Philosophy of Psychology 9780231888042

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1. The Armchair and the Laboratory
2. Determinism, “Hard and “Soft”
3. Reductionism: Models, Metaphors and Similes
4. Explanations
5. Ethics and Psychological Inquiry
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

Critical Assessments of Contemporary Psychology A Series of Columbia University Press Daniel N. Robinson, Series Editor

Philosophy of Psychology Daniel N. Robinson

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS N e w York 1985

Columbia University Press New York Guildford, Surrey Copyright © 1985 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Robinson, Daniel N., 1937Philosophy of psychology. (Critical assessments of contemporary psychology) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Psychology—Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series. BF38.R59 1985 150'. 1 84-23878 I S B N 0-231-05922-1 (alk. paper) I S B N 0-231-05923-X (pbk.)

Clothbound editions of Columbia University Press Books are Smythsewn and printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper.

To my wife Francine, who asked for this book for many years, and to my daughters Tracey and Kimberley, with love.

Contents

Preface

ix 1. The Armchair a n d t h e Laboratory

1

2. Determinism, "Hard" a n d "Soft"

21

3. Reductionism: Models, M e t a p h o r s a n d Similes

69

4. Explanations

109

5. Ethics a n d Psychological Inquiry

141

Notes

171

Bibliography

181

Index

187

Preface Not long after 1 had decided to write this book I had occasion to meet with a former student, now a highly credentialed philosopher with his fingers on the pulse of his discipline. He had, to my gratification, found use for other books of mine in several of his Philosophy seminars and so 1 thought he would be interested to learn of my plans for this book. "Philosophy of Psychology?" said he; "It's a dead subject!" I should say that this verdict—this autopsy report— did not come as a complete surprise to me, though it might well discourage readers from proceeding much further. Where intellectual pursuits are involved, "dead" must be regarded as a relative term now stripped of its customary finality. During the long and triumphant season of Behaviorism, for example, the study of Mind was a "dead" subject, but has since returned, through the cognitive sciences, to a position of dominance. To say a subject is dead, therefore, is not so much to describe it as to summarize the interests and attitudes of those who might be expected to nurture it. What my young friend was indicating was the general sentiment within academic Philosophy to the effect that Philosophy of Psychology was not as important as any number of other problem-areas amenable to philosophical investigation. Apparently,

PREFACE

X

m o s t of t h e influential m e m b e r s of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m u n i t y had r e a c h e d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e traditional i s s u e s of philos o p h i c a l P s y c h o l o g y were e i t h e r wrangles over t h e m e a n i n g of words, or had b e e n dissolved by scientific study or were b e s t understood

within

narrower

and

highly

specialized

compart-

m e n t s ; e.g., e p i s t e m o l o g y , c o m p u t e r s c i e n c e , linguistics, artificial intelligence, s o c i o l o g y of knowledge, etc. On t h i s construal, t h e body of p h i l o s o p h i c a l Psychology had died, but its members

were

still vital. If p h i l o s o p h e r s are inclined t o s e e t h i s s u b j e c t a s c a daverous, p s y c h o l o g i s t s t e n d t o regard it a s extraterrestrial! After all, what's t h e point of laboring t o d e v e l o p Psychology a s an ind e p e n d e n t s c i e n c e if, a century later, critics are still

proposing

p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e s u b j e c t ? Only when

psycholo-

g i s t s were willing t o a b a n d o n t h a t a r m c h a i r of dreamy s p e c u l a tion w a s t h e r e any possibility of a scientific Psychology. T h e final years of t h e twentieth century surely c a n n o t b e t h e t i m e t o b e a t a retreat. To m a n y psychologists, t h e n , t h e " p h i l o s o p h i c a l

psy-

c h o l o g i s t " is a strange, a n a c h r o n i s t i c creature; s o m e otherworldly m u t a n t for w h o m (or for which) t h e dividing-line b e t w e e n

idle

c h a t t e r a n d productive labor is invisible; o n e who fails t o realize that "philosophy" is what psychologists do when their work is done, a s o t h e r s might jog, play c h e s s or refinish old furniture. But all of this is at an utterly superficial level a n d c a n b e safely d i s m i s s e d a s little m o r e than an e x p r e s s i o n of a c a d e m i c f a s h i o n s . T h e plain fact is t h a t m u c h of what is now taken t o b e t h e leading e d g e P h i l o s o p h y is just p h i l o s o p h i c a l Psychology, a s is a substantial a m o u n t of theoretical and conceptual activity within Psychology. Every m o n t h t h e leading p h i l o s o p h i c a l j o u r n a l s h o s t s e a r c h i n g e s s a y s on intentionality, free will, thought, justice, a e s t h e t i c s , moral j u d g m e n t s , b e l i e f — t h e full panoply of i s s u e s arising from t h e facts of human nature, human psychology. And for their part, p s y c h o l o g i s t s from dawn t o dusk m u s t m a k e at least implicit a n d philosophical

d e c i s i o n s on t h e nature of e x p l a n a t i o n , c a u s a l de-

t e r m i n a t i o n s , t h e a p t n e s s of m o d e l s and m e t a p h o r s , t h e validity of c e r t a i n c o n s t r u c t s , etc. It may b e that p h i l o s o p h i c a l Psychology has, a s it were, g o n e underground, but certainly n o t by burial, a n d t h i s is what t h e following p a g e s are i n t e n d e d t o m a k e clear.

PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER

ONE

The Armchair and the Laboratory

F

or t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t working in t h e

penultimate

d e c a d e of t h e twentieth century, t h e s u b j e c t of

philosophical

psychology is likely t o b e regarded a s purely historical,

even atavistic. It was t h e very s u b j e c t that had t o b e a b a n d o n e d in order that real Psychology—"scientific" Psychology—could c o m e into being. Modern Psychology b e g a n , after all, only when t h e a r m c h a i r a n d its m a n y c o m f o r t s were sacrificed for t h e laboratory a n d its m a n y b u r d e n s . An e s p e c i a l l y vivid e x a m p l e of t h i s view was provided a few years a g o by a well-known e x p e r i m e n t a l psyc h o l o g i s t who had just returned from a visit t o a mutual friend. "How is X g e t t i n g o n ? " 1 asked. "Well," said he, " h e ' s going through a mid-life crisis; he's d o i n g a lot of p h i l o s o p h i c a l stuff." William l a m e s , however, knew better. He knew t h a t a s Psychology's scientific prosperity grew, s o t o o would its n e e d for philosophical maturity. A natural science of Psychology d o e s not m e a n a n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l Psychology: It m e a n s j u s t t h e reverse; it m e a n s a p s y c h o l o g y particularly fragile, a n d into which t h e waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every

2

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY joint. . . . A string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, and that our brain conditions them; but not a single law in the sense in which physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence can causally be deduced.1

lames, of course, enjoyed eminence both as a philosopher and as a psychologist. He was no enemy of the laboratory; indeed, a good case can be made for his priority over Wundt in this regard. But he also had learned to respect the "armchair" and to appreciate the irreducibly philosophical dimensions of science itself. Like the aging laborer who returns from his first University class and announces to his wife, "We've been speaking English prose all our lives!" many a psychologist has been immersed in philosophical speculation, if only half-consciously. The very selection of a laboratory as a place in which questions might be answered is a philosophical decision, and a momentous and vexing one at that. It launches the investigator into ever deeper "metaphysical waters," where the aimless voyage is far more common than the charted one. Or, to borrow from the other metaphor, we may say that although psychologists have been speaking prose all their lives, they have not always spoken it well or correctly. No matter how "scientific" the psychological investigation is, there are ubiquitous philosophical aspects of it which, when unnoticed, are likely to be fatally defective. But the term "philosophical" has very wide extension, often covering nearly anything taking place in the armchair. For present purposes this extension must be restricted so as to exclude both idle speculation at one extreme and purely logical abstractions at the other. Thus restricted, philosophical Psychology is confined chiefly to an examination of meanings: An examination of what it means to say that an event is caused or explained or somehow understood; an examination of the criteria associated with calling an event a "psychological" one; an examination of the considerations that go into making a question an "empirical" one or fit for experimental modes of address. At a superficial level we might think that questions of

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

3

meaning are settled simply by consulting the dictionary or by establishing how given terms and phrases are used by the native speakers of the language. Such a procedure, however, can yield no more than a "folk Psychology" perhaps useful to the anthropologist. Alas, modern psychological discourse is utterly infected with "folk" meanings and has no dictionary of its own with which to perform translations and corrections. But here we get ahead of ourselves. The point now is that an examination of the meaning of psychological utterances and claims must go deeper than a merely lexical inquiry. Thus, when the psychologist accounts for Smith's behavior by saying that Smith was impelled by "unconcious motives," we are interested in more than the meaning of the words. We are interested at least in what sort of "impulse" is involved and whether it is unopposably determinative. We are interested further in the sort of evidence adduced to support the claim that there are in fact "unconscious" motives and how these differ from those of which the actor is aware. Accordingly, we would be poorly served by the psychologist who offered no more than synonyms when pressed for a clarification. The choice of a psychoanalytic example might seem self-serving in light of the ostensibly "philosophical" nature of psychoanalytic theory itself. But a similar line of questioning is engaged by the claim that a food-deprived animal is "motivated" or somehow impelled toward behavior of a certain kind. In both instances psychologists are not merely reporting a statistically reliable association between two "variables," but affirming a lawful dependency. Even those who would insist on confining their statements to the observable association itself have adopted a metaphysical position that triggers still other queries. 2 And these too cannot be set aside by dictionary definitions of the terms employed. The psychologist who insists that all utterances be confined to statements of "observables" is accountable and must give reasons for the injunction. As we press on we will discover that a veritable philosophy of science stands behind it and that this philosophy itself is not vindicated by "observables"! To say, then, that the province of philosophical Psychology is the province of meanings is not to consign the subject

4

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

t o " s e m a n t i c s " or t o argue implicitly t h a t Psychology's p r o b l e m s are n o m o r e t h a n verbal q u i b b l e s . It is t o say i n s t e a d t h a t any discipline c l a i m i n g truth a s an o b j e c t i v e is finally a body of propositions-, p r o p o s i t i o n s regarding m e t h o d , fact, c o n f i r m a t i o n ,

mea-

s u r e m e n t a n d e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s and their logical connectives (i.e., their "if . . . then," "therefore" clauses) yield what may b e c a l l e d t h e arguments

of t h e discipline. T h e t a s k of philo-

sophical Psychology is t o unravel and t o test t h e meaning of t h e s e a r g u m e n t s . This is a task t h a t can b e deferred but not avoided indefinitely by any discipline t h a t would b e taken seriously. If t h e t a s k is t o b e realistic a n d rewarding, p h i l o s o p h ical Psychology m u s t not p r o m i s e t o o m u c h . It m u s t not e n c r o a c h on t h a t exclusively factual territory t o which t h e empirical

sci-

ences

the

have

laid valid claim. A p h i l o s o p h i c a l

inquiry into

m e a n i n g of psychological a r g u m e n t s leads t o a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a n d n o t t o an appraisal or discovery of t h e facts t h e m s e l v e s . To take a trivial e x a m p l e , we know that when S m i t h c l a i m s t o have an " i d e a of red" h e is not c l a i m ing t o have a "red idea." In recognizing t h e logical distinction b e tween an idea of X a n d an X - i d e a we d o n o t e s t a b l i s h either factually. S o m e of t h e scorn h e a p e d upon t h e " a r m c h a i r P s y c h o l o g y " of t h e past was invited by t h o s e who o v e r r e a c h e d t h e m s e l v e s in their o t h e r w i s e informing i n t r o s p e c t i v e activities. But t h e factg a t h e r e r s have a l s o o v e r r e a c h e d t h e m s e l v e s when, for e x a m p l e , they have m o v e d from what l a m e s c a l l e d "a little classification a n d generalization on t h e m e r e descriptive level" t o t r i u m p h a n t c o n c l u s i o n s regarding n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e n a t u r e of h u m a n nature. 3 Here, too, p h i l o s o p h i c a l Psychology h a s t h e e s s e n t i a l function of t h e referee who m u s t d e t e r m i n e which m o v e s are permissible. There are, after all, different types of generalization. There is t h e merely statistical p r o c e s s of e x t r a p o l a t i n g from an empirically e s t a b l i s h e d trend t o m o r e distant a n d u n t e s t e d r e g i o n s of t h e s a m e c o n t i n u u m . This is an e x a m p l e of t h e philosophically neutral induction that yields h a r m l e s s a n d often useful predictions. W e might call t h e s e horizontal

generalizations and contrast

t h e m with t h e very different vertical g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s that e x t e n d t o

5

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

r e l a t i o n s h i p s having n o or very little empirical support. T h e horizontal g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s c o m m o n t o t h e e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n c e s (and t o t h e established specialties within experimental Psychology, such a s p s y c h o p h y s i c s ) are d e f e n d e d a n d d e f e n s i b l e on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s governing t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p are known. For e x a m p l e , t h e s u b j e c t i v e b r i g h t n e s s of brief ( l e s s than 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s ) f l a s h e s of light is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e total energy in t h e flash. Thus, all o t h e r factors b e i n g e q u a l , b r i g h t n e s s is a function of t h e product of intensity X e x p o s u r e duration (I X t), which is t h e well known Bloch's Law of i n t e n s i t y - t i m e reciprocity. Now, since it is t h e total energy (I X t) t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e effect, we validly generalize (predict) t h a t t h e s a m e r e l a t i o n s h i p m u s t o b t a i n when f l a s h e s of different wavelength are e m p l o y e d ;

put

another way, that Bloch's Law applies t o lights of different "color." T h e i n f e r e n c e h e r e is b a s e d upon t h e prior discovery t h a t

energy

is t h e d e t e r m i n a t i v e variable and on t h e physical fact t h a t energy is a function of wavelength. Vertical g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s are different, radically

more

c o m p l e x , a n d ultimately d e p e n d upon t h e validity of t h e o r i e s of a higher order. Again for illustrative p u r p o s e s we may take t h e fact that M a c a q u e m o n k e y s are known t o p o s s e s s cells in their cerebral c o r t e x e s t h a t r e s p o n d selectively t o t h e s h a p e of t h e i r h a n d s . 4 And, at a different level of o b s e r v a t i o n , we discover t h a t h u m a n infants display a r e c o g n i t i o n of their own m o t h e r s ' faces. But t h e s e two d i s c o n n e c t e d facts would not permit t h e c o n c l u sion t h a t t h e infant is s o m e h o w e q u i p p e d with cortical cells "pret u n e d " t o t h e p h y s i o g n o m y of that infant's m o t h e r . Of c o u r s e , n o o n e h a s s u g g e s t e d o t h e r w i s e . But n o t e what would have t o s t a n d at t h e f o u n d a t i o n of such a s u g g e s t i o n were it seriously prop o s e d . Minimally t h e r e would have t o b e strong a r g u m e n t s supporting t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e evolution of t h e cerebral c o r t e x is nearly t h e s a m e in m o n k e y a n d in h u m a n being. But t h i s very e x p e c t a t i o n would rest on still o t h e r m e t h o d s for d e t e r m i n i n g — without assuming

t h e validity of t h e t h e o r y — t h e d e g r e e t o which

two different d e v e l o p m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s are "nearly t h e s a m e . " It is not n e c e s s a r y t o b e c o m e involved with this particular i s s u e t o appreciate how different this sort of generalization is from t h e o n e

6

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

based upon Bloch's Law in vision. In the latter instance the s a m e effect (perceived brightness) is the subject of the generalization and the s a m e physical continuum (energy) is taken to be the determinative independent variable for the s a m e observer. But with vertical generalizations such as the illustrative one we confront two different species, two different and not merely "physical" classes of stimuli ("distress" calls and human vocalizations), and two different patterns of behavior (cell discharges and the infant's orienting responses). Thus, to expect that the s a m e processes are involved is first to accept the validity and generalizability of that very evolutionary theory the findings would tend to support or challenge. What philosophical Psychology has to contribute here is partly a reminder and to s o m e extent at least a conceptual corrective. Only rarely, however, are such contributions of the neat and unarguably logical sort. That is, it is only rarely (one must hope) that psychological discourse is formally self-contradictory or fallacious. And given the fact that psychologists, too, are rational beings, it would not be necessary to depend upon the separate discipline of Philosophy to discover blatantly fallacious arguments or self-contradictory propositions. Philosophers do not have and do not claim proprietorship of logical coherence. What they do have are the benefits of a self-imposed discipline in the matter of cutting away the purely "folk" features of argument and getting at its fundamental conceptual assumptions and claims. Like the angel Ithuriel in Paradise Lost, Philosophy has an instrument designed to disclose the true nature of whatever it touches. But the analogy here is much t o o brazen. It is more apt to say that philosophical modes of analysis help us preserve whatever truths (better, facts) have been independently gathered as we insert these facts into more general propositions and arguments to which these facts are judged to be germane. It should be clear by now that philosophical Psychology is not offered as a panacea or a magicians's wand. Rather, it is a harbinger of conceptual dead-ends; an after-the-fact pathologist who helps to explain what killed a theory; a schoolmaster who, often tediously, insists on the proper grammatical forms; a

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

7

patient translator who assists interlocutors in the important business of making themselves intelligible to one another; and occasionally an expert witness summoned to instruct the court as to whether a regulative maxim of logic has been violated. In these various roles philosophical Psychology has always been at least an implicit part of psychological and scientific research and theory, just as Psychology itself has been an implicit part of nearly all of Philosophy except for Logic. The traditional topics of Philosophy—ethics, metaphysics, political philosophy, social philosophy—proceed from any number of psychological assumptions; assumptions about human motivations and goals; about human perception and belief; about human penchants for aggregating. Typically these assumptions are drawn from a combination of the philosopher's own (introspected) "nature" and from a general if imprecise notion of how other human beings have tended to behave in various circumstances. Thus, both the philosopher and the psychologist have, as it were, "been speaking English prose" all their lives; both have been philosophical psychologists, but in different ways. It may be true, as A. J. Ayer once said, that "Philosophical theories are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact" 5 but this is so only because of the formal propositional manner in which the theories are assembled. When the philosopher attempts to put together an argument for the "just state," the originating principle of the argument may be to the effect that human beings are by nature "self-interested." To turn up a few persons who may be said not to be thus "self-interested" is never sufficient to overturn the theory, since the theory itself claims validity only to the extent that the (theoretical) occupants of the state are in fact self-interested. Thus, if A. J. Ayer meant only that the form of philosophical theories and the (logical) methods of testing their coherence are neutral as regards matters of fact, we can surely concur. But at some point the theory takes on the burden of both prediction and explanation, and what it would predict or explain is some matters of fact. Perhaps at this point we would be inclined to take it now not as a philosophical but a scientific theory. Be that as it may, its author is no longer neutral!

8

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

Even if it is established, however, that philosophical Psychology is an implicit part or in the background of contemporary efforts in Philosophy and Psychology, the question still lingers as to whether this hybrid is itself a discipline or merely one of the tools used somewhat differently within two distinct disciplines. Are we to think of philosophical Psychology the way we think, for example, of physiological or sensory or developmental Psychology; or should it b e regarded as Statistics i s — a s a separate if indispensible "device" for settling questions of a certain kind? This is the sort of question that is surrounded by necessary equivocations. Statistics, let us recall, is also a branch of mathematics and is developed in abstract and formal ways by specialists who need never consider experimental findings. Logic, too, is both a formal and an abstract discipline unto itself and a practical device for drawing boundaries around rational discourse. One man's tool is another man's science. As with Statistics and Logic, the specialty of philosophical Psychology is likely to be a tool for the many, a science for the few. In this book it is treated only as a tool; as a set of guidelines for clarifying certain concepts, for assessing certain strategies, for weighing the merits of certain arguments. In many instances, this " t o o l " is seen to be nothing more than clear thinking. Indeed, o n e is inclined to describe, if not define, philosophical Psychology as the habit of clear thinking about psychological issues. But a statement of this kind is arrogant and offensive if not

qualified. "Read this book if you would think clearly"

is scarcely the way

to appeal to an intelligent audience of students and teachers! When I refer to habitual clarity of thought I am suggesting the refinement of a talent that already exists, and not o n e that remains to be acquired. There is a symmetry, then, between the habitual clarity of thought imparted by philosophical Psychology and the habitual clarity of method imparted by experimental Psychology. What the student is expected t o derive from the latter is a refinement of just that talent for precision, care, and problem-solving that is already present, but that has not yet b e c o m e habitual. The analogy holds all along the way. The trained experimenter knows that repeated measurement is necessary if the effects of the indepen-

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

9

d e n t variable are n o t t o b e c o n f u s e d with merely statistical fluct u a t i o n s in t h e p h e n o m e n o n of interest. T h e aim h e r e is n o t t o b e m i s l e d by c o i n c i d e n c e s , n o t t o b e c o n f u s e d by " n o i s e . " T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p s y c h o l o g i s t knows t h a t t o have t h e idea of " b l u e " is n o t t o have a " b l u e idea." But in b o t h i n s t a n c e s , t h e s p e c i a l i s t s are n o t in p o s s e s s i o n of dark truths t h a t are i n a c c e s s i b l e t o ordinary h u m a n intelligence. U n e d u c a t e d g a m b l e r s s i n c e

remote

antiquity have known enough t o b e suspicious when t h e dice keep yielding " 7 " a n d " 1 1 " or when t h e favored stallion falls a s l e e p in t h e starting box. Belief in m i r a c l e s is an a g e l e s s fixture of t h e hum a n e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h e c o n c e p t of a " m i r a c l e " is available only to t h o s e with t h e prior c o n c e p t of probabilities. So, too, with "blue i d e a s " a n d t h e like. W h o h a s ever required tuition in P h i l o s o p h y lest h e think that, in recalling an e l e p h a n t , t h e r e is an e l e p h a n t in his h e a d ? To a c c e p t t h a t t h e r e is, in fact, an external world is at l e a s t implicitly t o a c c e p t a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e act a n d t h e o b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h u s b e t w e e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s of t h e act and t h e a t t r i b u t e s of t h e o b j e c t . But a l t h o u g h t h e g a m b l e r s of history have known t h a t a long run of " 7 " s and "1 l " s is o d d — t h a t s o m e t h i n g is a m i s s — it was only with t h e a d v e n t of probability theory a n d S t a t i s t i c s t h a t we could quantify t h e o d d n e s s . And it only through t h a t habitual clarity of m e t h o d we call experimentation

t h a t we can quantify

t h e c o n f i d e n c e we are a l l o w e d t o have in t h e e f f e c t s o n e variable h a s o n a n o t h e r . W h e n we turn t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l Psychology t h e e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t s are similar, though not e x p r e s s i b l e numerically. T h e b e n e f i t s are e x p r e s s i b l e chiefly by e x a m p l e . W h a t are taken t o b e t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e s are given in t h e b a l a n c e of this book. In c h o o s i n g such e x a m p l e s it is i m p o r t a n t t o f o c u s on t h e g e n u i n e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l f e a t u r e s of psychological t h o u g h t ; on what are s o m e t i m e s referred t o a s t h e " m e t a - p s y c h o l o g i c a l " asp e c t s rather t h a n t h e psychological a s p e c t s per se. T h e latter are appropriately a s s e s s e d within t h e c o n t e x t of critical a p p r a i s a l s of specific psychological " s y s t e m s " or t h e o r i e s or p r o g r a m s of research

6

But t o c h o o s e o n e s e t of f e a t u r e s over a n d a g a i n s t o t h e r s

is p h i l o s o p h i c a l work in its own right a n d p r o c e e d s from a c l a s s -

10

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

ification, t h e principal t e r m s of which warrant d i s c u s s i o n . Just how d o we recognize an i s s u e or p r e m i s e a s p h i l o s o p h i c a l rather than, say, psychological or s c i e n t i f i c ? Again, I would draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e tween t h e factual c l a i m s a n d u t t e r a n c e s — t h e arguments—of cipline a n d an a n a l y s i s of t h e meanings

a dis-

properly a t t a c h e d t o t h e s e .

T h e m e a n i n g s a r i s e from what is finally t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l foundation on which s u c h c l a i m s are b a s e d . As u s e d here, " m e t a p h y s ical" refers t o two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e t h o u g h reciprocally informing c l a s s e s of q u e s t i o n s or p r e m i s e s ; viz., t h e ontological temological.

a n d t h e epis-

O n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s refer t o t h e existential s t a n d i n g

of an entity or p r o c e s s . Thus, w h e t h e r or n o t t h e r e are b o n a fide m e n t a l e v e n t s is an o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s tions arise when we adopt a critical attitude toward t h e very m o d e s of knowing t h a t a r e b r o u g h t t o b e a r on any q u e s t i o n . Obviously t h e s t a n d we take on t h e o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of an entity or proc e s s will b e d e t e r m i n e d by our e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

presuppositions

and vice versa. To ask, for e x a m p l e , if m e n t a l e v e n t s are real (as o p p o s e d t o b e i n g just physical e v e n t s by a n o t h e r n a m e ) is simult a n e o u s l y t o a s k for a certain kind of e v i d e n c e ; but this itself pres u p p o s e s t h e validity of a given m o d e of inquiry. T h e r e is a v i c i o u s circularity in all of t h i s t h a t is t o s o m e e x t e n t u n a v o i d a b l e . T h e o n t o l o g i s t who i n s i s t s that only physical e n t i t i e s have real e x i s t e n c e is c o n f r o n t e d by an adversary who d e c l a r e s that, in addition t o physical entities, t h e r e are m e n tal o n e s w h o s e a t t r i b u t e s include t h e o n e of b e i n g nonphysical. The s t a g e is now s e t for t h e gathering a n d weighing of relevant e v i d e n c e . But s u p p o s e at t h i s j u n c t u r e t h e physicalist insists t h a t only public e v i d e n c e — o n l y o c c u r r e n c e s a b l e t o e x c i t e t h e s e n s o r y and perceptual p r o c e s s e s of neutral o b s e r v e r s — w i l l b e a c c e p t e d . Clearly, this c o n d i t i o n b e g s t h e very q u e s t i o n at issue, s i n c e only physical occurrences can have sensory effects. We shall have much m o r e t o say o n t h i s specific m a t t e r in a later c h a p t e r . I u s e it h e r e t o illustrate t h e s u b t l e a n d t h e n o t s o s u b t l e ways t h a t o n t o l o g i cal a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c l a i m s are intermingled. W h e n we take a position on what t h e r e is, unavoidably we a l s o take a position o n how we ever know what t h e r e is. T o g e t h e r t h e s e o n t o l o g i c a l a n d

T H E ARMCHAIR AND T H E LABORATORY

epistemological

considerations

establish

the

1 1

metaphysical

b o u n d a r i e s within which t h e central a r g u m e n t s of a discipline are d e v e l o p e d . They are t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t permit at least a thin line t o b e drawn b e t w e e n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d t h e n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e n t s of psychological d i s c o u r s e . T h e line, however, is a thin o n e a n d r e s i s t s a t t e m p t s t o m a k e it p e r m a n e n t . W e learn, for e x a m p l e , t h a t " B e a t r i c e app e a r e d t o D a n t e in his s l e e p , " a n d we b e g i n t o p l u m b t h e m e a n ing of this claim. W h a t sort of entity a p p e a r e d t o D a n t e ? T h e o b vious answer is that "Beatrice" here refers not to an actual person but t o s o m e sort of apparition, a kind of h a l l u c i n a t i o n c o m m o n t o d r e a m e r s . The only proof we would require is t h a t B e a t r i c e was s o m e w h e r e e l s e at t h e t i m e D a n t e saw " h e r . " But in this c a s e we would only b e taking o n e first-person a c c o u n t ("I saw B e a t r i c e at dinner with her p a r e n t s . " ) over D a n t e ' s a c c o u n t ("I saw B e a t r i c e in my s l e e p . " ) Let us say, however, t h a t d o z e n s of p e o p l e saw Beatrice at d i n n e r with her p a r e n t s at just t h e t i m e D a n t e was s l e e p ing a n d " s e e i n g " Beatrice. We, a n d p r e s u m a b l y D a n t e too, would now b e satisfied t h a t t h e B e a t r i c e of t h e d r e a m was not really Beatrice but just a figment of D a n t e ' s dream-world. T h e position we have taken is o n e of c o m m o n s e n s e at o n e level but is a l s o m e t a physical at a n o t h e r . W e have a g r e e d t o c o n f e r o n t o l o g i c a l s t a n d ing only on t h e Beatrice publicly observed and t o withhold it from t h e entity s e e n only by t h e dreamer. But how is this strategy t o work when, for e x a m p l e , a C o p e r n i c u s i n s i s t s t h a t t h e sun is stationary at a t i m e when every m a n , w o m a n , and child s e e s it rising a n d s e t t i n g every day? In t h e c a s e of D a n t e ' s d r e a m we were willing t o s e t t l e t h e m a t t e r by a p p e a l i n g t o t h e m e t h o d s of social scie n c e . We c o n d u c t e d a poll, a s it were, and discovered t h a t relia b l e w i t n e s s e s all saw (the real) B e a t r i c e s o m e w h e r e e l s e at t h e t i m e D a n t e c l a i m e d t o have s e e n her in his room. But t h e Copernican c l a i m a l s o refers t o a publicly verifiable p h e n o m e n o n : To wit, t h a t t h e sun d o e s n o t move. T h e e x a m p l e s h o u l d not b e m i s c o n s t r u e d . It is, of course, trivially true t h a t C o p e r n i c a n i s m was s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n firmed by a c h i e v e m e n t s in a s t o n o m y a n d a s t r o p h y s i c s a n d t h a t t h e P t o l e m a i c alternative, which was in c l o s e r a c c o r d with c o m -

12

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

m o n e x p e r i e n c e , was shown t o b e false. But t h e e x a m p l e is getting at s o m e t h i n g q u i t e different. In t h e m a t t e r of D a n t e ' s d r e a m t h e r e was never any d o u b t t h a t t h e public record would s e t t l e t h e question. And, in t h e matter of Copernicus' thesis, there was never any d o u b t t h a t t h e ordinary facts of p e r c e p t i o n would not s e t t l e t h e q u e s t i o n . N o t e t h a t C o p e r n i c u s , too, " s a w " t h e sun rise a n d set. N o t e a l s o that t h e h e a v e n s would look t h e s a m e t o an earthly o b s e r v e r w h e t h e r t h e o b s e r v e r a d o p t e d t h e C o p e r n i c a n or t h e P t o l e m a i c perspective. W e might grant that s o m e of t h e resist a n c e t o C o p e r n i c u s was b a s e d on scripture and s o m e of it on t h e layman's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a moving earth would b e felt t o move. But in every k n o w l e d g e - c l a i m t h e r e is this e l e m e n t of conviction or b e l i e f a s well a s t h e e l e m e n t of o n e or a n o t h e r sort of experie n c e . T h e s e are t h e psychological

c o n c o m i t a n t s of e p i s t e m i c c l a i m s

but they m u s t a l s o b e taken into philosophical

c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Again,

sharp a n d p e r m a n e n t lines b e t w e e n t h e two may b e chimerical. If we insist t h a t t h e intensity of belief is a psychological factor t h a t h a s n o b e a r i n g whatever on t h e truth of what is believed, t h e n we are prepared t o a c c e p t t h a t belief is n e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y nor a sufficient c o n d i t i o n of truth. M o r e generally, we are prepared t o a c c e p t t h a t nothing of a purely psychological nature h a s any b e a r i n g on t h e truth-value of various p h i l o s o p h i c a l c l a i m s . But p e r c e p t i o n itself is "purely p s y c h o l o g i c a l " and c o n s t i t u t e s t h e very e s s e n c e of s o - c a l l e d empirical m o d e s of verification. It h a s b e c o m e c u s t o m a r y t o avoid t h e pitfalls of an utterly s u b j e c t i v e

epistemology—to

resist

"psychologism"—by

qualifying t h e role of b e l i e f in a s s e s s m e n t s of knowledge-claims. Thus, S m i t h is said t o know X when S m i t h b e l i e v e s X a n d h a s good reasons for s o believing. 7 This scarcely strips t h e e n t e r p r i s e of psychological a t t r i b u t e s , however, s i n c e t o have a g o o d r e a s o n is, a m o n g other considerations, to believe o n e has a good reason or at least t o have a r e a s o n m a n y o t h e r s b e l i e v e is a g o o d o n e . T h e qualification accordingly simply s u b s t i t u t e s a s o c i o l o g i c a l for a psychological standard. W e might a d o p t a conciliatory a n d pragm a t i c a t t i t u d e h e r e a n d just not worry a b o u t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . But t h e c o n s e q u e n c e is likely t o b e (as it h a s b e e n ) a very false s e n s e of security within Psychology a n d Philosophy. In t h e last

13

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY a n a l y s i s it does matter

w h e t h e r t h e a r m c h a i r o r t h e l a b o r a t o r y is

t h e p r o p e r s e t t i n g for i n q u i r i e s of a c e r t a i n kind. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a q u e s t i o n , properly u n d e r s t o o d , is a m e t a p h y s i c a l o n e w h o s e a n s w e r t u r n s o n c o n c e p t u a l a s o p p o s e d t o factual c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d s c i e n t i f i c a p p r o a c h e s will b e n u g a t o r y a n d m i s l e a d i n g . If o n l y for t a c t i c a l r e a s o n s , t h e r e f o r e , it is a d v i s a b l e t o defer the

"research

program"

long

enough

for t h e

necessary

metaphysical groundwork to b e performed. This is not t o say t h a t Psychology is t o sit still for s o m e i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d during which P h i l o s o p h y will l e g i s l a t e t h e psyc h o l o g i s t ' s a g e n d a . As a l r e a d y n o t e d , p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d p s y c h o l o g i s t s h a v e b e e n d o i n g e a c h o t h e r ' s work wittingly o r o t h e r w i s e all a l o n g . T h e r e is n o f o r m u l a , n o i n c a n t a t i o n , n o m a g i c a l p o t i o n for d i s c o v e r i n g w h o is t o h a v e c u s t o d y of " t r u t h s " a b o u t t h i s o r t h a t . An u n d e r g r a d u a t e , a f t e r a few c o u r s e s in P s y c h o l o g y

and

p r o p e r i n s t r u c t i o n in s t a t i s t i c s a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n , c a n und e r t a k e original r e s e a r c h a n d bring it t o a s o u n d a n d an i n f o r m a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n . As with a n y e n d e a v o r , e x p e r i e n c e

is a

good

teacher; but o n e need not have a doctoral degree to undertake a c c e p t a b l e r e s e a r c h . Nor m u s t o n e b e a p r o f e s s o r of P h i l o s o p h y in o r d e r t o t h i n k c l e a r l y a b o u t a s e t of q u e s t i o n s .

Philosophical

P s y c h o l o g y is not, t h e n , a c o m p o u n d - s u b j e c t t o b e a p p o r t i o n e d t o t w o d i s t i n c t g r o u p s , b u t o n e s u b j e c t t o b e c u l t i v a t e d by all int e r e s t e d p a r t i e s in a n o n g o i n g a n d o r g a n i c way a n d n o t in s e q u e n c e . W h e t h e r o r n o t it is t o b e c u l t i v a t e d well d e p e n d s chiefly o n t h e r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s of t h o s e e n g a g e d in t h e work. In t h i s t h e r e is n o s u b s t i t u t e for e a c h worker's w i l l i n g n e s s t o learn h o w t h e o t h e r ' s t o o l s a r e u s e d . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r w h o i n s i s t s , for e x a m p l e , t h a t an o r a n g e a f t e r i m a g e is j u s t like t h e e x p e r i e n c e p r o d u c e d by a real o r a n g e - c o l o r e d o b j e c t p l a c e d b e f o r e t h e e y e s 8 w o u l d h a v e had s e c o n d t h o u g h t s h a d h e known t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e size of a n a f t e r i m a g e varies with t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e experient a n d t h e background o n t o which t h e a f t e r i m a g e is p r o j e c t e d ( E m m e r t ' s Law). B u t o u r p e r c e p t i o n of a n e x t e r n a l o b j e c t d o e s n o t b e h a v e in a n y s u c h m a n n e r . T h e p o i n t is n o t t h a t t h e e n t i r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l arg u m e n t c o l l a p s e s o n c e t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l fact is known, b u t t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t itself m i g h t h a v e b e e n richer o r m i g h t e v e n

have

14

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

taken a different turn in light of the fact that after-images and veridical perceptions behave differently. And the computer scientist who regard the central question in artificial intelligence to be the nature of "the symbols in the b r a i n " 9 certainly would have benefited from the reminder that there are no symbols in the brain at all, only in the things we say about the brain! Again, this corrective is not at the expense of the entire specialty of artificial intelligence. Rather, it is an aid to t h o s e who would develop coherent arguments in favor of this specialty and its implications for an understanding of human intelligence. The m e s s a g e here b e c o m e s clearer when we examine again the differences between Dante's dream and Copernicus's claim. If we regard both at a merely superficial level of meaning there appears to be no difference at all. Dante is found to be insisting that he saw Beatrice while Copernicus declares that the earth is moving. But as it happens the two utterances are entirely unlike. What Dante is reporting is no more than a fact of experience, of an argument. The whereas Copernicus is presenting the conclusion question raised by Dante's report is whether or not his experience was tied to an external property of the world (e.g., the property of having Beatrice occupying a specific location at a specified time). In other words, what we want to establish when Dante says that he say Beatrice in his room is whether this fact of experience is also a fact about the world or is merely a fact of experience. Accordingly, we take it as decisive that other and equally reliable persons saw her elsewhere when Dante had the experience of her presence in his room. As stated, Dante's utterance is no more than—and was intended to be no more t h a n — a bald empirical announcement pertaining to private sensations. While accepting that Dante had such sensations, we reserve the right to determine whether their cause was external to Dante or arose entirely from purely internal and even eccentric features of Dante's unconscious or physiology or brain-states. But the Copernican claim to the effect that the earth is in motion is of a very different sort and, as noted, is not an empirical claim at all, since Copernicus's "experiences" are in this regard no different from anyone else's. Copernicus does not declare that he feels the earth moving or that he sees the sun to be

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

15

stationary. If p r e s s e d on t h e point, he will insist not merely that t h e earth m o v e s but that t h e earth necessarily moves, its movement being t h e necessary deduction of an argument w h o s e m a j o r premise is nothing less than a law of s c i e n c e . Dante saw Beatrice b e c a u s e of s o m e t h i n g u n i q u e t o Dante. And so Dante's claim is finally a description of Dante. Copernicus's claim is not a description at all and thus is not t o b e s e t t l e d by a p p e a l s t o perception alone. At a certain level we are inclined to treat Dante's dream a s a psychological p h e n o m e n o n and Copernicus's t h e s i s a s "scientific," but t h e r e is a q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g d i m e n s i o n t o this. Suppose, for example, that Dante—after learning that others had seen Beatrice s o m e w h e r e e l s e — i n s i s t e d that there might b e two Beatrices (perhaps identical twins) or, m o r e boldly, that his Beatrice was a s real a s any other, and not just t o him. Let us impute this argument t o Dante: 1. All knowledge-claims are grounded ultimately in the facts of experience and are, therefore, "private" at least to t h e extent that any e x p e r i e n c e is s o m e specific person's experience. 2. Such e x p e r i e n c e s are m a d e possible, in the last analysis, by particular states and processes within the brain of the experient. 3. The states and processes within Dante's brain at the t i m e he saw Beatrice in his room were identical t o t h o s e s t a t e s and p r o c e s s e s occurring when an (allegedly) " e x t e r n a l " Beatrice is perceived—by Dante or by a n y o n e else. 4. The m e r e fact that t h e s t a t e s and p r o c e s s e s corresponding t o " B e a t r i c e " h a p p e n e d to occur in t h e brains of a number of p e o p l e in a restaurant has no bearing on t h e validity of Dante's brain states. All that can b e said is that t h e brain-equivalents of " B e a t r i c e " o c c u r in many different brains and they happ e n e d to occur in Dante's (at h o m e ) while they were also occurring t o o t h e r s (at a restaurant s o m e d i s t a n c e from Dante's residence). The q u e s t i o n now is whether there is still a clear distinction to b e m a d e b e t w e e n "psychological" and "scientific" accounts. But n o t e that now Dante's position is radically different

16

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

f r o m a s i m p l e c l a i m t o t h e effect t h a t he saw s o m e t h i n g . For as a r e s u l t o f 1 - 4 a b o v e , D a n t e is a d o p t i n g a theoretical p o s i t i o n reg a r d i n g h i s e x p e r i e n c e s . H e is n o l o n g e r c o n t e n t t o r e p o r t w h a t he has seen, b u t has b e e n forced t o d e v e l o p a t h e o r y t o a c c o u n t f o r it. A t t h i s j u n c t u r e h i s a u t h o r i t y d i s a p p e a r s a n d h i s u t t e r a n c e s m u s t c o m e t o satisfy criteria that are i n d e p e n d e n t of his particular p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s . A s l o n g as he c o n f i n e d h i m s e l f t o t r u t h f u l r e p o r t s o f his own p e r c e p t i o n s h e e n j o y e d t h e s p e c i a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t c o m e s f r o m each of us having sole p r o p r i e t o r s h i p of o u r o w n e x p e r i e n c e s . B u t , o n c e h e f o u n d it n e c e s s a r y t o d e v e l o p arguments t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e e x p e r i e n c e s , h e e n t e r e d a d i f f e r e n t e p i s t e m i c r e a l m ; t h e r e a l m i n w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s , facts, i m p l i c a tions a n d logical entailments merge to f o r m testable hypotheses. He m o v e d f r o m t h e private duchy of his o w n personal "psychology," t h r o u g h t h e " w a t e r s o f m e t a p h y s i c s , " a n d o n t o w a r d a scie n t i f i c (in t h i s case, n e u r o l o g i c a l ) t h e o r y t h a t w o u l d e x p l a i n all p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of brain-states a n d processes. T h e r e is a l e s s o n t o b e d r a w n f r o m t h e s a g a o f t h i s fictionalized Dante, apart f r o m t h e o b v i o u s o n e t h a t teaches us n o t t o c o n f u s e a fact of private experience w i t h a scientific p r o p o s i t i o n a r i s i n g f r o m t h e l a w s o f s c i e n c e . T h e m o r e s u b t l e less o n is t h a t t h e r e a l m o f p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e is a s w e l l d e f e n d e d a g a i n s t s c i e n t i f i c e n c r o a c h m e n t s a s s c i e n c e is a g a i n s t e n c r o a c h ments from the other side! As we shall have occasion to discuss l a t e r i n t h e b o o k , t h i s is a l e s s o n n o t w e l l l e a r n e d b y m o d e r n Psyc h o l o g y . T o o o f t e n it is p r o p o s e d o r s u g g e s t e d t h a t a s c i e n t i f i c a c c o u n t o f t h e mechanisms b y w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s o c c u r is a t o n c e a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e s t h e m s e l v e s . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t a t h e o r y w h i c h a c c o u n t s f o r t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f a n e v e n t is, a t the same time, an exhaustive account of the nature of the event; t h a t a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f how s o m e t h i n g c o m e s a b o u t is i d e n t i c a l t o a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f what t h a t s o m e t h i n g is. T h e c o n f u s i o n is l e s s c o m m o n w h e r e i n a n i m a t e o b jects a r e i n v o l v e d . In i n v o k i n g t h e g r a v i t a t i o n a l l a w s t o e x p l a i n why a p e n c i l f a l l s , w e d o n ' t p r e t e n d t o e x p l a i n what a p e n c i l is o r w h a t i t s u s e s are. B u t p s y c h o l o g i s t s a r e n o t a s c a r e f u l t o n o t i c e t h e d i f ference between an analysis of the causal sequence leading up t o

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

17

t h e experience " b l u e " and an explanation of t h e experience as an experience. As we shall see, this conflation of how with what has driven psychologists and p h i l o s o p h e r s to any n u m b e r of peculiar o n t o logica! positions, not t h e least surprising of which is t h e denial of mental events. Let

us recall a l s o Quine's s e c o n d " d o g m a of empiricism" which would reserve m e a n i n g only t o t h o s e uttera n c e s that can b e completely reduced t o specific (sensory?) experiences. We can share Quine's i m p a t i e n c e with t h e woolliness of reductionistic t h e s e s of this sort without adopting his prefere n c e for behavioristic alternatives. As I have d i s c u s s e d at s o m e length elsewhere," there is all the difference between a percept and a concept, the latter being an entirely propositional affair which may b e and very often is " c o n t e n t l e s s " ; e.g., t h e c o n c e p t of the largest positive integer, or t h e c o n c e p t of the square root of minus 1. Recurring o n c e m o r e t o Dante's dream, we can say that, in referring t o Beatrice, Dante was reporting a percept whereas Copernicus, in referring t o a moving earth, was offering a short-hand a c c o u n t of his concept (his conception) of celestial dynamics. The " r e d u c t i o n i s m " criticized by Q u i n e would attach m e a n i n g t o this a c c o u n t only t o t h e extent that it could b e completely translated into specific e m pirical (experiential) e l e m e n t s . But, as t h e terrestrial experiences are exactly t h e s a m e whether o n e a d o p t s a P t o l e m a i c or a Copernican perspective, reductionism would b e found claiming that t h e P t o l e m a i c and t h e Copernican a c c o u n t s mean t h e s a m e thing! 10

Contemporary psychological discourse has moved s o m e d i s t a n c e away from radical empiricism, but even in its m o s t exotic "cognitive" form this d i s c o u r s e still remains tied to o n e or another variety of reductionistic thinking. We shall have much more to say on this in c h a p t e r 3. It is sufficient here t o call attention to t h e essentially philosophical nature of t h e a t t a c h m e n t and therefore t o t h e need for essentially philosophical m o d e s of analysis in any a t t e m p t t o a s s e s s it. A c o n c e p t such as " t h e largest positive integer" is likely t o b e treated even by cognitive psychologists a s t h e result of generalized learning or induction; i.e., a s t h e terminus of a c o n t i n u u m formed through (empirical) c o n tact with one's, two's, t h r e e ' s . . . n's. It is, of course, entirely pos-

18

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

sible that s o m e persons have no m o r e than this in mind when they refer t o the largest positive integer but, if so, they d o not in fact have the concept of the largest positive integer, for " t h e largest positive integer" is not a number, nor is it the terminal point on the continuum of positive integers. There is no "largest positive integer," only the concept

of such. The o n t o l o g i s t may b e con-

tent to treat such concepts as mere "truths about words," as Hume suggested, but their psychological

importance remains unaffected by

their ultimate ontological fate. If there "really" is no square root of minus 1, except in our conceptual life, the psychologist must still account for it. It cannot b e regarded as a species of hallucination (like Dante's Beatrice, for e x a m p l e ) simply on the grounds that there is no experience that corresponds t o it. N o r is it "subjective" in the sense of arising from eccentricities of the cognizer. Let m e c l o s e this phase of the discussion by noting only that our rapidly d e v e l o p i n g "cognitive P s y c h o l o g y " has yet to recognize the special status of concepts and has therefore failed t o d e v e l o p m e t h o d s of examining, let alone explaining, them. On the side of explanation, the cognitive specialties have tended t o pass off what are s e l d o m m o r e than metaphors or similes or allegories that attempt to describe or suggest what thought is "like." Such accounts contain the ubiquitous "process," but it is not at all clear what a " p r o c e s s " is, except that it is s o m e h o w "like" the " p r o c e s s e s " occurring within a c o m p u t e r or a brain or a telep h o n e switchboard. W e have now learned to accept that s o m e of these " p r o c e s s e s " are " u n c o n s c i o u s " and that they even

pass

through discrete " s t a g e s " of "cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t . " This is all quite hopeless, of course, and it w o u l d s e e m t o b e o n e of the missions of a mature philosophical Psychology t o begin t o unravel such knotted locutions. in saying that it is time t o begin

this work 1 d o not mean

t o imply that w e are at ground-zero, but that w e have been in something of a coasting pattern for the past t w o or three decades. M o s t of the philosophical energies within Psychology were spent on critiques of Behaviorism and, as of this date, there seems t o be only a partial recovery from the war of words. The " n e w " cognitive

sciences are to s o m e extent retracings of an

older

THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

19

"mentalism" that the behaviorists had attempted to bury. Even s o m e of our "pioneering" research could have been done—and, on a less than generous construal, was done—in Wundt's laboratory! 12 If we are to move ahead in research and theory, we must move ahead in our conceptualizations of the discipline. If there was something defective in the older mentalism, we are scarcely going to repair the defect merely by doing the s a m e research with better equipment or by analogizing the findings in the idiom of computer technology. And even if we decide to continue our business as usual, it is important that we know that we are doing so and why we are doing so.

