Political consultants and negative campaigning : the secrets of the pros 9780761810087, 0761810080, 9780761810094, 0761810099

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Political Consultants

ampaignin The Secrets of — the Pros ~ KeRWIN C. SWINT

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AND NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING

The Secrets of the Pros

Kerwin C. Swint

University Press of America, ® Ine. Lanham « New York ¢ Oxford

Copyright © 1998 by

University Press of America,® Inc. 4720 Boston Way Lanham, Maryland 20706

12 Hid’s Copse Rd. Cummor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Swint, Kerwin C.

Political consultants and negative campaigning : the secrets of the pros / Kerwin C. Swint. Pe koin Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Political consultants—United States. 2. Electioneering—United States. 3. Advertising, Political—United States. 4. Negativism. I. Title. JK2281.S88 1998 324.7°3°0973—dc21 97-46437 CIP ISBN 0-7618-1008-0 (cloth: alk. ppr.)

ISBN 0-7618-1009-9 (pbk: alk. ppr.)

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials ANSI Z39.48—1984

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Contents

List of Tables List of Figures

Preface Acknowledgements Chapter1

Introduction

Chapter2

The Negative Campaign

Chapter3

Successful Attack Strategies

Chapter4

Spiro Agnew for Vice President?: The Use of Humor in Negative Ads

Chapter5

Negativity is in the Eye of the Beholder

Chapter6

| When Do Campaigns Go Negative?

Chapter 7

Communicating Attack Messages

79

Chapter 8

Party and Gender Differences Among Consultants

oF

Chapter 9

There’s No Substitute for Experience: How Consultants Traits Such as Age And Experience Affect Media Selection

109

Chapter 10

Telephones and Push Polls:

121

Reach Out and Smack Someone

Chapter 11

Chapter 12

Case Studies 1. The Ballad of Margie Lopp

129

2.

A Senator, a Colonel, and a Marshall

135

3.

A Jersey Street Fight

145

Toward the Millenium

151

Appendix

157

Bibliography

167

Index

is

Author

LIS

List of Tables apminmrcncnes acne 2 eaten Ss OY ela eel Aen L os 5-1

9-5

Consultant responses to question: “Is this an example of negative campaigning?” Percent of consultants who would attack Media selection by consultants Cross-tabulation of media chosen for issue attack by media chosen for image attack Cross-tabulation of media chosen for image attack by whether type of message affects media Cross-tabulation of most important factor in choosing media by media selection for issue attack by a campaign with poor financial resources Cross-tabulation of most important factor in choosing media by media selection for image attack Cross-tabulation of most important factor in choosing media by media selection for issue attack by a campaign in a district race Partisan differences in defining negative campaigning Partisan differences among consultants saying they would use negative tactics Partisan differences in media selection Partisan differences in beliefs about the perceived increase in negative campaigning Gender differences among consultants saying they would use negative tactics Trait differences among consultants in media selection for image attack Discriminant model predictions for image attack Group means for personal attack Trait differences among consultants in media selection for issue attack Discriminant model predictions for issue attack

116

9-6

Group means for issue attack

Dy

6-1 7-1 7-2

7-3 7-4

7-5 7-6

8-1

8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5

9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4

56 71 84 88

90 94

94 95

100

101 103 104 106

(11 113 114 115

List of Figures 5-1

7-1

7-2 7-3

Percent saying negative ads have increased versus those who believe there is simply more media attention placed on negative campaigning Percent who indicate type of message affects media selection Preferred medium for negative messages Most important factor in choosing media

61

89 91 92

Preface ae a

Le

I'm going to scrape the bark off of

Michael Dukakis.’ -

Lee Atwater

This book is intended for anyone who has an interest in the process of running for public office. Although its focus is on negative campaigning, it really deals with the broader topic of political communication. As more money is poured into political campaigns at very level, it has never been more important for practitioners and observers to understand how to communicate ideas to voters that will help win

an election. Negative political communication, or negative campaigning as it

is called, is but one weapon in a campaign’s arsenal. But history has proven, and the evidence continues to show, that well-crafted, well-researched political communication with voters that focuses on why one’s opponent should not be elected can be a very effective piece of an overall campaign strategy. In large measure, the business of getting elected to office is now run by professional political consultants. Because of their dominance of this market, and their experience in researching and developing political communication strategies, I went to them for much of the research I present in this book. The book is part academic research and part observation and case study. Hopefully, this blend will give the reader some perspective on the state of modern political campaign communication. [Thomas Sweitzer, “Kill or Be Killed,” Campaigns & Elections, September 1996, p. 45

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. Michael Binford and Dr. Glen Abney for their advice and encouragement, without which I could not have completed this project. I would also like to thank the Political Communication Center at

the University of Oklahoma for their assistance in obtaining the video stills used in this book. I should also thank Tom Perdue, Ralph Chandler, Eichenbaum/Hemke Associates, the Republican

National Committee, Tony Schwartz, and Doak-Carrier Associates for their permission to use the video stills. Finally, I would like to thank the American Association of Political Consultants for providing their membership directory.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

It’s hard for someone to hit you when you have your fist in their face.

- James Carville! 1994

-

Florida

-

National

Telecommunications

Services,

a

telephone contact firm hired by Governor Lawton Chiles, called 70,000 Florida voters and, using a phony organization name, told them that Chiles’s opponent, the Republican nominee Jeb Bush, favors abolishing social security. Chiles won by 65,000 votes. 1996 - New Jersey - The campaign of Republican senatorial nominee Richard Zimmer aired a TV ad designed to mimic a television news update. A “news anchor” figure read a list of Zimmer’s criticisms of his opponent, Robert Toricelli, while the caption “Breaking News” rolled across the screen. The ad was criticized by many and several TV stations refused to air it because the legally required “paid for by” message was too small and too brief to adequately warn viewers. Zimmer lost by 11 percent.

