Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 30:3 Less Lethal Weapons 9781846634673, 9781846634666

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20/08/2007

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ISSN 1363-951X

Volume 30 Number 3 2007

Policing An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management

Less lethal weapons Guest Editor: Robert Kaminski

www.emeraldinsight.com

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management

ISSN 1363-951X Volume 30 Number 3 2007

Less lethal weapons Guest Editor Robert Kaminski

Access this journal online __________________________ 335 Editorial advisory board ___________________________ 336 Editorial __________________________________________ 337 Editorial introduction ______________________________ 338 Less lethal technology: medical issues Gary M. Vilke and Theodore C. Chan ______________________________

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Less lethal weapons: a technologist’s perspective Raymond L. Downs _____________________________________________

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Impact munitions: a discussion of key information David Klinger _________________________________________________

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Excessive force, civil liability, and the Taser in the nation’s courts: implications for law enforcement policy and practice Michael R. Smith, Matthew Petrocelli and Charlie Scheer _______________

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS continued

The impact of conducted energy devices and other types of force and resistance on officer and suspect injuries Michael R. Smith, Robert J. Kaminski, Jeffrey Rojek, Geoffrey P. Alpert and Jason Mathis __________________________________________________

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What we do not know about police use of Taserse e Kenneth Adams and Victoria Jennison _____________________________

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The impact of extended police stop and search powers under the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 Faiza Qureshi _________________________________________________

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Police officers’ attitudes toward citizen support: focus on individual, organizational and neighborhood characteristic factors Byongook Moon and Laren J. Zager ________________________________

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Community policing: is field training the missing link? Allison T. Chappell _____________________________________________

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The changing “soul” of Dutch policing: responses to new security demands and the relationship with Dutch tradition Dilip Das, Leo Huberts and Ronald van Steden _______________________

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Policing on the web ________________________________ 533 Perspectives on policing____________________________ 534 Book review_______________________________________ 539

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Dr Trevor Bennett Centre for Criminology, University of Glamorgan, UK

Professor Paul Mazerolle Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Griffith University, Australia

Inspector Patrick J. Devlin New York City Police Dept, New York, USA

Professor Mark H. Moore Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA

Professor Graham Farrell Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, Loughborough University, UK John Firman International Association of Chiefs of Police Research Program Information, Alexandria, USA Dr James Frank Division of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati, USA Dr Lorie A. Fridell University of South Florida, USA

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Dr Kenneth Novak Department of Sociology, Criminal Justice & Criminology, University of Missouri-Kansas City, USA Dennis E. Nowicki Chief of Police, Law Enforcement Center, Charlotte, NC, USA Dr Christy A. Visher The Urban Institute, Washington DC, USA

Chief Joseph McNamara Hoover Institute, Stanford University, USA

Dr Sam Walker Criminal Justice-Annex, University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA

Professor Stephen D. Mastrofski Administration of Justice, George Mason University, USA

Dr David Weisburd Institute of Criminology, Jerusalem, Israel and University of Maryland, College Park, USA

Editorial

Editorial In this issue, we are pleased to include a collection of papers exploring the use and effects of less lethal weapons. Professor Robert Kazinski of the University of South Carolina edited this special collection and deserves our thanks for his efforts in bringing these papers to publication. In addition to these six papers, the issue contains four more articles exploring other important policing issues. Two of these articles address the impact or “fit” of changes in police purposes or practices on community relations and organizational values or “soul.” The remaining two papers examine the relationship between the police and the community. One explores the adequacy of training for police to engage in community policing while the second explores police officer attitudes towards the community. All of the articles focus on timely questions concerning what police do, how they do it, and what may be the correlates of police practice. As usual, we believe this issue will be useful to police administrators and scholars who are seeking improved understandings of the police and police practice. The issue also contains the “Perspectives on policing” feature which reviews and summarizes much of the latest published research on policing. A “Policing on the web” review is also included. Finally, this issue contains a review of the recent book, Policing and Stress. We encourage you to consider contributing to the journal as well through preparing reviews, submitting articles, or even simply suggesting topics for future issues. As always, we welcome your suggestions and opinions about how we can improve the journal. Please feel free to contact us, should you have questions, comments, or concerns. Also, consider volunteering to serve as a manuscript referee. For the journal to continue its tradition of high standards requires the participation of police practitioners and scholars in the important roles of author and reviewer.

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Lawrence F. Travis III

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Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 338-340 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X

Editorial introduction Feudal police officers in Edo-era Japan (1603-1868) were known to carry probably the world’s first personal issue pepper spray device used to incapacitate resistive and combative suspects during arrest situations. Worn like a necklace, the device consisted of a small canister (sokutoku) filled with fine sand that had been boiled in a solution containing hot peppers. Designed to temporally blind criminals by “attacking the eyes” (metsubushi), officers removed the sokutoku’s plug with a short tug on its cord and blew sharply into the device’s mouthpiece to propel the mixture into an offender’s face (Cunningham, 2004, pp. 83-4). It is remarkable that the sokutoku was just one of several less-lethal weapons employed by feudal Japanese police designed to reduce the likelihood of suspect injury during arrest (Cunningham, 2004), while for the better part of the past 150 years modern police have had just two less-lethal choices; they could use their bare hands to grapple or strike or they could club or restrain suspects with a baton or other impact device. Two relatively recent developments radically changed the less-lethal landscape in law enforcement in the USA. The first, beginning in the 1990s, was the widespread adoption of modern day versions of the sokutoku, i.e. personal issue pepper spray or oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray canisters. Although the use of OC by law enforcement generated substantial controversy, the average patrol officer had for the first time a readily available and reasonably safe and effective alternative to hands-on tactics and impact devices[1]. The second major development in the less-lethal arena was the introduction of more effective conducted energy devices (CEDs) and their increasing adoption by US police forces during the 2000s. Whereas controversy over the use of OC has subsided in the USA, the use of CEDs by law enforcement continues to be the subject of considerable public debate[2]. A substantial body of independent research on OC has accumulated since its near universal adoption in the 1990s, but there have been few independent field studies on the safety and performance of CEDs and other less-lethal devices. Such studies are critical for informing the public debate regarding the appropriateness of these technologies for law enforcement and for the development of sound law enforcement policies to guide their proper and effective application. There is, in short, still much to learn. To help enlighten us, this special issue on less-lethal technology brings together contributors with expertise in a variety of areas related to less-lethal weapons and police use of force. Gary Vilke and Theodore Chan review the medical literature on blunt impact projectiles, chemical sprays, and CEDs. The authors discuss the history, mechanisms of action, physiologic effects, and the medical risks associated with these devices. One of their most important conclusions is that there is no conclusive evidence of a causal link between sudden in-custody death and the use of irritant sprays or CEDs, though they caution additional research is needed. Raymond Downs provides a comprehensive review of less-lethal technologies and the technical, operational, and management complexities and challenges involved in developing and deploying less-lethal weapons that ideally are safe, effective, affordable and practical. The principles outlined are particularly important given current

development efforts and possible near-term deployment of newer and exotic technologies, such as wireless CEDs, long range acoustical devices, and millimeter wave guns. David Klinger begins his presentation with a review of impact munitions, including their early deployment during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s, their more recent use by special weapons and tactics teams and regular patrol, their placement on use-of-force continua, and the extent to which various munitions have been adopted by American law enforcement agencies. Professor Klinger then presents a review of what is known from field research regarding the types of encounters in which these weapons are used by police and their outcomes. He concludes with a cautionary note for law enforcement regarding the proper tactical deployment of impact munitions. Liability associated with the use or misuse of force by police is an ever present concern for law enforcement officials. As Michael Smith, Matthew Petrocelli and Charlie Scheer point out, this is particularly the case when a new or emerging use-of-force technology is being adopted. Accordingly, they present a legal analysis of CED-related court decisions in the USA through January 31, 2007. They find that most reported cases result in the dismissal of claims against officers and municipalities for alleged CED-related excessive force violations. However, this was not always the case and the authors provide important information for police administrators wishing to remain compliant with emerging legal standards. Michael Smith, Robert Kaminski, Jeffrey Rojek, Geoffrey Alpert and Jason Mathis analyzed the effects of police use of CEDs and other types of force on officer and suspect injury using data collected from two law enforcement agencies. They found that CED use was associated with a reduction in the likelihood of officer and suspect injury and the severity of suspect injury in one agency. However, its use was unrelated to injury in the other agency. Recognizing that the disparate findings may be due to different histories regarding CED adoption and differences in the availability of other less-lethal weapons, the fact that the two agencies’ experiences with CEDs were not the same led the authors to call for additional research on CEDs in other settings. The special issue concludes with an article by Ken Adams and Victoria Jennison. They write that what we know about the impact of a new technology on an organization and its operating environment is limited during early stages of adoption. However, as adoption becomes increasingly widespread, policies and practice evolve demanding continuous research to ensure that new information is fed back into the knowledge base. Based on their review of what is known and unknown about police use of CEDs, it is apparent that we are in the early stages of the CED learning curve. The authors highlight a number of critical issues and areas for future research on CEDs. On a personal note, I thank Lawrence Travis for the opportunity to serve as Guest Editor of the Journal and I thank each of the authors for their contributions to this volume. Notes 1. So called “tear gas” (CS-CN), developed in the 1920s but not used widely by American police forces until the mid-1960s, was reasonably effective for crowd control situations and barricaded offenders but it was not very effective against individual suspects, particularly those who were mentally ill or intoxicated on alcohol or drugs. It also was ineffective against

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dogs, and cleanup and cross-contamination were significant issues (Foster, 2005). For these reasons CS-CN quickly lost favor with patrol officers. 2. OC spray and CEDs are, of course, not the only less-lethal weapons available to law enforcement. Others include pepper-ball guns, bean bag rounds, rubber bullets, flash-bang grenades, laser dazzlers and so forth. Typically used for special situations, such as barricaded suspects or crowd control, the use of some of these devices also has generated controversy.

Robert Kaminski References Cunningham, D. (2004), Taiho-jutsu: Law and Order in the Age of the Samurai, Tuttle Publishing, Boston, MA. Foster, R. (2005), Police Technology, Pearson Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm

Less lethal technology: medical issues

Less lethal technology: medical issues

Gary M. Vilke and Theodore C. Chan Department of Emergency Medicine, San Diego Medical Center, University of California, San Diego, California, USA

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Abstract Purpose – Less lethal weapons have become a critical tool for law enforcement when confronting dangerous, combative individuals in the field. The purpose of this paper is to review the medical aspects and implications of three different types of less lethal weapons. Design/methodology/approach – The paper conducted a comprehensive medical literature review on blunt projectiles, irritant sprays including oleoresin capsicum (OC), and conducted energy devices such as the Tasere. It reviews the history, mechanisms of action, intended and other physiologic effects, and medical safety risks and precautions of these devices. In particular, the paper focuses on the issue of sudden in-custody death and less lethal weapons, reviewing case reports, animal research and human investigative studies on this topic. Findings – In general, these three different types of less lethal weapons have been effective for their intended use. Each type of less lethal weapon has a number of physiologic effects and specific medical issues that must be considered when the weapon is used. There is no clear evidence that these devices are inherently lethal, nor is there good evidence to suggest a causal link between sudden in-custody death and the use of irritant sprays or conducted energy devices. Originality/value – While further research on the physiologic effects of these devices is needed, this paper provides law enforcement with a medical review of less lethal weapons including blunt projectiles, irritant sprays such as OC, and conducted energy devices such as the Taser. Keywords Law enforcement, Weapons, Police Paper type Research paper

Introduction Less lethal weapons have been a critical tool for law enforcement use when confronting dangerous, combative individuals in the field. Over the years, there have been many different less lethal devices used by law enforcement officers. These weapons include impact projectile weapons, irritant sprays and conductive energy devices (CEDs), which occupy an intermediate level in the use of force continuum. Use of these technologies is thought to increase the safety of both the intended target individual by avoiding the use of lethal force, as well as the officer by facilitating the control of dangerous individuals. However, injuries and deaths have occurred following the use of such weapons which were previously known as “less-than-lethal.” At times the injuries or deaths are directly linked to use of the devices, while in many cases, a causal link remains controversial. Impact or blunt projectiles include bean bags and rubber bullets. These weapons are less lethal than firearms and allow a safe distance between the officer and subject. Irritant sprays and riot control agents, such as tear gas, mace (CN) and oleoresin capsicum (OC), have been used by law enforcement to facilitate compliance and temporarily incapacitate violent individuals or crowds. CEDs such as the Taser have become increasingly popular in law enforcement as a less lethal technology to

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 341-357 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778787

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temporarily subdue individuals. In this chapter, we review the different types of less lethal weapons, including their history, mechanisms of action, intended and other physiologic effects, and medical safety risks and precautions. In addition, we review the research regarding the potential association of these devices with sudden in-custody deaths. This report includes a review of case reports, animal research and human research investigating this issue. In general, case reports of sudden deaths associated with these weapons cannot determine specific causality. Findings from animal research are limited in their applicability to humans. Even human studies investigating the physiologic effects of these devices may be limited depending on the specific conditions of the study subjects and how closely field conditions are replicated. Impact projectiles Impact projectiles are used as an alternative to standard firearm rounds when trying to disperse a crowd from a distance or subdue a combative, dangerous individual without the use of lethal force. Modern day impact projectile weapons were first used during the Hong Kong Riots of the 1950s and 1960s, utilizing projectiles made of wood. Similar weapons were used during conflicts in the Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine in the 1970s and 1980s. Early devices included hard rubber missile-shaped projectiles that were difficult to direct, resulting in injuries to the head, face and chest. These projectiles have evolved into PVC-type bullets, modern-day blunt rubber bullets, and bean bag type rounds, which are currently in use by law enforcement agencies. The action of the blunt impact projectile is to induce pain, irritation and minimal injury to the subject without causing any life-threatening injuries. In general, all involve a blunt type impact that can impart energies on the order of 100-200 Joules depending on the type of round and the distance from firing. The physiologic effects of blunt impact projectiles are directly related to anatomic location where the blunt impact projectile strikes the subject and induces blunt force trauma to the individual. Case reports, reviews and research studies The majority of the medical literature on this topic is based on case reports and case series. Both injuries and deaths have been reported with blunt impact projectiles which have caused injury by direct penetration into the body. Wawro and Hardy (2002) and Hardy report of a 56-year-old man who survived after his chest wall was penetrated by bean bag rounds fired from a 12 gauge shell at an unknown distance. Similar cases of intrathoracic bean bag penetration have also been reported by others, including penetration with intact bean bags as well as bean bag pellets when the bag fails (Charles et al., 2002; Grange et al., 2002). Suyama described 25 patients evaluated for injuries related to less lethal weapons implemented during a period of civil unrest in Cincinnati, Ohio. There were no deaths, but three patients required admission, including one with a pulmonary contusion, one with a liver laceration and one with an Achilles tendon rupture (Suyama et al., 2003). de Brito et al. (2001) retrospectively reviewed five years of bean bag injuries in Los Angeles County Hospital and reported on 40 patients with one death from a massive hemothorax caused by chest penetration of the projectile. In addition to penetrating trauma, blunt impact projectiles can also cause significant injury from blunt trauma. Chute and Smialak reported a case of a 61-year-old woman

shot in the chest with a plastic bullet (AR-1 baton round) who subsequently collapsed, suffered cardiac arrest and died. Autopsy showed she had sustained multiple rib fractures to the left chest, an underlying lung laceration, and heart lacerations that led to significant bleeding into the chest cavity. The cause of death was reported as blunt force injuries of chest due to plastic bullet wound (Chute and Smialek, 1998). Several studies have looked at the injury patterns from the use of plastic and rubber bullets. Their conclusions all tend to show that while generally regarded as less lethal weapons, significant injuries including death can occur when the weapons strike the chest, abdomen, or head. Millar et al. reviewed 90 patients who had sustained injuries to various parts of their bodies, concluding that the eyes, face, skull, bones, and brain are at greatest risk of injury from rubber bullets. The distance at which the rubber bullets resulted in serious injury ranged from 17 to 25 meters (Millar et al., 2005). Hughes reviewed 29 cases of injuries from a new plastic baton round in Northern Ireland. There were no fatalities, but seven patients required admission (Hughes et al., 2005). Steele retrospectively reviewed patients presenting to six hospitals during a one-week period of civil unrest in Northern Ireland who were injured by plastic bullets. He reported a total of 155 patients with 172 injuries, no fatalities, but 42 admissions, with three to intensive care. Of those in intensive care, one had globe rupture and multiple facial fractures, one had a laparotomy for three perforations of the small bowel and the third required splenectomy for a splenic laceration (Steele et al., 1999). Ritchie and Gibbons reported on 80 subjects injured by rubber bullets, with four who died, three from ventricular dysrhythmias secondary to cardiac contusion and one from a hemopneumothorax. An additional 19 patients required hospitalization for significant chest wounds (Ritchie and Gibbons, 1990). Commotion cordis is a rare occurrence when a direct blow to the chest causes a sudden fatal disturbance of cardiac rhythm in the absence of demonstrable signs of significant mechanical injury to the heart. Although, no in-custody death cases associated with impact projectiles have been specifically attributed to commotion cordis, blunt impact weapons generate energies that are on the order of those that have induced commotion cordis in other situations (such as an individual struck to the chest with a baseball). Therefore, one could speculate that these devices would have the same risk of causing ventricular fibrillation (VF) and sudden death. Overall, impact projectiles have been used widely and effectively as less lethal weapons. From the medical perspective, injuries and rare deaths have been directly related to the blunt traumatic force delivered by the projectile onto the individual. While efforts continue to focus on reducing this risk, it is unlikely that such injuries can be completely eliminated given that these devices are designed to deliver pain and irritation through blunt force. Irritant sprays Irritant sprays include agents like CN, CS, and OS (pepper spray), which can be used to disperse large gatherings or to temporarily incapacitate individuals. These agents are commonly dispersed as gases, smoke or aerosols, and therefore, may affect users as well as subjects. CN was first synthesized in 1871. It was used in World War I as well as served as the primary tear gas used by law enforcement and the military up through the 1950s. It is a colorless crystalline substance that can be disseminated in a smoke form from

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an explosive device, such as a grenade, or propelled as a liquid or powder. It acts as an irritant smoke when in contact with skin or mucous membrane tissues such as the eyes, nasal passages, oral cavity and airway. Symptoms of exposure include sneezing, rhinorrhea, coughing and increased airway secretions, as well as burning sensations of the nasal passages and airways. Oral cavity and gastrointestinal exposure can result in the sensation of burning in the mouth, increased salivation, gagging, nausea, and vomiting. Ocular exposure to CN causes a burning sensation in the eye, injection of the conjunctiva, eye irritation, photophobia, and tearing. Similarly, skin contact can result in burning, irrigation, and erythema. CS is an irritant agent first synthesized in 1928, and replaced CN as the standard riot control irritant agent in the US Army in 1959. Because of its perceived improved effectiveness, it had replaced CN in most law enforcement agencies in the USA by the lat 1950s as well. CS is typically disseminated by dispersion of the powder or solution by explosion, spray or smoke. Because of its insoluble nature, decontamination of buildings or other items after exposure can be challenging. CS also has a high-flammability rating and has been noted to have caused some structure fires (Danto, 1987). The clinical effects that may be seen with the use of CS are similar to those of CN, resulting in irritation and inflammation of the skin, airways, and mucous membrane tissues on exposure. The effects typically start within minutes of exposure and continue as long as the person is exposed to the material. After minutes of exposure, a sensation of skin burning will typically occur, particularly over moistened or freshly shaven areas. The degree of symptoms tends to worsen based on concentration and duration of exposure. Increased exposure can have symptoms progress to gagging and vomiting, more skin and mucus membrane burning and subjective tightness in the chest. These symptoms improve after removal of the exposure and gradually resolve over 30-60 minutes, but skin erythema may last up to several hours. However, if the exposure is with a high concentration of CS, under high temperature or humid conditions, severe erythema along with edema and skin vesication can occur, typically occurring within the first hour. Tolerance to CS has been demonstrated from prolonged or repeated exposures (Punte et al., 1963; Bestwick et al., 1972). During the riots in Washington DC in 1968, firefighters were often exposed to CS when they entered buildings in which the agent had been previously used. Movement around the building and use of water hoses re-aerosolized the material, causing erythema and edema on the skin of a number of firefighters (Rengstorff and Mershon, 1969a). In workers with repeated exposure and sensitization to CS, acquired contact dermatitis has occurred, confirmed by skin testing. Symptoms ranged from simple erythema to large vesicles and bullae. No pulmonary symptoms were reported (Shmunes and Taylor, 1973). OC or pepper sprays are derived from the natural oily extract of pepper plants in the genus capsicum. The use of OC spray by law enforcement agencies increased in the 1980s as the use of CS was on the decline, and by the 1990s, the majority of states had legalized OC spray use by the public (Smith and Greaves, 2002). Concentrations of OC may range from 1 to 15 percent, with the commercially available OC typically being about 1 percent in concentration. Delivery modes include liquid stream spray, aerosol spray, and powder delivered as a projectile. OC spray can cause direct irritation to the eyes, skin and mucous membranes. The onset of symptoms is almost instantaneous, causing burning and tearing of the

eyes, as well as eye spasm, ranging from involuntary blinking to sustained closure of the eyelids. Cutaneous symptoms may include flushing, tingling and intense burning sensation of the skin, particularly over recently shaved areas. Mucous membrane exposure, especially of the nasal passages, will cause irritation, rhinorrhea and congestion, with some subjects reporting nausea. Exposure of the airway and respiratory tract to aerosolized OC causes tingling, coughing, gagging and shortness of breath, as well as a transient laryngeal paralysis and a temporary inability to speak (Steffee et al., 1995). Case reports and reviews CN and CS: A few cases of severe allergic reactions have been reported with CN, particularly following a previous exposure. One case was reported in a military recruit who had been previously exposed to CN 17 years earlier which manifested as minimal itching at that time. Following a repeated exposure, he developed generalized itching, which progressed over the next several hours to generalized erythema all parts of his body except the face portion which had been covered by a mask. He developed a fever to 103 and by 48 hours had diffuse vesication and edema, followed ultimately by sloughing of much of his skin, but recovered (Queen and Standler, 1941). Other cutaneous reactions have been reported as well (Madden, 1951). Thorburn reported on the medical complications associated with prolonged exposure to CN in a prison where there were recurrent and prolonged exposures in closed spaces with limited ventilation. Cutaneous complications included first and second degree burns. Treatment with steroids and bronchodilators for laryngotracheo-bronchitis, inflammation of the airway, was needed in several patients, but none reported any permanent damage. All eye complaints were transient and required no specialized treatment, resulting in no corneal injuries or permanent damage (Thorburn, 1982). Chapman and White reported on a prisoner who was found dead under his bunk 46 hours after a reported prolonged CN gassing of inmates in cells with no ventilation. The deceased inmate was found in rigor mortis and on autopsy was noted to have evidence of inflammation and damage to his airway and lungs (Chapman and White, 1978). Another reported death occurred after closed room exposure with an estimated ten times the lethal concentration. On autopsy, there were similar findings as with the previous case (Punte et al., 1963). Park and Giammona report a case in which CS tear gas canisters were fired into a house resulting in a four-month-old infant being exposed for two-to-three hours. The infant required hospital admission for frequent suctioning of upper airway secretions and was treated with steroids and antibiotics as well as positive pressure ventilation for respiratory distress and wheezing. He was ultimately discharged home fully recovered after 28 days (Park and Giammona, 1972). Thomas et al. reported on nine marines involved with strenuous exercise and exposure to CS in field training who developed a transient pulmonary syndrome. They presented with cough, shortness of breath, hemoptysis and hypoxia, with some requiring close monitoring and treatment for hypoxia, but all nine recovered and demonstrated normal lung function within a week after the exposure (Thomas et al., 2002). Hu reported a case of exposure in an asthmatic who developed semi-chronic symptoms of cough and shortness of breath for up to two years after the exposure. Her FEV1 (Forced Expiratory Volume in 1 second) at four weeks post exposure was 62 percent of predicted and her forced vital capacity was 78 percent. At one and a half

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years after exposure, her FEV1 was 128 percent of predicted, with a 16 percent drop with brisk exercise in cool air (Hu and Christiani, 1992). Based on the report, it is difficult to determine if her subjective symptoms of dyspnea were related to her underlying chronic asthma rather than the CS exposure. The use of CS has resulted in reports of eye injuries, particularly when a tear gas cartridge is discharged at close range. In some cases, particles of agglomerated CS were driven into the eye tissue by the force of the dispersion device, typically a blast. In these cases, chemical reaction damage of the cornea was noted over the course of months to year, which are characteristically different than blast injuries from particles other than CS (Levine and Stahl, 1968). OC: Since, OC spray is commonly used by many law enforcement agencies, there are many case reports and case series of deaths and injuries following OC use (Steffee et al., 1995; Granfield et al., 1994; Pollanen et al., 1998; O’Halloran and Frank, 2000). Amnesty International claims that over 90 persons have died after exposure to pepper spray in the USA since the early 1990s (Amnesty International, 2005). Granfield et al. (1994) reported 30 cases of in-custody death following OC exposure, in which drugs and underlying natural diseases were a significant factor in a majority of these cases. O’Halloran and Frank (2000) reported of 21 cases of restraint in-custody death, of which ten of the restraint episodes were preceded by use of OC spray, and Pollanen et al. (1998) reported 21 in-custody restraint deaths of which four had been sprayed with OC. However, a causal connection between OC exposure and death remains controversial. There is no definitive evidence that OC is inherently lethal. In almost all of these cases of reported deaths associated with OC, the OC spray was determined not to have been the cause of death, with the exception of only one case. In that patient, Steffee et al. reported that a person who had a history of asthma and was sprayed with OC spray 10-15 times suffered a sudden cardio-respiratory arrest. Autopsy revealed severe epithelial lung damage with the cause of death attributed to severe bronchospasm probably precipitated by the use of pepper spray (Steffee et al., 1995). Billmire described a four-week old healthy infant who was sprayed in the face with a 5 percent OC spray when a key chain self-defense canister accidentally discharged. The child had sudden onset of gasping respirations, epistaxis, apnea, and cyanosis. The child required mechanical ventilation and extraocorporeal membrane oxygen support. The child was discharged home after a 13-day hospitalization (Billmire et al., 1996). An 11-year-old boy required intubation and ventilation four hours after exposure for severe croup (upper airway inflammation) that resulted from intentional inhalation of OC spray. He was extubated two days later and recovered uneventfully (Winograd, 1997). Since, OC is typically directed towards the face, symptoms often involve the eyes. Corneal abrasions have been reported in up to 7 percent by Watson et al. (1996) and 8.6 percent of cases by Brown et al. (2000). These findings have been noted as transient and do not require any additional treatment beyond decontamination with water irrigation. These temporary ocular injuries were also reported by Vesaluoma et al. (2000). Research studies CN and CS: There is limited human research on the risks of CN in terms of inducing disability or death. Although permanent eye damage has been reported associate with

the use of CN at close range, it is challenging to separate out whether the damage is from the CN or the actual weapon. However, at harassing or standard field concentrations, there is no evidence that CN causes permanent eye injury. Holland performed human studies in which 0.5 milligram of CN placed on subjects’ skin for 60 minutes caused irritation and erythema, as compared with CS which had no effects when used in amounts of less than 20 milligram. Skin vesication was seen with the same dose of CN when the skin was moist, whereas no vesication occurred with CS at levels of 30 milligram or less (Holland and White, 1972). There is little evidence that CS results in any permanent lung damage even after several exposures to field concentrations (Blain, 2003). In 36 subjects exposed to CS, Bestwick et al. (1972) found no change in tidal volume, peak flow or vital capacity when comparing pre-exposure values to those measured immediately afterward and at 24 hours post-exposure. In another study on human subjects, Punte et al. (1963) reported that individuals subjected to daily exposures to CS showed no changes in airway resistance immediately following, as four or ten days after CS exposure. In terms of other types if injuries, human studies have been performed to assess the effects of CS on skin using different concentrations and assessing the effects of various ambient temperatures and humidity levels. Subjects developed first and second degree burns at different levels and the authors concluded that many variables affect the likelihood of blistering, making risk assessment difficult to predict (Hellreich et al., 1967, 1969). Human ocular exposures of 0.1 or 0.25 percent CS carried in different solutions caused the inability to open the eyes for 10-135 seconds. Evaluation after the exposure via slit lamp examination noted a transient conjunctivitis, but no corneal damage (Rengstorff and Mershon, 1969a, b). OC: Because of its ability to block pain sensation and itching, capsaicin has been studied in many different clinical conditions including treatment of psoriasis, osteoarthritis, post-herpetic neuralgia, and diabetic neuropathy. These capsaicin-related pharmacotherapies have typically been associated with topical application of the agent. Given its ability to induce cough, capsaicin has also been utilized to study the cough reflex and the pulmonary system, as well as to assess the efficacy of various cough suppressants (Foster et al., 1991). Some animal and in-vitro human tissue studies have suggested that capsaicin increases airway resistance and bronchoconstriction (Lundberg et al., 1983; Hansson et al., 1992). However, clinical studies in humans with nebulized capsaicin are less definitive. Fuller reported that inhaled nebulized capsaicin resulted in a temporary increase in airway resistance that was dose-dependent, maximal at 20 seconds, and lasting less than 60 seconds (Fuller et al., 1985). Blanc et al. (1991) and Collier and Fuller (1984) both reported no significant decrease in FEV1 in subjects who inhaled nebulized capsaicin at concentrations sufficient to induce cough. However, direct bronchoconstriction caused by capsaicin may be masked by cough and deep inhalation as both have bronchodilatory effects. In fact, doses of inhaled capsaicin low enough to not induce coughing have been shown to cause changes in airway resistance and pulmonary function (Fuller, 1991; Maxwell et al., 1987; Hathaway et al., 1993). Unlike capsaicin, data on the human effects of OC spray are limited, particularly any interventional data (Ross and Siddle, 1996). A number of observational reports have been published assessing safety of OC spray use, including a two-year joint study

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by the FBI and US Army that reported that OC spray was not associated with any long-term health risks (Onnen, 1993). Chan et al. conducted a randomized, cross-over controlled trial in 35 volunteer human subjects who were exposed to either OC spray or placebo propellant without OC, followed by a ten minute period of being placed in either the sitting or prone maximal restraint position. Pulmonary function testing was performed and arterial blood gases sampled during this time. OC exposure did not result in abnormal pulmonary dysfunction, hypoxemia or hypoventilation when compared to placebo in either the sitting or restraint positions. However, there was an increase in mean heart rate and blood pressure in subjects exposed to OC that did not occur in the placebo group. The investigators concluded that OC spray did not result in any evidence of respiratory compromise with and without restraint that would make place subjects at risk for asphyxiation from OC exposure. The changes in cardiovascular parameters, however, indicated the need for additional study (Chan et al., 2002). Beyond clinical research in the laboratory setting, OC spray use has been widespread and a number of epidemiologic studies have reported on its use and safety. The California State Attorney General reported that no fatal consequences occurred in over 23,000 exposures to OC spray. Watson et al. reviewed 908 exposures to OC spray that had occurred locally and found that fewer than 10 percent of subjects required any medical attention, and more specifically less than 1 percent had respiratory complaints requiring medical treatment. None of these patients were determined to have any significant injuries. Additionally, no fatalities were reported in either of these studies (Watson et al., 1996; Lundgren, 1996). Overall, OC spray has been used hundreds of thousands of times with no long-term health effects reported. Although there are case reports of death following use, in the large majority of cases other causes such as drug intoxication, excited delirium or underlying medical condition, have been implicated as the primary cause of death in the large majority of these cases. Moreover, clinical and epidemiologic studies on OC have yet to report any compelling evidence that OC is inherently dangerous or lethal. Conductive energy devices CEDs were introduced into the law enforcement force continuum in the late 1970s. CED is a generic term referring to any device to subdue and control an individual by delivering electrical energy to the subject. The most well-known CED is the Taserw (Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle) energy device, but others on the market include the Stinger stun gun and the remote activated custody control (RACC) beltw. There are other electronic belts, shields, and a host of hand-held contact stun guns available to law enforcement. Many of these products are also available to the general public. In the past decade, the Taser has become the most popular incapacitating neuromuscular device on the market with an estimated 10 percent of all police officers in this country currently carrying the device (Hamilton, 2005). According to Taser Internationalw, Tasers have been purchased by over 9,000 police departments in the USA and abroad. The manufacturer asserts that the device helps officers avoid the use of deadly force while lowering the risk of injury to users. It has been reported that the device has been used on over 150,000 volunteers during training sessions and on over 100,000 subjects by law enforcement officers in actual field confrontations, though the true total number of uses is unknown (Taser International, 2006).

The Taser X26 is a handheld device resembling a handgun intended to be used on subjects up to 21 feet away. The energy output of the device is 26 watts total, 1.76 joules per pulse, at 1.62 milliamps, and 50,000 volts. It utilizes an automatic timing mechanism to apply the electric charge for 5 seconds. The device initially propels two probes at a velocity of 180 feet per second. The electrical energy is discharged through a sequence of dampened sine-wave current pulses each lasting about 11 microseconds. This energy is neither pure AC nor pure DC, but probably akin to rapid fire, low amplitude DC shocks. CEDs work by incapacitating volitional control of the body. These weapons create intense involuntary contractions of skeletal muscle, causing subjects to lose the ability to directly control the actions of their voluntary muscles. CEDs directly stimulate motor nerve and muscle tissue, overriding central nervous system control and causing incapacitation regardless of the subject’s mental focus, training, size, or drug intoxication state. Subjects report painful shock-like sensations and the feeling that all of their muscles are contracting at once. During the CED discharge, subjects are unable to voluntarily perform motor tasks, however they remain conscious with full memory recall. This effect terminates as soon as the electrical discharge is halted. Immediately after the taser shock, subjects are usually able to perform at their physical baseline. There is no known permanent lasting effect on the muscular system aside from any injuries that may result from an associated fall. There is a large experience of police trainees who have been tasered as part of their training. Most reported that the experience was unpleasant and declined to be re-tasered. A few subjects described a tingling sensation in the area under the probe sites lasting a few minutes after being tasered (Koscove, 1985). There is some residual muscle soreness reported by some who have been tasered. CED effects vary depending on the particular device used, body location of and distance between the probes, and the condition of subject. For example, probes spread apart over a larger distance on the subject’s body will have a greater effect because it allows for the electrical discharge to affect a larger portion of the body (Fish and Geddes, 2001). The effects of these devices have been reported to increase with the duration of application such that prolonged exposures may result in some sensation of fatigue and weakness even after the discharge is halted (Robinson et al., 1990). On the other hand, CEDs may fail to have their intended effect if the probes do not make adequate contact with the body, the probe spread is not wide enough thereby only affecting local muscle groups, or if the device fails to discharge. Case reports and reviews There has been a great deal of publicity in the lay press recently regarding in-custody deaths in subjects following use of the Taser (Hamilton, 2005). Amnesty International claims that more than 70 persons have died after Taser deployment by law enforcement. Some have postulated that the electrical discharge of CEDs on the body can induce life-threatening heart conduction abnormalities or cardiac dysrhythmias, disrupt normal respiration or cause metabolic derangements that could lead to death. However, there is limited research on the direct physiologic effects of CEDs and a direct causal connection between CEDs and the reported fatalities remains controversial. Kornblum and Reddy examined 16 deaths that were associated with Taser use over a five-year period. All of these cases involved young men with a history of drug abuse who were behaving in a bizarre or unusual fashion drawing police attention.

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The ultimate cause of death was determined to be drug overdose in the majority of cases. The authors suggest that most of the subjects died after being in a manic, agitated, combative state, known as agitated delirium. Drug intoxication itself caused or predisposed the subjects to have increased risk for sudden death, and that the taser was not likely the causative factor. There was one case, however, in which Taser was felt to be contributory. In this case, the subject had a history of cardiac disease, for which he had been told to get a pacemaker, but had not done so. On autopsy he had a diseased heart and lethal levels of PCP in his system, but the cause of death was listed as cardiac arrhythmia due to sick sinus syndrome, mitral valve prolapse, and electrical (Taser) stimulation while under the influence of PCP (Kornblum and Reddy, 1991). Overall, the authors of the report concluded that the Taser in and of itself did not cause death, but may have contributed in this one case. In a prospective case review conducted by Ordog in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s, 218 patients who presented to the emergency department after being shot with a taser were evaluated. These patients were then compared with 22 similar patients who were shot by police with 0.38 caliber handguns during the same time period. In 76 percent of the cases in which the Taser was utilized, subjects displaying bizarre and uncontrollable behavior. Ninety-five percent were men and 86 percent had a history of recent phencyclidine (PCP) use. The mortality rate in the taser group in this study was 1.4 percent (3 of 218 patients) and the morbidity rate was 0 percent. All three patients who died arrived to the emergency department in asystole, had high levels of PCP in their system and went into cardiac arrest shortly after being tasered, ranging anywhere from 5 to 25 minutes after taser deployment. The medical examiner’s reports on all three cases listed PCP toxicity as the cause of death, with no signs of myocardial damage, airway obstruction, or other fatal pathologic findings. Of the 22 patients shot with the 0.38 special, 50 percent of died and 50 percent had varying degrees of serious morbidity (Ordog et al., 1987). Strote et al. evaluated deaths associated with Taser use found via a search of Lexus-Nexus and Google. They identified 71 deaths associated with Taser use, with 28 (39 percent) having autopsy reports available. The average age was 34.8 years, all were male, and 39 percent were White, 46 percent were Black and 14 percent were Hispanic. No deaths were found to occur directly because of Taser use, but 21 percent reported a possible contributory component. Causes of death was felt to be directly drug related in 57 percent of cases, with 68 percent of the cases having cocaine or methamphetamine use. Excited delirium was either directly or indirectly responsible in 57 percent of cases and 46 percent of cases had significant pre-existing cardiac disease reported (Strote et al., 2005). Mehl reported a case of a miscarriage in a 32-year-old pregnant woman at approximately 8-10 weeks gestation one week after she had received a Taser activation. One probe lodged above the uterus in the abdomen, and the other in the left thigh. Reports of the duration of shock varied from 3 to 10 seconds. She fell to the ground and was reportedly unable to move for 5 minutes afterwards. One day later she began having vaginal spotting that continued for 7 days and was subsequently diagnosed with an incomplete miscarriage. Pathology analysis of the tissue from a uterine curettage revealed products of conception with extensive hemorrhage, necrosis, and inflammation. Though a temporal relationship is suggested between the Taser activation and miscarriage, no clear cause and effect relationship can be established (Mehl, 1992).

Research Human research on the effects and safety of CEDs is limited, with most physiologic investigations having been conducted in animal models. One of the reasons for the limited human studies is the requirement that such studies be approved by local human research protections committees, which are often wary of these devices because of preconceived notions based on media and press reports. In fact, the approval of the original devices were not based on actual human or animal studies, but rather theoretical calculations of the physical effects of dampened sinusoidal pulses, for which the US Consumer Product Safety Commission concluded that the taser should not be lethal to a normal healthy person (Obrien, 1991). One of the more common concerns regarding CEDs is whether these devices can cause cardiac dysrhythmias or cardiac standstill. The development of dysrhythmias or standstill would then cause the heart to not pump blood to the rest of the body, resulting in sudden death. The two main cardiac rhythm disturbances that are of greatest concern are VF, which is the lack of organized electrical activity and contraction of heart muscle cells, and asystole, which is the absence of any electrical activity. For externally applied current, the fibrillatory current (the current that produces VF in human beings is believed to be a function of the duration, frequency, and magnitude of the current, as well as the patient’s body weight and the timing in the cardiac cycle during which the current is applied (Koscove, 1985; Ferris et al., 1936; Kouwenhoven et al., 1959). The threshold for VF in men for externally applied, 60 Hertz current has been proposed to be 500 milliamps for shocks of less than 200 microseconds duration, and 50 milliamps for shocks of more than two seconds (Koscove, 1985). The longer a current flows, the greater the chance a shock will occur during the vulnerable part of the cardiac cycle (early ventricular repolarization which is approximately 10-20 percent of the cardiac cycle) (Forrest et al., 1992). The Taser X26 carries a current of 2.1 milliamps for a duration of 0.0004 seconds (Taser International, 2006). Additionally, resistance is also going to play a role into how much current actually flows for a given voltage (voltage ¼ current £ resistance). The lower the resistance, the larger the current that will flow. The total resistance of the body is the sum of internal resistance plus twice the skin resistance as current enters and exits the body (Forrest et al., 1992). A skin effect is known to exist when high-frequency electricity is used as these currents tend to stay near the surface of a conductor. Since, the Taser devices use very high-frequency electricity, the output of the Taser is believed to stay near the skin and muscle surface of the body and not penetrate deeply to the internal organs, such as the heart (Bleetman et al., 2004). A porcine study published by Roy in 1989 used an older model stun gun that produced high voltages (. 100,000 volts) and short duration pulses (, 20 microseconds). The investigators compared five different models of stun gun with varying energies. The average value of the current applied during each shock was calculated to be 3.8 milliamps. When towels were placed between the skin and the electrodes to simulate clothing, the maximum current spike was 190 milliamps with a pulse length of 20 microseconds. Using two anesthetized normal healthy pigs, the investigators were able to induce VF when the leads of the stun gun were applied directly to the heart or to the chest of one of the animals in which a cardiac pacemaker had been implanted. Important to note was that these adverse effects were immediate, not delayed. The authors surmised that the mechanism of action inciting VF was not

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pacemaker inhibition, but rather fibrillatory current directly accessing the heart via the pacemaker leads. This device’s shock also produced cardiac standstill when applied through layers of simulated clothing over a prolonged period. However, these findings only occurred with the two stun gun models delivering the highest energy. There were no cardiac effects seen with the lower energy units. This study demonstrated that VF was indeed possible, but only at very high-energy outputs and when the electrical discharge occurred directly over or with direct access to the heart (Roy and Podgorski, 1989). More recently, McDaniels and Stratbucker studied the Air Taser and Advanced Taser M26 in five anesthetized dogs with an average weight of 54 pounds. Over 200 electrical discharges of the devices placed directly over the chest failed to induce VF in any of the animals. The authors did note that when both probes were placed directly over the heart they were able to pace the heart similar to a pacemaker, but still did not induce VF (McDaniel et al., 2000). Stracbucker et al. studied 13 adult domestic pigs by applying Taser-like electrical discharge to the thorax similar to human use of the device, and then gradually increased the energy output above that level until VF was achieved. The investigators did not induce VF in the pigs until levels of energy 20 times that of the standard Taser level. When using energy levels below that threshold, 43/43 discharges did not induce VF (Stracbucker et al., 2003). In another animal study, McDaniel et al. evaluated the cardiac effects on nine pigs shocked using a device that delivered an electrical discharge identical in waveform and charge to the Taser X26 device. The electrodes were placed across the thorax of the animals using the barbs that matched the probes used by the standard device. The animals were shocked for 5 seconds, simulating field use of the device. The study used gradually increasing amounts of charge delivered to identify two levels. The first being the lowest amount of charge required to induce VF at least once, called the VF threshold. The second defined as the highest discharge that could be applied five times without inducing VF called the maximum safe level. The authors then compared this value to the standard device discharge and the ratio of the two values to determine the safety index. The study found that the electrical discharge required to induce VF was 15 to 42 times the energy output of a standard Taser discharge. This safety factor increased with the size and weight of the subject. The conclusion of the authors was that discharge levels output by fielded Taser devices have an extremely low probability of inducing VF (McDaniel et al., 2005). In one of very few studies in human subjects, Levine et al. conducted a study monitoring 67 subjects electrocardiographically immediately before and after Taser shock during police training sessions. The investigators reported no changes in cardiac rhythm, ECG morphology, or presence aberrantly conducted beats following the taser discharge. Mean heart rate increased by just over 19.4 beats/minute following the taser shock, but no abnormal cardiac dysrhythmias were identified (Levine et al., 2005). Recently, Ho et al. evaluated 66 volunteer subjects who received a standard five second Taser activation at a training course. The authors obtained venous blood samples before, immediately after, and 16 hours and 24 hours after activation. The blood samples were analyzed for troponin, myoglobin, lactate, potassium, glucose, blood urea nitrogen, creatinine, and creatine kinase levels. There were no significant changes from baseline values of the electrolyte or blood urea/creatinine ratio.

There was an increase in the serum bicarbonate and creatinine kinase levels at 16 and 24 hours. Serum myoglobin levels were elevated at all three time intervals post-Taser activation, but the troponin levels all remained , 0.3 nanograms per millilitre except for a single 24 hour post exposure level. That subject was evaluated at a hospital by a cardiologist, with no evidence of myocardial infarction or cardiac disability found. The troponin level returned to normal eight hours later (Ho et al., 2006). The potential for life-threatening cardiac dysrhythmias or cardiac muscle damage to occur as a result of the electrical discharge from current Taser devices appears to be low based on the available studies. However, there may be theoretical risks to patients with pacemakers or underlying cardiac disease, and the effect of recurrent or prolonged taser discharges remains unclear. To date, little research has been conducted on the non-cardiac effects of the Taser. An air force study published by Jauchem et al. investigated the metabolic effects of repeated taser activations on sedated swine that received five-second Taser activations alternating with five seconds of rest for three continuous minutes. The animals demonstrated transient, clinically insignificant increases in potassium and sodium, a significant decrease in blood pH (increase in acid level) that returned toward normal after 1 hour, a significant rise in blood lactate that returned to baseline after 2 hours, and a significant rise in whole blood pCO2 that returned to baseline after 1 hour. The correlation of these results to use in humans, where far fewer applications are utilized, is unknown (Jauchem et al., 2005). More recently, the respiratory effects of the Taser were studied in 32 human subjects who underwent a 5 second Taser discharge. In this study, pulmonary function, ventilation, oxygenation and carbon dioxide elimination were monitored in human volunteers up to 1 hour after the Taser shock. Overall, ventilation and respiratory rate actually increased during the first 10 minutes, then returned to baseline levels. The subjects did continue to breathe during the 5 second shock. There was no evidence of abnormally low oxygen or elevated carbon dioxide levels in the blood following the shock, suggesting the Taser had no detrimental impact on respiratory function (Chan, SAEM 2007). The effect of Taser discharges on neurologic function remain to be studied. Conclusion Impact projectiles, irritant spray agents, and CEDs are important in the use of force armamentarium for law enforcement when dealing with violent, combative individuals who place themselves and the general public at risk. While associated with rare cases of sudden in-custody deaths, it is unclear what causal connection may exist between these less lethal technologies and reported fatalities. In many instances, individuals were in conditions which placed them at high risk for sudden death regardless of what force was utilized. In addition, a combination of force methods may have been utilized in these cases. Further, research is needed to study the impact of these weapons on human physiology, as well as the underlying condition of those individuals who come in contact with law enforcement and are at greatest risk. References Amnesty International (2005), available at: web.amnesty.org (accessed March 28, 2005).

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Bestwick, F.W., Holland, P. and Kemp, K.H. (1972), “Acute effects of exposure to ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) and the development of tolerance”, British Journal of Industrial Medicine, Vol. 29, pp. 298-306. Billmire, D.F., Vinocur, C., Ginda, M., Robinson, N.B., Panitch, H., Friss, H., Rubenstein, D. and Wiley, J.F. (1996), “Pepper-spray-induced respiratory failure treated with extracorporeal membrane oxygenation”, Pediatrics, Vol. 98 No. 5, pp. 961-3.

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Blain, P.G. (2003), “Tear gases and irritant incapacitants. 1-chloroacetophenone, 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile and dibenz[b,f]-1,4-oxazepine”, Toxicological Reviews, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 103-10. Blanc, P., Liu, D., Juarez, C. and Boushey, H.A. (1991), “Cough in hot pepper workers”, Chest, Vol. 99, p. 27. Bleetman, A., Steyn, R. and Lee, C. (2004), “Introduction of the Taser into British policing. Implications for UK emergency departments: an overview of electronic weaponry”, Emergency Medicine Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 136-40. Brown, L., Takeuchi, D. and Challoner, K. (2000), “Corneal abrasions associated with pepper spray exposure”, American Journal of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 271-2. Chan, T.C., Vilke, G.M., Clausen, J., Clark, R.F., Schmidt, P., Snowden, T. and Neuman, T. (2002), “The effect of oleoresin capsicum ‘pepper spray’ inhalation on respiratory function”, Journal of Forensic Science, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 299-304. Chapman, A.J. and White, C. (1978), “Death resulting from lacrimatory agents”, Journal of Forensic Science, Vol. 23, pp. 527-30. Charles, A., Asensio, J., Forno, W., Petrone, P., Roldan, G. and Scott, R.P. (2002), “Penetrating bean bag injury: intrathoracic complication of a nonlethal weapon”, Journal of Trauma, Vol. 53 No. 5, pp. 997-1000. Chute, D.J. and Smialek, J.E. (1998), “Injury patterns in a plastic (AR-1) Baton fatality”, American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 226-9. Collier, J.G. and Fuller, R.W. (1984), “Capsaicin inhalation in man and the effects of sodium cromoglycate”, British Journal of Pharmacology, Vol. 81, p. 113. Danto, B.L. (1987), “Medical problems and criteria regarding the use of tear gas by police”, American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 8, pp. 317-22. de Brito, D., Challoner, K.R., Sehgal, A. and Mallon, W. (2001), “The injury pattern of a new law enforcement weapon: the police bean bag”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 383-90. Ferris, L.P., King, B.G. and Spence, P.W. (1936), “Effects of electrical shock on the heart”, Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineering., Vol. 55, pp. 498-515. Fish, R.M. and Geddes, L.A. (2001), “Effects of stun guns and tasers”, Lancet, Vol. 358, p. 687. Forrest, F.C., Saunders, P.R., McSwinney, M. and Tooley, M.A. (1992), “Cardiac injury and electrocution”, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol. 85, p. 642. Foster, G., Yeo, W.W. and Ramsay, L.E. (1991), “Effect of sulindac on the cough reflex of healthy subjects”, British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, Vol. 31, pp. 207-8. Fuller, R.W. (1991), “Pharmacology of inhaled capsaicin in humans”, Resp. Med., Vol. 85, p. 31, supplementary A. Fuller, R.W., Dixon, C.M.S. and Barnes, P.J. (1985), “Bronchoconstrictor response to inhaled capsaicin in humans”, Journal of Applied Physiology, Vol. 58 No. 4, p. 1080.

Granfield, J., Onnen, J. and Petty, C.S. (1994), Pepper Spray and in Custody Deaths, Executive Brief: Science and Technology, International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Institute of Justice, Alexandria, VA. Grange, J.T., Kozak, R. and Gonzalez, J. (2002), “Penetrating injury from a less-lethal bean bag gun”, Journal of Trauma, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 576-8. Hamilton, A. (2005), “From zap to zzzz. Time”, available at: www.time.com/time/magazine (accessed March 28, 2005). Hansson, L., Wollmer, P., Dahlback, M. and Karlsson, J.A. (1992), “Regional sensitivity of human airways to capsaicin-indu cough”, American Review of Respiratory Disease, Vol. 145, p. 1191. Hathaway, T.J., Higenbottam, T.W., Morrison, J.F.J., Clelland, C.A. and Wallwork, J. (1993), “Effects of inhaled capsaicin in heart-lung transplant patients and asthmatic subjects”, American Review of Respiratory Disease, Vol. 148, p. 1233. Hellreich, A., Goldman, R.H., Bottiglieri, N.G. and Weimer, J.T. (1967), “The effects of themally-generated CS aerosols on human skin”, Technical Report 4075, Medical Research Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, MD. Hellreich, A., Mershon, M.M., Weimer, J.T., Kysor, K.P. and Bottiglieri, N.G. (1969), “An evaluation of the irritant potential of CS aerosols on human skin under tropical climactic conditions”, Technical Report 4252, Medical Research Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, MD. Holland, P. and White, R.G. (1972), “The cutaneous reactions produced by o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile and 1-chloroacetophenone when applied directly to the skin of human subjects”, British Journal of Dermatology, Vol. 86, pp. 150-4. Ho, J.D., Miner, J.R., Lakireddy, D.R., Bultman, L.L. and Heegaard, W.G. (2006), “Cardiovascular and physiologic effects of conducted electrical weapon discharge in resting adults”, Academic Emergency Medicine, Vol. 13 No. 6, pp. 589-95. Hu, H. and Christiani, D. (1992), “Reactive airways dysfunction after exposure to teargas”, Lancet, Vol. 339, p. 1535. Hughes, D., Maguire, K., Dunn, F., Fitzpatrick, S. and Rocke, L.G. (2005), “Plastic baton round injuries”, Emergency Medicine Journal, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 111-2. Jauchem, J.R., Sherry, C.J., Fines, D.A. and Cook, M.C. (2005), “Acidosis, lactate, electrolytes, muscle enzymes, and other factors in the blood of sus scrofa following repeated TASER exposures”, Forensic Science International, Vol. 161 No. 1, pp. 20-30. Kornblum, R. and Reddy, S. (1991), “Effects of the Taser in fatalities involving police confrontation”, Journal of Forensic Science, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 434-48. Koscove, E. (1985), “The Taser Weapon: a new emergency medicine problem”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 14 No. 12, pp. 1205-98. Kouwenhoven, W.B., Knickerbocker, G.G. and Chestnut, R.W. (1959), “AC shocks of varying parameters affecting the heart”, Transactions of the American Institute Electrical Engineering (Communications and Electronics), Vol. 78, pp. 163-9. Levine, R.A. and Stahl, C.J. (1968), “Eye injury caused by tear gas weapons”, American Journal of Ophthalmology, Vol. 65, pp. 497-508. Levine, S., Sloane, C., Chan, T., Vilke, G. and Dunford, J. (2005), “Cardiac monitoring of subjects exposed to the taser”, Academic Emergency Medicine, Vol. 13 No. 5, p. S47. Lundberg, J.M., Martling, C.R. and Saria, A. (1983), “Substance P and capsaicin-induced contraction of human bronchi”, Acta Physiologica Scandanavia, Vol. 119, p. 49. Lundgren, D.E. (1996), “Oleoresin capsicum (OC) usage reports: summary information”, Report of the California State Attorney General.

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McDaniel, W., Stratbucker, R. and Smith, R. (2000), “Surface application of taser stun guns does not cause ventricular fibrillation in canines”, Proceedings of the Annu. Int. Conf. IEEE. Eng. Med. Biol. Soc., Chicago, IL. McDaniel, W., Stratbucker, R., Nerheim, M. and Brewer, J. (2005), “Cardiac safety of neuromuscular incapacitating devices”, PACE, pp. s284-7, Supplement 1. Madden, J.F. (1951), “Cutaneous hypersensitivity to tear gas (choroacetophenone)”, AMA Archives of Dermatology and Syphilology, Vol. 63, p. 133. Maxwell, D.L., Fuller, R.W. and Dixon, C.M.S. (1987), “Ventilatory effects of inhaled capsaicin in man”, European Journal of Pharmacology, Vol. 31, p. 715. Mehl, L. (1992), “Electrical injury from tasering and miscarriage”, Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandanavica, Vol. 1, pp. 118-23. Millar, R., Rutherford, W.H., Jonston, S. and Malhotra, V.J. (2005), “Injuries caused by rubber bullets: a report on 90 patients”, British Journal of Surgery, Vol. 62, pp. 480-6. Obrien, D. (1991), “Electronic weaponry-a question of safety”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 20 No. 5, pp. 583-7. O’Halloran, R.L. and Frank, J.G. (2000), “Asphyxial death during prone restraint revisited: a report of 21 cases”, American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 39-52, Erratum in: American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pahtology, Vol. 21 No. 2, p. 200. Onnen, J. (1993), “Oleoresin capsicum”, International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive Brief, p. 1. Ordog, G., Wasserberger, J., Schlater, T. and Balasubramanium, S. (1987), “Electronic gun (taser) injuries”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 73-8. Park, S. and Giammona, S.T. (1972), “Toxic effects of tear gas on an infant following prolonged exposure”, American Journal of Diseases of Children, Vol. 123, pp. 245-6. Pollanen, M.S., Chaisson, D.A., Cairns, J.T. and Young, J.G. (1998), “Unexpected death related to restraint for excited delirium: a retrospective study of deaths in police custody and in the community”, Canadian Medical Association Journal, Vol. 158, pp. 1603-7. Punte, C.L., Owens, E.J. and Gutentag, P.J. (1963), “Exposures to ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile”, Archives of Environmental Health, Vol. 6, pp. 72-80. Queen, F.B. and Standler, T. (1941), “Allergic dermatitis following exposure to tear gas (chloroacetophenone)”, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 117, p. 1879. Rengstorff, R.H. and Mershon, M.M. (1969a), “CS in trioctyl phosphate: effects on human eyes”, Technical Report 4376, Medical Research Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, MD. Rengstorff, R.H. and Mershon, M.M. (1969b), “CS in water: effects on human eyes”, Technical Report 4377, Medical Research Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, MD. Ritchie, A.J. and Gibbons, J.R.P. (1990), “Life threatening injuries to the chest caused by plastic bullets”, British Medical Journal, Vol. 301, p. 1027. Robinson, M.N., Brooks, C.G. and Renshaw, G.D. (1990), “Electric shock devices and their effects on the human body”, Medicine, Science and the Law, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 285-300. Ross, D. and Siddle, B. (1996), “Use of force policies and training recommendations: based on the medical implications of oleoresin capsicum”, PPCT Research Review, Belleville, IL. Roy, O. and Podgorski, A. (1989), “Tests on a shocking device- the stun gun”, Medical and Biological Engineering and Computing, Vol. 27, pp. 445-8. Shmunes, E. and Taylor, J.S. (1973), “Industrial contact dermatitis: effects of the riot control agent ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile”, Archives of Dermatology, Vol. 107, pp. 150-5.

Smith, J. and Greaves, I. (2002), “The use of chemical incapacitant sprays: a review”, Journal of Trauma, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 595-600. Steele, J.A., McBride, S.J., Kelly, J., Dearden, C.H. and Rocke, L.G. (1999), “Plastic bullet injuries in Northern Ireland: experiences during a week of civil disturbance”, Journal of Trauma, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 711-4. Steffee, C.H., Lantz, P.E., Flannagan, L.M., Thompson, R.L. and Jason, D.R. (1995), “Oleoresin capsicum (pepper) spray and ‘in-custody deaths’”, American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 185-92. Stracbucker, R., Roeder, R. and Nerheim, M. (2003), “Cardiac safety of high voltage Taser X26 waveform”, Proceedings of the 25th Annual International Conference of the IEEE EMBS, Cancun, Mexico, pp. 3261-2. Strote, J., Campbell, R., Pease, J., Hamman, M.S. and Hutson, R. (2005), “The role of tasers in police restraint-related deaths”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 46 No. 3, p. s85. Suyama, J., Panagos, P.D., Sztajnkrycer, M.D., FitzGerald, D.J. and Barnes, D. (2003), “Injury patterns related to use of less-lethal weapons during a period of civil unrest”, Journal of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 219-27. Taser International (2006), available at: www.taser.com (accessed May 3, 2006). Thomas, R.J., Smith, P.A., Rascona, D.A., Louthan, J.D. and Gumpert, B. (2002), “Acute pulmonary effects from o-chlorobenzylidenemalontrile ‘tear gas’: a unique exposure outcome unmasked by strenuous exercise after a military training event”, Military Medicine, Vol. 167, pp. 136-9. Thorburn, K.M. (1982), “Injuries after use of the lacrimatory agent chloroacetophenone in a confined space”, Archives of Environmental Health, Vol. 37, pp. 182-6. Vesaluoma, M., Muller, L., Gallar, J., Lambiase, A., Moilanen, J., Hack, T., Belmonte, C. and Tervo, T. (2000), “Effects of oleoresin capsicum pepper spray on human corneal morphology and sensitivity”, Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science, Vol. 41, pp. 2138-47. Watson, W.A., Stremel, K.R. and Westdorp, E.J. (1996), “Oleoresin capsicum (cap-stun) toxicity from aerosol exposure”, Annals of Pharmacotherapy, Vol. 30, pp. 733-5. Wawro, P.A. and Hardy, W.R. (2002), “Penetration of the chest by less-than-lethal ‘beanbag’ shotgun rounds”, Journal of Trauma, Vol. 52 No. 4, pp. 767-8. Winograd, H.L. (1997), “Acute croup in an older child: an unusual toxin origin”, Clinical Pediatrics, Vol. 16, pp. 884-7. About the authors Gary M. Vilke is a Professor of Clinical Medicine and Director of Clinical Research in the Department of Emergency Medicine at the University of California, San Diego. He is the former Medical Director for Emergency Medical Services at the County of San Diego. He has authored numerous publications and original research studies on less lethal weapons including Oleoresin capsicum spray and conducted energy devices. Gary M. Vilke is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected] Theodore C. Chan is a Professor of Clinical Medicine and the Medical Director for the Department of Emergency Medicine at the University of California, San Diego. He has authored numerous publications and original research studies on less lethal weapons, and is co-editor of the text, Sudden Deaths in Custody.

