'Philosophy' – After the End of Philosophy : In a Globalizing and Glocalizing World [1 ed.] 9781443869652, 9781443865388

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‘Philosophy’ – After the End of Philosophy: In a Globalizing and Glocalizing World

‘Philosophy’ – After the End of Philosophy: In a Globalizing and Glocalizing World

By

Nader N. Chokr

‘Philosophy’ – After the End of Philosophy: In a Globalizing and Glocalizing World By Nader N. Chokr This book first published 2014 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2014 by Nader N. Chokr All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-6538-9, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6538-8

For Lisa Without whom life itself would have been a mistake.

Let’s face it: Philosophy is arguably the most useless of all human endeavors. But it is also paradoxically a worthwhile and perhaps even necessary undertaking precisely because it is useless…So long as one remains acutely aware of its intrinsic limitations, blind spots, and constitutive tensions. I would also add: only if one is prepared furthermore to unlearn its entrenched and established history, the very coordinates of its assumptions and unquestioned presuppositions. And even to jettison the discipline altogether as merely a ladder which has served its limited purpose—enabling us then to rise to the next level in our understanding of the world, and our place in it.

CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................................ x Acknowledgements ................................................................................. xiv General Introduction ................................................................................... 1 Essay # 1 ..................................................................................................... 7 Consequences of “Cultural Complexity” 1. Introduction 2. A Brief History of the Concept of “Culture” 3. Contemporary Cultural Politics 4. Globalization and Cultures: Lessons Learned? 5. Cultural Analysis: Empirical and Normative Considerations 6. Philosophical and Political Implications 7. Conclusion References Essay # 2 ................................................................................................... 60 Who is (not) afraid of (Cultural) Relativism? 1. Why Ask a Different Kind of Question? 2. Cultural Relativism: Arguments & Counter-Arguments 3. The Normative Variation and Its Justification 4. Other Reasons for its Enduring Yet Misguided Appeal 5. An Empirically and Normatively Adequate Approach 6. Two Possibly Viable Options: Williams & Nussbaum 7. Closing Remarks References Esay # 3 .................................................................................................. 135 Even Deeper into “Bullshit”: A Philosophical Inquiry 1. The Age of Bullshit: Philosophers on “Bullshit” 2. Frankfurt: On Bullshit 3. Cohen: Deeper into Bullshit 4. Cohen & Frankfurt Get Hoisted on their Own Petard 5. Amendment and Improvement of Frankfurt’s Account

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6. Bullshit—Research, Detection, and Busting References Essay # 4 ................................................................................................. 167 Embodied and Situated Cognition: Significance and Promise of a Paradigm Shift 1. From Thinking-Things to Embodied-Situated Minds 2. Cartesianism, Cognitivism, Post-Cognitivism or ESC Paradigm 3. Varieties of Embodiment and Situatedness 4. The Situatedness of Human Cognition Revisited 5. Consequences of a Paradigm Shift References Essay # 5 ................................................................................................. 204 On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 1. Introduction 2. How Not to Construe the Capabilities Approach? 3. Institutional Distribution Schemes vs. Other Factors 4. Rawlsian Resourcism vs. the Capabilities Approach 5. How to Accommodate Natural Human Diversities? 6. Empowerment: Agency and Practical Reason 7. The Capabilities Approach and Social Justice 8. Closing Remarks References Essay # 6 ................................................................................................. 241 Solidarity, Moral Universalism, and Cosmopolitanism 1. Introduction 2. Rorty: Solidarity without Moral Universalism 3. Rawls: A Law of Peoples without Global Justice 4. Global Solidarity and Plural Universalism 5. Conclusion References Essay # 7 ................................................................................................. 268 Human Rights in the Emerging World: A Contextual, Dynamic and Cross-cultural Approach 1. Introduction 2. Preliminaries, Assumptions, and Working Hypotheses 3. Analysis: Beyond Universalism and Relativism

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4. Towards a New Framework: Contextual, Dynamic, and CrossCultural 5. Conclusion 6. Appendix—Case-Studies: From Abstract Concepts & Principles to Concrete, Multi-dimensional and Multi-vocal Contexts References Essay # 8 ................................................................................................. 326 On Justice in a Globalizing and Glocalizing World: In Defense of “Cosmopolitan Pluralism” 1. The Fundamental Dilemma of Liberalism 2. Nationalism, Political Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism 3. Cosmopolitan Pluralism: For a More “Realistic Utopia” 4. Closing Remarks References Essay # 9 ................................................................................................. 387 “Philosophy”—After the End of Philosophy 1. Introduction 2. The Tradition and its Postmodern Critique 3. Which Kind of “Critical Philosophy”? A Sketch 4. Philosophical Coda—A New Beginning for Critical Theory References Index ........................................................................................................ 407

PREFACE

This collection of essays is intended to be my “farewell to academic philosophy” as the latter has proved to me over the years and in retrospect to be completely worthless. I am now of the view that philosophy ought to be anything but an academic discipline. By temperament and by conviction, I am now more than ever inclined to view philosophy instead as a way of life, whose primary concern is the reduction of the everwidening and yawning gap between what is ideal and what is real, between the values and ideals that we preach or claim to uphold and the actions or behaviors that we actually carry out and display. A more sustained and robust illustration or defense of this view would have to wait for another season, when the flowers are once again in bloom. Except for essays 1, 2, 8, and 9 which have been previously published in shorter and radically different versions in venues that are not always easily accessible, most of these essays are still unpublished. They deal with various questions, problems and issues which have preoccupied me for the best part of the past decade, and which should be of interest and concern to anyone who is similarly even so slightly bothered as well. Clearly, they are not united by one single thread running through and through. The different strands of various lengths and strengths woven together should reveal instead criss-crossings, cross-cuttings, and overlappings—in short, discontinuities as well as continuities. Though essays # 3 & 4 may at first seem out of place in the present context, I am prepared to argue that they in fact fit in perfectly. Though essays # 6 & 9 are comparatively shorter and less developed, they also constitute in fact crucial strands of the rope-like structure of this work. A number of arguments and more or less complex forms of reasoning and analyses are marshaled and deployed in defense of the views and positions I am inclined to take. For the most part, I am still prepared to uphold them—albeit perhaps in some nuanced and qualified manner, given the benefit of hindsight. Initially, I had contemplated including a postscript in which I draft some carefully formulated replies to a number of possible objections and

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criticisms that could (and probably will) be leveled against the analyses, views and positions defended in the present essays. I subsequently came to believe that such a task is in fact best left to the readers. Besides, these essays are in the final analysis only to be viewed as so many opportunities for me to make some untimely confessions about the various contemporary problems and issues which have come to be on my philosophical plate in recent times, and not as attempts to win over some arguments in a contest of wits and analytical prowess. Such endeavors are once again best left to the “academic circles” that are so inclined, and that will surely find here enough fodder for their cannons. May 2014 ********* Despite our undeniable achievements in science and technology and in terms of economic development over the past hundred years or so, our world is still dramatically confronted by a number of serious challenges, grave risks and threats, dismal shortcomings and failures. Furthermore, let us not forget that these achievements have come at a huge, and some might say, exorbitant cost, viz., the sequence of wars and conflicts, mass killings and genocides, barbaric violence, mayhem and horrors that people and nations have unleashed upon each other often in the name of an idea or an ideology throughout the whole of the 20th century, and that they continue to perpetrate upon each other in various parts of the world up to this juncture in the 21st century. Besides, these achievements are obviously not enjoyed by all, or even by most people around the world. We are nowhere near achieving the minimum kind of human development and social justice morally required of us by the very values and ideals we seem to be trumpeting every chance we get. Not to mention global justice, which remains idealistic, wishful thinking on the part of academic philosophers eager to uphold, pace and contra Hegel, that “the Owl of Minerva can and must take its flight at dawn,” rather than wait until dusk. The current hegemonic system and world order (or rather, disorder) under which people, nations and states are operating today as if it were ineluctable, natural, or a matter of historical necessity, is clearly brutal and utterly destructive. By all estimations, it has turned billions of human beings into “disposable people”, with barely the ability to survive, let

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alone live a decent and flourishing life. It seems by all sane and persuasive analyses to be heading toward disaster, catastrophe or collapse. According to Slavoj Zizek, who is symptomatically often referred to in the Press, as “the most dangerous philosopher in the West,” global capitalism (in its neo-liberal incarnation) is fast approaching its terminal crisis; there is no longer any doubt about this. We are in effect “Living in the End Times” (Verso, 2010). Conjuring up a biblical image, he goes on to identify the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” as (1) the global ecological crisis, (2) imbalances within the economic system, (3) the biogenetic revolution, and (4) the exploding, irrepressible social divisions that have increasingly been rocking our world. Ever since the 2008 global financial tsunami which originated on Wall Street (almost) caused a total meltdown of the world’s economies, it has become clear to all that, when left to its own devices, unrestrained, unregulated and unmonitored, capitalism is a monster that devours its own children, and only best serves the interests of the 1% at the expense of those of the 99%. Its internal logic is in effect to undermine the very fabric of democracy, by the increasingly wider and wider inequalities it generates as a matter of course. The world is now owned and governed by “oligarchs,” whether you look West or East, North or South: their gains and profits are thoroughly privatized, while their losses are socialized. And if the corporations they own or manage are “too big to fail,” then they get their governments to rush to their rescue by pumping unimaginable sums of money into the black holes they have created in their wake. Meanwhile, the rest of us– who are “too small and too insignificant to matter”-scramble happily for slave wages, and struggle under extreme conditions of precarity to make a living, rather than making a life. As Thomas Piketty showed compellingly in his recent ground-breaking best-seller, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, 2014), capitalism was only able to accommodate itself with a lower degree of inequality and a slightly better record in terms of redistribution of wealth and income during the so-called “glorious thirty odds years” of the post-WWII reconstruction and development era, and in otherwise similarly unique and exceptional historical circumstances. In general however, capitalism thrives in times of chaos, war and disaster, and can therefore more readily accommodate a greater degree of redistribution thereafter. But over the course of most of its history, as can be ascertained by the

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substantial evidence gathered, capitalism inexorably leads to greater and greater inequality –unless it is duly and properly restrained. Will the leaders of our respective countries hear and heed the righteous demands and aspirations of the millions of people around the world who have taken part in the Occupy Movement or who consider themselves members of los indignados? Or will they just go on, as they seem to be, with business and politics as usual? Could they come to see that not only “another world is possible,” but it is urgently needed and desired by most people around the world. Ironically, rather than contemplating bold, courageous, and radical change, it has become increasingly easier to imagine or even envisage the end of the world or the end of human civilization as we know it, and for advised governments within the North trans-Atlantic Sphere of Influence to commission secret reports and studies for how to best deal and cope with various post-apocalyptic scenarios. What does this say about us, presumably evolved Homo sapiens with fairly developed cognitive and affective capabilities, that we can open our minds and become receptive to the idea of “radical change” only and only when we are on the brink, or sadly enough, in retrospect, when it is already too late? I leave it to you to ponder and speculate. August 2014 Oslo, Norway

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to all the friends and colleagues, who have over the years contributed each in their own way to the shaping and development of my philosophical temperament as well as the articulation and strengthening of my views and positions. The first essay “Consequences of Cultural Complexity” is based on a lecture prepared for the 12th International Conference of the International Association for Intercultural Communication Studies on the theme: “Globalization, Communication, and Identity” held in San Antonio, Texas, USA, August 2-4, 2006. A previous and much shorter version was subsequently published in China Media Research (3/2: 62-82). The present essay is based on the latter, as well as the results obtained in an earlier essay titled “A Fundamental Misconception of ‘Culture’: Philosophical and Political Implications” published in a collection edited by Thorsten Botz-Bornstein and Jurgen Hengelbrock, Re-Ethnicizing the Minds? Revival of Culture in Contemporary Thought, Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2006, chapter 22 (pp. 401-435). I thank Rodopi Publications for granting me permission to reproduce parts of it herein. The second essay “Who is (not) afraid of (Cultural) Relativism?” was produced upon request and in response to a call for papers launched by the editors of Traces (Ecole Normale Supérieure, Lyon, France) on the problem of relativism. I would like to thank Eric Monnet and Paul Costey, as well as an anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions and encouraging comments throughout the process leading up to the completion of this essay in its double (long and short) versions. A shorter and condensed version of this essay in French is already published in the paper and online edition of the review Tracés 12/1. The third essay “Even Deeper into ‘Bullshit’—A Philosophical Inquiry” is still unpublished. It was produced in response to a private communication with G. A. Cohen on the subject matter here in question during which he graciously agreed to share with me a copy of his paper “Deeper into Bullshit” which he wrote in response to Harry Frankfurt’s essay, in an effort to characterize a particular kind of bullshit, namely, academic or philosophical bullshit (in particular, of the French variety).

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The fourth essay “Embodied and Situated Cognition—Significance and Promise of a Paradigm Shift?” was produced in response to the growing interest and attention being devoted across disciplines to the new paradigm and its implications for their respective fields. A different version was previously published in a journal that is no longer active (Philosophical Frontiers 3/1, 2008). Since only the abstract is now accessible, its publication herein in a substantially revised form can therefore be considered a first. The ideas and analyses developed in the fifth essay “On the Capability Approach—Justification and Comparative Advantage” were first articulated during a Seminar on “The Capabilities Approach: Problems and Prospects” taught in the School of Philosophy and Social Development at Shandong University (Jinan, China) during the Fall Semester of 2006. A first draft was later discussed in a more focused manner during a subsequent Seminar dedicated to the work of Thomas Pogge in the spring semester of 2007 in the same context. I wish to thank all the (Chinese and Foreign) students and guest-visitors in attendance during both Seminars for their lively discussions and probing interventions regarding the question of the justification and comparative advantage (if any) of the Capabilities Approach. I also would like to thank Thomas Pogge for his sharp and challenging comments and criticisms of an earlier draft. As it becomes clear in the essay, in some cases, I have had to concede his points. In others, I have tried to dodge the bullet. In yet others, I could only re-iterate and reinforce my counter-objections and variations thereof. The sixth essay titled “Solidarity, Moral Universalism, and Cosmopolitanism” was originally written for the purpose of a lecture at Shandong University, Jinan, China in May 2004 whose aim was to provoke a critical evaluation of the contributions of two prominent American philosophers, Richard Rorty and John Rawls. It is so far unpublished. The ancestral, and much shorter version of the seventh essay “Human Rights in the Emerging World—Towards a New Framework” was first written in April 1999 (San Antonio, Texas, US), and submitted in 2003 to an International Conference on Human Rights in Qom, Iran—where it was published in the Proceedings without my knowledge. I subsequently lost it due to a computer crash and inadequate backup, and the sudden closing down of the web site, that of the Institute for Applied Philosophy and Public Policy, where an early draft was also published online. Fortunately

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I recovered a copy of the original, from a PhD student in South Africa. In view of the interest that this essay seems to have generated—from Bruxelles, Belgium to Iran and South Africa, and from the US to China—I decided to revise and update it in July 2011 (Oslo, Norway). Today, I would be inclined to formulate some of the main points somewhat differently. However, I am still prepared to uphold the main threads of reasoning and thought deployed herein. Though some of the examples and cases discussed (in the appendix) may seem somewhat distant or remote (or even minor), they are far from being outdated or insignificant; in fact, many of them can readily be carried over and serve to illuminate the present situation of human rights in many other parts around the world. The eighth essay “On Justice in a Globalizing & Glocalizing World: In Defense of Cosmopolitan Pluralism” was previously published (in Konstantine Boudouris (Ed.) Values and Justice in the Global Era. Vol. II. Athens, Greece: Iona Verlag Publications, 2007, pp. 20-80). I would like to thank Professor Boudouris for inviting me to the 18th International Conference of Philosophy organized by the International Association of Greek Philosophy (IAGP), held in Kavala, Greece in July 20-27, 2007, during which I articulated and tested out some of the main ideas and analyses discussed herein. I also would like to thank the participants for their lively and critical scrutiny of my main thesis and arguments. The final and ninth essay “’Philosophy’—after the End of Philosophy” is based on a lecture delivered at Shandong University (Jinan, China) in November 18, 2004 on the occasion of the UNESCO-sponsored celebration of the 3rd World Philosophy Day. This is a revised and condensed version prepared for the purpose of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy held in Seoul, Korea (July 30-August 5, 2008) on the theme “Rethinking Philosophy Today.”

