Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa: The Institutional Imperative 9781685858957

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgments
List of Acronyms
1 The Challenge of Structural Adjustment
2 Ghana: Capacity Building for Policy Change
3 Nigeria: Civil Service Reform and Development
4 Zambia: Form Versus Substance in the One-Party State
5 Tanzania: Moving Beyond the One-Party State
6 Kenya: Contextual Factors and the Policy Process
7 Botswana: Confronting the Realities of Capacity Building
8 Sustainable Policies, Management Capacity, and Institutional Development
9 Improving Management Performance in Africa: Collaborative Intervention Models
10 Institutional Development Revisited
Index
About the Editors and Contributors
About the Book

Citation preview

Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa

A Project of the USA Institut International des Sciences Administratives ILAS International Institute of Administrative Sciences

Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

edited by Louis A. Picard and Michele Garrity

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & L o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Policy reform for sustainable development in Africa : the institutional imperative / edited by Louis A. Picard and Michele Garrity. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-449-5 (alk. paper) 1. Structural adjustment (Economic policy)—Africa—Case studies. 2. Sustainable development—Africa—Case studies. 3. Africa— Politics and government—1960—Case studies. I. Picard, Louis A. II. Canity, Michele, 1951HC800.P634 1993 338.96—dc20 93-14601 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements (Q) of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Foreword. Turkia Ould Daddah Acknowledgments List of Acronyms

1

The Challenge of Structural Adjustment Louis A. Picard

2

Ghana: Capacity Building for Policy Change H. Akuoko-Frimpong

3

Nigeria: Civil Service Reform and Development Ah D. Yahaya and Ason Bur

4

Zambia: Form Versus Substance in the One-Party State Galian F. Lungu and Mulenga C. Bwalya

5

Tanzania: Moving Beyond the One-Party State Rwekaza S. Mukandala and William Shellukindo

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Kenya: Contextual Factors and the Policy Process Walter 0. Oyugi

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Botswana: Confronting the Realities of Capacity Building Keshav C. Sharma and Elvidge G. M. Mhlauli

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8

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CONTENTS

Sustainable Policies, Management Capacity, and Institutional Development Louis A. Picard, Athumani J. Liviga, and, Michele Garrity Improving Management Performance in Africa: Collaborative Intervention Models Louis A. Picard and Michele Garrity

113

127

10 Institutional Development Revisited Michele Garrity and Louis A. Picard

151

Index About the Editors and Contributors About the Book

169 181 183

Foreword Turkia Ould Daddah

Capacity building for policy change and sustainability is a subject now seriously confronting most Third World countries, as well as the organizations and agencies engaged in bilateral and multilateral development aid. This is one reason the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (HAS) believed it would be worthwhile to bring together African academics and high-ranking civil servants to work, reflect, and exchange their views on this matter. Moreover, IIAS believes that the experience of these Africans in positions of responsibility and their knowledge of national realities enables them to provide information and ideas to political decisionmakers, senior managers, and international donors in the field of institutional development. IIAS's main concern is to help improve the provision of g o v e r n m e n t services, both nationally a n d internationally, by supporting a comparative study of administrative p h e n o m e n a . The leadership of the institute believes that we are living in an era d o m i n a t e d by challenges of a global magnitude. Administrators cannot afford to ignore these challenges; rather, they must adapt to them by adjusting their structures and procedures. T h e views of the African contributors expressed in this book as well as Louis A. Picard and Michele Garrity's analyses are not meant to be an exhaustive study of all facets of institutional capacity vis-a-vis change and support for public policies. However, the contributors unanimously recognize that the solutions and their implementation will not stem from reforms confined to their administrative and technical aspects, or by taking a solely economic and financial approach. We now know that the administrative and technical vii

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FOREWORD

approach e r r e d by advocating abstract standards of efficiency designed for economic, social, and cultural conditions that are not reflective of African countries. Structural adjustment programs, with their emphasis on the macro aspects of economic policy, have often ignored the administrative aspects of policy reform. The readers may judge for themselves the results of this dialogue between academics and top-ranking African civil servants on an issue whose importance is widely recognized, and where the stakes concern every African state and the international community at large. I extend warm thanks to Louis A. Picard, who put his knowledge and expertise at the disposal of IIAS for a working group oriented toward action. I also want to thank the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) for agreeing to support and work with IIAS, thus allowing IIAS to benefit from their wide experience in Africa. Many thanks also to the Commonwealth Secretariat, which gave financial backing to this workshop intended to be an African contribution to the institutional development of the countries concerned. Turkia Ould Daddah Director General International Institute of Administrative Sciences

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to express their appreciation for the support given to them in this project by Carlos Almada and Turkia Ould Daddah, former and current directors general of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), Brussels, Belgium. The workshop in Arusha, Tanzania, was cosponsored by the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), then under the able directorship of Gelase Mutahaba, now of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the government of Tanzania. Funding for this project came from the IIAS; the Commonwealth Secretariat; the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM); the AAPAM; the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, the Office of Research, and the University Center for International Studies of the University of Pittsburgh; the American Consortium for International Public Administration; and the government of Tanzania. Our thanks to: Mohan Kaul, director of the Commonwealth Secretariat; Joan Corkery of the European Centre for Development Policy Management; Alfred Zuck, executive director of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration and then president of IIAS; and J e a n n e North, Office of Rural and Institutional Development, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). T h e Implementing Policy Change Project of USAID provided travel support for U.S. participants to the Arusha workshop. T h e following individuals from the government of Tanzania assisted in the organization of the Arusha workshop: Ambassador Paul Rupia, secretary to the cabinet; Joseph A. Rugumyamheto, head of the secretariat; S. H. Kasori, A. H. Milanzi, Stephen ix

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Mkokota, all of the President s Office; and Antipas Mwakila and Santiel S. Mbajo of the Regional Development Office in Arusha. The following people attended the conference a n d / o r assisted in the preparation of the proceedings: Vida Yeboah, Ministry of Education, Accra, Ghana; S. K. Wanjohi, National Management Policy Development Project, Nairobi, Kenya; M. N. Biam, Nigerian Military Government, Makurdi, Nigeria; Markka Kiviniemi, Finnish Technical Assistance Agency; J o a n Corkery, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, Netherlands; Colin Baker, University of Cardiff, UK; Bernard Mulokozi, chair, Civil Service Commission, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; J o a n Mbuya, g o v e r n m e n t of T a n z a n i a ; Pat Isman, USAID; Ben Crosby, Management Systems International, Washington, D.C.; Eric Nelson, Development Alternatives, Washington, D.C.; M u h a m e d Aboud, auditor general, government of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam; Byarugaba E. Foster, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda; a n d L. D. Mpande, Eastern and S o u t h e r n Africa M a n a g e m e n t Institute, Arusha, Tanzania. At HAS, Brussels, we also wish to thank Catherine Bourtembourg, deputy director general, and Francisca Sabbe and Maximin Emagna, research assistants. Our thanks also go to the following people, who helped in the preparation of this manuscript: Karen Jewell, Regan Petrie, Valarie Staats, Maureen Widsgowski, Joyce Valiquette, and Anita Tilford of the University of Pittsburgh, and Rosemarie Sigg and Linda Soisson, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Finally, the editors thank Lynne Rienner and her associates at Lynne Rienner Publishers for their support. Louis A. Picard Michele Garrity

Acronyms

A A P AM ACBI AFRC AFRC ASCON BDC BDP CCM CESAG CIPE DDC DPMC EDI EEC ERP ESAMI FEC GDP GIMPA GOK GTZ IBRD

African Association for Public Administration and Management Africa Capacity Building Initiative Armed Forces Revolution Council (Ghana) Armed Forces Ruling Council (Nigeria) Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Botswana Development Corporation Botswana Democratic Party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania) Centre Africain D'Etudes Supérieures en Gestion (Senegal) Center for International Private Enterprise District Development Committee (Kenya) Development Program Management Center (U.S.) Economic Development Institute (World Bank) European Economic Community Economic Recovery Program (Ghana) Eastern and Southern African Management Institute Federal Executive Council (Nigeria) gross domestic product Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration Government of Kenya German Technical Cooperation International Bank for Reconstruction and Development xi

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ACRONYMS

IDM HAS ILO IMF IMTC INCAE KANU LDCs LGSM MADREC MAN MDPI MRU MSD NAFTA NASPAA NCDP NEC NEMIC NGOs NICs NIPSS NLC NRC OMS&T PACC PARDIC

PNDC PNP PP PVO RFP RTC SADC SADCC

Institute of Development Management International Institute of Administrative Sciences International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (Tanzania) Central American Institute of Business Kenya African National Union less developed countries Local Government Service Management (Botswana) Management Development Resource Center Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria Management Development and Productivity Institute (Ghana) Management Resource Unit Mechanical Services Department (Zambia) North American Free Trade Agreement National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration National Commission for Development Planning (Zambia) National Executive Committee (Tanzania) National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Advisory Board (Botswana) nongovernmental organizations newly industrializing countries National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (Nigeria) National Liberation Council (Ghana) National Redemption Council (Ghana) Office of Management Services and Training (Nigeria) Policy Analysis and Coordination Center (Ghana) Public Administration Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementation Committee (Ghana) Provisional National Defence Council (Ghana) People's National Party (Ghana) Progress Party (Ghana) private voluntary organization request for proposal Regional Training Council Southern African Development Council Southern African Development Coordination Conference

ACRONYMS

SAPAM SMC SOEs SRBC UBLS UBS ULGS UNDF UNEDIL UNESCO UNIP USAID ZIMCO

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Special Action Programme in Administration and Management (UN) Supreme Military Council (Ghana) state-owned enterprises SADCC Regional Business Council University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland University of Botswana and Swaziland Unified Local Government Service (Botswana) United Nations Development Programme UNDP/EDI/ILO project United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation United National Independence Party (Zambia) United States Agency for International Development Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation

1 The Challenge of Structural Adjustment Louis A. Picard

In the wake of the transformation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, many governments t h r o u g h o u t the world are in various stages of economic and political transition. 1 For the less developed countries (LDCs), the hallmarks of this transition include a more prominent role for the market in economic development and a shift from highly centralized government to greater autonomy for intermediate and primary units of government. In Western Europe and North America, the transition is characterized by historical agreements to promote greater economic integration, such as the Maastricht Treaty and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although the economic dimensions of these efforts are fairly easy to discern—increased output, improved products and services, reduced trade barriers, competitive prices, higher and improved standards of living—the political dimensions of the transition are far f r o m clear. Particularly in the less developed countries, the movement to privatize large sections of the economy and to decentralize government functions has produced lingering questions about the fundamental nature of the developmental state and the appropriate role for the state in a pluralistic, decentralized, marketoriented economy. 2 Mounting evidence from the Asian "tigers" and the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Latin America strongly suggests that the state has played a m o r e active role in the development process than was previously recognized. 3 This evidence has been f u r t h e r buttressed by recent case studies f r o m the industrialized countries emphasizing the high-profile role of the state in the economic success of Japan and Germany. 4 Clearly, "getting prices right" and the "free" and "unhindered" 1

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flow of goods a n d services within a n d between countries is proving to b e m o r e d i f f i c u l t t h a n was o n c e a n t i c i p a t e d . As time a n d experiences accumulate, e c o n o m i c "miracles" are b e i n g increasingly u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of an interwoven series of complex activities carried out by both the public sector a n d the private sector. Further, u n d e r l y i n g these activities is a s h a r e d set of values, attitudes, a n d a s s u m p t i o n s that reflect national c h a r a c t e r traits a n d beliefs, t h e political will to a c c o m p l i s h difficult objectives, a belief in t h e legitimacy of those c h a r g e d with the n a t i o n ' s d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d , a m o n g t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c , a w i d e s p r e a d trust in t h e i r c h o s e n leadership. Such intangibles imply t h e r e is m u c h m o r e to the d e v e l o p m e n t process t h a n m e r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the best "mix" of trade- a n d investment-related policies, establishing the o p t i m u m e x c h a n g e rate, a n d r e d u c i n g d e b t - r a t i o levels. At issue a r e also q u e s t i o n s of g o v e r n a n c e involving d e g r e e s of o p e n n e s s , levels of transparency, a n d accountability; a d e f i n i t i o n of roles for t h e public a n d private sectors in the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process; a n d the a p p r o p r i a t e legal a n d institutional f r a m e w o r k for the p l a n n i n g , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , a n d m o n i t o r i n g of policy decisions.

Structural Adjustment Programs In the years since 1979, the most c o m m o n a p p r o a c h to assisting LDCs e n c o u n t e r i n g serious m a c r o e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s has been t h e structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m , a d m i n i s t e r e d by the International M o n e t a r y F u n d (IMF). As a r e s p o n s e to a widespread excess of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n d e b t e d n e s s , the IMF o f t e n f o u n d itself in t h e position of having to institute quick a n d effective remedies to satisfy a c o u n t r y ' s c r e d i t o r s a n d to i m m e d i a t e l y stabilize the d e b t o r country's economy. IMF activities of this n a t u r e quickly resulted in an off-the-shelf package of fiscal a n d m o n e t a r y measures that were routinely i m p l e m e n t e d in o n e country after a n o t h e r with little regard f o r country-specific n o n e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s . 5 Two r e g i o n s in particular were most heavily hit by excess d e b t problems: Africa— where countries are characterized by high levels of d e p e n d e n c e o n public f u n d s f r o m d o n o r countries; a n d Latin America—where d e b t was largely accumulated t h r o u g h private financial markets. 6 In Africa, g o v e r n m e n t s have b e e n o p e r a t i n g u n d e r strict structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s for almost ten years. Similar to the Latin A m e r i c a n e x p e r i e n c e , these p r o g r a m s have consisted of two main c o m p o n e n t s : stabilization policies a n d policy r e f o r m efforts. Stabilization e f f o r t s to r e d u c e t h e c u r r e n t a c c o u n t b a l a n c e a n d

THE CHALLENGE OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

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facilitate e x p o r t t r a d e necessitated b r i d g i n g loans f r o m t h e IMF to a d d r e s s t h e i m m e d i a t e d o m e s t i c n e e d s of d e b t m a n a g e m e n t . F u r t h e r stabilization r e q u i r e m e n t s i n c l u d e d r e d u c t i o n s in d o m e s t i c a b s o r p t i o n ; e x c h a n g e rate devaluations; r e d u c t i o n of t r a d e barriers; a n d t h e lifting of f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t barriers. 7 D e s i g n e d primarily f o r s h o r t - r u n exigencies, stabilization policies f o c u s e d o n t h e i m m e d i a t e r e d u c t i o n of a g g r e g a t e d e m a n d t h r o u g h m a c r o e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t c o n s i s t i n g of Fiscal a n d m o n e t a r y m e a s u r e s , a n d o f t e n a c c o m p a n i e d by d e v a l u a t i o n . 8 Policy r e f o r m b e c a m e t h e p r e r o g a t i v e of the W o r l d Bank, with long-term structural t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y as its m a i n goal. W o r k i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n with t h e IMF, l o a n s w e r e " c o n d i t i o n a l " u p o n t h e d e b t o r c o u n t r i e s a g r e e i n g to carry o u t s u c h r e f o r m s as r e d u c i n g t h e size of g o v e r n m e n t a n d r e d u c i n g its i m p a c t o n t h e m a r k e t place. 9

Public Sector Capacity and Sustainability Issues W o r k i n g within a s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t - i n d u c e d e n v i r o n m e n t , m a n y p r a c t i t i o n e r s have b e c o m e a w a r e of t h e d e m a n d s t h a t s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t m a k e s o n p u b l i c s e c t o r c a p a b i l i t y . In p a r t i c u l a r , s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s r e q u i r e t h e state to be effective in t h e a r e a s of p r i c i n g a n d t r a d e policies; b a n k i n g a n d finance; e c o n o m i c m o n i t o r i n g a n d d a t a analysis; p l a n n i n g ; a n d policy f o r m u l a t i o n , i n i t i a t i o n , a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . 1 0 S u c h e f f o r t s at r e f o r m i n g p u b l i c s e c t o r policies s h o u l d f a c i l i t a t e b o t h a s t r o n g private s e c t o r o p e r a t i n g u n d e r m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s a n d a c a p a b l e , t h o u g h n o t necessarily large, p u b l i c s e c t o r c o m m i t t e d to r a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c a n d social growth strategies. 1 1 T h e g e n e r a t i o n of i n f o r m e d a n d o b j e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n to s u p p o r t activity a c r o s s b r o a d a r e a s of t h e e c o n o m y is g r e a t l y d e p e n d e n t , however, u p o n t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t e c h n i c a l staff a r e i n s u l a t e d f r o m legislative, i n t e r b u r e a u c r a t i c , a n d i n t e r e s t g r o u p p r e s s u r e s . 1 2 In s u b - S a h a r a n Africa this i n s u l a t i o n has b e e n difficult to a c c o m p l i s h , a n d t h e issue has b e e n f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by what Nelson has d e s c r i b e d as a "limited analytical capacity to f o r m u l a t e d e t a i l e d a n d realistic a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s to a d j u s t m e n t . " 1 3 As a result, b o t h a b s o l u t e s h o r t a g e s a n d the misuse o r m i s p l a c e m e n t of m a n a g e r i a l a n d t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l has also m e a n t t h a t critical positions are filled by expatriates. Paradoxically, at a t i m e w h e n m o r e t h a n ever is b e i n g e x p e c t e d f r o m t h e public sector, t h e resources of t h e state are severely limited a n d u n d e r m i n e d . W h a t this situation p o r t e n d s f o r the f u t u r e has n o t

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b e e n adequately a d d r e s s e d by e i t h e r African g o v e r n m e n t s or t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o n o r c o m m u n i t y . In short, r a t h e r t h a n w i t h e r i n g away, p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t g o v e r n m e n t s will n e e d a s t r o n g capacity to s u p p o r t d e v e l o p m e n t activities at the national a n d local level, a n d o n e e l e m e n t of the capacity building process will r e q u i r e a m a j o r c h a n g e in the roles of many governmental organizations a n d their staffs. In t h e early 1980s, t h e political d i m e n s i o n of a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s was clearly t h e weak e l e m e n t of t h e d e b t m a n a g e m e n t strategy p u r s u e d by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y . Despite t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over t h e policy process, international organizations h a d little "control over t h e politics of a d j u s t m e n t inside t h e d e b t o r c o u n t r i e s . " 1 4 Yet, as Kahler p o i n t e d out, "politics was critical in d e t e r m i n i n g the b a r g a i n i n g behavior of d e b t o r states." 1 5 R e f o r m strategies in Africa directly c o n f r o n t e d many vested individual a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s w h e r e g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e m a n d a t e d by a d j u s t m e n t a g r e e m e n t s to i m p l e m e n t policy c h a n g e s . F u r t h e r , opposition was as likely to c o m e f r o m political leadership as f r o m public sector employees, all of w h o m h a d a stake in m a i n t a i n i n g existing a r r a n g e m e n t s . As Nelson n o t e d , higher-level civil servants, in p a r t i c u l a r , have f a v o r e d the status q u o , w h e r e many " h o l d extensive interests, personally or t h r o u g h their families, in private enterprises b e n e f i t t i n g f r o m existing a r r a n g e m e n t s . " 1 6 Such o p p o s i t i o n , c o m i n g as it d o e s f r o m within the state, has clearly u n d e r m i n e d policy reform in Africa and has emphasized the n e e d to a d d r e s s t h e politics of a d j u s t m e n t as well as t h e policies of adjustment.

The International Donor Community and Capacity Building T h e factors u n d e r l y i n g Africa's d e b t crisis of the 1980s a n d the problems that c o n t i n u e to plague much of the c o n t i n e n t today are a c o m p l e x b l e n d of d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r a n d influences. African g o v e r n m e n t s as well as the international d o n o r a n d b a n k i n g c o m m u n i t y have all c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e p r e s e n t situation, e i t h e r by act or omission. As m a n y observers of t h e c o n t i n e n t have n o t e d , Africa's capacity to steer its own p a t h , to distill d e v e l o p m e n t objectives, to elaborate plans a n d strategies, a n d to i m p l e m e n t t h e m has n o t d e v e l o p e d sufficiently to m e e t t h e d e m a n d s of t h e d e b t crisis. Decades of technical assistance a n d considerable increases in the n u m b e r s of e d u c a t e d a n d e x p e r i e n c e d Africans has n o t b e e n r e f l e c t e d in t h e e x p a n s i o n of capacity f o r

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effective direction and control over their development. 1 7 T h e absence of adequate institutional structures to deal with external agencies as well as a "top-down" process of governance—often accompanied by a lack of transparency and accountability—have added to the alienation of African governments and their actions from the mass of the population. Development programs a r o u n d the world over the last thirty years have concentrated on the technical aspects of policy content, while the institutional aspects of good governance have been relatively neglected by all parties. Until quite recently, the institutional requirements for formulating, i m p l e m e n t i n g , and maintaining policies received far less attention than the content of the policies. It appears that the basic assumptions and underlying rationale either took capacity for granted or the importance of capacity was not appreciated by the policy experts advising on and f o r m u l a t i n g policy. As a result, the standards of institutional effectiveness and efficiency in administrative and managerial capacity have been declining rather than improving in much of Africa. Structural adjustment programs operating within this context have o f t e n had a negative impact on h u m a n resources and institutional capacity. For example, planning mechanisms have substantially broken down; the capacity to undertake policy analysis studies has not developed in line with the need for such analyses; appropriate information and statistical data bases for planning and policy f o r m u l a t i o n are scarce; serious staff r e c r u i t m e n t and retention problems have arisen; and, finally, there is often an inability to sustain minimal budgets for operational costs. Overall, the evidence suggests that the failure to meet program goals under structural adjustment is related to administrative weakness. Many limitations of structural adjustment policies exist at the level "within bureaucracies themselves and where particular administrative structures and their environments meet." 18 Over and above all of these debilitating factors, there is a glaring lack of institutional structures to deal effectively with external agencies. T h e latter have profoundly affected the capacity of developing countries, in general, to participate on an equal footing in negotiations with the international donor community. Structural adjustment programs, in particular, have been designed almost exclusively by external funding agencies. The general view has been that this situation arose not so much f r o m a lack of capacity in Africa as from a preference on the part of the agencies to f u n d only programs designed by themselves. Indications of a d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h to the structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o c e s s — " s t r u c t u r a l adjustment with a h u m a n face" 1 9 —and the recognized need for a

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c h a n g e in the use of technical assistance are to b e welcomed. T h e aims s h o u l d be, however, to build m o r e c o n f i d e n c e in Africa's capacity to design its own path a n d to s u p p o r t e n d o g e n o u s capacity building as a long-term process. As a new c a d r e of LDC m a n a g e r s emerges a n d m u c h of t h e a t t e n t i o n o n c e given to the public s e c t o r shifts to n o n g o v e r n mental organizations (NGOs), t h e r e is a pressing n e e d to review t h e lessons l e a r n e d f r o m thirty years of technical assistance. An early a r g u m e n t r e m a i n s valid—sustainability r e q u i r e s i n s t i t u tional d e v e l o p m e n t . In a 1989 report, the World Bank linked t h e crisis in sub-Saharan Africa with sustainable growth a n d n o t e d that " b u i l d i n g private sector capacity s h o u l d e x t e n d b e y o n d h e l p i n g c o m m u n i t y associations. Local n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l associations can be drawn into the d e v e l o p m e n t effort as intermediaries. . . . Local c o n s u l t a n t s a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s c o u l d also b e mobilized." 2 0 Policymakers should define the relationship between sustainability a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t . Policy r e f o r m a n d s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p r o v i d e b o t h d o n o r s a n d LDCs with a s e c o n d try at i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t . S u s t a i n a b i l i t y a n d replicability are the keys to a successful strategy for d o n o r - s u p p o r t e d design a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d an on-going assessment process for technical assistance. LDC m a n a g e r s are increasingly c o n c e r n e d to d e v e l o p t h e capacity to i n s u r e t h e sustainability of p r o j e c t a n d p r o g r a m b e n e f i t s b e y o n d t h e limited time h o r i z o n of t h e d o n o r ' s d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t . Increasingly, d o n o r s such as t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) , t h e U.S. Agency for I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development (USAID), and the W o r l d Bank have r e j e c t e d the p r o j e c t m o d e 2 1 a n d see a project as a pilot f o r self-sustaining activity, Financed by host c o u n t r y i n s t i t u t i o n s . 2 2 LDC m a n a g e r s are m o r e likely to see a p r o j e c t as a n i n t e g r a l p a r t of an a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g p r o g r a m . In b o t h scenarios, p r o j e c t d e s i g n e r s n e e d to allow f o r o n g o i n g assessm e n t by b o t h the d o n o r a n d host country officials a n d to provide f o r t h e possibility of r e p l i c a t i o n a f t e r the p r o j e c t e n d s . LDC p r o g r a m m a n a g e r s a r e p a i n f u l l y aware t h a t d o n o r - s p o n s o r e d p r o j e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n s o f t e n d o not yet successfully p u r s u e t h e s e goals. 2 3 O n e of the m o r e successful interventions in postwar institutional d e v e l o p m e n t was that of the Rockefeller Foundation. Much of the f o u n d a t i o n ' s efforts targeted educational and training institutions. F r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o c u s e d u p o n selected p r o g r a m s with clearly d e f i n e d goals. In their university d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m , R o c k e f e l l e r ' s objective was to s t r e n g t h e n

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a few universities in Africa, Asia, and Latin A m e r i c a and to commit significant resources over a medium range o f fifteen to twenty years to ensure that a "critical mass" o f technical assistance was i n t r o d u c e d . 2 4 T h e R o c k e f e l l e r e x p e r i e n c e illustrated the importance o f "going first class" with a high-quality intervention o f highly qualified people. T h e R o c k e f e l l e r model o f the 1970s provides important lessons for institutional development in the 1990s. It has b e e n twenty-five years since d e v e l o p m e n t scholars highlighted the role of institutional development efforts in technical assistance. Although institutions are organizationally based, the c o n c e p t as used here is broader and "refers to rules, norms, and expectations that govern transactions and relations among people." 2 5 Organizations can be easily created, but fitting them into societal patterns is much more difficult. T h o u g h the ideas o f institutional development are not new, t h e r e is a growing realization that post-structural a d j u s t m e n t policies require support for institutional development. 2 6 As M i l t o n E s m a n a n d N o r m a n U p h o f f p o i n t e d o u t , "Governments and international donors . . . c a n n o t confine their efforts to e c o n o m i c policy, i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l investments a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l assistance. I n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t is also an essential c o m p o n e n t . " 2 7 D o n o r intervention to improve m a n a g e m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e will not be sue cessful without a sustained c o m m i t m e n t to institutional develo p m e n t , particularly for those institutions involved in design, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , and training. Moreover, such interventions n e e d to be u n e n c u m b e r e d by unrealistic timebound constraints in the project cycle. As J o n Moris observed, the time s c h e d u l e s p r o v i d e d in d o n o r p r o j e c t d o c u m e n t s are "hopelessly unrealistic." 2 8 T h e UNDP and the World Bank have both decided to shift from project financing to program and subprogram financing so that a longer time frame can be given to the phasing of activities. In the end, institutional development presupposes a satisfactory level of donor a n d / o r national commitment o f resources, a cadre o f LDC administrators who can take control of the technical assistance program, and an institutional capacity for organizations to plan and implement human resource development activities. T h e failure to address these issues will necessitate the continued use o f overseas facilities or the intervention by expatriate technical assistance personnel whose short-term contracts and limited vision are likely to ensure that the intervention will have a project structure rather than a program one.

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Institutional Development for the Future In t h e p a s t , m a n y o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n i t i a t e d internally or with e x t e r n a l assistance have f a i l e d to realize d e v e l o p m e n t objectives and p r o m o t e sustainable change. A m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r to these failed intervention strategies has b e e n the absence of an a d e q u a t e f r a m e w o r k for f o r m u l a t i n g and i m p l e m e n t i n g interventions. M o r e often than not, the institutional implications of an i n t e r v e n t i o n strategy have b e e n n e g l e c t e d , with little o r n o p a r t i c i p a t i o n f r o m k e y g r o u p s o r i n d i v i d u a l s h a v i n g a s t a k e in p o l i c y o u t c o m e s . In e f f e c t , a crisis o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n h a s d e v e l o p e d in m a n y c o u n t r i e s . H a v i n g i g n o r e d a n d / o r f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f s u s t a i n a b l e c h a n g e in A f r i c a , t h e essential institutional f r a m e w o r k of structures, processes, and h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t has b e e n seriously m i s m a n a g e d . Lingering over the landscape of scores of development-oriented p r o g r a m s , s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p o l i c i e s i n c l u d e d , is a d a r k l e g a c y : o f u n d e r d e v e l o p e d a n d f r a g i l e i n s t i t u t i o n s m a r g i n a l , at best, t o t h e policy process; of barely f u n c t i o n i n g systems o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h e r e i n f o r m a t i o n has b e c o m e a s c a r c e r e s o u r c e a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e few; a n d o f a g e n e r a t i o n o f d e m o r a l i z e d , dispirited professionals w h o c a n n o t f u n c t i o n effectively in either the public or private sectors. B o t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s in p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e A f r i c a n states a n d the d y n a m i c s o f d o n o r r e c i p i e n t relationships have h i n d e r e d the d e v e l o p m e n t of an institutional capacity to plan a n d m a n a g e c h a n g e . Most A f r i c a n countries have tended toward a centralized machinery of g o v e r n m e n t . O v e r t h e c o u r s e o f p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e h i s t o r y , this t e n d e n c y has b e e n s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e d y n a m i c s o f d o n o r r e l a t i o n s w h e r e e x t e r n a l a g e n c i e s b y p a s s e d s e c o n d a r y s t r u c t u r e s in f a v o r o f relationships with central authorities. Both ideology and c o n v e n i e n c e d i c t a t e d this p a t t e r n o f t o p - d o w n g o v e r n a n c e a n d c r e a t e d a p o w e r f u l central political a n d administrative elite w h o s e m e m b e r s o f t e n have m o r e contact with external f u n d i n g agencies t h a n with n a t i o n a l s o f t h e i r o w n c o u n t r i e s , b o t h i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e o f g o v e r n m e n t . H e n c e , a p r a c t i c e has e v o l v e d that is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a l a c k o f p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n at all levels a n d t h e i s o l a t i o n o f t h o s e i n v o l v e d in p o l i c y m a k i n g f r o m t h e mass o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . Misconceptions about appropriate national d e v e l o p m e n t strategies as well as t h e a b s e n c e o f will a n d l e g i t i m a c y to p u r s u e c h a n g e h a v e resulted. Sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t requires a domestic capacity for the f o r m u l a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f p o l i c y , a c a p a c i t y that is r o o t e d

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in the society, culture, and history of the country it serves. Although this capacity has long been advocated by development practitioners opposed to the top-down, blueprint approach, 2 9 the impetus for a second look at sustainability issues has arisen with the shift in attention away from government-managed e c o n o m i e s to marketoriented economies. T h e transition process inherent in this shift of o r i e n t a t i o n , resources, power, a n d i n f l u e n c e has raised many complex questions for donors and for the African governments involved. At issue are finding workable solutions to such questions as: What is the nature and role o f the state in a market-oriented economy that will maximize e c o n o m i c growth and development at all levels and a m o n g all sectors o f the economy? What is an appropriate balance between the public and private sectors in pursuit o f e c o n o m i c development? What constitutes appropriate levels o f pluralism and decentralization that will ensure democratic participation and good governance without descending to chaos in underdeveloped societies? What are the appropriate strategies for building implementation and managerial capacity both inside and outside of government? And finally, what overall objectives can donors and African governments pursue to bring about sustainable change? T h e following c h a p t e r s revisit the issue o f s u s t a i n a b l e development and capacity building, employing an action research model with a focus on the dynamics of change. T h e approach emphasizes the practical and empirical evidence from selected African countries, especially the experiences of African researchers and practitioners resident in the countries under examination. T h e i r analyses and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s address sustainable development and capacity building from the perspectives o f public, nongovernmental, and private organizations as well as the views o f external organizations.

Capacity Building for Policy Change and Sustainability Project T h e initial phase o f the project culminating in this book began with a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n by the Development Administration Working Group o f the International Institute o f Administrative Sciences (IIAS) (Brussels, Belgium) for a series of case studies to be carried out in several A n g l o p h o n e and F r a n c o p h o n e countries. 3 0 T h e six countries identified by IIAS in English-speaking Africa were Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana. In each country,

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the working g r o u p selected an academic and a practitioner to research and write the case studies together. The focus of the case studies was on the factors that have led to the sustainability of policy changes and on the impact that policy reform has had on capacity. Each of the research teams was asked to address the following questions during preparation of the case studies: 1. What is the nature of the policymaking/decisionmaking process in your country? 2. Does sustainability have to do with the m a n n e r in which (and the extent to which) institutional implications are taken into consideration at the formulation stage? 3. Are the designs of structures a n d processes of decisionmaking policy within institutions related to success or failure? 4. Are all actors who need to be involved in the process consulted? How? To what e x t e n t is c o n s u l t a t i o n a prerequisite for sustainability? 5. To what extent is the problem of lack of capacity related to issues of human resource development? To what extent is it also a matter of senior decisionmakers not approaching the problem with the broadest concept of "governance" in mind? 6. How can external actors, including donors, contribute effectively to internal capacity building to introduce desired policy changes and make them sustainable? 7. To what extent is the efficiency targeted in structural adjustment programs appropriate for African states? Because of the uniqueness of the countries involved, not all of the above questions could be answered definitively in the case studies. However, the authors did use the framework as a guide to their research. The research was carried out in 1990 and 1991, and had as its goal the identification of the political philosophy and patterns of political change required to achieve economic and social development in Africa during the 1990s. In the next six chapters, the authors present their research findings. Chapter 2 examines Ghana, a country that observers have concluded has i m p l e m e n t e d a successful program of structural adjustment. T h e Ghana case study stresses the linkages between policy capacity and economic reform and the need for a strong, efficient state system. Ghana is now committed to the principles of market mechanisms. This commitment is important for both public management and public policy capacity.

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Ghana initially had an advantage in terms of human resource d e v e l o p m e n t in the 1950s, but lost it through two decades o f political instability and e c o n o m i c collapse. Now the country is b e g i n n i n g to c o m e back economically. Political moves toward democratization have been less conclusive though the country held national elections in 1992. T h e country has also b e e n strongly supported in its efforts by the world financial community, which views Ghana's reforms with favor. In Chapter 3, the authors of the Nigeria case study rcject the unfettered free-market model and argue that t h e r e must be an activist state if development management is to succeed. T h e mixed economy model adopted by Nigeria and other African countries at i n d e p e n d e n c e resulted in the dominant role o f the state in the economy and in society. Initially, the availability of revenue from commodity export earnings permitted considerable progress to be made in the provision of basic infrastructure and social and welfare facilities. This initial success, however, was not sustainable because of the decline in revenue from export earnings and the lack o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l c a p a c i t y within t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r to play a developmental role. T h e failure o f the public sector bureaucracy in Nigeria to measure up to the challenges o f sustainable development started a movement to redefine the role o f the state in national development. In this movement, policy measures were advocated to deal with the c o u n t r y ' s s o c i o e c o n o m i c crisis and to a c h i e v e s u s t a i n a b l e development. T h e policies included reform and rationalization o f the civil service, the commercialization and privatization o f public e n t e r p r i s e s , and o t h e r forms o f e c o n o m i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g and stabilization. Nigeria currently faces two related problems that hinder effective policymaking: a decisionmaking process that depends on cronyism and the purchase of political influence, and, until very recently, the unwillingness o f the military regime to relinquish power to an elected civilian government. International influence on Nigeria's structural adjustment program has been limited by the country's unwillingness to a c c e p t many aspects o f I M F / W o r l d B a n k condi tionality. In Chapter 4, the Zambia case study stresses the importance o f environmental factors on the policy process, such as the pressure for unity u n d e r the Kaunda government, the movement away from the one-party state, and the precarious nature of the Zambian economy. T h e authors discuss the process o f government in an institutional context. T h e r e are three ways o f understanding the policy process and implementation, as identified by these authors. T h e s e include:

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(1) legal constraints and guidelines, (2) institutional structures and prescribed processes, and (3) individual and group behavior. The latter is particularly important. T h e authors are optimistic about the move to pluralism, but caution that donor conditionality in the past resulted in urban riots. They advise that, in the future, donors should use persuasion and slower techniques and be more humane and sensitive to the impact of conditionality on society. The declaration of a state of emergency in Zambia on March 3, 1993, by President Frederick Chiluba suggests that the cautionary warnings of the authors are well taken. In discussing capacity building in Tanzania (Chapter 5), the authors contrast the formal roles of policy institutions with their practical roles. The case study stresses the role of the constitution a n d the ideology of the country, a n d contrasts them with bureaucratic decisionmaking and modes of behavior. The authors argue that the former established rules of the game that could not be carried out. The party was to initiate policy and the government was to implement it. Under this arrangement the government ran into problems and the party leadership was shorn of power. T h e system did not synchronize, and the policy process was unable to meet the needs of society. In explaining what went wrong, the authors cite a lack of public involvement as the key problem. Feedback came only in the form of complaints. The failure of the one-party state eventually led to the transition to a multiparty political system in 1992. Chapter 6 looks at the context of policymaking in Kenya. Taking an institutional approach, the author uses a broad perspective of the context a n d m a n n e r in which public policy formulation a n d implementation takes place in Kenya. Although every policymaking process is influenced by the milieu, the chapter examines three specific environmental factors: (1) the social context and the problem of ethnic considerations in "agenda setting"; (2) politics— the party, legislature, and the executive; and (3) economics. T h e author notes that the ruling party is peripheral and weak; that expatriates continue to have a significant role in the policymaking process; and that political parties as such have had little or no influence on the policymaking process. T h e a u t h o r also notes several bottlenecks, especially those that adversely affect the implementation of development policies. The political and economic crises in Kenya led to severe social and ethnic instability, and controversial multiparty elections were held in 1992. While the situation had stabilized somewhat with the completion of the elections, many of the underlying social and ethnic problems have not been addressed by the government.

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The Botswana chapter (Chapter 7) offers a contrast to the other five case studies in that Botswana has never come under structural a d j u s t m e n t . T h e a u t h o r s stress the country's pragmatism in policymaking and note that Botswana's population is small and that the country has no major ethnic problems. The country's political life is also dominated by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Policymakers in Botswana see themselves as modernizers. Beginning at independence, the private sector has been explicitly emphasized. T h e role of the public sector has always been to support private sector development. Under this arrangement, policy f o r m u l a t i o n lies with the Economic Development Council, a coordinating mechanism the authors find successful. To sustain development, education and training policies have focused on both central and local government, as well as on the private sector. Human resource development remains a critical problem in the public, private, and parastatal sectors, however. T h e failure to address these h u m a n resource problems has the potential to undermine Botswana's capacity to carry out its development goals. Chapter 8 presents a discussion that occurred at a workshop in Arusha, Tanzania, from J u n e 2 to 6, 1991. Jointly organized by the HAS and the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) (Nairobi, Kenya), hosted by the President's Office of the United Republic of Tanzania, and co-sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and the Canadian International Development Agency, the workshop brought together all of the authors of the following chapters to discuss the conceptual issues arising from their research. Four major themes dominated the discussion. First, there needs to be an appropriate balance between public sector and private sector responsibilities f o r social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . Achieving a more proper balance will require an appropriate level of analytical capacity to develop public policies within the context of prevailing market forces and social needs. Second, it is important for societies to be able to move from single centers of decisionmaking (usually within government) to multiple centers of decisionmaking, focusing on efforts that will decentralize government functions and p r o m o t e pluralism. T h e decentralization of public sector decisionmaking should include both intermediate and primary units of government. Efforts to p r o m o t e pluralism should include the development of multiple channels of i n f l u e n c e a n d mechanisms of consultation a n d communication between societal associations and public sector institutions.

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T h i r d , policymakers n e e d to find a p p r o p r i a t e means to strengthen the implementation and management capacity in both the public and private sectors, including nongovernmental and notfor-profit agencies. A successful strategy for development will also include the identification of a p p r o p r i a t e and market-driven development activities, which will target small-scale entrepreneurs in both urban and rural areas. Fourth, sustainability issues are directly linked to the promotion of institutional development. T h e overall objective is to build capacity to design and implement policy change and to successfully manage the transition to a post-structural adjustment phase of development. Moreover, institutional development considerations must inform the activities of the private sector (both profit and notfor-profit) as well as the public sector. Development managers in all spheres must have the capacity to develop organizations a n d personnel appropriate for a diverse set of development-related tasks. An important r e q u i r e m e n t in the training of managers is the teaching of management techniques that emphasize an analytical or creative t h i n k i n g a p p r o a c h to p r o b l e m solving as well as emphasizing the technical aspects of developing s o u n d policy initiatives. In the end, capacity building involves sustainable institutions, placing institutional development at the center of the development process. 31 Chapter 9 examines institutional development within the context of human resource development—the a priori condition necessary for social and economic change. Drawing upon the experiences of four donor-supported institutional development interventions with a strong focus on human resource development, the authors assess what has worked and what has not. They found that institutional development and human resource development were more likely to occur where there was a high level of commitment among donors and host-country officials to develop collaborative models of cooperation. Collaborative a r r a n g e m e n t s may a p p e a r in many forms, but contracting-out, in particular, has several advantages. Based on a learning process model, it offers opportunities for feedback and adjustment. It also addresses important capacity building issues such as accountability and efficiency. In looking toward the future, a more concerted effort to adopt a collaborative approach to donor-supported interventions has the potential to reorder traditional donor-recipient relationships—an important but often overlooked aspect of management development strategies. In conclusion, Chapter 10 draws on the case study experiences in an attempt to compare the findings and synthesize conclusions f r o m the contributors to this project. At issue is the n e e d to

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highlight the various factors and influences that can both hinder and help efforts to promote policy reform and sustainability in Africa. T h e role of the post-structural adjustment state in Africa is in the process of being redefined. Economic reform began the process of redefinition. Political and administrative reform will complete the process. To speculate about the future at this stage is inviting, but foolhardy. Only with minor certainty can we conclude that the poststructural adjustment state in Africa will be less monolithic. T h e forces and influences that reform efforts have set in motion will determine the outcome in each country. For the donor community and Africans in leadership positions, this is an important point for it shifts attention away from final outcomes and macrostrategies to an emphasis on building the capacity of individuals and institutions to meet the demands of change. When emphasis was on public sector development, institutional development never got the attention it deserved, particularly among the donor community. O n e would hope that with the change in emphasis to private sector d e v e l o p m e n t a n d public-private partnerships this error will be corrected. For the foreseeable future, the international donor community can be expected to maintain a significant role in the African development process. The persistent problem of debt, ongoing structural adjustment programs, and the c o m m i t m e n t to policy reform have only reinforced the need for more donor attention to and support for institutional development activities. The contributors to this project have offered a n u m b e r of informative and realistic insights and recommendations that they hope will both interest and inform the policymakers of African governments, the international d o n o r community, and o t h e r interested observers in Africa's pursuit of sustainable development policies. Notes 1. See Ted Carpenter, "The New World Disorder," Foreign Policy (Summer 1991), pp. 24-39, and C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 9 6 112. 2. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 27. 3. Milton J. Esman, Managing Dimensions of Development Perspectives and Strategies (Bridgeport, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1991). 4. J o a n M. Nelson, " I n t r o d u c t i o n : T h e Politics of E c o n o m i c Adjustment in Developing Nations," in Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World, ed. Joan M. Nelson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 12.

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5. Susan George, A Fate Worse Than Debt: The World Financial Crisis and the Poor (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988). 6. Miles Kahler, "Conclusion: Politics and Proposals for Reform," in The Politics of International Debt, ed. Miles Kahler (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 258. See also Charles Lipson, "The International Organization of Third World Debt," in Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective, ed. Robert H. Bates (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 14. 7. George, A Fate Worse than Debt, p. 51. 8. Nelson, "Introduction," p. 4. 9. Charles Lipson, "International Debt and International Institutions," in The Politics of International Debt, ed. Kahler, p. 235. 10. Louis A. Picard and Michele Garrity, "Strategic Intervention and M a n a g e m e n t Effectiveness: T h e P r o g r a m Manager's Perspective" (unpublished paper, January 15, 1992). 11. Joan M. Nelson, "Conclusions," in Economic Crisis, ed. Nelson, p. 347. 12. Nelson, "Introduction," p. 21. 13. Nelson, "Conclusions," p. 334. 14. Miles Kahler, "Politics and International Debt: Explaining the Crisis," in The Politics of International Debt, ed. Kahler, p. 31. 15. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 16. Nelson, "Conclusions," p. 357. 17. See the essays in Economic Restructuring and African Public Administration: Issues, Actions, and Future Choices, ed. M. Jide Balogun and Gelase Mutahaba, (Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1989). 18. J o h n M. Cohen, Merilee S. Grindle, and S. T. Walker, "Policy Space and Systems Research in Donor Led Rural Development," Harvard Institute for International Development Discussion Paper (April 1984), as quoted in Stephan Haggard, "The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility," in The Politics of International Debt, ed. Kahler, p. 184. See also J o a n Nelson, "The Political Economy of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity, and Public Response," in Toward a Political Economy, ed. Bates, pp. 80-130. 19. Giovanni Andrea Cornea, Richard Jolly, and Frances Stewart, Adjustment with a Human Face (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 20. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth—A Long Term Perspective Study (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989), pp. 6-7. 21. UNDP Fifth Country Development Programme (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Development Programme, n. d.), draft. 22. Louise G. White, Creating Opportunities for Change: Approaches to Managing Development Programs (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 6. 23. The problem is not new. In 1962, J o h n Montgomery pointed to what he called "problems of mutuality" in donor-host country relationships. See J o h n D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962). 24. Joseph Black, James S. Coleman, and Laurence D. Stifel, eds., Education and Training for Public Sector Management in the Developing Countries (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, March 1977), pp. 1-6. 25. Louise G. White, Implementing Policy Reforms in LDCs: A Strategy for Designing and Effecting Change (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 7.

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26. White, Implementing Policy Reforms, pp. 6-9. 27. Milton Esman and N o r m a n T. Uphoff, Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 286. 28. J o n R. Moris, Managing Induced Rural Development (Bloomington, Ind.: International Development Institute, 1981), p. 33. 29. See J o n R. Moris, Managing Induced Rural Development; Coralie Bryant a n d Louise G. White, Managing Development in the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); and Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 30. In early 1990, IIAS established a working group on development administration that focused on capacity building for policy change and sustainability. T h e group met in Brussels o n j u n e 14-15, 1990, with a followup meeting in Madrid on November 8-14, 1990. T h e working g r o u p decided to focus on enhancing capacity for development planning, policy formulation, and implementation and on the role that public-private partnerships could play in the development process. IIAS, through the working group, subsequently organized research workshops in Arusha, Tanzania, for Anglophone Africa and in Dakar, Senegal, for Francophone Africa. This book is the result of the Arusha meeting. 31. Esman, Management Dimensions of Development.