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Less lethal weapons: a technologist’s perspective Raymond L. Downs Cumberland, Maryland, USA

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Purpose – To provide a comprehensive picture of the wide range of technical, operational, and management issues that must be considered when developing, acquiring or using less lethal weapons for law enforcement agencies. Design/methodology/approach – The source of the insights provided in this paper come from a careful reading and critique of the less lethal technology literature and the organization of and participation in many less lethal weapon technology conferences, technical working groups, and peer review panels. Findings – The essential attributes of less lethal weapons for law enforcement applications are described as well as the many practical considerations that must be made when acquiring and using them. Practical implications – This review should help law enforcement and corrections agencies make more informed decisions on the acquisition and deployment of less lethal weapons and should also be a useful starting point for weapon developers. Originality/value – Scientists and engineers seeking to develop new or improved less lethal weapons for law enforcement will benefit from having in one source a basic insight into the complexities and challenges of producing a successful less lethal weapon. Non-technical professionals will gain a greater understanding of the difficulty in producing less lethal weapons that are both very effective and very safe, but also affordable and practical. Keywords Weapons, Law enforcement Paper type General review

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 358-384 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778796

Introduction The modern history of science and technology applied to less lethal weapons can probably be traced to the 1960s. A 1967 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA, 1967) provides a review of non-lethal weapons (the term most commonly used then and now by the military) that were either in current use, in the research and/or development stage or existed only as new weapon concepts and proposals. They evolved slowly. The report of the 1986 Attorney General’s Conference on Less Lethal Weapons includes a list of possible less lethal weapons that looks very much like that from 1967 (Sweetman, 1987). Nevertheless, though 20-years old this report remains an excellent source for reviewing the concept of less lethal technology, and the broad-based recommendations that came out of the conference continue to be important and relevant to those designing or using less lethal weapons. This paper begins by considering all the ways that less lethal weapons can potentially impact human physiology to prevent or reduce the level of threatening behavior. It then describes and reviews the various types of weapons, ranging from never fielded prototypes, to weapons in current use, to those still under development and testing and finally concludes with a list of general principles and requirements that

the author believes must be considered to develop or deploy a successful less lethal weapon[1]. Physiological phenomena For a less lethal weapon to be useful it must incapacitate, debilitate or disrupt the thought process of an individual, several individuals or a crowd of people for a period of time that enables law enforcement or correctional officers to restrain the subject(s) or in the case of a crowd, disperse them or prevent their advance. To understand what physiological phenomena may be subject to changing human behavior, it is helpful to consider three major categories: fully or partially immobilizing movement, depriving or degrading one or more senses and producing pain. Almost every existing or proposed less lethal weapon can fit into one or more of these categories. Immobilization – full or partial Immobilizing or partially immobilizing a person for a short time period to prevent him or her from exerting purposeful energy in a dangerous manner meets the definition of incapacitation. Some approaches to achieving this are: . restricting or confining the range of motion of arms, legs and hands of a targeted subject; . disrupting muscle and/or nerve functioning of the limbs; . inducing coughing or gagging thereby preventing purposeful use of limbs; and . degrading cognitive abilities or inducing unconsciousness. Sensory deprivation Depriving or degrading the use of human senses can often prevent a targeted subject from effectively threatening an officer or others either physically with hands or feet or with a weapon. The effect may sometimes be slight and/or fleeting but still be sufficient to give officers an adequate “edge” allowing them time to employ other less lethal tools or simply “swarm” and physically overpower a subject resulting in minor or no injuries to the subject or officers. The loss of vision, for example, while not stopping motion could prevent purposeful and effective threat from a targeted subject. Loss or degradation of hearing, even if below the pain threshold, may not have much effect on the behavior of an individual but can prevent communication between multiple subjects and their coordinated behavior in a riot scenario. The sense of smell is not something required for coordinated use of force by a target subject, but assaulting this sensory organ with foul odors while not necessarily depriving or degrading a threat capability could cause persons to leave an area. Less lethal weapons creating sensory deprivation must have a good focusing capability or officers will have to wear protective gear to avoid exposure. Pain compliance Inducing pain in the context of a less lethal weapon and incapacitation is meant here to create a sensation that is so unpleasant that a person will immediately or gradually, depending on the type and degree of the source of pain, change their dangerous and/or illegal behavior to stop the effect. If the pain induced is instantaneous and severe a person may react immediately and involuntarily. If pain is induced gradually and

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increased in intensity over time which can still be fairly short, a person may consciously and voluntarily change their behavior if doing so will stop the pain. The distinction, though sometimes blurred between pain as a route to incapacitation rather than the phenomenon in the other two categories above, is that in many but not all cases the response by a targeted subject may be more voluntary than involuntary. Although any nerve or nerve group in the body can experience pain, it is perhaps helpful in a less lethal weapon context to think in terms of the response of distinct body parts or organs and their associated nerves to some type of external assault. Some of the most obvious ones that everyone has probably experienced at some level are those associated with limb muscles (a twisted ankle), skin (sunburn or pricks from thistles), eyes (the ophthalmologists’ bright light in a dilated eye) and ears (emergency vehicle sirens). Weapon types Some of the weapon concepts described below exist as commercially available less lethal weapons currently fielded by civilian law enforcement and corrections agencies. Other weapon concepts also described include those that were developed into prototype weapons and then abandoned, and some that are still in various stages of research, development and testing. The National Research Council (NRC, 2003) published a monograph in 2003 providing a comprehensive assessment of less lethal weapons for military application and made recommendations for their further development to meet the needs of all service branches. Many of these weapons are similar to those used in civilian law enforcement and corrections. Some of the more esoteric military less lethal weapons under development may eventually become part of the civilian armory. Police in other countries are actively pursuing development of new less lethal weapons. The UK in particular has developed and thoroughly tested many less lethal weapons especially impact weapons, chemical irritants and conducted energy devices (CEDs). Extensive reports have been published on the progress of this work over the past five years (Donnelly, 2001; Patten Reports, 2002/2006). The sharing of experiences and data on less lethal weapon development, operations and protocols in international workshops and other forums aids in the evolution of optimum weapons and best practices (Pennsylvania State University, 2002) (Table I). Less lethal weapons are designed to generate one or more of the physiological responses noted above. Except for chemically based weapons, most of them can be grouped into categories according to the source of energy that produces a physiological effect. This is the classification scheme used here. All have been developed at least to the feasibility or prototype stage and appeared in the news media. They will be described briefly in the context of their intended function. Kinetic energy Batons, impact projectiles and entanglement devices are included in the category of kinetic energy weapons. Batons are direct impact weapons, and their blunt trauma force is delivered by the muscles of the officer producing at least partial and temporary immobilization and of course pain. Impact projectiles propelled by gunpowder or compressed gas produce blunt trauma as the debilitating or partially immobilizing effect but at a stand-off distance that varies from 10 to 40 feet or greater in a few cases. They differ widely in their levels

X X

X

Induce coughing

X

X

X

X

Induce gagging

Pain compliance

X X

X

X

X

X X

X

X X

X

X

X X X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

Vision Hearing Skin Eyes Ear

Sensory deprivation or degradation

Notes: X’s denote where a technology concept has been or could be used to affect an incapacitating physical phenomenon; *these technologies could be used to enable of enhance the performance of one or more of the less lethal weapons in categories 1 through 5

X

X X

X

X

X

X X X

Immobilization – full or partial Freeze or disrupt Induce muscles unconsciousness

X

X X X X

X

Stop or degrade movement

1.0 Physical or mechanistic effects weapons 1.1 Direct impact 1.2 Projectile impact (solid, liquid, gas) 1.3 Entangle 1.4 Stick 1.5 Slip 1.6 Obscure vision 2.0 Electrical shock/stun weapons 2.1 Direct contact 2.2 Projectile – wires 2.3 Projectile – wireless 3.0 Acoustical weapons 3.1 Audible sound 3.2 Infrasound or ultrasound 4.0 Chemical weapons 4.1 Irritants 4.2 Calmatives and anesthetics 4.3 Malodorants 5.0 Directed energy weapons 5.1 Light 5.2 Millimeter waves 6.0 Enabling or enhancing technologies 6.1 Precise targeting * 6.2 Combined effects

LTL weapon technology concepts (energy source)

Physiological phenomenon of incapacitation

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Table I. Physiological phenomenon of incapacitation and LL weapon technology concepts

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of accuracy and potential safety and effectiveness (Klinger, this issue; Hubbs and Klinger, 2002; Kenny et al., 2001a; Donnelly, 2001; Patten Reports, 2002/2006). They are typically delivered by shoulder-fired weapons as simple as a standard 12-gauge shotgun or a 37 or 40 mm launcher also used to fire gas grenades. They are fairly crude weapons and with few exceptions are not very accurate. Their biggest challenge is to deliver a projectile with enough energy to be effective at long stand off distances (a maximum of about 130 feet for thrown rocks) yet not be deadly at short distances. Blunt trauma weapons can be deadly if the impact force is too great or if there is significant penetration of the skin. Effectiveness and particularly safety degrade rapidly with loss of accuracy down range. One of the most recent commercial designs (the FN303e from FN Herstal company) employs an aerodynamically shaped projectile (about 12-gauge diameter) fired from a riffled barrel using compressed air. It is much more accurate at extended ranges than most impact projectile weapons[2]. A more radical design, still under development for law enforcement use, is a ring-airfoil projectile, a rubber cylinder fired from a special launcher. The projectile is reported to be non-lethal at the muzzle, and it is diameter of 2 inches is larger than a human eye socket precluding penetration[3]. Prototype weapons firing “slugs” of water have been built but never commercialized. Vehicle-mounted water cannons as less lethal weapons have been evaluated and are available in some countries (Donnelly, 2001; Patten Reports, 2002/2006). If the pressure is controlled appropriately, it is probably a relatively safe and effective tool in some riot control scenarios, but the use of fire hoses against civil rights protestors during the 1960s has left such a negative image in the public’s mind that a water cannon may never be acceptable in the USA as a less lethal weapon. A vortex ring gun that fires a “slug” of compressed air has been developed into a prototype less lethal weapon (Lucey and Jasper, 1998) and has undergone testing, but this military-based program was terminated by DoD in 1998 (NRC, 2003). The only entanglement devices that have been commercialized are nets. Several capture nets have been commercialized, and one of these, WebShote had some sales but no longer appears to be on the market[4]. Although nets do not have the potential health concerns of chemical or electrical weapons, the problem of disarming and handcuffing subjects entangled in a net may have discouraged their use. Conducted energy devices The incapacitating effect of electrical shock less lethal weapons or CEDs is produced by contact to exposed skin or clothing with electrodes connected to a battery powered device that when activated completes the circuit of a pulsed wave of high voltage and low-amperage current. The electrical shock can cause pain and/or muscle contractions that result in loss of ability to make coordinated and directed movement including standing or holding a weapon. There are currently three types or categories of electrical shock less lethal weapons: (1) Direct contact weapons typified by either handheld devices that allow an officer to touch subjects with two electrodes, a belt with embedded electrodes worn by prisoners that can be activated remotely or an electrified shield carried by a correctional officer. (2) Weapons that fire barbed electrodes with trailing wires from a handheld launcher and power source.

(3) A stand off weapon with a long range that produces an electrical shock but does so without any wires attached to the launcher. In the first two categories, the probes or barbs in contact with the subject complete an electrical circuit, and current flows into the body from wires attached to the launcher either immediately on contact of the probes or barbs with skin or clothing or when a manually controlled operator switch is activated by the shooter. The TASERw electronic control device is probably the best known of the barbed electrode devices with trailing wires, but a similar competitive device with tethered barbs available from Stinger Systemse the STINGER S-200e has recently appeared on the market. CEDs have become extremely popular with law enforcement agencies and are used widely attesting to their perceived effectiveness. Their use is not without controversy concerning health and safety risks. In some police-citizen encounters subjects shocked with the weapons have subsequently died. The characteristics of these encounters often resemble those where officers used pepper spray and the exposed subjects died. The literature on all aspects of the TASER electronic control device use is growing significantly (See Adams and Jennison for applications and policy discussions and Vilke and Chan and Smith et al. for health and safety discussions, all in this issue). A recently published document on the development of standards for CEDs should help significantly in establishing best practices for their use leading to enhancements in both safety and effectiveness (Cronin and Ederheimer, 2006). Wireless CEDs represent the next generation of conducted energy less lethal weapons holding out the promise of increased accuracy, precision, reliability and longer range than wire-tethered weapons, but they will undoubtedly come with their own set of effectiveness and safety issues. Two approaches have arisen to eliminate wires: (1) generate an electrically conductive path in the air between the weapon operator and the targeted subject and immediately inject a high voltage low-amperage electrical discharge; and (2) generate a shock from the discharge of a projectile containing the required electrical energy source. Ideas for creating conductive paths between the shooter and the subject include explosively projecting a stream of tiny conductive fibers or creating ionized air paths with laser beams[5]. The use of a laser beam in the latter concept has some attributes of directed energy weapons, described more fully below, but because the laser beam creates a temporary conductive channel for an electrical discharge from another energy source that produces the incapacitating effect it seems more appropriate to consider it a CED device. Also, it is not the same phenomenon as the pulsed energy projectile (PEP) weapon that uses a pulsed laser beam to deliver energy directly to the targeted subject. Launcher size and complexity of the technologies and public reaction to a lightening-like beam may make these approaches more difficult to develop into a practical weapon than the somewhat more straightforward projectile concepts. One of the wireless projectile concepts uses embedded piezoelectric crystals that generate an electrical shock from the pressure produced by the projectile’s impact with the targeted subject’s body. Somewhat similar is a projectile that employs an embedded thin-film charge storage device that likewise generates an electrical shock on impact. Two more conventional wireless projectile concepts under development

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require the projectile to attach to the targeted subject on contact and deliver pulsed high voltage low-amperage currents similar to existing CEDs[6]. One of these developers, TASER International, expects its wireless CED called the Extended Range Electro-Muscular Projectile (XREPe) to be available in 2007. Chemical based Chemical-based less-lethal weapons include irritants, anesthetic/calmatives, obscurants, malodorants, slippery materials and sticky materials. The first two operate by producing some type of change in the body chemistry of exposed individuals while the latter are more physiologically benign. Irritants in the form of sprays from small pressurized canisters carried by officers or in the form of gas or aerosols from grenades are probably the most widely used less lethal weapon in policing today. These chemicals inflame the skin, cause tearing and closing of the eyes and varying degrees of swelling of the breathing passages resulting in coughing and restricted breathing. Pain and difficulty breathing can distract or incapacitate. Traditional tear gases have now been largely displaced by OC, an acronym for oleoresin capsicum the crude oily residue multi-component extract of the Capsicum (cayenne pepper) plant, or pelargonic acid vanillyamide (PAVA) a trace component found in OC that can be prepared synthetically as a single pure compound. Products from both materials are called pepper spray. In a survey reporting on 878 incidents of one-on-one uses of pepper spray officers were asked different questions to judge effectiveness. In about 85 percent of incidents officers reported that OC helped ease arrest, but when asked if the suspects were incapacitated, only 71 percent said yes (Kaminski et al., 1999). The analysis of nearly 800 uses of OC by Dutch police officers showed that OC was generally effective, but less effective on suspects under the influence of drugs, violent suspects, minority suspects and those warned before being exposed to OC (Adang et al., 2006). Deaths have occurred after people have been sprayed with OC creating concerns and controversy regarding its safety (Smith and Stopford, 1999). Pepper spray safety has been addressed by both clinical and case studies. The former are based on medical data collected on volunteers exposed to pepper spray while the latter are based on the collection and analysis of post-incident information from incidents where pepper spray has been used in the field. Clinical studies of particular interest are those by Chan et al. (2002) on respiratory effects and a study by Zollman et al. (2000) on effects on the eyes. In a case study conducted by forensic pathologist Charles Petty, 63 police-citizen encounters were examined where OC-exposed suspects subsequently died. Based on an analysis of all the information available, he concluded there is no evidence that OC as used by law enforcement officers in confrontational situations is a total or contributing cause of death except when preexisting asthma or a disease-narrowed airway is present, conclusions in two of the deaths (NIJ, 2003). Interestingly, OC was noted to be effective in only 20 percent of these encounters. Calmatives, those agents that can produce calm or tranquil behavior when administered to both animals and humans, include a broad category of central nervous system depressants. Anesthetic agents comprise one group in this category. It is helpful to discuss calmatives and anesthetics separately because in both the popular mind and in the context of a less lethal weapon application they connote very different things. One typically associates a calmative with a tranquilizer drug such as

Valium that generates a sense of calmness, but an anesthetic is typically associated with a drug that produces a state of unconsciousness, a different physiological state. One possible less lethal approach for dealing with the “fleeing felon” scenario mentioned in the 1986 Attorney General’s Conference on Less Lethal Weapons was a chemical dart (Sweetman, 1987). This led the National Institute of Justice in 1987 to begin funding what became a five-year program at the Army’s Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Command (ERDEC) to investigate anesthetic chemical candidates and develop a prototype dart system that could deliver by injection an anesthetic agent to a suspect. Because of increasing concerns in the early 1990s over possible liability from use of a chemical dart and the view by some that this less lethal weapon was perhaps too risky or extreme a solution for most threat scenarios, a decision was made to get another assessment or “second opinion” on this topic. Andresen and Grant (1997) provided an assessment of the best candidate anesthetic compounds for less lethal weapon applications, basically the same class of compounds as those identified in the ERDEC report. They also suggested a non-injectable delivery route for the drug, a transdermal dosing from a small solvent soaked “sponge” projectile fired from a simple launcher. They concluded it should be possible to use one of the fentanly-related opioids as the basis for developing a less lethal weapon based on an anesthetic chemical agent. Several factors besides liability mitigate against using less lethal anesthetic weapons “on the street.” The subjects encountered who could be the targets of the weapons may be on illegal drugs and could be put at high risk with a less lethal anesthetic drug, and controlling and protecting the anesthetic “ammunition” would be difficult. Fentanly is a recognized and increasingly popular street drug. Given the increased possibility of threat scenarios involving terrorists, anesthetics may yet have a role as a less lethal weapon. One obvious application is to stop terrorists or suicidal cult members from carrying out their mission when holding many people hostage in a confined space where it may be difficult to use deadly force even when justified. In the USA, a multiple-hostage scenario occurred at a Waco, Texas commune of the Branch Davidians in 1993, and in October 2002 a Moscow theater was taken over by explosive-carrying Chechen rebels. The physical environments and many other details of the two scenarios were very different as were the tools and tactics available to special law enforcement or military units. Both turned out tragically, but the use of anesthetic agents in the latter case probably saved hundreds of lives. More than 800 people attending a stage show were taken captive by 50 hostage takers who had guns and explosives. Some had explosives strapped to their bodies. A Special Forces unit of the Russian military used an anesthetic chemical agent (possibly a mixture of chemicals in gaseous and/or aerosol form) to rapidly induce unconsciousness. This technique achieved the goal of preventing hostage takers from killing their victims by setting off explosives. Although 750 hostages were rescued, more than 128 died during or after the incident. Of these, 123 deaths have been attributed to the gas. The health of many hostages was undoubtedly compromised by the extreme conditions that existed during the three day siege before exposure to the anesthetic agents (Brown and Baker, 2002; Wax et al., 2003). A comprehensive literature review and assessment of calmatives was published in 2000 by the Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine (Lakoski et al., 2000). The authors concluded that pharmacological agents can effectively act on the central

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nervous system tissues and produce less anxious, less aggressive, more tranquil-like behavior making it easier to manage an individual. Calmatives may in principle also find use for managing crowds, however, there are significant health and effectiveness issues to address before such an application and use of an indiscriminant calmative agent against crowds will almost certainly raise legal and public acceptability issues. Malodorants as less lethal weapons have had their share of newspaper and magazine headlines and articles, probably out of proportion to the amount of serious research and development expended. However, they have been considered as less lethal weapon options for many years, and the level of interest and R&D work on them has increased in recent years. Their possible applications include crowd control and clearing a space or (somewhat analogously) area denial. The chemical agent in liquid or aerosol form could be delivered in a variety of ways depending on whether the objective is to target individuals in a crowd, spread the agent over a crowd, cover a specific outdoor area or deny access to a room or building. Targeting a single individual with a foul smelling substance could at least partially incapacitate him or her by inducing a gagging response as well as repulsing others and reducing the chance of organized violent or destructive behavior. Use on a crowd could presumably be a strong deterrent and result in people leaving the area. Dispensing the malodorant over an outdoor area could create a non-physical barrier deterring approach to an off-limits area. There are many possible chemical candidates for malodorants, but like calmatives their safety and effectiveness must first be established. Some malodorants might be countered with nose-plugs, but others would likely be so invasive that only a gas mask would prevent their effects. A possible disadvantage of such chemicals is that they may discourage arrest by officers fearing contamination when this would otherwise be an appropriate action. Their use would very likely require that officers wear gas masks. The biggest concern may be decontamination of individuals if arrests are made and decontamination of the interior or exterior spaces where the agent is used. Whenever a malodorant is used outdoors it will, like tear gas, be subject to the effects of wind and may produce unwanted contamination of people, buildings, vehicles or other nearby objects. It seems that some level of residual persistency of the agent is required for its effectiveness as a crowd dispersant or as an area denial tool, but this property may also increase the level of active decontamination effort required. The problem will be exacerbated if something other than soap and water is needed for decontamination. The use of a sticky material to incapacitate a violent person is a concept like many others that has been on the brainstorming list of ideas for less lethal weapons for decades. It conjures up images of a harmless material dispersed in such a manner that it would prevent someone from effectively using a handheld weapon or fleeing from the scene of a police-citizen confrontation. A prototype device to demonstrate this concept was constructed and tested (Scott, 1997) but the disadvantages were found to outweigh advantages and the concept has not been pursued. Like sticky materials, substances that can be dispensed to produce a slippery surface have also been on various brainstorming lists for decades as a less lethal area denial tool. Anti-traction materials can make it very difficult for humans or vehicles to make controlled movements on surfaces that have been coated. Ultimate removal can be achieved by applying large quantities of water, but in the meantime, police officers and medical personnel will be as inhibited by the slippery material from traversing the

covered area as any threatening person or crowd. Slippery agents have not received much attention as a law enforcement less lethal weapon but have been investigated by the departments of defense and energy for force protection applications. Obscurants are chemical or inert physical materials that create a barrier to vision but are not meant to induce pain or any other physiological effect. They can be dispensed into a crowd to degrade vision and reduce the ability of people to effectively carry out violent behavior or access a prohibited area. Materials in this category include smoke and foams. When used to block vision, smoke can provide extra time for law enforcement officers to prepare for coordinated action to physically stop or restrain offenders. Donnelly (2001) describes some of the characteristics of smoke as a less lethal technology tool. Stabilized aqueous foams have been evaluated for their potential use as a less lethal weapon that can both obscure vision and prevent verbal communication when subjects are immersed in it, particularly when used in an enclosed environment such as a prison (Goolsby, 1997). Although health and safety risks appear minimal, the incapacitating effects, it produces for targeted subjects would likely inhibit the operational tasks of corrections officers who ultimately must bring prisoners under physical control. Acoustic energy Acoustic energy has long been on a list of possible ways to attack the human body in a disruptive but less lethal manner affecting distraction or incapacitation. The appeal of acoustic technology is its potential to act as a stand off less lethal weapon particularly for area denial or for dispersing uncontrollable crowds and rioters. As the energy of the sound drops off with distance, in principle rioters could be pushed back or prohibited from moving forward at some reasonable distance from the source where the sound intensity becomes too painful. There are three major frequency ranges of interest for acoustic energy: the audible (hearing) range (20-20,000 Hz), the frequency range below the threshold of human hearing called infrasound and the frequency range above the threshold of human hearing called ultrasound. An assessment conducted in 1997 by DoD’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) concluded that acoustic technology had too many serious technical or operational flaws in all frequency ranges to be both a safe and effective less lethal weapon (Busic, 1997). The problems included problematic exposure of operators to the acoustic energy, difficulty in focusing energy downrange, the rapid decrease in acoustic intensity with range and the power requirements for generating and maintaining high-continuous acoustic intensities. In the audible acoustic range, the energy required to repel a determined aggressor by inducing pain in an unprotected ear could also likely cause permanent hearing damage. Simple ear protection can be an effective countermeasure to ear pain. Acoustic pressures in the audible range impinging on other parts of the body at energy levels that would not destroy hearing were found to not be very effective. One of the appeals of infrasound is the apparent lack of any simple countermeasures. The claims that infrasound can induce nausea and disrupt the stomach and bowels clearly imply significant incapacitation. A major operational difficulty appears to be the ability to achieve a useful level of infrasound energy at practical distances and to focus the energy in an acceptable manner. Until recently little information was reported on ultrasound except that propagation of the energy was difficult.

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Some of the problems noted above, at least for certain frequency ranges, appear now to be at least partially solved with new technology that includes arrays of planar magnetic or customized capacitive transducers. This new technology has reduced the power requirements and dramatically increased both effective range and directionality of the sound waves in some types of acoustic energy devices. The new devices greatly enhance audible communication at long ranges. With sufficient energy and selected frequencies, it appears they may also be able to act as less lethal weapons to disrupt threatening or violent behavior. A system that has received particular attention is the vehicle-mounted long range acoustic device (LRAD). The LRAD technology requires the generation of two ultrasonic waves that overlap and create sound in the audible range. It has a 33 inch diameter antenna that can be manually rotated to point at a selected target and operate in a continuous or burst mode[7]. Directed energy The term directed energy weapon or technology, whether lethal or less lethal, has been a commonly used term in the military lexicon for some time and is beginning to find more use in describing certain types of less lethal weapon technology that may be applicable to civilian law enforcement. Lasers operating in the optical portion and radio-frequency devices operating in the millimeter wave portion of the electromagnetic spectrum are the sources of most current less lethal directed energy weapon designs. These weapons deliver their effect at near the speed of light, can be focused to very narrow or broad beams and depending on the energy source, can be transmitted very long distances. Electromagnetic energy interacts with the body in a much more complicated manner than blunt trauma or even chemicals. Consequently, safety concerns have been, and will continue to be, a major factor in less lethal directed energy weapon development, deployment and public acceptance. Bright white light and lasers have appeal as less lethal weapons because of their promise of being effective at long range (especially lasers), their capability of being turned on or off rapidly (pulsed) and their ability to produce an effect that could require little if any after-care for the targeted subjects. While it seems unlikely that these weapons will necessarily cause a suspect to drop their weapons, their distraction capability can provide officers a tactical edge and buy time to use other less lethal tools for incapacitating and restraining an offender. Portable less lethal laser devices designed to designate (showing the subject that he or she has been identified for some further action on the part of a soldier or police officer) and/or further distract by a “dazzling” glare were developed in the 1990s. These lasers operate in the green and red portions of the visible spectrum producing a glare and some degree of flash blindness. They have faced problems of being sufficiently eye safe when effective or sufficiently effective when eye safe, especially under daylight conditions. An acceptable handheld device, particularly for police use on the street, will likely have the specification that it be eye-safe at the output aperture (the “muzzle”), a very difficult challenge. Currently under development is a shoulder “fired” laser that will operate at two wavelengths and incorporate an eye-safe laser range finder to automatically adjust the power output of the system to ensure the maximum eye-safe glare at all ranges[8]. The PEP system may be the most technically sophisticated directed energy weapon currently being actively pursued. It may also be the most difficult to bring into the civilian policing arena. The term “projectile” is somewhat of a misnomer since it could

imply a pulse or train of solid objects like baton rounds when in fact it is a device that fires a high-energy pulsed laser beam in the optical (not necessarily visible) portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. When the beam hits a target, it heats the surface extremely rapidly forming a plasma (ionized gas) that absorbs more laser light. This plasma generates a large mechanical (pressure) force on the target surface while also producing a bright visible light. The audible shock wave and light produce a highly localized phenomenon somewhat like a flash-bang grenade. A PEP less lethal weapon would provide a combination of blunt trauma and visual distraction. The PEP began at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the early 1990s as a high-power laser weapon that could destroy materials (Moore, 2000) but has also evolved through advances in technology into a potentially practical less lethal anti-personnel weapon. It continues to be pursued by the military[9]. Although the specifications would likely be very different, particularly size and portability, and considerable safety testing would be required, the technology may ultimately be transferable to law enforcement. Costs and public acceptability could be significant barriers. Focused millimeter waves operating at a frequency of 95 gigahertz are at the heart of a US Air Force sponsored less lethal weapon called the active denial system (ADS). It uses a large vehicle-mounted (Humvee) antenna to project the invisible beam for hundreds of yards. The beam rapidly heats the outer surface of the skin (about 0.3 mm penetration) producing a sensation described as similar to touching a light bulb. The pain causes an immediate aversion reflex which inhibits hostile behavior. Although doubts have been raised about safety, the system has been tested extensively by the Air Force and is on track to be deployed by DoD[10]. Requirements and general principles Although less lethal weapons are used infrequently in arrests (Garner and Maxwell, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2004) their application has been controversial (Amnesty International, 2004) and civil rights groups have called for the establishment of appropriate standards for their adoption and use (ACLU of Massachusetts, 2005). The development, acquisition and deployment of less lethal weapons for law enforcement or corrections applications must be conducted with an appreciation of a wide range of often complex issues. Some of these issues have been touched upon in the previous section on weapon types. The following list of requirements and principles are presented in the hope of identifying as many of these issues as possible and stimulating further thought on how to make better less lethal weapons and how to deploy them more effectively and safely. Safe and effective Safe and effective are the two most critical attributes of any successful less lethal weapon, but it is important to stress that “safe” and “effective” can never be absolute terms. In many ways, they represent the two extremes of a continuum of force on the human body. Until the phaser of science fiction appears on the scene it seems unlikely that the only way to ensure 100 percent safety is for the less lethal weapon to produce an effect that is so mild that it may not induce any useful level of incapacitation. Likewise, the only way to ensure 100 percent incapacitation is for the less lethal weapon to produce an overwhelming effect that may have a high probability of serious injury or death.

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How safe a less lethal weapon should be for application in a particular incident should depend on the nature of the threat. If the threat level is low then the weapon needs to have a high level of safety. For example, if a less lethal weapon is being used as an alternative to hands-on restraint rather than as an alternative to a firearm it is particularly important that the less lethal weapon have a low level of risk to health and safety. In an incident, where a subject suffers a serious injury from a less lethal weapon, it may be problematic to use the excuse of, “it was better than a bullet,” if a bullet would not have been the normal or “reasonable officer” response. Conversely, if the threat scenario presents a high risk of injury or death to officers or the public and deadly force would be a justified response, the bar for health and safety risk of a less lethal weapon can clearly be raised. Indeed, in this case the failure to use a more effective less lethal weapon even when it carries with it a possibly higher health and safety risk could ultimately lead to the death of the subject, an officer(s) or others at the scene that might have otherwise been avoided. References to health and safety risks associated with several less lethal weapons are noted above in the Weapon types section. (For a review and discussion of medical issues for all the major less lethal weapons currently in use by police and correctional officers see Vilke and Chan this issue.) Effectiveness like safety is also a relative term. In a 1989 study of less lethal weapon effectiveness in Los Angeles, it was observed that CS/CN tear gas spray was effective in 19 out of 21 cases (90 percent). The spray was considered effective if the subject hit the ground (Meyer, 1991). In the 1999, carefully analyzed large survey noted above (878 use of force reports) OC was reported to have a effectiveness rate of 71-85 percent depending upon the definition of effectiveness (Kaminski et al., 1999). In a fairly recent study of 400 deployments and use of less lethal weapons that included TASER electronic control devices, chemical agents, impact weapons, defensive tactics (hands-on) and bean bag projectiles it was found that of 77 chemical agent uses 64 were considered immediately effective and four had delayed effectiveness for a combined total of 88 percent (Mesloh et al., 2005). As previously mentioned, in a special sub-set of suspects who died after being sprayed with OC the effectiveness rate was reported to be only 20 percent (NIJ, 2003). (For more comments on effectiveness and safety of chemical irritants see the weapon types, chemical based section above.) In the same study noted above Meyer (1991) observed that the TASER weapon available at the time of the data collection (1989) was effective in 86 percent (88 out of 102) of its uses. In the Mesloh et al. (2005) study of 282 initial deployments of a TASER electronic control device it was reported to be immediately effective 67.7 percent of the time and was delayed in its effectiveness 9.6 percent of the time for a combined effectiveness of 77.3 percent. When deployed a second time, the ineffectiveness rate dropped below 3 percent. There has been little quantitative information on the effectiveness of impact projectiles, but Klinger (this issue) has provided a large data base of incidents using this type of weapon. Some assessment of effectiveness can be inferred from the number of impact projectiles used per incident. To many in the public safety community and even in the general population, 85 percent effectiveness will be a very acceptable rate. To critics of one or more of the less lethal weapons, the response is more likely to be “the weapon is only 85 percent effective.” Vendors and some law enforcement advocates will stress studies and anecdotal information with the highest effectiveness numbers while critics will stress studies

reporting lower rates and anecdotal incidents of deaths and injuries. Effectiveness measures are generally obtained by self-report surveys from officers in the field, and their differing expectations undoubtedly influence this subjective measure. With the rising number of terrorists incidents around the world where loss of life is high and terrorists are committing suicide in the attacks the balance between safety and effectiveness for some less lethal weapon applications may need to be reevaluated. While deadly force is the appropriate response to stop a suicide attack, there may be scenarios where use of less lethal weapons might save more lives than deadly force, and use of a less lethal weapon or technology with higher risks may be appropriate. Finally, it must be remembered that improvements in technology alone will never make the use of less lethal weapons completely safe or effective. In a recent well publicized crowd control incident, officers using one of the most accurate and low-kinetic energy weapons still hit several subjects in the face causing skin penetration, and one person, an unintended target, was accidentally shot in the eye and died (Stern et al., 2005). Affordable Less lethal weapon developers must be aware that law enforcement and corrections agencies have very tight budgets. Personnel costs, communication equipment and vehicles consume a large part of their budgets. Most law enforcement agencies are very small and their budgets can support only very essential equipment. Training Substantive officer training is essential for ensuring that officers can use the weapons correctly, that operational benefits and limitations of the less lethal weapons are thoroughly understood and assimilated and that agency policies and procedures are clear. The costs of lost time in the field due to training and the cost of training expendables are important practical considerations when acquiring a new less lethal weapon. If the training requires paying experts from the vendor or from professional training organizations or a train-the-trainers program cannot effectively provide the necessary in-house expertise, additional costs will be incurred. Portability If a less lethal weapon is meant to be carried by an officer on patrol, it must be as light and compact as possible. It will be competing for room with many other essential tools carried by every officer. Weapons designed for use by a lone officer at a scene will typically have to be operated by one hand, the one not used for the officer’s firearm. This implies ease of operation and aiming even under stress. Even less lethal weapons that are not carried on the person must still be reasonable in size. If an officer must use both hands to operate a less lethal weapon, he or she should have a back-up officer present. Like the officer’s duty belt the trunks of police vehicles are also getting more and more crowded, by communication and other auxiliary equipment, and a bulky less lethal weapon may not be practical here either. Maintenance Maintenance requirements for any technology will never be zero, but the more complicated the technology the more challenging, it will be to minimize the time

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commitment and frequency of preventive maintenance. Ease of making repairs with affordable components must also be considered in acquiring new less lethal weapons. Power requirements Use of any technology that requires portable electrical power demands careful adherence to re-charging or replacement schedules for batteries. Failure to have adequate power at times of crisis can produce unnecessary and undesirable risks. Battery powered devices of any kind also generally result in restrictions on temperature extremes for use and in particular for storage of the device. Continual improvements by the larger scientific community in battery and power management technology are addressing these issues and providing some relief from the constraints of all battery powered devices. Dual-use One example of a dual use less lethal weapon is a single platform or launcher with two components, one that will fire a bullet from a tactical rifle, and a second under-carriage component activated by pulling a separate trigger or throwing a switch that will launch a less lethal projectile or generate some other incapacitating less lethal force. Two US military dual-use weapons use standard army rifles fitted with either a 40 mm grenade launcher or a 0.68 inch (approx. 12 gauge) compressed air projectile launcher to fire blunt impact projectiles[11]. In principle, this type of a dual-use weapon could be used in civilian law enforcement or corrections. Although this is an area where there are some differences of opinion, law enforcement managers have generally taken the position that there is too much risk of a mistake in the stress of an encounter to make dual-use weapons acceptable. While not arising from a mistake by pulling the wrong trigger or switch of a dual-use weapon, there are two instances reported (Klinger, this issue; Hubbs and Klinger, 2002) where police fired shotguns at suspects using standard rounds instead of beanbag rounds as intended. The 12-gauge shotguns had the dual use capability of firing either a lethal round or a beanbag round, and the wrong shell was chambered in the gun. The dangers of a dual use capability are thus not merely hypothetical. Variability of effect A somewhat related topic is the question of whether a less lethal weapon should have a variable effect adjustment capability. In principle, this could allow the user to adjust in the field the amount of “force” to be used against a given individual as a result of the user’s assessment of the subject’s ability to be incapacitated by the weapon’s effect. For example, the “force” would be adjusted upward for a large muscular subject and adjusted downward for a person with a slight build and normal physique. Similar adjustments could be made to allow for long or short distances between officers and subjects. Again, it seems unlikely that police managers will allow patrol officers to make these adjustments in the field where they are subject to stress and are often required to make rapid decisions. Unless the weapon is able to automatically make the adjustments, a very hard problem for the first case of adjusting the amount of force for persons with different physiques and a difficult but a not impossible technical challenge for the latter (ranging) case, such designs will be very difficult to sell to all

the necessary stakeholders. Unintended consequences leading to serious or fatal injuries can be difficult to defend. Environment There are dozens if not hundreds of possible scenarios requiring the use of force by law enforcement and correctional officers. In many, though clearly not in all threat situations, the force used by police can be a less lethal weapon. Threat environment characteristics can be viewed in terms of “why” has the threat occurred, “when” will the threat occur, “where” is the threat occurring, “who” is making the threat and “what” is the nature of the threat. Why the threat is being made and when it is being made are important questions relevant to violence avoidance or prevention strategies or for strategic planning in anticipation of violent situations but are not particularly relevant to the acquisition and deployment of a less lethal weapon. Locations where potential threats occur can be either inside structures, e.g. rooms in a house, bars, public buildings or retail stores, schools, airplanes, trains or boats, sport arenas or theaters and the interiors of stationary vehicles or outside, e.g. streets, yards or fields and stadiums. Characteristics that are particularly important for threats inside structures are constrictions in space to deploy weapons and the close proximity of bystanders. When using less lethal weapons outside weather (clear, cloudy, windy, very hot or very cold) and visibility (day, night, fog, rain, snow) can create unique constraints. Who is making the threat can simplistically be divided into individuals or crowds. The characteristics of individuals that must be considered are: physique (large, small, muscular, and frail), possible physical or mental impairments, age, sex and possibility of pregnancy. Critical characteristics of crowds are size, the existence of identifiable leaders and the demographics of the crowd. The “what” question (the circumstances of the threat) can include such characteristics as: . behavior (non-compliance with lawful orders, verbal threats, assaultive threats, suicide threats, and hostage taking); . the level of danger (unarmed or armed with a handheld weapon such as a knife or club, rock, explosive device or a gun); and . the separation distance between officers and threatening individuals or crowds. Determining what combinations of characteristics have a reasonable probability of occurring in the real world of a given law enforcement or corrections agency can guide the managers in that agency in their acquisition of less lethal weapons. Airplanes present a particularly unique threat environment. The threat of hostage takeovers of airplanes, which occurred in the 1970s, has now escalated to terrorist suicide missions. Although use of deadly force to stop hijackers is clearly justified, its use even by trained air marshals may create other risks that in some cases could be avoided by use of appropriate less lethal technology (Hart, 2002). Threat scenarios that occur outside may mean many more people are in the vicinity and this must be taken into account when a weapon is used. There may also be vehicle traffic that can provide additional complications. If the effect of the less lethal weapon is very disorienting but does not restrict movement, a confused or fleeing suspect might run into a roadway and be hit by a car. Also, some less lethal weapons may be viewed by bystanders as more acceptable than others in their effects on a subject, a factor that could be important if there is a hostile crowd at the scene.

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Less lethal weapons for one-on-one confrontations may also work in responding to crowd violence, but a broader range of weapons is usually required, some of which can affect behavior of many people at once. An international panel of less lethal experts met in 2001 to discuss the kinds of threatening crowd behavior that had been observed in a wide range of riots and crowd control incidents and to formulate ideas on how to more effectively respond to these situations including how best to use less lethal weapons. In their report, “Crowd Behavior, Crowd Control, and the Use of Non-Lethal Weapons,” it was concluded that targeting individuals engaged in violent behavior rather than the whole crowd was the most effective response (Kenny et al., 2001b). This means that less lethal weapons that are designed to incapacitate an individual are particularly important, but the panel also pointed out that choice of weapons is not only a technical issue but also a political one. A particular weapon used with one type of crowd or crowd behavior may not be suitable for use with a different crowd or crowd behavior for example, destructive and violent soccer fans and passive-resistant religious protestors. The panel also stressed the need for a less lethal weapons hierarchy which starts with barriers, moves to accurate targeting of violent individuals and finally to weapons that can affect the behavior of large groups or the whole crowd if there is a massive response from the crowd. Finally, they pointed out that forced dispersal of crowds (that could occur with certain types of less lethal weapons) may not always be the best approach as it could produce many smaller groups over a larger area that might exacerbate the situation. Targeting Accuracy in targeting is crucial to the safety and effectiveness of most less lethal weapons, particularly those that deliver a projectile for contact with a subject. Accuracy is affected by many factors: the size, mass, velocity and shape of the projectile, the type of launcher used to propel the projectile and the sighting system. Research has been conducted on projectile delivery systems with proximity sensors in the nose of the projectile or with transponders that communicate with the launcher with the goal of deploying a less lethal weapon effect at a stand off distance from the subject who would otherwise likely be seriously injured if impacted by the projectile (Sandia National Laboratories, Law Enforcement Technologies Inc., and Martin Electronics Inc., 2003). This technology is intended to achieve an incapacitating effect at long range, and its use of “automatic” feed-back should prevent operator error. This technology does not yet appear to have been incorporated into a commercial product. Optical, laser designator and holographic sights contribute significantly to the accuracy of projectile delivery, but devices and techniques that officers can use to accurately deliver a less lethal force, whether a projectile or some other energy source, independent of range continue to be needed. A laser dazzler prototype less lethal directed energy weapon is reported to incorporate such a targeting system (see Directed energy under Weapon types above). Countermeasures This may be an obvious requirement, but attention must be paid to the development of less lethal weapons whose effectiveness will not be degraded significantly by simple means for example, by heavy or padded clothing (projectile weapons) or simple eye or ear protection (glasses, goggles or ear plugs).

Onset time of incapacitation The ideal onset time for many less lethal weapons to take effect would be instantaneous or less than one second to cover all scenarios, but for suspects that are unarmed and force has to be used to gain compliance or prevent fleeing a few seconds delay might be acceptable. For chemical agents such as pepper spray this is indeed the common experience. If the suspect has a non-firearm weapon such as a knife, a less lethal weapon with instantaneous onset is highly desirable at any officer-subject distance, and armed backup is essential. As stand off distances become greater as might exist under some civil disturbance (crowd) scenarios or in prisons in an open area the onset time can perhaps be greater. Under these circumstances, a non-instantaneous effect may be acceptable even if the subjects have handheld weapons that are not firearms or the separation is sufficient that thrown objects cannot be injurious or deadly. In some scenarios, the onset time must be instantaneous. One of these is a hostage situation where the hostage taker is armed with or without a firearm and is believed to be both motivated and capable of causing serious injury or death to a hostage. If onset of the effect is not instantaneous, a hostage or multiple hostages could be killed or seriously injured. A bullet from a police sniper is usually the response and in almost every case will probably be justified. There are some circumstances, however, where a less lethal weapon might provide a more effective response or at least a first response before deadly force is used. One possible scenario is inadequate access for effective use of deadly force against a hostage taker. This inadequate access scenario can be made even more difficult when there are multiple hostage takers. If a rapid and complete incapacitation is not achieved with deadly force targeted at the hostage takers, they may be able to kill one or more (or all) of their hostages. (See the Moscow theater hostage incident described above.) This example of a worst case scenario illustrates one of the significant and relatively new challenges for weapon developers and users, developing and deploying a less lethal weapon that can rapidly incapacitate everyone at a scene but be rapidly reversible in its effects and produce no lasting health problems. By far, the most common threat scenario where an instantaneous onset is highly desirable is the lone suicidal person. Although this person can sometimes pose a deadly threat to officers in a “suicide-by-cop” phenomenon, they may kill themselves if a less lethal weapon is used against them and they have time to react. Time period of incapacitation How long is it necessary to maintain incapacitation, and how long is too long? For the most common scenario of subjects refusing a lawful order in an arrest situation or who immediately become aggressive or violent when confronted by an officer and physical force is required to gain compliance, the incapacitation time may only need to be a few seconds up to perhaps 20 seconds. Within this time period, depending on the degree of incapacitation achieved with a less lethal weapon, a trained officer should probably be able to have the subject in handcuffs and bring most resistance to an acceptable level of compliance. As the distance between a single subject and officers becomes greater the incapacitation time needs to be longer to provide adequate time for reaching the subject and applying restraints. Also, if the subject had a weapon that was dropped or made useless by the less lethal weapon, a longer incapacitation time is desirable to ensure the subject cannot regain useful control of the weapon. A minute may be adequate.

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When there are multiple subjects and the object of deploying a less lethal weapon is to disperse a crowd or stop people in the crowd from using weapons such as rocks, a short incapacitation time may be adequate or even desirable if it is both possible and understood by the subjects that the weapon can be redeployed multiple times. When less lethal weapons are used in hostage situations, it may be essential that the incapacitation effect last for many minutes. There can be upper limits on time periods of incapacitation. For example, once any threat weapon has been neutralized, it may be desirable that the subject be able to understand and physically respond to verbal orders such as coming into the open for visual inspection, lying down, moving into a position to be apprehended and moving under their own power to a vehicle or holding point. If the effect is too long, the subject could become overly stressed either physically, mentally or both. Finally, in some scenarios the image presented by the incapacitated subject to bystanders could be perceived, whether warranted or not, as abusive and create a negative attitude that is clearly not wanted and may be avoided if the incapacitation lasts only long enough to restrain and control the subject. Degree of incapacitation The degree of incapacitation achieved is not a less lethal weapon attribute that can be easily quantified, and every officer will have his or her own perspective very likely dependent in great part on his or her expectations of a less lethal weapon. Sometimes expectations of officers have been set unrealistically high by the sales hype from less lethal weapon vendors. Few less lethal weapons will cause a subject to “drop like a rock,” but one must remember that even the use of deadly force from firearms does not always result in immediate cessation of a threat. If the subject is unarmed, an acceptable degree of incapacitation will likely be lower than if the subject is armed, again with a non-firearm weapon. When armed, the subjects should be so incapacitated that they cannot use their weapon, and officers have sufficient time to safely restrain them. The object is to achieve a degree of incapacitation or effectiveness that will prevent them from using a weapon on officers, others that may be present, bystanders or hostages or themselves. (See Safe and effective section for discussion of effectiveness.) Less lethal weapons should produce incapacitating or debilitating effects that are completely reversible and ideally self-reversible, i.e. no medical intervention is required to return a subject to their pre-encounter state of health. In addition, the initial debilitating effect should not produce some delayed adverse medical condition. Unfortunately, the scientific testing required to provide an acceptable level of confidence that no ill side effects will happen at some future time can be very expensive and extend over long time periods. These are the reasons that often deter manufacturers from conducting proper testing before marketing a product, and are also the reason it is appropriate and important that such testing be done by independent government agencies. There are some scenarios where the threat level is so high and the risk of death so imminent that the use of less lethal weapons with potential of producing some irreversible physical effects can be justified. Impact projectiles, both hard cylinders and “bean bag” rounds used when the threat levels were high, have broken bones and produced serious lacerations (Klinger, this issue; Hubbs and Klinger, 2002), but the

weapons were used as alternatives to firearms under non-ideal conditions and/or in haste to try to prevent a more serious consequence. Although natural or spontaneous self-reversal is the ideal result desired, some level of post-incident intervention to help relieve pain or speed up the recovery process from minor injuries is not an unreasonable expectation. When pepper spray is used, there is often post-incident intervention, in this case washing of the subject’s eyes and skin. For TASER devices an appropriately trained person will likely remove the barbs from a subject’s skin on the scene or it will be done in a hospital emergency room. Use of an anesthetic chemical less lethal weapon will clearly require response by emergency medical teams and/or physicians to help speed the reversal of the effects. Physical condition and health of targeted subjects Individuals against whom less lethal force is used come in all ages, sizes, physiques, degrees of physical and mental health and can be male or female. Individual differences are perhaps the biggest single challenge for the designer of less lethal weapons. Common sense dictates that a young adult person in good physical shape and state of health will in most cases not react to the debilitating properties of almost any less lethal weapon in the same manner as a person in poor physical condition and/or one with health compromising conditions. For many existing less lethal weapons, their effectiveness and safety when used against a large young male in great physical condition and a small elderly female in poor physical condition will be vastly different. Besides, physical stature, a major issue with using less lethal weapons against females is the possibility that they may be pregnant with the resulting concern of possible effects of the weapon on fetuses. Physical and mental impairment of the suspects may often be unknown and a suspect’s recent use of drugs or alcohol can be a factor in the type and degree of response they will have to some less lethal weapons. Perceived impairments will influence police officer’s response to citizen encounters, including their use of less lethal weapons when some use of force is required (Kaminski et al., 2004). Mental condition of targeted subjects The mental condition of subjects may impact the effectiveness or safety of a deployed less lethal weapon. Mentally disturbed persons may behave in an unexpected manner compared to a person in a normal state of mind when exposed to different types of physically debilitating less lethal weapon effects. These possibilities must be kept in mind and become better understood if less lethal weapon exposure to this population is to achieve the maximum level of effectiveness and safety. Acceptable A less lethal weapon that meets all the requirements and principles described above may be acceptable to the law enforcement or corrections agencies but still not be acceptable to other stakeholders affected by the application of less lethal weapons. Two other major stakeholders are: (1) the governmental unit that is ultimately responsible for the actions of its law enforcement or corrections personnel and consequently will be the subject of any civil liability suit that might arise from use or abuse of a less lethal weapon; and

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(2) the general public made up of individual citizens and various community groups often with widely divergent views. The legal counsels for the cognizant local, State or Federal government agencies that have ultimate responsibility for policing or corrections operations will be concerned about health and safety issues of less lethal weapons in terms of liabilities, but they may also have concerns not readily apparent to politicians or the public. For example, the use of a less lethal weapon may violate or be interpreted as violating a personal or civil right not obvious to a person not trained in the law. This concern could result in the weapon being rejected as simply not acceptable or require that its use be severely restricted. Decisions by the courts in various kinds of use of force liability suits can be an important guide when considering acquisition of any new less lethal weapon. (For additional discussion of civil liability and court decisions involving less lethal weapons, see Smith et al., this issue) Legal counsel needs to be involved as soon as new less lethal weapons or technologies are being considered for acquisition. It is a generally accepted fact by public safety agencies required to use force in the conduct of their duties that they will from time to time be sued. It is not practical or even possible to produce a liability-proof less lethal weapon or device. One can only minimize the probability of a liability suit and more importantly be prepared to defend the function and operational use of the weapon. Acceptance by community leaders and the general public of police or corrections use of a less lethal technology depends on it having many of the desired attributes already mentioned, but in addition these particular stakeholders may focus on intangibles that may or may not have been considered by others. State and local law enforcement and corrections agencies in particular will have more success in introducing such technologies if they have educated and had dialogue with the public and if possible obtained their ideas on what may be acceptable and what may not. An excellent example of getting public participation in a dialogue on use of force, the need for less lethal weapons and indeed in their selection is the approach taken by the Seattle, Washington Police Department and Seattle community leaders. (A series of reports came out of these efforts. See Seattle, 2000, 2001; Seattle FORG Report, 2000; Seattle Progress Report, 2002). Conclusions Law enforcement and correctional officers use less lethal weapons to temporarily incapacitate, confuse, delay or restrain assaultive or non-compliant individuals or crowds in a variety of confrontational scenarios. These weapons are generally meant to provide alternatives to hands-on techniques or batons when a decision to use force has been made and the subject or crowd is unarmed. Under some circumstances, less lethal weapons may be an alternative to deadly force for example, if an aggressive armed subject does not have a firearm and deadly force backup is available. They may also be considered when deadly force is justified, but its use could cause undesirable collateral effects such as injury or death to innocent bystanders. Over-confidence of less lethal weapon capabilities have put officer’s lives at risk when they are used as a substitute for deadly force when the latter is indeed the appropriate response. The descriptions of the range of less lethal weapons currently available and those in the prototype or planning stages should in combination with the perspectives

presented on incapacitation phenomena, less lethal weapon requirements and guiding principles enhance the knowledge and appreciation of the reader to the challenges and complexities of these public safety tools. It must always be remembered that they are only tools. Less lethal weapons are never a substitute for good officer training and personal judgment, well designed agency policies and procedures and responsible professional law enforcement or corrections agency leadership.

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379 Notes 1. Many of the observations and suggestions provided here, particularly in the requirements and general principles section may appear to some to merely be common sense, but experience has shown that they are often overlooked or ignored. The author has based his observations on nearly ten years of discussions with street officers, police chiefs, sheriffs and wardens, legal experts, and policy makers, by organizing and participating in many less lethal technology conferences, advisory committees and peer review panels and finally, by a careful review of the less lethal weapon technology literature. 2. Basic performance data for the FN303 less lethal weapon can be found on the FN Herstal, web site: www.fnherstal.com/html/Index.htm 3. A 1960s Vietnam era ring airfoil grenade design for achieving a flat trajectory with improved accuracy in a jungle environment evolved into a design for a blunt trauma projectile applicable for riot scenarios. Extensive testing showed it promised a much more accurate, safer and longer range capability than the various baton rounds starting to be used by police during this period. The US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, supported the resurrection of this technology in the 1990s and continues to fund improvements to make this an effective and acceptable law enforcement tool. A description of the concept is provided in “NIJ takes the RAP,” Winter 1998 issue of TECHbeat, a publication of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center. Page 3, available as a PDF file, Document No. 211758; web site: www.ncjrs.gov 4. The “WebShot” net entanglement device developed by Foster-Miller, Inc., Waltham, MA, was sponsored by the US Army Armaments Research, Development and Engineering Center and received some funding from the National Institute of Justice. A brief description of the shoulder fired device can be found in the 1999 Phase III Accomplishments of the Small Business Innovative Research grant program. Page 19; web site: www.armysbir.com/ commercialization/stories.htm, it was also commercialized as a handheld weapon, but no longer appears to be available. In a 2004, TASER International press release a spokesperson for ALS technologies a distributor of the WebShot net said they had stopped ordering them because few police departments were buying them. 5. Three companies that have proposed wireless CEDs using conductive paths in air are Rheinmetall, using conductive micro-fibers, and Xtreme Alternative Systems and HSV Technologies, using laser induced ionized air channels. Very brief descriptions of the technology concepts are provided in the popular science news magazine New Scientist; web site: www. newscientist.com/article.ns?id ¼ dn6014. Additional information on how the ionized gas channel technology works can be found on the HSV Technologies web site: www.hsvt.org 6. The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) has provided funding to (at least) two wireless CED developers using projectiles that discharge an electrical shock on impact (Mide Technology Corporation and Physical Optics Corporation). A third HSARPA-funded developer, Lyntech, is using a projectile to carry a power supply that delivers an electrical shock, similar in principle to existing conventional CEDs. All three are briefly described in the August 13, 2005 issue of New Scientist magazine. See archived articles at: www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id ¼ mg18725126.300. TASER International,

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8.

9.

10.

11.

Inc. has received federal funding to develop a wireless taser system called the XREP that will fire a projectile from a shotgun. When attached to the targeted subject the projectile will deliver an electrical shock similar to TASER International’s existing products. See www. policeone.com/police-products/less-lethal/taser/press-releases/81387/ and http://phx. corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c ¼ 129937&p ¼ irol-newsArticle_print&ID ¼ 816707& highlight Like other new less lethal weapon technologies, there is an absence of journal articles describing the LRAD. Information appears available only from the developers and from popular technology news sources. The LRAD system is described by the developer at: www. atcsd.com/site/content/view/37/7. Brief descriptions of new focused acoustic devices and how they work can be found at: http://science.howstuffworks.com/lrad.htm and from issue number 2046 of New Scientist, September 7, 1996; web site: www.newscientist.com/article/ mg15120463.500-technology-perfect-sound-from-thin-air.html The Air Force Research Laboratory is developing a “dazzling” laser less lethal weapon system called Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response (PHaSR). This name is unfortunate. Unlike the “phaser” of Star Trek fame, this weapon is designed to neither stun (immobilize) or kill. Its glare will certainly designate and distract a targeted subject. From the limited information available, it is not possible to ascertain the time period of any flash blindness. An April 2006 Fact Sheet (see alphabetical listing of fact sheet titles) provides a brief description of the PHaSR and some history of laser dazzlers; web site: www.de.afrl.af. mil/factsheets. The National Institute of Justice is providing funding for a less lethal weapon project titled, “Multiwave Dazzler.” See NIJ Grant 2004-IJ-CX-K037 under Less-Lethal Incapacitation, 2004 awards; web site: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/awards/2004.htm There is little information on the PEP system, but a symposium presentation by Harry Moore in 2000 (see References this paper) describes the concept and a more recent sketchy technology news article gives an update; web site: www.globalsecurity.org/military/ systems/ground/pep.htm, a possible future law enforcement application is suggested by a National Institute of Justice project titled, “Compact and Rugged Pulsed Laser Technology for Less-Lethal Weapons.” See NIJ grant 2004-IJ-CX-K043 under Less-Lethal Incapacitation, 2004 awards; web site: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/awards/2004.htm A directed energy less lethal weapon using focused millimeter waves has been under development by the US Air Force for many years and continues to be supported by DoD. It may also have application for law enforcement. A Fact Sheet has been provided by the Air Force Research Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base and basic features of the system have been described in technology news magazines. See www.de.afrl.af.mil/Factsheets/ ActiveDenial.swf (current as of August 2006) and www.globalsecurity.org/military/ systems/ground/v-mads.htm (no date, but references made to 2007 activities). On January 27, 2007 the JNLWD at Quantico, VA had a Media Day and provided more detailed information on the ADS including a frequently asked questions sheet with literature references to journal articles on health effects; web site: www.jnlwp.com/ActiveDenialSystem. asp#mediaDay. The National Institute of Justice is funding a project titled, “Solid-State Active Denial System Demonstration Program.” See NIJ grant 2004-IJ-CX-K035 under Less-Lethal Incapacitation, 2004 awards; web site: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/awards/2004.htm Two dual use, lethal/non-lethal, weapon systems are the under-carriage 40 mm grenade launcher (M203) attached to a standard military rifle (M16A1or variant) for firing a XM1006 (sponge) round and the under-carriage FN303 0.68 inch caliber launcher also attached to a standard military rifle that fires an 8.5 gram projectile. Both projectiles produce a blunt trauma effect. Descriptions of these systems can be found on the Defense Technology web site: www.defense-technology.com and the FN Herstal, web site: www.fnherstal.com/html/ Index.htm

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Hubbs, K. and Klinger, D. (2002), “Impact munitions: data base of use and effects”, Final Report to the National Institute of Justice under Award 1998-LB-VX-K006. See also, Impact Munitions: Data Base of Use and Effects, Research for Practice, National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, October 2004, available Document Nos. NCJ 204433 and 206089, at: www.ncjrs.gov Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) (1967), Non-lethal Weapons for Use by Law Enforcement Officers, This study was sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), US Department of Justice, Publication No. S-271, NCJ 1959. A report with identical content titled Safe Police Weapons, by IDA was also published in 1968. It is listed on the NCJRS web site, as a reprint from Science and Technology, available Document No. NCJ 007955, at: www.ncjrs.gov Kaminski, R., DiGiovanni, C. and Downs, R. (2004), “The use of force between the police and persons with impaired judgment”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 311-38. Kaminski, R., Edwards, S. and Johnson, J. (1999), “Assessing the incapacitative effects of pepper spray during resistive encounters with the police”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 7-29, available Document No. NCJ 176927, at: www.ncjrs.gov Kenny, J.M., Farrer, D., Heal, S., Ijames, S., McPhail, C., Odenthal, D., Taylor, J. and Waddington, P. (2001b), “Crowd behavior, crowd control, and the use of non-lethal weapons”, Report of Findings from the Human Effects Advisory Panel, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, January 1, work conducted under US Marine Corps Contract No. M67004-99-D-0037-0001, available at: www.nldt.org/documents/ crowd_control_report.pdf Kenny, J.M., Heal, S. and Grossman, M. (2001b) The Attribute-Based Evaluation (ABE) of Less-Than-Lethal, Extended Range, Impact Munitions, The Applied Research Laboratory, The Pennsylvania State University, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, February 15, available at: www.nldt.org/documents/abe_report.pdf Lakoski, J., Murray, W. and Kenny, J. (2000), “The advantages and limitations of calmatives for use as a non-lethal technique”, College of Medicine, Applied Research Laboratory, The Pennsylvania State University, October 3, available at: www.nldt.org/documents/ calamative_report.pdf Lucey, G. and Jasper, L. (1998), “Vortex ring generator”, Non-Lethal Defense III, Johns Hopkins Applied Research Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland, Proceedings, February 25-26, available at: http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb ¼ getRecord&metadataPrefix ¼ html& identifier ¼ ADA337698 Mesloh, C., Henych, M., Hougland, S. and Thompson, F. (2005), “TASER and less lethal weapons: an exploratory analysis of deployments and effectiveness”, Law Enforcement Executive Forum, Vol. 5 No. 5, pp. 67-79. Meyer, G. (1991), “Non-lethal weapons vs. conventional police tactics: the Los Angeles police department experience”, Master’s thesis, California State University, Los Angeles, CA, available at: http://home.earthlink.net/ , gregmeyer/injury.html Moore, H. (2000), “Laser Technology Update: Pulsed Impulsive Kill Laser (PIKL)”, paper presented at the National Defense Industry Association, Joint Services Small Arms Symposium, August 29, available at: www.dtic.mil/ndia/smallarms/Moore.pdf National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (2003), The Effectiveness and Safety of Pepper Spray, Research in Practice report based on two final reports submitted to NIJ: An Evaluation of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Use by Law Enforcement Agencies: Impact on Injuries to Officers and Suspects, by J. Michael Bowling and Monica Gaines, 1997-LB-VX-K018 and Deaths in

Police Confrontation When Oleoresin Capsicum is Used, Charles S. Petty, NIJ Purchase Order 2001-M7-56, available Document No. NCJ 195739, at: www.ncjrs.gov NRC (2003), An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, Committee for an Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, Naval Studies Board, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, ISBN 0-309-08288-9. Patten Reports (2002/2006) Patten Report Recommendations 69 and 70 Relating to Public Order Equipment, A Research Programme into Alternative Policing Approaches towards the Management of Conflict, Five Less Lethal Steering Group Reports Phases 1 through 5 were prepared by a UK Steering Group led by the Northern Ireland Office, in Consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), available at: www.nio.gov.uk, under NIO Publications, Policing. Pennsylvania State University (2002) Report on the Second International Law Enforcement Forum on Minimal Force Options, October 29-30, sponsored by the Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, Applied Research Laboratory, The Pennsylvania State University, PA, published January 2003, under publications. Reports on additional international less lethal technology meetings are also available at this site, available at: www.nldt.org Sandia National Laboratories, Law Enforcement Technologies Inc., and Martin Electronics Inc. (2003) Variable range less-than- lethal ballistics, Final Report to the National Institute of Justice on Grant Number 2000LTBXK004, available Document No. NCJ 199046, at: www. ncjrs.gov Scott, S. (1997), “Sticky foam as a less-than-lethal technology”, in Alexander, J., Spencer, D., Schmidt, S. and Steele, B. (Eds), Proceedings of SPIE, Security Systems and Non-lethal Technologies for Law Enforcement, January 1997,Vol. 2934, pp. 96-103, available at: http:// spiedl.aip.org/journals/doc/SPIEDL-home/proc/ Seattle (2000) Less-Lethal Options – Community Workgroup Recommendations, Washington Police Department, Seattle, WA, available at: www.seattle.gov/police/Publications/default. htm Seattle (2001) Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers, Washington Police Department, Seattle, WA, available at: www.seattle.gov/police/Publications/default.htm Seattle FORG Report (2000) A Less Lethal Options Program for Seattle Police Department, A Report With Recommendations, Washington Police Department, Seattle, WA, available at: www.seattle.gov/police/Publications/default.htm Seattle Progress Report (2002) Less Lethal Options Program – Year 1, available at: www.seattle. gov/police/Publications/default.htm Smith, G. and Stopford, W. (1999), “Health hazards of pepper spray”, North Carolina Medical Journal, Vol. 60 No. 5, pp. 268-74, available at: www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6416/smithok.html Stern, D., Downs, R., Gittens, R., Howe, J., Ijames, S., King, P. and Stone, C. (2005) Commission Investigating the Death of Victoria Snelgrove, a Report of the Commission appointed by Boston Police Commissioner Kathleen M. O’Toole, May 5, available at: www.cityofboston. gov/police/pdfs/report.pdf Sweetman, S. (1987), Abt Associates, Inc., Cambridge, MA, Report on the Attorney General’s Conference on Less Than Lethal Weapons, Contract No. OJP-86-C-002, available Document No. NCJ 105195, at: www.ncjrs.gov Wax, P., Becker, C. and Curry, S. (2003), “Unexpected ‘gas’ casualties in Moscow: a medical toxicology perspective”, Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 41 No. 5, pp. 700-5.