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The contemporary problems and issues discussed and dealt with in this collection are wide-ranging and diverse, and fall within the area of social, moral, and political philosophy—broadly construed. In order to convey a sense of what it seeks to achieve, I provide below a brief synopsis aiming to describe the main motivation(s) and purpose(s) of each of the essays included herein. Essay #1: “Culture” has emerged in recent decades as the subject of intense and divisive political controversies at various levels. The intensity and divisiveness of these controversies can be felt in a number of areas. These include: identity politics or the politics of cultural differences and recognition, multiculturalism, cross-cultural communication or incommensurability, or more specifically, with the issue of cultural relativism vs. moral universalism, as it is brought to bear on the theoretical debates and political struggles about human rights, democracy, human development and social justice—to mention only a few of the most hotly debated ones. There is still today a widespread tendency to write or talk about “culture” as if it were a homogenous, coherent, bounded, tightly woven, unified or unitary entity with a distinct nature, whose identity-determining role on individuals and groups is uniform, continuous and stable. Such a view is, I argue, based on a number of faulty assumptions, and amounts to a fundamental misconception with serious philosophical and political implications. In the present essay, I argue essentially that we are well-advised to draw the consequences of “cultural complexity” in a world that is undergoing both “globalization” and “glocalization” at the same time in an effort to articulate an adequate conception of culture and cultural analysis—from both an empirical and normative point of view. I contend that, if and when we do, we would be able to come up with a compelling account of the complex mechanisms of identity-formation for individuals and communities. We would be able to better understand the complex internal dynamics of cultures as well as the diverse relationships that

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obtain (or not) between them at this juncture of our history. Apart from addressing a whole range of issues, we should also be able to move beyond the dead-end debate of cultural relativism vs. moral universalism, particularly as it bears on the problem of human rights, and ultimately articulate a “pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism,” that remains respectful enough of cultural differences. In Essay # 2, I examine the thesis of “cultural relativism” (in both its descriptive and normative version) in an effort to ascertain and impeach more perspicuously the reasons for the strong appeal it continues to exert today in a globalizing/glocalizing world—and this, despite the fact that it has been shown repeatedly to be inconsistent, self-defeating and misguided. Because of its highly objectionable and deeply troublesome consequences, esp., from an ethical and political point of view, it should be clear to anyone who cares to make such an assessment that we have good reasons for fearing relativism, and that such a fear (both as an emotional and intellectual response) is furthermore not only warranted but reasonable. My answer to the normative question of whether we should be afraid follows obviously from that. However, I believe that we stand to advance the debate further and thereby gain in our understanding of the issue by addressing the following question: “Who is (not) afraid of (cultural) relativism?” Taking my lead from Bernard Williams’ insightful analysis and recommendation, I argue essentially that though cultural relativism conjures up a general moral problem, it is in reality either too early or too late, and in our case, at this juncture of history, it is rather late. Only a movement away from cultural relativism and towards something like a “pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” can help us address the moral questions that we all face together in a globalizing/ glocalizing world, and in which we now form a new moral and conversational community confronted with urgent problems and new challenges. For this purpose, I consider two possibly viable options, those of Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum. After showing briefly why Williams’ case against ethical theory is far from being convincing or conclusive, and why his proposal of “reflection” as an alternative is ultimately inadequate, I turn to Nussbaum’s bold, substantial, and timely proposal in an effort to ascertain whether it is ultimately a viable and defensible one. I conclude that, though still fraught with various problems and difficulties, it is nevertheless compelling and commendable—despite her critics’ claims to the contrary. In closing, I distinguish several ways to “justify” “ethical universalism” and consider at least two variants of “pluralism” in an effort to show further some of the real philosophical

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problems and difficulties confronting Nussbaum’s proposal, and more generally, the fundamental challenge we face today. In Essay #3, I undertake a philosophical inquiry into bullshit -“one of the most salient features of our culture” today. Believe it or not, “bullshit” has recently become a serious object of concern and discussion among ordinary people, professionals of different stripes, and even among philosophers. Harry Frankfurt’s short essay (1986, 1988, 2005), is a pioneering discussion of this widespread but largely unexamined phenomenon of our times. It is however far from being unobjectionable and fully satisfactory as G. A. Cohen’s follow-up critical paper (2002) has shown at least in part. Both have certainly contributed to this renewed attention and interest. In this essay, I attempt to capture their respective insights and shortcomings in an attempt to go even deeper and further into “bullshit”. In Essay #4, I examine the significance and promise of the “paradigm shift” evinced by the emergence and reception of the “embodied and situated cognition” research program (ESC) in the past few decades. Such a program puts in question age-old assumptions, dichotomies and distinctions in the history of Western philosophy stretching back to Plato and onward to Descartes and beyond, up to the so- called “cognitivist framework” (CF), which has come to dominate in both (Anglo-American) philosophy and the cognitive sciences. In order to better understand the main point(s) of contention between these programs, I begin by tracing historically the emergence of CF to the Cartesian legacy—properly understood and interpreted, and proceed to characterize the fundamental contrast between CF and ESC, as I see it, in light of some of the empirical work done in recent years. I then turn to a philosophical discussion of the notions of “embodiment” and “situatedness” in order to delineate the proper and necessary background context for understanding ultimately what is at stake, in an effort to see how they are best “cashed in” both theoretically and empirically. Finally, I re-focus on the situatedness of human cognition in order to make a modest proposal that further emphasizes its importance and significance within a properly conceived ESC research program, in which, I argue, despite claims to the contrary, the distinction between “embodied” and “situated cognition” does not make much sense. The proposal I make has profound implications for future work at the intersection of philosophy, the cognitive sciences, and the social sciences, and possibly for re-conceiving these endeavors and their relationships altogether.

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Essay #5: In his well-known paper, “Can the Capability Approach be justified?” (2002), Thomas Pogge sets out to examine critically the Capability Approach (CA), and take a critical measure of its comparative advantage relative to the “Rawlsian Resourcist Approach” (RR), arguably its main competitor. He does so in an effort to determine which approach offers a plausible and workable public criterion of social justice. He concludes his lengthy and sustained analysis by claiming that CA is saddled with some serious conceptual, methodological, and practical difficulties, and cannot therefore be justified, let alone be considered superior. While Pogge’s effort to evaluate and critically engage CA is to be commended, the critical punch of his objections and criticisms rests, I believe, upon (1) his way of formulating the problem and setting up the main point of contention between CA and RR, and whether it is as straightforward and unproblematic as he claims it to be, and (2) his subsequent characterization and representation of the capability approach, and whether it is fair and accurate enough. I argue in this essay that (1) is objectionable, and that subsequently, (2) is inaccurate and problematic in some significant respect(s), which I attempt to identify. I conclude that these failures constitute sufficient grounds for brushing aside his objections and criticisms, precisely because they fail to hit their designated target as intended. Notwithstanding the real difficulties and problems still plaguing CA, I attempt in closing to articulate a qualified defense of CA and its conception of human development and social justice by bringing out some of its comparative advantages relative to RR on variations of a simple case-scenario. Essay #6: At a time when the world is reaching a state of interdependence and interconnectedness sufficient to enable us to talk about global solidarity, concrete universality (de facto as opposed to de jure), and cosmopolitanism, moral and political philosophy seems to be lacking the proper and necessary concepts and principles to underwrite such talk and properly conceptualize it. In this essay, I critically examine the views of two of the most influential philosophers, namely, Rorty and Rawls. I argue that they both fail, for different reasons, to provide a compelling treatment for dealing with the problem at hand. Apart from articulating briefly the reasons for their respective failure, I contend that a properly conceived notion of “plural universalism,” paradoxical as it may sound, may well serve to underwrite a realistic form of global solidarity and cosmopolitanism at this point in our history.

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Essay #7: Few scholarly topics or contemporary issues engender more readily heated controversies and debates than the question of the universality of human rights. It is not surprising therefore that discussion of the cross-cultural applicability of human rights was still characterized up until recently by the opposition between Universalists and Cultural Relativists. In fact, the debate on this question seemed to be never-ending and at an impasse. In recent times however, the de facto, albeit contingent, historical emergence of a “globalized human rights culture” coupled with (theoretical and methodological) developments in philosophy and anthropology, put in question the very basis of both universalists' and cultural relativists' arguments about human rights, and undermined the credibility of their (respective and common) assumptions. In some sense, these developments showed that these protagonists are still caught up in what now seems to be a rear-guard battle, which is arguably irrelevant at this point in our history. In the present essay, I argue that these recent developments not only contribute to moving the universalist vs. relativist debate out of the present impasse, but also assist us in the formulation of a new and more promising conceptual framework for comprehending the real and symbolic dimensions of current human rights practices and the flows of human rights values around the world. I submit that we need to develop and adopt an integrated, contextual, dynamic, interdisciplinary methodology of internal and cross- cultural analysis of human rights concepts and conceptions values and practices. In a “post-cultural, global & glocal world,” I contend that this is as good a place to start as any if we are to understand how, when, and why human rights become (or not) invested with meaning and significance in various cultural contexts. Only by expanding our understanding of the contemporary globalized & glocalized conditions of “cultural complexity” in which human rights enter as both a defining and defined set of goals and values (always contested), can we hope to perpetuate in an effective manner our steady progress toward a fuller realization of the respect for human rights worldwide. Essay #8: The question of whether and how to extend liberalism to the international or global realm brings up what seems to be a basic contradiction in how it ought to understand itself. We might characterize it as constituting the fundamental dilemma of liberalism. How should (liberal) political philosophers understand the moral status of states, nation-states, or national boundaries when dealing with international justice, or should I say indiscriminately, with global justice? And how should they conceive of justice, if it can be done at all, in the international/global context—as opposed to the national or domestic

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context? In this essay, I undertake in short order the critical evaluation of the proposals of nationalists-partialists-particularists-cultural perfectionists, Rawls’ proposal for an international justice based on his (pluralistic) political liberalism as well as those of his cosmopolitan critics for global justice (e.g., Beitz and Pogge). I argue essentially that they all fail (albeit for different kinds of reasons) to provide a satisfactory solution or dissolution of the dilemma. I therefore attempt to sketch out an alternative view that I call “cosmopolitan pluralism,” which, I contend, might better enable us to achieve a more “realistic utopia”—to use Rawls’ expression. Essay #9: In the past few decades, several of the so-called “postmodern philosophers” have leveled severe and sustained criticisms against “the Tradition.” They have radically put in question and undermined our traditional conceptions of Philosophy, its tasks and goals, claims and pretensions, methods and methodologies, its public image and self-image. In short, everything that Philosophers once held dear, and that some still hold dear today, moved as they are by a quest for Certainty and nostalgia for the Absolute. Many have come to view these radical, postmodern criticisms as having brought on the “End of Philosophy.” If this is so, what is to be done? Where do we go from here? What are our real options? What is there left for Philosophers to do, if anything, that is worthwhile and meaningful? Do we simply accept the postmodern critics’ verdict, and simply take up whatever they have proposed to replace Philosophy? Or do we boldly and imaginatively consider an alternative— albeit one informed by the latter’s positive contributions? This is what I propose to do in this last essay. I sketch out a programmatic ten pointsproposal for a reconstructed, renewed, and transformed “philosophy”— after the end of Philosophy—which, I argue, can only be a new kind of Critical Theory. It must be one which enables us to better understand our current predicament—confronted as we are by the brutality and failure of neo-liberal capitalism and the moral bankruptcy of representative democracies and authoritarian regimes, and to diagnose the pathologies of our Modernity. In the final analysis, it must have a clear and compelling emancipatory thrust.

ESSAY # 1 CONSEQUENCES OF “CULTURAL COMPLEXITY”

1. Introduction “Culture” has emerged in recent decades as the subject of intense and divisive political controversies at both the national and international (or should I say, global) level. The intensity and divisiveness of these controversies can be felt in a number of areas. These include: identity politics or the politics of cultural differences and recognition, multiculturalism, cross-cultural communication or incommensurability, and more specifically, the issue of cultural relativism vs. moral universalism, as it is brought to bear on the theoretical debates and political struggles about human rights, democracy, human development and social justice—to mention only a few of the most hotly debated ones. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the so-called “end of ideologies”, some authors have argued that the single most important conflict confronting the world today and for the foreseeable future will be a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996)—also characterized as a “clash of cultures” (in the broadest sense of the term), which are irremediably incommensurable and condemned to misunderstand one another. Paradoxically enough, this view is further supported and given credence by so-called “postmodernists” who are typically situated on the other side of the political spectrum. These thinkers (e.g., Lyotard, 1984) take a strong anti-metanarrative stance and recommend that we content ourselves and learn to live with diverging tales and narratives in irreconcilable idioms and languages. They urge that we forgo once and for all any attempt to make comparative evaluations on the basis of a presumably neutral (external, trans-historical, trans-cultural, and universal) set of standards, or to enfold them into synoptic or synthetic visions of any kind.

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Besides, the phenomenon of “globalization” 1—apprehended in at least one of its main dimensions—is commonly viewed as something fundamentally new and interpreted as one threatening cultural uniformity or homogenization around the world. It is in one sense taken to represent the new face of “cultural imperialism”. In effect, it is viewed mainly as “a threat to cultural diversity”. It is widely believed that the predominance and global expansion of uniformizing and homogenizing modes of production, consumption and information risks alienating non-Western and Western people alike from the intellectual and moral resources embedded in their own “distinctive” cultural traditions. In reaction to what is viewed as the erosion of 1

According to a widespread “consensus” characterization of “globalization,” the phenomenon is assumed to be something fundamentally new. Some authors however question such a characterization by putting forth what they deem to be a more historically informed and nuanced perspective. In their view, it would be more accurate to talk of the nth wave of globalization, where n is determined based on the historical periodization adopted. See, for example, Donnelly (2000: 239n1); Appiah (2006ab); see also Avineri (1970) for an insightful discussion of Marx’s classical analysis of the phase of globalization stretching from the 15th to the 19th century. Whatever historical parallels or antecedents one could bring up to qualify or mitigate the absolute novelty of globalization and that we are well-advised to take into account, one must nevertheless recognize that the accelerated pace of change, as well as the quantitative and qualitative differences in this era of “globalization” (characteristic of the decades on either side of the year 1990) are distinctive features which cannot be diminished or dismissed. Which of these distinctive features one choose to focus on will vary and depend on one’s purposes and objectives. Our analyses might arguably gain in both empirical reality and normative power if we were prepared however to countenance and adopt a not-sosimplistic perspective, in which “globalization” can be viewed as a process or an outcome; as a comprehensive whole or as a contingent clustering of disparate and separable elements or components. In this last respect, we could perhaps further advance and fine-tune our analyses by specifying the domain(s) or “scapes” (to use Appadurai’s term) within which it operates, and the particular modalities according to which it does so, viz., “finanscapes, tradescapes, technoscapes, ideoscapes, mediascapes, etc. Interestingly enough, most authors on the subject prefer to see it as a process rather than as an end-state, as an integrated holistic process characterized typically in a “monochromatic” manner rather than as a clustering of largely independent or semi-independent components. For some other insightful alternative analyses of globalization, see Arjun Appadurai (1996), Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington (2003), Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (1998), see in particular W.I. Robinson (2008) for a detailed and perspicuous review of various theories of globalization.

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traditional cultures and civilizations, we seem to be witnessing the reemergence of a tendency to “re-ethnicize the minds” through renewed and more or less systematic “cultural revivals” worldwide (viz., “hinduization,” “ivoirization,” “sinofication,” “nipponification,” “islamicization,” “indigenization,” “russification,” “gallicization,” etc.). Scholars of various stripes and persuasions are clamoring to understand and assess the significance of this phenomenon, as attested by the proliferation of publications on this subject (see Botz-Bornstein & Hengelbrock, 2006). In the past few years (2001), the UNESCO had convened a forum in order to hammer out a convention on the “protection and promotion” of cultural diversity. Such a convention was finally approved, I believe, in October 2005. The drafters worried that “the processes of globalization …represent a challenge for cultural diversity, namely in view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor countries.” The fear was that the values and images of Western mass culture, like some invasive weed, are threatening to choke out the world’s native flora. Subsequently, alarms are sounded and concerns raised about the imminent disappearance of “distinctive cultures”, and calls made to “preserve” all existing cultures— as if they each and all deserve to be saved, in each and all their respective components and elements.2 “Political correctness” aside, perhaps we should keep in mind that: “Cultures are not museum pieces, to be preserved intact at all costs” (Nussbaum, 1999: 37). Perhaps we also need to come to grips with the unavoidability and even desirability of “cross-cultural contamination, intermingling and fertilization” (Appiah, 2006a). More often than not, a problematic conception of “culture” is at work implicitly or explicitly in the views of various protagonists involved in 2

Upon closer scrutiny, the UNESCO document reveals contradictions and tensions. For example, it affirms both the necessity of protecting cultural diversity and the importance of the free flow of ideas, freedom of thought and expression, and human rights. But as we know, the latter values will become universal only if we chose to make them so. And it is manifestly unclear how to best arrive at this desirable result. In this context, shouldn’t we ask the difficult question: What is really important --cultures or peoples? Shouldn’t the most pressing question be instead: How can we articulate a viable ethics of globalization—judiciously and properly understood in its complexity? A defensible global ethics is arguably going to be one that tempers the respect for difference with a respect for the freedom of actual human beings to make their own choices.

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these debates. They write or talk as if “culture” were a homogenous, coherent, bounded, tightly woven, un-contested, unified or unitary entity with a distinct nature, whose identity-constituting and deterministic role on individuals and groups of people is uniform, continuous and stable. I contend that such a conception of “culture” underlying or underwriting many of the controversies raging today constitutes in fact a fundamental misconception, with profound and at times disturbing philosophical as well as political implications (Chokr, 2006). Admittedly, the concept of “culture” is “essentially a contested concept—like democracy, religion, simplicity, or social justice”, which is multiply defined, multiply employed, ineradicably imprecise (Geertz, 2000: 11). And a history of its evolution over the past couple of hundred years or so—to take a relatively limited yet arguably sufficient historical perspective—would attest to the vicissitudes it has undergone, the battles over its meaning, its use, and its explanatory worth. Short of undertaking a full-blown history of the concept, which would undoubtedly be a worthwhile enterprise (see Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1963),3 I propose instead to draw together some of the main insights and lessons that we have learned from various such efforts in an attempt to make a case for the notion of “cultural complexity” 4 and defend an 3

In their classic compilation of the various definitions of “culture” that have appeared in the literature since the 19th century, Kroeber and Kluckhohn had found 171 distinct definitions, which could then be sorted out into 13 categories. 4 In recent years, ideas from “complexity theory” have had a substantial impact on various disciplines outside the “hard” sciences from which they originated, in particular in sociology (e.g., Urry, 2003; Byrne 1998), organizational sciences (Stacey et al, 2000, Stacey, 2001; Richardson, 2005), and in anthropology (e.g., (Fikentscher, 1998; Hannerz, 1993; Denton, 2004). However, their impact on mainstream philosophy has not been as significant as one would expect. This is surprising given that the related domains of cognitive science and evolutionary theory have inspired plenty of philosophical investigations. In a recent paper, titled “Complexity and Philosophy,” Heylighen, Cilliers and Gershenson (2006) give at least three reasons for this, and they go on to show how (postmodern) philosophy could benefit from taking complexity seriously on a number of issues, including the structure of complex (social) systems or systems of meaning, the distinction between boundaries and limits, the problem of difference, the idea of the subject in political philosophy, ethics, relativism, life, mind, consciousness, and in turn how complexity theory could be further enriched by philosophy. They write: “Complexity is perhaps the most essential characteristic of our present society. As technological and economic advances make production, transport and communication

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alternative, more appropriate, conception according to which “culture” is always already ineradicably plural, compound, inconstant, and always already multiply contested both from within and without. Such a conception constitutes, I believe, a direct challenge to the “cookie-cutter conception of culture” with its focus on consensus, type and commonality. In the face of the kind and degree of fragmentation, dispersion, intermingling, cross-fertilization and contamination characteristic of the (globalizing and “glocalizing”) world today, I submit that the view of culture, a culture, this culture, as a consensus on fundamentals—shared beliefs, feelings, values and practices—is hardly tenable except for the socalled “guardians of cultural integrity and ethnic purity” who would like us to believe otherwise. Against such guardians, we must be prepared to countenance instead the compositeness and heterogeneity of cultures. In the present essay, I argue essentially that we are well-advised to draw the consequences of “cultural complexity” in a world that is undergoing both “globalization” and “glocalization”5 at the same time in ever more efficient, we interact with ever more people, organizations, systems and objects. And as this network of interactions grows and spreads around the globe, the different economic, social technological and ecological systems that we are part of become ever more interdependent. The result is an ever more complex “system of systems” where a change in any component may affect virtually any other component and that in a mostly unpredictable manner. The traditional scientific method, which is based on analysis, isolation, and the gathering of complete information about such a phenomenon, is incapable of dealing with such complex interdependencies. The emerging science of complexity (Waldrop, 1992; Cilliers, 1998, Heylighen, 1997) offers the promise of an alternative methodology that would be able to tackle such problems. However, such an approach needs solid foundations, that is, a clear understanding and definition of the underlying concepts and principles (Heylighen, 2000).” Despite the fact that concepts from complexity have not yet gone very deeply into philosophy, the process is already under way. Apart from the works of Derrida (1988) and Deleuze (1987) which are often mentioned in this regard, it is also worth noting those of Morin (1992), Cilliers (1998, 2004, and 2005), Rescher (1998), and Taylor (2003). 5 See the very insightful essay by Drori et al (2014) “Unpacking the glocalization of organization: from term, to theory, to analysis” in which the authors attempt to specify the dimensions of complexity and multidimensionality inherent in the notion of glocalization. For this purpose, they propose three sets of analytic conceptualizations: three axes of glocalization (vertical, horizontal, and temporal); three core themes (what, who, and how); and finally, several sequenced components (abstraction, construction of equivalency, adoption and adaptation). In their view, the notion of glocalization came to stand over the past two decades for more than what the term literally encompasses. Not only does it refer to the

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an effort to articulate an adequate conception of culture and cultural analysis—from both an empirical and normative point of view. I contend that, if and when we do, we would for example be able to come up with an account of the complex mechanisms of identity-formation for individuals and communities that is far more compelling empirically and normatively. We would also be able to better understand the complex internal dynamics of cultures as well as the diverse relationships that obtain (or not) between them at this juncture of our history. Finally, I will also argue that it would enable us to better address the issue of human rights for example, beyond the dead-end debate of (radical) cultural relativism vs. (traditional Western-centric) moral universalism, and thereby clear the ground for the articulation of “a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism”, that is nevertheless respectful enough of cultural differences.