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

2

Both Chiles and Zimmer went negative in their races, but only one of them was victorious. Why? The current conventional wisdom regarding political negativity seems to be that campaigns have become more negative because negative campaigning "works." Unfortunately, the rather amorphous term "works" has yet to be quantified adequately or explained. Does it mean that negative campaigning works all of the time, or only part of the time? If negative campaigning always "worked," then the most negative campaign would always win. It doesn’t. The election years of 1992, 1994, and 1996 are littered with the campaigns of candidates who attacked relentlessly, only to find that in the end it

wasn’t enough. Thus, the conventional wisdom is misleading. Negative campaign strategies, like all strategies, vary according to the circumstances and conditions faced in a campaign. Not every negative campaign is successful, and the most negative campaign does not always win. Instead of saying that "negative campaigning works," it is more accurate to say that negative campaigning "can be a very effective tool." This book will explore the world of political campaigns, with an eye toward understanding the dynamics and rationales behind what the public calls “negative campaigning.” It is taken largely as an article of faith in today’s political environment that to win, a campaign must at least consider the possibility of attacking their opponent. But campaign officials must concern themselves with a number of factors when considering a negative strategy. Previous research in the field of negative campaigning indicates that there

can be quite a bit of risk involved in the use of negative campaign tactics (Garramone 1985, Merritt 1984). A negative tactic that misses the mark, or backfires in some way, can bring disaster.

Therefore, decision makers of a campaign should carefully weigh the circumstances to determine not only if an attack message is appropriate to their particular situation, but they also need to think about the best way to craft such a message and communicate it to voters.

The majority of the research in the field of negative campaigning has been in two areas: political advertising and

Introduction

3

negative voting behavior. In fact, there is a fairly extensive body of research on the practice and the effects of negative political television advertising. 1989; Basil, Schooler,

(Garramone, and Reeves,

1983, 1991)

1984, 1985; Kern, Political scientists,

communications researchers, and advertising specialists have thoroughly studied how and why negative political ads work, which type of negative ads work best, and why some of them backfire. In addition, a significant amount of research has been dedicated to the study of negative voting behavior and negative perception of political

figures

(Lau,

1982,

1984,

1991;

Kernell,

1977;

Koenigs, 1974). A number of efforts from political behavioralists, voting specialists, and psychologists have documented the various types of negative voters, their psychological attachments to negative information, and the subsequent effects of negative voting on the political process. Some of the literature on political negativity has tied these two areas together, explaining the impact of negative advertising on voters and documenting their attitudes and responses to negative political messages. (Jamieson, 1992; Dionne, 1991). However, comparatively little attention has been paid to examining and understanding the decision making processes within political campaigns regarding the use of negative strategies. In fact, a search of the existing literature failed to find any systematic attempt to study the attitudes, priorities, and behavior of political campaign decision makers as they plot campaign strategy and weigh the value of negative political tactics and media. The expertise of professional campaign managers and political consultants represents a virtually untapped resource in the study Through examining the attitudes, of political negativity. preferences, and experiences of political professionals -- men and women whose livelihood, and often their reputations and careers,

depend on the strategic and tactical decisions they make in political campaigns -- we can obtain an insight into negative campaigning that has not been brought forth in previous research.

4

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

Research Questions

In gathering material for this book, I was interested in learning how political consultants plan and direct attacks on the opposition. I was also interested in the research that went into those decisions, and what factors are weighed in planning a strategy. Very often, decisions about attacking the opponent are judgment calls, which depend heavily on the experience and savvy of the campaign’s decision makers, who are increasingly paid political consultants. Also, what are the best types of media with which to attack? Is television always the best solution? When would TV not be the best option? What sorts of media allow you to more narrowly target an audience for an attack that may not be intended for all voters? Additionally, I wanted to know how consultants themselves define negative campaigning. Do they consider attacking a candidate’s family or personal life to be a negative tactic? Or is it negative to make undocumented or questionable charges about an opponent? Where do they draw the line? To find answers to these questions I performed a national survey of political consultants, which provided many of the research findings I will discuss.!! The survey included questionnaires and follow-up interviews with over 300 professional campaign consultants from around the country. The consultants were surveyed using a range of questions pertaining to how negative campaigning should be defined, when and how attacks are launched against an opponent, and what are the most appropriate media to deliver attack messages under varying circumstances. _ The Plan of the Book

This book is a combination of academic research, observation, and case study. I will begin by exploring some of the dominant

theories and perspectives on the uses of negative campaigning. will then review and discuss attack strategies that have been

I

Introduction

5

successful in the past. Why were they successful? Which types were not as successful? Many of the most effective and most memorable attack advertisements on television have been the humorous ones. Many campaign professionals believe that an attack on an opponent couched in a humorous context will get the message through, be remembered longer, and provide the least amount of public backlash to the attacking candidate. Some of the more famous humorous attack ads will be examined and discussed. Then the question of competing definitions of negative campaigning will be considered. What does it mean to go negative? How do the views of professional consultants differ from the views of reporters and voters? Results from the national

survey of political consultants will document their attitudes and opinions. What are some implications of how consultants define negative campaigning? Next, campaign decision making will be examined. How does a campaign decide if/when to go on the attack? What factors are considered? How much consideration is given to backlash from voters? What types of attacks are most effective for different situations? A campaign that goes after their opponent must decide how to communicate the attack message.

How does an attack strategy

affect a campaign’s use of media? What media should be used to deliver a negative message? Television? Mail? What determines which medium will be used? Finally, in order to put the research findings into perspective, three case studies will be presented that examine specific instances of campaigns that used negative attacks. I will discuss why they used them, how they used them, and how successful they were.

Notes

i Thomas “Doc” Sweitzer, “Kill or Be Killed: Military Strategies Can Help Win Campaigns,” Campaigns and Elections, September 1996

6

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

" See the appendix for a detailed description of the survey design and methodology.

Chapter 2

The Negative Campaign Professional political consultants will refrain from personal attacks on candidates, pledge not to disseminate false or misleading information, and document any criticisms against an opponent.

- Code of Ethics American Association of Political Consultants

The main purpose of this chapter is to review the research literature pertinent to the main research questions posed at the end of Chapter One. In doing so, it is useful to briefly review the research on negative political behavior and political advertising from the 1960s to the 1990s. This research is important because it generated the concepts and defined the issues that were to become the basis of current studies of negative campaigning.

Negative Political Behavior

Although negative voting has always existed to some degree and political campaigns have used negative tactics, systematic indepth studies of negativity in political behavior have been rare.

