2018a). As such, it is not only the marine life that is being displaced and killed by the reclamation works, but also the fishermen as they lose their livelihoods. Indeed, fishermen in the Tanjung Tokong neighbourhood on the north coast of Penang claimed that their catches have reduced by 50 per cent since development began on the STP2 development off the coast (Shepard, 2018a). Moreover, crustaceans like crabs have almost disappeared as the mud from reclamation works suffocates them. Reclamation will therefore not only impact the fisherfolk themselves, but food security in the northern region of Malaysia more broadly. Accordingly, Mohammad Idris said that Penang should instead ‘focus on is ensuring people’s needs such as food and education are met while leaving nature alone’ (Mok, 2019a). However, the Penang state government maintains that Penang’s fishing sector is an insignificant contributor to the industry nation-​wide, and has thus proposed the PSR as a way of helping fishermen transition into the more lucrative and sustainable aquaculture sector, which is a thriving industry in Penang (Woo, 2020: 4). In fact, the state government blames the fishing community for declining fish stocks around Penang through overfishing. In this regard, a recent Penang Institute report stated that ‘fishermen would rather empty the ocean than to moderate their catch’ (Woo, 2020: 4). The same report also suggested that fishermen were themselves polluting the oceans through discarded fishing equipment.4 As such, the report promoted the PSR as a way of improving the marine environment through better regulation and development which can ‘encourage environmental care’ (Woo, 2020: 5). This is based on the flawed viewpoint that ‘the natural environment occupied by a community with higher income is better cared for’ (Woo, 2020: 5). 128

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The mitigation and compensation measures proposed by the state government have thus sought to gentrify the area by ‘improving’ the fishing community by bringing them into the mainstream, middle-​class sector of society. This would be achieved through the provision of four fishing jetties to relocate those affected by the reclamation works. The PIC chairman further suggested that they could reach a ‘win-​win’ solution with the fishing community, as the fishing jetties would be located near the proposed Bayan Lepas LRT station in the south of Penang Island, which would allow travellers using the LRT line to ‘hop off … and enjoy a nice seafood cuisine before heading to their next destination’ (Penang Property Talk, 2020). The state government sees this as a way of ‘creating new economic opportunities on-​site so that young people will not need to migrate or move away to pursue their careers, thus reducing inequalities and sustaining the local community’ (Woo, 2020: 3). Furthermore, one of the key conditions for the project’s approval was the requirement to compensate over 900 affected fishermen with low-​cost houses in the Bayan Lepas area in the south of Penang Island (Tan, D., 2019). This condition was made by the National Physical Planning Council along with 17 others that would need to be met before work could begin on the project (Mok, 2019b). As such, former Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng claimed that Penang’s compensation to its fishermen was the ‘record highest in the country’ (Dermawan, 2017b). However, as the Environment and Natural Resources Minister Wan Junaidi rebutted, although the fishing community ‘may only be a minority in the state and their economic contribution may not be high but they are also Penangites and they deserve to be protected’ (quoted in Mok, 2017b). As Anil Netto pointed out, it is difficult –​if not impossible –​to adequately compensate for the loss of marine life, increasing scarcity of seafood and the permanent loss of earnings on behalf of fisherfolk. As such, fisherfolk have argued compensation is necessary, but there needs to be long-​term planning for them to carry on their legacy (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​46). One of the problems with the PIC proposal is that such jetties and the LRT likely wouldn’t be completed for at least ten years, by which point the fishing community would have been long since displaced. One fisherman suggested that the government or developers should provide them with ‘bigger boats rather than a pittance as compensation’, so that they could still make a living in the high seas (Nambiar, 2017a). More importantly, however, the fishing community was not consulted before decisions were made to reclaim the three islands. As one spokesperson said: ‘they should not just send the project consultants … to talk to us after decisions have been made. The room for negotiation is limited’ (in Looi, 2016a). The fishing community in Penang have therefore launched repeated protests against the potential harms caused by the reclamation projects and 129

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the inadequate compensation that they have received and been promised. In January 2017, for example, a fleet of around 150 fishing boats with approximately 500 people on board converged off Tanjung Tokong on the north coast of Penang to protest against the reclamation works which were just commencing there (Netto, 2017). The protest was organized by a group called Jawatankuasa Bertindak Hak-​hak Nelayan (Fishermen’s Rights Action Committee). Following this pressure, the state government in 2020 agreed to offer a tuition scheme and education for fishermen’s children; a training scheme for fishermen and their children; and employment opportunities for ‘eligible’ individuals (Dermawan, 2020c). There would also be an ex gratia payment and monthly allowance provided. However, the Penang Fisherman’s Association (PFA) said that they would not accept the ex gratia payment and allowances as the amount was merely imposed on the community without any prior consultation or negotiation. The PFA’s chairman explained that ‘if there is no dialogue or negotiation, it looks like they are giving us money to keep us silent’ (Yeoh, 2020). As he further pointed out, the PSR project will take 30 years to be completed, which makes them sceptical that the government can afford to pay the proposed RM18,000 per year per fisherman.5 Ultimately, the PFA stated that the principles of the fishing community remain unchanged, and that they still opposed the project because they ‘understand all the negative impacts that come from the mega project’ (Dermawan, 2020b). This is despite a ‘misleading’ statement by PIC CEO who said fishermen were more receptive to the proposed PSR project now that ‘they understood more about the project’ (Dermawan, 2020c). Moreover, they pointed out that environmental impact of the reclamation for the STP projects in Tanjung Tokong was still unmitigated, resulting in the significant reduction of their catch. This indicates a level of distrust between the fishing community and the state government, which is not surprising given the dismissive attitude that the government has expressed towards them and their contribution to society. There is also broader concern over the cultural sustainability of the fishing community, as future spill-​over development from the reclaimed islands ‘may see to the demise of the kampung atmosphere and social as well as cultural values’, as thousands of newcomers move into the area (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​47). Rather than the measures that the state government has proposed, the fishing community have therefore suggested that the government should instead create fishing areas gazetted as ‘heritage zones’, which would recognize its importance as a traditional economic activity (Looi, 2016a). This is justified as local residents believe the fishing settlement in Tanjung Tokong actually pre-​dated the arrival of Francis Light in 1786, who is widely credited as being the ‘founder’ of George Town (Netto, 2017). As such, fisherfolk argued that fishing should be seen as a vocation 130

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of generational tradition and be improved upon and upgraded, rather than stamped out (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​46). This would also be in line with the types of support provided for traditional trades in the George Town World Heritage Site, which seek to maintain both the tangible and intangible heritage of the townscape.

‘Tolak Reklamasi’: the potential for effective social movements against reclamation In addition to Penang, there are similar reclamation projects all over Malaysia, including in Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Melaka, Negri Sembilan, Johor, Pahang and Kelantan states. This includes the RM43 billion Melaka Gateway project, consisting of a series of offshore islands, including a deep sea port, cruise ship terminal and eco-​resorts off the coast of Melaka, a mid-​sized city on Malaysia’s southwestern coast (Connolly, 2022). Specifically, there will be three manmade and one natural island, totalling 609 acres in size. Reclamation work started in 2015 –​with a scheduled completion in 2025. However, much like the Penang reclamation projects, it poses considerable social, economic and environmental consequences for the city and its residents. This includes devastating impacts on the local Kristang (hybrid Malaccan/​Portuguese) community and their sea-​based livelihood, as well as the marine life and coastal ecology of the affected areas. One of the impacts of this reclamation is the silting up of the sea along the coastlines, which has had a detrimental impact on fishermen in these places, which includes a majority of Melaka’s Portuguese community. In response to these concerns, about 200 members of the Portuguese settlement in Melaka staged a peaceful ‘coffin protest’ with a mock funeral to protest against reclamation for the Melaka Gateway project (Sharif, 2018). Several of them laid inside coffins in front of the developer KAJ Development Sdn Bhd’s office to demonstrate that the activities had affected their livelihood. The Melaka Gateway is therefore a prime indication of how the cost borne by existing communities to make way for reclamation and development projects exerts not only an economic but also an emotional toll, due to the alienation from place which communities like the Kristang people have formed deep attachments to (see Teh, 2019). The Melaka Gateway project has been driven by Melaka’s ambition to transform the weekend economy ‘into an all round economy’ (Blooloop, 2017). The project is being funded largely by private funds, with little investment required by the State or federal governments. This speaks to the post-​developmental character of large-​scale infrastructure development projects, which simultaneously address both state and private interests. While the project’s developers have stated that ‘Melaka Gateway is a catalyst project by Malaysians, for Malaysians’ (New Straits Times, 2018), this conceals 131

