Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets [1 ed.] 9783030541927, 9783030541934

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
1: Introduction
The Realities of Drug Markets
Policing County Lines
Policing Drug Markets: A Research Agenda
Book Structure
References
2: County Lines
Conceptualising ‘Import’ Markets
What’s in a Name?
The Phenomenon’s (Official) Development
County Lines as ‘Chronocentrism’?
A Product of Saturation?
The Structure of County Lines Networks
The Involvement of Young People
Local Harms
The Advancement of Cuckooing
Conclusion
References
3: Policing Drug Markets
Pyramids and Mirrors: The Organisation of Drugs Policing
Operationalising Drug Market Policing
Sweeping Up
Cracking Down
Harmful, Ineffective and Symbolic?
The Effectiveness of Crackdowns
Symbolic Policing
The Case for Change: Applying Harm Reduction Principles to the Policing of Drug Markets
Shaping Drug Markets by Focusing on Externalities
A Realistic Approach?
The Way Forward?
Conclusion
References
4: Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field
Exploring the World of County Lines
Going Backstage
Navigating My Way Through the Field
Insider or Outsider?
Ethical Molehills
Conclusion
References
5: Policing a Crisis?
Dealers ‘Out of Place’
Dirty Business
The Threat to Young People
Violence as Instrumental or Expressive?
Partnerships and Control Signals
‘Another Pair of Eyes and Ears’
Drug Services as the Difficult Partner
Diverging from the Norm?
Conclusion
References
6: New Tactics
Put on Hold: Introducing the DDTRO
A Blunt Tool
The Symbolism of the DDTRO
From ‘Pushers’ to ‘Enslavers’
Practical Barriers
The Symbolism of Modern Slavery Convictions
Conclusion
References
7: More of the Same?
Time to Crackdown
Crackdowns as Weak Signals of Control
Days of Action
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes
Not So ‘Hot’ Hotspots
Welfare Checks as Double-Edged Swords
Conclusion
References
8: Drug Market Priorities
Netting the ‘Top Boys’: Variance and the Case of the ‘Ideal’ Line
A Time for Discretion?
The ‘Value-Neutral’ Problem
An Organic Shift to Harm Reduction Policing?
Prioritisation as Harm Reduction?
Mitigating the ‘Value-Neutral’ Problem
External Perceptions
Guiding Crackdowns
Prioritisation in Practice
Prioritisation in the Fast-Paced World of County Lines
Conclusion
References
9: Conclusion
Impure Market Evolutions: The Advancement of County Lines
The Symbolic Face of Drug Market Policing
Organic Shifts Towards Harm Reduction Policing
‘We Can’t Arrest Our Way Out of This’: Some Concluding Thoughts
References
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RISK, CRIME AND SOCIETY

Policing County Lines Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets Jack Spicer

Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society

Series Editors Kieran McCartan Department of Criminology University of the West of England Bristol, UK Beth Weaver School of Social Work and Social Policy University of Strathclyde Glasgow, Lanarkshire, UK

Risk is a major contemporary issue which has widespread implications for theory, policy, governance, public protection, professional practice and societal understandings of crime and criminal justice. The potential harm associated with risk can lead to uncertainty, fear and conflict as well as disproportionate, ineffective and ill-judged state responses to perceived risk and risky groups. Risk, Crime and Society is a series featuring monographs and edited collections which examine the notion of risk, the risky behaviour of individuals and groups, as well as state responses to risk and its consequences in contemporary society. The series will include critical examinations of the notion of risk and the problematic nature of state responses to perceived risk. While Risk, Crime and Society will consider the problems associated with ‘mainstream’ risky groups including sex offenders, terrorists and white collar criminals, it welcomes scholarly analysis which broadens our understanding of how risk is defined, interpreted and managed. Risk, Crime and Society examines risk in contemporary society through the multi-disciplinary perspectives of law, criminology and socio-legal studies and will feature work that is theoretical as well as empirical in nature. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14593

Jack Spicer

Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets

Jack Spicer Frenchay Campus, 3D014 University of the West of England Bristol, UK

Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society ISBN 978-3-030-54192-7    ISBN 978-3-030-54193-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licenced by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Lightworks Media / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Dad

Foreword

Over the past few years, barely a day has gone by without a story about ‘County Lines’ hitting the headlines of national and local news outlets across the UK. County Lines is a subject of considerable interest because it has shaken up the illicit drug trade and established understandings of how heroin and crack cocaine markets operate. What has made it a newsworthy source of significant attention and concern though are the harms associated with this model of drug supply. In particular, the urban drug-­ dealing networks involved in County Lines have been implicated in the rise in serious violence and castigated both for coercing young people into the drug world and the exploitation of vulnerable local populations, with the home takeover practice, known as ‘cuckooing’, being the most prevalent. Jack Spicer’s book provides an in-depth, richly textured and nuanced account of the policing of County Lines and the impact of evolving drug markets and enforcement interventions on local communities. In so doing, it adds a much-needed police perspective to the small body of literature on County Lines that cuts through the politics and press coverage to reveal what is actually going on. Policing County Lines should also be warmly welcomed for following in the footsteps of the pioneers of police research and making a valuable contribution to the recent wave of ethnographies in the field. vii

viii Foreword

The doctoral research that underpins this monograph commenced in 2016, when the concept of County Lines was novel, the police were starting to find their feet and the academic literature was all but non-existent. It was therefore exploratory in the truest sense of the word in that Spicer set out to gain a first insight into the policing of this new phenomenon. The examination of how officers initially framed, understood and responded to County Lines offers a rare and fascinating insight into the ways in which police act on and adapt to emerging threats and unfamiliar challenges. What’s more, because he was immersed in the field from the early days of policing County Lines, Spicer is in a unique position to be able to tell the story of its evolution to date. The fact that Spicer managed to successfully navigate these turbulent waters and keep on top of a rapidly developing subject matter is a testament to his skills as a researcher. On the latter point, the book’s state-of-the-art review of the existing literature on County Lines, which covers its etymology, development, novelty, drivers, structure and associated harms, really shows off Spicer’s deep understanding and firm grasp of the area. Ethnography has proved to be a crucial methodology for entering and understanding the world of policing. In proper ethnographic fashion, Policing County Lines draws on fourteen months of fieldwork, during which Spicer was embedded within a police force observing (and occasionally partially participating in) a range of policing activities alongside police officers, staff and partners. Observations were supplemented with thirty-seven interviews and analyses of intelligence products and other documentary sources. Through these methods, Spicer exposes and documents the behind-the-scenes values, narratives and routine activities of the police, including their sense of mission, perceptions of ‘good’ policing and strategies for resolving the tensions, ambiguities and contradictions of their work. He also details how law and policy ‘on the books’ is put into action and shines a light on the disparity between the way police organisations formally present themselves and the informal, lived realities of drug law enforcement on the streets. In his methodology chapter, besides the traditional sections on going backstage, positionality and ethical dilemmas, Spicer imparts some useful reflections on the benefits and challenges of doing fieldwork on a ‘newsy’ topic that the police are expected to do something about.

 Foreword 

ix

It is sometimes said that much police research is theoretically vacuous, but that is certainly not the case with Policing County Lines. Spicer’s empirical findings are rigorously analysed using an apt and progressive theoretical framework that merges the concepts of ‘symbolic policing’ and ‘harm reduction’. These concepts are introduced in the literature review and expertly applied and developed throughout. Over the course of the fieldwork, various new measures were introduced in response to the burgeoning threat of County Lines. The most prominent were Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Orders and the pursuit of modern slavery convictions. In addition to the communicative properties of these tactics, Spicer examines how they were viewed and operationalised by the police. Far from being the invaluable resources that were promised by politicians and senior management, officers found them to be practically unwieldy and were sceptical of their ability to deal with the problem at hand. Accordingly, police relied on the tried and tested tactics that they were well acquainted with, meaning that responses to County Lines took the form of familiar drugs policing interventions. ‘Crackdown operations’ and ‘days of action’ were designed to target ‘out-of-town’ dealers and restore order to local neighbourhoods. Indeed, Spicer details how the police employed a model of prioritisation to net the ‘top boys’ and most harmful drug market actors. There were undoubtedly some successful operations in this respect. At least in principle, people who use drugs and who had been caught up in County Lines activity, either through undertaking forms of labour or having been cuckooed, were represented as victims and not appropriate candidates for law enforcement action. As is all too often the case, however, the vast majority of those who were swept up by crackdowns were the local heroin and crack cocaine users. ‘Welfare checks’ were a significant component of County Lines operations. ‘Cuckooing letters’ and productive interactions between officers and local residents that were identified as vulnerable clearly demonstrated the value that drugs policing can have in terms of harm reduction. But welfare checks were a double-edged sword. Despite being premised on the basis of safeguarding, whether it be through arrests for possession offences or through the loss of their home, such interventions could end up leading to further exclusion and criminalisation.

x Foreword

In the news this week, there have been several stories about County Lines. Arrests for drug trafficking have soared since the lockdown began, after a Met purge on criminal networks. The Home Secretary has welcomed the impact of a major police crackdown, which resulted in hundreds of arrests and deal lines (apparently) closed, as well as drugs, cash and weapons seizures. Scores of young and vulnerable people have been (apparently) safeguarded. A number of senior officers are quoted saying that it is vital to keep up this relentless level of activity to tackle this abhorrent crime, which inflicts misery on communities across the country. The fight continues and the show must go on. As habitually happens in policing, especially when the issue at hand is highly politicised, the aims and measures of police interventions are focused on the symptoms of deeper, structural problems. Spicer draws attention to this matter in the final chapter of his book, which, in considering the implications for drug and social policy, argues that socio-economic deprivation, public service funding cuts and a culture that values competitive materialism are feeding the County Lines supply model and the vulnerabilities that are exploited. Until these macro-level shortcomings are addressed, the most realistic policy approach is to reduce the harms associated with drug markets rather than continuing futile attempts to eliminate them. County Lines is yet another stark reminder that it is impossible to arrest our way out of inequality. Spicer’s book is a thoroughly engaging, enlightening and enjoyable read that makes an original and important contribution to the literature on policing, drug markets and drug policy, as well as criminology and criminal justice more generally. It is beautifully written, deserves a wide readership and will be of interest to academics, policymakers and practitioners working in these areas. If you only read one book on County Lines, make it this one. University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK June 2020

Matthew Bacon

Acknowledgements

This book was only made possible with the help and support of a great number of people. Although it has since been developed, the content originated as my doctoral thesis, and I am indebted to my supervisors for getting me through my PhD and beyond. Ian Walmsley gave me more time, encouragement and critical feedback than I could have hoped for. He also continues to be a peerless mentor. James Hoggett was an invaluable source of guidance and placed a lot of trust in me to make much of this research possible. Nick de Viggiani diligently kept on top of all the administrative bureaucracy and ensured the ship stayed on course. I hope I can give someone a similar supervision experience at some point in my career. I was very fortunate to have a rigorous, stimulating and ultimately enjoyable PhD examination. Thanks to Matt Bacon, James Windle and Stuart McLean for that experience and your continued support and guidance. To Duncan, Sean, Jane, Andy, Kieran and all my colleagues at UWE, thanks for your friendship, support and occasional company in the pub. Although assurances of anonymity prevent me from naming them directly, I am indebted to all those who participated and helped facilitate the research. Thanks for letting me into your professional lives.

xi

xii Acknowledgements

I am so grateful to all my family and friends and for the various forms of support they’ve provided. To Mum, thanks for everything. Finally, thanks to Giulia for putting up with me waking up far too early in the mornings to undertake fieldwork, for continuing to write about it far too late into the evenings and for everything in-between. Your love and belief in me has meant the world.

Praise for Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets

“Jack Spicer’s book is a thoroughly engaging, enlightening and enjoyable read that makes an original and important contribution to the literature on policing, drug markets and drug policy, as well as criminology and criminal justice more generally. It is beautifully written, deserves a wide readership and will be of interest to academics, policymakers and practitioners working in these areas. If you only read one book on County Lines, make it this one.” —Matthew Bacon, Lecturer of Criminology, University of Sheffield, UK

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 County Lines 19 3 Policing Drug Markets 53 4 Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 89 5 Policing a Crisis?107 6 New Tactics137 7 More of the Same?159 8 Drug Market Priorities187 9 Conclusion221 Index249

xv

1 Introduction

The Realities of Drug Markets The hidden world of illicit drug markets, including how they change over time and the role of the police in responding to them, has been a principal concern of criminologists for decades. Across time and place, the buying and selling of illicit substances, the social terrain these exchanges are situated within and the relationship between those transgressing and enforcing drug laws have regularly been the focus of inquiry. Part of the reason for the popularity of these criminological endeavours is how they often allow for scrutiny into state responses to social problems and marginalised groups. Half a century ago, for example, Jock Young (1971) told a theoretically sophisticated ethnographic story of how cannabis users living in the Notting Hill area of London carved out a subcultural existence just below the surface of mainstream society. By studying their dynamic relationship with the police, wider society and the resulting forces of ‘fantasy’ and ‘deviancy amplification’, he classically outlined the types of social interactions and processes that can spiral out of the application of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. More recently, Travis Linnemann (2016) has interrogated the so-called meth epidemic in parts of rural © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_1

1

2 

J. Spicer

America, critically examining the cultural roles of various criminal justice and societal institutions in constructing the ‘meth imaginary’ that mediates how the problem is commonly perceived to exist. Many other fascinating studies have been undertaken in-between, and many more will be pursued in the future. The so-called drug war and those on both sides of the legal fence in this long-running saga therefore continue to be the subject of scrutiny, controversy and debate (Gossop 2016; Inciardi 2008). Imbued with mythology, moralising and misunderstanding, drug markets are social arenas that occupy a distinct cultural and political space, where often firm, but upon closer inspection, occasionally slightly blurred lines are drawn regarding what is considered right and wrong (Coomber 2006; Reinarman and Levine 1989). One rarely needs to look much further than the stereotypes, dramatisations and narratives that regularly underscore how the subject is covered in the news media for this to be put on full show (Alexandrescu 2018; Ayres and Jewkes 2012; Coomber et al. 2000). The many fictional representations of drug markets and the ‘cops and crooks’ involved with them also demonstrate the moral ambiguity and general ‘grey areas’ (Jacques 2019) that abound in this clandestine world (Linnemann 2016; Wakeman 2014). Yet, while not overlooking the significance of the cultural meanings subscribed to them, the pleasure that the drugs sold within them can bring or how they represent very different things to very different people, it is important to recognise that drug markets are frequently the sites of very real and often very significant harms (Coomber 2015; Hall et  al. 2008; Kleiman 2005; May and Hough 2004). Their human costs can be considerable. Individuals can be exposed to the types of harsh experiences rarely experienced anywhere other than at ‘virtually anarchic’ illegal market places (Jacques and Allen 2015). Those living and working in wider communities affected by drug markets can also be consumed with undesirable or sometimes exceedingly deleterious impacts associated with their presence. While often clandestine, the harms of this subterranean world can be numerous, substantial and cumulative. As those working in the realist tradition have stressed, to downplay, obscure or, at worse, ignore these harms risks criminology failing to address adequately some of the true actualities of crime, the attempts to control it and those whose lives

1 Introduction 

3

are often most affected (e.g. Matthews 2014). While not dismissing the continued value and importance of the rich tapestry of theoretical lenses that have been trained on this area, for an academic discipline with crime as its central focus or ‘meeting point’, this risks criminologists overlooking an important part of their brief. How they may be culturally represented and socially constructed is undoubtedly regularly distorted or exaggerated. But drug markets can very often be a significant problem. For better or for worse, plenty of professional’s lives are also spent trying to solve them. These fears, harms and subsequent responses are currently playing out every day on the streets, behind closed doors and in police stations up and down the UK. Paul Andell (2019) has recently argued, via the adoption of a critical realist framework, that thinking about and taking drug markets ‘seriously’ is of central importance. As has been observed by others, however, it is often difficult to separate drug markets and their machinations from the attempts at enforcing relevant laws against them by agents of formal social control (e.g. Ellis et al. 2002; Hall and Antonopoulos 2017; Matrix Knowledge Group 2007). Paying close and critical attention to the realities of how drug markets are responded to by the police and thinking about this ‘seriously’ can therefore be considered a complementary criminological endeavour of corresponding worth. Other researchers who have trodden similar paths to the empirical data reported in this book have argued much the same (Bacon 2016; Collison 1995). While remaining attentive to the importance and the inescapable influence of the social constructions and cultural meanings that swirl around and become difficult to reconcile from drug markets, it is amid the backdrop of attempting to document some of the realities of how particular local drug markets are policed that this book situates itself. As it attempts to detail ethnographically, these realities can be complex, exciting, frustrating and mundane. Sometimes they can be all of these things in the space of just a few hours. But they should be considered important. Ultimately, reporting and critically analysing such details on the policing of drug markets opens a window, albeit partially, into what is ‘actually going on’ in this fundamental component of the criminological world (Fielding 2006).

4 

J. Spicer

Policing County Lines More specifically, this book is concerned with detailing the local policing responses to a particular, and arguably particularly significant, contemporary drug market development. Across the UK, an apparent drug market ‘evolution’ has occurred over recent years involving the outreach practices of drug-dealing networks from major supply hubs to provincial satellite areas (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Widely referred to as the phenomenon of ‘County Lines’, urban groups involved in the supply of crack cocaine and heroin have been reported to be increasingly expanding their illicit operations from their native major urban conurbations and ‘setting up shop’ in more provincial areas including rural, coastal and market towns (NCA 2016; Robinson et al. 2019; Whittaker et al. 2020). To successfully achieve this, dedicated phone numbers are used by these supply networks to connect the various parties involved and facilitate drug supply. Rather than sourcing heroin and crack through local contacts, it appears that, over recent years, those living in provincial areas across the UK are finding that the dealers they are purchasing from are increasingly from elsewhere. The emergence, increasing recognition and apparent burgeoning of this outreach supply practice has generated significant attention and concern. Corresponding with the difficulties of separating illicit markets and the attempts at enforcing laws against them, it has often been difficult to divorce this high-profile drug market development from the various high-profile responses to it. This attention has been particularly intense among the police and other law enforcement agencies, with senior criminal justice officials and social control agencies with national influence being the original key drivers of the issue. In particular, as discussed in further detail later on in this book, the relatively new institution of the National Crime Agency has been particularly influential in bringing the issue to the fore and setting the general surrounding agenda (see NCA 2015). Correspondingly, it has also been highly influential in subsequently dictating the terms on which the issue has been discussed and, to a certain extent, how it is now commonly understood (see NCA 2016, 2017).

1 Introduction 

5

In an iterative process, this intense law enforcement agenda on County Lines has permeated out and become absorbed into wider political and policy spheres. In the formulation of their influential ‘drug-scare’ concept, Reinarman and Levine (1989) noted that during times of intensified attention on specific drug-related ‘problems’, various professional interest groups often fight for authority on speaking about the topic. A more general competition for ownership regularly also ensues. This appears to resonate closely with how the phenomenon of County Lines has played out over the past few years. Various politicians at various times have been outspoken on the topic, perhaps recognising the political currency available for doing so. It has also received significant attention from various political groups such as the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Runaway and Missing Children and Adults (see APPG 2017). Likewise, those that seek to straddle the divide between policy and practice have been consistently outspoken and sought to position themselves as prominent commentators on the topic. Organisations such as The St Giles Trust and The Children’s Society continue to regularly promote their work in the area and have produced various literature and other materials on the subject that have been picked up by those outside of their immediate practitioner circles (see e.g. St Giles Trust 2018). Reflecting this heightened attention, the media have somewhat inevitably seized on the topic and regularly placed it under the public eye. As is often the case, this media spotlight has often shone quite intensely, if not always in a completely accurate direction. At times over the past few years, barely a day has gone by without another new story about County Lines or the responses to it hitting the headlines of national and local news outlets across the UK. Complementing this, a number of documentaries of varying quality, but all generally purporting to have ‘gotten to the heart’ of the issue, have been made. In various manifestations, it has also made its way onto TV screens through other formats, often appearing on shows that might not appear a natural fit on face value, such as the soap opera, Hollyoaks. For better or for worse, County Lines can therefore comfortably be considered as having become a social ‘phenomenon’ over the past few years, meeting the criteria of what Loic Wacquant (2008) has referred to as being a ‘newsy’ topic. This has various important implications. One that serves as the central focus for this book is what this means

6 

J. Spicer

for those on the front line of the criminal justice system who are tasked with responding to and solving this ‘new problem’. Whether it emanates from senior criminal justice officials, politicians, the media or various professional interest groups, of particular concern related to the burgeoning County Lines supply model and the reasons for its ‘newsy’ status has been three key forms of harm associated with this type of drug supply. Sitting outside the central process of the transactions between buyers and sellers themselves, these might be more generally considered as drug market ‘externalities’ (Caulkins 2002). First is an apparent increase, both in seriousness and frequency, of what Paul Goldstein (1985) would term ‘systemic’ drug market violence reported in areas affected by the presence of this form of supply. Second, and something which the County Lines phenomenon has become almost synonymous with in some quarters, has been the involvement of young people in aspects of this supply practice and the harms they may experience as a consequence (Windle and Briggs 2015). Third has been the exploitation of vulnerable local populations, with the home takeover practice known as ‘cuckooing’ being the most prevalent (Spicer et al. 2019). All of these will be critically discussed in more detail in the next chapter. More generally, it has been suggested that this drug supply practice and its now burgeoning prevalence represents a distinct development or ‘evolution’ in the functioning of retail heroin and crack markets outside of major cities (Coomber and Moyle 2018). It should be made clear in this introductory chapter that it is this wider, specifically drug market-­ based conception of County Lines as representing a significant shift in the functioning of the supply of heroin and crack in provincial areas that provides the specific context of this book. It is the police responses to these evolving drug markets and the specific impact on local areas that comprise the core subject matter, as opposed to the involvement of young people. In fact, it is the responses to the other two ‘externalities’ of violence and exploitation in the form of cuckooing that comprise the main focus due to how central they are to the local market context and how they constituted the main concerns of the local police responses. Others have, and will likely continue, to focus on the involvement of young people in detail (see e.g. Windle et al. 2020). Elsewhere I have critically analysed some of the discourses surrounding it (Spicer 2020). But, for

1 Introduction 

7

this book at least, it is not worth losing sight that, broadly conceived, County Lines represents a wider drug market evolution worthy of specific and focused attention in and of itself. Based on this drug market-centric conception, the burgeoning presence and high-profile nature of County Lines suggest this supply practice may present new and increased challenges for the police in affected areas. This corresponds to observations of the increased mobility of organised crime groups internationally, with illicit networks being ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ to operate in different locations (see Morselli et  al. 2011). Rigorous academic research on the topic of County Lines remains limited. This is somewhat inevitable considering it is a relatively recent development. But this current paucity of attention is especially apparent for understanding both the policing of the issue and the geographical areas that have been affected by the ‘import’ of this supply methodology (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Reflecting the emphasis placed on media and political and wider public discourses, what has been written academically has focused dominantly on the involvement of young people and how this can be understood in relation to wider conceptions of ‘gang’ activity (e.g. Robinson et al. 2019; Whittaker et al. 2020). Focusing specifically on the local geographical context of County Lines and the understandings surrounding it, this book instead sets its sights more firmly on exploring the implications of this high-profile drug market evolution for local police and others responding to it in provincial towns. Doing so sheds light on a vital aspect of the County Lines phenomenon that has hitherto remained in the shadows.

Policing Drug Markets: A Research Agenda While the responses to the local drug market context of County Lines sit firmly as the backdrop to this book, situated alongside is a wider, complementary research inquiry. As Marks et  al. (2016) have noted, while a substantial body of empirical research on drugs policing exists, surprisingly little has been derived from direct observations and interactions with police officers during the course of their duties. Two notable British exceptions where researchers have spent extended periods of time with

8 

J. Spicer

police officers as they respond to drug markets are the ethnographies of Matthew Bacon (2016) and Mike Collison (1995). While not adhering to quite the same methodological slant, Dorn et al.’s (1992) landmark text, Traffickers, provides some relevant insight. Further afield, Peter Manning (2004) has explored this aspect of police work in parts of the USA.  However, for some time now, academic analysis of drug market policing has become grounded predominantly in data gleaned from actors who are active in the drug market themselves. Some, for example, have probed the consequences of police operations on the functioning of the drug markets from the perspective of those buying and selling within them (e.g. Maher and Dixon 1999). Others have sought to shed light on the experiences of drug market actor’s interactions with the police (e.g. Collins et al. 2019; Mason 2020). Highlighting this unequal empirical preference for those who are subjected to drugs policing rather than actually undertaking it is not to criticise this body of research. It provides invaluable insight and gives voice to some of the most marginalised populations. But to make greater sense of the “complex relationship between the law on the books and that on the streets” (Marks et al. 2016, p. 323), empirical research also needs to be conducted alongside and within the police, capturing the perspectives and experiences of those officers undertaking this work themselves. In addition to documenting the reality of this aspect of policing, there is a particular need to penetrate the ‘presentational front’ (Goffman 1959) of both officers and the institution they belong to. Doing so can help to complement the work of other drug market researchers and the lenses they adopt, promoting wider understanding and insight into this often controversial area. Despite the fact that most research under the banner of drug control addresses prevention and treatment (Caulkins 2017), as a percentage of expenditure, law enforcement continues to vastly subsume the overall amount of resources used across the world on drug policy (Ritter and Stevens 2017). Because of this relative lack of inquiry on drugs policing compared to treatment, it could be considered as having been given a disproportionately low level of scholarly attention. Writing over a decade ago, Lee and South (2008, p.  516) suggested that those undertaking research on the policing of drugs in the future should seek specifically to address how tensions and contradictions within the field of drug policy

1 Introduction 

9

are “(re)produced and negotiated” by those working in this area. This speaks to Lipsky’s (1980) classic notion of scrutinising the processes and outcomes of ‘street-level bureaucracy’, which concerns with how front line workers implement formal policy on the ground, the types of decision-­making processes they engage in, the discretion that they may (or may not) exercise in the course of their duties and the wider social and cultural conditions in which this plays out. It is within the contemporary drug market context of County Lines and its effect on local areas that this book, with its analysis of drug market policing and of the ‘street-level officials’ who perform it, focuses on. By specifically analysing the strategies and tactics used by police officers in this particular aspect of their work through ethnographic data, it considers how, and perhaps most importantly why, these operate in practice in the ways that they do. Doing so builds upon the wider body of comparable work that has focused on the enforcement of drug laws (e.g. Bear 2016; Marks and Howell 2016). Most importantly, when considering the overarching aim of this book, it ultimately also allows for significant insight into how County Lines is actually being responded to by the police. Methodologically, Bacon’s (2016) and Collison’s (1995) ethnographies of drug detective work serve as particular inspiration for this book. For those taking the first tentative and unstable steps in their research career, it is invaluable to know what others have found possible. Reading the accounts of their fieldwork as I was about to embark on my own stressed the value of spending prolonged periods of time observing and speaking to police officers about their occupation. It also demonstrated what I, as a relatively inexperienced PhD student at the time, may be able to realistically achieve. In the General Editors’ Introduction to Bacon’s (2016) monograph, Tim Newburn and Jill Peay stated that they hoped it would stimulate similar endeavours. This book can be considered an attempt to answer that call. How successful it is in doing so lies in how the content of the subsequent chapters is received. Bacon’s (2016) work, among others (e.g. Stevens 2013), also represents an important theoretical springboard for this book. As is discussed in great detail throughout many of the chapters, the application of harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets poses as a particularly key and fruitful academic avenue to explore. Bacon (2016)

10 

J. Spicer

concluded his monograph by stating that further empirical exploration and theoretical explication on this subject were necessary. In many ways, this book attempts to pick up from where he left off. Throughout, the perspective of ‘symbolic policing’ proposed by Coomber et  al. (2019) also serves as a valuable theoretical lens, not least because the nature of the fieldwork I undertook provided the opportunity to observe the activities and justifications of drugs policing from within the rare vantage points of police stations and those who inhabit them. This was a position that their original analysis and formulation of the perspective, though insightful and theoretically sophisticated, did not derive from. Relating back to the overarching focus on the policing of County Lines, foregrounding these two theoretical commitments alongside a wider ethnographic empirical endeavour serves to address the hitherto generally unanswered call from Windle and Briggs (2015) for greater understanding to be developed into how agencies are responding to this issue. In short, therefore, in addition to the empirical aim of documenting the realities of how the emergence of the County Lines phenomenon is being responded to by police officers working locally in affected provincial areas, a concerted emphasis is placed throughout this book on attempting to do so in a theoretically informed manner.

Book Structure As is de rigueur, to conclude this opening chapter, an outline for what is to come in the following pages will be provided. It is hoped that readers may find individual chapters of the book of interest in their own right. The two following chapters provide both original synthesis and critical review of a significant body of literature, posing various questions and answering several of them along the way. The subsequent empirical chapters, each telling an analytical ethnographic story of a particular aspect of the policing of County Lines, attempt to weave relevant theory throughout and locate findings in relation to wider bodies of existing work. That noted, there is a distinct and unavoidable narrative that, both theoretically and chronologically, runs throughout. To fully appreciate the arguments put forward in this book, the scaffolding process that chapters

1 Introduction 

11

attempt to achieve and the conclusions that are ultimately made, a thorough read from start to finish is encouraged. Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the phenomenon of County Lines and how it has developed over recent years. Reviewing the limited available literature on the subject, it begins by providing an outline of what this drug supply methodology is in order to clarify the etymology of the term and its use throughout the rest of the book. It moves on to trace the development of this drug market practice by scrutinising closely official reports and then critically contextualising and discussing them with reference to other relevant literature. Unpacking the central concept of drug market ‘saturation’ and other relevant aspects, the chapter moves on to address some of the key arguments as to why this supply ‘evolution’ has occurred. Finally, it focuses on some of the harms associated with this outreach supply methodology and the reasons why it has generated such intense levels of concern and attention. Ultimately, the chapter seeks to provide a necessary overview of the topic for the remainder of the book while also representing a useful exercise in critically synthesising all of the relevant literature that was available on the subject at the time of writing. Focusing specifically on the policing of drugs and how drug markets have been responded to by agents of formal social control, Chap. 3 provides a second literature-based chapter that constructs a theoretical framework to be drawn upon when considering the book’s empirical findings. It begins by addressing how policing has been structured in response to drug markets, and the traditional ways that the police have sought to tackle these illicit environments and the actors operating within them. It then moves on to take an explicitly critical view of the policing of this area. Drawing on the wealth of available literature, it outlines arguments that law enforcement activity has been ineffective in relation to the stated aims of prohibition, while simultaneously causing or exacerbating numerous harms. Importantly, it is here where the notion of drugs policing being considered as ‘symbolic’, with its central concerns of sending out ‘strong’ messages to others, is outlined and unpacked in theoretical detail. The final section of the chapter discusses alternative ways of policing drug markets. Drawing on the modest amount of valuable literature available, it addresses specifically the notion of applying harm reduction principles to this aspect of police work. It is concluded that this

12 

J. Spicer

poses as a valuable perspective that allows researchers a productive avenue to explore this area, although it is one that requires further empirical and theoretical development. Chapter 4 provides a thorough methodological account of the empirical research undertaken for this research. It provides a detailed description of the two main phases of data collection and analysis undertaken for this study, how they relate to one another and the research questions that were addressed. It justifies the methodological position undertaken and the use of the ethnographic method to address these research questions. Drawing on the history of police research and situating the book in the context of contemporary scholarship, a short reflexive discussion is provided on where the research for the book can be situated. Similarly, it discusses how I as an ‘outsider’ researcher was situated in relation to the officers I spent time with and the policing organisation more generally throughout the fieldwork. Throughout, the implications of researching a ‘newsy’ subject (see Wacquant 2008) are reflected upon. By providing this methodological detail, the chapter allows for the findings presented in the following chapters to be assessed and understood appropriately. Chapter 5 draws on original empirical data. It reports on the analysis of in-depth interviews with police officers tasked with responding to County Lines in an affected force area. These were undertaken during the relative infancy of the phenomenon as an initial exploratory phase of the research project. Centred on a core analytic category of ‘profit maximisation’, it provides detail on this specific outreach supply practice, the associated harms and the specific context of the phenomenon for those responding to in provincial affected towns. Perhaps most significantly, the chapter theoretically considers some of the surrounding meanings and understandings provided by officers regarding their towns being increasingly infiltrated by ‘out-of-town’ dealers. It concludes by outlining some of the initial ways that officers were considering responding to County Lines. In addition to providing important initial insights into these areas, the analysis presented in this chapter provides valuable conceptual foundations for the subsequent empirical inquiry reported on in subsequent chapters. Drawing on the main phase of ethnographic fieldwork undertaken as part of this research project, Chap. 6 is the first of two that provides

1 Introduction 

13

findings and analysis of some of the specific initial police responses to County Lines at a local level. It focuses particularly on two tactics that were ‘bespoke’ to this drug market development and the threat posed by the burgeoning presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers: the ‘Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Order’ and the pursuit of modern slavery convictions. It documents in detail the responses of officers on the ground to the promotion of these tactics and the reasons for their ultimate reluctance to engage with them. Throughout, the findings are contextualised in relation to the ‘symbolic’ policing perspective proposed by Coomber et al. (2019). Chapter 7 continues this focus by reporting findings and analysis of more traditional drugs policing responses that were applied or adapted to this specific drug market context. Again, two prominent examples and how they were undertaken by local officers are described in detail. These come in the form of ‘crackdown operations’ and ‘days of action’. The chapter considers their popularity among local officers and the communicative qualities that these activities attempted to achieve. Importantly, it also highlights some of the various negative outcomes of these forms of policing. These include how they were perceived by those located outside of the police and how the outcomes of various activities predicated on safeguarding often paradoxically exacerbated the vulnerabilities and social exclusion of local populations. Similar to the previous chapter, the perspective of ‘symbolic policing’ is drawn on throughout, with the analysis serving to empirically develop the scope of this perspective. Chapter 8 is the final empirically based chapter and provides ethnographic findings and analysis specifically on the notion of applying harm reduction principles to the policing of these local drug markets. Using one particular ‘ideal’ line as a case in point, it firstly considers the variance visible among those dealers that employ the County Lines supply methodology, suggesting the opportunity for such a strategy to be used. By detailing the realities of responding to this case, it then importantly highlights the practical and theoretical challenges associated with implementing such an approach. The chapter moves on to discuss a prioritisation strategy that was introduced and beginning to be adopted by some officers towards the end of the fieldwork period. It is suggested that this

14 

J. Spicer

appears to demonstrate a pragmatic way in which the policing of County Lines, and local drug markets more generally, might be able to move towards a more nuanced, harm reduction focused approach. Finally, the chapter reflects on some of the practical challenges associated with this model of prioritisation experienced regularly by officers seeking to pursue it. In addition to providing further insight into local responses to County Lines, the chapter adds important empirically grounded insight into the realities of the police applying harm reduction principles to how they respond to drug markets. Chapter 9 concludes the book by reflecting on and synthesising the key findings and arguments made in the previous chapters. It highlights the empirical insights and the theoretical developments each chapter provides in relation to some of the key drugs policing perspectives drawn upon throughout. Importantly, it also situates this in relation to the wider influence of County Lines in local provincial areas, suggesting some areas worthy of future consideration in order to develop understanding on the subject. To conclude, a discussion is provided on the role of social policy and drug policy in responding to County Lines. It is argued that these should be considered central to effective wider responses to the problem, but that they also interplay with and structure the specific field in which drugs policing operates.

References Alexandrescu, L. (2018). ‘Ethnobotanicals’ and ‘Spice zombies’: New psychoactive substances in the mainstream media. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 25(4), 356–364. Andell, P. (2019). Thinking seriously about gangs: Towards a critical realist approach. London: Palgrave Macmillan. APPG on Runaway and Missing Children and Adults. (2017). Briefing report on the roundtable on children who go missing and are criminally exploited by gangs [online]. Retrieved from https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/ files/appg-missing-gangs-and-exploitation-roundtable-report.pdf Ayres, T., & Jewkes, Y. (2012). The haunting spectacle of crystal meth: A media-­ created mythology? Crime, Media, Culture, 8(3), 315–332.

1 Introduction 

15

Bacon, M. (2016). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bear, D. (2016). The need to create a narrative: Examining the justifications police used to target drugs in the lead up to the 2011 London riots. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 317–328. Caulkins, J. (2002). Law enforcement’s role in a harm reduction regime. Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 64. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Caulkins, J. (2017). Improving research on drug law enforcement. International Journal of Drug Policy, 41(1), 158–159. Collins, A. B., Boyd, J., Mayer, S., Fowler, A., Kennedy, M. C., Bluthenthal, R. N., Kerr, T., & McNeil, R. (2019). Policing space in the overdose crisis: A rapid ethnographic study of the impact of law enforcement practices on the effectiveness of overdose prevention sites. International Journal of Drug Policy, 73(1), 199–207. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Resituating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2015). A tale of two cities: Understanding differences in levels of heroin/crack market-related violence—A two city comparison. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 7–31. Coomber, R., Morris, C., & Dunn, L. (2000). How the media do drugs: Quality control and the reporting of drug issues in the UK print media. International Journal of Drug Policy, 11(3), 217–225. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2018). The changing shape of street-level heroin and crack supply in England: Commuting, holidaying and cuckooing drug dealers across ‘county lines’. British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1323–1342. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Ellis, T., Denney, D., Nee, C., & Barberet, R. (2002). Cocaine markets and drug enforcement in Spain and the Netherlands. The Police Journal, 75(2), 101–110. Fielding, N. (2006). Fieldwork and policework. In D.  Hobbs & R.  Wright (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of fieldwork (pp. 277–291). London: Sage.

16 

J. Spicer

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Goldstein, P. (1985). The drug/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. Gossop, M. (2016). Living with drugs. London: Routledge. Hall, A., & Antonopoulos, G. A. (2017). “Coke on Tick”: Exploring the cocaine market in the UK through the lens of financial management. Journal of Financial Crime, 24(2), 181–199. Hall, S., Winlow, S., & Ancrum, C. (2008). Criminal identities and consumer culture: Crime, exclusion and the new culture of narcissism. Cullompton: Willan. Inciardi, J. (2008). The war on drugs IV: The continuing saga of the mysteries and miseries of intoxication, addiction, crime, and public policy. Boston: Pearson. Jacques, S. (2019). Grey area: Regulating Amsterdam’s coffeeshops. London: UCL Press. Jacques, S., & Allen, A. (2015). Drug market violence: Virtual anarchy, police pressure, predation, and retaliation. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 87–99. Kleiman, M. (2005). When brute force fails. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lee, M., & South, N. (2008). Drugs policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), The handbook of policing (pp. 497–521). Cullompton: Willan. Linnemann, T. (2016). Meth wars: Police, media, power. New York: New York University Press. Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Maher, L., & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health—Law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. British Journal of Criminology, 39(4), 488–512. Manning, P. (2004). The Narcs’ game: Organizational and informational limits on drug law enforcement (2nd ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Marks, M., & Howell, S. (2016). Cops, drugs and interloping academics: An ethnographic exploration of the possibility of policing drugs differently in South Africa. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 341–352. Marks, M., Howell, S., & Shelly, S. (2016). The fluidity of ‘police culture’: Encountering the contextual complexity of policing street-level drug use. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 11(3), 318–331. Mason, W. (2020). ‘No one learned’: Interpreting a drugs crackdown operation and its consequences through the ‘lens’ of social harm. The British Journal of Criminology, 60(2), 382–402.

1 Introduction 

17

Matrix Knowledge Group. (2007). The illicit drug trade in the United Kingdom. London: Home Office.. Matthews, R. (2014). Realist criminology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. May, T., & Hough, M. (2004). Drug markets and distribution systems. Addiction Research & Theory, 12(6), 549–563. Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The mobility of criminal groups. Global Crime, 12(3), 165–188. National Crime Agency. (2015). County lines, gangs, and safeguarding. London: NCA. National Crime Agency. (2016). County lines gang violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. National Crime Agency. (2017). County lines violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA.. Reinarman, C., & Levine, H. (1989). Crack in context: Politics and media in the making of a drug scare. Contemporary Drug Problems, 16(4), 535–577. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J.  B. Steinberg, D.  W. Lyon, & M.  E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Ritter, A., & Stevens, A. (2017). Improving knowledge on law enforcement in drug policy. International Journal of Drug Policy, 41(1), 89–90. Robinson, G., McLean, R., & Densley, J. (2019). Working county lines: Child criminal exploitation and illicit drug dealing in Glasgow and Merseyside. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 63(5), 694–711. Spicer, J. (2020). Between gang talk and prohibition: The transfer of blame for County Lines. International Journal of Drug Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. drugpo.2020.102667. Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5. St Giles Trust. (2018). Evaluation of county lines pilot project. London: St Giles Trust. Stevens, A. (2013). Applying harm reduction principles to the policing of retail drug markets. London: International Drug Policy Consortium. Wacquant, L. (2008). Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge: Polity.

18 

J. Spicer

Wakeman, S. (2014). ‘No one wins. One side just loses more slowly’: The Wire and drug policy. Theoretical Criminology, 18(2), 224–240. Whittaker, A., Densley, J., Cheston, L., Tyrell, T., Higgins, M., Felix-Baptiste, C., & Havard, T. (2020). Reluctant gangsters revisited: The evolution of gangs from postcodes to profits. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 26(1), 1–22. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015). ‘It’s like working away for two weeks’: The harms associated with young drug dealers commuting from a saturated London drug market. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 17(2), 105–119. Windle, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2020). ‘Vulnerable’ kids going country: Children and young people’s involvement in county lines drug dealing. Youth Justice. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473225420902840. Young, J. (1971). The drugtakers: The social meaning of drug use. London: MacGibbon & Kee.

2 County Lines

This book explores the policing responses to the specific drug market context of County Lines. It is only right, therefore, that detailed consideration is given to understanding what this supply practice is. Because of the vast amount of attention it has received over recent years, it would be no exaggeration to state that County Lines has become not just a high-profile UK drug market development but a social problem of national significance (Coliandris 2015; Robinson et al. 2019). At the most fundamental level, it involves the migratory practices of drug supply networks who, plying their trade in the sale of what are commonly referred to as ‘problem’ drugs of heroin and crack, travel out from their native major urban conurbations to establish retail operations in provincial satellite areas. Labelled under the banner of ‘County Lines’ and conforming to a distinct supply methodology regarding how they conduct their ‘business’ (Spicer 2019), the burgeoning presence and activities of these groups are argued to represent an evolution in how street-level heroin and crack markets now operate in many towns across the UK (Coomber and Moyle 2018). It is worth reiterating that it is the wider drug market conception of County Lines that this book is concerned

© The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_2

19

20 

J. Spicer

with, rather than some of its specific characteristics such as the involvement of young people. Taking the form of a narrative overview, this chapter provides a critical insight into this supply phenomenon. It reviews the body of academic literature available on the subject at the time of writing, drawing on other relevant sources such as official publications to help shed light on the issue where appropriate. Providing this critical overview is necessary on at least two grounds. Firstly, as the subject of County Lines serves as the core drug market context that this book explores the policing responses to, it is necessary to outline it in sufficient detail. Indeed, if it can be argued that there is a dynamic relationship between drug markets and enforcement, then to generate a deep understanding of the policing of this area, it is important to consider what it is that officers are up against. Secondly, because County Lines is a relatively recent drug market development, and an even more recent area of academic interest, there is value in drawing together, albeit with a critical eye, all that is currently known about the subject as a baseline exercise.

Conceptualising ‘Import’ Markets Before diving into the specific details of County Lines itself, it is worth considering briefly how this particular form of supply aligns conceptually with some existing insights into the functioning of illicit drug markets. A frequent aim of drug market researchers has been to differentiate how these sites of exchange manifest at the retail level. Perhaps the most common is where drug markets can be considered to sit on the ‘open’ or ‘closed’ scale and their reasons for doing so (May and Hough 2004). A much less-discussed form of drug market distinction concerns the geographical characteristics and the distance its actors travel to buy and sell drugs (Lum 2008; Rengert 2018). The few researchers who have recently recognised the potential benefits of considering this (see Johnson et al. 2013) have drawn primarily on a somewhat forgotten piece of work proposed by Peter Reuter and Robert MacCoun, two major figures in the field of drug policy. Originally seeking to “illustrate how more detailed knowledge about street markets could help us select effective policies to

2  County Lines 

21

combat them” (Reuter and MacCoun 1992, p. 236), the typology they formulated categorised retail drug markets in relation to the distance travelled by the sellers and buyers that populate them. Markets characterised by mostly indigenous resident sellers and buyers are described as ‘local’. Those markets where both sellers and buyers are mostly non-residents are described as ‘public’. Markets where local residents sell to nonlocal buyers are defined as ‘export’. Finally, markets where mostly non-resident dealers travel to sell to local populations are described as ‘import’ (see also Johnson et al. 2013; Reuter 2009). In addition to being a further heuristic device available for differentiating between retail markets, it has been argued that classifying and understanding markets in this way can provide further insight on their likely nature and characteristics (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). In particular, while originally formulated as a means to analyse a market’s vulnerability to law enforcement, the typology has more recently been suggested as a potentially valuable tool for the study, prediction and explanation of drug market violence (Reuter 2009). Local markets, for example, are considered as relatively peaceful due to the familiarity that is likely to exist between buyers and sellers. Export markets may also have relatively low levels of violence due to dealers seeking to make the areas they are located in as attractive option for buyers to travel to. However, import markets are hypothesised as likely to be more violent due to factors such as the lack of familiarity between buyers and sellers, the lack of social ties dealers may have to the community and the competition for territory that may result from their presence (Reuter 2009). Due to the various deleterious effects that migratory dealers may have on the area that they travel to for business, it has also been suggested that this may raise concern and anxieties among local residents, resulting in increased demands for police responses (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Despite the distance travelled typology’s potential utility in highlighting market differences and why some may be more prone to violence and other harms, it has been the subject of little theoretical or empirical development. Johnson (2016) sought to test the predictions of the typology in relation to levels of violence through statistical modelling. Although only a partial test, his findings provide some support for the original hypotheses made by Reuter and MacCoun (1992) in the formulation of the

22 

J. Spicer

typology, with public markets found to be significantly more violent than local markets. However, in the absence of other empirical research, current knowledge on the issue of distance travelled to drug markets and the variation and nature between these different market forms remains limited (Reuter 2009). The itinerant nature of County Lines drug supply and the conceptualisation of the provincial towns these networks service as ‘import’ markets therefore arguably become particularly analytically valuable. It represents an opportunity to explore the manifestation of these particular types of markets, their harms and, specifically in the context of this book, how these are understood and responded to by the police in affected areas. County Lines may represent a particular form of supply, identified in a particular time and context, but connecting a focus of local areas affected by these drug market evolutions to the distance travelled typology allows for insights on this particular phenomenon to be connected to a wider field of knowledge.

What’s in a Name? As a starting point when focusing on the topic of County Lines, it is important to clarify the etymology of this neologism. This is important because of its prominence and now widespread adoption in mainstream discourse. But it also clarifies its continued usage in subsequent chapters of this book, as it is not overlooked that readers will likely already have their own understandings. It is worth recognising that the term ‘County Lines’ was originally ascribed by senior figures in law enforcement, seemingly first appearing in a National Crime Agency assessment report (see NCA 2015). Having now entered popular parlance, the fact that it originates from criminal justice officials rather than being devised or necessarily even recognised by those actually engaged in the supply activity itself highlights how the construction of the issue is fundamentally rooted in official law enforcement understandings and representations. This is not to suggest that those who coined the term have necessarily created something without any ontological reality. In more informal drug or ‘street’ vernacular, those engaged in these outreach supply practices have been found to describe (as well as sometimes rap about) it using a range of

2  County Lines 

23

terms including, inter alia, ‘OT’ (out there), ‘going country’, ‘cunch’, ‘working the lines’ and ‘trappin’ (Robinson et  al. 2019; Storrod and Densley 2017; Windle and Briggs 2015a). Adding to the potential for terminological confusion, the true meaning of the term ‘County Lines’ has also been misunderstood and misrepresented. Perhaps understandably given the nomadic nature of the activity, some, for example, have interpreted it as referring to the process of drugs being physically trafficked across geographical county borders (see Spectator 2018). However, the etymology of the term as proffered originally derives from the core role of a single phone number or ‘line’ to facilitate this outreach drug supply methodology (NCA 2016). Resonant with Densley’s (2013) findings on gang activity in London, this use of a dedicated phone line is considered central to the overall supply operation, serving as the necessary conduit between the local heroin and crack using customers and the urban supplier seeking to service their locale (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Understandings of the typical functioning of this supply methodology suggest that local customers residing in a provincial town place orders, generally consisting of small retail amounts such as several £10 ‘wraps’ of heroin or small rocks of crack, to this designated phone number (Drugwise 2016). Those managing the phone line, usually residing back in their home city, relay these orders to those physically stationed in the satellite area and are holding the drugs, providing them information of where and when to meet for the transaction to take place (NCA 2016). Referring to a ‘County Line’ in the original, official sense therefore relates to the distinct phone number that is managed closely by the associated supply network and is considered fundamental to how the outreach supply methodology is enabled. Corresponding to wider observations regarding the central influence of mobile phones on streetlevel drug markets (Natarajan et al. 1995; Søgaard et al. 2019), this would appear to be further evidence of their prominence in street-level drug markets and how their presence can influence and enable evolutions in market organisation and function. The way this is utilised in this context via an ‘outreach methodology’ demonstrates how it interplays with the establishment and successful functioning of an ‘import’ market (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). As these phone lines are suggested as being actively

24 

J. Spicer

‘branded’ by the groups involved in this context (NCA 2017; Spicer 2019), this also suggests a further evolution from a drug supply phone number being simply associated with an individual, as has traditionally been observed at the retail level (May and Hough 2004). Despite its etymology, the term ‘County Lines’ has now also increasingly been used more generally to refer to, inter alia, the groups involved, a specific form of criminal activity and a wider ‘phenomenon’. This appears to have derived, at least in part, from criminal justice parlance. It is also likely a result of the term having permeated out to, and having been adopted by, other practitioners and the public amid the intense media coverage it has received. Perhaps owing to these multiple meanings, a concrete and stable definition for County Lines has not been forthcoming over the recent years. Arguably the most comprehensive attempt comes from official law enforcement literature, which outlines a number of core components that make up what is referred to as a “typical county lines scenario” (NCA 2017, p. 2.) These include: a. A group (not necessarily affiliated as a gang) establishes a network between an urban hub and county location, into which drugs (primarily heroin and crack cocaine) are supplied. b. A branded mobile phone line is established in the market, to which orders are placed by introduced customers. The line will commonly (but not exclusively) be controlled by a third party, remote from the market. c. The group exploits young or vulnerable persons, to achieve the storage and/ or supply of drugs, movement of cash proceeds and to secure the use of dwellings (commonly referred to as cuckooing). d. The group or individuals exploited by them regularly travel between the urban hub and the county market, to replenish stock and deliver cash. e. The group is inclined to use intimidation, violence and weapons, including knives, corrosives and firearms. Because the term has transcended its original reference point and now denotes a host of other things beyond just a phone line, relying on this broader conceptualisation, which relates to a more general supply methodology, the groups involved and associated drug market conditions, is perhaps the most appropriate way of using the term. This is not to

2  County Lines 

25

suggest that the lack of concrete definition, combined with occasional confusion and layers of complexity, may at times be problematic. However, as illustrated by the detailed outline provided by the NCA and the general understanding observable in the available literature (e.g. Coomber and Moyle 2018; Robinson et al. 2019; Whittaker et al. 2020), within the academic context there would appear to be a relatively unproblematic consensus around what the term ‘County Lines’ means. At the very least, and to avoid getting unhelpfully bogged down in semantics, adopting this wider understanding provides a suitable starting point for inquiry into it specifically as a drug supply methodology and a foundation for exploring the policing responses to it. Critically discussing those areas considered ‘common’ to a County Lines drug market scenario also serves as a useful way to organise the remainder of this chapter.

The Phenomenon’s (Official) Development When tracing the rise of County Lines onto various agendas of national prominence, a series of annual reports published by the National Crime Agency on the subject over recent years represent key publications. They are also key sources of information given the general paucity of academic research when they were published and the way the topic ‘exploded’ onto the criminal justice and public scene, at least in part because of their content. Due to their influence and their high-profile nature, with many practitioners, politicians, researchers and journalists grounding their understanding of the issue on their contents, these publications provide a valuable, albeit partial, window into how County Lines has been understood and represented by law enforcement. The reports’ annual nature of publication also allows for scrutiny into how the issue and the surrounding perceptions have developed incrementally over just a few years. In 2015, the NCA first identified County Lines as an emerging ‘criminal business model’ and sought to draw attention to the issue as one that should be of significant concern for front line practitioners (NCA 2015). Based on intelligence returns from a number of police forces, supplemented with information gleaned from others such as the Home Office Gang and Youth Violence team, this publication outlined the key

26 

J. Spicer

features of the drug supply methodology, proposed some potential links with issues such as prison release locations for how market locations are selected and established and identified heroin and crack as the principal substances being supplied. It also noted the diverse names used to describe relevant groups by different police forces at that time, including, for example, ‘Dangerous Dealer Network’ (NCA 2015, p. 2). County Lines drug dealing was reported as manifesting across at least seven police force regions, with 181 different supply groups identified, and London being by far their most popular origin. Relatively affluent commuter towns with amenable, short transport links to England’s capital city were noted as particularly popular destinations. Also suggested as attractive were coastal and market towns further afield that had high levels of deprivation and unemployment. Violence was commonly associated with the outreach supply methodology, with it reportedly being used when these groups infiltrated a new market and against rival suppliers when competing for business. In a follow-up national briefing published a year later that sought to refresh an understanding of the threat, as well as inform the Ending Gang Violence and Exploitation government initiative, the NCA (2016) provided further detail into the drug supply model. In particular, this report gave greater insight into its nature and national scale. Illustrating a clear development from what had been reported the previous year, it was suggested that 30 police forces were now experiencing these supply practices, with an additional 5 reporting an ‘emergent picture’ (NCA 2016, p. 5). The regularity with which County Lines dealers travelled between exporting hubs and importing locations to restock and transport money was highlighted, as was the observation that only a small number of members of the groups were typically ever present in the import area at one time. If on rare occasions a more significant presence did occur, this was understood to indicate attempts by these groups to ‘show strength’ or in direct response to local market conflict. In this report, there were some suggestions that these groups may be supplying heroin and crack of particularly high purity levels. Corresponding to the conceptualisation that the UK drug market is best considered as fragmented and horizontally structured than rigidly organised in a hierarchical pyramid (Dorn et al. 1992), it was speculated that

2  County Lines 

27

this might indicate County Lines dealers having access to higher volumes of direct import supplies. Alternatively, it was speculated that this could be used as a tactic to help achieve dominance within the market (NCA 2016, p. 7). Building on the presence of violence noted in the previous report, weapons and their use was also specifically noted. Corresponding with the time period where an apparent rise in youth violence began to take hold and spread alarm across the UK, knives were suggested as being the most popular way of County Lines groups arming themselves to undertake or protect themselves against predation. Other weapons reported by various forces as being associated with or having been used in their provincial areas by these supply groups included baseball bats, hammers, boiling water and Tasers (NCA 2016, p. 11). Supply groups originating from London, regarded as the most popular ‘exporting’ hub, were described as “predominantly Black British or Afro Caribbean” (NCA 2016, p.  6). Those from Liverpool and Manchester were described as often being White, while those from Birmingham were most frequently reported to be of Asian ethnicity. While members of these groups were described as overwhelmingly young males, and therefore corresponding to long-­standing observations of drug dealing being a ‘man’s world’ (see Adler 1993; Fleetwood 2015), this report also noted the occasional involvement of females in County Lines activity. It was suggested that their involvement sometimes took the form of peripheral or minor enabling roles in the supply model, or that it stemmed from being in some form of relationship with the male members of these networks. Further updates and assessments were made in the third and fourth reports published by the NCA in 2017 and 2018, respectively (NCA 2017, 2018). Both provided a particular emphasis on highlighting new or emerging trends. At the end of 2017, at least 38 police forces had reported County Lines activity (NCA 2017). The year after, the NCA went further to say that they now believed County Lines to be present in some form in all police force areas across England and Wales (NCA 2018). Of particular note, especially compared to the numbers of lines reported to be operating in the first assessment published in 2015, was the estimation of at least 720 different groups currently operating nationwide in 2017. This was suggested as being a ‘conservative estimate’ (NCA

28 

J. Spicer

2017, p. 8). Seemingly confirming this, by 2018, the number of known County Lines was reported as being around 2000 (NCA 2018). Other trends and developments were also outlined in these reports. Violence and the use of weapons continued to be of significant concern. Eighteen forces reported homicides associated with County Lines, with ‘turf wars’ suggested as often fuelling these and incidences of violence more generally (NCA 2017, p. 11). Links to firearms were also frequently made, although there were no reported incidents of one being discharged in relation to County Lines activity. Regarding profit levels, it was estimated that “a typical line can make in the region of £3,000 per day with some more prominent lines possibly making in excess of £5,000” (NCA 2017, p. 17). Because they are operating at the retail level servicing end users, such figures suggest that these dealers are highly active and have a readiness to operate at all hours of the day, perhaps shedding further light as to why travel between areas was reported as being so frequent. Relatedly, because of the relatively small quantities of drugs that members of these networks were seemingly in possession of in satellite markets (see Drugwise 2016), it was suggested that there was minimal impact on profit margins when successful arrests and seizures were being made by local police forces. Instead of this enforcement activity making a significant dent on these groups’ profits, it was reported as being passed down as a debt to the individuals caught holding the drugs who would then have to “work it off” (NCA 2017, p. 18). It is, of course, important to be mindful of the limitations of the data these publications are based on. But, taken together, these influential official reports provide valuable insight into the County Lines phenomenon, shedding partial light on how the groups who use this outreach supply methodology operate and the issues associated. Understood as representing an evolution in how many markets operate, they also demonstrate how this form of supply relates to understandings of how markets for heroin and crack in affected areas were previously understood to function. Scrutinised chronologically, it is possible to identify how, in just a short space of time, the phenomenon has developed and evolved. Not only has there seemingly been a significant increase in the numbers of groups operating, but mirroring observations regarding how markets adapt and respond to police pressure and other conditions (see Curtis and Wendel

2  County Lines 

29

2007), evolutions in how it is undertaken and facilitated are also apparent. Such is the stark message these publications provide, with serious violence and other harms situated within the backdrop of commercialised Class A drug supply, they also set the scene for wider social recognition and attempts to respond to it robustly. Following these publications, the phenomenon of County Lines has been consistently alluded to within other official polices and publications during this time period, including the government’s latest drug strategy (HM Government 2017). Due to their consistent ratcheting up of the threat of County Lines, it is unsurprising that it has also led it to being placed front and centre as a key priority for many individual police forces.