2 Ghana: Capacity Building for Policy Change H. Akuoko-Frimpong

A recent study by the World Bank on sub-Saharan Africa has observed that "in the most fundamental sense, development depends on the capacity to initiate, sustain, and accommodate change." 1 The study found, however, that "weak capacity in both [the] public and private sectors is at the very core of Africa's development crisis." 2 Indeed, by the mid-1980s, the development crisis in Africa had been perceived to be a p h e n o m e n o n stemming largely from weak capacity and mismanagement of economic policy at the national level. This situation was exacerbated by damaging international economic events and trends beyond the control of African governments. To overcome the problems, African countries n e e d e d to improve day-to-day economic policymaking. Such an improvement requires "research analysis and policy advice that is country-specific; and this suggests the importance of building u p policy analytic capabilities at the national level."8 Toward this end there is "need for one or more centres of excellence on the continent." 4 At issue is the n e e d to strengthen and e n h a n c e the sustainability of policies through a "strong sense of African ownership" of the policymaking process, which can be accomplished through "first-rate indigenous research and policy design capacity." 5 T h e accumulated experiences and p r o b l e m s with capacity building efforts in Africa resulted in the launching of the Africa Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI) in February 1991. The main aim of the ACBI is to build and strengthen "local capacities in policy analysis and development management in sub-Saharan Africa." 6 The main sponsors of the ACBI are the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the African Development

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Bank. In the context of this case study, the ACBI's operational focus is significant, for it provides a convenient analytical framework for the discussion of the relevant issues on capacity building in Africa, and Ghana in particular. T h e question is: What factors account for the observed problems in Africa? In this case study, an attempt was made to answer the question by a critical examination of the development strategies adopted in Ghana since the 1960s and the extent to which these strategies shaped the government's macroeconomic policies. In this regard, Ghana's efforts to achieve a balance between the public and private sectors of the economy was used to illustrate some of the problems observable in sub-Saharan economies arising f r o m the weak capacity f o r policy analysis and d e v e l o p m e n t management. Lessons f r o m the Ghanaian experience were drawn largely f r o m the country's economic policy reforms and administrative reform initiatives by governments of various political complexions since the 1960s. T h e highlights of these experiences are the implementation of Ghana's Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and the twin policies of ministerial restructuring and decentralization in the 1980s. By focusing on Ghana's economic and administrative reform efforts, I attempted not only to assess the country's widely acclaimed success in the implementation of the ERP but also to critically examine the program for the decentralization of government and the restructuring of ministerial organizations. Through restructuring, the g o v e r n m e n t sought to strengthen the policy coordination capacities that had weakened over the years. 7 The decentralization policy focused on restructuring institutions and processes that would e n h a n c e the participation of p e o p l e at all levels of administration, bringing about greater efficiency and productivity in government. 8 Under the adopted analytical framework, the pertinent issues addressed in the case study included the following: the nature of high-level decisionmaking and the policy process; the relationship between the design of structures and processes of decisionmaking within institutions, and the success or failure of past policy; the institutional implications for policy change and sustainability; the impact of consultation on sustainability of policy change; the problem of inadequate capacity and human resource development; and the role of external actors in internal capacity building for policy change and sustainability. T h e case study also d e m o n s t r a t e d the significance of the following view:

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African governments and the international donor community have all contributed to the present [crisis in Africa] either by act or omission. There has been a relative neglect of the institutional aspects of good governance by all parties. The development programmes [of African countries] of the last thirty years concentrated on technical aspects of policy content. The institutional requirements for formulating, implementing and maintaining these policies did not get the same attention as policy content Either the capacity was taken for granted or its importance was not appreciated by the policy experts advising on and formulating policy.9

T h e significance of this observed p h e n o m e n o n in Africa will become a p p a r e n t f r o m a critical analysis of G h a n a ' s experience in capacity building for policy change and sustainability since the 1960s.

The Economic Policy Framework In G h a n a the available evidence shows "the e x t e n t to which the e c o n o m i c policy framework of each g o v e r n m e n t that has e m e r g e d . . . over the past three decades has shaped the development of both the public and private sectors of the e c o n o m y a n d as a result, d e t e r m i n e d the level of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n toward t h e country's social a n d economic development." 1 0 For instance, the economic policies of the g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g the 1950s attempted to p r o m o t e the development of both the public and private sectors of the economy. This effort occurred d u r i n g a p e r i o d w h e n high-level d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d the policy process d e p e n d e d to a large extent on the technical inputs f r o m a relatively efficient and effective (albeit less d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d ) b u r e a u cracy bequeathed by the British colonial administration. At that time Ghana's capacity for policy change and sustainability was manifested not only by the quality of the policy content but also by the efficiency of t h e structures a n d processes of policy-level d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , implementation, and maintenance that had been created u n d e r the tutelage of technocrats of high caliber. T h e gradual b u i l d u p of capacity in G h a n a in the late 1950s continued into the early 1960s. But f r o m the mid-1960s the relative strength of the bureaucracy in policy analysis a n d d e v e l o p m e n t m a n a g e m e n t was p u t to a severe test. T h e s e years f o u n d t h e Ghanaian e n v i r o n m e n t increasingly characterized by political a n d e c o n o m i c instability, which h a d the effect of not only r e d u c i n g Ghanaian ownership of policy sustainability b u t also marginalizing the value of indigenous institutional requirements f o r formulating, i m p l e m e n t i n g , a n d m a i n t a i n i n g policies. T h e changes in devel-

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opment strategy included the centralization of decisionmaking and the d e p a r t u r e of the remaining colonial technocrats within the bureaucracy. T h e latter were replaced by increasing government d e p e n d e n c e on foreign scholars and experts for economic policy advice. The significance of the period was underlined by the idea that the government of Kwame Nkrumah "broke out of the 'colonial' mould and switched decisively to a socialist strategy. The strategy rejected an o p e n , market-oriented economy and instituted a planned, regulated and centralized economy in which the state was to become the p r e d o m i n a n t economic agent and the pursuit of development was to be given priority." 11 It is i m p o r t a n t to note, however, that the g o v e r n m e n t ' s development strategy during the 1950s and 1960s was not determined primarily by ideology but rather by pragmatism. For instance, in the 1950s President Nkrumah's government had always taken the view that the number of publicly owned commercial enterprises that had been set u p u n d e r the umbrella of the Industrial Development Corporation (established in 1951) should be privatized or sold to private entrepreneurs when they had become viable. 12 As late as 1958, the government established a committee to explore ways of assisting Ghanaian entrepreneurs. However, Nkrumah became increasingly disillusioned with the local private sector and eventually came to believe that there was "little realistic prospect of fostering an indigenous [private] entrepreneurial class capable of industrialising the country at the speed he w a n t e d . " 1 3 In 1960 came the a n n o u n c e m e n t that development efforts would focus on cooperatives r a t h e r than privately owned enterprises, that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would remain publicly owned, and that private enterprise would no longer receive special assistance. 14 The weak capacity of Ghanaian private entrepreneurs to respond positively to the government's economic policies did not, however, weaken the government's confidence in the role of private enterprise in the country's socioeconomic development process. Rather, the government a d o p t e d a pragmatic approach by looking beyond Ghanaian entrepreneurs. This approach was clearly demonstrated in the government's 1965 Annual Plan, which confidently stated that "the policy of e n c o u r a g i n g foreign private investors will be prosecuted with increased vigour." 15 Nkrumah's support for local private enterprise declined in the early 1960s, but he continued to support foreign direct investment, pointing out that "it b r o u g h t in much-needed managerial and technical skills which could be passed on to G h a n a i a n s . " 1 6 Consequently, when the Capital Investment Act of 1963 was passed,

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it offered "a wide range of fiscal and other concessions to would-be [foreign] investors." 17 Within the unfolding development strategy of the government, there were many strings attached to foreign investment. Clearly, the strategy was to structure foreign investment in ways that allowed the state to maintain control over domestic economic activity. 18 Public enterprises and a mixed economy were to become the vehicles for d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e policy u n d e r l i n e d a m a r k e d shift in the government's development strategy from private sector to public sector development. T h e question at this point is: Why did the economic policies of the government fail to make the desired positive and sustainable impact on the growth of Ghana's economy? Was it d u e to weak capacity for policy change and sustainability in the economy at that time? It can be argued that Ghana's bureaucracy in the early 1960s had the capacity to offer policy advice of high quality. This capacity was demonstrated by the work of Ghanaian technocrats at the Planning Commission and the Bank of Ghana. In addition, the government sought and used the advice of p r o m i n e n t foreign economists. 1 9 More significantly, Ghana's 1963 Seven-Year Development Plan had substantial policy inputs f r o m both Ghanaian technocrats and foreign scholars. Hence the view that what Nkrumah was trying to do in the 1960s "was in consonance with the ideas of most [foreign] development economists." 2 0 Given the quality of the content of the government's macroeconomic policies at that time and the support provided by foreign scholars in internal capacity building efforts, it could be f u r t h e r argued that the failure of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s economic policies to make the desired positive and sustainable i m p a c t on the growth of the e c o n o m y s t e m m e d f r o m the marginalization of consultation as a prerequisite for sustainability. Further, it could be argued that policy failures resulted from neglect of the institutional requirements for policy formulation, implementation, and m a i n t e n a n c e , rather than f r o m lack of policy analysis capabilities at the national level. In the latter case, it is noteworthy that most of the Ghanaian technocrats of proven policy analysis capability who helped to shape the economic policies of N k r u m a h ' s g o v e r n m e n t in the early 1960s were r e t a i n e d by subsequent governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s.21 Some have concluded that after the overthrow of N k r u m a h ' s government in February 1966, the military regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) (1966-1969) and the civilian regime of the Progress Party (PP) (1969-1972) r e t u r n e d to a more decentralized, market-oriented economy; and that after 1972, when it appeared that a market approach had failed, the second military

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g o v e r n m e n t (National R e d e m p t i o n Council [ N R C ] / S u p r e m e Military Council [SMC] of 1972-1979) again returned to a command economy. 2 2 T h e reality was that "continuity rather than change was the o u t s t a n d i n g characteristic of policies f r o m 1966 onwards." 2 3 Although policies regarding public enterprises, foreign companies, the promotion of small and medium-sized indigenous enterprises, and foreign investment changed during this time, 24 the significance of the changes related more to implementation and sustainability factors than to policy content or orientation. In particular, these policies were adapted so that more efforts would be directed at e n h a n c i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n , public education, a n d institutional development. 2 5 In fact, during this period "more emphasis was put on the role of the private enterprise, and on the need for efficiency in the [SOEs] sector, less importance was a t t a c h e d to noncommercial objectives, and some state enterprises were returned to the private sector." 2 6 This period also marked the beginning of privatization in Ghana. 2 7 The economic policies pursued by the NRC/SMC (1972-1979) also sought to s t r e n g t h e n the private sector's contribution to Ghana's social and economic development. Nonetheless, a marked increase in the role of the state as an e n t r e p r e n e u r was also observable. T h e state demonstrated increased participation in the economy when it acquired a 55 percent share in a n u m b e r of foreign-owned companies in several sectors of the economy—an act that seemed to support one of the conditions attached to Nkrumah's policy on participation of foreign interests in the economy. In consonance with Ghana's sustained policy of promoting a better balance between the public and private sectors of the economy, the N R C / S M C g o v e r n m e n t enunciated policies aimed at "healthy competition between the public and private enterprises." 28 Although the government's role was maintained in creating an enabling environment "which could stimulate individual initiative and private enterprise," the government also reserved the right "to intervene directly in production to stimulate rapid economic development." 2 9 The NRC/SMC government recognized that the private sector was capable of playing a vital role in Ghana's socioeconomic development efforts. As a result, during the 1975/76-1979/80 Five-Year Development Plan period, the government not only expected the role of the private sector to "increase to a much faster pace so that its contribution to both national output and employment [would] be greater" but also sought to "strengthen the facilities offered by various institutions set up to aid private investors in the economy." 30 Weakened capacity building for policy change and sustainability

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u n d e r m i n e d s o m e of the e c o n o m i c policies of the regimes that e m e r g e d in the country in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. T h e capacity of the central bureaucracy for policy analysis and economic m a n a g e m e n t was clearly stretched, following a d e c a d e of political a n d economic instability. Indeed, by the late 1970s the problem of weak i n s t i t u t i o n a l capacity ( i n c l u d i n g h u m a n r e s o u r c e develo p m e n t ) had to be addressed as a marked decline in the economy became a p p a r e n t . Further, as the economy worsened, many skilled professionals left the country. 3 1 The loss of capable professionals in all sectors of the economy inevitably u n d e r m i n e d t h e country's efforts at capacity building. T h e development of an internal capacity for policy analysis and d e v e l o p m e n t m a n a g e m e n t suffered accordingly. In particular, the research capacity of the country's universities and research institutions markedly declined, largely caused by the exodus of senior m e m b e r s of staff f r o m the country and i n a d e q u a t e f u n d s f o r res e a r c h . For i n s t a n c e , by the mid-1970s t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Economics at the University of Ghana, Legon, "had built u p substantial research a n d training capacity on the strength of about 85 percent of its full staff establishment at post: but by the early 1980s the staff strength at the Department was as low as 21 percent." 3 2 Although the u n f o l d i n g e c o n o m i c policies of t h e N R C / S M C g o v e r n m e n t were largely m a i n t a i n e d by the s u c c e e d i n g civilian People's National Party (PNP) g o v e r n m e n t , 3 3 f i n d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e solutions to the problems in the economy remained elusive until the e m e r g e n c e of the Provisional National D e f e n c e Council (PNDC) g o v e r n m e n t o n D e c e m b e r 31, 1981. T h e PNP g o v e r n m e n t h a d succeeded in enacting the Investment Code of 1981, designed "to o p e n u p the e c o n o m y to u n i n h i b i t e d foreign investment a n d to guarantee the investor the [necessary] incentives." 3 4 This d o c u m e n t provided the economic policy framework f o r the e n a c t m e n t of t h e PNDC g o v e r n m e n t ' s Investment Code of 1985, which has m a d e a significant and positive impact on Ghana's efforts at rebalancing the public and private sectors of the economy. 3 5 T h e extent to which the PNDC government has coped with the problem of capacity building for economic policy change and sustain ability in the 1980s and early 1990s is described below.

Capacity in Policy Analysis and Development Management As n o t e d , G h a n a ' s declining economy a n d t h e unstable political e n v i r o n m e n t h a d a negative impact on institutional a n d h u m a n

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resource development. Ghana's experiences were indicative of conditions in many sub-Saharan countries at the time. A World Bank document noted that "too often in Africa critical public policy issues are inadequately analysed; little relevant and timely research is d o n e by African universities and other centres of policy research; Africa data sources are generally inadequate or unreliable; and high level African officials in key economic ministries are sometimes poorly trained and equipped." 3 6 The World Bank faulted both political and economic factors for the poor state of policy analysis and management development. In the bank's view, the unfavorable political conditions had not "been conducive to the growth or sustenance of independent h u m a n or institutional capacity" and had lowered demand for policy analysis and advice, weakened morale in government ministries, and led to the neglect of educational and research institutions. 37 The financial crisis c o m p o u n d e d the problem as deficit reduction policies led to b u d g e t cuts t h r o u g h o u t the public sector "resulting in serious shortages of f u n d s for research, training, institution building and education in general." 3 8 T h e bank also acknowledged a lack of surprise that expatriates were increasingly being substituted for African managers and administrators, given current conditions. The bank report concluded that such "stop-gap" measures were not the long-term solution to the problem. Rather, it noted that in the long run "there is no substitute for Africa having its own indigenous capacity." 39 Few developing countries had suffered such rapid economic decline between the early 1970s and the early 1980s as Ghana. During the decade Ghana's real GDP "remained almost stagnant with per capita incomes declining at an annual rate of 3.1 per cent." 4 0 Inflation also accelerated rapidly with rates of 100 percent common, and the consumer price index increased at an average of 80 percent per annum from 1975, reaching triple digits in 1981. The rate of acceleration was one of the highest a m o n g developing countries. 41 More significantly, the large reservoir of skilled and trained manpower that characterized Ghana in the late 1960s had been markedly reduced by the early 1980s as a result of a "tremendous exodus" of managerial and professional p e r s o n n e l to o t h e r countries with relatively better living conditions. 42 This exodus had a negative impact on Ghana's efforts at capacity building. By the end of the 1980s, however, G h a n a ' s remarkable success with the management of ERP I and II on a sustainable basis was an outcome of the country's e n h a n c e d capacity f o r policy analysis a n d development management. In large measure the support provided

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by both bilateral and multilateral d o n o r agencies c o n t r i b u t e d immensely to Ghana's efforts at internal capacity building in several sectors of the economy. Institutional and h u m a n resource development capacity was to be strengthened in a n u m b e r of ways during both the first and second phase of the ERP and were mainly targeted at financial reforms, improving the management of publicly owned enterprises, and civil service reforms. Since mid-1987 the government has been i m p l e m e n t i n g a comprehensive restructuring of the financial sector directed at strengthening financial institutions and enhancing their effectiveness. In addition to the implementation of new banking and finance-related laws and regulations, a major effort to improve the management performance of banks has been undertaken. These improvements have included changes in the banks' boards of directors and other senior management positions of the banks as well as the introduction of new accounting standards and audit guidelines. To facilitate local decisionmaking the Ghana Association of Bankers is collaborating with the Central Bank of Malaysia to establish a central credit data base. To upgrade the skills of the finance sector, efforts are being made to develop professional training programs for both bankers and accountants through the formation of a banking college. Finally, preparatory work is now underway to mount a second phase of financial reforms that will, a m o n g o t h e r things, s t r e n g t h e n both the institutional a n d operational effectiveness of the Bank of Ghana, e n h a n c e the effectiveness of nonfinancial institutions, and continue the training of bankers and accountants. 4 3 G h a n a ' s e x p e r i e n c e with financial sector reforms clearly demonstrates the gradual enhancement of the country's capacity for policy analysis and development management. The financial reforms have been relatively smooth, but the reform of the state enterprise sector has been less successful, indicating that the focus of reform efforts has been on policy content at the expense of the institutional requirements necessary for policy change and sustainability. In part, the nature and scope of SOEs has presented formidable problems to effecting quick solutions in this sector. 4 4 Although considerable attention has been given to improving management and efficiency t h r o u g h staffing reductions, training programs, m a n a g e m e n t information systems, and support for the preparation of plans, budgets, and audit documents, major concerns remain about the performance of the sector. 45 Civil service reforms have included a phased reduction in its size, the recruitment of skilled Ghanaians to strengthen policy

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planning coordination in the higher levels of government, and the provision of logistical s u p p o r t to agencies responsible f o r implementing the recovery program. 4 6 T h e reform efforts in the SOE sector have clearly demonstrated the need to take institutional implications into consideration at the policy formulation stage. Despite the recurring problems of SOEs, the reforms here and in the financial sector have demonstrated Ghana's improved capacity for policy analysis and development management. T h e country's remarkable success with the ERP to date underlines Ghana's inherent potential for capacity building, albeit with the collaboration and assistance of the d o n o r community. We now turn to Ghana's experiences with administrative reform.

Administrative Reform Efforts The decade following the demise of the First Republic (1960-1966) in Ghana was critical in the country's political and administrative transformation. The decade was one of political instability, as well as governmental efforts to restructure the machinery of government at the subnational level on a more rational basis. In the latter case, the a d o p t i o n of an i n t e g r a t e d system of g o v e r n m e n t a n d administration in the Ghanaian political system in the early 1970s remains highly significant. U n d e r this system of decentralized administration, t h e r e is only o n e integrated organization for government and administration provided at each regional and district level, and it is composed of central government officials and local representatives. 47 This system of decentralized administration has been accepted in principle by regimes of various political complexions since the late 1960s. Thus, for over two decades there has been a consensus on the system of decentralized administration best suited to the Ghanaian situation. Nonetheless, Ghana's experience with the implementation of the decentralization policy has so far been disappointing. 4 8 During the decade following the demise of the Third Republic (1979-1981) the PNDC government also introduced innovative measures to ensure popular participation in the decisionmaking process and began a f u n d a m e n t a l restructuring of ministerial organizations. In particular, the latter measure was designed to restore to the ministries the "policy coordination capacities which they have lost over the years, and shed them of any responsibilities for the implementation of national development programmes." 4 9

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Whereas the policy o f promoting participatory democracy in the Ghanaian political subsystem has made an appreciable impact, the p r o g r a m for restructuring ministerial organizations has n o t yet yielded the desired outcomes. What factors account for Ghana's relatively low achievement rate with regard to administrative reform efforts? It could be argued that an inherently weak institutional capacity to a c c o m m o d a t e policy changes designed to ensure administrative efficiency has b e e n a major factor. This weakness is demonstrated by the inability of most o f the relevant ministries and departments to respond positively to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the ministerial restructuring a n d d e c e n tralization policies. For instance, the implementation o f the decentralization policy has b e e n o n g o i n g s i n c e 1974, yet a c o n s i d e r a b l e n u m b e r o f ministries and departments have not decentralized their operations. Delays and inaction remain the norm despite the efforts o f the Public Administration Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementation Committee (PARDIC) since the latter part of 1982 to explain the rationale behind the restructuring o f ministries. T h e less than enthusiastic response to the latest reform efforts can b e detected in similar administrative reform initiatives going back to the 1950s. T h e success rate of such initiatives has always been relatively low.

Decentralization and Ministerial Restructuring Political Will and Policy Implementation It is generally recognized that decentralization has been one o f the major policies adopted by successive governments in G h a n a since the late 1 9 6 0 s . However, t h e reality o f t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d administrative culture in G h a n a has stalled real progress o f the policy. T h e lack of political will and the unwillingness o f those entrusted with power at the national level to delegate authority to subnational units o f g o v e r n m e n t have had an impact on the successful implementation of the policy. 50 Indeed, with the exception of the PNDC government, the aims and objectives o f the decentralization policy as set forth by the administrative reformers o f the late 1960s have b e e n interpreted in varying degrees to serve t h e purposes o f different r e g i m e s . 5 1 Excluding the PNDC government, n o n e o f the past regimes has seriously addressed the issues o f effective implementation o f the policy. A l t h o u g h t h e N R C / S M C g o v e r n m e n t (1972-1979)

30

H. AKUOKO-FRIMPONG

a t t e m p t e d to a d d r e s s t h e issue by setting u p t h e O k o h Commission (1974-1976), the subsequent preoccupation with the search f o r a viable national g o v e r n m e n t ( u n d e r what was described as u n i o n g o v e r n m e n t ) effectively relegated decentralization to a low priority. T h e relatively low priority accorded to decentralization in the late 1970s continued until the assumption of power by the PNDC on D e c e m b e r 31, 1981. T h e PNDC regime exhibited both political will a n d a sense of c o n f i d e n c e within the h i g h e r levels of political l e a d e r s h i p a b o u t g e n u i n e l y t r a n s f e r r i n g power a n d the r e q u i r e d resources to lower levels of government. It is clear that u n d e r the PNDC g o v e r n m e n t an essential p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r effective implementation appears to have been satisfied, allowing decentralization to go forward. 5 2 T h e G h a n a i a n experience highlights n o t only the institutional implications of policy c h a n g e a n d sustainability but also the n e e d f o r g o v e r n m e n t s to have the will to a p p r o a c h policy issues in a m a n n e r that takes i n t o full a c c o u n t t h e overall interest of t h e g o v e r n e d . G h a n a ' s e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r t h e P N D C has b e e n encouraging. Participation and Policy Implementation Despite real constraints in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e f o r m process (shortages of p e r s o n n e l a n d f u n d s a n d relatively low levels of c o m m i t m e n t ) , it can be argued that the PNDC c o m m i t m e n t to the decentralization policy has m a d e it possible to e x p a n d p o p u l a r participation in the governance of the country. T h e success of the district assembly concept is illustrative. T h e creation of 110 district, municipal, a n d metropolitan assemblies by the PNDC g o v e r n m e n t has m a d e it possible for elected a n d a p p o i n t e d assembly m e m b e r s to work with ministry a n d d e p a r t m e n t officials in the p r o m o t i o n of social a n d economic development. T h e new system seeks to ensure both the effective and efficient m a n a g e m e n t of the d e v e l o p m e n t process in the country. It has been recognized that more work needs to be d o n e to ensure the full realization of the aims and objectives of the government's twin policy of decentralization a n d ministerial restructuring, but the o p e n i n g u p of the policy process has been a significant step forward. Strengthening Domestic Capacity Unlike G h a n a ' s e x p e r i e n c e with e c o n o m i c reforms, the policies that have s h a p e d the process of administrative r e f o r m in r e c e n t

GHANA

31

years have largely b e e n t h e work of i n d i g e n o u s t e c h n o c r a t s , e x p e r t s , a n d p o l i t i c i a n s . 5 3 T h e r e is a n e e d , however, f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t to maintain the m o m e n t u m g e n e r a t e d f o r capacity b u i l d i n g . Toward this e n d , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e n a t i o n a l Policy Analysis a n d C o o r d i n a t i o n C e n t e r (PACC) is desirable. As a r e s e a r c h a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n , PACC will b e e x p e c t e d to c o o r d i n a t e the efforts of the various bodies in t h e c o u n t r y t h a t have an i m p a c t o n capacity b u i l d i n g , t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g a m o r e r a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k f o r policy analysis a n d d e v e l o p m e n t m a n a g e m e n t . This initiative, however, n e e d s to b e a c c o m p a n i e d by efforts to s t r e n g t h e n the country's universities, r e s e a r c h bodies, a n d m a n a g e m e n t d e v e l o p m e n t institutions to e n a b l e t h e m to c o n t r i b u t e m o r e t o w a r d h u m a n r e s o u r c e development.

Conclusion T h e G h a n a case study has revealed a n u m b e r of factors that have c o n t r i b u t e d to a gradual a n d potentially sustainable process of capacity building. First, pragmatism r a t h e r t h a n a d o m i n a n t ideology has i n f l u e n c e d e c o n o m i c policies a n d r e f o r m efforts. Second, a weakening e c o n o m y and political instability h i n d e r e d capacity b u i l d i n g initiatives, as a mass e x o d u s of professional a n d managerial talent left the country a n d f u n d i n g f o r research activity a n d higher educational institutions decreased. T h e success of the E c o n o m i c Recovery Program, however, with its emphasis on u p g r a d i n g m a n a g e m e n t skills in the b a n k i n g a n d state enterprise sector, has b e g u n to improve m a n a g e m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e in G h a n a . Third, civil service reforms and administrative r e f o r m have also b e g u n to show results. In p a r t i c u l a r , the p r o g r a m f o r ministerial r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d efforts to d e c e n t r a l i z e have increased p o p u l a r participation in the policy process a n d have highlighted the i m p o r t a n c e of political will as a significant factor in t r a n s f o r m i n g the public sector a n d e n h a n c i n g capacity. Much more needs to be d o n e in Ghana, particularly in the development of p a r t i c i p a t o r y g o v e r n m e n t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e d o n o r c o m munity c o n t i n u e s to play a significant role in m a c r o e c o n o m i c policymaking. Increasingly, the policy process in G h a n a is evolving toward G h a n a i a n ownership t h r o u g h policies that p r o m o t e b o t h institutional a n d h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t . Policy successes such as the ERP i n d i c a t e that sustainability factors are b e i n g addressed t h r o u g h m o r e focused attention on developing indigenous capacity.

32

H. AKUOKO-FRIMPONG Notes

1. The World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, A Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1989), p. 38. 2. Ibid. 3. Catherine Gwin, Rockefeller Foundation Meeting on Capacity Building in International Economics in Africa: Summary of Discussion (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, July 22-23, 1985), p. 3. 4. Ibid. 5. The World Bank, The African Capacity Building Initiative: Toward Improved Policy Analysis and Development Management (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1991), p. 5. 6. Ibid., p. 1. 7. See Report of the Public Administration Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementation Committee (PARDIC) (Accra, Ghana: Government Printer, 1990). 8. See Preamble to PNDC (Establishment) Proclamation of 1981. 9. See Louis A. Picard with V. Moharir and J . Corkery, "Capacity Building for Policy Change and Sustainability: Lessons from the African Experience" (paper delivered to the Development Administration Working Group, I IAS, Brussels, Belgium, October 1990). 10. H. Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Public and Private Sectors in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana (Paris: OECD Development Centre Technical Papers, no. 14, June 1990), p. 18. 11. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978), p. 229. 12. See ibid., p. 36. 13. Ibid., p. 37. 14. Ibid., pp. 36-37. Also see Ghanaian Times (Accra), October 10, 1960. 15. See Republic of Ghana, Annual Plan for the Second Plan Year (of the 1963 Seven-Year Development Plan) (Accra: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965). Cited in H. Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Sectors, p. 18. Also see K. B. Asante, "Privatisation of Public Enterprises: The Case of Ghana," in African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), Public Enterprise Performance and Privatisation Debate: A Review of the Options for Africa (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd, 1987), p. 420. 16. Killick, Development Economics, p. 37. 17. Ibid. 18. In the words of Nkrumah: "The Government accepts the operation in the country of large-scale enterprises by foreign interests, provided that they accept the following conditions: first, that foreign private enterprises give the Government the first option to buy their shares, whenever it is intended to sell all or part of the equity capital; and secondly, that foreign private enterprises and enterprises jointly owned by the state and foreign interests be required to re-invest 60 percent of their net profits in Ghana." In addition, Nkrumah stated: "The domestic policy of (the) government is the complete ownership of the economy by the state." See ibid., pp. 37-38. 19. Including W. Arthur Lewis, Dudley Seers, and Nicholas Kaldor. 20. Killick, Development Economics, p. 53. 21. In particular, E. N. Omaboe and J . H. Mensah played significant roles in shaping the economic policies of the government during the period.

GHANA

33

22. Killick, Development Economics, pp. 299-300. 23. Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Sectors, p. 19. 24. Ibid.; Killick, Development Economics, p. 300. 25. For example, policy continuity is evident in the relative success of the policy of p r o m o t i n g indigenous private e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p in the economy—a policy that has, indeed, been maintained by all subsequent regimes of various political complexions. The policy emanated from the NLC g o v e r n m e n t ' s Ghanaian Enterprises Decree of 1968, the PP government's Aliens' Compliance O r d e r of 1969, and the Business Promotion Act (334) of 1970. 26. See International Bank for Reconstruction a n d Development (IBRD), Study of Public Enterprises in Ghana: Final Report, vol. 1, no. 4 (November 1985), p. 82. 27. H. Akuoko-Frimpong, "The State as an Entrepreneur in Ghana: An Analysis of the Challenge Posed by Private Entrepreneurship," in ibid., vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1988), p. 319. 28. K. B. Asante, "Privatisation," p. 429. 29. Ibid. 30. See Republic of Ghana, Five-Year Development Plan (1975/761979/80), part 1 (Accra: Ministry of Economic Planning, January 1977), p. 43. Cited in Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Sectors, p. 20. These institutions included the Bank of Ghana, National Investment Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, Capital Investment Board (now National Investment Centre), and the Office of Business Promotion. The latter was subsequently transformed into the Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission, and then merged with the National Board for Small-Scale Industries in January 1991. The National Board for Small-Scale Industries had been set up in 1985 to coordinate the promotion of entrepreneurship development in the Ghanaian economy. In addition, institutional support was provided by the Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI) through its Ghanaian Business Bureau (now transformed into Private Sector Development Management). 31. The World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Programme for Adjustment (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1984), p. xv. The World Bank report in reviewing this period noted that it was characterized, in varying intensity, by persistent high inflation, declining production and exports, flourishing illegal activities (including "kalabule"), and political instability. The report further noted that a gradual decline in per capita income had also increased the incidence of absolute poverty and that this increase was accompanied by a worsening of income distribution and growing unemployment 32. H. Akuoko-Frimpong, Report on a Survey of Advanced Research and Training Capacity in International Economics at African Universities and Other Institutions (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, February 1986), p. 28. Report prepared at the request of the International Relations Division of the Rockefeller Foundation. 33. The People's National Party government followed a brief but significant intervention in government by the Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC) from June 4 to September 24, 1979. 34. See Republic of Ghana, Two Years of Rehabilitation and Redirection (24th September 1979-24th September 1981) (Accra: Ministry of Information and Tourism, September 1981), p. 1. 35. See Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Sectors. 36. The World Bank, African Capacity, p. 7.

34

H. AKUOKO-FRIMPONG

37. Ibid., p. 10. 38. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 39. Ibid., p. 7. 40. The World Bank, Ghana, p. 1. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. For a more detailed discussion of these reforms, see Republic of Ghana, Enhancing the Human Impact of the Adjustment Programme, Report Prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Sixth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana (otherwise known as Donors' Conference), Paris, May 14-15, 1991 (Accra: Tema Press of the Ghana Publishing Corporation, April 1991), p.l. 44. T h e latest available evidence shows that the SOE sector presently includes more than 340 enterprises, statutory boards, authorities, and corporations. SOEs are dominant in the mining, energy, utilities, business, and financial services sectors of the total economy; and, in the m o d e r n formal sector SOEs are p r e d o m i n a n t in construction, transportation, and communications, as well as in wholesale and retail trade. At the census of 1984 more than 240,000 workers were employed in public enterprises, of which nearly 60,000 were employed at the Ghana Cocoa Board and its subsidiaries. See ibid. 45. For a comprehensive account of the problems of and reform efforts in this sector, see William A. Adda, PNDC secretary (minister) and chairman of the State Enterprises Commission, "The Role of the State: Restructuring Public Enterprises" (paper presented at the Senior Policy Seminar on the I m p a c t of Industrial Policy Reforms: Public and Private Enterprise Experiences, organized joindy by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank a n d the Ghana Institute of M a n a g e m e n t a n d Public Administration [GIMPA], Greenhill, Achimota, Accra, March 21-27, 1991); IBRD, Public Enterprises, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 95; and Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Sectors, p. 24. 46. See a summary of an address by Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, PNDC secretary (minister) for the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning at the First National Seminar on Private Sector Development in Ghana (Accra, April 15, 1988) organized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Accra. Summary given in Akuoko-Frimpong, Rebalancing the Sectors, p. 13. 47. See also H. Akuoko-Frimpong, "Decentralized Administration: The G h a n a i a n E x p e r i e n c e , " in C o m m o n w e a l t h Secretariat, Decentralized Administration in Africa: Policies and Training Experience (London: Management Development and Programme, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989), p. 155. 48. Ibid. 49. Report of PARDIC (see Note 7). 50. For e x a m p l e , see H. Akuoko-Frimpong, "Decentralized Administration," p. 160. For the sake of political expediency, the Progress Party (PP) government (1969-1972) could not implement the decentralization policy without severe modifications of its aims and objectives. 51. Both decentralization and ministerial restructuring had as their goals the following: to p r o m o t e efficiency a n d effectiveness in the management of the public services; to change the existing content of work of most public officers by distinguishing the policy p l a n n i n g and coordinating roles of the ministry head office from the implementing or operational roles of the departments and the districts; to ensure increased

GHANA

35

management competence in the implementation of public decisions closest to the area of implementation in a decentralized organization; to discourage and even to prevent ministerial organizations from involvement in day-today management of government departments and the management of the smallest projects in the district locations; and, more significantly, to restrict ministerial organizations to policy planning coordination. In addition, the decentralization policy is expected to achieve a fundamental restructuring of the machinery of government, introducing more democratic forms of participation and greater efficiency and productivity in the state machinery. 52. Akuoka-Frimpong, "Decentralized Administration," pp. 160-163. 53. The success uf the current seaich by the PNDC government foi a viable framework for constitutional government in the country is further testimony to Ghana's improved capacity to effect sustainable policy changes. It must also be acknowledged that the contributions of the d o n o r community, including the UNDP, the World Bank, and the British Overseas Development Administration in particular, continue to be important in efforts to improve and strengthen domestic capacity.

3 Nigeria: Civil Service Reform and Development All D. Yahaya Of Ason Bur

Africa is e n g u l f e d in a social a n d e c o n o m i c crisis o f i m m e n s e proportions. The crisis can be partly attributed to the failure o f the state to achieve the objectives o f national security, s o c i o e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t goals. 1 T h i s c h a p t e r e x a m i n e s Nigeria's e x p e r i e n c e with capacity building for policy c h a n g e a n d a r g u e s that successful d e v e l o p m e n t p o l i c i e s must address the question o f state failure.

Development Policy and t h e State T h e state in Africa, as in o t h e r T h i r d World countries, exercises a d o m i n a n t role in national d e v e l o p m e n t and has b e e n historically conditioned. T h e failure of the market to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c growth during the colonial period led to the a c c e p t a n c e o f the Keynesian m a c r o e c o n o m i c m o d e l as a policy o p t i o n . First in E u r o p e a n d subsequently in Third World countries, Keynesian theory b e c a m e the intellectual rationale for state intervention in the e c o n o m y . T h e d o m i n a n c e and logic o f state intervention in the e c o n o m y inevitably led to the leading role o f the state in politics and society, as the contemporary m o d e r n welfare state assumed e c o n o m i c and social responsibility on b e h a l f o f the people. As the state assumed control o f the c o m m a n d i n g heights o f the e c o n o m y and took c e n t e r stage in national development, this action had implications for the civil service, e x p a n d i n g both its size and scope. As g o v e r n m e n t attempted to i m p l e m e n t an array o f d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d programs, it increasingly s t r e n g t h e n e d a n d localized t h e b u r e a u c r a c y with t h e unintended c o n s e q u e n c e s o f creating an inefficient and oversized state.

37

38

ALI D. YAHAYA & ASON BUR

N i g e r i a ' s p r o g r e s s in t h e p r o v i s i o n o f social a n d w e l f a r e facilities was s i g n i f i c a n t d u r i n g t h e 1950s a n d in t h e p e r i o d i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r independence

and

precipitated

an i m m e n s e

optimism

and

high

e x p e c t a t i o n a m o n g t h e p e o p l e . T h i s was an era o f b u o y a n t r e v e n u e d e r i v e d f r o m the w o r l d prices f o r N i g e r i a n c o m m o d i t i e s .

Resources

were

expended

readily available

to g o v e r n m e n t ,

and these w e r e

heavily in t h e p r o v i s i o n o f basic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d e d u c a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , N i g e r i a ' s initial successes w e r e n o t s u s t a i n a b l e , a n d o p t i m i s m s o o n g a v e way to d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t a n d p o l i t i c a l crisis governed

by

successive military r e g i m e s . 2 T h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e state t o m e e t

as

the

the

social

country

collapsed

into

demands placed upon

civil

war

and

was

it r a p i d l y d i m i n i s h e d .

Public

sector

p e r f o r m a n c e b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y less e f f e c t i v e a n d e f f i c i e n t , l e a d i n g to t h e p r e s e n t social a n d e c o n o m i c crisis c o n f r o n t i n g N i g e r i a . In t h e p r o c e s s t h e b u r e a u c r a c y c a m e to e x e r t a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e on

influence

policymaking. Paradoxically,

the

dominance

of

the

Nigerian

state

in

the

e c o n o m y a n d s o c i e t y has b e e n t h e basis o f its greatest weakness. T h e expansion

a n d s c o p e o f t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y N i g e r i a n state w i t h o u t

c o m p l e m e n t a r y e f f o r t s to build institutional capacity and a viable political

process

has u n d e r m i n e d

t h e state

as an

instrument

of

d e v e l o p m e n t a n d m a d e sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t i m p o s s i b l e .

Redefining The

the Role of the State

failure of

many African

states t o b e c o m e

an i n s t r u m e n t

d e v e l o p m e n t has u n l e a s h e d a m o v e m e n t f o r a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f r o l e o f t h e state in t h e p u r s u i t o f n a t i o n a l

social a n d

g o a l s . A s t h e m o v e m e n t has g a i n e d m o m e n t u m

of the

economic

it has f o c u s e d o n

t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y crisis o f t h e m o d e r n state in A f r i c a , a n d t h e r e is increasing d e m a n d

that t h e A f r i c a n state s h o u l d b e r e l i e v e d o f a

n u m b e r o f functions. Both the private sector and

nongovernmental

o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) a r e b e i n g c a l l e d u p o n to assume l a r g e r r o l e s in d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s . In N i g e r i a such c o n c e r n s h a v e r e s u l t e d in p o l i c i e s d i r e c t e d at r e f o r m o f t h e civil s e r v i c e , t h e p r i v a t i z a t i o n public enterprises, and the d i s e n g a g e m e n t

o f t h e state f r o m

of the

p r o v i s i o n o f m o s t g o o d s a n d services. R e d e f i n i n g t h e state s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with the

state.

It

simply

means

a

recasting

or

a

dismantling

reformulation

of

d e v e l o p m e n t o b j e c t i v e s a n d p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s a n d o f t h e ways in which

the

state

can

best

facilitate

economic

growth

and

de-

v e l o p m e n t . Just h o w f a r t h e state s h o u l d r e t r e a t f r o m its p r e v i o u s level o f i n v o l v e m e n t , h o w e v e r , r e m a i n s a s o u r c e o f c o n t r o v e r s y . A s o n e E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r has n o t e d :

NIGERIA

39

Africa needs the support of states to extricate itself from the current situation and to encourage its own development. Let us help the states to act in another manner, let us not [deprive] them of their essential responsibility. Let us not apply our criteria—albeit even sometimes contested in the developed countries—to those countries which are in a pre-economy state. Let them invent a development model and process; but there is no development without a state. 3 F r o m t h e a b o v e , it is obvious t h a t t h e s t a t e will c o n t i n u e to b e actively i n v o l v e d in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e s t a t e m u s t h a v e a r o l e in b u i l d i n g c a p a c i t y f o r e c o n o m i c policy f o r m u l a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Policy Reform in

Nigeria

O n e m a j o r a c t i o n u n d e r t a k e n in N i g e r i a to resolve t h e p r e s e n t e c o n o m i c crisis is a s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m . A n u m b e r of policy e l e m e n t s constitute the e c o n o m i c recovery p r o g r a m i n c l u d i n g : t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of d e m a n d m a n a g e m e n t policies; t h e a d o p t i o n of m e a s u r e s t o s t i m u l a t e d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i o n a n d b r o a d e n t h e supply base of t h e e c o n o m y ; c h a n g e s in t h e e x c h a n g e rate policy a n d r e s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e tariff regime; t r a d e liberalization a n d t h e r e d u c t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e controls; t h e a d o p t i o n of m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e p r i c i n g policies; a n d t h e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a n d c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n a n d , in s o m e cases, t h e p r i v a t i z a t i o n of p u b l i c enterprises. T h e s e d e c i s i o n s have i m p o s e d new d e m a n d s o n t h e state a n d r e q u i r e m o r e effective a n d e f f i c i e n t p e r f o r m a n c e f r o m t h e p u b l i c sector. T h e c h a l l e n g e s f a c i n g t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r u n d e r this p r o g r a m a r e inevitably m o r e c o m p l e x ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , m a n a g e m e n t capacity u n d e r t h e p r o g r a m m u s t b e of high quality in o r d e r to e n h a n c e p e r f o r m a n c e . Given t h e latter, t h e n e e d f o r capacity b u i l d i n g has b e e n r e c o g n i z e d in Nigeria, a n d a systematic a n d s t r u c t u r e d strategy has b e e n a d o p t e d toward this e n d , involving s t a k e h o l d e r s , b e n e f i c i a r i e s , i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , a n d p u b l i c o f f i c e r s a n d political leaders.

T h e Policy Analysis Framework in Nigeria Public policy in N i g e r i a is t h e e n d p r o d u c t of a series of activities a n d d e c i s i o n s c a r r i e d o u t at d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s a n d at d i f f e r e n t g o v e r n m e n t levels, e a c h of which is i m p o r t a n t in its own r i g h t a n d i n c l u d e s key institutional, g r o u p , a n d individual p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h u s ,

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public policy is not only i n f l u e n c e d by special interest groups; it is also affected by the t h r e e tiers of g o v e r n m e n t at which policies are made, articulated, a n d i m p l e m e n t e d . Nigeria is a f e d e r a t i o n of twenty-one states a n d t h e f e d e r a l capital territory of Abuja. T h e states are subdivided into 504 local g o v e r n m e n t areas. Each of the t h r e e levels of g o v e r n m e n t (federal, state, a n d local) makes public policies. Similar to t h e activities of special interest g r o u p s , these c o m p e t i n g g o v e r n m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s r e p r e s e n t distinct ideas about how social authority a n d responsibility s h o u l d b e a l l o c a t e d . A l t h o u g h military c o n t r o l of t h e p r e s e n t g o v e r n m e n t has given a false sense of federally led public policies that work h a r m o n i o u s l y at each level of authority, t h e political s t r u c t u r e of the c o u n t r y e n s u r e s c o m p e t i n g interests a m o n g t h e three tiers of government. T h e r e are t h r e e organs of g o v e r n m e n t that have responsibility for policymaking u n d e r the federal military g o v e r n m e n t . T h e most i m p o r t a n t a n d highest is the A r m e d Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). It c o m p r i s e s a p p r o x i m a t e l y n i n e t e e n m e m b e r s drawn f r o m key sections of the a r m e d forces a n d is h e a d e d by the p r e s i d e n t of Nigeria a n d the c o m m a n d e r in chief of the a r m e d forces. T h e inspector general of police is also a m e m b e r . In the main, the AFRC combines the role of the legislature, the executive, a n d the judiciary (in dispensing the prerogative of mercy). T h e situation is i n f o r m e d by t h e n a t u r e of t h e military, which is a highly c e n t r a l i z e d bureaucracy. T h e s e c o n d body is the N a t i o n a l Council of States, which comprises all the state military governors, the service chiefs, a n d the president, who chairs the council meetings. T h e council addresses national issues such as the national budget, national d e v e l o p m e n t plans, a n d o t h e r matters having state implications. T h i r d , there is the Federal Executive Council (FEC), or Council of Ministers. FEC meetings are p r e s i d e d over by the president. T h e FEC is the executive arm of the military government. In most cases it initiates policy m a t t e r s a n d also e n s u r e s t h e i r f a i t h f u l implem e n t a t i o n . Both military a n d civilian ministers are m e m b e r s of the FEC. In the main, the AFRC, the Council of States, and the FEC are the policymaking o r g a n s u n d e r t h e federal military g o v e r n m e n t of Nigeria. At t h e state level, the State Executive Council is t h e only policymaking body. It is m a d e u p of the state governor, the military c o m m a n d e r in the state capital, representatives f r o m the navy a n d air force, a n d the state commissioner of police. T h e commissioners at the state level (the equivalent of ministers at the federal level) are also members. T h e council meetings are chaired by the governor.

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At the local level, the Local Government Council is the highest policymaking body. It makes decision on all matters affecting entire communities in the local government area. T h o u g h the existence of local g o v e r n m e n t is recognized in the constitution, its a u t o n o m y is limited by f r e q u e n t interventions f r o m the state g o v e r n m e n t . T h e interventions are usually in the areas of budgetary control, jurisdictional control, and personnel matters. T h e e p h e m e r a l n a t u r e of the policymaking machinery in the Nigerian political system lias c o n t r i b u t e d greatly to public policy failure. Each succeeding government has t e n d e d to modify inherited structures and processes o r create new ones in o r d e r to address a new reality. T h e 1988 civil service reforms, f o r instance, were designed in large measure to facilitate the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the government's structural adjustment program.