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Zollman, T.M., Bragg, R.M. and Harrison, D.A. (2000), “Clinical effects of oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) on the human cornea and conjunctiva”, Ophthalmology, Vol. 107 No. 12, pp. 2186-9. About the author Raymond L. Downs was a Manager for the Less Lethal Technology program at the National Institute of Justice. Over a period of ten years, he initiated and managed other technology program areas for the institute, including Safe Schools Technology and Concealed Weapons Technology. He received his PhD in chemistry and spent most of his career as a materials scientist in nuclear energy research. He is now retired. Raymond L. Downs can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Impact munitions: a discussion of key information

Impact munitions

David Klinger Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri-St Louis, St Louis, Missouri, USA

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Abstract Purpose – To provide readers with some basic information about the use of impact munitions in modern American police work. Design/methodology/approach – The paper identifies various sorts of impact munitions and places key findings from previous studies of these devices in a broader historical context of police force options. Findings – Impact munitions are an increasingly popular feature of contemporary American policing that rarely lead to serious injury, but can, under certain circumstances, cause fatal injuries. Originality/value – The paper provides interested academics and professional with information about an increasingly popular police force option. Keywords Law enforcement, Weapons, Policing, United States of America Paper type General review

Since, the dawn of the modern police in the nineteenth century, Western democracies have struggled with a variety of questions about how officers should exercise their powers to use force against citizens. In the USA, these questions have long revolved primarily around the application of the ultimate form of police coercion; deadly force. Since, the 1850s, American police officers have routinely carried firearms, and since that time the use of police firearms has been a source of considerable controversy in American society. The 1858 shooting of a fleeing suspect by a New York City officer, for example, led the New York Times to pen a critical editorial that argued that the police should use deadly force only when life is in clear peril (Geller and Scott, 1992). And a bit more than two decades later (and the better part of a continent away), City Marshall Virgil Earp and three of his deputies – Wyatt Earp, Morgan Earp, and John “Doc” Holiday – were charged with murder for their actions in the famous “Shootout at the OK Corral” that took place on October 26, 1881 in Tombstone, AZ (Tefertille, 1997). In recent years, the use of deadly force by police officers has continued to be a controversial issue, one that has led to considerable press scrutiny, political turmoil, and even civil disturbances in numerous American communities during the last few decades (Klinger, 2004). As the controversy over deadly force continued apace in recent decades, American law enforcement sought to develop means to reduce the number of shootings by its officers. One component of this effort has been concerted attention to the development and refinement of technology that would permit officers to take combative and/or potentially violent citizens into custody without having to resort to deadly force. This effort gained considerable momentum in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of a national shift away from the routine institutionalization of psychologically and emotionally disturbed individuals that had begun in the 1960s. One consequence of this

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 385-397 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778804

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de-institutionalization movement was an increase in the number of mentally and emotionally disturbed individuals living in local communities (Engel and Silver, 2001). This, in turn, led to an increase in the number of situations in which police officers were called upon to deal with mentally and emotionally agitated individuals – many of whom were clearly suicidal – who had armed themselves with dangerous weapons such as knives, swords, and bats. While the police were able to resolve most of these encounters bloodlessly, some number of them ended in gunfire. These unfortunate shootings were a consequence of the fact that the traditional non-lethal force options that officers possessed (empty-handed control tactics, batons, and so on) were not well suited for subduing armed and agitated individuals who could not be talked into custody, because using them required officers to place themselves in dangerously close proximity to armed subjects (Geller and Scott, 1992). The gap in police officers’ capacity to safely subdue armed and combative individuals from a distance without resorting to deadly force led forward-thinking members of the American law-enforcement community to seek technological means to fill this gap. This effort led to the deployment of a variety of new types of weapons that were designed to permit officers to subdue people from a safe distance without seriously injuring or killing them. Among the more notable of these weapons are chemical agents (such as oleoresin capsicum), conducted energy weapons (AKA electro-muscular disruption weapons, such as TASERS), and impact munitions; a family of firearm-delivered projectiles that have a low probability of causing serious physical injury or death, because they are softer and travel at a much lower velocity than conventional lead bullets. Impact munitions were first used in the 1960s and 1970s during crowd-control operations to disperse rioters. As the race riots, student uprisings, and other civil disturbances that were part and parcel of the late 1960s and early 1970s proceeded apace, some law-enforcement agencies used shotguns and gas launchers to fire munitions such as wooden dowels, foam rubber projectiles, and bean bags at rioters. Since, these munitions permitted the police to deliver a stunning blow from a distance, they came to be seen as potentially useful tools for dealing with the problem presented by armed individuals who were mentally and/or emotionally disturbed. The first documented usages of impact munitions against armed mentally/emotionally disturbed individuals occurred during protracted stand-offs involving Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams who had been called-out when the initial responding officers realized that the problem confronting them was beyond their ken. When circumstances indicated that the disturbed individual could not be taken into custody through the use of verbal tactics, that some sort of physical force was required, but that deadly force was not justified, SWAT officers could (and did) employ impact munitions to resolve the matter with minimal risk of major injury to the subject and themselves. As time passed and SWAT teams developed a track record of using impact munitions to safely take armed agitated individuals into custody without killing them, the use of these devices expanded beyond the narrow application of SWAT call-outs involving emotionally/mentally disturbed persons. One component of this was the expansion of the use of impact munitions within the SWAT environment to include situations that did not involve mentally/emotionally disturbed persons, such as call-outs involving barricaded criminal suspects and the service of high-risk warrants. This occurred as SWAT teams came to realize that

the potential utility of impact munitions was not dependent on the mental or emotional state of individuals, but rather was a function of the nature of the tactical problem facing them. A non-compliant knife-wielding robbery suspect, for example, presents the same tactical dilemma as a mentally/emotionally disturbed individual armed with a knife, for in both cases the presence of a cutting instrument places the same constraints on the range of force options officers can safely use to resolve the situation. Many police agencies also came to realize that impact munitions could play a fruitful role in patrol work because patrol officers sometimes find themselves in situations in which it was not realistic to either call upon or wait for SWAT assets to deal with an immediate threat. Citizens (both mentally/emotionally disturbed persons and criminal suspects) armed with edged weapons, for example, sometimes forced patrol officer’s hands by moving aggressively towards them. If only the weapons officers possessed to stop, the attack were traditional police firearms, an officer-involved shooting was the likely result. If officers had impact munitions, on the other hand, they could attempt to subdue the individual without resorting to deadly force. As a result of this realization, many police agencies around the nation integrated some sort of impact munitions delivery system into their patrol operations, primarily in the form of 0.12 gauge shotguns that fire beanbag rounds. The diffusion of impact munitions in American law enforcement has raised several issues about the role that these tools play in contemporary policing. The remainder of this paper focuses on a few of them, beginning with a discussion of contemporary thinking about impact munitions in the context of the force options available to police. Force options and the force continuum The law-enforcement community commonly considers the application of force by officers in terms of a continuum that arrays force options from lesser to greater in terms of the potential they hold to do harm (Klinger, 1995; Terrill, 2001). At the bottom of the generic force continuum lies voice commands[1]; at the top lies deadly force (most commonly indicated by the use of standard police firearms that fire-lethal bullets); and in between lie a variety of other options – from lower to higher – such as grabbing, striking with empty hands, and striking with impact weapons (such as, police batons). Within the continuum framework, officers’ use of a given level of force is predicated upon the degree of resistance that citizens present. Officers would thus use verbal commands to control a compliant citizen and use higher levels of force as citizens’ resistance increases; up to the point where officers may use deadly force to deal with a citizen whose resistance presents an imminent threat to innocent life. Since, impact munitions are designed with the express purpose to not seriously harm or kill, they fall below deadly force on the force continuum. Most authorities equate impact munitions with other sorts of impact weapons such as the various types of hand-held batons that officers around the nation carry (e.g. PR-24s and ASPs), and thus place impact munitions on par with these options on the force continuum. In this connection, however, it should be noted that like their hand-held counterparts, impact munitions can cause serious injury (and even death; see discussion below on deaths from impact munitions) when they strike certain parts of the human body (e.g. the head and neck). Impact munitions can consequently be construed as a form of lethal force when they are directed towards vulnerable parts of citizens’ bodies. In a related vein, some sorts of impact munitions have a greater propensity to cause harm than others

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and should thus be used with more caution than others; a topic that is addressed in the next section, which deals with the various sorts of impact munitions that are available to American law enforcement. Types of impact munitions Impact munitions vary in size, composition, density, method of delivery, and other characteristics. The two most common methods of delivery for impact munitions are 0.12 gauge shotguns and larger bore firearms of 37 or 40 millimeter diameter (often called “launchers,” and which are also commonly used to deliver chemical agents). In addition to their more substantial bore, 37 and 40 millimeter firearms have longer chambers, which can hold munitions of up to 8 inches (as opposed to a 3 inch maximum for a standard shotgun). Because of their more substantial bore and chamber length, 37 and 40 millimeter launchers are capable of delivering larger payloads than their 0.12 gauge cousins. Depending on the nature of the type of munition this means that projectiles fired from 37 and 40 millimeter launchers typically deliver more foot-pounds of energy when they strike a target. Impact munitions are made of a variety of materials, including wood, various plastics, foam rubber, and harder types of rubber. Some munitions consist of a single sort of material (e.g. wood dowels; see below), while others are composites, such as 37 millimeter plastic rounds with foam rubber noses. Some munitions even incorporate chemical agents that disperse upon impact in order to enhance to ability of the munition to incapacitate an individual (Kenny et al. (2001) for a more thorough overview of impact munitions types). Among the most widely used sort of impact munitions are bean bags made of cloth that contain a payload of small size lead shot. The first bean bag munitions to obtain wide-spread acceptance in American police circles were relatively small (approximately 2 £ 2 inch) flat pillows containing about 40 grams of lead that were folded in half and loaded lengthwise into 0.12 gauge shot shells. Concerns about the accuracy of these square bags and their potential for causing severe injury (if they strike with a edge as opposed to one of the two flat surfaces; see discussion of injuries below), led to the development of another type of 0.12 gauge bean bag munition that has widely supplanted the square-type bag; the “drag stabilized bag.” Drag stabilized bean bags are made by placing approximately 40 grams of lead in the middle of a small sheet of soft fabric, bringing the edges of the fabric together, and tying or crimping the fabric off near the lead shot so that the remainder of it trails behind. When fired from a shotgun, the heavier portion of the munition (i.e. that containing the lead) leads through the air, the trailing fabric serves to stabilize the munition’s flight to the point of impact, and the lead-containing portion of the munition flattens against the target upon impact, which spreads the energy of the munition to a larger surface area. Impact munitions can be classified along a number of dimensions besides what they are made of; including the number of projectiles in a given munition. Some contain a single projectile, some contain several projectiles, and some contain a dozen or more projectiles. Single-projectile munitions of the 37 and 40 millimeter variety include plastic baton rounds, sponge rounds, and bean-bag rounds. Single-projectile 0.12 gauge munitions include rubber balls, wood dowels, and bean bags. At the next level are 37 and 40 millimeter munitions that contain several pieces of foam or wood, which are each typically about 1.5 inches in length. Munitions at the upper end of

the projectile count scale typically contain a large number of relatively small rubber balls, which typically range from 32/100ths of an inch to 60/100ths of an inch in diameter (i.e. 0.32-0.60 caliber). Because of their smaller size, 0.12 gauge rubber ball munitions typically contain 12-15.32 caliber projectiles, while 37 and 40 millimeter rubber ball munitions can contain a few dozen 0.60 caliber or several dozen 0.32 caliber projectiles. The various sorts of impact munitions available provide law enforcement with numerous options for dealing with a variety of types of incidents they may be called upon to handle. In a crowd control situation, for example, munitions that contain multiple foam projectiles or large numbers of small rubber balls may be fired directly at individuals, while munitions containing multiple wood dowels are designed to be fired into the ground in front of individuals, so that they bounce up and strike them in the lower legs – a tactic known as “skip-firing” – in order to avoid the serious injuries that could be imparted by the relatively inflexible wood. Munitions containing multiple projectiles can also be used to subdue a lone subject, but single-projectile munitions are the preferred tool for such situations, as they are inherently more accurate than their multiple-projectile cousins and thus provide officers with the capacity to direct their shots to specific localized areas of a subject’s body. Extent of impact munitions deployment As is the case with many aspects of American law enforcement, information about the extent to which police agencies across the nation count impact munitions among their force options is quite limited. As a consequence, the picture we have of how widespread these devices are in contemporary American law enforcement is quite muddied. One source of information suggests that impact munitions are used by the vast majority of sizable police agencies across the country. In 2005, Defense Technology, the nation’s largest manufacturer and supplier of impact munitions, conducted a survey wherein they asked each of the largest police agencies in each of the 50 states (to a maximum of 50 agencies per state) whether they included any sort of impact munitions in their force option inventory. Approximately, 90 percent of the agencies that responded indicated that they did, in fact, have at least one type of impact munitions (Ford, 2006). Other data suggests that the 90 percent adaptation figure might be a bit high, however. Since, the late 1980s, the US Department of Justice has regularly (i.e. every few years) collected data about various aspects of police organizations from a sample of some 3,000 American law-enforcement agencies under the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) program. In both, 2000 and 2003, the LEMAS survey instrument included under a question about agencies’ authorization of “non-lethal weapons or actions” whether officers were permitted to use “rubber bullet(s)” and “soft projectile(s).” The data from 2000 indicates that 3 percent of the agencies authorized the use of rubber bullets and that 9 percent of them authorized soft projectiles. By 2003, these figures had increased to 8 percent for rubber bullets and 28 percent for soft projectiles (Hickman and Reaves, 2003, 2006). The LEMAS survey instrument does not clearly define the sorts of munitions that would fall under the “soft projectile” and “rubber bullet” headings, but it would appear that at least bean bag and sponge/foam rounds would properly be counted as types of soft projectiles and that plastic baton rounds and rounds containing rubber pellets would be counted as forms of rubber bullets. Assuming that the responses to the two

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LEMAS items reflected police departments usage of sponge, bean bag, plastic baton, and rubber pellet rounds, the LEMAS data would not reflect the extent to which American law-enforcement agencies used the various other sorts of impact munitions on the market (e.g. wood dowels, pepper ball) during the years in question. Given the lack of clarity about just what the LEMAS data reflect about impact munitions usage, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from this information about how widespread impact munitions were in 2000 and 2003. The data are useful, nonetheless, as a marker for assessing some important points about the usage of impact munitions in the world of modern American policing. One point of interest is that the adaptation of impact munitions has not been uniform across American police agencies of different sizes. This is quite obvious when one breaks agencies down by the size of the population they serve. In 2000, for example, one third (33 percent) of the reporting agencies serving populations of 1,000,000 or more authorized soft projectiles, but just 4 percent of those serving populations of less than 2,500 did so. Where rubber bullets go, 7 percent of the biggest agencies (i.e. those serving populations of 1,000,000 or more) authorized them, but just 2 percent of the smallest ones (i.e. those serving populations of less than 2,500) did. Another interesting point in the 2000 LEMAS data is that the highest adoption rates for impact munitions were observed among medium-sized agencies, with 41 percent of police departments serving populations between 100,000 and 249,999 permitting the use soft projectiles and 13 percent of agencies serving populations between 250,000 and 499,999 authorizing the use of rubber bullets. Notable differences in adoption rates across different sized agencies were also apparent in the 2003 LEMAS data. About 69 percent of the largest agencies included soft projectiles among their less-lethal options, while just 13 percent of the smallest ones did so. The highest rate of adoption was observed among agencies serving populations of 50,000 to 99,999 – 72 percent – while the lowest was the aforementioned 13 percent among the smallest agencies. Where rubber bullets are concerned, the highest rate of adoption was 25 percent, which was observed among the largest agencies, and the lowest was 6 percent, which was observed among both the smallest agencies and those serving populations of 2,500-9,999. A more complete picture of how impact munitions authorization varies with agency size is presented in Table I.

Population served

Table I. Impact munitions authorization among different-sized police agencies

1,000,000 plus 500,000-999,999 250,000-499,000 100,000-249,999 50,000-99,999 25,000-49,999 10,000-24,999 2,500-9,999 Under 25,000 All sizes

Percent authorizing soft 2000

Percent authorizing soft 2003

33 23 25 41 33 23 14 5 4 9

69 48 59 66 72 57 42 28 13 28

Percent authorizing Percent authorizing rubber 2000 rubber 2003 7 6 13 12 10 9 4 3 2 3

25 16 22 22 22 19 10 6 6 8

In sum, the LEMAS data indicate that the number of agencies that include impact munitions in their less-lethal inventories has increased notably in recent years, particularly among departments serving larger populations. The LEMAS numbers are not consistent with those produced by the survey conducted by the leading impact munitions manufacturer, however. The discrepancy between the LEMAS and industry numbers could be due to any number of factors. Among the most likely are: . a goodly number of agencies acquired impact munitions between 2003 and 2005; and . the 2003 LEMAS data underestimate the number of agencies authorizing impact munitions. One aspect of the undercount would likely be that some agencies that authorize beanbag, foam, plastic baton, and rubber pellet rounds did not report this because they were not sure what sorts of munitions should be classified as “soft projectiles” and “rubber bullets.” Another might well be that agencies authorizing wood baton and similar projectiles did not report that they used impact munitions because such munitions would not fit into either of the measurement categories on the LEMAS survey. Whatever the case regarding the true extent to which impact munitions have penetrated the American law-enforcement community, it is clear that these less-lethal instruments are an increasingly popular feature of contemporary policing in the USA. Attention now turns to an overview of the limited empirical evidence presently available about the use of impact munitions during encounters with citizens. Field usage In 1998, the National Institute of Justice funded a study to examine a variety of questions about how law enforcement agencies were using impact munitions and the effects these munitions have on the citizens against whom they are used. The study – conducted by Sergeant Ken Hubbs of the San Diego Police Department, with the assistance of the author of this paper – collected information about these issues via a survey of North American law-enforcement agencies that were known to include impact munitions in their weapons inventories as of 2000 (identified through a combination of rosters supplied by impact munitions manufacturers and publicizing the study in police publications and web sites; see Hubbs and Klinger, 2004 for details). The study used a case-based methodology wherein participating agencies reported details about incidents in which officers fired impact munitions at citizens. Information collected included the nature of the incident (e.g. barricaded suspect, hostage situation), the weapons possessed by suspects taken under fire, the types of impact munitions fired, and the injuries sustained by suspects. During the course of data collection, a total of 373 separate case reports were collected. The rest of this section reviews some of the key findings of the Hubbs/Klinger study, beginning with what it disclosed about the sorts of situations that led officers to employ impact munitions. By far, the most common type of problem in which officers used impact munitions were those involving suicidal individuals; nearly half of the cases (N ¼ 181) involved subjects who were threatening to take their own lives. Among the remaining 137 cases that included information about incident type (respondents did not report incident type in 55 cases), the most common were those involving violent subjects who did not

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Table II. Type of incident for 318 incidents

display any signs of suicidal intent and who were in some sort of open space, such as a street, vacant lot, or field (N ¼ 70). A total of 48 other cases involved non-suicidal individuals who were barricaded inside structures or vehicles, while the remaining 19 cases involved a variety of situations, such as hostage incidents and civil disturbances. In sum and as shown in Table II (with the 55 cases missing information removed), this information from the Hubbs/Klinger study indicates that while officers use impact munitions in a variety of types of situations, they use them most commonly when dealing with individuals whose mental/emotional state has deteriorated to a point that they have threatened to take their own lives. Another point of interest from the Hubbs/Klinger study is that among the 306 cases for which respondents provided information about the weaponry possessed by subjects is that the most common sort were edged weapons; exactly 50 percent of the cases (N ¼ 153) involved subjects carrying knives, swords, machetes, and other similar armaments. Subjects possessed firearms in 29 percent of the 306 cases, with handguns leading the way (N ¼ 64), followed by shotguns (N ¼ 15), and rifles (N ¼ 11). Subjects were armed with blunt instruments such as clubs, bats, and sticks in 6 percent of the cases (N ¼ 17), and miscellaneous objects such as rocks and bottles in 4 percent (N ¼ 11). Finally, 11 percent (N ¼ 35) of the subjects against whom officers used impact munitions carried no weapons at all. These numbers are displayed in Table III. A look at the 316 cases in the Hubbs/Klinger data that included information about the number of munitions fired showed that officers discharged a total of 969 munitions across these cases, and yielded two additional notable findings. The first is that the there is considerable variation in how many rounds officers discharged; from 1 to 141. The second is that the vast majority of the time officers fired a small number of rounds; ten or fewer in 98 percent of the cases, five or fewer in 93 percent, and a single round (the mode) in 39 percent. The information on range and central tendency indicates that while officers sometimes fire copious numbers of rounds when they employ impact munitions, they rarely do so (Table IV). Of the 969 rounds fired, respondents specified munitions type in 962 cases. This information indicates that 0.12 gauge bean bag rounds were by far the most Nature of incident

Frequency

Percent

Suicidal subject Open air Barricaded person Other

181 70 48 19

57 22 15 6

Type of weapon

Table III. Type of weapon in 306 incidents

Edged weapon Firearm Blunt object Miscellaneous objects Unarmed

Frequency

Percent

153 90 17 11 35

50 29 6 4 11

Number fired 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 32 141

Frequency

Percent

122 70 47 35 20 9 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 1

37 22 15 11 6 3 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.3

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Table IV. Number of rounds fired in 316 incidents

frequently used sort of round (accounting for 65 percent of the munitions fired), that 37 millimeter plastic baton rounds were the next most popular munition type employed (28 percent), and that other sorts of munitions were rarely used (i.e. all other types together constituted the remaining 7 percent of the known munitions types fired). Respondents provided information about the number of munitions that struck their intended target in 313 of the 316 cases for which they reported the number of rounds fired. This information disclosed, not surprisingly, that citizens were typically struck by a small number of rounds when officers took them under fire with impact munitions; four or fewer rounds in 90 percent of the cases. The Hubbs/Klinger report also provided information about the injuries that citizens suffered from 772 of the rounds that struck them (Table V). The most common sort of injury that citizens’ sustained was bruising, which occurred in 52 percent of the munitions strikes. Another 31 percent of the rounds caused abrasions, 7 percent caused no injury, 6 percent caused lacerations, 3 percent fractured bones, and 2 percent penetrated the skin of the subject shot, but caused no notable additional injury. Unintended consequences In addition to suffering these various non-lethal injuries, eight citizens involved in incidents reported in the Hubbs/Klinger study died after being struck by impact munitions[2]. Five of the six fatalities about which respondents provided a clear

Injury sustained Bruise Abrasion Laceration Fracture Penetration None

Frequency

Percent

398 239 43 27 14 51

52 31 6 3 2 7

Table V. Injury sustained from 772 munitions strikes

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indication on the body area impacted were due to projectiles that struck subjects in the chest. In the sixth case, the fatal round struck the subject’s throat. And in two other cases, the individuals who died were struck by multiple munitions that impacted multiple parts of their bodies, so it was not possible to determine precisely which munitions striking what part of the decedent’s body caused the lethal injury. A more detailed look at the six cases in which citizens were killed by impact munitions strikes to specific body locations discloses two notable points. The first point is that in all but one of the cases the decedents were struck by multiple munitions. The second is that in all but one case the fatal injuries were caused just one round. The individual who died from a round to his throat, for example, was struck by a total of thirteen 37 millimeter foam rubber and bean bag rounds (the fatal round to his throat was a bean bag). Two of the citizens who succumbed to torso injuries died from 0.12 gauge bean bag rounds that penetrated their chest cavities; in one case lodging in the citizen’s heart, in the other, in a lung. (Both of these cases involved square pillow-type bags that struck edge first, slicing through the decedents’ rib cage.) Two of the other fatalities from chest impacts occurred when 37 millimeter plastic baton rounds fractured the citizens’ ribs, which, in turn, cut into their hearts and lungs. The final death from a chest impact was the result of a single 0.12 gauge bean bag round that did not penetrate the citizen’s chest wall. The Hubbs/Klinger data included all known North American deaths from impact munitions as of May 30, 2000. Since, that time, six other people are known to have died from impact munitions strikes (Ijames, 2006). Three of these individuals died from torso shots (one from a ruptured spleen and two from heart and lung damage; all caused by 0.12 gauge bean bag rounds), two suffered fatal wounds from single rounds to the head (a 0.12 gauge bean bag in one case, a munition containing a chemical agent in the other), while the sixth person died from multiple strikes from several different types of rounds. As reports of fatal injuries from impact munitions circulated in law-enforcement circles, the police community sought ways to reduce even further the chance of death from these devices. In this connection, police trainers devoted considerable effort to teaching officers to try to avoid shooting subjects in the portions of the body that had led to known deaths; i.e. the upper torso, neck, and head. While it is not always possible for officers to avoid these areas, the fact that only six people are known to have died from impact munitions strikes in the last six years while the number of agencies using these devices has increased markedly indicates that the training may well be paying off. Whatever the case regarding why few people have died from impact munitions strikes in recent years, the fact that more than a dozen people are known to have been killed by devices that are designed to be non-lethal indicates that impact munitions can sometimes lead to tragic unintended consequences. And consideration of another aspect of impact munitions deployment indicates that they can also lead to another form of deadly unintended consequence; the death of police officers. In July of 1997, Tacoma (WA) Police Officer Bill Lowry was murdered by a suspect he was trying to arrest after another officer took the suspect under fire with impact munitions. The suspect, Sap Kray, had threatened to kill his wife with an assault rifle and had barricaded himself inside a single-family residence before Officer Lowry and other members of the Tacoma SWAT team arrived. When Kray came to the door,

Officer Jack Nasworthy shot him twice in the chest with 0.37 millimeter plastic baton rounds. Kray fell back inside the house, and Officers Lowry, Nasowrthy, and two other SWAT team members immediately entered to take Kray into custody. Unfortunately, Kray was able to retrieve his rifle and shoot Officer Lowry in the chest when Lowry entered the house. Officer Lowry died soon thereafter at a nearby trauma center. Even though Officer Lowry was killed by a felon’s bullet, consideration of how he came to be shot discloses that he would not have been murdered if Kray had not been shot with impact munitions. As well-trained SWAT officers, Lowry and his partners would not normally have entered a residence wherein a suspected felon had barricaded himself. In this case, they did so only because Kray had been struck by the less-lethal rounds. Believing that it was safe to do so, they moved into take their suspect into custody. By the time, they realized that Kray had re-armed himself, the four officers found themselves in exposed positions staring down the barrel of an assault rifle. Caught in the open, Officer Lowry was an easy target for Kray’s murderous attack. Working back, it is apparent that: . Lowry would not have been shot if he had not confronted an armed suspect from an exposed position; . he would not have found himself in the exposed position if he had not entered the residence; and . he would not have entered the residence if impact munitions had not been employed against Kray. In sum, because the application of the impact munitions set in motion a series of events that led to Officer Lowry’s murder, the impact munitions clearly contributed to his death. Discussion and conclusion Officer Lowry’s death is a dramatic example what appears to be a widespread challenge facing American law enforcement where impact munitions are concerned; the temptation to count on impact munitions to resolve stand-offs with individuals who possess firearms. As previously noted, impact munitions were initially intended for against individuals armed with unorthodox weapons, such as swords, knives, and clubs (in non-crowd control situations, that is). The beauty of impact munitions in such circumstances is that they give officers a realistic opportunity to resolve the situation from a safe distance. When subjects are armed with guns, however, distance alone normally matters not one whit. Police trainers generally recognize this point and teach officers that when it comes to dealing with subjects armed with guns that impact munitions must take a subordinate position to standard police firearms. In this framework, police are taught to ensure that the first officers on-scene deploy with lethal firearms, that subsequent officers may then deploy with impact munitions, and that all officers should maintain points of cover until they are certain that it is safe to move. Despite this doctrine, however, there are numerous cases besides the Lowry incident in which officers have violated some aspect of it. In a recent incident in a suburb of St Louis, MO, for example, the first officer responding to a call of a teen armed with a rifle at a local high school initially opted to deploy with a 0.12 gauge beanbag shotgun. The teen was eventually shot with lethal ammunition (he survived) by another officer

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when he pointed his gun at two other officers, so nothing bad came of the initial officers’ decision to deploy with impact munitions. But, things could have turned out very badly indeed if the teen had opted to shoot at either the first officer or at any of the numerous citizens who were present before the officers armed with lethal weapons had arrived, for the officer with the beanbag shotgun would have been at a decided tactical disadvantage. As previously noted, the widespread use of impact munitions in policing today is the result of the American law-enforcement community’s diligent work over the last several decades to develop ways to resolve dangerous situations short of gunfire. The available evidence indicates that impact munitions have been a successful innovation on this front, saving the lives of many people who would otherwise have been shot with standard police firearms. The evidence also indicates, however, that the diffusion of impact munitions in American policing has brought with it some un-intended risks that can place officers’ lives in jeopardy. As impact munitions continue to be used, the policing community should keep in mind the potential they hold to create the very thing they are designed to prevent and work diligently to ensure that officers to use them only when doing so does not place their lives in unnecessary jeopardy. Notes 1. Some continua list “officer presence” as the lowest level of force, but verbal commands are the lowest sort of forceful action officers who are present at a given encounter can take. 2. Hubbs and Klinger (2004) also report on the deaths of two people who were shot with lethal munitions that the officers who shot them mistook for impact munitions. References Engel, R. and Silver, E. (2001), “Policing mentally disordered suspects: a reexamination of the criminalization hypothesis”, Criminology, Vol. 39, pp. 225-52. Ford, P. (2006), Personal Communication. Geller, W. and Scott, M. (1992), Deadly Force: What we Know, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC. Hickman, M. and Reaves, B. (2003), Local Police Departments 2000, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Hickman, M. and Reaves, B. (2006), Local Police Departments 2003, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Hubbs, K. and Klinger, D. (2004), Impact Munitions Use: Types, Targets, Effects, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. Ijames, S. (2006), Personal Communication. Kenny, J., Heal, S. and Grossman, M. (2001), “The attribute-based evaluation of less-than-lethal, extended range, impact munitions”, available at: www.arl.psu.edu/documents/iNLDT/ abe_report.pdf Klinger, D. (1995), “The micro structure of non-lethal force: baseline data from an observational study”, Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 20, pp. 169-86. Klinger, D. (2004), Into the Kill Zone: A Cop’s Eye View of Deadly Force, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Tefertille, C. (1997), Wyatt Earp: The Life Behind the Legend, Wiley, New York, NY.

Terrill, W. (2001), Police Coercion: Application of the Force Continuum, LFB Scholarly Publishing, New York, NY.

About the author David Klinger is an Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri-St Louis. His research interests include police arrest practices and the use of force. Prior to pursuing an academic career, he was a street cop with the Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) Police Departments. David Klinger can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Excessive force, civil liability, and the Taser in the nation’s courts

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Implications for law enforcement policy and practice Michael R. Smith Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, USA

Matthew Petrocelli Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, Edwardsville, Illinois, USA, and

Charlie Scheer Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, USA Abstract

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 398-422 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778813

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to help inform the ongoing policy and training debates over use of the Taser and its proper role in the use of force continuum. Design/methodology/approach – This paper qualitatively analyzes all reported court decisions (n ¼ 53 as of January 31, 2007) in which a Taser was used by a law enforcement officer. Findings – The majority of reported cases have resulted in the dismissal of claims against officers and municipalities for alleged Taser-related excessive force violations. In most cases, plaintiffs were unable to show the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to support municipal liability. As for the liability of individual officers, most cases were decided in the officer’s favor on summary judgment, particularly when the suspect was exhibiting physical resistance. In a few cases, summary judgment was denied to officers when the plaintiff alleged that he or she was fully compliant when the Tasering occurred. Research limitations/implications – This analysis was confined to reported court decisions, which do not necessarily represent a random sample of all Taser-related lawsuits filed in the courts. Likewise, Taser-related lawsuits appear to be increasing as the use of the Taser proliferates among law-enforcement agencies. Thus, the trends and patterns in Taser liability identified in the analysis may change and evolve with newly decided cases. Practical implications – The analysis suggests that agencies should review their policy and training guidelines on Taser usage to remain compliant with emerging legal standards. Officers should be trained to articulate a physical threat or potential threat before using a Taser against a verbally resistant subject. Originality/value – Civil liability is always of concern to law enforcement officials, particularly when an emerging technology is involved. At the time of this writing, there were no published analyses of Taser-related excessive force claims. Keywords Law enforcement, Civil law, Liability, Weapons, United States of America Paper type Research paper

As law enforcement agencies rush to adopt the Taser for its promise of safe and effective less lethal control of resistive suspects, communities and interest groups have begun to raise concerns over its use, and Taser-related excessive force litigation is on the rise. In reaction, police executives have struggled to draft appropriate Taser policies and training programs to preserve it as a less lethal option. This paper analyzes the nation’s 53 reported court decisions for patterns and trends that may inform the ongoing policy and training debates over the Taser. The authors find that courts routinely approve of the use of the Taser against assaultive and physically resistant suspects and that most allow its use even against non-compliant or restrained suspects. Implications and suggestions for policy and training are discussed. In 1984, on the heels of “broken windows” and the rage of enthusiasm for community policing and its associated hope for a retooling of police strategy, Samuel Walker lamented that the promises of technology and revolutions in policing have produced a strain on both police agencies and the public they serve by inappropriately raising expectations. A “parallel revolution in expectations about the quality of life” ensued (Walker, 1984, p. 81), captured by media-broadcast images and unrealistic demands of a public who believed that the arrival of any new police technology would immediately translate into an improved standard of living and a reduction in disorder. Coupled with public demands for a technological “brave new world” in policing are increased pressures on the police themselves to accomplish unrealistic feats of social control, as though to suggest that the arrival of new technology will be, in itself, a panacea. As to this, Walker (1984, p. 82) describes the police as “both the source and victims of this revolution.” In the past five years, the development, widespread adoption, and integration of the Taser[1] as a less lethal weapon of choice in many police agencies has produced such a revolution in attitude and policy, in this instance towards police use of force. Thus, with the acquisition of a single weapon, the potential for change in law-enforcement attitudes toward the use of force and associated policy decisions has accelerated. Moreover, the use of the Taser appears to be increasing across agencies where jurisdiction size and budget would traditionally be obstacles to the extensive implementation of a new technology, suggesting that policing has embraced the Taser in a manner not seen since the widespread introduction of pepper spray in the 1990s. However, a review of national headlines reinforces the persistence of controversy surrounding the Taser. In May 2005, a highly publicized series of articles printed by the Palm Beach Post found that one-fourth of subjects involved in incidents where police used Tasers were not violent or threatening, but merely noncompliant, stirring public concern (Barton, 2005). In Pittsburgh, one year after city police endured public admonishment for using the devices against anti-war protestors, the suburb of Mt Lebanon was sued by a storeowner who was Tasered following a confrontation over a parking violation (Fuller, 2005; Ward, 2006). In Seattle, police used the Taser on a pregnant motorist who refused to sign a summons for speeding, igniting racial controversy (Castro, 2005). In May 2006, the Florida State House of Representatives unanimously approved a bill restricting law enforcement officers’ use of the Taser, a measure supported by the Florida Police Benevolent Association and the Florida Police Chiefs Association. In a state that leads the USA in Taser-related deaths, one recently involving a 56-year old woman in her wheelchair, lawmakers found public concern powerful enough to

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mandate additional hours of training and stricter guidelines for Taser use (Benn, 2006). To the law-abiding public, media images such as these have created a gulf of suspicion and mistrust regarding a tool that seems unfamiliar and potentially dangerous. Citizens, steered by the media, see the Taser as being wielded in situations where even passively noncompliant, non-violent, or merely argumentative persons are forced to obey by a Taser-happy police ethic. Law enforcement officials, meanwhile, struggle to subdue such public concerns in an atmosphere where agencies are adopting the Taser without sufficient forethought for the legal and policy ramifications of those decisions. As with any new policing technology, legal confrontations surrounding the use of the Taser are inevitable, and law-enforcement officers have been sued for allegedly using Tasers inappropriately. In addition, and as occurred with pepper spray, reported instances of subject death in association with the Taser have captured the attention of the media and the public and have resulted in calls by some to place a moratorium on Taser use (Schlosberg, 2005). As a result, law enforcement executives and other policy-makers have struggled to craft policies and training guidelines that appropriately locate the Taser within their use of force continua. These decisions have been hampered by a lack of information concerning Taser’s risks and benefits, as well as by an incomplete or misguided understanding of how the courts have begun to shape the legal landscape surrounding the use of Tasers by US law-enforcement agencies. The purpose of this paper, then, is twofold. Its obvious message will be to educate agencies about the breadth, scope, and success of civil litigation involving Taser use in a police setting. Many of the lawsuits involve individual officers as litigants, while some seek to hold state or local governments legally accountable for perceived rights violations. Our assessment of the legal atmosphere surrounding Taser use, however, contains a second message: agencies and administrators urgently need to be apprised of these strands of litigation for practical reasons. Some agencies may not yet have adopted the Taser, and are considering doing so with an “ear to the ground” for potential legal conflict. Many agencies, already having implemented the Taser, seek to discover ways to improve their policies and training to avoid potential litigation or to prevail should they be sued. Still more agencies may need answers as to how the litigation, seemingly distant, may affect them in the long run. By analyzing and discussing the existing legal issues surrounding the Taser, we hope to dispel myths, inform policy-making, and further the ongoing debate over this revolutionary less-lethal weapon. Methods As discussed above, the purpose of this paper was to identify patterns or trends in the existing case law on the use of Tasers by police and to determine whether those trends could help inform the ongoing policy debate over the proper role of Tasers as a less-lethal option for America’s law enforcement officers. We began our analysis by conducting a Westlaw search of all state and federal cases in which the word “Taser” appeared. We conducted searches in the ALLSTATES and ALLFEDS databases available on Westlaw, which contain reported and unreported[2] cases from all state and federal courts that issue written opinions. As of January 31, 2007, this search uncovered 291 federal cases and 339 state cases in which “Taser” appeared in print. Although other hand-held stun guns, stun belts, and projectile-deploying

conducted energy devices are currently in use by law enforcement agencies[3], our review of the literature, discussions with police executives from around the country, attendance at various NIJ-sponsored less-lethal symposia, and an examination of government-funded studies of less-lethal technology convinces us that Taser is by far the dominant conducted energy device on the market and is the device that is at the center of controversy nationally. Thus, we chose to focus our analysis on Taser. Once the 630 cases were identified in which “Taser” appeared, we downloaded and read them to determine whether, under the facts of the cases: . a Taser was used by a law enforcement officer; . the Taser was used during the course of an arrest or in an attempt to control a free citizen; . the use of the Taser resulted in a constitutional claim of excessive force against the officer, a supervisor, or a governmental entity; and . the Taser-related claim was actually adjudicated by the court. Based on these criteria, we eliminated from our analysis cases where Tasers were used by prison guards, security officers, or private citizens. We also eliminated cases where Tasers were used against convicted persons or pre-trial detainees since these cases are decided under the 8th or 14th Amendments and according to a different legal standard than applies to police use of force cases (Hudson v. McMillian, 1992; Bell v. Wolfish, 1979). The requirement that the use of a Taser by a law-enforcement officer must have resulted in a constitutional claim of excessive force against the officer, a supervisor, or a governmental entity resulted in the elimination of all criminal cases, all cases involving miscellaneous state law claims (e.g. assault and battery, negligence) and five cases where only the conduct of Taser International, Inc. itself was at issue[4]. Finally, we eliminated cases where a court did not reach the merits of a Taser-related claim because of some procedural default by one of the parties. Applying these initial rules of decision left, 53 cases remaining for analysis. These cases are summarized in the Appendix, and selected cases from among them are discussed below. Findings In this section, we present the result from our analysis of the 53 reported court decisions in the USA[5] that have addressed the propriety of the use of a Taser by a law enforcement officer to control an allegedly resistant suspect. We begin by discussing the cases that involved governmental entities or supervisors as defendants. Next, we turn to cases against individual officers decided by federal district courts on motions to dismiss. In most cases, these opinions provide little guidance on how courts view the use of the Taser because the standard of review is so limited under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[6] governing such motions. Nonetheless, some of these cases do provide an indication of the outer boundaries of appropriate Taser use under existing legal standards. Finally, we discuss cases against individual officers decided on motions for summary judgment, beginning first with those where the defendants’ motions were denied and then those where the defendants’ motions were granted. These latter cases provide the clearest indication of the contours of appropriate Taser usage as viewed by various federal courts.

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Taser use and municipal or supervisory liability Only one reported decision has resulted in a finding of liability against a municipality arising out of a Taser incident. In McKenzie v. City of Milpitas (1990), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs – a mother and son – who had sued the city under 42 US C § 1983 for allegedly violating their Fourth Amendment rights when two of its police officers used Tasers to subdue them[7]. Milpitas officers had been dispatched to the McKenzie residence for a domestic dispute and had encountered a chaotic scene in front of the house involving several of the McKenzies and their relatives. At some point, one of the officers (Ferguson) stepped between Lucille McKenzie and her sister to end an argument, and Lucille’s son, Cecil: . . . bolted across the front yard toward Officer Ferguson, ignored Officer Comfort’s command to halt, and began to jump over a low fence that separated him from where Officer Ferguson stood . . . (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990, p. 1296).

As he was in midair leaping over the fence, he was Tasered in the back by Officer Comfort and was immediately handcuffed by Officer Ferguson. Meanwhile, thinking that her son had been shot with a handgun, Lucille ran toward Cecil and Officer Ferguson and was herself Tasered in the back by another officer (Pangelinan) after ignoring commands to stop. As a result of this incident, Lucille and Cecil McKenzie sued the City of Milpitas for failure to properly train its officers in the use of the Taser and for Taser-related policy failures that allegedly resulted in the plaintiffs being Tasered in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Among their arguments was that the custom and practice of the Milpitas Police Department (MPD) allowed officers to carry their Tasers unholstered, which rendered them incapable of using physical arrest techniques to control suspects (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990). In fact, prior to the Tasering incident, Officer Comfort stood on the McKenzie’s lawn covering the front porch where Cecil was standing with his unholstered Taser (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990). The plaintiffs also argued that the MPD’s training course provided no guidance to officers on the appropriate constitutional or ethical standards for using the Taser and was silent on the issue of when the Taser should not be used. Finally, the McKenzie’s complained that the MPD custom and practice of using the Taser after voice commands and before the use of physical arrest techniques was improper and condoned the use of excessive force (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990). Following a jury trial on the issue of municipal liability, a jury awarded Lucille $200,000 in damages and Cecil $10,000. The city appealed the verdict, and the case was heard by the Ninth Circuit. In order to establish municipal liability under 42 US C. § 1983, plaintiffs must establish that their constitutional rights were violated as a result of a city policy or custom (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs, 1978) or that the municipality failed to properly train its officers, which itself led to the constitutional violation (Canton v. Harris, 1989). According to the Ninth Circuit, no constitutional doctrine authorizes the police to always use a Taser against a suspect who fails to respond to verbal commands as allowed for under the MPD Taser policy. The MPD policy allowed for the use of Taser after verbal commands and according to the “prudence” of the threat. The court held that this language, coupled with the fact that the policy did not require officers to holster their Tasers, resulted in a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Importantly, the court cited with approval

language from the LAPD Taser policy that allowed for the use of Taser against violent or potentially violent subjects and contrasted that language with the more permissive MPD policy that mentioned only the “prudence” of the threat posed by the subject. Next, the court upheld the jury verdict on the failure to train theory, despite the city’s argument that the plaintiffs had failed to show other instances of Taser misuse or that the city was aware of potential misuse. The city argued that under Canton, a failure to train claim may only be supported by a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality and that a single incidence of misconduct does not qualify as “deliberately indifferent.” This argument was unpersuasive to the court. Finally, the court held that a Fourth Amendment violation does not require proof of long-term harm or serious physical injury and that the plaintiffs’ relatively minor physical injuries and emotional trauma were sufficient to support the monetary damages awarded to them by the jury (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990). McKenzie is obviously a troubling case for municipalities and law-enforcement agencies. However, it is the only reported decision to uphold municipal liability arising from the use of a Taser, it was an unpublished decision, and it was decided by what is widely considered to be the USA’s most liberal circuit court of appeal. Despite its relative isolation, though, McKenzie is instructive on at least one issue – policy language matters. The MPD policy allowed for the use of Taser once a subject failed to respond to verbal commands and “so long as the ‘threat [is] prudent in the use of [the taser]’” (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990, p. 3). This language is nonsensical and probably was meant to authorize the use of a Taser when prudent given the threat posed by the subject. This small change would have brought the policy much closer to the LAPD policy that was cited with approval by the court and which allowed for the use of the Taser against violent or potentially violent (e.g. threatening) persons. In addition to McKenzie, one other reported decision has raised the specter of possible municipal liability resulting from the use of a Taser. In Green v. Fewell (2006), the sheriff of Ouachita Parish, Louisiana was sued in his official capacity under Section 1983 for alleged policy and failure to train violations when one of his deputies Tasered a suspect fleeing from the deputy on foot. The sheriff moved for summary judgment, but was denied. Unfortunately, the facts of the case where not well developed by the court, and the reasons for its decision were not clearly articulated. The fact remains, though, that the court denied summary judgment to the sheriff and allowed the case to move forward on the apparent theory that policy and training which allow for the Tasering of a fleeing suspect could potentially constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. However, this case stands in direct contrast to several others where courts granted summary judgment to officers on facts that showed far less resistance by suspects (McBride v. Clark, 2006; Devoe v. Rebant, 2006; Draper v. Reynolds, 2004). Whether these cases can be reconciled with the Louisiana district court’s decision in Green is discussed below. In contrast to the McKenzie and Green cases, which involved the actual use of a Taser, at least one reported decision has decided the merits of whether a municipality can be held liable for failing to equip or train its officers with Tasers. In Plakas v. Drinski (1994), an Indiana deputy sheriff shot and killed a man who threatened him with a fire poker. The man’s family sued the officer and the county for among other things, failing to equip its officers with a greater range of less-lethal force options (including the Taser) and for failing to use those options in subduing the apparently

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mentally unstable subject. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive means for controlling a violent person but rather only requires that the actions taken by the police be reasonable. Furthermore, the court found no constitutional duty for law enforcement agencies to equip their officers with particular kinds of equipment. Given that Plakas had already fled in handcuffs from the police once and had charged the deputy with a fireplace poker raised over his head, the court found no Fourth Amendment violation on the part of the county. According to the court, the decision of whether or not to purchase and equip officers with Tasers or other less-lethal weapons is not a matter of constitutional concern, or as the court stated, “the Constitution does not enact a police administrator’s equipment list” (Plakas v. Drinski, 1994, p. 1150). Finally, no reported Taser decision from among those that we reviewed imposed liability or even allowed a case to go to a jury based on a theory of supervisory liability. The case of Magee v. City of Daphne (2006) is instructive. In many Section 1983 lawsuits, one or more supervising officers, and often the chief law-enforcement executive, are named as defendants. In Magee, the chief of police for the City of Daphne, Alabama was named as a defendant in an excessive force lawsuit brought as the result of the Tasering of a suspect who was wanted for domestic violence. The chief was not at the scene of the incident and did not take part in it. The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama first noted that supervisors cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their subordinates. Moreover, supervisory liability could only be imposed if a supervisor knew of a pattern of abuse by a subordinate and failed to correct it or if the supervisor personally directed the constitutional violation. In Magee, as in most cases, the plaintiff was unable to produce any evidence that the chief of police either knew about and approved of the alleged constitutional violation or directed it himself. Thus, the court dismissed the supervisory liability claim against the chief. Motions to dismiss The value of reviewing Taser cases decided on motions to dismiss is to identify facts and circumstances, which when accepted as true by courts, would allow a case to move forward in the litigation process. In ruling on these early motions brought to terminate a lawsuit, federal courts will grant them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only if the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs fail to prove any sort of claim that would entitle them to relief (Hishon v. King & Spalding, 1984; Conley v. Gibson, 1957). As a result, motions to dismiss brought by law enforcement defendants are denied in the majority of cases. Five of the eight motion to dismiss cases (out of the set of 53 total cases) revolve around a common theme. In each of them, the plaintiff alleged that an officer Tasered him or her without any justification whatsoever (Batiste v. City of Beaumont, 2006; Schmittling v. City of Belleville, 2006; Lang v. City of Largo, 2006; N.A. v. Inabinett, 2006; Rios v. City of Fresno, 2005). For example, in Ainsworth v. Inabinett (2006a), a deputy allegedly ran into the bedroom of a suicidal teenager who was kneeling on his bed talking with another deputy, jumped onto the boy and began beating him, and then stood up and fired his Taser point blank into the youth. Although the deputy undoubtedly disputed those facts, the court was obliged to accept them as true in

ruling on the deputy’s motion to dismiss. Applying the balancing factors specified in Graham v. Connor (1989) for deciding upon the reasonableness of force used by the police[8], the court held that no reasonable officer would have believed that the amount of force employed, including the use of the Taser, was reasonable under the circumstances. The case against the deputy was later dismissed on summary judgment, however, when evidence developed during the discovery process indicated that the plaintiff had, in fact, violently resisted arrest Ainsworth v. Inabinett, 2006b. Likewise, Schmittling v. City of Belleville (2006), Rios v. City of Fresno (2005) and Lang v. City of Largo (2006) contain allegations that officers used Tasers against non-threatening and non-resistant suspects. Similarly, the plaintiff in Blair v. County of Davidson (2006)[9] alleged that she was Tasered without provocation while a pre-trial detainee in the Davidson County, North Carolina Detention Center. Although the legal standard for deciding excessive force claims involving pre-trial detainees is found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Bell v. Wolfish, 1979; Riley v. Dorton, 1997), rather than in the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, the outcome of this case was the same as in the others. In all of these cases, the district courts denied the law-enforcement defendants’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that Tasers cannot be used without provocation against non-resistant subjects. In addition to these cases where the Taser allegedly was used without provocation, at least one court has denied an officer’s motion to dismiss on the ground that multiple uses of the Taser in quick succession stated a claim for relief. In Greer v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (2006), a deputy sheriff allegedly used the Taser several times to gain compliance from a mentally ill subject who had locked his arms around a chair and refused to comply with the deputy’s orders to submit to arrest. Accepting these facts as true in the complaint, the court held that the stated claim was sufficiently meritorious to survive the motion to dismiss. This case is difficult to reconcile with others that have dismissed claims entirely against officers who also used Tasers multiple times against suspects who exhibited defensive resistance by grasping and holding onto objects. Summary judgment denied to officers The cases discussed in this section involve motions for summary judgment brought by defendant officers that were denied by courts on the grounds that factual disputes remained to be sorted out by the fact-finder – usually a jury. A motion for summary judgment seeks to terminate a lawsuit before it goes to trial and will be granted only if, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 1986). In an excessive force lawsuit, summary judgment will be granted only if the plaintiff’s version of what happened and the officer’s version of what happened are not in dispute, and the uncontested facts entitle the officer to judgment as a matter of law. As in the motion to dismiss cases discussed above, several cases decided at the summary judgment stage involved allegations that officers used Tasers against non-resistant suspects in violation of the Constitution (Autin v. City of Baytown, 2005; Batiste v. City of Beaumont, 2006; Castaneda v. Douglas County Sheriff’s Investigator Rory Planeta, 2007; DeSalvo v. City of Collinsville, 2005; Franklin v. Montgomery County, MD, 2006; Holzman v. City of South Bend, 2006; Hudson v. City of San Jose,

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2006; Muro v. Simpson, 2006). According to the officers in Hudson, a motorist stopped for a minor traffic infraction attempted to place a matchbook in his mouth following a pat-down search, precipitating a struggle and the eventual use of a Taser. The motorist denied placing the matchbook near his mouth or the need for force at all. In Batiste, Beaumont, Texas police officers allegedly used unnecessary physical force and a Taser against a compliant woman they had taken into custody on a mental detention order. Autin and DeSalvo likewise alleged the use of Tasers against persons who where not physically resisting arrest. In each of these cases, the defendant officers recounted dramatically different versions of the events in question, thereby creating factual disputes that could not be decided on motions for summary judgment. The key factual disparity in these cases revolved around the alleged use of a Taser against a compliant citizen. Obviously, Tasers should not be used against persons who are complying with police requests or demands. Similarly, Tasers should not be used against suspects who are under physical control but who continue to offer verbal challenges, utter obscenities, or otherwise try the patience of the arresting officer. In DeSalvo, a Collinsville, Illinois police officer arrested a suspect for obstruction of justice. After he was handcuffed behind his back but before he was put into a police car, the suspect allegedly protested his innocence and asked why he was being arrested. At that point, according to the plaintiff, the arresting officer Tasered him in the neck. Similarly, officers were denied summary judgment in a number of cases where suspects had allegedly ceased resistance and were attempting to comply with police directives when they were Tasered (Beaver v. City of Federal Way, 2006; Fletcher v. Schwend, 2006; Harris v. County of King, 2006; Hoskins v. Woulfe, 2006). For example, in Fletcher v. Schwend (2006), the plaintiff, who was a suspected drug dealer, fled on foot from the defendant officers but was cut off in an alley and forced to surrender. The plaintiff claimed that he had stopped and put up his hands when he was Tasered, while the officers claimed that he disobeyed their orders. The court denied summary judgment to the officers and allowed the case to move forward to trial. Likewise, the court in Hoskins v. Woulfe (2006) denied summary judgment to some Milwaukee officers who engaged in a protracted fight with the plaintiff, who was under the influence of drugs. According to the plaintiff, the officers Tasered him at least three times after he was lying face down and incapacitated from earlier Taser discharges, OC spray, and baton blows. They key fact in the case that prevented summary judgment for the officers was the alleged Taserings after the suspect had been subdued. These cases represent allegations of a Taser being used when no force was required at all, either because the suspects had never resisted or because at some point they allegedly stopped resisting and gave up. They underscore that a Taser, like any other use of force option, is appropriate only when a suspect resists arrest or reasonably poses a threat to himself, the officer, or a third party. When a suspect ceases to resist, then officers must de-escalate their force in response. The more difficult questions, and those with which law-enforcement agencies are currently struggling, are how best to define resistance and how to identify the conditions of resistance under which a Taser lawfully may be used. For example, in Belford v. City of Akron (2006), the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the defendant officers summary judgment, even though the suspect was actively resisting arrest when he was Tasered. The court believed that the two officers,

both of whom were in their mid-30s and weighed over 200 pounds, may have used too much force in knee striking and Tasering the much smaller and older suspect (age 50, 155 lbs.). Rios v. City of Fresno (2006) presents a similar case where officers used a Taser to control a single, smaller suspect. Based on the conflicting reports of experts on the propriety of using the Taser under the circumstances, the court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment. The Rios case in particular stands in sharp contrast to most other cases (discussed below) where courts have approved of the use of the Taser to avoid physical struggles and the possibility of injury to suspects and officers. Summary judgment granted to officers In this next set of cases, courts granted summary judgment to officers because no genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute and because for various reasons, officers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law before the cases were submitted to a fact-finder. Generally speaking, these cases provide the most useful guidance on policy and training issues because they present facts and circumstances involving Taser use that courts have explicitly or implicitly approved of in dismissing lawsuits against the police. On one end of the resistance spectrum stands the case of McBride v. Clark (2006). In McBride, the plaintiff was arrested on a drug charge and detained in the Christian County, Missouri jail. On the second day of his detention, the plaintiff became extremely disruptive in the jail, yelling obscenities at the deputies, banging his head on a shower door, and threatening suicide. At the request of a jail nurse, deputies put the plaintiff in a restraint chair where he was immobilized so that his vital signs could be assessed and an IV started. Thrashing and struggling in the restraint chair, the plaintiff managed to dislodge the IV, attempted to pull free from the restraints, and spit at and tried to bite the deputies and nurses that were attempting to care for him. At that point, one of the deputies, allegedly fearing for her safety and the safety of the other jail staff, Tasered the plaintiff in the neck. He was immobilized in the restraint chair at the time that he was Tasered. Finding that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, rather than the 14th Amendment’s due process standard, governed the plaintiff’s claim for excessive force, the district court held that the deputy’s actions in Tasering the plaintiff were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and granted summary judgment to the deputy. Although combative and disruptive, the suspect in McBride was immobilized in a restraint chair specifically designed to control resistant persons when he was Tasered. Nonetheless, the court found no Fourth Amendment violation by the deputy as a matter of law. In Draper v. Reynolds (2004), Dargan v. Hernandez-Vega (2006), and Magee v. City of Daphne (2006) the suspects failed to comply with police directives and were Tasered as a result. In Draper, a trucker was stopped by sheriff’s deputy for a minor traffic infraction and could be seen on the patrol car video shouting at the deputy and protesting that he had done nothing wrong. After the deputy’s fifth request for the trucker’s license and registration and the continued failure by the driver to comply, the deputy fired his Taser at the driver and took him into custody after he fell to the ground. In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the deputy, the court of appeals held that the deputy’s actions in Tasering the driver were not unconstitutional as a matter of law. Furthermore, the court held that under the tense

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and uncertain circumstances of the event, the deputy was not required to give a verbal arrest command to the driver prior to using the Taser and noted that such a command might well have caused the situation to escalate even further. Dargan v. Hernandez-Vega presents a fact pattern similar to that in McBride. In Dargan, deputies responded to a trespassing complaint and found an intoxicated man passed out in the complainant’s bedroom. The deputies awakened the suspect and at least twice ordered him to leave the apartment. Under the suspect’s version of the facts, he got out of bed, walked toward the front door of the apartment, and was Tasered in the back by the deputies. Even assuming the plaintiff’s version of the facts to be true, the district court granted summary judgment to the officers on the plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Noting first that the need for force under the circumstances was a close case, the court went on to state that the amount of force used (a single use of the Taser) was minimal and that the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated list of injuries did not demonstrate a constitutional violation. Finally, in Magee v. City of Daphne, officers shot the plaintiff with a Taser while he was standing in the doorway of his home. He had been told that he was under arrest for domestic violence and had refused the officers’ directives to come outside. The court granted summary judgment to the officers on the plaintiff’s excessive force claim, noting that the use of the Taser was a better option than physically subduing a drunk and hostile suspect. The circumstances in Draper, Dargan, and Magee on the one hand, and those in Green v. Fewell (2006) and Rios v. City of Fresno (2006) on the other, present similar questions for resolution under the Fourth Amendment. First, what level of resistance must be offered by a suspect before a Taser lawfully can be employed? Second, must police provide a warning to a suspect before discharging a Taser? In Draper, the suspect was verbally resistant and non-compliant with the deputy’s directives when he was Tasered. In Dargan, the suspect was, according the version of the facts accepted by the court, committing a trespass and walking away from the officers at the time he was Tasered. In Magee, the suspect refused to comply with commands to come outside and submit to arrest. In none of these cases did the officers give warnings to the suspects before employing the Taser, and yet, in all three cases, courts upheld the use of the Taser under the circumstances. These cases are difficult to reconcile with Green and Rios where other courts refused to dismiss excessive force claims against officers even though in one of them (Green) the suspect was actually fleeing from the officers on foot when Tasered and in the other (Rios) the plaintiff pulled his arm away and struggled with an officer attempting to arrest him before being Tasered by another officer. Despite Green and Rios, when suspects move from verbal resistance or flight to active resistance or assaultive behavior, courts routinely approve of the use of the Taser as a means for control (Ainsworth v. Inabinett, 2006a, b; Carroll v. County of Trumbull, 2006; Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 2006; Gruver v. Borough of Carlisle, 2006; Hansen v. Pierce County, 2006; Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, 2006; Henderson v. Inabinett, 2006; Maiorano v. Santiago, 2006; Nichols v. Davison, 2005; Policky v. City of Seward, 2006; Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 1992; RT v. Cincinnati Public Schools, 2006; Todd v. Moore, 2007; Willkomm v. Mayer, 2006; Wylie v. Overby, 2006). For example, in Nichols, police arrived at a private residence and pepper sprayed three men who were engaged in a fight. Two of the men stopped fighting, but one continued to resist the officers’ attempts to control him. They sprayed the third man a second time, and then

struck him with their batons when he kicked at them. Next, they Tasered him five or six times and finally were able to bring him under control. He later died at the hospital from wounds suffered during the original fight and not from the officers’ attempts to arrest him. In dismissing the excessive force lawsuit brought by the deceased man’s family, the court held that the use of the Taser was objectively reasonable given that the suspect was actively resisting the officers’ attempts to control him during the entire sequence of events. Stanley v. City of Baytown (2005) also depicts an actively resistant subject and reveals a court willing to approve of the application of the Taser without first requiring the use of empty hand control techniques. In Stanley, a Baytown police officer was called to assist EMT-paramedics in controlling a large, muscular man suffering from seizures. As the man kicked and flailed at the EMTs in the back of an ambulance, the officer attempted to calm him down and talk the man into allowing himself to be strapped down onto a stretcher for treatment and transport to a hospital. After several unsuccessful attempts to gain compliance from the subject, the officer warned him that he would be Tasered if he did not calm down. When the man attempted to stand up, the officer Tasered him on the back, which changed the dynamics of the encounter and brought the subject under control. In granting Officer Elizondo’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s excessive force claim, the court noted that the officer’s use of the Taser before attempting physical control tactics “may well have prevented much greater harm to Plaintiff and/or other people in the ambulance had Elizondo engaged in a physical struggle to restrain Plaintiff” (p. 7). Thus, the Stanley court recognized the value of a less-lethal force option (Taser) in preventing the need for a physical struggle and the high probability of injury that such a struggle may yield. Finally, Schumacher v. Halverson (2006) presents yet another variation of suspect resistance where a court has approved of the use of the Taser and granted summary judgment to the defendant officer. In Schumacher, a police officer from Lino Lakes, Minnesota attempted to stop and question an intoxicated man whom the officer had seen driving his motorcycle around to the back of a house. After the man refused the officer’s requests to accompanying him to his patrol car and then locked his arms around a basketball pole, the officer warned the suspect three times that he would be Tasered if he did not comply with the officer’s directives. After the third warning, the officer used the Taser to dislodge the suspect from the pole. Although the plaintiff attempted to characterize his resistance as “passive,” the court had no trouble holding that the use of the Taser under the circumstances was constitutionally permissible. Implications for policy and training As departments move toward either formulating or refining their policies and training guidelines for Taser use, the aforementioned cases provide valuable lessons that should be considered and incorporated by agencies which seek to limit their exposure to civil liability while continuing to use force effectively and humanely when necessary. It is equally important that police agencies understand that the media is quick to seize upon any incident involving Taser use, no matter how justified, and report this use of force as potentially damaging headline news. In terms of the former, policy and training guidelines are beginning to emerge from a close reading of the extant case law on Taser use by police. First and foremost,