8

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

Until the 1970s, negative political forces and reactions were only hinted at. For example, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes

(1960) suggested that variations in electoral outcomes can be explained by "a negative public reaction to the record of the party in power." (p. 554) Various studies, such as Mueller (1973) and Bloom and Price (1975), attempted to link the electoral success of incumbent presidents with changes in economic conditions, but with limited degrees of success. The first in-depth study of negativity in political behavior was performed by Samuel Kernell (1977). In an alternative to the more traditional "surge and decline" model of off-year congressional voting, in which the president's party gains seats in

presidential election years and loses seats in mid-term elections, Kernell posits that the determining factor is a negative one, namely that the incumbent party can be hurt more by its supporters who disapprove of the job the president is doing than it can be helped by partisans of the other party who approve of his job performance (Kernell, 1977, p. 52). Is negative information more powerful than positive information? Some of the most extensive research on political negativity has been performed by Richard Lau (1982, 1984, 1992). Lau defines negativity as "the tendency for negative information to have more weight than equally extreme or equally likely positive information in various impression-formation or cognitive processing tasks" (1982, p. 355). He documents social and psychological research which indicates that negative traitdescriptions are more influential than comparable positive-trait descriptions (Anderson, 1965; Hamilton and Zanna, 1972; Koenigs, 1974). Similarly, negative first impressions are more . resistant to change than positive first impressions (Beigel, 1973; Richey, McClelland and Shimkunis, 1967).

Lau provides evidence for more than one type of negativity in political perception. First, he illustrates negativity as a consequence of evaluation by extending Kernell's analyses to the 1974 and 1978 congressional elections. Kernell's model predicts that

turnout,

defection,

reinforcement,

and

candidate

choice

among independents should all be stronger among those who disapprove of the president's job performance than among those

The Negative Campaign

9

who approve of his performance. Using the 1974 and 1978 Michigan elections studies, Lau controls for party identification, because Democrats overall have a greater tendency to defect from their party than do Republicans, which could skew the results if left uncontrolled. In both years the results support the hypothesis that respondents who disapprove of the president's job performance will vote (to protest the president's activities) in larger numbers than will respondents who approve of the president's performance (1982, p. 357). Thus, the negative motivation is stronger than the positive motivation. Overall, Lau's data indicated support for the negativity hypothesis in nine of twelve possible tests, a record he finds "fairly impressive" (1982, p. 358). Lau utilizes two other studies to perform the "more formidable task" of documenting negativity in the formation of political evaluations.

The data for these studies came from the 1968, 1972,

and 1980 NES/CPS American National Election Studies. Survey respondents were interviewed twice, once before the election and once after it. Open-ended questions about reasons for voting for and against each major candidate provide relatively accurate and distinct measures of positive and negative information about them, according to Lau (1982, p. 359). One competing explanation for the formation of impressions could be that of "rationalizations" instead of negativity. "Even though the open-ended responses were collected at the beginning

of the pre-election interview...it cannot be determined for certain whether the reasons respondents gave for the vote were the determinants of those decisions or rationalizations generated after the fact" (1982, p. 360). Therefore, Lau's analysis was conducted

in ways that minimize the possibility of rationalization. Lau’s results clearly indicate strong support for the negativity

hypothesis.

In the six regressions in the predecisional sample

(before the vote), the negative information slope is almost twice as large as the comparable positive information slope. In the postdecisional

sample

(after the vote, where

rationalization

is

more of a possibility), the negative information slope is again larger than the positive information slope, although the differences are not as large as in the predecisional sample.

Lau

10

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

concludes that his analyses provides "strong evidence for a negativity effect in the formation of evaluations of presidential candidates" (1982, p. 362). Political Advertising

Before analyzing negativity in political advertisements, it is useful to discuss some of the dominant theories on the general effects of political advertising and the motivations of audience members. How does political advertising affect its viewers? What is effective and what isn't? Is it the same for all viewers? These questions have been studied in some detail since the early 1970s (Atkin et al., 1973; Schwartz, 1973; Garramone, 1983, 1984, 1985; Kern, 1989; and Jamieson, 1992). For example, according to Gina Garramone, "the meaning and

effect of a political advertisement may depend on the audience's motivation to attend to the advertisement" (1983, p. 59). This view, known as the "uses and gratifications" approach, is based on the notion that audience members must be viewed as active

processors rather than passive receivers of media messages. What an audience member brings to a media presentation, or what Garramone (1984) calls his "audience orientation" can be crucial to what he gets from it. One of the general findings of

research in this area is that individuals who view political ads for informational rather than captive audience reasons tend to learn more (Atkin et al., 1973). Garramone suggests that such factors may influence the considerations of a political campaign in deciding what type of content to feature in their political ads. According to Tony Schwartz, one of the pioneers of political advertising, "the real question in political advertising is how to surround the voter with the proper auditory and visual stimuli to evoke the reaction you want for him, i.e., his voting for a specific

candidate" (1973, p. 93). Schwartz asserts that advertising doesn't have to change fixed beliefs or political philosophies to be effective, but merely touch certain feelings or emotions in the voter that will affect his "overt

The Negative Campaign

11

voting behavior" (p. 94). Most political decisions result from an interaction of many feelings and attitudes, often covering a wide spectrum of social beliefs. To Schwartz, television is an ideal medium for bringing to the surface feelings voters already have, and giving these feelings a direction by providing stimuli that may evoke the desired behavior. For the 1964 Lyndon Johnson presidential campaign, Schwartz produced what many people to be the “mother” of all televised attack ads -- the Daisy Girl spot. Pictured is a young girl sitting in a field, picking daisies as she counts them. Then a voice-over begins a count-down to a rocket launch (10-9-8-7-6-...), as the camera zooms closer to the girl’s face. When the announcer gets to zero, the camera has zoomed into the girl’s eyes and we see a nuclear explosion, followed by a mushroom cloud. Then Johnson’s voice is heard: These are the stakes -- to make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die.” An announcer then

says, “Vote for President Johnson on November 3. The stakes are too high for you to stay home.” The target of the Daisy Girl ad was Johnson’s opponent, Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater. The intent was

to

reputation

capitalize as

on

a hawk

public on

apprehension

defense,

and

of Goldwater’s

to remind

people

of

statements Goldwater had made in the past, such as “we ought to lob nuclear weapons in the men’s room of the Kremlin.” Though Goldwater was never mentioned by name, nor did his picture appear, the message was clear -- Barry Goldwater is a threat to world peace, and a threat to your survival -- vote for Johnson!

The Daisy Girl spot was aired only one time -- during CBS’s Monday Night at the Movies. Although it was roundly criticized at the time, it had the desired effect. It got attention, and the message about Goldwater was very clear. What helped get the message across was the fact that the Johnson campaign also ran ads about nuclear weapons that did mention Goldwater by name. The reaction from the Goldwater campaign was outrage, but there was little that could be done -- the ad had aired and the message had been received by the voters.

12

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

The “Daisy Girl” ad for the 1964 Johnson campaign was one of the turning points in American political advertising Courtesy of Tony Schwartz.

