Political Discourse and Media in Times of Crisis 1839982829, 9781839982828

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Introduction
Chapter 1 - Conceptualising Crisis: Events, Crisis Processes and Collective Sensemaking
Chapter 2 - A Reversed Narrative of Public Crisis: Xinhua’s Framing of Medical Experts in COVID-19 Pandemic
Chapter 3 - Representations and Social Influence in Political Discourse in Times of Crisis
Chapter 4 - Fall of Circulation, Savage Oligopolisation and Downgrading of the Media: The Implications of Memoranda in the Greek Press
Chapter 5 - Elites versus the People? Tracing Populist Narrative through the Presentation of the Turkish Health Reform in Media
Chapter 6 - Disinformation and the Prespa Agreement: A Case Study
Chapter 7 - Framing the Pandemic: Strategic Rhetoric in Political Elite Discourse during the COVID-19 Health Crisis
Appendices
Index

Citation preview

Political Discourse and Media in Times of Crisis Edited by Emmanouil Takas Sofia Iordanidou Nael Jebril

Anthem Press An imprint of Wimbledon Publishing Company www.anthempress.com This edition first published in UK and USA 2023 by ANTHEM PRESS 75–76 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8HA, UK or PO Box 9779, London SW19 7ZG, UK and 244 Madison Ave #116, New York, NY 10016, USA © 2023 Emmanouil Takas, Sofia Iordanidou, Nael Jebril editorial matter and selection; individual chapters © individual contributors The moral right of the authors has been asserted. All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. 2022921029 ISBN-13: 978-1-83998-282-8 (Hbk) ISBN-10: 1-83998-282-9 (Hbk) Cover Credit: Photo Kozyr/Shutterstock.com This title is also available as an e-book.

CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables

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Introduction1 Emmanouil Takas, Sofia Iordanidou and Nael Jebril Chapter 1. Conceptualising Crisis: Events, Crisis Processes and Collective Sensemaking Jamie Matthews

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Chapter 2. A Reversed Narrative of Public Crisis: Xinhua’s Framing of Medical Experts in COVID-19 Pandemic Yu Xiang

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Chapter 3. Representations and Social Influence in Political Discourse in Times of Crisis Emmanouil Takas and Gerasimos Prodromitis

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Chapter 4. Fall of Circulation, Savage Oligopolisation and Downgrading of the Media: The Implications of Memoranda in the Greek Press Sofia Iordanidou and Leonidas Vatikiotis Chapter 5. Elites versus the People? Tracing Populist Narrative through the Presentation of the Turkish Health Reform in Media Ays¸ecan Kartal Chapter 6. Disinformation and the Prespa Agreement: A Case Study Lefteris Kretsos and Valia Kaimaki

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81

99

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Chapter 7. Framing the Pandemic: Strategic Rhetoric in Political Elite Discourse during the COVID-19 Health Crisis Katerina Diamantaki and Lemonia Mourka

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Index

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figures 2.1 Comparisons between seven medical experts across five categories 29 2.2 Comparisons of Seven Medical Experts from January to November 2020 31 2.3 Overall trends of five categories from January to November 2020 34 3.1 Hierarchical classification of verbal material of the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the first Memorandum 49 3.2 Factor analysis of the political parties that participated in  the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the first Memorandum51 3.3 Hierarchical classification of verbal material of the parliamentary debate on the voting of the second Memorandum 52 3.4 Factor analysis of the political parties that participated in the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the second Memorandum53 3.5 Hierarchical classification of verbal material of the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the third Memorandum 54 3.6 Factor analysis of the political parties that participated in the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the third Memorandum 57 4.1 Change of GDP 2009–2018, at constant basic prices 65 4.2 Greece: yearly circulation of political newspapers (1000s) 70 4.3 Turnover, publishing of newspapers, change 2009/2018 72 4.4 Turnover, publishing of journals and periodicals, change 2009/201873 4.5 Trust in News I Use 74

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Tables 2.1 Coding categories and rules 2.2 Comparisons between seven medical experts across five categories 4.1 Decline in newspaper sales in Greece 2009/2018 4.2 Decline in magazine sales in Greece 2009–2018

28 30 69 69

INTRODUCTION Emmanouil Takas Panteion University

Sofia Iordanidou Open University of Cyprus, Advanced Media Institute

Nael Jebril Media Studies Program, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies

If  there is  something that  we have learned as  an international community during the  past few (and not  only) years is  that  in  today’s interconnected world, a  crisis  is never ‘far away’ from us. From the  recent paradigms of the  international financial crisis  in  2008 and its aftermath to the  pandemic of  COVID-19 and the  war between Russia  and Ukraine, we have all experienced the effects of a crisis in different contexts and depths. Research on crisis  and crisis  communication involves many models and definitions, but with the common denominator that a crisis is a major occurrence with a  potentially negative outcome (Coombs 2015). A  basic condition of a crisis is a non-specific event, which has a strong effect on the entire social tissue and creates feelings of uncertainty (Seeger 1998). In this environment, political communication is expected to highlight clear leadership with the aim of alleviating the  symptoms of this  crisis  and strengthening the  structures so  that  the  next crisis  will have milder effects. Along with the  term ‘crisis’, that  is  both experientially and scholarly defined, the  term ‘political communication’ has been widely researched and sometimes vaguely defined. For  example, Pye (1993: 422) follows a  social-constructivist definition by arguing that political communication is ‘the flow of messages and information that gives structure and meaning to the political process’. In addition, Blumler (2014: 39) highlights the  importance of the  media  organisations suggesting that  political and media  organisations ‘show a  horizontal interaction while on a  vertical axis, they separately and jointly engage in  disseminating and processing information and ideas  to and from the  mass citizenry’. Other scholars (  Jamieson and Kenski 2014; Powell and Cowart 2003) with a wider

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approach define political communication as  a  communicative activity of citizens, individual political figures, public institutions, media  and social movements. Perloff (2018: 12) defines political communication as a ‘complex, communicative activity in which language and symbols, employed by leaders, media, citizens and citizen groups, exert a multitude of effects on individuals and society, as well as on outcomes that bear on the public policy of a nation, state or community’, highlighting the notion of political leadership. At  this  point, Kahn (2020) identifies two models of leadership, namely the Political Prominence Model, where the political protagonist receives advice from experts but still reserves the decision-making process and the Expert Appointee Prominence Model, where the politician focuses on delegation of the decisionmaking process. In both models, trust is a crucial factor in political communication during crisis ( Van Zoonen and Holtz-Bacha 2000). In this volume, both models are apparent, highlighting that the way in which a crisis is interpreted by political actors and media underscores their strategic leadership. In  addition, scholars such as  Haslam et  al. argue that  effective political and media  communication during a  crisis  should be built on a  social identity approach. The  authors argue that  social protagonist should focus on building a ‘togetherness’ rather than a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Under this prism, they argue that the rhetoric of political and media actors to motivate others is grounded to their identity leadership especially in crises where identity plays a significant role (Steffens et al. 2014). This  volume addresses a  central and multifaceted question in  different contexts: How does political rhetoric and media deal with a crisis? Although the  question has  been explored many times at  different levels, this  volume focuses on the  following areas: (a) the  economic and social crisis  of the Memoranda  in  Greece and the  impact of the  logic of the  Memoranda  on journalism, (b) populism as a political choice, (c) the geographical crisis with the conflict of geopolitical interests and (d) the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this volume is to explore the common grounds and differences of political rhetoric at different levels of ‘crisis’ in different examples. More specifically, the volume aspires to contribute to the narrative of political communication and the media by the following: Examining how responses to crises are mediated through media  and political discourse • Identifying the key challenges of political communication in times of crisis • Discussing politically populist trends and discourses in time of crisis Assessing the  implications of the  financial crisis  on media  and political discourse.

Introduction

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In the present context, where crisis is more frequent than tranquility and social balance, this  volume consists of different paradigms and approaches, aspiring to contribute to the  wider discussion on crisis  communication, political rhetoric and media. Chapter 1 (  Jamie Matthews) focuses on the relationship between crises, as an event and a process and as a process of collective sense making. The chapter provides the theoretical ground for the term ‘crisis’, that even though is mostly considered as  an opaque term, there are many definitions across different disciplines that  agree that  a  crisis  is an ‘unexpected disruption that  will or is perceived by some, to lead to adverse outcomes’. The chapter contributes in  seeking the  concept of crises, namely its nature, its different forms, the underlying processes and actors that shape crisis and its outcome. It begins with a  qualitative exploration of definitions from different fields, namely differentiations and common characteristics between different theoretical approaches. This exploration sets the narrative boundaries of each approach and highlights the characteristics of each theoretical paradigm. The narrative of this  chapter follows the  notion of ‘crisis  events’, ‘crisis  processes’, ‘sense making and construction of crisis’ and the characteristics of a crisis (visibility and absence, elite sources and narratives. The author argues that a crisis is a  social construction and subject to collective sense-making processes and highlights the role of the media as an integral part of the sense-making process. Following this  theoretical background, Chapter  2 (Yu Xiang) analyses the  framing processes of the  medical experts by Xinhua, the  leading state media and mediator of the party line and the largest news agency in China, during the COVID-19 pandemic. China has been placed in the epicentre of the  COVID-19 pandemic, often by the  western media  attributing missteps to the Wuhan government. In this context, China used proactive diplomatic strategies, such as providing masks and vaccines to other countries, to increase its soft power and reverse the  negative image of the  country. This  reversal has  been accomplished through a  strategic effort of the  domestic media, such as  Xinhua, in  an effort to construct and support a  positive image of the Chinese government. By employing content analysis, the chapter focuses on Xinhua’s coverages of seven Chinese medical experts, with five of them having governmental backgrounds. The  corpus consists of samples across 10 months, from 20 January 2020 to 28 November 2020 and five categories arose: (a) professional knowledge, (b) positive interpretation, (c) support for government initiatives, (d) individual achievement recognition and (d) government accreditation and award. These categories are used to highlight the processes of framing for each of the  seven experts during the  examined period. The  main findings show that  two events were decisive in  constructing the  Chinese

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anti-pandemic narrative: (a) the lifted lockdown of Wuhan in April and (b) the  celebration ceremony at  the  Great  Hall of the  People in  September, where Xi Jinping awarded four medical experts for their contribution and celebrated the ‘victory’ over the pandemic. These experts were framed as heroic figures contributing to an epic narrative of ‘conquering the contagion’ and were used as a basis and proof of the ability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to successfully navigate the Chinese nation through the COVID-19 pandemic. Chapter  3 (Emmanouil Takas  and Gerasimos Prodromitis) focuses on the Greek political rhetoric through an extremely harsh period, namely from 2008 to 2015, where the three Memoranda were signed. The impacts of the international financial crisis  hit  Greece hard resulting in  a  major societal, political and financial turmoil that the country still faces. This chapter provides the historical context of the signing of the three Memoranda and explores the political rhetoric through the exploration of the official parliamentary transcripts regarding the voting of the  first, second and third Memorandum. The authors argue that  in  times of crisis, as  suggested in  Chapter  1, political rhetoric forms representations, explanations and evaluations of the  crisis. These  representations are encapsulated in  the  process of social influence, highlighting what ‘should be done’ and what ‘is necessary’. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to explore the dominant representations of the parliamentary discussions and how these were constructed to achieve social influence. The authors analysed the official transcripts of the parliamentary debates regarding the  three memoranda  to highlight the  dominant representations and party positioning, by applying thematic and structural analyses using hierarchical classification. For  each parliamentary discussion, hierarchical classification was  employed as  well as  factor analysis  of the  political parties that  participated in  each parliamentary discussion. The  hierarchical classification in each parliamentary discussion depicts the main themes, their connections and their content. The  factor analysis  in  each parliamentary discussion, according to its pro- or anti-memorandum rhetoric, shows the party positioning and the dividing borders of each political party. The main conclusions of this chapter, regarding representations, highlight that in the parliamentary discussion regarding the first Memorandum, ‘Europe’ was  the  main  representation. In  the  second Memorandum, the  dominant representation was ‘Debt’ and in the third one, the dominant representation ‘intra-parliamentary procedural issues’ shows how the Greek political system internalised the  necessity of remaining in  Europe and accepting the  Debt, issues that until today play a crucial role in the cohesion of the social context. Following the same period as in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 (Sofia Iordanidou and Leonidas Vatikiotis) focuses on the implications of memoranda in Greece

Introduction

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in  the  Greek Press. We stand in  a  period that  not only the  circulation of printed newspapers and magazines was affected because of the rise of new media, but we also face the harsh austerity measures that were imposed by the  Troika  (IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank) on the Greek society. Greece was under the strict supervision of the Troika from May 2010, when the first Memorandum was signed, until August 2018, when the third Memorandum officially expired, and suffered a huge loss in GDP during those years. In  a  context of severe social, financial and political crisis, the authors focus on whether the general decline of the press was due to declining revenues or to changes that  affect the  media  industry because of the  new media. Comparative examination of indicators in  Greece and other European countries was  used, in  two variables: first, the  circulation and second, the publishers’ revenues. Indicators were used in comparison to highlight the extent to which the Greek Press differed from other European countries under the  logic of the  Memoranda  and the  suffocating austerity measures imposed by Troika. The authors conclude that the differentiations in Europe during 2009–2018 were significant regarding the drop in newspaper and magazine circulations, suggesting that  there is  a  positive relationship between GDP/income and the purchase of newspapers and magazines, thus shrinking the circulation of newspapers in  countries, where structural adjustment programmes  were imposed. Building on the argument that the Memoranda politics had negative impact on the freedom and the polyphony of the press, the authors highlight that the decline in newspaper and magazine readership, and thus the quality of information, was greater among the lower-income and social strata. This leads to a dependence of the circulation on higher-income strata, that affects the content of the newspapers and magazines, thus tightening the ties between the press and the higher, but smaller, socially delimited readership. On another case, where elites and the ‘people’ relate in terms of populism, Chapter  5 (Aysecan Kartal) discusses populism in  media  in  the  paradigm of the Turkish health reform. In particular, it analyses how the newspapers that self-identify as close to the government (Zaman and Yeni Safak) depicted the  government’s health sector reforms in  the  period from 2002 to 2011. These reforms included compulsory service in the eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey and included both general practitioners and specialist doctors. The  State required them to work for between 300 and 600 days in the region, but the law impacted doctors that had never worked in public service before and those who graduated after the law was passed, thus not all doctors in Turkey were included in this compulsory scheme. The Ministry of Health was  still, after the  passage of the  law, trying to understand the  lack of doctors in eastern and south-eastern provinces and the pro-governmental

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media  framed the  doctors opposing to this  law as  ‘self-interested’. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to explore how and to what extent the pro-governmental media portray the health sector reform, and how it provides and receives narrative frames to and by the government. The  theoretical framework of this  chapter draws upon the  populistic discourse studies, highlighting that  populistic narratives can be used as a strategic choice and as  a  ‘thin-centred’ ideology. The  chapter also  uses the concepts of ‘neoliberal populism’ or ‘neopopulism’ that recently emerged. Moving to the north borders of Greece, Chapter 6 (Lefteris Kretsos and Valia  Kaimaki) theorises on ‘disinformation’ regarding the  2018 Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia. The  authors argue that this  agreement initiated narrative episodes of political disinformation, propaganda and xenophobic populism. The Prespa Agreement was a crucial incident in  modern politics of Greece and south-eastern Europe, since for more than 25 years after the dismantlement of Yugoslavia and the creation of a  new State in  the  north-west of Greece, these two countries failed to reach an agreement regarding the  name. The  ‘new State’ chose the  name ‘Macedonia’ for itself, a  name that  had strong connotations geographically and historically to Greece. Nevertheless, as the authors argue, the potential of a NATO membership of this new State brought the name issue as an urgent manner. Therefore, in June 2018, the Greek and Northern Macedonia Foreign Ministers signed the Agreement, in the presence of both prime ministers. Set as an example, the analysis focuses on theoretical discussions regarding media  power, media  manipulation and rising populism. In  addition, it  examines the  structural elements of media  systems in  both countries, in order to explore the role of the media in manipulative and disinformative narratives. The authors build their analysis on evidence and views expressed by media policymakers and professional journalists from both sides in a highlevel meeting held in Athens, Greece, in 2019. The  authors conclude that  in  terms of media  analysis, the  case  of this Agreement did not provide evidence of Greek or Northern Macedonian exceptionalism in  terms of the  disinformation, propaganda  and media manipulation that took place. Therefore, they argue that disinformation and propaganda  regarding the  Agreement were products of specific political and financial context as well as structural factors of media ecologies in both countries. A volume on political discourse, media and crisis could not ignore the relation of these notions to the COVID-19 pandemic, a crisis that has affected our social interactions, thoughts, feelings and practices in tremendous ways. Chapter 7 (Katerina  Diamantaki and Lemonia  Mourka) focuses on the  rhetoric of the  political elite during the  COVID-19 health crisis. This  cross-national

Introduction

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analysis explores the narratives of political leaders in the United States, UK, Germany, Greece and New Zealand. The theoretical framework of this chapter is based on theories regarding the discursive construction of legitimation and the  main  legitimation type’s authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoeia. The  study analysed a  sample of 16 texts by the  political actors’ statements and explored the legitimation and frame-building processes as well as rhetorical and persuasive power in political discourse. By  applying both quantitative and qualitative methods, the  authors identified five major thematic categories regarding preferred types of legitimations and discursive strategies: (i) exigence, (ii) a collective problem of shared responsibility, (iii) authority and leadership discourse, (iv) instrumental rationalization and (v) variations in  political actors’ pandemic response. The  authors conclude that  strategic intentionality and legitimation are an integral part of the pandemic-related political discourse. The picture presented by the chapters in this book suggest that there are many theoretical approaches to the notion ‘crisis’, but still many paradigms. The political and media discourse is called upon to initiate processes of sense making and navigate through a crisis, even though both political and media are mostly in a crisis themselves. On the one hand, political scepticism arises and on the other hand, media often find themselves aligned to the governmental imperatives, causing public mistrust. Although the cases discussed in this book may not be representative of all crises, they shed light to the continuous debate regarding crisis and if crises could be avoided, foreseen or, at  least, more inclusively communicated. We hope that  the  present contributions would further develop interdisciplinary approaches and provide readers with useful insights on the subjects.

References Blumler, J. G. (2014). Mediatization and democracy. In Mediatization of Politics (pp. 31–41). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Coombs, W. T. (2015). The value of communication during a crisis: Insights from strategic communication research. Business Horizons, 58(2):141–148. Kahn, L. H. (2020). Who’s in charge? Leadership during epidemics, bioterror attacks, and other public health crises. ABC-CLIO. Kenski, K. and Jamieson K. H. (2017). Political communication: Looking ahead. In Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication. Oxford Handbooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.86. Perloff, R. M. (2018). Mass communication research at the crossroads: Definitional issues and theoretical directions for mass and political communication scholarship in an age of online media. In Advances in Foundational Mass Communication Theories (pp. 273–298). Routledge. Powell, L. and Cowart, J. (2003). Political Campaign Communication: Inside and Outside. New York: Routledge.

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Pye, L. W. (1993). An introductory profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s political culture. The China Quarterly, 135:412–443. Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L. and Ulmer, R. R. (1998). Communication, organization, and crisis. Annals of the International Communication Association, 21(1):231–276. Steffens, N. K., Haslam, S. A. and Reicher, S. D. (2014). Up close and personal: Evidence that shared social identity is a basis for the ‘special’ relationship that binds followers to leaders. The Leadership Quarterly, 25(2):296–313. Van Zoonen, L. and Holtz-Bacha, C. (2000). Personalisation in Dutch and German politics: The case of talk show. Javnost – The Public, 7(2):45–56.

Chapter 1 CONCEPTUALISING CRISIS: EVENTS, CRISIS PROCESSES AND COLLECTIVE SENSEMAKING Jamie Matthews Bournemouth University

Crisis  is an opaque term, applicable to a  range of different domains and practices. Its origins lie in  the  progression and treatment of disease, where crisis  indicates a  turning point at  which the  disease becomes more serious (Kamei 2019). Central to many definitions that  are shared across different disciplines is that a crisis is an unexpected disruption that will, or is perceived by some, lead to adverse outcomes. In sociology and political science, a crisis is characterised as  a  ‘period of discontinuity, marking the  breaking point in a patterned process of linearity’ (Boin 2005). Crises and their effects have been conceptualised at different levels at which they occur. First is the micro level. These are crises that affect or are a result of errors made by an individual. Next is the meso level, which are the crises that impact on organisations or are a consequence of organisational failures. Finally, there is the macro level, the crises that have widespread repercussions for society. The focus of this chapter is these crises that have a wider societal impact. While some may appear more limited in their geographic or temporal latitudes, with their acute impacts experienced by a particular state or country, many reflect the  accumulation and intersection of vulnerabilities that  lead to crisis. This includes those that connect to or are a consequence of global challenges, the  climate crisis, pandemic risks and structural inequalities, for example. This chapter seeks to illuminate the concept of crisis. It addresses questions concerning the  nature of crisis, their different forms and the  underlying processes and actors that shape crisis and their outcomes. To this end, it begins by evaluating the contrasting definitions and the common characteristics of

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crises. At a macro level, a crisis is often understood as a disruptive event or process that  will have a  significant impact on society. These  may be slow burning, evolving gradually and over time, environmental degradation and persistent conflict are two evident examples here, and, as a consequence, there may be uncertainty about the appropriate course of action (Nohrstedt 2008). Others, such as disaster and financial shocks, are characterised as acute events. While this typology of crises is well established within the literature, it is unable to encompass the breadth of risks, vulnerabilities and underpinning processes that precipitate crisis. This chapter also considers the social construction of crisis and the extent to which crisis  and their impacts are products of collective sensemaking process. This approach acknowledges how the interests of claims makers may be advanced in defining an issue or event as a crisis and thereby necessitating intervention (Spector 2019). The  boundaries and narrative to a  crisis  are socially constructed, as  a  consequence of the  negotiation between different actors about appropriate courses of action. Significantly, the  media  are integral to these processes by giving voice to different actors, reproducing or challenging elite discourse and presenting different policy choices. In  addressing these two broad aims, the  discussion will draw on  recent examples of crises affecting the UK, including the crisis processes of extremism and terrorism, those brought into focus by the  disaster at  Grenfell and Brexit referendum.

Crisis Events The  orthodox view is  that  crises are events that  possess ‘the  characteristics of  threat’ and as  consequence it  is  these unexpected happenings that  often become the  focus of analysis  (Spector 2019). The  types of event that  may constitute a  crisis  are extensive. Some distinguish between internal and external events. At a state or societal level, an internal crisis arises from political conditions, conflict or internal hazards that lead to adverse impacts for residents and communities. External events are those that  cut across geographical terrain  and are transitional in  their scope, a  major disaster event, external conflict or financial collapse, such as  that  triggered by subprime mortgage lending and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The central critique of the crisis as events model is that a crisis is seldom the  result of a  single isolated event and often derives from the  interactions between different happenings or is  the  manifestation of underlying process and vulnerabilities. To  borrow from the  related concept of disaster, Pescaroli et al. (2018) explore how disasters often cascade, with a natural or human-induced hazard event interacting with other events to create adverse



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impacts. A trigger for a cascading crisis, and one that will have wider societal impacts, may be characterised as  an external event and one that  is  outside of the  authority of the  state, the  emergence of a  novel virus, for example, or volatility within  the  international financial markets. This  external event may interact with those internal to state, a change in government following disputed or inconclusive election result, for instance, that  creates further instability. Others go beyond the  notion of cascades to conceptualise crises or disaster events that extend further than ‘national political boundaries’ and have no clear point of origin as Trans Social System Ruptures (Quarantelli et al. 2018). These are the crises that have global resonance and can disrupt ‘multiple systems that operate across national borders’ (Wachtendorf 2009). The crisis as discrete events approach also seeks to reflect their temporal characteristics, describing both fast and slow-burning crisis events. Fast crises are the sudden disruptive shocks, the low probability yet high-impact events. At  a  societal level, these are the  unexpected and significant events. Slowburning crises are those that  evolve gradually, exemplified by underfunding of healthcare resources, unemployment, inequality and environmental degradation. Their future impacts cannot be foreseen, yet over time may accrue and will come into focus at  critical moments. It  is  these periods of discontinuity and the events that follow, rather than their underlying processes, that become the focus of attention. Therefore, when people take to the street to protest against inequality and injustice, it  is  the  event that  may have precipitated this  action or the  collective action that  becomes defined and understood as  crisis. This  highlights the  limitations of the  crisis  as  events model. A narrow focus on events draws attention away from the underlying crisis processes. There are also many critical moments that will fail to register as significant disruptions and as a consequence there is lack of coordinated responses to address these conditions (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2019). The  crisis  as  event approach also  recognises the  implications of place and proximity for understanding a  crisis  and their impacts. Events are often considered as arising from and impacting on a geographically defined area. Distance is also a variable that determines how an event is perceived. The fire that destroyed Grenfell Tower block in South London in 2017 may, within the events paradigm, be characterised as limited in its geographic scope and to those communities directly affected by this tragic event. This disaster, however, also represented a crisis moment for the United Kingdom. It served to illuminate issues of governance concerning the built environment, in particular, in  respect of fire safety, but  also  the  issues of inequality and deprivation. As a crisis, it also fed into wider political debates about the incumbent prime minister, Theresa  May’s, leadership and the  consequences of the  UK’s fiscal austerity programme. A subsequent public enquiry into this event was

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initiated, which is  ongoing and at  the  time of writing is  yet to report. As a critical juncture, the Grenfell crisis, shed light on these different processes.

Crisis Processes A  crisis  such as  that  presented by the  Grenfell Tower fire highlights the limitations of the crisis-as-event model. It fails to recognise the complexity and interactions between different processes that can become known and constituted as crisis. An alternative conceptualisation is that for the state or society, a crisis may represent a  period of critical transformation (Hay 1999) or a  progressive process that  may not  be restricted to one area  within  a  common border (Mikušová and Horváthová 2019: 1847). A crisis may initially be disruptive with adverse effects but will also facilitate opportunities for positive change. Another view, and one that is outlined further in this chapter, is that a crisis is the product of crisis processes (Boin 2005). It is necessary, then, to turn our attention to these and understand how these processes and their interactions, rather than events, may lead to adverse outcomes. Some have argued that  crisis  processes are difficult to isolate and define. They  are sometimes imperceptible until they begin to emerge as a threat to society (Rosenthal et al. 2001: 7 cited in Boin 2005). Buckle (2005), consequently, characterises these processes as open ended. They are more than a sequence of interrelated and cascading events but  instead are the  deep-seated, protracted and complex phenomena  that  intersect and give rise to uncertainty. These  processes are broad and multifaceted but include deprivation and development inequalities, ecological and environmental destruction, declining legitimacy and public trust in institutions and shifts in public attitudes and values. Simon Cottle (2009) has  advanced the  notion of global crisis, as  threats that are transnational in their scope and emerge as a feature of globalisation are increasingly complex. These  global crises are beyond the  prerogative and capacity of national governments to respond and require coordinated international solutions. The  climate crisis, financial collapse, forcible population movements and poverty are illustrative of global crises that persist and cannot be understood as exceptional events. A flood, therefore, may be constructed and understood as  a  single ‘natural’ hazard event, yet flooding and its impacts will be due to ongoing, dynamic and interconnected processes of change and destabilisation, such as rising sea levels, urbanisation and poor infrastructure. To  offer a  further example, the  refugee and migrant crisis  as  it  become known and constructed in discourse is underpinned by a series of interrelated and non-linear crisis processes. To understand the nature of this crisis, it is



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necessary to consider the push and pull factors that cause migration. People may be forced by conflict or persecution to leave their home, and as refugees are seeking safety and security. The crisis processes, therefore, are those push factors that  compel people to leave, the  most common of which are war, conflict and political, religious or social persecution (Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement Survey 2019). Other factors that contribute to human insecurity, natural hazards, hunger and famine and increasingly climate change also  cause forcibly displacement of populations and as  such are the crisis processes that drive migration. Political instability and governmental collapse can lead to the  persecution of groups in  society. In  turn, this  can contribute to further violence and conflict. As  has  been witnessed in  Syria, the  root causes of public grievances towards regimes in  the  Middle East and North Africa region were complex and multifaceted, including political repression, economic inequality, corruption, unemployment and youth demographics. These also are illustrative of the continual or transformational processes that contribute to crisis. The  pull factors that  explain  migration, which include seeking better employment opportunities, education or social reasons, may also be defined as crisis processes. Global inequalities, in  particular, in  terms of wages and employment opportunities, are significant drivers of migration patterns. Migration then is  also  a  consequence of the  structural imbalances within the international system and this represents a crisis process that creates and sustains these disparities. Crisis processes may occur spontaneously, but most can be characterised as  persistent and long-standing issues. Boin  et  al. (2020: 123) introduce the  notion of creeping crises, which are non-linear processes that  will ‘demonstrate small bursts of acceleration’ and then are followed by ‘periods of stasis  or reversal’. This  represents a  point at  which a  crisis  process may reach a  tipping point and necessitate interventions from policy actors. One criticism of such responses is  that  they often seek to address the  symptoms that  these processes create, rather than the  underlying issues themselves, which often recur and create further crises (Bernanke, Geithner,  & Paulson 2019 cited in Boin et al. 2020). A similar line of argument has been advocated when considering the  antecedent conditions for disaster, with disasters only made visible when they have reached a critical moment. Disasters, therefore, result from the  intersection of hazards and persistent vulnerabilities, and it is necessary to reconfigure notions of disaster (Matthews and Thorsen 2020). Some argue that complexity, their transborder characteristics and pervasive nature of such process mean that periods of exceptions and crisis have become the  norm (Agamben 2005). Others have described contemporary society as marked by a state of permanent crisis (Beck 1992).

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It is necessary to acknowledge that the process view of crisis is not without critique. Processes by their definition reach into and across all domains from economic, social, institutional, political and cultural. Crisis  processes also, as has been argued, intersect with and are affected by others. It is, therefore, difficult to isolate and develop solutions when they may be so all encompassing.

Sensemaking and the Construction of Crisis Thus far the discussion of crisis has centred on crisis as objective and verifiable events or process. More explicitly that crisis and what constitutes a crisis are uncontested. The  reality, however, is  that  crises are social constructions and subject to sensemaking process. That  is  not to say that  crises may represent a real, present and long-standing threat  to the  state or society but that what becomes constituted as crisis and how they are presented are often disputed. Some crises or crisis processes fail to register; others may be constructed as a such by groups whose interests are served by this definition, for example. If an event or issue is constructed as a crisis, it necessitates forms of action, interventions or policies to meet the perceived threat or vulnerability. It is to this important debate that the chapter now turns. Social constructionist approaches recognise how crises are defined and legitimised by social actors (Gergen 1985). They acknowledge that the social world is not objective but has subjective meaning (Berger and Luckmann 1991). Moreover, these social construction processes are situated within  the  social, historical and cultural contexts that  shape discourse (Fairclough 1993). It is possible, therefore, to argue that  a  crisis  is a  social construct. It is the negotiation between different actors and the contexts in which meanings are produced that  determine what  becomes known and constituted as a crisis and the narratives or frames through which they are communicated. Spector (2019: 276–277) proposes the  ‘crisis  as  claims’ model to outline the social construction of crises. In this framework, a crisis will be established by ‘claims makers’, those who define a problem and may do so to advance their own interests. By describing an event or process as a crisis, these actors ‘exercise their power to raise awareness, focus attention, and devote resources towards some matters and away from others.’ This  model, as  within  other domains of social construction, is concerned with power and how it is deployed through what is defined, communicated and understood as  crisis. For  those crises affecting the state, our attention is focused on the social, political and institutional actors that hold power within these systems. Communication is  central to understanding social construction and its processes (Burr 2015). Language is a tool for both understanding the social world and constructing meaning. Therefore, language is  not neutral and



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cannot be separated from its social and cultural context. The communicative choices that  are made, how issues and events are presented, justified and framed, through the use of particular linguistic constructs, such as the use of metaphors or labels, can serve to construct and reconstruct a crisis narrative. Within the discourses on crisis, their urgency has been underlined by the use of alternative constructs. An event may be described as  an emergency or a  permanent crisis, which implies that  their severity and immediacy are of greater concern than other issues or events. In  a  similar way, Marchese (2011) described the deployment of the oxymoron, ‘a permanent emergency’ to describe a  failure to address the  issues of housing and extreme poverty in Argentina. In recent years, there has also been a shift in public discourse away from the  term climate change to reference the  climate crisis  or emergency when describing the process and consequences of global warming. This is reflected in the way many national and local governments have made climate emergency declarations and the adoption of the expression ‘climate emergency.’ The  Guardian newspaper’s style guide was  updated in  2019 to reflect this change, explaining that climate emergency would be its preferred term to ‘better reflect the scientific consensus that this was a catastrophe for humanity’ (Carrington 2019). The  rhetoric of emergency is  a  call to action, accentuating the  need for a response and a commitment from policymakers. As a discursive construct, an emergency can advocate the  need for special measures, powers that  are often enacted and legitimised in  response to series threats to the  state. The introduction of emergency powers and the extension of the state security apparatus in European countries in response to terrorist attacks through 2016 and 2017 were justified as necessary to mitigate the risk posed by terrorism. Many have argued that these measures were disproportionate, illustrated, for example, by the discourse on returning foreign fighters that has contributed to the securitisation of migration and border control within European states (Baker-Beall 2019). In  response to COVID-19, governments across the  world have enacted a raft of measures to curb the spread of the virus, including the introduction of emergency legislation that has placed unprecedent limitations on businesses and people’s freedom of movement and assembly. As  with terrorism before, Agamben (2005, 2020) has argued that the extension of state powers in response to COVID-19 demonstrates how emergencies have become situations of exception that  have been used to expand the  powers of the  state. Other theorists refute this idea, contending that the human, social and economic toll of Coronavirus show that Coronavirus is a real and significant health crisis and government interventions, many of which were temporary, were necessary to save lives and to safeguard public health systems (Walby 2021).