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officers must be trained when not to use the Taser: specifically, without provocation against a non-resistant citizen. Next, policy language should be carefully crafted and officers should be trained that they must be able to articulate a physical threat or potential threat before using a Taser against a verbally resistant subject. The threat need not be of an assault; rather, a reasonable fear of injury to the officer, the suspect, or a third person should suffice. If the officer perceives a reasonable threat, policy and training should emphasize the use of verbal warnings or commands prior to the use of the Taser. The circumstances of each unique encounter will, of course, dictate whether or not this is practical. But, in an era where police behavior is now videotaped either overtly by a patrol car camera or covertly by a citizen, it is obviously in the interest of the officer, his department, and the governmental entity that pays the tab for the officer to clearly articulate the intent to use the Taser before its application, both for both legal and public relations purposes. Policy and training guidelines also must provide clear guidance to officers on when the Taser can or should be used. Here, most courts are explicit in permitting the use of Tasers to control actively resistant or assaultive suspects. Although a few courts have permitted excessive force cases to go to trial on the use of Tasers against verbally resistant or non-compliant subjects (Green v. Fewell, 2006), the weight of the case law permits the use of the Taser under these circumstances, particularly if the officer can articulate a reasonable fear of injury to himself, the suspect, or a third person if other means of control were to be used (Stanley v. City of Baytown, 2005; Willkomm v. Mayer, 2006). Ultimately, the use of the Taser, like any other application of force by the police, will be judged by courts and juries under a reasonableness standard (Graham v. Connor, 1989). Thus, agencies should give consideration to policy and training guidelines that place reasonable boundaries around the use of the Taser. For example, the Police Executive Research Forum’s (2005) policy and training guidelines on the use of conducted energy devices suggest that no more than one officer should activate a CED against a person at one time and that multiple activations or continuous cycling should be avoided. Likewise, training should emphasize that the Taser is not a panacea and that officers should be prepared to transition to other use of force options if the Taser is ineffective. In addition, policy and training should stress the need for officers to consider the nature of the offense, the amount of resistance, and the physical characteristics of themselves and the citizen when deciding to employ the Taser. For example, officers certainly ought to take into account the age, size, gender, and apparent physical capabilities of the suspect. Not matter how unruly, departments must consider how Tasering a minor or a senior citizen will be viewed and digested by a highly critical media and public. The same logic applies to citizens with obvious or known medical conditions; Tasering a pregnant woman or an individual in a wheelchair or on oxygen will not play well in the press or in front of a jury if the case makes it that far, even if an officer could otherwise articulate legitimate reasons for using the Taser under such circumstances. Safety concerns not specifically addressed by the court must also be taken into account. It is obviously unwise to Taser a suspect encountered at any distance from the ground (e.g. a balcony, bridge, etc.) that could result in an injury from a fall. Also, suspects behind the wheel of a running vehicle could potentially harm themselves,

officers, or bystanders if the electric jolt stimulates a depression of the accelerator or causes them to lose control of the vehicle. Additionally, exposure to 50,000 volts of electricity in the presence of a flammable liquid could potentially cause grievous bodily harm or death to the suspect from an unintended fire. Lastly, it is imperative that officers fully understand how the Taser works on the body and what steps should be taken after a suspect is brought under control by the Taser. While some departments require that officers themselves be Tasered in order to appreciate the full effect of the weapon, it is perhaps more critical that training include a comprehensive discussion of the how and why the Taser works physiologically. The crucial corollary to this instruction is how to remediate the possible lethal or adverse effects of the Taser. For example, officers who carry pepper spray are routinely instructed on decontamination procedures and to watch carefully for unusual or adverse reactions to the spray. Similarly, officers must be prepared to quickly identify extreme or uncommon reactions to the Taser and to take appropriate remedial steps if necessary. Consideration should be given to having EMS or medical personnel remove Taser barbs embedded in the skin and to evaluate any underlying medical or psychological conditions that may have precipitated the need for the Taser. Conclusion The proliferation of the Taser among US law-enforcement agencies gives line-level officers the ability to control violent or resistive suspects with seemingly little harmful effects. Further research on the medical implications of the Taser and its impact on injury rates to citizens and officers is currently underway and should provide a more definitive answer to questions concerning the safety and effectiveness of this less lethal device[10]. In the meantime, US courts have issued 53 written opinions concerning the reasonableness of Taser usage in arrest situations. Most have approved of the police using the Taser to control resistant persons. Careful consideration of these opinions and their implications for policy and practice should allow agencies to limit their exposure to legal liability and to respond effectively to concerns about the Taser raised by members of their communities or outside interest groups. Notes 1. The Taser is a conducted energy device designed to control resistant subjects through the use of electricity. Wires or probes attached to the Taser device make contact with the skin or clothing of a subject and deliver 50,000 volts of electricity in two or five second bursts. The electricity causes loss of neuromuscular control and incapacitates the target while the electricity is being delivered (Taser International, 2006). In most cases, the subject recovers quickly after the burst of electricity ends. 2. For various reasons, courts may issue unreported, unpublished, or non-published cases that under local court rules, cannot be cited as binding precedent in the courts of that jurisdiction. These opinions serve only as a rationale for the case at hand. 3. We are aware of at least one other conducted energy device – Stinger – that functions in a similar fashion to Taser. 4. These cases alleged negligence or products liability claims against Taser International (Rosa v. City of Seaside, 2006; Lewis v. City of Tallahassee, 2006; Lash v. City of Moberly, 2007; Nowell v. Conner, 2006; Torres v. City of Madera, 2005)

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5. These were the cases that met our inclusion criteria as of as of January 31, 2007. All were decided in the federal courts. 6. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) can be granted only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. In construing motions to dismiss, courts take all facts pleaded by a plaintiff as true and construe all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor (Conley v. Gibson, 1957). 7. This case originally was reported at the summary judgment stage by the District Court for the Northern District of California (McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990). 8. The three factors set forth in Graham are (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer or others; and (3) whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to flee. 9. Because Blair is a pre-trial detainee case decided under the 14th Amendment, it is not reported in the Appendix and was not counted among the 53 reported decisions involving the use of the Taser by a law-enforcement officer against a free citizen. It is mentioned only to illustrate its congruity with the other cases discussed in this section that were decided under the Fourth Amendment. 10. In January 2006, the National Institute of Justice funded researchers at the University of South Carolina to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of injury outcomes resulting from the Taser and other less lethal force alternatives – A Multi-Method Evaluation of Police Use of Force Outcomes. References Ainsworth v. Inabinett (2006a), WL 29722 (M.D. Ala.). Ainsworth v. Inabinett (2006b), WL 2709850 (M.D. Ala.). Autin v. City of Baytown (2005), WL 3556677 (5th Cir.). Barton, A. (2005), “Are officers too quick to fire?”, Palm Beach Post, May 29, p. A1. Batiste v. City of Beaumont (2006a), 421 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Tex.). Batiste v. City of Beaumont (2006b), 426 F. Supp.2d 395 (E.D. Tex.). Beaver v. City of Federal Way (2006), WL 3203729 (W.D. Wash.). Belford v. City of Akron (2006), WL 2381507 (N.D. Ohio). Bell v. Wolfish (1979), 441 US 520. Benn, E.S. (2006), “Use of stun guns reined in”, Miami Herald, May 4, available at: www.miami. com/mld/miamiherald (accessed August 1, 2006). Blair v. County of Davidson (2006), WL 1367420 (M.D.N.C.). Canton v. Harris (1989), 489 US 378. Carroll v. County of Trumbull (2006), WL 1134206 (N.D. Ohio). Casey v. City of Federal Heights (2006), WL 2711760 (D. Colo.). Castaneda v. Douglas County Sheriff’s Investigator Rory Planeta (2007), WL 160816 (D. Nev.). Castro, H. (2005), “Pregnant woman ‘Tasered’ by police is convicted”, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 10, available at: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com (accessed August 1, 2006). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 US 317. Conley v. Gibson (1957), 355 US 41. Constant v. City of Baytown (2006), WL 2795243 (S.D. Tex.). Dargan v. Hernandez-Vega (2006), WL 822558 (M.D. Fla.).

DeSalvo v. City of Collinsville (2005), WL 2487829 (S.D. Ill.). Devoe v. Rebant (2006), No. 05-71863, WL 334297 (E.D. Mich.). Draper v. Reynolds (2004), 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.). Fletcher v. Schwend (2006), WL 1867890 (N.D. Tex.). Franklin v. Montgomery County (2006), WL 2632298 (D. Md.). Fuller, N. (2005), “Popular Tasers bring new problems to police”, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 23, p. B1. Graham v. Connor (1989), 490 US 386. Green v. Fewell (2006), WL 222835 (W.D. La.). Greer v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (2006), WL 2535050 (M.D. Fla.). Gruver v. Borough of Carlisle (2006), WL 1410816 (M.D. Pa.). Hansen v. Pierce County (2006), WL 2136761 (W.D. Wash.). Harris v. County of King (2006), WL 2711769 (W.D. Wash.). Hassan v. City of Minneapolis (2006), WL 2583182 (D. Minn.). Henderson v. Inabinett (2006), WL 2547435 (M.D. Ala.). Henry v. Purnell (2006), WL 1071892 (D. Md.). Hishon v. King & Spalding (1984), 467 US 69. Holzman v. City of South Bend (2006), WL 2788587 (N.D. Ind.). Hoskins v. Woulfe (2006), WL 2252878 (E.D. Wis.). Hudson v. City of San Jose (2006), WL 1128038 (N.D. Cal.). Hudson v. McMillian (1992), 503 US 1. Lang v. City of Largo (2006), WL 889990 (M.D. Fla.). Lash v. City of Moberly (2007), WL 148762 (E.D. Mo.). Lewis v. City of Tallahassee (2006), WL 231291 (N.D. Cal.). Magee v. City of Daphne (2006), WL 3791971 (S.D. Ala.). Maiorano v. Santiago (2005), WL 1200882 (M.D. Fla.). Maiorano v. Santiago (2006), WL 2024951 (M.D. Fla.). McBride v. Clark (2006), WL 581139 (Mo.). McKenzie v. City of Milpitas (1990), 738 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Cal.). McKenzie v. City of Milpitas (1992), 953 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.). Mattox v. City of Jefferson (2007), WL 120651 (N.D. Ohio). Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs (1978), 436 US 658. Muro v. Simpson (2006), WL 2536609 (E.D. Cal.). Nichols v. Davison (2005), WL 1950361 (W.D. Okla.). Nowell v. Conner (2006), WL 36860 (N.D. Tex.). Plakas v. Drinski (1994), 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.). Police Executive Research Forum (2005), PERF Conducted Energy Device Policy and Training Guidelines for Consideration, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC. Policky v. City of Seward (2006), WL 1426506 (D. Neb.). Riley v. Dorton (1997), 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir.). Rios v. City of Fresno (2005), WL 1829614 (E.D. Cal.).

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Rios v. City of Fresno (2006), WL 3300452 (E.D. Cal.). Rosa v. City of Seaside (2006), WL 581090 (N.D. Cal.). RT v. Cincinnati Public Schools (2006), WL 3833519 (S.D. Ohio). Russo v. City of Cincinnati (1992), 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir.). Schlosberg, M. (2005), Stun Gun Fallacy: How the Lack of Taser Regulation Endangers Lives, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, San Francisco, CA. Schmittling v. City of Belleville (2006), WL 1308577 (S.D. Ill.). Schumacher v. Halverson (2006), WL 3740804 (D. Minn.). Stanley v. City of Baytown (2005), WL 2757370 (S.D. Tex.). Taser International (2006), “Taser technology summary with q&as”, available at: www.taser. com/facts/qa.htm (accessed August 6, 2006). Todd v. City of Zanesville P.D (2006), WL 1027756 (S.D. Ohio). Todd v. Moore (2007), WL 201032 (S.D. Ohio). Torres v. City of Madera (2005), WL 1683736 (E.D. Cal.). United States Ex. Rel. v. Village of Spring Valley (2006), WL 1889912 (S.D.N.Y.). Walker, S. (1984), “‘Broken windows’ and fractured history: The use and misuse of history in recent police patrol analysis”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 75-90. Ward, P.R. (2006), “Tasered shop owner sues Mt Lebanon police”, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 24, p. B2. Willkomm v. Mayer (2006), WL 582044 (W.D. Wis.). Wylie v. Overby (2006), WL 1007643 (E.D. Mich.). Further reading Richards v. Wisconsin (1997), 520 US 385. Tennessee v. Garner (1985), 471 US 1. Wilson v. Arkansas (1995), 514 US 927.

Corresponding author Michael R. Smith can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Plaintiff allegedly Tasered repeatedly by officer after she used a brick to knock on door of brother’s house Compliant plaintiff allegedly Tasered repeatedly after she was detained pursuant to a mental detention order

District court denied officers’ motion for Compliant plaintiff allegedly Tasered repeatedly after she was detained pursuant summary judgment – factual issues still in dispute over reasonableness of officers’ to a mental detention order actions Plaintiff allegedly subjected to eight District court denied officers’ motion for Taserings during arrest for burglary summary judgment – genuine issue of material fact existed on whether plaintiff continued to pose a threat after he fell to the ground (continued)

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Autin v. City of Baytown, 2005 WL 3556677 (5th Cir.)

Batiste v. City of Beaumont, 2006a, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (Tex.) 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss – complaint stated cause of action for excessive force. Court granted supervisors’ motion to dismiss on allegations of failure to train and/or supervise Batiste v. City of Beaumont, 2006b, 426 F. Supp.2d 395 (Tex.)

Beaver v. City of Federal Way, 2006, WL 3203729 (Wash)

Mentally ill plaintiff allegedly Tasered by officer while laying on bed

District court denied officer’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss – complaint stated cause of action for excessive force District court granted officer’s motion for summary judgment – use of the Taser against physically combative subject was not unconstitutional Court of appeals upheld district court’s ruling denying summary judgment to the officer – factual issues still in dispute over reasonableness of officer’s actions District court denied officers’

Ainsworth v. Inabinett, 2006 WL 2709850 (Ala)

Mentally ill plaintiff allegedly Tasered by officer while laying on bed

Section 1983 excessive force

Disposition/reasoning

Ainsworth v. Inabinett, 2006 WL 29722 (Ala)

Key allegations

Principal taser-related claim

Case

Appendix

Law enforcement policy and practice 415

Table AI. Summary of Taser cases in US courts, January 2007

Section 1983 excessive force

Carroll v. County of Trumbull, 2006, WL 1134206 (Ohio)

Section 1983 excessive force

Dargan v. Hernandez-Vega, 2006, Section 1983 WL 822558 (Fla) excessive force

Constant v. City of Baytown, 2006, WL 2795243 (Tex)

Section 1983 Castaneda v. Douglas County excessive force Sheriff’s Investigator Rory Planeta, 2007, WL 160816 (Nev.)

Casey v. City of Federal Heights, Section 1983 2006, WL 2711760 (Colo) excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force

Belford v. City of Akron, 2006, WL 2381507 (Ohio)

Table AI. Principal taser-related claim Disposition/reasoning

District court denied officers’ motion for summary judgment – given differences in size and age between plaintiff and officers, factual issues in dispute over reasonableness of officers’ conduct District court granted officer’s and Plaintiff allegedly Tasered by SWAT officers after he was handcuffed and his legs municipalities’ motions for summary judgment – plaintiff failed to show that were restrained with leather strap Tasering handcuffed subject was unreasonable Plaintiff allegedly Tasered after pulling District court granted officers’ motion for away from officer during pedestrian stop summary judgment – officer was struggling to control plaintiff when plaintiff was Tasered by second officer Compliant plaintiff allegedly Tasered District court denied officers’ motion for during booking process summary judgment – factual issues in dispute over resistance offered by plaintiff during booking District court granted police chief’s and Plaintiff allegedly Tasered by officers operating under an unconstitutional policy, city’s motion for summary judgment – no evidence that police chief or city maintained practice, or custom maintained by police unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom chief and/or city regarding Taser use Trespassing plaintiff allegedly Tasered District court granted officers’ and sheriff’s after refusing to leave premises motion for summary judgment – close case but single Tasering caused de minimis injury (continued)

Plaintiff allegedly Tasered and stuck with knees after refusing to exit his car

Key allegations

416

Case

PIJPSM 30,3

Section 1983 excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force

DeSalvo v. City of Collinsville, 2005, WL 2487829 (Ill)

Devoe v. Rebant, 2006, WL 334297 (Mich)

Draper v. Reynolds, 2004, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.)

Fletcher v. Schwend, 2006 WL 1867890 (Tex.)

Greer v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, 2006, WL 2535050 (Fla.)

Section 1983 excessive force

Green v. Fewell, 2006, WL 222835 Section 1983 (La.) excessive force

Franklin v. Montgomery County, Section 1983 2006, WL 2632298 (Md.) excessive force

Principal taser-related claim

Case

Disposition/reasoning

Handcuffed plaintiff allegedly Tasered after District court denied officer’s motion for he asked why he was being arrested summary judgment – factual issues still in dispute over reasonableness of officer’s actions. Court granted summary judgment to city on failure to train claim District court granted officer’s motion for Officer allegedly Tasered handcuffed summary judgment – single drive stun was plaintiff who resisted being moved to a appropriate to prevent physical struggle police car Court of appeals affirmed district court’s Officer Tasered motorist who was grant of summary judgment to officer – belligerent and who refused to produce Tasering of belligerent motorist who requested documents during traffic stop refused to produce documents on traffic stop was reasonable, even though officer did not provide verbal arrest commands Plaintiff allegedly Tasered following foot Court denied officers’ motion for summary chase but after he surrendered judgment – factual dispute existed over whether plaintiff had surrendered or was continuing to resist Plaintiff allegedly Tasered after he asked Court denied officers’ motion for summary officer to return his driver’s license judgment – factual dispute existed over plaintiff’s conduct and whether it was threatening to officers/summary judgment granted to county Plaintiff Tasered while fleeing on foot from District court denied sheriff’s motion for the police summary judgment – factual dispute existed as to whether the use of a Taser against a fleeing suspect was excessive and whether sheriff properly trained deputy District court denied officers’ 12(b)(6) Mentally ill plaintiff allegedly Tasered multiple times when he refused to cooperate motion to dismiss – complaint stated cause of action for excessive use of the Taser at psychiatric facility (continued)

Key allegations

Law enforcement policy and practice 417

Table AI.

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force

Hansen v. Pierce County, 2006, WL 2136761 (Wash.)

Harris v. County of King, 2006, WL 2711769 (Wash.)

Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, 2006, WL 2583182 (Minn.)

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Henry v. Purnell, 2006, WL 1071892 (Md.)

Holzman v. City of South Bend, 2006, WL 2788587 (Ind.)

Henderson v. Inabinett, 2006, WL Section 1983 2547435 (Ala.) excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force

Gruver v. Borough of Carlisle, 2006, WL 1410816 (Pa.)

Table AI. Principal taser-related claim Disposition/reasoning

District court granted officers’ and city’s motion for summary judgment – Tasering of physically resistant suspect was reasonable District court granted county and officers’ Plaintiff allegedly pulled from a sleeping motion for summary judgment – robbery bag and Tasered repeatedly without suspect refused to comply with police provocation requests Plaintiff wanted on felony warrant allegedly District court denied officers’ motion for Tasered even though he was compliant summary judgment – factual dispute remained over whether plaintiff resisted arrest and fled from officers/summary judgment granted to city Plaintiff armed with a machete allegedly District court granted summary judgment Tasered multiple times of officers and city – officers had no choice but to use Tasers on armed man Plaintiff who had violently resisted arrest District court granted summary judgment was Tasered in the leg when he refused to to officers – use of Taser and physical control techniques produced only de get out of patrol car minimis injuries District court denied officer’s motion for Officer accidentally drew his handgun, instead of his Taser, and shot the plaintiff summary judgment – factual issues remained in dispute over the reasonableness during the course of an arrest of the officer’s mistake District court denied summary judgment to Terminally ill and non-resistant plaintiff and allegedly Tasered by officers who came officers – factual dispute remained over whether plaintiff threatened officers with a to check on his welfare raised fist (continued)

Officer Tasered diabetic plaintiff who was acting erratically and who resisted arrest

Key allegations

418

Case

PIJPSM 30,3

Officer Tasered motorist who allegedly attempted to place something in his mouth following a pat-down

Officers allegedly Tasered subject without provocation while assisting daughter in retrieving property from subject’s home Plaintiff who suffered an adverse reaction to medication, and son who tried to control him, allegedly Tasered without provocation by police Without warning, officer allegedly Tasered high school student-plaintiffs who were involved in a physical altercation

Without warning, officer allegedly Tasered high school student-plaintiffs who were involved in a physical altercation

Hudson v. City of San Jose, 2006, Section 1983 WL 1128038 (Cal.) excessive force

Lang v. City of Largo, 2006, WL Section 1983 889990 (Fla.) excessive force

Lash v. City of Moberly, 2007, WL Section 1983 148762 (Mo.) excessive force

Maiorano v. Santiago, 2006, WL Section 1983 2024951 (Fla.) excessive force

Maiorano v. Santiago, 2005, WL Section 1983 1200882 (Fla.) excessive force

Plaintiff who initially resisted arrest allegedly Tasered repeatedly after he was subdued

Section 1983 excessive force

Hoskins v. Woulfe, 2006, WL 2252878 (Wis.)

Key allegations

Principal taser-related claim

Case District court denied summary judgment to officers – factual dispute existed over whether the repeated use of the Taser was justified given plaintiff’s resistance District court denied officer’s motion for summary judgment – factual issues remained in dispute. Court granted city’s motion for summary judgment – no evidence that an official policy caused the excessive force, if any District court denied officer’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss – complaint stated cause of action for excessive force. City’s motion to dismiss was granted on failure to train and supervise allegations Summary judgment granted to city on all claims against municipality – city did not have an unconstitutional policy or custom of force violations and did not fail to train District court denied officer’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss – use of a Taser was not de minimis as a matter of law and complaint stated a cause of action for possible excessive force. Court also denied sheriff’s motion to dismiss on alleged policy violation District court granted summary judgment to officer and sheriff on supervisory liability claim – use of the Taser to break up a fight was de minimis in nature (continued)

Disposition/reasoning

Law enforcement policy and practice 419

Table AI.

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

McBride v. Clark, 2006, WL 581139 (Mo.)

McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1990, 738 F. Supp. 1293 (Cal.)

McKenzie v. City of Milpitas, 1992, 953 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.)

Muro v. Simpson, 2006, WL 2536609 (Cal.)

Nichols v. Davison, 2005, WL 1950361 (Okla.)

Mattox v. City of Jefferson, 2007, Section 1983 WL 120651 (Ohio) excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force

Magee v. City of Daphne, 2006, WL 3791971 (Ala.)

Table AI. Principal taser-related claim Disposition/reasoning

Officers Tasered plaintiff who was standing District court granted summary judgment in doorway and refused commands to come to officers, chief of police, and city – use of the Taser under the circumstances was outside reasonable/no supervisory or municipal liability District court granted summary judgment Plaintiff involved in vehicle pursuit allegedly Tasered after he gave up and after to supervisor of officer – supervisor did not participate or encourage alleged he was incapacitated with seizures unconstitutional conduct Deputy Tasered plaintiff while immobilized District court granted officer’s motion for in a restraint chair in the county jail summary judgment – use of Taser against a restrained by actively resistant subject was reasonable Officers Tasered mother and son during District court denied city’s motion for domestic dispute summary judgment – factual issues surrounding city’s Taser policy and practice remained Officers Tasered mother and son during Circuit court upheld jury verdict in favor of domestic dispute the plaintiffs – evidence was sufficient to show unconstitutional Taser policy and custom Non-resistant plaintiff allegedly Tasered by District court denied officers’ motion for officers who mistakenly attempted to serve summary judgment – factual dispute remained on question of plaintiff’s a warrant at wrong address resistance Officers Tasered violent suspect involved in District court granted officers’ motion for a fight summary judgment – use of the Taser was appropriate to control assaultive suspect (continued)

Key allegations

420

Case

PIJPSM 30,3

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Plakas v. Drinski, 1994, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.)

Policky v. City of Seward, 2006, WL 1426506 (Neb.)

Section 1983 excessive force

Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 1992, Section 1983 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir.) excessive force

RT v. Cincinnati Public Schools, 2006, WL 3833519 (Ohio.)

Rios v. City of Fresno, 2006, WL Section 1983 3300452 (Cal.) excessive force

Rios v. City of Fresno, 2005, WL Section 1983 1829614 (Cal.) excessive force

Principal taser-related claim

Case

Disposition/reasoning

Officer fatally shot suspect who threatened District court granted summary judgment him with a fireplace poker to officer and county – 4th Amendment does not require county to supply officers with Tasers Officer pointed Taser at man acting District court granted summary judgment erratically due to possible diabetic reaction to officer and city – pointing a Taser does not give rise to constitutional violation as a matter of law Officer Tasered plaintiff after he stiffened District court denied officers’ 12(b)(6) his arm in response to the officer’s attempt motion to dismiss – complaint stated a cause of action for excessive force. Plaintiff to handcuff him permitted to amend complaint against city Officer Tasered plaintiff after he stiffened District court denied officers’ summary his arm in response to the officer’s attempt judgment motion – factual dispute over whether officers should have used the Taser to handcuff him or used physical control tactics on smaller plaintiff. Summary judgment granted to city on policy claim District court granted officer’s motion for Juvenile plaintiff who refused to comply with officer’s directives and resisted arrest summary judgment – use of Taser after warning was reasonable. Summary was Tasered in school hallway judgment granted to city on policy claim Officer fired Taser several times at suicidal Circuit court reversed district court’s denial man armed with knives of summary judgment to officer – officer entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that a reasonable officer would not have known that his conduct violated the law. Court reversed grant of summary judgment to city on failure to train claim (continued)

Key allegations

Law enforcement policy and practice 421

Table AI.

Officer Tasered subject who was combative due to the effects of a seizure Officers used Taser on subject during arrest

Stanley v. City of Baytown, 2005, Section 1983 WL 2757370 (Tex.) excessive force

Todd v. City of Zanesville P.D., 2006, WL 1027756 (Ohio.)

Officer Tasered plaintiff who pushed officer away and fled from arrest

Officer Tasered plaintiff when he refused to place his hands behind his back and after he maneuvered handcuffs to the front of his body District court granted summary judgment Officers Tasered plaintiff who slid out of police car and attempted to walk away from to officers – plaintiff’s assaultive and resistive acts rendered use of the Taser the officers reasonable under the circumstances

Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force Section 1983 excessive force

Wylie v. Overby, 2006, WL 1007643 (Mich.)

Officers used Taser against suspect who resisted arrest and refused to place his hands behind his back as directed

District court denied city’s and officer’s 12(b)6) motions to dismiss – complaint stated cause of action for excessive force and custom and practice violation District court granted summary to officer and city – use of the Taser against defensively resistant suspect was reasonable District court granted summary judgment to officer and city – use of the Taser was reasonable and prevented the need for a physical struggle District court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment – factual issues remained in dispute over reasonableness of officers’ actions District court granted officers’ motion for summary judgment – use of the Taser in drive-stun mode for three, five second bursts was reasonable to control resistant suspect District court granted city’s motion for summary judgment – officer’s use of force was reasonable; therefore, no city liability District court granted summary judgment to officer and city – use of the Taser under the facts was reasonable

Disposition/reasoning

United States Ex. Rel. v. Village of Spring Valley, 2006, WL 1889912 (SDNY.) Willkomm v. Mayer, 2006, WL 582044 (Wis.)

Todd v. Moore, 2007, WL 201032 Section 1983 (Ohio.) excessive force

Section 1983 excessive force

Officer allegedly Tasered plaintiff after he refused to comply with directives and grabbed onto a basketball pole

Section 1983 excessive force

Schumacher v. Halverson, 2006, WL 3740804 (Minn.)

Officer allegedly Tasered compliant man after his involvement in a traffic accident

Section 1983 excessive force

Key allegations

Schmittling v. City of Belleville, 2006, WL 1308577 (Ill.)

Table AI. Principal taser-related claim

422

Case

PIJPSM 30,3

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm

The impact of conducted energy devices and other types of force and resistance on officer and suspect injuries

The impact of conducted energy devices 423

Michael R. Smith, Robert J. Kaminski, Jeffrey Rojek, Geoffrey P. Alpert and Jason Mathis Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, USA Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of police use of conducted energy devices (CEDs) on officer and suspect injuries while controlling for other types of force and resistance and other factors. Design/methodology/approach – Data on 1,645 use-of-force incidents occurring between January 1, 2002 and July 2006 were obtained from two different law enforcement agencies. Logistic and generalized ordered logistic regressions are used to model the odds of injury and severity of injury. Findings – The use of CEDs was associated with reduced odds of officer and suspect injury and the severity of suspect injury in one agency. In the other agency CED use was unrelated to the odds of injury; however, the use of pepper spray was associated with reduced odds of suspect injury. Among other findings, in both agencies the use of hands-on tactics by police was associated with increased odds of officer and suspect injury, while the use of canines was associated with increased odds of suspect injury. Research limitations/implications – Although this research was carried out in two distinctly different law enforcement agencies with different histories of CED adoption, the fact that CED use was associated with reductions in injuries in one agency but not the other indicates the need for additional research on the impact of CED use in other settings Practical implications – The analysis suggests that relative to other forms of force, the use of CEDs and pepper spray can reduce the risk of injury to both suspects and law enforcement officers. This information should prove useful to law enforcement agencies considering adopting CEDs and suggests that agencies should consider the use of these less lethal alternatives in place of hands-on tactics against actively resistant suspects. Originality/value – At the time of this writing there was no published independent research on the risks of injury associated with CED use in field settings. The findings reported herein will help inform the public debate on the utility of CEDs for law enforcement. Keywords Law enforcement, Weapons Paper type Research paper

The use of force by police has been the subject of empirical inquiry for more than 40 years. In that time, much has been learned about the nature and extent of the force used by police and the conditions and correlates that affect its application. Among the most important issues that have received attention from use-of-force researchers over the years are those involving injuries to officers and suspects. Almost half a century later, however, much of the research on injuries remains descriptive in nature or contains substantial data and analytic limitations that prevent the research from being

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 423-446 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778822

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used optimally to make policy or training decisions at the agency level. Furthermore, with the proliferation in recent years of conducted energy devices (CEDs) such as the Taserw and Stingerw, questions have arisen regarding the safety of such weapons and what their impact has been on injuries and in-custody deaths (Amnesty International, 2004). The lack of independent research on CEDs and injuries has again left law enforcement agencies without the information they need to make sound policy decisions or to respond to inquiries from citizens, special interest groups, and policy-makers, some of whom question whether CEDs are an appropriate less-lethal alternative for general police use. In the early to mid-1990s, police found themselves in a similar position with respect to oleoresin capsicum (OC) or pepper spray. In those days, OC was spreading rapidly among US police forces and concerns were being raised concerning its misuse and safety (Amnesty International, 1997). The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded a variety of studies on the safety and effectiveness of OC (Edwards et al., 1997; Granfield et al., 1994; Petty, 2004), and several other researchers examined its incapacitative effects and the relationship between OC use and officer and suspect injuries (Kaminski et al., 1998, 1999; Morabito and Doerner, 1997; Smith and Alpert, 2000; Lumb and Friday, 1997). Illustrative of the limitations associated with most of the injury-related research from that era is Kaminski and Sorensen’s (1995) study of 1,550 non-lethal assaults on police in Baltimore County, Maryland. They were primarily interested in identifying variables that predicted injuries to officers during violent police-citizen encounters. Using logistic regression, they examined the effects on injury of more than two dozen variables, including the type of force used by officers and the type of resistance offered by suspects. Their force and resistance variables, though, were simple binary measures that captured police use of force and suspect resistance as involving either: . hands-on tactics; or . weapons (gun/other weapon). The data did not allow for a more discerning analysis that would have accounted for the various levels of force and resistance reflected in a standard, linear use-of-force continuum, nor did their 1980s data contain any uses of CEDs. Unfortunately, even more contemporary studies of police use of force and injuries have suffered from similar data limitations (Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). Moreover, although CEDs are now in use by more than 7,000 law enforcement agencies in the US (General Accounting Office, 2005), the few epidemiological studies conducted of CEDs have been descriptive in nature and none has examined the relationship between CEDs and injuries within the broader use-of-force context (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, 2006; Jenkinson et al., 2006; Seattle Police Department, 2002). No research exists, for example, that has analyzed the relationship between CEDs and injuries while controlling for the effects of other types of force used by the police. Because many use-of-force encounters involve multiple types of force, it is critical to assess the independent contribution of CEDs to injury outcomes so as to avoid erroneous conclusions about cause and effect. Thus, significant gaps exist in the literature on the use of force by police and officer and suspect injuries, especially as they relate to CEDs. These gaps leave law enforcement executives and other policy-makers with scant

information on which to base critical decisions regarding policy, training, and equipment. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to help fill in these gaps by presenting the results from a unique analysis of police use of force data obtained from two different law enforcement agencies. For the first time in the reported literature, we are able to account for and control for all standard levels of officer force and suspect resistance in a single regression model with injury as the outcome variable. In the past, researchers examining injuries have used binary measures of force and resistance or have accounted only for the highest level of force used in an encounter. By modeling a broader range of force and resistance, we are able to isolate the relationship between a particular type of force (e.g. CED, OC spray) or resistance (e.g. defensive resistance, active aggression) and the likelihood of an injury occurring. We begin with a brief discussion of representative findings from the existing literature on police use of force and injuries. Following that discussion, we outline our data sources, methods, and analytic strategy. We next present the findings from our analysis and conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of what we have found. Use of force related injuries While the empirical literature on police use of force has grown over the past four decades, limited attention within this body of work has focused on injuries sustained by suspects and officers during these encounters. The deadly force literature has examined the patterns and characteristics of police shootings and resulting fatalities, which represents analysis of the most extreme injury to suspects (Alpert and Dunham, 1995; Fyfe, 1978; Geller, 1982; Scharf and Binder, 1983; Sparger and Giacopassi, 1992; White, 2002). In addition, other researchers have examined the patterns and characteristics of encounters that result in police deaths in the line of duty (Cardarelli, 1968; Kaminski, 2002, 2004; Kaminski et al., 2000; Kaminski and Marvell, 2002; King and Sanders, 1997; Quinet et al., 1997; Mencken et al., 2004). Less effort, however, has been directed at the examination of non-lethal injuries to suspects and officers. The following discussion provides a review of the existing empirical literature on non-lethal injuries sustained by suspects and officers. Suspect injury In general, injuries to suspects resulting from use-of-force incidents are infrequent relative to the overall number of police-citizen contacts. The 2002 National Survey of Contacts between the police and the public found that approximately 1.5 percent of citizens who had contact with the police reported that officers used or threatened to use force against them, with 14 percent of these respondents claiming they sustained an injury (Durose et al., 2005). Similar low levels of suspect injuries sustained during use-of-force encounters have also been found in single agency analyses using surveys of law enforcement officers (Kaminski et al., 2004; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). Alternatively, studies using official agency records found somewhat higher rates of injuries to citizens during use-of-force encounters, generally around 40 percent (Alpert and Dunham, 2004; Henriquez, 1999)[1]. Despite the differences in the reported rates of suspect injury, both officer surveys and agency reports have found that most injuries are relatively minor, typically consisting of consisting of bruises, abrasions,

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and muscle strains and sprains (Alpert and Dunham, 2000; Henriquez, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2004; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). A few studies moved beyond the general reporting on the frequency of suspect injuries to examine this likelihood relative to specific use-of-force tactics and weapons. Meyer’s (1992) analysis of Los Angeles Police Department use-of-force reports revealed that the use of a flashlight resulted in moderate or major suspect injuries in 80 percent of incidents in which it was employed. Punching suspects resulted in major or moderate injuries 64 percent of the time, the use of a baton 61 percent, and other bodily force 46 percent. Interestingly, officer use of older generation CEDs and chemical irritants resulted in no major or moderate injuries to suspects or officers. A similar high likelihood of suspect injury was found in relation to physical force and the use of a baton in Alpert and Dunham’s (2000) analysis of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD). Smith and Petrocelli (2002) also found that suspects were most likely to be injured when officers used bodily force. Campbell et al. (1998) found that police use of canines significantly increased the risk of suspect injury, particularly when suspects threatened or attacked the dog. Officer injury The analysis of injuries to officers in use-of-force encounters has provided mixed results with regard to frequency of occurrence. Several studies found that about 10 percent of officers were injured during use-of-force incidents (Henriquez, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2004; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). However, analysis of data from MDPD and the Baltimore County (Maryland) Police Department revealed substantially higher rates of officer injury, 38 and 25 percent, respectively, (Alpert and Dunham, 2000, 2004; Kaminski, and Sorensen, 1995). Interestingly, the above agencies that had lower levels of officer injury allowed their officers to use OC spray, whereas the two agencies with higher injury rates did not authorize OC. Studies of assaults on police also found relatively high-injury rates, which ranged from about 25-50 percent (Hirschel et al., 1994; Kaminski and Sorensen, 1995; Uchida et al., 1987; US Department of Justice, 2006). Similar to findings regarding suspect injuries, research on force-related officer injuries found that most also were relatively minor (Alpert and Dunham, 2000; Brandl, 1996; Brandl and Stroshine, 2003; Kaminski et al., 2004; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). A few researchers have examined the likelihood of officer injury relative to the type of force used by officers. Alpert and Dunham’s (2000) analysis of official use of force records in Miami-Dade found that the greatest likelihood of officer injury occurred when officers attempted to subdue a suspect with bodily force (punching, kicking, take-downs, wrestling, and joint locks), which accounted for 69 percent of injuries. Similar results were found in the analysis of other agencies, regardless of whether official use-of-force reports or officer surveys were utilized (Meyer, 1992; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002), however, one study found that officers were less likely to be injured when they used bodily force versus a gun or other weapon, though the effect was statistically significant only at the 0.10 level (Kaminski and Sorensen, 1995). Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that getting close to suspects to use hands-on tactics increases the likelihood of officers sustaining injuries. In summary, the extant research suggests that a relatively small proportion of use-of-force encounters result in injuries to suspects and officers. However, when

official records were examined suspect injuries were higher, which may be attributable to reporting thresholds that result in the elimination of incidents where minor force is applied. The injuries sustained by suspects and officers tend to be minor or moderate in nature, with only a handful representing broken bones or gun shot wounds. That most injuries are minor by no means diminishes the fact that suspects and officers are still being harmed, and measures should be taken to reduce them. Research also suggests that suspects have a higher likelihood of injury when officers use canines, bodily force, and impact weapons (such as batons or flashlights), and officers are more likely to sustain injury when they use bodily force. The implications of this last pattern suggest the need for agencies to consider alternatives to officer use of hands-on tactics and impact weapons if they wish to reduce injuries, which as the above discussion on the frequency of officer injury suggests may be found in less-lethal weapons such as OC and CEDs. The impact of less-lethal weapons on injuries For more than 30 years the law enforcement community has been on a quest to find less lethal weapons that would provide officers with the ability to effectively manage use-of-force incidents while at the same time reducing the potential for injury to suspects and officers. Although this interest has prompted the development of numerous devices, we limit our focus to OC and newer generation CEDs. These two devices have received the greatest level of deployment among patrol offices nationwide, and therefore have the most potential for impacting the frequency of suspect and officer injuries. OC spray OC spray was developed with the intent of providing a quicker and more effective means for safely incapacitating suspects than traditional chemical agents used by law enforcement, such as chloroacetophenone and o-chlorobenzyildene malonoitrile (Chan et al., 2001). OC spray was rapidly adopted by law enforcement agencies across the USA through the late 1980s and early 1990s, but this diffusion was not without controversy. Notably, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern California had made the accusation that OC spray was causing the death of individuals in police custody (ACLU of South California, 1995). This concern ultimately prompted the NIJ to fund research on the link between OC spray and in-custody fatalities, which found that the deaths occurring post OC spray use were exclusively or largely the result of positional asphyxia, pre-existing health conditions, or drug-related factors (Granfield et al., 1994; Petty, 2004). A handful of research efforts subsequently followed that directly or indirectly examined the impact of OC spray on non-lethal injuries to suspect and officers. Several studies found that the adoption of OC by departments led to substantial reductions in assaults on officers and declines officer and suspect injury rates, that OC use was associated with low rates of both officer and suspect injury (around 10 percent and in some cases no officer injuries), and that injuries were almost always minor (Edwards et al., 1997; Gauvin, 1995; Kaminski et al., 1999; Lumb and Friday, 1997; NIJ, 2003; Nowicki, 1993; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). Moreover, Morabito and Doerner (1997) examined the injury rate related to OC spray as the Tallahassee Police Department transitioned its use from a level equivalent to impact weapons to one

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equivalent to hand-on tactics (punches, kicks, and pain compliance techniques) and found that OC spray-related injuries remained low at both levels. This finding is important in light of the findings above indicating that officer use of impact weapons and hand-on tactics was associated with higher levels of suspect injury. It suggests that OC spray provides an alternative for reducing such injuries. A limitation to the findings on OC spray, however, is that they are largely descriptive in nature with analyses that rely primarily on simple frequencies of injuries relative to OC use. These studies did not employ methodologies that controlled for the level of suspect resistance and other specific use-of-force tactics that may have been used in conjunction with OC in any given use-of-force encounter. As a result, we do not know the independent effect of OC spray on suspect and officer injuries after holding constant other types of force and resistance that may have been used. Conducted energy devices CEDs have been available to the law enforcement agencies in the USA since the 1970s. However, in 1999, TASER International introduced a new generation of CED that was more compact and reportedly more effective in overcoming suspect resistance than past devices (Laur, 2000; TASER International, 2006). In accordance with these claims, there has been wide-spread adoption of these new generation CEDs across American law enforcement. TASER International reports they have sold more 140,000 devices to over 7,000 law enforcement agencies in the USA. Similar to the introduction of OC spray, however, the diffusion of these CEDs has not gone without criticism. Amnesty International and the ACLU have alleged that CEDs have caused the death of numerous individuals, which at the time of this writing is estimated to be more than 175 people since 1999 (Amnesty International, 2006; Schlosberg, 2005; Anglen, 2006). These claims have prompted research efforts within in the medical community, but currently there is no consensus regarding the causal relationship between CED use and death in custody (Ho et al., 2006a, b; Jauchen et al., 2005; Lakkireddy et al., 2006; Levine et al., 2005; Nanthakumar et al., 2006). The examination of the relationship between CED use and non-lethal injuries, however, has received almost no attention in the empirical literature. What analysis that does exist primarily comes from reports produced by law enforcement agencies and TASER International. As an example, the Seattle Police Department’s analysis of CED use incidents one year after implementation found that suspects were injured in 13 percent of incidents where the device was used, and these injuries were the result of the suspect falling to the ground after impact or punctures from the CED darts. In 5 percent of CED deployments officers received an injury (Seattle Police Department, 2002). TASER International has complied CED injury related data from multiple agencies using their device and report the some agencies have seen as much as 80 percent reductions in suspect and officers injuries after implementation. Although suggestive, as with most of the research on the effects of the adoption of OC spray in the 1990s, these simple one group pretest-posttest designs suffer from a number of threats to internal validity (Kaminski et al., 1998). The only study appearing in the peer reviewed literature found a low level of injury associated with CED use, but the data used in their analysis came from a database maintained by TASER International (Jenkinson et al., 2006).

Aside from the ongoing debate on CED-related fatalities, these findings suggest that CEDs are a use-of-force alternative that may lower levels of non-lethal injuries relative to hands-on tactics and impact weapons. These findings, however, are not the product of research produced by independent sources, which has been a point of contention for Amnesty International and the ACLU (Amnesty International, 2004, 2006; Schlosberg, 2005). In addition, these analyses suffer from the same problems mentioned in relation to research on OC spray in that they do not measure the effect of CEDs on injury risk independent of situational characteristics and other types of force used in conjunction with CEDs in any given incident. Data and methods The data for this project came from two distinctly different law enforcement agencies: the Richland County, South Carolina Sheriff’s Department (RCSD) and the Miami-Dade County, Florida Police Department (MDPD). Both sets of data came from use of force reports completed by agency personnel after a use-of-force incident. In the case of the MDPD, the data were transferred from paper reports by MDPD clerical staff and are maintained electronically on a continual basis. With the RCSD, use of force reports completed by officers are maintained in paper files but are not captured electronically. Data from these reports were coded and entered into a data file by trained graduate students. Below we describe each agency and its use of force data in greater detail. Richland County Sheriff’s Department The RCSD is a full-service law enforcement agency of approximately 475 sworn personnel that serves the unincorporated portions of Richland County, South Carolina[2]. RCSD deputies are equipped with Glock 0.40 pistols, collapsible metal batons, OC spray, and increasingly with the model X-26 Taser. The RCSD began phasing the Taser into use in late 2004. At the time of data collection, about 60 percent of patrol deputies were equipped with the Taser. During the period represented in this analysis, RCSD deputies adhered to the following linear use-of-force continuum, which was contained in a formal use of force policy and reinforced by training: . deadly force; . intermediate weapons (Taser, baton, and OC spray); . hard empty hand control (strikes and takedowns); . soft empty hand control (joint locks and pressure points); and . verbal direction. RCSD variables On average, the RCSD generates 30-40 use of force reports each month. For the purposes of this analysis, we coded 467 useable use-of-force reports[3] covering the year and a half period from January 2005 to July 2006. Summary statistics for the RCSD (and MDPD) data appear in Table I. The dependent variable in the RCSD models was no injury/injury and was binary coded as 0 or 1. Injuries were coded in this fashion because of the relatively low number of total injuries in the data – 78 suspects and 46 officers – and because most injuries were minor (bruises, muscle strains, cuts, or abrasions). Of the 49 separate injuries recorded for officers (three officers had more than one injury), 46 involved bruises, abrasions, or lacerations. For suspects, 92

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Table I. RCPD and MDPD summary statistics

Variable RCPD Dependent vars. Officer injury Suspect injury Indp. Vars. Soft empty hand control Hard empty hand control OC spray Taser Collapsible baton Canine Threatened handgun Passive resistance Defensive resistance Active aggression Deadly force Num. witnesses Suspect resisted arrest/assaulted officer Num. officers MDPD Dependent vars. Officer injury Suspect injury Suspect injury (trichotomized) Indp. vars. Soft empty hand control Hard empty hand control Taser Canine Suspect resistance Suspect age Suspect race Suspect sex Suspect impaired Officer race Years of service

Range

Mean

SD

0-1 0-1

0.10 0.17

0.30 0.37

0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-5 0-3 1-18

0.59 0.10 0.10 0.18 03 0.04 0.30 0.34 0.51 0.37 0.08 1.54 0.72 2.50

0.49 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.182 0.19 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.27 1.18 0.62 1.72

0-1 0-1 1-3

0.17 0.56 1.66

0.37 0.50 0.650

0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 1-5 7-73 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-34

0.37 0.08 0.43 0.06 3.80 30.84 0.52 0.90 0.34 0.71 10.01

0.48 0.27 0.50 0.24 1.18 11.83 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.45 6.67

separate injuries were recorded, and 69 of those were bruises, abrasions, or lacerations. Most of the remaining suspect injuries were dog bites, although three involved broken bones or internal injuries. Given the number and distribution of injuries, we could not create an injury severity index that might have served as the basis for a different type of analysis (see discussion of models below), such as an ordered logistic regression approach. This is a limitation to our analysis and one that is common to injury research in the police setting. With the exception of canine bites, moderate and severe injuries to officers and suspects are rare events (at least in our data) and thus large amounts of data would be needed to model these unusual outcomes. The policy implications of the observed injury distribution are further discussed below. The independent variables in the RCSD models included measures of officer force, suspect resistance, and the numbers of officers, witnesses, and resistant suspects on

the scene at the time of an incident. The officer force variables all were binary coded as either 0 (type of force not used) or 1 (type of force was used). Likewise, suspect resistance levels also were binary coded as 0 (type of resistance not offered) or 1 (type of resistance offered). Although conceptualized as force and resistance in many use of force continua, verbal commands by officers and verbal resistance by suspects were not included in the models reported because of their low probability for producing injury[4]. The independent variables for the numbers of officers, suspects, and witnesses present were recorded as simple counts of persons in each category present at the scene. These situational variables were available in the data and were included in the models because of their significance as predictors of force in previous research (Garner et al., 2003). The RCSD models were conceptually designed to examine the effects of officer force, suspect resistance, and other situational variables on injuries, irrespective of the individual-level characteristics of the participants. RCSD models For the RCSD analysis, two sets of two logistic regression models were estimated, for a total of four separate models. One set of models pertained to officers and the other pertained to suspects. In Model 1 reported for officers and suspects, only the variables discussed above were included. In the second model (Model 2), two interaction terms were computed and included for the purpose of determining whether the inclusion of these variables would moderate the relationship between the original terms and the probability of injury. In particular, a multiplicative interaction term for soft empty hand control (by officers) and active aggression (by suspects) was included in the second officer model, and an interaction term for hard empty hand control (by officers) and active aggression (by suspects) was included in the second suspect model. These interaction terms were included for two reasons. First, active aggression was a significant predictor of injuries in the initial models for both officers and suspects, while soft and hard empty hand control were significant in the officer and suspect injury models, respectively. More importantly, the use of low-level control (soft empty hand) by officers against actively aggressive suspects contravenes RCSD use-of-force policy and training (which suggest higher levels of control) and may have contributed to the officer injuries associated with soft empty hand control in the first officer model. Although the use of hard empty hand control against actively aggressive suspects is within the range of alternatives available to officers under policy, we were interested in evaluating whether the combination of hard empty hand control and active aggression contributed to injuries to suspects. Thus, an interaction term for this effect was included in the second suspect injury model. As the dependent variable was dichotomous (injury/no injury), binary logistic regression was used to calculate the odds of injury. Furthermore, unlike many use of force reports, the RCSD report requires officers to indicate all types of force that were used rather than just the highest level of force. Thus, if an officer attempted to use soft empty hand control (e.g. a pressure point) but then transitioned to an intermediate weapon (e.g. CED), then both levels of force would have been captured on the report. Likewise, all levels of suspect resistance were captured in the data as well. This detailed reporting allowed us to consider all relevant types of force and resistance together in the models and permitted us to estimate injury probabilities for each. This provides a distinct advantage over the analyses reported in the existing police use of

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force/injury literature, which typically cannot disentangle which type of force or resistance produced an injury because the full range of force and resistance is not represented in the models. Finally, we note another limitation to our analysis of the RCSD data. Although we were able to clearly identify each suspect and the injuries that he or she sustained, we were unable to identify how many times a particular officer appeared in the data set. Because one might expect to see correlated injury outcomes (for either officers or suspects) associated with the same officer appearing multiple times in the data, there is potentially some level of non-independence among the cases represented in our analysis that could impact standard errors and tests of statistical significance (Bliese and Hanges, 2004; Moerbeek, 2004). Miami-Dade Police Department With approximately 3,000 sworn personnel, the MDPD is the largest law enforcement agency in the Southeast and one of the largest departments that has never issued OC spray to its patrol officers[5]. Historically, the officers have been armed with semi-automatic weapons and intermediate weapons, including batons and the PR-24. In 2003, the Department purchased M-26 Tasers and has since made the transition to the X-26 model. Although the MDPD has not reached full deployment, approximately 70 percent of the officers carry the Taser. The department’s use of force policy follows the traditional linear model that includes verbal direction, minimal control tactics, physical control, intermediate weapons and deadly weapons. MDPD variables Data from the MDPD consist of 1,178 use-of-force incidents that occurred between January, 2002 and May, 2006. Given the complexity of analyzing incidents involving multiple officers using multiple types of force and multiple suspects using multiple types of force, we simplified the MDPD analysis by extracting incidents that involved a lone officer and a lone suspect for this analysis (N ¼ 762)[6]. Officers were substantially less likely to be injured than suspects, with 16.6 percent (124) of officers injured and 56.3 percent (414) of the suspects injured. As with the RCSD, most officer and suspect injuries were minor, but the larger number of suspect injuries in the MDPD data allows for a more refined analysis for this group. Specifically, we are able to move beyond previous research to examine predictors of the severity of suspect injury, not just predictors of injury versus no injury. This outcome is an ordered dependent variable with three categories: 1 – no injury, 2 – minor injury, and 3 – major injury[7]. Although there are similarities regarding the included variables across the models for the two law enforcement agencies, there also are some notable differences (Table I). Variables common across the models using the same coding scheme are soft empty hand control, hard empty hand control, CED, and Canine. The MDPD does not issue chemical agents to its line officers, and there were too few gun and baton uses to include them as separate regressors. Suspect resistance is included in the MDPD model, but it is treated as an ordinal regressor with five categories ranging from no resistance to assaults on officers. However, for comparative purposes we also test a dichotomous version of the variable, coded 1 if the suspect actively resisted and zero otherwise (result reported in text)[8]. Control variables include suspect age, officer length of service, and dummy indicators of suspect sex (coded 1 if male), suspect

impairment (coded 1 if impaired by drugs or alcohol), and officer and suspect race (coded 1 if nonwhite and zero if Caucasian). Note that information on officer age was not available and there were not enough female officers in the dataset to include officer sex as a variable. MDPD models As in the RCSD analysis, we estimate separate binary logistic regression models for officer and suspect injuries. We also include an interaction term for officer soft empty hand control by suspect resistance in the second officer injury model, and an officer hard empty hand control by suspect resistance interaction term in the second suspect injury model. Note, however, there are two major differences in the analysis of the MDPD data. First, because of the larger sample size, the standard errors in all models are adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data (i.e. officer and suspect injuries nested within officers) (Long and Freese, 2001, p. 74). Second, because of the greater frequency of suspect injury in MDPD than in the RCSD, we also estimate generalized ordered logit models (GOLM) to examine the factors associated with the severity of suspect injury[9]. Whereas the binary logistic regression model may identify a factor associated with officer or suspect injury, the GOLM can indicate whether that factor is associated with minor injury, major injury, or both. The full GOLM results are presented in Table VI (to conserve space, log odds are not presented). Findings RCSD results Table II shows the results from the logistic regression analysis that examined predictors of injuries to deputies in the RCSD. In the first model, which does not include the interaction terms, the following variables either reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level or came close: soft empty hand control ( p ¼ 0.053), active aggression ( p ¼ 0.014), and deadly force ( p ¼ 0.055). For the purposes of this discussion, all three are treated as being statistically significant. Recall from Table I (summary statistics) that soft empty hand control was the most frequent level of force used by deputies. A total of 59 percent of all use of force encounters in Richland County resulted in an officer using soft empty hand control techniques on a suspect. After holding all other force and resistance levels constant, Model 1 from Table II indicates that the use of soft empty hand control techniques increased the odds of officer injury by about 160 percent. Thus, deputies were at greatest risk for injury when using the lowest level of physical force on the existing RCSD use of force continuum, a finding consistent with previous research on suspect and officer injuries (Smith and Alpert, 2000; Smith and Petrocelli, 2002). Not surprisingly, deputies also were at increased risk for injury when confronted with a suspect who was actively aggressive or who posed a threat of deadly force. In fact, of the three statistically significant variables in the model, the deadly force variable showed the highest odds ratio (3.028), indicating that the odds of injury to deputies increased by a factor of two when faced with a suspect exhibiting a threat of deadly force. Model 2 in Table II includes an interaction term between soft empty hand control and active aggression. Although the interaction term itself was not statistically

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Table II. Logistic regression models of deputy injury, RCSD

Model 1 Variable Soft hands Hard hands OC Collapsible baton CED Canine Firearm Passive resistance Defensive resistance Active aggression Deadly force No. of resistant suspects No. of deputies No. of witnesses Soft hands £ active aggression Constant Model x 2 Pseudo R 2 N

B 0.959 0.509 0.227 20.139 0.383 0.017 20.535 20.415 0.389 0.890 1.108 0.327 0.017 20.103 – 23.825 37.97; p ¼ 0.001 0.079/0.168 459

Model 2 p

eB

0.053 0.252 0.669 0.870 0.367 0.988 0.368 0.267 0.317 0.014 0.055 0.316 0.889 0.527 – 0.000

2.608 1.664 1.255 0.870 1.467 1.017 0.586 0.660 1.475 2.436 3.028 1.387 1.018 0.902 – –

B 0.269 0.432 0.228 20.100 0.392 20.086 20.580 20.441 0.452 20.336 1.143 0.411 0.021 20.112 1.503 20.3.426 40.51; p ¼ 0.000 0.084/0.178 459

p

eB

0.672 0.336 0.665 0.908 0.360 0.940 0.328 0.243 0.252 0.710 0.048 0.222 0.859 0.502 0.128 0.000

1.308 1.541 1.256 0.905 1.480 0.918 0.560 0.643 1.572 0.715 3.137 1.508 1.022 0.894 4.497 –

Notes: B ¼ log odds, eB ¼ odds ratios; R 2 ¼ Cox & Snell’s and Nagelkerke’s, respectively; N ¼ number of observations after listwise deletion

significant, it was fairly close at the 0.10 level ( p ¼ 0.128), suggesting that the increased probability for officer injury associated with soft empty-hand control tactics may have been partially a function of the use of these techniques against actively aggressive suspects. Seemingly then, officers were at greater risk for injury when using low-level control techniques against suspects who exhibited a higher relative level of resistance. Table III is the counterpart to Table II and shows predictors for suspect injuries. In the first model, the variables hard empty hand control, OC (pepper spray), canine, deputy aimed gun at suspect, and active aggression were statistically significant. Among these, two variables – OC and deputy aimed gun at suspect – showed a reduction in the odds of injury. In fact, after controlling for all other levels of force and resistance, the use of OC reduced the odds of an injury occurring to a suspect by almost 70 percent (odds ratio ¼ 0.306, p ¼ 0.046). This finding is consistent with the existing research on OC, almost all of which has found low-injury rates associated with this less lethal force alternative (Edwards et al., 1997; Gauvin, 1995; Morabito and Doerner, 1997). Similarly, pointing a weapon at a suspect reduced the odds of injury by more than 80 percent (odds ratio ¼ 0.181, p ¼ 0.001). Since, there were only three firearms discharges recorded in the RCSD dataset (all misses), it appears that pointing a firearm at a suspect effectively ended the suspect’s resistance in the vast majority of potentially deadly force encounters. In contrast, the use of an RCSD canine posed, by far, the greatest risk for injury to suspects. The use of a canine increased the odds for injury by almost 40 fold (odds ratio ¼ 41.37, p ¼ 0.000). Suspects who exhibited active aggression towards deputies also were more likely to suffer injury (odds ratio ¼ 2.05, p ¼ 0.020). Interestingly, CED use was statistically insignificant and neither increased

Model 1 Variable

B

p

Soft hands 0.250 Hard hands 0.906 OC 2 1.185 Collapsible baton 0.299 CED 2 0.051 Canine 3.723 Firearm 2 1.709 Passive resistance 0.005 Defensive resistance 2 0.182 Active aggression 0.718 Deadly force 0.774 No. of resistant suspects 0.185 No. of deputies 0.102 No. of witnesses 2 0.180 Hard hands £ active aggression – Constant 2 2.105 Model x 2 83.01; p ¼ 0.000 Pseudo R 2 0.165/0.278 N 459 B

Model 2 eB

0.514 1.284 0.021 2.473 0.046 0.306 0.680 1.349 0.892 0.950 0.000 41.374 0.001 0.181 0.988 1.005 0.568 0.833 0.020 2.051 0.175 2.167 0.494 1.203 0.329 1.107 0.220 0.835 – – 0.000 –

B 0.273 1.222 21.189 0.314 20.059 3.759 21.713 0.017 20.212 0.793 0.775 0.178 0.104 20.193 20.479 22.124 83.36; p ¼ 0.000 0.166/0.279 459

p

eB

0.477 1.314 0.60 3.393 0.045 0.305 0.666 1.369 0.875 9.42 0.000 42.893 0.001 0.180 0.956 1.017 0.512 0.809 0.018 2.210 0.174 2.171 0.509 1.195 0.323 1.109 0.195 0.824 0.554 0.619 0.000 –

2

Notes: B ¼ log odds, e ¼ odds ratios; R ¼ Cox & Snell’s and Nagelkerke’s, respectively; N ¼ number of observations after listwise deletion

nor decreased the odds of injury to suspects (odds ratio ¼ 0.950, p ¼ 0.892). This finding is inconsistent both with the Miami-Dade results below and with most of the emerging literature on the relationship between Taser useage and injury (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, 2006; Hougland et al., 2005; Seattle Police Department, 2002), suggesting that not every agency’s experience with the Taser will be the same. Model 2 in Table III included an interaction term to account for the possible interaction between hard empty hand control and active aggression. However, the interaction term was not nearly statistically significant (odds ratio ¼ 0.619, p ¼ 0.554). Thus, the increased probability for injury associated with the use of hard empty-hand control tactics and an actively aggressive suspect is apparently not the result of the interface between those two variables. Both increased the likelihood of suspect injury independent of each other. MDPD results Tables IV and V present the MDPD logistic regression results for officer and suspect injury, respectively. As shown in Model 1 in Table IV, the use of both soft-hand tactics (odds ratio ¼ 2.33, p ¼ 0.02) and hard-hand tactics (odds ratio ¼ 2.62, p ¼ 0.012) by officers more than doubled the odds of officer injury. Conversely, the use of CEDs was associated with a 68 percent reduction in the odds of officer injury (odds ratio ¼ 0.32, p ¼ 0.040). Among the remaining regressors, only the level of suspect resistance was statistically significant, with each increase in the level of suspect resistance associated with a 160 percent increase in the odds of officer injury ( p ¼ 0.000).