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the origins of part of the funding for the project, and also the buyers and consumers (most likely not Malaysians). Moser (2018: 939), has been critical of this point in relation to Forest City –​a luxury mega-​development on four reclaimed islands on the southern coast of Johor –​noting that such projects create an unequal relationship that ‘enriches few in Malaysia, causes vast environmental and ecological damage, engages in unsustainable development, and privatises resources’. A Melaka-​based developer (who asked to remain anonymous) agreed, saying Melaka was oversaturated with development projects that rarely met local demands (Kwan, 2020). Penang-​based activist Khoo Salma said the negative effects were already showing, with the 2019 Household Income Survey reporting an increase in Melaka’s absolute poverty, from 2.6 per cent in 2016 to 3.9 per cent (Kwan, 2020). Ultimately, permission for the project was cancelled in December 2020, due to political and economic turmoil in Malaysia between 2018 and 2020, which resulted in the project getting far behind schedule. This speaks to the broader themes in this chapter and the book as a whole, regarding the social and ecological damage posed by overly ambitious redevelopment objectives. Beyond Malaysia, land reclamation is increasingly common throughout Asia, and has in many places been met with fierce resistance by local communities. For instance, a movement against a reclamation project in Teluk Benoa, Bali, managed to halt the project from moving forward. Similarly, in Jakarta, the city government cancelled plans for the construction of a $40 billion land reclamation project pushed by the federal government in Jakarta Bay, known as the Giant Sea Wall project (Colven, 2017; Gokkon, 2018). Launched in 2014 to mitigate the high level of land subsidence in Jakarta due to the encroachment of seawater further inland, the project was initially planned to have 17 islands. However, much like the PSR project, environmental activists and fishing communities had criticized the project for the harm to local ecosystems and livelihoods that it would cause.6 As one Indonesian activist stated: ‘when we are consistent with the campaign –​ there is a chance to stop the project’ (quoted in Teh, 2019). Yet, the city authorities acknowledged that they would probably be sued for the halting of the project, as has happened when other reclamation projects in the region had been cancelled –​and that permission could be granted again in the future under a different government (Gokkon, 2018).

Conclusion Despite the frequently stated need for Penang (and other similar city-​ regions) to grow economically, the scale of environmental destruction and displacement caused by large-​scale land reclamation projects ultimately undermines their ability to achieve sustainable and inclusive development –​a 132

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goal which is ironically at the centre of Penang’s 2030 agenda (Yeoh, 2020). Projects such as Penang’s PSR have therefore raised deep-​seated concerns about whether Malaysia is serious about ensuring environmental sustainability, which is one of the three stated objectives in the 12th Malaysian Plan (Teh, 2019). This is particularly salient in the fact that the federal government does not include a cabinet position related to the environment. Moreover, the glut of high end property on reclaimed land sold for other developments in the state –​and across the region more broadly –​may further undermine the economic goals underpinning such schemes (see Colven, 2017; Shatkin, 2017; Moser, 2018). As Evelyn Teh (2019) has argued, using loosely defined objectives such as ‘development’ as justification for land reclamation and land-​use change often legitimizes displacement and dispossession, which only deepens the social and environmental inequalities that are already growing throughout much of the Global South, including Malaysia. In this regard, Federico Cugurullo (2017) has argued that forms of urbanization based on expensive infrastructure largely produces expensive places –​such as that envisioned in the BiodiverCity plan for the Penang PSR project –​meaning that it is primarily high-​income people that can afford to live there. This will impact the future existence of adjacent communities as the impact of increased land values may result in locals selling off their land. Even though Penang’s southern islands are proposed to contain affordable housing, this is certainly not the reason for the development of the islands, nor will they be designed with the needs of low-​income groups in mind. Indeed, respondents consulted for the EIA report for the PSR project questioned the logic of building low-​cost or affordable housing on reclaimed islands, especially when they will be sold to a third party developer (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​46). As such, the intensive and extensive nature of urbanization and land reclamation in Penang and Malaysia more broadly –​driven through luxury residential, tourism and infrastructure development –​has deepened the marginalization of those dependent on the coasts and marine resources for their livelihoods. As political ecologists have pointed out, environmental benefits tend to be unequally distributed, and the burdens of environmental degradation and climate change tend to fall upon the most vulnerable groups (see Heynen et al, 2006; Cugurullo, 2017; Bartels et al, 2020). However, it is not only the livelihoods of the Penang fisherfolk that are likely to be lost through reclamation, but also the tangible and intangible heritage associated with the community. Moreover, as Teh (2019) has lamented, the true costs of large-​scale reclamation projects like the PSR may not be fully realized until after their completion, when the promised economic benefits fail to materialize, or the project runs out of financing part way through construction. This makes 133

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the promised compensation problematic and uncertain as the government may not generate the financial resources to offset the income that could be sustainably generated from the ocean. The various land reclamation projects planned or ongoing in Penang will therefore further exacerbate inequalities in Penang, including the greater marginalization of the local fishing community. Given the accelerating prevalence of land reclamation in the Asian region and beyond, this is a crucial topic for future work in UPE, particularly to understand how attendant ‘ocean sprawl’ contributes to processes of extended urbanization.

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8

Conclusion: An Island on an Urbanizing Frontier Over the past half century, Penang has grown from a largely rural state into an almost completely urbanized conurbation. The explosive land-​use changes, rising civil society and environmental vulnerabilities, including flooding and landslides, have intertwined with the dynamics of urban transformations spreading far beyond the city’s boundaries. In this sense, Penang is illustrative of Asia’s rapidly urbanizing and globalizing cities which pose significant challenges to the development of socially and ecologically just futures. As such, the book has sought to document the ways in which Penang’s residents are actively involved in the remaking of their city, and towards what end. Its central intent is thus to shed light on the innovative forms of urban governance, and participatory planning being pursued in the state, with the hope that doing so will inform a critical assessment of the potential for more sustainable approaches to urbanization to prevail. Theoretically, this book has sought to illustrate how an LPE approach is useful for breaking down the dichotomies between bounded places, types of places (for example ‘cities’, towns, rural areas, etc) and scales (for example local/​global). Landscape is a hybrid concept which allows tracing the social, biophysical processes and/​or infrastructure networks under consideration wherever they may lead, whether or not that is within the boundaries of ‘the city’, or even the nation (see Lepawsky et al, 2015; Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan, 2017). The attention to the landscape histories of urbanization in Penang problematizes assumed distinctions between nature and culture, and illustrates how cultural and natural dimensions of landscapes are intertwined. In this way, the book brings UPE analysis in new directions, and illustrates the the changing spatial dynamics of Asian urbanism and their socio-​ecological implications. By way of an extended vignette, this concluding chapter uses the case of Jerejak Island, which is a small, uninhabited island off the southeastern 135

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coast of Penang, to reflect on the key themes discussed in the book, and competing visions for Penang’s future. The island has considerable cultural heritage, as it has, in the past, served as an immigration quarantine for Malaya, a leprosarium, tuberculosis sanatorium, prison for political prisoners and –​ most recently –​a resort. While some of the structures associated with these facilities have been demolished, many are still there, slowly being reclaimed by nature. Competing plans are now in place to develop the island into a mixed-​use resort, including residences, hotels and a bridge connecting the island to Penang Island; or, on the other hand, conserve the island, its flora and fauna, and remaining structures, making it only accessible to pedestrians and cyclists. This latter plan would not entirely prohibit development of the site, but would rather aim for a collaborative approach to developing the island which is sensitive to its cultural, historical and ecological significance. This could also involve designation of Jerejak as a forest reserve and/​or heritage site, which would complement the George Town World Heritage Site, and the Biosphere Reserve on Penang Hill. It would thus reject land reclamation, and the construction of a bridge, or the development of a theme park, as was proposed by the state government upon closure of the resort in 2016. Given that Jerejak has many parallels with the processes discussed in the foregoing chapters, it serves as a fitting concluding chapter to discuss the wider significance and implications arising from Penang’s ongoing urban transformations. After discussing the Jerejak case and its implications for Penang’s future, the chapter returns to and reflects upon the theoretical and empirical insights that have been developed throughout the foregoing chapters.

