Police brutality, misconduct, and corruption : criminological explanations and policy implications 978-3-319-64438-7, 3319644386, 978-3-319-64437-0

This Brief proposes a criminological typology for understanding and addressing police misconduct. Through examination of

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Police brutality, misconduct, and corruption : criminological explanations and policy implications
 978-3-319-64438-7, 3319644386, 978-3-319-64437-0

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-ix
Introduction and Overview (James F. Albrecht)....Pages 1-2
Understanding Police Deviance (James F. Albrecht)....Pages 3-8
Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States (James F. Albrecht)....Pages 9-25
Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance (James F. Albrecht)....Pages 27-34
Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity (James F. Albrecht)....Pages 35-45
Discussion and Conclusion (James F. Albrecht)....Pages 47-51
Back Matter ....Pages 53-55

Citation preview

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN CRIMINOLOGY POLICING

James F. Albrecht

Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption Criminological Explanations and Policy Implications 123

SpringerBriefs in Criminology Policing

Series editor M.R. Haberfeld City University of New York John Jay College of Criminal Justice New York, NY, USA

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11179

James F. Albrecht

Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption Criminological Explanations and Policy Implications

James F. Albrecht Pace University New York, NY, USA

ISSN 2192-8533     ISSN 2192-8541 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Criminology ISSN 2194-6213     ISSN 2194-6221  (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Policing ISBN 978-3-319-64437-0    ISBN 978-3-319-64438-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948032 © The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

I have to extend my sincerest appreciation to my family. My parents made sure I knew the difference between right and wrong and taught me the importance of a good education. My children, Jimmy and Kristiana, keep me energized with their daily enthusiasm, their love, and their desire to learn. This book is dedicated to police officers across the globe who continue to make sacrifices to ensure that society remains safe and secure and especially those who have lost their lives while serving their communities. “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.” Matthew 5:9—King James Bible

Contents

1 Introduction and Overview ������������������������������������������������������������������������  1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  1 The Need for a Clear Typology for Police Deviance ������������������������������������  1 Understanding Police Deviance ��������������������������������������������������������������������  2 Examining Police Deviance Through Trends������������������������������������������������  2 Research Must Have Purpose: Practical Recommendations��������������������������  2 2 Understanding Police Deviance������������������������������������������������������������������  3 Police Deviance in the United States ������������������������������������������������������������  3 Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review������������������������  4 Theories of Crime and Police Deviance��������������������������������������������������������  5 Defining Police Deviance: A Clear Typology������������������������������������������������  6 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  7 3 Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States ����������������������������������������������������������������  9 Timetable of American Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct (1960s–Present)��������������������������������������������������������������������������  9 The 1960s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  9 The 1970s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10 The 1980s������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11 The Early 1990s (1990–1993) ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 The Late 1990s (1994–2000) ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 14 2001 to the Present���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21 Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD�������������������������������������� 22 Summary: Police Deviance���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 24 4 Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance������������������������������������ 27 Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance���������������������������������������� 27 Theories of Crime and Police Corruption������������������������������������������������������ 27 Theories of Crime and Police Criminality ���������������������������������������������������� 29 vii

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Contents

Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force �������������������������������������� 30 Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority���������������������������������������� 31 Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct���������������������������������������������������� 32 Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence”���������������������������������������� 32 Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury���������������������������������������������������� 33 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 34 5 Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity���������������������������������������������������������������������� 35 Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity�������� 35 Pre-employment Screening for Law Enforcement Officials�������������������������� 35 Pre-employment Screening to Deter Police Deviance���������������������������������� 36 Personality Testing and Psychological Screening������������������������������������������ 37 Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel ���������������������������������������� 39 Mandatory Hiring Qualifications ������������������������������������������������������������������ 40 Post-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity and Professionalism �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 44 6 Discussion and Conclusion�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47 Discussion and Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47 Bibliography�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47 Index���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53

About the Author

James F. Albrecht is presently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Homeland Security at Pace University in New York. James F. Albrecht received a prestigious Fulbright Fellowship in 1998 and worked as a Professor at the National Police College of Finland, and is considered an authority in Police Use of Force, Community/Zero Tolerance Policing initiatives, Police Response to Terrorism, Emergency Incident Planning and Management, Democratic Policing, Law Enforcement Leadership Practices, Corruption Control, Instituting Police Volunteer Programs, and other International Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement issues. Professor Albrecht has lectured at police facilities and at universities in China, Taiwan, Russia, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Turkey, Canada, Dubai, Kosovo, Macedonia, Malta, Ukraine, Trinidad & Tobago, the UK, and throughout the USA; and serves as a consultant to the United Nations, the US Department of Homeland Security, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Institute of Justice on terrorism and policing matters. Jimmy Albrecht has extensive practical policing experience as he retired as a NYPD Captain and Commanding Officer after serving in the New York City Police Department for more than 22 years. Afterwards he served three years as the Police Chief of Criminal Investigations in the joint United States/European Union Rule of Law (EULEX) Mission in Kosovo (former Yugoslavia). He was a first responder and incident command team manager at the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 and at numerous critical events within New York City.

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Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview

Introduction One of the most contentious issues impacting America today is the perception that police personnel in the United States have consistently acted in an abusive and corrupt fashion, particularly as it relates to their interaction with minority group members. When these allegations have been substantiated, law enforcement administrators often react on a case-by-case basis, without routinely acknowledging systemic or organizational trends that may warrant more comprehensive action.

The Need for a Clear Typology for Police Deviance One of the flaws in many prior studies is that researchers have attempted to explain unacceptable police practices uniformly while not acknowledging that there are clear distinctions across the spectrum of potential deviant police behaviors. As such, in order to better grasp the plethora of concepts and variables that are commonly referred to as police deviance, it would be beneficial to specifically define the different types of serious police misconduct. A close examination of these incidents nationally (and globally to a general extent) has revealed to the author that police deviance can be categorized into five basic types: 1. Police corruption 2. Police criminality 3. Excessive use of force 4. Abuse of authority 5. Police misconduct This typology will ultimately permit tangible analysis and theoretical discussion. © The Author(s) 2017 J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7_1

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Understanding Police Deviance To be more specific, police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for official misconduct, and official misconduct. Police criminality occurs when police officials engage in direct acts of crime, such as robbery or theft, whether on or off duty. The use of excessive force involves engaging in menacing (i.e., threatening with a weapon) actions, assault, battery, and perhaps murder, when it is not legally justified while acting in the capacity of a police professional. Abuse of authority involves violating the legal mandate of the police position. Such infractions could include illegal stops, searches, and arrests. Finally, police misconduct includes acts that violate the rules and regulations of the respective law enforcement agency. Such agency infractions could include arriving to work late or an unprofessional appearance (which could be indicators of other serious personal issues that could negatively affect police performance). By understanding the distinctions between these misbehaviors, researchers can more easily incorporate theoretical analysis into future research endeavors. As a direct result, many sociological and criminological theories can be applied to the distinct tendencies and patterns that have been revealed.

Examining Police Deviance Through Trends In order to better understand the patterns apparent in American policing as it relates to police deviance, historical trends in the United States over the last five decades will be evaluated, and specific incidents of serious police misbehavior occurring within the New York City Police Department, a large urban law enforcement agency often viewed as a “trend setter” (but not always for positive accomplishment), the Los Angeles Police Department, and other American police departments will be closely examined. Sociological theories will be applied to apparent patterns that have been revealed.

Research Must Have Purpose: Practical Recommendations As no research can be considered as meaningful without resulting in practical implications, the sociological theories that have been identified will be followed by recommendations to the pre-employment and in-service practices and policies generally present in American law enforcement agencies in an effort to deter police deviance, enhance organizational professionalism and transparency, and improve executive leadership capabilities.

Chapter 2

Understanding Police Deviance

Police Deviance in the United States The United States routinely ranks in the top 20 nations (of 182 United Nations member states) when the public perception of government corruption is ranked. However, the United States has consistently received a score that indicates that the public believes that approximately 25–30% of American government officials engage in acts of corruption (Transparency International 2017). Clearly this is alarming, but this would be even more disturbing if the agencies responsible for enforcing the law were excessively involved in these practices. Fortunately the evidence appears to point predominantly in the direction of private corporations and special interest groups attempting to obtain advantages within the political arena. When the American law enforcement profession was recently examined, the rate of police misconduct within the United States was noted to be below 0.5%, i.e., less than half of 1% of all police personnel had been the subject of allegations of criminality or serious misconduct in 2009 and 2010 (Packman 2010). This supports the findings of the Christopher Commission that revealed that less than 0.5% of LAPD officers could be labeled as being “problematic” (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 1991). Even when examining involuntary terminations from law enforcement agencies, less than 2% of police officers were found to have been separated from the organization for cause, including dismissals, terminations, and forced resignations or retirements. Of those involuntary separations, more were found to be attributable to profit-oriented corruption than to brutality or other allegations of civilian abuse and were found to likely involve male rather than female officers (Fyfe and Kane 2006). Other studies have supported the notion that a small percentage of officers account for a disproportionate amount of agency misconduct (Harris 2009). While ultimately the goal should be total eradication of police deviance, it should be noted that the number of reported incidents of police misconduct is relatively minimal and that many empirical analyses have based their findings on the total amount of allegations made and not the number of ­substantiated © The Author(s) 2017 J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7_2

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cases or criminal convictions, which undoubtedly would result in a much smaller value for identified deviant police personnel. Regardless, any accusation of police deviance or criminality often taints the reputation of the entire agency involved, and the more sensational cases (e.g., the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles, the Abner Louima attack in New York City, etc.) have often placed the credibility and legitimacy of the entire law enforcement profession into question.

Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review The first issue that researchers should attempt is to specifically delineate what police deviance is. Unfortunately there is no one common definition or typology for this phenomenon, and many researchers have listed different inappropriate behaviors when discussing the topic. Kappeler et  al. (1998) included corruption, abuse of authority, police crime, and occupational deviance as categories of police deviance, but this examination was not inclusive of all potential classes of police misbehavior. Klockars et al. (2003) produced the seminal survey instrument to examine the perceptions of corruption. Actions which they described as involving police corruption also included working in the security profession while off duty,1 accepting free coffee and meals,2 police officers referring victims to specific businesses, drinking alcohol while on duty, and other questionable or illegal actions by law enforcement personnel. Their research has been replicated in other countries including Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia (Haberfeld et al. 2000). Barker and Carter (1993) identified five patterns of police deviance which included corruption, courtroom perjury, police brutality, sex on duty, sleeping on duty, and drinking on duty. Punch (2000) separates the concept of police deviance into three categories, namely, corruption,  In New York City and other jurisdictions, police officers are permitted to work in most security positions with the specific permission of their agency administrators, so this does not necessarily mean that police personnel who work a second job in the security field are deviant or corrupt. As such, classifying the option of working security as a secondary profession as ‘police deviance’ or ‘corruption’ would not always be accurate. 2  Accepting free coffee has presented some discomfort to police administrators. On one hand, the police should move closer to the community, and accepting a cup of coffee or a nonalcoholic beverage would be considered appropriate within the boundaries of community policing. Some businesses that operate 24 h (e.g., 7/11 stores, Dunkin Donuts, diners, and some gas stations) have established the standard practice of providing free coffee to uniformed police personnel, more so on the night shift. On the other hand, there are businesses that provide free coffee and/or discounted meals to police personnel often with an expectation (e.g., no traffic tickets issues in front of their business or perhaps permitting illegal activity such as gambling to take place on those premises). Again, this is a sensitive situation as each instance may have to be judged on its own specific characteristics and intentions. A troubling issue for frontline police personnel is that they often see high-ranking administrators attending community, business, or interagency meetings where meals are served and they do not understand how that is different from them accepting coffee or discounted meals from local restaurants. The matter also has to be evaluated in relation to its perception by the public. 1

Theories of Crime and Police Deviance

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misconduct, and police crime. We are thus left with no universally accepted definitions or typology for police deviance, police corruption, and other forms of professional abuse and the absence of a distinct typology is apparent. More importantly, this vacuum has often made it difficult for researchers, practitioners, and policy makers to comprehensively address these troubling phenomena.