CHAPTER

TWO

Determinism, "Hard" and "Soft" ' ' ¥ ¥ appv is the man who knows the causes of 1 ¥ things," says the ancient maxim, though we may wonder if its author appreciated the great confusion and ambiguity surrounding the concept of causation. Nonetheless, the concept traditionally has been at the very center of our notions about science and scientific explanations. Even in this, our metaphysically tutored age, we generally regard a body of knowledge as scientific when it contains causal accounts of why things are as they are or come to be as they come to be. We would modify the old bromide to read, "Scientific is the enterprise that establishes the causes of things." But now we must ask, What sort of entity is a cause? When we say, for example, that apples fall toward the center of the earth because of the laws of gravity, what meaning is to be attached to this "because"? More generally, how are we to understand assertions to the effect that a given event was determined to occur when and in the way it did? As will be made clear, deterministic philosophies have had a troubled history in general and continue to be plagued by mixtures of incoherence, tautology, and contradiction. Psychology

22

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

has not o n l y b o r r o w e d f r o m b u t has also c o n t r i b u t e d to this history w h o s e liabilities are at t h e f o u n d a t i o n of m a n y of our current confusions. The following illustrate h o w psychologists make use of causal language: 1. S m i t h f o r g e t s w h e r e h i s keys are b e c a u s e of a t e m p o r a l - l o b e t u mor. 2. S m i t h f o r g e t s w h e r e h i s keys a r e b e c a u s e of r e p r e s s e d h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d t h e p e r s o n he m u s t d r i v e t o v i s i t . 3. S m i t h is f o r g e t f u l b e c a u s e of a r e i n f o r c e m e n t h i s t o r y t h a t f a i l e d to reward attentiveness. 4. S m i t h ' s m e m o r y l a p s e s r e s u l t f r o m a n e u r o t i c d i s t u r b a n c e . 5. S m i t h is e a s i l y d i s t r a c t e d , n e r v o u s a b o u t t r a v e l , a n d t h e r e f o r e o f t e n m i s p l a c e s t h i n g s w h e n h e is a b o u t t o u n d e r t a k e a j o u r ney. 6. S m i t h f o r g o t h i s keys b e c a u s e h e h a s a l o t o n h i s m i n d . 7. S m i t h lacks t h e m o t i v a t i o n it t a k e s t o k e e p t r a c k of t h i n g s . 8. S m i t h ' s m e m o r y - d e f i c i t s a r e p a r t o f a g e n e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l d e f i c i t arising from a m i l d retardation. 9. S m i t h ' s f a t h e r w a s f o r g e t f u l , t o o ! These nine a t t e m p t s to account for t h e p h e n o m e n o n provide examples of the m o s t frequently e m p l o y e d causal or deterministic approaches taken by m o d e r n Psychology. The app r o a c h e s a r e g r o u n d e d i n n e u r o l o g i c a l h y p o t h e s e s (1), o r p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r i e s ( 2 ) , o r t h e o r i e s o f c o n d i t i o n i n g (3), o r n o t i o n s o f p s y c h o p a t h o l o g y ( 4 ) , o r p e r s o n a l i t y " t y p e s " (5), o r m o d e l s o f " i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g " ( 6 ) , o r t h e o r i e s o f m o t i v a t i o n (7) o r o f i n t e l l e c t (8), o r t h e o r i e s o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l h e r i t a b i l i t y (9). B u t i n t h e s e a n d related forms, the attempts s e l d o m derive benefits from anyt h i n g r e s e m b l i n g a critical p o s i t i o n in t h e m a t t e r of t h e i m p l i e d or explicit causal relations. Instead, psychologists t e n d — w i t h m o r e than a trace of u n i n t e n d e d i r o n y — t o a d o p t "scientific" conventions regarding causation, even t h o u g h t h e latter are of that pec u l i a r H u m e a n s t r i p e t h a t is psychological f r o m s t a r t t o f i n i s h . It w i l l be instructive to review H u m e ' s f a m o u s and influential theory of causal determinations.

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

23

Aristotle and Hume on Causation To appreciate the dimensions of Hume's achievement, we should remind ourselves of the Aristotelian model that Hume's all but completely replaced, at least within the modern sciences. I say Aristotelian by way of acknowledging any number of notions grafted on to Aristotle's original formulations. Together, the original formulations and their various additions and refinements may be taken as the Rationalist tradition in the matter of causality. Aristotle argued in several places' that earlier philosophers had an incomplete conception of causation and were thus at a loss to offer or even discover the principles covering a complete explanation of any natural event. Such an explanation, he insisted, would have to begin with an appreciation for the differences among knowing that, knowing how, and knowing why something is the way it is. He sought to repair the older and defective view through his fourfold theory of causation, the famous theory of Material, Formal, E f f i c i e n t , and Final causes. According to his model, we have not given a full causal account of, for example, a house merely by specifying its (material) composition or by pointing to the structural (formal) principles it satisfies. Nor, however, is the account completed once we have listed the entire series of physical actions performed by the builders. Their effects on the materials constitute the efficient cause in the way that the effects of hammer and chisel on stone are the efficient cause of a statue. But if the complete causal explanation of a house is to be given, it is further required that we include the architect's plans, objectives, goals—in a word, the end (telos) toward which all the various actions were performed. This ultimate purpose is realized last in time (it is "final" in this sense) but conceptually first. Aristotle himself, unlike a number of later Aristotelians, was careful to note that the Final Cause may be the Good or may only be the apparent Good toward which the chain of events proceeds. 2 He employed the concept in a variety of contexts, somewhat differently in each. We may surmise, for example, that

24

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT"

he had t h e Atomists and their radical materialism in mind when he insisted that, if the art of shipbuilding were in the wood, there would be ships by nature1 His point, of course, is that, no matter how long p i e c e s of wood are e x p o s e d t o t h e purely natural e l e m e n t s , t h e fully fitted trireme will never b e t h u s produced. If there is t o b e a trireme, there must b e an intelligent and intending agent t o organize purely physical a c t i o n s in such a m a n n e r a s t o have such a ship made. In his ethical writings, t h e Final Cause surfaces a s t h e ingredient of intentionality allowing t h e moral character of act i o n s t o b e a s s e s s e d by permitting distinctions a m o n g intended, unintended, and accidental outcomes. 4 In his political treatises the s a m e c o n c e p t is deployed when we are called upon t o judge t h e various forms and m o d e s of political organization. It permits us to recognize what is e s s e n t i a l t o t h e proper a s s e s s m e n t of governments; viz. t h e ends to which statecraft is c o m m i t t e d , whether t h e form of government is oligarchic, monarchic, democratic, etc. 5 A vital q u e s t i o n arising from such a theory pertains t o t h e kind of relationship that exists between events and their (fourfold) c a u s e s . The pivotal consideration here is supplied by t h e c o n c e p t of necessity. Aristotle is extremely c a u t i o u s on this issue. He d o e s not want t o b e charged with arguing that, for example, it rains so that t h e corn will rot on t h e threshing f l o o r ! 6 He a p p r o a c h e s t h e question, therefore, with an analysis of t h e c o n cept of necessity in Book II of his Physics.7 There are at least three s e n s e s of t h e word " n e c e s s i t y " : t h e logical, the definitional, and t h e hypothetical. The first is illustrated by the c o n n e c t i o n between a conclusion and t h e p r e m i s e s of a valid syllogistic argument. If t h e p r e m i s e s are true and if t h e form of t h e syllogism is valid, necessarily t h e c o n c l u s i o n is true. Definitional necessity is found in m a t h e m a t i c s where, for example, t h e sum of t h e a n g l e s of a triangle e q u a l s a straight line. Or, to take a different example, in i n s t a n c e s of synomymy such as, "All unmarried men are b a c h e lors necessarily." Now, t h e relationship between t h e "that for the sake of which" (the end or goal or telos) and the specific steps taken to achieve it is neither logically nor lexically necessary. There are, after all, many different ways of building a h o u s e such that " h o u s e " — a s an e n d — d o e s not logically necessitate any given step.

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

25

Nor is "bricklaying" or "masonry" synonymous with "house." Rather, the relationship between, on the one hand, the material, formal and efficient causes and, on the other, the Final Cause is one of hypothetical necessity. If there is to be a house, necessarily this and that must be done, this and that must exist, etc. As Aristotle says, in asking why a saw is the way it is, It is, therefore, necessary for it to be of iron if we are to have a saw and perform the operation of sawing. What is necessary then, is necessary on a hypothesis-, it is not a result necessarily determined by antecedents. Necessity is in the matter, while "that for the sake of which" is in the definition. {Physics, ll:9) 8

In saying that the "that for the sake of which" is in the definition, Aristotle calls attention to the fact that a word like "house" carries with it such functions as shelter, safety, location. Every house serves certain common ends, and thus the word "house" necessarily implies functions of a given type. Here we have the feature of definitional necessity. Now, in building a house, if we are to build it of a certain size and in just so much time, necessarily we must have tools for cutting wood. The house is not necessarily determined by such antecedents as woodcutting. That is, it is not necessarily determined the way the conclusion of a syllogism is necessarily determined by its premises. Aristotle notes in the same chapter that there is often a mixture of definitional and hypothetical necessities. Thus the word "saw" refers by definition to properties of just the sort that are necessary if certain objectives are to be met; e.g., dividing hard substances such as wood. No end of misunderstanding has been spawned by a passage in the same essay which finds Aristotle saying, "It is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose." 9 Regarded in a certain light it seems to anticipate a Spinozistic necessitarianism which, in fact, Aristotle would have rejected out of hand. For Aristotle not everything that happens in nature is natural, nor are the ends of natural events unfailing. As there are accidents in art, so too are there accidents in nature. When we discover monstrosities such as the "man-faced ox progeny" cited by

26

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

Empedocles, we don't inquire into t h e "that for t h e sake of which" such c r e a t u r e s occur. They are errors; a s we would say today, defects in t h e g e n e t i c t e m p l a t e . For Aristotle, then, what is natural is t h a t o u t c o m e which is nearly invariable; that which, with very few e x c e p t i o n s , is t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of o n t o g e n e t i c p r o c e s s e s

under

nurturing c o n d i t i o n s . It is simply wrong t o a t t r i b u t e t o Aristotle the theory that everything that happens is for s o m e " e n d " or, worse, that everything t h a t h a p p e n s is for t h e " G o o d . " From his claim that t h e r e is p u r p o s e in n a t u r e it is i m p e r m i s s i b l e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t h e believed n a t u r e had p u r p o s e s . " N a t u r e " here is akin t o "art," not t o t h e artist. W h e t h e r t h e r e is, a s it were, an artist b e h i n d t h e arts of n a t u r e is a s e p a r a t e m a t t e r . T h e s e e d s of controversy were sewn, therefore, not by Aristotle's " r a t i o n a l i s m " (such a s it was) or even by his teleology, t h o u g h t h e r e is r o o m for e n e r g e t i c d i s c o u r s e on b o t h of t h e s e . T h e idea t h a t would b e c o m e central t o H u m e ' s critique was, instead, t h e o n e e x p r e s s e d in such p a s s a g e s as, " N e c e s s i t y is in t h e matter. . . ." It was t h i s n o t i o n of a material n e c e s s i t y t h a t sugg e s t e d t h e real e x i s t e n c e of c a u s a l forces, powers, properties inherent in things. At t h i s p o i n t it may b e m o r e useful t o retreat from Aristotle's own words a n d t h e t h e o r y arising from t h e m a n d turn t o what may b e c a l l e d t h e Aristotelian

tradition in t h e m a t t e r

of c a u s a l " p o w e r s " and their (controversially) necessary

effects.

If t h e t a s k at hand, referring t o our e x a m p l e , is cutting wood, we will of c o u r s e take r e c o u r s e t o a t o o l t h a t is harder than w o o d a n d sharp. E x p e r i e n c e t e a c h e s t h a t finely h o n e d steel t e e t h will m a k e short work of t i m b e r . And e x p e r i e n c e here is e x c e p t i o n less. Such i n s t r u m e n t s always cut through wood. In o t h e r words, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e saw and t h e disintegration of t h e l u m b e r is n o t a c c i d e n t a l . What sort of relationship is it, t h e r e f o r e ? M o r e generally, just what is t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c a u s e a n d effect if n o t a necessary o n e ? It surely isn't a c cidental, for if it were t h e o u t c o m e would b e statistically indeterminate. Let us take t h e traditional t r i c h o t o m y applied t o o b served events. W e say t h a t " X " occurred e i t h e r by c h a n c e or not by c h a n c e and, if not by chance, then by . . . ? By what? The third

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

27

possibility is either necessity or contingency. The second of these alternatives is ordinarily invoked when "X" is neither a logical inevitability nor a necessary definitional truth. Thus, we say the occurrence of "X" is a contingent occurrence when, in fact, no canon of logic would be violated had "X" not occurred. It is (merely) contingently true that animals with kidneys are animals with hearts; it is surely not necessary. And it is (merely) contingently the case that of all the ways green plants could manufacture their cells, the process of photosynthesis is the one actually involved. It is imaginable that a green plant could nourish itself without photosynthesis, but it is unimaginable that a false conclusion results from true premises in a valid syllogistic argument; just as it is unimaginable—it is impossible—that some bachelors are married. But is it just the case that the sharply honed steel teeth of a saw cut through wood and that a rubber hose does not? That is, is it merely contingent that the effect of sharpened steel on wood is what it is? Metaphysics in the patrimony of Aristotle answered this in the negative. Since the causal sequences in nature are nearly invariant—and, in fact, are invariant except where there is a defect of some sort in the causal agency—it is clear that causes necessarily have their effects. When Aristotle declares, therefore, that "Necessity is in the matter," he is acknowledging that certain material attributes necessarily have the effects they have. He is not quite as innocent about this as later disciples would be, for he notes, as pointed out above, that there is often an inextricable connection between definitional and hypothetical necessities. It is fair to say that, to some extent, Aristotle would have accepted the proposition that even his "material necessity" is viciously tautologous. The proposition could be defended thus: (a) An exhaustive definition of "saw" must include the attributes of hardness and sharpness; (b) an exhaustive definition of "hardness" and "sharpness" must include relativistic qualifiers such that something has the attributes of hardness and sharpness relative to entities having less of each; (c) through a thorough classification of real objects according to their relative densities and shapes, all items answering to the name "saw" are given higher standing in hardness and sharpness than items answering to the name "wood."

28

DETERMINISM, " H A R D " AND " S O F T '

Therefore, "Saws cut wood necessarily" is as tautologously true as "Bachelors are unmarried men." The necessity is not "in the matter," then, but in the definition of a saw. Even in accepting this argument, however, neither Aristotle nor his disciples would have accepted the implication that nature just is, willynilly, the way it is. First, nature is not willynilly but structured. Secondly, the very survival and perpetuation of species can be explained only by recourse to the teleological principle. Nest building is for a purpose, whether the bird "knows" the purpose or not. Although it is true, therefore, that some degree of definitional necessity creeps into our accounts of hypothetical necessity, the latter obtains in nature. But hypothetical necessity includes ends, for what makes it hypothetical is just the phrase, "If such and such is to be, then. . . ." Accordingly, natural effects result necessarily from their causes precisely because nature, "operates for a purpose." The melding of Aristotelian metaphysics and Christian theology was the work of many hands for many centuries. Over the seasons, a more or less official view took hold, though in each of these seasons there were far more criticism and controversy among the intellectual "faithful" than popular histories indicate. If anything, however, the triumphs of seventeenth-century science—the triumphs of Newton and Galileo—rendered the official view even firmer. The Newtonian universe, with its clocklike precision and unswerving laws of motion, was the veritable symbol of intended natural necessities. It was in its way the scientific completion of the Medieval worldview; a view that encompassed a perfectly designed reality in which each thing had its place and function, regulated by fixed laws and emblematic of unseen but revealed higher purposes. Newton himself was sure of this. 10 The mechanistic physics of the time opened the way for mechanistic physiologies (e.g., Descartes's) and, later, mechanistic psychologies (e.g., Locke's). The fun that Galileo had at Aristotle's expense, and his own, subverted confidence in Aristotle's Physics but left his Metaphysics largely unscathed, if not reinforced. Causal necessitarianism was raised to a higher scientific authority even as Aristotle's theories of motion were ridiculed.

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

29

T h e s e c o n f i d e n c e s would begin t o shake in t h e last d e c a d e of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century and c r u m b l e by t h e middle of the eighteenth. The process began innocently enough with Locke's a t t e m p t at a " N e w t o n i a n " Psychology; an essentially corpuscular theory of mind in which a s s o c i a t i v e principles o p e r a t e d in a m a n ner akin to gravity. The details of this Psychology are not relevant here but several of Locke's a r g u m e n t s in its behalf are. We can set a s i d e t h e i m p r o b a b l e claim that Locke was c o m m i t t e d to refuting D e s c a r t e s ' s (alleged) theory of "innate i d e a s " 1 1 and we can a l s o break t h e habit of treating Locke a s a radical "empiricist." Locke p r o p o s e d a n u m b e r of "original a c t s " of t h e mind (each of t h e m c o m i n g a s c l o s e t o " i n n a t e i d e a s " a s anything proposed by Descartes), and left a m p l e room for intuition and demonstration in his c a t a l o g u e of t h e human m o d e s of knowing. Where Locke's fam o u s Essay 1 2 c a u s e d a crack in t h e foundations of t h e official Metaphysics was in his distinction b e t w e e n primary and secondary "qualities" of things. His arguments against perceptual realism were influential, if defective. He developed a very strong c a s e for t h e claim that perceptual m o d e s of knowing involve not merely reactions t o t h e physical properties of external o b j e c t s , but transactions by which t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of perception are not reducible t o or images of their physical a n t e c e d e n t s . Our idea of hardness, for example, is fashioned out of s e n s a t i o n s of the "primary" quality of an o b j e c t ; viz., its density. That is, t h e s e n s a t i o n m a t c h e s t h e o b j e c t i v e attribute. But our idea of " b l u e n e s s " arises from a transaction b e t w e e n a property (not a " b l u e " property) of t h e o b ject and a property of t h e m e c h a n i s m s of color vision. " B l u e , " therefore, is a secondary or derived quality, not a primary or directly given one. The p e r c e p t i o n s in both c a s e s are c a u s e d by t h e physical attributes of t h e external " o b j e c t i v e " body or event, but t h e knowledge that is tied t o secondary qualities is not direct knowle d g e of t h e physical attributes that produce t h e m . Put in our modern idiom, we would say that p e r s o n s with normal vision s e e " b l u e " but they do not see wavelengths. It remained for George Berkeley to perform his surprising intermediary s t e p t o set t h e s t a g e for David Hume. Berkeley's m e t a p h y s i c s is a c o m p l i c a t e d affair which must b e neglected

30

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

here. 1 3 It is enough at this point to see how he out-Locked lohn Locke, and how he d i d so with reasonings as tight as their results were (and are) implausible. If, as both Locke a n d Descartes insisted, we do not have direct knowledge of an external world but only direct knowledge of our own sensations (call them perceptions, ideas, c o n s c i o u s events), then all knowledge is of (Locke's) "secondary qualities." It makes no sense at all to claim that we experience hardness because an object is, in fact, hard but that we experience "blueness" for s o m e other reason. In both cases what we experience can only be the contents of our own minds. Years later a n d more rigorously, Kant would make the distinction between things as in themselves they really are (their noumenal reality) and things as they are known by us phenomenally. Kant would reject Berkeley's s o - c a l l e d "subjective idealism" but would, in the process, neglect Berkeley's subtle distinctions. W e will not tarry to explore the full range of implications Berkeley drew from his critique of Locke. O n e of the implications is, however, worth noting. Referring to Newton's extraordinary discovery of the Universal Law of Gravitation, this utterly consistent philosopher tellingly insisted that he could find nothing in the Law "signified besides the effect itself." 1 4 Enter Hume. H u m e ' s treatment of causation is developed both in the Enquiry15 a n d his A Treatise of Human Nature, 16 works that have had unparalleled influence on Philosophy in the English-speaking world. H i s argument in both texts is empiricistic and p h e n o m e n alistic, the net effect being to convert the concept of causation from a metaphysical to a psychological one. The conclusion of his arguments may be briefly stated thus: The reference of causal attributions a n d of "necessary connections" is the experiential history of the observer a n d not the external physical events t h e m selves. Thus, to say that A is the cause of B a n d that B results necessarily from A is, on Hume's account, not a description of what an observer actually sees, but an inference—an implicit theory— forged out of a number of similar perceptions in the past. We come to regard A as the c a u s e of B after frequent exposure to events of the A-type being followed by events of the B-type. Whenever the criterion of constant conjunction is faithfully satisfied, we impute

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

31

causation to the pairings. And in regarding as necessary the dependence of effects on their " c a u s e s " — t h e dependence of consequents on their antecedents—we are acknowledging only that the conjunction of the two has been exceptionless in our experience. In relocating the reference of causal statements Hume "psychologized" both science and metaphysics. In the Rationalist tradition, statements to the effect that "A is the cause of B" referred to something—some power or agency—in "A" and "B." But in the Humean tradition, the same statements actually refer to mental associations forged out of current and prior experiences. The same is the case with "necessity." To say that causes necessarily have their effects is either to utter a definitional truth (which cannot add in any way to our knowledge of the real world) or to make the purely historical claim that these particular antecedents have always been followed by these particular consequents in experience; in everyone's experiences. Causality and necessity, therefore, are not "out there" but are productions or expressions of certain habitual tendencies of mind. He defines "cause" in the Treatise as, an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the o n e d e t e r m i n e s the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the o n e to form a more lively idea of t h e other, (p. 170)

The "so united" refers, of course, to constant conjunctions which provide the conditions by which our mental associations are formed. When such conditions prevail we ascribe causation to the eventsequences. Hume's otherwise odd claim that, therefore, "anything may produce anything" 1 7 follows logically from his theory of causation. Our minds, after all, could have been so constituted that we could only sample events once each minute rather than more or less continuously. The creature that gets a glimpse of the world only once per minute, and only for, say, 100 milliseconds of each such sample, would surely have a radically different scheme of causal dependencies. In a word, whatever A is, it will be taken to be the cause of B, whatever B is, when A and B have been constantly conjoined in experience.

32

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT" Through long s e a s o n s of r e f i n e m e n t s , a n d

notwith-

standing its many and well-known defects t o t h e contrary, Hume's t h e o r y of c a u s a t i o n c a m e t o b e a d o p t e d by t h e natural s c i e n c e s , (ohn S t u a r t Mill's influence h e r e was very great, for he recast t h e H u m e a n -model in a form t h a t yielded t h e experimental

methods

s u i t a b l e t o t h e discovery of " c a u s e s . " 1 8 T h e triumph of H u m e ' s p o s i t i o n is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d largely a s t h e result of t h e zeal with which n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s c i e n t i s t s s h u n n e d all t h a t was " m e t a physical." A totally e m p i r i c i s t i c m o d e l of c a u s a t i o n — a m o d e l in which only o b s e r v a b l e " o b j e c t s " figured in t h e c a u s a l l a n g u a g e of s c i e n c e — w a s an effective way t o k e e p m e r e p h i l o s o p h y out of t h e p r e c i n c t s of e x p e r i m e n t a l s c i e n c e . Psychology, of c o u r s e — a l w a y s e a g e r t o a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d m e t h o d s of t h e d e v e l o p e d s c i e n c e s — w a s " H u m e a n i z e d " in t h a t century and h a s r e m a i n e d s o in very nearly all of its e x p e r i m e n t a l forms a n d in m o s t of its t h e o r e t i c a l a n d explicative efforts. It is n o t surprising, therefore, that when psychological explanations are deterministic they are causal e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e H u m e a n sort. An e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e s e m u s t begin, then, with an appraisal of this nearly official Humean model.

Causal Explanations T h o m a s Reid was but t h e earliest t o recognize s o m e of t h e d e f e c t s in H u m e ' s a c c o u n t 1 9 a n d h e h a s b e e n followed by a veritable legion of critics ever s i n c e . 2 0 It is doubtful that m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s t o d a y would regard t h e m s e l v e s a s unflinching disc i p l e s of H u m e on t h e m a t t e r of c a u s a t i o n , t h o u g h a large n u m ber would d e c l a r e a n d have d e c l a r e d t h a t H u m e was at least on t h e right track. For t h e s a k e of brevity, it is sufficient here t o ign o r e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n H u m e ' s own s t a t e m e n t s and t h o s e t h a t have a r i s e n from t h e m o r t h a t have b e e n offered a s improvem e n t s . Instead, all of t h e m c a n b e t r e a t e d a s i n s t a n c e s of a regularity theory of causation according t o which t h e c o n c e p t of " c a u s e " refers ultimately t o t h e perceived statistical reliability o b t a i n i n g b e t w e e n (prior) A-type e v e n t s a n d (later) B-type events. A c a u s a l

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT"

33

law, then, is just the shift in tense from statements of the form, "A has always been followed by B" to the form, "A-types are followed by B-types." Statements of the form, "A is the cause of B" are then regarded as pithier versions of all of these. Nothing "necessary" is involved in any of this, however, necessity being reserved for exclusively logical rather than natural relations. Reid rejected the regularity thesis on the grounds that it is disconfirmed by the only two kinds of evidence that could support it. There are many instances of sequential regularity that are never taken to be causal and there are singular sequences that are immediately recognized as causal. No one regards day as the "cause" of night even though the two are constantly conjoined; nor is anyone doubtful as to the cause of his own actions even when these are performed for the first time. We need not do something over and over again in order to ascertain that we are (probably!) the cause of its happening. Nor does the notion of generalizations or inferences from past experience help here, for we could only generalize from the first instance if we already took that instance to be one in which we were the cause of our own actions. Reid was inclined to think that it was just our own sense of ourselves as agents having the power to bring things about that gave rise to the notion of "causes" or agencies in nature. But in any case, he found no evidence to support Hume's insistence that perceived regularities exhaustively explained causation. Quite apart from the psychological evidence telling for or against the regularity thesis there are conceptual difficulties as well. To equate causes and effects with "objects"—and here Hume could only be referring to objects of perception—is finally to be vulnerable to the (Kantian) argument according to which perception itself is regulated by the nonempirical ("pure") contexts ("intuitions") of time and space, and is accordingly not willynilly. To speak of an "event-sequence" is to speak of temporally ordered and spatially organized happenings that are explicable only in terms of "causal laws," as it were, that are never the result of experience. If A is perceived as occurring earlier in time than B this must be because either (a) it does occur earlier or (b) the nuances of information-processing by the brain or mind result in its being

34

D E T E R M I N I S M , " H A R D " A N D "SOFT'

perceived a s occurring earlier or (c) both (a) and (b). But t h e perceiver has no evidence at all of (b), nor any independent m e a n s by which t o gather such evidence. All an inquiry into this s u b j e c t can yield is t h e imposition of the very s a m e n u a n c e s on t h e inquiry itself. That is, t h e inquiry could never produce discoveries of t h e sort, "Aha! I believed that A preceded B b e c a u s e of t h e way my mind p r o c e s s e s information, whereas I now know (see?) that A actually follows B ! " On Hume's account, therefore, we are required t o regard t h e perceived s e q u e n c e a s t h e actual s e q u e n c e b e c a u s e we have no empirical grounds for claiming anything about how t h e mind works internally, since t h e s e workings are never perceived; they are never " o b j e c t s . " But this leaves us only with possibility (a); viz., that A is perceived as preceding B because, in fact, it p r e c e d e s it. But t o p r e c e d e it, A must occupy a position in t i m e different from t h e position o c c u p i e d by B and this difference in residency is necessary for A and B t o occur distinguishably. Thus, for there to b e two " e v e n t s " there must (i.e., necessarily) b e distinguishable spatial and temporal residences for each. And for one of t h e m t o b e "earlier," it must b e "earlier" in a way that is ind e p e n d e n t of our perhaps eccentric but forever undiscoverable m o d e s of knowing it is earlier. For ordinary mortals, therefore, for whom the laws of perception or of cognition cannot be shown to be wrong by any method involving perception and cognition, t h e regular m o v e m e n t of A-type events t o B-type events is perceived t o take place b e c a u s e it does take place, and any negation of t h e proposition could not b e empirically intelligible even if conceivable. That is, an empirical instantiation of t h e c o u n t e r a r g u m e n t is impossible. But if the empirical instantiation of the negation is impossible, then the initial proposition is necessary. This is surely what Kant's famous Second Analogy is getting at: "Everything that happens, that is, b e g i n s t o be, pres u p p o s e s s o m e t h i n g upon which it follows by a rule." 2 1 It may b e argued that t h e " n e c e s s i t y " here arises from (the admittedly incontrovertible) peculiarities of human knowle d g e - m o d e s and that s o m e o t h e r kind of creature would, in a m a n n e r of speaking, s e e things differently. B e that as it may, we

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

35

could never discover this empirically, meaning that its demonstration could never be presented as either an " o b j e c t " or an "event." It is important to make the distinction between causal laws being necessarily what they are (which is false) and causes necessarily having the effects they do. Ohm's law is not necessarily true, for it is possible for current, voltage, and resistance to be related in ways different from the way expressed by the law. But if Ohm's Law is true then the effect of changing the resistance in a circuit is a necessary effect. This is so for entirely unsurprising syllogistic reasons. But that the change in resistance must precede and the change in current follow is also necessary, and not for (merely) syllogistic reasons. When we say that the current in a cirdetermined by the resistance we are not utcuit is, ceteris paribus, tering a tautology but explaining just those causal relations that define a circuit. A circuit is nothing more than and no different from a collection of objects whose electrical behavior is determined by Ohm's Law. The inclination among philosophers, at least since the time of Hume, is to regard such determination as "contingent," meaning thereby that although it is not accidental it is also not necessary. "Contingent" here means the determination could have been otherwise, whereas with necessary determination it could not have been otherwise. The inclination, that is, is to regard all necessity as logical, never natural. Accordingly, "X is necessary" only when the proposition not-X is a formal contradiction. Some, however, such as William Kneale 2 2 and George have revived an interest in the necessitarian theory of natural laws chiefly through damaging assessments of the common alternative. Borrowing from Popper the example of a fictitious creature, the "moa," who dies before reaching its fiftieth year, Molnar offers the case of there being only one such creature in the history of the world, and this one accidentally dying at an age less than fifty. We now have just the empirical grounds on which to declare as a law of nature, ALL MOAS DIE BEFORE REACHING FIFTY! In attributing the death of the only moa to an accident, we might only be admitting ignorance of just what killed it. But even Molnar 2 3

36

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

if we isolated the condition leading to its death, we surely could not say that such conditions kill moas for there has only been one such moa. But the larger point is well made in Molnar's concluding passages: If it is conceivable that a particular sequence is accidental, then it is conceivable that a regular sequence should be accidental, even if the regularity is on a cosmic scale. This is the basis of our feeling that the description of laws as contingent empirical generalizations, true independently of local conditions, fails to reveal what it is about laws that enables them to limit possibilities. Such generalizations state that something is universally just so, and I cannot see, as Kneale could not see, how something's being just so can make its not being so impossible. The case of the inexplicable and accidental death of the lone moa therefore ought to be admitted as a counterexample to the analysis of law under discussion.24 The causal laws of nature do limit possibilities; e.g., the relativity laws render it impossible for anything to move faster than light. But empirical generalizations set no such limit on the possible. The difference between relativity laws and empirical generalizations is not t o be found in the observational realm. We do not say that nothing travels faster than light simply because we've never seen something traveling faster than light but because we take the limit to be expressive of a law of nature. But from the empirical fact of that lone moa's death at age 49, we do not take as a law of nature the proposition, "All moa's die before 50." In the present context it is not important to make out a case for or against necessitarian theories of causation. It is enough to indicate that a purely descriptive and correlational approach to the explanation of natural phenomena leads to counterintuitive results. There is, we must suppose, something determinative about causal laws, even as we remain metaphysically neutral as to "powers," "hidden forces," and "agencies." We are inclined to take the determining "agency"—call it what you w i l l — to be the source of those Humean constant conjunctions, while recognizing that not all such invariances are instantiations of causal determination. "Correlation," as the introductory psychology texts affirm, "does not imply causation."

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

37

On t h e necessitarian view, but no less on the Humean view, causal factors are a m a t t e r of public record and require nothing of a purely personal property of observers. It is trivially true, of course, that Humean c a u s a t i o n is a perceptual affair, but not in t h e solipsistic s e n s e of being exclusively " m y " or " h i s " affair. And on t h e m o r e formal construal of causal laws, the causal s e q u e n c e s are taken t o b e "true in all p o s s i b l e worlds," a s t h e expression goes, if all p o s s i b l e worlds are physical in the s e n s e that ours is; that is, in all worlds in which specifiable initial c o n ditions obtain. N e e d l e s s t o say, actual observers need not inhabit t h e s e o t h e r worlds for t h e causal laws t o operate. Exit Berkeley. At this point we can turn our attention t o various deterministic m o d e l s within Psychology, recognizing that t h e succ e s s of any of t h e m requires t h e satisfaction of certain minimal criteria. First, t h e model must b e grounded in or must make appeals to causal laws of just that sort that limit possibilities. The s e n s e in which t h e regularity theory allows "anything t o b e t h e c a u s e of anything" is precisely t h e s e n s e in which strict Humean c a u s a t i o n cannot b e at t h e roots of deterministic models. No correlation, no matter how great, implies causality, nor d o e s any correlation, no matter how great, legislate against e x c e p t i o n s arising from still o t h e r s a m p l e s . The law-type s t a t e m e n t s of a deterministic model are nomic, not descriptive. They are proscriptive and not permissive. And, unlike empirical generalizations, laws of causal determinism are a b l e t o a b s o r b and in no way b e e m b a r r a s s e d by c o n trary-to-fact conditional s t a t e m e n t s . No n u m b e r of astronomical observations and generalizations based on them would permit o n e to say that, if t h e Earth's gravitational forces were eliminated, t h e m o o n ' s trajectory would c e a s e t o b e elliptical. It is just in t h e nature of empirical generalizations that they are generalizations from what has o b t a i n e d . There is no room for what would have b e e n t h e c a s e had what we observed b e e n radically different from what it was. Again, causal laws in science, in limiting p o s s i b i l i t i e s — i n cluding unobserved and unobservable p o s s i b i l i t i e s — a r e a s applic a b l e t o counterfactuals a s t o actuals. Thus, psychological determinism, e x p r e s s e d in t h e form of determinative causal laws, must a l s o a c c o m m o d a t e counterfactuals, m e a n i n g a m o n g o t h e r c o n -

38

DETERMINISM, " H A R D " AND " S O F T '

siderations that it must be based upon something different from descriptive statistics! Finally, determinative causal laws in Psychology must be aloof to "private" evidence and private epistemic states. This requirement will b e c o m e clearer when "authenticity" is discussed within the context of free will. But to leave this part of the issue announced but unaddressed, it is enough to say that the psychological determinism proposed must be no more beholden to what the observer has to say about himself than would be physical determinism in the inanimate realm.

Determinism There are so many and such varied arguments for determinism that it is hazardous to discuss the concept without first indicating the s e n s e in which the term is used. Richard Taylor, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, offers a general definition that provides a good starting point: " D E T E R M I N I S M is t h e g e n e r a l p h i l o s p h i c a l t h e s i s which , p^ [

1I

s t a t e s t h a t for e v e r y t h i n g t h a t e v e r h a p p e n s t h e r e conditions

such

t h a t , given t h e m ,

nothing else

are

could

happen."25

The key notions in this general definition are "conditions" and "could," for t h e s e are the notions that tend to permit distinctions among the several formulations of determinism. Consider the legend told of the baseball umpire Bill Klem. As the tale goes, he had just called "strike three" when the irate batter hurled his bat in the air. Klem declared, "If that bat c o m e s down, you're out of the g a m e ! " That, in fact, the batter's ejection was inevitable is guaranteed by the laws of gravity. Thus, referring back to Taylor's definition, we can say that the relevant "conditions" in this c a s e are just those gravitational laws coupled with the promise that, should t h e s e laws hold, ejection will follow. But note that the batter's ejection is actually determined by

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT"

39

more than one sort of "conditions." Assuming the validity of the gravitation laws, the bat's descent is deductively certain. But it is not certain that Mr. Klem might not "change his mind" during the interval. Then again, suppose baseball's rules contained the provision, "A batter who intentionally throws his bat more than four feet in any direction shall be ejected from the game." Now we have added a "condition" (a rule) that renders the batter's ejection inevitable by rendering Mr. Klem unable to "change his mind." What this vignette provides are two instances of inevitability, but instances that are entirely unlike. There is, first, the inevitability of the bat's descent, determined by causal laws in Physics; and there is the inevitability of the batter's ejection determined by the proscriptive rules of the game. The obvious point here is that events or occurrences can be inevitable in more than one way and that, therefore, inevitability cannot be sufficient to make the case for the determinism now under consideration. The determinism we must address is the one that covers both natural laws and conventional rules; the one that regards not only the bat's descent as inevitable but also the invention of the game of baseball and the rules that will govern it, as well as such events as an umpire's "changing his mind." It is the determinism that covers, in Taylor's words, everything

that ever happens.

Historically, the most common objection to this variety of determinism has come from those who regard the human will to be free and therefore to be exempted from coverage. But before examining arguments of this sort, it is important to consider more recent (twentieth-century) objections arising from the alleged indeterminacy of purely physical events. The objections are based on the well-known Heisenberg Principle according to which uncertainty relations have ontological status and are not merely the result of experimental or technical limitations. It is just in the nature of subatomic particles such as "wavicles" that the actual relationship between position and energy is indeterminate and not merely undeterminable. Indeed, the relationship is necessarily undeterminable because it is indeterminate. If we suppose that this principle of modern quantum mechanics is true in some ultimate sense, then surely the deter-

40

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

ministic thesis as defined by Taylor is false in that there is no set of conditions able at once to guarantee both the location and the mass-energy of at least some states or "things" or events. Such a truth would limit the range of phenomena covered by determinism but it would leave entirely untouched the question of psychological determinism or deterministic laws of Psychology. The immunity of the latter to the truth of such uncertainty relations arises from two considerations. The first is that defenders of psychological indeterminism or of freedom of the human will never have equated either "indeterminacy" or "freedom" with statistical phenomena or as kindred with such notions as "chance," "randomness," "anarchy," and the like. The freedom asserted is, instead, the result of human agency and is inextricably tied to human motives, purposes, rationality, and ends. As the particle physicist would not judge uncertainty relations as arising from choice, advocates of human freedom regard choice as the very linchpin of their arguments. Secondly, the causally determinative laws of science remain applicable to macroscopic phenomena despite the hypothesized indeterminacy of subatomic relations. For example, the sense in which Ohm's Law is determinative is unaffected by the "indeterminate" nature of events within those electrons whose overall behavior establishes the voltage, current, and resistance properties of the circuit. Whatever else may be said of those events regarded as relevant to the question of human freedom, all of them have in common at least the property of being macroscopic! In light of these two considerations, it is not useful to challenge deterministic theories of human psychology with notions or even with "truths" known to be applicable only at the level of particle-interactions. Instead, we should take the deterministic thesis as asserting, For everything that ever h a p p e n s at t h e level of observable human behavior, there are conditions such that, given them, nothing e l s e could happen.

Great care is required, however, lest this modified thesis be construed in such a way that it is no more than a tautology. Again, the key terms are "conditions" and "could." Let us take

DETERMINISM, " H A R D " AND " S O F T

41

t h e c a s e of S m i t h ' s going t o t h e opera. If t h e claim a s s e r t e d in (D 2 ) is that anyone w h o s e entire history, from the m o m e n t of c o n ception to t h e m o m e n t that Smith leaves for the opera, is exactly t h e s a m e a s S m i t h ' s must a l s o leave for t h e opera, then t h e claim is tautologously true, for such an " a n y o n e " would b e indisting u i s h a b l e from Smith. Indeed, for " a n y o n e " and " S m i t h " t o have identical h i s t o r i e s — i n c l u d i n g t i m e - s p a c e identities, g e n e t i c identities, etc., " a n y o n e " and " S m i t h " would b e the s a m e entity. The care required, then, is what protects us against accepting a logical truth a s an empirical proof. We must regard " c o n d i t i o n s , " therefore, a s scientific laws that apply indifferently over all h a p p e n ings of t h e type under consideration. The laws governing S m i t h ' s going t o t h e opera are t h e s a m e as t h o s e governing S m i t h ' s going anywhere or a n y o n e going anywhere, in just the way that O h m ' s Law covers all s i m p l e circuits. If there are such laws, then Smith could not but go t o t h e opera. His behavior in this i n s t a n c e is regulated in q u i t e t h e s a m e way a s would b e his falling at an acceleration of 32 feet/sec./sec. were h e dropped from a height. Understood this way, (D 2 ) is t h e s t a t e m e n t of HARD DETERMINISM. Ever s i n c e Donald Davidson's Actions, Reasons and Causes26 there has b e e n a richer a w a r e n e s s of how t h e traditional arguments against psychological determinism might b e dealt with, though Davidson's own position has not b e e n entirely static. 2 7 Before exploring t h e s e recent proposals, we should clarify further t h e c o n c e p t u a l and empirical points of entry that modern (and not s o modern) Psychology has created for t h e deterministic thesis, D 2 . The m o s t welcoming c o n c e p t u a l point of entry is t h e simple fact that significant human a c t i o n s are not random, but b e a r a c o h e r e n t relationship t o specified goals. If only in t h e venerable Aristotelian s e n s e , then, S m i t h ' s a c t i o n s are, a s it were, determined by S m i t h ' s o b j e c t i v e s through a hypothetical necessity. But since the objectives themselves have been caused—in just the way S m i t h ' s hungers, thirsts, and m o r e general n e e d s are all c a u s e d — it follows that S m i t h ' s a c t i o n s have b e e n c a u s e d by t h o s e externally e s t a b l i s h e d c o n d i t i o n s within Smith t o which his behavior is a response.

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

42

That many actions are thus caused has never been seriously disputed, but the requirement of D2 is more demanding than this. It requires the rejection of such claims as, "Smith chooses at least some of his objectives, and his choices here are not determined in the required sense, for they are "determined" by Smith's moral autonomy." In a word, there are some objectives allegedly arising from Smith's free will. Let us refer to this as the voluntarism thesis and denominate it V. The burden of determinism thus becomes one of establishing either that V is false or that it is, in fact, compatible with D2. A special set of arguments has been spawned by the second of these possibilities. Collectively these arguments produce the thesis of Compatibilism, C, which may be generally expressed thus: T h e r e a r e c a u s a l l y n e c e s s a r y a n d s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s for I P )

all h u m a n a c t i o n s t h a t a r e " f r e e " in t h e s e n s e r e q u i r e d

1

by V.

1

The defense of C, as shall be discussed, takes the form of showing that V and D2 can be jointly asserted without contradiction. Thus, at least s o m e voluntarists can be compatibilists. But some cannot. The latter are those subscribing to a (hard) voluntarism of this sort: A c t i o n s a r e free if a n d o n l y if t h e a c t o r ' s c h o i c e i n t e n IV u 1

tionally expresses reasons and beliefs that are authenti-

1

cally his.

H l

What VH asserts is "hard voluntarism" which rejects both D2 and C. It rejects D2 for transparent reasons; it rejects C through the requirement of authenticity. As the term is now employed by philosophers, 2 8 it makes a distinction between those reasons or beliefs of a person's that have been externally supplied or imposed or are otherwise "determined," and those which are not thus derived. The distinction is between s o m e attribute or psychological disposition being merely "his" in contrast to being "his own." When an infant is christened "George," for example, the name becomes "his," but not in the authentic sense of his having freely chosen it. Thus, it is "his" but not "his own." The burden that must be

DETERMINISM, " H A R D " AND " S O F T '

43

borne by VH is, among other considerations, arguing successfully for the authenticity of an actor's freedom or the authenticity of those personal states or e l e m e n t s that dispose the actor t o this as opposed to that course of action. The distillation of what has been said so far is this: D2 denies the authenticity of human action sequences and VH affirms it. Accordingly, C is not contradicted by V but is by VHWe are now in a position to give s o m e shape and content to the notion of soft determinism which, at least since the time of William James, has been largely dismissed or ridiculed. On the face of it, what "soft" determinists seem to aver is that VH and D2 are (somehow) compatible. )ohn Stuart Mill in the last century 2 9 and B. F. Skinner in our own 3 0 offer two examples of "determinists" in the odd position of exhorting us to accept (choose) their proposals! Neither's arguments have succeeded, but it is not clear that every argument for a "soft" determinism must be incoherent. I shall return to this later in the chapter, where concepts such as freedom and autonomy are considered not as abiding attributes of this or that species (or even this or that human actor), but are states arising within systems that are not entirely "closed."

Reasons and Causes The distinction between reasons and causes is a venerable one and has been defended in o n e or another form by Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hegel, to mention just three luminaries. 31 It is a distinction that can be made in a variety of ways but t h e s e can be collapsed into a more or less official version of the following form: Causes are purely natural phenomena in which the element of "agency" is neither discernible nor necessary. Reasons, on the other hand, entail "agency" and create a category of agent-causality quite unlike the event-causality of the physical world. Significant human actions are unintelligible in the a b s e n c e of an ac-

44

DETERMINISM, " H A R D " AND " S O F T '

count of the reasons behind these actions; the motives, desires, expectations, and objectives framed by the actor and impelling just those actions capable of realizing the actor's purposes. Thus, for example, a causal account of the death of Smith might be confined to the (natural) fact that Smith's aorta was punctured by a bullet, but the full explanation of Smith's death would have to include the motives (the reasons) that led the assailant to commit the lethal action. Similarly, all genuinely social and historical events are inexplicable except through the concept of reasons (motives), for we can never account for historical and social episodes by confining attention to merely physical properties of the persons and places involved. To the extent that events can be exhaustively accounted for by taking recourse only to physical descriptions, the events are simply not "historical" or "social" at all; they are "natural." We can develop a more precise distinction among compatibilists, determinists, and voluntarists using this general statement of the "resons vs. c a u s e s " argument. The defenders of D2 will reject the categorical separation of reasons and causes and will insist that "reasons" themselves are caused, and that the causes of " r e a s o n s " are drawn from utterly natural-physical sources. Accordingly, there are not "reasons," as such, but certain effects produced in actors and referred to as " r e a s o n s " for want of a scientific understanding of their origin and nature. The compatibilist defending C is prepared to accept that there are reasons in the accepted sense of the term, but that natural-causal conditions bring them about. On this construal, a person may be said to act on the basis of reasons, but the reasons themselves are not s o m e thing over which the actor has total control, nor are they s o m e thing of his own making. Like other mental entities, reasons too are supplied from the outside—are learned—and are not "authentic." Thus, in the sense in which authenticity has already been used, we can say that an actor's reasons are his but not his own. Finally, the defenders of VH accept the reasons-causes distinction fully and grant to the actor the authentic authorship of at least s o m e actions which, therefore, are explained through agent-causality. The most obvious rejoinder to advocates of VH is that

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

45

an a c t o r ' s r e a s o n s , ultimately u n d e r s t o o d , are in fact c o n d i t i o n s within t h e a c t o r — c o n d i t i o n s of a neural or biological nature—such t h a t t h e actual c a u s e s of t h e a c t i o n a r e physical, a l t h o u g h t h e a c t o r h i m s e l f is unaware of this. T h e general p r o b l e m of ical reductionism

psychophys-

will b e taken up in t h e next chapter. W i t h o u t a n -

ticipating t h a t analysis, it is e n o u g h t o n o t e t h e special p r o b l e m of r e d u c t i o n i s m when a p p l i e d t o t h e r e a s o n s - c a u s e s issue. T h e a d v o c a t e of V H h e r e is u n d e r n o o b l i g a t i o n t o a c c e p t any given theory regarding t h e " u l t i m a t e " s o u r c e s or even " c a u s e s " of t h e a c t o r ' s r e a s o n s . W h a t V H a s s e r t s is t h a t s o m e a c t i o n s are t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of r e a s o n s a n d t h a t t h e actor, in a c t i n g upon t h e s e reas o n s rather t h a n others, t a k e s his a c t i o n s t o b e t h e result of his own c h o i c e s . Now here a s u b t l e e l e m e n t enters, for we are c a l l e d upon t o ask w h e t h e r t h e r e is any d i f f e r e n c e — g e r m a n e t o V H — b e tween an a c t o r b e i n g free t o a c t upon his r e a s o n s a n d merely believing h e is free in t h i s respect. Let us take t h e e x a m p l e of a driver who e n t e r s a race in which t h e c o m p e t i n g vehicles are (apparently) assigned to drivers randomly. As it h a p p e n s , our driver—we shall call him A. ). F o i l — h a s b e e n given a c a r e q u i p p e d with a c o m p u t e r t h a t actually determines t h e velocity and acceleration of t h e vehicle at every point in t h e c o u r s e of t h e race. W h e n Foil p r e s s e s down on t h e a c c e l erator, t h e r e is a r e s p o n s e , b u t t h e r e s p o n s e is n o t proportional t o Foil's behavior. It is, instead, governed by a c o m p u t e r program. When t h e race is over, Foil c o m p l a i n s t h a t h e "tried everything t o get t h e car moving, but s o m e t h i n g s e e m e d t o b e holding it back." W h e n we ask Foil w h e t h e r or n o t h e was under instructions t o drive t h e way h e did, o r w h e t h e r his e x p e r i e n c e s a s a driver m a d e him l e s s a b l e t o reach t o p s p e e d , o r w h e t h e r he was under s o m e internal p r e s s u r e of fear or d o u b t t h a t prevented him from d o i n g what he knew h e s h o u l d b e doing, h e tells us no, no, a n d no. In a word, he c l a i m s t h a t everything h e did w a s d o n e freely. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t is relevant h e r e is b e t w e e n

(a)

f r e e d o m defined a s t h e a b s e n c e of externally i m p o s e d c o n s t r a i n t s on o n e ' s actions a n d (b) f r e e d o m d e f i n e d a s t h e a b s e n c e of externally i m p o s e d c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e consequences

of o n e ' s a c t i o n s . Mr.