County Lines as ‘Chronocentrism’? As useful as these official publications are, as with any criminological phenomenon that ‘explodes’ on to the scene and generates such high levels of media and political attention, there will inevitably be doubts that it may not be quite as new as is portrayed. The tradition of critical criminology stresses the importance of these suspicions. As the legacy of many moral panics has demonstrated, constructions of social problems can be particularly problematic when concepts such as ‘gangs’ and ‘drugs’ are evoked, and where law enforcement and the media are central in shaping understandings (see Hallsworth 2013; Murji 1998; Young 1973). So-called drug scares (Reinarman and Levine 1989) have, of course, been consistently observed in Western societies for the best part of a century, with drugs, those who use them and their markets found to be politically expedient outlets for the diversion of fear and anger (see also Coomber 2006, 2011; Spicer 2020). More generally, criminology as a discipline has also been argued to have problems with its long-term memory and a penchant for neophilia. Rock (2005) famously lamented the tendency for criminologists to engage in ‘chronocentrism’, a practice he described where researchers generally ignore anything written that was over 15 years old. This, he argued, leads to the discipline being in an almost perpetual state of declaring new beginnings, searching for something fresh and making claims of uncovering ‘new’ phenomena. Taking into

30 

J. Spicer

consideration who set the terms of the agenda for this subject, critically examining just how ‘novel’ County Lines is might be considered particularly relevant given that the NCA was a relatively new agency when it began reporting on the phenomenon. Applying this critical gaze to the contents of the aforementioned NCA reports, it could be suspected that the vast increase in the number of the groups identified and the number of force areas reporting activity is, at least in part, a result of increased recognition of the practice. As I have argued elsewhere (see, Spicer 2020), with the supply practice being given a formal, well-publicised name, and with police forces actively tasked with looking for, responding to and reporting such activity, it would appear overwhelmingly likely that the data reported have been as much a product of this as they are a true reflection of the realities of this crime model. Investigative drug journalist, Max Daly, has also suggested that the practice has been going on for considerably longer than commonly presented. Allusions to the outreach supply methodology are made in his book Narcomania (see Daly and Sampson 2012). More specifically, he has provided evidence of the infancy of outreach supply practices similar to that of the County Lines phenomenon occurring over a decade ago in select areas such as Brighton (Daly 2018). This suggests there are reasons for believing that County Lines, at least in the way that it has often been represented in the media and elsewhere, is perhaps not quite as new as might be assumed. Rather than being considered a completely “new type of organised crime” (see e.g. ITV News 2016), there would appear to be at least some precedent. While recognising this, there is at the same time some strong evidence to suggest that over recent years, the practice has burgeoned and has significantly developed in the field of drug supply, marking a genuine evolution in how crack and heroin are retailed to end users residing in provincial towns and changing the face of much of these markets across the UK (Coomber and Moyle 2018). It is worth remembering that drug dealers being outwardly mobile—transporting drugs from major urban hubs to smaller towns and migrating to other areas—is not a novel phenomenon in itself (Dorn et al. 1992). Markets for crack and heroin have, of course, long flourished outside of major urban conurbations (see e.g. Pearson

2  County Lines 

31

1987). However, the general evidence from the body of drug market research in the UK context suggests that migratory dealers have traditionally operated slightly further up the hierarchy, towards the ‘middle market’ level (Matrix Knowledge Group 2007; Pearson and Hobbs 2001). As Coomber and Moyle (2018, p. 2) note: “Until very recently, none of the historic UK local drug market research referred to anything other than indigenous street-level distribution and simply assumed that to be ‘how it was done’”. This is not to suggest that dealers from major cities have not previously had a foothold within provincial markets. But evidence would suggest that their activities were typically limited to either selling at wholesale weights or brokering deals to lower-level local dealers and networks of user-dealers, who would then supply crack and/or heroin to end consumers (May and Hough 2004; Moyle and Coomber 2015). Based on these observations, the novel aspect of the burgeoning County Lines supply model can be considered as the establishment of entrenched retail operations in targeted areas and the sustained presence of ‘out-of-town’ street-level dealers in provincial locales. Rather than operating in the more murky middle market, County Lines dealers are located more firmly at the retail level, interacting consistently with local customers (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Aligning with how the wider UK drug market operates at various, albeit fragmented, levels, this corresponds with other observations of a general shift in who is now operating in the so-called middle market (Andell 2019; McLean et al. 2019) While those such as Daly (2018) are right to point out that there may have been some precedent of its existence in the past, the scale and frequency of County Lines operations across the UK would appear to warrant it being considered a genuine and intensifying market development. This is not to suggest that there should not be a critical eye trained at the phenomenon. As I have argued elsewhere (see Spicer 2020), continued scrutiny on how it may be used to fit certain political agendas and as a form of scapegoating for social policy failures should be encouraged. But it should be considered as a genuine supply evolution that poses significant challenges to affected areas. Combined with the acute, wider societal attention County Lines has received, local police and other professionals are therefore now facing unfamiliar drug market challenges (Andell and Pitts 2018; Drugwise 2016).

32 

J. Spicer

A Product of Saturation? While regularly sensationalised and perhaps not quite as new as sometimes portrayed, if it can be argued that County Lines does represent a genuine drug market evolution, an inevitable question that arises is what is driving it. Put simply, why are so many dealers now deciding to ‘up sticks’ and ‘go country’? One of the most persuasive responses to this has been that the answer may lie, at least in part, in the ‘saturated’ conditions of the crack and heroin markets in the major cities where these supply networks originate from (Windle and Briggs 2015a). Corresponding with observations on who is participating in street-level heroin and crack supply (Densley 2013; Densley and Stevens 2015; Harding 2014), this explanation rests on the contention that recent years have seen an increasing cohort of relatively deprived young actors seeking to enter the drug markets in their native major urban conurbations for commercial reasons (Densley et al. 2018). Of these, the ‘new breed’ of marginalised inner-city young people increasingly associating themselves with the so-called gang lifestyle, of which servicing crack and heroin retail markets is considered a major component, would appear to be highly prominent (Mclean et al. 2018a). This could perhaps be considered the natural extension of the period in the history of UK drug supply that Dorn et al. (1992, p. 31) describe as when “things got nasty” where, in comparison to what were considered as being the ‘good old days’, in the 1980s, drug supply became increasingly undertaken by those with commercial mindsets, who often ruthlessly pursued the cash that might help them escape their social exclusion. Driven by the increasingly socially ‘bulimic’ conditions of late modernity (Densley and Stevens 2015; Young 2007), there are strong reasons to believe this is now even more pervasive. Those kept at the margins of society, while simultaneously driven to pursue the trappings of consumer society, appear to be increasingly finding refuge in the world of illicit drug supply (Irwin-Rogers 2019). It is worth noting that this is just one side of the drug market saturation coin. Exacerbating these conditions, the apparent increase in the numbers of young commercial dealers entering the market has not been met with an increase in the number of people available to sell to (Ruggiero

2  County Lines 

33

2010). Although some recently reported data indicate a potential recent increase in crack use (Home Office 2019), broadly speaking, there has been an apparent historical reduction in heroin use, combined with an ageing user cohort. This cohort also makes up the largest proportion of those contributing to the increasing number of drug-related deaths in the UK (Stevens 2019). While there appear to be more dealers entering into the drug market, the customer base in their local urban areas is therefore not seemingly getting any bigger. This may also be further exacerbated if users of heroin and crack favour sourcing their supply from more socially based ‘closed market’ networks dominated by user-dealers (May and Hough 2004). It is in response to this market saturation that those involved in the supply of these potentially very profitable illicit commodities appear to be increasingly ‘pushed’ out from their native locale, with establishing ‘import’ markets in more provincial areas representing a solution to this problem. To some, this now apparently burgeoning practice of ‘going country’ may come as little surprise. Retrospectively examining findings detailing the conditions of markets in major inner cities provides some indication of increased saturation and the itinerant responses by those engaged in supply. Of particular note is research reported on just over a decade ago by Gavin Hales and Dick Hobbs (2010), who provided a case study of one London borough’s drug market and the activities of some of its actors. They reported that supply was coming close to the point of saturation in the borough, suggesting that “market growth may have reached a natural limit” (Hales and Hobbs 2010, p.  14). In response to this, the more entrepreneurial dealers from the borough were observed as becoming more mobile, with an increasing ‘willingness to travel’ to other areas and service other markets. What Hales and Hobbs may well have therefore been describing was the infancy of what is now generally considered as the County Lines phenomenon. At the very least, such ‘pre-County Lines’ studies help document some of the relevant market conditions and responses that now appear to have become widespread and intensified. Also illustrating a precedent for retail supplier mobility, Coomber and Moyle (2018) have outlined several types of ‘out-of-town’ dealers, which their research has uncovered as operating in areas outside of their immediate locale. Similar to Hales and

34 

J. Spicer

Hobbs (2010) and Windle and Briggs (2015a), these findings are based on data collected during the time period when the County Lines supply model was reported to have taken meaningful hold. In addition to the archetype County Lines supply networks who occupy a more permanent presence in a ‘host’ town, they identified other itinerant supply models involving suppliers migrating out of their immediate inner-city markets and creating ‘import’ markets in provincial areas. One of these were ‘commuters’, who make daily trips to service an import market. Another were ‘holidayers’, who stay over in a foreign locale for just two or three days (Coomber and Moyle 2018). McLean et al. (2019) have also provided examples of import market creators in Scotland who may not conform to the archetypal County Lines model. Included in their findings are those who use kinship ties in more rural locations to ‘muscle in’ on the local drug markets. In various ways, a willingness to travel on the part of those involved in drug supply therefore appears to have become ‘en vogue’ during the last decade. In addition to conditions associated with urban heroin and crack markets, further factors have also been proposed as to why the County Lines methodology has become so popular among those involved in supply. A related driver to the concept of saturation is the attractiveness of many provincial ‘host’ towns due to the ample supply of accessible customers situated within them (Robinson et al. 2019). Combined with this is the perception of comparatively less challenging competition from local drug dealers who may be unwilling or unable to mount much of a response to those seeking to lay claim to their turf (Andell and Pitts 2018). Making allusions with legitimate contemporary business practices, Coomber and Moyle (2018) suggest that this can be understood as analogous to neoliberal rationality and the type of moral order associated with ‘late-stage capitalism’. County Lines dealers, it could be argued, mirror legitimate companies such as Amazon by identifying new markets and taking them over aggressively. Perceived increased anonymity within these areas has also been suggested as attractive, with these dealers not being as well known by local police officers, especially in comparison to those they may well become familiar with in their origin city (NCA 2016; Whittaker et al. 2020). Further illustrating the dynamic relationship between markets and those responding to them, there have been other suggestions

2  County Lines 

35

that the groups perceive the police in their host towns as being generally less capable and able to apprehend them (Andell and Pitts 2018). Adopting the ‘push-and-pull’ factors model of organised crime mobility developed by Morselli et  al. (2011), the burgeoning presence of County Lines supply networks over recent years could therefore be considered to be as a result of the saturated conditions ‘pushing’ them out of their immediate locale, combined with some of the real or perceived characteristics of foreign towns ‘pulling’ them into provincial areas. Because of the role of these various factors, the development of County Lines would appear to correspond to a range of other social and market-­ specific factors. These include heightened level of social exclusion (Irwin-­ Rogers 2019; Spicer 2020) and the propensity for markets to transition and evolve in response to a range of external and internal influences (Curtis and Wendel 2007; May and Hough 2004). When seeking to develop an understanding of the phenomenon, it is vital that all of these are appreciated suitably.

The Structure of County Lines Networks Having outlined its development and surrounding explanations of why this market evolution has occurred, it is worth considering how these networks are structured, who they comprise of and how they might be conceptualised. From what is known about the operations and inner workings of those that utilise this drug supply methodology, these networks can be considered relatively well organised. Regarding their structure, it would appear that fundamental to how they operate is as part of a recognisable group, an organisation or a network (Robinson et  al. 2019). This grouping of typically young males in the undertaking of drug supply has often led to them being ascribed the ‘gang’ label. Politicians and the media have uncritically adopted this parlance (Spicer 2020) and so too, at times, have official publications (e.g. HM Government 2018). While remaining attentive to the pervasiveness of ‘gang talk’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008) and its damaging qualities, there might be some element of truth to this. The work of those such as Densley (2013) and Whittaker et al. (2020) would suggest that inner-city ‘street collectives’

36 

J. Spicer

who may well correspond or formally identify with the notion of the ‘gang’ are likely to be involved. This might especially be the case as they develop as organisations, rising up the levels of the fragmented drug market pyramid (Mclean et  al. 2018b). However, other entrepreneurial groups and more loosely structured organisations that do not approximate the ‘gang’ also appear to engage in County Lines drug supply (Coomber and Moyle 2018). As the NCA (2017, p. 2) have themselves noted, the groups involved in this activity and the actors within them may not necessarily be ‘gang affiliated’. Posing as a useful way of mitigating these issues, Coomber and Moyle (2018) adopt the term ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers when referring to those servicing ‘host’ locales at the retail level of the market. Recognising its value, it is this term that will be principally used throughout this book. Beyond how these groups can be conceptualised—by attempting to provide insight into the structure of County Lines groups—how they engage in drug supply and how they successfully create a functioning ‘import’ market, Coomber and Moyle (2018) have usefully identified three core roles typically played by the actors involved. It has been argued that each of these is typically fundamental to the facilitation of this itinerant criminal business model. Illustrating a consistency with traditional understandings of drug supply mechanics, these roles and functions also conform to the well-discussed notion of drug supply groups being organised in a recognisably, although not necessarily strictly, hierarchical structure (Matrix Knowledge Group 2007; May and Hough 2004; Windle and Briggs 2015b). Operating at the upper end of a County Lines hierarchy and commanding deference from those lower down, are those described as ‘top boys’, the ‘main man’ or the ‘big boss’ (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Because of how a functioning County Line is typically understood to operate, it is these who tend to remain in the origin cities and manage the phone line at the supply end, receiving the orders from local customers and relaying them back to those stationed in the satellite area (see Whittaker et al. 2020). This physical distance helps shield them from police attention, as well as the often-harsh, unglamorous realities of street-level crack and heroin markets. Yet, as Coomber and Moyle’s (2018) findings suggest, they often retain an active role in closely monitoring, or even micromanaging, the enterprise and day-to-day

2  County Lines 

37

performance of those undertaking the street labour from afar (see also Robinson et al. 2019; Storrod and Densley 2017). Despite the benefits of adhering to this distance, they may also not always be completely physically removed from the satellite location. Instead, they may, on occasions, be present in the area to perform an essential role related to either the local market they are operating in or their group’s organisation. The second core-identified County Lines role is performed by those described as ‘sitters’ (Coomber and Moyle 2018). These actors are suggested as being slightly lower-ranking members of the group and typically younger than the ‘top boys’ orchestrating the activities of the line. A fundamental difference between the two roles is that the ‘sitters’ will be resident for prolonged periods in the host towns. Taking their orders from the ‘top boys’ above them while retaining some agency (Moyle 2019), their main role is to manage the day-to-day supply operation taking place in the satellite area. They engage in the physical movement and restocking of heroin and crack from the urban base to the more rural supply hub, sometimes perform driving duties and generally manage the drug distribution in the ‘colonised’ community (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Although there is likely to be variation, ‘sitters’ are suggested as spending varied time periods situated in the provincial locations, ranging from few weeks to many months. While doing so, they will generally spend their time inconspicuously by staying hidden in  local premises (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Perhaps the sitter’s most important and immediate responsibility is to manage and organise the activities of those at the bottom end of the County Lines supply chain. The third and final key role of ‘runner’ is one that, in addition to being identified as core in relation to County Lines (see Robinson et al. 2019; Windle and Briggs 2015a), is familiar in drug markets across different times and places (e.g. Gilman and Pearson 1991). Because County Lines supply groups are retail-level operations, their success relies ultimately on servicing the local heroin- and crack-using population efficiently. They undertake running duties and are tasked with street-level face-to-face drug dealing or ‘serving up’ to the end users, and they are therefore a central, indispensable resource (Coomber and Moyle 2018; Moyle 2019). Without them, there would be no business (McLean et al. 2019). Reported as working in a manner reminiscent of being ‘on

38 

J. Spicer

call’ for hours on end, runners receive the orders relayed back from those in control of the phone line, and they physically distribute the heroin and/or crack to customers. Because of the centrality of this activity and their position within the wider County Line set-up, they are in many ways taking the most risk for the least gains (Robinson et al. 2019).

The Involvement of Young People Identification of the essential role of runner leads into a key area of harm surrounding this drug supply methodology. As indicated by the “typical county lines scenario” (NCA 2017, p. 2) outlined earlier in the chapter, in addition to drug supply and more general violence, central to discourses surrounding County Lines has been the exploitation of individuals described as ‘vulnerable’ in order to facilitate the servicing of these import markets (see e.g. HM Government 2017). County Lines supply is argued to thrive on exploitation, serving to distance the more powerful senior perpetrators from getting their hands ‘dirty’ and garnering them protection from the law (Coliandris 2015). One of the chief areas this has been suggested to manifest is who undertakes the ‘running’ duties for these groups. Particularly notable is how young County Lines runners often are (APPG on Runaway and Missing Children and Adults 2017; Windle et al. 2020). Indeed, arguably the primary reason why the issue has developed such high levels of national popular attention and concern has been the reported widespread involvement of young people, with many regularly found to be working for these groups in areas far from their home residence (Robinson et al. 2019). Almost exclusively originating from the group’s native city (Windle and Briggs 2015a), social media has been suggested as a way in which young people can become involved. Storrod and Densley (2017) uncovered the often conspicuous presence of young people involved in County Lines on various online platforms, identifying the use of hashtags such as ‘#goingcnt’ and ‘#Backondamotorway’, sometimes accompanied by images of money supposedly generated by running duties. This, they argue, illustrates the interplay between the ‘expressive’ actions of those involved and their ‘instrumental’ concerns of generating profits through the supply model.

2  County Lines 

39

In light of such findings, it might be suggested that the young people involved are demonstrating agency, weighing up the risks and benefits of being involved in drug supply in the context of their structural conditions. Engulfed in a process of ‘subterranean structuration’ (Densley and Stevens 2015), they could be considered as making a cognisant, albeit constrained, decision to enter this world of the ‘street casino’ (Harding 2014) due to the cultural allure to make money expeditiously (Fast et al. 2017). However, an alternative perspective has been put forward on the reasons behind this population’s involvement. Instead of making an informed and criminally culpable choice, it has been suggested that young people’s involvement is a result of them being ‘coerced’ or subjected to a form of grooming (NCA 2016). Those in control of the line are suggested as ‘preying’ on them to enlist them into their ranks. Some discussions have even promoted the complete removal of any consideration of agency on behalf of the young people involved. As Robinson et al. (2019, p. 697) note: Current discourses surrounding the exploiters and exploited involved in County Lines portray a helpless victim that has been forced against his or her will into a life of criminality by a ruthless, violent gang member.

Making comparisons between youth involvement in County Lines and cases of child sexual exploitation, some have suggested that it could represent the ‘next grooming scandal’ (see Andell 2019). In light of such concerns, it has been suggested that the young people involved in County Lines should be put on a somewhat equal footing and viewed as victims of ‘child criminal exploitation’. As others and I have argued elsewhere, a critical and sober appreciation of young people’s involvement in this form of supply would be of use (see Spicer 2020; Windle et al. 2020). That said, regardless of considerations of agency, undoubtedly a host of harms are associated for those involved. Perhaps corresponding most closely with the notion of exploitation have been reports of ‘debt bondage’, with young runners reportedly being set up and robbed of the drugs and money they are holding, often by the ‘elders’ they are working for (McLean et al. 2019). As indicated by NCA reports, when charged with having to pay this debt off, they are

40 

J. Spicer

effectively forced into working for the network. Other harms beyond those perpetrated by the more senior members of County Lines groups have also been identified. Participating in heroin and crack markets is likely to expose young people to their well-documented harms, including being involved in violence and living in the harsh conditions associated with these social environments (Windle and Briggs 2015a). They are at significant risk of criminalisation, especially given the type of sentences associated with supply-related offences of Class A drugs. The wider body of literature on missing children would also suggest that extended absences away from home will put a strain on family and social relations, impact negatively on educational attainment and make state support more difficult to implement (Evans et  al. 2007). Clearly, for a host of reasons, the involvement of young people is therefore of significant concern. However, it is also intriguing to observe that, from the discourses surrounding their involvement, just as drug markets evolve, so too can perceptions and criminal justice responses to some of the actors participating in them.

Local Harms While the involvement of young people has generated particularly intense scrutiny and popular attention, it is important to note that they are by no means the only population who perform the role of runner. Illustrating the specific impact of County Lines on local areas and populations, it is also frequently undertaken by local adults of the town where the ‘import’ market is based. Notably, in the research sites of Coomber and Moyle (2018), it was these who were the population primarily involved in this activity, contrasting with dominant perspectives of County Lines consisting inherently of young people. By far the most common local adult population who engage in running are those who use heroin and crack themselves (Moyle 2019). It would appear likely that they are recruited typically through their exposure to these groups as customers. Financial rewards and free drugs are suggested as being the main reasons why this population engages in County Lines ‘labour’ (Moyle 2019). From a drug market perspective, their involvement arguably serves to blur the

2  County Lines 

41

boundaries between the more traditional user-dealer-dominated provincial markets (see May and Hough 2004; Moyle and Coomber 2015) and how they have evolved through the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers. It also suggests a related development regarding traditional understandings of user-dealing and how this particular form of supply has adapted within the context of ‘import’ markets (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Similar to young people, the involvement of local populations has often been understood as a form of exploitation, stressing that these are also ‘vulnerable’, socially marginalised and taken advantage of (Coliandris 2015; Moyle 2019). Corresponding with the high rates of victimisation they experience (Nunes and Sani 2013; Windle and Silke 2019), what little is known on the subject suggests that this population experiences significant harms due to undertaking running duties as part of County Lines operations. Moyle (2019) reports threats and violence as common forms of control. The presence of bullying, with women in particular experiencing verbal attacks relating to their appearance and overall self-­ worth, is further noted (see also Spicer et al. 2019). The very nature of the work is also considered ‘gruelling’, with little remuneration for their labour or often far less than was originally promised (Moyle 2019). Drug markets, like many other social arenas, have long functioned on somewhat unequal power relations (McSweeney et al. 2008). But in the reporting of County Lines and the associated evolution of provincial markets, this would appear to be particularly pronounced and having a significant impact on local populations.

The Advancement of Cuckooing In addition to undertaking ‘labour’ for these groups, a particularly prominent way local populations have been reported as being exploited by County Lines has been the rise of a crime model referred to as ‘cuckooing’ (Coomber 2015; Spicer et  al. 2019). Fundamentally, this involves locals having their homes taken over so that they can be used as bases by ‘out-of-town’ dealers. Such incidences, reported regularly in the media (e.g. BBC News 2019), appear to stem specifically from the itinerant nature of the County Lines supply methodology and the associated

42 

J. Spicer

establishment of an ‘import’ market (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Moving into a foreign locale with the aim of generating a sustained dealing presence, ‘out-of-town’ dealers require prolonged access to some form of accommodation. Somewhere to base themselves and to rest is, of course, fundamentally necessary. But somewhere to store and package drugs, while shielding themselves from the gaze of the police and others, is also of importance. It is seemingly because of this desire for a protective base that cases of cuckooing appear to have emerged and proliferated in line with the more general burgeoning of the County Lines supply model. The explicit terminology of ‘cuckooing’, evoking the nest-stealing practices of wild cuckoo birds, indicates that this is a further aspect of County Lines considered to be rooted in exploitation (Moyle 2019). As with those who become engaged in running and other forms of labour, it has been suggested that establishing these satellite bases is accomplished frequently by specifically targeting the homes of those described as ‘vulnerable’ (Coliandris 2015). Illustrating this overlap, those reported as having been ‘cuckooed’ by such dealers are typically those with drug dependencies (NCA 2016). People with what might be thought of as ‘classic’ vulnerabilities, or more closely conforming to ‘ideal victim’ status (Christie 1986) through being disabled, having poor mental health or being elderly, have occasionally been targeted as well (Chakraborti and Garland 2015; Spicer et al. 2019). Ultimately, however, it would appear that the vast majority of those affected already have some exposure to the local crack and heroin market. Highlighting the way victims of cuckooing may be targeted, the NCA (2017, p. 12) have stated how County Lines groups will specifically pursue “vulnerable individuals who attend recovery groups, dependency units, and areas associated with those experiencing problems”. Access to properties is understood as being typically enabled through force or coercion (Moyle 2019; Whittaker et al. 2020). For the latter, offers of free drugs or financial compensation are suggested as being the common way that access is leveraged, further highlighting the propensity of users of heroin and crack to be particularly affected (Coomber 2015). Conditions in the home once the ‘nest’ is established are described as frequently evolving into something further predatory, violent and generally noxious (Spicer et al. 2019). Having been cuckooed, many have been described as

2  County Lines 

43

being effectively imprisoned in their own homes (Spicer et  al. 2019). Violence, threats and sexual exploitation have also been reported as common, with these used as ways for dealers to demonstrate dominance over their supposed hosts and ensure compliance. While for some ‘hosts’ there may be a perception that entering into this situation might lead to some mutual benefits, this is often swiftly dispelled (Moyle 2019). As with the wider phenomenon of County Lines, it is worth briefly considering just how novel the practice of cuckooing is. The natural comparison is with the so-called crack houses (Parkin and Coomber 2009). Similar to cuckooing, these indoor set-ups are adopted by dealers to minimise visibility and vulnerability from the police (Buerger 1992). However, while there has been some recognition of more exploitative ‘takeover’ practices within these environments (see Briggs 2010), there are important differences. Crack houses are typically venues visited by those wishing to purchase and consume heroin, crack or other substances. Supply takes place within them, and users may often congregate in these venues to consume what they have just purchased (Bourgois 2003; McCorkel 1998; Sterk-Elifson and Elifson 1990). In contrast, venues suitable to be described as being ‘cuckooed’ in the context of County Lines serve as primary bases for ‘out-of-town’ dealers. They are not places where the use of drugs is promoted, nor are they likely to be sold from directly (Spicer et al. 2019). Beyond the more exploitative way that these venues are established and maintained, the difference between crack houses and cuckooed venues therefore revolves around their ultimate purpose and function. While they can be considered different from other indoor drug market contexts and to represent a distinct characteristic of an ‘import’ market, illustrating the complex and often messy realities of the crack and heroin retail market milieu, cuckooing is far from a homogenised practice. Coomber and Moyle (2018) suggest that cuckooing can best be understood as a ‘varied model’. Building on this, Spicer et  al. (2019) have attempted to provide greater insight into both the experiences of those affected and the variation of this crime model. Taking inspiration from the body of work that stressed the important differences in crack house environments (Geter 1994; Inciardi 1995; Parkin and Coomber 2009; Mieczkowski 1990), we have proposed a typology that highlights the

44 

J. Spicer

differences in this practice and how it can occur. This illustrates the diverse ways in which locals can become cuckooed and the often complex, messy and ambiguous nature of these cases. While exploitation is omnipresent, there are important differences to how this may manifest and be experienced. Aligning most closely with the dominant narratives of vulnerability and exploitation surrounding cuckooing is the typology of ‘parasitic nest invading’ (Spicer et al. 2019). Access to homes here is achieved by force or under false pretence, with violence, threats and attempts at social isolation used to try and ensure compliance and prevent those affected from reporting the situation. A second typology identified is what we term ‘quasi-cuckooing’ (Spicer et  al. 2019). While some minimal levels of deception or false pretence may be used to obtain access, for such cases, local ‘hosts’ are viewed as having made a relatively informed decision to allow dealers to enter their home, albeit one that is constrained by their typical social position and influenced by their drug use (see also Moyle 2019). Once access is obtained, conditions of violence, threats and intimidation are again common. This is considered particularly prevalent when the host indicates that they are unhappy with the arrangement or attempt to remove the dealers from their home (Spicer et al. 2019). A final typology of cuckooing identified in the context of County Lines is what we term ‘coupling’ (Spicer et al. 2019). Here, it is some form of sexual or romantic relationship between County Lines dealers and local hosts that is central to leveraging and maintaining access to homes in satellite locations. Although not exclusively, this is again often highly exploitative, with dealers, for example, going back to have sex in local women’s homes, and then using the access obtained to take it over. Familiar experiences of coercion, violence and a general sense of ‘pollution’ by having their homes taken over (see Maguire 1980) are again common. Demonstrating a further way in which drug markets are gendered (Adler 1993; Fleetwood 2015), sexual exploitation within the ‘nest’ is also used as a further method of control and dominance (Spicer et al. 2019). Apparently driven by the itinerant nature of the County Lines, the practice of cuckooing and other local harms associated with this outreach supply methodology demonstrate the market conditions that have developed alongside it. This illustrates the ‘evolving’ nature of provincial

2  County Lines 

45

markets and the wider ramifications of this burgeoning supply practice on affected areas. Building on Reuter and MacCoun’s (1992) distance travelled typology, these harms appear to represent particular characteristics of ‘import’ markets. Notable from this are the various ways that local users of heroin and crack can become not just affected but also embroiled more generally in County Lines activity due to their exposure to the local market, perhaps subsequently serving to break down the heroin and crack ‘moral economy’ in these more provincial areas (Wakeman 2016). Similar to the involvement of urban-based young people, however, the discourses of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘exploitation’ demonstrate that a more nuanced understanding of their involvement is being developed (Coliandris 2015; Moyle 2019). This highlights the need to understand not just the impact of County Lines on the local market but also the associated police responses.

Conclusion Perhaps best understood as a response to the saturation of drug markets in major cities, County Lines poses as one of the most high-profile and significant UK drug market developments in recent years. While likely not quite as novel as often suggested, its intensified prevalence across the UK means that it represents a genuine evolution in the way that crack and heroin retail markets operate in many provincial areas. As a distinct and now burgeoning supply methodology, it potentially leaves much of the previous understandings of how markets operate in rural, market and seaside towns now somewhat redundant (Coomber and Moyle 2018). Understood in relation to the wider drug market structure, this may alter the way that the levels of drug supply have typically been delineated. Especially in relation to the conceptually blurred ‘middle market’ (Pearson and Hobbs 2001), the operations of County Lines groups arguably make distinguishing between more national or regional wholesale and local street dealing now even more problematic (Andell 2019). What would appear clearer is that it would seem conceptually appropriate to consider the emergence of this form of supply as representing the widespread manifestation of ‘import’ markets (Reuter and MacCoun

46 

J. Spicer

1992) across the UK. Understanding County Lines in this way provides a useful opportunity to explore particular characteristics associated with this market form and how they function. The types of market externalities and harm associated appear to indicate some of the issues that might be prominent among markets serviced by ‘out-of-town’ dealers. The elevated levels of serious violence are one clear example of this, as are the impact and experiences of local populations, especially in relation to cuckooing. Combined with a reconfiguration of how some of those exposed to and involved in the drug market should be viewed, the presence of these market harms also has distinct implications for those responding to it. With the overwhelming focus of the relatively small body of literature on the subject of County Lines being on the experience of young urban actors engaging in this outreach practice, little is known about the local market context or how police officers on the ground are understanding, interpreting and responding to this drug market development. Amidst the intense attention given to the issue within political, media and public spheres, police officers based in affected locales are faced with a number of unfamiliar drug market challenges. Because of the emphasis placed on it by senior criminal justice officials and others, they are also faced with expectations to do something about them.

References Adler, P. (1993). Wheeling and dealing: An ethnography of an upper-level drug dealing and smuggling community. New York: Columbia University Press. Andell, J., & Pitts, J. (2018). The end of the line? The impact of county lines drug distribution on youth crime in a target destination. Youth and Policy. Retrieved from http://www.youthandpolicy.org/articles/the-end-of-the-line Andell, P. (2019). Thinking seriously about gangs: Towards a critical realist approach. London: Palgrave Macmillan. APPG on Runaway and Missing Children and Adults. (2017). Briefing report on the roundtable on children who go missing and are criminally exploited by gangs [online]. Retrieved from https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/ files/appg-missing-gangs-and-exploitation-roundtable-report.pdf

2  County Lines 

47

BBC News. (2019). ‘Cuckooing’: When drug gangs take over your own home [online]. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-46738016 Bourgois, P. (2003). In search of respect (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Briggs, D. (2010). Crack houses in the UK: Some observations on their operations. Drugs and Alcohol Today, 10(4), 33–42. Buerger, M. (1992). Defensive strategies of the street-level drug trade. Journal of Crime and Justice., 15(2), 31–51. Chakraborti, N., & Garland, J. (2015). Hate crime: Impacts, causes and responses. London: Sage. Christie, N. (1986). The ideal victim. In E. Fattah (Ed.), From crime policy to victim policy (pp. 17–30). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Coliandris, G. (2015). County lines and wicked problems: Exploring the need for improved policing approaches to vulnerability and early intervention. Australasian Policing: A Journal of Professional Practice and Research, 7(2), 25–36. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Resituating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2011). Social fear, drug-related beliefs, and drug policy. In G. Hunt, M. Milhait, & H. Beregron (Eds.), Drugs and culture (pp. 37–54). London: Routledge. Coomber, R. (2015). A tale of two cities: Understanding differences in levels of heroin/crack market-related violence—A two city comparison. Criminal Justice Review., 40(1), 7–31. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2018). The changing shape of street-level heroin and crack supply in England: Commuting, holidaying and cuckooing drug dealers across ‘County Lines’. British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1323–1342. Curtis, R., & Wendel, T. (2007). “You’re always training the dog”: Strategic interventions to reconfigure drug markets. Journal of Drug Issues., 37(4), 867–891. Daly, M. (2018). How city drug gangs first used teens to take over British towns [online]. Retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/ne9gjz/ how-city-drug-gangs-first-used-teens-to-take-over-british-towns Daly, M., & Sampson, S. (2012). Narcomania: A journey through Britain’s drug world. London: Random House. Densley, J. (2013). How gangs work. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Densley, J., McLean, R., Deuchar, R., & Harding, S. (2018). An altered state? Emergent changes to illicit drug markets and distribution networks in Scotland. International Journal of Drug Policy., 58(1), 113–120.

48 

J. Spicer

Densley, J., & Stevens, A. (2015). ‘We’ll show you gang’: The subterranean structuration of gang life in London. Criminology and Criminal Justice., 15(1), 102–120. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Drugwise. (2016). Highways and buyways: A snapshot of UK drug scenes 2016. London: Drugwise. Evans, K., Houghton-Brown, M., & Rees, G. (2007). Stepping up: The future of runaways services. London: The Children’s Society.. Fast, D., Shoveller, J., & Kerr, T. (2017). The material, moral, and affective worlds of dealing and crime among young men entrenched in an inner city drug scene. International Journal of Drug Policy., 44(1), 1–11. Fleetwood, J. (2015). Mafias, markets, mules: Gender stereotypes in discourses about drug trafficking. Sociology Compass., 9(11), 962–976. Geter, R. (1994). Drug user setting: A crack house typology. International Journal of Addictions., 29(8), 1015–1027. Gilman, M., & Pearson, G. (1991). Lifestyles and law enforcement. In D. Whynes (Ed.), Policing and prescribing (pp. 95–124). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hales, G., & Hobbs, D. (2010). Drug markets in the community: A London borough case study. Trends in Organized Crime., 13(1), 13–30. Hallsworth, S. (2013). The gang and beyond: Interpreting violent street worlds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hallsworth, S., & Young, T. (2008). Gang talk and gang talkers: A critique. Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal., 4(2), 175–195. Harding, S. (2014). Street Casino: Survival in violent street gangs. Bristol: Policy Press. HM Government. (2017). 2017 Drug strategy. London: Home Office. HM Government. (2018). Serious violence strategy. London: Home Office. Home Office. (2019). Increase in crack cocaine use inquiry. London: Home Office. Inciardi, J. (1995). Crack, crack house sex, HIV risk. Archives of Sexual Behaviour., 24(3), 249–269. Irwin-Rogers, K. (2019). Illicit drug markets, consumer capitalism and the rise of social media: A toxic trap for young people. Critical Criminology., 27(4), 591–610. ITV News. (2016). ‘Going country’: ITV News reveals scale of children being exploited and sent around Britain to carry drugs [online]. Retrieved from https://www.itv.com/news/2016-09-29/going-country-itv-newsreveals-the-scale-of-children-being-exploited-and-sent-around-britain-tocarry-drugs/

2  County Lines 

49

Johnson, L. T. (2016). Drug markets, travel distance, and violence: Testing a typology. Crime & Delinquency., 62(11), 1465–1487. Johnson, L. T., Taylor, R. B., & Ratcliffe, J. H. (2013). Need drugs, will travel?: The distances to crime of illegal drug buyers. Journal of Criminal Justice., 41(3), 178–187. Lum, C. (2008). The geography of drug activity and violence: Analyzing spatial relationships of non-homogenous crime event types. Substance Use & Misuse., 43(2), 179–201. Maguire, M. (1980). The impact of burglary upon victims. British Journal of Criminology., 20(1), 261–275. Matrix Knowledge Group. (2007). The illicit drug trade in the United Kingdom. London: Home Office. May, T., & Hough, M. (2004). Drug markets and distribution systems. Addiction Research & Theory., 12(6), 549–563. McCorkel, J. A. (1998). Going to the crackhouse: Critical space as a form of resistance in total institutions and everyday life. Symbolic Interaction., 21(3), 227–252. McLean, R., Densley, J.  A., & Deuchar, R. (2018a). Situating gangs within Scotland’s illegal drugs market (s). Trends in Organized Crime., 21(2), 147–171. McLean, R., Deuchar, R., Harding, S., & Densley, J. (2018b). Putting the ‘Street’ in Gang: Place and space in the organization of Scotland’s drug-­selling gangs. The British Journal of Criminology., 59(2), 396–415. McLean, R., Robinson, G., & Densley, J. (2019). County lines: Criminal networks and evolving drug markets in Britain. London: Springer. McSweeney, T., Turnbull, P. J., & Hough, M. (2008). Tackling drug markets and distribution networks in the UK: A review of the recent literature. London: Institute for Criminal Policy Research: King’s College London. Mieczkowski, T. (1990). The operational styles of crack houses in Detroit. In Drugs and violence: Causes, correlates and consequences (pp. 60–91). National Institute on Drug Abuse Research 103. Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The mobility of criminal groups. Global Crime, 12(3), 165–188. Moyle, L. (2019). Situating vulnerability and exploitation in street-level drug markets: Cuckooing, commuting, and the “County Lines” drug supply model. Journal of Drug Issues., 49(4), 739–755. Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2015). Earning a score: An exploration of the nature and roles of heroin and crack cocaine ‘user-dealers’. British Journal of Criminology., 55(3), 534–555.

50 

J. Spicer

Murji, K. (1998). The agony and the Ecstasy: Drugs, media and morality. In R.  Coomber (Ed.), The control of drugs and drug users: Reason or reaction? (pp. 69–85). Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers. Natarajan, M., Clarke, R. V., & Johnson, B. D. (1995). Telephones as facilitators of drug dealing. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research., 3(3), 137–153. National Crime Agency. (2015). County lines, gangs, and safeguarding. London: NCA. National Crime Agency. (2016). County lines gang violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. National Crime Agency. (2017). County lines violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. National Crime Agency. (2018). County Lines drug supply, vulnerability and harm. London: NCA. Nunes, L., & Sani, A. (2013). Victimization of the drug addict. Journal of Modern Education Review., 3(9), 677–684. Parkin, S., & Coomber, R. (2009). Informal ‘Sorter’ Houses: A qualitative insight of the ‘shooting gallery’ phenomenon in a UK setting. Health & Place., 15(4), 981–989. Pearson, G. (1987). Social deprivation, unemployment and patterns of heroin use. In N.  Dorn & N.  South (Eds.), A Land Fit for Heroin? (pp.  62–94). London: Palgrave. Pearson, G., & Hobbs, D. (2001) Middle market drug distribution. Home Office Research Study 227. London: Home Office. Reinarman, C., & Levine, H. (1989). Crack in context: Politics and media in the making of a drug scare. Contemporary Drug Problems., 16(4), 535–577. Rengert, G. F. (2018). The geography of illegal drugs. London: Routledge. Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. Crime, Law and Social Change., 52(3), 275–284. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J.  B. Steinberg, D.  W. Lyon, & M.  E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Robinson, G., McLean, R., & Densley, J. (2019). Working county lines: Child criminal exploitation and illicit drug dealing in Glasgow and Merseyside. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology., 63(5), 694–711. Rock, P. (2005). Chronocentrism and British criminology. The British Journal of Sociology., 56(3), 473–491.

2  County Lines 

51

Ruggiero, V. (2010). Unintended consequences: Changes in organised drug supply in the UK. Trends in Organized Crime., 13(1), 46–59. Søgaard, T. F., Kolind, T., Haller, M. B., & Hunt, G. (2019). Ring and bring drug services: Delivery dealing and the social life of a drug phone. International Journal of Drug Policy., 69(1), 8–15. Spectator. (2018). Mind your language: County Lines [online]. Retrieved from https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/07/mind-your-language-county-lines/ Spicer, J. (2019). ‘That’s their brand, their business’: How police officers are interpreting County Lines. Policing and Society., 29(8), 873–886. Spicer, J. (2020). Between gang talk and prohibition: The transfer of blame for County Lines. International Journal of Drug Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. drugpo.2020.102667. Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5. Sterk, C. E., & Elifson, K. W. (1990). Drug-related violence and street prostitution. In M. De La Rosa, E. Lambert, & B. Gropper (Eds.), Drugs and violence: Causes, correlates, and consequences (pp. 208–220). US Department of Health and Human Services: Rockville. Stevens, A. (2019). ‘Being human’ and the ‘moral sidestep’ in drug policy: Explaining government inaction on opioid-related deaths in the UK. Addictive Behaviors., 90(1), 444–450. Storrod, M., & Densley, J. (2017). ‘Going viral’ and ‘going country’: The expressive and instrumental activities of street gangs on social media. Journal of Youth Studies., 20(6), 677–696. Wakeman, S. (2016). The moral economy of heroin in ‘Austerity Britain’. Critical Criminology., 24(3), 363–377. Whittaker, A., Densley, J., Cheston, L., Tyrell, T., Higgins, M., Felix-Baptiste, C., & Havard, T. (2020). Reluctant gangsters revisited: The evolution of gangs from postcodes to profits. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research., 26(1), 1–22. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015a). ‘It’s like working away for two weeks’: The harms associated with young drug dealers commuting from a saturated London drug market. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 17(2), 105–119. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015b). Going solo: The social organisation of drug dealing within a London street gang. Journal of Youth Studies., 18(9), 1170–1185. Windle, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2020). ‘Vulnerable’ kids going country: Children and young people’s involvement in county lines drug dealing. Youth Justice. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473225420902840.

52 

J. Spicer

Windle, J., & Silke, A. (2019). Is drawing from the state ‘state of the art’?: A review of organised crime research data collection and analysis, 2004–2018. Trends in Organized Crime., 22(4), 394–413. Young, J. (1973). The amplification of drug use. In S. Cohen & J. Young (Eds.), The manufacture of deviance (pp. 350–360). London: Constable. Young, J. (2007). The vertigo of late modernity. London: Sage.

3 Policing Drug Markets

Having critically outlined the specific drug supply context of County Lines, this chapter considers the policing of illicit drug markets. An often highly contentious area of law enforcement, for the past half century, policing has remained the principle way that drug markets and the various actors involved in them are responded to officially by the state. Among other things, the role of the police as the visible representation of the ‘war on drugs’ stresses the importance of understanding and analysing how their work in this area is actually undertaken. If illegal drug markets and the way they operate can be considered as inextricably allied with the policy of prohibition, it is arguably only right that attention is trained acutely on those on the opposing side who, as Young (1971, p. 28) put it, “man the barricades which society sets up between itself and the deviant”. Adopting a narrative approach, this chapter focuses on some key conceptual issues and perspectives, constructing a theoretical framework applied in the subsequent empirical chapters of the book that report on the local police responses to County Lines. It is structured into three key sections. The first details how policing has been structured in response to drug markets and how it has been operationalised, seeking to situate this © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_3

53

54 

J. Spicer

in relation to more general models of policing. Building on this, the second section takes an explicitly critical perspective. Drawing on a wealth of literature, it details the harmful outcomes of much of drugs policing, importantly discussing the ‘symbolic’ qualities of much of its associated activities. In response to these critiques, the final section of the chapter explores the options for more productive forms of drugs policing and alternative approaches. Considering the idea of applying harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets by interrogating what literature is available on the area, a case is made to explore its potential.

 yramids and Mirrors: The Organisation P of Drugs Policing The relationship between the police and how they respond to drug markets is so culturally ingrained that it would be easy to overlook how it has been structured historically and how it has evolved (Lister et al. 2008). While it is undoubtedly rooted in certain policies, practices and ideas, far from being a static area, drugs policing has changed and adapted over time in response to social and criminal justice contexts. Tracing its history in the UK, the release of what is referred to commonly as the ‘Broome Report’ (ACPO 1985) proved highly influential in shaping operational strategies and how the police organised themselves in response to drug markets more generally (Dorn et al. 1992). As Bean (2014, p. 163) states, “In so far as there is, or ever has been, a policy for policing drugs in Britain, that policy was derived from the Broome Report of 1985”. Its release corresponded to the advancement of drug markets in the UK and the apparent influx of more commercially orientated dealers (see Dorn et al. 1992; Parker et al. 1988; Pearson 1987). It was in the face of these drug market developments and associated societal fears that a more formal drugs policing strategy was considered necessary as a response (Leishman and Wood 2000). The Broome report advocated a three-tiered hierarchical pyramid policing structure comprising a ‘regional/national’ level at the top, a ‘force’ level in the middle and a ‘divisional’ level at the bottom (Dorn

3  Policing Drug Markets 

55

et al. 1992). This was presented as a way of ‘mirroring’ the British drug distribution system’s apparently hierarchical pyramid structure and being appropriately organised to respond to and disrupt it (Dorn et al. 1991). Each of the three ascribed policing levels was aimed at a corresponding level of the drug distribution system (Chatterton 1995). Regional crime squads were tasked with addressing major distribution at the national and international levels, force drug squads focused on ‘middle market’ wholesalers and coordinated force intelligence (see Collison 1995) and those at the divisional level encountered drugs in their day-to-day activities and out on the streets (ACPO 1985). Due to the structure it promoted, core to the drugs policing philosophy underpinning the Broome model was that the ‘best’ (or at least most senior) officers would be focused on taking out the ‘big fish’ operating higher up in the drug distribution system. Lower-ranking officers were left to interact with the low-level ‘minnows’ swimming about in the shallow end of the retail market (Dorn et al. 1992). Broome’s report was so influential that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary used the model and the general approach it espoused as an assessment benchmark when evaluating each constabulary’s drug strategy (Leishman and Wood 2000). However, despite its prominence and intuitive appeal, following the widespread adoption of its recommendations, the recognition that Britain’s drug distribution system was not as strictly hierarchical in structure as it was assumed to be undermined the model and its legitimacy (Ruggiero and South 1995). Attempts to tackle the drug market based on how it was somewhat naively believed to be organised put officers at a significant disadvantage of disrupting and dismantling those higher up. The desired ‘trickle-down effect’ on those operating below did not materialise (see Dorn et al. 1991), and drugs policing success did not follow in the manner it was believed it would (Murji 1998). In addition to being flawed regarding achieving enforcement goals, it has also been argued that considerable harms were caused by embracing the Broome report’s approach. Demonstrating the interplay between drug markets and socio-economic conditions (Pearson 1987; Seddon 2006; Stevens 2011a), the lack of attention given to Britain’s street-level drug markets during their formative years has been suggested as having allowed them to rapidly grow, develop and embed themselves within deprived

56 

J. Spicer

communities (Bean 2014). Perhaps recognising this, while aspects of this model are still visible today, the focus and organisation of drugs police activity has somewhat shifted (Bacon 2013). This is partly explained by levels resources, with specialist drug squads often one of the first things individual forces cut back on when faced with tighter budgets (UKDPC 2011), but there is now also arguably greater recognition of the market’s fragmentation and more attention placed on street-level dealing and markets (Lister et al. 2008). Among other things, this illustrates a capacity for reform and change in the future (Bacon 2016a).

Operationalising Drug Market Policing Regardless of how the police have attempted to formally organise themselves in response to the drug distribution system, arguably of principle analytic concern both in the UK and elsewhere is how responses to markets and their actors play out on the street (Maher and Dixon 1999). It has been suggested that of all the areas of work that police officers encounter or perhaps even specialise in, drugs is of particular intrigue (Manning 2004). Regularly understood as a dull, unnecessary hassle under the 1920s ‘British system’ (Berridge 1999), this perception changed markedly in the latter half of the twentieth century. Writing during the infancy of the drug war, Skolnick (1975, p. 120) noted, “Those qualities which policemen have come to admire as constituting ‘real’ police work are to be found in the work of the narcotics officer”. As prohibition rumbled on ever more vigorously, the police’s work in responding to drug markets came to play a representational, symbolic function, defining both how officers were viewed externally by society and how they viewed themselves (Collison 1995). Attempts at responding formally to drug markets have often been the site of significant developments in law enforcement practice and intelligence-­generating tactics, permeating out to other areas of police work or even becoming emblematic of policing more broadly (Lee and South 2008). The use of informants, undercover officers and the establishment of specialist squads, for example, all correspond to well-­ established, culturally engrained elements of policing this illicit

3  Policing Drug Markets 

57

subterranean world, but they are also now regularly employed in many other areas of law enforcement and detective work (Loftus 2019; Maguire and Norris 1992). Built upon mobilising against a much feared and maligned ‘other’—whether that be the substances themselves or the dealers that ‘push’ them (Coomber 2006)—drugs policing provides an opportunity for what former undercover officer Neil Woods (2017) has termed ‘fighting the good fight’. This is reinforced by it often being driven by public and media concern (Murji 1998). Serving as the ‘thin blue line’ against what is regularly portrayed popularly as a morally reprehensible ‘scourge’ of communities (Taylor 2008), it also fits into traditional aspects of police culture, including a sense of mission, an orientation around ‘action’ and how officers perceive their societal role (Bacon 2016b; Collison 1995).

Sweeping Up It is within this operational context, underpinned by the wider drugs policing structure, that a range of strategies and tactics have been employed. In geographically specific, usually inner-city areas identified as having endemic ‘open’-market activity, so-called street sweeps have historically been undertaken (Dorn and South 1990). Utilising an overwhelming, preferably constant police presence, these involve intensive efforts to eradicate the presence of drugs and related activity in the area. Dorn et  al. (1992) provide several case studies of their use in the UK. Associated with mass arrests, such operations closely resemble the zero-tolerance approach made famous in New  York during the 1980s (Punch 2007). Taken at its most literal, zero tolerance can be conceptualised as the police mechanistically enforcing the law, resisting any form of discretion and taking the toughest action against all those who are in violation of it (Dixon 1997). More theoretically, such approaches are typically considered as being underpinned by the ‘broken windows’ thesis (see Wilson and Kelling 1982). Central to this is how they function on a symbolic level, attempting to send out unequivocal messages to those involved in drug markets and wider communities about who has power and control over the streets.

58 

J. Spicer

Due to their punitive nature and emphasis on what might be considered ‘militarised enforcement’ (Lea and Young 1984), zero-tolerance policing approaches such as street sweeps arguably represent the archetypal prohibitionist approach to drugs policing (Canty et al. 2005). Just as drug war rhetoric provides a popular political tool to tap into ‘public punitiveness’ (Sprott 1999), so too can complementary forms of policing serve as fashionable punitive masts that people can attach their flag to. The ostensible simplicity of ‘zero tolerance’, how it can complement a wider metanarrative and its capacity to resonate with contemporary societal concerns have all been cited as reasons for its attractiveness (see Newburn and Jones 2007). Specifically applied to drugs, operating under this ‘get tough’ banner provides the police with a mandate to ‘get tough’ on offenders and the motivation for the mass arrest of all those who are in breach of drug laws (Dixon 2005). With a strict adherence to enforcing the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 as written ‘on the books’ encouraged (Belackova et al. 2017), this can also be performed by officers with a sense of ‘mission’ (Reiner 2010) and little recourse or incentive to consider unintentional or negative outcomes of enforcement measures.