2. A Brief History of the Concept of “Culture” Before taking up these tasks however, it behooves us to take stock briefly of the contemporary concept of “culture”, i.e., how “culture” came to be conceived today on the basis of (1) the Modern View and (2) the Received View. My account here will be woven primarily on the basis of those provided by Clifford Geertz (2000) and Seyla Benhabib (2002), among others.

2.1 The Modern View of Culture The modern view is perhaps best characterized by two sets of binary oppositions: (a) “culture” vs. “nature” and (b) “culture” vs. “civilization”. If by virtue of its Latin etymology “colare”, “culture” was originally associated with activities of preservation, tending to, and caring for, and if “agriculture” was once considered to be the quintessential cultural activity, such a meaning was radically transformed by Western modernity, and the emergence of its key concomitant features: rationalized scientific worldview, capitalist commodity economy, and bureaucratic administrative control (Benhabib, 2002: 2).

mutually constitutive character of the global and the glocal, it also spearheads the challenge to the numerous dichotomies that have dominated previous discussions of globalization, and points to the dualities of similarity and variation as well as universalism and particularism. In the end, they argue that the conceptualizations proposed can best serve, taken together, as the basis for the description and analysis of glocalization, and that the important principle of such an analytic approach to the multidimensionality of glocalization is the intersection, or conjuncture, among the three sets of conceptualizations proposed.

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Subsequently, “culture” was first contrasted, in a typically Modern manner, with “nature”, and similarly sorted out into “kinds” on the basis of the distance any of its components moved away from nature. As we might guess or expect, the ethnocentric criteria used for this “measurement” and “sorting out” included, among others, the following considerations: monotheism, individualism, monogamy, and property protection. It came to be viewed in a generic sense as “a universal property of human social life, the techniques, customs, traditions, and technologies—religion and kinship, fire and language—that set it off from animal existence” (Geertz 2000: 248). This “generic conception of culture” held sway during most of the 19th century and well into the early part of the 20th. As for the contrast between “culture” and “civilization”, it was meant to bring out the fact that the latter did not encourage “tending to”, or “caring for”, while the former did by virtue of its original, etymological meaning. Furthermore, it reflected “the challenge posed by (emerging) commodity capitalism poised to yoke science and industry for ever more rapid expansion” (Benhabib 2002: 2). Such a contrast was most clearly and forcefully articulated by the German Romantic, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), for whom “culture” (Kultur) consisted of “shared values, meanings, linguistic signs and symbols of a people—itself considered a unified and homogeneous entity”. It consisted of the diverse forms and modalities through which the “spirit” or “genius” of a people as distinct from another is expressed. Under this idealistic, Romantic view, an individual’s acquisition of “culture” involved a soul’s immersion and shaping through education and socialization in the ways and values of “a people”. It was viewed in other words as a process of intellectual and spiritual formation (or Bildung), i.e., a forming and shaping of the soul (see Ryle and Soper 2002). In this sense, Herder’s definition of culture kept something of its original meaning. In contrast, “civilization” was said to refer to the material values and practices that are shared with other peoples and that don’t reflect particularity or individuality.

2.2 The Received View of Culture Concerning the Received View, it has unquestionably been influenced and shaped by British social anthropology, French structuralism, and American anthropology as well. In the aftermath of WWI, because of the increased number of anthropological field research projects, especially among “social isolates” and “encapsulated peoples” (such as jungle people, island people, desert people, artic people, etc.), a growing skepticism about the usefulness of “the generic conception of culture” led to the adoption of what has been called

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the “configurational conception of culture” (see Fleischacker 1994, chapter 5 for details on the history of such a conception). As a result, we now had “cultures” instead of just culture as such; there were bounded, coherent, cohesive, and self-standing cultures. However, after WWII, when even putative social isolates and encapsulated peoples grew fewer in number and anthropologists turned their attention to more mixed-up, culturally complex regions of the world, the configurational model became in turn hard to sustain in the face of accumulating evidence. Its anthropological reality was increasingly put in question. Anthropologists became increasingly critical of Eurocentric presumptions and sought to democratize the concept of “culture” by deconstructing further the binary opposition which served to demarcate its meaning, and in which it was taken as a term of critique of that of “civilization”. As a result, the modern, value-laden distinction between “culture” (Kultur) and “civilization” could no longer be sustained and became increasingly irrelevant. Thus “an egalitarian understanding of culture” progressively emerged and lo and behold came to be dominant (Benhabib 2002: 3). As Geertz points out quite pertinently, the vicissitudes of “culture” (the mot, not the chose—there is no chose), which began in the 50’s have continued ever since. And “[i]n its ups and downs, its drift toward and away from clarity and popularity […] we can see anthropology’s lumbering, arrhythmic line of March…” (Geertz: 12). Thus, he writes: By the 1950s, the eloquence, energy, breadth of interest, and sheer brilliance of such writers as Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Ruth Benedict, Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, Geoffrey Gorer, Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinovski, Edward Sapir, and most spectacularly, Margaret Mead […] made the anthropological idea of culture at once available to, well, the culture, and so diffuse and all-embracing as to seem like an all-seasons explanation for anything human beings might contrive to do, imagine, say, be or believe (Geertz, 2000: 12).

In such a context, many young anthropologists felt condemned to work with an inflationary logic and a language in which concept, cause, form, and outcome had the same name. Dissatisfied with such a state of affairs, they took it upon themselves “to cut the idea of culture down to size, and to turn it into a less expansive affair”. For them, as Geertz puts it, “it seemed urgent, (and it still seems urgent) to make “culture” into a delimited notion, one with a determinate application, a definite sense, and a specified use—the at least focused subject of an at least somewhat focused science” (Geertz 2000: 13, my italics).

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In the meantime, “culture” came to be viewed as the sum total of social systems and practices of meaning-making, signification, representation, and symbolism, each with its own autonomous logic, separate from, yet not reducible to the intentions of individuals or groups through whose actions and practices it emerges and is reproduced (see Benhabib 2002: 3). In an egalitarian vein, all such social systems and practices developed by different groups of human beings in their respective environments and in response to their particular conditions constitute as many different “cultures”, i.e., as many different, equally viable ways of setting themselves apart from “animal existence” and away from “nature”. And more often than not, the ubiquitous notion of an autonomous and distinct culture was associated with the notion of identity. Though the old culture/civilization distinction was discarded, Herder’s identification of the “spirit” or “genius” of a people with expressions of its cultural identity was still countenanced.

2.3 Further Clarification Obviously, there is a broad and narrow sense of the term “culture” According to the former; “culture” denotes virtually every aspect of the social, political, economic, intellectual, religious and artistic life of a people. In this sense, “culture” refers to the customs, civilization, and achievements of a given people. This was the view taken for example in the classic work of Tylor (1871/1924), who regarded culture as including “knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society.” In contrast to such an all-embracing notion of culture, there is also another, equally widely used, notion of culture that narrowly focuses only on the intellectual and aesthetic achievements of a people. In the latter sense, culture is then defined as “the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively.” In the present context, it is obviously the former sense of culture that is of interest to us. It is also the sense in which the UNESCO commission addresses the problem of cultural diversity (2001).

3. Contemporary Cultural Politics 3.1 Dubious Assumptions, Premises, and Theses It is fair to say that cultural politics today is for the most part still characterized by a strange mix of two elements: (1) “the anthropological received view of the democratic equality of all cultures” and (2) “the

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Romantic, Herderian emphasis on each culture’s irreducible uniqueness and distinctness” (see Joppke and Lukes, 1999: 5; see also Benhabib, 2002: 3). As a result, it is widely assumed that the boundaries separating peoples as well as cultures are easy to draw and delineate, and that each distinct people has a distinct “culture”. Thus, still too many contemporary discussions, including the most well-intentioned ones, seem to be committed to some versions or others of the following assumptions, premises, or theses: (1) Cultural Egalitarianism. (2) Cultural Essentialism/ Monism/ Holism/ Hermeticism. (3) Cultural Idealism/ Determinism/ Reductionism.6 By (1) “cultural egalitarianism”, I don’t mean to suggest that all cultures were viewed necessarily as equally deserving of merit in terms of their “material” and “symbolic” systems of production and reproduction— although this view may also have been taken by some of the protagonists. I only wish to capture the anthropological received view that all cultures came to be given equal consideration as distinct and unique cultures— 6

Pierik (2004: 524) has a different way of making this kind of analysis. He writes: “Cultural groups are taken for granted as distinct entities, internally homogenous, externally bounded, and seen as basic constituents of social life. Such a conceptualization runs the risk of falling prey to the culturalistic fallacy.” He quotes Bidney (1953: 51): “The culturalistic fallacy may be said to be committed when one defines culture as ideational abstraction and then proceeds to convert or reify this ens rationis into an independent ontological entity subject to its own laws of development and conceived through itself alone.” He then distinguishes three aspects of the culturalistic fallacy as follows: “First, the reification of culture: to regard something abstract as something material or concrete. Second, the compartmentalization of culture: the tendency to view cultures as discrete entities with sharp borders. Third, the essentializing of culture: the tendency to see culture as an autonomous and immutable entity, in which individual members are regarded as only the passive bearers of culture.” He goes on to add: “The extreme essentialist and naturalized descriptions are nowadays generally dismissed. Over time, we have seen a shifting emphasis from “natural” to “cultural” descriptions of groups, phrased in terms of “blood” via “race” and “ethnicity” to “culture.” It is generally accepted now that culture is a socially constructed concept. On the other hand, constructivism dissolves into reductionism when it denies that culture is a real phenomenon in society, and merely sees it as a “narrative discourse,” a “process,” or as an “identity.” I am not as certain as Pierik that the essentialist construal of culture is as widely rejected as he suggests. And while I agree with the social constructivism’s construal of culture and the danger of falling into reductionism, I would still want to point out that it matters a great deal what particular version of social constructivism (among the wide variety thereof) one opts for.

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providing a distinctive set of answers and solutions to the problems encountered by a given people in their environment.7 By (2) “cultural essentialism/ monisn/ holism/ hermeticism”, I mean to capture in an adumbrated manner the most problematic and widespread view according to which each culture has presumably a distinct, essential nature—that is one, whole and somehow hermetically closed off to other cultural influences. Each such culture is furthermore considered to be congruent with a distinct group or people. It is typically apprehended along only one of its dimensions in terms of a powerfully and strictly determining homogenous and uniform symbolic system of meanings, values and beliefs (often without much regard for the material constraints at work) acting or operating in similar ways on all of its members or carriers (often without much regard for the powerfully individuating historical and psychological forces or factors at play). This view is underwritten by what I call the thesis of (3) “cultural idealism/ determinism/ reductionism”—whereby individuals are viewed as being strictly or blindly determined by their respective culture and their lives as reducible to the culture they belong to in that they are shaped “as a cake-mold shapes a cake, or gravity our movements” (Geertz, 2000: 13). It is worth noting that given (1)-(3), it is only a very short step to the thesis of either (4) Ethnocentrism, or (5) Cultural Relativism. Contrary to some authors (e.g., Rorty) who may wish to distinguish between these two notions for self-serving and dubious purposes, I assume that cultural relativism is merely the anthropological or sociological form of ethnocentrism or ethnocentricity, construed in psychological terms.

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In a polemical and highly critical introduction to Patrick West’s The Poverty of Multiculturalism (2005), Kenneth Minogue writes: “As the doctrine of tolerance began in the 1960s to turn into a morality of acceptance and inclusion, it also began to make claims about reality, and turned into multiculturalism, the belief that all cultures are equal in value. The doctrine is that we must, on pain of committing discriminatory racism, regard every individual, and every culture in which individuals participate, as being equally valuable” (p. vii). In the same piece, titled interestingly enough “Multiculturalism: A Dictatorship of Virtue,” he adds: “The multiculturalists explained to us that all cultures were equal. This vague expression might mean, what an anthropologist would certainly think, that every culture must be understood as a human response to a context and therefore as having moral value and intellectual interest in its own terms” (pp. xi-xii). Given however the remainder of his discussion, it is obvious that he does not agree with such a view.

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In such a context, it is perhaps perfectly understandable why the thesis of “cultural diversity” meets with overwhelmingly broad and wide support—at times though almost uncritically and without much needed nuances and qualifications. 8 We are told at both ends of the political spectrum—albeit for differently expressed reasons—that the preservation and continuation of all different cultures is a good and desirable goal. On the Left, we are told by a diverse group of authors [e.g., Taylor (1992; 1994), Kymlicka (1997; 2000; 2001)] that cultures should be preserved as distinct entities, and if need be, they should be given their own enclaves in order to redress and remedy historical or institutional patterns of domination, oppression and/or symbolic injury involving the disrespect, un- or misrecognition, or mistreatment of some cultures by others. Examples of such cases abound not only with regards to one multicultural or multi-national country, but between “cultures” across the world. They were particularly acute during the times of colonialism and imperialism. These examples constitute today the fertile ground for the kind of moral problems and dilemmas stemming from “multiculturalism” and “cultural diversity.” While we all can agree that they must be addressed, justly and fairly, we may however disagree over the liberal recommendations and policy 8

As noted earlier, “diversity” and “freedom” may often be at odds, and the tensions between them are not always easy to resolve. The rhetoric of preservation and diversity does not seem of much help in dealing with the contradictions that emerge. Let us consider a couple of provisions included in the UNESCO convention on cultural diversity (2001). Take for example the principle affirming equal dignity and respect for all cultures. Does this mean each, any and all cultures, or what? Does this mean affirming the equal respect for each and all components or aspects of a given culture? Do the cultures deserving protection for diversity’s sake include the KKK and the Taliban? Take also the principle affirming the importance of culture for social cohesion, and its potential for the enhancement of the status and role of women in society. Doesn’t cohesion argue for uniformity or conformity? Wouldn’t enhancing the status and role of women involve changing, rather than preserving, some cultures—at least in some important respects? Unquestionably, human variety and cultural diversity matter --not for their own sake or in themselves, but because they offer people different options to which they are entitled in order to flourish (see Mill, 1860/1982). If however we would want to preserve a wide range of cultural and human conditions because it gives free people more options, and subsequently the best chances to make their own lives as they see fit, can we thereby justify enforcing diversity by trapping people within differences that they themselves long to reduce and seek to escape?

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initiatives put forth for doing so, and in particular, over the underlying conception of “culture” that serves to underwrite them. Thus, I doubt that proposals which encourage and promote “cultural enclavism” and “cultural preservationism” are the way to go.9 [For a compelling critical analysis of both Taylor’s and Kymlicka’ views, see Benhabib, (2002: 5157; 59-67)] On the Right, we are told that cultures should be preserved so as to keep peoples and groups separate because cultural confrontation is a real 9

According to Appiah (2006ab), it may be useful to distinguish between “preserving cultural artifacts” produced by different cultures over time from “preserving cultures.” It is hard to see how one could object to the former— commensurately with one’s means and resources. But it is not clear how much we can or should preserve cultures as such—as if they can be preserved “frozen in time” like “pickles in a jar” if they are unable to survive through changes and adaptations and endure, if only as a historical entity. Let’s not forget that cultures are made of continuities through changes, and the identity of a culture (as a historical entity) typically survives through these more or less radical changes. A culture which does not survive through various kinds of changes is not more authentic, but merely dead. The so-called “preservationists” often make their case by invoking the evil of “cultural imperialism.” The picture underlying their position can be depicted, in broad strokes, as follows: There is a world system of capitalism. It has a center and a periphery. At the center—in Europe and the United States—is a set of multinational corporations. Some of these are in the media business. The products they sell around the world promote the creation of desires that can be fulfilled only by the purchase and use of their products. They do this explicitly through advertising, but more insidiously, they also do so through the messages implicit in movies and in television drama. Leading critics of mediacultural imperialism claim that “it is the imagery and cultural perspectives of the ruling sector in the center that shape and structure the consciousness throughout the system at large.” From a certain (experiential) point of view, this theory seems to be borne out at least in part, but it is doubtful whether a sociological analysis of evidence (in due form) would corroborate this picture in an unmitigated way. Recent studies in this area show interestingly enough that people around the world respond to these cultural imports differently depending on their values, needs and priorities in their respective cultural contexts. In short, it seems that adaptations, re-interpretations, transfers and filterings are taking place in so many different ways. Besides, doesn’t talking of cultural imperialism “structuring the consciousness” of people living in the so-called periphery treat them like blank slates on which global capitalism unfettered writes its subliminal messages, leaving in its wake only “cultural automatons or zombies.” Isn’t this deeply condescending, apart from being unsupported by the complexities of cultural interactions and exchanges around the world in this era of both globalization and glocalization? I will return to this point in due course.

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threat, perhaps even the only threat we need to concern ourselves with in the aftermath of the Cold War and the so-called “end of ideologies” (Huntington, 1996).10 Furthermore, we are told that cultural hybridity can only produce tensions, instabilities, and eventually lead to serious conflicts. It is believed that the “clash of civilizations” (or “cultures” broadly construed) can be avoided somehow by the establishment and reinforcement of political alliances that closely follow cultural-ethnic identity rifts. It does not take much political ingenuity or sophistication to recognize that such a goal is unrealistic, and cannot be borne out by the political realities of any given country, let alone the world. The political-culturalethnic map is to say the least often scrambled in surprising ways—in a given society and all the more so across the globe. And there may be some lessons to be learned here from attending to the particular ways in which such a map is often scrambled in different parts of the world—and to the reasons why it is thus scrambled. Only a naïve and unsophisticated political theory could surmise that political alliances would always necessarily follow cultural, ethnic or racial lines of demarcation or, for that matter, gender or even class distinctions (see Nussbaum, 1999, 2000; Benhabib, 1995, 2002; Sen, 1999; 2006).

3.2 Suspect Ethnocentrisms/ Relativisms If “conflict avoidance” is one of the rationalized motivations behind Huntington’s kind of “descriptive and normative ethnocentrism”, “cultural renewal” and “moral creativity” is the other rationalized motivation for the kind of ethnocentrism defended by Levi-Strauss and Rorty respectively. According to Levi-Strauss (1985), ethnocentrism is not only not in itself a bad thing, but, as long it does not get out of hand, a rather good one. 10

In a recent book, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (2006), Amartya Sen takes aim at the logic of conflict underlying the reductionist approach pitting “us-vs.-them” (the West vs. the Rest) found in the work of Huntington, and in which members of different cultures seem to be locked up in “little boxes” from which they cannot escape. Interestingly, or rather ironically, Huntington’s outlook is shared by those “radical Muslim fundamentalists” against whom his analysis seems to be aimed. Along similar lines, Jean-Francois Fayart, in The Illusion of Cultural Identity (2005), argues that the “clash of civilizations” is not unavoidably our fate. We come to believe otherwise only if we adopt a problematic and objectionable conception of cultural identity as natural.