Pulau Jerejak: a battleground for competing visions of Penang Pulau Jerejak is the largest of Penang’s five outer lying islands and also the closest. But it is also not very well known. As Penang Forum member Rexy Chacko recalled: ‘growing up, I saw this beautiful island from the window of my room every day and it often evoked a sense of tranquillity and mystery. In those days, I always wondered what might be hidden in this beautiful green paradise’ (Chacko, 2016). Currently, Jerejak consists of mostly dense jungle and hills (see Figure 8.1). Of the island’s 362ha, only 10–​15 per cent of it is flat land. It is also a repository for natural biodiversity, with more than 100 species of trees and 20 species of ferns recorded on the island (Nambiar, 2017b). Much like Penang Island as a whole, it is rich in natural and cultural heritage, including considerable social history, wildlife and forests. With regards to its cultural heritage, Penang-​based author Mike Gibby has argued that ‘Jerejak has more history per square inch than most other 136

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Figure 8.1: Pulau Jerejak as seen from Penang Island

Source: Photo by author, 2017.

places in Malaysia’ (Nambiar, 2017b). It has a long and diverse history dating back to the 19th century, having been a base for rural fishing communities; a shipyard; leprosy colony; quarantine station; refugee camp; tuberculosis sanatorium; detention centre; prison; granite quarry; and, most recently, a holiday resort. The Jerejak Island Resort was established in 2003, and briefly closed to the public in 2016, but it reopened in 2020 along with some small-​scale regeneration to attract local tourists to the island, including the painting of the pier in rainbow colours, a white ‘stairway to heaven’, giant bird nests and large swings. So far, Jerejak has been largely been excluded from the extensive development on Penang Island. At time of writing, much of the island’s heritage still remains, including a small part of the large quarantine complex (1911), a multiracial cemetery, some barracks buildings, a 1930s prison complex and hospital, a Catholic church (1896), the jetty and a reservoir. As Rexy Chacko has observed: ‘while Penang Island kept developing and the population grew, Pulau Jerejak seemed to stay cocooned in a time capsule, evergreen and untouched’ (Chacko, 2016). However, Jerejak has recently been slated for development. In October 2016, it was reported that a joint venture agreement announced plans to redevelop the Jerejak Rainforest Resort and Spa and 32.37ha of land surrounding it into a mixed development. It was reported that a bridge linking Jerejak to Penang Island, 1,200 residential units, a theme park, a marina, four-​and five-​star hotels and a cycling track will be built there (Ngui, 2017a). As one of the developers elaborated, they plan to develop a beach-​front promenade like that along Gurney Drive. There would also be 137

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an ‘exclusive zone’ where they plan to build: ‘luxury places that take into account the ability of the locals to afford them. But local residents are also high-​end. This is a high-​end product, where the buildings will have their own jetty, yacht club and so on’ (Gibby, 2018: 242). As Rexy Chacko lamented, ‘it was not just the fact that Pulau Jerejak would be developed which bewildered all of us but also the massive scale in which it was to be done’ (Chacko, 2016). This sentiment holds true for much of the public concern over redevelopment elsewhere in Penang. Much like the various plans for the PTMP, the development of Jerejak had already been approved without a public consultation or even any mention of an EIA. As Chacko questioned at the time, ‘isn’t it a requirement for a detailed EIA, which includes public consultation, to be carried out before development of this scale is approved?’. In response to these criticisms, the state government attempted to shift responsibility by arguing that the development plans had been approved under the previous government (in power until 2008) and thus had to uphold the government’s agreement with the developer (Loone, 2017b). This proposal to develop Jerejak raises a fundamental question as to how best to preserve and protect the island’s cultural and natural heritage attributes and the identities associated with them. While proposals for the island’s use as a holiday resort date back to 1948, the area used for the existing hotel only occupies a small part of the island. As Rexy Chacko argued, ‘the underlying problem is Pulau Jerejak has never been marketed aggressively for ecotourism or its heritage and thus its true value is not really known’ (Chacko, 2016). He added that ‘though many of us here have not set foot on it or are familiar with its surroundings, we would definitely not want to know it as yet another developed isle with towering condominiums and hotels’ (Chacko, 2016). Chacko further argued that ‘Penangites are in dire need of more green spaces for recreation and ecotourism and Jerejak is a perfect place for this’. He noted that other large cities in the world have had to bring nature ‘back in’ in response to the growing concretization of urban landscapes; but Penang has a significant amount of high quality green spaces already, and should fight to maintain them (Chacko, 2016). In this regard, Mike Gibby (2018) suggested that Jerejak, along with Penang’s forested hills, provides some much-​needed respite from the increasingly congested urban areas. After numerous calls to gazette the 285ha forest reserve Pulau Jerejak, this was finally completed in 2020, which Gibby added was ‘a long overdue step needed to protect the natural heritage of Jerejak’ (Nambiar, 2017b). This is in line with the island’s historical use, as 400ha of its forests were used as a forest reserve since 1889 (Mok, 2019c). However, Gibby (2018) has noted that the solution cannot be a blanket ban on any development on Jerejak, as the remaining physical structures 138

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there would continue to be deteriorate and be lost over time. As such, the Penang Forum advocates for the development of Jerejak in a way that respects the tangible, intangible and natural heritage values of the island. As local heritage activist Ben Wisman asserted, ‘any form of development designed for Pulau Jerejak should be sustainable, and based on a master plan for the island’ (Nambiar, 2017b). Similarly, Penang activist Neil Khor expressed hope that ‘whatever development may take place on Jerejak Island will be in tune with the aspirations of the Penang Statate Government’s Vision 2030, which is based on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals’ (quoted in Gibby, 2018: x). The same can be said for the whole of Penang and the various infrastructure projects associated with the PTMP. A long-​term vision is therefore needed, which is able to balance the island’s cultural and natural heritage while also facilitating sustainable development. Like other sites on Penang Island, Jerejak was proposed as a National Heritage Site by the Malaysian National Heritage Board (Jabatan Warisan Negara) in late 2017. The PHT has even called for Pulau Jerejak to be listed together with Sungai Buloh leprosarium on Penang Island as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. If either proposal were to go ahead and achieve cooperation from the state government, this could provide the framework that is needed to achieve this delicate balance and allow for more Penangites, Malaysians and foreign visitors to explore and appreciate Jerejak’s unique cultural and natural heritage attributes. It would also fit in with the 11th Malaysia Plan, which places ‘green growth for sustainability and resilience … at the centre of the nation’s future economic growth’ (Jacobs, 2016b: S26). In this sense, Jerejak can be seen as one of the latest battlegrounds for competing visions of Penang. One vision consists of proliferating skyscrapers and luxury condominiums, regardless of the deepening high-​end property glut and economic crises; large-​scale land reclamation and artificial islands constructed at the expense of Penang’s marine ecologies and the livelihoods that they sustain; and multi-​lane highways, despite the proven inefficiencies of private transport systems. The other, as Anil Netto (2016b) put it: seeks a more balanced, sustainable approach to development, taking into account the state’s limited financial realities. It includes a call for a more holistic transport masterplan that would be cost-​effective and cause minimal harm to the natural environment, while taking into account the mobility needs of ordinary people, especially vulnerable groups. It also seeks to preserve or revitalise historically significant sites, as links to the past, to ground our present, and carry us forward into the future. The controversial proposal for Jerejak thus stands in contrast to this alternative vision for Penang’s future, and which side will ultimately prevail remains to be seen. 139

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Landscape political ecologies of a worlding city-​region Through critically examining controversies over ongoing and proposed development in Penang, the book has teased out the contradictions and challenges inherent in the state government’s ambition to become a ‘green and smart’ state by the year 2030. As Asher Ghertner has argued in the case of Delhi, such targets operate as a form of speculative and ‘future-​oriented technology, shifting collective horizons toward the long run and projecting the norms of appearance and civility of the future city across the existing landscape’ (Ghertner, 2015: 8). The ‘green’ and ‘smart’ state envisioned by the Penang state government relates to both (locally rooted) quality of life concerns, technologies that make everyday life possible, as well as broader ideals of what constitutes a modern, world-​class urban society. As Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan (2017: 6) have noted, such strategies attempt to re-​situate the built environment of Asian cities in relation to various (and shifting) global standards of ‘greenness’. The PTMP is a crucial part of the Penang 2030 agenda, which serves as a speculative vehicle for achieving this mission through the generation of profit for private developers and state revenue through the sale of (reclaimed) land. Through this model, the present is wagered on the future, and any social or ecological hardships that are caused in the meantime are justified by the anticipated benefits associated with the PTMP. Such models are primary ways in which Asian cities seek to attract capital investments for the construction of infrastructure, but also cultural investments which can make them more distinctive to global tourist flows (see Roy and Ong, 2011; Rademacher and Sivamakrishnan, 2017). Yet, the transformation of Penang’s forested hillsides and coastlines for redevelopment has given rise to flooding, landslides, and other socio-​ecological harms that have threatened the possibility of ecological resilience in the longer term (see Chapter 5). In this way, the book builds on recent research in urban studies which has sought to theorize emergent processes of extended urbanization (see Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Kanai and Schindler, 2019). It also highlights the utility of the LPE approach, which highlights the hybrid dimension of urban landscapes. Many of the book’s chapters have illustrated that the urban is not a discrete entity, but rather deeply interconnected to surrounding metropolitan environments through various infrastructure networks. Rather than viewing landscape as a passive arena for urbanization, the book has thus demonstrated how landscapes actively shape and are shaped by the processes of urbanization. As such, the urban is understood as a process –​rather than a spatially bound entity –​breaking with assumed distinctions between urban and rural. This was seen through the il/​legal developments encroaching on Penang’s forested hillsides (Chapter 5), as well as the numerous transportation networks connecting Penang with its surrounding region (Chapters 3 and 4). 140