Cracking Down Another form of strategic drugs policing operationalisation that remains notably popular within the UK context are ‘crackdown’ operations. Although slightly more difficult to define neatly, cracking down involves a focus on attempting to eliminate, or at least severely disrupt, a particular aspect of a drug market (Sherman 1990). Common examples include a focus on a specific drug, certain market practices or the broader presence of drugs and their supply within a geographical ‘hot spot’ (Rengert et al. 2005). Often actively well-publicised, these operations are considered popular among the public who may well empathise with the police’s well-communicated aim of targeting specific drug-related issues (Kleiman and Smith 1990). Characteristically high-profile, highly visible and sometimes instigated directly by public concerns, they also represent evidence of the police more generally ‘getting things done’ (Alkadry et al. 2017). While the aforementioned zero-tolerance approaches arguably

3  Policing Drug Markets 

59

function as a means for police to demonstrate control over a specific area and population, targeted crackdowns may, at least in principle, represent a more focused attempt to respond to and solve a specific issue deemed problematic (Lawton et al. 2005). Allusions between drug market police crackdowns can arguably be made with the model of ‘Problem Orientated Policing’ (POP). Introduced as a way to increase the effectiveness of the police and provide greater clarity on what they can realistically achieve, this approach sought to counter the ‘means over ends syndrome’, where officers and the police as an organisation become so preoccupied with the methods of operating, that they lose sight of their primary purpose for existing. The instigator of this approach, Herman Goldstein (1979, p. 396), argued that the reality of police work is most accurately described as “dealing with problems”. As expecting the police to fully solve or eradicate them is likely to be unrealistic, they should instead focus on reducing the frequency that they occur or minimise the associated harms. For those engaging with POP, the approach can be broken down into three main stages (Tilley 2008). First, considerable care and attention should be taken in defining what the problem exactly is. Second, research should be conducted into its true nature and scale. Finally, alternative responses to those currently being used should be explored (Bullock et  al. 2006). By doing so, the problems affecting the communities that police officers serve can be responded to effectively. Sherman (1990) has similarly suggested that crackdown operations can be broken down into three constitutive elements. By attempting to unpack their mechanisms, this delineates how they seek to achieve their specific aims of enforcement and deterrence. The first element is described as ‘presence’. For Sherman (1990), this fundamentally comprises of increased numbers of officers per potential offender present. This could be achieved conspicuously by increased uniformed patrols in ‘hot spot’ areas in an attempt to communicate a threat (see Longstaff et al. 2015). Alternatively, it could be achieved via more clandestine methods such as test purchasing. This particular tactic involves what can be thought of as ‘classic’ undercover work (Bacon 2016a), with an officer posing as someone who uses drugs and attempting to purchase from a dealer in order to generate intelligence or incriminating evidence (Nathan 2017). The

60 

J. Spicer

second element of a crackdown for Sherman (1990, p. 8) are ‘sanctions’, which “denote any coercive police imposition on offenders or potential offenders”. A clear example is the use of stop and search, a much-­discussed and often controversial power, especially regarding racial discrepancies (see Eastwood et al. 2013), but considered traditionally as one of an officer’s greatest assets (Delsol 2015). Specifically in the context of a crackdown, it would appear to offer potentially both the opportunity of drug market enforcement and wider deterrence with some residual effect. The third and final element of a crackdown identified by Sherman (1990) is the use of ‘media threats’. This involves both the operation and those it is targeting being openly broadcasted. The emphasis placed on this media engagement highlights their often high-profile nature and the general attempts to ‘send out a message’. Combined, these theoretically illustrate how a crackdown may function when the police seek to take action against an identified drugs ‘problem’. It is perhaps through these elements, within the wider context of a ‘problem-orientated approach’, that an ideal drug market crackdown from the perspective of those undertaking it might be modelled on.

Harmful, Ineffective and Symbolic? Despite their identifiable theoretical mechanisms and apparent popularity among both those who undertake them and the wider public, the harmful impact that the policing of drug markets can have has been well documented. Criticisms of drug market policing and its outcomes abound. Of note, given the drugs involved with County Lines, these critiques have been identified most prominently in relation to heroin and crack markets. This is likely due to these being particularly targeted heavily (Collison 1995), and the socially marginalised position of many of their actors who become subjected to attention (Werb et  al. 2011). Central to these critiques is that, in response to police efforts, drug markets do not simply roll over and disappear. Despite prohibitionist aims and apparent success, people keep supplying and people keep using. Instead, markets and their various actors change their behaviour to fit the context they find themselves in.

3  Policing Drug Markets 

61

In an influential study, Maher and Dixon (1999) observed how an increased police presence did not lead to supply even necessarily reducing, let alone stopping, but it did lead to riskier behaviour by those engaged in supply. Dealers, for example, adapted to the increased police threat and began storing and distributing heroin caps orally to prevent detection. The oppressive conditions associated with crackdowns have also been associated with a range of riskier consumption practices. One is discouraging the carrying of injecting equipment, resulting in increased sharing of syringes (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009). Another is rushing the injecting process, resulting in important steps in the preparation of drugs being skipped, injection sites not being cleaned, intended veins being missed and strength and purity not being tested (Aitken et al. 2002; Broadhead et al. 2002; Cooper et al. 2005). Demonstrating some of its wider implications, intensive drug market policing can interrupt health service use and access to needle exchange programmes (Wood et  al. 2003). This has sometimes been attributed to users seeking to avoid being identified by the police (Small et  al. 2006). More often, however, this appears to relate to the issue of displacement, with users being reluctant to enter the specific geographical areas where police crackdowns are taking place and where services are often based (Kerr et al. 2005). As a population that is often hard to maintain engagement with at the best of times, police-induced displacement has been found to exacerbate this, compounding their marginalisation (Curtis et al. 1995). The issue of displacement, a common observation when examining the outcomes of intensive drugs policing (see Windle and Farrell 2012), is itself associated with a further range of harms. At the individual level, users may move away from areas targeted by law enforcement and start using less-safe environments to avoid the heightened risk of detection (Small et al. 2006). At a more macro level, displacing this population to other locations risks dispersing them and any associated problems into different communities (Maher and Dixon 2001). This not only undermines the ‘success story’ (see Shearing and Ericson 1991) often constructed by the police following a crackdown operation, but it can also lead to drug supply and its associated by-products such as antisocial behaviour being present in areas unfamiliar with such occurrences (Aitken et  al. 2002). Perhaps most problematic, however, is that the

62 

J. Spicer

displacement or arrest of dealers can lead to the creation of vacuums and market instability (Brownstein et  al. 2000), ultimately resulting in increased violence. This was the conclusion of Werb et  al.’s (2011) systematic review, who found that an increase in police presence and attempts to disrupt drug markets not only routinely failed to reduce violence but, somewhat paradoxically, frequently led to it increasing, often in its most serious forms. Evidence also suggests that some of the individual-level tactics employed by the police during intensive responses to drug markets can create or exacerbate harmful conditions. The use of test purchases is perhaps the most notable. Demonstrating the ‘socialised’ nature of drug markets (Dwyer and Moore 2010), knowledge or rumour that this tactic is being used can have a detrimental impact on those engaging with them. May and Hough (2001) found that, in response to this tactic being used, dealers started to become suspicious, demanding that customers use a small amount of what they had purchased in front of them or face violent repercussions. Such responses not only clearly elevate the possibility of violence, but may additionally promote more harmful using practices. Faced with the heightened risk of facing criminal justice sanctions, as opposed to ‘sorting out’ their social network to finance their own use, user-dealers may also turn to less risky, but arguably more socially detrimental, forms of acquisitive crime instead (Maher and Dixon 1999; Moyle and Coomber 2015). Finally, it is also worth considering the “deep pile of hurt” (Marx 1989, p. 129) that this may cause to the undercover officers undertaking it themselves. In addition to being threatened with violence, as one detective in Bacon’s (2016a, p. 226) study stated, “the worst thing that can happen is when the drugs are plugged. Dealer takes it out of his arse and tells you to put in your mouth. Fucking disgusting! But you’ve gotta do it, a crackhead would do it”. The account former undercover officer Neil Woods (2017) provides of his time undertaking such work further depicts its highly dangerous nature and lasting impact, long after the work has been done. Ultimately, just as intensive drugs policing activities represent a way of operationalising the drug war, the resulting outcomes often appear to be a mass of varied harms experienced by a range of different people.

3  Policing Drug Markets 

63

The Effectiveness of Crackdowns Putting their harmful by-products to one side, it is also dubious how effective crackdowns are in relation to formal prohibitionist aims (Canty et  al. 2005). Despite their frequent use and high-profile nature, little rigorous evaluation research has been conducted on them. As stated by Mazerolle et al. (2007, p. 138), “the general quality of research in drug law enforcement is poor, the range of interventions that have been evaluated is limited, and more high-quality research is needed across a greater variety of interventions”. One exception to this in the UK is Webster et al.’s (2001) evaluation of a police operation targeted at crack houses in London. They concluded that despite the police’s intense efforts, there was little effect on drug availability and price in the area. The venues targeted were also either displaced to other locations or reopened shortly after. This is indicative of a wider limitation of the policing of this area. Because intensive drug market policing by definition requires significant resources, it will be strictly time-limited. This is especially the case during a time of austerity (UKPDC 2011). At some point, an inevitable ‘back-­ off’ will occur (Sherman 1990). As has often been observed, when this happens, the propensity for markets to simply re-emerge once the presence is removed is very high, severely undermining any claims that intensive policing has been successful in having any lasting impact. Other evaluations have found similarly minimal impact on reducing levels of supply and their attempts at disruption creating negative unforeseen supply-related consequences. Operation ‘Reduction’ undertaking in Brighton was associated with a short-term spike in overdose deaths due to the dealers replacing those who had been arrested supplying higher purity heroin (see Stevens 2013). Among other things, this highlights how, even when police are successful in arresting retail-level dealers, they are typically swiftly replaced, sometimes for the worse. As discussed in the previous chapter regarding the concept of ‘market saturation’ (Windle and Briggs 2015), there are nearly always a host of other actors willing and able to step into a dealer’s shoes when they become vacant. Rather than conforming to the aforementioned ‘problem-orientated policing’ model and its underlying theoretical aims, by embodying highly visible

64 

J. Spicer

responses in conjunction with intensified media attention, crackdowns therefore risk being a classic example of unfocused, reactive law enforcement (Murji 1998). This might be appealing to generate short-term effects and to display a robust and swift police response to a pressing issue. Yet, in practice, a reactive ‘fire-fighting’ approach is unlikely to be sustainable or effective. Instead, it may lead to a ‘demand spiral’ (Squires 1998), with police officers constantly chasing after the next drug market ‘fire’ that needs to be put out, becoming overstretched and increasingly inefficient.

Symbolic Policing When critically discussing drugs policing and its outcomes, it is important to recognise that because of the demands of UK drug policy, there is still a fundamental societal expectation and legal duty for drug markets to be responded to through a law enforcement response (Bacon 2016b). Despite the apparent ineffectiveness and regularly counterproductive outcomes of crackdown operations, due to the laws on the books, the role that police officers have in relation to drugs and the general public’s expectations, they must be seen to be doing something about drug markets and the very real concerns these markets engender (Collison 1995). Sometimes what they communicate can have ostensible benefits. This is illustrated by a further finding of Webster et al.’s (2001) aforementioned crack house crackdown evaluation that, despite its failures in achieving most of its enforcement aims, the operation was endorsed widely by the community and generated greater public confidence in the police. However, in contrast, it is also worth noting that crackdowns have the capacity to amplify public dissatisfaction. Foster (2000), for example, observed the police implementing a very visible crackdown in response to residents’ concerns about drug dealing in the area, with officers attempting to stress that they were actively doing something about the problem. When this ultimately failed, it left local agencies demoralised and those in the wider community believing that these problems would inevitability persist or worsen. Developing these notions of police imagery, public perceptions and the communicative signals that reverberate around drug market

3  Policing Drug Markets 

65

crackdowns, Coomber et al. (2019) have proposed that much of this type of drug law enforcement activity can be understood as ‘symbolic policing’. Two main concepts are drawn to provide the theoretical underpinnings and explanatory power of this perspective. The first is Innes’ (2014) influential concept of ‘signal crimes’. Originating out of attempts to address the fear of crime, this perspective seeks to understand how certain crimes or signs of disorder may be “particularly de-stabilizing to an individual’s and community’s sense of security” (Innes and Fielding 2002, p. 12). As Innes (2014) recognised, such concerns are particularly relevant regarding drugs. Visible signs of drug use, drug supply and perceived drug-related crime are regularly cited as a significant cause of citizens feeling unsafe. They are also associated with wider concerns of social disorder and community decline (see Fitzgerald and Threadgold 2004). This is likely compounded given the prominence of the stereotypical depictions of drug dealers or ‘pusher myths’ (Coomber 2006) and the associated link between drugs and crime (Bennett and Holloway 2009). Importantly, just as ‘signal crimes’ can have this effect on public perception, the visible actions of law enforcement can function in a similar manner (Innes 2014). Highly visible, ‘spectacular’ drug raids on the homes of suspected dealers, for example, can be interpreted positively by a community as ‘signals of control’, providing evidence of the police taking strong action against a problem and sending a message to those participating in the drug market that a knock on their door may be next (Bacon 2016a; Dorn et al. 1992). However, illustrating the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of this aspect of police work, if highly visible drugs policing action is viewed as ineffective or having failed, this can be interpreted negatively. Resonant with the aforementioned findings of Foster (2000), a display of apparent drugs policing weakness can promote a sense that the problem will worsen. As one half of the ‘symbolic policing’ perspective, drawing on the interactionist signal crimes perspective illustrates how the perception of drug problems and the police responses to them are fundamentally rooted in and shaped by their communicative qualities. To appreciate the societal role and function of drugs policing, these are therefore vital to consider analytically. Operating at a more macro level, the second conceptual half of Coomber et al.’s (2019) ‘symbolic policing’ perspective is the notion of

66 

J. Spicer

‘symbolic policy’. This derives from Murray Edelman’s (1988) analysis of the political arena, which involves placing attention on how the ‘spectacle’ of the political system is constructed. Rather than providing accurate representations and discussions of pertinent issues, Edelman (1988) argued that the field of politics is imbued consistently with a binary mirage of emotive threats on one side and firm, resolute assurances on the other. These are then widely projected out to society. Despite often being highly affecting, in reality, these will rarely have much actual influence on what people experience in their day-to-day lives. However, this construction may create new challenges or problems in itself. Summarising Edelman’s position, DeCanio (2005, p. 339) states: political realities are largely inaccessible to the public, save by the mediation of symbols generated by elites. Such symbols often create the illusion of political solutions to complex problems—solutions devised by experts, implemented by effective leaders, and undemonstrably successful in their results.

Applying this theoretical perspective to the context of drug law enforcement, Coomber et  al. (2019) argue that the field of policing can be understood as frequently operating at the level of the ‘spectacle’. Beyond their general societal role and the powers that they physically enact on the street, the police are suggested to “exhibit an ‘invisible’ symbolic power that has a deeper meaning” (Coomber et al. 2019 p. 5). Relating back to Edelman’s (1988) ideas, those who enforce drug laws are argued to represent notions of power, authority and ‘law and order’ in opposition to perceived threats. As ‘guardians’ (Waddington and Braddock 1991), the police also become entrenched representations of assurance for citizens. Clear theoretical links from this can be made to Loader’s (1997) complementary discussion on the wider symbolic qualities of the police as an institution. Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1990) notion of ‘symbolic power’, he argues similarly that the cultural position of the police interplays with citizen’s sense of selves, representing a way of making sense of the world around them, and is a means of providing ‘ontological security’ (see Young 2007). All of this appears particularly pertinent to the world of drugs where drug war rhetoric, ‘othering’, scapegoating, fear and myths pervade (Coomber 2006; Reinarman and Levine 1989; Spicer 2020; Szasz 1992).

3  Policing Drug Markets 

67

Combined with Innes’ (2014) signal crime perspective, these macro insights provide a useful theoretical framework for interrogating the specifically ‘symbolic’ nature of drugs policing. Initial forays into applying these ideas empirically have provided insight into how these dynamics interplay with the ‘dramaturgical’ aspects (Goffman 1959) of drugs policing, as well as greater understanding into how and why law enforcement in this area is enacted (Bacon 2016a). One particularly notable finding is that, while crackdowns are often framed and promoted by the police as being concerned with targeting the ‘threat’ of harmful commercial dealers and organised crime groups, they often end up focusing more on general local drug activity and low-level actors instead (Coomber et al. 2019). Great effort is regularly made on sending out strong messages via the media about such operations and their purpose. However, rather than suitably cracking down on the ‘threat’ that was originally presented as the problem and used to instigate the intensified enforcement action, they often serve primarily to sweep up the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of highly visible, local user-dealers (Coomber et al. 2019). This observation of crackdowns tending to cast a wide but shallow net further undermines the notion that they operate within a well-organised ‘problem-orientated’ model with strategically informed aims. Instead, they appear to be often unfocused, with targets and objectives becoming vague and ill-defined (Mason 2020). One reason for this appears to be how test purchasing is used and the nature of the intelligence that comes from it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, empirical research into this area is minimal. But as both Bacon (2016a) and Collison (1995) have noted, this tactic appears to be deployed typically in a wide, exploratory manner, particularly when the market is relatively closed or officers are not sure exactly who is operating in it. From Coomber et al.’s (2019) interviews with local users of heroin and crack in areas where such operations have taken place, it appears that when entering and attempting to infiltrate the local market, undercover officers typically target and approach those on the streets who are highly visible. These may well be user-dealers involved in low levels of supply, or potentially just users congregating in well-known areas who are willing to ‘sort out’ a fellow user, especially if they become a well-recognised or even trusted face. Based on this intelligence, it is these who frequently become the main focus of police attention, especially if getting higher up the

68 

J. Spicer

chain proves unachievable. Vast swathes are swept up and charged with supply-related offences, despite it being arguably inappropriate to treat them as drug dealers ‘proper’ (Coomber and Moyle 2014). Especially in relation to the context of County Lines and ‘import’ markets (Reuter and MacCoun 1992), this can have a particularly deleterious, unintended outcome when undertaken outside of major conurbations. Coomber et al. (2019, p. 12) argue that the consequences of who is typically arrested in such crackdowns may serve to “repeal the protective effects of a dominant low-level indigenous dealing population”, leaving it open to predatory, violent and highly commercially orientated dealers to move in or monopolise. At their worst, not only may such crackdowns therefore create a misleading spectacle by targeting those at the very lowest ends of the drug market structure, but they may inadvertently foster conditions that exacerbate the very threats they express an ambition to reduce.

 he Case for Change: Applying Harm T Reduction Principles to the Policing of Drug Markets By detailing the harmful outcomes, symbolic qualities and general failure to make any meaningful progress of eliminating drug supply, this chapter has painted a rather pessimistic picture of the policing of drug markets so far. Despite everything thrown against them, drug markets continue to be resilient, with illicit substances bought and sold in vast quantities. As illustrated by the development of County Lines, they also continue to evolve, manifesting in different forms and in geographical areas and become associated with an increased range of harms. Faced with this ‘abject failure’ (Wodak 2014), there is a sense that things can and perhaps must be done differently. Calls for radical policy change and the implementation of a legalised market have grown louder, with the stated ambition of many policy activists being to take the business out of the hands of organised criminals and into a legally regulated, state-managed system (e.g. Transform 2009). Corresponding with the ‘systemic’ explanation of drug-related violence (see Goldstein 1985), those arguing from this

3  Policing Drug Markets 

69

position suggest that eliminating the illegality of drug markets would rid them of the ‘virtually anarchic’ conditions that foster the associated violence and other harms (Jacques and Allen 2015). More recently, this has also been specifically presented as the answer to County Lines (see Woods 2018). Regularly presented as a panacea, the legalisation argument is frequently compelling. However, there are two key issues that arguably render it flawed. Firstly, it has to be questioned whether this ‘unbridled optimism’ is founded in the realities of what the true effect of legalisation would be (Bean 2014). Despite their illegal status, the majority of drug markets are peaceable most of the time (Reuter 2009). As has been demonstrated in relation to comparisons with alcohol prohibition (see Burnham 1968), an over-reliance on explanations based purely on legal status risks overlooking some of the underlying reasons why violence occurs and how best to respond to it. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, is the matter of pragmatism. Despite a ‘quiet revolution’ taking place internationally (Eastwood et al. 2016), there remains little hope of immediate wholescale drug policy change in Britain. More informal progressive practices such as drug testing and diversion schemes are observable (see Measham 2019), but the type of fundamental reform required for full legalisation remains arguably a long way off. The recent ‘moral sidesteps’ (Stevens 2019) used by Conservative politicians in response to suggestions of evidence-based policy reform and the goal of a drug-free society in the government’s most recent drug strategy (HM Government 2017) would suggest the continued entrenchment of prohibitionist ideology among those in power (see Stevens and Zampini 2018). Even in the face of the growing chorus of strong and often persuasive calls for drug policy reform, it would appear that drug markets will continue to be an area of police concern and responsibility (Caulkins and Kleiman 2018). Pragmatically, it is therefore worth considering how the policing of this area could be undertaken differently and what its aims should be (Bacon 2016b; Maher and Dixon 1999). This chapter has described how blunt, unfocused forms of drugs policing that judge their success on measures such as the quantity of arrests and seizures have widely failed in the wider context of formal prohibitionist aims (Canty et  al. 2005). Beyond minor disruption, there has been little success at

70 

J. Spicer

supply reduction and numerous unintended consequences (Murji 1998). Drug markets not only continue to thrive, but associated with them are a range of harms that are detrimental to individuals and communities. In response to this observation, a growing trend within the academic literature has been to suggest the potential benefits of a shift in approach away from policing that is rooted in traditional prohibitionist logic, to one that seeks to address and minimise the specifically ‘noxious’ elements of drug markets that make them particularly harmful (Caulkins and Reuter 2009). In search of a suitable theoretical framework for such an approach, those writing in this area have looked to the paradigm of harm reduction (Stevens 2013). Long recognised as a crucial pillar in the response to and management of drug use, harm reduction has been described in a variety of ways. It can be thought of as a principle, movement, policy or goal, with the terms used often interchangeably (Single 1995). Fundamentally, it is built upon a public health approach that prioritises reducing the harms associated with drug use, rather than seeking purely to prevent or eliminate it (Ritter and Cameron 2006). Refusing to either denounce or condone drug use, it takes a pragmatic, ‘value-neutral’ third path (Nadelmann 2004) to address associated harms, with needle exchange programmes a classic example. Intrinsic to this perspective and the practices informed by it, is the belief that attempts to eradicate drug use are unachievable, that abstinence-based approaches may not always be appropriate and that it should be recognised that some drug-using practices are less harmful than others. This perspective has been criticised as condoning dangerous or morally wrong behaviour by prohibitionists as well as those who advocate abstention. There have also been concerns that policies or practices of harm reduction may operate as a ‘Trojan horse’ for legalisation (see Kilmer and MacCoun 2017). Yet, as has been demonstrated since its original formulation (see Newcombe 1987), not only can harm reduction prove to be lifesaving for individuals and invaluable for communities and society, but it is also possible for it to function successfully within the legal framework of prohibition (Erickson 1995). Although considering how this paradigm could be aligned with the policing of drug markets is a relatively new and growing movement (see Bacon 2016a; Kammersgaard 2019), there is some precedent in this area. Writing in the early 1990s, Pearson (1992, p.  15) tentatively

3  Policing Drug Markets 

71

acknowledged its potential, arguing that “there is a pressing need that the concept should be expanded to include drug enforcement, criminal justice and the penal system”. As Stevens (2013) proposes, when applied to the specific context of policing and drug markets, fundamental to a harm reduction approach is the recognition that the level of harm present is more important than a market’s overall size. This is not to dismiss that there may be some correlation between the two. However, this conscious shift of focus subverts the traditional goals of supply reduction, with its concern on reducing the amount of drugs being sold and used, and sets in place an alternative guiding framework for law enforcement to identify and seek to reduce the harms present within drug markets (Canty et al. 2005). This then extends the concept of harm reduction beyond its traditional goal of reducing the harm per unit of drug used, to reducing the harm per unit of drug sold (UKDPC 2009). Applying these principles to the area of drug markets serves as a platform for suggesting how the policing of drug markets could alternatively operate. Specifically for the purposes of the empirical focus of this book, it poses as an intriguing perspective to explore within the context of responding to County Lines.

Shaping Drug Markets by Focusing on Externalities For Bacon (2016a), applying harm reduction principles in the context of drug law enforcement equates ultimately to the police attempting to regulate drug markets informally. Correspondingly, he argues it is valuable to draw upon the work of regulatory theory. In line with the broader definition proffered by those such as Braithwaite (2008), regulation for this purpose is defined as “attempts to steer the course of events according to explicit standards or purposes with the intention of producing specific outcomes” (Bacon 2016a, p.  248). This contrasts with narrower, more state-centred definitions relating to strict governance, enforcement of laws and mechanistic sanctions undertaken against those that transgress. Through this framework, Bacon (2016a) proposes that the police could adopt the role of ‘responsive regulator’, seeking, where possible, to persuade and positively influence those engaged in drug-dealing offences,

72 

J. Spicer

rather than resorting automatically to punishment and prosecution. By applying this logic, it is suggested that, just like any other market, illicit or otherwise, regulation can be a valuable tool to manipulate how it operates positively (see also Caulkins and Reuter 2009; Kleiman 2005). By becoming informal regulators, it is suggested that the police will help to beneficially shape the market to operate in less harmful ways or, as Curtis and Wendel (2007) have termed it more creatively, ‘train the dog’. The notion of ‘training’ or ‘shaping’ drug markets is central to a drugs policing approach informed by harm reduction. As indicated in the previous chapter’s discussion regarding County Lines, drug markets and their actors are highly resilient and capable of significant levels of adaptation in the way that they operate. This is typically framed as the ‘push down, pop up’ or ‘balloon’ effect that law enforcement activity has on drug markets and their actors (Caulkins 2002). Put simply, as the police apply pressure on the market in an attempt to suppress it, there will be a reaction, adaptation and manifestation elsewhere. It is common for this trend to be interpreted pessimistically as illustrating the inability to enforce prohibition. Windle and Farrell (2012) note the tendency for it to be prefaced as ‘merely displacement’ in much of the academic literature. But they also argue that this overlooks the potential benefits that might be associated with it. Indeed, through the lens of harm reduction, it is precisely this capacity of drug markets to adapt that has been identified as being law enforcement’s greatest tool (Caulkins and Reuter 2009). By recognising the inevitable responses to their actions, it is suggested that the police, instead of attempting the impossible task of eradicating markets, can purposely manage and shape them to function in less harmful ways (Dorn and South 1990; Stevens 2013). Examples of specific areas that policing could target in such an approach include particularly noxious individuals or groups, areas where drug markets are particularly damaging and harmful behaviours such as the exploitation of vulnerable people (see UKDPC 2009, p. 29). It is seemingly here, therefore, that the harms of markets, such as those associated with County Lines, can potentially be targeted with the aim of reducing them specifically. Unpacking the theoretical mechanisms behind this, Caulkins (2002) has likened the application of harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets as moving beyond a ‘zero-sum game’. He stresses that for

3  Policing Drug Markets 

73

actors involved in supply, their existence in the market is predicated on the intrinsic desire to meet consumer demand and that they do not have an “innate need to create externalities (harms suffered by others)” (Caulkins 2002 p. 8). Recognising that the ultimate desire for commercial drug dealers is to service markets and generate profit, any challenge to their ability to do so, as is the traditional aim of drugs policing, will typically be resisted at all costs (Kleiman 2005). However, if dealers recognise that they are less likely to generate police attention and are more likely to be able to continue to deal and make money by not creating externalities, then it is argued that such modified supply practices will likely be adopted (Caulkins and Reuter 2009). Put simply, the police may have minimal impact on whether drug supply takes place, but they may well have significant influence on how it is undertaken and on the other types of behaviour associated with it. Focusing on the noxious elements or individuals associated with supply, rather than simply supply itself, moves drugs policing away from a ‘zero-sum game’ to something where significant successes in the form of reducing harmful supply-related activity can potentially be achieved (Caulkins 2002). As Kleiman (2005, p. 153) notes, doing so exerts “both Darwinian and economic pressure to push drug-market activities in less harmful directions”. It is through this more informal regulatory mechanism that a harm reduction approach towards the policing of drug markets rests.

A Realistic Approach? Having subjected the likelihood of wholescale drug policy reform to critique, it is worth considering how realistic a prospect it is for a policing approach informed by harm reduction to be undertaken in practice. This is addressed in more detail empirically in later chapters of this book, but it is worth considering it within the context of other published work in detail here first. Notably, it would appear that if the move towards applying harm reduction principles to drug market policing is now ‘coming of age’ (Stimson 2007), then it has been developing for considerable time. Elvins (2008, p. 241) highlighted the statement by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (now subsumed as part of the National Crime Agency)

74 

J. Spicer

that it is a “harm reduction agency with law enforcement powers”. As Bacon (2016a, p.  43) argues, rather than such ideas being a sudden, radical move, there would appear genuine signs that drug law enforcement has been slowly “moving towards a ‘post war era’ for quite some time”. Acknowledging that they had not been able to significantly achieve supply restriction, let alone market eradication, Dorn and Lee (1999) suggested that British police had begun slowly moving away from ‘war on drugs’ style policies by the end of the twentieth century and had started focusing on managing drug markets instead (see also Murji 1998). Attention became primarily based with ‘keeping the lid on’ (Parker 2006), with a “community damage limitation approach” becoming the dominant strategy (Lee and South 2008, p. 509). While prohibitionist logic and practice undoubtedly remain (Coomber et al. 2019), there would appear to be strong evidence that the aims of drugs policing, and what can be considered as successful outcomes, have broadened beyond prohibitionist notions of market suppression to issues such as reducing levels of visible drug dealing and protecting communities from drug-market-related harms (Lupton et al. 2002). Demonstrating this widening recognition of what should be considered drugs policing ‘success’, a report published over 25 years ago by the Advisory Council for the Misuse of Drugs stated that: (if ) a crackdown on dealing in a public place leads to dealers switching their business operations to a private house and drug availability and consumption remain undiminished, this may be regarded as a failure in enforcement terms. But the other outcome may be to restore a public amenity for the benefit of the wider community, in which case the police should be given the credit. (ACMD 1994, p. 27)

Alongside this appears to be a growing recognition within the police of the value of more traditional harm reduction measures based on drug use. In part, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners appears to have advanced this. Many have adopted the role of ‘drug policy actor’ and promoted more progressive policies (Austen 2016). Rather than emanating sporadically from the occasional ‘thinking copper’ (e.g. Grieve 1993), the relentlessly punitive logic and rhetoric of the drug war is also now

3  Policing Drug Markets 

75

being questioned by many stationed on the front line more regularly (Bacon 2016a). Reflecting this, many harm-reduction-inspired initiatives operating under the support or even design of the police have sprung up over recent years in the UK. These include diversion schemes for those caught in possession of illegal drugs in Avon and Somerset, the acknowledgement that users and low-level growers of Cannabis will not be prosecuted in Durham and the work of ‘The Loop’ in providing drug-testing facilities at various festivals and nightclubs (see Measham 2019). Internationally, there have also been recent examples of how policing practices can minimise harm within the existing prohibitionist framework. Houborg et al. (2014, p. 261) observed “a remarkable change in the police strategy (…) from zero tolerance to a non-enforcement strategy” in a neighbourhood hosting the largest open drug market in Denmark. Similarly, in their ethnographic exploration of drugs policing in South Africa, Marks and Howell (2016) found that officers recognised that existing strategies based on prohibition were ineffective, time-­ consuming and often counterproductive, providing some evidence that the police wanted to pursue alternative strategies. The establishment of Police Pacification Units (PPUs) in Brazil is also notable. Having accepted that winning the drug war is not achievable, in this context attention has been placed on reducing the levels of drug market violence in specific problematic areas, acknowledging implicitly that less harmful dealing will continue elsewhere (Pinto and Do Carmo 2016). Police presence and activity has been specifically used to dissuade gangs from engaging in territorial battles and violence, with a simultaneous emphasis on community policing, addressing resident fears and attempting to generate greater neighbourhood engagement (Cano and Ribeiro 2016). The PPU approach can be viewed as a general example of an increasingly popular, formalised law enforcement approach defined as ‘focused deterrence’ (Braga et al. 2014). Illustrating how these strategies appear to fit broadly with the emphasis of harm reduction principles, Caulkins and Kleiman (2018, p. 136) note, “there is great heterogeneity in drug-dealer behaviour. Some are highly destructive to public welfare; most just want to quietly make as much money as possible. Targeted enforcement can help replace the former variety with the latter”. As a point of departure for these strategies, it is argued that unfocused, blanket prohibitionist

76 

J. Spicer

approaches can lead to the police not prioritising action against the most violent and harmful behaviours or groups (Felbab-Brown 2013). Instead, selectively focusing on removing or punishing a specific criminal group or type of behaviour that has been identified as particularly noxious is suggested as being more productive (Kennedy 2011). In addition to capacity denial in the form of arresting individuals, focused deterrence strategies are underpinned by the belief that the threat of punishment will serve as a deterrent to those considering committing harmful acts (Braga 2008). Integral to this is clear communication from the police to those engaged in harmful behaviour that if they cease, they will not be punished, but if they do not, they will face a swift and robust criminal justice response. Sometimes packaged as a form of ‘Drug Market Intervention’ (Corsaro and Brunson 2013), evaluations of their implementation have found them to be frequently successful in reducing drug market harms such as violence and open-air dealing (Braga et al. 2014; Braga and Weisburd 2012; Saunders et al. 2016).

The Way Forward? Predicated on a strong, although still developing, theoretical base, the application of harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets arguably presents as a genuine, albeit partial, way forward through the ‘dialogue of the deaf ’ that has regularly comprised the debate on law enforcement and drug policy (Leishman and Wood 2000). While there is often a popular preoccupation with the police being associated principally with enforcing the law, if it is accepted that the chief role of the police is order maintenance and ‘keeping the peace’ (Reiner 2010), then such an approach is not only legitimate but is likely to be productive. It can be justified on ethical and pragmatic grounds (Stevens 2013) and corresponds with legal and moral human rights requirements (Stevens 2011b). Pragmatically, it promotes more problem-orientated forms of policing rather than reactionary measures or those based on ideological or symbolic commitments (Coomber et al. 2019). Of course, in order to function, it relies on officer discretion, or at least nuanced strategic decisionmaking. But despite the police sometimes being represented as a

3  Policing Drug Markets 

77

rule-bound bureaucracy, officers do not mechanically enforce the law (Maher and Dixon 1999). As illustrated in the discussion on the concept of zero-tolerance policing, this is not only highly undesirable in practice but also an undesirable form of social control. Drawing on the fundamental tool of discretion in an officer’s ‘toolkit’ (Reiner 2010) may instead be of significant benefit. Doing so seemingly paves the way for the type of pragmatic approach where police officers ask, “What sort of markets do we least dislike, and how can we adjust the control mix so as to push markets in the least undesired direction?” (Dorn and South 1990, p. 186). While clearly not conforming to prohibitionist goals, by broadening concerns from what has traditionally been narrowly defined around restricting supply, it represents an opportunity for officers to achieve genuine success in their response to drug markets. In short, policing can go beyond the unachievable task of attempting to be drug market eliminators to drug market regulators (Curtis and Wendel 2007). It can potentially have the power to transform drug law enforcement from often being understood as a losing battle or constraint on individual freedoms, to something which can be “a potentially humane and positive force” (Pearson 1992, p. 19). For all of its potential, however, it is important to recognise that it remains an under-researched area requiring significant theoretical and empirical development. One particular area of concern is the practicalities of implementation. Despite evidence of their success, implementing focused deterrence approaches has proven challenging (Saunders et  al. 2016). The logic, rhetoric and influence of prohibition continue to loom large. More focused enforcement in Mexico, for example, raised public concern of the police going ‘soft’ on dealers, potentially undermining their legitimacy. Elsewhere, illustrating the inescapable role of symbolism, political pressure placed on police officers to make public places ‘clean’ from drug users and dealers, who are seen to pose a threat to the peaceful lives of ‘decent’ people, has meant that low-level users and user-­ dealers remain easy targets and a convenient way of increasing arrest rates (Marks and Howell 2016). This enduring issue of police performance targets and officer disposition has also been noted by others. Bear (2016), for example, demonstrated how making arrests for drug possession offences helped police officers in London to construct a vocational

78 

J. Spicer

narrative, demonstrate tangible outcomes from their work and served as a way to ground themselves in a changing field. Finally, more theoretically, it has been argued that the core philosophy of harm reduction is inappropriate to be applied to the context of drug markets, as the ‘valueneutral’ stance it traditionally provides to drug users is not applicable to those involved in supply (Blaustein et al. 2017). In light of all of these potential challenges, how harm reduction principles may be applied either formally or informally to drug markets, County Lines or otherwise, remains to be seen. At the very least, it represents an area ripe for exploration.

Conclusion Drugs policing is an often contentious, yet intriguing area. By tracing how this area of law enforcement has traditionally been undertaken and highlighting its failures and harmful consequences, this chapter has provided a critical account of this particular aspect of police work. While often highly visible, efforts at supply reduction have had minimal success. Alongside this, harmful market externalities also continue to blight communities and the lives of individuals. Faced with these observations, there is a dilemma for researchers. In many ways, drugs policing remains an easy target for those committed to be critical of its very existence. Caulkins (2017, p.  157) argues that “more than a little DLE (Drug Law Enforcement) research is conducted by people who despise law enforcement and has the implicit if not explicit purpose of discrediting DLE by showing it performs badly”. As demonstrated by the content of this chapter, a result of this is that a great deal written on the subject focuses on “the negative lessons to be learned: what enforcement should not do” (Caulkins and Kleiman 2018, p. 136). Undoubtedly, it is important to continue to scrutinise the counterproductive nature of much of this activity. Analysing the symbolic nature of drugs policing, the specific ways that it is operationalised through crackdowns and how it is rooted in concerns of communicating messages and constructing appearances is particularly worthy of continued theoretical and empirical development, both from the perspectives of those inside and outside the police. Yet,

3  Policing Drug Markets 

79

alongside this, it should also be recognised that there is significant scope to make positive suggestions of what could or should be done differently. One of the distinct values of the promotion of applying harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets is that it provides a productive lens to view the world of drug law enforcement and explore how practices can best minimise harm within the existing prohibition framework (Bacon 2016b). It recognises that markets and the attempts to control them are difficult to separate. How they manifest are regularly predicated on each other’s existence and actions. However, compared to the common policy prescription of wide-sweeping, radical drug policy change, by adopting this perspective, researchers are able to pragmatically provide alternative conclusions (see Maher and Dixon 1999). Both the harm reduction and ‘symbolic’ policing perspectives require further empirical and theoretical development. Combined with the continued value of undertaking research on drugs policing that takes place with and within the police themselves, this provides a clear research agenda (Marks et al. 2016). As Manning (2004) suggests, the realities of drugs policing can only truly be understood by focusing on how it is being operationalised at the ground level. The everyday practical challenges and the tensions between this and prohibition pose as areas ripe for investigation. Doing so within the high-profile context of County Lines and the associated evolution of local markets that officers are faced with represents a particularly fitting social arena to do so.

References ACMD. (1994). Drug Misusers and the Criminal Justice System, Part II, Police, Drug Misusers and the Community. London: HMSO. ACPO. (1985). Final report of the working party on drugs related crime. London: ACPO. Aitken, C., Moore, D., Higgs, P., Kelsall, J., & Kerger, M. (2002). The impact of a police crackdown on a street drug scene: Evidence from the street. International Journal of Drug Policy, 13(3), 193–202.

80 

J. Spicer

Alkadry, M. G., Blessett, B., & Patterson, V. L. (2017). Public administration, diversity, and the ethic of getting things done. Administration & Society, 49(8), 1191–1218. Austen, L. (2016). Police and crime commissioners: Emerging “drug policy actors”? Safer Communities, 15(1), 4–10. Bacon, M. (2013). Endangered species. Drugwise [online]. Retrieved from https://www.drugwise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Endangered-species.pdf Bacon, M. (2016a). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bacon, M. (2016b). Maintaining order in the drug game: Applying harm reduction principles to drug detective work. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 306–316. Bean, P. (2014). Drugs and crime. London: Routledge. Bear, D. (2016). The need to create a narrative: Examining the justifications police used to target drugs in the lead up to the 2011 London riots. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 317–328. Belackova, V., Ritter, A., Shanahan, M., & Hughes, C. E. (2017). Assessing the concordance between illicit drug laws on the books and drug law enforcement: Comparison of three states on the continuum from “decriminalised” to “punitive”. International Journal of Drug Policy, 41(1), 148–157. Bennett, T., & Holloway, K. (2009). The causal connection between drug misuse and crime. The British Journal of Criminology, 49(4), 513–531. Berridge, V. (1999). Opium and the people: Opiate use and drug control policy in nineteenth and early twentieth century England. London: Free Association Book. Blaustein, J., McLay, M., & McCulloch, J. (2017). Secondary harm mitigation: A more humanitarian framework for international drug law enforcement. International Journal of Drug Policy, 46(1), 66–73. Bourdieu, P. (1990). Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity. Bourgois, P., & Schonberg, J. (2009). Righteous dopefiend. Berkeley: University of California Press.. Braga, A. A. (2008). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies and the prevention of gun homicide. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(4), 332–343. Braga, A. A., Hureau, D. M., & Papachristos, A. V. (2014). Deterring gang-­ involved gun violence: Measuring the impact of Boston’s operation ceasefire on street gang behavior. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 30(1), 113–139. Braga, A. A., & Weisburd, D. L. (2012). The effects of focused deterrence strategies on crime: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the empirical evidence. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 49(3), 323–358.

3  Policing Drug Markets 

81

Braithwaite, J. (2008). Regulatory capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it work better. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Broadhead, R. S., Kerr, T. H., Grund, J. C., & Altice, F. L. (2002). Safer injection facilities in North America: Their place in public policy and health initiatives. Journal of Drug Issues, 32(1), 329–355. Brownstein, H.  H., Crimmins, S.  M., & Spunt, B.  J. (2000). A conceptual framework for operationalizing the relationship between violence and drug market stability. Contemporary Drug Problems, 27(4), 867–890. Bullock, K., Erol, R., & Tilley, N. (2006). Problem-oriented policing and partnerships. Cullompton: Willan. Burnham, J. C. (1968). New perspectives on the prohibition “experiment” of the 1920’s. Journal of Social History, 2(1), 51–68. Cano, I., & Ribeiro, E. (2016). Old strategies and new approaches towards policing drug markets in Rio de Janeiro. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 364–375. Canty, C., Sutton, A., & James, S. (2005). Strategies for community-based drug law enforcement: From prohibition to harm reduction. In T.  Stockwell, P. Gruenewald, J. Toumbourou, & W. Loxley (Eds.), Preventing harmful substance use: The evidence base for policy and practice (pp. 225–236). London: John Wiley & Sons. Caulkins, J. (2002). Law enforcement’s role in a harm reduction regime. Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 64. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Caulkins, J. (2017). Improving research on drug law enforcement. International Journal of Drug Policy, 41(1), 158–159. Caulkins, J. P., & Kleiman, M. (2018). Lessons to be drawn from US drug control policies. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 24(2), 125–144. Caulkins, J., & Reuter, P. (2009). Towards a harm-reduction approach to enforcement. Safer Communities, 8(1), 9–23. Chatterton, M. (1995). Performance indicators for local anti-drug strategies: A preliminary analysis. London: Home Office Police Research Group.. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Resituating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2014). Beyond drug dealing: Developing and extending the concept of ‘social supply’ of illicit drugs to ‘minimally commercial supply’. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 21(2), 157–164.

82 

J. Spicer

Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17. Cooper, H., Moore, L., Gruskin, S., & Krieger, N. (2005). The impact of a police drug crackdown on drug injectors’ ability to practice harm reduction: A qualitative study. Social Science & Medicine, 61(3), 673–684. Corsaro, N., & Brunson, R. K. (2013). Are suppression and deterrence mechanisms enough? Examining the “pulling levers” drug market intervention strategy in Peoria, Illinois, USA. The International Journal on Drug Policy, 24(2), 115–121. Curtis, R., Friedman, S. R., Neaigus, A., Jose, B., Goldstein, M., & Ildefonso, G. (1995). Street-level drug markets: Network structure and HIV risk. Social Networks, 17(3), 229–249. Curtis, R., & Wendel, T. (2007). “You’re always training the dog”: Strategic interventions to reconfigure drug markets. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(4), 867–891. DeCanio, S. (2005). Murray Edelman on symbols and ideology in democratic politics. Critical Review, 17(3), 339–350. Delsol, R. (2015). Stop and search: The anatomy of a police power. London: Springer. Dixon, D. (1997). Law in policing: Legal regulation and police practices. Oxford: Clarendon. Dixon, D. (2005). Beyond zero tolerance. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Policing: Key readings (pp. 483–507). Cullompton: Willan. Dorn, N., & Lee, M. (1999). Drugs and policing in Europe: From low streets to high places. In N. South (Ed.), Drugs: Culture, controls and everyday life (pp. 86–102). London: Sage. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1991). Mirroring the market? Police reorganisation and effectiveness against drug trafficking. In R. Reiner & M. Cross (Eds.), Beyond law and order (pp. 91–106). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Dorn, N., & South, N. (1990). Drug markets and law enforcement. British Journal of Criminology, 30(2), 171–188. Dwyer, R., & Moore, D. (2010). Understanding illicit drug markets in Australia: Notes towards a critical reconceptualization. The British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), 82–101. Eastwood, N., Fox, E., & Rosmarin, A. (2016). A quiet revolution: Drug decriminalisation across the globe. London: Release.

3  Policing Drug Markets 

83

Eastwood, N., Shiner, M., & Bear, D. (2013). The numbers in black and white: Ethnic disparities in the policing and prosecution of drug offences in England and Wales. London: Release. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Elvins, M. (2008). Identity theft? Re-framing the policing of organized drug crime in the UK as harm reduction. Contemporary Drug Problems, 35(2–3), 241–263. Erickson, P. (1995). Harm reduction: What it is and is not. Drug and Alcohol Review, 14(3), 283–285. Felbab-Brown, V. (2013). Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities. London: International Drug Policy Consortium. Fitzgerald, J.  L., & Threadgold, T. (2004). Fear of sense in the street heroin market. International Journal of Drug Policy, 15(5–6), 407–417. Foster, J. (2000). Social exclusion, crime and drugs. Drugs: Education, Prevention & Policy, 7(4), 317–330. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & Delinquency, 25(1), 235–258. Goldstein, P. (1985). The drug/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. Grieve, J. (1993). Thinking the unthinkable. Crime and Justice Matters, 12(1), 8. HM Government. (2017). 2017 drug strategy. London: Home Office. Houborg, E., Frank, V. A., & Bjerge, B. (2014). From zero tolerance to non-­ enforcement: Creating a new space for drugs policing in Copenhagen, Denmark. Contemporary Drug Problems, 41(2), 261–291. Innes, M. (2014). Signal crimes: Social reactions to crime, disorder and control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Innes, M., & Fielding, N. (2002). From community to communicative policing: ‘Signal crimes’ and the problem of public reassurance. Sociological Research Online, 7(2), 1–12. Jacques, S., & Allen, A. (2015). Drug market violence: Virtual anarchy, police pressure, predation, and retaliation. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 87–99. Kammersgaard, T. (2019). Harm reduction policing: From drug law enforcement to protection. Contemporary Drug Problems, 46(4), 345–362. Kennedy, D. M. (2011). Don’t shoot. New York: Bloomsbury.

84 

J. Spicer

Kerr, T., Small, W., & Wood, E. (2005). The public health and social impacts of drug market enforcement: A review of the evidence. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(4), 210–220. Kilmer, B., & MacCoun, R. J. (2017). How medical marijuana smoothed the transition to marijuana legalization in the United States. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13(1), 181–202. Kleiman, M. (2005). When brute force fails. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kleiman, M., & Smith, K. (1990). State and local drug enforcement: In search of a strategy. In M. Tonry & J. Wilson (Eds.), Drugs and crime (pp. 69–108). Chicago: Chicago University Press. Lawton, B. A., Taylor, R. B., & Luongo, A. J. (2005). Police officers on drug corners in Philadelphia, drug crime, and violent crime: Intended, diffusion, and displacement impacts. Justice Quarterly, 22(4), 427–451. Lee, M., & South, N. (2008). Drugs policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), The handbook of policing (pp. 497–521). Cullompton: Willan. Lea, J., & Young, J. (1984). What is to be done about law and order? London: Penguin.. Leishman, F., & Wood, T. (2000). Mood swings: Debates and developments in drugs policing. In F. Leishman, B. Loveday, & S. Savage (Eds.), Core issues in policing (pp. 140–155). Harlow: Pearson. Lister, S., Seddon, T., Wincup, E., Barret, S., & Trayner, P. (2008). Street policing of problem drug users. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Loader, I. (1997). Policing and the social: Questions of symbolic power. British Journal of Sociology, 48(1), 1–18. Loftus, B. (2019). Normalizing covert surveillance: The subterranean world of policing. The British Journal of Sociology, 70(5), 2070–2091. Longstaff, A., Willer, J., Chapman, J., Czarnomski, S., & Graham, J. (2015). Neighbourhood policing: Past, present and future. A review of the literature. London: The Police Foundation. Lupton, R., Wilson, A., May, T., Warburton, H., & Turnbull, P. J. (2002). A rock and a hard place: Drug markets in deprived neighbourhoods. London: Home Office. Maguire, M., & Norris, C. (1992). The conduct and supervision of criminal investigations. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Research Study No. 5). London: HMSO. Maher, L., & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health—Law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. British Journal of Criminology, 39(4), 488–512.

3  Policing Drug Markets 

85

Maher, L., & Dixon, D. (2001). The cost of crackdowns: Policing Cabramatta’s heroin market. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 13(1), 5–22. Manning, P. (2004). The Narcs’ game: Organizational and informational limits on drug law enforcement. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.. Marks, M., & Howell, S. (2016). Cops, drugs and interloping academics: An ethnographic exploration of the possibility of policing drugs differently in South Africa. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 341–352. Marks, M., Howell, S., & Shelly, S. (2017). The fluidity of ‘police culture’: Encountering the contextual complexity of policing street-level drug use. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 11(3), 318–331. Marx, G.  T. (1989). Undercover: Police surveillance in America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Mason, W. (2020). ‘No one learned’: Interpreting a drugs crackdown operation and its consequences through the ‘lens’ of social harm. The British Journal of Criminology, 60(2), 382–402. May, T., & Hough, M. (2001). Illegal dealings: The impact of low-level police enforcement on drug markets. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 9(2), 137–162. Mazerolle, L., Soole, D., & Rombouts, S. (2007). Drug law enforcement: A review of the evaluation literature. Police Quarterly, 10(2), 115–153. Measham, F. C. (2019). Drug safety testing, disposals and dealing in an English field: Exploring the operational and behavioural outcomes of the UK’s first onsite ‘drug checking’ service. International Journal of Drug Policy, 67(1), 102–107. Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2015). Earning a score: An exploration of the nature and roles of heroin and crack cocaine ‘user-dealers’. British Journal of Criminology, 55(3), 534–555. Murji, K. (1998). Policing drugs. Aldershot: Ashgate.. Nadelmann, E. (2004). Criminologists and punitive drug prohibition: To serve or to challenge? Criminology & Public Policy, 3(3), 441–450. Nathan, C. (2017). Liability to deception and manipulation: The ethics of undercover policing. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34(3), 370–388. Newburn, T., & Jones, T. (2007). Symbolizing crime control: Reflections on zero tolerance. Theoretical Criminology, 11(2), 221–243. Newcombe, R. (1987). High time for harm reduction. Druglink, 2(10), 11–12. Parker, H. (2006). Keeping the lid on: Policing drug related crime. Criminal Justice Matters, 63(1), 6–38. Parker, H., Bakx, K., & Newcombe, R. (1988). Living with heroin. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

86 

J. Spicer

Pearson, G. (1987). The new heroin users. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Pearson, G. (1992). Drugs and criminal justice: A harm reduction perspective. In R. Newcombe, P. O’Hare, A. Matthews, U. Buning, & U. Drucker (Eds.), The reduction of drug related harm (pp. 15–29). London: Routledge. Pinto, R. F., & Do Carmo, M. S. (2016). The pacifying police units of the state of Rio de Janeiro (UPPs): Incremental innovation or police reform? Public Administration and Development, 36(2), 121–131. Punch, M. (2007). Zero tolerance policing. Bristol: Policy Press. Reinarman, C., & Levine, H. (1989). Crack in context: Politics and media in the making of a drug scare. Contemporary Drug Problems, 16(4), 535–577. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rengert, G. F., Ratcliffe, J., & Chakravorty, S. (2005). Policing illegal drug markets: Geographic approaches to crime reduction. New  York: Criminal Justice Press. Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 275–284. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J.  B. Steinberg, D.  W. Lyon, & M.  E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Ritter, A., & Cameron, J. (2006). A review of the efficacy and effectiveness of harm reduction strategies for alcohol, tobacco and illicit drugs. Drug and Alcohol Review, 25(6), 611–624. Ruggiero, V., & South, N. (1995). Eurodrugs: Drug use, markets, and trafficking in Europe. London: UCL Press. Saunders, J., Ober, A. J., Kilmer, B., & Greathouse, S. M. (2016). A community-­ based, focused-deterrence approach to closing overt drug markets: A process and fidelity evaluation of seven sites. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Seddon, T. (2006). Drugs, crime and social exclusion: Social context and social theory in British drugs—Crime research. The British Journal of Criminology, 46(4), 680–703. Shearing, C. D., & Ericson, R. V. (1991). Culture as figurative action. British Journal of Sociology, 42(4), 481–506. Sherman, L.  W. (1990). Police crackdowns: Initial and residual deterrence. Crime and Justice, 12(1), 1–48. Single, E. (1995). Defining harm reduction. Drug and Alcohol Review, 14(3), 287–290. Skolnick, J. H. (1975). Justice without trial: Law enforcement in democratic society. New Jersey: Wiley and Sons.

3  Policing Drug Markets 

87

Small, W., Kerr, T., Charette, J., Schechter, M.  T., & Spittal, P.  M. (2006). Impacts of intensified police activity on injection drug users: Evidence from an ethnographic investigation. International Journal of Drug Policy, 17(2), 85–95. Spicer, J. (2020). Between gang talk and prohibition: The transfer of blame for County Lines. International Journal of Drug Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. drugpo.2020.102667. Sprott, J. B. (1999). Are members of the public tough on crime?: The dimensions of public “punitiveness”. Journal of Criminal Justice, 27(5), 467–474. Squires, P. (1998). Cops and customers: Consumerism and the demand for police services. Is the customer always right? Policing and Society, 8(2), 169–188. Stevens, A. (2011a). Drugs, crime and public health: The political economy of drug policy. London: Routledge. Stevens, A. (2011b). Drug policy, harm and human rights: A rationalist approach. International Journal of Drug Policy, 22(3), 233–238. Stevens, A. (2013). Applying harm reduction principles to the policing of retail drug markets. London: International Drug Policy Consortium. Stevens, A. (2019). ‘Being human’ and the ‘moral sidestep’ in drug policy: Explaining government inaction on opioid-related deaths in the UK. Addictive Behaviors, 90(1), 444–450. Stevens, A., & Zampini, G. F. (2018). Drug policy constellations: A Habermasian approach for understanding English drug policy. International Journal of Drug Policy, 57(1), 61–71. Stimson, G. V. (2007). Harm reduction—Coming of age: A local movement with global impact. International Journal of Drug Policy, 18(2), 67–69. Szasz, T. (1992). Our right to drugs: The case for a free market. New York: Praeger. Taylor, S. (2008). Outside the outsiders: Media representations of drug use. Probation Journal, 55(4), 369–387. Tilley, N. (2008). Modern approaches to policing: Community, problem-­ orientated and intelligence-led. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of policing (pp. 373–403). Cullompton: Willan. Transform. (2009). After the war on drugs: Blueprint for regulation. Bristol: Transform Drug Policy Foundation. UKDPC. (2009). Refocusing drug-related law enforcement to address harms. London: UK Drug Policy Commission. UKDPC. (2011). Drug enforcement in an age of austerity: Key findings from a survey of police forces in England. London: UKDPC.

