Policy by Other Means : Alternative Adoption by Presidents [1 ed.] 9781603445405, 9781585445134

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THE JOSEPH V. HUGHES JR. AND HOLLY O. HUGHES SERIES ON THE PRESIDENCY AND LEADERSHIP James P. Pfiffner, General Editor Series Editorial Board Peri Arnold H. W. Brands Jr. George C. Edwards III Fred I. Greenstein Erwin C. Hargrove Charles O. Jones Martha Joynt Kumar Roger Porter Steven J. Wayne

POLICY BY OTHER MEANS Alternative Adoption by Presidents

STEVEN A. SHULL

Texas A&M University Press, College Station

Copyright © 2006 by Steven A. Shull Manufactured in the United States of America All rights reserved First edition The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48–1984. Binding materials have been chosen for durability. o Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shull, Steven A. Policy by other means : alternative adoption by presidents / Steven A. Shull.— 1st ed. p. cm. — (The Joseph V. Hughes Jr., and Holly O. Hughes series on the presidency and leadership) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-58544-513-4 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58544-513-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Executive power—United States—History. I. Title. II. Joseph V. Hughes, Jr., and Holly O. Hughes series in the presidency and leadership studies JK511.S54 2006 352.23'80973—dc22 2005028718

Dedicated to my mother, Mildred N. Shull, 1914–2004, and to my father, Arthur G. Shull, 1912–.

CONTENTS

List of Figures viii List of Tables ix Preface

xi

1

Understanding Presidential Prerogatives 3

2

Explaining Presidential Alternative Actions 29

3

Measurement of Variables 56

4

Budget Agreement: Chief Budgeter

73

5

Executive Orders: Chief Executive

95

6

Executive Agreements: Chief Diplomat 114

7

Committing Troops: Commander in Chief 134

8

Conclusion 154 Methodological Appendix Notes 197 References 207 Index

221

175

FIGURES

Figure 1.1.

Interrelationship of Political System and Policy Process 20

Figure 4.1.

Economic Indicators, 1980–2015 77

Figure 4.2.

Budget Agreement, 1949–2000 86

Figure 5.1.

Executive Orders, 1949–2000

Figure 6.1.

Executive Agreements, 1949–2000

Figure 7.1.

Comparison of MIDs and Uses of Force Data Sets 140

Figure 7.2.

Uses of Force, 1949–2000

104

145

124

POLICY BY OTHER MEANS

TABLES

19

Table 1.1.

Variables in the Analysis

Table 2.1.

Expected Influences on Presidential Unilateral Powers 53

Table 3.1.

Dependent Variable Correlation Matrix 63

Table 3.2.

Independent Variable Correlation Matrix 67

Table 4.1.

Budget Agreement and Political Time Controls

Table 4.2.

Budget Agreement

Table 5.1.

Executive Orders and Political Time Controls

Table 5.2.

Executive Orders

Table 5.3.

Major (Policy) Orders 110

Table 6.1.

Treaties and Executive Agreements, 1789–2000

Table 6.2.

Executive Agreements and Political Time Controls

Table 6.3.

Executive Agreements

Table 6.4.

Percent Executive Agreements

88

90 105

107

127 128

123 125

x

LIST OF TABLES

146

Table 7.1.

Use of Force and Political Time Controls

Table 7.2.

Use of Force

Table 7.3.

Poisson Model of Major Uses of Force

Table 8.1.

General Model Results across Four Prerogative Powers 158

Table 8.2.

Political Time Controls across Four Prerogative Powers 161

Table 8.3.

Policy Area Controls for Prerogative Powers

Table A.1.

Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 178

Table A.2.

Lagged Regressions of Dependent Variables in Process Model 181

Table A.3.

Thirteen Variable General Model 185

Table A.4.

VIF Test for Multicollinearity 187

Table A.5.

Poisson Model of Policy Orders

Table A.6.

Poisson Model of Use of Force

147

189 190

149

163

PREFACE

This

book develops from several diverse interests,

particularly utilizing a public policy approach to studying presidential-congressional relations (Shull 1983, 1997, 1999, 2003). Most authors view the president as setting the agenda and formulating policy while Congress is seen as modifying and adopting policy. More recently scholars have recognized that presidents also adopt policy alternatively, thereby extending their range of influence in the policymaking process. These unilateral or alternative powers are an extension of presidents’ legislative relations because they typically create policy, and even precedent, if not formal legislation. This study examines four such actions systematically, assesses their determinants, considers the frequency of usage, and compares them to one another. As such, it attempts to integrate prerogative power into broader theories of presidential power. The title of this book might appear to be drawn from Ginsberg and Shefter (1999), who argue that elections have largely been eclipsed by Politics by Other Means. However, the focus here is not on the irrelevance of elections but on the argument that legislation by Congress often is eclipsed by presidents’ adoption of Policy by Other Means. Under such circumstances presidents often act alone, rather than engaging Congress, which seems largely to violate the constitutional principles of checks and balances. In that sense this study is more akin to Hinckley’s (1994) argument that Congress has often failed to hold presidents accountable, and it is appearing to but not actually monitoring executive branch policy actions. Hinckley believes that such monitoring has been Less Than Meets the Eye. Along with Fisher (1998), I find much presidential discretion and little congressional scrutiny of such actions as budgeting, executive orders, executive agreements, and commitment of

xii

PREFACE

troops. Although presidents exercise many discretionary powers, I examine only these four that actually adopt new or revise existing public policy. What I find in this study is validation of the basic thesis of this book. That is, one must compare a variety of actions to get a full picture of presidential prerogative powers. Such actions are used quite differently by presidents and none are directly related empirically to the others. Examining a single action, such as executive orders, is insufficient because such behavior is indeed different from other actions and an incomplete understanding of presidential actions would emerge from its examination alone. Indeed, I observe considerable increases in executive agreements but also decreases in executive orders over the extended fifty-two-year period of this study. At the same time, budget agreement and commitments of troops are more complicated in not revealing obvious or clear patterns of usage over time. Thus, my comprehensive examination is more inclusive than any previous quantitative study of presidential prerogative powers. Another confirming element of the research is the decision to use a variety of explanatory variables, something akin to what I call a multiple perspective approach. This approach combines narrower theories of the personal president, institutional presidency, and environmental factors external to government into a broader theory that includes elements of all of them. Yet, I produce a parsimonious model of just six explanatory variables allowing direct and comprehensive comparison among all four alternative policy actions by presidents. I receive solid explanatory power for each action despite the fact that different elements are important for each (for example, personal for executive agreements, institutional for executive orders, and environmental factors for budget agreement and uses of force). Also included in this research are controls for trend, policy area, and several elements of political time. What I observe is that three of the four actions are influenced somewhat by prior decisions. The four time controls also have temporal dimensions. The first is historical era, dividing the actions into pre and post-reform congresses (before and after 1974). This control is significant for three of the four actions. The second control is by presidential party, which also has some solid effects on presidential usage of prerogative powers. Third, quite a few differences are observed by the ten individual presidents during the time period of this study (1949–2000). Finally, year in presidential term of office is the least useful of the four political time controls. In addition, a test for foreign versus domestic prerogative actions is made. Important differences in actions and in their explanation occur, lending legitimacy to the two-presidencies thesis. The purpose of this book is to investigate the importance of various tools

PREFACE

xiii

available to presidents in adopting policy largely independent of Congress. It is somewhat related to Sinclair’s Unorthodox Lawmaking, which shows dramatic efforts by Congress to enact policies in a changing political environment. Policy by Other Means argues that presidents also adopt policy and that their environment for policymaking too has changed. Rather than trying to explain presidents’ legislative success or support in Congress, I use success as just one of many factors that help explain alternative policy adoption by presidents. My predictors consist of individual, institutional, and environmental elements and several controls that may influence unilateral or alternative policy actions. A distinguishing feature of the book is its breadth and synthesis. Each of these alternative actions are seldom challenged by Congress, and this is even true of overall budget agreement. The courts also have rarely intervened in alternative presidential policy adoption. Accordingly, Neustadt’s traditional bargaining model of policymaking may not apply to exercise of prerogative powers. Presidents seemingly have been deferred to in their use of such discretionary powers, and this appears particularly so in the international arena. The first three chapters lay out the theoretical and measurement elements of the book. Then each of the four discretionary actions is covered in separate chapters (4–7). The last chapter synthesizes overall findings, considers legislative responses to alternative powers, and assesses the implications of Policy by Other Means. Finally, an appendix handles numerous methodological issues. All in all, important findings are revealed in this comprehensive and comparative study of alternative policy adoption by presidents. I find that presidents are able to adopt policy alternatively and frequently bypass Congress in the process. Throughout the book I discuss alternative models and potentially different procedures but generally conclude that I would not do much differently in this study. Yes, it is a preliminary comparison, but it contributes to the growing empirical research agenda on the presidency and particularly, how they adopt public policy, not always unilaterally, but not always collaboratively either. I argue that Congress will have to seek renewed challenges in order to play a more equal policymaking role with presidents but has revealed little inclination to do so heretofore. Thus, important issues of separation of powers and checks and balances are raised. As is the case with any major project, this book could not have been completed without generous assistance from others. My friend and colleague Christine Day read the entire manuscript and provided some critical but always useful comments. My two superior graduate assistants each provided valuable services. Chad Nilson prepared vital data, analyses, and tables while

xiv PREFACE

Megan Osterbur read the entire manuscript for grammar and assisted with updates, some reanalysis, and the references. My friends and colleagues Brandon Prins and Marc Rosenblum both read three substantive chapters and provided helpful comments on the methodological appendix. My closest friend and colleague Susan Howell provided extremely helpful comments on the appendix. Others read portions of the manuscript and provided great assistance. My wife, Janice Shull, read the entire manuscript and prepared the index, while a single chapter was read by graduate students Rosie Barnett and Bethany Comboy and by friends and faculty members elsewhere: Brad Gomez and Bryan Marshall. Two important scholars in the field of presidential unilateral power, William Howell and Ken Mayer, each read the first two chapters of this book. Law librarian Georgia Chadwick provided invaluable assistance with certain research needs I had, particularly with executive agreements. I am grateful for helpful suggestions by all of the above.

POLICY BY OTHER MEANS

1 UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES

After years of writing about Congress as an equal policymaking partner to the president, I began to wonder about this long-held judgment during the early thinking and writing about this project. The 107th Congress (2001–02) seemed to have accomplished little other than passing President George W. Bush’s major tax cuts and education reform initiatives. Less than a month before the 2002 midterm election, after the fiscal year had already begun, not a single one of the thirteen appropriations bills needed to run the federal government had been passed by both chambers. Congress could not resolve health care issues or, only after considerable debate, authorize President Bush to go to war against Iraq. Of course, an easy explanation for this inactivity is that Congress was closely divided by party: the House was controlled by Republicans and the Senate by Democrats (by a single vote). Because of conditions limiting legislative lawmaking, presidents have used strategies to adopt policy alternatively. Despite this seeming direct challenge, most congresses have shown little will to seriously rebuff presidents, and if they do not do so, then presidents will have great, and largely unfettered, discretion. It is these presidential prerogative or discretionary powers, adopting policies without legislative branch involvement, that are the subject of Policy by Other Means.1 But is it because presidents have difficulty in the legislative arena that they often turn to alternative discretionary policy adoption? Close party divisions within Congress do delay presidential policy initiatives but a closely divided Congress is probably also less able to challenge the president. Such controversy might also lead presidents toward policy by other means. It is true that much of what presidents want or propose requires congressional approval. But presidents can make many important policy decisions,

4 CHAPTER 1

particularly when there is a vacuum in leadership or cooperation in Congress. During the early 1970s, Congress enacted a wave of legislation that even today gives the appearance of greatly limiting presidential discretionary powers. In response to proportionately fewer treaties being submitted to the Senate, Congress enacted the Case-Zablocki Act in1972, which required that executive agreements be submitted to the Senate. However, they have almost never been challenged by Congress. In 1973, Congress passed the war powers resolution, but Congress has not since formally opposed presidential commitments of troops or required their removal.2 Congress adopted the Budget and Impoundment Control Act in 1974, presumably to limit presidents from withholding funds that Congress had appropriated, but subsequent presidents have used rescissions or related devices for essentially the same purpose. In 1976 Congress passed the National Emergencies Act and most such emergencies are called by executive orders. Did these reforms matter? Despite numerous efforts in each of these areas, Congress seems largely to have hiked the ball to the executive and let presidents be the quarterback in both foreign and domestic public policymaking. Indeed, chapter 8 suggests that these “reforms” may actually have diminished the oversight role of Congress. Some will argue that the primary reason for congressional acquiescence and corresponding presidential assertiveness is divided government—Congress and the presidency controlled by different political parties. While the leadership vacuum in Congress seemed particularly evident in 2001–02— Congress barely responded to President George W. Bush’s unilateral suspension of much of the clean air and water acts—it also has occurred more frequently during the modern period of American government than during the years following World War II. But is divided government the only culprit? Certainly institutional combat is more likely under divided than unified government (Brady and Volden 1998; Cameron 2002; Shull 1997, chap. 4). How much has divided government limited Congress and contributed to presidential discretionary powers? Are we less likely to see recent presidents (1975 to present) utilize such devices than those in the period of 1949–74 when government was more often unified? Perhaps if presidents are unable to move their agendas legislatively, they will turn to unilateral actions. Presidents presumably prefer legislation but may use decree or alternative power strategically to get legislation. Also, what factors contribute to presidential use of unilateral powers? I delve into several prerogative powers in the modern era and use a multiple perspective approach to assist in their explanation. Presidents appear able to exercise such prerogatives relatively independently, which challenges the conventional bargaining model of policymaking.

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 5

Rather than being unable to command as Neustadt (1960) argues, presidents have many alternatives to do just that: adopt alternative public policy and assert their policy preferences.

WHAT ARE POLICIES BY OTHER MEANS? Prerogative or discretionary power refers to presidents taking actions that are not specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitution. Fisher (2000, 51) defines prerogative power as “allowing executives to act in absence of law and sometimes against it.” There are so many of these unilateral actions that a single book cannot cover them all. For example, executive privilege, the withholding of information by the executive from Congress, is not enumerated in the Constitution, but by itself does not create policy. Others make opposing arguments about whether this power may be implied from that document. In any event, instances of executive privilege are relatively few and almost impossible to compile in any systematic fashion (Berger 1974; Rozell 2002 in private conversation). An important 2004 Supreme Court decision upheld the device even for presidents’ top assistants (Cheney v. U.S. District Court). What other unilateral powers might be available to presidents? Administration rule making is an executive prerogative but because it is so detailed it is primarily under the auspices of the bureaucracy (Kerwin 2003). Only a few modern presidents had reorganization authority over limited portions of the executive branch so it too is not a power that can be examined over time from a presidency perspective. However, recent research examines agency creation, usually through executive orders (Howell and Lewis 2002). Finally, Cooper (2002) discusses proclamations, national security directives, and presidential signing statements, but these devices usually occur less frequently and records often are not available before the 1980s.3 Cooper covers a very different set of unilateral actions, and the limited data available for several would make quantitative comparisons nearly impossible. Three recent university press books have appeared on presidential exercise of unilateral actions. The first book-length volume on executive orders only was by Mayer (2001), titled With the Stroke of a Pen. Obviously it is a detailed study that contains both quantitative and qualitative elements. Mayer uses some of the same variables that I do and thus reports at least some similar results for both all and a different subset of significant orders. He also performs individual detailed analyses of two important issue areas: civil rights and foreign policy. Mayer shows, as do other presidential scholars (Howell 2003, Shull 1997), that presidents can often pursue policies independent of

6 CHAPTER 1

presumed congressional preferences. Although executive orders are often thought of as directed at the executive branch only, Mayer shows that they are also used to legislate or, what I call adopt, policy independently of Congress. Cooper’s By Order of the President (2002) is the only study besides mine to examine a wide range of presidential alternative policy decisions. While executive orders overlaps with my four actions, Cooper provides useful historical information on presidential memoranda and proclamations as well as more recent actions: signing statements and national security directives. He argues their importance in stating that “most Americans do not realize that rule by decree is so common” (2002, 15). Unfortunately, systematic data are not consistently available for these actions over a long period of time such as I examine. Like the third book I mention, Cooper argues large deference to presidential actions by Congress and the judiciary. Such actions are a quick way to push policy preferences and appear to reflect an end-run around Congress. Cooper’s book too reflects the use and abuse of presidential power. In a further important and fascinating study, Howell (2003) uses game theoretical and neo-institutional approaches to study presidential prerogative power. The data in Power without Persuasion are executive orders but he mentions other actions very briefly. Like Mayer, Howell finds it important to separate significant from trivial orders and uses only a few of the variables that I consider. Howell points out that executive orders can be as powerful as law but are, of course, much easier to attain with little fear of having them overturned (180). Perhaps the most significant portion of the book is a systematic examination of responses. Howell concludes that neither Congress nor the judiciary have challenged presidents much, so presidents’ primary question is “what do I want and what can I get away with?” (187). All three of these volumes reflect serious efforts at tapping presidential prerogative power. They range from relatively descriptive and historical to highly quantitative works that generally come to the same conclusion. That is, that presidents are relatively unencumbered in their efforts to push their prerogative powers because other actors (primarily Congress and the judiciary) lack the will to challenge presidential actions. So what is different about my book? I have already mentioned that I wanted to compare four different presidential actions that serve as alternatives to legislation. Because I compare them directly as no one else has, I begin with numerous explanatory variables but end up with a rather simple model consisting of three components: personal, institutional, and environmental factors plus numerous controls. This decision involves some compromises because some variables work better with one or more actions than with others. Still, I felt that a complete

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 7

comparison was more desirable than the greatest possible explanatory power for each one in isolation. My six-variable model not only is quite parsimonious but it also includes elements that have been very important in presidential research (for example, whether to examine the presidency from individual or institutional levels). Obviously I include both as well as the commonly excluded environment. What largely remains are budgeting, executive orders,4 executive agreements, and commitment of troops. Each of these activities reflects broad discretionary powers frequently claimed by presidents (except for budgeting) to derive from the Constitution (usually implied) and that can be considered alternative adoption of public policy. Although each of them was originally given to Congress—even declaring war—this seems not to have hindered the usage of prerogative powers by presidents. A frustrated Congress frequently attempted (1950s) and sometimes passed (early 1970s) legislation to curtail presidents’ usage of unilateral discretionary power. Chapter 8 considers whether such legislative actions have made a difference.

BUDGET AGREEMENT: CHIEF BUDGETER Although the Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, that body chose to require the president to submit an executive budget, beginning in 1921 through the Budget and Accounting Act. Probably this was necessitated by the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial economy and the expansion of government. Although presumably intended by Congress as a device to maintain a balanced budget, President Franklin Roosevelt utilized the executive budget tool to assert personal leadership (LeLoup and Shull 2003, 158). Subsequent presidents have used budgeting to further their policy preferences by pushing their programmatic requests (Kamlet 1987; Mowrey 1980). The prerogative element results from Congress’s decision to share the power of the purse with presidents in annual budgeting. No doubt at the time, Congress did not realize this potential for executive leadership. With passage of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act in 1974, Congress tried to reassert itself, but presidents now largely set the budget agenda. Although shared, budget power has mainly been delegated to the executive. Even though not a pure prerogative power in relative terms, the president has substantial budget authority. The president’s role is significant strategically because he has “first move” power in setting the budget agenda items. Because of sequence, Congress is forced to react to the budget the president initiates. So, unlike regular legislation, the president is the budget

8 CHAPTER 1

initiator rather than the responder. Indeed, the president has become chief budgeter because Congress has trouble focusing on centralized rather than decentralized policy (Fisher 2000). Prior to the post–World War II era, the United States had a long tradition of balanced budgets and, despite contentiousness, relatively stable relations between the two branches. Wildavsky (1964) wrote eloquently of institutional agreement over a budget base, around which changes made by Congress usually were small or incremental. However, deficit politics was beginning about the time in which Wildavsky first wrote, and he subsequently found incrementalism less relevant (1988). Indeed, no formula can substitute for political consensus, which has been much harder to achieve between the two branches (Cox et al. 1993; Kettl 1989). Congress now largely depends on presidents to make necessary budget cuts (Wildavsky 1988). The growing deficits during the 1980s and early 1990s made consensus even more problematic under frequently divided government and strengthened the president in budgeting. One promising measure is budget agreement between Congress and the president because it reveals institutional conflict. Although not strictly a prerogative power, high agreement could reveal presidential leadership in the budget process or acquiescing to what he knows Congress wants. In that sense, budgeting is different from the other three actions I examine, which are largely unilateral. Extraordinary resolution was necessary to prevent deadlock during the balanced budget standoff of 1995–96. Perhaps no issue was more important to the new Republican Congress in 1995 than balancing the federal budget. They would approach the issue aggressively, seeking total victory over the repudiated congressional Democrats and a weakened President Bill Clinton. House Republicans concocted a plan with nearly a trillion dollars in spending cuts over seven years, including sharp reductions in Medicare, enough cuts to allow them to incorporate $350 billion in tax cuts during the same period. They tried to force the president to go along by threatening to shut down the government and default on federal debt if necessary. Although he gradually moved toward their position and agreed to seek a balanced budget, Clinton stood up to House Speaker Newt Gingrich and the Republicans. Clinton’s approval ratings soared while the Republicans’ tumbled. Both sides decided that it would be better to resolve the deadlock over balancing the budget by the 1996 elections (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1996, 2–5). This case is an example of how divided government and party differences over economic and budget policy can result in partisan bickering, deadlock, and potentially harmful results. Nothing positive was accomplished by the government shutdowns or threats to default on federal debt. The case

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 9

certainly shows enhanced congressional capacity to lead government in terms of defining issues and formulating solutions. However, it also shows the limits of congressional leadership when there is substantial opposition from the White House. The Republicans were unable to pressure Clinton into accepting their plan, and their tactics backfired politically. In retrospect, many Republicans believe it was a mistake to force the government shutdowns to pressure the president. This case involved veto bargaining by the president (Cameron 2002), which is implicit in the Constitution. Ultimately there must be a high level of budget agreement because Congress and the president must resolve their differences to adopt a budget each year. Budget agreement overall and for defense and nondefense is examined in chapter 4.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS: CHIEF EXECUTIVE Executive orders are presidential decisions that technically have the same legal effect as legislative statute, “if issued under a valid claim of authority and published” (Cooper 1986, 240).5 They remain the law of the land unless overturned by act of Congress or subsequent executive order. However, a strict interpretation of the Constitution might preclude executive orders because they are a type of presidential legislation and thus an infringement on separation of powers. Yet, presidents have issued them often and cited the authority for executive orders as coming from Article II of the Constitution or legislation itself. The Supreme Court has allowed considerable legislative delegation to the president, therein upholding this device of presidential leadership, especially in foreign policy. Executive orders have long been used for narrow routine administrative matters; certainly that was the rule prior to World War II (Ragsdale 1993, 74). Since then, however, presidents increasingly have issued orders as broader instruments of public policy as well. One author asserts that their usage increased dramatically with presidential war and emergency power (Cooper 1986, 236). Although executive orders have become an important instrument of presidential prerogative power, it is assumed that most still are issued for routine, administrative purposes (such as Clinton’s order in 1996 adjusting civil service pay rates) rather than to bring about large-scale policy change. However, many orders appear to have broader coverage than just the executive branch. After receiving little scholarly attention for years, executive orders have been widely examined in recent years (Cooper 2002; Deering and Maltzman 1999; Howell 2003; Krause and Cohen 1997; Mayer 1999; 2001; Shull 1997). Civil rights is an issue area of great presidential discretion (Shull 1999).

10

CHAPTER 1

The most important legislation before or since passed during the 1960s (Civil Rights Act 1964, Voting Rights Act 1965), and fair housing was by far the most contested topic. Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson set the stage for the 1968 Fair Housing Act that was to follow by issuing a series of executive orders. Executive order #11063 issued by Kennedy on November 20, 1963, two days before his death, was a very limited beginning as the Johnson administration quickly discovered. Johnson tried to broaden the Kennedy order during the next year but faced enormous legal and political hurdles in trying to eliminate discrimination in private housing. Johnson ultimately decided so seek legislation, which subsequently passed. However, prior executive actions were clearly precursors to this legislation (Mayer 2001, 202). Johnson’s focus on legislation seems natural because he was faced with a situation where legislative authority was needed for further government action and because of his experience as majority leader of the Senate. Thus, while issues are on the legislative agenda, executive actions may be less necessary. Clearly, Johnson obtained substantial legislative support for virtually all of his major civil rights initiatives. Rule making by the bureaucracy frequently precedes executive orders by presidents (Kerwin 2003). Well over 4,000 rules and regulations were promulgated covering 19,233 pages in the Federal Register by the Bush administration in 2003 alone. The volume of such actions makes it very difficult for Congress, let alone the affected parties and the general public, to keep up with them, and many of these initiatives escape the spotlight; others become important elements of the presidents’ policy agendas and become adopted policies. Although George W. Bush initiatives often were in response to 9/11 terrorism, others were new initiatives on the environment, health care, and product safety. Although most of the above remained as bureaucratic rules, others reached the higher status of presidential actions. Executive orders overall and by policy areas are examined in chapter 5.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: CHIEF DIPLOMAT The Constitution grants foreign policy powers to both Congress and the president but nowhere does it make the president preeminent. However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936) allowed greater delegation by Congress in foreign than in domestic policy. Actually, the majority opinion went much further and the president was deemed “the sole organ of the government in the field of international relations” (299 U.S. 320, 1936). In a later decision (United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 1942), the Court,

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 11

similar to Curtiss-Wright, determined that executive agreements have the same force of law as treaties. Ragsdale (1998, 298) argues that presidents use them not to circumvent treaties or Congress but as “convenient tools that can accommodate the policy complexity created by both routine and important foreign policy matters.” Clearly executive agreements are the least examined of presidential prerogative powers. They are not discussed or even mentioned by many works on presidential-congressional relations, such as Fisher 1998; Hinckley 1994; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; or Robinson 1987. The limited research on the topic is somewhat dated (Johnson and McCormick 1978; Stevens 1977), although useful volumes on executive agreements appeared in the 1980s (Johnson 1984 and Margolis 1986). Executive agreements are pacts made by presidents with foreign leaders or governments that are not treaties, protocols, and conventions. All of these constitute international agreements. Unlike treaties, executive agreements do not require congressional consent (except they must be submitted to the Senate under the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972).6 They do not supersede U.S. laws with which they conflict, but in the absence of law, they are just as binding as treaties. Most executive agreements presumably are minor and derive from existing statutes, treaties, or presidential authority (Caruson 2002, 21). One writer finds that procedural matters constitute 50 to 60 percent of all executive agreements from Lyndon Johnson to Jimmy Carter (Margolis 1986, 108–109). Trade agreements, the annexation of territory, military commitments, arms control pacts, and a host of less important actions have all been concluded through executive agreements. While infrequent in the nineteenth century, by the mid-1930s they have become and remain much more common than treaties (LeLoup and Shull 2003, 120). Executive agreements expand the president’s implied power of chief diplomat, but the potential legislative role should not be ignored (Martin 2000). The frequency and determinants of international agreements (overall and by policy area) are examined in chapter 6. During Carter’s second year in office (1978), he issued nineteen executive agreements with Mexico and eighteen with Egypt. Regarding the former, most concerned the drug trade while only one of the latter did. The primary concern with Egypt was to encourage the peace process with Israel and, at the time, these two countries were the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid. Most of the executive agreements to Egypt were through the State Department’s Agency for International Development (AID), but others dealt with art, electrical development, agriculture, and technological planning. Certainly, no one called the assistance to either country a payoff for peace but it

12

CHAPTER 1

did have the successful result of preventing further warfare between Egypt and Israel. None of the above agreements dealt with weaponry or other controversial foreign policy issues and most actually appear noncontroversial. Recall that many types of international agreements exist but the number of executive agreements is substantial and they largely dominate modern U.S. foreign policy. Certainly they are not all minor. George W. Bush, for example, used a series of agreements during 2002–04 with Russia concerning nuclear weaponry. The focus was to reduce strategic offensive arms and production of plutonium. Part of the effort was geared toward former Soviet republics but Bush’s efforts to create a defensive nuclear shield, as had Ronald Reagan, made agreement with Russia difficult. The utilization of executive agreements seems not to matter much between party of the president or even whether divided government exists.

COMMITTING TROOPS: COMMANDER IN CHIEF As with other prerogative powers, the end of World War II revealed the reemergence of the presidency and the subsequent decline of Congress. The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war but makes the president the commander in chief of the armed forces. With that grant, presidents have chosen to exercise the discretionary right to commit troops. President Harry Truman’s entry into the Korean War was “the first time that a president used independent power to intervene in a major war, and Congress failed to protect its prerogatives” (Fisher 2000, 33). Presidents have cited the U.N. Charter, its Security Council resolutions, and subsequent legislation (NATO treaty in 1949, Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964) to justify uses of force overseas. This is an oversimplification, of course, since none of these documents give the president a totally free hand to go to war. Yet assertive presidents have interpreted these and other documents to suit their own purposes, largely shifting war power to presidents (Fisher 1999a; 2000, 40; Hinckley 1994). A prominent scholar argues that the Constitution “vested in Congress the power to initiate hostilities against foreign nations” (Fisher 2000, 63). Such actions have become regular occurrences during the period of this study but presidents commit troops differently. Kennedy and Richard Nixon used force more widely while Gerald Ford and Carter less frequently acted with uses of force. However, troop commitments increased dramatically under Ronald Reagan and, particularly, George H. W. Bush and Clinton. One could argue that at least the latter two presidents sought prior legislative approval before sending troops to the Gulf War and to Bosnia.7 Even George W. Bush

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 13

sought legislative support for a possible war against Iraq due to his claim that its leader, Saddam Hussein, was supporting terrorism and producing weapons of mass destruction. In October 2002, both chambers voted by large margins (although Democrats were split in both) to encourage but not require the president to give United Nations inspectors a chance to work, but otherwise gave him the authorization he sought. In 1983, President Reagan invaded the tiny Caribbean country of Grenada, presumably under the context of protecting American medical students on the island. It also provided the larger context for Reagan to flex his muscles against a communist regime that had close ties to Castro’s Cuba. Another pretext was that Cuba was helping Grenada build a military-grade airport that, along with a growing Marxist presence, was perceived a threat by other Caribbean nations. The invasion of Grenada began with about 1,200 troops but soon escalated to around 17,000. It took about three days until the pro-Marxist regime of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was toppled in a bloody coup. The death rate was forty-nine for the United States, twenty-nine for Cuba, and forty-nine for Grenada. After about two months of scattered fighting, U.S. troops returned home and a pro-U.S. government took control of the country. In some sense it constituted war between the U.S. and Cuba, although the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 was an even more serious confrontation. The war in Grenada was also perhaps a flexing of muscle against the USSR, which President Reagan had called the “evil empire.” With his substantial military buildup, Reagan wanted to show that he was prepared to stop the spread of communism. This invasion was one of those instances when the president decided to act without advising Congress ahead of time. Most of the fighting was over within just a few days, yet Congress still felt that they had not been consulted ahead of time. However, a suit by a member of Congress challenging the invasion of Grenada was dismissed because the invasion was over. Generally the courts will avoid such constitutional disputes and the balance between the political branches tends to be determined by just that: politics. George W. Bush’s primary use of force was, of course, the attack on Iraq in 2003. He had previously also invaded Afghanistan since terrorist leader Osama bin Laden was headquartered there. World opinion more clearly understood U.S. efforts in Afghanistan because our country had been directly attacked by terrorists, and a great outpouring of sympathy was offered to America. Bush’s claim of a terrorist linkage with Iraq was not as easily accepted by nations around the world given that the United States had not been attacked even though many agreed with Bush’s dislike for its leader Saddam Hussein. Uses of force have been analyzed by many scholars (DeRouen and

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Peake 2002; Fordham 1998; Ostrom and Job 1986), and U.S. troop commitments are examined in chapter 7.

ASSESSMENT Presidents have considerable authority through executive orders and other devices to express their preferences (Canes-Wrone 1999, 25; Mayer 2001, 28; Moe and Howell 1999, 855; Sala 1998). Obviously, such presidential power can be overemphasized. First, subsequent presidents can overturn unilateral actions as George W. Bush did early on with Clinton’s last minute exercise of discretion. Although such overturning actions are relatively infrequent, they give prerogative actions potentially less permanence than would legislative adoption. Second, we have seen diminished use of some alternative powers and limits on delegation of authority by Congress to the executive (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Third, scholars demonstrate that the legislative branch plays a considerable role in bargaining with the executive, even in the realm of foreign policy (Martin 2000). Presidents too can bargain with Congress through veto threats and other strategies prior to final decisions (Cameron 2002). Presumably these developments relate to the increase in divided government. Still, the exercise of discretionary power continues to provide presidents with important opportunities for alternative policy adoption.

WHAT FACTORS MIGHT INFLUENCE PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE DECISIONS? I argue here that studying presidential discretionary powers requires a comprehensive approach. After examining theories of presidentialcongressional relations, I adapted a framework used to study Congress that can easily be applied to presidential-congressional relations or presidential unilateral actions. It essentially requires including a variety of individual or personal, institutional, and systemic or environmental elements. Deering (1989, 1–13) developed this three-pronged analysis, with each focusing attention on certain aspects of Congress in producing different kinds of policy outputs. Presidents are individuals but they also operate within a larger institution and possess environmental constraints. This approach assures that a broad variety of elements are also used to examine these seemingly diverse actions by presidents. Here I compare Congress and the president at each of these three levels of influence because presidential unilateral powers would not exist without congressional acquiescence.

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 15

INDIVIDUAL At the individual members-of-Congress level, Deering sees 535 individuals each elected from his or her own constituency. Members, by virtue of their election, control substantial resources and help shape their own political destiny. They usually behave as rational, goal-oriented people, motivated by reelection, the enhancement of political power, and the achievement of certain ideological and policy goals. It is at this level that leadership, whether from party or committee leaders or from rank-and-file members, is important in determining patterns of policymaking with the president. Policy “outputs” at the individual level include casework and constituent service, pork-barrel projects, and the creation of a personal political base. Decentralization in Congress since the 1970s has encouraged individualism. Much of the earlier analyses of presidents are also at the individual president level, including the huge array of presidential autobiographies and biographies by historians, journalists, and some political scientists. Even those choosing a more analytical bent to studying the presidency tended to focus on the individual, although researchers sometimes compared presidents. It is often said that because presidents of the same era have similar powers, then the individuals must matter greatly because of the substantial variation in exercise and success of presidential actions. Because the presidency is often called a unitary office, the individual should matter more than in the study of Congress, where individual roles may be important but are often harder to stake out within larger institutional arrangements. Clearly, individual presidents have diverse preferences and resources and exercise their formal and informal powers differently, some of which may also be related to historical opportunities and precedents. Presidents and Congress have different preferences, particularly under divided government. Researchers often examine political party differences and some use ideology as a more refined measure of preferences. Another frequently used personal measure is the extent to which presidents can garner public support (popular prestige in Neustadt’s terminology). Most scholars use some resource indicator of the presidents’ popular approval rating. Presidents presumably go public to persuade Congress and others (Kernell 1986; Neustadt 1960). Speechmaking and public messages may reflect this important activity (Shull and Shaw 1999). Finally, presidential proposals to Congress may be important devices to advance policy preferences (Howell 2003). Thus, measures of preferences and resources are potential personal influences on presidential actions.

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INSTITUTIONAL A second level of influence used by Deering focuses on Congress as an institution: committees, subcommittees, caucuses, leadership organizations, and the formal and informal rules that produce collective action (or inaction). The individual behaviors of members help shape the institution, determining how power and resources are distributed, and how rules and procedures for doing business are developed. At the same time, Congress as an institution is more than the mere sum of its parts. Since Congress has developed its own traditions and identity over two centuries, congressional institutions constrain individual members and help shape their behavior (Davidson 1969; Matthews 1960). Policy outputs at this level are most familiar: legislation in the form of public or private bills, resolutions, confirmation of nominees, committee reports, as well as codes of ethics and other norms. Institutional arrangements are critical in determining the congressional role in policymaking. For example, institutions that strengthen rank-and-file members and weaken leaders may enhance reelection chances and the delivery of benefits to constituents to the detriment of timely, decisive action. Conversely, other rules and procedures may empower congressional leaders, streamline decision making, and emphasize collective outputs rather than individual action. After the creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, researchers also began to argue that the presidential office was larger than one person and, therefore, institutional or presidency approaches were deemed important to consider. The neo-institutional literature has influenced this level of analysis in the study of both Congress and the presidency. Such authors as Pika (1981–82) and Moe (1985) writing in the 1980s argued that the president is one person but the presidency in the modern era consists of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individuals with whom presidents must interact to be effective. The functions of the modern president are too vast to think that a single individual influences all of them. Institutional arrangements could be particularly important in prerogative powers, which constitute policy adoption (or creating outputs) separate from legislation. Presidents’ party margin and their legislative success, staffing arrangements, and institutional capacity are important at the institutional level of influence. Although alternative powers presumably influence only the executive branch, they are often much broader in scope (Mayer 2001, 4). They may also have direct institutional contexts in that they may reorganize government. For example, Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order moving the Bureau of the Budget (now the OMB) from the Department of the Treasury to the Executive Office of the President. In addition, many orders have changed

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 17

the number of employees in particular organizations, and size is an important element in this research. As a final example, with executive order #12291, Reagan succeeded in limiting the rules that executive agencies could write. After being rebuffed by Congress, George W. Bush issued a series of orders as part of his faith-based initiative, directing agencies to treat religious and secular organizations equally in federal grants and contracts. All in all, institutional arrangements should matter for each of the four prerogative powers.

ENVIRONMENT The third level of influence looks at Congress as part of the larger political system, one crucial cog in the constitutional framework of government. This level includes systemic factors that help determine patterns of policymaking with the president. Congress responds to the international arena, to the state of the national economy, to the actions of the president and courts, and to events and changes in American society and the world. How Congress and presidents interact to make policy and why it matters are largely influenced by their internal and external environments. I prefer this term to system, because it implies that factors apart from individuals and institutions are critical elements. Obviously, some prerogative powers, such as commitment of troops, should be more heavily influenced by external conditions. Even more than Congress, presidents operate within the larger political system or environmental context where economic conditions, for example, consume much of their time and efforts. Easton (1965) has shown us that authoritative decision makers rarely act in isolation but rather their decisions are the product of inputs, demands, and supports from other institutions. Additionally, he points out that the broader environment within (for example, unemployment) and outside the nation (for example, trade) affects the decisions and outputs that are made in any political system. Although the U.S. president may seem powerful, he actually ranks only about average in formal powers compared to chief executives in other industrialized democracies (A. King 1993). However, informal or implied powers are also important, and it is from these powers that presidential prerogatives have largely developed.

MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE APPROACH The lines between individual, institutional, and environmental influences are often blurred. Legislators and presidents want to be reelected, help constituents, make good policy, exert strong leadership, and sometimes support or oppose the other branch, but these goals are often incompatible. For

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example, spending money on pork-barrel projects in the district promotes reelection but conflicts with the broader policy objective of keeping taxes low and reducing the budget deficit. Congressional behavior may appear paradoxical because the legislative process seeks various goals and operates under complex internal rules and external constraints. Presidents may be perceived as strong or weak individual leaders but they influence and are influenced by institutional arrangements. In addition, some presidents simply have bad luck (like a recession) or perhaps experience a crisis situation that inspires patriotism, such as after the terrorist attack on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. George W. Bush was not perceived as accomplishing much as president during his first months in office but exhibited leadership after 9/11 that rekindled his political support and influence. Recognizing factors at each level of influence is key to understanding legislative-executive relations, presidential exercise of prerogative powers, and the overall governing capacity of the political system. The personal or individual president approach fails to recognize that changes in organizations may facilitate comparison of similarities across presidents (Edwards, Kessel, and Rockman 1993). At the same time, personal factors are important and should be considered even in research that is largely institutionally based. As with studying Congress, no single approach to the presidency is right for all analyses. Perhaps even more important in presidency research is to get away from the problem of having too few cases to analyze empirically. Therefore, scholars often have turned to decisions or years rather than presidents as the units of analysis (G. King 1993). But the appropriate unit of analysis depends upon the research question examined. Greenstein (2000) argues that four factors determine the personal impact of presidents: ability to structure the environment, ability to mobilize resources, personal strengths, and situational ambiguity. Hager and Sullivan (1994) find that institutional factors are most important but that personal factors also matter. While presidents have personal and institutional goals, more than any other official in U.S. government, they must operate in the broader environmental context. Thus, all three levels are important in an analysis of prerogative power. Even champions of institutionalization like Ragsdale and Theis (1997, 1283) argue that “institutionalization results from the interplay between individuals’ interests within the organization and the environment.” Jones (2002) too argues for the inclusion of both. Also, policy area, political time, and the economy are important environmental factors. Thus, none of these three levels discussed can be considered in isolation. Rather, we need a mul-

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 19

tiple perspective approach that includes personal (individual), institutional, and environmental (system) elements to understand presidential prerogative powers. Shull and Shaw (1999) observe that all three elements are usually necessary to explain presidential-congressional interactions. Accordingly, variables representing multiple levels of influence along with appropriate controls are included in a comprehensive theory of presidential discretionary powers. Ultimately I chose just two variables from each of the three levels of influence and examine them across fifty-two years, which is the unit of analysis in this research. These six variables appear in table 1.1 along with the four controls and dependent variables (or prerogative powers) used in this study. Greater rationale for the independent variables selected appears in chapters 2–3 and in the appendix where I discuss excluded variables. The multiple perspective model discussed above and the systems/process model considered next are important bridges into how presidents adopt alternative public policy.

Table 1.1. Variables in the Analysis Dependent Variables

Budget Agreement Executive Orders Executive Agreements Uses of Force Independent Variables

Personal Presidential Ideology Presidential Popular Approval Institutional Legislative Success Size of the Executive Office of the President Environmental Trade Balance Unemployment Control Variables

Pre/Post Reform Period Presidential Party Year in Presidential Term Individual Presidents

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Figure 1.1. Interrelationship of Political System and Policy Process

SYSTEM/PROCESS Policy adoption reveals the overlap of two important theories in political science. The first is systems theory, which is certainly among the most comprehensive frameworks in the discipline of political science. Systems theory is a model focusing on decision making as being derived from a variety of inputs, which leads to outputs and outcomes and, perhaps most important of all, feedback through subsequent inputs. Inputs refer to demands and supports into the system often coming from nongovernmental actors such as interest groups. Outputs refer to the products of government and are often equated with policy adoption. Outcomes refer to the consequences of government policies. In arguing for continuity in policymaking, Easton (1965) and his proponents show that most decision making is gradual and multifaceted. Systems theory also relates to models of the policymaking process, both of which suggest dynamic decision making (Shull 1999). Figure 1.1 shows the overlay of systems elements and stages in the process (typically, agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and impact). Both models hypothesize a temporal dimension to policymaking but also argue that the process is continuous and never ending. Both encompass roles for nongovernmental actors as well as potential influences broader than government. The president is often thought to have major roles in agenda setting and formulation (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Light 1999; Shull 1999). Cameron’s (2002) important study of veto bargaining shows how presidents can immerse themselves earlier in the process, such as in policy formulation.

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 21

Although the role for Congress is deemed greater in policy adoption (outputs), the exercise of alternative powers, especially when unchallenged by Congress, provides presidents an extensive role in policy adoption as well.

WHAT CONTROLS ARE IMPORTANT? Consciously or not, much of the existing literature offers a policy content or issue area explanation of differences in presidential-congressional powers and relations. Presidential discretionary powers cannot be understood apart from relations with Congress. Most authors view the president as more important in foreign policy and Congress as more influential in domestic policymaking.8 Thus, part of the disagreement about relative influence is attributable to policy area differences that constrain the behavior of both branches. A respected body of literature adheres to the notion that the president “proposes” and Congress simply, rather automatically “disposes.”9 If this early assertion is true, then the foreign policy role of Congress obviously is very different from its substantial power and discretion in domestic policymaking. In addition, institutional relations and presidential alternative actions have been shown to vary by important time periods, and this research incorporates behavior differences by certain cycles of time as well as using time series analysis. A final control used in this volume is for major or significant alternative actions.

SUBSTANTIVE POLICY AREAS The policy area approach is based upon the theory that policy content “structure[s] the interests involved and help[s] determine the political arenas in which decisions are contested or made” (Spitzer 1983, xiv). As a result, variations in the content of policies under consideration produce variations in the roles and behaviors of actors. Scholars have suggested that differences in policy content can be substantive (Clausen 1973; Kessel 1974; King and Ragsdale 1988) or functional in nature (Edelman 1974; Froman 1968; Lowi 1964; Salisbury and Heinz 1970). I incorporate a well-known substantive typology in this research, the two presidencies thesis. Numerous reasons have been offered for why presidents appear to dominate foreign but not domestic policy (Fisher 1972; Shull 1979). Congress has constitutional powers, but it operates at a clear disadvantage in foreign policy decision making. Writers argue that its diverse and fragmented character makes Congress ill-suited to initiate most foreign policy, often relegating it to reaction rather than initiation (Destler 1974, 85; Donovan 1970; Hargrove

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1974, 155). Thus, Congress can exercise negative sanctions by denying support for the president’s proposals, but it cannot force him to accept a formal alternative (Hilsman 1968). This view of presidential dominance provides little opportunity for Congress to initiate foreign policy. Indeed, of the twenty-two foreign policy measures Robinson studied, Congress initiated only three, and had an influence greater than the president on only six (1967, 65). Thus, the 1960s writers viewed presidents as having a relatively free hand in foreign policy compared to domestic policy. Wildavsky ([1966] 1991) maintained that presidential influence with Congress differs so much in foreign and domestic policy that there are, in effect, two presidencies. During the past forty years, this thesis has been subject to numerous theoretical and empirical arguments and interpretations. The literature developed to such an extent that an entire collection of research on the two presidencies appeared (Shull 1991). Researchers after Wildavsky continued to find differences between domestic and foreign policy in presidential influence over Congress, but generally not the wide diversity Wildavsky observed (LeLoup and Shull [1979] 1991; Sperlich 1975). If the president has increased his powers somewhat in domestic policy, he has perhaps lost some of his authority vis-à-vis Congress in the realm of foreign policy. Here the thesis is used to examine at least some of these prerogative powers since it has been argued by scholars (Lindsay and Steger 1993; Shull 1991; 1994) that the two presidencies thesis needs to be studied in executive or nonlegislative relations to ascertain its full applicability to policymaking. Issues may condition presidents to use unilateral power differentially, which may be explained by individual, institutional, and environmental factors. Although some have challenged the existence of the two presidencies (Bond et al. 2000), others reveal its persistence in presidential-congressional relations. Shull and Shaw (1999) found domestic-foreign distinctions on three of four presidential-congressional interactions. Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) observe that Congress is much more likely to delegate authority to presidents in foreign than in domestic policy. Canes-Wrone et al. argue that Wildavsky “got it right the first time” (1999, 2). They contend that presidents have informational and institutional advantages in foreign policy that are much greater than they possess in the domestic sphere. Like Shull and Shaw, Canes-Wrone et al. find that presidents do much better in defense than nondefense budgeting and (similar to Shull 1997, chap. 7) also examine executive orders by policy area. Rudalevige (2002) finds important two presidencies effects in his examination of the role of centralization in presidential success in Congress.