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Some have argued that  in  the  discursive construction of terrorism and COVID-19, the  language of emergency or crisis  has  heightened the  need for such special measures. Despite the  debates about the  proportionality of responses, such presentations contribute to public anxiety about these crises and may enhance support for emergency interventions. Critiques of government responses to terrorism (Jackson 2005) and the COVID-19 health emergency (Agamben 2020) have claimed their construction as  permanent emergencies are illustrative of these dynamics. Rather than being manufactured, crises can be understood as both real and socially constructed (Beck 1999). As Walby (2021: 35) argues, a crisis will have disputed ‘origins and remedies’, its narrative will be contested and there will be a ‘struggle over its meaning and implications.’ Media are integral to these processes of sensemaking. By deciding what makes the news and how issues and events are presented to their audiences, news media are a source of symbolic reality. This process is the consequence of interactions between different levels of discourse (Pan and Kosicki 1993), such as  the  sociopolitical and cultural contexts in which news is produced but also the professional practices and values of journalism (Schudson 1978). Kotišová (2019) argues then that journalism and journalists are not separate from but integral to the construction of crisis. Visibility and absence Crises are made visible through news media. The  discussion above demonstrates how significant disruptive events, in  contrast to slow-burning issues, are more likely to become constituted as  a  crisis. Even if we only consider events as manifestations of crisis processes, those deemed significant in one context may not resonate in others. There are different explanations that can be offered for the visibility and absence of these crises in media. Some emphasise the  systemic factors that  influence international news coverage. Global economic and media systems, such as the presence of news agencies, determine that  events that  impact on countries that  sit  at  the  top of these hierarchies, often Western countries, are more likely to receive coverage (Wu 2003). This leads to greater attention afforded to crises that affect these countries and their interests (Himelboim et  al. 2010). For  crises affecting lower-income countries, it  is  only when they reach a  threshold in  terms of their significance, magnitude and scale of their impacts that they register for international media (Alexander 2005: 27; Gans 1980). News values, including geographic and cultural proximity, influence what makes the  news. Stories that  are perceived to be distant from and therefore of less relevance to audiences will only be reported when



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they have wider regional or global significance. Proximity explains  why European  media  afforded widespread coverage of the  shootings at the Charlie Hebdo offices in  Paris  in  January 2015. Yet, the  deaths of 2,000 people  in Baga, northern Nigeria, following attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram, received very little international news coverage. Both events, however, reflected the  persistent security crisis  of terrorism and violent extremism. Commercial imperatives, editorial decisions, limitations in resources and professional practices of journalism also  contribute to the visibility and  absence of events and processes, and as  consequence what may become constituted as crisis. Elite sources Journalists due to practical considerations but  also  due to the  cultural authority and credibility they afford to news reports, will often defer to official or elite sources (Crow and Boykoff 2014). This privileged position allows these sources to act as the primary definers of news events, enabling them to shape agendas and to establish the parameters of debate around issues and events (Hall et al. 2013). Elite sources include representatives of the government, political elites and business. Journalists, therefore, will take the  lead from these sources. While recent studies present a more nuanced assessment of the influence of these sources, demonstrating how digital media  has  enhanced the  diversity of sources that have access to the media (Barnoy and Reich 2021), elite sources still dominate in  many areas  and in  particular in  coverage of crisis  and matters of security (Larsen 2019). Significantly, during periods of instability and crisis, the media operate in  what  Hallin  (1984) describes as  ‘a  sphere of consensus’, where those that may seek to present different views and policy choices are not afforded access to the  media. Media, therefore, tend to reproduce the  official narrative to issues and events and there is  a  narrower range of sources that  have access to the  media. What  becomes constituted as  crisis  will reflect elite discourse and how crises are constructed and interpreted by elites. It  also  may constrain  the  extent that  opposing views or criticisms of crisis response are recognised. Jarvis (2021) identifies how the language of crisis evolved through UK government discourses on COVID-19, where it was depicted as a national emergency, a global crisis and the most severe moment threat to the UK since the Second World War. This narrative was, consequently, reproduced in media and public discourse, mirroring this elite framing of this crisis.

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Narrative of crisis News media can adopt the  language of elites, thereby acting as  secondary definers of crisis. Through the  selective decisions that  are made when presenting stories and issues to their audiences, they are also able to amplify and reconstruct discourses of crisis. These  include the  types of stories that  journalists select and also  the  narratives that  are used to engage their audiences, for example, those that may focus on individual human-interest stories or emphasise conflict or discord. These narratives can reflect universal story forms (Kitch 2003) but are also a consequence of journalism practices and how stories are translated and packaged for audiences. A crisis, therefore, could be framed as  such in  news accounts to illustrate its significance. For the UK, Brexit  was  a  significant moment, a  constitutional crisis, as  some described it (Wincott et al. 2021). It is also drawn as a crisis in news accounts as it reflected and created discord in society. Scholars have shown, therefore, that  the  construction of Brexit  in  the  UK media  was  a  function of the language and rhetoric of crisis, one that was articulated by elites, illustrated by both Leave and Remain sides of the referendum debate, but one that was also  reconstructed through the  media. This was evident in the  way ‘social and cultural differences between’ the typical representations of supporters of the  two different positions were presented through media  coverage and served to reproduce the  polarising debates that  characterised the referendum campaign (Zappettini and Krzyżanowski 2019). A narrative to the crisis  continued through and beyond the  UK’s subsequent withdrawal from European Union in December 2020. Media  can also  sensationalise or adopt crisis  frames. The  use of emotive language, rhetoric, headlines or images, for example, can facilitate the  construction of crisis. This  is not  to say that  media  work in  a  vacuum but that it is the features of news discourse that may underline their severity and contribute to these processes of sensemaking.

Conclusions This  chapter explores the  concept of crisis  and its social construction. In evaluating the different typologies of crisis, it has been shown that crises are often understood as disruptive events. In reality, they are often a symptom of crisis  processes, the  persistent and long-standing issues that  create vulnerabilities. While events are significant, as critical moments that become the  focus of attention, they are often symptomatic of long-standing issues. As such, they may function as tipping points when recognition and intervention become necessary.



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It  has  also  sought to demonstrate how crises are social constructions and subject to collective sensemaking processes. What  becomes known and constructed as  a  crisis  may reflect the  interests of dominant groups. Moreover, the  frames or narratives through which they are communicated, and the meaning implications of crisis are often uncertain. In the UK, this has been evident in  the  complex and fractured narratives to the  long-standing crisis processes of terrorism and extremist violence and, more recently, those illuminated by the disaster at Grenfell and through Brexit. This  chapter has  argued that  the  media  are integral to these processes of sensemaking. To  illustrate this, it  has  highlighted factors both external and internal to journalism that may contribute to the social construction of crisis. These may be through providing visibility to crisis processes, through prioritising the  perspectives of elites and in  the  reproduction of dominant narratives and representations of crisis.

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Chapter 2 A REVERSED NARRATIVE OF PUBLIC CRISIS: XINHUA’S FRAMING OF MEDICAL EXPERTS IN COVID-19 PANDEMIC Yu Xiang Shanghai University, Shanghai, China

Introduction As the world continues to linger in the gloom of COVID-19, the narrative of the  epidemic has  been flipped in  China  where the  virus controversially originated. With the public memories about the missteps took by the Wuhan government in handling the outbreak fading away, the mass media adapted the tragic story to a national victory achieved by the central government (Case 2020). Proactive diplomatic strategies, such as providing masks and vaccines to other countries, have been taken to boost the soft power of China in the global sphere (Verma 2020). Accordingly, it is argued that instead of being weakened by the ‘blundering initial responses’, Xi Jinping managed to present himself as ‘a forceful and triumphant leader on the world stage’ (Huang 2020). Such reversal was  accomplished through ‘a  tremendous behind-the-scene effort’ made by the  domestic media  (Yuan 2021a). Facilitated by the  tightened censorship during the  pandemic (Shibu 2020), state media  abiding by the party line has been the dominant sources of information that has been shaping the  mainland audiences’ perception of the  crisis. It  is  revealed in  a  recent study that  by ‘sharing positive stories and promoting the  CCP (Chinese Communist Party) pandemic response, rewriting recent history in a manner favourable to the CCP as the coronavirus pandemic evolved, and using targeted ads to spread preferred messages’ (Molter and DiResta 2020) the state media frames the onslaught of COVID-19 as an ‘extraordinary and historic test’ that the Chinese nation led by the CCP eventually passed after hard fighting (Zhao and Liu 2020).

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Among the heroic figures that constitute the epic narrative of conquering the contagion, medical professionals seem the  most outstanding group highlighted by the  government and the  media  (Stanway and Pollard 2020). In  September  2020, on a  ceremony celebrating the  victory over the crisis  held at  the  Great  Hall of the  People in  Beijing, Xi Jinping awarded four medical experts who are regarded as  the  ‘role models in  the  country’s fight against the  COVID-19 epidemic’ (CGTN 2020). As  the  awardee of the  highest honour in  China  – ‘Medal of the  Republic’, respiratory expert Zhong Nanshan along with many other scientists and specialists contributed significantly to rewriting the  tragedy of the  COVID-19 pandemic into an inspiring story of the  central government leading its people to overcome disasters. Throughout the year 2020, medical experts as authoritative sources of knowledge on the disease were constantly feeding the public informative messages through the media. Their mediatised presence played a large part in endorsing the government’s measures to contain the epidemic, reassuring and reducing the public’s anxiety, and in so doing, consolidating government legitimacy. The  nexus between these public figures  and the  media  is  key to the formation of the reversed narrative of the health crisis event, and it is of vital importance to find out how they are framed specifically to contribute to the triumphant narrative. This research deploys the method of qualitative content analysis  to examine Xinhua’s coverage of seven medical experts in  the  10 months from 20  January to 28  November in  2020. The  findings of this research show that the transformation of the narrative is manifested in the changing composition of the experts’ five categorised content based on two major events in April and September 2020.

Crisis Framing in China: Rooting for Government Legitimacy As the major primary source of information, media coverage provides people the ‘best – and only – easily available approximation’ of reality (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 185). Numerous studies conducted in  different social and cultural contexts (Dursun 2005; King 1997; Sheafer 2007) have redefined the dictum of Bernard Cohen (1963) to the point that the media can not only influence people ‘what to think about’ but also instruct them ‘how to think’ which is  mainly achieved by ‘framing’. It  is  defined by Entman that  the essence of framing is  to ‘select some aspects of a  perceived reality and make them more salient in  communicating text, in  such a  way to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/ or treatment recommendation’ (1993: 52). Similarly, the purpose of the media to frame a story is to ‘create consequence out of sequence in a meaningful and understandable way’ to ‘promote certain social values’ (Chen 2005: 19).



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This attempt is particularly evident in  the  public event of a  crisis, since ‘people seek information about the crisis and evaluate the cause of the event and the organisational responsibility for the crisis based on media coverage’ (An and Gower 2009: 107). The study of Iyengar and Simon (1993: 380) on the  Persian Gulf crisis  shows that  the  audience with less knowledge about the event is more likely to be influenced by the media coverage. That is to say, more often than not, framing is  particularly effective for crises of complex causes that  are not  easily known to the  public. Under such circumstances, government legitimacy can be particularly vulnerable as  ‘social tension is aggravated to the level of open conflict’ (Tong and Zuo 2014: 67). In the case of reporting crisis in China, media framing and its impact on public perception are directly related to government legitimacy as  the  press is  ‘owned either directly or indirectly by the government’ (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, cited in Zhang and Fleming 2005: 324). It is argued that journalism in the post-Mao reform era has been drifting away from the  ‘old-style propaganda  of a  Leninist state’ (Stockman and Gallaghar 2011: 459) and transferred to a hegemonic hybrid of commercial and ideological nexus (Zhao 1998). However, it remains the reality that even the most liberalised media in Guangzhou is profoundly intertwined with Party power (Lantham 2000). This  becomes increasingly true as  the  president of China Xi Jinping further stressed in 2016 that ‘Party-owned media must hold the  family name of the  party’ (Zhuang 2016). The  loyalty of journalists to socialism is being tested to tighten the Party’s grip on the media (Kuo 2019; Zheng 2019). It only seems natural that guarding, or at least not sabotaging, government legitimacy is the priority. Especially in the events of crises when the legitimacy depending on ‘the consent of the governed’ is under scrutiny (Rosenfeld 2011: 1311, cited in Tong and Zuo 2014: 67), the media in China, while being heavily restricted by censorship, plays the  vital role in  framing a positive narrative that  favours the  authorities. For  example, during the SARS outbreak in Guangdong in 2003, the ‘coverage in the early period of the  epidemic was  controlled, delayed and dysfunctionally underreacted to by the Party-government’ (Zhang and Fleming 2014: 335). A few outspoken media were warned of the story with some of them being closed unexplained (Cunningham 2003). The  silent media  contributed to the  emergence and dissemination of rumours (Ma  2008: 383). The  public’s panic caused great damage to the  economy and led to a  plummeting of the  ruling party’s legitimacy. Some believe that  such scenarios raised ‘government awareness on public attention’ (Liu and Chan 2018: 30). Instead of refraining from addressing the  detrimental impact of the  crises, rewriting these negative narratives as inspirational stories seems a more effective option for controlling public opinion.

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As seen in the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the state media in China were constantly producing new topics, such as highlighting the United States– China  confrontation, to distract the  public’s attention from condemning the authorities for the crisis (Zhao 2020). Xinhua, as the largest news agency in  China, is  widely regarded as  the  state media  serving as  ‘a  government political and ideological apparatus for the ruling Chinese Communist Party’ (Hong 2011: 377). The  positive framing of Xinhua  and its endorsement of government legitimacy have been noticed in  many studies (Chen 2005; Zhao and Xiang 2019). One comparative study on Xinhua’s framing of SARS and Ebola suggests that the positive image of the Chinese government is  promoted by the  more often deployment of ‘reassurance and confidence in  government frames for SARS than Ebola’ indicating that  diseases are better handled at  home (Li et  al. 2017). In  response to the  COVID-19, Xinhua took more proactive approaches to engage public opinion than it did in  SARS. To  counter  the  prevailing rumours about the  pandemic during the lockdown of Wuhan, to calm down the public tension, and to strengthen the  government’s credibility, Xinhua  deployed the  strategy of thrusting medical experts into the spotlight and crowning them as the heroes following the order of the central government. The first appearance of a medical expert on Xinhua was on 20 January with  Zhong Nanshan admitting the  human-to-human transmission and healthcare staff being infected (Wang and Qu 2020). This  clarification debunked the lies of the  Wuhan government and credited the  central government (Yang D. L. 2020). The  debut  of Zhong was  followed by a government-appointed specialist team with him as the leader and 13 members including Li Lanjuan, Zhang Boli, Chen Wei, and so  on (Hu 2020). The  epidemiologist Li Lanjuan, though denied by herself (Xinhua  2021), was entitled the ‘lockdown architect’ by pushing the control plan on Wuhan (Cyranoski 2020a). The expert of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) Zhang Boli promoted the government-recommended treatment of TCM remedies to alleviate the  symptoms of COVID-19 (Cyranoski 2020b). The  military specialist of biodefense Chen Wei led the team that developed the vaccine which was publicised as world-leading progress (Lewis 2020). They have been important references for the  public’s opinion as  their names were featured in Xinhua’s reports on Wuhan during the lockdown. To further solidify such a triumphant narrative, Xinhua incorporates grassroots figures with medical backgrounds, such as  Zhang Wenhong and Li Wenliang, into the  broader discourse of national heroes. The former – the infectious disease specialist from Shanghai  – went viral on social media  for his  provoking comments on the  pandemic (Yan 2020), and the  latter is  famous for being one of



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the first to warn about the virus (Davidson 2020). Both official and unofficial medical experts are included in  the  discourse of national heroes but  with different framing deployed to narrate each of them. To  further investigate such differences in their specific contexts, a systematic analysis of Xinhua’s coverage of medical experts is necessary.

Method Content analysis, often used as a research method for quantitative analysis of qualitative content (Morgan 1993), originated in  the  eighteenth century in  Scandinavia  (Rosengren 1981). In  recent years, a  growing number of studies have begun to uncover the  qualitative dimensions of content analysis to analyse textual data. In comparison with the quantitative approach, qualitative content analysis not only quantifies the frequency of occurrence of words but  also  conducts an in-depth study of the  context. It  is  defined as a research method ‘for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data  through the  systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1278). The  procedures of qualitative content analysis  involve two central approaches: inductive category development and deductive category application. The former is to ‘formulate a criterion of definition, derived from the theoretical background and research question, which determines the aspects of the textual material taken into account’, and the latter ‘bring[s] them in connection with the text’ (Mayring 2000). Sampling The research subjects of the content analysis are Xinhua’s coverages of seven Chinese medical experts with five of them of governmental backgrounds. The selection of the five official medical experts, Zhong Nanshan, Zhang Boli, Chen Wei, Zhang Dingyu, and Li Lanjuan, is  based on two critical references. One is  the  report on the  government-appointed team of 14 medical specialists (Hu 2020), and the  other is  the  list of four awardees of the  highest national honours of ‘Medical of Republic’ and ‘People’s Hero’ (Zhao and Liu 2020). To illustrate the contrast, medical practitioners outside of the  official context, such as  Li Wenliang and Zhang Wenhong, are included in the study. The period of the samples spans 10 months from 20 January 2020, when medical expert first showed up in Xinhua responding to the pandemic, to 28 November 2020 – the starting date of this research. A total of 471 Chinese articles were extracted from the LexisNexis database

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Table 2.1  Coding categories and rules. Category

Definition

Example

Professional Knowledge (PK)

Medical experts’ explanation about the transmission, prevention and treatment of COVID-19 virus.

‘With adequate nutrition, 80% of mildly ill patients will automatically recover, and the remaining 20% need to be admitted to the nearest hospital’ (Xu 2020).

Positive Interpretation (PI)

Medical experts’ optimistic interpretation of the control and treatment of COVID-19.

‘We have achieved a phased victory … and I am confident that we will eventually defeat the epidemic’ (Qi et al. 2020).

Support for government initiatives (SGI)

Medical experts express clear support and approval of the measures taken by the government to control the outbreak.

‘The course of COVID-19 is like a parabola. Chinese medicine has a better role to play at both ends. Combination of Chinese and Western medicine is the highlight of Chinese program’ (Wang, Z. 2020).

Individual Achievement Recognition (IAR)

Tribute to the professional background, personal information and achievements of medical experts.

‘Li Lanjuan, who is 73 years old, sleeps only three hours a day, “I’m not going back until the epidemic is over” ’ (Zhao, C. 2020).

Government Accreditation and Award (GAA)

Awards and honours given by the government to medical experts in recognition of their contributions.

‘[They] made great efforts to fight against the epidemic and are honoured and commended at the national level’ (Ma, Z. 2020).

using the keywords of the medical experts’ Chinese names. After excluding the  reports that  are irrelevant to the  COVID-19 pandemic, 370 samples remain valid. To analyse separately each expert’s presentation, repetitions are not excluded which means that one article containing different medical experts may be counted multiple times. Five categories of the  news content are listed and defined in  Table  2.1 with examples and rules to explain what the categorised coverage is supposed to be and how it is coded. It  is  worth noting that  the  qualitative nature of this  method is  indicated in  the  fact that  each category is  represented not  only by the  paragraph directly related to medical experts but also by the link between the passages and the overall context of the news (Figure 2.1).



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200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Zhong Nanshan

Zhang Boli

Chen Wei PK

PI

Li Lanjuan Zhang Dingyu SGI

IAR

Zhang Li Wenliang Wenhong

GAA

Figure 2.1  Comparisons between seven medical experts across five categories.

Intercoder reliability Two intercoder reliability tests were conducted with two coders in each test: the researcher and two trained coders (different trained coders for each test). The first test is 49 Xinhua news about Zhong Nanshan, and the second test is 56 news about Chen Wei. Based on the reliability co-efficient of Cohen’s kappa (Bakeman and Gottman 1986), the statistical value of the former test is 0.86 and the latter is 0.78 (average value of five categories).

Major Findings Zhong Nanshan: spiritual totem of legitimacy As indicated in Table 2.2, of all five categories of news content calculated for this  study, Zhong Nanshan accounted for 35.70%, almost twice the  total of second-placed Zhang Boli, making up the  largest portion of Xinhua’s reports on the  seven medical experts. Due to his  excellent performance in the SARS crisis (Ho and Guo 2020), Zhong was entrusted by the  government with the  vital mission of leading the  fight against COVID-19. Zhong’s media  content is  almost evenly split  across the  five categories with the top two highest percentages of SGI and IAR at 25.81% and 22.04%, respectively. From the distinguished origin in a family of medical professionals (He  2020) to the  exceptional professionalism (Zhang 2020) and heroic contributions to defeating the  contagion (Chen et  al. 2020), Zhong was  completely enveloped by the  spotlight. Xinhua  attempted to

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Table 2.2  Comparisons between seven medical experts across five categories. Medical Experts

PK

PI

SGI

IAR

GAA

Total

Zhong Nanshan

34 (18.28%)

31 (16.67%)

48 (25.81%)

41 (22.04%)

32 (17.20%)

186 35.70%

Zhang Boli

13 (13.27%)

11 (11.22%)

39 (39.80%)

19 (19.39%)

16 (16.33%)

98 18.81%

Chen Wei

10 (13.16%)

10 (13.16%)

20 (26.32%)

16 (21.05%)

20 (26.32%)

76 14.59%

Li Lanjuan

6 (10.53%)

10 (17.54%)

6 (10.53%)

17 (29.82%)

18 (31.58%)

57 10.94%

Zhang Dingyu

1 (1.89%)

1 (1.89%)

5 (9.43%)

19 (35.85%)

27 (50.94%)

53 10.17%

Zhang Wenhong

13 (39.39%)

4 (12.12%)

2 (6.06%)

9 (27.27%)

5 (15.15%)

33 6.33%

Li Wenliang

0 (0.00%)

0 (0.00%)

0 (0.00%)

11 (61.11%)

7 (38.89%)

18 3.45%

Total

77 (14.78%)

67 (12.86%)

120 (23.03%)

140 (26.87%)

117 (22.46%)

521

brand Zhong as  a  reliable spokesman for government legitimacy with his presence being regarded as ‘a sedative for the social sentiment’ (Sohu 2020). And when the government refuted that COVID-19 started in Wuhan, Zhong Nanshan endorsed such claim and ‘stated that SARS-CoV-2 may not  have originated in  China’ in  a  press conference in  February which ‘raised the eyebrow of the international community’ (Verma 2020: 252). As the ‘public face’ of the COVID-19 fight in China (Feng 2020), Zhong’s media  coverage extends beyond the  area  of medical issues. He  showed up as  a  heroic figure  on various occasions, including educational events (Wei and Ma  2020), sporting activities (Wang, H. 2020) and even movie premiers (Xinhua  2020a). It  is  evident in  Figure  2.2 that  he  has  been the  protagonist of Xinhua  at  various stages. The  comprehensive media  exposure throughout the  year 2020 contributes to his  enormous popularity among the public. As the officially certified national hero, Zhong was idolised as the spiritual totem of China’s triumph over the pandemic and was perceived culturally as a celebrity that people would scream for autographs (CCTV 2020). Therefore, when he  was  questioned publicly on Weibo about the  commercial incentives behind his  promotion of the TCM remedies – Lianhua Qingwen – the questioner was soon silenced and disappeared by the social media platform after being heavily attacked



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A REVERSED NARRATIVE OF PUBLIC CRISIS 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

Zhong Nanshan Li Lanjuan

Zhang Boli

Chen Wei

Zhang Wenhong

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Figure 2.2  Comparisons of Seven Medical Experts from January to November 2020.

by the  vicious comments from netizens (Sina  2020). His  credentials are therefore as unassailable as the legitimacy of the government. Official experts: bespoke salience of specialties In comparison, the coverage of the rest official experts has varying focuses. For  Zhang Boli, his  heightened presence first emerged in  February when Xinhua started to promote the usage of TCM (Xinhua 2020b). As the symbolic panacea of the advanced Chinese civilisation, the reported success of TCM in curbing the disease (Tian et al. 2020) not only proved the effectiveness of the government’s decision-making but also solidified the surging nationalism in China (Jakhar 2020). Being the major advocator and specialist of TCM, Zhang was  one of the  pillars promoting the  government’s management strategies. This is proved by the most salient category of his media coverage which is SGI at 39.80%. A similar framing approach is noticed in the case of Chen Wei whose outstanding media  content also  lies in  the  category of SGI  at  26.32%. Although Chen showed up in  Xinhua  in  late January (Chen and Dong 2020), her appearance grew significantly in  April when the progress of the vaccine started to be publicised (Hu et al. 2020b). From late May, when the first phase of clinical trials yielded promising results (Tan et al. 2020), to late November, the vaccine to be launched (Guo and Zhang 2020), Chen kept Xinhua updated on the good news. In return for building

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up an encouraging story, she  was  grandly praised by the  government as  one of the  three medical experts that  Xi Jinping personally presented with the  award of ‘People’s Hero’. This  explains the  prominence of her GAA which is equal to SGI at 26.32%. Additionally, being one of the few women among the  official experts (Allen 2020), Chen earned herself extra credit from the media (Wang and Wang 2020). The  other female expert studied in  this  research  – Li Lanjuan gained the same media attention (Lin et al. 2020). Her identity as a female medical expert  fighting on the  front line at  the  advanced age of 73 was  one of the main subjects of Xinhua (Zhou 2020). Li first proposed a ‘No In No Out’ policy to shut down Wuhan (Global Times 2020), and her major mediatised presence concentrates in  the  months of lockdown from January to April. It is noticeable that her achievement was closely bonded with governmental awards as  that  her largest category of GAA  at  31.58% is  followed by IAR at  29.82%. However, Li faded away from the  media  after April. Her name, ‘Lockdown Architect’, seemed to be associated with the  public’s negative memories of Wuhan’s casualties (Langley 2020). To  ‘play down, if not  forget, the  deaths and hardship’ of the  lockdown (Buckley et  al. 2021), the  government left Li out of the  national celebration finalised by the ceremony at the Great Hall of People in September. In contrast, Zhang Dingyu, the third awardee of ‘People’s Hero’ besides Zhang Boli and Chen Wei, had a similar coverage composition with Li – the largest proportion of GAA at 50.94% followed by IAR at 35.85%. Zhang’s physical suffering as a patient of the fatal disease – amyotrophic lateral sclerosis – and his dedication to the  pandemic as  the  head of Jinyintan Hospital in  Wuhan were highly praised (Xinhua  2020c). But  unlike Li, Zhang’s most intense presence appeared in September. As one with the highest percentage of GAA among the five official experts, Zhang has the lowest PK and PI both at only 1.89%. The inference is that Xinhua mainly focused on him being awarded and less attention was  paid to his  concrete contribution. Although Zhang’s specific achievement was rarely acknowledged by the media in the first half of 2020, comparing to Li, he became a better choice for Xinhua to construct the victory narrative as he represented the heroic spirit of sacrifice, which was in line with the media campaign for Wuhan (Wang, L. 2020). Grassroot celebrities: refracted stories of loyalty Unlike the official experts whose main presence is in the state media, Zhang Wenhong and Li Wenliang have a  much larger profile outside Xinhua. Their limited coverage  – the  former at  6.33% and the  latter at  3.45%  – in  Xinhua  is  only the  retouched segment of their entire involvement



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in  the  crisis-related discourse in  China. Zhang Wenhong has  3.6 million followers on Weibo. Many of his  views seemed at  odds with government advocacy but  became hot topics among the  public. In  comparison with the prominent SGIs of the official experts, Zhang’s SGI at 6.02% occupies the smallest proportion of his media content. His first appearance was him pressing doctors of party members to go to Wuhan (Guo et al. 2020). However, his  other candid comments, such as  disapproving of excessive lockdown, encouraging high-protein  breakfasts and denying the  overseas  origin  of the virus (Yuan 2021b), were hardly seen on Xinhua. His divergent opinions were filtered out, which is the reason behind the low SGI. On the contrary, Zhang is particularly highlighted in the news that contains scientific knowledge about COVID-19. Zhang’s PK at 39.39% is not only the largest proportion of his entire coverage but also the largest among all the experts. The netizens’ trust in  Zhang due to his  straightforward advice on how to deal with the disease was used by Xinhua to boost its credit among the public. This is especially true in April when he appeared most frequently and the closure of Wuhan’s lockdown started to be narrated as a national victory. But in the final triumphant discourse in  September, Zhang was  not there. Along with the transformed official narrative of the epidemic, it is noticed that Zhang’s tone has  been trimmed too. In  February  2020, he  implied that  imported vaccine has  a  better effect (Guancha  2020), and one year later, he  became one of the  exemplary public figures  that  take and promote Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccine (Global Times 2021). In comparison with the subtle framing of Zhang Wenhong, Xinhua took a  more direct approach to deconstruct Li Wenliang’s disputed character. Although Xinhua  retains the  report that  Li Wenliang was  punished as a ‘law-breaker’ for spreading rumours (Liao and Feng 2020), his  identity as  a  whistle-blower and his  history of being detained for it  were bluntly denied after his death in February (Xinhua 2020d). As the public sentiment over Li turned into the ferment of agitation (Kuo 2020), Xinhua responded immediately with condolences and a  statement that  investigation into his admonishment by the local police was carried out by the central government (Liang and Yu 2020; Xinhua 2020e). Since February, Xinhua started to report him constantly throughout the  following eight months until September. His  heroic sacrifice was  heavily praised. With IAR at  61.11%, Li beats others in  this  category and becomes the  one whose individual achievement was  maximised. Different from other experts whose coverage is  seen in  all five categories, Li’s coverage is  focused on two categories only  – IAR and GAA  with the  rest remaining empty. Without expounding on the  dissident nature of his  whistling-blowing, Xinhua  recasts Li Wenliang as  a  loyal CCP member and a  martyr who died to save Wuhan from devastation

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(Xinhua 2020f). In a lengthy Xinhua report criticising former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Li Wenliang along with other official specialists were cited as the testimony to the Chinese government’s excellent management of the plague (Xinhua 2020g). Li was therefore included as one of the national heroes that stand for the legitimacy of the ruling government.

Conclusion As  the  findings of this  research show, two events are decisive in  moulding the transformation of the anti-epidemic story in China: the lifted lockdown of Wuhan in April and the celebration ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in September. Xinhua, which played a crucial part in setting the tone for these events, deployed designated framing to narrate the  medical experts due to their different attributes. As seen in Figure 2.3, the difference between the five categorised content was  not particularly significant until April. The  coverage of scientific knowledge about the  epidemic (PK) even came in  second place in the first two months. However, in April when the first stage of national victory over the crisis was accomplished by extinguishing the outbreak in Wuhan, the top three categories became IAR, SGI, and GAA. At this stage, Xinhua’s reports of individual experts, as analysed in the above sections, provided references to Wuhan’s triumph via multiple facets. The next three months, from May to July, saw the epidemic in China subside as a result of vigorous mobility controls, and accordingly, the reports on medical experts dropped significantly. By September, however, a climax of reports emerged, with the two most striking categories of

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

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Figure 2.3  Overall trends of five categories from January to November 2020.