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The book has also sought to understand the urban governance strategies being forged to respond to the consequences of extended urbanization, such as the PHW and LPP discussed in Chapter 5. Such approaches are important for monitoring and mitigating the impacts of urbanization on the urban fringe which are often not easily regulated by the municipal or regional governments. In this way, LPE approaches can provide powerful insights into the ways in which particular landscapes can be seen as crucial sites in generating local resistance to processes of extended urbanization. Socially, the state government hopes that Penang 2030 will ‘encourage citizens to participate in policy making and to take responsibility for their own future’ (Penang2030 Unit, 2019: 02). The Penang 2030 agenda therefore seeks to inspire among Penangites a will to participate in this discourse and to make its objectives their own. In examining this claim, the book has focused on the ways in which Penang’s residents and civil society groups have mobilized their own ideologies of how cities should be integrated within their natural environment in order to push forward a more sustainable form of development than that pursued by the state government. This was seen most clearly in Chapter 5, which discussed how forms of participatory governance have been articulated and practiced by local actors in generating greater socio-​ecological connectivities within Penang’s urbanizing landscapes. The natural environment can therefore be seen as an active agent in the crafting of a future urban society, which pushes back against the reliance on engineered approaches to socio-​ecological ‘resilience’. Chapter 6, for example, demonstrated how the integrated ecological and built environment of Penang Hill has provided an important source of identity and attachment to place which has been instrumental in resisting the proposed transformation of the hill through large-​scale, tourism-​focused development plans. More broadly, the controversies over urban redevelopment in Penang documented throughout the book highlight the connections between the infrastructure, histories, ecologies and identities that are constitutive of the urban region and its people. The plans for Penang’s future have thus been so controversial precisely because they threaten the sustenance of various forms of livelihood, as well as cultural and ecological belonging for certain groups of people, such as the fisherfolk who make their living from the coastal marine environment (discussed in Chapter 7). Relatedly, the book has pointed to the growing awareness among some local civil society groups of the importance of their urban heritage for socio-​ecological well-​being and sustainable development. This is a central theme underpinning almost all of the book’s empirical chapters, illustrating the importance of cultural and natural heritage conservation for sustainable urban development initiatives. As argued in Chapter 6, the issue of heritage constitutes a significant gap in the field of UPE, and is an important one to address, as struggles over heritage in urban settings are full of uneven power 141

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relations, nature–​culture relations and other concerns that are central to urban political ecologists. A key contribution of the approach in this book is to thus demonstrate that natural and cultural landscapes (and heritages) are interlinked in urban landscapes and constitute an increasingly important focus for urban redevelopment and governance initiatives. The book’s focus on the discursive dimensions of urbanization has further demonstrated how the various relationships that people form with the landscape and natural environment provide the possibility for them to conceive and articulate fundamentally different forms of urban development. For example, as Chapter 6 illustrated, the environmental imaginaries that shape place-​based identities are part of a deeply sensuous and everyday process. In this way, ‘the dynamic realm of urban ecology in Asian cities is a product of everyday spatial and material practices in which urban political identities, alliances and structures are produced and through which urban nature and environmental amenities are sensed, fought for and managed’ (Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan, 2017: 12). As the book has argued, such discursive constructions of place are central to understanding the myriad ways in which urban nature is given meaning and shaped by urban residents. They are also central to the LPE approach as set out in Chapter 2. Processes of community engagement and the environmental imaginaries underpinning urban space are therefore foundational to building alternative pathways of urban development driven by forces other than the ‘logic of capital’ (Gandy, 2018; Perrotti, 2020). They can help to build participatory planning processes that promote equitable, inclusive, sustainable and just futures while also preserving local identities. By focusing on such imaginaries, I have argued, landscape approaches can help to build a stronger case for relational and hybrid understandings of urban political ecologies and urban metabolism. As noted in the introduction, this type of grounded approach is important for highlighting the ‘heterogeneous socio-​ecological textures of urban space’ that can be overlooked in research that is more global than local in methodological orientation (see Gandy, 2018: 103). This has necessitated the long-​term, participatory and ethnographic research approach used for this book, involving ongoing research in Penang (both physically and virtually) and continued dialogue with key stakeholders over a period of eight years. In this regard, it is important to note that the divergent visions of ‘sustainable urbanization’ articulated in Penang can only be understood when analysed in a specific spatial and social context. While connections have been drawn to similar processes of urbanization in other Malaysian and Southeast Asian contexts, Penang has unique cultural, spatial and political characteristics that result in these processes playing out in a fundamentally different manner. For instance, Penang has a relatively large and active civil society sector compared to other Malaysian cities, which creates a greater 142

Conclusion

potential for pursuing alternative, and more socially and environmentally just, urban futures. The book has also illustrated how competing articulations of Penang’s infrastructure and spatial form have drawn on competing inspirations from cities around the world –​including both positive and negative examples. The focus on such inter-​referencing has helped to distill the type of urban futures that are imagined and articulated by the state government, on the one hand, and that of civil society groups on the other. This was seen most clearly in Chapter 4 which illustrated how the government’s plan for the PTMP has been sought after to ‘globalize’ the city through the redevelopment and modernization of its transportation infrastructure; and how civil society groups have pushed back on such plans with more modest proposals for upgrading the state’s infrastructure. While these competing aspirations for Penang’s future do contrast significantly, the book has demonstrated how such negotiations have been relatively co-​productive, involving prolonged interaction from both sets of actors. These competing worldviews, imaginaries and assessments ultimately differ in their assessment of the stakes of urban environmental change, and how these might be exacerbated by further development. For instance, the infrastructural imaginaries put forth by different stakeholders can also be seen as a contest over cultural identities tied to the landscape, as seen in the controversies over the PTMP and PSR projects. However, there are also the articulations mobilized by other stakeholders including developers and architects which have helped to shape the government’s vision for Penang’s spaces, which are sometimes implemented directly as proposed. This was seen in the BiodiverCity plan proposed for the PSR scheme, discussed in Chapter 7; and Aspen Vision City discussed in Chapter 3. The implementation of these plans have resulted in most infrastructure projects mimicking ideals of ‘global’ urbanism and thus exacerbating enclavization and the exclusion of more marginal groups (see Shatkin, 2017: 233). These cases have shown how the urban area in Penang has been actively extending into its hinterlands and oceans through patterns of urban sprawl and the construction of new urban spaces that are creating new ‘exurban’ geographies of extended urbanization (Chapters 3 and 7). Such hybrid urban landscapes are important to study in order to identify possibilities for urban sustainability in an era of extended, or ‘planetary’, urbanization (see Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Vitz, 2018). Chapter 7, for instance, examined how the BiodiverCity Scheme and other large-​scale land reclamation projects along Penang’s coastlines (used to finance the PTMP) constitute a form of ‘ocean sprawl’, and pose significant consequences for the marine environment and local livelihoods. Despite the increasing prevalence of large-​scale reclamation in Asia, it is a topic that has yet to be investigated in the UPE literature. In this way, the book highlights land reclamation as an important empirical 143

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lens through which to advance both the UPE and planetary urbanization literatures through a focus on landscape. Given the haphazard nature of planning in the state, projects like the PSR/​BiodiverCity scheme will ultimately result in Penang’s development continuing to unfold in a sprawling and fragmented pattern. Embraced by a state government that has been pulled towards the adoption of an entrepreneurial urban politics by the forces of inter-​urban competition and an unequal distribution of federal resources in Malaysia, the mega-​projects associated with the PTMP have formed around the convergence of state, corporate, and real estate interests. Despite the ‘green’ and ‘ecologically friendly’ design of projects like the BiodiverCity scheme, they ultimately ‘exhibit an inherent tendency toward exclusion and elitism, as developers seek to create self-​enclosed spaces of corporate capital accumulation’ (Shatkin, 2017: 214). As Ghertner (2015: 14) has argued, this model of urban development is founded on both ‘speculative theories of ever-​rising land prices’, but also the glorification of luxury property as a means of world-​class city making. However, as illustrated in Chapter 7, such projects inevitably lead to the physical displacement of existing residents, in addition to indirect forms of displacement through gentrification and the transformation of social spaces that they bring about. A final recurrent theme of the book is that of failure, as ‘the coalescence of state and corporate interests creates a policy push toward increasingly speculative ambitions for urban transformation and financial gains’ (Shatkin, 2017: 214). As Penang’s civil society groups have repeatedly warned, the consequences and costs of this potential for failure will inevitably affect all of Penang’s residents, not only financially, but also in the form of ecological damage, and the aesthetic impacts of the remaining ‘white elephants’ on the landscape. The spectre of failure is a broader theme underpinning work on large-​scale urban redevelopment projects in Asia more broadly, as the intersection of financial crises with over-​ambitious planning has resulted in numerous failed projects across the region (see Cugurullo, 2016; Colven, 2017; Shatkin, 2017). In sum, this book has argued that urban and regional governments must prioritize bottom-​up and attainable development goals that are embedded within existing urbanisms rather than pursue ambitious visions that risk successful implementation. These must respect the cultural values embedded within local landscapes and remain attentive to localized proposals for urban and regional development. In this way, my hope is that the book can offer some ideas as to how urban governance might be reconfigured to create more socio-​environmentally just and sustainable futures in the rapidly urbanizing regions of Southeast Asia and beyond.