The Negative Campaign

13

Most researchers and campaign professionals would agree that the intended effect of “negative,” or attack political advertising is to create negative feelings toward the targeted candidate and/or positive feelings toward the sponsoring candidate. Often, however, this goal produces a tendency to make untruthful or deceptive accusations regarding an opponent, a practice which has drawn considerable criticism. Since political commercials are not regulated as strictly as product advertising, many candidates feel they are able to make fraudulent or misleading charges about an opponent. The practical effects of this type of unethical campaigning tend to reinforce the general public's conception of the political process as unsavory and self-serving. The Boomerang Effect

To a political campaign, the real danger in using negative, or attack, campaign tactics is that they may also produce unintended effects, or as Garramone (1984) calls them, "boomerang effects." A strong attack on a candidate, if perceived by the audience as untruthful, undocumented, or in any way unjustified may create more negative feelings toward the sponsor, rather than toward the target. Similarly, an attack perceived as unjustified may generate more positive feelings toward the target. (Garramone, p. 251)

Many studies attest to the dangers of backlash from using negative campaign tactics. These findings contend that the use of negative ads discourages voter participation and induces anger toward the sponsor to the point where "going negative" becomes a highly questionable decision (Basil, Schooler, and Reeves, 1991; Lemert

et al., 1991; and Johnson-Cartee

and Copeland,

1989)

Such findings provide encouragement to opponents of negative advertising. Basil, Schooler, and Reeves (1991) find that the effectiveness of individual ads depends on the emotional valence, or tone, of ads as well as the valence of the surrounding ads. Ads have more

14

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

impact when the valence, of the ad is the same as the surrounding material. They assert that when the ad's valence matches its "This finding is in surroundings, the ad becomes influential. partial accord with spreading activation theories, such as the mood congruency effect, that posit greater attention and processing effort for messages agreeing with an individual's current mood" (p. 258). This suggests that "in order to maximize influence, it is preferable to run positive ads in positive campaigns and contexts, and especially to run negative ads in negative campaigns and contexts." Therefore, "because most television programming and advertising is positive, using positive ads would ensure similar valence with surrounding material" (p. 258). Basil, Schooler, and Reeves conclude that positive ads are more

effective in promoting candidate think a candidate would be a campaigns for either candidate "both" candidates. They suggest demonstration of backlash effects

"liking" and leading people to strong leader, while negative create negative perceptions of these findings provide a further (Garramone, 1984).

Many researchers insist, however, that backlash can be avoided

under the right circumstances. According to Garramone (1985), if the candidate is not identified as the sponsor of a negative commercial, then the intended negative effects of the commercial toward the target may carry more weight. "Independent political action committees sponsoring negative political advertising offer the candidates they help this anonymity advantage. Independent sponsors may contribute the additional benefit of greater credibility" (p. 259). Support for this finding is offered by Kaid and Boydston (1987), who found that ads targeted at certain

Democratic candidates sponsored by NCPAC had the benefit of generating negative attitudes toward the target without causing harsh feelings toward the Republican challengers. These findings generally support the claim that “sponsor and

rebuttal” contribute to the impact of negative advertising on perceptions of the candidates involved and subsequent vote intentions. Independent sponsorship was more effective than candidate sponsorship, resulting in greater intended effects against the targeted candidate and fewer backlash effects against the

_

The Negative Campaign

15

opponent. Rebuttal by the targeted candidate increased backlash against the opponent, but failed to influence perceptions of the target (Garramone, 1985, p. 157). This is an important finding, which supports the quick retaliation strategies in use today by James Carville, Ed Rollins, and others.

Among those who question the effectiveness of negative political ads, one of the most often cited studies was performed by Shayne Merritt (1984). Her study of negative ads in a California senate race raises serious questions about the value of negative advertising, especially when used by a minority party candidate. She found that exposure to negative ads caused negative evaluations of the sponsor and positive evaluations of the opponent among constituents who identify with the opponent's party. She suggests that minority party candidates need a strategy

that will encourage those who identify with the opponent's party to "switch" rather than one that will turn them against the sponsor of the ad. How Effective Are Negative Ads?

Even though some analysts may see negative advertising as a risk, the use of attack ads has not abated, but seems to have increased. Recent elections have featured negative ads at every level of elective office, from President of the United States down to local races. Why? The reason, as most political professionals will tell you, is that negative ads are effective (Moyers, 1984; Nugent, 1987; Sabato, 1981; Pfau and Burgoon, 1989). Newhagen and Reeves (1991) examine the effectiveness of

If success is negative advertising in two different contexts. defined as recognition memory, then negative advertising does increase both the accuracy and speed of visual recognition. If success is defined as "liking," negative ads are judged less favorably than ads with at least some positive material. However, Newhagen and Reeves speculate that the endurance of these two effects are different -- "namely, that the degree of liking may be forgotten while the information is not -- which, in a practical sense, makes negative advertising a good bet" (p. 215).

16

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

Kaid and Sanders (1978) report similar findings. What they call the "sleeper effect" is the finding that memory for a message's content persists, despite initial negative ratings for its source. This reflects the view of most political professionals -- that although people say they dislike negative advertising, it nonetheless effects people's "overt voting behavior," as Schwartz called it (1973). What about Lau's assertion that negative information is more Is this supported by the powerful than positive information? research on negative advertising? Several studies indicate better memory and recall for negative emotional stimuli than for positive emotional stimuli (Friestad and Thorson, 1985; Reeves, Newhagen, et al., 1989; Shapiro and Rieger, 1989). Lang (1991) found this to be especially true for negative political advertising. Her findings "support the notion that negative commercials may lead to greater visual memory, which suggests that important information be placed in the video portion of the commercial" (p.

240). A 1991 study by Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar explored the causal effects of television advertising on citizens' voting behavior. Their findings resulted from a factorial experiment conducted during the 1990 California gubernatorial campaign. The experiment utilized multiple variations of a single campaign ad to create conditions that could test the

persuasiveness of negative ads and determine whether or not they depress voter turnout.

Their political ad varied along three dimensions: sponsor, valence, and issue. The ads were sponsored by either Dianne Feinstein or Pete Wilson; they either promoted the sponsor or attacked the opponent; and they discussed either the environment or crime. The experimental nature of the design was created by manipulating the audio portion of the ads and juxtaposing the candidates, the issues, and the ad content. identical, but had different soundtracks.