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IAR and GAA. As the time to celebrate the final victory arrived, the individual achievements of medical experts were to be honoured. To  amplify the  voice of the  authorities, the  official experts occupy 90% of the  media  coverage. The positive image of the official experts is created with tailored framing focusing on their specific contribution to overcoming the crisis. The example of Zhong Nanshan shows a  sustained, integrated and comprehensive Xinhua  coverage of his  extraordinary persona. His  heroic status and the  national victory over COVID-19 are an interdependent package of government legitimacy which is underpinned by the high SGIs of the other official experts. In sharp contrast, the  limited coverage of the  unofficial medical experts has  much lower SGIs. On the one hand, Xinhua manoeuvres the popularity of the grassroots celebrities and magnifies the  views in  favour of the  government’s image. On  the  other hand, the  divergent even antagonistic attributes against the  government are deliberately omitted. As seen in the cases of Zhang Wenhong and Li Wenliang, the former’s minimal exposure, mainly about spreading professional knowledge on the  pandemic, ceased completely in  September and the  latter, though recruited as  one of the  extinguishable martyrs, was  seldomly mentioned after the celebration. The trimmed-down grassroots experts along with the bespoke idols of official specialists are woven into the same narrative of national heroism which ‘built a  Great  Wall against the  virus bringing light and hope to the nation’ (Xinhua  2020h). To  cater to the  authorities’ particular imperative for the anti-epidemic campaign to be flawless, the coverage of both the official and the unofficial medical experts on Xinhua, such as the contexts in which they are situated and the times in which they appear, was deliberately edited and polished. Yet as the global pandemic is still far from the end, the final narrative of China’s part in this crisis remains to be seen.

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Chapter 3 REPRESENTATIONS AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS Emmanouil Takas Experimental Social Psychology Lab, Panteion University

Gerasimos Prodromitis Experimental Social Psychology Lab, Panteion University

Historical Context First memorandum In January 2019, the increased borrowing needs of Greece, which signalled the concept of ‘public debt crisis’, led the rating agency Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the country’s credit rating from A to A–. Under such pressure, the prime minister of Greece, K. Karamanlis, affiliated with New Democracy (ND) (the Greek right-wing party), announced early elections for 4 October 2009, where PASOK (the Greek centre party) emerged as the winning party with a percentage of 43.92% with the party leader G. Papandreou uttering the characteristic words ‘The money’s there’. Sixteen days later, on 20 October 2009, the – at the time – Minister of Finance G. Papakonstantinou announced to ECOFIN that the deficit for 2009 would be around 12.7% as a percentage of GDP and not 6%, as had been calculated by the previous government of ND. At the same time, on 22 October, the rating agency Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit  rating from level A  to level A– and on 8  December, from A– to BBB+. Eight days later, the  Standard  & Poor’s agency downgraded Greece from status A to status BBB+ and, on 23 December, the Moody’s from level A1 to level A2. At  the  same time, the  European press appeared to be aggressive towards Greece (see the cover of the German magazine Focus, on 22 February 2010, with the title ‘Swindlers in the Euro Family’ and the statue of the Goddess Aphrodite (Venus de Milo) ‘making an obscene gesture’ against

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Europe or the cover of The Economist reminiscent of the movie Apocalypse Now with the modified title Acropolis now, which depicts the Acropolis surrounded by military helicopters and Angela Merkel on the right side of the cover next to the  subtitle ‘The  horror, the  horror’). In  this  context of solid European pressure, Greece was called upon to comply with the European labour market reform and fiscal consolidation, which has  begun since the  1990s, with the main aim of strengthening competitiveness. Second memorandum Following Papandreou government’s first memorandum and the severe social unrest, Papandreou resigned. Before that, he  had announced a  referendum on the  new loan agreement that  was  cancelled four days later, following the  stance of the  European partners, who jointly decided that  in  the  event of a  referendum, the  question should be whether Greece will remain  in the  EU or not. Besides highlighting the  uncertainty of domestic political developments in  Greece, Europe exerted additional pressure by postponing the first disbursement after the referendum’s announcement on the Eurozone summit’s decisions. Papandreou’s announcement of the  intention to hold a referendum ‘raised concern’ within the European powers. Wolfgang Schäuble considered the referendum to be a process of voluntary exit of Greece from the Eurozone, followed by the Financial Times’ revelation regarding Jose Manuel Barroso’s proposal to replace the Papandreou government with a technocratic government, led by Mr. Papadimos. This notion was characterised as a direct intervention of Europe in the interior of Greece. As they were widely described, the new ‘austerity’ measures– were voted in the parliament on 12 February 2012. Outside the  parliament, the  mass demonstrations were dramatic and led to injuries to protesters and police officers, as the ‘Aganaktismenoi’ (Indignados) movement was at the peak of its mobilisations (Karamichas 2015; Sotiropoulos 2017). Third memorandum Early national parliamentary elections were held on 25  January 2015. SYRIZA  (left-wing), under Alexis  Tsipras, won the  elections with 36.34%, winning 149 parliamentary seats, and formed a  coalition government with the  Independent Greeks  – National Patriotic Alliance (extreme right-wing), which received 4%. With electoral promises regarding ‘restoring dignity’ and ‘repealing the Memoranda with a single law’, the new government began five months of continuous negotiations with the lenders, ending in June being close to an agreement. However, new demands from creditors led to a stalemate,



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with the  prime minister returning from Brussels on 26  June announcing his intention to hold a referendum on whether the draft agreement should be accepted or not. Following the referendum announcement, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the Chancellor of Germany Angela  Merkel and the  President of France François  Hollande, in  a  joint statement, highlighted that  the  referendum would concern the  remain  of Greece in the Eurozone or not in an unprecedented intimidation campaign (  Jurado et al. 2015). On  29  June, Greek banks closed for a  week, and capital controls were imposed. On 30 June, a few hours before the current programme’s expiration, the  Prime Minister wrote a  letter requesting a  third support programme that would cover Greece’s expiring debts, so the country would not declare bankruptcy. The  request was  rejected in  a  Eurogroup teleconference on the same day. In contrast to the Referendum polls, which predicted a slight margin and a  victory of Yes, albeit  marginally, the  results brought a  predominance of the  No vote. Despite that, the  government resumed discussions on a  new memorandum that ended after hours of negotiations in a painful compromise with lenders on a new programme on 13 July. With 222 ‘yes’, 64 ‘no’ and 11 ‘present’ votes, the  Plenary Session of the  Parliament voted the  bill, which ratified the agreement of the government with the ‘Institutions’ for the third programme of support of the Greek economy.

Literature Review In this context, the Greek political scene was called to understand the extent of  the  crisis, to evaluate and interpret the  situation and, above all, to communicate it. This  rhetorical imprint through parliamentary minutes has  four distinct and interconnected audiences. The  first is  the  intra-party, where the political actors construct and diffuse their party identity; the second is  the  intra-parliamentary, where the  political actors are called to vote for the  Memorandum in  a  climate of redistribution of their party sphere of influence. The third audience consists of the Greek society, which seems to be affected by economic developments and the absence of clear policymaking regarding the response to the crisis. The fourth audience is the international one, mainly the  European audience, which monitors and simultaneously evaluates both the  Greece’s situation and the  Europe’s ability to secure European banking capitals and the Euro (Takas et al. 2020). In this context, Greek political discourse produces representations of the main political issues that serve as interpretation to the broader society in an effort not only to persuade but as calls to conform to the new measures.

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The  concept of social representations (Moscovici 1961/1976) exceeds the  limitations of more classical concepts, such as  opinion, image, attitudes and concepts, that  do not  involve the  dynamic and active participation of individuals, which through their constant interaction form reproduce and reconstruct social reality. In  this  way, the  social actor is  actively involved in creating social meaning. At the same time, older approaches viewed the social actor as  a  simple receiver of a  message from the  external environment. On  the  contrary, the  concept of social representation puts each individual as a co-creator of his background in a continuously enriched reconstruction of both the individual and the social environment. As the central function of social representations is the transformation of the unknown into the known (Moscovici 1988), they function as  a  symbolic tool that  allows members of a group to make sense of their social world and their relationships with other groups (Andreouli and Howarth 2013). Thus, how political actors construct representations underlines how they make sense of the social world and their relations with other political groups and the wider Greek society. In  this  way, the  social representations are based ‘beyond’ and not  ‘within’ the  individual or simple collective (  Jodelet 1984). They  involve the  interplay between different points of view that define the phenomenon in various ways for a  specific audience at  a  particular time. This  recurring feature of social representations provides the  conditions for cognitive polyphasia  (Provencher and Wagner 2012)  – that  is, the  multitude of pre-existing, and sometimes opposite, objectification in the same ‘audience’. On the other hand, intra-atomic characteristics such as  attitudes are maintained as  cognitive characteristics that  influence a  person’s inclination towards a  phenomenon to formulate a  view towards that  phenomenon. In  this  communication intersection, the intra-personal interacts with the interpersonal, and the individual becomes a  participant and co-communicator of social representations. Individuals involved in  the  fermentation and use of social representations integrate them into understanding, evaluation and communication through two processes: objectivation and anchoring (Moscovici 1961/1976, 1988). Objectification involves issues of rendering the meaning to the phenomenon being represented. The available information is categorised, selected and simplified, in the process of de-contextualisation and then this  information is  provided as  the  core representation of the phenomenon (Abric 1996). Therefore, through the process of objectification, the study of the political discourse regarding the Memorandum underlines how a new meaning for the Greek reality is being constructed. Political actors constitute the Memorandum’s representation in abstract terms to create the interpretive core of the Memorandum itself. In this process, however, older collective interpretive schemes are added, such as that of ‘debt’, ‘crisis’, to give and enrich the meaning of the Memorandum, so that this strange and vague



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notion is formed into something more specific, more tangible, more ‘familiar’ and therefore more manageable. The process of enriching with new ‘information’ marks the integration of the phenomenon into an already existing thought and understanding system, what Moscovici calls ‘anchoring’. The construction and centrality of the representations in political discourse are crucial and provide a deeper understanding of the Greek political system since these representations serve as the interpretative core to the broader social context serving, therefore, as elements of social influence. Social influence is based on, and describes the transformation of judgments, attitudes, perceptions and memory based on interaction, changes social attitudes and representations and influences attitudes (Moscovici 1976; Papastamou et al. 2017; Tedeschi 2017). In this approach, the concept of influence is called upon to underline the  mechanisms with which, first, the  Greek political system was  influenced by the  European requirements for the  ‘necessity’ of the Memorandum and, second, how the political system itself exerted influence on an intra-party, intra-parliamentary and broader social system. The starting point for developing a  process of influence is  the  existence of a  principled dimension in the source’s perceptions and the target of influence for an object’s nature or the  relationship between them. Thus, pro-memorandum and antimemorandum rhetoric are expected to reflect different perceptions regarding the  necessity and existence of Memoranda, activating processes of influence as a communicative activity of repetition or otherwise enriching and altering consensus restored. Moscovici (1976; Moscovici et  al. 1985) links the  process of influence to the notion of negotiation, in which the social subject constructs arguments and thus interpretations, capable of being accepted by peer social actors. This fact implies the return of validity and legitimacy of his position. However, the fact that there are different types of initial disagreement and lack of consensus, and hence various depictions of the reality under negotiation, led to the distinction of three kinds of influence, which correspond to the construction, maintenance and change of the social field (Faucheux and Moscovici 1967). The  first type concerns normalisation (construction) and consists of the convergence of individual arguments, within the group, to a typical average, which constitutes the  new collective rule, that  is  the  norm. The  second type concerns compliance (maintenance), that is the adaptation of an individual’s or group’s opinion and behaviour, to the majority’s idea and behaviour, or of the part of the group that is considered dominant. Kelman (1958), considering that a central element of a communicative political message is the change of attitudes at the collective and individual level, developed a  typology of social compliance, consisting of three forms. First, compliance, where one person accepts the  influence, hoping for a positive reaction from another person or group, without necessarily receiving the  message itself. In  the  case of real internal change, conversion processes are

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activated (Moscovici 1976). Compliance tends to be associated with power relations, believing that  power controls behaviour, through domination, which causes submission and compliance (Hornsey et al. 2003; Jost and Major 2001). Therefore, if the Greek political rhetoric recognises the Memoranda process as imposed and non-negotiable, it acknowledges the sovereign power of the support mechanism and of Europe and their ability to intervene directly in the formulation of a political strategy of Greece. Second, identification, where the individual accepts influence in the expectation that a satisfactory self-determined relationship will be established with another individual or group. This relationship can take the form of classical identification, where the  individual assumes the  role of another individual, or the state of the reciprocal part, where the individual accepts the relationship while the content remains secondary (Kelman 1958). Correspondingly, pro-memorandum rhetoric focuses on the domestic political scene’s relationship in terms of alignment with the  European one and sets this  relationship as  a  priority, regardless of the qualitative content. Third, internalisation occurs when the individual accepts the  influence as  the  proposed behaviour, its ideas  and components, which are considered the most appropriate solution. At this level of compliance, the individual evaluates the  message’s content or behaviour and fully accepts it. Accordingly, political rhetoric considers the content of the Memorandum as the only solution, under conditions of optimal choice, the sequence of which will lead to ensuring ‘growth’. The  third type of influence concerns innovation (change) and refers to how an individual or a group opposes the prevailing norms and consistently challenges them. The three types of influence mentioned above, normalisation, compliance and innovation, are essentially three forms of reducing disagreement and forming common assessments within  a  social sphere. Through these forms of social influence, social normative interpretive schemes of the social field’s definition are constructed, reaffirmed and transformed, which perform an evaluative and regulatory function regarding the  definition and redefinition of the  social field. On  the  one hand, they describe the  ‘desirable’, forming hierarchies of meanings and values, and on the  other hand, they regulate the  behaviour and interpretive patterns of individuals. The  definition of ‘tolerance’ for difference and disagreement within the group is the measure of these interpretive schemes’ regularity, which underlines the  different perception and definition of social cohesion.

Methodology The  official transcripts of the  parliamentary debates regarding the  three Memoranda voting were analysed to highlight the central representations and party positioning. By  applying thematic and structural analysis, with



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Iramuteq open source software (Ratinaud 2009; Ratinaud and Marchand 2012), the dominant classes in each parliamentary discussion are based on the  statistical significance of the  appearance of the  words in  the  corpus. The method used for this analysis is based on the method of hierarchical classification (Reinert 1983, 1990). This  method categorises the  verbal material into separate ‘classes’ while capturing the percentage covered by each class about the overall text as well as the hierarchical appearance of the words, based on the value x2 of each word (see Figure 3.1). This first analysis  allows the  first recording of the  verbal material in  semantic categories and is the beginning of recognising the interpretive schemata of each class. The analysis method allows the most critical parts of the text to be distinguished per class, thus enabling the identification and analysis of each class separately. In  addition, factor analysis  has  been employed to highlight the  political parties’ positioning regarding the  voting of each Memorandum.

Figure  3.1 Hierarchical classification of verbal material of the  parliamentary discussion on the voting of the first Memorandum.

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Results First memorandum The thematic and structural analysis led to the classification of the content of the parliamentary debate on Memorandum 1 into five classes. Based on the tree diagram (see Figure 3.1), class 1 and class 2 concern the intra-parliamentary/ procedural issues, mainly regarding the way of voting on the Memorandum but also the parliamentary debate organisation. Classes 3–5 present a dialectic between the construction of the image of Europe (class 5), the Greek political system (class 3) and the Greek people (class 4). In this way, the Greek political system constitutes the people’s image. It delimits its relationship with Europe by invoking popular and national interest. In contrast, at the same time, how the political system approaches the conflicts and overlaps between the Greek people, the political system itself, and Europe is evident. The  first reading of the  position of the  political parties through factor analysis (see Figure 3.2) reflects based on the first axis the great distance between PASOK and the parties of the broader Left (SYRIZA, KKE) while at the same time the affinity of LAOS and ND and the SYRIZA (left-wing party) and KKE (Communist party). Under this  approach, PASOK seems to have split  from the narrow centre-left space and is a separate political category. It is the party blamed for the country’s memorandum involvement. Simultaneously, the second axis is the divisive ideological intersection between the parties of the centre-left (PASOK, SYRIZA, KKE) and the right (LAOS, ND). Also, the  second axis  is the  divisive section regarding political parties’ attitude towards the Memorandum. Thus, PASOK and LAOS are in the promemorandum space, in the negative pole of the second axis, while their apparent ideological distance is reflected at the same time. The positive pole of the second axis  reflects the  anti-memorandum rhetoric, which consists of the  parties of ND, SYRIZA and KKE and reflects the ideological distance between ND and the  parties of the  broader Left (SYRIZA, KKE) and the  ideological affinity of SYRIZA with the KKE. As a first reading, therefore, the attitude towards the  Memorandum seems to have a  strong influence on ideological positions, but without being the absolute divisive intersection. The attitude of the parties towards the  Memorandum still seems to be mobilised by their ideological positions. Thus, LAOS and ND are close by, even though they are separated by the intersection of the Memorandum axis. SYRIZA and KKE are also close, although the KKE’s stance at the end of the quarter implies a more absolute and rigid stance on political rhetoric and stance. Finally, PASOK is portrayed as an almost ‘extreme value’ in the factor chart, as is the political party that introduced the Memorandum in parliament and its rhetoric focuses on providing arguments by balancing its political stance and pro-memorandum stance.



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Figure  3.2 Factor analysis  of the  political parties that  participated in  the  parliamentary discussion on the voting of the first Memorandum.

Second memorandum The  thematic and structural analysis  application led to the  classification of the content of the parliamentary debate regarding the second Memorandum into five classes (see Figure 3.3). The  first ‘reading’ of the  class figure  highlights the  Debt’s importance (class 1), which seems to be a  separate construct in  political discourse and acts as  a  reference point with the  other four classes. The  next divisive section separates the  fifth class, which concerns the  ‘parliamentary voting procedure regarding Memorandum 2’, which was  voted in  the  parliament by the procedure of urgency as well as Memorandum 1. The next divisive section separates the fourth class, the ‘Greek People’, and focuses on the effects of the vote and not on the Memorandum on Greek society. The other two classes concern the  dialectic between the  ‘Greek political system’ (class 3)

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Figure 3.3  Hierarchical classification of verbal material of the parliamentary debate on the voting of the second Memorandum.

and the  image of ‘Greece and Europe’ (class 2). From the  very beginning, the  parliamentary debate regarding the  second Memorandum presents structural differences regarding the corresponding one for voting on the first Memorandum. While in  the  case of the  first Memorandum, an attempt was  made to understand, interpret and evaluate the broader economic and political scene, the parliamentary debate on the second Memorandum shows the consolidation of the concept of debt as a key concept of political identity and rhetoric. Debt is a threat, a core concept, which affects the texture and composition of other concepts. Thus, the Greek debt functions as an anchor in political rhetoric and shows in some way the Greek political system’s compliance with this concept. Debt now seems to have become internalised and a central point of threat, as it builds pro- and anti-memorandum rhetoric. The  first reading of the  position of the  political parties through factor analysis  (see Figure  3.4) and based on the  first axis  highlights, on the  one hand, the  pro-memorandum rhetoric with Papadimos, PASOK and ND



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Figure 3.4  Factor analysis of the political parties that participated in the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the second Memorandum.

and on the  other the  anti-memorandum rhetoric, the  opposition, with the parties of the broader Left, SYRIZA and KKE, and LAOS. The second axis  reveals  a  great  distance between the  rhetoric of Papadimos and all political parties. As  Papadimos is  not directly elected by the  Greek people, he uses different rhetoric about the political discourse of the party protagonists. Papadimos is an ‘extreme value’ in the factor chart, which does not seem to have rhetorical convergences with any other political party. SYRIZA and the KKE, as in the first Memorandum, remain in the ‘Left’ area where their relationship reveals common rhetorical places; on the other hand, their distance is justified as the KKE, from its position in the factorial diagram, seems to adopt its rigid rhetoric, as  in  the  first Memorandum, while SYRIZA distances itself, possibly as an attempt to become a party of power. The  reading of the  second axis  also  reveals the  rhetorical affinity

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of PASOK, ND and LAOS. While PASOK and ND have been placed on the  pro-memorandum axis, the  distance from LAOS seems to be equal to that  between LAOS and the  Left’s parties. LAOS seems to be ‘wavering’ between a former pro-memorandum stance and a current anti-memorandum stance, but  without aligning itself with leftist rhetoric. At  the  same time, a  distance is  recorded between PASOK and ND, as  PASOK maintains the  coherence of its pro-memorandum stance, while ND is  called upon to manage its pro-memorandum shift. Third memorandum The  thematic and structural analysis  application led to the  classification of the content of the parliamentary debate on the third Memorandum into five classes (see Figure 3.5). The first reading of the figure leads to the separation of the fifth class from the other four. The fifth class concerns ‘Iintra-Parliamentary procedural issues’ regarding the amendment submitted by the SYRIZA–ANEL

Figure  3.5 Hierarchical classification of verbal material of the  parliamentary discussion on the voting of the third Memorandum.



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government to the  Greek parliament. The  next divisive section highlights the fourth class, ‘European Union and Debt’, which now reflects the complete identification of the  concepts of the  European Union, growth and debt. The  next dividing section separates the  third class from the  other two, and focuses on the Prime Minister himself and the ‘On the Prime Minister’, while the next dividing section reflects the dialectic between the second class ‘Party Boundaries’ and the first ‘Negotiation of Conversion’. From the above, it appears that the pro-memorandum shift of SYRIZA led from the  beginning to the  full internalisation of the  concepts of Debt and the  country’s remain  in the  European Union, while in  the  parliamentary debate on the  first Memorandum, the  representation of European Union was  dominant. A  separate class emphasising its significance for the  Greek political system and the  way of rhetorically constructing the  concept, in the parliamentary debate on the second Memorandum, the dominant class was  the  concept of Debt; emphasising the  importance of the  concept for the Greek political system, in the current parliamentary debate, the dominant class consists of rhetorical controversies over intra-parliamentary procedures, while the concepts of the European Union and Debt have been reduced to the fourth class, which is the second smallest class. The first divisive section highlights the fifth heading, as the largest heading in the parliamentary debate (26% of all speech materials), which no longer focuses on the  Memorandum itself, as  happened with the  debates on the first and second Memoranda, but  on specific amendments and provisions. Now  the  ‘Memorandum’ has  been rhetorically downgraded to a  ‘Bill’, and the essential content of the Memorandum is not discussed, apart from the provisions concerning the further cuts in pensions. Thus, the fifth class, ‘From Memorandum to Amendment’ emphasises the  full internalisation of the  Memorandum construction and the  full compliance of the  Greek political system with the  European requirements. The  next divisive section concerns the dialectic between the European Union and Debt (fourth class) and is the second smallest, in extent, class (16.9%). This class under the name ‘Europe and Debt’ contains two key concepts, which were dominant classes in the previous parliamentary debates. More specifically, the  Memorandum was  the  dominant class in  the  first parliamentary debate (see Figure 3.1) and the Debt was the dominant class in  the  parliamentary debate on the  second Memorandum . These  two key concepts of the past have now been reduced to the fourth class (16.9%) (see Figure 3.5), underlining the processes of full internalisation and freely accepted submission to the European mechanisms. The next dividing line separates the third class (22.4%) ‘Prime Minister’s Time’ from the  other two classes, the second (21.5%) ‘Party Boundaries’ and the  first (13.2%) ‘Negotiation’ of

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the transformation emphasising the party system’s need to delimit its political vital space both due to the pro-memorandum change of the government and due to the new-entering political parties. From the first analysis of the verbal material hierarchical classification regarding the parliamentary debate on the voting of the third Memorandum, it  appears that  now the  rationale of the Memoranda has been fully internalised in the Greek political system and that the  pro-memorandum transformation of the  SYRIZA–ANEL minimised the critique of the Memorandum and led the political parties to redefine their political life rather than to be effectively critical of the Memorandum. While in the respective factor diagrams of the previous two Memoranda, both the  ideological distances and the  pro- and anti-memorandum attitude were evident, but  this  factor diagram does not  reflect ideological attitudes, as the previous two. The first reading of the position of the political parties, through the factor analysis (see Figure 3.6) and based on the first axis, underlines the safe distance of the KKE from the rest of the political system. The  KKE’s consistently anti-memorandum, anti-European rhetoric highlights the coherence of its stance towards the Memoranda and Europe. Regarding the same axis, the anti-memorandum stance of the Golden Dawn (Nazi party) is  also  reflected, which, however, does not  take an extreme position, as  KKE and is  closer to the  other systemic parties. The  same axis reflects the SYRIZA–ANEL co-government and their relative position, as  well as  the  relationship between PASOK, ND and POTAMI  (Liberal party). From the first analysis, therefore, according to the first axis, the divisive section strictly related to the attitude towards the Memoranda in the previous parliamentary debates, seems to be less clear in  the  current parliamentary debate, as  PASOK and POTAMI  are marginally in  favour of the  promemorandum rhetoric. Therefore, the  pro-memorandum change of the government seems to have ‘blurred’ the content of the political rhetoric regarding the Memoranda and to have replaced it under conditions of intraparliamentary opposition stance. The second axis places the political parties SYRIZA and ANEL in close distance, due to their decision to form the co-government. At the same time, the Golden Dawn and the KKE are on the same axis, possibly due to their broader anti-memorandum stance. The  attempt to rhetorically manage the  pro-memorandum shift of SYRIZA  and ANEL may share common interpretations with the  KKE regarding the  negative image of Europe. The  same axis  places PASOK, ND and POTAMI  nearby, since the  latter attempts to acquire its political space in the wider area of the ‘centre’. A  second consequence of the  pro-memorandum shift of SYRIZA  and ANEL is the fact that clear ideological divisions are no longer visible. While in the respective factual diagrams of the parliamentary debates for the two



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Figure 3.6  Factor analysis of the political parties that participated in the parliamentary discussion on the voting of the third Memorandum.

previous Memoranda  the  ideological identity and position of each political party were clear, this one does not reflect anything similar. On the contrary, ANEL has  been placed at  a  great  distance from the  ‘traditional’ right of the ND, SYRIZA far from the area of the broader Left, while it is interesting to place the  Golden Dawn on the  anti-memorandum axis, but  close to the  rhetoric of ANEL. Overall, therefore, the  above factorial diagram highlights the  rhetorical and ideological ‘confusion’, a  consequence of the  memorandum position of the  government, which, in  combination with the entry of new political forces in the Greek parliament, pushed the political parties to further rhetorical rivalries. However, in order to investigate in depth the rhetorical convergences or distances of each party, 20 of the most formal excerpts of each political party follow, classified according to their attitude towards the voting of the third Memorandum.

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Conclusion Regarding the investigation of the central representations in the parliamentary debates on the three Memoranda, the parliamentary debate on the voting of the  first Memorandum highlighted as  main  representations ‘Europe’ (fifth class), the ‘Greek people’ (fourth class) and the ‘Political system’ (third class) (see Figure 3.1). This parliamentary debate, as it is the first parliamentary debate on the voting of Memoranda, functions as a rhetorical field of objectification, that is it is the beginning of the formation of central representations in political discourse as the Greek political system is called to construct the main issues. Europe was formed under two conditions: first under political conditions and second under economic conditions. In terms of its political composition, the European Union is not developed so much in terms of content as in terms of structure, that  is  it  is  represented as  part of a  Troika  (European Union, European Bank and International Monetary Fund) and not  as  a  political structure. This  formation is  created by the  need to construct the  ‘other’ as a reference group, but at the same time, it is formed under conditions of dependence, as ‘Europe’ has the power to render rewards and punishments. The pro-memorandum rhetoric argues that in case the Memorandum is not voted in  favour, Europe will not  meet the  borrowing needs of Greece and from there the  country is  driven to bankruptcy, thus establishing the  norm ‘Memorandum or Bankruptcy’, framing the Memorandum terms of ‘necessity’ and ‘patriotic duty’. The anti-memorandum discourse rejects the legitimising rhetoric of the Government and frames the Memorandum under conditions of ‘delegation of responsibilities’ to the Troika, a ‘permanent attack’ against Greek society while at the same time this agreement is considered a ‘guillotine of labour and social rights’ and a  constant struggle against the  working class. In  this  way, the  dilemmatic conflict between the  two central poles of the divisive section ‘pro- and anti-Memorandum rhetoric’ is recorded, mainly at the ideological level of the ‘Europe’ representation, as pro-memorandum rhetoric considers Greece’s stay in  Europe as  non-negotiable, while antimemorandum rhetoric proposes an ‘alternative path’. The  Greek people are the  central point of credibility of both pro- and anti-memorandum rhetoric and the  terms are not  constructed as  content but  as  a  point of reference, which emphasises that  the  representation of the ‘people’ does not concern its qualitative, structural characteristics but their ‘interest’. Under this approach, the country’s stay in Europe is a good thing, as  it  ensures the  avoidance of bankruptcy, the  ‘consolidation’ of fiscal irregularities of previous years and the country’s stay in the ‘heart of Europe’. The  opposite interpretive scheme, however, constitutes the  Greek people under conditions of ‘social cost’, considering that the country’s obsession with



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staying in Europe demolishes the social and labour conquests of all previous years, condemns Greek society and accuses the  pro-Memorandum axis  of compliance. Thus, the  ‘people’ is  structured as  the  recipient of the  vote’s effects (or not) of the first Memorandum. The  link between Europe and the  Greek people represents the  ‘political system’, as it is called to decide on the future of Greece. The political system is formed mainly under terms of ‘responsibility’ but with different qualitative characteristics and temporal reference. On  the  one hand, the  government rhetoric, trying to reach a consensus, refers holistically to the political system, as the totality of all political parties over time, which have ‘responsibility’ for the Greece’s situation and at the same time the then present political parties must respond collectively in  the  ‘responsibility’ of saving the  country. Antigovernment rhetoric, however, deconstructively contradicts this  position, considering that it is not a participant and denies the diffusion of responsibility across the political spectrum. Of these, the central representations in the parliamentary debate on the vote on the  first Memorandum formed the  relationship between the  Greek people, the Greek political system and Europe, in an attempt by the Greek political system to make sense of the new era of the Memoranda, to define the concepts and relationships and be interpreted in the new reality. In  the  parliamentary debate on the  second Memorandum, the  central representation is  the  concept of ‘Debt’. ‘Debt’ is  represented as  the  cause and effect of the crisis. On the one hand, the budget deficit, the ineffective policy of previous years and the inability to consolidate the Greek economy led to ‘Debt’. On the other hand, the concept of debt reduction is underlined through the signing of the Memorandum, which in this parliamentary debate is  framed as  a  ‘Programme’. Debt management, therefore, requires fiscal targets, structural change, increased competitiveness and confidence, primary surpluses and safeguarding fiscal activity. While in the parliamentary debate on the voting of the first Memorandum, the central representations were Europe, the Greek political system and the Greek people, in  the  parliamentary debate on the  voting of the  second Memorandum, there is  a  decline in  the  centrality of these representations. The  Greek people continue to be the  source of credibility of political rhetoric as  the  Greek political system decides based on ‘national interest’. All these constructions, however, are overshadowed by the  centrality of Debt, a frightening representation, the formation of which brings back older interpretations of debt, bankruptcy and the disintegration of the social fabric to make sense of a future without a Memorandum. This  picture is  completely changing in  the  parliamentary debate on the  voting of the  third Memorandum, as  the  pro-memorandum shift of

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SYRIZA  and ANEL led to the  full internalisation of the  memorandum necessity, essentially recognising the dependence of Greece-Europe. The level of conflict was  transferred from the  processes of framing the  central representations to the ironic and deconstructive attitude of the party system towards the  SYRIZA–ANEL government. In  the  parliamentary debate on the first Memorandum, ‘Europe’ was the dominant class (25.1%) (fifth class of the  parliamentary debate on the  first Memorandum) while the  concept of debt was  not reflected in  a  separate topic (see Figure  3.1), as  the  Greek political system was  in  a  process of elaborating the  Memorandum itself as  an external construction. In  the  parliamentary debate on the  voting of the  second Memorandum, the  ‘Debt’ was  a  separate construction and was  the  dominant class (25%) while ‘Europe’ appeared as  a  subject of Greece’s stay in  the  European Union as  the  settlement of the  Greek debt through the second Memorandum was considered a necessary condition for the country to remain in Europe. In the parliamentary debate on the voting of the third Memorandum, ‘Europe’ and the ‘Debt’ have now merged into the second smallest class (class 4, 16.9%), emphasising the full internalisation of the reasoning of the Memoranda in the Greek political reality and the full compliance of the Greek political system with the norm ‘Memorandum equals to Europe’, which had already been established by the parliamentary debate on the vote on the first Memorandum.