88 

J. Spicer

Waddington, P. A., & Braddock, Q. (1991). ‘Guardians’ or ‘Bullies’?: Perceptions of the Police amongst adolescent black, white and Asian boys. Policing and Society, 2(1), 31–45. Webster, R., Hough, M., & Clancy, A. (2001). An evaluation of operation crackdown. London: South Bank University. Werb, D., Rowell, G., Guyatt, G., Kerr, T., Montaner, J., & Wood, E. (2011). Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review. International Journal of Drug Policy, 22(2), 87–94. Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. Atlantic Monthly, 249(3), 29–38. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015). ‘It’s like working away for two weeks’: The harms associated with young drug dealers commuting from a saturated London drug market. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 17(2), 105–119. Windle, J., & Farrell, G. (2012). Popping the balloon effect: Assessing drug law enforcement in terms of displacement, diffusion, and the containment hypothesis. Substance Use & Misuse, 47(8), 868–876. Wodak, A. (2014). The abject failure of drug prohibition. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 47(2), 190–201. Wood, E., Kerr, T., Small, W., Jones, J., Schechter, M.  T., & Tyndall, M. W. (2003). The impact of a police presence on access to needle exchange programs. JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 34(1), 116–117. Woods, N. (2017). Good cop, bad war. London: Random House. Woods, N. (2018). Drug wars. London: Ebury Press. Young, J. (1971). The drugtakers: The social meaning of drug use. London: MacGibbon & Kee. Young, J. (2007). The vertigo of late modernity. London: Sage.

4 Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field

I walked into the police station feeling apprehensive. I had encountered him briefly before, but this was my first proper meeting with one of my main gatekeepers, a senior detective in the force. Also scheduled to join us was a community safety manager from the local council who facilitated some of the local partnership work in response to County Lines. The meeting agenda was to discuss my research and set up the foundations for my fieldwork. Police stations can be intimidating at the best of times but sitting in the car park for forty five minutes having set off from home far too early in the morning due to the fear of being late probably didn’t help. I also wanted to make a good impression. How I came across at this meeting was going to be key for me to gain long term and in-depth access. I tried to put the unsettling stories told by other researchers of police officers being less than welcoming to inquisitive academic intruders to the back of my mind and sought to reassure myself that the relatively warm tone in the emails I had received the previous week was a positive sign. I was greeted in reception, where the detective shook my hand and immediately looked down at my chest. “Afternoon, Jack. Oh good, you’ve got your security pass. You’ll notice we do that all the time round here, before you speak to anyone they’ll look down at your pass to see what colour it is and who you are”. I chuckled, he responded with a friendly wink and my anxiety partially subsided. “Shall I give you a tour of the place?”. I nodded and off we went. The station was newly built and imposing. As he explained, it had replaced many © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_4

89

90 

J. Spicer

of the smaller local stations that had been sold off over recent years and was now home to various teams and departments. “It’s a bit of a pain, especially for the uniformed officers because it means travelling times can be really long” he mentioned, pointing out that the reason all the uniformed officers were based on the ground floor was to help them get out as quickly as possible in an emergency. “Are there any benefits to the new station?” I enquired. “Well, it does mean that if something like a double murder happens then the whole station won’t get wiped out. In the old smaller ones if something like that happened in their area then the whole place is taken over by it”. We walked down to the bottom floor so I could be shown around the cells. On our way we passed numerous sworn officers and members of staff who nodded their heads deferentially and addressed the detective as “boss”. The responses to me ranged from inquisitive looks to friendly smiles. I could sense a distinct hierarchical structure and wondered if being seen with a senior officer was helping to legitimise my presence within the station or was fuelling rumour. “I’ll warn you now, it’s full of grumpy fuckers down here”, the detective said in hushed tones. “That’s something we do in the police, if you’re a miserable fucker then you’ll often get put down somewhere like this”. We walked in, slowly opening numerous heavy doors that slammed shut violently behind us along the way. I was given a full run through of the process a County Lines dealer experiences when they were arrested in the area. We started outside in the loading bay where the police vans dropped a “prisoner” off and made our way inside through a maze of corridors to the cells. A shower that it was believed had never been used was referred to. “Most people who end up in here don’t care about being clean”, claimed one of the custody officers as we walked past. A signpost was also pointed out for a corridor labelled “affray”. “If they go down there then they’ll meet our ‘Welcome Committee’”, the detective said with a smile, “although we don’t call them that anymore due to um… politically correct reasons”. I looked around the sterile cell we were standing in and caught sight of myself in a corner mirror with the safety conscious rounded edges that graced every piece of furniture in the custody suite. I still felt very much out of place but was pleased that I was already being given back stage access to the police station and to the relatively uncensored thoughts of some of the officers. [Field notes]

Perhaps not wanting to keep his readers waiting any longer before presenting the findings of his time observing an English drug police squad at work, Collison (1995, p. 83) concluded a brief methodological account of his fieldwork by claiming that “enough has been said about ethnographic research”. There is certainly no paucity of texts that can be

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

91

consulted by those wishing to learn more about undertaking qualitative inquiry, criminological or otherwise. However, as tempting as it is to rush forward to the presentation of my own data, in the context of this book, it would be remiss to omit a necessary and important methodological discussion. Just like Hobbs (2013), I have no desire to feel the wrath of the ‘methods police’. But I also consider there to be value in discussing the methodological foundations that make up this book’s empirical content and reflecting on my experiences of undertaking fieldwork on this particular subject. For the sake of transparency and for the analysis put forward in this book to be appreciated suitably, it is important to document how the study was actually carried out. Fieldwork involving the police poses unique and intriguing challenges, but so too in this case did the experience of conducting research on a ‘newsy’ topic. Reflecting on this will hopefully make a contribution to wider methodological concerns, outlining a research experience rarely considered in any real depth in the research methods literature. Corresponding with the general emphasis placed on the ‘reflexive turn’, doing so also provides further context to the analysis presented in the following chapters of this book.

Exploring the World of County Lines It is, of course, common for qualitative studies to describe themselves as ‘exploratory’. Highlighting just how exploratory this particular research was, it is worth noting that at the commencement of the project in 2016, the subject of County Lines was very much still in its infancy. Little was formally known about the topic; it was referred to by various terms and had been subjected to scant academic and policy attention. I had no idea that it would become increasingly the subject of high-profile media outputs, political attention, a central concern for the police or explode onto national prominence more generally in the way that it did. Whether I would have conducted the research in the same way if I had known this, or conducted research on the topic of County Lines at all, is something I have often considered. As of yet I do not have a definitive answer. What is more certain are the number of benefits and challenges related to its prominence and overall ‘newsy’ status that I faced along the way.

92 

J. Spicer

Because of the position I was in at the outset of the project, combined with the general state of knowledge at this time, it was important initially to generate a greater understanding of what this phenomenon termed County Lines actually was. This was, in part, an attempt to answer the call from Windle and Briggs (2015) for better understandings of this drug supply practice to be developed. Alongside this, due to its increasing prominence and high-profile nature, it was important to critically explore how it was being constructed and interpreted by those responding to it. Two suitably broad research questions were developed to initially guide the project: • What is County Lines? • How is County Lines being interpreted and understood by police officers in affected areas? In an attempt to address these, an initial phase of fieldwork was undertaken where I interviewed a range of police officers working in a force area affected by significant County Lines activity. Overall, ten in-depth interviews were conducted with the ranks of the officers ranging from police constable to detective inspector. Crucially, all of those I interviewed were specifically working on the issue of County Lines at a local level and had direct experience of relevant cases. While they engaged in various other tasks as part of their day-to-day workload, responding to the presence of County Lines and the associated issues in several towns across their force area had recently become their primary concern. Relatedly, it had also just been made one of their force’s top priorities. This sampling strategy of spending time and speaking in-depth with those specifically working on the issue, as opposed to the temptation of casting a wider net, was a valuable way of generating rich and particularly relevant data. It was therefore adopted throughout subsequent stages of the fieldwork. Demonstrating how finding myself researching a topic that was becoming increasingly ‘newsy’ (Wacquant 2008) assisted with data collection, access to these officers was obtained fortuitously after I was contacted by a member of their force’s communications department who was planning a local awareness campaign on the subject. Acting as an informal consultant led to contact with a detective inspector who introduced me to three other detectives in the team tasked with responding to County Lines

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

93

within their force. Drawing on the strategy of ‘theoretical sampling’ (Charmaz 2014), following these interviews, I considered it worthwhile to speak to officers without a detective function to glean the perspectives of those undertaking different tasks and with different experiences of the phenomenon. Contact with a police inspector responsible for responding to County Lines in the same force led to me being introduced to six other relevant uniformed colleagues. All but one were able to sit down with me for about an hour or so and be interviewed. As a necessary first step at the outset of the research process, conducting these interviews allowed for a detailed exploration into County Lines and how officers were interpreting and considering responding to it. Given the exploratory nature of the research, a highly inductive analytic approach was adopted, consistent with the general tenets of grounded theory methodology (see Glaser and Strauss 1967). The analysis provided valuable insight in addressing the initial research questions and proved both empirically and theoretically ‘sensitising’ to areas worthy of further exploration in subsequent fieldwork (Charmaz 2014). Extended findings from this initial phase of interview-based fieldwork are presented in Chap. 5 (see also Spicer 2019). The analysis also raises a number of critical issues that are subsequently addressed and developed further on in the book.

Going Backstage While the interview data collected during the initial phase of the research were sufficiently rich, with officers often candidly discussing relevant cases and their understandings of the phenomenon, from a dramaturgical perspective, I had not sufficiently penetrated their ‘presentational front’ (Goffman 1959). This is vital when researching any organisation and those who inhabit it, but it is arguably especially important given the typically guarded nature of the police and the sensitive nature of the topic being discussed (Reiner and Newburn 2007). Despite successfully eliciting rich, detailed responses, the interview data were inevitably imbued by forms of ‘scripting’ and ‘impression management’ on behalf of the officers (Goffman 1959). Aligning with standard concerns of observational studies, there was also a need to explore how what officers said they did compared to what they actually did. What was required was to get ‘backstage’.

94 

J. Spicer

Analytically, a slightly less inductive approach that was more in line with ‘adaptive theory’ (Layder 1998) was adopted for this second main stage of the research project. Building on the first stage and engagement with some theoretical ideas or ‘sensitising concepts’ (Charmaz 2014) within the extant literature, a set of three further research questions were developed: • How is County Lines and the establishment of ‘import’ markets being responded to by the police in provincial towns? • What is the role of symbolism in local police responses to County Lines? • To what extent can local police responses to County Lines be understood as applying harm reduction principles? In order to address these questions sufficiently, I needed to hear how officers talked about and understood County Lines outside of a formal interview setting, as well as witness how commitments to notions such as safeguarding and enforcement played out in practice. I needed to observe how officers were pursuing these itinerant supply networks, the impact on local populations and the realities of policing County Lines out on the streets. Ensuring a strong theoretical ‘thread’ ran through the project and that it connected to a wider field of knowledge, I was also keen to explore how ideas regarding ‘symbolic policing’ (Coomber et al. 2019) and applying harm reduction principles (Bacon 2016) could be understood specifically in this context. Finally, given the emphasis placed on the role of other agencies highlighted in the first phase of the research, it appeared important to explore the perceptions and experiences of other organisations working on or exposed to the issue. Relying on interview data alone was only ever going to produce a partial and mediated account of this increasingly fast-paced and ‘newsy’ world. It was time to take heed of Robert Park’s famous advice to “go get the seats of your pants dirty” (quoted in McKinney 1966, p. 71) and adopt the ethnographic method. In light of this, the second phase of data collection that comprises the main empirical component of this book is based on an in-depth period of ethnographic fieldwork. This was undertaken with a different police force from where the initial interviews took place. Access was achieved by drawing on the existing contacts of one of my PhD supervisors. Two

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

95

primary gatekeepers—a senior detective and an intelligence manager— both working specifically on responding to the presence of County Lines in their force area were approached and provided access to the field. Similar to the initial interview phase of the project, the fact that this was an increasingly ‘hot’ issue and one that the police were keen to gain some academic insight on likely helped provide the type of access obtained. After a formal meeting attended by various members of the force where I outlined what I wanted to do, my proposal was accepted. I was vetted, given an access card to the stations and provided with computer login details and an email account. Without County Lines being so topical, this level of access would otherwise have been much harder to achieve or justify. Making the most of this access, I spent 14 months between September 2017 and November 2018 ‘embedded’ within the police force, observing and occasionally partially participating in a range of policing activities alongside different teams and officers. The fieldwork was based primarily across four provincial towns, all of which were significantly affected by County Lines activity. Adopting the role of ‘observer as participant’ (Gold 1958), I spent time accompanying uniformed and plain-clothed officers as they conducted relevant work, as well as several fruitful weeks embedded in intelligence units. I attended various meetings and briefings, went out on patrols, observed ‘days of action’, witnessed warrants being executed, combed through intelligence reports, regularly accompanied officers conducting welfare checks and spent considerable downtime simply ‘hanging out’ in the stations. Consistent with addressing the lines of inquiry I wished to pursue, the majority of the data collected during this period came in the form of detailed field notes that I wrote up each evening based on my observations and informal conversations that day. Some of these are provided in later chapters. Writing these up was often an arduous task, especially when the day had begun (as it often did) with an early start. However, this was balanced against the general enjoyment and occasional excitement of conducting observational fieldwork. Supplementing these field notes were in-depth interviews with twelve key police officers and staff members, with many interviewed on multiple occasions. I was also able to engage in regular analysis of relevant police intelligence. Beyond the

96 

J. Spicer

more ‘bread and butter’ drugs police work (Dorn et al. 1992), as part of this fieldwork, I was offered the opportunity to observe a recently formed partnership group consisting of organisations such as housing providers, community safety officers and drug service workers, who were working alongside the police in response to County Lines. As well as observing their meetings, I conducted formal interviews with 15 representatives from across these partnership organisations. This provided further insight into the local responses to County Lines, while also importantly allowing me to explore how police responses were viewed by other relevant professionals. Combined, it is the data collected during this period of ethnographic fieldwork that are reported on in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8.

Navigating My Way Through the Field Central to the conception of the ethnographic researcher and the type of qualitative inquiry that lies at the heart of this book is the notion of reflexivity. While subjectivity is welcomed, it is only with a suitable amount of reflexive practice that an ethnographer can achieve rigour and transparency (Berger 2015). It is, as Wacquant (2011, p. 438) notes, “not a decorative device, a luxury or an option (like vitamins in an intellectual smoothie). Rather, it is an indispensable ingredient of rigorous investigation and lucid action”. Core to these considerations is the positionality of both the researcher and the research they are undertaking. In the context of this research, this is arguably of particular importance given the long history of police research and the nature of fieldwork with the police (see Westmarland 2016). To situate this book and myself as its author appropriately, it is worth briefly reflecting on these long-standing concerns. From the first path-breaking studies up until the late 1980s, Robert Reiner (1989) suggested that British police research had gone through at least four distinct stages, with the general focus and nature of the studies varying considerably over time. This began with the ‘consensus’ stage in the 1960s, moving into the ‘controversy’ and ‘conflict’ stages of the 1970s and then the final identified stage emerging from the late 1980s considered to be ‘contradictory’. While critical and theoretical work was still visible,

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

97

it was at this stage that a shift towards more realist perspectives became dominant, reflecting the espousal of such approaches at the time (e.g. Lea and Young 1984). Rather than being oppositional and attempting to seek out what was wrong with the police, researchers began adopting a role more in line of a ‘critical friend’ (Murji 2011) and started productively highlighting what was good about practice and policy. More recently, Reiner and Newburn (2007) have suggested that the contradictory stage of police research has now been resolved and that an agenda based on crime control now dominates. This is perhaps illustrated most clearly in the continued rise of the ‘evidence-based policing’ movement, which appears increasingly wedded to an arguably narrow outlook, valorising the so-called gold standard methods that chase the prestige of certain scientific techniques (Bullock et al. 2019). However, rather than simply conforming and adopting this arguably restrictive lens (see Greene 2013), the need for critical, theoretically informed inquiries endures. Academics should not lose sight of their unique position to challenge consensus and draw attention to critical issues that may be unconsciously overlooked or consciously swept under the rug (Jackson 2020; Souhami 2020). By gaining ‘behind the scenes’ access, they can examine the practices, beliefs and rules that lie in the everyday realities of those working within the policing organisation (Westmarland 2016). More broadly, as Jock Young (2011) passionately argued, the need for the ‘criminological imagination’ remains vitally important for the health of the wider discipline. It is in line with this that I hope this book can be situated. Leading police scholar Martin Innes (2010, p.  129) argues that “research can make new discoveries; can shift the paradigms and alter the lenses through which we view the world that we’re engaging with”. It was in this mode of ‘critical friend’ (Murji 2011) that I sought to position this research. In the empirical chapters that follow, I have attempted a critical, theoretically informed analysis, as arguably all ethnographic work in this tradition should (see Herbert 2017). But I have not shied away from going on a ‘quest for good’ policing (Reiner 1989) or grounding my discussions on practical matters where appropriate.

98 

J. Spicer

Insider or Outsider? While important to situate this book within the wider police research context, it is also worth reflecting on my own position whilst undertaking the fieldwork that it is based on. Originally deriving from the considerations of anthropologists, the insider/outsider dichotomy has been a perennial concern for studies involving fieldwork (Dwyer and Buckle 2009). It is of particular interest when ethnographic data collection takes place within organisations (see Bruskin 2018) and is especially pertinent to police research given the nature of the institution and aspects of their occupational culture, such as a suspicion of outsiders and resolute internal solidarity (Reiner 2010). By way of conceptualising the various roles that can be adopted, Brown (1996) identified four types of police researchers based on their relationship with the organisation they are studying. These are ‘inside insiders’, ‘outside insiders’, ‘inside outsiders’ and ‘outside outsiders’. It is the final category, where researchers are neither commissioned to conduct the study by the police nor personally employed by them, that is the typical role of academics. This is also the role I found myself in. Unsurprisingly, gaining access is likely to pose the most problems for ‘outside outsiders’ due to the lack of contacts within the police or perhaps a general unwillingness from the organisation to cooperate due to fears of what the research findings might be or the general disruption caused by a researcher’s presence (Reiner 1989). Reiner and Newburn (2007) note ways to navigate these hurdles include outlining how the research can make policy or practice contributions and having the backing of an established researcher. Taking note of this, drawing on one of my supervisor’s existing contacts and offering to help inform the response to County Lines in the area where I conducted the research helped enable me considerable access, despite my ‘outsider’ status. More generally, as indicated previously in this chapter, the ‘high-profile’ nature of County Lines and the increasing emphasis on the police responding to it effectively were also likely fundamental to my requests for access being viewed as favourably as they were. It is, after all, far easier to argue for the importance of research when it is on a subject that those holding the keys to the access gates are particularly interested in themselves.

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

99

As the extracts from my field notes presented at the start of this chapter indicate, initial access negotiations and the general process of making my way ‘inside’ the police were facilitated principally by a senior detective. As is often the case in ethnographic endeavours, this informal research ‘sponsor’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007) was key to undertaking successful fieldwork. I was able to draw on his professional contacts in the various towns across the force that I collected data in, and he vouched to colleagues that I was worthy of their time and could be trusted. He also literally served as the sponsor for my vetting to be undertaken, pushing for it to be fast-tracked so that my time in the field could be maximised. As Fielding (2006, p. 281) notes, it is worth recognising that support from senior officers has “a symbolic as much as a practical function”. This research ‘sponsorship’ had many clear benefits, but as significant as it was, being granted this formal access and having the door opened for me was just one of a number of hurdles I had to jump over. Even when provided to an ‘outside outsider’, persuading other officers to engage or cooperate with a researcher can be an equally, if not more, demanding task (Loftus 2009). Ultimately, while the high-profile, ‘newsy’ nature of County Lines and my relationship with this senior officer enabled me to get my ‘foot in the door’, I was acutely aware of the “difference between access and cooperation” (Fielding 2006, p. 281). A significant source of consideration in the early stages of the fieldwork was attempting to break down the more informal barriers that I encountered when interacting with officers. More informal access challenges are regularly reported by ethnographers as most intense during the first few days of entering the field. While I was fortunate not to receive the same levels of overt scepticism or hostility as Bacon’s (2016, pp. 91–92) initial experiences with ‘DS Daniels’, my presence was sometimes surrounded by uncertainty and occasional rumour. Wary of my ‘outsider’ status constraining the research, I made significant effort in the first few weeks of introducing myself to as many people as I could, making myself useful, being clear about what I was doing and generally developing my ‘researcher identity’ (King and Liebling 2006). I memorised a loose script to recount when asked the inevitable questions of “who are you?” and “what are you doing here”, to ensure that this was clear and consistent. During the occasional downtime of the working day, I would also try to

100 

J. Spicer

engage with staff members and discuss things unrelated to the research. While mindful of never being too outspoken, I did not shy away from voicing some of my personal stances on various issues, even if they conflicted with those held by the people I was spending time with. As with more general access, the topical nature of County Lines also helped to break down some of these initial boundaries with those I encountered. The reason for my presence and interest in this particular aspect of their work was often seemingly viewed as being legitimate and worthwhile by officers specifically because of its ‘newsy’ nature. The subject was also an easy conversation starter or something to fall back on if dialogue dried up. After a few weeks, rather than being interpreted as a ‘challenger’ (Holdaway 1983, p. 71), the cold reception I received occasionally began to thaw. This appeared to relate partly to the passing of time, with officers becoming increasingly open and trusting as they became more familiar with my presence. But I also developed certain levels of trust, cooperation and engagement by attempting to be friendly, unpretentious and interested in their work (see Rowe 2007). Having personal access to stations and being able to sit unsupervised at a computer went from being something I and perhaps some of the officers considered as slightly odd or uncomfortable, to illustrative of my legitimacy and cultural capital. Importantly, it also minimised my intrusion. No one had to let me in or out of a station. The occasional document an officer believed I would find useful could also, where appropriate, simply be forwarded to my email account. This particular practical aspect was important more generally. Conducting research within organisations always has costs for those involved. Especially given the state of police funding at the time the fieldwork took place, I was mindful to minimise the costs associated with mine. While cognisant of Fielding’s (2006) warning that police fieldwork passing too smoothly can be indicative of the researcher having had the ‘wool pulled over their eyes’, having been uncritical or having been unwilling to engage in more challenging areas of police work, I attempted to be as flexible as possible to fit around the schedules of the officers I spent time with and tried to avoid treading on their toes. Sufficiently outlining who I was and the reasons for my presence also appeared to lead me to rarely being considered as a ‘nuisance’ (Hodgson et al. 2006).

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

101

I soon became the butt and occasional purveyor of jokes and adopted various nicknames. The more flattering included ‘lucky charm’ and ‘team mascot’. Many officers found me to be of use while out on the streets. Whether it was holding some rocks of crack for an officer following a successful stop and search or using the satnav on my phone to provide directions to a suspected cuckooed address or being strategically stationed to see if anyone jumped out of the back window of a flat the officers had just entered, being considered a source of help rather than hindrance served to break down these barriers—the social distance between myself and the officers—and was of benefit to the research (see Skinns et  al. 2015). A particularly memorable moment was when I was copied into an email thread sent to a senior officer asking if I could accompany a different officer’s team the following week because I was “generally useful to have around”. Specifically for some of the more senior officers I spent time with, I was able to brief them on academic research, help out at community events they spoke at and position myself as a sounding board for them to bounce ideas off. This led to several insightful interviews where I was able to go far deeper than how these officers usually interacted with other ‘outsiders’ such as journalists. While always aware of my ‘outsider’ and ‘observer as participant’ status, recognising my researcher role’s capacity for fluidity, paying close attention to how I presented myself and generally being prepared to get ‘stuck in’ (see Sherif 2001) ultimately allowed for a more rewarding fieldwork experience and richer ethnographic data.

Ethical Molehills Standard ethical procedures were adhered to throughout the fieldwork. All of the areas where the research took place are anonymised, as are all of those described in field notes or who participated in interviews. When analysing police intelligence, I created sanitised and anonymised field notes based on their content. These were then checked by the relevant intelligence officer before being taken out of the station. At the start of each day of fieldwork, I introduced myself to all of those I came into contact with, letting them know that I would be making notes of what I observed. I also made it clear that they were under no

102 

J. Spicer

obligation to allow me to spend time with them and there would be no negative repercussions if they decided they did not want me to do so. When out in the field, while getting stuck into general helpful activity that promoted rapport, I stopped short of engaging in any formal policing activity. While I was privy to several slightly inappropriate comments, I did not observe or hear anything that put me in an overly uncomfortable position or gave me recourse to consider ‘ethnographic whistleblowing’ (Westmarland 2001). During the fieldwork, there were a few of what Rowe (2007) has described as ‘ethical molehills’ that needed to be navigated. In addition to interacting with police officers and staff, I inevitably also came across members of the public. These included suspects, those who had been arrested and general citizens. Because of the nature of many of these interactions and who these people were, ethical challenges presented themselves and required consideration. A form of ‘situational’ ethics was adopted (see Bear 2016; Norris 1993). As soon as was appropriately possible I, or occasionally the officers I was with, would inform members of the public who I was and what I was doing. Sometimes due to the nature of the situations I found myself in, this was not achievable immediately. In cases where it was either not possible or appropriate, I did not record any details in my field notes at all. On a few occasions, this meant that some potentially interesting observations did not make their way into my final analysis, but this was an ethical price worth paying. Informing people of my presence and status was especially important when entering people’s homes, something I did frequently when accompanying officers on welfare checks. Fortunately, due to the nature and procedure of these visits, making it clear who I was at the very start of the interaction was nearly always easily achievable. Occupants were also assured that if they did not wish that I enter their home, then I would leave straight away. Surprisingly to me, this only happened once. Those we visited were otherwise generally content for me to stay and observe, sometimes asking me questions about my research. Occasionally, some were considerably more pleasant towards me than they were to the officers I was spending time with. Both in people’s homes and out on the streets, there were times where I took it upon myself to be removed or distanced from the ‘action’

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

103

(Goffman 1974). On one occasion, for example, a man considered at risk of being cuckooed made it clear that he no longer wanted the police in his flat. While the officers continued to talk to him and did not leave for several minutes, I left straight away. At other times, I used my own judgement and removed myself from the situation if someone was becoming upset, nervous or if a sensitive discussion was taking place. On one occasion, much to the amusement of the two officers I was with, the thickness of the cigarette smoke that consumed a tiny bedsit we had visited was simply too much for my asthmatic lungs to tolerate and I staggered, coughing and spluttering, outside. Throughout the fieldwork, I consulted regularly with colleagues about situations I had experienced or what I would do if faced with certain scenarios. As many other novice ethnographers have found, the nature of the fieldwork and my lack of experience meant that while setting out into the field each day was exciting, it was also a source of anxiety. Having these regular consultations provided valuable reassurance and ensured that I was well prepared for the situations I encountered.

Conclusion While commitments to anonymity preclude any more specific details, this chapter has provided a reflective account of how the research reported on in this book was undertaken, including the setting it took place, the nature of the data collected and the overarching aims of the fieldwork. It is worth noting that the role of researching a ‘newsy’ subject had a clear effect on methodological areas such as access, data collection and the experience of conducting the research more broadly. Without County Lines ‘exploding’ in the way that it did during the fieldwork period, the content of this book would be very different. My experiences as a relatively inexperienced criminologist making his way into academia would likely have been altered significantly as well. Hopefully, despite what is currently valorised in many corners of police research, and contemporary social science more generally, the value of ethnographic approaches to exploring criminological topics will be made in the following chapters. The benefits of criminologists going out into the field, seeing things with

104 

J. Spicer

their own eyes and hearing things with their own ears endure. The ethnographic method continues to be important, not just within an academic context of creating new knowledge but with the potential for valuable insights into policy and practice. To refer back to the assertions made by Collison (1995) in the introduction of this chapter, in this book at least, perhaps enough has now been said about methods.

References Bacon, M. (2016). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bear, D. (2016). The need to create a narrative: Examining the justifications police used to target drugs in the lead up to the 2011 London riots. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 317–328. Berger, R. (2015). Now I see it, now I don’t: Researcher’s position and reflexivity in qualitative research. Qualitative Research, 15(2), 219–234. Brown, J. (1996). Police research: Some critical issues. In F.  Leishman, B.  Loveday, & S.  Savage (Eds.), Core issues in policing (pp.  179–190). London: Longman. Bruskin, S. (2018). Insider or outsider? Exploring the fluidity of the roles through social identity theory. Journal of Organizational Ethnography, 8(2), 159–170. Bullock, K., Fielding, N., & Holdaway, S. (2019). Evidence-based practice and policing: Background and context. In N. Fielding, K. Bullock, & S. Holdaway (Eds.), Critical reflections on evidence-based policing (pp.  12–17). London: Routledge. Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing grounded theory. London: Sage. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Dwyer, S. C., & Buckle, J. L. (2009). The space between: On being an insider-­ outsider in qualitative research. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 8(1), 54–63.

4  Navigating a ‘Newsy’ Field 

105

Fielding, N. (2006). Fieldwork and policework. In D.  Hobbs & R.  Wright (Eds.), The Sage handbook of fieldwork (pp. 277–291). London: Sage. Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Gold, R. (1958). Roles in sociological field observation. Social Forces, 36(1), 217–223. Greene, J. (2013). New directions in policing: Balancing prediction and meaning in police research. Justice Quarterly, 31(2), 193–228. Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. (2007). Ethnography: Principles in practice. London: Routledge. Herbert, S. (2017). Accountability: Ethnographic engagement and the ethics of the police (United States). In D. Fassin (Ed.), Writing the world of policing: The difference ethnography makes (pp.  23–41). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hobbs, D. (2013). Lush life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hodgson, P., Parker, A., & Seddon, T. (2006). Doing drug research in the criminal justice system. Addiction Research and Theory, 14(3), 253–264. Holdaway, S. (1983). Inside the British police: A force at work. Oxford: Blackwell. Innes, M. (2010). A ‘Mirror’ and a ‘Motor’: Researching and reforming policing in an age of austerity. Policing, 4(2), 127–134. Jackson, W. (2020). Researching the policed: Critical ethnography and the study of protest policing. Policing and Society, 30(2), 169–185. King, R. D., & Liebling, A. (2006). Doing research in prisons. In R. King & E. Wincup (Eds.), Doing research on crime and justice (pp. 431–452). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Layder, D. (1998). Sociological practice: Linking theory and social research. London: Sage. Lea, J., & Young, J. (1984). What is to be done about law and order? London: Penguin. Loftus, B. (2009). Policing culture in a changing world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKinney, J.  C. (1966). Constructive typology and social theory. New  York: Meredith Publishing. Murji, K. (2011). Working together: Governing and advising the police. The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles, 84(3), 256–271.

106 

J. Spicer

Norris, C. (1993). Some ethical considerations on field-work with the police. In D.  Hobbs & T.  May (Eds.), Interpreting the field (pp.  123–143). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reiner, R. (1989). The politics of police research. In M. Weatheritt (Ed.), Police research: Some future prospects. Aldershot: Avebury. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reiner, R., & Newburn, T. (2007). Police research. In R. King & E. Wincup (Eds.), Doing research on crime and justice (pp. 343–374). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rowe, M. (2007). Tripping over molehills: Ethics and the ethnography of police work. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 10(1), 37–48. Sherif, B. (2001). The ambiguity of boundaries in the fieldwork experience: Establishing rapport and negotiating insider/outsider status. Qualitative Inquiry, 7(4), 436–447. Skinns, L., Wooff, A., & Sprawson, A. (2015). The ethics of researching the police. In M. Brunger, S. Tong, & D. Martin (Eds.), Introduction to policing research: Taking lessons from practice (pp. 185–201). London: Routledge. Souhami, A. (2020). Constructing tales of the field: Uncovering the culture of fieldwork in police ethnography. Policing and Society, 30(2), 206–223. Spicer, J. (2019). ‘That’s their brand, their business’: How police officers are interpreting County Lines. Policing and Society, 29(8), 873–886. Wacquant, L. (2008). Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge: Polity. Wacquant, L. (2011). From ‘Public Criminology’ to the reflexive sociology of criminological production and consumption: A review of public criminology? By Ian Loader and Richard Sparks. The British Journal of Criminology, 51(2), 438–448. Westmarland, L. (2001). Blowing the whistle on police violence. Gender, ethnography and ethics. British Journal of Criminology, 41(3), 523–535. Westmarland, L. (2016). ‘Snitches get stitches?’: Telling tales on homicide detectives. In M. Hviid Jacobsen & S. Walklate (Eds.), Liquid criminology: Doing imaginative criminological research (pp. 49–64). London: Routledge. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015). ‘It’s like working away for two weeks’: The harms associated with young drug dealers commuting from a saturated London drug market. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 17(2), 105–119. Young, J. (2011). The criminological imagination. Cambridge: Polity Press.

5 Policing a Crisis?

When high-profile criminal justice phenomena have come to the fore previously in the UK, the tendency for the police to engage in moral entrepreneurship has been noted. Perhaps the most classic example is the ‘mugging scare’ of the 1970s, with Hall et al. (1978) masterfully documenting the role of the police in constructing this particular ‘crisis’ and how they were chiefly involved in setting, manipulating and extending the agenda surrounding the behaviours and people that became associated with it. However, police officers do not always sit in the driving seat, play an influential role in accelerating problems onto various agendas or steer the general direction of how they are constructed. As noted regarding fears of the arrival of crack cocaine to the UK in the late 1980s, the police found themselves in the awkward position of having to be seen to be responding to a social ill that had been identified and then amplified primarily by politicians and the media. Far from setting the agenda, the issue and its definition had slipped from their grasp, and they were faced with having to manage the expectations of what many expected they should be doing, despite the disparate realities of what their actual work regarding the policing of drugs continued to involve (see Dorn et al. 1991). Similarly, as the saga surrounding the first generation of ‘legal highs’ played out in © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_5

107

108 

J. Spicer

the UK, officers typically learnt about them through external sources. Even after they fell under their remit, the police only began to become somewhat knowledgeable and interested in them (see Bacon 2016). Far from simply setting agendas and dictating them to others, it would appear that the police often have rather more complex relationships with the various drug market problems they face up against. This is something perhaps exacerbated by the terrain of late modernity (Young 2007). Drawing on a set of exploratory interviews undertaken with police officers tasked with responding to County Lines during the infancy of the phenomenon, this chapter explores this relationship by considering how it was being initially framed. It unpicks the understandings that these particular police officers had about County Lines, those involved in this form of drug supply and why they believed the practice was apparently burgeoning in their area. As a key mediator of the relationship between police officers and the problem, it considers the meanings and interpretations surrounding the phenomenon, specifically in the context of facing an external threat from ‘outsiders’. Building on this, it also looks into the reaction by officers to the presence of County Lines in their towns, documenting what responses were being proposed.

Dealers ‘Out of Place’ Immediately clear when speaking to the police officers was that they believed something had apparently changed in many of the areas they policed. Mirroring suggestions by Coomber and Moyle (2018), the heroin and crack markets in many of their local towns were described as having ‘evolved’ over recent years. The intensified presence of ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers using the County Lines methodology was suggested as having brought about a number of specific market-based problems, but also shifted how they functioned more fundamentally. A principal explanation for this was how the local heroin and crack markets in their towns, rather than being the traditional sites of nuisance, disturbance and social undesirability, were now also where financial profits were ruthlessly pursued. If, according to Dorn et al. (1992), the 1980s represented a period where ‘things got nasty’ in many inner-city drug markets, it might be

5  Policing a Crisis? 

109

suggested that the 2010s be considered a time where ‘things got commercial’ in many provincial drug markets across the UK. As one officer stated: This is XXXX [name of force area]. It’s pretty, quiet, somewhere people want to come and visit. Yeah, we have our druggies and stuff, but we shouldn’t have these sort of dealers running about.—[Police Constable]

This framing of County Lines drug supply as representing a distinct, commercially driven shift in the functioning of heroin and crack markets in their local towns was perhaps illustrated most clearly by the consistent comparisons made between ‘out-of-town’ dealers and legitimate businesses. The groups, referred to regularly in a form of shorthand as “from the cities”, were described as operating similarly to lawful commercial enterprises. When explaining their presence in local areas and the ultimate motivations to engage with more provincial markets, the apparent desire to not just generate drug supply profit but to maximise their potential for doing so was placed at the centre of the officer’s narratives. The striking frequency that these ideas were evoked as an explanatory framework suggested this to be a dominant interpretation and a key way that they were understanding and explaining the intensified presence of this supply activity in their area. As one detective stated: Like I said, it’s run like a business and it’s a pretty horrible business, it ruins people’s lives. But that’s what they do and they’re pretty much dead set on achieving it.—[Detective Sergeant]

Explanations surrounding these supply groups’ ‘willingness to travel’ (Hales and Hobbs 2010) aligned with this emphasis on commercialisation. McLean et al. (2019) suggest that drug dealer movement to other areas can take the form of either a ‘smash-and-grab’ mentality or playing a ‘longer game’ by developing a steady, albeit more low-key, income stream. For the officers interviewed, the practice of dealers travelling to their towns did not necessarily fit neatly into these binary categories. Instead, it was viewed as resulting chiefly from a considered choice of where these groups believed they would have the best chance of taking over a significant slice of the local drug market, while facing minimal

110 

J. Spicer

competition, violence or other forms of resistance from indigenous dealers. Some specifically reflected on how the presence of County Lines in several of their local towns was shaped by a lack of local governance by local suppliers, with little willingness or ability to mount hostile responses to the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers: There’s no established dealers in places like XXXX [names of two local towns]. They can come in and start dealing pretty much straight away. Trying to get into a city like XXXX [name of local city] would be harder though, I think a couple of the ones from the Met [London] have tried and there’s been some violence in response.—[Police Constable]

Overlapping with the concept of market saturation (Windle and Briggs 2015), despite other cities likely having a larger customer base, it was suggested that, through a practice similar to legitimate hostile takeovers, ‘out-of-town’ dealers judged many of the heroin and crack markets in their towns as being easy pickings. It was considered often relatively straightforward for them to become one of the, if not the main, sources of local supply. Despite these provincial locales often being far from their origin city, the potential for profit to be made by servicing them ultimately led them being highly attractive. In addition to how the itinerant practices of ‘out-of-town’ dealers related to the organisation and structure of the drug markets in their local towns, this wider framing of County Lines around profit maximisation was also predicated on the specific substances they sold. As discussed critically elsewhere (see Spicer 2020), a narrative favoured by some in the media and political spheres has been to suggest that ‘middle-class’ powder cocaine users, who regularly hoover up lines in between courses of fair-­ trade organic food while entertaining friends at dinner parties, are to blame for fuelling County Lines drug markets. However, the officers were clear that the drugs being sold via this supply methodology were heroin and crack. The retail markets for these and powder cocaine were considered as very separate, both in terms of who were buying them and who were selling them. To have suggested otherwise would have undermined any credibility I had as someone professionally interested in drug markets and would have probably led to me being laughed out of the station.

5  Policing a Crisis? 

111

On a practical level, it was suggested that heroin and crack were particularly convenient for County Lines dealers because of their physical form. Being packaged typically in small ‘wraps’ meant that they could be transported inconspicuously in relatively large amounts. This was considered to have obvious benefits for transporting drugs from one area to another, especially because it was often young people doing so by train or other forms of public transport. To travel with alternative substances such as cannabis was considered not only practically unfeasible but also financially imprudent given the physical quantities required to match the levels of profit associated with heroin and crack. As one detective explained: It’s usually wrapped up in tiny little wraps. Some of them plug it, you know what that means? Yeah. Or they might just have it in a bag.— [Detective Sergeant]

Perhaps more importantly, the presence of heroin and crack also functioned at a more ideological level for the officers. The supply of these particular drugs appeared to reinforce the interpretation of ‘out-of-town’ dealers being particularly ruthless and profit-driven. This was demonstrated by the regularly voiced belief that, supplying what one officer considered “that dangerous, poisonous shite” was a morally reprehensible act, undertaken only by those who placed financial gain over the death and destruction associated with these substances. Similarly, County Lines dealers were considered to prey on the addictions of those who used heroin and crack in their local area. They were viewed as making a calculated judgement to service a clientele who were more complicit, helpless and ‘vulnerable’. This allowed for a more robust and efficient business model, with the regular custom of the local heroin- and crack-using population providing greater returns for the time the dealers spent in their local towns. As one officer reflected: When you see what some of them out there buy, it’s crazy. Crack, heroin sometimes two or three times a day, every day. If you’re a dealer with those people depending on you you’re quids in, aren’t you?—[Detective Constable]

112 

J. Spicer

Throughout these discussions, the discourse of vulnerability, which has become dominant in relation to County Lines more generally (Moyle 2019), was drawn upon consistently. Based on the perceived characteristics associated with local users of heroin and crack, officers suggested that supplying these specific drugs provided ‘out-of-town’ dealers greater exposure to those who were socially excluded, lacking in social and ‘street’ capital (Sandberg 2008) and unwilling to report victimisation to the police. These would then be prime candidates for cuckooing in its various forms (Spicer et al. 2019), something considered an essential objective for County Lines dealers when seeking to establish a well-organised and financially efficient ‘import’ market (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Ultimately, in comparison to servicing more recreational users of other drugs (cf. Salinas 2018), users of heroin and crack were considered to represent a more profitable, but also more exploitable, population: Obviously, the users of those [Heroin and Crack] are typically more vulnerable as well. You know, when they come down here they’re going to be able to find the ones they can cuckoo pretty sharpish and take advantage of their addictions much more easily in that group.—[Detective Inspector]

For the officers, the meanings underlying the presence of ‘outsider’ dealers, the associated establishment of ‘import markets’ and the general presence of County Lines in their area therefore appeared to be grounded in how this represented a commercial shift in the local supply of heroin and crack. Similar interpretations of actors involved in drug supply ruthlessly pursuing financial gain have been identified previously in other contexts. The detectives Bacon (2016, p. 220) spent time with, for example, tended to view the dealers they chose to target as “business criminals”. Collison (1995) and Dorn et  al. (1992) also identified similar depictions put forward by those involved in drugs policing. However, the geographical dynamics of County Lines and the manifestation of this form of supply at the retail level of the market suggest that, in this context, these underlying meanings and general framing of the issue have manifested in a culturally specific way. Drawing on anthropological conceptions of ‘purity’ and ‘danger’, the presence of these more organised, unfamiliar and ruthless supply groups of urban origin may therefore best

5  Policing a Crisis? 

113

be considered as representing what Douglas (1966, p.  33) famously referred to as “matter out of place”. So-called Middle England’s perceptions of the presence of drugs have been reported as being associated with ‘outsiders’ bringing them in previously (see Girling et al. 2000). In the specific context of County Lines, this appears to have ratcheted up to a point where the influx of commercially driven dealers from urban conurbations, taking the place of more traditional forms of ‘social supply’ (Coomber and Moyle 2014) and destabilising ‘moral economies’ (Wakeman 2016), signifies a distinct form of ‘pollution’ (Douglas 1966) for local officers in provincial areas. From a policing perspective, the ‘penetration’ (Hallsworth 2013) of these unfamiliar dealers into their towns appears to represent an anxiety-inducing and destabilising shift in how heroin and crack are bought and sold, and a more general symbolic threat to the ontological security of how the ‘drug game’ (Bacon 2016) between them and their local markets is supposed to play out.

Dirty Business This contrast between how heroin and crack supply was understood to have previously manifested in their local area compared to the recent influx of County Lines supply was further demonstrated when officers described some of the specific dealing practices employed by ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers. Aligning with the emphasis placed on commercialisation, ‘out-of-town’ dealers were described as regularly employing shrewd and sophisticated tactics to generate a dominant market presence. Similar to Hallsworth’s (2013) identification of the ‘corporatisation’ discourse that regularly swirls around gang activity, this propensity for employing ‘business-­like’ tactics that the officers were unfamiliar with appeared to compound the sense of them being ‘dirty’ (Douglas 1966). This underlying meaning of impurity related to not just how these dealers were selling the particularly morally insalubrious substances of heroin and crack, but also how the practices they were adopting within the illicit market were out of step with what was expected in the local area. A clear way this ‘pollution’ of the local markets was demonstrated was the role of phone lines. As outlined in Chap. 2, a defining feature of

114 

J. Spicer

County Lines drug supply is the use of a specific phone number that becomes the ‘brand’ of the groups involved (NCA 2017). Of course, the use of particular phone numbers by dealers to facilitate supply is nothing new in how drug markets function (see Søgaard et al. 2019). But officers considered it as having been taken to a new level in the case of County Lines. Being integral to the ‘business model’, it was suggested that these phone lines and their associated brand were guarded vehemently by ‘out-­ of-­town’ dealers. For the ‘elders’ controlling the lines, these were assets of considerable value, the durability of which was integral to enabling successful supply. As one detective stressed: There’s a massive reluctance for County Lines to change numbers. That’s their brand, their business.—[Detective Sergeant]

The officers reported that the use of branding allowed County Lines dealers to advertise their business effectively to local customers when attempting to initially establish themselves. Placing a particular emphasis on their ‘brand’ also helped them develop a reputation, with the ultimate aim perceived to be something akin to the legitimate practice of brand recognition. Drawing on intelligence from an ongoing case, several officers described how County Lines dealers would engage in an exercise of handing out slips of paper with their brand name and phone number to the local heroin- and crack-using population when they moved into a new area. This, it was wryly noted, was not dissimilar to the conventional use of business cards or flyers. Having placed these orders, local customers would collect them at various agreed locations, stating the name of the brand to the runner. Adhering strictly to this procedure was viewed as keeping the process of physical transactions smooth, while retaining a level of protection from police tactics such as test purchases. Buerger (1992) has previously termed similar practices as ‘speakeasy markets’, noting how it allows for dealers to engage with a potentially large market, while providing some safeguards from the threat of law enforcement. Alongside cuckooing, how this was described as being used in this context indicates how ‘out-of-town’ dealers facilitate the successful functioning of an ‘import’ retail market (Reuter and MacCoun 1992) and how

5  Policing a Crisis? 

115

their operations are situated on the ‘open’ or ‘closed’ retail market scale (May and Hough 2004). Echoing Coomber and Moyle’s (2018) findings, despite a reputation for violence and exploitation, many officers believed that County Lines supply was popular among the local users of heroin and crack. This was credited to two principal characteristics deemed to be consistent among these supply networks. The first was how they sold drugs of superior quality. Drawing on reports they had received following seizures and more general intelligence, all of the officers believed firmly that both the heroin and crack being sold by ‘out-of-town’ dealers were of significantly higher purity than that typically provided by local dealers. While this may well be the case, it is also worth noting that this perception might have been exacerbated by the widely observed upsurge in purity levels related to dynamics in producer countries over the same time period of the emergence of the County Lines phenomenon (Pirona et al. 2018). The second characteristic that made these dealers popular was their dependability. In comparison to the often less reliable local suppliers and user-dealer networks, County Lines runners were suggested as delivering quickly and at all times of day and night. This is consistent with Coomber and Moyle’s (2018) findings who reported these supply operations and the performance of the runners stationed in the host towns are managed and orchestrated tightly. Combined, this better-quality product and more reliable service led officers to believe that local brand recognition was achieved rapidly. County Lines groups therefore became increasingly well -known and established in their local towns in a relatively short time. Any competition from local dealers, if they had not already been scared off by intimidation or acts of violence, was believed to be often undermined substantially due to them operating in a more professional and organised manner. Explaining this by way of a fast food analogy, one detective stated: It’s supply and demand really, isn’t it? It’s like burgers … who does the best burgers? McDonald’s? Burger King? You know, people buy from them because they give them what they want. The reason Wimpy went out of business was because their burgers were shit so people stopped buying.—[Detective Inspector]

116 

J. Spicer

Further business-like tactics when entering a new area in an attempt to ‘get their product to market’ and quickly establish themselves were also discussed. These included offering cheap introductory prices to new customers and incentivising locals to spread the word among their social groups. This was presented as further evidence of how, in a relatively short time and aided by deploying conventional marketing tactics, ‘out-­ of-­town’ dealers were increasingly coming to dominate their local drug markets. Similar to how cases of cuckooing have been reported to manifest (see Spicer et al. 2019), one officer recalled: So, the first one [County Lines case] I helped on was [with] a couple that were dependent on drugs. They’d been given freebies I think, they’d [got] loads of texts trying to get them to buy from them, so you can see how they get so popular with people like that.—[Police Constable]

Analogies between drug market practices at various levels of the supply chain and legitimate business have been made by numerous researchers (e.g. Adler 1993; Pearson and Hobbs 2003; Ruggiero and South 1995). Branding is also nothing new in the world of drug dealing. Goldstein (1985) reported how it was commonly used in the crack cocaine markets of New York in the early 1980s and how it contributed to incidents of ‘systemic’ violence (see also Wendel and Curtis 2000). However, something reported by the officers, which is far less discussed in the literature, was the adoption of practices more analogous to franchising. Traditionally, talk of turf wars and predatory violence as opposed to communication and collaboration has dominated both popular and academic perceptions of relations between drug dealers (Coomber 2006; Matrix Knowledge Group 2007). There has been some recognition of cooperative practices (e.g. Zaitch 2005), but such accounts are few and far between. Notable, therefore, was how several of the detectives discussed how they had recently become aware of the practice of County Lines dealers selling off their established line to another group. Adding further insight into the value of an established ‘branded’ line, one detective noted:

5  Policing a Crisis? 

117

A lot of them seem to go down the franchise route, they’ll sell off their County Line to someone else who can then use it to deal from, the people that buy it can use the credibility of that line.—[Detective Inspector]

It was also believed that the groups were collectively aware that such acts served as a way of helping to avoid law enforcement detection. As one officer said: That makes it harder for us to catch them as well if they’re moving it around to different people every few weeks.—[Police Constable]

More generally, the existence of this franchising practice reinforced the officer’s perception of how ‘out of town’ dealers taking over their local areas and commercialised supply was becoming the norm. It was suspected that many of these groups, if leaving a local town due to fear of police detection (see McLean et al. 2019), would look to sell off collated lists of customer phone numbers to others who would use this to engage in their own focused advertising and selling to customers. Illustrating this with a dramaturgical ‘prop’ (Goffman 1959), one detective reached into a pile of paperwork on his desk and showed off a list of over 100 local telephone numbers that they had recently recovered from a cuckooed flat in one of their towns. With these itinerant groups apparently recognising the mutual benefits of engaging with one another, this appeared to help maintain the presence of ‘import’ markets (Reuter and MacCoun 1992) and perpetuated the cycle of them emerging and dominating supply in the area, regardless of some of the successes the police might have against them. Just how common such collaboration is requires further empirical exploration. However, that officers considered these strategies as making it harder for them to track down and arrest these dealers perhaps adds further insight into the challenges faced by traditional crackdown operations when seeking to target more commercial and organised suppliers (Coomber et al. 2019).

118 

J. Spicer

The Threat to Young People While framing the burgeoning presence of County Lines supply through the lens of profit maximisation was used by the officers to understand some of their specific supply practices, it was also used to explain some of the associated ‘externalities’ (Caulkins 2002). A key element of this was the involvement of young people, something that officers were keen to stress made County Lines an especially pernicious drug supply methodology. Rooted again in the perceptions of commercialisation, the involvement of young people was interpreted as a way for the ‘top boys’ to both reduce their risk of being caught and pay those working for them minimal sums of money. This then fed into wider discourses of vulnerability and exploitation. Some officers recounted their experiences with some of the young runners they had arrested and how some had reported being coerced into becoming involved or entrapped through forms of debt bondage into working for these groups with little remuneration: What we’ve seen is that they’ll say to them ‘I’ve just given you new trainers, I’ve given you a new phone, what you need to do now is to take this package across town for me’. So, they’ll give them a package to take across, say for example a kilo of something, and when he gets to the other end they’ll say, ‘that’s only half a kilogram I got, so you owe me a kilo and so you’ll have to work that off’. But they’ll never work that off. So that’s how they keep them in check.— [Detective Sergeant]

Concerns regarding the exploitation of young people arguably conform to the ‘pusher myths’ (Coomber 2006) that make up the stereotypical, culturally embedded image of drug dealers being predatory, dangerous and unscrupulous individuals who prey on the young and the vulnerable. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the world outlook commonly attributed to police culture (Reiner 2010) and the discourses beginning to become prevalent around County Lines at the time, these representations were voiced frequently by the officers, with these dealers rendered as a threat to vulnerable local people and otherwise law-abiding communities. Several talked in a particularly morally outraged manner of a recent case that was subsequently picked up by (or perhaps fed to) the local media where:

5  Policing a Crisis? 

119

… a child was being used to sell the drugs and had been brought up from another county, they were a missing person in that county and then was brought up here and used. They put him into a school uniform from the local area, so he would blend in and could sell drugs more easily that way.—[Police Constable]

It was striking that it was this specific case that was emphasised across several interviews as being particularly shocking. This may have been due to the symbolic qualities this incident possesses. It is, of course, the threat to children that has been one of the main tools traditionally emphasised in ‘drug warrior’ discourse (Flacks 2018; Naddelmann 2004). The wearing of the school uniform appeared to further underline just how young those involved in County Lines were, the damage to their ‘purity’, the ‘dirtiness’ of the more senior dealers (Douglas 1966) and the perceived risk that these foreign, commercially orientated dealers may pose to local communities. Such depictions also align with the element of ‘monstrousness’ within the gang talk discourse (Hallsworth 2013). The fact that County Lines dealers would go to such lengths as to purchase a local school uniform and put a young person in it was interpreted by the officers as illustrating just how far they were prepared to go to facilitate their drug supply operations and ruthlessly pursue their commercial goals. In this sense, the stereotypical, culturally embedded fears surrounding drug dealers and the concept of profit maximisation interacted with and reinforced one another, with the lengths these groups were willing to go to further their financial gain being suggestive of the extent to which they also would be prepared to engage in other harmful stereotypical drug dealer behaviour.