The 1988 Civil Service Reforms Given the problems a n d failures of the policymaking process, the 1988 civil service reforms were designed to e n h a n c e policy mana g e m e n t , g e n e r a t e h i g h e r productivity, and ease i m p l e m e n t a t i o n problems of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s structural a d j u s t m e n t policies. T h e reforms rest on four pillars: politicizing the u p p e r echelons of the civil service; professionalizing the r e m a i n d e r of the civil service; improving the performance, productivity, and responsiveness of civil servants; a n d e n h a n c i n g public accountability. In particular, t h e reform provisions relating to professionalization require every officer to specialize. A major advantage of the latter is that officers have a m o r e p r o f o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the responsibilities of t h e i r ministries, thereby e n h a n c i n g their efficiency and productivity. I n t r o d u c e d in January 1988, the reforms have not taken root in all the states of the f e d e r a t i o n , making it difficult to generalize. Although some states a n d the federal g o v e r n m e n t have m a d e bold efforts to i m p l e m e n t the reform measures effectively, o t h e r states have hesitated to initiate reforms. E x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h e i r slow progress have included lack of funds a n d shortages of personnel and e q u i p m e n t . Due to the unevenness of the reforms, not m u c h has really c h a n g e d in the policymaking process. W h e r e r e f o r m s have o c c u r r e d , central ministers a n d t h e i r counterparts at the state level now exert greater influence over policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, the civil service still shares in the initiation, f o r m u l a t i o n , a n d e x e c u t i o n of p u b l i c policies. T h e person who appears to have lost out u n d e r t h e new dispensation is the director general of a ministry, whose status has

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now been reduced from that of chief executive and accounting officer to that of second in command in a ministry or department. Another result of the reform efforts has been increased reliance on ad hoc bodies in policymaking. In particular, committees have risen to prominence with mandates that focus on new issues as well as the resolution of old problems. A greater proportion of the functionaries in these committees is drawn from outside the civil service, but the bureaucracy continues to provide technical support and assistance to the committees. Thus, the civil service remains critical to the policymaking process. In general, public policymaking in present-day Nigeria conforms to a familiar pattern f o u n d in other African countries, although there have been some visible deviations. In spite of the reforms over the past twenty years, the Nigerian civil service continues to be characterized by what J o s e p h calls "cronyism" and "prebendalism" in which patron-client relationships and personalistic loyalties i n f l u e n c e the p o l i c y m a k i n g process. 4 T h e f o l l o w i n g section examines more fully the process of policymaking in Nigeria.

T h e Process of Policymaking In idealized form Nigeria has developed a process of policymaking that is conducive to development management at both the macroand the microlevels. Much remains to be done, however, to put into operation the processes of decisionmaking and implementation. T h e policy cycle as it is presently constituted has both strengths and weaknesses: Problem identification. At this initial stage in the policy process certain conditions in society are perceived and defined as problems and are accepted as policy issues that government is eventually f o r c e d to do something about. T h e task of converting a societal problem into a public issue and calling government attention to it is a crucial aspect of the Nigerian national political process. T h e task of articulating and aggregating the interests of the people is accomplished through organized pressure groups such as the M a n u f a c t u r e r s ' Association of Nigeria (MAN) and through public opinion and the mass media. T h e civil service has also played a leading role in this respect, and more recently, ad hoc committees are becoming sources of aggregated interest claims. Policy formulation. O n c e an issue has been a c c e p t e d on the government's policy agenda a number of activities are likely to oc-

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cur, although the f o r m u l a t i o n of public policy proposals remains an activity carried out by the executive arm of g o v e r n m e n t (see above). D e p e n d i n g o n its scale, complexity, a n d urgency, the policy issue is submitted for careful study a n d research within t h e bureaucracy or by an ad hoc c o m m i t t e e of experts. R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a r e t h e n p r e s e n t e d to the executive for consideration. At this stage all t h e key t e c h n i c a l a n d s o m e n o n t e c h n i c a l d i m e n s i o n s of the issue are closely scrutinized a n d assessed, a n d d a t a are g e n e r a t e d that help to shed light o n possible causes a n d solutions. Proposed policies are t h e n identified, a n d their technical s o u n d n e s s a n d desirability analyzed a n d ascertained. T h e goals of t h e policy are prioritized, the means of achieving t h e m identified, t h e time r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r each goal established, a n d the physical a n d h u m a n resource r e q u i r e m e n t s d e t e r m i n e d . Many of the above activities take place in the ministries. In ministries w h e r e a m a n d a t o r y D e p a r t m e n t of P l a n n i n g , Research, a n d Statistics has b e e n established, the d e p a r t m e n t plays a crucial role in policy f o r m u l a t i o n . A c a b i n e t c o m m i t t e e , c o m p r i s i n g the minister, director general, a n d o t h e r directors, oversees the activities of the d e p a r t m e n t in policy matters. In ministries w h e r e t h e relationship of the chief executive a n d the director g e n e r a l is not cordial, the c a b i n e t is a o n e - m a n c o m m i t t e e , with the minister issuing o r d e r s directly to d e p a r t m e n t heads with or without the knowledge of his deputy. Legitimation. Legislative action is necessary (almost indispensable) in the Nigerian p o l i c y m a k i n g process. It a c c o r d s the p r o p o s e d policy political support, legality, a n d legitimacy. W h e t h e r or not the policy p r o p o s a l gets a d o p t e d d e p e n d s a g r e a t deal o n t h e value p r e f e r e n c e s of the d o m i n a n t g r o u p s or coalition in the legislative body. Legislative authorization also ensures that an a p p r o p r i a t i o n or requisite r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n is m a d e f o r the successful implementation of the policy. Policy implementation. O n c e a policy is f o r m u l a t e d a n d legitimated it must be i m p l e m e n t e d in a sustained a n d effective m a n n e r in o r d e r to create t h e d e s i r e d impact. Sustainability a n d effectiveness are c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e caliber of the h u m a n resources available, the quality a n d r e l e v a n c e of t h e policy design a n d p r o p o s a l , a n d p o p u l a r political s u p p o r t f o r the policy action. I n d e e d , the political d i m e n s i o n in N i g e r i a has b e e n critical in t h e a t t a i n m e n t of sustainability a n d effectiveness a n d is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e u n d u e i n f l u e n c e of specialized interests. It is this political d i m e n s i o n that tends to be i g n o r e d a n d u n d e r r a t e d in m a n a g e m e n t d e v e l o p m e n t

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strategies, and, combined with weaknesses within the civil service, it limits the effectiveness of the Nigerian process of policymaking as described above. Policy evaluation. The advantage of policy evaluation is that it is a learning process. Evaluation enables policymakers to record their experiences for future use, and information gathered from the exercise forms the basis for adjusting existing policy. In an incrementalist policy process the new information forms part of the data base available for future policy considerations. In Nigeria there is no serious effort to evaluate policies. This is one of the factors contributing to frequent policy failures. Even in cases where government has evaluated public policies, the exercise did not have an impact on the policy. This has been the experience of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS). Likewise, policy evaluation efforts in the ministries has been sporadic and inefficient. The civil service reforms envisage that the Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics will be involved in policy evaluation, but the department is still in its embryonic stage. A review of the policymaking framework in Nigeria reveals that the policymaking process has not yet evolved regularized procedures or the institutional structures for mobilizing popular involvement or for generating widespread consultation in policy development. Two programs of the present government stand out as exceptions to the above tendency: the structural adjustment program and the transition to civil rule program. In both cases there was widespread consultation with the people as they were called upon to debate and submit recommendations to government on policy preference. These debates generated considerable interest and participation of the people, and the policy decisions of government were heavily influenced by this popular consultation. A policy decision in which there was minimal consultation with stakeholders was the decision to establish the National Directorate of Employment. The directorate was created to mitigate the pains of the structural adjustment program through the generation of employment opportunities. In 1985 the government directed the ministries in charge of employment, labor, and productivity; education; social development, youth, and sports; and national planning to collaborate with state governments and the organized private sector to produce strategies for dealing with mass unemployment, with special attention given to school leavers. A committee of twenty-seven members was constituted; but almost all of the members, including the chairman, were civil

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servants. T h e c o m m i t t e e was g u i d e d in its d e l i b e r a t i o n s by t h e w o r k i n g papers a n d proposals s u b m i t t e d by t h e various ministries, state g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d the organized private sector. T h e r e was n o visible contact with the stakeholders d u r i n g the early stages of policy development. It was primarily a civil service activity.

Capacity Building Through Training and the Civil Service Reforms This section examines capacity building in Nigeria t h r o u g h h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t , with particular r e f e r e n c e to t h e 1988 civil service reforms. T h e d o m i n a n t role of g o v e r n m e n t in a m o d e r n welfare-oriented state such as Nigeria has called into question the capacity of the civil service to m a n a g e the system effectively a n d efficiently. It s h o u l d b e n o t e d , however, t h a t b e c a u s e policy m a n a g e m e n t involves b o t h policy f o r m u l a t i o n a n d policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , capacity p r o b l e m s a r e n o t restricted to t h e civil service. Policy m a n a g e m e n t also requires well-informed a n d capable political leaders. T h e p r o b l e m s of policymaking in Nigeria are the result of many factors a n d , in particular, include the following. The policymaking process is structurally diffuse. A l t h o u g h this diffusion may n o t necessarily p o s e m u c h difficulty at t h e policy f o r m u l a t i o n stage, it is likely to d o so at the policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n stage. For example, there are many bodies i m p l e m e n t i n g g o v e r n m e n t policies in h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n , security, a n d o t h e r sectors. This p r o b l e m is c o m p o u n d e d by the fact t h a t policyp l a n n i n g expertise is scarce in the country, b o t h inside a n d outside of g o v e r n m e n t . A m o n g t h e o r g a n i z e d i n t e r e s t g r o u p s w h o are e x p e c t e d to i n f l u e n c e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of policy issues a n d t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of policy, little capacity exists f o r policy analysis. A similar situation is evident in the various g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s e x p e c t e d to make technical contributions to the policy f o r m u l a t i o n p r o c e s s a n d w h o have responsibility f o r policy e x e c u t i o n a n d evaluation. Policy knowledge is inadequate. A m a j o r p r o b l e m a r e a in t h e p o l i c y m a k i n g process is t h e lack of quality data, w i t h o u t which policymaking is f o r c e d to rely u n d u l y o n guesswork or even on the personal or idiosyncratic p r e f e r e n c e s of the policymakers. P l a n n i n g without facts has b e c o m e t h e b a n e of policymaking in Nigeria. T h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d n a t u r e of the work of the various data g a t h e r i n g a n d

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research institutions in the country has been further complicated by political corruption, all of which has seriously distorted information gathering and policy analysis activities. Power is imbalanced. A n o t h e r major problem reflects the lack of balance in power a m o n g political executives and their top bureaucrats. For many years the bureaucrats have exerted a disproportionate influence on policymaking. T h e crucial issue c o n c e r n i n g the role of public administrators in policymaking in Nigeria is not whether they will continue to be actively and centrally involved in initiating, formulating, and i m p l e m e n t i n g policies. Rather, the issue has focused on how public administrators can be transformed from an essentially powerful and anonymous class-based g r o u p , o r i e n t e d primarily toward compliance with regulations and a d h e r e n c e to procedures, into a committed, effective force f o r social c h a n g e and sustained, mass-based economic development. T h e historical record offers no indication that f u r t h e r education and retraining or approaches that rely on bureaucratic initiative and voluntary compliance will provide the basis for a reorientation of the public services in this direction. Deeper politicization and tighter control of the bureaucracy by democratically elected civilian leaders a p p e a r to be more promising avenues for effecting such a transformation. The current civil service reforms appear to have e n t r e n c h e d political supremacy over the bureaucracy, assuming the ascendancy of a democratically elected civilian government. It is claimed that the recent economic crises in the country have been traceable, at least in part, to the power imbalance between the political and professional executives. Public-private sector relationships lack openness and transparency. Project i m p l e m e n t a t i o n failures often can be traced to the relationship between the principal actors in the public and private sectors. Multinational corporations and companies, consultancy firms, and construction companies operating in the country constitute a formidable force in the process of government program execution. 5 Various investigations carried out at different times in the past have clearly demonstrated that government officials and private sector organizations have often acted in collusion to defraud government of a substantial part of the financial resources allocated for the execution of public projects. Corruption remains a major policy issue in Nigeria and is present at many different stages and levels of the policy process.

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Civil service capacity needs to be strengthened. Given these problems in the policymaking process, it is necessary to enhance policy management skills. Increased attention to capacity building and the civil service reforms in general are also necessary to guarantee the success of the economic recovery program and other structural adjustment policies. At issue is the country's n e e d to strengthen institutional capacity f o r policy analysis, f o r m u l a t i o n , a n d implementation, and the need to imbue every civil servant with a sense of purpose and urgency. 6 T h e n e e d for a professionalized civil service a n d t h e p e r f o r m a n c e focus of the civil service reforms has placed staff training in much bolder relief than before. In order to improve efficiency in the operation of the ministries and to raise the p e r f o r m a n c e standards of employees, each ministry has been required to operate and maintain employee training programs within or under a particular ministry. 7 The 1988 civil service reforms were a comprehensive package of provisions that aimed at enhancing the capacity of the Nigerian bureaucracy. After the reforms had been promulgated, the Office of Management Services and Training (OMS&T) recognized that it would be difficult to meet these aspirations unless the nation first adopted a training policy to guide all human resource development. It was against this background that the OMS&T organized a national c o n f e r e n c e on h u m a n resource development and utilization in March 1989. The conference was a critical first step in a series of activities that would lead to the emergence of a virile and dynamic human resource development and utilization policy for Nigeria. T h e emphasis that the new reforms have placed on the professionalization of the civil service was a conscious attempt to e n h a n c e the capacities of public officials in policy management. Capacity building is also reflected in the new dispensation that requires officers to make their careers entirely in the ministry or d e p a r t m e n t of their choice. This directive will enable them to acquire the necessary expertise and experience through relevant specialized training and uninterrupted involvement with the work of their respective ministry or department. Research has shown that this provision is a welcome attempt at capacity building. 8 With regard to promotions, performance has been emphasized over seniority. A total promotion rating scale of 100 percent now allots 9 5 p e r c e n t to p e r f o r m a n c e (based on interviews a n d additional qualifications and examinations) and only 5 percent to seniority. Such changes, if implemented, provide evidence of the extent to which government is determined to build the capacity of public officials in policy management.

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T h e reforms have also emphasized the regular flow o f staff between the public service and the private sector. This development is based on the belief that ideas and experiences shared between the two sectors can assist in enhancing productivity in the public service. T h e main strategy by which the government is attempting to build capacity in policy analysis emphasizes civil service training. 9 T h e n u m b e r o f public officers, including ministers and directors general, attending training programs has increased tremendously since 1988, when the reforms were l a u n c h e d . T h e n u m b e r o f workshops, conferences, and seminars organized since 1988 has also increased. Although overseas training programs continue to be sponsored, m o r e attention is b e i n g focused on training public officers at local institutions. T h e two most favored institutions are NIPSS, based in J o s , and the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON), based in Lagos. T h e former focuses on policy issues, and ASCON emphasizes the d e v e l o p m e n t o f policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n strategies and skills.

Conclusion T h e policy process of initiation, formulation, implementation, and evaluation constitutes a four-step cycle. T h e successful completion of the policy cycle is contingent upon both an institutional capacity and human resource capability. In the case of Nigeria, institutional capacity outside o f g o v e r n m e n t is nonexistent. Much of public policy-related activity remains within the exclusive preserve of the civil service. A new trend is emerging, however, in which the organized private sector and ad hoc bodies composed o f members outside the civil service now contribute to the policy process. For example, the political transition program originated from the r e c o m m e n d a tions of o n e such body, the Political B u r e a u (a mixed government/nongovernment committee), and has been highly successful. T h e future role o f the civil service will be critical to increasing the capacity of the Nigerian state to p r o m o t e economic and social development. It is not a question of whether the civil service will be involved in the initiation and formulation o f development policy. Rather, the question is how the civil service can be transformed from a powerful, special-interest and class-based group that operates on the basis o f patronage and corruption to a transparent and effective agent that can promote policy changes and e c o n o m i c and social development. T h e r e is both promise and potential danger in attempts to

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reform the civil service in Nigeria. On the one hand, the reforms are designed to increase the capacity of the bureaucracy to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c and social change. O n the o t h e r hand, the civil service has a history of personalistic decisionmaking and self-promotion as it makes and implements policy. T h e s e contradictory tendencies n e e d to be r e c o n c i l e d as the c o u n t r y moves toward civilian government and political transparency. 1 0 Given the continued debt and e c o n o m i c difficulties facing Nigeria in the 1990s and beyond, the country's policymaking process will continue to be of concern to international development agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Notes 1. A number of core activities have been recognized and accepted as the responsibilities of the state. These are security, regulation, the provision of services, and socioeconomic development. How the state is organized to achieve specified objectives determines the management of public policy. Public policy can be viewed as a set of processes through which policies are initiated, formulated, implemented, sustained, and evaluated. Through such processes, the state is able to perform and achieve results. See Merilee S. Grindle, ed., Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), for a discussion of public policy processes. 2. On recent events in Nigeria see Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1988); Thomas J . Biersteker, Multinationals, the Slate, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Sayre Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). Thomas Callaghy compared Nigerian structural adjustment efforts with those in Ghana and Zambia. See his "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," in Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World, ed. Joan M. Nelson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 257-319. 3. In particular, Edgar Pisani had concerns about externally imposed free-market conditions in the African context: "If the state did not support the national reality which is in the process of emerging, if there was no national protectionism opposed to completely deregulated international markets, the economy of the developing countries would be in a worse state than it is today. To simply and clearly preach obedience to the law of the market place is to wish to impede the establishment of an African agriculture and economy; to speak of enterprises is too often to speak of foreign enterprises and to encourage their conquering advances." Edgar Pisani, "Accessibility and Sensitivity of Public Administration" (paper presented at the International Conference of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Marrakesh, Morocco, August 1990), p. 27.

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4. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics. 5. See T h o m a s Biersteker's analysis of the role of multinational corporations, local business, and state actors in Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy. 6. Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market," p. 261. 7. See Section 4(1) and 4(2) of Decree 43 (Abuja: Government of Nigeria, 1988). 8. Jerald Hage and Kurt Finsterbusch, Organizational Change as a Development Strategy: Models and Tactics for Improving Third World Organizations (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp. 77-78 and 241-242. On the other hand, Guy Peters warned against a professional value system that places professional loyalties above that of the administrative a n d political systems as a whole. See B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 1989), pp. 276-277. 9. Training, as defined by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Report on Mass Communication, No. 73 (Paris: UNESCO, 1975), involves a planning process to influence attitudes and transmit the skills necessary to induce the effective communication of ideas, information sharing, and experience transfer. 10. The abrogation of Nigeria's J u n e 12, 1993, elections by the military regime brings this change into question.

4 Zambia: Form Versus Substance in the One-Party State Gatian F. Lungu & Mulenga C. Bwalya

W r i t i n g a b o u t politics a n d p o l i c y m a k i n g in Z a m b i a today is a d a u n t i n g t h o u g h interesting a n d exciting exercise. 1 First, like m u c h of the rest of Africa, t h e r e has b e e n a general absence of a policy analysis perspective or tradition in Zambia. S e c o n d , Zambia has e n t e r e d the e r a of political pluralism, which e n g e n d e r s its own p r o b l e m s of analysis. Finally, public policies have generally b e e n a p p r o a c h e d f r o m a d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g perspective a n d within the c o n t e x t of m a c r o e c o n o m i c s . Rarely has t h e interdisciplinary nature and the institutional arrangements and rearrangements n e c e s s a r y f o r e f f e c t i v e policy analysis, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , a n d e v a l u a t i o n b e e n given a d e q u a t e a t t e n t i o n . It w o u l d n o t b e surprising, f o r e x a m p l e , if o n e failed to f i n d literature on Zambian public policy t h a t specifically refers to or prescribes institutional o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s f o r policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , c h a n g e , a n d sustainability. This gap r e n d e r s it difficult to confidently p r e s e n t the Zambian case. With t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of pluralism in O c t o b e r 1991, 2 m a n y writers have b e e n carried away with speculation a b o u t what things will or s h o u l d b e like a f t e r t h e c h a n g e of g o v e r n m e n t . S u c h s p e c u l a t i o n has n e i t h e r c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e n o r a s u s t a i n a b l e f o u n d a t i o n . It was this p r o f o u n d d i l e m m a that p e r s u a d e d us to e x a m i n e what has b e e n in existence over the past seventeen years, namely, p u b l i c policy in o n e - p a r t y Z a m b i a , r e f l e c t i n g o n t h e experiences of capacity building for policy c h a n g e a n d sustainability. T h e policy successes a n d f a i l u r e s of t h e o n e - p a r t y state s h o u l d provide a n i n t e r e s t i n g analytical f r a m e w o r k , especially with t h e return to a multiparty state a n d with all the hopes, expectations, a n d dangers that accompany such a m a m m o t h transition.

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Public Policymaking in Zambia The Institutional

Arrangements

Zambia has applied a mixed approach to the policy process. T h e adoption of a combination of approaches has been both the cause and the result of the nature of the institutions themselves a n d the institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s made for policymaking. Consequently, in theory the government comprises a complex array of institutions organized in various and a p p r o p r i a t e ways to ensure that relevant, realistic, and balanced policies are formulated in which goals are matched with resources and strategies are put forth for goal achievement. The reality, however, has not lived up to the aspirations of those who designed Zambia's policymaking bodies. Political

Institutions

In the one-party system that existed in Zambia from 1973 to 1991, the organ at the apex of the system was the U n i t e d National Independence Party (UNIP). According to Article 7 of the UNIP Constitution: "The party is the s u p r e m e organization and the guiding political force in the land. Its main task and objectives as expressed in Article 4 shall provide guidelines for all persons and institutions in the Republic." 3 It is instructive here to note the key words: "shall provide guidelines for all persons and institutions in the Republic." These words d e n o t e that the party (UNIP) was both the source and confluence of policies in the nation and therefore was supreme. Further, as Article 8 of the constitution enunciates, "no law, regulation or Act shall be enacted, passed or d o n e by any state organ which is in conflict or inconsistent with the National Policies of the Party."4 Thus, all Zambian policymaking institutions, whether party, government, or nongovernmental, were to draw guidelines from and operate within the broad policy provisions of the party. We must hasten to point out here that although the party was supreme in accordance with the philosophy of humanism, it was not above h u m a n beings. Rather, it was supposed to be a tool or an instrument for the service of humans. 5 The party operated through a hierarchical series of ordinarily elective national and local organs. At the apex of the five national organs was the Party Congress, followed by the National Council, the Central Committee, the Committee of Chairmen, and the Party Control Commission. T h e local organs were more n u m e r o u s

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(thirteen in all) and ranged from provincial committees down to section councils. T h e Party Congress, known as the General Conference until 1988, met once every five years and was the supreme policymaking organ of the party and government. Its wide membership included all members of the National Council and up to 600 delegates from each province. Its main functions included: the election of the president and members of the Central Committee of the party; the definition and orientation of genera! policies for the nation's development; and the formulation, revision, and the consideration and approval of national development plans. Operating as the organ for formulating general policy and guidelines of both the party and the government, the decisions of the Party Congress were considered "valid a n d obligatory to the Party, G o v e r n m e n t and public institutions and [could] only be revoked or altered by the Party Congress." 6 During the interval between one Party Congress and the next, the National Council of the party assumed the m a n t l e of policymaking at its yearly meetings. T h r o u g h several committees covering important national policy areas, the council had the responsibility to: 1. Direct the activities of all organs of the party and the state within the framework of the principles and resolutions passed by the Party Congress; 2. Determine the political line for the implementation of party policies, review and appraise party programs and national development plans, reappraise the legal and sociocultural organization and development of the country; and 3. Approve candidates for the office of president of the party and members of the Central Committee. T h e inclusion in the National Council of groups such as permanent secretaries; district executive secretaries; senior officers from the state house, the party headquarters, and the cabinet office; chiefs of the defense and security forces; and so on, was an effort to integrate at the highest level of policy formulation the technocratic, defense, and security organs of government. The goal was to inject the necessary technocratic inputs into the policy analysis process. Next there was the Central Committee of the party, with its inner circle Committee of Chairmen of subcommittees of the Central Committee, whose j o b was to further concretize the broad policies and guidelines emanating from the National Council. Beginning in 1988 the composition of the Central Committee was increased to

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sixty-eight members, consisting of forty-one members elected by the Party Congress, seven members appointed by the president of the party, and not more than twenty cabinet ministers. T h e inclusion of twenty cabinet ministers and seven appointed members in the Central C o m m i t t e e was i n t e n d e d to ensure that technocrats and professionals with expertise in relevant policy areas were included. This allocation also allowed for the participation of both technocrats and politicians at the highest levels of policy formulation. I n d e e d , through the twenty-three-member C o m m i t t e e o f Chairmen (under the chairmanship of the president o f the party), the Central Committee ensured not only that major policy areas were identified and specific policies analyzed but also that decisions regarding the running of the party and government were made and concretized. Again, it is important to note that each o f the ten subcommittees ( o f the Committee of Chairmen) was not only responsible for a particular policy area (for example, defense and security, social and cultural, rural development, and so o n ) , but it also was supported by up to six technocrat/professional advisers competent in a relevant subject area. In addition, after 1989, the secretaries of the subcommittees were experienced and competent technocrats or professionals at the permanent secretary level. At the 1988 national c o n f e r e n c e a n o t h e r organ, the Party Control Commission, was added to the list. It consisted of eleven members, and its main function was to monitor party, government, and state-owned enterprises and see that they understood and actively implemented party policies, decisions, plans, directives, and programs. T h e commission became the watchdog of the party and government, overseeing that all arms of the government operated within the policy guidelines of the party. Below the national organs there were thirteen local party organs whose main functions included: organizing the party; explaining and publicizing party policies and programs; planning, guiding, and supervising all development and financial activities; instilling a spirit of hard work and self-reliance; and mobilizing the people for socioeconomic and political development in their areas of jurisdiction. These levels also followed the principle of integrating technocrats and politicians. Ideally, the decisions arising from the local organs should have been based on objective and rational analysis. Government

Institutions

Although the main function of the government was to implement the policies of the party, it was not entirely excluded from the

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policymaking function. As we have noted above, government officers (technocrats) participated in the policymaking process through their membership in the various party organs. Through these various organs the government did, in fact, play a policy formulation and articulation role in its own right, in addition to its traditional policy implementation function. The organs through which government performed its functions included: the National Assembly, the cabinet ministries and departments, provincial and district administrations, parastatal bodies, and other agencies of the government in different sectors of the national economy. These organs, like those of the party, were organized hierarchically from national level down to the grassroots in the form of ministries, departments, provinces, districts, sections, stations, and camps. Although policy analysis transcends the entire spectrum of the government structure, the main organs of policy analysis were supposed to be the National Assembly, the cabinet and cabinet office, the National Commission for Development Planning, and the Ministry of Finance and other central ministries. The extent to which the National Assembly was a party or government organ tended to be complicated by the nature of the assembly's composition in a one-party state. In fact, it was aligned to the government hierarchy by virtue of Parliament being one of the three arms of government (the executive, the judicial, and the legislative). T h e National Assembly, therefore, was not, strictly speaking, a policy-formulating organ; rather, it was a policylegitimatizing, -legalizing, and -enabling organ. Like the courts and service commissions, the National Assembly was more or less an independent organ of the party and the government, which ensured the translation of policy resolutions and guidelines for implementation into b i n d i n g legal instruments and directions for governmental actions. Without the legislative seal, party policies could not be translated into practical policy outcomes by the g o v e r n m e n t machinery. Thus, the assembly e m p o w e r e d the g o v e r n m e n t ' s policy-implementing organs to i m p l e m e n t party policies. It had a significant influence on policymaking because legally the National Assembly could refuse to sanction or implement funding for policies that it did not support. Although the cabinet and the ministerial structures that flowed from it were primarily party policy-implementing organs, they were also policy-influencing bodies. Through membership in the cabinet and various cabinet committees, ministers, and other officials or technocrats were given the privilege of helping formulate party and government policy on all subjects, since it was through the cabinet and cabinet committees that broad party policies and programs

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were put into operation. At the same time, these were also the bodies through which suggestions from the ministries, departments, and g o v e r n m e n t agencies were discussed and crystallized for parliamentary consideration. These discussions i n c l u d e d the n o n w o r k a b i l i t y of policies, or a l t e r n a t i v e ways f o r t h e implementation of policies. The National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) 7 acted as a central planning agency translating party policy into concrete a n d comprehensive national development plans. T h e commission also took into consideration contributions from other government organs and the private sector and consulted with the budget office. T h e NCDP also coordinated the policy analysis process and arranged that planning data and resources were made available by the relevant ministries or through other sources. It was also responsible for monitoring the progress of all development programs in the country as well as being the body through which requests for foreign development assistance could be channeled. The ministries, provinces, and parastatal organizations f o r m e d the technocratic bodies for the practical implementation of policies. As technocratic organizations they followed a bureaucratic model. 8 T h e parastatal organizations also emphasized profit making. In practice, of course, the bureaucratic model was mediated and h i n d e r e d f r o m p e r f o r m i n g as well as it could by various environmental factors (for example, political interference, corruption, and nepotism) as well as the failure of the system to provide properly qualified, competent, highly committed, and ethically grounded personnel. The party and government organs were connected and formally interacted in many ways. First, the prime minister and his ministers were also members of the Central Committee of the party. Second, the Central Committee and cabinet held so-called joint meetings once every m o n t h . T h i r d , the C o m m i t t e e of C h a i r m e n had representatives f r o m both organs. In general, there were various opportunities for close interaction between party and government in policy formulation through their supervision of the large policy areas covered by the ministries and the parastatal sector. The

Process

From a national perspective, policymaking in Zambia has taken a two-pronged approach. The official position u n d e r UNIP was that policymaking would be conducted through a decentralized and participatory process. However, a fusion of a centralized policy approach and a decentralized policy approach existed (that is, up-

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down a n d d o w n - u p ) , which was s u p p o r t e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d by rational, t e c h n o c r a t i c analyses. In p r i n c i p l e this m e a n t that b o t h g e n e r a l a n d specific policy issues, problems, a n d suggestions were discussed a n d progressively s c r e e n e d f o r relevance, s o u n d n e s s , consistency, political correctness, a n d so on, by b o t h political a n d t e c h n o c r a t i c g r o u p s t h r o u g h a variety of institutions b e f o r e b e i n g crystallized a n d prioritized into policy options. 9 D e p e n d i n g u p o n the m a g n i t u d e , sensitivity, or h i e r a r c h i c a l / g e o g r a p h i c a l coverage of each policy a d o p t e d , it was p r o n o u n c e d by a n d allocated to any of several party a n d g o v e r n m e n t levels for action. In general, t h e r e was a system of mutually c o m p l e m e n t a r y a n d interactive policymaking between the political a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c technocratic hierarchies. T h e political hierarchy was c o n c e r n e d with the social, subjective, integrative conflict r e s o l u t i o n a n d survival interests of public policies. T h e c o n c e r n was to e n s u r e that t h e social values a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e p r e d o m i n a n t ideology or p h i l o s o p h y in the society were fulfilled. O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c - t e c h n o c r a t i c hierarchy was m o r e c o n c e r n e d with t h e specific, g o a l - o r i e n t e d o p t i o n s of society t h a t w e r e e c o n o m i c , rational, i n p u t minimizing, a n d o u t p u t maximizing. 1 0 T h r o u g h the interactive a n d consultative policymaking processes a m o n g the two hierarchies, b a l a n c e d policies (taking i n t o a c c o u n t relevant social, political, a n d e c o n o m i c realities) should have e m e r g e d . In this way practically all t h e basic policy d o c u m e n t s , s u c h as t h e party m a n i f e s t o s o r g u i d e l i n e s , national d e v e l o p m e n t plans, a n n u a l budgets, a n d so forth, should have been discussed a n d the necessary inputs o b t a i n e d at the various levels of the two hierarchies b e f o r e adoption. In terms of local or sectoral policies, t h e a p p r o a c h was to deal with t h e m at the local a n d sectoral levels so long as they did n o t significantly d i f f e r f r o m or conflict with b r o a d n a t i o n a l policy guidelines. T h e establishment of the integrated local administration system ( h e a d e d by a political appointee) in 1980 was d o n e precisely to s u p p o r t a n d e n s u r e that policymaking (at least f o r issues of local or s e c t o r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ) was d o n e t h r o u g h a d e c e n t r a l i z e d a p p r o a c h . Similar to what o c c u r r e d at t h e n a t i o n a l level, an i n t e g r a t e d a p p r o a c h b e t w e e n the political a n d t e c h n o c r a t i c h i e r a r c h i e s was provided f o r at the local a n d sectoral levels, with policy issues subjected to b o t h political a n d t e c h n o c r a t i c scrutiny before adoption. In practice, however, some of these provisions were n o t always followed. For e x a m p l e , "ad hoc-ism" o c c u r r e d to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t t h r o u g h o u t the p e r i o d of K a u n d a ' s presidency, with t h e p r e s i d e n t m a k i n g s u d d e n decisions in e m o t i o n a l o u t b u r s t s at

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public meetings and without the benefit of counsel. There have been many cases where what we have termed the "political/integrative/subjective" approach has led to policies being a n n o u n c e d in public before being subjected to the " e c o n o m i c / rational/analytical" process. Without proper scrutiny and detailed knowledge of the range of policy options and probable implications, policy issues have emerged as national policies in political addresses and declarations delivered at various occasions. Often this was d o n e to satisfy the social-psychological needs and expectations of the audience or for political or ideological expediency. Two r e c e n t a n d related examples of "ad hoc-ism" seem appropriate to examine. At a press conference held at the State House on November 2, 1988, President Kaunda announced: (1) the setting up of a housing conglomerate to take charge of government housing, and (2) the transfer of the erstwhile Civil Service Mechanical Services D e p a r t m e n t (MSD) to ZIMCO (Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation) and directed that it be split into provincial companies. T h e president then went on to note that "what I want to see is that civil servants get good housing allowances and find themselves housing." Current government houses "must be for rent, d o i n g business parastatal wise. We must succeed, we cannot fail." 11 Regarding MSD, the president announced that the government would hold 51 percent of the shares; private capital would take the rest. It was also a n n o u n c e d that foreign investors would provide machinery and general managers for the next five years. T h e intention and rationale of these policy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s were well meaning. T h e president wanted not only good a n d efficient housing and mechanical services for the public service and the populace at large, but he also wanted the new organizations to operate on profit lines, generating their own incomes and standing on their own feet. This action was meant to end g o v e r n m e n t subsidies to these organizations, freeing more investment for other public ventures or for deficit reduction. In the end, the government would be able to provide an adequate, viable, and efficient service to the people. Strangely enough, however, the newly appointed top managers were instead directed not only to study and p r o pose workable structures and ways and means of making the organizations operate; they were f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d to scout a r o u n d for suitable investors and initial f u n d s to enable them to start operating. This is an example of both the social/subjective and ad hoc approaches to policymaking. The policy pronouncements seemed to be little more than politically expedient, thinly veiled responses to

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a n d pacification of the growing mass of vocal p e o p l e who h a d b e e n persistent in their complaints about the shortages a n d inadequacy of housing or the m e d i o c r e services r e n d e r e d by MSD. T h e n a t u r e of t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t s clearly n e g a t e d any possibility of t h e a priori subjection of overtly desired social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s to rational scrutiny in o r d e r to arrive at policy options; their social, economic, a n d political implications; the types a n d sources of resources; and the institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s n e e d e d to i m p l e m e n t the options. Not surprisingly, both policy directives have m e t with difficulties in i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e policy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s w e r e m a d e without outlining the c o r r e s p o n d i n g organizational structures; without d e f i n i t e knowledge of a n d c o n c r e t e a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r the types of resources required, their availability, a n d their source; a n d without stipulating the institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s , operational rules, a n d the standards of m e a s u r e m e n t of their goal a t t a i n m e n t levels. In the case of housing, apart f r o m the director general's post t h e r e was n o provision f o r s u p p o r t staff, which h i n d e r e d t h e i m m e d i a t e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the policy. At the same time the new organization was d e p e n d e n t o n e c o n o m i c r e n t s ; yet n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s were (or have b e e n ) m a d e to a d j u s t the h o u s i n g allowances of civil servants to levels that would e n a b l e t h e m to pay the e c o n o m i c rents e x p e c t e d , most likely because the g o v e r n m e n t p r o b a b l y h a d n o e x t r a f u n d s . Lack of clear g u i d e l i n e s a n d t h e i n a d e q u a c y o r lack of skilled p e r s o n n e l only a g g r a v a t e d t h e situation, needlessly delaying policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e r e is a n o t h e r h i n d r a n c e to t h e practical application of a balanced a p p r o a c h to policymaking. T h e measures taken to institute a m o r e d e c e n t r a l i z e d a p p r o a c h to p o l i c y m a k i n g s o m e w h a t c o n s t r a i n e d t h e process. Because of the relatively low d e g r e e of integration between the c e n t e r a n d the periphery, national leaders r e m a i n e d suspicious of decentralized power a n d the extent to which local leaders wanted to exercise direct control. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , local leaders saw this as i n t e r f e r e n c e in a n d attempts at u s u r p a t i o n of power by t h e national leadership. Mistrust r e i g n e d between t h e c e n t e r a n d t h e p e r i p h e r y , l i m i t i n g c o m m i t m e n t to policy implementation. The competition for power between national a n d local leaders m e a n t wasted efforts s p e n t in f e n d i n g off real or i m a g i n e d t h r e a t s to a u t h o r i t y at t h e e x p e n s e of policy implementation. G i v e n t h e s i g n i f i c a n t r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s in Z a m b i a , c o m p o u n d e d by the high costs of mobilization a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n of highly d e c e n t r a l i z e d systems as well as the s o m e t i m e s overt apathy o b s e r v a b l e a m o n g local p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , s o m e n a t i o n a l

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leaders and technocrats have tended to see the decentralized approach as too wasteful and inefficient to merit their support. Among these doubting Thomases there has been an absence o f committed and concerted effort to see the policies succeed.

Capacity Building for Policy Change and Sustainability The Status Quo T h e discussion o f policymaking institutions has shown that arrangements during the Kaunda period emerged from a series of reform measures to improve the capacity o f political and technocratic institutions in formulating and implementing policies. T h e reforms have been predicated largely on the greater integration of political and t e c h n o c r a t i c elements to improve objectivity, effectiveness, and efficiency in the formulation and implementation of policies. For example, we have seen the deliberate widening of the membership of the Central Committee of the party from the original twenty-five members to sixty-eight members to include a sizable n u m b e r o f seasoned technocrats holding very high, influential, and strategic positions in the government; parastatals (including mining companies); and the private business and trade union sectors. Second, the party leadership created a c o m m i t t e e 1 2 to coordinate and supervise the formulation and implementation of national party policies. They also established the Party Control Commission to monitor the administration of policies as well as to periodically r e c o m m e n d areas of improvement in the policy development and implementation process. Third, we noted the reorganization of ministries to reduce their size, activities, and staff contingents to improve coordination and reduce operational costs. T h e Ministry of Finance, for example, was merged with and swallowed the NCDP, and the Division of Science and T e c h n o l o g y has been added to the Ministry of Higher Education. T h e r e have also been actions such as the hiving off of ministries, departments, or divisions and establishing them as independent corporations or companies operating on free-market principles. As examples of the latter, we noted the experiences of the Mechanical Services Department and the Public Housing Division of the Public Works Department. Fourth, key planning and policy monitoring institutions were strengthened. Examples include the Ministry of Finance's efforts to strengthen the NCDP and to upgrade the budget office; the transfer

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of t h e division f o r decentralization to the c a b i n e t office; a n d t h e creation of provincial a n d district p l a n n i n g units t h r o u g h o u t t h e country to c o o r d i n a t e a n d advise on d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g activities at the lower levels of the policy process. T h e structural a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d o r g a n i c c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e new institutions were n o t only relevant a n d conducive to rational, effective, a n d efficient public policy f o r m u l a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n tation, b u t they were also in k e e p i n g with t h e socialist-oriented national philosophy of h u m a n i s m d e f i n e d by President Kaunda a n d UNIP. Admittedly, most of these measures were p u t in place b e f o r e the 1991 elections, m a k i n g it difficult for a fair evaluation of their impact on t h e policy process. Even so, it is possible o n the basis of previous experience to make an ex-ante evaluation of the impact a n d sustainability of such changes, if only to have a clear prognosis of likely things to come. The

Constraints

In the past o n e of the m a j o r f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e quality of policymaking a n d successful policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d sustainability has not been the structural aspect, b u t , r a t h e r , t h e process aspect. By process, we refer to a whole matrix of intraorganizational factors i n c l u d i n g choice a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n of activities, p l a n n i n g , time m a n a g e m e n t , c o n s u l t a t i o n , discipline, g r i e v a n c e h a n d l i n g , delegation, learning, a n d , above all, decisionmaking. T h e lack of a p p r o p r i a t e skills in t h e s e a r e a s has m e a n t t h a t even s i m p l e p r o b l e m s o r n o n p r o b l e m s can halt the process of g e n u i n e , welli n f o r m e d policymaking or effective i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f r o m t a k i n g place. Both the f o r m u l a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of policy r e q u i r e highly skilled, c o m p e t e n t , perceptive, flexible, strong, a n d effective m a n a g e m e n t p e r s o n n e l at all levels of the policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n process. Hunan resources. T h e c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e r e g a r d i n g m a n a g e m e n t p e r s o n n e l within the civil service is that they are o f t e n weak, misplaced, f r i g h t e n e d , f r u s t r a t e d , a n d o f t e n u n c o m m i t t e d to the policies of the nation. Such behavior is not conducive to effective a n d rational policy f o r m u l a t i o n , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , a n d sustainability, even w h e n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e institutional structures exist. As Ollawa has observed, the typical behavior of such p e r s o n n e l u n d e r these circumstances is to base their j u d g m e n t s on an assessment of their s u p e r i o r s ' (politicians) i n t e r e s t in t h e m a t t e r , o r w h e t h e r t h e i r superiors have taken a public stance on the matter. 1 3 T h e m a n a g e m e n t attitudes observed by Ollawa can be the result

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of several factors: gross m i s p l a c e m e n t of p e r s o n n e l in an effort to effect e t h n i c balancing; the lack of properly qualified a n d skilled staff; a n d t h e very p o o r salaries a n d conditions of service f o u n d in the public sector. R e g a r d i n g the latter, a typical civil servant with similar qualifications a n d e x p e r i e n c e o f t e n will receive a salary three times smaller t h a n h i s / h e r parastatal c o u n t e r p a r t , a n d u p to six times less t h a n h i s / h e r private sector c o u n t e r p a r t , a n d without any f r i n g e benefits. In view of t h e w o r s e n i n g e c o n o m i c situation in Zambia, with galloping inflation a n d the resultant high cost of living, the civil service offers little incentive to e n g e n d e r c o m m i t m e n t a n d productivity on a sustainable basis. T o b e s u r e , t h e Z a m b i a n g o v e r n m e n t has e m p l o y e d many q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n n e l in ministries a n d parastatal c o m p a n i e s . T h e problem is that these are too few a n d they are often deployed in jobs they were n o t trained for, making it extremely difficult f o r t h e m to have a m e a n i n g f u l impact. Moreover, qualified p e r s o n n e l d o not stay long in g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y m e n t d u e to the p o o r conditions of service. Consequently, overall h u m a n resources are u n d e r q u a l i f i e d , with the result that g o v e r n m e n t capacity to formulate a n d i m p l e m e n t policies is seriously i m p a i r e d . In local g o v e r n m e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , many district councils d o not have qualified engineers, accountants, or economists, let a l o n e p l a n n e r s , so that even o r d i n a r y r o u t i n e duties are not adequately a t t e n d e d to. Finance and infrastructure. Even if Zambia had well-placed, skilled, a n d c o m p e t e n t p e r s o n n e l m a n n i n g the policymaking a n d policyi m p l e m e n t i n g organs of the party a n d the government, their impact would n o t be g r e a t because they would lack the basic tools a n d i n s t r u m e n t s of t h e i r t r a d e . Again, t h e d i s c o u r a g i n g e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t o b s e r v e d earlier p r e c l u d e s the p r o c u r e m e n t of an a p p r o p r i a t e a n d a d e q u a t e policy i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ( f o r e x a m p l e , computers, transport, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n facilities). Many policies also have f l o u n d e r e d d u e to t h e i n a d e q u a t e f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s that a r e r e q u i r e d to i m p l e m e n t t h e m . For instance, the educational reforms p r o p o s e d in 1976-1977 stalled in the 1980s, partly d u e to i n a d e q u a t e f u n d i n g f o r e x t e n d i n g the years of compulsory basic education f r o m seven to nine years. O n e of the p r o b l e m s leading to i n a d e q u a t e f i n a n c i n g is that many policies are d e s i g n e d without financial c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e educational r e f o r m proposals f u r n i s h an excellent e x a m p l e of a public policy that was vigorously f o r m u l a t e d but lacked a budget. U n d e r c o s t i n g of policies is a n o t h e r p r o b l e m . T h e case of f o o d coupons, a n n o u n c e d in 1990, is o n e such example. T h e cost of f o o d c o u p o n s was calculated d u r i n g the policy formulation stage, but the

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costs f o r administering the p r o g r a m were ignored. T h e basic a n d underlying problem in Zambia, however, is the poverty that exists to a c o n f o u n d i n g d e g r e e . Since t h e collapse of the c o p p e r - b a s e d economy in the mid-1970s, the financing of almost all development policies has been extremely difficult. Donors have come to the rescue on several occasions, but this has increased the external debt and resulted in the devaluation of the national currency. T h e involvement of international lenders and donors in financing development policies has also created pressure for the Zambian g o v e r n m e n t to resort to strategies that exclude popular participation. Adjustment programs, for example, are merely a n n o u n c e d to the nation, and the g o v e r n m e n t appears to have little say in the f o r m u l a t i o n of these e c o n o m i c a d j u s t m e n t policies. Reorganization fever. An additional constraint in Zambia has b e e n the incessant tendency for reorganization. Although policy change is a necessary a n d i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in c r e a t i n g a responsive policymaking system, too m u c h c h a n g e can be d e t r i m e n t a l a n d counterproductive. T o o f r e q u e n t reorganizations, reshuffling, a n d transfers of structures, functions, and p e r s o n n e l not only create t u r b u l e n c e in the policy system, they also h i n d e r continuity a n d breed insecurity and uncertainty. Unless structures are given time to institutionalize, they will be of little i m p o r t a n c e to the capacity building process. S o m e of t h e r e f o r m m e a s u r e s have already h a d c o u n terproductive effects. For instance, the reduction of the retirement age of civil servants a n d reductions in the civil service personnel establishment have not had, at least in the short run, the i n t e n d e d effect of i m p r o v i n g the efficiency of the civil service. O n the contrary, r e t i r e m e n t s a n d p r u n i n g exercises have left ministries, d e p a r t m e n t s , a n d agencies with not only y o u n g a n d largely inexperienced personnel but also with fewer numbers. All of this is occurring at a time when the tasks of government are increasing in both size and complexity. Over the past few years these actions have contributed to both poorly analyzed policies a n d a slowdown in the pace of implementation. Such actions have no d o u b t c o n f o u n d e d the worsening socioeconomic conditions in Zambia today.