Foil was free in t h e first s e n s e a n d n o t free in t h e s e c o n d . This is

46

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

a b a s i c d i s t i n c t i o n in t h a t , w e r e Foil n o t f r e e in t h e first s e n s e , then we would have g o o d reason to believe that he was unfree simpliciter, e v e n if h e t h o u g h t o t h e r w i s e . B u t let u s a s s u m e t h a t ins t e a d o f t a m p e r i n g with h i s c a r w e p u t a drug in h i s f o o d t h a t would slow down his voluntary a n d reflexive m o v e m e n t s .

More-

over, in m o n i t o r i n g h i s e v e r y a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e r a c e , w e l e a r n t h a t on each t u r n — a n d contrary t o t h e rules of t h e r a c e — h e s h o u t e d e p i t h e t s a t t h e o t h e r d r i v e r s — d o i n g s o , h e t e l l s u s later, b e c a u s e of h i s f r u s t r a t i o n a t n o t b e i n g a b l e t o drive a s well a s h e c u s t o m arily d o e s . W e c a n s a y t h a t t h e c a u s e of h i s f r u s t r a t i o n w a s t h e e f f e c t of t h e drug, b u t t h a t h i s r e a c t i o n t o his o w n f r u s t r a t i o n w a s s o m e t h i n g h e c o u l d h a v e c o n t r o l l e d . Thus, w e w o u l d n o t h o l d h i m r e s p o n s i b l e for h i s p e r f o r m a n c e a s a driver, b u t w e s u r e l y c o u l d h o l d h i m a c c o u n t a b l e f o r h i s lack o f s p o r t s m a n s h i p , s i n c e t h e l a t t e r is n o t t h e i n v a r i a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e f o r m e r . To this made:

point, two different distinctions

a distinction

between

straints on the c o n s e q u e n c e s

constraints

on

have

been

and

con-

actions

of a c t i o n s ; a n d a d i s t i n c t i o n

be-

tween induced internal constraints and their effects on t h e o n e hand, and on t h e other induced internal constraints and effects t h a t a r e n o t c a u s a l l y t i e d t o t h e m , e v e n if u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in t e r m s o f t h e m . W h e r e a s w e w o u l d r e f e r t o t h e d r u g a s t h e cause o f F o i l ' s p o o r performance, a n d therefore part of t h e c a u s a l chain t h a t led t o Foil's frustration, t h e drug m u s t b e regarded a s nothing m o r e t h a n a condition—neither c o n d u c t of a certain

necessary nor sufficient—under kind (e.g., u n s p o r t s m a n l i k e

which

behavior)

be-

c o m e s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . N o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t in j o i n t l y e s t a b l i s h i n g t w o c r i t e r i a — t h e c r i t e r i o n o f a condition

that renders behavior un-

d e r s t a n d a b l e , a n d t h e c r i t e r i o n of a c o n d i t i o n t h a t i m p o s e s i n t e r nal c o n s t r a i n t s o n a n a c t o r — w e h a v e still n o t d e f e a t e d V H a s a n account

of t h e

unsportsmanlike

actions. Accordingly,

it is

not

e n o u g h for d e f e n d e r s o f e i t h e r D 2 o r C t o s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e r e l i a b l y a n t e c e d e n t t o c e r t a i n a c t i o n s reg a r d e d by t h e a c t o r a s " f r e e l y " t a k e n . T h e y m u s t s h o w in a d d i t i o n t h a t still o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s o r parts of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s w e r e

causally

e f f i c a c i o u s in p r o d u c i n g b o t h t h e s p e c i f i c b e h a v i o r and t h e a c t o r ' s b e l i e f t h a t t h i s s p e c i f i c b e h a v i o r w a s f r e e l y p e r f o r m e d . W h a t is in-

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

47

volved here is something like posthypnotic suggestion where the suggestion includes admissions by the actor that the hypnotically performed actions were "free" and where the actor additionally is rendered amnesic with respect to having ever been hypnotized. There is, then, a difference between freely doing and freely choosing to do. The usual (reductionistic) rejoinders to VH are based on proofs that the doing was constrained while leaving the element of choice neglected. However, there have been frontal attacks on choice as well by those who have challenged the authenticity of the actor's desires, motives, and/or beliefs. This is a more recent literature that repays close examination. 3 2 It is supportive of a species of C, though its tendencies are clearly in the direction of D2. I have alluded to it a few times already and I should now state the authenticity-challenge more precisely: An action is authentic in the s e n s e required by V H if and only if the motives, reasons, or o t h e r factors warranting the action are framed by the actor independently of external constraints, compulsions, or coercions, or of internal constraints, compulsions, or coercions over which the actor d o e s not have c o n s c i o u s control.

In treating of authenticity, Robert Young has referred to an agent's "reflective powers" (p. 576) and has argued that, even though a given motive or desire was initially established by conditioning, the agent remains autonomous as long as he is able to "identify" with the conditioned desire in his "reflective judgings" (p. 573). 3 3 Note that Young and a number of compatibilists do not deny that an actor's motives are brought about by conditioning or "socialization." Rather, they insist that the resulting actions can still be regarded as autonomous if the actor has so assimilated the motives as to make them his own; i.e., if the motives or reasons are authentic. Suppose, for example, the actor has habitually displayed aggressive behavior toward his supervisor and, in the course of a successful psychotherapy, comes to recognize that his enmity toward any form of authority was caused by an especially troubled relationship he had had with his own father. Now that he can reflect on the sources of his aggressiveness, he is able to judge it as irrational when directed willynilly at those

48

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

who happen to have positions of authority. Thus enlightened, he can regulate his responses to internal states that had heretofore triggered angry behavior. Moreover, even when he does give vent to his passions, his behavior is now autonomous because he understands the conditions promoting it. The desires are now really (iis own in that he enjoys full, conscious, and comprehending proprietorship of them. Compatibilism of this sort has attracted its share of criticism. As Mark Bernstein has written, a proponent of D 2 when faced with an example such as the one I've just provided, would hardly be stymied. He would counter by saying that the newly acquired knowledge is just more grist for the socializationist mill. That is, this enlightened person might be so socialized such that when he notices what processes caused him to have certain motivations, he will inevitably and unavoidably accept or reject his motivational make-up.34 Yet, there is a feature of the authenticity criterion that has not been noticed, though it would seem to enjoy a certain immunity against this sort of criticism. Recall that the challenge to D 2 comes from the proposition that some of an agent's actions are autonomous in that they arise from authentic predispositions. What is central to this claim is that the predispositions are the agent's own and not merely installed by conditioning or socialization. They are his own in the sense, for example, that a pain is his own whereas his name is merely his. But, like his pains, the agent's motives too have a certain "protected" status once the owner claims them. When someone claims to have a toothache, for example, he enjoys a very special epistemic authority that he does not enjoy when making claims about any empirical fact external to himself. To be satisfied that someone has a toothache, we must have at least the evidence of his report to that effect. (We would not say, "You have an intense toothache, but you don't know it!") The formal statement of this is that observers' first-person reports of sensations are incorrigible in that they cannot be shown to be wrong through methods external to the observers themselves.

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

49

W h a t is i n t e r e s t i n g a b o u t t h e incorrigibility t h e s i s in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h a t authenticity,

o n a n y c o n s t r u a l , is a n at-

t r i b u t e t h a t c a n n o t b e e s t a b l i s h e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e a g e n t ' s own s t a t e m e n t s , f e e l i n g s , b e l i e f s . T h a t is a t s o m e p o i n t in t h e evidentiary p h a s e , w e n e e d t h e a g e n t ' s f i r s t - p e r s o n r e p o r t s a s t o t h e ( a l l e g e d ) a u t h e n t i c i t y of a f e e l i n g or m o t i v e or d e s i r e or g o a l . B u t if his r e p o r t s a r e t o b e r e g a r d e d a s r e l e v a n t t o t h e q u e s t i o n of authenticity, t h e y m u s t b e a c c e p t e d a s autonomously

given. (We m u s t

a s s u m e , t o t a k e a trite e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e r e is n o o n e b e h i n d t h e curtain t h r e a t e n i n g t o kill t h e reporter u n l e s s h e says this or that.) Thus, t h e o n l y e m p i r i c a l t e s t of D 2 's c h a l l e n g e e n t a i l s t h e very a u t o n o m y t h a t D 2 d e n i e s . B u t if, in fact, t h e d e f e n d e r of D 2 i n s i s t s t h a t n o a c t — i n c l u d i n g v e r b a l r e p o r t s of d e s i r e s or g o a l s — i s a u t o n o m o u s , t h e D 2 t h e s i s t u r n s o u t t o b e u n c o n f o r m a b l e a n d irref u t i b l e in p r i n c i p l e a n d is t h e r e f o r e n o t a s c i e n t i f i c t h e s i s a t all. It is n o t e v e n a n e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o r " s t a t i s t i c a l law." T o put t h e m a t t e r in t h e form of a n orderly a r g u m e n t , w e c a n say t h a t , 1. Autonomy, A, requires authenticity, A'. 2. A' refers to the relationship between an agent's actions and his predispositions P. 3. P are internal states associated with such items in awareness as reasons, desires, feelings, and beliefs. 4. P may be either imposed (by conditioning, socialization, coercion, etc.) or adopted, the former symbolized as Pf and the latter as P„. 5. The ultimate empirical verification of any P (whether P, or P a ) is in the form of first-person reports, R. 6. For evidence to count as verifying, R must be uncoerced. 7. There is at least one P associated with uncoerced R's if D2 is testable. 8. Thus, (7) implies P„; P„ implies A'; A' implies A. If, for e x a m p l e , (7) is d e n i e d , t h e n (5) is i m p o s s i b l e a n d D 2 is unt e s t a b l e in p r i n c i p l e . W h a t w e s e e , t h e n , is t h a t a n y — t h e word is any—empirical

t e s t of D 2 e n t a i l s t h e validity of V by a s s u m i n g t h e

e x i s t e n c e of A ' a n d t h e r e f o r e A.

50

D E T E R M I N I S M , " H A R D " A N D "SOFT"

Reasons as Causes It would s e e m that " r e a s o n s " must survive at least a s an explanatory device and that s o m e a c t i o n s must b e regarded a s taken a u t o n o m o u s l y in that they proceed from a u t h e n t i c motives or ends on t h e part of t h e agent. But this still leaves open t h e question as to the nature of the relationship between reasons and actions. To say that Smith a c t e d because he had a reason is t o appeal t o s o m e sort of causal account, and so t h e question has t o do with t h e s e n s e in which this " b e c a u s e " is t o b e taken. In his i m m e n s e l y influential essay, Actions, Reasons and Causes, Donald Davidson 3 5 argued for r e a s o n s as c a u s e s and expressed t h e optimistic view that traditional explanations b a s e d upon an actor's r e a s o n s would b e ultimately transformed into t h e more c o m m o n naturalistic (causal) explanations of science. Davidson's later retreats from this p o s i t i o n 3 6 have retained t h e view that r e a s o n s are still s o m e h o w like c a u s e s or function as causes, even if they c a n n o t b e a b s o r b e d into t h e explanatory framework of t h e natural s c i e n c e s . When we d e s c r i b e s o m e o n e as acting on a reason, says Davidson, our explanation includes " t h e idea of cause, and the idea of rationality. . . . The advantage of this m o d e of explanation is clear: we can explain behavior without having t o know t o o much a b o u t how it was caused. And t h e cost is appropriate: we c a n n o t turn this m o d e of explanation into s o m e t h i n g more like s c i e n c e . " 3 7 But t h e alleged advantage of retaining reas o n s is scarcely comforting on Davidson's account, in part because such explanations cannot be turned into scientific ones. But even more damaging than this limitation is t h e dubious or trivial nature of t h e s e " r e a s o n s " e x p l a n a t i o n s when they are tied t o t h e notion of t h e actor a s an intending agent. Davidson's important argument on this point may b e summarized thus: Let us a s s u m e that Smith d o e s X and that, in an a t t e m p t to explain X, we say, "Smith must b e understood a s an agent with r e a s o n s and intentions, and t h e action X was brought a b o u t by this (his) agency." The central question here is whether this s e n t e n c e actually adds anything t o t h e bald empirical utterance, " S m i t h acted." That is,

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT'

51

d o we know anything through t h e longer s e n t e n c e t h a t g o e s b e yond t h e information c o n v e y e d by t h e pithier o n e ? Davidson's a n a l y s i s first e x a m i n e s w h e t h e r t h e r e is a difference between t h e action X and "Smith c a u s e d X." Those who would insist t h a t t h e latter is distinct from t h e former m u s t ass u m e t h a t " S m i t h c a u s e d X " is itself an a c t i o n of s o m e sort functionally related t o X. But t h e n we have t h e vicious c o n d i t i o n of an a c t i o n b e i n g n e c e s s a r y for an a c t i o n , ad infinitum.

That is, if

" S m i t h c a u s e d X " is itself an action, t h e n we will n e e d a " S m i t h c a u s e d W " a s an earlier a n d n e c e s s a r y a c t i o n for " S m i t h c a u s e d X," and a "Smith c a u s e d V" a s t h e precondition for "Smith c a u s e d W," etc. An infinite regress e n s u e s s u c h t h a t any a c t i o n will not o c c u r until an infinite s e r i e s of earlier o n e s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d . T h e only alternative t o this, Davidson h a s argued, is t o regard " S m i t h c a u s e d X " a s just a s o m e w h a t psychologized version of " S m i t h X ' e d , " t h e latter stripped of n o t i o n s of agency. T h e s u c c e s s of t h i s a n a l y s i s is, however, only a p p a r e n t and is g r o u n d e d in a s s u m p t i o n s of a d u b i o u s a n d q u e s t i o n - b e g ging nature. Only if r e a s o n s were c a u s e s — o n l y if g e n u i n e

actions

were t h e merely physical effects of earlier physical e v e n t s — w o u l d it follow t h a t an a c t i o n is n e c e s s a r y for an action, ad infinitum. Alt h o u g h c a s t i n g h i m s e l f a s a c o m p a t i b i l i s t , Davidson actually m u s t s u b s c r i b e t o a version of D 2 when h e i n s i s t s t h a t an a g e n t m u s t perform an a c t i o n t o perform an a c t i o n . But it is just this line of a r g u m e n t t h a t d e f e n d e r s of V H o p p o s e . To say t h a t S m i t h is an agent—to

say t h a t at least s o m e of his a c t i o n s arise from physi-

cally u n d e t e r m i n e d a n d irreducibly rational c o n s i d e r a t i o n s — i s t o say at least t h a t his " a g e n c y " is not caused in t h e ordinary s e n s e of c a u s a t i o n . W h e n we a t t e m p t t o explain

Hamlet

by referring t o

S h a k e s p e a r e ' s plans, r e a s o n s , beliefs, i n t e n t i o n s , a n d a s p i r a t i o n s , we m e a n t o say m o r e than, " S h a k e s p e a r e wrote Hamlet,"

unless,

of c o u r s e , " w r o t e " is given its wider (and proper) m e a n i n g . In t h e narrow s e n s e of "wrote," t h e r e is n o way t o distinguish b e t w e e n what S h a k e s p e a r e did four c e n t u r i e s a g o a n d what s o m e o n e is now doing when he sits down a n d c o p i e s t h e words of t h e play. Nor d o e s a criticism of " a g e n c y " a m o u n t t o m u c h when it rests

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on the problem of infinite regression. There is, after all, the writing of one's first play, first words, first letters. One need not write a play as a condition for writing another one, any more than one needs to have a toothache as a condition for having another one. The VH thesis promises nothing if not originality! It confers on the actor precisely the status of an author and, accordingly, is not surprised or embarrassed when a "first work" or "novel twist" or "unexpected production" is forthcoming. Part of the reigning confusion in the literature on human agency is attributable to a less than clear and consistent use of the term "action." Philosophers and psychologists have been far too beholden to examples from Physics and far too eager to keep even these unwisely chosen examples as simple as possible. Thus do we find a literature that is bloated with instances of raising one's arm, throwing a ball, lifting an object, scratching a nose. Indeed, most of the behavior chosen to illustrate this or that hypothesis is best regarded not as a species of action but as a species of reaction or reflex. The fallacy behind such choices is the belief that because human activity is part of a closed system in some of its expressions it is part of a closed system in all of them. The fallacy, then, is just another version of D2. A system is closed when all observable and measurable transactions are covered by principles of conservation; when an "output" from any part of the system is an "input" to the system as a whole; when all events have their effects only within the system and when events beyond the system have no effects on it; when, in a word, the "content" of the system is constant, no matter how varied the form of the content may be. We can, for example, make a strip out of two metals with different coefficients of expansion such that the strip bends in one direction when the surrounding temperature falls and in the other direction when it increases. A simple thermostat is thereby created with the strip closing an electrical circuit (and thus turning on the furnace) when the room is cool and opening the same circuit when the room is hot. Here we have a closed system which may not be different in principle from the "human system" when arms are raised, balls are thrown, objects are lifted, and noses are scratched. In all such

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instances we are dealing only with rudimentary ballistic responses that are defined in precise mechanical-mathematical terms. It is, however, just because such occurrences are so completely describable that we are lulled into the belief that invoking "agency" adds nothing. To see what "agency" adds we must turn to events whose mechanical properties are not the salient ones or to events even whose mechanical properties are not "mechanically" describable in an exhaustive way. We need not choose Hamlet to illustrate the point. Consider only a virtuoso performance of, say, the Moonlight Sonata. The final movement of this piece taxes even the most accomplished pianist. There are stretches when a dozen or more notes must be struck within a second or so; i.e., when the interval between successive "actions" is far too short to allow the sensory consequences of action-1 to be delivered to the brain in time to influence the motor events that will lead to action-2. Clearly, what the virtuoso performer is doing is different from what a novice does even when the latter strikes two successive notes very (equally) quickly. The master of the piece, we say, has something of a "motor template" built into his system (brain?) such that, once the first note in a series is struck, the entire "template" is triggered and the remaining notes in the series are "read-out," as it were, without any deliberation on the part of the pianist. It would make no sense in such a case to refer to the striking of any given note as "intentional," but we would scarcely describe the performance as "accidental" or "unintended" or "unconscious." The "action" in such cases is the playing of the Sonata, and not the striking of individual keys. What we finally judge are the hours and years of preparation for this "action"; a preparation that culminates in so disciplined and so habitual a series of reactions as to yield a nearly perfect performance. Suppose now that, when we insist the pianist is an "agent" whose achievements have been forged out of hope, desire, resolve, etc., we are asked by the Davidsonian, "Is there anything added to 'He played the Moonlight Sonata' by invoking the concept of him as an agent?" Or, "Was his causing the performance itself an action or was it just the performance itself?" Our

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answer will be unavoidably truncated. Indeed, "He played the Moonlight Sonata" so thoroughly entails the notion of "agency" that reference to "agency" is entirely gratuitous in such cases. Like "playing" chess, "playing" the piano with mastery is unimaginable with agency removed. There are, of course, player-pianos and even more modern gadgets by which musical compositions are "played" by no more than machinery, but this is quite beside the point. There are no equivalent instances of virtuouso performances of the Moonlight Sonata by human beings who have never studied, practiced, desired, believed, etc. I dwell on this illustration because it brings into focus two important attributes of actions. The first is that, as habitual modes of behavior, some actions are neither "intentional" nor "unintended" and require as a different modifier the word habitual or its kin. We might think of these as "second-nature" actions which unfold with the same precision and predictability as (first-nature) reflexes. They are common in the performing arts and in other technical persuits, though on some philosophical accounts even virtue must become thus habitual! But what is important here is to recognize that an action need not stand in the same temporal relation with the intentions that produce it as (natural) effects stand in relation to their (natural) causes. The reason we are disinclined to describe the pianist's striking of each note as "intentional" or "unintended" is because we tend to adopt physical models when describing reasons-actions sequences. But the theory of human agency (VH) rejects the applicability of just these models and is not, therefore, to be charged with queerness or eccentricity when requiring or affirming temporal relations unheard of in the physical realm. The actor is the agent behind his habits not in the sense that a cause stands behind its effects but in the sense that Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet; i.e., in the sense of personal creation. The second attribute of actions illustrated by the virtuoso performance is that they must be intelligible in the way that cause-effect sequences are not. Berkeley was getting at just this point when he chided that he could find nothing in the gravitational laws except the effects themselves. We claim to know that

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A and B are causally related when A and B have a common history in our experiences. We do not impose the criterion of intelligibility on the causal relation. For example, we do not say that it somehow makes more sense that short-wavelength radiation yields the experience of blue whereas longer wavelengths yield that of orange and red. After all, the particular relationship between energy and color vision could have been otherwise and we would have had no grounds for being surprised had it been so. But what makes a sample of human behavior an action is its connection to real or imaginable goals in the future and to occurrent beliefs and preparations in the past. We have, then, several grounds on which to base objections to the thesis that reasons are (or are somehow like, or function as) causes. First, the actions arising from reasons are not determined in the way that effects are determined by causes. The temporal relations between the former dyad are different from those obtaining between the latter. Nor are actions readily or aptly reducible (without remainder) to discrete, ballistic responses common to closed mechanical systems. In some cases, the "action" is an entire ensemble of events, no element of which is intelligible when removed from the ensemble in which it is otherwise and actually imbedded. Some actions clearly have open-system attributes and must arise from agents who are open systems in this respect. We need consider only information as an example of an unbound variable not covered by principles of conservation and (thus) not explicable in the language of physical economies. We do not lose information by passing it on, nor does it get used up by being used, nor (as best as we can tell) do we need proportional amounts of energy to increase its extent. Even as the entropy of the universe increases, we—on our little solar satellite—decrease it locally with every successful imposition of order, predictability, and understanding* The psychological term we have customarily applied * Note that recent cosmologies are more neutral on the monotonic increase in entropy, but not because of anything we are doing!

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to cover all of this is "creativity," though the word has been devalued by inflationary usage. But what the word is getting at is often neglected by those who would attempt to abosrb human actions into the causal nexus in which (merely) physical transactions occur. Perhaps "agency," too, has become so colored by spiritistic innunendo as to disturb the repose of the nonsectarians! Yet, the infelicitousness of a word cannot justify a denial of the facts the word seeks to define or depict or explain. To those who wonder what we've added to or learned about an event when we say that Smith, as an intending agent, brought it about, we can say that we've added understanding to what would otherwise have been an unintelligible and bald perception. As it happens, "Smith was the intending agent who brought about X," is not shorthand for "Smith X'ed." It is a radically different claim, even if flawed or misguided. The former sentence carries with it what is ultimately a moral assignation that is inapplicable in principle to any and every purely natural event (effect). It carries with it also a recognition (perhaps faulty or misguided) that the event thus brought about had a point, whereas purely natural events (effects) do not. (It never makes sense to ask what is the point of Ohm's Law). As should be clear, concepts of "agency" and "creativity" successfully dodge the problem of infinite regression by conferring on the actor the powers of authorship and originality, not to mention spontaneity, inconsistency, hesitation, and retreat. Being an agent is not, in itself, to perform an action but to frame an action-consequence sequence. Thus, being an agent—if there is an infinite regress involved at all—is to be an agent! And to frame an action-consequence sequence is not necessarily to realize it. The totally paralyzed patient is no less an agent for his incapacities, though he must be an unrequited one. There is a customary connection between agency and action, but not a logical one or, for that matter, a relentless psychological one. We are left, therefore, with only one difficult question for V H , and that is the nature of the relationship between agency and action, now that we have recognized that it is not the concept of agency itself that is troubled or in trouble. lust how is it

DETERMINISM, "HARD" A N D "SOFT'

57

that an agent, having framed action-consequence sequences, initiates the action itself? As we shall note in the next chapter, the dualism of the Plain Man carries its own very heavy burdens, but some form of coherent dualism would seem to be the only tactic by which to retain agency and, at the same time, honor what we already know about brain mechanisms and behavior. Put tersely, the task is to show how agents achieve ends by engaging the unequivocally causal apparatus of the nervous system—but while recognizing that agency itself is not reducible to the same causal apparatus. That is, once we must be content with the fact that reasons are not causes in the scientific sense of the latter term, we are far less able to explain the relationship between agency and action, even as we affirm the essentiality of agency to an understanding of action. Another look at "soft determinism" and compatibilism might repay the effort.

"Soft Determinism" Reconsidered In saying that the mark of "agency" is the framing of action-consequence sequences, where the action component is intelligible, 1 have attempted to make a distinction between actions and responses on the one hand, and actions and outcomes on the other. With unavoidable imprecision, I have described actions as akin to works or compositions or performances having a nearly narrative quality and not limited to unique modes of execution. Ordinary language respects these attributes in such phrases as, "the action of the jury," "the government took decisive action," "he acted well in the circumstance." This is not to say that actions are never discrete responses; only that they often are not and that, even when they are, explaining them requires far more than a description of their topographies. Added to this liberated conception of actions is an appreciation of the complex relationship between the action qua action and the particular behavioral elements constituting it. As noted in the instance of the concert pianist, we regard only awk-

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wardly the striking of any given note as "intended" or as "unintentional," though we have no doubt but that the action of "playing the Moonlight Sonata" is intentional. Again, we can conceive of of whose constituents is "ina performance—an action—none tended" (in the usual sense) but all of them collectively yielding an intended outcome. It is because of this that attempts to analyze actions into molecular or atomic components is useless and misleading labor if the goal is to understand the actions themselves. Properly regarded, what I have called "second-nature" actions are really reactions (reflex-like habits) amenable to a causal analysis and even a physiological or neural reduction. What stands behind actions are intentions and beliefs in addition to a competence gained by practice and preparation. What stands behind actions, that is, are agents framing action-consequence sequences. The realization of a given consequence requires typically not only additional actions but a number of reactions or responses or "behavioral elements," s o m e or even most of which may not be—or may not continue to be—"intended" in the received sense. Where D2 gains its ostensible strength is in the choice of these intermediary responses and in the ability to explain them in purely naturalistic-causal fashion. Where VH suffers its ostensible losses is in often not being able to point to any particular "behavioral element" as one arising from an agent with the freedom to choose a course of action. Commonly, the defender of VH, faced with an example like that of the pianist, wants to say that the pianist, as agent, intends to strike each note, but also does not know how to address the fact that so rapid a sequence of responses leaves no time for deliberation and choice. But the performance of the Moonlight Sonata is, in fact, a remote consequence of the agent's framing of action-consequence sequences. The actions relevant to this particular consequence—this particular performance—may be weeks or months or even years removed from the consequence itself. A useful analogy is the writing of a will: Smith's action (writing the will) made Jones a millionaire twenty years after Smith's action; i.e., once Smith had died and his will had been probated. What Smith intended to bring about was Jones's ultimate wealth and he employed the instrument of a will to accomplish it. It is

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just in t h e nature of g e n u i n e a c t i o n s that their intended c o n s e q u e n c e s are often temporally r e m o t e and where t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a neat causal chain is largely illusory. The actor-agent who frames action-consequence s e q u e n c e s does so without being able to "limit possibilities" in t h e way that bona fide c a u s e s do. Thus, even in t h e s e n s e that such an agent d o e s " c a u s e " certain c o n s e q u e n c e s , he d o e s not do so in t h e m a n n e r in which natural c a u s e s produce natural effects. Indeed, on t h o s e o c c a s i o n s when h e s e e m s t o do so, it is only b e c a u s e his a c t i o n s have availed t h e m s e l v e s of natural c a u s e s . Smith puts rat poison in t h e b a s e m e n t and awakens to discover a dead rat. The s e n s e in which Smith caused the death of t h e rat is different from t h e s e n s e in which t h e poison c a u s e d the death of t h e rat. S m i t h ' s action could not foreordain t h e efficacy of t h e poison, t h e rat's eating it or t h e rat's eating enough of it for t h e o u t c o m e t o b e fatal. W e s e e again that r e a s o n s are not a s p e c i e s of c a u s e and neither, therefore, are t h e a c t i o n s arising from these reasons. In realizing or attempting to realize a given c o n s e q u e n c e , a g e n t s take recourse t o a c t i o n s c o n s i s t e n t with and exploitative of t h e causal laws of nature, but distinct from t h e m . It is just this ontological gap between r e a s o n s and c a u s e s that prohibits natural c a u s e s from determining bona fide reasons. Natural c a u s e s can and do o p e r a t e on the purely natural (physical) c o n d i t i o n s of t h e body such that Smith may b e caused (determined) t o misperceive, m i s s t h e mark, fail t o hear t h e cry for help, s e e t h e wrong face in the crowd, forget his aunt's birthday, etc. It is in this way that he may b e caused (determined) to initiate or frame a nugatory a c t i o n - c o n s e q u e n c e s e q u e n c e or otherwise b e "doomed to fail." Similarly, he may b e distracted by pain, weakened by hunger or blinded by e m o t i o n . In many and various ways t h e particular a c t i o n - c o n s e q u e n c e s e q u e n c e framed by an agent may reflect c o n d i t i o n s that are t h e m s e l v e s not part of the s e q u e n c e , not intended by t h e agent, and still causally involved in t h e process of framing such a s e q u e n c e . It may even b e t h e c a s e that, in light of the ubiquity of such natural influences, there is never an i n s t a n c e of an utterly authentic intention, desire, belief or plan. That is, practically it may b e t h e c a s e that such so-called propositional attitudes invariably rise only to t h e level of relative

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authenticity. But if this is so, it is not necessarily or permanently the case, for it is the business of an in-principle autonomous being to gain control over those internal conditions that might otherwise "limit possibilities" for genuine (i.e., autonomous, intended, reasoned, and authentic) actions. At the beginning of this chapter I offered nine generic explanatory schemes invoked by today's psychologists as they set out to place human activity within a natural-causal context. 1 chose forgetfulness to illustrate these schemes so that the schemes themselves would have the appearance of plausibility. Forgetting, after all, is the sort of event that lends itself to one or another sort of causal analysis. One does not intend to forget where one's keys are, nor can the process of forgetting be regarded as an authentic expression of an agent's framed action-consequence sequences. But let us now apply the same nine explanatory schemes to what we would ordinarily take to be an action of the type discussed so far: Ad a m S m i t h wrote "Wealth of Nations": 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

because because because because because because because because because

of a condition of his brain of unconscious motives of his reinforcement history of certain neurotic disturbances he just happened to have a certain personality he was not distracted by other things on his mind he had the right motivation he had the requisite intelligence economics was discussed often in his childhood

I shall reserve to the next chapter the specific and peculiar liabilities of explanations of type-1, noting here only that putting Wealth of Nations in Smith's brain leaves the burden of explanation entirely unmitigated. A necessary piece of evidence, even if it proves to be less than decisive, regarding why Smith wrote Wealth of Nations is Smith's account thereof, and this account will totally ignore any fact pertaining to his brain. The type-2 explanation cannot succeed, if only because Smith cannot be aware of his unconscious motives and, there-

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fore, cannot incorporate them into action-consequence sequences. 3 8 Such motives cannot "cause" any part of Wealth of Nations that Smith caused as an agent. The type-3 explanation also fails since, to train (reinforce, "shape," "brainwash," encourage, exhort) Smith to do X, there must be an envisaged X to begin with. It makes some sense to say that Smith was reinforced to write, but surely not to say that he was reinforced to write Wealth of Nations! This same criticism applies of course to type-9 explanations, as it does to types 4 and 6. The action we have set out to explain has Wealth of Nations as its specific consequence and it cannot therefore be explained by any general condition of mental health or life's circumstances. And, finally, explanation-types 5, 7 and 8 are merely circumlocutions. What, after all, do we mean by "Smith wrote Wealth of Nations" if not that he had the requisite personality, intelligence, motivation, etc? These nine explanation-types all fail individually and collectively to explain Wealth of Nations, but each does figure in one or another form in any complete explanation we might attempt to fashion. Properly framed, they constitute the overall psychological and social context within which Adam Smith's authentic intentions to write just what he wrote must be realized. We may go so far as to say that the action-consequence sequence culminating in Wealth of Nations could not have been realized had such conditions as those embraced by 1 - 9 not prevailed. Understood in this way, such conditions may be taken to be permissive rather than determinative. The conditions of Smith's brain and body, the environment of his childhood, and the many other factors over which Smith could not exercise intentional control, make up the totality of that causal context within which possibilities are limited and within which also a given action-consequence sequence must strive for achievement. This sort of "soft determinism" is, indeed, compatible with VH and with common sense. But it does not challenge the concept of agency or even address it. Alas, it assumes it! lust what is it that such conditions limit—just what possibilities do they allow or withhold—if not the accomplishments envisaged by the framer of an action-consequence se-

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quence? Such conditions are permissive but not determinative of actions and thus they are not the causes of them.

Volition and Motivation The ageless excuse for incontinent actions is "The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak," an excuse that often is regarded as a challenge to the alleged freedom of the will itself. We retain the ancient Greek word akrasia to cover those instances in which a person has failed to do what he judges to be the right thing to do, even though there is no external and constraining imposition. We turn again to Donald Davidson for a most economical statement of the dilemma created by what we usually regard as incontinent actions: P,. If an agent wants to d o x more than he wants to do y and believes himself free to d o either x or y , then he will intentionally do x if he d o e s either * or y intentionally. The second principle connects judgements of what it is better to do with motivation or wanting: P 2 . If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y , then he wants to do x more than he wants to do y. P, and P 2 together obviously entail that if an agent judges that it would be better for him to d o x than to do y , and he believes himself to be free to d o either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he d o e s either x or y intentionally. This conclusion, 1 suggest, a p p e a r s to show that it is false that: P 3 . There are incontinent actions. 3 9

In addressing the general question of How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? from which the foregoing passage is taken, Davidson is drawn to the conclusion that, in the matter of incontinence, "the actor cannot understand himself: he recognizes, in his own intentional behavior, something essentially surd," 40 since there can be no rational basis for choosing to act when, by one's own lights, a different and better course of action is freely available. Thus, as Davidson notes, there is no point in inquiring as to the

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reason for such an action for "the agent has no reason." 41 Here I shall not review Davidson's argument for this conclusion—interesting and, in my view, sound though it is. Rather, let us take these passages from his essay as a point of entry to the larger question of the relationship between motives and intentions and the bearing this relationship has on the question of free will and on the proposition that human agency stands behind human actions. We may begin by noticing that the predicates in Davidson's P] and P 2 are of a radically different psychological nature, "wanting" and "judging" having no more in common than "needing" and "affirming." Accordingly, it is not at all difficult to imagine someone wanting to do x more than y while recognizing that y is better (more prudent, more noble, more lawful) than x. The ordinary way of distinguishing between wants and judgments is to regard the former as arising from emotional and motivational ("visceral") factors, whereas the latter are taken to be grounded in cognitive and rational ("cerebral") processes. But just where the will stands in all of this is not clear. Taken as a whole, the modern psychological literature makes virtually no distinction between motivated and willed behavior, except to refer to the latter as little as possible or to treat it as a hoary metaphysical notion bequeathed by the Schoolmen. But we must now begin to wonder whether the ancient practice—still common in psychological and philosophical discourse—of partitioning persons into congeries of "faculties," "motives," "volitions," and "judgments" is the most useful way to comprehend the relationship between agents and their actions. At a common-sense level, persons generally conduct themselves in a manner likely to bring about a certain state of affairs. Some such states answer to the general description "health" or "freedom from suffering"; but there are other states that do not make any apparent contact with the needs of the body as such. Now, to bring about a state of affairs is, minimally, to have some conception of what that state is, and how it differs from the prevailing one. This is all the work of rationality and is inexplicable in motivational or "visceral" terms. The creature that consumes food so that a given state of affairs will be thereby pro-

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duced is an agent; the one that behaves similarly, but with no such pictured or framed state of affairs thus conceived, is not. Surely many animals achieve by instinct what human beings can accomplish only through deliberation. Take the case of someone marooned and having access either to water or to food, but not to both, though having good reason to expect a change in his fortune if he can hold on long enough. Quite apart from the psychobiological question of whether his desire for food is greater or less than his desire for water, the stranded party who knows that he can live longer without food than without water will engage in deliberations unavailable to a mere creature similarly situated. Thus, even if the stranded man unwisely answers to his desire for food, he will do so unwisely. A complete description of his intentions will, therefore, require attributions that would be inapplicable to a similarly behaving brute or person ignorant of the relative costs of unrequited hungers and thirsts. The very expression "weakness of the will" is misleading. In some respects, so is "freedom of the will." Less confusion would surround the entire issue if we agreed to treat persons as "agents" in the sense that on at least some occasions their behavior can be explained only as an expression of a framed actionconsequence sequence where the consequence was intentionally selected by the agent. We will not find ourselves hearing that he "chose to bring it about against (his own) better counsel," though we will often discover that he failed to do what the framed sequence required if the consequence was to have any likelihood of occurring. The person who "acts on impulse" is better regarded as reacting. He has not grounded his conduct in reasonableness and thus his behavior—even if it leads to a desired state of affairs—could not have arisen from the framing of such. Unlike Davidson, I would not be inclined to think of such behavior as intentional, though I would regard as intentional the readiness to abandon reason and to react to the impulses. What is ultimately an incontinent action is one that allows permissive conditions to be causally determinative. The incontinent action thus arises from

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a cause rather than a reason in settings in which the actor, through reason, could have prevented permissive conditions from becoming causally efficacious. The actor has "thrown in the towel"—and has done so intentionally—so that his subsequent behavior can in fact be spared the moral burden carried by genuine actions. The man who is floating in the ocean does not intend to move where the tides take him, but he may be held responsible for placing himself in a situation in which purely natural occurrences would dictate his subsequent behavior. It seem clear, then, that the psychology of motivation has little or nothing to do with VH, since volitions are essentially cognitive affairs. Prevailing motives, as noted in the previous section, provide part of the general context within which action-cons e q u e n c e s e q u e n c e s are framed. They constitute s o m e of the conditions the agent must weigh or oppose or exploit, but they are not determinative of actions since they are not sources or attributes of reasons. Considered as "drives" or as biological conditions of disequilibrium or need, motives represent conditions that wax and wane; conditions that can be satisfied and thus eliminated. Few of the significant human desires are of this sort. The actor-agent who would bring about consequences that are just or fair, or who would seek to honor and preserve friendship, or who would have his conduct relate intelligibly to his desires, is not s o m e o n e who gets enough of all this and then turns to s o m e thing else! Needs and wants can b e sated in a way that the desires of reason cannot. Perhaps what VH should be construed as asserting is not freedom of the "will"—whatever that refers to—but the power to represent freely or depict or frame intelligible connections between actions of a certain kind and states of affairs that preserve this very power. Like any power, and unlike any cause, this one too can be withheld intentionally or abused or neglected. Note, then, that it is entirely unlike hunger, thirst, pain, and t h o s e other "motivating" conditions that impel palliating behaviors or those ordinarily thought of as "drive-reducing." These are part of the person as a dosed system. The freedom customarily ascribed to the

66

DETERMINISM, " H A R D " A N D "SOFT'

will is better construed as a set of initiatives the actor-agent can take to escape from this closed system, if only in his intended (as opposed to realized) objectives. In referring to the desires of reason I may seem to be mixing apples and oranges, but 1 can find no other phrase that better expresses the widespread (universal?) penchant for making our actions intelligible, or for the confusion and consternation resulting from irrational behavior on the part of others. Ascribing desires to rationality is odd only because of the historical habit of compartmentalizing psychological states as if they occupied different locations! Perception, cognition, desire, affect, and rationality are words we use when we wish to highlight one or another of the many concurrent performances or states associated with any significant action. As William lames warned, however, it is only by way of the "psychologist's fallacy" that we come to regard the actor himself as divisible into the sorts of processes and states which our experiments artificially extract from the whole. Lest we commit the same fallacy, we quickly acknowledge that the "desires of reason" are just the desires of a person when that person exercises his rationality for the purpose of choosing a course of action toward a (desired) goal. There is no "reason" external to the person or living as another entity within the person. To select rationality (or "cognitive processes") for study is a worthy undertaking but it is not to be thought of as akin to taking a specimen off a shelf. The latter action removes something from where it once was; selecting this or that "process" does not remove it from the person who possesses it, nor does it impersonalize it. It is still Smith's rationality, even if in the experiment it seems to operate the way everyone else's does. The researcher may understand such processes in a way that Smith doesn't. The experiment may make accessible to study all sorts of operations of which the subject is entirely unaware. But to this very extent the findings are unlikely to provide an explanation of Smith's actions, for to explain these we must include in the account Smith's reasons, intentions, desires—everything of which Smith must be conscious for his behavior to be properly regarded as an action in the first place.

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT

67

Summary Psychological explanations, striving for scientific status, are routinely phrased in causal language although theoretical psychologists remain insufficiently aware of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of causation even (especially) within the developed sciences. With due caution, however, we can regard a causal explanation in science as one that severely limits possible outcomes by asserting a law. Though we remain open on the question of whether causes necessarily yield their effects, we recognize that traditional arguments against necessitation are both unconvincing and at odds with at least the implicit understanding of the developed sciences. In any case, the Humean analysis of causation is seen to be defective and weak, offering finally no justification for attempts by psychologists to equate causal explanation with no more than reliable or even unfailing coincidences. If contemporary understandings of causation are incomplete in Psychology, notions of "determinism" are often incoherent. Regarding the laws of science as descriptions of causal determination, we examine the application of such nomic principles to human actions and discover a variety of often striking incompatibilities. There is at least some human conduct that is explicable only in terms of agency, where an agent is taken as an entity able to frame action-consequence sequences intentionally and to harbor authentic motives, desires, and beliefs. We see that hard psychological determinism D 2 is far less plausible than hard voluntarism V H , although the latter has been too loyal to ambiguous concepts of "free will." We have good reason to be skeptical about the reality of classifications that would sharply divide the human psychological domain into reason, emotion, motivation, belief, volition, etc. Agents (actors) are not "free" in the unqualified sense of suffering no condition of constraint or coercion imposed on their actions. Rather, through rational assessments of a given situation, persons are able to liberate their actions from natural-causal conditions that would otherwise be dispository. Absent rationality, these conditions are in fact causal; with ratio-

68

DETERMINISM, "HARD" AND "SOFT"

nality, they are best regarded as permissive or at least to s o m e degree not binding or determinative. Properly understood, "freed o m " is freedom from causal determination and is secured only by operations that are rational. The "will," therefore, is free only to the extent that volitions are taken to be desires of reason or rational desires rather than (brute) motives, inclinations, urges, and the like. A species of "soft determinism" is thus coherent, or at least not self-contradictory, but only when applied to c a s e s in which the rational capacities of the actor are either suspended or blunted or lacking. Typically, variations in t h e s e capacities are continuous rather than discrete and thus any given sample of significant behavior may well include both causally determined and "free" features. This is especially obvious in instances of "secondnature" actions—habitual forms of behavior that are the consequence of a (perhaps long ago) framed action-consequence sequence. None of the various explanatory s c h e m e s dominant within Psychology directly confronts or coherently includes the features of agency, authenticity, intentionality and related elements of V H . Thus, none of t h e s e s c h e m e s describes, let alone explains, human actions.

CHAPTER THREE

Reductionism: Models, Metaphors and Similes

I

t is often alleged that models of complex processes or phenomena, no matter how lacking these are in face-validity, have heuristic value. By this is meant that the models are tools of discovery permitting conceptual manipulations that would be impossible or impractical at realistic levels of observation and description. Commonly within Psychology the models are of this or that "system"—the nervous system (or parts thereof), motivational systems, memory systems—though the concept of a "system" is not clear at the outset. Indeed, it is not at all clear which criteria are adopted as psychologists set out to construct such models. If they have anything in common it is the property of relative simplicity. The actual processes or phenomena are said to be "reducible" to a simpler model of them or somehow explicable in the simplified (reduced) language permitted by the model. In this chapter we shall inquire into the heuristic contributions made by various reductionistic strategies and the usefulness of explanations arising from them. S o m e classification at the outset will be helpful. What is a model and what distinctions should be made among the different types?