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 23

USING POLITICAL TIME The notion of political time may also be useful in understanding presidential prerogative powers. In a democracy like the United States, policymaking occurs within a complex internal and external environment. At certain junctures, the political environment is conducive to dramatic policy change, such as the periods following the elections of presidents Roosevelt, Johnson, and Reagan. Some scholars have attempted to discern broader patterns in public expectations for policy leadership. Barber (1980), Schlesinger Jr. (1986), and Sundquist (1981) all suggest that American history unfolds in cycles. Schlesinger and Barber argue that public expectations shift from demands for dramatic departures from the past, to a period of consolidation, to a period of reaction and retrenchment. Sundquist emphasizes the existence of particular cycles in presidential-congressional relations. The greater the public desire for consolidation, the greater will be the influence of Congress and the more constraints the president will encounter. It would be easy to assert that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were characterized by congressional dominance and the twentieth century by presidential dominance. Indeed, that is what Sundquist (1981, 21–36) largely does but calls the early period of American history (1789–1860) the era of competition, 1861–1900 the period of congressional ascendancy and, since 1901, the presidential dominance era. Jones has a very different view, admitting that the presidency dominated policymaking in the early portion of the twentieth century but seeing very little presidential dominance subsequently (1995, 11). Indeed, except for brief periods early in the Johnson and Reagan administrations, Jones believes the post–World War II era is quite balanced, sometimes cooperative but at other times adversarial. He believes adversity maintains congressional influence (if not dominance). Skowronek (1997) views political time differently by tying it in with the notion of presidential leadership. For Skowronek, political time refers to the rise and fall of “regimes,” that are led by strong presidents who emerge as leaders after major election victories as reconstructionists. Obviously, most presidents fail to completely crush their election opponents and restructure the politics of the day. Skowronek sees Andrew Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt as playing such political roles in breaking with the past but finds that most other presidents had fewer lasting influences. Indeed, he reveals how subsequent presidents, even from the same party, cannot attain the promise of these initiators but are mere articulators. He then presents disjunctive presidents, such as Franklin Pierce and Jimmy Carter, who fail to provide clear

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courses of action in American politics, leading to subsequent reconstructions by the opposite party.10 Skowronek’s main contribution is in showing the necessity of considering individual presidents in a temporal dimension within the larger political system. Various groupings of years have been shown by scholars to have theoretical and empirical utility. Although some authors refer to long eras in institutional competition (Lewis and Strine 1996), this book explores one mid-range (pre/post reform) and two short-range (year in term and individual president) cycles of such relations for our extensive fifty-two-year time period (1949–2000). Dividing these data evenly by pre- (1949–74) and post(1975–2000) reform should reveal major differences in institutional assertiveness, primarily because Congress passed legislation to reassert its own leadership over these presidential prerogatives in the 1970s. Previous notions of presidential dominance (Neustadt 1960; Schlesinger 1973) were subsequently challenged by legislative assertiveness and reform in the early 1970s (Barger 1984; Crovitz and Rabkin 1989; LeLoup and Shull 2003, chap. 2). Thus, my mid-range cycle of pre/post reform Congress should matter for exercise of presidential discretionary powers. One element of political time seems largely decade changes. Scholars have discussed the changing roles of Congress during the 1950s, 1970s, and 1990s. During the 1950s, Eisenhower frequently obtained his greatest legislative support from Democrats, particularly through strong leadership (Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader of the Senate Lyndon Johnson; Davidson 1969; Ripley 1969). Chapter 8 will assess the various reforms made by Congress to limit presidential prerogative power. The 1990s showed Republican control return to the House after a forty-year hiatus but also efforts to strengthen party leadership and more centralized control over that body. During other decades (for example, 1960s and 1980s), presidential leadership seems more dominant. Presidential party is frequently examined as a surrogate for ideology or preferences. However, it is a static variable and I wanted a more dynamic one in the personal level of influence, so I incorporated presidential ideology, which may change annually. Still, party is important and used as a separate control for political time since it exists for short periods (for example, four years for Carter) or long periods (for example, up to twelve years for Reagan and George H. W. Bush). Party and ideology are too highly correlated to use in the same model, so that is my rationale for including both but separately. On a short-term basis, the products of policy adoption frequently are measured according to a two-year Congress or a four- or more-year presi-

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 25

dency. However, scholars have observed other cycles of government activities, frequently related to particular year in presidential term of office (Kessel 1984; Light 1999; Nathan 1983; Neustadt 1960; Pfiffner 1996b; Shull 1983; 1997; Shull and Gleiber 1995). Selected years in the presidential terms, while sometimes containing few cases, may also be important to behavior. Probably the honeymoon year is frequently different from other years (Kessel 1984; Light 1999; Shull 1983; 1997). Scholars have shown the importance for presidents to “hit the ground running” but also that first years differ from reelection years (Kessel 1984; Pfiffner 1996b; Shull 1999). Hence, important short-term cycles may be reflected in groupings of such years (first, last, and reelection) as well as individual presidencies (Truman through Clinton) in political time. Individual presidents also have been shown to vary in their legislative relations (Beck 1982; Shull 1997; Shull and Gleiber 1995) and in assertiveness over time. They should also vary even more in their use of discretionary prerogative power and thus the individuals should matter. Chapter 2 reveals some of the expected differences by presidents in their exercise of unilateral power. In a sense, controlling for presidents also provides a control for political time since presidents serve chronological terms ranging from two and one half years (Ford) to eight years (Eisenhower, Reagan, and Clinton).

IMPORTANT ACTIONS For three of the prerogative powers (except for budget agreement), I am able to separate out significant from all actions. Use of major prerogative actions does not mean that I consider the other actions trivial; indeed, that term is unlikely to characterize uses of force. Still, these designations by other scholars should provide useful comparisons between all and important prerogative actions. Of course, examining only a subset will reduce the number of observations for empirical testing but this is not believed to be much of a problem, and the advantages of such a comparison should outweigh this disadvantage. My multiple perspective approach (containing three levels of influence) as well as controls for policy area, political time, and importance of actions should help us understand presidential discretionary powers during this extended time period of fifty-two years. All three controls may provide valuable explanatory power on the four prerogative powers (budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and uses of force) beyond inclusion of theoretical factors in the three-level scheme.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The final section of the chapter begins by laying out the broad parameters of the research. It reiterates the relevance of both structural and environmental conditions for the exercise of presidential unilateral powers. Structural variables encompass personal resources and preferences as well as broader institutional arrangements. Environmental conditions also include resources and constraints, both within individuals and institutions as well as exogenous elements to either, but which are integral to the political system. All three levels are argued to be important in understanding presidential exercise of prerogative powers. In the concluding section I describe what I consider to be the five major contributions of the study.

A THREE-LEVEL ANALYSIS The common starting point for studies of presidential-congressional relations is the separation of powers—the division of executive, legislative, and judicial branches in the Constitution. Yet the phrase “separation of powers” is misleading. The Constitution intermingled powers among three branches of the national government and the states, thereby overlapping responsibility for governing. It is more accurate to think of separation of powers, as Neustadt has characterized it, as “separated institutions sharing powers” (1960, 26). But separated does not mean independent. I argued earlier (LeLoup and Shull 2003; Shull 1997) that policy adoption requires substantial cooperation. However, this book contends that change in public policy can occur even without ultimate agreement between the “first two” branches. The Constitution also proscribes the structure of government, which plays an important role in institutional capacity. The Founders’ decision to share power through checks and balances was designed to prevent tyranny by blocking the accumulation of power by any one branch. This was accomplished by placing institutions in conflict and competition with one another. James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, described it in the Federalist #51 as a system in which “ambition must be made to counter ambition.” As the scope of government expanded, and the institutional capacity of both the executive and legislative increased, separation of powers sometimes made governing more difficult. Accordingly, like executives elsewhere (Carey and Shugart 1998), presidents have chosen to exercise extensive prerogative powers. Contentiousness due to frequently divided government has exacerbated institutional conflict in recent years (Edwards,

UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES 27

Barrett, and Peake 1997; Shull and Shaw 1999; Thurber 1996). Such conflict seems largely to have worked to the president’s advantage.

CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH Policy by Other Means enhances the theoretical and empirical development of the existing literature in several ways. First, I seek to understand the multifaceted nature of presidential exercise of unilateral actions and integrate them into broader theories of presidential power. The analysis encompasses four discretionary actions presidents use as they adopt public policy in line with their preferences and resources. Although limited prior research has examined each of these activities individually, no one has examined them together, as related phenomena. Comparing them and using trend analysis will improve our understanding of such relationships over the extended fiftytwo-year period of this analysis. I am convinced that the legislative success that presidents obtain, while important, does not reflect the total explanation of such actions. In this context, I seek a better understanding of whether and how the four presidential discretionary actions are influenced and related. Second, my broad model encompasses three levels of explanatory factors containing six diverse variables. These factors (individual, institutional, and environmental) are compared for their relative explanatory power on each of the four presidential actions. Intuitively, individual variables should exert more influence than they do for presidential-congressional relations because presidents (except for budget agreement) have almost total discretion in exercising prerogative power. Components from all three levels should differentially influence the four discretionary actions. External considerations, such as the state of the economy, are seldom incorporated in models seeking to explain presidential behavior and I include several. My multiple perspective approach is related to other theories of presidential power. Third, it is important to study whether policy areas help us understand presidential discretion in exercising prerogatives. I expect to observe differences between foreign and domestic policy across the unilateral actions, thereby confirming the two presidencies as a valid typology of policy content. Issue areas may indeed help explain the politics and, perhaps, even the process of policymaking (as envisioned by Lowi 1964; Ranney 1968). Also considered is whether budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and troop commitments are related at all in the process of policy adoption. This book will strive to observe the theoretical and empirical util-

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ity of policymaking by policy area as definitively as possible through multivariate analysis in several venues. Fourth, apart from controlling for policy areas, Policy by Other Means also groups these government activities by political time: overall and by trend, dichotomized by early (pre) and late (post) reform eras, by presidential party, by selected year in presidents’ term of office, and by presidents separately (from Truman through Clinton). Research has suggested that each of these time components have explanatory power (Fiorina 1996; Gibson 1995; Kessel 1984; Lewis and Strine 1996; Light 1999; Mayhew 1992; Neustadt 1980; Shull 1983; 1997). Examining the presidents individually (and also chronologically) offers a temporal component to the research as well. Yet, we will see that time can be treated theoretically as well as simply empirically. A final element is a control for major actions among these four discretionary arenas. I cover a lot of ground in Policy by Other Means, but am also convinced that complexity is the nature of presidential prerogative powers. Such actions cannot be represented by a single action as has occurred heretofore. Still, because the four actions are discretionary and all tap policy adoption, I expect them to be related. The study also offers a long time-series of data for use by scholars of presidential actions alternative to legislation. Present research frequently suffers from theory and data limitations that are not always stated or recognized. None of the four discretionary actions are fully representative by themselves but, by comparing them using a common explanatory framework, theory building on presidential prerogative power is enhanced. Assessing several components of discretionary policy adoption, comparing the influence of three levels, and controlling for policy areas, political time, and significance of actions provide useful contributions toward understanding the all-important uses of presidential prerogative powers.

2 EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

Some might wonder why a book about the exercise of presidential prerogatives discusses Congress so extensively. The answer is really quite simple. At least three of the powers examined are, in whole or in part, grants of authority by the Constitution to Congress rather than to presidents. Executive orders are not mentioned at all but were among the first uses of discretionary powers by presidents as alternatives to legislation. The Senate must approve all treaties but the executive agreements alternative does not appear in the Constitution. Presidents had no role in budgeting in the Constitution since all powers of the purse were given to Congress. Congress itself delegated budget powers to presidents early in the twentieth century. The commitment of troops might seem the exception since the Constitution makes the president the commander in chief of the armed forces while giving Congress the power to declare war. But the United States had no permanent military establishment during most of the nation’s history so the commander-in-chief role was not considered very important until the post–World War II era (Robinson 1987, 133–35). It is evident that some of the above four alternative powers have more of a constitutional basis than others. Nevertheless, presidents often make decisions in a highly charged political atmosphere. This is evident by the fact that most research on presidential decision making focuses on crises, usually through the analysis of discrete actions (see, for example, Allison 1971).1 However, crisis decisions often encompass many unique situations while generalizable (and predictable) patterns of behavior may be more observable in the routine decisions that presidents must also make. Yet scholars have seemingly found routine actions uninteresting, particularly in comparison to those made during international military crises. Presidents’ alternative deci-

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sions encompass both important and routine matters. Some have decried the limited research on more routine decision making and few propositions or general theories guide empirical research on discretionary presidential actions (Edwards and Wayne 1983). We simply do not know much about routine decision making. The four alternative powers examined in this book might seem important but considerable evidence exists that, even with committing troops, many presidential prerogative actions constitute relatively routine policy adoption (Canes-Wrone et al. 1999; Caruson 2002; Gomez and Shull 1997). Of course, others are major, perhaps even momentous in their importance to relations among institutions and for the American political system. An example is the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 by President Thomas Jefferson from Emperor Napoleon of France. Yet neither the courts nor Congress have shown much propensity to deny presidents’ discretionary authority (Hinckley 1994; Howell 2003). Presidents seldom are challenged in their exercise of prerogative actions, which have the same effect as legislative adoption. A reason for legislative acquiescence is that individual members treasure the decentralized nature of Congress, which gives them individual clout and furthers their goals of group and constituent policymaking. Legislators’ primary goal of reelection (Mayhew 1974) is best preserved by maintaining their autonomy and perhaps by not encouraging Congress as a whole to challenge presidents too much. However, a centralized presidency has structural advantages in the institutional power struggle with a decentralized Congress (Moe and Wilson 1994, 20–21). The primary purpose of this chapter is laying out the theoretical basis for the book. First, I discuss the four prerogative powers that serve as the dependent variables of the study. I suggest that they are quite different from one another and thus need fuller comparison. The next section introduces the three levels of the multiple perspective approach. I review the literature on the importance of numerous explanatory variables and tie the four alternative actions into broader theories of presidential power. I discuss several rival theories and explain why I chose the model used. The final major section discusses preliminary expectations for each prerogative action. Last, I wrap up the chapter with a summary of the variables and conclusions about the elements selected for empirical testing.

FOUR ALTERNATIVE POWERS The year 1949 is a good time to begin a study of presidential prerogative powers because Franklin Roosevelt had set the stage for presidential assertive-

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ness in alternative adoption. Subsequent presidents beyond Roosevelt also asserted their policy preferences. While Neustadt (1960) argued that presidents must persuade because they cannot command, the use of discretionary powers largely refutes that assumption (Howell 2003). Still, presidents must weigh the costs and benefits of such actions and thus will behave strategically (Mayer 2001; Moe and Howell 1999). It is possible that the exercise of unilateral powers could be differently scrutinized by Congress, which makes their comparative examination important. One study compares several such actions historically and legally (Cooper 2002) but includes only executive orders among the four examined here: budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and committing troops. A multiple perspective approach, consisting of three levels of influence and several controls, is used to examine these four presidential discretionary activities. Such an approach provides a more comprehensive explanation than has occurred before.

BUDGET AGREEMENT Budgeting, at least since the 1920s, is a long-standing element of presidentialcongressional relations. The dominant view in traditional research on budgeting is that, unlike the veto, budgeting usually is not very controversial between Congress and the president. This notion relates to Wildavsky’s (1964) assertion of incrementalism, or small change from prior decisions. However, a number of writers questioned the theory of incrementalism before Wildavsky (1988) himself recanted it. Some scholars argue that the concept is ambiguous; that an incremental process does not necessarily produce an incremental result (Bailey and O’Connor 1975; Berry 1990). LeLoup (1980) contends that the concept limits understanding the changes in the budgeting process. Schulman (1975) and others show that budgets of certain agencies, like early in the NASA space program, may not exhibit incremental tendencies at all. Authors also disagree over the magnitude of incrementalism, using figures ranging from 5 percent to 20 percent change in congressional appropriations from presidential budget requests (Shull and Franklin 1978). Individual presidents see the budget process differently and exhibit varying degrees of involvement. LeLoup (1980, 144–46) shows that on the one hand Gerald Ford, who most would consider a nonassertive president, was actually a budget “enthusiast,” as was Harry Truman. Both presidents brought an interest in the topic with them from their years in Congress. On the other hand, LeLoup calls Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon budget “reluctants.” Since LeLoup’s book, we know that Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton were much more involved in the details of budgeting

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than was the elder George Bush, who expressed his boredom with the topic (Rockman 1991). These differences among individual presidents suggest that examining presidents separately will be a useful control in order to understand budget preferences and activities. Little research has examined budgeting by political time, particularly year in presidential term of office. A notable exception is Pfiffner (1996, 94), who shows the necessity of different budget strategies during the president’s first year. Shull and Shaw (1999) also reveal differences between the honeymoon and the lame-duck years. They also find popular approval from the personal level and size of government from the environment as important for overall budget agreement (1999, 128). They observe that institutional variables contribute little to explaining this important action. However, they also find the economic situation important for domestic budget agreement. Overall, defense budgeting is better explained than nondefense budgeting by their somewhat similar three-level analysis to the three levels of influence used here. Apart from individual presidents, divided government may increase conflict over the allocation of resources (Brady and Volden 1998; Cox et al. 1993). However, Kettl (1992) acknowledges that unified government does not necessarily solve budgeting problems. In this research I use presidential popular approval and presidential ideology as personal level variables. These factors should have less influence on budget agreement than the other two levels because the president is initiating budgets while Congress responds to them. Although budget agreement is not a unilateral power, Congress has delegated and even deferred much decision making to presidents. However, because presidents and Congress both must act, I expect that legislative factors, such as legislative success, will be more important here than for other purely prerogative powers. We shall see whether budgeting has certainly developed into an institutional power struggle where the agenda has moved more toward presidential control and shifted somewhat away from Congress (Kettl 1992, chap. 6). Thus, institutional conditions are likely more important than personal ones and greater than for the other prerogative actions. Finally, budget agreement should be influenced by the economy. The unemployment rate and trade likely have much to do with government capacity to engage in new funding initiatives, and when economic conditions are particularly poor, to funding even existing programs at current levels. Some writers would like to examine the budget from an economic rather than political orientation. These authors often seek rational models of decision making (ranging from PPBS to MBO to ZBB) but others doubt reforms would affect this budget process (Ippolito 1978, 196–98; Kramer 1979,

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chaps. 3–5).2 However, most political scientists argue that budgeting is inherently political and politics is impossible to remove from the process (Kettl 1992, chap. 3; Wildavsky 1988, chap. 6). Thus, studying budget agreement, defined as the proportion of presidential requests that are appropriated by Congress, should provide insight into whether increased presidential independence has occurred in budget policy adoption.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS Executive orders have been around since the nation’s beginning. Gomez and Shull (1995; 1997) are among the first to conduct quantitative studies of executive order issuance. They find both personal and institutional aspects helpful in examining presidential decision making. They also doubt that such decisions are made from a single environmental perspective. Constraints on presidential action appear from other authoritative decision makers who share policymaking functions with presidents. Political and institutional constraints come from all branches of government and throughout the political system. The legislative institutions, including divided government and party margin in Congress, influence presidential decision making. Clinton circumvented a Republican Congress by issuing numerous orders that reshaped policy on the environment, the workplace, and in patient privacy. An interesting question arises over the purpose of executive orders and presidents’ motivations, which probably vary considerably. Orders may be issued in response to nonsupport for presidents’ policy preferences in Congress, and/or as an alternative form of policy adoption (Nathan 1983; Peterson 1990, 87). Such orders are designed to take new policy directions and may be fairly dramatic, resulting from a highly energized, controversial legislative environment. Others seem designed more to implement laws passed by Congress that meet the president’s favor.3 Examples include several Clinton orders early in 1993 to move legislation quickly by a Democratic Congress that had been stymied by Republican presidents for twelve years. Thus, even when highly supported in Congress, presidents may issue orders to carry out specific rules for agencies to follow, which are necessary since lawmaking itself tends to be highly general (Kerwin 2003). These latter orders would be less policy-oriented, less controversial, and more routine in scope, resulting largely from the executive environment. Gleiber and Shull (1992, 447–48) have discussed this dual nature of executive orders. A third potential motivation may also exist. In a desire to change the role or growth of government, presidents may issue orders concerning reorganization or other routine administrative matters. These executive orders could

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have varied functions or purposes and might be less substantive and controversial than those falling within substantive policy areas (Gomez and Shull 1997; Ragsdale and Theis 1997). Obviously, these three motivations (adoption, implementation, administration) must be viewed as ideal types, given that goals behind executive order issuance are probably mixed. For example, orders that implement policy may also have administrative reorganization functions. Thus, executive orders likely have varied motivations, but these three designations may have conceptual utility. This preliminary effort does not categorize executive orders according to these perceived motivations. Such an effort would probably require a detailed content analysis of an average of about sixty numbered executive orders issued annually. However, the preliminary findings in this book based upon related notions may reveal whether such a future enterprise, however time-consuming, would be worthwhile. Presidential goals for alternative action could be more implementation or administration than adoption when Congress supports their policy preferences (as in the previous Clinton example). However, legislative success in the institutional level likely is important and probably encourages presidents to adopt alternative policy. Also, in the more recent era of partisan or ideological conflict with Congress, stronger ideological and policy motivations for presidents’ decisions may exist. The literature on executive orders has grown dramatically in the last several years, and scholars have used sophisticated models to predict the use of this prerogative power. Krause and Cohen (1997) find that legislative success and party margin are related to issuance. They also find more orders during difficult economic times. Others find several influences, such as an association with popular approval (Gleiber and Shull 1992; Mayer 2001, 1999), but Mayer and Price (2002) find the opposite for significant orders. Also, Democratic presidents appear to issue more orders (Gomez and Shull 1997; Mayer 1999, 462). Although Krause and Cohen (1997) show no pattern across presidential term, Mayer (1999) and Shull (1997) show differences by president and year in office. These factors should all influence executive order issuance. In addition, I control for the annual number of major orders and compare the results to all orders. All in all, diverse influences appear to exist for executive orders. Resources like popular approval and legislative success are likely more important than preferences such as presidential ideology. However, I believe that employees in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) could be a factor in identifying options for presidents (either for accepting legislation or developing alternative policy). I also hypothesize that economic factors will relate to executive order issuance, especially when the economy is poor and/or

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when the president perceives that Congress is not responding to economic conditions in a timely enough fashion.4

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS As mentioned in chapter 1, executive agreements are a very neglected topic, even after the passage of the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, which required their transmittal to the Senate. In the final chapter we will see that they are almost never examined by that body, but for now I will discuss some of the findings of the limited research available. As with executive orders, agreements are issued for both major and minor reasons. Executive agreements are now more often used for important issues than were previous agreements (Margolis 1986, 6–7). Even the Korean War was begun and ended through this device. As most scholars are aware, executive agreements have largely supplanted treaties and on average since 1940 have accounted for about 94 percent of all international agreements (counting both protocols and conventions). Put slightly differently, the ratio of treaties to executive agreements was 3:1 in the early years of our country but less than 1:15 more recently. Important book-length studies of executive agreements have appeared (Johnson 1984; Margolis 1986). Johnson provides separate chapters on efforts by the Senate to limit them through the Bricker Amendment in 1953 and the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act. Margolis asserts that the Constitution provides no congressional scrutiny of this prerogative power and even since the Case-Zablocki Act there has been little review of such actions, which average about 245 instances per year since 1949. Of course, many executive agreements are not contentious and are made after Congress has called for executive action. As stated in chapter 1, the Department of State claims that almost all executive agreements follow the will of Congress. All in all, Margolis argues that while executive agreements may contribute to secrecy, their frequent numbers would bog down the Senate and inhibit the speed with which they could be made (1986, 97). Caruson (2002) examines executive agreements by issue area and by presidential four-year terms of office from 1981 to 1996. Few differences in issuance occur by administration; however, Clinton issued the fewest executive agreements as a percent of all international agreements (92 percent). Caruson divides agreements into four issue areas by frequency of occurrence. George Bush the elder issued the most in the national security area and Reagan during his second term issued the fewest in the diplomacy area. The two other issue areas, economy-trade and business-science-technology, are less distinguishable among the four presidential administrations. All in

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all her categorizations are not very discriminating since some contain more than 20 percent of agreements each and others fewer than 5 percent each. The few studies examining executive agreements seldom employ quantitative data. Margolis (1986) finds that presidents frequently do use the device when they wish to avoid the Senate. For my extended time period, Democrats controlled the Senate more often than Republicans. So perhaps Margolis’s finding of much greater use by Republican than Democratic presidents stands to reason since the former have less often had a party majority in the Senate (1986, 44–45). Margolis finds party margin in Congress related to executive agreement issuance. He also examines individual presidents and year in term of office and observes a relationship for both. Individual presidents vary considerably and more executive agreements appear in the first year in office and fewer in reelection years (Margolis 1986, 34). Because of the very limited empirical literature on executive agreements (but see Martin 2000), speculation about the importance of particular variables is largely that. Although Martin argues that presidents can evade Congress she finds little support that presidents use them instead of treaties or when they are unsuccessful in Congress. Martin finds more executive agreements during presidents’ first years but has few results for other variables in her or my models. I assert that institutional factors will be more important than personal ones but also that the exogenous environment (consisting of two economic indicators) will be the most important influence.

COMMITTING TROOPS I now move away from largely administrative efforts to decisions that involve committing troops, perhaps more clearly a unilateral power. Obviously, presidents have great autonomy in uses of force. These decisions are often last resorts when diplomacy has failed. DeRouen and Peake (2002, 206) argue that force and nonforce actions (for example, commitment of troops and executive agreements) should all be examined and compared as is done here rather than studied individually and in isolation (see also Cooper 2002). All authors agree that presidents have much discretion in the commitment of troops due to the commander-in-chief role. Clearly uses of force are important instruments of foreign policy. Of course, troops cannot be committed frivolously but do sometimes provide presidents with political cover. Indeed, authors have discussed the public’s tendency to “rally around the flag” when the nation is involved in military crises (James and Oneal 1991; Mueller 1970). Thus, such actions always provide presidents at least temporarily with a political boost at home.

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A large body of literature examines and posits sophisticated analyses of uses of force by presidents. Perhaps the best-known work is by Ostrom and Job in the American Political Science Review (1986). They incorporate a wide variety of explanatory variables in their examination and, similar to this study, list them within three different environments: personal, domestic, and international. Ostrom and Job find that variables from all three environments are necessary for understanding troop commitments. Included is one incorporated here: presidential popular approval. DeRouen and Peake find no relationship between popular approval and uses of force (2002, 204). Ostrom and Job appear to equate overall success with popular approval over the presidents’ term but most authors find little relationship between these two variables (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; Shull and Shaw 1999). Still, the decision to use force is expected to be related to these two variables because presidents see such a legislative resource as enhancing their overall political clout. Most studies find little party difference in presidential uses of force (Morgan and Bickers 1992). In that sense, presidential ideology might offer greater explanatory power. Contrary to Blechman and Kaplan (1978), Ostrom and Job (1986, 556) and James and Oneal (1991) find that domestic influences are more important than international factors in predicting commitment of troops. Unfortunately, I cannot divide uses of force into domestic and foreign as is possible in the other three discretionary actions. However, several of the three level influence variables relate more to domestic (for example, unemployment) than foreign matters (for example, trade balance). In addition, I examine major uses of force as a control for importance (see chapter 3). Another expectation is that presidents are more likely to use force during periods of economic difficulty (Fordham 1998). DeRouen and Peake (2002, 203) find a strong relationship between unemployment and the use of force. Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) use the misery index (inflation plus unemployment) in their analyses and observe a relationship between economic variables and uses of force. Fordham (1998), however, prefers modeling the relationship between party and the economy differently. He thinks it is conditional and argues that Republicans are reluctant to use inflationary devices to reduce unemployment, while Democrats are reluctant to use unemployment efforts to reduce inflation. Thus, as others have found, Democrats are more sensitive to unemployment pressures and Republicans to inflation pressures (Saeki and Shull 2002; 2003). Poor economic conditions have been related to greater uses of force, although their influence is hotly debated (DeRouen and Peake 2002, 203; Fordham 1998, 421).

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As mentioned earlier, several international relations scholars have examined numerous predictors of uses of force and compare national versus international factors. As mentioned, their relative importance is mixed. Bennett and Stam present sophisticated models in their Behavioral Origins of War (2004). They use sixteen different explanations ranging from individual state level characteristics (for example, level of democratization), dyadic level variables (balance of power), and international system level conditions (polarity and power concentration). Only one or two incorporated variables relate in any way to those considered here (for example, trade interdependence and economic cycles), but they are operationalized differently and used for different purposes. Although they compare a wide range of theories they still argue for a broadly encompassing theoretical orientation. Although scholars have observed varied findings, I can state my own expectations in general terms. Personal factors are probably important in presidential uses of force, and research has found an important role for popular approval particularly. Institutional factors likely are much less related and past studies do not seem to think that either variable included here matters much. However, economic conditions likely are influential in such decisions. Again, I expect influences from more than one level in that a single variable likely will prove inadequate for explanation in presidential commitment of troops. Considerable research on the use of force looks at controls for time periods: years in presidential terms and individual presidents. Fordham (1998) includes event related variables, such as the Korean or Vietnam war years or the breakup of the Soviet Union. Some studies find that uses of force are more common during presidential election years (Ostrom and Job 1986; Stoll 1984). However, Meernik and Waterman (1996) dispute these relationships. On a related point, presidents appear to spend more time on domestic policy during their first (honeymoon) year and more time on foreign policy as their term wears on. Thus, the above finding of more uses of force during reelection years has another basis—growing foreign policy experience and increased opportunities for international disputes over presidential terms. Individual presidents and presidential party may also matter and are important controls (Fordham 1998). Ostrom and Job (1986, 560) find that Kennedy was five times more likely to use force than was Truman.

THREE LEVELS OF STUDYING THE OFFICE Studying decision making is often conceptually difficult because researchers need to, but rarely do, tap the varied personal, institutional, and environmental constraints presidents face. Although many decisions might seem solitary,

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presidents rarely act unitarily. An early view of the presidency was Rossiter’s (1956) depiction of the president “wearing many hats.” However, even if one accepts such roles (for example, the president as “chief executive”), presidents seldom act without input and constraint from others. Indeed, a continuing controversy in the literature is whether to view presidents from an individual (Barber 1992; Lowi 1985; Neustadt 1960) or an institutional perspective (Edwards, Kessel, and Rockman 1993; King and Ragsdale 1988; Moe 1985). Thus, a mixed approach seems appropriate in examining say, executive order issuance. Although institutional factors are important in decision making, presidents bring personal characteristics and preferences to the task as well. They may have strong orientations toward activism in policymaking and philosophical views about the proper role of government. Presidents also possess a variety of resources in performing the decision-making task. Neustadt (1960) discusses numerous resources presidents have in policymaking, including persuasion, professional reputation, and public prestige. Subsequent authors have tried to theorize further about these components of power (Cronin 1980, 130; Tatalovich and Daynes 1979; Thomas 1977, 170); others have sought to examine such factors empirically (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; Gleiber and Shull 1992; Kerbel 1991; Shull and Shaw 1999). What has not been considered much are environmental or system factors. Those scholars studying presidential commitment of troops have done the most to include both domestic and international policy elements in explaining this prerogative power. The political system can be both constraining and liberating to presidents. Military and economic crises have long been shown to influence both foreign and domestic politics and policies. Influences outside of government, such as trade, gross domestic product, and the economy increasingly influence decision making by individual nations including the United States. More scholars are including economic factors in studying presidential-congressional relations (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Peterson 1990; Shull and Shaw 1999). Since the three levels of influences included are interrelated, examining relative as well as combined influences of individual, institutional, and environmental elements is important.

INDIVIDUAL (PRESIDENTS) For a long time, research on the presidency focused on the individual incumbent. Many of these studies were biographies and case studies without much theoretical orientation. This situation led the presidency subfield to lag behind others, such as legislative and voting behavior, where greater the-

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oretical and empirical development occurred. Gradually, however, several authors studied particular concepts to examine individual presidents. These analytical studies of the individual presidents often focused on such concepts as greatness, personality, and power. However, even this research was more theoretical than empirical, leading several scholars (Edwards 1981; King 1993) to call for more quantification of research on the presidency. Here I very briefly assess these three concepts regarding individual presidents. Historians, beginning with Arthur Schlesinger in 1948, have been most interested in comparing presidents on some indicators of greatness or accomplishment. Schlesinger’s single criterion was performance in office but some (for example, Bailey 1966; Maranell 1970; Murray and Blessing 1994) have considered that single judgment too limited. Subsequent research tried to make such assessments more scientific but they have all been criticized for subjectivity and for assuming that presidents from different eras can be compared easily. However, studies measuring greatness with multivariate models (for example, Holmes and Elder 1989; Simonton 1987) have found numerous factors related to higher greatness rankings: strong personality, reelection, lack of scandal, and presence of war. Greatness is often equated with, but seems a broader concept than image. Cameron (2002) argues that increasingly polarized politics reduces the chance for greatness. Among contemporary presidents, Truman is considered near great and Nixon a failure with the other presidents during this period only about average. Many criticisms have been made of these studies. Some argue that they are measuring the unmeasurable or that those doing the rankings may be biased (Bailey 1966). It would be easy to dismiss such research as soft and lacking theory, but most of them in fact produce high agreement in their results. For example, Lincoln and Washington are always at the top and Grant and Harding are always near the bottom. So, is there something to such rankings even when they use different criteria and research techniques? In short, they appear to have considerable face validity. However, many of the independent variables used to predict greatness are not manipulable by presidents and may be the result of sheer luck, whether good or bad. Simonton (1987) is of the view that the personal characteristics of presidents are not very good predictors of greatness. Another element of the individual is personality assessment. Here, a long tradition of analyses by political psychologists and political scientists has produced some interesting research. Much of it is case study analysis of single presidents (for example, George and George 1956; Greenstein 1982), while other studies are more ambitious in their comparison of presidents. Hargrove (1974) and Barber (1992) attempt more theoretical and comparative analyses

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based upon a theoretical framework. Hargrove sees three personality types while Barber develops a fourfold typology that he claims predicts “performance in office.” Barber’s primary claim to fame is “predicting” failure in the then popular Nixon due to a personality flaw, but his other categorizations of presidents seems less compelling than the Nixon case to most scholars (Ambrose 1982; Greenstein 1982; Kearns 1976). Barber’s work has been criticized by many as not well grounded in the psychology literature and being selective in the examples provided (George 1974). Recent research (George and George 1998, Greenstein 2000) recognizes theoretical and methodological problems inherent in efforts to apply psychology theory to presidential behavior. Perhaps as a result, there have been few empirical tests verifying categorizations of personality types with presidential decision making (but see Cohen 1980, Ruckman 1995). In relating Barber’s typology to greatness rankings, Pederson (1989) finds a modest relationship. Relatedly, Tulis (1981) observes that our greatest president (Lincoln) suffered from Barber’s least desirable personality type and, thus, the categories are flawed. Despite questions about Barber’s scheme, it has generated much thought about whether personality matters. Thus, it remains an interesting if elusive avenue to study the individual dimension of the presidency. Greenstein (2000) ties personality variables with power and leadership, which I consider next. Surely the single most cited work on the presidency is Neustadt’s Presidential Power (1960), and this concept is more important for my research than personality or greatness. Unlike earlier research that focused primarily on formal or legal power (for example, Corwin 1957) or roles (Rossiter 1956), Neustadt argues that such powers do not reveal the full differences in leadership exercised by presidents. He contends that while formal powers are important, such differences are primarily due to variation in the persuasive abilities of individual presidents. In addition to persuasion, Neustadt argues that popular prestige and professional reputation are important in helping presidents obtain their goals. In this regard, he admired Roosevelt’s leadership abilities more than Eisenhower’s among the contemporary presidents he examined in some detail. In retrospect, Neustadt’s argument seems simple and obvious, but it was an important departure in thinking about the elusiveness of presidential power. Power has received more empirical attention than the other two concepts that I label personal or president-related. Indeed, most researchers of the presidency feel compelled to cite Neustadt and the potential limits of presidential power, which is often equated with leadership. However, because Neustadt did not operationalize the determinants of power, it has been

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left to individual scholars to interpret their meaning. Many have viewed power as achieving some goal, usually presidential success in Congress. However, the predictors of power have also remained elusive. Persuasion is sometimes equated with skill (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1980, 1989) or through such devices as speechmaking (Ragsdale 1998; Shull and Shaw 1999). Popular prestige is almost always measured by the Gallup popular approval measure, despite Neustadt’s criticism that it is a broader concept. Finally, professional reputation refers to the views of the Washington community, and some scholars have chosen to measure this indicator by using newspaper editorials (Gleiber, Shull, and Waligora 1998; Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989). In this study, personal variables (including preferences and resources) largely related to power, are examined as influences on presidential prerogative power.

INSTITUTION (PRESIDENCY) Obviously, considerable institutionalization of the presidency has occurred over time. No longer are presidents reliant upon a clerk or two, whom George Washington paid out of his own pocket. But the roles of presidents expanded greatly over time, particularly in response to the economy or international crises and when earlier staffing arrangements proved inadequate (Hart 1995, 17). As presidents assumed more responsibility, they needed advisors rather than clerks. When President Roosevelt created the Brownlow Commission by executive order, that body subsequently announced that “the president needs help.” Following upon much of the recommendations of the commission, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) was created in 1939. Congress severely limited the original staffing arrangements (Polenberg 1966), but they were expanded in later years. Since the creation of the EOP, the nature of the presidency has become more institutionalized. It has greatly assisted presidents but has also required presidents to become more capable managers than previously. Much presidential time seems devoted to management issues within the executive branch. Until recently, however, relatively little research has focused on institutional aspects of the presidency (but see Ponder 2001; Walcott and Hult 1995; Warshaw 1996). As I suggested in chapter 1, considerable recent scholarly attention has focused on institutional arrangements rather than just on individual presidents. Pika (1981) led one of the earliest efforts at emphasizing the presidency as an institution. His primary argument is that the president performs many institutional roles and these can be examined systematically through interviewing and other techniques. Moe (1985) introduces presidency schol-

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ars to the importance of rational choice explanations of presidential behavior. He has a more optimistic view of presidential leadership powers than does Neustadt, who saw presidents themselves largely as clerks. Moe sees numerous advantages to presidents in the role of chief executive, including, expertise, experience, and information. While individual legislators often have close relationships with particular agencies, Moe contends that Congress as a whole cannot match the institutional advantages of presidents. Additionally, Feldman (1993) states that organization theory approaches are useful in studying the presidency. In their important work The Elusive Executive, King and Ragsdale (1988, chap. 1) argue the need to study the plural rather than singular presidency. They find four components of the plural presidency: program complexity, group diversity, organizational diffusion, and incumbent’s strategies and interests. The fascinating data that they present are largely based on individual presidents, however, and they never fully test the relative contribution of personal versus institutional variables. Ragsdale and Theis (1997) also advance the importance of institutional factors relative to personal factors. They argue persuasively that “institutionalization is obtained when the office attains high levels of four features: autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and coherence” (1997, 1280). They operationalize each of these concepts and find important developments in the institutionalization of the presidency over time. Other “neo-institutional” theories (Cohen 1988; Walcott and Hult 1995) have made this topic a compelling one for presidency scholars. Burke (1992) provides an interesting discussion of the institution level in a book entitled The Institutionalized Presidency. He argues for the superiority of this approach but also discusses the importance of individuals. For example, he suggests that Nixon and Reagan attempted to politicize and centralize the office and staff, while Ford and Carter were less likely to do so. Carter was the only recent president not to begin his administration with a Chief of Staff. The individual and institutional linkage is also important. Moe (1985, 239) also discusses the importance of both elements, arguing that “individuals create institutions but institutions condition individual choices.” Deering (1989) makes a similar argument for feedback and, of course, the systems-process model discussed in chapter 1 suggests that reverse influences are also likely. As “chief executive,” presidents have extensive dealings with many institutions within the executive branch. Size, number of separate organizations, and the general thickening of government (Light 1995) are ways of measuring institutionalization in the executive branch. Over time, the functions of presidential staff members and overall institutions have increased.

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Although presidents prefer loyalists in sensitive positions (Moe and Wilson 1994, 18), some positions and most of the organizations in the EOP carry over across presidential administrations. Many of the positions are created by Congress, and thus presidents are limited in the extent that they can reorganize the Executive Office of the President. Over the years, the White House Office (WHO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have emerged as two of the most important institutional arrangements. The former includes most of each president’s personal staff members, those typically housed in the west wing of the White House. OMB is increasingly important because it must determine whether agency budget and program requests are congruent with the presidents’ preferences. One author presents an interesting analysis of the degree to which presidents’ legislative proposals are centralized within the White House or decentralized in the rest of the executive branch, finding that overcentralization is harmful to legislative success (Rudalevige 2002). Institutional variables tend to be broader than personal variables, but the two concepts probably are related. For example, success in Congress is an institutional resource just as popular approval is in the personal sphere, and both should indicate the degree to which presidents will seek unilateral action. Another institutional resource is the number of employees in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), but unlike presidential success in Congress, it may be somewhat more under presidents’ control. The Executive Office of the President contains many persons (in the OMB for instance) who are actually permanent employees and not directly part of presidential staff. Staff size was greatest under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon and least under Kennedy and Bill Clinton. Some may wonder why I chose presidential success rather than presidential party margin or divided government as institutional variables. I did include all of them in earlier analyses but find them highly related to other independent variables but, more importantly, not contributing much to the explanation of the four prerogative powers. These earlier analyses appear in the appendix for comparison purposes. Ultimately I wanted to use the fewest explanatory variables possible but also found that success in Congress is a better reflection of policy adoption than the two excluded variables.

ENVIRONMENTAL (SYSTEM) As argued by some scholars of the presidency (for example, Peterson 1990; Shull and Shaw 1999), broader environmental factors are important in studying presidential decision making, and are more encompassing than either

EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 45

individual or institutional variables. The environment encompasses many elements both inside and outside government. Economic factors have been shown to relate to presidential-congressional relations but also to some prerogative powers (Fordham 1998; Gomez and Shull 1997; Krause and Cohen 1997; Ostrom and Job 1986). Domestic economic factors such as unemployment should be important, but more foreign policy elements, such as trade, should also be relevant to presidential alternative actions. All three levels of influence reflect some combination of preferences, activities, and resources, and all should be important. It is also clear from the above discussion that political time and policy area relate to levels of influence. Another environmental element is the stage of public policy one is examining (see chap. 1, fig. 1.1). Most scholars find that presidents have considerable influence early in the process, particularly in agenda setting and formulation (Light 1999; Shull 1999). This is because presidents can use the “bully pulpit” to recommend legislation and express their policy preferences to Congress. The Constitution allows the president to recommend legislation to Congress. We rarely have clear indicators of presidential formal proposals, but considerable evidence shows that the White House helps draft legislation that gets introduced by friendly legislators. Congress frequently works over presidential proposals, and often they reach the floor in very different form. An important recent data set shows how legislation initiated by the White House fares in Congress (Rudalevige 2002). However, use of prerogative powers reveals alternative policy adoption by presidents. In later policy stages, presidents are chief executives but seemingly have little influence over how the bureaucracy implements policy that has been adopted. Finally, their role in assessing the impact of policies is also very constrained. Thus, presidents have considerably more influence earlier than later in the policymaking process (Light 1999; Shull 1999; Soden 1999), but the exercise of prerogative powers extends the range of their influence at least through policy adoption. A dynamic model of the policy process appears in the appendix.

MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE APPROACH The three levels of influence discussed above all relate to broader theories of the presidency. The empirical literature on presidential-congressional relations began in the 1950s arguing the importance of president-centered variables (Neustadt 1960; Robinson 1967). Later views (for example, Moe and Teel 1970; Sundquist 1968) realize greater potential from Congress. The debate continued into the 1990s (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Brady and Volden

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1998; Edwards 1989; Hinckley 1994; Ripley and Lindsay 1993), where authors viewed Congress-centered variables as most significant. What seemed to be lacking was more encompassing models that recognized the importance of both sets of variables. Peterson (1990) introduced a tandem institutions model, and Brace and Hinckley (1992) and Shull and Shaw (1999) also included broader influences—including economic variables—in efforts to understand presidential-congressional relations. Among studies at the individual level, power is the most important of the three concepts receiving most scholarly attention. It consists of three analytical components: public prestige, professional reputation, and most important for Neustadt (1960), persuasion. While many scholars have examined one or more of these notions, usually such research has been limited to presidential support or success in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards, 1989; but see Rudalevige 2002; Shull and Shaw 1999). While some have found the operational indicators used inadequate (for example, professional reputation), empirical research on presidential power greatly eclipses that on greatness and, especially, on personality. I have also mentioned the emerging theory of institutionalization for studying the presidency. Much scholarship so far has been formal theory and rational choice perspectives with relatively few quantitative applications with two exceptions. The first is the “administrative presidency” thesis, which argues for considerable presidential influence over the rest of the executive branch (Durant 1992; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989). This is a “topdown” model suggesting considerable presidential leadership if not dominance of the executive branch. Several scholars observe Nixon and Reagan as major proponents of the administrative presidency. This thesis is closely tied to “agency theory” (Eisner and Meier 1990; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 1994), where the argument is for greater presidential influence (through principals) than bureaucratic discretion. Critics of the top-down model argue the importance of the lower level executives or even “street-level” bureaucrats (the “bottom-up” theory). Significant research (Brehm and Gates 1997; Lipsky 1980; Moe and Wilson 1994) shows that important policies are made at lower levels of the executive branch. Kerwin 2003 reveals that bureaucrats not only interpret or implement policy but also make it through rule making and issuing regulations. Thus, like presidents, bureaucrats can adopt policy seemingly on their own. It could be argued that individual president and EOP characteristics better reflect principal agency, while influences from the remainder of the executive branch better tap bureaucratic discretion.

EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 47

I mentioned that environmental or exogenous influences are less often studied in the presidency subfield than are individual and institutional variables. Researchers in international relations have been much more willing to consider multinational and even systemic characteristics (Bennett and Stam 2004; Ostrom and Job 1986) that seldom occur in studies of U.S. policymaking. Many studies are now including environmental variables in their research, so a broad encompassing approach makes sense as an explanation of presidential unilateral powers. To conclude, I examine three levels of influence because I am convinced that all three, what I call a multiple perspective approach, are needed for adequate explanation. As Jones (2000) argues, persons, institutions, and events are important to include in models of the presidency. Each of the levels may also influence the others (Deering 1989), so it would be wise to include all elements and to examine their interactions. The three levels of influence are not just groupings but relate to other theories of presidential decision making, such as presidential power and the administrative presidency. As such, they provide a solid basis for studying the exercise of presidential alternative powers from a broader theoretical perspective. As mentioned in chapter 1, other unilateral actions are possible to examine, but not all are tractable or reflective of policy adoption.

PRELIMINARY EXPECTATIONS Political time, policy areas, and importance provide valuable controls in examining presidential prerogative actions. Overall, the expectation is for greater use of presidential alternative powers over time (Canes-Wrone et al. 1999). These expectations reflect growing assertiveness by presidents in exercising discretionary actions. The extent to which presidents choose to be active in policymaking is a crucial consideration. Also important is whether they desire expansion or contraction of government programs (LeLoup and Shull 2003, chap. 3). Either of these preferences implies a change in policy from the status quo. Decision makers seldom offer totally new or innovative ideas; most policy adoption builds heavily from existing programs (Jones 1984; Wildavsky 1979, 65). To the extent that policy innovation does mean altering the nation’s agenda, however, innovative policies (that is, vigorous actions to expand or contract) frequently occur with partisan or ideological changes in government, or both. Substantive policy areas, divisions of political time, and the importance of decisions should contribute to the understanding of the four presidential alternative powers.