Theories of Crime and Police Deviance Many noteworthy researchers have attempted to apply specific theoretical explanations for police deviance or corruption, but there has been no universal consensus as to the specific actions or categories that would define deviant police behavior, nor to the distinct criminological or sociological theories that would help in better understanding these phenomena. One interesting viewpoint promoted by Kappeler et al. (1998) and Erikson (1962) is that deviance must be measured from two separate perspectives, the perception of the actors who are committing the corruption and the other view through the eyes of those who observe, investigate, or research the matter. As such, while the public may view certain actions of the police as being inappropriate or deviant, the law enforcement officers involved, due to the subcultural environment, may believe that their acts should be construed as being appropriate or ‘correct’ in order to more effectively deter crime and remove criminals from the streets. Some more common examples of police deviance include professional courtesy at traffic stops, not reporting police misconduct involving colleagues to supervisors or administrators, and even courtroom perjury. Unfortunately fidelity to other police officers under these circumstances has exceeded their loyalty to their oath of office and their service to the public, as these deviant officers have clearly opted to engage in and to justify obvious illegal behavior. The use of excessive force against criminal suspects and falsifying evidence or courtroom testimony have often been rationalized through the “just desserts” conception, in which no true harm has been done to society through these actions, since criminals deserve to be punished. Such acts have been routinely referred to as “noble cause” corruption (Crank and Caldero 1999), since officers may have considered their efforts to ensure that criminals be properly punished, regardless of methods used, to be an acceptable option to control crime. As a result, some police officers have incorporated aspects of police deviance into their law enforcement and order maintenance practices. These disconcerting actions clearly must be addressed in order to reintroduce professionalism, integrity and legitimacy into policing in practice. Emphasis on ethics and public service must be paramount. Many other studies on the application of criminological theory to inappropriate police behavior have been reported. One significant research publication made an attempt to apply control balance theory (Tittle 1995) to police deviance. Tittle (1995) and Hickman et al. (2001, p. 503) theorized that “the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise (the control ratio) affects both the probability of deviance as well as the specific form of devi-

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ance.” Control balance theory outlines that actual deviance is a product of complex interactions between three factors: motivation, constraint, and opportunity. Each person has a “psychic need” that draws them toward deviant action and a desire for autonomy. Their actions within a specific opportunity are therefore triggered by an imbalance within their “control ratio.” A person could then be motivated to act in a deviant fashion if they could escape a “control deficit” and extend a “control surplus.” As a result, the opportunity for some type of deviance is almost always present (Tittle 1995). Within police work, the frequency of the opportunities and the isolated and unsupervised nature of the events add to the potential that officers may act in a deviant fashion. The findings of this research revealed that police personnel with control deficits were more likely to report police misconduct to supervisors and agency administrators (Hickman et al. 2001), which is counter to what is commonly observed in many police organizations. As such, this conclusion poses that officers with stronger attitudes toward ethics were more likely to engage in appropriate conduct and less likely to engage in activity that would support the “blue wall of silence” phenomenon. This theory would appear to provide support for the need for effective pre-employment screening methods, organizational and supervisory leadership, and mandatory integrity control measures. Once again, however, using one criminological theory to generalize all categories of police deviance leads to challenges in developing and implementing appropriate policy measures to enhance individual and organizational professionalism.

Defining Police Deviance: A Clear Typology Police deviance can take many forms, from serious crime to simple violations of agency rules. In simplest terms, police deviance can be defined as disregarding agency policy, rules and regulations, policies, and/or criminal law. The observations and research conducted by the author concluded that there are five basic categories of police deviance: 1. Police corruption 2. Police criminality 3. Excessive use of force 4. Abuse of authority 5. Police misconduct Police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for official misconduct, and official misconduct. Police criminality occurs when police officials engage in direct acts of crime, such as robbery or theft, whether on or off duty. The use of excessive force involves engaging in menacing (i.e., threatening with a weapon) actions, assault, battery, and perhaps murder, when it is not justified while acting in the capacity of a police professional. Abuse of authority involves

References

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violating the legal mandate of the police position. Such infractions could include illegal stops, searches, and arrests. Finally, police misconduct includes acts that violate the rules and regulations of the respective law enforcement agency. Such agency infractions could include arriving to work late or an unprofessional appearance (which could be indicators of other serious personal issues that could negatively affect police performance). Most acts of police misconduct are not illegal but are violations of agency policies and procedures. They are usually punished through administrative means (e.g., loss of a fixed amount of pay, suspension from duty for a fixed period, demotion, or a change in assignment). In order to establish a more concrete understanding of police deviance, significant related events, incidents, and agency protocols that have occurred within the New York City Police Department,3 as an example of an American municipal police agency, over the last 50 years will be comprehensively examined. Additional examination of sensational police scandals in the Los Angeles Police Department and other American law enforcement agencies will be conducted. After describing the accomplishments and ignominious experiences of the NYPD, an evaluation of the research related to law enforcement pre-employment screening and the application of theoretical explanations for crime will be conducted in order to determine if there are any effective means to screen out potentially problematic individuals before hiring or during the police academy and field training stages to avoid and deter later criminality and serious misconduct within police organizations. In addition, concluding recommendations will follow that will outline practical measures to enhance individual and organizational integrity and to prioritize professional and ethical standards.

References Barker, T., & Carter, D. L. (1993). Police deviance (3rd ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company. Crank, J. P., & Caldero, M. A. (1999). Police ethics: The corruption of noble cause. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company. Erikson, K. T. (1962). Notes on the sociology of deviance. Social Problems, 9, 307–314. Fyfe, J. J., & Kane, R. (2006). Bad cops: A study of career-ending misconduct among New York City police officers. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Haberfeld, M. R., Klockars, C. B., Kutnjak Ivkovich, S., & Pagon, M. (2000). Police officer perceptions of the disciplinary consequences of police corruption in Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and the United States. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 1(1), 41–72. Harris, D. A. (2009). How accountability-based policing can reinforce—Or replace—The fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 7, 149. Hickman, M. J., Piquero, A. R., Lawton, B. A., & Greene, J. R. (2001). Applying tittle’s control balance theory to police deviance. Policing, 24(4), 497–519.

 The author worked for the New York City Police Department for 22 years from 1982 through 2003, including an assignment conducting internal investigations. 3

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Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department. (1991). Report of the independent commission on the Los Angeles police department. Los Angeles: Independent Commission on the LAPD. Kappeler, V. E., Sluder, R. D., & Alpert, G. P. (1998). Forces of deviance: Understanding the dark side of policing (2nd ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Klockars, C. B., Kutnjak Ivkovich, S., & Haberfeld, M. R. (2003). The contours of police integrity. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Packman, D. (2010). National police misconduct Reporting system. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Punch, M. (2000). Police corruption and its prevention. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 8, 301–324. Tittle, C. (1995). Control balance: Toward a general theory of deviance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Transparency International. (2017). Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Berlin: Transparency International.

Chapter 3

Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

 imetable of American Police Deviance and Serious T Misconduct (1960s–Present) In order to avoid making generalizations about police deviance by evaluating a small number of incidents or isolated events, the more effective approach will be to examine the most significant and disturbing trends observed over the last five decades. National and local occurrences will be outlined, with those taking place in the New York City Police Department over that time frame given the most attention, in line with the resulting impact that those media and government reports have placed on the policing profession across the United States. In addition, the New York City Police Department often considers itself to be a national and global trend setter, whether it is dealing with crime reduction efforts or measures to increase organizational professional standards and integrity.’

The 1960s From a law enforcement perspective, the 1960s were notable for a number of critical events. The civil rights movement placed law enforcement personnel in a position to attempt to maintain the peace at demonstrations that often turned violent. When police officers countered disruptive or threatening demonstrators with force (mainly physical force or use of the police baton), many groups, including minority group advocates and the media, often alleged that the force used by police was excessive (Mara 2009). What made matters worse was the formation of extremist groups (e.g., Black Panthers, Red Army Faction, Weather Underground, Puerto Rican Independence Front, etc.) who engaged in planned attacks and routine assassinations of police resources across the United States. This placed police patrol officers continually on the defensive. © The Author(s) 2017 J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7_3

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

In order to counter the rising crime rate, President Lyndon Johnson addressed the US Congress in 1965 with a specific request which was called “Special Message to the Congress on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice” (Johnson 1965). As a result of the president’s request, the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance was developed. A number of initiatives resulted including developing strategies on the federal and local level to address the growing organized crime threat, maintaining universal crime statistics at the national level, conducting victimization surveys, imposing drug control measures, and developing strategies to reduce juvenile delinquency (Katzenbach 1967). As part of these many recommendations, the Commission also called for enhanced training for police personnel. Traditionally police officers had previously served in the military and were deployed with only limited police academy exposure and were presented with a brief list of agency rules and regulations. Most police officers were left to learn their trade on the streets. The Commission recommended not only enhanced training but also college education for law enforcement personnel and provided funding to universities for these purposes (Katzenbach 1967). Likely the most significant events that impacted the law enforcement profession were US Supreme Court cases that restricted and developed police authority. Examples include Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 [1968]), Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), Elkins v. United States (364 U.S. 206 [1960]), and Rios v. United States (364 U.S. 253 [1960]). Each one of these cases (among others) redefined the authority of police officers and created concrete direction to ensure that law enforcement actions were in line with constitutional guidelines. In summary, the 1960s left a notable impression on the New York City Police Department and many American law enforcement agencies, which often implemented formalized police academy training measures and distributed detailed rules, regulations, and directives, based on policy recommendations made by government commissions and resulting from the findings of major US Supreme Court decisions.

The 1970s New York City and other large American municipalities were faced with dramatically increasing serious and violent crime rates throughout the 1970s, much of it revolving around a growing organized crime and street level illicit drug distribution threat. Of similar importance was federally imposed legislation that mandated that minorities and women be granted equal hiring and promotional opportunities in private and public organizations. Federal laws prohibiting discrimination strengthened continually from the early 1960s to 1970s (Player 2009). This drastically changed the work atmosphere within the predominantly white male New York City Police Department. Most notably, both females and blacks were granted opportunities that had previously been organizationally (albeit often unofficially) prohibited.

The 1980s

11

Two major events radically influenced policing in New  York City during the 1970s. The first was the uncovering of a corruption scandal that essentially reached all levels of the New York City Police Department. The agency’s corruption practices came to light when a number of officers reported their concerns to the New York Times in 1970. This action led New York City Mayor John Lindsay to form a panel, called the Knapp Commission, which would investigate corruption practices within the New York City Police Department from 1971 to 1972 (Mass 1973). Although only a small number of NYPD officers lost their jobs or were arrested, it was strongly believed that the corruption, which routinely involved weekly payoffs to patrol officers to permit organized crime activity to continue, went to the top levels of the police department. The final half of the 1970s was defined by overwhelming budgetary problems in New York City, with the Mayor coming close to publically declaring bankruptcy. As a result, the New  York City Police Department cut thousands of police officers. With the limited number of patrol officers, NYPD personnel were moved from traditional foot patrol to police vehicles equipped with new two-way radios (Kavanaugh 2010). The belief thereafter was that this would permit law enforcement officers to respond quickly to crime calls and apprehend the majority of criminal suspects shortly after the act. This never came to fruition and the only thing that resulted was the movement of police officers away from close contact with the community.

The 1980s With the start of the 1980s came political and financial stability. The New York City Police Department commenced an 8-year trend of hiring a minimum of two 2000 strong police candidate classes each year.1 While this may sound unbelievable, the New York City was attempting to bring the complement of police personnel to pre-­ 1975 levels while also addressing the escalating crime and violence rates. With the dawn of crack cocaine, drug-related murders quickly became rampant. And crime committed by drug abusers to feed their addictive habits resulted in notable increases in theft, robbery, and assault complaints. With such a quick and dramatic increase in patrol personnel, the New York City Police Department implemented the Community Patrol Officer Program in 1983 in one police station but reported initial successes resulted in department-wide implementation to all 75 police stations throughout New York City. As a direct result of this initiative, each police station was tasked with deploying ten police officers in large fixed area beats. These officers, called community policing beat cops, were to evaluate crime problems, look for underlying causes, and recommend strategies for correcting them in partnership with community members and government and private agencies (Vera Institute of Justice 1984). The program was essentially a combination of the foot patrol program  The author was hired by the NYPD in January 1984 with more than 2200 other police officers, after having served more than two years as a volunteer NYPD auxiliary police officer. 1

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

promoted by Trojanowicz (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1998) and the problemsolving concept made popular by Goldstein (1990). Ultimately, this endeavor had no significant impact on crime, as the murder rate exceeded 2000 annually in New York City during the final years of the 1980s (United States Department of Justice 1989; United States Department of Justice 1990). In 1986, the New York City Police Department was once again embarrassed by a major corruption scandal that took place in the 77th Precinct (police station), a high crime neighborhood within the borough of Brooklyn. In this isolated case, a small cadre of police officers had been caught engaging in thefts and robberies of drugs from small street level drug dealers and later with resale of the stolen controlled substances in the same neighborhoods. At times, they accepted payoffs to “protect” drug dealers from arrest by fellow officers. The New  York City Police Department was finally able to complete the investigation by granting the two lead corrupt officers immunity from prosecution in return for their cooperation, which ultimately led to the arrest of many of the police officers who were working the midnight shift at that police station (McAlary 1989). The predominant lesson learned from this sad episode was that these police officers believed that they were above the law, particularly as New York City Police Department management distanced themselves from these events in order to save their careers. Ultimately no upper level manager within the agency was held responsible for this relatively long-term and glaring violation of the criminal law.