70

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS A N D SIMILES

Analytical and Physical M o d e l s It is not enough to say that, for example, X is a model of Y to the extent that X has properties in common with properties of Y. This is too general and would permit very nearly anything to be a model of very nearly anything else. Rather, we say that X is a model of Y when those properties that permit Y to be assigned to a class or category (of things, processes, performances) are partially or fully preserved by properties of X. Where the preservation is secured through one or another form of description, the model is analytical. Where the preservation is secured through a mimicry of actual processes or performances, the model is physical It is sometimes the case that analytical models are developed where the creation of physical models would be impossible; and it is sometimes the case that high-fidelity simulations (physical models) can be produced where no adequate analytical model is available. Thus, we can make reasonably good speechsynthesizers although we do not have adequate analytical models of the speech-producing mechanisms and processes of human beings. Similarly, we have detailed analytical models of quantumphenomena that we are unable to simulate physically. Understood in a certain light, the laws of science are universalized analytical models—typically, mathematical models— which describe observed causal sequences. The laws are redescriptions of things and events otherwise described in observation-language or, as we say, "empirically." What the mathematical model or "law" achieves is a kind of translation of observation terms into quantitative terms, the latter permitting accuracy and predictability not as readily achieved by the former. As noted in the preceding chapter, Berkeley contended that Newton's celebrated law was merely a description of the observed effects themselves. Berkeley is not alone in wondering whether the laws of science ever rise higher than the level of translation or redescription. Are analytical models and the very laws of science nothing more than curve-fitting operations? If we already have the effects at the level of observation, what is gained (other than a certain economy) by putting them in the form of an

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

71

equation? There is no point in striving for a redescription unless the existing descriptions are inadequate or defective; but if they are then any analytical model of them will (must) include the same inadequacies or defects as well! Such considerations have often encouraged commentators to be skeptical about the value of analytical models.' But the criticism itself is based on an incomplete recognition of both the nature and the purpose of analytical models, not to mention a certain innocence about the nature of observation itself. Illustratively, we might examine the well-known psychophysical law according to which the magnitude of a sensation—say, the sensation of brightness—is a linear function of the intensity of the visual stimulus when this is expressed in logarithmic units. Thus, (1) B = k logio I (Fechner's Law)

Now, to the critic who insists that (1) provides only a summary of what we already know, we are obliged to inquire into just what it was we "knew" prior to articulating this particular law. If what the critic means is that the actual brightness-estimations at various levels of intensity were all a matter of record, this of course is true. But the very act of measuring sensation-magnitudes against systematically altered intensities of stimulation proceeds from a model of the sort given in (1). That is, the model—though in less than complete form—is already in place, as it were, when the experimental program is undertaken. The model that generates the research is of the form, (2) B = / ( l )

and the whole point of the experiment is to establish the precise function of intensity that brightness is. Note that the actual sequence of events is not RESEARCH > (2) > (1), but (2) > RESEARCH > (1). Because of this, it is only partly correct to say (as Berkeley did) that the analytical model simply describes (or redescribes) already possessed knowledge. A scientific law is not simply a redescription of data but a refinement of an earlier (and

72

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

p e r h a p s o n l y i m p l i c i t ) law w h i c h itself w a s n o t a d e s c r i p t i o n b u t a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of n a t u r e . It is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e

analytical

m o d e l s a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s a n d n o t m e r e l y s u m m a r i e s o f fact t h a t they are productive a n d not merely descriptive of nature. This p o i n t is i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e s a m e e x a m p l e . B e g i n i n g with (2), w e p r o c e e d t o c o n d u c t i n q u i r i e s t h a t c u l m i n a t e in (1) w h e r e t h e valu e s of B a r e b a s e d u p o n r e s p o n s e s by t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s u b j e c t . Now knowing t h a t , a t t h e level of " e x p e r i e n c e , " t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n B a n d I is l o g a r i t h m i c , w e c a n a s k w h e r e in t h e s y s t e m as-a-whole this log-transformation takes place.2 Indeed, an entire p r o g r a m of r e s e a r c h is o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d s u c h q u e s t i o n s a s : Is (I) invariant across different values of stimulus duration? How is (1) affected when different wavelengths of stimulation are used? Does (1) depend upon the size of a stimulus or its retinal locus? Is (1) preserved in the behavior of the receptors? Is (1) preserved in the responses of optic nerve fibers? Do gross cortical recordings yield (1)? W e s e e , t h e n , t h a t far f r o m m e r e l y d e s c r i b i n g a given s e t of d a t a points, t h e analytical m o d e l — h e r e , t h e psychophysical law—generates and directs any n u m b e r of e x p e r i m e n t s leading to discove r i e s o t h e r w i s e i g n o r e d by a n y purely d e s c r i p t i v e a c c o u n t . T h e r e a r e d a n g e r s a s well a s p r o f o u n d

implications

c o n t a i n e d in t h e o t h e r w i s e h a r m l e s s e q u a l sign. E x p r e s s i o n s of t h e sort, (3) E = mc2 a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from (1) a n d (2) in t h a t s o m e t h i n g radically diff e r e n t f r o m a f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p is c o n v e y e d . In (3), t h e

=

e x p r e s s e s a n identity r e l a t i o n s u c h t h a t m a t t e r a n d e n e r g y a r e b u t d i f f e r e n t m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of e a c h o t h e r . With (3), w h a t h a s b e e n a c h i e v e d is a g e n u i n e reduction

in t h a t w e a r e n o l o n g e r r e q u i r e d

t o partition nature into entirely distinct o n t o l o g i c a l categories, o n e c o n t a i n i n g o n l y m a t t e r a n d t h e o t h e r c o n t a i n i n g o n l y energy. In b o t h (1) a n d (2), h o w e v e r , t h e r e is n o s u c h o n t o l o g ical r e d u c t i o n , s i n c e in n e i t h e r e q u a t i o n d o e s t h e =

s t a n d for is

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

73

IDENTICAL TO or is T H E S A M E AS. What (1) and (2) provide are t r a n s f e r f u n c t i o n s allowing us to specify the value of B once we have chosen values of 1. What is asserted in (1) or (2) is not that brightness is 1 or logiol, but that it is a f u n c t i o n thereof. Too often analytical models are taken as reductive when they are only functional, and the illusions of reductionism thus become pervasive. Again, the psychophysical law helps to clarify these important considerations. We know, for example, that brightness-estimates are entirely independent of the duration of flashes when durations are very brief. The well-known reciprocity law of Bloch establishes the temporal limit at about 100 milliseconds for small stimuli delivered to the fovea. Thus, with such stimuli, (1) can be modified as follows:

(4) B = felog,0 E (under C,)

where E is the total energy in a flash and where C, refers to those conditions in which flashes are foveally delivered and subtend angles of less than 1° on the retina. Now, if we take (1) as actually asserting, (5) B = felog|0 I x t (where t is duration)

then (4) is a successful reduction of (1) in that, under C,, it permits the elimination of at least one ontological category; viz., time. It is not, however, a reduction B and is thus not even relevant to the issue of reductionistic psychology. Given that expressions such as those of (1), (2), (4), and (5) are unlike (3)—given, that is, that they are not identity-relations but transfer-functions—no operation performed on the physical side of the = can affect the psychological part of the expression in any way whatever. We might alter the physical side in any number of ways, since the total energy in the flash will depend upon the intensity, the area of the radiating source, the wavelength and duration of light, the density of the media through which the light passes, etc. But these considerations have no bearing, finally, on arguments for a reductionistic psychology—or a reductive model of perception—because they in no way affect the boundaries of the ontological domain in which the sensation of brightness is found. Again, a

74

REDUCTIONISM: M O D E L S , M E T A P H O R S AND SIMILES

s u c c e s s f u l a n d b o n a fide reduction is a c h i e v e d only when we succ e e d in showing t h a t what were o n c e t h o u g h t t o b e functional relationships

are,

in fact,

identity-relationships

of t h e kind

ex-

It may b e a r g u e d t h a t I have s o far c o n f i n e d

the

p r e s s e d in (3). m e a n i n g of " r e d u c t i o n " t o t h e n u m b e r of t e r m s in t h e analytical m o d e l a n d have ignored t h e n a t u r e of t h e t e r m s . O n e might say, for e x a m p l e , t h a t if (1) is true a n d if, further, we discover that, (6) B=/(D„), where D„ are discharge-rates of neurons and, finally, t h a t (7) D„ = 61ogi0 I t h e n we have reduced t h e s e n s a t i o n of b r i g h t n e s s t o D„ by e s t a b lishing t h e e q u i v a l e n c e of (1) a n d (7). This, however, is fallacious, for all we have now a c c o m p l i s h e d is t h e discovery t h a t o n e of t h e ways (1) c o m e s a b o u t is by way of (7). W h a t (7) provides is n o t a reduction of (1) but o n e of its explanations.

T h e r e is n o alteration in

our c o n c e p t i o n of " b r i g h t n e s s " ; only in o u r a p p r e c i a t i o n of s o m e of t h e (neural) c o n d i t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with it or even n e c e s s a r y for it. W h e r e physical m o d e l s a r e i n v o l v e d — s i m u l a t i o n s of o n e sort or a n o t h e r — t h e c l a i m s of r e d u c t i o n i s m are even further m i s p l a c e d , t h o u g h for r e a s o n s t h a t are n o t widely noticed. In p o s s e s s i o n of, say, (1), (6) and (7) above, an engineer might s e t a b o u t t o c o n s t r u c t a d e v i c e t h a t r e s p o n d s t o incident radiation in t h e visible region of t h e s p e c t r u m . The r e s p o n s e might even b e vocal, but whatever it is t h e functional r e l a t i o n s h i p given in (1) is c o m pletely preserved. (It is worth noting t h a t B l o c h ' s law is r e a s o n a bly well preserved in t h e b e h a v i o r of p h o t o g r a p h i c e m u l s i o n s exp o s e d t o p u l s e s of light. T h e earliest reciprocity laws were, in fact, b a s e d upon just such chemical p r o c e s s e s in photography.) But what a s i m u l a t i o n of t h i s sort yields is n o t a reduction of (1) t o s o m e thing o n t o l o g i c a l l y simpler; it results i n s t e a d t o t h e replacement

of

(1) by an e x p r e s s i o n with exactly t h e s a m e n u m b e r of o n t o l o g i c a l categories:

REDUCTI0N1SM: M O D E L S , M E T A P H O R S AND SIMILES

75

(8) R = 6log| 0 I (where R is the device's response) T h e R in (8) m a y b e f u r t h e r r e d u c e d t o , for e x a m p l e , a s i m p l e circuit o r t o c o m p l e x c h e m i c a l e q u a t i o n s , b u t t h i s h a s n o b e a r i n g o n B in (1). T h e p h y s i c a l m o d e l g o e s a s far it c a n o n l y w h e n a r e d u c t i o n of R in (8) is s h o w n t o b e i d e n t i c a l t o a s i m i l a r r e d u c t i o n of D„ in (7). T h e f u r t h e r s t e p , involving p r o o f of t h e identity of B in (1) a n d , e.g., D„ in (7), c a n n e v e r b e m a d e s o l e l y o n t h e b a s i s of t h e a d e q u a c y of (8). Put a n o t h e r way, t h e T u r i n g - a r g u m e n t is g r o u n d e d in a m i s t a k e . 3 R e d u c t i o n a n d r e p l a c e m e n t a r e different o p e r a t i o n s a n d e n t a i l d i f f e r e n t a s s u m p t i o n s a n d implic a t i o n s . T h e m o d e r n v a c u u m c l e a n e r is n o t a " r e d u c t i v e m o d e l " of w h a t h o u s e k e e p e r s did in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b u t a rep l a c e m e n t of t h e h o u s e k e e p e r ' s b e h a v i o r by a d e v i c e a r i s i n g from e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s of o p e r a t i o n , t o say t h e l e a s t . A n d t h e h o p e o r t h e s t r a t e g y o n which a r e b a s e d a t t e m p t s a t v e r i t a b l e c l o n e - l i k e p h y s i c a l m o d e l s c a n n o t s u c c e s s f u l l y d e p e n d on r e d u c t i o n i s t s t h e s e s e i t h e r . If t h e a c h i e v e m e n t is t o t a l l y s u c c e s s f u l , w e will h a v e a n e n t i t y o r a d e v i c e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e e n t i t y s u p p l y i n g u s with ( 1 ), a n d t h u s , far from having reduced ( 1 ), we will s i m p l y h a v e r e p e t i t i o n s of it.

Models and the Criterion of Publicity—Wittgenstein's Bequest A p e r s i s t e n t t h e m e in r e d u c t i o n i s t i c p s y c h o l o g y is t h e n e e d or, a s it were, t h e right t o b a s e m o d e l s e n t i r e l y o n t h e m e a s u r a b l e , p u b l i c behavior

of p e r s o n s o r " o r g a n i s m s , " e v e n if t h e b e -

havior itself is t o b e r e g a r d e d a s a sign o r c o r r e l a t e of s o m e int e r n a l s t a t e o r e v e n t . T h e s t r a t e g y c o m e s a b o u t by d e f a u l t in t h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r is s a i d n e v e r t o h a v e d i r e c t a c c e s s t o t h e "priv a t e " s t a t e s , p r o c e s s e s , o r e v e n t s of t h e s u b j e c t ( o b s e r v e r ;

re-

porter; " b e h a v e r " ) . T h e r e a s o n i n g h e r e is s o u n d a s far a s it g o e s , a s l o n g a s t h e implicit i n a d e q u a c i e s a r e n o t o v e r l o o k e d . A p a r a -

76

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

d i g m a t i c c a s e is p r o v i d e d a g a i n by t h e v a r i o u s p s y c h o p h y s i c a l rel a t i o n s h i p s of t h e b r o a d form, R=/(S) w h e r e s o m e c h o s e n r e s p o n s e (R) is e x a m i n e d o v e r a r a n g e of valu e s o f t h e p r e c i s e l y c o n t r o l l e d s t i m u l u s (S). A s C. H. G r a h a m p r o p o s e d y e a r s a g o , 4 t h e b a s i c q u e s t i o n a n i m a t i n g all p s y c h o p h y s i cal research is ultimately a q u e s t i o n a b o u t t h e s t i m u l u s - r a n g e over which r e s p o n s e s a r e invariant. T o ask, t h e n , w h e t h e r S m i t h a n d ) o n e s " s e e t h e same

r e d " is t o a s k o n l y w h e t h e r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e

s t i m u l u s - r e s p o n s e f u n c t i o n s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s a m e o r different. T h e q u e s t i o n , t h e n , w h e n p r o p e r l y c o n c e i v e d is n o t a b o u t

"pri-

v a t e e x p e r i e n c e s " b u t publicly

"red-

v e r i f i a b l e m e a s u r e s of, e.g.,

n e s s . " In brief, t o i n q u i r e i n t o w h a t a n o b s e r v e r p e r c e i v e s is t o e s t a b l i s h t h e d e g r e e of c o v a r i a t i o n e x p r e s s e d by s t i m u l u s - p r o p erties and response-properties. A s n o t e d a b o v e , t h i s is n o t a n a p p r o a c h t h a t y i e l d s a reduction,

but a substitution or replacement. The R = / ( S )

relation-

s h i p r e s t s u p o n t h e (at l e a s t i m p l i c i t ) a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e c h o s e n (R) is itself q u a n t i t a t i v e l y i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e with t h e r e l e v a n t perc e p t i o n a n d its various m a g n i t u d e s or qualities. It only m a k e s s e n s e t o work with R = / ( S ) if t h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s for a s s u m i n g t h a t R = / ( P ) , w h e r e (P) refers t o t h e a c t u a l p e r c e p t u a l e v e n t o r e x p e rience.

For e x a m p l e ,

it is well e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e

perceived

b r i g h t n e s s of a flash is r e g u l a t e d by B l o c h ' s law (vide supra)

but

t h a t r e a c t i o n t i m e is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i n t e n s i t y of a flash i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e f l a s h ' s d u r a t i o n ; i.e., r e a c t i o n t i m e d o e s n o t reflect

the

I x t reciprocity

relations

obtained

when

perceived

b r i g h t n e s s is directly a s s e s s e d . In light o f this, w e r e w e t o c h o o s e reaction t i m e a s t h e " p u b l i c " e v i d e n c e of perceived brightness, t h e i m p l i c i t a s s u m p t i o n — R = / ( P ) — w o u l d b e invalid a t all e x p o s u r e d u r a t i o n s l e s s t h a n a b o u t 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s . Note, therefore, that t h e apparently "objective"

mea-

s u r e s of o v e r t b e h a v i o r a r e t h e m s e l v e s e i t h e r d u b i o u s o r invalid or arise from a r g u m e n t s or o t h e r data t o t h e effect that t h e b e havioral d a t a faithfully r e f l e c t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l o r " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " s t a t e s t h a t a r e t o o " p r i v a t e " for e x p e r i m e n t a l p u r p o s e s ! G r a h a m ' s

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

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formulation of the strategy is a contribution to methodology, not ontology and, as such, his formulation and all like it cannot be taken as supporting reductionistic claims. Nothing is reduced when behavior is chosen over introspection or when a "public" datum is substituted for a "private" experience. A notion that has made much progress in philosophical circles in recent decades is that a successful reduction was achieved by Wittgenstein's searching analysis of so-called "private languages"; an analysis that produced the conclusion that such languages were simply impossible and that so-called private states or sensations were therefore chimerical. Regrettably this analysis is set forth in his Philosophical Investigations5 in so epigrammatic a fashion as to render his arguments elusive. The secondary literature spawned by them is enough to reveal the wide interpretive terrain marked off by these incomplete and somewhat homiletic utterances. 6 Nevertheless, these utterances have been considerable in their influence and constitute a formidable challenge to any explanation in Psychology grounded in assumptions about the "privacy" of experience and the ability of a language to express such experience. We begin to comprehend the nature of this challenge when we ask, with Wittgenstein, "How do words refer to sensations?" (#243). 7 He raises this question after posing a case in which a person, in isolation, writes down or vocalizes something that somehow stands for each feeling or mood or sensation. What this would seem to yield is a "private language" whose terms are correlated with these "private experiences." The individual words of this language are to refer t o what can only b e known t o t h e person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. S o another person cannot understand the language. ( # 2 4 3 ) 8

But if this is granted, we c o m e to face to face with Wittgenstein's famous "beetle in the box" dilemma: S u p p o s e everyone had a box with s o m e t h i n g in it: we call it a " b e e t l e . " No o n e can look into anyone e l s e ' s box, and everyone says he knows what a b e e t l e is only by looking at his b e e t l e . — H e r e it would b e quite p o s s i b l e for everyone t o have s o m e t h i n g differ-

78

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES ent in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty.—No, one can "divide through" by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (#293)9

However, to those who would take this passage as a vindication of radical behaviorism, Wittgenstein also makes clear that his analysis is not ontological but linguistic: Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?"—If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. (#307)10 It is central to Wittgenstein's philosophy that language is an irreducibly social affair. It is governed by rules and, as such, is conventional. But convention entails social standards. It is therefore oxymoronic to speak of a "private language" if, by this expression, one has in mind a language that is in principle knowable only to one person. Thus, when it comes to feelings or pains or sensations of any kind, it is entirely unclear that the terms used can in any way be referential if the conditions or states are in principle and totally "private." If Smith's "beetle" is changing while Jones's isn't and while Brown's box is actually empty, then their respective utterances of "beetle" are nonreferential. Quite apart from the ontological question of whether or not there is anything in any of these purely personal boxes, the utterances are grammatical fictions. The pain-words we come to employ once we have learned the "language game" do not therefore describe a private state but replace older and public expressions such as tears, crying, and grimaces." Where Smith, as a child, once held his swollen cheek and sobbed, he now exclaims, "I have an intense toothache." If there is a grammatical reference in such an expression, it is the early class of public behaviors that have now been replaced by these words. It is because, as other players of the language-game, we know that "You have a toothache" (always in the

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past) referred to cheek-holding and crying-behavior, that we now can assign meaning to Smith's utterance, "I have an intense toothache." If the words were invented by Smith to refer only to his "beetle", no one—not even Smith—could extract a conventional reference from the utterance. To accept this analysis is to adopt at least a methodological behaviorism and to grant to instrospective reports no psychological significance beyond the act of reporting. Graham's position is wed to this. The psychophysical experiment, accordingly, is not an inquiry into (private) sensations or perceptions as such, but a specification of the stimulus-range over which a given response (including a verbal report) remains invariant. As Graham himself was wont to say informally, psychophysical research is the study of, for example, "vision," not "seeing." Wittgenstein was, himself, unable to stretch his analysis to cover the more fundamental ontological question as to the status of sensations. But even his modest objective—that of consigning "private language" to the category of grammatical fictions—was not achieved as fully as many of his disciples insist. It is not at all clear, for example, that anyone can learn the language-game—as it pertains to sensations—in the way that Wittgenstein envisaged. It makes good sense to say that Smith has violated linguistic conventions; that he has made a mistake or committed a "Freudian slip" or is guilty of a Spoonerism. But what sense does it make to say that Smith is similarly mistaken about his pain? I refer here not to the so-called incorrigibility thesis'2 to be discussed later but to the problem of teaching the language-game as Wittgenstein requires. The community of linguists who would shape the young and render them fit for participation can do so only by correcting mistaken uses. Thus, if Tommy says (incorrectly), "This is a knife," we can supply the corrective; "No, that is a spoon." The corrective is possible only if each such noun is ostensively defined. But suppose Tommy comes in clutching his stomach, crying, and declaring, "I have a toothache!" If we reply, "No, it must be a stomach ache because you're holding your stomach," we have not corrected Tommy's ache but his vocabulary or, more technically, his knowledge of human anatomy. Tommy

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has learned nothing new a b o u t his s e n s a t i o n s ; only a b o u t how t o signal t h e m and their location t o others. He is learning how t o answer t h e question, "Where d o e s it hurt?" Wittgenstein was dubious about claims of the sort, "No o n e can have my pains." Which are my pains? . . . In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. And it would also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same—not just the corresponding—place. That might be the case with Siamese twins, for instance. ( # 2 5 3 ) 1 3 But this has no bearing finally on t h e existential fact of this pers o n ' s pain, for every pain is someone's pain. Even granting that Sia m e s e twins could have pains in t h e s a m e place t h e r e would still b e two pains felt and not o n e . From t h e fact or allegation that, "it is a l s o p o s s i b l e for us both t o have t h e s a m e pain," it d o e s not follow that there is only o n e pain, nor d o e s it follow that a person who has t h e s a m e pain a s I do therefore has my pain. It would, after all, not follow from t h e fact that s o m e o n e has t h e s a m e memory of an event that I do that that person has my memory. Wittgenstein wondered a b o u t just what t h e "criterion of identity" ( # 2 5 3 ) is in such i n s t a n c e s and, although this is an interesting question, it may well b e b e s i d e t h e point at issue. A given pain—say, a t o o t h a c h e — h a s minimally t h e attributes of duration, location, and intensity. T h e s e might b e taken a s t h e criteria of sameness in that, if Smith and l o n e s have pains of identical duration and intensity occurring in their respective left-incisors, t h e pains answer to identical descriptions. N o n e t h e l e s s , we still have two pains, no m a t t e r how similar they might b e in their prothetic and topographic properties. Alas, there can b e no "criterion of identity" a c r o s s percipients; only a "criterion of s a m e n e s s . " For there to b e an identity it would b e necessary that t h e pains or pain-descriptions b e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e and indiscernible, a condition that c a n n o t b e satisfied a s long as we have two distinguishable percipients. As noted, Wittgenstein was c o n c e r n e d chiefly with t h e grammatical d i l e m m a s arising out of t h e notion of a "private"

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language developed to describe or refer to forever "private" sensations. He was quite aware of the fact that we inform others and are informed by them about all sorts of sensations, so he was surely not skeptical toward either the existence or the publicity of t h e s e sensations. The pivotal question in his analysis is the question of reference. Sensation-terms are either referential or are meaningless. If they are drawn from an irreducibly private vocabulary, they are removed from all possible language-games and are therefore unintelligible even to the user. But since such terms are intelligible, their referents must be public. Thus, sensation-terms derive their meaning from the e n s e m b l e s of behavior to which they were initially attached and which, in time, they c o m e to replace. So far so good. But from a psychological (in contrast with a lexical or philosophical) perspective, we are still left with the task of determining of what this behavior itself is (was) a function. The psychological analysis cannot stop with the observation that talk of a certain kind has c o m e to replace s o m e other kind of behavior. We must press on to establish the original, R = / ( S ) , if our ultimate psychological explanations of verbal R's are to make any contact with reality. Whatever the final standing may be of Wittgenstein's conceptual analysis, it appears to be defective beyond repair as a psychological account of sensations. There is certainly no empirical evidence to support the supposition that congenital mutism leads to life-long patterns of infantile modes of pain-induced behavior. This may seem to be a trivialization of a profound philosophical conjecture but, as I noted in the first chapter, the philosopher who would instruct psychologists might at least occasionally consult the realms of fact to make sure that his assumptions have not already been overcome by the data. The patient in intractable pain, undergoing a thalamotomy for the relief of this pain, is consulted by the surgeon to signal when the sensation is attenuated. Obviously rule-governed conventions must be observed by patient and doctor if the (public) behavior of the patient is to be regarded as revealing the (private) sensation that the surgery is to eliminate. But to engage in the convention the patient must have something with which to correlate his own be-

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REDUCTION ISM: M O D E L S , M E T A P H O R S AND SIMILES

havior. T h e p a t i e n t m u s t have t h e pain! And in raising his h a n d t o signal s o m e t h i n g like "it's l e s s severe now," t h e p a t i e n t is not replacing but in fact is describing t h e sensation. The affair is not much different from a g a m e in which o n e of t h e players is t o raise his h a n d when h e h a s t h e s o l u t i o n t o a m a t h e m a t i c s p r o b l e m . T h e s o l u t i o n is " h i s " a n d r e m a i n s utterly private until h e v o i c e s it. We don't know w h e t h e r o r n o t h e h a s solved t h e p r o b l e m until h e publicizes what he knows, but he knows whether he tells us or not. S u p p o s e , now, t h a t t h e r e are five such players a n d all of t h e m raise their h a n d s at just t h e s a m e t i m e . Let us s u p p o s e further that all give exactly t h e s a m e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m . Shall we ask with Wittgenstein what is t o b e t h e criterion of identity in such c a s e s ? W h a t difference would it m a k e if t h e root q u e s t i o n h a s t o d o with t h e privacy of m e n t a l e v e n t s or, better, with t h e private ownership of o n e ' s i d e a s ? It is true, b u t only trivially, t h a t psychological research into m e n t a l or s e n s o r y p r o c e s s e s m u s t avail itself of r e s p o n s e indicators of t h e cognitive or perceptual e v e n t s of interest. T h e r e s p o n s e - i n d i c a t o r s provide t h e only b a s i s upon which t h e investigator can know that t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s u b j e c t h a s e x p e r i e n c e d or cognized anything. But t h e s e indicators, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they are valid, are not t o b e regarded a s e l e m e n t s of a reductive a n a l y s i s for, again, n o t h i n g h a s b e e n reduced. Indeed, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e s p o n s e - i n d i c a t o r provides only a partial record of what t h e s u b ject has actually experienced or cognized, t h e reduction is achieved at t h e c o s t of validity. W h a t t h e properly c o n d u c t e d psychophysical or cognitive study strives for is a narrowing of t h e r e s p o n s e d o m a i n such t h a t variation a c r o s s s u b j e c t s will not b e i n c r e a s e d by s o u r c e s of v a r i a n c e intrinsic t o t h e r e s p o n s e - i n d i c a t o r s t h e m selves. (We would not have s u b j e c t s heft a forty-pound weight in a r e a c t i o n - t i m e study, for e x a m p l e , nor in a c o l o r - n a m i n g study d o we usually permit "azure," " b e i g e , " "vermillion," a n d t h e like.) But in reducing t h e r a n g e of p e r m i s s i b l e r e s p o n s e s t h e experim e n t e r a l s o r e d u c e s t h e n u m b e r of s t i m u l u s - v a r i a b l e s governing t h e s e r e s p o n s e s . In t h e end, it is n o t t h e " m e n t a l " that h a s b e e n reduced t o s o m e t h i n g n o n m e n t a l or ( s o m e h o w ) l e s s m e n t a l . It is t h e s a m p l e of m e n t a l e v e n t s t h a t h a s b e e n artificially c o n s t r i c t e d

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

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for purposes of quantitative description. The use of public criteria is demanded by the very nature of research. But the assumption that these criteria are validly and consistently used by the percipient is necessary if the resulting data are to have any relevance at all. In light of the foregoing, we are in a position to assess those models constructed out of a behavioristic perspective or one that treats only output variables in an attempt to simulate or mimic or "explain" psychological processes. The fallacy that is common to all of them is the assumption that systems displaying identical functional relationships—of the form R = /(S)—may be regarded as copies or clones of one another. The fact, of course, is that any given transfer-function can be materially produced in numerous and radically different ways. Consider only the number of different circuits or mechanical contrivances that will impose a logarithmic transformation on an input-signal. But, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, X is a model of Y only when those properties that permit Y to be assigned to a class or category are partially or fully preserved by properties of X. Let us take as an illustration the phenomenon of selective forgetting (Y) that is reliably associated with painful experiences. If the only memory-deficits that count as instances of Y are those empirically tied to painful experiences known to have been endured by the subjects under study, then "painful experiences" become conditional properties by which a given performance is assigned to the category Y. If we now construct a device—some sort of computer—whose memory-locations are cleared whenever an entry is followed by, say, an input-signal in excess of so many volts, we might conceivably produce a record of input-output relations exactly like the record produced by the experimental subjects. Is this a model? Is the "overvolting" of a circuit a "painful experience"? The conditional property required for assignment to category Y is to be found nowhere among the attributes of this device. Accordingly, the device is not a model of selective forgetting, but an overly cumbersome way of copying empirically obtained curves. What has been modeled is not the phenomenon but the experiment. We are not to make too much of the criterion of pub-

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REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

licity. T h e p s y c h o l o g i s t ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d it s h o u l d b e o n e of r e s i g n a t i o n a n d n o t r e v e r e n c e . W e w o u l d all p r e f e r t o g e t i n t o t h e m i n d a n d s e n s o r i u m of t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s u b j e c t , b u t w e m u s t b e c o n t e n t with reaction time, j u d g m e n t s of brightness, X ' s on a page, e v o k e d b r a i n p o t e n t i a l s , a n d t h e like. It h a s b e e n t e m p t i n g a n d all t o o r e a s s u r i n g for d e c a d e s n o w t o regard t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n a n a l y s i s a n d o t h e r s like it a s a w a r r a n t for a b a n d o n i n g t h e m e n tal. B u t a n y a n a l y s i s t h a t p r o v e s t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of private s e n s a t i o n s , t h o u g h t s , a n d f e e l i n g s is itself a c a n d i d a t e for d e m y t h o l ogizing. In r e g a r d i n g t h e c r i t e r i o n of p u b l i c i t y a s s o m e t h i n g of a n e c e s s a r y evil w e will b e m o r e i n c l i n e d t o find a n d u s e r e s p o n s e indicators t h a t t a p t h e m e n t a l realm m o s t directly a n d deeply, a n d less inclined to a d o p t d i m e n s i o n l e s s indicators which are unrealistically " o b j e c t i v e . " T h e s a m e is t r u e of s p e c i o u s " m o d e l s " f o r g e d o u t of u n r e a l i s t i c o r m a r g i n a l l y valid b e h a v i o r a l d a t a . T h e right s o r t of m o d e l is c o n s t r u c t e d after t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s h a v e b e e n e x a m i n e d . It is n o t p r o d u c t i v e t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e e x a m i n a t i o n a n d it is utterly m i s l e a d i n g t o a s s u m e s i m p l i c i t y s i m p l y b e c a u s e o n l y a s i m p l e m o d e l h a s b e e n c o n j u r e d . O n e e x a m p l e of t h e right s o r t of m o d e l is t h a t d e v e l o p e d by t h o s e working in t h e a r e a of s p e e c h s y n t h e s i s a n d s p e e c h - r e c o g n i t i o n . 1 4 M o d e l s in t h i s a r e a a r e b a s e d upon t h e known h a r m o n i c a n a l y s e s performed by structures in t h e i n n e r e a r a n d t h e known p e r f o r m a n c e of l i s t e n e r s r e q u i r e d t o recognize speech conditions.

sounds

Here the

u n d e r a variety of a c o u s t i c a l l y psychophysical

data and the

relevant

biophysical

p r o c e s s e s have b e e n exhaustively e x a m i n e d . Resulting m o d e l s , b o t h a n a l y t i c a l a n d p h y s i c a l , r e p r e s e n t all of t h e m a j o r f u n c t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s p e r f o r m e d by a c t u a l a u d i t o r y s y s t e m s . Accordingly, s u c h m o d e l s c o m e to have explanatory power and c o m e to

provide

c o n v e n i e n t a n d instructive m e a n s by which t o t e s t h y p o t h e s e s a n d construct ever m o r e c o m p l e t e t h e o r i e s of a c o u s t i c

information-

p r o c e s s i n g . T h e s e m o d e l s d o not, of c o u r s e , i n c o r p o r a t e t h e sensation

of h e a r i n g b u t t h o s e p r o c e s s e s o n which s u c h

sensations

u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d . My p o i n t is t h a t w e h a v e m a n y g o o d m o d e l s of w h a t a g o o d m o d e l is. It is o n e t h a t r e s p e c t s t h e c o m p l e x i t y — t h e r e a l i t y — o f t h e p h e n o m e n a t o b e m o d e l e d a n d t h a t draws di-

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

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rection from the already established principles responsible for these phenomena. The goal of the model-builder is not reduction but a kind of portraiture. Accordingly (and unlike Wittgenstein), the modelbuilder searches for criteria of sameness and not criteria of "identity." The model is a portrait, not a photograph. What is left out is not a reality the model-builder refuses to accept but those (ontologically) undoubted elements not essential to the creation of a high-fidelity portrait. Jerry Fodor pointed out some years ago 15 that the socalled Turing-game is generally framed in such a way as to be either uninformative or question-begging—liabilities that are common to behavioristic models. It is not enough to say that a machine has successfully played such a game when its performance leaves judges doubtful as to whether a person or a machine provided answers to questions or solutions to problems. As Fodor insisted, it matters how the machine accomplishes this; it matters too that such a machine is still unable to perform any number of other and even trivially simple tasks well within the capabilities of any person. As Fodor put it, Turing would p r e s u m a b l y have b e e n dissatisfied with a d e v i c e t h a t c o u l d a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s a b o u t how t o boil w a t e r if it routinely put t h e kettle in t h e i c e b o x when t o l d t o brew t e a . (pp.

126-127)16

We are tempted to say of such failures that the device knows some things and not others, and that it need pass only one relevant test to be regarded as "intelligent" or "cognitive" or (more boldly) "conscious." Clinical neurology turns up any number of patients who, though unarguably conscious persons, do the equivalent of putting the kettle in the icebox; apraxics who, for example, can tell us anything we want to know about a jacket but cannot put one on. What counts, then, is not whether a Turing machine can do everything or even most things done by human beings within a given perceptual or cognitive context, but whether it does anything in just the way that human beings do that same thing. What Fodor erected as the relevant criterion was a functional equivalence between the machine-processes and the human cognitive (or perceptual) processes by which the respective outputs are governed.

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REDUCTI0N1SM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

This is a s o u n d strategy but, a s we shall s e e in t h e next two s e c tions, o n e that is not easy t o translate into nonarbitrary and practical programs of research and theory.

Functional Equivalence We may take as the t h e s i s of functional equivalence (F.E.) that X is a model of Y if and only if (a) the outputs of X and Y under relevantly c o m p a r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s are relevantly indisting u i s h a b l e and (b) the p r o c e s s e s or internal o p e r a t i o n s generating t h e s e o u t p u t s are functionally equivalent. However, t h e criterion (b) a s s u m e s that we p o s s e s s a taxonomy of functions and that we know which items within this t a x o n o m y are available t o Y. The brutal fact is that we remain u n a b l e t o test (b) until t h e entire program of cognitive psychology has b e e n brought t o a s u c c e s s ful c o n c l u s i o n ! This, however, is not t h e only problem, for even where we have s o m e evidence t o t h e effect that a given cognitive performance arises from a specific p r o c e s s (e.g., addition) it is not clear just what a device would have to do for it t o b e regarded a s doing the " e q u i v a l e n t " of addition. What is the criterion or standard or t e s t of " e q u i v a l e n c e " ? The device might b e c o n s t r u c t e d in such a way a s t o hold an electrical charge in its capacitors and, on a given signal, to have all t h e capacitors discharge into s o m e other device that gives a readout of total volts. We can say that t h e final readout is t h e sum of all previously stored charges, but it would b e merely metaphorical t o say that t h e device had b e e n engaged in the process of addition or was " d o i n g " addition. It is easier, of course, to establish nonequivalence even when we lack a fixed standard of equivalence. There are the socalled calendar savants who can give t h e day of t h e week on which any d a t e falls—past, present, or future. Such p e r s o n s will need no m o r e time t o s t a t e on which day of t h e week April 7, A.D. 204 fell than on which day August 11, 1996 will fall. From t h e empirical fact that performance here is nearly entirely independent of t h e

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range of d a t e s covered by t h e ability, it follows t h a t t h e perform a n c e is not t h e e q u i v a l e n t of t h u m b i n g through a file or s c a n ning a table. A m o r e c o m m o n e x a m p l e is memorizing t h e multiplication t a b l e s a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o d o i n g multiplication by t h e p r o c e s s of s u c c e s s i v e addition. The p e r s o n engaging in t h e latter p r o c e s s will require m o r e t i m e t o a n s w e r " 7 t i m e s 6 " t h a n t o answer " 4 t i m e s 6." Indeed, a s s u m i n g t h e s a m e t i m e is d e v o t e d t o e a c h s e t of 6 ' s t o b e added, t h e total t i m e n e e d e d t o o b t a i n t h e result will b e a linear function of t h e value of t h e multiplier. Thus, " 1 0 t i m e s 6 " will take twice a s long a s "5 t i m e s 6 . " O n c e we discover, therefore, t h a t t h e t i m e required t o a n s w e r multiplication problems is unaffected by the value of t h e multiplier—within s o m e given range of values of t h e m u l t i p l i e r — w e can b e s u r e t h a t t h e p r o c e s s is n o t o n e of s u c c e s s i v e addition. If we know in such a c a s e t h a t a c o m p u t e r is p r o g r a m m e d t o provide s o l u t i o n s by succ e s s i v e addition we can say t h a t t h e program is n o t a m o d e l of t h e p r o c e s s e m p l o y e d by t h e p e r s o n . Even t h o u g h t h e respective o u t p u t s are relevantly i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , t h e r e is n o t a functional e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n t h e respective internal o p e r a t i o n s g e n e r a t ing t h e s e outputs. To c h o o s e just o n e m o r e example, we note that it t a k e s very little t i m e for an o b s e r v e r t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r a string of letters forms a known word; e.g., prillicarn.

If t h i s j u d g m e n t re-

quired t h e observer t o consult that mental file in which every known word is stored, t h e j u d g m e n t would take an indefinitely long t i m e and would b e a function of t h e size of t h e vocabulary of e a c h of t h e o b s e r v e r s in t h e study. Clearly, t h e facts e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e p r o c e s s involved in classifying strings of letters a s words or n o n words is not iterative. A c o m p u t e r program that produces t h e s a m e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , b u t that d o e s s o by c o m p a r i n g e a c h c a n d i d a t e string of letters with every word s t o r e d in memory, would n o t b e t h e functional e q u i v a l e n t of t h e h u m a n p r o c e s s , whatever t h e latter turns o u t t o be. Still, we d o n o t now have t h e n e c e s s a r y c a t a l o g u e of h u m a n cognitive p r o c e s s e s , nor have we d e v e l o p e d nonarbitrary criteria of e q u i v a l e n c e . P e r h a p s Kohler's principle of

isomorphism

c o m e s a s c l o s e t o a p r e c i s e criterion of e q u i v a l e n c e a s anything p r o p o s e d by p s y c h o l o g i s t s , 1 7 but it is a p p l i c a b l e , if at all, only t o

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a relatively modest range of psychological processes. According to the principle, for every specific percept there is a unique brainprocess that is isomorphic with it. Note that the principle does not require something "circular" in the brain when the percipient sees a circle! The principle is more subtle even if the Gestalt psychologists have not fully developed it. What isomorphism asserts is this: For any phenomenal experience (E), there is a corresponding brain-event (B) such that a unique function (/) renders properties of E equivalent to properties of B. It is not clear, however, that the concept of isomorphism is applicable to nonphenomenal mental events such as those ordinarily regarded as "abstract." What pattern or attributes of B, for example, might be isomorphic with the concept of the square root of minus 1 or "the largest positive integer" or a "transcendental number" or the logical relation of formal necessity? Moreover, a successful table of isomorphic relations, like a successful table of functional equivalents of any sort, would not be reductive in the (ontologically) required sense. The device that matches the person, process for process and output for output, is not a reductive model of the person but a (functional) clone or copy. For each discernible and relevant human cognitive or perceptual process, the designers have installed a process in the device. There is no sense in which the achievement of this one-to-one correspondence can count as a reduction. But, "Ah!", some will say, "there is a reduction, for when it comes to the device we need not refer to anything psychological' or 'mental' or 'private' in accounting for its operations and its performance." Not at all! The lexical economies are utterly illusory. Reference to or the creation of each of the device's processes implicitly revives the "psychological," for this is just what the process has been modeled after. One who is trained in Morse Code might just as well proclaim, "Ah! 1 no longer have to burden myself with the uselessly ornamented words of English, for now I can say everything using no more than dots and dashes." The plain fact is that Morse Code either allows every possible sentence in the coded language to be expressed—in which case there is no reduction of the language—or it eliminates sentences, in which case

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89

it is a defective code. To say that t h e works of S h a k e s p e a r e can b e " r e d u c e d " t o a twenty-six-letter a l p h a b e t is false unless t h e proviso is that t h e letters can b e c o m b i n e d in any p o s s i b l e s e q u e n c e and set off from e a c h other by marks of punctuation. But given this proviso, t h e r e has not b e e n a " r e d u c t i o n " of t h e works of Shakespeare. Rather, the qualified statement establishes the set of all possible literary works'. This set is larger than " t h e works of S h a k e s p e a r e , " not smaller.

Reductive Materialism If t h e r e is t o b e a plausible and successful reductive model it is o n e likely t o c o m e from t h e neural or b r a i n - s c i e n c e s rather than from t h e various s c h o o l s of behaviorism. No behavioristic t h e s i s h a s successfully reduced t h e ontological domain of Psychology, or even m a d e a good c a s e for t h e equivalence of mental and behavioral variables. W h e t h e r or not Psychology can "get along just a s well" without reference t o inner life, c o n s c i o u s ness, private mental states, etc. is a question of strategy, not ontology, and t h e force of t h e claim has little behind it except for t h e criterion of publicity c o n s i d e r e d in c h a p t e r 2. Various forms of reductive materialism, however, are not just pragmatic or strategic programs, but genuinely o n t o l o g ical proposals. There is, for example, eliminative materialism, w h o s e defenders insist that mental terms will b e successively removed from t h e vocabulary a s scientific findings c o m e t o show that, for each such term, there is a unique neural or physical event that exhaustively d e s c r i b e s it. 1 8 Then, too, there is t h e kindred Identity Thesis'9 according t o which every mental s t a t e or event is in fact a s t a t e or an event in t h e brain such that, t o refer t o t h e mental is invariably t o refer only t o such a neural event or state. Finally, there are garden-variety forms of epiphenomenalism which, though not reductive in t h e ontological s e n s e , do c h a l l e n g e any theory that would confer special or private or t r a n s c e n d e n t status on mental life. In arguing that e a c h identifiable mental event is uniquely de-

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termined (caused) by an antecedent brain-process, the epiphenomenalist has not reduced the ontological realm of Psychology but has reduced the size of the explanatory vocabulary needed to account for psychological events.20 What is common to all three theses is the insistence that the brain (or, more generally, the material organization of the body) is not merely a necessary condition for (allegedly) mental life, but is causally sufficient. (Having a tooth is a necessary condition for having tooth-decay but is not causally sufficient for tooth-decay.) There are many different ways of expressing these several theses, but perhaps the most dramatic is in the form of hypothesized brain-transplants. To wit: If Smith's living brain were placed in the suddenly brain-dead but living body of lones, all true and relevant psychological attributes of Smith would thereupon be ascribable to lones. Indeed, one philosopher endorsing this view has gone so far as to say that, although this psychological transplantation may not be logically required, any alternative formulation would be "scientific nonsense."21 In a word, the psychological self goes where the brain goes. There is, then, not really a "mind/body" problem but—if there is any problem at all—a "mind/brain" problem; for it is the brain itself, and not any other organ or system of the body, that constitutes the materially causally sufficient condition for mental (or allegedly mental) events (effects). That the psychological self goes where the brain goes has the ring of the obvious about it, but the proposition is not without serious scientific liabilities. There is, as it happens, a body functionally integrated with Smith's brain and not merely an appendage to it. Assuming that Smith has lived some years—long enough at least for there to be a psychological "self"—his body will have been modified by experiences, habits, diseases, and related influences. His peripheral nervous system will have taken on certain properties uniquely tied to these influences. His autonomic nervous system, to be sure, will have had its own conditioning-history and will lend color and intensity and individuality to the emotional events with which it comes to be associated. It must be understood, therefore, that the brain that is moved to

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a different body will, as a result, receive inputs from the periphery with characteristics determined by the nuances of these peripheral processes. Without yet addressing the question of just what the psychological " s e l f " is or how the concept of " s e l f " is properly understood, we can still say that it is scarcely nonsense to have scientific reservations about the thesis under consideration. Smith's brain, just after the successful transplant, will be overcome by peripheral information of the strangest sort; odd odors, unfamiliar tactile sensations, peculiar visceral responses to various persons and places. Smith's brain will also initiate motor signals that will arrive at muscular and glandular destinations somewhat different in nature from those occupying Smith's original body. The resulting vocalizations will have a different sound; the digital precision once involved in piano playing may now be clumsy and tentative; a once learned second language may now be expressed in an utterly unintelligible way. To the extent that Smith's " s e l f " had ever been just this collection of habits, abilities, feelings, sensations, and performances, there is no scientific reason to believe that this "self" would survive the transplantation intact. And, for the very s a m e reasons, we should not expect that Jones will have Smith's "self" or (ones's. By the time the relocated brain and its new quarters become accustomed to one another, some new "self" will have arisen and neither Smith's nor lones's will be anywhere to be found. I do not want to press this analysis too hard, but it is of sufficient merit to claim at least parity with the more common and now not at all obvious alternative. If my own expectations were confirmed scientifically, therefore, we would not be on firm ground in claiming that every or any psychological state or event can be no more than a process in the brain. We might be inclined to believe that at least Smith's memories will be relocated in the new body, but even this relatively modest proposal faces hardships. Smith and Jones may, of course, have the same memories quite apart from swapping brains. The central question is whether Smith's memories—as Smith's—are now (somehow) "in" Jones's body. For this to be the case, there would have to be the continuing existence of that "self" who was Smith (when in Smith's body)

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b u t it is j u s t t h i s c o n t i n u i t y t h a t t h e t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n d i s r u p t s . T h e alternative I have b e e n defending would result in alarming d o u b t s a s t o w h o s e m e m o r i e s a r e n o w r e c a l l e d with t h i s brain in a different body. T h e Identity T h e s i s , w h i c h 1 h a v e d i s c u s s e d in o t h e r p l a c e s , 2 2 r u n s i n t o s i m i l a r t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s in a d d i t i o n t o very s e r i o u s c o n c e p t u a l o n e s . T o c l a i m , a s J. J. C. S m a r t h a s c l a i m e d , t h a t " S e n s a t i o n s a r e b r a i n p r o c e s s e s " 2 3 is t o trivialize b o t h s e n s a t i o n s and brain p r o c e s s e s . S e n s a t i o n s are t h e c o m p l e x c o n s e q u e n c e of e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p i n g e m e n t s o n s e n s o r y o r g a n s a n d t h e p r o c e s s i n g of n e u r a l s i g n a l s a r i s i n g f r o m t h e s e o r g a n s . T h e b r a i n , receiving t h e s e s i g n a l s , is a l s o r e c e i v i n g s i g n a l s f r o m t h e b a l a n c e of t h e body, a n d s e n d i n g s i g n a l s t o t h e b o d y — i n c l u d i n g t h e s e n sory m e c h a n i s m s a s w e l l — i n virtually c o n t i n u o u s a n d c l o s e d - l o o p f a s h i o n . T h e t e r m " b r a i n p r o c e s s " is a c t u a l l y m o r e akin t o " d i g e s t i o n " o r " m e t a b o l i s m " t h a n t o a n y unitary o c c u r r e n c e with d e f i n a b l e l o c a t i o n a n d b o u n d e d o n s e t a n d o f f s e t t i m e s . W h a t is e v e n t like in t h e b r a i n is s o by virtue of o u r m e t h o d s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n , which t e n d t o t a k e still p h o t o g r a p h s a n d n o t m o t i o n p i c t u r e s . T h e r e are, of c o u r s e , o c c u r r e n c e s in t h e brain t h a t a r e p h a s e - l o c k e d t o s t i m u l i o r with w h i c h c e r t a i n r u d i m e n t a r y m o t o r e v e n t s are p h a s e - l o c k e d . But even in t h e s e i n s t a n c e s , b o t h t h e brain a n d t h e p e r i p h e r a l e v e n t a r e g o v e r n e d in t h e i r activity by t h e e n t i r e h i s t o r y of t h e o r g a n i s m ; by p a s t s e n s a t i o n s , a c t i o n s , a g i n g s and p e r f o r m a n c e s . Accordingly, s e n s a t i o n s are not merely brain p r o c e s s e s e v e n in t h e s c i e n t i f i c s e n s e , a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t

be

m e r e l y b r a i n p r o c e s s e s in a n y s e n s e . D e f e n d e r s of t h e Identity T h e s i s m i g h t e n l a r g e t h e i r h y p o t h e s i s t o i n c l u d e w h a t w e a l r e a d y know a b o u t t h e p h y s i o l o g y of s e n s a t i o n . T h e y m i g h t s a y t h a t , " S e n s a t i o n s a r e p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s , " a n d a v o i d t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n p r o b l e m of r e f e r e n c e by d e c l a r i n g t h a t , if " s e n s a t i o n s " refers t o a n y t h i n g , it refers t o p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s in t h e b o d y of t h e p e r c i p i e n t . S t a t e d t h i s way, t h e t h e s i s c l a i m s t h a t s e n s a t i o n s (or, by e x t e n s i o n , all m e n tal e v e n t s ) a r e n o t c a u s e d by p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s b u t j u s t are t h e s e p r o c e s s e s ; i.e., p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s a n d m e n t a l are

identical.

events

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93

How this proposed identity is to be taken is not entirely clear, however. It surely is not a formal identity, for if it were then necessarily every mental event would be a brain process. This cannot be so, for if it were then any denial of the proposition would involve a logical contradiction. Nor can the identity come about by way of a veiled tautology such that all mental events are physiological processes in just the way that all unmarried men are bachelors. Surely "mental events" doesn't mean physiological processes, and we can say many true things about mental events that cannot be said about physiological processes; e.g., I experience my mental events directly, whereas 1 know about my physiological processes only by description. Might the relationship be, as Smart has wondered, of the Morning Star-Evening Star variety, the so-called PhosphorusHesperus problem? Is it the case that what is said of Phosphorus can be said of Hesperus, salva veritate, because, "Phosphorus is Hesperus" is tautologously true? This matter enjoys a veritable tradition in Philosophy and, as of now, our answers to such questions have to be of the "that depends" variety. The tradition, which has Medieval roots, surfaces in modern times in the form of this pair of observations: 1. T h e M o r n i n g S t a r is t h e E v e n i n g S t a r b u t , 2. T h e c l a i m in (1) is i n f o r m a t i v e in a way t h a t n e i t h e r " T h e M o r n ing S t a r is t h e M o r n i n g S t a r " n o r " T h e E v e n i n g S t a r is t h e E v e ning S t a r " is.