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Notes Chapter 1 1

2 3

4

The Agenda 21 Declaration was developed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (‘the Earth Summit’), which helped to define cities as important sites for the enactment of sustainability principles (see Newman, 2015: xxiii). For exceptions see Ishizawa (2017) and Winter and Daly (2012). This is also the case in other UNESCO cities such as Luang Prabang (Laos), where the government has concentrated on the protection of the heritage zone (for much needed tourist revenue), while neglecting or even destroying built heritage elsewhere (Logan, 2002: 67). For a discussion on the use (and limitations) of emergent forms of internet ethnography in studying urban aspirations among ‘everyday’ actors (see Liew and Pang, 2015). Names cited here are pseudonyms, unless otherwise requested by the person quoted.

Chapter 2 1

2 3

Duncan and Duncan (2001: 391) define aesthetics as ‘the unarticulated, unmediated and naturalised pleasure one takes in the concrete materiality of things in themselves’. This is a topic that is addressed most explicitly in Chapters 5 and 6. Also known in political ecology as ‘chains of explanation’ (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987).

Chapter 3 1

2

3 4

5

6

7

In order to obtain city status, local authorities in Malaysia must fulfil certain criteria, including a population exceeding 500,000 and revenue of RM100 million. The higher expectations comes along with the higher taxes for residents living in cities as opposed to municipalities. In addition to Penang, the NCER includes Perlis, Kedah and northern Perak states. The road cannot be easily expanded due to the topography of the land with steep cliffs on one side, and the ocean on another. The cable car project has been proposed twice previously, and overturned due to environmental and heritage impacts, but has recently been revived as of June 2020 (see Chapter 6). The Penang Green Connectors project is a collaborative initiative between the state government, MBPP and GTCDC. Think City is a regional ‘city-​making agency’, or think tank, and subsidiary of Malaysia’s strategic investment agency Khazanah National Berhad. The agency has experience with numerous urban regeneration projects across peninsular Malaysia, including George Town, Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru. 145

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8

Typical of most development projects in the state, the reclamation project is based on a partnership between the state government and Malaysian company Rayston Consortium.

Chapter 4 1

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

BUCG (Beijing Urban Construction Group) was the contractor responsible for the Beijing Olympic Stadium (or ‘the Bird’s Nest’) but was dropped from the Consortium in 2016 at the request of the Penang state government, following a construction accident in Kuala Lumpur (Lin, 2016; Azhar, 2020). I will thus use the current name Zenith Consortium for the remainder of the chapter. SRS Consortium is comprised of three different companies, Gamuda (60 per cent) –​an infrastructure company; Ideal Property Group (20 per cent) –​a Penang developer; and Loh Poh Yen Holdings (20 per cent) –​a Penang property company. These consortiums also lack expertise in the construction and development of infrastructure, which has been a major point of concern among civil society members (Penang Forum, 2016a: 8). For a detailed analysis of the ‘Better, Cheaper, Faster’ proposal, see Connolly (2019b). In addition to its political status, this is due to the fact that Penang is comprised of mostly Chinese ethnic Malaysians, rather than Malay-​Muslims, which are dominant in most other states and control much of the federal politics. This is a common stance among critical NGOs in Malaysia, as opposition to development projects can be regarded as defying the national interest (see Hezri, 2016: 137). This would require a modal share of at least 85:15 per cent public to private transport (assuming no change in bus ridership), whereas the current figure is over 90 per cent private transport. In September 2021, the fishing community in Penang successfully won an appeal against the Malaysian Department of Environment’s approval of the EIA for the PSR, putting the future of the project in question (Dermawan, 2021). As I have illustrated in earlier work (Connolly, 2017), the UNESCO World Heritage status in George Town can be used as a powerful political tool for prompting government action. As transport consultant Eric Britton has pointed out, the two consortiums involved in the PTMP projects lack crucial expertise in the construction and development of infrastructure, which is a major area of concern (in Penang Forum, 2016a: 8).

Chapter 5 1

2

3

4

5

For instance, in 2015, 55 blocks of high-​r ise housing (some as tall as 45 stories) had been given approval on land above 76 metres or on slopes steeper than 25 degrees, encompassing approximately 10,000 residences (Schneider, 2018). This situation has arisen as the Penang state government has relied on the sale of land for much of its revenue in previous years. However, on a personal visit to the hill, there was a man stationed at the bottom of the illegal ‘road’ to the summit, keeping watch over the site. The presence of this ‘guard’ –​ and his active monitoring and control of the site –​raised further suspicion with my guide that the developer may be planning to develop the site further. One limitation, however, is that it requires a smart phone (with GPS) to take photos and record information about the clearing, which may exclude some members of the population. Remaining cases were duplicates of the same site.

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Notes

Chapter 6 1

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

Singapore was later dropped from George Town and Malacca’s joint listing due to the challenges involved in managing a transnational heritage site. By intangible cultural heritage, I refer to individuals and cultural or economic practices that exist in a given area, while tangible heritage refers to the built heritage, including buildings and other physical landscape features. For a detailed critique of the UNESCO approach to heritage conservation, see Ishizawa (2014). While various terms have been proposed to indicate the interconnection between cultural and natural landscapes, such as ‘natural-​cum-​cultural’ heritage (Jim, 2005) and ‘historic urban landscape’ (Caballero, 2016), the notion of urban heritage is used here to incorporate both of these dimensions. The term sustainable development refers to development which does not negatively impact the nature of biodiversity and traditional cultural practices (handed down from previous generations) (see Winter and Daly, 2012). Today, only 7 per cent of Penang State’s forests remain in tact. While I am aware of the argument that the beauty of landscapes like Penang Hill ‘can obscure the exclusion as well as the exploitation that produces them’ (Duncan and Duncan, 2001: 389), this is a point that is beyond the scope of the present chapter, and has been documented elsewhere (see Aiken, 1987; Gibby, 2017; Ghertner, 2021). ‘Study on the Development of Hill Stations Final Report’, prepared for the Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department. However, the state did illustrate some improvement in the transparency of the development plans for Penang Hill. Though the plans are still not available online, they did commit to displaying the draft Structural Area Plan for two months, in order to receive public feedback.

Chapter 7 1

2

3

4

5

6

It will require a separate EIA as the area that will be reclaimed is under federal jurisdiction (Dermawan, 2019a). However, the EIA was approved with 72 conditions that will need to be complied with, which has raised some concern among civil society groups regarding the desirability of the project and extent to which all of the conditions will be met (Dermawan, 2019a). Another is the use of ‘starchitects’ like Bjarke Ingels, which, as I will demonstrate later in the chapter, has been problematic due to other controversial projects that he has been involved in. Yet, as the local fishing community pointed out, overfishing is conducted by illegal trawlers operating in the area, and is an issue that they have raised with the state government in the past (to no avail), as it has negatively impacted the marine environment and resources that they depend upon for their livelihoods (Dr Nik & Associates, 2017: ES-​46). However, the PFA chairman explained that he had conflicting thoughts about their position, and felt pressure to resist because ‘If I say yes to the compensation, maybe NGOs will blame me for not fighting for the fishermen’ (Yeoh, 2020). Four of the islands were already completed by the time the planning permission for the remaining islands was revoked, but the Jakarta government claimed these would be used to serve the ‘public interest’ (Gokkon, 2018).

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Winter, T. and Daly, P.T. (eds) (2012) ‘Heritage in Asia: converging forces, conflicting values’, in Routledge handbook of heritage in Asia. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp 1–​35. Woo, J. (2018) ‘Penang Transport Master Plan makes financial sense’, Malaysiakini, 23 June. Available at: www.malaysiakini.com/​letters/​430949 (Accessed 24 August 2018). Woo, J.S.Z. (2020) Evaluating the Penang South Reclamation (PSR) project according to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Penang Institute. Available at: https://​pena​ngin​stit​ute.org/​publi​cati​ons/​iss​ues/​eva​ luat​ing-​the-​pen​ang-​south-​recl​amat​ion-​psr-​proj​ect-​accord​ing-​to-​the-​uni​ ted-​nati​ons-​sust​aina​ble-​deve​lopm​ent-​goals/​ (Accessed 6 January 2022). World Bank (2019) Private participation in infrastructure (PPI). The World Bank. Available at: https://​ p pi.worldb​ a nk.org/​e n/​ppi (Accessed 1 September 2020). Wu, F. and Keil, R. (2020) ‘Changing the geographies of sub/​urban theory: Asian perspectives’, Urban Geography, 41(7): 1–​7. doi:10.1080/​ 02723638.2020.1712115. WWF Malaysia (2001) Study on the development of hill stations. Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, pp 1–​168. Available at: www.repository.wwf.org.my/​technical_​reports/W ​ /W ​ WFM_H ​ ill%20 Stations%20Study%20Vol2_​2001.pdf (Accessed 10 December 2018). Wylie, J. (2009) ‘Landscape’, in Gregory, D., Johnston, R.J., Pratt, G., Whatmore, S., and Watts, M. (eds) The dictionary of human geography. Fifth edition. Malden: Blackwell, pp 409–​411. Yam, T. (2020) ‘Hong Kong must not be misled about the unneeded Lantau Tomorrow Vision’, South China Morning Post, 25 November. Available at: www.scmp.com/​comment/​opinion/​article/​3111159/​hong-​kong-​ must-​not-​be-​misled-​about-​unneeded-​lantau-​tomorrow-​vision (Accessed 11 December 2020). Yaneva, A. and Heaphy, L. (2012) ‘Urban controversies and the making of the social’, Architectural Research Quarterly, 16(1): 29–​36. doi:10.1017/​ S1359135512000267. Yeang, K. (2021) ‘Tropical spice garden evolves to survive Covid-​19’, Penang Monthly. Available at: https://p​ enangm ​ onth ​ ly.com/​arti​cle/​20438/​tropi​cal-​ spice-​gar​den-​evol​ves-​to-​surv​ive-​covid-​19 (Accessed 19 September 2021). Yeoh, B.S.A. (1996) Contesting space: power relations and the urban built environment in colonial Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press. Yeoh, R. (2020) ‘CM turning back on Vision 2030 by pressing on with Penang reclamation, says activist’, The Vibes, 26 October. Available at: www.thevibes.com/​articles/​news/​4044/​cm-​turning-​back-​on-​vision-​ 2030-​by-​pressing-​on-​with-​penang-​reclamation-​says-​activist (Accessed 2 November 2020).