References Abric, J.-C. (1996). Specific processes of social representations. Papers on Social Representations, 5:77–80. Andreouli, E. and Howarth, C. (2013). National identity, citizenship and immigration: Putting identity in context. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 43(3):361–382. Faucheux, C. and Moscovici, S. (1967). Le style de comportement d’une minorité et son influence sur les réponses d’une majorité. Psychologie sociale théorique et expérimentale, 442. Hornsey, M. J., Spears, R., Cremers, I. and Hogg, M. A. (2003). Relations between high and low power groups: The  importance of legitimacy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(2):216–227. Jodelet, D. (1984). Représentation sociale: Phénomènes, concept et théorie. Psychologie Sociale, 2:357–378. Jost, J. T. and Major, B. (2001). The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations. London: Cambridge University Press. Jurado, I., Konstantinidis, N. and Walter, S. (2015). Why Greeks voted the way they did in the bailout referendum. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog. Karamichas, J. (2015). Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis. Oxford University Press. Kelman, H. C. (1958). Compliance, identification, and internalization three processes of attitude change. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(1):51–60. Moscovici, S. (1961/1976). La psychanalyse, son image et son public. Presses universitaires de France.



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Moscovici, S. (1976). Social Influence and Social Change (Vol. 10). London: Academic Press. Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of social representations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 18(3):211–250. Moscovici, S., Mugny, G. and Van Avermaet, E. (1985). Perspectives on Minority Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Papastamou, S., Gardikiotis, A. and Prodromitis, G. (2017). Majority and Minority Influence: Societal Meaning and Cognitive Elaboration. Psychology Press. Provencher, C. and Wagner, W. (2012). Cognitive polyphasia: Introductory article. Papers on Social Representations, 21(1):1.1–1.15. Ratinaud, P. (2009). IRaMuTeQ: Interface de R pour les Analyses Multidimensionnelles de Textes et de Questionnaires. Téléchargeable à l’adresse, http://www.iramuteq.org. Ratinaud, P. and Marchand, P. (2012). Application de la méthode ALCESTE à de ‘gros’ corpus et stabilité des ‘mondes lexicaux’: Analyse du ‘CableGate’ avec IRaMuTeQ. Actes des 11eme Journées internationales d’Analyse statistique des Données Textuelles, 835–844. Reinert, A. (1983). Une méthode de classification descendante hiérarchique: Application à l’analyse lexicale par contexte. Cahiers de l’Analyse des Données, 8(2):187–198. Reinert, M. (1990). Alceste une méthodologie d’analyse des données textuelles et une application: Aurelia De Gerard De Nerval. Bulletin of Sociological Methodology/Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique, 26(1):24–54. Sotiropoulos, G. (2017). Staging democracy: The  Aganaktismenoi of Greece and the squares movement(s). Contention, 5(1):84–107. Takas, E., Prodromitis, G. and Papastamou, S. (2020). Representing Europe in times of crisis. Rhetorical construction of ‘Europe’ in the parliamentary discussions regarding the  voting of the  three Memoranda  in  Greece. Journal of Education, Innovation and Communication, 2(1):26–44. Tedeschi, J. T. (2017). The Social Influence Processes. Routledge.

Chapter 4 FALL OF CIRCULATION, SAVAGE OLIGOPOLISATION AND DOWNGRADING OF THE MEDIA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MEMORANDA IN THE GREEK PRESS Sofia Iordanidou Associate Professor of Journalism and Communication, Open University of Cyprus

Leonidas Vatikiotis Adjunct Lecturer, Open University of Cyprus,  Journalist

Introduction The Greek crisis and the memoranda In  2009, Greece entered an unprecedented economic crisis, well beyond the scale that other countries faced during the same period, in terms of duration and productive decline. The cumulative loss of around 26% of GDP during the  2009–2016 period, the  skyrocketing unemployment that  reached 27% in 2014 (nearly three times the previous 10 years’ average) and the bankruptcy of 200,000 small and medium enterprises were just the tips of the iceberg. The  crisis  in  Greece was  an integral part of a  broader structural crisis that was described as a crisis of neoliberalism, perceived as the insistence on private enterprise and on the weakening of the broader public sector (Dumenil and Levy 2011). The  crisis  showcased the  weaknesses and the  frailty of an economic structure that depended on the excessive growth of fictitious capital (Harvey 2010). The increase of public and private debt, and the dependence of consumption on lending as a counterweight to the austerity policies, was not a Greek peculiarity. It became a common characteristic of all Western economies immediately after the  structural crisis  of the  early 1970s. In  the  United States, the  economy was  shaken by the  securitisation of structured bonds

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that included an unknown amount of high-risk loans of the mortgage market (Krugman 2012). In Ireland and Spain, the overdeveloped mortgage market was also at the heart of the financial crisis. In Cyprus, the banks themselves and in particular their risky investments led the state to emergency lending to prevent their collapse. Greece was led to the memorandum of understanding (MoU) (conditionalities) imposed by the IMF and the EU as a prerequisite for its lending, due to its inability to borrow and service the public debt, which was the trigger of its economic crisis. Thus, public debt proved to be the weak link in a long chain of structural imbalances (Bofinger 2012). A  common feature of all these different crises was  the  reproductive incapacitation, under its working terms, of an economic model based on two pillars. The first pillar was continuous austerity and low wages (Blyth 2013). The  second pillar was  borrowing by employees, households and businesses, which facilitated the expansion of commodity production, the realisation of surplus value and the expanded reproduction of capital (Streeck 2014). In the euro area in particular, the distorted structure of the monetary union was made obvious (Lapavitsas et al. 2012). The euro crisis, as it was named, had at  its core the  fundamental contradictions between the  centre and the periphery of the Eurozone, and rigidities that at critical moments did not allow the  adoption of necessary flexibility, as  for example, that  displayed by the US Federal Reserve (Stiglitz 2016). The diffusion of the crisis in September 2011 when Mario Draghi, at  the  time president of the  European Central Bank, committed to do ‘whatever it  takes’ to save the  euro, helped to save the common currency. However, it did not prevent the substantial bankruptcy of member states, such as Greece (Galbraith 2016). The leap in Greece’s public debt to 180% of GDP after the bailout, from 115% of GDP before the bailout, together with the perpetuation of austerity, remains the most tangible evidence of the catastrophic nature of the imposed solutions (Lordon 2015). Greece remained directly and formally under a regime of suffocating oversight from May 2010, when the first memorandum was adopted, until August 2018, when the third memorandum officially expired, at the expense of the people’s standard of living and decades’ worth of social achievements (Vatikiotis 2020). The imposition of the memoranda was facilitated by the distortion of the Greek official statistics, under the guidance of the IMF and Eurostat in order to increase debt and budget deficit figures excessively (Vatikiotis 2018). The  ‘special period’ essentially started in  2009 because that  was  when the  first signs of recession appeared and the  first austerity measures were imposed. By 2018, when the implementation of the third memorandum ended and GDP growth had resumed, starting in  2017, its cumulative reduction as shown in Figure 4.1, reached 19.48%. In essence, the regime of effective supervision of the Greek economy did not  end in  2018, but  will be maintained for decades, due to the  enhanced

IMPLICATIONS OF MEMORANDA IN THE GREEK PRESS 80.00

65

66.67 65.03



40.00 20.00

39.86 36.35 36.00 30.96 30.00 27.66 27.44 26.43 24.88 21.27 20.52 20.51 18.38 17.69 15.56 15.54 15.20 13.97 12.82 10.24 10.18 7.96 6.23 5.23 3.11

60.00

20.00 40.00

19.48

MT IE EST PL LT LU SK HU RO SE CZ BU DE LV SI DK AT EU BE NL FR FI CY ES PT HR IT GR

0.00

Figure 4.1  Change of GDP 2009–2018, at constant basic prices.

surveillance regime imposed by Regulation No 472/2013 (art. 14.1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 based on which ‘a  member state shall be under post-program surveillance report as  long as a minimum of 75% of the financial assistance received from one or several other member states, the EFSM, the ESM, or the EFSF has not been repaid’. A result of the drastic changes that the MoU policies effected on the Greek economy (reduction of salaries and pensions, abolition of collective bargaining for wage and salary setting, liberalisation of the  market, etc.) was  a  series of very serious, negative developments that  occurred in  the  daily lives of citizens. These developments concerned, for example, popular eating habits as vegetable and fish consumption was abandoned, while the consumption of pasta and meat increased (Backes et al. 2018). A New Media landscape During the same period that Greece and other countries of the European South were tested by the economic crisis, a transformation of historical significance reached its climax and was  completed in  the  news media: the  emergence of New  Media  (blogs, sites, twitter, Facebook, etc.) and their consolidation as an alternative source of news, along with, and in opposition to, traditional media (newspapers, magazines, television, radio, etc.). In this new landscape, circulation of print media decreased constantly despite changes in its content and appearance, in order to become more ‘attractive’ to different audiences (Poulet 2009). The  sale in  January 2020 by billionaire Warren E. Buffet of all his print media holdings (31 newspapers), even though he had described

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himself in 2012 as a ‘newspaper addict’, demonstrated the bleak prospects of newspapers (Merced 2020). The  internet won because it  changed not  only the channels but also the content of the news, which was transformed from a product into a process, a ‘work in progress’, facilitating the production and sharing of content (Ramonet 2011). Any report, comment, analysis or title can be fundamentally changed or improved, taking into account the reactions and comments of readers that are immediately seen by the editors. At the same time, in  the  new news media  landscape, distortion of news content thrives as  a  series of new phenomena  such as  filter bubbles and echo chambers begin to appear and dominate (Wardle and Derakhsan 2017). The truth is that the decline in newspaper traffic began before the advent of search engines and Google News. Newspapers are an endangered species. Since the beginning of the 1970s their average daily access to population and their circulation have declined virtually everywhere – except in some Third World or ‘threshold’ countries. (Shoenbach et al. 1999)

This  decline in  newspaper circulation in  the  United States and Germany was attributed to the competition from radio and television and their attractive content, to the inability of the newspapers to relate with the general public in terms of content, appearance, and so on and to structural changes, such as aging societies and stagnating incomes (Shoenbach et al. 1999). However, even in  some developed capitalist countries, most notably Sweden and the other Nordic countries, there are notable exceptions where print media  have shown resilience. This  resilience has  been attributed to their ability to keep up with developments in society, satisfying the need for guidance and information, providing rich and varied content (Weibull 1992). In  Greece, on the  other hand, newspaper circulation followed the  general trend and was steadily falling, long before the economic crisis broke out. […] With the entry of a plethora of private channels and radio stations, reader demand diminishes year by year. Thus, since the early 1990s the Greek press has entered a state of permanent crisis. (Papathanassopoulos 2001)

This crisis was attributed to the emergence of (private) radio and television channels,1 the  decline of interest in  politics and the  indifference shown by the younger generations towards newspapers (Papathanassopoulos 2001).

1 Private radio stations were allowed in Greece after 1987 and TV channels after 1989.



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Therefore, analysing the  decline in  newspaper and magazine circulation in Greece, we cannot separate it from a broader trend of shrinking circulation and influence of traditional media, as well as a broader distrust towards them. However, the relationship between the press and the quality of democracy has always been a field of intense controversy and debate. Even more so today, the decline of collective organisations has left the media as the only connective tissue of democracy (Gunther and Mughan 2000). From the first post-war period, the importance of ‘social accountability’ was recognised as a counterpoint or at best a complement to the function of the media as a means of profit or influence (Siebert et al. 1956). Developing research into the  relationship between the  media  and political systems has revealed diverse operating models, depending on the  political environment inside which they operate (Hallin  and Mancini 2004). The research that examines and showcases the social and political implications of media  ownership (public to private) and the  positive relationship between democracy and the proper functioning of the political system on the one hand and press freedom on the other (Djankov et al. 2003; Norris 2004) is especially extensive. It is debatable, however, whether investigative journalism functioning as  a  driving force of democratisation and human development precedes democracy that allows the development of independent journalism (Müller 2014). The developments of the last decades that saw tendencies of concentration and oligopoly within  the  news organisations grow have raised doubts about whether the  development of journalism contributes automatically to the development of democracy. The view that the media are a guardian of the  public interest and a  means of defending the  citizen against state authoritarianism has  received significant criticism. This  perception is considered outdated because it  underestimates the  ballooning of private broadcasters in size and influences to such an extent that they use their power to promote their independent private interests ultimately against the  public interest (Curran 1996). Such a  risk though is  non-existent according to the capitalists, active in the media. In the words of tycoon Rupert Murdoch, […] because capitalists are always trying to stab each other in  the  back free markets do not lead to monopolies. Essentially monopolies can only exist when governments support them […]. (Giddens 2006)

Reality, however, fails to confirm the Australian tycoon’s view, since the most comprehensive research conducted worldwide shows the  reality of the tendency towards content media  consolidation (Noam 2016). This, despite the fact that research distinguishing between two categories of media, those creating content and those distributing it  over network platforms, showed

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that the second category affirms the view of optimists who believe in increasing competition and pluralism. In  any case, there is  agreement that  monopoly market capture reduces media  diversity, public choice and popular control (Curran 1996). Finally, for many journalists, the  mission of promoting democracy ‘is meaningless … Journalism is an assortment of activities going off in all directions and accomplishing a number of things, some socially important and some not. There is no purpose to journalism […] Forget this talk about mission. (Merrill 2006)

The situation becomes even bleaker when taking into account that television is inferior to newspapers as a means of promoting democracy: Our so-called newspapers give us only snippets of news  – the  rest being advertising, entertainment, opinion, commentary, features, and sports. TV and radio have even less news content. Helping to establish social order, national progress, and more democracy is not a media priority. (Merill 2011)

The 2016 US election campaign that led to the Trump presidency heightened mistrust of the role of television in critical political periods as ‘TV news outlets lavished far more attention on Trump than all other presidential candidates’ (Pickard 2020).

Methodology In this context, a question arises: Is the decline of the press due to declining revenues or due to changes that  affect the  media  industry as  a  result of the emergence of new media? We answer this question by comparing Greek indicators with indicators of other European countries. To this end, we will utilise two variables: First, the  comparative examination of circulations for some countries and some years, since there are no fully comparable data sets, and second the comparison of newspaper and magazine publishers’ revenues, with the help of Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics. For revenue, there exist uniform and fully comparable time series. The  absence of uniform and complete circulation time series for all countries did not  allow the  use of uniform variables for the entire reference period. Finally, we will present the conclusions of our research. Rapid sales decline in Greece The changes caused by the austerity measures in Greece also affected daily habits such as reading newspapers and magazines. As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2,



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Table 4.1  Decline in newspaper sales in Greece 2009/2018. Type of newspaper

 

Political

–69.68

Financial

–87.39

Classified ads

–91.94

Sports

–78.84

General

–94.06

Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority, date of retrieval: 27 June 2021.

Table 4.2  Decline in magazine sales in Greece 2009–2018. Women’s interest

–82.18

General interest

–63.37

Automotive

–90.31

Children

–75.20

TV

–61.47

ICT

–99.56

Sports

–92.07

Leisure entertainment

–49.19

Men’s interest

–98.34

Astrology

–83.85

Music

–95.75

Military

–82.41

Erotic

–88.35

Technology

–90.73

Home decoration

–97.42

Other

–88.51

Total

–73.50

Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority, date of retrieval: 27 June 2021.

during the  period under examination, the  period of implementation of the memoranda, 2009–2018, the already declining circulation and readership of newspapers and magazines in  Greece declined even faster. Specifically, the decrease in newspaper sales exceeded 75% and that of magazines 73%. Within  each general category, there were notable differences. For  example, among newspapers, the  general interest publications suffered the  largest decline in circulation (–94.06%) since their content was more easily covered by

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2,00,000 1,80,000 1,60,000 1,40,000 1,20,000 1,00,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

Figure 4.2  Greece: yearly circulation of political newspapers (1000s). Source: ELSTAT, retrieved on 29  July 2021 at  https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/ publication/SCI09.

internet sources, while political newspapers were the least affected (–69.68%), due to the fact that their audience has always been more demanding. Among magazines, the  largest drop in  circulation was  observed in  the  category of Information and Communication Technologies (–99.56%) and the  smallest in the category of Leisure and Entertainment (49.19%). The effect is noticeable in Figure 4.2. Total circulation of Greek political newspapers was  falling yearly ~5% on average between 2003 and 2009, while it dropped at an average rate of ~7.7% between 2009 and 2017. Circulation of magazines and newspapers The  circulation of newspaper and magazine has  declined in  all Western markets in recent years. The only region in the world that had perhaps bucked the trend in the early years of the 2010s is Asia. For example, in India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, from 2011 to 2016, there was, according to the  World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, an increase in circulation in many countries (WAN IFRA Report 2016, 2017) – although other independent sources paint a different picture and only India has seen a  robust increase in  print circulation (Sparks et  al. 2016). During the  same period (2011–2016) in  the  developed capitalist markets, the  circulation of



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newspapers decreased significantly, even in  Asia. Indicatively, in  Japan, it  decreased by 10.46% (from 48.42 million issues to 43.36). The  decline was similar in the rest of the world: In Russia by 10.96% (from 9.06 million to 8.07 million), in France by 20.72% (from 9.85 million to 7.81 million) and in the United Kingdom by 24.42% (from 13.92 million sheets to 10.53). Taking the  years we focused on to examine newspaper circulation in Greece as a reference period, the circulation in Germany of paid daily and Sunday newspapers decreased from 2009 (22.8 million) to 2018 (15.6 million) by 31.6%. In the United States, the circulation of paid Sunday newspapers decreased by 33.23% (from 46.16 million to 30.82 million issues) between 2009 and 2018 (Statista b). Turnover of newspapers and magazines Examining newspaper revenue in  the  EU during the  period 2009–2018, as shown in Figure 4.3, we see that it decreased on average by 10.84%. The five countries with the  largest decrease were the  following: Greece (–76.79%), Romania  (–71.30%), Cyprus (–63.68%), Croatia  (–55.87%) and Portugal (–54.43%). We observe that  among the  countries with the  largest recorded decrease in  newspaper revenues, three (Greece, Cyprus and Portugal) were severely affected by the  debt crisis  of 2010 and implemented structural adjustment programmes as a precondition for their bailouts. As a result, GDP has either decreased from 2009 to 2018 (in the case of Greece by –19.48%) or has recorded a smaller increase than the EU average (Portugal 6.23% and Cyprus 10.18%, compared to the  EU average of 15.54%). Croatia, which recorded the  fourth-largest drop in  newspaper sales, had the  second-lowest GDP growth from 2009 to 2018: just 5.23%. At the other end of the list, there are seven EU countries in which newspaper revenue has increased over this period: Estonia (78.32%), Belgium (23.45%), Austria  (20.3%), Czech Republic (9.41%), Spain  (6.60%), Germany (6.49%) and Finland (5.53%). Among them are core countries of the  EU and the Eurozone, considered to have benefited from monetary integration (Germany, Austria), while in most of them, GDP growth during this period exceeded the EU average (Estonia 36.35%, Austria 15.56%, Czech Republic 24.88%, Germany 20.52%). Examining the  magazine revenue during the  2009–2018 period, we observe that  at the  EU level, there was  a  decrease of 8.57% on average, as shown in Figure 4.4. However, in each EU28 member state, developments followed a very different trajectory. The five countries with the largest decrease in magazine revenues were as follows: Greece (–78.71%), Croatia (–63.55%), Cyprus (–58.50), Portugal (–56.45%) and Finland (–51.54%). But  there

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78.32

100.00 80.00

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Greece Romania Cyprus Croaa Portugal Bulgaria Lithuania Slovenia Latvia Hungary Norway UK France Sweden Italy EU28 Poland Denmark Slovakia Finland Germany Spain Czechia Austria Belgium Estonia

80.00

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17.08

0.00

6.49

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Figure 4.3  Turnover, publishing of newspapers, change 2009/2018. Source: Eurοstat. Data extracted on 29 April 2021. Last updated: 08 March 20212.

were also three countries where magazine revenues increased: Luxembourg (3.03%), Germany (4.73%) and France (37.14%). The  same pattern observed for newspapers is  repeated for magazines. The record reduction of revenues was reached in Greece, which is the only country that recorded a decrease in its GDP in the aforementioned period, of the order of 19.48%. GDP growth was lower than the European average for the  other four countries that  showed a  large decline in  magazine sales: Croatia (5.23%), Cyprus (10.18%), Portugal (6.23%) and Finland (10.24%). Structural adjustment programmes have been imposed on three of these five countries. 2 For the countries Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Netherlands, there are no data because they are either confidential or of low reliability. The  reference periods for EU28 are 2011–2018; Spain: 2016–2018; Czech Republic: 2015–2018 and Estonia 2010–2017.



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37.14

60.00

20.00 0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00

Greece 78.71 Croaa 63.55 Cyprus 58.50 Portugal 56.45 Finland 51.54 Slovenia 48.26 Romania 46.53 Bulgaria 44.53 Denmark 40.59 Lithuania 38.93 Latvia 37.94 Italy 34.52 Belgium 29.92 Norway 29.25 Poland 23.46 Hungary 23.06 Sweden 22.39 Slovakia 21.60 Austria 16.17 Spain 15.03 EU28 8.57 Estonia 7.41 UK 6.25 Czechia 0.75 Luxembourg 3.03 Germany 4.73 France

40.00

Figure 4.4  Turnover, publishing of journals and periodicals, change 2009/2018. Source: Eurostat. Data extracted on 29 April 2021. Last updated: 08 March 20213.

Two of the  three countries where magazine sales saw an increase (Luxembourg and Germany) are core Eurozone countries, whose economic growth exceeded the European average: 30.96% and 20.52% versus 15.54%. From the ‘circulation’ crisis to the quality crisis Marketers have always argued that  lifting government restrictions on news would increase pluralism and innovation (Adam Smith Institute 1984). This claim, however, is refuted by reality as high-quality journalism has always been subsidised (  John and Silbester Loeb 2015). In this context, the very poor performance of Greece in those indicators that evaluate the quality of the journalism provided is not hard to interpret. We highlight three very recent negative evaluations from reliable sources. First, a Pew Research Center survey showed the deep crisis of confidence that  governs relations between Greeks and their media. ‘People in  Europe show the greatest opposition to political bias in their news, including 89% in

3 Endnote: For the countries Ireland, Malta and Netherlands, there are no data because they are either confidential or of low reliability. Reference period: Spain: 2016–2018; EU28: 2011–2018; Estonia: 2009–2016; Czech Republic: 2015–2018. For  all other countries: 2009/2018.

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30%

34%

30%

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37%

Italy

Bulgaria

39%

UK Czech

38%

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42%

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50%

Belgium

Spain

52%

Switzerland Austria

47%

52%

Ireland

40%

44%

52%

Denmark

50%

Romania Croatia

55%

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Poland

Hungary

59%

Portugal Norway

58%

61%

59%

Turkey

60%

Germany

69%

70%

61%

80%

Netherlans

Spain  and 88% in  Greece who think this  is  unacceptable.’ ‘There  are only two countries in which majorities say their news media are not doing a good job reporting in  the  most important news events: Greece (57%) and South Korea  (55%).’ The  median (the  middle number in  a  list of figures  sorted in ascending or descending order) in Europe is 29%. In addition, Greece had the  lowest percentage of those who say their news media  are doing very/ somewhat well at reporting: 18%. In other European countries, that number was  higher: Spain  33%, Italy 36%, Poland 40%, Hungary 42%, France 47%, UK 52%, Sweden 66%, Germany 72% and Netherlands 74%. Greece maintains the worst perception of media fairness in covering all sides. Eighty per cent of Greek respondents report that the media are not fair, while for the rest of the European countries, the negative answers range from 24% (Netherlands) to 66% (Spain), with the median at 51%. It should be noted that in the Pew Research Center survey, Greece had the highest number of negative answers regarding the fair treatment of different views (Mitchell et al. 2018). Second, the disrepute of the media in Greece is also noted in the Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report. In short, ‘The media remain widely distrusted by Greeks, with few outlets seen as  independent from political or business interests. Fewer than a third (30%) trust the news they use themselves – among the lowest in our survey. Many of the popular sources such as Skai News and Newsbomb are also the least trusted’. As shown in Figure 4.5, Greece maintains its worst performance in Europe in terms of citizens’ trust in the media they use (Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020). Third, the  deterioration of news reporting in  Greece is  also  reflected in  the  Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index (WPFI),

20% 10%

Figure 4.5  Trust in News I Use. Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020.

France Greece

Sweden

Finland

0%



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which assesses press freedom. Based on the  most recent ranking (2021), Greece was in 70th place (among 180 countries) collecting 29.01 points, down from the  65th in  2020 and 2019. This  is a  collapse from the  31st place among 173 ranked countries reported in  the  2008 WPFI. Norway and North Korea, respectively, occupy the first and last positions in these rankings, compiled since 2002. The  index assesses the  pluralism and independence of the  media, the  quality of the  legal framework and the  safety of journalists in  each country. The  rationale for downgrading Greece is provided in an assessment titled ‘Dangerous Cocktail for Press Freedom’. This notes a number of incidents that undermined freedom of the  press in  2020: Police bans, incidents of violence and arrests during coverage of refugee camps in  the  Aegean by journalists, mistreatment of journalists by the Hellenic Police, restrictions on journalists’ access to hospitals and on medical staff statements to the press, censorship of state radio and television controlled directly by the  prime minister, and so  on (Reporters Without Borders 2021). Undoubtedly, two events that  stood out in  the  evaluation of Reporters Without Borders and beyond are the  discriminatory state funding of the media and the assassination of journalist Giorgos Karaivaz. Regarding state funding, in 2020, the government, as part of the measures for economic relief from the pandemic, announced a financial support package for media  through a  subsidy of 20 million euros. The  list of media  outlets that  were funded excluded high-circulation newspapers that  support investigative journalism but are critical of the government, while subsidising websites with a minimal of visitors (International Press Institute 2020). In addition, the murder in 2021 of Giorgos Karaivaz, a well-known crime reporter, outside of his home, created a climate of fear among professionals engaged in investigative journalism in Greece (BBC 2021).

Conclusions Examining press circulation and newspaper revenues in Greece and the EU, we can see that  although during the  period 2009–2018 we had a  drop in  newspaper and magazine circulations of 11% and 9%, respectively, within  the  EU, there was  significant and non-random differentiation. The largest decline in revenues was recorded in countries that saw a drop in GDP (Greece) or a smaller than average increase (Cyprus, Portugal and Croatia). Most of them were at the epicentre of the debt crisis – or the euro crisis as it has been called – which led to their acceptance of the imposition of the  strict austerity policies included in  the  structural adjustment programmes.

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At  the  other end, newspapers and magazines from Eurozone core countries  such as  Germany, whose fiscal adjustment was  significantly more limited than that undertaken by the countries of the South, saw an increase in revenue. On  the  basis  of this  finding, which shows a  positive correlation in the EU between GDP/income and the purchase of newspapers and magazines, we can argue that  the  decline in  press circulation, even if accelerated by the emergence of new media, would not have reached this extent in countries affected by the  crisis, where austerity policies were not  implemented concurrently. The  reduction in  salaries and incomes that  occurred resulted in a decrease in sales of newspapers and magazines, thus confirming the high correlation of newspaper and magazine sales on income. Consequently, in  countries where structural adjustment programmes were imposed, not only has society been impoverished, but news production has also shrunk. The drastic reduction in newspaper and magazine circulation has  degraded public awareness and the  mechanisms of auditing political and economic power, as  citizens have stopped reading newspapers and magazines and turned to social media  and television. Television, however, from its first steps and even more so  in  recent years, seeks the  eye-catching and the  spectacular  and sacrifices informing its audience on the  altar of the dramatic, which is expressed in two ways: staging images and exaggerating meaning (Bourdieu 1996). In  this  way, the  audience does not  focus on the  message itself, but  on the  ‘context’, and thus is  diverted from political, social and economic developments. Moreover, in  Greece as  in  the  rest of the world, broadcast media have not enjoyed the same degree of freedom, or independence from power, as the press (McQuail 1995). As for social media, its susceptibility to disinformation campaigns and its dependence on algorithms that  are meant to maximise user ‘interaction’ and not  news quality present a media landscape that is full of pitfalls and traps (Menczer and Hills 2020) and in large part devoid of original investigative journalism. Indicative of the changes that occurred in the media landscape in Greece during the  memoranda  years are transfers of ownership. Media  groups that had put their stamp on news reporting for many decades went bankrupt under the  burden of huge loans, ceased activities by firing thousands of employees or were acquired for token amounts (Lambraki Group, Pegasus, etc.). Shipping magnates, owners of oil refineries and tankers, football team owners and a variety of other entrepreneurs have become even more actively involved in the media sector. In the new environment, the oligopoly trends of the  market reached unprecedented heights. This  culminated in  the  protests and lawsuits of major daily and Sunday newspapers (Kathimerini, Dimokratia, Nea  Selida and Dokumento) against the  one and only newspaper distribution



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agency, controlled by the largest media owner in Greece. These complaints concern accusations of arbitrary withholding and late payment of sales revenues, which have created liquidity problems, even fake circulation numbers! This  conflict has  reached the  point that  many newspapers do not allow the agency to publish their circulation numbers, claiming that they do not correspond to reality. The controversy produced by vertical consolidations confirms that these forms of oligopoly allow for greater market control and additional profit  opportunities (Manning 2001). In  this  environment of precariousness, rapid changes and oligopolistic control in media ownership, phenomena  of censorship and self-censorship by the  journalists themselves flourished in the years of the memoranda further undermining the prestige of news media (Iordanidou et al. 2020). The rise of oligopoly trends in the media sector is nothing new. Ownership concentration is a prominent trend in the media (Chomsky 1994), resulting in  stricter control of the  message conveyed by journalism. In  Greece and throughout Southern Europe, this  trend accelerated in  the  context of the ‘savage deregulation’ that took place in the transition from state to private television in the late 1980s (Hallin and Mancini 2004). For the period 2009– 2018, however, in Greece, the existence of an oligopoly was a contradiction because it  was  during this  very period that  the  market was  supposed to be liberalised. The  measures voted in  Greece under the  guidance of the  IMF and the EU had as an ultimate goal, according to their instigators, the removal of outdated and excessive regulations that  restricted private initiative and, at  the  end of the  day, market liberalisation. Instead, what  emerged was a ‘savage oligopolisation’. The  deterioration of news media  in  Greece, as  a  result of declining press circulation and market oligopoly, underscores the  importance of distinguishing between structural and instrumental power in news production (Murdock 1982). Although they both act in parallel and complementarily, the  structural dimension, as  found in  the  restrictions placed on owners, publishers and journalists, proves to be much more effective compared to external pressures or interventions exerted on a  case-by-case basis  on the journalism’s product. Building on the  above conclusion, we can argue that  the  decline in newspaper and magazine readership did not  occur horizontally among all income groups but that the decline was greater among the lower-income and social strata. The loosening of the ties between the poorest strata and the press and the  dependence of its circulation on the  higher-income strata  in  turn affected their content, which shifted so as to satisfy the relatively affluent social strata. This  created a  vicious circle as  the  press was  increasingly targeting a smaller, socially delimited readership.

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In conclusion, the need to abandon austerity policies is not just a social or economic imperative. It concerns equally the freedom of the press, the right to be informed and democracy.