Thus, if (1) is non-trivially true—in that it expresses a discovered fact of nature—then it is not a tautology. Yet, "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" refer to the same entity. Imagine a tribe in which two distinct forms of defective color vision were present; a form of dichromatism whose sufferers were insensitive to red and another form whose sufferers were insensitive to green. A stranger comes to the village. He has red hair and green eyes. Half the tribe comes to know him as "Red" but can recognize him only in the light of day. The other half comes to know him as "Green" but, because of an additional visual defect, can only recognize him after the sun goes down. Later, through

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improved diet a n d corrective l e n s e s , every m e m b e r of t h e tribe gains normal vision a n d discovers t h a t " R e d " is " G r e e n . "

The

stranger's n a m e is actually S m i t h . 1. S m i t h is Smith (Law of Identities) 2. Everything t r u e of S m i t h is t r u e of Smith. (Law of Identities) 3. "Red" and "Green" are conventional n a m e s given t o Smith, (fact) 4. Everything physically true of Smith is true of "Red" and "Green." (Law of Identities) 5. There is s o m e o n e w h o d o e s not know ( l ) - ( 4 ) u n d e r c o n d i t i o n C.

W h a t s h o u l d b e c l e a r from t h i s is t h a t n o t h i n g a b o u t Smith is affected by (5), a n d t h a t c o n d i t i o n C is a d e s c r i p t i o n n o t of S m i t h b u t of an o b s e r v a t i o n . From t h e logical rule a c c o r d i n g t o which everything is identical t o itself, it d o e s n o t follow that every observation of a thing is identical t o every other observation of it. Thus, H e s p e r u s is P h o s p h o r o u s analytically, t h o u g h n o given o b s e r v a tion of H e s p e r u s is n e c e s s a r i l y an o b s e r v a t i o n of P h o s p h o r u s for n o two o b s e r v a t i o n s are ever necessarily

identical. 1 leave t h i s un-

a v o i d a b l e digression by e m p h a s i z i n g that, whatever t h e identity of mental events a n d physiological

processes,

it is n o t of t h e P h o s p h o -

r u s - H e s p e r u s variety, for it is not analytic. " H e s p e r u s is H e s p e rus" is n o t an o b s e r v a t i o n . W e are left, therefore, only with t h e possibility that mental

events

are contingently

identical

with

physiological

pro-

c e s s e s , t h e possibility r e c o m m e n d e d by S m a r t himself. 2 4 T h e cele b r a t e d e x a m p l e of c o n t i n g e n t identity h a s a p e r s o n using t h e t e l e p h o n e . W e shall call him S m i t h , (ones, who knows Smith, says t o Brown, " S m i t h is on t h e t e l e p h o n e . " White, who d o e s not know S m i t h , says t o Black, " S o m e o n e is o n t h e t e l e p h o n e . " As it happens, " S o m e o n e " a n d " S m i t h " refer t o t h e s a m e p e r s o n a n d thus, " S o m e o n e " a n d " S m i t h " are said t o b e contingent identities. But t h i s will not work. It is t h e c a s e , of c o u r s e , t h a t of all t h e p e r s o n s who might have b e e n using t h e t e l e p h o n e S m i t h (contingently) is t h e o n e who is actually using it. But it would b e bizarre t o a s s e r t that, of all t h e p e r s o n s S m i t h might be, h e is (contingently) t h e o n e h e is! The S m i t h - S o m e o n e pairing is a formal identity whereas "being

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on the telephone" is an activity. No activity is logically necessary. Smith just happens to be on the phone, but he does not just happen to be himself. Not only is there something peculiar about the notion of Smith being "contingently" identical to s o m e o n e but, as Saul Kripke 25 and others have argued, the very concept of a contingent identity is oxymoronic or at least ambiguous. As 1 have noted elsewhere 2 6 the identity thesis has the additional burden of being inconsequential in that, were it true, nothing would change! That is, on the assumption that every mental event is unfailingly a brainevent or process, the recorded, current, and future mental events of the human race remain utterly unaffected by the fact. Hopes, fears, desires, motives, memories, concepts, plans, curiosities, creations, and dilemmas are exactly what they are—even as many persons proceed in their "mental" lives without having a hint that all of t h e s e events just are processes occurring in their craniums. We don't even have the promise of scientific confirmation, for as Smart himself observed there is no possible experiment that would permit us to c h o o s e between this thesis and such alternatives as psychophysical parallelism and epiphenomenalism. 2 7 In light of this, the thesis itself is not to be regarded as a scientific thesis since the latter species is reserved for propositions that are at least in principle decided by empirical findings. Actually, the c a s e against neurophysiological theories of mental life is somewhat stronger than might appear at first blush, even in this era of technical and scientific progress in the neural sciences. There are, of course, the well-known correlations between neuropathology and psychological deficits, not to mention the veritable handbook of scientific studies linking psychological states to events occurring or induced in brain tissue. But a neurophysiological theory of mental life must go beyond such observed correlations and attempt to provide the explanation for them. Theories, as I have noted, are not descriptive or predictive alone, but explanatory. The most plausible theory in the present context is one that would assign causal properties to the brain and would therefore be a version of epiphenomenalism. This s e e m s to be the most plausible for, unlike the identity thesis or elimi-

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native materialism, epiphenomenalism at least grants the mind and mental life existential status, even if a depreciated and utterly dependent one. But if versions of epiphenomenalism are plausible in their ontologies, they are less so as causal explanations. Once mental events are granted, we still must c h o o s e a set of attributes by which any candidate-event may be assigned to the category of "mental," and o n e of t h e s e attributes must be nonphysical. Somewhere along the line the epiphenomenalist must be willing to have a "ghost in the machine" (pace Ryle) that is distinguishable from any of the machine's moving (massive) parts; and if not a ghost, at least ghost-like phenomena so-called b e c a u s e they cannot b e completely or even partly described in the language of Physics. Somewhere along the line, for example, the epiphenomenalist must be willing to posit a self in which various sensations and feelings inhere; a se// that has the necessary possessory rights with respect to ideas, plans, intentions, etc. (since every idea is someone's). We could of course attempt to avoid all possible contamination by spiritism and say only that every idea (or pain or feeling) is s o m e brain's idea (or pain or feeling) but success at this sort of ploy must be illusory. We do not produce a causal theory of a physicalistic sort by assigning to the brain all of the mental states and attributes customarily assigned to persons. This is an illicit step, not a reductive one. If the task is to provide a causal theory of the experience of pain or of the having of an idea, nothing is gained by giving the experience or the possession to the brain, for now we have to explain how a brain experiences pain or has an idea. Note, then, that the dilemma remains as long as we retain nonphysical events or attributes and is not in any way resolved by moving t h e s e events or attributes from o n e place to another. There is no epoch so brief as to record a permanent state within any cell of the body, including the brain. Cellular life is continuous and dynamic. Nonetheless, there are psychological states or mental properties that may remain stable for fractions of a lifetime. The very continuity of one's self is illustrative of per-

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manence in the face of biological change. Thus, a neurophysiological causal theory of mental life suffers the problem of phase in that the relevant time-constants in the two domains are often and totally incompatible. Nor is this problem defeated by appeals to the notion of recurring states that are the "same," for the attribute of sameness can only be assigned from a position external to the system. From whose (what) perspective is neural state-A the same as neural state-B? Then, too, there is the problem of localization. Every process in the brain can be located within a threedimensional coordinate system, though it would b e droll to say the s a m e of a desire or a judgment or a promise. The point here is not that we cannot say with s o m e propriety that Smith makes promises only when Smith's brain is in state-X, but that statements of this type cannot be shown to be part of some larger causal script. Smith also makes promises (a) only when prepared to do so; (b) only when called upon to do so; (c) only when awake; (d) only to m e m b e r s of his own family; (e) only during the course of his life; (f) only in writing. The greatest problem by far, however, is the striking and qualitative mismatch between anything physical and anything mental. When Berkeley argued that an idea can be like nothing but another idea he was defending an immaterialism that need not be invoked here, but he was also noting the sui generis status of mental constructs. An idea is just not like an object or any part thereof. We can conceive of events in the brain causally determining other physical events, including all the movements by the body, the secretions of the glands, and so forth. But from the ionic movements that constitute the neural impulse we cannot construct a promise or a pain. How, then, can we construct a promise or a pain from ionic movements in two such neurons, or twenty-two or twenty-two million? I do not here fall back on those ancient and medieval notions according to which X cannot be the cause of Y unless X and Y have something in common, though t h e s e are notions not to be dismissed lightly. After all, neural and mental events are cotemporaneous, so they do have at least something in common. Rather, I am noting a distinction that is entirely obvious to the Plain Man and that will not be removed

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REDUCTIONISM: M O D E L S , M E T A P H O R S A N D SIMILES

by a wave of the hand. It is t h e distinction between any introspectively a u t h e n t i c a t e d event and any ostensively definable entity, including a brain-process. The usual c o u n t e r t o this argument from i n c o m m e n surability is o n e or a n o t h e r form of emergentism, but this turns out t o b e a begging and not an answering of t h e q u e s t i o n . It is simply contingently true that no observable property of a network of neural units is different in kind from properties observed in single units. Depending on t h e level of analysis, t h e s e properties are exhausted by t h e p r o c e s s e s of excitation, inhibition, fatigue, and structural change. The typical e m e r g e n t i s t e x e m p l u m — t h a t H 2 0 has properties not found either in H 2 or 0 2 — i s b e s i d e t h e point in at least two ways. First of all, all of t h e properties of H 2 0 chemically discernible are physical properties and therefore t h e exa m p l e is not an e x a m p l e of t h e e m e r g e n c e of a new c l a s s of properties. It is true that H 2 0 has certain phenomenal properties (such as wetness) not shared by the molecules of the constituent gasses, but it is just t h e s e p h e n o m e n a l properties we're trying t o explain. Nothing a b o u t t h e chemistry of oxygen or hydrogen or water explains any e x p e r i e n c e we have when we are in c o n t a c t with 0 2 , H 2 or H 2 0 . Secondly, it is not clear that s o m e t h i n g has " e m e r g e d " out of t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e g a s s e s . Surely any exhaustive and exclusively physical description of 0 2 will include the fact that, when united in t h e proper c o m b i n a t i o n with H 2 , it will (for exa m p l e ) dissolve salts and retain heat. Nor is there any physical mystery a b o u t how H 2 0 c o m e s t o b e a solvent in a way that neither H 2 nor 0 2 is. But a s t a t e m e n t of t h e sort, "Given e n o u g h H 2 a n d 0 2 , properly c o m b i n e d , a n d x g r a m s of NaCI will b e d i s s o l v e d "

is radically different from a s t a t e m e n t of t h e sort, " G i v e n e n o u g h H 2 a n d 0 2 , properly c o m b i n e d , a n d t h e c o m m i t m e n t t o c h a n g e b e n e f i c i a r i e s in t h e will shall b e c a u s a l l y b r o u g h t about."

The radical difference is not t h e result of H 2 0 having no central function in neural t r a n s m i s s i o n or synaptic physiology, but in

99

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES c h e m i c a l s per se h a v i n g n o psychological

a t t r i b u t e s . T h e d i f f e r e n c e is

o n l y a p p a r e n t l y b l u r r e d w h e n t h e e x a m p l e is, " G i v e n e n o u g h a c e t y l c h o l i n e s t e r a s e a n d S m i t h will n o t b e a b l e t o write a n e w will."

It is t r u e t h a t

if his n e u r o m u s c u l a r t r a n s m i t t e r s a r e

inhibited

S m i t h ' s m o v e m e n t s will b e ( c a u s a l l y ) i n h i b i t e d . B u t t h i s h a s n o more bearing on Smith's testamentary intentions than would a pair of h a n d c u f f s . A n d t o s a y t h a t , j u s t a s a c e t y l c h o l i n e is req u i r e d for S m i t h (physically) t o write a n e w will, s o t o o is n e u r o c h e m i c a l X r e q u i r e d for h i m t o i n t e n d t o , is t o m a k e i n t e n t i o n s a s p e c i e s of m o v e m e n t . This, a l a s , is t o b e g t h e q u e s t i o n which h a s to

d o with w h e t h e r

or n o t

psychological

states

are

physical.

M o r e o v e r , it is t o waffle o n t h e q u e s t i o n of c a u s a l i t y , s i n c e t h e e x p r e s s i o n " r e q u i r e d for" is n e u t r a l a s r e g a r d s t h e i s s u e of c a u sality. W e n e e d h e a r t s t o h a v e h e a r t d i s e a s e , b u t w e d o n o t t h i n k of h e a r t s p e r s e a s t h e c a u s e of h e a r t d i s e a s e . M o r e generally, " X is a r e q u i r e m e n t for Y " is n o t s y n o n y m o u s with " X is t h e c a u s e of Y." Still a n o t h e r a p p r o a c h t o t h e p r o b l e m of i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y is t o s h o w t h a t a t l e a s t s o m e m e n t a l a t t r i b u t e s

are

c o e x t e n s i v e with p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s a n d t h a t , a c c o r d i n g l y , it is e n t i r e l y p o s s i b l e (with f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h , e t c . ) t h a t w e will d i s c o v e r all of t h e m are. T h i s is t h e a p p r o a c h Karl P o p p e r h a s referred t o a s " p r o m i s s o r y m a t e r i a l i s m " 2 8 a n d s e e m s t o b e a t t h e r o o t of t h e Whole Person Materialism

e s p o u s e d by Irving Thalberg. 2 9 To avoid t h e

t h o r n y p r o b l e m of c o n n e c t i n g a given m e n t a l e v e n t with a s p e cific neural e v e n t , T h a l b e r g p r o p o s e s a m o n i s t i c m o d e l by w h i c h w e p r o f i t a b l y c o n f i n e o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s t o s o m e t h i n g like t h i s : T h e b o u n d a r y m a r k i n g o u t t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e p e r s o n is a t o n c e t h e b o u n d a r y m a r k i n g o u t t h e l o c a t i o n of t h a t p e r s o n ' s p a i n s . Apart f r o m t h e fact, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h i s d o e s n o t s e e m t o d o m u c h e i t h e r way t o clarify t h e i s s u e , it h a s t h e a d d i t i o n a l b u r d e n o f b e i n g e m pirically disconfirmed. T h e patient with " P h a n t o m l i m b " h a s a pain w h o s e l o c a t i o n is n o t filled by any p a r t of h i s a n a t o m y . T h e r e is a l s o t h e r e v e a l i n g a n d , it w o u l d s e e m , i n e r a d i c a b l e d i f f e r e n c e in t h e e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s u p o n which w e d e f e n d t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e

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person and his pains fall within a c o m m o n boundary. We can establish the boundary of the person without his help—even if he is dead—but we cannot locate his pains this way. The criterion of publicity referred to earlier is scientifically vital, but we must b e cautious in the implications we draw having imposed it. Smith s e e s White in a crowd and announces, "There's White." lones, looking from a different angle, replies, "Yes, it's White." We can say they both s e e the s a m e person, but not that they both have the s a m e perception. Smith sits before a split screen, o n e half of which contains a colored light which he must match in the other half by adjusting dials controlling the amount of red, blue, and green (plus intensity) appearing in the test-field. Smith manipulates the dials and announces, "The two fields are perfectly matched." Jones performs the task, but Jones suffers from a form of dichromatism and is utterly insensitive to red. Thus, in achieving a match, he takes no account of the red in the standard field. After adjusting the dials he announces, "The two fields are perfectly matched." We now inspect the two s e t s of dial settings and discover that Smith added x units of red but Jones added none. What shall we say? Did they have different experiences? Yes and no. Both of them (truthfully) reported that the two fields were perfectly matched, so both of them had the experience of a perfect match, so both of them had the s a m e experience. But o n e of them can't s e e red and the other can, so they obviously did not s e e the s a m e stimulus properties. But there is no way to tell what it means to "experience" red except by consulting our own experiences (our own " b e e t l e s " ) or, in a scientific context, by measuring either the range of wavelengths over which cooperative observers continue to apply the name "red" or the amount of "red"correlated wavelengths observers add in achieving a color match. If we say to Jones, "You didn't use any red in your match," it is not clear what he can make of the statement, since we're referring to a " b e e t l e " he has never seen. Actually, the light Smith saw was not "red"; it was a light whose maximum transmission was in the range of 7 2 0 - 7 4 0 nanometers. But Smith does not see wavelengths, he sees colors. Thus, it would be uninforming to say that Jones did not see 740 nanometers, for no one sees such items. What

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Smith and Jones saw, in a manner of speaking, was what was there for e a c h of t h e m . But t h e only b a s i s upon which we can finally regard their e x p e r i e n c e s a s different is self-referential. We know what red looks like and we know that t h e two fields will not b e m a t c h e d unless red is added t o o n e of them. Jones's vision is defective, then, only on t h e a s s u m p t i o n that his reports are t o b e trusted and then c o m p a r e d with our own. It is only by accepting his claim that t h e match is perfect that we have any justification for a s s u m i n g that he lacks red-sensitivity. Here, then, we have t h e now c e l e b r a t e d incorrigibility attribute that a t t a c h e s t o all cooperative reports of experience. 3 0 What Smith or J o n e s or a n y o n e e l s e says a b o u t an e x p e r i e n c e — a pain, a color, a s e n t i m e n t — c a n n o t b e corrected from the outside. Such reports are incorrigible in that only t h e percipient has the last word on what that percipient is experiencing, if Smith says, "I s e e it a s red," we can say the e x p e r i e n c e is illusory or odd or not grounded in fact or t h e result of pathology, but we c a n n o t say, " N o you d o n ' t " and make it stick. Again, t h e so-called private language problem is a philosophical digression. What is private a b o u t S m i t h ' s e x p e r i e n c e is t h e e p i s t e m i c proprietorship he has over it, not t h e language he uses t o describe it. But neither he nor anyone else enjoys the s a m e privileged position regarding any s t a t e m e n t m a d e a b o u t any brain process, including the reporter's own. O n e may always b e provably wrong in identifying or describing a physiological event; o n e is never provably wrong in identifying or describing a (private) s e n s a t i o n . It is this incorrigibility that arises from and at the s a m e t i m e d o e s much t o e s t a b l i s h the incommensurability obtaining between physical and mental p h e n o m e n a . An idea is like only ano t h e r idea, a pain like only a n o t h e r pain. But we go beyond Berkeley here in recognizing that t h e likeness is not merely p h e n o m e nal but e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l . There is no theoretical limit to t h e level of detail that might b e a t t a i n e d in our knowledge and description of neural p r o c e s s e s until we reach t h e s u b a t o m i c level. The problem of "reduction," therefore, is not technical a s such but c o n ceptual. To what might the reporter's incorrigibility claims b e red u c e d ? The very q u e s t i o n underscores t h e incommensurability of

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REDUCTIONISM: M O D E L S , METAPHORS A N D SIMILES

physical and mental events. The so-called "central state materialist" 3 ' who would "reduce" the experience of pain to s o m e (in principle) d e s c r i b a b l e s t a t e of t h e nervous system is no b e t t e r off in dealing with incorrigibility. What " s t a t e " of t h e nervous system confers on t h e percipient's reports of pain t h e incorrigibility they enjoy, but withholds it from t h e percipient's report that it is raining? When Smith says it is raining he is making a factual claim regarding t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o t h e r s would have were they looking at what Smith is looking at. What is different a b o u t S m i t h ' s statement that he is in pain is not that it is any less factual but that only fie can, as it were, look at "it." This is true of no "central state," for any such s t a t e can in principle b e looked at by anyone c o m petent to investigate t h e central nervous system. There is, alas, m o r e than o n e respect in which the various " s o l u t i o n s " t o the Mind/Body p r o b l e m fail a s reductive accounts. With both e p i p h e n o m e n a l i s m and the Identity thesis, t h e psychological side of t h e e q u a t i o n remains a s p o p u l o u s as it is in t h e h a n d s of the mentalist, s o t h e r e is no reduction at all. With Eliminative or Central S t a t e materialism there is, finally, no causal explanation forthcoming, for neither can o v e r c o m e t h e problem of incommensurability. And where there is no causal explanation t h e r e is no reduction, for all causal explanations of a scientific nature are reductive. Mimimally, a causal explanation is o n e that identifies t h e (minimum) c o n d i t i o n s unfailingly sufficient to bring a b o u t an e v e n t — t h e conditio sine qua non. But this is achieved scientifically only through bridging laws which have in c o m m o n t h e rejection of a o n c e alleged incommensurability between t h e i n d e p e n d e n t and t h e d e p e n d e n t variables. Thus, t h e causal explanation of lightning b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e o n c e we know that t h e m o v e m e n t of charged particles can s i m u l a t e the effect; i.e., that t h e r e is no fundamental incommensurability between electrical p h e n o m e n a and t h o s e traditionally referred t o as "lightning." Eliminative materialism is not reductive: it d o e s not reduce the n u m b e r of mental entities; it d e n i e s that there are any. But t h e s u c c e s s available t o defenders of this t h e s i s can b e secured only after it is shown that there is no reliable " m e n t a l " entity or attribute for which a c o m m e n s u r a b l e neural entity or at-

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103

tribute is lacking. Again, what might the neural equivalent of incorrigibility b e ? And what might the neural equivalent of privacy be?

Artificial Intelligence and Computer Simulations Having addressed elsewhere 3 2 the limitations of computer science in the matter of modeling psychological processes, I will only offer s o m e general considerations in this section. Perhaps the most general has to do with the illicit nature of the alleged "reductions" achieved by this approach. As discussed in the two preceding sections, even the illicit reductions are not really reductive, but it is their illicit nature that is of concern here. I should say first, however, that in discussing artificial intelligence (AI) and computer simulations, I shall disregard the important practical and technical accomplishments earned in these fields, and confine my remarks only to t h o s e undertakings designed to explain or reductively account for human psychological processes, either perceptual or cognitive. (We can agree that the tape recorder is a wonderful device without regarding it as a contribution to our knowledge of human memory!) There are several superficial resemblances shared by a modern computer facility and the sorts of things done by human beings as perceivers, cognizers, memorizers, and problemsolvers. The resemblances are scarcely accidental, since the machinery was designed to mimic t h e s e very processes. The question that arises, in light of the successful mimicry, is whether the human functions are best understood (explained) as a species of the types of functions incorporated into these devices. In a computer facility there is first a technique for getting data into the system; for having an input format compatible with the processor-mechanisms which are usually of the "microchip" variety, and with the "machine-language" in which various programs are written. In most systems, inputs can be typed or "keyed" directly. The c o n s e q u e n c e of the operator's typing is to

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REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

a c t i v a t e specific microcircuits t h a t a r e hard-wired t o treat t h e input in specific ways. (There may a l s o b e a " l e a r n i n g " feature s u c h t h a t t h e microcircuits actually u n d e r g o c h a n g e s a s a function of previous inputs but, a s we shall s e e , t h i s is less relevant t o t h e central i s s u e than it might a p p e a r t o be.) T h e parallel with h u m a n perceptual f u n c t i o n s is not hard t o s e e . T h e external world impinges on s e n s e o r g a n s which t r a n s d u c e t h e input into a format (electrical) c o m p a t i b l e with t h e " m a c h i n e l a n g u a g e " of t h e nerv o u s system. Within t h e central p r o c e s s o r (the " b r a i n " ) of t h e syst e m , t h e various electrical e v e n t s are g o v e r n e d by a specific program; or, better, t h e various electrical e v e n t s are d e s i g n e d t o realize a specific program which may call for a r i t h m e t i c o p e r a t i o n s or c h e s s m o v e s o r t h e activation of an a s s o c i a t e d

speech-syn-

thesizer. From t h e user's perspective, t h e electrical e v e n t s a r e invisible a n d u s e l e s s . W h a t is n e e d e d is an a p p r o p r i a t e output

format

t h a t is provided in t h e user's language; e.g., printed n u m b e r s , printed words, intelligible s p e e c h , etc. Thus, b e t w e e n t h e central p r o c e s s o r a n d t h e r e a d o u t device, t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e sort of dictionary or algorithm

by which t o t r a n s l a t e e a c h t e r m in t h e pro-

c e s s o r ' s l a n g u a g e into a t e r m in t h e user's language. What is o c curring in t h e p r o c e s s o r , of course, is t h e m o v e m e n t of electrical p u l s e s through pathways organized a s printed circuits. T h e trick is t o have t h e s e p u l s e s finally a c t i v a t e a readout device w h o s e o u t p u t is in t h e user's language. Again, at first blush, this s e e m s t o b e just what t h e h u m a n " p r o c e s s o r " is d e s i g n e d t o do. T h e external world impinges on t h e s e n s e organs, by transduction t h e s e stimuli are c o d e d into electrical pulses, which m o v e a l o n g t h e c o m p l e x a n a t o m i c a l p a t h s (the circuitry) of t h e nervous s y s t e m , arrive at various loc a t i o n s within t h e brain (the central p r o c e s s o r ) , a n d are organized according t o a "program," partly genetic (pre-wired) and partly learned. In turn, t h e brain's o u t p u t s are all electrical a n d m u s t a c t i v a t e a r e a d o u t m e c h a n i s m s o t h a t t h e percipient (the " u s e r " ) g e t s n o t t h e electrical p u l s e s but, for e x a m p l e , a t r e e b e n d i n g in t h e wind o n a s u n n y day in N o v e m b e r . If t h i s is t o b e achieved, t h e n we t o o n e e d s o m e sort

REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES of algorithm

105

by which t h e p u l s e - c o d e d o u t p u t s of t h e brain are

t r a n s l a t e d into t h e user's language. But for such a t r a n s l a t i o n t o occur, it is n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e s y s t e m p o s s e s s at least two lang u a g e s , for t h e p r o c e s s of t r a n s l a t i o n e n t a i l s at least two lang u a g e s . In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e l a n g u a g e s would have t o b e (a) t h e electrical o n e t h a t is t h e m a c h i n e l a n g u a g e of t h e brain a n d (b) a p h e n o m e n a l or experiential o n e w h o s e e l e m e n t s include such entries a s "tree," "sunny," "bending." However, with human beings (or higher a n i m a l s of any stripe), t h e r e is only o n e way into t h e brain, a n d t h a t is via t h e s e n s e organs. Thus, t h e only l a n g u a g e we c a n ever g e t to the brain is t h e m a c h i n e l a n g u a g e itself; viz., p u l s e - c o d e d electrical signals. There is n o way of getting " t r e e " or " s u n n y " or " b e n d i n g " t o t h e brain, a n d s o t h e r e is n o way of c o n s t r u c t i n g an algorithm from within t h a t could p o s s i b l y translate electrical pulses into anything but electrical pulses. Recall that with c o m p u t e r s we write t h e p r o g r a m s a n d we provide t h e translation a l g o r i t h m s . A c o m p u t e r system, e q u i p p e d with s e n s o r s a n d e x p o s e d t o t h e crisp air of N o v e m b e r may well yield, T R E E B E N D I N G IN T H E W I N D .

.

. IT IS A S U N N Y DAY . . .

THERE

IS A

IT IS N O V E M B E R .

But it d o e s s o only b e c a u s e percipients who have experienced trees b e n d i n g in t h e wind on sunny N o v e m b e r days have s e e n fit t o program a d e v i c e t o provide such o u t p u t s when certain information is read into it. With t h e brain, however, t h e rule is pulses in and pulses out with narry a t r e e t o b e f o u n d ! Translation e n t a i l s not merely multiple l a n g u a g e s but a knowledge of s a m e . For t h e brain, via s o m e " t r a n s l a t i o n a l " algorithm, t o a c h i e v e s u c c e s s f u l t r a n s l a t i o n s , t h e brain would have t o know ( s o m e h o w ) b o t h its own m a c h i n e l a n g u a g e and t h e lang u a g e into which its own is t o b e t r a n s l a t e d . On t h e (radically) materialistic t h e s i s according t o which we are only our brains, this a m o u n t s t o saying t h a t b r a i n s m u s t know b o t h b r a i n - t e r m s a n d p h e n o m e n a l terms. If nothing else, however, this would mean that t h e r e could n o t p o s s i b l y b e a scientific q u e s t i o n regarding t h e " l a n g u a g e of t h e brain," for we (brains) surely know t h i s l a n g u a g e or c o u l d n o t t r a n s l a t e it into any other. As it h a p p e n s , however, t h o u s a n d s of s c i e n t i s t s over t h e p a s t two c e n t u r i e s have l a b o r e d diligently t o unearth just t h i s " l a n g u a g e of t h e brain," a n d only

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REDUCTIONISM: MODELS, METAPHORS AND SIMILES

with mixed and incomplete success. Clearly, either the brain as brain has no language—and thus can't do any of these things— or dualism is necessarily true, or both. What creates the impression that AI and computer simulations are relevant to reductionism is the failure to appreciate the extent to which the psychological side of the equation remains entirely outside such simulations. Within the devices there are only moving parts; no words, thoughts, hopes, feelings, judgments, confusions, expectations. The simulation has no "language"—machine or otherwise—but only a design that permits us to use it for certain linguistic transactions. When we speak on the telephone, the telephone isn't saying anything. Interestingly, the brain itself is finally but a congeries of moving parts which can no more have a language than a sense of humor. That we need such moving parts for us to have a language is contingently the case during this, our sublunary life, but this requirement is not unlike needing an amplifier if we would be heard. To think otherwise is to traffic in a kind of superstition and to confer on mere things all sorts of dark powers and magical potentialities. Dualism may lack economy and neatness, but it is by far less spooky than the now popular alternative.

Summary The three major programs of reductionistic psychology are the behavioristic, the neurological, and the computational. All are finally materialistic in that all seek to "neurologize" mental entities and anchor them to purely physical processes. Each deals with the embarrassment of private mental events in a different but an equally unsuccessful way; either by assuming there is a problem where there is none (e.g., the "private-language" pseudoproblem); or by assuming there is no problem when indeed there is (the materialist's inability to deal with psychophysical incommensurability and with the incorrigibility of first-person accounts

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of mental events); or by re-creating the problem in a merely distracting setting (e.g., computer "simulations"). Mentalism, at least in its non-gaudy forms, survives all of these programs and alerts psychologists to the requirement that mental life must be dealt with in its own terms. The primary data of Psychology remain introspective, no matter how t h e s e data are later coded or transformed for purposes of analysis. The fundamental issues in Psychology are the gift of t h e s e data and cannot be traded in for more tractable issues in biology, computer science, or animal behavior.

CHAPTER FOUR

Explanations

T

h e principal a i m of psychological d i s c o u r s e , research, a n d theory is of c o u r s e t o p r o d u c e expla-

nations. At t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l or m e t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l

level, it is

n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e criteria of e x p l a n a t i o n s o that t h e prod u c t i o n s of t h e d i s c i p l i n e c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t m o r e or less s e t tled s t a n d a r d s of explanatory rigor, validity, a n d c o m p l e t e n e s s . W e owe t o Carl H e m p e l t h e revival a n d r e f i n e m e n t of a m o d e l of scientific e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t is at least implicit in t h e works of many older c o m m e n t a t o r s from Aristotle on. 1 The m o d e l — c a l l e d nomological-deductive

or "covering l a w " — i s o n e t h a t regards

e v e n t s a s scientifically e x p l a i n e d w h e n they are shown t o b e ins t a n c e s of a universal law n o t violated by any known fact or o b servation. Thus, all other relevant conditions being equal, we have explained t h e free-fall b e h a v i o r of an o b j e c t by invoking a (Newtonian) gravitational law t h a t covers all such events. T h e scientific a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n of why such o b j e c t s fall is n o t h i n g m o r e than a n d n o t h i n g different from a s t a t e m e n t of t h e law itself. H e m p e l h i m s e l f h a s argued t h a t t h e m o d e l is fully a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e social s c i e n c e s 2 b u t m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s have offered a variety of c r i t i c i s m s a g a i n s t t h i s view, a n d o t h e r s have r e j e c t e d t h e m o d e l even when a p p l i e d t o t h e physical s c i e n c e s . 3 It will b e u s e -

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EXPLANATIONS

fui to set up several of the more compelling arguments for and against the nomological-deductive model as a brief introduction to the problem of explanation in general and in the "human sciences" in particular.

For the Nomological-Deductive Model As a model of scientific explanation, the "covering law" approach is largely indifferent to nuances of method and subjectmatter, and is therefore open to the wide range of scientific endeavors. It leaves as much room for a possibly scientific History or Psychology or Economics as for such traditional sciences as Physics and Chemistry. What confers scientific status on an enterprise is the logic of its explanatory statements; as long as these are confined to empirical events and are grounded in true universal laws, they are scientific whatever their subject-matter or particular methods may be. As indicative of what the established sciences have been historically, the covering-law model has the added advantage of being compatible with the classical achievements in Physics, Chemistry, and Biology. The gravitational laws of Newton, the gas laws of Boyle and Charles, the astronomical laws of Kepler and the mechanical laws of Galileo are illustrative. What we generally regard to be the very best scientific explanations, coming from the most developed branches of scientific knowledge, are those grounded in universal laws of exceptionless reliability. We also expect—as the covering-law model requires—a symmetry to obtain between explanation and prediction such that the statements in the science that are explanatory with respect to what has occurred are the same statements offered as accounts of what will occur. Putting this another way, and referring back to topics discussed in chapter 2, we expect scientific statements to be not only predictive but predictive in contrary-to-fact conditional contexts. Given the universal law, we can say not merely what will

EXPLANATIONS happen, but what would happen were such and such conditions to obtain. A scientific explanation is not therefore simply an empirical generalization or a summary of data at hand.

Against the Nomological-Deductive Model Criticisms have been arrayed against the model from a variety of perspectives, not all of them compatible with the rest, though neither singly nor collectively have they constituted an alternative model. They fall into distinguishable if occasionally overlapping classes. 4 1. Exclusivity-. In light of the criteria demanded by the model, it has been argued that bona fide scientific work is excluded. Note, for example, that evolutionary theory does not possess universal laws and does not display symmetry between explanation and prediction. The basis upon which variations among species are explained does not provide us with a means by which to anticipate what the long-term future of the animal kingdom will yield. Even the alleged universal law of "natural selection" is an after-the-fact postulate. Only from the fact that a species has survived can we say that its nuances are the gift of "selection." The "law," then, may be said to be instantiated by a given species but is never predictive of one. Accordingly, explanations grounded in evolutionary concepts are not scientific (or not yet scientific), and this seems to be at variance with our intuitive understanding. It is, the critics say, just counterintuitive to declare that the theory of evolution is not a scientific theory. Recall that there is no universal law to be found in Economics, Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology, or even in many branches of Biology and Chemistry. Are all of these to be excluded from the province of science? Then, too, at the subatomic level of observation we discover that troublesome uncertainty discussed in chapter 2; a veritable principle of uncertainty which legislates against the very nomic necessity upon which the covering-

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EXPLANATIONS

law model would seem to depend. Is the entire field of particlePhysics to be excluded from the domain in which scientific explanations are fashioned? 2. The Fallacy of Omniscience: The covering-law model requires that the universal laws invoked to explain phenomena be true, for the very compelling reason that a false law explains nothing! But how do we know that a law is true? Might not the future disconfirm even our most settled laws, and must we then reach the counterintuitive conclusion that our earlier explanations were not only wrong but unscientific? The inescapable burden of human fallibility imposes limitations on our grasp of truth. We can never say that a nontautologous statement is true come what may, and so we can never say that a law of science is true come what may. To accept the nomological-deductive model is, then, to reject the very possibility of science. 3. Ideographic vs. Nomothetic Explanation:5 Human beings, and for that matter all advanced species, are biogenetically unique and thus develop in a manner that expresses the unique interaction between a given m e m b e r of the species and the complex nurturing environments in which it has been placed. The human personality is formed and sustained not only by complex and elusive variables, but also by t h o s e that differ from o n e person to the next. Any explanation of psychological attributes must be tailormade to fit the unduplicated aspects of the life of the given individual. To be able to say why Smith does this or that or will do this or that requires that we know about Smith, and not simply about the species of which Smith is a member. There are, of course, certain processes (e.g., sensory, digestive, reflexive) common to all normal members of the species and nomothetic explanation is possible with respect to these. This is not the case, however, with respect to any complex psychological process, such as volition, motivation, emotion, creativity, conviction, and the like. 4. Irreducibly Social Phenomena: When it c o m e s to significant human endeavors, the covering-law model is simply inapplicable, for what gives such endeavors their identifying character is the mixture of utterly individualistic motives, reasons, strategies, and objectives. Social and historical phenomena are not just

EXPLANATIONS

113

s o many balls rolling down s o many inclined planes. 6 O n e c a n n o t even d e s c r i b e such p h e n o m e n a without including irreducibly psychological (emotive, motivational, rational) terms, and o n e would not find intelligible any explanation of t h e m devoid of t h e s a m e terms. 5. The Sociology of Science: What the covering-law model ignores, and what gives it its artificial nature, is t h e fact that scie n c e is d o n e by actual p e r s o n s w h o s e undertakings occur within definable historical and social and personal contexts. T h e s e psychosocial conditions cannot b e removed from science, and a given scientific endeavor can never b e totally divorced from them. 7 Like s h o e s and ships, a society makes s c i e n c e and makes it for social purposes. Every now and then and unpredictably there is a tumultuous or revolutionary breakthrough in what is typically t h e normal life of science. But on t h e whole t h e scientific endeavor is o n e guided by well worn " p a r a d i g m s " of a conservative nature expressive of t h e social history and t h e social context within which t h e s c i e n c e was forged and by which its fate is determined. T h e s e five c l a s s e s of criticism are not exhaustive, but they cover m o s t of t h e grounds on which rejections of the model have b e e n b a s e d . They are formidable but not fatal criticisms and we should review at least in general t e r m s how t h e model might b e defended against t h e m . Replies to # 1 : As a model of scientific explanation, t h e nomological-deductive criteria are intended t o b e exclusive, but not in the static or eternal s e n s e . Thus, a given explanation (e.g., evolutionary theory) may fail t o qualify a s a scientific explanation for r e a s o n s that may b e o v e r c o m e by future research, observations, and conceptualizations. Presumably, the molar facts of evolution express m o r e fundamental events occurring at t h e level of molecular biology. Bridging laws are c o n c e i v a b l e by which we can move from t h e m o l e c u l a r biology of t h e g e n e t o t h e phenotypic characters conferring adaptive potential on the species. With even further progress, it may b e p o s s i b l e t o specify relationships b e tween m o l e c u l a r p h e n o m e n a and any given ecological circumstance, thereby rendering evolutionary explanations symmetrical with predictions of i m m i n e n t s p e c i e s variations. Lacking t h e s e

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EXPLANATIONS

bridges and lacking embracing covering laws, fields such as Evolutionary Biology, Economics, Psychology, and the rest cannot now offer scientific explanations but (via reliable empirical laws) can provide "explanation-sketches" 8 that hold out the promise of an ultimate nomological-deductive framework. Exclusion, therefore, may be only temporary. In any case, the exclusionary principles constitute the definable goal toward which aspiring sciences should aim. Replies to # 2 : It goes without saying that we may always be wrong in our statements about nature, including our nomic statements. However, from the fact of fallibility we are not to derive permission for anarchy! We can all agree that what is provably false is never an explanation. Thus, scientific explanations, if framed in the language of laws, must be erected on true laws. That the future may embarrass our confidence is a possibility that must be faced with eagerness, not anxiety; and surely not dubiety. Still, during any specific interval of scientific activity, we must have some standard of truth to which we submit our laws; and when the best tests are passed, we have no alternative but to accept the laws as true. Typically, advances in science are not at the total expense of an earlier nomological-deductive system, but require a modification of it. We do not say in the wake of Relativity Theory that Newton was wrong, but that the Newtonian formulations are true within boundary-conditions once thought to be limitless. There is a space-time coordinate system within which Newtonian explanations continue to be instantiated and within which Newtonian predictions are faultlessly confirmed wherever the observations are made within that system. Newton did not know that at super-velocities mass undergoes change, but this fact has no bearing— practical or theoretical—on the explanations and predictions offered of the behavior of objects moving at velocities significantly less than the speed of light. Replies to # 3 and # 4 : There is nothing in the nomological-deductive model that requires physical causation of events, only lawful causation. If the "law" of supply and demand were universally true, the discipline of Economics would possess scientific explanations whether or not such a law was ultimately grounded

EXPLANATIONS

115

in m o r e b a s i c laws of Physics. The m o d e l is o n t o l o g i c a l l y neutral a s t o t h e kinds of b a s i c " s t u f f " actually existing in t h e universe, leaving a s m u c h r o o m in principle for m e n t a l or motivational entities a s for electrical or a t o m i c o n e s . T h e critic who insists t h a t p e r s o n s are u n i q u e a n d are uniquely affected by their environm e n t s m u s t b a s e this c l a i m on o b s e r v a t i o n s . If t h e claim is true, t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s are reliable. And if t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s are reliable, they can b e s u b s u m e d under a (provisional) statistical law which, itself, may well b e g r o u n d e d in a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l universal law. Idiosyncrasy a l o n e d o e s not disqualify an event or item (or person) from scientific study or scientific explanation. If, however, there is a d e f e n s i b l e a n d principled a r g u m e n t a c c o r d i n g t o which ing

noth-

of a lawful nature c a n b e said a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o r or psychol-

ogy of p e r s o n s , t h e n it follows that n o scientific e x p l a n a t i o n is p o s s i b l e . It just follows t h a t t h e d i s c i p l i n e s a c c e p t i n g proprietorship of such p h e n o m e n a c a n n o t b e scientific a n d s h o u l d a t t e m p t t o d e v e l o p s t a n d a r d s of e x p l a n a t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h o s e applicable to science. Replies

to # 5 : W h e t h e r or n o t t h e Kuhnian " p a r a d i g m s "

a m o u n t t o any m o r e t h a n what P o p p e r h a s c a l l e d " t h e myth of f r a m e w o r k , " 9 they are scarcely sufficient t o sustain an e s s e n t i a l l y s o c i o l o g i c a l view of s c i e n c e . S c i e n c e is d o n e by h u m a n beings, even for h u m a n b e i n g s , but this would s e e m t o have n o m o r e bearing on t h e e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of s c i e n c e t h a n it d o e s on t h e e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of P l a n e Geometry. W e can a c c e p t that s c i e n tists a p p r o a c h their work with various m o t i v e s a n d under t h e inf l u e n c e of various historical (biographical) a n d social forces without granting t h a t t h e work itself m u s t carry t h e s e s t a m p s or ever has carried t h e m . What social fact or biographical detail of t h e life of A r c h i m e d e s m u s t b e taken into a c c o u n t a s we a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e scientific

s t a n d i n g of his laws of b u o a n c y ? T h e fac-

tors t h a t impel p e r s o n s toward or away from rationality are distinct from t h e logical criteria that are invoked t o determine whether an a r g u m e n t is sound, c o h e r e n t , or self-refuting. Let us say t h a t under t h e c e l e b r a t e d i n f l u e n c e of Newton's Physics, John Locke was inclined t o d e v e l o p a m e n t a l s c i e n c e of a c o r p u s c u l a r n a t u r e in which associative principles were t o do the work of gravity. This

EXPLANATIONS

116

claim, if true, would h e l p us u n d e r s t a n d why, of all t h e m o d e l s of t h e mind t h a t Locke might have c h o s e n , h e favored o n e t h a t was c o m p a t i b l e with Newton's m o d e l of t h e universe. But t h e claim, true or false, is utterly b e s i d e t h e p o i n t of w h e t h e r or not Locke's t h e o r y of i d e a t i o n is correct. It is simply a s p e c i e s of t h e ad

hom-

inem fallacy t o c o n f l a t e a s s e s s m e n t s of a scientific t h e s i s with a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e " p s y c h o l o g y " of t h e p e r s o n w h o a d v a n c e s it. Scientific t h e o r i e s are, t o b e sure, perspectival a n d can b e rep l a c e d by m a s s i v e shifts in perspective. This possibility is at t h e root of t h e D u h e m - Q u i n e t h e s i s which allows any theory t o b e rendered c o n f o r m a b l e t o t h e facts if we are willing t o m a k e radical e n o u g h a d j u s t m e n t s t o t h e s y s t e m a s a whole. 1 0 But when all of this is c o m p l e t e d , we are still o b l i g e d t o s u b m i t our a d j u s t m e n t s and o u r radically altered p e r s p e c t i v e t o t e s t s of internal coherence

a n d external

correspondence

with t h e facts

them-

selves. The p o t e n t i a l for " p l u r a l i s m " r e s i d e s n o t in t h e t e s t s or t h e s t a n d a r d s of truth b u t in t h e variety of ways such t e s t s a n d s t a n d a r d s might b e satisfied. T h e laws of m o t i o n c a n b e s u m marized e i t h e r through a differential c a l c u l u s applied t o t h e unfolding p h e n o m e n a t h e m s e l v e s or an integral c a l c u l u s t h a t e m braces t h e c o m p l e t e d behavior of t h e system. Whichever the c h o s e n m e t h o d , t h e laws of m o t i o n m u s t b e equally a n d perfectly described.

Whim

may

explain

the

choice

of

mathematical

ap-

p r o a c h e s b u t not t h e s t a n d a r d e i t h e r a p p r o a c h m u s t satisfy. In a word, t h e r e is a s o c i o l o g y of s c i e n t i s t s , but not of s c i e n c e qua scie n c e . For t h e latter, we have only a logical, not a s o c i o l o g i c a l framework.