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Table III. Logistic regression models of suspect injury, RCSD

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Table IV. Logistic regression models of officer injury, MDPD

Variable Soft Hands Hard Hands CED Canine Suspect Resistance Suspect Age Suspect Race Suspect Sex Suspect Impaired Officer Race Soft Hands * Suspect Resistance Constant Pseudo R2 N ¼ 621

0.847 0.964 21.135 20.370 0.954 20.001 0.095 0.223 20.167 0.136 – 25.841 0.229/0.315 621

0.020 0.012 0.040 0.495 0.000 0.930 0.798 0.685 0.474 0.694 – 0.000

eB 2.334 2.621 0.321 0.691 2.597 0.999 1.100 1.25 0.847 1.145 – –

B

Model 2 p

1.444 0.989 2 1.088 2 0.294 1.042 2 0.001 0.101 0.222 2 0.158 0.129 2 0.124 2 6.276 0.229/0.316 621

0.420 0.008 0.019 0.624 0.005 0.922 0.791 0.683 0.524 0.704 0.760 0.002

eB 4.239 2.687 0.337 0.745 2.837 0.999 1.106 0.999 0.853 1.138 0.883 –

Notes: B ¼ log odds, e B ¼ odds ratios; R2 ¼ McFadden’s and Nagelkerke’s; N ¼ number of observations after listwise deletion; constants are not exponentiated; model x2 values not reported with adjustments for clustering

Variable

Table V. Logistic regression models of suspect injury, MDPD

Model 1 p

B

Soft hands Hard hands CED Canine Suspect resistance Suspect age Suspect race Suspect sex Suspect impaired Officer race Hard hands £ suspect resistance Constant Pseudo R 2 N ¼ 621

B

Model 1 p

1.542 0.932 22.050 3.022 0.223 0.008 20.801 0.737 20.098 20.010 – 20.525 0.449/0.616 621

0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.523 0.003 0.038 0.673 0.981 – 0.599

eB 4.676 2.539 0.129 20.535 1.250 1.008 0.449 2.090 0.906 0.990 – –

B

Model 2 p

1.522 2 2.694 2 2.065 2.984 0.196 0.007 2 0.808 0.747 2 0.093 2 0.006 0.814 2 0.394 0.451/0.618 621

0.000 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.570 0.003 0.031 0.697 0.988 0.013 0.687

eB 4.581 0.068 0.127 19.760 1.217 1.007 0.446 2.110 0.911 0.994 2.257 –

Notes: B ¼ log odds, e B ¼ odds ratios; R 2 ¼ McFadden’s and Nagelkerke’s; N ¼ number of observations after listwise deletion; constants are not exponentiated; model x 2 values not reported with adjustments for clustering

These results are somewhat congruent with the RCSD results in that in the direction of the estimates for soft- and hard-hand control tactics are the same, though only the former achieved statistical significance in the RCSD model. A major difference, however, concerns the effect of CEDs, which was statistically insignificant and in the opposite direction in the RCSD. Further, although the interaction term between officers’ use of soft-hand tactics and active resistance by suspects was nearly significant at the

0.10 level in the RCSD model, as shown in Model 2 in Table IV, it is not nearly significant at the 0.10 level in the MDPD model (odds ratio ¼ 0.883, p ¼ 0.760). The dichotomized version of the suspect resistance variable also was not nearly significant (odds ratio ¼ 2.11; p ¼ 0.503). Regarding the model for suspect injury, Model 1 in Table V indicates that officer use of any hands-on tactics (soft hands or hard hands) also significantly increased the odds of suspect injury (only hard-hand tactics were significantly associated with suspect injury in the RCSD model). The use of canines increased greatly the odds of suspect injury (odds ratio ¼ 20.54, p ¼ 0.000), a finding congruent with the RCSD results. However, while CED use was unrelated to suspect injury in the RCSD, the use of CEDs by officers in the MDPD decreased substantially the odds of suspect injury (odds ratio ¼ 0.129, p ¼ 0.000). If we reverse the sign of the coefficient for CED prior to exponentiation, we find that CED use was associated with a 677 percent increase in the odds of suspects not being injured during use-of-force encounters. Thus, whereas hands on tactics significantly increased the risk of injury among both officers and suspects, CEDs significantly decreased the risk of injury to both groups. Among the other significant findings in Model 1, we see that each increase in the level of suspect resistance was associated with a 25 percent increase in suspect odds of injury (odds ratio ¼ 1.25, p ¼ 0.015), a finding consistent with the RCSD results. We also observe that the odds of injury were approximately double for male suspects compared to female suspects, and that the odds of injury were significantly lower for nonwhite suspects than for white suspects. Finally, unlike in the RCSD model, the interaction term between level of suspect resistance and officer use of hard hands was statistically significant and positive, indicating an increase in the odds of suspect injury when officers resorted to the use hard-hand tactics at higher levels of suspect resistance (odds ratio ¼ 2.26, p ¼ 0.013)[10]. As discussed earlier, the use of the generalized ordered regression model provides additional insight into the relationships between the regressors and the degree of suspect injury. As shown in the top panel of Table VI, the use of soft-hand tactics, hard-hand tactics, and canines by officers increased the odds of both minor and major injury to suspects, while the use of CEDs significantly decreased the odds of both types of injury. However, higher levels of suspect resistance and male suspects were both associated with increases in the odds of minor injury but not major injury. Interestingly, suspect minority status was associated with a significant reduction in the odds of minor injury, but not more serious injury[11]. Finally, as shown in the bottom panel of Table VI, the interaction term between officer use of hard-hand tactics and suspect resistance was associated with an increase in the odds of only minor injury to suspects. Discussion and conclusion This study utilized multiple regression to predict injuries associated with the use of force in general and intermediate weapons specifically. Importantly, the two sites differed in that Richland County deputies had the ability to use OC spray while the Miami-Dade officers did not have that option, though both had CEDs. The findings from Richland County indicated that the use of OC on suspects was one of the most important variables linked to a reduction in suspect injury, while CED use was not associated with either a decrease or increase in injury. The data from the MDPD, whose

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Table VI. GOLM of severity of suspect injury with and without interaction term, MDPD

Variable Soft hands Hard hands CED Canine Suspect Resistance Suspect age Suspect race Suspect sex Suspect impaired Officer race Constant R2 Proportional odds N Model with interaction term Soft hands Hard hands CED Canine Suspect resistance Suspect age Suspect race Suspect sex Suspect impaired Officer race Hard hands £ suspect resistance Constant R2 Proportional odds N

eB

Injury $ 2 p

eB

Injury $ 3 p

6.653 3.570 0.180 35.299 1.260 1.012 0.449 2.180 0.891 1.090 2 1.124 0.519 112.81, p ¼ 0.0000 621

0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.389 0.001 0.020 0.627 0.791 0.278

0.010 4.38 £ 102 8 0.012 11.142 1.073 1.013 2.455 2.044 1.280 0.580 20.166

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.748 0.372 0.211 0.592 0.543 0.276 0.945

6.489 0.102 0.177 33.738 1.226 1.011 0.444 2.198 0.891 1.093 2.220 2 0.987 0.520 113.26, p ¼ 0.0000 621

0.000 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.422 0.001 0.015 0.627 0.783 0.018 0.331

0.010 1.80 £ 102 8 0.012 10.920 1.063 1.012 2.452 2.059 1.280 0.582 1.217 20.130

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.780 0.393 0.213 0.589 0.543 0.281 0.614 0.957

Notes: The coefficients for injury $ 2 correspond to the logit formed from the two categories (major injury þ minor injury) and no injury; the coefficients for injury $ 3 correspond to the logit formed from the two categories (major injury) and (minor injury þ no injury). R 2 ¼ McFadden’s; e B are odds ratios; proportional odds ¼ approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories; N ¼ number of observations after listwise deletion; constants are not exponentiated

officers did not have access to OC as an intermediate weapon, showed that the use of CEDs was associated with reductions in injury to both officers and suspects. Moreover, the analysis of suspect injury severity in the MDPD found that the use of CEDs was associated with reductions of both minor and major injuries, clearly a more desirable outcome than if CEDs were linked to reductions in minor injuries only. Why CED use was not associated with a significant reduction in injuries in the RCSD is unclear. However, since the majority of the RCSD deputies had a long history of using OC spray and the introduction of CEDs was relatively recent, the reliance on OC may have mitigated its injury reduction effects. Perhaps, if both sites had a similar history with the same less-lethal weapon options, the findings would have been more comparable. Additional research in other settings may shed further light on this, but

the results of this study suggest that not every agency’s experience will be the same regarding CED use and injuries. Nonetheless, it is clear that the use of CEDs and OC can have a significant and positive effect on injury reduction. Whereas CEDs and OC spray, which typically are deployed some distance from resistive or combative suspects, were associated with injury reduction, the use of hands on tactics that require officers to be in close physical proximity to suspects to effect arrests was associated with an increased risk of injury to both officers and suspects. Although we do not advocate the blind or wholesale substitution of intermediate weapons for hands-on tactics, the RCSD analysis suggests that some deputies were more likely to be injured when using soft-hand controls to subdue actively aggressive suspects. To the degree that OC and/or CEDs would be authorized and appropriate for use in such encounters, their deployment in place of soft empty-hand controls may help prevent some injuries, albeit mostly minor ones. An additional important finding in this study concerns the use of canines and suspect injury. Few researchers have examined police use of canines in broader use-of-force studies (Garner et al., 2003; Kaminski et al., 2004) and fewer still have examined the association between the use of police dogs and suspect injury (Hickey and Hoffman, 2003; Mesloh, 2006). However, police dog bites can produce serious injuries (Dill, 1992), and an analysis by Campbell et al. (1998) found that although minorities were no more likely to be bitten than whites, canines were disproportionately deployed in areas with greater concentrations of minority residents, even after controlling for levels of crime and other factors. Our analysis shows that while canines were used infrequently, their deployment increased substantially the risk of injury to suspects in both the RCSD and the MDPD. Moreover, the analysis of injury severity in the MDPD found that canine use increased the likelihood of both minor and major injuries. Given these findings, it is important for police administrators to review their policies on canine use and if necessary develop appropriate guidelines that would restrict intentional canine bites to persons who pose an immediate threat to officers or citizens or to those fleeing from felonies and violent misdemeanors (e.g. CDV). Although our research did not address specifically the reduction in deadly force, other research and common sense demonstrates that it is probable that the use of CEDs would replace the use of firearms in some limited number of instances where lethal force is justified, and thereby reduce deaths that would occur had a firearm been used (Ho et al., 2006a; Adams, this volume). Further, although rare cases of sudden in-custody death do occur with the use of CEDs, the causal connection remains unclear (Vilke and Chan, this volume) and the number of lives saved appears to far outweigh the number of deaths associated with CED exposure (Ho et al., 2006a). Therefore, given the accumulated evidence to date and the results of the present study, and assuming the existence of appropriate training, policies, restrictions on use and monitoring (Police Executive Research Forum, 2005; ACLU of South California, 1995), it is our conclusion and recommendation that police agencies adopt use-of-force policies and training regimens that permit officers to use CEDs to control threatening or physically resistant suspects. The findings from Miami-Dade and Richland Counties suggest that officers and citizens are at greatest risk for injury when they engage in physical struggles, particularly when the suspect is actively or violently resisting arrest, and that CEDs and OC spray reduce the probability of injury.

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Given the minor nature of most injuries to officers and suspects, though, the substitution of OC spray or CEDs for hands-on control primarily will result in the prevention of bruises, abrasions, sprains, and the like. Balanced against this injury savings are the pain, irritation, and decontamination requirements associated with OC spray and the minor dart puncture wounds and rare complications associated with CEDs. Nonetheless, every use-of-force encounter carries with it the potential for serious injury and even minor injuries can result in the need for medical treatment or time lost from work. More importantly, the use of less lethal technologies from a stand-off distance may help to prevent the occasional serious injury that might otherwise occur from physical contact between officers and citizens. Consequently, the use of CEDs or OC spray under these conditions makes the control of resistant persons safer for everyone. Future research needs In light of the findings reported here, additional research is needed on the causes and correlates of injury outcomes, particularly as they relate to CEDs. To begin with, the analyses conducted above were cross-sectional in nature. We did not have historical data that would have allowed for a time series analysis of the impact of CED technology on injuries. The little available research that has examined pre and post-CED adoption injuries to officers and suspects has largely been descriptive in nature and has been done in-house by law enforcement agencies themselves (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, 2006; Seattle Police Department, 2002). Further, research of this nature is needed by social scientists to help establish empirical patterns and trends (if any) in injuries that may be associated with arrival of CEDs to the law enforcement arsenal of less lethal weaponry. Secondly, research is needed on the impact of organizational variables on injuries. Does agency size, type, amount of training, or use-of-force policy language correlate with injury outcomes? In particular, does the placement of the CED on an agency’s use of force continuum predict the likelihood of injury to officers or suspects? These are important questions that could be addressed with agencies as the units of analysis or in conjunction with situational-level data in a multilevel model. Third, further research is needed on the use of canines as a force option. Little research has been conducted on this topic, and yet our findings show a clear relationship between dog bites and substantial injuries. In order to prompt further discussion on the use of canines in law enforcement, exploratory research is needed to document when and under what conditions law enforcement agencies allow for the use of canines and what the outcomes of those encounters may be. Finally, replication of our general analytic approach is needed to determine whether the results reported here hold in other agencies when the full spectrum of officer force and suspect resistance is accounted for in a multivariate model. Only through this approach can the contribution to injuries of particular tactics and weapons be assessed. The arrival and widespread adoption of CEDs has prompted a renewed interest in use-of-force research. The findings reported here are part of that renaissance and suggest that new technologies, and even some old ones (OC spray), hold promise for improving effectiveness and reducing injuries. Much work remains to be done, though, and our results must be viewed as preliminary. Nonetheless, the stakes are high when law enforcement agencies use force, and so it is important that new research findings

be disseminated quickly and that agencies re-evaluate their policies and practices as new information becomes available. Notes 1. This disparity in injury rates can partially be attributed to the different research methodologies, as well as different police departments. Official police reports generally require that the officer’s action meet a certain threshold before a report is submitted, such a control lock or tackle. Surveys, on the other hand, can capture lower levels of force like grabbing and holding. As a result, the surveys capture a much broader level of force incidents, thereby increasing the denominator used to calculate the injury rate. 2. The population of unincorporated Richland County is about 200,000 people and is 50 percent White, 46 percent Black, and about 3 percent Hispanic. As a whole, the RCSD is a professional and well-trained agency that maintains excellent records on use of force. Each time that an RCSD deputy uses force beyond a firm grip, including the use or threatened use of a weapon, the deputy is required to complete a detailed use of force report. The reports capture basic demographic information on suspects and contain detailed data on the nature of the force that was used, drug or alcohol impairment of the suspect, the type of call, levels of suspect resistance, injuries sustained by officers or suspects, and the number of witnesses and officers present. Reports are reviewed by first-line supervisors, region commanders, the RCSD training unit, and internal affairs. 3. A handful of reports were excluded because they were incomplete or reflected force used only on animals. 4. In fact, we ran the models with verbal “force” and resistance included but found no substantive differences in the outcomes reported. 5. The MDPD provides police services to the unincorporated areas of Miami-Dade County, Florida, which together contain more than 1 million people in a 1,840 square mile area. The population is about 20 percent black, 80 percent white, and 55 percent Hispanic. The overall racial composition of the department is comparable to that of the county (about 23 percent black, 56 percent Hispanic, and 21 percent non-Hispanic white). The MDPD is a highly professional department that has earned international and state accreditation. Its training and professional compliance bureaus are widely recognized as exemplary. The department is a leader in collecting and maintaining comprehensive reports and general statistics on the use of force. The supervisor’s report of response to resistance detail the actions of the officer(s) and suspect(s). In addition, there is a separate form that must be completed when an officer discharges a CED. These reports are reviewed at several levels, including supervisors, training and professional compliance. 6. We caution readers that the dynamics of use-of-force encounters involving multiple suspets and/or multiple officers in the MDPD may be different than those involving single officers and single suspects. Consequently, inferences regarding injuries in the present study are necessarily limited to the latter context. 7. Major injuries (N ¼ 73 or 10 percent) include bites, punctures, broken bones/fractures; internal injuries, gunshot wounds; minor injuries (N ¼ 341 or 46 percent) include bruises/abrasions, sprains/strains, lacerations, and other. 8. The ordered suspect resistance variable is coded as 1 – no resistance, 2 – passive resistance, 3 – flight, 4 – actively resisted arrest, and 5 – assaulted officers. The dichotomous version is coded 1 if suspects actively resisted arrest or assaulted officers and zero otherwise. 9. The ordered logit model is preferred over the binary and multinomial logit models because it exploits the ordered nature of the dependent variable and offers more precision (Long, 1997). Note, however, diagnostic tests indicated the effects of the independent variables are not

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invariant to the thresholds or cutpoint categories in the ordered logit model (proportional odds assumption). Therefore, a generalized ordered logit model is employed, which relaxes the proportional odds assumption and allows the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables to vary with the level of the response category thresholds (Fu, 1998). 10. Note, however, the interaction term using dichotomous version of the suspect resistance variable was not nearly statistically significant, though the direction of the effect is consistent (odds ratio ¼ 1.51, p ¼ 0.805). 11. In fact, the direction of the effect in column three suggests a substantial increase in the odds of major injury for minority suspects, though the effect in not statistically significant at the 0.10 level (odds ratio ¼ 2.45, p ¼ 0.213). References ACLU of South California (1995), Pepper Spray Update: More Fatalities, More Questions, American Civil Liberties Union of South California, Los Angeles, CA. Alpert, G.P. and Dunham, R.G. (1995), Police Use of Deadly Force: A Statistical Analysis of the Metro-Dade Police Department, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC. Alpert, G.P. and Dunham, R.G. (2000), Analysis of Police Use of Force Data, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. Alpert, G.P. and Dunham, R.G. (2004), Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. Amnesty International (1997), “USA: Police use of pepper spray – tantamount to torture”, Amnesty International, London, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ engAMR510671997 (accessed December 26, 2006). Amnesty International (2004), “Excessive and lethal force? Amnesty international’s concerns about deaths and ill-treatment involving police use of tasers”, Amnesty International, London, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511392004 (accessed December 26, 2006). Amnesty International (2006), “USA Amnesty International’s continuing concerns about Taser use”, Amnesty International, London, AI Index AMR 51/030/2006, available at: www. amnestyusa.org/countries/usa/document.do?id ¼ ENGAMR510302006 Anglen, R. (2006), “167 cases of death following stun-gun use”, The Arizona Republic, January 5, available at: www.azcentral.com/specials/special43/articles/1224taserlist24-ON.html (accessed August 22). Bliese, P.D. and Hanges, P.J. (2004), “Being both too liberal and too conservative: the perils of treating grouped data as though they were independent”, Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 400-17. Brandl, S. (1996), “In the line of duty: a descriptive analysis of police assaults and accidents”, Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 24, pp. 255-64. Brandl, S.G. and Stroshine, M.S. (2003), “Stroshine toward an understanding of the physical hazards of police work”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 6, pp. 172-91. Campbell, A., Berk, R.A. and Fyfe, J.J. (1998), “Deployment of violence: the Los Angeles police department’s use of dogs”, Evaluation Review, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 535-61. Cardarelli, A.P. (1968), “An analysis of police killed by criminal action: 1961-1963”, Journal of Criminal Law Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 59 No. 3, pp. 447-53. Chan, T.C., Vilke, G.M., Clausen, J., Clark, R., Schmidt, P., Snowden, T. and Neuman, T. (2001), Pepper Spray’s Effects on a Suspect’s Ability to Breathe, National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC.

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Kaminski, R.J. (2002), “An opportunity model of police homicide victimization”, Dissertation Abstracts International (UMI No. 3053970). Kaminski, R.J. (2004), The Murder of Police Officers, LFB Scholarly Publishing, New York, NY. Kaminski, R.J. and Marvell, T.B. (2002), “A comparison of changes in police and general homicides, 1930 – 1998”, Criminology, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 701-20. Kaminski, R.J. and Sorensen, D.W.M. (1995), “A multivariate analysis of individual, situational, and environmental factors associated with police assault injuries”, American Journal of Police, Vol. 14 Nos 3/4, pp. 3-48. Kaminski, R.J., Edwards, S.M. and Johnson, J.W. (1998), “The deterrent effects of oleoresin capsicum on assaults against police: testing the velcro-effect hypothesis”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 1, pp. 1-20. Kaminski, R.J., Edwards, S.M. and Johnson, J.W. (1999), “Assessing the incapacitative effects of pepper spray during resistive encounters with the police”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 22, pp. 7-29. Kaminski, R.J., Jefferis, E.S. and Chanhatasilpa, C. (2000), “A spatial analysis of American police killed in the line of duty”, in Turnbull, L., Hendrix, H.E. and Dent, B.D. (Eds), Atlas of Crime: Mapping the Criminal Landscape, Oryx Press, Phoenix, AZ, pp. 212-20. Kaminski, R., DiGiovanni, C. and Downs, R. (2004), “The use of force between the police and persons with impaired judgment”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 7, pp. 311-38. King, W.R. and Sanders, B.A. (1997), “Nice guys finish last: a critical review of ‘killed in the line of duty.’”, An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 392-407. Lakkireddy, D., Wallick, D., Ryschon, K., Chung, M.K., Butany, J., Martin, D., Saliba, W., Kowalewski, W., Natale, A. and Tchou, P.J. (2006), “Effects of cocaine intoxication on the threshold of stun gun induction of ventricular fibrillation”, Journal of the American College of Cardiology, Vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 805-11. Laur, D. (2000) Taser Technology Research Paper, Ottawa, available at: www.cprc.org/tr/tr-200001.pdf (accessed January 9, 2007). Levine, S.D., Sloane, C., Dunford, J., Chan, T., Vilke, G. and Dunford, J. (2005), “Cardiac monitoring of subjects exposed to the Taser”, Acad Emerg Med, Vol. 12, p. 71, Suppl 1. Long, J.S. (1997), Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Long, J.S. and Freese, J. (2001), Regression Models for Categorical Dependents Variables Using Stata, Stata Press, College Station, TX. Lumb, R.C. and Friday, P.C. (1997), “Impact of pepper spray availability on police officer use-of-force decisions”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 136-48. Mencken, F.C., Nolan, J. and Berhanu, S. (2004), “Juveniles, illicit drug activity, and homicides against law enforcement officers”, Homicide Studies, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 327-49. Mesloh, C. (2006), “The impact of training on police canine force outcomes”, Police Practice and Research, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 323-35. Meyer, G. (1992), “Nonlethal weapons vs conventional police tactics: assessing injuries and liabilities”, The Police Chief, Vol. 59, pp. 10-17. Moerbeek, M. (2004), “The consequence of ignoring a level of nesting in multilevel analysis”, Multivariate Behavioral Research, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 129-49.

Morabito, E.V. and Doerner, W.G. (1997), “Police use of less-than-lethal force: Oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 680-97. Nanthakumar, K., Billingsley, I.M., Masse, S., Dorian, P., Cameron, D., Chauhan, V.S., Downar, E. and Sevaptsidis, E. (2006), “Cardiac electrophysiological consequences of neuromuscular incapacitating device discharges”, Journal of the American College of Cardiology, Vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 798-804. NIJ (2003), “The effectiveness and safety of pepper spray”, Research for Practice, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. Nowicki, E. (1993), “Oleoresin capsicum: a non-lethal force alternative”, Law Enforcement Technology, Vol. 20, pp. 24-7. Petty, C.S. (2004), Deaths in Police Confrontations When Oleoresin Capsicum is Used: Final Report, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. Police Executive Research Forum (2005), Conducted Energy Device Policy and Training Guidelines for Consideration. PERF Center on Force & Accountability, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC. Quinet, K.D., Bordua, D.J. and Lassiter, W. (1997), “Line of duty police deaths: a paradoxical trend in felonious homicides in the United States”, Policing and Society, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 283-96. Scharf, P. and Binder, A. (1983), The Badge and the Bullet: Police Use of Deadly Force, Praeger, New York, NY. Schlosberg, M. (2005), Stun Gun Fallacy: How the Lack of Taser Regulation Endangers Lives, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, San Francisco, CA. Seattle Police Department (2002), The M26 Taser Year One Implementation, Seattle Police Department, Seattle, WA. Smith, M.R. and Alpert, G.P. (2000), “Pepper spray: a safe and reasonable response to suspect verbal resistance”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 233-45. Smith, M.R. and Petrocelli, M. (2002), “The effectiveness of force used by police in making arrests”, Police Practice and Research, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 201-15. Sparger, J.R. and Giacopassi, D.J. (1992), “Memphis revisited: a reexamination of police shootings after the Garner decision”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 211-25. TASER International (2006), Deadly Rhetoric: How the ACLU of Northern California’s Fight Against Law Enforcement Control Tools Endangers Communities, TASER International, Phoenix, AZ, available at: www.taser.com/savinglives/documents/ Deadly%20Rhetoric%20V12.pdf (accessed January 9, 2007). Uchida, C.D., Brooks, L.W. and Koper, C.S. (1987), “Danger to police during domestic encounters: assaults on Baltimore county police”, Criminal Justice Policy Review, Vol. 2, pp. 357-71. US Department of Justice (2006), Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 2005, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC, available at: www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2005/ table68.htm (accessed January 20, 2007). White, M.D. (2002), “Identifying situational predictors of police shootings using multivariate analysis”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 726-51.

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Further reading Garner, J.H., Maxwell, C.D. and Heraux, C.G. (2002), “Characteristics associated with the prevalence and severity of force used by the police”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 705-46. Ho, J.D. and Dawes, D.M. (2007), “Respiratory effect of prolonged electrical weapon application on human volunteers”, Academic Emergency Medicine, available at: www.aemj.org/ (accessed February 7). Jaccard, J., Turrisi, R. and Wan, C.K. (1990), Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression, Sage, Newbury Park, CA. Corresponding author Michael R. Smith can be contacted at: [email protected]

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What we do not know about police use of Taserse

Police use of Tasers

Kenneth Adams and Victoria Jennison University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida, USA

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Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to review the police literature, select agency reports, and media publications to examine issues involving police use of Taserse Design/methodology/approach – The focus of inquiry is on questions of policy development, deployment, training, use and impact of Tasers from organizational and community perspectives. Findings – Limited research reflects a lack of consensus in the development and application of policies related to Taser training and use. Variations in policy and training and the substitution of Tasers for other technologies across the use-of-force continuum result in operational inconsistency. This inconsistency makes it difficult to compare police departments in terms of the impact of Tasers on improved officer and citizen safety and reductions in the use of lethal force. This inconsistency is also reflected in media reports and has the potential to jeopardize community relations. Key policy issues center on length and content of training, training staff qualifications, and substitutions on the use-of-force continuum. Further study of Taser policy development, implementation, and evaluation is necessary to build a substantial and reliable body of knowledge to inform safe and effective police policy. Additional research is needed to evaluate the organizational and community implications of Taser implementation. Practical implications – Evidence-based Taser policy development is necessary to maintain the integrity of the technology, protect officer and citizen safety, and encourage the use of less-than-lethal force. Originality/value – This paper calls attention to the dearth of research on Taser use in policing, while discussing the challenge of implementing new weapon technologies into the police arsenal and the need for careful consideration of use-of-force substitution practices. Keywords Police, Weapons, Policing Paper type Research paper

New technologies carry the potential to transform police work, sometimes dramatically. Patrol cars and radio communications, for example, have substantially altered policing in terms of work group activities, supervisory functions and police-community relations. Less dramatic technological changes are occurring constantly, and these too are having an impact on the ways that police organizations operate. Recently, there has been considerable interest in less-than-lethal use-of-force technologies that police can use to control potentially dangerous and uncooperative subjects. Police are experimenting with a wide variety of less-than-lethal technologies, such as oleoresin capsicum spray, conductive energy devices, distraction devices, and blunt impact projectiles, in an effort to expand their use-of-force repertoire (Pilant, 1993). A popular albeit controversial less-than-lethal technology is the Tasere colloquially referred to as a “stun gun.” Tasers are hand-held weapons that fall in the category of electro-muscular disruption devices or conductive energy devices. One popular model (M26 by Taser International) operates by delivering a 50,000 volt electric shock via two stainless steel barbs. The electric shock can be delivered either close up by pressing the barbs against a person’s body (drive stun mode) or at a distance up to 35 feet by launching the barbs as wired projectiles (probe mode). In stun

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 447-465 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778831

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mode, the Taser operates as a pain compliance device; in probe mode, it operates as an incapacitation device by disrupting central nervous system signals resulting in loss of neuromuscular control (Taser International, n.d.). Use of Tasers by police has been increasing steadily. At present, roughly 40 percent of law-enforcement agencies (over 7,000 agencies out of 18,000) are using approximately 140,000 Taser units (GAO, 2005). The potential for increased Taser sales is substantial, given that only 10 percent of law enforcement officers in the USA and 2 percent worldwide have Tasers (Helm, 2004). Current growth in Taser use by US law enforcement stands at 1-2 percentage points per year, but the rate of growth could change with increasing emphasis on national security (Helm, 2004). Indeed, investors are so exuberant about the future sales prospects of Tasers that the stock price of Taser International increased 650 percent in one year (Helm, 2004). At the same time that Taser use has been expanding, there have been vocal criticisms of the technology, leading to calls for sharp restrictions on Taser use. News accounts of police officers using Tasers on children, the elderly, the mentally ill, and handcuffed prisoners capture attention and provoke angry reactions among the citizenry. Amnesty International, a world-wide human rights advocacy organization, is calling for a moratorium on Taser use (Amnesty International, 2004). They cite concerns over lasting health effects and point to 152 civilian deaths in the USA and Canada that occurred subsequent to Taser use (Amnesty International, 2006). Issues of Taser safety are complicated, involving a host of physiological and technical considerations (Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner, 2005), and a review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that debates over Taser safety continue on an international stage and that opponents of Taser use make potential injury a central part their argument (Amnesty International, 2006). Knowledge regarding the impact of a new technology on an organization and its operating environment tends to be limited in the early stages of adoption. As the level of implementation increases, policies and practice evolve. This development demands continuous research and reflection to ensure newly generated information is updated into the knowledge base. And so it is with Tasers. There is much we do not know about how Tasers are used by police officers in the field and about how their use is managed by police organizations through regulations, policies and training. We have only a handful of agency reports, research studies, and scattered anecdotal evidence to rely on for insight. Nevertheless, it is important to take stock of what we tentatively know and of what we wish to know in order to guide future investigators along productive and fruitful courses of inquiry. This paper examines the available information on police use of Tasers from organizational and community perspectives. The main focus is on policy-related concerns with regard to how police officers use Tasers, how police administrators regulate and control use of Tasers by line officers, and how police organizations and the communities they serve potentially benefit from or are harmed by the use of Tasers. Specifically, issues involving the deployment, training, and use of Tasers along with issues of policy development and impact evaluation are addressed. Training Since, Tasers inflict pain and possibly injury on people, training takes center stage as an essential activity for insuring the well-being of both police officers and citizens.

At this time, we do not know how much and what types of training are being provided to police officers across the country. A recent report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) provides some information on training in seven selected law-enforcement agencies (2005). All of the sampled agencies provided training programs ranging from four to eight hours in length. All required a physical competency test at the end of training, while only three required an additional written test. The written test generally presented “10 true or false questions related to the application of use-of-force policy, proper use of weapon, and appropriate safety measures” (GAO, 2005, p. 11). With regard to training content, the report noted that training programs emphasized: . . . such matters as how to (1) properly handle the weapon; (2) locate the shot; (3) safeguard the Taser; (4) conduct proper function tests, (5) overcome system malfunctions in a timely manner, and (6) perform post-Taser deployment actions (GAO, 2005, pp. 10-11).

All but one of the agencies required yearly recertification in Taser use, with the exception agency reporting no plans to consider a recertification policy. The GAO report suggests that the amount of Taser training provided is minimal and that considerable variation exists in the length of training. Furthermore, training focuses primarily on technical issues of weapon use, and contextual policy issues concerning proper application are addressed occasionally in a fairly elementary manner. The GAO survey involved a small number of agencies that were not randomly selected and therefore are not statistically representative of a population. The extent to which the results accurately characterize the state of affairs in police agencies across the country is not known. Are there some agencies that do not provide training? Is training sometimes carried out after Tasers are issued to officers? How many hours of training is the norm? Is recertification the norm? Is use of Tasers incorporated into firearms training? How common is it for officers themselves to be subjected to the Taser as part of their training? Is it the norm to exclude decision making and judgment issues within the context of Taser training? When decision making and judgment issues are addressed, are officers specifically instructed about situations in which Tasers might carry undue risk of harm to citizens? Are officers specifically instructed about use of Tasers on special populations, such as the elderly, mentally ill, children, potentially suicidal citizens, and citizens under the influence of drugs, alcohol and other chemical substances? Are officers specifically instructed about use of Tasers in special settings, such as schools and hospitals, or in special situations, such as large crowds or public events? What changes in training protocols have been made over time? Understanding the current state of affairs, as framed by the questions above, is important if we are to make informed policy decisions regarding police Taser training. Key policy issues center on minimum training lengths, required content of training and necessary qualifications of the training staff. We cannot address these issues adequately until we know what police departments presently are doing in these areas. There also are policy related questions of standardization across police departments within states or counties. Should training standards be a local matter, dealt with differently by individual departments, or should statewide requirements be established in the form of minimum standards that departments have to meet? Again, we cannot adequately address this issue until we have a better picture of what departments are doing and how they stack up against each other.

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Deployment Police agencies take different approaches when equipping their departments with Tasers. Some agencies opt for full deployment where all officers are given Tasers; other agencies choose various forms of limited deployment (GAO, 2005). We do not know which strategy is more common, although there are financial and training considerations that may lead departments to favor limited deployment, at least initially. Full deployment of Tasers changes the nature of police work for all officers in a relatively short period of time. Widespread use of Tasers brings greater potential for problems and abuses, and rapid deployment means that opportunities to learn from other’s experiences are more constricted. Various types of limited deployment can be observed. Some police departments will limit Tasers to certain categories of officers, such as those with patrol duties (Phoenix Police Department) or those on special assignments (Austin Police Department) (GAO, 2005). This strategy implies that Tasers are more appropriate or useful for certain types of police work. One department trained a selected group of officers for Tasers and made them available as an on-call resource for other officers (Seattle Police Department, 2001). While this strategy limits abuse by restricting direct access, waiting for a Taser equipped officer to arrive may not be practical in fast-moving, rapidly changing police-citizen encounters and may create a “too little, too late” situation. Some departments issue Tasers on request, leaving individual officers to decide whether they will carry this weapon (Knetzger and Knetzger, 2006). Other strategies include limited deployment by geographic region (selected areas of the city or selected patrol beats) or by location (e.g., schools or entertainment complexes). Limited deployment can be seen as a conservative and judicious approach, especially through the lens of police-community relations. These virtues can evaporate quickly, however, when a controversial incident occurs and mass speculation suggests that outcomes would have been better if the involved officer(s) had been Taser equipped. Among the various Taser deployment options that police agencies face, we do not know which are more effective or efficient, nor which are less prone to abuse or misuse. Limited deployment is likely to expand over time into full deployment as politics and budgets allow. This reality requires constant evaluation and application of the most current knowledge about Taser use in policing in order to maximize resources and best protect officers and citizens. Tasers on the use-of-force continuum Police use of force is generally administered along a use-of-force continuum. The most popular use-of-force continuum conceptualizes police actions in a step-ladder arrangement of increasingly higher force levels synchronized to corresponding levels of increasingly defiant, threatening or dangerous behaviors by citizens. Police officers are trained to use the minimum level of force necessary to control a situation, which generally translates in practice as force behavior one level above that displayed by the citizen. Although, the “use-of-force continuum” is a relatively standard training device, the continuum itself is far from standardized. The current federal scheme comprises five general and open-ended levels of tactical response by the officer: (1) cooperative controls; (2) contact controls;

(3) compliance techniques; (4) defensive tactics; and (5) deadly force (GAO, 1996). An older federal scheme used five different levels that are more tangible and illustrative in terms of officer actions: (1) physical presence; (2) verbalization; (3) physical contact; (4) hand-held impact weapons; and (5) lethal force (Hunter, 1994). This older scheme is the basis for the use-of-force continua currently used by many state and municipal police departments. Some researchers report that police departments have developed a fairly discriminating continuum comprising as many as nine force levels (Garner and Maxwell, 1999). More detailed schemes are consistent with the notion that use of force should be viewed as a continuous range of responses rather than as a categorical set of options. Of note, police departments differ within and between formats in terms of where many given force options fit along continuums. The first question we might ask is where do Tasers fit on the use-of-force continuum? A report by the GAO (2005) suggests that there is no consensus with regard to the federal use-of-force continuum. Collectively, the seven departments surveyed in the GAO report placed Tasers across three different levels. Given that Tasers do not qualify for level one (techniques used with compliant citizens) or level five (lethal force), the GAO report indicates that Tasers are classified by police departments at every use-of-force level for which they could possibly qualify. Arguably, no other weapon technology in the police arsenal has offered such broad application nor been as widely applied across the use-of-force spectrum as Tasers. Nationally, police departments appear to place Tasers “just about everywhere” on the federal use-of-force continuum. There is clearly a lack of operational consistency with regard to Tasers, which may result from conceptual vagueness or lack of clarity in the current federal use-of-force schema. Perhaps, analyses of state and municipal use-of-force continua will show more inter-agency consistency, but we do not know if this is the case. Categorical inconsistencies across non-federal agency schemes suggest that there will be differences in Taser rankings among use-of-force options. If these categorical inconsistencies reflect underlying conceptual differences, it may prove difficult to reconcile the differences, absent state or national level standardization. Why should we be concerned that police departments locate Tasers on different levels of the use-of-force continuum? Could it be that police departments simply organize their work differently and prefer one set of tools over another? Could it also be that Tasers are an extremely versatile tool, lending themselves to a variety of applications? While, some diversity in viewpoints and operations is understandable and perhaps even desirable, a wide assortment of views and practices suggests that something is amiss, especially when discussing weapons technology that has potential to cause physical harm. Widely varied operational policies suggest similarly varied understandings of purpose, function and proper use of Tasers. These differences are

Police use of Tasers

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not inconsequential, as each operational perspective involves a different set of costs and benefits. We do not yet know the trade-offs associated with various operational policies of police Taser use, but differences surely exist and surely matter to both police and the public. As long as these differences are unknown, policy choices remain opaque and decision-makers remain unaccountable. Taser placement on the use-of-force continuum has implications for training and extent of use in the field. Tasers need to be incorporated into use-of-force training, but it is not enough to assign it to a use-of-force level and instruct officers in its technical operation. Tasers introduce a new element into the police armory that redefines the range of officer response. This change requires a new understanding on the part of officers - how to choose among the various available options by considering them in relation to each other. The lower Tasers are placed on the use-of-force continuum, the greater the number of situations in which Tasers could potentially be deployed. Greater latitude in deployment demands more significant officer judgment. That demand in turn demands training for on-the-spot decision making where multiple factors have to be identified, processed and analyzed within seconds, all skills far more complex than the more common training in technical mechanics and policy. Given this context, conceptual inconsistencies and ambiguities within a use-of-force continuum become impediments to sound policy and police practice development. Improved operational clarity is required with respect to the scales used to assess both the level of force used by the officer and the suspect’s level of force against police officers. Placing Tasers at a given level, along with pepper spray, for example, does not imply that the two are functionally equivalent and operationally interchangeable, although some might make this inference. Likewise, if Tasers are authorized for “passive resistance” situations, it must be clear how much and what type of resistance needs to be demonstrated over how long a period, otherwise, in the words of one police chief, we might face situations in which officers tase citizens “(j)ust because a person says no.” (Colarossi et al., 2006). Inconsistent assessments of a suspect’s behavior will result in varying levels of force response by officers, regardless of their understanding of the police use of force levels. Taser use in the field We can anticipate that Tasers will change how police use force, both in terms of frequency and context. Many police see Tasers as an attractive tool for controlling suspect behavior. The results are quickly delivered and dramatically effective. Tasers can be deployed at a distance, so the likelihood of an officer becoming engaged in a scuffle or being subjected to misdirection of the weapon are minimized. Finally, the chances of either the citizen or officer being seriously injured from the Taser itself are small, with a correspondingly low risk of injury requiring medical treatment. For these reasons, police often view Tasers as the weapon of choice for a wide range of police citizens encounters. As a less-than-lethal technology, one might presume that Tasers will reduce the incidence of deadly force by providing an alternative to firearms. However, this benefit may be mitigated by a possible increase in the total incidence of force that results from expanding the number of force options available to officers. Concerns that officers may be inclined to use force more frequently with the addition of a new technology become increasingly plausible to the degree that the new choice is seen as highly convenient and effective. Introduction of a new upper-level force option also may increase the incidence

of more serious non-lethal force with or without a change in the overall number of incidents if officers are inclined to substitute the new choice for lower-level options. Furthermore, one might foresee that decision-making will become more complex with the addition of more use-of-force options. Greater complexity can result in lower quality decisions or fewer optimal decisions, and it could also result in slower decisions, which may be problematic in situations where split-second choice is required. Use of new technologies involves a learning and adoption process often described as an “s-curve” which generally demonstrates a low rate of use in the beginning, rapid increases in use during the middle period, and a leveling off of use in the end phase (Rogers, 2003). Taser use will probably follow this pattern, but since police use of Tasers is a relatively new phenomenon, we do not yet know the rate of growth and point at which rates of use will level off. In charting changes in Tasers use over time, one eventually has to confront the problem of how to define “use.” Among, the various actions that constitute use are removing the Taser from its holster, pointing the Taser at a suspect and threatening to use it, arcing the Taser while in hand, discharging the Taser at a suspect, and cycling the Taser for more than one cycle. Any given situation might involve multiple uses of Tasers by one or more police officers against one or more suspects. To date, police departments have different definitions of use. Some, for example, do not include display of the weapon as use, nor do they include the threat of firing (Knetzger and Knetzger, 2006). More generous definitions of use are more helpful in terms of researching how police officers are using this technology. Rates of use can be important because new technologies tend to replace old technologies over time, and they also tend to find new or expanded applications across a broader range of situations. With regard to changes in the overall rates of use of force, the little available data are conflicting. At least one police department, Cincinnati, reports a 50 percent reduction in use-of-force overall after Taser deployment (Cincinnati Police Department, 2004), while at least one department, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, saw a rise of 37 percent in the use-of-force (Amnesty International, 2004). Sheriff’s officials attribute the increase to a change in reporting practices whereby introduction of Tasers required administrators to be clearer regarding which incidents should be reported which led officers to be more conscientious about reporting. Changes in reporting practices are a common threat to internal validity when using administrative data, and the threat tends to be greater when organizational developments draw attention to reporting activity. Substitution and displacement Given the attractiveness of Tasers, we might hypothesize that officers will tend to use it in place of other use-of-force technologies. Three types of substitution can be identified: downgrade displacement which occurs when the new technology substitutes for an old technology at a higher level, resulting in a lower level of force being used; upgrade displacement which occurs when the new technology substitutes for an old technology at a lower level, resulting in a higher level of force being used; and lateral displacement, which occurs when the new technology substitutes for an old technology at the same level, such that no change in use-of-force levels occurs. We do not know the extent to which displacement occurs, nor do we know the extent to which the various types of displacement occur.

Police use of Tasers

453

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Downgrade displacement Downgrade displacement might be seen as the most common form of substitution, given that Tasers are promoted as a less-than-lethal technology that can replace firearms in many situations. The general public supports and encourages the substitution of less-than-lethal technologies for more lethal technologies, and this line of reasoning undergirds the citizenry’s support of Taser use by police. Indeed, police departments across the nation point to situations in which the availability of Tasers obviated the need to use deadly force and thereby saved someone’s life. Based on the number of such anecdotes found in newspapers and other informal outlets, chances are that police Taser use has resulted in some lives being spared and some avoidance of deadly force. The key questions are how many lives saved and how many instances of deadly force avoided. While, we may think impact is substantial, there are several considerations that obfuscate this conclusion. Chief among them is the fact that police departments emphasize to officers that Tasers do not take the place of firearms in potential deadly force situations, and that officers are advised or even required to limit Taser use only to situations where police backup can provide deadly force cover. Even so, arguing that Tasers saved lives in specific situations by substituting for deadly force requires varying degrees of speculation, the strength of which varies with encounter circumstances. There is always some question as to whether deadly force would have otherwise been used and whether its use would have been lethal. The most one can say with a high level of assurance is that Tasers were used in situations in which deadly force was authorized. There is, however, some suggestion that Tasers reduce the incidence of non-firearm higher level use of force. The Columbus Police Department in Ohio reports that use of level four force involving strikes, kicks and punches declined 24.1 percent and use of level five force involving impact weapons declined 20.7 percent after introduction of Tasers (Columbus Police Department, 2005). It is not clear, however, that these declines can be attributed specifically to Taser use, especially since changes in the overall incidence of force are not discussed. Upgrade displacement Upgrade displacement is a matter of considerable policy concern since it means that citizens will be subjected to higher levels of force than would otherwise occur. This is not to say that such force is illegal or illegitimate. Rather, upgrade displacement can be seen as unacceptable because it is proportionately unnecessary, and because it constitutes a slippery slope with an indistinct incline that ends in a decidedly greater concentration of police power. Training in the use-of-force continuum and administrative policies on Taser use might prevent upgrade displacement from occurring. Alternatively, ambiguities in the use-of-force continuum, supervisory deference to on-the-spot decisions as correct, and weak or non-existent administrative policies on Taser use give police officers considerable latitude when it comes to use of force. Thus, we do not know how often officers forsake professional presence and verbal persuasion in favor of technological shortcuts such as Tasers, and, in the process, transform law enforcement objectives from cooperation to compliance. While this observation applies to all use of force technologies, the perceived attractiveness of Tasers relative to other use of force technologies, such as pepper spray and batons, makes this issue especially salient.

Upgrade displacement is difficult to identify because it usually involves speculative inference. On a case by case basis, upgrade displacement might be reflected in officers who very quickly escalate encounters to high levels of force. On an officer by officer basis, upgrade displacement might be reflected in changes over time in the number and types of use-of-force incidents suggesting that officers are “trigger happy.” On a departmental level, upgrade displacement might be reflected in an overall increase in use-of-force reports or changes in the distribution of types of force, although such findings are subject to multiple interpretations. Lateral displacement On the face of it, lateral displacement would appear to be least controversial, since it involves the substitution of equivalent techniques with no increase in force level. However, each use-of-force technology has its advantages and disadvantages, and one cannot assume that the trade offs in switching from one to another are trivial or inconsequential. Some use-of-force technologies might offer improved ease-of-use, increased effectiveness, and reduction in negative collateral consequences, which are usually seen as desirable changes. These positive features, however, may lead to quicker and more widespread use of police force, which can be considered negative sequelae. Law enforcement literature frequently compares Tasers to pepper spray, and many use-of-force continua place these two technologies at the same level. Since, Tasers are generally promoted as superior to pepper spray in many circumstances, one might hypothesize that there would be a tendency for officers to substitute the former for the latter when possible. The experience of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office indicates that deployment of Tasers does decrease the use of other weapons, most notably chemical agents. Taser use rose from 43.3 percent of weapon use in 2001 to 73.5 percent in 2002 to 77.7 percent in 2003. Meanwhile, chemical agents went from 41.9 percent in 2001 to 14.1 percent in 2002 to 7.8 percent in 2003 (Mesloh et al., 2005). We do not know whether police departments across the nation have experienced decreases in other use of other force technologies with the introduction of Tasers in ways that suggest substitution. It is worth noting that at least one law enforcement expert considers Tasers as a notch above pepper spray in the use-of-force continuum (Force Science News, 2004). Indeed, the Columbus, Ohio police department report a 36.8 percent drop in the use of chemical spray since the introduction of Tasers, suggesting a form of substitution. However, Tasers rank higher on the use-of-force continuum than pepper spray so any substitution of Tasers for pepper spray would be a case of upgrade displacement, not lateral displacement. In discussion of upgrade displacement, quick escalation of police-citizen encounters was named as one possible contributing factor. In contrast, the Cincinnati police department reported a substantial decrease in use-of-force incidents after Taser deployment, which suggests that the role of Tasers in de-escalation of police-citizen encounters should be discussed. De-escalation primarily occurs by deterrence; the threat of being shot with the Taser prompts citizens into compliance. One study reported that suspects surrendered nine out of ten times when an officer drew the Taser, making for a remarkable 90 percent de-escalation rate (Mesloh et al., 2005). Similar but less striking, figures are reported for Madison, Wisconsin, where an in-house report indicated that in 57 percent of Taser use, officers gained compliance by displaying or threatening to use the weapon (Madison Police Department, n.d.).

Police use of Tasers

455

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456

These reports of de-escalation are remarkable and should be considered in policy formulation that supports a generous definition of Taser use in the context of administrative reporting. Two aspects of the de-escalation phenomenon are worth noting. First, as Taser use becomes more widespread in a community and as citizens become more familiar with its effects, deterrence might increase. Second, a strong deterrent effect will likely encourage officers to use Tasers in a pre-emptive manner, which could backfire in terms of community relations and the public’s perception of the police department. For example, officers may become more inclined to draw and point their Taser in the early stages of an encounter before trying fully to gain compliance verbally, which could create perceptions that officers are “trigger happy” and unwilling to give fair consideration to citizens. Consequently, simply displaying or threatening to use a Taser cannot be ignored when considering the role of Tasers in use-of-force policy and tactics. Incomplete evidence We do not know much about the circumstances in which police use Tasers. There is some evidence available from police department reports, but the picture is sketchy and incomplete. The evidence tends to suggest that police predominately use Tasers in situations that involve relatively low-level criminal behavior. The Green Bay, Wisconsin Police Department reports that Tasers are used three out of five times (62 percent) in situations that lead to misdemeanor charges only, with the most common misdemeanor charge being resisting an officer (Knetzger and Knetzger, 2006). In 14 percent of situations, Tasers were used in non-criminal circumstances such as emergency detention, attempted suicide and protective custody. The report goes on to note that 29 percent of Taser use involves calls about civil disturbances and 35 percent involves calls about violent suspects. Similar statistics are reported for Madison, Wisconsin where 59 percent of Taser incidents involved misdemeanor only charges and 16 percent involved non-criminal circumstances (Madison Police Department, n.d.), and for Orlando, Florida where, 55 percent of those arrested pursuant to Taser use were charged with a misdemeanor (Colarossi et al., 2006). In Orlando, misdemeanor suspects were nearly always charged with resisting without violence, “which can mean as little as refusing to immediately obey a police officer’s order” (Colarossi et al., 2006). Furthermore, among all defendants adjudicated almost one-forth (22 percent) had the charges dismissed and were not convicted (Colarossi et al., 2006). Thus, the available evidence suggests that police officers do not use Tasers to apprehend serious, violent felons. Instead, Tasers are used primarily in situations were citizens are not cooperative and the encounter escalates to the point where the officer engages with force. In situations that involve police use of force, arrest charges oversimplify a complex interaction of police and citizen behavior played out in the context of police agency policy, use of force training, community-based norms and standards of behavior, situational factors and individual predilections. In particular, the full scope of the citizen’s behavior is not clear, and the citizen’s contribution to the escalation is not known. It has been observed, however, that resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and assaulting an officer constitute a trilogy of arrest charges that are used by police as post hoc justification for use of force (Human Rights Watch, 1998). The fact that the available evidence indicates that officers typically proffer misdemeanor resisting arrest charges suggests the possibility that Tasers are used more for

order-maintenance purposes rather than crime control. Further, clarification might be gained by comparing level of force used and charge dismissal rates both before and after the introduction of Tasers. In addition, it may be useful to learn more about why officers do not use Tasers more often to apprehend felons or those who are potentially violent or committing serious crimes. It may be that officers see Tasers as inappropriate for these situations for a variety of reasons, suggesting that there are discernable boundaries to on the street use of Tasers as crime-control technology. Some characteristics of situations in which police use Tasers are less ambiguous. Officers have a distinct tendency to use Tasers when citizens are perceived to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In Green Bay, Wisconsin, 81 percent of suspects subjected to Tasers were intoxicated or otherwise impaired by drugs (Knetzger and Knetzger, 2006). The comparable figure for Columbus, Ohio is 35 percent (Columbus Police Department, 2005). Although comparable figures are not available, Orlando reports that one out of five Taser incidents occur in a six square block area of downtown that is crowded with bars and dance clubs (Leusner, 2006). Officers also have a propensity to use Tasers in situations involving the mentally ill. Columbus, Ohio reports that one out of five instances of Taser use involve someone who is suspected of being emotionally disturbed (Columbus Police Department, 2005), while approximately one in ten of all arrests involve mentally ill suspects (Teplin, 2000). There also is evidence to indicate that Tasers are being used with regularity in situations involving suicidal citizens. In Green Bay, Wisconsin ten percent of Taser use involved suicidal suspects, while a Seattle report simply notes that “many of the suspects were in highly intoxicated or disturbed states . . . ” (Knetzger and Knetzger, 2006, p. 17). The Columbus Police Department identified 14 instances in which use of deadly force was avoided owing to the availability of Tasers, with twelve of those involving attempted suicide (Columbus Police Department, 2005). Given the manner in which Tasers are promoted by Taser International and appear to be used on the street for order maintenance, it is not surprising to find that they are used on persons under the influence of dugs and alcohol or on the mentally ill. In all these instances, suspects are shown as a potential threat during close-in encounters and as relatively immune to standard use-of-force techniques, especially pain compliance techniques. Intoxicated people are seen as potentially uncooperative and belligerent, while persons under the influence of drugs are described as out of touch with reality with the potential for extra-normal strength. Likewise, the mentally ill often are viewed as potentially violent and unpredictable (Nunnally, 1961) and mental illness is a documented risk factor for violence (Monahan, 1992). Policy development Media attention toward potential Taser-related abuse of force has stimulated debate about the role that Tasers should play in policing. Unfortunately, we know very little about policy development for the training, use and evaluation of Tasers. The status of Taser-related policy in police departments across the USA is largely unknown. If little reliable data are available, how then were current policies developed? For most police agencies, the likely answer is that there are no specific policies. The GAO study of seven police agencies found that none of the sampled agencies had any separate policies related to Taser use (2005). Instead, all agencies added Tasers into their current use-of-force policy.

Police use of Tasers

457

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458

While each agency identified where Tasers should fall on the use-of-force continuum, this is not substitute for adequate policy development (IACP, 2005). Both the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (2005) have developed model policies for Taser use, but the extent to which these model policies have been adopted in whole or in part is unmeasured. IACP emphasizes that policies should not only specify when Tasers can be used, but they “also should be explicit as to when use is inappropriate” (IACP, 2005, p. 12). IACP also emphasizes that decisions about operational considerations should be made and written into polices and procedures before deployment of Tasers. The GAO, IACP and PERF all identify a number of situations that should be addressed in Taser policy. These include fleeing subjects, mentally challenged persons, persons with known or visible impairments that indicate compromised health, vulnerable populations such as children, elderly, and pregnant women (IACP, 2005), handcuffed prisoners (PERF, 2005), flammable liquids, and bystanders (GAO, 2005). In addition, policies should address when Tasers can be used for compliance, when multiple discharges are permitted and when direct stun is permissible (IACP, 2005). The extent to which police agencies have policies that specifically address all or some of these issues is not known. In addition to questions of inadequate policies and across-agency variations in policy, the issue of policy evolution should be addressed. How often are policies reviewed, by whom and under what circumstances? Are policies only reviewed reactively, after a major incident occurs? Police agencies have a tendency to review policies on a case by case basis, as a type of quality control to insure that policies are being followed. Very often, they do not pay attention to larger-scope policy review functions, failing to see patterns in problem situations and ignoring feedback from the environment. Thus, issues of whether executive review of policy periodically occurs are important. In order for police executives to set rational and intelligent policy they need relevant data to inform their decisions. Given this context, it is noteworthy that the GAO report indicates that four out of seven of the agencies reviewed do not have a special incident report for Taser use (2005). Looking beyond specialized data collection efforts, police departments often fail to utilize data that is routinely available. For example, the Orlando Sentinel newspaper asked both the municipal police department and the county Sheriff’s office for arrest charge and disposition data on people who were subjected to Tasers (Colarossi et al., 2006). The Sheriff’s office was not able to supply any useable data, while the municipal police department could provide data on less than two-thirds of defendants. There are three remarkable features about this situation. The local newspaper appeared to be more interested in knowing how Tasers were being used than the law-enforcement agencies that were using them. The newspaper recognized a connection between disposition data and policy issues, whereas the law-enforcement agencies did not. Data routinely collected by other parts of the criminal justice system are sometimes of little to no value to law-enforcement agencies, because they lack the capability to evaluate the data in constructive ways. Although data-driven policy decisions tend not to be the norm in policing, changes in use-of-force weapon policies can have a large impact on how often and under what circumstances police officers use Tasers. For example, the Orlando Police Department initially allowed Tasers to be used against people who verbally refused a police

officer’s orders. In the following year, the policy was changed so that the suspect had to pose a physical threat or attempt to flee. The policy change was implemented on the heels of lawsuits against officers and the substantial media coverage of the arrest of another officer (Colarossi et al., 2006). Subsequent to the policy change, use of Tasers by Orlando police officers declined by nearly one-third (Colarossi et al., 2006).

Police use of Tasers

Impact assessment New programs and other innovations in criminal justice settings tend not to be evaluated for their impact on agency operations for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are lack of time, money and motivation. A handful of police agencies have investigated changes in operations after Taser field deployment. These reports provide us with much of what we know today about how Tasers impact police work. While these departments are to be commended for doing what many of their peers have not done by way of responsible management practices, imperfect research designs often seriously compromise their ability to obtain valid or reliable information. Most police agencies that collect statistics on Taser use will look for changes using one-group pretest-posttest comparisons on a set of criterion measures (Knetzger and Knetzger, 2006). With this approach, outcomes are measured within the agency both before and after Taser implementation. Any changes are attributed to use of the new hardware. This type of design has low internal validity, because the level of assurance that observed changes are due to Taser deployment is not strong. Other factors, reflecting changes in organizational policy and practices or in community features such as numbers and types of crimes, may be operating to produce the observed differences. Multiple-group comparison studies are needed to increase internal validity but are difficult and expensive to conduct. With full implementation, one has to look to other agencies with similar organizational and environmental characteristics, although true equivalence of the two agencies will usually be difficult to obtain. With selective implementation, one has to contend with various selection biases like who is given access to Tasers (including self-selection) and with complicated intra-agency comparisons between Taser and non-Taser users. Randomized experimental designs are most desirable because they have the greatest internal validity but are difficult to carry out in criminal justice settings. In the short-term, a more realistic strategy is a longitudinal extension of the number of pre- and post-Taser implementation observations in conjunction with concerted efforts to identify and rule out competing explanations for observed changes.