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Merill, J. C. (2011). ‘Journalism and Democracy’ in Changing the  News: The  Forces Shaping Journalism in Uncertain Times, eds: Lowrey, W. & Gade, P., Routledge. Merrill, J. C. (2006). Media, Mission and Morality, Spokane, WA: Marquette Books. Mitchell, A., Simmons, K., Matsa, K. E. & Silver, L. (2018). Publics Globally Want Unbiased News Coverage, but Are Divided on Whether Their News Media Deliver, Pew Research Center, 11 January. https://pewrsr.ch/3fd19C2. Müller, L. (2014). Comparing Mass Media in Established Democracies, Patterns of Media Performance, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Murdock, G. (1982). ‘Large Corporations and the  Control of the  Communications Industries’ in: Culture Society and the Media, eds: Gurevitch, M., Bennett, T., Curran, J. & Woollacott J., Methuen. Noam, E. M. (2016). Who Owns the World’s Media? Media Concentration and Ownership Around the World, Oxford University Press. Norris, P. (2004). ‘Global political communication: Good governance, human development and mass communication’, in: Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges, eds: Esser, F. & Pfetsch, B., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 115–150. Papathanassopoulos, St. (2001). ‘The Decline of Newspapers: The Case of Greek Press’, Journalism Studies, 2(1):109–123. Pickard, V. (2020). Democracy without Journalism? Confronting the Misinformation Society, Oxford University Press. Poulet, B. (2009). La fin des journaux et l’ avenir de l’ information, Éditions Gallimard. Ramonet, I. (2011). L’ Explosion du journalism. Des médias de masse á la masse de medias, Éditions Galilée. Reuters Institute Digital News Report. (2020). Reuters Institute – University of Oxford. https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/. Shoenbach, K., Lauf, E., McLeod, J. M.,  & Scheufele, D. (1999). ‘Distinction and Integration; Sociodemographic Determinants of Newspapers Reading in the USA and Germany, 1974–96’, European Journal of Communication, 14(2):225–239. Siebert, F., Peterson, T. & Schramm, W. (1956). Four Theories of the Press, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Sparks, C., Wang, H., Zhao, Y., Lü, N. & Wang, D. (2016). ‘The Impact of Digital Media on Newspapers: Comparing Responses in China and the United States’. Global Media and China, 1(3):186–207. Stiglitz, J. E. (2016). The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe. London: W. W. Norton & Company. Streeck, W. (2014). Buying Time, The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, Verso. Vatikiotis, L. (2018). Pour l’ indépendance des statistiques grecques contre l’ intervention de la main ‘invisible’ des creanciers. Statistique et Societé, Vol. 6, No 2, Novembre. Vatikiotis, L. (2020). Postfazione. La  pandemia  ancora  minacciosa  dei memorandum, in: Antonio di Siena: Memorandum, una  moderna  tragedia  griega, l’AD Edizioni, Gruppo Editoriale ETS. WAN IFRA Report. (2016). World Press Trends, France. WAN IFRA Report. (2017). World Press Trends, Germany. Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making, Council of Europe report, DGI/09. https://bit.ly/34PkEuB. Weibull, L. (1992). ‘The Status of the Daily Newspaper: What Readership Research Tells Us about the Role of Newspapers in the Mass Media System’. Poetics, 21:259–282.

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Internet Sources Reporters Without Borders: https://rsf.org/en/ranking. Statista b, study id 12527, Print media in the United States, p. 37. International Press Institute (2020) Greece urged to ensure fair and transparent media support scheme, 15 July. https://bit.ly/3hKtEZH. BBC (2021) Giorgos Karaivaz: Veteran crime journalist shot dead in  Greece, 10  April. https://bbc.in/3oHpymu.

Chapter 5 ELITES VERSUS THE PEOPLE? TRACING POPULIST NARRATIVE THROUGH THE PRESENTATION OF THE TURKISH HEALTH REFORM IN MEDIA Ayşecan Kartal Galatasaray University, Turkey

Introduction This chapter looks at how the newspapers that position themselves as politically close to the government portrayed and presented the health sector agenda of the government. The chapter is based on a scan of two major pro-government newspapers of the  period, Zaman1 and Yeni Şafak, between 2002 and 2011. These two dailies were scanned for news articles and columns on health policy changes in particular and the Turkish health sector in general. The aim of this chapter is to show how the pro-government media portrayal of the  health sector complemented a  broader discursive narrative of the government on health. This portrayal positions the government determined to end victimisations caused by the pre-AKP (  Justice and Development Party) era healthcare system, presents changes introduced to the healthcare system

1 It  should be noted that  the  17-25  December 2013 corruption investigations targeting the government changed the relationship within AKP circles and the Gülen movement changed dramatically. Following that  period Zaman which had an organic link with the Gülen movement can hardly be defined as a pro-government newspaper and from 4 March 2016, the newspaper was run by an appointed trustee by Istanbul 6th Criminal Court of Peace. Following the  15  July 2016 coup attempt, it  was  closed down with a statutory decree issued by the government within the state of emergency authorization on 27 July 2016.

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by the  AKP as  unprecedented developments and depicts opponents of the reform – namely doctors – as driven by self-interest. In  the  AKP’s populist discourse, serving the  people, treating all citizens as equal, being just, representing a radically different approach from previous governments and the  claiming to introduce a  total change of mentality in  the  country emerge as  central themes. This  populist politics rests on a discursive opposition constructed between the ‘Old Turkey’, where the AKP claims the  citizens were victimised by the  elites, and the  ‘New  Turkey’ that the AKP offers to construct on the basis of equality. Day-to-day issues such as  health and transformation are areas  through which the populist politics are constructed as  the  short-term consequences of those issues are compatible with the short-term result-oriented agenda of populist politics. This  study will look at  how the  populist politics of AKP is  constructed through health reform. In  this  broader political picture, healthcare emerged as a key discursive space where the AKP’s populist claims to end ‘Old Turkey’s’ social inequalities and ‘victimisations’ materialised. Furthermore, the  AKP’s changes to the  healthcare system were presented as  steps that  symbolised the  creation of a  ‘New  Turkey’ where previously victimised people are saved from privileged elites. In other words, it was not only structural changes that the AKP insistently aimed to introduce into the health system through the Health Transformation Programme (HTP) but also a strong discursive determinacy to propagate these changes as the end of the inequalities of ‘Old Turkey’ that created a rupture in Turkey’s larger political field. Social scientists, political scientists and sociologists have used the  term populism frequently in the last two decades. Its wide usage for explaining diverse political contexts has  triggered discussions over its definition. The  frequent usage of the term in the media to explain political currents in various regions of the world has blurred the concept further. Its different connotations depend on context, such as  right-wing and anti-immigration parties in  Europe and left-wing parties in Latin America, which according to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) led to a discussion centred not only on what it is but on whether it exists. For  those that  see it  as  an ideology, of which Mudde’s work is  among the most influential, populism is first and foremost a set of ideas characterised by an antagonism between the people and the elite, as well as the primacy of popular sovereignty, whereby the virtuous general will is placed in opposition to the moral corruption of elite actors (Gidron and Banikowski 2013). Scholars that see it as a discursive style, on the other hand, regard populism as a ‘rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between the  el pueblo and the  oligarchy. (de la  Torre 2000, as  cited in  Gidron and Banikowski 2013).



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This  approach regards populism as  a  political strategy that  they analyse through policy changes, political organisation and forms of mobilisation (Gidron and Banikowski 2013). This approach is frequently observed in the works of sociologists and political scientists that work on Latin America. Madrid defines populism ‘as those aiming at economic redistribution and the nationalization of natural resources, and populist mobilization as consisting of antiestablishment and anti-system appeals’ (Madrid 2008, as  cited in  Gidron and Banikowski 2013). Mudde’s definition of the concept as a thin-centred ideology allowed him to define it  as  an ideology that  can be used as  a  framework to explain divergent political contexts in different time periods. He states that ‘as a thin-centered ideology populism can easily be combined with very different (thin  and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism and socialism’ (Mudde 2004). Mudde places his  definition within  the  ideational approach, thus considering the  concept of populism as  a  world view. In  their co-authored work with Kaltwasser, they differentiated the  ideational approach from the  popular agency approach, the  Laclauan approach, the  socio-economic approach, the  political strategy approach and the  folkloric style of politics approach (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). The  key features of populism according to Mudde and Kaltwasser are the people, the elite and the general will. The people in the populist ideology is  a  combination of the  people as  sovereign, the  common people and the  people as  a  nation. The  elite is  positioned as  the  corrupt and opposite of the pure people; the antagonism between the people and the elite rooted in from political power, socio-economic status and nationality. As for the elites, the main distinction between them and the people emerges on the basis of morality. The economic, political and cultural elite are portrayed as a collective block that stands as an obstacle to the general will. This  study takes the  ‘thin-ideology’ definition of populism by Mudde as a departure point and makes use of the concepts of neoliberal populism and neopopulism that emerged in the literature on Latin America as conceptual tools to pursue its discussion of the reflection of the Turkish Health Reform in media. While different approaches enlist diverse building blocks that characterise populism (which undoubtedly overlap), I will make use of a combination of those components to discuss the health policy discourses of the AKP through the conceptual framework of neoliberal populism. Those components that  will be of use in  this  chapter are an antiestablishment emphasis in terms of criticism of the institutions, bureaucracy and political parties; an anti-elite emphasis that defines the people as the rulers against the elites.

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The  anti-establishment discourse was  formed via  how health services improved and were extended to cover previously excluded people. The divide between the  people and the  elite was  most specifically mapped onto the  doctor–patient divide which the  pro-reform discourse constructed. The  regulations regarding the  detainment of patients, the  introduction of a  general health insurance scheme and improvements to the  infrastructure of healthcare units in eastern provinces were other issues through which antiestablishment discourse emerged in the narratives of the AKP. Through these issues, the  AKP underscored their difference through their prioritisation of the endowment of equality and serving the people. Healthcare was a primary issue on the agenda from the first days of AKP governance. Following the  establishment of the  first AKP government on 19 November 2002, the first circular of the AKP government was published by the Ministry of Health on the issue of detaining patients in hospitals.2 The circular was communicated to all governorships of the 81 provinces countrywide and stated that As there are cases where patients, babies, mothers, and the bodies of the deceased are detained for the  reason they have not  paid the  fees for the  services they received at the hospital, from now on no patient or body of a deceased person will be detained in hospitals on the justification of the nonpayment of fees.3

Healthcare providers and receivers emerge as two opposing sides in the AKP’s discourse on healthcare reform. As this chapter will demonstrate, this opposition between providers and receivers was also central to the pro-government media’s representation of healthcare reform. In  other words, the  pro-government media  consistently pit  providers against receivers. News articles portray doctors a self-interest driven and present the AKP as a protector of citizenpatients from health personnel and institutional practices that victimised the patients in the pre-AKP health system. The  chapter is  organised into three parts. The  first concerns the portrayal of the  pre-AKP healthcare system which underscored how

2 The issue of patients detained in hospitals was a frequent news item on the evening news and in newspapers of the 1990s. If patients without social security coverage was unable to pay after the completion of their treatment, the hospital administration could refuse to discharge them or release a burial certificate for a funeral. This practice of blocking discharges was commonly referred to as being ‘detained’ or ‘held captive’. 3 ‘25521-2002/119 sayılı Taburcu İşlemleri Hakkında  Genelge’, 2  November  26, 2002 ‘Circular no: 25521-2002/119 on Discharge Procedures’ http://www.istanbulsaglik.gov. tr/w/mev/mev_gen/tedavi_hiz/taburcu_islemleri_Hakkinda_Genelge.pdf.).



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it victimised people. The second part focuses on the portrayal of doctors as self-interest-driven actors. The  third part concerns how anti-HTP actors are portrayed.

Portraying the Pre-AKP Health System: A System that Victimises the People The  anti-establishment emphasis  dominated the  discourses of the  AKP governments especially throughout the  theme of ‘New  Turkey’. The  state institutions before the AKP’s arrival to power were portrayed as not serving the people but as maintaining the privileges of a certain segment of society, mostly portrayed as  Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP) and its electorate. Within  the  ‘elite versus the  people’ discourses of the  AKP, bureaucracy and state institutions emerged as  places where the  inequality among these two groups materialised. For  instance, serving the people emerged as a counter position with regard to the institutional habits of the ‘old Turkey’ and was presented as a defining feature of the ‘New Turkey’ of the AKP. Especially in the first half of the 2002–2011 period, there are a significant number of news articles in Zaman and Yeni Şafak newspapers focusing on stories about people encountering difficulties with the health system resulting in their becoming victims. At times, these resulted in permanent health problems or death. This subsection presents some of those articles and discuss how these stories are presented, how these difficulties are explained and what  they present as the source of problem. This  category of articles is  significant as  they clarify how the  progovernment media  make use of such articles to justify transformations that are proposed for the health system. By saying this, I neither dispute the truth of the stories nor deny the structural problems that they are concerned with (such as absence of ambulances and health personnel), but I argue that those stories also  have value as  justification for structural changes to the  existing health system. The stories can be divided into three categories. In the first category are articles about patients not released from hospitals even though their treatment was complete because they could not pay their bill. In some cases, the detained patients were children or babies, and the  story was  told by the  parents. In most cases, one day after the publication of these articles, another article about Recep Akdağ concerning that  particular case is  published, ordering the immediate release of the patient in question. A news article entitled ‘Despite the Order of the Minister of Health, the Patient Was Not Released for 3 Days’ (Sağlık Bakanı’nın talimatına rağmen

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hasta, üç gün rehin kaldı, Zaman, 2002) was about a five-year-old child who was not released from the hospital after a surgery as the parents could not pay the bill.4 The  first circular published by the  Ministry of Health of the  58th Government on 26  November 2002 concerned the  discharge of patients. In  this  circular, which was  sent to the  governors’ offices of all provinces in  Turkey, Recep Akdağ requested that  ‘In  no health institutions patients, mothers and babies should be kept detained with the  motive of nonpayment of hospital expenses’ (Hastalar Rehin Tutulmayacak, Zaman, 2002). This circular is emphasised in the article twice. As  in  similar articles in  this  category, the  emphasis  is on patients who were not  released from hospitals suffering from practices that  belong to the  past. The  foremost responsibility of the  new minister, the  articles emphasised, was  to bring an end to this  unequal treatment of patients. That the circular on the discharge of patients was the first of the ministry is  significant in  understanding the  emphasis  placed by the  Justice and Development Party on universal access to health services and its discursive claim to end the  victimisations of the  pre-AKP system. As  this  chapter will demonstrate, through news articles concerning specific cases, the progovernment media  contributed to and reinforced the  AKP’s discourse on detained patients. The second most encountered type of news article are those about people suffering from the organisational or structural problems of Social Insurance Institution (SSK) hospitals. These stories are especially common from late 2002 until the transfer of SSK hospitals to the Ministry of Health. The problems encountered due to structural obstacles related to the  fragmented social security system (such as  not being able to receive a  service from a  certain hospital or not  being able to buy a  prescribed medicine because access to that medicine is only provided through one channel) can be discussed under this  category. These  news articles gradually decrease in  number following the transfer of SSK hospitals to the Ministry of Health and the enactment of the Law on Social Security and General Health Insurance in April 2008. The  articles on SSK hospitals focus mainly on the  lack of personnel and equipment and the  overload of patients. When interviewed, hospital managers state that they try to provide service with the present equipment and personnel. The article ‘Little Buse Had a Seizure while Waiting in the Queue for Medicine’ (Annesiyle 5 saat ilaç kuyruğunda bekleyen küçük Buse havale

4 The manager of the hospital states that as the family of the child did not present their Green Card before the surgery, they had no option but to invoice them.



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geçirdi, Zaman, 2003) tells how a five-year-old child waited five hours to get her prescription filled at an SSK hospital pharmacy.5 This story emphasises the  hospital’s inability to provide sufficient services to the  patients present. In the article ‘The Lack of MRI Facility Creates Problems in a SSK Hospital’ (SSK Hastanesi’nde tomografi cihazı olmaması sıkıntıya  yol açıyor, Zaman, 2003), SSK Çorum Hospital is  revealed to have no MRI  facility despite the fact that there are 60,000 patients treated there each month. Additionally, it is stated that due to the lack of a radiologist, the existing ultrasound facility is  not being used. In  the  article ‘There  Are Not  Enough Doctors in  SSK’ (SSK Hastanesinde Doktor Sıkıntısı Yaşanıyor, Zaman, 2003), the insufficient number of health personnel in Gebze’s SSK hospital is mentioned. In addition to children, the  elderly are held up as  visible victims of the  health system. The article ‘Patients with the SSK Scheme Wait for Hours for Their Health Certificate’ (SSK’lılar Sağlık Karnesi için Saatlerce Kuyrukta Bekliyor, Zaman, 2002) highlights the  hours-long wait  for a  health certificate in  Bursa  SSK hospital. The emphasis is on a lack of personnel and buildings, which were the reasons for the long queues. These  news articles portray SSK hospitals as  structurally insufficient institutions, but the emphasis, unlike in the cases of detained patients mentioned above, is not on the initiative of hospital personnel but rather the inability of managers to improve the situation as minimum requirements are not met by the SSK. These articles form the basis for the opinion that the social security system in general is fragmented and specifically the SSK social security scheme and its components need transformation. The  third category of articles are those that  focus on the  lack of health personnel – especially doctors – in rural areas in eastern and south-eastern provinces. The  articles describe cases in  which patients suffered severely or died either because there was  no health unit  where they lived or, even if a unit existed, no health personnel staffed it and the patients had to travel. At the time when the law on compulsory service (zorunlu hizmet) was being discussed, there were articles in newspapers showing insufficient number of doctors in certain provinces, especially in Eastern and South-eastern Turkey. In  the  article ‘Distribution of Doctors Is Unbalanced’, the  places with the highest number of patients per doctor were indicated as Ardahan, Tunceli, Bayburt, Kilis, Hakkari, Iğdır, Şırnak, Siirt, Bingöl and Gümüşhane (Doktor Dağılımı Dengesiz, Yeni Şafak, 2006). It  is  stressed that  the  people in  these provinces are helpless and the lack of health personnel result in deaths. 5 Before the transfer of SSK hospitals to the Ministry of Health, the patients with the SSK scheme were able to buy their medicines only from the pharmacies of the hospitals or from the pharmacies that have a protocol with SSK.

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The case of six patients dying in Hakkari province was a highly covered news  item in  early 2004 (‘Haydi doktorlar doğuya!’ Yeni Şafak, 2004). Six patients with kidney failure died in  one month due to a  lack of doctors with a specialisation in dialysis. Even though one of the undersecretaries of the Ministry of Health stated that the deaths of these patients were not directly related to the  absence of health personnel, a  doctor with a  specialisation in dialysis was appointed to Hakkari immediately and it was stated that legal regulations to improve the  personal benefits for doctors working in  eastern and south-eastern provinces would soon be presented to parliament. The appointment of doctors to eastern provinces was an important item on the agenda of the Ministry of Health in the first half of the 2002–2011 period. The presence of this issue in the media will be covered in the subsection where the portrayal of doctors will be discussed. The  portrayal of ‘victims of the  system’ in  the  news articles provides a  broad  representation of the  pre-AKP period. The  health system present when the AKP came to power is depicted as one where access was difficult, coverage was  limited and geographic disparities were apparent. As a consequence, it  is  implied, children, babies, pregnant women and elderly  – the most vulnerable parts of the population – suffered severe consequences such as loss of life, not receiving services or receiving the services belatedly.

Portraying Doctors as Self-Interest-Driven Actors The  anti-elite component emerged as  a  theme that  materialises through the  patient–doctor divide in  the  discourses of the  AKP. In  the  anti-elite discourse, the  main  emphasis  is on the  sharp division between the  two groups  – the  elites and the  people  – which emerges as  the  doctors versus the people. The main difference of this theme in the case of this research from that of the anti-establishment theme is the strong emphasis on two groups of people and the clear-cut definition of doctors as elites. In this sharp divide, the portrayal of the doctors includes the elements of ‘elites’ that are underscored in  the  populism literature, the  most prominent of which is  corruption and impurity compared to the  people. In  the  Turkish case, this  corruptness and moral impurity manifests itself – in the field of health – through issues such as  obligatory rotation, the  anti-HTP position of the  Turkish Medical Association (TTB), the full-time employment law and the alleged demand of doctors for extra payments. The  articles portray doctors as  a  professional group who prioritise their own interests rather than patients in  the  practice of the  profession. These  articles can be examined in  two categories. First, some articles focus on the  income-oriented choices of doctors and the  internal regulations of



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hospitals. The second group is about the lack of doctors in eastern and southeastern provinces due to the unwillingness of doctors to work in those places. Doctors as a professional group are described as people whose main objective is  not to serve the  people but  rather to focus on their own material interests. In  line with this  general description, the  following representations and claims prevail in  the  news articles: the  people are deprived of the  service they deserve as a consequence of doctors’ choices and the medical profession itself is  transformed into a  tool to abuse the  people’s essential health service needs. These themes can be observed in the following articles, the first of which concerns the case of an institution (a university hospital) making a profit-oriented decision. The  article entitled ‘Being Examined by a  Professor Costs 50 Million More’ (Profesöre Muayene Olmak 50 Milyon Daha  Pahalı, Zaman, 2003) summarises a  practice introduced by the  Istanbul University Faculty of Medicine. According to a notice published by the dean, patients wishing to be examined by a professor or associate professor would need to pay an extra sum of between 50 and 65 million lire.6 This  is justified by the  administration as  a  means to increase income for the  department. However, department members stated that  they were not  informed where this  additional income would be channelled. Patients prefer to be examined by doctors with academic titles and were disappointed by this new practice, calling it a ‘professor tariff ’. Additionally, the  Ministry of Finance General Directorate of Budget and Financial Control (Maliye Bakanlığı Bütçe ve Mali Kontrol Genel Müdürlüğü) stated that this practice is not lawful as members of the department are only allowed to examine patients for a  different tariff outside of working hours. The decision made by the hospital was declared in the article to be unlawful and unacceptable by the  responsible unit  of the  Finance Ministry. Thus, the government did not approve the ‘profit-oriented’ practice of the hospital. Declarations by the Minister of Health about the practices of some doctors can be considered as  a  certain  way of portraying the  profession. In  such declarations, which will be analysed further in  the  following subsections, the  ministry and the  government’s role is  defined as  to protect patients from practices that  victimise them. As  in  the  previous article, an article entitled ‘Akdağ: Report the Doctors Who Give Business Cards to the Governors’ (Akdağ: Kartvizit Veren Doktorları Valilere Bildirin, Zaman, 2005) states that the number of private offices of doctors are decreasing as payments to doctors who work only in  public hospitals increased.7 Hence, it  is  unacceptable for a  doctor to 6 As  of 1  January  2005, Turkish Lira  was  revaluated and six zeroes were dropped from the currency. Thus, 50 and 65 millions referred in this article equal to 50 and 56 turkish lire. 7 Here Akdağ refers to the  performance-based payments before the  full-day working regulation.

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refuse to examine a patient in a hospital. His emphasis was on the protection of patients, as mentioned above, and he concludes his statement accordingly: ‘No one can show another work address than the hospital he works in. If a doctor gives you his business card, please make a complaint to the governor’ (Akdağ: Kartvizit Veren Doktorları Valilere Bildirin, Zaman, 2005). An article entitled ‘Doctors Have Less Income than Those on Minimum Wage!’ describes the statement of the Adana Revenue Office about the selfdeclared taxable income of doctors in Adana province. According to revenue office records, the annual declared income of doctors was 1,188 million lire,8 which is  less than minimal wage. When evaluated on the  basis  of declared income, the  medical profession ranks among the  least income-generating professions. The head of Adana Provincial Revenue office declared, following the release of figures, that ‘we prefer that doctors who practice such a sacred profession declare their income realistically rather than look for ways to pay less tax’ (Doktor Asgari Ücretliden Daha  az Para  Kazanıyormuş! Zaman, 2004). The  last article related to this  sub-theme shows the  income-oriented professional choices of doctors, but on a larger scale. An article entitled ‘When Private Hospitals Proposed High Salaries 3000 Doctors Resigned from State Jobs’ stated that  3,274 doctors resigned from public hospitals to start working in private hospitals. The article is based on data provided by Türk-Sağlık Sen, a health sector union known for its proximity to the nationalist right. According to the article, when the salaries of doctors in private hospitals went up to 15,000–20,000 lire a month, it became harder for public hospitals to encourage doctors to continue working there. In Turkey, there were 108,000 doctors, 63,000 of which work for the Ministry of Health. And while the  ratio of patients per doctor is  653, for doctors working for the Ministry of Health it is 1,104. This difference, the article shows, is a result of the inclination of doctors to work in private hospitals. In all articles, doctors as a professional group are portrayed as people who prioritise their own interests rather than serving the people, acting contrary to the ethos of their profession which, as defined in the last quote, is sacred. Patients are shown as victims of this structural, deeply rooted practice among doctors. The  ministry and the  government, on the  other hand, position themselves as the actor bringing novelty to the health sector, introducing its own ethos of service to the people, and making medical professionals serve the people, too. The  second category of articles focus on the  issue of the  insufficient number of doctors in eastern and south-eastern provinces as a consequence

8 This when converted to the post-revaluation currency is 1,818 Turkish Lire.



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of the unwillingness of doctors to work there. The emphasis is that doctors, despite material incentives introduced by the  Ministry of Health, do not choose to work in these provinces. Articles published after the introduction of compulsory service for doctors focus instead on how doctors try to find ways of not going to where they are appointed. In an article entitled ‘Even Doubled Salaries Could Not Persuade Doctors to Go to the East’ (İki Katı Maaş Bile Doktorları Doğuya Gitmeye İkna Edemedi, Zaman, 2004), the  practices of the  Ministry of Health to encourage doctors to go to eastern provinces is  summarised. Doctors are offered approximately a threefold higher salary than what is paid in western provinces; additionally, they would be able to receive shares of revolving funds. At the time this article was written, compulsory service for general practitioners had been abolished, and instead, a  voluntary, contract-based employment model was  in  place for eastern and south-eastern provinces. However, article stated that  there were 940 vacant posts for specialists, to which only 177 specialist doctors applied. As for general practitioners, there were 413 applications for 2,545 vacant posts. It is emphasised in the article that doctors do not prefer to work in the eastern and south-eastern provinces as, unlike in western provinces, there is no possibility to work in  a  private health unit  or hospital after standard working hours. What is underlined, as mentioned earlier, is that doctors choose to work in their own interest rather than to do what is ethically and professionally required. This  choice of doctors is  portrayed as  the  only reason behind the  high number of patients per doctor in eastern and south-eastern provinces. In an article entitled ‘Akdağ: In  the  Underdeveloped Regions We Are Short of Doctors’(Akdağ: Az Gelişmiş Bölgelerde Hekim Güçlüğü Çekiyoruz, Zaman, 2005), a statement of Recep Akdağ’s focuses on the unwillingness of doctors to go to eastern provinces despite the  high salaries offered to them. In  an article published on the eve of the reintroduction of compulsory service for doctors, the  statement of the  chair of TTB Gencay Gürsoy is  cited in  an article titled ‘A  Strange Defense from Gürsoy’. Gürsoy’s statement focuses on infrastructural problems, such the  lack of accommodations, in  eastern and south-eastern provinces and states that  if those problems are resolved, there would surely be doctors who would respond to the  call to fill vacant posts. The title of the article suggests that the reasons given by Gürsoy are illegitimate; rather, they are excuses for not going to the eastern provinces. Compulsory service was  reintroduced in  July 2005 and included both general practitioners and specialist doctors. It  required them to work for between 300 and 600 days in the region. The law impacted doctors that had never worked in public service before and those who graduated after the law was passed. Thus, not all doctors in Turkey were included in this compulsory scheme. The Ministry of Health was still, after the passage of the law, trying to

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understand the lack of doctors in eastern and south-eastern provinces. In an article entitled ‘Follow-up Is Introduced for Those Who Do Not  Perform Compulsory Service’ (Zorunlu Hizmete Gitmeyen Doktorlara  Yakın Takip Geliyor, Zaman, 2006), it is emphasised that the Ministry of Health was seeking to understand the  reasons for the  unwillingness of doctors to go to eastern provinces. Following the regulation introduced in July 2005, the Ministry of Health made monthly appointments to eastern and south-eastern provinces and decided to make regular visits to the region. The  Ministry of Health is  portrayed in  the  articles as  an actor taking measures to ensure that doctors work in eastern and south-eastern provinces. However, doctors are portrayed as resisting their appointed posts. An article entitled ‘They  Arranged a  Pseudo-Marriage to Avoid Compulsory Service’ (Mecburi Hizmete Gitmemek için Sahte Evlilik Yaptılar, Zaman, 2007) outlines a case where doctors entered a false marriage to avoid going to where they are appointed, and the preventive measures of the Ministry of Health to avoid such attempts. The article recounts the case of a female doctor who married a  doctor working in  Istanbul after being appointed to Bingöl. This  false marriage was discovered after photos were uncovered of an unofficial marriage of the  same doctor, and an investigation by the  magistrate was  initiated. The human resources manager of the ministry declared that such attempts had decreased compared to previous years but that the ministry cannot take any more preventive measure other than asking for documentation of marital status to verify the veracity of marriages. The measures taken by the Ministry of Health to decrease the discrepancy between eastern and western provinces in  terms of the  number of doctors suggest that  it  could only be resolved through a compulsory service system and that doctors are even trying to bypass this system. The position of doctors in these cases is portrayed being ethically paradoxical to a service orientation and to what the government is trying to achieve in terms of creating more equal access to the health system. It does not – it is claimed – correspond to the ethos of the medical profession.

Dismissing the Anti-Health Transformation Programme Actors and Discourses Following the  announcement of the  HTP by the  government, strikes and demonstrations were organised by the TTB with the collaboration of the SES (Health and Social Workers Union) and local medical chambers, mainly of the provinces of Istanbul and Ankara. In this section, the discussion is limited to how pro-media  government covered these protests. Articles that  cover the  major strikes are examined in  order to look at  what  themes were foregrounded in the pro-government media while presenting these events.