Conclusion This c h a p t e r shows clearly that the institutions a n d processes of policymaking in Zambia have u n d e r g o n e rapid transformation. T h e

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p u b l i c policy e n v i r o n m e n t o f t h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d 1 9 9 0 s is radically d i f f e r e n t f r o m that o f t h e 1960s a n d early 1970s. T h e 1 9 8 0 s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d and p r o p e l l e d by a d e e p a n d p r o l o n g e d e c o n o m i c crisis, which has so f a r p r o v e d i n t r a c t a b l e . T h e 1 9 9 0 s will b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y a n d f u r t h e r e c o n o m i c challenges as d e m o c r a t i c regimes struggle to survive. T h e well-adapted institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r policymaking and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n that have b e e n put in place in Zambia can only b e a r fruit a n d b e sustained if they can c o n t e n d with the following factors. T h e inertia and lack o f c o m m i t m e n t to policy and program i m p l e m e n t a t i o n on t h e part o f b o t h political and t e c h n o c r a t i c p e r s o n n e l must be overcome. T h e issue o f inadequate funding and o t h e r relevant resources, or delays and hitches in the cash flow for project activities, must be addressed. Attention also must be given to the p r o b l e m s o f ineffective a n d p o o r m a n a g e m e n t a n d s u p p o r t services and the a b s e n c e o f support for systematic training, not only o f policy f o r m u l a t o r s and e x e c u t o r s but t h e e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f system p e r s o n n e l . Finally, policymakers must address the p r o b l e m o f i n a d e q u a t e i n f o r m a t i o n flows f o r t i m e l y f e e d b a c k a n d readjustment in the policy process.

Notes 1. Sources used in the preparation of this chapter include: M. C. Bwalya, "Policy Teaching at the National Institute of Public Administration," AMTIESA [Association of Management Training Institutes for Eastern and Southern Africa] Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 1 (1991), pp. 2-6; K. D. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation, Parts 1 and 2 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967 and 1974); G. F. Lungu, "Citizen Participation in Zambia Development Administration: A Critical Appraisal of the Development Committees," Africanus, vol. 17, no. 112 (1987), pp. 5-20; S. A. Quick, "Bureaucracy and Rural Socialism in Zambia," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 15, no. 3 (1977), pp. 379-400; and Politics in Zambia, ed. William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974). 2. On October 31, 1991, Kenneth Kaunda was defeated in a landslide victory by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), led by Frederick Chiluba. Kenneth Kaunda had been ruling Zambia since 1964. Zambia became a one-party state in 1973. For a detailed discussion of Zambian politics, see Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, Class Struggles in Zambia, 1889-1989 and the Fall of Kenneth Kaunda, 1990-1991 (New York: University Press of America, 1992). 3. United National Independence Party Constitution, as amended at the party conference held at Mulungushi Rock, Kabwe, Zambia, August 18, 1988, p. 8. 4. Ibid. 5. Kaunda drew on the idea of African humanism, a communal approach to social welfare, which he claimed was a pillar of strength in

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precolonial society. H u m a n i s m was contrasted with the individualistic approach of capitalism. In practice, humanism came to refer to Zambia's state-centered socialism. 6. United National Independence Party Constitution, Article 53. 7. Headed by a director general (at the level of a senior p e r m a n e n t secretary). 8. T h e bureaucratical model is characterized by a hierarchy with specialization of tasks; considerable centralization of decisionmaking power; reliance on formal rules, regulations, and procedures; a n d appointments based on qualifications, career service, and impersonality. T h e structure of the technocratic bodies emphasized the concepts of rationality and efficiency in the implementation of party policies and programs. 9. It must be noted here that before the fourth national development plan, the party and government relied on external experts for policy analysis on the pretext that there was no local expertise. 10. More specifically, a concern with finding combinations with a greater probability of maximizing outputs from limited available resources. 11. See Times of Zambia, November 3, 1968, p. 1, and Zambia Daily Mail, November 3, 1988, p. 1. 12. Of chairmen of subcommittees of the Central Committee of the party. 13. Patrick E. Ollawa, Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development (Devon: Arthur Stockwell, 1979).

5 Tanzania: Moving Beyond the One-Party State Rwekaza S. Mukandala

&f William

Shellukindo

It is now recognized that policymaking involves choice, but it is also t r u e t h a t t h e p r o c e s s of m a k i n g c h o i c e s has received l i m i t e d attention f r o m Africans a n d Africanists alike. M u c h has b e e n said a n d written a b o u t t h e rights of African states to m a k e their own decisions a n d policies. T h e s e rights have b e e n r e g a r d e d as a sine q u a n o n f o r real s o v e r e i g n t y . W i t h i n t h e A f r i c a n d o m e s t i c p o l i c y m a k i n g a r e n a , m u c h also has b e e n said a b o u t w h i c h institutions are s u p r e m e in decisionmaking. These institutions have r a n g e d f r o m the party to the military. Yet, t h e r e has b e e n little c o n c r e t e r e s e a r c h a n d d i s c o u r s e on t h e a c t u a l p r o c e s s of decisionmaking, the actions involved, their impact, a n d implications for sustainability.

Decisionmaking and the Policy Process in Tanzania T o fully a p p r e c i a t e T a n z a n i a ' s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d policy process we must c o n s i d e r b o t h its formal a n d its practical d i m e n s i o n s as well as the i m p o r t a n t issue of actors. Formal Policymaking Decision

Structures

T a n z a n i a ' s constitution, like similar d o c u m e n t s elsewhere "sets out the framework a n d the principal functions of the organs of g o v e r n m e n t of a state, a n d declares the principles g o v e r n i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n of those organs." 1 Shivji correctly refers to the c o n s t i t u t i o n as t h e grundnorm2 a n d t h e basic n o r m . 3 T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n d e f i n e s , describes, a n d sanctions the laws a n d distribution of policymaking 67

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authority in the nation-state. The constitution also spells out the hierarchy of power and authority relationships, defines the relauonships, and describes the functioning of the various state organs and their responsibilities and limitations regarding policymaking. 4 T h e d o m i n a n t political ideology is also an important formal structural feature of policymaking in Tanzania. Since 1967 and until very recently, the ideology of Ujamaa or socialism and self-reliance has been an important factor that has formed the background for almost all policy decisions. The ideology spelled out the ends to be sought and the means to those ends. It also spelled out preconditions that had to be met before one becomes an important actor in the policy arena. 5 Tanzania's constitution and ideology established the rules of the game, defined what was legal and acceptable, p r o p o u n d e d the important characteristics of the political and policymaking system, and established the general parameters within which policies were made. These two features were also relatively stable and have been a result of the nature of developments in other important spheres of the political system, including struggles within and over the state. According to the Tanzanian constitution of 1977, the sole political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), is "the final authority in respect of all matters" in Tanzania. 6 Between 1965, when Tanzania became a one-party state, and 1977, when the constitution was enacted, the leading role and final say on "all matters" did not derive from the constitution. The party simply asserted its leadership. 7 It was only in 1977 that the party's leading role was constitutionally provided. The party's policymaking structures ranged from the party chairman, who currently is also president of the United Republic, through the Central Committee, the National Executive Committee (NEC), and the party general conference, which is held every five years. The party's policymaking and administrative functions 8 are coordinated by a secretariat. Top leaders of the party are also members of the cabinet as ministers without portfolio. According to CCM, "the party guides the Government and its organs by first of all setting the goals and objectives, policies, directives, and frequent orders, which are then transformed by the Government into plans of action and laws."9 Next in the formal structure is the government, which is headed by the president, in whom all executive powers relating to the union are vested. 1 0 The president is assisted by a cabinet appointed in consultation with the prime minister of his choice. T h e public sector is organized a r o u n d a ministerial system, but includes independent departments like the Civil Service Department in the Office of the President; commissions, which include t h e Civil

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Service Commission; and standing committees, such as the Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations. According to the constitution a n d the party, the role of government in policy decisionmaking is the transformation of policy decisions of the party into plans of action and laws. According to the formal design, the party decides and the government implements or decides on implementation. Thus, the party pronounces on basic policy, with the government deciding on operational policy. This is the conception that informed Goran Hyden's seminal paper on policymaking in Tanzania. 11 The Practice of

Policymaking

In practice, demands and needs from the public entered the policy process through both party a n d government structures. Government ministries initiated policy in response to public needs and demands manifested through field workers, the mass media, parliament, or citizens. As Shellukindo has pointed out: When a problem has been identified in a certain Ministry or field of work, the Ministry responsible usually initiates the policy process by preparing policy proposals in the form of a "Draft Cabinet Paper." The Draft policy proposals are then circulated to other Ministries and independent departments. The next stage is a final draft for discussion by Permanent/Principal Secretaries. The government has established an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) comprising all the Principal Secretaries. This is the intermediate stage where policy recommendations are firmed-up. 12

As the paper f u r t h e r explains, depending on the opinion of the IMTC a go-ahead may be given for the ministry c o n c e r n e d to prepare a cabinet paper requesting a policy decision at cabinet level, which may lead to the enactment of a law. There are also occasions when policy proposals are referred to the initiators for recasting. There are also instances when a proposal is turned down at the IMTC level. For a turned-down draft cabinet paper, the ministry responsible is normally advised to solve the real or assumed problem using existing mechanisms. 13 It must be emphasized that the above process involved not only secondary or operational policy, but also principal or basic issues. Because such issues may be involved, the party was represented in the cabinet by its chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary-general. The chairman was, of course, also the president. The other two were ministers without portfolio. The party also initiated policy through its own structures. The party secretariat and its various committees could research policy

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a n d f o r w a r d the results to t h e Central C o m m i t t e e a n d , ultimately, the NEC f o r decision. Party b r a n c h e s a n d o t h e r organs at the district a n d regional level could also express needs a n d / o r d e m a n d s , which c o u l d t h e n be c h a n n e l e d u p w a r d in t h e p a r t y s t r u c t u r e f o r processing a n d decision, a l t h o u g h this was rare. A majority of Tanzania's key policies were d e c i d e d u p o n by the NEC. Decisions were based o n submissions of the party secretariat e n d o r s e d by the Central Committee. At times, decisions were based o n submissions of the party c h a i r m a n . Such policy decisions include the A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n (1967); "Politics Is A g r i c u l t u r e " (1972); "Agriculture: Life or Death" (1974); t h e dissolution of cooperative u n i o n s (1976); a n d the M u s o m a Resolution on E d u c a t i o n (1974). T h e power of the NEC reflects its central role in g o v e r n a n c e in T a n z a n i a , particularly d u r i n g t h e years w h e n J u l i u s N y e r e r e was president. It also must be p o i n t e d o u t that, given the structures m e n t i o n e d above, t h e r e was little pressure-group activity r e g a r d i n g public policy until recently. T h e r e were few i n d e p e n d e n t associations in civil society, a n d those that did exist t r e a d e d carefully when it c a m e to a n y t h i n g r e s e m b l i n g p r e s s u r e o n the party-state. T h e few official organizations, such as the party-affiliated t r a d e unions, were m e e k a n d hesitant. Institutions of h i g h e r l e a r n i n g r e m a i n few, a l t h o u g h they have at t i m e s o f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e criticism a n d have c o n t r i b u t e d to the policy process. T h e lack of t h i n k tanks a n d s e a s o n e d p u b l i c policy analysts a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s is also a debilitating factor. Many of the pressure g r o u p s are issue o r i e n t e d a n d deal with local issues r a t h e r t h a n n a t i o n a l c o n c e r n s . T h e i r o c c a s i o n a l i n v o l v e m e n t in n a t i o n a l issues has b e e n rarely appreciated, as university students f o u n d out in April/May 1990. 14 T h e mass m e d i a have played a role in the policy process, b u t t h e i r d a t a have s o m e t i m e s b e e n u n r e l i a b l e a n d t h e i r analysis superficial. T h e i r p r e o c c u p a t i o n with what is "newsworthy" has tilted t h e focus in favor of personalities r a t h e r t h a n issues, a n d even sensationalism r a t h e r than objectivity. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the media have sensitized policymakers to p r o b l e m s or p o t e n t i a l p r o b l e m s requiring their attention. Overall, t h e r e was a serious gap between what the policy process was s u p p o s e d to be, a n d what it was in reality. Party supremacy was m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n real. T h e above scenario p r o v e d difficult to realize in practice a n d was the result of several incongruencies. First, t h e r e developed a misfit between the perceived policy role of the party a n d its policy d e c i s i o n m a k i n g capacity. T h e party s u f f e r e d f r o m a serious d e a r t h of talent in policy a n d o t h e r related fields. Most party officials h a d little e d u c a t i o n , let a l o n e t h e k i n d of

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sophisticated skills necessary for policy analysis. Second, the secondary role d e f i n e d for g o v e r n m e n t in policymaking did not match the resources in personnel, structures and systems, and finances available to the government. Third, there was a misfit between the self-declared commitment, dedication, and competence of the party in policymaking, and the failure of some of its self-declared policies in practice. Party policies that did not work include the policy on education (Musoma Resolution of 1975); the trade policy (Operation Maduka, 1976); the policy on Cooperative Unions and Local Authorities (1972-1976); and the policy on irrigation (Iringa Declaration). The fourth factor is the incongruence between what Nyerere has called the "trappings of independence" 1 5 on the one hand, and the realities of the power of the international capitalist system of which T a n z a n i a is a part. Tanzania's d e p e n d e n c y on i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions for goods, markets, services, technology, skills, and finances has been a major constraint on the formal machinery of policymaking. The inability to meet its needs from readily available domestic resources hindered many policy objectives, especially given the nature of the goals that the party wanted realized, including a frontal transformation and modernization of the country's economy and society. These are huge and complex goals that have eluded even those countries that are better e n d o w e d in resources, leadership, implementation capacity, and historical circumstances.

Redefining Decisionmaking Structures and Processes In the 1980s, there were changes in government structures, party structures, and in the policy relationship between government and party in Tanzania. All of these changes were responses to past failures, confusion, ineffectiveness, and even conflict in policymaking. The winds of liberalization and multi-partyism have brought in even more profound changes since 1987. Changes in Government

Structures

T h e changes in g o v e r n m e n t structures c e n t e r e d a r o u n d the ministries and the cabinet. Before 1982, the cabinet secretariat consisted of a secretary of the cabinet and a clerk to the cabinet. In 1982, a cabinet secretariat of four cabinet coordinators, one clerk, and one deputy clerk was established. In 1984, a system of cabinet under secretaries was established. These represented the professions involved in policymaking, especially political scientists and adminis-

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trators, economists, financial analysts, lawyers, and foreign service officials. Presently, the cabinet secretariat has an establishment of thirteen professionals. The Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (whose functions were described above) was also established at this time. A cadre of private secretaries was also f o r m e d to assist ministers a n d regional commissioners in their policymaking functions. Policy units are currently being established in each ministry to strengthen the policy analysis functions. Finally, cabinet liaison officials have now been a p p o i n t e d for each ministry to improve policy dialogue, c o o r d i n a t i o n , and analysis between ministries and the cabinet secretariat. Political changes associated with the introduction of multipartyism have been accompanied by the depoliticization of the state bureaucracy. The civil service can no longer be involved in partisan politics, although its members retain their civic and political rights. Changes in Party

Structure

The party also made structural changes to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. At its Congress in 1982, the party e x p a n d e d and consolidated its secretariat through a number of measures: creating more organizational units or departments; appointing members of the Central Committee to head the departments of the NEC; reestablishing the post of secretary-general of the party, which had been abolished in 1967; and, finally, appointing an overall secretary to the party NEC. T h e party secretary-general was now in charge of all party affairs. Second, the size of the Central Committee was reduced f r o m forty m e m b e r s to eighteen to facilitate decisionmaking, and the Central Committee began to function as a politburo. The whirlwind of changes brought about by calls for liberalization and multiparty democracy resulted in f u r t h e r changes in the party and to the party system. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution 1 6 removed relevant sections in the constitution that gave the party monopoly control of the political space in the country. It also removed party supremacy in policymaking; other acts f r e e d local authorities from party control. The drying up of government subsidies to the party also resulted in belt-tightening measures. These measures included the firing of more than one-third of party employees; the closure of almost all ideological training colleges; and the reduction of departments and commissions. Some of the party functionaries, including party chairpersons at all levels, now work on a voluntary basis. The p o m p and pageantry are also gone,

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including a police escort for the party secretary-general and special license plates for party cars and trucks. All party branch offices at places of work have also been closed, and the party's women and youth organization affiliates have been banished from work places. Finally, party representatives are no longer a permanent fixture on decisionmaking bodies such as the boards of directors of public enterprises. Changes in the Relationship of Government and Party The respective roles of government and party in policymaking as formally defined in the constitution have been hard to realize in practice. In response to policy-related problems, the late Prime Minister Edward M. Sokoine issued Prime Ministerial Circular Number 1 of 1984, which among other things redefined the concepts of basic or principal policy and secondary or operational policy. The former was confined to political decisions that sought "major changes" and involved high-level decisionmaking. 1 7 All substantive policy issues were left to the normal government machinery. Second, it was put on record that government through its ministries could initiate "basic policy." All that had to be done was to seek the blessing of the party before implementation. T h e above changes, among others, formally reinstated the bureaucracy in its traditional policymaking role. As the economic crisis of the 1980s intensified and Tanzania moved closer to the IMF and World Bank, party dominance in policymaking continued to wane in favor of government. Personnel from multilateral lending agencies were more likely to talk to fellow technocrats in the g o v e r n m e n t ministries, banks, and public enterprises than with politicians. As the 1980s progressed the party increasingly reigned rather than ruled over the policy process. The party rubber-stamped agreements already reached, diplomatically airing disagreements where policy choices were unacceptable. In effect, the party role was reduced to watching from the sidelines as government professionals and technocrats took direction from the international lending agencies. T h e introduction of multi-partyism has formalized the above arrangements. As noted, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in 1992 abolished the supremacy and the political monopoly of the sole political party. Additional legislation provided for the formation of political parties and the separation of party activities f r o m government activities. 18 Parties can now deliberate and formulate policies, and if elected to power, they can oversee policy implementation by the bureaucracy.

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Institutional Implication of Sustainability In the past, policymaking as described above rarely took institutional implications into consideration at the policy formulation stage. This omission was a result of several factors. T h e very n a t u r e of policymaking, formally dominated by the party but in practice a domain of the bureaucracy, had many u n i n t e n d e d consequences. Devoid of a capacity for effective policy analysis, the party proceeded to make policy pronouncements with little analytical backing. This practice was accompanied by a tendency to ignore and denigrate technical and professional advice, especially from the bureaucracy. Government was also not above blame. The capacity for policy analysis, research, and review has been totally lacking in some of the ministries. Policies were never revised unless there was a crisis or some important people were affected. T h e r e was no systematic evaluation of policy and no clear understanding and appreciation of the importance of policy analysis. Senior officials confused policy analysis with the planning of projects. Until recently, there was no institutional policy analysis framework at the ministerial level. It is only recently that policy analysis as a discrete activity has been established. As a consequence of past practices, policy reversal was very difficult and policy termination almost out of the question, even when evidence existed of institutional incapacity or bottlenecks. In cases where institutional shortcomings could no longer be ignored, policy change was lengthy and difficult. For example, the shortcomings of the Civil Service Act of 1962 were realized in 1981, but it was not until 1989 that changes were finally effected. In a n o t h e r instance, c r o p authorities swindled peasants and accumulated huge bank overdrafts for a decade beginning in 1976 before structural changes were introduced in agricultural marketing during the period 1985-1986. The following three additional factors have been consistently overlooked during the policy formulation stage. Finances. Rarely have a d e q u a t e costing and o t h e r financial implications of proposed policies been worked out. Presumably the underlying assumptions were that a d o n o r could be secured, contributions could be collected from the people, or taxes could be raised. Ideology may also have had something to do with this nonchalant attitude toward money. The Arusha Declaration decreed that "money is not the basis of development." 1 9 Such thinking and practices have had serious consequences for the sustainability of projects. In particular, little attention has been given to costing and budgeting for maintenance. Once a road or building project was completed, for example, budget allocations for maintenance were

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never a serious c o n c e r n , a n d rapid d e t e r i o r a t i o n inevitably occurred. The poor state of roads in the country is a result of this tendency. Human resource development. Many aspects of h u m a n resource development were also not taken into account. T h e numbers, quality, and motivation of personnel were more often than not overlooked. The Civil Service Census of 1988, for example, illustrates this tendency. The census counted ihe number of people in office by establishment, but gave no information about their skill levels. No j u d g m e n t s were made about the level of education, the value system in place, or the appropriateness of j o b placement within the civil service system. Policy linkages. Policy linkages have n o t always b e e n fully a p p r e c i a t e d . The party t e n d e d to p r o n o u n c e policy without consulting government. Government was regarded purely as an i m p l e m e n t i n g organ. Within government, ministries t e n d e d to initiate sectoral policies without consultation with other ministries. For example, many industrial projects were initiated by the Ministry of Industry without assuring a d e q u a t e power supply t h r o u g h consultations with the Ministry of Energy and the power supply company. Musoma Textiles, Mwanza Textiles, and the spinning and weaving mills at Tabora all fell victim to the above omission. In a n o t h e r instance, cashew n u t - p r o c e s s i n g capacity was b e i n g expanded through the construction of new factories when cashew nut p r o d u c t i o n was declining. Liaison with the Ministry of Agriculture could have resulted in a change of policy. Finally, a starch-processing factory was put into operation in Shinyanga without first securing assurances of adequate supplies of the raw material cassava from the concerned ministry. T h e importance of sound policy analysis and development management has been realized only recently, and were a result of internal self-criticism and evaluation following past problems and inadequacies. Gradually, public policy actors in Tanzania have realized the need for change. Even before the current changes the party had recognized that policy analysis did not hurt, and if anything, minimized the likelihood of failure. It also recognized that sound policy analysis "provides standards of a r g u m e n t and an intellectual structure for public discourse." 2 0 T h e g o v e r n m e n t bureaucracy also came to realize the importance of planning and structuring for policy analysis and coordination. The above changes in o r i e n t a t i o n were also partly a result of pressures f r o m international finance institutions.

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Consultation and Policy Sustainability T h e issue of consultation needs to be discussed at two levels: government functionaries and government clients. Efforts have been m a d e to m a x i m i z e t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e civil service in policymaking. T h e creation of a cabinet secretariat; the formation of the IMTC to which various experts can be invited by relevant principal secretaries; the creation of cabinet liaison officers; and the r e d e f i n i t i o n of basic a n d secondary policy have all i n c r e a s e d bureaucratic participation in the policy process. It is at t h e level of policy recipients, the clients of p u b l i c organizations, that p r o b l e m s remain. T h e a b s e n c e of i n t e r e s t groups has been an important factor. Moreover, lack of appreciation f o r the e f f o r t s of the few g r o u p s that d o exist has n o t b e e n e n c o u r a g i n g . T h e n a t u r e of Parliament, especially its structural characteristic as a committee of the party, and the low n u m b e r of members of Parliament who are elected rather than appointed, have c o n s t r a i n e d P a r l i a m e n t ' s f u n c t i o n as a m o u t h p i e c e of policy recipients. Changes have now been introduced to remove the first constraint. T h e n u m b e r of parliamentarians directly elected by constituencies is b o u n d to increase in the next Parliament. Stateparty control of the media (press and radio) has also h i n d e r e d the policy process, but s o m e change has b e e n o c c u r r i n g , with several papers now published by private groups, although the radio remains u n d e r state control. What needs to be emphasized is the negative c o n s e q u e n c e s of lack of consultation. It c a n n o t be denied that it has had financial, h u m a n , a n d even political consequences. The issue of the h e a d tax can be used f o r illustrative purposes. A bill was i n t r o d u c e d in Parliament m a n d a t i n g the taxation of every citizen over seventeen years in Tanzania. Unlike the colonial hut tax, which, in practice, taxed m e n as o w n e r s / h e a d s of households, the h e a d tax included women. Although the g e n d e r issue was raised with regard to the head tax by some members of Parliament and some councils, it was brushed aside. In practice, the law contravenes one of the basic cultural norms of several groups in Tanzania whereby women are not supposed to interact with outsiders. T h e interaction between tax collectors and women has at times b e e n an infringement of that n o r m a n d has not been looked on favorably by some of the societies c o n c e r n e d . As a consequence, not only have the taxes not been paid, but bitterness and alienation have also accompanied attempts to collect the tax. Had there been meaningful consultation, many of these difficulties could have been avoided.

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Policy Capacity and Human Resources Many of Tanzania's senior policymakers are either unaware of or lack a b r o a d c o n c e p t i o n a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n of p u b l i c policy management. Many are from the professions and have not had t h e benefits of an orientation into the broader issues of governance. It must also be pointed out that although most Tanzanians have had access to formal education, only 5.6 percent are educated above the secondary level and G7 percent possess only a basic education. M o r e o v e r , few of t h e e d u c a t e d have h a d o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r c o n t i n u o u s t r a i n i n g a n d retooling. T h e r e has also b e e n little o r i e n t a t i o n f o r s e n i o r officials a s s u m i n g new positions. For e x a m p l e , the t o p executive t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m has placed little emphasis on policy analysis and m a n a g e m e n t issues. T h u s , old habits have continued unchecked. Changes in methods of recruitment into the civil service have not been helpful. The adoption of the system of allocating university graduates into positions in the civil service without the b e n e f i t of interviews, p e r s o n n e l assessment, a n d a selection process has b r o u g h t u n q u a l i f i e d p e o p l e into the bureaucracy. A system of a p p o i n t i n g p e o p l e to senior positions that disregards e x p e r i e n c e and age has had adverse effects. As a result, inexperienced persons have assumed top positions without learning and knowing how to manage a n d c o o r d i n a t e complex ministerial responsibilities. T h e c o m b i n a t i o n of youth a n d i n e x p e r i e n c e has also p r o d u c e d a tendency to stay too long (until r e t i r e m e n t ) , thus p e r p e t u a t i n g a level of i n c o m p e t e n c e . On the o t h e r h a n d , some personnel leave government after a short time to complete their education abroad, disrupting the smooth operation of the organization.

External Actors and Internal Capacity Building T h e r e is n o question that external actors c o n t i n u e to play an important role in Tanzania given international structural realities. The economic crisis of the last decade has e x p a n d e d their role even further. Interviews with many senior policymakers reveal several interesting points. First is their conviction that sustainable policy changes are those initiated from within the country, albeit with d o n o r assistance. Recipient-driven programs have a greater chance of sustainability than donor-driven initiatives. Second, there is a concern that many d o n o r initiatives lack analysis of what is on t h e g r o u n d . Consequently, there is a noted tendency to impose new programs

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even where similar initiatives are already in place. Third, t h e recipient's capacity to change or to internalize c h a n g e has not b e e n fully analyzed or appreciated. Finally, there has been an overemphasis on spending or, in donors' parlance, "moving money," a practice which many LDC policymakers find wasteful. All of the above have contributed to a resentment of d o n o r involvement in policymaking. What appears to be p r e f e r r e d is the institutionalization of mutually agreed u p o n procedures that would give d u e weight to recipient realities, resources, a n d sovereignty. D o n o r involvement t h r o u g h f u n d i n g technical s u p p o r t , supplying machinery and e q u i p m e n t , and providing training a n d research can only contribute to sustainable capacity when recipient realities are fully taken into account. See Chapter 9 for f u r t h e r discussion of this issue. Conclusion This c h a p t e r has a t t e m p t e d to describe a n d analyze t h e policymaking structures, processes, and actors in Tanzania. It has been pointed out that there was a divergence between what was m a n d a t e d by law a n d ideology o n the o n e h a n d , a n d what in practice constituted policymaking in Tanzania. It has been shown that steps were taken during the 1980s to bridge that gap. T h e chapter has also focused on the institutional changes that have b e e n initiated in light of past policymaking i n a d e q u a c i e s , bottlenecks, a n d even failures. These changes have o c c u r r e d in g o v e r n m e n t structures, party structures, a n d in the relationship between the two. T h e question of actor consultation has also been discussed. Although measures to e n h a n c e consultation between and within the party and the state have been taken, the same c a n n o t be said about consulting with the clients of public organizations: civil society. T h e r e remains a serious lack of consultative m e c h a n i s m s t h r o u g h which societal g r o u p s can effectively c o m m u n i c a t e with g o v e r n m e n t . It has also b e e n p o i n t e d out that several aspects of h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t still r e q u i r e a t t e n t i o n . Finally, i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o n o r participation in developing c o u n t r y public policymaking, implementation, and evaluation has increased during the 1980s. More efforts need to be made, however, to rationalize and c h a n n e l d o n o r involvement toward the creation of self-sustaining public policy capacity.

Notes The authors wich to acknowledge the helpful comments and criticisms made by Joseph Rugumyamheto, director, Policy Analysis, Research and

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Review, Civil Service Department, Government of Tanzania. 1. I. Shivji, The Legal Foundations of the Union in Tanzania's Union and Zanzibar Constitutions (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1990), pp. 8-9. 2. Ibid. For example, ground law or fundamental law. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Such as politicians divesting themselves f r o m property a n d investments that might influence their policy choices, or the mandate that civil servants not be allowed to own rental property. 6. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1990). 7. In 1992, Tanzania changed to a multiparty political system. 8. Since 1967, political officers from the party have headed Tanzania's regional and district administrations. 9. Mwongozo wa CCM (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1981), p. 103. 10. The Constitution of 1977, Section 34. Union matters include the constitution and the government of the United Republic, external affairs, defense and security policy, emergency powers, citizenship, immigration, external trade and borrowing, the public service, income tax, harbors, aid, transport, posts and telecommunications, currency, coinage a n d legal tender, banks, industrial licensing, and statistics. Nonunion matters include education, internal trade, health, and so on. 11. Goran Hyden, "We Must Run While Others Walk: Policy-making for Socialist Development in Tanzania-Type of Politics," in Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania, ed. Kwan S. Kim, Robert B. Mabele, a n d Michael J. Schultheis. (London: Heineman Educational Books, 1979), pp. 5 13. See also G. Munishi, "Policymaking and Implementation in the Social Services Sector," in Conflicts on Structural Adjustment, ed. G. W. Strom (London: Macmillan, 1991); Rwekaza S. Mukandala, "Bureaucracy and Agricultural Policy: T h e Case of Tanzania," in Bureaucracy and Developmental Policies in the Third World, ed. H. K. Asmerom, R. H o p p e , a n d R. B. Jain (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1992), pp. 60-74. 12. William Shellukindo, " E n h a n c i n g Public Policy M a n a g e m e n t Capacity in Africa: Issues and Critical Skills" (Dar es Salaam, mimeo, 1989). 13. Ibid. 14. Students at the University of Dar es Salaam went on strike in April 1990, demanding among other things an increase in the education budget, necessary repairs to the university building a n d o t h e r infrastructure, increased salaries for university lecturers, closure of the city waste d u m p l o c a t e d in a heavily p o p u l a t e d n e i g h b o r h o o d , e x p l a n a t i o n a n d accountability f r o m those responsible for b u r n i n g down the Bank of Tanzania building in 1988, a n d so on. T h e government r e s p o n d e d by closing down the university for more than one year. 15. J. K. Nyerere, "The Process of Liberation," in Politics and State in the Third World, ed. Harry G o u l b o u r n e (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1979), pp. 248-258. 16. U n i t e d Republic of Tanzania, Eighth A m e n d m e n t to t h e Constitution, 1992. 17. According to the principal secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, Government Minute, 1991. 18. See, in particular, United Republic of Tanzania, Act No. 5, 1992.

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19. Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). 20. G. Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 7.

6 Kenya: Contextual Factors and the Policy Process Walter 0. Oyugi

T h i s c h a p t e r presents a broad perspective o f the c o n t e x t and m a n n e r in which public policy formulation and implementation occur in Kenya. T h e point of departure is a brief statement on the sociocultural factors influencing the policy process.

T h e Sociopolitical and Economic Setting As Bauer and Gcrgen 1 have pointed out, policymaking is the setting of courses of action designed to implement the values, usually o f a fairly large group o f persons, on a given issue without unduly c o m p r o m i s i n g o t h e r values on o t h e r issues. If we a c c e p t this position, then the social, political, and e c o n o m i c setting within which the process takes place has direct bearing on the policy made. The demands to which the policymakers respond usually originate in the society, and it is that environment that places limits and constraints upon what can be done by those charged with the task o f policymaking. 2 Often the policy agenda (that is, what should be acted u p o n ) is also i n f l u e n c e d by the dynamics within that environment. It is my c o n t e n t i o n that social, political, and e c o n o m i c conditions in Kenya directly influence agenda setting as well as the actual formulation of public policies. At the social level, the value orientation of many Kenyans, which influences them to react to policies and their i m p a c t in e t h n i c terms, is often a m a j o r consideration in both agenda setting and actual policy formulation. Policies affect people directly or indirectly. In Kenya, society continues to be predominantly organized geographically, according

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to e t h n i c g r o u p identities. Policies relating to the d e v e l o p m e n t of certain areas are, ipso facto, policies that affect a given ethnic g r o u p directly. T h e c r i t e r i o n of social e q u i t y has t h e r e f o r e b e e n a consideration, given the n a t u r e of the social structure of the society. At the political level, the roles that each of the legally authorized political organs (the executive, the legislature, a n d the ruling party) of the state play in policymaking varies. Over the years, the executive has e m e r g e d as the c e n t e r of policy initiative a n d also as the c e n t e r of a g e n d a d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e political arms of the executive are t h e president a n d his cabinet. By law a n d convention, the cabinet u n d e r the l e a d e r s h i p of t h e p r e s i d e n t is responsible for policy approval r e g a r d i n g b o t h s u b s t a n c e a n d timing. T h e executive also works t h r o u g h the civil bureaucracy. Both the strengths a n d weaknesses of t h e b u r e a u c r a c y in policy analysis b e a r directly o n the quality of policies f o r m u l a t e d a n d i m p l e m e n t e d . T h e legislative role in policymaking has b e e n primarily reactive. T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c is partly d u e to t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n h i b i t i o n s i n h e r i t e d at i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e Westminster model of g o v e r n m e n t t h a t Kenya i n h e r i t e d was m o d i f i e d w h e n t h e n a t i o n b e c a m e a republic, but the p r o c e d u r e s associated with it in the passage of bills r e m a i n s u n c h a n g e d . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the initiative o n the policy f r o n t r e m a i n s with the p r e s i d e n t a n d his cabinet. T h e r o l e t h e legislature plays is t h e r e f o r e limited because it c a n n o t meaningfully p a r t i c i p a t e in s e t t i n g a policy a g e n d a . T h e 1993 c o n v e n i n g of a multiparty P a r l i a m e n t a f t e r controversial elections is not likely to c h a n g e this. T h e structural c o n f i g u r a t i o n of Kenya's p a r l i a m e n t is also a m a j o r c o n s t r a i n t . P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s lack t h e r e q u i s i t e facilities necessary for the satisfactory discharge of legislative duties, namely, a well-developed library with up-to-date material, a s u p p o r t staff to assist in the p r e p a r a t i o n of policy papers, a n d a d e q u a t e office space. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e are n o s t a n d i n g functional committees that can r o u t i n e l y s u b p o e n a g o v e r n m e n t officers a n d / o r relevant public officials to testify o n m a j o r policy issues. T h e political e n v i r o n m e n t has also i m p o s e d c o n s t r a i n t s o n p a r l i a m e n t a r y a u t o n o m y in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e e m e r g e n c e of " c o u r t " politics u n d e r Mzee J o m o Kenyatta 3 ( 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 7 5 ) f u n d a m e n t a l l y r e d u c e d t h e i n f l u e n c e of p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s in t h e legislative process. As a result, t h e P a r l i a m e n t was increasingly r e q u i r e d to simply e n d o r s e decisions already m a d e by the "court" actors. T h e d o m i n a n c e of t h e political executive a n d the systematic p a t r o n a g e c u l t u r e t h a t a c c o m p a n i e d it m e a n t t h a t only t h o s e parliamentarians perceived to be supportive of the regime benefited f r o m the system. This style of politics h a d the effect of t a m i n g

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Parliament, effectively reducing its voice o n legislative matters. T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the p o l i t i c a l e x e c u t i v e a n d the Parliament during Daniel T . arap M o i ' s r e g i m e ( t h e p e r i o d o f the d e facto one-party state, 1978-1992) did not c h a n g e f o r the better. If anything, executive d o m i n a n c e continued, and M o i ' s interventionist style ensured that there would b e n o doubt about the thinking o f the executive o n the issues o f the m o m e n t . I n d e e d , M o i ' s p r e e m p t i v e decisionmaking style o f t e n put o t h e r policy actors o n the defensive and deprived them o f the initiative. H o w e v e r , the relative strength o f the Kenya P a r l i a m e n t in contrast with those o f o t h e r T h i r d W o r l d countries ( o t h e r than I n d i a ) s h o u l d also b e e m p h a s i z e d . O v e r the years the K e n y a n Parliament has had a g r o u p o f very active backbenchers w h o have, w h e n e v e r opportunities arose, seriously scrutinized policies initiated by the executive. T h e r e have also b e e n many instances in which individual backbenchers have initiated legislation on their own through private m e m b e r bills. O f t e n these were rejected by the f r o n t bench, only to reappear later in m o d i f i e d f o r m as g o v e r n m e n t bills. T h e r e f o r e , o n e cannot deny that backbenchers have sometimes had a direct role to play in policymaking in Kenya. I n d e e d , there are a few cases w h e r e as a result of individual m e m b e r initiatives, bills w e r e d r a f t e d and subsequently a c c e p t e d and i m p l e m e n t e d by the g o v e r n m e n t . For instance, the practices o f hire-purchase and paying married w o m e n house allowances were the result o f private m e m b e r bills. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t to note, h o w e v e r , is that n o t h i n g can b e a c h i e v e d by Parliament if the political executive opposes the measure. If the role o f Parliament in p o l i c y m a k i n g has b e e n marginal, that o f the ruling party, the Kenya African National U n i o n ( K A N U ) ( 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 9 2 ) has b e e n even m o r e dismal. T h e r e is no e v i d e n c e to show that K A N U has b e e n a key actor in the policymaking process. As David L e o n a r d correctly observed, the Kenyatta years p r o d u c e d an administrative state, w h e r e bureaucrats rather than politicians made most o f the day-to-day decisions. 4 T h e e m e r g e n c e o f such a state o f affairs s u b o r d i n a t e d the political party to the executive, giving the party no voice in policy matters. 5 T h e efforts o f the M o i r e g i m e to breathe some life into K A N U had little, if any, e f f e c t o n its o p e r a t i o n . T h e c h a n g e s w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g o c c u r r e d in 1989 w h e n a d e c i s i o n was m a d e to strengthen the administrative capacity o f the party by creating new administrative units in the party secretariat, h e a d e d by partya p p o i n t e d directors. T h e action was taken in recognition o f the fact that the party lacked an internal organizational f r a m e w o r k through which it c o u l d i n f l u e n c e policy. T h e absence o f a w e l l - d e v e l o p e d

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and staffed secretariat had been a major missing link since the inception of the party in 1960. Even after the strengthening of the secretariat in 1989, not much was heard f r o m the party on matters of policy formulation. As it later turned out, the directors did not have much to do. No attempt was made to synchronize their roles with relevant departments in the central bureaucracy. For instance, the director of legal affairs did not know how his activities related to those of the attorney general. The same absence of knowledge was also evident in the attorney general's office with regard to the activities of the director's office and of the director of youth and women affairs vis-a-vis her counterparts in the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. Others operated similarly. In the process of trying to justify their positions, some directors tried to p r e e m p t certain roles for their units or departments, only to run into problems that eventually led to the dismantling of most of the newly created units in May 1991 and the dismissal of the directors. The state was not prepared to have the party intrude upon its traditional operational domain. 6 Apparently there was no will on the part of the political executive, who was also the head of KANU, to change the nature of the relationship between the executive and the party on matters of public policy formulation. Thus, KANU remained a peripheral actor in the policy formulation process throughout the time it existed as the state party (1963-1992) and before the reemergence of a multiparty system. An analysis of the institutional context of policy formulation in Kenya must also focus on private sector institutions (including NGOs), considering the important role that they play in national development. Indeed, their role is underscored in the current National Development Plan (1989-1993), which notes that the plan "will rely a great deal on growth initiatives from the private sector." 7 Kenya also depends on external sources in financing budget deficits and for general investment, with d e p e n d e n c e on external support increasing steadily. For instance, external public debt outstanding from 1980 to 1987 grew from KE0.7 to K£3.8 billion, representing a rise from 32 percent to 62 percent of GDP at factor cost. 8 Overall, domestic private and nongovernmental institutions as well as external institutions exercise significant i n f l u e n c e on monetary and related d e v e l o p m e n t policies because of their financial leverage over the state. Several i n s t r u m e n t s of i n f l u e n c e are at work. O n e such instrument, especially in the field of development policy, is that of technical assistance. T h e ideas and values of donor-originated

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t e c h n i c a l assistance have directly i n f l u e n c e d t h e n a t u r e a n d character of most of the development policies that Kenya has b e e n associated with since i n d e p e n d e n c e . 9 Foreign investors, t h r o u g h local agents of various t r a n s n a t i o n a l , also seek on a regular basis to i n f l u e n c e the policy process. T h e i r influence is expressed in both i n f o r m a l (for e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h personal contacts) a n d f o r m a l channels (for example, through interest g r o u p activity, including the Kenya Association of M a n u f a c t u r e r s , F e d e r a t i o n of Kenya Employers, and the Kenya C h a m b e r of Commerce and Industry). T h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t e r e s t g r o u p s o n p u b l i c policy decisionmaking has been o n the increase, especially since 1971 when civil servants were officially allowed to engage in private business. 1 0 T h e result has been the overlapping presence of many senior civil servants ( t h e policymakers) in b o t h public a n d private sector organizations. This overlapping membership and interest is what has provided f o r the informality with which some policy decisions are made. T h e f o r e g o i n g discussion suggests that the d o n o r community a n d t h e private sector have h a d m o r e i n f l u e n c e o n policy formulation in Kenya than has the Parliament and the ruling party (KANU) a n d that the civil bureaucracy with t h e s u p p o r t of t h e presidency has been the major actor. This overview of the policy process has also shown the e x t e n t to which various c o n t e x t u a l factors influence and often control the process. A better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the institutional context of policymaking in Kenya can be g a i n e d if some tangible policies are isolated and analyzed. That is the main task of the remainder of the chapter.

The Formulation of Macropolicies T h e distinction drawn between t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of macropolicies and sectoral policies is analytical and, therefore, somewhat artificial. However, the distinction is m a d e simply to indicate that t h e r e are some policies that by their n a t u r e require the involvement of the m o r e m a n i f e s t l y political i n s t i t u t i o n s o r actors. Policies on d e v e l o p m e n t goals, the economy, national d e v e l o p m e n t strategy, and so o n fall within this category. A closer examination of some existing policies suggests that the involvement by political institutions has not been fully achieved. A case in p o i n t is the formulation of the broad national development goals a n d policies contained in the 1965 Sessional Paper on African s o c i a l i s m . 1 1 T h e s e policies a n d goals have g u i d e d Kenya's development efforts since i n d e p e n d e n c e . Some important tenets of

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the document include: egalitarianism as a major development goal, the concept of regional balance in pursuing development strategies, and the principle of a mixed economy. However, the ruling party as such had no direct involvement in the preparation of the paper. Rather, the d o c u m e n t was prepared by a few senior civil servants working closely with an expatriate adviser. O n c e approval was obtained at the a p p r o p r i a t e level of government, it was t h e n p r e s e n t e d to Parliament as a sessional p a p e r . T h e d o c u m e n t generated a lot of debate in Parliament, but n o n e of the policy recommendations were changed as a result of the debate. 1 2 It is important to stress again that this document, which Kenyatta once referred to as Kenya's development bible and which continued to be regarded as such in the Moi regime, was produced with no input from the ruling party and Parliament. The broad goals and policies contained in the 1965 Sessional Paper can be f o u n d in all the national development plans produced since then. As with the preparation of sessional papers, the national development plans have never been presented to the ruling party for discussion a n d appraisal. In the case of P a r l i a m e n t , the development plans have b e e n presented as finished products intended for general information of the parliamentarians. T h e general and specific policies that find expression in the d e v e l o p m e n t plans are o r i g i n a t e d by individual g o v e r n m e n t ministries, working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and National Development. Sectoral and intersectoral working committees set up to generate ideas on specific policies for a given plan are exclusively made u p of civil servants and their expatriate colleagues scattered throughout the various ministries. On some occasions, local academicians have been coopted into the committees. Committee recommendations are usually discussed inhouse by an expanded committee of the same people, with no effort made to involve outsiders. In the end, what comes out as the national development plan for a given period is a document that reflects the values and priorities of the civil service and the donor community. A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t ideological policy d o c u m e n t that was p r o d u c e d by the g o v e r n m e n t and contained broad, national development values, goals, and strategies is the 1986 Sessional Paper on economic management, which articulated privatization and other s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t m e a s u r e s . 1 3 Like the 1965 paper, this d o c u m e n t was the brainchild of senior bureaucrats a n d their expatriate advisers, especially in the Ministry of Planning and National Development. Having received formal approval at the appropriate level in government, the document was also presented

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to Parliament as a sessional paper and was endorsed intact. As noted, the examples cited also had substantial involvement by the d o n o r community through their locally based staff. Therefore, whatever mistakes have been made in the policymaking process, expatriate input can be viewed as part and parcel of the problem. Indeed, a recent World Bank document observed that to the extent that international donor agencies have been deeply involved in the development efforts in Africa since i n d e p e n d e n c e , they c a n n o t escape part of the blame for the African economic crises today, 14 T h e party manifestos p r o d u c e d between elections have also been sources of broad development values. They, too, have lacked i n p u t f r o m the relevant party organs b e f o r e they have been published. On some occasions, the authors have been civil servants. It is interesting to note that this essentially KANU-style of manifesto preparation has been emulated by the new political parties that have emerged in the multiparty era in Kenya. For instance, none of the major opposition parties that p r o d u c e d an election manifesto subjected the document to any open discussion by party supporters or their representatives. Some parties even acknowledged the authors of the document, an indication that the ideas contained in the document were of limited origin. T h e picture that emerges is that the formulation of macropolicies in Kenya has been dominated by the civil bureaucracy acting in collaboration with donor representatives and supported by the political executive (that is, the presidency). 15

Sectoral Policies In the formulation of sectoral policies, two approaches have been institutionalized in Kenya: (1) sectoral working committees; and (2) presidential committees or commissions on selected problems or issues. What appears to be a third approach has emerged in the last d e c a d e a n d involves a more open, participatory a p p r o a c h to policymaking. The Sectoral Working Group

Approach

Development planning is a major source of national development policies. At independence, Kenya inherited a weak planning system based on ad hoc committees, which dissolved as soon as a public sector investment plan had been prepared. 1 6 A formal planning organization did not come into being until December 1964, when the Ministry of Economic Development was created and immediately

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c h a r g e d with the task o f p r o d u c i n g the first national d e v e l o p m e n t plan.

Since

then,

development

planning

has b e c o m e

a major

policymaking activity. Up

to

the

end

of

the

third

plan

period

(1974-1978),

participation in d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g was a restricted affair. Even with the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f d e v e l o p m e n t c o m m i t t e e s in the mid-1960s and the district p l a n n i n g exercise in 1974-1975, the situation d i d n o t change. T h e intention to involve lower level units in p l a n n i n g had b e e n expressed, but it was not m e a n i n g f u l l y practiced. Decisions and policies that m a t t e r e d c o n t i n u e d to be f o r m u l a t e d at ministry headquarters and w e r e expressed in the sectoral plans. T h e key actors in the p l a n n i n g process, b e g i n n i n g in 1964, w e r e the

senior

professionals

and

their

expatriate

advisers

and

counterparts. A n e x p e r i m e n t with a cabinet d e v e l o p m e n t c o m m i t t e e was

s h o r t - l i v e d , 1 7 a n d the i d e a o f c r e a t i n g a p l a n n i n g

advisory

c o m m i t t e e 1 8 in which the private sector w o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d was not even given a chance f o r implementation. T o w a r d the e n d o f the third plan p e r i o d ( 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 8 ) , the idea to o r g a n i z e sectoral w o r k i n g g r o u p s was b o r n . T h e f o u r t h

plan

b e n e f i t e d directly f r o m the work o f these groups, as have all the plans p r e p a r e d since then. As indicated, the w o r k i n g g r o u p s are usually o r g a n i z e d o n a sectoral basis and are c o m p o s e d o f civil servants, expatriate advisers, and s o m e local academics. T h e main task o f the m e m b e r s d u r i n g the planning p e r i o d is the preparation o f b a c k g r o u n d policy papers f o r g r o u p discussion. T h e papers are o f t e n p r e p a r e d by individuals r e g a r d e d as k n o w l e d g e a b l e in relevant fields. T h e policy papers are usually p r e p a r e d in consultation with headquarters as well as with field-level

officials.