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POLICY AREAS The two presidencies thesis has long been used in studying presidentialcongressional relations. Despite being only a dichotomy, considerable research finds variation in domestic and foreign policy areas (Fleisher and Bond 1990; LeLoup and Shull [1979] 1991; Renka and Jones 1991; Sullivan 1991; Wildavsky [1966] 1991). Other scholars, and even its originator (Oldfield and Wildavsky [1989] 1991), have questioned its appearance (Edwards [1987] 1991; Fleisher et al. 2002; Lindsay and Steger 1993; Sigelman [1979] 1991), but the two presidencies formulation continues to be widely used (Shull 1991; 1994). The typology appeared useful in recent studies (CanesWrone et al. 1999; Prins and Shull 2005; Rudalevige 2002; Shull 1997; Shull and Shaw 1999) and is used in this research as a separate control for the four discretionary powers. I was able to divide three of these activities by the domestic and foreign policy distinction. Overall, I expect that personal and executive influences probably are more determinants of foreign policy actions, while institutional and legislative factors are more likely to influence domestic prerogative actions. Legislators should find domestic issues more helpful in their primary goal of reelection (Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974). Environmental factors should be more important for foreign than for domestic alternative actions. All in all, presidents should use alternative actions more in foreign than in domestic policy adoption.

POLITICAL TIME The notion of political time also is an important consideration in understanding presidential discretionary policy adoption. Broader time periods should matter, with personal and executive institutional variables likely being more important earlier in the study during the era of a “heroic” or “imperial” presidency (Schlesinger 1973), and legislative institutions and the environment being more pervasive since the mid-1970s under a more “imperiled” or “impossible” presidency (Barger 1984; Crovitz and Rabkin 1989). Also, the growing deficit (except from 1998 to 2001) should make environmental factors important during the more recent period. Within more specific time frames, personal variables probably are more important during the perceived “presidential eras” (1960s and 1980s), while institutional variables probably are more influential during the perceived “congressional eras” (1950s, 1970s, and 1990s). Thus, the political era control for political time should indicate greater prerogative exercise since the mid-1970s. Research by Shull and Shaw (1999) and others has shown considerable

EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 49

variation in behavior by each of the aggregations of data: pre/post reform era, presidential party, year in presidential term of office, and presidents individually. As stated earlier, presidents appear to fare better earlier rather than later in their terms of office. Congress and the environment appear less deferential in later years when presidents may be more vulnerable politically. Reelection years differ because the heightened political climate may decrease presidential assertiveness. Although presidents differ by party, and I control for such differences, the individuals themselves are also unique. Indeed, Beck (1982) and Kernell (1986, 223) believe that policy agendas vary more by administration than by party. Kennedy and Johnson probably exercised discretionary actions the most among Democrats and, following Nathan’s (1983) logic in the Administrative Presidency, Nixon and Reagan most among Republicans. Shull (1997) found Carter and Reagan issuing the most executive orders on an annual basis and Shull and Shaw (1999) observe individual president differences in budget agreement. I have already discussed some president differences in the other two prerogative powers. Thus, presidential exercise of discretion probably varies greatly among individual presidents, which may be a distinguishing element of political time.

EXPECTATIONS BY ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS Presidents possess distinct preferences that they would like to see put into effect, and personal, institutional, and environmental characteristics should influence how presidents use their discretionary powers. The multiple perspective approach encompasses measures of preferences and resources across three levels of influence to explain all four unilateral actions. This is a more encompassing model than heretofore and should produce a better understanding of how these elements across three levels and numerous controls affect presidential alternative policy adoption decisions. The argument is that no single level should completely account for any of the four alternative actions studied herein; rather, they are influenced variously by elements of each. In addition, the prerogative actions are also examined together in chapter 3 to see if they are related over time.

Budget Agreement Budgets are a primary battleground of presidential-congressional relations because they are obligatory decisions that occur each year. When presidential resources are greater, presidents should receive appropriations from Con-

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gress closer to their original requests than should presidents who make less effort and are resource poor. Also, budget agreement likely is greater in foreign than in domestic policy and in the earlier (pre-reform) than the later (post-reform) period (Schick 1986). This earlier discussion suggests that budget agreement will be affected by institutional and environmental more than personal levels and will also be influenced by political time and policy area considerations. General economic conditions, such as taxing and spending decisions, may also affect budget agreement. I anticipate that institutional factors will be positively and more strongly related to budget agreement than are individual factors. When presidents are enthusiasts rather than reluctants, however, the roles of the OMB and other agencies will be more limited because such activist presidents will involve themselves directly. I posit that popular approval is important for budget agreement as Shull and Shaw (1999) found. With presidential ideology, I expect that Democrats (more often liberals) will fare better than Republican presidents because Congress most often had a Democratic majority during this period. The two institutional variables should be positively related to budget agreement. Shull and Shaw (1999, 128), however, find that the size of EOP is not related to budget agreement. Poor economic conditions (high unemployment) should be associated with less budget agreement since presidents often get the blame for a worsening economy. However, trade balance presumably would indicate greater pleasure in Congress in relations with other countries and thus is likely to be positively related to budget agreement.

Executive Orders More executive orders should occur in domestic than in foreign policy because presidents have other tools in the latter policy area (Shull 1997, 106). Also, because domestic policy is given greater attention earlier in presidential administrations, orders in the foreign policy area should increase relative to domestic orders over their years in office. Overall, however, executive order use generally should be less frequent in the contemporary period (1975–2000) than earlier, because presidents now have more discretionary administrative tools at their disposal. Executive order issuance should vary according to selected year in presidents’ term of office. Because it was earlier argued that presidents would be more assertive during their first and last year, more orders should occur then rather than during their reelection year (but see Mayer 1999, 458). However, presidents presumably concentrate on legislation early, but then turn to administrative solutions later in their term.

EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 51

Democratic (liberal) presidents are more assertive in order issuance than Republican presidents (Gomez and Shull 1995; 1997). Presidents issue more orders under divided rather than unified government, when they have fewer of their partisans and less success in Congress (Krause and Cohen 1997, 467; but see Gleiber and Shull 1992; Shull 1997). Mayer and Price (2000) and Krause and Cohen (1997) find popular approval significant, and I posit a similar negative relationship. Unemployment should be negatively related but could prompt orders in the subsequent year. It may be that these two negative circumstances pressure presidents to use alternative actions, particularly to legislation. I think trade balance will be positively related to executive order issuance because quite a few orders (although not nearly as many as agreements) deal with trade issues. I expect the strongest influences to be approval, ideology, size of the EOP, and the economy. More administrative staff give presidents more administrative options such as issuing orders over legislation. Overall then, influences on executive order issuance should occur from each of the three levels.

Executive Agreements Executive agreements have increased over time so more should occur later (post-reform period) than earlier. Following Margolis (1986), I assert that Republicans take these unilateral actions more often than Democrats because of greater foreign policy interest and more hostile congresses. Note that this is the opposite relationship expected with executive order usage, perhaps because executive agreements are more often foreign, and executive orders domestic oriented. Presidents also appear to use executive agreements more during reelection years than during their first (honeymoon) years. Finally regarding controls, and also contrary to executive order issuance, I expect more agreements in foreign than in domestic policy. This policy area split might seem strange but Ragsdale (1998) provides an interesting policy area designation, which is discussed in chapter 3. These anticipated differences with executive orders particularly provide another reason why we need to examine several rather than a single prerogative power within a particular study. The three levels of influence should all be important for the issuance of executive agreements. Popular approval and presidential ideology presumably are negatively related to executive agreement usage but I have suggested that personal elements are probably seldom involved in the often-routine decisions sometimes made bilaterally with other nations. The institutional variables probably are more likely related to prerogative power usage. As

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with executive orders, staff size (size of the EOP) should encourage executive agreements due to greater numbers of advisors to research such nonlegislative options. However, legislative success should dampen executive agreement usage because presidents would have less need for nonlegislative alternatives. Finally, a poor economy and tense trade relations, are probably prescriptions for increased executive agreements. Because the U.S. economy often affects those of other countries, such nations may be particularly encouraged to engage in executive agreements regarding these economic issues. Thus, important relations with executive agreements should emerge from personal, institutional, and environmental conditions.

Committing Troops The literature on uses of force has tested some of the relationships posited in this book. Obviously, unlike the other three prerogative powers, no domestic-foreign distinction can be made in the uses of force. I have already suggested that commitment of troops likely has increased in the more recent period so the control for pre/post reform should be statistically significant. This could be due to presidents challenging the War Powers resolution, but it seems to have had little effect on presidential uses of force. Much literature has discussed the rally-around-the-flag notion, which suggests greater presidential commitment of troops during reelection than during first years in office (Ostrom and Job 1986). In addition, I expect limited difference by presidential party in use of this prerogative (Fordham 1998, 428). Relatedly, poor legislative success likely discourages uses of force (Ostrom and Job 1986; Stoll 1986). On the personal level, popular approval is likely negatively related (Ostrom and Job 1986, 557; but see DeRouen and Peake 2002, 204). A poor political situation (reelection year and low popular approval) likely will lead to increased commitment of troops (DeRouen and Peake 2002; Ostrom and Job 1986). Thus, institutional variables (for example, legislative success) probably matter little and should be less important than for other uses of prerogative power. However, the individual president variables should be greater predictors for uses of force than for more routine presidential actions (for example, executive agreements). Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton likely will score high and Johnson, Ford, and Carter low on annual use of force. Clinton had several major incursions into Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia, while Ford became president just as the United States was extricating itself from Vietnam. Finally, the external environment (for example, trade and unemployment) may be most important for this unilateral action.

EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 53

Table 2.1. Expected Influences on Presidential Unilateral Powers FOUR ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS Budget Agreement

Executive Orders

Executive Agreements

Commitment of Troops

+ +

– +

– –

– –

+ +

+ +

+ –

– +

– +

– –

– –

+ –

+ –

+ –

– +

+ –

+ –

+ –

– +

– +

+ –

– +

– +

– +

– +

+ –

– +

md md

Independent Variables

Personal Approval Ideology Institutional Size of the EOP Leg. Success Environmental Unemployment Trade Balance Controls

Era Early Late Presidential Party Democrat Republican Year in Term First Reelection Individual Presidents Policy Area Domestic Foreign

NOTE: Increases in each variable should lead to direction of anticipated effect. Ideology

refers to liberal direction.

This is because using force is a highly visible action, perhaps designed to divert public attention away from these conditions.

Assessment Table 2.1 provides a way of summarizing the multiple perspective approach and the preliminary expectations. First, I lay out the four alternative actions, which are the phenomena I seek to explain. The interrelationships among the four dependent variables are examined in chapter 3 before ascertaining the degree to which they are influenced by the three levels and controls utilized in chapters 4–7 as independent variables. Many of the components of the model will be quite familiar to students of presidential-congressional re-

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lations and of presidential executive or alternative powers. However, apart from the standard predictors (such as presidents’ popular approval or their legislative success), other variables are included that have not been used previously. Including preferences and resources help expand the dimensions of the three broader levels: personal, institutional, and environmental. In addition, the numerous controls should be particularly important for presidential exercise of prerogative power. Table 2.1 provides the parameters of the study, previewing the theoretical and anticipated relationships I explore.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION This chapter has examined the extant research on each of the four discretionary actions, allowing the president to formally and largely independently adopt public policy. More systematic research exists on presidents’ legislative support and success than on these presidential alternative actions, but the scholarly literature has ignored none of them. Part of the problem with the existing research on these discretionary actions, however, is that each of the actions has been examined in isolation and sometimes the analyses are not driven by theory. However, they may be interrelated as part of the temporal process of alternative policy adoption. In addition, much existing research covers limited time periods, which frequently does not allow for the inclusion of short-range cycles, let alone even longer eras of institutional change in presidential prerogative exercise. Although presidents are often considered individually, few examinations have used year in presidential term of office as a control for political time. Almost no research has examined mid-range political eras, my pre/post (before 1975 and after) dichotomy. Another time consideration incorporated here is trend analysis of the dependent variables in explaining each action. In addition, little attention, at least in studying executive orders and executive agreements, has been given to policy areas as a control in the analyses. The main purpose of this chapter was to develop the framework for Policy by Other Means. I examine decisions within the context of a multiple perspective model that encompasses necessary preferences and resources as being important to alternative policy adoption decisions by presidents. I argue that presidents respond to a range of influences within three levels: personal, institutional, and environmental. The three levels are developed from broader models of the administrative presidency and agency theory. Presidents will not take such actions without giving thought to strategic considerations of the costs and benefits of alternative adoption of public policy. They have resources and engage in activities to further their own prefer-

EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS 55

ences but they also must operate within broader internal and external environmental contexts. Still, as Howell (2003) argues, they may be able to exert “power without persuasion.” Controls for political time, policy area, and significance of decisions are also used. The measurement of all of the concepts and more specific variables are provided in the following measurement chapter.

3 MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

Budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and commitment of troops are the four dependent variables that I use to measure presidential discretionary power in policy adoption, and this chapter begins with their operationalization. Chapter 1 posited that the four government activities probably are not independent of one another and I examine this with simple correlation tables. Then I turn to the three levels each containing two independent variables. Third, I operationalize the control variables of the study, including political time, policy area, and importance of actions. These complex relations may demonstrate the diversity of multiple presidential actions as they adopt unilateral public policy. Next I discuss the six main independent variables, encompassing both activities and resources. These include individual (presidential ideology and popular approval); institutional (legislative success and executive staff size); and environmental (unemployment and trade balance) variables. I began with thirteen independent variables and grouped them by levels of influence through F tests. Seven variables were not significant in the models, but were highly related to other independent variables and contributed little to explanation, so I dropped them in the interest of parsimony. (Excluded variables are discussed in the appendix.) I have already shown how all three levels of influence are developed from Deering (1989), and the theoretical model contains preferences and resources derived from larger theories of presidential power, the administrative presidency, and agency theory. Thus, alternative actions in policy adoption require a multiple perspective approach to enhance our understanding. Then I explicate how political time and policy areas are used as controls

MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

57

in the analysis. Political time refers here to both long- and short-term variables: long-term eras (pre-1975/post-1974) were selected because much congressional resurgence through reform efforts was completed by 1975–76. The three short-term periods are by presidential party, selected year within presidential term of office, and individual presidents. Another aspect of political time is trend analysis, using count and one-year lagged variables, which show both the short- and long-term effects of time. These controls for political time are analyzed separately. All of these elements and the data and analysis techniques are discussed in the appendix. Policy area refers to my incorporation of the foreign-domestic issue area distinction in the analysis. In this control, three of the four dependent variables are divided according to the domestic-foreign counterparts and compared with the overall values as a base line, but no such determination is possible for commitment of troops. A final control is for importance, and three of the actions are so designated. Finally, a summary and discussion serves as a prelude to the data analysis of each of the presidential discretionary activities examined in chapters 4–7.

OPERATIONALIZING FOUR PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS The president uses several types of discretionary power to adopt public policy and I examine budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and U.S. troop commitments. These are the dependent variables of the study. In addition, I control for significant or major actions for three of the prerogative actions (except for budget agreement where no such determination is possible). I considered and rejected several other prerogative powers (for example, impoundment and executive privilege), because sufficient data for empirical analyses were unavailable for my extended time period. The four actions I chose all measure policy adoption and thus are more comparable for analysis than other possibilities.

BUDGET AGREEMENT Although presidential budget requests and congressional appropriations have long been incorporated in scholarly literature, little research examines them over a long time series. A reason for this situation may be that definitions of such terms changed over time and presumably no consistent time series was available. Ornstein et al. in Vital Statistics on Congress (2002, 158– 60) provide differences in requests (president’s budget) and appropriations (budget resolution) values from 1976 to 2000. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988)

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consider presidential budget requests as a good measure of presidents’ budget preferences. For earlier years, presidents’ requests come from the annual budget they submit, while appropriations include all regular budget authority funds for each year (Budget of the United States Government). The final figure I use is the percent of the president’s annual budget request that is appropriated by Congress.1 I had hoped to examine impoundments by presidents (prior to 1974) but few presidents before Nixon utilized the device (Fisher 2000, 115). The 1974 law outlawed impoundments but granted presidents rescission authority.2 Rescissions are available from 1974 but, of course, not for the early period of this study. An interesting and the only real alternative measure is budget agreement between the two institutions (see Canes-Wrone et a1.1999; Peterson 1995–96; Shull and Shaw 1999). Also, budget agreement represents presidential requests submitted in their budget divided by final congressional appropriations agreed upon in both chambers. These are aggregate figures that do not reveal the political maneuvering between Congress and the president on particular items during any particular budget cycle. However, budget agreement appears consistent over the entire time frame of this study while inconsistency is a problem with virtually any other indicator of budget agreement. Although limited in some ways, budget agreement should reveal presidential leadership in budgeting if clearly not an unchecked unilateral power.3 I am aware of some potential for both aggregation and disaggregation bias but believe the control for foreign/domestic budget agreement over a long time period provides the best available comparison of presidential and congressional preferences by issue area.4 These values are defense plus foreign aid to reflect foreign and the residual from the total to reflect domestic budget agreement. Some confusion at first arises over exactly what constitutes budget agreement. First, my measure does not account for tax expenditures. Second, according to Ornstein et al. (1998, 180) the values are for calendar, not fiscal years: “The amounts shown are for budget authority provided in appropriations acts and do not include permanent appropriations or budget authority provided in legislative acts.” However, since two years overlap in both Ornstein et al. and the Budget of the United States Government, and because those concurrent years have the exact same values, I believe that I have uncovered a consistent and reliable indicator of budget agreement over fifty-two calendar years. Besides, calendar year is more appropriate for all of the other variables in the analysis and thus allows a more precise comparison.

MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

59

EXECUTIVE ORDERS This research uses the total number of executive orders per year as another indicator of presidential unilateral power. One may find executive orders in the Federal Register (as a requirement of Executive Order #10006 issued by Harry Truman in 1948). Executive orders also appear in the Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, and in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, and, beginning with the Jimmy Carter administration, the latter contains the same information as Public Papers of the Presidents. The online version of Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents from 1995 is available at www.access.gpo.gov. Shull (1993) and others used these sources to collect civil rights executive orders, but Ragsdale (1998) categorized all numbered orders into seven substantive policy areas (which I then also group into the two presidencies dichotomy). These orders provide the data for this analysis. For both executive orders and executive agreements, the data provided in Ragsdale provide very useful information for scholars, and the former have been used previously (Gomez and Shull 1997; Shull 1997). All numbered executive orders for this time period (1949–2000) are included for overall orders. For major orders, I exclude the following Ragsdale categories: ceremonial/ cultural, federalism, and personnel and agency requests. These orders are less substantive and thus are not policy oriented (Gomez and Shull 1997; Ragsdale and Theis 1997). This leaves orders from seven substantive policy categories as major or significant. Then I combine aid, trade, and defense for foreign and social welfare/civil rights, government/economic management, natural resources/environment, and agriculture for domestic. These data appear in Ragsdale (1998, 353–56) and were coded by her from the Code of Federal Regulations. I updated the number of executive orders by policy area for the last years covered based upon an expansion of her coding rules (Shull 1997, Appendix A-1). To reiterate, I include Ragsdale’s policy specific orders to control for important executive orders. An example of a symbolic (not major) order is Clinton’s establishing the Armed Forces Service Medal: #12985, January 11, 1996. I could have used Mayer’s (2001, 83–85) definition for significant orders instead but they constitute only 1–7 orders per year. Mayer admits that his definition is inexact and subjective but he bases his judgment on the following: appearance in the national media, whether Congress held hearings on it, and whether the president made routine statements about it. Mayer finds significant orders more likely in foreign than in domestic policy. My

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definition for major orders is essentially the same as that of Ragsdale and Theis (1997) who also use policy orders as a surrogate for major orders.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS Executive agreements are one form of international agreements, a more encompassing term, which includes treaties, executive agreements, protocols, and conventions (Cooper 2002). I use executive agreements, which is a prerogative power, while treaties must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Ragsdale (1998, 319) argues that treaties and executive agreements are no longer distinguishable after 1984 in the Current Treaty Index. However, Harold Stanley made separate treaty and executive agreement data available to me through 2000. Although I am primarily interested in executive agreements, the percentage of agreements to treaties gives some indication of whether the Senate is exercising oversight in this discretionary power as well as a measure of importance. These congressional reactions are discussed further in chapter 8. I use all international agreements only when examining this chief diplomat power by issue area. Ragsdale’s data provide much useful information for scholars. They are taken from Ragsdale (1998, table 7.8) where she provides the source and operationalization. The same categorization by seven policy areas is also included, which might surprise some since treaties and executive agreements seem inherently foreign policy in nature. When I posed this question to Ragsdale, she stated to me in a private conversation (Ragsdale 2002) that the subject matter largely determined its categorization, so if it was an agriculture issue and included a U.S. component, it became domestic agriculture. She followed the same coding rules for them as she did for executive orders but admits that the policy designation for agreements may be less reliable than for orders. Although some might quibble about policy differences, I make a foreign-domestic distinction here for comparison purposes to the other alternative powers. Ragsdale’s designations are available only through 1997 so, for the foreign-domestic executive agreements distinction only, fewer data points exist. No one has compared executive orders and executive agreements, and they likely are inversely related (decreasing orders, increasing agreements). Coming up with an indicator of major executive agreements was not so easy.5 Greater globalization has probably increased the need for more complicated arrangements with other nations, while executive orders often deal with government structure that should not change that often. For major I used the ratio of executive agreements to treaties or the percent of the two that are ex-

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61

ecutive agreements. This last one constitutes my indicator of major agreements but it is not ideal since it varies little over my fifty-two-year time period. Certainly, neither indicator of major is perfect since they both include the nonunilateral element of treaties. The percentage measure (treaties plus executive agreements divided by executive agreements) was rescaled times 100 due to the limited range of its values. This indicator is discussed in the executive agreement chapter (chapter 6) and also with legislative responses in chapter 8.

COMMITMENT OF TROOPS More research has been conducted on uses of force than on the other presidential prerogative powers examined here. I considered using annual data collected by Hinckley (1994), Ragsdale (1998), or Stanley and Niemi (2000), but they mention very few cases and to my knowledge have not been used much in empirical research. A substantial body of international relations literature examines the two most common and much more extensive data sets: MIDs (Militarized Interstate Disputes) and the Uses of Force data set, originally compiled by Blechman and Kaplan (1978). For the former, Jones et al. (1996) provide an extensive discussion of rationale and coding rules. The larger data set includes over 2,000 cases but, of course, I would have limited the analysis to only those involving the United States between 1949 and just updated to 2001. The overall MIDs data include many cases, and they are clearly defined, operationalized, and studied by scholars. Although they do not always constitute actual use of force by the United States, they do demonstrate a range of hostility from a threat to use force at the low end, to a mobilization in the middle and, to an interstate war at the high end. Rather than using the MIDs data set, which includes all interstate disputes, I opted instead for the expanded Uses of Force data. Not only do uses of force provide quite a few more cases (annual mean of 7.5 compared to about half that for MIDs), but I also became convinced by an article comparing the two data sets. Fordham and Sarver (2001) make a very strong argument that the MIDs data set contains irrelevant data, omits uses of force against nonstate actors (for example, terrorists), and focuses on disputes more than actual uses of force (455–58). The expanded version of the Blechman and Kaplan data set, limited only to the United States, is more relevant to “political uses of force.” Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 12) define this term as “when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence . . . the behavior of individuals . . . without engaging in

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a continuing contest of violence.” Fordham and Sarver (2001) provide further documentation about what is included in this terminology. They state on their Web site, bingweb.binghamton.edu/~fordham.papers (p. 2) that, “Our understanding of a use of force includes those intended to initiate ‘a continuing contest of violence’ but follows their [Blechman and Kaplan] definition in other respects.” Interestingly, major, protracted wars are excluded from these data compilations as mentioned elsewhere. Like the MIDs data, uses of force covers a long time period and has been updated through 1995. It also indicates major uses of force on a five-point scale, which I incorporate even though few cases occur annually. I used Fordham’s political uses of force data set which is available from his Web site above.6 Few other data sets on the commitment of troops or uses of force are available.7 Although annual data are used I exercise caution in the analysis because of few cases. Although minor uses of force may not even involve actual troop commitments, major ones may not involve war either. Readers will recall the exclusion of full-scale wars from the definition of political uses of force. However, major uses are usually identified as “nuclear capable.” Ostrom and Job (1986, 564) cite Blechman and Kaplan’s definition as the three highest of five categories, including the “use of a strategic nuclear unit and a major force component (aircraft carrier group, at least one ground battalion, or at least one combat wing).” Obviously, focusing on only major commitments of troops reduces the number of observations even further. I now discuss a possible time relationship among the four unilateral actions.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PREROGATIVE ACTIONS The four dependent variables are only moderately correlated. Because they are just slightly related, they reflect four quite different presidential prerogative activities. Table 3.1 shows that the highest correlation is between executive orders and executive agreements (r = –0.304). This relationship is fairly low but significant at the 0.05 level and is the only one that approaches statistical significance. It suggests that when presidents issue more executive orders, they issue fewer executive agreements. The other relationships are lower, with budget agreement correlating with uses of force (r = 0.261) and executive agreements (r = 0.250), suggesting a slight tendency for greater budget agreement relating to greater commitments of troops and more executive agreements. Finally, executive orders have almost imperceptible negative correlations with uses of force (r = –0.106) and budget agreement (r = –0.064). To reiterate, all relationships among the four pre-

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Table 3.1. Dependent Variable Correlation Matrix

Executive Orders Budget Agreement Executive Agreements Use of Force

Executive Orders

Budget Agreement

Executive Agreements

Use of Force

1.000 –0.064 –0.304* –0.106

1.000 0.250 0.261

1.000 –0.057

1.000

* Indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

rogative actions in the same year are small and clearly reflect different presidential actions. Because the coefficients are small, I shall attempt a different examination in the appendix to see whether a temporal process of policy adoption is occurring.

OPERATIONALIZING THREE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE I posit that three levels (independent variables) will differentially influence the four presidential alternative actions (dependent variables). They include aspects of individual (president) influences, institutional (presidency) influences, and environmental (outside government) influences. Presumably, individual conditions are more important for some actions than others, while the opposite circumstances may occur for institutional variables. Because I doubt that any one actor or level dominates, I expect that variables from each level are differentially important. Such findings would confirm the relationships posited in chapter 2 and the overall multiple perspective approach. Individual variables should have greater influence on executive orders and commitment of troops than on executive agreements or budget agreement. That is because the former two originate more directly in the presidency while the latter two are more under Congress’s control. Budget agreement is the activity examined over which Congress has by far the greatest influence. Popular approval should influence executive orders and commitment of troops the most between the personal factors, especially when it is negative as found in the literature. Ideology is likely more important for budget agreement because preferences of both actors must be compromised. In addition, the notion that environmental factors also influence policymaking is important in my research. Certainly I expect characteristics of the economy and trade to be important in presidential prerogative actions. This could be potentially important for budget agreement and commitment of troops because I have suggested that they may strongly reflect economic conditions.

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INDIVIDUAL At the personal or individual level, I include measures of preferences and resources. I will presently show that these aspects are important influences on presidents’ behavior, and they are not highly correlated with one another. Thus, they represent different dimensions of this level of influence. The individual level incorporates one resource: Neustadt’s (1980) notion of popular prestige as tapped by popular approval. It also includes an indicator of the presidents’ legislative preference or ideology as reflected in the ADA score. I excluded activity variables (discussed in the appendix), which proved insignificant in the earlier analyses. As others have done, I utilize popular approval in Gallup polls as a measure of public prestige (Bond and Fleisher 1990, chap.7; Edwards 1989, chap. 6). I use the average percent per year who approve of “how president’s name is handling his job as president.”8 Neustadt criticizes the Gallup approval score as personal popularity and not a complete measure of prestige (1980, 65; Rivers and Rose 1985, 184). However, as a general measure of popular prestige it contains all of the conceptual components of mass approval of presidents. Empirical studies using popular support (or approval) find it related to legislative success (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Prins and Shull 2005; Rivers and Rose 1985; Rudalevige 2002; Zeidenstein 1983) and thus, in part, construct and content valid. However, other research questions the influence of popular approval on presidents’ legislative success (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Collier and Sullivan 1995; Edwards 1989). Canes-Wrone and di Marchi (2002) find that its influence depends upon the salience and complexity of issues.9 The second personal variable is ideology, which is based on the presidents’ average liberalism score on the positions they take on votes before Congress. These scores are based on twenty votes identified by the liberal organization, the Americans for Democratic Action, with a score of 100 being the most liberal and a score of 0 being the least liberal. Presidents may not take positions on all roll calls identified by the ADA but the measure has been widely used in the literature and deemed reliable by numerous authors (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Gleiber and Shull 1992; Gomez and Shull 1997). Presidential ideology varies annually and thus is a more discerning indicator of presidential preferences than is presidential party, which does not vary at all for any individual president. I obtained earlier years in hard copy from the organization but updates for legislators are available from the ADA Web site, www.adaction.org/votingrecords.htm, and the same votes can be used to calculate presidential ideology with the help of CQ Roll Call.

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INSTITUTIONAL The first indicator at the institutional level is one that focuses on staff resources. I use the size of the Executive Office of the President, called “Total Executive Office” by Stanley and Niemi (2000, 250). Obviously, this variable has deviated from a very low figure under Truman (about 1,200 employees) to its highest level under Nixon (over 5,700 in 1972). The size of the Executive Office gradually decreased to about 1,550 under Clinton, its lowest level since 1984 (Stanley and Niemi 2000, 250–51). Staff resources should allow greater presidential capacity to gather information and act in their congressional relations. Obviously, this declining resource (with a mean of about 2,159) must be husbanded carefully by presidents. These data were updated from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (www.opm.gov). The second institutional variable I examine is presidential success in Congress. Although I would have liked to have used Rudalevige’s (2002) measure since it is based upon actual proposals to Congress, the range of cases is simply too small to use annually. Thus, I use the frequently incorporated measure of presidential success (or wins) on their legislative vote positions annually. These are the percentage of presidential positions upheld in both chambers. Most scholars have used this measure (since the box score of president’s success on legislative initiatives has been unavailable) but some have also considered legislative support (percentage of legislators voting with the president). These two measures sometimes are used interchangeably but should be considered separately since they are different both theoretically and empirically (Prins and Shull 2005; Shull 1997, chap. 6).10 One could ask why I did not also include presidential party margin in Congress. Regrettably, it is highly related to other variables that I am using. It was correlated at (r = 0.75) with success in Congress and I considered the latter variable a more direct and likely more important condition for the exercise of alternative powers by presidents. Party margin was also highly correlated with presidential ideology (r = 0.67) and, of course, correlated highest of all with divided government (r = –0.86). These high relationships among independent variables also led me to exclude divided government because of its high relationship with historical era (r = 0.82).11

ENVIRONMENT Because prerogative activities are more likely to involve foreign policy than many presidential-congressional joint activities, the environment should include broader potential influences than just individual or institutional rela-

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tionships. Thus, I use two dimensions of the economic health of the nation internally and externally. As mentioned earlier, Fordham (1998) cautioned about the use of the misery index (unemployment plus inflation) and feels that it masks explanation of commitment of troops. But troop commitments may also divert attention from a bad economy. Accordingly, I use only unemployment, measured as the percent of the labor force over age sixteen without a job but still looking for one. The importance of this variable may vary in political time, by president or presidential party. For example, Democratic presidents are likely more concerned about unemployment conditions than are Republican presidents (Saeki and Shull 2002; 2003). The unemployment data were updated from the online version of the Economic Report of the President (February 2002, B-36). A second environmental variable used is trade balance, of which there are many possible indicators available. After examining these, I settled on the “trade balance on current account.” These data are available from Stanley and Niemi (2000, 348) and according to these authors, the variable “is the broadest trade gauge, measuring the difference between imports and exports of merchandise trade and trade in service; also includes certain one-way flows of money into the U.S., such as pension payments.” I updated this measure from the online version of the Economic Report of the President (February 2002, B-103). Because trade balances were such large numbers, I rescaled the values dividing by 1,000. This is done so that the regression coefficients have values larger than zero. By the way, rescaling does not affect the significance levels of variables. I have also discussed another variable included in the environment level: a one year lag of each dependent variable for that particular model. The lag suggests that each subsequent adoption activity is, in part, a function of the activity that precedes it. Sometimes these influences reflect a one year lag and at other times they appear to occur within the same calendar year as the subsequent variable. I chose to include the one-year lag for each action to make the four models more comparable. They reveal any possible effects of prior actions and are not directly tied to either of the personal or institutional levels of influence. Accordingly, these lag variables round out my three level models. A one year lag in each model also helps to control for the effects of time in time series data, controls for which are discussed in the appendix.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LEVELS In this section, I discuss the relationships among the independent variables of the research, consisting of indicators of the personal, institutional, and en-

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Table 3.2. Independent Variable Correlation Matrix President Popular Legislative Employees Trade UnemployADA Approval Success EOP Balance ment

President ADA Popular Approval Legislative Success Employees EOP Trade Balance Unemployment

1.000 0.061 0.289* –0.141 –0.106 –0.457**

1.000 0.150 –0.178 –0.086 –0.1057

1.000 0.102 0.535** 0.423

1.000 0.261 –0.229

1.000 0.585

1.000

* Indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. ** Indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

vironmental levels. The bivariate correlations among these component variables appear in table 3.2. There it may be observed that most of the variables are not highly correlated; thus, they measure different components of three different levels. Within the personal level, the presidents’ ADA is barely correlated with popular approval (r = 0.061). This presidential liberalism score is slightly correlated with the second institutional variable, success in Congress (r = –0.289), significant at the 0.05 level. Liberal presidents, primarily Democrats, are more successful than Republicans since they generally had unified rather than divided government and also a higher percentage of their partisans in Congress. Presidential ADA is fairly high but negatively correlated with the unemployment rate (r = –0.457), significant at the 0.01 level and is as predicted. That is, liberal presidents (primarily Democrats) usually are in office when unemployment is lowest, thereby confirming the hypothesis of taking greater care of their “have-not” constituency. The next two variables, popular approval and number of EOP employees, are not correlated with any of the other variables in the models. However, success in Congress is related to trade balance (r = 0.535, significant at 0.01 level). Thus, the more favorable the balance of trade, the more successful the president. No other relationships among the six independent variables are significant, so I anticipate few problems of multicollinearity in this analysis. However, this phenomenon (which occurs when highly related independent variables contaminate the results) will be tested more precisely in each substantive chapter. Table 3.2 shows only bivariate relationships among the independent variables, not any effects of multicollinearity on the dependent variables. All in all, I feel confident in asserting the utility of the three levels as providing three potentially different explanations of presidential discretionary activities. I end up using only two variables at each of the three levels even though

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I began with more than twice as many. Admittedly, the chosen ones were largely for methodological reasons. I excluded variables that were either insignificant or to avoid multicollinearity in the models. By reducing the number of explanatory variables I maintain and often increase overall explanatory power and also increase the degrees of freedom in each of the equations. Obviously, preserving the number of data points is important in annual analyses, which is another reason for reducing the number of unimportant independent variables. The methodological appendix briefly discusses the excluded variables for each of the three levels.

OPERATIONALIZING CONTROLS In this study, three different approaches are used to control the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. The first is policy area, dichotomizing the data into domestic and foreign, which has a long tradition in research on presidential-congressional relations. Many authors have observed differences by domestic and foreign policy areas but questions have also arisen about appropriate measurement (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; Meernik 1993). The second approach is political time, consisting of divisions into several controls: (1) pre/post reform periods, (2) presidential party, (3) selected year in presidential term of office (first, last, and reelection years), and (4) individual presidents. These distinctions proved useful in accounting for presidential-congressional relations in an earlier volume (Shull 1997). Third, I control for significant actions to see if their explanations vary from all actions. This distinction is not possible for budget agreement.

POLICY AREAS Many studies have analyzed presidential success and support using Wildavsky’s ([1966] 1991) domestic and foreign dimensions (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Cohen [1982] 1991; Edwards 1980; 1989; Fleisher et al. 2000; LeLoup and Shull [1979] 1991; Shull and Shaw 1999). A policy approach is both valid and valuable since considerable research has shown that presidentialcongressional relations vary according to the type of policy (Gibson 1995; Pritchard 1983; Shull 1983; 1997). Some scholars have also examined presidential unilateral actions by the two presidencies distinction (Canes-Wrone et al. 1999; Mayer 2001; Shull 1997). A policy approach advances such insight and understanding. Certainly conceptual difficulties and problems with coding exist, but they should not be deterrents. The operationalization of the substantive typology of public policy is

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discussed here. Ragsdale’s (1998) disaggregated seven issue areas are grouped into domestic and foreign. Specifically, foreign aid, foreign trade, and defense become the foreign category, and government, civil rights/social welfare, resources, and agriculture become the domestic category. The specific issues that are included in updating this two presidencies typology appear in (Shull 1997, Appendix A, table A.1). As shown there, intercoder reliability was well within acceptable levels and, thus, domestic issues can be differentiated from foreign issues. The great advantage of the Ragsdale data is that she categorizes executive orders and executive agreements by her seven issue areas and I can then aggregate them by domestic-foreign policy areas. However, I made my own designation for budget agreement, also consisting of a foreign-domestic designation.12

POLITICAL TIME Using political time in this volume goes beyond standard examinations of chronology or presidents as units of analysis. Aggregating by years allows for differing levels of generality, ranging from the most to the least aggregated. The first is looking at each activity across the entire fifty-two-year time period. Such aggregation permits examination for general patterns. Overall patterns of budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and troop commitments are provided. Gross differences across policy areas over the entire time period can be observed. In addition, I incorporate trend analysis (count variable, year = one to fifty-two) and a one-year time lag of the annual data. Thus, the data are examined overall and then by four aggregations of political time. The first of these aggregations of time is a dichotomy splitting the study into two time periods (early and late). I have already demonstrated that scholars generally see presidential-congressional relations from the 1940s to the 1970s quite differently than they view the more current period of interactions. Many efforts were made by Congress during those transition years (1969–74) to reassert their influence over what many considered to be an imperial presidency (LeLoup and Shull 2003, chap. 2; Schlesinger 1973). Some of these reform efforts proved more effective than others, but they subsequently seemed to have provided minimal congressional scrutiny of presidential alternative decisions (see chapter 8). Although some writers subsequently spoke of an imperiled or impossible presidency rather than an imperial one (Barger 1984; Crovitz and Rabkin 1989), it is less evident in oversight of prerogative actions than in legislative success. In chapter 8, I examine whether Congress has been more willing to challenge presidents in

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each of my four actions. In each substantive chapter I separate the data out to control for these two exactly equal reform eras: early or pre (1949–74; n = 26 years) and late or post (1975–2000; n = 26 years). The second control is by presidential political party, which can be as short as four years (Carter) to as long as twelve years (Reagan through George H. W. Bush). I do not use party as a personal variable in the final analyses because it is so closely related to presidential ideology; that is, the more liberal presidents are all Democrats and the more conservative ones are all Republicans. Still, presidential party can be useful for grosser aggregation to examine the frequency of presidential prerogative activities. It was observed in chapter 2 that some argue that such activities do not vary at all by presidential party while others find some party differences. Comparisons of selected years in presidential term of office may also be useful. Although fewer data points may appear for each, scholars have found variation in presidential-congressional relations by such years (Kessel 1984; Lewis and Strine 1996; Light 1999; Shull 1997). Of particular interest are first, last, and reelection years within each administration.13 Such groupings are useful but can be reaggregated, thereby retaining all data points. However, Shull and Gleiber (1995) found that year in term effects on government activities in civil rights are less than when aggregating by individual presidents. Individual presidents are compared to see if the thrust of policy adoption has altered over time, both within one administration and across presidential terms. Data for Truman at the beginning are incomplete but I am able to explore the entire administrations of Eisenhower through Clinton. Previous research finds distinctions for individual presidents in presidentialcongressional relations (Peterson 1990; Shull and Shaw 1999) and for prerogative actions (Shull 1997, chap. 7). All in all, these four political time aggregations are important in this analysis and controlled separately in the regression equations rather than simply as percentage of observations used previously (Shull 1997). However, the political time analyses are done separately from the analyses using the three levels of influence to preserve the number of data points.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION This chapter divulges the sources of my data and explains how I operationalize my variables. It began with the four dependent variables: budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and troop commitments. Then the three levels (independent variables) and controls are covered. A discussion of the data (with excluded variables), a test of the policy

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process model, and analysis techniques for this research appear in the methodological appendix. The research also utilizes the two presidencies typology and offers several controls for political time, particularly by (1) pre/post reform eras, (2) individual presidential administrations, (3) presidential party, and (4) selected year within presidential term of office. The control for policy area splits three of the four dependent variables into their foreign and domestic components and compares regressions on each with the general models of unilateral actions. Separate regressions using each of the aggregations of political time provide controls on the overall relationships. In addition, I provide a one year lag and a count variable as further controls for time. A final control examines important or significant presidential alternative actions to see if they are explained differently from all such actions. Most importantly, the analysis seeks to explain these four unilateral actions as a function of three levels. I considered thirteen variables but ended up keeping only six, which actually increased explanatory power as well as the number of cases available for testing.14 The analysis in the following chapters should tell us which levels help us understand differences in presidential unilateral decisions. I expect the individual level to be more influential for executive orders and commitment of troops while the institutional level should provide greater explanatory power for executive agreement and budget agreement. Personal preferences should drive the former while resources are more important in the latter. The environment should be more important for budget agreements and commitment of troops. However, these explanations are too simple because I expect that all three levels will make some contribution to the explanation of all four alternative activities presidents use in adopting public policy. Some might question the advantages and comparability of various measures of presidential prerogative actions. Certainly there are difficulties with all such indicators, whether they are frequency counts (like three of them) or percentages (like budget agreement). No single quantitative measure of presidential alternative action is perfect, which is one good reason to compare four different ones using the same model. Qualitative indicators could be just as important (Cooper 2002), but actions are difficult to obtain over time and to examine systematically. Which of the three levels of influence best explain presidential alternative power? At what stage in the president’s term of office does he have the most autonomy? Do presidents’ terms matter more than presidential party or other aggregations of the data? Do preferences or resources provide the best explanation of discretionary actions? Do powers vary by time and pol-

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icy area? How much discretion do presidents appear to have in their exercise of unilateral powers? These questions are frequently addressed but seldom resolved in the scholarly literature. Subsequent chapters will show whether the multiple perspective approach does a reasonable job of answering these questions and of explaining four different presidential alternative actions in the adoption of public policy. If that occurs, then it will provide an extension of existing theories, such as presidential power, the administrative presidency, and agency theory.

4 BUDGET AGREEMENT Chief Budgeter

The history of budgeting reflects a course of changing authority fluctuating between the president and Congress (Cox et al. 1993; Fenno 1966; Pfiffner 1979). According to the Constitution, Congress bears the responsibility for providing a budget for the nation. However, Congress yielded authority to the executive branch with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, thereby shifting the responsibility for preparing the initial budget document to the president. The intent of the act was to shift criticism for budget decisions away from Congress toward the president (Wildavsky 1988). However, this structural change permitted assertive presidents, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, to set the budget agenda, while Congress was left a reactive role in the budget process. Pfiffner (1979) and Kettl (1992) detail presidential dominance until 1974 when Congress tried to regain some lost power through the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Although Congress and the president now share more equally in the budget-making process, the president sets the agenda for budget negotiations and conflict. Recent presidents and Congresses were unable to deal effectively with the growing deficit problem during the 1980s and mid-1990s, a problem that returned by 2003. Congress attempted to impose sanctions on both itself and the president to ensure across-the-board budget cuts if neither party was willing nor capable of making such reductions on its own. These efforts were directed at cutting the federal deficit, which had soared to unprecedented heights. Although Congress initiated this legislation, the nature of the law was such that if Congress did not respond to the deficit, automatic spending cuts would go into effect (Pfiffner 1996a). Because these cuts occurred automatically in the absence of congressional activity, they can be considered

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external constraints even though Congress formulated the legislation. Ultimately, Congress changed the legislation (generally known as GrammRudman) three times in five years, revealing the difficulty both Congress and presidents faced in actually reducing spending. Both actors realized that they were not capable of making the difficult political decisions necessary to reduce the deficit and balance the budget (Thurber 1996, 196). Thus, they placed themselves at the mercy of legislation that would take effect via their own inaction. Such automatic cuts were politically tolerable because they diffused responsibility for budget cuts away from specific members of Congress. The courts, however, took the bite out of early attempts at such legislation by declaring the automatic budget cuts in Gramm-Rudman I unconstitutional (Kettl 1992; Wildavsky 1988). Additionally, Congress was equally imaginative at both circumventing such legislation and scaling back deficit targets in later legislation during 1991–92. Although the many variations of budget reform did provide for some deficit reduction, gains were nominal at best and ultimately Gramm-Rudman was a failure (Kettl 1992). Most contemporary budgeting has been characterized by increased conflict between the president and Congress over their budget preferences.1 The Democratically controlled House was a consistent source of consternation during the Republican presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. The U.S. economy fell into recession in the early 1990s, exacerbating budget deficit problems. Deficits continued at stubbornly high levels but would have been much worse without the 1990 deficit reduction package. Bush had to eat his words when he had earlier stated: “read my lips. No new taxes.” Combined with an improving economy, the 1993 deficit reduction package under Clinton set the deficit on a gradual downward course over the next five years. Focusing on George H. W. Bush’s sinking popularity after the end of the Gulf War, Bill Clinton won the presidency in 1992 with his campaign mantra, “It’s the economy, stupid.” He too faced an immediate deficit crisis and had to trade his planned tax cuts for a deficit reduction package in 1993. It cut the deficit by $530 billion over five years, with about half coming from new taxes and half from spending cuts. It was a bitter political battle that expended much political capital on the part of the president. It passed by one vote in the Senate, and not a single Republican voted for the package. A year later, Congress blocked his health care reform proposal, and the Democrats were turned out of control of Congress in 1994. With the Republicans in charge of the House and Senate, the political climate was reversed from that of the 1970s and 1980s (Republican president and Democratic Congress). In 1995, Clinton and the Republican Congress

BUDGET AGREEMENT 75

clashed sharply over the federal budget to the point that government shut down on at least two occasions; however, the Republican Congress was saddled with most of the blame (CQ Almanac 1995). Pfiffner (1996a; 2000) shows Clinton’s bitter defeat from Republicans but then his political resurrection after Republicans in Congress overextended themselves. Congress and the president agreed in 1997 on a bipartisan plan to balance the budget by Clinton’s sixth year in office, in which the budget was balanced for the first time in thirty years. After sixteen years of conflict over the deficit, both parties were helped by stronger than expected economic growth, using the nation’s prosperity to deliver promised tax breaks and new spending programs to constituents. The year 1997 marked a new but very temporary change in budgeting. Instead of the president having to veto the entire budget he could make specific line-item vetoes and surgically remove congressional appropriations that he disliked. Clinton first used the line-item veto on three tax breaks in the early fall of 1997. However, a negotiated settlement with Congress made a congressional override attempt unnecessary on two of the measures. In a defense appropriation bill in October of that year, Clinton line item vetoed thirty projects, worth an estimated $287 million. He claimed to “set objective criteria and take politics out of the decision making process.” Still, by late October 1997, Clinton had vetoed less than 1 percent of fiscal 1998 appropriations. It was a short-lived device, however, and ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1998. The item veto had been part of the Republican contract with America and is a further example of congressional abdication in budgeting (Fisher 2000). George W. Bush was chosen in a close and controversial election in 2000. By the time he was inaugurated, the U.S. budget had shifted from years of red ink to projected surpluses for years to come. But this rosy scenario would not last long. Bush’s top campaign promise had been a massive tax cut, comparable to Reagan’s twenty years earlier. Given a Republican Congress, he pushed for a $1.6 trillion tax cut from the minute he took office. It was one of his most important legislative accomplishments even though it was scaled down by Congress to $1.3 trillion. Democrats were remarkably compliant to the tax cuts and Bush celebrated the most dramatic legislative victory in his first six months in office. The U.S. Senate gave final passage to a bill that was the largest tax cut in twenty years. Despite his narrow and controversial election to the presidency, Bush was able to enact the cornerstone of his domestic agenda. At the end of the day, it was a case of presidential leadership because the Bush administration was able to set the agenda and play the more dominant role in shaping the policy.