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For  strikes and demonstrations organised nationally by the  TTB, the emphasis of the articles is that the majority of doctors did not participate. An article entitled ‘In the Doctor Demonstration There Were More Police than Doctors’ (Doktorların Eyleminde Doktordan çok Polis  Vardı, Zaman, 2003) states that a demonstration organised by the Istanbul Medical Chamber about the increase of salaries attracted greater interest among the media and police than among doctors. The  stress on the  lack of participation in  the  strikes is  more evident as  participation in  the  strikes  – during which strikes were not  providing healthcare services  – was  mentioned to be contrary to the  professional ethics of doctors. The statement of Recep Akdağ regarding doctor’s lack of participation in the demonstrations is as an example: ‘Throughout the country doctors did not participate much in the strikes. This is a consequence of doctors’ sensibilities and awareness of the importance of health care services’(Tabip Odası: Bu Bir Uyarı Eylemi; Bakan Akdağ: Demokratik Hak, Zaman, 2003). Before the  strike of 24  December  2003, an article entitled ‘Doctors of the TTB Are Going on Strike Again on 24 December’ stated that participation in  the  strike on 5  November 2003 was  lower than expected and that  only private clinics had benefited from the  strike. Ministry of Health hospitals did not join the strike, but some SSK hospitals took part (TTB’li Doktorlar 24 Aralık’ta Yeniden Sahneye Çıkıyor, Zaman, 2003). Following the strike on 24 December 2003, in an article entitled ‘Doctor Members of Parliament of AKP Made a Call for Dialogue to Doctors of TTB’, it is stated that nowhere in  the  country was  there strong participation in  the  strike, and in  some provinces, no doctors participated at  all (AK Partili Doktor Vekiller İş Bırakan TTB’li Doktorlara  Diyalog Çağrısı Yaptı, Zaman, 2003). The  title of the  article ‘Medical Chambers Called It  Strike Doctors Called It  Duty’ (Tabip Odaları Grev Doktorlar Grev Dedi, Zaman, 2007) itself distinguishes between doctors who decided to go on strike and those who do not agree with them. It is additionally stressed that health professionals did not participate in  high numbers. As  can be seen from the  titles of the  articles mentioned previously in  this  section, the  strikes also  suggest a  division between ‘TTB doctors’ and other doctors. According to the articles, while TTB doctors, who were low in number, participated in the strikes, and the majority of doctors are portrayed as prioritising ‘their duties’, –that is, providing health services to patients. While there is  emphasis  on how the  TTB’s national calls to strike did not receive a high response from doctors, there is even stronger emphasis on how the  strikes will negatively impact the  lives of citizens. This  second theme especially arises in articles published before the strikes. In the articles published following the strikes, the emphasis is on how strikes made it difficult

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for patients to receive services. Stories about patients who could not receive services constituted a large portion of the articles. Furthermore, doctors who participated in  strikes are portrayed as  having directly, negatively impacted the lives of these patients. The titles of the articles that appear before the strikes have a discouraging tone: ‘Doctors Are on Strike, So Do Not Get Sick Today’ (Doktorlar Grevde Bugün Sakın ola Hastalanmayın, Zaman, 2003) and ‘Doctors Are on Strike, So  Do Not  Go to the  Hospital Tomorrow’ (Doktorlar Grev Yapıyor Yarın hastaneye Gitmeyin, Zaman, 2003) are titles of the articles published before the strike on 5 November 2003. ‘Health Services Will Slow Down for 2 Days’ (Sağlık Hizmetleri İki Gün Aksayacak, Zaman, 2004) is  also  typical, and all these titles characterise the strikes as obstacles to receiving services. The statements of Recep Akdağ and Ministry of Health officials appear in  articles published before the  strikes. In  these statements, the  legality of the strike is questioned and doctors who participate are accused of trespassing the ethical codes of their profession. Additionally, it is emphasised that doctors who participate in the strike would be subject to administrative investigations. A  common theme that  emerged in  the  previous subsections is that the  health reforms of the  AKP government are presented as  a  rupture from previous healthcare practices with an emphasis  on increased access, equality and the  service of citizens in  a  way that  prevents them from being vulnerable to the structural inconveniences of the healthcare system that is handed over to the AKP government from the previous governments. From this perspective, the strikes of doctors in particular and the political stance of the TTB in general are presented as opposed to the AKP’s aim to provide an equal, accessible healthcare system that  serves the  people rather than professional interests. The  Ministry of Health, in  addition to stressing that  they will start legal proceedings against striking doctors, also emphasised that the opposition to the healthcare policies of the AKP did not want the healthcare system to improve either in terms of quality of service or accessibility to more citizens. In the article entitled ‘Akdağ: Investigations Will Start into Doctors Who Strike’ (Akdağ: İş Bırakacak Doktorlar Hakkında  Soruşturma  Açılacak, Zaman, 2003), Recep Akdağ states that Being a health professional means serving the people. I also worked as a doctor under hard conditions but  never imagined striking. In  a  public institution belonging to my ministry, whoever  – for whatever reason  – does not  provide proper service to citizens will face an administrative investigation. Neither the  Turkish people nor  most Turkish doctors can accept such a  situation. (Akdağ: İş Bırakacak Doktorlar Hakkında Soruşturma Açılacak, Zaman, 2003)



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The strike is defined as an obstacle to the delivery of services. In  the  same article, the  stance of the  TTB is  presented as  an archaic ideological heritage that is completely opposed to the novelties introduced by the AKP. The strike in question was organised to protest government health policies in  general and the  draft law on fixed-term contracts for healthcare personnel. Gencay Gürsoy was chair of the Central Council of the Turkish Medical Council at the time and stated that Our first aim with such strikes is to share the wrongs of the health care system with the people and search for a dialogue with the government. The Ministry of Health budget should increase by 5 percent in  2004 and by 10 percent the following year. Health is among the essential duties of a social state. Patients should not  be seen as  clients, and the  salaries of doctors should be doubled. (Tabip Odası: Bu bir uyarı Eylemi; Bakan Akdağ: Demokratik Hak, Zaman, 2003)

Akdağ commented on the strike’s supporters as follows: They  want the  model of socialist countries of the  1960s. This  model was appropriate for those times within a statist framework, but we are now in 2003 and heading in the direction of Europe; we cannot go the opposite direction of Europe and the world. We are in 2003, but our friends are living in the 1960s. (Akdağ: İş Bırakacak Doktorlar Hakkında Soruşturma Açılacak, Zaman, 2003)

The opposition of the TTB, as mentioned earlier, is presented as holding back government efforts to apply a  contemporary standard, which is  expressed as European. The strikes and demonstrations of doctors are presented as at the expense of citizens for the sake of the self-interest of doctors. Following the 14 March 2011 demonstrations, Recep Akdağ stated that One has  to make a  comparison with the  previous situation, as  well. The Che Guevara banner in the demonstration has nothing to do with the health care system. I can’t remember the chambers of medicine coming together with marginal groups to organize such demonstrations against the health system in the past. I wonder, were there any demonstrations for the problems of citizens 8-10 years ago. Because they have had ‘ideological ideas’ since their establishment, it is because of their ‘immobility’ that I do not agree with their ideology. (Vatandaşın Çektiği Sıkıntılar için Hangi Eylemi Yapmışlar?, Yeni Şafak, 2011)

The positions of the TTB and the Medical Chambers are presented as irrelevant to the structural issues that directly impact citizens and as reflections of their – according to the Ministry of Health – outdated political identity.

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As mentioned, another common theme emerging in  the news articles is that  the  strikes left patients in  a  bind. Patients are portrayed as not supporting the  strikes as  they  – it  is  claimed  – directly suffered the consequences. For example, in an article entitled ‘Unfriendly Demonstration’, it is stated that patients were frustrated as they could not get any services; striking doctors faced the  negative reactions of patients as  only emergency and cancer patients were accepted into the  hospitals. The  Association of Patients and their Families (Hasta ve Hasta Yakını Haklarını Savunma Derneği or HAYSAD) stated that these strikes abused patients and that using a megaphone close to a hospital was highly inappropriate behavior by health professionals. (Sevimsiz Eylem, Yeni Şafak, 2004)

Other articles published following the  strikes also  present stories of patient discontent. In an article entitled ‘When Doctors Went on Strike the Relatives of Patients Had to Do the Nursing’ (Doktorlar İş Bırakınca Hasta yakınları Hemşirelik Yaptı, Zaman, 2003), the  story of a  paralysed patient who was refused an examination by a doctor and the story of an 80-year-old man who had to wait on a stretcher in the rain were given as examples of situations that patients were experiencing as a consequence of the strike. In  an article entitled ‘Doctors Went on Strike and Patients Rebelled’, it is stated that ‘patients are losing their temper as doctors have been on strike four times in the last four months. Patients who were supporting the doctors have changed their minds. The patients say that ‘while the doctors are asking for an increase in  their salaries, we are not  being treated’ (‘Doktorlar zam istiyor, biz tedavi olamıyoruz’. ‘Doktorlar İş Bıraktı Hastalar İsyan Etti’, Zaman, 2004). As  this  quote exemplifies, the  strikes are not  only presented as  having a direct, negative impact on patients but also as not being supported by patients. Recep Akdağ said, ‘While we are working hard so that more patients can go to the hospital, others are trying to make it so that people cannot go to the hospital’ (Akdağ: Bazıları Hastanelere Gidilmemesi için  Çaba  Sarfediyor, Zaman, 2004). In sum, as this section demonstrates, Zaman and Yeni Şafak newspapers portrayed the strikes and demonstrations against the HTP as actions to prevent the improvement of the  healthcare system that  the  government is  trying to achieve. This shows that the self-interest of strike organisers – mostly equated with doctors  – is  the  sole motivation for opposition to healthcare reform. In other words, as  with other topics discussed in  this  article, the  providers– receivers split was also central to the pro-government media’s presentation of opposition to the HTP.



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Concluding Remarks In  sum, this  chapter demonstrates that  the  pro-government media’s portrayal of the  health sector complemented the  broader discursive narrative of the  government on healthcare reform. As  the  analysis  of two major progovernment newspapers of the  2002–2011 period  – Zaman and Yeni Şafak  – reveals, the pro-government media’s coverage positioned the AKP as an actor determined to end the  victimisations caused by the  pre-AKP-era  healthcare system, presented changes introduced into the  healthcare system by the  AKP as  unprecedented developments and depicted opponents of the  reform, namely doctors, as  driven by self-interest. As  with the  AKP’s own discourse, the antagonism constructed between healthcare providers and receivers emerges as a central theme in the pro-government media’s discourse on healthcare reform.

References De la Torre, C. (2000). Populist Seduction in Latin America, Ohio University Press. Gidron, N. & Banikowski, B. (2013). Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda. Working Paper 13-4, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Mudde, C.  & Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A  Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Mudde, C. (2004). Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4):541–563. Madrid, R. (2008). Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America. World Politics, 60(3):475–508.

Newspaper Articles Sağlık Bakanı’nın talimatına rağmen hasta, üç gün rehin kaldı. (2002, December 1). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2002/12/01/haberler/h9.htm. Hastalar Rehin  Tutulmayacak. (2002, November 27). Zaman. http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/ news/189894.asp. Annesiyle 5 saat  ilaç kuyruğunda  bekleyen küçük Buse havale geçirdi. (2003, January 25). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2003/01/25/icanadolu/h7.htm last access 13.08.14. SSK Hastanesi’nde tomografi cihazı olmaması sıkıntıya  yol açıyor. (2003, March 30). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2003/03/30/icanadolu/h10.htm. SSK Hastanesinde Doktor Sıkıntısı Yaşanıyor. (2003, January 9). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman. com.tr//2003/01/09/marmara/h11.htm. SSK’lılar Sağlık Karnesi için Saatlerce Kuyrukta Bekliyor. (2002, December 25). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2002/12/25/marmara/h9.htm. Doktor Dağılımı Dengesiz. (2006, March 14). Yeni Şafak. Haydi doktorlar doğuya! (2004, April 25). Yeni Şafak. http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/ arsiv/2004/nisan/25/g03.html. Profesöre Muayene Olmak 50 Milyon Daha Pahalı. (2003, March 16). Zaman. http://arsiv. zaman.com.tr/2003/03/16/haberler/h1.htm.

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Akdağ: Kartvizit Veren Doktorları Valilere Bildirin. (2005, August 21). Zaman. http://www. zaman.com.tr/gundem_akdag-kartvizit-veren-doktorlari-valilere-bildirin_203685. html. Doktor Asgari Ücretliden Daha az Para Kazanıyormuş! (2004, March 11). Zaman. http:// www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_doktor-asgari-ucretliden-az-para-kazaniyormus_25054. html. İki Katı Maaş Bile Doktorları Doğuya Gitmeye İkna Edemedi. (2004, April 14). Zaman. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_iki-kati-maas-bile-doktorlari-dogu-ya-gitmeyeikna-etmedi_36760.html. Akdağ: Az Gelişmiş Bölgelerde Hekim Güçlüğü Çekiyoruz. (2005, November 21). Zaman. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_akdag-az-gelismis-bolgelerde-hekim-guclugucekiyoruz_231159.html. Zorunlu Hizmete Gitmeyen Doktorlara  Yakın Takip Geliyor. (2006, June 11). Zaman. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_zorunlu-hizmete-gitmeyen-doktorlara-yakintakip-geliyor_292736.html. Mecburi Hizmete Gitmemek için  Sahte Evlilik Yaptılar. (2007, September 21). Zaman. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_mecburi-hizmete-gitmemek-icin-sahte-evlilikyaptilar_591246.html. Doktorların Eyleminde Doktordan çok Polis Vardı. (2003, January 15). Zaman. http://arsiv. zaman.com.tr//2003/01/15/marmara/h3.htm. Tabip Odası: Bu Bir Uyarı Eylemi; Bakan Akdağ: Demokratik Hak. (2003, November 6). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2003/11/06/haberler/h10.htm. Doktorlar Grev Yapıyor Yarın hastaneye Gitmeyin. (2003, November 4). Zaman. http:// arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/11/04/haberler/h9.htm. AK Partili Doktor Vekiller İş Bırakan TTB’li Doktorlara  Diyalog Çağrısı Yaptı. (2003, December 25). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/12/25/haberler/h7.htm. Tabip Odaları Grev Doktorlar Grev Dedi. (2007, March 15). Zaman. http://www.zaman. com.tr/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=513219. Doktorlar Grevde Bugün Sakın ola Hastalanmayın. (2003, November 5). Zaman. http:// arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2003/11/05/haberler/h7.htm. Doktorlar Grev Yapıyor Yarın hastaneye Gitmeyin. (2003, November 4). Zaman. http:// arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/11/04/haberler/h9.htm. Sağlık Hizmetleri İki Gün Aksayacak. (2004, March 10). Zaman. http://www.zaman.com. tr/gundem_saglik-hizmetleri-iki-gun-aksayacak_24683.html. Akdağ: İş Bırakacak Doktorlar Hakkında Soruşturma Açılacak. (2003, October 27). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/10/27/haberler/h9.htm. Tabip Odası: Bu bir uyarı Eylemi; Bakan Akdağ: Demokratik Hak. (2003, November 6). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2003/11/06/haberler/h10.htm. Vatandaşın Çektiği Sıkıntılar için Hangi Eylemi Yapmışlar? (2011, March 15). Yeni Şafak. Sevimsiz Eylem. (2004, March 11). Yeni Şafak. Doktorlar İş Bırakınca  Hasta  yakınları Hemşirelik Yaptı. (2003, November 6). Zaman. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr//2003/11/06/haberler/h8.htm. Doktorlar İş Bıraktı Hastalar İsyan Etti. (2004, March 11). Zaman. http://www.zaman. com.tr/gundem_doktorlar-is-birakti-hastalar-isyan-etti_25051.html. Akdağ: Bazıları Hastanelere Gidilmemesi için  Çaba  Sarfediyor. (2004, March 11). Zaman.http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_akdag-bazilari-hastanelere-gidilmemesiicin-gayret-ediyor_25053.html.

Chapter 6 DISINFORMATION AND THE PRESPA AGREEMENT: A CASE STUDY Lefteris Kretsos Lecturer, Brunel University London; Honorary Senior Lecturer, City, University of London

Valia Kaimaki Assistant Professor, Department of Digital Media and Communication, Ionian University

Historical Context The Prespa Agreement is considered as a critical incident in modern politics of Greece and North Macedonia. It  basically ended the  name dispute commonly referred to as  the  Macedonian issue that  has  been arguably one of the  most incomprehensible issues in  Europe. For  more than 25 years after the dismantlement of Yugoslavia and the creation of a new State in the northwest of Greece the  two neighbours failed to reach an agreement about its name. Macedonia, the  name the  new State chose for itself, had strong geographical and historical connotations that  the  Greeks could not  accept, so  they only recognised it  as  ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). But even though its official name stayed as such, over the years, the new country was commonly referred to as ‘Macedonia’ all over the world. Nevertheless, the  potential of a  NATO membership of ‘FYROM’ brought the name issue on the table in an urgent manner. Political consensus was finally reached in June 2018 when the Agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Nikos Kotzias and his North Macedonian counterpart, Nikola Dimitrov in the presence of PM Zoran Zaev and PM Alexis Tsipras at the lake of Prespa. The long-term dispute between Greece and North Macedonia  (the  name that  replaced both FYROM and Macedonia) ended. It was a historical moment for both countries that entailed elements of an authentic compromise and common understanding.

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The  Prespa  Agreement forced Greece to accept the  existence of a ‘Macedonian’ nationality and a ‘Macedonian’ language and a commitment not to veto Northern Macedonia’s entry in the NATO alliance. Macedonia in turn had to change its name to Northern Macedonia following a constitutional change and to abandon any historical references to the  Ancient (Greek) history of Macedonia. The  conclusion of the  agreement was  politically painful, as it was met with strong opposition by political parties and local communities in both countries. It further had to be adopted first by a referendum in North Macedonia and then by parliamentary votes in both countries in a context of intensified political turmoil. The aim of this chapter is not to discuss the Prespa Agreement itself. Instead, the Prespa Agreement is used as a good case to critically analyse and theorise on the issue of modern political disinformation, propaganda and xenophobic populism. Should we throw the  stone of anathema  to the  social media  for the spread of fake news and propaganda  used by populist political groups? Should we instead focus on the structural elements of national media systems and their intersections with politics, policy and regulatory failures and silences? How was media power exercised before and during the conclusion of the Prespa Agreement? The analysis is organised in three stages. First, we provide a short review of theoretical discussions of media  power and how media  manipulation  is linked to rising populism. Then, we examine the  structural elements  of media systems and regulations in both countries so as to explore their role. The  analysis  that  follows provides evidence of fake news and propaganda regarding the Prespa Agreement and discusses the experiences of policymakers and media practitioners in both countries. Our approach offers conceptual refinements and new methodological insights to media  manipulation tactics used in  both countries to block the implementation of the  Prespa  Agreement. Our perspective moves beyond the conventional analysis  that  considers social media  as  the  main  factor for rising populism, disinformation and propaganda  politics. Such politics had established a  strong foothold in  the  media  industry in  Greece and North Macedonia  long before the  Prespa  Agreement and the  rise of the  internet. For this reason, we argue that any given Prespa-like Agreement would have provoked similar reactions and strategies by media and political actors.

Media Power and Populism The  issue of media  power attracts much sociological and political interest and is  often seen as  a  significant element in  explaining political decisions and outcomes. The influence of media on political life and public discourse



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has long been discussed and analysed (Castells 2009; Chomsky 1998; Curran 2002; Lukes 2005). Early studies in  mass communication strategies by prominent scholars have indicated the  implications of the  media  and their capabilities to change the character and functioning of societies (Bernays 1928; Lasswell 1927), while Walter Lippmann set in, as early as, 1922 the theoretical foundations for public opinion studies and the  theory of agenda  setting (McCombs and Shaw 1972). According to the  seminal work of Lasswell (2003) there are inherent political implications of policy, as politics constitute a key context in which policy ideas are developed and rolled out. Control of the media has a significant role to play in both politics and policy. Classical sociological and political studies have highlighted the  reasons behind strong networks of ties between the elite media and the State. Such networks are established due to the ability of media to hegemonise definitions, to construct reality and to induce consent to the dominant order using cultural and symbolic interactions (Bourdieu 1991, 2005; Carey 1989; Couldry 2008; Gramsci 1971). As Herman and Chomsky (1988) explained, the mass media  ‘serve to mobilize support for the  special interests that  dominate the state and private support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity.’ Relevant sociological analysis  by Miliband (1969) concludes that the media  are both an expression of a  system of domination and a  means of reinforcing it. In  a  similar vein, critical perspectives on mass culture by the Frankfurt school considered commercial media as a tool used by the elite to fragment, distract and disempower its citizens (Adorno 2001). Mills (1959) also argued that the  ability to hegemonise flow of information become less a technical detail than a crucial component of control and an objective in itself. As  Kellner (1995) notes, most theories of media  manipulation and domination in  the  1960s and 1970s assumed that  media  were all-powerful forces of social control that  imposed a  monolithic dominant ideology on their victims. Hegemony theory in  turn was  used to explain  the  rise of Reaganism and Thatcherism in the United States and the United Kingdom during the  1980s. Reflections of hegemony theory and media  were later developed in  other countries focusing on the  concentrated media  power of certain business and political elite figures. For example, certain narratives and accounts tried to explain the rise of Berlusconi in Italy (Padovani 2015). Other scholars in  turn highlight the  structural reasons that limit the influence of media  outlets and the  agenda  of economic elite or successive governments. Wayne (2015), for example, attributes the difficult position that the Murdoch’s media empire was brought to in 2012 to the key contradictions within capitalism, as media competitors (The Guardian) and a parliamentary committee on culture, media and sport drove the investigations of the phone

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hacking scandal in  News of the  World (a  Murdoch’s group newspaper). The  investigations resulted subsequently in  the  collapse of British Sky Broadcasting deal that the Conservative government had previously blessed, as well as to the shutdown of the News of the World newspaper, the initiation of Leveson inquiry, many sanctions, resignations and penalties. Today, the  issue of media  and political hegemony remains prevalent in public debates and communication studies even if many modern theories and early internet enthusiasts have emphasised the power of audiences to resist media  manipulation (Downes 2009; Jenkins et  al. 2013; Negroponte 1996). In an opposite vein, McChesney (2000) asserts that the media have become a significant anti-democratic force in the United States (and beyond) by stifling civic and political involvement. The  relevant discussion has  exacerbated using both contemporary and historical accounts, especially after Brexit and Trump’s victory in 2016 (Ball 2017; Levinson 2017). The burgeoning interest in  the  dynamics and sources by which fake news are spread gave boost to a growing literature seeking to categorise confusion and define disinformation, misinformation and (computational) propaganda.1 Significant analyses have also  addressed the  issue of orchestrated propaganda  and fake news and the  capacity of social media  platforms to disrupt democracy and influence political outcomes (Bakir and McStay 2018; Bennett and Livingston 2018; Bucy and Newhagen 2019; Graves and Wells 2019; Krause et al. 2019; Lazer et al. 2018; Lewandowsky et al. 2017), while others throw the stone of anathema to the unaccountable tech power that facilitate xenophobic populism and a new type of surveillance capitalism (Barnett 2017; Benkler et al. 2017; Zuboff 2019). As such media manipulation is often treated either as the empirical object of analysis that is associated with populist political leadership or as the apotheosis of digital platforms’ capacity to extract, sell and manipulate users’ data. At the same time relevant research has shown that social media are proving to be particularly fertile soil for fake news not  only because of bot activity, but  also  or because of real human activity (Vosoughi and Aral 2018). For  example, Goertzel (1994) attributed conspiracy thinking to a ‘monological belief system’ long before the hegemony of Facebook, Amazon and Google. Nevertheless, modern literature highlights the dynamics of populism and media manipulation, but underestimates that the phenomenon of propaganda, false or misleading information has always played a role in human societies throughout the  ages (Taylor 2003). As  Schudson (2019) has  emphatically argued, ‘politics inspires lying, and there is a historical precedent for what we see today’. The years following Brexit and the 2016 US presidential election 1 See, for example, Tucker et al. (2017).



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the  analytical focus on understanding media  and disinformation, populism and propaganda  issues is  almost totally driven by reference to the  digital age and the  impact of social media  (Freelon and Wells 2020; Zimdars and McLeod 2020). To  our knowledge the  analysis  of Freedman (2018) provides a  more complete paradigm to examine the  way modern media  environments provide space and opportunities for far-right movements, propaganda  and xenophobic populism. This is happening because Freedman (2018) addressed the nature of mediated populism by not fetishising the role of the media and its technological advancement. Mediated populism does not  come out of a  historical vacuum. The  ability of far-right movements and populist groups to circulate misinformation, conspiracy thinking and media visibility is strongly related to neoliberal and austerity policies, because such policies affect the  character of the  political economy of media  and they further intensify the  economic and cultural tensions on which far right populism develops. Studying the  interactions of the  social and institutional setting with media policy practices that are embedded in and shaped by the broader political economy is  more than necessary (Blyth 2013). Besides, as  other scholars have argued, the  constellation of media  genres that  includes fake news, media  manipulation and propaganda  have to be defined and analysed by situating our understanding of disinformation and populism within the wider crisis of democracy and political communication (Freelon and Wells 2020). As Freedman (2018: 606) notes: ‘existing liberal approaches to media policy have contributed to highly unequal and distorted communication systems that  have been exploited by forces on the  far right and that  need to be corrected as  part of a  broader challenge to right-wing populism’. Misinformation and xenophobia thrive in an environment that is characterised by ‘policy failure’ (Pickard 2014), ‘regulatory failure’ (Horwitz 1989) and ‘media policy silences’ (Freedman 2014). We adopt this approach to explore how structural conditions and media  policy frames in  Greece and North Macedonia facilitated misinformation and political manipulation in the course of the Prespa Agreement.

Media and Politics in Greece and North Macedonia To  fully acknowledge the  intersection between media  and politics we must first understand the entire media ecosystem and especially the main outlets and influencers. To better understand the drivers of media behaviour we must also  take into consideration the  full range of economic transactions taking place between media owners and political executives. Media conglomerates

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rely on the  state for lucrative broadcasting licenses, public contracts, state advertising funding and competition rules that do not affect their operation. Social capital theory and Bourdieu’s emphasis (1985) on the type or quality of resources network members have access to provide new insights on the  transactions between media  actors and political executives, especially in  socioeconomic settings characterised by economic crisis, nepotism and high degree of informality (Koukiadaki and Kretsos 2012). However, given the  limitations of the  current contribution we will not  examine all aspects of the media ecosystem in Greece and North Macedonia, but their main characteristics and actors’ strategies. A  very first conclusion from the  media  ecology in  both countries is that it  is  characterised by high degree of polarisation and segmentation. The media  market in  Greece is  characterised by online fragmentation, a  changing and polarised TV market, a  print sector in  crisis  and one of the  highest uses of social media  for news (Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey 2018). By the time of Prespa Agreement in the long-suffering by the  crisis  media  sector, there were more than 2,000 websites, almost 1,100 analogue radio stations and 90 regional TV stations and five times more newspapers per capita  than Britain  and France. Furthermore, according to data from Nielsen and the EBU, TV viewing is still significant across the country. Greece has one of the largest TV viewing rates across Europe especially among older segments of the population. Overall viewing figures are stable and there was actually a slight increase over the last two years before the Prespa Agreement. As it is mentioned in the Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman et al. 2018) the United Kingdom, a country six times larger than Greece, has half the  number of national newspapers. Greeks report using on average more than five online news sources per week, the second highest among 38 countries (Newman 2018). This is partly related to the low trust in the traditional media. Trust in  the  news remains one of the  lowest in  the  Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey. Greeks feel that many journalists and news organisations are closely interconnected with specific economic and political interests. Only 6 per cent of the Reuters Institute survey sample think the media is free from political or business influence, and 23 per cent trust news overall (Newman et al. 2018). Such findings are consistent with the  conclusions of the  Eurobarometer Surveys, the  2019 EBU report Trust in  Media and a  recent survey by Pew Research Center. According to the  Pew Research Center survey (Mitchell et al. 2018) that took place during the negotiations on the Prespa Agreement only 18 per cent of Greeks believe that their national media are doing a good or somewhat  good job of reporting on political issues (this  is  the  lowest



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percentage among the 38 countries surveyed).2 In another survey of the Pew Research Center in 2018, Greeks are among the four most dissatisfied people with the way democracy is working.3 Such strong evidence of distrust should not  be considered as  isolated to the  way the  media  industry was  deregulated and expanded before and after the  emergence of the  internet and social media. For  example, Papathanasopoulos (1997: 351) has  argued that  ‘the  deregulation of the broadcasting sector (in  Greece) has  been closely associated with politics rather than a  well-organized plan according to the  needs of the  industry’. Earlier research has  also  indicated that  clientelism in  media  governance and regulation in  Greece have strong roots and tradition (Iosifides and Katsirea  2014; Leandros 2010; Papathanasopoulos 1997). According to relevant analyses Greece belongs to the  Mediterranean model, which is  known as a polarised pluralist model where state intervention in terms of funding and regulation is strong and the media organisations are generally considered to be used as a means to meet political ends (Hallin and Papathanasopoulos 2002). As  a  consequence, a  regime of a  disproportionately large media  market with high levels of media  capital concentration in  the  hands of wealthy entrepreneurs in the areas of construction, shipping, petrochemicals and real estate was  established. Those organised interests exacerbated the  pressures exerted on media  policymakers and journalists according to their own agenda. Dominant mainstream political parties and the  elite media  were engaged in a ‘gifts’ exchange’ and TV channels provided political support for the inaction of the State to regulate media, which in practical terms would have forced big TV owners to pay for the use of spectrum frequencies. Powerful media  outlets were also  having privileged access to funding by the banks, which in turn were strongly associated with Ministers of Finance and other influential politicians. From 2015 and on, the  government of Syriza  introduced legislation designed to reinstate the  public broadcaster (closed by the  previous government in  2013), to increase transparency of media ownership and break up media monopolies. This represents a policy breakthrough in the long-term inertia in the specific area of media regulation, but  it  created a  lot of friction with elite media. Not  surprisingly the  antiSyriza  stance of mainstream TV broadcasters was  to some extent reflected in the case of the Prespa Agreement.

2 See https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/01/11/publics-globally-want-unbiasednews-coverage-but-are-divided-on-whether-their-news-media-deliver/. 3 See https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/31/the-countries-where-peopleare-most-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/.

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Similar findings were also apparent in North Macedonia, even if the size of the media market is much smaller. Dimitrijevska-Markoski and Daskalovski (2018) explain  that  there have been three stages of media  development in Macedonia. The first stage (1991–1997) is characterised by demonopolisation and deregulation of the  television industry. The  second stage (1998–2005) is  marked by the  introduction of new legislation and initial efforts towards promotion of journalistic professionalisation in the newly created commercial media. The  third stage (2006–present) features legislative consolidation, continuing professionalisation of journalism, and the  beginning of media concentration processes. In  North Macedonia, the  commercial media  sector is  fragmented with 48 and 72 active television and radio outlets respectively. There is linguistic diversity among commercial TV and radio outlets, as many stations broadcast and release news in  Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Romani and Turkish language.4 According to a more recent analysis at the end of April 2020, a total of 47 TV stations operated on the television market, of which 11 at national, 17 at regional and 19 at local level (Fùrnemont and Trpevska 2020). What is of great  importance is  that  the  State remains one of the  main  and biggest advertisers in  the  media  market, while certain  TV owners are also  political leaders (Dimitrijevska-Markoski and Daskalovski 2018). In general, similar elements to the Greek media system are evident in the case of North Macedonia, such as close ties and the significant interconnections between major media  outlets and leading political parties. This  makes the media landscape less stable and more dependent on political governance. For example, as it is noted in a recent analysis, North Macedonia has seen two significant shifts in the structure of its media systems (Greene et al. 2021). The first one took place during the 2006–2017 governance of the country by Nikola Gruevski and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE or VMRO hereafter). VMRO put under its tight control the  mainstream media in order to discredit political opponents and promote nationalistic – and often anti-western – standpoints. Political change that emerged was associated with changes in the editorial teams in a number of key TV stations. VMRO media influence was reduced when it lost the power and the most aggressive anti-government rhetoric can only be found on selected local TV outlets and certain YouTube channels. The  second trend highlighted by the  report of Greene et  al. (2021) is  related to the  ‘invasion’ of Péter Schatz and other Hungarian nationals 4 See Register of radio outlets available at: https://avmu.mk/registar-na-radija-mk/ and the Register of TV outlets available at: https://avmu.mk/registar-na-televizii/.



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in  North Macedonia’s media  market who are politically linked to Orbán administration. Such investors have been accused of illegally transferring money from Slovenian firms in order to buy several media outlets that used to be the primary sources of VMRO propaganda (TV Alfa, the internet portals Kurir and Republika). Since 2018 when VMRO has been in the opposition, these media outlets have been involved in numerous disinformation campaigns, not only to discredit  the  Social Democratic Union of Macedonia  government, but  also  to undermine the  Prespa  Agreement with Greece with a  lot of polarising narratives that  involve imagined threats to Macedonian identity. For  example, the  Prespa  Agreement was  the  reason for thousands of new social media  accounts associated with the  referendum boycott campaign in North Macedonia (#bojkotiram). In  a  similar vein  in Greece polarising narratives were evident and widespread across certain  media. At  the  same time new social groups and hashtags, such as  Makedonia  is  Greece, Committee for the  Greekness of Makedonia, @macedoniarally with thousands of followers were also getting more notice by mainstream media. Other social groups, such as football club supporters were also supporting the need to block the Prespa Agreement. In all cases, those campaigns against the Agreement managed to revitalise identity politics to an extent that  they became mainstream. The  most illustrative example of this was the restless efforts of getting the ownership of massive mobilisations and large demonstrations for the name and the history of Macedonia. Prominent Greek politicians from the main opposition centreright wing party New  Democracy, as  well as  loyalists of Greek Orthodox Church and the fascist party Golden Dawn (after a trial that lasted five and a  half years, on 7  October  2020, the  tribunal declared Golden Dawn to be a  criminal organisation) and other nationalists’ fractions joined proudly the demonstrations. They took photos and made relevant Facebook and Twitter posts to confirm their attendance in  the  demonstrations aimed to defend the ‘greekness’ of Macedonia. Such demonstrations enjoyed live coverage by mainstream TV stations. Those TV stations committed much of their prime time to highlight the success of the anti-Prespa Agreement mobilisations and to express their commitment to protect Greece from a  harmful agreement for the  ‘greekness’ of Macedonia. In  essence, they contributed to political polarisation by providing space for the expression of extreme statements and narratives during the anti-Prespa mobilisations. Such tolerance and support echoes Mazzoleni’s (2008) criticism on liberal media  outlets that  have paved the  way for the  normalisation of populist agendas on several topics, such as immigration and crime. This was not the first time that the mainstream media in Greece has given visibility and tolerance to such agendas. For example, they indulged the populist right wing party LAOS

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agenda  in  the  2004 and 2007 elections, while they adopted a  tougher stance than the New Democracy government on the same Macedonian issue to match that of the ascendant extreme right Political Spring political party in the elections of 1993. They also ignored the danger coming from Golden Dawn and by 2012 elections some media outlets started referring to Golden Dawn members as ‘good boy-scouts’, picturing a man with a Golden Dawn t-shirt standing protectively near two ‘nice ladies’ outside a bank ATM (Prinos 2014).