The ads were visually

The results were very interesting. Attack ads appear to have what Ansolabehere and Iyengar call a "mediated influence" on turnout (p. 9). Attack ads alone do not seem to discourage voting, but turnout does vary according to source and valence. When

The Negative Campaign

17

Wilson promoted himself 76 percent of the respondents said they

intended to turnout, and when he attacked the figure rose to 84 percent. The reverse was true for Feinstein, suggesting that the audience was more accepting of attack ads from Wilson than from Feinstein (p. 9). The overall pattern of voting preferences indicates that viewers were persuaded by the ads. Feinstein did best when she attacked Wilson on crime, and worst when she was attacked by Wilson on either crime or the environment. Wilson did very well when on the attack. Interestingly, seeing an attack ad from Wilson actually stirs people to vote, but seeing an attack ad from Feinstein depresses turnout. Such a finding has important implications for practitioners of negative advertising and is an important theoretical issue to explore. The lessons of this study, according to Ansolabehere and Iyengar, are ones of “deactivation” and “persuasion.” Overall, attack ads do reduce turnout, and a candidate's support grows whenever voters see one of his or her ads. They conclude that the primary value of negative ads which attack an opponent is not so much to persuade swing voters, as to suppress that opponent’s turnout. The authors reinforce these findings on a much larger scale in their book Going Negative (1996). Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1992) has analyzed the use of negative campaigning from Eisenhower to Bush. She studied the form and style of negative appeals and measured their impact on the

viewing audience and the voting public. Although she finds this sort of electioneering distasteful and believes it is harmful to the voting public, she admits it can be a very effective tactic when used with skill by experienced campaigners. As with most studies on negative campaigning, she focuses on television and the use of advertising and news coverage. As a result of her research, Jamieson asserts that political advertising in general and negative advertising in particular are effective due to television's "multimodal" capabilities (1992, p. 50). Television utilizes the spoken word, print information, sound and pictures to send messages that touch both emotions and intellect through several senses. She also contends that the nature

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

18

of television makes people less able to scrutinize the messages it sends. By flooding us with words, sounds, and images, these stimuli

reduce the time that we have to respond and overload our analytic capacity. With that reduction comes a lessened ability to dispute the offered material, a lessened ability to counterargue. Once these defenses are gone, a persuasive message that might otherwise have been challenged or rejected can slip by. (Jamieson 1992, p. 60)

Montague Kern (1989) also argues that such negative campaign tactics, despite being risky, can be very effective. They can weaken the opponent, whose later messages are therefore not credible. And contrary to the experimental literature that has focused on the possibility that negative advertising has the primary effect of backfiring, the candidate who launches such an attack can win. The primary conditions for this are making sure that the attack is perceived to be fair and that the attacker represents a positive contrast to his opponent. (Kern, p. 139)

Quite contrary to the various research that might suggest turning away from negative political ads, campaign professionals continue to use them, albeit with great caution and consideration,

and always with an eye toward matching circumstances and conditions with the message. Although you have to be very careful, says Peter Fenn, a Democratic

media

consultant,

voters

do

want

to know

the

differences between candidates. “They watch and listen more intently when given information that compares candidates or

proves what they dislike about a candidate,” says Fenn.1 A technique that Fenn’s firm is using more frequently involves the use of video or audio of their opponent saying something that they know voters will reject. One candidate for example, called

for privatizing social security and Medicare -- using the Chile model. More of what candidates are saying is being recorded and showing up in political ads to real effect, says Fenn.

The Negative Campaign

19

Voters are less inclined to believe a quote out of a newspaper -- or out of context -- but actual footage is hard to refute. The future will see more “America’s home videos’ as name-calling will be replaced with VHS tapes. So watch for the person with a microphone or a camera! (Fenn, Campaigns and Elections, February 1997, p. 25)

Hard-Sell and Soft-Sell Ads:

Lessons Learned

What about different types of negative advertisements? How are they similar and how do they differ as far as content and approach? In a content analysis of political attack ads, Kern (1989) found that very few of them were neutral; in other words they did not convey a concept or idea without using a production tone that implied a threat or a value associated with the candidate's issues or character (p. 94). In order to test the proposition that negative advertising carries

value and affect-laden messages that serve a purpose opposite that of positive ads, Kern developed a typology of negative ads so that comparisons could be made about the use of such advertising in different contexts. Reinforcing the findings of Ansolabehere and Iyengar, Kern asserts that the purpose of negative ads in part is to "attempt to sever real or potential bonds of trust between candidate and voter" (p. 94). Kern hypothesizes that two major styles of negative advertising are used: soft-sell and hard-sell. Hard-sell ads use dark colors and threatening voices to create what Kern calls "harsh reality" advertising. "In this advertising, the case that the candidate is different from the voters, and therefore cannot be trusted, is made

in the strongest possible visual and aural fashion. Few light entertainment related appeals are used, and the focus is on a

serious threat to the viewer" (p. 94). Ads developed by NCPAC are good examples, according to Kern. The soft-sell advertisement makes greater use of lighter entertainment values, humor, self-deprecation, storytelling, or the

unexpected turn of events. Kern adds that it might also be argued that there is a category of

20

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning get-em-mad ads, which are designed to stir anger at the intentions of the opponent...Pocketbook issues, sure-fire routes to viewer attention and potential recall, might well be raised in such ads. (Kern, p. 95)

Many consultants now believe that the hard-sell types of ads have outlived their effectiveness.

The

dark tone, music

and

message approach has been around for a decade or so and viewers may be on to it. According to Thomas “Doc” Sweitzer of The Campaign Group, a Democratic media consulting firm, Voters can now tell when they are about to be subjected to a negative ad from the very first sneer of the voice-over. Their protective shield immediately goes up and the information they

get is viewed with a jaundiced eye." To counter this situation, Sweitzer and The Campaign Group used a more subtle approach in 1996 and tried to present negative information in ads that didn’t look negative. In one campaign they were able to move 35 points in the polls using comparative ads that were very tough, but because of their soft-sell design, copy, and tone, voters didn’t perceive them to be unfair, or even negative. Other consultants are catching on too. Some of the most brilliantly conceived attack ads in recent memory were produced for President Clinton’s 1996 re-election campaign by the media consulting firm of Squier, Knapp, and Ochs. The campaign spots for both Clinton and Dole were pointedly negative, as most ads in presidential campaigns have been for most of the last 30 years. An important difference, though, was that the 1996 Clinton ads . didn’t seem negative. Far from the dark, dour tones of hard-sell ads, most of them featured an upbeat, positive tone -- but the messages were still negative. The copy of the ad or the announcer’s statements criticized Bob Dole, but the attacks were couched in a context of positive visual images. One of the best was a spot called “Parents,” which was an ad that warned voters of the effects Dole’s budget proposals would have on families. The ad features a Texas couple speaking about

The Negative Campaign

the death of their daughter, whose picture is then shown.

oh

A

female announcer then says: “President Clinton signed the Family and Medical Leave law so parents can be with a sick child and not

lose their job.” As a black and white photo of Dole appears, the announcer

continues:

“Bob

Dole led a six year fight against

family leave.” The ad closes with a shot of President Clinton sitting beside a little girl in a wheelchair. In essence, Squier’s firm found a way to attack Bob Dole that was almost unidentifiable

as an attack ad.