T h e general agriculture)

practice is to break up a sector

into

its

smaller

components

(for

(food

example,

production,

c o m m o d i t y p r i c i n g and marketing, f a r m inputs, and so o n ) . Ideas g e n e r a t e d and accepted are then integrated into a sectoral draft plan f o r discussion by senior g o v e r n m e n t officials o n an interministerial basis. It is the duty o f the Ministry o f National P l a n n i n g to put the draft national plan t o g e t h e r f o r approval by the appropriate political authorities b e f o r e the final plan is printed. T h e w o r k o f sectoral planners is c o o r d i n a t e d by the respective planning units o r divisions within the individual ministries. It is the duty o f the planning units to identify the participants and to ensure their f u l l i n v o l v e m e n t . T h e a p p r o a c h has i m p r o v e d

interactions

tremendously

during

both

within

and

between

ministries

p l a n n i n g process. P o l i c y outputs are now m o r e fully assured having broad a g r e e m e n t within g o v e r n m e n t .

the of

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Presidential Committees and Commissions Since i n d e p e n d e n c e many African governments have made f r e q u e n t use of committees or commissions set u p by the h e a d of government or state to p r o b e into a particular policy problem. These problems have usually c e n t e r e d a r o u n d h u m a n needs, d e p r i v a t i o n , a n d dissatisfactions that are identified by a leader or by others, and for which relief is sought. 1 9 In Kenya, policymaking t h r o u g h the institution of presidential commissions is now a well-established approach. O n c e appointed, a c o m m i t t e e or commission receives general a n d specific powers. D e p e n d i n g on the n a t u r e of the p r o b l e m , the coverage can b e extensive or it can be c o n f i n e d to a specific organization or a geographic area. T h e committees have always worked in the o p e n by inviting and receiving written a n d oral submissions f r o m both experts a n d the general public. Various committees have worked f r o m six m o n t h s to two years, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e m a g n i t u d e of the p r o b l e m b e i n g addressed. In the e n d , a r e p o r t is p r o d u c e d based on an analysis of the information received f r o m individual a n d g r o u p submissions as well as f r o m o t h e r relevant secondary sources. T h e r e p o r t is t h e n subjected to close study by the head of state and his aides to identify aspects of the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s that can be i m p l e m e n t e d . T h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s are then d r a f t e d into a sessional p a p e r by the appropriate authority and subsequently forwarded to Parliament for debate a n d approval. Some areas where c o m m i t t e e reports have been used as sources of policy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s include: the civil service, education and training, local government, manpower a n d employment, parastatals, and investment strategy. 20 T h e c o m m i t t e e / c o m m i s s i o n a p p r o a c h has b e e n institutionalized in the public policy process of Kenya and has been o n e of the most effective ways of involving the general public in the policy process. This approach, however, has not been without its critics. In a n u m b e r of cases, commissions have b e e n established to make r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a b o u t decisions that have already b e e n made by the executive. T h e Mackay Committee on the establishment of a second university is a good example. By the time the committee was established, a decision had already been made by President Moi to establish the second university in his h o m e district at Eldoret. 2 1 Among o t h e r things, the committee was charged with examining the feasibility of establishing such an institution, when it should m o r e appropriately have focused on the modalities of establishing the i n s t i t u t i o n . In o t h e r i n s t a n c e s , a n u m b e r of salary review

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commissions have been created after decisions were already made to increase salaries. The creation of some committees or commissions have served as delaying actions on the part of the state. Indeed, it is possible to view the creation of some committees and commissions as a way of generating consensus around decisions previously made, or for the purpose of depersonalizing the context of decisionmaking once a p r o n o u n c e m e n t has been made by the executive. Notwithstanding the potential strength i n h e r e n t in the c o m m i t t e e / c o m m i s s i o n approach, the policy recommendations of these groups have more often than not reinforced the status quo and failed to benefit those who n e e d state intervention the most t h r o u g h such policy instruments. For example, the Ndegwa Commission on U n e m p l o y m e n t (1991) 2 2 should have recommended policies to narrow the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Instead, the commission's recommendations most probably widened the gap even more by advocating such measures as freedom for civil servants to engage in business activities, and the introduction of a variety of fringe benefits for senior civil servants, such as free use of state vehicles and statesubsidized domestic servants. Explanations for such behavior may be found in the selection process of committee/commission membership, which has tended to be confined to those with known present or past association with the regime. These were men and women who share similar values regardless of their institutional affiliations.

The Participatory Approach Two policies have been associated with the participatory approach, namely, the 1981 National Food Policy and the policies u n d e r the District Focus for Rural Development Strategy, introduced in 1983. 23 As a policymaking strategy, the participatory approach involves the holding of a structured seminar on a particular policy. Initially, the key organization or organizations concerned with implementation are asked to prepare papers stating the nature of the policy in detail as well as their perceived role in the implementation of the policy. These ideas, together with other seminar contributions, are then synthesized into a policy document. T h e latter subsequently forms the basis of future seminars, undergoing revisions until a final version is produced. The success of the approach is premised on the interaction between policymakers (both political and administrative) and the

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policy implementors. T h e seminars are arranged both at the center and at various administrative units in the field. At some point the seminars b e c o m e awareness oriented, as the characteristics of the policy are explained to late-entry participants (usually lower-level a c t o r s ) . T h e s e m i n a r s a p p e a r to b e an ideal a p p r o a c h in formulating policies whose successful implementation depends on wide, popular support. The Case of National Food Policy T h e b a c k g r o u n d to this policy was the f o o d crisis o f 1 9 8 0 , occasioned largely by maladministration. It began with a b u m p e r maize harvest in 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 7 7 ; the Cereals and Produce Board filled its stores to capacity with purchases from farmers. In 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 8 , the board was unable to reach its usual level of purchasing. As a result, many farmers with p o o r or n o on-farm storage facilities suffered great losses. This situation discouraged them from planting during the next season. Meanwhile, the board had decided to reduce its stock through export sales. By mistake, the national strategic reserves were tapped. By the time the mistake was realized it was too late. T h e 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 7 9 harvest was meager, and the board could not satisfy public d e m a n d during 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 0 . By 1980, the p r o b l e m had reached crisis proportions with long food queues forming all over the country. T h e government was forced to import yellow maize from the United States. It was against this background that the 1981 National Food Policy was formulated. T h e initiative c a m e from the president, who wanted to avoid such a crisis in the future. T h e then c h i e f secretary established a framework for the preparation of a food policy. T h e setting was the Ministry o f Agriculture (the Planning Division), where background papers were commissioned on various aspects o f the policy. T h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f the policy was a j o i n t effort between Kenyan bureaucrats and various technical assistance groups. T h e Harvard advisory group, then operating in the Ministry of Agriculture, had significant input as did o t h e r expatriate advisers attached to the Office o f the President (Policy Analysis Unit). Seminars were held to discuss the papers at the Kenya Institute of Administration, near Nairobi, and later in the provinces and districts. T h e purpose o f the seminars was to involve both local-level staff and m e m b e r s o f t h e f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t y responsible for implementation. T h e policy was expected to remain in force until 1989 and to center on food production. It was an effective weapon in the hands of the bureaucrats to convince the political leadership that, at long

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last, a well-thought-out food policy was in place. There was significant commitment to the policy from 1981 to 1984. 2 4 In 1984, the country experienced a massive drought and some food had to be imported. This condition p r e s e n t e d an opportunity to the proponents of balanced crop development (that is, food and cash crops) to intervene to change the policy. The need for expanding acreage for export cash crops was stressed and finally f o u n d expression in the 1986 Sessional Paper on e c o n o m i c management. 2 5 The supporters of cash crop expansion argued that it was the surest way to mobilize the foreign exchange needed to import food when droughts or unexpected food crises occurred. O t h e r policy areas such as marketing and farm subsidies were also revised in response to structural adjustment interventions. By 1986, the 1981 food policy had been virtually abandoned, three years earlier than expected. The experience showed both the strengths a n d the weaknesses of the policy process. T h e food policy's most i m p o r t a n t success was the use of seminars that involved local-level staff and farmers as well as administrators and politicians in policy development and implementation issues. T h e high level of commitment given to the policy during the period 1981-1984 illustrates the merits of employing an open participatory approach. With the drought and subsequent food imports in 1984, the policy was increasingly coopted by consultants financed by USAID and, in particular, the Harvard Institute of International Development, which was working in the Ministry of Agriculture. Critics have a r g u e d that these individuals lacked both the technical knowledge and a sensitivity to the local situation. Although the policy began with significant potential for institutional development, its success was undercut during a period of crisis by the intervention of technical assistance groups. The District Focus Strategy T h e District Focus for Rural Development can be described as a procedural policy, one dealing with how government is organized and how it conducts its business. 2 6 Decentralization is a good example of a procedural policy, and it is what the district focus strategy is all about. The success of a procedural policy requires the involvement of those whose work procedures are affected by the policy. Accordingly, the architects of the policy opted for the open participatory approach. As conceived, the policy was intended to address the problem of

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concentrated decisionmaking powers at ministry headquarters, thus improving management efficiency in the development process. 27 The roots of the policy can be f o u n d in a 1971 civil service review commission r e p o r t and, more recently, in a 1982 r e p o r t on government expenditure. 2 8 T h e district focus recommendations were accepted, and the president announced the decision to adopt the policy in September 1982. Up to this point, no other institution had been involved. Once the decision had been taken, however, the next step was to ensure the widest possible involvement in its elaboration and in the preparation of the implementation strategy. This step was meant to gain the acceptance of those whose support was considered crucial to the policy's success. Seminars were organized at the Kenya Institute of Administration for senior civil servants and national-level politicians to discuss both the idea in general terms and ways in which the policy could be fleshed out. Seminars were also held in the provinces and districts to involve those in the field, on whom the success of the policy hinged. By 1983, a policy d o c u m e n t was p r o d u c e d outlining the characteristics of the policy. T h e d o c u m e n t was later revised through more seminars and workshops. 29 In the meantime, central coordinating committees were created and the number of awareness seminars increased. Studies of the district focus policy suggest that of all the decentralization policies the government has tried since indep e n d e n c e , this has been the most successful. 3 0 Because of the policy, the financial management of district-specific projects now occurs at the district level, more senior personnel are operating at the district level, and development committees have significant input at the project identification stage. T h e success of the policy can be attributed to the commitment of top political leadership. Such an open commitment has been responsible for the policy's acceptance by even those ministries that in the past have shown reluctance to i m p l e m e n t any form of decentralization policy. T h e effective mobilization of the people involved in the implementation of the policy was another important factor contributing to its success. Moreover, there was very little, if any, involvement by non-Kenyans in the formulation of this policy. The ideas that found their way into the policy were generated at the seminars organized and directed by Kenyans. A n u m b e r of lessons can be learned from the district focus case. The design and structure within which the policy was formulated appear to have facilitated its success. The policy was developed for

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and with the involvement of the people affected by the policy. An o n g o i n g a n d visible c o m m i t m e n t by Kenya's political l e a d e r s h i p persuaded reluctant ministries to stay with the policy. Finally, t h e r e was marginal i n p u t f r o m externa! actors. T h e policy's success owes m u c h to Kenyan ownership of the policy process in this instance. Gaining the acceptance of all the relevant actors at various stages of the process kept u p the m o m e n t u m and ensured the widest possible involvement of those whose s u p p o r t was necessary f o r policy sustainability.

Achievements and Limitations G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g a n d in c o m p a r i s o n with o t h e r A f r i c a n administrations, the Kenyan bureaucracy has d o n e reasonably well in the m a n a g e m e n t of national development. A review of national development plans p r o d u c e d since i n d e p e n d e n c e reveals that t h e r e has b e e n progress on many fronts, which can be attributed to t h e efforts of t h e civil service. Kenya has also r e c o r d e d satisfactory a c h i e v e m e n t s in many sectors of the economy. As would b e e x p e c t e d of any developing country, there have also b e e n many frustrations, suggesting that more could have been done. In the 1970-1974 plan, implementation problems f r o m the first plan p e r i o d were cited. T h e s e p r o b l e m s i n c l u d e d a lack of c o m m i t m e n t to plan policies and programs, i n a d e q u a t e p r o j e c t preparation, insufficient coordination, scarcity of key personnel, and inadequate organization of rural development strategies. 31 Over the years, s u b s e q u e n t plans have e n u m e r a t e d other problems such as the f r a g m e n t e d a n d ad hoc nature of policymaking, lack of initiative, p o o r organizational climate, lack of trained policy analysts, p o o r deployment practices, a n d lack of operational support. These problems have adversely affected the implementation of d e v e l o p m e n t policies. I n d e e d , an authoritative g o v e r n m e n t r e p o r t has p o i n t e d out that "many policies agreed by Cabinet have b e e n unnecessarily delayed or distorted d u r i n g the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . " 3 2 T h e r e p o r t goes on to observe that midway through the 1979-1983 plan period, for example, little work had been d o n e to i m p l e m e n t about half of the cabinet decisions recorded in the policy chapter of the plan, a n d a d d e d that "the poor implementation of hard policy choices has c o n t r i b u t e d significantly to the present [that is, 1982] financial crisis and at the same time has reduced government impact on development." 3 3 T o improve the policy process, the working g r o u p issuing the r e p o r t a d v o c a t e d a process that stressed policy a n d p r o g r a m

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analysis. 3 4 T h e working group also lamented that, despite active government support, the staff training program for the civil service had not been carefully planned a n d coordinated. 3 5 T h e report concluded that improving management was the most pressing issue g o v e r n m e n t f a c e d . 3 6 In the c u r r e n t plan (1989-1993), the g o v e r n m e n t again observed: "Currently t h e r e is n o effective monitoring a n d evaluation system that can provide information necessary to indicate the extent to which the process of development programming meets set objectives." 37 In proposing a solution, the plan advocated that a secretariat be established, building on the monitoring and evaluation unit already existing in the Ministry of Planning and National Development. 3 8 However, the unit referred to is underdeveloped and needs to be e x p a n d e d a n d strengthened. Reference was also made to the planned establishment of supportive sectoral policy committees to facilitate integrated evaluation of emerging issues. 39 The question that needs to be addressed at this point is: What is the s o u r c e of this policy m a n a g e m e n t p r o b l e m ? A partial explanation lies in Kenya's colonial heritage. During the colonial period, the structure of administration was highly compartmentalized within the hierarchy of authority, which e x t e n d e d f r o m headquarters in Nairobi down to the provinces and districts. A similar situation occurred within departments, by division, location, and sublocation. A culture of "departmentalism" and the relative autonomy that goes with it was inherited intact, in spite of the majimbo (regional) constitution. During the first plan period (revised 1966-1970), a n e e d for some integration through a network of development committees was r e c o m m e n d e d , both at the center and in the field. Department-level staff were unenthusiastic. Attendance at c o m m i t t e e meetings at the district level was irregular, and committees were not seriously regarded. 4 0 Over the years, however, and especially since the introduction of the district focus strategy, there have been some noticeable, positive changes, but much remains to be done. What "departmentalism" means in the context of policy development is that each ministry enjoys a good deal of autonomy over its own policies relative to other ministries. The result is a lack of cooperation and coordination, even where such joint activity is a condition for success. T h e relationship that a ministry head cultivates with key staff is a n o t h e r critical variable in policy m a n a g e m e n t . It has been alleged that lack of consultation is common. So is lack of effective delegation. Both of these create an unhealthy organizational

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climate, making g r o u p decisionmaking almost impossible. Good policies require substantive input from all those concerned. There are few ministries that follow a collective d e c i s i o n m a k i n g system outside of the development planning framework discussed above. In practical terms, only the Ministry of National Planning and Development has established a special unit for policy development. However, it has yet to be appropriately staffed and utilized. Most of the large ministries still rely on ad hoc working groups and donor-supported policy interventions. The policymaking process c o n t i n u e s to be characterized by lack of f u n c t i o n a l integration among the ministries and between the center and the field agencies. T h e tendency in the case of center-field relationships is to regard the field merely as a source of data. But it is common knowledge that their data base is quite weak. As a result, policies are made that have only a marginal bearing on reality. A major missing link in policy management in Kenya is the lack of an institutionalized process of policy analysis that would assist in the "systematic investigation of alternative policy options and the assembly and integration of evidence for and against each option." 4 1 Such a process would enable the development manager to assess a policy in terms of costs and benefits, both direct and indirect, and to examine implementation constraints and opportunities. T h e process is lacking in Kenya, precisely because of the ad hoc nature of policymaking. T h e situation in the elected, local authorities is even worse than that in the central government. Local authorities have a weak resource base and a poorly trained staff. A weak resource base has forced them to rely on the central government for survival. As a result, they have lost the relative autonomy promised in their charters of incorporation. Over the years, they have operated as mere field agencies of the central government. T h e center's weak capacity for policy analysis has had a direct effect on them as well. However, the context of policymaking by the local authorities has changed since the introduction of the district focus strategy. 42 Policymaking activities now center a r o u n d the District Developm e n t C o m m i t t e e (DDC), r a t h e r than the Ministry of Local Government. D e p e n d e n c e on the central g o v e r n m e n t remains significant, however, as the DDCs lack capacity to formulate policies on their own. 4 3 Building capacity at this level remains a development m a n a g e m e n t priority if decentralization efforts are to be successful.

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Improving the Policy Management System This chapter has demonstrated that there is a need to improve the policy m a n a g e m e n t system within the b u r e a u c r a c y through strengthening existing organizations and/or creating new ones. O n e way of upgrading the quality of policymaking in Kenya would be to improve the analytical skills of the staff involved in policymaking. T h e various aspects of p r o j e c t m a n a g e m e n t also n e e d more attention, especially problem identification and definition, the preparation of feasibility studies, and monitoring and evaluation techniques. Currently, policy coordination rests with the cabinet office. However, as a United Nations report observed, the office is not adequately staffed to discharge that responsibility effectively. 44 T o continue playing that role, the office needs to expand both its staff and scope of activities. An expanded office could be responsible for policy initiation, development, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. Similar units could also be created within individual ministries and in the field with a framework established that would link the ministry organizations to the cabinet office on a routine basis (studies and seminars). T h e United Nations' Special Action Programme in Administration and Management (SAPAM) activities could be expanded to pursue these institution-building efforts. 4 5 Alternatively, there exists the possibility of forming a national center for policy studies, similar to India's Centre for Policy Research or Nigeria's National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies. 46 A high-quality program for policy management must also pay attention to human resource development. Kenya has a reservoir of well-educated staff that could be trained as policy analysts at minimal cost. For example, the Kenya Institute of Administration could be s t r e n g t h e n e d to support such a training p r o g r a m . 4 7 Another consideration is the development o f a postgraduate program in public administration at the University of Nairobi, with a special focus on policy analysis.

Conclusion O f the three sociopolitical influences on policy formulation in Kenya, the nature of the economy and the bureaucracy appear to be the major ones. T h e openness of the economy has encouraged greater external intervention in the policy process. T h e executive, through its administrative arm, has emerged as the dominant policy actor. This conclusion is supported by the key roles the executive

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and the d o n o r agencies play in the initiation and determination of Kenya's policy agenda. T h e c o u n t r y ' s t r a c k r e c o r d in policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is satisfactory, but institutional bottlenecks continue, and they have inhibited the smooth m a n a g e m e n t of the policy system. T h e missing links a p p e a r to be the lack of well-developed policy analysis units, weak policy-related skills in the various government ministries, and the absence of input from organizations outside of government. As a result, policy analysis, evaluation, and feedback—all so critical to the success of development efforts—are weak o r nonexistent.

Notes 1. Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J . Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formulation (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 3. 2. J . F. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 29. 3. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Politics of Neo-Colonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 4. David K. Leonard, African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 5. Walter O. Oyugi, "Uneasy Alliance: Party-State Relations in Kenya," in Politics and Administration in East Africa, ed. Walter O. Oyugi (Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1992). 6. Ibid. 7. Republic of Kenya, National Development Plan 1989-1993 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1989), p. 63. 8. Ibid., p. 71. 9. Walter O. Oyugi, "Role of Technical Assistance in National Development: The Case of Kenya," in Technical Assistance Administration in East Africa, ed. Y. Tandon (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1973); Gerald Holtham and Arthur Hazlewood, Aid and Inequality in Kenya: British Development Assistance to Kenya (London: Croom-Heim, 1976); and Walter O. Oyugi, Rural Development Administration: A Kenyan Experience (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing Co., 1981). 10. Republic of Kenya, Report of Commission of Inquiry, Public Service Structure and Remuneration Committee (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971). 11. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and Its Application in Planning to Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965). 12. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 13. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 1 on Economic Management (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1986). 14. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981). 15. Leonard, Management Successes, p. 222. 16. D. Ghai, "The Machinery of Planning in Kenya" (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, Sussex Conference Paper, 1969). 17. Ibid.

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18. Republic of Kenya, National Development Plan 1970-1974 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970). 19. For example, see J. F. Anderson, Public Policy-Making, p. 55. 20. For example, see the following Rebublic of Kenya reports: Report of Commission of Inquiry (see Note 10, above); Report of the Civil Service Review Committee 1979-1980 (1980); Kenya Education Commission Report (1964); Working Paper on the Second University (1981); Presidential Working Party on Education and Training for the Next Decade and Beyond (1981); Report of the Presidential Commission on Unemployment (1983); Report of the Presidential Commission on Unemployment (1991); Review of Statutory Boards (n.d.); and Working Paper on Government Expenditures (1982). (All published in Nairobi by the Government Printer.) 21. Republic of Kenya, Working Paper on the Second University. 22. Republic of Kenya, Report on Unemployment. 23. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 4 on National Food Policy (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981); and Republic of Kenya, District Focus for Rural Development Strategy, revised (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1987). 24. Walter O. Oyugi, "Kenya: T h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the 1981 National Food Policy" (unpublished paper, 1992). 25. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 1. 26. J. F. Anderson, Public Policy-Making, p. 55. 27. For example, see Republic of Kenya, District Focus. 28. Republic of Kenya, Report of Commission of Inquiry; Republic of Kenya, Working Paper on Government Expenditures. 29. Republic of Kenya, District. 30. Walter O. Oyugi, "Kenya: Two Decades of Decentralization Efforts," African Administrative Studies, no. 26 (1986), pp. 133-161; Walter O. Oyugi, "Decentralization D e v e l o p m e n t Planning a n d M a n a g e m e n t in Kenya: An Assessment," in Decentralization Policies and Socio-Economic Development in Sub-Sahara Africa, ed. Ladipo Adamolekun et al. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990). 31. Republic of Kenya, National Development Plan 1970-1974, p. 71. 32. Republic of Kenya, Working Paper on Government Expenditures, p. 15. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p. 70. 35. Ibid., p. 73. 36. Ibid., p. 74. See also United Nations, Development Administration Division, Report of the Special Action Programme in Administration and Management: Programming Mission to Kenya (Nairobi, February 13 to March 16, 1989) (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1989), which reached similar conclusions about the management situation in Kenya. In particular, the report cited underdeveloped policy coordination methods, compartmentalism of policy issues, absence of periodic evaluation of policies, and lack of integration of resource inputs. 37. Republic of Kenya, National Development Plan 1989-1993, p. 40. 38. Ibid., p. 41. 39. Ibid. 40. Oyugi, "Kenya." 41. J a c o b B. Ukeles, "Policy Analysis: Myth or Reality," Public Administration Review, vol. 37, no. 3 (May-June 1977), pp. 223-228. 42. Republic of Kenya, District Focus. 43. Oyugi, "Decentralization Development Planning." 44. United Nations, Development Administration Division, Report of the

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Special Action Programme. 45. In order for the SAPAM program to succeed in this regard, four things would have to happen: (1) the program would have to sell itself better than it has done so far; (2) the program would have to move from its present low-profile status to one in which it becomes a major catalyst in policy initiative. To achieve this goal, the program would have to find ways and means of assisting key ministries such as industry, agriculture, treasury, and education to establish policy analysis units of their own, and thereafter assist them in establishing their own mechanisms of operation; (3) the program would have to mobilize resources from many donor sources and, in doing so, impress upon the donors the need for cooperation versus competition, which is presently the case; and (4) the program would need to commission policy studies and hold interministerial seminars to establish a linkage framework. 46. V. Moharir, "Institutionalization of Policy Analysis in Developing Countries: An Explanatory Approach," in Bureaucracy and Developmental Policies in the Third World, ed. H. K. Asmerom, Robert Hoppe, and R. B. Jain (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1992). As Moharir noted, the two institutions are Financed by their respective governments, which also appoint the leading staff, although they are independent with regard to selection of issues and publication of results. Drawing upon the experiences of these institutions, there appears to be no reason why the Kenyan government could not create such an institution and initiate policy studies that it could then have the right to have published under confidential or restricted circulation. The key question, however, is whether the establishment of such an institution is a guarantee for improving the quality of public policy management. 47. In fact, the current GOK/UNDP policy support project (SAPAM), based at the Kenya Institute of Administration, could form the basis for the establishment of such a center. Once established, authorities in the field of policy analysis, both local and expatriate, could be identified and invited from time to time to conduct relevant courses.

7 Botswana: Confronting the Realities of Capacity Building Keshav C. Sharma & Elvidge G. M. Mhlauli

Starting f r o m Scratch

Many countries on the African continent are characterized by economic crisis, political instability, and regional-ethnic tensions. Critics have also regularly taken note of the tendency of African countries to mismanage resources and of their poor human rights records, lack of integrity in the civil service, and authoritarian political leadership. Botswana, by contrast, has experienced political stability and sustained economic growth and has been relatively free of regional and ethnic tensions. A World Bank study appropriately concluded that Botswana "has built an enviable reputation as having one of the most effective public sector managements in Africa, and indeed a m o n g developing countries." 1 It is worthwhile to more closely examine Botswana's achievements in light of the present attention being given to the need for rapid and effective political and economic reform. Botswana has been pointed to as a model of success, 2 but its early beginnings were not hopeful. When the nation became independent in 1966 its GDP per capita was one of the lowest in the world, and the country was grouped among the least developed. During the protectorate period, Britain showed little interest in the territory because it was convinced that the country had no natural resources of c o n s e q u e n c e a n d was not attractive to capital investment. As a result of such thinking, Botswana experienced eighty years of colonial neglect. With i n d e p e n d e n c e the government set off on a course of economic and social development, creating an infrastructure that included a new capital, roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, a civil 101

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service, a police force, and, some years later, a d e f e n s e force. A n u m b e r of d e v e l o p m e n t plans were f o r m u l a t e d and i m p l e m e n t e d for economic development and social welfare. T h e stated objectives of Botswana's d e v e l o p m e n t policy are rapid e c o n o m i c growth, economic i n d e p e n d e n c e , sustained development, and social justice. C o n s i d e r a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t s have b e e n m a d e in t e r m s of e c o n o m i c growth as Botswana has moved f r o m a t r a d i t i o n a l economy based o n cattle raising to a dualistic e c o n o m y led by a small but vigorous m o d e r n sector. 3 Shifts in the pattern of domestic p r o d u c t i o n a n d in t h e s o u r c e s a n d levels of i n c o m e since i n d e p e n d e n c e have been dramatic, although domestic p r o d u c t i o n is strongly d o m i n a t e d by minerals and the economy heavily d e p e n d s on t r a d e . M o r e o v e r , t h e capital-intensive n a t u r e of m i n e r a l production and of the m o d e r n sector generally has not provided as much new employment as was originally anticipated. At i n d e p e n d e n c e Botswana d e p e n d e d on substantial grants to cover its b u d g e t deficit, had no financial reserves, a n d h a d an i n f r a s t r u c t u r e totally i n a d e q u a t e f o r any significant e c o n o m i c growth. Faced with such challenges, the g o v e r n m e n t a d o p t e d the politics of d e v e l o p m e n t over the politics of ideology. 4 This has resulted in the careful h u s b a n d i n g of revenue, the limitation of e x p e n d i t u r e to essentials, and a deliberate, c o n c e n t r a t e d effort to f i n a n c e only those projects essential to e c o n o m i c growth. As a result, Botswana's public debt has been managed responsibly and most of the trappings of power have been shunned. 5

The Pursuit of Realistic Development Strategies T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s overall e c o n o m i c strategy has been to achieve rapid and large returns f r o m intensive capital investment in mining, particularly the country's large d i a m o n d reserves, a n d to reinvest those returns to improve the living standards of those who do not benefit directly f r o m mining sector expansion. Further, government policies have emphasized the complementary themes of employment creation a n d rural d e v e l o p m e n t , i n c l u d i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s in infrastructure, education, and health facilities. T h e highest proportion of g o v e r n m e n t i n v e s t m e n t to d a t e ( i n c l u d i n g t h e i n v e s t m e n t program of parastatals) has g o n e to build u p the basic infrastructure of the country. Despite its efforts, the country has b e e n less than successful in diversifying its e c o n o m y and e x p a n d i n g e c o n o m i c growth to the rural areas, w h e r e m o r e than 80 p e r c e n t of the Batswana live. Government development plans are not intended to stifle private

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initiative but rather to create favorable conditions in which the private sector can contribute to Botswana's development. 6 In fact, more than 80 percent of Botswana's GDP is produced by the private sector. T h e private sector also actively participates in the planning process through such advisory c o m m i t t e e s as the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Advisory Board (NEMIC), and the National Technical Training Advisory Committee. As in Kenya and Nigeria, there has been a strong orientation toward market-oriented policies and private investment. Both foreign and domestic private investment have been welcomed. Botswana's National Development Plan 6 recognizes the benefits of a market-oriented system for Botswana, noting that the system is more efficient in producing goods and services, and is more economical in the use o f scarce administrative capacity. T h e plan also stresses that the principal means for initiation and ownership of industry and trade is the private sector and that there will be a continuing need for foreign investment, especially in those areas where the necessary skills and technologies are not available locally. Like the other market-oriented African states (Kenya, Nigeria, and the Cote d'lvoire), the Botswana economy has not escaped the economic downturn of the late 1980s. Unlike the experience of these other countries, however, the country's frugal fiscal policies have allowed it to avoid extensive external debt and the need for stabilization and structural adjustment programs. Botswana has also escaped an important budget constraint so familiar in other African countries. Public enterprises in Botswana are fairly efficient and do not strain the national budget. Botswana is also o n e o f the few countries in Africa that has a convertible currency. Given the potential for success, Botswana has attracted a sizable proportion of donor funding over the years. This technical assistance generally has been utilized prudently, and Botswana's credibility with donor agencies has consistently remained high.

Botswana's Developmental State T h e relationship between political leadership and the bureaucracy has undergone significant changes in many African countries since independence. T h e emergence of military rule and one-party states has resulted in relationships quite different from those of the British model, which emphasizes the neutrality of the civil service. T h e cumulative effect of such changes has been to move many African countries away from the ideals of the development-oriented state that so predominated early postindependence thinking. By contrast,

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Botswana has been able to retain a functioning multiparty system with free and fair elections. Racial, religious, ethnic, or regional tensions have b e e n negligible. Corruption in political leadership and in public service circles has been limited, although in the last five years, the country has g o n e t h r o u g h a n u m b e r of corruption scandals that have decreased the credibility of what historically has been an efficient a n d effective state administration. To be sure, the issue of corruption has been addressed quickly and openly. Implicated political leaders, including the former vice-president, Peter Mmusi, promptly lost their jobs. President Ketumile Masire has advised those who seek to compromise the principle of integrity and who exhibit partisan inclinations to resign f r o m public service and practice their politics in the open with a clear conscience. 7 Pursuing the politics of development in Botswana has produced a political elite who have assumed the role of modernizers. This role has placed emphasis on and responsibility for developing the country to the highest possible level given its economic resources. Botswana has gone far to meet the challenge of establishing a development-oriented administration. Such a commitment to development management is unusual in Africa. 8 Rather than rapidly localize its public service at independence, the leadership has pursued a policy of gradual localization and, as has been the case in Kenya, made liberal use of expatriate advisers, technicians, and administrators who over the years were given substantive authority with little political interference. On the whole, the country's experience with expatriate personnel has been congenial and productive, although the government periodically comes u n d e r mild attack for not moving more quickly on localization. Since independence, the government has taken responsibility for educating the labor force that is required by the economy and is itself the largest single employer. Overall, the government defines the legal, fiscal, and monetary framework within which all sectors of the economy operate and has the responsibility for securing favorable international economic arrangements for domestic producers and consumers. The Machinery for Public Policymaking and Development Planning

A cabinet led by the president and a parliament including the representatives of opposition parties compose Botswana's highest authority for public policymaking and development planning. Below

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this level, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning plays a central role. There is also active participation by the Directorate of Public Service Management, the Department of Statistics, the Bank of Botswana, and the p l a n n i n g units of various ministries and district-level organizations. A j o i n t ministry that combines f i n a n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t planning and is responsible for planning and budgeting has been quite successful in Botswana. This institutional a r r a n g e m e n t has helped to promote coordination between planning and budgeting activities and has avoided the many planning and budgeting conflicts that are common in other developing countries. Another important feature of the development planning process has been the posting to various ministries of planning officers belonging to a common cadre controlled by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The most significant organization for major policy decisions and development strategy is the economic committee of the cabinet, which consists of all the ministers and p e r m a n e n t secretaries, the head of the police, the commander of the defense force, and the governor of the Bank of Botswana. Decentralization

in Development

Planning

Decentralized planning and district-level planning structures are also characteristic of the Botswana policy process. According to the District Planning Handbook of the Government of Botswana: The overriding aim of the District Planning process is to provide a decentralized planning and implementation capacity which is sensitive and responsive to needs, problems and priorities of local communities. . . . It must recognise the need for a high level of local participation if development activities are to have an impact and to be sustained over the long run. The concept is o n e of "bottom-up" planning and development that will have critical inputs into the formation of national policies and programmes. 9

Decentralized, district-level, development-planning exercises have faced a n u m b e r of problems, however, which need to be addressed in order to bridge the gap between the intention and the reality of a decentralized process. These problems include policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and guidance as well as difficulties in establishing both vertical and horizontal communication flows. The n a t u r e of the p l a n n i n g process in Botswana has been described as "top-down" planning, as opposed to "bottom-up" planning. 1 0 Development plans are formulated at the national level.

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Although the contribution of district-level organizations has been steadily increasing, their impact on the policy process remains limited. More often than not, consultations between the national and district level take the form of an explanation of policies or elaboration of plans formulated at the higher levels of government. Ministry field staff in the districts either receive communication about the contents of their district plan through instructions from the ministry, or they wait until they hear from their headquarters before presenting their submissions to the district plan managers. In some cases, office equipment and computers for district-level staff is marginal. This is particularly true in the field offices of ministries. As a result, district-level staff are o f t e n unable to make any worthwhile contribution to the planning exercise and d e p e n d on assistance from above. In general, communication links between the center and the districts are ineffective, with district-level staff lacking adequate, satisfactory, and timely information. This inefficiency is due in part to large staff turnover at headquarters or to the posting of relatively j u n i o r staff in such positions. It is also partly due to insufficient sensitivity on the part of some officers in providing p r o m p t and adequate responses. It is fair to conclude that district-level planning deserves to be taken more seriously by the central planners. District-level planning structures and processes need to be f u r t h e r strengthened before decentralization efforts are fully realized. Planning has to be done not only in terms of the professional caliber and training of relevant staff, but also in terms of staff commitment to the task at hand. Administrative

Capacity

and

Local

Authorities

With a view to promoting decentralization, Botswana has created district councils, which are legal entities (statutory bodies) and instruments of political decentralization. They have been given responsibilities mainly for the administration of primary education, primary health services, construction and maintenance of rural roads, water supply, community development, and social welfare. Although their administrative capacity for the performance of these functions has been gradually improving, their influence remains limited. The councils receive substantial financial assistance from the central government. Council staff are provided through a specially organized Unified Local Government Service (ULGS), now known as Local Government Service Management (LGSM). T h e councils also receive a great deal of assistance and guidance from central

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g o v e r n m e n t ministries, a n d the central g o v e r n m e n t exercises various k i n d s of c o n t r o l s over t h e councils that limit t h e i r a u t o n o m y . Limited administrative capacity can b e primarily a t t r i b u t e d to t h e weaknesses in political leadership, staffing, financial standing, a n d relations with the central government. Heavy reliance on the central g o v e r n m e n t a n d a high d e g r e e of control f r o m the c e n t e r have p r o d u c e d district councils that are limited in b o t h f u n c t i o n a n d autonomy. Given such constraints, the potential f u t u r e growth of t h e councils into responsible bodies of local g o v e r n m e n t is seriously inhibited, and, i n d e e d , may d e f e a t the very rationale f o r which they were originally created. In o r d e r to correct the situation, it is necessary f o r the central g o v e r n m e n t to begin r e d u c i n g its control, gradually increasing council a u t o n o m y as administrative capacity e x p a n d s . Capacity b u i l d i n g efforts in this i n s t a n c e will r e q u i r e a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g f o r b o t h staff a n d councillors. Grassroots

Parlicipation

D u r i n g t h e last few years, administrative accountability a n d public responsibility have i n c r e a s e d in Botswana t h r o u g h g r e a t e r public awareness a n d political education. T h e c u r r e n t challenge is to make t h e b u r e a u c r a c y m o r e responsive a n d to d e v e l o p closer, two-way c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e p e o p l e . Gove r n m e n t needs to know m o r e a b o u t the needs, problems, priorities, expectations, a n d capacities of the people; a n d t h e public needs a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of public policies, d e v e l o p m e n t strategies, d e v e l o p m e n t plan priorities, a n d the limitations a n d expectations of g o v e r n m e n t . Public p a r t i c i p a t i o n in d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g a n d public policymaking needs to b e c o m e more m e a n i n g f u l a n d real in the f u t u r e . Increasing people's participation through decentralization efforts f r o m the national level to the district level is a shift in t h e right direction. However, the process of decentralization will have to b e e x t e n d e d to t h e subdistricts a n d t h e villages. A l t h o u g h t h e districts have c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t t h e lack of seriousness given to district-level d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , t h e districts t h e m s e l v e s are n o t i m m u n e f r o m such criticism. They have d o n e very little to p r o m o t e increased a u t o n o m y within subdistrict organizations or bodies such as village d e v e l o p m e n t committees or traditional institutions such as the Kgotla (village assembly). D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is only partially c o m p l e t e if it stops at the district level. Village-level organizations will have to receive g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n a n d a u t o n o m y if d e c e n t r a l ization is to be fully carried out.

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The Role of Public Enterprises in Development Botswana's public enterprises, a l t h o u g h limited in n u m b e r , play a significant role in the country's economy. 1 1 Unlike parastatals in some o t h e r African countries, they have not have been organized for ideological reasons. Primarily, t h e i r r o l e is to facilitate t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d m a n a g e m e n t of c e r t a i n activities of vital significance to the e c o n o m y and to m a n a g e public utilities. T h e g o v e r n m e n t has m a d e it clear that it does n o t believe in nationalization. Several g o v e r n m e n t aims have b e e n cited with r e g a r d to parastatals in b o t h National D e v e l o p m e n t Plans 6 a n d 7: They should p r o m o t e the creation of new economic opportunities; avoid c o m p e t i n g with Batswana e n t r e p r e n e u r s ; positively assist citizen e n t r e p r e n e u r s to start u p or to acquire or participate in viable businesses; a n d , w h e r e possible, sell off suitable v e n t u r e s to Batswana owner-managers. 1 2 T h e g o v e r n m e n t has also e n c o u r a g e d public-private partnerships in vital sectors such as mining. For example, South African multinational firms have a significant position in the investment and m a n a g e m e n t of Botswana d i a m o n d mines. T o achieve a m o r e p r o p e r balance in the relationship, their a g r e e m e n t also includes a substantial role for the Botswana government in the m a n a g e m e n t of the mines. M i s m a n a g e m e n t and c o r r u p t i o n in the parastatal sector have b e e n limited in n a t u r e in Botswana. Moreover, s o m e public enterprises, such as the Botswana Meat Commission, have e a r n e d substantial profits and have contributed to economic development. Some institutional a n d organizational d e v e l o p m e n t p r o b l e m s persist a m o n g public sector enterprises, however. These include: a g e n e r a l lack of clarity r e g a r d i n g o p e r a t i o n a l objectives a n d p e r f o r m a n c e criteria, the absence of established s t a n d a r d s and procedures for board-management relations and employeremployee relations, lack of effective control mechanisms, a n d a shortage of adequately trained and skilled manpower. Critical Shortages of Qualified

Manpower

A s h o r t a g e of qualified m a n p o w e r has b e e n Botswana's biggest constraint in increasing administrative capacity. At the time of i n d e p e n d e n c e the country had very few graduates, no university of its own, a n d a very small n u m b e r of locals in senior positions of the p u b l i c service. T h e m a g n i t u d e of t h e s h o r t a g e of q u a l i f i e d m a n p o w e r is discernible f r o m the fact that out of a very small

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establishment of 184 administrative posts in the public service at independence, only 24 positions were held by Batswana. Even at the lower levels, only 275 out of 613 positions in the technical, executive, and secretarial grades were held by local officers. 13 The first government secondary school was started only in 1965. Up to 1964 there were only two mission schools and one school organized as a private venture. Moreover, in 1964 only twenty-seven students passed the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate. T h e i n d e p e n d e n t University of Botswana was established in 1982. T h e latter replaced the University of Botswana and Swaziland (UBS), which was the direct successor to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS). In 1965, the UBLS had only twentythree students from Botswana. Since 1965, education in Botswana has expanded considerably. T h e n u m b e r of secondary schools has grown steadily, vocational training institutions have been established, and training institutions like the Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce and the Institute of Development Management have expanded greatly. The expansion of educational facilities is also evident in the physical development of the University of Botswana. In spite of the rapid expansion, however, the development of managerial personnel in Botswana for both the public and private sectors has been constrained by inadequately developed educational facilities, the limited operations of training institutions, a n d problems with microlevel manpower planning. 1 4 Although the senior positions of generalists in the public service have been localized (filled by Batswana) for some time, many professional positions continue to be held by expatriates (doctors, engineers, accountants, and so o n ) , whose n u m b e r has also increased in some cases due to expansion and development of public sector activities. The government of Botswana has adopted a realistic attitude toward localization and does not believe in localizing at the cost of efficiency. In some cases, for example, the government has also been prepared to delocalize certain positions (that is, secretaries for very senior officials in the public service, and for ministers) to maintain standards of efficiency and productivity. Where localization has been accomplished, the government remains concerned about raising the standards of proficiency and productivity of personnel o p e r a t i n g in the civil service, local authorities, parastatals, and private enterprises. In particular, administrative and managerial personnel need to be more sensitive and responsive to the aspirations and expectations of the population and to address the problems of productivity, discipline, morale, and incentives more adequately.

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Conclusion Botswana's prosperity and success can be attributed to a number o f factors: the country's sound political leadership, pragmatic public policies, and p r u d e n t e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t . T h e country's mineral resources have also provided a steady source of revenue. In particular, Botswana's successes have been the result o f its ability to bring t o g e t h e r all these factors in a prudent and responsible manner. 15 It has been observed that sustainable development requires a domestic capacity f o r the f o r m u l a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f policy—a capacity that is rooted in the society, culture, and history of the country that it serves.16 In economic policymaking Botswana's experience reveals that it has been prudent in organizing the roles o f the public and private sectors, giving due consideration to the realities of domestic capacity. R e c o g n i z i n g the l i m i t e d capacity of the state, Botswana's political leadership chose not to overextend the public sector. T h e limited n u m b e r of state-owned and c o n t r o l l e d enterprises is a primary e x a m p l e of a pragmatic response to realistic capacity considerations. T h e slow pace with which localization has been pursued is another example. W h e r e domestic experience, capital, and expertise have not been available, the government has not been reluctant to e n c o u r a g e f o r e i g n investment and multinational participation. Capacity considerations have also been evident in the government's willingness to encourage and experiment with various types of partnerships. For example, efforts in the mining sector have produced working partnerships between government and f o r e i g n investors. In the case of the Botswana D e v e l o p m e n t Corporation ( B D C ) , the g o v e r n m e n t has been an active j o i n t venture partner with indigenous entrepreneurs. Capacity building considerations have also i n f l u e n c e d the government's efforts to increase grassroots participation through strengthened local government organizations. Here the results are mixed. At both the district and subdistrict levels, the government has been repeatedly c h a l l e n g e d to find innovative structures and processes that devolve authority and enhance participation. At issue has been the need to balance the demands f o r increased autonomy with the existing capacity to handle expanded responsibilities. T h e d e m o c r a t i c nature of Botswana civil society and its institutions and the e c o n o m i c policies under the leadership of Sir Seretse K h a m a and Sir K e t u m i l e Masire have c r e a t e d an environment of peace and progress. T h e challenge has been to ensure that public policies d o not result in the creation of wide

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disparities in wealth and i n c o m e and that the benefits of growth d o n o t accrue only to limited s e c t i o n s of the p o p u l a t i o n . S h o u l d ownership and distribution issues b e c o m e contentious, not only the prevailing peace and tranquility could be disturbed, but the very nature of Botswana's democratic institutions and the framework of present public policies could b e c o m e questionable. F o c u s i n g o n p r a g m a t i s m a n d productivity, B o t s w a n a has attempted to pursue more vigorously its efforts to build capacity in the civil service, parastatals. local g o v e r n m e n t organizations, and private enterprise. It has r e m a i n e d steady in its c o m m i t m e n t to achieving higher standards of integrity, efficiency, responsibility, and accountability.

Notes 1. Nimrod Raphaeli et al., Public Sector Management in Botswana: Lessons in Pragmatism, Staff Working Paper no. 709 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984). 2. Louis A. Picard, The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success? (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987). 3. As Lewis has observed, in all countries the economy and the society will show evidence of "dualism." Dualism is characterized by some sectors (mostly in agriculture but also in urban areas) that exhibit "low productivity, family-centered organization for business and farming, substantial overt and disguised unemployment, often considerable landlessness in the agricultural sectors, and relatively low income per capita." By contrast, the modern sectors will exhibit "larger organizations, wage employment at substantially h i g h e r skill a n d wage levels, m o r e advanced technology, a n d correspondingly much higher income per capita." See Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., The Economics of Apartheid (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1990), p. 20. 4. Picard, The Politics of Development. 5. Raphaeli et al., Public Sector Management. 6. Government of Botswana, National Development Plan 6: 1985-1991 (Gaborone: Government Printer, 1985). 7. The president, Sir Ketumile Masire, has expressed his unequivocal commitment to the principle of public service neutrality by pointing out that it is not possible for a civil servant who exudes partisan politics to be honest and dedicated in performing functions of public service. Daily News (Gaborone, Botswana), January 7, 1985. 8. Picard, The Politics of Development. The moderate stance of the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), has also influenced the way the government has managed the economy. It has rejected both the extreme left and right, ethnic conservatism, and African socialism as all equally unacceptable development paths for Botswana. 9. Government of Botswana, Ministry of Local Government and Lands, District Planning Handbook (Gaborone: Government Printer, n.d.), pp. 6 and 79. 10. Picard, The Politics of Development.