What Makes an Explanation "Good"? This is not t h e p l a c e t o d e c i d e for or a g a i n s t t h e n o m o l o g i c a l - d e d u c t i v e m o d e l . T h e c r i t i c i s m s a g a i n s t it are n o t frivolous a n d t h e replies t o t h e m are n e i t h e r entirely s u c c e s s f u l nor unsuccessful. What t h e model captures is t h e a e s t h e t i c appeal held forth by a s e t of e x p l a n a t i o n s marking o u t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l d o m a i n

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117

of classical Physics. Perhaps it is only within that domain that such explanations ever could have been minted. But the aesthetic dimension is not to be depreciated, even if it does imply subjectivity and the vagaries of fashion. The aesthetic dimension is not engaged, we should recall, until the explanations have recommended themselves on all of the other and objective bases: completeness, predictive efficiency, accuracy, confirmation, symmetry. Only when two competing explanations are equally good do we ask which is more "elegant" (as mathematicians use the term) or more parsimonious or more coherent. As suggested in chapter 1, in connection with Dante's apparition, it is not the public record of perceptions that stands as the court of final recourse in matters of explanation. Explanations may be disconfirmed by facts, but not finally sanctioned by them. Allegedly true accounts of the world must correspond to the observable events in the world but they must do more. They must provide a coherent account and not merely a catalogue of these events. Explanation is more than taxonomy, more than description. It has a certain narrative property that imposes an inevitability on the occurrences it reports. In classical Physics this inevitability is guaranteed by the nomic necessity of scientific laws (chapter 2), but the inevitability it s e e m s must b e found elsewhere when the phenomena of human actions are the subject of study. Before testing this claim we should examine just what we are looking for in any explanation and why we want o n e in the first place. S o m e perceived regularities in nature are so abundant and invariant that the events are obviously answerable to a law of nature. If only b e c a u s e of the predictive power such laws confer, we have strong pragmatic reasons for looking for them. Where the regularities are less consistent but at least suggestive, science has shown that the careful and proper partitioning of the sources of variation will often disclose an invariant relationship. The record to date strongly supports the belief that, with respect to purely physical happenings at the molar level of observation, there is an inviolable law of nature at work. Once discovered, the law obviates the need for further observation, since we now know how the variables will behave within those boundaries set by the

118

EXPLANATIONS

law itself. Technical a d v a n c e s may permit an e x p a n s i o n of t h e o b servation s p a c e and t e s t s to determine t h e fuller range over which t h e law has its dispository powers. New laws may have t o b e framed t o a c c o m m o d a t e v i o l a t i o n s occurring in c o n t e x t s not initially envisaged. This, in c a p s u l e form, h a s b e e n t h e progress of s c i e n c e s i n c e at least t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century. It is t h e story of s c i e n c e . But it is a story t h a t we d o n o t a n d p e r h a p s c a n n o t tell from t h e b e g i n n i n g . W e have e x p l a i n e d t h e free-fall b e h a v i o r of an o b j e c t by invoking t h e law a c c o r d i n g t o which o b j e c t s atttract e a c h o t h e r with a force proportional t o t h e product of t h e i r m a s s e s a n d inversely proportional t o t h e s q u a r e d d i s t a n c e b e tween t h e m . But o u r story d o e s n o t explain why t h e s e forces are a s they are o r why they are d i m i n i s h e d in proportion t o t h e d i s t a n c e . S c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e ultimate

squared

n o t in t h e s e n s e of

b e i n g e x h a u s t i v e b u t in t h e s e n s e of e s t a b l i s h i n g where on t h e continuum of t i m e human knowledge must begin its accounts. With r e s p e c t t o t h e p h e n o m e n a e m b r a c e d by t h e m , scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s are " g o o d " chiefly b e c a u s e t h e y can b e n o better. To move to an earlier point on t h e continuum we must a b a n d o n t h e reassurances of knowledge per se and accept the mixed b o u n t y of what is finally a m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d n o t a scientific understanding. At this point t h e price we pay for a c o n s i s t e n t and c o h e r e n t "world view" is any n u m b e r of a n t i n o m i e s , c o n u n d r u m s , paradoxes, a n d e x c e p t i o n s . Again, t h e " u l t i m a t e " nature of scientific explanations is less a matter of t h e s u c c e s s of science than of t h e failure of alternatives. At p r e s e n t , s c i e n c e will sustain t o varying d e g r e e s b o t h a " b i g b a n g " and a " c o n t i n u o u s c r e a t i o n " a c c o u n t of t h e very e x i s t e n c e of t h e universe, t h e m o r e recent form u l a t i o n s t e n d i n g t o s u p p o r t t h e former. T h e scientific e x p l a n a tion is at last a summary of t h o s e conditions that would b e causally sufficient t o a c c o u n t for t h e o b s e r v a b l e data. To ask whether, for e x a m p l e , an e x p l a n a t i o n g r o u n d e d in t h e o l o g y is " b e t t e r " is a c tually t o s e e k a c o m p a r i s o n of i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e s . W h e r e t h e t h e ological a c c o u n t a s s u m e s t h e a c t i o n s of an intelligent being, t h e resulting e x p l a n a t i o n is entirely indifferent t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of causal sufficiency a n d is a d d r e s s e d i n s t e a d t o t h e radically different n o t i o n of rational purpose. It is an a n s w e r t o a why-type and n o t a

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how-type q u e s t i o n and it is largely indifferent to o b s e r v a b l e data. That is, theological propositions refer t o a causal agency no matter what t h e actual o b s e r v a b l e facts of t h e world may be. They are not, then, explanatory but, a s it were, justificatory and c o n s t i t u t e what may b e called ultimate justifications in that no o t h e r justification can b e m o r e fundamental. It is not my intention t o i m p o s e eccentric m e a n i n g s on ordinary words and s o I must qualify t h e c o n c l u s i o n according to which scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s are "ultimate." Surely the t h e o logian m e a n s t o explain why things are a s they are when referring to "the will of God" or "the divine plan" or "Providence." But such terms are after all indifferently a p p l i c a b l e t o nearly every or any natural p h e n o m e n o n . Declaring an event t o b e c o n s i s t e n t with or ordained by " t h e will of G o d " is not an explanation of t h e event as much a s a moral conviction that t h e event ought t o have occurred. There is no limit t o t h e m e a n s available t o an o m n i p o t e n t being, and t h u s scientific laws may reveal just o n e of t h e ways an o m n i p o t e n t will e x p r e s s e s itself. Regarded in this light, t h e theological a c c o u n t is m o r e fundamental than t h e scientific for it at o n c e includes the (scientific) explanation of how things c o m e about and t h e justification for their being a s they are. 1 insert this otherwise digressive c o m p a r i s o n to underscore t h e subtlety of q u e s t i o n s regarding t h e " g o o d n e s s " of explanations. We c a n n o t assign values of g o o d n e s s to any acc o u n t until we are sure of t h e level at which we are a t t e m p t i n g to understand the p h e n o m e n a under consideration. It is at this point that t h e difference between vertical and horizontal generalizat i o n s (chapter 1) b e c o m e s especially relevant. Theological and scientific a c c o u n t s are at different levels; t h e former at t h e level of justification where sufficient reasons are p o s t u l a t e d and t h e latter at t h e level of explanation where sufficient causes are specified. Scientific a c c o u n t s are n o n e v a l u a t i v e — n o t "value-neutral" but Monevaluative. Neutrality is a position between a n t a g o n i s t i c alternatives. In t h e evaluative realm, scientific a c c o u n t s have no position, including t h e neutral one. With all due respect t o ordinary language, therefore, I must point t o t h e difference between explaining an event and giv-

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ing a reason for it. We explain the voltage-drop in a circuit when we invoke Ohm's law and note that a resistance has just been inserted into the circuit. This, however, cannot be the reason for the voltage-drop, for rationality plays no part. It is convenient to use the terms "explanation" and "reason" interchangeably in many contexts, but it is also a source of confusion when we examine carefully the sorts of accounts the discipline of Psychology should strive to develop. Thus, the laws of sensory physiology may provide a good explanation for Smith's claim that a perceived light has grown in brightness but they do not provide a reason for Smith's choice of Impressionist over pre-Raphaelite paintings. Now, the likely response to this comparison is that aesthetic preferences involve more than sensory physiology; they involve prior learning, complex cognitive processes, various emotional factors. But this is really off the point. What is different about aesthetic preferences when compared with judged brightness is not the complexity of the former but the implicit justificatory argument needed to account for it. Even if it were shown that the preference is (somehow) causally determined by events in Smith's nervous system, we could still press on to establish whether there were good reasons for the preference, whatever its cause. It is because of this that the century-old search for mechanisms has distracted psychologists perhaps more than it has helped them." This will become clearer as we review several genres of psychological explanation and attempt to determine if they are "good" ones. The concept of motivation will be used illustratively in the following sections. Psychoanalytic Explanations The argot of psychoanalytic theory has now been absorbed into the working vocabulary of the general public such that entirely theoretical terms function as if they were causal explanations. In chapter 2, in the context of the reasons-causes tension, I referred briefly to the oxymoronic nature of "unconscious motivation" and 1 shall now expand upon that preliminary judgment. 1 should begin by noting the ambiguity surrounding

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the concept of motivation itself. It has had a checkered history in Psychology. It has been used to refer to entirely biological processes, 1 2 to specific volitions, 1 3 to instinctive dispositions, 1 4 and to learned behavioral dispositions. 1 5 In s o m e texts it is a species of "desire," in others a blind impulse of "drive." Suggestively, it is generally included with the topic of emotion in most introductory treatments, presumably b e c a u s e motives, like emotions, are "felt" and b e c a u s e they impel the organism toward or away from stimuli of a certain kind. In ordinary language, persons describe themselves as "motivated" when explaining the relish they take in o n e or another activity; i.e., as synonymous with "desirous" or "eager." Thus, in ordinary language the concept of motivation is distinguished from compulsion. One is not likely to say that he parted with his wallet b e c a u s e the thief "motivated" him. But the concept is also distinguished from whim or caprice. The utterance "I don't know why I did it" is typically reserved for actions for which a discernible motive cannot b e found even by the agent. In common parlance, then, a motive is or at least is kindred to a reason. Thus, in common parlance, an unconscious motive is a contradiction in terms. Learned disciplines are not, however, obliged to honor the linguistic conventions of the general public. Psychoanalysts may have good reasons for speaking of unconscious motives or for rejecting the c o m m o n wisdom as regards the rough equivalence of motives and reasons. One good reason would be that such usage permits them to frame good explanations for events otherwise inexplicable. But a good explanation here is o n e grounded in causal sufficiency and appealing to nothing less than a law of science. It is o n e that specifies the initial conditions under which "unconscious motivation" invariably produces the behavior to be explained. To achieve this level of explanation, however, we are not permitted to include the causal element in the definition of the explanandum, for this would give us no more than a definitional truth of the vis dormativa variety. What is needed, therefore, is a basis upon which to classify a behavioral event as unconsciously motivated without smuggling unconscious motivation into the definition or description of the behavior.

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Aggression or hostility is often cited a s arising from u n c o n s c i o u s motives. But, of course, aggression and hostility are often quite consciously directed toward others and for reasons well known t o t h e person having t h e s e feelings. S o far we can say that u n c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s may b e sufficient t o produce t h e sentim e n t but not necessary. If they are t o b e productive of t h e s e n timent they must arise from repressed feelings of which t h e experient is unaware. It turns out, then, that repression is a sufficient (and necessary?) condition for there t o b e unconsciously motivated aggression. But this then yields a s e q u e n c e in which aggressive s e n t i m e n t s are sufficient for (later) aggressive s e n t i m e n t s ! The middle s t a g e of t h e s e q u e n c e involves " r e p r e s s i o n " but there is no description or definition of this " p r o c e s s " that d o e s not include t h e c o n c e p t of t h e u n c o n s c i o u s . It c a n n o t b e a t e s t of t h e t h e s i s for t h e t h e s i s must b e a s s u m e d in order for there t o b e " r e p r e s s i o n " at all. " R e p r e s s i o n " is taken t o b e purposive forgetting—forgetting for a reason—but this implies either that t h e actor knows what he's forgetting (in which c a s e it is not unconscious) or is forgetting for u n c o n s c i o u s reasons. The latter, which is a l s o oxymoronic, makes it i m p o s s i b l e t o define repression in any t e r m s except t h o s e of u n c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s ; but repression is then regarded a s o n e of t h e t e s t s of just t h e s e p r o c e s s e s . Freud was persuaded that such difficulties would b e removed by a d v a n c e s in t h e neural s c i e n c e s such that the theoryterms of psychoanalysis would b e replaced by t h e observationt e r m s of neurophysiology. But this is impossible. The neural scie n c e s are correlative. They e s t a b l i s h correlations between events in t h e nervous system and certain functions performed by pers o n s or animals. We can s p e a k intelligibly of t h e neural correlates of learning or m e m o r y or perception b e c a u s e learning, memory, and perception are publicly displayed by o r g a n i s m s satisfying empirical criteria. But we c a n n o t verify psychoanalytic c o n c e p t s through neurological m e a s u r e s s i n c e t h e f o r m e r — a t least when pertaining t o t h e " u n c o n s c i o u s " — d o not satisfy empirical criteria. What makes o n e failure t o recall a s p e c i e s of forgetting and a n o t h e r a s p e c i e s of repression is not s o m e t h i n g determined by events in t h e nervous system but by t h e t h e o r i e s we propose. We

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must first have a non-neural basis for the distinction before we can hunt about for neural correlates of each. Let us return to the question of whether the psychoanalytic notion of unconscious motivation is a good explanation of a certain class of events such as forgetting, hostility, or slips of the tongue. The record now seems clear enough for us to take at least the provisional position that the notion of unconscious motivation cannot function as a determinative causal law and so does not provide a scientific explanation at all. Rather, it may provide a justification of the sort: Given what Smith has been exposed to in childhood and thereafter, and given the way that background has shaped Smith's perceptions of himself and others, it is quite reasonable to expect him to harbor feelings of hostility and resentment toward persons in authority. We should not be surprised to discover that persons with backgrounds similar to Smith's do not have such feelings, or that others with very different backgrounds do. We should not be surprised because the feelings themselves arise not from causal sequences of a purely natural-physical nature but from ideographic considerations in which the actor's autonomy plays a part. The psychoanalytic account is a story, a narrative, but not a scientific one. It is rather a historical narrative—something of a saga—which is "good" or less than good depending upon the contact it makes with the reader's own experiences and thoughts. We ask of such accounts only whether they make sense, recognizing that they are but one of an indefinite number of possible accounts all of which may make as much (or as little) sense. Where scientific theories are explanations of facts, psychoanalytic theories are, in a way, theories about theories. The patient has a theory: "1 must have a reason for disliking (ones so much"; and the analyst has a theory too: "He reminds you of your father". In the course of therapy, this is all expanded and plumbed, the result being a dramatic recreation of the patient's life. In the end, the patient must decide how good the recreation is, but must do so without any standard of comparison. Thus, even the successful therapy may be just one of an indefinite number of equally successful ones, but for practical and personal purposes, one is enough!

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The problem with psychoanalytic formulations is not that they are insufficiently "scientific" but that their defenders seek to install them as scientific at all. This is based upon a mistake as to just where such formulations fit in the scheme of understandings. They are not descriptive or explanatory but, ironically, rational and justificatory. I say ironically because of the murky irrationalism that psychoanalytic theory adopted from the first. But the appeal that psychoanalysis must make is ultimately to the patient's (and the critic's) rationality. The patient must discover that fears or feelings of a certain kind are not justified; they do not make intelligible contact with the current facts of the patient's life. In a word, they are the wrong fears or feelings now, no matter how understandable it is that they would initially come into being. Setting aside all the interpretive energies, all the symbology and hocus-pocus, the therapeutic setting becomes effective when the patient begins to recognize the depicted past as his own and thereupon begins to weigh prevailing sentiments and thoughts arising from the past against current facts and current possibilities. The patient on the mend is the one who knows the reason for, not the "cause" of the disturbance. If Freud's rather innocent hopes could have been realized such that a patient could be given a complete neurological record of all the events leading up to the current illness, the record would count as nothing toward the ultimate resolution of the dilemma. A knowledge of causes would be academic, scientific, nugatory. For the same reason, irrationalist accounts are therapeutically ineffective. They make no sense because they make no contact with events occurring at the level at which the patient's problems are found and felt. By way of summary, I would say that psychoanalytic approaches to the concept of motivation are to be understood as rationalistic and justificatory, the latter in only a weak moral sense. Causal explanations in science are never justificatory in either a strong or a weak sense and are not intelligible in the way that rational accounts are. In light of this, traditional formulations of motivation in psychoanalytic writings are off the point when they are grounded in instinctive processes or putative biological mechanisms. In the nonscientific sense of explanation, the psy-

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choanalytic explanation of human behavior is a "good" explanation in a way that a play has a good plot or a novel is credible or historical essays are intelligible. The sort of judgment brought to bear on accounts of this kind is of the form "It may very well have come about this way," not "It is true because it is an instance of a universal law," or "It was inevitable because it was determined by causally sufficient conditions." As I have discussed at length in another context 1 6 this is but one of the reasons why such accounts have no place in the evidentiary phases of adjudication. A psychoanalytic account of felonious behavior is neither a scientific explanation nor a moral justification (in the strong sense) but a rationalization by which the facts of the crime b e c o m e intelligibly connected to the biological and cognitive nuances of the defendant's life. Such accounts cannot establish that the crime was determined or irresistible or compelled; only that, "It may very well have come about that way." When all this is considered, we begin to appreciate the pointlessness of programs designed to translate psychoanalytic statements into scientific ones. The more credible and useful alternative is one in which concepts such as motivation are employed to render a story intelligible; to allow empathic responses from its auditors; to raise still other questions about other ways the same events might have come about or might have been resolved.

Mechanistic Explanations Referring to the work of D. J. MacFarland, 17 Austen Clark notes that, "The idea that deviations from a physiologically optimal state actuate behavioural mechanisms controlled by negative feedback is very fruitful" (p. 58). 18 In the same passage Clark shows that this concept of negative feedback is at the center of many theories of motivation, including those advanced by E. C. Tolman, Clark Hull, Dalbir Bindra, and MacFarland himself. In the tradition made prominent by Hull, such theories are often called "drivereduction" models of motivation in that they take motivation to

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b e equivalent t o or operationally definable as a s t a t e of physiological disequilibrium. The behavior triggered by such states either restores equilibrium and is t h u s "reinforcing" or d o e s not. In t h e latter instance, survival itself is in jeopardy. The successful organism, however, e m i t s behavior that reduces or e l i m i n a t e s t h o s e internal events or signals that led to the behavior itself. Here, then, is the "negative feedback" c o m p o n e n t of a system designed t o minimize e x t r e m e devitations. Taking t h e actual behavior of fooddeprived or water-deprived animals, t h e theorist is then a b l e to construct an analytical model (and, in principle, a physical o n e t o o ) that predicts such events a s rate or force of r e s p o n s e under specified c o n d i t i o n s of deprivation, and o n e that is a b l e a l s o t o match the m a n n e r in which such behavior d e c r e a s e s a s t h e system is restored t o an equilibrium-state. Where thirst and starvation are t h e s o u r c e s of deviations within t h e system, "equilibrium" is roughly s y n o n y m o u s with "satiety." The question arising from this interesting approach is whether such m o d e l s provide a good explanation of motivation; whether motivation is t h e sort of condition or property suited t o scientific explanation at all. It is useful, if not unavoidable, t o begin appraisals of such m o d e l s with t h e aid of introspection. Were we totally unaware of our own motives, t h e r e would b e no known "problem of motivation" for s c i e n t i s t s and t h e o r i s t s t o consider. Introspectively, however, there is n o evidence of physiological disequilibrium, only of e x p e r i e n c e s or s e n s a t i o n s (hunger, thirst, pain) of a certain kind. The c a u s e of S m i t h ' s eating may b e physiological, but the reason Smith e a t s is that h e is hungry. In other words, t h e c a u s e of S m i t h ' s eating may not b e S m i t h ' s cause. Accordingly, a negative-feedback model of motivation may provide a good account of p r o c e s s e s leading up to eating, but n o a c c o u n t at all of t h e b a s i s upon which t h e r e s p o n d e n t undertakes t h e activity or answers t h e s u m m o n s . M e c h a n i s t i c m o d e l s of motivation may b e interpreted as "psychological" by implication, in that we might regard m e a sures or d e g r e e s of disequilibrium a s t h e o b s e r v a b l e correlates of such introspectively known c o n d i t i o n s as " h u n g e r " and "thirst." But if the authors of such m o d e l s actually a s s u m e as much, t h e

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m o d e l s t h e m s e l v e s are i n c o m p l e t e until there is s o m e c o m p o nent or m o d u l e included that has t h e function of awareness, feelings, and t h e like. What might make disequilibrium motivating is not simply its m a g n i t u d e but its s e n s e d or experienced magnitude. A model of t h e former that leaves no room for t h e latter is not, then, a model of motivation but of, for example, m e t a b o l i s m or digestion. O n e might c o u n t e r this by insisting that such m o d e l s are good or bad only t o t h e extent that they predict behavior under specified c i r c u m s t a n c e s and, if they can do s o without rec o u r s e to "psychic" p r o c e s s e s , all t h e better. This, however, is an ignoratio fallacy s i n c e t h e q u e s t i o n has t o do with how well such m o d e l s explain motivation and not with how accurately they predict behavior. The symmetry between explanation and prediction is preserved only through universal (covering) laws. A m e c h a n i s tic model of motivation would explain motivation, therefore, only if its predictions were grounded in such a law or took it for granted from the first. But what, then, is t h e law? If it is a physiological law—to the effect that t i s s u e - n e e d s invariably c r e a t e s t a t e s of disequilibrium successfully reversed only by provision of nutrients—then we must wrestle with the fact that the nutritive value of a s u b s t a n c e d o e s not predict t h e behavior of food-deprived animals. 1 9 As noted in t h e previous chapter, prediction and explanation are i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e only under rare circumstances. Evolutionary theory provides explanations of phenotypic variation but not predictions of t h e m . W e a t h e r forecasting provides predictions of climatic c o n d i t i o n s but not scientific explanations of t h e m . Psychoanalytic e x p l a n a t i o n s are retrodictive and are "explanatory" only in t h e s e n s e previously discussed. It is not sufficient, therefore, t o point t o t h e predictive prowess of m e c h a n i s t i c acc o u n t s of motivation when t h e q u e s t i o n is o n e of explanation. Moreover, what makes such m o d e l s predictive is no m o r e than what would make an empirical function predictive. Were we to plot r e s p o n s e - r a t e as a function of hours of food-deprivation, and include a s a p a r a m e t e r t h e percent of r e s p o n s e s resulting in the delivery of food during postdeprivation trials, we would have t h e

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s a m e predictive efficiency a s t h a t offered by any s u c h m o d e l . T h e m o d e l , after all, is a m o d e l of t h e data, n o t t h e o r g a n i s m . W e c a n a p p r e c i a t e its heuristic value without b e i n g m i s l e d by its scarcely c o i n c i d e n t a l predictive power. T h e latter is actually a veiled retrodictive power supplied entirely by data already at hand. W h e n we m o v e from t h e level of a n i m a l behavior, a n d specifically t h a t which p r o c e e d s from appetitive motivations, a n d c o n s i d e r human motivation, m e c h a n i s t i c m o d e l s of t h e sort n o t e d a b o v e are even l e s s p l a u s i b l e . T h e c o m m o n e r forms of h u m a n motivation are a s s u m e d by defenders of mechanistic m o d e l s (e.g., Hull) t o a r i s e from m o r e " b a s i c " drives such a s t h o s e for food, water, a n d pain. Money, for e x a m p l e , is said t o take on t h e properties of a " s e c o n d a r y reinforcer" b e c a u s e of its reliable a s s o c i a tion with such "primary r e i n f o r c e r s " a s food a n d shelter. P e r s o n s are t h e n said t o b e " m o t i v a t e d " t o work for m o n e y via a g e n e r a l ization from o n e reinforcer t o a n o t h e r or a learned s u b s t i t u t i o n of o n e (the "primary") for t h e o t h e r (the " s e c o n d a r y " ) . W h a t is not at all clear from such a c c o u n t s is whether money, in this case, h a s t h e s a m e drive-reducing powers a s food a n d r e s t o r e s " e q u i librium" in t h e way that food is a l l e g e d t o when a hunger-drive exists. This s e e m s intuitively t o b e nearly preposterous, for it would lead t o t h e prediction t h a t p e r s o n s suddenly l o s e their a p p e t i t e s on payday! Kindred e x a m p l e s drawn from a n i m a l learning are n o m o r e plausible, even if l e s s patently absurd. M o d e l s t h a t require secondary-reinforcers t o gain their efficacy by sharing in t h e drivereducing p r o p e r t i e s of primary reinforcers c o n t a i n n o p l a u s i b l e c a u s a l or m e c h a n i s t i c e l e m e n t by which t h i s sort of t r a d e could take place. T h e c h i m p who works for t o k e n s t h a t a c t i v a t e a foodd i s p e n s i n g device surely is n o t treating t h e t o k e n s a s "reinforcing" in t h e way t h a t food is, u n l e s s t h e c h i m p p r o c e e d s t o e a t t h e t o k e n s . T h e t o k e n s will n o t satisfy any t i s s u e - n e e d p r o d u c e d by food-deprivation. They may (as in t h e Hullian a c c o u n t ) p r o d u c e " a n t i c i p a t o r y " r e s p o n s e s — i n c l u d i n g visceral o n e s — b u t such a n t i c i p a t i o n s are e v i d e n c e of a m e a n s - e n d strategy or cognitive proc e s s which is n o t at all e m b r a c e d by s o m e t h i n g a s s i m p l e a s " n e g a t i v e f e e d b a c k . " Such " a n t i c i p a t o r y " s t a t e s are an e x a m p l e of s m u g g l e d psychological t e r m s in a m o d e l t h a t would p r e s e n t itself a s purely m e c h a n i s t i c .

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Then, too, the state of "satiety"—the psychological equivalent of physiological "equilibrium"—is introduced only clumsily into a coherent and general theory of human motivation. Ordinary persons, called upon to list the chief motives of their lives and works, are inclined to offer objectives with which we do not become "satiated." Social beings are motivated to form friendships, to attain some success in their relationships with others, to conduct their affairs in a manner that is equitable and virtuous, to live in a state of harmony and justice. We surely do not have "enough harmony" or "enough friendship" in the sense that we have "enough water." Nor would we be inclined to overlook wickedness on the grounds that the perpetrator had, after all, been decent "long enough"! It just turns out that what fills the lists of human motives are entries entirely unlike the basic biological impulses routinely included in drive-reduction models of motivation. 20 The latter are exemplars only of members of the same genre and attempts at vertical generalization have the quality of drollery. The theoretical ambiguities occur when we conflate the concepts of drive and motivation or treat the having of impulses as akin to the having of purposes, even where the latter are pursued impulsively. There is, for example, still much arbitrariness in definitions of motivation even among those otherwise inclined to avoid mentalistic language. The term is sometimes (often) employed to refer to a condition of the organism; sometimes to refer to a goal; sometimes to refer to an experimental operation; sometimes to refer to a preference for one of two or more stimuli. Nor is it clear that there is one general state of motivation that may be applied to any number of external "satisfiers," or a specific motive for each external the animal will work to obtain or to avoid. The literature on frustration-effects points to any number of "substitute-gratifications" chosen by animals unable to reduce a "relevant drive"; but this is a literature that is rife with both implied and stated psychological terms and, as a result, ceases to qualify as a defense of mechanistic theories of motivation. 21 Physical models of motivation, whether in the form of animals or block-diagrams or physically realized block-diagrams, are of value to the extent that they render more tractable the nag-

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ging p r o b l e m s p o s e d by human motivation. Presumably, t h e appropriate strategy is o n e that b e g i n s with the m o r e reliable facts of human motivation and then attempts t o translate or model t h e s e in such a way a s t o provide at least c o n c e p t u a l control over t h o s e variables that are sufficient t o yield versions of t h e s e facts. But t h e traditional strategy within m e c h a n i s t i c Psychology has b e e n t o ignore t h e m o s t obvious and reliable facts of human motivation, and t h e n t o construct a model of t h e behavior of o r g a n i s m s of doubtful r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s e x p o s e d to c o n d i t i o n s of doubtful relevance. S u c c e s s is then c l a i m e d when t h e m o d e l — w h i c h is devised in light of experimental f i n d i n g s — g e n e r a t e s o u t p u t s similar t o t h o s e o b t a i n e d from t h e experimental s u b j e c t s . I should not c l o s e this section without pausing t o exa m i n e the notion of "equilibrium" itself, which is at t h e core of many m e c h a n i s t i c m o d e l s of motivation. It is not at all obvious that equilibrium-states are c o m m o n in biological systems, or even desirable; nor do traditional drive-reduction t h e o r i e s specify just where in t h e system and in what m a n n e r t h e alleged equilibrium reveals itself. The very p r o c e s s of stimulation is disequilibrating only in relation t o a resting-state which is no m o r e normal or typical than a s t a t e of excitation. Recall that the ultimate "steadys t a t e " is death, not tranquility. At t h e cellular level, the p r o c e s s e s of learning and memory—which are presumably central t o motiv a t i o n — l e a d t o structural synaptic c h a n g e s and perhaps to recurrent patterns of excitations dramatically different from t h e s t a t e of t h e system prior t o t h e s e acquisitions. Of c o u r s e o n e might say that such p r o c e s s e s represent new equilibrium-levels, but this renders t h e c o n c e p t even m o r e arbitrary and less distinguishable from whatever it is that equilibrium is to b e contrasted with. Thus, n o t i o n s such a s "dynamic equilibrium" are empty when applied t o c o m p l e x o r g a n i s m s since, for such organisms, there can b e no "static equilibrium" as long a s life endures. The m e t a b o l i c physiology of o r g a n i s m s includes a n a b o l i c and even morbid c o m p o nents, for t h e p r o c e s s e s of growth and physiological m a i n t e n a n c e are earned at a price. To speak in recognizable physiological terms, we should contrast not "equilibrium" and "disequilibrium," but normal and pathological, where t h e latter refers t o identifiable phys-

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iological changes of sufficient magnitude to produce either the death of the organism or a permanent dysfunction of one of its systems. But this meaningful distinction then makes improbable any useful connection with the facts of motivation and these significant physiological changes. Long before we reach the level of human beings, we will discover motivated behavior bearing no relationship to biological survival per se, except for relationships that beg the very question at issue. The primate that avoids food in order to peer through a small window to observe other animals or human beings is scarcely the model of a motivational system secured to considerations of survival. 22 There is no doubt but that animals behave in such a way as to enhance the probability of continued life. By virtue of reflexive and instinctive patterns of behavior, such adaptations become possible even in the absence of training, coaxing, or conditioning. The behavior is impelled or driven by factors relatively independent of reinforcement histories or, at the human level, deliberation and choice. But since we already know that the more important human motivations are inextricably connected to deliberation and choice, we have reason to wonder whether such reflexive and instinctive patterns are apt models of human motivation. There is good reason to think that by far the better model is one in which the animal too acts on the advantages of prior experience and memory; that is, where the animal's "motives" are acquired and not plausibly construed a s either reflexive or instinctive. But, as noted, the behavior associated with acquired motives is often so removed from considerations of survival as to have practically no relationship to it at all. Are mechanistic explanations of motivation good ones? Unlike psychoanalytic accounts, they hold out the promise of being explanations, for they make appeal directly to causally sufficient (scientific) laws. The problem, however, is that they do not appear to be (scientific) explanations of motivation qua motivation, at least as studies of human motivation give meaning to the term. Mechanistic explanations would seem to be versions of physiological laws or tendencies or mere restatements of them. In the form of models, the explanations are of data, not organisms or their physiologies.

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Teleological Explanations The general public understands the concept of motivation teleologically and in this has the support of humanistic psychologists, rigorous and otherwise. 23 To say that Smith is motivated is to say that Smith has a goal or purpose and is acting in such a way as to attain it. Smith's behavior is understood in light of Smith's purposes, these taken to be synonymous with Smith's "motives." The advantage of teleological explanation is obvious: It conforms perfectly with a common sense not paralyzed by the refinements of analysis. The disadvantages are also obvious: There is an irritating circularity in the definitions of "motivations" and "goals," not to mention the reckless anthropomorphism encouraged by the "goal-directed" behavior of infrahuman organisms. Perhaps worst of all, however, is the status given to Smith in this matter for, on the common sense account, only Smith can truly know his own motives (pace Freud). Teleological accounts are not, however, univocal. An entity may act for a purpose without acting with a purpose; e.g., a carrier pigeon with a note tied to its leg. An entity may attain a goal serendipitously so that, although there was a purpose, the behavior that attained it did so by accident or inadvertence. Evolutionary theory is teleological in the sense that phenotypes are "selected" for survival; e.g., some male birds have plummage that is sexually exciting to female members of the species and this so that there will be copulation. But evolutionary theory is not teleological in the sense that an intending agent must be assumed for the selections to occur. Psychoanalytic theory is also teleological in this respect, in that it treats unconscious motivation as serving a purpose but does not attribute to the patient any conscious or intentional part. What is common to the evolutionary and the psychoanalytic accounts is the elimination of autonomy on the part of participants whose behavior nevertheless serves some purpose judged to be vital. Having discussed autonomy at length in chapter 2, it is enough to say here that this elimination renders both evolutionary theory and psychoanalytic theory largely irrelevant to the issue of human motivation. If Smith has "repressed"

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a thought or feeling, such that he has no c o n s c i o u s a w a r e n e s s of it, then although t h e allegedly repressed material may motivate Smith, it c a n n o t b e S m i t h ' s motive. More generally, t o t h e e x t e n t that his behavior is impelled (as, for example, by t h e laws of m e chanics), it d o e s not proceed from Smith's motives. This is not averted by reducing Smith's motives to s o m e state or condition of Smith's brain or body (cf. chapter 3), for what is under consideration here is t h e b a s i s upon which Smith understands himself t o b e behaving. He d o e s not know that hypothalamic nuclei are active, but that he is hungry; he does not know that a t u m o r is invading structures in t h e limbic system, but that he is anxious. The bodily c o n d i t i o n s may b e the cause of this or that psychological s t a t e but c a n n o t b e t h e reason why Smith d o e s X or Y when in this state. As every idea is s o m e o n e ' s , s o t o o every reason is s o m e o n e ' s . It is b e c a u s e of this that the evolutionary account fails a s totally a s t h e psychoanalytic. There may b e s o m e physical basis on which John is drawn t o Mary; a b a s i s regulated by genetically governed reflexes and instincts s e l e c t e d over t h e e o n s t o favor heterosexual pairings. To this extent, t h e attractive forces are indifferent t o any given pairing, including that of John and Mary. But this cannot b e John's motive, since he, a s it happens, left school in t h e third grade and has never heard either of g e n e s or of t h e theory of evolution. We might want t o say at this point that )ohn is just ignorant of t h e "real" s o u r c e of t h e attraction, but this is t a n t a m o u n t t o saying that |ohn is acting on the wrong motive. However, how can o n e act on t h e wrong motive? It makes s e n s e to say that, given motive-X, action-A will not satisfy it; e.g., t h e hungry rat runs toward a drinking-tube rather than a food-well. But it makes no s e n s e t o say that t h e motive t o eat is t h e wrong one. As with his a c h e s and pains, Smith has t h e last word on his motives. And his motives turn out t o b e different from anything occurring at t h e level of his genes, his olfactory tract, or his limbic system. The teleological approach t o human motivation cannot b e usefully removed from t h e introspective d o m a i n in which actual p e r s o n s a t t e m p t t o identify just what goal or o b j e c t i v e it

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is t o which their behavior is functionally and intelligibly related. Thus, the approach when properly m a d e d o e s not p r o m i s e a scientific explanation of motives but, again, a rationalization of t h e m . I would judge it t o b e t h e s o u n d e s t approach if only b e c a u s e it is t h e only o n e that is not transparently irrelevant. It carries t h e now grave liability of not fitting comfortably into the laboratory, though it may in fact contain observational possibilities rather m o r e rigorous than m e r e gossip. Most will agree, 1 should think, that t h e m o r e important s o u r c e s of human motivation are t h o s e tied to social c o n texts in which t h e feelings, judgments, and e x p e c t a t i o n s of o t h e r s c o u n t in t h e formation of personal goals. Alternatives t o t h e teleological approach would s e e m t o b e especially implausible in t h e s e contexts. As Peter Winch argued s o successfully years ago, 2 4 m e c h a n i s t i c and reductionistic programs in t h e social s c i e n c e s are unintelligible or illicit. They suffer t h e latter fate when essentially social c o n s t r u c t s are imported into our m e c h a n i s t i c vocabulary. To " r e d u c e " interactions a m o n g p e r s o n s t o s o m e t h i n g nonsocial requires first t h e translation of " i n t e r a c t i o n s " into s o m e n o n s o cial alternative. Winch's point, s t a t e d all t o o briefly here, is that there are minimal criteria by which an event is recognizable as a social event; t o erect a barrier against t h e inclusion of t h e s e criteria is not finally t o explain social p h e n o m e n a but t o deny their occurrence. Collingwood 2 5 m a d e t h e s a m e c a s e in t h e matter of historical events, a s did Hegel e a r l i e r 2 6 and William Dray later. 2 7 Only recently, through research and theory in t h e area of social cognition, 2 8 has Psychology m o r e fully respected t h e implicitly propositional nature of social interactions; interactions that c o m bine p e r s o n s with unique and quasi-theoretical p o s i t i o n s regarding t h e motives, character, attributes and perceptions of their c o horts. Social interactions take place for a purpose and are regulated, if that is t h e right word, by t h e mixture of purposes and beliefs each m e m b e r brings to t h e social context. I would prefer t o s t a t e t h e point in a way that makes such activities s e e m less conspiratorial, but here 1 pass on only t h e flavor of an important if still t o o scientistic literature. What makes it important is surely not that discovery of t h e obvious which b e s e t s Psychology when it a g r e e s

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t o address life beyond t h e laboratory. Rather, t h e literature is important b e c a u s e it is gradually uncovering sound and replicable m e t h o d s for isolating what are often very subtle but significant a s p e c t s of social interaction. S o m e of what is now routinely reported was never obvious; and much that is obvious is now b e c o m i n g s y s t e m a t i c rather than merely anecdotal. Yet, the b e s t of this literature is teleological from start t o finish, even if this elem e n t is c o n c e a l e d by journalese. Predictably, t h e a c c o u n t s are primarily narrative, for all t h e statistics, and invite t h e reader t o e s tablish an essentially e m p a t h i c relationship with t h e n a m e l e s s p e r s o n s behind t h e findings. What we receive, therefore, is not a causal explanation in t h e scientific s e n s e but, again, a s p e c i e s of rationalization. It may s e e m , in light of t h e repeatability of such studies, that this designation d o e s not fit; that here, at least, we do have a scientific explanation for here at least there is prediction, precision, and lawfulness. There are, indeed, t h e s e three, but t h e lawfulness is not causal in t h e s e n s e developed in chapter 2. It is b e c a u s e p e r s o n s enter social c o n t e x t s with rationally articulated o b j e c t i v e s and with rationally defended beliefs or attitudes that we are a b l e t o predict how they are likely t o react t o d i s a f f i r m ing evidence or t o o b s t a c l e s denying ready a c c e s s t o their goals. That is, it is b e c a u s e they are rational that their reactions can b e lawfully described and predicted. Note that I am not claiming that their attitudes or beliefs are, in t h e abstract, "rational"; only that their defense of them takes a rationalized form. The important factor is t h e participants' overarching goal to render their attitudes and beliefs c o n f o r m a b l e t o t h e dictates of rationality or intelligibility. Presumably, they could at any point s u s p e n d this c o m m i t m e n t or even c o m m i t t h e m s e l v e s t o pure caprice. Were this t o occur, t h e generalizations c o n t a i n e d in this literature would b e overturned and t h e studies t h e m s e l v e s would b e entirely unreplicable. Rationalized beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes are fundamental t o social p h e n o m e n a and are recovered in any careful study of such phenomena. That t h e b i s h o p will only b e moved diagnonally in a g a m e of c h e s s can b e predicted with certainty, a s s u m i n g both

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players are playing chess. What confers predictive efficiency in this c a s e is not a law of s c i e n c e or causal determination, but t h e Rules of C h e s s c o m b i n e d with t h e stipulation that n o o n e plays c h e s s e x c e p t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e rules. P e r s o n s having t h e strong conviction t h a t t h e world's e n d is i m m i n e n t are inclined t o a d m i t t h a t they got t h e d a t e wrong when t h e earth is still intact, but they d o n o t surrender t h e belief. W h a t we have in such i n s t a n c e s is just a n o t h e r way of d e s c r i b i n g what it m e a n s t o have a conviction

as

o p p o s e d , for e x a m p l e , t o a scientific h y p o t h e s i s or a m e r e opinion. Our ability t o predict how t h o s e with strong c o n v i c t i o n s will react t o d i s c o n f i r m i n g e v i d e n c e is tied t o t h e very m e a n i n g of a strong conviction a n d t o t h e t o o l s of rationalization a v a i l a b l e t o rational b e i n g s faced with s u c h a d i l e m m a . W e m u s t n ' t m a k e t o o m u c h (or t o o little) of t h e social p s y c h o l o g i s t ' s s u c c e s s in predicting such o u t c o m e s . W e would m a k e t o o m u c h of it if we a s s u m e d t h a t prediction w a s g r o u n d e d in c a u s a l laws; t o o little if we a s s u m e d t h a t only t h e o b v i o u s or t h e trivial had b e e n (re-)discovered. T h e fair a n d p r o f i t a b l e a s s e s s m e n t is t h a t such research p o i n t s clearly t o t h e centrality of t e l e o l o g i c a l factors in any syst e m a t i c a c c o u n t of social p h e n o m e n a . S o c i a l b e i n g s who strive for consistency, or labor t o reconcile their convictions t o t h e facts, or form a t t i t u d e s by which t o diminish t h e c o m p l e x i t y of social interactions, or bring their judgments into line with t h o s e of a group or with t h o s e in authority are d o i n g t h e s e t h i n g s with an e n d in view. 2 9 P r e s s e d t o d e f e n d any of t h e s e strivings, they will offer a rational a c c o u n t in which purposes form an integral part. They may not know t h e particular p r e s s u r e s they're giving in t o and may n o t even know all of t h e d e v i c e s (cognitive, a t t e n t i o n a l , affective) e m ployed in b e h a l f of t h e s e p u r p o s e s . But in t h e very a c t of rationalizing their p o s i t i o n s t h e y d i s c l o s e an a s p e c t of t h e m s e l v e s t h a t is intelligible only on t e l e o l o g i c a l or purposive grounds.

Are There Good Explanations in Psychology? C o n s i d e r t h e a r e a of social Psychology refereed t o a s attribution

theory,30

which in b r o a d t e r m s is c o n c e r n e d with how

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p e r s o n s arrive at understandings of t h e conduct of others. Let us say that we are observing a g a m e of c h e s s at a d i s t a n c e and, after a time, notice that o n e of t h e players no longer moves t h e B i s h o p diagonally but now b e g i n s t o move it vertically and horizontally. S t u d i e s of attribution indicate that in such c i r c u m s t a n c e s we are inclined t o understand t h e earlier c o n d u c t as externally controlled (here, by t h e rules of c h e s s ) , but t h e later c o n d u c t a s arising from s o m e t h i n g internal in t h e player; s o m e t h i n g a m i s s or even reproachable. We might b e inclined to say that a condition of a m nesia set in during t h e game, or that t h e players's visual perception had b e c o m e untrustworthy, or even that the wrong moves were inspired by a s c h e m e to take unfair advantage of t h e o p p o n e n t . Now, s u p p o s e our q u e s t i o n is, "Why do observers look t o b l a m e players making wrong moves, but attribute t h e correct o n e s t o factors external to the players?" And suppose the answer is of this general form: When we attempt to account for the behavior of others, we actually perform a kind of hypothesis-testing. If external causes are sufficient to account for the behavior, we settle for a kind of causal account but where they are not we are inclined to attribute the actor with (internal) private motives or states of a praiseworthy or blameworthy nature. What sort of explanation is this, and is it a g o o d o n e ? Clearly, it is not a nomological-deductive explanation for no universal law is known t o cover such effects which are, after all, only t e n d e n c i e s in any c a s e . Nor is it a reductive explanation for n o n e of t h e psychological t e r m s has b e e n reduced to nonpsychological or physical o n e s . It is, in fact, a teleological explanation b e c a u s e it is tied to t h e a s s u m p t i o n , if only implicit, that o b servers are striving t o understand t h e behavior of o t h e r s and, in t h e process, will c o n s t r u c t and test o n e theory after a n o t h e r until they have o n e that makes t h e behavior in q u e s t i o n intelligible, lust as t h e observers are a t t e m p t i n g t o locate t h e behavior within a rational (rationalized) context, so also are the experimenters and theoreticians trying to rationalize the observed performance of the observers. Whether we judge the attribution literature as presenting good e x p l a n a t i o n s or not d e p e n d s in t h e last analysis on our empathic reactions t o such a c c o u n t s . We a r e — l i k e the observers t h e m s e l v e s — t r y i n g t o make s e n s e of t h e explanation by ask-

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ing ourselves if it would cover our own j u d g m e n t s had we b e e n the observers. O n e who reads articles in this vein must ask, "Is this t h e sort of logic 1 follow when faced with c o n d u c t by o t h e r s that is not clearly explicable in terms of external constraints?" Let us take a c a s e where a new Soviet president declares a policy of nuclear d i s a r m a m e n t at a b o u t t h e s a m e t i m e a s a similar proposal is m a d e by the President of t h e United S t a t e s . We might discover that many A m e r i c a n s would explain t h e U.S. policy as inspired by pacifism and t h e Soviet policy a s arising from fear or duplicity. Social psychologists could explain t h e s e different attrib u t i o n s a s grounded in traditional beliefs a b o u t t h e motives of t h e two nations; beliefs that now can b e consistently held only by ascribing radically different motives to political leaders who have advanced the s a m e proposal. This is a good explanation only from t h e essentially introspective perspective of t h o s e weighing it. We ask whether it c o n f o r m s to t h o s e relationships between belief and attribution c o m m o n t o our own experiences. It is not u n c o m m o n for critics of t h e social s c i e n c e s to d i s m i s s such e x p l a n a t i o n s as obvious, trivial, and unscientific, but t h e criticism is derived from flawed e x p e c t a t i o n s a s t o what such "sciences" have as a plausible and defensible objective. Their findings and e x p l a n a t i o n s are not always " o b v i o u s " and are often far from trivial. The apparent o b v i o u s n e s s is conveyed by what is finally t h e rationality of t h e a c c o u n t s and not any a priori certainties we have as t o what t h e findings will be. Thus, t h e literature addressed t o attribution theory, for example, is " o b v i o u s " to t h e disinterested critic b e c a u s e , after weighing it, the critic finds it t o b e obviously true or at least obviously true in many c a s e s . No o n e seriously avers that, "Well, now that 1 think a b o u t it, force really is equal to t h e product of m a s s and a c c e l e r a t i o n . " But it is only after we think a b o u t it that, indeed, we s e e how our own attributions are often rooted in t h e implicit logic guiding the experimental subjects studied by t h e social psychologists. The theory and research are not scientific, but not for r e a s o n s of c a r e l e s s n e s s or incomp e t e n c e or ignorance. They are not scientific chiefly b e c a u s e they have b e e n stripped of t h e e l e m e n t of causal n e c e s s i t a t i o n which prima facie just has nothing t o do with t h e p h e n o m e n a of interest.