Alex Castellanos, Bob Dole’s

media consultant, calls the ad “state of the art...the negative ad of the future.” Deciding to Go Negative

The above research makes it clear that determining the effectiveness of negative advertising depends on a number of factors. There are times when negative strategies are clearly called for, and yet other times when going negative is a highstakes gamble. Therefore, a campaign must carefully consider the circumstances it faces and weigh the costs and benefits of using negative tactics. Basil, Schooler, and Reeves (1991) suggest that as the frequency and intensity of negative campaigning have increased, questions regarding the “strategy” of going negative have become "increasingly germane" (p. 259). Questions about campaign decision making and the strategy of attack have rarely been the subject of academic interest. Unlike the literature on negative political advertising, there is comparatively little research on the types of calculations made during a political campaign, as strategic decisions are made regarding the use of negative tactics. The literature that is available focuses on the practical, not the For example, in defense of negative advertising, theoretical. political consultant John Nugent (1987) has this advice for

campaign managers: - Avoid personal attacks.

opponent’s record.

Instead, emphasize the issues or your

22

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning Vague Use focused, not fuzzy challenges. - Be specific. challenges carry less impact than pointed ones. - Be relevant. Some charges are so peripheral they miss the mark and boomerang. (Nugent, p. 48)

Nugent states unequivocally that "negative campaigns work. They are easier to mount, often cheaper to produce, and they can undo more expensive positive campaigns" (p. 49). He asserts that because negative appeals are oversimplified, they are easier to recall and are more effective in converting the undecided than positive appeals. In order to improve the image of negative campaigns, Nugent urges campaigns to stop using the term "negative advertising." He suggests a more neutral term, such as "comparative ads" or "contrast ads." He also believes campaigns should respond to critics. "For example, to the charge that political ads debase the issues, why not counter that by opening up the issues we set the terms of the debate? To journalists who say we are negative, ask why they report mostly negative news?" (p. 49). Polls Drive Strategy

In such a highly charged political atmosphere, campaign managers must exercise caution. They must also have a feel for what concerns the public and where the emotional boundaries lay. For this information they rely on market research: focus groups and tracking polls. Research allows a campaign to gauge the

public's attitudes and determine if negative strategies and tactics are appropriate for their particular situation. As Bruce Felknor (1992) put it, every politician regards "going © negative" as a dangerous tactic, susceptible of calamitous backfiring if it goes wrong, that is, if it is perceived as overkill, untrue, unfair, too cruel, or gratuitous.

The clever ones chart their course in these treacherous waters with great care and, usually, no little anxiety. The compass that successful campaign managers use to .navigate modern campaigns, positive and negative, comes, like focus groups, from

The Negative Campaign

23

marketing: the tracking poll, a small but highly representative polling sample, meticulously selected with the right demographics to reflect the whole electorate. (Felknor, p. 38)

According to Richard Armstrong (1988), polling is used to determine how people feel about candidates and issues, and "why" they feel that way. "Armed with that information, the campaign strategist formulates messages that will fortify the soft-favorables, persuade the undecided, and convince the soft-opposed" (Armstrong, p. 235). Polling data can tell a campaign what kind of mood the electorate is in, what kind of messages will be favorably received, and how previous messages effected their candidate's support. Often, this kind of information can help a campaign evaluate the relative worth of "going negative." Tracking polls are essential to a campaign because they provide current data on the success of the candidate's messages and his level of support among the voting public. A candidate whose tracking polls indicate his support is slipping or stagnant might want to alter the campaign strategy, which could lead to the use of attacks on the opponent. Likewise, poll data that indicate strong support for a candidate might lead him to shy away from negative tactics.

Notes

i “T essons Learned,” Campaigns and Elections, February 1997.

ii “T essons Learned,” Campaigns and Elections, February 1997. iii Joe Klein, “The Limits of Negativity,” Newsweek, 9/23/96.

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Chapter 3

Successful Attack Strategies He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. - Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Jamieson (1992) provides a fairly comprehensive analysis of the strategies of political attack, why they work, and why they fail. She identifies the risks and the rewards of varying types of attacks, which directly relates to the kinds of calculations that must be made by political managers in determining whether negative tactics are appropriate for their campaign. In adopting negative strategies, a campaign embarks on a delicate balancing act. The goal of attacks should be to drive

down the opponent’s support, while avoiding a serious backlash that could harm the attacking campaign. Not all campaigns are able to accomplish this. There are a number of tactics that history and research have proven successful, however, and some of them are discussed below.

Apposition

Campaigns try to draw a contrast between their candidate and They make their candidate a synonym for the opponent.

26

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

everything that is good and transform the opponent into an antonym for those values. Or, as Jamieson puts it, "Decency Corrupt political versus debauchery. Loyalty versus treason. insiders against honest citizen outsiders...After associating one's candidate with good and the opponent with evil, all a campaign has left to do is remind voters of the resulting contrasts" (1992, p. 47). The trick is to do so in a way that resonates with the public. Under the right circumstances, such uses of "apposition" can be quite effective. For example, in Jesse Helms's first U.S. Senate campaign in 1972 his slogan was, "He's one of us." The implied message was that his opponent was "not one of us," which played on the racial anxieties of the majority-white electorate. This set the tone not only for that campaign, but for all of Helms's subsequent reelection efforts (Jamieson, p. 66). Similarly, the 1988 presidential campaign of George Bush attacked Michael Dukakis as being somehow different, and adverse to the values of most Americans. The revolving door ad criticizing Dukakis' prison furlough program, combined with the independently produced ad featuring Willie Horton convinced many Americans that Dukakis was soft on criminals, and did not share the concerns of most Americans toward punishing violent crime. The Bush campaign also attacked Dukakis as unpatriotic for opposing a Massachusetts bill that would return prayer to schools. "What Dukakis mistakenly read as a challenge to the constitutional justification of his action was instead a direct, hardhitting assault on his patriotism" (Jamieson, p. 68). When the Dukakis campaign realized what effect Bush’s ads was having it . was too late.