459

Citizen concerns Complaints Little data are available about how Taser use affects the frequency or type of citizen complaint. Introduction of a new use-of-force technology might be expected to increase the number of citizen complaints, especially if that technology could encourage officers to use force more readily or to use more force at higher levels. However, the Columbus, Ohio police department reported a 25.3 percent drop in use-of-force complaints since Taser deployment (Columbus Police Department, 2005). Based on their data, it appears that non-use-of-force complaints also declined at approximately the same rate. Cincinnati reported a 50 percent reduction in overall complaints since Taser deployment (Cincinnati Police Department, 2004), with use-of-force complaints not

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identified separately. With regard to managerial judgments of Taser incidents, only five out of 1,243 Taser incidents in Orlando were disapproved after administrative review (Colarossi et al., 2006). Comparable statistics for other use-of-force technologies were not provided. In light of the findings in Columbus and Cincinnati, it is not clear why Tasers reduced the number of non-use-of-force complaints, and this issue merits further scrutiny. The Columbus findings may be affected by seasonality since the last six month of year are being compared to the first six months, thus highlighting the need for a longer term perspective and longitudinal designs. The Cincinnati police department has been operation under a memorandum of agreement with the US Department of Justice since 2002 regarding use of force, training, and citizen complaints (US Department of Justice, 1999). Finally, the low administrative disapproval rate in Orlando is not surprising, since very few use-of-force complaints are sustained nationwide. In general, complaints might be low because suspects and other citizens are not familiar with the technology and are not able to identify boundaries of proper use. It is worth recalling that Tasers tend to be used against the mentally ill and persons under the influence of drugs and alcohol. It may be that as a result of their altered mental state, these citizens are less inclined to file complaints, perhaps because their memory of the police encounter is fuzzy. Complaints from these citizens may have a lower-than-average level of credibility that could lead to relatively low disapproval rates for Taser use. Lawsuits Another measure of citizen dissatisfaction and concern with police actions is reflected in criminal and civil lawsuits. There are sporadic reports in the media of lawsuits involving Taser use. A Google News search (27/11/06) for “Taser lawsuits” produced 434 stories, some of which refer to the same incident. Many of these legal actions involve product liability issues. There also are web sites that track potentially controversial Taser incidents www.campaignagainstheTaser.com and Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) but the incidents reflected in these web sites are generally collected opportunistically outside of scientific data collection protocols. Reported reductions in use-of-force complaints suggest that the number of Taser-related lawsuits against police departments is low and that general use-of-force lawsuits may have declined. Lawsuits might be infrequent because serious injury is relatively rare, and lawyers are still trying to identify successful litigation strategies. If these speculations are correct, there is a fair chance that complaints and lawsuits will increase over time as lawyers, suspects and citizens become more familiar with proper use of the technology, and lawyers are able to better document the harms derived from Taser use. Injury reduction The potential to reduce substantially injuries to both officers and citizens is a major promotional feature of Taser use. Arguably, Taser technology can pay for itself if fewer officers are injured on the job and workman compensation costs go down, and if fewer citizens are injured with a resulting in a drop in civil litigation. Economics

aside, a reduction in the number of injuries to police officers and citizens and the resulting decrease in physical pain and/or psychological anguish have immense value. The Taser International web site promotes Tasers use as safe and cost-efficient with an array of self-reports from law-enforcement agencies. Specifically, the web site notes the reductions in injuries attributable to Taser deployment as shown in Table I. These statistics are impressive and, on the face of it, offer evidence that Taser use reduces injuries to police officers and citizens alike, in some cases dramatically. Unfortunately, most of these statistics derive from weak research designs that reduce confidence in the validity of results. For example, the Granite City, Illinois Police Department implemented a multi-faceted risk-management program in response to high insurance expenses. This plan included use of Tasers (Taser International, n.d.). After two years, the department reported that injuries declined substantially and that workman compensation expenses were nil. Clearly, a number of changes were implemented in this multi-faceted program, but the proportion of reduction attributable to Tasers is unclear. Could the same goal have been achieved, in total or substantial part, without deploying Tasers at all? Other police departments may be attributing a drop in injuries to Taser use when they also made changes in other operations that account in some measure for the observed reductions. In the absence of a strong research design, we cannot say with confidence how much Taser use is responsible for the reductions, if at all. Another example illustrates how statistics on injury reduction can be ambiguous. The Orlando Police Department introduced Tasers in February, 2003. In 2004, a major policy change led to a one-third drop in Taser use. Officer and suspect injuries currently equal or exceed 2002 levels (Colarossi et al., 2006). This situation emphasizes the following questions: Are injury reductions after Taser implementation temporary? Do officers and suspects adopt caution as an initial posture when dealing with a new use-of-force technology, which gives way as they become more familiar with the technology? What relation do changes in Taser use over time have to changes in numbers of injuries? Again, questions such as these can only be answered with confidence when data are generated from strong research designs. Finally, we should note that information on the nature or types of injuries prevented is not generally provided, nor are the cost savings that derive from prevented injuries Police agency

Injury reduction

Orange county, FL Cape Coral, FL

89 percent drop in arrest-related officer injuries 68 percent drop in suspect injuries 93 percent drop in officer injuries 40 percent drop in suspect injuries 70 percent drop in police officer assaults and injuries 67 percent drop in injuries to citizens 43 percent drop in suspect injuries 41 percent drop in officer injuries 41 percent drop in suspect injuries 46 percent drop in officer injuries 24.1 percent drop in suspect injuries 23.4 percent drop in officer injuries

Cincinnati, OH Phoenix, AZ Austin, TX Topeka, KS Columbus, OH

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Table I. Injury reductions reported by Taser International (n.d.)

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measured. This information is very useful when analyzing Taser use from a benefit cost perspective. Police community relations Anecdotal evidence such as letters to newspaper editors suggests that citizens hold mixed opinions about police use of Tasers. Beyond this general observation, the contours of public sentiment are not clear and need to be charted more systematically and completely. Increased contact with Taser use will shape points of view as opinions move from the abstract and hypothetical experiences to real and concrete experiences. As perception can be influenced by experience, public opinion of police Taser use is dynamic. This state of affairs allows considerable opportunity for strong and appropriate policy development and application to influence public opinion. A significant concern for communities and police agencies concerns the introduction of Tasers into community policing strategies. Cities like Orlando, FL are at opposite ends of the neighborhood policing spectrum in high-crime communities. On one hand, they routinely express support for police community partnerships, but conversely also support their “hunters” the young, aggressive officers assigned to no-tolerance squads intended to actively seek out crime in the same neighborhoods (Colarossi and Leusner, 2006). Minority communities have expressed concern over aggressive policing tactics, such as profiling in traffic stops, that are historically vulnerable to criticisms of racial bias. Tasers will eventually be subjected to the same criticism unless police departments take proactive steps to deal with these rising concerns. A lack of Taser-specific training for officers in critical thinking and decision making threatens to deteriorate hard-won working relationships between police and the communities they serve. There is undeniable dissonance when police organizations make a commitment to relate to communities in more democratic ways and then arm themselves with weapons that discourage discourse and discretionary judgment. Well-designed large-scale research on Taser use needs to address tensions between bureaucratic and community structure and activities, organizational and community values, and police and local cultures. Summary The use of Tasers in law enforcement is a relatively new phenomenon, and in attempting to summarize our state of knowledge, we have emphasized how much we still need to know. Specifically, we raised such questions as: How are Tasers being used in the field? What types of training are being provided? How is police officer use-of-force behavior changing as a result of Tasers? What policies govern the use of Tasers? How consistent are policy and actual use? How are policies reviewed and modified? How have rates of injury and use of force changed? How have citizen complaints and lawsuits changed? How do communities perceive police use of Tasers? What data are available or needed in order to make informed policy decisions? These questions are critical, because many police departments are considering adding Tasers to their arsenal, and police departments that already use Tasers are seeing a dramatic rise in their application. For example, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office has seen Taser use increase from 43 percent of weapons used in 2001 to 78 percent of weapons used in 2003 (Colarossi et al., 2006). The GAO report observes that police officers are more likely to use less-than-lethal weapons that can be deployed

at a distance and that will protect their safety as well as the safety or bystanders (GAO, 2005). These observations suggest that Tasers are en route to becoming the weapon of choice for police officers, bumping out other use-of-force technologies. Taser-related use-of-force issues of accountability and training are more critical in scope and dimension than those of other proven weapon technologies. While, Tasers appear to offer police officers a relatively fast and safe way to assert a high level of control over a situation, shortcomings in both policy and training suggest that a non-trivial number of incidents could be diffused before Taser level force is applied. Organizational policies guiding Taser assignment, use and evaluation appear broadly inconsistent. This reality has the potential to cripple the community-oriented policing movement. Tasers may actually increase the number of incidents in which force is used, jeopardizing police-community relationships. As one government report notes: . . .[t]he absence of a province-wide use-of-force reporting system and inadequate or absent administrative oversight increases the potential for abuse. Accountability in many instances remains below a level we believe is acceptable. The Taser has more built-in accountability that any other weapon system; the challenge is for organizations to utilize the information properly (Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner, 2005, p. 39).

Although this report discusses the situation in Canada, similar observations apply to the USA. Data collection and analysis are critical elements for completing the feedback loop as agencies move from policy to training to practice and back to policy - an all too uncommon loop in many police departments. There also is anecdotal evidence that Taser use is impacting community trust and police-community relations. Notwithstanding the availability of Tasers for more than two decades, law enforcement is still in the early part of the adoption curve, and so there is little information on the role Tasers play in changing how police use force and how Tasers impact the use-of-force continuum. Agencies are only now experiencing Taser implementation rates that can support large-scale study. This research is vitally important if Tasers are to be used productively within the contexts of community policing and democratic governance. References Amnesty International (2004), “Excessive and lethal force? Amnesty international’s concern about deaths and ill treatment involving police use of Tasers”, Amnesty International, London, AI Index 51/139/2004. Amnesty International (2006), “USA Amnesty International’s continuing concerns about Taser use”, Amnesty International, London, AI Index AMR 51/030/2006. Cincinnati Police Department (2004), Letter from Lieutenant Douglas C. Ventre to Taser International, Cincinnati Police Department, Cincinnati, OH, available at: www.taser.com/ documents/cincinnati.pdf (accessed July 27). Colarossi, A. and Leusner, J. (2006), “Tough solutions for parramore”, Orlando Sentinel, available at: www.orlandosentinel.com/news/orl-tasermain0806may08,0,2225904.story?coll ¼ orlnews-headlines (accessed May 8). Colarossi, A., Leusner, J. and Moore, K. (2006), “Are OPD officers too quick to tase?”, Orlando Sentinel, available at: www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/orl-tasermain0706may07,0, 2347898.story (accessed May 7).

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Columbus Police Department (2005), Six Month Taser Study. Intra-Divisional Memorandum from Sergeant BA Bruce to Chief of Police JG Jackson. Columbus, Columbus Police Department, Ohio, OH, available at: www.taser.com/documents/Columbus_TASER_ Study_June_2005a.pdf (accessed July 5). Force Science News (2004), Should Cops Stop Using Tasers? The Force Science Research Center Weighs in on the Controversy, Issue No. 8, The Force Research Center. Minnesota State University, Manketo, MN. GAO (1996), Use of Force: ATF Policy, Training and Review Processes are Comparable to DEA’s and FBI’s, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, (accessed March). GAO (2005), “Taser weapons: use of Tasers by selected agencies”, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee in National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, (accessed May). Garner, J. and Maxwell, C. (1999), “Measuring the amount of force used by and against the police in six jurisdictions”, Use of Force By Police: Overview of National and Local Data, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. Helm, B. (2004), “Taser: stunning in plenty of ways”, Business Week Online, available at: www. businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2004/nf20041118_7014_db014.htm (accessed November 18). Human Rights Watch (1998), “Shielded from justice: police brutality and accountability in the United States of America”, available at: www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo17.html Hunter, J. (1994), “Pepper spray – use-of-force continuum”, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 63 No. 5, pp. 24-6. IACP (2005), Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology (EMDT): A Nine-Step Strategy for Effective Deployment, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA. Knetzger, M.R. and Knetzger, L.A. (2006), Green Bay Police Department Taser Report, Green Bay Police Department, Green Bay, WI, available at: www.gbpolice.org/Taser%20Study.pdf Leusner, J. (2006), “Drunk and unruly? You risk a Taser”, Orlando Sentinel, available at: www. orlandosentinel.com/news/orl-taserside0806may08,0,4126448.story?coll ¼ orl-newsheadlines Madison Police Department (n.d.), Taser Report, Submitted to Chief of Police N Wray by Lieutenant V Wahl. available at: www.ci.madison.wi.us/police/PDF_Files/Taser%20 Report.pdf Mesloh, C., Henych, M., Hougland, S. and Thompson, C. (2005), TASER and Less Lethal Weapons: An Exploratory Analysis of Deployments and Effectiveness, Law Enforcement Executive Forum, Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board, Macomb, IL, available at: www.leeforum.com/articledetail.php?recordID ¼ 418 Monahan, J. (1992), “Mental disorder and violent behavior: perceptions and evidence”, American Psychologist, Vol. 47 No. 4, pp. 511-21. Nunnally, J. (1961), Popular Conceptions of Mental Health, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, NY. Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner (2005) Taser Technology Review Final Report. OPCC File No. 2472, Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner, Victoria. PERF (2005), PERF Conducted Energy Device Policy and Training Guidelines For Consideration, Perf Center on Force and Accountability, Washington, DC. Pilant, L. (1993), Less-than-lethal Weapons: New Solutions for Law Enforcement. Executive Brief, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA.

Rogers, E.M. (2003), Diffusion of Innovation, 5th ed., The Free Press, New York, NY. Seattle Police Department (2001), Use of Force by Seattle Police Department Officers: SPD Special Report, Seattle Police Department, Seattle, WA. Taser International (n.d.), Non-Lethal Systems: Reducing Injuries and Saving Lives. Executive Summary, Taser International, Scottsdale, AZ, available at: www.Taser.com/documents/ TASERS_saving_lives_compilation-short.pdf Teplin, L. (2000), “Keeping the peace. Police discretion and mentally ill persons”, National Institute of Justice Journal, available at: www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000244c.pdf US Department of Justice (1999), Contacts between Police and Public: Findings from the 1999 National Survey, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC. About the authors Kenneth Adams, PhD, is a Professor of Public Affairs at the University of Central Florida. His research interests include criminal justice program evaluation, police use of force, juvenile crime policy and prison administration. Kenneth Adams is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected] Victoria Jennison RN, MS is a doctoral student in the Public Affairs Program at University of Central Florida.

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The impact of extended police stop and search powers under the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003

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Faiza Qureshi Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, Loughborough University, Leicester, UK

Received 6 April 2006 Revised 6 January 2007 Accepted 8 January 2007

Abstract Purpose – The introduction of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003 extended police stop and search powers. It allowed officers to stop and search for articles concerning the commission of the offence of criminal damage. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the act produced a change in the extent and nature of stop/searches. Design/methodology/approach – Data from police-recorded stops in a southern town are compared for periods before and after the act came into force on January 20, 2004. The same time periods in the previous year are used as comparison groups. Findings – The four key findings are that there was: a large increase in observed compared to expected stop/searches, an increase in the likelihood of individuals of an Asian or Asian British Pakistani origin and Black and Black British of African origin being stopped and searched relative to others. A decrease in the proportion of stop/searches resulting in arrest; and the distribution of arrests being patterned by the ethnicity of a suspect stopped and searched. Research limitations/implications – The same time periods in the previous year are used as comparison groups since traditional geographically based comparison groups are not feasible to assess policy implemented nationally. The research is a small-scale study focusing on a 70 day-time frame to analyze the impact of the CJA 2003, therefore the results generated can be skewed and warrants further research with a longer follow up period. Originality/value – The effects of extending police stop and search powers under the CJA 2003 are discussed. The findings are examined with regard to their implications for further research and policy. Keywords Police, Criminal justice, Arrest, Ethnic groups, Laws and legislation, United Kingdom Paper type Research paper

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 466-483 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778840

Introduction The Criminal Justice Bill was introduced by the Labour Government as a means to improve all facets of the criminal justice system (CJS), which had recently become a subject of intense concern due to its ineffectiveness (Auld, 2001; Halliday, 2001; Home Office, 2001a, b; Cragg, 1999 cited in Slapper and Kelly, 2004). The Bill received Royal Assent on the November 20, 2003[1]. The Criminal Justice Act (CJA, 2003) made a number of key changes to police procedures such as changes to police bail, arrestable offences and stop and search[2] powers (Taylor et al., 2004). The act modified police stop and search powers on two levels. The first was that it extended the requirements of stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 by allowing officers to look for articles concerning the commission of the offence of criminal damage (as defined under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act (CDA) 1971). However, it is imperative to note that the CJA 2003 does not apply to offences that

threaten to destroy or damage property (Section 2(a) and (b) CDA 1971) or to possession offences under Section 3 of the CDA 1971. The omission of the latter section does appear to create an anomaly within the new stop and search powers (Taylor et al., 2004). For example, if a person were carrying a prohibited article with which to commit criminal damage, that person would only be committing a possession offence of “going equipped” if intent to use the article for the commission of an offence of criminal damage is established (Taylor et al., 2004). Although the CJA 2003 was a minor amendment to existing legislation, Part One of the Act[3] “represents a major extension to the existing powers of Stop and Search” (unpublished Home Office guidance cited in Keogh, 2004, p. 5). The second modification to police powers under the CJA 2003 was that it widened the scope of prohibited articles under the existing legislative provision of Section 1 of PACE 1984. Previously, prohibited articles were categorized as “offensive weapons or articles used for the purpose of burglary or related crimes” but this has now been amended to include any article: . . . made or adapted for use in, or in connection with a criminal damage offence or where the person having the article with him, intends it for such use, whether by himself or anybody else . . . (Taylor et al., 2004, p. 2).

Thus, prohibited articles can now include objects such as spray cans and marker pens as well as activities associated with political protest and graffiti (Taylor et al., 2004). In effect, the Act has granted police officers with greater powers to tackle street disorder (Taylor et al., 2004). The extension of police powers to target street disorder was essentially a Labour Government initiative to reduce levels anti-social behaviour as the CJA 2003 ran in direct parallel to the implementation of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act (2003), which strengthened police powers further to target public order offences. The Labour Government’s rationale in directing legislation toward their concern of anti-social behaviour was the perception that “it reduces our quality of life, degrades our environment (and) allows crime to take hold” (Labour Government, 2004). This statement is similar to the ideological origins of zero tolerance policing in the US based on the broken windows thesis (Kelling and Coles, 1997). The thesis assumes that visible “minor” crimes such as street begging (panhandling), graffiti and vandalism generate fear amongst the public and encourages community decline (Johnston, 2000), thereby increasing the occurrence of serious crimes. In essence, this mode of policing becomes: A Strategic, future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control focussing upon the identification, analysis and “management” of persisting and developing “problems” or “risks” (which may be particular people, activities or areas) rather than on the reactive investigation and detection of individual crimes (Maguire, 2000 cited in Maguire and John, 2006, p. 68).

Thus, the implementation of the CJA 2003 becomes a proactive policing method via stop and search to target perceived risks of anti-social behaviour in the form of criminal damage. Yet two underlying consequences of the act surface to the forefront. Primarily, the extension of police stop and search powers by the Labour Government has reflected the highly politicized arena of policing in which the state determines responsibility for crime control (Zedner, 2006) and intervening in social conflict (Jones, 2005 cited in Newburn). This can play a significant role in affecting policing priorities

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and policing styles in the guise of government crackdowns on specific crimes (Jones, 2005 cited in Newburn), as the power to set the policing agenda rests solely on the home secretary (as specified by the Police Reform Act 2002) (Sharp, 2005b). Evidently, this has become manifest in the reformation of police powers that have increased the authority available to the police to tackle minor crime and anti-social behaviour (Sharp, 2005a), effectively prioritizing the public order role of the police (McLaughlin, 1994). The problematic nature of the inter-relationship between the state and policing is that the former takes precedence in setting targets based on police performance to assess the effectiveness of the police service (Jones, 2005 cited in Newburn). The current Government priorities have a two-fold effect upon policing. The police organization becomes accountable to the state to achieve its targets that invariably has a compound effect upon individual police officers to take a proactive approach to tackle certain offences to meet government targets (McLaughlin, 1994) by focusing on certain groups. This is on the assumption that police officers will concentrate on black and minority ethnic (BME) groups[4] to meet their performance quotas (Cashmore, 2001). There is an inherent presumption that BME groups are soft targets for police officers (Cashmore, 2001) that can lead to the creation of racial disparities within the CJS as it: . . . Impacts disproportionality on those from minority communities, who are not only more likely to be victims of crime, but also more likely to be caught up in the CJS (criminal justice system). Black people are five times more likely to be stopped and searched by police than White people... Members of minority ethnic communities . . . are far less confident than White members of the public that defendants are fairly treated by the system (Home Office, 2001a, b, Paragraph 1, p. 19).

The broadening of police stop and search powers could also have a significant impact on ethnical and human rights issues. The overarching aim of police powers is to provide a legislative framework to protect civil liberties, but it can give rise to abuse (Jones, 2005 cited in Newburn). The concept of ethical policing is intertwined with the issue of police discretion where members of the public can be stopped and searched in instances where reasonable suspicion is undermined (Smith and Gray, 1983 cited in Zander, 1999; Brown, 1997; Mooney and Young, 1999; Sanders and Young, 2005 cited in Newburn). Therefore, many stops and searches could be illegal under the European Union (EU) Directive 43/2000 “Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Race or Ethnic Origin” (European Roma Rights Centre, 2005). The directive placed an onus on all EU member states to enact laws prohibiting racial discrimination and led to the passing of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 in the United Kingdom. The act places an obligation on all public authorities – including the police service – to promote equal opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups (O’Brien, 2000 cited in Green et al., 2000). Yet this has been undermined through the disproportionate application of police stop and search powers against members of BME groups (Home Office, 2000, 2001a, b, 2002, 2003, 2004a, b, 2005, 2006). In this context, stop and search could be a fundamental breach of article 14 – the prohibition of discrimination – of the European Convention on Human Rights (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). The paper provides that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms of the convention must be protected without:

. . . discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or any other opinion national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status (Whitaker, 2001 cited in Starmer et al., 2001, p. 96).

Research aims Research aims: The central aim of this research is a preliminary assessment of the impact of part one of the CJA 2003 upon the nature and distribution of police stops and searches. The discussion is inclusive of all vehicle and all pedestrian encounters. The evaluation has two main objectives to identify changes in the: (1) overall volume of Stops and Searches and subsequent arrest rates; and (2) proportions of ethnic minority groups subject to stop and search and arrest. The reasons for drawing attention to the issues of stop and search, arrest and ethnicity are two-fold. First, one of the anticipated results of the CJA 2003 was that it would increase the number of stops and searches being conducted (Keogh, 2004) and could also have a knock-on effect upon arrest rates. Thus, the examination of police stop and search records could partially test this hypothesis. Second, evaluating changes in the proportion of BME groups subject to Stop and Search is a historical yet global problem (Scarman, 1981; Police Assessment Resource Center, 1991; Keith, 1993; Solomos, 1993; Chan, 1997; Macpherson, 1999; Cashmore, 2001; Wilson et al., 2001; Wortley and Tanner, 2003; Whitefield, 2004). In the UK, the historical nature of police-public encounters has it origins in the legislative provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Vagrancy Act 1829 and Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. It became apparent that under these laws a significant number of young blacks were being detained (DeMuth, 1979 cited in Fitzgerald, 1999; Cashmore, 2001; Bowling and Phillips, 2002). For example, under the Vagrancy Act 1824, Lea and Young (1984) cited in Cashmore, 2001) noted that 42 percent of blacks were arrested in 1976 compared to 12 percent of those arrested under other provisions. This, prima facie suggested that the law was operating in a racist fashion. This trend has been supported by figures published by the Home Office under Section 95 of the CJA 1991 where recent figures suggest that relative to the UK population, Blacks are six times more likely to be stopped and searched than Whites whilst Asians are twice as likely to be stopped and searched (Home Office, 2006). A similar picture has also emerged in the US in terms of the existence of racial profiling techniques which are deemed to disproportionately target Blacks through pretext stops (Cox et al., 2001; Bayley, 2002; Harris, 2002, 2003; Petrocelli et al., 2003; Becker, 2004; Johnson, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Shepard-Engel and Calnon, 2004). While there are clearly connections between the present study and police research and practice in many countries, the emphasis in what follows in upon a UK case study. Methodology Research site The research location is unable to be identified due to confidentiality reasons[5]. The research site was a southern English town developed as one of six new towns selected under the New Towns Act 1946. The town was urbanized as part of the regeneration of the London region after the Second World War. Owing to the town’s close links with

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London, the area is characterized by a heavy transient population, as in excess of 30,000 individuals commute into the town on a daily basis. At the time of the 2001 census, the town had a resident population of nearly 1,000 people of which 88.5 percent were White and 11.5 percent from ethnic minority groups. The national average of ethnic minority residents for England and Wales was 9.1 percent. In addition, 88.4 percent of residents were born in the UK, 2.8 percent in Europe and 8.7 percent outside Europe. Arguably a key characteristic of the town is that it has one of the highest employment and one of the lowest unemployment rates in the country. The employment figure stands at 69.2 percent compared to the national average of 60.6 percent, whereas the unemployment rate stands at 2.3 percent, in comparison to the national average of 3.4 percent. Research design The research data comprised police records of stop and search covering the whole town. The evaluation is limited to an impact period of 71 days after Part One of the CJA 2003 came into force as for present purposes; the records were only available for the period up to March 31, 2004. This is admittedly a relatively short evaluation period but it can still facilitate the examination of change in the immediate aftermath of altered police powers. The researcher has the intention to replicate the evaluation with a longer period of data when such becomes available. However, if the findings from a longer-term replication prove the same then the present study was indicative. If the findings from a longer-term evaluation prove different then there is evidence of differences between short- and long-term impact of changed police powers. In either scenario, there is clear justification for the present study that also forms a platform for an evaluation with longer reference periods. As the CJA 2003 was implemented nationally there were no geographically distinct areas in which the act was not implemented. Consequently, the comparison group uses the same before and after time periods from the year prior to the change in police procedure. The data was divided into 471 day periods: before and after January 20, 2003, and before and after January 20, 2004. The first two-time frames serve as the comparison group data whereas the second two-time frames serve as the experimental group data. The key outcome measure presented below is the odds ratio, as used elsewhere (e.g. Farrington et al., 2006). In what follows, references to stop and search include all stops and all stops and searches. Findings Stop and search In the comparison data for before and after January 20, 2003, stops and searches declined by 16 percent from 1,196 cases to 1,009. In contrast, the experimental data for 2003-to 2004 revealed stops and searches increased from 998 to 1,311cases – a relative increase of 31 percent (Figure 1). This produced an overall odds ratio of 1.56, that is, a 56 percent increase between the observed number of stops and searches relative to the expected count after the introduction of Part One of the CJA 2003. Previous research has shown the volume of stops and searches varies with time of day, therefore reflecting variation in routine activities (Fitzgerald, 1999; Reed, 2004; Waddington et al., 2005). Seasonal variation might also be expected for similar reasons if individuals spend more time on the streets in summer than in winter due to longer

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Figure 1. The distribution of stops and searches before and after January 20, 2003 and 2004 (n ¼ 4,514)

daylight hours (Waddington et al., 2005). Taken as a whole, the long-term distribution of stops and searches from April 2002 to March 2004 revealed no seasonal variation in the distribution of police encounters with members of the public (Figure 2). The prevalence of stops and searches from April 2002 to March 2003 peaked in September and December with 626 and 627 cases, whereas for the following year (April 2003-March 2004), police initiated encounters peaked in May and June with 698 and 682 cases. In all, the standard deviation of stops and searches from April 2002 to March 2004 was 94[6] whilst the average number of stop and search records compiled per month stood at 515. However, the pattern of monthly variation suggests that the

Figure 2. The distribution of stops and searches – April 2002 to March 2004 (n ¼ 12,359)

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difference between experimental and comparison groups found here could be due to “normal” month-to-month variation. Further, analysis using extended reference period would be required to produce a definitive answer about the impact of the new legislation. The increase in stops and searches under Part One of the CJA 2003 parallels the increases identified after other stop and search legislation including: Section 1 of PACE 1984, Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and, Sections 44 (1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Home Office, 2000, 2001a, b, 2002, 2003, 2004a, b, 2005). Home Office figures for 2004/05 showed an increase of 14 percent in police-public encounters compared to 2003/2004 (Home Office, 2006). The 56 percent increase between observed and expected stops and searches found here might be partly explained by routine operational policing factors. These could include, inter alia targeted policing activities and high-visibility policing. Ethnicity The Stop and Search records incorporated a “16 þ 1” classification of ethnicity as used by the police. It is the standard system of ethnic monitoring introduced in all agencies in the CJS in April 2003 (Home Office, 2006). The classification requires police officers to record the self-defined ethnicity of every person stopped, in accordance to the categories used in the 2001 census. The person stopped will be asked to select one of the five main categories representing broad ethnic groups: Asian, Black, Mixed, Other and White (Home Office, 2006). They will then be asked to choose a more specific cultural background from within this group (Home Office, 2004a, b). The “plus one” element is the extra category for respondents who do not give a response to the question (Home Office, 2004a, b). The information generated from the 16 þ 1 classification is: “required to obtain a true picture of Stop and Search activity and to help improve ethnic monitoring, tackle discriminatory practice, and promote effective use of the powers” (PACE 1984 Code of Practice A, Paragraph 18, 2004, p. 19). However, the 16 þ 1 categorization of ethnicity can be problematic for police officers as it involves directly collecting data from a suspect on the street. The suspect may not be willing to co-operate, and a question on ethnicity may generate further grievance and as a consequence, a high proportion of ethnic data is incomplete (Home Office, 2006). The Home Office (2006) does not stipulate the actual proportion of incomplete ethnic data. In circumstances where a suspect is not willing to identify their ethnic background, police officers are permitted to provide their own visual opinion of a suspect’s ethnicity based only on four groups: Asian, Black, White and Other (Home Office, 2006). The self-classification of ethnicity of the person stopped and searched was used in the present analysis, even though this criteria can sometimes be problematic because: . . . if the person gives what appears to the officer to be an “incorrect” answer (e.g. a person who appears to be White states that they are Black), the officer should record the response that has been given (PACE Code of Practice A, Notes for Guidance 18, 2003, p. 18).

In the following analysis, a total of n ¼ 44 cases were excluded from the original sample of n ¼ 4514 (n ¼ 4,470) as the ethnicity of the person stopped and searched had not been recorded. The results presented in Table I are patterned by a degree of distortion for certain BME groups as in three instances, the odds ratio could not be calculated and therefore,

Before 5 35 56 9 105 40 14 3 57 0 9 9 13 2 2 4 21 971 1 18 990 1182

Ethnicity

Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi Indian Pakistani Any other Total: Asian or Asian British Black or Black British: African Caribbean Any other Total: Black or Black British Chinese or any other ethnic group: Chinese Any other Total: Chinese of other ethnic group Mixed: White and Asian White and Black African White and Black Caribbean Any other Total: mixed White: British Irish Any other Total White Total: all groups

4 30 42 7 83 23 17 2 42 8 2 10 7 3 8 2 20 824 3 17 844 999 215 215

25

þ11

216

211

Comparison After Change (percent) 5 32 37 9 83 28 16 4 48 1 1 2 8 5 5 6 24 807 0 22 829 986

Before 7 64 69 22 162 31 30 4 65 0 3 3 11 2 12 4 29 1016 4 24 1044 1303 þ 26 þ 32

þ 21

þ 50

þ 35

þ 95

Experimental After Change (percent)

1.48 1.55

1.27

1.35

1.82

2.47

Odds ratio

Extended police stop and search powers 473

Table I. The odds ratio of BME groups stopped and searched in comparison and experimental groups (n ¼ 4,470)

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it is only presented for the overall total of each ethnic group. There were anomalies in the data for the Chinese or any other ethnic group: any other category, which accounted for 0.3 percent (15 cases) of the total population stopped and searched, yet represented the greatest increase in cases between the expected and observed counts. The data was also skewed for the Asian or Asian British: any other and Bangladeshi groups. These groups illustrated a nominal number of cases in comparison to other Asian or Asian British sub-classifications. The odds ratio revealed remarkable increases in the proportion of BME groups stopped and searched. The difference between the expected and observed counts from before January 20, 2003 to after January 20, 2004 was 148 percent for Asian or Asian British of Pakistani origin, 91 percent for Black or Black British of African origin, and 48 percent for White British. Home Office research has identified that Blacks are more likely to be stopped and searched than any other ethnic group under Section 1 PACE 1984 and other legislation (Home Office, 2000, 2001a, b, 2002, 2003, 2004a, b, 2005, 2006). The findings raise the issue that Blacks of an African origin encounter police officers more frequently than those from a Caribbean origin relative to the proportion stopped and searched. These preliminary findings suggest that the CJA 2003 has had a negative impact insofar as that can be inferred from an increased stop/search differential between key minority ethnic groups. It could have wider implications in terms of ethics and human rights issues. These two factors emphasize the notion of proportionality, as there is “the need to find a fair balance between the protection of individual rights and the interest of the community at large” (Starmer, 1999 cited Newburn, 2005, p. 585). However, two factors need to be considered that could be intrinsically linked in explaining this finding. Firstly, the data only provides a snapshot of Stops and Searches for a short period and so it is possible that variation in the data could play a role. Secondly, the town used in the analysis had a higher proportion of BME groups standing at 11.5 percent compared to the national average of England and Wales at 9.1 percent and therefore, the town will have a greater number of BME groups available to be Stopped and Searched. In recent years, literature on Stop and Search and disproportionality has begun to focus on the concept of the “available population” (Fitzgerald and Sibbitt, 1997; Bland et al., 2000a, b; Miller et al., 2000; MVA and Miller, 2000; Stone and Pettigrew, 2000 and Waddington et al., 2005). BME groups are deemed to be more “available” to be stopped and searched than their White counterparts, especially young males (Fitzgerald and Sibbitt, 1997) due to three reasons: minority groups experience higher levels of unemployment than Whites, are disproportionately excluded from school (Fitzgerald and Sibbitt, 1997) and are more likely to go out two or more evenings per week (Fitzgerald and Hale, 1994 cited in Fitzgerald and Sibbitt, 1997). In spite of this, the concept of the available population has come under fierce criticism. In response to the Macpherson (1999) Report the Home Office commissioned a series of research papers to explain the disparity of BME groups in police stop and search Figures (Bland et al., 2000a, b; Miller et al., 2000; MVA and Miller, 2000; Stone and Pettigrew, 2000). Despite the fact the Report (1999) noted that: It is pointless for the police service to try to justify the disparity in these figures . . . attempts to justify the disparity through the identification of other factors, whilst not being seen vigorously to address the discrimination which is evident, simply exacerbates the climate of distrust (Macpherson, 1999 Report, Paragraph 45.10, p. 312).

It is within this climate that the issue of the available population emerged. Its critique arises from the presumption that the police are actively selecting certain groups to be stopped and searched based on their experience on which groups are likely to be involved in crime (Bridges, 2001). As such, “disproportionality is, to some extent, a product of structural factors beyond their (police) control” (MVA and Miller, 2000, p. vii). It can explain disproportionality only if the targeting of stop and search activity is not due to police policy and the strategic deployment of resources (Bridges, 2001). The Home Office research held that police officers were targeting “hot spot” areas (Bland et al., 2000a, b; Miller et al., 2000; MVA and Miller, 2000). Yet the deployment of resources to target such areas based on crime figures fails to take into account that recorded statistics are not a true indicator of the actual prevalence of crime. In addition, recorded crime statistics can also be reflective of high stop and search activity and various police operations (Bridges, 2001). Arrest rates The stop and search records were limited in respect of assessing arrest rates for criminal damage offences. Before the records were divided into “before” and “after” categories, the first data file contained an extra variable that provided an overview of the distribution of arrests for criminal damage incidents but the second data file did not contain this variable. As a result it was omitted from the first data set, in order to ensure a greater degree of comparability between the stop and search records for the four-time periods. Any analysis of the omitted variable would simply provide a highly skewed portrayal of arrest rates for criminal damage offences. The current Home Office figures for 2003/2004 showed that 14 percent of searches for criminal damage articles resulted in an arrest[7] (Ayres and Murray, 2005). In 2004/2005, this figure had declined to 10 percent (Ayres and Murray, 2005). The small percentage of persons arrested has to be considered within the context that Home Office recording of criminal damage incidents came into force on January 20, 2004. The ensuing analysis will focus upon two elements. The first part of the discussion will draw attention to whether or not an individual was arrested after a stop and search encounter. The second part of the analysis will consider the ethnic composition of the distribution of persons arrested. The prevalence of whether or not an individual was arrested after a police initiated encounter was based on a sample of n ¼ 4,511 stop and search records. Three categories of records were omitted: fog lights, description of offenders, and firearms. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, there was only one case in each category and this would have produced an extremely distorted picture of arrest rates. Secondly, by excluding these categories it would ensure valid comparisons could be made with the same group of records in both data sets. The odds ratio was calculated to measure the effect size of arrest rates. The number of persons arrested in the control data declined by 6 percent from 66 to 62 cases, producing an odds ratio of 0.94, whereas in the experimental group, arrests declined by 17 percent from 117 to 97 cases. When the odds ratio for the control and experimental data were taken into account, the overall odds ratio of 0.88 revealed a twelve percent decline in observed relative to expected arrest rates (Table II). It is reflective of trends identified in stop and search literature which notes that as stops and searches increase (Figure 1), the number of arrests decline (Ayres and Murray, 2005; Home Office, 2005, 2006; Sanders and Young, 2005 cited in Newburn).

Extended police stop and search powers 475

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Table II. The odds ratio of arrest rates in comparison and experimental groups (n ¼ 4511)

In contrast, the number of police-initiated contacts in which no action was taken search declined by 16 percent in the comparison data, from 1130 to 947 cases (Table II). The experimental data witnessed an increase from 880 to 1,212 cases where police officers did not pursue further action against an individual after an encounter had taken place. By taking into consideration the odds ratio for the four-time frames, an overall ratio of 1.64 was produced, effectively illustrating a 64 percent increase between the observed and expected counts where police officers took no further action against an individual once a stop and search encounter had been initiated. This finding successfully highlights the core function of stop and search, which is “to enable officers to allay or confirm suspicions about individuals without exercising their power of arrest” (PACE 1984 Code of Practice A, Paragraph 1.4, 2003, p. 3). Furthermore, literature in this area has continually revealed that in terms of arrests, stop and search has a relatively low success rate (Smith and Gray, 1983 cited in Zander, 1999; Fitzgerald and Sibbitt, 1997; Willis, 1983; Mooney and Young, 1999; Cragg, 1999 cited in Slapper and Kelly, 2004; Fitzgerald, 1999; Reiner, 2000; Martin, 2003; Reed, 2004 and Home Office, 2005), mirrored by this research. The next issue to take into consideration was the relationship, if at all any, between the ethnic identities of an individual arrested after a stop and search encounter has taken place within the comparison and experimental groups. The analysis was based on a relatively small total sample of n ¼ 343 cases. The results presented in Table III must be viewed with caution, as the small sample can provide a highly distorted representation of the ethnic identities of persons arrested after a police-initiated encounter. As the odds ratio could only be calculated for seven of the 16 ethnic groups, due to the low number of persons arrested in each subcategory, it was deemed appropriate to only include the ratio for the total of each ethnic group. Nonetheless, the difference between the expected and observed counts from the comparison group to the experimental group revealed a 500 percent increase in arrests for Asian or Asian British of Pakistani origin (the odds ratio for stops and searches for this sub-group increased by 148 percent), a 50 percent increase (this figure is the same percentage increase for stops and searches for this group) for Black or Black British of Caribbean descent and a 12 percent decline for those identified as White British (even though this group witnessed a 48 percent increase in stops and searches between the comparison and experimental groups) (Table III). There is a vast array of literature – national statistics and academic research – that support the abovementioned findings and emphasize the concern that BME groups are far more likely than their White counterparts to be arrested (Home Office, 2000, 2001a, b, 2002, 2003, 2004a, b, 2005, 2006; Wilson et al., 2001; Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Bowling et al., 2004). Yet it is

Before Arrested No Action Taken Total

66 1130 1196

Comparison Change After (percentage) 62 947 1009

26 216 216

Experimental Change Before After (percentage) 117 88 997

97 1212 1309

217 þ38 þ31

Odds ratio 0.88 1.64 1.56

Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi Indian Pakistani Any other Total: Asian or Asian British Black or Black British: African Caribbean Any other Total: Black or Black British Chinese or any other ethnic group: Chinese Any other Total: Chinese or other ethnic group Mixed: White and Asian White and Black African White and Black Caribbean Any other Total: mixed White: British Irish Any other Total: White Total: all groups

Ethnicity 0 3 4 1 8 2 0 1 3 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 52 0 0 52 66

Before 0 3 1 0 4 2 1 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 48 0 3 51 62

After

Comparison

22 26

þ 200

250

0.0

250

Change (percentage) 1 3 4 1 9 5 2 0 7 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 5 91 0 5 96 117

Before 0 4 6 3 13 0 3 0 3 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 3 77 0 1 78 98

After

Experimental

219 216

240

234

257

þ44

Change (percentage)

0.83 0.89

0.20

0.50 0.66

0.43

2.88

Odds ratio

Extended police stop and search powers 477

Table III. The odds ratio of BME groups arrested in comparison and experimental groups (n ¼ 343)

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imperative to consider that the figures presented in Table III portray a snapshot of the ethnic identity of a person arrested and raise similar concerns identified in the previous discussion on ethnicity. Discussion and conclusions The CJA 2003 was introduced at a time when police institutional discrimination, with stop and search as arguably its most tangible manifestation, has become part of the public imagination. In recent years, Home Office statistics have shown that Blacks and Muslims are, relative to the resident population, disproportionately stopped and searched under Section 1 of PACE 1984, Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and Section 44 (1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, respectively, (Home Office, 2006). The recent extension of police stop and search powers was introduced at a time when the UK government was seeking to tackle anti-social behaviour through various means. Anti-social behaviour of various types was perceived as a contributing factor in encouraging community decline as identified by the range of offences targeted by zero tolerance policing (Kelling and Coles, 1997). It can increase the public’ perception of being at risk of serious crime (Johnston, 2000). Johnston (2000) argued that a risk-oriented perception has a two-fold impact upon policing. First, police officers become highly proactive in targeting low-level disorder and by inference, become more invasive (Johnston, 2000). The impact of the CJA 2003 in tackling street level disorder will bring officers into greater contact with the available population (Keogh, 2004). This could be a source of contention in police-public relations. In this respect, police officers may have to take greater steps to reduce potential conflict. This might be achieved by additional effort to keep the public informed of changes to police stops and searches and its consequences – such as the increase in the number of police-public encounters as a necessity to target activities related to criminal damage offences. There may be an argument for further police awareness training to ensure stop and search interactions are conducted appropriately and as stipulated by the European Code of Police Ethics (2005). It has centered upon improving race relations and racism awareness (Scarman, 1981 Report; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997, 1999, 2000; Holdaway, 1998; Macpherson, 1999 Report). This can serve to help to build and maintain good community relations between the police and members of the public. The present study should be viewed as preliminary. It warrants replication for other places, and extension using data with a longer follow-up period. However, the findings of this study suggest that the changes to stop and search introduced by the CJA 2003 may be more than minor. The data for a southern English town suggested three fairly significant findings: (1) a significant increase in the overall volume of stop/search; (2) a differential impact upon ethnic minority groups subject to stop and search and arrest; and (3) a significant proportional decrease in the volume of persons arrested. These findings warrant further investigation but, particularly in relation to the second main finding, may suggest that the CJA 2003 has produced some unanticipated outcomes. Direct generalizations cannot be inferred from the evaluation. These findings are only applicable to the southern English town in which the study was based.

Further, research in this area is needed. The stop and search records examined here only provided a snapshot of the impact of the Act from 2002 to 2004. The timeframe for the assessment of impact was a relatively short 71-day period after the provision came into force. Research examining the long-term impact could therefore be of considerable value, and the present author hopes to develop a further assessment when such data becomes available.

Extended police stop and search powers 479

Notes 1. The act will be fully implemented by April 2007 (Statutory Instrument No. 751 (c.17), 2006: The Criminal Justice Act, 2003 (Commencement No. 12) Order 2006, available at: www.opsi. gov.uk/si/si2006/20060751.htm). 2. In what follows, capitalization of the first letters of stop and search is used to distinguish these legally distinct procedures undertaken by the police from the everyday usage of the same terms. 3. Part One of the Criminal Justice Act, 2003 was introduced on the January 20, 2004. 4. The term “BME” group was coined by the Home Office to effectively replace the notion of ethnic minority, available online at: www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/facts/ index39.aspx?ComponentId ¼ 12534&SourcePageId ¼ 6970 5. The sources contained in this section cannot be identified so as to ensure the anonymity of the Southern English town used in this research. 6. The standard deviation can be used here because, with no long-term trend, the mean was constant over time. 7. The figure for 2003/2004 published in the Home Office statistical bulletin “Arrests for Notifiable Offences and the Operation of Certain Police Powers” stood at 21 percent (Murray and Fiti, 2004). The figure was later revised for the current addition of the bulletin to 14 percent (Ayres and Murray, 2005). References Anti-Social Behaviour Act (2003), available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030038.htm (accessed March 30, 2006). Auld, R. (2001), A Review of the Criminal Courts, Home Office, London. Ayres, M. and Murray, L. (2005), Arrests for Notifiable Offences and the Operation of Certain Police Powers under PACE, England and Wales, 2004/2005, Home Office, London, Issue 21/05. Bayley, D.H. (2002), “Policing hate: what can be done?”, Policing and Society, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 83-91. Becker, S. (2004), “Assessing the use of profiling in searches by law enforcement personnel”, Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 23, pp. 183-93. Bland, N., Miller, J. and Quinton, P. (2000a), Upping the PACE? An Evaluation of the Recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry on Stops and Searches, Police Research Series Paper 128, Home Office, London. Bland, N., Miller, J. and Quinton, P. (2000b), Managing the Use and Impact pf Searches: A Review of Force Interventions, Police Research Series Paper 132, Home Office, London. Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2002), Racism, Crime and Justice, Longman, London. Bowling, B., Phillips, C., Campbell, A. and Docking, H. (2004), “Policing and human rights: eliminating discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and the abuse of power from police

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work”, Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme, Paper Number 4, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Switzerland. Bridges, L. (2001), “Race, law and the state”, Race and Class, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 61-76. Brown, D. (1997), “PACE ten years on: a review of the research”, Home Office Research Study: 155, Home Office, London. Cashmore, E. (2001), “The experiences of ethnic minority police officers in britain: under recruitment and racial profiling in a performance culture”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 642-59. Chan, J.B.L. (1997), Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. Cox, S.Y., Pease, S.E., Miller, D.S. and Tyson, C.B. (2001) Interim Report of Traffic Stops Statistics for the State of Connecticut, available at: www.web.wtnh.com/Report_Narrative. pdf (accessed June 12, 2004). Cragg, D. (1999), “Stop and search powers: research and evaluation”, cited in Slapper, G. and Kelly, D. (2004), The English Legal System, 7th ed., Cavendish Publishing: London. Criminal Justice Act (2003), Criminal Justice Act 2003 – Explanatory Notes, The Stationery Office, London. European Code of Police Ethics (2005) Recommendation (2001) 10 Adopted by the Committee Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics, available at: www.eupat.org/Proxima/1%20Mission/Eupoliceethicscode.htm (accessed March 29, 2006). European Roma Rights Centre (2005) Directive 43/2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Race or Ethnic Origin, available at: www.errc. org/cikk.php?cikk ¼ 2283 (accessed March 29, 2006). Farrington, D., Bennett, T.H. and Welsh, B. (2006), “The Cambridge evaluation of the effects of CCTV on crime”, in Farrell, G., Bowers, K.J., Johnson, S.D. and Townsley, M. (Eds), Imagination for Crime Prevention: Essays in Honour of Ken Pease, Volume 21 of Crime Prevention Studies Monsey, Criminal Justice Press, New York, NY. Fitzgerald, M. (1999), Final Report into Stop and Search, The Metropolitan Police Authority, London. Fitzgerald, M. and Sibbitt, R. (1997), Ethic Monitoring in Police Forces: A Beginning, Home Office Research Study 173, Home Office, London. Green, D.G., French, J., Grieve, J., Ignatieff, M., O’Brien, M. and Skidelsky, R. (2000), Institutional Racism and the Police: Fact or Fiction?, The Institute for the Study of Civil Society, London. Halliday, J. (2001), Making Punishments Work: Review of the Sentencing Framework of England and Wales, Home Office, London. Harris, D. (2002), “The fallacy of racial profiling”, SAGE Race Relations Abstracts, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 5-19. Harris, D.A. (2003), Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work, The New Press, New York, NY. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (1997), Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities, Home Office, London. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (1999), Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities Revisited’, Home Office, London. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2000), Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity, Home Office, London.

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Neyroud, P. and Beckley, A. (2001), Policing, Ethics and Human Rights, Willan Publishing, Uffculme. O’Brien, M. (2000), “The Macpherson report and institutional Racism”, in Green, D.G., French, J., Ignatieff, M., O’Brien, M. and Skidelsky, R. (Eds), Institutional Racism and the Police: Fact or Fiction?, The Institute for the Study of Civil Society, London, pp. 25-36. Petrocelli, M., Piquero, A.R. and Smith, M.R. (2003), “Conflict theory and racial profiling: an empirical analysis of police traffic stop data”, Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 31, pp. 1-11. Police Assessment Resource Center (1991), The Report of the Individual Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, available at: www.parc.info/reports/pdf/ christophercommission.pdf (accessed April 18, 2005). Reed, S. (2004), “Stop and search: facing up to the challenge of our strengths and weaknesses”, Police Magazine, pp. 6-9. Reiner, R. (2000), The Politics of The Police, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford. Rojek, J., Rosenfeld, R. and Decker, S. (2004), “The influence of driver’s race on traffic stops in Missouri”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 126-47. Sanders, A. and Young, R. (2005), “Police powers”, in Newburn, T. (Ed.), The Handbook of Policing, Willan Publishing, Uffculme, pp. 528-55. Scarman, L. (1981), The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981: Report of an Inquiry, Home Office, London. Sharp, D. (2005a), “Who needs theories in policing? An introduction to a special issue on policing”, The Howard Journal, Vol. 44 No. 5, pp. 449-59. Sharp, D. (2005b), “Counterblast: democracy and policing”, The Howard Journal, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 86-8. Shepard-Engel, R. and Calnon, J.M. (2004), “Comparing benchmark methodologies for police-citizen contacts: traffic stop data collection for the Pennsylvania state police”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 97-125. Solomos, J. (1993), Race and Racism in Britain, 2nd ed., Macmillan Press, Basingstoke. Starmer, K., Strange, M. and Whitaker, Q. (2001), Criminal Justice, Police Powers and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Statutory Instrument No. 751 (c.17) (2006) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 12) Order 2006, available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006?20060751.htm (accessed March 30, 2006). Stone, V. and Pettigrew, N. (2000), The Views of the Public on Stop and Search, Police Research Series Paper 129, Home Office, London. Taylor, R., Wasik, M. and Leng, R. (2004), Blackstone’s Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Waddington, P.A.J., Stenson, K. and Don, D. (2005), “In proportion: race and police stop and search”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 44, pp. 889-914.

Whitaker, Q. (2001), “Stop and search, arrest and detention”, in Starmer, K., Strange, M. and Whitaker, Q. (Eds), Criminal Justice, Police Powers and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 95-105. Whitefield, J. (2004), Unhappy Dialogue: The Metropolitan Police and Black Londoners in Post-War Britain, Willan Publishing, Uffculme. Willis, C. (1983), The Use, Effectiveness and Impact of Police Stop and Search Powers, Research and Planning Unit Paper 15, Home Office, London. Wilson, D., Ashton, J. and Sharp, D. (2001), What Everyone in Britain Should Know about the Police, Blackstone Press, London. Wortley, S. and Tanner, J. (2003), “Data, denials and confusion: the racial profiling debate in Canada”, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 45 No. 3, available at: www.utpjournals.com/product/cjccj/453/453_wortley.html (accessed February 21, 2006). Zander, M. (1999), Cases and Materials on The English Legal System, 8th ed., Butterworths, London. Zedner, L. (2006), “Policing before and after the police”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 46, pp. 78-96. Further reading Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2005), “Police powers”, in Newburn, T. (Ed.), Handbook of Policing, Willan Publishing, Uffculme, pp. 528-55. Economic and Social Research Council (n.d.), “Ethnic minorities in the UK”, available at: www. esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/facts/index39.aspx?ComponentId ¼ 12534& SourcePageId ¼ 6970 (accessed March 20, 2006). Foster, S. (2003), Human Rights and Civil Liberties, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow. Jones, J.M. (1980), Organisational Aspects of Police Behaviour, Gower Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot. Jones, T., Newburn, T. and Smith, D.J. (1994), Democracy and Policing, The Policy Studies Institute, London. Lundman, R.J. (1980), Police and Policing: An Introduction, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Orlando, FL. Manning, P. (2005), “The study of policing”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 23-43. Neyroud, P. (2005), “Policing and ethics”, in Newburn, T. (Ed.), The Handbook of Policing, Willan Publishing, Uffculme, pp. 578-602. Reiner, R. (1982), “Who are the police?”, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 53 No. 2, pp. 165-80. About the author Faiza Qureshi completed her MSc in Criminology and Criminal Justice at Loughborough University, having written a research thesis on police Stop and Search procedures. She is currently a Doctoral Student undertaking research in the Area of Policing. Faiza Qureshi can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Police officers’ attitudes toward citizen support Focus on individual, organizational and neighborhood characteristic factors Byongook Moon

Received 28 August 2006 Revised 28 November 2006 Accepted 4 December 2006

Department of Criminal Justice, University of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, USA, and

Laren J. Zager Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State, Washington, District of Colombia, USA Abstract Purpose – The increased contact that police have with citizens that characterizes community policing makes mutual trust and respect between police and citizens crucial to success. Despite the importance of examining officers’ perceptions of citizen trust and support, few studies have been conducted to examine officers’ perspectives. The current research attempted to fill that void by examining the effects of individual, organizational and beat characteristic variables on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support, using a sample of 434 Korean police officers. Design/methodology/approach – The current research attempted to fill that void by examining the effects of individual, organizational and beat characteristic variables on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support, using a sample of 434 Korean police officers. The results of OLS regression analyses indicate that individual and organizational factors such as seniority and the level of the officers’ assigned police department were significantly related to officers’ attitude toward citizen support. Findings – The results of OLS regression analyses indicate that individual and organizational factors such as seniority and the level of the officers’ assigned police department were significantly related to officers’ attitude toward citizen support. As expected, beat characteristic variables (i.e. the perceived community income level and the perceived community crime problem) have significant effects on the officers’ perceptions of citizen support. Research limitations/implications – To better understand determinants of officers’ perceptions of citizen support further research is necessary to examine the effects of personality traits, occupational socialization, and working environments, all features which were found to have significant effects on officers’ attitudes and behaviors. Originality/value – Overall, the current study augments our understanding of officers’ perceptions of citizen support and factors affecting those perceptions. Keywords Police, Community policing, Community relations, South Korea Paper type Research paper

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 484-497 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778859

Introduction The traditional reactive policing model has failed to satisfactorily control social unrest, reduce violent crime, or sustain the type of relationship between the police and community that is sought by modern police executives. Faced with these limitations and frustrations, the community-policing paradigm emerged and has become widely

accepted and implemented in many countries, since the 1970s (Kratcoski et al., 1995; Oliver and Bartgis, 1998; Pelfrey, 1998; Rosenbaum, 1994; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Trojanowicz et al., 1998). Community policing is fundamentally different in many aspects, including the emphasis of service roles, the positive relationship with citizens, and the decentralization of the police structure (for the differences between traditional policing model and community policing, see Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). A significant number of studies have been conducted on various issues related to community policing, focusing especially on police officers’ attitudes toward the philosophy of community policing, police culture and community policing, and the effectiveness of community policing programs (Lewis et al., 1999; Lurigio and Skogan, 1994; Moon, 2006; Moon et al., 2005; Peak and Glensor, 1999; Seagrave, 1996; Travis and Winston, 1998; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Wilson and Bennett, 1994; Winfree and Newbold, 1999; Yates and Pillai, 1996). Also, significant attention has been given to citizens’ attitudes and perceptions toward police and satisfaction with police (Reisig and Parks, 2000; Sims et al., 2002). Surprisingly, few studies have been conducted to examine police officers’ attitudes toward citizen support, despite of the importance of the issue (DeJong, 2004; Worden, 1993; Paoline et al., 2000; Sun, 2002). Active cooperation through the increased contacts with citizens is crucial to the success of community policing (Moore et al., 2000; Schafer, 2000; Trojanowicz et al., 1998; Wilkinson and Rosenbaum, 1994). Without mutual trust, respect, and support between police and citizens, such collaboration cannot succeed. Therefore, it is critical to understand officers’ perceptions of citizen support and what factors influence those attitudes, since these attitudes could affect the ways police officers interact with citizens. Despite this relationship and the recognized advent of community policing, this topic remains rarely researched. The current study, therefore, attempts to examine the relationship between the police and citizens from officers’ perspective and factors affecting officers’ perceptions of citizen support. Using a sample of 434 Korean police officers, multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the effects of individual factors, organizational factors, and beat characteristic variables on Korean officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. The history of community-based policing in Korea The term “community policing” was never specifically used in Korean society, yet the precepts of that philosophy are imbued in the Korean culture itself. Traditionally, Korean police officers kept close contact with community members rather naturally, and that facilitated better understanding and more effective social control. Throughout the country, diverse voluntary community organizations were established with police collaboration to assist those officers in preserving community order and controlling deviant behaviors. These methods, so similar to contemporary community-based policing practices and the principles of what is now termed “restorative justice,” were not emerged from a well-planned strategy and concrete efforts by the police or academics in Korea; instead, many scholars (Ames, 1981; Bayley, 1991; Jiao, 1995; Parker, 2001) argue that the Korean culture (Eastern Asian culture) itself, a culture of “collectivism,” facilitated the development of a “kind of community policing” as an effective way to maintain social order and prevent crime.