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It is only b e c a u s e work in such a r e a s is c o n d u c t e d within an experimental framework that we often have the flawed expectation of genuinely scientific explanations. But t h e " e x p e r i m e n t s " c o m e c l o s e r t o a kind of controlled interview than t o an a s s e s s m e n t of truly causal d e p e n d e n c i e s . In recording the utterances of t h e s u b j e c t s , t h e psychologist in such settings takes for granted their autonomy, authenticity, rationality, intentions, and t h e like. T h e s e nonscientific factors fail t o a p p e a r in t h e experimental design or in t h e data not b e c a u s e they have b e e n " c o n t r o l l e d " or eliminated, but b e c a u s e they c o n s t i t u t e t h e very c o n t e x t — t h e n e c e s sary a s s u m p t i o n s — f o r t h e research q u e s t i o n s t o b e framed and addressed. The explanations forthcoming are g o o d b e c a u s e they are r e a s o n a b l e . Their r e a s o n a b l e n e s s is earned by way of an introspective t e s t t o which scientific explanations are never properly submitted. It is only by t h e s a m e t e s t that such characterizations as o b v i o u s n e s s or triviality could b e applied. What, then, of o t h e r psychological explanations? I should think t h e s a m e t e s t is applicable to all of t h e m ; t h e t e s t of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , of introspective plausibility, of e m p a t h i c evocativeness. 1 do not legislate here on t h e activities of psychologists or t h e kinds of s t a t e m e n t s they must strive t o make. The psychologist who is interested in (probably causal) relationships b e tween hypothalamic l e s i o n s and f o o d - c o n s u m p t i o n is free t o explore them, a s long a s we recognize that t h e results are not t o b e taken as a causal explanation of hunger as a motive. The results are b e t t e r a s s i g n e d t o scientific knowledge a b o u t t h e physiology of appetitive behavior than t o psychological knowledge a b o u t t h e nature of human motivation. There is room for argument on both sides of t h e issue and t h e r e are, no doubt, hard c a s e s each side would have difficulty a c c o m m o d a t i n g . R e a s o n a b l e n e s s and plausibility are ultimate but not exclusive criteria of psychological explanations. The point is that they are not criteria at all of scientific explanation when they are taken as arising from irreducibly introspective sources. I should repeat c a u t i o n s given throughout this chapter. I a m not proposing that t h e word " e x p l a n a t i o n " b e reserved

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exclusively for nomological-deductive accounts unless the explanation is offered as a scientific one. Obviously, there are good explanations that are not scientific. What I have attempted to develop is a provisional taxonomy of explanations as well as arguments as to where within this taxonomy psychological accounts most defensibly fall. There are strong reasons for being wary as to the place of the nomological-deductive model itself, even within the sciences. What critics of the model have not accomplished, in my view, is an alternative that is as inclusive, exclusive and coherent. Such alternatives as the functional one discussed in the previous chapter and the teleological one in the present chapter leave too much to be desired. Functional explanations with any predictive power at all rest on empirical laws of sufficient reliability to qualify as explanation-sketches and to suggest the operation of more basic laws of a genuinely nomic variety. To state the case briefly, functional explanations are less alternatives to than incomplete species of nomological-deductive explanations. Teleological accounts with psychological states and processes removed are not credible or even intelligible in their treatment of the sorts of phenomena in which Psychology traditionally and currently takes interest. And with the psychological dimension preserved, these same accounts are largely indistinguishable from the rationalized and narrative accounts found in historical scholarship, in ordinary common-sense explanations, and in literature.

CHAPTER

FIVE

Ethics and Psychological Inquiry

T

he present chapter may appear at first to be incongruous in light of preceding pages, but there are at least three justifications for it. First, there are points of contact between Ethics and Psychology that are not found in the sciences in general. A fuller appreciation of the philosophical character of Psychology is thus cultivated by an examination of these points of contact. Secondly, the subject-matter of Ethics arises from certain facts of human nature. To the extent that this subject-matter is regarded as significant, we must inquire into the degree to which Psychology may help to explain it. Finally, psychological research and practice carry certain ethical burdens whose implications are t o o often ignored or lightly treated. A book devoted, as this o n e is, to the philosophical dimensions of Psychology has as o n e main objective the encouragement of debate on matters casually regarded as settled or irrelevant. There are ethical matters that have, alas, not been settled and that are by no means irrelevant either to the practice of Psychology or to an understanding of its essential nature. It is not accidental that both Ethics and Psychology, just a century ago, tended to be paired

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under the general heading Moral Science, and that leading texts regularly treated the ethical and psychological dimensions of human nature as mutually elucidating. 1 lean Piaget 2 earlier in this century and Lawrence Kohlberg 3 at the present time are but two examples of psychologists who have productively explored the connection. But the numbers remain small, even as the influence of Psychology on ethical and political thought increases. 4 It is surely not my intention within the limited space of a single chapter to touch upon, let alone closely examine, all of the points of contact between Psychology and Ethics. Nor, in the same space, can a critical exegesis of ethical theory be developed. Instead, the present chapter is offered as an illustration of the bearing these subjects have on each other; an illustration based upon only a few selected topics of sufficient generality to invite attention to the full range of interactions. In choosing representative and suggestive topics, there is a certain barrier to thematic integrity; a certain ad hoc character imparted to the chapter and likely to be distracting. I alert readers to this and encourage them to take each section as more or less independent of the others, even where overarching ethical principles are cited or implicitly assumed.

Science, Psychology, and Values Whether or not Thomas Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions is sound, there has surely been something of a Kuhnian revolution in the social sciences since the appearance of his influential book. 5 Many psychologists have adopted an essentially Kuhnian position on Psychology, and regard its methods, subjects and guiding principles as "relative" to ever-shifting cultural and historical norms. There is now a quite general skepticism toward "absolutes" in any field of inquiry, including the physical sciences. Where the social sciences once and defensively insisted they were "value-neutral," they now tend to present themselves as unavoidably "value-loaded"; but in a way common to all sci-

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entific and intellectual pursuits. 6 Marxist or quasi-Marxist interpretations of the scientific enterprise find renewed vigor when apparent class-considerations seem to be at the bottom of fraudulent scientific reports. 7 But even when a specific ideological perspective is unuttered, psychologists and sociologists generally agree that science, as a human and social activity, can never sanitize itself against the intrusion of private or public aspirations, biases, and enthusiasms. This allegation is not confined to the social sciences themselves, but is stretched to embrace all of science. It is a "We're-no-worse-than-anybody-else" thesis when it is not a kind of fatalistic solipsism. But is it true? Rather, does it claim to be true? For if the thesis is a species of claimed truth then it makes appeal to standards of truth denied by the thesis itself. We begin to see, therefore, that this "sociology of knowledge" is not settled enough to be taken for granted as we attempt to comprehend the essential nature of scientific inquiry. It is not a datum but a theory. Actually, it is a theory of knowledge in that it sets limits on the objectivity and absoluteness of every knowledge-claim, including any coming from science. But it is a very complex and disorderly theory whose assets and defects are not easily discerned until the theory itself is dissected. What does it mean to say that a scientist's own values or those of the reigning culture are inextricably bound up with the scientific activity itself? Certainly a scientist brings his or her values to the laboratory in the same way as aches and pains too are brought to the laboratory. But the sociological thesis does not rest on mere coincidences. What the thesis asserts is not that scientists, in possession of values, are the embodiment of these values wherever they happen to be; rather, the values as values affect the scientific undertaking itself. The proposed relationship is akin to having a toothache and going to the dentist. Our values ("valuestructure") must be taken into account in any explanation of what scientists do as scientists. Understood in this light, the thesis is provocative and rich in implications. Still, we must be clear on how the concept of "values" is meant to be taken, and where in the various stages of scientific activity its (alleged) influences are to be found. It may

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b e true, for e x a m p l e , b u t only trivially s o t h a t Dr. Smith v a l u e s a n t i q u e s a n d d o e s scientific r e s e a r c h s o t h a t t h e r e is m o r e disp o s a b l e i n c o m e t o u s e for such "valuables." Dr. Jones, on t h e other hand, values t h e collegial friendships arising from teamwork in t h e laboratory a n d is c o m m i t t e d t o s c i e n c e chiefly b e c a u s e of t h i s benefit. Dr. Brown, however, is a pathologically m i s a n t h r o p i c c a d w h o s e r e s e a r c h is d e s i g n e d t o prove t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e natively wicked a n d can only b e m a n a g e d by r u t h l e s s m e a n s . In all t h r e e i n s t a n c e s t h e " v a l u e s " of t h e s c i e n t i s t s inform u s of t h e m o t i v a t i o n s or p u r p o s e s t h a t a r e t o b e s a t i s f i e d by scientific labor, b u t in n o n e of t h e t h r e e d o e s t h e m o t i v a t i o n a l fact d e s c r i b e or explain t h e work actually d o n e o n c e t h e s c i e n t i s t e n t e r s t h e laboratory. Indeed, t h e t h r e e s c i e n t i s t s m a y actually b e working on the s a m e problem, may be using the s a m e m e t h o d s and may o b t a i n t h e s a m e r e s u l t s which t h e y p r o c e e d t o p u b l i s h in very nearly t h e s a m e form. Are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s o ciological t h e s i s , t h a t o u r p o s i t i o n o n t h e s e p u b l i s h e d r e p o r t s should b e reserved until we learn which motives s t o o d b e h i n d t h e efforts of e a c h of t h e c o n t r i b u t o r s ? The m o s t c e l e b r a t e d c a s e u s e d t o d e f e n d sucii a c o n clusion is t h a t of Cyril B u r t 8 During a long a n d p r o d u c t i v e career, Burt b e c a m e o n e of Britain's m o s t e m i n e n t psychologists a n d had m u c h t o d o with t h e u s e of psychological t e s t s in p r e - c o l l e g e edu c a t i o n . He was, too, a c o m m i t t e d hereditarian, fortified by his own research a n d t h a t of o t h e r s in t h e belief t h a t g e n e t i c f a c t o r s w e r e chiefly r e s p o n s i b l e for v a r i a t i o n s in a c a d e m i c a n d s o c i o e c onomic achievement. A m e a s u r e of his p r o m i n e n c e is given by t h e fact of his k n i g h t h o o d . Thus, w h e n a g o o d c a s e for f r a u d o n Sir Cyril's part w a s p r e s e n t e d shortly a f t e r his d e a t h , a v e r i t a b l e growth-industry was s p a w n e d t o deal with t h e scandal. It s o o n b e c a m e clear t h a t a n u m b e r of Burt's p a p e r s i n c l u d e d e i t h e r illicit m a n i p u l a t i o n s of t h e d a t a or r e p o r t e d " d a t a " which Burt h a d simply inv e n t e d . Articles p u b l i s h e d over a p e r i o d of y e a r s a n d d e s c r i b i n g entirely different s a m p l e s included correlations identical to t h e third place after t h e decimal ( r = 0.771). Articles also included t h e n a m e s of co-authors w h o s e existence could not b e established even after

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t h e b r o a d e s t publicity. S o m e of t h e m o r e influential p a p e r s app e a r e d in a leading journal under Burt's own e d i t o r s h i p d e s p i t e their serious deficiencies in presenting t h e m e t h o d of research and t h e d e t a i l s of t h e t e s t e d s a m p l e s . S p e c u l a t i o n on why Burt res o r t e d t o such t e c h n i q u e s h a s b e e n e n e r g e t i c . P e r h a p s t h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e t h e s i s is t h a t Burt was sure of t h e general hereditarian c o n c l u s i o n s a n d p a t c h e d s o m e a r t i c l e s t o g e t h e r t o revive interest in t h e m during years when radical e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s m was reigning social

philosophy. 9

the

In t h e interest of fairness, and in t h e

face of f o r m i d a b l e if c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o t h e contrary, we m u s t a l s o leave r o o m for t h e possibility t h a t his n a m e d c o - a u t h o r s did, in fact, work with him but a r e now nowhere t o b e found a n d t h a t s i m p l e s l o p p i n e s s w a s b e h i n d his reported c o r r e l a t i o n s . But Burt's m o t i v e s a n d even his guilt are not central t o t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n . Rather, he is offered a s illustrative of a scientific p e r s o n a g e w h o s e social a n d p e r s o n a l a t t r i b u t e s b e c o m e thoroughly e n t a n g l e d with what h e would have t h e public take t o b e a value-free scientific program. Even t h e d e f e n d e r s of t h e sociological t h e o r y of s c i e n c e will grant t h a t c a s e s such a s t h i s are rare, but will insist t h a t they r e p r e s e n t t h e extremity of a c o n t i n uum on which all of s c i e n c e , all of h u m a n endeavor, m u s t b e loc a t e d . Thus, if t h e Burt affair proves t o b e irrelevant or u n a b l e t o s u s t a i n this t h e s i s , we c a n b e r e a s o n a b l y sure t h a t t h e t h e s i s itself is defective. Actually, t h e t h e s i s is s o m e w h a t mixed in its implic a t i o n s . In s o m e form, it r e q u i r e s t h a t we recognize even t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of s c i e n c e t o b e v a l u e - l o a d e d ; in weaker forms, only t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e larger social c o n t e x t t o which s c i e n c e a n d scie n t i s t s are a n s w e r a b l e a n d t o s o m e d e g r e e o b e d i e n t . The strong version of t h e t h e s i s can, I think, b e d i s m i s s e d rather readily. W h e t h e r or n o t intellectual c a p a c i t i e s are highly h e r i t a b l e e i t h e r is or is not a scientific q u e s t i o n , which is t o say a q u e s t i o n t h a t can only b e s e t t l e d by s p e c i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n s m a n d a t e d by a rigo r o u s t h e o r e t i c a l framing of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . Heritability (h 2 ), a s it is usefully m e a s u r e d a n d m a n i p u l a t e d in a g r o n o m y a n d a n i m a l husbandry, c a n n o t b e directly a p p l i e d t o s e t t i n g s in which t h e r e is u n c o n t r o l l e d a n d largely " o p e n " breeding. There are, therefore,

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very substantial arguments against the possibility of obtaining valid measures of h2 in human populations, at least with respect to complex phenotypes. This is not the place to consider the details of the scientific and technical issues. It is sufficient to say that hereditarians, including Cyril Burt, have been overly confident about the practical means by which biogenetic analysis and population genetics might be applied to this issue. Note, however, that a judgment in this area is grounded exclusively in statistical and genetic principles that are entirely independent of personal ideologies, social penchants and governmental policies. The same, however, cannot be said of attempts to specify t h o s e phenotypes that go into making up "intelligence" or "mental ability" or, for that matter, "academic achievement." When h2 is computed in agronomy and husbandry, the phenotypes are measurable in relatively straightforward and physical ways; e.g., the average height of crops, the average adult weight of litters, the ratio of fat to muscle, the average size of litters. The mental or cognitive dimensions of human psychology do not admit of such straightforward measurement or of such unarguable specification. The validity of mental tests typically rests upon the predictive efficiency they display in relation to performance in realistic settings. We would doubt the validity of a test of intelligence if scores earned by t h o s e taking it were entirely uncorrelated with intellectual accomplishments. It is here, of course, that a vicious circularity intrudes itself, for the very notion of "intellectual accomplishment" is intelligible only within a cultural context. Defenders of psychometric evaluations of this sort would serve their own interests better if they simply acknowledged this fact and offered no more than a shortcut technique for assessing "culturally specified intelligence." But let us not make too much of this. The standard tests of mental ability consist of sections devoted to calculational agility, verbal fluency, inductive and deductive reasoning, and a general knowledge of salient features of the history of civilization, including politics, art, and literature. To say that such matters are culturally "relative" is to suggest that there might be a worthy and attractive "culture" even where no premium whatever is placed

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upon such capacities. Well, perhaps there may be in s o m e abstract s e n s e a place so constituted. But how could it be judged as worthy (by us or by the indigenous population) unless there were sufficient expressivity in the local language and sufficient familiarity with qualitative and quantitative scaling and with valid modes of reasoning? I say we are not to make t o o much of the generous concession to the effect that standard I.Q. tests are value-laden. The "value" they are thus burdened by is one that has been adopted by every definable culture, East and West, throughout the recorded history of Homo sapiens. What is valued and what has been valued is the ability to perform mental operations by which communication, measurement, reasoning, and strategies might be shared with others or used for constructive personal purposes. Again, the point here is that we can identify the part of the issue that is "sociological" and we can also establish criteria by which even this part might be assessed. Thus, even where the sociological considerations are uppermost, we are still not abandoned to mere caprice, hopeless relativism, and the like. We can get a fairly good "fix" on the performances that are essential if mental ability is properly said to be abundant or limited or average, and we have noncapricious ways of determining the (statistical) relationship between measures of this ability and measures of successful performance in relevant contexts such as the classroom, the office and the factory. We may reject, therefore, any argument to the effect that the resulting data are not only loaded with implicit values, but that we have no way of extricating the objective elements from the evaluative ones. Whether a pound of beef c o s t s $3.75 or 60 sea shells or a third of an elephant's tusk, the child in these different economies who knows that two pounds cost $7.50 or 120 sea shells or two-thirds of a tusk knows something and can do something unavailable to the children who don't. It is o n e thing to say that culture-X "values" mathematical prowess, whereas culture-Y doesn't. It is quite another to say that, b e c a u s e of this relativity of values, we can't be absolutists on whether $7.50 is twice $3.75! It would not be fair to blame Thomas Kuhn for relat i v i s t s excesses, for he has generally a g r e e d ' 0 that the sociolog-

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ical elements in science tend to be marginal where the science itself is developed. For the latter he gives us a perhaps too "tribal" image of the scientific community thus insulated from external and social pressures but, if only as a historical account, his view seems sound. Theoretical Physics is obviously not as vulnerable to popular whims as is Sociology or Psychology. But Kuhn and his disciples have not, it would seem, traced out the implications of this fact. Physicists, as the phrase has it, are people too. Their resistance to external social pressures is not to be understood in psychological terms but in terms of the scientific coherence relating the facts, theories, and methods of Physics. It is simply false that sociological factors necessarily infect science (because they infect scientists), or that scientific pronouncements invariably express the "(relative") values of a culture or subculture. It is false because it is contradictory when properly analyzed. To the extent that it purports to be a statement of fact, it must submit itself to standards of proof, but in so doing would implicitly deny the conclusion of the statement. To the extent that it purports to be an assertion of logical necessity, its falsity is established by the fact that a statement of the form "Scientific Law-X is true in all possible worlds" is not self-contradictory. Adult persons the world over are known to engage in activities that require perception, memory, reasoning, and symbolic modes of communication. We take these to be "mental" processes or, on the mechanistic construal, "neural" processes. There is not now and never has been a known culture in which the categories of "correct" and "incorrect" have not been available and applied to these same processes. Some persons within a given culture will be right more often than others within the same culture. To a first approximation, therefore, we can say that in any numerous sample there will be variation in the performances of these and related tasks. Presumably, there is a test capable of disclosing the variation. In the abstract—and setting aside technical matters—we can ask the extent to which the measured variance is attributable to genetic variations within the sample. Putting the question with proper scientific and theoretical modesty, we can at least wonder how this measured variation might

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h a v e differed h a d every p e r s o n in t h e s a m p l e t h e s a m e g e n e t i c c o m p o s i t i o n a s every o t h e r . There m a y b e s o u n d r e a s o n s for c o n c l u d i n g t h a t s u c h a q u e s t i o n c o u l d never b e s e t t l e d empirically; or t h a t t h e p u b l i c policies e s t a b l i s h e d for t h i s c u l t u r e s h o u l d b e indifferent t o t h e results; or t h a t s o m e other challenge might c o m e t o face t h i s c u l t u r e a n d t h a t t h e low-scoring m e m b e r s w o u l d b e m o r e fit t o m e e t it; or t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t a l i n t e r a c t i o n s with g e n o t y p e s a r e s o c o m p l e x a n d n u m e r o u s t h a t any c o n c e i v a b l e result w o u l d b e largely u n i n t e r p r e t a b l e . T h e s e are all s e r i o u s reservat i o n s a n d , in t h e last analysis, conclusive. But t h e y a r e n o t s u p portive of t h e sociological t h e s i s a n d in fact t h e y c o m b i n e t o ref u t e it. The r e s e r v a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s c a n b e s e g r e g a t e d i n t o scientific, social, a n d t e c h n i c a l categories, a n d t h e principles of segregation will b e accepted by c o m p e t e n t scholars n o m a t t e r what t h e i r i d e o l o g i e s m i g h t be. If t h i s w e r e n ' t so, Burt w o u l d n o t h a v e h a d t o lie, if h e did. For t h e r e t o b e fraud, t h e r e m u s t b e a s t a n dard of identification; t h e r e m u s t b e a g e n u i n e dollar bill for t h e r e to be a counterfeit. In c h a p t e r 2 scientific laws w e r e p r e s e n t e d a s s t a t e m e n t s t h a t limit possibilities, a n d t h i s is a n a p t c o n t e x t for inserting t h i s f e a t u r e . In general, t h e r o o m m a d e available for v a l u e s within a n o t h e r w i s e scientific e n d e a v o r is just w h a t is left over w h e n scientific laws h a v e b e e n i n c l u d e d in t h e s a m e s p a c e . W h a t r e n d e r s Physics i m m u n e t o s m u g g l e d values, w h e n it is i m m u n e , is n o t s o m e t h i n g u n i q u e t o t h e m e t h o d s or t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e discipline. The i m m u n i t y is c o n f e r r e d by scientific laws a n d by t h e logical c o n n e c t i v e s a n d formal rules of i n f e r e n c e g e t t i n g u s from o n e s e t of laws t o a n o t h e r . Psychology in t h e m a i n is n o t in p o s s e s sion of such laws and, a s a r g u e d in t h e p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s , is n o t likely t o be. Thus, Psychology a n d kindred disciplines c a n n o t avoid t h e i n f u s i o n of v a l u e s in t h e i r g e n e r a l d i s c o u r s e , t h o u g h t h e y c a n in t h e purely q u a n t i t a t i v e m i s s i o n of d a t a - g a t h e r i n g a n d analysis. But t h e d a t a - g a t h e r i n g p r o c e e d s f r o m a q u e s t i o n , a n d t h e q u e s tion typically e x p r e s s e s at least an implicit e v a l u a t i o n of w h a t is i m p o r t a n t t o psychological b e i n g s a n d t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e m . There is, t h e n , a value-fact c o m p o u n d in t h e social s c i e n c e s t h a t d o e s n o t o c c u r a s uniformly a n d ineradicably in t h e n a t u r a l

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sciences. Here, then, is but another criterion by which to recognize the formal difference between the two.

Ethical Values It is another feature of the awkward manner in which the social sciences approach the issue of values that entirely dissimilar concepts are lumped together and treated as if there were no defensible way of distinguishing among them. Thus, the scientific enterprise is alleged to be value-laden or value-neutral depending upon the presence of (a) opinions, (b) merely personal inclinations or biases, (c) ethical presuppositions, (d) debatable professional estimations of significance, (e) veiled or explicit political or social agendas, or even (f) theoretical preferences. Part of the problem is the equivocality of the word "value" which may refer to an abstract ethical canon; or merely a desirable attribute; or the price the market sets on a specific and material object; or a description of personal sentiments attached to an issue or action or thing. Thus, one may be said to value a friend, or to have got a good value for the price, or to recognize truth as a value or to assign higher value to a good book than to a good painting. These are, of course, incommensurable uses of the word and not all of them can be applied indifferently. To say, for example, that science is "value-neutral" cannot be to refer to (c), for the establishment of science is not only devoted to truth but actually depends for its very survival on the commitment to truth by its practitioners. It is, indeed, the central ethical presupposition of science that truth is preferred to falsehood and is to be pursued for its own sake. What sort of enterprise would science be were it not "laden" with this value? What must be meant by those who would affirm or deny the neutrality of science in the matter of values is that science qua science places no stock in (a), (b), and (e) above, and makes provision for (d) and (f) only to the extent that these further the cause of science. Science does not "value" opinion or

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purely personal biases, nor does it tailor its discoveries to fit the prevailing political or social agenda. Unavoidably, scientists must decide what sort of science is worth doing and must proceed in their work within s o m e sort of theoretical framework. The choice of topics and the wager placed on theories are governed by evaluative and not merely empirical considerations. They will be colored by eccentricities and hunches, and will often be forcefully shaped by establishmentarian mentalities. Nobody's perfect! But if this is all that is meant by "value-laden," the term is scarcely a reproach and is scarcely something the scientific community should or even can avoid. Where the issue arises is at the point scientists externalize either the evaluative e l e m e n t s that are indispensable to scientific work or internalize t h o s e otherwise c o m m e n d a b l e social and political values which are, nonetheless, irrelevant or even damaging to the scientific enterprise. In the first instance, what is a useful finding highly productive of illuminating research is offered to the public as equally useful for settling matters that are nonscientific in the first instance. More generally, this externalization takes the form of requiring nonscientific issues to be determined according to standards that are appropriate only to science itself. We witness this unwarranted and often impertinent externalization in a growing number and variety of settings, typically for purposes of advocacy. I will turn to this in the next section. Internalization is in evidence when scientists c h o o s e questions and topics on the basis of social trends or governmental interests, or when the essential nature of the scientific endeavor is apologetical. The Burt affair turned up its share of quasi-scientific publications in which social values and policies were internalized by the factions within the scientific community." Genuinely ethical or moral values function in a manner similar to that displayed by genuinely scientific laws. And ethical or moral arguments are of the s a m e form as the nomological-deductive arguments of the established sciences. Note that what is asserted here is that the functions and the forms are similar, not the content and not the criteria of truth. As with "covering laws," so too are moral premises universalized. Granting the va-

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lidity or truth of a univesal moral p r e m i s e , t h e c o n c l u s i o n of a moral a r g u m e n t is deductively certain o n c e t h e (factual) m i n o r p r e m i s e is supplied. T h e s y m m e t r y may b e t h u s illustrated: M O R A L (RATIONAL)

SCIENTIFIC (CAUSAL)

EXPLANATION

EXPLANATION

1. It is universally o b l i g a t o r y

1. It is universally d e t e r m i n e d t h a t X.

t h a t X. 2. A c t i o n - Y is a s p e c i e s of X.

2. E v e n t - Y is a n i n s t a n c e of X.

3. N e c e s s a r i l y , Y is o b l i g a t o r y .

3. N e c e s s a r i l y , Y o c c u r s .

If, for e x a m p l e , t h e m a j o r moral p r e m i s e is t h a t it is universally wrong t o take t h e life of an i n n o c e n t a n d n o n t h r e a t e n ing h u m a n being, n e c e s s a r i l y it is wrong t o take t h e life of S m i t h if S m i t h is an i n n o c e n t a n d n o n t h r e a t e n i n g h u m a n being. As with n o m o l o g i c a l - d e d u c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s , t h e c o v e r a g e of universalized moral p r e m i s e s may b e limited by various a n d specified initial or b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . And a s with

nomological-deductive

e x p l a n a t i o n s , t h e factual m i n o r p r e m i s e (e.g., t h a t S m i t h is b o t h i n n o c e n t of any o f f e n s e a n d in n o way a threat t o t h e well-being of others) must benefit from empirical m o d e s of confirmation. There is always r o o m for d i s a g r e e m e n t over t h e e v i d e n c e favoring or c h a l l e n g i n g t h e m i n o r p r e m i s e b o t h in s c i e n c e a n d in moral discourse. W h a t clearly d i s t i n g u i s h e s " m o r a l s c i e n c e " from natural s c i e n c e is n e i t h e r t h e form of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n s nor t h e criteria a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e purely factual part of t h e respective argum e n t s . The d i s t i n c t i o n is found in t h e radically different n a t u r e of t h e m a j o r p r e m i s e s t h e m s e l v e s . A universal law in natural s c i e n c e predicts future occurrences and can b e disconfirmed by them. The law a r i s e s from direct o b s e r v a t i o n s of natural p h e n o m e n a a n d req u i r e s e x c e p t i o n l e s s r e p e a t a b i l i t y of o u t c o m e s under relevantly e q u i v a l e n t c o n d i t i o n s . But m a j o r p r e m i s e s in moral p h i l o s o p h y are prescriptive, n o t predictive. They d e c l a r e what o u g h t t o b e t h e c a s e , n o t what is t h e c a s e . They d o n o t a r i s e from e x c e p t i o n l e s s and o b s e r v e d natural o c c u r r e n c e s a n d they c a n n o t b e c o n f i r m e d or d i s c o n f i r m e d by any purely empirical p h e n o m e n o n . Granting t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n moral

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premises and scientific laws, we still must take note of the equivalent forms of explanation, for it is this equivalence that removes moral discourse from the realm of mere opinion, private feelings, and popular enthusiasms. The likes and dislikes of persons or groups of persons are of no moral consequence whatever unless a major moral premise is stipulated such that a universalized duty or obligation arises from such likes and dislikes. Intuitively we recognize that the Tightness or wrongness of murder would not be affected merely on the showing that large numbers of persons "felt" it to be right or wrong. Thus, when we refer to "values" in an attempt to specify whether or not science is value-laden or value-neutral, we must be careful to distinguish between bona fide ethical values—which is to say, ethics—and opinions or tastes or social conventions. As I've said, there are ethical presuppositions associated with all scientific activity; presuppositions regarding the requirement of truth; the superiority of rational modes of inquiry over opinion or superstition or conviction; the duty to make knowledge available to others and to publicize it if only so that errors may be detected and removed; the willingness to b e constrained by methodological requirements known to promote accuracy and informativeness. One may defend these ethical canons on pragmatic and utilitarian grounds or on deonotological grounds or both, just as one can defend the major premises of moral philosophy on both grounds. But whatever the grounds of defense, the presuppositions themselves are an indisputable feature of the scientific enterprise. Nevertheless, these presuppositions do not in any way determine the actual data resulting from scientific inquiry. Nature is under no compulsion to honor the ethical presuppositions of those who observe and report on natural phenomena. Any "value" the individual scientist has which might lead to distorted observations and reports is a "value" at variance with science's fundamental commitment to truth. There are, indeed, ethical values that surround the labors of science and on which the credibility of these labors depends. In this respect, science is not value-free in its mission or in its internal standards. But it is totally nonevaluative in its proprietorship of the facts of the natural world and in its reportorial

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a n d a n a l y t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e s e f a c t s . T h i s is t h e n a t u r e o f s c i e n c e in principle.

Departures from this constitute malfeasance, and

t h e guilty s c i e n t i s t t h u s invites r e b u k e a n d e n d u r i n g s u s p i c i o n . In light o f t h e e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e of m o r a l m a x i m s a n d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e s e a n d s c i e n t i f i c laws, it s h o u l d b e c l e a r t h a t n o fact of s c i e n c e c a n ever overturn or install t h e

major

p r e m i s e s o f a m o r a l s y s t e m . O n e s u c h f a c t of s c i e n c e is t h e m e a sured opinions of persons asked t o c o m m e n t on or judge the desirability of a given c o u r s e of action. S u c h opinions, no

matter

how widely shared, can only b e c o u n t e d a s o p i n i o n s ; t h e c e n t a g e s s t a n d as no m o r e than a descriptive fact of how

perre-

s p o n s e s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d in a s a m p l e . E v e n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e utilitarian c a l c u l u s , a fact o f t h i s kind c o u l d n o t b e e t h i c a l l y informing, for t h e s a m p l e d o p i n i o n s c o u l d y i e l d disutilitarian

c o n s e q u e n c e s if

t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p o l i c y . T h u s , e v e n o n u t i l i t a r i a n c o n s t r u a l s of e t h ics, o p i n i o n o r e p h e m e r a l f e e l i n g s o r s h i f t i n g f a s h i o n s c a n n e v e r overturn t h e m a j o r utilitarian p r e m i s e s a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e right c o u r s e o f a c t i o n is t h a t w h i c h is u t i l i t y - p r o m o t i n g . If t h i s is s o of t h e l e a s t t r a d i t i o n a l of e t h i c a l s y s t e m s , it is d o u b l y s o of t h e m o r e deductive and traditional (Kantian) alternatives. S o m e rather o d d i m p l i c a t i o n s have b e e n drawn from t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f e t h i c a l a n d s c i e n t i f i c laws. T h e r e is, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p o p u l a r view t h a t , b e c a u s e e t h i c a l c a n o n s c a n n o t b e empirically c o n f i r m e d , t h e y c a n h a v e n o e x i s t e n t i a l s t a n d i n g o r t h e y can at m o s t refer t o n o m o r e t h a n t h e idiosyncratic s e n t i m e n t s of t h o s e w h o a d o p t t h e m . Here we have an i n s t a n c e of t h e extern a l i z a t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c c r i t e r i a i n t o r e a l m s in w h i c h t h e s e c r i t e r i a h a v e n o p l a c e . N o t e t h a t w e c a n n o t c o n f i r m empirically

that true

c o n c l u s i o n s n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w f r o m t r u e p r e m i s e s in a v a l i d syll o g i s t i c a r g u m e n t . T h i s is a l o g i c a l , n o t a n e m p i r i c a l , t r u t h

and

t h u s t h e empirical criteria of validity are irrelevant. A moral p r e m i s e o f t h e f o r m , "It is a l w a y s w r o n g t o X . . ." is a u n i v e r s a l i z e d s t a t e m e n t w h i c h (therefore)

c a n never b e e m p i r i c a l l y c o n f i r m e d . B u t

m o r e t o t h e p o i n t , it c a n n o t b e e m p i r i c a l l y d i s c o n f i r m e d e i t h e r , s i n c e it r e f e r s t o a n o n e m p i r i c a l p r o p e r t y ( t h e wrongness)

of a c e r -

t a i n c l a s s o f a c t i o n s X, T o r e j e c t t h e p r e m i s e is t o a s s e r t t h a t it is

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never necessary t o offer justifications for doing X and never obligatory t o prevent or discourage t h e performance of X-type a c t i o n s . Nor, therefore, would it make any s e n s e t o punish t h o s e who did X. But this line of a r g u m e n t c u l m i n a t e s in a total skepticism regarding ethical values of any sort, including t h o s e that regulate scientific endeavors. It is an argument that is finally skeptical about truth itself; a b o u t t h e duty t o truth. S i n c e such an argument permits or is neutral with respect t o fraud and deception, it is an argument that would rule out even t h e ethical standards of science. Setting a s i d e this total skepticism, there is still room to wonder just what sort of entity an ethical principle is, granting that it is not "empirical" or, at least, physical. It is a rule-type entity not generically different from entities of the sort, "The B i s h o p must b e moved only diagonally." Ethical rules regulate social life and permit, in a manner of speaking, the "game of life" to be played in harm-limiting, loss-limiting fashion. The g a m e may thus proc e e d in a way that permits all participants t o cultivate their faculties, t o add m e a n i n g t o life, t o s h a r e in the b o u n t i e s of society and civilization. Ethical rules are rules for fiumanization, specifying tersely t h o s e minimal conditions which must obtain if persons are t o realize their p o t e n t i a l s and express their b e s t natures. What we require of t h e s t a t e d m a x i m s of e t h i c s is that they stand in c o herent relation t o t h e possibility for a h u m a n e and respectful t r e a t m e n t of o t h e r s and of ourselves. W e require that such maxims, which are c o n s t r a i n t s on personal autonomy, b e justified by being shown t o b e e s s e n t i a l to t h e larger and m o r e fundamental o b j e c t i v e t o which this a u t o n o m y a t t a c h e s itself. Thus, such maxims must b e argued into being and must make a p p e a l s t o t h e rat i o n a l i t y — n o t t h e s e n s e s — o f t h o s e w h o s e allegiance is sought. There are t o b e sure grounds for diagreement over just what t h e larger and m o s t fundamental o b j e c t i v e s of human a u t o n o m y may be. Thus, there is t o this extent a "relativity" in t h e regulative maxims of Ethics. But o n c e certain minimum o b j e c t i v e s are s e t — for example, t h e immunity of t h e innocent t o punishment, t h e freedom to pursue truth and to enter into bonds of friendship and

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love with others, protection against unwarranted a s s a u l t s on our person or unwarranted seizures of our p o s s e s s i o n s — o n c e t h e s e are set, t h e room for "relativity" is strikingly constricted.

Ethics and Advocacy* Advocacy in s c i e n c e takes two general forms, o n e that is explicitly political and a n o t h e r that would present itself a s authoritative. In t h e former c a s e , a professional or scientific a s s o c i ation, through its governing boards, speaks out on issues of broad social c o n s e q u e n c e , hopeful of being heard not b e c a u s e of relevant expertise but only by virtue of t h e m e m b e r s h i p ' s extensive education or p r e s u m e d intelligence or character. If, for example, t h e American Meteorological Society were to take a position on, say, affirmative action, t h e grounds on which t h e Society might expect recognition would have nothing to do with c o m p e t e n c e in meteorological research and theory. Such actions, then, are b e s t understood a s pro bono g e s t u r e s and are harmful, if at all, only t o the extent that they c o n t r i b u t e to what is already a rampant sent i m e n t a l i s m in modern a p p r o a c h e s t o social and political problems. Advocacy that is advanced on t h e grounds of authority, however, is quite a n o t h e r matter, for in this c a s e there is t h e potential for fraud or m i s f e a s a n c e . Psychology is particularly vulnerable here b e c a u s e it is widely recognized a s having an authoritative standing where " h u m a n " i s s u e s are involved. It is not clear t o t h e general public, for example, that t h e American Psychological Association is no m o r e or less c o m p e t e n t to address an issue such a s affirmative action than, say, t h e American Meteorological Society. There are a few i s s u e s on which t h e APA. has taken

* A version of this section is given in " E t h i c s and Advocacy," American

Psychologist,

1984, 39, 7 8 7 - 7 9 3 .

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the advocate's role and which will help to illustrate the schism between fact and value and the dangers of externalizing scientific criteria to nonscientific contexts. The A.P.A. has spoken out corporately on (a) so-called "Gay rights" in the matter of so-called "sexual discrimination"; (b) the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA); (c) alleged "women's rights" in the matter of abortion. I cite these three highly charged areas because they seem to include considerations which psychologists might be generally perceived as having some special competence to address. I will not attempt to reach the right answer on any of these issues. The point in raising them is only to inquire into the ethical dimensions of professional advocacy where issues such as these are involved. Statutes opposed to hiring homosexuals for certain public employments (e.g., teaching in the lower grades) or to permitting homosexuals certain otherwise private occupations (e.g., the adoption of children) historically arose from a combination of settled principle and arguable fact. The principle was that children, as highly impressionable and malleable persons, must be protected against influences judged to be untoward. The arguable fact is that sexual proclivities are developed in part according to influential adult models and that children regularly exposed to homosexual models may be inclined in the same direction. In a State in which early education is compulsory, the State itself has the special responsibility to ensure that the environments created by it and the institutions it subsidizes and licenses are compatible with the expectations and values of the electorate. These expectations and values must, of course, themselves be compatible with fundamental constitutional principles, but appointment as a teacher or as an adopting parent is not a constitutional right. There are in both instances requirements for eligibility that include "moral character" and fitness to have regular and significant influence on children placed in one's charge. What has the APA corporately to contribute either to the principle or (even) the arguable fact standing behind this issue? Perhaps there are reliable studies to indicate that homosexual teachers and homosexual parents do not have untoward effects on children. Yet, there are also studies strongly suggesting that

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sexuality is in s o m e m e a s u r e a learned pattern of behavior; t h a t p e r s o n s a r e given " s e x r o l e s " a n d c o m e t o a d o p t " s e x - r o l e s t e r e otypes" on t h e basis of social indoctrination. To say t h e least, then, t h e factual a s p e c t of traditional p o l i c i e s r e m a i n s a r g u a b l e even within t h e relevant research literature. T h e only ethical s t a n c e for a b o d y such a s APA would b e o n e t h a t h o n o r s t h e a r g u a b l e nature of t h e existing e v i d e n c e . But on the separate and very different question of who h a s rights of a given kind, t h e APA, like t h e American M e t e o r o l o g ical Society, h a s n o s p e c i a l s t a n d i n g at all. Even if t h e s t a t u t e s d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t p e r s o n s o n racial grounds, t h e APA, a s an a s s o c i a t i o n of psychologists,

would have n o relevant e x p e r t i s e by

which t o t a k e an authoritative p o s i t i o n . O p p o s i t i o n t o such a policy would have t o b e g r o u n d e d n o t in psychological c o m p e t e n c e b u t in moral s e n s i b i l i t i e s . On t h e m a t t e r of a d o p t i o n by h o m o sexuals, t h e r e might even b e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which t h e b i o l o g i cal p a r e n t s s p e c i f y — a s a c o n d i t i o n of releasing t h e child t o an a d o p t i o n a g e n c y — t h a t t h e a d o p t i n g p a r e n t s b e h e t e r o s e x u a l or, for t h a t matter, h e t e r o s e x u a l Presbyterians. Is it within t h e professional ambit of psychologists t o take an official position on w h o s e rights prevail in such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? T h e s a m e p r e s u m p t u o u s n e s s is in e v i d e n c e when APA (along with m a n y o t h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l groups) d e c l a r e d a b o y c o t t on c i t i e s w h o s e S t a t e s had n o t approved t h e ERA. As it h a p p e n s , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h o l a r s q u i t e in s y m p a t h y with t h e o b j e c t i v e s b e hind the A m e n d m e n t have criticized t h e specific wording. O n e can b e totally c o m m i t t e d t o full and equal rights for w o m e n without favoring t h e specific A m e n d m e n t p r o p o s e d t o a c h i e v e it. For an organization such a s t h e APA, therefore, t o put its professional weight b e h i n d this

specific A m e n d m e n t

is absurd.

Psychological

re-

search c o m p a r i n g m e n a n d w o m e n on any n u m b e r of perform a n c e - t a s k s h a s shown a n d will c o n t i n u e t o show that t h e r e is n o significant difference on s o m e t a s k s a n d s o m e significant diff e r e n c e s on o t h e r t a s k s w h e r e group averages provide t h e b a s i s for c o m p a r i s o n . This, of c o u r s e , h a s n o t h i n g whatever t o d o with t h e a l l o c a t i o n of rights in a just society. W e d o not r e d u c e t h e rights of a person o n t h e g r o u n d s of t h a t p e r s o n ' s b e i n g t h e m e m b e r of

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s o m e group which, on average, does not c o m e up to the level of s o m e other group on average. Such rights or privileges that the law may confer are conferred on individuals. From the fact that the majority of men talented enough to play basketball in the National Basketball Association are black, we do not conclude that "Caucasians Need Not Apply." Ethics proper is simply not carved out of the mountain of often conflicting data amassed by social scientists. The law keeps one eye on ethical principles and the other on relevant facts, but it is aided in neither c a s e by such conflicting data. Psychologists who know this and who still bring corporate and professional pressures to bear on legislation in the domain of rights are committing what can only be called a fraud. And t h o s e who do not recognize the difference between the propositional character of ethical-legal argument and the factual character of psychological research are incompetent in a far more damaging respect. Finally, what might an organization such as the APA be able to contribute to the issue of abortion? There is, alas, a literature in which we will find interesting facts describing the psychological prowess of prenatal and postnatal human beings. There is nothing of a psychological nature that the one-day-old infant can express which is not expressed by the infant two days earlier. To the extent that one's position on the issue turns on whether or not birth per se brings about discriminable improvements in mental or behavioral capacities, the psychological findings are germane. But this is not something we need the corporate APA to tell us. Nor would the literature itself constitute an argument for or against the alleged right women have to obtain abortions. Mothers do not have the right to terminate the life of children who are psychologically defective. Thus, psychological comparisons of prenatal and neonatal performances are obviously irrelevant to the ethical question of whether life-ending measures are permissible. So far I have spoken only of corporate advocacy by way of illustrating the externalization of empirical criteria of truth to the domain of nonempirical ethical canons. But psychologists function as advocates one-at-a-time as well, whether as teachers

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or scientists or practitioners. They are educated men and women who have both the right and the duty to share their knowledge, their wisdom, and even their intuitions with those who may derive benefit from them. But it is precisely because of the authoritative standing they have in o n e discipline that it is incumbent upon them to make clear whether their writings and utterances are proceeding from that authority. The psychologist who declares that criminals are made and not born receives more respectful attention than a dentist making the s a m e claim. S o too with psychologists who speak of the healing powers of positive thinking; of the efficacy of corporal punishment; of the "personalities" of political leaders; of the effects of television on behavior; of the likelihood of a patient, when released, committing a violent crime. The list could be expanded indefinitely. Much of this talk has b e c o m e loose talk, in part because it is spoken by persons confused as to what they are really able to say. Thus: 1. From the fact that empirical studies of "values" turn up significant cross-cultural differences, it does not follow that ethical canons are themselves "relative." (Studies showing wide variations across cultures in the sums obtained on arithmetic problems would not sustain the conclusion that the rules of addition are "relative"; only that s o m e people don't know how to add.) 2. From the fact that, on average, scores on achievement tests predict later academic success, it does not follow that this score will predict the later performance of this student. 3. From the fact that h2 is practically incalculable using human subjects and complex psychological phenotypes, it does not follow that the phenotypes are not highly heritable; only that we do not know. 4. From the fact that, on average, children exposed to brutalizing experiences tend to be hostile and aggressive later in life, it does not follow that this person's felonious conduct was "caused" by such early experiences. This list too could be extended indefinitely. Psychological inquiry takes on ethical burdens only to the extent that the discipline's masters speak beyond the perimeter of the known

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without alerting auditors to the fact. In all significant spheres of human conduct and human thought and feeling, psychological certainties are not to be found. Psychologists speaking on matters psychological are not like physicists speaking on matters physical. We have no unifying and coherent theories vindicated by nearly exceptionless evidence. We have no covering laws worth the name, and only a few empirical laws of any generality. None of this need be a source of embarrassment, and none of it should be camouflaged to create a good impression. Given the state of the discipline, psychologists should be diffident as advocates and grudging in the few generalizations warranted by what we know.