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For, to be loyal to a certain set of values inevitably makes people partially or totally insensitive to other values to which other people, equally parochial, are equally loyal. It is not at all invidious to place one way of life or thought above all others, or to feel little drawn to other values. Such “relative incommunicability” does not however authorize anyone to oppress or destroy the values rejected or those carrying them. Provided this is absent, and the “liberal virtue” of respect for “compartmentalized” differences is upheld, ethnocentrism is not at all repugnant, Levi-Strauss claims. In The View from Afar, he writes interestingly enough: It may even be the price to be paid so that the systems of values of each spiritual family or each community are preserved and find within themselves the resources necessary for their renewal. If […] human societies exhibit a certain optimal diversity beyond which they cannot go, but below which they can no longer descend without danger, we must recognize that, to a large extent, this diversity results from desire of each culture to resist the culture surrounding it, to distinguish itself from them—in short, to be itself. Cultures are not unaware of one another, they even borrow from one another on occasion, but in order not to perish, they must in other connections remain somewhat impermeable toward one another (1985: xiii; italics added).

Thus, it may even be an illusion that humanity can ever escape completely from ethnocentrism, or even that it will care to do so. For LeviStrauss, it would not be a good thing if it did so. We are better off recognizing that ethnocentrism is “consubstantial with our species”, and as such it can never completely disappear, but it can grow dangerously weak, “leaving us prey to a sort of moral entropy”. Cultural renewal and moral creativity require, according to this view, ethnocentrism. “…[A]ll true creation, in Levi-Strauss’s view, implies a certain deafness to the appeal of other values, even going as far as to reject them if not denying them altogether” (1985: 23). Characteristic of a view for which human communities are, or should be, “windowless (semantic) monads”, (Bernstein, 1991: 92), Levi-Strauss also states elsewhere something to the following effect, namely, that we are passengers in the trains which are our cultures, each moving on its own track, at its own speed, and in its own direction. The trains rolling alongside, going in similar directions and at speeds not too different from our own are at least reasonably visible to us as we look out from our compartments. But trains on an oblique or parallel track which are going in an opposed direction are not. And he adds regarding the latter case: “[We] perceive only a vague, fleeting, barely identifiable image, usually

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just a momentary blur in our visual field, supplying no information about itself and merely irritating us because it interrupts our placid contemplation of the landscape which serves as the backdrop to our daydreaming” (1985: 10). The appeal of such “a relax-and-enjoy-it approach” to one’s imprisonment in one’s “cultural train, or compartment” may explain (at least in part) its popularity in recent social and political thought. Rorty’s defense of “ethnocentrism” (1989, 1991, and 1998) offers us another opportunity to diagnose this appeal. Thus, in “Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism”, he writes: “[We] have to work out from the networks we are, from the communities with which we presently identify (1991: 202). I hope to suggest how “we” (postmodern bourgeois liberals) might convince our society that “loyalty to itself is loyalty enough”—that it needs to be responsible only to its own traditions” (1991: 199). And he adds: [T]here is no “ground” for our loyalties and convictions save the fact that the beliefs and desires and emotions which buttress them overlap those of lots of other members of the group with which we identify for purposes of moral and political deliberation (1991: 200).

Adopting Putnam’s statement in Reason, Truth, and History (1981: 216) Rorty goes on to conclude: “We can only hope to produce a more rational conception of rationality and a better conception of morality if we operate from within our tradition” (1991: 202). No doubt Levi-Strauss and Rorty have different starting points (Kantianism without a subject vs. Hegelianism without an Absolute Spirit) and different end-points or goals (a trim world of transposable forms vs. a disheveled one of coincidental discourses). Nevertheless there is a striking similarity between their respective ethnocentrism. Just as Levi-Strauss, Rorty too believes that invidious distinctions between groups are not only normal but essential to moral creativity. However, unlike Levi-Strauss, Rorty is not so much interested in other people’s trains as he is concerned with where his own train is heading. Consistently with his general philosophical outlook as a reconstructed neo-pragmatist, he claims that “the moral justification of the institutions and practices of one’s group is mostly a matter of historical narratives rather than philosophical meta-narratives”. And the most we can hope to

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achieve is to construct “contrast-effects” narratives—“which serve to develop, consolidate, or modify a group’s self-image (in contrast to that of another), by, for example, apotheosizing its heroes, diabolizing its enemies, mounting dialogues among its members and refocusing its attention” (1991: 200). He speaks of more or less accidental “overlap” of belief systems between “rich North American bourgeois” communities and others—that we “need to talk with” as somehow enabling “whatever conversation between nations may still be possible, as well as leaving American intellectuals in a better position to converse with their fellow citizens” (1991: 201). What should we think of a philosophy which can think of nothing better to do with other ways of going at life than to make them look worse than our own through constructed “contrast-effects” narratives—of the kind that V.S. Naipaul and Salman Rushdie have presumably become famous for? What kind of world is this bound to lead to, other than one in which condescension and patronizing arrogance will find a fertile ground? Given the interdependence of the world today, are we not under a moral and pragmatic imperative to forge as wide and broad, an unforced “overlapping consensus” (to use the expression of one of Rorty’s heroes, Rawls) between as many communities as possible through a genuine dialogical or conversational process which is not reduced to a one-way or unidirectional talk? Is the kind of conversation depicted by Rorty the only possible one we may still have today? Would American intellectuals be truly in a better position talking to their fellow citizens? —If they unabashedly adopted Rorty’s ethnocentrism, even (or especially) in its most “postmodern bourgeois liberal” incarnation? Is it possible to articulate a more plausible and politically sound as well as more sophisticated position, one which does not encourage a happy and easy surrender to the comfortable numbness of being ourselves, locked up in compartments in our respective “cultural trains” (Levi-Strauss) running on different tracks and cultivating cultural deafness to each other, nor rests content with maximizing gratitude and gratification by way of condescending and patronizing “contrast-effects” narratives (Rorty) with other cultures? In short, is it possible to articulate a view that is neither normatively ethnocentric nor relativistic? I believe not only that we can, but we should do so urgently and in earnest.

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3.3 A Fundamental Misconception of Culture To this end, the analysis sketched out above is intended to suggest that the characterizations and defenses of “cultural diversity” on both the Right and the Left seem to be burdened by similarly faulty assumptions, premises, or theses. If “conflict avoidance” is one of the rationalized motivations behind Huntington’s kind of “descriptive and normative ethnocentrism”, “cultural renewal” and “moral creativity” is the other rationalized motivation for the kind of ethnocentrism defended by LeviStrauss (1985) and Rorty (1989, 1991) for example. The faulty or questionable assumptions on which such views are based can be summarized as follows: (1) Cultures are clearly delineable wholes, somehow congruent with peoples or population groups. [Cultural Essentialism, Monism, Holism, Hermeticism]. (2) A non-contested, uniform description of the culture of a given people or group can be given, which operates uniformly on its members or carriers in that it strictly determines their outlook and identity in a homogenous, cohesive and stable manner. [Cultural Idealism, Determinism, Reductionism]. (3) The facts of “cultural complexity” do not constitute or pose any serious problems or moral dilemmas in terms of cultural politics in a multicultural and multinational society—or are readily amenable to just and fair, and sustainable solutions. [Naïve, Unjustified Political Optimism]. The line of reasoning leading up from (1) to (3) is in fact a direct one, and can therefore easily be undermined by putting in question the empirical validity of the first step. Thus, regarding (1), it suffices to point out that because of a shuffling process which has been going on for quite some time, and which is, by now, approaching extreme and near universal proportions, social and cultural boundaries coincide in fact less and less closely. As for (2), it is doubtful that a uniform, non-controversial and non-contested description can be given of any culture. A culture can never fully capture all the beliefs and values that are held to be internal to it at a given point; similarly, a culture can never fully capture the present and future commitments and attitudes of its members or carriers. Finally with regards to (3), it should be pointed out that the political optimism of many multiculturalists or preservationists as well as ethnocentrists or relativists is unjustified in that it is underwritten by a naïve approach to cultural analysis which fails to properly countenance “cultural (and political) complexity”. By the latter, I mean here to underscore among other things the often neglected fact that cultures and peoples (or groups) may not and do not actually stand in a neat one-to-one correspondence; there is often

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more than one culture within a given people or group, and furthermore, more than one people or group may possess the same or similar cultural traits or features. Examples of both kinds of cases abound in the world. The assumptions, premises, or theses listed above serve arguably to underwrite what Benhabib has called “reductionist sociology of culture” (2002: 5). In this regard, Turner is right when he states that a conception based on such assumptions, premises, or theses risks essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race; it risks (i) reifying “cultures” as separate entities by overemphasizing their boundedness and distinctness; it risks (ii) overemphasizing the homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimize repressive demands for communal conformity, and by treating cultures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways that put them beyond the reach of critical analysis (1993: 412).

These last two consequences cannot be stressed enough. It is arguably a test of the adequacy of a given conception of culture if, from a normative point of view, it does not validate any of these consequences. It is thus a fair assessment to say that much of the current thinking in moral and political philosophy and in contemporary debates on cultural politics is still often saddled by such a highly objectionable conception. Needless to say, this has serious normative (moral as well as political) consequences for how we think culturally-based or motivated injustices among peoples or groups should be dealt with or remedied, and how we address the problem of “cultural diversity”. In a minimal sense, it implies that a defensible approach to the latter must factor in “cultural complexity” and a morally normative and evaluative stance—from the diverse contesting points of views both within and without. Besides, it cannot consist in measures and policies that merely seek to preserve “cultural enclaves” at any and all costs, regardless of the consequences that some cultural practices, beliefs and values may have on the dignity, freedom, and well-being of individuals and groups. Ethnocentric (or relativistic) views are but different versions of a rather common “to-each-his-own-morality” view on “cultural diversity” whose significance (if any) lies perhaps in the fact that it provides us, to use Bernard Williams’ distinction, with “alternatives to us” as opposed to “alternatives for us” (1985). But doesn’t such a view make both rather more and rather less of the fact of cultural diversity than it should? On the

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first score, doesn’t it seem to suggest that a person has somehow a real practical option, about which s/he must make a decision, as to whether s/he can have a different life than the one s/he has—by choosing to be born in a different culture? On the second score, doesn’t it seem to obscure the power of cultural diversity to transform an individual’s sense of what it is like for a human being to think, feel, value, believe, act and behave, etc.? The problems and challenges raised by the fact of cultural diversity have less to do with whether we can escape preferring our preferences or avoid being committed to our commitments. “We are, by definition, so committed as we are to having our headaches” (Geertz, 2000: 75), They have more to do with our capacity to understand different forms of life, learn foreign or alien language-games, feel our way into other forms of sense and sensibility, appreciate unfamiliar sensitivities and modes of thought we do not possess, and are not likely to acquire very easily or readily. This being said, I don’t think it is impossible. In another context, I have argued forcefully against the thesis of strong (cross-cultural) incommensurability—from a logical, empirical and normative point of view (Chokr, 2006). The implications of the position articulated and defended herein do not bode well for the “we-are-we” and “they-are-they” approach to things cultural. The most important of these is that the problems and challenges raised by cultural diversity do not merely arise at the boundaries of our societies and cultures, where one would expect them under such an approach, but at the boundaries of our own selves. As Geertz puts it quite aptly “foreignness does not start at the water’s edge, but at the skin’s”. (2000: 66). Our socio-cultural world does not seem (pace Rorty) to be divided up “at its joints”, so to speak, into perspicuous “we’s” with whom we can converse and empathize, however much we differ with them, and enigmatic “they’s” with whom we cannot converse or empathize, however much we would like to defend their right to differ from us. Only a misconceived form of cultural analysis, underwritten by a misconstrued conception of social constructivism based on an excessively socialized and culturally deterministic and reductionist view of self and group identity, can lead us to think, I argue, that human communities or cultures are “windowless monads” (Bernstein, 1991). It is arguably more plausible to hold instead that the real boundaries of societies, cultures, groups and selves are to be found in the gaps and asymmetries that exist between what “we” do, think, feel and believe and what “others” do, and that make it possible to locate where we are now in the world and how we

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are thus situated, at what sort of angle, and according to what particular modality. Clearly, the presumed “we” and “others” should here be drawn out in dotted lines, provisionally, so to speak, in a way that is mindful of the facts and dynamics of cultural complexity. What ethnocentrism or relativism does, and is arguably designed to do is “to obscure and relegate these gaps and asymmetries to the realm of ignorable difference, or mere unlikeness” (Geertz, 2000: 78), and thereby locking us up within our respective cultures. In doing so, it does take away from us the possibility of changing not only our minds, but our ways and practices as well—in short, of more or less radically changing our way of life and being-in-the-world? In this regard, we are better off keeping in mind what Richard Falk reminds us of, namely, that “[a]ll cultures evolve in relation to experience, being influenced partly by intra-cultural and inter-cultural interaction, as well as through their participation and reflection upon wider normative frameworks…” (1995: 49). A cursory survey of the history of each and all peoples around the world (as well as for that matter the personal history of each and all individuals) would attest to the fact such a history has been one involving such changes, usually slowly, sometimes more rapidly—as when a “crisis” occurs, or following a more or less radical questioning and revision of one’s web of beliefs and values. This has arguably always been the case, but it is even more so today, in this era of globalization.

4. Globalization and Cultures: Lessons Learned? What exactly has the phenomenon of “globalization” revealed about “cultures” which must be taken into account by any empirically and normatively adequate analysis? Most writers on the subject, as I pointed out at the outset, typically focus on the cultural uniformity and homogenization, and the so-called “threat to cultural diversity” that it has presumably brought on. But while globalization can indeed produce homogeneity, it also constitutes a threat to homogeneity—as anyone who kept informed about world affairs since the 90s onward and who travels a bit around the world can attest to. Just as there are good reasons (that need not be rehearsed here) for maintaining and protecting “bio-diversity,” there are equally good (or perhaps even better) reasons for being concerned about “cultural diversity, and for taking appropriately conceived and implemented measures, as suggested

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earlier, to counteract any serious or real threat to it—assuming of course that it already constitutes a “clear and present danger”, or will soon become one. In the meantime, and “political correctness” aside, we should perhaps also ask ourselves how much cultural diversity is still realistically possible or even desirable at this point of world history. Furthermore, one should not underestimate the resiliency and adaptability of cultures around the world, and their ability to endure and continue to thrive as viable and dynamically creative and evolving cultures have always done, and that is, by adopting and incorporating new forms and ways, new values and ideals while preserving what must (can or should) be preserved. This is not a covert or implicit argument for some sort of “cultural survival of the fittest.” We should be wary about any approach straightforwardly seeking to “biologize” cultural phenomena. However, I believe that we must properly countenance what we have learned from the history of cultures, i.e., from a properly conceived materialistic and historicist perspective on the “evolution” of cultures, namely, that there are good reasons why some cultures endure over time and others don’t.

4.1 “Cultural Complexity” in the World Today There is another fact about “globalization” that is less readily acknowledged, and that is, it has also brought home the facts of “cultural complexity”, i.e., it has revealed the diversity, multiplicity and plurality inherent in “each” culture, 11 as well as the similarities/ dissimilarities/ differences, points or areas of more or less convergence or divergence between cultures. Taking this fact into account in our analyses is bound, I contend, to have some important theoretical (philosophical) as well as 11 During the drafting of this essay, I have become increasingly aware of what may be called a double-bind situation. On the one hand, I am endeavoring to deconstruct the received view of culture, and, on the other, I am struggling to find the most appropriate expressions to put across an alternative conception that in my view better reflects the reality of the world today and the facts of cultural complexity. However, as it appears above, I find myself unable to completely jettison the essentialist, monistic, holistic language characteristic of the fundamental misconception of culture here under attack. Is it because, as Derrida repeatedly warned us, the language we use is perhaps inextricably caught up in the logocentric metaphysics of presence of the Western philosophical tradition, and therefore always already underwritten by a series of fundamental binary oppositions and essentialist assumptions?

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practical (political) consequences. How can it be otherwise?—this is arguably the most significant point of this essay.12 In any case, Clifford Geertz puts it well when he writes (2000: 246) that there is a paradox, little reflected upon about the current world scene. The world is both more global and more divided, more thoroughly interconnected and more intricately partitioned at the same time. Affirmations of greater unity and integration of the world are immediately met by vehement proclamations of renewed and reinforced nationalisms, sectarianisms, religious and cultural fundamentalisms of various kinds. In such a world, we must acknowledge that cosmopolitanism and parochialism (or provincialism) are in fact no longer opposed, but rather linked and mutually reinforcing. In fact, paradoxical as this may sound, as one increases so does the other. In view of this, the expression “global village” is perhaps best viewed as an over-blown and inflated metaphor, not yet borne out by the reality of the world today, since the so-called “village” has neither the requisite solidarity nor tradition, at least not yet, and even lacks the desired wholeness and cohesiveness. “Globalization” is in fact accompanied less by a reduction of cultural differences and loosening of cultural demarcations than by their reworking, multiplication, and intensification. Richard Falk’s comment in this regard is right on the mark, and worth quoting in full: One important consequence of the globalization of social, political and economic life, he states, which often goes unnoticed is cultural penetration and overlapping, the coexistence in a given social space of several cultural traditions, as well as the more vivid interpenetration of cultural experience and practice as a consequence of media and transportation technologies, travel and tourism, cross-cultural education and a logarithmic increase in human interaction of all varieties. (1995: 46; italics added).

The demands that such a reality makes of us are distinctive and pulling us in opposite directions: on the one hand, we must strive to respect 12

As we contend with works in cultural studies and contemporary politics, we should always ask: what is the underlying or explicit conception of culture that the author is putting into play? On what assumptions is it based? Is it empirically valid, historically real, and normatively compelling? Does it reflect “the facts of cultural complexity” and does it fully countenance the lessons of globalization-cumglocalization in a nuanced and qualified manner?

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cultural differences (and thereby seek to sustain diversity properly conceived under appropriate provisions); on the other hand, we must strive to acknowledge various degrees of similarity or sameness (and thereby seek to re-establish perhaps some universalist normative order—albeit different from the traditional Western-centric kind.13 In effect, we must contend “with this always-shifting interplay between the valuing of difference and the quest for sameness” (Falk, 1995: 46). In such a context, we are better off heeding Geertz’s warning: The discrimination of cultural breaks and cultural continuities, the drawing of lines around sets of individuals as following a more or less identifiable form of life as against different sets of individuals following more or less different forms of life—other voices in other rooms—is a good deal easier in theory than it is in practice. (2000: 247; italics added; see Kant [1793/1994] for an enlightening discussion of the political implications of disconnect between theory and practice).