The Early 1990s (1990–1993) The most significant case that negatively affected the law enforcement profession in the United States in the 1990s was the incident involving the Los Angeles Police Department and suspect Rodney King in March 1991. Following a long vehicle pursuit, suspect Rodney King allegedly failed to comply with the directions of Los Angeles Police Department personnel who were attempting to place him under arrest. To counter the suspect’s resistance, police personnel opted to repeatedly strike the suspect with their batons. The suspect was eventually arrested. The incident was videotaped by a bystander. Four LAPD officers were eventually cleared in a California state court of assault and related charges but were later convicted of violating the suspect’s civil rights in federal court. The acquittal in state court in April 1992 led to widespread rioting across Los Angeles. This was the first major case where videotaped police behavior led to social unrest across the United States and allegations of excessive use of force quickly became more relevant. The 1990s as it relates to the New York City Police Department must be divided into two eras. From 1990 through 1993, the NYPD embarked on a comprehensive overhaul of the agency’s philosophy with the implementation of community policing as the agency-wide strategy. Violent crime rates had risen to unforeseen levels, and the citizens of New York City actually agreed to pay increased taxes in order to pay for the hiring of thousands more police officers. In exchange for this proposal,

The Early 1990s (1990–1993)

13

both the Mayor of New York City and the Governor of New York State mandated that the new police officers be placed on neighborhood foot patrol in every community throughout the city. Over 3 years, this deployment greatly increased the visibility of uniformed police officers who were assigned to fixed foot patrol beats (ranging between 30 and 70 in every police station) and who were required to utilize long-term problem-solving approaches (New York City Police Department 1990). The enhanced police presence had an immediate and striking result in that crime rates across all categories, including murder, began to stabilize and actually declined slightly by the end of 1993. Another important agency development was the imposition of steady shifts for all NYPD police stations. This brought an end to a rotating work schedule which resulted in patrol personnel moving from a 5-day work week of midnight shifts (from 11 PM to 7 AM), to a 5-day work week of day shifts (7 AM to 3 PM), to a 5-day work week of evening shifts (3–11 PM), and so on. Since 1990, NYPD patrol personnel have worked steady day shifts, or steady evening shifts, or steady night shifts, and the rotating schedule was eliminated since it was believed to cause undue health and stress risks to employees (Cosgrove and McElroy 1986). In contrast to these positive developments, the New York City in 1992 was once more disgraced by two separate large-scale corruption scandals that involved two high crime, drug-ridden police stations, the 75th Precinct in eastern Brooklyn and the 30th Precinct in northern Harlem in Manhattan. In the 75th Precinct, a team of police officers on the midnight shift were found to be stealing drugs from drug dealers for personal use and for resale. More embarrassing was that it was not the NYPD but rather another police agency in Long Island, New York, that apprehended these police officers for dealing narcotics. In the 30th Precinct, numerous police officers on the midnight shift were caught by NYPD internal investigators stealing drugs and committing perjury in court as it related to facts involving drug arrests. The New York City Mayor appointed a panel of experts, called the Mollen Commission, to investigate these cases and make recommendations to better control corruption and criminality by police personnel within the New York City Police Department (Mollen 1994). As a direct result of the report by the Mollen Commission, the New York City Police Department revised the internal affairs investigation mechanism through a number of critical steps: enhancing the number of investigators and supervisors assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau, naming a civilian commissioner to head the Internal Affairs Bureau, performing both random and target integrity tests,2 conducting random and promotional drug tests,3 increasing the hiring qualifications by

 Integrity tests evaluate a police officer’s reaction to found currency or narcotics and ensure that legal and police department procedural guidelines are complied with. Most tests are randomly administered but can also be conducted on targeted police officers when there is suspicion that they may be engaging in thefts or other criminality. 3  Drug tests can also be administered for cause when there is reasonable suspicion that the police employee has smoked or ingested illegal narcotics. 2

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

raising the minimum age from 20 to 224 and the educational requirement from a high school diploma to 60 college credits, implementing mandatory routine ethical and integrity training, and selecting Internal Affairs Bureau investigators and supervisors not only from direct applicants but from the list of all applicants seeking an investigative assignment5 (Mollen 1994). Another outcome of the public outcry regarding the most recent NYPD corruption scandal was that the New  York City Mayor in 1993 shifted the Civilian Complaint Review Board and its investigators from NYPD supervision to an independent agency under direct civilian oversight (NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board 2012).

The Late 1990s (1994–2000) In January 1994, Republican candidate Rudolph W.  Giuliani was sworn in as New York City’s Mayor. His platform promoted a hard stance against crime and a promise to improve the quality of life throughout the city. To spearhead these efforts, Mayor Giuliani appointed former Boston Police Chief William Bratton as the New York City Police Commissioner. His first month in office saw the total restructuring of the upper executive corps with highly motivated “young blood” administrators taking over the top executive positions. In addition, a number of radical initiatives were immediately commenced that revolved around the corporate management model favored by Commissioner Bratton. The most significant strategies included the implementation of the “zero tolerance” proactive policing model and the use of timely crime statistics to permit the strategic deployment of police resources to crime-plagued locations (Albrecht 2011). In 1994, NYPD crime reduction strategists theorized that individuals who committed lower-level offenses may later be responsible for participating in more violent criminal activity.6 By targeting and detaining offenders for less serious infractions, the police may be preventing a more tragic incident from occurring (Albrecht 2011). While this concept may sound like a recent innovation, it was first introduced by Patrick Colquhoun (1795) in the 1790s, when he advocated targeting  This would permit a potential police candidate to have served 4 years in the military or complete a bachelor’s degree. 5  When a police officer, detective, sergeant, or lieutenant applied for a position within the NYPD’s Detective Bureau, Narcotics Division, or other criminal investigative units, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) received “first choice” in transferring that applicant to the IAB to ensure that the IAB had experienced investigative staff and management. 6  The author was a supervisor within the NYPD’s research and planning units from 1990 through 1994, and his firsthand exposure to the various elements of community policing from its inception in the early 1980s through his promotion to police station commander at the turn of the millennium makes it difficult to reference many aspects since programmatic elements and statistics were obtained while in service and were common knowledge to NYPD practitioners, particularly those in executive ranks. 4

The Late 1990s (1994–2000)

15

nonviolent unlawful activity, e.g., gambling, public intoxication, etc., to deter more serious illegal activity. The NYPD quickly initiated a “zero tolerance” policy and began proactively enforcing lower-level offenses including panhandling, public intoxication, excessive noise, and disorderly conduct. All NYPD patrol personnel were supplied with pocket-sized cards outlining legal references and procedural guidelines involving the lower-level infractions. An additional goal of this strategy was to improve the quality of life in public areas (Albrecht 2011). In line with George Kelling’s and James Q. Wilson’s “Broken Windows” posed theory, both sociologists and practitioners believed that addressing the quality of life concerns of the community should improve public confidence in the police and reduce the level of fear in the traditionally higher-crime neighborhoods in the city (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Since its inception in January 1994, this initiative has been highly effective and has greatly contributed to the impressive −87% decrease in FBI Index Crime levels in New  York City through 2017.7 As a result, New  York City continues to be regarded as the safest city in the United States of America with a population exceeding one million residents (Albrecht 2011). The other half of the corporate management model was the implementation of a new agency mindset that would hold police command executives completely accountable for all operations within their respective police stations and units. Police commanders were granted the discretion to assign their personnel as they deem necessary and no longer as per predesignated staffing percentage guidelines. In order to be best informed and to appropriately deploy manpower, it is clear that police commanders must have information regarding current crime trends and productivity indicators readily available. Due to the archaic handwritten fashion in which criminal incidents were recorded in the past, statistical information regarding index crimes, arrests, and summary activity was routinely available 90 days to 6 months after the fact. In order to remedy this situation, the NYPD undertook the task of inputting all crime incident reports and arrest information into a computerized database. Precinct commanders and police executives thereafter received a weekly report that outlines summary statistics involving command demographics, precinct/unit staffing levels, civilian complaints, overtime, summons activity, sick rate, radio runs, and response time with comparisons to prior year and city-wide data. Of even more importance is the weekly comparison report that documents criminal incident, arrest, and summons activity on a week-, month-, and year-to-­ date basis. Each commander must prepare a weekly response delineating efforts being made by their respective units to further improve the statistics and reduce serious crime (Albrecht 2011).  The author recognizes that there may be other contributing factors that have supported the dramatic drop in crime in New York City and across the United States since 1993, which include relative economic stability and low unemployment rate, decrease in the American juvenile and adolescent populations, increased incarceration and lengthened prison terms, notable decline in crack cocaine usage and addiction, more effective treatment in the correctional and probationary environments, enhanced use of technology (e.g., DNA analysis, video surveillance, etc.) to prevent and solve crime, etc. 7

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

In order to ensure that police commanders had been (and are) continually analyzing this information and addressing necessary concerns, they were (and continue to be) summoned to unannounced “COMPSTAT” (COMPuter STATistic) meetings at police headquarters, at least once each month. These commanders are subjected to direct questioning by the police commissioner, the NYPD chief of department and other high ranking police executives regarding the respective efforts being undertaken to address recent violent and serious crimes and trends within their specific areas of jurisdiction and to ensure that crime reduction strategies, as instituted, have been and continue to be effective.8 Police commanders are additionally asked about their most recent contacts with community leaders and groups and about civilian complaints made against their personnel (Albrecht 2011). Ultimately what was revealed is that by closely analyzing crime and crime trends and by strategically deploying police resources to crime-prone locations in an effort to remove the criminal element from the streets by employing a “zero tolerance” philosophy for crime and disorder, serious offences and violence can be tackled and the quality of life can be markedly improved. On the other hand, the community policing concept, which promoted community participation and involvement, became the unforeseen victim of the success of the proactive strategic deployment model. Community policing foot patrol officers were slowly transferred to enforcement teams such as those within the Narcotics Division and Street Crime Unit. The practice of the precinct community council9 selecting the three priority problems slowly came to an end, and direct community involvement into agency decision making has essentially disappeared (Albrecht 2011). It was clear that Mayor Giuliani’s “get tough on crime” stance had a clear impact on illegal and violent conduct and improved the quality of life on New York City’s streets. Thorough analysis of crime has resulted in the strategic deployment of NYPD resources in the neighborhoods with the highest crime rates. In New York City, these areas tend to be predominantly minority (i.e., African-American and Hispanic) communities at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. The dramatic increase in uniformed police presence initially drew cries of a “police state” in these neighborhoods, but once violent crime subsided, most community leaders quickly supported the new initiatives. It is now relatively safe to walk on the streets again,  As a tenured police commander or deputy police commander in different police stations, the author personally experienced positive results in drops in crime and increased arrests of criminal suspects by strategically deploying police resources to areas where crime patterns and trends had developed. Although refuted by some, the author believes that there is a direct relationship between the crime analysis/proactive enforcement model of policing and the sharp reduction in index crime rate. 9  In 1990, all NYPD police station commanders were tasked with chairing the monthly “Community Council Meetings” that were held directly in each police station and that were open to all precinct residents and business persons. The purpose of these gatherings was to allow all members of the public to relay their concerns and complaints directly to the police station commander, who in 1994 was given the new responsibility as problem-solving coordinator for the jurisdiction. Three members of each Precinct Community Council would sit with the police station commander and the community policing unit commander and identify the three primary “problems” that police personnel would address over the next 30-day period. 8

The Late 1990s (1994–2000)

17

even in communities that traditionally had high crime rates. However, some minority leaders and political activists have publicly extolled that the increased police presence in minority neighborhoods is racially motivated and is a coordinated effort to target only African-Americans and Hispanics for summary action and arrest (Albrecht 2011). Some of these minority community leaders often refuse to publicly acknowledge the positive impact of the statistical analysis of violence and crime trends, the strategic deployment of police personnel to high-crime neighborhoods, and refuse to accept the reality that the majority of serious crime in New York City is committed by minority males [85%], most of whom are African-American [55%] (Ridgeway 2007). The same leaders maintain that relying on statistics will result in stereotyping which in essence promotes racism (Albrecht 2011). Two incidents compounded these beliefs and drew public and media criticism upon the proactive police practices that are credited with dramatically decreasing crime rates. In August 1997 in the early morning hours, as a crowd was leaving a dance club that was closing for the night, a large group of Haitian immigrants began fighting with each other. When NYPD 70th Precinct police personnel responded to the call for assistance, they themselves were turned upon by the intoxicated crowd. After further police officers arrived and the crowd was finally separated, one of the original combatants, Abner Louima, punched a uniformed police officer in the face without provocation. That officer, Justin Volpe, placed the individual under arrest. What happened next was clearly bizarre and difficult to comprehend. Later the same day, the suspect made the sensational allegation that the officer that had arrested him had brutally and sexually attacked him in the police station bathroom. The Haitian and African-American communities immediately staged large-scale demonstrations. The media grasped the allegation as the major headline for months, relying mainly on the fabricated claim by certain African-American leaders that this single isolated incident was an indication that police brutality against minorities in New York City was widespread. Almost 2 years later in the summer of 1999, Police Officer Volpe pleaded guilty to this unbelievable crime. This brutal attack on an unarmed and handcuffed suspect was the first of a small number of incidents that have drained police-community relations in minority neighborhoods and have initiated a sense of mistrust in the New York City Police Department (Albrecht 2011). Another event that led to scrutiny of the New  York City Police Department occurred in February 1999, when the NYPD’s elite plainclothes Street Crime Unit, with its reputation for arresting large numbers of violent and armed suspects throughout New York City, was deployed in the Soundview section in the Bronx in search of a violent serial rapist. One evening while patrolling the streets in their unmarked vehicles, two officers observed a male in a dimly lighted doorway that they believed resembled the sketch of the wanted suspect. As they exited their auto, the first two officers were joined by two colleagues who had also observed the suspect. The four officers identified themselves as police officers and directed the suspect to stop and raise his hands. The suspect, in apparent defiance, started turning away and reached into his pocket while standing in the dark apartment building doorway. The officer standing closest to the suspect observed the male removed a black object from his pocket and yelled the word “gun!” to his colleagues, and, in self-defense, the police

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

officer drew his firearm and fired. The three other officers also fired, believing that the ricocheting bullets were actually bullets being fired at them. At the conclusion of the event, which lasted only 5 s, the four officers had fired 41 bullets, and the suspect lay dead in the building doorway. The object in the suspect’s hand turned out to be a black wallet. It is unclear why the suspect made the evasive and furtive movements. All four officers involved in the incident were white, and the same African-American leaders once again proclaimed that the incident was a clear example of racism and racial profiling and called for large-scale demonstrations and civil disorder. The media also fueled the “antipolice” environment by reporting that the police had shot and killed an “unarmed street peddler,” when the victim’s occupation had nothing to do with the incident. The Bronx prosecutor, Robert Johnson, himself an AfricanAmerican, in an apparent effort to gain political favor, charged the four officers with intentional premeditated murder (Albrecht 2011). The media attention and public outcry compelled the New  York City Police Department to evaluate recent trends in the stopping of criminal suspects based on Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]) guidelines.10 The African-American community alleged that NYPD personnel had routinely engaged in racial profiling and thereby intentionally targeted mainly African-American and Hispanic individuals when conducting criminal investigations (Albrecht 2011)11. The NYPD analyzed documents to ascertain if these claims were true. The results of this investigation were interesting and notable. Although 90% of suspects described by crime victims were minorities, only 85% of the suspects stopped and investigated by police were African-American or Hispanic, and 13% were white. These statistics therefore counter the claim that NYPD officers engage in racial profiling by intentionally detaining a larger proportion of minority suspects. It appears that police officers in New  York City are merely stopping suspects in response to descriptions provided by crime victims, who in 81% of violent crime incidents are minorities themselves (New York City Police Department 2000). Mayor Giuliani and NYPD executives were quick to emphasize that their own findings countered the claim made by the US Department of Justice that NYPD personnel engage in widespread racial profiling (Albrecht 2011).