Free Inquiry and the Rights of Others Owing to the differences between psychological entities and merely physical ones, the former impose constraints on free inquiry that are largely absent in the physical sciences. 1 refer to psychological entities rather than to persons, because the constraints in question extend to nonhuman species as well. An important question has to do with just how many of the same constraints apply and to what extent. I shall take up this question shortly. But since the entire issue is engaged by the concept of rights—whether the "right" to free inquiry or the "right" to be treated in a certain way—it is proper to consider the concept of rights first. Bentham's famous dictum—that natural rights are but "nonsense on stilts"—impatiently expresses the frustrations endured by those who have attempted to give bulk and meaning to the notion of rights. Any number of standard texts may be consulted for evidence of the continuing ambiguity surrounding the notion, 12 and none of what 1 had to say in chapter 2 should be taken as conclusive in this vexatious matter. On the construal of legal positivists, a right is no more than the promise made by law to those who, on one basis or another, are regarded as qualified. Thus, such a right is not some abstract feature of the person or

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s o m e native possession; less is it "natural" in any informed s e n s e of t h e term. Rather, it is a promised protection extended for purp o s e s of expediency and withdrawn whenever larger social or political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d e m a n d it. I have elsewhere argued against this view 1 3 but in t h e present context it is not necessary t o hold to any specific theory of rights. It is enough t o recognize that such entities are not "empirical" and can never therefore b e s a n c tioned or illuminated or challenged by science, least of all " s o cial" s c i e n c e . Ethics, a s 1 said earlier in this chapter, arises from certain attributes of human nature, but t h e s e are not physical or are at least not reducible t o physical attributes. Even on t h e old Humean theory, according t o which t h e moral categories are grounded in our e m o t i o n a l or s e n t i m e n t a l reactions, we are not able to explain either the universalizability of moral canons or our readiness t o classify a c t i o n s as right or wrong independently of our or a n y o n e e l s e ' s visceral s e n s a t i o n s . Nor d o e s t h e theory explain why t h e b a l a n c e of t h e animal e c o n o m y — i n which there is every evidence of e m o t i o n a l or s e n t i m e n t a l i m p u l s e s — r e v e a l s nothing identifiable as a moral prescription. Without taking s i d e s in t h e wrangle here, 1 n o t e only that t h e rights now claimed by citizens in t h e Western d e m o c r a cies rest on a sturdy and traditional legal foundation, but one that cannot prevent frequent and even damaging collisions. Society has a right (as it were) to b e protected from dangerous persons. Dangerous p e r s o n s s o m e t i m e s inform psychologists or psychiatrists or c o n f e s s o r s of an intended assault. A "privilege of confidentiality" is alleged by which psychologists, et al. have t h e "right" not t o d i s c l o s e what a patient or o n e of t h e faithful has said. Or, t o take a n o t h e r case, p e r s o n s have a right not to b e defrauded. They have, that is, a right t o expect that o t h e r s will not use t h e m for e n d s of which they are unaware and t o which they may very well b e o p p o s e d . This right presumably covers their privacy such that o t h e r s have no right t o trick t h e m into making known personal matters or personal feelings which they would not voluntarily reveal. But social s c i e n t i s t s (and others) have an (alleged) right of free inquiry and this includes research w h o s e o b j e c t i v e s might b e rendered i m p o s s i b l e u n l e s s experimental s u b j e c t s are kept igno-

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rant of or even deceived about the actual aims of the study. Or, finally, persons are thought of as having the right to be spared actions taken against them or constraints imposed upon their autonomy unless they have given an informed consent to those interested in or responsible for such actions. But various therapeutic modalities are indefinite in their consequences and thus neither the therapist nor the client can be fully informed in a sense that would make consent meaningful. 14 It should be clear that collisions of this sort cannot be fully avoided by means developed within Psychology itself. Because of this, it is somewhat hazardous to rely upon a "professional ethics" as if it were more trustworthy or apt than the more developed and general ethics suffusing long established political and legal institutions. When it comes to settling antagonisms between the aims and practices of a scientific or clinical discipline and this more developed and general ethics, therefore, psychologists should be prepared to confer greater authority on the latter. From an ethical point of view, the fact that an activity occurs within a professional discipline has no bearing on whether it is positive or negative in its ethical "sign." The grounds, if such there be, on which fraud or manipulation or deception or cruelty is wrong are surely wide enough to surround professional actions. If fields such as "biomedical" ethics and "business ethics" are to be apt and useful, their aim should be the weighing of practices in medicine or business against established ethical canons; not the coining of new, untried, and disjointed quasi-principles that happen to make some sort of ad hoc contact with medical or business practices. The same is true of "psychological ethics." An action cannot be wrong (morally) in Detroit and right (morally) in Toledo; wrong (morally) in the operating room but right (morally) in the stock exchange. What may differ from setting to setting are conditions that specify the relevant and ruling maxim. The ambiguities surrounding moral assessments have to do with the problem of finding the appropriate principle, not with anything intrinsically ambiguous about the principle itself. I turn now to a specific issue that has animated controversy for decades; an issue that stands as an ethical "hard case" and that illustrates the futility of

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attempting solutions within the psychological disciplines themselves.

"Animal Rights" If we remain with the uncontroversial definition of rights as a range of protections conferred by law, we can begin with the fact of law that cruelty toward animals is an offense punishable by fine and/or imprisonment depending on the jurisdiction and the severity of the offense. In this purely legal respect, animals have rights; they have the promised protection of law against treatment of a certain kind. It is not beside the point to inquire if only briefly into the understandings that underlie such legislation. The protection is extended to animals partly on the same grounds as those applying to persons. It is because persons and animals have the capacity for suffering that laws are enacted to spare them unnecessary and unjustifiable suffering. Note that the protection is not conditional on the beneficiary's ability to claim it. It is claimed in behalf of all potential sufferers by laws that have reached a settled position on the ethical status of cruelty. We may now ask whether the right of "free inquiry," to the extent that it may collide with protections against cruel treatment, takes precedence over the right to be spared from such treatment. If, for example, free inquiry is on some intelligible and defensible scale of higher worth, then the right to engage in studies in which terrible pain and suffering are caused would presumably extend to studies of human beings. Note that the protection itself is grounded in the recipient's capacity for suffering. To the extent that this capacity is of comparable magnitude in all of the advanced species, the protection is comparably extended. Let us say, however, that there is a moral distinction to be made between acts of gratuitous cruelty and those that cause suffering in a way that is unwanted but unavoidable. The sadist tortures a victim for the sadistic pleasures yielded by the act,

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whereas t h e scientist is motivated by t h e quest for truth and would happily a b a n d o n p a i n - p r o d u c i n g m e a s u r e s if t h e q u e s t c o u l d b e carried through without t h e m . Again, t h i s difference in m o t i v e s surely would n o t b e sufficient t o justify p a i n - i n d u c i n g m e a s u r e s b r o u g h t t o b e a r o n h u m a n b e i n g s . How t h e n might it justify t h e s a m e m e a s u r e s when c o n f i n e d t o c r e a t u r e s t h a t are n o t h u m a n but a r e still c a p a b l e of s u f f e r i n g ? 1 5 T h e a n s w e r m o s t frequently given by t h e scientific c o m m u n i t y is t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s are regarded (by human beings!) a s having higher moral worth than any and all n o n h u m a n b e i n g s . Thus, research c a p a b l e of reducing human suffering is justified even t h o u g h it m u s t c a u s e suffering t o nonhuman organisms. This, I say, is t h e c o m m o n reply, but it is not entirely satisfying. First, it is n o t c l e a r just how t h i s putative c o n t i n u u m of moral worth is c o n s t r u c t e d o r just how an entity's p o s i t i o n on it is d e t e r m i n e d . T h e r e is a definite strain of " s p e c i e s - i s m " in t h e position, n o t entirely unlike garden varieties of racism a n d sexism. It surely would not follow, for e x a m p l e , from t h e fact t h a t we are t h e m o s t fully evolved or m o s t a d v a n c e d s p e c i e s t h a t we have a right t o m a i m a n d ravage all o t h e r forms of life in our own int e r e s t . W e are, a c c o r d i n g t o a p o p u l a r a n d powerful theory, t h e m o s t a d v a n c e d of t h e primates, t h a n d o g s are a s canines

but we are n o m o r e "fully evolved"

or birds a s avians.

Each e x t a n t s p e c i e s ,

including our own, is just w h e r e it is on an evolutionary c o n t i n uum t h a t h a s not e n d e d . T h e only way o u t of t h e b i n d — a n d it is n o t a particularly ethical way—is t o acknowledge that t h e entire realm of ethics exists only by dint of h u m a n rationality, a n d t h a t this s a m e rationality h a s v o t e d for h u m a n life a n d h u m a n i n t e r e s t s over t h e life a n d i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s p e c i e s w h e n e v e r t h e two are in conflict. Thus, where h u m a n life can b e e n h a n c e d a n d h u m a n suffering dim i n i s h e d by t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u s e of n o n h u m a n creatures, we v o t e for ourselves. To s e e t h i s a s an i s s u e at all, however, is t o s e e t h e n e e d for a virtually t r a n s p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e research and t h e relief of h u m a n suffering or t h e e n h a n c e m e n t of h u m a n life. It is not, t h e n , t h e (alleged) "right" of free inquiry t h a t pro-

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vides moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for t h e suffering e n d u r e d by a n i m a l s u b j e c t s . Rather, it is a p r a g m a t i c s t a n d a r d t h a t is a d o p t e d , o n c e we have a g r e e d t o give moral p r e c e d e n c e t o h u m a n b e i n g s . But t h i s s t a n d a r d is s e t n o t by t h e m e t h o d s or t h e o r i e s of s c i e n c e ; it is s e t by t h e e x p r e s s e d n e e d s a n d d e s i r e s of t h e public at large. It is t h e public t h a t d e c i d e s , through its legislators, w h e t h e r t h e privilege t o e n g a g e in ethically u n s e t t l e d research is t o b e granted; w h e t h e r t h e p r o m i s e d g a i n s are of sufficient i m p o r t a n c e in

human

terms t o permit actions that would otherwise b e unacceptable and u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . They would b e u n a c c e p t a b l e a n d u n c o n s c i o n a b l e w h e n e v e r their only e x c u s e was t h e private d e s i r e of t h e practitioner, even w h e r e t h a t d e s i r e was a i m e d at "inquiry" a n d its resulting s a t i s f a c t i o n s . It m u s t b e g r a n t e d in t h i s c o n n e c t i o n t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m u c h of psychological research a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l relief of h u m a n suffering or e n h a n c e m e n t of h u m a n life is l e s s t h a n t r a n s p a r e n t . S o m e of it is merely habitual a n d even m o r e of it is prosaic, uninspired, m o n o t o n o u s l y repetitious, a n d trivial in its i m p l i c a t i o n s . Through it all, t e n s of t h o u s a n d s of a n imals are c r a m m e d into unnatural settings and m a n a g e d a s if they were i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from inert matter. T h e t e m p t a t i o n s t o hyp e r b o l e a n d s e n t i m e n t a l i s m can b e m a d e q u i t e strong by t h e s p e c t a c l e of t h e "vivarium," but they m u s t b e resisted. My chief o b j e c t i v e h e r e is n o t t o p r o p a g a n d i z e for a " m o v e m e n t " — t h e r e is an Animal Rights M o v e m e n t — b u t t o clarify t h e justificatory princ i p l e s a p p l i c a b l e t o research of t h i s type. T h e principles are not t h e internal c o d e s of a p r o f e s s i o n a l group or c a s t e , b u t t h e external o n e s that permit society to establish its own priorities, its own b e s t interest. O n c e this is recognized, p s y c h o l o g i s t s will b e l e s s given t o huffy a n d s a n c t i m o n i o u s d e f e n s e s of their craft.

Ethics as a Subject of Inquiry I referred earlier t o t h e p i o n e e r i n g research of Piaget and t h e r e c e n t work of L a w r e n c e Kohlberg, noting t h a t t h e n u m b e r s working in t h i s a r e a remain small. I noted, too, that it was

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only a century ago when the better known writers routinely included the moral dimensions of human life in treatises of a psychological nature. It was a chief objective in chapter 2 to elucidate the incommensurability between scientific laws and explanations of human conduct; in chapter 3, the incommensurability between reductionistic programs and coherent explications of psychological processes. In both instances, the incommensurability becomes especially striking when the psychological side of the equation is occupied by moral terms and actions. Nonetheless, philosophers indebted to various traditions continue to take firm positions on the nature and even the origin of moral judgments; positions that are either explicitly psychological or at least beholden to one or another folk-theory regarding human psychological attributes. Those writing in that sentimentalist tradition made so compelling by Hume are given to believe that the subject-matter of morals is largely exhausted by the feelings or emotions persons customarily experience in response to actions of a certain kind. According to this emotive theory, the rational or cognitive side of moral discourse is principally a rationalization of the feelings themselves; an attempt to impose a systematic and logical construction on what, at root, is nothing but felt pleasure or aversion. Philosophers in the rationalist tradition of Kant or the natural-law tradition of Thomas Aquinas16 insist that the moral domain is irreducibly cognitive and propositional; that it is entered only by creatures able to frame means-ends possibilities; that it is rooted in the ground of intention and purpose. What makes an action good or bad, right or wrong, is thus not a "feeling" created in the actor or in those witnessing or suffering the action but in the principle or maxim of which the act is expressive. Again, Piaget and Kohlberg are among the astonishingly few psychologists to recognize the essential role of psychological inquiry in an issue of this kind. The philosophical disputes are, we must think, accessible to the facts unearthed by research into alleged moral "sentiments" and alleged moral "reasoning." It may indeed be the case that the genuinely philosophical aspects of the issue will survive nearly any conceivable finding, but

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it is only under the light of reliable facts that these aspects can be clearly seen. It is not my intention here to prejudge the outcome of enlarged research, nor would 1 suggest that the terms of the philosophical dispute would be significantly altered were psychologists to discover any degree of diversity or uniformity in the manner in which persons come to have various moral inclinations. More than one enthusiast—whether utilitarian or deontologist—has found the naturalistic fallacy irresistible and I should not want to lengthen the list on either side. Nonetheless, the discovery that solutions to morally dilemmatic problems display rather abrupt logical discontinuities is suggestive. 17 One would think that a conditioning history linking moral judgments to this or that emotion would produce only variations in what might be called the strength of conviction, not the actual principles on which the conviction rests. If anything, however, psychologists have mostly ignored the principled basis of evaluative discourse and have focused instead on what must be the least interesting and least informing of facts; viz, the statistical incidence of support for various points of view or "feelings." It is not a sign of maturity for a discipline to be preoccupied with "counting heads," as it were, and to avoid the serious question of the variables that come to determine the positions thus polled. What, finally, are the bases upon which persons come to hold moral positions and are they similar to or different from the bases on which beliefs, opinions, and convictions are erected? We can agree in advance that answers to these questions will not simultaneously settle the fundamental question of morals but we can also agree that the psychological and the moral realms are not entirely disparate. The relative aloofness of psychologists toward moral "phenomena" is but a species of the larger relative indifference to rationality itself. For all the research and theory devoted to "cognitive science," there remains a very wide region of rationality that is neglected. lust a few questions illustrate the point: 1. What are the psychological marks of knowledge and how do these differ from the marks of belief or speculation or hunches?

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2. Setting a s i d e t h e Piagetian q u e s t i o n of when children c o m p r e h e n d universals, what is t h e m i n i m u m psychological or cognitive e q u i p m e n t necessary for a n y o n e of any age t o traffic in universalized p r o p o s i t i o n s ? 3. How are a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t s r e p r e s e n t e d ? In t h e argot of today's Cognitive Psychology, how are such c o n c e p t s a s imaginary n u m b e r s or infinite s e t s or right and wrong or justice " s c h e m a t i z e d " or " c o d e d " or " r e p r e s e n t e d " ? Certainly o n e reason for t h e short-changing of rationality is that t h e s u b j e c t d o e s not lend itself t o the normal forms of experimental inquiry, replete with t-tests, c o m p u t e r - g e n e r a t e d displays, and t h e like. Perhaps a m o r e subtle factor is t h e utter ubiquity of rationality such that, merely to serve a s an experimental subject, o n e is p r e s u m e d t o b e in p o s s e s s i o n of t h e necessary faculties of reasoning. But this is just a s true of research in visual perception or short-term memory, and in neither of t h e s e c a s e s has t h e ubiquity of t h e requisite faculties prevented s o u n d and informing experimental analyses. But in t h e matter of rationality—and of o n e s p e c i e s of it; viz., moral r e a s o n i n g — a t t e n t i o n has b e e n given primarily t o developmental and pathological departures from t h e norm rather than to t h e norm itself. As of now, we have no s y s t e m a t i c study of, for example, individual differences in performance on logical or moral problems. But it is surely plausible t o c o n s i d e r such differences to b e behind at least s o m e of t h e well known differences in "personality" or learning or, for that matter, c a t e g o r i e s of deviancy. (Recall Locke's t h e s i s that madmen reason rightly from wrong premises.) As with t h e o t h e r m a j o r t o p i c s of this book, t h e subject of Ethics is included t o draw attention t o t h e discipline's p e n c h a n t for taking for granted what is far from obvious or for neglecting that which may well b e central t o its larger agenda. I would not, of course, p r e s u m e t o lay out a program of research on moral reasoning, if only b e c a u s e Kohlberg has d o n e a s much at least within a limited context. Nor would I s e e k t o legislate a professional ethics for psychologists, though as I have argued above there would s e e m t o b e need for greater thought on t h e part of t h o s e who would use t h e profession for purposes of advocacy. Finally, I certainly do not seek to foist an "animal rights" thesis with

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missionary zeal or out of a desire to turn off the lights in the laboratory, though, as noted, our alleged rights in this area cannot be casually assumed to be boundless or beyond the call for justifications. Psychology turns out to be "value-laden" in more ways than one, even if its attention to values per se is sporadic and desultory.

Summary Discussions within Psychology as to the value-neutral or value-laden nature of scientific inquiry have been deflected by spurious conceptions of "values" and by a somewhat habitual incomprehension of just what it is that makes the physical sciences far less sensitive to such considerations. There has been a general and invalid supposition to the effect that the motives and convictions of scientists are inextricably connected to their actual findings and theories. Thus, a prevailing relativism asserts itself within psychological circles addressing the character and aims of science. This discourse has even moved toward the odd conclusion that a different species of Ethics applies to scientific inquiry; that, since all values are "relative," there are specific values covering the scientific enterprise different from those operating in the nonscientific context. Unclear as to the nature of Ethics, the psychological establishment has found itself in positions of advocacy where it lacks relevant standing and where it thus invites the charge of fraud or innocence. In the same state of confusion the same establishment has undertaken to articulate justificatory grounds for any number of practices—whether in research or in therapy—but where the grounds themselves are either misplaced or, if thoroughly tilled, portentous. Through it all, Psychology has been surprisingly aloof to those intellectual and rational processes by which persons develop ethical systems. Thus, the attribute that may be our most distinguishing has been neglected by the one discipline whose methods and perspectives would seem uniquely suited to assessments of it.

Notes 1. The Armchair and the Laboratory 1. W i l l i a m lames, Principles of Psychology, pp. 467-468. 2. Various behavioristic strategies since the t i m e of lohn Watson have striven w i t h o u t success t o achieve a "purely" descriptive system. The adverb here is will-o'-thewisp. The very c o m m i t m e n t t o descriptivism is a metaphysical one calling for analysis and justification. 3. Examples are everywhere, but none more to the p o i n t t h a n B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity New York: Knopf, 1971 4. C. G. Gross, C. Rocha-Miranda and D. Bender. "Visual properties of neurons in inferotemporal cortex of t h e Macque." \ournal of Neurophysiology

(1972) 35 96-111. It is

unlikely that the case is even this simple in the realm of the monkey brain. That a given (single) cell "fires" at a greater rate in the presence of one visual form than in response to others surely does not confer perceptual experiences on that cell. 5. A. |. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 7. 6. In this connection, see my Systems of Modern Psychology: A Critical Sketch. In this earlier work I have examined specific and still highly influential approaches to the subject, largely ignoring the meta-psychological

problems t o which the current work is de-

voted. 7. In b o r r o w i n g this piece of modern philosophical reasoning I d o not mean to stand behind it. The n o t i o n of knowledge as "a true b e l i e f " or "a belief that the subject is justified in h o l d i n g " is plagued by difficulties that have not gone unnoticed in the recent philosophical literature. It is useful to note here the difference between the strict philosophical sense of "knowledge" and the looser psychological sense. The psychologist is likely t o regard Smith's c l a i m e d knowledge as knowledge simpliciter, even if Smith happens to be wrong. The psychologist, t h a t is, may have no purpose that requires testing such claims for validity since what is under investigation is the process and not the c o n t e n t

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1. THE ARMCHAIR AND THE LABORATORY

per se Philosophically, of course, it is senseless for Smith to claim "I know about uni-

corns," since no such entity exists and therefore the knowledge-claim refers to nothing. Following Ryle, many have found it useful to distinguish between knowing how (e.g., to dance,

to drive) and knowing that (e.g., the President is elected to no more than two terms). Belief

does not enter into the former, which is nonpropositional, but does seem to be inextri-

cably tied to the latter. If Smith knows that presidents are limited to two terms, surely he believes it. If, however, he believed that three terms were allowed, he could not be said to know it, for it is false Thus, knowledge and belief are different states of a claimant that

are to be evaluated in "justificatory" terms. A little thought is sufficient to show that this will not put the matter to rest!

8. This is found in |. |. C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes."

9. See chapter 11 of Richard Hofstadter's Gdiet, Escher, Bach. An Eternal Golden

Braid. New York: Basic Books, 1979. Throughout this long and oddly composed "fugue,"

the author is comforted by reducing the dilemma to the discovery of just such "symbols,"

as if the brain qua brain could possess them. The search for a neuropsychological Rosetta

Stone must be aimless, since brain qua brain has no language qua language. In the next

chapter this issue is examined at some length.

10. This famous analysis is found in ch. 2 of Quine's From a Logical Point of View. 11. Robinson, Systems of Modern Psychology, ch. 4.

12. I refer, of course, to recent work employing reaction time to assess the time-

constants and "processing" nuances associated with cognition. The older "complication

experiments" of the Leipzig laboratory were impelled by similar considerations and often involved similar methods

2. Determinism 1. The works of Aristotle referred to are taken from The Basic Works of Aristotle,

edited by Richard McKeon It is in book II, ch. 3 of the Physics that the fourfold theory is set forth and used to assess critically older approaches to the problem of causation. Ad-

ditional discussions and applications appear in On the Parts of Animals (639b-640a), Book

A, ch. 3 and Book A, ch. 2 of the Metaphysics and (implicitly) in ch. 3 of the

Nichomachean

Ethics, where volition, choice, etc. are examined.

2. In book V, ch. 2 of the Metaphysics he leaves no doubt about this: ". . . that

for the sake of which other things are tends to be the best and the end of the other things; let us take it as making no difference whether we call it good or apparent good" 1013b)

The same point, in nearly the same words,is made in book II, ch. 3 of the Physics (195a).

3. Book II, ch. 8 of the Physics (199b): "Art does not deliberate. If the ship-build-

ing art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature." 4. Nichomachean

Ethics, ch. 111.

5. Politics, book III, chs. 4 and 5.

6. Physics, book II, ch. 8. Action for an end is, says Aristotle, present in that which

comes to be and is by nature, but there are also coincidences. It does not rain so that food will rot on the threshing room floor, though the relationship between rain and the growth of crops is surely not coincidental.

7. An amplified sense of natural necessity requires a separate inquiry into Ar-

173

2. DETERMINISM istotle's u s e of t h e t e r m nature [physics). S e e , for e x a m p l e , his d i s c u s s i o n in Metaphysics,

book

V, ch. 4. 8. Again, "in t h e m a t t e r " m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s n o t coincidental^ or t h e thing. In b o o k V ch. 6 of t h e Metaphysics,

in t h e m a t t e r

for e x a m p l e , A r i s t o t l e n o t e s t h a t t h e identity

i m p l i e d by " C o r i s c u s is m u s i c a l " is of a n a c c i d e n t a l o r m e r e l y c o r r e l a t i o n a l n a t u r e . Cori s c u s is n o t " m u s i c a l " in t h e way t h a t h e is a man.

He is o n e of t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n s of t h e

d e f i n i t i o n of " m a n " a n d , t o b e a t all, h e w o u l d h a v e t o b e s u c h an i n s t a n t i a t i o n . His b e i n g , however, is n o t c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n his m u s i c a l i t y . 9. Physics, b o o k II, c h . 8 ( 1 9 9 b ) 10. In all of N e w t o n ' s l o n g e r t r e a t i s e s , e v e n in O p t i c s , h e rarely m i s s e s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o n o t e t h e d i v i n e h a n d b e h i n d t h e o r d e r a n d l a w f u l n e s s r e v e a l e d by his d i s c o v eries. I l l

d i s c u s s t h i s in An Intellectual

History of Psycholgoy,

12. l o h n L o c k e , An Essay Concerning

Human

rev. e d . ch. 7.

Understanding

(1690).

13. For a n e x c e l l e n t a n d a c c e s s i b l e t r e a t m e n t , c o n s u l t A. A. L u c e , Berkeley's

Im-

materialism 14

G e o r g e Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning

15. David H u m e , Enquiry

Concerning

16

David H u m e , A Treatise of Human

17

H u m e , Treatise,

the Principles of Human

Human

Understanding.

Knowledge

(1710).

1904.

Nature

I, III, xi>

18. On Mill's g e n e r a l i n f l u e n c e a n d his d e b t s t o H u m e , s e e my Toward a of Human

Science

Nature 19. T h e r e h a s b e e n a revival of i n t e r e s t in Reid o v e r t h e p a s t d e c a d e o r so,

a n d his principal works a r e now m o r e readily a v a i l a b l e . S e e B i b l i o g r a p h y . Interpretive e s s a y s c a n b e f o ' i n d in vol 61 (2) o f The Monist ( 1 9 7 8 ) my Toward A Science of Human

Nature,

Mill's ( H u m e a n ) war on intuitiomsm,

In t h e c h a p t e r d e v o t e d t o I S. Mill in

t h e R e i d - H u m e t e n s i o n s a r e d i s c u s s e d in r e l a t i o n t o so-called.

20. T h e m o s t a c c e s s i b l e c o l l e c t i o n of s e m i n a l e s s a y s on c a u s a t i o n is T o m L B e a u c h a m p , ed., Philosophical

Problems

of Causation.

21. I m m a n u e l Kant, Critique

1974.

of Pure Reason

( A 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 = B 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 ) ( 1 7 8 1 ) . For

an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n of t h e S e c o n d Analogy, s e e L W Beck, " O n c e M o r e Unto t h e Breach: Kant's Answer to H u m e Again." 22. W i l l i a m K n e a l e , " U n i v e r s a l i t y a n d n e c e s s i t y . " 23. G e o r g e Molnar, " K n e a l e ' s a r g u m e n t r e v i s i t e d . " 24. I bid. 25. R i c h a r d Taylor, " D e t e r m i n i s m . " In The Encyclopedia

of Philosophy,

2:359.

26. D o n a l d D a v i d s o n , " A c t i o n s , R e a s o n s a n d C a u s e s . " 27. D a v i d s o n ' s i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h i s i s s u e a r e drawn t o g e t h e r in his r e c e n t Ess ays on Actions and Events. In " P s y c h o l o g y a s P h i l o s o p h y " (pp.229—244) we find Dav i d s o n m o v i n g away from t h e s o m e w h a t " s c i e n t i z e d " a r g u m e n t s of " A c t i o n s . R e a s o n s a n d C a u s e s . " For a n i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of D a v i d s o n ' s e a r l i e r a n d l a t e r p o s i t i o n s , s e e l o h n B i s h o p , " A g e n t C a u s a t i o n , " Mind ( 1 9 8 3 ) 9 2 : 6 1 - 7 9 . 28. T h e l i t e r a t u r e o n authenticity

is s o m e w h a t s c a t t e r e d a n d e p i s o d i c .

Recent

a n d i n f o r m i n g t r e a t m e n t s of t h e s u b j e c t a r e p r o v i d e d by R o b e r t Y o u n g , " A u t o n o m y a n d S o c i a l i z a t i o n " a n d , in r e b u t t a l , by M a r c B e r n s t e i n , " S o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d A u t o n o m y ) . " 29. On Mill's d i l e m m a in t h i s regard a n d his r e l i a n c e on t h e c o n c e p t of " c h a r a c t e r " t o s o l v e t h e d i l e m m a , s e e my c h a p t e r on Mill in Toward a Science of Human 30. Again, his Beyond

Freedom

and Dignity is q u e e r in j u s t t h i s way

Nature

174

2. DETERMINISM

31. In Aristotle the d i s t i n c t i o n is central to his very concept of "final causes." Leibniz makes the reasons-causes d i s t i n c t i o n in a n u m b e r of places and quite explicitly in Sec. XIX of his Discourse on Metaphysics where he says this against materialistic a t t e m p t s to explain significant actions: When one seriously holds such o p i n i o n s which hand everything over t o material necessity or t o a kind of chance . . . it is d i f f i c u l t to recognize an intelligent author of nature. The effect s h o u l d correspond to its cause and indeed it is best known through the recognition of its cause, so that it is reasonable t o introduce a sovereign intelligence ordering things, and in place of making use of the w i s d o m of this sovereign being, to employ only t h e properties of matter to explain phenomena. As if in order t o account for the capture of an i m p o r t a n t place by a prince, the historian s h o u l d say it was because of the particles of powder in the cannon having been t o u c h e d by a spark. (G. W. v. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics.) Hegel, of course, raised reason t o an active principle of which t h e very course of h u m a n history is expressive. 32. Bernstein, "Socialization and A u t o n o m y . " 33. Young, A u t o n o m y and Socialization." 34. Bernstein, "Socialization and A u t o n o m y . " p. 123. 35. Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy" 36. Davidson, ibid., p. 233. 37. 1 bid 38. This point is paradoxically honored by expressions such as "unconscious motivation." Motives, as part of the causal c o n d i t i o n s under which agency must operate, need not be consciously recognized by t h e actor or even intelligible t o him. 39. Donald Davidson, " H o w Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" pp. 93-113. 40. I bid. p 113

3. Reductionism 1. A trenchant expression of this scepticism, still worth reading, can be f o u n d in B. F. Skinner's "Are Theories of Learning Necessary?" A l t h o u g h the word "learning" is featured in the title, Skinner's i n d i c t m e n t can be directed at all scientific theories of a certain kind. He is especially and effectively critical of theoretical explanations based upon assumed or even observed processes at levels of observation different from the level at which the phenomena to be explained have been observed. Skinner does not, of course, object t o statistical inferences from recorded facts or to general mathematical descriptions of them, b u t such inferences and descriptions are not after all "theories" if all they claim to achieve is a short-hand summary of what has already been observed. 2. The hand-in-glove relationship between sensory physiology and psychophysics is sufficient t o defend the general p r o p o s i t i o n that analytical models are productive and not merely descriptive or redescriptive. In t h e absence of reliable psychophysical data, the experimenter w o u l d be hard-pressed to discern which of any of a large n u m b e r of physiological records c o n s t i t u t e d the relevant correlate of a given perceptual outcome. Historically, reliable psychophysical findings have directed the course of neurophysiological research in sensory processes. The interdependence is brilliantly set forth in F. Ratliff, Mach Bands. Here the Nobel Prize w i n n i n g efforts of H. K. Hartline on inhibitory mechanisms in the c o m p o u n d eye of Limulus are tied together w i t h decades of psychophysical

3. REDUCTIONISM

175

studies of contrast phenomena The mathematical model of lateral-inhibitory mechanisms both describes and predicts psychophysical phenomena and does so in the causal manner of genuinely scientific explanations.

3 For A. Turing's own statement of the thesis, see his "Computing Machinery

and Intelligence," pp. 433-460. There are at least two Turing-arguments though it is not

clear in what sort of relationship, if any, they stand to each other. One has to do with the theoretical proposition that any given decision-process is expressible as a finite number

of binary events and is therefore reducible to such events. But "reducible" here is ambig-

uous. If it is the case that every decision-process is in fact composed of such binary events,

then the Turing-argument is not reductive but algorithmic. The second argument, to the effect that a true test of "intelligence" or its simulation calls for competent judges to be

able to distinguish between the person and the machine is also not a defense of reductionism If, for example, the person and the machine actually do exactly the same opera-

tions in arriving at decisions, then their indiscernibility again cannot be taken as an in-

stance of "reduction."

4. C. H. Graham, "Behavior, Perception and the Psychophysical Methods," pp. 108-120. 5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical

1 nvestigations.

6. The philosophical journals are still alive with interpretive essays on one or

another feature of Wittgenstein's teaching. Major exegetical treatments have been pro-

vided by |. Griffin, Wittgenstein's George Pitcher, The Philosophy

Logical

Norman Malcom, Knowledge

Atomism,

of Wittgenstein.

been offered by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein

and

Certainty;

More recently a summoning interpretation has on Rules and Private

Language.

My own assess-

ment of the Wittgensteinian dilemma is different from Kripke's in a number of ways and

makes much more of the private nature of sensations than Kripke does. 7. Wittgenstein, Philosophical

Investigations.

8 . I bid.

9. 10.

Ibid. 1 bid.

11. Note how this concept of replacement

in Wittgenstein merges with Turing's

and, like Turing's, fails to be reductive. Assume, for example, that for every early psycholog-

ical state (S E 1 giving rise to an early behavioral expression (B E ). there is ontogenetic re-

placement by a later behavioral expression (B L ). In what sense can these more recent

expressions be regarded as reductions

of S E ? I submit, none. Wittgenstein is working on the

wrong side of the functional equation, B = (/)S. If there is to be a reduction, the S, not the

B has to be pared down, and this cannot be achieved by any program concerned with "replacements" in the B-category.

sations."

12. For an instructive discussion of this thesis see Kurt Beier, "Smart on Sen13. Wittgenstein, Philosophical

Investigations.

14. Very much progress has been made in this area over the past decade, to

the point where the deaf now can look forward to devices that deliver coded signals di-

rectly to the inner ear. Though now somewhat dated, an instructive introduction to the methods of analysis and to the relationship between sensory research and the technology

of communication, see |. C. R. Licklider, "Three Auditory Theories." Along similar lines,

consult T Sterling, E Bering, S. Pollack and H Vaughan, eds., Visual ciplinary

Dialogue

Prosthesis:

The

Interdis-

of

Psychol-

(New York: Academic Press, 1971).

15. lerry Fodor, Psychological

ogy (especially pp. 124-134).

Explanation:

An Introduction

to the Philosophy

3. REDUCTIONISM

176

16.

I

bid.

17. W o l f g a n g Kohler, The Task of Gestalt Psychology.

F o r a recent

e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t , s e e ch. 3 of A u s t e n Clark, Psychological Mechanism:

An Examination

of Reductionism

in Psychology.

philosophical

Models and

Neurological

C l a r k offers three criteria b y w h i c h

p s y c h o p h y s i c a l i s o m o r p h i s m m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s e s t a b l i s h e d , n o n e o f t h e three r e q u i r i n g a strict, p o i n t - f o r - p o i n t i s o m o r p h i s m or " i d e n t i t y . " Generally, i s o m o r p h i c identities m a y b e a s s u m e d w h e n (a) l e s i o n , s t i m u l a t i o n and/or p h a r m a c o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s y i e l d c a u s a l l y sufficient r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n b r a i n p r o c e s s e s a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s or f u n c t i o n s ; (b) w h e n t h e i m p l i c a t e d s t r u c t u r e s a r e sufficiently r o b u s t t o s e r v e a s " v a l u e s o f t h e varia b l e in q u e s t i o n " ; (c) w h e n o n at least s o m e o c c a s i o n s there is direct o b s e r v a t i o n of t h e p s y c h o n e u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p (p. 96). E v e n in t h e s e m o d e s t terms, t h e t h e s i s o f i s o m o r p h i s m s e e m s t e s t a b l e o n l y in l i m i t e d a n d ad hoc f a s h i o n , a l l o w i n g very little g e n e r a l i z a t i o n b e y o n d t h e specific c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e t e s t s p r o c e e d . 18. For t w o w h o l e s o m e l y controversial s t a t e m e n t s of the position, c o n s u l t Paul F e y e r a b e n d , " M a t e r i a l i s m a n d t h e M i n d / B o d y P r o b l e m " a n d R i c h a r d Rorty, " I n D e f e n c e of E l i m i n a t i v e M a t e r i a l i s m , " pp. 1 1 2 - 1 2 1 . In h i s " F u n c t i o n a l i s m , M a c h i n e s a n d I n c o r r i g i b i l ity," Rorty s a y s that, ". . . if w e u n d e r s t a n d m a t e r i a l i s m a s a p o s s i b l e replacement

for c o m -

m o n s e n s e , t h e n it is o b v i o u s l y t r u e " (p. 219). B u t h i s a r g u m e n t really d o e s n o m o r e t h a n seek to e s t a b l i s h rules for talking,

w h i c h is all that a n a r g u m e n t for replacement

lish. T h e m e n t a l i s t m i g h t just a s well a r g u e for a n eliminative

mentalism

can estab-

w h e n it c o m e s t o

h o p e s , fears, p e r c e p t i o n s , t h o u g h t s , etc., i n s i s t i n g that, in regard to t h e s e states, it is n o n s e n s e to refer to n e u r o n s , t r a n s m i t t e r s , etc 19. A clear m o d e r n s t a t e m e n t of t h e t h e s i s is I. |. C. S m a r t s, " S e n s a t i o n s are Brain Processes." 20. Clark in Psychological

Models w a r n s a g a i n s t a s s u m i n g that the failure of a term-

for-term r e d u c t i o n i m p l i e s the failure of a n e x p l a n a t i o n - f o r - e x p l a n a t i o n r e d u c t i o n (p. 154). B u t t h e n h e t a k e s " e x p l a n a t i o n " t o i n v o l v e r e n d e r i n g " s o m e p u z z l i n g p h e n o m e n o n clear or i n t e l l i g i b l e " (p. 155). W h a t h e d o e s n o t s h o w is that p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s are " p u z z l i n g " or that p h y s i o l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s are s o m e h o w m o r e clear or intelligible. A s I a r g u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r e s e n t chapter, there is a w o r r i s o m e strain of unintelligibility

in state-

m e n t s in w h i c h neural t e r m s r e p l a c e p s y c h o l o g i c a l o n e s . 21. R. Puccetti, " T h e D u p l i c a t i o n A r g u m e n t D e f e a t e d , " pp. 5 8 2 - 5 8 6 ; " T h e n o t i o n that o n e c o u l d e x c h a n g e o n e ' s brain . . . for a n o t h e r a n d r e m a i n t h e s a m e p s y c h o l o g ical entity m a y not b e contradictory, b u t it is scientific n o n s e n s e " (p. 582). 22. B o t h in t h e final c h a p t e r of m y A n Intellectual

History of Psychology,

4 of |. C. E c c l e s a n d D. N. R o b i n s o n , The Wonder of Being Human. 23

a n d in ch.

Our B r a i n and Our

Mind.

Smart, " S e n s a t i o n s . "

24. 1 bid. 25. For t h e s e m i n a l article, s e e S a u l Kripke, " N a m i n g a n d N e c e s s i t y . " 26. E c c l e s a n d R o b i n s o n , Wonder

of Being Human,

ch. 4.

27. |. |. C. S m a r t , " S e n s a t i o n s . " 28. Karl P o p p e r a n d l o h n C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin; S p r i n g e r - V e r lag, 1978); s e e e s p e c i a l l y pp. 9 6 - 9 8 . 29

Irving Thalberg, "Immateriality," p p

1 0 5 - 1 1 3 . T h e p o s i t i o n taken h e r e is

o n e of W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n s k e p t i c i s m b u t I c a n ' t s e e that t h e a u t h o r h a s a d v a n c e d t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e very far a l o n g . 30. Cf. Kurt Beier, " S m a r t o n S e n s a t i o n s . " 31. C e n t r a l state m a t e r i a l i s m c a n b e t a k e n a s a s p e c i e s of t h e Identity T h e s i s

4. EXPLANATIONS

177

but it c o u l d also be phrased in a manner c o m p a t i b l e with epiphenomenalism. Perhaps the best general defense of it is Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical". The Essay and a Postscript. It is interesting that philosophical materialists, w h o often come t o modify or even disavow earlier positions, d o so in response to no particular scientific finding. It would seem that one's p o s i t i o n on this matter is dangerously invulnerable t o any fact arising from research o n the brain. 32

Eccles and Robinson, Wonder of Being Human, ch. 4.

4. Explanations 1. Hempel's influential essays are collected in Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Aristotle anticipates the model in several places b u t most directly in the Posterior Analytics. Book I, Chs. 1 - 6 For example, in 7 1 b - 7 2 a he says, "We suppose ourselves t o possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a t h i n g . . . when we think that we know the cause o n which the fact depends . . . and . . . that the fact c o u l d not be other t h a n it is." 2. Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation." 3 W i l l i a m Dray, w h o d u b b e d the nomological-deductive model the "covering law" model, provides an incisive argument against t h e applicability of such models t o historical events W i l l i a m Dray, Laics and Explanation

in History. For a clear statement of the

thesis Dray opposes, C. G. Hempel's "The Function of General Laws in History" is still instructive. On conceptual problems w i t h the model, see R. Eberle, et al„ " H e m p e l and O p p e n h e i m o n Expanation." 4. I d o not discuss certain lexical d i l e m m a s faced by the model, t h o u g h some m e n t i o n here may be useful A typical objection of this sort is as follows: Suppose we take as a universal law, Water expands when cooled. We now have a sample of water; we observe that it has not undergone expansion and we conclude (deduce) that it was not cooled. Question: Have we explained why? The general p r o b l e m is one of going from a universal law legislating what is. t o an explanation of why it is. Presumably, explanations are replies t o interrogatives From t h e nonexpansion of water, however, we surely d o not know why that water was not cooled, only that it was not But as I try t o show in t h e chapter, there is a special standing to be assigned to scientific explanations grounded in nomic necessity. Agency plays no part and therefore a nomological explanation is not part of the universe of discourse in which ordinary agency-prone interrogatives occur. 5. Note that this is not necessarily t i e d to reasons-causes

tensions but is more

the sui generis argument for the unique character of personal as well as historical p h e n o m ena, or really any p h e n o m e n a of a nonrecurring and nonreplicable variety. 6. Enter "final causes". For the immensely influential nineteenth-century argument, consult G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History. A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History. The influence can be f o u n d in R. G Collingwood's The Idea of History, a n d surely animates the cited work by W i l l i a m Dray. 7. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has become the more or less official text for this position. For a review of its ambiguities and of Kuhn's own more recent and perhaps shifting allegiance toward it, see his "Reflections on My Critics" in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 8. Hempel developed this in "The Function of General Laws in H i s t o r y "

178

4. EXPLANATIONS 9. Karl Popper s p o s i t i o n o n this is clearly set forth in " N o r m a l Science and

Its Dangers." 10. Pierre Duhem's version of the thesis is set forth in La Theorie Physique. Son Objel et sa Structure (1905). The English edition is The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. W. v. O. Quine's development of the thesis is given in his From a Logical Point of View. Il

l discuss this at some length in t h e last chapter of Systems of Modern Psy-

chology: A Critical Sketch. 12. Clark Hull, Principles of Behavior. In the H u l l i a n system, m o t i v a t i o n is a drivereducing operation, but t h e drives themselves are rooted in tissue-needs and are explicable in exclusively biological terms. 13. David McClelland's The Achieving Society is a totally "psychologized" approach to h u m a n motivation. 14. Consider only psychoanalytic theories of psychosexual development. 15. A coherent behavioristic account of m o t i v a t i o n is provided by B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior. 16. Daniel N. Robinson, Psychology and Law. Can \ustice Survive the Social Sciences? 17. D. I. MacFarland. Feedback Mechanisms in Animal

Behaviour.

18. Austen Clark, Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of Reductionist)! in Psychology. 19. The classic study is, of course, F. D. Sheffield a n d T. B. Roby, "Reward Value of a Non-nutritive Sweet Taste." Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology (19501 43:471-481. But even Pavlov's work o n fistulated dogs makes the same point. 20. See, for example, McClelland, The Achieving Society. 21. For illustrations, see A. Amsel, "Frustrative nonreward in partial reinforcement and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n learning"; T. Thompson and W. Bloom, "Aggressive Behavior and Extinction-induced Response-rate Increases," Psychonomic Science (1966) 5: 535-536 22. Psychologists are familiar w i t h the "Butler box" as a device for illustrating the strong curiosity of the monkey. See also D. E. Berlyne, "Novelty and Curiosity as Determinants of Exploratory Behavior." 23. loseph Rychlak, in The Psychology of Rigorous Humanism tries to reconcile teleological and scientific explanations, but with mixed results. Like the psychoanalysts, t o o many humanistic psychologists deny themselves the full benefits of their approach in order to secure the ever elusive a n d marginally useful schemes of the developed sciences. 24. Peter Winch, The Idea of A Social Science. 25. Collingwood, The Idea of History. 26. Hegel, Reason in History. 27. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History. 28. The entire field owes much to Fritz Heider's The Psychology of Interpersonal Relationships. David Schneider now edits the journal devoted to the subject (Social Cognition) and numerous books have recently been spawned. 29. Relevant findings are abundant: S. E. Asch, " O p i n i o n s and Social Pressure," L. Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. 30. E. E. lones, et al. Attribution. Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.

5. ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

179

5. Ethics and Psychological Inquiry 1. I w o u l d refer to volumes in my own edited collection, Significant

Contributions

to the History of Psychology (28 volumes), Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1977-1978. Bain, Wundt, Herbart, Stout, W a r d — r e a l l y all of the nineteenth-century architects of m o d e r n Psychology reserved a special place for moral sentiments or moral reasoning o i moral impulses. Some (such as Gall and Maudsley and, t o a lesser extent, Bain) were inclined to understand this attribute of h u m a n m e n t a t i o n as neurologically c o n d i t i o n e d whereas others (such as I. S. Mill) chose t o address it at the psychological and social levels. But none of the major writers ignored the subject or t h o u g h t of it as tangential to psychological issues. 2. lean Piaget, The Moral judgment of the Child. 3 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order.'' 4. Quantitative measures of this influence are elusive and w o u l d probably be misleading. In Psychology and Law. Can justice Survive the Social Sciences? I have shown this influence at work on traditional jural positions regarding t h e rights of testacy and the pres u m p t i o n of moral responsibility. 5. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 6 A recent and coherent statement of this position has been made by P. Manicas and P. Secord, "Implications for Psychology of t h e New Philosophy of Science," American Psychologist (1983)38:399-411. My brief c o m m e n t on their essay may be consulted: D N Robinson, "The New Philosophy of Science: A New Reply t o Manicas and Secord." American Psychologist (1984)39:920-21. In their essay Manicas a n d Secord reject b o t h the covering-law model of scientific explanation and what they take to be the Humean theory of causation. Their

"new" philosophy of science w o u l d replace Hempel's (and Hume's)

contingent regularities w i t h a species of natural necessity not unlike what 1 have defended in chs. 2 and 3. But Manicas and Secord misjudge the implications of all this for Psychology and also fail to show how we c o u l d ever distinguish between (a) an unfailing c o n t i n gent regularity and (b) natural necessity. 7. See, for example, Leon Kamin, The Science and Politics of 1Q. 8. An excellent review of the case, t h o u g h one not entirely distinguished by some of its conclusions, is B. Evans and B. Waites, IQ and Mental Testing. 9 The likelihood that r = +0.771 will show up when different samples are tested on three separate occasions is t o o remote for mention. But Gregor Mendel, too, gave us his famous phenotypic r a t i o s — t o the nearest whole n u m b e r — a s if these were empirically obtained. His samples were just t o o small for such exactitude to be forthcoming. Again, Mendel probably saw how the numbers were falling, assembled the theory t o account for t h e m and then just applied a "corrective" t o the actual data. None of this excuses Cyril Burt, of course, but one wonders whether t h e many nearly hysterical denunciations directed at him w o u l d have been as numerous and as spirited had his statistical arts been in the service of environmentalism. 10. The orderly retreat from relativism has appeared in a number of essays written after the 1962 treatise. See, for example, Thomas Kuhn, "The History of Science." 11 Compare only R. Herrnstein, IQ in the Meritocracy w i t h L Kamin, Science and Politics of IQ.

180

5. ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 12. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty; Felix Oppenheim, Dimensions of Freedom,

H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?"; R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth, 1977.

13. Robinson, Psychology and Law. 14. I have said more on this in both Psychology and Law. and in "Therapies: A

Clear and Present Danger."

15. It would be convenient to say that suffering that is not intended cannot

be the product of cruelty since the latter term carries with it the implication of intent. The

law itself often ignores this, however, as when a punishment is regarded as "cruel and

unusual" quite apart from the intentions of the prison administration or the legislative

body. Even in ordinary parlance we are inclined to say that, for example, a child acts "cruelly" when pulling the dog's tail, even if the child does not know the pain thereby caused. ity.

16. These names are illustrative and not intended to suggest historical prior17. Kohlberg, "Development of Children's Orientations."

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Beck, L. W. "Once M o r e U n t o t h e Breach: Kant's Answer t o H u m e Again." Ratio, 1967 (9):33—37. (Reprinted in Beauchamp, q.v.) Beier, Kurt "Smart o n S e n s a t i o n s " In C. V Borst, ed., q.v. Bender, D., C. G. Gross, C. Rocha-Miranda. "Visual Properties of Neurons in lnf e r o t e m p o r a l Cortex of t h e Macaque." Journal of Neurophysiology (1972) 3 5 : 9 6 111 Berkeley, George. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, # 9 0 . La Salle, Illinois: O p e n Court, 1963. Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. L o n d o n : Oxford University Press, 1969. Berlyne, D. E " N o v e l t y a n d Curiosity a n d D e t e r m i n a n t s of Exploratory Behavior." British Journal of Psychology (1950) 41:68-80. Bernstein, Mark "Socialization and a u t o n o m y . " Mind (1983) 92:120-123. Bishop, John. "Agent Causation." Mind (1980) 89:61-79. Bloom, W., T. T h o m p s o n , "Aggressive Behavior and E x t i n c t i o n - i n d u c e d sponse-rate Increases." Psychonomic Science (1966) 5:535-536

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