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The political environment was unusual in 2001 because of how extraordinarily close the electorate was divided between Republicans and Democrats. The weakness of Bush’s electoral mandate was balanced by the fact the Republicans controlled the presidency, House, and Senate for the first time in forty-eight years. However, the margin in the House was tiny and the Senate was tied fifty–fifty for the first time in history (Republican Vice President Cheney supplied the tiebreaking fifty-first vote). Some Democrats were still bitter about the election and were determined to oppose the president. Other Democrats felt the tax cuts would result in a return to budget deficits and would only help big business and the wealthy. Bush pledged to work for bipartisan support for this proposal. In the end, he would gain only a handful of Democratic votes but they would prove enough to be the margin of difference. What about the impact of the Bush tax cuts? Bush pushed for further cuts and Democrats were blaming the Bush tax cuts for the budget deficits that had reappeared. The economic argument for major tax cuts to stimulate the economy became even stronger as the recession and the events of September 11 unfolded. But the economic environment shifted quickly with a recession made worse by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Soon, unemployment jumped from 4 percent to over 6 percent, 2.5 million people were laid off, and the stock market dropped despite eleven interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed). In 2002 and 2003, Bush and the Democrats in Congress feuded over tax cuts and stimulus packages to help the struggling economy, which was further damaged by the war against Iraq in April 2003. In September 2004, the Congressional Budget Office stated that the deficit would be the greatest ever for fiscal 2005—$422 billion (see Figure 4.1). Budget making has become more complicated and more important to the president and members of Congress. As deficits returned under George W. Bush, Congress and the president continued to disagree. Presidents persisted in using a variety of largely alternative actions in budgeting. Although impoundment is no longer possible, rescission and deferral give the president considerable budget discretion. One truly unilateral decision by Bush was ordering his HHS secretary, “Tommy” Thompson not to reveal the projected costs of a Medicare prescription drug benefit that the president pushed for and Congress passed in 2003. Obviously, much of the continuing fighting between Congress and the president is due to congressional attempts to check presidential power in the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and to the fact that most of this period has been characterized by divided rather than unified government (Thurber 1996; 2002).

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Figure 4.1. Economic Indicators, 1980–2015

WHAT IS BUDGET AGREEMENT? Conceptually, budget agreement reflects efforts by the president and Congress to shape and enact their preferences via the power of the purse and thus is not a unilateral power of presidents alone. Rather, it is a shared power despite what appears to be frequent deference to presidents by Congress. Scholars have debated the best way to tap the degree of conflict and/or cooperation in budgeting, but the percent of budget agreement appears to be a useful indicator (Peterson 1985–86; Shull and Shaw 1999). Admittedly, budget requests by presidents are simply the first step in what may be a long process, and since presidents could still veto congressional appropriations bills, agreement may not occur along the way. Budget agreement is measured as the final appropriations by Congress as a percentage of the funds requested

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by the president. As such, budget agreement reflects the overall level of fiscal consensus that exists between the president and Congress. If budget agreement is high, near 100 percent, then both the branches have probably reached consensus regarding their respective budget preferences. However, if budget agreement is low (above or below 100 percent), it is doubtful that the president and Congress have reached agreement on their preferences and Congress is undoubtedly acting to curtail the preferences of the president by adding or denying funds for his preferred programs. The percentage measure means that decisions by both actors is on the same metric so that funding for uncontrollable issues should not matter as both Congress and presidents are using the same base. Several conceptual and measurement issues occur with the budget agreement variable. First, one is not able to distinguish exactly whose preferences are being enacted. It is possible that Congress might rearrange presidents’ total budget requests and appropriate funds as they see fit. In this situation, the variable of appropriations as a percent of requests might appear to show a high degree of consensus when in reality, money for presidential preferences has been reallocated to reflect Congress’s preferences (CanesWrone 2001; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). While this situation is a possibility, it seems unlikely given the president’s ability to veto a congressional budget that is not to his liking. Conversely, the president will not opt to use the veto lightly since it means vetoing the entire bill, not just a specific component. Certainly, the political costs of vetoing an omnibus bill containing several appropriations bills make it difficult for the president to indiscriminately veto those that do not exactly match his preferences (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). Yet, the threat of the veto prevents wholesale revision of presidential requests by Congress in their appropriations. Consequently, while there are discrepancies between presidential requests and congressional appropriations, such discrepancies are typically minor. A second measurement issue with the percentage variable budget agreement is that it does not possess a high degree of variation. In fact, just over twenty percentage points variation occurs between the lowest value (80.1) and the highest value (102.2), with a mean score of 96.3 (see appendix). Despite this problem, budget agreement is an important variable, and its use and study herein contribute significantly to the literature. Since it is a gross aggregated measure, finding anything at all will be beneficial. I know of no other variable that taps presidential and congressional preferences, let alone presidential discretionary powers in budgeting, that does not also possess problems and limitations.2 Also, since both requests and appropriations ap.

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pear to tap actor preferences (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988), my combining them gets at the proximity of preferences. A final measurement concern on this topic is that even if budget agreement is 100 percent, it is arguable whether this is 100 percent of presidents’ requests or Congress’s adjustments to the presidents’ requests. Also, the question remains, is 100 percent better than 103 percent or is 103 percent better than 100 percent? Initially, one might consider that anything over 100 percent must be better. Presumably though, President Reagan would consider 100 percent better than 103 percent due to his fiscal conservatism. For my purposes, I consider 100 percent optimal and anything over 100 percent as suboptimal but better than less than 100 percent.3 While 100 percent budget agreement may reflect only presidential requests, over 100 percent likely includes almost all funding requested by the president and additional legislative preferences. The assumption I make is that the president will only consider optimal appropriations up to the amount of his requests. As in the chapters to come, I follow a standard format in presenting the expectations and results. First, I offer expectations for the trend and the political time control variables (historical era, presidential party, select year in presidential term, and individual president). Next, I present expectations by policy area and posit whether domestic (nondefense) budget agreement will be different from budget agreement in the foreign (defense and aid) sphere. I then consider potential influences for the three levels (personal, institutional, and environmental). Next, I present the results for the general model overall and by policy area. Then I discuss efforts to limit the presidents’ discretion in budgeting. Finally, I offer a summary and then develop conclusions regarding budget agreement.

EXPECTATIONS TREND The above summary of the modern budgeting process in the United States suggests a pattern of congressional dominance (prior to the 1930s), followed by a period of growing presidential dominance from 1933 to 1973 (Pfiffner 1979), followed finally by a period of presidential-congressional conflict (after 1974). Since my time series begins in 1949 during growing presidential dominance, I expect to find an overall declining trend in budget agreement. That is, budget agreement in the early years of the series should be high or near the 100 percent mark. Following Nixon and the Budget Act of 1974, I expect to find that budget agreement takes a slight downward turn, with

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greater divergence between presidential requests and congressional appropriations during the more recent years. Although I anticipate a downward trend since the early 1970s due to increasing divided government and ideological conflict, I expect to find an incremental effect in budget agreement overall. That is, the one year lag of budget agreement should exercise a modest effect over the current years’ level of budget agreement. I predict this incremental effect despite Wildavsky’s (1988) claim that we have entered a new era in budgeting in which entire programs may be subject to budget cutting. Even where budget cutting is substantial, such as in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under Reagan, evidence suggests that these are short-term reductions from which agencies can recover (Wood and Waterman 1994). Additionally, even in the case of the somewhat extreme automatic cuts intended in GrammRudman I, the legislation called for across-the-board cuts such that no one program or agency would bear the brunt of the budget cutting axe. There should be little long-term trend from the count variable since I anticipate only a slight, but gradual decrease in budget agreement due to more divided government recently.

POLITICAL TIME I have several expectations when examining the four separate political time controls (historical era, presidential party, select year in presidential term, and individual president). I have already anticipated that frequently divided government leads to greater conflict between Congress and the president, which has occurred much more often in recent years. I anticipate then that in looking at the historical era variable, the post-1974 period should reveal a negative coefficient, indicating that budget agreement has generally decreased since Nixon. The 1974 budget act created the budget committees in both chambers and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as a rival to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in order to encourage future Congresses to challenge presidents more often in budgeting. Obviously, differences in budget agreement by presidential party should occur. Democratic presidents generally had more favorable congressional majorities (except under Truman and, especially, under Clinton). It is easy to assume that Democrats obtain greater budget agreement with the proviso above that historical era mitigates that expectation. Republican presidents, being more conservative, probably receive a higher percentage of what they request while more liberal Democrats are likely to receive lower amounts. This relates to Peterson’s (1985–86, 583) finding that Republicans received

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a slightly higher percentage of their budget requests appropriated than did Democratic presidents. Thus, presidential party should matter for budget agreement, perhaps more so than for some of the other prerogative powers. I anticipate more budget agreement in presidents’ first years than in reelection and last years. It is in the honeymoon year that the president possesses his greatest amount of political capital as well as general goodwill and appeal to popular mandate (Pfiffner 1996b). General deference to the president during his honeymoon year should produce greater budget agreement. Last years could also produce substantial budget agreement since the current president is leaving office and may experience a gesture of good will from Congress. Reelection years, however, pose an interesting problem. When the president and Congress are controlled by the same party, one would expect greater budget agreement in the interest of furthering the reelections of both; however, if divided government exists, it is possible that budget agreement will decrease with each party attempting to stall a budget resolution in hopes that the other party will receive the blame for the lack of a budget and thereby end up losing out at the polls (CQ Almanac 1995). Such action is risky at best since it is difficult to discern how the general public will react in such situations. Regardless though, I expect budget agreement to be lower in reelection years than in first or last years. Finally, for individual presidents I anticipate the following effects. The presidencies of Gerald Ford, Carter, George H. W. Bush, and especially Clinton should be negatively related to budget agreement. Although Carter served in conjunction with a Democratic Congress, his outsider status hurt his ability to effectively deal with Congress (Jones 1988) and, as a result, his overall budget agreement should be lower. Ford and George H. W. Bush took conservative positions on social welfare programs that often pitted them against a Democratically controlled Congress and resulted in numerous budget clashes. Reagan scored surprisingly high budget agreement (Peterson 1985–86) perhaps in part because he had a Republican Senate during six of his eight years in office. Consequently, the control for their terms in office should also reveal a negative association with budget agreement. A caveat is in order about individual presidents since they likely do not differ very much given the small variation in budget agreement over time. Although Clinton was not the political outsider that Carter was, he faced the first Republican controlled Congress in forty years during his second two years and throughout his second term. Budget clashes were inevitable as conservative Republican legislators, particularly in the House, rushed to take full advantage of their new majority status, which continued at reduced levels after 1996. Thus, Clinton’s term should also reflect a negative relation-

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ship with budget agreement. Finally, beyond the individual aspect of each of these presidents, a collective reason exists for expecting these presidents in particular to demonstrate a negative relation with budget agreement. All of the presidents discussed above held office following the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974. Thus, in addition to any individual president characteristics that influence budget agreement, this more conflictridden recent period of budgeting should emerge in this aspect of political time. The year 1997 had the potential for considerable budget disagreement between President Clinton and the 105th Congress. Clinton’s large electoral margin over former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R, Kansas), along with more conservative Senate leadership under Trent Lott (R, Mississippi), suggested considerable potential for deadlock in presidential-congressional relations. However, gridlock was avoided when both sides compromised in May 1997 over the 1998 budget by both cutting taxes and balancing the budget over five years (Pfiffner 2000). Each side took credit in closing the deal, which provided something for both liberals and conservatives, yet neither side was completely satisfied. However, compromise was easier because both sides wanted to avoid shutdowns of government that had occurred during 1995–96, and because the economy continued to be healthy, allowing $200 billion more in revenue over five years than had been anticipated. I have shown that much of that revenue and surpluses quickly disappeared with the huge tax cuts in 2001. George W. Bush did very well on his major tax cut proposal. In fact, he received roughly 70 percent of what he asked for in 2001, and he also received further cuts in 2002 and 2003. Surprisingly, a deeply divided Congress—especially the Senate—rarely challenged these huge changes in taxing policy. As the 2004 election neared, continuation of the cuts became a campaign issue when Bush’s opponent, Senator John Kerry (D, Massachusetts), proposed rolling back the cuts to the nation’s wealthiest Americans (those making over $200,000 per year). Bush ridiculed the idea saying that these citizens were the very ones producing the jobs needed to strengthen the economy. Bush got his way as Congress approved most of the so-called middle-class tax cuts in September 2004.

POLICY AREAS Canes-Wrone et al. (1999) find greater presidential success in foreign than domestic budget proposals. Although domestic and foreign policies often diverge, I anticipate less of a policy distinction in examining budget agree-

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ment than in the other more prerogative dependent variables examined. I expect more influence from political factors like popular approval or success in Congress on budget agreement in the domestic sphere. This is because domestic budgeting may be more redistributive and subject to constituent and interest group pressure and of greater interest to legislators.4 Of course, defense spending in the form of pork barrel distributive policy could affect this policy distinction. Unemployment is less likely while trade should be more likely to influence foreign than domestic budget agreement. Both the personal and institutional levels should influence domestic budget agreement, but I expect president variables to be more important in foreign policy since Congress may defer to the president in these matters. However, such deference often involves legislation or actions that do not necessarily require resource expenditures. It is a much different matter when money is at issue for foreign aid and national defense. Congress is less likely to support presidents’ requests for money for foreign than domestic policy for two reasons: (1) money spent on foreign affairs could be spent on domestic projects that could translate into votes, and (2) defense expenditures are typically the largest pool of discretionary spending available to Congress. Consequently, unless there is a major security threat to the United States (whether perceived or real), Congress can use defense expenditures to fund other programs. Reagan may be the exception in being able to generate more than moderate support for defense spending (Kamlet 1987; Peterson 1985– 86). Although I expect to find personal variables dominant for most foreign policy distinctions, in terms of budget agreement, I anticipate that institutional variables also play a role in determining foreign budget agreement.

THREE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE Consistent with the fundamental argument presented herein, I expect to find that all three levels (personal, institutional, and environmental) have some connection with budget agreement. One might think that institutional variables are more important than personal ones since Congress makes the final determination regarding appropriations. Concerning environmental factors, the economy should exert a strong effect on budget agreement since public concern and scrutiny over federal spending appears to fluctuate with overall economic prosperity (Frendreis and Tatalovich 1994; Kettl 1992; Wildavsky 1988, 216–17). When the economy is faring poorly, budget agreement should be lower since there are fewer funds to allocate to each actor’s preferences. I now turn to more specific expectations for the individual variables.

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Personal Beginning with the personal level, presidential ideology should have little direct effect on budget agreement. This is because both extreme liberals and conservatives probably do poorly, so the influence of overall ideology is probably washed out. Any discernable effects of ideology should be positive in that the ideologically liberal president may feel compelled to advocate important elements of his budget and use rhetoric to gain widespread attention and support for his budget preferences. Initially one might think that popularity would have a strong effect on budget agreement since popular approval (rightfully or wrongfully) is equated with mandates (Conley 2002); however, room for doubt exists. Although a high popularity speaks well for presidents and their influence, it may entice them to ask for too much from Congress (Brace and Hinckley 1992, 7). Thus, if the president becomes overconfident and requests too much, diminished popularity could produce less budget agreement. However, popular approval should have a positive effect since Congress should be more indulgent of the president if his popularity is high rather than low. Budget agreement then should increase as presidential popular approval increases and the relationship should be positive.

Institutional Presidents’ staff resources in the size of the EOP variable present a mixed bag of expectations. A larger staff may increase the resources available for developing the budget. Since the early 1970s the OMB has acted to coordinate and better develop budget proposals to reflect presidential preferences (Kettl 1992; Wildavsky 1988). However, it does not necessarily hold that increased resources or the coordination introduced by the OMB will make a “better” budget or a budget that is more appealing to Congress and, as stated earlier, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was intended as a check against the OMB (Kettl 1992). The 1974 legislation itself was partially a reaction to the way in which Richard Nixon had handled Congress. Previously, Nixon had used unilateral impoundments to cut money from agencies and programs that Congress had already appropriated. Thus, in the spirit of the Congressional Budget Act and in reaction to the behavior displayed by President Nixon, particularly in the area of impoundments on already appropriated funds, Congress struck back hard. As such, little to no effect should occur for size of the EOP.

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In contrast, presidents’ legislative success should have a stronger effect on budget agreement. This is because the preferences of both the president and Congress should more closely resemble each other and should lead to increased budget agreement. Since Congress acts after presidents, legislative success should matter. However, the fact that the president and Congress possess different constituencies argues for a milder effect. CanesWrone (2001) argues that presidents have learned what Congress will accept. The varying constituency interests possessed by each actor could still lead to disagreement over the budget, such as during the Carter administration, despite possessing large partisan majorities but only limited success in Congress.

Environmental Although budgeting has been suggested above to be more institutional than personal, economic factors probably are of greatest importance. This is because politicians use budget decisions to try to alter economic conditions and vice versa. Unemployment and trade should be among the most important predictors of budget agreement. Indeed, the external conditions may be the most important for budget agreement, more so than for the other three more unilateral actions. This is due to the importance of the economy as a whole in making budget decisions, particularly in recent years when deficit spending threatened to upset the national economy. Thus, a prosperous economy should have a positive effect on budget agreement.

RESULTS TREND ANALYSIS Figure 4.2 shows the time trend for the budget agreement variable. Although I anticipated a slight downward trend since the early 1970s due to frequently divided government and ideological conflict, I also expected to observe little change in budget agreement overall. Observing the trend line in figure 4.2 shows a slight but significant (at the 0.10 level) effect from the one year lag of the variable. This finding indicates that an incremental effect occurs in budget agreement such that the previous year’s values slightly influence the current year’s values. However, there was no effect from the count variable, confirming that no monotonic process is involved in budget agreement. However, the count variable actually explained somewhat more in the frequency level of budget agreement than did the lag variable.

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Figure 4.2. Budget Agreement, 1949–2000

The most startling aspects of the trend line are the distinct spikes in budget agreement. The first downward spike occurs under Harry Truman, who appears to have considerable support when, in fact, the values represent Congress’s additional funding for the Korean War.5 By far the most dramatic drops occur for Clinton in 1999 and 2000 and, of course, he was hampered in pushing policies that were opposed by the Republican dominated Congress from 1995 to 2000. Some unusually high spikes are also of interest (see figure 4.2). Congress actually gave President Reagan more than he requested and so probably more money than he wanted (see note 2). Eisenhower often received higher appropriations than he had requested and even Clinton on one occasion exceeded 100 percent of his requests.

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POLITICAL TIME Four separate models of political time are examined prior to the analysis using the multiple perspective approach. The first political time control, historical era, fails to attain statistical significance and therefore does not appear to have a relationship with budget agreement. Although a slight difference appears between the overall percentage of budget agreement prior to 1975 and the percentage of budget agreement after 1974, this difference does not show up as statistically significant in the model. The 1.21 coefficient does not even possess the expected negative direction for the post-1974 period. This lends some doubt to the argument that budget agreement has declined since the 1974 Budget Act, but without statistical significance it is not possible to say whether or not this relationship has occurred at random. The greater incidence of divided government during the modern period has not dampened budget agreement. Presidential party reveals a significant relationship with budget agreement, where Democrats actually do –2.86 percent worse than Republicans (see table 4.1; Peterson 1995–96). This seems a bit inexplicable but the result is largely due to the unusually poor performance of Clinton. We shall see shortly that he received the least budget agreement of any president. Nevertheless, presidential party provides the strongest relationship among the political time controls in the analysis and is significant at the 0.05 level. Republican presidents receive nearly 98 percent budget agreement (compared to about 93 percent for Democrats) so Republicans’ presumably more conservative budgets must find greater favor in Congress. Select year in presidential term exhibits a greater effect than Shull and Shaw (1999) observed with 5 percent of the variance explained (see table 4.1). Presidents do poorly as lame ducks (last year in office) where budget agreement is nearly five percentage points lower than average and also worse in first (honeymoon) years. Oddly enough, budget agreement appears highest in reelection years but only slightly so, and the coefficient is not statistically significant. Contrary to recent experiences then, reelection years may be the most agreeable years in terms of budget agreement. However, it should be reiterated that first and reelection year coefficients are not statistically significant and only last year is important (significant). Thus, budget agreement is not influenced much by whether or not it is the president’s first or reelection year, but lame duck years make a significant and negative difference.6 Turning to individual presidents, the results in table 4.1 also indicate

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Table 4.1. Budget Agreement and Political Time Controls N

Coefficient

26 26

1.21 95.78****

24 28

–2.86** 97.71****

9 5 7 31

–0.78 –4.70** 1.35 96.79****

4 8 3 5 5 3 4 8 4 8

94.87**** 0.78 0.11 1.13 1.88 3.81 2.45 4.55 4.45 –2.07

Historical Era

Post Reform (≥1975) Pre Reform (constant) Presidential Party

Democratic Republican (constant)

0.0754**

Select Year in Term

First Year Last Year Reelection Year Other (constant)

0.0505*

President

Truman (constant) Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Clinton

Adjusted R 2 –0.0028

0.0486

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

that the individual president dummy variables also do not have much of an effect on budget agreement as hypothesized, largely because Truman’s poor showing absorbs most of the variance. Although the variables for Reagan and George H. W. Bush come close to attaining significance, none of the individual presidents prove important in explaining budget agreement. The model possesses modest explanatory power, an adjusted R2 of 0.049; however, no individual president is significant. Therefore, any explanatory power of the model is spurious. The only interesting coefficient is the negative value exhibited for Clinton, the only president to score lower budget agreement overall than the constant (Truman). The results for the four separate political time controls on budget agreement reveal that budget agreement is not a function of historical era or individual president, but it is related to presidential party and year in presidential

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term. Recall that there is an incremental effect in which the previous year’s level of budget agreement influences the current year’s level of budget agreement. Finally, I now turn to the general and policy models of three levels as potential explanations of budget agreement.

GENERAL AND POLICY MODELS I originally anticipated that all three levels would have some effect on budget agreement but that the environmental level was the most important. The results in table 4.2 indicate that for the general model, only the environment level has an effect, while variables in the personal and institutional levels do not. As found for Democratic presidents above, liberals do slightly worse in budget agreement but more popular presidents do slightly better. However, these coefficients are so small as to be not very reliable and are not statistically significant. A similar situation occurs for the institutional level where neither variable approaches statistical significance. Things start to get interesting for trade balance and, especially, unemployment; both are positively related to budget agreement. Somewhat surprisingly, the lag variable washes out in the overall model and so trend is not a factor when including other explanatory variables. The overall model does just an adequate job of explaining budget agreement.7 Readers of Shull and Shaw (1999, chap. 7) will probably be shocked that I use a model in this study that explains considerably less of the variance in the same dependent variable, budget agreement. My reasons for this decision to include this variable are several. First, I am comparing nonunilateral budget agreement to presidential unilateral powers here rather than to presidential-congressional interactions. Second, some of the variables used in the earlier study were highly related to some of the variables I use here, and others were dropped for theoretical reasons.8 For example, I wanted to use Mayhew’s (1991) budget situation index, but decided that unemployment was a better measure for some of my alternative powers than others that could have been included. Third, different independent variables are used here to tap broader theoretical interpretations of presidential power. All in all, the limited findings that appear here for budget agreement are much better in subsequent chapters and, of course, I wanted to use the same parsimonious six variable model to study all four presidential alternative actions. Table 4.2 also differentiates the results by domestic and foreign policy. The explanatory power of the domestic model is lower, perhaps indicating that other factors may affect domestic policy budget agreement.9 I lose just a bit of the already limited explanatory power of the general model in the

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Table 4.2. Budget Agreement (with Robust Standard Errors in all Models) General Model

Domestic Model

Foreign Model

Personal

President ADA Popular Approval

–0.019 (0.025) 0.018 (0.035)

–0.028 (0.088) –1.135*** (0.870)

0.042*** (0.019) –0.013 (0.032)

0.013 (0.069) 0.000 (0.001)

0.161 (0.196) –0.008** (0.007)

–0.001 (0.043) 0.000 (0.000)

0.000* (0.000) 1.051** (0.455)

0.019 (0.056) –8.585*** (6.765)

–0.005 (0.005) 0.0509 (0.400)

Institutional

Legislative Success Employees EOP

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

Adjusted R2 Durbin-Watson h Statistic Breusch-Godfrey LM

0.217 (0.197) 69.053**** (20.120) 0.3290**** –0.15 0.82

–0.354** (0.225) 256.14**** (125.255)

0.008 (0.150) 90.122*** (14.888)

0.2534** –0.12 0.31

0.1995 0.57 0.56

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients are the standard errors.

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

domestic model. However, in this domestic model, all three levels of influence have an effect. Unpopular presidents have greater budget agreement as do presidents having smaller executive staffs. As expected, lower unemployment in the exogenous environment is strongly related to budget agreement (at the 0.01 level of significance). Finally, the lag variable reemerges in the domestic model, suggesting that it is highly related to time. It is interesting that the domestic model is quite different from the general model in that totally different variables influence budget agreement. The foreign policy model of budget agreement is a disappointment with only 19 percent of the variance explained. In foreign policy I find that presi-

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dential liberalism is strongly related to budget agreement (significant at the 0.01 level). This is a curious finding but, of course, agreement was quite high for liberals Kennedy and Johnson. No other variable in the model approaches statistical significance, and the coefficients of most are so small that I would not wish to suggest much even about directionality of relationships. Only unemployment has a slight positive relationship with foreign policy budget agreement. In short, the foreign model is not as well specified as the domestic or, particularly, the general models of budget agreement. Overall, the findings for budget agreement are limited, especially compared to those of Shull and Shaw (1999, chap. 7). The multiple perspective approach is supported in part by the fact that all three levels are necessary to explain domestic budget agreement and that is a useful result. It was also important that, despite limited explanatory power, different variables were important in each of the three models, suggesting the need to divide prerogative powers into issue areas. However, it was a disappointment that only a single variable was useful in the foreign policy model and just two variables were significant for the overall model. Surprisingly, presidents’ legislative success was the only variable that failed to attain significance in any of the three models of budget agreement.

RESPONSES TO PREROGATIVE ACTIONS The president largely became chief budgeter beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, yet Congress supposedly had the power of the purse. That conflict led to considerable disagreement beginning in the early 1970s and continued with divided government. Congress sought to gain the upper hand in the budget process with the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, but found that centralized decision making in Congress is elusive and individual committee decisions remain important. Wildavsky (1988, chap. 4) argues that the Act brought more checks and balances but no more congressional control of the process. Studies show that presidents continue to use and Congress to support a related form of impoundment, called rescissions (McMurty 1997). However, congressional Republicans sought greater influence for party leaders on budgeting after gaining a majority in both chambers in 1995 (Pfiffner 2000). Congress did chip away at presidential dominance in budgeting. Shuman (1992, 214) states that the 1974 legislation was designed to discipline both institutions. However, the emerging deficit made discipline even from the conservative Republican 104th and 105th Congresses problematic. They were not able to gain the budget goals that they had sought in challenging Presi-

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dent Clinton. Mowrey (1980) suggests that Congress is unable to fill the vacuum in budgeting, even under ineffective presidential management. The 1980s and 1990s brought budget resolutions that were particularly controversial and partisan (Cox et al. 1993). Schick (1986, 8–15) shows how the changed process allowed Congress to influence presidents’ budgeting plans but simultaneously gave presidents greater leverage over congressional decisions. Sometimes deadlock occurred while it was avoided on other occasions. Fisher (2000, 125) argues that the Budget and Impoundment Control Act has done little to further congressional influence in budgeting. Although it did centralize the legislative process it made budgets much more difficult to pass and increased deadlock, particularly under frequently divided government. As seen in the late 1990s and into the new century, presidents and Congress had a difficult time agreeing to the thirteen annual budget bills on time and, on several occasions, budgets were simply continued without review until much later in the fiscal year. Several legislative reforms, such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, were unsuccessful in dealing either with looming deficits or with budget targets, and the courts declared one unconstitutional. As we shall see with war powers, however, the courts generally refused to intervene between the political branches to settle their disputes.

DISCUSSION The Budget of the United States is a political document and therefore a primary battleground for conflicts between presidents and Congress (Thurber 1996, 209). The budget process reveals an important interaction between the two modern institutions due to the fact that, as mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, Congress requires a budget document from modern presidents. I also indicated that this device gives presidents a leg up on the legislature because of the unified nature of the executive branch and because presidents act first while Congress responds. Numerous studies document the changes in presidential-congressional relations brought about by the various reform efforts since the 1921 Budget Act (LeLoup 1980; Schick 1986; Thurber 1996). Scholars generally agree that the 1974 Act changed Congress’s own practices rather than those of the executive (Marini 1992, 8). It centralized decision making more in Congress but shifted power somewhat between the president and Congress. Schick (1986, 15) contends that the 1974 Act constrained both actors and made them even less cooperative. Shuman (1992, 16) argues that although presidents set the budget agenda, they influence subsequent decisions only marginally. The courts rarely intervened in dis-

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putes between the two branches. In U.S. v. Nixon, impoundment was deemed illegal, but other devices have been effectively used by presidents. In addition, the item veto, a device given to a Democratic president by a conservative Republican Congress, was soon declared unconstitutional by the courts. Rare court decisions, legislation, and a decentralized Congress (even after some centralization of the budget process) allowed presidents to use budgeting as an administrative presidency device to gain leverage over Congress in spending decisions. Unlike the other three more prerogative actions examined, budget agreement is neither a consistently increasing nor decreasing phenomenon; rather, the trend analysis indicates that its frequency varies marginally. Additionally, budget agreement is not influenced much by historical era, select year in presidential term (except last year), or individual presidents, but it is influenced by political party (Republicans do slightly better than Democrats; see table 4.1). The trend line as well as the post-1974 coefficient reveal that slightly greater budget agreement has occurred in more recent years and during presidential reelection years. These findings provide some evidence that political time factors have at least marginal consequences on budgeting. Modern presidents actually received greater budget agreement than those prior to 1975. The three (one general and two policy) models show that only the environmental level influences the general model. Thus, as expected, economic variables are most important. While unemployment continues to influence the domestic policy model, it is joined by influences from the personal and institutional levels. The foreign policy model is poorly explained and only by a single personal variable. Although I anticipated that all three levels should have an effect on the alternative powers, the fact that all are necessary to explain domestic budget agreement, supports the thesis that no single level within the multiple perspective approach is adequate to fully understand presidential prerogatives. Thus, models of budgeting must be more inclusive. The strong effects of the exogenous environment make considerable sense. Most of the funds that the president and Congress deal with each year are already obligated and, therefore, basically uncontrollable. However when the economy is improving with deficits decreasing, one would expect Congress and the president to have more flexibility in their negotiations, and for Congress to possess a greater willingness to fund the budget requests made by the president. This compromise attitude should derive from less concern over fiscal discipline and less public scrutiny. The one thing we know with a great deal of certainty is that budget agreement does not vary by huge amounts either from year to year or across many years.

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The importance of the environment reminds us of systems theory notions and influences external to government. Little evidence of administrative presidency or presidential power theories appear since individual or personal president factors mattered little. Neo-institutionalism also fails to explain much in my models of budget agreement. Still, individuals, institutions, and the environment are all important in budgeting, but to greatly varying degrees across policy areas. Hopefully examining the following three more unilateral presidential powers will provide a clearer understanding of the performance of the multiple perspective model (with its various controls). Neither Congress nor the president is able to change much of what must be allocated to pay personnel, fund programs, and pay interest on the debt. Thus, the president and Congress wrangle over increasingly limited discretionary (controllable) dollars that seem like much to the general public, but which are relatively small when compared to overall federal expenditures. Although budget agreement varies little, I explain a considerable portion of the variation in this important presidential-congressional interaction, and it appears to be largely and increasingly under presidential discretion. Congressional reform efforts to date have largely diminished rather than heightened the role of the first (legislative) branch in the “power of the purse.” Budgeting remains among the most important interactions between Congress and presidents. Securing the homeland and the War in Iraq, combined with massive tax cuts, returned the nation to deficit financing with the largest deficit in U.S. history in 2003–2006.

5 EXECUTIVE ORDERS Chief Executive

On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman issued two momentous executive orders: #9980 to end racial discrimination in government employment and #9981 requiring equality of treatment in the armed forces. In also pushing for a civil rights plank in the Democratic Party platform, Truman angered many in his own Democratic Party. This action led to the revolt by the southern Dixiecrats and nearly cost him reelection to the presidency in 1948. Much more recently, in December 2002, George W. Bush issued executive orders pushing his “faith based initiative,” which had failed to pass during the 107th Congress. His orders on the subject required among other things equal treatment of religious and nonreligious organizations in applying for federal funding. Although civil liberties groups opposed his actions, the order was a response to congressional inaction on a high profile agenda item. In this chapter, executive order issuance is examined as one form of unilateral decision-making activity by presidents. The Bill Clinton–George W. Bush transition reveals some interesting uses of this prerogative power. Clinton faced a hostile Republican Congress during his last six years in office. Before departing office, Clinton received much publicity for certain actions such as pardons, which is a power given to presidents in the Constitution. Less attention was given to his exercise of executive orders late in office, which are authorized neither by Congress nor the Constitution. One author discusses Clinton’s utilization of executive orders and other devices, such as rules changes, in order to “circumvent Congress . . . and reshape federal policy on the environment, the workplace and other areas” (Fram, New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 13, 2000, A-10). Apart from the faith based executive orders mentioned above, Bush utilized sev-

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eral devices to undo numerous actions Clinton had taken, many of them in the environmental area. George W. Bush used administrative presidency devices, some of which seemed to go against his expressed views during the 2000 election of favoring more support for states’ rights. Even conservative Republicans expressed concern about federal intrusion into matters that concerned the states. Obviously, many Bush actions were through regulations rather than law or even executive order. Such is not atypical but Bush seemed unusually aggressive in pushing such regulations (New York Times, August 15, 2004, 16). Certainly, many actions were in response to perceived threats to domestic security. Two executive orders were immediate responses to the 9/11 Commission, who had expressed dismay about intelligence lapses. Bush initially opposed an intelligence czar who would have control over personnel and budgets of the fifteen intelligence agencies but eventually came around to the idea that someone other than the CIA director needed fuller authority to control budgets and personnel of these agencies. This book is about presidents using their prerogative powers to gain greater influence in policymaking, but sometimes they must compromise to obtain at least some of their preferences. Most of the competition for influence involves Congress, but it can also refer to restricting or enabling the rest of the executive branch. Many authors have recognized that the characterization of the president as the “chief executive” is somewhat misleading. It assumes principal agency rather than bureaucratic discretion, but the evidence is quite mixed as to which theory best explains executive branch relations (Brehm and Gates 1997; Eisner and Meier 1990; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 1994). Certainly issuing proclamations, executive orders, national decision directives, and other unilateral devices should enhance presidential influence over the rest of the executive branch. By passing more general or omnibus legislation (Krutz 2001), Congress has somewhat bypassed presidents and granted great authority to bureaucratic agencies, such as the writing of specific rules (Kerwin 2003). As legislation has become more technologically complex (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999), legislators do not particularly like to deal with specific details, which leaves much of the enforcement to agencies with little congressional oversight. West (1995) observes a laxness by all three branches (presidents, Congress, and the courts) that has led to agencies gaining much administrative discretion. He points out how Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan in particular, attempted to reduce rule making by the bureaucracy, often without much success. In 1981, Ronald Reagan issued executive order #12291, which required

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that all new regulations be subject to cost-benefit analysis through the OMB. The OMB has central clearance over agency program and budget requests, so the order was designed to make new regulations compatible with presidential policy preferences. Harris and Milkis (1996) argue that Reagan seemed to have a particular antipathy toward social agencies while George H. W. Bush sought “kinder, gentler” regulatory reform. Despite several other efforts to reduce regulations, neither president was able to eliminate a single regulatory law or agency. Indeed, the brief reduction in the number of pages in the Federal Register (a good indicator of growth in government) under Reagan increased dramatically during Reagan’s final years and into the George H. W. Bush term. When William Clinton became president in 1993, he was less concerned with limiting regulation. In fact, he issued executive order #12866, which largely repealed Reagan’s more restrictive order. Although Clinton was conservative on government costs, he was more willing to allow regulation and rule making to continue than were his two immediate predecessors.

WHAT ARE EXECUTIVE ORDERS? Executive orders are “instruments of government authority” (Cooper 1986, 236) and are important actions despite receiving very little attention in the empirical literature until recently (Gleiber and Shull 1992; Howell 2003; Shull 1997, chap. 7; Mayer 1999; Utter and Cooper 1995). Although executive orders can serve purely routine (or administrative) functions, they may also have policy purposes. Examples of dramatic orders include Franklin Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese Americans in 1942, Richard Nixon’s classifying of sensitive national security information, and Ronald Reagan’s limiting administrative regulation. Mentioned above are orders both before and after the years of this study, the primary concentration of which is 1949– 2000. There are two types of executive orders: those primarily for policy adoption and those largely intended to implement policy (Gleiber and Shull 1992). Executive orders issued as mechanisms of policy adoption are seemingly separate from the legislative process, yet are the presidential actions most likely to be influenced by interactions with Congress. Those issued primarily for implementation purposes seem more likely to be directed at the bureaucracy and to be more routine and organizational.1 I have suggested that executive order issuance relates to presidents’ legislative relations. Some argue that presidents issue executive orders when they are not highly supported in Congress, as part of an “administrative presidency” strategy (Durant 1992; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989). Although evidence is mixed, other research finds a positive relationship between these

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two variables. Gomez and Shull (1995) observe a 0.48 correlation between success and executive order issuance. Little additional research has been conducted on the interrelationship of these legislative and executive actions, or examining these orders according to groupings of political time and policy areas (but see Gomez and Shull 1997). The most extensive examinations of executive order issuance by issue area have been in civil rights. Shull (1989; 1999) argues that presidents have considerable discretion in this issue area, and that issuing executive orders is a device that they have used to pursue their policy preferences. Congress is not likely to take the lead on controversial redistributive policies like civil rights (Lowi 1964; Shull 1997, chap. 2), and occasionally presidents will use orders as a prelude to requesting legislation, as happened during the 1960s (Mayer 2001, 184).2 This was particularly necessary due to the dominance of southern conservatives in Congress during the 1950s and early 1960s. Obviously, large numbers of former southern Democrats left the Democratic Party and Lyndon Johnson’s liberal policies. I mentioned the importance of civil rights executive orders here and in earlier chapters, but other important orders have occurred as well. Ironically, Kennedy’s order #10925 created the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and placed in charge Vice President Johnson, who would emerge as our greatest presidential champion of civil rights (Shull 1999). Not only did the most important legislation pass during his five-year tenure, but he also took the greatest number and the most liberal vote positions, and requested the highest budgets for civil rights (controlling for inflation) of all modern presidents (Shull 1999, 89, 106). Clearly he did not need to issue as many executive orders compared to other presidents and actually issued fewer than the average number. Although Clinton was nonassertive legislatively in civil rights, he issued more annual orders on average in civil rights than any president but Carter (Shull 1999, 87, 125). All in all, presidents have executive options in policymaking, but such motives and decisions also depend on the legislative environment they face. Presumably, presidents who are highly supported in Congress should have less need to issue executive orders, at least in order to adopt policy. Such an interpretation would argue that executive orders depend little upon legislation; rather, they are discretionary administrative actions. However, earlier research (Gomez and Shull 1997) reveals that orders are issued within a legislative context. In addition, personal factors like preferences and resources may also influence such decision making. I expect influences on executive order issuance by personal, institutional, and environmental factors. Political time and policy areas should also provide useful distinctions in this impor-

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tant unilateral action. This analysis should help scholars assess these important linkages since executive orders are a clearer presidential prerogative power than was budget agreement from the previous chapter.

EXPECTATIONS TREND Mayer (1999) observes that executive order issuance generally decreases each decade, so it is not surprising that I expect the same phenomenon. I have suggested that this decline may be due to the growing availability of other devices for presidents to further their policy preferences. These include executive agreements (discussed in the next chapter), proclamations, signing statements, national security directives, and statements of administration policy (SAPs). Evans and Oleszek (2002) argue that the latter are similar to veto threats, but the compilation of this device is available only from the 105th Congress. Cooper (2002, 13) argues that counting the number of orders is not useful, but I contend that we need to decipher any patterns occurring over time. Any scholar wishing to measure them empirically must utilize some kind of count, so I examine frequencies of order issuance (both all and major orders). Overall, the gradual decline in order issuance should be incremental, and as such, the count and lag variables should be only marginally related.

POLITICAL TIME As mentioned in chapter 1, executive orders are the only prerogative action by presidents studied here that was not challenged by major legislation in the 1970s; hence, I expect not only an incremental effect, but also a slightly decreasing effect over time. Contrary to earlier expectations on civil rights (Flaxbeard 1983, 12; Morgan 1970, 78–80), Shull (1989, 94) finds that Republicans, not Democrats, are more likely to issue civil rights orders; however, this tendency may not occur for other issue areas or overall. In addition, Gomez and Shull (1995) show that Democrats are more assertive. The literature reveals that presidents have used executive orders within this policy realm for different reasons. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton were among the heaviest users of civil rights executive orders, although their policy preferences differed greatly (Shull 1999). One scholar finds that Carter used orders to seek greater representativeness and participation, while Reagan used them as a device to reduce bureaucratic rule making (Kerwin 2003, 70). Research of this sort describes motivations and activities overall and

100 CHAPTER 5

occasionally by issue area, but it provides limited theoretical explanation for such decisions by presidents. All in all, party differences in executive order issuance should be small, but Democrats should issue more orders, probably due to greater overall assertiveness (Mayer 2001, 98; 1999, 462). Individual presidents likely will vary considerably in their utilization of executive orders. Because of the earlier finding by Gomez and Shull (1995), it is easy to hypothesize that presidents receiving greater legislative support (for example, primarily Democrats) will also issue more executive orders. However, it is possible that support is not the operative variable; rather, individual president is the driving force. In other words, presidents who are assertive in taking vote positions could also be assertive in issuing executive orders. In any event, the expectation is that Truman, Carter, and Reagan will push many orders, the latter two perhaps due to the extensive regulatory efforts by both administrations in civil rights (Shull 1999) and in other issue areas. Conversely, Dwight Eisenhower, Gerald Ford, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton should issue fewer orders. Of course, Ford inherited the office from the vice presidency, served very briefly, and had little inclination to adopt alternative policy. Mayer (2001, 458) and Howell (2003, 90) find significant differences in executive order issuance by individual presidents. Finally, executive order issuance should vary according to selected year in presidents’ term of office. Because it was earlier asserted that presidents would be more assertive during their first and last year, it might be assumed that more orders should occur then rather than during their reelection year. However, presidents presumably concentrate on legislation early, but then turn to administrative solutions later in their term. Accordingly, executive orders should be issued with least frequency during their first year in office and more during their reelection year (Mayer 2001, 98; 1999, 458–59). However, a caveat is in order here because I have suggested that Reagan and George W. Bush issued numerous orders upon taking office to counter actions by their Democratic predecessors. Also, because domestic policy is given greater attention earlier in presidential administrations, orders in the foreign policy area should increase over their years in office. However, Krause and Cohen (2000), find no pattern across presidential term.

POLICY AREAS Executive order issuance probably has changed by policy area over time, as government has grown more complex. One might think that order issuance would be greater in areas traditionally deferred to more by Congress (for ex-

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ample, foreign policy; Canes-Wrone et al. 1999). However, these are prerogative powers and I argue here that domestic issues receive greater executive order attention, while executive agreements and national security directives make order usage less important in the realm of foreign policy (Mayer 2001, 181). Thus, order issuance increasingly should be concentrated more often in routine domestic areas. On average, Republican presidents should issue more orders in foreign policy than Democrats, and the highest percentage of domestic orders should occur during presidents’ last year in office (Shull 1997, 105–106). Perhaps not surprisingly, Shull (1997) finds George H. W. Bush issuing his highest percentage of executive orders in foreign policy (63 percent), while Richard Nixon issued just 31 percent of his orders in that domain.3 Individual presidential differences may also vary by policy areas. As stated earlier, I do not expect much difference by policy area in personal variable effects on executive order issuance. Liberals are expected to push domestic policy more, while conservatives will concentrate more on foreign policy. In the institutional environment, the effects of executive staffing will probably be marginal in foreign policy because of the growing complexity of issuing orders in that domain. Trade should affect foreign policy order issuance while unemployment should have greater effect on domestic policy orders. Diverse influences should occur from the three levels of the multiple perspective approach across the three models (overall, domestic, and foreign policy areas) in issuance of executive orders.

THREE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE Personal Recall that I use just six explanatory variables (two within each of three levels of influence) plus a lag variable to examine each of the four prerogative powers. It was assumed in chapter 2 that both personal variables would be positive in the explanation of executive orders. Ideology should matter with liberals being more assertive in pushing their policy preferences, a finding congruent with Gleiber and Shull (1992). One might think that conservatives would do the same, but I assume, with the possible exception of Reagan, that they are less assertive overall. Interestingly, as with its relationship with legislative success, the effects of popular approval for order issuance remains elusive. Krause and Cohen (1997, 469) find no relationship but Mayer (1999, 459) and Mayer and Price (2000, 379) find approval negatively related to executive order issuance. Therefore, I posit a modest negative relationship on the assumption that presidents who are unpopular will seek to show

102 CHAPTER 5

activity to curry favor with the general public. If personal variables are important, then contrary to Neustadt (1960), presidents can command as argued by Howell (2003) rather than being limited to persuasion.

Institutional The two institutional variables include both executive and legislative branch elements, but I anticipate similar effects for the two institutional variables (a positive relationship both for size of the Executive Office of the President and for legislative success). One could assume that more staff help the president develop executive order options to legislative adoption and also for bureaucratic implementation (Gleiber and Shull 1992). I suggested earlier that a positive relationship exists in studies relating presidents’ legislative success to executive order issuance (Gomez and Shull 1995; Krause and Cohen 1997, 475), so it appears that success encourages presidents to utilize their prerogative powers further. Of course, since Democratic presidents appear to use executive orders more and are overall more successful, these two variables may be working together. Neo-institutional theory would be persuasive if these two variables are significant for executive order issuance.