Fake News, Propaganda and the Prespa Agreement On 29 March 2019, journalists from both Greece and the North Macedonian Republic that had already investigated the subject in their respected media or fact checking organisations met in  Athens on the  premises of the  General Secretariat for Media and Communication to discuss fake news before, during and after the  signing of the  Prespa  Agreement.5 Both sides shared their frustration and agreed that  opposition propaganda  had been very strong, not  hesitating to use even outright lies and provoking general confusion. Both politicians and media created strong bases for hatred of the ‘other’ over the border.

Political Disinformation The  political tensions developed in  both countries in  the  course of the  Prespa  Agreement were extreme. As  Stavros Kapakos, the  General Secretary of the  Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers (ΕΣΗΕΑ) pointed out ‘The  political antagonism in  both countries, is  beyond every limit and limitation. And it’s a real catastrophe that the strategy of tension, with its fascist nature, is included in these political parties and the conflicts they provoke’. Such tension occurred even after the  final text of the  Agreement was  made public in  both countries. The  transparency on the  content of the  Prespa  Agreement did not  prevent the  proliferation of misinformation, speculations or downright lies. For  Damjan Manchevski, Minister of Information Society and Administration of the Government, the basic type of misinformation was the lack of

5 The event was addressed by Media Ministers, Journalists and leaders of media institutions and media professional organisations. It was jointly organised by the Greek Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media and the Ministry of Information Society and Administration of the Republic of North Macedonia. Video available at: https:// media.gov.gr/parapliroforisi-kai-symfonia-ton-prespon/.



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proper information. For example, the opposition was arguing that the government was hiding the content of the Agreement. In  a  similar vein, Nikolaos Zirganos (  Journalist in  the  Newspaper of the Editors) argued that in Greece the Prespa Agreement provoked not only a fierce political confrontation, but also an ‘asymmetric communication war’ mainly on the internet with mainly the opposition party as a protagonist but also all those who had different sorts of interests with to ‘first preventing it and then delegitimizing it’. In Greece, on 11 December 2018, the opposition leader (and now prime minister) Kyriakos Mitsotakis  stated in  his  speech at  the  Greek Parliament: ‘You  exchanged the  Skopjan6 issue so  as  not to have to cut on pensions. You exchanged a measure that you should not have voted for with a major national retreat.’ This accusation of ‘retreating’ in a national claim in exchange for the EU not obliging Greece to more cut in pensions was a recurrent theme of misinformation. In North Macedonia, the reaction of the opposing party VMRO-DPMNE, immediately after signing the Agreement, was that such Agreement has done damage to the country. ‘Zoran Zaev is the greatest weapon the Greek side ever had in the negotiations about the name. By concluding such an Agreement, Zoran Zaev causes irreparable damage to our country. The Agreement foresees deleting the name Macedonia, amending the Constitution and endangering the Macedonian identity’ (Spasoski 2018). While in  North Macedonia  many saw a  forced name change ‘as  a fundamentally unfair solution, especially because of its erga omnes7 requirement’ (Dominioni 2018), in  Greece one of the  most widespread pieces of misinformation coming from the  opposition party of New  Democracy was that there were no erga omnes obligations (Troupis 2018). Trademarks were also  widely discussed in  Greece. In  March  2019, Maria  Spiraki, the  porte parole of New  Democracy on that  time, stated to journalists that ‘without disclosing the name of the particular company, I  inform you that  its petition to use the  name “Macedonian” for their products was  rejected from China, in  the  grounds that  this  name cannot be used without permission from our neighboring country’. Ms Spyraki ‘failed’ to mention that  this  was  standard practice from China  since 2010, not  only for Greek products but  also  for those coming from North Macedonia (To Pontiki 2019).

6 Greek nationalists and many politicians and public figures used the name of the capital Skopje to name the country to avoid any use of the word Macedonia. 7 In any occasion in the country and abroad.

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Media Echoing Propaganda The media in both countries had only to echo the political tensions adding some seasoning (for the institutional media) or altering the reality (for social media). A common ground for misinformation was the wish presented as a fact that  the  Agreement will either not  be ratified in  the  neighbouring country or it will not be respected. This was widely reported from both sides, either by politicians, mainstream media and the social media, without any grounds. In North Macedonia, media and social media insisted that the constitutional amendments had already been written by Greece and submitted to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. From fabricated lies to conspiracy theories the  leap is  short. In  Greece, people heard about the  ‘well-known’ German plan for Macedonia  of the  Aegean and the partition of Greece8 as well about a future military invasion from North Macedonia. At  the  other side of the  border, people were informed that ‘Nostradamus has  predicted that  there will be an attempt to destroy our country but  in  the  end it  will be saved’, as  stated by Filip Stojanovskifrom the Metamorphosis Foundation in North Macedonia. Statistics presented by the  Minister of Information Society and Public Administration of North Macedonia  Damjan Manchevski show that misinformation started before the referendum and continued all through the ratifications of the Agreement from the North Macedonian and the Greek Parliaments. Media  close to the  opposition parties relayed misinformation but it was on social media and especially Twitter that fake news was completely free to circulate. ‘Plenty of times, journalists relayed sources without checking the information first’ according to Katerina Ajnadiskova, who is president of the journalist’s union in North Macedonia. For  the  journalist Sashka  Cvetkovska  it  seems that  the  importance of social media  was  even greater for the  #Boycott campaign. In  the  eve of the referendum, ‘the Transatlantic Commission for the Integrity of Elections,9 analyzed the  Twitter profiles in  North Macedonia  involved in  the  boycott campaign and found that  the  new twitter profiles created in  the  last 60 days prior to the referendum day made up 12 percent of all Twitter profiles in the country’.

8 «Τι είναι η Μακεδονία του Αιγαίου;». https://www.cna.gr/stories/ti-einai-i-makedoniatoy-aigaioy/ 9 The  TCEI  brings together more than a  dozen eminent persons from backgrounds in politics, media and the private sector chaired by former NATO Chief and Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and former US Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff.



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As reported during the conference relevant research by the Investigative Reporting Lab (IRL) on the Twitter campaign #Boycott found that out of 1084 profiles analysed, more than 200 were newly created. A  good part of the profiles was created as early as January 2018 before the public had any idea that a deal with Greece was possible. In particular, on 22 January new twitter profiles were created with the  task to create fake news and campaign against any agreement with Greece. The  hashtag #boycott begins to formally be used a few days after the signing of the Agreement with Greece. The  digital forensic investigation by IRL  – member of the  Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, revealed for the first time that from 30,000 tweets in July 2018, only 1,084 were shared by the real users, while the remaining tweets were shared by fake profiles, the so-called bots.

Xenophobic Populism The rise of xenophobic populism in both countries was almost inevitable, as  spreading disinformation through images and video was  evident across media outlets and the social media. The contradictory nature of populism regarding the  Prespa  Agreement is  crystal clear according to the  – at the time – government spokesman Dimitris Tzanakopoulos: In both North Macedonia and in Greece the opposition claimed that the Prespa Agreement is nationally harmful, even treacherous. But  how can the  Agreement be treacherous on both sides of the border? The Prespa Agreement wave of misinformation had a stronger presence in  North Macedonia  as  there was  a  referendum involved. According to Filip Stojanovski, Director for Partnership and Resource Development of Metamorphosis Foundation ‘an ordinary citizen of North Macedonia, would receive conflicting information about Greece’. There  were actually two referendum campaigns in North Macedonia: the one that called for a turnout supported by the government, the EU and non-governmental organisations, and the  one that  called for a  boycott. The  second campaign was  definitely controversial and the  IRL  – Macedonia  revealed connections with populist conservative movements according to investigative reporter Saska Cvetkovska. In particular, the persons behind the boycott campaign against the name deal was related to the anti-Soros campaign that began after the early parliamentary elections in 2016 and which produced so much tension that the country came to the brink of a civil war. The second campaign used the hashtag #Boycott both on Facebook and Twitter. The Greek media described the Agreement as ‘treacherous and ‘criminal’. There were also rumours about how Greece is granting an Exclusive Economic

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Zone10 to Northern Macedonia  (Kariotis  2019), a  country that  has  no sea, giving it  the  right to fish in  the  bay of Thermaikos. In  North Macedonia, VMRO raised the issue of a Slavo-Macedonian minority in Greece, although the Agreement was very clear on this issue. Finally, there was  also  widespread talk about the  Macedonian language. Since the third UN Conference for the standardisation of geographical names held in Athens, Macedonian has been recognised as an official language (UN 1977), something that would satisfy the North Macedonians. As for the Greeks, the Prespa Agreement explicitly states that this language belongs to the group of southern Slavic languages and that it has nothing to do with ancient Greek culture. Nonetheless both accused their governments of treason.

Conclusions and Discussion A  surge in  international scholarly interest on the  issues of disinformation, propaganda  and media  manipulation is  strongly related to critical political incidents that  took place after 2016 and to a  general lack of trust towards media  and political institutions. The  Prespa  Agreement was  a  painful and complex political project that took place in the midst of political polarisation and anxiety that were to some extent driven by heavily politicised media outlets. The Agreement met harsh opposition by political parties and social groups and it was associated with significant efforts to spread anger, fear and anxiety among people in both countries. Media played an important part in this by promoting news stories that  helped mediated populism to thrive. This  is not  unique nowadays and it  should have been expected, as  the  so-called Macedonian issue was up to 2018 one of the most hotly debated and complicated foreign affairs issues. We believe that in terms of media analysis the case of the Prespa Agreement does not  provide strong evidence of Greek or Northern Macedonian exceptionalism in  terms of the  disinformation, propaganda  and media manipulation that took place. It does not further lead us to an apotheosis of the  power of social media  to influence decision-making, governance and the  public domain. Social media  should not  be fetishised and be used as  the  basic explanation for any disinformation and fake news problem observed. The  roots and the  causes of such a  problem are deeply political in nature and related to the wider crisis of democracy. 10 An exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as  prescribed by the  1982 United Nations Convention on the  Law of the  Sea, is  an area  of the  sea  in  which a  sovereign state has  special rights regarding the  exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.



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Disinformation and propaganda regarding the Prespa Agreement was not at all immune to the specific political and economic context and the structural factors of media ecologies in both countries. Conditions characterised by political polarisation and austerity fatigue, falling levels of trust to media  and political institutions, strong traditions of clientelism and oligopolistic structures in the media industry are all to blame for the revitalisation of identity politics and xenophobic populism in the course of the Prespa Agreement. The increased levels of false information circulating through social media  were associated with the  strategic efforts of movements and parties of the opposition to recruit new supporters and mobilise their political constituencies against the government. Social media helped those institutions achieve their strategic actions, but they cannot be considered as an underlying and the most significant reason for the dissemination of fake news and disinformation regarding the  Prespa  Agreement. Social media  simply followed the failures and silences of media regulation and policy.

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Chapter 7 FRAMING THE PANDEMIC: STRATEGIC RHETORIC IN POLITICAL ELITE DISCOURSE DURING THE COVID-19 HEALTH CRISIS Katerina Diamantaki Associate Professor, Deree – The American College of Greece

Lemonia Mourka Political Communication Researcher – The American College of Greece

Introduction The  COVID-19 pandemic had all the  hallmarks of any crisis: novelty and unusual circumstances; urgency and time constraints; conflicting, limited, or misleading information and a need for governments, leaders, and authorities to expedite a  rapid and effective action plan under conditions of extreme pressure. The  COVID-19 pandemic was, however, unlike any other crises in  recent times. It  was  a  healthcare, economic, humanitarian, and social crisis, presenting a multitude of challenges and effects and shaping the future global risk landscape (World Economic Forum 2020). It had the characteristics of a  cascading ‘flash’ crisis  (  James and Wooten 2010), as  well as  of what D’Auria and De Smet (2020: 2) describe as a ‘landscape scale’ crisis: ‘an unprecedent disruptive event of massive scale, the sheer unpredictability of which results in high levels of uncertainty that leads to disorientation, a feeling of loss of control, and strong emotional disturbance’. Against this backdrop, the present study examines the political pandemic rhetoric of five national leaders, all of whom were called upon to tackle the pandemic between February and November 2020. Based on a corpus of speeches from the leaders of five democratic countries around COVID-19, we aim to demonstrate how political actors responded to the pandemic’s exigence and rhetorical situation (Bitzer 1968) and in a way that was deemed strategically

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‘appropriate to the  moment’ (Martin  2015). Furthermore, we attempt to identify the  discursive, rhetorical, and argumentative modalities by which the  leaders tried to build their legitimacy and authority in  a  crisis  moment when it was particularly fragile and more needed than ever.

The characteristics of emergency crises communication The  COVID-19 pandemic exemplified a  global emergency of far-reaching consequences and immense complexity, where communication and public discourse played a central role. As crisis communication scholars Leonard and Arnold (2007) explain, all emergent crises share certain features, such as ‘high stakes and urgency, as  well as  the  likelihood of major, imminent losses to life, health, property, heritage, or other valued social or private assets’ (p. 1). They involve a high level of contingency, that is variability in possible outcomes from different actions, while ‘response leaders’, whether politicians or other operational officials, are called upon to improvise in the absence of tested scripts for action and ‘operate beyond the bounds of what they had planned, practiced, and are resourced for’ (p. 7). When this crisis situation persists for weeks, months or even years (as  in  the  case of the  COVID-19 pandemic), it  becomes even more imperative for the decision-makers to be seen as ‘in charge’ and as actively engaged in communication about the situation (p. 6). In handling a crisis, leaders need to exhibit a number of core competencies, such as  resilience, preparedness, decision-making, transparency, and leadership – in order to craft a narrative that helps reduce uncertainty and grants them the license to take rapid emergency decisions in order to resolve and mitigate the  crisis  (Lukacovic 2020). Research asserts that  leaders’ communication skills are a crucial element in successful crisis management, as  their ability to communicate with confidence, clarity, accuracy, purity, positivity, and empathy shapes public perceptions of the events and of their leaders’ ability to manage the crisis (Wooten and James 2008). Tone of voice and political language can instil confidence in  the  public and help frame a shared reality (McGuire et al. 2020). Gigliotti (2016) stresses the importance of being humanly authentic and the  role of the  leader as  comforter and counsellor, helping their constituents make sense of the crisis and reassuring them about a better future. Similarly, Johnson (2018) underlines the need for crisis leaders to respond to the emotional needs of both victims and the wider community through facilitating a process of grieving and promoting healing and recovery. In  fact, in  a  sudden and violent “flash” crisis, a  core competence for leaders is  to ‘be visible and appealing to the  public in  need of hearing that  the  shattered world will be healed’ (Helsloot and Groenendaal 2017).



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As  leadership scholar Jeremy Hunter says: ‘Leaders should think about themselves as islands of coherence in a sea of chaos’ (Abrams 2020). This refers to the process of ‘meaning-making’ that Boine et al. (2005) notably identified as  one of the  core duties of leadership under crisis, defining it  as  reducing ambiguity by offering a  plausible explanation of what  is  occurring, why it  is  happening and what  needs to be done. More emphatically, Helsloot and Groenendaal (2017) consider meaning-making to be ‘the  single, most significant determinant of leadership perceptions during flash crises’, while the  prime strategy of meaning-making is  ‘the  public articulation and expression of sentiments that citizens feel privately but are unable or unwilling to express by themselves’ (p. 351). According to this  viewpoint, the  impact that a political speech will have depends not only on the power and status of the  speaker (Chilton and Schaffner 2002), but  also  on whether the  speaker will succeed in entering a ‘dialogue’ with the context of its listeners – to meet the listeners at the cognitive and emotional level where they are. To that end, leaders employ framing rhetorical and linguistic devices, claims and lines of arguments, justifications, commitments and prognoses, all in the form of speech acts (Austin  1962) through which they try to discursively respond  – rather than simply react – to the ongoing emergency while presenting their constituents with a cohesive, coherent, and legitimate messaging.

Types of Discursive Legitimation At  the  core of the  present study’s theoretical framework are theories about the  discursive construction of legitimation in  public discourse (Reyes 2011; Van Leeuwen 2007; Dijk 1998). Legitimation is  a  discursive practise that  is  necessary for public discourse, particularly around crucial decisions and events. Specifically, we draw from Van Leeuwen’s (2007) framework for the  analysis  of authority legitimation and the  four main  legitimation types he  identifies: authorisation (through authority), moral evaluation (through values), rationalisation (through purposes) and mythopoesis  (through stories). Each one of these categories relates to various reference domains or subcategories, such as  authorisation achieved via  personal authority (whereby a  person has  legitimatising authority due to their status or role in a certain context) or via impersonal authority (as enshrined in the impersonal authority of laws, rules, and regulations), via custom (conformity or tradition) or via  experts and role models (commendation). The  category of rationalisation refers to legitimation based on making practices appear rational, sensible, or truthful, a process which is closely connected with the tactic of ‘moralisation’, whereby moral values, such as patriotism, responsibility, solidarity, or freedom, are invoked for rhetorical purposes. Furthermore, rationalisation comes

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in two types: instrumental rationalisation – whereby practices are legitimised by reference to their goals (goal oriented) or uses (means oriented) or effects (effects oriented), and theoretical rationalisation, whereby practices are legitimised by reference to some truths or a  natural order of things, rather than a  purpose (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 100–105). Last, mythopoesis refers to legitimation that is pursued through the creation and telling of either moral or cautionary stories and tales (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 105–107). A  similar categorisation of legitimacy strategies to that  of Van Leeuwen has  been proposed by Reyes (2011), who suggests additional types of legitimations in  political discourse, namely through the  use of emotions (particularly fear), the hypothetical future, rationality, voices of expertise and, finally, altruism, featured in  the  discourse of various politicians who, oddly, may belong to different political ideologies. For Reyes, legitimation is prototypically political. As  a  discursive practice, it  entails ‘the  semantics of justification’ (Reyes 2011: 782) and is  intrinsically related to political discourse and its intentionality (Reyes 2011: 783). Concurrently, the  study draws from conceptualisations of strategising  – as  a  distinctively rhetorical activity that  reconfigures  the  situation through persuasive discourse (Martin 2015) – and of the rhetorical situation as a targeted response to a particular exigence in situations where issues need to be managed and public attitudes to be influenced (Bitzer 1968, 1980). Back in  1968, Lloyd Bitzer had claimed that rhetorical discourse obtains its character ‘from the circumstances of the historic context in which it occurs’, what he defines as  rhetorical situation; once nourished by the  circumstances, rhetoric becomes ‘pragmatic’; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself ’ (p. 3). So, rhetoric does not  dwell in  a  vacuum; ‘it  exists in  order to either perform some tasks or to produce an action of some kind’ (pp. 3–4). A similar line of scholarly thought and research has conceived of discourse as constitutive of Power. Hodge and Kress (1993: 6) discuss the power of strategising, specifically the  power of language as  an instrument of control, while Bourdieu (1991) famously elaborated on how specific linguistic ways manifest symbolic power in discourse and society. Likewise, for van Dijk (2002: 225), political discourse is  determined mainly by its function, which depends on the  intention of the speaker, the persons to whom it is addressed, the circumstance in which it  is  uttered and the  goals it  serves (e.g. to influence the  potential voters, to attract the votes of the undecided, to direct the individuals to adopt general political or social attitudes, to support a specific policy, etc.). Last, the  study operationalises rhetorical theories of persuasion (Aristotle’s triptych of ethos, logos, pathos); theories of apologia (Coombs 2007; Benoit 2005), as well as theories of argument reconstruction in discourse from the critical discourse analysis approach (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).



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Methodology The present study examines the political pandemic discourse of five selected national leaders: Germany (Angela  Merkel), Greece (Kyriakos Mitsotakis), New  Zealand (  Jacinda  Ardern), UK (Boris  Johnson) and the  United States (Donald Trump)  – all of whom were called upon to handle the  pandemic between February and November 2020. The aim is to illustrate how political actors employed discursive strategies as ‘appropriate to the moment’ (Martin 2015) in keeping with the ‘rhetorical’ exigence (Bitzer 1968) that the pandemic had created. As  explained above, the  definition of discourse used in  this  study is  to be understood against the  background of social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1991 (1966)), according to which discourses, realised in concrete texts, public performances, and utterances, not  only describe the  social actors, entities, and social events they refer to, but  actually constitute them in the first place. The socially constructive role of political discourse becomes even more acute during a public health emergency, given that linguistic and argumentative choices  – for example, to use one word or another  – carry implications that  go beyond political communication, while they operate as  primary sites for the  enactment of legitimation, power, and ideological positioning (Kuypers 2010; Lakoff 2004). We examine this formulation of political language within a specific societal and historical frame, that of the COVID-19 health pandemic, using discourse analysis, since ‘language must be seen (and analysed) as a political phenomenon’ and ‘politics must be conceived and studied as  a  discursive phenomenon’ (Pelinka  2007: 129). More specifically, this  study examines the  relationship between political discourse and the handling of a major crisis at the level of communication and is therefore part of the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis, as  scholars of this  stream of research analyse discursive practices to decode the  relationship between language and power (Chilton 2004; Fairclough 2010; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Wodak 2004). Critical discourse analysis interrogates the relationship between language, power and ideology and explains how discourse originates from and serves the  social structure and power relations. Ιn the context of this study, the analysis focuses on the  frames used by political leaders in  their response to the  COVID-19 crisis  and examines both the  intentions from which these announcements originated and the  effects that  they produced. Ultimately, it  aims to analyse the ways in which legitimacy takes place at the linguistic level. With regard to data  collection and data  analysis, the  researchers coded a  sample of 16 texts by the  political actors’ statements (public address, interviews, and conference speeches) (Table 1), in which the coded attributes

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comprised elements that previous research has shown to have legitimation and frame building, as well as rhetorical and persuasive power in political discourse (see Table 2). Two coders participated in the coding of the total sample studied. Coding was applied on the entire text level, as well as on the level of argument (unit of analysis). Through an iterative categorisation and progressive focusing of both deductive and inductive codes of the  political pandemic discourse, the  variables that  informed the  study were tested and correlated in  search for patterns, themes, frequencies, similarities, and differences. The data were coded manually, also using the NVivo software to help store and organise codes and coding text. Text fragments were analysed qualitatively, using general discourse analytic and linguistic techniques; however, significant descriptive numerical data  have also  been extracted, since they can contribute to an interpretive, contextual inquiry (Yanchar 2011) and help advance a  study’s theoretical purpose (Westerman 2006).

Findings and Discussion The  triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data  in  this  study yielded a number of results regarding preferred types of legitimations and discursive strategies. Based on these, five major thematic categories were identified: (i) exigence, (ii) a  collective problem of shared responsibility, (iii) authority and leadership discourse, (iv) instrumental rationalisation and (v) variations in political actors’ pandemic response. Framing the exigence: responding discursively to the moment The  exigence that  called for rhetorical discourse, the  ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, was framed by all political actors as a global but also as a national crisis of great severity, which would inevitably affect all national health systems, the  economy and society at  large. It  was  characterised as  ‘unprecedented’ (1), as  a  ‘horrible infection’ (2) or most commonly as  an ‘invisible enemy’ (3) that  comes to ‘dramatically change our daily lives’ and undermine our ‘idea  of normality’ (4).1 In  their pandemic response, the  political actors clearly framed ‘a new reality for the world’: one constructed and defined by a dramatic common experience and a new set of responsibilities for citizens and governments alike. 1 Numbering of excerpts is continuous. Τhe underlining highlight the linguistic realizations of concepts examined. The initials of the names of the Political actors to which each excerpt refers are placed in round brackets. The excerpts are placed in a random order, with readability in mind.



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(1)  The world is now facing an unprecedented Public Health crisis (KM) (2) Over the past few weeks, the world has changed, and it has changed very quickly […] This is because we are experiencing an unprecedented event, a global pandemic (  JA) (3) We […] issued the highest level of travel warning on other countries as the virus spread its horrible infection (DT) (4) All over the world we are seeing the devastating impact of this invisible killer (BJ) (5) T he  coronavirus is  changing daily life in  our country dramatically  […] Our idea  of normality [….] is being put to the test as never before (AM)

The  virus was  also  framed by the  study’s male elite as  a  ‘threat’, a  ‘risk’ and a  real ‘danger’ that  resembled a  war, actually using war-like language, as is evidenced in the following excerpts: (1)  But in this fight, we can be in no doubt that each and every one of us is directly enlisted (BJ) (2)  But our arsenal is not inexhaustible (KM) (3) And I know there’s a risk, there’s a danger, but that’s okay […] The virus will not have a chance against us […]. we will ultimately and expeditiously defeat it (DT)

Bitzer’s (1968) exigence or Aristotle’s ‘Kairos’ was underscored and framed by the use of numerous temporal deictic expressions (now, time, today, immediately) by all of the political actors, thus enhancing the urgency of the situation: (1)  Tonight, I want to speak with you about our nation’s unprecedented response to the coronavirus outbreak that started in China and is now spreading throughout the world (DT) (2)  We will immediately: close all shops selling non-essential goods (BJ) (3)  Right now, we can take decisive action all together […] Every day counts now (AM) (4)  Starting today, let us all make personal hygiene an unconscious daily routine (KM) (5)  Today I’m announcing an alert system for covid-19 (  JA)

Such deictic expressions provide personal authorisation through the legitimation practice of ‘time summons’ (Van Leeuwen 2005: 131), since the leaders are legitimised through personal status (in  their capacities as  prime minister, president, head of state) to speak for the ‘moment’, to determine time frames for the implementation of measures and policies, and to foresee when and under what conditions the crisis will be over. Handling the pandemic: a collective problem of shared responsibility Particularly evident in the political actors’ pandemic discourse is their constant and unanimous framing of the  concept of ‘responsibility’. A  dual sense of this  concept is  presented in  all political actors’ discourse: (a) responsibility

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exhibited by governments/leaders (with use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ and affirmative language), as in excerpts 1, 2 and 3: (1)  I must be reassured that we are meeting the expectations of New Zealanders and that comes first (  JA) (2) From this evening I must give the British people a very simple instruction - you must stay at home (BJ) (3)  We are now asking you to implement these plans (  JA)

And (b) as  responsibility pertaining to citizens themselves (with the  use of the pronouns We and Us, as in excerpts 4, 5 and 6 – although the use of ‘us’ and ‘we’ here may also include the entity as a whole, including both citizens and political actors: (4)  Every single one of us can make a big difference by [….] following hygiene rules (BJ) (5)  It is up to each and every one of us to do so, without any exception (AM) (6)  Believe me, though: no public measure can substitute individual responsibility (KM)

In  all texts, references to a  collective effort to weather the  storm of the  pandemic can be found. But  who does the  responsibility fall upon? The  strategic use of the  inclusive personal pronoun We is  pertinent in  addressing this  question, given that  it  is  a  key linguistic strategy to overcome differences in  political discourse and convey that  the  leader is assimilated to “the people” (Fairclough, 1989). During the pandemic, all five leaders utilised this deixis to build the frame of a ‘shared responsibility’ that  brings leaders and citizens together. Political discourse can stimulate audience perceptions that  produce collective forms of identification, as  well as  a  sense of togetherness which drives consensus, acceptance of the message and therefore compliance. (1) For now, I ask that New Zealand does what we do so well: we are a country that is creative, practical and community minded (  JA) (2)  We stood together and followed the guidelines, out of consideration and common sense (AM) (3)  One by one and all together we can make a difference (KM) (4)  We are all in this together (DT) (5)  We will beat the coronavirus and we will beat it together (BJ)

But the We is also used to denote the administrations’ actions and initiatives to ‘protect’ the people; to underscore the government-led yet collective effort that  was  required to fight against the  coronavirus. In  this  sense, ‘shared



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responsibility’ amounts to a new patriotism (the patriotism of solidarity and responsibility) and the politics of care (‘we protect each other’). (1) We made a lifesaving move with early action on China. Now we must take the same action with Europe (DT) (2) Because that  is  the  way we reduce the  number of people needing hospital treatment at any one time, so we can protect the NHS’s ability to cope - and save more lives (BJ) (3) T his  is when we move to reduce our contact with one another, we increase our border measures, and we cancel events (  JA) (4)  We are already taking the necessary actions to safeguard Public Health (KM).