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11. Botswana's significant public enterprises cover m a n u f a c t u r i n g (Botswana Meat Commission), public utilities (Botswana Power Corporation and Botswana Water Utilities Corporation), livestock (Botswana Livestock Development C o r p o r a t i o n ) , housing (Botswana Housing Corporation), banking (Bank of Botswana), promotional activities (National Development Bank), marketing (Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board), airways (Air Botswana), and general purpose economic development activity (Botswana Development Corporation). 12. Government of Botswana, National Development Plan 6 and National Development Plan 7: 1991-1997 (Gaborone: Government Printer, 1991). 13. C. Colclough and S. McCarthy, The Political Economy of Botswana: A Study of Growth and Distribution (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 209. 14. J.C.N. Mentz and Louis A. Picard, "Localization in Botswana: A Reexamination" (Pittsburgh, unpublished paper, 1992). 15. Ibid. 16. See Louis A. Picard with V. Moharir and J. Corkery, "CapacityBuilding for Policy Change a n d Sustainability: Lessons f r o m the African Experience" (paper delivered to the Development Management Working Group, I IAS, Brussels, Belgium, October, 1990).

8 Sustainable Policies, Management Capacity, and Institutional Development Louis A. Picará, Athumani J. Liviga & Michele Garrity T h e African participants at the J u n e 1991 c o n f e r e n c e at Arusha, Tanzania, identified a n u m b e r of critical issues relating to capacity building for policy c h a n g e and sustainability. This chapter (based on the discussions at the c o n f e r e n c e ) presents those issues within the broader context of four interlocking themes (see Chapter 1 and below) underlying policy reform efforts in Africa, and it attempts to capture the flavor of the dialogue at the meeting. Finally, the chapter posits ten summary statements that highlight the special problems a n d c o n c e r n s characterizing structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s in Africa.

The Appropriate Balance Between Public Sector and Private Sector Responsibilities After i n d e p e n d e n c e , the state in many African c o u n t r i e s was conceived of as a provider, intervening through state-owned a n d / o r state-controlled enterprises or other means in virtually every area of economic and social life. In many cases the African state became a burden for development-related activity over time. If the state is to accomplish its main objective—social a n d economic development—the role and scope of the state has to be restricted. Restricting state activity does not imply an abdication of responsibilities on the part of the state but, rather, a c h a n g e in focus. In some instances, the state will be less involved while in others m o r e state involvement will be n e e d e d . Moreover, each country has to develop the a p p r o p r i a t e mix of p u b l i c / p r i v a t e involvement that best represents the forces a n d influences most capable of effecting changc within the national context. 113

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Such p u b l i c / p r i v a t e sector a r r a n g e m e n t s c a n n o t be viewed as rigid in nature. Both the strengths a n d weaknesses of the public a n d private sectors have to b e d e t e r m i n e d in assessing various policy alternatives, with the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that each p a r t n e r must a d a p t to c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t h a t t r a n s i t i o n a l phases c o u l d b e necessary. T o a t t e m p t to rationalize divisions of labor is probably n o t viable a n d all kinds of public-private p a r t n e r s h i p s s h o u l d b e e x p l o r e d . In t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of s u s t a i n a b l e p a r t n e r s h i p s , it is essential to reconcile predictability a n d flexibility. In m a n a g i n g e c o n o m i c a n d social development, the state should be responsible for the following t h r e e functions. The state as provider. T h e state has responsibility f o r core activities such as the definition of a set of m a j o r policies f o r socioeconomic d e v e l o p m e n t ; t h e provision of m a j o r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; a n d o t h e r activities r e l a t e d to n a t i o n a l sovereignty issues such as n a t i o n a l defense a n d foreign policy, financial policy, a n d the m a i n t e n a n c e of public o r d e r . The state as facilitator. T h e state has responsibility f o r t h e overall policies a n d t h e rules a n d r e g u l a t i o n s that create an e n a b l i n g e n v i r o n m e n t f o r e c o n o m i c growth a n d development, particularly for t h e i n d i g e n o u s A f r i c a n private s e c t o r . T h i s also i n c l u d e s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p r o m o t i o n of the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l , not-for-profit sector. The state in partnership. T h e state has responsibility f o r b u i l d i n g a climate of cooperation a n d trust a m o n g the public, private, a n d notfor-profit sectors t h r o u g h efforts to develop m o r e formal consultative mechanisms a n d f o r the transfer of ownership (both direct a n d indirect) of previously state-controlled a n d / o r - m a n a g e d activities. T h e r e e m e r g e s in Africa a m i x e d p i c t u r e of country-specific experiences in r e d e f i n i n g a n d refocusing the role of the state with specific e x a m p l e s w h e r e grassroots organizations, the press, NGOs a n d PVOs (private voluntary organizations), interest-based groups, a n d the c h u r c h have h a d s o m e i n p u t into the policy process. Both the i n p u t a n d i n f l u e n c e of n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l actors have varied f r o m o n e c o u n t r y to a n o t h e r d u e to d e g r e e s of o p e n n e s s , a lack of e n t h u s i a s m by key p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s to utilize s o c i e t a l - b a s e d institutions, lack of i n f o r m a t i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n , a n d low levels of u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g a r d i n g specific policy implications a n d impacts. In the African state t h e r e are difficulties in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of policy. Both practitioners a n d academics in Africa recognize that

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in order to improve the quality of policies, increase the commitment of the implementation machinery, and enhance the sustainability of policies, there is a need to decentralize and increase participation at all levels of society. However, the nature of participation and, in particular, the multiparty political system remain controversial. T h e processes and mechanisms of consultation, participation, and decentralization n e e d to be refined and better understood by the key stakeholders in the policy process. A l t h o u g h consultation is a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r sustainability, the p r o b l e m of c o n t i n u o u s consultation needs to be avoided to prevent stalemate. Individuals as well as g r o u p s must trust their respective legal and political institutions to faithfully carry out the law. In the same vein, d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s s h o u l d not b e c o m e an a t t e m p t at microcontrol from the center.

Patterns of Decisionmaking: T h e Nature of the State

T h e r e are two distinct c o m p o n e n t s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g : the decentralization of public sector decisionmaking to intermediate and primary units of government; and efforts to promote multiple channels of communication and influence between government and societal-based organizations. V a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s have d i s p l a y e d d i f f e r i n g d e g r e e s of centralization and decentralization in policymaking. T h e diversity of institutional frameworks and the p r e s e n c e of country-specific nomenclatures have also had a direct bearing on the nature of the policymaking process. More often that not, there is a gap between the form and the reality of institutional structures, with implications for both the mode of operation and effectiveness of decisionmaking. As a result, the actual process of p o l i c y m a k i n g is o f t e n quite different than the formal, institutional structures would indicate. T h e f o r m versus reality issue is perhaps best e x e m p l i f i e d by the dominance of the political executive in many countries. In discussing the nature of the state and how it affects the policy process, a distinction needs to be made between differing types of government structures: the one-party state, the activist state with a civilian regime, and the activist state with a military regime. In the first two types of states, the basic, formal process t h r o u g h which policy proposals should go are present and honored, at least in the formal sense. Further, in a one-party state the speed of processing decisions is often related to the interest in the issue at hand by the head of state. Other major deficiencies of the one-party state include

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the absence of substantive opposition political activity; the relatively m i n o r role that even the sole political party plays in the decisionmaking process; and, Finally, the limitations on the articulation and aggregation of interests among all societal-based groups. By contrast, the civilian activist state allows many opportunities for extensive consultation between the government, donors, and interest groups, with the implications of implementation more likely to be examined. In a military regime, the possibility of policy formulation by decree exists. Where policy is made by decree, more often than not there is a lack of analysis of problems, or of critical feasibility issues. As a result, downstream problems are likely to occur involving the availability of resources a n d / o r interaction with other sectors. Under such circumstances, policy successes are often t h r e a t e n e d from the beginning. In all instances, however, the role of the state remains unclear, which posits the question of whether or not the role of the state can be articulated in a single statement that defines a regime type. In almost all African states, the strong, personalistic role of the African president limits debate and often results in impulsive, nonrational policymaking by fiat. For development to occur a strong predictable state is important because policy reform efforts require leadership by a diverse set of actors (both political and administrative) and the h u s b a n d i n g of scarce resources both inside and outside government. Despite the p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t in defining specific state characteristics, any efforts to identify and determine the role of the state in the policy process must first address the nature of the state with respect to its decisionmaking structures, processes, a n d capacity. Issues of form versus reality are significant when it comes to making policy decisions stick, especially where the bureaucracy may resist policies. T h e tendency in some countries for bureaucracies to shelve, delay, or ignore policy directives has p r o d u c e d many policy failures, even where the political will to carry out reform has been high. Much remains to be d o n e to identify the necessary and appropriate organizational structures for building decisionmaking capacity. Attempts to decentralize government functions as well as efforts to p r o m o t e pluralism in the broader societal context have been characterized by a rapid rise in new policy-oriented units a n d / o r organizations. Although some African countries may need new organizational structures, consideration should be given to integrating new functions into existing structures for efficiency reasons. T h e overcommitment of scarce resources to new institu-

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tional arrangements is a major concern, as is the need to streamline and consolidate existing functions and responsibilities of the state. Such assessments should be directed at organizations operating outside o f government as well. In summary, the successful shift f r o m a single c e n t e r o f decisionmaking to multiple channels of communication, discussion, and decisionmaking remains an open and unresolved question in many African countries. A n u m b e r o f the case studies described in this book show that even where multiple centers o f decisionmaking occur, their influence can vary. Thus, many African states continue to be characterized by a lack o f openness, a weak commitment to a transparent policy process, and little capacity to assess policy implications. In addition, the shift to multiple centers has been carried out with insufficient consideration for existing institutional capacity, and many of the evolving democracies in African remain fragile. S o l u t i o n s to issues o f participation urgently r e q u i r e t h e development of an appropriate set of structures and processes that will clarify role definitions, develop organizations through strong e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m s , assist in t h e c r e a t i o n o f mechanisms o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and e n h a n c e the capacity for monitoring and evaluating policy decisions.

Building Implementation and Management Capacity Policy m a n a g e m e n t structures and processes in many African countries are weak and have been hindered by several factors. First, human resource development is critical; yet many aspects of human resource development have been overlooked or ignored in Africa. In particular, management skills are in short supply throughout the continent. S e c o n d , an important prerequisite for building policy implementation and m a n a g e m e n t capacity is an understanding o f the various threats and opportunities p r e s e n t in the political, economic, and social environment; yet stakeholder analysis is often absent from the policy process. Third, m a n a g e m e n t issues must relate to both national and international circumstances and the role that donors play in the public management process; yet it is often the case that d o n o r priorities prevail over domestic c o n c e r n s . Fourth, m o r e effort needs to be directed at bridging the gap between and among different sectors of the economy through the policy analysis process. Sectoral working groups have now b e c o m e the n o r m in many African c o u n t r i e s with regard to national planning exercises, but they have not been duplicated in other areas

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of government activity such as policy analysis. Developing a strong capacity for policy analysis is directly related to the manpower available, to appropriate structures and management systems, and to the participation of a diverse set of actors. In the end, h u m a n resource development strategies provide the foundation for building implementation and management capacity. There are no shortcuts to ongoing institutional development, which is essential for political stability and economic development. Finally, whether the intent is to create new structures and processes or to strengthen existing institutions, there is a need to clearly identify what is not working in order to begin the capacity building process. Institutional development activities should begin with the objective of giving governments an information base, analytical tools, and decision points. All are part of the sustainability process. T h e r e are four prerequisites to strengthening the implementation and management capacity of national, subnational, functional, and sectoral organizations: 1. T h e specific roles of different organizations and actors relevant to the policy process should be clearly identified. 2. Where appropriate, such organizations should be endowed with adequate resources and training in the formulation and implementation of public policy. 3. Effective mechanisms should be developed to improve communication among the different actors and to facilitate the coordination of their activities. 4. Appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms should be developed to ensure that problems are identified in a timely m a n n e r and that the appropriate remedial action is taken. In varying degrees in many African countries the necessary analytical capacities for policy analysis are available; but these capacities are often misused due to misplacement and the misuse of personnel, the lack of essential tools, and lack of communication. Efforts needs to be made to bridge the gap between the supply and demand for these capacities. Both the scarcity of qualified personnel and the misplacement of p e r s o n n e l have c o n t r i b u t e d to the complexities and subüeties of policy implications being ignored. T h e analytical capacities of policy units should have the following three components. Quantitative techniques. These techniques are necessary for carrying out cost-benefit analysis as well as the overall and specific financial

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implications of various policy alternatives. They are also necessary for the appraisal of impacts, needs, and available resources. Qualitative analysis. This component is necessary to assess feasibility, expectations, attitudes, and values. Such assessments identify the main actors in a given situation, establishing the potential winners and losers, and indicate the appropriate strategies for building consensus and coalitions between and among groups and individuals. The legal framework. This c o m p o n e n t of policy analysis is often neglected but is necessary for both understanding the legal context in which policy alternatives will operate and the need to establish and/or a m e n d relevant rules and regulations. Avoidance of rigid preconceptions of the private and public sector are also important in defining and implementing structural adjustment programs, as is the need for examining the merits of transitional phases during the implementation process.

Institutional Development and Sustainability Institutional development and capacity building need to be considered within the larger context of developing sustainable policies. T h e implications and diverse issues o f the present structural adjustment-induced environment are controversial, as are the dynamics and potential of the post-structural adjustment era. One point is clear, however: there is an overwhelming need to more effectively balance policy content considerations with institutional development and implementation considerations. T h e international donor community as well as African governments have been slow to recognize the capacity building demands of structural adjustment programs and their implications for sustainability. Considering the poor state of economies in Africa, the policies advocated under structural adjustment seem to be unavoidable. T o ensure sustainability, however, these policies must be indigenous and not donor imposed. Without exception, the prevailing countryspecific conditions most often determine whether or not a structural adjustment package will be successful. Moreover, during the implementation phase of structural adjustment programs, there is a need to appreciate the limitations of criteria of efficiency and rationality advocated in the programs. Policy management capacity has remained weak in Africa over the past thirty years, despite significant investment in human resource development. In part, this weakness is due to a lack of total

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institutional development, that is, the development processes, p e r s o n n e l , a n d systems a p p r o p r i a t e to political, economic, cultural, and social environment policy process operates. Specifically, the following six be addressed to ensure sustainability.

of structures, the specific in which the issues should

The institutional implications of specific policies. T h e m a n n e r and extent to which institutional implications are taken into account at the policy formulation stage has much to do with the sustainability of policies. The success or failure of different policies is closely related to the design of organizational structures and the processes of decisionmaking within institutions. Feasibility considerations, in particular, are i m p o r t a n t for the success and sustainability of policies. Resource allocations, manpower, acceptability, technical considerations, coordination, communication, and participation are all critical elements during the planning stage. The enhancement of existing institutional resources. E n h a n c i n g the policy-oriented capacities of existing institutional resources is one promising avenue for ensuring sustainability. In general, these include universities, research institutions, and training organizations. Also i m p o r t a n t are government-related policy units, such as Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), and the Policy Analysis Unit in Kenya as well as similar units in NGO trade, business, agricultural, and labor organizations. The improvement of information flows. Improving information flows throughout society can also enhance sustainability. Such efforts can assist in determining the needs and priorities of people at different levels of society and can raise the consciousness and awareness of the public of the capacities, role, and limitations of the state. Key organizations of civil society include the parliament, the media, interest-based groups, and public s e c t o r - o r i e n t e d NGOs and community-based organizations. T h e development of d i f f e r e n t institutional and organizational arrangements for involving diverse groups in the process of consultation has begun to occur in a number of African countries as part of the democratization process. The effectiveness of these arrangements, however, has varied, and as a c o n s e q u e n c e , the sustainability of policies continues to be jeopardized. In one-party states, for example, an elaborate structure exists in principle for linking the national level to the village level. In practice, however, this does not achieve participation. The Kenya experience with the seminar approach is an example of an attempt

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to energize the consultative-participative process. Nigeria also has a provision for public debate on issues of national importance. Such efforts are limited in practice, however, and many of the efforts are mechanical and informative rather than consultative. Underlying all of the approaches to the development of participative mechanisms are the issues of how to get people involved, who should participate at what levels in the policy hierarchy, and the need to distinguish between local and national policies. The improvement of information systems. T h e creation a n d / o r e n h a n c e m e n t of policy-oriented information systems has not been adequately addressed in Africa. Analytical tools and the capacity to utilize various consultation/communication mechanisms are critical to institution building. The identification of decisionmaking points and systems that facilitate the capacity to clarify and, as necessary, review the roles of the several organizations and agencies involved in the policy process are essential to capacity building. Much needs to be d o n e to develop m a n a g e m e n t information systems that are appropriate to a resource poor environment. The development of human resources. Although a few African countries still suffer f r o m a lack of trained manpower, the problem in the majority of cases appears to be one of proper utilization of available manpower and the development of a suitable reward structure. The nature of the human resource shortage needs more careful analysis at both the national and local levels. It may be that an absolute shortage of requisite skills exists; in some cases, there may be a maldistribution of skills. While there may be talented people at the senior levels of the public service, there is often a severe shortage of skilled personnel at the middle level of the public sector. An important contributing factor that complicates the planning of strategies for human resource development is a lack of clarity in the role of the state in structural adjustment programs and policies. Inadequate personnel policies and systems have had a negative effect on the policy process and will continue to do so until the role of the state in development m a n a g e m e n t and the nature of the skills shortage is more appropriately defined. The twin issues of motivation and attitude are critical problems affecting h u m a n resource development. Structural a d j u s t m e n t programs have brought about a crisis with regard to compensation for public servants. Inadequate salaries have seriously affected the state's capacity to attract and retain staff persons of adequate caliber. In a broader context, attitudes shared by both civil servants and the general public regarding the value of public service have been

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seriously e r o d e d , causing a crisis of m o r a l e . Moreover, structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s have o f f e r e d little to the general public or to the civil servant to replace the p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e national f e e l i n g of g o o d will felt toward national service that motivated so many in the early years of statehood. T h e r e a r e several key a r e a s w h e r e t r a i n i n g n e e d s to b e s t r e n g t h e n e d . For e x a m p l e , h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s n e e d to m o r e closely focus on the i m p o r t a n c e of contextual factors in t h e policy process. T h e s e i n c l u d e n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n c e r n s a n d priorities as well as local a n d regional c o n d i t i o n s . Policy p l a n n i n g , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , m o n i t o r i n g , a n d policy analysis activities all r e q u i r e a capacity to deal with e l e m e n t s of diverse e n v i r o n m e n t s t h a t h a v e an i m p a c t o n i n t e r n a l m a n a g e m e n t f u n c t i o n s . M a n a g e r s n e e d to b e a b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n conditions that have to be taken as given a n d those p r o b l e m areas that can b e addressed. Constraints as well as o p p o r t u n i t i e s must be r e c o g n i z e d a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o policy strategies. P e r s o n n e l t r a i n i n g in this r e g a r d is closely related to a host of g o v e r n a n c e issues that are b o t h sensitive a n d c o m p l e x but that n e e d to b e addressed. The reordering of donor-client relations. D o n o r s a n d host c o u n t r y p r o g r a m m a n a g e r s n e e d to avoid t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s t h a t have resulted in p o o r policies in the past. It is i m p o r t a n t f o r recipient states to m a n a g e d o n o r s by r e q u i r i n g t h e m to work within an institutional context. Although structural adjustment programs r e d u c e d waste a n d led to b e t t e r policy m a n a g e m e n t , t h e r e is a d a n g e r of rigidity in d o n o r - i n d u c e d e c o n o m i c policy. Given t h e diversity of African countries, t h e r e is a n e e d for flexibility in d o n o r a p p r o a c h e s to policy r e f o r m . C o n c e p t u a l d i f f e r e n c e s o f t e n arise between e x t e r n a l agencies a n d African g o v e r n m e n t s over the n e e d for certain policies a n d over how they can be most effectively i m p l e m e n t e d a n d m o n i t o r e d . T h e situation is b e g i n n i n g to c h a n g e , however, as m o r e c o g n i z a n c e is t a k e n of n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e n d e v e l o p i n g s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t programs. This c h a n g e has arisen partly f r o m the m o r e active role b e i n g taken by the African countries c o n c e r n e d . In some cases, f o r e x a m p l e , Nigeria a n d Zambia, d o n o r involvement was r e j e c t e d d u e to c o n f l i c t i n g a p p r o a c h e s , a n d s u b s e q u e n t relationships d e v e l o p e d between t h e d o n o r a n d the recipient country that were o n a d i f f e r e n t basis. D o n o r s have i n f l u e n c e d a n d c o n t i n u e to influence, a n d in some cases d o m i n a t e , t h e policy process. An a p p r o p r i a t e system f o r d o n o r / p o l i c y m a k e r i n t e r a c t i o n n e e d s to be d e f i n e d . W h a t s h o u l d

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the nature o f donor involvement be? At issue is the definition o f institutional development within a particular political environment. O n e suggestion is that external agencies work with countries to f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l issues a n d t h e development o f institutional capacity rather than imposing d o n o r preferences for certain institutional arrangements. D o n o r assistance is important in the strengthening o f existing institutional capacities, particularly through the provision o f resources that would strengthen the localization o f training and that would m o r e fully develop local training institutions. T h e develo p m e n t o f such capacity is important for dealing with external agencies, for ensuring that African governments have the required institutional infrastructure, organizational capacity, personnel, and procedures for achieving proper integration o f externally supported programs within the appropriate national policy frameworks.

The Need for More Cooperative Efforts At issue is more than the question o f structural adjustment policies. T h e debate is over the attitudes of donors and the values of program managers. T h e problem lies in the way structural adjustment was introduced and what was rational within the prevailing situation in the early 1980s. At that time there was little understanding o f the impact of structural adjustment on society. In the 1990s this issue and both the economics and the feasibility of specific policies need to be examined. Success lies in the partnership that can develop, for example, between the IMF and the recipient country, and in the way that the World Bank, the UNDP, and other donors complement that partnership. African g o v e r n m e n t s n e e d p r o g r a m s r a t h e r than projects, and interactive action rather than episodic activity. In the past ten years the IMF, the World Bank, and African governments have learned a great deal. T h e African state, not the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , is ( o r s h o u l d b e ) r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementation of government policies. In the 1980s IMF policies pushed/forced governments to take certain actions that were not domestically feasible. In many cases this increased human suffering. Such outcomes do not constitute acceptable policy reform. In the 1990s there needs to be more cooperation and a better awareness o f the institutional requirements for policy reform with a human face. Structural adjustment requirements have not helped strengthen the public sector, although the reforms depend upon public sector capacity. In many countries, motivation is low, civil servants are depressed, and this poor morale has resulted in retention problems

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(at least as far as those with talent are concerned). Attitudes have also been affected more widely and the ever-present spirit of national service that characterized the postindependence period is long gone. Regrettably, nothing has replaced the postindependence idealism and commitment to national development. T o correct the above, African governments are now more active in national priority setting and in managing donor involvement, which is crucial to regaining ownership of the process. Such actions must also be accompanied by more efforts to allow local personnel to manage externally supported programs. Donor awareness of and c o m m i t m e n t to these issues should be a priority o f African governments and other actors concerned with the capacity building process in Africa.

Capacity Building for Policy Change At the conclusion of the conference ten summary statements were prepared by the participants in an effort to capture and articulate the major themes surrounding capacity building efforts to support policy change and sustainability in the African context. They are as follows. 1. Capacity building is related to a complex set of human resource development issues that range from strategies of localization, training, and professionalization of the civil service, to the issue o f " d e r e a l i z a t i o n " of positions under structural adjustment (or for efficiency criteria). 2. Structural adjustment makes requirements on governments. Thus, there is a need for a strong and efficient state to carry out policy change and economic reforms. 3. T h e r e continues to be a role for an activist, interventionist state in the development process in a post-structural adjustment period. 4. A major issue in the structural adjustment debate is the role of the private sector and the market system as well as the a p p r o p r i a t e b a l a n c e between the public and private (including the not-for-profit) sectors. 5. Reforms often involve the introduction of task forces (as in military governments) or working groups a n d / o r other ad hoc arrangements to solve problems. T h e s e groups can make a contribution but their institutional experience is often lost when they are dissolved without integrating their experiences into the public management system.

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6. T h e bottleneck of policymaking a n d , in particular, policy r e f o r m is the policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n process. Attempts to avoid the difficult questions that implementation often poses can lead to the dangerous situation of choosing a policy that r e q u i r e s very little i m p l e m e n t a t i o n r a t h e r than a m o r e effective policy that d e m a n d s r i g o r o u s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n resources. Reformers thus opt for privatization rather than public-private partnerships. 7. T h e n a t u r e of t h e political process a n d t h e way that p a r t i c i p a t i o n o c c u r s , o r does n o t o c c u r , p r o v i d e s a framework for policymaking. Transparency and consultation are i m p o r t a n t . At issue is the question of w h e t h e r or not t h e r e is a particular political framework that ensures good policy and debate about policy alternatives. 8. D o n o r s have i n f l u e n c e d , c o n t i n u e to i n f l u e n c e , a n d , in same cases, d o m i n a t e the policy process. An a p p r o p r i a t e system f o r d o n o r / p o l i c y m a k e r i n t e r a c t i o n n e e d s to b e defined. 9. T h e r e are t h r e e ways to u n d e r s t a n d the policy process. Policymaking involves: legal constraints a n d guidelines, i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d p r e s c r i b e d processes, a n d individual and g r o u p behavior. In s t r e n g t h e n i n g the policy p r o c e s s , e a c h c o m p o n e n t of p o l i c y m a k i n g must b e addressed. 10. T h e r e are often problems of goal distortion in the policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n process: either t h r o u g h nonaction; diversion of, or lack of, resources; or t h r o u g h c o r r u p t i o n , which u n d e r m i n e s equitable access to resources. Efforts n e e d to be m a d e in all phases of the policy cycle to avoid such distortion.

Conclusion In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the state was seen as "developmental" with the public sector coming to dominate society. In the 1980s this view was significantly altered. Many talked a b o u t rolling back the state in terms of its areas of responsibility. In the 1990s there is likely to be a m o r e balanced view of the state with little discussion of either state-centric development or the abolition of the state's d e v e l o p m e n t role. T h e extremes on both e n d s of t h e ideological s p e c t r u m have b e e n discredited. W h a t remains is the n e e d for appropriate models for the formulation and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of development policies in the public, private, and

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not-for-profit sectors. There will continue to be a need to scale back on state activity in African countries. At the same time, governments must have appropriate development policies in order to plan for institutional development throughout society. There continue to be some who accept the need for a smaller state and some who do not. This conflict is real. For many who advocate state-planned development, decentralization is often seen as an alternative to privatization. An appropriate balance between the two strategies of reform must be developed for each country within its own historical, cultural, and social context. Policy reform needs to focus on changing the domestic private sector in Africa. Policy change must include nurturing strategies for the fledgling private sector in many African countries. These strategies must be accompanied by a serious discussion of public s e c t o r - p r i v a t e sector b o u n d a r i e s , a n d a serious a t t e m p t to deregulate indigenously based economic activity. For example, there is no longer any room for state policies that limit the access of private taxis to and from airports or international hotels, or that defend retail traders against the informal sector. Deregulation must not be approached from an ideological perspective, but from a taskoriented, practical, and entrepreneurial viewpoint. Discussions of policy reform should evolve out of realistic appraisals of what the state can and cannot do, given its limited financial resources and h u m a n skills. T h e r e also needs to be a continued focus on governance and the transition from single to multiple centers of decisionmaking. Multiple centers of decisionmaking and influence require organizational capacity, institutionalized processes, and an agreed-upon definition of the nature of the decisionmaking process. The process involves the definition of roles and the extent to which they should be formalized. The nature of governance and models of decisionmaking remain controversial in many African countries. An absence of an agreement on basic principles will continue to impede the development of sustainable policies in many countries.

9 Improving Management Performance in Africa: Collaborative Intervention Models Louis A. Picará & Michele Garrity Donor-supported interventions have been an integral part of the development process in Africa over the past thirty years. T h e structural adjustment decade (1980s) of policy reform and privatesector d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m s has drawn b o t h bilateral a n d multilateral donors deeper into the development process of many African countries. Given the radical changes being implemented, and the need to prepare for the post-structural adjustment period, it is important to reexamine the nature and scope of donor involvement in institution building, p r o g r a m m a n a g e m e n t activities, and h u m a n resource development, and in what ways these activities have impacted on the performance of African managers and institutions. In particular, it is important to assess the extent to which African educational and training institutions as well as newly emerging NGOs are prepared to assume responsibility for training managers and administrators for the twenty-first century. This chapter examines institutional development and capacity building issues within the context of donor-recipient relationships and assesses the extent to which donor-supported interventions have improved m a n a g e m e n t performance. The discussion is based on our experiences with capacity building in Africa. Lessons f r o m technical assistance activities in Guinea-Conakry, in the Southern African Development Coordination C o n f e r e n c e (SADCC), 1 and from a World Bank institutional development project in support of management training in Southern and Western Africa inform the discussion. It is our contention that d o n o r efforts to improve m a n a g e m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e in Africa have not met the challenge posed at i n d e p e n d e n c e . H u m a n resource development has long

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been related to institutional development and sustainability, 2 but management skills, in particular, continue to be the weak link in the development policy chain. There are a number of factors that have contributed to the present situation. First, explanations can be f o u n d in the nature of the donorrecipient relationship. Over the years, technical assistance projects have t e n d e d to be rigid and predictable. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development's h u m a n resource development activities have relied almost exclusively on participant training tied to U.S.-based academic institutions and contracting organizations. Large n u m b e r s of short courses and certificate programs have continued to move hundreds of thousands of African participants to U.S. classrooms, despite the numerous language and logistical problems inherent in such activity. Although factors such as ideology, foreign policy, and efficiency have most certainly informed the decisions for such arrangements, they have not served the development of African educational and training institutions well. Second, the donor-recipient relationship has evolved very little over the past thirty years. Host countries have remained the "recipients" of d o n o r largesse. Little attention has been given to imparting donor methods, strategies, and rationales to host-country program managers in any significant or formal way. As a result, African program managers, when they are so inclined, have been f o r c e d to learn the intricacies of d o n o r language, project d o c u m e n t a t i o n , a n d f u n d i n g mechanisms on their own. T h e cumulative impact of this uneven relationship has often been negative and soured the best intentions of mission personnel and other field staff to establish a more equal relationship with host country counterparts. Frequent influxes of short-term consultants with narrowly focused expertise have also reinforced the unequal quality of the relationship. Third, explanations can be f o u n d in the nature of interdonor relations, which are tenuous at best. Donors both run in packs and actively compete against one another. Once again, ideology, foreign policy concerns, and different operating styles have often mitigated against successful j o i n t endeavors and coordination. Both institutional a n d h u m a n resource development have suffered from poorly coordinated d o n o r interventions, particularly where projects and programs are long term and wide in scope. Much attention has focused on identifying problems, designing activities, and clearing u p implementation snags, but sustainable development remains elusive. The initiation of structural adjustment policies, with their emphasis on market forces, has revealed

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important insights about environmental factors that have a direct i n f l u e n c e on capacity building and sustainability issues. T h e attention now being given to stakeholder a n d interest g r o u p influence in project planning activities has opened up new avenues for capacity building in the public sector. Implicit in this focus has been the need to bolster weak states while trimming away at bloated bureaucracies. An increased role for NGOs also has provided a ready source of information and expertise outside of traditional authority structures and has the potential to build capacity over a broad range of areas outside of the public sector. At the same time, the focus on market-driven policies has highlighted the weaknesses of past institution building and human resource development strategies. The need for efficient managers, public-private partnerships, reliable systems for data collection and analysis, a n d m u l t i c h a n n e l i n f o r m a t i o n flows s u p p o r t s t h e contention that management skills are an art as well as a science. Donor interventions have not been effective at transferring the highly refined skills of analytical thinking that are so critical to the development of the systems and processes necessary for sustainable development. Management performance in Africa has suffered accordingly f r o m the past failures of donor initiatives to build capacity. Out of the institution-building experiences of the projects examined in this chapter, we have reviewed what has worked and what has not. Where linkages between and among donors and other host country actors were not developed, the projects suffered, and little occurred in the way of institutional and h u m a n resource development; the projects were designed and i m p l e m e n t e d in isolation. On the other hand, where linkages were recognized as important to project success, collaborative models of cooperation emerged. Inherent in the models were efforts to consider the environmental factors at work, the need to establish long-term relationships, the importance of sharing responsibilities, and the need for accountability. In looking toward the future, a particular type of collaboration has merit. Contracting-out as a development model has a number of advantages relevant to both public and private sector activities. From a theoretical perspective, it is truly a learning process model, with many opportunities for feedback and adjustment. From a practical s t a n d p o i n t , it emphasizes accountability, stresses efficiency, redefines old patterns of relationships, and builds both institutional and h u m a n resource capacity in innovative ways. It also has the potential to become a reliable framework within which many types of collaborative arrangements can emerge.

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The Nature of the Projects The Performance Management Experience in SADCC From 1984 to 1988, the P e r f o r m a n c e Management Project, t h r o u g h t h e N a t i o n a l Association of Schools of Public Affairs a n d Administration (NASPAA), 3 c o n d u c t e d research and design work, and h e l p e d establish the M a n a g e m e n t Resource Unit (MRU) of the SADCC Regional Training Council. 4 T h e intervention in S o u t h e r n Africa was designed to s u p p o r t the council and the m a n a g e m e n t unit as it developed a capacity to provide assistance to regional a n d national m a n a g e m e n t training institutions in both the public a n d the private sector. Following a major research project on m a n a g e m e n t training in s o u t h e r n Africa, 5 NASPAA r e s p o n d e d to a request by t h e USAID regional mission in late 1985 to assist in the creation of the MRU a n d in the development of a series of pilot research a n d training projects on intraregional trade, transport, and agriculture. An organizational assessment or learning process model, based on professional collaboration of African and U.S. professionals, was d e f i n e d in the SADCC pilot project workplan for calendar year 1987.6 Each of the pilot activities had three separate but interlocking activities—design, implementation, and assessment—carried out by t h r e e separate collaborative teams. In each case, a collaborative a r r a n g e m e n t with a S o u t h e r n African regional o r g a n i z a t i o n occurred. T h e first two pilot activities involved training. O n e pilot on intraregional trade in SADCC was carried out in cooperation with the Institute of Development Management (IDM) in Botswana; the s e c o n d pilot activity, on t r a n s p o r t m a n a g e m e n t , was d o n e in collaboration with the National Railways of Zimbabwe. In each instance a separate assessment team examined the activity. Both assessments were f r a n k and often critical of the activities they were examining. T h e third pilot on agriculture was aborted. SADCC and the SADCC Regional Business Council In 1988, SADCC i n i t i a t e d t h e f o r m a t i o n of an i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework that would d e f i n e and articulate the c o n c e r n s of the regional business community to their respective governments a n d the various organs of SADCC. T h r o u g h a cooperative agreement with USAID/Harare, the goal was to create a regional-based institution (the SADCC Regional Business Council or SRBC) that would s u p p o r t a n d foster t h e

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development of ten national, nongovernmental trade and businessrelated organizations t h r o u g h a variety of institution-building activities. T h e latter i n c l u d e d applied research on regional economic policy issues, training workshops, and i n f o r m a t i o n dissemination activities. T h e end result of such activities would establish a smoothly f u n c t i o n i n g network of SADCC-wide trade and business-related NGOs that would support the regional business community through membership programs and services. It was also h o p e d that the network would foster the development of shared values and a longterm commitment to improving the region's economic development. In addition to USAID's support for a regional institution (the SRBC), the UNDP and several agencies of the European Economic Community (EEC) were also active in the region providing technical assistance to individual SRBC members. 7 Two years after the SRBC was established, an internal study of the SRBC and its members f o u n d that many organizational development issues, such as management skills training, strategic planning and program design, and implementation and evaluation had received insufficient attention. 8 A 1992 USAID evaluation also found weak institution development. In particular, problems arose from the way in which technical assistance occurred at the various member organizations. Technical assistance had tended to follow one of two patterns: a specific set of activities was f u n d e d with s u p p o r t for one or more resident foreign advisers, or both operational and program monies were available with support for o n e or m o r e resident advisers a n d successive, s h o r t - t e r m consultants. In the latter pattern, one of the resident advisers typically assumed administrative responsibility. In either situation, training for local counterparts was usually included through on-thej o b or participant training arrangements, and little or no training was provided for the executive directors or the board members of the NGOs. The limitations on organizational development u n d e r such circumstances were many. In particular, the recommendations of the internal study urged the SRBC to focus more attention on institution-building and training activities for its individual m e m b e r institutions. The Performance Management

Experience in

Guinea

Beginning in 1986, NASPAA, through its field office in Guinea, worked with the Ministry of Agriculture in a series of training and organizational development activities. 9 The intervention in GuineaConakry took an organizational development format within Guinea's

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Ministry of Agriculture (formerly the Ministry of Rural Development). T h e goal of the project was to use organizational development techniques to increase management effectiveness. The NASPAA intervention began with a request by the secretarygeneral of the then Ministry of Rural Development to assist in the organizational strengthening of the ministry. Initial design work in late 1986 p r o p o s e d a series of iterative interventions with a c o n t i n u o u s feedback process. T h e organizational development activity was to begin with the top management of the ministry (the secretary-general a n d his directors general) and work outward throughout the central ministry and eventually into the field. The process involved the ministry in defining both its own mission in the post-Sekou Touré period, and the nature of the ministry's extension services in the areas of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. After an initial set of activities, the project bogged down for most of calendar year 1987, with changes of personnel in both the USAID mission and in the project management team. A resident adviser was provided to the ministry in 1988; in late 1989, the USAID Guinea mission awarded NASPAA a direct contract to manage the project. As of 1993, the project continued intermittently to deliver short-term technical assistance. 10 Most of the 2.8 million dollars in the project have been consumed by administrative and overhead costs. The World Bank UNEDIL Project

In 1985, the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI), in c o o p e r a t i o n with the UNDP and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), began the design of an institutionb u i l d i n g p r o j e c t f o r t r a i n i n g institutions t h r o u g h o u t Africa ( U N E D I L ) . 1 1 T h e UNEDIL project gave priority to the develo p m e n t of collaborative mechanisms between LDC institutions and individuals and organizations in the industrialized countries. 1 2 T h e purpose of the UNEDIL project was to provide support for regional training institutions, both F r a n c o p h o n e a n d Anglop h o n e , t h r o u g h U N E D I L - s p o n s o r e d training, organizational development, research, a n d consultancy missions. 1 3 U n d e r the project, ten to fifteen of the strongest institutions on the continent were to be provided with significant financial support and be utilized as subcontractors in training activities where appropriate. Such a practice is well developed in many parts of Latin America and Asia. Following usual World Bank practice, the UNEDIL project took a long time to germinate. For over two years, regional seminars and

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workshops were held with institute representatives throughout the continent under the leadership of the EDI. Several applied research projects and a number of training activities also occurred at target institutes. In 1987, regional representatives were appointed in Gaborone, Botswana, for Anglophone Africa, and in Yaonde, Cameroon, for Francophone Africa. The project sputtered on for some five years with low levels of activity, and the resident offices were terminated in March 1993. Separate Tracks Versus Collaborative Linkages for Training and Institutional Development USAID in Guinea did not involve an African or Guinean institution in the ministry's organizational development project. In part the USAID decision was based on the recognition that there were no training institutions in Conakry capable of involvement in the Ministry of Agriculture project. Further, there was no discussion in Guinea that training institution capacity be created within the country. The Guinea USAID mission, and the ministry in Guinea, could have considered linking project training activities to a Francophone regional training institution. This type of collaborative model had already been successful in the first SADCC pilot activity where institutional services were subcontracted with the IDM in Botswana and with NASPAA acting as an adviser. Although the suggestion was made to involve regional institutions between 1986 and 1987, there was no interest in the USAID Conakry mission to develop a collaborative arrangement. 1 4 USAID officials were leery of involving third-country or regional organizations because it would complicate the project. Instead, NASPAA involvement replicated the normal contractor/mission relationship with a host country client, with a resident adviser assisted by U.S.-based "parachute" missions put together by NASPAA in Washington. With the project's expansion through a NASPAA direct management contract, there also might have been an attempt to formalize linkages between NASPAA (or a NASPAA subset of schools) and a West African institute, for the long-term planning and implementation of Guinea a n d / o r regional activiues. 15 The Guinea project lingered on for over five years without significant program activity. T h e project continued because the USAID mission needed to expend funds regardless of the lack of program p e r f o r m a n c e in the activity. T h r o u g h the NASPAA intervention in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Guinea USAID

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mission had h o p e d to placate a Ministry of Agriculture that was cut out of major project support when sectoral f u n d i n g u n d e r structural a d j u s t m e n t c a u s e d t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of agricultural-based rural development projects in 1986. 16 Despite t h e initial collaborative successes, the SADCC/MRU was stillborn, lasting little more than a year as an experimental activity. T h e project did not meet its goals because it failed to develop longterm collaborative linkages with o t h e r host country a n d regional actors. T h e absence of such linkages also m e a n t that the project never developed significant domestic institutional capacity. Lack of d o n o r s u p p o r t for the project also caused problems. For example, the SADCC/MRU project was battered by a USAID regional mission (Southern Africa) that c h a n g e d its regional priorities three times in f i f t e e n m o n t h s . 1 7 A f t e r a b a n d o n i n g the MRU project, USAID officials b l a m e d t h e MRU a d m i n i s t r a t o r (on the j o b less than eighteen months) for the failure of the project. T h e World B a n k / U N E D I L project began about the same time that NASPAA began its intervention in G u i n e a a n d in SADCC. However, despite t h e close proximity of interests, few bilateral d o n o r s b e c a m e involved in UNEDIL activities. As a result, the bilateral training projects evolved in separate tracks from the World Bank effort at institutional strengthening. Although the UNEDIL project did not link up with bilateral training efforts, advocates of collaboration between local institutions and d o n o r s did exist at the time. Within the West African region, and particularly in the F r a n c o p h o n e area, there had been discussion by USAID of an increased emphasis on m a n a g e m e n t training using West African regional institutions u n d e r the UNEDIL project. Some USAID officials in the region have argued that this should be the case with regard to research and consultancy training as well. 18

Approaches to Collaboration at the SRBC Given the SRBC's private-sector development focus, the organization was d e l u g e d with offers of technical assistance f r o m a host of bilateral, multilateral, and private aid agencies. Most of these offers, however, consisted of short-term assistance provided by teams of foreign-based consultants. Following the SRBC's internal assessment study and a strategic planning workshop for the members, the SRBC pursued a n u m b e r of creative approaches to build capacity through linkages with o t h e r NGOs. O n e such a p p r o a c h involved a collaborative a r r a n g e m e n t with the U.S.-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) to

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improve overall management performance using CIPE's expertise in training programs for n o n p r o f i t managers. 1 9 Beginning with an initial workshop involving regional business-related NGO managers, the SRBC p l a n n e d to collaborate with CIPE in establishing a Southern Africa-based management training program. Another collaborative approach focused on the development of an SRBC-sponsored chamber of commerce exchange program. The program's goal was to build institutional linkages between individual NGOs across the region and the more successful NGOs, providing personnel and technical assistance to less developed NGOs. A secondary goal was to strengthen the consulting and marketing capacity of the program's participants. A third approach was aimed at developing regional consultants. Through collaborative partnerships, the SRBC would contract with local expertise in the areas of trade, investment, and management for the design and delivery of special programs or packages of services that would be marketed to other NGOs in the region. 20 These and o t h e r innovative approaches tried at the SRBC, however, were never vigorously supported by the USAID regional mission in Harare. Nor did the SRBC's parent organization, the SADCC, fully s u p p o r t its initiatives. Both USAID and SADCC personnel failed to understand both the uniqueness of the SRBC experiment and the nature of the institutional constraints the SRBC faced in the region. In particular, institutional and human resource capacity issues were ignored by the mission and SADCC. As a result of the low priority given to capacity issues, all the SRBC members were viewed as viable organizations capable of fully implementing and sustaining SRBC-sponsored programs directed at the regional business community. In practice, many of the SRBC members could not meet the demands of planning, coordinating, or implementing activities. T h e SRBC was slow to recognize that weak institutional and human resource capacity was bogging down its activities. Once the dimensions of the problems became apparent, however, the SRBC focused more efforts on institution-building activities directed at the member organizations rather than an exclusive focus on business community-related activities. Support for the former, however, was challenged repeatedly by the d o n o r and misunderstood by SADCC headquarters, resulting in endless revisions to the SRBC workplan and needless delays in actually carrying out activities. In this environment, many of the collaborative approaches adopted by the SRBC were never fully implemented, and capacity issues continued to plague the SRBC. USAID support for the SRBC terminated in 1992 after less than two years of support.