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Index References to figures and photographs appear in italic type. References to endnotes show the page and chapter number and the note number (146ch5n1). A aesthetics of landscape  24, 31, 99 architecture, iconic  9, 118– 119 artificial islands  see land reclamation projects; Penang South Reclamation (PSR) project Aspen Vision City  54– 55, 143 Autonomous Rail Transit (ART) System  68– 69 B  Batu Ferringhi  45, 47 Batu Kawan  44, 54– 55 Bayan Baru  44, 51, 54 Bayan Lepas  41, 117 LRT  66, 67, 73, 129 Berjaya Plan  101– 104 ‘Better, Cheaper, Faster’ plan  58, 61– 62, 68– 69, 69, 73, 75 Bilbao, Spain  51 BiodiverCity plan  117– 119, 118, 122– 124, 133, 143, 144 Biosphere Reserve  109– 110, 110– 111, 112, 113 Botak (Bald) Hill  79, 83– 85, 83, 94 Botanic Gardens  101, 102, 106, 108, 109 ‘bourgeois environmentalism’  14 Bukit Bendera  see Penang Hill (Bukit Bendera) Bukit Kukus highway project  60 Bukit Relau (Botak Hill)  79, 83– 85, 83, 94 Burra Charter  34 Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems  61, 66, 68, 69, 70 Butterworth  6, 44, 56, 70 cultural regeneration  51 decline  49– 50 modernization plans  48, 49, 50– 51 Penang Sentral  41, 51 C  canopy bridges  92, 93 capital accumulation  26, 53, 144

Chacko, R.P.  70, 83, 89, 136, 137, 138 China  43, 49, 64, 114 Chow, K.Y.  1, 49, 50, 51, 52, 62, 65, 71, 85, 110 city-​regions, shift from ‘gobal cities’ to  55 civil society sector  2, 12, 48, 72, 142– 143 alternative development trajectories  13– 14 community-​led heritage movements  12– 14, 96, 103– 104 defining  11 early successes  12– 13 in internet age  17 Langur Project Penang (LPP)  92– 93, 94 post-​politics of government dealings with  71– 75, 75– 76 PTMP  alternative model  58– 59, 61– 62, 68– 69, 69, 73, 75 concerns over  46, 60, 63, 67, 68, 69– 70, 75– 76 original proposing of  58– 59, 67 public consultations  107– 108 ‘Save Penang Hill’ campaign  12– 13, 103– 104 see also Penang Forum; Penang Hills Watch (PHW) climate change  46, 88– 89, 124, 133 colonial history  20– 21, 100, 104 corals  122, 123 corridors  ecological  46, 93, 118 urban  40, 41, 43, 51, 54, 56, 66 COVID-​19 pandemic  61, 62, 64, 126 Cronon, W.  27 Cugurullo, F. 118, 133, 144 cultural geography  30, 34, 37 iconic architecture  9, 118– 119 landscape approaches within  4, 20, 22– 23, 34 cultural heritage  34, 49, 98 division between natural heritage and  34, 98– 99 Jerejak Island  136– 137, 138– 139

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Penang’s forested hillsides  81– 86 cultural landscapes  8, 34, 96– 97, 108 studies  33, 37 UNESCO recognition of  105 urban heritage conservation and interlinking of natural and  4– 5, 97– 100, 112, 113, 135, 141– 142 see also heritage landscapes cyborgs  25, 31 cycling  61, 62, 118, 136, 137 Penang Bicycle Route Master Plan  45– 46 D debt  53, 125 deforestation  flooding, landslides and  77, 86– 89 of Penang Hill  101– 103 Democratic Action Party (DAP)  62, 68, 71 displacement of communities  7, 9– 10, 48, 51, 53, 128, 133, 144 Douglass, M.  5, 10– 11, 14, 57, 93 Drainage Contribution Fund  89 Dubai  2, 114, 126 durian plantation  84– 85 ‘dwelling landscapes’  22 E Eastern Seafront Development project  45 eco-​tourism  110, 111– 112, 138 Eco World Development Group  54 ecological corridors  46, 93, 118 ecology offset programme  122– 123 11th Malaysia Plan  1, 42, 106, 139 environmental imaginaries  21– 22, 78– 79, 80– 81, 82, 94, 142 environmental impact  of hillside development  86– 89 of large-​scale land reclamation  122– 126 environmental impact assessments (EIA)  Jerejak Island  138 PSR  64, 67, 116, 118, 126, 127, 128 PTMP  74 environmental justice  29– 30, 76 environmental protection laws  82 F failure, spectre of  37, 43, 123, 133– 134, 144 and unfinished projects  54, 60, 126 fishing communities  116 and Melaka Gateway project  131 and PSR project  122– 123, 126– 131 flooding  77– 78, 87– 89 flash  77, 87, 88– 89 mitigation projects  88, 89, 124 flora and fauna  80, 82, 84, 85, 92, 108, 110, 113, 122 food security  128 foreign investment  attracting  1, 10, 42, 44, 140

property as a source of  47, 63, 64 Forest City  63, 114, 132 forest fragmentation  92– 93, 94, 107 forested hillsides of Penang  Bukit Relau  79, 83– 85, 83, 94 calls for ban on development  89 cultural significance  81– 86 deforestation, flooding and landslides  77, 86– 89 legal developments  86 legal protections and loopholes  82– 83 LPP and protection of wildlife  92– 93, 94 participatory approach to governance of  89– 92 private ownership  83– 84 water catchments  77, 85 see also Penang Hill (Bukit Bendera) Fortmann, L.  20, 27, 30, 34, 80, 99 Forum Seberang Perai  52 Friends of Penang Hill  103, 107 G Gandy, M.  4, 25, 27, 28, 36, 93– 94, 100, 112, 113, 142 George Town  5, 39, 44, 49, 68, 131 Festival  51 heritage  10 heritage management  12 sensitive, slow pace of development  104– 105 as a UNESCO World Heritage city  7, 48, 51, 70, 97, 99, 105, 111 urban development  6– 7 George Town Conurbation Spatial Strategy (GTCSS)  40 ‘global city’  ambitions  2, 57– 58, 117, 120, 143 and shift to city-​region  55 Goh, B.L.  5, 7, 9, 14, 105 Gooi, D.  71 governance  environmental  79 ‘good’  12, 79 participatory  12, 141 Langur Project Penang (LPP)  92– 93, 94 Penang Hills Watch (PHW)  89– 92, 94 poor, and weaknesses in planning  47, 48, 52 urban  66, 75, 76, 78– 79, 141 challenges in Penang  46– 48 grassroots  10– 14 Gramsci, A.  11 Great Garuda Sea Wall project  124, 132 ‘green and smart state’ agenda  1, 46, 56, 70, 78, 106, 111, 118– 119, 140 Gurney Drive  50, 85, 120, 121 Gurney Wharf  44, 45– 46, 120– 121, 120, 122 Gustafson, S.  3, 39– 40

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see also mega-​projects; Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP); transportation infrastructure Ingels, B.  118, 118, 147ch7n3 Ingold, T.  22 interviews  16 IUCN Red List  122