Violence as Instrumental or Expressive? When discussing another prominent County Line supply ‘externality’, it was common, especially during the early stages of the interviews, for officers to stress how County Lines dealers were highly dangerous, ‘evil’ gang members who routinely undertook sadistic acts of violence. Graphic examples recounted from recent cases ranged from the pouring of boiling water on a runner’s genitals, to the kidnap and fatal stabbing of a local

120 

J. Spicer

heroin user. The way these incidents were presented conformed to stereotypical depictions of drug dealers being extremely violent, willing to use weapons and perhaps even deriving some pleasure from doing so. Some officers also explicitly engaged in ‘gang talk’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008), with violence related to County Lines reduced to a cultural product of the supposed workings of highly organised gangs in major British cities, now ‘penetrating’ (Hallsworth 2013) their local towns. As one proposed: The violence comes from gangland culture, they’ve got a big knife crime problem up in London you know, it’s much more accepted up there so they bring it down here as well.—[Detective Sergeant]

However, when probing below the surface of some of these violent incidents, slightly altered and nuanced stories were revealed. Instead of violence being spectacular, expressive acts, it appeared to be employed almost exclusively for instrumental purposes. Rather than being a part of the sadistic tendencies or cultural ‘gang’ norms of ‘out-of-town’ dealers, its use was apparently more closely intertwined with commercially orientated drug supply practices. Most commonly, acts of violence associated with County Lines appeared to be related to either drug debts accrued by local customers or particularly ‘parasitic’ forms of cuckooing (Spicer et al. 2019). It was this population of far from ‘ideal victims’ (Christie 1986) that seemingly bore the brunt of this violence. Further details concerning the aforementioned kidnap and fatal stabbing of a local heroin user are given in the following example: They didn’t mean to kill him. They often do that sort of thing to get them to pay up, you know. Sometimes do it in their bum so they think of them when they sit down. They stabbed him in the leg because it was a big piece of flesh, they thought it would just hurt him a lot and send a message, they didn’t realise they were going to hit an artery and have him bleed out.—[Police Constable]

A further example of this interplay between instrumental and expressive motivations included acts or threats of violence deployed by ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers towards their local rivals when moving in to the area. Such

5  Policing a Crisis? 

121

incidents were presented by some officers as being illustrative of how the local drug market had changed dramatically due to the presence of these foreign and dangerous ‘gangland’ groups (Hallsworth 2013). However, as many went on to acknowledge, this was a typically short-term occurrence, with violence used instrumentally to intimidate and ensure compliance from local dealers in order to gain drug market dominance. As McLean et al. (2019) have suggested, a reputation of ‘city dealers’ being dangerous and willing to use violence may reduce attempts by locals to respond violently to their presence. In the context of the local towns the officers worked in, if violence did subsequently occur, it was seemingly almost always related to enforcing drug debts as opposed to violent performances related to status. Despite the officers being initially keen to present serious incidents of violence related to County Lines as expressive and illustrative of sadistic tendencies fostered by gang culture, once discussed in detail, it was arguably more appropriate to interpret these events within the instrumental profit maximisation framing they had used to explain most other aspects of the ‘out-of-town’ dealer’s conduct. In addition to providing greater insight into the wider interplay between instrumental and expressive behaviour undertaken by those involved in County Lines (see Storrod and Densley 2017), this undermines the contention that such groups and their activities can be explained simply as products of gangs. As discussed in Chap. 2, this is backed up by traditionally ‘gang talk’-littered official publications, which recognise the diversity of the groups involved (NCA 2017).

Partnerships and Control Signals It is quite possible that the officers were keen to present County Lines violence as spectacular to an ‘outsider’ researcher to emphasise the importance of their work, the threat they were up against or just to make the interviews more interesting. Recourse to ‘gang talk’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008) and tales of drug dealers engaging in ‘expressive violence’ (see Copes et al. 2015) may well have been what they thought I wanted to here. However, rather than being reserved solely for my benefit, it became evident that these types of depictions had also been presented to

122 

J. Spicer

others, seemingly often being used by the police for instrumental purposes of their own. This was specifically apparent when the officers discussed engaging with other agencies to raise awareness of County Lines and stress the threat it posed to local communities. They sought to encourage local organisations to work with the police and also take on some responsibilities for responding to County Lines themselves. As one detective recalled: I did a little tour, went to adult safeguarding, housing associations and tried to shock them into action a bit. Told them some of the grizzly violent stuff that County Lines have done. I think there’s a feeling in XXXX [gives name of force area] of ‘it’s not happening in my backyard’ and people just aren’t really that aware of it. So I try to give them a bit of a shock and make them actually start paying attention.—[Detective Inspector]

Specifically recounting—perhaps even slightly embellishing—some of the most violent County Lines incidents appeared to be considered a valuable method for the officers to draw attention to the issue at a local level and to generate the engagement and cooperation they were seeking from other agencies. There was an apparent attempt to take these typically hidden or unfamiliar drug market harms associated with County Lines and expose them to such an extent that they served the purposes of ‘signal crimes’ (Innes 2014). Stories of extreme, sadistic and expressive violence appeared as valuable recourse for helping construct a local drug market ‘spectacle’ (Edelman 1988) and ultimately help officers achieve their aims of raising awareness and communicating with partner agencies. A more general emphasis placed on engaging with other agencies was also prominent throughout the interviews. All of the officers discussed the importance of partnership work in responding to County Lines locally and the perceived benefits that this could bring. It was clear that this form of working had been promoted by senior figures both within the force and elsewhere, and all of the officers appeared in favour of pursuing it. Notably, however, the reasons provided for why doing so was valuable often differed between officers. Some of the detectives suggested that a lot of the work that their force were currently undertaking in response to County Lines should be covered by others. Efforts at

5  Policing a Crisis? 

123

safeguarding and forms of prevention were viewed as inappropriate police work, with their desired role considered to relate almost exclusively to enforcement. In addition to wider notions of symbolism, such attitudes correspond with Bacon’s (2016) observations, with detectives viewing multi-agency work and community engagement as ‘soft’ policing and departing from the ‘proper’ representation of the policing activities they sought (see also McCarthy 2014). For the detectives, the drive for partnership work therefore appeared to be less about forming mutually beneficial and productive relationships to reduce local drug markets harms. Instead, it was more of a way to lessen the load that the police were burdened with so that time and resources could be freed up to do more ‘proper’ police work of arresting and detecting ‘out-of-town’ dealers. As one detective stressed: They’ve got to come to the table, they’ve got to start pulling their weight. Social services, for example, there’s things they can do but they don’t do it, it comes down to resources normally. You know the police are about enforcement really, if others engage with safeguarding then we can focus on arresting and doing what we do best.—[Detective Sergeant]

In contrast, the uniformed officers, who were typically more active on a day-to-day basis at the street level and exposed to the wider impact on communities, discussed efforts at engaging with partner agencies more in line with wanting to work more closely alongside them. This was considered to be of benefit to them as the police, the other agencies and those who might be affected. Some provided examples of how the process of imposing a partial closure notice on an address that had been cuckooed ran smoother when the relevant housing associations were closely involved. By making other agencies aware of what was going on and why this action was being undertaken, they suggested this allowed organisations to support local residents and them in the action they sought to take. As one officer described: You know if we’re trying to rehouse somebody we can’t do that on our own, we need help from [names of housing associations] … we need to get them working closely with us.—[Police Constable]

124 

J. Spicer

These two contrasting perceptions of working with other organisations demonstrate two familiar perceptions of police partnership work. The first considers multi-agency work in response to County Lines as a way for the police to delegate responsibilities to others, demarcating symbolically what they consider their own and other people’s jobs should be. The second involves police officers seeking to engage in what can be perhaps considered as more ‘genuine’ partnership work, with both parties ‘playing nicely with each other’ (O’Neill 2014) and placing an emphasis on problem-­solving and pursuing mutually beneficial and agreed-upon outcomes. These conflicting conceptualisations of partnership work have long been identified in many facets of police work. In this particular context, the very nature of County Lines and how local police officers were responding to it appeared to have brought it to light in a very clear way.

‘Another Pair of Eyes and Ears’ In addition to the responsibilities and roles of other organisations, another key driver of partnership work outlined by both the detectives and uniformed officers was the intelligence that these agencies could provide. Having this additional source was considered invaluable for enabling both law enforcement and safeguarding. At the time of the interviews, officers suggested that many relevant local organisations and agencies lacked awareness regarding County Lines. Fundamental knowledge regarding its implications for local communities was considered to be lacking. This provided the motivation for some of the officers to visit other agencies and to attempt to raise awareness. One of the key benefits discussed for doing so was receiving intelligence of better quantity and quality from staff members within these agencies. This included drug supply activity and forms of exploitation such as cases of cuckooing that may previously have gone unnoticed. As one detective explained: We get a lot of intelligence since we’ve gone to all of these places, because people are more aware of it now. They’re aware that this person might be keeping very different company, or that there might be people in their property that they’ve

5  Policing a Crisis? 

125

never seen before and might be talking on their behalf, even stopping people going in. For example, it could be that a social worker has gone round and they’re like, ‘oh, no, so and so doesn’t want to see you, they’re in bed’. So they [County Lines dealers] may try and put that barrier up, but people are more aware of that now because we’ve gone around and explained about how County Lines work.—[Detective Sergeant]

Adopting a police-centric view of why the problem of County Lines had burgeoned in recent years, many of the officers were outspoken regarding the reduction of neighbourhood policing. It was regularly suggested this had contributed significantly to the supply practice flourishing and had made it more difficult for them to gain intelligence about the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers in the area and cases of cuckooing. Many of the officers suggested community-orientated police work was sorely needed to successfully identify County Lines activity and effectively safeguard populations. By building relationships and becoming familiar with the local community, it was suggested that neighbourhood police officers were far more likely “to pick up on stuff” and receive information from members of the community during informal and routine neighbourhood policing activities. As one uniformed officer explained: If you haven’t got neighbourhood policing there then who are people going to say this to? It then becomes far more formal and you’re relying on people picking up the phone and ringing someone who they don’t know. Whereas if you’ve got neighbourhood policing in there, you’ve got someone they’re familiar with, they’re then so much more likely to go and tell you stuff.—[Police Constable]

In an attempt to generate more effective methods of safeguarding and increase links with other agencies, some of the officers discussed how they had recently worked with their communications department to create bespoke materials such as leaflets, which they provided to other organisations. Those working in housing, for example, were advised to “look out for changes in living arrangements or attitudes of tenants”. Health workers were encouraged to “use their professional judgement to help flag this up early” by noting individuals more regularly visiting GPs or hospitals or, conversely, consistently missing scheduled appointments. During several

126 

J. Spicer

interviews, I was also shown posters and leaflets that had been provided to local agencies, which they were encouraged to put up in their premises to help raise awareness among clients and the public. This was considered by the officers as a particularly valuable way of engaging those who were more likely to come into contact with these agencies than the police. The guidance in these materials appeared broad and applicable to a variety of people experiencing a whole range of issues. Signs to look out for in young people, for example, included “Increasingly disruptive or aggressive behaviour” and “returning home late”. Rather than being popular among officers because of their practical worth, it could be considered that these were somewhat symbolic attempts to demonstrate that they were attempting to respond to this increasingly high-profile issue at a local level. Indeed, while some of the officers were firmly outspoken that these strategies had the potential for making a positive impact on raising awareness and generating information among both agency staff and the broader public, for many of the others, simply having these materials as something tangible to present and use to respond to this pressing issue appeared to be enough. Engaging with other agencies to generate intelligence was viewed by some of the officers as a pragmatic way of filling the gaps that had been created by the withdrawal of neighbourhood policing in recent years. Attempting to make those working in other organisations who had a strong presence within local communities aware of the signs of County Lines appeared to be a key way in which they sought to generate the type of intelligence traditionally generated by neighbourhood policing. Unfamiliar actors who were considered to be in advantageous positions to report signs of County Lines activity, such as housing maintenance workers, were regularly discussed. Their familiarity and relationships with communities were suggested as making them particularly suitable candidates to fill the role of neighbourhood police officers almost by proxy, with one officer even speaking about how he had recently been thinking of how he could “give them a route in through our team so they can add to the reports and stuff”. This could perhaps be viewed as a further development in the ‘pluralisation’ of policing (Loader 2000). Interestingly in this context, while this was instigated partly by current police resources, it was perhaps prompted more prominently by the perception of how local drug markets were evolving.

5  Policing a Crisis? 

127

Drug Services as the Difficult Partner Despite the officers generally suggesting that recent work with many local agencies had been positive, attempts at engaging with local drug services were reported as often being challenging. Those working in these organisations were described as being sceptical of the officers and their motivations. In particular, the repercussions of being seen to associate with the police too much from the perspective of their service users was interpreted as being why they were hesitant to engage with them. As one detective stated: They don’t trust us I don’t think—we’re the [with emphasise] ‘POLICE!’, you know? I think they’re worried that we’re going to start kicking down their user’s doors and stuff—they don’t get that it’s a safeguarding issue.—[Detective Inspector]

This apparent reticence left some of the officers frustrated, believing their lack of engagement to be irrational and counterproductive. This was made particularly acute because of how these agencies were considered to be in a particularly strong, perhaps even unique, position to engage with the local heroin- and crack-using population and help implement safeguarding strategies in response to the threat of ‘out-of-town’ dealers. Having recently visited one local drug service with the range of leaflets and posters, one officer recounted how they had been unwilling to put them up within their premises. He claimed this was an illustration of them being “overly difficult” and acting in a way that was at odds with what he believed their goals should be. Other officers, however, spoke about this relationship between the police and drugs services in more empathetic terms. They noted that due to the emphasis placed on support and harm reduction by drug services, it was unrealistic for them to believe that they would accept them as a natural ally regarding the general well-being of their service users. The central importance of trust and how this could potentially be undermined by the presence, whether explicit or implicit, of the police were also recognised. As one officer said:

128 

J. Spicer

I’m not saying that they’re not helpful, it’s just that it’s a sort of culture change for them, and us really, to try to and work together, when they obviously have that trust relationship with whoever they’re seeing and to keep them on board, keep them coming back and making appointments they need, I don’t know. They’re concerned about any sharing of information really.—[Police Constable]

Despite the clear frustration displayed by some officers, the presence of these counter-narratives suggests that there was some understanding why drug services had apparently been hesitant to engage formally with them or allow for more informal measures such as the putting up of posters in their premises. Similar to the perception of partnership working more broadly, it was noteworthy that this more empathetic view was put forward typically by the uniformed officers, with the voices of frustration emanating more strongly from the detectives who had interpreted partnership work as means of fostering more ‘proper’ police work. In addition to the lasting impact of prohibitionist policies and how drug laws have historically been enforced, this perhaps stresses the continued importance of ‘cop culture’, its plurality and officer perceptions of what they and others should be doing in response to issues, when understanding the realities of the work of drugs policing (Bear 2016; Collison 1995).

Diverging from the Norm? Attempts at generating greater engagement and collaboration with drug services and others fed into the wider descriptions of how the officers were seeking to respond to County Lines and its associated problems locally. Notable in the context of contemporary innovations in drugs policing (see Bacon 2016) was how regularly diverging from the prohibition-­centric ways of responding to drugs and drug offenders was discussed. It was striking that at the start of nearly all of the interviews, when responding to a broad introductory question regarding County Lines, nearly all of the officers began by saying something similar to: (Sighs) To be quite honest drugs have been around since the year dot, haven’t they? They’re not going away anytime soon.—[Detective Sergeant]

5  Policing a Crisis? 

129

In many ways, County Lines was therefore viewed as just one—albeit particularly pernicious and unfamiliar—further development in the illicit drug economy, just as there had been in the past and would be in the future. The so-called drug warrior rhetoric (Leishman and Wood 2000) or prohibitionist goals of making their local area free from drugs were non-­existent. Some officers were even outspoken in highlighting what they believed to be the flaws of ‘traditional’ drugs policing. Scepticism was raised of whether ‘traditional’ drugs policing was the appropriate response to many drug offences, and they recounted their experience of the cyclical process of arresting local offenders, only to do so again soon after. As one detective proposed: What we’ve always done is arrest and lock up isn’t it. But instead I think you’ve got to think, you know especially with the users, there’s probably a problem there, and by arresting and locking up all the time is that solving that problem? It’s probably just going to happen again.—[Detective Sergeant]

Whilst there was some inevitable variance, such a position was generally consistent among the officers and appeared to be influencing how they were considering responding to County Lines. The use of discretion was viewed as appropriate when engaging with not just those that might be guilty of possession offences but also for those who might technically be guilty of having their premises to be used as cuckooed ‘nests’ (Spicer et  al. 2019). Resonant with some of the more ‘informal’ interactions Bacon (2016) observed between officers and those who were using drugs, one officer explained: A real tool for us, I believe, is discretion. You know if I or any of my officers are speaking to a user we’re not compelled to search him. If they’re telling us about something that’s going on, about someone or them themselves being cuckooed that’s what we want, we’re not going to have any desire to search them or arrest them because we suspect they’ve got something on them.—[Detective Inspector]

At least in principle, those local users of heroin and crack characterised as vulnerable and who had been caught up in County Lines activity, either through undertaking forms of ‘labour’ or having been cuckooed

130 

J. Spicer

(Moyle 2019), were represented as victims and not appropriate candidates for law enforcement action. Instead, many officers stated that their main aim was to actively safeguard these people who use drugs and prevent them from being harmed. As one detective proposed: I suppose classic policing is, you know, somebody’s dealing drugs, we deal with them … that’s it—thanks very much and we move on to the next. That was our old, you know, policing style. But then County Lines, the way they work, they will look to exploit people who have got [drug] habits and so although they’re committing crime they’re still potentially vulnerable. So, it’s identifying what we can put in place in order to assist them … to try and sort of bubble wrap them, if that makes sense.—[Detective Sergeant]

The notion of preventative work was stressed specifically by several uniformed officers who voiced their desire to work more ‘upstream’ alongside other agencies to try and prevent incidents such as cuckooing happening, rather than responding to them or setting actions in place after they had occurred. One officer, clearly influenced by wider trends surrounding a ‘public health approach’ that were also starting to emerge in public discourse at the time, argued that those who became someway embroiled in County Lines should not be viewed as isolated incidents but as part of a broader, intensifying local problem of people becoming socially excluded and vulnerable to exploitation. He described that, as police: We’ve got more and more drawn in to pulling people out of the river. Our department now are wanting to set up camp at the point in which people are falling in the river, whereas I want to try and stop them from even walking to the river in the first place.—[Police Inspector]

Yet, despite these arguably welcome progressive ambitions, many of the officers were also acutely aware of the communicative messages they were sending out to the public. Some discussed how treating the local heroin- and crack-user population as victims and using their limited resources to safeguard them would likely be viewed negatively by many sections of society. One detective estimated that it would probably be:

5  Policing a Crisis? 

131

fifty/fifty in the general public about who would be in favour of us spending our time and resources trying to stop users being victimised.—[Detective Sergeant]

Others discussed how, despite potentially being treated as victims if embroiled in County Lines activity, many would already be involved in other forms of offending such as acquisitive crime, adding further complexity. It was also specifically noted that this was challenging in cases of cuckooing that diverged from the classic ‘parasitic nest invading’ (Spicer et al. 2019), where occupants had been initially willing for ‘out-of-town’ dealers to enter their residence or were reluctant to engage with officers. However, the thread of pragmatism among the officers ultimately ran deep. Seemingly demonstrating further potential for alternative drugs policing approaches to be undertaken, when finally discussing their overall aims, it was striking how, even when talking about responding to dealers, this was seemingly in contrast with notions of prohibition. For many of the officers, their concerns appeared far less about the drugs themselves and far more about the harms associated with their supply. Taking what one officer described as a “pragmatic approach”, it was suggested that significantly reducing levels of drug supply in the area was unlikely to be achievable. Instead, emphasis was placed on trying to reduce the multiple externalities associated with County Lines. As he went on to describe: Well you have to be realistic, are we going to prevent drug dealing? No, it’s always going to be there. Are we going to stop County Lines coming down to [name of county]? Probably not, no I think they’ll keep coming down whatever. What I am really concentrated on is preventing the violence and exploitation that comes out of this. That’s what success would look like for me. I don’t set myself up to fail.—[Detective Inspector]

Combined with more nuanced responses to local users of heroin and crack, many of the officers were therefore prepared to use their discretion to recognise the vulnerabilities of those affected by County Lines, especially for those who would be guilty of drug offences beyond pure possession if the ‘law on the books’ was followed strictly. This was viewed not just as pragmatic but as an important way of responding to the harms of County Lines and the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers. Alongside the

132 

J. Spicer

recognition of what was considered achievable regarding levels of supply in their local area, this indicates a potential step towards incorporating harm reduction principles into their drugs policing practices.

Conclusion Through the perspectives of police officers initially tasked with responding to it in affected ‘import’ areas, this chapter has provided an opening empirical exploration into the policing of County Lines. The underlying meanings and interpretations surrounding the apparent commercial evolutions of their local drug markets demonstrate the relationship police officers have with this particular ‘problem’. The central framing around the shift towards commercialisation appears key. Theoretically interplaying with Douglas’ (1966) anthropological concepts of purity and dirt, and more familiar criminological notions such as ‘pusher myths’ (Coomber 2006) and ‘gang talk’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008), there were a number of fears associated with these outsider groups developing an increasing presence in their area. The evolution of many of the heroin and crack markets in their towns from ‘local’ into ‘import’ markets, the increased commercialised practices within them and the associated harms to local populations also stress the importance of appreciating the impact of County Lines on local areas and how this influences the way the phenomenon is interpreted. While playing a role in setting the County Lines agenda locally, officers were therefore also clearly attempting to respond to a challenge that had been laid before them. Given the relatively small, albeit specifically targeted, numbers of officers interviewed, it is important to recognise that the findings presented in this chapter provide a partial window into this area. Specifically for the purpose of this book, they provide an important foundation for further empirical and theoretical investigation. The insights regarding how officers were intending to respond to the problem of County Lines are particularly compelling. The implications of understanding and representing these groups as dangerous, commercially orientated unfamiliar outsiders are noteworthy. This suggests a potential recourse to symbolic responses, especially when combined with the politicisation and ever-increasing

5  Policing a Crisis? 

133

national attention given to the issue. However, indications that officers were approaching the policing of this area in a way that diverges from the maxims of strict prohibition alongside themes of partnership working suggest more nuanced, pragmatic responses also coming to the fore. Combined, these insights provide an empirical and theoretical agenda to be built on in the following chapters.

References Adler, P. (1993). Wheeling and dealing: An ethnography of an upper-level drug dealing and smuggling community. New York: Columbia University Press. Bacon, M. (2016). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bear, D. (2016). The need to create a narrative: Examining the justifications police used to target drugs in the lead up to the 2011 London riots. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 317–328. Buerger, M. E. (1992). Defensive strategies of the street-level drug trade. Journal of Crime and Justice, 15(2), 31–51. Caulkins, J. (2002). Law enforcement’s role in a harm reduction regime. Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 64. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Christie, N. (1986). The ideal victim. In E. Fattah (Ed.), From crime policy to victim policy (pp. 17–30). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Resituating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2014). Beyond drug dealing: Developing and extending the concept of ‘social supply’ of illicit drugs to ‘minimally commercial supply’. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 21(2), 157–164. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2018). The changing shape of street-level heroin and crack supply in England: Commuting, holidaying and cuckooing drug dealers across ‘county lines’. British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1323–1342. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17.

134 

J. Spicer

Copes, H., Hochstetler, A., & Sandberg, S. (2015). Using a narrative framework to understand the drugs and violence nexus. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 32–46. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1991). Mirroring the market? Police reorganisation and effectiveness against drug trafficking. In R. Reiner & M. Cross (Eds.), Beyond law and order (pp. 91–106). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and danger. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Flacks, S. J. (2018). Drug law reform, performativity and the politics of childhood. International Journal of Drug Policy, 51(1), 56–66. Girling, E., Loader, I., & Sparks, R. (2000). Crime and social change in middle England: Questions of order in an English town. London: Routledge. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Goldstein, P. (1985). The drug/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. Hales, G., & Hobbs, D. (2010). Drug markets in the community: A London borough case study. Trends in Organized Crime, 13(1), 13–30. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., & Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the crisis. London: Macmillan. Hallsworth, S. (2013). The gang and beyond: Interpreting violent street worlds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hallsworth, S., & Young, T. (2008). Gang talk and gang talkers: A critique. Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal, 4(2), 175–195. Innes, M. (2014). Signal crimes: Social reactions to crime, disorder and control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leishman, F., & Wood, T. (2000). Mood swings: Debates and developments in drugs policing. In F. Leishman, B. Loveday, & S. Savage (Eds.), Core issues in policing (pp. 140–155). Harlow: Pearson. Loader, I. (2000). Plural policing and democratic governance. Social & Legal Studies, 9(3), 323–345. Matrix Knowledge Group. (2007). The illicit drug trade in the United Kingdom. London: Home Office. May, T., & Hough, M. (2004). Drug markets and distribution systems. Addiction Research & Theory, 12(6), 549–563.

5  Policing a Crisis? 

135

McCarthy, D. (2014). ‘Soft’ policing: The collaborative control of anti-social behaviour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McLean, R., Robinson, G., & Densley, J. (2019). County lines: Criminal networks and evolving drug markets in Britain. London: Springer. Moyle, L. (2019). Situating vulnerability and exploitation in street-level drug markets: Cuckooing, commuting, and the “county lines” drug supply model. Journal of Drug Issues, 49(4), 739–755. Naddelmann, E. (2004). Criminologists and punitive drug prohibition: To serve or to challenge? Criminology & Public Policy, 3(3), 441–450. National Crime Agency. (2017). County lines violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. O’Neill, M. (2014). Playing nicely with others: Lessons from successes in partnership working. In J.  Brown (Ed.), The future of policing (pp.  203–216). Oxford: Routledge. Pearson, G., & Hobbs, D. (2003). King pin? A case study of a middle market drug broker. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 42(4), 335–347. Pirona, A., Matias, J., & Giraudon, I. (2018). Recent changes in Europe’s cocaine market: Results from an EMCDDA trendspotter study. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J.  B. Steinberg, D.  W. Lyon, & M.  E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Ruggiero, V., & South, N. (1995). Eurodrugs: Drug use, markets, and trafficking in Europe. London: UCL Press. Salinas, M. (2018). The unusual suspects: An educated, legitimately employed drug dealing network. International Criminal Justice Review, 28(3), 226–242. Sandberg, S. (2008). Street capital: Ethnicity and violence on the streets of Oslo. Theoretical Criminology, 12(2), 153–171. Søgaard, T. F., Kolind, T., Haller, M. B., & Hunt, G. (2019). Ring and bring drug services: Delivery dealing and the social life of a drug phone. International Journal of Drug Policy, 69(1), 8–15. Spicer, J. (2020). Between gang talk and prohibition: The transfer of blame for County Lines. International Journal of Drug Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. drugpo.2020.102667. Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5.

136 

J. Spicer

Storrod, M., & Densley, J. (2017). ‘Going viral’ and ‘going country’: The expressive and instrumental activities of street gangs on social media. Journal of Youth Studies, 20(6), 677–696. Wakeman, S. (2016). The moral economy of heroin in ‘Austerity Britain’. Critical Criminology, 24(3), 363–377. Wendel, T., & Curtis, R. (2000). The heraldry of heroin: “Dope stamps” and the dynamics of drug markets in New  York City. Journal of Drug Issues, 30(2), 225–259. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015). ‘It’s like working away for two weeks’: The harms associated with young drug dealers commuting from a saturated London drug market. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 17(2), 105–119. Young, J. (2007). The vertigo of late modernity. London: Sage. Zaitch, D. (2005). The ambiguity of violence, secrecy, and trust among Colombian drug entrepreneurs. Journal of Drug Issues, 35(1), 201–228.

6 New Tactics

Emanating out of the perceived novelty of County Lines, over the course of the fieldwork, various policing strategies and tactics were introduced in attempts to try and respond to it. These were devised and promoted at a national level following the increased presence of these groups in ‘unfamiliar’ areas and the more general burgeoning of this supply model and its associated harms across the UK.  Throughout, I observed many of these responses as they were introduced and was able to document how they played out locally in affected areas. I was able to explore how they were viewed by officers, how they were (or were not) put into practice and analyse some of their outcomes. This chapter focuses on two particularly prominent ‘new’ tactics that were introduced and represented as being specifically bespoke to the issue of County Lines. These are the use of ‘Drug Dealing Telecommunication Restriction Order’ and the pursuit of modern slavery convictions. They are focused on here specifically due to their prominence nationally, but also how their emergence is related to police practice in the local areas where I undertook my fieldwork. Formulated and promoted at the national level, local officers had to interpret these tactics and decide if or how to use them. How they went about doing so provided valuable insight into the responses to County Lines © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_6

137

138 

J. Spicer

and the nature of drug market policing more generally. In addition to the external communicative properties of these diverse forms of policing activity, I was also able to explore the symbolic processes these tactics went through within the police organisation itself.

Put on Hold: Introducing the DDTRO During the early stages of the fieldwork, one of the most high-profile bespoke responses to County Lines announced at a national level was to provide the police with a new power to shut down mobile phone lines suspected of being used to facilitate these drug supply activities. Introduced as part of the Digital Economy Act (2017), this allowed the police to apply for a ‘Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Order’ (DDTRO), which would disconnect phone lines suspected as being used for drug supply and put those using it out of business. The introduction of this power was promoted heavily by politicians and senior officials at the time. The then Home Secretary Amber Rudd MP, for example, stated that it “demonstrates this Government’s determination to crack down on gangs and sends a very clear message that we will not tolerate this despicable criminal activity” (GOV.UK 2017). Presented as something of a flagship tactic, the DDTRO was a response that attempted to illustrate a political commitment to eliminating County Lines by supporting more intensive and targeted criminal justice action. It might therefore be considered as one of the early indicators of how those in the political sphere were to increasingly view responding to County Lines as providing an opportunity to demonstrate ‘totemic toughness’ (Stevens 2011). Noticeable immediately in the very early stages of the fieldwork was eager anticipation of this new power. Having been recently announced and suggested as imminently available, expectation among many of the officers I encountered initially was palpable. In a meeting I had with one team where we discussed the focus of my fieldwork, it was suggested that, as they would likely be looking to implement a DDTRO imminently, I should attempt to follow the process and track its likely success. For several weeks, detectives, uniformed officers and intelligence analysts all

6  New Tactics 

139

spoke in expectant, upbeat tones of how this could potentially represent a significant part of the answer to the problem of County Lines and the challenges of responding to it locally. As one noted: I know it’s definitely something we want to pursue. It just makes sense doesn’t it? We can start [causing] some really big disruption for them.—[Uniformed officer]

As a tactic, it appeared to meet many of the officer’s informal criteria of being a pragmatic addition to the range of policing tools they had at their disposal. It had intuitive appeal, made common sense and was considered as likely to help them achieve their aims. Notably, it was also interpreted as recognition that the challenges they were encountering locally from the burgeoning presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers, and the County Lines phenomenon more generally, were being acknowledged by those higher up in the police and in government. Indeed, the granting of the DDTRO power aligns very neatly with notions discussed in the previous chapter regarding the centrality of the phone line to the County Lines supply methodology, the role of the associated ‘brand’ and its wider importance in relation to the profit-orientated business model. If, as was emphasised by officers in those initial interviews and official NCA reports (e.g. NCA 2017), the use of phone lines were so key to this drug supply practice, then the natural criminal justice response appeared to be to place them front and centre in their targets. Yet, as the first few weeks of my fieldwork quickly passed, little progress on using the power was evident. The initial enthusiasm of officers also subsided. While I was keen to pursue this potentially interesting research opportunity and generally get a foothold in something tangible during the early stages of fieldwork, my informal enquiries on the matter were typically met with vague responses. Despite my initial concerns, this did not appear to be due to my ‘outsider’ status or being ‘kept in the dark’ (Rowe 2007). Rather, many officers evidently did not know of any developments themselves. Some of the responses recorded in my field notes to my enquiries during these first few weeks included: Ah no sorry mate I don’t really have a clue what’s going on with all that at the moment.—[Uniformed Officer]

140 

J. Spicer

I was going to ask the skipper [supervising officer] about that. I thought we would have had something through by now—[Detective]

During this period, other officers also commented that they had heard concerns that use of the DDTRO power could provoke what was generally referred to as “blue on blue activity”, with one police force switching off a phone line potentially disrupting an ongoing investigation by another. It was further suggested that it had been difficult to communicate with some mobile phone network providers about the power. Particular concerns were raised about what staff should say to a County Lines dealer if they were to enquire about why their phone was no longer working and the uncomfortable position they might be put in. It was only when the DDTRO had been piloted apparently successfully by another police force that talk of its use resurfaced several months later. In contrast to the initial enthusiasm, however, there was now little appetite to use it among the officers. This was especially the case among those who would have to formally apply for an order to be taken out. As outlined by the force’s designated point of contact for the power, who I interviewed shortly after he had been briefed on its roll-out across the country, this reticence appeared to stem specifically from the practicalities surrounding its use. The hoops, hurdles and general process he described as having been put in place were, it seemed, not what had been originally anticipated: I think it’s not going to be as effective as we wanted it to be. So in September 2017 we should have had it up and running with the NCA leading, but that didn’t happen. We’ve just had some guidance documents, like a policy on how it should work, and I’ve read through it and it’s actually unworkable and really expensive. So, what they’re suggesting is that a force sees a line that they’re not happy with, they do a huge amount of work around the phone and understanding its use. They then fill out some documentation and put it up to the ROCU, who then do the same. Then they put it up to the National Crime Agency who look at it, then maybe give it the all clear. Then it goes back to the ROCU. Then it goes back to the force, who’ve got to redo some of that work because it will have been a few weeks since they’ve put it in, and then they’ve got to end up going to one of three or four courts in the country that can look at it (sighs). And it’s just nonsense, Jack. Because actually what we’re looking at really is some

6  New Tactics 

141

relatively low-end bunch of idiots with machetes dealing a bit of drugs. We’re not looking at terrorists. And the format that they’ve produced is some sort of ‘Rolls Royce’ format which is based on taking something out significantly more than a County Line. And it’ll cost a fortune, it’s incredibly bureaucratic and everything else. Whereas I don’t think the legislation intended for that to happen. I think we’ve ended up putting our own layers of bureaucracy onto it through legal services and speaking to different solicitors. It’s just nonsense really.—[Senior Detective]

Far from being the invaluable, bespoke resource to the problem of County Lines that many of the officers had envisaged originally, the process of applying for a DDTRO was perceived instead to be overly complex, bureaucratic and arduous. Given the emphasis traditionally placed on ‘action’ by officers, combined with a disdain for paperwork, this reaction and general frustration could perhaps be considered as illustrating enduring signs of familiar aspects of police culture (Loftus 2009). However, attributing it to this alone would be a superficial analysis and overlook some of the more pressing concerns raised by officers. It was noteworthy that it was generally accepted by officers that a rigorous application process for a DDTRO was necessary. Avoiding any potential ‘blue-on-blue’ activity or other unintended consequences was often at the forefront of officer’s minds. Similar to processes surrounding other police tactics, it was considered a necessary evil. As one officer put it: Imagine if we got it wrong and shut down a Doctor’s phone who was on call or something—fucking hell!—[Uniformed Officer]

It was not, therefore, simply the perceived administrative burden that was central to their reservations. Rather, it was the length of time it would take to get an order in place and how this could severely restrict their ability to achieve their desired results. Ultimately, the inability to quickly apply for and obtain a DDTRO meant that the hope of launching sustained, coordinated and debilitating attacks on the numerous County Lines supply groups’ operations across their various towns was dashed. The original excitement of putting these groups ‘out of business’ via this tactic that was so palpable just a few months prior, soon became a distant memory.

142 

J. Spicer

A Blunt Tool In addition to the general lack of enthusiasm regarding the practical realities and bureaucratic process of applying for a DDTRO, having given it some sustained thought, among many officers there was also a strong resignation that it was unlikely to be the answer to the problem they were after. Stemming from a combination of the increasing numbers of County Lines operating in many of the local towns, the resilience of those involved in this form of drug supply to initial enforcement efforts and the sustained issues emanating from their presence, a belief that a DDTRO was ultimately a blunt tool became voiced widely behind the closed doors of the stations, growing quickly to become a culturally accepted axiom (Sackmann 1991). Instead of being the panacea to the threat posed by recent evolutions to their local drug markets, there was a concession that it was ultimately unlikely to be a decisive solution. As one detective explained in detail: It’s also not going to stop them dealing. So, it’s probably not a stand-alone tactic. You know so if we’ve got the XXXX [gives name of County Line] line working out of XXXX [gives name of local town] and we want to make XXXX [local town] absolutely unpalatable for them to work in, we’re going to take out all their key players, we’re going to warn off their local dealers, we’re going to get word out on the street that we’re not happy with that line, and we’re also going to turn off the phone. So, we’re going to do numerous things to make it unpalatable for them. So that has potential. But if you think as a stand-alone tactic it’s going to work, well it’s not. It’ll just be an inconvenience for them, which might just last a couple of days. It’s just one small part of the bigger picture. If they’ve got a phone list, they could quite easily pick up a ‘pay as you go’ phone the next day, input all the numbers back on the phone, then just send out a text message saying, ‘here’s the new XXXX [gives name of County Line] line’. And that’s the same as any of our friends who change their mobile, you get a text message saying here’s my new number, so you delete the old one and you put the new one in. And if it takes us six weeks to turn a phone line off because of the ­bureaucracy then they’ve got plenty of time with that phone. And, actually, it makes it cleaner for them as well if they keep changing their phones. In terms of benefit versus resource, I think it’s probably easier for them to change their phone line

6  New Tactics 

143

than it will be for us to turn the phone off. And it’s not going to change their behaviour doing that anyway.—[Senior Detective]

Many officers therefore recognised that even if a successful application was made for a DDTRO, it appeared to offer little means of addressing the problem of illicit supply. Despite the centrality of the phone line to the supply methodology and the general emphasis placed on it by officers, shutting down an active line was considered an inconvenience at best and highly unlikely to prevent the groups from continuing to go about their ‘business’ (Spicer 2019). Particularly intriguingly when viewed through the perspective of applying harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets, some officers also recognised that this tactic seemingly had little capacity to address the harmful ‘externalities’ (Caulkins 2002) of these supply groups. As illustrated at the end of the aforementioned quote provided by the detective and recognised by many others, simply shutting down a supply line was considered unlikely to lead to a beneficial change in drug dealer behaviour and a reduction in the various types of harm associated with County Lines. There was no reason to believe, for example, that it would encourage them to cease exploitatively cuckooing the homes of vulnerable local people or committing acts of serious ‘systemic’ violence in their towns (Goldstein 1985). The ‘zero-sum game’ critique that has been levelled at similar drug market policing activities (see Caulkins 2002) is therefore seemingly applicable to the DDTRO. By setting its sights solely on seeking to hinder a drug supply group’s ability to deal, this tactic appears little more than an extension of prohibitionist-inspired supply reduction responses. Even if an order was to be successfully taken out, minimal levels of disruption would realistically be the best possible outcome, with little to no capacity for it to reduce the harmful drug market conditions that have made the emergence of County Lines such a concern and instigated the drive to find robust criminal justice responses to it in the first place. This critique fundamentally undermines the potential for DDTROs to be considered a successful response to County Lines. That these criticisms were often being levelled by some of the officers themselves demonstrates how these concerns also feed into drugs policing practice.

144 

J. Spicer

The Symbolism of the DDTRO In addition to its practical challenges, the attempts to promote the new DDTRO power and the resistance to it by officers at the local level also demonstrated some important aspects of how the responses to County Lines and drug market policing more generally are imbued with symbolism. Beyond how drugs policing regularly places an emphasis on sending out messages and communicating strong ‘signals’ to outsiders as discussed by Coomber et al. (2019), the introduction of the DDTRO highlighted the role of symbolism and the meanings and messages that play out internally within the police as an organisation itself. The initial enthusiasm from local officers, who generally reacted positively to the announcement of its imminent introduction, suggests they are themselves not immune to being drawn into what could ultimately be considered as a drug law enforcement ‘spectacle’ (Edelman 1988). Discursively constructed in the form of drugs policing “word work” (Collison 1995 p. 198), the tactic and its potential were promoted by actors such as politicians and senior officials who would ultimately not be involved in using it themselves. During the fieldwork, such actors were regularly discussed with the type of abject disdain reported by other police researchers (see Reiner 2010, p. 125). Their attempts at ‘meddling’ in police work were considered as being self-serving opportunities to generate attention by introducing new methods, or claiming responsibility when officers themselves had been successful in their work. Yet, notable during the early stages of the fieldwork was how this ‘spectacle’, albeit for a short period of time, was genuinely bought into by many of the officers. As has been shown by previous policing responses to drug markets (e.g. Dorn et  al. 1991; Maher and Dixon 1999), doing so serves to perpetuate the idea of prohibitionist strategies being the expected, most appropriate and achievable responses to drug problems, despite them being doomed to fail in terms of both conventional prohibitionist and more nuanced harm reduction aims. This could perhaps be explained as akin to a form of ‘fetishistic disavowal’ (Zizek 2008). In the case of the DDTRO, many of the officers did perhaps not want to know what deep down their own experiences and the general history of drugs policing would suggest the likely success of using

6  New Tactics 

145

this power would be. Instead, similar to Linnemann’s (2016) observations regarding the meth epidemic in the USA, it might have been more ontologically secure to buy into this new response that aligned with familiar prohibitionist ideals and logic. Interpreted as a process of structuration (Giddens 1979), by doing so, they were able to continue acting in a way that reproduced the failures of existing drug policy and the flawed conception of what the police could expect to achieve in response to drug markets. Neatly concluding how the introduction of the DDTRO was imbued with symbolism, when returning to the topic during interviews with several officers at the end of the fieldwork period, talk of this new power was limited almost exclusively to it being contrasted to more popular, conventional drugs policing tactics. In contrast to some of the initial excitement surrounding its novel and bespoke qualities, it was regularly placed in direct opposition to methods that they and their colleagues were familiar with. In comparison to taking out a DDTRO, more traditional tactics were suggested as requiring far less effort to implement, but likely to be equally, if not more, effective. Increased use of stop and search was almost universally championed. Similar to discussions in the previous chapter, an emphasis on community policing and engagement was also considered to be of significant value. Other tactics promoted by the officers included the use of warrants on properties suspected of being used by these groups. These were understood not just as being “quick, cheap and easy” (see Bacon 2016, p. 208), but also capable of generating significant results. As one officer put it: An inspector can give orders for a property to be checked, big searches that sort of stuff. Those can happen pretty much immediately and are often far more intrusive than just shutting a phone line down.—[Detective]

Perhaps most notable within these discussions, however, was how the use of the DDTRO power was dismissed as something that, if it was to be pursued by them at some point in the future, would be done primarily to look good when the force was inspected. Bacon (2016, p. 103) recalled how, when responding to the emergence of legal highs, responses comprised primarily of officers answering the ‘calls from upstairs’ and

146 

J. Spicer

showing that they were ‘doing something’. Similarly, in the case of responding to County Lines by taking out the DDTROs, one detective admitted: I don’t think we’ll do it. I could be wrong but I don’t see anyone wanting to go down that road. If we do it’ll be one of those things we do to tick a box and be able to say ‘yep, look we’ve done that’.—[Detective]

Compared to how it was perceived from the start to the end of the fieldwork, the shifts in meaning, significance and status attributed to the introduction of the DDTRO power therefore went almost full circle. From politicians and senior officials originally bestowing this power to local officers and strongly encouraging its use, the tactic’s ultimate fate concluded with it being suggested that, if it were to be taken out, it would be done primarily as a superficially ‘symbolic’ exercise by these officers to demonstrate to outside scrutineers that they were performing their drugs policing duties in the manner expected of them. Rather than the DDTRO power being the productive outcome of ‘those from above’ recognising the challenges of having to respond to the burgeoning presence of County Lines and evolving drug markets in many of their towns, it came to be considered as something that had been primarily devised by those removed from the immediate context of drug marker policing to achieve their own symbolic goals.

From ‘Pushers’ to ‘Enslavers’ While not bespoke in the same manner as the DDTRO power, a second particularly prominent new tactic that emerged at the national level during the fieldwork was to encourage police officers to charge senior County Lines dealers under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This is a notable divergence from the traditional recourse of drug-supply-related prosecutions under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Closely aligned with dominant discourses surrounding County Lines, attempts at modern slavery prosecutions seemingly highlight the centrality of notions of ‘exploitation’ and ‘vulnerability’ in shaping how the issue is viewed and how it should

6  New Tactics 

147

be responded to (Moyle 2019; Robinson et al. 2019; Spicer et al. 2019). During the fieldwork, I first became aware of this development when an officer I was spending time with attended a Home Office briefing, where it was initially pitched and promoted. I subsequently discussed it informally with other officers during the fieldwork, and it was alluded to openly in media outlets soon after (see e.g. Swindon Advertiser 2017). Towards the end of the fieldwork, the first example of its use by a police force in this context was covered heavily in the national media (see The Guardian 2018). Beyond being generally viewed as an appropriate response to the County Lines problem, the core justification from senior officials for using this legislation was reported to me by a number of officers as being underpinned by a belief that those prosecuted for modern slavery offences would be viewed highly unfavourably. Being convicted for these specific offences was perceived to have very different connotations to ‘regular’ drug-dealing convictions. The latter was considered more likely to be considered a badge of honour, rite of passage and a way to enhance what Harding (2014) has described as ‘street capital’ (see also Sandberg 2008). In contrast, officers reported how it had been relayed to them that a modern slavery conviction was less ‘criminally respectable’, afforded less gravitas and was something dealers would actively seek to avoid. In particular, one of the main justifications given to them was the contention that this would likely lead to a tougher experience during the offender’s time in prison compared to other inmates. When viewed through the perspective of harm reduction principles, the promotion of this tactic is intriguing. In contrast to the DDTRO power, the underlying principle of pursuing alternative forms of criminal convictions to discourage drug dealer behaviour and focus on market externalities considered particularly problematic could in some way be considered to conform to the blueprint sketched out by those such as Bacon (2016). Referring back to Dorn and South’s (1990, p. 186) harm reduction inspired suggestion that those involved in drugs policing should pragmatically ask themselves “What sort of markets do we least dislike, and how can we adjust the control mix so as to push markets in the least undesired direction?”, drug supply activity interpreted as forms of modern slavery would inevitably be considered something highly undesirable,

148 

J. Spicer

with targeting this specifically noxious aspect of the marker an appropriate priority. As a drugs policing response, it is therefore not solely rooted in blunt prohibitionist notions of supply reduction, directing attention solely on trying to prevent dealing from occurring. Instead, by focusing explicitly on particularly harmful market externalities and a drive towards behaviour change, it can be considered arguably analogous to elements of focused deterrence strategies (Braga et al. 2014). Some of the criticisms levelled at the DDTRO power are therefore avoided. However, while this drug market policing tactic shifts from the narrow confines of rigid prohibitionist aims, observations during fieldwork suggested that on matters of theoretical coherence and practical use, similar to the use of DDTROs, this would also appear ultimately flawed. After being briefed on pursuing modern slavery convictions from senior officials outside of the force, a detective summarised how it had been promoted to him and other colleagues. His description revealed how it was being perceived by senior officers such as himself who were being encouraged to pursue it at the local level. In particular, there appeared to be significant scepticism regarding the underlying rationale that those convicted of modern slavery would be stigmatised: There was loads and loads of talk about using Modern Slavery. And I think that’s what some of the politicians, and some of the think tanks are thinking that this is how they’ll be able to prevent them from targeting the vulnerable. I mean, the theory is fine. Their theory, or at least seems to be, is that the police charge people with some form of human trafficking or Modern Slavery offences, and they believe that the individuals charged with that offence would be so tarnished among their fellow drug dealers so that when they went to prison they would be picked on because they’ve been charged with that certain offence. Personally, I think that’s pretty naive. People are doing the same thing. What’s on the charge sheet … it doesn’t make them a paedophile, you know. It doesn’t make them rapists of young boys or anything like that. It just means they’ve been moving young kids around and taking advantage of locals or whatever. I don’t actually think it will make a spot of difference on the prisoner.—[Senior Detective]

While viewing dealers as ‘the lowest of the low’ and having no qualms with the arguably morally dubious justification for using this legislation,

6  New Tactics 

149

many of the officers I discussed this with recognised that it would appear to be built on shaky epistemic foundations. As stressed in the aforementioned quote provided by the detective, the notion that prison inmates would base their opinion of others on what specific law or act they were charged under, rather than on the more general interpretation of their criminal activity, would appear naïve. Indeed, despite my attempts during and after the fieldwork, it was not possible to identify any evidence base for the assertion put forward by various senior officials that stigma would be attached to offenders, or where the belief originated from. Briefly across various teams. Similar considering some insights from other academic literature further reinforces the weaknesses of using modern slavery legislation for the stated aims of engendering acute moral outrage among prison inmates. Likely to be well versed on ‘road life’ (Hallsworth 2013) or the wider illicit economy (Hobbs 2013), many of those in prison may well have engaged in drug supply or been exposed to it at a young age themselves. That someone they encounter has been prosecuted for having young people involved in their drug supply operation is therefore unlikely to be overly surprising or warrant adverse reactions. Similarly for cuckooing, just as problematic drug users are rarely viewed particularly favourably or afforded much sympathy in the wider society, it would seem equally unlikely that they would be viewed any differently by the wider prison population (Simmonds and Coomber 2009). Users of heroin and crack have frequently been the target of brutal and humiliating expressive violence from other offenders in attempts to assert a clear moral distinction (Copes et  al. 2015). Within prisons, ethnographic research has similarly found users of these drugs to be often held in contempt, which, when coupled with a culture of individual responsibility, means that little sympathy is likely to be on offer (see Crewe 2005). Again, the proposition that inmates would consider those who have been engaged in even highly ‘parasitic’ forms of cuckooing (Spicer et al. 2019) as contemptible or worthy of comeuppance would therefore appear somewhat detached from reality. Perhaps most important was how this was recognised by the officers being encouraged to pursue these convictions based on these justifications.

150 

J. Spicer

Practical Barriers In addition to the inconsistencies recognised by officers regarding some of its theoretical assumptions, similar to the DDTRO, charging County Lines offenders with modern slavery offences was also considered problematic on a practical level. In addition to the aforementioned scepticism regarding the aims described to them of charging and prosecuting offenders under this specific Act, throughout my fieldwork I observed a more general reluctance to pursue this strategy. Throughout, a number of challenges were discussed regularly both informally and more formally by various officers of various ranks and across various teams. Similar to the ‘axiomatic’ knowledge (Sackmann 1991) surrounding the DDTRO power, by also quickly becoming culturally accepted, these perhaps represented an even more fundamental reason as to why this tactic was so strongly resisted. One central challenge that was identified frequently by many of the officers was the requirement for them to find what they considered to be an ‘obvious’ victim who would be willing to give evidence. This was something that most believed as being unlikely to occur. As has been noted elsewhere within the academic literature (e.g. McLean et al. 2019; Moyle 2019; Spicer et al. 2019), those who become embroiled in County Lines rarely represent passive actors that are devoid of agency. For the officers responding to the issue on the ground and regularly coming into contact with these people, the type of ‘ideal victim’ they interpreted as being necessary to exist in order to pursue such a case rarely existed. Whether it be local users of heroin and crack having ‘out-of-town’ dealers using their homes or the young people found undertaking running duties in their towns, the representations of helpless victims depicted in national briefings and wider coverage of County Lines did not appear to chime with their interpretations of the people they were routinely engaging with through this part of their work. It was also suggested by several officers that, even if a suitable victim was identified and prepared to engage appropriately with the police and give evidence, pursuing such a case would be costly and complex. County Lines dealers who became defendants were considered far more likely to

6  New Tactics 

151

plead not guilty to a modern slavery offence due to the perception (and likely legal advice) that they stood a much better chance of not being convicted compared to drug offences. Doing so would lead to an expensive and time-consuming trial, something considered widely by officers of various ranks as something to be avoided, if at all possible. Relatedly, several officers noted that the Crown Prosecution Service had made it clear to them that they were not in favour of pursuing such routes if there were simpler and more established routes to conviction available. The familiar, tried and tested ‘possession with intent to supply’ offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 apparently remained a firm favourite for prosecuting County Lines dealers. Some of the detectives who had been involved in a recent crackdown operation informally reiterated this, recalling how the dealers they had charged with supply offences immediately pleaded guilty, therefore preventing the cases having to go to trial. They raised scepticism whether swift, ‘conveyor-belt-style’ convictions would have been the outcome had they been charged with modern slavery offences instead. Again, similar to the introduction of the DDTRO, this vocational gossip and informal advice to other officers quickly made its way around the various teams across the force. Combined, these numerous practical concerns appeared to comprise the central reasons why pursuing modern slavery prosecutions within the context of County Lines was so unattractive for those being encouraged to do so. Because of how many of these practical challenges there were and how they often overlapped, these also appeared to interplay with and compounded one another. The challenges officers described with regard to identifying an ‘obvious’ victim highlight the complexities associated with this particular form of drug supply. While notions of ‘exploitation’ and ‘vulnerability’ are easy to deploy discursively, they can be difficult to interpret and implement in practice (Coliandris 2015). While recognising their marginalised position and exposure to those taking advantage of it, because those affected very rarely typified ‘ideal victim’ status (Christie 1986), and instead more often fitted the label of so-called ‘victim/perpetrators’ (Coliandris 2015), or even ‘police property’ (Waddington 1999), this seemingly made the officers less willing to view those they encountered as ever reaching the threshold to be considered suitable. These

152 

J. Spicer

observations suggest that the officers did not typically believe it appropriate to consider County Lines offenders as committing acts of modern slavery, viewing the promotion of this legislation as a somewhat symbolic attempt by senior officials to generate the type of novel, headline-worthy convictions that matched the novel, ‘newsy’ drug supply threat they were facing. Similarly, those promoting this tactic could also be considered as having failed to explain adequately why it might be appropriate and worthwhile to pursue these convictions in some cases, and how it might fit with the messy realities that officers experience on the ground.

The Symbolism of Modern Slavery Convictions In addition to the practical barriers to achieving these convictions and the scepticism of whether it would achieve the stated aim of attaching stigma to offenders, there also seemed little incentive for the officers to pursue modern slavery convictions in line with their general aim of arresting and ‘locking up’ as many ‘out-of-town’ dealers for as long as possible. While regularly being considered difficult to achieve or inappropriate to consider, there was also substantial doubt that these convictions would lead to significantly longer prison sentences compared to what they would receive for ‘traditional’ supply offences. This was based partly on other modern slavery convictions outside of the context of County Lines that officers had been involved in over recent years. As one detective responded when asked if there was an appetite to achieve one of these convictions for County Lines dealers operating in his town: The evidence isn’t there, people aren’t being convicted of the offence. And those that are, in slightly different circumstances, we’re just not seeing long prison sentences. So, we can waste a whole load of time and effort and go through not-­ guilty trials, and putting victims and witnesses through pretty traumatic experiences, without achieving our real goal which is to lock them up and prevent them from doing those types of activities. Whereas if we go down a more traditional route of possession with intent to supply, they can be getting two or three years, or they can get six to eight years depending on what we’ve got on them.—[Detective]

6  New Tactics 

153

As a tactic promoted specifically in response to the burgeoning threat of County Lines to local areas, it therefore seemingly failed to tap into the ‘mission’ element traditionally identified within cop culture (Reiner 2010). If it had, this might have served as a catalyst for officers to attempt to navigate some of the real or perceived challenges they encountered when considering whether to pursue it. On top of this, the added pressures from the Crown Prosecution Service clearly added further reticence. This was reinforced following a regional meeting where a detective from another force recounted how he and his team had actively pursued such convictions but had been unable to take them further due to resistance from the CPS. Indeed, while the several recent successful cases that have occurred nationally would suggest that it is possible for modern slavery legislation to be used (see Stone 2018) arguably the most notable feature of these cases are their infrequency. As a specific tactic in response to County Lines, pursuing modern slavery convictions would not appear to be one that can be regularly used by forces, if at all. Similar to the introduction of the DDTRO, this fundamentally undermines its capacity to adequately respond to and reduce the genuine externalities associated with this form of supply. Similar to the introduction of the DDTRO power, the symbolism of this tactic operated both at national and local levels, with significant interaction often taking place between the two. The media coverage of the select few successful convictions that occurred at the end and shortly after the fieldwork had finished provides useful insight into the external communicative properties that surround it. One particularly notable feature of the reporting of these cases, beyond the sheer quantity, was how each of the first three convictions under this law was described in various outlets as the “first ever” to be secured within the context of County Lines (e.g. The Guardian 2018; The Telegraph 2019). The emphasis placed on this, combined with its inaccurate repetition, reinforces how the use of this legislation meets the desire for a ‘new’ and attention-­ grabbing type of criminal justice response to complement this ‘new’ and headline-hitting type of crime. As arguably demonstrated by the cooperation of senior police officers with many of these news articles, generating these convictions also appears to be a way of demonstrating just how

154 

J. Spicer

seriously the police are taking this new issue and their particular commitment towards responding to the vulnerability, exploitation and general threat that this ‘impure’ (Douglas 1966) drug supply practice represents. Based on the media representation and perceptions of officers, the select few dealers that have been convicted under this legislation nationally appeared to take on a prized status. Within the traditional context of drugs policing, such scalps have only been achievable via the capture of a ‘Mr Big’ deemed to be pulling the strings high up the drug supply chain (see Dorn et al. 1992). However, despite them occupying the relatively low rungs of the drug market ladder, the presence of ‘gang talk’, the particularly ‘monstrous’ way County Lines dealers have been depicted (see Hallsworth 2013; Spicer 2020) and the general high-profile status of the phenomenon granted dealers charged with modern slavery offences greater notoriety and status. Just as was the case for how the introduction of the DDTRO played out internally among officers, the symbolic process that took place surrounding the promotion of modern slavery convictions within the police locally was also intriguing. Perhaps most notable was how those officers who had pursued modern slavery convictions in other forces were discussed. After returning from a conference at Hendon Police Training College, one of the main topics of conversation among the officers who had attended was a presentation made by a relatively young detective involved in one of the first modern slavery convictions. Having recounted enthusiastically the success he and his team recently had of using the legislation and the way he had, as one officer put it, “been wheeled out” by some of the senior officers in attendance, the general consensus was that he was “clearly ambitious”. Just as many drug markets in provincial towns apparently represent a lucrative drug market opportunity, for officers looking to make their way up in the world of policing, it was considered that so too does capturing the dealers attempting to service them. Aligning with this, while such convictions had not been pursued within the force by the end of the fieldwork, there was an impression that if they were, it would be primarily a police exercise in ‘keeping up appearances’.