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Collaborative Models and Institutional Development T h e r e are several observations that can be made about NASPAA 21 and the Performance Management Project and from its unfulfilled synergy with the UNEDIL project. They apply equally as well to the SADCC-SRBC project. A comparison of activities can provide lessons for future management development efforts. Capacity building efforts need to avoid the creation of separate tracks for educational and training efforts and institution-building activity. All training efforts should involve local or regional training institutions. In the Guinea project, no attempt was made in the first three years of the project to involve either a Guinean or West African regional training institution in the activity. Rather, the project was managed by the Washington-based NASPAA with a coordinator resident in Conakry. From an institutional development perspective, this may have been a major flaw in the design of the project. In addition to the o t h e r problems o f the NASPAA/MRU project, the absence of interdonor coordination had a significant and negative impact on this complex experiment. An effort to involve the multilateral UNEDIL project would have been useful to USAID interventions in both SADCC and Guinea. T h e absence of multilateral and bilateral donor coordination weakened both efforts. As both examples show, USAID and other donors require continual prodding to insure that all of their management support activities are collaborative and are based on a learning process mode o f operation. A successful donor intervention requires the development o f viable collaborative linkages between and among host country stakeholders and technical assistance delivery mechanisms. T h e r e must be something in it for all players or the effort will fail. Donor c o o r d i n a t i o n , though difficult, also needs to be aggressively pursued. Between 1979 and 1989, NASPAA and the P e r f o r m a n c e Management Project tried, with only mixed success, to develop a professional collaboration model in a number of their field-based research and training and organizational development activities. 22 M o r e o v e r , NASPAA tried to work with an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l development and learning process model that included both ongoing and independent assessments o f its activities, and a step-bystep adjustable planning approach. 2 3 Such a collaborative mode and its learning process model of organizational development may be a useful model not only for the USAID but for other donors as well. T h e two interventions by NASPAA under a USAID Cooperative A g r e e m e n t 2 4 illustrate the various approaches such a model offers

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a n d h i g h l i g h t the p r o b l e m s that can arise w h e n d o n o r s play a significant role in institutional d e v e l o p m e n t activities. T h e r e is little i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e m o r y in t h e d o n o r - c l i e n t relationship. In the SADCC-SRBC project, it is ironic to n o t e that two years into the project n e i t h e r the SRBC n o r USAID was aware of the NASPAA-SADCC/MRU project, even t h o u g h the USAID mission in H a r a r e f u n d e d b o t h activities a n d the first MRU pilot activity involved i n t e r r e g i o n a l t r a d e , an a r e a of i n t e r e s t to t h e SRBC. Linkages between the MRU a n d the SRBC were virtually nonexistent. Although personnel f r o m the Regional Training Council had e x p r e s s e d r e p e a t e d i n t e r e s t in m e e t i n g a n d w o r k i n g with SRBC p e r s o n n e l , this received little interest f r o m USAID p e r s o n n e l , a n d t h e SRBC relied on o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r e x p e r t i s e , notably outside the region. In addition, USAID p e r s o n n e l did not s u p p o r t or facilitate the d e v e l o p m e n t of linkages with o t h e r regional actors. Despite the many d o n o r s already working with the ten m e m b e r s of t h e SRBC, efforts to c o o r d i n a t e d o n o r activities fell on deaf ears. F u r t h e r , despite the SRBC-CIPE initiative to establish a regionalbased m a n a g e m e n t training p r o g r a m , n o local training institutions were b r o u g h t into the discussions. Rather, lacking time a n d with very little s u p p o r t f r o m the USAID office f o r the activity, the SRBC s p o n s o r e d a scaled-down, poorly organized one-time workshop. Given the context of an increased e m p h a s i s o n third-country training, a n d training institution d e v e l o p m e n t f o r both the private a n d p u b l i c sectors, t h e r e a r e a n u m b e r of lessons t h a t can b e l e a r n e d f r o m these experiences. T h e present focus on training for the private sector, a n d f o r public sector s u p p o r t of market-based e c o n o m i c activities, is likely to prove critical to the institutional d e v e l o p m e n t of regional a n d national-based organizations. 2 5 Central to any c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y t h a t c o u l d d e v e l o p b e t w e e n s u c h m u l t i l a t e r a l p r o j e c t s as U N E D I L a n d bilateral d o n o r t r a i n i n g activities s u p p o r t i n g public-private p a r t n e r s h i p s are institutional d e v e l o p m e n t efforts that are targeted at key regional a n d nationallevel t r a i n i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Given t h e c u r r e n t t r e n d s , it is r e a s o n a b l e to expect that any new h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t projects in Africa in the 1990s are likely to have a m a j o r institutional development component. Yet o u r project examples provide little evidence of s u p p o r t for institutional d e v e l o p m e n t a m o n g U.S. technical assistance officials. In the past decade, USAID in West Africa has shown little interest in institutional d e v e l o p m e n t within Africa in g e n e r a l a n d within the F r a n c o p h o n e region m o r e specifically. T h e U N E D I L p r o j e c t was u n d e r u t i l i z e d as an i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t m e c h a n i s m . M o r e o v e r , as t h e U n i t e d States moves t o w a r d private s e c t o r

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development, traditional techniques involving U.S. contractors and U.S.-based participant training remain the hallmarks of technical assistance. This continues to be the case in spite of the failure of these techniques to build capacity within the public sector in Africa. Interventions such as that occurring in the Guinea project continue to operate in isolation from other, similar interventions and from the indigenous institutional base that needs to be a natural part of the intervention process. Participant training continues throughout Francophone Africa in spite of the difficulties in trying to bring Americans to West Africa to work in French or to train West Africans in French in the United States—a participant training practice that goes back to the mid-1960s. 26 Discussions of Africa-based (as opposed to U.S.-based) research, design, and training activities reinforce arguments made in earlier chapters that there is no substitute for the twin strategies of institutional development and sustainability for improving the m a n a g e m e n t effectiveness of African states. In the early 1990s, donor-supported interventions are in danger of losing much of their long-term impact, whether the purpose is training, organizational development, or applied research. Whether the target is the public or the private sector, no long-term national or regional institutional capacity will develop if i n d i g e n o u s education and t r a i n i n g institutions are not involved. Further, it is not unreasonable to expect that training institution development and organizational development activities can successfully run on parallel tracks or that synergistic efforts can be achieved with multiple donors pursuing common goals t h r o u g h u n c o o r d i n a t e d strategies. Only program managers in LDCs can ensure that the donor/contractor focus is on transferring the capacity for organizational development to local or regional organizations rather than relying on externally based organizational development contracts or noniterative management training activities. 27 There is a negative influence running though much of the technical assistance activity for human resource development including such areas as: overseas participant training (both long and short-term); discrete, noniterative, and noninstitutional in-country training seminars; and externally managed organizational development activity. Each of these activities lacks the critical i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g c o m p o n e n t that is essential to sustainability. 28

The Limits of Collaboration

It is fairly easy to see with hindsight the need to develop more collaborative modes of intervention. But it is important to note there

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must be realistic a n d p r a g m a t i c m e c h a n i s m s available for achieving s u c h goals. To b e truly effective, these m e c h a n i s m s must fit t h e fragile institutional e n v i r o n m e n t in Africa. In particular, the host of p r o b l e m s that p l a g u e African e d u c a t i o n a n d t r a i n i n g institutions must b e a d d r e s s e d . In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d how m a n a g e m e n t d e v e l o p m e n t can o c c u r , we n e e d to e x a m i n e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of African education a n d training organizations. 2 9 T h e weak link in most e d u c a t i o n a n d training institutions in Africa is internal m a n a g e m e n t , particularly financial m a n a g e m e n t . T h e W o r l d B a n k / U N E D I L p r o j e c t c o u l d have c o m p l e m e n t e d d o n o r - f u n d e d projects (such as USAID's efforts in SADCC) in its s u p p o r t f o r internal m a n a g e m e n t capacity. I n d e e d , internal m a n a g e m e n t was to be a m a j o r focus of intervention in the UNEDIL project. This is not an area w h e r e the UNEDIL project has m a d e great strides. Internal m a n a g e m e n t is a sensitive area to LDC prog r a m m a n a g e r s a n d policymakers. Nonetheless, it is an organizational weakness that n e e d s to be recognized a n d addressed. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of potential s u b c o m p o n e n t s to this issue that were d u e to be addressed in the UNEDIL project. T h e s e were strategic p l a n n i n g , faculty g o v e r n a n c e , motivation, a n d financial m a n a g e ment. Strategic planning. A c o m m i t m e n t to strategic p l a n n i n g a n d m a r k e t analysis on the part of m a n a g e m e n t training organizations was seen as f u n d a m e n t a l to the success of the World B a n k / U N E D I L project. C o m p l e m e n t a r y d o n o r s u p p o r t to work with these organizations in developing long-term strategic plans could e n h a n c e an institution's p e r f o r m a n c e a n d regularize its basis of externally g e n e r a t e d revenue. Such efforts are particularly i m p o r t a n t in light of d o n o r interests in private sector development. Faculty governance. A n o t h e r r e c u r r i n g p r o b l e m has b e e n t h a t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e l f - m a n a g e m e n t . 3 0 Many African t r a i n i n g a n d e d u c a t i o n institutions have political or civil service a p p o i n t e e s as d i r e c t o r s , m a n y of w h o m lack an a p p r o p r i a t e b a c k g r o u n d in training a n d e d u c a t i o n issues. Without a b a c k g r o u n d in such issues the potential for a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of staff motivation a n d a lack of sensitivity to d e m a n d s is greatly increased, particularly a m o n g those staff e d u c a t e d in a nonhierarchical teaching faculty system in N o r t h America or Western E u r o p e . A b r e a k t h r o u g h on the issue of staff or faculty g o v e r n a n c e that is culturally a p p r o p r i a t e would be a m a j o r contribution to the institutional d e v e l o p m e n t of such organizations. Motivation. T h e issue of motivation is central to the p r o m o t i o n of applied research a n d consultancy. In light of Maslow's hierarchy of

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n e e d s 3 1 in t h e d e p r e s s e d c o n d i t i o n s o f m a n y L D C e d u c a t i o n a l

and

t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , it is basic h u m a n n e e d s that p r e d o m i n a t e m o s t African

environments.

individual's

research

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the

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that

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c o n s u l t a n c y f e e s a n d m e r i t salary i n c r e a s e s also c o n t r i b u t e to e g o enhancement. T r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s in A f r i c a o f t e n s u f f e r f r o m two e x t r e m e s . A t the o n e

extreme,

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the

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have

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exists the

problem

In t h e l a t t e r , t h e s t a f f n e g l e c t s

and of

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r e s e a r c h , a n d m a t e r i a l s d e v e l o p m e n t w o r k in o r d e r to p u r s u e m o r e l u c r a t i v e c o n s u l t a n c i e s . O n e a p p r o a c h to " r u n a w a y " c o n s u l t a n c i e s is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a f o r m u l a f o r s h a r i n g within the i n s t i t u t i o n . 3 2 Financial management. W i t h o u t a s o u n d p r o g r a m of financial m a n a g e m e n t r e f o r m , t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e n o t likely to a p p r o a c h financial self-sufficiency. Internal financial m a n a g e m e n t problems w e r e g i v e n h i g h p r i o r i t y in t h e d e s i g n o f t h e U N E D I L p r o j e c t . U S A I D , t h r o u g h its s u p p o r t o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t activities, c o u l d h a v e c o m p l e m e n t e d t h e W o r l d B a n k p r o j e c t in this a r e a . N A S P A A , f o r e x a m p l e , in its s u p p o r t o f t h e S A D C C M a n a g e m e n t R e s o u r c e U n i t , b e c a m e i n v o l v e d in t h r e e s e t s o f i n t e r n a l m a n a g e m e n t activities t h r o u g h its s u b c o n t r a c t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s with t r a i n i n g institutes. T h e activities i n c l u d e d institute b i l l i n g , f i n a n c i a l r e p o r t i n g , a n d c o n s u l t a n t e x p e n s e s u b m i s s i o n . By the t i m e N A S P A A c o m p l e t e d its c o o p e r a t i v e a g r e e m e n t , it h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n s i g h t into the internal financial m a n a g e m e n t of a n u m b e r of m a n a g e m e n t t r a i n i n g institutes a n d s u p p o r t o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

Collaborative Models Between and Among Donors The

examples

can

capacity building

also b e

used

to e x a m i n e

another

that n e e d s to be a d d r e s s e d w h e n

aspect

collaborative intervention m o d e l s — t h e successful coordination multiple, complementary

d o n o r activity. I n t e r d o n o r

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neglected

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and

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b u i l d i n g e f f o r t s in A f r i c a . F o r e x a m p l e , a l t h o u g h t h e r e was a g r e a t deal of potential complementarity within S A D C C between support,

German

Technical

Cooperation

(GTZ),

and

USAID

European

C o m m u n i t y s u p p o r t f o r h u m a n r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t , this was n o t

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effectively exploited, even though all three provided support for the SADCC regional training council and its management resource unit. Neither was there any attempt to involve the World B a n k / U N E D I L p r o j e c t in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f SADCC m a n a g e m e n t t r a i n i n g institutes. 35 In spite o f SADCC's eight years o f existence, the U N E D I L project neither treated the SADCC states as a separate subregional u n i t n o r used the SADCC R e g i o n a l T r a i n i n g C o u n c i l as a mechanism to coordinate the World Bank project in the subregion. T h e r e was no effective donor coordination on management training between the UNEDIL project and the bilateral donors in SADCC. I n t e r d o n o r coordination between the World Bank and USAID as well as o t h e r technical assistance organizations (such as those in Canada o r Germany) has been difficult at best since USAID began its support o f the SADCC Regional Training Council in the early 1980s. After 1988, the absence of interdonor cooperation, management weakness, vacillation within the g o v e r n m e n t o f Swaziland, and lethargy on the part of USAID officials in the Southern African region led German technical assistance to take the lead role in the MRU Unit activity. U.S. involvement in human resource develo p m e n t in SADCC was diverted to the private sector, w h e r e eventually the USAID-funded SADCC Regional Business Council e m e r g e d with no linkages to o n g o i n g training programs in the region.

Collaboration Through Contracting-Out Strategies f o r institutional d e v e l o p m e n t and h u m a n r e s o u r c e development must be pursued simultaneously. T h e strategies must also be pursued in ways that will promote the utilization o f local institutions and that will build capacity both within local institutions and within the c o m m u n i t i e s they are to serve. O n e effective mechanism involves collaboration based on a contracting-out mode between d o n o r s and key regional and national-level t r a i n i n g institutions and/or NGOs. O n e contracting-out scenario involves developing and utilizing appropriate regional institutions that could replicate and perhaps eventually replace the contractor capacity in U.S.-style participant training a n d U.S.-contracted design and implementation activities. A contracting-out model involving regional institutions o r associations o f institutions would bring participants to a regional center for m a n a g e m e n t training rather than send participants to the

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United States. 34 The coming to power of a nonracial government in South Africa will significantly increase the pool of African education and training institutions that can deliver management training and make the model even m o r e attractive. To ensure m a n a g e m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e , internal USAID evaluations could place equal emphasis on both training a n d institutional development in assessments of the management training activity. Hands-on training is all that training institutions in Africa currently provide. Consequently, little capacity exists for applied research and consultancy. Whatever their advantages, short courses, fellowships, and networking activities alone will not provide African training institutions with the kind of professional experience that meeting the demands of a contract or subcontract will provide. The primary need of management training institutions in Africa is donor support in the development of an applied research and consultancy capacity rather than support for training activity alone. 35 Contracting-out mechanisms also allow f o r less intrusive methods of internal m a n a g e m e n t strengthening. For example, organizations contracting with a donor or a prime contractor would not be paid until the task is completed and the billing and expense reports are completed correctly. Further, contracting allows for an auditing mechanism based on deliverables that is not politically feasible in d o n o r / c l i e n t relationships. Support for financial m a n a g e m e n t based u p o n these "on the j o b needs" would be appropriate whether the work is being done in the public or the private sector; the model is replicable over a variety of situations and a m o n g many types of donors. Pursuing e n h a n c e d management performance through a contractor/subcontractor mode rather than a donor-client mode changes both perceptions and the practical needs of capacity building through its focus on accountability and transparency. 36 The model proposed above explicitly recognizes that a central c o m p o n e n t in developing training institution capacity lies in the understanding that bilateral and multilateral donors are potentially major "clients" of African training and research institutions. 3 7 T h r o u g h the contracting-out m o d e of operation, donors can accomplish a number of objectives: (1) they contribute to the basic financial support of the organization; (2) a sound, high-quality p r o d u c t in research, organizational development, or training is developed and delivered; (3) the donor as client maintains the right to evaluate ( a n d audit) the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e of contractual obligations in ways that are not possible through the normal technical-assistance relationship; and (4) t h r o u g h the financial reporting process, the d o n o r or prime contractor can

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provide the organization with feedback on its internal financial management system. 38 Along these same lines, assistance could also be provided for the development of consortiums o f institutions (both U.S. and A f r i c a n ) , which would then c o m p e t e for contracts (using the r e q u e s t for p r o p o s a l process in U S A I D p a r l a n c e ) . African consortiums for p r o j e c t design, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , and evaluation activities would contribute significantly to an institutional capacity in training and research. A n o t h e r mechanism for promoting local institutional capacity would be a requirement by donors that there be local institution representation in international competitive bids (or set-aside projects). T h e s e could occur along the lines of the Eight-A firm requirements in the United States. Work within SADCC under the Performance Management Proj e c t and the SRBC e x p e r i m e n t provided a major, if brief, opportunity for innovative and flexible collaboration between USAID and African training institutions and host country professionals. T h e SADCC Regional Business Council experience had the potential to e x t e n d the collaborative c o n c e p t to include the rapidly growing N G O sector. These experiences are not unique to the SADCC region, and the collaborative model should be viewed as a viable alternative over a wide variety of circumstances and geographic locales.

Conclusion African institutional capacity is out of sync with that in many parts of Asia and Latin America. This, in part, reflects the chronic nature o f Africa's e c o n o m i c crisis. Institutional incapacity may also be a partial cause of the crisis. T h e Performance Management Project throughout its ten-year history conveyed a message of "professional collaboration" between practitioners in LDCs and their U.S. counterparts; professional collaborators should be an integral c o m p o n e n t of all technical assistance interventions in the 1990s and b e y o n d . 3 9 However, collaboration does not come naturally, and unless it is built into the competitive bidding process, it will get scant attention from USAID and other donors and contractors. Donor-supported interventions for m a n a g e m e n t effectiveness work best when based upon an institution-building model. This model is not put forward because African educational and training institutions are strong. They are not. If anything, educational and training capacity has decreased since i n d e p e n d e n c e in much o f Africa, which has had a negative i m p a c t on p u b l i c s e c t o r

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performance, and now threatens to u n d e r m i n e the m a n a g e m e n t performance of the private sector (including NGO activity) in many African countries. The failure to address institutional development issues in the 1990s inevitably will result in a continual spiral of foreign-based training activities and a lack of internal institutional capacity for human resource development in Africa. This is an issue that can best be m o n i t o r e d by the LDC policymaker and the program manager. It is in the interest of the donor recipient, not the donor, that institutional development occur. Left to their own devices, many donors will continue to rely on externally managed participant training, in-country training, and organizational d e v e l o p m e n t activities that have characterized much of the post-World War II period. They do so because U.S.-managed activities are relatively efficient and because they move money quickly. Many of the institutional development issues discussed in this chapter, such as internal management, involve matters of extreme sensitivity. No doubt, many are beyond the scope of d o n o r interest and the d o n o r system as it now exists. 4 0 Yet, i n s t i t u t i o n a l development remains o n e of the pillars of USAID policy, and institutional capacity building is crucial to developing successful strategies for public-private partnerships that are currently being pursued. It is an issue that will not go away. The absence of linkages between the NASPAA interventions in Western and Southern Africa and the World Bank/UNEDIL project, and between the SRBC and these actors, also illustrates the need for complementarity of d o n o r activity. Donors both run in packs in terms of policy priorities and compete with one a n o t h e r for the attention of LDC program managers. It is this competition that may allow local managers to set technical assistance priorities. T h e 1990s are likely to see a new paradigm in technical assistance. Now that many donors have declared that the "war" to upgrade the public sector has been won (or lost, d e p e n d i n g on one's perspective), attention has turned to the battle to upgrade the private sector in Africa. S u p p o r t for the private sector will undoubtedly face the same issues of d o n o r complementarity and institutional development that have challenged public sector support for the last thirty years. P r o f e s s i o n a l collaborative r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d especially contracting-out as a development model, provide a n u m b e r of interesting and potentially highly successful activities aimed at adapting current practices. As the examples in this chapter have shown, there are n u m e r o u s approaches to collaborative arrangem e n t s a m o n g b o t h the traditional t r a i n i n g and e d u c a t i o n

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institutions and their newly e m e r g i n g counterparts in the not-forprofit sector. T o g e t h e r these institutions offer a diversity of vehicles for upgrading management performance in Africa.

Notes 1. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is a regional development organization based in Botswana, comprising the m e m b e r governments of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, a n d Zimbabwe. In 1992 the regional body was renamed the Southern African Development Council (SADC). Given the time period covered in this chapter we will continue to use the more familiar name. 2. See for example, Joseph Eaton, ed., Institution Building and Development: From Concepts to Application (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972). 3. Between 1979 and 1989, NASPAA comanaged the Performance Management Project through a cooperative agreement with USAID. The p u r p o s e of the project, through its applied research and strategic interventions, was to develop new knowledge about the management needs and institutional requirements for public and private sector organizations. During the ten-year period, NASPAA consultants carried out research and sponsored interventions in organizational development and management training in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 4. USAID was already providing support to the SADCC Regional Training Council (RTC), under which the Management Resource Unit (MRU) was to be located. The RTC was a representative board made up of delegates from each of the then nine SADCC countries. Its administrative secretariat was supposed to be the Swaziland Department of Economic Planning and Statistics. However, the Swazi government would not allocate personnel for the RTC. As a result, USAID decided to try to provide administrative capacity by financing a subunit, the MRU, which was outside of the Swaziland civil service establishment. Technical assistance personnel were divided between the RTC and the MRU, a decision that had a negative impact on both the organizational capacity to grant assistance to educational and training institutions and on the long-term sustainability of the activity. 5. The research project used the critical incidents method. The project report recommended, among other things, the creation of a Management Development Resource Center (MADREC) as part of a projected major U.S., EC, and German intervention in support of private-sector and public-sector management training in SADCC. The USAID-funded MRU was a scaleddown version of the MADREC concept. Improving Management in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, July 1, 1985). The research director of the project was Prof. J o h n Montgomery of Harvard University. One of the authors of this chapter (Picard) served on the research team. 6. "Workplan and Schedule of Activities," Management Resource Unit, April 1987-April 1988 (Mbabane, Swaziland: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, March 1987). The term "assessment," in the organizational development sense, should not be confused with "evaluation" in the donor sense of the word. As defined by

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the donors, "evaluation" is a midpoint or terminal action that is separate from on-going project activity. NASPAA advocated a f r a n k assessment of organizational a n d / o r training institution capabilities that occurred within the context of the ongoing implementation of an activity. As such, j u d g m e n t was not made of the overall project, but each activity was to be assessed as part of a planning adjustment process that would allow activities to move from one stage of the project to the next (as in the Guinea project) or from one pilot to the next (as in the SADCC activities). Both programmatic and administrative (for e x a m p l e , f i n a n c i a l m a n a g e m e n t a n d r e p o r t i n g ) assessments were components of the process. 7. T h e U N D P was involved in Zambia a n d Angola a n d was negotiating with the Government of Tanzania to provide organizational development support for a newly created national chamber of commerce. In Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, chambers of commerce and t r a d e - r e l a t e d NGOs were receiving various levels of s u p p o r t for organizational development and institution-building activities from USAID and from German and Scandinavian aid agencies. Except for USAID in Botswana and the proposed UNDP project in Tanzania, most of the technical assistance projects were small in size and of limited duration. Accordingly, the impact of such projects was negligible given the low levels of institutional development of many of the grantees. 8. Michele Garrity, Needs Assessment Study for the SADCC Regional Business Council (Gaborone: SADCC Regional Business Council, April 9, 1991). 9. Activities were initially carried out u n d e r the Cooperative A g r e e m e n t between NASPAA and USAID's Bureau of Science and Technology, the USAID mission in Conakry, and the G o v e r n m e n t of Guinea. Later, NASPAA became a contractor to USAID Conakry for the project. 10. In March 1993, the project was put out for competitive bid. 11. "Proposal for SADCC Regional Program in Management Training; Pre-MADREC Phase" (Mbabane, Swaziland: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, July 11, 1986) and "Description of U N D P / E D I Project to S t r e n g t h e n T r a i n i n g Institutions in Africa" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, n.d.). T h e UNDP/EDI Project was called the "UNEDIL Project" in the field, the acronym coming from the first two initials of UNDP, EDI, and ILO. T h e project took four years to develop and still is criticized for doing more talking than implementing. T h e project's field operations were terminated inconclusively in March 1993. 12. T h e World Bank, in its African Capacity Building Initiative program for sub-Saharan Africa, also pledged support for the institutional development of management training institutions as part of their strategy to strengthen NGO management, professional associations, consultancy firms, and policy analysis units. The African Capacity Building Initiative: Toward Improved Policy Analysis Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991). 13. Lee Roberts, The Policy Environment of Management Development Institutions in Anglophone Africa: Problems and Prospects for Reform (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990). 14. O n e of the authors of this chapter (Picard), as director of the NASPAA/AID project, helped to design the Guinea activity during this period. 15. The Centre Africain d'Etudes Superieures en Gestión (CESAG) in

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Senegal (among others) might have been an appropriate candidate for such a linkage, given its academic level and its involvement in the World Bank UNEDIL upgrading project. 16. This statement is based on discussions one of the authors (Picard) had with officials in the USAID mission in Conakry in 1987. 17. Further, the regional mission found it easier to move money by buying hardware for transport projects in Mozambique than to invest the time a n d effort in the painful and slow process of h u m a n resource development and capacity building. 18. Personal communications with one of the authors (Picard) during trips to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Centra! African Republic, CongoBrazzaville, and Zaire in March 1987. 19. CIPE is an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and provides grants to a wide range of NGOs in less developed countries, particularly for institutional development activities. In Latin America, CIPE's collaborative efforts with NGOs evolved into a local training institute offering both practical and theoretical coursework on the management and operation of chambers of commerce. 20. For example, trade promotion programs involve a n u m b e r of discrete activities such as sectoral studies, feasibility studies, buyer/seller meetings, and overseas and regional trade missions. Taken together, these activities constitute a package or program of services and products that can be marketed to trade and investment-related organizations. 21. NASPAA and USAID might have better publicized its m o d e of operation within the international d o n o r community and within Africa. At this p o i n t far too little is known a b o u t the NASPAA/Performance Management mode of operation, particularly in Africa. During the ten years of its existence the project was litde understood by most USAID missions in the field, and it often became seen as little more than a contracting mechanism to move awkward amounts of money without the necessity of a competitive bidding process. 22. These activities included the 1984 SADCC Management Needs study, the University of Pittsburgh Francophone Management Seminars, NASPAA's s u p p o r t for SADCC m a n a g e m e n t training activities, a n d its organizational development work in Guinea (as well as similar activities in Latin America and Asia). 23. See Derick W. B r i n k e r h o f f , Improving Development Program Performance: Guidelines for Managers (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne R i e n n e r Publishers, 1991), pp. 27-62, for a discussion of this. T h e ideas behind the learning process model go back more than fifty years as bottom up or action l e a r n i n g . However, it was David Korten, working u n d e r t h e Ford F o u n d a t i o n a n d later NASPAA, who popularized the term "learning process" in development m a n a g e m e n t . See David Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 480-511. 24. The Development Program Management Center (DPMC) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture was also a co-operant. 25. Oral interview, USAID Regional H u m a n Resource Development Officer, REDSO, Abidjan, Ivory Coast. 26. These programs should now be phased out. It is significant that the Scandinavian countries, recognizing the language barriers, have largely stopped bringing participants to Scandinavia for training. Rather, support is given for training within a recipient country or within the region, with third-

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country training in an English-speaking country an alternative for higherlevel training. T h e Rural Development Center at Holte in Denmark was closed in the mid-1970s for this reason. As Japan increases its foreign aid to LDCs it is beginning to address similar issues in its technical assistance policy. 27. Morgan a n d Duffau categorically p o i n t e d out the limits of measuring any impact of the discrete training activity: "In a short seminar or workshop with rather general goals it is unlikely that much more than opinion and modest learning can be measured, unless the trainee returns for several iterations which could provide longitudinal data for the assessment of behavioral change, or even organizational effects." E. Philip Morgan and J e a n Marie D u f f a u , "Institutional M a n a g e m e n t I m p r o v e m e n t : T h e Francophone Development Management Seminars in the Central African Republic" (paper submitted to the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, September 1986). 28. T h e plea for institution building was made by William J. Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries," Public Administration Review, vol. 36, no. 1 (January-February 1976), pp. 61-71. 29. Many t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t e s a r e actually QUANGOS (quasinongovernmental organizations) in the British parlance because they have linkages with governments. 30. See, f o r e x a m p l e , K a m a l a C h o u d h r y , " S t r a t e g i e s f o r Institutionalizing Public Management Education: The Indian Experience," in Education and Training for Public Sector Management in Developing Countries, ed. Lawrence D. Stifel, Joseph Black, and James S. Coleman (New York: Working Papers of the Rockefeller Foundation, April 1978), pp. 101-110. 31. Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1968), pp. 21^13. 32. An appropriate formula might be 50 percent of fees shared up to a certain n u m b e r of days (possibly two to three days a month). After that, 100 percent of consultancies would revert to the institution. A subcontracting arrangement with an institution might include such a "conditionality." 33. It should have been possible for the RTC (and its donor sponsors) and the MRU to work closely with the World Bank/UNEDIL project in developing a f o r m a l linkage a r r a n g e m e n t with EDI a n d a regional institution in a third pilot activity on agricultural m a n a g e m e n t or applied research training. In spite of the close proximity of the NASPAA project and the UNEDIL project in Washington (and the personal relationships which project managers of the two projects had with each other in the United States and in Africa), no linkages developed between the UNEDIL project and the NASPAA Guinea Project or with the SADCC Management Resource Unit in Swaziland. 34. In Francophone Africa, these centers could include Dakar, Senegal; Lomé, Togo; or Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. In Anglophone Africa, these could include Nairobi, Kenya; Arusha, Tanzania; Harare, Zimbabwe; or, in the future, J o h a n n e s b u r g , South Africa. T h r o u g h a buy-in to the UNEDIL project, USAID missions would then have had a mechanism to utilize region-based, third-country training within Western and Southern Africa. 35. T h e 1984 NASPAA study, Improving Management in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, July 1, 1985), makes this point. It should be noted that d o n o r pressure for "training activities" remains very strong. In spite of the

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NASPAA study, the USAID missions in Harare a n d Mbabane resisted the idea of a nontraining pilot project, opting instead for pilot projects with traditional formal training seminars. 36. NASPAA, u n d e r the Performance Management Project, operated in t h e s u b c o n t r a c t i n g m o d e in its SADCC activities. S u b c o n t r a c t i n g arrangements were negotiated with the IDM in the first pilot, and similar contractual a r r a n g e m e n t s were developed by SADCC's M a n a g e m e n t Resource Unit with the National Railways of Zimbabwe, the Management Services Board, a n d the Eastern a n d S o u t h e r n African M a n a g e m e n t Institute (ESAMI) in the second pilot training project (January-February 1988). NASPAA's collaboration with the Central American Institute of Business (INCAE) also offers another example of this kind of collaboration. Donors in the 1990s are likely to continue to support training needs assessment, organizational development, the delivery of training seminars, and m o u n t i n g of project design, evaluation, or o t h e r applied research activities. Whenever feasible and for institutional development purposes, subcontracting arrangements between donors a n d U.S.-based contractors and regional or national institutions in Africa should occur. T h e s e institutions, r a t h e r t h a n U.S. universities, s h o u l d be the p r i m a r y beneficiaries of this type of service delivery contract. T h e latter could be utilized in a n advisory or primary research capacity in s u p p o r t of the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the regional a n d national institutes t h r o u g h linkage a r r a n g e m e n t s . In an e x p a n d e d "professional collaboration" m o d e l , partnership arrangements with local institutions for the mounting of teams could include both members from "core" (that is, World Bank-targeted) institutions in Africa as well as members from the United States or Western Europe as appropriate. 37. An earlier version of this model was presented in Louis A. Picard, Report on Strengthening Management Institutes in Africa ( P i t t s b u r g h : International Management Development Institute, December 11, 1988). This report was f u n d e d by and presented to the Technical Cooperation Project of NASPAA u n d e r the auspices of USAID's P e r f o r m a n c e Management Project. 38. Interestingly, in spite of the fact that the UNEDIL project focuses in part on internal management concerns, the d o n o r role/responsibility as a "client" has n o t been directly addressed within E D I / U N E D I L project activities. 39. This is particularly true for African training institutions. Without professional collaboration, program development, faculty support efforts, and, most important, internal management concerns, will rightly be seen as highly intrusive by the faculty and administration of management training institutes. 40. It may be worth noting that for the ten years of its existence, the Performance Management Project impacted, if only in a limited way, both the theory and practice of development management in many of the areas discussed in this chapter. Unfortunately, the project has rarely received the appropriate recognition for its contribution that it deserves (as well as criticism for its institutional development "failures"). This lack of recognition is largely because project managers did not adequately disseminate the findings of their applied research.

10 Institutional Development Revisited Michele Garrity & Louis A. Picard

Africa is subject to stereotypes. T h e r e is a sameness to the images of "tropical gangsters" a n d greedy expatriates, ethnic conflict and the failure of the African state. 1 With military coups, ethnic-based civil wars, a n d the idiosyncracies of dictatorships on the left a n d right, t h e r e is m u c h to be depressed about. And yet, Africa is m a d e u p of over fifty states; some, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, are very large, a n d others, such as the Gambia a n d Swaziland, are microstates. A l t h o u g h n o n e are NICs a n d can match t h e progress of s o m e countries in Latin America, there is a diversity to their e c o n o m i c condition a n d the ability of the state to make and i m p l e m e n t policy that belies much of the conventional wisdom about the continent. T h e chapters in this book have presented that diversity. In this chapter we look at patterns of reform as a change strategy a n d the interaction between r e f o r m processes a n d the domestic policy e n v i r o n m e n t . We c o n c l u d e with a discussion of s o m e strategies for policymaking a n d policy implementation that may lead to m o r e efficient and effective development policies in Africa.

Policy Reform and Governance Developing societies face a set of issues that relate to governance— the institutions and processes of g o v e r n m e n t — a n d the way in which m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g are p r o m o t e d . A d d r e s s i n g g o v e r n a n c e issues is p a r t of the policy r e f o r m process because structural a d j u s t m e n t interventions are almost always a c c o m p a n i e d by political reforms. Effective political communication is at the heart of efforts to create multiple centers of decisionmaking. W i t h o u t

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improved information flows and mechanisms to ensure feedback and political and economic accountability, effective governance cannot be achieved. T h e key to success in these efforts lies in a commitment to institution building both within government and in society as a whole. Constitutional

Reform, and the Policy Process

In the countries analyzed in our case studies, constitutional reforms have occurred or are occurring in the one-party states (Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya) and in military regimes (Nigeria and Ghana). Botswana alone has maintained a formal democratic process since i n d e p e n d e n c e . Promoting multiple levels of decisionmaking has involved strengthening legislatures and interest organizations and i n t r o d u c i n g multipartyism. In all of these countries efforts at democratic governance are incomplete. Attempts at introducing pluralism through the development of multiple centers of influence and decisionmaking as well as various attempts at decentralization are fragile. Policymakers have been challenged both to discover and to correct the true causes of institutional weakness and capacity. T h r o u g h o u t Africa, there has been lack of sustained political will to move beyond cosmetic changes. Among our case studies, Ghana and Nigeria, in particular, have witnessed a succession of government—military and civilian— that have reinterpreted reform mandates for their own purposes. In Tanzania, after the 1967 Arusha Declaration, the party and party ideology were used to control the policy process, with government assuming the role of implementor. However, both party and government officials lacked the necessary skills and talent to make and implement policy. With the introduction of economic and political reforms after 1985, the party was relegated to reigning over the policy process, rather than making policy, as government officials and technocrats worked ever more closely with international lending agencies in implementing structural adjustment. Even with the move to a multiparty state there has been little involvement from NGOs in the policy process. In one-party Zambia, a more integrated approach to policymaking was a d o p t e d , with g o v e r n m e n t bureaucrats holding overlapping memberships in party organs. Zambian ideology did not call for the same kind of party dominance that had been sought in Tanzania, though, as in Tanzania the government assumed the role of implementor. Although the machinery of government typified the bureaucratic model, the implementation of policies was hindered and mediated by political interference, nepotism, corruption, and

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lack o f competent personnel. T h e party was weaker in purpose in Zambia than was the case in Tanzania, but stronger in terms o f articulating the e c o n o m i c interests of the organizational elites in both government and party. Elections for a new government in 1991 have done little to address these fundamental capacity problems. Policymaking in Kenya has been dominated by the executive, where the president and the cabinet have ruled supreme, and the legislature was reduced to a reactive role. Kenya has long b e e n characterized by a weak party system 2 a n d President Moi's preemptive style of decisionmaking and his long reign has marginalized the KANU role. Authoritarian rule and ethnic tensions continue to permeate Kenyan society. T h e role o f the Kenya bureaucracy has not been insignificant in the policy process and was further aided by legislation in the early 1970s that allowed civil servants to engage in private enterprise activities. T h e i r influence, c o m b i n e d with that o f foreign private investors a n d r e s i d e n t f o r e i g n d o n o r advisers, r e s u l t e d in development policies that were technocratic, but which in large measure closed the policy process to n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations and grassroots participation. Ghana's political leaders early on lost ownership of the policy process. B o t h political instability and e c o n o m i c d e t e r i o r a t i o n resulted in a mass exodus o f indigenous professionals. Successive governments came to power with little interest in participatory styles of decisionmaking. Although the situation has greatly improved with the introduction of an e c o n o m i c recovery program, the coming to power o f the PNDC military g o v e r n m e n t , a n d the s u b s e q u e n t transition to civil rule, m u c h still r e m a i n s to b e d o n e to institutionalize and open up the policy process to civil society. In Nigeria, a federally based system has produced a three-tiered structure in which c o m p e t i n g interests a m o n g local, state, and federal officials have proved difficult to mediate over the years. This problem has been c o m p o u n d e d by alternative patterns o f civilian and military rule and by the policies of successive governments, which have tended to modify both g o v e r n m e n t structures and processes to reflect prevailing priorities. Out of these circumstances t h e r e has e m e r g e d a powerful b u r e a u c r a c y — a n o n y m o u s , class based, and with strong ties to elements o f the business community, which exerts considerable influence on the policy process. Botswana, at first glance, seems to have escaped the problems o f governance. With a relatively efficient state and a set o f pragmatic e c o n o m i c policies, it has the highest e c o n o m i c growth rate in Africa. A closer look, however, reveals similar weaknesses in Botswana to the other states we have examined. A strong expatriate

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presence masks a weak organizational structure within the public sector. Although political institutions have not been challenged by class or ethnic tensions, many fear they have been weakened by the domination of a self-serving organizational elite based in the civil service. 3 T h e development responsibilities of district councils have grown over the years, but efforts to devolve power to local authorities have met with limited success. The Limits of

Democratization

Increasingly, reformers in Africa are targeting political change and d e m a n d i n g a clear strategy for r e f o r m i n g central a n d local government organizations. T h r o u g h o u t the continent, national conventions and constituent assemblies are debating pluralism and multiparty democracy. T h e process of democratizing the public sector and policymaking requires the transfer of both administrative and political authority to intermediate as well as primary units of government. 4 Concerns for political development are not new. The late 1950s and 1960s are rich with academic studies on the requirements for political stability and representative democracy. 5 Preconditions for the latter generally include high rates of urbanization, advanced development of voluntary organizations, overlapping and crosscutting social affiliations, widespread literacy, a d e q u a t e and equitably distributed personal incomes, and a shared sense of national identity. C o n t e m p o r a r y debates over governance reflect differences a m o n g this earlier generation of scholars. O n e position suggests that political stability, g o o d m a n a g e m e n t , and t r a n s p a r e n t decisionmaking are prerequisites to economic and social development. 6 For others, participatory democracy is the prerequisite for development. 7 Critics of governance ideas suggest that it is difficult to find correlations between governance principles and economic performance. 8 A first step in the policy change process is achieving a proper balance of responsibilities between the public and private sectors. Economic reforms introduced u n d e r structural adjustment and conditionality often stumble because of governance and participation issues. Political instability often makes it difficult to define the boundaries between the public and the private sector, and it makes public-private partnership strategies difficult. More important, ideological differences continue to be significant in Africa, and many African elites remain ambiguous about the role of the private sector in a way that no longer characterizes Asia, Latin

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America, or even much of Eastern Europe. Pluralism efforts usually focus on electoral mechanisms. Elections, of course, are essential and serve to identify policy elites a n d g o v e r n a n c e mechanisms. O t h e r f o r m s of participatory democracy are also important. In many countries t h e r e is an absence of nongovernmental and community-based organizations and little participation by interest groups in the policy debate. Many countries still lack i n d e p e n d e n t media. Elections without g r o u p representation a n d debate do not constitute democratic gove r n m e n t . Promoting the role of NGOs and interest groups and increasing the independence of the media are part of an opening up of political space. Promoting

Democratization

In the p r o m o t i o n of democratization, measures to i n t r o d u c e political and economic accountability and improve information flows t h r o u g h o u t society are crucial. Mechanisms must be developed and sustained to formalize communication between the public and private sectors and a m o n g the various sections of the economy as well as government units (horizontal and vertical). African countries also must develop cross-cutting collaborative relationships across the institutional environment to encourage and p r o m o t e debate, develop i n d e p e n d e n t research and consultancy pools, s t r e n g t h e n internal m a n a g e m e n t f u n c t i o n s a n d policy analysis, a n d strengthen a sense of African ownership of the development process. Collaborative relationships are also needed between government and civil society f o r service delivery and p o p u l a r participation in policy debates. T h e s e collaborative relationships n e e d to be e x t e n d e d to the highest levels of g o v e r n m e n t and may even include formalized a p p r o a c h e s to policymaking between government and organized interests in a development corporatism model of decisionmaking. 9 The Importance

of

Decentralization

Nigeria has experimented with federalism to lessen the dominance of central government on policymaking. Botswana, Kenya, and Nigeria continue to debate decentralization as a way to devolve power f r o m national to regional, district, and subdistrict level councils. Although Ghana, Tanzania, a n d Zambia also have experimented with devolved political authority, all t h r e e states remain highly centralized. Central-local relationships are important. Political and admin-

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istrative reforms need to accompany economic reforms to decrease the absolute power and scope of the state. The decentralization of policymaking and policy implementation functions has the potential to widen the policy process to include a more participatory and pluralistic model of governance. Throughout Africa, policy elites have been less than successful in decentralizing policymaking and administration. Several of the chapter authors argue that there must be an effective decentralization of the public sector to intermediate and primary units of governments for development management to occur. Reform efforts should focus on both central and local government organizations. An upgrading of specialized policy units at the national level needs to be accompanied by similar efforts at the subnational level. Outside of government, efforts need to be made to upgrade and improve the p e r f o r m a n c e of policy-oriented NGOs. 10 Issues of intergovernmental relationships and decentralization are mentioned by most of the chapter authors. Both decentralization and pluralism have foundered on lack of resources (physical and human), a lack of skills, and the lack of political will to commit to devolved, participatory government. Political elites must make a commitment to a strategy for promoting and institutionalizing multiple centers of decisionmaking. The latter needs to be accompanied by commitments from host country and donor stakeholders to a strategy of organizational and geographical decentralization, which takes into account both local conditions and national priorities.

Policymaking and Institutional Development Form Versus

Substance

The failure of institutional development in African countries in the 1960s and 1970s was directly linked to the economic failures that became manifest in the 1980s. Policy reform offers a second try at institutional development in Africa. What is needed is an effective policymaking process that captures the most productive blend of grassroots, local, and national inputs into the public policy process through a strategic planning effort that: (1) includes all the major stakeholders—beneficiaries, target groups, and primary and secondary winners and losers; (2) considers the environmental threats and opportunities to successful implementation that are posed by various social, economic, and political factors; and (3) incorporates an appropriate institutional framework based on the

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requisite organizations and the rules, procedures, and laws that affect specific policies. 1 1 Employing a b o t t o m - u p strategy of development (the learning process approach) remains the most effective strategy by which private business and NGO community groups are able to generate initiatives. Limitations on policy capacity have evolved within differing country conditions. The case studies in this book provide us with a n u m b e r of insights into the policy process about which several conclusions can be drawn Discussions a b o u t the n a t u r e of policymaking in each country have shown the extent to which the formal a n d constitutional aspects of governance differ f r o m the reality of how policies are made. The economic, political, and administrative reform efforts u n d e r structural adjustment in Africa have met head on with this "form versus reality" problem. Although policy elites are often able to articulate a set of strategies in both political and economic terms, they are often not able to implement these goals. T h e form versus reality dichotomy has had an impact on both the political and administrative reform measures introduced, and it highlights the importance of country-specific environmental factors when change initiatives are planned. The reform process itself is also responsible for some of the stumbling blocks that currently face policymakers in Africa. As several of our case studies illustrate, u n d e r structural adjustment and conditionality, reforms were externally initiated and they only partly involved i n d i g e n o u s stakeholders. Many policy r e f o r m initiatives that have failed have shown that expatriate advisers have an u n d u e influence on decisionmaking and that their comings and goings often result in a lack of coordination and an insensitivity to local conditions. There is a need to create a sense of African ownership of the reform process and policy development structures and processes. In order to get beyond the agenda of the donors, it is important to push, if not force, the concept of "donor coordination." This is an issue that is given much lip service, but little action on the part of donors, and it is the absence of such coordination that pulls the program officer and the LDC in a variety of directions. 1 2 Nongovernmental organizations are particularly susceptible to these tensions. As newly e m e r g e n t d o n o r recipients a n d with little experience in managing multiple agendas and sources of funding, NGO managers can be easily overwhelmed and lose sight of their own goals and objectives. At the national level, as our case studies illustrate, a tendency for "ad-hocism" has emerged. Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania have all experimented with reorganization to rationalize government

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functions at the center. A common approach has been the creation of committees and commissions for a specific purpose, but they often lack the institutional memory to allow for ongoing and strategic policy management. Ad-hocism (through committees and commissions) has become a substitute for policy analysis units and the skilled individuals who would staff such units. It has also been used by political leaders who, f o r emotional, ideological, or p a t r o n a g e reasons, make decisions without the i n p u t of policy specialists and relevant stakeholders. T h e frequency of ad-hocism has led many of the authors to conclude that committees and commissions have become an "institutionalized" tool for policy management. The development of information gathering systems and consultative mechanisms to increase formalized, two-way communication flows is the most effective way to counter such tendencies. Policy Change and Human

Resource

Development

Strategic m a n a g e m e n t begins with the question, "What is the m a n a g e m e n t task?" rather than who is responsible for administration. By placing task definition first a strategic m a n a g e m e n t process can t h e n begin to identify both governmental and nongovernmental entities whose participation and activities are essential to implementation of the policy. Clearly, in some cases one can identify nongovernmental groups with comparative advantage for taking on some tasks, and means can be determined to induce NGOs to share or assume responsibility for providing key services. There are also some things that must be done by government for planning or equity reasons. In keeping with the task-oriented approach, human resource issues b e c o m e i m p o r t a n t for addressing policy analysis a n d implementation capacity in both the public and the private sectors. All of o u r authors suggest that there is a need to establish a development-oriented civil service and NGO m a n a g e m e n t at all levels of society. Although there will be continued dependence on the center for guidance, financial support, and planning services, i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d mobilization must occur at the primary government level and can often be assisted by NGO activity. Kenya and Botswana have continued to face problems of human resource capacity, particularly at the regional a n d local level. Specialized skills and experienced managers are also in short supply in Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia. The shortage of h u m a n and financial resources continues to plague local efforts for autonomy. Even in Botswana, which has the most developed local government

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system in Africa, district councils are weak for this reason, and expatriates continue to dominate the policy process at all levels. Many African countries are characterized by a small pool of local talent and a public sector that carries large n u m b e r s of unqualified and inexperienced personnel. In part, this is a reflection of the poor state of African education a n d training institutions where financial shortages and mismanagement have reduced the monies available for maintenance and upgrading. Any attempt to realistically address issues of h u m a n resource development must begin with efforts to strengthen these organizations. Black, Coleman, and Stiffel have pointed out that there are several types of technical transfer that occur in strategic interventions in s u p p o r t of increasing management capacity. These technical transfers include tools, techniques, and technologies; skills in the analysis of the e n v i r o n m e n t ; principles of organization a n d management; and unstructured skills and analysis capacity. 13 T h e tools and techniques of administration transfer most rapidly and are not worth high levels of investment. Unstructured skills are the most difficult to transfer because they require a "synthetic mode of thought . . . [in which] something explained is viewed as part of a larger system and is explained in terms of its role in that larger system." 14 At the u p p e r levels of management, and for development management in general, it is the unstructured skills of j u d g m e n t and analysis that make management an art rather than a science. In Africa, there is a need to establish a culture of management and organizational development principles that emphasizes management as an art as well as a science. T h e assumption here (as with any generalization, there are, no doubt, some exceptions) is that creative development management (the synthetic mode of thought), for the most part, cannot be practiced by those who have not experienced the intellectual development that occurs with a university degree or its equivalent. 15 Thus, a future set of policy and managerial elites can develop only by strengthening education and training capacity in postgraduate university p r o g r a m s and high-level m a n a g e m e n t d e v e l o p m e n t institutes. Such assumptions have not always been made, especially in postcolonial Africa where ten years of basic education has been often considered adequate for even the most senior positions in the public and parastatal sectors 16 —and where aging civil servants retire to the private sector, often to f r o n t for international or minority community-dominated enterprises. The patterns that have emerged in African public management have not fostered the intellectual capacity that is critical for development management.