Against the currently predominant view, Geertz goes on to add quite pertinently, I believe: Whatever we might wish, or regard as enlightenment, the severalty of culture abides and proliferates, even amidst, indeed in response to, the powerfully connecting forces of modern manufacture, finance, travel and trade. The more things come together, the more they remain apart: the uniform world is not much closer than the classless society (2000: 248; italics added).

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See for example Chokr (2006) for an articulation and defense (around the issue of human rights) of what may be called “a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” that could be arrived at as a result of an unforced “overlapping consensus” based on the normatively justifiable resources and contributions of the main cultural and philosophical traditions of the world. I argue that if we could in principle draw a meaningful distinction between the “what” and “why” of things, such an overlapping consensus with a universal ethical force could be achieved on what --a set of rights, or of values, ideals, and principles between individuals and peoples differently situated and with divergent comprehensive doctrines or conceptions, even if there may still be some substantial disagreement about the justification (or the why) for these agreed upon rights, values, ideals, and principles. This line of reasoning inspired by Rawls’ work has also been adopted by philosophers as diverse as Jacques Maritain, Charles Taylor, and Martha Nussbaum. More on this line of reasoning further in this essay and book.

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It quickly becomes evident to anyone who cares to really look that “the lived universe of cultures always appears in the plural” (Benhabib, 2002: 41). Everything is motley, porous, mixed, conflicted, inter-penetrated and dispersed; the search for totality or uniformity is an unreliable and uncertain guide, and the sense of closure unattainable. [W]e have come to such a point in the moral history of the world (a history that is anything but moral) that we are obliged to think about diversity rather differently than we had been used to thinking about. If it is in fact getting to be the case that rather than being sorted out into framed units, social spaces with definite edges to them, seriously disparate approaches to life are becoming scrambled together in ill-defined expanses, social spaces whose edges are unfixed, irregular, and difficult to locate, the question of how to deal with the puzzles of judgment to which such disparities give rise takes on a rather different aspect—confronting landscapes and still lives is one thing, panoramas and collages quite another (Geertz, 2000: 85; italics added).

To consider a couple of commonly cited visual metaphors in cultural studies, suppose, as it has been suggested, that we look at “cultures” as dots or tiles (see Fleischacker, 1994, chapter 5 for a discussion of what is called the configurational model or conception of culture). This would not be helpful either in dealing with the puzzles now confronting us. One would arguably still be held captive by misleading pictures which fail to capture the cultural complexity and diversity in the world today. Geertz is right on the mark, when he states: A picture of the world as dotted by discriminate cultures, discontinuous blocks of thought and emotion—a sort of pointillist view of its spiritual composition—is no less misleading than the picture of it as tiled by repeating, reiterative nation-states, and for the same reason: the elements concerned, the dots or the tiles, are neither compact, nor homogeneous, simple nor uniform. When you look into them, their solidity dissolves, and you are left not with a catalogue of well-defined entities to be arranged and classified, a Mendelian table of natural kinds, but with a tangle of differences and similarities only half sorted out [if at all, one might add] (Geertz: 249; italics and brackets added).

4.2 Cultural Identity/Difference, Originality/Distinctiveness In the face of the kind and degree of fragmentation, dispersion, intermingling, cross-fertilization, and contamination characteristic of the world today, “the view of culture, a culture, this culture, as a consensus on

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fundamentals—shared conceptions, shared feelings, shared values—is hardly tenable, except perhaps for the so-called “guardians of cultural integrity and ethnic purity” (e.g., intellectual elites, leaders, nationalists, cultural ideologues, or fundamentalists) who would want us to believe otherwise. Instead, it seems that it is the fault lines, discontinuities, fissions and fissures that mark out and best serve to characterize the configuration of “collective selfhood”. The “cookie-cutter conception of culture” with its focus on consensus, type and commonality must give way to the “compositeness and heterogeneity conception of culture” for which culture is always already ineradicably plural, compound, and inconstant and multiply contested—both from within and without. Again, what is worth noting here is not merely the fact of cultural heterogeneity as such and how much more visible it is than at any other time in our history, but, as Geertz points out, “the enormous variety of levels at which such heterogeneity exists and has an effect” (2000: 252). Thus, one can hardly find an allegedly common outlook, form of life, behavioral style, material or symbolic expression that is not either itself further partitioned into smaller, enfolding and inclusive ones, or incorporated and patched into larger and more complicated encompassing ones. There is hardly a case in which one can say without qualification or trepidation this is the point where consensus ends or begins. If one considers the cases of countries like Indonesia, India, Brazil, Nigeria, the United States, or even China, for example, we don’t find separated “cultures” or “peoples” or “ethnic groups” as so many lumps of sameness and uniformity marked out by the limits of consensus and homogeneity. Instead, we find various modes and modalities of involvement in a collective life that takes place on many different levels, scales, domains, and realms at once. Under such an analysis—which, by the way, applies to countries and societies North-South, East-West, the crucial point has to do with the way in which, and the degree to which, the contrasting effects of a given overall “cultural complex” are represented in the formulation of a group’s identity. Perhaps, as it has sometimes been suggested, it is less a matter of consensus that is at issue than finding a viable way of doing without. In almost all parts of the world, we see great cultural traditions which are rich, complex, distinctive, and historically deep coexisting with one another, in an almost endless progression of differences within differences, as well as multiple forms and degrees of similarities, overlappings, criss-

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crossings and cross-cuttings. This realization compels us, Geertz argues pertinently, to confront the following questions which can no longer be dismissed as inconsequential: How is it, in so multifold a world, that political, social and cultural selfhood comes to be? If “identity without unison” is in fact the rule—in India or the United States, in Brazil or Nigeria, in Belgium or Guyana, or even in Japan, that supposed model of immanent like-mindedness and essentialized uniqueness—on what does it rest? (Geertz, 2000: 225; italics added.

More than likely, there are as many ways in which identities are put together as there are materials and elements with which to put them together, and reasons and motivations for doing so. Just like “cultures”, the identities of peoples can no longer be grasped as coherent, seamless unities, or unbroken wholes. We should be suspicious and even outright critical of all conceptions which try to reduce matters of identity to uniformity, conformity, homogeneity, to like-mindedness and consensus. More often than not, the answers given to identity-queries about “who (what) we are”14 do not form an orderly, cohesive or coherent structure, nor even a stable one over time. Whatever unity, sameness, coherence, or identity there is, it is probably going to be negotiated and produced out of differences, and vice-versa. As Amartya Sen argued (2006), each of us contains in fact multitudes. “The same person can be, without contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origins, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a long-distance runner, a historian, a school-teacher, an environmental activist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician, etc.” One’s cultural identity is not one’s destiny. We can choose from a myriad of identities, emphasizing those we share with others rather than those we do not. Admittedly our choices will be limited by external circumstances. Still, to concede that identity choices are constrained is a far cry from the claim that (cultural) identity is destiny. By arguing for the freedom to choose one’s identity affiliations, Sen’s proposal is perhaps best viewed as an antidote to the divisive extremism of nationalists and fundamentalists alike. He sees Huntington’s thesis of cultural conflict as yielding a onedimensional approach to human identity, and leading ultimately to the

14 As Appiah observes in The Ethics of Identity (2004), the question of “who we are” has somehow always been linked to the question of “what we are.”

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“civilizational and religious partitioning of the world,” which can only occasion and bring about great global disorder.15 In a world increasingly interconnected in so many ways and so thoroughly, the range and catalogue of available identities or identifications for members of a given community is constantly expanding, contracting, changing shape, ramifying, multiplying, intensifying, and developing in unexpected directions. This overall complex picture of “cultural identity” that emerges is one best viewed as “a force field” in which differences and similarities confront one another at every level— 15 Jean-Francois Fayart has argued along similar lines in his book, The Illusion of Cultural Identity (2005). He claims that the concept of “cultural identity” has become for many a convenient explanation from most of the world’s political problems. He offers a sustained critique of this rationalization by dispelling the notion that fixed identities do, in fact, exist. In his view, the very idea of cultural identity prevents us from grasping the cultural dimensions of political action and economic development. Identities, he argues, are fluid, never homogeneous, and more often than not invented. The conflicts we read about in the news draw their murderous force from the supposition that a “political identity” corresponds to each so-called “cultural identity,” which is in reality illusory. What the facts indicate is that each of these identities is often a recent construction. There is no “natural identity” which imposes itself to us by the sheer power of things. There are only “identity strategies,” rationally produced by actors easily identifiable, and identity dreams or nightmares to which we adhere because they either seduce or terrorize us. In any case, Fayart argues, we are not condemned to remain prisoners of such devious manipulations. The “clash of civilizations” need not be our fate. Also, worthy of note in this context is the essay by Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (2001), in which he offers a philosophical exploration of what a culture without entrenched identities, or tribalistic forms of identities would be like. Writing from a position of multiple identities, which, he claims, to share with many people around the world, he addresses such complicated and timely issues as how we judge religious traditions that have embraced violence and brutality, modern manifestations of “otherness,” how language facilitates and breeds nationalism, and most importantly, the contradiction between stark identity-based political conflicts and how the same identity-based cultures can be shared by different groups. In the end, Maalouf does not naively demand that personal identities be dismissed, but suggests a number of ways in which identities can remain intact and might form not a “meaningless sham equality” but “rather the acceptance of a multiplicity of allegiances as all equally legitimate.” While “the wind of globalization” could lead us to disaster, he writes, it could also lead us to success. Maalouf envisions a globalized world in which our local identities are subordinated to a broader “allegiance to the human community itself.” And in this regard, he may be viewed as a proponent of what Appiah (2006b) calls “a rooted cosmopolitanism.”

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from the family, the village, the neighborhood, the region, to the country, nation-state, and beyond. Though clearly derived from physics, the above mentioned metaphor is here used for political reasons and meant to convey the struggles involved in the politics of identity and recognition, as well as the possibility of reconfiguring one’s identity by privileging and counterposing one component over another within a given cultural complex, e.g., ethnicity, race, religion, gender, class, language, conception of the good life, etc. In any case, whatever solidarities or divisions, convergences or divergences we may find at every level, they are more than likely to be mutually or contrastively sustaining and defining of one another. This is arguably what is going on everywhere around the world as we know it today.

4.3 For an Alternative Conception of “Culture” If we countenance the kind of understanding and appreciation of “cultural complexity” sketched out thus far, then we could say that whatever “originality” and “distinctiveness” a given culture and form of life may have (relatively speaking), it arises out of the ways in which the variety of conceptions, values, and practices which make them up are positioned, configured and composed. The italicized terms are here used under erasure (in a proper deconstructive manner) so as to avoid lapsing back into the essentialism that language seems to imply and dredge back up. We should also keep in mind that cultures have always borrowed (more or less) from one another, and will continue to do so. In many instances, it is often hard to ascertain clearly what belongs distinctively and originally to what culture. This is even more the case today than ever before (see Amartya Sen, 2000, 2005, 2006 for various striking examples strewn throughout his discussions).16

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Many of the ideas, ideals, values, practices and institutions which are today commonly deemed to be Western had antecedents or precursors, or even originated in Non-Western cultures and civilizations, e.g., in India, China, the Arab world, Africa, or elsewhere. These include: deliberative and participatory democracy, human rights, religious tolerance, rational and argumentative reasoning, governance, atheism, skepticism, materialist thinking, etc. We could also include the numerous contributions made in mathematics (trigonometric sine function, the zero), astronomy, linguistics, medicine, architecture, and political economy made by both Indian and Arabic cultures and civilizations. It is safe to say that many of the culinary practices for example associated with a particular culture today originated in fact elsewhere.

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However, by adopting and extending Wittgenstein’s image of a “rope” in the Philosophical Investigations (1953), we could say that whatever originality and distinctiveness a given culture and form of life has does not arise from a single thread running all the way through it uniformly, and thereby defining it and making it into some kind of homogenous whole. It arises instead from various threads, differing in kinds, in some respects or others, overlapping, intersecting, entwining, and intertwining, crisscrossing, and cross-cutting, some taking up where others break off, some stretching through and through, while others are running short, with all of them contra-posed in effective tensions and contrasts with one another to form a heterogeneous and composite complex. To pursue this image further, an adequate analysis of any culture today must at least consist in teasing out its various threads, characterizing their contrastive differences in kind and respects, bringing out their overlappings, ascertaining their points of intersections, intertwinements and entwinements, their connections, tensions and contrasts, probing the very compositeness and heterogeneity of the cultural body, its deep internal diversity and degree of complexity. It should be clear by now that the articulation of an epistemologically and methodologically sound conception of “culture” must be supported as much as possible by the best anthropological and sociological evidence and underwritten by reasonably pragmatic and defensible political assumptions. Such a conception would enable us to more effectively address the kinds of problems, challenges and dilemmas we are confronting within our respective societies, and between them, across a world deep in the throes of globalization and glocalization. Unfortunately, there is still a widespread tendency to write as if “culture” were a homogenous, uniform, coherent, cohesive, bounded, tightly woven, seamless whole, a unified or unitary entity with a distinct nature and a clearly delineated set of identifying and distinguishing features whose identity-determining and constitutive role on individuals and groups is uniform, un-contested, continuous and stable. This is an encapsulated-summary formulation of what I would like to call a fundamental misconception of “culture” which, I contend, must be jettisoned and done away with. In contrast, I would like to submit an alternative conception of “culture” which is arguably more compelling, both empirically and normatively: “Culture” is always already a network of sometimes overlapping (consensual) and sometimes diverging (dissensual) tendencies

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making it through and through a multi-fold nexus of contestations, protests, and debates both from within and without. It is thus an open-ended and “rhizomatic”17 network involving both convergent and divergent processes, cross-cut and crisscrossed by various local, regional, national, and global influences, and affected by the “memes,”18 values, institutions, practices and behaviors of differently situated actors or agents (and diversely constituted groups thereof) in specific and concrete, materially constrained contexts, who are furthermore enmeshed in complex “webs of meanings, narratives, and interlocutions”19 and power relations and struggles. This alternative conception would enable us, I argue, to better understand and account for the complex internal dynamics of cultures as well as the diverse relationships that obtain (or not) between them at this juncture of our history. Here I mean to say, given a proper and judicious assessment of what the era of “globalization” has brought on or revealed, 17

By using this term derived from Deleuze and Guattari (1987) I do not intend to endorse all the specifics of their work, nor all the diverse uses to which it has been put by these authors and their followers. However, I do wish to convey some of the connotations commonly associated with it, namely, connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity, constant creation and recreation of networks as they expand, contract, emerge, and recede. For Deleuze and Guattari, multiplicity celebrates the many and plurality in contradistinction to unitary, binary and totalizing models of Western thought. Their interest in “rhizomatics” is to extirpate roots and foundations, to thwart unities and break dichotomies, and to spread out roots and branches, thereby pluralizing and disseminating, producing differences and multiplicities, and ultimately, making new connections, which is the essence of creative living. 18 This neologism was originally defined as “a unit of cultural transmission or imitation” to convey analogically to the “gene” of biological evolution the selfpropagating, self-replicating, and circulating unit of cultural evolution. It is believed that it might prove useful in explaining various recalcitrant aspects of human behavior and cultural evolution. “Memes” have as their fundamental property “evolution via selection” in that replication, mutation, survival and competition influence them. In more casual parlance, a “meme” refers to any piece of information or meaning regardless of its mode or medium of expression that circulates, is reproduced and passed from one mind to another. Examples might include thoughts, ideas, theories, practices, habits, songs, dances, and even moods, etc. 19 These expressions [respectively from Arendt (1958/1973), Benhabib (2002), Weber (1917/1949) and Geertz (2000)] are here used interchangeably to convey a “narrative view of the self and identity” in contrast to the traditional conception which characterizes the latter in terms of a “substantive, constitutive and essentially defining core.”

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i.e., the lessons learned which are however not yet fully acknowledged. These include: the diversity, multiplicity, and plurality inherent in each culture; each culture is multiply contested, negotiated and re-interpreted not just from without, but from within; apart from obvious differences, the similarities and points or areas of considerable convergence or overlap that (may) exist between apparently different cultures; the relationship between the local and the global is not, as is often surmised by simplistic accounts, merely a one-way affair; we have to contend with what some have called “glocalization”—that is, that global influences are invariably adapted, reinterpreted, and transformed to suit local conditions and particularities (Appiah, 2006a).20

5. Cultural Analysis: Empirical and Normative Considerations What follows from this entire discussion with regards to cultural analysis generally speaking from both an empirical and normative point of view? What follows more specifically with regards to the problems and issues announced at the outset?

5.1 Social Constructivism Revisited In accord with the alternative conception of culture articulated above, an appropriately conceived version of “social constructivism”21 must be 20 According to Appiah (2006a), the ideal of “contamination” has few exponents more eloquent than Salman Rushdie. The novel that occasioned the fatwa issued against him by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran is said to celebrate “hybridity, impurity, intermingling, and the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelisation and fears the absolutism of the Pure Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this, a bit of that is how newness enters the world.” This fact notwithstanding, we must still entertain the possibility that there can be spurious forms of utopian contamination, just as, we now recognize, there are spurious forms of utopian purity and authenticity? Is the larger human truth on the side of contamination— the endless process of imitation and revision, or on the side of purity ---and the endless process of purification and preservation? What does history teach us? Whose history, one might ask? 21 Social constructivism is a very broad category and movement that covers various theoretical orientations and methodological strategies—ranging from postmodernism to critical social theory, from postcolonial studies to Marxist or non-Marxist functionalism. Generally speaking however, it is fair to say that these strategies

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adopted as a comprehensive explanation of cultural differences/ similarities, and against attempts in normative moral and political theory that reify cultures and cultural groups and their struggles for recognition. And subsequently, a critique of “cultural essentialism” and “cultural determinism/ reductionism” must be articulated, which will prove to have significant implications as suggested from the start for how we deal with general issues of stemming from the politics of (self or group) identity, cultural differences and recognition, multiculturalism, cross-cultural (in)commensurability, as well as with the problem of cultural relativism vs. moral universalism, generally speaking, and more specifically, with regards to concrete issues. An adequate approach to cultural analysis must be based on an appropriately construed social constructivism which focuses on and seeks to shed some light on the processes by which cultural purity is transformed into impurities, mixtures and hybrizations, and what is said to be fundamental and immutable into historically contingent achievements, always subject to further changes. It would view the dynamic and evolving interplay between structural and cultural imperatives as not only possible but desirable. It would keep in view the functional as well as structural imperatives of “material systems of actions and practices” such as economic systems of production, administrative and bureaucratic apparatuses of control, management instruments and procedures, and various other disciplinary technologies in their dynamic and intricate relationships with the symbolic imperatives of “frames of meaning” or “systems of cultural signification and representation”. Finally, it would pay close attention to the power relations and struggles that members of a given community are often enmeshed or embroiled in. Hence, an adequate approach to cultural analysis—whether carried out from an empirical or normative standpoint—must, I believe, countenance, the following conception of “culture”—as the sum total of social systems have for the most part failed to explain identity-based movements in a satisfactory manner. In particular they could not explain the fact that these movements and the activists within them picked up various “cultural shreds and patches” (Gellner, 1983: 56) from the cultures surrounding them and were thus able to address or resolve some of the more enduring identity dilemmas confronting them in boldly creative and imaginative ways. Like other contributions to the politics of identity and difference, they seem to have been “afflicted by the paradox of wanting to preserve the purity of the impure, the immutability of the historical, and the fundamentalness of the contingent (Benhabib, 2002: 11).