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A collective culture has distinctive characteristics. Individuals are considered to be a part of the community, not an independent being (Triandis et al., 1990), and the community is expected to exert control and supervise individual members’ behavior to maintain harmony and cohesion. Extensive community resources such as religious organizations, schools, and even families of offenders and victims are typically called upon to handle unacceptable behaviors of community members. Restoration of justice, reconciliation, and harmony through informal control mechanisms is preferred over punishment of an offender through formal control mechanisms. Consistent with that premise, formal arrest by the police has been considered a last resort. In such an environment, the police role is remarkably broad, and cannot be limited to law enforcement alone. Rather, police perform duties as service providers, mediators, and counselors to preserve the harmony and peace of the community (Rho, 2000). Though the police in Korea have long been the primary and formal entity of maintaining social order and preventing crime, the forces of its collective culture ensured that the community also played a significant role in keeping harmony and order through informal mechanisms (Bayley, 1991; Dutton, 1992; Jiao, 1995). This is illustrated well by the evolution of a mini-police station system unique to South Korea, which was later adopted in several Western countries as a strong expression of community policing (for more on the roles of a mini-policing station, Moon et al., 2005; Rho, 2000). Rapid industrialization, urbanization, and political instability in the late twentieth century, however, transformed Korean society, especially with regard to the respective roles of the community and the police in everyday life. During the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea achieved an unprecedented economic success (the “Miracle of Han River”) that introduced rapid industrialization and urbanization of the Korean society. In a very brief span, Korea went from a predominately rural/agrarian society to a predominately urban society, and individualism has tended to replace the previous collective culture; consequently, the traditional role of the community in controlling behaviors of its members through informal social control mechanisms has weakened significantly. Along with economic influences on Korean society were political ones as well. Government instability in Korea from the early 1950s until the 1990s had a direct and powerful effect on narrowing the role of the Korean police and radically altering the relationship between them and the public. Specifically, as political instability grew in South Korea, the government came to rely on military protection for a sustained period, and thus weakened the legitimacy of the government. As so often happens in social histories, these regimes then became heavily dependent on the police as a political tool to suppress anti-government demonstrations and restrain citizens and political opponents (Hoffman, 1982). As a spearhead of illegitimate governments, the Korean police inevitably took actions that suppressed citizen freedoms, violated civil rights, and intervened in the election processes – all to serve the interest of only a few, select people. The legitimate role of the police to enforce law and serve the public was neglected (Hoffman, 1982). The traditional relationship between the public and the police eroded and eventually became antagonistic, measurably compromising police authority (Heo, 1998; Nahm, 1988; Vreeland et al., 1975). Facing this crisis, Korean police implemented a major reform near the end of the twentieth century. Influenced at least partially by the community-based policing movement in the USA, Korean police administrators adopted an operational theme emphasizing the service roles of the police (citizen-oriented policing), and the importance of

a partnership with the public – a partnership relying on a cooperative/collaborative relationship between the public and the police. Concrete programs to improve the relationship with the public and to enter into such a partnership with the community for crime prevention were ultimately developed and implemented (Pyo, 2001). The relationship between citizens and police in Korea As stated, the long period of political instability in Korea saw the power of the police diverted from its valid social role to one of enforcing illegitimate ruling governments. Torture and harsh maltreatment of political suspects resulted in countless human rights violations and torture-related deaths (Pyo, 2001). This pervasive use of brutality in furthering the welfare of a government instead of the society ultimately and predictably created an antagonistic, untrusting relationship between the citizens and the most visible face of that illegitimate government, the police (Heo, 1998; Nahm, 1988; Vreeland et al., 1975). Though such abusive practices have ended, the stigma has remained: the Korean people yet harbor antagonism and mistrust toward the police (Nahm, 1988). Ironically, under the protection of the current legitimate and democratic government (since 1993), people have begun to openly question the fairness and legitimacy of the police, some revealing obvious and intense hatred toward them. Research on the relationship between Korean citizens and the police (Choi and Gy, 1997; Lee, 1984, 2002) indicated a widespread mistrust and antagonism between them. Lee (2002), sampling 223 police departments in South Korea and 1,746 police departments in the USA, conducted a cross-national comparative study of police between two countries. The results indicate that a majority (71 percent) of police departments (a questionnaire filled out by a representative in each department) in South Korea reported a negative relationship with citizens, and 92 percent of them believed that Korean people do not trust the police. These percentages are far higher than those faced by American police. In an initial effort to remediate the problem, “Operation Grand Reform 100 Days” was implemented in 2000 under the former Commissioner, General Lee (Pyo, 2001). At the heart of the reform effort were initiatives designed to reestablish the public service role of the police, generate a police image of fairness and trustworthiness, and create a positive relationship between the police and the public. These initiatives emphasized citizen-oriented policing and partnerships between the citizens and the police, crime prevention over crime fighting, and a policy change eliminating the use of CS gas in controlling demonstrations. Additionally, the police introduced programs designed for citizens to become involved with police agencies (for instance, citizen police academies and volunteer community patrol schemes) to give average citizens insight to police work. To help ensure fair investigations and reduce police officer misconduct, the “Chungmun Gamsagan” (a separate unit charged with reviewing and investigating allegations of impropriety) was established at every police station throughout the country. Though an objective evaluation of these major police reforms has not been conducted, an initial examination has indicated a significant decrease of police malpractices and improvement of the police image (Pyo, 2001). Factors affecting officers’ perceptions of citizen support No study has previously been conducted to examine factors affecting officers’ attitude toward citizen support in Korea. Absent guiding precedent, the current study primarily

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used individual and environmental factors identified in the research within the US as relevant factors in examining officers’ attitude toward citizen support. Though limited, several studies (Paoline et al., 2000; Sun, 2002; Worden, 1993) were conducted to examine officers’ attitudes toward citizen support and trust. Many factors have been examined as the predictors of officers’ perceptions of citizens, and these factors have been categorized into two groups: individual and occupational variables. Among individual variables, studies show that gender and education were significantly related to officers’ attitude toward citizens’ cooperation and trust (Paoline et al., 2000; Worden, 1993). Using a sample of 740 officers in 24 police departments, Worden (1993) examined the relationship between officers’ gender and their attitudes toward citizens. Seven items were used to measure officers’ perception toward citizen support, cooperation, and evaluation of police service. Examples of these items are “Most people in this community respect police officers” and “The likelihood of a police officer being abused by citizens in this community is very high.” The study found that white female officers were more likely to have positive perception toward citizens’ cooperation than white male officers. Paoline et al. (2000), sampling police officers in the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) and the St Petersburg Police Department (SPPD), found that educational level was significantly related to police officers’ attitude toward citizens’ cooperation and distrust. Officers with at least some college experience in IPD were more likely than officers with high school degree only to distrust citizens, and officers with some college experience in SPPD were more likely to have a negative perceptive toward citizens’ cooperation. Sun (2002), using the data of the Project on Policing Neighborhoods, found no significant relationship between individual characteristics (i.e. sex, race, and education) and officers’ attitude toward citizens’ cooperation. Among occupational variables, studies show that seniority and unit assignment were significantly related to officers’ attitudes toward citizens (Paoline et al., 2000; Sun, 2002). These studies found that more experienced officers are more likely to have a positive attitude toward citizens’ cooperation. Regarding the relationship between community policing assignment and officers’ attitudes toward citizens, the results are somewhat mixed. Paoline et al. (2000) found a positive relationship between community policing assignment and officers’ attitudes toward citizen trust. Officers having community policing assignment are more likely to trust citizens. However, Sun (2002) found a negative relationship between community policing assignments and officers’ attitudes toward citizen cooperation. Community policing officers were less likely to have a positive attitude toward citizen cooperation. Though these studies increased understanding about officers’ attitudes toward citizen support and trust, there are several shortcomings in the previous research. First, few studies on the relationship between the police and citizens from officers’ perspective were conducted in the USA. Unfortunately, no empirical studies have been conducted to examine factors affecting Korean officers’ attitudes toward citizen support, despite the active implementation of community policing in recent years. Second, none of the aforementioned studies examined the possible effects of officers’ beat characteristics on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. Several studies (Garner et al., 2002; Smith, 1986), which examined the effects of neighborhood characteristics on the use of force by the police against citizens/suspects, found the significant relationship between them. Smith (1986), using the 5,688 police-citizen

encounter cases, found that the proportion of racial minorities is positively related to the use of force by the police. Sun (2003) also found that officers whose beats are racially heterogeneous are more likely to have a positive attitude toward a broad role orientation. However, no studies were conducted to examine the effects of beat characteristics on officers’ perception of citizen support, despite the fact that working environments such as neighborhood characteristics (i.e. crime rate and racial heterogeneity) are known to have significant effects on officers’ attitudes and job orientations. The current study, therefore, attempts to address some of these limitations by examining the effects of individual and organizational factors along with three beat characteristic variables (the perceived community income level, the perceived community crime problem, and beat zoning characteristics) on Korean officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. Method Sample The Korean police have a highly centralized national police system. Under the supervision of a national police headquarters are provincial police headquarters, each in charge of administering various police stations in its prescribed geographical district. There are 14 provincial police headquarters and a total of 241 police stations throughout the country. Individual police stations are sub-categorized into one of three levels, with each level being defined by the number of citizens within its jurisdiction. A police station is considered a first-level police station when the number of residents within its jurisdiction is more than 250,000. Since, more than two-thirds of all Koreans reside in metropolitan cities, about half of the police stations (121 out of 241) in South Korea belong in this category. The number of employees in a first-level police station varies between 500 and 700, depending on the number of residents within its jurisdiction. Second-level police stations are responsible for medium-sized cities with populations between 150,000 and 250,000. In 2003, 36 police departments were categorized as second-level police stations with the number of police officers staffing those stations typically around 250. Third-level police stations are responsible for rural areas where the number of residents is fewer than 150,000. At the time of this study, 74 police stations were categorized as third-level police stations, each being staffed by about 150 officers. In the summer of 2002, the data for this study were collected from a sample of all three different levels of police stations in South Korea to better represent the Korean national police in general. A police station was randomly selected from each category among police stations in the Taegu and KyungSang provinces. Taegu is the third-largest city in the nation, while KyungSang province consists of numerous medium-sized cities and rural areas. Taegu and KyungSang provinces do not have any remarkable features in terms of poverty or concentrations of any particular demographic groups compared to other cities and provinces. With the assistance of each police station, the current project was announced and questionnaires were distributed to all of the police officers working in these three different levels of police stations. Officers on duty were asked to fill out the questionnaire by themselves and return them to an administration unit. Anonymous and voluntary participation was stressed. Among the 600 questionnaires distributed to the first-level

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police station, 519 questionnaires were collected for a response rate of 87 percent. Of the 300 questionnaires distributed to the second-level police stations, 229 were collected, or a response rate of 76 percent. About 140 questionnaires were distributed to the third-level police stations and 129 of those were collected, giving a response rate of 92 percent. The overall response rate was 84 percent, which may appear high by Western standards, but is fairly typical in Korean organizational culture. Since, the focus of the current study is to examine the effects of the characteristics of one’s patrol beat on officers’ attitude toward citizen support, only respondents who had assigned beats were included in the current study. Specifically, 400 officers – most notable supervisors and officers in various support-type units – reported no assigned beats, and were consequently excluded from analyses. Ultimately, after list-wise deletion of missing data, 434 valid cases remained and were used for analyses. Of the sample, about 50 percent of the respondents reported having a high school diploma, 27 percent having up to a two-year college degree, and another 23 percent having a four-year college degree or higher (Table I). The average years of police experience was around 12 years, and the average years of officers’ experience of working at a mini-police station was around seven. Of the respondents, 61 percent (265 officers) were assigned to a first-level police station, with 24 percent (104 officers) to a second-level station, and 15 percent (65 officers) to a third-level station. Independent variables Three demographic variables (educational level, seniority, and years of experience working at a mini-police station) and one organizational variable (the level of the police station) are used as independent variables. Regarding education, the category of “officers with a four-year college or higher degree” was used as a reference to compare to those with a high school diploma and to those with a two-year college degree. Years of police experience (seniority) and mini-police station experience are continuous variables. For the level of a police station, the category of “officers working at the first level police station” was used as reference to compare to those working at second- and third-level police stations. In addition to demographic and organizational variables, three characteristics of officers’ beat were measured: the perceived community income level within the beat, the perceived community crime problem of the beat area, and the perceived predominate real estate zoning (residential, commercial, or industrial) of the beat. Number (percentage)

Table I. Social demographic characteristics of police officers in the sample

Educational High school or less Some college experience Four year college or higher Mean seniority Mean years of experience at MPS Level of police station First Second Third Total number ¼ 434

217 116 101 11.9 7.3

(50) (27) (23) (8.0) (5.3)

265 (61) 104 (24) 65 (15)

The perceived community income level was measured by asking respondents whether they regarded their beat as a high-, middle-, and low-income community. Of the respondents, 38 percent (166 officers) in the sample reported that their main beat is a middle-income community, while 62 percent (268 officers) perceived that their beat is a low-income community. None of the respondents perceived that their beat as a high-income community. The perceived community crime problem was measured by asking respondents the seriousness of crime problems in their beat. The response options were “very serious,” “somewhat of a problem,” and “no crime problem.” Of the respondents, 51 percent (219 officers) in the sample perceived that their beat does not have any problem with crime, and 47 percent that their beat has somewhat of a crime problem. Only 4 percent of respondents (15 officers) perceived their beat area having a serious crime problem. Because so few officers in the sample reported that their beat has a serious crime problem, the perceived community crime problem was dichotomized into “no crime problem” and “crime problem.” The perceived predominate zoning of the beat was measured by asking respondents whether their beat is mainly residential, business, commercial, or other. A majority of officers (57 percent) in the sample reported that their main beat is a residential area, while 14 percent indicated that their main beat is commercial area. Around seven percent reported that their main beat is business area, and 23 percent as some combination of types. The category of “residential” was used as a reference.

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Dependent variable The dimension of “police officers’ attitude toward citizen support” was created by summing three items which were partially adopted from the study of Worden (1993). These items are “citizens are suspicious of police officers,” “citizens respect police officers,” and “citizens have positive attitudes toward law enforcement.” The response options of each item were from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). One item was reverse coded so that higher scores indicate officers’ positive attitudes toward citizen support. The composite measure of police officers’ attitude toward citizen support (Cronbach a ¼ 0.74) ranges from 3 to 11, with a mean level of 6.9 and a standard deviation of 1.5. Visual inspection of the frequency distribution shows a normal distribution of the variable, making ordinary least squares regression analyses appropriate. The results in Table II show that a majority of Korean officers in the sample perceived that citizens do not support the police, consistent with a previous finding (Lee, 2002). Strongly agree N Agree N Disagree N Strongly disagree (percentage) (percentage) (percentage) N (percentage) Officers’ perceptions toward citizen support 1. Citizens are suspicious of police officers 21 (5) 2. Citizens respect police officers 6 (1) 3. Citizens have positive attitudes toward law enforcement. 11 (3) Total number ¼ 434

248 (57)

161 (37)

4 (1)

124 (29)

271 (62)

33 (8)

159 (37)

228 (53)

36 (8)

Table II. Police officers’ perceptions toward citizen support

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Sixty-two percent of the respondents either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement that “citizens are suspicious of police officers,” and 70 percent of them either “strongly disagreed” or “disagreed” with the statement that “citizens have positive attitude toward law enforcement.” Consistently, a majority of the respondents (61 percent) either “strongly disagreed” or “disagreed” with the statement that “citizens have positive attitude toward law enforcement.”

492 Results The results of OLS regression analyses of the independent variables on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support are presented in Table III. In order to separately examine the amount of variation in the officers’ attitudes toward citizen support that is explained by demographic/organizational and beat characteristics variables, two different models were used. In Model 1, four demographic/organizational variables (educational level, seniority, years of experience at mini-police station, and the level of the police department) were included, while in Model 2, three beat characteristic variables (perceived community income level, perceived crime problem, perceived beat zoning) were added. Examination of the variance inflation factor indicates that there is little evidence of collinearity among the independent measures. The results in Model 1 show that the seniority and the level of the police department were significantly related to officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. More senior officers were more likely to have positive attitudes toward citizen support. Officers who worked at the third-level police department were more likely than officers

Individual/organizational variables

Table III. Regression of citizen support on individual/organizational variables and beat characteristics

Educational level High school diploma Some college Four year college or higher (reference) Seniority Years in a police box Level of a police station Third level Second level First level (reference) Beat variables Perceived community income (median income level) Perceived crime problem (crime problem) Type of beat area Business area Commercial area Other Residential area (reference) Constant R2 Notes: *p , 0.05; * *p , 0.01; * * *p , 0.001

Officers’ attitudes toward citizen support Model 1 Model 2 B (b) B (b ) 0.03 (0.01) 2 0.36 (20.11)

0.00 (0.00) 20.35 (2 0.10)

0.03 (.14) * 2 0.01 (2.04)

0.03 (0.17) * 20.02 (2 0.06)

0.88 (0.21) * * * 0.19 (0.06)

0.85 (0.20) * * * 0.08 (0.02) 0.43 (0.14) * * 20.30 (2 0.10) * 20.31 (2 0.05) 20.10 (2 0.02) 20.16 (2 0.04)

6.58 0.07

6.65 0.10

assigned to the first-level police department to have positive attitudes toward citizen support. The R 2 indicates that demographic and organizational variables explained about seven percent of the variance in officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. In Model 2, where three beat characteristic variables were added to Model 1, seniority and the level of the police department continued to exert significant effects on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. The standardized coefficients show that the level of the police department has the most significant effect on officers’ attitude toward citizen support, even after the inclusion of three beat variables (b ¼ 0.20 for the third level police department vs the first-level police department). Among the beat variables, the perceived income of their beat and the perceived crime problem were significantly related to officers’ perceptions of citizen support in the expected direction. Police officers who perceive their beat as a middle-income community are more likely to report a positive attitude toward citizen support than those who perceive their beat as a low-income community. Officers who also perceive that their beat has a crime problem are less likely to report citizen support than those who perceived no crime problem. The examination of R 2 in both Model 1 and 2, however, indicate that adding beat characteristic variables did not add much to the explanatory power of the model. All three beat variables added only 3 percent of the explained variance. Discussion and conclusion The current study, using a sample of 434 Korean police officers, examined the effects of individual factors, organizational factors, and beat characteristic variables on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. Consistent with previous findings (Choi and Gy, 1997; Lee, 1984, 2002), the study found that a majority of Korean police officers perceived that citizens do not support the police. These findings suggest that distrust and antagonism between the police and citizens is deep-rooted in the minds of the Korean police. Considering that it is essential to develop and maintain active collaboration with the public for successful implementation of community policing and the Korean police have made effort to create a “positive” image during the reform movement since 2000, these findings are discouraging to Korean police administrators. The results clearly show the need for Korean police administrators to make even more aggressive efforts to improve their relationship with citizens. As previous studies on community policing indicate, successful implementation of community policing can only occur when the police and citizens trust each other and enter into the activity with a true spirit of cooperation; absence of those qualities will almost certainly sabotage even the best-planned and best-funded efforts. Regarding the determinants of officers’ attitudes toward citizen support, the results indicate that some individual/organizational factors and beat characteristics factors are significantly related to officers’ perceptions of citizen support. Consistent with the previous findings (Paoline et al., 2000; Sun, 2002) in the USA, seniority is positively related to officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. Experienced officers are more likely to have a positive attitude toward citizen support. The results also indicate that officers working at the third-level police department (rural areas) are more likely to report a positive attitude toward citizen support than those working at the first-level police department (urban areas), even though South Korea has maintained a highly centralized and standardized national police system. This finding is consistent with previous studies in the USA that a rural police department is more likely to have a close relationship with residents compared to an urban police department, a condition

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attributable to the uniqueness of community factors in rural areas such as dense informal networks and low population (Decker, 1979; Meagher, 1985; Weisheit et al., 1994). As expected, the perceived community income level and the perceived community crime problem were significantly related to officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. The results indicate that working environmental factors have a significant effect on officers’ perceptions of citizen support, consistent with the previous findings that neighborhood characteristics exert significant effects on officers’ working orientation and behaviors (i.e. officers’ role orientation and the use of force). However, contrary to our expectation, the inclusion of three beat characteristics variables did not significantly increase the explanatory power of the model. Three beat characteristics variables added only 3 percent of the explained variance in officers’ attitudes toward citizen support. It may be that, despite previous research which used official beat characteristics (i.e. violent crime rate, racial heterogeneity, and official community income level), the use of perceived beat characteristics by police officers has an effect on the results. This finding suggests further research on this issue. There are several limitations to the current study. First, the study did not include personal disposition/traits which inspire individuals to choose policing as their career. It might be useful to examine the effects of these personal dispositions/traits on the officers’ attitude toward citizen support, since personal dispositions/traits are known to consistently affect individual behaviors and attitude toward various issues. Second, officers’ gender has been found to have a significant effect on officers’ attitudes toward citizen support and trust in previous research. The gender variable, however, was not included in the current analyses because none of female officers in our sample reported having beat areas[1]. Therefore, the results of the current study may not generalize to female police officers. Overall, the current study augments our understanding of officers’ perceptions of citizen support and factors affecting those perceptions in South Korea. The findings indicate a continued distrust between citizens and the police and the urgent need for the Korean police to show genuine determination to reform its organization to facilitate mutual trust and cooperation. To better understand determinants of officers’ perceptions of citizen support, future research needs to include personality traits, occupational socialization, and working environments, all features which were found to have significant effects on officers’ attitudes and behaviors. Note 1. As gender has been found to be an important predictor of the acceptance of community policing and attitudes toward citizen support in previous research, a “gender” item was included in the questionnaire of the current study. However, respondents who completed the questionnaires were almost all men (98 percent), which is representative of all the police officers (96 percent) in South Korea. Furthermore, none of female officers in the sample reported having beat areas. References Ames, W. (1981), Police and Community in Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Bayley, D. (1991), Forces of Order: Policing Modern Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.

Choi, I. and Gy, K. (1997), A Study on Relationship Between Social Class and Crime, Korean Institute of Criminology, Seoul. Decker, S. (1979), “The rural county Sheriff: an issue in social control”, Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 4, pp. 97-111. DeJong, C. (2004), “Gender differences in officer attitude and behavior: providing comfort to citizens”, Women and Criminal Justice, Vol. 15, pp. 1-32. Dutton, M. (1992), Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to “the People”, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. Garner, J.H., Maxwell, C.D. and Heraux, C.G. (2002), “Characteristics associated with the prevalence and severity of force used by the police”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 705, p. 746. Heo, N. (1998), History of Korean Police Administration, Dongdowon, Seoul. Hoffman, V. (1982), “The development of modern police agencies in the Republic of Korea and Japan: a paradox”, Police Studies, Vol. 5, pp. 3-16. Jiao, A. (1995), “Community policing and community mutuality: a comparative analysis of American and Chinese police reforms”, Police Studies, Vol. 18, pp. 69-91. Kratcoski, P., Dukes, D. and Gustavson, S. (1995), “An analysis of citizens’ responses to community policing in a large Midwestern City”, in Kratcoski, P. and Dukes, D. (Eds), Issues in Community Policing, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH, pp. 199-212. Lee, W. (1984), “Police and community relations in the republic of Korea”, policy paper for Master’s degree, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI. Lee, Y. (2002), “A cross-national comparative study of police: criminal investigative policies and practices in the USA and South Korea”, unpublished PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI. Lewis, S., Rosenberg, H. and Sigler, R. (1999), “Acceptance of community policing among police officers and police administrators”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 22, pp. 567-88. Lurigio, A.J. and Skogan, W.G. (1994), “Winning the hearts and minds of police officers: an assessment of staff perceptions of community policing”, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 40, pp. 315-30. Meagher, S. (1985), “Police patrol styles: how pervasive is community variation?”, Journal of Police Science and Administration, Vol. 13, pp. 36-45. Moon, B. (2006), “The influence of organizational socialization on police officers’ acceptance of community policing”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 704-22. Moon, B., McCluskey, J. and Lee, S. (2005), “Korean police officers’ attitude toward the efficacy of mini-police stations”, Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 33, pp. 441-9. Moore, M., Trojanowicz, R. and Kelling, G. (2000), “Crime and policing”, in Oliver, W. (Ed.), Community Policing: Classical Readings, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, pp. 41-59. Nahm, A. (1988), Korea: Tradition & Transformation – A History of the Korean People, Hollym International Corporation, Elizabeth, NJ. Oliver, W. and Bartgis, E. (1998), “Community policing: a conceptual framework”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 21, pp. 490-506. Paoline, E., Myers, T. and Worden, R. (2000), “Police culture, individualism, and community policing: evidence from two police departments”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 575-605. Parker, C. (2001), The Japanese Police System Today: A Comparative Study, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY.

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Peak, K.J. and Glensor, R.W. (1999), Community Policing and Problem Solving – Strategies and Practices, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Pelfrey, W.J. (1998), “Precipitating factors of paradigmatic shift in policing: the origin of the community policing era”, in Alpert, G.P. and Piquero, A.R. (Eds), Community Policing: Contemporary Readings, Prospect Heights, Waveland, IL, pp. 79-92. Pyo, C. (2001), “Policing: the present and future”, Crime & Justice International, Vol. 17, pp. 7-8. Reisig, M.D. and Parks, R.B. (2000), “Experience, quality of life, and neighborhood context: a hierarchical analysis of satisfaction with police”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 607-30. Rho, H. (2000), “Pachulso sunchal haldongae yangu (Efficient management of a mini-police station)”, Journal of Korean Association of Public Safety and Criminal Justice, Vol. 10, pp. 37-74. Rosenbaum, D. (1994), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Schafer, J. (2000), “The challenges of implementing successful organizational change: a study of community policing”, unpublished PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI. Seagrave, J. (1996), “Defining community policing”, American Journal of Police, Vol. 15, pp. 1-22. Sims, B., Hooper, M. and Peterson, S. (2002), “Determinants of citizens’ attitudes toward police: results of the Harrisburg citizen survey – 1999”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 25, pp. 457-71. Skolnick, J.H. and Bayley, D.H. (1986), The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities, The Free Press, New York, NY. Skolnick, J. and Bayley, D. (1988), Community Policing: Issues and Practices Around the World, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Smith, D.A. (1986), “The neighborhood context of police behavior”, in Reiss, A.J. Jr and Tonry, M. (Eds), Communities and Crime, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 313-41. Sun, I.Y. (2002), “Police officer attitudes toward peers, supervisors, and citizens: a comparison between field training officers and regular officers”, American Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 27, pp. 69-83. Sun, I.Y. (2003), “Police officers’ attitudes toward their role and work: a comparison of Black and White officer”, American Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 28, pp. 89-108. Travis, L. and Winston, C. (1998), “Dissension in the ranks: officer resistance to community policing, cynicism, and support for the organization”, Journal of Crime and Justice, Vol. 21, pp. 139-56. Triandis, H., McClusker, C. and Hui, H. (1990), “Multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 59, pp. 1006-20. Trojanowicz, R. and Bucqueroux, B. (1990), Community Policing, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH. Trojanowicz, R., Kappeler, V., Gaines, L. and Bucqueroux, B. (1998), Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH. Vreeland, N., Just, P., Martindale, K., Moeller, P. and Shinn, R. (1975), Area Handbook for South Korea, Foreign Area Studies, Washington, DC. Weisheit, R., Wells, E. and Falcone, D. (1994), “Community policing in small town and rural America”, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 40, pp. 549-67. Wilkinson, D. and Rosenbaum, D. (1994), “The effects of organizational structure on community policing: a comparison of two cities”, in Rosenbaum, D. (Ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 110-26.

Wilson, D. and Bennett, S. (1994), “Officers’ response to community policing: variations on a theme”, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 40, pp. 354-70. Winfree, T. and Newbold, G. (1999), “Community policing and the New Zealand police: correlates of attitudes toward the work world in a community-oriented national police organization”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 22, pp. 589-617. Worden, A.P. (1993), “The attitudes of women and men in policing: testing conventional and contemporary wisdom”, Criminology, Vol. 31, pp. 203-41. Yates, D.L. and Pillai, V.K. (1996), “Attitudes toward community policing: a causal analysis”, Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, pp. 193-209. Corresponding author Byongook Moon can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Community policing: is field training the missing link? Allison T. Chappell

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Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA

Received 24 May 2006 Revised 14 February 2007 Accepted 26 February 2007 Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which traditional field training incorporates community-oriented policing and problem solving in its formal evaluation process. Can community policing be successfully integrated into the San Jose field training model as a formal component of training and evaluation of police recruits? Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyzes formal field training evaluations and narratives in one police agency that uses the San Jose Field Training Officer Program. The agency endorses and practices community policing and problem solving. Findings – Field training in this agency did not successfully integrate community policing and problem solving into the formal evaluation process. Practical implications – Because field training occurs immediately after the academy, it is the best place to expose recruits to community policing and problem solving in practice, thus linking training with practice. If police agencies are truly committed to community policing, they must update their field training curricula to reflect the new philosophy and practice. Originality/value – Though there has been considerable research in the area of community policing, little of it focuses on training, especially field training. Ironically, even though most agencies claim to practice community policing, they have failed to prepare their officers in the philosophies and skills necessary to perform the tasks well. Police academies are beginning to train recruits in community policing, but most agencies still use the San Jose FTO model, which was developed before contemporary community policing existed. Because field training is such an important part of police socialization, it must teach recruits the skills of community policing. Keywords Training, Police, Community policing Paper type Case study

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 498-517 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778868

Introduction “Community policing could arguably be called the new orthodoxy of law enforcement in the United States” (Sadd and Grinc, 1996, p. 1). By 2000, over 90 percent of our nation’s police agencies reported that they engaged in community policing, a newer form of policing that emphasizes community partnerships, problem solving, and crime prevention (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). Politicians, academicians and police officers themselves support the philosophy and practice of community policing and problem solving. Essentially, community policing entails focusing on community needs, solving recurring problems, preventing crime (rather than only responding to it), as well as “flattening” the tall, bureaucratic structure that characterized the traditional police agency. In a nutshell, the community policing officer is supposed to be more of a The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.

community resource officer than simply a law enforcer (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce, 2004). Community policing is not without critics. It has been criticized for uneven implementation, failing to live up to the standards of “real” police work, and for being just another public relations fad (Lab, 2000; McLaughlin and Donahue, 1995). In the era of community policing, we are asking much more of our officers than we did in the reform era (Kelling and Moore, 1988). We are not only asking them to be law enforcers and crime fighters, but also we are expecting them to coordinate multi-pronged crime prevention efforts on behalf of the neighborhoods they serve. For example, if community residents complain that they need more street lights in their neighborhood, the officer is expected to take their cause to city officials and act as their advocate (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Community policing officers are expected to attend civic league meetings and listen to the concerns of neighborhood residents so to build trust and reduce fear of crime (Community Policing Consortium, 2006). These skills require training; training that is much more complex than the training that officers received when they were only expected to focus on enforcing the law (King and Lab, 2000). Officers must learn communications and diversity skills, as well as how to coordinate with other municipal agencies. Potential police officers are screened before they enter the first phase of training, known as academy training. Academy training often resembles military boot camp and prepares recruits for the general skills of policing, such as high-risk driving, using firearms, and the mechanics of arrest (Alpert and Dunham, 1997). Newer academy training programs, such as those in Florida, also provide courses in cultural diversity, ethics, problem solving, and community relations (Chappell, 2005). Following academy training, the recruit enters the police agency where he or she has gained employment and goes through a subsequent training program, known as field training, or FTO training. This training period resembles an apprenticeship, as the recruit goes “on the street” with a series of senior officers (i.e. Field Training Officers, or FTO’s) who mentor and teach the recruit the rules and procedures of policing in that particular agency (Haberfield, 2002). Though there has been considerable research in the area of community policing, little of it focuses on training, especially field training. Ironically, even though most agencies claim to practice community policing, they have failed to prepare their officers in the philosophy and skills necessary to perform the tasks well. Recent statistics suggest that 79 percent of police academies train their new recruits in community policing (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004), but we know that this training can range from simply one course in community policing to an entire curriculum based on the community policing philosophy. For example, Florida and Illinois have revamped their entire curricula to reflect a community policing and problem solving approach, while most other states have simply added extra courses in community policing (Chappell et al., 2005, Dantzker et al., 1995; Trojanowicz and Belknap, 1986). Nonetheless, police academies are making progress. Field training, on the other hand, has been largely neglected. Most (approximately 4,000) agencies continue to use the San Jose FTO model, which was developed in the early 1970s, before contemporary community policing existed (COPS Office, 2001; Scott, 2000). Therefore, it is becoming more common for police recruits to receive academy training in community policing, then go into field training programs based on traditional philosophies of policing (e.g. law enforcement). Agencies then expect them

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to engage in community policing activities once they become fully trained certified police officers. Field training must “catch up” if academy training in community policing is going to have a lasting impact on recruits and new officers. Because field training occurs immediately after the academy, it is the best place to expose recruits to community policing and problem solving in practice, thus linking training with practice (Haarr, 2001). Mastrofski and Ritti (1995) warn that the effects of high quality academy training can dissipate once officers are exposed to the powerful effects of everyday work, the organization, and the occupational culture of more experienced and veteran officers. Therefore, recruits exposed to community policing and problem solving activities in the academy may find little value in those experiences if field training and their department affords them few opportunities to apply those skills (Mastrofski and Ritti, 1995). Haarr’s (2001) research confirmed their warnings. She surveyed police recruits at four different time periods, and found that attitudes toward community policing improved after community policing-based academy training, but those attitudes dissipated after field training and the rookie year. Haarr concluded that because field training is the point at which the recruit enters the police culture, it represents a critical stage in the learning process. Van Maanen (1973) agrees stating, “Clearly, it is during the field training phase of the recruit’s career that he is most susceptible to attitude change.” Because most agencies still use the San Jose model, this paper seeks to determine how the FTO program in one department incorporates COPS in its evaluation process. Other researchers have written about the importance of updating performance measures to reflect the principles of community policing because they send a message about what is valued in an agency (Alpert et al., 2001; Goldstein, 1987; Palmiotto and Donahue, 1995). However, this idea has not yet been applied to the FTO process. In order to accomplish this, I analyze formal evaluations in one field training program in Florida that uses the San Jose model and has adopted community policing department-wide. The San Jose model was designed to be adaptable for use in particular agencies; therefore, an agency that practices community policing should be able to integrate it into its field training program (Haberfield, 2002). The field trainers are charged with teaching the values of the agency, therefore, they should train the recruits in community policing. Thus, the question remains: can community policing be successfully integrated into the San Jose FTO model as a formal component of field training and evaluation of police recruits? Lessons for incorporating cops into the San Jose FTO model Although the San Jose FTO model was developed during the traditional policing era, it was designed so that it can be modified to suit the needs of particular agencies. It follows that an agency that endorses community policing should be able to incorporate it into their field training program. However, based on the formal evaluation and daily narratives in the present analysis, it appears that the model has become so standardized that it continues to reinforce traditional policing practices. There are places on the evaluation form that provide entre´e for community policing and that is what this study focuses on. For example, self-initiated activity is an evaluation tenet that could be interpreted as proactive problem solving; human skills and communications skills are necessary components of community policing, and they could be expanded to include measures of diversity. In other words, the form used for

evaluation could, in theory, be updated to reflect newer approaches to policing (Alpert et al., 2001). However, the present analysis indicates that the barrier in this agency is that the terms were too vague and left to the interpretation of individual FTO’s who chose to operationalize them in terms of traditional policing rather than community policing. The COPS Office (2001) notes that there have been multiple attempts to update the San Jose model to reflect community policing, but they have been unsuccessful. This may be because most FTO’s, who were likely trained and socialized into traditional policing, feel more comfortable training new officers in traditional policing techniques than community policing. This would indicate that it is not the model itself that is causing the problem, rather it is a subcultural preference toward traditional policing. Many scholars have written about resistance to community policing. Reasons for resistance that have been cited include: lack of training (Sadd and Grinc, 1994; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994), lack of managerial support (Rosenbaum et al., 1994; Sherman, 1973), lack of resources (Goldstein, 1990; Sadd and Grinc, 1994), structural barriers (Maguire, 1997), lack of time to do both traditional (answering calls for service) and COPS duties, and subcultural resistance to community policing (Paoline et al., 2000), among others. The subculture is notorious for valuing crime fighting and law enforcement over problem solving and working with the community (Paoline et al., 2000). Indeed, observers of community policing regularly recognize the police subculture as the single biggest impediment to the successful implementation of policing reforms in general, and COPS in particular (Herbert, 1998; Sadd and Grinc, 1994; Sparrow et al., 1990). It is also plausible that field training officers feel it is more important to spend their time teaching trainees the “basics” of policing (e.g. mechanics of arrest, geography, radio communications, and other skills associated with traditional policing) before delving in the realm of community policing. In other words, they have limited time to spend with trainees and likely think that it is more important for trainees to practice law enforcement related tasks rather than tasks associated with the “softer” side of policing, such as problem solving and crime prevention. Other scholars have discussed the inherent conflict between the police (as authority figures) and the community (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce, 2004; Lyons, 2002). Community policing assumes a “partnership” between police and the community, but it can be argued that differences in power between police and civilians (as well as differences in power between different types of communities) make the success of community policing unlikely. The argument posits that policing is “inherently political because social control is a task of governance” rather than cooperation (Lyons, 2002). Weisburd, Mastrofski and colleagues (Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2004) studied the implementation of COMPSTAT in a sample of American police departments. COMPSTAT and COPS are different policing philosophies, but they have similar characteristics, such as problem solving. They found that the best implemented elements of COMPSTAT tended to be those that were consistent with the traditional, paramilitary structure (e.g. chain of command, centralization of authority), and those aspects of COMPSTAT that did not complement the traditional bureaucratic structure had less success. They frame their findings in terms of the “structural inertia” characteristic of bureaucracies. The failures of the traditional bureaucratic model of policing have been noted by many police scholars (Goldstein, 1979) and one of the goals of COPS is to flatten that structure.

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However, attempts to change bureaucracies are often unsuccessful, thus their structure remains inflexible, impersonal, and unresponsive (Mastrofski, 1998). Obviously, this is a challenge for COPS in that it advocates a more “personal” element to policing. Indeed, the formalization of the FTO process fits in with and reproduces the hierarchical bureaucratic style. The adherence to rules in field training (e.g. following a curriculum, documenting trainees’ behavior) may interfere with the actual learning process, and certainly interferes with independent critical thinking (e.g. problem solving). The lessons learned by Weisburd, Mastrofski, and colleagues will, therefore, provide a useful point of discussion throughout the analysis. Field training in community policing Field training is the initial job assignment in which community policing ideals can be reinforced, as it presents the first opportunity to link community policing training with practice (Haarr, 2001). The San Jose FTO model was not designed to teach community policing, or COPS. However, it is still being widely used by agencies that endorse the COPS philosophy. McEwen (1997) found that among 532 law enforcement agencies that use field training, only 23 percent require FTO’s to have some knowledge of community policing and only 25 percent of them provide FTO’s with specialized community policing training. Therefore, most academy graduates are going into field training programs with FTO’s who have not even been trained in community policing themselves. Though little research has been conducted on field training in community policing, tenets of community policing that should be integrated into field training include: cultural diversity, problem solving, mediation and conflict resolution, police-community relations, critical thinking skills, collaborating with other agencies, facilitating meetings, and identifying resources to assist communities (Palmiotto, 2003). In COPS, officers must be able to communicate with business leaders, the mayor, and other city officials when working on behalf of the communities they serve. Jerry Hoover, former Chief of Police in Reno, Nevada, provides more in-depth recommendations for integrating COPS into field training (Kaminsky, 2002). He argues that standard evaluation forms should be written to address the changing job tasks associated with COPS and problem solving. Specifically, he says that trainees should be evaluated on four main criteria. The first is “demographic orientation,” which evaluates the trainee’s ability to determine the cultural makeup, size, population density, and neighborhood boundaries of the assigned area of responsibility. Trainees should have a good understanding of the cultural make up of their beat, as well as the areas surrounding their beat, so that their policing style can accommodate such nuances. The second area that trainees’ should be evaluated on is “problem-solving techniques,” which refers to the trainee’s ability to recognize problems and generate possible solutions. A trainee who earns a superior rating in this category should be able to use the (scan-analyze-respond-assess) SARA model and identify root causes of problems, rather than only symptoms (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Third, trainees should be evaluated on “communicating and interacting with people,” which refers to the trainee’s ability to communicate and interact with diverse members of the community. A superior rating would indicate that the trainee manages time in such a way that allows increased citizen contacts and the ability to provide information to citizens, while viewing the citizen as an equal. Finally, Hoover recommends that trainees be evaluated on “community organizing.” This tenet evaluates the manner in which a

trainee assists members of the community in handling neighborhood issues. The successful trainee actively seeks out public involvement in neighborhood watch programs and attends neighborhood activities. S/he should also encourage citizens to participate in decisions affecting their community and assist with locating resources for the community to use (Kaminsky, 2002). Field training in community policing should be based on an interactive, adult learning model. Traditional police training is militaristic and utilizes a pedagogical method (mainly lecture style), but the militaristic structure is rigid and not conducive to learning COPS (Birzer and Tannehill, 2001). Newer educational research recognizes that adults learn in different ways. For example, they learn best by building on their existing knowledge, and learning by “doing” in an informal and comfortable environment (Kaminsky, 2002). Dantzker et al. (1995, p. 50) argued: If the intent of community policing training is to produce fundamental changes in policing, then training materials and approaches must explicitly reflect and support those changes. Learning to think critically, to solve problems, or to share responsibilities with citizens is not fostered by authoritarian or non-interactive training techniques.

Further, community policing should be local (i.e. neighborhood level). A primary tool in problem solving policing is code enforcement and nuisance abatement; therefore, police officers should be knowledgeable about local ordinances regarding applicable codes in the neighborhoods in which they work (Langworthy and Travis, 2003). Public relations is also important to community policing in order to maintain relationships with other agencies, organizations and the general public (Langworthy and Travis, 2003). As stated above, many agencies have attempted to update the San Jose Model to incorporate community policing techniques, but these attempts have not been met with success. Because of this, police executive research forum, the COPS Office, and the Reno, Nevada police department teamed to develop a new field training model to better incorporate community policing and problem solving. The new training program is called the Police Training Officer (PTO) Program (also known as The Reno Model) and it incorporates methods of adult education, problem solving, community relations and shared responsibility (COPS Office, 2001). The small amount of research that exists on field training points to its importance in the shaping of recruits’ attitudes. In a time when the majority of police agencies have adopted community policing, training must be provided to prepare recruits for good practice. If agencies can establish training programs that send consistent positive messages toward community policing, community policing may finally reach fruition. Alternatively, the absence of such training increases the likelihood that community policing strategies will be destined for failure. Current study The agency in which I have conducted my research endorses and practices community policing; the academy that prepares the officers has recently (2002) revamped its curriculum to reflect a problem-solving, community policing approach. The purpose of this paper is to discern whether community policing is being integrated into the field training program which is based on the San Jose model. Considering that research suggests that field training is a critical stage in learning to become a police officer, this is an important question. I aim to see if community policing and problem solving are a

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part of the formal evaluation in field training in one police agency. I then go a step further to analyze how the concepts are operationalized in practice. Data and methods The agency is a medium-sized municipal police department serving a city of approximately 100,000 people. It is made up of approximately 275 sworn officers and 90 non-sworn personnel. It has an aviation unit, a K-9 unit, a forensics unit, a Special Weapons and Tactics Team, a mounted patrol, and a motorcycle unit. The agency practices a form of community-oriented policing (COPS) that places officers in geographical patrol areas for a year or longer so that they are able to build relationships with community residents. The agency has been practicing some form of COPS since 1985[1]. They have also adopted COMPSTAT in the past few years. The agency uses a standard version of the San Jose FTO model. The program lasts approximately 14 weeks and occurs in three-four week periods of training followed by a two-week evaluation period (Haberfield, 2002). In the evaluation period, the FTO may dress in plain clothes and act solely as an observer (McCampbell, 1986). Training occurs on each of the three workday shifts (day, evening, night) and is concentrated in two districts. Recruits are assigned to different FTO’s for each period in order to gain exposure to different policing styles and to ensure that one’s evaluations are objective (Cox, 1996). Each FTO provides training consistent with a specific curriculum developed for the program and evaluates the respective trainees’ abilities, skills, and knowledge. Trainees are evaluated each day in narrative format, and at the end of each stage on a series of quantitative proficiency scales (i.e. stage evaluation forms – see Appendix). Each FTO recommends whether the trainee should progress to the next stage or be referred to remedial training. The scales range from 1 to 5; anything three or above is considered “proficient.” There is also the option to check “not observed.” The stage evaluation forms and narratives provide the data for this study. On the evaluation form, tasks are grouped generally by subject area: human skills, appearance, knowledge, and performance. The current study focuses on aspects of the form that have the potential to be operationalized in terms of community policing; this research will determine whether and to what extent they actually are. Data include detailed field training files and stage evaluation forms for 65 recruits who graduated from the community policing academy training and gained employment with the agency that ostensibly endorses community policing. Herein, I analyze the forms and suggest how the form could better reflect community policing and problem solving. Results COPS and the San Jose model: one agency’s experience In reviewing the formal evaluations and narratives, I learned that the following issues were most often discussed in the FTO files: Radio and dispatch, accepting criticism, report writing, attitude, driving and parking, geography, officer safety, policies and procedure, assertiveness, and investigation skills. Note that these skills are primarily associated with traditional policing. There was little discussion of community policing and problem solving in the narratives, and there was little variation in the formal quantitative evaluations (i.e. scales). The majority of trainees received ratings in the range of “2” and “3” in their first two stages of FTO, and by the end, they were

achieving ratings of “3” and “4”. Trainees had to have at least a rating of “3” on all tasks in order to successfully complete the FTO program. Out of 65 recruits, one quit after the first few days, two resigned toward the end of the FTO program, two were terminated (fired), one was demoted to a police service technician position (non-sworn), four completed an accelerated program (these trainees only completed three of the four stages due to prior law enforcement experience), and ten spent time in remedial training. Next, I discuss the areas of the evaluation form that provide entre´e for community policing. Human skills. The first group of scales is called human skills and includes the following areas that provide entre´e for community policing: . interpersonal; . decision making; . oral communications; and . decisiveness. Interpersonal skills and oral communications are necessary components of community policing. A police officer who practices community policing must have the ability to develop rapport with citizens, so that trust can be built between community residents and the police. For example, one FTO wrote, “PT[2] is polite when speaking with citizens and suspects and is able to gather the necessary information to complete the investigation.” Another FTO explains: PT has excellent interpersonal skills. He seems at ease talking to people of all walks of life. Another officer had arrested a boy for battering his mother. PT obtained the boy’s information for the arrest mittimus, but then he continued to talk to the boy to let him know that even though we were arresting him, we were concerned that he understand why we took the actions we did.

When there is trust between citizens and officers, officers are more likely to be in a position to gather information to solve crimes and help members of the neighborhood with their problems. The ability to communicate well with diverse groups is a necessary component of interpersonal skills. Most trainees were commended on their interpersonal skills: “PT is very personable and has no difficulty speaking with subjects from all walks of life. PT communicates well with citizens as well as fellow officers.” However, not all trainees had good interpersonal skills: PT does have a tendency to speak with frankness that may seem rough or even rude to some citizens. We discussed being able to adjust demeanor from situation to situation. We also discussed the differences between night and day shifts and one side of town from the others.

Well-developed interpersonal skills are valued by the agency, and FTO’s are expected to teach trainees how to deal with people in a polite manner. In this regard, FTO’s are teaching trainees skills that complement COPS. Now, we turn to decision-making and decisiveness, which are separate on the form, but seem to be intertwined in practice. Good decision making and decisiveness are necessary components of all policing, including COPS, but the vagueness of the terms on the evaluation form is problematic. For instance, FTO’s likely define “good decision making” differently (e.g. decisions

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regarding parking tactically vs problem solving). Further, investigation into the FTO narratives revealed that decision making is operationalized in terms of knowing how to proceed with an investigation. Narratives indicate that few FTO’s define decision making in terms of solving problems (e.g. making the “decision” to help a person or neighborhood in need). For example: PT has trouble making decisions on what actions to take. In non-stress situations (scenarios in the vehicle), PT can answer my scenario questions. When dealing with calls or self-initiated activity, PT hesitates to make a decision or give verbal directions to suspects. Once prompted by me, PT deals with the situation.

Another FTO commends his trainee’s decision making: PT made the decision, without prompting or consulting, to arrest the suspect based on the victim’s statement and the physical evidence. He conducted a thorough investigation, determined PC for arrest, and then made the arrest without any assistance.

This FTO refers to the effect of decisiveness on investigations and interviewing: PT knows the elements of crimes but at times seems a little apprehensive at what decision to make. With this little bit of indecisiveness comes the need of a little more experience to investigate a crime and interview victims.

Many trainees were indecisive due to “second guessing” themselves and feeling like they needed approval from the FTO to proceed: The PT shows some indecisiveness. However, this is mostly related to a lack of understanding of the FTO process (she is questioning if she is doing what I want her to do), and not so much in handling calls. She is still somewhat unsure on all of the decisions to be made in handling calls, but as she has new experiences, and has a better understanding of what to do, she will put it into practice.

Although some trainees have problems with decision making, most FTO’s were optimistic about the potential for improvement: PT is sometimes indecisive. PT usually knows what he should do or the answer to the question he is asking, but second guesses himself. We have discussed this. I believe that this will improve as PT continues the training process.

Again, decision making and decisiveness could provide the opportunity to evaluate trainees on their problem solving activity, but in this agency, it was operationalized in terms of completing investigations. Further, in COPS, decision making is decentralized; supervisory staff are supposed to seek input from line officers (who are most exposed to community issues) in the decision making process. However, this is a tenet of COPS that has not been met with success, according to police researchers (Maguire, 1997; Mastrofski, 1998), and based on the present analysis, this agency is no exception. Bureaucracies are characterized by rational-legal authority, and those vested with such authority are expected to act decisively (Weber, 1946). It is obvious from the narratives that trainees are expected to make quick rational decisions and display their authority. Although decision making, in theory, could reflect community policing activities, it is consistent with traditional policing in this agency. Oral communications, like interpersonal skills, are necessary for good policing, especially community policing, which calls for a closer relationships between the police

and the public. Though the term seems straightforward, a more in-depth analysis of FTO narratives revealed that “assertiveness” was an important part of communication. For example, many of the trainees in the sample showed hesitance when getting out of the car at crime scenes and traffic stops. When this occurred, the FTO would make a note, such as, “PT should be more aggressive and forceful.” Trainees must have a strong “officer presence” and cannot “become intimated.” FTO’s often note that trainees need to “step it up,” take control of a scene, and not show cowardice. Police trainees need to be reminded that “we are the police,” and, therefore, have the authority to take control of situations. They must have an assertive stance and give strong verbal commands. If they fail to, it is noted in the evaluation. For example, “PT is slow to take control and appears to be unsure of herself.” Another FTO criticizes his trainee’s performance: PT is slow to engage with people who may cause a threat or be confrontational. PT does not take charge of the situations and use his authority to control some of his contacts. I don’t know if this is a stalling tactic because PT is afraid or uncomfortable with the new situation and isn’t sure how to address it.

One trainee had the following experience: The trainee failed to enter a residence for the second time, so the FTO was forced to take the lead. The FTO wrote: This is the second time PT was reluctant to enter this residence. I asked PT why he failed to enter and he replied, “I guess I’m just a little leery!” I inquired as to whether these were acts of cowardice. He assured me that he wasn’t afraid.

Obviously, cowardice is not tolerated and officers are expected to be assertive. This is not to say that they should not be polite to citizens, but assertiveness (or lack thereof) is regularly noted in narratives. Even giving the impression of being shy is considered bad: PT and I are going to be working the downtown bar areas this Friday and Saturday to expose PT to as much “in your face” contact as possible. PT’s weakest area remains the “timid perception.” PT appears to be willing and ready to engage, but gives off the impression she is shy or timid.

Another trainee has been instructed to be more aggressive: The PT needs to be more assertive when on scene. The PT also needs to be quicker to take charge of the scene . . . PT has been instructed to be more aggressive and take control of these situations.

Though assertiveness is important in some “law enforcement” situations, it may lead to a negative reaction from the community with which one is trying to build a relationship in service or order maintenance situations. Law-abiding citizens whose help is needed to solve problems should be dealt with on an equal (or deferent) level rather than on an authoritative level. New officers must be taught how to establish effective communication with community members who like the police and who could help strengthen community ties (Glenn et al., 2003). Further, trainees must recognize that most residents are law-abiding. FTO’s who are committed to the practice of community policing can model this behavior so that the trainees can emulate it and learn how to communicate effectively with citizens.

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Relatedly, a common occurrence in local policing is to pull over vehicles and bicyclists for faulty equipment (e.g. broken taillights). The main purpose of these stops is to ask the “suspect” for a consent search. The suspect has the right to say no, but this is not made clear. It is accepted and reinforced in training to use an assertive tone when asking a citizen for a search. Though it is only a request, it may send the message to the suspect that the search is involuntary. It also sends the message that if the suspect complies, he or she may be less likely to “get in trouble.” Thus, assertiveness is instrumental in the sense that it may lead to an arrest and is, therefore, rewarded as good police work. Again, assertiveness is an example of exercising rational-legal authority in traditional bureaucracies. There is a hierarchy in the agency that centralizes decision-making and authority, and officers reproduce that hierarchy on the street by displaying their authority to citizens. As long as police agencies remain bureaucratic organizations, it will be a challenge for officers to engage in the personal, human, and responsive aspects of community policing (Mastrofski, 1998). The overarching theme, human skills, would be the ideal area to include an evaluation of how the trainee interacts with a diverse population. This component is completely absent from the form, which illustrates the fact that it is outdated. All current training curricula and research point to an increased emphasis on cultural diversity and sensitivity training in our increasingly racially, ethnically and otherwise diverse society (COPS Office, 2001). Therefore, this component must be an explicit part of the training and evaluation of police trainees. Appearance. The second grouping of scales falls under appearance and includes the following that may be related to COPS: . acceptance of criticism; and . attitude toward job. PT has a positive attitude toward the job, a professional appearance, and has shown up to briefing every night on time. She seems to accept criticism well and does not take it personally.

The importance of “acceptance of criticism” emerged as a significant theme in FTO narratives. One trainee was in the final stage of FTO when the following situation occurred: While patrolling on foot in the downtown area, the FTO noticed three individuals urinating as they stood in the alley between two bars. The trainee initially did not respond, until the FTO told him to do so. The trainee proceeded to speak to them about their violation while the FTO continued to advise him to handcuff and search them. The trainee refused, and the FTO took him aside and admonished him for failing to search and arrest the suspects. According to the trainee, he did not actually see the violation so he was hesitant to proceed. The FTO wrote a letter to the FTO Lieutenant explaining the violation and accusing the trainee of being “insubordinate” for not following the directions. The trainee eventually graduated from the FTO program, but was terminated within a year. The ability to accept criticism was noted regularly, sometimes every day. Most comments are positive and include examples of the trainee listening to criticism, thanking the FTO, and not asking any questions. For example, “Trainee X responds well to constructive criticism and is eager to correct any deficiencies.”

With the community policing emphasis on autonomy and self-directed problem solving, the emphasis on acceptance of criticism seems at odds with such an approach. Trainees that failed to accept criticism well (e.g. became upset, contested the criticism) were met with contempt, anger, and threatened with the loss of their jobs. One FTO writes:

Community policing

PT did not respond to constructive criticism. PT did not feel that there was a valid complaint of her having a problem with her report writing. PT stated that she did not feel she had any problems with her report writing.

509

How can we expect rookie officers to be self-directed when they are fearful to discuss their performance evaluations with their supervisors? After all, they should be learning to communicate with people from all rungs of society. Can police organizations expect their officers to go to city hall and advocate for community members when their training teaches them to be afraid of their superiors – to accept criticism without comment? Field training is the perfect opportunity to practice communication skills with superiors. However, field training in this agency was vertical and reflected the quasi-military structure typical of traditional policing. The militaristic style may be appropriate when learning technical and procedural skills, but less so when in the “acquisition of essential non-technical competencies such as problem solving, judgment, and leadership” (Birzer, 2003, pp. 31). Weisburd, Mastrofski, and colleagues (Willis et al., 2004) discussed similar issues in their study of COMPSTAT. That is, officers were often afraid to speak in COMPSTAT meetings for fear of being humiliated. The humiliation reinforces top-down control and chain of command. Similarly, they found that the extensive rules and regulations were much more often used to punish officers rather than to reward them. The acceptance of criticism, then, fits in with and reproduces the traditional hierarchical authority structure. Attitude toward job is important and has been shown to improve with community policing (Greene, 1989; Yates and Pillai, 1996). A positive attitude is often noted in the narratives by the FTO. Certainly, officers who show a positive attitude toward their job will be friendlier to the public and better at policing in general, including community policing. It makes sense that officers will appear more approachable when they have a better attitude. FTO’s regularly comment on attitude: “Trainee X exhibits a positive attitude towards police work and has been eager to ‘hit the street’ each day.” Interestingly, the issue of accepting criticism may be related to attitude toward job. It is likely that trainees who contest their evaluations (i.e. fail to readily accept criticism) may be seen as having a poor attitude toward their job. In other words, they may be seen as unable/unwilling to defer to authority. However, one can argue that a trainee who questions a poor evaluation is only attempting to better understand their feedback. Performance. Performance includes many sub-areas. Two of them are related to COPS: . geography; and . self-initiated activity. Geography is operationalized in terms of how well a trainee is able to find locations, whether she or he uses a map, and how often she or he gets lost. Knowledge of city

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geography was discussed regularly and presented a problem for many trainees. Trainees were commended on knowing city geography and not needing to use a map. “Trainee X has a good grasp of [City] geography; trainee seldom used a map and located most calls without assistance.” On other hand, many trainees had difficulties finding locations and FTO’s documented this in detail: PT had a really hard time finding the residence and drove in a round about way to the house. PT drove west on NW 23rd Ave from NW 13th street to NW 21st Street and headed north to NW 34th Ave. to NW 19th street to NW 39th avenue. PT then went west on NW 39th avenue to NW 28th street and turned south into the housing area. PT drove around and could not locate the address, at which time he got the map and located the address on the map. PT then drove west on NW 39th avenue to NW 34th street and then onto NW 31st avenue. PT traveled east on NW 31st avenue to NW 27th street and located the address.

In community policing, officers are responsible for small geographic areas so that they can get to know residents, their problems and concerns (Langworthy and Travis, 2003; Oliver, 1998). They are supposed to receive permanent assignments, rather than be rotated from beat to beat. Although officers in this agency are assigned to beats for a year or more (consistent with COPS), “geography” in the field training evaluation was not operationalized in community policing terms; it generally referred to the trainee’s knowledge of city geography, ability and willingness to use a map, and ease and speed of finding call locations. Difficulty finding locations was discussed regularly as many trainees would show up late to calls because of their inability to locate the address of the call. In this agency, geography was operationalized in terms of traditional policing. Self-initiated activity is the main criteria in the FTO evaluation that directly relates to problem solving. However, from reading the FTO narratives in detail, I learned that self-initiated activity refers to stopping persons and vehicles for speeding and faulty equipment, rather than getting involved in the community and solving problems. One FTO comments, “You have to stop bicyclists in order to make those good busts.” Another FTO commends his trainee’s behavior with this comment: “PT was proactive and wrote a parking ticket and a traffic citation. PT handled 100 percent of call.” Aggressive proactivity seems to be this agency’s translation of self-initiated activity. The officers have redefined problem solving into a simplistic proactivity which includes little more than stopping bicyclists and other vehicles to look for more serious violations (e.g. drugs). Obviously, this type of proactive behavior is a long way from COPS or problem solving. For example: PT went to [a park] and walked around on foot. PT contacted four subjects and completed [Field Interview] cards on them. PT gained consent to search all the subjects but was unable to locate any contraband.

Obviously, self-initiated activity refers to looking for drugs: PT observed a [black male] riding a bike without a light. PT conducted a traffic stop on the bike and realized that the rider had an open container of alcohol in his possession. PT arrested the rider for the open container and a search incident to arrest revealed a suspected “crack” pipe. PT transported the defendant to [jail], due to not having any identification. PT completed a uniform traffic citation, the mittimus, a property card and the report without any problems. PT did a good job self-initiating this call (Emphasis added).

Self-initiated activity also refers to traffic enforcement: The PT’s self initiated activity falls a little short. The PT isn’t overly active in self initiated traffic stops during spare time. PT has shown little in self initiated activity, but is trying. He actively patrols our zone but not checking out with anyone. Our call load has been extremely slow giving PT plenty of proactive time. He needs to focus on traffic violations and suspicious people.

On its face, self-initiated activity appears to be the ideal opportunity to evaluate the trainee on proactive problem solving activities. Trainees should get the opportunity to participate in activities that are typically a part of a community police officer’s day. Examples include analyzing and solving a neighborhood’s problems, meeting with community groups, attending civic league meetings, working on crime prevention, and meeting with business owners (Glenn et al., 2003). Instead, self-initiated activity in practice referred to traditional law enforcement activities. Willis et al. (2004) found that problem solving (a component of both COP and COMPSTAT) had not evolved very much. District commanders were not likely to deviate from the norm and be creative because they could expect humiliation from the chief if their strategy was not successful. Though agencies are collecting and analyzing more data than they used to, they are failing to use it to find creative solutions to problems. Instead, Willis et al. (2004) found that most agencies still rely on traditional tactics like saturation patrols and increased arrests to deal with crime problems. Being innovative, or applying new tactics to old problems, is risky. Officers (and trainees) must feel that they can risk failure because new approaches may not be met with success the first time they are used. Indeed, the SARA model builds in the opportunity for failure (i.e. assessment allows the officer(s) to review their response, and respond in an alternative manner in the event that the first approach did not work). Stopping cars and looking for drugs is less risky than proactive problem solving because it is a traditional practice that is accepted among the command staff. Similarly, in COMPSTAT, Willis et al. (2004) found that district commanders felt pressure to implement solutions to problems prior to the COMPSTAT meeting so to avoid criticism for lack of response. In reality, problem solving requires time and deliberation and the department as a whole would benefit from the opportunity to brainstorm about problems during the COMPSTAT meeting (Willis et al., 2004). Although self-initiated activity had promise to be operationalized in terms of problem solving, in reality, it referred to traditionally policing tactics. Therefore, the evaluation form must be changed in line with Hoover’s recommendations above. There must be new categories added to the evaluation form that refer to community policing activities. Most of the evaluation covers traditional law enforcement, rather than service, order maintenance, or problem solving. On the rare occasion that community policing was mentioned, it was brief. For example, “We discussed community-oriented policing and crime watch groups. I explained the functions of the community resource officer and of crime watch groups.” I documented three similar occurrences when an FTO mentioned community policing by name. This represents a major failure in incorporating community policing in field training.

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Conclusion The purpose of this research was to determine the extent to which one agency using the San Jose FTO model integrated community policing as a formal part of the evaluation process. The agency endorses community policing and the recruits have been trained in community policing in the regional academy. Findings suggest that, overall, the agency failed to incorporate COPS in the field training process. Although some of the evaluation tenets provided the opportunity to teach COPS and problem solving, related narratives suggested that operationalizing the concepts in terms of COPS was rare. There were a few exceptions. One FTO routinely spoke to his trainees about the importance of community policing. Other FTO’s taught their trainees how to search buildings and discussed with them the importance of checking businesses at night. Many of the FTO’s commented in the narrative section of the evaluation that the trainees were especially good communicators and/or had a talent with dealing with a “diverse population” (recall this was not part of the form). So, even though the form itself is vague, FTO’s noted important details with regard to community policing in the narrative section of the form at times. Most of these comments focused on community relations, interpersonal skills, and diversity. The field training process is regarded as critical in the shaping of new police officers’ attitudes. It is the time when new officers are most open to learning new philosophies that will influence their police work throughout their careers. Myers notes the importance of the field training process: . . . perhaps the most profound learning experience for police officers is their Field Training Officer (FTO) mentoring. It is a unique time when their life skills and acquired academy training are translated into the organizational culture of their employing agency. FTO’s teach officers “how we do things around here” (Myers, 2004, pp. 172).

Even though the San Jose model does not explicitly endorse community policing, field training in an agency is supposed to reflect the values of the respective agency. However, past attempts to integrate community policing into the San Jose Model have not been met with success. Though my data do not directly speak to this issue, the failure of the San Jose model to incorporate COPS in this agency indirectly illustrates some of the barriers associated with the San Jose model and with COPS resistance in general. For example, the organizations literature and the research on COMPSTAT by Weisburd and colleagues provide food for thought. Is it possible for a large bureaucratic organization to accommodate the flexibility required of COPS? In studies of community policing implementation, scholars have regularly found that police agencies have failed to decentralize, despecialize, and deformalize, even if they are implementing aspects of community policing (e.g. foot patrol). The overemphasis on rules, regulations and formality in field training in this agency impeded the use of independent and creative problem solving and responsiveness to communities. It appears that, like COMPSTAT, the San Jose Model reinforces the traditional bureaucratic structure. Indeed, the findings from my study illustrate the “structural inertia” plaguing departments attempting to fully implement community policing. On the other hand, if an agency is truly committed to integrating COPS and problem solving into field training, it is likely possible. FTO’s would need training in COPS and problem solving as well as incentives to instill those principles in new officers. They

should be rewarded for a job well done. FTO’s should be chosen from officers who have shown that they are committed to community policing and they should be compensated and rewarded for their efforts. And of course, the evaluation form must be expanded and updated to reflect the new policing philosophies and practices. Officers will not see COPS as important unless it is tied to the evaluation process (Alpert et al., 2001). Future research should study the implementation of community policing and problem solving in other agencies that continue to use the San Jose FTO model as well as those using the PTO model. Such a comparison and analysis may allow practitioners to delineate methods to overcome challenges to the implementation of community policing. Notes 1. In 1985, community policing began as a separate unit of the police agency. In the 1990s, the agency moved toward a department-wide community policing philosophy. Current practices include permanent assignments, community involvement (neighborhood crime watch groups, citizen’s academy, etc.), problem solving, police substations in high-crime neighborhoods, working with social service agencies and schools, and geographic accountability. 2. FTO’s refer to trainees as “PT” in the narratives, or police trainee. References Alpert, G.P. and Dunham, R.G. (1997), Policing Urban America, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, IL. Alpert, G.P., Flynn, D. and Piquero, A.R. (2001), “Effective community policing performance measures”, Justice Research and Policy, Vol. 3, pp. 79-94. Birzer, M.L. (2003), “The theory of andragogy applied to police training”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 29-42. Birzer, M.L. and Tannehill, R. (2001), “A more effective training approach for contemporary policing”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 233-52. Bureau of Justice Statistics (2004), Local Police Departments, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC. Chappell, A.T. (2005), “Learning in action: training the community policing officer”, Dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. Chappell, A.T. and Lanza-Kaduce, L. (2004), “Integrating sociological research with community-oriented policing: bridging the gap between academics and practice”, Journal of Applied Sociology/Sociological Practice, Vol. 21 No. 6, pp. 80-98. Chappell, A.T., Lanza-Kaduce, L. and Johnston, D. (2005), “Police training: changes and challenges”, in Dunham, R.G. and Alpert, G.P. (Eds), Critical Issues in Policing, 5th ed., Waveland, Prospect Heights, IL, pp. 71-88. Community Policing Consortium (2006), “About community policing”, available at: www. communitypolicing.org/about2.html (accessed April 2). COPS Office (2001), PTO: An Overview and Introduction. A Problem-based Learning Manual for Training and Evaluating Police Trainees, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Cox, S.M. (1996), Police: Practices, Perspectives, Problems, Allyn & Bacon, Needham Heights, MA.