Environmental Lastly, I assume that poor economic conditions (trade imbalance and high unemployment) would encourage executive order issuance. However, Mayer (1999) finds no effects of the economy. Still, we know that presidents get some credit for a good economy but much blame for a poor one (Frendreis and Tatalovich 1994). Also, I documented earlier that Democrats will be particularly concerned with high unemployment and will be more likely than Republicans to seek executive solutions to solve this problem (Saeki and Shull 2003). Trade imbalance is a trickier variable to predict because it seems more remote. Probably when imbalance is greater, presidents will utilize executive options to resolve this potentially damaging problem for the economy. Trade is likely to be more important for foreign than domestic policy order issuance.

RESULTS The discussion begins with plots of the annual frequency of executive order issuance. I include in this graph the lag and count variables to examine the effects of trend. Then I consider the political time controls: by the pre/post

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congressional reform period, by presidential party, by individual president, and then by year in presidential term of office. This discussion is followed by the regression analysis of three levels of influence variables: personal, institutional, and environmental, both overall and by policy area. The final analysis consists of examining major executive orders as a control to see how they differ from overall executive orders.

TREND The results of the trend analysis appear in figure 5.1, where the decrease of executive order issuance over time is evident. Except for spikes under Truman, Kennedy, and Carter, the overall decrease is rather gradual. Truman issued the most (119) in 1951, while Clinton issued the fewest (thirty-four) in 1999. Except for the unusual year of 1974 (with two presidents, Nixon and Ford) where just forty total orders were issued, that low figure was reached and even reduced on eight occasions since then. The one year lag is highly significant in demonstrating that executive order activity from the previous year affects current year activity in a downward trend. However, no longterm trend occurs in the count variable in the propensity to issue executive agreements; it is negative but insignificant. Overall, presidents average about sixty orders per year. In the next chapter I examine whether or not executive agreements have taken up the slack in executive order issuance.

POLITICAL TIME The results of the four separate models serving as controls for political time appear in table 5.1, where three of the four models are statistically significant. On average, and as predicted, more than sixteen fewer executive orders occur annually in the post-reform era (1975 and after) than in the earlier years. The results show that the two historical eras are statistically different from each other at the 0.01 level. Democratic presidents also issue twelve more executive orders on a yearly basis than Republicans and party overall is significant at the 0.05 level. This finding is consistent with Shull (1997, chap. 7), who observes that Democratic presidents, often characterized as more activist than Republicans, do indeed average many more orders. Shull also observed that Democratic presidents were much more successful on their positiontaking on legislative votes than were Republicans (1997, chap. 6). Therefore, Democrats probably are not issuing orders for independent executive policy adoption, but rather to implement policies with which they agree. Also, Democratic presidents (except Truman and Clinton) have always had their

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Figure 5.1. Executive Orders, 1949–2000

partisan supporters in charge of both chambers of Congress. This fact relates to the dichotomous divided government variable (excluded here), which is slightly better (at 25.9 percentage points) than party at differentiating executive order issuance.4 Perhaps surprisingly, year in term is not at all statistically significant and explains just 1 percent of the variance in executive order issuance. Presidents issue more orders in their first year and issue fewer during last and, especially, reelection years. However, none of the yearly differences are significant (see table 5.1). Last year does not stand out in order issuance; thus, orders are seldom used to adopt alternative policies to legislation as presi-

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Table 5.1. Executive Orders and Political Time Controls N

Coefficient

26 26

–16.11** 68.00****

24 28

12.02** 54.39****

Historical Era

Post-Reform (≥ 1975) Pre-Reform (constant) Presidential Party

Democratic Republican (constant)

0.0787**

Select Year in Term

First Year Last Year Reelection Year Other (constant)

0.0130

9 5 7 31

7.23 –3.95 –10.98 60.55

President

Truman (constant) Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Clinton

Adjusted R2 0.1583***

0.5803****

4 8 3 5 5 3 4 8 4 8

99.50**** –39.75**** –23.50** –37.70**** –40.33**** –38.00**** –21.75** –49.25**** –58.25**** –56.00****

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

dents leave office. This finding is contrary to preliminary expectations. Presidents average the fewest orders during reelection years. A possible explanation is that greater public attentiveness means presidents might not wish to chance such visible actions. Overall, however, few perceptible differences in average frequency of order issuance across selected year in presidents’ term of office are observable. If year in term is not useful, each individual president issued statistically significantly fewer executive orders than the constant (Truman), who averaged one hundred orders annually. This is an interesting contrast to budget agreement, where no president was statistically different from Truman. Kennedy and Carter are significant at only the 0.05 level, which means that their more frequent usage showed less deviation from the high Truman level.

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Nathan (1983) argues that Nixon and Reagan best represent an administrative presidency strategy. However, other literature shows that Nixon did not try to dismantle the great society; in fact, he expanded it in some areas (Ripley, 1972). Somewhat surprisingly, the differences are greatest for Nixon, who issued the greatest percentage of his orders among all presidents in the domestic realm (Shull 1997). Thus, despite Nixon’s foreign policy interests, he gave considerable attention to domestic matters. Such a finding could reflect bureaucratic discretion in the domestic realm. The fact that Reagan was even less likely to issue orders does not square with observations of his assertiveness in the administrative presidency (Durant 1992; Nathan 1983; Waterman 1989). George H. W. Bush issued the fewest executive orders on a yearly basis (about forty-two fewer than Truman). Clinton was not far behind with just two more per year on average than Reagan. However, Bush the elder was clearly an outlier, showing more disdain for the domestic realm than any modern president. Overall, the model of individual president in explaining executive order issuance is highly significant (explaining 58 percent of the variance).5 The near steady decline in issuing executive orders is particularly evident in the last three presidents (Reagan–Clinton).

GENERAL AND POLICY MODELS Table 5.2 provides the multivariate analysis of the multiple perspective variables with overall and policy executive orders. Recall that overall refers to all orders (including more routine symbolic, agency personnel, and federalism). The adjusted R2 for the general model is a robust 63 percent of the variance explained, and the model is highly significant at the 0.001 level. These overall results for the six variables are much more parsimonious and provide better explanation than the original thirteen variables (R2 = 0.56 percent), discussed in the appendix. The three levels provide the best explanatory power for executive orders among my four presidential unilateral actions. Obviously the model is quite powerful and serial correlation is not a problem.6 I now discuss the three levels of influence separately, first for the general and then for the policy models of executive order issuance. The personal variables prove a disappointment in the overall model of executive order issuance (see table 5.2). There it can be observed that neither of the personal variables is statistically significant, even at the 0.10 level. Liberal presidents issue slightly more orders than conservatives, and presidents with lower approval also issue more orders than those with greater popular approval. Still, it is hard to see how these personal variables matter

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Table 5.2. Executive Orders (Robust Standard Errors Except for Domestic Model) General Model

Domestic Model

Foreign Model

Personal

President ADA Popular Approval

–0.008 (0.032) –0.135* (0.086)

0.074 (0.058) –0.296 (0.235)

0.072 (–0.051) –0.231 (0.157)

0.365* (0.151) –0.002 (0.002)

0.279* (0.000) 0.000 (0.002)

0.191** (0.073) –0.004**** (0.002)

0.061** (0.030) –0.985 (.148)

0.038 (0.027) –0.324 (1.372)

0.034** (0.012) –1.090 (0.813)

0.318** (0.147) 42.49* (27.734)

0.274 (0.172) 23.076 (19.46)

Institutional

Legislative Success Employees EOP

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

Adjusted R2

0.6311****

Durbin-Watson h Statistic Breusch-Godfrey LM Statistic

0.03 1.98

0.4693**** –0.09 3.3

0.005 (0.161) 29.951 (11.066) 0.4315**** 0.10 1.93

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients are standard error values. **** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level. *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

at all in explaining this prerogative action. Accordingly, the hope is for greater explanatory power from institutional and environmental variables. In examining the two institutional influences, legislative success is positively related (as predicted) rather than negatively associated with executive order issuance but is significant at only the 0.10 level. Thus, presidents who are more successful also issue the most orders overall (see table 5.2). This finding is consistent with Gomez and Shull (1995) and Mayer (2001). The other institutional variable, employees in the EOP, has no influence on general executive order issuance. What these findings seem to suggest is that the

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legislative environment is more important than the administrative one in explaining the usage of this prerogative power. Finally, I examine the importance of the two environmental conditions. Trade balance is positively related at the 0.05 level, which is the best explanatory variable in the general model of executive order issuance. A potential explanation for this finding is that quite a few executive orders deal with issues of trade (Shull 1997). Unemployment is not significantly related to executive order issuance, but the coefficient suggests that when unemployment is low presidents issue more executive orders. All in all, the environment provides the best explanation of executive order issuance across the three levels of influence. Finally, the one year lag is significant at the 0.05 level and is suggestive of the downward trend in general executive order issuance, even with other influences in the model. Next I examine executive order issuance by issue areas. Mayer (2001, 81) reports increasing order issuance in foreign policy and decreases in such domestic areas as public lands and civil service. Shull (1997, chap. 7) finds that presidents average significantly more executive orders (by 11.1 percentage points) in the domestic sphere than in foreign policy.7 Obviously, part of this explanation is due to the passage of more domestic than foreign legislation. In comparing foreign and domestic order issuance in table 5.2, the domestic policy model provides lower explanatory power than the overall model, but is still highly significant, explaining 47 percent of the variance. Only legislative success among the six variables in the multiple perspective approach is significant for domestic order issuance, and only at the 0.10 level. The foreign policy model actually explains somewhat less variance, but is more interesting because at least one variable from each of the three levels helps explain the still robust 43 percent variance. As with the domestic policy model for budget agreement, the multiple perspective approach is especially important for foreign order issuance. Here we get stronger findings for success, but even better explanatory power for trade balance, and especially for employees in the EOP. In fact, the latter variable was totally unimportant for general or domestic order issuance, but fewer EOP employees relates the highest of all variables to more foreign policy orders. Even popular approval is significant at the 0.10 level in the foreign model of order issuance. The overall result is that the lag variable washes out in the policy models and, at least in the foreign policy model, greater complexity is provided with the multiple perspective approach.8 The findings reveal the utility of the two presidencies thesis. Most results were as expected: Democrats give relatively greater attention to domestic policy; George H. W. Bush especially emphasized foreign policy. Shull

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(1997) finds that Democratic presidents (Truman and, particularly, Kennedy and Clinton) averaged many more domestic than foreign orders. Only two presidents issued more foreign than domestic orders (Reagan by a small margin and George H. W. Bush by a large margin). Presidents are more attentive to foreign policy executive orders during their reelection year. Although seemingly discretionary, presidents may choose not to emphasize highly visible domestic matters through executive action when running for reelection. All in all, this two presidencies dichotomy was quite useful in understanding this important (but somewhat declining) administrative action available to presidents (Shull 1997).

MAJOR EXECUTIVE ORDERS The final analysis in this chapter focuses on major or significant orders. For this portion of the project I examine only those orders that are important or policy oriented. In addition, the major category is simply the sum of the two policy categories and excludes procedural and other types of routine issues mentioned earlier.9 The overall results for the model for policy orders appear in table 5.3 and are interesting because more variables are significant and the effects of the lag variable are washed out. Indeed, both personal and institutional variables work in the model even though neither of the environmental variables is significant. Success is the most important explanatory variable (0.01 level of significance). At the same time, the overall explanatory power of the policy orders model is actually slightly less than for all executive orders issued annually. I still have sufficient orders annually but also present count regression for this variable in the appendix. Depending on the purpose of the research, major orders seem a good alternative to all executive orders for scholars.

RESPONSES TO PREROGATIVE POWERS Presidential discretion exists in executive order issuance because presidents argue strongly that this device is necessary in their role as chief executive. Congress has indeed delegated much to presidents, especially more in foreign than domestic policy (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). These authors argue that divided government tends to discourage such delegation, but that Congress still delegates heavily in the areas of agriculture and trade policy. Perhaps surprisingly, Congress has done little to restrict executive orders that alternatively adopt public policy (Howell 2003, chap. 5). Hinckley (1994) argues that Congress overdelegates to presidents and that Congress does not

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Table 5.3. Major (Policy) Orders Independent Variable

Coefficient

President ADA

0.089* (0.045) –0.322** (0.132) 0.431*** (0.142) –0.004** (0.002) 0.020 (0.000) –0.773 (1.18)

Popular Approval Legislative Success Employees EOP Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

0.164 (1.38) 33.533** (16.4)

Adjusted R2

0.558****

Durbin-Watson h Statistic Breusch-Godfrey LM Statistic

0.001 0.001

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients are standard error values. **** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level. *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

exercise proper oversight to maintain its own preferences in policymaking. Recall that this is a unilateral power not referred to at all in the Constitution but asserted by presidents to further their role as chief executive. When national emergencies occur, they are usually handled through executive orders. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 (PL 94–412) did spell out more clearly what constitutes an emergency, but presidents still use emergency situations to justify executive actions, often without consulting Congress. Executive orders may be intended for policy adoption or designed for policies already adopted by the executive or Congress (Gleiber and Shull 1992). They also seem to be used more by Democrats and when presidents have greater rather than less support in Congress. Even if the latter were not true, Congress has relatively few tools to punish a president who substitutes them for legislation or who misinterprets legislative intent (Carey and Shugart 1998, 260). Howell (2003) provides the only empirical study of leg-

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islative and judicial scrutiny of executive orders. His fascinating research shows little congressional scrutiny over this and other unilateral actions, using data based on the number of bills that refer to particular orders. Thirty-five executive orders have been challenged by Congress, but most fail, and only three bills actually passed restricting these orders (see also Canes-Wrone et al. 1999, 28). Congress is much more likely to prevail when it supports rather than opposes such orders (Howell 2003, 113, 121). Generally, Congress can restrain the president more easily in domestic than in foreign policy. Howell (2003) observes that Congress is more likely to challenge executive orders when they affect their constituencies. He finds a similar result with court challenges, where orders are more likely to be challenged if opposition exists in Congress, the public, the media, or interest groups (158). Howell observes that the first judicial challenge was Little v. Barremme (1804) primarily because the president had acted illegally against existing statute. Still, he finds that presidents prevail 83 percent of the time, and will be challenged much less often by lower than the Supreme Court and when no countering legislation exists (159). In a CRS Report for Congress, Fisher (1999b) provides examples of executive orders and proclamations during the modern period that led to controversies with Congress and the courts but contends that the latter two institutions have imperfect tools to rein in presidents who usurp their legislative authority. What we can conclude, then, is that the president can almost always act with impunity in issuing executive orders. The other two branches do not have easy or effective challenges to presidential use of this prerogative power.

DISCUSSION This last section of the chapter begins with some general findings about executive order issuance, revealing the utility of grouping these data by policy areas and political time. Then I draw some conclusions and implications about this unilateral action. Overall presidents issue on average nearly sixty executive orders annually. The gradual decline in order issuance has occurred especially in the post-reform period. Democrats issue more orders than Republicans and a higher proportion occur under unified than divided government. Obviously, Democratic presidents are much more likely to experience unified government than Republican presidents. Among individual presidents, Truman and Carter issued many, as expected, but Nixon and Reagan were not as assertive as the administrative presidency thesis would suggest (Nathan 1983). All in all, every subsequent president issued significantly fewer orders than Truman; Reagan, and particularly, George H. W. Bush and

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Clinton, reveal the decreased trend in executive order issuance. Presumably this decline has been taken up by other unilateral or prerogative actions available to presidents, as we shall see in subsequent chapters. Policy area differences were interesting but somewhat less well explained than overall order issuance. Although all three models are highly significant, the domestic policy model includes only one single significant variable, while the foreign policy model has four, at least one from each environment. Thus, some of the expectations were supported, while others were not. As anticipated, orders are more likely in domestic than in foreign policy. Democrats do issue more orders overall and a higher proportion of domestic orders relative to Republicans. Reagan and Bush the elder, particularly, issued greater proportions of executive orders in the foreign than domestic realm. Certainly the latter is not surprising, given George H. W. Bush’s disdain for domestic and budget policy (Rockman 1991, 22). Foreign policy orders are more likely during reelection year and proportionately more domestic orders occur during the last year in office (Shull 1997, 106). Presidents probably need to issue more orders in the domestic realm as alternative policy adoption, while their greater legislative support in foreign policy suggests they use such orders to carry out legislation with which they agree, or for routine administration. The multiple perspective approach is parsimonious but also explained a considerable amount of executive order issuance. For overall order issuance, legislative success among other variables was important, and for domestic order issuance, it was the only significant variable. Success was particularly important in the foreign policy model. Thus, presidents should consider their legislative relations when issuing executive orders. Indeed, Gomez and Shull (1995) also observe that legislative support was among the most important influences on the frequency of executive orders. But in the foreign policy realm, so was staff size, suggesting strong neo-institutional influences. On average, presidents receiving the most success/support also issue the most executive orders. Thus, they are not in a situation where they must adopt alternative policy because of a hostile Congress. Trade balance was equally important for both overall and foreign orders, suggesting that many of the foreign orders may have an international trade orientation. This finding suggests that scholars need to include a wider array of influences (other than presidential power variables) to explain presidential decisions. Related to the above finding, Democratic presidents appear to be using executive orders as a tool of implementing laws adopted by Congress with which they agree. This is because when they are supported in Congress, they issue more orders; thus, Democrats have less need than Republicans to

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adopt alternative policies autonomously. When not supported in Congress, presidential motives are more likely alternative policy adoption. When receiving high levels of support, presidents apparently issue orders to provide more specific rules and administrative routine to carry out the legislation. Examining only major orders excludes more routine actions by presidents but makes for greater explanatory power for individual variables, such as the size of EOP. Accordingly, major (or policy) orders could be used exclusively in future research, perhaps as a substitute to Mayer and Price’s (2002) significant orders, which are very few. I also find that presidential ideology and unemployment are never important for executive order issuance. However, popular approval is significant (at the 0.10 level) and employees in the EOP are highly significant in the foreign model of executive order issuance. I would not have obtained a complete picture of executive order issuance had I not also distinguished them by domestic and foreign. Because of varied motivations for executive orders, political time, policy areas, and the multiple perspective approach help to reveal the diverse strategies available to presidents. The models of executive order issuance work very well overall, much better than they did for budget agreement. Perhaps this is because budget agreement is not as directly a prerogative power as is executive orders. While I concede the point, I am convinced that some budget indicator is needed to compare to other more agreed upon prerogative powers over this extended time period. Although presidents use executive orders for a variety of purposes, it is clear that they have continued to exercise this prerogative throughout American history. While order issuance is diminishing since the 1970s and other unilateral actions are taking up the slack, executive orders continue to be an important alternative to legislation and in need of further research. As was seen earlier, some of them have been monumental decisions. Often presidents have used them when they wish to move in a new policy direction, such as Lyndon Johnson on civil rights, but also to implement policies that have already been adopted. Presidents appear not to issue orders when opposed by Congress, but assertive presidents use them more when supported by Congress to further their policy preferences. Institutional explanations were more important than personal or environmental ones. Whatever their motivations, presidents have little need to worry about either Congress or the courts overturning their utilization of this important prerogative power.

6 EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS Chief Diplomat

Executive agreements are an additional and important prerogative power for presidents. Chapter 5 discussed the close relationship between legislation and executive orders. The latter cannot be inconsistent with the former but they are law if they do not conflict with statute or the Constitution. A similar situation occurs with executive agreements and treaties although the connection is even closer. Actions that begin as treaties must continue as such, while new agreements or actions increasingly are called executive agreements. Similar to executive orders, executive agreements may not countermand the Constitution, treaties, or statute. However, their use has become much more widespread than treaties and, while we saw executive orders generally declining over time, we shall see that the incidence of executive agreements is increasing dramatically. This has caused some tension between the branches since legislators sometimes argue that presidents use agreements to bypass Congress. The Constitution may be ambiguous about the war power, but responsibility for treaties with foreign nations is clear: the president negotiates treaties, and the Senate ratifies by a two-thirds vote. Of course, interpreting the Constitution is never that simple. Since the days of George Washington, treaty negotiation has been an executive prerogative, with the Senate limited to approval or rejection of the final document. That approval has not always been easy to get. The defeat in the U.S. Senate of the Treaty of Versailles, negotiated by President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I, was a devastating blow to his presidency. As chief diplomat, presidents have discretion in the enforcement of the document (Kirgis 1997, 1). The president has final powers over treaties by submitting statements to Congress putting them into effect (Johnson 1984, 4). Still, perhaps as a result of difficulties

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with Congress, presidents in the modern era increasingly turned to executive agreements (which do not need Senate ratification). I begin this chapter with case studies of both kinds of actions, important treaties and executive agreements, in 1978 during the administration of Jimmy Carter, and also under George W. Bush. As in the other results chapters, I provide examples of important and not so important activities under previous presidents and then under George W. Bush. On April 18, 1978, with only one vote to spare, a two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty that would turn over operation of the Panama Canal to the nation of Panama in the year 2000. This followed an identical sixty-eight to thirty-two vote in March over the neutrality treaty with Panama. Ratification of these two treaties was a victory not only for President Jimmy Carter but also for Senate leaders who had navigated through a legislative minefield for two months. Immediately after the vote, Carter said, “These treaties can mark the beginning of a new era in our relations not only with Panama but with the rest of the world” (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 22, 1978, 917). Renegotiating the control of the Panama Canal, however, could not be disposed of by executive agreement. A treaty with Panama had existed since 1903, revised in 1936 and 1955. By the 1960s, U.S. control of the canal had become a sore point among the United States, Panama, and other nations of Latin America. Early in his first year in office, Jimmy Carter promised the Organization of American States that he was “firmly committed to negotiating . . . a new treaty which will take into account Panama’s legitimate needs as a sovereign nation” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 18, 1977, 526). Over the course of the year, the administration finalized work on two separate treaties: one establishing the neutrality of the canal zone, and the second turning over control of the canal to Panama over twenty years later. The treaties were signed on September 7, 1977. In October, the Panamanian people approved the treaties in a national plebiscite. Now the challenge for the president would be to work with Senate leaders to secure the necessary votes for ratification. Given Carter’s unspectacular legislative record in his first year, the prospects for getting a two-thirds majority seemed slim at best. Clearly, the political environment was unfavorable for such an outcome, with deep public fears fanned by opponents of the treaty. The president’s congressional liaison efforts, much maligned in the previous year, were given high marks by senators. Individual leadership played a crucial role both in working the intricate rules of the Senate and in setting a high moral tone in the debate. Despite the interbranch conflict that characterized the 1970s, Congress evidenced a respect for the prerogatives of the executive branch in negotiating treaties. At the same time, the administration compromised by

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accepting a number of reservations to help alleviate congressional concerns. Cooperation emerged when both branches acted responsibly on a measure they believed was in the broad national interest even though it had little public support. What were the policy impacts of the Panama Canal treaties? Although it is impossible to say exactly what would have happened if the treaties had been defeated, Latin American experts agree that it would have been very damaging to U.S. relations with that region. In the years since ratification, the canal remained open to shipping as responsibility was gradually shifted to Panamanians. Without the treaties, the canal might have been subject to sabotage, targeted for terrorist attacks, or shut down by local protests. Ratification also helped relations with third world nations and was supported by U.S. allies. The treaties did not do anything to improve the government in Panama; the United States intervened there militarily in 1989. This was not primarily to safeguard the canal, however. Although the treaties did not solve all the conflicts between the United States and its Latin American neighbors, they represented a step toward that goal.1 The second case in this chapter is a general discussion of Carter’s ten executive agreements (from January 1978 to January 1979) with Mexico regarding the drug trade that were mentioned in chapter 1. These were not the first executive agreements regarding the long troubled relations between the United States and Mexico. First, the United States annexed Texas through an executive agreement. Second, it seized the northern half of Mexico after a war in the mid-nineteenth century in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Perhaps for these reasons, Mexico–United States relations had often been tense over matters related to trade, illegal immigration, the importance of democratization, poverty, and drug trafficking among other concerns. After years of neglect, the Carter administration tried to coordinate policymaking in the area of drugs, and the ten agreements included a variety of incentives to get Mexico to assist the United States to limit drug trafficking. Some of these agreements appear quite extensive, from training officers to providing helicopters and communications equipment (Margolis 1986, 141–42). However, one study argues that these efforts by Carter were largely ineffective (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2001, 13, 89). These authors mention how many of the helicopters sent were old and frequently inoperable and how many of the ten U.S. agencies (and seven Mexican ones) dealing with drug interdiction often had their own agendas (47, 76). This situation illustrates considerable bureaucratic discretion rather than administrative presidency elements. The two countries had cooperated on several drug trafficking efforts, be-

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ginning with Operation Intercept in 1969, although this action was a unilateral decision by the United States. More direct bilateral efforts occurred with Operation Condor, but the initial positive assessments proved illusory in later practice. According to Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro (2001, 42), the effort only emboldened the larger growers, while driving out the small and less efficient traffickers. Illegal drugs continued to enter the United States from Mexico at record levels. Of course, other nations in the Americas, particularly Columbia, were also sources of illegal drugs into the United States.2 Drug trafficking continues to be a major source of conflict between the United States and Mexico and some countries of Central America. Readers will not be surprised that many alternative actions during the George W. Bush administration occurred in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. This is also true regarding executive agreements where numerous cooperative ventures occurred concerning information and technology exchange, border security (especially with Canada and Mexico) and with the United Kingdom on confiscation of funds of terrorists. Lest the impression be given that all agreements revolved around foreign policy, many are primarily domestic in nature. During 2003, the United States and Norway signed an agreement on social security to provide coordination of coverage and to eliminate dual taxation and coverage for citizens of one country living in the other. Interestingly, social security was the subject of Bush agreements with Australia and the Netherlands. Other agreements with Norway dealt with preservation of cultural sites and scientific cooperation. Recall that Ragsdale (1998) provides both executive orders and executive agreements according to seven issue areas (three in foreign and four in domestic policy).

WHAT ARE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS? Executive agreements are rather vaguely defined. According to Margolis (1986, 25) they are “any understanding that has not been approved by Congress before going into effect.” Although some authors refer to their frequently routine nature, I mentioned earlier and in this chapter that many important executive agreements also occur. Interestingly, even though agreements might seem a vague power without any referent in the Constitution whatsoever, the formal mention of treaties in that document appears not to have constrained presidents in using the counterpart of executive agreements. Numerous court cases have examined their legitimacy and in Watts v. U.S. (1870) the Supreme Court determined that executive agreements are “not equivalent to treaties and hence not the law of the land.” However,

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subsequent cases determined that they do have the force of law unless they violate either the Constitution or legislation, both of which are superior. The Mexican government seemed to feel that the Ronald Reagan administration was too heavy-handed but that the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations “responded constructively to Mexico” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2001, 44). Cynics might argue that the United States had renewed interest in Mexico after huge oil reserves were discovered in the mid-1980s and when world oil prices were high. However, Mexico had its own collapsed economy and was also hurting financially at about the same time. Obviously, one of the most important relationships regarding these two countries is NAFTA, approved by Congress in 1993. It is a free trade agreement that also includes Canada. Interestingly, NAFTA is neither a treaty nor an executive agreement but a congressional-executive agreement. Congressional-executive agreements are negotiated by presidents but must be approved by a majority in each chamber of Congress rather than by a two-thirds vote of the Senate alone as for treaties. In that sense, they are considered equal to treaties but legally superior to sole executive agreements that, as we have seen, cannot violate either statute or the Constitution. The Trade Act of 1974 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 allowed presidents to negotiate and Congress to approve such congressionalexecutive agreements. A federal circuit court allowed the practice for NAFTA determining that it was a nonjusticiable political question (Grimmitt 2002, 1). Thus, at least for trade, a third type of international agreement exists. We have seen that there are many types of international agreements, and the distinction among them is not as clear as legislation versus executive orders in the previous chapter. None of these international agreements are numbered and one has to check carefully to ascertain what kind of action is being utilized and for what purpose. Presumably Clinton thought he would have a more difficult time getting a two-thirds majority in the Senate alone than a simple majority in each chamber for the controversial NAFTA. Clearly the 1990s saw U.S. officials more attuned to Mexican concerns (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2001, 133), while Mexico became more democratic and recognized the huge potential market to the north. Clearly, Mexico and the United States have a very long shared border, but the nation to the south has also become the second largest trading partner to the United States after Canada. Treaties and congressional-executive agreements are superior to “sole” executive agreements legally. In 1912, the Supreme Court stated in Altman & Co. v. United States that executive agreements “lacked the dignity of treaties,”

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but that does not make them invalid. Some oral agreements are never written down (Margolis 1984, 25) and may appear and be used years later. As mentioned earlier, the precise boundary between these international agreements is not very clear. Another problem is that many executive agreements are never reported to Congress because they are classified for national security reasons. Ironically, only the president can decide which documents will be transmitted to Congress because of security reasons (Fisher 1991, 241–42). I mentioned earlier that no executive agreement power was given to presidents in the Constitution. However, recall that our Founding Fathers thought that the United States would be relatively aloof from international relations and presumed that the treaty power would provide sufficient opportunities for any such decisions. Of course, they might not like the fact that international agreements lack the clear check and balance that treaties require. At the same time, they would not have expected the extensive role that the United States plays today in world affairs and the need for presidents to act quickly often when treaties are not feasible in a timely enough fashion. There is no way that Congress could be involved in all international agreements made by the United States in any given year. Indeed, many appear so routine that Congress likely would not want to handle the many detailed matters that would take time from important constituency and reelection concerns. Major executive agreements were discussed earlier and include important unilateral decisions, such as the Louisiana Purchase, the Annexation of Texas by the United States, and U.S. entry into the Korean War. Follow-up major agreements include many military alliances under Dwight Eisenhower. President John Kennedy used an agreement to establish a direct telephone “hot-line” between Washington and Moscow in 1963. The difficulty in determining “major” has to do with definition and the even more difficult problem of obtaining all of them due to secrecy classifications (see chapter 8). In one sense executive agreements are not unilateral because they are negotiated with one or more countries or heads of government. Still, they do not require the approval of Congress.

EXPECTATIONS TREND Several authors have discussed the growing tendency of executive agreements to eclipse treaties in numbers annually (Johnson 1984; LeLoup and Shull 2003, chap. 5). This expectation then is opposite to what was observed for executive orders, where a gradual decrease in order issuance was clearly evident over the years of this study (1949–2000). By contrast, executive

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agreements are on the increase and, despite some difficulty of distinguishing the various types of international agreements, I have depended upon collections by Ragsdale (1998) and Stanley and Niemi (2000) for my annual frequencies of executive agreements. Also, increases in frequencies of major agreements are anticipated over the fifty-two-year time period. This trend should reveal the importance of long-term trend (count variable) as well as short-term effects (one year lag variable).

POLITICAL TIME Since executive agreements reveal a reasonably steady increase over time (Margolis 1986, 34), we should observe more agreements in the post-reform era than before 1975. As discussed earlier in chapter 2, some evidence suggests that Republican presidents issue more executive agreements than Democratic presidents (Margolis 1986, 44). No other study taps presidential party difference on this variable. I accept Margolis’s view about party based upon the argument that since Republicans are more interested in foreign policy, they should issue more executive agreements. Year in presidential term of office has been a consideration in the literature. Martin (2000, 67–68) observes more executive agreements during the first year but no effect of reelection year on their issuance. However, Margolis (1986, 34) finds the opposite for these years, more during reelection years and fewer during honeymoon years, so further testing is necessary. Neither of these authors examine last years, and it is possible that presidents are most desirous of leaving a foreign policy legacy. Thus, last years should be important while first and reelection years are more likely to be dominated by domestic legislation. Finally, individual presidents should matter as the above two authors observed and Ragsdale (1998) reveals these differences in executive agreement frequency. One might anticipate that the modern presidents most interested in foreign policy (Kennedy, Nixon, George H. W. Bush) would negotiate the most executive agreements on an annual basis. However, Reagan became more interested in foreign policy as his term wore on, so considerable differences among these individual presidents appear likely.

POLICY AREAS I have already mentioned that most studies assume that executive agreements are foreign policy related and, therefore, one could argue that the two

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presidencies distinction is unimportant. Although Ragsdale (1998) classifies them by policy types, I still argue that more agreements will occur in foreign policy than in the domestic policy realm. Other scholars use different classifications for executive agreements. Caruson (2002, 24) points to the greater incidence in trade than in science and technology. Johnson (1984, 25) points to military being the largest issue area overall, while Margolis (1986, 117) argues that military agreements are smaller than his two other groupings of agreements: procedural and providing goods. In short, no one has used Ragsdale’s seven issue area designations or examined executive agreements by domestic–foreign policy distinctions. Some differences by these two broad policy areas should be evident.

THREE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE The final section of expectations discusses potential relationships between individual, institutional, and environmental factors and executive agreements. I have already shown that the complexity of presidential unilateral powers requires explanation from multiple influences and that neither a president-centered nor a Congress-centered model alone is satisfactory. Indeed, my multiple perspective approach offers utility for tapping such relationships more fully than more simplistic explanations of presidential behavior, such as individual or institutional variables alone. This section discusses each of the three potential levels of influence. Apart from Martin (2000) no one has analyzed executive agreements with multivariate models so this research on executive agreements is exploratory.

Personal With personal (or president) variables, I expect the opposite relations for executive agreements from what I observed for executive orders in chapter 5. Perhaps because agreements may be more foreign policy oriented than orders, I expect conservative presidents (who should be more interested in foreign policy) will issue more of them than liberals, so ideology should be negatively related to agreement frequency. In addition, presidents probably engage in more agreements when they are unpopular rather than popular. Presidents will want to show that they are being active to obtain greater public support, even though executive agreements usually are not as visible as treaties or other unilateral presidential actions.

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Institutional Here I examine the same two institutional variables: size of the Executive Office of the President and presidents’ legislative success. Some might question whether presidents use executive agreements to avoid treaties. Martin (2000, 67) finds limited support for that proposition but does observe that legislative success is negatively related to executive agreements. My measure of legislative success should tap that potential influence, and I expect a similar negative relationship. For size of the EOP, greater staff should encourage more agreements because presidents have more resources to apply to these often mundane but complicated negotiations.

Environmental The final level of influence is exogenous to government and includes two variables: the unemployment rate and trade balance. Since I expect many agreements to be on trade issues, the trade balance should be an important consideration in such agreements. When the trade balance is poor, more agreements should occur. In addition, many trade issues and some other issue areas deal with domestic and international employment matters, which makes categorization by issue area difficult. Unemployment continues to be an important element of the U.S. domestic economy. When unemployment is high, however, the United States might be less willing to engage in executive agreements to protect domestic labor. Thus, unemployment should influence domestic agreements more while trade balance should have greater effects for foreign executive agreements.

RESULTS I begin the findings section a bit differently than the other chapters of Policy by Other Means because I provide a brief historical overview of the incidence of treaties and executive agreements. The discussion then presents the plots of the annual frequencies of executive agreement issuance. Also included in that figure are the lag and count variables. Then I examine the political time controls: pre/post congressional reform period, presidential party, individual president, and year in presidential term of office. This discussion is followed by the analysis of three levels of influence variables: personal, institutional, and environmental both overall and by policy area. The final analysis consists of examining “major” international agreements as a control to see how they differ from overall executive agreements.

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Table 6.1. Treaties and Executive Agreements, 1789–2000 Years

1789–1839 1839–89 1889–1932 1933–44 (Roosevelt) 1945–52 (Truman) 1953–60 (Eisenhower) 1961–63 (Kennedy) 1964–68 (Johnson) 1969–74 (Nixon) 1975–76 (Ford) 1976–80 (Carter) 1981–88 (Reagan) 1989–92 (Bush) 1993–2000 (Clinton)

Number Treaties

Number Executive Agreements

60 215 431 131 132 89 36 67 93 26 79 117 67 205

27 238 804 369 1,324 1,834 813 1,083 1,317 666 1,476 2,837 1,350 2,025

Executive Agreements as % of Total

34.% 53 65 74 91 95 96 94 93 96 96 96 95 91

SOURCE: Adapted from Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on

American Politics (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 329; updates provided by Stanley to author.

I now present a historical overview of the incidence of treaties, executive agreements, and also executive agreements as a percent of the total of the two, which is the surrogate measure of important or major agreements. These first values appear in table 6.1, where it can be seen that a dramatic increase in this prerogative power has occurred in the post–World War II era. Up until the twentieth century, presidents averaged only about one executive agreement per year and Margolis (1986, 95) argues that these were seldom very important. Until late in the nineteenth century, executive agreements were less than half of all international agreements, but constituted above 90 percent from presidents Truman through Clinton. Ironically, these two presidents, the first and last in the time series, had lower percentages of agreements than all of the presidents between them. Clearly it can be seen that executive agreements have come to dominate treaties among international actions.

TREND Next I examine the yearly plot of executive agreements and it is evident in figure 6.1 that this device has generally increased over the period of this study. The biggest spikes were in the mid-1970s (especially Carter) and late 1980s (especially Reagan and the elder Bush) and unusually low issuance

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occurred in the late 1960s (Nixon) and early 1980s (Reagan). While treaties average about fourteen per year, executive agreements average about 244 per year in the modern period. The count variable is negative and insignificant, suggesting no long-term trend, but the one year lag variable is positive and highly significant. Thus, agreements in the previous year greatly affect and encourage increases in agreements in the current year and the executive agreement series is highly correlated with itself.

Figure 6.1. Executive Agreements, 1949–2000

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Table 6.2. Executive Agreements and Political Time Controls N

Coefficient

26 26

70.65**** 208.76****

24 28

–19.60 253.14****

9 5 7 31

–2.19 14.38 –2.41 243.42****

4 8 3 5 5 3 4 8 4 8

3.00 4.25* 11.0**** 6.80*** 2.5 6.5** 2.00 7.5*** 3.0 3.125

Historical Era

Post Reform (≥1975) Pre Reform (constant) Presidential Party

Democratic Republican (constant)

–0.0027

Select Year in Term

First Year Last Year Reelection Year Other (constant)

–0.0585

President

Truman (constant) Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Clinton

Adjusted R 2 0.2055****

0.1782**

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

POLITICAL TIME I again use four separate models to test for the effects of political time. These political time controls reveal some interesting findings for executive agreements in four different regression models. Historical era is highly significant (see table 6.2). On average, nearly seventy-one more executive agreements appear annually in the post-reform period (1975–2000) than earlier (1949–74) and this difference is highly significant. The historical era model explained 21 percent of the variance in executive agreements and was significant at the highest 0.001 level.3 The pre/post reform (or historical era) variable is the most important of the controls for political time in examining executive agreements, but others also contribute something to explanatory power.

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Presidential party differences are not statistically different even though Democrats averaged nearly twenty fewer executive agreements annually than Republican presidents (see table 6.2). However, the adjusted R2 is negative and infinitesimal. As others have found, presidents do issue more executive agreements in their last year (over fourteen more) and fewer during first and reelection years (about two fewer), but none of these differences are statistically significant, not even last year. Finally, considerable differences exist by individual president, which explains about 18 percent of the variance in executive agreements (see table 6.2). Truman, Nixon, Carter, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton negotiated the fewest agreements while Eisenhower, Kennedy (especially), Johnson, Ford, and Reagan issued the most agreements, all significantly greater than Truman (the constant).

GENERAL AND POLICY MODELS In table 6.3 I present the three models for executive agreements: overall, and then by domestic and foreign agreements.4 I have already mentioned some questions about this latter division as provided by Ragsdale (1998) but have presented these separate policy area results for comparison purposes to the other unilateral powers. Besides, quite a few domestic agreements appear in her data set and the seven categories appear different enough to suggest utility in the groupings by policy type. The general model explains a respectable 46 percent of the variance in agreements but only a single variable (other than the one year lag) is statistically significant, and that is presidential ADA. Accordingly, personal (rational choice) factors are the most important level for agreements. The general model reveals that conservative presidents actually use agreements somewhat more than liberal presidents. Perhaps that is partially explained by liberal presidents using other prerogative powers more or the earlier argument about their greater emphasis on domestic policy. Certainly presidents, especially Republicans, seem to be using executive agreements to further their policy preferences. Although the coefficient is small and not close to significant, directionality suggests that unpopular presidents use executive agreements slightly more than popular presidents. As we shall see shortly with commitment of troops, the number of employees in the Executive Office of the President has almost nothing to do with executive agreements. However, also at the institutional level, presidents who are unsuccessful in Congress negotiate executive agreements more, but this relationship is also insignificant. Finally, in the external environment, the trade balance has very little effect on use of agreements, while the unemployment rate has a small negative effect. That is, when unemploy-

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Table 6.3. Executive Agreements General Model

Domestic Model

Foreign Model

Personal

President ADA Popular Approval

–0.444* (0.256) –0.025 (0.667)

0.145 (0.264) –0.141 (0.563)

–0.154 (0.158) 0.132 (0.356)

–0.257 (0.745) –0.008 (0.008)

–0.441 (0.641) –0.003 (0.006)

0.081 (0.415) –0.001 (0.004)

–0.068 (0.000) –0.839 (6.148)

0.179** (0.000) 3.369 (5.535)

0.105 (0.000) –2.467 (3.303)

Institutional

Legislative Success Employees EOP

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

0.586**** (0.114) 162.15 (87.508)

Adjusted R2

0.4574****

Durbin-Watson Statistic Breusch Godfrey LM

0.23 1.82

0.358** (0.161) 123.56 (66.380)

0.534*** (0.149) 54.34 (43.01)

0.2643*

0.1714**

–0.10 0.48

–0.78 0.56

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients are the standard errors.

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

ment is low, presidents engage in greater use of executive agreements. Of course, overall executive agreements continue to be heavily influenced by such actions in the previous year.5 Thus, while the explanatory power of the three levels on general executive agreements is good, the lag variable may be absorbing much influence from variables other than presidential liberalism. The explanatory power of both the domestic and foreign models of executive agreements is considerably lower than the general model (26 percent and 17 percent of the variance explained respectively). Trade balance is significant in the domestic model, while none of the variables attain significance in the foreign model of executive agreements. An interesting finding

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is that the signs of the coefficients are opposite in the foreign and domestic models for presidential ADA, popular approval, legislative success, and unemployment, suggesting at least some utility for the policy area distinction.6

MAJOR AGREEMENTS In table 6.4 I present a model largely based on table 6.1, the percent of executive agreements of all international actions. I use this percentage measure because others (LeLoup and Shull 2003; Margolis 1986) have found it useful and because treaties and executive agreements are so closely intertwined. It is the closest that I could come to an indicator for major agreeTable 6.4. Percent Executive Agreements (major) (rescaled X100) Independent Variable Personal

Coefficient

President ADA

–0.018 (0.018) 0.054 (0.484)

Popular Approval

Institutional

Legislative Success Employees EOP

–0.017 (0.052) –0.000 (0.001)

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

–0.010 (0.009) 0.094 (0.008) 0.500 (0.136) 0.4268**** (0.143)

Adjusted R2

0.2930***

Durbin-Watson h Statistic Breusch-Godfrey LM Statistic

2.57 2.23

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients ae the standard errors. **** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

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ments, but it offers little to my statistical analysis of executive agreements. Because there is so little variance in the ranges of the dependent variable, I rescaled this variable times 100 so that not all the coefficients would be zero. The coefficients are still very small and, interestingly, the lag variable also washes out in this model. Presumably the primary explanation for the limited effect is the small annual variation that occurs in this variable in the post–World War II period. At the same time it is surprising that all these small and insignificant coefficients could produce anything close to the 29 percent of the variance explained in this model.7

RESPONSES TO UNILATERAL POWER Much presidential discretion exists in negotiating executive agreements through their clearly constitutional responsibility as chief diplomat. Congress has some oversight possibilities, but the evidence for a major congressional role in executive agreements is mixed. Legislators have often decried the fact that a large portion of international agreements are in the form of agreements rather than treaties (Johnson 1984, 5). At the same time, Johnson argues that a very high percentage (perhaps 87 percent) of such agreements are based upon statute. Margolis cites the State Department claim that 90 percent of executive agreements follow the will of Congress (1986, 97). If this is true, then it is clear that presidents are not using them as alternatives to legislation or even to treaties. However, I am convinced that it is used as an important unilateral power. Recall too that presidents have sometimes used congressional-executive agreements, which seem easier to obtain through a majority vote of both chambers than a treaty, which requires a twothirds vote of the Senate only. After World War II, Congress engaged in two major efforts to limit the president’s role in issuing executive agreements. The first was the Bricker Amendment, which was a constitutional amendment that would have greatly limited this unilateral power. After several failed attempts it came closest to passage early in the Eisenhower administration, where ironically, it was mostly Republican senators who sought to control presidential discretionary power. It was a very contentious battle during 1953–56 containing many amendments and largely pitting isolationists against internationalists. In one instance, the final vote was a very close one-vote victory for Eisenhower, who with the help of Democrats, had lobbied hard against the amendment. If the Bricker Amendment was a failure, the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972 (PL 92– 403) was a legislative victory for those wishing to limit presidential prerogative powers. The sixty-day reporting requirement probably has forced the

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State Department to improve its reporting procedures, and Johnson argues that it is a major improvement over the earlier period (1984, 122, 150). To ensure congressional notification, Case-Zablocki was updated in 1977 to require departments to submit to the State Department all executive agreements within twenty days of their signing (Fisher 1993, 157). The original 1972 Act required the State Department to submit all agreements to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee within sixty days. However, as we shall see in chapter 8, frequently such notification has been late, so controversy over executive agreements continues. Indeed, there seems to be widespread resistance by executive branch organizations to coordinate informing Congress about such orders (Johnson 1984, 124). No doubt executive agreements contribute to secrecy in government, especially in their classification for national security reasons in foreign policy. Presidents can even fund actions without authorization by Congress through reprogramming, secret funds, leasing of materials, and transfers between accounts (Margolis 1986, 67). Yet Martin points out that legislators can influence executive agreements through appropriations and overseeing implementation (2000, 60). She also mentions several indirect means of influence that may constrain presidents. Martin admits that executive agreements are a type of delegation to the executive but contends that “delegation need not be abdication” (2000, 63). It may be that Congress does delegate on less important issues (Margolis’s procedural category) and that such delegation may allow Congress to preserve legislative influence elsewhere (Krehbiel 1991). The courts have done very little to limit executive agreements, according to the few authors who have examined this issue. I mentioned some earlier Supreme Court cases that discussed this exercise (for example, U.S. v. Belmont [1936]; U.S. v. Pink [1941]), but the few cases available appear to expand the president’s power rather than restrict it. Although legislation requires submission within sixty days, only about 51 percent of executive agreements are actually submitted by the State Department to Congress (Caruson 2002, 23). This would be an interesting court challenge because Case-Zablocki seems quite clear in its time limits for reporting. Part of the reason for inadequate transmission problems may be due to logistical problems or the fact that many of the agreements are classified.