6  New Tactics 

155

Conclusion Because of the vast amount of attention and genuine challenges posed by the burgeoning presence of County Lines, it comes as little surprise that various ‘new’ tactics have been designed specifically in reaction. Both the introduction of DDTROs and the promotion of modern slavery convictions represent distinct attempts at formulating bespoke responses to this specific drug supply practice. There are some important differences between the two, with both taking aim at different aspects of this form of supply. By focusing on phone lines, the use of the DDTRO is predicated on disrupting the particular aspect considered as central to their successful servicing of an ‘import’ market. In comparison, by ratcheting up the nature of the convictions given to those involved, the promotion of the Modern Slavery Act represents an attempt to respond to the particular harms associated with this form of supply. However, there are also some striking similarities. For those officers on the ground having to consider whether or how to use them, practical challenges and scepticism of their effectiveness were present for both. Their practical unpopularity was also matched by their apparent inability to hold much promise in reducing the drug market harms they were facing. In addition, while arguably lacking in practical utility, they held some important significant symbolic ambitions. The ways in which both were formulated and promoted by senior figures demonstrate their use as primary ways to communicate robust messages of how the County Lines ‘problem’ was being responded to. How this played out from behind the closed doors of local stations stresses the importance of understanding ‘symbolic policing’ (Coomber et al. 2019) internally, and why, despite appearances, the ‘new tools’ given to officers might not always be used in the ways they are intended to be.

References Bacon, M. (2016). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Braga, A. A., Hureau, D. M., & Papachristos, A. V. (2014). Deterring gang-­ involved gun violence: Measuring the impact of Boston’s operation ceasefire on street gang behavior. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 30(1), 113–139.

156 

J. Spicer

Caulkins, J. (2002). Law enforcement’s role in a harm reduction regime. Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 64. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Christie, N. (1986). The ideal victim. In E. Fattah (Ed.), From crime policy to victim policy (pp. 17–30). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Coliandris, G. (2015). County lines and wicked problems: Exploring the need for improved policing approaches to vulnerability and early intervention. Australasian Policing: A Journal of Professional Practice and Research, 7(2), 25–36. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society., 29(1), 1–17. Copes, H., Hochstetler, A., & Sandberg, S. (2015). Using a narrative framework to understand the drugs and violence nexus. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 32–46. Crewe, B. (2005). Prisoner society in the era of hard drugs. Punishment & Society, 7(4), 457–481. Available from https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2017/30/contents/enacted Digital Economy Act. (2017). (part 6, no.107). Dorn, N., & South, N. (1990). Drug markets and law enforcement. British Journal of Criminology, 30(2), 171–188. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1991). Mirroring the market? Police reorganisation and effectiveness against drug trafficking. In R. Reiner & M. Cross (Eds.), Beyond law and order (pp. 91–106). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and danger. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis. London: MacMillan Press. Goldstein, P. (1985). The drug/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. GOV.UK. (2017). Government takes action on county line drug gangs [online]. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-takesaction-on-county-line-drug-gangs. Hallsworth, S. (2013). The gang and beyond: Interpreting violent street worlds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

6  New Tactics 

157

Harding, S. (2014). Street casino: Survival in violent street gangs. Bristol: Policy Press. Hobbs, D. (2013). Lush life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linnemann, T. (2016). Meth wars: Police, media, power. New York: New York University Press. Loftus, B. (2009). Policing culture in a changing world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maher, L., & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health—Law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. British Journal of Criminology, 39(4), 488–512. McLean, R., Robinson, G., & Densley, J. (2019). County lines: Criminal networks and evolving drug markets in Britain. London: Springer. Moyle, L. (2019). Situating vulnerability and exploitation in street-level drug markets: Cuckooing, commuting, and the “county lines” drug supply model. Journal of Drug Issues, 49(4), 739–755. National Crime Agency. (2017). County lines violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robinson, G., McLean, R., & Densley, J. (2019). Working county lines: Child criminal exploitation and illicit drug dealing in Glasgow and Merseyside. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 63(5), 694–711. Rowe, M. (2007). Tripping over molehills: Ethics and the ethnography of police work. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 10(1), 37–48. Sackmann, S. (1991). Cultural knowledge in organizations: Exploring the collective mind. London: Sage. Sandberg, S. (2008). Street capital: Ethnicity and violence on the streets of Oslo. Theoretical Criminology, 12(2), 153–171. Simmonds, L., & Coomber, R. (2009). Injecting drug users: A stigmatised and stigmatising population. International Journal of Drug Policy, 20(2), 121–130. Spicer, J. (2019). ‘That’s their brand, their business’: How police officers are interpreting County Lines. Policing and Society, 29(8), 873–886. Spicer, J. (2020). Between gang talk and prohibition: The transfer of blame for County Lines. International Journal of Drug Policy. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102667 Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5.

158 

J. Spicer

Stevens, A. (2011). Drugs, crime and public health: The political economy of drug policy. London: Routledge. Stone, N. (2018). Child criminal exploitation: ‘County lines’, trafficking and cuckooing. Youth Justice., 18(3), 285–293. Swindon Advertiser. (2017). ‘Cuckoo’ drug gang members jailed. Swindon Advertiser [online]. Retrieved from http://www.swindonadvertiser.co.uk/ news/15144911._Cuckoo__drug_gang_members_jailed/. The Guardian. (2018). ‘County lines’ heroin dealer jailed under child trafficking law [online]. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/ oct/04/drug-dealer-county-lines-jailed-trafficked-children-sellheroin-birmingham?CMP=share_btn_tw. The Telegraph. (2019). First county lines drug dealing gang jailed using modern slavery laws. [online]. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2019/05/14/first-county-lines-drug-dealing-gang-jailed-using-modernslavery/. Waddington, P.  A. (1999). Policing citizens: Authority and rights. London: UCL Press. Zizek, S. (2008). The sublime object of ideology. London: Verso.

7 More of the Same?

While various new and bespoke tactics aimed at responding to the problem of County Lines emerged and were promoted to officers intermittently, the majority of the activity they actually undertook during the fieldwork came in the form of familiar drugs policing approaches. Driven primarily by the desires of local teams, ‘crackdown operations’ and ‘days of action’ were employed regularly and were types of drugs policing that they were already well acquainted with. Applied in a slightly adapted way to fit the specific context of the evolving local drug markets, they were used in all of the affected towns across the force area. Taken together, they therefore comprised the central way that the presence of County Lines was responded to at a local level. Throughout my fieldwork, I gained considerable insight into both these ‘traditional’ forms of drugs policing by partially participating in many of the activities associated with them. Building on what was discussed in the previous chapter, the ethnographic data describing their use provide further insight into the realities of how County Lines was actually being responded to by officers on the ground and their symbolic qualities.

© The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_7

159

160 

J. Spicer

Time to Crackdown Throughout the fieldwork, the ‘bread and butter’ drugs policing staple of the ‘crackdown operation’ (see Dorn et al. 1992) endured as a popular mode of policing in response to the burgeoning threat of ‘out-of-town’ dealers. This popularity was indicated by their frequency—with one finishing shortly before the start of the fieldwork period and another shortly after—and how they were viewed and described among officers. These were, it was suggested, the type of police work that many of the officers thrived on and enjoyed. Specifically for some detectives, being involved in these operations appeared to be what they had hoped they would experience when they had signed up for the job. As one with many years of detective experience recounted: They’re bloody hard work, mate. I mean you end up working silly hours and having your missus pissed off, but we all love it. [Detective]

Because of some sensitivities regarding specific elements of the crackdown operations such as covert surveillance and test purchasing, I was unable to participate in these as closely as in some of the other responses to County Lines. I was, however, able to glean significant insight into their procedures and outcomes via in-depth interviews with some of the officers involved and other observations. As a general process, they involved a prolonged period of intelligence gathering, culminating in dramatic ‘strike days’ resulting in mass arrests from the coordinated targeting of multiple local addresses. To prevent any intelligence leaks that might undermine their success, the dates of these days were guarded closely, with the morning raids often taking other agencies and even other police staff by surprise. As with similar crackdown operations publicised by other forces over the same time period, they generated significant media attention. This was something senior officers promoted actively, regularly being quoted in local news outlets with sound bites such as “we will not tolerate this activity in our towns”. The strike days and resulting convictions were promoted widely by police press releases and covered extensively by local newspapers and other media outlets. Resembling what cultural criminologists refer to as a ‘hall of mirrors’ (see Ferrell et al.

7  More of the Same? 

161

2015), these forms of news media were then promoted by the force’s own social media platforms, presented by officers to various stakeholders such as local councillors and shared regularly at partnership events attended by a range of other organisations. As the stories surrounding the crackdowns became told widely and the representations of them shared and reproduced, the operations often developed a certain mythic status locally. As was recounted at several internal events where these operations were discussed within the wider context of the force’s response to County Lines, when applying for the significant resources needed to undertake them, official objectives stipulated by the senior investigating officers included “removing open drug dealing”, “reducing gang violence” and “improving community confidence”. The first two of these were represented as being specific products of the burgeoning presence of County Lines in their local area, aligning with observations elsewhere of highly visible drug market activity often rising quickly to become local policing priorities (Aitken et al. 2002). As admitted by one senior detective, the latter, however, was suggested as being “something that you always have to put on” when making the application. It did not seem quite as important either to him, to his officers or to the operation more generally. More informally, both among the officers who specifically participated in the crackdowns and those who did not, these operations were often referred to not just as ‘proper’ police work but also as the appropriate local response to the threat posed by ‘out-of-town’ dealers. Because of their nature and the narratives that surrounded them, the operations were viewed as a way of bringing about ‘order’ (Harcourt 2002) to specific local neighbourhoods heavily affected by the destabilising presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers. By setting their sights at local crack and heroin markets, these operations also appeared to tap into the various reasons why intensified policing of these drugs in particular has been popular historically among those working in law enforcement (see Collison 1995). The particularly negative perceptions of these drugs, those who use them and the links with crime were all common justifications provided. That noted, while an emphasis was placed firmly on ensuring that the outcomes of crackdowns were securing a significant number of convictions, the operations were not detached entirely from responding to the types of issues specifically connected with County Lines. Protecting

162 

J. Spicer

those deemed vulnerable, who were notably also often the same heroinand crack-using population discussed as being a problem, was also generally referred to as being a core aim of the operations, with it taken as axiomatic that the targeting of ‘out-of-town’ dealers would go in some way to address issues such as exploitation and more general harms associated with this form of supply. Without fail, upon the completion of the operations that took place during the fieldwork, many arrests were made. An often-relayed ‘victory story’ (Shearing and Ericson 1991) regularly recounted by officers in one town was how one strike day resulted in a newly built station’s cell capacity being reached for the first time. However, these stories of apparent success were ultimately a partial and mediated account of their true results. Of striking resonance to Coomber et al.’s (2019) analysis, when analysed more closely, their predominant outcome was the widespread criminalisation of local populations. The vast majority of those who became the target of this intense policing were not the dangerous ‘out-oftown’ dealers identified as causing so much harm, exploiting vulnerable local populations, posing a threat to local communities and representing the very reason why the crackdowns were undertaken in the first place. Instead, the demographics of those convicted suggested vast swathes of local heroin and crack users had been swept up. This was confirmed by, among others, a manager of a local drug service who spoke of the impact of a recent crackdown in one town: I mean, if you look at a recent operation that took place locally, I think around two thirds that were arrested and charged were service users of ours. I would assume they’re at the very much lower end of the scale in terms of their involvement with the gangs and those networks. [Drug Service Manager]

While they were almost always convicted of drug offences beyond possession and presented as being involved in County Lines in some way, the vast majority evidently did not play any serious commercial role in these supply operations. They were local to the town or surrounding area, but they were almost exclusively users of heroin and/or crack, well known to a range of local services, predominantly middle-aged and often boasting an extended history of low-level offending such as acquisitive crime. Far

7  More of the Same? 

163

from being highly organised and ruthless ‘gangsters’, they appeared to be, at best, local user-dealers located at the very bottom rungs of the drug market. Some were undertaking ‘labour’ on behalf of these city-based supply networks (Coomber and Moyle 2018; Moyle 2019), while others had become embroiled in other County Lines activities, usually through housing ‘out-of-town’ dealers in cuckooing scenarios that did not embody the type of classic perceptions of exploitation (Spicer et al. 2019). Despite the stories told about the crackdowns and the way that they were presented in the media and other public forums, most of the officers were not naive to these outcomes. They recognised that most of those that they or their colleagues had arrested were not County Lines dealers. But by evaluating the success of these familiar policing methods via prohibitionist measures such as quantity of arrests while neglecting other outcomes, this bolstered a sought-after sense of solidarity and success (see Bacon 2016; Collison 1995). Among a few, it also fed into a more general belief that this could significantly undermine local drug markets. The crackdowns and their outcomes were perceived as demonstrating that they were capable of responding to this nationally high-profile issue of County Lines and the threat it specifically posed to their local towns. Similar to some of the initial responses to the introduction of the ‘new’ tactics discussed in the previous chapter, this perhaps illustrates a further process of drugs policing structuration (Giddens 1979). From the interplay between those enacting this policing activity on the ground level and the wider policy context in which they find themselves, this ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky 1980) and the representation of its outcomes appeared to reproduce the dominant rules of the ‘drug game’ and how it was played by officers and the ‘usual suspects’ of their local drug markets. In practice, following these crackdowns, there seemed to be minimal, if any, noticeable impact on levels of local heroin and crack supply in the areas where they had taken place. While the formal stated objectives of these operations seemed to suggest a more nuanced approach, with particularly harmful aspects associated with County Lines supply being targeted, by seeking to achieve this via what was ultimately a blunt, supply-orientated response, the operations seemingly failed to address meaningfully any of the drug market externalities. In fact, some areas, they may have even exacerbated them. In one particular town where a

164 

J. Spicer

crackdown was undertaken, the overwhelming consensus just a few months later among intelligence and local officers was that the market was now serviced almost completely by ‘out-of-town’ dealers. It could be suspected, as Coomber et al. (2019) predicted, that having arrested so many locals over such a short period, this propelled what was an already evolving local drug supply picture into a fully ‘import’ market (Reuter and MacCoun 1992), controlled and serviced completely by outsiders engaged in the County Lines supply methodology. Creating this vacuum appeared to have presented a gap for new dealers to fill and an opportunity for some of those already operating to strengthen their grip even tighter. This was demonstrated by several new lines that the officers were not familiar with emerging shortly after these crackdowns took place, and how most of the more familiar ‘out-of-town’ dealer names and branded lines continued to come through on intelligence reports as being active in the town.

Crackdowns as Weak Signals of Control Regardless of the true realities of their outcomes, because of their nature and how the mass arrests allowed certain narratives to be constructed, the operations undoubtedly played an important symbolic function. This was visible internally among officers and teams in various towns, but also externally in the attempts made at achieving recognition from the public and external stakeholders. Regarding media relations, the police are typically judged to “keep their cards close to their chest” Skogan (2004, p. 260), sharing only select, partial or mediated insights into their work, as and when it suits them. In this specific context, local officers found the crackdown operations a particularly popular option to lay down on the table to display. The mass arrests were well publicised and members of one of the operational teams received an award for their success. The operations appeared to be considered a highly effective way of demonstrating their commitment and success in tackling the County Lines problem. They provided evidence that they, as the police, recognised, and were on top of, the associated issues. Importantly, these attempts at communicating and promoting their work were also aimed simultaneously at communities to demonstrate what was being undertaken by local teams, and more widely across the area to demonstrate the commitment of the

7  More of the Same? 

165

force in responding to this national law enforcement priority. As one officer described: You have to think about this from the public’s view. ‘You’ve got the visibility of the police, that’s what people want. They want to see us out and about keeping our streets safe. You know, they’ll see us bashing in a door or a load of mugshots in the newspaper and think ‘yeah I’ll pay my council tax for that’. [Uniformed Officer]

Further demonstrating their role as ‘signals of control’ (Innes 2014), many of the officers perceived that crackdowns communicated to ‘out-oftown’ dealers themselves that the local towns they were based in were alert to and intolerant of the ‘impurity’ and ‘dirt’ (Douglas 1966) that their presence represented. This served to quench a deeper anxiety expressed consistently among officers, and perhaps perpetuated by some of the claims made in NCA reports (e.g. NCA 2017), that their force area, and by association they as local police teams, were a “soft target”, “push overs” and generally not taken seriously by these ‘out-of-town’ dealers. As one officer lamented: I think a lot of them think that they can come down here and do what they want and run around and not have the same risk that they do from the Met or wherever. [Uniformed Officer]

Feeding into wider anxieties regarding policing in an era of austerity, this was compounded by the insecurities officers felt following significant reductions to resources they had experienced over recent years (Greig-­ Midlane 2019). This was an almost daily topic of conversation and anger during my time in the field. Some of the more restrained quotes I recorded included: I’ve been in this job over 20 years and I’ve never known policing like it! [Detective]

In this sense, the crackdown operations and other highly visible policing activities often appeared to serve a reassuring function to officers, even if they were not involved in them personally, of their ability to

166 

J. Spicer

effectively carry out their role regarding local drug markets and maintain their wider societal function. It provided some semblance of ontological security (Young 2007) at a time when, beyond the challenges posed by County Lines, the policing of their local towns was considered by many as no longer offering the same rewarding and supportive occupational existence that it had in the past. Intriguingly, however, as useful a symbolic function as they may have been internally with the police, interviews with many of those working for other organisations suggested that these communicative displays of strength, victory and control had not been bought into by others in the way officers might have hoped. The meanings attributed to the crackdown operations locally by the policing teams were far from universally subscribed to by other professionals. The discrepancy between the crackdowns being represented as successful responses to the threat posed by the presence of new, ‘dangerous’ outsiders, while ultimately targeting local users, was recognised by many of those working for a range of local organisations, who were also engaged in partnership work with the police. Following one particular crackdown operation that resulted in a substantial number of arrests, many voiced surprise and disenchantment about its ultimate outcome. After reading about the convictions that were publicised a few days prior in the local newspaper, one local authority worker reflected: I had two initial thoughts. The first was ‘oh I know that name, I know that name’ (laughs). I suppose the other was that I was quite surprised about the amount of local people on there. Because County Lines is, most of them are people that don’t come from XXXX (gives name of local county), they obviously recruit local people as well, so that was my other surprise really, how many local people were actually on the list. I thought there would have been a lot more ‘out of County’ individuals. [Community Safety Manager]

A community safety officer who worked in the same town and had extensive professional experience with many of those arrested also voiced significant disappointment:

7  More of the Same? 

167

The 50 arrests and stuff, when you look through those, in reality there’s probably, what, about five or six of them that are actually the County Lines. The rest of them are local scrotes. Half of them you read it and they’re the who’s who of who’s been causing us issues for years, on all fronts, drinking in public that kind of stuff, just the low-level annoyance in our neighbourhoods. So it’s great that we’re kind of dealing with them, I guess, but I still feel that—I think it’s partly because of the complications of how it works and stuff—I never feel there’s been enough…. I would like to see a lot more of the London, Somalis, you know the gangs that have been coming down here. I would like to see a lot more of them in prison than just our local low level scrotes. And that maybe sounds a bit negative—and I think there’s been some great work been done—but I’m not sure … I would have liked to have seen more of the London gang members actually caught and taken to task. But I think the problem is that they’re not stupid, are they? That’s why they use all of these runners actually … they won’t have the drugs on them. It’s the locals and stuff that do the donkey work for them and take on all the risk. So, yeah, I would like to see some higher level stuff, because it still feels a lot like you can arrest hundreds of these low-level people, but they’ll just wait a while, they’ll come back and use other people and it becomes just a cycle. So, unless you’re taking out the guys that are sat back from London where the headquarters are from, unless you take them out, in reality, you’re just taking out that low tier and it’s going to a be a continuing cycle. [Community Safety Officer]

Rather than viewing these intensive, high-profile operations as evidence of successful local policing responses to County Lines, representatives of partner agencies therefore often tended to express pessimism or disillusionment. They were not convinced that the crackdown operations were having a positive impact or that they would likely do so in the future. Some also expressed confusion over why some local people who had been the subject of recent safeguarding discussions between the police and other organisations in partnership meetings were being arrested, instead of the ‘out-of-town’ dealers who were considered the threat. This appeared to create a sense that local policing activity was unlikely to have any effective impact on the genuine and increasing issues associated with County Lines that they were facing. A manager of a local drug service, for example, was particularly concerned by recent escalating violence and the exploitative cuckooing of his service users. As he discussed:

168 

J. Spicer

We seem to be having lots of people that are having injuries where they’re claiming to have fallen downstairs and things like that. You know, obviously drug users are going to be impaired to a degree, so it does make accidents more likely, but certain things like that seem to be increasing in frequency … We have had service users telling us about people that they’ve willingly let in to their property but then, all of a sudden, they see machetes and other weapons. [Drug Service Manager]

The mass arrests of many service users who were experiencing this increase in violence themselves were not, however, considered reassuring that effective action was being taken or that these issues were going to be reduced. For others working in different organisations such as housing, the outcomes of the crackdowns reinforced concerns that, if this was the best the police could achieve—something implied by their continued positive coverage and commendation—there was little they or others could do in response to County Lines. Instead, this was now a problem that was considered ‘here to stay’. As one worker from a local housing provider discussed: This is how I feel, it’s a personal opinion, is that you feel like they’re never going to go away now. So, we’ve got to now sort of accept it and deal with it. You know it’s become part of our organisational practice, how to deal with Organised Crime Gangs, which two or three years ago we’d never even thought of. So, it’s quite a new thing. So, you just feel like you’re just going to keep moving them. I mean, there’s so many properties and you keep just going round and round and round (…) But you do, you just feel like it’s part of your routine, you’re just waiting for the next one really. [Neighbourhood Manager for Housing Provider]

These pessimistic responses to the crackdowns and the resignation that little was possible to be done in response to County Lines provide important insight into some of the negative, but often less-recognised, unintended consequences of crackdown operations. While intended to be strong ‘signals of control’ (Innes 2014), to this audience they appeared to often have the opposite communicative effect the police sought, something further reinforced by their highly visible profile. As a binary policing ‘spectacle’ (Edelman 1988), they could therefore be considered lopsided. The ‘threat’ from the dangerous ‘out-of-town’ dealers, which other organisations were increasingly aware of through their own

7  More of the Same? 

169

professional experiences, the heightened national publicity and the recent local awareness-raising efforts by the police had not been met with appropriately orientated policing actions and outcomes to provide a suitable level of ‘reassurance’. Instead, the crackdowns provided an unsatisfactory ‘illusion of order’ (Harcourt 2002). Adding to more general critiques of similar drugs policing activity being superficial or counterproductive, these observations suggest the potential damage that the adoption of high-profile, unfocused operations can have for those with a professional foothold in the functioning of the local drug market and an awareness of their true outcomes. Crackdown operations that seek to achieve and demonstrate success through prohibitionist measures such as numbers of arrests and convictions appear ill-­ suited to tackling the type of recent local drug markets evolutions in the UK. Exacerbated by the complexities associated with the itinerant and exploitative nature of County Lines, they regularly fail to get beyond the thick layer of indigenous actors who lie at the bottom of the local heroin and crack markets. The representations of success that surrounds the crackdowns might serve useful functions internally and among some audiences, but not everyone buys into them (see Foster 2000). Their failure to be effective is often seemingly recognised by some of those local organisations most in need of constructive and reassuring ‘signals of control’ (Innes 2014). Ardently striving to construct a spectacle of success that does not match the true outcomes of these operations risks the police being considered as either purposely misrepresenting their achievements or being worryingly ignorant of their true impact on the local drug market. Either way, this risks fostering cynicism, negativity and a loss of commitment in efforts to collaboratively respond to local problems at a time when, for reasons relating to resources and genuine challenges faced, it is arguably needed most.

Days of Action In addition to the high-profile spectacles provided by the occasional crackdown operation, the burgeoning presence of County Lines in local towns also led to traditional policing activity being undertaken in the form of

170 

J. Spicer

local ‘days of action’. These were situated more firmly at the ‘low-­key’ end of the local drugs policing scale, with a far greater number of officers involved in the activities associated with them. Generally planned a week or so in advance, these days were devised at trying to specifically respond to the threat and more general ‘impurity’ (Douglas 1966) posed by the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers. It was expected by senior officers within the force that these would occur in the towns affected by County Lines to show that they were responding to the problem. But they were also a popular option among officers and local teams, occurring almost weekly in some towns, especially in the summer months. Indeed, it was common, regardless of how successful they were perceived to have been, for officers to state upon returning to the station at the end of each day how nice it was to “get out from behind the desk” (see also Bear 2016; Loftus 2009). Despite some occasional overlap, these days of action fell generally into one of two main forms: intelligence-initiated or resource-initiated. For the former, heightened levels of what was described as ‘good’ intelligence typically prompted the action, usually consisting of a tip-off regarding where County Lines dealers were staying or where transactions between runners and customers were taking place. Occasionally, however, this intelligence related to specific incidents. A day of action in one town, for example, was prompted by a Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) who had purportedly been told by a suspected dealer to “go away and let them deal” when patrolling a local park a few days prior. Although it was ultimately unclear if this was a County Lines dealer, this provoked outrage in the local police station and was perceived by the sergeant as the ‘out-of-town’ dealers “taking the piss”. Another was organised swiftly after an officer reported that she had been driven at by a dealer after he fled a cuckooed address. In comparison, the days of action that were initiated by resources occurred when there were enough local officers available to undertake a meaningful day’s work. A suitable date where there was little else specifically planned would be circulated, and officers were asked to make themselves available. These days were also occasionally boosted when it was feasible to draft in officers from other neighbouring areas, or if the Regional Organised Crime Unit was the instigator and had provided some additional personnel of their own. Almost always starting very early in the morning, these days began with a formal briefing, usually in the form of a hastily cobbled together

7  More of the Same? 

171

PowerPoint presentation from the local sergeant or other officer designated with coordinating the day. The detail and quality varied between stations, different officers and whether the days were initiated by intelligence or resources. Typically, however, a range of local addresses known to have been cuckooed in the past or suspected as currently being used by ‘out-of-town’ dealers were assigned to different teams of officers to visit. Between four or five of these visits per team was the general allocation expected to be achieved before lunchtime. Specific locations where dealing was suggested as taking place were also usually identified, predominantly in the form of parks, churchyards or housing estates. These were again designated to different teams or occasionally generally suggested as being places for all of the officers involved in the day of action to visit at some point during the day. Corresponding with the lexicon surrounding County Lines, much of the formal emphasis surrounding the build-up to these days was placed on safeguarding local populations deemed as vulnerable to cuckooing or other harms by conducting welfare checks. By the time we had been divided into teams of between two and four officers, left the station and jumped into the various cars with our “packs” containing the mugshots of various County Lines dealers known to frequent the town, what was often on most of the officers’ minds, however, was to “make some arrests”.

Smoke Gets in Your Eyes During these days of action a County Lines dealer would occasionally be spotted and apprehended. Sometimes they were found in the addresses we visited. Other times, it was more fortuitous. On one afternoon, for example, a plain-clothed officer I was assigned with literally walked into a dealer from London looking down at his phone as we left the home of a well-known local heroin user. As exciting as these arrests were for the officers, they were, however, relatively rare. After participating in many of these days, what soon became apparent was how often attention would become displaced quickly onto more generic illicit drug activity. Rather than targeting and finding ‘out-of-town’ dealers, it was visible local users, sometimes of drugs not associated with County Lines supply, who

172 

J. Spicer

frequently became the focus of attention instead. Although by no means exclusively, this was particularly apparent for the days of action that were more ‘resource-’ rather than ‘intelligence-’initiated. The following field notes describing the events of one sunny summer morning provide a good example: After conducting a short welfare check at the home of a man who had previously been cuckooed, intelligence came through from the Sergeant back at the station that two County Lines runners had recently left a nearby flat and were walking towards the town centre. We set about going for a drive trying to find them. A few minutes passed when a crackling came through on the radio. “We’ve just arrested someone for drugs in the park, he’s getting a bit agro!” came the voice of a female officer. “I’m not getting agro!” came a more distant male voice in reply. “Sounds like they need back up” said the officer behind the wheel, turning the car around instinctively. He flicked on the flashing lights, the wheels skidded with a jolt and we went zooming over to the other side of town. As the three of us arrived at the park we were met by another police car containing a team of three officers. We ran down the path where five PCSOs, two police officers and two police horses stood. Two men were in handcuffs and being spoke to. The arresting officer came forward and explained how one of the men had flicked what she believed to be a cannabis joint into the bushes when they approached them. “What, so you’re arresting me for a little lollipop joint?!” said one of the men in handcuffs overhearing the conversation. “Drugs are drugs” replied one of the PCSOs. We all stood around for over half an hour. Two PCSOs scrabbled around in the nearby bushes trying to find the discarded joint, but had no luck. The arresting officer expressed disappointment that she had not had her body worn camera on to record the moment. Initially she was adamant that further action needed to be taken: “He needs to be taken to the station”, she implored to her colleagues. They were both searched, nothing was found on them and after a while they were sent on their way. We and the other team went back to the cars with the aim of going back in search of the County Lines dealers we had received intelligence about earlier. Some comments were made about what the local residents who had been peering over the park wall must have thought was going on given the vast police presence. The officer driving the car also feared that the opportunity to act on the live intelligence and find the County Lines dealers before they disappeared into a different flat might have been missed.

7  More of the Same? 

173

We started to make our way back to the other side of town, but within minutes another call came through over the radio that more drug arrests had been made. We turned around back to the park and pulled up to see some of the PCSOs as well as three other police officers with two teenagers, their bikes leant up against the wall. They were being searched, and given the amount of officers and the call for back up, I assumed they were County Lines runners, perhaps even the ones we were looking for. Further information on them came back to say that they were 16, but that they were both local to the area. Out of the pockets of one came a cannabis grinder, but no other incriminating evidence such as a burner phone or large amounts of cash. For the other, a small amount of cannabis was found. After a bit more digging it was discovered that they were students from the local sixth form who had come to the park on a free period. [Field notes]

This specific extract speaks to a divergence of attention on cannabis users. Perhaps unsurprisingly, similar attention and policing activities were also placed towards users of heroin and crack. This was a general occurrence but often became particularly intense under certain circumstances. On one day of action that was more intelligence-initiated, for example, after tracking and arresting the occupants of a car known to be used by a prominent County Lines group operating in the local area very early in the morning, heroin supply in the town appeared to have been disrupted significantly. Local users of heroin became more visible than usual, something speculated as being due to them becoming more desperate at trying to score. For the officers who carried on with the rest of the planned day of action, combined with a lack of dealers to target, this led to a shift comprised of, as one put it, “looking for shit”. Extracts from my field notes describe what this comprised of in more detail: We were split up into two teams of four, each provided with a large van and sent out with the vague instructions of “have a look who’s about for the day” and “turn some people over if you find them” ringing in our ears. We headed out of the station, with the officers amused at a colleague from another team who was leaving on his bike for a patrol of the town at the same time. “Unlucky mate!” shouted one, stifling a laugh. “We’re horrible fuckers, aren’t we?” another said turning to me.

174 

J. Spicer

We spent the morning driving aimlessly around the town. Two of the officers riding in the van did not know the area as well as the officer who was driving and he was encouraged to take us to the “shittest” estates. It was thought that these would give us the best chance of coming across drug related activity and help them succeed in their mission of “looking for shit”. When we drove past people who the officers thought looked like “smackheads” or “turds” we slowed down or attempted to follow them, with the officers trying to get a good look at who they were and what they were up to. Often picking up on this, especially when they were the focus of the attentions multiple times, many began sarcastically waving at the officers in our conspicuously large van as we drove past. Towards the end of the day as we slowly approached some traffic lights, the officers perked up when they drove past what were described as a group of five “junkies” congregated together. “Is that…” said one of the officers, thinking one might be a woman who was wanted for an outstanding offence, “Yeah, I reckon” replied another. The van was quickly pulled over to the side of the road, the officers jumped out and ran up to the group. By the time the officers got to them they had dispersed slightly with two walking off in the opposite direction. The woman who they thought might have a warrant out for her arrest quickly transpired to be someone else. She and one of the men were searched, although nothing was found on them. The officers traipsed disappointed back to the van at the side of the road. “To me, they all look the same those type of druggie women” one of them said. [Field notes]

Combined with the previous field notes, this illustrates the tendency for these supposedly targeted days of policing action on the streets to slip into generic and generally unhelpful drugs policing activities. It would appear easy for attention and resources to become focused on what would widely be regarded as very low-level drugs offences and certainly those which were not related to County Lines. While the specific nature of these days was intended for targeting ‘out-of-town’ dealers and reducing the harms associated with their presence, frequently this translated into officers going out and attempting to “turn over” as many usual local suspects as they could. A similar propensity for police officers to use drug possession offences as a way of achieving tangible outcomes from their day’s work has been identified in other contexts. Bear (2016), for example, has discussed this in relation to inner-city London. In these more provincial towns, a similar process regularly appeared to play out. Intensified

7  More of the Same? 

175

‘officer boredom’ (see Phillips 2016), combined with a motivational morning briefing and the general status and meaning associated with County Lines, meant such activity was a superficially welcome achievement. It provided the means of achieving ‘symbolic objectives’ (Barbalet 1999) in response to this high-profile issue on what were otherwise often frustrating, uneventful days of work that lacked the type of ‘action’ that was ultimately sought.

Not So ‘Hot’ Hotspots As often central parts of these days of action, the practice of targeting apparent drug-dealing ‘hotspots’ appeared to further perpetuate this slipping of focus onto locals. Rather than recognising the more nuanced ‘speakeasy’ (Buerger 1992) style operations associated with County Lines, the local drug market was often conceptualised by officers out on the street more crudely in relation to physical transactions taking place in well-defined geographical areas, reminiscent of a classically ‘open’ market (May and Hough 2004). Having typically been briefed on these areas at the start of the day, officers spent many hours scoping out various parks, churchyards or alleyways with the belief that, sooner or later, illicit drug activity would occur. Where possible, this was attempted inconspicuously. Being in plain clothes myself and considered a good tool not to raise suspicion due to my appearance, I often accompanied plain-­clothed officers on walks around these areas as they tried to spot who might be dealing. Initially this was quite exciting, with the hope of being able to identify a County Lines dealer running high. However, because of the overwhelming lack of success associated with this activity in the multiple towns where I was able to participate, it soon became clear that these geographically rigid conceptualisations of the drug market were not grounded in reality. In practice, County Lines runners did not have a set physical territory or ‘corner’ where they dealt with local customers. This was further reiterated during the time I spent analysing the content of intelligence reports. Instead, most of the identified ‘hotspots’ appeared to be places where a local beat officer had received complaints about more general low-level

176 

J. Spicer

antisocial behaviour or youth congregation. This was indicated by how frequently these were playing fields, parks or areas stereotyped as places where, as one officer put it, “the druggies hang out”. Spending so much time at these areas not only appeared to be a poor use of resources, but also exacerbated boredom among officers and a disproportionate suspicion of anyone who vaguely looked out of place. The following field notes, included only partially because of their humorous content, illustrate this: By lunchtime we had visited all the suspected cuckooed addresses on our list. It was suggested that we head over to a playing field which had been identified as being somewhere that dealing had been taking place. Two of the plain clothes detectives walked around one way while I and another set off in the other direction. Little seemed to be going on, with young parents being the main inhabitants. After about half an hour, conversation dried up and we stood aimlessly in the middle of the field. Suddenly breaking the silence, the detective whispered to me “Ey up, this guy looks a bit shifty, he keeps giving us the eyes. Reckon I should go and have a word?”. I turned around, hoping to see the face of one of the County Lines dealers pinned on the wall of the station I had been looking at earlier to break the monotony. Instead, I was greeted by the sight of a colleague walking his dog. He had spotted me from a distance, but because of his knowledge of what I was doing was wary of coming over. Despite the temptation to alleviate the tedium of the afternoon by encouraging a search to take place, I quickly informed the officer that I knew who the shifty looking gentleman was and explained why he was ‘giving us the eyes’. [Field notes]

This was by no means the only time these type of situations occurred. Another similar scenario involved officers becoming suspicious, based on rumours that one had heard when working in a different area, that a lady pushing a buggy in the park was not actually taking her new-born for a walk but was using it as a prop for dealing. After following her for several minutes, a swift walk past to peek inside the pram confirmed that it did indeed contain a small human occupant. Albeit somewhat intelligence-based and reminiscent of the type of approaches promoted by those who extoll the virtues of ‘hotspot’ drug market approaches (Rengert et al. 2005), episodes such as these illustrate how a conceptualisation of the local drug market conforming to stereotypical depictions of strict geographical boundaries, rather than how and

7  More of the Same? 

177

where transactions actually take place, results in ineffective policing. Not only were they time-inefficient, but because of the frustration and the suspicion that arose from anyone frequenting these areas, if drug arrests were made, they were almost always for more generic low-level activities, rather than who they set out to target and who was ultimately causing the most harm. It could, therefore, be argued that caution perhaps needs to be taken before applying these types of approaches in an unsophisticated way. Police officers based in semi-rural areas have been found to be usually incorrect in identifying specific locations that are suitable to be treated as hotspots, despite their confidence in being able to do so, based on their own perceptions (Sutherland and Mueller-Johnson 2019). In light of the observations reported on here, what is arguably required is for a more nuanced, ‘socialised’ understanding of drug markets (Dwyer and Moore 2010) to be deployed by the police in order for localised responses to be effective and to avoid ‘symbolic’ outcomes.

Welfare Checks as Double-Edged Swords As a major component of these ‘days of action’, the nature and outcomes of welfare checks on local residents deemed as vulnerable to the threat of ‘out-of-town’ dealers were also noteworthy. Focused on local residences known to have been cuckooed previously or suspected of having County Lines dealers currently staying, on several occasions as part of these checks some ‘out-of-town’ dealers were again found. On one of my earliest outings, I endured a volley of verbal abuse in the back of a police van from a teenager from a faraway city, who went into great detail about the sexual activities he planned to do with the wife and daughter he assumed I had. On another occasion, I ended up helping an officer trying to coax two ‘out-of-town’ dealers off an unstable shop roof they had jumped onto from the window of a neighbouring flat we had just visited. But these incidents were rare, not least because if dealers were present, doors would seldom be opened to officers by the occupants. Despite a couple of ‘inventive’ techniques occasionally being used, officers could not get in without a warrant. When doors were opened to officers, these visits typically comprised of often quite interesting interactions between them and local residents who,

178 

J. Spicer

aligning with who are generally affected by cuckooing (Spicer et al. 2019), were users of heroin and/or crack. From the vast number of welfare checks I observed, this policing activity appeared beneficial in some cases. At other times, however, despite being premised on the basis of safeguarding, their outcomes paradoxically appeared to compound the exclusion and vulnerability of local populations. In this sense, from a harm reduction policing perspective (Bacon 2016), they could therefore be considered something of a double-edged sword. They cut in both directions, simultaneously being favourable or unfavourable drugs policing activities that could result in productive or harmful drugs policing outcomes. One of the core elements of the welfare checks involved providing the occupant with a ‘cuckooing letter’. The generally stark content of these included a warning that officers were keen to stress: Intelligence links you and your address to the supply of drugs. This intelligence indicates links to organized crime groups from outside of this region. I must warn you that if your address is found to being used to facilitate this supply you could be prosecuted under section 8 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

However, amid the general emphasis of the risk of prosecution, other sentences did strike a more empathetic tone, stating that: If you are being asked or threatened to allow your premises to be used by these groups please ask for help.

Encouraged to do so by their senior colleagues, the officers attempted to provide these letters to all of those they visited for welfare checks. They also made a point of recording the receipt of them on their body-worn cameras. In some cases, the use of these letters appeared to have significant utility for those who received them. Several formerly cuckooed residents recounted how they had been able to show the content of these letters to ‘out-of-town’ dealers during attempts to re-establish a local base. They were presented as evidence that the police were watching their home and that it was not a good idea for them to stay there. One even had it carefully placed by their door so that it was close to hand should they get a knock by an unwelcome visitor. Faced with a lack of ‘street capital’

7  More of the Same? 

179

(Sandberg 2008), these letters therefore appeared to provide some with the means to either prevent being cuckooed or remove existing ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers using their home in a way that was relatively non-­ confrontational. Because of the often cyclical process of cuckooing reported by those who become affected (see Moyle 2019; Spicer et  al. 2019), having this resource could be considered especially valuable. Despite these examples of clear benefits from the use of the letters, in other cases, their use and outcomes appeared to be less about the welfare of the local residents and more as a tool to facilitate disciplinary action and social control. For some who were regularly reported to have County Lines dealers staying in their flats or who did not engage with the police or other agencies in the way they wanted them to, evidence that they had previously received a cuckooing letter was used to enact measures such as evictions or closure orders on their homes. The content of the letter was used to demonstrate in applications for these actions that the occupant had been offered help but had failed to take it. The full closure of their home or their eviction was therefore justified or presented as the only option, with the letter also used to show that the resident had been warned that this could happen. One officer who developed something of a reputation for enacting closure orders in her town described her approach as: A lot of the time I tend to go down the housing route. Because I think the fear of them losing their property means so much more than anything we can do. So yeah, like I said, I try to go down that route really of, if you continue to have these people in your home then I’ll do what I can to get your house taken off you. [Police Officer]

While important, the use of cuckooing letters was, however, just one aspect of the welfare checks. The general nature of the interactions that took place between officers and the local residents as part of these visits was also of note. The extent to which many locals were often willing to share detailed information with the officers about the state of local drug market and who was operating within it was quite intriguing. Some, who were described by some officers as being “old school users”, would take an adversarial approach, often letting officers into their flat begrudgingly

180 

J. Spicer

and not providing any more information to them than necessary. But many others often needed little encouragement to share detailed information, often empathising with the threatening portrayal of County Lines dealers that officers provided to them. These friendly interactions were especially common among some officers who had built up a clear rapport with certain locals. Often having questions couched to them in a humorously self-aware way, such as “I don’t want to stop you from scoring later today but could you tell us about who’s currently operating in the area?”, many of those we visited provided extensive detail including which lines were currently operating in the town, what their phone number was, where dealers were currently staying and what was generally going on in the local heroin market. In return, many of the officers went to considerable lengths to help them obtain benefits, access to drug services or just simply listened to their troubles for half an hour or so. Similar to the ‘double-edged’ use of cuckoo letters, however, despite how productive these visits often were, the capacity for the interactions between officers and occupants to result in negative outcomes for locals was rarely far away. One case involving a local woman who became the subject of increased attention over the course of several months due to intelligence suggesting that dealers from one particular County Line were staying in her home illustrated this well. I recorded my first encounter with her case in my field notes: We headed out from the station to visit her home. Her address was particularly notable as it was the first time I had come across an occupant living in a whole house rather than a flat. As we drove over the officer recounted how two of his colleagues had visited her several weeks prior. She had let them in, and while one spoke to her downstairs, the other looked around ostensibly to see if any County Lines dealers were hiding in any of the rooms. None were found, but a small amount of heroin and a needle was discovered in her bedroom. The decision was made to arrest her and she was taken down to the station. The officer finished the story just as we pulled into her housing estate, “let’s see what type of response we get from her today”, he said. We arrived at her house, parked up and knocked on the door. It didn’t take long for her to answer but she opened the door only slightly ajar. A camp bed was visible in the room behind her which she avoided answering the officer’s questions about, immediately raising his concerns. He tried to negotiate his way

7  More of the Same? 

181

inside, but despite his best efforts the lady refused, citing the experience she had previously with “your two mates” a few weeks prior. The door was soon slammed shut in the officer’s face and we were left with nothing else to do but head back to the station. “That was really shit policing that they did there a few weeks back”, said the officer. [Field notes]

My field notes recorded a week later demonstrate how it developed: Soon after I arrived at the station the officer told me how intelligence of County Lines dealers continuing to use the women’s home was increasingly being received from multiple sources. Complaints were also being made from some of her neighbours about apparent drug dealer activity, with people reported as coming and going from the house at all times of the night and cars pulling up in the estate. Accompanied by an additional officer we drove over to her home again. This time, there was no response to the officer’s persistent knocks. We stood quietly outside for several minutes. A slight flicker of the curtains gave the game away that there were people inside. The officers went back and continued to knock on the door, pleading for her to open it so that they could “just check she was alright”. However, the door remained firmly closed, and after several more minutes it was decided that we would leave. “She’s not leaving us with many options now, is she?” said the officer as we drove back to the station. [Field notes]

As with similar cases I encountered during the fieldwork where those subjected to welfare checks became criminalised, the challenge of conducting these visits in ways that are effective and appropriate would appear significant. Rather than officers genuinely addressing the vulnerabilities these individuals may have because of their exposure to the drug market, there is an apparent propensity for them to become somewhat symbolic exercises that superficially feign efforts at addressing the risk of exploitation. Despite appearances and stated aims, when undertaken in certain ways or under certain conditions, they often remain rooted in or even exacerbate policing approaches that are antithetical to harm reduction. Importantly, some observations suggest it is possible for officers to engage positively with those affected by cuckooing and potentially reduce drug market harms in the process. Yet, because of the structurally

182 

J. Spicer

engrained adversarial relationship between the two groups, not least through the ‘laws on the books’ (Marks et al. 2016), it would seem inevitable that negative outcomes will often occur. Ultimately, while welfare checks were justified by the police as a safeguarding response to the threat posed by County Lines dealers, whether it be arrests for possession offences or the loss of their home, they can clearly also lead to further exclusion and criminalisation of local populations. Predicated on responding to this burgeoning drug market threat by ‘outsiders’, there appears a significant risk that their increased use, rather than adequately addressing vulnerabilities, leads to greater antagonism between local police officers and those who use drugs.

Conclusion Despite the national promotion of novel and innovative ways to respond to the new and burgeoning threat of County Lines, it is perhaps unsurprising that familiar policing activities that were popular among officers remained the dominant way that it was responded to at a local level. Adapting and applying ‘crackdown operations’ and ‘days of action’ to fit the specific drug market context of County Lines was a way for officers to demonstrate their ability to respond to this high-profile issue of national prioritisation in their towns, and the related harms and concerns that were being increasingly reported in their communities. The nature of these policing activities, combined with how familiar officers were with them, meant they represented an opportunity to achieve the goals expected of them externally, as well as the desires that many officers had within local teams. It is because of this that the communicative properties of both ‘crackdowns’ and ‘days of action’ and their outcomes are central to developing a full appreciation of them. How these responses to the threat of ‘outsiders’ and their related signals of control were interpreted and experienced by other local organisations and populations is particularly noteworthy. The outcomes of the crackdown operations were familiarly ‘symbolic’ because of how they primarily swept up the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of the local market. They can therefore be familiarly critiqued accordingly (see Coomber et al. 2019).

7  More of the Same? 

183

But the frustration and disillusionment shared by those working in other organisations demonstrate that these high-profile, yet blunt forms of policing can also be of significant detriment to the perceptions of professionals who work outside of the police. Just as the prominence of the County Lines, with its acute national attention and genuine local impact, provides an opportunity for local officers to construct a particularly dramatic ‘spectacle’ (Edelman 1988), so too does it appear to ratchet up despondency among some when they ultimately fail to live up to their hype. In the pragmatic spirit of harm reduction, it is important not to overlook that aspects associated with the ‘days of action’ represented genuine opportunities for drug market harms to be reduced. Cuckooing letters and productive interactions between officers and users of heroin and crack demonstrate the value that drugs policing can have. As with the dominant outcomes of the crackdowns and general time spent out on the streets, however, it is perhaps ironic that in the face of this outsider threat, even the outcome of these more welfare-orientated activities was often the increased punitive gaze on some of the usual local suspects.

References Aitken, C., Moore, D., Higgs, P., Kelsall, J., & Kerger, M. (2002). The impact of a police crackdown on a street drug scene: Evidence from the street. International Journal of Drug Policy, 13(3), 193–202. Bacon, M. (2016). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barbalet, J. M. (1999). Boredom and social meaning. The British Journal of Sociology, 50(4), 631–646. Bear, D. (2016). The need to create a narrative: Examining the justifications police used to target drugs in the lead up to the 2011 London riots. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 317–328. Buerger, M. (1992). Defensive strategies of the street-level drug trade. Journal of Crime and Justice, 15(2), 31–51. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books.

184 

J. Spicer

Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2018). The changing shape of street-level heroin and crack supply in England: Commuting, holidaying and cuckooing drug dealers across ‘County Lines’. British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1323–1342. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and danger. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Dwyer, R., & Moore, D. (2010). Understanding illicit drug markets in Australia: Notes towards a critical reconceptualization. The British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), 82–101. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ferrell, J., Hayward, K., & Young, J. (2015). Cultural criminology: An invitation. London: Sage. Foster, J. (2000). Social exclusion, crime and drugs. Drugs: Education, Prevention & Policy, 7(4), 317–330. Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis. London: Macmillan Press. Greig-Midlane, J. (2019). An institutional perspective of neighbourhood policing reform in austerity era England and Wales. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 21(4), 230–243. Harcourt, B.  E. (2002). Illusion of order: The false promise of broken windows policing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Innes, M. (2014). Signal crimes: Social reactions to crime, disorder and control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Loftus, B. (2009). Policing culture in a changing world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marks, M., Howell, S., & Shelly, S. (2016). The fluidity of ‘Police Culture’: Encountering the contextual complexity of policing street-level drug use. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 11(3), 318–331. May, T., & Hough, M. (2004). Drug markets and distribution systems. Addiction Research & Theory, 12(6), 549–563.

7  More of the Same? 

185

Moyle, L. (2019). Situating vulnerability and exploitation in street-level drug markets: Cuckooing, commuting, and the “County Lines” drug supply model. Journal of Drug Issues, 49(4), 739–755. National Crime Agency. (2017). County lines violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. Phillips, S. W. (2016). Police discretion and boredom: What officers do when there is nothing to do. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 45(5), 580–601. Rengert, G. F., Ratcliffe, J., & Chakravorty, S. (2005). Policing illegal drug markets: Geographic approaches to crime reduction. New York: Criminal Justice Press. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J. B. Steinberg, D. W. Lyon, & M. E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251) Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Sandberg, S. (2008). Street capital: Ethnicity and violence on the streets of Oslo. Theoretical Criminology, 12(2), 153–171. Shearing, C. D., & Ericson, R. V. (1991). Culture as figurative action. British Journal of Sociology, 42(4), 481–506. Skogan, W. (2004). Review of policing contingencies. The American Journal of Sociology, 110(1), 259–261. Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5. Sutherland, J., & Mueller-Johnson, K. (2019). Evidence vs. professional judgment in ranking “power few” crime targets: A comparative analysis. Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing, 3(1–2), 54–72. Young, J. (2007). The vertigo of late modernity. London: Sage.