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and practices operating at both the material and symbolic levels of production and reproduction that can be associated with a given group of people situated in a given environment (see Benhabib, 2002). The material level of production/reproduction has to do with those activities, practices and processes which sustain the life of members of a culture or society. These include of course the economic provision of means of subsistence and the maintenance of the goods and various products that such a community deems necessary or useful, i.e., tools, technologies, infrastructures, modes and systems of communication, cultural and artistic artifacts, etc. As for the symbolic level of production/reproduction, it has to do with the following complex processes: (a) The socialization to which a given community subjects its individual members so as to enable them to function within a certain language-game which is itself part of a form of life, under a certain set of reciprocal expectations and moral obligations. (b) The production, maintenance and reproduction of clusters of ideas, meanings, values and beliefs through which members of a given community interpret and view the world as well as their own situatedness in the world. (c) The coordination by members of a given community of their cooperative activities, practices, interactions and exchanges in accordance with certain rules, sanctions, and norms as a result of both (a) and (b). The practices of meaning-making, signification, representation, and symbolism have each with their own autonomous logic, separate from, yet not reducible to the intentions of individuals or groups through whose actions and behaviors it emerges and is reproduced. It should be noted that, though cultural and artistic artifacts are listed at the material level, they clearly have something to do with the symbolic level as well. Conversely, one might add, the processes involved at the symbolic level also require institutional and material realizations. The point worth stressing here is that there may well be occasionally tensions and conflicts between the material and symbolic levels in that the processes adopted at the symbolic level may or may not prove to be the most appropriate or helpful for members of a given community in terms of material production or reproduction, and vice-versa. This, as can be expected, may require that changes or adjustments be made (at one or both levels) in order to insure continuity over time of the “culture” in question.

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In addition to (1) the distinction introduced earlier between material and symbolic levels of production and reproduction, it must also provide satisfactory accounts of the following distinctions: (2) between the internal and the external (or critical) point of view: participants vs. observers; and (3) identity-ascription by others vs. self-ascription as well as inscription and shared community building [see Benhabib (1995, 2002) and Pierik (2004) respectively].

5.2 Point(s) of View: Participants vs. Observers Participants in a culture (or more accurately, in a given “cultural complex”) experience from within, as it were, their ways, practices, beliefs, traditions, stories, rituals and symbols, tools and material living conditions through more or less shared narrative accounts—albeit always already contested and contestable. From within, a culture need not and usually does not appear as a unified, coherent and clearly bounded whole because the required distance is absent. Rather, it may seem to form a multiply partitioned and divided, crisscrossed and cross-cut “horizon of understanding and practice” that somehow escapes our grasp or recedes each time one approaches it or seeks to apprehend it in a totalizing way. In contrast, observers take a view from the outside, and may include ethnographers, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, travelers, narrators, chroniclers, military generals, linguists, educational reformers, business persons, secret agents, development workers or volunteers, etc. They are the ones who (together with “local elites” and the so-called “guardians of cultural integrity”) seem to be interested in imposing unity and coherence on cultures as “observed and observable entities” for the purposes of understanding and perhaps even control, depending on their particular interests and purposes. From such a perspective, “cultures” are then conveniently viewed or taken as clearly delineable and bounded wholes. The point that needs to be stressed here is that, apart from being a participant, an individual can also become an observer of her own culture and way of life if she acquires a critical distance from it and begins to question or challenge its normative, moral order. She can acquire, in other words, a kind of “social reflexivity” which allows members of a given culture and society to engage in “internal criticism”, and to question and challenge their beliefs and practices in the name of some newly acquired, or differently interpreted, normative standards—from within or from

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without, or from both perspectives. Such a possibility represents presumably a permanent feature of the so-called transition from tradition to modernity—or more accurately, to post-modernity. The significance of the participant-becoming-critical observer lies in the fact that it serves readily to undermine the thesis of “cultural determinism/ reductionism”: individuals are not strictly or blindly determined by their respective culture, and their lives are not therefore shaped by their culture “as a cake-mold shapes a cake or gravity our movements” (Geertz, 2000: 13). Besides, it enables us to easily explain why cultures present themselves through narratively contested accounts, and are thereby always created, recreated and negotiated from both the individual’s and the group’s point of view.

5.3 Processes of Identity-Formation: Ascription by Others vs. Self-Ascription, Inscription, and Community Building Identity ascription by others involves a process of attribution by outsiders of certain characteristics, behaviors, practices, and beliefs to individuals or groups who are deemed to share certain attributes (e.g., lifestyle, ethnicity, religion, gender, language, sexual orientation, etc.). As a result of such a process, individuals or groups are conveniently placed in different categories and labeled accordingly. Though the individuals or groups thus categorized may not necessarily identify themselves with the attributes associated with them by outsiders, and though they may not even share common beliefs, norms or values, such processes of ascription nevertheless influence their situation and lived experiences, and may even determine their life-prospects. In contrast, identity self-ascription is a voluntary process of categorization involving a more or less constrained choice of the identity one wishes to adopt for oneself—as an individual or as a group—among the plural identities available at a given point in our history, and which consists in assigning to oneself a number of attributes, beliefs, practices, norms deemed more important or valuable for one's purposes—given one's conception of the good life. Such a process could take different forms: In the case of individuals below the age of reason (i.e., children), it could occur implicitly or imperceptibly as when certain beliefs, characteristics, behaviors and practices are passed on to new members of a social group by socialization or acculturation. In this case, we might talk of inscription—in order to characterize the process in which social norms and expectations are inscribed and thereby transferred to children through socialization and acculturation in the family, at school, through peer

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groups in the community or in society at large, etc. For the individual involved, it implies the internalization of shared beliefs based on distinctions between various social categories. In the case of groups, it could also occur explicitly as when a given community organized itself around a (more or less) shared set of beliefs, practices, norms and values and seeks thereby to give its members a sense of togetherness and belonging. In this case, we might talk of a shared community building—in order to characterize the self-categorization process by which members of a community distinguish themselves from others. Shared community building processes can take place around a particular comprehensive conception of the good life, religion, language, ideology, nationality, ethnicity, or any number of these. These kinds of processes are obviously dependent on the process of inscription discussed above, as the latter constitutes the way by which the conception of the good life, religion or language is passed on to the children of that community. Though I have distinguished the processes of identity formation for analytical purposes, in the way I have done above, it must be noted that they in fact always interact, and rarely if ever occur separately, or one to the exclusion of the others. The key point to emphasize here however is this: despite the processes of ascription by others, or of inscription and shared community building, an adult individual always has the option of accepting or rejecting any one of them upon due reflection, and choosing to forge (under some constraints) her own identity—from the range of possible identities that her life-history has made available to her.

5.4 Inescapable Double Hermeneutics— Narratives and Evaluations In the approach to cultural analysis advocated herein, it is assumed, on the one hand, that “human actions and relations are formed by a double hermeneutics: we identify what we do through an account of what we do; words and deeds are equiprimordial, in the sense that almost all socially (or culturally) significant human action is identified as a certain type of doing through the accounts the agents and others give of that doing.” (Benhabib, 2002: 6). This is obviously even more so when there is a disagreement or misunderstanding between doer and observer, because the latter requires the former to explain and justify his actions. On the other hand, it is further assumed that, in addition to being constituted through narratives that together form “webs of narratives, interlocutions, meanings,” human actions and interactions are also constituted through the

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actors’ evaluative stances toward their doings, whereby second-order narratives are taken to entail a certain normative attitude toward accounts of first-order deeds. In view of these assumptions, we may then conclude that “[w]hat we call “culture” is the horizon formed by these evaluative stances, through which the infinite chain of space-time sequences is demarcated into “good” and “bad”, “holy” and “profane”, pure and “impure”. Cultures are formed through binaries because human beings live in an evaluative universe” (Benhabib, 2002:7; italics added). In effect, they “live, are suspended or thrown” into the webs which they themselves have spun and woven at least in part. In this sense, they always (implicitly or explicitly) make evaluations (in a weak or strong sense) of what they say and do, what they do by their words, statements, and stories, what they say by their doings, actions and behaviors—and, of course, what they hear others say or see them do, etc. Naturally, the evaluations human beings engage in will vary and include the simple and more common expressions of preference, approval and disapproval (weak sense) to the articulation of well-reasoned and principled normative, moral judgments (strong sense). Consistently with such a perspective, we might then say that “acculturation” consists in “growing up in the midst of, or among narratives”, one’s own, those of our parents, teachers, schoolmates, friends, religious and political leaders, authority figures, and various other sorts of what Saul Bellow once called the “reality instructors”. As Jerome Bruner once put it, “we live, in other words, in a sea of stories” (1996: 147). Telling stories, about ourselves and about others, to ourselves and to others is “the most natural and the earliest way in which we organize our experience and knowledge…” “We represent our lives (to ourselves as well as to others) in the form of narratives”. “[We] make sense of the world by telling stories about it—by using the narrative mode for construing reality”. Stories are tools, i.e., “instruments of the mind on behalf of meaning-making (Bruner, 1996: 121; 130; 40-1). Acculturation (and one might as well add, education and socialization) involves therefore a complex intra-cultural dialogue putting into play various stories and narratives, from a diverse range of sources—some homegrown and endogenous, some exogenous and foreign, and others, a mixture thereof. As a result, the boundaries separating cultures and the peoples that are their members or carriers are extremely contested, fragile, not easily delineable or always clearly demarcated. Nevertheless, it may be

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still meaningful to maintain that “acculturation” in a particular “cultural complex” marked by a predominance of certain stories and concomitant narrative modes and styles makes one an insider (as opposed to an outsider), i.e., a participant member—who retains however the ability of becoming a critical observer of his or her culture. What this implies is that it is also possible for an observer to become a participant in some sense, provided she is subjected to the appropriate “acculturation”. These possibilities may be helpful in explaining why the so-called “guardians of cultural integrity” are vigilant in keeping the boundaries of culture always securely guarded, their stories and narratives purified, their rites and rituals carefully monitored, and their practices protected and vehemently defended in order to maintain some presumed “distinctiveness” and “originality.” Lest we adopt a naïve, and thereby impeachable, approach to cultural analysis, we should not forget that “cultural boundaries circumscribe power in that they legitimize its use within the group or community” (Benhabib, 2002: 7; italics added). The kind of analysis advocated herein does not imply in any way that cultural differences are shallow, superficial, or somehow unreal. Quite to the contrary, cultural differences are considered to be substantial, deep and real. For even if the boundaries between cultures are imagined, as they often are, they nonetheless have the force of reality that even imagined things have in the mind of those who imagine them (see Anderson, 1983). Even though what is believed to be true is not necessarily so, this epistemological truism is here irrelevant in that political and cultural realities do not always succumb in a simple or straightforward way to the strictures of philosophical epistemology and logic. Assuming then that it is so, should we always (or ever) take at face value or for granted the cultural stories or narratives of individuals or groups? Arguably, we should not always. Our analysis stands to gain in explanatory power, empirical and normative perspicuity if we endeavored to understand the broadest socio-political-economic, historically contingent context, of which culture is only an aspect—albeit an important one, which admittedly matters (see Huntington and Harrison, 2000) without however being essentialist, deterministic, or reductionist about it. If we were to put to work the “analytical dispositif” sketched out here, we might then say that cultures and societies must reproduce themselves materially and symbolically first and foremost from the standpoint of their participants or members if they are to survive and endure. The continuing

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identity of a culture and society must therefore be based on its capacity to deal with internal challenges (e.g., from participants turned “critical observers”) as well as external challenges and other contingencies (such as encounters with other forms of life, and possible ensuing confrontations, or cross-cultural dialogues and evaluations), 22 while at the same time retaining somehow the unforced belief in its normative order of those who claim to be its members or carriers, and who accept to claim allegiance or affiliation to it in terms of their individual and communal identity. Suppose, in a somewhat pedestrian manner, we characterize “culture” as the sum total of all the solutions—at both the material and symbolic levels—to the problems in terms of production and reproduction encountered by a given group of people in its environment. Then we can expect that as their problems change both in nature and kind, and as they confront new problems in a changing and changed environment, the solutions to these problems will also change. Naturally, we should also expect that there will be different interpretations of the problems encountered as well as different, conflicting or even opposing, proposed solutions. More often than not, transformations come about a result of social and cultural systems confronting various kinds and degrees of internal and external threats, and adapting to more or less severe “crises”, that is, commensurately with their ability to change and thereby avoiding being swept away into the dustbin of history. This is usually what happens following a “real confrontation” between cultures (as opposed to notional one)—to use another of Bernard Williams’ useful distinctions (1985: 160ff). Strong normative evaluations are bound to happen and are even to be expected in the former, while they may be absent or minimal in the 22

As I have sought along with others to object forcefully to the “logic of conflict” underlying the so-called “clash of civilizations” thesis, I have also been brought to examine more candidly the underlying logic --presumed or tacit and unacknowledged-- of the opposite thesis, namely, that of “cross-cultural dialogue.” Thus, I now question more specifically the underlying conception of “culture” that such a position assumes, and wonder if it is not one covert-variant of the fundamental misconception that I have identified herein --fundamentally an essentialist, determinist, and reductionist conception? Is the thesis of “crosscultural dialogue” consistent and compatible with the alternative conception of “culture” advocated in this essay? How does such a conception constrain (or not) the nature of the “dialogue” envisaged here between “cultures”? These kinds of questions have to be taken up in another context.

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latter. And there are today many more such confrontations than in any previous period of world history. While recognizing this fundamental vulnerability, the challenge for each culture consists in finding in itself (and elsewhere, if need be) the resources necessary to demonstrate the kind of “imaginative excellence” in re-interpreting its conceptual and symbolic framework, which would enable it to purchase a form of “radical hope” into the future, so that the “culture” (as a historical entity) endures, even when, in the worst case scenario, its conceptual and symbolic framework no longer make sense, or allows its members to make sense of their lives, under the radically changed circumstances and historically new conditions they may be confronted with.23

6. Philosophical and Political Implications 6.1 Human Rights in a Globalizing & Glocalizing World In order to illustrate the merits of the approach advocated herein, I will next consider briefly the issue of human rights in a globalizing & glocalizing world—beyond the dead-end debate of radical cultural relativism vs. traditional Western-centric moral universalism—in an effort to make a case for “a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism”, that is nevertheless respectful enough of cultural differences. Admittedly, the notion of “pluralistic universalism” is apparently paradoxical. But the paradox dissolves as soon as one understands that the universalism here in question is, unlike the traditional form which sought to ground its justification in a monolithically construed, ahistorical foundation, interested in a non-metaphysical, non-foundational, contextual and historically contingent and enlightened “justification” on the basis of a

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I borrow here the felicitous terms of Jonathan Lear. In his book, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (2006), Lear provides a powerfully argued and masterfully constructed analysis of the case of the Crow Indian Nation and Culture facing devastation and possible extinction at the hand of the white settlers In the mid-west plains of the US in the 19th-20th century. It is focused on the leading role played by the last of the Great Crow Chiefs, Plenty Coups, in creatively and imaginatively articulating the necessary conceptual and ethical resources which enabled his people, the Crow nation and culture to endure with radical hope --despite being irrevocably and irremediably changed and transformed in the process. There are here lessons and insights of general and broader import that are worth pondering by members of any and all cultures.

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diverse range of sources from different cultural and philosophical traditions.24 6.1.1 Beyond Radical Ethnocentrism and Relativism It should by now be obvious that I object to the radical versions of cultural relativism and ethnocentrism which seek to somehow “lock us up” in our respective cultures and traditions. I am prepared however to countenance some weak or moderate versions of these theses, which, I would argue, are not only defensible but perhaps even desirable. Let me explain briefly why. A moderate form of ethnocentrism can be seen as the basis for acceptance of the norms, practices and institutions of a given culture, an acceptance that is arguably a matter of material survival and psychological well-being for members who claim allegiance to that culture. An awareness and appreciation of one’s ethnocentrism in this sense can lead one to grant others “the right to their own ethnocentrism”, to be “different” from us in some crucial respects, to a greater or lesser extent. In contrast, extreme or radical ethnocentrism can easily breed intolerance and hostility toward members of another culture who do not conform to our norms and values, expectations and models. It may even lead to the “dehumanization” of those individuals or groups deemed different, whether it is operating as an initial justification or as a subsequent rationalization. This tendency underlies, as we know, many of the cases of oppression of one culture or society by another, of one group by another within the same culture or society.

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In the post-metaphysical and anti-foundationalist context of contemporary philosophy, I believe that Nussbaum (2000) and Benhabib (2002) are also striving toward such a goal from their respective theoretical perspectives: For the former, Rawlsian political liberalism based on “overlapping consensus” informed by a distinctive version of the capability approach (different from Amartya Sen’s) with universalist aspirations, which yet wishes to remain contextually sensitive; for the latter, a deliberative democracy approach informed by a distinctive post-Habermasian version of communicative action theory and discourse ethics. For a distinctly postHabermasian framework to “Rethinking Human Rights” see also the arguments for “multiple foundations” as a prelude to genuine “Intercultural Dialogue” proposed by Jeffrey Flynn (2005).