 The Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]) decision by the US Supreme Court in 1968 directed that police officers across the United States could stop suspects, even forcefully if necessary, if they had reasonable suspicion that the suspect had been, is presently, or would be engaging in criminal conduct and, in addition, that police officers could frisk those suspects if they reasonably suspected that those individuals may be armed. 11  Advocates for some minority groups have repeatedly alleged that since the percentage of minority group members that have been stopped by the police during these constitutionally permissible “Terry” encounters has exceeded the percentage of African-Americans or Blacks in the general population, that these police actions should be considered to be evident of disparate or discriminatory law enforcement practices. The police across the United States have generally stated, however, that African-Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics in many cities and jurisdictions disproportionally engage in a greater proportion of serious and violent crimes and that police officers working within these communities are merely reacting to crime trends and public demands. 10

The Late 1990s (1994–2000)

19

The four officers were tried in Criminal Court and in February 2000 were acquitted of all charges, having been found to have acted in self-defense. The African-­ American leaders disregarded the jury’s findings and continued to cause more controversy. In two subsequent cases in which African-American suspects were killed by police in New York City, these same leaders claimed that racism played a role, even though the police officers involved were themselves minorities and, in both cases, were involved in life-and-death struggles in which the suspect was trying to take the officer’s firearm. It often appeared as if the media enjoyed causing increased sensationalism and community unrest by emphasizing inaccurate information in their headline reports (Albrecht 2011). In August 1997, in response to the 70th Precinct police brutality case, the NYPD released a new strategy aimed at improving the professional image of the police by emphasizing increased courtesy and respect to the public, criminal suspects, and NYPD supervisors and peers. A copy of the report, entitled Courtesy Professionalism Respect (New York City Police Department 1997), was distributed to each of the 41,000 police officers and 9000 civilian employees of the NYPD. The ultimate goal of this strategy, nicknamed “CPR,” was to “breathe new life” into police-­community relations (Albrecht 2011). The report emphasized positive interaction with the public and noted that if “crime levels decline, but members of the community are reluctant to approach police for fear of a negative encounter, then the police have not met their obligations to the public” (New York City Police Department 1997, p. 3). The document continued that “negative perceptions of police behavior toward the public” may emanate “not only from incidents of actual misconduct, but also from situations where proper police actions were mistakenly viewed by the public as inappropriate” (New York City Police Department 1997, p. 3). What has to be acknowledged is that not only actual acts of police deviance but also perceived acts of inappropriate police conduct will cause the public to lose trust in that police agency. The NYPD has undertaken considerable effort to improve the image of the police. New initiatives have been instituted to enhance the quality of newly hired police officers. The applicant screening process has been revised to emphasize the “screening in” of candidates with desirable characteristics, rather than the “screening out” of unqualified candidates. In addition, efforts have been made to recruit most candidates from the pool of New  York City residents, rather than from the surrounding suburbs (New York City Police Department 1997). Many sociologists believe that persons who reside outside of major American cities may not appreciate the diversity and comprehend the cultural differences in the various communities in the neighboring metropolis (Albrecht 2011). New York City residents now receive extra points toward the final score on hiring and promotional exams, and increased effort has been made to conduct recruitment drives at colleges and schools in minority neighborhoods. Educational requirements for supervisory ranks were increased to mandate fixed levels of college education as one progresses up the management ladder (New York City Police Department 1997). In 1994, the NYPD introduced the “verbal judo” concept when interacting with suspects and other members of the public (Albrecht 2011). Every member of the

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

NYPD has attended the “verbal judo” course, which emphasizes verbal de-­ escalation techniques to help police officers avoid and defuse conflicts while obtaining voluntary compliance, improve communication skills, and reinforce concepts of professionalism and respect to ensure the minimal use of necessary force (Thompson 1983). In addition to attending mandatory community meetings with representatives from the respective neighborhoods in which they serve, all police officers have obtained and will continue to receive both ethical and cultural awareness training and have the opportunity to obtain language instruction to overcome barriers and better communicate with neighborhood residents (New York City Police Department 1997). The NYPD has six separate performance monitoring programs which are designed to proactively identify and track police officers who have had histories of disciplinary infractions, appear to use excessive force, or have personal difficulties which may impact their job performance. This computerized early warning system supplies numerical points to incidents that occur within a police officer’s career. When a police officer obtains a target number of points, the individual is called into police headquarters and is interviewed by a peer counselor who apprises officers of the situation and the negative impact it may have on their career aspirations. If the negative conduct fails to improve, then the officer concerned will be assigned to a non-patrol function. In addition, precinct and unit commanders are apprised of the special monitoring status of personnel within their command and must then continue to reevaluate the performance and progress of the individual officers (New York City Police Department 1997). As for new initiatives in the New York City Police Department that have been developed to enhance police cooperation into the investigation of allegations of police corruption and other deviance, a new policy was enacted in 1997 that directed that any police officer caught lying or making false statements during an internal investigation would be immediately terminated (New York City Police Department 2002). This policy was implemented to overcome the “blue wall of silence,” a common practice in which police officers12 routinely will not provide any information that would implicate another police officer in an internal investigation. In return for volunteering information about acts of police deviance and for openly cooperating in these investigations, police officers who did so were quickly rewarded with desirable assignments and promotions. On the other hand, those who clearly lied when talking to internal investigators were administratively charged and eventually terminated. When these investigations were conducted by federal authorities, police officials who did not properly cooperate or who were believed to have lied where also criminally charged in federal court. These policies and practices have considerably changed the mindset of NYPD personnel.13  This is also noted in other tight-knit and dangerous professions such as firefighting and in the military services. 13  What the author and most police officers have come to realize is that those who engage in the isolated events of police deviance tarnish the reputation of every officer working in that agency. It is therefore in the agency’s best interests to proactively counsel or to terminate these individuals as soon as possible. 12

2001 to the Present

21

In summary, the 1990s in the New York City Police Department has been looked upon positively due to successful endeavors to dramatically reduce crime, but others may say that the sensational incidents of police corruption and deviance have taken away from the positive reputation of the NYPD.

2001 to the Present Clearly the most significant event that has impacted law enforcement in the United States and internationally since the start of the new millennium involves the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Considerable resources have been redeployed to counterterrorism-related responsibilities since that tragic day.14 The New  York City Police Department however has continued its effective deployment with the accompanying impressive crime reduction throughout the new millennium. Ultimately since crime levels have declined to levels not seen since before crime statistics were maintained,15 federal, state, and local governments have considerably reduced budgetary financing for law enforcement endeavors. Essentially the police in America have become the victims of their own success. The police manpower of the NYPD has declined from a high exceeding 41,000 in 2001 to the present level of approximately 36,000 in 2017. Even with the drastic reduction in the number of NYPD personnel since 2001, there has been a continuous push to maintain the amount of summary activity, i.e., arrests, traffic tickets, criminal court summonses, “Terry” stops, etc., to maintain the positive effects of the highly respected proactive police strategy. This quest to ensure that NYPD officers maintain a certain expected level of summary activity has led to repeated allegations that police personnel have been given “quotas” for monthly police activity that they are mandated to meet. With the steep decline in personnel resources and due to supervisory pressure, a small number of police officers are alleged to have engaged in criminal misconduct by falsely arresting suspects, placing fake evidence on arrested individuals,16 and writing “phantom” traffic tickets and other summonses to individuals or vehicles that did not commit any violation of the law.17 In addition, in 2010 and 2011, a number of police officers were found to have “taken care of”18 parking and traffic tickets for  This event and the resultant counterterrorism responsibilities have not significantly affected police integrity, ethics, or deviance, other than concerns regarding the implementation of the Patriot Act, which does not overwhelmingly affect local law enforcement agencies like the NYPD. 15  As noted, uniformed crime reports were first maintained in the 1960s. 16  The practice of making false arrests and of planting fake evidence on suspects is called “flaking.” 17  Some police officers were found to have used the phone book and information found on department databases to write “phantom” summonses and tickets to individuals and vehicles. The summonses and tickets were actually never issued, but individuals only found out about them when the courts notified them that they had failed to pay a fine or show up in court. 18  A police officer could “take care of” a traffic ticket by discreetly disposing of it or by providing false testimony in traffic court. 14

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3  Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States

relatives and friends of police officers. This practice was apparently coordinated by police union representatives (Baker and Goldstein 2011). Even with the normally effective measures that the NYPD and its Internal Affairs Bureau have in place, there have been isolated arrests of off-duty NYPD officers who have provided “protection” for illegal drug groups or who have robbed or ­stolen money from drug dealers in the middle of illegal narcotics transactions. Some have even participated in bank robberies (New York City Police Department 2012). Contemporary allegations involving police abuses and brutality routinely revolve around allegations of racial bias in deployment and enforcement practices. The high-profile death of Eric Garner in July 2014 while resisting his arrest by NYPD officers had shortly followed another sensationalized shooting by police in Ferguson, Missouri. These events among others across the United States have given rise to the “Black Lives Matter” movement, whose supporters have alleged racial bias and excessive use of force by law enforcement personnel across America, particularly as it relates to African-American criminal suspects. While these accusations continue to be made, there has been limited investigatory evidence or empirical support to substantiate these claims. However, the president’s task force on twenty-first-­ century policing has made considerable recommendations to address these claims and to enhance community perceptions and trust in the police (COPS Office 2015).

Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD Police corruption and other forms of police deviance are clearly unacceptable. Police officers, due to their oath of office and the amount of authority that they have been granted, are held to a higher standard than the average citizen. That is why reported police deviance is so sensationalized and why punishments tend to be severe. However, from another perspective, the incidents of police corruption and police deviance are notably rare and have normally involved only an isolated number of officers. The number of NYPD police officers arrested each year (since the early 1990s) encompasses less than 0.5% of the entire complement of uniformed police personnel. The vast majority of these arrests routinely involve domestic and alcohol-related incidents (New York City Police Department 2012).19 When analyzing the larger-scale corruption events that have involved the New York City Police Department since the 1980s, a number of common factors have been identified (Albrecht 2013). The major scandals all occurred within high-­crime police stations, namely, the 77th Precinct, the 30th Precinct, the 75th Precinct, and the 70th Precinct.  The number of NYPD police officers arrested on an annual basis is less than 0.5% of the total complement of police officials, and this has remained stable since 1990. The overwhelming number of arrests is made for domestic incidents and alcohol-related offences such as bar altercations or drunk driving. The extreme (ab)use of excessive force, police corruption, and police criminality are exceptionally rare events and have tended to involve one or two police officers and not a large team of officers as seen during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. 19

Summary: Police Deviance

23

These communities are plagued by widespread street-level and indoor drug dealing. Since these police stations were undesirable to police personnel, they were the most common locations where troublesome police officers were transferred to after they had been identified as “problem” employees.20 The police station commander often assigned these officers to the midnight shift in an effort to limit their contact with community residents. Since these police stations had high workloads, the supervisors assigned within these precincts were normally overwhelmed with work, which limited time to provide “problem” officers with extra supervision. In addition, some of the “problem” employees were supervisors themselves with poor or indifferent management skills. Due to the high crime rate, these police stations were not routinely visited or inspected by police managers from NYPD’s central headquarters or from the regional command office. Even those involved in NYPD internal investigation units avoided travel to these areas and opted to spend more time conducting surveillances in more desirable and safer communities. In essence, police personnel who worked in high-crime, drug-prone police stations, specifically those who worked on the midnight shift, were not tightly supervised by the police station and external police management. This eventually provided the problem officers with “free reign” to perform their duties as they wanted to (Albrecht 2013). When closely examining the police officers who eventually turned to corruption and criminality in the identified large-scale cases, most of the officers involved actually were later identified as being “proactive” employees who routinely made arrests for drug offences and other serious crimes. The high crime rates made it easy to take summary action (i.e., make arrests). A common trend was often observed. These officers initially engaged in proper arrest processing but eventually, and likely due to the lack of appropriate supervision, engaged in evidence and inventory abuses, which included drug disposal to avoid paperwork, and then moved on to theft of some of the drugs to reward cooperative informants, then to theft of some of the currency that was recovered, to theft of all the money retrieved from the suspects or crime scenes, and finally to the theft of the drugs seized for resale to other drug dealers. Almost all of the officers engaged in some form of perjury when preparing police reports or while testifying in court (Albrecht 2013).

Summary: Police Deviance As mentioned above, police deviance cannot be generalized to one form of inappropriate or illegal conduct. The five general classifications within the police deviance typology are (1) police corruption, (2) police criminality, (3) excessive use of force, (4) abuse of authority, and (5) police misconduct. In addition, the phenomena  “Problem” employees include police officers who were involved in higher-level disciplinary cases. As part of the punishment process, these officers would be transferred to undesirable work locations, and those who had performed in an exemplary fashion at those same police stations were permitted to transfer to a more desirable precinct. 20

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involving the “blue wall of silence” and the recent and consistent occurrences of courtroom perjury and “ticket fixing” are also unacceptable practices that must be included within the umbrella of serious police misconduct. It should also be noted that officers involved in police misbehavior at times take part in more than one of the outlined classifications.