8 Drug Market Priorities

The data and analysis presented in the previous two chapters have suggested that initial police tactics and operational responses to County Lines were, if used at all, typically ineffective, symbolic and regularly fell back to habitual and arguably flawed methods of drug market policing. As perhaps depressingly familiar as some of this was, it is important to note that throughout the fieldwork there was another contrasting ‘strand’ to the policing response I observed. Especially towards the latter part of the fieldwork period, this intensified around what could be understood broadly as the application of harm reduction principles (Bacon 2016a; Kammersgaard 2019; Stevens 2013). By way of further analysing the local responses to County Lines, but also in an attempt to theoretically develop this perspective and apply it within this specific contemporary context, this final empirical chapter presents a range of findings that specifically relate to harm reduction policing. The chapter is divided into three sections. It begins by focusing on the few occasions when some senior ‘out-of-town’ dealers situated higher up in some of the County Lines networks operating in the local area were arrested. Focusing on the case of a seemingly ‘ideal’ line, it considers the wider variance visible across different ‘out-of-town’ supply groups and © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_8

187

188 

J. Spicer

the implications this case raises to applying harm reduction principles to the policing of this drug market context. In the second section, the chapter focuses on a model of prioritisation that some of the officers sought to apply to the policing of County Lines within the force area. By mitigating some of the limitations of applying the philosophy of harm reduction in its pure form to drug market policing, the emergence of this strategy is suggested as representing a pragmatic way of achieving genuine, albeit modest, progression in how this may be undertaken in practice. In the final section, the chapter discusses some of the practical challenges associated with this model of prioritisation. It would appear that attempts to undertake an objective, systematic strategy may face a number of barriers.

 etting the ‘Top Boys’: Variance and the Case N of the ‘Ideal’ Line While the previous chapter documented how low-level local populations were by far the most affected by the various policing responses to County Lines, during the fieldwork period, as part of crackdown operations and other policing activity, occasionally senior ‘out-of-town’ dealers were also arrested. Often presented both internally among colleagues and externally to those outside the police organisation as akin to ‘king pins’ (Pearson and Hobbs 2003) or ‘big kahunas’ (Gundur 2020), these prized arrests represented reassuring evidence for some officers that dealers higher up in the County Lines supply chain were not completely out of their reach. Police staff working in intelligence were often particularly enthused upon their capture. This was perhaps explained by how familiar they had become with the names of these “senior nominals” or how, in one case, they had been tasked with undertaking the laborious job of combing through thousands of phone records to generate evidence. Yet, while these arrests served as welcome encouragement that success could be achieved, this was ultimately short-lived when these dealers and their respective lines were swiftly replaced. One line, which was monitored closely after several arrests of its members had been made, was

8  Drug Market Priorities 

189

found to have only been disrupted for around four hours, with two replacement runners travelling down and almost immediately picking up where the others had left off. Similar to the narratives discussed in Chap. 5, the officers considered this response as further evidence of the commercialised and ‘business-like’ nature of County Lines dealers (see also Spicer 2019). On other occasions, it transpired that some of those arrested were not quite as senior as they were first thought or represented to be. One morning, for example, officers I was spending time with were left puzzled when a local heroin user, visited as part of a welfare check, showed them that a line they believed to have recently been ‘taken out’ was still actively advertising itself to local customers several weeks later. Whether this was the result of the ‘franchising’ technique discussed in Chap. 5, those arrested not being as high-up as was initially believed or something else was unclear. Regardless, the sense of success they had achieved soon evaporated. In addition to these perhaps predictable or familiar outcomes, out of these arrests, some other notable issues emerged. One particularly intriguing case that I was able to study in detail involved the arrest of a County Lines ‘elder’ (Coomber and Moyle 2018), understood to be at the head of the supply operation. It was believed that his line had been well established for over a year in a local town. Extensive intelligence gathering, including the use of test purchases, found him to be running a highly organised and profitable operation, with a core group of runners servicing high numbers of local customers. He was traced back to his urban origin, arrested and received a lengthy prison sentence for drug supply offences. As a demonstrable outcome of an operation instigated in response to the problem of County Lines in the force area, it was considered a significant success. Intriguingly, however, when discussing the case in detail with the officers involved, it transpired that, while engaging in outreach supply and establishing an ‘import’ market, this dealer and the line he managed were engaged in minimal levels of the harmful behaviour typically associated with this supply methodology. As one of the detectives involved in the case discussed: If we look at what XXXX [name of dealer] did, who was one of the guys we took out on Op XXXX [name of operation], he was probably one of the most palat-

190 

J. Spicer

able of our dealers, because he actually understood the impact on the ­community. And we know that because we found his notebooks. And in them, it was almost like a career review, like one-to-ones with dealers operating in XXXX [local town]. And it was things like ‘Tidy up the backyard, be nicer to customers’. Oh, another one was ‘Improve your communication skills’ (laughs). But he was setting parameters on what their behaviour should be like and how they should look after the locations they were in. And he was renting properties. So, he was looking to rent properties, not dealing from them, and keeping the property looking ok so it wouldn’t come to the attention of the police. And then take the dealing away from the property. So, the property might store drugs, store cash, and it might have people who were dealing drugs sleeping there. But the activity on that particular street wouldn’t appear to the neighbours to be [different to] any other house. [Senior Detective]

By abstaining from the externalities associated with County Lines supply, through a harm reduction perspective, this dealer arguably represented an almost ‘ideal’ out-of-town retail drug supplier. Although involved in significant levels of heroin and crack supply, by operating out of rented properties, not engaging in cuckooing, promoting good interactions with customers and being mindful not to draw local residents’ attention, his network’s effect on vulnerable local populations and the wider community appeared to have been relatively minimal. This was reinforced given that the line was not particularly associated with the use of violence. The runners were also complicit ‘out-of-town’ adults, meaning the type of exploitation of young people or vulnerable locals in the manner commonly associated with County Lines was also not present (Moyle 2019; Robinson et al. 2019). Intriguingly, this case therefore indicates that it is not inevitable that dealers employing this supply outreach methodology will be engaged in overly harmful dealing practices. Albeit with significant levels of organisation, it is seemingly possible for outsiders to service provincial retail markets without perpetuating the types of deleterious drug market externalities routinely associated with or even considered intrinsic to County Lines. Indeed, even if the officers had enthusiasm for attempting to charge drug supply offenders with modern slavery convictions, in this case there was nothing that they could have identified in order to pursue

8  Drug Market Priorities 

191

these offences. While the evidence provided in previous chapters and other literature in relation to County Lines would generally suggest Reuter and MacCoun’s (1992) prediction that ‘import’ markets are disposed to be more violent and generally problematic than ‘local’ markets to be true, this case demonstrates that this is not strictly a given. In fact, by going to such organisational lengths to reduce attention and manage the conduct of those operating at the street level, this particular supply operation may well have generated less harms than some local dealers. Sensitised to this notion of variance between ‘out-of-town’ dealers, I sought to explore it further. Throughout the fieldwork, a ‘live’ spreadsheet that intelligence analysts used to collate all of the intelligence reports for each known line over a two-year period proved invaluable for looking for differences between the range of groups that fell under the umbrella of ‘County Lines’. Upon analysing its content, significant variance became apparent. For example, while most physically dealt to customers away from where they were staying, a select few engaged in ‘serving up’ very close to local residences. This appeared to often result in heightened community concerns and complaints from neighbours. Regarding cuckooing practices, some groups engaged routinely in ‘parasitic’ forms of cuckooing, ruthlessly trying to create and maintain as many local bases as they could (Spicer et al. 2019). Others, seemingly having built up a network of potential addresses, stayed in a number of different flats across a town, moving between them regularly, sometimes even daily. This contrasted with the ‘out-of-town’ dealers who used just a select few premises where they had developed strong relationships with the host, often in more mutualistic ‘rental’ (Coomber 2015) scenarios. Finally, there were a select few that avoided cuckooing altogether and based themselves in other forms of accommodation such as local ‘bed and breakfast’ inns. The local presence of many groups also varied. In one of the smaller affected towns, a particularly prominent line had a full-time presence, was regularly described by users as always being ‘on’ and was seemingly close to monopolising the local market. It was subsequently confirmed by an officer after an intelligence briefing on who was dealing heroin and crack in the town that:

192 

J. Spicer

I think that’s pretty much it now, it’s all people from outside, there’s no local outfits anymore. [Uniformed Officer]

In other larger towns, however, some lines were more ‘part-time’, operating intermittently or sometimes coming down sporadically. Relatedly, how embedded these ‘out-of-town’ dealers were with local populations also varied. Some would exclusively use local adults as runners, sometimes also employing them as drivers to return to their native city to restock, colluding with them to find a range of premises to stay in or using their contacts to advertise their ‘branded’ line. Others were far more detached, seemingly only coming into contact with locals when they cuckooed or sold drugs to them. While being mindful of the limitations of these data and not overlooking the often very striking similarities between these groups, it would therefore appear that ‘out-of-town’ dealers are far from homogenous. This is itself a notable finding regarding the wider understanding of the County Lines phenomenon. Since its emergence, little consideration has been made that different lines and different ‘out-oftown’ dealers will differ. As the history of drug markets more broadly would suggest, however, it would be naive to believe that they are all the same (Coomber 2015). Perhaps most importantly in the context of local police responses, because of this variance, the levels of harm associated with different lines would appear to vary in sometimes significant ways.

A Time for Discretion? Recognising this variance raises some interesting implications for applying harm reduction principles to the local policing of this form of drug supply. For the aforementioned ‘ideal’ line, an argument could be made that it was a remarkably prime candidate for the police to have used their discretion to monitor, rather than taking immediate enforcement action. Several of the officers acknowledged that drug market conditions in the respective town had worsened since the arrests had been made and the line had been ‘taken out’. A period of market ‘instability’ (see Brownstein et al. 2000) and several attempts by locals to rob some of the new ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers that had replaced this line seemingly led to an increase in

8  Drug Market Priorities 

193

violence. Corresponding to the findings of May and Hough (2001), intelligence reports also suggested that some users were being forced to use some of their drugs in front of dealers upon purchase, likely because of anxieties following the well-publicised arrests. Confirming these more noxious market conditions, one local detective, when interviewed a few weeks after these arrests had been made and asked if there had been an escalation in violence, responded: Yeah I think so. We’ve certainly had, over the last couple of weeks we’ve done a number of threat to life notices, where we’re either telling the victims or potential victims that they’re likely to be harmed unless they do certain things to prevent that. And we’ve been telling certain individuals, ‘we know what’s going on, we’re looking at you, you’re not to carry out any violent acts’. We had one chap who was tortured, another who were badly beaten, another who was stabbed. [Detective]

This spike in violence, combined with the realisation of just how ‘ideal’ the line that they had taken out had been, led to several officers musing informally that it might have been better to leave the line in place.” As one noted: I guess if you’re gonna have a line in your town you probably want one like that. [Uniformed Officer]

But these ‘backstage’ (Goffman 1959) considerations were ultimately conjectural. Having got to the point where extensive intelligence had been gathered, warrants obtained and substantial resources deployed, what would have amounted effectively to ‘turning a blind eye’ to this dealer and his line was not a feasible practical option from an organisational or cultural perspective. The senior investigating officer was never going to be content with the outcome of their operation being an attempt to informally regulate the local market by keeping a relatively non-­ problematic drug supply line in place. Beyond going against policy, it would have required an extraordinary act of braveness to justify it to the superiors or to face the inevitable outcry from the media if they found out that an active decision had been made not to arrest a heroin and crack dealer. Noting this paradox, an intelligence officer outlined:

194 

J. Spicer

When you take people out then you just get people taking over. And that’s when you get a lot of the violence actually. But if people found out the police weren’t arresting some dealers though, they’d not be happy. I mean, they’d be pretty angry. Even internally, there would be a lot of people that wouldn’t be happy with that, you know. [Intelligence Officer]

As classically depicted by Major Colville’s “Hamsterdam” experiment in the HBO’s The Wire (see Wakeman 2014), actively going against the rules of the ‘drug game’ (Bacon 2016a), even with the best intentions, was not a viable position for the officers. The culturally engrained perceptions of those involved in drug supply generally (see Coomber 2006) and the acute attention given to the topic of County Lines ensured there was no room for discretion. While often recognising that their actions may result in a worsening of conditions and an intensification of problems, because of the structures in which they operate and their symbolic role in enforcing drug laws, officers had little capacity to pursue alternative approaches. Instead, with distinct occupational risks associated with being seen as deviating from their prescribed ‘crime fighter’ role (Holdaway 1983), the types of policing and its structures that exacerbate some of the harmful aspects of drug markets were reproduced.

The ‘Value-Neutral’ Problem This case of the ‘ideal’ line and the paradox of harm surrounding it arguably represent the fundamental theoretical limitations of the police applying the philosophy of harm reduction in its pure form within the context of drug supply. As discussed in Chap. 3, the concept of harm reduction was built pragmatically upon the desire to reduce the harms experienced by people who use drugs. Its fundamental principles are based on reducing the ‘primary harms’ (Nadelmann 2004) associated with drug consumption, while taking a ‘value-neutral’ stance towards users and their use. Yet, as Blaustein et al. (2017) note, this perspective, quite intentionally does not cover the ‘secondary harms’ associated with illicit drug distribution, with a value-neutral stance considered inappropriate for those engaged in drug supply. In this policing context, while officers recognised

8  Drug Market Priorities 

195

that the ‘ideal’ line was relatively unproblematic and created comparably minimal ‘secondary harms’, they were not structurally positioned to afford a value-neutral stance towards the supplier involved. Importantly, they were also not culturally willing to. Even though the dealer did not engage in overt violence or exploitation, he was still viewed as “scum” (see Loftus 2007) and worthy of punishment and stigmatisation. As one officer responded when talking about the case: Look, I mean he might have been a running a slick operation and not causing us much problems, but he was still a dealer. He was still selling heroin. Anyone doing that deserves to go to prison. [Uniformed Officer]

These attitudes are unsurprising given the officer’s occupation, but they are also reflective of societal thought more broadly (Coomber 2006). Even the most ardent critics of prohibition are generally unwilling to afford much sympathy to dealers, especially those of a commercial mindset (Nadelmann 2004). When considering the practical prospect of applying harm reduction principles to drug market policing, it could be concluded as flawed to conceive of the police as harm reductionists. The relationship between the police and those involved in supply is fundamentally different, for example, to someone working for a drug-testing facility at a festival and those who choose to use the service (see Measham 2019). Transplanting directly the ethos of harm reduction to the context of the policing of drug markets can therefore be considered as theoretically and practically incompatible. As the case for the ‘ideal’ line demonstrates, finding the ‘space for discretion’ (Marks and Howell 2016) in this manner is simply not available towards dealers.

An Organic Shift to Harm Reduction Policing? These observations suggest that distinct practical challenges exist in terms of how policing responses to County Lines and drug markets more broadly might move towards a more harm-reduction-orientated approach. As theoretically sound as many of the arguments are, when combined with some of the findings from the previous two chapters, a

196 

J. Spicer

conclusion that drug market policing is destined to continue unmoved, chained within the prohibitionist structures in which it operates, would not be unreasonable. However, policing County Lines was not simply ‘business as usual’, and throughout the fieldwork it was certainly possible to ‘detect change’ (Bacon 2016a). In fact, building on notions raised in Chap. 5, ideas about policing local drug markets differently, looking beyond prohibitionist logic and moving in some way towards applying what could generally be considered harm reduction principles were often the topic of informal conversation, more formal consideration and even tentative application by some officers. These seeds of an alternative approach, sown increasingly in response to the realisation of what could genuinely be achieved, began to show signs of sprouting in the latter stages of fieldwork. Sensitised to the perspective of harm reduction when entering the field, I expected that I would need to raise these ideas explicitly during informal discussions or interviews in order to elicit relevant data. I also envisaged that this perspective might, at least at times, be given short shrift by some of the officers I spent time with. Similar to Bacon (2016b), on occasion, ‘harm reduction’ was considered analogous to ‘supply’ or ‘crime’ reduction. For a few officers, it appeared to be ‘axiomatic knowledge’ (Sackmann 1991) that arresting someone for a supply-related offence inevitably reduced local drug market harm. However, among many officers, there was often a genuine recognition of a wider concept of harm conforming to the notion of drug supply externalities and how this could translate into a genuinely different form of drug market policing. Rather than needing to be prompted, it soon became clear that these ideas were on the minds of many officers and that there was genuine consideration of how this could feed into both overarching drugs policing aims and practice. An exchange I recorded in my field notes between two officers over an early morning coffee before I accompanied them executing a warrant on a local flat provides a good demonstration: Sergeant: There is a school of thought that says as long as they’re not harming anyone and causing any issues to the community then you should just let them continue. Certainly, you have to be very

8  Drug Market Priorities 

197

careful who you take out because, as we’ve found, the backfill can actually be a lot worse. Officer: Yeah, for example, I’m pretty sure where I live in a cul-de-sac that a house down the road is dealing drugs. Although I haven’t got any proof, you see cars coming by, stopping outside for 10 minutes then driving off. But that doesn’t have any impact on me or the neighbours, so I’m not really bothered by it. Jack: How feasible would it be to apply that thinking to County Lines? Sergeant: Well that’s sort of what we’re looking to do with the tasking process. Although we’re not saying we won’t take those people out eventually, we’re saying we’ll take those that score highly on the MoRile first. But to do it properly it would have to be a formal policy put in by place by those from up high. And that’s pretty tricky politically. I mean the Daily Mail wouldn’t be too happy with that would they? You’d also have to get every officer on board and agreeing to it. Because you can’t legally stop an officer from making an arrest if a crime’s been committed. If I wanted to arrest someone for doing 31 mph in a 30 mph zone then I have every right to do that. You see what I mean? You’d need to have every officer on board if you were going to do that formally. Officer: But there definitely is some precedent for it. At the festivals in the summer we won’t be arresting people for that. There’s people everywhere smoking cannabis. It’s not that we turn a blind eye, but we don’t make arrests. These and other similar conversations were not borne out of an awareness of the academic literature on the part of the officers. Ideas of using law enforcement more strategically as a regulatory tool to manage and shape the local drug market were not derived from being familiar with scholarly work. Rather, these considerations appeared to have emerged naturally out of sometimes decades’ worth of drugs policing experience and the observation that not only were drugs, their use and those supplying them apparently as prevalent as ever but, especially given the prevalence of County Lines, the issues surrounding their markets were considered to be getting worse. Corresponding to the vernacular of Parker (2006), ‘keeping a lid on things’ was cited typically as the main aim of

198 

J. Spicer

policing the local heroin and crack markets. As one officer commented, this principally manifested in “a game of whack a mole”, with officers scrabbling after the next dealer that popped up or became the focus of their attention. Secondary related aims conformed to contemporary policing priorities (see Charman 2017) and included keeping communities happy and safeguarding those considered vulnerable. Notions of prohibition, a ‘drug war’ and ridding communities of heroin and crack supply were non-existent. With these more pragmatic aims placed at the centre of their drugs policing focus, some officers began to consider alternative approaches to how they undertook their work. Moving towards a more nuanced approach corresponding with harm reduction principles would therefore appear not to be an abstract, theoretical idea. Instead, it appears, in some quarters at least, to be organically coming to the fore, with many drifting naturally towards it. Rather than considering such an approach as a radical shift in the nature of their work, for some officers, it was considered to be close to current practice. When I posed the idea to one detective, for example, she replied: Well, to be honest that’s pretty much what we do now. If they don’t cause harm then we’re not going to be taking action, they’re probably not even on our radar. [Detective]

As highlighted in previous chapters, as with much discussion on the wider nature of contemporary policing and what they were able to achieve, this was also often framed in the context of austerity. It was suggested that if it were ever possible to try and target all dealers, the lack of resources they were now faced with made this an impossibility (see UKDPC 2011). As one detective noted: Last time I looked we had over forty different lines operating across the force. With the resources we’ve got now, and everything else we have to do, we can be looking at probably three, max’ four, at any one time. [Detective]

Relatedly, I lost track of the number of times that various officers stated how the dealers who ‘kept their heads down’ and stayed inconspicuous

8  Drug Market Priorities 

199

would be unlikely to ever have action taken against them, even if it involved supplying heroin or crack. On several occasions, officers across different teams joked that, if they were ever to be unemployed or in need of money, a relatively easy and safe way of remedying this would be to, as one put it, “deal a bit of drugs”. Implicit in these and other similar informal conversations was the recognition that the police ultimately only ever really undertook action against a select few dealers. As has been noted elsewhere, acting on intelligence, responding to the most serious crimes and making cases against the most serious criminals can generally be considered “business as usual” for drug detective work (Bacon 2016b, p.  134). The police ‘cherry-picking’ particular dealers to focus on has long been recognised as a fundamental feature of this aspect of their work (Collison 1995). With the type of zero-tolerance, rigidly prohibitionist attitudes no longer existing, if they ever truly did, this would suggest moving towards a more nuanced, informal regulatory policing strategy might not be quite as big a step as it may first appear.

Prioritisation as Harm Reduction? While reflecting a general trend in the policing of local drug markets, the consideration of more strategic drug market enforcement was particularly prominent among officers who were following a new ‘prioritisation’ process that had been tentatively proposed and subsequently implemented in response to County Lines during the fieldwork. As alluded to by the sergeant in the ‘pre-warrant’ conversation recounted earlier, a ‘scoring’ approach was being introduced, involving each County Line known to be operating in the force area to be individually assessed and ranked based on received intelligence using the MoRile system. The rationale for this was that it would feed directly into a tasking process, allowing the most harmful groups using serious violence or causing significant disruption within a local community to be specifically targeted. This would then allow more senior officers to focus resources and the attentions of various teams on those causing the most problems. Notably, such an approach did not appear to be unique to the force I conducted fieldwork with, as similar processes were reported as being used elsewhere during regional meetings.

200 

J. Spicer

Important parallels can be made between this process of formal prioritisation and the notion of applying harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets. As a guiding drugs policing model, it acknowledges implicitly that not all dealers, even of the County Lines variety, can be the focus of policing efforts. Specifically targeting those judged most problematic while reducing unnecessary attention on those responsible for relatively minimal harms is considered more appropriate instead. This conformed to the realities of what most of the officers experienced on a day-to-day basis in relation to County Lines. It was widely acknowledged, albeit sometimes slightly reluctantly, that they did not have the capacity to focus on every group operating in their area. Attempting to formalise a more strategic approach that attempted to maximise the impact of their enforcement efforts was therefore considered a helpful step in the right direction. It is worth noting that I did come across one officer who, having been briefed on this approach, stated it was something he felt uncomfortable with. The following field notes recorded during an informal interview describe his reservations: Uniformed Officer:  Yeah, I’ve heard that from senior management about being careful who you take out because it might cause more problems. You do have to think, ‘are they going to be replaced? are they going to be worse?’ But that just doesn’t sit well with me. I don’t like the thought that while we’re sitting in here there are people out there that we’re not going after. (Shout from the corridor of the station that it was time to execute a warrant on a flat suspected of harbouring County Lines dealers) Uniformed Officer:  [jumping out of his seat and putting his stab vest on] “And anyway, doing these warrants, busting down doors, I wouldn’t want to stop doing that whenever we can, I love it!” But apart from this, the vast majority of the officers discussed it with me and among themselves in positive terms. It appeared to make sense and was considered a pragmatic, appropriate response. There was no

8  Drug Market Priorities 

201

suggestion of the ‘fight’ against County Lines being a war that could be ‘won’ in the sense of the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers being eradicated. The term “we can’t arrest our way out of this” became an almost daily cliché parroted by officers of various rank. Instead, reflecting the general perception of local drug market policing, prioritising particularly problematic County Lines through this process was considered as simply formalising what was already the general realities of how they were practically seeking to respond to the drug market at a local level.

Mitigating the ‘Value-Neutral’ Problem Based on these observations, it could be suggested that a formalised strategic model of prioritisation demonstrates how a more nuanced policing approach aligning with harm reduction ideas could be applied in practice. Not being perceived as an overly radical shift from how drugs policing is already undertaken is one reason for this is. Perhaps most importantly, however, is how it mitigates some of the aforementioned theoretical challenges of applying the philosophy of harm reduction. In particular, it would appear to avoid the unfeasible application of a ‘value-­ neutral stance’ towards those involved in supply and the prospect of police officers ‘turning a blind eye’ to dealers they are primed to take enforcement action against. By identifying those that cause the most harm and specifically targeting them, the practically unviable position of making a decision not to pursue or arrest dealers considered less harmful out of fear that doing so may lead to more harmful ones replacing them or more deleterious drug market conditions more generally should be avoided or at least minimised. Done correctly, those groups causing relatively limited drug market harms are unlikely to find themselves the target of specific activity. Instead, with their sights trained on those causing the most harm, officers can pursue targeted dealers with a sense of ‘mission’ (Reiner 2010), suspecting reasonably that their arrests will lead to a positive effect on local drug market conditions. This perhaps represents a way of achieving Skogan’s (2008) dictum on police reform of turning abstract concepts and theoretical propositions—which the notion of applying harm reduction principles to the policing of drug markets could

202 

J. Spicer

be argued to be up until this point—into practically orientated, day-to-­ day policing activities officers can engage with and pursue (see also Kammersgaard 2019). Importantly, a formal strategy of prioritisation means that it is also still possible for officers to adopt an acceptable presentational front that does not diverge or undermine prohibitionist sensibilities. The sergeant’s caveat in the aforementioned conversation that they will get to the lesser ranking groups “eventually”, and the other officer’s assurance that despite not making arrests they were “not turning a blind eye”, illustrates this. In reality, both almost certainly knew that by prioritising the most harmful groups they would ultimately keep ‘creaming off the top’, generally not getting deep enough to restrict levels of supply in any meaningful way. The problem of the binary ‘good versus evil’ nature of prohibitionist logic, however, is that any example of the police not fully adhering to their given role risks them being accused of dereliction of duty or, at worse, being in favour of the other side winning (see Nadelmann 2004). Yet, despite these structural and cultural conditions and an emphasis among officers on ‘action’ (Reiner 2010), the generally widespread positive responses from officers to the approach suggests it is seemingly possible to reconcile this more selective model of prioritisation with the ascribed cultural role of the police regarding drug markets and the ‘law on the books’ (Beletsky et al. 2005). Faced with the realities of what they can feasibly achieve in response to those operating in their local drug markets, an approach that seeks to make the most out of their labour appeared to satisfy the desires of officers to continue to take meaningful action against the genuine problems and community concerns they were faced with.

External Perceptions Beyond the acceptability of this approach internally among officers, the external perceptions of this prioritisation model from those outside the policing organisation and the wider public were also noteworthy. Such considerations and how it relates to the overall feasibility of introducing this model are particularly important given the symbolic qualities

8  Drug Market Priorities 

203

of the drug market policing that have been stressed throughout this book and elsewhere (Coomber et al. 2019). Concerns regarding fears of how they might be perceived by the public if they were to openly acknowledge their limitations arose among officers before the process of prioritisation had been formally introduced. One senior detective, for example, openly admitted to me that he and officers in other towns had accepted that County Lines drug markets were always going to exist. I suggested to him that a logical end point from this was that the police would want those who were dealing to do so in ways that caused the least harms. While he informally agreed, he was ultimately concerned of how this would be perceived by outsiders. As he discussed: I know (sighs). How do I sell that message to the public though? How do I sell that message to the public that actually, as an organisation or even as a partnership, we’re accepting that there’s always going to be drug dealing? That is really tricky. I mean the wording might have to be slightly different to that. You might have to say that, ‘we accept that with the resources we’ve currently got, the problems that are being posed and the demands on the street, we can’t target every drug dealer, so we’re going to target those who, you know, commit the most harm to vulnerable people’. And if people think, ‘well actually they’re accepting nice drug dealing, and being anti towards nasty drug dealing’ well that’s … yeah … that might be ok’. [Senior Detective]

This tension highlights the contradictions of drugs policing between its presentational front based on spectacles and control signals and the backstage realities experienced by officers (Goffman 1959). However, just as the more pragmatic model of prioritisation posed internally acceptable, subsequent observations throughout the fieldwork period suggested it could help resolve some of these tensions. This was illustrated when I accompanied this detective and other officers to partnership meetings or at various events where they gave presentations and discussed the new approach. Carefully couching the notion of prioritisation in positive terms, they stressed how important it was for the police to specifically target those causing the most harm. To back this up, a concrete example of why some lines were being made a priority was also usually provided. A fatal stabbing involving County Lines dealers that occurred “just 150

204 

J. Spicer

yards from where we are now” was, for example, recounted to attendees at one local event. Selective enforcement was therefore presented not just as a pragmatic and productive approach, but one corresponding to the general role of the police in responding to local drug markets and their related issues. Implicitly, of course, it was being communicated that the police were not able to target all dealers operating locally. But stressing the particular importance and strength of their focus on those that they were pursuing seemingly allowed for a strategy of prioritisation to pragmatically bridge the gap between a more harm-oriented policing strategy and the traditional drug market ‘eliminator’ role represented by the police. Those in attendance at these events appeared to widely interpret this as an acceptable position. In contrast to the general pessimism reported in the previous chapter regarding the impact of initial crackdown operations during the earlier phases of the fieldwork, it was viewed favourably by those working in other organisations. At one local event on the subject of County Lines, I did note an attendee lean over to the colleague sitting next to them and concernedly whisper, “are they saying that they can’t stop this?” But generally, at these presentations or meetings, and in subsequent interviews, those working for local organisations who had been the audience to this message responded positively. Prioritising specific County Lines was not interpreted as the police being weak and surrendering to the evolving local drug market, but that they were seeking to actively target those dealers causing serious harm. When I asked a welfare officer for a local housing association what she thought about the approach, for example, she responded: I think I am in favour of that because it’s the dangerous ones that are harming people, you know that really are harming people. I’ve heard some awful things where they’ve used awful violence. They put a cat in a microwave. I’ve heard some awful things. But, yeah, I think, the thing is, me personally, when I work with the police, I would rely on them to know what is the best thing to do. And if it’s the ones that are harming people like that and they think, ‘actually, we need to get that first because that then might reduce the harm’, then I’m all for it. [Welfare Officer, Housing]

8  Drug Market Priorities 

205

Others related it back to their own practice and the ways that they had to prioritise themselves. A drug service worker in one town noted: That makes total sense. You know it’s not dissimilar to what we do with clients. When our caseload is increasing, we just have to devote time and energy on those that are the highest risk. It just makes sense. [Drug Service Worker]

Similarly, a community safety manager who was professionally aware of public pressure and expectations because of aspects of her role outlined: So if you’ve got a serious and organised crime group that are clearly doing something illegal but they’re not actually hurting local people and the community, but then you’ve got the other group that is, then you’re going to choose that one, aren’t you? So, yeah, I would be happy to explain that to people if it came out to the public that that’s what was happening. But it’s the same with anything, you have to prioritise your workload. It’s the same with any service we commission. Anything we do, there’s always a criteria or a threshold or something that filters the workflow. Because you have to, you can’t accept everything. [Community Safety Manager]

These responses suggest that for organisations outside the police, it is the drug market ‘externalities’ (Caulkins 2002) that are of chief concern. It could therefore be argued that attempts to present symbolically to outsiders that the fight against the local supply of heroin and crack is one that they are still attempting to win in terms of prohibition are not necessary or perhaps even desirable. Returning to Skogan’s (2004) card game metaphor regarding the relationship between the police and the media referred to in the previous chapter, it would appear acceptable for officers to lay their hand down on the table and be open about what they can achieve and what their priorities are. In contrast with some of the pessimistic responses to the outcomes and representations of crackdown operations, a shift to a more harm-reduction-orientated approach would appear not only acceptable on pragmatic grounds but actually encouraged by many who were aware or exposed to some of the issues associated with County Lines.

206 

J. Spicer

Guiding Crackdowns In addition to positively informing the local strategic response to County Lines more generally, a formalised process of prioritisation was also described as having significant potential to guide crackdown operations to operate in a more focused way. As discussed in the previous chapter, these popular, resource-intensive activities resulted in mass arrests, but often of those at the very lowest levels, or sometimes of groups such as the ‘ideal’ line that were not overly problematic. Providing insight into why this misplaced focus occurred, some of the detectives involved talked of how these operations were undertaken in ways that were too geographically restricted. Once a specific town was chosen and resources for the crackdown acquired, corresponding with previous observations of how the tactic is used (Bacon 2016a; Collison 1995), undercover officers were typically deployed to engage in test purchasing and become exposed to as many lines as they could. Following this period of intelligence gathering, detectives then cast their net as wide as was practically feasible, trying to generate evidence on as many of those involved in supply in the town as they could. Ultimately falling back on attempting to disrupt the market in the town as much as possible, any considerations or attempts to differentiate between different dealers or networks were quickly lost. As one detective explained: What tends to happen is, if we target an area geographically, so say we want to take out all the drugs gangs in XXXX [name of local town], and we’ve put some assets into that area, we basically end up buying the drugs from the people who offer themselves up to sell the drugs. So, what I’m trying to say is we might end up buying the drugs from a non-violent gang, or a gang that we’re not massively worried about. So, we might clear out four or five drug gangs in one town, but we might not end up targeting our most dangerous groups. It’s like, you know, fish in a barrel. There’s loads of fish coming out, but it might not necessarily be the one that we want. [Detective]

Similarly, officers also discussed that once an operation was underway and intelligence began being generated, the decision of which lines they would ultimately attempt to take action against was not made on the

8  Drug Market Priorities 

207

basis of their characteristics or overall propensity for harm but on the ease in which evidence could be collected and a conviction be made. Another detective described the final stages of a recent crackdown he had been a part of and the decision process of who they ultimately decided to focus on when organising the culminating strike days: When we did XXXX [name of operation] we had to choose which lines we were going to dismantle. Because we touched about 20 lines, we touched a lot of lines, bought from a lot of lines. And what we did do is followed our evidence. So the people that we had our strongest cases on, we followed those lines up the chain, and we tried dismantling those lines, some of them quite successfully. What we didn’t necessarily do is sit down, have a conversation and say ‘ok, which is our most dangerous? Let’s try and take out those ones’. We did what was easiest for us to do. We took out the ones with the evidence. And there’s a lot of reasons for that. One is resources, one is time—we needed to get those people on that operation back to their day jobs because they’d been seconded out. And probably a lot of it would have been that we didn’t really understand which ones were our most violent actually. [Detective]

This insight into the latter part of an operation provides important understanding into the outcomes of crackdowns undertaken against County Lines. Building on the work of Coomber et al. (2019) and the analysis presented in the previous chapter, it would appear that some of their practical organisational constraints and how these influence the decisions of officers may help explain why their outcomes appear ‘symbolic’ and antithetical to attempts at reducing drug market harms. Further demonstrating its potential, however, as with its influence on the wider local drugs policing strategy, the model of prioritisation was considered by many officers, and by some of the detectives in particular, to have the capacity to make these specific operations more targeted and effective. Perceptions of undertaking operations within this more formalised prioritisation context suggested some of the issues associated with their use previously could be mitigated. Future crackdown operations informed by this model, it was suggested, could look beyond focusing on one particular town and attempting to disrupt its market as much as possible via mass arrests. Resources and activity could be targeted

208 

J. Spicer

towards those groups already identified as particularly harmful, regardless of where they were operating. As one detective who had been the senior investigating officer of a previous operation outlined: So, we’re currently working on a process of how we can forget the geography— which unfortunately makes things difficult around finance and who’s paying for it—but forget the geography and just hunt down our top lines through a similar tactic, but by being more nimble around how we move resources round and how we target them. So, therefore, we’re always continually taking out the very top rather than concentrating on a geographical area. And in that way, we know who we want before we start, whereas before we were just looking at an area, whereas now we can look at what lines we want to tackle before the operation and we can already be having that conversation up in London or wherever they’re coming from and try to coordinate it a bit better. [Senior Detective]

Although this raised some additional internal and practical challenges around areas such as finance, the model of prioritisation was therefore considered as a way of helping crackdown operations to become more focused. While not a panacea to some of their limitations or to the presence of County Lines in their town more generally, many of the officers considered it as a more beneficial way of generating the type of meaningful results they were after. While interpreting this as a clear example of the police adopting harm reduction principles might be a step too far, how this pragmatic strategy is aligned with responding to drug supply externalities and producing outcomes that reduce them demonstrates what would appear to be an organic move towards a more nuanced and progressive drug market policing approach.

Prioritisation in Practice The adoption of this formalised prioritisation strategy and how it was considered internally and externally acceptable appear to demonstrate how the policing of drug markets can be adapted progressively within the confines of the existing prohibition framework. As Bacon (2016b) notes, although far from ideal from a wider drug policy perspective, within the

8  Drug Market Priorities 

209

existing confines of prohibition, such reforms are the best that can be realistically hoped for in the short to medium term (see also Caulkins and Kleiman 2018). However, as potentially progressive and effective as this policing model of drug market prioritisation may theoretically be, its success at reducing market harms and how it ultimately functions would appear inevitably rooted in how it operates in practice. While the process was only beginning to be implemented at the end of the fieldwork period, I was able to observe and discuss some of the practical realities associated with undertaking it. While not insurmountable, it was clear that there were several significant barriers in place. One immediate concern voiced by some of the detectives and analysts was having the necessary resources to undertake the analysis and accurate ranking of each County Line operating in the force area. The number of known lines believed to be operating across the force varied during the fieldwork period, peaking at 55 and rarely going below 40. This appeared to be quite an accurate snapshot of the County Lines picture across the force area. Streams of intelligence came in daily from a range of sources, and any new lines that started operating in any of the towns quickly became known. However, even at their lowest numbers, it was considered unlikely that there would be the capacity to undertake research of sufficient quality on all of the lines and for them to be regularly assessed in detail and scored in relation to one another. As one intelligence officer noted: At the moment it looks like we’ve got over 50 County Lines across the force. If I’m being honest I don’t think we’ve got the capacity to do the threat, harm and risk around all of them, or the research. [Intelligence Officer]

This highlights the importance of recognising that the burgeoning presence of County Lines in provincial areas is not just a problem for local officers on the ground, other agencies and wider communities. It also presents significant problems for those working more ‘behind the scenes’ within the police and who are central to strategically informing the direction and actions of those responding to the local markets on the ground.

210 

J. Spicer

Another potential practical barrier discussed by several officers regarding prioritisation was the undue influence by particular colleagues in the process and the wider role of subjectivity. Rather than being a systematic and objective process, it was suggested that the decision of which lines became prioritised and targeted may be significantly influenced by who, as one officer put it, “made the loudest noise”. Discussing this in more detail, one detective suggested: I think you’ll find that it all comes down to [different officers’] personality about who gets targeted. That can be a good thing because you get some who get really hot on a violent County Line and go after them hard. But then it also means you get dragged in to dealing with some that are really not worth it. You know, a complaint will come in about there’s some dealing going on in this street and the officer in that area will respond to it and say, ‘Right, ok, we’re going to get them’, all the while though we know that there’s actually a much more dangerous group operating a few streets away from them that we would be much better off targeting. [Detective]

This particular issue comes as no great surprise when considered in light of observations of other researchers. Loftus et  al. (2015) noted a similar tendency for officers in certain teams to overemphasise the scale and nature of some drug supply groups in order to obtain extra resources and use covert operatives. In the context of prioritising specific County Lines, it was acknowledged by many officers that those considered most harmful were likely to be guided by different officers’ own motivations and internal dynamics. Similar to what they had experienced when conducting assessments of local organised crime groups, some confided the various informal ways and means of ensuring that a particular group could become a priority. One of these was for an officer to increase the amount of reports and intelligence submitted about one group. Another was to use the scope for interpretation during a ‘threat, harm and risk’ assessment to ensure that it became graded highly. As one detective described: The more intelligence we submit on a line, and the more activity we do on a line, the higher its threat, harm, risk. That’s not to say, if we had a number of

8  Drug Market Priorities 

211

intelligence sources and a line was constantly being mentioned by different people, and it was thought that they were doing certain things, then it would rise anyway. But the police are probably the biggest influencer around how to generate a score. And, to be honest, I’ve done it myself, I’ve done it before to manipulate a situation. So, for example, if I was a Sergeant in [gives names of town] and I wanted assistance with activity on a drug line, I could manipulate a situation by putting in a number of intelligence reports, by doing a little bit of activity, then all of a sudden the threat looks a lot bigger, and you get some support. In the same way as if you’d got a handful of PCSOs working in different parts of a town. If you’ve got one PCSO who’s excellent, and really enthusiastic about drugs in the community and submitting a lot of intelligence, then the line working in their area is going to be flagged up a lot higher than in an area with a PCSO who may be excellent with reassuring the community and working with OAPs. [Detective]

Similar to Collison’s (1995) observation that the decision of which dealers to target is often heavily guided by subjective measures such as detective’s intuition and perspective, there would therefore seem significant propensity for these decisions to be unduly influenced. Although not overlooking the potential value in allowing for certain levels of professional judgement, this could fundamentally undermine the wider process and what it is attempting to achieve. Drug markets may well be messy, contingent and partially understood, especially when viewed solely through the lens of police intelligence, but there would appear to be an underlying reality worth striving to uncover. It is only by doing so that a strategy of prioritisation can be effectively based on. Some of these issues and the wider reliability of the prioritisation process were put under the spotlight in the latter stages of the fieldwork when a local heroin user was murdered by a member of a County Line. The attack was undertaken brutally, with one officer describing it as “similar to an execution”. In light of this, it would be reasonably expected that the dealers involved would be ranked somewhere near the top of those considered most harmful. However, rather than this County Line being the subject of specific attention and targeted policing activity, it was ranked 35th out of all those currently operating in the force area. Ultimately, therefore, it was far from being considered a priority. As one detective explained:

212 

J. Spicer

There was a guy called XXXX [name of victim] who was murdered in XXXX [name of town]. He was killed by a County Line, which on our list was right down at the bottom. So, we’d either not got round to grading their risk, because we didn’t feel like they were an issue, or we graded the risk as very low. So, they were at number 35. And yet they carry out a killing. And it wasn’t a moment of anger, they’d got someone up to carry out the killing. Got a taxi there, or a local transport there. Did what they wanted to do, then came away. So, it was very calculated in terms of what they were doing. [Senior Detective]

That the County Line responsible was so far down the list of priorities of who was to be targeted was inevitably of significant concern to the officers involved. Unsurprisingly, the group associated were reassessed and placed at the top of the priority list. In some respects, this could be seen as evidence of the process working, with the police shifting their attention appropriately towards those that had the willingness and propensity for creating the most serious of drug market harms. A certain amount of reaction can perhaps be considered inevitable in a process of prioritisation, with officers responding to intelligence or offences when making judgements on who is the most harmful. However, what could be considered concerning is that those assessing the ‘threat’ of the line had been either unable to identify their propensity for harm or had significantly misjudged it. Although an extreme example, if it takes something as serious as an organised murder for dealers to become a priority, it could be questioned how much harm will ever be proactively reduced.

Prioritisation in the Fast-Paced World of County Lines In addition to these wider drug market challenges, others associated with applying this prioritisation process to the particular market context of County Lines were also observable. Demonstrating the generally challenging nature of responding to these ‘out-of-town’ dealers at a local level and the way that the County Lines supply model has broken down the more traditional ways of understanding the difference between the retail and middle-market levels of the drug market (Andell 2019; Coomber and Moyle 2018), officers found it particularly difficult to generate a

8  Drug Market Priorities 

213

detailed understanding of who was involved in this form of supply and their characteristics. Because of the itinerant nature of County Lines and the inherent unfamiliarity of the ‘out-of-town’ dealers involved, it was considered difficult to create an accurate picture of the current supplier landscape. Simply identifying individuals as being involved in drug supply was not in itself overly challenging. However, gaining a greater appreciation of who they were and their propensity for creating market-related harms, as was required to prioritise certain groups appropriately, was often beyond their capabilities. As described by one officer: The problem with County Lines is that it moves so quickly. If they’re rotating the people who are working in your area, just to try and keep people under the radar from the police, well one week you might have a bunch of nutters working in your force area, the next week those people might be elsewhere and you’ll have people who might be more calm. [Uniformed Officer]

This made it more challenging to make a strategically informed decision as to which County Lines should be prioritised. In comparison to the more traditional market context of local organised crime groups where officers would generally have a good knowledge of those involved, the more fluid, fast-paced and ultimately unfamiliar nature of County Lines groups made them more difficult to assess. Speaking about this, another officer compared the situation in the town dominated by County Lines where he now works to a major city where he had previously worked: Up in XXXX [name of city] we’ve got a number of gangs there who we’ve known for a long, long time. They were born and bred in XXXX [name of city]. Then we’ve got ones that are more Somalian based who may not have been there all their lives but have been there for a long time. But as a force we’re quite comfortable with them, because we know who they are, we know [who] they are if we need to pick them up. We know who they hang around with. There are methods of getting intelligence. So it’s quite easy to pick up the information for them of what they’re doing and where they are. And we’ve got some dangerous people there. But it’s not massively difficult to keep a lid on it. Whereas here we’ve just got an unknown quantity, which is the real danger of it. We’ve literally got no idea of who’s coming in and out. [Detective]

214 

J. Spicer

These challenges associated with the fast-paced and fluid nature of County Lines groups, and the very nature of ‘import’ markets more broadly (Reuter and MacCoun 1992), were highlighted further in the workings of a multi-agency ‘disruption panel’ set up by the police in one town to respond to County Lines. Comprised of a range of organisations including housing associations, community safety partnerships and drug services, it was hoped that this would help maintain a strong focus on the top three ranked supply groups in the area. Those involved met on a monthly basis to share information and sought to build up a detailed intelligence picture that would ultimately help targeted enforcement action be undertaken. Immediately after the first meeting, however, it became clear that the nature of the ‘out-of-town’ supply groups meant that the process of information sharing among this group was made almost redundant. Information from a housing provider suspecting that a County Lines was based in the flats of one of their tenants two weeks prior, for example, was considered already out of date and of little value to officers, given that they had moved on just days after. In a general sense, the establishment of the multi-agency group could be seen as a welcome development in the local response to County Lines. It provided officers with the type of partnership work that many in Chap. 5 appeared to be striving for and gave those working for other organisations a sense of involvement that might help reduce the pessimistic responses to the outcomes of local crackdowns. Yet, the very nature of the drug supply activity they were attempting to respond to suggests that, in order to complement the wider strategy of prioritisation, such approaches need to adapt to this specific market context. Combined, these observations suggest that responding to County Lines in a manner similar to more generic organised crime groups or local drug-dealing groups is inappropriate. As part of a more harm reduction focused drugs policing strategy, Bacon (2016a, p. 162) has talked of an informal “drug trade code of practice” that might be applied by officers to the context of a local market. Even with the general disbanding of drug squads over recent years (see Bacon 2013), this might still be applicable in areas dominated by ‘local’ markets where indigenous dealers continue to service customers (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). However, in the

8  Drug Market Priorities 

215

contemporary context of the many provincial towns which are now structured as ‘import’ markets and serviced by ‘out-of-town’ dealers (Coomber and Moyle 2018), this appears problematic. A policy of prioritisation may pose as a pragmatic, welcome progression, with the potential for much more effective drugs policing responses to County Lines. However, there would appear to be significant challenges in operationalising it and for its true potential to be realised.

Conclusion Aligning with some of the concerns levelled by others (e.g. Blaustein et al. 2017; Nadelmann 2004), it would appear that the application of a harm reduction philosophy in its ‘pure’ form to the policing of drug markets is theoretically and practically unfeasible. The culturally engrained status of drug dealers and the structural restraints placed on the policing of this area mean that such discretion is not possible, even in the case of an almost ‘ideal’ line where the outcome of action is recognised as likely to cause more harmful market conditions. However, a formal process of prioritisation would appear to represent a genuine way of moving the policing of this area towards a more nuanced, targeted approach. While inappropriate to consider it as a panacea, either to the problem of County Lines or to some of the problems of drug market policing, by mitigating some of the issues surrounding the ‘value-neutral’ problem (Blaustein et  al. 2017) and proving both internally and externally acceptable, it poses as a genuine way of guiding more selective enforcement without diverting from the prohibitionist, symbolic role that the police have to play in the drug war ‘spectacle’ (Edelman 1988). That it does not represent a radical shift in approach for officers on the ground and can be presented to those outside the policing organisation in a manner that does not undermine the cultural expectations how the police should respond to drug markets is perhaps a key strength for it becoming accepted and pursued internally. Beyond how it can inform a wider progressive strategy, the findings of this chapter suggest that, within the context of specific police activity

216 

J. Spicer

such as crackdown operations, prioritisation may also help guide them to be undertaken in a way that is more focused, effective and problem-­ orientated. Recognising this simultaneously provides greater insight into why the often counterproductive, ‘symbolic’ outcomes of previous crackdown operations occurred, building on the analysis of Coomber et  al. (2019) and others who have critiqued the tendency for the ‘low-hanging fruit’ to be swept up by this activity. That noted, with all of its genuine potential, there are a number of practical issues that risk rendering the strategy of prioritisation problematic. The role of subjectivity, undue influence and the broader challenges related to the nature of ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers suggest that, despite best intentions, those who pose the most harm are specifically subjected to police attention might not always be achieved. While an organic shift towards a drug market policing strategy resembling something like harm reduction appears to be in process, responding to the harms of evolving ‘import’ markets (Reuter and MacCoun 1992) and the actors that service them remains a theoretical and practical work in progress.

References Andell, P. (2019). Thinking seriously about gangs: Towards a critical realist approach. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bacon, M. (2013). Endangered species. Drugwise [online]. Retrieved from https://www.drugwise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Endangered-species.pdf Bacon, M. (2016a). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bacon, M. (2016b). Maintaining order in the drug game: Applying harm reduction principles to drug detective work. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 306–316. Beletsky, L., Macalino, G., & Burris, S. (2005). Attitudes of police officers towards syringe access, occupational needle-sticks, and drug use: A qualitative study of one city police department in the United States. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(4), 267–274. Blaustein, J., McLay, M., & McCulloch, J. (2017). Secondary harm mitigation: A more humanitarian framework for international drug law enforcement. International Journal of Drug Policy, 46(1), 66–73.

8  Drug Market Priorities 

217

Brownstein, H.  H., Crimmins, S.  M., & Spunt, B.  J. (2000). A conceptual framework for operationalizing the relationship between violence and drug market stability. Contemporary Drug Problems, 27(4), 867–890. Caulkins, J. (2002). Law enforcement’s role in a harm reduction regime. Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 64. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Caulkins, J. P., & Kleiman, M. (2018). Lessons to be drawn from US drug control policies. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 24(2), 125–144. Charman, S. (2017). Police socialisation, identity and culture: Becoming blue. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Resituating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2015). A Tale of Two Cities: Understanding Differences in Levels of Heroin/Crack Market-Related Violence—A Two City Comparison. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 7–31. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2018). The changing shape of street-level heroin and crack supply in England: Commuting, holidaying and cuckooing drug dealers across ‘County Lines’. British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1323–1342. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17. Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Gundur, R.  V. (2020). Finding the sweet spot: Optimizing criminal careers within the context of illicit enterprise. Deviant Behavior, 41(3), 378–397. Holdaway, S. (1983). Inside the British police: A force at work. Oxford: Blackwell. Kammersgaard, T. (2019). Harm reduction policing: From drug law enforcement to protection. Contemporary Drug Problems, 46(4), 345–362. Loftus, B. (2007). Policing the ‘irrelevant’: Class, diversity and contemporary police culture. In M. O’Neill, M. Marks, & A.-M. Singh (Eds.), Police occupational culture: New debates and directions (pp. 181–204). Oxford: Emerald. Loftus, B., Goold, B., & Mac Giollabhui, S. (2015). From a visible spectacle to an invisible presence: The working culture of covert policing. British Journal of Criminology, 56(4), 629–645.

218 

J. Spicer

Marks, M., & Howell, S. (2016). Cops, drugs and interloping academics: An ethnographic exploration of the possibility of policing drugs differently in South Africa. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 341–352. May, T., & Hough, M. (2001). Illegal dealings: The impact of low-level police enforcement on drug markets. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 9(2), 137–162. Measham, F. C. (2019). Drug safety testing, disposals and dealing in an English field: Exploring the operational and behavioural outcomes of the UK’s first onsite ‘drug checking’ service. International Journal of Drug Policy, 67(1), 102–107. Moyle, L. (2019). Situating vulnerability and exploitation in street-level drug markets: Cuckooing, commuting, and the “County Lines” drug supply model. Journal of Drug Issues, 49(4), 739–755. Nadelmann, E. (2004). Criminologists and punitive drug prohibition: To serve or to challenge? Criminology & Public Policy, 3(3), 441–450. Parker, H. (2006). Keeping the lid on: Policing drug related crime. Criminal Justice Matters, 63(1), 6–38. Pearson, G., & Hobbs, D. (2003). King pin? A case study of a middle market drug broker. The Howard Journal, 42(4), 335–347. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J.  B. Steinberg, D.  W. Lyon, & M.  E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Robinson, G., McLean, R., & Densley, J. (2019). Working county lines: Child criminal exploitation and illicit drug dealing in Glasgow and Merseyside. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 63(5), 694–711. Sackmann, S. (1991). Cultural knowledge in organizations: Exploring the collective mind. London: Sage. Skogan, W. (2004). Review of policing contingencies. The American Journal of Sociology, 110(1), 259–261. Skogan, W. (2008). Why reforms fail. Policing & Society, 18(1), 23–34. Spicer, J. (2019). ‘That’s their brand, their business’: How police officers are interpreting County Lines. Policing and Society, 29(8), 873–886. Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5.

8  Drug Market Priorities 

219

Stevens, A. (2013). Applying harm reduction principles to the policing of retail drug markets. London: International Drug Policy Consortium. UKDPC. (2011). Drug enforcement in an age of austerity: Key findings from a survey of police forces in England. London: UKDPC. Wakeman, S. (2014). ‘No one wins. One side just loses more slowly’: The Wire and drug policy. Theoretical Criminology, 18(2), 224–240.

9 Conclusion

This final chapter draws the book to a conclusion by pulling together its key empirical findings and main theoretical arguments. Although not the primary purpose of the book, here it is worth reflecting briefly on some of the insights it has provided regarding the evolution of local heroin and crack markets. Throughout many of the chapters, the central importance of the meanings and understandings of this phenomenon by police officers has been stressed both implicitly and explicitly. Theoretically unpicking the fear generated by these ‘import’ markets and the threat posed by the burgeoning presence of ‘impure’ outsiders, alongside the genuine evolutions in  local supply the practice represents, is vital for greater understanding on the subject. More fundamentally it is perhaps worth taking stock and thinking critically about what this thing called County Lines actually is. Some tentative conclusions regarding this will be made in the first section of this chapter. As a distinct thread running through many of the ethnographic insights provided in this book, some concluding thoughts on the symbolic nature of the responses to County Lines and drug market policing more generally are also worth providing. This book has sought to theoretically and empirically develop the perspective originally put forward by Coomber © The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4_9

221

222 

J. Spicer

et al. (2019) from the ethnographic vantage point of police stations. In addition to the contribution to the academic literature, a number of practical implications also come out of this analysis and are worth reflecting on. Similarly, it is worth critically considering the findings relating to the application of harm reduction principles. With the context of County Lines providing a valuable opportunity to explore this perspective, a number of key conclusions, tentative or otherwise, can be taken from the findings presented in this book, with several potential insights to inform future practice and research. Finally, alongside the general emphasis on understanding County Lines through a drug market perspective, considering the role of social policy and drug policy in the context of responding to County Lines and how they interplay with the policing of this area represents a suitable place to conclude.

Impure Market Evolutions: The Advancement of County Lines To return briefly to considerations outlined at the beginning of this book regarding how drug markets are evolving in many provincial towns across the UK, it is clear that the state of knowledge and theorising on County Lines remains underdeveloped. This is indicated via the continued reliance by many on official NCA reports to guide understanding, academics included. The majority of the scholarly attention the subject has received suggests an increasing tendency for it to be absorbed into the notions of the ‘gang’ and accompanying concepts (Andell 2019; Robinson et  al. 2019; Storrod and Densley 2017; Whittaker et  al. 2020; Windle and Briggs 2015). While providing some important insights, allowing this agenda to be overly dominant risks perpetuating stereotypical perceptions of who is involved in County Lines, fostering an uncritical acceptance of the ‘gang talk’ and the other forms of scapegoating that surround it (Spicer 2020). Perhaps most importantly in the context of this book, an over-reliance on viewing County Lines through this ‘gang’ lens also risks that the implications of this phenomenon specifically through a drug market perspective are neglected. In the midst of the acute and

9 Conclusion 

223

emotive attention that gang discourses can engender, it is therefore worth placing continued effort on situating it within this context. Coomber and Moyle (2018) have helped pave the way by outlining the machinations of this particular drug supply methodology and how it represents a genuine evolution in the supply of heroin and crack. McLean et al. (2019) also provide some relevant insight. More generally, connecting findings to wider conceptual drug market knowledge represents a fruitful way that future work should be guided if deeper understandings are to be developed. Although making a modest contribution, some of the data and analysis presented in this book help to achieve this aim. The utility of situating County Lines within the framework of Reuter and MacCoun’s (1992) distance travelled typology suggests it is useful to consider this particular supply phenomenon as representing the widespread manifestation of ‘import’ retail markets. Rather than focusing on the urban contexts of where these supply networks originate from, as is the case for the dominant ‘gang’ focus, collecting data within provincial areas where the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers is suggested to have burgeoned helps to shed light on aspects of this supply practice that have otherwise remained in the shade. By providing insight on notions such as ‘branding’, the interplay between expressive and instrumental violence and how this form of supply fits within enduring concerns such as the dichotomy between ‘open’ or ‘closed’ markets, some of the findings presented in previous chapters have helped paint a picture of what the ‘changing shape’ of street-level heroin and crack supply outside of major urban conurbations looks like (Coomber and Moyle 2018, see also Spicer 2019). Perhaps one of the most notable aspects is identifying the variance amid the drug supply operations that fall under the umbrella criminal justice categorisation of ‘County Lines’. As the case of the ‘ideal’ line suggests, while ‘out-oftown’ dealers undoubtedly have striking similarities, there are often subtle or occasionally more pronounced distinctions between them. This can range from how their supply activity is organised, to their impact on ‘host’ locales and resulting harms. Recognising variance and propensity for adaptation within drug markets, rather than relying on overly homogenised conceptions of those operating within them, has long been identified as analytically important and practically significant (e.g.