H Habitat at Penang Hill  110 Halcrow Plan  59, 61, 62, 72, 75 Haraway, D.J.  25 Harrison, R.  34, 40, 106 Harvey, D.  26, 66, 100, 127 heritage landscapes  11, 33– 35, 68, 96– 97, 113 see also cultural landscapes ‘heritage zones’  130– 131 Heynen, N.  23, 26, 29, 133 highway projects  Bukit Kukus  60 development deals  60, 63 environmental concerns  85 and forest fragmentation  92– 93, 94 Pan Island Link 1 (PIL1) highway  72, 85, 111 protests against  85– 86, 86 protecting wildlife crossings  92, 93 PTMP and  66 hillside development  see forested hillsides of Penang; Penang Hill (Bukit Bendera) Hong Kong  1– 2, 49 ‘Lantau Tomorrow Vision’  125 hotels  101, 103, 108, 137, 138 housing  affordable  54, 62, 64, 119, 125, 133 Batu Ferringhi  47 Batu Kawan  54 for fishermen  129 high-​density  42, 48, 63 high-​end  47, 54, 62, 63, 115, 116, 121, 138 oversupply  60, 63– 64, 126, 133 hillside developments  82, 146ch5n1 Hong Kong  125 see also property development

J Jakarta Bay  124, 132 Jenkins, G.  5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 44, 51, 53, 84, 87, 88, 98, 100 Jerejak Island  135– 136, 136– 139, 137 Johor  42, 43, 63, 114, 132 K Kaika, M.  21, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 36, 64, 80, 81, 113 Kanai, J.M.  36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 60, 140 Khoo, S.  12, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59– 60, 66, 67, 72, 73, 121, 123, 124, 126, 132 Khor, M.  13, 91, 97, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109 KOMTAR building  8, 8, 10 Kota Kinabalu  39 Kowloon  49 Kuala Lumpur  10, 38, 39, 41, 43 Kuching  68– 69

I Indonesia  43, 124, 132 infrastructure  development  8, 56, 68, 77, 86, 89, 92, 131, 133 feasibility and desirability of  57– 58 flooding and damage to  78 ‘green’  46 hillside development and environmental damage  86– 89 inter-​city  40– 43 ‘land-​for-​infrastructure’ deals  60, 67– 68, 115, 122 landscape political ecologies of  35– 37 poor governance and  47, 48, 52 post-​politics in planning  71– 75, 75– 76 social justice issues  45 ‘trap’  53 unfinished projects  54, 60, 126

L Land Conservation Act  82 ‘land-​for-​infrastructure’ deals  60, 67– 68, 115, 122 land reclamation projects  2, 114– 134 displacement and dispossession  127, 133, 144 environmental impact  115– 116, 122– 126 Jerejak Island  137– 138, 139 ‘Lantau Tomorrow Vision’  125 Linear Waterfront project  44– 45 Melaka Gateway project  54, 131– 132 ‘ocean grabbing’  127 ongoing in Penang and Malaysia  116– 122 potential for effective social movements against  131– 132 profitability  115 socio-​economic impacts of largescale  126– 132 Sri Tanjung Pinang Phase 2 project (STP2)  120– 122, 123, 128, 130 land scarcity  60, 64, 115 land values  82, 133, 144 landscape  aesthetics  24, 31, 99 change  5, 28– 31, 98 conceptualizing through political ecologies  21– 24 definitions  34 Marxist understanding  21– 22, 23

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ownership  99 power relations and shaping  23, 24 production  22– 23 social construction  22, 23– 24 social identity and  20, 21– 22, 81 transformation of urban  20– 21 landscape political ecology (LPE)  12, 135, 137– 138, 140– 144 discursive and material components  28– 31 framework  28 of heritage  33– 35, 112– 113 of infrastructure  35– 37 resilience, environmental imaginaries and  79– 81 towards a  27– 28, 37 of urbanization  4– 5, 31– 33 landslides  77, 78, 86, 91, 93, 94, 107 Paya Terubong  60, 87– 88, 89 Langur Project Penang (LPP)  79, 92– 93, 94 ‘Lantau Tomorrow Vision’  125 Latour, B.  25, 33 Lefebvre, H.  5, 25, 32, 39 Ley, D.  24 light rail transit (LRT) system  arguments for better alternatives  61, 62, 68– 69, 69 Bayan Lepas  66, 67, 73, 129 Lim, C.E.  8, 12– 13, 67, 81, 104 Lim, G.E.  1, 9, 48– 49, 57, 69– 70, 84, 107, 121, 127, 129 Linear Waterfront project  44– 45 local plans  absence of gazetted  52– 53, 74– 75, 83 Penang Hill  103, 106 Loftus, A.  5, 17, 21, 25, 26, 36, 58, 80, 98, 124 M Mahathir, M.  9, 41, 133 Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang (MBPP)  45, 53, 84, 86 Malacca  7 Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) campaign  47, 63– 64 maps  Penang Hill  102 Penang State  6 marine ecosystems  122– 125, 126, 128, 147ch7n4 see also fishing communities Marxist  concepts of landscape  21– 22, 23 understanding of infrastructure  36 Massey, D.  10, 23, 30 mega-​cities  38 mega-​projects  7, 8, 8, 10, 13, 43, 47, 48 at expense of climate change and flood mitigation strategies  124– 125

mismatch between existing landscape, infrastructure, finances and  57– 58 non-​state actors and  46– 47 unfinished  54, 60, 126 unintended impacts  53– 54 urban integrated  63 see also Penang South Reclamation (PSR) project; Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP) mega-​regions  40, 46, 55 megapolitan political ecology  40 Melaka Gateway project  54, 131– 132 metabolisms  25 city  35– 36 reworking urban and regional  38– 56 urban  25, 40, 80, 115, 142 Mitchell, D.  10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 33, 37, 104, 106 mitigation measures  91, 92, 93 Bukit Relau  84 canopy bridges  92, 93 and compensation for fishing communities  129– 130 flood mitigation projects  88, 89, 124 marine ecology offset programme  122– 123 modernity, quest for  9 monorail  57, 60, 61, 62, 69 multi-​species flourishing  91, 93, 113, 122 Multimedia Super Corridor (MMSC)  41 Mumford, L.  5, 41 Municipal Youth Park  101, 106 N natural heritage  34, 96 Biosphere Reserve to protect cultural and  109– 110, 110– 111, 112, 113 division between cultural and  34, 98– 99 Jerejak Island  138– 139 natural landscapes  4– 5, 23, 35, 104 changes to  96– 97 urban heritage conservation and interlinking of cultural and  4– 5, 97– 100, 112, 113, 135, 141– 142 natural spaces, cities as  26 nature, urban  4, 25, 26– 27, 80, 100, 113, 142 Netto, A.  60, 64, 67, 70, 75, 103, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 139 Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER)  40, 51, 54 NPP-​2 (Second National Physical Plan)  42– 43 O oceans  marine ecosystems  122– 125, 126, 128, 147ch7n4 ‘ocean grabbing’  127 overfishing  128, 147ch7n4

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P Pan Island Link 1 (PIL1) highway  72, 85, 111 protests against  85– 86, 86 Park on the Sea project  120– 121 participatory governance  1, 12, 141 Langur Project Penang (LPP)  92– 93, 94 Penang Hills Watch (PHW)  89– 92, 94 Paya Terubong landslide  60, 87– 88, 89 Peet, R.  21, 22, 80, 81 Penang 2030 agenda  50, 56, 65, 110, 133, 140, 141 ‘green and smart’  1, 46, 56, 70, 78, 106, 111, 118– 119, 140 Penang Bay project  44 Penang Bicycle Route Master Plan  45– 46 Penang Bridge  8, 70, 71 Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce (PCCC)  65, 72 Penang Development Corporation  8 Penang ferry service  70– 71 Penang Fishermen’s Association (PFA)  130 Penang Forum  13, 49, 52, 71, 76, 85 ‘Better, Cheaper, Faster’ plan  58, 61– 62, 68– 69, 69, 73, 75 criticism of land-​swap deals  122 criticism of state government survey on PTMP  72– 74 launch of Penang Hills Watch  81 opposition to developments on Penang Hill  107, 108, 111 on Paya Terubong landslide  88, 89 proposals for Jerejak Island  138– 139 Penang Global City Centre (PGCC)  13 Penang Heritage Centre  7 Penang Heritage Trust (PHT)  7, 10, 103, 139 Penang Hill (Bukit Bendera)  12– 13, 81, 96, 101, 141 (re)development trajectories  106– 112 Berjaya Plan  101– 104 Biosphere Reserve  109– 110, 110– 111, 112, 113 cable car plan  106– 108, 111 colonial history  100, 104 deforestation  101– 103 hotels  108 local plans  103, 106 map  102 memorandum of understanding  101 natural environment  105 ‘Save Penang Hill’ campaign  12– 13, 103– 104 Special Area Plan (2020)  111 tourism  12– 13, 101, 106– 109, 110, 111– 112 urban heritage  100– 106, 112, 113 Penang Hill Corporation (PHC)  106, 108, 109, 111– 112