DISCUSSION The approval of the Panama Canal treaties is a case of mixed presidentialcongressional leadership. The Carter administration negotiated the treaties and then used all its resources to gain Senate ratification. However, this case

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involves significant differences from the Persian Gulf War (discussed in the next chapter) and other instances of presidential leadership in foreign policy. First, the Senate’s constitutional legitimacy in ratifying treaties is less ambiguous than the dispute between congressional war powers and the president’s powers as commander in chief. Second, the Senate made important substantive revisions to the treaties, forcing the White House to accept a number of reservations. Finally, although ratification represented a significant victory for President Carter, capping one of his administration’s more effective lobbying campaigns, final approval was made possible only by the bipartisan efforts of legislative leaders. The second case involving drug trafficking was much less successful for President Carter. The resources provided to Mexico were substandard and many of the helicopters simply did not work and were too old. That situation may have continued Mexico’s suspicions about the “colossus of the north.” Only much later under George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton did relations with Mexico improve much.8 Congress seemed to have little role in this series of executive agreements in 1978 but did assist later with loans and other aid to the failing Mexican economy. Treaties and executive agreements, particularly if the latter are “sole” agreements not based on statute, will likely be continually resisted by Congress. The George W. Bush case on executive agreements with Russia revealed new cooperation but also lingering suspicions between the two nations. Russia opposed U.S. development of defensive weapons, the war with Iraq, and expansion of NATO and the European Union with former Soviet satellite nations. Of course, the major orders had to do with reductions in plutonium for offensive weapons that both countries had in abundance. Many Bush agreements dealt with post-9/11 security, but other agreements concerned domestic issues that were of relatively little concern to Russia. It is clear from this chapter that executive agreements have increased dramatically, while the instances of treaties have remained relatively stable over time. Obviously, Congress would not be in a position to consider the average of 244 executive agreements that are made annually but can handle the approximately fourteen treaties. Still, agreements have averaged more than 93 percent of all international agreements since the Roosevelt administration. While there is an upward trend in agreements, there are also considerable peaks (mid-1960s and 1970s, late 1980s) and valleys (late 1960s, early 1980s, and late 1990s). Agreements in one year greatly affect agreements in the subsequent year, but presidents still have great discretion in their negotiation. The political time controls did a reasonably good job of explaining executive agreements, especially historical era and individual president. These

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two models explained a considerable portion of executive agreement issuance. Significantly more agreements appear annually in the post-reform era (after 1974) than previously, so their increase clearly does not appear limited by the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972. Congress has not enforced the reporting requirements of this widely discussed reform. Kennedy averaged more executive agreements annually than other presidents but Reagan, Ford, and Johnson were not far behind. While Reagan fits Nathan’s (1983) administrative presidency notion on use of this prerogative power, Nixon does not. The results for the three levels of influence were fairly solid with all three models (general, domestic, and foreign) being statistically significant.9 However, individual variables did not do a very good job of explaining executive agreements. In the general model, only presidential ADA was significant, with conservatives (Republicans) issuing more agreements as predicted. This suggests that the personal influences matter overall. In the domestic model only trade balance was significant, indicating influence from the exogenous environment for executive order use. In the foreign model none of the six multiple perspective variables provided statistically significant explanations for executive agreements and no clear influences. However, the one year lag was important for all three models. The most disappointing of all was the percentage of executive agreements variable, my surrogate for major actions. There the model was significant, but not a single variable helped explain this percentage. This was a bit surprising since the lag variable was also insignificant in this model. The best explanation I have is that not enough annual variance occurs in this variable to adequately tap its explanation from my multiple perspectives approach (since it was in the mid–90 percent during most of this period). Overall, I am satisfied that the parsimonious general and policy models did a reasonably good job of explaining executive agreements in the period from 1949 to 2000. Studies show how treaties and executive agreements are necessarily interrelated. Fisher argues that most executive agreements are based on treaties or legislative statute and “to implement treaties, executive officials must enter into agreements with other countries” (1993, 156). Congress has expressed dissatisfaction with “sole” executive agreements that have no basis in legislation, just as they have objected to committing troops without prior notification of Congress (see next chapter). More than with executive orders, Congress has tried to monitor executive agreements in various ways, particularly with reporting requirements and counter legislation. Presidents maintain significant advantages with secrecy as chief diplomat that Congress cannot match. This problem for Congress is exacerbated with the large increase in executive agreements in the modern era.

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Executive agreements may often be important, but they also may require secrecy and speed of action, characteristics that the U.S. Senate finds difficult to do. In addition, senators may feel that their time is too important to waste on many routine decisions that executive agreements often entail. It is also likely that a very high percentage of such agreements are follow-ups to statute and existing legislation that the Senate would not like to rehash. The number of agreements annually is simply too many for any extensive congressional oversight to occur. Accordingly, Congress probably has accepted the fact that it cannot be an equal partner on this particular presidential prerogative power. The courts rarely involve themselves in “political questions” or disputes between the first two branches. Since the negotiations of executive agreements often go unchecked, this prerogative power is better explained by the rational choice thesis. Neo-institutional factors were least important in this analysis.

7 COMMITTING TROOPS Commander in Chief

On January 16, 1991, President George H. W. Bush’s Press Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, announced to the nation, “The liberation of Kuwait has begun.” The president of the United States had succeeded in leading the country and the international community to act against the aggression of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Bush dominated policymaking internationally by forging an unprecedented coalition of nations, composed of Arab and Western countries. He dominated policy domestically by successfully urging Congress to give him the formal authorization to use force in the Persian Gulf. After weeks of a punishing air war, followed by a lightning ground war, the United States and its allies won. The jubilant nation gave President Bush the highest public approval ratings ever recorded to that date. The outcome of the war overshadowed a number of questions about earlier U.S. support for Iraq, which may have led Iraq to believe that its invasion of Kuwait would not be opposed. U.S. policymakers seemed to ignore ominous Iraqi troop movements until it was too late, and, in fact, the State Department had given a green light to some of Saddam’s previous aggressive actions in the region. By the last week in July 1990, American intelligence judged that Iraq was preparing to seize a small part of Kuwait. But the Bush administration was unprepared when Iraq launched a massive invasion early in August, and its tanks rolled over Kuwait in a matter of hours. Saddam Hussein announced to the world that Kuwait had become Iraq’s nineteenth province. After joining the world in denouncing Iraq’s aggression, the Bush administration’s most immediate concern was the security of Saudi Arabia and its oil reserves. The large Iraqi army was in a position to continue its advance across the Saudi desert; if the Iraqis chose to do so, they would have ex-

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panded their proportion of the world’s oil supplies. Unwilling to risk becoming an energy hostage to Iraq, Bush announced that U.S. troops and naval forces would be deployed immediately in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Operation Desert Shield would attempt to deter further advances by Iraq. Many Arab nations, although they had historically been opposed to a U.S. military presence in the Middle East, supported the move. The president initially received strong bipartisan support for the deployment of U.S. troops to the gulf. Both houses of Congress passed a resolution in support of the president by nearly unanimous margins. The administration’s other main strategy was diplomatic, urging the United Nations to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. Very quickly, the U.N. Security Council passed several resolutions condemning Iraq and authorizing a virtual economic blockade around it. The administration also worked to build a multinational force in Saudi Arabia, including troops from Egypt and other Arab states. Within a matter of weeks, the United States had deployed over 200,000 troops and tons of equipment and materiel. Back home, the invasion was having severe economic effects. Oil prices doubled at one point, to over $40 a barrel. Soon the administration doubled the number of U.S. troops in the Gulf to over 400,000. This constituted a move toward an offensive posture, and the administration successfully pushed a U.N. resolution that authorized the use of force if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Dissent in Congress grew steadily, as the earlier bipartisan consensus eroded. Democrats and some Republicans warned the president that only Congress had the power to commit the nation to war, but the administration claimed that, as commander in chief, the president did not need congressional authorization. By January 1991, support for the president had split Congress, largely along party lines. Bush requested that Congress adopt a resolution that “would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq’s leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively” (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, January 12, 1991, 70). On January 16, Desert Shield became Desert Storm as the air attack on Iraq began. Days later, both the House and Senate passed nearly unanimous resolutions supporting the president and U.S. troops. Within weeks, coalition forces had expelled Iraq from Kuwait, in the process destroying much of Iraq’s vaunted military might. The United States stopped short of occupying Baghdad and forcing Saddam Hussein from office—a decision that would later be subjected to considerable second-guessing. Chaos gripped Iraq for weeks, with Kurds rebelling in the north and Shiite Moslems rebelling in the south. Saddam Hussein regrouped and reestablished control of the country.

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In the United States, the nation was euphoric. A jubilant George H. W. Bush said, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” (Newsweek, March 11, 1991, 30). It was a crucial victory for the Bush administration. How was President Bush the elder able to dominate policymaking? Although the presidency has a number of political advantages in foreign and military affairs, congressional support in the crucial vote was far from guaranteed. The United States itself had not been attacked, and many people questioned how essential it was to restore Kuwait’s ruling royal family to power. In addition, there was a clear alternative to military action. The economic sanctions initiated by the administration had not had time to work, and there was strong sentiment among many members of Congress to give them more time (Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 18–24, 1991, 30). Bush prevailed because he made his case and effectively sold it to Congress. The administration skillfully used the United Nations to its advantage, bringing international pressure on Congress. Although later evidence suggested that the administration was not as unified as it had appeared, it was clear and unwavering in defining its goals and ways to achieve them (Woodward, 1991). The president’s approval ratings approached 90 percent. The war had several immediate policy consequences. It restored confidence in the American military and proved the capability of many of the advanced weapons that had been procured during the 1980s. The main objective of the policy—the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait—was achieved. Much of Iraq’s offensive military capacity apparently was destroyed, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The process strengthened the United Nations and established important precedents for multilateral cooperation in the post–Cold War world. Middle East peace talks between Arab nations and Israel began. The war also affected oil prices; a year after the war, gasoline prices in the United States were 20 percent lower. Despite these achievements, questions about the impact of the war remained. Ten years later, Saddam Hussein had managed to cling to power and rebuild the Iraqi military, which remained formidable for years thereafter. George H. W. Bush’s political advantages proved fleeting, as public attention turned from the war to an economy mired in recession. A year later, Democrats once again had a 10 percent lead over Republicans in party identification, and Bush’s approval ratings had plunged below 40 percent as he entered the election year. His seemingly ignoring domestic and economic policy cost him reelection to Democrat Bill Clinton.1 The Clinton years witnessed much less attention to Iraq than during either Bush administration. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, the George W. Bush administration engaged in further action against Iraq as part of the larger war on terrorism.

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He did it with very little approval from U.S. allies other than Great Britain and, some would say later, without solid enough intelligence that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction. The second Gulf War was launched when George W. Bush was very popular following his leadership after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, after the war he was greatly criticized for not having committed enough troops and for not planning ahead for what would be a long occupation. Many more troops were lost after than during the toppling of the Hussein regime. By late 2003, Bush’s popularity was nearly as low as his father’s had been going into his reelection year. These dramatic developments for George W. Bush show what can happen when the war does not end quickly and favorably. Bush was criticized roundly during the 2004 election for ignoring the concerns of other nations, for faulty planning and intelligence, and for rewarding favored contractors in the rebuilding of Iraq. Although Bush tried to declare it over, Iraq is an example of a protracted use of force. Like other wartime presidents, George W. Bush also committed troops in other instances. In July 2003, he decided to send a small force of U.S. troops to end a civil war raging in Liberia. He did so only reluctantly and stated that such troops would be limited to assisting other African nations and only after President Charles Taylor had left the country. Taylor had been essentially a dictator and was accused of war crimes against neighboring Sierra Leone. Although Taylor promised to leave, he took his time doing so. Subsequently, Bush sent a naval force of 2,300 marines to remain just off the coast of Liberia until later joining together with Nigerian peacekeepers (New York Times, July 26, 2003, 1). In early August, Bush authorized a small contingent of less than a dozen marines to enter the nation. The show of force seems to have had its effect when Taylor departed and the various factions negotiated with the help of the United Nations over an interim government. Although peace was precarious, Bush obtained his goals with relatively little U.S. troop commitment in contrast to massive efforts in the Gulf.

WHAT ARE COMMITMENTS OF TROOPS? Much research has been conducted on several measures of troop commitments, and I mentioned the definition used in chapter 3. Interestingly, the first Gulf War is not classified as a use of force. Recall that major wars are excluded in the definition of “political” uses of force, which constitute political uses of armed forces rather than extended military combat (Ostrom and Job 1986, 541). Ostrom and Job go on to state that they “fall somewhere between acts of diplomacy and intentional uses of military powers, such as Korea and Vietnam” (1986, 542). Not surprisingly, some confusion occurs over

138 CHAPTER 7

definition and operationalization. However, during 1991–93 several instances of commitments of troops in Iraq did occur in the Fordham data set and some of them are classified as major (nuclear capable) and others as not meeting that definition. For example, in 1991 up to 10,000 troops entered northern Iraq to enforce the no fly zone, classified as a major instance, while in 1992 a carrier task force entered the Persian Gulf to enforce Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire resolution (a minor instance). Regardless of major or minor, the president is seen as the primary actor in all uses of force (Fordham 1998, 420; Meernik 1994, 123), and I tabulate each separate commitment per year. The invasion of Grenada in October 1983 mentioned in chapter 1 is classified as a major use of force. Even though the duration of the action was brief, it was a shooting war that involved loss of life on both sides. Another example of a major (but lesser) use of force concerned the assassination of Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in June 1961. It involved a show of troops, and the United States expressed a willingness to deploy Marines in November to support the Balaguer regime against Trujillo’s brothers. Many examples of minor uses of force are available. One case involved the United States sending three transport aircraft to the Congo in July 1967 to provide logistical support for president Mobuto’s effort to crush a revolt in Katanga. A slightly more serious (but still minor) episode came in May 1993 when a carrier task force was sent within range of Bosnia for possible use in enforcing “safe areas” (see Fordham’s data set for descriptions). Ironically, committing troops is the one prerogative power studied here that is clearly provided in the Constitution to presidents as commanders in chief. However, the above cases demonstrate that presidents would be wise to consult Congress in exercising even the constitutionally proscribed power of commander in chief. This is true because Congress has the power to declare war. In fact, presidents George H. W. Bush in the first Gulf War, Bill Clinton in Bosnia, and George W. Bush in the second Gulf War against Iraq did just that. So, while many commitments of troops were made through emergency powers expressed through executive orders, these three presidents sought prior legislative approval, even though modern presidents have opposed restrictions on their commander in chief role. Of course, they also know that Congress has never challenged presidential uses of force and that presidents’ popular approval inevitably is enhanced when they do commit troops (Meernik1994; Mueller 1970). Such is the meager constraint that Congress has over this important unilateral presidential power, discussed more fully in the concluding chapter. Like the other alternative actions discussed in this book, I argue that

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presidents have much discretion in alternative policy adoption, such as the commitment of troops. Previous research reveals that many factors, only some of which are considered here, are related to uses of force. I expect some distinctions across my designations for political time and recall that no policy area distinction is possible. Also, personal, institutional, and environment factors should influence uses of force just as they have other prerogative powers. After presenting the expectations and results, I will discuss responses to this prerogative action before concluding the chapter.

EXPECTATIONS TREND I anticipated in chapter 2 that commitments of troops likely have increased slightly during the fifty-two years of this analysis. However, recall from the above that serious large-scale wars are not included in the political uses of force data set, so I am limited to the identification of cases compiled by others. In eyeballing the data, it will be easy to spot that the expected increase probably does not exist. Despite the growing role of the United States in world affairs, presidents are seldom encouraged to commit U.S. troops in international conflicts, perhaps because such actions are much more risky than other discretionary actions, and domestic constraints also exist. The growth of such devices as national security directives might help presidents limit the number of military actions along with cooperative uses of force (such as the elder Bush with the United Nations in the first Gulf War). Recall that I use frequencies of uses of force annually, and while the Ns are rather small, they still occur much more often than instances in the MIDs (Militarized Interstate Disputes) data discussed in chapter 3. Fordham and Sarver (1998) argue that uses of force are more appropriate than MIDs for studying U.S. commitment of troops, which is my concern here. They state that most studies using the Blechman and Kaplan (1978) data focus only on the United States, but these are only a small percentage of the very large MIDs data set (Fordham and Sarver 1998, 456). They point to overlap in the two data sets and contend that they are not exactly equivalent; indeed, Fordham and Sarver discuss problems that could occur comparing them because of different coding rules. The annual numbers of both indicators of troop commitments appear in figure 7.1. In almost all years, more uses of force occur than MIDs observations, which is part of my reason for selecting the former. I was also convinced that uses of force provided better data for my own particular purposes (Fordham and Sarver 1998).

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Figure 7.1. Comparison of MIDs and Uses of Force Data Sets

POLITICAL TIME I have just suggested that I do not expect much change over my fifty-twoyear time period in the frequencies of commitment of troops. On that basis, I would anticipate little influence from either the count or lag variable. However, chapter 2 did speculate more uses later in the period studied than earlier, and such a finding could be due to the greater globalization of U.S. military responsibilities more recently (particularly by1980s) than earlier (particularly 1950s). Of course, the United States had military bases all over the world in the 1950s and during the height of the cold war. In short, these conflicting circumstances may reveal few differences in uses of force during the pre- (1949–74) and post- (1975–2000) reform period of this analysis. Democratic presidents should be slightly less inclined to use force as hypothesized earlier. Probably such a finding is attributable to their perceived less interest in foreign policy than for Republican presidents. Alternatively, Democrats may have to counter the “dove” label with voters preferring “hawks” during tense international conditions (Smith 1998). Fordham (1998) is the exception to literature not focusing much on presidential political party differences. However, he argues that party only works through the nation’s economic conditions. He finds Democrats committing troops more during high unemployment and Republicans during high inflation, a finding

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congruent with Saeki and Shull (2003) about presidential party preferences and economic conditions. At the same time, authors find presidents much more likely to use force during reelection than during their honeymoon year in office (Fordham 1998, 433; Ostrom and Job 1986; Stoll 1984). This phenomenon may be related to the notion of the “October surprise,” during the president’s reelection year, when some have charged that they are more likely to commit troops to get the general public to “rally around the flag” (Meernik 1994). Presidents are fully aware that the general public will rally around them in short-term, successful military operations and may be more inclined to utilize the device when they are more politically vulnerable (for example, reelection rather than honeymoon year in office). The effect on approval is on average quite small, perhaps 1–3 percent (Meernik 1994; Ostrom and Job 1986). So only if the election were close would a rally make any difference. Other factors could also matter and thus may be used by presidents. Only a few authors studying uses of force or using the MIDs data examine individual president differences in these actions.2 I already mentioned Ostrom and Job’s observation that Kennedy exercised such decisions five times more often annually than Truman (1986, 560). That finding suggests that there should be significant differences among the ten presidents studied during this time period. Probably Truman was preoccupied with Korea and Johnson with Vietnam, so I would not expect as many instances of committing troops elsewhere for them compared to Reagan, who we know was engaged in numerous high profile actions (for example, Grenada and Lebanon). Nixon was largely bogged down in Vietnam and had little time for other ventures.3

THREE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE More theoretical development has occurred with uses of force than with the other three prerogative powers examined here. Meernik (1994) provides an interesting examination of presidential “opportunities” to use force, which he prefers to actual uses. Ostrom and Job (1986) argue that presidents operate in three different spheres (commander in chief, chief executive, and chief diplomat or political leader) and all can be important in decisions to commit troops. Several authors examine the relative influence of domestic versus international factors on such unilateral decisions.4 Evidence is mixed as Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) find domestic factors more important while Meernik (1994) observes international elements to provide better explanation for use of force opportunities. Mitchell and

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Moore (2002) reevaluate the Ostrom and Job article and find international factors to be the most important influences on presidential use of force. However, Fordham (2004) argues that both elements are needed for explanation. International relations scholars have used the broadest models to study the incidence of war if less so for U.S. commitments of troops. Bennett and Stam (2004) analyze systemic, bilateral, and individual factors in the context of assessing and arguing for multiple theories. Although they use virtually none of the variables I incorporate, their complex model of multiple factors makes a similar argument. In the abstract, predicting the origins of war is very important, but it is less germane for my purposes than is understanding presidents’ unilateral decisions to commit troops. These and other authors include elements that appear in this research to predict such presidential decision making and recognize that presidents must consider many factors in committing troops. Ostrom and Job (1986) find political factors most important but argue for a consideration of multiple factors. Such a finding might suggest that personal and institutional factors are more important than environmental conditions, but I expect the latter also play a role in presidential decisions to commit troops. Recall that war was deemed a political rather than a military decision in the 1946 reorganization of the Department of Defense, ensuring that even the highest ranking of military officers would report to several layers of civilian authorities. Following are the expectations for the same personal, institutional, and environmental factors used to predict commitment of troops.

Personal The two personal (or president) variables are presidential ideology and presidential popular approval, one preference and the other resource based. Presidential party sometimes has been used but not the more variable presidential ideology to study troop commitments. Although liberal presidents were predicted to exercise prerogative powers more extensively than conservative presidents, that might not be the case for uses of force. My reasoning is that liberal presidents are more concerned about extensive domestic agendas and might not wish to encumber the high costs associated with committing troops overseas. The literature for presidential popular approval is more convincing that presidents are particularly inclined to take such actions when their popular approval is declining (James and Oneal 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986; but see DeRouen and Peake 2002). However, Ostrom and Job

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observe as I do later in the chapter that popular presidents undertake major uses of force because they have a reserve of support to sustain such important actions.

Institutional The two institutional (or presidency) variables are both resource based. It is clearly my expectation that success in Congress will be positively related to uses of force. Presidents likely will not take this important decision if they are politically vulnerable in Congress. Ostrom and Job (1986) and Stoll (1987) find such a relationship, so greater presidential success in Congress may be related to greater uses of force. Recall the Ostrom and Job definition of success is the difference between beginning versus later popular approval, which is different from my measure and that of Stoll. Admittedly, I do not expect much effect for number of employees in the EOP on decisions to commit troops because such decisions are made at the highest levels, while more routine prerogative powers may be more dependent upon ample staff resources. It is possible that more staff would provide presidents with more information about world affairs. However, I was unable to uncover any empirical assessments of the effects of staffing on troop commitments.

Environmental The environment (including two factors exogenous to government) should have important relations with decisions to commit troops.5 Trade probably is not as important as the economy because trade matters likely can be handled through more routine executive orders and executive agreements than through military actions. However, a large trade imbalance might encourage uses of force while greater balance is likely to indicate a lessening of any international tensions. Readers will be familiar with the “wag the dog” phenomena, which suggests that presidents might seek a foreign war to improve political and economic situations at home. The United States did not recover fully from the long depression the country suffered throughout the 1930s until America’s entry into World War II (Frendreis and Tatalovich 1994, 32), which employed millions of Americans in military and civilian positions. All in all, I expect that high unemployment will be positively associated with uses of force. Although surely not a conscious motivation, a major war likely would reduce subsequent unemployment by expanding both the civilian and military workforce, thereby reducing unemployment.

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RESULTS This section begins with plots of the annual frequency of commitment of troops, a term used synonymously with political uses of force. Included in the plots presented are the count and lag variables to control for trend in the time series. Then I examine the political time controls: pre/post congressional reform period, by presidential party, by individual president, and then by year in presidential term in office. This discussion is followed by the analysis of three levels of influence variables: personal, institutional, and environmental. The final analysis consists of examining major uses of force as a control to see how they and their determinants differ from all troop commitments. Subsequently, I present responses to this potential action and discuss implications from uses of force.

TREND The results of the trend analysis for commitment of troops appear in figure 7.2, and the line is not as obvious as those for executive orders (decrease) and executive agreements (increase). Although more variation occurs than for budget agreement, a clear trend is not immediately evident. At least one use of force occurs in each of the fifty-two years, and there appears to be a very slight (but insignificant) decrease over time according to the count variable. However, the lag variable shows a dramatic effect in that uses of force in the most recent year affect presidential decision making in the subsequent year. Indeed, the lag variable explains over 30 percent of the variance in uses of force. That is, a single variable gives us nearly one-third explanatory power in uses of force. Overall about 7.5 uses of force occur annually. Only one instance of commitment of troops occurs each in 1949, 1955, and 1977, but large numbers occur in the early 1960s, early to mid-1980s, and the early 1990s.

POLITICAL TIME The results for commitment of troops by various aggregations of political time appear in table 7.1. Only one of the four separate models (individual presidents) is significant, but it is strongly so. Individual presidents account for 27 percent of the variance in uses of force, but the other political time controls account for between only 1.5 and 2 percent each. There is no perceptible difference in uses of force by the pre/post reform periods, where only slightly more uses of force occur annually during the post-reform period as was predicted. Democrats commit troops less often than Republican presidents as

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Figure 7.2. Uses of Force, 1949–2000

predicted, but the party difference is small (less than one fewer per year), and not statistically different. Year in term of office is also disappointing because the results are very limited and contrary to what was expected. Presidents commit somewhat more troops in their first year in office but fewer troops during their last year in office. Contrary to the hypothesis, reelection years also show a slight decrease in uses of force, but recall that none of the yearly differences are statistically significant at even the lowest level of 0.10. I now turn to the only really interesting finding by political time, differences by individual presidents. Truman serves as the constant for comparison and like Nixon, Carter, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton, these presidents

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Table 7.1. Use of Force and Political Time Controls N

Coefficient

26 26

0.08 7.46****

24 28

–0.62 7.78****

9 5 7 31

1.16 –2.21 –0.76 7.61

Historical Era

Post Reform (≥ 1975) Pre Reform (constant) Presidential Party

Democratic Republican

–0.0148

Select Year in Term

First Year Last Year Reelection Year Other (constant)

–0.0191

President

Truman (constant) Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Clinton

Adjusted R2 –0.0199

0.2667***

4 8 3 5 5 3 4 8 4 8

3.0 4.25* 11.0**** 6.8*** 2.5 6.5** 2.0 7.5*** 3.0 3.12

**** Indicates value is significant at the 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at the 0.01 level ** Indicates value is significant at the 0.05 level * Indicates value is significant at the 0.10 level

commit fewer than half of the average number of troops annually and are not statistically significantly different from one another (see table 7.1). The remaining presidents (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Reagan) score above the constant and all exercise statistically greater uses of force than those presidents just mentioned. Kennedy’s average of 11.0 uses annually appears to justify his characterization by Miroff (1976) as a “cold warrior” of reckless utilization of military adventures. Kennedy was by far the highest (significant at 0.001 level) in troop commitments followed by Reagan and then Johnson and Ford. Even Eisenhower committed troops significantly more (0.10 level) than Truman. One interesting caveat to Kennedy and Johnson, however, is that neither engaged in more major uses of force during their presidencies than some presidents (especially Reagan).6 Of course,

COMMITTING TROOPS 147

individual presidents likely are also responding to varied international conditions.

REGRESSION MODEL Table 7.2 provides the multivariate analysis of uses of force with the six multiple perspective variables (plus the lag). Generally, I am pleased with the overall explanatory power of the model (47 percent), which is highly significant at the 0.001 level. While the percent variance explained by the independent variables is not as high as for executive orders, the explanatory Table 7.2. Use of Force (with Robust Standard Errors) General Model Personal

President ADA Popular Approval

0.015 (0.014) 0.059 (0.031)

Institutional

Legislative Success Employees EOP

0.066 (0.026) –0.000 (0.000)

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

0.002 (0.004) 1.330**** (0.369) 0.342*** (0.110) –10.608** (4.386)

Adjusted R2

0.4687****

Durbin-Watson h Statistic Breusch-Godfrey LM Statistic

1.81 0.285

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients are the standard errors. **** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

148 CHAPTER 7

power of the uses of force model appears quite decent, and is even slightly better than for executive agreements.7 I now turn to the explanatory power of each of the three levels of influence. Neither of the personal variables works in the model of uses of force; both presidential ADA and popular approval are slightly positive but insignificant. Although the positive direction could indicate something (liberals Kennedy and Johnson committing troops more often; and popular presidents also more willing to do so), it is hard to see how these personal variables matter at all in explaining this important prerogative action. In fact, both results were counter to my expectations. The null finding for ideology is similar to the earlier finding of minimal differences by presidential party. However, I did expect that popular approval would have some effect as Ostrom and Job (1986) demonstrated that presidents with declining popularity use force more frequently (see also DeRouen and Peake 2002; Meernik 1994). Institutional variables explain commitment of troops just as poorly, especially employees in the EOP, which has absolutely no effect whatsoever with a zero coefficient.8 Perhaps in future research one could examine National Security Council employees as a percent of all Executive Office of the President personnel to see if staffing matters in this most “foreign related” of all prerogative powers examined here. Legislative success works a bit better and seems to slightly encourage uses of force. This finding is consistent with my expectation that presidents would use force when they are confident in their legislative relations and also relates to previous research (Ostrom and Job 1986; Stoll 1987). Finally, the two environmental factors are considered and, interestingly as predicted, it is the more domestic-oriented unemployment than the more foreign-oriented trade balance that is important for uses of troops.9 In fact, trade is like employees in the institutional environment with a very small coefficient (even when rescaled), thereby showing virtually no relationship. However, the unemployment rate is highly significant (0.001 level), indicating that greater unemployment strongly relates to greater uses of force. In bad economic times, presidents are much more likely to commit troops overseas. Clearly the environment provides the best explanation of uses of force across the three levels of influence. Finally, the one year lag is strongly significant but again not much long-term trend appears in uses of force.

MAJOR COMMITMENTS OF TROOPS Uses of force were first designated by Blechman and Kaplan (1978), and several component variables of their data set are reported in the ICPSR code-

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book. The most important for my purposes was force level, which I use as a component of major (levels 1–3) versus minor (levels 4–5). Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 49–50) and Ostrom and Job (1986, 562) identify major uses of force as the three levels that are considered “nuclear capable” and consist of at least one of the following: (1) “two or more armed aircraft carrier groups, (2) more than one ground battalion, or (3) one or more combat wings” (Ostrom and Job 1986, 564). Compared to major uses, minor uses are sometimes perceived simply as threats or as a show of force. Mitchell and Moore (2002) and Clark (2003) have also examined major uses of force. I have already discussed the small N problems with examining major uses of force but, of course, wish to be able to compare their occurrence with all commitments of troops. Because the instances are so few, I have used an event count explanation here, which I also provide in the appendix for all uses of force. The explanation for major uses of force appears in table 7.3 where some interesting results appear. Presidential popular approval in the

Table 7.3. Poisson Model of Major Uses of Force Independent Variable

Coefficient

President ADA

–0.002 (0.008) 0.018** (0.021) 0.006 (0.022) –0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.161** (0.197)

Popular Approval Legislative Success Employees EOP Trade Balance Unemployment

Lag Constant

0.062 (0.132) –1.207 (0.241)

Pseudo R2

0.1261***

Durbin-Watson h Statistic Breusch-Godfrey LM Statistic

1.81 2.11

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at the 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at the 0.10 level.

150 CHAPTER 7

personal level and unemployment in the environment level are both statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It is interesting that popular but not unpopular presidents use force more and, as might be expected, they also use force when unemployment is high. The fact that the influence of number of employees and trade balance are still imperceptible makes me think that major and all uses of force are explained well without their inclusion. Another interesting point is that the lag variable is no longer significant in the count regression of major uses in contrast with the OLS analysis of all uses of force.10

REACTIONS TO UNILATERAL POWERS The research on commitment of troops or uses of force is extensive, but the data may be criticized for eliminating major wars and also for the few observations available annually. Still, several research techniques can account for these problems, and it has been the prerogative power analyzed most extensively. As commander in chief presidents have a constitutional capacity that overmatches Congress’s ability to declare war. All five of the nation’s declared wars have been requested by presidents, and Congress has also acceded to the last three presidents who asked for congressional approval of major troop commitments (Gulf Wars I and II and Bosnia). But Congress has also raised some challenges to presidential use of this unilateral power. The most important is the War Powers Resolution (PL 93–148) of 1973. Whether the War Powers Resolution has had any limiting effect on presidential troop commitments is open to severe questioning (Margolis 1986, 91). Auerswald and Cowhey (1997) find that the duration of military actions by presidents have decreased since the Act and conclude that presidents are tailoring their operations to congressional preferences and constraints. In contrast, Fisher (2000) and Hinckley (1994) argue that the only real effect it could have is if Congress fully regained the power of the purse and used appropriations to limit presidential war powers. For example, some legislators have discussed the need to cut off funding to force presidents to remove troops, but it has never been seriously contemplated. Indeed, Congress often is more desirous of committing troops than are presidents and they might be quite reluctant to withdraw support from U.S. troops fighting in a foreign war simply to rein in the president. Legislators will never know as much as presidents about most foreign policy situations, but they must keep informed if they are to provide effective oversight. Seldom do the courts get involved in issues of war and peace. During the Vietnam War, the judiciary consistently refused to hear challenges brought

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by members of Congress concerning the constitutionality of an undeclared war. Despite the courts’ unresponsiveness, legal challenges by legislators against the president have proliferated in recent years. A suit seeking to test the legality of U.S. presence in El Salvador was dismissed in 1983 (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 7, 1989, 14). A suit challenging the invasion of Grenada was dismissed in 1985 because the invasion was over. Similarly, federal courts refused to hear cases seeking to test the constitutionality of U.S. policy in Nicaragua and the sending of the U.S. Navy to the Persian Gulf in 1988. Thus, presidents appear unencumbered in war making.

DISCUSSION Even though some might argue that political uses of force is the only prerogative power discussed here that is provided for in the Constitution, it clearly has the potential for major implications for U.S. foreign policy and relations with other countries. In that sense, even less important uses of force probably are more important than many of the clearly routine decisions that presidents make through executive orders and executive agreements. At the same time, some of them are momentous as well, just as some uses of force listed in Fordham’s data set appear trivial. This is one reason why I have included controls for major actions in three of the four unilateral powers examined in this book, including the commitment of troops. The results of the analysis in this chapter were both interesting and provocative. Despite overall solid explanatory power for the uses of force model, some variables were not very important. Except for individual presidents, where significant differences occurred, none of the other political time variables (pre/post reform, presidential party, and year in presidential term) were significant in explaining political uses of force. Nearly the same thing happened in the multiple regression where only unemployment and the one year lag were significant explanations of uses of force. Contrary to expectations, neither personal nor institutional variables mattered much, and thus the administrative presidency thesis offers little explanation here. Exogenous systems theory notions are more useful. Lastly, major uses of force was explained less well than uses overall, but both popular approval and unemployment were strong predictors. Also the lag variable washed out as an explanation of major uses of force, and thus these findings conform to expectations better than for all political uses of force. What these results show is that a highly parsimonious model explains nearly half of the variance in uses of force but that no one variable (except perhaps unemployment or the one year lag) dominates the model. Presi-

152 CHAPTER 7

dents appear to engage in such “wag the dog” actions when domestic conditions are poor. Thus, the political system notion of external influences (in this case the economy) is important here. Even though my remaining variables contribute something, the search should continue for other explanatory factors to explain uses of force. It may well be that some international factors, such as global tension or military “capability” (Fordham 2004), would be useful explanations for this prerogative power but perhaps not for the other less foreign related unilateral actions presidents take. In a case with high stakes for the nation, the Persian Gulf War of 1991 generated greater conflict between branches. George H. W. Bush initially received strong bipartisan support from Congress for his decision to commit U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, but that support became weaker on the question of using force. A historic debate on that subject occurred soon after the 102nd Congress, under control of the Democrats, convened in January 1991. The debate was characterized by restraint and lack of recrimination, despite the severe differences between the two sides. Although the margins of victory were close, enough Democrats in both houses crossed over to support the president so that authorization was approved. While this cross-partisan vote allowed the president to conduct the war, Bush implicitly acknowledged Congress’s war-making power by asking for legislative approval. The legitimacy of the war was enhanced immeasurably by the House and Senate votes. Bush might have pursued military force even without approval from Congress, but the level of interbranch conflict would have escalated and national unity diminished. National security decisions dominated by the White House are particularly susceptible to the demands for quick action, and the results can sometimes be disastrous. Janis (1982) has documented a series of policy fiascoes that stemmed from the phenomenon of “groupthink” within the presidency—when presidents do not seek diversity of opinion but focus prematurely on a single policy alternative. The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and the decision to escalate the war in Vietnam are two prime examples. Even though the Gulf War (1991) succeeded in achieving its main short-term objectives, its long-term consequences were less clear. Ten years later, Saddam Hussein was still in power, one of the three “axes of evil” identified by President George W. Bush. The terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 led to great bitterness toward Muslim leaders. Almost immediately, a multinational force had positive initial results, toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and damaging the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The second Gulf War in April 2003 against Iraq also was won quickly. However, positive initial results in both countries

COMMITTING TROOPS 153

may not mean much down the road. After much effort, Saddam Hussein was captured but terrorist leader Osama bin Laden was not. Some say that George W. Bush’s actions revealed faulty planning for how to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq after the military victories had been won. Of particular significance was widespread criticism by the bipartisan 9/11 Commission and others of the planning and intelligence gathering for these two major U.S. efforts. George W. Bush faced much resistance to his decisions in Iraq after he received the initial go-ahead from Congress. Although the wars themselves went well, obtaining peace was much more difficult. Insurgents kept fighting after the war was supposedly won trying to disrupt the newly elected Iraqi government. Apart from the 9/11 Commission criticism about preparedness, Bush faced attacks from Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry in the 2004 election about its execution. Kerry also put Bush on the spot by favoring all of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission while Bush initially opposed several but reluctantly agreed to have an intelligence czar with full budget and personnel authority. The public too began to question the invasion of Iraq. Still, the country was at war and Bush prevailed in his reelection bid but by a rather small margin of victory. Going to war is among the most important and consequential decisions that governments have to make. Presidents have dominated in such decisions throughout our nation’s history despite the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. It appears that the president’s power has always been paramount to Congress’s power to declare war. Still, committing troops, even in the post–World War II era, is not an action that presidents have taken lightly. Indeed, the nation has sometimes later rebelled against some major military actions, like Korea and Vietnam. Even the second Gulf War in 2003 quickly became less popular than the original decision once questionable intelligence decisions, lack of international support, the greater loss of troops after than during the war, and the huge costs of rebuilding Iraq became evident.

8 CONCLUSION

This book integrated four presidential alternative actions into broader theories of presidential power. It both confirmed and challenged the importance of the personal presidency, but also the more recently dominant institutional and administrative presidency theses. What was most surprising was that environmental factors were even more important, showing the importance of the political system and conditions external to government. The findings reveal the necessity of more encompassing models, such as the multiple perspective approach utilized here. The relatively few variables in this parsimonious model explained much in the alternative adoption of budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and commitment of troops. The tendency of presidency scholars is to study a single prerogative power. Some very important work has been conducted on executive orders and commitment of troops with less attention to budget agreement and almost none recently to executive agreements. Only Cooper (2002) discusses the need for a comparative approach to presidential alternative actions, but his orientation is legal and historical rather than empirical. Despite its interesting and informative nature, his book has a certain anecdotal character that lacks systematic comparisons among actions. In addition, many of Cooper’s actions begin in the 1980s making quantitative analysis virtually impossible. Alternatively, the tendency to focus on a single activity ignores other aspects of presidential-congressional relations in which both actors attempt to assert their respective preferences. Again, research that takes such a onedimensional approach fails to capture not only the complexity but also the breadth and diversity of presidential discretionary actions. The four activities

CONCLUSION 155

examined here are very different from one another and are unrelated empirically over several short-term time periods. Four different presidential unilateral actions are studied in order to better illuminate diversity inherent in such decisions in adopting alternative public policy. Even studies of presidential-congressional relations typically investigate only a single dependent variable, such as presidents’ legislative success or support, but even those two variables, despite their frequent use interchangeably in the literature, are not identical (Prins and Shull 2001; Shull 1997). It seems all too obvious that presidential prerogative actions are multifaceted and take place across a number of different circumstances and conditions that are incorporated in this study of budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and commitment of troops. My coverage is more comprehensive than any other empirical study and allows direct comparisons of presidents utilizing discretionary powers. Consequently, I break new ground by incorporating and comparing four separate alternative presidential actions to adopt public policy. Although limited somewhat by using yearly analysis, the study examines the longest and most up-to-date time series yet (1949–2000). Alternative actions are modeled using the same three levels of influence to allow direct comparison in explaining these actions in adopting public policy.1 Short- and long-term trend is also controlled for as well as controls for four elements of political time: historical era, party of the president, year in presidential term of office, and individual presidents. Another control employed is for policy type (domestic and foreign). Several authors have documented the changing roles of Congress and the presidency by policy areas (Hinckley 1994; Peterson 1994; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Shull 1991; 1997). All in all, my analysis provides a more sophisticated and more comparative assessment of several presidential prerogative powers than has occurred heretofore. My argument is that presidential discretionary actions extend beyond a single president-centered, Congress-centered, or even a tandem institutions approach. Rather, presidential prerogative actions need to be understood from “a multiple perspective” that includes not only the diverse elements within individual (president) and institutional (presidency) conditions, but also from the exogenous environment. This outside environment includes economic activities that are often ignored in studies of presidential policymaking. The four data analysis chapters show that each of the four prerogative actions in alternative policy adoption are influenced by different levels (individual, institutional, and environmental), so it would be unwise to generalize across these actions without such comparison as is performed here.

156 CHAPTER 8

Therefore, the need for breadth and comparison is obvious from the findings presented herein. This chapter begins with a summary of major findings of the research within the context of the various theories offered in the literature, such as Neustadt’s power and the administrative presidency notions. Of course, I argue for the necessity of a more encompassing multiple perspective model that includes elements of several theories. Next I consider the utility of the controls for political time and policy areas, finding both to have some discriminating value. Then I discuss who controls policymaking with judgments about president-centered and Congress-centered approaches and consider what reforms would be necessary for Congress to play a more meaningful role in policymaking. Finally, I point to some possible research directions and posit implications and the contributions of this research.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS RESULTS FOR FOUR PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS I examined four presidential actions that are not related empirically but are all part of alternative policy adoption tools available to presidents.2 In each case they are executive activities that seek to facilitate or constrain the enactment of legislation, to further implementation of existing policy, or to move quickly in a crisis situation when legislation is considered too slow. Once the agenda has been set and different proposals are formulated to address the agenda, then the process begins to affect adoption of a particular formulated preference (see chapter 1, figure 1.1). That is, given varying preferences over policy formulation, the president and Congress each attempt to adopt their preferred positions. Yet, unlike most research that assumes Congress plays the greatest role in policy adoption through legislation, I find that alternative actions give presidents much greater adoption discretion than commonly recognized. Thus, complexity occurs within what is frequently viewed as a single stage (adoption) in the policymaking process. Next I summarize the results for the general models of presidential discretionary actions. For my purposes, budget agreement is measured as the percent of the president’s overall budget request that is appropriated by Congress.3 Overall, I find that budget agreement is high but not explained very well by this multiple perspective model of influences. It is the only discretionary action that requires action by Congress even though all scholars have recognized that the president has become chief budgeter and his overall budget requests generally are agreed to by Congress. The general model of budget agreement is explained only by exogenous (systems) variables, but this is the only

CONCLUSION 157

action where both environmental factors (trade balance and unemployment) are important. There is no short- or long-term trend in budget agreement. Although my approach works quite well considering how little variation occurs in budget agreement, Shull and Shaw (1999) explain considerably more of this variable with other factors. The number of executive orders annually is well explained by two of the levels of influence, legislative success in the institutional level and, particularly, unemployment in the environmental level. Thus, agency theory is important for executive orders. I get my best overall explanatory power in this unilateral action with a small group of independent variables and, like two of the other alternative actions, the one year lag is significant in the model. Major executive orders are nearly as well explained as are all orders and, surprisingly, it is the individual and institutional variables that are all significant, while neither of the two environmental variables are important. These results clearly indicate that policy (major) orders are explained quite differently than overall executive orders. Also, the overall number of executive orders is declining over time. Unlike executive orders, the number of executive agreements is increasing annually over the fifty-two years of this study based upon a strong one year lag in these data. Perhaps surprisingly, presidential ideology is the only one of the multiple perspective variables that is important for this prerogative power. This finding suggests that liberal presidents do choose to exercise this prerogative more than conservative presidents. Rational choice seems to be the best theory, and the parsimonious six variable model does a good job of explaining executive agreements. The one year lag variable is also significant, suggesting that presidential actions in the previous year affect their actions in the current year. Regrettably, using executive agreements as a percent of all international agreements was poorly explained by my model. Thus, its inability to capture major agreements limits its utility for my purposes. The final prerogative power examined here, commitment of troops, also is well explained by the parsimonious multiple perspective model.4 Somewhat surprisingly, however, it is only unemployment among the independent variables that is a good predictor. High unemployment levels strongly relate to more uses of force by presidents, suggesting a cynical “wag the dog” explanation; presidents are more likely to commit troops when economic problems occur at home. These findings suggest the importance of broader systems theory. The one year lag variable is also significant. However, when I examine major uses of force, and very few instances occur annually, popular approval is related; that is, when presidents are popular, they are more

158 CHAPTER 8

likely to engage in major troop commitments. High approval seems to be a primary condition for such an important decision.

GENERAL MODELS Table 8.1 presents a summary of the effects of the explanatory variables (levels) used herein on the general model of my four prerogative actions by presidents. This table clearly shows the guiding focus of this work: namely, no one level is capable of fully explaining any of the four presidential alternative actions. In three of the actions, decisions in the immediate prior year (lag) are important predictors. Also, the exogenous environment is important in explaining three of the prerogative powers. The personal level was useful only for executive agreements and the institutional level only for executive orders. However, presidential popular approval (in the personal model) and size of the EOP (in the institutional model) are not important for any of the four general models of alternative actions. The fact that neither personal nor institutional variables are consistently important for presidential alternative actions raises questions about models that focus on them almost exclusively (for example, presidential power [personal or rational choice] or administrative presidency or agency theory [institutional]). Therefore, presidential power and discretion must be more complex. Since environmental (or outside government) factors are so important, scholars must rethink models not only for examining presidentialTable 8.1. General Model Results across Four Prerogative Powers Budget Agreement

Executive Orders

Executive Agreements

Use of Force

Personal

President ADA Popular Approval

+

Institutional

Legislative Success Employee EOP

+

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

+ •

Lag • Indicates significance at the 0.05 level. + Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

• • •

•

•

CONCLUSION 159

congressional relations but also for presidential prerogative actions. Systems theory notions should be included due to its assumptions of strong environmental influences. My six variable model provides solid explanation despite the fact that the four discretionary actions are quite different. Thus, to be able to compare them empirically, one needs a broad multiple perspective approach along the lines that I have provided. Diversity, comparison, and breadth should also be goals in studying presidential alternative decision making. I selected just two variables for each level of influence. Obviously, only two variables do not exhaust the potential measures for any of these three levels (individual, institutional, and environmental). Certainly, other factors could have been used in conjunction with or in place of these. In fact, I initially examined thirteen independent variables to model presidential alternative powers. However, only one did as well as my six variable model so the extras were eliminated due to high correlations among them and to maintain parsimony in the set of six independent variables (plus the time lag) in my model.5 The point here is that the particular set and/or overall effectiveness of any one variable over the four dependent unilateral actions may not be all that important in the broader scheme of things. These results indicate that a multiple perspective, my expansion of the tandem institutions approach, is necessary for a fuller explanation of presidential alternative actions in the complex process of adopting alternative public policy. While there are some costs in imposing the identical model for each of the four discretionary powers (perhaps greater explanatory power for a particular model with different variables), my scheme does allow direct comparisons among them. Some could argue that the best explanations should be used for each action, but I chose to be able to use the same model of influences for each to allow me to see not only explanatory power but also the relative and identical impact of the three levels (personal, institutional, and environmental).