References Albrecht, J. F. (2011). Analyzing the implementation and evolution of community policing in the United States and Scandinavia. In I. M. Guzman, A. M. Das, & D. K. Das (Eds.), Strategic responses to crime: Thinking globally, acting locally. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Albrecht, J. F. (2013, October). Corruption control through effective leadership: Understanding police deviance. Philadelphia: Presentation at the Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Baker, A., & Goldstein, J.  (2011, October 28). Unsealed indictments shed light on procedures for ticket-fixing by officers. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/nyregion/ in-ticket-fixing-scandal-16-officers-to-be-charged.html Colquhoun, P. (1795). A treatise on the police of the metropolis. Patterson Smith Reprint Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement and Social Problems (7th ed.), Publication No. 42 (reprinted 1969). COPS Office. (2015). President’s task force on 21st century policing implementation guide: Moving from recommendations to action. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Cosgrove, C. A., & McElroy, J. E. (1986). The fixed tour experiment in the 115th precinct: Its effects on police officer stress, community perceptions, and precinct management. Executive Summary. New York: Vera Institute of Justice. Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206. (1960). Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-oriented policing. New York: McGraw-Hill. Johnson, L.  B. (1965, March 8). Special message to the congress on law enforcement and the administration of justice. Online by G.  Peters & J.  T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26800 Katzenbach, N. D. (1967). The challenge of crime in a free society: A report by the president’s commission on law enforcement and administration of justice. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Kavanaugh, J. J. (2010). No back-up needed: How veteran New York City cops struggled through the summer of 1975, when New York City went broke. Oakland, OR: Red Anvil Press. Mara, W. (2009). Perspectives on civil unrest in the 1960s: Riots and their aftermath. New York: Benchmark Books. Mass, P. (1973). Serpico, the cop who defied the system. New York: Viking Press. McAlary, M. (1989). Buddy boys: When good cops turn bad. Kirkwood, NY: Putnam Publishing Group. Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436. (1966). Mollen, M. (1994). Commission report: Commission to investigate allegations of police corruption and the anti-corruption procedures of the police department. New York: City of New York. New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board. (2012). History of the CCRB. NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board Website. http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/history.html New York City Police Department. (1990). NYPD staffing needs plan. New York: NYPD Printing Office. New York City Police Department. (1997). Courtesy, professionalism, respect. New York: NYPD Printing Office.

References

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New York City Police Department. (2000). NYPD response to the draft “Police practices and civil rights in New York City”. New York: NYPD Printing Office. New York City Police Department. (2002). NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau Annual Report 2001. New York: NYPD Printing Office. New York City Police Department. (2012). NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau Annual Report 2011. New York: NYPD Printing Office. Player, M. A. (2009). Federal law of employment discrimination in a nutshell (6th ed.). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company. Ridgeway, G. (2007). New York: Analysis of racial disparities in the New  York City Police Department’s stop, question and frisk practices. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Rios v. United States 364 U.S. 253. (1960). Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1. (1968). Thompson, G. (1983). Verbal judo: Words as a force option. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishers. Trojanowicz, R., & Bucqueroux, B. (1998). Community policing: How to get started (2nd ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company. United States Department of Justice. (1989). Crime in the United States 1988. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. United States Department of Justice. (1990). Crime in the United States 1989. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Vera Institute of Justice. (1984). The community patrol officer program: A pilot program in community oriented policing in the 72nd precinct. Interim Progress Report (Internal Document). New York: Vera Institute of Justice. Wilson, J.  Q., & Kelling, G.  L. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. Atlantic Quarterly, 256, 29–38.

Chapter 4

Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance

Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance Now that a typology for police deviance has been delineated, there is the need to better understand the criminological explanations and roots for these categories of police misconduct.

Theories of Crime and Police Corruption Police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for official misconduct, and engaging in official misconduct. After the Knapp Commission review in 1972 involving the NYPD agency-wide payoff scheme, most incidents involving corruption payoffs were eliminated. However, with the emergence of the highly profitable illicit drug trading that developed across New York City through the 1980s, the potential for bribery attempts and offers of other benefits to law enforcement personnel in exchange for allowing local drug dealing to flourish arose. The most lucrative areas for drug dealing were in the impoverished and crime-ridden areas. In applying theories of crime to police corruption, which involves the willful acceptance of bribes and other rewards, the officer has in essence committed to engaging in official misconduct. In most cases, the incentive to engage in this deviance would involve the reception of money or other valuable item or items. One possible theory of crime that could be applied is the strain theory as it has been clarified by Merton (1968). Merton’s strain theory proposed that societal pressure to achieve unattainable material goals can coerce individuals to engage in criminality. Specifically as it applies to the New York City Police Department, whose officers © The Author(s) 2017 J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7_4

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have been recognized as some of the most underpaid within the northeastern US region and are the one of the lowest paid among America’s largest municipal police agencies,1 one can identify the potential for NYPD officers to desire more material goods to keep up with the social pressures of the high cost of living in New York City. Many of those who were later apprehended were found to own lavish homes, sport cars, and other luxury items (McAlary 1989). One routine recommendation by three NYC mayoral commissions that have followed the major scandals has been an increase in salary for NYPD personnel to counter the potential for temptation to engage in deviance or corruption (Mollen 1994). In the newer generation of identified corrupt NYPD officers, some have been found to have had prior associations or contacts with criminal gangs or street-level criminals. These relationships were not revealed during the pre-employment screening process. These younger officers continued their involvement with some of these criminal elements and were drawn into corrupt activities to further their commitment to their private associates.2 These officers have likely been influenced by differential association, but in this case, their loyalty is stronger to outside contacts and friends, rather than to their work cohort. Their socialization to the deviant elements in the community had been developed prior to their police employment. As such, in these isolated cases, this form of corruption (and associated criminality) could be attributed to Sutherland’s differential association theory (Gaylord and Galliher 1988), which suggested that individuals learn their personal values, techniques, and motives for their illegal activities through contact with others within their respective social network. One final theoretical explanation to explain police corruption could involve Becker’s rational choice theory. Rational choice theory proposes that criminals, and all people, weigh the costs and risks and potential rewards and benefits when considering whether to engage in criminal conduct. Economic factors also play a significant role. Proper planning to avoid detection and apprehension will be devised, and criminals actually conduct a probability analysis before engaging in deviant acts (Becker 1968). In the case of police officers, they may believe that since they are the actors charged with the enforcement of the law, the potential for detection or arrest would be relatively low. As such, some corrupt police personnel may have believed that their position has left them “above the law.”

 At one point in 2004, the New York City Mayor actually decreased the starting salary for new police officers by more than −25%. Even with tax surpluses that at times exceeded $4 billion annually over the last 15 years, no raises or cost of living increases were provided to NYPD personnel on a routine basis. The situation changed in 2007 when New York City was embarrassed that the NYPD could not fill their budgeted police academy complements. 2  This is one reason why the NYPD does not permit enforcement personnel to live in the area in which they work. However, the policy does not preclude police officers from working in areas where they had previously lived, attended school, or had been employed. 1

Theories of Crime and Police Criminality

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Theories of Crime and Police Criminality Police criminality encompasses criminal actions undertaken by police personnel other than corruption and the excessive use of force. These incidents would involve theft, robbery, drug dealing, and other illegal endeavors. In the three most significant cases, New York City Police Department officers assigned to the crime-ridden, drug-prone 30th, 75th, and 77th Precincts engaged in the routine theft of money, drugs, and other valuables, at times threatening violence. In many cases, stolen drugs were used to reward informants or were resold by the police officers themselves to increase criminal profit (McAlary 1989; Mollen 1994). The investigation and some of the interviews of the officers involved later revealed that many of the police officers had started their careers by engaging in productive enforcement of the laws. They expressed frustration when seeing the criminal offenders promptly returned to the street (commonly referred to as the “revolving door court system”) with little or no punishment. The detailed and tedious evidence inventory process led many to destroy some of the drugs recovered. As this went on undetected, the officers slowly progressed to removing some and eventually all of the recovered currency for their personal use. Eventually further greed developed, and the officers reverted to not making arrests and merely stealing the criminal proceeds and either delivering the recovered drugs to cooperative drug dealers or selling the drugs either within the boundary of the police station or outside the New  York City borders (McAlary 1989; Mollen 1994). Clearly there was an evolution to the deviance that had arisen in almost all cases. From a theoretical perspective, the most likely explanation for these developments would rely on Becker’s rational choice model (Becker 1968). It would appear that the officers calculated the likelihood of detection and, noting its unlikelihood, progressed from low-level criminality to serious crime and violence. In the perspective of these criminal officers, Tittle’s proposed “control ratio” (Tittle 1995) theory would have weighed in on the side of deviance, as the lack of personal integrity and effective supervisory practices appeared to be deficient or absent in many of the identified scandals. This was most obvious in the NYPD’s sensational cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s and in the LAPD’s Rampart Division events in the late 1990s, where isolated but small teams of officers engaged in the theft of drugs and currency and other criminality without the fear of detection or apprehension. In addition, since these three scandals involved a small cadre of criminal police officers all routinely working together on the same shift, one could propose that Sutherland’s differential association theory (Gaylord and Galliher 1988) played a role in their illicit conduct. In these scenarios, which involved groups of officers and not simply individual actors, it would appear that many officers believed that they would not be identified as a member of “the team” unless they participated in criminal activities. The absence of personal ethics, limited integrity control measures, and specific instances of weak supervision appear to have often resulted in unrestricted criminal actions in these scandal-plagued police stations.

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Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force Police brutality involves the use of more than the minimal amount of force needed to overcome resistance or counter an attack or threat. The criminal law and police policy and procedure almost universally delineate that the use of force by law enforcement officers must involve no more than what is needed to overcome the use or threat of force directed at them or a third party. When police officers exceed the amount of force necessary, then they may be acting with criminal intent or in a reckless manner. Law enforcement personnel who utilize excessive force are therefore acting in a deviant manner.3 It is obvious that police agencies, either through initial police academy, probationary, field, or in-service training or through agency policies and procedures, do not foster more than the use of minimal, necessary, and reasonable force to counter the specific threat involved. As such, other practical and theoretical explanations should be considered. Regarding the excessive use of force, the phenomenon can best be explained in similar fashion to other criminal behavior in which the perpetrators inflict injury to their intended victims. As it relates to the use of excessive force by police, this use of violence, intentionally and often without remorse, could best be elucidated through trait theory, which promotes that biological, genetic, or psychological factors influence an individual to engage in violent outbursts (Siegel 2011). In essence, the police officers who engage in police brutality may be plagued by a biological deficit that leaves them prone to inflict guilt-free physical punishment. The use of disproportionate or unwarranted force or violence can also be explained through social learning theory (Widom 1989), which proposed that those who have had childhood or adolescent exposure to violence or have been victimized by physical abuse are more likely to engage in violence against others, and as such, these aggressive behaviors had been learned earlier by these individuals as being socially acceptable. If either (or both) of these theories are accepted, then one must question the effectiveness of the psychological, background, and other screening processes that have taken place during the pre-employment period. In either case, whether trait theory or social learning theory is acknowledged as the primary explanation, it is highly likely that police officers who engage in brutal conduct have done so in the past and will do so in the future unless efforts are made to terminate these problematic individuals from the police agency, either through criminal or administrative processes (Albrecht 2017). Another critical matter that  This has to be contrasted with the “perceived” use of excessive force by police personnel, which is more common than the actual incidents involving force-related police deviance. The sensationalized cases often highlighted by the media have routinely resulted in prosecutorial or jurist conclusions that the police officers had acted appropriately given the known circumstances and facts at the time of the decision to deploy force. This often differs dramatically from the related allegations of racism and police brutality made by minority group and other community advocates. It is clear that the perception of police brutality has to be addressed by police administrators, but it should not be confused with the actual use of excessive force by law enforcement actors. 3

Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority

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will be addressed later is the practice of the blue wall of silence, in which police officer who work with these abusive colleagues fail to report the unacceptable incidents to police command staff.

Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority While the use of excessive force would fall under the domain of abuse of authority, this has been addressed separately (see above). The remaining categories of police abuse of authority include discourtesy, abusive language, ethnic slurs, and verbal threats. In practice, since these matters deal more so with disrespect than ethical issues, allegations involving these incidents are routinely referred to as “civilian complaints” against the police and are often investigated by an independent agency staffed by non-law enforcement investigators.4 In the field, it is not uncommon for patrol officers to escalate their verbal discourse when confronted with an uncooperative individual. If one considers the potential increases in the police use of force spectrum that match the threat posed by a suspect, so too do police personnel cater their verbal interactions to the amount of verbal or physical cooperation or resistance displayed by persons with whom they are interacting. When a suspect or other civilian encountered continues to be uncooperative with law enforcement personnel, the verbal requests and directives presented by the police will likely get louder and possibly escalate to the use of abusive language. While clearly unprofessional, some officers perceive that the use of louder verbal direction coupled with abusive language will result in a higher likelihood for cooperation and thus negate the need to elevate the interaction to one that requires the use of physical force. As such, in many police organizations, the use of abusive language (e.g., cursing) does not necessarily lead to instruction or reprimand by agency supervisors. Under these circumstances, frontline police personnel, supervisors, and even police administrators may have rationalized this type of behavior as being acceptable. This is in line with Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory (Hunt and Manning 1993; Kappeler et al. 1998), which opined that individuals can justify specific conduct, often illegal or socially unacceptable, through a process of personal rationalization. These individuals undertake “techniques of neutralization” in which they deny the existence of personal responsibility and injury to intended victims while condemning the criminal justice system and promoting their noble calling to ensure criminals receive “appropriate punishment.” The utilization of discourteous or abusive language is viewed in stark contrast to the use of ethnic slurs or unjustified threats that police officers may verbally convey to suspects or encountered civilians. This type of behavior is unquestionably unacceptable. One theoretical explanation for these two categories of abusive dialogue is social learning theory (Widom 1989), in that abusive and threatening dialogue  In New York City, allegations involving abuse of authority are investigated by an independent agency staffed by civilian employees and supervised by the Civilian Complaint Review Board. 4

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and discriminatory representations of different ethnic groups may have been learned during infancy and adolescence from family members and friends and later through peers. These officers involved have opted to disregard agency ethical and cultural awareness training and continue to engage in these forms of police abuse of authority.

Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct Police misconduct involves the failure to abide by agency policy, procedure, rules, and/or regulation. While some infractions may rise to the level of criminal conduct, most are rule violations normally addressed by verbal or written reprimand and instruction or through a formal administrative process. While issues like tardiness, unprofessional appearance, sick leave abuse, and other minor rule infractions would not normally warrant overwhelming attention, repeat violations could be signs of a more serious issue. Chronic tardiness, disheveled appearance, routine unplanned absences, or excessive sick leave may be signs of a more serious personal disorder or issue. Within the law enforcement profession, recurring incidents involving one or all of the above could be a sign of alcohol or substance abuse or familial instability. Without instruction or early intervention, these employees could engage in criminal conduct (e.g., theft) to support an alcohol or drug addiction or could exhibit abusive conduct (verbal or physical) in response to fatigue or abuse experienced at home. It is quite common for police colleagues and agency managers to overlook these infractions and the potential future problems as part of the subcultural custom involving the “blue wall of silence” (which will be addressed later). Unfortunately this lack of attention may lead these officers, who unquestionably require assistance, to engage in harmful behavior and possibly to later commit suicide. As previously outlined, the New York City Police Department and many law enforcement agencies across the United States have developed a comprehensive early warning and intervention mechanism in an effort to effectively identify potentially problematic employees.

Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence” The “blue wall of silence” involves the common practice in which police officers do not take the initiative to report misconduct or other police deviance involving work colleagues, nor do they cooperate in internal or external investigations that are examining forms of corruption or police deviance. Similar practices have been noted in other dangerous professions (e.g., military personnel and firefighters). The common belief is that by reporting others who commit misconduct or deviance, one could place themselves in harm’s way since there is a likelihood that work colleagues will not come to their assistance when needed. This practice is not learned

Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury

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prior to employment and is initiated when first deployed to the post-training field work. This informal code is prevalent in all ranks and not only in frontline personnel. In the upper ranks, misconduct and deviance may be overlooked to spare the agency from embarrassment. As such, except in extreme cases or in instances when the incidents have been drawn to the public’s attention through another mechanism (e.g., media), it is believed that much of the misconduct and deviance that takes place within law enforcement agencies goes unaddressed or unpunished. While it had been common practice to remain silent as it has pertained to misconduct and deviance by fellow police colleagues, the move to enhanced professionalism, agency transparency, media access, and the use of technology (e.g., patrol car video cameras, body cameras, and civilian cell phone cameras) have moved police officer actions into a “fish bowl” environment. Even in situations when officers may have opted to not cooperate in the past, they have been forced to provide supporting testimony since the evidence against their misbehaving and deviant colleagues may have been obvious. To also ensure cooperation, the New York City Police Department in 1997 implemented a policy that any employee openly covering up or lying in an internal investigation will be terminated (New York City Police Department 2002). As a result, the “blue wall” is slowly being “torn down” in the NYPD, and many other law enforcement agencies as police personnel have acknowledged that the agency’s and their own personal reputations are routinely criticized, questioned, and ridiculed due to the detected misconduct of one or a small number of their peers. From a theoretical perspective, the “blue wall” phenomenon can be explained by applying Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory (Hunt and Manning 1993; Kappeler et al. 1998) to this custom. The same could be said of the practice of providing police officers and government officials with “professional courtesy” during traffic stops.5 The officers could rationalize their actions through the belief that neither of these rituals causes overwhelming harm to the public, thereby neutralizing the effect of their actions. As these practices are normally learned through organizational exposure, social learning theory (Widom 1989) would provide a reasonable explanation for this form of misconduct.

Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury Courtroom perjury could have been included within the police criminality category of police deviance; however, it will be looked at separately due to its recurrence in recent NYPD scandals. In those cases closely examined by the Mollen Commission and some subsequent incidents, NYPD officers were found to fabricate certain aspects of the events leading up to arrests in order to strengthen the likelihood of

5  “Professional courtesy” during traffic stops often involves the reservation of on-duty police personnel to issue traffic summonses to off-duty law enforcement officials and often their family members.

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conviction.6 Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory (Hunt and Manning 1993; Kappeler et al. 1998) could be applied as a theoretical explanation as police officers may have rationalized this form of criminality by believing that their intent was simply to place “bad people behind bars.” As previously indicated, this practice has often been referred to as “noble cause” corruption (Crank and Caldero 1999). In addition, this form of deviance could be supported practically by instruction or coercion by peers, trainers, or perhaps even other criminal justice actors (e.g., prosecutors). As such, Widom’s social learning theory (Widom 1989) could provide a plausible explanation for this serious criminal misconduct.

References Albrecht, J.  F. (2017, February). Critical concepts of police leadership. Presentation at the Norwegian Police College, Oslo, Norway. Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 196–217. Crank, J. P., & Caldero, M. A. (1999). Police ethics: The corruption of noble cause. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company. Gaylord, M. S., & Galliher, J. F. (1988). The criminology of Edward Sutherland. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Hunt, J., & Manning, P. (1993). The social context of police lying. In K.  Delos (Ed.), Deviant behavior. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kappeler, V. E., Sluder, R. D., & Alpert, G. P. (1998). Forces of deviance: Understanding the dark side of policing (2nd ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. McAlary, M. (1989). Buddy boys: When good cops turn bad. Kirkwood, NY: Putnam Publishing Group. Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. New York: Free Press. Mollen, M. (1994). Commission report: Commission to investigate allegations of police corruption and the anti-corruption procedures of the police department. New York: City of New York. New York City Police Department. (2002). NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau Annual Report 2001. New York: NYPD Printing Office. Siegel, L. J. (2011). Criminology: The core (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishers. Tittle, C. (1995). Control balance: Toward a general theory of deviance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Widom, C. S. (1989). The cycle of violence. Science, 244, 160–166.

 The most common examples included police officers testifying that they discovered a gun or illicit narcotics on the body of the suspect, when in fact the contraband had been found on the floor nearby, in the suspect’s car, or in the suspect’s home. When questioned, the officers often admitted that they merely wanted to strengthen the criminal case (Mollen 1994). 6

Chapter 5

Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity

 olicy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational P Integrity The challenge now will be to outline particular policy recommendations and options to enhance individual and organizational integrity and to improve the professional standards across the agency. There are two primary alternatives available to police administrators and government leaders. One option would target the quality of individual police personnel and the second involves the potential reformation of organizational policy, procedure and practice. Specific measures can be undertaken to improve the quality of police personnel, during the pre-employment vetting stage, while at the police academy or training facility, and throughout the professional careers of police resources. As will be delineated in further detail, a more intensive pre-employment vetting procedure, combined with enhanced recruit qualification, e.g. required pre-employment college or military experience, have the potential to improve the inherent quality of police personnel. In addition, the implementation of hightened professional standards and leadership criteria for all agency resources and the incorporation of proven mechanisms that can more effectively deter, identify and address acts of police deviance must be instituted in an effort to improve organizational integrity and to enhance public confidence in the police.

Pre-employment Screening for Law Enforcement Officials One of the potential options for enhancing professionalism within law enforcement organizations involves improving the effectiveness of the pre-employment screening processes. Pre-employment screening for law enforcement and other

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government officials involves a number of common endeavors in an attempt to employ the highest quality candidate. Routinely the prehiring process will include all or most of the following: 1 . Test of cognitive ability 2. Background investigation 3. Physical ability test 4. Medical screening 5. Drug testing 6. Personality testing and psychological screening 7. Personal interview This procedure has been generally designed to “screen out” undesirable individuals for government employment. On the other hand, there are many desirable qualities that police officers should possess, including integrity, commitment, and loyalty, with a recent move toward enhanced abilities for critical thinking and problem solving. In addition, evaluations, challenges, and examinations posed during the police academy and field training periods serve as the critical steps to eliminate potentially problematic employees.

Pre-employment Screening to Deter Police Deviance It is imperative that personnel seeking employment in police agencies and other organizations entrusted with security and other sensitive responsibilities be properly and effectively screened prior to hire. In addition to physical and medical issues, there is the need to closely evaluate the character, background, and past experiences of police candidates. Personality testing, background investigation, and psychological screening are tightly interwoven as it relates to the critical task of selecting a suitably capable law enforcement officer. A number of research endeavors have involved the examination of police deviance and corruption in an attempt to identify personality qualities or indicators common among police officers who act inappropriately and, conversely, determining those attributes and qualities that would indicate that these law enforcement recruits will perform exceptionally. The New York City Police Department internally has called for revising recruitment and selection criteria to promote the “selecting in” of applicants with positive attributes while “weeding out” inappropriate personality characteristics (Albrecht 2011b). One challenge has been accurately identifying distinct positive qualities that would identify an individual as a potential productive and problem-free police officer during the pre-employment process. Those characteristics that would not be suitable for law enforcement personnel have been much easier to identify (Burbeck and Furnham 1984).

Personality Testing and Psychological Screening

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Personality Testing and Psychological Screening While the Wickersham Commission in 1931 promoted the use of intelligence testing as the proper screening mechanism for police recruits (Wickersham Commission Reports 1931), the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Johnson 1965) first recommended the widespread use of psychological personality testing for law enforcement personnel as a major step in enhancing the professionalism of police officials.1 A specific recommendation from the Commission was for jurisdictions to consider the use of “psychological tests, such as the MMPI {Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory}, and interviews to determine emotional stability” of police candidates (The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967, p. 129). In addition, two significant judicial decisions have highlighted the requirement to screen applicants properly during the prehiring stage. In Hardy v. Town of Hayneville (1999), it was decided that the jurisdiction could be held responsible for the negligent hiring of a police officer who was later deemed to be unfit when a more thorough review of his background was conducted. And in Bonsignore v. City of New  York (1982), New York City was held civilly responsible for the failure of the New York City Police Department to adopt an effective psychological screening protocol. In practice, the New  York City Police Department and most American law enforcement agencies employ the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)2 (or MMPI-II) as the predominant psychological screening mechanism (Sanders 2008) during pre- and post-employment evaluation. One main criticism is that the MMPI was originally designed to test for psychological problems in patients, not to assess job performance in normal populations (Barrick and Mount 1991). In addition, since normative sample data of the MMPI did not include an ample number of female, black, and other minority police officers and since the MMPI questionnaire has included questions about religious attitudes and sexual orientation, the MMPI could face claims of discriminatory biases (Arrigo and Claussen 2003) that could question the instrument’s validity and effectiveness, particularly in a diverse profession such as law enforcement. More importantly, the MMPI fails to measure the construct of conscientiousness, which has been identified by many as being one of the best predictors of job performance and work behavior (Kornfield 1995). A contemporary concern is that the MMPI and other commonly used psychological screening mechanisms may have to be revalidated in order to properly assess the attitudes of younger generation police applicants (e.g., “Generation X,” “Generation Y,” the “new Millennials,” and “Generation Z”).