Attached to the  concept of ‘Shared Responsibility’ is  the  ‘Values’ concept, as the latter are frequently invoked in the leaders’ speech. Values in this context make appeals to cultural unity (Ardern), solidarity (all political actors), protection of the vulnerable (all political actors), discipline to restrictive measures (all political actors except for Trump), freedom (Merkel), self-determination (Mitsotakis) and the country’s democratic ideals (Merkel, Mitsotakis). According to Chilton (2008: 227), many of these terms abound in  the  political vocabulary and they could not  have been absent from pandemic discourse. Here, legitimacy is  expressed in  a  moralising way (Van Leeuwen 2008: 109) through the  use of abstract value concepts that link specific activities considered to be needing legitimation (i.e., the  measures) with moral values. The  evocation of such values, as  well as the repetition of the collective We pronoun, foregrounds the collective meanings activated through this rhetoric and evokes a sense of conformity in the legitimation formula of ‘these are our core values/this is what we are/this is what we do’, while at the same time solidifying a common definition of the situation. The  notion of the  ‘People’, the  most frequently occurring lexical type in the entire corpus (Figure 1), functions as a value statement that binds political actors with their audiences. In this context, ‘People’ – semantically tied to other words such as ‘home’, ‘country’, ‘nation’ and ‘society’ – was formed as a subject and acquired a ‘voice’ through the speech of its representatives, as is the case for almost all political speeches and addresses (Stavrakakis 2014). Interestingly, the word had multiple usages and connotations in the studied texts: to signify either national identity (e.g., the  American people), or individuals who are most vulnerable to the  virus (grandparents, youth, the  ill or everyone), and either in a more populist and abstract use (1 and 2) or a more pragmatic or humanitarian/people-based one (3 and 4). (1) We are marshalling the full power of the federal government and the private sector to protect the American people (DT)

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(2) T he people of this country will rise to that challenge (BJ) (3) T hese are not just abstract numbers in statistics, but this is about a father or grandfather, a mother or grandmother, a partner – this is about people (AM) (4) T hat means we need friends, family and neighbours to support our older New Zealanders and people who may be in this group by doing simple things, like keeping in contact and dropping off food or other supplies (  JA)]

Whatever its use, the category ‘People’ is employed as another proven frame and a well-understood linguistic trope to evoke collectivity and help the public conceive of the political leader as ‘the right leader, in the right place, at the right time’ (Helsloot and Groenendaal 2017). Reinstating authority and leadership The political leaders’ texts demonstrated a high degree of authoritative talk, ethos-building claims, and imperative/affirmative speech, as they announced measures, assumed responsibility or even apologised. The  following are instances of the  political actors asserting their leadership qualities through their speech. (1)  My administration is coordinating directly with communities with the largest outbreaks, and we have issued guidance on school closures, social distancing, and reducing large gatherings. Smart action today will prevent the spread of the virus tomorrow (DT) (2) T he government will, of course, continue to support companies and workers affected by the health crisis (KM) (3) I cannot allow the gains we have all made to be squandered by processes not being upheld. My job is to keep New Zealanders safe (  JA) (4)  Allow me, therefore, to say that this is serious. Please also take this seriously (AM)

A  balanced use of Ethos (1), Logos (2) and Pathos (3) was  observed, demonstrating credibility, decisiveness and empathy in the political discourse. Through their utterances, the political actors comforted, reassured, informed and instilled hope (successfully or not) to their constituents: (1)  No Prime Minister wants to enact measures like this […] When I told you two weeks ago that we were pursuing a local and a regional approach to tackling this virus, I believed then and I still believe passionately that it was the right thing to do (BJ) (2) Today’s data is clear: the virus is spreading mainly among young people (KM) (3) And I  know this  will be upsetting to some New  Zealanders seeking to return home to visit dying relatives and loved ones however the risk to our collective efforts to eliminate Covid are simply too great (  JA)



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Legitimacy through ‘authorisation’ (Van Leeuwen 2007) was  further strengthened by the use of ‘Commendations from Experts’ – the authority of expertise and validity deriving from the recognised credentials of an individual (Kahane and Cavender 2006) – as well as by the use of ‘Impersonal References to Rules’. Both tactics were employed to strengthen the political message and thus promote compliance with the  measures. Mitsotakis  and Merkel made most use of appeals to Expert Voices: (1) As Prime Minister, however, I have to listen to the scientists [….] I have to present the situation with absolute sincerity. Based on the advice of science […] Beware: Experts warn that in times of carelessness we become more vulnerable to the virus (KM) (2) […] everything I  tell you about this  comes from the  Federal Government’s ongoing consultations with the  experts from the  Robert Koch Institute and other scientists and virologists (AM)

Despite the  difference in  tone of voice, the  following excerpts clearly demonstrate the use of appeals to rules as a means to rationalise and ensure compliance: (1) Our success will also largely depend on how disciplined each and every one of us is in following the rules (  JA) (2) If  you don’t follow the  rules the  police will have the  powers to enforce them, including through fines and dispersing gatherings (BJ)

At the linguistic level, the leaders used imperatives (do’s and don’ts), active voice (We are, we do, we need); personal involvement (I know, I understand), commitment statements (We will do so, I  assure you), metaphor (cushion the  economic impact), metonymy (Greece became an example to be imitated  ) and the rule of three (the lives, health and safety) – linguistic devices that help audiences make sense of the novel situation while reinforcing the persuasiveness and credibility of a leader’s speech. Instrumental rationalisation: persuading through means-goals-effects A recurring theme that serves as a salient legitimation strategy is References to Goals. Goals can be a major legitimation strategy in the manner of ‘instrumental rationalisation’ (Van Leeuwen 2008) or as  the  ‘means-goals-effects’ strategy (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012), with leaders legitimising the  proposed measures as ‘vital’ and ‘imperative’, as ‘the only way’ to achieve the commonly shared goal of curbing the infections and restoring normality. The following

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instances illustrate linguistic materialisations of instrumental rationalisation by two of the European leaders: (1) So it’s vital to slow the spread of the disease. Because that is the way we reduce the number of people needing hospital treatment at any one time, so we can protect the NHS’s ability to cope - and save more lives (BJ) (2) But we only have to sacrifice temporarily, and in the end, we are doing it for our own benefit. For  our own health and that  of those who we can prevent from getting sick. To prevent our health system from getting overwhelmed, to keep our schools and childcare centers open. For our economy and our jobs (AM)

Arguments were legitimised, in other words, as concrete ways for reaching specific goals: for generating abidance to the  measures or for setting a  standard on how the  crisis  was  to be handled. Technically, we could argue, the  ‘means-goal’ strategy was  the  modern operationalisation, in  the  political actors’ pandemic utterances, of Aristotle’s enthymemes in  the  sense of logical syllogisms that  provide rhetorical proof by virtue of the unconscious, automatic physiological and emotional responses they evoke (Lunceford 2007). While instrumental rationalisations are mostly based on Logos, the textual analysis showed that ‘positive sentiment’, ‘emotional language’, ‘hope appeals’ and ‘a  hypothetical future’ were employed to strengthen the  political actors’ goal-oriented messaging. The  political leaders used ‘negative sentiment’ (such as  fear appeals) with caution and moderation, rather than opting for a  positive impact (hope and gratitude) on their audience’s minds. In fact, Hope Appeals has been a prevalent emotional theme in the analysed texts, and expectedly so, given that hope has persuasive power and the potential to be a  powerful motivator for influencing behaviour. As  Chadwick (2015), explains, hope appeals contain two parts: (a) the evocation of hope through the  presentation of an opportunity and (b) recommended actions to take advantage of the opportunity and achieve the desired outcome. According to Lazarus’s appraisal theory (1991), the core relational theme of hope is ‘fearing the  worst but  yearning for better’ (as  cited in  Chadwick 2015: 599); hope is also related to perception of threat or an unexpected stimulus that we cannot control, while also  anticipating a  positive end outcome (hypothetical future outcome). Efficacy Appeals, proven to be more persuasive than threats (Ort and Fahr 2018), have also been used to a high degree. In fact, a fear appeal may integrate both a  ‘threat’ component (associated with Fear) and an ‘efficacy’ component (associated with hope) (Nabi and Myrick 2019). The  instances



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below illustrate the use of Hope and Efficacy Appeals to justify recommended actions in the view of a positive future outcome: (1)  If we are vigilant — and we can reduce the chance of infection, which we will — we will significantly impede the transmission of the virus. The virus will not have a chance against us (DT) (2) But what we need to believe in right now is that we will be able to overcome this crisis. It  will suffice for all of us to follow the  instructions of doctors and scientists  [….] At  the  beginning of 2021, therefore, along with the  new year, a  new day may rise in the war against the coronavirus (KM) (3) Here’s how we will know what to do and win (JA)

‘Sharing of the  political actors’ personal emotions’ with their audience  was also observed. Displays of personal feelings is often contradictory to conventional expectations from leaders; however, in a context of a crisis, the political actors must balance between authenticity and control, in an effort to inspire confidence under conditions of extreme uncertainty and respond to the emotional and psychological needs of their audiences. This point illuminates the paradox of the public and private roles of the crisis leader (Gigliotti 2016). Such displays of authenticity combined with shared commonalities and the use of language that  places the  leader on the  same level as  followers help generate trust and acceptance of the  leader (Davis  and Gardner 2012). Through empathy, transparency, honesty and clarity, the leaders seem to ‘level with’ their audience: (1) Personally, over the past days, I have felt a strong urge to rely on my faith and draw strength to stand up to the circumstances (KM) (2) We may not have experienced anything like this in our lifetimes, but we know how to rally, and we know how to look after one another and right now what could be more important than that (  JA) (3)  We are all in this together (DT) (4)  I am truly, truly sorry for that (BJ)

Finally, in terms of their overall tone of voice and non-verbal language, we can agree with D’Auria and Smet (2020) that leaders exhibited ‘bounded hope and deliberate calm’, generally utilising the  devices of effective non-verbal communication to convey a message of credibility and pragmatism. Variations in leaders’ pandemic response The findings of the study provide evidence that political rhetoric and discursive frames were strategically employed by all political leaders of the study in their effort

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to define the situation, manage the issue, influence public attitudes and policies, establish the  core values of the  nation and their governance, and ultimately, ‘construct’ and ‘refigure’ the  pandemic reality as  experienced at  the  national level. Despite commonalities, the  leaders employed diversified, in  some cases even antithetical, rhetorical responses to the  public health crisis  (e.g., Donald Trump versus Angela Merkel) and appropriated the exigence through different assessments of audience, purpose and message. Such differences suggest that a government’s handling of a crisis event – even if this event is the most global event we have experienced as  humanity in generations  – is  firmly embedded in the nation’s internal politics, local audiences as well as the existing patterns of leadership exemplified in the Elite’s unique political persona. Donald Trump

President Trump engaged in ‘attention-based politics’, drawing attention to himself through the media, at the expense of an efficient response to the major health crisis  (Altheide 2020). As  Altheide (2020) points out, the  classical rhetorical appeals (e.g., racism, nativism and populism) that had helped Trump cultivate his personal brand name in the four years of office were less apparent during the 2020 pandemic, when the focus was himself, although his ‘strident, conflictual and evocative commentary style’ characterised his  COVIDrelated discourse as well. The findings of the present study provide support to Altheide’s (2020) conclusions. Boris Johnson

Boris  Johnson’s carrot and stick approach to his  pandemic policy includes both thanking the British for their sacrifice and also threatening them for their potential non-abidance by the  new rules, in  the  name of the  protection of public health, thus enhancing his perceived credibility and control of the crisis which, along with his natural charisma (Smith 2017), shapes the British Elite’s political profile during the first phase of the pandemic. Angela Merkel

The  German Chancellor, Angela  Merkel, was  the  only one of our political actors to fully capitalise on her certified scientific knowledge, thus significantly building on her Ethos and presenting a solid Logos, which strongly supported her ‘politics of care’. The Chancellor was, also, the only Elite not to refer to the globality of the pandemic in her first address to the nation in March, choosing to render a  local frame to the  health crisis; this  choice may be attributed to



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national cultural elements for in-house protection during a crisis in Germany, which seemed to prevail in Angela Merkel’s first pandemic discursive response. Kyriakos Mitsotakis

The  Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, is  an aficionado of pragmatic political speech. In most of his discursive performances, Logos outweighed Pathos, thus avoiding stirring the  emotions of the  Greek audience. In his last speech of our sample (October), Mitsotakis addressed Greek youth, using a  moralising legitimation strategy; specifically, the  obedience to measures was  moralised in  terms of a  discourse of ‘agency’, asking the youth to become the real protagonists of our days, to speak out and act. As a legitimation strategy, this approach falls under Van Leeuwen’s (2007) ‘Moral Evaluation through Abstraction’, by referring to practices in  abstract ways that  ‘moralise’ them by distilling from them a  quality that links them to discourses of moral values. Jacinda Ardern

The  innate communicative charisma  and the  personal kindness of New Zealand’s Prime Minister were the main characteristics of her pandemic discourse. Her ‘politics of kindness’ and authentic care for her audience’s well-being reinforced her Ethos, which was further supported by her Logos and her ability to exercise a unique kind of empathetic realism in her politics (McGuire et al. 2020).

Conclusion Our findings have clearly provided support to the claim that language, speech, and argument are the key mechanism for social construction; a form of social practice which serves the political power, while, at the same time, transforming society (Wodak 2004). The study’s results indicate that strategic intentionality and legitimation are integral parts of pandemic-related political discourse. More precisely, the majority of the analysed texts use explicit legitimation as a response to the implicit question of ‘why should this be done’, which is in line with Van Dijk’s (1998) claim that legitimation most commonly is an institutional practice. The five political actors exercised political rhetoric in order to frame the situation (pandemic crisis) and the audience’s perceptions towards the political leaders’ intentionality; still, the determinant factor for their success was their mode of action to ‘formulate what was at stake in the situation’ (Martin 2015: 30).

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It is right to say that the political actors were already holding a ‘personal authority legitimacy’, which Van Leeuwen (2007) described as  legitimacy conferred through status and derived from the  individual’s role within  an authority-wielding institution. As he explains, in this case, the authorities do not need to provide any justification for what they require others to do ‘other than a  mere “because I  say so”, although in  practice they may of course choose to provide reasons and arguments’ (p. 94). In this context, a presidential address is legitimate ‘by default’ as it is delivered by a serving president, prime minister, of head of state. The president is a role in which authority is vested by definition. At the most basic linguistic level, such legitimacy through personal status is  expressed in  verbal articulations where the  ‘projected sentence’, the utterance of the person in power, contains a normative modality (obligation) (Halliday 1985, as cited in Van Leeuwen 2008: 106). The obligation is usually expressed by third-person verbs (‘should/must’) and expressions (‘it is necessary’), in  a  combination that  expresses a  responsibility and sets time frames (‘it is urgent’), as well as through semantically related terms expressed with adverbs (‘today’, ‘in time’), nouns (‘progress’, ‘effort’, ‘duty’), adjectives (‘required’) and verbs (‘to take over responsibilities’, ‘to accelerate’, ‘to act’). Above all, the analysis showed how all means-oriented and goals-oriented instrumental rationalisations were employed for legitimising announced measures, governmental actions and specific core values, such as  solidarity and discipline. Often such concrete instrumentality is foregrounded through moralistic or value-based claims, and in this case such legitimations resemble the  ‘purpose constructions’ that  Van Leeuwen (2008: 113) talked about, as  types of legitimations that  contain  an element of ‘moralisation’. In  such instances, value words are used strategically in their capacity to serve as means for compliance. Following Martin  (2015), the  COVID-19 pandemic was  the  strategic moment (exigence) when political rhetoric was  called upon to effectively re-appropriate a  situation, utilising both the  personal authority of the political actors and the power of their political language. The five political actors’ personal rhetorical charisma  and persuasiveness determined the level of success of their discursive endeavour to shape their audience’s attitudes, provide alternatives and outline possible future outcomes and new perspectives, in the time and space frame of the exigence. They attempted a political rhetoric that combined ‘continuity with provocation’ (Martin 2015), meaning that they discursively attempted to ‘endorse established ideas while advancing new ones’ (p. 28); for example, by framing the concept of ‘nation’, they all tried to persuade their audience to embrace the concept and practices of ‘individual’ and ‘shared responsibility’ in order to fight the pandemic.



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APPENDICES Table 1  Study sample (Feb. 2020–Nov. 2020). Type of discourse

Political elite/ country

Date

Word count

1.

Public speech

Johnson, UK

23 March

2.

Interview

Johnson, UK

24 July

1703

3.

Press conference (lockdown)

Johnson, UK

31 October

1964

4.

Public speech

Ardern, New Zealand

21 March

1283

5.

Press conference (new cases) Ardern, New Zealand

17 June

6.

Interview (full)

Ardern, New Zealand

24 March

1197

7.

Facebook interview (Q&A)

Ardern, New Zealand

26 March

353

8.

Public speech

Merkel, Germany

19 March

2024

9.

Public speech

Merkel, Germany

18 October

482

10.

Press conference

Merkel, Germany

16 April

248

11.

Public speech

Mitsotakis, Greece

11 March

1270

12.

Public speech

Mitsotakis, Greece

22 October

1457

13.

Interview

Mitsotakis, Greece

16 September

14.

Public speech

Trump, USA

11 March

15.

Public (short) speech (after hospitalization)

Trump, USA

11 October

274

16.

Interview (short, after first debate)

Trump, USA

16 October

223

946

282

938 1353



137

FRAMING THE PANDEMIC

Table 2  Coding categories. Coding categories

Thematic unit

‘Central claims’

(political argument reconstruction)

‘Means-Goal’ – ‘Rationalization’

Coded segments 141 203

‘Values’

32

‘Argument from Authority’

70

‘Positive consequences’

176

‘Negative Consequences’

160

‘Authorization’ ‘Emotions’

(legitimation strategies)

147 14

Altruism’

13

‘Expert Voices’

10

‘Hypothetical Future’

19

‘Ethos’ ‘Pathos’

(persuasive rhetoric)

51 55

‘Logos’

20

‘Kairos’

356

‘Language used’

48

‘Tropes of Argumentation’

251

‘Rhetorical (linguistic) devices’ ‘Apology’

64

(apologia)

5

‘Denial’

1

‘Differentiation’

1

‘Evading responsibility’

4

‘Excuse’ ‘Justification’ ‘Transcendence’

4 31 8

138

POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND MEDIA IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Figure 1  NVivo word cloud for 50 most frequently occurring words.

INDEX Abric, J.-C. 46 Adana Provincial Revenue office 90 Adana Revenue Office 90 Adorno, T. 101 Agamben, G. 13, 15, 16 Aganaktismenoi 44 Ajnadiskova, Katerina 110 Akdağ, Recep 85, 86, 91, 93–96 AKP. See Justice and Development Party Alexander, D. E. 16 Allen, K. 32 Altheide, D. L. 130 amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 32 Andreouli, E. 46 Ankara 92 antagonism 82, 83, 97 anti-Health Transformation Program 85 anti-immigration 82 Aral, S. 102 Ardahan 87 Ardern, Jacinda 121, 131, 136 Armed Conflict Survey 13 austerity 5, 11, 44, 63, 64, 68, 75, 76, 78, 103, 113 Austin, J. L. 120 Austria 71 authority legitimation 119 authorization 119 Baga 17 Bakeman, R. 29 Baker-Beall, C. 15 Bakir, V. 102 Banikowski, B. 82 Barnett, A. 102 Barnoy, A. 17 Barroso, Jose Manuel 44

Bayburt 87 Beck, U. 13, 16 Belgium 71 Benkler, Y. 102 Bennett, W. L. 102 Benoit, W. L. 120 Berger, P. L. 14, 121 Bernays, E. L. 101 Bingöl 87, 92 Bitzer, L. F. 120, 121, 123 Blyth, M. 64, 103 Bofinger, P. 64 Boin, A. 11, 13 Boli, Zhang 26, 27, 30 Bourdieu, P. 76, 101, 104, 120 Boykoff, M. 17 British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) 102 Brussels 45 Buckley, C. 32 Bucy, E. P. 102 Buffet, Warren E. 65 Burr, V. 14 Carrington, D. 15 Castells, M. 101 Cavender, N. 127 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party Central Council of the Turkish Medical Council 95 CGTN 24 Chadwick, A. E. 128 Chan, R. H. 25 Chang, T. K. 16 Charlie Hebdo 17 Che Guevara 95 Chen, F. 29, 31 Chen, H. C. 24, 26

140

POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND MEDIA IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Chilton, P. 119, 121, 125 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 4, 23, 26, 33 Chomsky, N. 77, 101 climate crisis 9, 12 cognitive polyphasia 46 Cohen, Bernard 24 conceptualization 12, 120 constitutional crisis 18 contagion 4, 24, 29 content analysis 3, 27 Coombs, T. W. 1, 120 corpus 3, 49, 125 corruption 13 Cottle, Simon 12 Covid-19 pandemic 3, 4, 6, 24, 28, 118, 122, 132 creeping crises 13 crisis communication 1, 3 crisis events 10 crisis processes 12, 13 Critical Discourse Analysis 120, 121 criticism 17, 67, 83, 107 Croatia 71, 72 Crow, D. 17 cultural proximity 16 Cunningham, P. J. 25 Curran, J. 67, 68, 101 Cvetkovska, Saska 110, 111 Cyprus 71, 72 Cyranoski, D. 26 Czech Republic 71 Daskalovski, Z. 106 D’Auria, G. 129 Davidson, H. 27 Davis, K. M. 129 de la Torre, C. 82 debt 59 debt crisis 71, 75 de-contextualization 46 delegation 2 democracy 67, 68, 78, 102, 103, 105, 112 democratization 67 demonopolization 106 Derakhsan, H. 66 destabilisation 12 Dimitrijevska-Markoski, T. 106

Dimitrov, Nikola 99 Dimokratia 76 Dingyu, Zhang 27, 30 DiResta, R. 23 discourse 121 Discourse Analysis 121 Djankov, S. 67 Dokumento 76 Dong, R. 31 Downes, L. 102 Draghi, Mario 64 Dumenil, G. 63 Dursun, O. 24 Ebola 26 ECOFIN 43 economic crisis 64–66, 104 economic inequality 13 Ekengren, M 13 elite sources 3, 17 Entman, R. M. 24 environmental degradation 10, 11 Estonia 71 EU. See European Union Euro Crisis 64, 75 Eurobarometer Surveys 104 European Central Bank 5, 64 European Commission 5, 45 European Parliament 65 European Union (EU) 18, 55, 58, 60, 64, 71, 75–77, 109, 111 Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics 68 Eurozone 44, 45, 64, 71, 73, 76 Eurozone summit 44 Expert Appointee Prominence Model 2 extremism 10, 17 extremist violence 19 Fahr, A. 128 Fairclough, I. 120, 121, 127 Fairclough, N. 14, 120, 121, 127 fast-burning crisis 11 fatal disease 32 Feng, G. 33 fermentation 46 financial collapse 12 financial crisis 1, 2, 64 Financial Times 44

Index Finland 71, 72 fish consumption 65 Foreign Ministers of Greece 99 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 99 France 72 Freedman, D. 103 Freelon, D. 103 Fùrnemont, J. F. 106 FYROM. See Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GAA. See Government Accreditation and Award Galbraith, J. 64 Gallaghar, M. E. 25 Gans, H. J. 16 Gardner, W. L. 129 GDP 5, 43, 63, 64, 71, 72, 75, 76 General Secretariat for Media and Communication (GSMC) 108 geographic latitudes 9 Gergen, K. J. 14 Germany 7, 71, 72, 121 Giddens, A. 67 Gidron, N. 82, 83 Gigliotti, R. A. 118, 129 global inequalities 13 Global Times 32, 33 global warming 15 globalisation 12 Goertzel, T. 102 Golden Dawn 56, 57, 107, 108 Google News 66 Gottman, J. M. 29 Government Accreditation and Award (GAA) 3, 30, 32–35 Gower, K. K. 25 Graves, L. 102 Great Hall of People 4, 24, 32, 34 Greece 7, 71, 74, 75, 100, 121 Greek culture 112 Greek media 106, 111 Greek Orthodox Church 107 Greek political system 4, 47, 50–52, 55, 56, 58–60 Greek Press 5 Greek society 5, 45, 46, 51, 58, 59

141

Greene, S. 106 Grenfell and Brexit referendum 10 Grenfell crisis 12 Grenfell Tower 11, 12 Groenendaal, J. 118 Gruevski Nikola 106 Guangdong 25 Guangzhou 25 Gümüşhane 87 Guo, J. 33 Guo, R. 29 Guo, S. 31 Hakkari 87 Hall, S. 17 Hallin, D. 67, 77, 105 Haram, Boko 17 Harvey, D. 63 Hay, C. 12 health care 26, 81, 82, 84, 93–95 health care reform 84 health care system 81, 82, 84, 94–97 Health Transformation Program (HTP) 82, 92, 96 Helsloot, I. 118, 126 Herman, E. S. 101 Hills, T. 76 Himelboim, I. 16 Ho, M. 29 Hodge, B. 120 Hollande, François 45 Hong, J. 26 Horváthová, P. 12 hospital administration 84 Howarth, C. 46 Hsieh, H. F. 27 HTP. See Health Transformation Program Hu, H. 31 Hu, Z. 31 Huang, Y. 23 human development 67 human insecurity 13 IAR. See Individual Achievement Recognition ideological affinity 50 ideological nexus 25 Iğdır 87

142

POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND MEDIA IN TIMES OF CRISIS

impersonal authority 119 Independent Greeks 44 Individual Achievement Recognition (IAR) 3, 29, 30, 32–35 Information and Communication Technologies 70 institutional actors 14 intentionality 120 intercoder reliability 29 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party 106 international community 1, 30 international financial crisis 4 international media 16 intervention 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 44, 77 Investigative Reporting Lab (IRL) 111 Iordanidou, S. 77 Iosifidis, P. 105 Iramuteq 49 Istanbul 92 Istanbul Medical Chamber 93 Istanbul University Faculty of Medicine 89 Iyengar, S. 25 Jakhar, P. 31 James, E. 118 Jarvis, J. 17 Jinyintan Hospital 32 Jodelet, D. 46 John, R. R. 73 Johnson, Boris 118, 121, 130 journalism 16–19, 25, 67, 73, 75–77, 106 Juncker, Jean-Claude 45 Jurado, I. 45 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 81–86, 88, 94, 95, 97 Kahane, H. 127 Kahn, R. 2 Kaltwasser, C. 82, 83 Kamei, K. 9 Kapakos, Stavros 108 Karamanlis, K. 43 Karamichas, J. 44 Kathimerini 76 Katsirea, I. 105 Kellner, D. 101 Kelman, H. C. 47, 48

Kilis 87 King, P. 24 Kitch, C. 18 KKE (Communist party) 50, 53 Kosicki, G. M. 16 Kotišová, J. 16 Kotzias, Nikos 99 Koukiadaki, A. 104 Krause N. M. 102 Kress, G. R. 120 Kretsos, L. 104 Krugman, P. 64 Kuo, L. 25, 33 Kuypers, J. A. 121 Laclauan approach 83 Lagadec, P. 11 Lakoff, G. 121 Lambraki Group 76 Langley, W. 32 Lanjuan, Li 26–28, 30, 32 Lapavitsas, C. 64 Lasswell, H. D. 101 Law on Social Security and General Health Insurance 86 Lazer D.M.J. 102 Leandros, N. 105 Lehman Brothers 10 Leisure and Entertainment 70 Levy, D. 63 Lewandowsky S. 102 Lewis, D. 26 LexisNexis 27 Liang, J. 33 Lianhua Qingwen 30 Liao, J. 33 Lin, H. 32 Lippmann, Walter 101 Liu, C. 27 Liu, Y. 23, 25 Livingston, S. 102 Lordon, F. 64 Luckmann, T. 14, 121 Lukes, S. 101 Luxembourg 72 Madrid, R. 83 Manchevski, Damjan 108, 110

Index Mancini, P. 67, 77 Manning, P. 77 Marchand, P. 49 Marchese, M. C. 15 market liberalization 77 Martin, J. 120, 121, 131, 132 mass demonstration 44 Matthews, Jamie 3, 13 May, Theresa 11 Mayring, P. 27 Mazzoleni, G. 107 McChesney, R. 102 McCombs, M. 24, 101 McCreery, S. 16 McGuire, D. 131 McLeod, K. 103 McQuail, D. 76 McStay, A. 102 media communication 2 media discourse 7 media diversity 68 media manipulation 6, 100–103, 112 media power 100 Medical Chambers 95 Mediterranean model 105 Menczer, F. 76 Merill, J. C. 68 Merkel, Angela 44, 45, 121, 127, 130, 131, 136 Merrill, J. C. 68 Metamorphosis Foundation 110 migrant crisis 12 migration 13, 15 Mikušová, M. 12 Miliband, R. 101 Mills, C. 101 Minister of Finance 43 Minister of Information Society and Administration of the Government 108 Minister of Information Society and Public Administration of North Macedonia 110 Ministry of Finance General Directorate of Budget and Financial Control 89 Ministry of Health 5, 84, 86–95 Mitchell, A. 74, 104 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos 109, 121, 127, 131, 136

143

mobility controls 34 mobilization 83, 107 Molter, V. 23 moral corruption 82 moral evaluation 7, 24, 119, 131 moralization 119 Morgan, D. L. 27 Moscovici, S. 46–48 Mudde, C. 82, 83 Müller, L. 67 Murdock, G. 77 Myrich, J. G. 128 mythopoeia 7 mythopoesis 119, 120 Nabi, R. L. 128 Nanshan, Zhong 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 35 “Medal of the Republic,” 24 national heroism 35 National Patriotic Alliance 44 nationalism 31, 83 nativism 130 Nea Selida 76 neoliberalism 63 neopopulism 6, 83 New Democracy (ND) 43, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 107–109 new media 5, 65, 68, 76 New Zealand 7, 121 Newhagen J. E. 102 Newman, N. 104 Noam, E. M. 67 Nohrstedt, D. 10 normalisation 47, 48, 107 Norris, P. 67 North Korea 75 North Macedonia 6, 99, 100, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109–112 Northern Macedonia Foreign Ministers 6 Norway 75 NVivo software 122 objectification 46, 58 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project 111 Ort, A. 128 oxymoron 15

144

POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND MEDIA IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Padovani, C. 101 Pan, Z. 16 Papakonstantinou, G. 43 Papandreou, G. 43, 44 “The money’s there” 43 Papastamou, S. 47 Papathanasopoulos, S. 105 Partnership and Resource Development of Metamorphosis Foundation 111 PASOK (the Greek centre-party) 43, 50, 52, 54, 56 Pegasus 76 Persian Gulf 25 personal authority 119 Pescaroli, G. 10 Pew Research Center 73, 74, 104, 105 Pickard, V. 68, 103 Plenary Session of the Parliament 45 polarised pluralist model 105 policy-making 45 political actors 2, 7, 45, 46, 100, 121, 122n1, 123–126, 128–132, 139 political communication 1, 2, 103, 121 political consensus 99 political discourse 2, 6, 7, 45–47, 51, 53, 58, 120–122, 124, 126, 131 political identity 52, 95 political instability 13 political organization 83 Political Prominence Model 2 political repression 13 Pollard, M. Q. 24 Pompeo, Mike 34 populism 5, 6, 82, 83, 88, 100, 102, 103, 111, 130 mediated 103, 112 neoliberal 6, 83 xenophobic 6, 100, 102, 103, 111, 113 Portugal 71, 72 Poulet, B. 65 Powell, J. 1 Prinos, I. 108 Provencher, C. 46 proximity 11, 17, 90 public debt crisis 43 public health crisis 130 public institutions 2, 94 public policy 2

Qu, T. 26 quantitative analysis 27 Quarantelli, E. L. 11 racism 130 Ramonet, I. 66 Ratinaud, P. 49 rationalization 7, 119 instrumental 7, 120, 127, 128, 132 theoretical 120 Reaganism 101 Reese, S. D. 25 Referendum polls 45 refuge crisis 12 Reich, Z. 17 Republic of Macedonia 110 Republican People’s Party 85 resilience 66 restoring dignity 44 Reyes, Antonio 119, 120 rhetorical situation 120 Rhinard, M. 13 Romania 71 Rosengren, K. E. 27 SARS 25, 26, 29 SARS-CoV-2 30 savage oligopolization 77 Scandinavia 27 Schaffner, C. 119 Schäuble, Wolfgang 44 Schudson, M. 16, 102 scientific knowledge 33, 34, 130 Seabrooke, L. 11 Second World War 17 self-censorship 77 Shanghai 26 Shannon, S. E. 27 Shaw, D. L. 24, 101 Sheafer, T. 24 Shibu, S. 23 Shoemaker, P. J. 25 Siebert, F. 67 Siirt 87 Silbester Loeb, J. 73 Simon, A. 25 Şırnak 87 slow-burning crisis 11

Index SMEs 63 Smith, P. 130 social cohesion 48 social construction 3, 10, 14, 18, 19, 131 Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) 107 social influence 4, 47, 48 social representations 46 socialism 25, 83 Sotiropoulos, G. 44 South Korea 74 sovereignty 82 Spain 71 Spasoski, S. 109 Spector, B. 10, 14 Spiraki, Maria 109 SSK Çorum Hospital 87 SSK hospitals 86, 87, 93 stagnating incomes 66 Standard & Poor’s agency 43 Stanway, D. 24 state intervention 105 Stavrakakis, Y. 125 Stiglitz, J. 64 Stockman, D. 25 Stojanovski, Filip 111 Streeck, W. 64 structural crisis 63 support for government initiatives (SGI) 29–35 Support Mechanism 48 Syria 13 SYRIZA (left-wing party) 44, 50, 53 Takas, E. 45 Tan, J. 31 Taylor P. M. 102 technocratic government 44 Tedeschi, J. T. 47 temporal latitudes 9 terrorism 10, 15–17, 19 Thatcherism 101 The Association of Patients and their Families (Hasta ve Hasta Yakını Haklarını Savunma Derneği/ HAYSAD) 96 The Guardian newspapers 15

145

The Macedonian issue 99, 108, 112 The Prespa Agreement 6, 99, 100, 103–105, 107, 108, 111–113 theoretical framework 6, 7, 119, 121 Thermaikos 112 Thorsen, E. 13 Tian, X. 31 Tong, J. 25 Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) 26, 30, 31 traditional media 65, 67, 104 Trans Social System Ruptures (TSSRs) 11 Transmission 26, 28 Troika 5, 58 Trpevska, S. 106 Trump, Donald 68, 102, 121, 125, 130, 136 Tsingou, E. 11 Tsipras, Alexis 44, 99 Tunceli 87 Turkish health 5, 81 Turkish Health Reform 83 Turkish Lire 90 Turkish Medical Association (TTB) 88, 91–95 Türk-Sağlık Sen 90 U.S.-China confrontation 26 unemployment 13 United Kingdom (UK) 7, 10, 11, 17–19, 71, 74, 101, 104, 121, 136 United States of America (USA) 7, 63, 66, 101, 121, 136 US election campaign 2016, 68 US Federal Reserve 64 US Secretary of State 34 vague notion 47 van Dijk, T. A. 119, 120, 124, 131 Van Leeuwen, T. 119, 120, 123, 125, 127, 131, 132 Vatikiotis, L. 4, 64 Verma, R. 23, 30 victimizations 81, 82, 86, 97 Vosoughi, S. 102 Wachtendorf, T. 11 Wagner, W. 46

146

POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND MEDIA IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Walby, S. 15, 16 WAN IFRA Report 70 Wang, B. 26 Wang, H. 30 Wang, L. 32 Wang, P. 32 Wang, Z. 32 Wardle, CL. 66 Wayne, M. 101 Wei, Chen 26, 27, 30 Weibo 30, 33 Weibull, L. 66 Wells, C. 102, 103 Wenhong, Zhang 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35 Wenliang, Li 26, 27, 30, 32–35 “law-breaker” 33 Westerman, M. A. 122 whistleblower 33 Wodak, R. 121, 131 Wooten, L. P. 118 World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers 70 World Press Freedom Index (WPFI) 74 Wu, H. D. 16 Wuhan government 3, 23, 26

Xi Jinping 4, 23–25, 32 Xiang, Y. 26 Xinhua 3, 26, 27, 29–35 Yan, A. 26 Yanchar, S. C. 122 Yang, D. L. 26 Yeni şafak 96, 97 youth demographics 13 Yu, P. 33 Yuan, L. 23, 33 Yugoslavia 6, 99 Zaev, Zoran 99 Zhang, Y. 31 Zhao, W. 23, 26 Zhao, X. 26 Zhao, Y. 27 Zheng, L. 31 Zheng, W. 25 Zhuang, P. 25 Zimdars, M. 103 Zirganos, Nikolaos 109 Zuboff, S. 102 Zuo, L. 25