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Dantzker, G., Lurigio, A., Hartnett, S., Houmes, S., Davidsdottir, S. and Donovan, K. (1995), “Preparing police officers for community policing: an evaluation of training for Chicago’s alternative policing strategy”, Police Studies, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 745-70. Eck, J.E. and Spelman, W. (1987), “Who ya gonna call? The police as problem busters”, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 33, pp. 53-70. Glenn, R.W., Panitch, B.R., Barnes-Proby, D., Williams, E., Christian, J., Lewis, M.W., Gerwehr, S. and Brannan, D.W. (2003), Training the 21st Century Police Officer: Redefining Police Professionalism for the Los Angeles Police Department, RAND, Santa Monica, CA. Goldstein, H. (1979), “Improving policing: a problem-oriented approach”, Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 25, pp. 236-58. Goldstein, H. (1987), “Toward community-oriented policing: potential, basic requirements, and threshold questions”, Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 6-30. Goldstein, H. (1990), Problem-oriented Policing, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. Greene, J. (1989), “Police officer job satisfaction and community perceptions: implications for community-oriented policing”, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 168-83. Haarr, R.N. (2001), “The making of a community policing officer: the impact of basic training and occupational socialization on police recruits”, Police Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 402-33. Haberfield, M.R. (2002), Critical Issues in Police Training, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Herbert, S. (1998), “Police subculture reconsidered”, Criminology, Vol. 36, pp. 343-69. Kaminsky, G. (2002), The Field Training Concept in Criminal Justice Agencies, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Kelling, G. and Moore, M. (1988), “From political to reform to community: the evolving strategy of policing”, in Greene, J. and Mastrofski, S. (Eds), Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality, Praeger, New York, NY. King, W.R. and Lab, S.P. (2000), “Crime prevention, community policing, and training: old wine in new bottles”, Police Practice and Research, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 241-52. Lab, S. (2000), Crime Prevention: Approaches, Practices, and Evaluations, 4th ed., Anderson, Cincinnati, OH. Langworthy, R. and Travis, L. (2003), Policing in America. A Balance of Forces, 3rd ed., Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Lyons, W.T. (2002), The Politics of Community Policing, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI. McCampbell, M. (1986), “Field training for police officers: state of the art”, National Institute of Justice, Washington DC. McEwen, T. (1997), “Community policing training survey: draft report”, unpublished manuscript, Institute of Law and Justice, Alexandria, VA. McLaughlin, V. and Donahue, M.E. (1995), “Training for community-oriented policing”, in Kratcocski, P.C. and Dukes, D. (Eds), Issues in Community Policing, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH. Maguire, E. (1997), “Structural change in large municipal police organizations during the community policing era”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 14, pp. 547-76. Mastrofski, S.D. (1998), “Community policing and police organization structure”, in Brodeur, J. (Ed.), How to Recognize Good Policing: Problems and Issues, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Mastrofski, S.D. and Ritti, R.R. (1995), “Police training and the effects of organizations on drunk driving enforcement”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 13 No. 2.

Myers, R. (2004), “What future(s) do we want for community policing?”, in Fridell, L. and Wycoff, M.A. (Eds), Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC, pp. 169-82. Oliver, W.M. (1998), Community-oriented Policing: A Systemic Approach to Policing, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Palmiotto, M. (2003), Policing and Training Issues, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Palmiotto, M. and Donahue, M. (1995), “Evaluating community policing: problems and prospects”, Police Studies, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 33-53. Paoline, E. III, Myers, S.M. and Worden, R.E. (2000), “Police culture, individualism, and community policing: evidence from two police departments”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 575-605. Rosenbaum, D.P., Yeh, S. and Wilkinson, D.L. (1994), “Impact of community policing on police personnel: a quasi experimental test”, Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 331-53. Sadd, S. and Grinc, R.M. (1994), Innovative Neighborhood-oriented Policing: Descriptions of Programs in Eight Cities, Vera Institute of Justice, New York, NY. Sadd, S. and Grinc, R. (1996), Implementation Challenges in Community Policing, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. Scott, M.S. (2000), Problem-oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Sherman, L. (1973), Team Policing: Seven Case Studies, Police Foundation, Washington, DC. Sparrow, M.K., Moore, M.H. and Kennedy, D.M. (1990), Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing, Wiley, New York, NY. Trojanowicz, R. and Belknap, J. (1986), Community Policing: Training Issues. The National Center for Community Policing, The National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI. Trojanowicz, R.C. and Bucqueroux, B. (1990), Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH. Trojanowicz, R.C. and Bucqueroux, B. (1994), Community Policing: How to Get Started, Anderson, Cincinnati, OH. Van Maanen, J. (1973), “Observations on the making of policemen”, Human Organization, Vol. 32, pp. 407-18. Weber, M. (1946) in Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (Eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, trans. and eds. Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., McNally, A.M., Greenspan, R. and Willis, J. (2003), “Reforming to preserve: COMPSTAT and strategic problem solving in American policing”, Criminology and Public Policy, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 421-56. Willis, J., Mastrofski, S. and Weisburd, D. (2004), “COMPSTAT and bureaucracy: a case study of challenges and opportunities for change”, Justice Quarterly, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 463-96. Yates, D.L. and Pillai, V.K. (1996), “Attitudes toward community policing: a causal analysis”, Social Science Journal, Vol. 33, pp. 193-209.

Further reading Germann, A.C. (1969), “Community policing: an assessment”, Journal of Criminal Law and Police Science, Vol. 60, pp. 89-96.

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Lurigio, A.J. and Skogan, W.G. (1994), “Winning the hearts and minds of police officers: an assessment of staff perceptions of community policing in Chicago”, Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 40, pp. 315-30. Mayhall, P.D., Barker, T. and Hunter, R.D. (1995), Police Community Relations – and the Administration of Justice, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Skolnick, J. (1994), Justice without Trial, Wiley, New York, NY. Van Maanen, J. (1978), “The asshole”, in Kappeler, V. (Ed.), The Police and Society, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, IL. Weisburd, D., McElroy, J. and Hardyman, P. (1988), “Challenges to supervision in community policing: observations on a pilot project”, American Journal of Police, Vol. 7, pp. 29-50. Whitaker, G., Mastrofski, S., Ostrom, E., Parks, R. and Percy, S. (1982), Basic Issues in Police Performance, US Department of Justice, Washington DC.

Appendix. Stage evaluation form Date: Trainee’s Name/ID_____________

FTO Name/ID______________

Based on the performance observed during this stage, rate the level of proficiency that was consistently obtained. If a trainee was rated above or below an acceptable rating of “3” and/or the trainee was given remedial training, describe the reasons for the rating(s). Proficiency rating scale Not proficient Proficient 1 2 3 4 5 TASKS Human skills 1. Interpersonal 2. Decision making 3. Directing others 4. Oral communications 5. Decisiveness 6. Adaptability Appearance 7. General 8. Acceptance of criticism 9. Attitude towards job 10. Dependability Knowledge 11. Department policies and procedures 12. Criminal statutes and city ordinances 13. Juvenile procedures 14. Traffic laws

1

2

3 4 5

Not observed

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15. Accident investigations 16. Arrest/prisoner handling procedures Performance 17. Driving: non-stress 18. Driving: under stress 19. Geography 20. Paperwork: accuracy 21. Paperwork: organized 22. Field Performance: non-stressed 23. Field Performance: stressed 24. Investigative skills and interviewing 25. Self initiated activity 26. Officer safety: general 27. Officer safety: when in contact w/suspects 28. Conflict control: verbal 29. Conflict control: physical 30. Radio: proper codes 31. Radio: listens and comprehends 32. Radio: articulation of transmissions Narrative comments Most acceptable area(s) of performance: Least acceptable area(s) of performance: Has the trainee been counseled on his/her deficiencies? Have these deficiencies required remedial training? If yes, describe the training: Overall status of the trainee’s progress to date: Narrative continuation form attached: Other forms attached:

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Yes Yes Acceptable Yes Yes

No No Unacceptable No No

Additional comments: FTO’s signature _____________ Trainee’s signature_____________ FTO Lieutenant’s signature_____________ Training Unit/FTO Program Coordinator_____________

Corresponding author Allison T. Chappell can be contacted at: [email protected] To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints

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The changing “soul” of Dutch policing Responses to new security demands and the relationship with Dutch tradition Dilip Das

Received 20 September 2005 Revised 1 February 2007 Accepted 14 February 2007

The International Police Executive Symposium, Guilderland, New York, USA, and

Leo Huberts and Ronald van Steden Department of Public Administration and Organizational Science, Vrij Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to address the changing organization and culture of the Dutch police over the last decade. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on personal observation, desk research and a survey among the police and administrative elite in The Netherlands, the paper describes, analyzes and reflects upon developments which are out of tune with the Dutch tradition. Findings – From the 1960s onwards, The Netherlands was famous for her pragmatic, decentralized and friendly style of community policing. The slogan “the police are your best friend” summarizes the “essence” or the “soul” of Dutch policing. Increasingly, however, the typically tolerant, friendly and social policing style has come under pressure. The system of relatively independent regional police departments has been fiercely criticized because of the lack of effectiveness and efficiency in solving crime, safety and security challenges. National government now wants a much bigger say in setting its police programs and priorities. Moreover, as elite government officials stipulate, the police must be more “tough” on crime and terrorism. This attitude has led to centralization, penalization and, at the local level, responsibilization, which signifies that a variety of private, (often profit-seeking) policing agencies and companies are made responsible for public order maintenance. Such changes are leading toward a “state-centered” police model at some distance from citizens, a development that is seen as contrary to the social soul of Dutch policing. Originality/value – The paper offers an analysis into the changing “soul” of Dutch policings. Keywords Community policing, Law enforcement, The Netherlands Paper type Research paper

Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 30 No. 3, 2007 pp. 518-532 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639510710778877

Introduction This paper is an attempt to capture the “soul” of Dutch policing in relation to the pressures of the new demands on national security. The methodology used is quite unconventional and subjective. Our search for a “soul” of policing in The Netherlands has been inspired by the observation of Dilip Das, the American author of this paper. He conducted research on the Dutch police in early 1990s and, like some other scholars, he was struck by the friendly and decentralized character of the police. Drawing on Das’ insightful studies, Leo Huberts and Ron van Sedan, the two native Dutch authors, have supplemented his explorations with recent findings and together we present a

brief assessment of the policing situation at the edge of a new era. The results of a survey will be presented in order to clarify and understand the view of elite government officials – i.e. mayors (or burgomasters), chief constables of police and head public prosecutors – responsible for the current reorganization and reorientation of policing, public of private, in The Netherlands (Huberts et al., 2004) The nature and organization of policing in The Netherlands appears to be changing rapidly. Public confidence in the police is diminishing fuelling a mood of dissatisfaction and crisis. Under the center-right governments of the recent years, Dutch politicians have been urging for the centralization of the so-called ineffective and inefficient regional police system. Throughout the current reform process the government also acknowledges non-state agents and agencies, more in particular commercial ones, to be active players in maintaining livable and safe environments – an acknowledgement associated with Garland’s (2001) “responsibilization strategy.” The open domain of streets, roads and parks, is progressively controlled by private security guards, neighborhood watches and electronic surveillance cameras. Under these circumstances, as Pakes (2004) puts forward, Dutch criminal justice is pulled into a pretty sinister crime complex (Garland, 2001) of combined public and private order maintenance and punishment strategies. These trends are not particularly surprising, given that American and British criminal law policies have much earlier utilized punitive crime fighting tactics to manage today’s fears and discontents, but – and that is what interests us most – the Dutch policing and justice apparatus has traditionally been associated with pragmatism, tolerance and a sympathetic distaste for “anything which smacks of militarism” (Wintle, 1996, p. 194). British criminologist David Downes (1988) praised what he considered a humane post-war penal regime in The Netherlands. But, what he also pointed out, the spreading of crime and fear around the country could possibly cause a watershed in the characteristically Dutch-style handling of offenders. In this sense, Downes proved to be right. Approaches in crime control now succeed so quickly that The Netherlands seems to drift toward the opposite side of the previously progressive ideal. Opponents of what is happening to overall policing strategies or, as some prefer to say the “governance of security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003), despair that the essence or soul of Dutch policing is changing inevitably and irreversibly. In the pages that follow we first delve into the idea of Dutch police officers “taking a liberal approach, avoiding where possible the social exclusion and stigmatization of offenders and aiming rather at integration and normalization” (Wintle, 1996, pp. 181-2). First, it is explored how officers operate in their daily work. For gaining a better understanding of what they do, we refer to the different policing styles, with the dominant style aiming at pragmatic pacification and non-confrontation instead of repression and coercion: an illustration of the maxim, “the police are your best friend.” This philosophy of policing, albeit altering significantly, fits well with the Dutch culture of consensus, equality and relative harmony (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002) – not suggesting that the police are totally immune from misbehavior and corruption (Punch, 1985; Huberts and Naeye´ 2005). Second, our paper provides an overview of the organization and practices of the Dutch police over the last decade. The focus is particularly on the slow but sure centralization of its decentralized structure, which today includes 25 regional setups and two special police units active at the national level. Additionally, we dwell on the fact

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that the Dutch police organization is characterized by its dual system of authority and control. We explain that the mayor and the public prosecutor are the local officials who have the authority over the police and explain that, at the national level, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice hold special power and responsibilities. Third, our paper discusses recent developments in the character of Dutch policing. These boil down to a deepening split between “unorthodox” state-centered, punitive policy on one hand and multi-agency clusters of public and private crime control on the other. The criminal justice apparatus has gained prominence, while, simultaneously, the police are no longer seen as the “sole guardian” responsible for public order (Punch et al., 2002, p. 69). New discourses on security and policing have emerged. Governmental bodies, civil initiatives and predominantly commercial institutions merge into “police extended families” (Johnston, 2003, p. 185) safeguarding urban spaces. Fourth, we show that shifts toward “centralization,” “penalization” and “responsibilization” are recognized at the elite level of the Dutch police system. Their ideas, preferences and expectations are somewhat conflicting, but have generally revealed that the three tendencies mentioned above will have inevitable consequences for the social “soul” of Dutch policing. The Netherlands seems underway to a country that no longer deserves her reputation for tolerance. In fact, the criminal justice state expands at the expense of a, unlike in the years gone by, more socially and community-minded paradigm (Pakes, 2005). Finally, we attempt to explain why this could all happen so quickly and almost unobtrusively. Answers lie in, probably populist-driven, safety politics sailing “on the compass of fear” (Van Swaaningen, 2005, p. 294). Because of the dramatic rise of crime rates over previous decades, and because of the feelings of insecurity and uncertainty spreading through society, people feel serious discontent with the lack of presence and poor performance of police officers who are accused of spending much time on bureaucratic tasks (paper work) instead of on their key role of safety and security providers. Moreover, in a fundamental way, the traditional emphasis on prevention (and not on repression) is collectively questioned. A too soft representation puts the legitimacy of police officers under pressure. What this might mean for the future “soul” of Dutch policing will be discussed in the concluding paragraph. A progressive society The Netherlands is a small country (42,000 square kilometers) with approximately 16 million inhabitants, a vital economy and a stable democratic system based on diplomacy, negotiation and consensus. Up to the 1960s and also in the 1970s, this system was characterized by “pillarization” (verzuiling). It refers to a four-fold, religiously inspired division between a Protestant, a Roman-catholic, a Social Democrat and a “neutral Liberal pillar” in the low countries. Furthermore, the concept of pillarization also refers to the so-called poldermodel of consensus-based policy-making at all levels of society (Lijphart, 1968; Blom, 2000). In political terms, this meant a solid government elite above deep cleavages among the people. For order maintenance, the police could rely on fairly aloof and strict municipal setups (gemeentepolitie) in conjunction with a national force (Rijkspolitie) for the sparsely populated rural areas. However, from the 1960s, as emancipation and secularization waves and, migration influxes took their toll, the calm but paternalistic Dutch culture altered dramatically. Ultra-conformity crippled down to disintegration resulting in emphasis not on

hierarchical (vertical) but on equal (horizontal) relationships between citizens and public authorities such as the police. These developments, in short, laid the foundation for a fairly peaceful multicultural society and a fairly even distribution of wealth and power. In the words of Punch et al. (2002, p. 64), The Netherlands represented one of those “progressive Societies” with a strong welfare state, enlightened attitudes to social issues, and lenient approaches to crime and punishment. Mutual respect, tolerance and the avoidance of repressive actions had become central values in The Netherlands. These are values that have shaped the internationally admired (and sometimes maligned) “strong social element” (Punch et al., 2002, p. 75) encapsulated in what have, at least for the last 30-40 years, consider the ”soul” of public policing activities. A hallmark in this respect was the 1977 report A Changing Police (Politie in Verandering; POS, 1977), which stressed the importance of a professional police organization with a submissive role. A basic assumption behind the considered community-based orientation was to achieve better public acceptance and legitimization of the police. Albeit “community policing” remains a pretty vague and contested concept, it advocated closely-knit associations with local populations and reinforcement through informal social controls (Ponsaers, 2001). This assured robust ties between police officers and the citizens they were expected to serve. Pragmatic policing It is not easy to grasp what the police are actually doing, what “real” police work is (Bayley, 1994, p. 5). Like elsewhere in the world, Dutch officers perform countless tasks (e.g. patrolling, emergency assistance, ticketing for offences, and directing traffic), while being confronted with all sorts of people and urgent problems that require different treatments. Following Bittner’s (1990, p. 251) eloquent summary, the police’s unique competence consists of dealing with events containing “somethingthat-ought-not-be-happening-and-about-which-somebody-had-better-do-somethingnow.” They are professional street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980; Reiner, 1997) who enjoy relative autonomy from their superiors to respond quickly and sort out complicated situations. Few years ago, Van der Torre (1999) conducted an intensive observational research on daily police work in two basic units of the Rotterdam Police Force, the second largest city in The Netherlands. His studies claim that four archetypal types of police officers can be distinguished: The pragmatist, the pessimist, the restorer of order and the social worker. Firstly, the pragmatic type takes a practical, common sense approach to daily conflicts. He (or she) is generally accepted by a wide network of people and uses his contacts for informal problem solving. Finding reasonable solutions, not callous law enforcement, is the raison d’eˆtre here. Secondly, the pessimist has a fatalistic outlook. This police officer thinks crime is a normal phenomenon of urban life, so his efforts do not really matter. As a result, the pessimist has a resigned attitude of avoiding problems and his social connections are limited. Thirdly, the restorer of order tries to nail wrongdoers wherever he meets them. This type of officer has deep moral beliefs and a sturdy reputation of punishing through street justice. Finally, the social worker is a police officer who identifies himself as a gentle and understanding person, spending much of his energy in assisting and helping people. For him, therefore, the police organization stays, in any circumstance, too strongly committed to stringent order maintenance.

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In line with what Jones (1995, p. 40) depicts as a “culture with a predisposition towards compromise and accommodation,” it is not amazing that Van der Torre (1999) concluded that most (circa 65 percent) of the Dutch police officers could be described (and often saw themselves) as officers with a pragmatic style of policing. Neutralizing potentially contentious situations, they tried to keep away from legalistic approaches as much as possible. Instead, police officers’ capacity to intervene successfully depended heavily on their communication and persuasive skills. One of the tactical strategies in panel policy, then, was to condone (gedogen) deviant behavior. Political preferences to treat, for example, coffee shops and prostitution with permissiveness are widely known (and more than often heavily criticized) internationally. Moreover, “community safety” and “crime prevention” referring to “all measures and policies that seek to increase public safety and are oriented at the social context in which crime emerges rather than at the punishment of offenders” (Van Swaaningen, 2002, p. 261) had long been central concerns on which police priorities were set. Officers were dedicated to lowering crime rates and enhancing (subjective) safety within a social justice framework. Structure of policing Remarkably, the structure of Dutch public policing did, with exception of the German occupation from 1940 to 1945, not change much for over a hundred years (Jones, 1995, Chapter 3). The 1851 Municipalities Law (Gemeentewet) grounded a highly fragmented array of 148 municipal forces and a national force for the countryside. Earlier on, in 1814, the Royal Military Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee; KMAR) was set up to function as a nationwide operating force carrying out both military and civil police tasks. Almost immediately grave concerns were raised about the ineffectiveness of the police system, but, despite such concerns, no especial change occurred during the twentieth century. The Dutch police proved to be an extremely conservative organization. After long running and continuous debates, the 1993 Police Act took effect in April 1994 response to endemic crises attributed to the local patchworks of police services (Wintle, 1996). Currently, the country is split up into 25 police regions and two national forces (see below) employing around 50,000 officers. Roughly, 85 percent of these employees serve on a full-time basis. Women account for about 18 percent of the police (Ministry of the Interior, 2000a, p. 8). The size of each regional force varies from about 600 to 6,500 officers, depending on the population density and crime level of a region. Most regions are divided into a number of districts, which are, in turn, subdivided into a number of police units. These units (or police departments) cover small areas to help develop solid contacts with local residents. In addition, alongside the Royal Military Police, the Dutch Police Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten; KLPD) was instituted for the supervising the national infrastructure (motorways, railways and waterways), nation-wide crime investigation, providing expert support to the 25 forces and safeguarding the Royal House. The KLPD, in short, exceeds the the activities of the regional police administrations and serves as a coordinator for police authorities involved in order maintenance and criminal investigation (Ministry of the Interior, 2000a, b). Today’s regionalized system occupies a middle ground, a position between having one national police organization with local branches, and local forces enjoying a larger dose of autonomy within the boundaries of national regulation. However, what has remained largely unresolved, are the problems arising from the dualism of local and national forces and the dualism of shared authority over the police exercised by the

mayor and the public prosecutor (Wintle, 1996), These two bipartite distinctions are still enshrined in law and, as discussed next, promote political disputes about the desirability of a centralized police system until the present day. Call for further reform Regional boards have turned out to be problematic institutions within the Dutch political-administrative system (Muller, 2002). The core of this problem concerns the delegation of responsibilities for administration (finance and personnel) and authority (tasks and deployment) in police matters to several bodies and functionaries. At the national level, the Minister of the Interior takes responsibility for funding and organizational matters of police regions. The Minister of Justice, on the other hand, is also involved because of his responsibility for the work of public prosecutors. In essence, this system separates assorted powers over the police among different branches in order to guarantee democratic governance. The oversight and management of the police is delegated to 25 regional boards (regionale colleges) consisting of the mayors of all the municipalities within the force area. The mayor of the largest municipality in each force area is the chief regional manager (korpsbeheerder) of a regional board. He participates with the regional chief constable and chief public prosecutor in a system of triangular consultation and decision making (driehoeksoverleg). They meet with all mayors in the region and establish policy on the distribution of finance, personnel, vehicles and buildings. Once general decisions are made mayors, police chiefs and public prosecutors implement policies at the municipal level (Van Steden and Huberts, 2006). A central objective of the 1993 reorganization was to combine a close relationship between police officers and citizens with integrated units at the regional level to tackle serious crime and improve coordination between different agencies (Jones, 1995). In a sense, this reorganization weakened the mechanisms of democratic accountability, as locally elected municipal councillors lost their direct influence over policy issues to the regional boards. Direct democratic control over the police has yet always been absent in The Netherlands. The main governing functionary for police forces – the mayor – is, after all, appointed by central government instead of being elected by votes of citizens (Jones, 1995). Nonetheless, what really matters for the power over policing is that even though the law only permits regional boards to decide on police organization and finance, their actions also directly influence policing policy. The separation between administration and authority is, in other words, difficult to maintain in practice. This ambiguity about the demarcations between responsibilities has stimulated a concentration of powers within the regional boards, while, at the same time, proper supervision over these boards is almost lacking (Van Steden and Huberts, 2006). Thus, in term of accountability, the Dutch police administration suffers from a structural democratic deficit (Huberts, 1997), with police forces retaining considerable autonomy in setting their own policy priorities. In response, the Centre-Right Balkenende II coalition initiated a state commission (Leemhuis-Stout, 2004) to advise on improving the effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility and transparency of the current police system. One of its main proposals was to sustain the 25 regions, but hand over local responsibilities surrounding administration to both the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice. The mayor and public

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prosecutor stay formally in charge of the police (the authority function), whilst in everyday affairs, as opponents apprehend, their priorities and decisions would be heavily influenced by government programs. For the present government, the commission’s advice did not suffice. Its preference is a national police system with regional and local branches having a limited amount of autonomy. Parliamentary decision making about these proposals will have to wait until after the forthcoming elections in November 2006. Changes towards “mixed” policing In the early 1990s it became more commonly believed in politics “that traditional Dutch tolerance has gone too far” (Punch et al., 2002, p. 64). This turning point has also slowly influenced the style of community policing practiced by executive police personnel. Initially, beat unstable served as “the friendly cop” whose mandate was broadly defined as “keeping the neighborhood quiet and safe.” They took their social function seriously and were very aware of the strong caring element in their work. However, criticism arose concerning the credibility and legitimacy of this type of police methods. Colleagues felt that many beat officers were “loners” and “psychiatrist” not doing “proper” police work (Punch et al., 2002, p. 65). The Dutch police tried to counter these arguments by introducing community officers (Punch et al., 2002, pp. 67-8) viewed as “street-level leaders” (Vinzant and Crothers, 1998) who occupied a pivotal position between the community they served and the police department. Their aim was to create more extensive cooperation between the police, citizens and a range of institutions such as schools and housing associations. The 1985 White Paper Society and Crime (Samenleving en Criminaliteit; Tweede Kamer, 1985) gave the initial push for this kind of structural change. It promoted a more general sharing of the task of crime prevention and provision of public safety between state and non-state policing agencies. Eight years later, such “responsibilization” strategies were further confirmed when the government promoted the concept of “integral safety” (Ministry of the Interior, 1993) acknowledging the interdependence of local government and civil society, and the reality that multiple of private organizations are involved in the maintenance of an orderly society (Van Steden and Huberts, 2006, p. 17). Along these lines, the inhabitants of small-scale neighborhoods were progressively seen as active and responsible associates in preserving a livable social environment – a new e´lan implying that “security is not a matter exclusively for the police” (Ministry of the Interior, 1993, p. 8). As Crawford (1999, p. 25) argues: . . . [w]here once the state was expected to hand down an authoritative answer for the problems and needs of society, now we are increasingly witnessing a situation in which those same problems and needs are rebounding back on society, so that society has become implicated in the task of resolving them.

Politicians have been moving towards a much broader concept of policing, in which partnerships among multiple agencies and institutions large and small, have their role. Mutually, public and private players are captured in complex, “nodal” or “networked” governance (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p. 18) that seek to build enhanced local capacities for reassurance and security. Most strikingly, like in other western countries, the Dutch private security industry has mushroomed rapidly from 10,000 to over

30,000 employees in just about two-and-a-half decades (Van Steden, 2004). While the Dutch parliament was very critical about these developments, the cabinet lately announced that “municipalities are, under strict conditions, allowed to bring private security firms into action for maintaining the order in public domains” (Ministry of the Interior, 2000b, p. 106). Private guards now visibly turn up in, among other areas, neighborhoods, city centers and yacht basins as incorporated members of locally instituted policing partnerships. According to Ponsaers (2001, pp. 488-92), such a novel view on community-oriented policing along public-private lines tends to overrule the moral values of equality, brotherhood and fairness. Van Swaaningen (2005, pp. 296-7) agrees: Looking at all these forms of crime prevention “new style” one would think that all the original community safety projects are dead and forgotten, but that is not at all the case. It is striking that nobody has ever said that these were a mistake, and that we are therefore taking a different route now. [. . .] Words like “neighborhood” or “community” are still widely used in recent policy documents, but the actual practice seems to go another way. The police now refer to themselves as “gatekeepers” who clear the streets of “bad guys” rather than as contributing to community building. [. . .] We can observe a shift from an inclusive to an exclusive society (Young, 1999).

Elsewhere, Van Swaaningen (2002) is not so pessimistic as he argues that crime prevention and community safety can have a happy marriage in balancing the negative (exclusive) vision of the first with the positive (inclusive) vision of the later one (Van Swaaningen, 2002, p. 261). Yet, greater attention to public fears and anxieties in recent years has bent politicians to the sharpening of crime stopping strategies which increasingly result in steps to banish deviants from society. Changes towards “firm” policing In the previous section, we discussed the endorsement of responsibility for crime control on civil society. Peripheral police tasks are redistributed to the commercial security industry, multiplying numbers of authorities, forming alliances and shedding state sovereignty to private organizations. Meanwhile, as Pakes (2005) reports, the Ministry of Justice’s budget rises sensationally with injections of e70 million in 2003 and an expected e200 million in 2008, with the police force growing from 40,000 to circa 50,000 officers in less than ten years time. Somewhat schizophrenically, governments perceive the society to be responsible to defend itself and evoke “zero tolerance” policies on (criminal) nuisances. Politicians come up with such a policy to let citizens know they are protected by a muscular state. Whether new policy plans are driven by populist considerations or not, the Dutch police system seems to be moving into a more firm and repressive direction. As described in the national government’s report Towards a Safer Society (Naar een Veiliger Samenleving) this denotes higher priority to crime fighting, more attention for maintaining public norms and values, more legal competencies for the police, various incentives for competitive policing and stricter performance measurements (Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior, 2002). What are the consequences of these shifts in government tone for the tolerant and community-oriented “soul” of Dutch policing? Have the police really evolved into an instrument of control or are the arguments for an affable force still valid?

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Table I. Elite views on police priorities (percentage that agrees or agrees very much)

In order to help to find out, we conducted survey research among the police elite of The Netherlands, comprising the 25 mayors of the largest municipalities, the 25 police chief commissioners and the 25 chief public prosecutors (Huberts et al., 2004). As already indicated, these tripartite regional consultation boards are, by far, the most powerful actors in determining the content of police strategy, work and organization. The response rate was satisfying. Nine regional police chiefs (36 percent), 11 mayors (44 percent) and 11 prosecutors (44 percent) participated in our research. The first central issue to measure was how fervently regional police elites defend the characteristics of conventional community policing followed by their views on the aptness of crime fighting in lieu of pragmatic and compassionate routines. From Table I, it can be seen that the answers do not bring much optimism for pragmatic, social and friendly policing. We commented that skills and interactions (i.e. assisting people) were special characteristics of Dutch policing. In spite of this, however, the bulk (58 percent) of respondents indicated this was something to dispose of, albeit an overwhelmingly majority of mayors (91 percent), who are, after all, the country’s premier citizens, think that community policing and police assistance needs more balanced precedence. The call for deploying harsher law and order regimes further confirms our conviction that criminal justice policies today are crisis-driven. Almost 90 percent of the survey interviewees personally agreed with the statement that “endeavors against crime have become harsher and harder” with 65 percent expressing that the police should be “more tough” on crime. Indeed, The Netherlands has shed off its lenient image in regard to vice and deviance. The survey results are in line with Van Swanningen’s (2005) observation about widespread discontent and disarray about national security – i.e. crime, terrorism and the influx of foreigners. Emphasis is shifting toward risk profiling, unfolding disciplinary measures, privatization and “responsibilized” public-private partnerships

A lot of police assistance is “welfare” work that officers should abandon Community policing and police assistance deserve a higher priority Endeavors against crime have become harsher and harder I am favoring harsher and harder action against crime and insecurity Harsher and harder crime fighting policies are the result of: Increases in actual crime numbers Disappointing results of previous policies Increasing unrest among citizens and in the media Nowadays, politicians are trapped between the citizens’ demand for security and the knowledge that government is (no longer) capable of guaranteeing this security

Police chiefs (percent)

Mayors (percent)

Public prosecutors (percent)

All (percent)

56

55

64

58

25

91

9

42

89

73

100

87

89

46

60

65

44 67

36 55

64 64

48 62

100

82

82

88

78

82

82

81

that threaten to derail The Netherlands into a closed and incredibly paranoid country. The brazen murder of the daring filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh by an Islamic extremist in November 2004, brought the fight against terrorism even higher on political and social agendas as some politicians interpreted it in terms of a war that has been started against us. More resources and powers have now been granted to secret service, police and security organizations, which fundamentally altered the social face of “community safety to a visage of exclusion and polarization”. As Van Swaaningen (2005, pp. 302-3) gloomily concludes: At present, the penal rationale has permeated virtually all measures of crime prevention. “Prevention” now mainly means proactive intervention on the basis of risk profiles. Banishment is the new metaphor of this politics of public safety and the law-abiding citizens are the driving force behind it. The popularity of politicians increasingly depends on “tough” statements on crime and insecurity.

Behind the rhetoric The rhetoric of Dutch politicians and top functionaries coincides with a negative public opinion about police effectiveness. Research conducted among 90,000 people shows that police officers are increasingly under pressure. Although 53 percent of the respondents are still “very satisfied” with the overall police performance in their neighbourhood, this number has dropped by 9 percent over the last ten years. People complain that the visibility of police officers has diminished and that the police are understaffed (B&A Group and Intomart, 2003). Underlying reasons for reduced satisfaction with police officers are often linked to the dramatic rise of crime in The Netherlands following the mid-1960s. Since, then, the number of reported felony offences has, under influence of progressing economic welfare (Beki et al., 1999), spurred enormously from around 140,000 cases in 1960 to approximately 1.4 million at present. Crime rates have thus increased ten fold (when corrected for population growth, nearly six folded) over the last 40 years, causing a sense of crisis which Pim Fortuyn, leader of a political party named Livable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland), attributed to immigration problems, maladjusted asylum seekers, a “backward” Muslim culture and failing authorities (Pakes, 2004, pp. 289-90). Fortuyn was able to strike a chord with this agenda as he was fighting in the national elections, But, he got brutally murdered in May 2002. This assassination shocked the country so deeply that his party indeed achieved victory and participated in government for a short period of time. Nonetheless, things are not so simple as Pim Fortuyn depicted them. First of all crime rates have more or less stabilized in the last two decades (Figure 1) and, secondly, the influx of foreigners must not be exaggerated as their number dropped over the 1990s (Van Swaaningen, 2005). Van den Brink (2002, p. 7) provides an answer asking us to turn our gaze to the explosion of violence caused by youngsters (including Moroccan and Antillean youngsters). His research suggests that an assertive lifestyle of “faster, bigger, better” lies at the heart of such aggressive spirals. This, in combination with a hunt for “thrills” proud self-esteem and loose moral discipline, creates a perilous atmosphere of hostility, while nighttime leisure economies, drowned in alcohol and lawlessness (Hobbs et al., 2005), in addition to anonymous urban spaces (Lofland, 1973), tend to make the situation even worse. An individualized society seems, as Boutellier (2004, p. 2) formulates it nicely, very sensitive to deviant behaviors:

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Figure 1. Registered crime rates (x 1000), 1960-2004 Source: Dutch Census

[A] liberal culture that has elevated self-fulfillment to the true art of living also has to make every effort to stipulate and maintain the limitations of individual freedom. A vital society generates a great need for safety and thus comes up against an undeniable paradox: if liberal freedom is to be unreservedly celebrated, its boundaries need to be set.

Boutellier’s observation fits well into the “risk society” originally sketched by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992, 2000). Where unprecedented prosperity goes hand in hand with a deeply felt fragility (whether in the face of crime, terrorism, migrants or other “hazards”), he says, pursuits for protection and shelter are all-pervasive. Emotions of insecurity and uncertainty have become endemic in our late modern society. It is commonly assumed that the Dutch police are poorly prepared to meet such fears and anxieties. Not that the police forces are, in absolute staff numbers, overburdened, but attention needs to be given to the allocation of scarce police resources. A study on four similar jurisdictions illustrates that circa 45 percent of the total police capacity is spent on management and office work, 10 percent on criminal investigation, 30 percent on community policing, 7 percent on operational support, 7 percent on responding to emergency calls and 1 percent on other work (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003): The category of “management and office work” absorbs a huge amount of police capacity (Table II). This must be treated with some caution, because absence through, for example, illness and training is included in the

Management and office work Criminal investigation Community policing Operational support Emergency calls Other work Table II. Allocation of Dutch police resources in 2001

a

Force 1

Force 2

Force 3

Force 4

43 9 39 6 3

51 12 31 5 **

48 10 27 8 7

*

1

*

45 10 24 10 10 1

Notes: aThese numbers include the absence of police officers owing to, for example, illness training or work outside their own jurisdiction; *less than 0.5 percent; * * emergency calls are embedded in other categories

same category. It can yet confidently be surmised that officers spend a lot of time on writing reports, policy-making, communication, logistics and meetings. The Dutch police system is highly bureaucratized. As Manning (1977, p. 15) observed, the drama of the police is unquestionably its “impossible mandate.” Officers must carry out elementary control functions in society, but there are frictions between towering public expectations and the burden they can realistically bear. Police are simply not capable of pledging full reassurance. All this confronts mayors, police chiefs and public prosecutors with a colossal dilemma. They realize that both citizens and the media are demanding more security than can reasonably be delivered, but there is no escape available. “The predicament (emphasis added) for government authorities today,” Garland (2001, p. 110) comments: . . . is that they see the need to withdraw their claim to be the primary and effective provider of security and crime control, but they also see, just as clearly, that the political costs of such a withdrawal are liable to be disastrous.

As a result, public officials are very ambivalent and unsure about the best route to follow. Politicians constantly juggle popular measures against crime with handing over state responsibility to both the free market and civil schemes. When and if the security trap will lead to a more centralized police system remains unclear. Many police chiefs, public prosecutors and mayors think that a new discussion about centralizing the Dutch police is inevitable (48 percent says “very much”). In addition, 45 percent of these respondents are in favor of introducing more national crime-fighting units, whereas 78 percent of the police chiefs, 82 percent of the mayors and 55 percent of the public prosecutors claim that one integrated national force is not a good plan (Huberts et al., 2004). We should bear in mind that the police elite is working at the regional and local levels in The Netherlands. The proponents of a nationalized police system, alternatively, have their power bases elsewhere. They are to be found in the ministries and in the parliament. To this group belong political leaders who feel the pressure from media coverage, lobbies and forthcoming elections making them more inclined to strongly steer the police at the expense of the regional boards members. Concluding remarks The Netherlands, once a country with a reputation of tolerant community policing, appears to be on its way to a punitive and defensive country. What does this imply for the “soul” of Dutch policing? Predicting the future is hedged with caveats. Academics always know better, but only looking backwards. Anyhow, policing, no doubt, is a product of political priorities, needs of the moment, as well as the conventional values of a particular era (Das, 1994). The Dutch are traditionally known for their relaxed and open-minded outlook on deviance, which has shaped a social penal atmosphere. Times, however, have painfully changed. Crime, terrorism and general public fears have caught front-line police officers in a “crossfire” (Wintle, 1996, p. 184) between liberal ideals and burning security issues. This has resulted in tendencies of centralization, penalization and responsibilization as shown in Figure 2. Even though drifts towards a centralized system of policing are not repressive and unfriendly per se, the combination with penalization at the national and responsibilization at the local level may appear to be very influential. In The

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Figure 2. Developments in Dutch policing

Netherlands, general crime policies are issued at the national level of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, while community and citizen-based policing is decided upon at the local and regional level. The “hyperpoliticization” (Van Swaaningen, 2005, p. 293) of safety and security may well bring out lines of thinking that are less apprehensive about a community basis for policing. For reasons of “effectiveness” in fighting crime and terrorism, a more “hierarchical model” (Ponsaers, 2001, pp. 473-6) of command and control revives with orientations towards defending national security and bigger distances between population and police. This means, the continuation of Dutch policing as pragmatic, social and friendly is under pressure of centralization and penalization, while, at the local level, police forces are sharing responsibilities for safety and security with others. What further consequences the developments will have for the culture and organization of policing, is difficult to foresee precisely. But, it seems more than plausible that it will progressively weaken the “soul” of Dutch police in years to come. References Algemene Rekenkamer (2003), Zicht op taakuitvoering politie, Sdu Uitgevers, Den Haag, Tweede Kamer vergaderjaar 2002/2003 28791, nrs. 1-2. Andeweg, R.B. and Irwin, G.A. (2002), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire. B&A Groep and Intomart (2003), Politiemonitor 2003. Landelijke rapportage, Hilversum, Den Haag. Bayley, D.H. (1994), Police for the Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Beck, U. (1992), Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London. Beck, U. (2000), “Risk society revisited: theory, politics and research programs”, in Adam, B., Beck, U. and Van Loon, J. (Eds), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory, Sage, London. Beki, C., Zeelenberg, K. and Van Montfort, K. (1999), “An analysis of the crime rate in The Netherlands 1950-93”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 401-15.

Bittner, E. (1990), Aspects of Police Work, North-eastern University Press, Boston, MA. Blom, J.C.H. (2000), “Pillarization in perspective”, West European Politics, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 153-64. Boutellier, H. (2004), The Safety Utopia. Contemporary Discontent and Desire as to Crime and Punishment, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Crawford, A. (1999), The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Das, D.K. (1994), Police Practices, Scarecrow Press, Lanham, MD. Downes, D. (1988), Contrast in Tolerance: Post-War Penal Policy in The Netherlands and England and Wales, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Garland, D. (2001), Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hobbs, D., Hadfield, P., Lister, S. and Winlow, S. (2005), Bouncers: Violence and Governance in the Night-Time Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Huberts, L.W.J.C. (1997), Blinde vlekken in de politiepraktijk en de politiewetenschap, Gouda Quint, Arnhem. Huberts, L.W.J.C. and Naeye´, J. (2005), Integriteit van de politie. Wat we weten op basis van Nederlands onderzoek, Kerckebosch, Zeist. Huberts, L.W.J.C., Verberk, S., Lasthuizen, K. and Van den Heuvel, J.H.J. (2004), Paradoxaal politiebestel, Kerckebosch, Zeist. Johnston, L. (2003), “From ‘pluralisation’ to the ‘police extended family’. Discourses on the governance of community policing in Britain”, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 185-204. Johnston, L. and Shearing, C.D. (2003), Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice, Routledge, London. Jones, T. (1995), Policing and Democracy in The Netherlands, Police Studies Institute, London. Leemhuis-Stout, J.M. (2004), Lokaal verankerd, nationaal versterkt (stuurgroep evaluatie politieorganisatie), Utrecht (available at: www.politiebestel.nl). Lijphart, A. (1968), The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in The Netherlands, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Lipsky, M. (1980), Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY. Lofland, L.H. (1973), A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Public Space, Basic Books, New York, NY. Manning, P.K. (1977), Police Work. The Social Organization of Policing, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior (2002), Naar een veiliger samenleving, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior, Den Haag. Ministry of the Interior (1993), Integrale veiligheidsrapportage 1993, Ministry of the Interior, Den Haag. Ministry of the Interior (2000a), Policing in The Netherlands, Ministry of the Interior, Den Haag, available at: www.politie.nl Ministry of the Interior (2000b), Integrale veiligheidsrapportage 2000. Over aspecten van veiligheid, Ministry of the Interior, Den Haag.

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Muller, E. (2002), “Policing and accountability in The Netherlands: a happy marriage or a stressful relationship?”, Policing and Society, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 249-58. Pakes, F. (2004), “The politics of discontent: the emergence of a new criminal justice discourse in The Netherlands”, The Howard Journal, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 284-98. Pakes, F. (2005), “Penalization and retreat: the changing face of Dutch criminal justice”, Criminal Justice, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 145-61. Ponsaers, P. (2001), “Reading about ‘community (oriented) policing’ and police models”, Policing, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 470-96. POS (1977), Politie in verandering, Staatsdrukkerij, Den Haag. Punch, M. (1985), Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control, Tavistock, London. Punch, M., Van der Vijver, K. and Zoomer, O. (2002), “Dutch ‘COP’. Developing community-policing in The Netherlands”, Policing, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 60-79. Reiner, R. (1997), “Policing and the police”, in Maguire, M., Morgan, R. and Reiner, R. (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 997-1049. Tweede Kamer (1985), Samenleving en criminaliteit. Een beleidsplan voor de komende jaren, Tweede Kamer, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 1984/1985, 18995, nrs. 1-2. Van den Brink, G. (2002), Geweld als uitdaging. De betekenis van agressief gedrag bij jongeren, NIWZ, Utrecht. Van der Torre, E.J. (1999), Politiewerk: politiestijlen, community policing, professionalisme, Samsom, Alphen aan den Rijn. Van Steden, R. (2004), “Particuliere Beveiliging in Nederland: Een Branche”, Een Branche in Beweging, VPB, Gorinchem, pp. 11-26. Van Steden, R. and Huberts, L. (2006), “The Netherlands”, in Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (Eds), Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective, Routledge, London, pp. 12-33. Van Swaaningen, R. (2002), “Towards a replacement discourse on community safety. Lessons from The Netherlands”, in Hughes, G., McLaughin, E. and Muncie, J. (Eds), Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions, Sage, London, pp. 260-78. Van Swaaningen, R. (2005), “Public safety and the management of fear”, Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 289-305. Vinzant, J.C. and Crothers, L. (1998), Street-Level Leadership. Discretion and Legitimacy in Front-Line Public Service, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC. Wintle, M. (1996), “Policing the liberal state in The Netherlands: the historical context of the current reorganization of the Dutch police”, Policing and Society, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 181-97. Young, J. (1999), The Exclusive Society, Sage, London. Further reading Franke, H. (1990), “Dutch tolerance: facts and fables”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 81-93. Corresponding author Dilip Das can be contacted at: [email protected] To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints

Policing on the web The FBI Library While this column normally focuses on the entire web site of an organization or agency relevant to the law enforcement community, this installment reviews one of the many pages on the FBI’s web site. The FBI’s Library, (available at http://fbilibrary. fbiacademy.edu/), serves as a valuable resource for any law enforcement agency by providing a wealth of informational materials available only to law enforcement agencies. According to the FBI, the web site for the FBI Library provides “an electronic interface to identify informational resources available at or through the FBI Library to serve the current FBI community and local and state law enforcement.” Through this web site law enforcement agencies can find and request information in a wide variety of formats, including: books, newspapers and magazines, materials in analog and digital audio and video formats, as well as books on tape, CDs, CD-ROMs and DVDs, and government documents. In addition to the above materials, the FBI Library has a wide selection of online scholarly journals from nearly every field imaginable. Visitors to the FBI Library web site have a number of resources to help locate materials relevant to their topic of interest. Visitors can search the online catalog to locate a book by title, author or subject, or locate a scholarly journal by either browsing their list or searching for keywords. Visitors can also access a large collection of bibliographies composed by the FBI which deal with topics such as child abduction, identity theft, financial institutions fraud, undercover operations, and women in law enforcement. Each of these bibliographies includes a list of citations directing the user to books, articles, or other resources within the individual subject area. Visitors can also access a list of statistical sources such as the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fedstats, the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, and the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. There are also a number of links to outside web sites categorized by topic areas, such as drugs and medical issues, colleges and universities with criminal justice programs, and even links to sites dedicated to Islam and Islamic studies. The web site for the FBI Library is extremely user-friendly, with straightforward links to materials and internal search engines that are intuitive in their use. In particular, one of the features of the FBI Library web site which makes it extremely helpful is that through it, users can access many of the materials for viewing via the internet allowing instantaneous access to materials and information. However, if the materials desired are not available for viewing via the internet, they are available for pick up at the FBI Library in Quantico, Virginia; or, materials can even be sent to a borrowing agency’s local FBI office for pick up. J.W. Carter II University of Cincinnati

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Perspectives on policing Public Confidence on Policing: A Neo-Durkheimian Perspective Jonathan Jackson and Jason Sunshine The British Journal of Criminology 2007 Vol. 47 No. 2 pp. 214-224 TJackson and Sunshine (2007) investigate the core predictors of public confidence in policing on the basis of neo-Durkheimian perspective, which argues that the public perception of police is shaped by lay evaluations of community cohesion and moral consensus rather than by individual worries about falling victim to crime. In particular, the authors predict: . individuals are more satisfied with the police response not when they fear for their own safety, but when they believe that their community is morally deteriorating; . public satisfaction with the police is driven by individual judgments about whether the police embody community values and morals; . as identification with the community increases, the importance of identification with the police is expected to increase, and the importance of concerns about social cohesion will decrease; and . identification with the police will be associated with perceptions of procedural justice or the belief that the police treat people with respect, dignity, and fairness.

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The authors also present the findings of previous research which revealed that “fear of crime” and “punitive attitude” of citizens are driven by concerns about the breakdown of social organization and moral norms. A single-contact mail survey was conducted for the 5,906 residents that were randomly drawn from seven sets of towns and villages within a predominantly rural area in the North-East of England. A total of 1,023 completed questionnaires were received, leaving the response rate at 18.0 percent. The authors analyze these data with four structural equation models: (1) “the instrumental model” states that environmental perceptions shape beliefs about crime and risk perceptions, which in turn shape worries about crime, and these worries finally decide the public perception of policing; (2) “the neo-Durkheimian model: stage one” suggests that perceptions of crime and social cohesion play a bigger role in predicting public confidence in policing than worries about crime do; (3) “the neo-Durkheimian model: stage two” adds two more neo-Durkheimian predictors: “the public identification of values and morals of police officers,” and “procedural justice”; and

(4) “the community identification model with interaction effects” tests the role of community identification. While instrumental worries about personal safety is found to be significantly related to the public confidence in policing in the first model, the second structural model reveals this significant relationship is, in fact, spurious, and that feeling that one’s local community lacks cohesion, social trust and informal social control is much more important in deciding public confidence in policing. Furthermore, the third structural model shows very strong predict power of “public judgment about fairness of policing” and “public identification of police values.” The fourth model also gives support to the hypothesis that as identification with the community increases, so does the importance of social identification, but the importance of concerns about social cohesion decreases in relation to the increase in community identification. Jackson and Sunshine suggest that public confidence in policing is not decided by disorder or fear of crime, but is rooted in a particular form of social perception, which is associated with lay evaluations of social order, cohesion, trust, and moral consensus. The public look to the police to defend community values and moral structures when they believe these values and moral structures to be under threat, and they want the police to be strong representatives of their community. The authors also strongly suggest that this is achieved when officers treat the public fairly and with dignity. Due to the spatial limitation of this research, however, the authors are discreet in generalization of their findings to urban area, and recommend the future study incorporating the data from broader locations. COPS Grants and Crime Revisited John L. Worrall and Tomislav V. Kovandzic Criminology Vol. 45 No. 1 2007 pp. 159-90 Worrall and Kovandzic (2007) examine the finding of Zhao et al. (2002) that funding of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS Office) led to significant reductions in violent and property crimes in cities with populations greater than 10,000. With enacting provisions of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, a total of $8.8 billion were appropriated to local police departments in the form of grants to hire additional officers and improve their community policing capabilities during fiscal years 1995 through 2000. The task of COPS Office has been to provide several types of these grants to eligible law enforcement agencies. Previous research on COPS effectiveness can be classified into two types: studies focusing on: (1) how much COPS funds increased hiring and/or community policing capabilities in America’s law enforcement agencies; and (2) to what extent crime rates have been reduced. The authors focus on the latter effect of COPS’ spending on crime and revisit the work of Zhao et al. with a panel data analysis.

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The panel data from 189 large US cities covering the period 1990-2000 is analyzed. While the study at hand employs a smaller sample of cities than did Zhao et al.’s work which covered 6,100 cities, the extension of time frame from 5 to 11 years allows 2,079 observations for the analysis. A total of seven indexed crime rates, including homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, are adapted for dependent variables; three indicators of COPS grants corresponding to three main grant categories are included as predictors; and annual fiscal expenditures are included in order to control for non-COPS-related expenditures. As it is unlikely that COPS grants or annual fiscal expenditures influence crime instantaneously, a one-year lag is applied to both spending variables. To analyze these data, a series of two-way fixed-effects regressions are estimated, which include dummy variables for each city and year. The authors also use a log-log model, which allows estimating the percent change of dependent variable expected from a one percent change in the independent variable, holding all other factors fixed. Contrary to the expectation based on previous research, all the outcomes from analyses at hand reveal that COPS grants had no discernible effect on serious crime during the period. Tests on overall spending or only COPS spending fail to reveal any significant effect of COPS grants on crime rates. All the robustness checks, which are adapted to ensure that these results are not driven by other issues, also show that no COPS coefficient is significant. Only when both city and year dummies are excluded, do the COPS variables achieve significance for more than one crime type: hiring grants are associated with reductions in murder, robbery, and assault. It is, however, a significant omission to exclude such dummies in any fixed-effects regression. In the model with state-specific effects, three states show the significant effects of COPS grants on violent crimes: only Arkansas, however, shows negative effects of COPS grant and others show positive effects. Worrall and Kovandzic present three possible explanations for this outcome: (1) even while COPS grants provides funding for 100,000 new police officers, the actual number patrolling the streets is much lower; (2) even if the number of police officers were doubled, the number on the street would remain quite small; and (3) police presence or patrol may not be effective to some people. The authors also recommend the study of new strategies aiming at specific types of crime because it is likely that a targeted policing program better reduces crime, while a strategy of hiring more police officers alone does not seem to reduce crime significantly. Prior Police Contact and Subsequent Victim Reporting: Results from the NCVS Min Xie, Greg Pogarsky, James P. Lynch, and David McDowall Justice Quarterly Vol. 23 No. 4 2006 pp. 481-501

Xie et al. (2006) test how the police response to past victimizations of both the victim and other household members influences the victim’s future reporting behavior. Previous research revealed that victimization reports to the police depend on various factors: . community characteristics; . the seriousness of the victimization; . the relationship between victim and offender; . interactions with third parties; and . attitudes toward the police. Few studies, however, have investigated how the police response to the victimization affects subsequent victim reporting. The authors build four hypothetical frameworks based on several psychological principles, such as procedural justice and vicarious learning: (1) The probability of victims reporting to the police relates positively to: . whether an arrest was made; and . the level of investigative effort by police after the individual was previously victimized. (2) The probability of victims reporting to the police also relates positively to the police’s response to a household member’s previous victimization experience with the police. (3) The favorability of the police response to an individual’s own prior victimization should be more strongly associated with the probability of subsequent reporting to the police than the police response to a victimization of another household member of that individual. (4) The police response in a prior victimization should influence the future reporting behavior more when the individual, rather than someone else, reported the prior victimization. Longitudinal data from the NCVS, which is a stratified multistage cluster survey with a rotating panel design of approximately 50,000 housing units, are employed. In this survey, each member of each household who was age 12 or older was interviewed up to seven times at six-month intervals. Among 19,514 households (22,615 victims), in which at least one household member was victimized, the data of 1,635 respondents who themselves suffered prior victimizations between 1998 and 2000, and 1,371 respondents for whom another household member was victimized in the same period are analyzed in the study at hand. In the analysis of prior personal experience with the police, the authors find greater police effort following the respondent’s most recent victimization is positively related to whether the respondent reported a subsequent victimization, but whether the police made an arrest for the prior victimization was unrelated to subsequent reporting. In the analysis of prior household victimization, however, the authors find that neither the extent of police effort nor arresting a suspect following a household member’s prior victimization significantly affects victim reporting. Even when victimized household member was closely related to the victim or suffered from the same type of

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victimization with the victim, the police response variables remain unrelated to the probability of reporting. The outcomes from both analyses imply the association between prior police effort and the probability of reporting is stronger for police effort following the respondent’s own prior victimization than for the victimization of one of the respondent’s household members. The analysis with “self-reporter” and “non-self reporter” groups reveals that the positive correlation between prior police effort and subsequent reporting is stronger when the victim reported his or her own prior victimization. While Xie et al. find only partial support for their hypotheses, their analyses produce several important implications: . the victims’ perception of how fairly they were treated by police after a prior victimization, rather than how favorable the outcomes were, is more strongly related to their future behavior toward the police; . the findings of previous research on procedural justice are supported; and . direct experience lead to greater attitude consistency than do indirect effect. The authors present some limitations of their study, such as: . . . .

including indirect experience from only household members; requiring more explanation about the effect of prior police effort; studying over only a three-year reference period; and not addressing predictors of first-time victim reports, and recommend future study with a more comprehensive model of what are reasons for effect of prior police effort and how information and incentives affect victim reporting decisions. Seong Min Park University of Cincinnati

Book review Policing and Stress Heith Copes Pearson Prentice-Hall Upper Saddle River, NJ 2005 pp. 8-183 Keywords Policing, Stress, Coping, Mental health, Police administration, Occupational Review DOI 10.1108/13639510710778886 Unlike other works of its kind, this volume represents a compilation of original interdisciplinary (i.e. criminal justice, sociology, psychology, and health), cross-cultural pieces of work authored by 11 researchers well versed in the science of police stress. Copes’ stated purpose is to address whether stress is an important matter of scientific inquiry rather than an overstated problem in law enforcement, given that members of various occupations also experience a great deal of job-related stress but lack the public and scholarly attention afforded to police officers. While the studies included in this volume lack comparative occupational samples to empirically address the first portion of the purpose, the contributors do investigate well the notion that police officers experience and are troubled by stress. Indeed, the book examines the stress-coping process and is separated into three distinctive parts – sources of stress, consequences of stress, and coping with stress. An unexpected but unobtrusive feature of this book are several provocative “Questions for Discussion” found after the conclusion of each chapter. In Part I (Chapters 1-4) contributors support much of the extant empirical literature, reporting that stress largely stems from the job. More specifically, from acute (intensely immediate) critical incidents, as well as situations that are chronic, or more lingering in nature endemic in the occupation of policing, such as administrative practices and lack of reward and recognition. The first chapter certainly may capture any reader’s attention since it examines officer stress pre- and post-9/11, using two samples (Boston Police Department and a national sample of officers employed in different-sized agencies). While this lead contribution has several major limitations, to be discussed below, it is a nice addition for several reasons. First, it addresses a salient contemporary issue in policing and suggests that 9/11 has serious impact on officer stress; second, the researcher endeavors to demonstrate linkages between coping strategies and sources of stress; and third, it explicitly includes officers employed in rural departments. Building on this theme, the chapters that follow examine critical incident stress (Chapter 2); the legal sources of officers stress as they struggle with domestic dispute calls which often create barriers to their effective handling of situations (Chapter 3), and the effect of prolonged exposure to stress originating from adjustments to organizational transition in philosophy from order-maintenance to that of community and problem-oriented policing services. The author of this work notes

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stress may result from faulty diagnosis of person-environment (or job task) fit among officers of varying rank. Part II of the book deals directly with the consequences of stress among law enforcement officers. The three chapters in this portion (Chapters 5-7) demonstrate well what occurs when stress is unchecked and officers experience prolonged exposure to situations they may perceive to be out of their realm of control. Coverage entails a progression of various psychological factors (e.g. anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation), that culminate in Chapter 7 with an examination of suicide. All contributors in this section suggests individual and group characteristics are important in determining “. . . resiliency, an ability to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, stress, and trauma” (p. 95). The centrality of resiliency (Chapter 6) cuts across all of these chapters as authors emphasize that the insidious impact of distress is most pronounced among those officers that either lack flexibility and/or are ill-equipped to manage stress. Discerning officers’ personality types it is argued will allow the institution of policing to better screen recruits and train officers in the area of stress management which can be practiced and reinforced through social psychological support of all types including: the workplace, professional mental health assistance, and family and friendship networks. Part III is dedicated to investigating how officers cope with stress. Of the four articles included in this section, the last, Chapter 11 is examined separately given the authors arguably controversial perspective on police stress. The other three chapters (8-10) represent one of the distinctive contributions of this volume for which one would be hard-pressed to discover in similar books; that being, direct attention to the idea that in spite of the “toughness” culture of policing, emotions should be central to any study of stress and that stress-coping may vary by the “minority” status (i.e. gender and race) of the officer in the police organization. Contributors note studies dedicated to uncovering a gender stress-coping linkage has been undertaken exceedingly more often than that of race, but nevertheless a review of studies conducted reveals that regardless of race and gender, officers tend to identify similar stressors and utilize common strategies to deal with them. It is also pointed out, “[A]lternatively, irrespective of the nature of the stressors, some groups may cope with stress differently than do others” (p. 162). This book concludes with a contribution by an author with experience in policing and academe who offers a critical analysis of police stress and coping. The author’s thesis emphasizes that while distress following critical incidents must be acknowledged, the occurrence of these occupational hazards are rare, stress among police officers is overstated, and, furthermore, is no more overbearing and/or relevant than the stress experienced by individuals and groups in other challenging occupations (e.g. firefighters, medical professionals, professors, and the like). Like other researchers (Seyle, 1981; Anshel, 2000; Toch, 2002), this author contends that stress is essentially a matter of perception which “[O]bviously the officer who dwells on the negative aspects will suffer worse consequences than the officer who deals with the issue and then moves on” (p. 181). Given reported variation in officers self-reported stress levels in countless studies, the author recommends rather than police agencies approaching stress management globally, “[E]ither offer those individuals assistance or encourage them to find less stressful work” (p. 183). The variety of stress dimensions covered in this volume has much to offer; however, there is a lack of clarity in temporal ordering within several of the articles examining

the stress coping process – a well-noted challenge in the police stress literature (Toch, 2002; Anshel, 2000). For example, factors such as absenteeism, excessive drinking, prayer, smoking and alienation are identified as consequences of stress in some studies, while other studies within this same volume and external to it identify these same factors as coping mechanisms. Moreover, if coping strategies are mediating factors between sources of stress and the consequential outcomes, it seems to follow that the contributions in Part III (coping) should come directly after Part I (sources) and Part II (consequences) would be more logically placed as the last section of this volume. Another limitation of this book can be found in Chapter 1. Beyond the captivating topic, the information contained therein lacks supportive statistical analyses for the findings articulated in this study (pp. 10-17). For example, as one might expect, the mean ranking of various stressors indicates stress is more pronounced after 9/11; however, determining whether these differences are statistically significant is impossible to discern. Likewise, if the reader is interested in statistical linkages between stress and specific types of “consequences” (some of which might best be termed “coping strategies”), included are plenty of typologies, tables, and even explanations of results from some earlier study, but again, statistical evidence based on the samples is conspicuously absent. Although this volume of work has some limitations, the many attractive features offset them through an engaging collection of research on stress and coping in police work. Yolanda M. Scott Associate Professor, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI, USA References Anshel, M.H. (2000), “A conceptual model and implications for coping with stressful events in police work”, Criminal Justice and Behavior, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 375-400. Seyle, H. (1981), Stress Without Distress, Lippincott, Philadelphia, PA. Toch, H. (2002), Stress in Policing, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.

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