 The Los Angeles Police Department had commenced the first psychological screening for police personnel in the 1950s. 2  Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 1

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5  Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity

Given these noted deficiencies, many jurisdictions and agencies have opted to concurrently utilize a number of other personality testing mechanisms. The most common alternatives, either used independently or in combination, include the Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI), the California Psychological Inventory (CPI), the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), the NEO Personality Inventory-­ Revised (NEO-PI-R), or the 16 Personality Factor (Dantzker 2011). The predictive ability of these personality screening instruments has been comprehensively researched. One meta-analysis that analyzed the relationship between the MMPI, MMPI-II, and the IPI has reported significant preferable outcomes when predicting successful performance of law enforcement patrol personnel (Simmers et al. 2003). Closer examination of distinct elements of the MMPI, in particular the “Goldberg Index,” which evaluates psychosis has been found to be highly indicative of future poor performance (Costello et al. 1982). Pallone (1992) also reported that a number of individual scales within the MMPI were either correlated positively or negatively to job performance. Certain scales and indexes within the MMPI have been found to have predictive correlations to negative job performance (Workowski and Pallone 1999), early career disciplinary suspensions (Costello et al. 1996), job terminations (Bartol 1991), the unnecessary use of force (Hargrove et al. 1988), and violence proclivity (Travis 1994) involving police personnel. Most jurisdictions and police agencies, however, have moved on to using a combination of personality tests with the goal of predicting later police deviance or superior job performance. Arrigo and Claussen (2003) have advocated employing the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) and the Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI) together as part of the pre-employment procedure and eliminating the MMPI in order to obtain a better predictor instrument for future police deviance. Their findings have revealed that the IPI may permit a more effective prediction of antisocial behavior, while the NEO-PI-R may perceive future conscientiousness to a better degree (Arrigo and Claussen 2003). Similar conclusions had previously been drawn by Costa and McCrae (1992) who reported that although the IPI is not considered effective in measuring conscientiousness, when combined with the NEO-PI-R, the IPI can be utilized to evaluate the potential for antisocial behavioral characteristics, while the NEO-PI-R can be helpful in assessing the personality trait of conscientiousness. The NEO-PI-R is additionally considered a predictor of lower job performance, as those who received lower performance evaluation ratings were found to also have had higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness scores (Detrick and Chibnall 2006). The IPI when applied alone emerged as a significant predictor of citizen complaints (Scogin et al. 1995), absences and tardiness (Knatz et al. 1992), and absences and minor misconduct (Inwald and Shusman 1984). The IPI was found to more accurately predict termination from the agency (Arrigo and Claussen 2003). Yet, when the IPI and MMPI were utilized together, there was a dramatic increase in the capability for predicting both negative and positive job performance (Inwald and Brockwell 1991). The California Psychology Inventory has been found to be a reasonable predictor of later problematic behavior as the instrument has been found to be useful in screening out individuals who could be classified as being less dependable, less

Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel

39

willing to observe social norms and customs, less disciplined, less stable, and less likely to plan ahead (Hargrove and Hiatt 1989). In addition, the tolerance scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) has been reported to be the single best personality predictor of law enforcement performance (Aamodt 2004). The CPI has also been recommended as a tool to measure the Big Five, or five-factor model of personality, as a test for predicting police behavior (Sarchione et al. 1998). Of the “Big Five” personality indicators, Sanders (2008) discovered that active police officers in one metropolitan police agency scored highest in their conscientiousness score and lowest with the neuroticism score. Of interest is that one factor that supervisors rated as highly important in police personnel is age, in that older officers were believed to be better and more effective employees. Police managers also reported that work attitude was a better predictor of job performance than were any of the Big Five personality traits (Sanders 2008). Personality characteristics that have been common among deviant police personnel in the past have included immaturity, unreliability, and egocentricity (Gips 1998). Emotional instability was found to be the strongest predictor of future problematic behavior, while openness was the best predictor of police academy grades and conscientiousness was the best predictor of supervisory performance rating (Aamodt 2004). Once any one or a combination of the above personality and psychological screening instruments have been used, the responses and results should be reviewed by agency psychologists or psychiatrists. Aamodt (2000) has recommended that the best suited psychologist for this responsibility is the industrial/organizational psychologist. In addition, when marginal screening results have been produced, the police candidate should be interviewed separately by more than one psychologist or psychiatrist with a final agreement and recommendation being made by the entire assessment team (Colaprete 2012). Some jurisdictions rely on vocational interest inventories, but they have not been shown to be valid predictors of employee performance. As it relates to the law enforcement profession, vocational interest inventories do not appear to be correlated to job performance (Aamodt 2004). On the other hand, assessment center and job-related structured interview ratings have been shown to be highly related to later job performance (Aamodt 2004). Unsurprisingly, physical ability tests were not strong forecasters of future accomplishment or misbehavior (Aamodt 2004).

Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel Since law enforcement organizations are tasked with enforcing laws regulating controlled substance and marijuana possession and the sale and transfer of these illegal drugs, it is prudent to include drug testing in the prescreening process. In addition, drug testing of career personnel should continue to be part of the in-service process to ensure the highest standards of ethics and integrity. Probationary period, random, for-cause, and voluntary promotional drug testing should be incorporated into agency practices with specific policy guidelines in place to insure compliance and

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5  Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity

comprehension of potential penalties. The New York City Police Department continues to use all of these options to deter employee illegal drug usage and the abuse of prescription medications. Contemporary challenges include the recent legalization of recreational and medical usage of marijuana and the misuse and abuse of over-the-counter and prescription medicine, particularly involving opioids (such as Oxycontin and Vicodin), stimulants, anabolic steroids, and drugs commonly used to treat ADHD, e.g., Adderall and Ritalin. Jurisdictions and police agencies will have to prepare specific protocols for drug testing involving these substances and must prepare procedures that outline termination or treatment-oriented options for violations. Of note is that female officers have been found to be more likely than males to fail agency drug tests (Fyfe and Kane 2006) and are more likely to abuse prescription drugs (Colaprete 2012).

Mandatory Hiring Qualifications One of the more noteworthy findings related to background screening and pre-­ employment qualifications has involved the college education requirement in place or being considered by many departments. Studies indicate that requiring college education prior to hiring police personnel may lead to improved police academy grades, higher performance ratings, enhanced enforcement activity, fewer disciplinary events, decreased number of citizen complaints, reduced absenteeism, less frequent vehicle accidents, and diminished use of force (Aamodt 2004).3 These positive findings remained consistent regardless of which major or field of study was undertaken at the college or university by the police officer prior to his police employment. While many law enforcement agencies provide hiring and promotional preference to candidates with prior military experience, a number of notable correlations were noted. Police officers with prior military experience were found to receive more commendations, were more likely to perform better while in field training, and were likely to be injured less often in confrontational situations (Aamodt 2004). On the other hand, prior military experience was related to an increased likelihood for dismissal due to misconduct (Fyfe et al. 2002). Another relevant issue is that providing hiring preference to military veterans has the potential to create a disparate effect as it relates to the hiring of females (Aamodt 2004). One of the stronger indicators of future poor performance and problem behavior can be revealed during the character or background investigation. Individuals who have an arrest record, who possess a history of school or work disciplinary problems, or who have frequently received traffic tickets tend to receive lower perfor What is most interesting is these factors were found to be statistically significant regardless if criminal justice was the college major, i.e., criminal justice majors fared no better than other college majors. 3

Mandatory Hiring Qualifications

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mance evaluations and use more sick time (Aamodt 2004; Fyfe and Kane 2006). Of relevance is that individuals who experienced these negative events were more likely to have not been hired, so permitting those with these variables to become police officers is rare. However, these negative indicators do exhibit strong validity (Aamodt 2004) and should be strongly taken into consideration in an effort to avoid problematic behavior and misconduct within law enforcement agencies. It is highly recommended that the questionnaires completed for medical, psychological, personality, and background screening be compared to ensure consistency and to analyze the integrity of the applicant (Colaprete 2012). Following the Mollen Commission recommendations, the New York City Police Department in 1994 conducted its own internal assessment4 to determine if there were any personality traits that would predict effective job performance or future police deviance. This analysis revealed that some level of college education and increased age were predictors of reduced police misconduct in NYPD personnel. These findings were used in 1994 to support the increase in minimum hiring age from 20 to 22 years of age and the application of a 60-credit college requirement to newly hired police officers. On the other hand, the police officers who were involved in the police deviance investigated by the Mollen Commission on average started their police careers at a later age (i.e., 25 years old) and had undertaken some college studies (Albrecht 2011a), which would appear to counter the recommendations made. Another interesting conclusion was that police officers who resided outside of the New York City limits were determined to be less empathetic to the plight of individuals and neighborhood residents in minority communities and those in the lower socioeconomic class. As a result, the New York City Police Department continues to provide extra points on hiring and promotional exams to those who reside with the metropolitan borders, rather than in the surrounding suburbs. In summary, there has been limited but noteworthy success in identifying traits or actions that may be useful in predicting future corruption or deviance by police personnel. This list of potential predictors includes prior criminal or traffic violations and arrests; disciplinary incidents in high school, college, or involving prior employment; and documented history of other irresponsible conducts. In addition, certain factors revealed during personality inventory screening have been shown to be predictive of future law enforcement deviance or potential exemplary performance,5 and efforts should be made to replicate those findings in an effort to eventually apply them generally across geographical American regions, communities, ethnicities, races, genders, and cross-generationally.  This internal NYPD report was informally called the “Bad Boys Report.” The author was a member of the team that conducted the evaluation. 5  Since most of the studies that have reported correlations between personality index scales or responses and later predictions of deviant or problematic behavior have been conducted on small samples with little if any replication, it is critical that these studies be evaluated on a larger scale to ascertain if there is validity to these findings; it would appear that agency psychologists should consider giving a battery of personality tests to police candidates and then evaluating the scales and indices that prior research has preliminarily shown to be correlated to disciplinary incidents or poor performance. 4

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5  Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity

 ost-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity P and Professionalism Given the plethora of behaviors that could classify as police deviance, law enforcement administrators should take a number of measures to enhance agency professionalism, strengthen integrity, and improve supervisory leadership. Firstly, law enforcement executives should clearly define the relevance of ethical standards and professional practices by delineating them in agency mission statements, procedures, policy statements, and rules and regulations and by incorporating them into all training curricula, including continuously through in-service instruction. Pre-employment screening must include the thorough examination of the psychological and behavioral history of police department applicants. As noted, studies have shown that a record of disciplinary events in school or in prior employment, arrests for criminal conduct (even those that do not result in conviction), and repeat traffic violations are indicative of future misconduct and deviant behavior (Gips 1998). Personality and psychological screening mechanisms can be used to effectively screen out applicants by evaluating indices and scales that have been shown to be correlated to later misconduct or termination.6 Agencies should consider employing a battery of personality screening tests (i.e., MMPI-II, NEO-PI-R, IPI, and the CPI) to “weed out” potentially problematic individuals and to “screen in” likely productive candidates for police positions. When there are indications revealed during the psychological screening process that require further analysis, it is recommended that follow-up interviews be conducted independently by at least two psychologists and that there be unanimous agreement that the individual should be recommended for hiring or retention. In addition, positive actions like involvement in community programs and volunteer activities could be granted more attention during the background screening processes. Disciplinary events and performance evaluations during the police academy and field training/probationary period should be closely scrutinized, and efforts should be made to document the negative actions of chronically problematic employees with the potential goal of terminating persistent violators at the earliest opportunity rather than waiting for a more serious or criminal event to occur (likely later in their careers when termination proceedings may be more tedious). In addition, if they do not already do so, police agencies should strongly consider requiring 2–4 years of pre-employment college education, which has repeatedly been shown to be correlated to enhanced performance and diminished problematic behavior. Law enforcement supervisors should receive comprehensive leadership training that advocates strong decision making and routine documentation of misconduct  Prior research has indicated that specific indices or scales in the MMPI, CPI, NEO-PI-R, and IPI have been shown to be predictive of misconduct and termination. Further research is needed to validate these findings, but agency psychologists should at the minimum pay close attention to these factors when interviewing these job candidates prior to employment. 6

Post-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity…

43

and other inappropriate activity by police personnel. In addition, agency managers should use the monthly and annual performance evaluation processes to provide mentoring, instruction, and corrective discourse to subordinate personnel. All negative incidents should be promptly addressed, and constructive instruction should be provided, but if ineffective, the agency should make an effort to commence termination proceedings for repeat offenders at the earliest stages in an officer’s career. If not already in place, an early intervention mechanism should be implemented in an effort to proactively monitor apparently problematic employees and to provide the opportunity for counseling and personal enrichment. On the other hand, the agency should develop a transparent reward and promotion system for personnel who perform in an exemplary fashion and for those who proactively report deviance and serious misconduct by coworkers. In addition, any actions that could result in potential criminal charges should be referred to the prosecutor’s office for guidance and formal investigation. This will eliminate future allegations of preferential treatment, cover-up, or conflict of interest. In an effort to deter deviance in police stations that have been shown to be more prone to negative behavior by law enforcement personnel,7 regular supervisory visits should be made by upper and middle management from the agency central and regional headquarters at all times of the day (i.e., on all working shifts and in particular during the night time hours) to police stations that are plagued by high crime and rampant drug dealing. Internal affairs investigations must be conducted in an effective fashion in an effort to conduct inquiries into the specific misconduct alleged. Command and control could also be strengthened by decreasing the supervisor-­to-officer ratio to no more than eight uniformed police officers assigned to patrol or administrative duties or four officers, investigators, or detectives for each supervisor tasked with managing undercover personnel or those working in civilian attire. Police administrators must continue to reward those who bring forward information about corrupt and abusive police officers and appropriately punish those who do not cooperate in these investigations. Police managers who have been found to have condoned unacceptable behavior or have ignored it should be held responsible and face appropriate disciplinary action (e.g., administrative charges of “failure to supervise” or criminal charges of “official misconduct”). Additionally, all police agencies should implement integrity and drug testing on random and targeted bases to ensure compliance with criminal law and department procedure, with renewed attention placed on the potential for misuse of prescription medication. Ultimately, police executives should pride themselves in maintaining highly professional standards throughout their organizations and allowing for transparency to ensure the highest levels of citizen confidence.