224 

J. Spicer

Coomber 2015; Coomber and Maher 2006; Dorn et  al. 1992; Zaitch 2005). For this recent drug supply evolution, the importance for more nuanced and ‘socialised’ (Dwyer and Moore 2010) drug market understandings of County Lines continue to endure. Indeed, that this observation of variance is so noteworthy arguably illustrates how, despite the extraordinary amount of media and public attention, there remains a lack of rigorous, critical inquiry into the County Lines phenomenon from a specifically drug market perspective. When first stepping out into the field, a central research question at the forefront of my mind was ‘what is County Lines?’ As the fieldwork unfolded and my analysis began to take shape, it became apparent that there was no clear, definitive answer that would sit neatly into strict conceptual parameters. Nor, perhaps, will there ever likely be. Because of this, the complex meanings and interpretations surrounding it are important to scrutinise. Critically exploring these, specifically from the perspectives of local officers responding to it, is especially significant because of how the subject of County Lines has been constructed, its ‘newsy’ nature (Wacquant 2008) and how its dramatic rise to prominence has been built on intense law enforcement scrutiny and related awareness campaigns (e.g. APPG 2017; NCA 2016). The focus placed on the ‘business-like’ nature of this supply practice and the drive to maximise profits highlight how understandings are grounded in concerns of a commercialised shift in  local markets (see also Spicer 2019; Whittaker et  al. 2020). This is reinforced through this framing being built on officers contrasting their evolving, unfamiliar local markets with the more traditional, less-­ organised ways that heroin and crack supply was previously understood to take place in their provincial towns (see Matrix Knowledge Group 2007; May and Hough 2004). A well-observed aspect of police culture is a resistance to change (Loftus 2009). This has been traditionally understood in the context of internal organisational dynamics. But it is perhaps worth recognising the ontological insecurity that can occur due to shifts and evolutions in the social arenas that they attempt to socially control. Correspondingly, the anthropological notion of ‘dirt’ (Douglas 1966) provides a theoretically useful way of understanding this framing by police officers. Conceptions of ‘purity’ and ‘danger’ appear to abound within the meanings attributed to County Lines by those affected at a

9 Conclusion 

225

local level. The very nature of ‘import’ markets (Reuter and MacCoun 1992) directly feeds into this interpretation and representation, with the physical reality of these drug markets being located in more rural towns but being serviced by those who are from urban cities, underscoring the cultural dynamics that bubble away under the surface. Simply put, the presence of ‘foreign’ commercial dealers from major conurbations represents ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas 1966, p. 33) for local police officers, serving to ‘pollute’ their local areas. The genuine market evolutions instigated by County Lines suggest there is, of course, an underlying reality to this, but such interpretations also rest on and are compounded by the perpetuation of stereotypes such as ‘pusher myths’ (Coomber 2006) and ‘gang talk’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008). Beyond internal understandings, this then feeds into how the subject is represented externally to others outside of the police, with recourse to more ‘expressive’ explanations of violence, for example, used to construct and send signals of the new threat these ‘out-of-town’ dealers represent to their area. As a result, alongside the genuine drug market evolutions and associated harms, County Lines drug supply comes to represent more than the sum of its parts because of its fundamentally ‘impure’ essence. Because of the importance of these meanings, when attempting to progress understanding of retail drug markets, how they may differ from each other and why they are responded to in the ways that they are, considering the cultural interplay between the rural and the urban appears particularly worthy of closer attention in the future. Expanding Reuter and MacCoun’s (1992) conceptualisation of retail markets beyond simply the ‘distance travelled’ by the two key groups of buyers and sellers, to also consider the wider environmental and cultural terrain that they are located in, is one potential way of doing this. As illustrated by the framing and responses to the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers by officers in this book, the geographic location of a drug market and whether those servicing them are of urban or more rural origin are central to market dynamics. As it stands, the typology functions in the manner of ideal types. While not overlooking the value of this clarity, there would appear worth in attempting to imbue some cultural dynamics into these classifications for them to be further developed, be more dynamic and take into

226 

J. Spicer

account other important aspects that influence why and how retail markets manifest in particular ways. Building on this, the manifestation of the phenomenon of County Lines locally appears to demonstrate that what is considered ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas 1966) by those in areas where provincial drug markets are operating also has the capacity to evolve. Heroin and crack markets have long represented ‘impurity’ and ‘pollution’ in more rural or coastal towns (Coomber 2015; Coomber et al. 2019). For the past few decades, this has centred historically on the often very visible presence of particular groups who use these drugs (Collison 1995; Girling et al. 2000). As the day comprised of ‘looking for shit’, recounted in Chap. 7, demonstrates, remnants of this undoubtedly remain. But the general emphasis surrounding the local response to County Lines appears to show that concerns of drug market ‘dirt’ and ‘danger’ have shifted more firmly onto the foreigners infiltrating these markets. This then interacts with the cultural dynamics of an ‘import’ market (Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Indeed, it is perhaps notable that the recourse to focusing on the ‘usual suspects’ of visible users occurred principally on the occasions when the presence of ‘out-of-town’ dealers had reduced substantially or was otherwise hard to come by. In various ways, findings presented throughout this book have demonstrated the acute anxieties that have been induced by the drug market development of County Lines. These are held by local police officers, but as interviews with many of those working in other organisations show, this is often being felt intensely by those outside of the formal policing organisation as well. Such fear is likely being replicated nationally, further stoked by the amount of often dramatic and alarmist attention the subject is receiving in political, media and other spheres. Consistent with the numerous ‘drug scares’ that have manifested periodically across Western societies (Reinarman and Levine 1989), County Lines could therefore be considered as representing a further incarnation and evolution of drug-­ related fear, something felt perhaps most severely in provincial areas. Coomber (2011, p. 25) has noted that:

9 Conclusion 

227

Things that disturb us often do so because they are other to our sense of identity, to system order and thus to our feeling of security in the world. Drugs are abject and have long been associated with ‘others’ those seen as threatening the safety and stability of a group or society.

While in the case of County Lines it is the ‘externalities’ (Caulkins 2002) associated with this particular drug supply methodology that have raised intense fears and concern, rather than the traditional focus of the substances themselves, situating perceptions of it within this framework appears to have significant analytic value. This is not to suggest, as has been the case historically for other drug-related problems (e.g. Young 1971), that County Lines should be reduced as representing a moral panic. Doing so risks overlooking the genuine evolution in street-level markets that has occurred over recent years (Coomber and Moyle 2018), the increasing commercial impetus of many young people in urban areas (McLean et al. 2018; Irwin-Rogers 2019; Whittaker et al. 2020) and the genuine harms associated with the supply methodology (Robinson et al. 2019; Windle and Briggs 2015). However, the very nature of the phenomenon’s construction and the associated discourses clearly aligns very closely with contemporary societal and criminal justice anxieties including escalating street violence, the intensifying presence of ‘gangs’ and the exploitation of vulnerable people (Coliandris 2015; Hallsworth 2013; Moyle 2019; Spicer 2020). Specifically for provincially located police officers, understanding the burgeoning practice of County Lines as being facilitated by a combination of reductions to their resources, a lack of appropriate support from other organisations or senior figures and the perception that they were more of an ‘easy target’ compared to their urban counterparts (see NCA 2016) means it also often appears to cut to the core of internal anxieties and their ontological security. County Lines represents a distinct and genuine drug market development external to the context of the responses put in place to respond to it (Coomber and Moyle 2018). But it also cannot be separated from the contemporary social, cultural and organisational terrain that policing currently finds itself in.

228 

J. Spicer

The Symbolic Face of Drug Market Policing The importance of the interplay between the cultural meanings, underlying realities and resultant general framing of County Lines is brought into sharp, practical relief when considering how it inevitably influences the practical responses undertaken by police officers on the ground. It is through a slightly widened ‘symbolic policing’ lens than that originally constructed by Coomber et al. (2019) that arguably much of the initial policing responses and outcomes to this identified problem can best be understood. From the rarely held ethnographic vantage point within the policing organisation, the empirical findings help bring to light how these activities played out internally. For the police, just as the County Lines phenomenon represents a new and challenging threat, it also represents something new to tackle. Solutions need to be generated, and expectations become levelled at the doors of their stations. But there is also potential for success to be achieved. The communicative qualities of responses to those outside of the organisation, combined with the processes that take place internally among officers, are therefore important to consider for developing a better understanding of how responses are introduced and used. Forms of drugs policing, and policing more generally, have long been understood in relation to appearances (Innes 2014; Loader 1997). For the ‘wicked problem’ of County Lines (see Coliandris 2015) that has generated such intense attention, not only within the field of criminal justice but also within political and public spheres (e.g. APPG 2017), it would seem inevitable that the police responses to it would be rooted in efforts to send out significant external signals, ‘spectacular’ or otherwise, to various external audiences (see Coomber et  al. 2019). However, amid all this, it is worth noting that local officers, while inherently involved in them, constitute something resembling an audience to these responses themselves. Unpicking the realities of how exactly they and their colleagues went about responding to County Lines, and how this work was constructed and communicated both internally and externally, helps to develop the limited knowledge on how drugs policing is actually ‘done’ by those undertaking it (Bacon 2016; Collison 1995; Dorn et al. 1992).

9 Conclusion 

229

The process surrounding the drive to establish and promote novel ways of responding to the problem of County Lines illustrates neatly the centrality of external and internal symbolic concerns. It also demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the two. For senior criminal justice officials and politicians, bestowing officers with a new ‘bespoke’ power in the form of the DDTRO, or encouraging them to pursue more momentous prosecutions under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, served to demonstrate to external audiences how committed they are to countering the high-profile phenomenon of County Lines, but also communicated internally to officers that the challenges they are facing on the ground, the expectations that are being placed on them and their associated fears are all being recognised. The brief excitement and expectation that these tactics were initially met with by officers and how this contrasted with their eventual perceptions demonstrate how successfully their design and promotion aligned with the type of understandings and anxieties surrounding this area, rather than being genuinely useful tools to reduce market harms. The DDTRO power tapped into the commercialised nature of this form of supply and the ‘business-model’ framing, with the targeting of the centrality of the ‘brand’ and the overall phone line methodology representing an opportunity to significantly disrupt these supply operations. Similarly, the promotion of Modern Slavery convictions aligned with the perceived ‘monstrousness’ and ‘gang talk’ surrounding the phenomenon (Spicer 2020), placing a focus on the particular ‘threat’ these groups were argued to pose to vulnerable populations and representing an opportunity to treat those responsible as being guilty of something more than just drug supply. Because of the nature of both of these tactics, their communicative qualities and ultimate apparent failure, perceptions of the likely efficacy and appropriateness of drugs policing responses among those formulating them continue to appear grounded in how closely they reflect how the market is understood to function. Similar to what has been observed during previous phases in the history of UK drug market policing, the introduction of these new tactics could be considered a further example of ‘mirroring’ the market (Dorn et al. 1991). Just as the Broome report (ACPO 1985) rested on the desire to structure drugs policing in ways that ‘looked like’ the commercially organised structure of the market in

230 

J. Spicer

the 1980s, and ‘spectacular’ raids became levelled at crack dealers when fears of its supply became prominent in the UK (Dorn et al. 1992), the ‘novel’ tactics generated in response to County Lines could be considered a further recent attempt to restructure drugs policing to reflect contemporary evolutions in illicit supply. However, while initially a cause for hope, potential sources of ‘action’ (Reiner 2010) and ways of communicating a commitment and ability to respond to this new problem, when both of these tactics were dismissed as unusable or ineffective, led to them being ultimately a source of frustration and disappointment. Whereas the philosophy championed in the Broome report (ACPO 1985) was critiqued for its naïve representation of how the drug market actually operated, the potential downfall of these strategies therefore appears more closely related to their perceived lack of practical utility among those being encouraged to use them on the ground. That it was concluded by local officers that they were tools to be ‘stage-managed’ for the purposes of appeasing those who had provided the power to them, rather than be used for their own potential benefits, is perhaps the clearest evidence of this. The complex symbolic relationship officers had with these tactics themselves also illustrates how the original communicative qualities attached to forms of drugs policing do not necessarily disappear, but can be subjected to internal organisational inversion. It is within this context of the disappointment and frustration with the novel tactics that the reliance on the more familiar “bread and butter” (Dorn et al. 1992, p. 135) drugs policing activities can be situated. The use of ‘crackdown operations’ and local ‘days of action’ was underpinned by ‘axiomatic’ police knowledge (Sackmann 1991) of them being the appropriate response to crack and heroin markets (see Collison 1995), while also having the capacity to be adapted and applied to the specific context of County Lines. As a dominant way that County Lines was responded to locally, officers relied on these to deliver the outcomes that they desired and were expected of them. This perhaps helps to explain why, aligning with Coomber et  al.’s (2019) analysis, those ultimately affected were predominantly local populations rather than the feared ‘outsiders’. The drive to send out ‘control signals’ (Innes 2014) and construct drugs policing ‘spectacles’ (Edelman 1988) by disrupting the local market meant that mass arrests were a vigorously pursued and celebrated

9 Conclusion 

231

achievement. However, because of the blunt nature of these responses, exacerbated by the itinerant nature of County Lines, the local ‘low-­ hanging fruit’ (Coomber et al. 2019) became the predominant targets. Inverting the classic public order policing dictum of ‘winning while appearing to lose’ (Reiner 2010), local officers were instead ultimately seemingly ‘losing while appearing to win’ (see Spicer 2019). This indicates a particular challenge that police officers face regarding the high-­ profile phenomenon of County Lines, but it may also be of relevance to responding to ‘import’ markets more generally. It is worth noting that in addition to providing further weight to Coomber et  al.’s (2019) original theoretical framework, the fieldwork undertaken from within the vantage point of the police organisation empirically develops this perspective. In particular, the findings provide greater insight into why these ‘symbolic’ results occurred and the wider ramifications of these policing activities. The type of harmful or counterproductive outcomes discussed in Chaps. 6 and 7 that resulted from some of the initial responses to County Lines have been reported and critiqued consistently by researchers in many other drug market contexts. These critical appraisals are typically rooted empirically in the experiences of affected actors. But minimal academic insight has been provided as to exactly why and how officers embark on these activities, or how they experience them. As stressed throughout this book, it is worth considering the structural policing constraints that these activities are undertaken in. For the initial crackdown operations embarked on in response to the burgeoning presence of County Lines in various towns, centrally important to understanding their ‘symbolic’ outcomes were some of the practical factors that simultaneously enabled and restrained how officers were able to undertake them and the decisions they made (see also Collison 1995). Being placed in a geographical straightjacket and only able to cast a net on one particular town at a time, the familiar drugs policing aims of being as disruptive to the local market as possible appeared to be a key driver of the resulting mass arrests of local populations (see Aitken et al. 2002). This was exacerbated by the practical and cultural impetus of the teams involved, the external expectations placed on them to deliver results in response to this increasingly high-profile issue and being strictly timeand resource-limited. Despite the ‘spectacle’ that is often constructed

232 

J. Spicer

around their conclusions, it is worth remembering that behind these crackdowns are often a relatively small number of officers facing a range of pressures, practical barriers and competing demands. It should not be surprising that if unrealistic expectations are placed on them to get results, police officers will find a way of attempting to show that they have done so (Bear 2016). In the context of County Lines, sweeping up low-hanging fruit of low-level offenders represents a particularly suitable outlet. For the local ‘days of action’, similar concerns as well as the influence of geographical concerns also appear relevant to their often symbolic outcomes, albeit at a more micro level. A crude reliance on focusing on locations considered drug market ‘hotspots’ (Rengert et al. 2005) contributed somewhat paradoxically to a loss of focus on who they ultimately set out to target. Perhaps more importantly, the informal motivations hidden partially underneath the surface of these days, including anxieties of being perceived as ‘weak’ and a desire to assert an ability to maintain control of their ‘turf ’, appeared to fuel the dominant gaze on local populations. As indicated by some of the negative repercussions of the ‘safeguarding’ activities, the often inescapably adversarial relationship between the police and users of drugs underpinned by the ‘law on the books’ (Marks et  al. 2016), the typical status of these populations as ‘police property’ (Waddington 1999) and the ability for arrests for drug possession to provide tangible outcomes for a day’s work (Bear 2016) should also not be overlooked as primary drivers of these outcomes. Fundamentally, it was, of course, the actions of individual officers and their teams that produced the nature and results of these days. But these actions and the choices underpinning them did not operate in a vacuum, devoid of the structural and cultural forces that drugs policing is imbued by. Recognising the interplay between how drugs policing is structured and the agency of officers, it is perhaps appropriate to understand this as a process of drugs policing structuration. Through these ‘days of action’, officers often ended up reproducing the dominant order of the ‘drug game’ (Bacon 2016) between them and their local drug markets, by embarking on actions that were constrained and enabled by the very rules and routines that structure this order in the first place.

9 Conclusion 

233

For both of these popular local responses to County Lines, it could be concluded that there is a pressing need for them to become more nuanced and targeted if they are to become more effective and avoid producing counterproductive or ‘symbolic’ outcomes. While not overlooking their often significantly problematic elements, this conclusion is justified from a realist perspective due to their popularity, suggesting that they are likely to continue to be undertaken regularly (see Matthews 2014). Although not as en vogue as the often rather shallow political clamour for a ‘public health approach’ to policing has been recently, there is arguably much to be said for ensuring the focus of officers engaged in these activities is orientated specifically towards the identified ‘problem’ that ultimately necessitates them (Goldstein 1979). Such approaches have been previously found to be effective at targeting more problematic dealers and market practices (Kirby et al. 2010). Doing so might also help engender more nuanced perceptions of what can be realistically achieved in response to it and what success might look and feel like locally. This could be of benefit to police officers and other professionals with a professional foothold in the local drug market or affected by the presence of County Lines. When attempting to bridge the gap between some of the theory discussed in previous chapters and practice, it is worth noting that the notion of ‘action’ runs, in various ways, throughout the responses to County Lines. ‘Taking action’ is something that the officers wanted to do themselves, were expected to do by others and forms the cultural basis of how they as an organisation considered success as likely to be achieved. Theoretically, this acute impetus in this context is perhaps best explained through a key feature of ‘action’ having been identified as “the relatively brief stretch of time between the moment of initiation and the moment of resolution” (Handler 2012, p. 183, see also Goffman 1974). The manner that County Lines quickly came to the fore of policing agendas, combined with wider societal attention it received demanding success to be achieved, provided the necessary ingredients for ‘action’ to be placed at the forefront of how it was responded to. By practically orientating the focus of this ‘action’ more firmly towards what constitutes the actual County Lines ‘problem’ locally, this could reduce the tendency for both of these activities leading to the intensified criminalisation of the usual drug market suspects, with attention placed instead on those considered

234 

J. Spicer

most harmful (Bacon 2016). This could also help better respond to vulnerabilities (Coliandris 2015), recognising and building on the genuine benefits that some safeguarding activities such as welfare checks and cuckooing letters appear to have when used appropriately in certain contexts. At the very least, reorienting the desire for, and focus of, ‘action’ in this way could help reduce the complex but genuine vulnerabilities and general exclusion of some of the most marginalised local populations being exacerbated. Relating back to the inescapable role of symbolism, this reoriented ‘action’ focus arguably also has the potential to send out stronger, more meaningful communicative signals (Innes 2014). Specifically arresting the most problematic dealers could provide greater legitimacy to claims of success and their areas being ‘hostile’ places to travel to and deal in. This may be to the benefit of any deterrent effects aimed at those actors who will inevitably be left operating within the market (see Kleiman 2005). For other local agencies receiving and interpreting these messages, the results of more focused police activity could also avoid cynicism or pessimism (see Foster 2000), demonstrating what genuine, realistic success looks like and stimulating a sense of what can be achieved collaboratively. Of course, all of this has little practical worth if it is not going to prove agreeable to officers on the ground. Recognising the alignment with well-observed features of police culture (Loftus 2009), importantly, this focused orientation could be considered as being possible to undertake within the culturally acceptable context of ‘action’ remaining at the fore of police work and the desires of officers. Few would disagree that some form of ‘action’ needs to be taken in response to County Lines. If the police are to be the leaders of this, ensuring that this action is directed appropriately will ensure that the outcomes of it are more productive.

 rganic Shifts Towards Harm O Reduction Policing Just as the responses to County Lines has opened a window to explore and develop the perspective of ‘symbolic policing’ (Coomber et al. 2019), so too has it allowed for empirical inquiry into the application of harm

9 Conclusion 

235

reduction principles to the policing of drug markets. While historical precedent is visible in this area (Caulkins 2002; Curtis and Wendel 2007; Dorn and South 1990; Kleiman 2005; Maher and Dixon 1999), as Bacon (2016, p. 246) notes, this remains a “relatively new movement” that exists firmly in academic circles (see also Kammersgaard 2019). Even in the midst of a ‘quiet revolution’ of drug policy reform internationally (Eastwood et al. 2016), due to how politically charged drug policy debates are (Stevens 2011) and the engrained ‘drug war’ logic that continues to permeate this area (Leishman and Wood 2000), change remains inevitably slow in this area. While not overlooking the continued presence of problematic and ‘symbolic’ forms of drugs policing, particularly notable from the findings of this book, therefore, is the extent and positivity to which a more nuanced policing approach conforming to some of these ideas was discussed both ‘backstage’ among officers and at times openly in the presence of others. The very nature of County Lines, the understandings of the phenomenon and previous experiences of unintended drug market policing consequences appeared to lead many officers to consider such an approach organically. Aligning with the potential benefits of focusing specifically on noxious aspects of the market and its externalities (Caulkins 2002), of primary concern were the harms associated with the supply methodology rather than the supply itself. While important to acknowledge that this is not without precedent or necessarily an overly radical departure from traditional goals (see Collison 1995; Parker 2006), this perhaps illustrates the evolving drug market context police are now working in compared to when Collison (1995) or even Bacon (2016) conducted their comparable fieldwork. Based on informal officer perceptions and more formal goals, it would appear that drugs policing is beginning to move naturally towards strategies and processes that embrace aspects of harm reduction principles. Some of the observations and analysis surrounding the ‘symbolic’ policing of County Lines have suggested that, within certain contexts, practices among officers can continue to reproduce or even exacerbate counterproductive modes of drugs policing that produce outcomes that are antithetical to aims of reducing market harms. But it should be recognised that informal practices also have the capacity to shift the general structures of drug market policing that encourage the integration of harm reduction

236 

J. Spicer

principles (Kammersgaard 2019). While the drive to respond to this market evolution may have evoked some forms of action that produced a superficial spectacle initially, so too may it ultimately encourage officers to reflect on how they can modify their practice in ways that help them pragmatically achieve some of their aims in the future. Based on these observations, a productive way forward would appear to be to identify, facilitate and promote practices that help progress policing in this direction. While their use was sometimes problematic, the examples of success associated with cuckooing letters and engagement with local drug-using populations demonstrate how policing can be progressively adapted within its existing formal prohibition context (Stevens 2013). As with other recent developments such as facilitating drug testing at festivals and diversion schemes (see Measham 2019), these practices should be recognised for their capacity to reduce drug-market-related harms and achieve outcomes that are beneficial for those subjected to policing, as well as the officers undertaking it themselves. However, when considering the wider functioning of the market, it is the pursuit of the prioritisation process that arguably poses as particularly intriguing with regard to the practical implications and more theoretical concerns surrounding harm reduction policing. As a formalised strategy, it appears to represent a genuine way that the policing of County Lines, and drug markets more generally, can move in a progressive direction specifically in relation to supply-related harms, while remaining both externally and internally acceptable. With notions such as the police ‘licensing’ dealers (e.g. Bacon 2016) or ‘turning a blind eye’ being too radical, prioritisation poses as a genuine way of mitigating the apparent incompatibility of applying the philosophy of harm reduction in its ‘pure’ form, successfully navigating the ‘value-neutral’ problem outlined by Blaustein et al. (2017) regarding reducing the harm associated with drug supply (see also Nadelmann 2004). Such a strategy is something that the police can pursue immediately, with it fitting within existing policy and being considered appropriate practice by officers on the ground. As suggested by the response from those working in other organisations, officers should also feel comfortable acknowledging their limitations and justifying the more ‘selective’, targeted and informal ‘regulatory’ approach (Bacon 2016) that they are pursuing in practice. Indeed, it may even help legitimise the type of ‘control signals’ they seek to send out.

9 Conclusion 

237

Even as an arguably welcome, modified form of policing in relation to harm reduction principles, it is worth recognising that aspects of this formalised prioritisation strategy appear difficult to achieve in practice. Illustrating the importance of recognising the genuine evolution to local markets associated with the burgeoning presence of County Lines, there appear to be challenges of operating in this way for this specific drug supply context. Generating a clear understanding of who exactly these ‘out-­ of-­town’ dealers are represents one notable hurdle, compounded by the frequent use of different runners, the ‘franchising’ practices between groups and the generally agile nature of County Lines networks (Coomber and Moyle 2018; Robinson et  al. 2019; Whittaker et  al. 2020). This could be considered indicative of how the application of harm reduction principles to drug market policing has been almost exclusively proposed in relation to more ‘local’, urban markets (e.g. Curtis and Wendel 2007; Maher and Dixon 1999). The unique challenges associated with applying them to those provincial markets that can be considered as ‘import’ (Reuter and MacCoun 1992) may therefore have been overlooked. More predictable issues such as the ability to assess each line sufficiently and the capacity to objectively decide which one needs to be prioritised are also of note (see Loftus et  al. 2015). Ultimately, just as the emergence of County Lines appears to have gone in some way to promote a move towards more harm-reduction-orientated drug market policing strategies, so too does it raise new practical challenges about how this might be effectively undertaken. Recognising that difficulties in implementing such an approach or achieving the outcomes it desires may be more closely to do with these rather than theoretical inconsistencies is important if progressive ways of policing drug markets are to be continued to be pursued.

‘We Can’t Arrest Our Way Out of This’: Some Concluding Thoughts To conclude this book, it is worth looking beyond the immediate organisational and operational field of policing. As argued by Dorn et  al. (1991), this can be considered particularly important given how efforts

238 

J. Spicer

to respond to drug market problems by creating ‘common sense’ policing strategies with a narrow vision have previously sidelined other responses that might be better placed to do so. Even when highly resourced and with the most enlightened of goals and strategies, in isolation, law enforcement is severely limited to what it can achieve to complex social problems such as County Lines (Coliandris 2015). This is particularly the case in the context of drug markets, where the formal demands of prohibition are clearly unachievable, but the surrounding political and moralistic rhetoric demands an unequivocal commitment (Bacon 2016; Caulkins 2002; Kleiman 2005). With the analysis presented in this book in mind, it is therefore worth considering the wider implications of what an effective response to County Lines might look like. The role of both social policy and drug policy and how they relate to policing and the field in which officers are in are worthy of particular consideration. Discussing them here within the context of County Lines is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion. Rather, building on the insights provided in previous chapters, it serves to indicate areas for future research and analysis. It can also be considered as something of a rebuttal to suggestions that wide-sweeping, intensive policing and punitive criminal justice responses should be pursued in response to County Lines (e.g. Centre for Social Justice 2018). For the purposes of this discussion, drawing on the ‘push-and-pull’ factors model provided by Morselli et  al. (2011) serves as a useful guiding framework as it aligns with the itinerant nature of County Lines, the recognition of the fundamental limitations of prohibition and the adaptive capacity of drug markets. Regarding social policy and the wider field of political economy (see Reiner 2007), it is first worth considering why drug markets in inner cities are becoming ‘saturated’, resulting in the expansion of drug supply networks into provincial locales (Hales and Hobbs 2010; Windle and Briggs 2015). As outlined in Chap. 2, heightened levels of social deprivation combined with restricted legitimate job opportunities and a culture that valorises conspicuous consumption appear to be increasingly propelling young people into participating in illicit drug markets (Densley and Stevens 2015; Irwin-Rogers 2019). As important as it is to view them with a critical eye, official figures of just how many lines there currently are illustrate this (NCA 2018). Without addressing the intensifying

9 Conclusion 

239

‘social bulimia’ (Young 2007) and the creation of vast swathes of ‘flawed consumers’ (Bauman 2004), large numbers of those seeking to profit from drug supply will inevitably keep being ‘pushed’ out to provincial areas. ‘Import’ markets will continue to grow, leading to an increase in their associated harms. Indeed, while it is important to recognise that ‘systemic’ violence (Goldstein 1985) is not inevitable (see Coomber 2006), there would appear to be a risk that what can currently be considered relatively new provincial drug market ‘externalities’ (Caulkins 2002), such as serious violence, the involvement of young people or exploitative forms of cuckooing, might become increasingly embedded as part of their general machinations (see Coomber 2015; Robinson et al. 2019). Rather than being able to differentiate between less harmful dealers, these practices may become an engrained part of local drug market culture, with cases such as the ‘ideal line’ an increasing rarity. If this does occur, it poses significant challenges to the potential of pursuing even the most theoretically and practically robust police prioritisation strategy and the more general application of harm reduction principles to these ‘import’ markets. In addition to the inner cities where ‘out-of-town’ dealers typically originate from, conditions of deprivation and inequality are also worth considering in relation to the areas where they are being ‘pulled’ to (Morselli et al. 2011). While it may serve various interests and feed sensationalist ‘gang talk’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008) for those in the media and elsewhere to portray ‘out-of-town’ dealers as targeting peaceful, clean, provincial areas and making them ‘impure’ and ‘dirty’ (Douglas 1966), there are, of course, significant pockets of poverty in affected rural, market and coastal towns. Over recent years, corresponding to the emergence and intensification of the County Lines phenomenon, reductions in local council budgets and service provision have intensified this deprivation (Petrie et  al. 2018). The removal of support and resulting social conditions inevitably feed the County Lines supply model, the vulnerabilities of local populations that are exploited and the demand in the markets they service (Moyle 2019). As has been argued in this book and by many others, officer discretion is an important part of creating positive outcomes from drugs policing. But there are, of course, limits to this. For example, even in its least harmful forms, no form of cuckooing is

240 

J. Spicer

tolerable from a policing or wider community perspective (Spicer et al. 2019). To get rid of, or at least significantly reduce the markets that County Lines dealers service, deep structural change is required. Pragmatically, even if levels of supply remained the same, the return to a more embedded local ‘moral economy’ (Wakeman 2016) would be a significant success and would reduce incidences of local populations being exploited or generally embroiled with ‘out-of-town’ dealers. As those such as Currie (1993) have argued, effectively responding to drug markets and their associated problems requires addressing the social roots of why actors populate them (see also Hall et al. 2008; Parker et al. 1988; Pearson 1987; Seddon 2006). This will always be far beyond the role or capability of the police. In the context of responding to County Lines, drug policy is also worth considering. It is worth remembering that this should also not be considered as necessarily separate from social policy and the wider field of political economy. Those at the lowest ends of the socioeconomic hierarchy experience a disproportionate amount of drug-related harm (Stevens 2011), and this would appear to be illustrated firmly by the typical actors involved and affected by the County Lines phenomenon. Ambitious and important arguments will continue to be made for the transformative capacity for complete legal regulation (Transform 2009). Some of these may even increasingly gain traction. But as compelling as some of these may be, in the short to medium term it is worth considering more pragmatic and potentially immediate responses to this area. Heroin-assisted treatment provision targeted at the most problematic local users poses as a potentially beneficial way of reducing what ‘pulls’ County Lines dealers to these provincial areas. Doing so could reduce the potential local customer base, as well as make these populations less vulnerable to cuckooing or becoming embroiled in activities such as running. As hostile an environment as local police may seek to make their towns to ‘out-of-­ town’ dealers (Coomber and Moyle 2018), a reduced and less-complicit clientele is likely to pose as making their areas a far less attractive destination. The decriminalisation of drug possession offences also poses as a valuable tool in responding to and reducing the harms of County Lines experienced by local populations. From a harm reduction policing perspective,

9 Conclusion 

241

the case not to criminalise populations for possession offences is clear, as one of the principal ways that the police can reduce harm is to cease imposing punishment on those that use drugs (see Stevens 2013). While engaging in running or more mutualistic forms of cuckooing may mean that some are technically culpable for other drug offences (Moyle 2019; Spicer et al. 2019), as Coomber and Moyle (2014) have argued, it is not appropriate to view user dealers as drug dealers ‘proper’. Attempts to avoid the criminalisation of these populations, especially in light of evidence presented by various sources including law enforcement themselves that many are threatened into drug running or coerced into having their homes appropriated by these groups (e.g. NCA 2016), can therefore be justified. Importantly, a policy of decriminalisation would also appear to offer greater opportunities for productive engagement between officers and local user populations, resulting in more genuine safeguarding. Observations during fieldwork suggested this was already often possible. Formally removing the framework of criminal sanctions could help promote this further, as well as avoid some of the more negative, counterproductive outcomes that these can lead to. Just as early warning signs are often successfully used in the context of drug use (see Hando et al. 1998), there would appear potential for these to be used, in adapted form, within the context of markets, including, for example, the presence of ‘parasitic’ forms of cuckooing (Spicer et  al. 2019). Greater engagement between officers and local user populations, without the looming fear of criminalisation, could be one way of achieving this. In the context of this book, with its empirical and theoretical focus on the realities of drug market policing, it would appear clear that recognising the role of both social and drug policy in relation to responding to County Lines is worthy of continued reflection and foregrounding. The influence of both of these and the wider field of political economy places significant structural restraints and hurdles on what the police can achieve. But, with suitable reform, it can also enable developments and suggest how the policing of this area can be undertaken more successfully. In the face of drug market problems, such as County Lines, the police do not simply have a binary choice of either demanding more resources and cracking down harder on drug markets or giving up on the ‘drug war’ and

242 

J. Spicer

completely embracing legalisation. Instead, as Murji (1998, p.  83) has argued, they can “redefine the issue as a social problem linked to or caused by structural features such as poverty, unemployment, etc.”. By typically only dealing with the consequences of burgeoning drug markets rather than their causes, the police should not be expected to solve the problem of County Lines on their own. When they attempt to do so, they set themselves up to fail, placing undue emphasis on symbolic outcomes and being rightly criticised when these are antithetical to wider harm reduction concerns (Coomber et al. 2019). It would be easy to consider the more ‘symbolic’ forms of responding to County Lines discussed in this book as simply further evidence that drug market policing is at best ineffective and often counterproductive. But there is arguably still an important and potentially beneficial role for them to play. What is clear is that their role in relation to drug markets is not going away anytime soon. It is therefore worth continuing to consider how strategies and tactics within the ‘drug game’ can be modified progressively. When high-profile policing activities and arrests are undertaken, for example, instead of considering this a suitable end point and cause for celebration, it may be more productive to consider this as the start of a bigger process. If supply disruption is achieved in a town, even if for just a short period of time, this may offer an invaluable window to promote drug service engagement and treatment provision. Similarly, if successful arrests are made of commercial ‘out-of-town’ dealers responsible for harmful drug market conditions, consideration could be given to the potential ramifications of moving on to pursue and remove local dealers who are unlikely to cause such problems. While far from a panacea, such strategies, alongside the types of aforementioned policy reforms, pose as an effective response to the very real problem of County Lines in many areas of the UK. Policing can go beyond the ‘Sisyphean task’ (Curtis and Wendel 2007) of attempting to eliminate drug markets, to one where comparably modest, yet genuine, achievements in the form of reducing their harms can be achieved.

9 Conclusion 

243

References ACPO. (1985). Final report of the working party on drugs related crime. London: ACPO. Aitken, C., Moore, D., Higgs, P., Kelsall, J., & Kerger, M. (2002). The impact of a police crackdown on a street drug scene: Evidence from the street. International Journal of Drug Policy, 13(3), 193–202. Andell, P. (2019). Thinking seriously about gangs: Towards a critical realist approach. London: Palgrave Macmillan. APPG on Runaway and Missing Children and Adults. (2017). Briefing report on the roundtable on children who go missing and are criminally exploited by gangs [online]. Retrieved from https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/ files/appg-missing-gangs-and-exploitation-roundtable-report.pdf Bacon, M. (2016). Taking care of business: Police detectives, drug law enforcement and proactive investigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bauman, Z. (2004). Wasted lives: Modernity and its outcasts. Cambridge: Polity. Bear, D. (2016). The need to create a narrative: Examining the justifications police used to target drugs in the lead up to the 2011 London riots. Police Practice and Research, 17(4), 317–328. Blaustein, J., McLay, M., & McCulloch, J. (2017). Secondary harm mitigation: A more humanitarian framework for international drug law enforcement. International Journal of Drug Policy, 46(1), 66–73. Caulkins, J. (2002). Law enforcement’s role in a harm reduction regime. Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 64. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Centre for Social Justice. (2018). It can be stopped: A proven blueprint to stop violence and tackle gang and related offending in London and beyond. London: Centre for Social Justice. Coliandris, G. (2015). County lines and wicked problems: Exploring the need for improved policing approaches to vulnerability and early intervention. Australasian Policing: A Journal of Professional Practice and Research, 7(2), 25–36. Collison, M. (1995). Police, drugs and community. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Resituating the drug dealer. London: Free Association Books. Coomber, R. (2011). Social fear, drug-related beliefs, and drug policy. In G. Hunt, M. Milhait, & H. Beregron (Eds.), Drugs and culture (pp. 37–54). London: Routledge.

244 

J. Spicer

Coomber, R. (2015). A tale of two cities: Understanding differences in levels of heroin/crack market-related violence—A two city comparison. Criminal Justice Review, 40(1), 7–31. Coomber, R., & Maher, L. (2006). Street-level drug market activity in Sydney’s primary heroin markets: Organization, adulteration practices, pricing, marketing and violence. Journal of Drug Issues, 36(3), 719–754. Coomber, R. and Moyle, L. (2014). Beyond drug dealing: Developing and extending the concept of ‘social supply’ of illicit drugs to ‘minimally commercial supply’. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 21(2),157–164. Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2018). The changing shape of street-level heroin and crack supply in England: Commuting, holidaying and cuckooing drug dealers across ‘County Lines’. British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1323–1342. Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M.  K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating targeted police operations/‘crackdowns’ on street-level drug markets. Policing and Society, 29(1), 1–17. Currie, E. (1993). Reckoning: Drugs, the cities, and the American future. New York: Hill and Wang. Curtis, R., & Wendel, T. (2007). “You’re always training the dog”: Strategic interventions to reconfigure drug markets. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(4), 867–891. Densley, J., & Stevens, A. (2015). ‘We’ll show you gang’: The subterranean structuration of gang life in London. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 15(1), 102–120. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1991). Mirroring the market? Police reorganisation and effectiveness against drug trafficking. In R. Reiner & M. Cross (Eds.), Beyond law and order (pp. 91–106). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Dorn, N., & South, N. (1990). Drug markets and law enforcement. British Journal of Criminology, 30(2), 171–188. Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and danger. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Dwyer, R., & Moore, D. (2010). Understanding illicit drug markets in Australia: Notes towards a critical reconceptualization. The British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), 82–101. Eastwood, N., Fox, E., & Rosmarin, A. (2016). A quiet revolution: Drug decriminalisation across the globe. London: Release.

9 Conclusion 

245

Edelman, M. (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Foster, J. (2000). Social exclusion, crime and drugs. Drugs: Education, Prevention & Policy, 7(4), 317–330. Girling, E., Loader, I., & Sparks, R. (2000). Crime and social change in middle England: Questions of order in an English town. London: Routledge. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & Delinquency, 25(1), 235–258. Goldstein, P. (1985). The drug/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. Hales, G., & Hobbs, D. (2010). Drug markets in the community: A London borough case study. Trends in Organized Crime, 13(1), 13–30. Hall, S., Winlow, S., & Ancrum, C. (2008). Criminal identities and consumer culture: Crime, exclusion and the new culture of narcissism. Cullompton: Willan. Hallsworth, S. (2013). The gang and beyond: Interpreting violent street worlds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hallsworth, S., & Young, T. (2008). Gang talk and gang talkers: A critique. Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal, 4(2), 175–195. Handler, R. (2012). What’s up, Doctor Goffman? Tell us where the action is! Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 18(1), 179–190. Hando, J., Darke, S., O’Brien, S., Maher, L., & Hall, W. (1998). The development of an early warning system to detect trends in illicit drug use in Australia: The illicit drug reporting system. Addiction Research., 6(2), 97–113. Innes, M. (2014). Signal crimes: Social reactions to crime, disorder and control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Irwin-Rogers, K. (2019). Illicit drug markets, consumer capitalism and the rise of social media: A toxic trap for young people. Critical Criminology, 27(4), 591–610. Kammersgaard, T. (2019). Harm reduction policing: From drug law enforcement to protection. Contemporary Drug Problems, 46(4), 345–362. Kirby, S., Quinn, A., & Keay, S. (2010). Intelligence-led and traditional policing approaches to open drug markets—A comparison of offenders. Drugs and Alcohol Today, 10(4), 13–19. Kleiman, M. (2005). When brute force fails. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

246 

J. Spicer

Leishman, F., & Wood, T. (2000). Mood swings: Debates and developments in drugs policing. In F. Leishman, B. Loveday, & S. Savage (Eds.), Core issues in policing (2nd ed., pp. 140–155). Harlow: Pearson. Loader, I. (1997). Policing and the social: Questions of symbolic power. British Journal of Sociology, 48(1), 1–18. Loftus, B. (2009). Policing culture in a changing world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Loftus, B., Goold, B., & Mac Giollabhui, S. (2015). From a visible spectacle to an invisible presence: The working culture of covert policing. British Journal of Criminology, 56(4), 629–645. Maher, L., & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health—Law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. British Journal of Criminology, 39(4), 488–512. Marks, M., Howell, S., & Shelly, S. (2016). The fluidity of ‘police culture’: Encountering the contextual complexity of policing street-level drug use. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 11(3), 318–331. Matrix Knowledge Group. (2007). The illicit drug trade in the United Kingdom. London: Home Office. Matthews, R. (2014). Realist criminology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. May, T., & Hough, M. (2004). Drug markets and distribution systems. Addiction Research & Theory, 12(6), 549–563. McLean, R., Deuchar, R., Harding, S., & Densley, J. (2018). Putting the ‘street’ in gang: Place and space in the organization of Scotland’s drug-selling gangs. The British Journal of Criminology, 59(2), 396–415. McLean, R., Robinson, G., & Densley, J. (2019). County lines: Criminal networks and evolving drug markets in Britain. London: Springer. Measham, F. C. (2019). Drug safety testing, disposals and dealing in an English field: Exploring the operational and behavioural outcomes of the UK’s first onsite ‘drug checking’ service. International Journal of Drug Policy, 67(1), 102–107. Morselli, C., Turcotte, M., & Tenti, V. (2011). The mobility of criminal groups. Global Crime, 12(3), 165–188. Moyle, L. (2019). Situating vulnerability and exploitation in street-level drug markets: Cuckooing, commuting, and the “County Lines” drug supply model. Journal of Drug Issues, 49(4), 739–755. Murji, K. (1998). The agony and the ecstasy: Drugs, media and morality. In R.  Coomber (Ed.), The control of drugs and drug users: Reason or reaction? (pp. 69–85). Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers.

9 Conclusion 

247

Nadelmann, E. (2004). Criminologists and punitive drug prohibition: To serve or to challenge? Criminology & Public Policy, 3(3), 441–450. National Crime Agency. (2016). County lines gang violence, exploitation and drug supply. London: NCA. National Crime Agency. (2018). County Lines drug supply, vulnerability and harm. London: NCA. Parker, H. (2006). Keeping the lid on: Policing drug related crime. Criminal Justice Matters, 63(1), 6–38. Parker, H., Bakx, K., & Newcombe, R. (1988). Living with heroin. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Pearson, G. (1987). Social deprivation, unemployment and patterns of heroin use. In N.  Dorn & N.  South (Eds.), A land fit for heroin? (pp.  62–94). London: Palgrave. Petrie, I., Ayrton, C., & Tinson, A. (2018). A quiet crisis: Changes in local government spending on disadvantage. London: New Policy Institute. Reinarman, C., & Levine, H. (1989). Crack in context: Politics and media in the making of a drug scare. Contemporary Drug Problems, 16(4), 535–577. Reiner, R. (2007). Law and order: An honest citizen’s guide to crime and control. Cambridge: Polity. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rengert, G. F., Ratcliffe, J., & Chakravorty, S. (2005). Policing illegal drug markets: Geographic approaches to crime reduction. New  York: Criminal Justice Press. Reuter, P., & MacCoun, R. J. (1992). Street drug markets and inner-city neighbourhoods: Matching policy to reality. In J.  B. Steinberg, D.  W. Lyon, & M.  E. Vaiana (Eds.), Urban America: Policy choices for Los Angeles and the nation (pp. 227–251). Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Robinson, G., McLean, R., & Densley, J. (2019). Working county lines: Child criminal exploitation and illicit drug dealing in Glasgow and Merseyside. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 63(5), 694–711. Sackmann, S. (1991). Cultural knowledge in organizations: Exploring the collective mind. London: Sage. Seddon, T. (2006). Drugs, crime and social exclusion: Social context and social theory in British drugs—Crime research. The British Journal of Criminology, 46(4), 680–703. Spicer, J. (2019). ‘That’s their brand, their business’: How police officers are interpreting County Lines. Policing and Society, 29(8), 873–886.

248 

J. Spicer

Spicer, J. (2020). Between gang talk and prohibition: The transfer of blame for County Lines. International Journal of Drug Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. drugpo.2020.102667. Spicer, J., Moyle, L., & Coomber, R. (2019). The variable and evolving nature of ‘cuckooing’ as a form of criminal exploitation in street level drug markets. Trends in Organized Crime. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-019-09368-5. Stevens, A. (2011). Drugs, crime and public health: The political economy of drug policy. London: Routledge. Stevens, A. (2013). Applying harm reduction principles to the policing of retail drug markets. London: International Drug Policy Consortium. Storrod, M., & Densley, J. (2017). ‘Going viral’ and ‘going country’: The expressive and instrumental activities of street gangs on social media. Journal of Youth Studies, 20(6), 677–696. Transform. (2009). After the war on drugs: Blueprint for regulation. Bristol: Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Wacquant, L. (2008). Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge: Polity. Waddington, P.  A. (1999). Policing citizens: Authority and rights. London: UCL Press. Wakeman, S. (2016). The moral economy of heroin in ‘Austerity Britain’. Critical Criminology, 24(3), 363–377. Whittaker, A., Densley, J., Cheston, L., Tyrell, T., Higgins, M., Felix-Baptiste, C., & Havard, T. (2020). Reluctant gangsters revisited: The evolution of gangs from postcodes to profits. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 26(1), 1–22. Windle, J., & Briggs, D. (2015). ‘It’s like working away for two weeks’: The harms associated with young drug dealers commuting from a saturated London drug market. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 17(2), 105–119. Young, J. (1971). The drugtakers: The social meaning of drug use. London: MacGibbon & Kee. Young, J. (2007). The vertigo of late modernity. London: Sage. Zaitch, D. (2005). The ambiguity of violence, secrecy, and trust among Colombian drug entrepreneurs. Journal of Drug Issues, 35(1), 201–228.

Index

A

C

Access, 27, 42, 44, 61, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97–100, 103, 180 Agency, 4, 10, 30, 37, 39, 64, 74, 94, 122–127, 130, 150, 160, 167, 179, 209, 232, 234 Arrests, ix, x, 28, 57, 58, 62, 69, 77, 117, 129, 160, 162–164, 166–169, 171, 173, 174, 177, 180, 182, 188, 189, 192, 193, 197, 201, 202, 206, 207, 230–232, 242 Axiomatic knowledge, 150, 196

Cannabis, 1, 75, 111, 172, 173, 197 Chronocentrism, 29–31 Closed markets, 33, 223 Commercialisation, 109, 113, 118, 132 Community policing, 75, 145 Control signals, 121–124, 203, 230, 236 Cop culture, 128, 153 Crack, vii, ix, 4, 6, 19, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30–34, 36–38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 67, 101, 107–113, 115, 116, 129, 131, 132, 149, 150, 161–163, 169, 173, 178, 183, 190, 191, 193, 198, 199, 205, 221, 223, 224, 226, 230 Crackdowns, ix, x, 58–61, 63–65, 67, 68, 74, 78, 117, 138, 151, 160–169, 182, 183, 188, 204–208, 214, 216, 231, 232

B

Backstage, viii, 93–96, 193, 203, 235 Branding, 114, 116, 223 Broome Report, 54, 229, 230

© The Author(s) 2021 J. Spicer, Policing County Lines: Responses To Evolving Provincial Drug Markets, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54193-4

249

250 Index

Crack house, 43, 63, 64 Cuckooing, vii, 6, 24, 41–46, 112, 114, 116, 120, 124, 125, 130, 131, 143, 149, 163, 167, 171, 178, 179, 181, 183, 190, 191, 234, 236, 239–241 D

Days of action, ix, 95, 159, 169–183, 230, 232 DDTRO, see Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Order Decriminalisation, 240, 241 Detectives, 9, 57, 62, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 99, 109, 111, 112, 114–118, 120, 122–125, 127–131, 138, 140–143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151–154, 160, 161, 165, 176, 189, 193, 198, 199, 203, 206–211, 213 Dirt, 132, 165, 224, 226 Displacement, 61, 62 Distance travelled typology, 21, 22, 45, 223 Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Order (DDTRO), ix, 138–148, 150, 151, 153–155, 229 Drug policy, x, 8, 14, 20, 64, 69, 73, 76, 79, 145, 208, 222, 235, 238, 240, 241 Drug scare, 5, 29, 226 Drugs service, 127 E

Ethics, 102 Ethnography, vii, viii, 9

Exploitation, vii, 6, 38, 39, 41–45, 72, 115, 118, 124, 130, 131, 146, 151, 154, 162, 163, 181, 190, 195, 227 Expressive, 38, 119–122, 149, 223, 225 Externalities, 6, 46, 71–73, 78, 118, 119, 131, 143, 147, 148, 153, 163, 190, 196, 205, 208, 227, 235, 239 F

Field notes, 90, 95, 99, 101, 102, 139, 172–174, 176, 180, 181, 196, 200 Franchising, 116, 189, 237 G

Gangs, 7, 23, 24, 29, 32, 35, 36, 39, 75, 113, 119–121, 138, 162, 167, 206, 213, 222, 223, 227 Gang talk, 35, 119–121, 132, 154, 222, 225, 229, 239 H

Harm reduction, ix, 9, 11, 13, 14, 54, 68–76, 78, 79, 94, 127, 132, 143, 144, 147, 178, 181, 183, 187, 188, 190, 192, 194–208, 214–216, 222, 234–237, 239, 240, 242 Heroin, vii, ix, 4, 6, 19, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30–34, 36–38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 63, 67, 108–115, 120, 127, 129–132, 149, 150, 161–163, 169, 171, 173, 178, 180, 183, 189–191, 193, 195,

 Index 

198, 199, 205, 211, 221, 223, 224, 226, 230 Hierarchy, 31, 36, 240 Hot spots, 58, 59 Housing, 96, 122, 123, 125, 126, 163, 168, 171, 179, 180, 204, 214 I

Ideal line, 187–195, 206, 215, 223, 239 Import market, 20–23, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40–43, 45, 68, 94, 112, 117, 132, 155, 164, 189, 191, 214–216, 221, 225, 226, 231, 239 Injecting, 61 Instrumental, 38, 119–122, 223 Intelligence, viii, 25, 55, 59, 67, 95, 101, 114, 115, 124–126, 138, 160, 164, 170–172, 175, 178, 180, 181, 188, 189, 191, 193, 199, 206, 209–214

251

Modern slavery, ix, 137, 146–155, 190, 229 Moral panic, 29, 227 N

National Crime Agency (NCA), 4, 22–28, 30, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42, 114, 121, 139, 140, 165, 222, 224, 227, 238, 241 NCA, see National Crime Agency Neighbourhood policing, 125, 126 Newsy topic, viii, 5, 91 O

Open market, 57, 175 Out-of-town dealers, ix, 33, 36, 41, 42, 46, 108–116, 120, 121, 123, 125, 127, 131, 139, 150, 152, 160–165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 177–179, 187, 188, 191, 192, 201, 212, 213, 215, 216, 223, 225, 226, 237, 239, 240, 242

L

Low hanging fruit, 67, 182, 216, 231, 232 M

Media, 2, 5–7, 24, 29, 30, 35, 38, 41, 46, 57, 60, 64, 67, 91, 107, 110, 118, 147, 153, 154, 160, 161, 163, 164, 193, 205, 224, 226, 239 Middle market, 31, 45, 55, 212 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, 1, 58, 146, 151, 178

P

Paperwork, 117, 141 Parks, 171, 175, 176 Partnerships, 89, 96, 121–124, 128, 133, 161, 166, 167, 203, 214 Pessimism, 167, 204, 234 Phone lines, 23, 24, 36, 38, 113, 114, 138–140, 142, 143, 145, 155, 229 Plain clothes, 175, 176 Political economy, 238, 240, 241 Politicians, ix, 5, 6, 25, 35, 69, 107, 138, 144, 146, 148, 229

252 Index

Pragmatism, 69, 131 Prioritisation, ix, 13, 14, 182, 188, 199–204, 206–216, 236, 237, 239 Prison, 26, 147–149, 152, 167, 189, 195 Problem orientated policing, 59, 63 Profits, 28, 38, 73, 108–111, 118, 119, 121, 224, 239 Prohibition, 11, 53, 56, 69, 70, 72, 75, 77, 79, 131, 133, 195, 198, 205, 208, 209, 236, 238 Provincial town, 7, 22, 23, 30, 95, 154, 174, 215, 222, 224 Purity, 26, 61, 63, 112, 115, 119, 132, 224 Push-and-pull factors, 35, 238 Pusher myths, 65, 118, 132, 225

Speakeasy, 114, 175 Street capital, 112, 147, 178 Street-level bureaucracy, 9, 163 Street sweeps, 57, 58 Structuration, 39, 145, 163, 232 Symbolic policing, ix, 10, 13, 64–68, 79, 155, 228, 234, 235 Symbolic policy, 65 T

Test purchases, 62, 114, 189 Top boys, ix, 36, 37, 118, 188–195 Treatment, 8, 240, 242 U

User dealer, 31, 33, 62, 67, 77, 115, 163, 241

R

Retail market, 21, 32, 43, 45, 55, 114, 115, 190, 223, 225, 226 Runners, 37–40, 114, 115, 118, 119, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 189, 190, 192, 237 S

Saturation, 11, 32–35, 45, 63, 110 Sitters, 37 Social bulimia, 239 Social deprivation, 238 Social policy, x, 14, 31, 222, 238, 240

V

Value-neutral, 70, 78, 194–195, 201–202, 215, 236 Victims, ix, 39, 42, 120, 130, 131, 150–152, 193, 212 Violence, vii, 6, 21, 24–29, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 62, 68, 69, 75, 76, 110, 115, 116, 119–122, 131, 143, 149, 161, 167, 168, 190, 193–195, 199, 204, 223, 225, 227, 239 Vulnerability, x, 13, 21, 42–45, 112, 118, 131, 146, 151, 154, 178, 181, 182, 234, 239

 Index  W

Y

Warrants, 31, 95, 145, 149, 174, 177, 193, 196, 200 Weapons, x, 24, 27, 28, 120, 168 Welfare checks, ix, 95, 102, 171, 172, 177–182, 189, 234

Young people, vii, 6, 7, 20, 32, 38–41, 45, 111, 118–119, 149, 150, 227, 238, 239

253

Z

Zero tolerance, 57, 58, 75, 77, 199