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A weak or moderate version of cultural relativism would acknowledge a more or less substantial degree of differences between cultural forms, respect the validity of normative claims made within them with regards to their respective values, beliefs, and practices, dismiss the idea that morality can somehow be placed beyond culture, and knowledge beyond both. In this regard, Geertz argues quite rightly that the relativism/anti-relativism (or universalism, as traditionally construed) discourse is better seen as an exchange of warnings rather than as an analytical debate. I also agree with his conclusion that the “objection to anti-relativism is not that it rejects an it’s-all-how-you-look-at-it approach to knowledge or a when-in-Rome approach to morality, but that it imagines that they (these approaches) can only be defeated by placing morality beyond culture and knowledge beyond both. This…is no longer possible. If we wanted home truths, we should have stayed at home” (2000: 65). We must therefore reject the traditional Western-centric defense for moral universalism, and seek to countenance a weak or moderate form of cultural relativism. Though it would reject as meaningless or pointless any search for (moral and epistemological) absolutes, it would still seek to articulate some Universalist norms and standards through a process which is characterized by respect and tolerance, and pluralism. In contrast, radical cultural relativism, by locking us up in our respective “cultural compartments or trains running on different tracks”, underwrites cross-cultural incommensurability and undermines moral evaluation and judgment. And as such it may thereby breed tolerance of injustices, or in any case, impair action against injustices. By rejecting critical evaluation of human actions and practices, it leaves us unable to enter into communicative interaction, to criticize cross-culturally, or cross-sub-culturally. It takes away the opportunity or the right to make cross-cultural comparisons, and to insist on universal normative standards that apply to all human beings regardless of their cultural, ethnic or racial affiliations, allegiances or memberships. Generally speaking, the radical versions here in question seem to be saddled with one form or another of the fundamental misconception of culture. Thus, (1) cultures are assumed to be “windowless semantic monads” and hermetically sealed wholes’. (2) Conflicted and dissident interpretations, internal tensions, contradictions, contestations, and debates within cultures are barely acknowledged or their significance is often underestimated. (3) The range of different conceptual and normative options available to participants in a given cultural complex is hardly if ever taken into account and even ignored. And last, but not least, (4) they are unable to reconcile the

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symbolic dimensions of “cultures” as clusters of values, meanings and interpretations with the imperatives of material production and reproduction of a form of life, its practices and institutions. As a result, they always seem to be proceeding from theoretical abstractions, making them unable to deal effectively with the real and practical challenges and dilemmas experienced by most, if not all cultures and societies in the world today. Perhaps then, one way of nudging the traditional cultural relativism/universalism debate beyond its current impasse is to acknowledge the socio-political-economic-historical situation in which we find ourselves today, and seek thereby to dissolve the problem rather than solving it analytically, as many philosophers still seek to do (see for example, Teson 2001). One can hardly deny that our present situation is one of worldwide interactions, interchanges, and real confrontations between the imperatives of modernity/post-modernity and the often pleading or nostalgic demands of tradition and so-called “cultural integrity”. As such, it undermines de facto the “detached spectator posture” surveying the presumed clearly demarcated “cultural landscape” that relativists are prone to take. Recall for example that in The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard argues that an epistemologically enlightened postmodernist should not seek legitimation or justification, for this has typically been the imperialistic cloak of Western cultures. Instead, one should assume the attitude of a curator of a conceptual museum who “gazes in wonderment at the variety of discursive species, just as we do at the diversity of plant or animal species” (1984: 26). The analogy drawn here is to say the least problematic from an empirical point of view, and morally bankrupt from a normative standpoint. As participants-members of various cultures and societies question their social and cultural order and assume the observers’ point of view vis-à-vis their own frames of meaning, values, and normative systems, they engage in “a moral conversation” with each other and draw each other into “an everwidening hermeneutical circle of meaning, interpretation, and understanding”. This is arguably bound to considerably increase the chances for an “overlapping consensus” between their differing and diverging cultural perspectives—on particularly controversial issues such as human rights, democracy, human development and social justice. In this sense, Seyla Benhabib is right in saying that, in a globalizing world, “there are only participants exerting moral claims upon each other” (1995: 241).

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6.1.2 Beyond Traditional, Western-Centric Moral Universalism Traditionally and up until recently, the defense of moral universalism in human rights has been carried out from a Western-centric point of view, on the basis of metaphysically suspect notions of “human nature”, “rationality”, or “persons as individuals” 25 and dubious epistemological foundations (Rorty 1998: 167-185). One need not again rehearse the arguments made against such an approach by authors of diverse persuasions. It shall suffice to take note of the fact that these arguments have sufficiently established in my view the lack of normative and pragmatic power of such a defense. In fact, they have revealed that such a defense is suspiciously and disturbingly ethnocentric, and irremediably incapable of providing the necessary cultural legitimacy most urgently needed for human rights in the present situation. If, as An-Na’im quite rightly points out, “the lack or insufficiency of cultural legitimacy of human rights standards is one of the main underlying causes of violations of those standards”—apart from the multitude of other factors (1995: 19), then we should seriously consider an alternative approach. Such an approach would seek to find a compelling way to make a case for a “pluralistic universalism” on the basis of a properly conceived and carried out internal dialogue within each cultural complex as well as cross-cultural dialogue between various cultural complexes. Only in such a way can we hope to insure the future expansion and increased legitimacy of the “human rights culture” that is already gaining ground globally in so many respects— according to the Argentinean philosopher Eduardo Rabossi—as quoted approvingly by Rorty (1998: 170). 6.1.3 In Defense of Cultural Justice—Toward a Pluralistic, Historically Enlightened Ethical Universalism The call for an increased and genuine intra- and inter-cultural dialogue need not remain an empty, though well-intentioned, gesture. It would start from one of the main tenets defended in this essay: each culture is in fact always already internally contested in that “all individuals and groups within a society do not hold identical views on the meaning and implications of cultural values and norms” (An-Na’im, 1995: 20). It would 25

A widespread strand of philosophical liberalism has equated the concept of “person” with the “individual as an atomistic unit”, very narrowly and problematically construed. I believe however that this conception may be rehabilitated by attending to other strands which in contrast emphasize the intrinsic and fundamental links between persons and community.

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further make the reasonable and defensible assumption that “any cultural heritage is morally rich enough that it can, if appropriately construed, under some circumstances make inspirational contributions to the struggle for human rights, democracy, and social justice” (Falk 1995: 54). The many and diverse forms that moral concepts, precepts, and/or principles take are but a product of the particular historical circumstances of the cultures and societies that adopt and use them. In each case however, criteria are subject to continuous questioning and change, and fundamental conceptions are sustained in a dynamic and dialectic manner so as to provide guidance to the thoughts and actions of their respective members or carriers, and possibly give meaning and purpose to their lives. One may claim that such criteria, though differing in forms, do comprise some universals in the sense of “least common denominators” that can be extracted from the range of variations across human cultures (Herskovits 1964: 62). Such a conception is however inadequate to make a case for a “pluralistic moral universalism”. It is true that all cultures have something like morality, and in this sense, one may say that morality is universal. But this does not help in ascertaining the content of that morality, or in providing substantive criteria for judgment or action by members of this or that culture or other cultures. What is needed is an approach that seeks (i) to include more substantively some basic concepts, precepts and/or principles, (ii) to validate and legitimate the shared moral values and norms from the inside, i.e., from the standpoint of each culture, and not by external imposition, and (iii) to broaden and deepen the set of common values and norms so as to support certain vital and fundamental human rights. The “pluralistic universalism” that I have in mind can be “justified” (in a non-foundationalist sense) using the Rawlsian constructivist methodology of “reflective equilibrium” in that a genuine, unforced “overlapping consensus” can arguably be arrived at if we are prepared to engage in creative, imaginative and bold (if at times, radically reformist) hermeneutics of each and all the major cultural and philosophical traditions of the world (see Rawls 1993; 1999a; 1999b; 2001). Even if it is still appropriate to distinguish between internal criticism or reinterpretation and external criticism or re-interpretation, cultural relativism (of the weak or moderate variety) would not impair either—whereas the strong and radical kind clearly would. It would merely make us more sensitive to the necessity of striving for greater cultural legitimacy of

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human rights—as much as possible in accord with the norms and standards (albeit re-interpreted) internal to each culture. This, of course, does not preclude cross-cultural judgment and action; it merely recommends the most effective ways for engaging in them. If however, as Geertz pointed out (2000: 65), morality and knowledge cannot be placed beyond culture, then we cannot act, in intercultural relations, as if they are the exclusive achievements of some cultures and not of others. The crosscultural validity of our evaluations, judgments and actions would increase commensurately with the degree of universality that can be attached to the values and norms on which they are based. And our actions would gain in effectiveness commensurately with the degree of sensitivity and understanding we are able to exhibit with regards to other cultures’ internal logics as well as their conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Let us assume, with Jacques Maritain (1951: 77) followed later on by Charles Taylor (2001: 410), that (i) people of divergent ideological allegiances, philosophical and religious traditions, cultural backgrounds and historical experiences could agree on a common formulation of practical conclusions, a set of moral (and/or legal) norms, norms of conduct, and even a catalogue of rights—as they have in fact done in 1948 for the formulation of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but (ii) could not agree on the theoretical conceptions or philosophical justifications for their practical conclusions. Such an assumption is by the way supported by the recent groundbreaking study of the drafting, origins and intent of UDHR carried out by Morsink (2000). In it, he takes an approach based on consensus among the drafters, rather than providing a traditional philosophical justification for the universality of human rights. He argues essentially that the process by which UDHR was drafted included a variety of social, cultural, religious, and ideological traditions, and the final document reflects this diversity, while at the same time transcending the divisions that could have undermined it. And he concludes that, rather than being an ethnocentric document that present Western values as universal rights, the drafting process compel us, he claims, to view it as an inclusive set of rights for all human beings. Interestingly enough, Glendon (2001) reaches similar conclusions in her highly acclaimed study. It is arguably useful to distinguish the above mentioned two levels in our discussions and struggles for human rights. Building on the substantial agreement achieved on practical conclusions, we could then endeavor to seek a rapprochement between the divergent “whys” of their philosophical justifications by way of a creative and radically bold hermeneutics. This

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would involve, as Taylor puts it, “mutual learning, and moving toward a “fusion of horizons” in Gadamer’s term, where the moral universe of the other becomes less strange. And out of this will come further borrowings and the creation of new hybrid forms” (2001: 420). The formulation of a pluralistic and historically enlightened ethical universalism on a global scale now appears not only as a possibility, but most importantly as a necessity. As we have become moral contemporaries caught in a tighter and tighter “web of interdependence” (which is part of the objectively emerging historical reality), one of the moral imperatives of the present is, to put it succinctly, the following: to translate this objective interdependence into a normative, cosmopolitan one—aiming at achieving a “community of conversation” across cultures.

7. Conclusion In the face of the current globalizing trends, which seem to intensify and multiply the confrontations taking place between cultures and societies, “we are, to paraphrase Sartre, condemned to understand each other”, or else, to simply endure the consequences that these confrontations are having on our lives and those of others. As the latter option is not a real one, how, one might ask, should an interdependent world, seeking to resolve those issues of common concern to all, best proceed to become a moral community, i.e., a community of conversation? Arguably, a genuine cross-cultural dialogue based on the minimal norms of respect and reciprocity is the way to go. One need not invoke, as some philosophers have claimed, some essentialist theory of human nature, or a transcendentally grounded notion of “super-humanity” in order to justify the pragmatic merit of such a dialogue. It should be obvious that such a dialogue is required by the global situation of interdependence which has intensified interactions and exchanges as well as confrontations at various levels and in various forms between different cultures and societies. Given the imperative confronting us, the relevant moral questions then are these: How can we best help others preserve their way of life without forcing them to destroy themselves or forego their dignity? In other words, how can we promote the material and symbolic continuity of those forms of life and cultural expressions which can be made more compatible with the

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normative, moral requirements of respect, reciprocity and dignity of all human beings? The purpose of a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism is to make a case for the necessity of moral conversation and action in the face of the needs and suffering of others. We cannot abdicate our responsibility toward others by giving in to objectionable and defective arguments about radical cultural relativism or ethnocentrism, or with an easy surrender to the comforts of a culturally walled in existence. As long as we can more or less understand each other’s languages, the meanings and values of each other’s cultures, we need no further proof of our shared humanity: we are interlocutors in a moral conversation; we are partners in the struggles concerning the problems and issues common to us all. In the process of such a conversation and struggle, we stand to discover what unites us as well as what separates us. Our differences should not however constitute grounds for exclusion from the conversation, or the struggle. Interestingly, or rather ironically, we must first respect the others as human beings in some real and substantial sense like us in order to understand how different they are from us. In order words, the recognition of cultural differences must be predicated upon the recognition of our dialogically, conversationally, and politically grounded common humanity—beyond all forms of essentialism.

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Benhabib, S. (1995). “Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical Community.” In Women, Culture, and Development. Edited by Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover. (pp. 235-259). Oxford: Clarendon Press. —. (2002). The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bernstein, R. (1991). “Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited.” In Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives. Edited by Eliot Deutsch (pp. 85-103). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991. Botz-Bornstein, T. and Hengelbrock, J. (Eds.). (2006). Re-ethnicizing the Minds? Cultural Revival in Contemporary Thought. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi. Bruner, J. (1996). The Culture of Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Byrne, D. (1998). Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction. London: Routledge. Chokr, Nader. N. (2006) “A Fundamental Misconception of ‘Culture’: Philosophical and Political Implications.” In Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten and Jurgen Hengelbrock (Eds.). Re-ethnicizing the Minds: Cultural Revivals in Contemporary Thought. (Chapter 22, pp. 401-435). Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi. Cilliers, P. (1998). Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems. London: Routledge. —. (2004). “Complexity, Ethics ad Justice.” Journal for Humanistics. 5/19, 19-26. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP. —. (2005). “Complexity, Deconstruction, and Relativism.” Theory, Culture and Society 22/5, 255-267. Dawkins, R. (1976/1989). The Selfish Gene. (1st and 2nd Edition.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Denton, T. (2004). “Cultural Complexity Revisited.” Cross-Cultural Research 38/1, 3-26 Derrida, J. (1988). Limited, Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Donnelly, J. (2002). “Human Rights, Globalizing Flows, and State Power.” In Globalization and Human Rights. Edited by Alison Brysk. (pp. 226-241). Berkeley: University of California Press. Drori, Gili S. et al. (2014). “Unpacking the glocalization of organization: from term, to theory, to analysis.” European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 1/1: 85-99. Falk, Richard. (1995). “Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights.” In Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus. Edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im. (pp. 44-64). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Fayart, J-F. (2005). The Illusion of Cultural Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Fikentscher, W. (1998). “Cultural Complexity.” New Mexico: Santa Fe Institute, Monograph 98-10-087. http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wopsafiwp/98-10087.htm Fleischacker, S. (1994). The Ethics of Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Flynn, Jeffrey. (2005). “Rethinking Human Rights: Multiple Foundations and Intercultural Dialogue.” Presented at the Third Berlin Roundtable on Transnationality: Reframing Human Rights. Berlin, Germany. Pp.1-8. Geertz, C. (2000). “Passage and Accident: A Life of Learning.” “Anti-AntiRelativism.” “The Uses of Diversity.” “The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the Century.” In Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics. (pp. 3-20; 42-67; 68-88; 218-263). New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalisms. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Glendon, Mary Ann. 2001. A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York: Random House. Hannerz, U. (1993). Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning. New York: Columbia University Press. Herder, J. G. (1797/1997). On World History. Edited by Hans Adler and Ernest A. Menze. London: M. E Sharpe. Herskovits, Melville. (1964). Cultural Dynamics. New York: Knopf. Heylighen, F., Cilliers, P., & Gershenson, C. (2006). “Complexity and Philosophy.” http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.cc/0604072. Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Huntington, S. & Harrison, L. (Eds.). (2000). Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books. Jameson, F., & Miyoshi, M. (Eds.). (1998). The Cultures of Globalization. Duke University Press. Joppke, C., & Lukes, S. (Eds.). (1999). Multicultural Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, I. (1793/1994). “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice.” In Kant: Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (Eds.). (1963). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. New York: Vintage Books. Kymlicka, W. (1997). States, Nations and Cultures. Spinoza Lectures: The University of Amsterdam. Assen: Van Gorcum. —. (2000). Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford University Press. —. (2001). Politics in the Vernacular. Oxford University Press. Lear, J. (2006). Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Levi-Strauss, C. (1985). The View From Afar. New York: Basic Books. Lyotard, J-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Maalouf, A. (2001). In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. New York: Penguin Books.

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Maritain, Jacques. (1951). Man and the State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Mill, J. S. (1860/1982). On Liberty. New York: Penguin Books. Morsink, Johannes. (2000). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Drafting, Origins and Intent. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Morin, E. (1992). “The Concept of System and the Paradigm of Complexity.” In M. Maruyama (ed.) Context and Complexity: Cultivating Contextual Understanding. (pp. 125-136). New York: Springer-Verlag. Nussbaum, M. (1999). Sex and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pierik, R. (2004). “Conceptualizing Cultural Groups and Cultural Difference: The Social Mechanism Approach.” Ethnicities 4/4, 523-544. Putnam, Hilary. (1981). “Two Conceptions of Rationality.” In Reason, Truth and History. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, John. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Lectures III, IV, IX. —. (1999a). Collected Papers. Edited by Samuel Freeman. Harvard University Press, chapters 1, 16, 18, 20, 22. —. (1999b). The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press, pp., 58, 86n. —. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Harvard University Press, pp. 2637; 134-6; 181-198. Rescher, N. (1998). Complexity: A Philosophical Overview. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions. Richardson, K. (Ed.). (2005). Managing the Complex, Vol. 1: Philosophy, Theory and Application. Greenwich: Information Age Publishing. Robinson, W.I. (2008). “Theories of Globalization.” In The Blackwell Companion to Globalization. Ed. George Ritzer. London: Blackwell Pub, 2008, Chapter 6, pp. 125-143. Rorty, Richard. (1989). Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 44-69; 189-198. —. (1991). “Solidarity or objectivity,” “Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism,” “On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz.” In Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21-34; 197-202; 203-210. —. (1998). “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality,” “Rationality and Cultural Difference.” In Truth and Progress. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 167-185; 186-201. Ryle, Martin and Kate Soper. (2002). To Relish the Sublime? Culture and SelfRealization in Postmodern Times. London: Verso. Sen, A. (1999). “Global Justice: Beyond International Equity.” In Inge Kaul et al (eds.) Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. (pp. 116-125). New York: Oxford University Press. —. (1999b). “Culture and Human Rights.” In Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. Chapter 10. —. (2005). The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture, and Identity. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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—. (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. New York: W.W. Norton & Cie. Stacey, R. (2001). Complex Responsive Processes in Organizations: Learning and Knowledge Creation. London: Routledge. Stacey, R., et al. (2000). Complexity and Management: Fad or Radical Challenge to Systems’ Thinking? London: Routledge. Taylor, C. (1992). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. —. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. —. (2001). “A World Consensus on Human Rights.” In The Philosophy of Human Rights. Edited by Patrick Hayden. (pp. 409-423). New York: Paragon House Publishers. Taylor, M.C. (2003). The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Teson, Fernando. (2001). “International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism.” In The Philosophy of Human Rights. Edited by Patrick Hayden. Paragon House Publishers, pp. 379-395 Turner, Terence. (1993). “Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What Is Anthropology That Multiculturalists Should Be Mindful of It?” Cultural Anthropology 8, no. 4: 411-29. Tylor, E.B. (1871/1924). Primitive Culture. 7th Ed. 2 Vols. New York: Brentano. UNESCO. (2001). Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Text available online at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf Urry, J. (2003). Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Weber, M. (1917/1949). Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Edited and translated by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. West, P. (2005). The Poverty of Multiculturalism. With an Introduction by Kenneth Minogue: “Multiculturalism: A Dictatorship of Virtue.” A Report produced for Civitas. The Institute for the Study of Civil Society. London: Cromwell Press. Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.

ESSAY # 2 WHO IS (NOT) AFRAID OF (CULTURAL) RELATIVISM?