 Those police stations that are located in high-crime and drug-prone communities have been shown to be of higher risk of police deviance. 7

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References Aamodt, M. G. (2000). The role of the I/O psychologist in police psychology. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 15, 8–10. Aamodt, M. G. (2004). Research in law enforcement selection. Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker Press. Albrecht, J. F. (2011a). Three decades of policing reform in the New York City Police Department. In J. F. Albrecht & D. K. Das (Eds.), Effective crime reduction strategies: International perspectives. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Albrecht, J.  F. (2011b). Analyzing the implementation and evolution of community policing in the United States and Scandinavia. In M. Guzman, A. M. Das, & D. K. Das (Eds.), Strategic responses to crime: Thinking globally, acting locally. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Arrigo, B.  A., & Claussen, N. (2003). Police corruption and psychological testing: A strategy for preemployment screening. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47(3), 272–290. Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The big five personality dimensions and job performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1–26. Bartol, C. R. (1991). Predictive validation of the MMPI for small-town police officers who fail. Professional Psychology Research and Practice, 22, 127–132. Bonsignore v. City of New York 521 F. Supp. 394, aff’d 683 F.2d 635, 2nd Cir. (1982). Burbeck, E., & Furnham, E. (1984). Personality and police selection: Trait differences in successful and non-successful applicants to the metropolitan police. Journal of Personality and Individual Differences, 5(3), 257–263. Colaprete, F. A. (2012). Pre-employment background investigations for public safety professionals. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Costa, P.  T., & McCrae, R.  R. (1992). Revised NEO personality inventory and new five factor inventory: Professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Costello, R.  M., Schneider, S.  L., & Schoenfeld, L.  S. (1996). Validation of a preemployment MMPI index correlated with disciplinary suspension days of police officers. Psychology, Crime and Law, 2, 299–306. Costello, R. M., Schoenfeld, L. S., & Kobos, J. (1982). Police applicant screening: An analogue study. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38(1), 216–221. Dantzker, M. L. (2011). Psychological pre-employment screening for police candidates: Seeking consistency if not standardization. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 42(3), 276–283. Detrick, P., & Chibnall, J.  T. (2006). NEO PI-R personality characteristics of high performing entry-level police officers. Psychological Services, 3, 274–285. Fyfe, J. J., Jones, P. R., Kane, R., & Silver, C. (2002). Bad cops: A study of career-ending misconduct among New York City police officers. Chicago, IL: Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Fyfe, J. J., & Kane, R. (2006). Bad cops: A study of career-ending misconduct among New York City police officers. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Gips, M. (1998). A corrupt personality? Security Management, 42(9), 14. Hardy v. Town of Hayneville 50 F.Supp.2d 1176 M.D. Ala. (1999). Hargrove, G. E., & Hiatt, D. (1989). Use of the California Psychological Inventory in law enforcement officer selection. Journal of Personality Assessment, 53, 267–277. Hargrove, G. E., Hiatt, D., & Gaffney, T. W. (1988). F + 4 + 9 + Cn: An MMPI measure of aggression in law enforcement officers and applicants. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 16, 268–273. Inwald, R. E., & Brockwell, A. L. (1991). Predicting the performance of government security personnel with the IPI and MMPI. Journal of Personality Assessment, 56(3), 522–535. Inwald, R. E., & Shusman, E. J. (1984). The IPI and MMPI as predictors of academy performance for police recruits. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 12(1), 1–11.

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Johnson, L.  B. (1965, March 8). Special message to the congress on law enforcement and the administration of justice. Online by G.  Peters & J.  T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26800 Knatz, H. F., Inwald, R. E., Brockwell, A. L., & Tran, L. N. (1992). IPI and MMPI predictions of counterproductive job behaviors by racial group. Journal of Business and Psychology, 7, 189–201. Kornfield, A. D. (1995). Police officer candidate MMPI-2 performance: Gender, ethnic and normative factors. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 536–540. Pallone, N. J. (1992). The MMPI in police officer selection: Legal constraints, case law, empirical data. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 17, 171–188. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (1967). Report of the president’s commission on law enforcement and administration of justice. Washington, DC: White House. Sanders, B. A. (2008). Using personality traits to predict police officer performance. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 31(1), 129–147. Sarchione, C. D., Cuttler, M. J., Muchinsky, P. M., & Nelson-Gray, R. O. (1998). Prediction of dysfunctional job behaviors among law enforcement officers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 904–914. Scogin, F., Schumacher, J., Gardner, J., & Chaplin, W. (1995). Predictive validity of psychological testing in law enforcement settings. Professional Psychology Research and Practice, 26, 68–71. Simmers, K. D., Bowers, T. G., & Ruiz, J. M. (2003). Pre-employment psychological testing of police officers: The MMPI and the IPI as predictors of performance. International Journal of Police Science and Management, 5, 277–294. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (1967). Task force report: The police. Washington, DC: USGPO. Travis, M.  A. (1994). Psychological health tests for violence-prone police officers: Objectives, shortcomings, and alternatives. Stanford Law Review, 46(6), 1717–1770. Wickersham Commission Reports. (1931). Report on the police, No. 14. Washington, DC: USGPO. Workowski, E. J., & Pallone, N. J. (1999). Previously unscored pre-service MMPI data in relation to police performance over a decade: A multivariate inquiry. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 29, 71–94.

Chapter 6

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion and Conclusion Police deviance unfortunately takes many forms. Criminological analyses have revealed that no one theoretical model has been found to apply to all forms of inappropriate law enforcement misbehavior; however, there are clear sociological trends when each of the five specific categories of police deviance is independently and more closely examined. Police executives and government leaders can take specific steps to ensure that only the highest-quality candidates are hired, deployed in the field, and are left to interact with the public. Effective pre-employment screening and accurate entry level and in-service performance evaluation may hold the key to a superior and professional work force. Given that deviance is present in all aspects of life and in all fields of employment, eliminating gross misbehavior from the law enforcement profession will continue to provide a compelling challenge to those responsible for ensuring the safety and well-being of the community at large. Law enforcement administrators must realize that even with impressive crime reductions, the agency’s (and their personal) reputation will be questioned if citizens lack confidence and trust in the police and if the organization’s legitimacy and credibility come under scrutiny.

Bibliography Aamodt, M. G. (2000). The role of the I/O psychologist in police psychology. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 15, 8–10. Aamodt, M. G. (2004). Research in law enforcement selection. Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker Press. Albrecht, J. F. (2011a). Three decades of policing reform in the New York City Police Department. In J. F. Albrecht & D. K. Das (Eds.), Effective crime reduction strategies: International perspectives. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

© The Author(s) 2017 J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7_6

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Albrecht, J.  F. (2011b). Analyzing the implementation and evolution of community policing in the United States and Scandinavia. In M. Guzman, A. M. Das, & D. K. Das (Eds.), Strategic responses to crime: Thinking globally, acting locally. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Albrecht, J. F. (2013, October). Corruption control through effective leadership: Understanding police deviance. Presentation at the Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Philadelphia. Albrecht, J.  F. (2017, February). Critical concepts of police leadership. Presentation at the Norwegian Police College, Oslo, Norway. Arrigo, B.  A., & Claussen, N. (2003). Police corruption and psychological testing: A strategy for preemployment screening. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47(3), 272–290. Baker, A., & Goldstein, J.  (2011, October 28). Unsealed indictments shed light on procedures for ticket-fixing by officers. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/nyregion/ in-ticket-fixing-scandal-16-officers-to-be-charged.html Barker, T., & Carter, D. L. (1993). Police deviance (3rd ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company. Barrick, M.  R., & Mount, M.  K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and job performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1–26. Bartol, C. R. (1991). Predictive validation of the MMPI for small-town police officers who fail. Professional Psychology Research and Practice, 22, 127–132. Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 196–217. Bonsignore v. City of New York 521 F. Supp. 394, aff’d 683 F.2d 635, 2nd Cir. (1982). Burbeck, E., & Furnham, E. (1984). Personality and police selection: Trait differences in successful and non-successful applicants to the metropolitan police. Journal of Personality and Individual Differences, 5(3), 257–263. Colaprete, F. A. (2012). Pre-employment background investigations for public safety professionals. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Colquhoun, P. (1975). A treatise on the police of the metropolis. Patterson Smith Reprint Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement and Social Problems (7th ed.), Publication No. 42 (reprinted 1969). COPS Office. (2015). President’s task force on 21st century policing implementation guide: Moving from recommendations to action. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Cosgrove, C.  A., & McElroy J.  E. (1986). The fixed tour experiment in the 115th precinct: Its effects on police officer stress, community perceptions, and precinct management. Executive Summary. New York: Vera Institute of Justice. Costa, P.  T., & McCrae, R.  R. (1992). Revised NEO personality inventory and new five factor inventory: Professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Costello, R.  M., Schneider, S.  L., & Schoenfeld, L.  S. (1996). Validation of a preemployment MMPI index correlated with disciplinary suspension days of police officers. Psychology, Crime and Law, 2, 299–306. Costello, R. M., Schoenfeld, L. S., & Kobos, J. (1982). Police applicant screening: An analogue study. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38(1), 216–221. Crank, J. P., & Caldero, M. A. (1999). Police ethics: The corruption of noble cause. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company. Dantzker, M. L. (2011). Psychological pre-employment screening for police candidates: Seeking consistency if not standardization. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 42(3), 276–283. Detrick, P., & Chibnall, J.  T. (2006). NEO PI-R personality characteristics of high performing entry-level police officers. Psychological Services, 3, 274–285. Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206. (1960). Erikson, K. T. (1962). Notes on the sociology of deviance. Social Problems, 9, 307–314.

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Index

A Abuse of authority, police, 31, 32 Administrators, police, 43 Advocates, 9 African-American communities, 17, 18 Agency-wide payoff scheme, NYPD, 27 American law enforcement agencies, 10, 37 American police, deviance and misconduct early 1990s (1990–1993), 12–14 1960s, 9, 10 1970s, 10, 11 1980s, 11, 12 late 1990s (1994–2000), 14–20 2001 to present, 21, 22 involving NYPD, 22, 23 Antipolice environment, 18 Applicant screening process, 19 B Bad Boys Report, 40 Becker’s rational choice theory, 28 Big Five personality traits, 38 Blue wall of silence, 20, 32, 33 Bratton, W., 14 Brutality, police, 30 Budgetary problems in New York City, 11 Bullets, 17 C California Psychological Inventory (CPI), 37, 38 Civil rights movement, 9 Civilian commissioner, 13

Civilian Complaint Review Board, 31 Civilian complaints, 31 Commanders, police, 15 Community Council Meetings, 16 Community Patrol Officer Program in 1983, 11 Community policing, 11, 12, 16 COMPSTAT meetings, 15 Control balance theory, 5 Control ratio theory, 29 Corporate management model, 14, 15 Corruption, 1, 2 scandal, 11–14 police, 27, 28 Counterterrorism, 21 Courtesy professionalism respect (CPR), 19 Courtroom perjury, 33–34 Criminal gangs, 28 Criminal justice, 40 Criminality, police, 29 Criminological analyses, 1, 2, 47 D Deviance and misconduct, American police early 1990s (1990–1993), 12–14 1960s, 9, 10 1970s, 10, 11 1980s, 11, 12 late 1990s (1994–2000), 14–20 2001 to present, 21, 22 involving NYPD, 22, 23 Disciplinary events, 42 Drug dealers, 12 Drug testing, police, 39 Drug tests, 13

© The Author(s) 2017 J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7

53

Index

54 E Economic factors, 28 Elite plainclothes Street Crime Unit, NYPD, 17 Emotional instability, 38 Extremist groups, formation of, 9 F Federal laws, 10 Fish bowl environment, 33 Five-factor model, 38 Fixed foot patrol beats, 13 Flaking, 21 Foot patrol program, 11 G Giuliani, R.W., 14 H Haitian immigrants, 17 I Immigrants, Haitian, 17 Integrity tests, 13 Intelligence testing, 36 Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB), 13, 14, 21 Internal affairs investigation mechanism, 13 Inwald personality inventory (IPI), 37, 38 J Johnson, L., 10 K King, R., 12 Knapp Commission, 11, 27 L Law enforcement, 9, 12, 30 administrators, 47 agencies, 40 executives, 41 misbehavior, 47 officers, 11 pre-employment screening for officials of, 35, 36 supervisors, 42 Leadership, 41, 42

Lindsay, J., 11 Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 12, 36 M Managers, police, 43 Media, 9 Merton’s strain theory, 27 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 36–38 Misconduct, police, 32 Mollen Commission, 13, 33, 40 Municipalities, 10 N NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-­PI-­R), 37, 38 New York City Police Department (NYPD), 9–14, 17–23, 27–29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 41 Noble cause corruption, 5, 34 O Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, 10 Opioids, 39 P Patriot Act, 21 Performance evaluations, 42 Performance monitoring programs, 20 Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), 37 16 Personality factor, 37 Personality testing, 36–39 Phantom, 21 Police brutality, 4 Police corruption, 4, 5, 22 Police deviance, 47 behaviors, 1 categorized, 1 corruption, 4, 5 definition, 6, 7 examination, 2 practical implications, 2 theories of crime to Blue Wall of Silence, 32, 33 corruption, 27, 28 courtroom perjury, 33–34 criminality, 29 excessive use of force, 30, 31

Index misconduct, 32 police abuse of authority, 31, 32 understanding, 2 in US, 3 Police integrity, 41–43 Police station, 11, 12, 22, 43 Policing, 2 Potential predictors, 41 Pre-employment screening, 41, 42, 47 to deter police deviance, 36 for law enforcement officials, 35, 36 Proactive employees, 23 Problem employees, 22 Problem-solving concept, 12 Professional courtesy, 33 Professionalism, 41–43 Psychological screening, 36–39, 42 Q Qualifications, hiring, 40, 41 R Rampart Division events, LAPD, 29 Revolving door court system, 29 S Social learning theory, 30, 33 Special Message to the Congress on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 10 Street-level criminals, 28 Supreme Court, US cases, 10, 18 Sutherland’s differential association theory, 28, 29 Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory, 31, 33, 34

55 T Techniques of neutralization, 31 Theories of crime, 5, 6 and blue wall of silence, 32, 33 courtroom perjury, 33–34 excessive use of force, 30, 31 police abuse of authority, 31, 32 police corruption, 27, 28 police criminality, 29 police misconduct, 32 Training, police, 10 Trait theory, 30 Two-way radios, 11 U Uniformed crime reports, 21 US Supreme Court cases, 10, 18 V Verbal judo concept, 19 Violent crime rates, 12 Volpe, J., 17 W Wickersham Commission, 36 Widom’s social learning theory, 30, 31, 34 Y “Young blood” administrators, 14 Z Zero tolerance proactive policing model, 14, 16