Veiled Referential Attacks

Often, a campaign will utilize a "veiled attack; one that whispers fears and prejudices privately held but publicly denied" (Jamieson, p. 84). The slogan from the 1972 Helms campaign

Successful Attack Strategies

27

mentioned above would be an example. The value of this tactic is that it gets a certain type of message across to voters, while allowing the candidate "plausible deniability.". Thus, by using double messages, a campaign can attack its opponent without taking responsibility for the message that was received, and therefore, avoid "backlash."

In his 1984 contest against Jim Hunt, Helms successfully used the "us versus them" strategy, but in a way that gave him deniability. Kern (1989) characterizes Helms's strategy as pitting the "mythic moral crusader (Helms) against a variety of evils, represented by Hunt's candidacy" (p. 142). Helms's moral crusade emphasized religion, home, and family, and criticized not only Hunt, but also "outsiders" who would undermine such virtues.

His mythic use of media and his religious policy stances were a crucial mobilizing force for grassroots fundamentalists that ultimately played a key role in turning out thousands of votes for

Helms (Kern, p. 142). Helms's religious posture also allowed him to stay on the moral high ground, even while using blistering negative attacks on his opponent. Helms's negative ads were effective because they attacked the opposition in a visual medium, but in a verbally deniable fashion. By contrast a Hunt direct mail piece accusing Helms of "bigotry" backfired, because the burden of proof was on Hunt. Helms could cite numerous instances of friendships with blacks, and even blacks on his staff. Thus, Helms was able to use "facts" to deflect charges of racism, even though some of his

campaign messages could be construed as double messages, appealing to racial anxieties without explicitly stating them. Kern suggests that Helms's success in attacking while maintaining deniability is built on "Four Commandments" for referential attacks:

1. Use symbols appropriate to the visual media, rather than words, which have specific, identifiable meanings. 2. Remember that each message on television has several audiences. . Uo Stay on the offensive. 4. Never acknowledge a political motivation. (Kern, p. 143)

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

28

Another important element of Helms's strategy was the early use of advertising and attacks on Hunt, which helped Helms to turn what was supposed to be an easy victory for Hunt into a "competitive" race in the eyes of the political community. As Kern states, "When an underdog, in this case Helms, moves to where he is within 10 points, the fund-raising community defines the race as competitive, and money is more readily available" (p. 145). Thus, Helms's status as an “underdog” helped define his strategy -- one of aggressive attacks and early advertising to overcome Hunt's lead in the polls. As suggested earlier, data from tracking polls often affects a campaign's decisions on strategies and tactics. The Helms-Hunt race is a case in point. Hunt's fall in the polls precipitated a switch to a more attack style of campaigning, because the campaign's strategy of staying positive and focusing on the issues was not working. Hunt was forced to respond to Helms's attacks. Jamieson argues that television advertising is particularly effective in communicating "veiled" cues to voters. She uses the 1991 Mabus-Fordice gubernatorial race in Mississippi as an example. Fordice ran an anti-establishment campaign that attacked liberals, welfare abuse, and racial quotas. According to Jamieson, his candidacy gained momentum with his call for mandatory hard labor for prisoners (p. 94). As Jamieson states, One of Fordice’s television ads against the welfare system called for

“workfare, not welfare” and showed a stark still photo of a

black woman holding a baby in her arms. However, the ad also showed a middle-class black woman pushing a shopping cart... The presence of two images of black women in Fordice’s ads immunized him from the challenge that he was explicitly inviting audiences to see blacks as the problem. The availability of both images meant, however, that those disposed to focus on one rather than the other were free to do so. (p. 94)

Fordice won with less than five percent of the black vote and an overwhelming majority of the white vote.

Successful Attack Strategies

29

Jamieson asserts that such attacks will work if a campaign can imply that their opponent rejects the values of the voters, and can convincingly sell that message to the electorate. Such negative messages "gain force by repetition undignified by any invitation to reflect or reformulate. And television's rapidly paced visual telegraphy makes it more difficult to recognize and counter moves that traffic in audience fears and stereotypes" (p. 101).

Successful Attacks Use Facts

Negative oppositional messages, even those that are misleading and visceral, are effective if they contain a high level of "factual content." In fact, Jamieson asserts that good oppositional ads share four characteristics: 1) The stronger the attack, the greater the amount

of factual

content in the ad; 2) The stronger the attack, the more

likely the ad is to cite multiple sources of support including direct quotation of the opposing candidate; 3) The stronger the attack, the greater the likelihood that the claims will be ascribed to some presumably neutral, non-partisan authority such as a newspaper; 4) The amount of factual content is higher in oppositional and engaged ads than in self-promotional ads. (1992, p. 103)

These characteristics hold some important lessons for political managers considering the use of negative tactics. The “quality” of an attack message is very important. In this context, quality means an ad that is credible and relevant -- in a word, effective. One of the lessons of years of televised attack ads and of a good bit of academic research is that a high quality attack ad is one with a high level of factual content.

The importance of factual content is also emphasized in Kern's analysis (1989) of the Helms-Hunt senate race in 1984. Kern believes that one of the significant lessons of 1984 was the

30

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

effectiveness of "quick-response advertising." According to Kern, in the Helms-Hunt contest, "the ads became the race" (p. 138). The Helms campaign was particularly adept at waging a successful, hard-hitting negative advertising campaign. His media advisors put together a series of hard-sell negative harsh reality black and white ads that, according to Kern, "focused on facts and newsprint thrown onto the screen" (p. 138). The idea was to make the ads look like news, and they were successful. A content analysis of the Helms ads revealed that 65 percent replied directly to a Hunt commercial or drew on a current news story. Kern states that the Helms team was also better at finding visuals to use in the ads "that were simply unassailable in proving important points, points which left the Hunt campaign without a viable response" (p. 138). Jamieson believes that in 1988 the Republicans were able to use a number of what she calls "atypical instances" to attack Dukakis and drive down his support. Some have been mentioned -- Willie Horton, Dukakis on prayer, etc. Another involved Boston Harbor. Although, according to Jamieson, Dukakis' overall record on the

environment was much better than Bush's, the Bush campaign was able to capitalize on provocative visuals of the pollutionclotted Boston Harbor to bring into question Dukakis' credibility on environmental issues.