Penang Hills Watch (PHW)  81, 86, 87, 89– 92, 94, 107 criticism of  94 on Paya Terubong landslide  87– 88 Penang Infrastructure Corporation (PIC)  117, 127, 129, 130 Penang Island City Council (MBPP)  45, 53, 84, 86 Penang Property Talk  72, 117, 120, 121, 128, 129 Penang Sentral  41, 51 Penang Smart State agenda  1, 55, 57, 65, 70 see also ‘green and smart state’ agenda Penang South Reclamation (PSR) project  45, 52, 59, 66– 67 BiodiverCity plan  117– 119, 118, 122– 124, 133, 143, 144 compensation  129– 130 economic and social benefits  119 environmental impact  122– 125 environmental impact assessment (EIA)  64, 67, 116, 118, 126, 127, 128 financing PTMP  62– 64 fishing communities and  122– 123, 126– 131 as part of ‘green and smart’ agenda  119 true costs  133– 134 as an urban integrated mega project  63 Penang Structure Plan (PSP)  60, 82, 85, 103 Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP)  2, 35, 51, 53, 57– 76, 140, 143 concerns over  46, 60, 63, 67, 68, 69– 70, 75– 76 costs  46, 59– 60, 61 environmental impact assessment (EIA)  74 financing  60, 62– 64, 67– 68 Halcrow Plan  59, 61, 62, 72, 75 ‘land-​for-​infrastructure’ deals  60, 67– 68, 115, 122 light rail transit (LRT) system  61, 62, 66, 67, 68– 69, 69, 73, 129 motivations  58, 64– 71 ‘move people, not vehicles’  67 overview  58– 62 Pan Island Link 1 (PIL1) highway  72, 85, 111 protests against  85– 86, 86 Penang Forum alternative plan  58, 61– 62, 68– 69, 69, 73, 75 post-​politics and  71– 75, 75– 76 Southern Reclamation Scheme Consortium (SRS)  2– 3, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 146ch4n2 state government survey  72– 74 support from business groups and local residents  65, 72 undersea tunnel  50– 51, 52, 57, 63, 69 Zenith-​BUCG Consortium  59, 62, 63, 66, 146ch4n1

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peri-​urban spaces  31, 32– 33 development  40– 41, 42, 47– 50, 52–53 high-​density housing  42 Philippines  114 ‘planetary urbanization’  36, 39, 40, 55, 114, 115 poly-​centric urbanism  56, 119 design in Penang  43– 46 in Hong Kong and Kowloon  49 impact on urban peripheries  49– 50 in Malaysia  40– 43 non-​state actors and governance of  46– 47 and Seberang Perei renaissance  48– 55 population statistics  6, 38, 39 post-​politics  71– 75, 75– 76 property development  41, 60, 101, 144 to attract foreign investment  47, 63, 64 high-​end  47, 54, 62, 63, 115, 116, 121, 138 glut of  60, 63– 64, 126, 133 ‘land-​for-​infrastructure’ deals  60, 67– 68, 115, 122 Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) campaign  47, 63– 64 visions for Jerejak Island  137– 138, 139 see also housing property prices  48, 60, 64 PTMP  see Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP) Pulau Jerejak  see Jerejak Island Q quasi-​objects  25, 33 R rainfall  88, 89 reefs, artificial  122– 123 regional urbanization  40, 41– 42 research methodology  15– 18, 141 resilience thinking  78, 79– 80, 81, 84 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  61– 62 river restoration projects  44, 50 roadkill  92, 93 Robbins, P.  23 S SAM (Sahabat Alam (Friends of the Earth) Malaysia)  103, 114, 117, 121, 123, 126, 128 Schindler, S.  36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 60, 140 Scott, J.  37 sea levels, rising  38, 124 Seberang Jaya  50, 54 Seberang Perai  6, 6, 39, 44 renaissance  48– 55 Second National Physical Plan (NPP-​2)  42– 43 shophouses  7 Sim Leisure Group  107

Sim, Choo Kheng  107 Singapore  7, 43, 65, 97, 104, 117, 120, 121 Singh, B.  45 Singh Deo, J.  39, 45, 46, 108, 124 Singh, K.  84 ‘smart cities’  42, 55 ‘green’ and  1, 46, 56, 70, 78, 106, 111, 118– 119, 140 ‘smart growth’ thinking  43, 46, 57 social identity, landscape and  20, 21– 22, 81 social movements  in digital age  17 against reclamation  131– 132 Southern Reclamation Scheme Consortium (SRS)  2– 3, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 70, 74, 75, 146ch4n2 Speechley, S,-​T.  10 ‘splintering urbanism’  53 Sri Lanka  114 Sri Tanjung Pinang  63 Phase 2 project (STP2)  120– 122, 123, 128, 130 state power  37 suburban political ecology  33 sustainable development  BiodiverCity plan  117– 119, 118, 122– 124, 133, 143, 144 expanding cities and  32 heritage conservation and  12, 34, 97, 100, 141 incompatibility of PTMP with  68 international policy-​making and  55– 56 on Jerejak Island  139 land reclamation and  115– 116, 132– 133 and multi-​species flourishing  91, 93, 113, 122 participatory governance initiatives and  89– 93, 94 Penang Biosphere Reserve  109– 110, 110– 111, 112, 113 Swyngedouw, E.  11, 12, 14, 23, 24– 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 64, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80, 98, 113 T Tanjung Bungah  41, 45, 56, 63, 87 Teluk Bahang  92, 107, 109 10th Malaysia Plan  39 Think City  38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 145n7 tourism  attracting international  12– 13, 101, 108, 140 cable car plan and  106– 108, 111 eco-​  110, 111– 112, 138 hotels  101, 103, 108, 137, 138 Jerejak Island  137, 138 ‘nature and heritage’  106, 108– 109

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Penang Hill  12– 13, 101, 106– 109, 111– 112 transit-​oriented development  41, 46, 47, 53 transportation infrastructure  36, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48 NPP-​2 and development of  43 in Seberang Perei  50– 51 see also Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP) Tropical Spice Garden  109 tunnel, undersea  50– 51, 52, 57, 63, 69 turtles  122 12th Malaysia Plan  133 Tzaninis, Y.  29, 33 U UNESCO  Biosphere Reserve status  109– 110 World Heritage sites  139 division between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’  99 George Town  7, 48, 51, 70, 97, 99, 105, 111 ‘outstanding universal values’  105 United Nations Agenda  21 1, 55, 145ch1n1 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  12 United Nations Habitat  47 urban corridors  40, 41, 43, 51, 54, 56, 66 urban exceptionalism  78, 92 urban governance  66, 75, 76, 78– 79, 141 challenges in Penang  46– 48 grassroots  10– 14 LPP outreach initiative  92– 93, 94 PHW and  89– 92, 94 urban heritage conservation  12, 34, 35, 112, 113, 141– 142 balancing development and  7– 10, 14, 97 community-​led movements for  12– 14, 96, 103– 104 interlinking cultural and natural approaches to  4– 5, 97– 100, 112, 113, 135, 141– 142

international legislation  34 landscape political ecologies and  33– 35 local and national stakeholders  11 of Penang Hill  100– 106, 112, 113 power relations in management of  98– 99 urban integrated megaprojects (UIMs)  63 urban metabolisms  25, 35– 36, 40, 80, 115, 142 reworking regional and  38– 56 urban nature  4, 25, 26– 27, 80, 100, 113, 142 urban political ecology (UPE)  4– 5, 11, 24– 27, 29, 33, 37, 39– 40, 112, 124 of infrastructure  35– 36 interrelations between nature and culture  99– 100 urban sustainability  32, 50, 55–56 extended urbanization and  143 urbanization  extended  4, 32, 33, 41, 116, 134, 140, 141, 143 landscape political ecologies of  4– 5, 31– 33 in Penang  5– 6, 38– 39, 77, 142– 143 ‘planetary’  36, 39, 40, 55, 114, 115 political ecologies of  24– 27, 39– 40 rapid  5, 38– 39 V Vision 2020 (Wawasan 2020)  9 W Walker, P.  20, 23, 27, 30, 34, 80, 99 walking interviews  16 water catchments  77, 85, 107, 110 waterfront developments  44– 46, 50, 116, 117, 120– 122, 124 Watts, M.  21, 22, 80, 81 Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020)  9 wildlife, protection of  92– 93, 94, 122 world cities  1, 7, 60, 76 Z Zenith Consortium  59, 62, 63, 66, 146ch4n1

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“Focusing on the contested socio-ecological remaking of a small city and surrounding regional landscapes that have often been overshadowed even in research on Malaysia, Connolly breaks new ground for urban political ecology.” Tim Bunnell, National University of Singapore

Creighton Connolly is Assistant Professor in the School of Graduate Studies at Lingnan University.

Connolly uses ongoing urban redevelopment in Penang in Malaysia to provide stimulating new perspectives on urbanization, governance and political ecology. The book deploys the concept of landscape political ecology to show how Penang residents, activists, planners and other stakeholders mobilize new relationships with the urban environment to contest controversial development projects and challenge hegemonic visions for the city’s future. Based on six years of local research, this book provides both a dynamic account of the region’s rapid reshaping and a fresh theoretical framework in which to consider issues of sustainable development, heritage and governance in urban areas worldwide.

ISBN 978-1-5292-1414-7

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