POLITICAL TIME I would have preferred to incorporate the political time controls directly into the models; however, with an N of fifty-two the addition of more variables would have used up valuable degrees of freedom. Consequently, I presented separate models using four different political time controls: historical era as the most aggregated (only two categories), presidential party (only two categories), selected years in presidents’ term (four groupings), and each of the ten presidencies separately. All four sets of controls have some benefit and

160 CHAPTER 8

are widely used in scholarly literature (Kessel 1984; Lewis and Strine 1996; Light 1999; Neustadt 1980; Shull 1983; 1997). Divisions of political time provide interesting dimensions for investigation. Similar to exogenous variables, political time variables are divergent and indicate broader trends in the four unilateral actions. Research on both the presidency and party realignment has speculated that there may be broad generational trends in control of the presidency and cycles of political party dominance (Barber 1980; Lewis and Strine 1996; Schlesinger 1986; Skowronek 1997). The research herein has focused on one longer and three shorter spans of political time, and they reveal interesting results. All four of these controls contribute to understanding the four presidential unilateral actions under investigation with varying degrees of success. Table 8.2 presents the summary effects for my political time controls. Historical era, presidential party, and individual presidents appear to be the most useful controls, with select year in presidential term least useful. The constant (prior to and including 1974) for historical era is significant across three of the four prerogatives, and the post-1974 period is significant for three actions (all but budget agreement). I chose through 1974 as my break point because it represents a reassertive Congress and, therefore, the presumed end of an era of presidential dominance (LeLoup and Shull 1993, chap. 2). Consequently, budget agreement has increased slightly since the earlier period of the study and decreases have occurred in executive order issuance. However, executive agreements have increased dramatically while use of force has changed hardly at all in the more recent period. These findings by the two time periods indicate not only growing contentiousness but also increased assertiveness by both actors to assert their policy preferences and institutional prerogatives. Presidential party was relatively important in this analysis, but significant differences in Democratic and Republican presidents occurred only for budget agreement and executive orders.6 Perhaps surprisingly, Democrats obtain nearly three percentage points less budget agreement than Republican presidents, while Democrats, as expected, issue significantly more executive orders than their Republican counterparts. Obviously, presidential party is closely related to presidential ideology and could not be used in the multiple perspective model incorporated here since the latter variable was deemed more useful because its values change annually for each president while party is static. Presidential party also relates to divided government with Truman and Clinton being the only outliers among the ten presidents (for example, Democrats unified and Republicans divided). The third political time control, select years in presidential term, does

CONCLUSION 161

Table 8.2. Political Time Controls across Four Prerogative Powers N

Budget Agreement

Executive Orders

Executive Agreements

Use of Force

26 26

• •

• •

•

•

24 28

• •

• •

•

•

Historical Era

Post-Reform (≥ 1975) Pre-Reform (constant) Presidential Party

Democratic Republican (constant) Select Year in Term

First Year Last Year Reelection Year Other (constant)

9 5 7 31

• •

•

President

Truman (constant) Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush Clinton

4 8 3 5 5 3 4 8 4 8

•

•

• • • • • • • • • •

+ + • •

+ • •

•

•

•

•

• Indicates significance at the 0.05 level. + Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

not appear to be all that useful (see table 8.2). Last (lame duck) year had an effect only on budget agreement, and its effect was negative as predicted. First and reelection years are never important for any of the four presidential prerogative actions, which was quite a surprise and counter to much literature. Thus, I feel confident that the particular year in term has very little to do with explaining most presidential prerogative actions. The fact that the theoretically unimportant “other” years (a residual category of all remaining years not fitting into one of the three designations) is significant in two models makes me cautious about this particular control; I recommend its elimination in future research on unilateral powers. Finally, individual presidents appear to have considerable effect across three of the models (see table 8.2). Only in the budget agreement model does individual president seem to play a minimal role. Although the presi-

162 CHAPTER 8

dential dummy set (dichotomous variable for each president) does not always account for much variation in the dependent variable, these findings do support the argument that one cannot ignore the individual within the larger institution when examining the presidency. That is, characteristics regarding individual presidents are important in their ability to interact with and apart from Congress. Considerable debate has occurred over whether to study the individual president (n = 1 problem; Heclo 1977) or whether to examine the institutional presidency and largely ignore individual characteristics. Scholars like Neustadt (1960) and Lowi (1985) focus on the former, while Ragsdale (1996), Rockman (1984), Moe (1985) and Pika (1979) emphasize the latter. Hager and Sullivan (1994) show that both matter and need attention in scholarly research. Also, the evidence here suggests that both the individual (through the presidential dummies as well as presidential preferences and resources) and institutions (through variables like legislative success) are differentially important in the four models of presidential alternative actions. Since the individuals are so important, we cannot so easily write off Neustadt’s power model. Using political time in this volume goes beyond standard treatments. It represents a new way of thinking about presidential prerogative powers according to recurring cycles instead of purely chronological time. The concern is more with understanding patterns and meaning in relationships between Congress, the presidents, and their behavior. In addition to historical era, presidential party, selected year within president’s term of office, and individual presidents facilitates comprehension of stability and change in agendas, preferences, and activities. Political time allows for a more sophisticated and extended analysis than chronological time alone provides. I reiterate the utility of such controls, except for year and term, and I provide the longest time series yet incorporated for examining these controls on presidential unilateral actions.

POLICY AREAS In order to test for the domestic/foreign policy distinction, I disaggregated three of the four dependent prerogative actions by policy area. I examined both budget agreement (Shull and Shaw 1999) and executive orders (Shull 1997) by issue area in previous research, and it was easy to update these data. Ragsdale (1998) provides data for two of them (executive orders and executive agreements) by seven issue areas, and I then collapsed them into domestic and foreign categories. Only for commitment of troops does such a distinction appear impossible, and thus policy area was excluded from the

CONCLUSION 163

analysis of uses of force. Each of the other three actions was disaggregated by policy area and then used as the dependent variable in the respective equation. For example, executive orders were split into number of orders per year each on domestic and foreign policy. The general model is the combination of domestic and foreign policy orders. The roles and influence of both the president and Congress vary considerably by policy areas and several such divisions have been used to study presidential-congressional relations (Shull 1997). For a dichotomy, the two presidencies thesis retains some utility after forty years since Wildavsky’s (1991 [1966]) original research.7 Since virtually all of the two presidencies studies deal with success and/or support in Congress, its utility for presidential prerogative powers has remained largely unexamined (but see CanesWrone et al. 1999; Howell 2003). The overall findings here are mixed and seemingly inconsistent. Lower explanatory power appears for virtually all policy designations (even for executive orders), but the policy areas reveal different explanatory variables as important, not only when comparing domestic and foreign but also when comparing either to the general models. The latter finding suggests that policy areas are discriminating by tapping different dimensions of the unilateral powers. Table 8.3 shows the summary effects for disaggregating each discretionary power by policy area. Overall, the two policy areas had mixed results in examining presidential unilateral actions. First, separating by policy area

Table 8.3. Policy Area Controls for Prerogative Powers Domestic Foreign Budget Executive Executive Budget Executive Executive Agreement Orders Agreements Agreement Orders Agreements

Personal

President ADA Popular Approval

• •

+

Institutional

Legislative Success Employees EOP

•

• •

•

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment

•

•

Lag

•

• Indicates significance at the 0.05 level. + Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

•

•

•

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partially confirms the finding that no single environment is capable of explaining any of the actions. Only for domestic budget agreement are variables from each of the three levels of influence important, while in foreign budgeting just one variable is significant. For the prerogative power of executive agreements, only a single variable is important. Legislative success (in the institution level) was the only variable important for both domestic and foreign executive orders, but variables from each level contributed to foreign orders. Finally, every one of my six variables was significant in at least one of these six policy models in table 8.3, but none dominated. Therefore, the overall multiple perspective model seems reasonably well specified.

WHO CONTROLS POLICYMAKING? After World War II, in the dawn of the nuclear age, amid the tensions of the cold war, many scholars and political leaders argued persuasively for presidential dominance in foreign affairs (Dahl 1950; Destler 1974; Donovan 1974; Robinson 1967). In addition, most presidents preferred foreign policy. There was less competition, and they could deal with lofty issues such as world peace rather than welfare checks. This dichotomy led Wildavsky to assert that there were two presidencies in the United States: one for foreign policy and one for domestic policy (Wildavsky 1991 [1966]; Shull 1991). British scholar Marcus Cunliffe (1972, 18) wrote of this imbalance that “the presidency works badly . . . there is not enough leeway in domestic affairs . . . and in foreign affairs he possesses too much capacity to commit the nation to disaster.” However, presidents also began to assert themselves much more into domestic policymaking as well, and it is here that much of the interbranch conflict arose. Such tensions were exacerbated under frequently divided government in the modern period of American politics.8 More than any other single event, the Vietnam War caused a reassessment of the presumption of presidential superiority and led Congress to reassert an independent, substantive role in foreign policy. Numerous studies have confirmed and supported the expanded role of Congress (Johannes 1972a; Orfield 1975; Ripley and Lindsay 1993); yet other scholars question whether Congress has increased its influence substantially (Peterson 1994; Hinckley 1994). Constitutional ambiguity with regard to congressional war powers and the president’s power as commander in chief became an “invitation to struggle” over control of foreign policy in the post-Vietnam War era. The decades since the 1970s have witnessed a search for an appropriate balance between the two branches (Crabb and Holt 1989; Peterson 1994; Shull 1997). Officials at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue have been dissatisfied

CONCLUSION 165

with the balance that has emerged. Historically, Congress played a significant role in shaping the defense budget and deciding issues related to foreign aid, weapons systems, base locations, and other aspects of military policy that had local and regional implications (Huntington 1961, 124). In the post-Vietnam War era, however, congressional influence extended into numerous other foreign policy areas. Critics argued that Congress was guilty of excessive micromanagement, which made American foreign policy less coherent than the policies emerging from unified parliamentary democracies. When asked what struck him most about the American political system, a former British ambassador pointed to the “extraordinary power of Congress over foreign policy” (Rodgers 1979, 49). Scholars and journalists continue to debate the role of the two branches in making policy. Many observers consider the president better suited for effective leadership, particularly in foreign affairs. They echo Hamilton’s view that the president’s advantages over Congress include unity, dispatch, representativeness, and secrecy (Dahl 1950; Donovan 1974; Federalist Papers 1956; Robinson 1967). Advocates of presidential leadership emphasize that the diverse and fragmented nature of Congress is unlikely to produce the needed clarity of policy and speed of action (Destler 1974, 85; Robinson 1967, 65). In recent years, even in the area of foreign policy, a growing number of scholars support an enhanced or even an equal role of Congress vis-à-vis the president, disputing assumptions about the inherent advantages of the presidency (Jones 1994; 1995; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Sundquist 1981). Particularly with the end of the cold war and the breakup of the Soviet Union, arguments about the necessity of presidential leadership are weakened. The literature is deeply divided on the relative influence of Congress versus the presidency in policymaking, even in the realm of foreign policy, where presidents are presumed to have their greatest influence. The legislation of the 1970s seemed to reveal a Congress that wanted to be an equal partner with the president. However, Hinckley (1994) argues that the legislation has generally been a failure, or “less than meets the eye.” In addition to war power, she finds Congress not holding the president accountable in such areas as trade, arms sales, and foreign aid authorizations. In fact, Hinckley argues that Congress now is much less assertive than when such legislation passed in the 1970s. She contends that the two branches have chosen symbolic rather than actual battles. Although the debate continues, I have long supported a generally equal role for the first two branches in policymaking (LeLoup and Shull 2003). A choice between them need not be made, but continuing interaction will change the institutional arrangements over time. Congress must maintain its institutional prerogatives if it wishes to be a

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competitor with the executive, however, and it has many tools that it could use in oversight of presidential alternative powers. Too often it complains but ultimately lacks the will to follow through with budgetary or other actions that it could use to challenge executive discretionary actions. Legislation itself often proves inadequate in overseeing executive actions, such as many of the acts during the 1970s summarized above. Congress could designate certain committees with regular and permanent oversight powers just as it does with those overseeing the CIA. Congress also needs to rethink whether its decentralized tendencies can be curtailed enough to more carefully monitor presidential unilateral actions.

CAN CONGRESS REGAIN AN EQUAL ROLE? In the nation’s third century under the Constitution, many questions remained unanswered about the balance between legislative and executive institutions and which branch shapes public policy. This review of interbranch relations has suggested that patterns of policymaking have shifted over time, depending on the political environment, the state of institutional development, the policy agenda, and the effectiveness of leadership. Policymaking today is not dominated by Congress as it was in the nineteenth century, or by the president as it was in the mid-twentieth century. Instead, a shifting array of patterns seems to be occurring, including cooperation or deadlock as well as rare dominance by Congress or, more likely, by the president. Yet many questions about the constitutional basis for interbranch competition remain unanswered. Fisher (2000, 163) argues that, despite the founders’ preference for checks and balances, they have largely failed in the twentieth century. He admits that there are good reasons for presidential dominance in many areas of policymaking but also argues that citizens should demand a greater role for Congress or that institution will risk losing their respect. Some observers are pessimistic about Congress recapturing any equal footing with the executive, especially regarding prerogative powers. That may be true because some presidential actions reside in constitutional provisions (such as the commander in chief role) that are difficult for Congress to dislodge, especially when the courts seem unwilling to challenge their exercise by presidents.

MODIFYING ALTERNATIVE POWERS Budgeting has been a particularly contentious basis for institutional relations, especially since the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act. Somewhat

CONCLUSION 167

ironically, I find a rather high level of budget agreement between Congress and the president at the most aggregated level. Fisher (2000, 174) argues that presidents are more likely the sources of very large programs than is Congress. The required budget resolutions are just as confusing as is the old system of budgets prepared by separate appropriations committees. He points out how the “centralized” procedures in Congress did not automatically yield benefits or improvements. “The more complex the budget process, the less suitable it is for representative government” (2000, 177). Finally, Fisher argues that the very decentralization that protects congressional prerogatives was diminished by a more centralized budget process with the 1974 legislation. So the 1974 Act does not seem to be the answer. It centralized budgeting while other elements of Congress were becoming more decentralized, such as the expansion of subcommittee autonomy. What Congress could do is think more carefully and strategically about its own budget calculations. If it were able to make more explicit allocations of funds toward its own agenda items, it would be able to more closely determine whether presidential rescissions are appropriate. Congress has paid attention to presidential rescission decisions and has not accepted many of the total number or dollar amounts. According to the Congressional Research Service (October 10, 2002, 17) only 38 percent of rescissions have been approved by Congress. What this finding suggests is that despite the relatively high level of overall budget agreement, Congress is monitoring executive actions and is far more willing and able to limit such discretionary actions than it was before this Act when impoundment sometimes ran rampant. Presidential use of proclamations and executive orders was quite rare in the early days of the nation but has become very prominent as a source of executive legislation. A related type of executive legislation is the extensive rule-making authority of the bureaucracy (Kerwin 2003). Not surprisingly, bureaucratic (bottom-up) policy adoption has been criticized by Congress if less so by the courts. When congressional prerogatives are encroached upon, both of these institutions occasionally provide challenges to the executive. An example is the Russell Amendment added to legislation passed by Congress in 1944, prohibiting creation of an agency by executive order without legislative authority (Fisher 1993, 63). While the amendment remains in force today, it has occasionally been circumvented by presidents. Congress has developed a complex system of mostly informal oversight but must be forever vigilant if it wishes to preserve its own legislative prerogatives. It is sometimes argued that executive orders are issued on minor administrative matters. However, that does not appear to be the case since the number of annual policy (or major) orders is substantial.9 Congress possesses

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few alternatives to executive orders short of passing its own legislation, but if it does so, legislation is legally superior to executive orders. While it has been argued that many executive orders are based on legislation, only Howell (2003) has examined this contention and then only with a subset of orders. Further investigations of executive orders need to ascertain whether they are in accordance with legislative preferences and if not, what Congress could do about it short of legislation or limiting funding for these actions. The options available to Congress seem most limited in monitoring this prerogative power. Legislation (Case-Zablocki) has specifically required that all executive agreements be sent by the State Department to Congress (Senate Foreign Relations Committee). However, classified orders do not have to be transmitted, and only the president makes that determination. One could see the CIA oversight committees in both the House and Senate (the only permanent oversight committees in Congress) as requiring that even classified executive agreements be submitted on a timely basis. At the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations committee could be designated with permanent oversight over all other executive agreements. What is important to recognize however, is that with an average of 240 agreements per year, Congress is not in a position to give careful scrutiny to all executive agreements anyway, so it would have to choose its oversight decisions carefully and responsibly. The General Accounting Office has identified numerous executive agreements over the years that were not submitted to Congress in a timely fashion, and even the Department of State submitted a list of thirty-nine out of 150 agreements that were submitted after the sixty-day reporting period for the year 2000 alone (White House letter, March 2, 2001). Obviously a big question is whether Congress can do more to enforce its own rulings, and how do we even know that Congress examines such agreements and/or passes any kind of judgment on them? I find little evidence that it provides any scrutiny and have my doubts about proper oversight, as do Fisher (1999; 2000) and Hinckley (1994). Sometimes the executive complains about the many hurdles of the Act and its amendments. In some cases, agreements go into effect if Congress approves, while others allow disapproval by a single chamber or even cancellation if Congress does not act (Margolis 1986, 90). Regarding the war power, measured here as uses of force, Fisher (2000) argues that Congress needs to closely watch presidential actions through funding. He mentions how public pressure on Congress to challenge the Vietnam War and Iran-Contra show how Congress can play a meaningful oversight role. Fisher is aware of the arguments by some that Congress should not micromanage the president in foreign policymaking, and some criticize the

CONCLUSION 169

War Powers Resolution as the wrong kind of micromanagement. Even Fisher, a long-time champion of greater congressional scrutiny, calls the Act “ill-conceived and badly compromised from the start, replete with tortured ambiguity and self-contradiction” (2000, 170). He argues that a failed 1998 amendment narrowing the scope is a “good place to begin” to restore the role of Congress. Fisher says that Congress must pass legislation by strong bipartisan majorities in both chambers to maintain its institutional prerogatives. However, voting in foreign policy has become much more partisan in recent years as many scholars have demonstrated (Meernik 1993; Prins and Marshall 1999; Prins and Shull 2005). Accordingly, is it realistic to think that large majorities of both parties can agree on actions that would either strengthen Congress or the president in war making powers? Closely divided legislatures did authorize George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush to commit troops overseas, so some agreement within Congress between branches over uses of force seems possible. However, presidents may have oversold these wars, since rebuilding after the peace in each instance proved much more difficult than fighting the wars themselves. This “going it alone” was especially attributed to George W. Bush. I have suggested some reform possibilities for Congress to strengthen its resolve and its policymaking role relative to the executive. Although a strong champion of Congress, Fisher does not believe that Congress can recapture its prerogatives on its own. He contends that growing court and especially public awareness are needed to maintain strong checks and balances. He argues that the media also needs to press for a strong Congress, which will help it maintain its unique role in U.S. politics. Fisher would like to see the framers’ fear of monarchy return to the citizenry (2000, 184). Surely major institutional or structural reforms requiring constitutional amendments are highly unlikely, so we should beware of the lure or likelihood of drastic changes, such as moving toward a parliamentary system.

COLLABORATIVE POLICYMAKING Over the past forty years, Congress has enhanced its capacity to shape the policy agenda, formulate and enact legislation, and hence, try to negotiate as an equal partner with the president. With the addition of more cohesive parties, it means that unless parties achieve absolute majorities and control of the presidency and Congress, some kind of bipartisan or cross-partisan coalition must be built. As one Democratic senator observed, “We have coalition government now. It only works when both sides are on board” (Congressional

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Quarterly Weekly Report, December 30, 1989, 3354). But, growing party splits makes bipartisanship more problematic. This situation enhances the influence of members who are near the median in terms of ideology in Congress. Moderate centrists in both parties are more important as parties use cross-partisanship to win on important issues. That pattern was apparent with the George W. Bush tax cut of 2001 and seems to have become more prevalent, with a group of moderate senators agreeing to support reasonable Bush judicial nominees. Although bipartisan coalitions can blur party differences, cooperation tends to produce more broadly accepted policy outcomes. If deadlocks occur, extraordinary means of resolution can be sought. They may prove useful in dealing with tough issues, such as the growth of Medicare and Social Security before baby boomers begin to retire, but also the lessening ability to pay for it. In the final analysis, arriving at effective foreign and domestic policies, which respond to the rapidly changing environment, is more important than clarifying party differences. Cross-partisanship can preserve party differences. Both parties can establish a record to run on based on their negotiating positions and using the media to clarify their differences. Collaboration does not mean that all issues will take the pattern of consensus/cooperation. If political conditions are right, certain policies can still be led by either Congress or the president, particularly if the other branch believes that the costs of opposition are high. Governing by cross-partisan collaboration in a separated system is comparable to a multiparty governing coalition in a parliamentary system. Might such a system be possible in the United States? Is the presidency-centered era of national policymaking over? Even the national unity following the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, did not displace shared governance for long and, perhaps, not at all in areas not related to the war on terrorism. The postmodern presidency in the aftermath of the cold war shares governance with an assertive Congress. Although Congress has the ability, it often has not shown the will to be a coequal partner to presidents. The legislative body must do so or presidents will continue to use their alternative powers with virtually no legislative oversight. Until one party or the other can dominate both branches, collaborative policymaking in some form seems necessary for national policymaking. Without collaboration, however, presidents will continue to adopt policies unilaterally.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS What I have not been able to accomplish in this book is a systematic examination of the relative powers of the first two branches of our national gov-

CONCLUSION 171

ernment. Is major public policy made more often by presidents or Congress? To what extent can either actor overturn actions of the other? Obviously I have not examined these questions but am able to draw some conclusions about presidential power, which is both limited and substantial. Most of the alternative actions are not affected by variables easily manipulated by presidents. Indeed, factors outside government appear to be most important. Yet individual presidents matter apart from their own preferences and resources, which, along with institutional factors, have little to do with these discretionary actions by presidents to adopt public policy alternatively. Probably no president revealed a greater range of unilateral powers than George W. Bush from fall 2001 into 2004. He created an advisor of homeland security by executive order even though Congress later approved the cabinet department (over his initial objections). He ordered military strikes against al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist suicide attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. He created new courts to try alleged terrorists and enemy combatants that some said violated their civil liberties by jailing them without lawyers or trial. He made tax and budget demands that greatly increased the federal deficit to the highest levels ever after several years of balanced budgets. Domestically, he cut clean air and water funding, and Congress largely acquiesced. Not all of Bush’s actions were successful. Although he won a swift military defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, he was not able to get the United Nations or even many U.S. allies to agree with the action. In addition, he was highly criticized for his rationale for entering the war, since no direct association with terrorists or weapons of mass destruction were found. Bush was also faulted for lack of planning, botched postwar security, and allowing certain firms to reap huge profits in the rebuilding of Iraq. The Department of Homeland Security, originally created by executive order and then by statute may have reduced concerns but certainly did not end them, since most of its component organizations did not change much just because they became part of a larger department. Even moderates in his own party could not support all of Bush’s tax and several budget cuts because they were perceived as benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the poor and middle class. His proposed changes in Social Security generated great controversy in Congress in 2005. Ignoring former allies also had its costs in that most refused to help in the rebuilding of Iraq after the U.S. invasion. Conducting the war was much easier than bringing stability to that country. Congress also initially challenged Bush’s overtime pay plan. The above George W. Bush examples show all four discretionary actions and how they are often interrelated. Neustadt is right that personal factors

172 CHAPTER 8

are important, but I found some deleted persuasion variables not significant (see appendix). Institutional factors were not much more influential than personal factors, so the plural or institutional presidency thesis has little independent support here. Rational choice and agency theories seemed to matter little. Environmental conditions generally influence presidential alternative policymaking the most, so context must be considered. Contrary to Neustadt’s argument that presidents cannot command, it is clear that at times they can. National security issues make command even more likely, but presidents also make discretionary policy domestically. If they do not want to report certain actions to Congress, they can issue proclamations or national security directives that have less stringent reporting requirements or none at all if they are deemed national security matters by presidents themselves. As Howell (2003) argues, presidents exercise unilateral power because they act first and alone. Although there is no guarantee that such actions will not be challenged, the likelihood of them being overturned by either Congress or the judiciary is very small. Presidents take advantage of centralization in the executive to push policy preferences knowing that a negative legislative response will be rare (Moe and Wilson 1994, 29). Another theoretical thread examined in this book is the administrative presidency. The basic argument is that presidents will use alternative actions when they are not supported in Congress. However, I find little support for this theory since personal factors and legislative success seldom influence these actions and, when they do, they more likely encourage rather than discourage prerogative actions. Part of the reason for this is that legislators do not care much about regulating the bureaucracy. I share the view of some that legislators find advantages in strong relationships with agencies, which can provide them with valuable constituent services. Another theoretical thread is neo-institutionalism, elements of which are included in the models tested. Congress has largely allowed presidents to build their own institutions (Moe and Wilson 1994, 33), although size of the EOP matters even less often than does legislative success. As Moe and Wilson argue, presidents have major “advantages in the institutional struggle with Congress” (1994, 3), and they have pursued them with vigor, perhaps to maintain the executive advantage from unwanted legislative oversight. Although I have not found much that I would do differently in this study, it is clear that future research is necessary. Presidential party seems to be important but presidential ideology is more variable and also is important in explaining executive agreements. A possible resolution could be found in NOMINATE scores, which like ADA scores, can be computed for presi-

CONCLUSION 173

dents and legislators. Perhaps all three can be compared simultaneously in models of unilateral policymaking. I remain somewhat troubled by year as the unit of analysis since three of the four unilateral powers can be examined at lower levels. However, despite budgeting being different, I am convinced that it is important, and doubt that a good variable exists other than annually. One possibility, even though it exists only for the modern period, is to use the number of rescissions (or the percentage approved by Congress), since 1,175 occurred between 1974 and 1999. The disadvantage is that no comparison to the pre-reform period exists because impoundments were few and not regularly recorded. Still, I have the longest yearly series yet analyzed. Another avenue for future research might be to use different models for different prerogative actions. Such a technique would not allow the kind of direct comparisons possible here but would likely increase explanatory powers of each action. An alternative would be a larger array of independent variables and then a final best fit model that would include the most important elements for each action. I discuss both of these options further in the appendix. Because individual presidents are important in the assessment of presidential discretionary actions they cannot easily be dismissed. Perhaps those presidents emerging as particularly significant could be included within the larger models but not all ten because of the reduction in number of observations that would occur. This is the only empirical study of presidential prerogative powers that is comparative; that is, examining four different alternative actions to adopt public policy. The multiple perspective approach seems to work better in explaining the four than any other single theoretical perspective. Personal (president) variables were only important for executive agreements while institutional (presidency) variables made a difference only for executive orders. More important for three of the four prerogative powers are outside environmental conditions of the economy, which must be included in future research. Together the three levels explained considerable variance in the actions but were also aided by the political time and policy area controls. Overall, the multiple perspective model was quite parsimonious and effective in explaining presidential prerogative actions. The policy process model argues that presidents play a major role in agenda setting but their influence wanes in subsequent stages (Shull 1999). However, I argue here that presidents use prerogative powers to skip any modification and adopt public policies on their own with little, or more often no, congressional input. Such a situation bodes ill for congressionalists or even for those who would like to see more equal power sharing between the

174 CHAPTER 8

first two branches of the U.S. government. Congress will have to keep a more “watchful eye” if it plans to be relevant in policymaking where presidents are largely unencumbered in alternative policy adoption. Presidents likely will continue to expand their discretion to pursue their policy preferences (Moe and Wilson 1994, 24). But, this can only happen if Congress fails to challenge presidential expansions to unilaterally adopt Policy by Other Means.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

In this appendix, I lay out a more detailed discussion of the data and the analysis techniques utilized in Policy by Other Means. In particular, I review the data incorporated and any modifications made to the data adapted from other sources. Next I present the particular descriptive statistics for both dependent and independent variables of the study. Also included is a discussion of the independent variables excluded from the analysis. I also cover the analysis techniques employed and the decision to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Additionally I present tables for Poisson regression for two of the count variables where some might think that such a technique would lead to better specification. Next I describe the procedures used for various tests of the models.1 The four overall models of presidential alternative power are summarized as are models of policy areas and political time controls. Finally, I suggest different specifications that might be possible in future analysis. I present models with excluded variables and discuss other alternatives considered and rejected.

DATA The data for this analysis are drawn from a number of sources as discussed in chapter 3. The unit of analysis is the year, consisting of fifty-two cases (1949– 2000). Some will no doubt criticize year as the unit of analysis. Even with my extended time frame I have just fifty-two cases for analysis (only fifty-one when using a lagged variable). Three of the four variables could be examined at smaller time increments, such as month or quarter, but budgeting is available only yearly. However, relatively few uses of force occur even on an an-

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nual basis. Furthermore, many of the independent variables, such as presidential ideology and size of the EOP, are also only available annually. Thus, I made some compromises in order to keep all variables (except time controls) on the same yearly time period and minimize any specification problems. I am well aware of the need to examine large N studies, particularly in the presidency field, which has been criticized for the limited generalizability of much of its research (Edwards, Kessel, and Rockman 1993). In recent years, several of my research efforts have used smaller units of time (Prins and Shull 2005; Saeki and Shull 2003) but I believe that year is the appropriate unit of analysis in this research. Several authors capture more data points by using month or by using another unit of analysis (Mayer 1999), but some criticism can be made about these decisions as well. For example, some independent variables change much more slowly than monthly (for example, success in Congress). In my case, all of the data are on the same annual metric, which clarifies the analysis. The time period 1949–2000 represents the longest time series to date in research on presidential-congressional relations and certainly for some presidential prerogative powers. Although a number of my variables were fairly easy to obtain, I present at least two variables that have heretofore been unattainable for this entire time series in a single secondary source. The first alternative action is budget agreement, which is composed of measures of presidential budget requests divided by congressional budget appropriations. Shockingly, neither of these variables is easily acquired for this entire time period. Secondary sources provided only spotty reporting of both variables for years prior to the 1970s. Such reporting seems odd considering the heavy emphasis on quantification in the budgeting subfield and the fact that I found data available for every year, as far back as 1949, when examining original source material. Shull and Shaw (1999) uncovered data for budget agreement that are consistent over the entire time period. CIS U.S. Serial Set vol. 14038 (Senate Document #102–11, p. 750) provides extensive documentation allowing comparison of budget estimates (called requests) and appropriations. Page 749 of this source provides these two variables for fiscal 1966–94, congruent with Ornstein et al. (1996). They uncovered a similar Senate document for the years beginning in fiscal 1946 (CIS U.S. Serial Set vol. 12760, Senate Document #58, p. 743). I have confidence that the values are equivalent since the few overlapping years of both sources provided the identical figures. In that source the compilers point out that the concepts and measures differ and change across time. They state on p. 1025 that “figures include permanent appropriations for refund of taxes and sinking fund and other debt retire-

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 177

ment accounts.” Editions prior to the 86th Congress included such data for all years through 1958. Other comparisons by year are provided in detailed footnotes to both volumes. The second variable previously unavailable for the time series is executive agreements. I mentioned earlier that Ragsdale provides these data through 1984 but considered them not separable from treaties thereafter. However, I obtained them separately through data available from Stanley and Niemi (2002) and used them both individually and together in this analysis. Some research has examined executive agreements descriptively (Johnson 1984; Margolis 1986), while Martin (2000) provides an interesting multivariate analysis arguing that presidents do not use them to avoid Congress or treaties. Still, no one has compared executive orders and executive agreements, and I reveal here that they follow very different patterns of alternative presidential policy adoption. The other two dependent variables are also quite different, which justifies a systematic comparison of the four different presidential prerogative actions.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES The four prerogative powers (or dependent variables) examined are budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and uses of force. Of the four dependent variables only budget agreement is a percentage while the other three are count variables. Budget agreement is the percent of presidential requests that are actually appropriated by Congress. Budget agreement ranges from as little as 80 percent of requests appropriated to as much as 102 percent of requests appropriated (that is, all of the president’s requests were appropriated as well as additional monies). The range is rather small and percentage of budget agreement provides no indication of the dollar amount of funds actually appropriated. For example, 98 percent or 102 percent budget agreement could each occur in a year when there is extreme spending or in a year of fiscal restraint.2 Characteristics of all the variables are presented in table A.1. Executive orders and executive agreements are count variables and exhibit considerable range and relatively large numbers annually (mean = 60 for executive orders and 244 for executive agreements; see table A.1). Thus, I do not feel compelled to utilize count regression for number of executive orders or executive agreements. However, I present it anyway for major executive orders. Uses of force offer a particular problem because the numbers are very small on an annual basis (7.5 instances on average). Therefore, I compare count to OLS when examining major executive orders and uses of

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Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Range

Dependent Variables

Budget Agreement Executive Orders Executive Agreements Use of Force

96.4 59.9 245 7.5

80.1 34 113 1

102.2 119 434 21

22.1 85 321 20

50.5 54.6 67.9 2159 –44699 5.7

0 26 36.2 1078 –410341 2.9

100 76 93.1 5721 18116 9.7

100 50 56.9 4643 428457 6.8

Independent Variables

President ADA Popular Approval Legislative Success Employees EOP Trade Balance Unemployment

force and major uses of force, the latter of which are very few on an annual basis. Accordingly, I initially compare the prerogative actions in the same way before considering alternative specifications.

TREND ANALYSIS Two variables are included in the time plots to control for long and short trends in the four dependent variables. The first is a simple count variable (from 1 to 52 representing all the years of the study) for each dependent variable, which is then entered into a bivariate regression model of each dependent variable. Thus, year is a right hand side variable for the trend with 1949 representing 1 and 2000 representing 52. This relationship taps any long-term trend in the series. The second is a yearly lag that measures a very short trend. It represents the simple bivariate relationship of the previous year to the current year. Obviously, when this variable is included, one data point is lost in the analyses and the N is 51 rather than 52. All models except that of budget agreement indicated the need for the one year lag of the dependent variable included as an independent variable, but it was retained in that model for comparison purposes.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES The two explanatory variables at the personal (president) level are both percentages. Table A.1 shows that presidential ADA is a very discriminating variable, averaging a near perfect moderate position (50.5) with both extremes

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 179

of 0 and 100 being represented. This variable has not been used widely in the literature on presidential discretionary actions (but see Gleiber and Shull 1992; Krause and Cohen 2000), and has some interesting properties. As mentioned in chapter 3, it is highly correlated with presidential party margin. Presidents’ popular approval does not vary quite as much as presidential ADA but still has a 50-point spread between the low and high values. Presidential approval offers one of the longest time series in presidency studies, beginning in the late 1930s, but the number of observations have increased, which could present a small problem with using annual averages. In other words, many more observations compose the annual average in recent years than earlier. At the same time, presidential popular approval is used extensively in examining presidential-congressional relations if less so in studying presidential prerogative powers. At the institutional (presidency) level, legislative success averages over two-thirds on presidential vote positions annually, and it ranges from 36 percent to 93 percent (see table A.1). Extensive literature is available on this widely used measure (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989), and it should be recalled that it is not the old CQ boxscore measure of success on proposals (Covington, Kenney, and Wrightson 1995; Peterson 1990; Rudalevige 2002; Shull 1983). Nor is it CQ’s current legislative support, measured by the percentage of members supporting the president’s vote position (Ragsdale 1998; Shull and Shaw 1999). In this research success is the percent wins on vote positions annually (see Shull 1997 and Prins and Shull 2005 for distinctions among these variables). The second institutional variable is number of employees in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), which is a count variable. Employees in the EOP varies from 1,078 to 5,721 showing some decline since its high level in the 1970s. Executive branch institutional variables are seldom used in quantitative presidency research (Shull and Shaw 1999), but they emphasize the institutional presidency rather than individual presidents. Thus, the institutional environment contains both executive and legislative elements, but the former has less explanatory power in this study. Finally, in the exogenous environment, trade balance generally shows high negative values and a large range. The trade variable was not as easy to uncover as I had thought it would be. I considered several other trade measures as mentioned in chapter 3 but settled on the balance on current account, which did contain considerable annual variance. It was rescaled (divided by 1,000) so that its large values would not equal zero coefficients. The unemployment rate is widely used in scholarly research and it was adopted instead of an index, such as the misery index (Fordham and Sarver 2001) or May-

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hew’s (1991) budget situation. Unemployment averages 5.7 percent and ranges from a low of about 3 percent to a high of nearly 10 percent (see table A.1). This table of descriptive statistics reveals a broad range in type of variables used in the analysis.

A PROCESS MODEL A large body of literature discusses policymaking as a temporal process (Jones 1984; Peters 2004; Shull and Gleiber 1994; but see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). These studies examine the evolution of policymaking from an early idea stage (for example, agenda setting) across a sequence of behaviors in which a policy is formally initiated, adopted into law, implemented by the bureaucracy, and evaluated by the public or experts (Shull 1999). Because all four of my presidential prerogative actions focus on policy adoption, my concerns are different from other writers. I posited that the single adoption stage could also be a process. Although I expect budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and commitment of troops to be related to one another, I anticipate that they will be different enough so that they can be studied separately but also compared. I also seek to understand how each of these activities might influence the others over time. In order to test these relationships, I examine the degree to which they are correlated at any one time and over two further year time periods. I viewed this as an empirical exercise and began with a large correlation table of all possible relationships and up to four year lags. None of the relationships were very clear so I reduced the table to what seemed like a more logical theoretical arrangement that also had the best empirical results. One could argue that since budget agreement occurs late in policymaking, it should be influenced by such preceding decisions as executive agreements or commitment of troops. I have posited a general temporal sequence in the order presented, where each activity relates most closely to the activity that precedes it: budget agreement, executive orders, executive agreements, and commitment of troops. The latter should relate most directly to budget agreement, therein continuing the “process” anew sequentially through feedback. Had this occurred, a process model of policy adoption through presidential alternative actions would appear. Despite only moderate correlations among these four unilateral activities, they may reflect a temporal process in presidential decision making over one or two years. Since responses could be greater over time I test for such a process by examining same, one, and two year time lags through regression

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 181

analysis (see table A.2). The only variable predicted to vary systematically with budget agreement was the previous year’s commitment of troops. However, they were only related to each other in the current year at the 0.10 level, so no temporal relationship is present. Executive orders were supposed to relate to budget agreement, but no significant relationships occur. Executive agreements should have been best predicted by executive orders, but neither current year nor the lags were significant. Although the two year lag was slightly better, I see no reason to lose two data points when it was not instructed by the results. A similar insignificant result occurred for uses of force. No other current year or one or two year time lag was significant. The above procedures suggest that my four dependent (alternative action) variables are not interrelated and have very little influence over one another at least in the short term.3 Accordingly, I have dropped this exercise from any further discussion because it is difficult to justify either theoretically or empirically for presidential discretionary powers in policy adoption. Accordingly, no process model of policy adoption seems to be occurring with presidential prerogative actions.

Table A.2. Lagged Regressions of Dependent Variables in Process Model Coefficient Use of Force Predicting Budget Agreement

Current Year One Year Lag Two Year Lag

0.258 –0.036 0.169

Budget Agreement Predicts Executive Orders

Current Year One Year Lag Two Year Lag

–0.013

–0.174 –0.462 –0.899

Executive Orders Predicting Executive Agreements

Current Year One Year Lag Two Year Lag

0.1496*

0.046 –0.001 –1.753*

Executive Agreements Predicting Use of Force

Current Year One Year Lag Two Year Lag * Indicates value is significant at the 0.05 level.

Adjusted R2 0.030

–0.046

–0.006 0.001 –0.003

182 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

EXCLUDED VARIABLES In this next section I discuss the seven independent variables dropped from the analysis for reasons given in chapter 3. Regrettably, the two personal variables I exclude are both activity measures. The first is an indicator of presidential rhetoric. The president communicates to persuade citizens, political elites, and public servants. Even with an extensive repertoire of persuasive techniques, modern presidents may become isolated in the White House. The result is that presidential persuasion has come to rely heavily on going public (Kernell 1986). Public messages, such as Jimmy Carter’s fireside chats, are used to further their policy preferences. Messages seem a useful surrogate for Neustadt’s concept of persuasion. Ragsdale (1984) has done some interesting research on presidential speech making and data on major and minor public speeches appear in her 1998 edition of Vital Statistics on the Presidency. Another indicator of presidential activity I considered is number of specific messages directed to Congress annually. Rudalevige (2002) advised me privately that messages are communications that include one or multiple legislative requests and could relate more directly to presidential prerogative actions than messages directed toward the general public. I also considered minor and major speeches, but neither of these were important in any of my four models of discretionary actions, and number of major speeches annually vary little by president. The second set of personal variables dropped were presidential proposals to Congress (Covington 1987; Rudalevige 2002). These proposals relate most closely to the abandoned CQ boxscore and reflect presidential initiatives to Congress rather than presidential reactions by taking positions on votes before Congress (See Shull 1997 for a discussion of these distinctions). Although Congressional Quarterly stopped collecting the boxscore in 1975, a new data set first used by Rudalevige will be very useful to scholars as a way to tap the presidents’ legislative agendas. I had hoped that number of proposals would be useful for my purposes because they are quite frequent and because I seek to know whether they are linked to presidents’ unilateral actions; however, they had no effect on presidential unilateral actions. I also considered number of annual vote positions made by presidents on legislative roll calls, a measure that I have examined previously (Shull and Shaw 1999; 2004), but it too proved unimportant for my analysis. Similar to the personal level, the institutional level potentially consists of activity, resource, and preference variables. Congress-centered variables have been considered by Bond and Fleisher (1990) to be more important than president-centered ones in explaining presidents’ legislative success.

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Of course, these authors consider the president’s party margin to be a congressional rather than a presidential variable, and its location is crucial because of its perceived prominence in explaining presidential-congressional interactions. Given that both electoral politics and government institutions in the United States are organized by the two major political parties, partisan strength in Congress is a relevant elite-based political resource for both actors. However, it is a characteristic largely outside presidents’ direct control and, thus, considered here as part of the institutional environment. Not surprisingly, because party margin was highly related to presidents’ legislative success (r = 0.81), I chose success over party margin because the former should be more germane to the exercise of prerogative power. In addition, party margin closely relates to the control variable presidential party, since Democrats normally had larger margins than did Republicans. The second congressional variable excluded is based on an activity rather than a resource. Patterson and Caldiera (1988) find bills and resolutions passed (a slightly different variable from number of public laws) to be important in predicting controversy of congressional voting. Despite some limitations, number of public laws (or workload) as found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac is a useful indicator of presidential-congressional interaction (Shull and Shaw 1999). However, the growth of omnibus legislation could undermine the validity of this variable and the Patterson and Caldiera variable suffers from the same potential problem (Krutz 2001). Regrettably, number of public laws did not relate to any of the four presidential unilateral or discretionary powers. I considered a third institutional variable that deals with broader institutional resources (number of civilian employees) in the federal government. These data come from the Economic Report of the President (1996, table B-31) and are reported in thousands of persons sixteen years or older in the civilian labor force. This source provides other variables that could be used across my time series. I wanted to include an activity variable and initially focused on the number of pages in the Federal Register but, because it was so highly correlated with other variables in the analysis, it had to be dropped. Size of government may tap public perceptions of “big government” and is a useful institutional resource to further policymaking preferences. Caution is warranted, however, since contracting out and other activities over time could affect its ability to influence government activities. Shull and Shaw (1999) use this variable, but it is less useful in my analysis and is excluded here. The first environmental variable excluded is an index that deals with the economic health of the nation. It was utilized by Mayhew (1991), who called it budget situation, as an influence on the passage of important legislation. I

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prefer to think of this variable as a broader economic indicator and call it “economic situation.” The variable is operationalized as the nation’s deficit or surplus divided by federal outlays (expenditures). This index provides a good indicator of discretion that institutions have to develop public policy and may even be viewed as a resource variable. Even though the raw variables alone are highly correlated, the indicators are indexes or percentages (for example, requests divided by appropriations and deficit or surplus divided by outlays). As calculated, I found “economic situation” not highly related to the dependent variable, budget agreement. Data on deficit or surplus and outlays are available from the OMB Web site (www.whitehouse.gov/ omb/budget) but this variable was unimportant for my analysis. The second excluded environmental variable is annual growth in the gross domestic product (GDP). This variable is the total value of goods and services produced in the nation during a given year. Even though the measure is standardized by percent change, I had planned to use a figure in constant 1996 dollars to make certain that annual values were equivalent. I suspect that GDP is of somewhat less concern to presidents in their routine decision making than unemployment but may still have some influence in unilateral actions presidents take. However, it was insignificant in all of the models. Next I present the full thirteen variable regression models to illustrate their inferiority to my incorporated six variable models.