In other words, Bush was able to sneak

right into Dukakis’s back door, which was totally unexpected. According to Jamieson: Where in mid-summer voters perceived that Dukakis had the better environmental record, by election day Bush had all but closed the gap. The lesson: unrepresentative instances dramatized in ads can override the more traditional and abstract cues obtained from party, group endorsements, and past candidate performance. (p. 106)

Successful Attack Strategies

31

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In the Boston Harbor spot of 1988, Bush went to the “backyard” of Michael Dukakis to criticize his environmental record.

Courtesy of the Republican National Committee

31

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

32

But, to campaign professionals, the significance of the Boston Harbor ad is that it “worked.” It worked because it had factual content presented in powerful visuals -- the unsightly pollution of the harbor. That made the charge against Dukakis, and the attack ad, a “high quality message.” If the Republicans did not have at their disposal some quality ammunition -- a polluted Boston Harbor -- an attack on Dukakis's environmental record would have rung hollow, and likely would not even have been attempted. There are numerous examples of lower quality messages, especially

in the

1990s,

used

in attacks

that didn't work,

or

backfired, and probably should not have been used. A campaign management team must consider the circumstances, take into account all available information, and consider their strategy from various points of view, or risk having a tactic backfire. For example, tolerance levels for political attacks can differ a good bit from state to state. An ad that is business as usual in New Jersey might be highly offensive to viewers in Minnesota. As Jamieson notes:

When former Vermont Governor Richard Snelling moved onto the attack in 1986 against Senator Patrick Leahy he produced a backlash because Vermont is not a state accustomed to strong attacks. Leahy’s offended response resonated with voters. (1992, jee

Negative messages that do not contain factual content, or are implausible, outlandish, or unbelievable

backlash.

are very susceptible to

An ad against Senator James

Sasser in 1986 that

featured a Fidel Castro impersonator thanking Sasser for voting to provide assistance to Cuba was simply not plausible to most ~ Tennessee viewers. Nor did Texans take kindly to the unproved allegation that Democratic gubernatorial nominee Ann Richards was a drug abuser. The ad created a clear backlash against the sponsor of the ad. Finally, when the source lacks credibility and the claim is ridiculous, it will not be believed. This was the case with Lyndon LaRouche’s 1976 assertion that “if Jimmy Carter were to be elected on

Successful Attack Strategies

33

November 2, this nation would be committed to thermonuclear

war probably no later than the summer of 1977.” (Jamieson, p. 115)

The lesson here is that attacks that cannot be backed up by facts, or in some way justified, are very risky, and should not be a part of a sound campaign strategy. Jamieson notes that "a backlash can be created against deceptive claims by vigilant, respected civic organizations, reporters, papers, and stations that offer factual, not strategy-based, ad watches" (p. 119). Challengers Should Attack Early and Often

It has long been conventional wisdom that challengers use negative tactics more often than incumbents (Trent and Trent, 1974). This has been true for several reasons. Challengers are normally behind in the polls, therefore think it necessary to attack their opponent to shake up the race. In fact, there are many who would argue that it is not the fact that a candidate is a challenger as much as it is that he is behind in the polls that makes them attack (Felknor, 1992).

Challengers normally proceed from an assumption that if they are to defeat an incumbent, they must give the voters a reason to “fire” him. That invariably means going negative in some way. Incumbents,

on the other hand, often have little to gain from

attacking a challenger -- unless that challenger is closing the gap or if it is already a tight race. Incumbents normally prefer to stay above the fray and run on their record, if they have one. Kern provides an interesting analysis of traditional campaign theory and actual campaign practice as it relates to the use of communication, and specifically advertising, in a challenger's campaign against an entrenched incumbent. In traditional theory, there are four stages of communication fcr a challenger. First is name identification, second is a focus on positioning the candidate as an individual and on the issues, the third is the attack phase, and fourth is a return to positive

advertising.

Failure to focus on developing a positive image

34

Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning

before attacking may lead to the candidate becoming known negatively. In this theory, after you have made your candidate trusted and likable, you can launch a wave of negative attacks in order to give undecided voters a reason to vote against your opponent (Kern, p. 161). Kern tests this theory against the actual campaigns of challengers and finds it lacking. For example, in 1984 Republican challenger Ken MacKenzie attempted to unseat Congressman Phil Sharp of Indiana by relying on the traditional formula outlined above. MacKenzie had some natural advantages. Redistricting had made the district heavily Republican, President Reagan was very popular in the district, and the incumbent was seen as vulnerable. Even with all of these advantages, MacKenzie lost. In retrospect, MacKenzie concluded that a _sharper-edged approach would be more successful in future campaigns. In his race against Sharp he "should have launched an early soft-sell negative attack to break the incumbent's credibility" (Kern, p. 163). Kern points to the 1984 victories of Republicans Pat Swindall of Georgia and Howard Coble of North Carolina as examples of challengers effectively utilizing early negative advertising and flooding the airwaves to control the message agenda (p. 200). Swindall's campaign tied the opponent, incumbent Democrat Elliot Levitas, to the national Democratic party and the presidential ticket of Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. A series of attack spots running in September and early October linked Levitas's voting record with Ferraro's, specifically, support for higher taxes. These and other attacks by the Swindall team threw Levitas off balance and created a boon for Swindall's fundraising efforts. In the end, it was Swindall who defined the issues in the race and whose messages dominated the media coverage of the campaign (Kern, p. 191). Thus, in contrast to traditional theory, which delays the use of

attack, Kern finds that a challenger's incumbent are better if the attacks come to play a role in setting the campaign issues. Kern believes this strategy is effective

chances of unseating an early, which allows him agenda and defining the

because:

Successful Attack Strategies

2B)

in stage one of a race, it is necessary to gain the attention of the press in a fashion that will greatly amplify the effect of a small amount of money actually spent on the ads. This can greatly facilitate fund-raising efforts. Also, such early advertising can make a race competitive by raising viewer consciousness of the fact that there is a contest that presents a clear electoral choice. Further, if unanswered, it can take on a life of its own. (p. 203)

Challengers are usually in the position of having to rely on negative campaigning in order to overcome the incumbent's advantages in name recognition and fundraising. As Kern indicates, the use of negative advertising is higher among challengers than incumbents (p. 176). This is because, as Felknor states,

the advantages of incumbency in any modern, highly valued, elective office pose great obstacles to the challenger...without attention-grabbing, cogent, memorable, negative campaigning, almost no challenger can hope to win unless the incumbent has just been found guilty of a heinous crime. (1992, p. 29)

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