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In the early years after independence, policymakers in many African countries used short "bridging" courses to train African administrators who were to replace colonial officials. This practice resulted in the placement of many poorly trained administrators in senior positions. Although in-service training has its role, 17 it should not be used as a substitute for long-term educational development. Education and training are important components of policy reforms. Evidence from the case studies suggests that h u m a n resource development and the development of institutional memory are prerequisites to institutionalized policy management. T h e historical problems of training have been compounded by the limited opportunities that are available for continuous training and the near absence of orientation for senior officials assuming new positions. Africa needs to develop a leadership cadre of managers for the twenty-first century, including the next generation of policy elites and an upper-level administrative cadre that can provide strategic management skills for all sectors of society. Leonard's important book on successful managers in Kenya 18 shows that this is possible. Lessons for the Future As a new cadre of LDC managers emerges and much of the attention once given to the public sector shifts to nongovernmental organizations, there is a pressing need to review the lessons learned from thirty years of technical assistance. An early argument remains valid—sustainability requires institutional development. In a recent book, Osborne and Gaebler 1 9 called for the reinvention of government in the United States. They argued that what is needed is an "entrepreneurial government" where the focus is "not simply on public services, but on catalyzing all sectors— public, private, and voluntary—into action to solve their community's problems." 2 0 Reinvention strategies in international terms suggest the examination of new models of technical assistance and policy choices. While recognizing the differences between the public and the private sector, Osborne and Gaebler called for a strategy of replicating the e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l i s m of the private sector in government. T h e following four components of their model translate into a developing country setting. Flexible financial management. Financial management systems require a fungible, flexible budget. Normal budget processes are wasteful because bureaucrats rush to spend all monies by the end of the year.

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Agencies should focus on saving rather than spending funds. By allowing organizations to keep their surpluses every year, administrators will be encouraged to save rather than spend funds, resulting in more effective and efficient government—a government that is a c t i n g e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l . As o u r case studies show, financial m a n a g e m e n t in a resource-poor LDC e n v i r o n m e n t is a m a j o r challenge of development management. 2 1 Employees as entrepreneurs. W h e t h e r inside government or out, employees need to be motivated to be entrepreneurial. O n e idea is to financially reward innovative employees by allowing them to keep a certain percentage of the savings/earnings that their innovations have provided. Entrepreneurial government models also call for decentralized authority and f l a t t e n e d hierarchies to p r o m o t e creativity. Reordering relationships. Two important sets of relationships can c h a n g e u n d e r e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l government. First, the d o n o r recipient relationship is redefined, with donors b e c o m i n g the customers of host country organizations. 2 2 Assuming a g r e e m e n t between the LDC and the host country, reordering donor-recipient relationships through more professional modes of operation places the d o n o r in the position of a "client," who has contracted out for service deliverables. The donor as "client" can also act as "auditor" and provide feedback and criticism to those host country organizations that deliver agreed-upon services. S e c o n d , in the domestic s p h e r e , the g o v e r n m e n t - c l i e n t relationship can change with government treating their f o r m e r clients as potential customers of government services. Both sets of r e l a t i o n s h i p s have historically b e e n hierarchical in n a t u r e . E n t r e p r e n e u r i a l g o v e r n m e n t r e o r d e r s traditional p a t t e r n s of interaction, and with the change in perspective, group behavior can be modified. Particularly important is the emphasis entrepreneurial government places on empowering formerly subservient groups ( d o n o r recipients a n d LDC societies in this case) to make governance systems work more effectively and efficiently. In both instances, the g o v e r n m e n t becomes an e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l agent producing services based on customer needs. Steering versus rowing the process of government. Entrepreneurial g o v e r n m e n t divides the process of governing into two parts: "steering" functions, where government acts as a catalyst and uses strategic planning to develop the "best" implementor, using some combination of government, private, and nongovernmental organi-

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zations; and "rowing" functions, where the government stays out of the o p e r a t i o n a l side of the policy process. E n t r e p r e n e u r i a l g o v e r n m e n t s are active, b u t their responsibilities d i f f e r — t h e government plays a planning and facilitating role rather than an implementing role. In addition, government may also act as a catalyst in creating other steering organizations. A good example is government support (through direct f u n d i n g or public endorsement) for the creation of NGOs whose major activities are strategic planning and coordination and who will draw in community-based organizations to empower citizens and provide a bottom-up process for setting priorities. 23 A n o t h e r LDC application of the "steering versus rowing" concept utilizes a foundation as a steering mechanism for policy planning and management. The major advantage of a foundation is that it allows for an interface with government organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. Other advantages include: (1) the provision of multiple types of f u n d i n g through grants and contracts; (2) the ability to act as a coordinating mechanism facilitating the formation of multiple partnerships and coalitions a m o n g government organizations, the private sector, and NGO and donor organizations; (3) the ability to p e r f o r m as a development agency expanding the potential pool of f u n d i n g available through the introduction of matching f u n d s (or challenge grants); and (4) by not being connected either to the government or the private sector, the foundation is seen by all stakeholders as independent. In South Africa, the f o u n d a t i o n model is being applied to a n u m b e r of development efforts as the country moves toward majority rule. 24

Institutional Development Within the Foundation Approach If d o n o r technical assistance targets the creation of real opportunities for collaborative efforts to p r o d u c e high-quality project proposals and to promote learning of the necessary skills to develop such proposals, a foundation approach could go a long way toward t h e c r e a t i o n of a l e a r n i n g - p r o c e s s m o d e l t h a t results in sustainability. Working through a foundation, technical assistance agencies can use request-for-proposal procedures a n d unsolicited proposals as mechanisms to f u n d development activities. Developing proposals f o r a foundation requires a prospective N G O or g o v e r n m e n t recipient to d e m o n s t r a t e organizational capacity to implement the project. Long before grantee funds or a contract is awarded, a collaborative and interactive relationship can develop between donor and recipient, with clear expectations about

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the p r o j e c t and its goals. M o r e o v e r , the b o a r d and c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s o f recipient organizations can also be e n c o u r a g e d to participate in the process along with the L D C program manager, e n h a n c i n g the opportunities f o r capacity building. N G O / P V O o r g a n i z a t i o n structures, with the b o a r d m a n d a t e d with policy responsibilities and secretariats assuming the day-to-day administrative duties, require close teamwork and a clear understanding about where the organization is headed in order to be successful. T h e foundation approach has the potential to bring all the relevant stakeholders into the process at an early stage. T h e r e is some evidence that the new Clinton administration is beginning to apply some of the principles of entrepreneurialism to the federal government. As the literature on privatization and publicprivate partnerships illustrates, what begins as domestic policy in N o r t h A m e r i c a and Europe o f t e n enters the policy debate on international d e v e l o p m e n t efforts. 2 5 With a reorganization of the U.S. A g e n c y f o r International D e v e l o p m e n t in the cards, there is likely to be much discussion of entrepreneurial g o v e r n m e n t in technical assistance circles over the next several years.

Conclusion Much remains to be d o n e to d e f i n e the relationship between sustainability and institutional development. A strategy to build implementation and management capacity must focus on sustainability factors in human resource d e v e l o p m e n t , organizational development, and overall education and training strategies. Such a strategy must be accompanied by efforts to upgrade local education and training institutions through collaborative models at the national and regional level and through processes that produce a "spread effect" in terms of policy analysis and policy management. In Africa, organizational development and capacity building for strategic management require the development of suitable technical assistance and host country participating agency procedures and communication processes. 26 Recipients need to be able to manage their relationship with donors, and donors need to professionalize their relationships with recipients. Both sides of the relationship can be i m p r o v e d by using contracting-out mechanisms to separate human resource d e v e l o p m e n t activities f r o m service delivery activities. Implementation is important. Improving planning and policy analysis capacity does not in and of itself increase the capacity of g o v e r n m e n t to achieve its goals. Sustainability factors that improve

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capacity i n c l u d e a focus on h u m a n resource d e v e l o p m e n t , organizational development, and overall education and training strategies. In particular, the development of m a n a g e m e n t skills improves capacity and increases the potential for sustainability of programs and policies. While many aspects of implementation require technical skills, it must be remembered that management is an art as well as a science, and that some management courses must emphasize problem solving from an analytical perspective. A major focus of technical assistance should be the intersection between government and the private sector because the implementation of policy change requires the development of partnership a r r a n g e m e n t s between the two. 2 7 At issue is the need to clarify perceived interest conflicts and their relationship to policy objectives and related strategic management issues. Such partnerships should be considered as a part of the public policy arena. 2 8 The models vary and achieving a balance must be country specific, based upon the historical context of the country and the nature of interest groups that operate within the developing polity. Successful partnerships require a planning process that is task oriented, financially realistic, and capacity based. The development of partnership arrangements also affects d o n o r strategies, which should include the identification of appropriate strategies and approaches to the privatization of government functions, 2 9 and the effective and efficient reform of those functions that remain in the public sector. In particular, privatization strategies should include measures to enhance financial analysis capacity to ensure that public monopolies do not become private monopolies. Both contractor service organizations and research institutes should be given a monitoring responsibility to track the social and economic costs of policy reforms. The design and introduction of effective monitoring systems within government are also necessary to assess the effects of policy reforms on the socioeconomic patterns at the macrolevel. Sustainability and replicability are the keys to a successful donorsupported design and implementation strategy and an on-going assessment process for technical assistance. As o u r case studies show, African development managers are increasingly concerned to develop the capacity to insure the sustainability of project and program benefits beyond the limited time horizon of the donor's direct involvement. 30 At issue is the way in which the public-private balance is achieved a n d the e x t e n t to which the p a r t n e r s h i p reflects development priorities. A strategic planning process that includes all of t h e m a j o r s t a k e h o l d e r s of society, i n c l u d i n g p o t e n t i a l beneficiaries a n d target groups as well as potential winners and

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losers in the development process, is fundamental in defining the partnership arrangement. Negotiating policies for development in this setting should be part of a broader set of negotiations that can establish the principles of governance throughout Africa.

Notes 1. Robert Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters: One Man's Experience with Development and Decadence in Deepest Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 2. Henry Bienen, Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). 3. Louis A. Picard, "Bureaucrats, Catde a n d Public Policy: Land T e n u r e Changes in Botswana," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 13, no. 3 (October 1980), pp. 313-356. 4. George Peterson, "Decentralization and Democratic Governance: A Review of Latin American Experience and Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa" (paper prepared for the Office of Housing and U r b a n Programs, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., Urban Institute, March 1991). 5. See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Litde, Brown, 1966), a n d the Series on Political Development of Princeton University Press (Princeton, N.J.): Communications and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye (1963); Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (1963); Political Modernization in fapan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (1964); Education and Political Development, ed. James S. Coleman (1965); Political Culture and Political Development, e d . Lucian W. Pye a n d Sidney Verba (1965); Political Parlies and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (1966); and Crises in Political Development, ed. Leonard Binder et al. (1971). 6. See Managing Development: The Governance Dimension: A Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, August 29, 1991) for a discussion of this view. Samuel H u n t i n g t o n argued that political order rather than participation was a key factor in promoting social and economic change. See his Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968). A later book with Joan M. Nelson maintained that political participation can be a by-product of economic development. See their No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). For a survey of these issues see Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development (Itasca, 111.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1989). 7. See Robert Charlick, "Governance Working Paper" (prepared for the A.I.D. Africa Bureau u n d e r the Africa Bureau Democracy a n d Governance Program, Burlington, Vt., Associates in Rural Development, January 1992). 8. See Deborah Brautigam, Governance and Economy: A Review, Policy Research Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, December, 1991). See also J o a n M. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), for a discussion of this issue. 9. We are grateful to Maureen Widzgowski for this point. See her

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"Structural Adjustment and the Political Economy of Mexico: The Prospects for Continued Wage Repression in the 1990s" (unpublished paper, Pittsburgh, 1992). See also Michele Garrity and Louis A. Picard, "Organized Interests, the State, and the Public Policy Process: An Assessment of Jamaican Business Associations," Journal of Developing Areas, vol. 25 (April 1991), pp. 369-394, for an elaboration of this point. 10. Strengthening state institutions includes the upgrading and development of specialized policy units capable of delivering the kind of policy analysis needed to make effective development decisions. To achieve sectoral balance and pluralist governance patterns requires policy parallelism in implementing policy change. Parallelism involves the pairing of related public sector and private sector organizations that are concerned with similar policies and their implementation. Pairing suggests that if training or the development of a policy analysis capacity to increase the capacity of a government organization occurs, the need for sectoral balance (avoiding overstrong government) requires increasing the capacity of private sector organizations that interact with the state. For example, if management implementation skills in a particular part of the public sector are increased, then private sector skills should abo be upgraded. Parallelism is an effective way of ensuring public-private sector balance in terms of capacity building. Thus, support for an export promotion council in Country X to strengthen international trade would require strengthening of a nongovernmental exporters association at the same time. 11. Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Improving Development Program Performance: Guidelines for Managers (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991). Our guidelines have incorporated Brinkerhoffs framework for "looking out, looking in, looking ahead" ideas. 12. India comes to mind as a country that takes a very strong management role vis-à-vis donors. 13. Picard has noted four types of administration in LDCs (maintenance administration, scaffolding administration, praetorian administration, and development administration). Louis A. Picard, Administrative Attitudes and Time: Role Changes in Bechuanaland and Botswana, SICA Occasional Paper Series, 2nd series, no. 7 (Austin, Tex.: Section on International and Comparative Administration, American Society for Public Administration, 1985), p. 7. General management at the upper levels of an organization, and development administration generally, is different than maintenance administration at the middle and lower levels. These, in turn, differ from sectoral management skills (health, education, agriculture, transport, and marketing). See also Joseph Black, James S. Coleman, and Laurence D. Stiffel, eds., Education and Training for Public Sector Management in the Developing Countries (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, March 1977), p. 44. 14. Black et al., Education and Training for Public Sector Management, p.44. 15. It is, of course, not the bits of paper from a university that allows for creative thinking and judgment. Rather it is the nature of the experience that some, not all, receive in a university-based experience that is important. Certainly there are people without a university experience that have rich analytical experience and through experience and intellect have had an intellectual development process that is analogous to the best of those who attend university. However, the university experience is the most likely route to unbounded analytical thinking. 16. Wyn Reilly made this point. See his Training Administrators for

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Development (London: Heineman, 1979). 17. In-service training is required to transfer the techniques of policy analysis, organization m a n a g e m e n t , d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g , a n d management for the public, parastatal, and private sectors. Institutes of business m a n a g e m e n t , administration, a n d d e v e l o p m e n t m a n a g e m e n t n e e d to include internal management skills. 18. David K. Leonard, African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 18. 19. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1992). 20. Ibid., p. 20. 21. Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New York: J o h n Wiley & Sons, 1974). 22. Donors as "customers" or "clients" could occur by i n t r o d u c i n g competition within the authorization process and including public sector o r g a n i z a t i o n s in r e q u e s t - f o r - p r o p o s a l (RFP) bids. D o n o r - r e c i p i e n t relationships would also change because e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l g o v e r n m e n t introduces an ongoing assessment into them. LDC managers are likely to see the project as an integral part of an already existing program. Project designers need to allow for continual evaluation by both the donor and host country officials and to provide for the possibility of replication after the project ends. LDC program managers are painfully aware that donorsponsored project interventions often do not successfully pursue these goals. See J o h n D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962). 23. A good illustration of this support in practice hits been occurring in South Africa where "umbrella" NGOs are supporting the development of widely dispersed community-based organizations. T h e South African experience differs only in that these umbrella organizations currently work without the support of government. With the transition to majority rule, it is anticipated that the new g o v e r n m e n t will rely extensively on such mechanisms to meet the heavy demands of citizens from forty-odd years of apartheid. 24. For e x a m p l e , see F o u n d a t i o n for Public M a n a g e m e n t a n d Development, Action Plan, April 1-August 1, 1992 (Johannesburg: FPMD, 1992). T h e Educational Opportunity Council is another such organization that is likely to coordinate technical assistance for higher education in South Africa. 25. Clyde Mitchell-Weaver a n d B r e n d a M a n n i n g , "Public-Private Partnerships in Third World Development: A Conceptual Overview," Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 26, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992), pp. 45-67. 26. Where possible, technical assistance could include in its programs the teaching of d o n o r recipient concepts and procedures to host country cooperants. Donor m a n a g e m e n t and procedures a n d appropriate clientdonor relationships are thus far a neglected area in m a n a g e m e n t training and education. 27. See Mitchell-Weaver and Manning, "Public-Private Partnerships," pp. 43-65. 28. This section, in part, is taken from Louis A. Picard, "Implementing Policy C h a n g e a n d the Public/Private Interface" (unpublished paper, Washington, D.C.,January 14, 1992).

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29. See, for example, Keith Marsden, African Entrepreneurs: Pioneers of Development, International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper no. 9 (Washington, D.C.: T h e World Bank, 1990); Developing the Private Sector: The World Bank's Experience and Approach (Washington, D.C.: T h e World Bank, 1990); Prospects for the Business Sector in Developing Countries, International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: T h e World Bank, 1989); and Guy P. Pfeffermann, Private Business in Developing Countries: Improved Prospects, International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1988). 30. Louise G. White, Creating Opportunities for Change: Approaches to Managing Development Programs (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 6. UNDP has transformed its efforts from a project to a program basis.

Index

AAPAM. See African Association for Public Administration and Management ACBI. See Africa Capacity Building Initiative Accountability. See under Policymaking Ad hoc committees, 57-59, 87, 94, 96, 124, 157, 158 Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON), 48 AFRC. See Armed Forces Ruling Council Africa, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8; Anglophone, 9, 132; Francophone, 9, 132,137, 138; Southern, 127, 130, 141, 144; sub-Saharan, 3, 6, 19, 20, 26; Western, 127,133, 136, 137,138, 144. See also individual countries Africa Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI), 19 African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), 13 African Development Bank, 19-20 Agricultural community, 74, 91; management training, 130, 132 Agriculture, Department of (Tanzania), 75 Agriculture, Ministry of (Guinea-

Conakry), 131-132, 133, 134 Agriculture, Ministry of (Kenya), 91, 92 "Agriculture: Life or Death" (1974) (Tanzania), 70 Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) (Nigeria), 40 Arusha conference (1991), 13, 113 Arusha Declaration (1967) (Tanzania), 70, 74, 152 ASCON. See Administrative Staff College of Nigeria Asia, 1, 7, 132 Banking, 4, 5, 27, 75 Bank of Botswana, 105 Bank of Ghana, 23, 27 Bauer, Raymond A., 81 BDC. See Botswana Development Corp. BDP. See Botswana Democratic Party Black, Joseph, 159 Botswana, 9, 13,101-111, 133, 152, 153, 155, 158; decentralization, 105-107; development, 13, 102103, 104, 108, 109,110-111; donor advising/investment, 103, 108, 110; human resources and education, 104,108-109;

169

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INDEX

policymaking institutionalization, 104-105, 106, 110; popular participation, 105, 107, 109, 110; private sector, 103, 108, 110; public enterprises, 101-102,108, 110 Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), 13, l l l ( n 8 ) Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), 110 Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce, 109 Botswana Meat Commission, 108 Budget deficits, 84, 102 Bureaucracy, 5, 23, 46, 56, 72, 73, 74, 82, 83, 85, 87,91,97, 103, 107, 116, 129,152,153; professionalization, 71-72, 88. See also Civil Service; Elite Cambridge Overseas School Certificate, 109 Cameroon, 133 Canada, 141 Canadian International Development Agency, 13 Capacity building process, 4, 5, 6, 17(n30), 19-20, 107, 113, 119, 127, 129; and human resource development, 10, 14, 118, 124-125; institutionalizing, 5-6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 21, 118, 136, 144, 163; project research model, 9-10, 20. See also Private sector; Public sector; under Ghana; Nigeria; Tanzania; Zambia Capital Investment Act (1963) (Ghana), 22 Cashew-nut production, 75 Cassava, 75 Cattle, 102 CCM. See Chama Cha Mapinduzi Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 134-135, 137 Central Bank of Malaysia, 27 Central Committee (Tanzania), 68, 70, 72 Central Committee (Zambia), 52, 53, 54, 56, 60

Centralized government, 1, 8, 155; field relations, 96, 155-156 Centre for Policy Research (India), 97 Cereals and Produce Board (Kenya), 91 Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (Tanzania), 68 Chiluba, Frederick, 12, 64(n2) Church, 114 CIPE. See Center for International Private Enterprise Civil service, 4, 27, 28, 31, 37, 58, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 102, 154; depoliticization, 72,103, 104; and private business, 85, 90, 153; professional, 41, 47, 124; recruitment and retention, 5, 77, 90, 121, 122, 123-124; reform, 11, 41-42, 47-48; training, 41, 48, 95, 124, 158, 159, 160. See also Bureaucracy; Elite; Human resource development; under Nigeria; Tanzania; Zambia Civil Service Act (1962) (Tanzania), 74 Civil Service Census (1988) (Tanzania), 75 Civil Service Commission (Tanzania), 68 Civil Service Department (Tanzania), 68 Civil Service Mechanical Services Department (MSD) (Zambia), 58, 59, 60 Clinton administration, 163 Collaborative management training. See Management training, donor collaboration Colonialism, 95, 101, 103 Committee of Chairmen (Zambia), 52, 53, 54, 56 Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, 13 Communication, 8,13, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120, 129,151,155,158, 163. See also Information-gathering Community associations, 6, 155 Conditionality, 3, 12, 154 Constitutional reform, 152

INDEX Consultation, 6,13, 20, 24, 74, 76, 78, 95,106,114,115, 116, 120,121, 125, 135, 139, 140, 142, 155, 158 Contracting-out. See under Management training Cooperatives, 22, 70 Cooperative Unions and Local Authorities (1972-1976) (Tanzania), 71 Copper industry, 63 Corruption, 11, 46, 74, 104, 108, 125 Council of Ministers (Nigeria), 40 Court politics, 82 Credit data base, 27 Cronyism, 11, 42 Crop development, 92 Cultural norms. See Societal patterns Currency: convertible, 103; devaluation, 3, 63 DDC. See District Development Committee Debt, 2, 15, 63; bargaining, 4; management, 3, 4, 102, 103. See also Structural adjustment programs Decentralization, 1,9, 161; in policymaking, 13, 115, 116, 126, 152, 154, 155-156; See also under Botswana; Ghana; Kenya; Zambia Decisionmaking, 8, 13, 67; decentralized, 92-93, 96, 115, 117, 126, 151, 152, 153, 156 Democracy, 9, 11, 29, 46, 110,117, 120, 152, 154-155 Departmentalism, 95 Deregulation, 125 Development Administration Working Group (HAS), 9 Development conference (Arusha), 13-14, 113 Development programs, 4, 5, 6, 7-8, 9, 12,13-14,19, 87, 123, 162; recipient-driven, 77-78. See also Sustainable development; under Botswana; Ghana; Nigeria; Zambia Development projects, 6, 7, 46, 97, 123

171

Diamonds, 102, 108 District Development Committee (DDC) (Kenya), 96 District Focus for Rural Development Strategy (1983) (Kenya), 90, 92-94 District Planning Handbook of the Government of Botswana, 105 Domestic absorption, 3 Donor community, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-8, 9, 15,21,63, 116, 117, 119, 163; interdonor communication and collaboration, 128, 129,136, 140141, 144, 157. See also Donor-recipient relations; Management training; Technical assistance; under Botswana; Ghana; Kenya; Tanzania; Zambia Donor-recipient relations, 6, 7-8, 9, 14, 16(n23), 122-123, 127-128, 153, 157, 162, 163,164; entrepreneurial reform, 161; foundations, 162-163; institutionalizing, 122123, 125, 127, 131, 137, 138. See also Donor community Drought, 92 Economic development. See Development programs; Development projects Economic Development, Ministry of (Kenya), 87-88 Economic Development Council (Botswana), 13 Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (Ghana), 20, 26, 27, 28, 31 Economy: centralized, 22; dualistic, 102; government-managed, 9; indigenous, 126; market-oriented, 9; mixed, 86 EDI. See World Bank, Economic Development Institute Education/training, 4, 6, 7, 13, 24, 26, 31, 38, 60, 62, 71, 77, 89,102,104, 106, 109, 114,117, 138,163; higher, 70, 89, 159. See also Management training EEC. See European Economic Community

172

INDEX

Egalitarianism, 86 Eight-A firm requirements, 143 Elections, 155; manifestos, 87 Elite, 8, 104,153, 154, 160 Employment, 44, 89,102 Energy, Department of (Tanzania), 74 Entrepreneurs/entrepreneurial ism, 14, 22, 108, 110,160,161 ERP. See Economic Recovery Program Esman, Milton, 7 Ethnic issues, 12, 81. See also Societal patterns European Community, 140 European Economic Community (EEC), 131 Exchange rate policies, 3, 39 Executive bodies, 82, 89-90. See also Bureaucracy Expatriates. See under Policymaking; Technical assistance Exports, 11, 90 FEC. See Federal Executive Council Federal Executive Council (FEC) (Nigeria), 40 Federalism, 40, 155 Federation of Kenya Employers, 85 Finance, Ministry of (Zambia), 55, 60 Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of (Botswana), 105 Financial analysis, 5, 74-75, 105, 118, 164 Financial management, 93; in entrepreneurial reform, 160-161; in management education institutions, 139, 140 Food crisis (1980) (Kenya), 91 Food policy, 91-92 Foundations, 162-163 Funding agencies, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 20, 162 Gaebler, Ted, 160 General Conference (Zambia), 53 Gergen, Kenneth J., 81 German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 140

Germany, 1, 141 Ghana, 9,10-11, 20-31, 152, 155, 157, 158; Annual Plan (1965), 22; banking, 27, 31; capacity building and human resources, 11, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25-28, 31, 33(nn 25, 31); decentralization/administration, 20, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31; development strategy/management, 21, 22-23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30; donor advising/investment, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32(nl8); Five-Year Development Plan, 24; governments, 24, 25, 28, 33(n33); institutional capacity, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29; policymaking and analysis, 21-22, 23, 24, 25, 2627; popular participation, 20, 28-29, 30, 31; public/private sector roles, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25; Seven-Year Development Plan (1963), 23; state-owned enterprises (SOE), 22, 23, 24, 27-28,31 Ghana Association of Bankers, 27 Government/governance, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 82; entrepreneurial, 161-162; institutional aspects, 5, 21, 126, 151, 154; intermediate levels, 1, 8, 13,115,136; popular participation, 8, 12; primary levels, 1, 13, 115. See also Centralized government; Decentralization; State GTZ. See German Technical Cooperation, 140 Guinea-Conakry, 127, 131-132, 133, 136 Harvard Institute of International Development, 91, 92 Health services, 102,106 Higher Education, Ministry of (Zambia), 60 Hire-purchase legislation, 83 Housing, 58 Humanism, 52, 61, 64(n5) Human resource development, 5, 7, 8, 10, 43, 47, 118, 129, 163; entrepreneurial reform, 161;

INDEX institutional development, 14, 97, 117, 121-122, 158; reward structure, 121,140. See abo Civil Service; Management training; under Botswana; Ghana; Nigeria; Tanzania; Zambia Hyden, Goran, 69 IIAS. See International Institute of Administrative Sciences ILO. See International Labour Organisation IMF. See International Monetary Fund IMTC. See Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee India, 83, 97 Industrial Development Corporation (Ghana), 22 Industry, Ministry of (Tanzania), 75 Industry/industrialization, 22, 75 Information-gathering, 3, 5, 8, 114, 121, 158. See also Communication Infrastructure. 11, 38, 62, 101,102, 114 Institute of Development Management (Botswana), 109, 130 Institutional development, 5, 6, 7-9, 10, 14, 15, 119, 120-123, 127, 129, 152; continuity, 158, 160, 163; participants, 10, 87-89, 92, 138. See also Institutional structures/ capacity; under Capacity building process; Donor-recipient relations; Government/governance; Human resources development; Management capacity; Management training; Nongovernmental organizations; Policy analysis; Policy implementation; Sustainable development; Technical assistance; individual countries Institutional structures/capacity, 2, 5, 6, 8,10,11-12,115,116,125,157, 160; existing and new, 77,116-117, 120,124; in practice, 115,116,157. See also Institutional development Interest groups, 76, 85,114,116, 129, 152, 155, 164; special/vested

173

interests, 4, 43, 45, 48 Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) (Tanzania), 69, 72, 76 International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), 9, 13 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 132 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2, 3, 11,49, 73, 123 Intervention. See Development programs Investment, 3, 153. Seeabo Donor community; under Botswana; Ghana; Kenya; Zambia Iringa Declaration (Tanzania), 71 Irrigation, 71 Japan,1 Joseph, Richard A., 42 Kahler, Miles, 4 KANU. See Kenya African National Union Kaunda, Kenneth, 11, 57, 58, 61, 64(n2) Kenya, 9, 12, 81-98, 120, 152, 155, 157, 158, 160; decentralization policy, 92-94, 96; donor advising/ investment, 84, 85, 86, 87; food policy, 90-92; government and institutionalized participation, 8283, 84, 85, 86, 87-91, 92-93,94, 96, 97, 98; macropolicy documents, 85-87; Office of the President, 91; party influences, 8384, 85, 153; policy analysis, 94,96, 97, 98; public/private sector, 84, 85, 87, 88; sectoral planning working groups, 87-91, 94, 95; technical assistance, 84-85 Kenya African National Union (KANU), 83-84, 85, 153 Kenya Association of Manufacturers, 85 Kenya Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 85 Kenya Institute of Administration, 91, 93, 97

174

INDEX

Kenyatta, Mzeejomo, 82, 83, 86 Keynesian economic model, 37 Kgotla (village assembly) (Botswana), 107 Khama, Seretse, 110

145, 155, 163; indigenous, 138, 139; institutional development, 128, 135, 137, 138, 159, 164; internal financial management, 139, 140, 144, 155; learning process model, 14, 129, 130, 136, 157, 162; noncollaborative Labour, 44, 104 training, 133, 137, 138, 140-141. Latin America, 1, 2, 7, 132 See also Management capacity LDC. See Less developed countries Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria Learning process model. See under (MAN), 42 Management training Market economy, 1, 3, 9, 13. 14, 103, Legislative bodies, 82, 152. See also 124, 128, 129, 135; fre^market Parliament conditions, 49(n3) Lending agencies, 73 Masire, Ketumile, 104, 110 Leonard, David, 83, 160 Maslow, Abraham H., 139 Less developed countries (LDC), 1, 6, Media, 70, 76,114,155 7, 132, 162 Military regime. See under State LGSM. See Local Government Service Minerals, 102, 110 Management Mining, 102, 108, 110 Loans, 3, 73; conditionality, 3, 12, 154 Ministerial restructuring, 28-29, 31 Local government: in one-party state, MMD. See Movement for Multiparty 120. See also Decentralization Local Government, Ministry of Democracy (Kenya), 96 Mmusi, Peter, 104 Local Government Council (Nigeria), Moi, Daniel T. arap, 83, 86, 89, 153 41 Morale, 8, 121-122, 123 Moris, Jon, 7 Local Government Service Management (LGSM) (Botswana), 106 Movement for Multiparty Democracy Localization, 104,109, 124. See also Pol(MMD) (Zambia), 64(n2) icymaking, indigenous ownership MRU. See Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Management Resource Unit Mackay Committee (Kenya), 89 MSD. See Civil Service Mechanical Macroeconomic management, 2, 3, 31, 37,51,164 Services Department Multiparty state. See under State MAN. See Manufacturers' Association Musoma Resolution on Education of Nigeria Management capacity, 3, 75, 95, 138; (1974) (Tanzania), 70, 71 Musoma Textiles, 75 analytic thinking, 14, 129, 159, Mwanza Textiles, 75 164; institutional development, 6, 7, 9, 14, 20, 95, 117, 118,119,124, 127-128, 138, 158, 159, 163. See NASPAA. See National Association of also Management training Schools of Public Affairs and Management training, 14, 77, 109, Administration 117, 129, 130-145,163; and National Assembly (Zambia), 55 business community, 19; contractNational Association of Schools of ing-out, 14, 129, 132, 141-143, Public Affairs and Administration 163, 164; donor collaboration, 14, (NASPAA), 130, 131-132, 133, 15, 129, 132, 136, 138-139, 140136, 137, 140, 144

INDEX National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) (Zambia), 55, 56, 60 National Council (Zambia), 52, 53 National Council of States (Nigeria), 40 National Development Plan (19891993) (Kenya), 84 National Development Plan 6 and 7 (Botswana), 103, 108 National Directorate of Employment (Nigeria), 44 National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Advisory Board (NEMIC) (Botswana), 103 National Executive Committee (NEC) (Tanzania), 68, 70, 72 National Food Policy (1981) (Kenya), 90,91 National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) (Nigeria), 44, 48, 97, 120 National Liberation Council (NLC) (Ghana), 23 National Planning and Development, Ministry of (Kenya), 88, 96 National Railways of Zimbabwe, 130 National Redemption Council/ Supreme Military Council (NRC/ SMC) (Ghana), 24, 25, 29 National Technical Training Advisory Committee (Botswana), 103 NCDP. See National Commission for Development Planning Ndegwa Commission on Unemployment (1991) (Kenya), 90 NEC. See National Executive Committee Nelson, Joan M., 3, 4 NEMIC. See National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Advisory Board Newly industrializing countries (NIC), 1 NGO. See Nongovernmental organizations NIC. See Newly industrializing countries

175

Nigeria, 9, 11, 37-49, 97,122, 152, 153,155,157,158; capacity building and human resources, 39, 45-47, 48; civil service reform, 38, 41-42, 45,46, 47-49; development, 39,48, 49; economic policy, 38, 39, 49; government, 40-41, 44, 46, 48; institutional capacity, 38, 44, 4546, 47, 48; policy analysis and process, 39-40, 41, 42-46, 47, 48; popular participation, 44; public/ private sector, 38, 39, 44,46, 48; social welfare, 38, 45, 48, 49; state role, 38-39, 40; structural adjustment program, 11, 39, 41, 44, 47 NIPSS. See National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies Nkrumah, Kwame, 22, 23, 32(nl8) NLC. See National Liberation Council Nongovernmental organizations (NGO), 6, 38, 84, 114, 131, 134, 135, 155, 157, 162, 163; institutional capacity, 7, 9, 14, 120, 127, 129, 143, 152, 156,158,160 Not-for-profit sector, 14, 114, 124, 125, 135 NRC/SMC. See National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council Nyerere, Julius, 70, 71 Office of Management Services and Training (OMS&T), 47 Okoh Commission (Ghana), 30 OUawa, Patrick E„ 65 OMS&T. See Office of Management Services and Training One-party state. See under State Operational policy, 73, 76 Operation Maduka (1976), 71 Organizational management. See Management capacity Osborne, David, 160 PACC. See Policy Analysis and Coordination Center Paras ta tal sector, 13, 56, 62, 69, 89, 102, 108, 159 PARDIC. See Public Administration

176

INDEX

Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementation Committee Parliament (Kenya), 82-83, 85, 86, 87, 89 Parliament (Tanzania), 76 Party Congress (Tanzania), 72 Party Congress (Zambia), 52, 53 Party Control Commission (Zambia), 52, 54, 60 Party-state relations, 70, 73, 83-84, 116, 152, 153 People's National Party ( P N P ) (Ghana), 25 Performance Management Project: in Southern Africa, 130, 136, 143, 149(n40) Planning and National Development, Ministry of (Kenya), 86, 95 Planning Commission (Ghana), 23 Planning, Research, and Statistics, Department of (Nigeria), 43, 44 Pluralism, 1, 9, 12, 13, 51, 116, 152, 154, 155 PNDC. See Provisional National Defence Council PNP. See People's National Party Policy analysis, 3, 5, 13, 56, 129, 155; institutionalized, 117-119, 121. See also under Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; Tanzania Policy Analysis and Coordination Center (PACC) (Ghana), 31 Policy Analysis Unit (Kenya), 120 Policy evaluation, 6, 44-45,95,117, 118 Policy formulation/planning, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 74, 81, 84, 87-88, 90, 95,96, 105,116,117,129, 164; decentralized, 104, 105; top-down, 105-107 Policy implementation, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,11,12,14, 43-44, 75, 81, 91, 94, 116, 117, 125,156,163; decentralized, 104, 114-115,156; institutionalized, 119, 156 Policymaking, 2, 8, 10, 11, 42^*4, 124-125; accountability/transparency, 2, 4, 5,14,117,125, 129, 142;

continuity, 94, 138, 158, 160; defined, 73, 76, 81,92; expatriate participation, 12, 86, 88,91, 104, 109, 153, 154; indigenous ownership, 6, 8,9,12, 19, 21, 26, 31, 67, 76,81,82,93, 94, 114,119, 123, 124, 153, 155, 157; legal framework, 2, 12,43, 78, 119, 125; participants, 57-59, 86, 87, 88,9091,92, 93,94, 96, 98,106, 114, 120, 124, 133, 156,157,158; stakeholders, 8, 76,93-94, 115, 117,129,156,164; study center, 97. See also Decentralization; Decisionmaking; Informationgathering; Institutional capacity; Institutional development; Policy analysis; Policy formulation/ planning; Policy implementation; Policy research; Societal patterns; Sustainable development; under individual countries Policy monitoring/assessment, 2, 6, 95, 105, 117, 118, 164 Policy reform, 2, 3, 4, 6, 15, 17(n30), 113, 125, 156, 166(nl0). Seealso Capacity building process; Sustainable development Policy research, 25, 26, 31, 46, 138, 140,142, 155,164; indigenous, 19, 26,31, 138 Political Bureau (Nigeria), 48 Political divestment, 68, 79 (n5) Political influence, 13. Seealso Corruption Political will, 2, 8, 116, 152, 156 "Politics Is Agriculture" (1972) (Tanzania), 70 Popular participation, 8, 10,12, 44, 89,91-93, 96, 105, 114-115, 117, 121, 155, 156. See also under Botswana; Ghana; Nigeria; Tanzania; Zambia Post-structural adjustment policies/ programs, 7, 14,15, 119, 127 PP. See Progress Party Prebendalism, 42 Presidential commissions, 89-90

INDEX

Pressure groups, 70 Prime Ministerial Circular Number 1 of 1984 (Tanzania), 73 Private sector, 2, 3, 6, 8,9, 13,14, 15, 19,124,125,126, 157, 160; indigenous, 114; management training, 134-135, 137, 139, 141, 144, 164. See also Public-private sector relations; under Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; Zambia Private voluntary organizations (PVO), 114, 154,160,162 Privatization, 1, 11, 86, 125,163, 164 Profitmaking, 14, 56, 58 Progress Party (PP) (Ghana), 23 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Ghana), 25, 28, 29, 30 Public Administration Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementation Committee (PARDIC) (Ghana), 29 Public Housing Division (Zambia), 60 Public involvement See Popular participation Public-private sector relations, 9, 129; balance, 13,113-114,119,124, 126, 154; partnership, 15, 20, 137, 163 Public sector, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 19, 115, 123, 125, 129, 138, 144, 159, 160, 164. See also Civil service; Public-private sector relations; under Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; Tanzania; Zambia Public Service Management, Directorate of (Botswana), 105 Public Works Department (Zambia), 60 PVO. See Private voluntary organizations Regional Training Council. See under Southern African Development Coordination Conference Replicability, 6, 141 Research capability. See Policy research Rockefeller Foundation, 6

177

Rural development, 102 Rural Development, Ministry of (Guinea-Conakry), 132 SADCC. See Southern African Development Coordination Conference SAPAM. See United Nations, Special Action Programme in Administration and Management Science and Technology, Division of (Zambia), 60 Sectoral policy development, 87-90, 117 Seminars, 90-91, 92, 93,120, 133 Sessional Paper on African Socialism (1965), 85-86 Sessional Paper on Economic Management (1986), 86, 92 Sessional papers, 89 Shellukindo, William, 68 Shivji, I., 67 SMC. See National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council Social development, 3, 11, 12, 13, 24, 38, 82, 89,102, 106 Socialism, 22, 61, 68 Societal associations, 13, 78 Societal patterns, 2, 7, 12, 76, 81-82, 114, 157, 164 SOE. See State-owned enterprises Sokoine, Edward M. (prime minister of Tanzania), 73 South Africa, 108, 142,162,167(n23) Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), 127, 130-131, 133, 134, 139, 140, 141, 143; Management Resource Unit (MRU), 130,136, 137, 141; Regional Business Council (SRBC), 130,131,134, 135, 136, 137,141,143,144; Regional Training Council, 130, 137, 141 Sports, 44 SRBC. See Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Regional Business Council

178

INDEX

Stabilization efforts, 2-3, 11,103 Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations, 69 Starch production, 75 State, 3, 4,11,12,19,116,129; civilian regime, 115, 116; in development process, 1, 9, 37, 113-114, 116, 124,125,126; military regime, 11, 23-24, 40,103, 115, 116, 152; multiparty, 12, 71, 72, 73, 104, 115,152,154; oneparty, 12, 51, 52, 68, 103,115-116, 120, 152; presidential role, 116. See also Government/governance; Party-state relations State-owned enterprises. See under Ghana; Zambia Statistics, Department of (Botswana), 105 Structural adjustment programs, 2-3, 4, 5, 6, 10,15, 86, 92,103,121, 128, 154; and institutional development, 5, 7, 8, 119, 122, 123, 124. See also Post-structural adjustment policies/programs; under Nigeria; Zambia Student unrest, 70 Subsidies, 92 Sustainable development, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 19, 20,21,23, 43,51, 61, 74, 76,102, 110, 113,119,129; institutional requirements, 120123, 160,163,164; project research model, 9-10. See also Development programs; Development projects; Institutional development Swaziland, 141, 145(n4) Tanzania, 9,12,67-78,152,155,157; capacity building and human resources, 75, 77-78; civil service, 74, 75, 76; constitution, 67-68, 72, 73,152; donor advising/investment, 71, 77-78; government and party structure, 68-69, 71-73, 76, 78, 79 (nn 7, 8), 152; ideology, 68, 72, 74, 78,79(n5); institutional

development, 74-75,78; policymaking and analysis, 68, 69, 70, 71-73, 74, 75,76, 77; popular participation, 69, 70, 78; President's Office, 13, 68; public sector, 68 Tariffs, 39 Taxation, 76 Technical assistance, 3, 4, 6, 7, 84-85, 91,92, 103,131,132,138, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164; expatriate, 3, 7; institutional development, 7,127, 131, 141, 143, 144, 160 Technocrats, 56, 57, 73, 153 Textile industry, 75 Toure, Sekou, 132 Trade, 3, 39, 71; training project, 130 Transport, 130 Ujamaa, 68 ULGS. See Unified Local Government Service UNDP. See United Nations, Development Programme UNEDIL (institution-building project), 132, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 144 Unemployment, 44, 90 Unified Local Government Service (ULGS) (Botswana), 106 Unions: dissolution of cooperative (1970), 70 UNIP. See United National Independence Party United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Zambia), 52, 56, 61 United Nations: Development Programme (UNDP), 6, 7, 19, 123, 131, 132; Special Action Programme in Administration and Management (SAPAM), 97 United States: exports, 91; technical assistance, 137-138. See also U.S. Agency for International Development Universities, 6, 70, 89 University of Botswana, 109 University of Botswana and Swaziland, 109

INDEX University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 109 University of Ghana: Department of Economics, 25 University of Nairobi, 97 Uphoff, Norman, 7 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 6,92, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144; Cooperative Agreement, 136 USAID. See U.S. Agency for International Development Village development, 10 Welfare facilities, 11, 38 Women, 73, 76, 83, 84 World Bank, 3, 6, 7,11, 19, 26, 49, 73, 87, 101, 123, 132, 140, 141, 144; Economic Development Institute (EDI), 132, 133 (see also UNEDIL); institutional development project, 127, 139 Youth, 44, 73, 84

179

Zambia, 9, 11-12, 51-64, 152,153, 155, 158; capacity building and human resources, 51, 60, 61, 62, 63; civil service, 61, 62, 63; decentralization, 57, 59-60, 61, 62; development, 51, 63, 65(n9); donor advising/investment, 56, 58, 63, 65(n9), 122; economic conditions, 58, 59, 62-63, 64; education, 62; government organization, 51, 52-54, 55, 56, 60, 63; housing, 58, 59; institutional capacity, 51, 52, 56, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64; popular participation, 59, 63; public policy process and government participation, 51, 52, 54-60, 64, 152; public/private sector, 58, 60; social welfare, 61, 62, 64(n5); state-owned enterprises (SOE), 54; structural adjustment programs, 63 Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), 58 Zimbabwe, 130 ZIMCO. See Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation

About the Editors and Contributors

Louis A. Picard is associate professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. His many publications include The Politics of Development in Botswana and South Africa in Southern Africa (with Edmond J . Keller). Michele Garrity is the managing director of P & G Associates, a development management consulting Firm. She is the author of "Organized Interests, the State, and the Public Policy Process" (with Louis A. Picard), Journal of Developing Areas (1991), and Sanctions Against South Africa (with Louis A. Picard and Veronique Lozach). H. Akuoko-Frimpong is acting director of the Management Development and Productivity Institute in Accra, Ghana. Mulenga C. Bwalya is principal, National Administration, Lusaka, Zambia.

Institute of Public

Ason Bur is deputy governor, Benue State Government, Makurdi, Nigeria. Athumani J. Liviga is senior lecturer of political studies, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and is currently affiliated with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. Gatian F. Lungu is professor of public administration at the University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. 181

182

ABOUT THE EDITORS & CONTRIBUTORS

Rwekaza S. Mukandala is senior lecturer of political studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Elvidge G. M. Mhlauli is associate director of the Directorate of Public Service Management, Gaborone, Botswana. Walter 0. Oyugi is professor of political science at the University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya. Keshav C. Sharma is professor and chair of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana. William Shellukindo is principal secretary, Civil Service Department, Office of the President, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Ali D. Yahaya is secretary general of the African Association of Public Administration and Management, Nairobi, Kenya.

About the Book

Thirty years of donor-supported development programs in Africa have shown that the intricacies of policy content have usually won out over the institutional requirements necessary for effective and efficient government. Consequently, administrative and managerial capacity has been declining rather than improving in much of the continent, and the introduction of structural adjustment policies has tended to compound the problem. Reform initiatives to strengthen weak markets and bolster weak states have typically ignored the critical institutional imperatives necessary for generating vibrant markets and a viable governance process. This book revisits issues of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t a n d capacity b u i l d i n g , f o c u s i n g on the e x p e r i e n c e s of African researchers and practitioners. The authors—representing the public and nongovernmental sectors as well as the d o n o r community— concentrate on four themes: good governance requires an appropriate balance of responsibilities between the public and private sectors; pluralism and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n are f u n d a m e n t a l to sustainability; management capacity is the weak link in development programs; and institution building is directly linked to sustainability. The case studies cover Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Botswana.

183