THIRTEEN VARIABLE MODELS As stated in each chapter, the six variable models nearly always provided better explanation of presidential prerogative actions than the less parsimonious thirteen variable models. In this section of the appendix, I present the longer general models only for the four alternative actions as well as the one year time lags to make these analyses comparable (see table A.3) It may be seen in table A.6 that budget agreement is nearly identically explained (R2 = 0.33 percent with both models (see chapter 4)). Number of public laws, and civilian federal government employees are significant at the 0.05 level, while economic situation is significant at the 0.01 level. As in the six variable model, unemployment was highly significant. It is interesting to note that messages, the one year lag, and party margin mattered not at all in explaining budget agreement. For executive orders, the more complex model actually provides considerably worse explanatory power (56 versus 63 percent of the variance explained; see table A.3). What is even more troubling is that far fewer variables

Table A.3. Thirteen Variable General Model Budget Agreement

Executive Orders

Executive Agreements

Uses of Force

–0.010 (0.023) 0.014 (0.043) 0.018 (0.039) 0.007 (0.009)

–0.016 (0.100) –0.229 (0.236) 0.037 (0.179) –0.066 (0.040)

0.023 (0.437) 0.249 (0.841) 0.056 (0.727) 0.093 (0.176)

0.033 (0.258) –0.006 (0.050) –0.047 (0.043) 0.023** (0.011)

0.059 (0.059) 0.010** (0.009) –0.120 (0.113) 0.000 (0.001) 7.05e–06** (3.36e–06)

0.192 (0.276) –0.030 (0.019) 0.629 (0.483) –0.001 (0.002) –0.000 (0.000)

0.012 (1.181) 0.104 (0.083) –1.778 (2.144) –0.012 (0.010) 0.000 (0.000)

0.128* (0.065) 0.003 (0.005) –0.228* (0.126) –0.001 (0.001) –2.53e–06 (3.70e–06)

0.134** (0.061) –0.289 (2.312) 1.267 (1.097) 22.132 (48.331) 0.199 (0.181) 71.229 (60.317)

–0.427* (0.240) 4.910 (9.771) 7.277 (4.797) 132.847 (210.497) 0.444*** (0.159) –95.744 (232.025)

–0.010 (0.015) 1.125* (0.640) –0.093 (0.300) –12.269 (12.675) 0.314** (0.151) 5.808 (14.012)

0.561

0.491

0.445

Personal

President ADA Popular Approval Presidential Messages Proposal

Institutional

Legislative Success Public Laws Congressional Party Margin Employees EOP Civilian Federal Employees

Environmental

Trade Balance Unemployment GDP growth Economic situation Lag Constant

Adjusted R2

0.012 (0.013) 2.324**** (0.514) 0.612** (0.258) 31.360*** (10.933) 0.040 (0.150) 56.443*** (16.698) 0.333

NOTE: Values in parentheses underneath coefficients are the standard errors. **** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

186 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

are significant in the more complex model. Only trade balance is related to executive orders. Interestingly, the lag, which was a strong predictor in the six variable model, washes out totally in the thirteen variable model. Again, party margin, messages, unemployment, GDP, and economic situation are totally unimportant for presidential use of executive orders. A result that I did not anticipate is that the thirteen variable model did a slightly better job explaining executive agreements than the more parsimonious six variable model (49 versus 46 percent adjusted R2). This result is a bit difficult to figure out, but it partly relates to the fact that only one variable apart from the lag in the six variable model (presidential ideology) was significant. If there is any good news in this turn of events it is that none of the thirteen variables except the one year lag were significant but only at the 0.10 level. Thus, we get decent explanation but little contribution from our model other than from previous executive agreements. Indeed, without the lag, the six variable model would have been superior to the thirteen variable model as in the other three prerogative actions. Finally, I find that as in two of the other three prerogative powers, the thirteen variable model does a poorer job of explaining commitments of troops than the six variable model (R2 = 0.45 to 0.47). Proposals, legislative success, number of public laws, employees in the Executive Office of the President, total civilian employees, and the lag variable are all important. Unemployment, which was very highly significant in the six variable, is important here only at the 0.10 level of significance in the thirteen variable model. Overall, these findings suggest that I am quite a bit better off retaining the seven degrees of freedom I have in the six variable model, which provided as good or better explanatory power than the thirteen variable models for three out of four alternative actions by presidents.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS MULTICOLLINEARITY AND SERIAL CORRELATION STATA is used for estimating all of the models because it provides powerful diagnostic tools. STATA allows easy and more thorough tests of possible multicollinearity, or interdependence among the independent variables that may contaminate the regression results as well as tests for violations of least squares assumptions. Recall that table 3.2 showed that the independent variables were not highly correlated with one another, but that does not mean that they could not contaminate the multiple regressions with any of the dependent variable models. The VIF test (Fox 1991, 10–13) indicated no multicollinearity for any of the four general models. Literature suggests that one

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 187

should be concerned if the mean VIF for any model is 10.0 or above (Gujarati 2003, 362). None of the tests reach even 2.0, which suggests that no multicollinearity is occurring in these analyses (see table A.4). I used two statistics to control for serial correlation in my time series data. First is the Durbin-Watson h statistic. In addition I incorporated up to three

Table A.4. VIF Test for Multicollinearity Budget Agreement

Variance Inflating Factor

Legislative Success Trade Balance Unemployment President ADA Lag Employees EOP Popular Approval Mean VIF

2.02 1.89 1.63 1.63 1.34 1.30 1.12 1.56

Executive Orders

Variance Inflating Factor

Lag Legislative Success Trade Balance Unemployment President ADA Employees EOP Popular Approval Mean VIF

2.78 2.37 2.03 1.87 1.63 1.61 1.59 1.98

Executive Agreements

Legislative Success Trade Balance President ADA Unemployment Employees EOP Lag Popular Approval Mean VIF Use of Force

Legislative Success Unemployment Trade President ADA Employee EOP Lag Popular Approval Mean VIF

Variance Inflating Factor

1.95 1.69 1.61 1.49 1.36 1.26 1.15 1.50 Variance Inflating Factor

1.82 1.75 1.70 1.63 1.33 1.28 1.20 1.53

188 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

lags with the Broesch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier (LM). No serial correlation was detected using either of these methods. It is not possible to use these techniques with the Poisson models estimated in this appendix.4 Because no serial correlation was evident there was no need to use the CochranOrcutt autoregressive technique (Ostrom 1990) to recapture the data point lost in the Cochran-Orcutt equations (Norusis 1994). Another test was performed for heteroskedasticity.5 A major consideration that I faced in the multivariate regression analysis was whether or not to use ordinary least squares regression (OLS) or a two stage least squares regression model (2SLS). The reason for this concern is the well-documented reciprocity problem that often exists, say among position taking, legislative success, and popular approval. Essentially, the problem is that not only does presidential popular approval affect each of these dependent variables but each dependent variable also influences popular support. This of course violates the causal structure of the model (Brace and Hinckley 1992) and raises questions about how the hypotheses should be stated (that is, causal direction and such feedback biases regression coefficients). However, because these variables are independent variables in the models, causation among them is not an issue. Shull and Shaw (2002; 2004) deal much more extensively with the utilization of 2SLS regression and its proper specification. More serious for my analysis than the 2SLS problem is that three of my four dependent variables can be considered count variables. This raises the question of whether or not to use King’s (1989) generalized event count regression (GEC model) to analyze these three variables. Again, I chose to proceed with OLS due to the fact that results often offer few differences when compared to estimates obtained with count regression and to increase comparability across the analyses. Ultimately, standard OLS proves quite robust even when violating some of its underlying assumptions (Cohen and Cohen 1983). Its robust properties hold true even when dealing with more refined analysis techniques. Quite often, the results of 2SLS and event count (Poisson) regression models mirror the results obtained in OLS equations using the same data.

OLS VERSUS COUNT REGRESSION Since I wanted to use the same multiple perspective approach to examine all four dependent variables, I had to compromise to keep the analysis truly comparable. Thus, I encountered a problem of comparison if I treated one

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 189

dependent variable as continuous (budget agreement) and the other three dependent variables as Poisson (or count) variables. Consequently, in order to maintain comparability across the four models, and for the reasons stated above, I chose to use OLS throughout the analysis, correcting for time series problems where necessary. However, I also compare event count models where Ns are small and compare the results to OLS estimations. The N for policy (or major) executive orders is quite large (over 50 per year) but I still provide the event count model for this variable in table A.5. This Poisson model reveals that the same four independent variables are significant as in the OLS model of major policy orders (table 5.3), but the explanatory power of the model is much lower with a Poisson estimation. Obviously, it is difficult to compare R2 (OLS) and Pseudo R2 (Poisson) directly but the difference is quite large so I feel comfortable with the OLS estimation in chapter 5. Next, I compare the Poisson model with the OLS model of major uses of force. In this case a stronger argument can be made for using count regression because the Ns are so small. Again, I obtain much less explanatory power overall with the Poisson model of uses of force, and popular approval is significant where it was not in the OLS model (see table A.6). There is no question that it is necessary to use Poisson count regression for major uses of force because in some instances no annual observations are present, but it is debatable whether it is necessary for all uses where the annual frequency is from 1 to 21 and the average number of observations is 7.5. I am aware of the arguments for using count regression but remain unconvinced, especially Table A.5. Poisson Model of Policy Orders Independent Variable

Coefficient

President ADA Popular Approval Legislative Success Employees EOP Trade Balance Unemployment

0.002*** –0.007**** 0.011**** –0.000**** 0.000 –0.009

Lag Constant

0.003 3.411

Pseudo R2

0.2927****

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level. *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

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Table A.6. Poisson Model of Use of Force Independent Variable

Coefficient

President ADA Popular Approval Legislative Success Employees EOP Trade Balance Unemployment

0.0017 0.009* 0.007 –0.000 0.000 0.182****

Lag Constant

0.039** –0.438

Pseudo R2

0.2097****

**** Indicates value is significant at 0.001 level. *** Indicates value is significant at 0.01 level. ** Indicates value is significant at 0.05 level. * Indicates value is significant at 0.10 level.

after viewing these comparisons from table A.6 to those of the general models in chapters 5 and 7. Few satisfactory ways exist to identify the dynamics of event count models. Using a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable is the simplest technique and is used here in all four models of presidential alternative activities in adopting public policy. Admittedly, this technique says something about “trend, but not necessarily a cyclical or dynamic component” (Brandt and Williams 2001, 166). However, I have already found that no serial correlation exists in any of the models and am confident in these results even though I cannot provide the usual tests (Durbin-Watson h and BreuschGodfrey LM statistics) for the Poisson models.

POLICY CONTENT Rather than simply add a dummy variable to control for policy content, I disaggregated the data by the foreign/domestic policy split and thereby created two substantive policy dependent variables for three of the four discretionary actions. For example, in looking at order issuance, I first estimated the general model using overall executive orders. I then disaggregated orders by domestic and foreign and then reestimated the regression equations using the two new policy specific dependent variables. The following are the regression equations used to obtain the estimates used in the general and policy models.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 191

ESTIMATING THE MODELS Equation for Budget Agreement: BA = a1 + ADAX1 + PAX2 + EOPX3 + SCX 4+ TBX5 + UNX 6 + LAGX7 + e Where: BA

Budget agreement, dependent variable

ADA

Presidential Ideology

PA

Popular Approval

EOP

Number of employees in the Executive Office of the President

SC

Presidential Success in both chambers of Congress

TB

Trade Balance

UN

Unemployment Rate

LAG

One Year Lag of Dependent Variable

Domestic and foreign budget agreement were substituted for BA in the respective policy models.

Equation for Executive Orders: EO = a1 + ADAX1 + PAX2 + EOPX3 + SCX 4 + TBX5 + UNX 6 + LAGX7 + e Where: EO

Executive Orders, dependent variable

ADA

Presidential Ideology

PA

Popular Approval

EOP

Number of employees in the Executive Office of the President

SC

Presidential Success in both chambers of Congress

TB

Trade Balance

UN

Unemployment Rate

LAG

One Year Lag of Dependent Variable

Domestic and foreign executive orders were substituted for EO in the respective policy models.

Equation for Executive Agreements: EA = a1 + ADAX1 + PAX2 + EOPX3 + SCX 4 + TBX5 + UNX 6 + LAGX7 + e Where: EA

Executive Agreements, dependent variable

ADA

Presidential Ideology

PA

Popular Approval

EOP

Number of employees in the Executive Office of the President

SC

Presidential Success in both chambers of Congress

192 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

TB

Trade Balance

UN

Unemployment Rate

LAG

One Year Lag of Dependent Variable

Domestic and foreign executive agreements were substituted for EA in the respective policy models.

Equation for Uses of Force: UF = a1 + ADAX1 + PAX2 + EOPX3 + SCX 4 + TBX5 + UNX 6 + LAGX7 + e Where: UF

Uses of Force, dependent variable

ADA

Presidential Ideology

PA

Popular Approval

EOP

Number of employees in the Executive Office of the President

SC

Presidential Success in both chambers of Congress

TB

Trade Balance

UN

Unemployment Rate

LAG

One Year Lag of Dependent Variable

No domestic or foreign policy models were possible for uses of force.

POLITICAL TIME I would have liked to have included political time controls with the multiple perspective model in a single regression equation but found that such an exercise limits the degrees of freedom and takes away from the primary purpose of comparing each of the four unilateral actions with the same independent variables. Clearly, different time controls affect the dependent variables differently and, thus, comparability would again be compromised. Consequently, I estimated the four political time control equations separately and presented the results in four separate models at the beginning of the results section of each substantive chapter. Political era (pre/post reform) and presidential party are regular dichotomous dummy variables, but the other political controls require some explanation.6 I ran each dummy set of control variables against the four dependent variables. For both select year in presidential term of office and individual president, I used (G–1; where G = the number of dummy variables) sets of dummy variables. That is, in both instances one of the dummy variables was excluded from the set and the constant substantively interpreted in its place. For select year in presidential term of office the constant is substituted for “other” years, while first, last, and reelection years were included in the model as dummies. For individual president, the constant was substi-

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 193

tuted for Truman and dummies included in the model for Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton. Despite the problem of Truman being the outlier in budget agreement and executive order issuance, I wanted to use him as the base line (default) to which all other presidents could be compared. There is a strong spike under Truman in budgeting because of the Korean War which means that no other presidents stand out. However, in executive order issuance, all other presidents are significantly lower in relation to Truman because of his huge number of actions. Still, Truman provides an appropriate base line as the constant for individual president in looking at the four prerogative powers. I used the following four equations, using budget agreement as the dependent variable: Pre-1975 and Post-1974 BA = a1 + P74X1 + e Where: BA

Budget agreement

P74

Dummy variable, 0 = 1974 and before (constant) and 1 = post-1974

Presidential Party BA = a1 + DemX1 + e Where: BA

Budget Agreement

Dem

Dummy variable, 1 = Democrat and 0 = Republican (constant)

Select Years in Presidential Term BA = a1 + S1X1 + S2X2 + S3X3 + S4X4+ e Where: BA

Budget agreement

S1

First or honeymoon year

S2

Reelection year

S3

Last year

S4

Other (nondesignated years is constant)

Individual President BA = a1 + HT (constant) + DEX1 + JKX2 + LJX3 + RNX4 + GFX5 + JCX6 + RRX7 + GBX8 + BCX9 + e

194 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Where: BA

Budget agreement

HT

Harry Truman (constant)

DE

Dwight Eisenhower

JK

John Kennedy

LJ

Lyndon Johnson

RN

Richard Nixon

GF

Gerald Ford

JC

Jimmy Carter

RR

Ronald Reagan

GB

George H. W. Bush

BC

Bill Clinton

ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION In addition to the above, I initially employed a number of techniques that were ultimately rejected. As mentioned earlier in this appendix, I originally began with thirteen independent variables and then thought about including best fit models using backward regression. The intent behind this exercise was to eliminate statistically insignificant variables thereby reducing any suppression in the models and showing the “best fit” relationship with the three levels of influence. What I found with the backward regression best fit models was that generally, the same variables were significant and that the overall explanatory power of the models varied little. Consequently, I opted not to include what I felt was essentially redundant information, and, in fact, the six variable models provided the best fit and best explanatory power overall. I also found, looking at best fit models, that paring down the general and policy models to include only the significant variables produced R2s very similar to the full general and policy models. Again, I chose not to include such information because of its redundancy; however, this finding gave me greater confidence in the somewhat high R2 values of the overall six variable models. High R2 values can indicate multicollinearity in the set of independent variables. This produces models with inflated explanatory power and usually few significant variables. I was reasonably confident that by examining the correlation coefficients among the independent variables prior to regression analysis that this was not the case; yet, the high R2 values obtained were somewhat suspicious. However, the best fit models, in which I included only the significant variables from the original models, produced similarly high variance explained. This indicated to me that even in reduced

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 195

form, the models were still producing very similar R2 values. Such findings gave me further confidence that the independent variables were not overly inflating the explanatory power of the models. Of course, the VIF tests resolved any lingering multicollinearity concerns. In addition, using lagged variables allows a control for short-term trend, and the Durbin-Watson h and Breusch-Godfrey LM tests revealed no serial correlation. My main methodological contribution is one of breadth of analysis: using the same multiple perspective model of just six independent variables to explain and compare four different unilateral actions by presidents. Not all such actions have increased (or decreased) over time and variables that explain one unilateral action do not always explain another. Thus, comparative analysis is useful so that the nature of prerogative powers is not generalized from a simple or single action but from multiple actions. This time series analysis makes possible a theoretical advancement beyond the oftendescriptive analyses that occur when examining presidential alternative actions in adopting public policy.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

In a private conversation with Kenneth Mayer (2003) he reminded me to distinguish between unilateral powers, which are typically a response to an implied grant of power, and prerogatives, which are inherent in the office. Technically, commitment of troops might be seen as more a prerogative power, but I avoid that term and consider these alternative or discretionary actions. Mayer also reminded me that while some gray area exists, all prerogatives are unilateral, but not all unilateral powers are prerogative ones. One example was during the Lebanon occupation in 1983 when House Speaker Tip O’Neill informally allowed Reagan eighteen months to extricate troops from Lebanon. When a suicide bomber killed hundreds of marines in a barracks, the U.S. troops were removed prior to the deadline. Another possibility might be veto threats, and some interesting work has been done on this topic (Deen and Arnold 2002; Spitzer 1988). Despite my interest in vetoes (Gleiber and Shull 1999; Shull and Shaw 1999), threats are negative actions that may oppose but do not create policy. National emergencies also exist but are called through executive orders. Some confusion exists over the distinction among executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations. The former are numbered and are more public than directed at private parties. However, no legal distinction among them exists (Utter and Cooper 1995, 4–5). Caruson (2002, 26) argues that executive agreements that affect domestic law require legislative action. However, it is not clear how often this procedure is followed. One could question whether it still constitutes a prerogative power if Congress approves it, but such instances are very few. Those areas of congressional influence in domestic policy initiation have been identified by Chamberlain 1946; Gallagher 1977; Jones 1984; Moe and Teel 1970; Price 1972; Sundquist 1968, 535.

198 NOTES TO PAGES 21–58

Those arguing early on for presidential dominance in foreign policy include Clausen 1973; Dahl 1950; Destler 1974, 85; Donovan 1974; Koenig 1975; Robinson 1967. However, early studies countering that Congress has an important foreign policy role include Chamberlain 1946; Gallagher 1977; Fisher 1972; Johannes 1972a; 1972b; Moe and Teel 1970; Orfield 1975; Sundquist 1968. 10. Obviously the fifty-two years (1949–2000) do not allow the opportunity to study long-term regime change. However, the control for individual presidents can show, for example, whether Carter behaved differently from Kennedy and Johnson, as Skowronek (1997) argues. 9.

CHAPTER 2

Although Allison’s work is based upon a single decision in the Cuban missile crisis, it is not a descriptive case study since he posits three theoretical models as potential explanations for the decision: rational actor, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics, the latter of which he gives greatest credence. 2. PPBS, called Planning Programming Budgeting Systems, was introduced in the Department of Defense early in the Lyndon Johnson administration. It requires comprehensive estimates of costs and benefits of government programs. Johnson applied its provisions to other agencies but it was quickly scuttled when such calculations proved more difficult in nondefense programs. Management by Objective (MBO) was introduced in the Gerald Ford administration to provide a less comprehensive way to plan and manage federal expenditures. It was quickly abandoned by Jimmy Carter who introduced Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB), which he had used effectively as governor of Georgia. This device proved more difficult to apply to the federal government and it too was soon dropped. 3. These terms, adoption and implementation, are incorporated frequently in models of the policymaking process (see figure 1.1). See Jones (1984) and Shull (1999) for descriptions and Shull and Gleiber (1994) for an empirical test of such a process. 4. Although I initially considered more independent variables in all three levels (see chapter 3 and the appendix), I settle on unemployment and trade balance as representative of the exogenous environment. 1.

CHAPTER 3

A problem could occur with uncontrollable expenses, amounts that neither the president nor Congress can change without new legislation. However, these figures and even the fact that the percent is not based on constant dollars (controlling for inflation) should not matter because I am using the same metric for both institutions (percent of raw dollar presidential requests appropriated by Congress). 2. The percentage of rescissions approved by Congress from 1974 only is discussed in chapter 8. I received this variable from Virginia McMurty of the Congressional Research Service (1997). 1.

NOTES TO PAGES 58–69 199

3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Obviously budget agreement is always reached eventually but the percentage varies. Since it is not possible to examine line-by-line variations, 100 percent of requests appropriated is the closest approximation I can think of to agreement. Such bias could also occur for foreign and domestic executive orders and executive agreements but are felt worth the risk. To make these data more comparable to executive orders, I drop the ceremonial/ cultural category, leaving me with the same substantive issue areas as described above for executive orders. However, recall that Ragsdale has such breakdown only for all international agreements, which include treaties. In consultation with several international relations scholars, I updated to 2000 the uses of force data from the SIPRI data set. I used only “planned certifiable military activities” involving the United States from 1996 to 2000. For major uses of force I include only those involving 10,000 troops or more. I performed several independent tests (including lags) and found that these updated data are reasonably typical of the entire uses of force data (1949–95). Stanley and Niemi (2002) have a different measure but it is not even available by date. Popular prestige, as manifested in the Gallup support score, is “the prevalent impression of a president’s public standing, setting the tone and defining the limits of what Washingtonians do for him, or do to him” (Neustadt 1980, 65). The Gallup score is by far the most widely used measure in quantitative research on the presidency. The specification of a nonrelationship between popular approval and legislative support and/or success continues to be controversial. Some find evidence for a linkage (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Edwards 1980; and Rivers and Rose 1985), but others find little support for a relationship (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003; Collier and Sullivan 1995). Shull and Shaw (2002) provide a two stage least squares test of approval and support and find no significant relationship. Subsequent variations of the box score that incorporate innovative approximations of presidential agenda preferences appear in Light (1982) and Peterson (1990). Cohen ([1982] 1991) and Shull (1983) provide a long historical period for these data. Rudalevige (2002) provides the first empirical investigation of proposals to Congress (one of the variables incorporated here) that closely approximate the old CQ box score. I was able to get the success variable back to 1949 through a jackknifing technique, which provides average coefficient estimates for a series of regression coefficients that successively omit a different observation, thereby indicating the robustness of the coefficients across cases. High correlations among independent variables likely would mask the contribution of individual variables in the analysis and lead to increased multicollinearity and biased results in the models. Budgets are not designated foreign or domestic per se. However, I was able to closely approximate the designations by adding foreign aid to the defense figures to get “foreign.” No separate trade designation was available. All of the residual amounts were considered nondefense (for example, “domestic”).

200 NOTES TO PAGES 70–89

Foreign and domestic budget agreement should be comparable across the fifty-two years. 13. Unfortunately when examining selected years, the data points are few, especially for last (lame duck) year, which equals just five cases (1952, 1960, 1968, the latter because Johnson announced early in that year he would not seek reelection, 1988, and 2000). A potential problem is that more than half of my observations fall in the nondesignated “other” year category. Because this residual category is theoretically uninteresting, it serves as the constant in the multiple regressions. Although some scholars also consider first and second terms (for example, Neustadt 1960), the data points are few for such analysis. 14. Technically I have not reduced the number of cases, which remains at fiftytwo, but reducing the number of independent variables makes the results more reliable because the degrees of freedom remain higher and less information is lost. CHAPTER 4

1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

Portions of this introduction appear in Shull and Shaw (1999, chap. 7) and LeLoup and Shull (2003, chap. 7). Besides, an average of over 96 percent agreement suggests considerable overall congressional deference in appropriations to overall presidential budget requests. Obviously, some deviation will occur on individual programs, but the final figures are surprisingly congruent, suggesting that presidents largely set the budget agenda or, I believe much less likely, accede to what funding levels they believe Congress prefers. Congress seldom gives presidents more than what they want overall but, of course, can alter individual priorities as it did when it increased funding for AIDS research under Reagan. Overall, Congress usually gives presidents much of what they request (Peterson 1985–86). We can order the preferences of the president as follows. Where A = 100%, B > 100% and C < 100%, the president should possess the following preferences: A is preferred to both B and C, B is preferred only to C, and C is the least preferred outcome. Thus, anything more is less than optimal but still better than not getting as much as requested. Strategic under or over estimates may occur, but this subtle dimension of budget preferences is elusive. Redistributive policies in Lowi’s (1964) formulation are pushed more by presidents than Congress and tend to redirect costs and/or benefits more from one group in society to others than do distributive or regulatory policies. The Truman spike is basically an artifact of the available data. In order to calculate the variable, Shull and Shaw (1999) used the nonsupplemental requests and appropriations (see chapter 3). However, the 1950 appropriations values reported by CQ include the Korean War supplemental appropriations in the overall appropriation figures but not in the request figures. Recall from chapter 3 that few (five) last years exist (1952, 1960, 1968, 1988, 2000). Shull and Shaw (1999) find two additional variables significant for budget agreement (size of total executive branch of government and presidential approval). Popular approval was not important in this analysis.

NOTES TO PAGES 89–106 201

8.

9.

The overall model is 0.33 adjusted R2. The original thirteen variable model provides no improvement and produces exactly the same adjusted R2. No serial correlation appears in any of the models but all had to be corrected for heteroskedasticity. The lower explanatory power of the domestic model is 0.25 adjusted R2.

CHAPTER 5

Later research should examine whether executive orders may be seen in terms of adoption, implementation, or administration. They may relate to three additional concepts (activity, demands, and autonomy) tentatively posited. Activity refers to the president’s desire for assertiveness, which may be largely related to personality and predispositions (Barber 1992). Personal preferences are also important, but are not exercised in isolation; rather, they depend upon resources and constraints evident in the president’s external environments. Autonomy is the traditional assumption that as chief executive, presidents “control” implementation and operate in the executive or administrative environment with few limitations. Research is divided over whether presidents influence the executive branch (Moe 1985; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 1994) or whether bureaucrats have considerable discretion from presidential influence (Eisner and Meier 1990; Garand and Gross 1982; Shull and Garland 1996). Finally, as chief legislators, presidents are often influential actors within the legislative system. Conversely, demands from Congress constrain even seemingly administrative activities by presidents. 2. Lowi (1964) introduced an important typology arguing that the politics determines the policy. For example, because distributive policies spread benefits widely, they are not very controversial and would likely be pushed by Congress. Redistributive policies, however, take benefits from one group and give them to another, so are much more controversial. Accordingly, presidents are more often the source of such redistributive policies as civil rights. 3. Shull (1997, chap. 7) examines executive order issuance according to two different policy categorizations. First is the two presidencies, and I have already discussed these expectations. Second, the components that make up the two presidencies are Ragsdale’s (1998) seven issue areas (three within foreign and four within domestic). Overall, the most orders are issued in trade and defense within the foreign realm and government and resources within the domestic sphere (Shull 1997, 107). The fewest are issued in aid (within foreign) and agriculture (within domestic). 4. All further evaluations of executive order issuance by type of government differed so minutely from presidential party that the distinction is dropped from further analysis. Some argue that a dichotomous variable of divided government has limited discriminating power (see Goldfinger and Shull 1995). Certainly degrees of divided government exist, such as when Reagan had a Republican Senate but a Democratic House and when George W. Bush had a Democratic Senate (from mid-2001 until January 2003) but a Republican House. 5. Some might wonder why I used Truman as a constant here since he was such an outlier. First, his average of one hundred orders annually makes compar1.

202 NOTES TO PAGES 106–132

isons with other presidents easy and intuitive. However, even more important, I wanted to use the same constant throughout the book to facilitate comparison of the four alternative actions. 6. Although the one year lag was significant, values for the Durbin-Watson h and the Breusch-Godfrey LM statistics are included. Neither indicated serial correlation in the models. Because two of the models revealed heteroskedasticity, I present robust standard errors for them. 7. Note that the two presidencies tables in Shull (1997) and Ragsdale (1998) are smaller for executive orders than the overall Ns because they omit the other (nonsubstantive) categories (ceremonial, personnel/agency requests, and federalism). Still, sufficient numbers of orders are available to examine on an annual basis. 8. Although the lagged variable is not significant in either policy model, I left it in for comparison purposes. The overall explanatory power or the effects of the individual variables were almost exactly the same whether or not a lagged variable was included. None of the three tests revealed any serial correlation in either of the policy models. 9. An example of the former is Clinton’s foreign disaster assistance order #12966 on July 14, 1995. CHAPTER 6

1. 2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

Much of this case is drawn from LeLoup and Shull (2003, chap. 5). Lupsha (1981) provides an interesting comparison of drug trafficking from Mexico and Colombia. The adjusted R2 statistic shows the percentage of the total variance in the dependent variable explained by all of the independent variables in any given model. It also controls for the number of independent variables. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was not significant for any of the models of executive agreements. This result shows that the error variance is constant. The original thirteen variable model actually provided worse explanatory power (adjusted R 2 = 0.42) than the more parsimonious six variable model incorporated here (see appendix). Neither control for serial correlation was statistically significant, so no time dependencies appear in the models of executive agreements. No multicollinearity appears in the model of major agreements. George W. Bush, with his knowledge of the Spanish language and his friendship with Mexico’s president Vicente Fox, initially suggested a continuing of a constructive relationship. However, Bush soon got bogged down in another war in the Gulf, which Mexico strongly opposed. Stricter immigration measures following terrorist attacks from 9/11 further clouded relations between the two countries. Recall that none of the models exhibit serial correlation or multicollinearity problems.

NOTES TO PAGES 136–155 203

CHAPTER 7

1. Portions of the above case come from LeLoup and Shull (2003, chap. 5). 2. In an interesting study of the “opportunity” available for presidents to use force, Meernik (1994, 126) finds that Reagan had by far the most and Truman and Carter the fewest opportunities. Relatedly, Fordham (2004, 653) observes that “capability” makes use of force more likely. He concludes that “possession of a very sharp sword indeed appears to have been a source of temptation.” 3. Recall that analyzing presidents as part of the model exhausts degrees of freedom, so individual presidents are tested separately to identify whether they differ in committing troops. 4. Recall that we cannot divide actual uses of force into domestic or foreign, so these authors are referring to the relative mix of independent variables. 5. I noted that many authors have examined the relative influence of domestic versus international factors in decisions to commit troops. Trade and unemployment are certainly external and contain some international elements, but I consider them primarily domestic in this analysis. Thus, without explicit international elements, some might consider my model underspecified, at least for commitments of troops. 6. I discuss this point later in this chapter. Some interesting comparisons can be made among the individual presidents regarding annual average major uses of force: Truman = 0.8, Eisenhower = 1.3, Kennedy = 3, Johnson = 3, Nixon = 0.6, Ford = 1, Carter = 1.5, Reagan = 5.0, George H. W. Bush = 2.8, Clinton = 3.3. Recall that only three years worth of major uses data exist for Clinton. 7. The original thirteen variable model was much less effective in explaining uses of force (adjusted R 2 = 39 percent) and, of course, less efficient because it reduces the degrees of freedom in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic is well above the acceptable range and is actually strong (2.10) for demonstrating that no serial correlation exists among my fifty-two observations. 8. The zero coefficient for size of the Executive Office of the President might suggest that the variable might need to be rescaled. However, that procedure would not affect the variable’s importance in the model and would make it incomparable to its role in the three other alternative powers, where it does reveal values above zero. 9. I concede beforehand that any decision to classify trade as foreign and unemployment as domestic is problematic due to the likely intermestic (mixed foreign, domestic, and economic) nature of both issue areas (LeLoup and Shull 1979; Manning 1977). 10. Unfortunately the pseudo R2 for major uses of force is small, but the model is highly significant. Of course, one cannot directly or easily compare R2 to pseudo R2 values. CHAPTER 8

1.

I test and control for multicollinearity, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity in the models.

204 NOTES TO PAGES 156–188

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

As mentioned earlier, presidents also have other devices at their disposal, such as proclamations, which have the same legal status as executive orders. Durant (1998, 4) argues that proclamations are largely directed at the general public, while executive orders are intended for executive agencies. Presidential signing statements are also important unilateral actions available to presidents but are only available for recent years. A problem with this interaction variable is in knowing whose preferences were enacted in the final budget agreement. While 100 percent agreement may occur, it is possible that Congress is replacing the president’s preferences with their own in the appropriations process. This variable does not deal with whose budgetary preferences are achieved but only the concurrence of preferences. The concern here is to show which of the three levels influence the ways in which both the president and Congress attempt to enact their policy preferences. Consequently, it is not important to know who wins but rather to show whether personal, institutional, or exogenous environments influence the variation in this interaction. Recall that the three levels include a total of just six independent variables plus a one year lag of the dependent variable for each model. Such high correlations might produce multicollinearity and bias the results. In the appendix I discuss how this problem was dealt with. This occurs despite the fact that the Republican constant was significant for all four prerogative powers. The recent decision by CQ to include an economic dimension, instead of just domestic and foreign, has been suggested by others (for example, LeLoup and Shull [1979] 1991; Manning 1977). Portions of this section are drawn from LeLoup and Shull (2003). Ragsdale’s annual number of routine policy orders, in contrast, is rather small.

APPENDIX

1.

2. 3.

4.

Tests used include the following as defined by Gujarati (1995): heteroskedasticity (whether disturbances in the population all have the same variance) (355); autocorrelation (“correlation between members of series of observations ordered in time”) (400); multicollinearity (violation of linear assumption that independent variables are intercorrelated but not perfectly so) (320). However, by using the percentage measure, no endogeneity problem (reverse causality) likely exists with economic variables (unemployment or trade). I initially included the current year process variable in the models to help explain each presidential prerogative action. I considered the most directly related “process” variable as part of the exogenous environment to explain each subsequent activity (e.g., executive orders to predict executive agreements). This decision did not necessarily mean that the micro policy adoption process was hypothesized to occur within a single year. In any event, since no process occurs, these variables were excluded in the final analyses. I considered the Durbin-Watson d statistic and all of my estimations were higher than the threshold of 1.7 which could suggest serial correlation, but this

NOTES TO PAGES 188–192 205

5.

6.

statistic is not appropriate when lagged dependent variables appear in the model. I used the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values for the dependent variables. Based upon the Chi-square tests, only a few models revealed slight heteroskedasticity, for which I reported robust standard errors. I remind readers that I use presidential party as a political time control rather than as a personal variable for several reasons. First, party is chronologically and time based with a particular administration although the same party could exist over several administrations. Mainly, however, presidential party was very closely related to presidential ideology (r = .94) and it is not possible to use both in the regular models. Thus, party was relegated to a separate political time control.

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INDEX

Page numbers for tables and figures are in italics ADA scores. See Americans for Democratic Action scores administrative presidency, 46, 172 agency theory, 46, 157; “bottom-up” approach, 46, 167; “top-down” approach, 46 alternative power. See prerogative powers Altman & Co. v. United States (1912), 118–19 Americans for Democratic Action scores, 64, 172–73, 178–79 balanced budget showdown (1995–96), 8–9 Barber, James David, 40–41 Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), 152 Blechman, Barry, 61–62 Bond, Jon, 182–83 “bottom-up” approach. See agency theory: “bottom-up” approach Bricker Amendment (1953), 35, 129 Brownlow Commission, 42 budget agreement, 8–9, 31–33, 49–50, 90 Table 4.2, 92–94; congressional role, 7–8, 73–76, 91–92, 166–67; and deficit reduction, 73–74, 76; defined, 33, 77–78; domestic policy, 89–90; foreign policy, 90–91; influences on, 32, 83–85; measurement, 57–58, 78– 79; policy areas, 82–83; political time,

32, 80–82, 87–89, 88 Table 4.1; presidential role, 7–8, 31–32, 73–76; trend analysis, 79–80, 85, 86 Figure 4.2 Budget and Accounting Act (1921), 73 Budget and Impoundment Control Act (1974), 4, 7, 73, 76, 91, 166–67 budget rescissions, 91, 167, 173 bureaucratic rule making. See executive agency rule making Burke, John, 43 Bush, George H. W.: budget, 32, 74, 81; commitment of troops, 134–36, 145, 152; executive agreements, 35; executive orders, 97, 106; persuasive ability, 136; popular approval, 136 Bush, George W.: budget, 75–76, 82; commitment of troops, 12–13, 137; executive agreements, 12, 117, 131; executive orders, 95–96; leadership, 18; popular approval, 137; tax and budget cuts, 171; unilateral actions, 171; War in Iraq (2003), 13, 136–37, 152–53, 171 By Order of the President (Cooper), 6 Caldiera, Gregory, 183 Canes-Wrone, Brandice, 22 Carter, Jimmy, 43, 49; budget, 31, 81; commitment of troops, 145; executive agreements, 11–12, 116–17, 131; treaties, 115–16, 130–31

222 INDEX

Case-Zablocki Act (1972), 4, 11, 35, 129–30 CBO. See Congressional Budget Office Cheney v. U.S. District Court (2004), 5 civil rights, 9–10, 98 Civil Rights Act (1964), 10 Clinton, Bill: balanced budget showdown (1995–96), 8–9; budget, 31, 74, 81–82, 86; commitment of troops, 145; executive agreements, 35; executive orders, 33, 95–97, 106; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 118 coalition government, 169–70 commitment of troops, 12–14, 36–38, 52–53, 147 Table 7.2; congressional oversight, 168–69; congressional role, 135, 150, 152; constitutionality, 150– 51; defined, 137–38; influences on, 141–42; major use of force, 138, 148– 50; measurement, 61–62; Poisson model of major uses of force, 149 Table 7.3; political time, 140–41, 144–47, 146 Table 7.1; presidential role, 135–36, 138–39; trend analysis, 139, 144, 145 Figure 7.2 Congress: decentralized nature, 15, 21– 22, 30, 91–92, 165–67; domestic policy, 21–22; exogenous environment, 17; foreign policy, 21–22, 164–65; members of, 15; oversight role, 4, 96, 165–66, 169 (see also subheading congressional oversight under executive agreements; executive orders; and commitment of troops); power to declare war, 138, 152–53; powers, 29 Congressional Budget Office, 80, 84 congressional-executive agreements, 118, 129 congressional institutions, 16–17 Constitution: power sharing, 7, 10, 12, 26; powers of the president, 5, 7; separation of powers, 9, 26, 29, 164, 166; treaty-making power, 114 Cooper, Philip, 5–6 count regression. See Poisson regression technique count variable, 69 courts: and commitment of troops, 13, 150–51; and executive orders, 111

Cuba and the invasion of Grenada (1983), 13 Cunliffe, Marcus, 164 data sources, 175–77 Deering, Christopher, 14, 16 Department of Homeland Security, 171 dependent variables, 56–57, 177–78; correlation, 62–63, 63 Table 3.1; lagged regression, 181 Table A.2; trend analysis, 178 discretionary power. See prerogative powers divided government, 4, 14, 76, 81, 164 domestic policy, 21–22, 162–64. See also two presidencies thesis drug trafficking. See Mexico-U.S. agreements Easton, David, 17 economic indicators, 77 Figure 4.1 economy: influence on budget agreement, 32–33, 73–76, 83, 85; influence on troop commitment, 37–38, 135 Eisenhower, Dwight: Bricker Amendment, 129; budget, 31, 86; commitment of troops, 146 Elusive Executive, The (King and Ragsdale), 43 environmental variables. See exogenous environment EOP. See Executive Office of the President equations, 191–94 executive agency rule making, 5, 9–10, 96–97, 167 executive agreements, 10–12, 35–36, 51–52, 127 Table 6.3; compared to treaties, 35, 60, 114, 123, 131; congressional oversight, 129, 133, 168; defined, 11, 117; influences on, 121; legal authority, 11, 117–18; major agreements, 119, 128, 128 Table 6.4; measurement, 60–61; national security, 119, 130; policy areas, 120–21; political time, 120, 125–26, 125 Table 6.2, 131–32; trend analysis, 119–20, 123–24, 124 Figure 6.1, 131. See also congressional-executive agreements; treaties

INDEX

Executive Office of the President (EOP), 16, 34, 42, 65, 84, 179 executive orders, 33–35, 50–51, 107 Table 5.2; administrative function, 97, 112–13; compared to legislation, 168; congressional oversight, 109–11, 167–68; decline in numbers issued, 111–12; influences on, 101–102; legal authority, 9; major/significant orders, 109, 110 Table 5.3; measurement, 59–60; policy adoption, 97, 113; policy areas, 100–101, 108–109, 112; political time, 99, 103–105, 105 Table 5.1; research needs, 201n. 1; trend analysis, 99, 103, 104 Figure 5.1; types, 33–34 executive staff size. See presidential institutions: executive staff size exogenous environment, 17; measurement of influence, 65–66; trade balance, 45, 66, 85, 102, 108, 122, 143, 179; unemployment, 45, 66, 85, 102, 108, 122, 143, 179 Fair Housing Act (1968), 10 Fisher, Louis, 5, 168–69 Fleisher, Richard, 182–83 Ford, Gerald: budget, 31, 81; commitment of troops, 146 Fordham, Benjamin, 61–62 foreign policy, 10–11, 21–22, 36, 162– 65. See also two presidencies thesis Gallup popular approval measure, 42, 64, 199n. 8 Gingrich, Newt, 8 Gomez, Brad, 33 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (1985), 74, 92 Grenada, invasion of (1983), 13, 138 groupthink, 152 Gulf War (1991), 134–36, 152

223

178–80; correlation, 66–67, 67 Table 3.2; exclusions, 68, 182–84 individual presidents. See presidents as individuals; names of individual presidents individual variables. See President: ideology; President: popular approval influences. See levels of influence; see also subheading influences on under budget agreement; commitment of troops; executive agreements; and executive orders Institutionalized Presidency, The (Burke), 43 institutional variables. See presidential institutions: executive staff size; presidential institutions: legislative success international agreements. See executive agreements Iraq: economic sanctions, 135; Gulf War (1991), 134–36; War in Iraq (2003), 136–37 issue areas. See policy areas as control Job, Brian, 37 Johnson, Loch, 35 Johnson, Lyndon, 10, 49; commitment of troops, 141, 146; executive orders, 98 Jones, Daniel, 61 Kaplan, Stephen, 61–62 Kennedy, John, 10, 49; commitment of troops, 141, 146; executive agreements, 119; executive orders, 98 Kerry, John, 153 King, Gary, 43 Kuwait, invasion of (1991), 134–36

Hinckley, Barbara, 165 historical cycles, 23–25 Howell, William, 6 Hussein, Saddam, 134–37

lag variable, 66 legislative success. See presidential institutions: legislative success LeLoup, Lance, 31 levels of influence, 14–19 Liberia, civil war in (2002–03), 137 Little v. Barremme (1804), 111 Lowi, Theodore, 201n. 2

incrementalism, 31, 80 independent variables, 56–57, 63–68,

Madison, James, 26 major actions as control, 25, 49, 56–57

224 INDEX

Management By Objective (MBO), 198n. 2 Margolis, Michael, 35 Mayer, Kenneth, 5–6, 197n. 1 Mexico-U.S. agreements, 116–17, 131 Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data set, 61–62, 139–40, 140 Figure 7.1 military policy, 136. See also commitment of troops multicollinearity, 67, 186–88; VIF test, 186, 187 Table A.4 multiple perspective approach, 8, 14, 17–19, 27–28, 45–47, 154–55, 173; assessment, 53–54, 89–91, 106, 112, 126–28, 147–48, 159, 164; components, 56–57 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement National Emergencies Act (1976), 4, 110 national security. See executive agreements: national security; president: national security neo-institutionalism, 16, 42–43, 172 Neustadt, Richard, 31, 41–42, 64, 171–72 9/11 Commission, 153 9/11 Terrorist Attack (2001), 152–53 Nixon, Richard, 49; budget, 31, 84; commitment of troops, 141, 145; executive orders, 106 NOMINATE scores, 172–73 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993), 118 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 44, 80, 84, 97 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988), 118 ordinary least squares regression (OLS), 188–90 Ostrom, Charles, 37 Panama Canal treaties, 115–16, 130–31 Patterson, Samuel, 183 Planning Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS), 198n. 2 Poisson models: major uses of force, 149

Table 7.3; policy orders, 189 Table A.5; use of force, 190 Table A.6 Poisson regression technique, 188 policy areas as control, 21–22, 27–28, 48, 56–57, 68–69, 162–64; across prerogative powers, 163 Table 8.3 policymaking: collaboration in, 169–70; congressional role, 169; control of, 164–66; evolution of, 166, 180 policy process, 20, 156, 180. See also system/process model political party and ideology, 24, 169–70. See also president: ideology; president: political party political system. See system/process model political time as control, 23–25, 28, 48– 49, 56–57, 69–70, 88 Table 4.1, 105 Table 5.1, 125 Table 6.2, 146 Table 7.1, 159–62, 192–94; across prerogative powers, 161 Table 8.2. See also count variable; lag variable popular approval. See president: popular approval power sharing. See Constitution: power sharing Power Without Persuasion (Howell), 6 PPBS. See Planning Programming Budgeting Systems prerogative powers, 3–7, 96, 109–10, 138; comparisons, 155; defined, 5; as dependent variables, 177–78; distinguished from unilateral powers, 197n. 1; general model results, 158 Table 8.1; influences on, 53 Table 2.1; limitations of, 14, 150–51; policy area as control, 163 Table 8.3; political time as control, 161 Table 8.2; research, 27–28 president: chief executive role, 43, 109– 10; commander-in-chief role, 12, 36, 138, 150; decision making, 20, 29, 38–39, 141–42, 152; domestic policy, 21–22; exogenous environment, 17– 18, 39, 44–45; foreign policy, 21–22; ideology, 24, 64, 84, 101, 121, 142; influences on, 17–19, 63; leadership ability, 18, 23–24; limitations of power, 14, 30; national security, 110, 119, 152–53; policy preferences, 15,

INDEX

156, 172; political party, 24, 36, 80–81, 87, 140–41; popular approval, 15, 37, 64, 84, 101–102, 121, 142–43, 179; role in policy process, 20–21, 45; year in term of office, 25, 38, 81, 87, 100, 104–105, 141. See also presidential institutions; presidents as individuals presidential-congressional relations, 21, 45–46, 92–94; policy areas, 22; political time, 23–24 presidential dominance, 21–22, 165, 169, 173–74 presidential greatness, 40 presidential institutions, 16–18, 39, 42– 44, 46; executive staff size, 44, 65, 84, 102, 122, 179; legislative success, 44, 65, 85, 102, 107, 122, 143, 179; measurement of influence, 65 presidential power concept, 46 Presidential Power (Neustadt), 41–42 presidential powers, 29, 41–42 president, prerogative power of. See prerogative powers presidents as individuals, 15, 18, 31–32, 39–42; historical rankings, 40; measurement of influence, 64; personality assessment, 40–41; persuasive abilities, 41. See also names of individual presidents process model. See system/process model Ragsdale, Lyn, 11, 43, 59–60, 182 rational choice theory, 157 Reagan, Ronald, 49; budget, 31, 74, 81, 86; commitment of troops, 13, 141, 146; executive agreements, 35; executive orders, 96–97, 106 regression analysis, 180–81, 186–90 rescissions. See budget rescissions research: comparative approach, 155; future needs, 172–73. See also multiple perspective approach Rudalevige, Andrew, 22, 182 rule making. See executive agency rule making Russell Amendment (1944), 167 Sarver, Christopher, 61–62 Schlesinger, Arthur, 40

225

separation of powers. See Constitution: separation of powers Shaw, Thomas, 19, 22 Shull, Steven, 19, 22, 33 Skowronek, Stephen, 23–24 system/process model, 20 Figure 1.1, 173–74, 180–81 systems theory, 20, 157 tandem institutions approach, 159 Taylor, Charles, 137 Texas Annexation Agreement (1845), 116 Theis, John, 43 “top-down” approach. See agency theory: “top-down” approach Trade Act (1974), 118 trade agreements. See executive agreements trade balance. See exogenous environment: trade balance treaties, 60; number issued by years, 123 Table 6.1. See also executive agreements Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), 116 Treaty with Panama (1978), 115–16 trend analysis: count variable, 69; lag variable, 66. See also subheading trend analysis under budget agreements; commitment of troops; executive agreements; and executive orders troop commitment. See commitment of troops Trujillo, Rafael, 138 Truman, Harry: budget, 31, 86; commitment of troops, 12, 141, 145–46; executive orders, 95, 105 two presidencies thesis, 21–22, 48, 108–109, 163–164 two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), 188 unemployment. See exogenous environment: unemployment unilateral power. See prerogative powers United Nations: economic sanctions against Iraq, 135; Liberian civil war, 137 United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), 10

226

INDEX

United States v. Nixon (1974), 93 United States v. Pink (1942), 10–11 use of force. See commitment of troops Uses of Force data set, 61–62, 139–40, 140 Figure 7.1 variables, 19 Table 1.1; correlation matrix, 63 Table 3.1, 67 Table 3.2; descriptive statistics, 178 Table A.1; general model, 185 Table A.3; operationalization, 56–57; thirteen variable models, 184–86. See also count variable; lag variable veto: bargaining, 9; in budget agreement, 78; line-item, 75; threats of, 14, 197n. 3

Vietnam War, 152; and foreign policy role of Congress, 164 VIF test. See multicollinearity: VIF test Voting Rights Act (1965), 10 War in Iraq (2003), 136–37, 152–53 War Powers Resolution (1973), 4, 150, 169 Watts v. United States (1870), 117 White House Office, 44 Wildavsky, Aaron: incrementalism, 8, 31; two presidencies thesis, 22, 164 With the Stroke of a Pen (Mayer), 5–6 Zero Based Budgeting, 198n. 2