1. Why Ask a Different Kind of Question? As the world grows increasingly inter-connected and inter-dependent, and as we progressively come to recognize and draw the “consequences of cultural complexity” that such a world entails and reveals, one could have expected to see a higher degree of “moral convergence” between members of various cultures, or at least, a more substantial “overlapping consensus.” 1 Similarly, one could have expected the “cosmopolitan outlook” (that Kant, and long before him the Stoics talked about) and its underlying “moral universalism,” to have gained more ground and become, if not widely accepted, at least more widely tolerated.2 Instead, it is seen in some circles as the threatening expression of Western hegemony and cultural imperialism. As a result, we have been witnessing in recent years repeated affirmations of cultural distinctiveness and national identity, and vehement celebrations of provincialism, parochialism, particularism, sectarianism, nationalism, and fundamentalisms of various kinds— religious and secular. Needless to say, the specter of “cultural relativism” is writ large in all these affirmations and celebrations.3 Cosmopolitanism 1 I am here using Rawls’ expression (1996) without however endorsing his brand of “political liberalism” and the particular strictures or conditions under which he believes such a notion makes sense. I do so along the same line as Nussbaum, as we shall see later on. 2 The notion, question and problem of “tolerance” will be, as can be expected, at the center of my reflection and discussion for a number of reasons. It is often evoked or conjured up as part of the justification for (normative) cultural relativism, and for the critique of Western hegemony and cultural imperialism. It is also evoked because it is a cardinal virtue of Western liberalism and one of the main values of the Enlightenment, whose legacy is precisely in question today (see Graham, 1996; Harrison, 1976). It is obviously at the center of contemporary ideological struggles, it is perhaps even merely ideological. 3 At this point, I am neither reinforcing nor justifying any of the perspectives, views or outlooks implicated here. I am merely setting up the problem in a

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and cultural chauvinism (or narrow-minded nationalism) are nowadays no longer opposites, it seems, but instead mutually reinforcing and defining of each other: as one does increase, so does the other. This is a hypothesis that can be easily confirmed by any well-informed observer of world affairs in the past decade or two. Why, one may ask, has the thesis of cultural relativism proven to be so resistant to the cold, rigorous and hard-edged “knife” of logic and rational arguments? Is it because it seems, despite its apparent problems of consistency and coherence,4 to convey some profound insights about the human condition and alert us to some real and difficult (perhaps even intractable) moral problems? Or is it because, though it is based on a deeply problematic and controversial way of thinking, it can nevertheless readily serve the personal, ideological and political purposes (even conflicting ones) of those who uphold it? Both sets of considerations must arguably be taken into account in any fair and meaningful discussion of this thesis. However, because of its highly objectionable and deeply troublesome consequences, esp., from an ethical and political point of view, it should be clear to anyone who cares to make such an assessment that we have good reasons for fearing relativism, and that such a fear (both as an emotional and intellectual response) is furthermore not only warranted but reasonable. I am mostly interested here in the fact that cultural relativism precludes in the final analysis any normative, critical judgment—either intra-culturally or interculturally. This is in my view the most damning implication of such a thesis from an ethical and political point of view. The voice of dissent and contestation is rarely if ever taken into account (see Benhabib, 2002; Wellman, 1963, 1975). My answer to the normative question of whether we should be afraid of relativism follows obviously from that.

provisional only to show further the possible conceptual links that may be said to obtain (or not) between (some of) them, e.g., between cultural relativism and particularism, or communitarianism. 4 Putnam writes: “We all know that cultural relativism is inconsistent” (1983: 236); see Brandt, 1984 for a refutation. See however Steven D. Hales (1997) for a valiant effort to show how one can make relativism consistent from a logical point of view. See also Harman (1977, 1996, 2000a, 2000b), Wong (1985, 1986, 1991, 1996), Walzer (1994) for other, yet different attempts to defend moral relativism. See finally Williams (1985) for an attempt to state normative relativism in a coherent and not self-defeating way.

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However, I believe that we stand to advance the debate further and thereby gain in our understanding of the issue by addressing another question, and that is, “Who is (not) afraid of (cultural) relativism?” 5 I submit that by trying to ascertain to whom it appeals or not, and more precisely, why it appeals to some people and not to others, and by focusing thereby on what is at stake between opposing camps, we can better understand some of the uses, or rather abuses of relativism. We might also thereby understand better the possible conflicts, divisions, and tensions that may subsequently emerge between them. Besides, by attending not only to the arguments and counter-arguments given by proponents and opponents of relativism, but also to their respective motivations, 5

I am naturally aware that the latter question sounds more like an empirical question, perhaps better addressed through a socio-historical inquiry, whereas the former is, properly speaking, to be understood as a normative question, and therefore squarely situated within the realm of moral philosophy. And I certainly do not intend to commit myself to a defense of “the naturalistic fallacy,” and seek somewhat trivially to derive an “ought” (norms, what we ought to do) from an “is” (facts, what we are and what we do). Nevertheless, I believe that our normative thinking is best (more realistic and more convincing) when it is constrained in some way by relevant kinds of empirical considerations, though not determined by, nor merely derived from them. This should be taken in the context of a broader concern with a prominent trend in moral and political philosophy (esp., in the Anglo-American tradition), in which philosophers, despite claims to the contrary are in fact far too focused on ideal-theoretical considerations and less or not enough on real-world conditions. They do not always factor in relevant and appropriate considerations about the world as we know it, what human beings are and have shown themselves to be in the course of recorded history. But most importantly, they do not consider what humans and/in the world can both realistically become—provided they are prodded by a judiciously calibrated normative and arguably “utopian thinking.” Compare and contrast with Rawls for example (The Law of Peoples, 1999), or with Rousseau (Social Contract). The latter writes at the opening of his famous work: “My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principle of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall try to bring together what right permits with what interest requires so that justice and utility are in no way divided.” Rousseau also said: “The limits of the possible in moral matters are less narrow that we think. It is our weaknesses, our vices, our prejudices, that shrink them. Base souls do not believe in great men. Vile slaves smile mockingly at the word freedom” (II, 12, #2). In the Law of Peoples, Rawls claims to follow Rousseau. He writes: “I shall assume that his phrase “men as they are” refers to persons’ moral and psychological natures and how that nature works within a framework of political and social institutions; and his phrase “laws as they might be” refers to laws as they should, or ought, to be” (1999: 7, 13). See also Essays # 6 & 8.

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background assumptions, as well as their personal, ideological or political purposes, we can show more effectively why cultural relativism is untenable and unacceptable today, not even for the reasons for which it is often upheld by its proponents. In turn, we might be able to show how the challenge it raises can best be met and countered (Rachels, 1999; Renteln, 1985). In this essay, I propose to discuss the thesis of “cultural relativism” (in both its descriptive and normative version)6 in an effort to ascertain and impeach more perspicuously the reasons for the strong appeal it continues to exert today in a world deep in the throes of the nth wave of “globalization.”7 6 To keep my discussion within manageable bounds, I will not seek herein to discuss all versions and variations on the thesis of relativism. However, it will be obvious that much of what I have to say about (normative) “cultural relativism” has a certain degree of generality and wider applicability (see Krausz, 1989; Krausz & Meiland, 1982). Relativism is certainly one of the most tenacious views with a pedigree and a history as old as philosophy itself—in both Western and Eastern traditions. In the ancient Greek world, both the historian Herodotus and the sophist Protagoras have presumably endorsed some form of relativism. The latter’s view was famously discussed by Plato in the Theaetetus. This has, as we know, given rise to philosophical controversies about what Protagoras really meant by his well-known statement: Man is the measure of all things,” but also naturally about Plato’s interpretation. In the ancient Chinese world, the Taoist philosopher, Chuang-Tzu (whose name is nowadays spelled “Zhuangzi”) is also said to have put forward a non-objectivist view which is often interpreted as a kind of relativism (see Westermarck, 1906-8, 1932; Allinson, 1989: 112-142 on the question of relativism in Chuang Tzu). Nearly as ancient as its history is the criticism that such a view is untenable and self-refuting. However, despite its ancient history, it was not until the 20th century that it became a prominent and highly controversial issue in philosophy as well as in other areas or domains. Since then, it has been submitted to a continuous barrage of other objections and criticisms. Yet, it seems to have endured—in one form or another—and continues to exert an appeal, even though it has been shown repeatedly to be profoundly misguided (see for example Brandt, 1984 for a refutation; see also Putnam, 1983). 7 Unlike many writers today dealing with this subject, I am here taking a historically more informed, and therefore more nuanced and qualified position about “globalization.” Thus I assume that we have witnessed several waves of “globalization” before—starting roughly back in the 6th century BC, and upward in time through the 15-16th centuries until the 19th and 20th centuries, and in more recent times (how many depends on when one starts and the “periodization” of history one favors). However, I contend that the latest wave, which is commonly said to have started in the 80s, is one that is substantially different (qualitatively

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The approach I take is the one recommended by Bernard Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. “Rather than seeking to know whether we should think in a relativistic manner, for logical or conceptual reasons, or whether this is impossible, we must instead ask ourselves what place we could reasonably find for a thought of this kind, and in what sense it responds more adequately to reflection” (1985: 160). This is precisely the leading question of my inquiry. However, I must quickly note that, given the character properly philosophical of my inquiry, I will not be able to dispense completely with a certain amount of preliminary logical and conceptual work. I believe however that, by heeding Williams’ injunction to the extent possible, and by situating our efforts within such an approach, we might be able to ascertain certain real and serious moral problems and difficulties to which we had not perhaps paid sufficiently attention. We might also come to better appreciate (the reasons for) the enduring and powerful appeal that it has exerted for more than two thousand years, and continues to exert today on individuals and groups of diverse philosophical, political and ideological persuasions, and this, regardless of the strictures placed upon them by purely logical or conceptual considerations. This appreciation of the peculiar “resistance” of relativism to logical and conceptual analysis might in turn give us a uniquely informed vantage-point from which to address (the question of) the “fear of relativism” (Scanlon, 1995). To clarify further my theoretical and methodological commitments, the following caveat is in order. Though I have taken up Williams’ recommendation and will be appropriating and using a number of his most and quantitatively) from all previous ones. Its impact on all spheres of life (economic, political, social, cultural, etc.) is of a different kind and far more extensive. The challenge before us is to figure out how to think through the consequences of these developments, and in the case that is of interest to us here, we need to figure out what this means for the commonly accepted conception (or misconception) of “culture” at this juncture of our history. As I will show in due course the thesis of “cultural relativism” is underwritten by an inadequate conception of “culture,” one that is committed to dubious and objectionable assumptions (of essentialism, monism, holism, hermeticism, idealism and determinism), and therefore inadequate from both an empirical and normative point of view. In short, relativists fail to taken into account what I call “the consequences of cultural complexity” and most specifically the fact that “globalization” is invariably accompanied by “glocalization”—i.e., the adaptation and appropriation of global phenomena in terms of local and particular factors and considerations. See Essay # 1.

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insightful concepts and notions for my purposes, I do not intend however to situate my entire analysis squarely within the conceptual, theoretical and explanatory framework that his work seems to suggest. Williams has unquestionably offered us one of the most insightful, perspicuous, and nuanced discussion of moral relativism. Thus, I am favorably disposed to adopt a number of his insights and points in these regards as part of the background of my inquiry. However, I believe along with a number of sympathetic critics that his contribution is in the final analysis confronted with aporias, serious difficulties and tensions (see Nussbaum, 2003: 9-12; Scheffler, 1987, reprinted in 2002: 197-216). For one thing, it is arguably unclear, and thus it is a matter of philosophical debates, whether Williams (1985) can be viewed as attempting to see how (if) we can make relativism coherent or as defending outright some version of moral relativism. For another, it is doubtful whether this alternative proposal to ethical theory or to “the morality system,” to use his expression, will satisfice (i.e., satisfy and be sufficient) for the purpose of normative social and political criticism, which he obviously engages in and deems necessary. I will attempt to show why I entertain such doubts when I take up later on my critical examination of Williams’ view. I will consider, in particular, his alternative proposal based primarily on “reflection” and his recommendation that we replace the “thin” concepts favored by the “morality system” and its theorists with “thick” concepts—of the sort that were prevalent in the ethical thought of ancient Greece. In the end however, I agree with Williams on the following point. Though cultural relativism conjures up admittedly a general moral problem, it is in reality either too early or too late (Williams, 1972, 1981, 1985, 2002). In our case, and at this juncture of history, we must recognize that it is rather late in the day. In an increasingly globalizing/glocalizing, inter-connected, and inter-dependent world, we need to heed the consequences of “cultural complexity” and articulate a more appropriate conception of “culture” than the one that typically serves to underwrite the relativists’ view.8 If and when 8

Among the relativists here in question, I would include all the self-appointed and elitist “guardians of cultural purity and integrity,” comprising, among others, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Li Kuan Yew, officials and numerous intellectuals of the People’s Republic of China, various other Asian, African and Latin American leaders and intellectuals, various religious and secular leaders and scholars of the Muslim world, a number of Western intellectuals and philosophers [such as Rorty (1991), Levi-Strauss (1985), and Lyotard (1984) for example, apart from those already mentioned], and many other protagonists around the world who do not have the courage of standing clearly and firmly behind their beliefs and

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we do so, we would better be able to see the normative, pragmatic and political requirements imposed upon us all at this juncture to take our moral responsibilities toward one another more seriously than we have so far. We might then perhaps be more inclined to break down even further the walls of our “cultural prisons,” and reject the “comfortably numbing” yet “dangerous illusions” of a walled-in relativistic existence. In such a context, I argue, the old debate between “cultural relativism” and the “moral universalism” 9 of yesteryears—with regards to human rights, for example—is in my view not only at a dead-end, but outdated, literally overcome and made irrelevant by the events, so to speak. It seems then that only a movement away from cultural relativism and towards something like a “pluralistic, historically enlightened, ethical universalism” can help us. We must address the questions that we all face together in a world caught up in the nth wave of “globalization,” and in which we now all form a new moral and conversational community confronted with urgent questions as well as new and unprecedented problems. But, of course, the philosophical interesting and urgent question is how can we best make a case for such a perspective—which aims to be sufficiently respectful of cultural differences, while countenancing at the same time strong normative requirements and constraints for the purpose of social and political criticism. A number of contemporary philosophers are attempting to articulate precisely such a view from their respective philosophical and political standpoint (see for example, Nussbaum, 2000, 2006; Pogge, 2002; Benhabib, 2002). The view I am inclined to uphold and advocate bears obviously some clear and strong affinities with Nussbaum’s in her effort to articulate and defend a “partial theory of social and global justice” anchored within “the capabilities approach” for which I also have great sympathies.10 However, I positions, and that one may characterize therefore as “closet or reluctant relativists.” See Essay # 1. 9 What I mean to say here obviously is that the traditional formulation of the problem is outdated, not that the stakes are and should no longer be our concern. By the notion of “moral universalism,” I mean the traditional, Western-centric approach which sought to find its justification in a metaphysical or transcendental way on the basis of some suspiciously ethnocentric, monolithic notion of human nature, reason, rationality, or even person (see Donnelly, 1984; Renteln, 1985; Okin, 1998). 10 It may be worth noting, ahead of the forthcoming in-depth discussion of Nussbaum’s view, that the “capabilities” are associated with “the freedom to

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seek to defend such a view without resorting for its “justification,” as Nussbaum does, to a prior account of the human good based on a Marxian/neo-Aristotelian form of (internal) essentialism.11 We are better off proceeding in a radically non-foundationalist and non-metaphysical manner, on purely pragmatic and political grounds. The “justification” for a pluralistic, contextually sensitive, and historically enlightened ethical universalism should therefore be based on historically contingent normative considerations which could be the object of an “overlapping consensus” between members of different cultural traditions around a “free-standing moral and political conception” of social and cultural justice and human development or flourishing. I contend more specifically that what they could agree upon are some basic and minimalist set of pragmatic conclusions, provisions, principles, or values upholding a certain open-ended, defeasible and “multiply founded” basic proposition about what is right (and therefore also good) for each and all human beings. They could do so, I believe, even if they may have to resort for their fundamental justifications to their respective and at times conflicting (philosophical, moral or religious) comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good life.12

2. Cultural Relativism: Arguments & Counter-Arguments 2.1 The Thesis—Formulation, Clarification, Preliminary Problematization The thesis of cultural relativism here of interest, and that I intend to examine critically can be formulated as follows:13 choose,” and that as such, they serve to underwrite a partial (thick-vague) conception of the good—comprising at least the freedom to choose one’s conception and way of life. 11 Nussbaum disagrees in this regard with Rawls who has insisted on the “priority of right” in relation to “ideas of the good” (Rawls, 1996: 174-211). Despite her claims to be proceeding in this regard in a non-metaphysical way (though in an internal essentialist neo-Aristotelian way), it is questionable whether she actually succeeds in doing so (see Nussbaum, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2000b, 2003, 2003b, 2004, 2006). In due course, I will articulate several other grounds for possible objections to Nussbaum’s approach. 12 Just as they have done already in 1948 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). See Jacques Maritain (1951), Charles Taylor (2001: 409-423), and Nussbaum (2004: 63) for a similar line of reasoning. See Essay # 1. 13 At a meta-theoretical level, I make some relatively unproblematic and widely accepted and reasonable background assumptions. Quite generally, a position is said to be relativistic, if it holds that a determinate thing is relative in some

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Essay # 2 (CR) Different cultures have different moral standards, and the standards by which the action and conduct of any individual are (can or should be) evaluated and measured are those of the community to which the individual belongs.

Because such a thesis is easily confused with a number of moral claims, it might be useful to draw some distinctions for the sake of clarification, and setting up if only in a preliminary manner the problematic as I see it. It is one thing to note that (as in the first part of CR) that “different cultures have different moral standards” and subsequently assert that “there is a plurality of standards associated with different cultures, peoples—and one might even add, times and places. This may be called “descriptive moral relativism.” It is another to state that there is no single universally valid moral standard for all cultures, peoples, times and places. In such a view, a plurality of standards provides the only frames of reference against which the truth (or justification) 14 of moral claims can be evaluated. Such claims, it is said further, cannot be evaluated unless and until a framework is specified. We may call this variant, “philosophical moral relativism.” It is also sometimes referred to as “meta-ethical relativism” because it asserts in effect that “the truth (or justification) of a given action, behavior or judgment is indexed or relative to cultural and historical context of the community in which the action or behavior is carried out, or the judgment is made.” It is meta-ethical because it is a thesis about the conditions under specifiable way to another. In others words, where there is relativity, there is at least a two-term relation. A relativist scheme functions on the basis of a dependent variable (A) and an independent variable (B): A is relative to B. This scheme can be applied obviously to a number of areas or domains, and may thus seem general enough and innocuous. But the stakes become more serious and clearer when it comes to choosing the variables and determine the strength of the relation (whether it be one of necessity, probability, or sufficiency). The debates about relativism, as attested by the exploding literature in the 20th century, are all the more acrimonious and heated if truth, rationality, knowledge, language, or morality is chosen as a dependent variable rather than an independent one. They bear furthermore on following kinds of considerations: the scale (local or global), the domain of application (moral, epistemological, ontological, semantical, or cultural), the pretensions and aims (descriptive vs. normative, theoretical vs. empirical, weak vs. strong) or the kinds of connections or combinations that can be established or assumed between various claims (e.g., moral relativism to substantive normative relativism), and which a particular version relativism can claim (or not) for itself (See Krausz, 1989; Krausz & Meiland, 1982; Munthe, 2005). 14 Because the point is often made with respect to truth or justification (or both), it is useful to include both aspects in our general characterization (see MacIntyre, 1994).

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which judgments are true or justified. Moral truth is relativized to a moral community. It is yet quite another to assert that we should be tolerant of those who use moral standards different from our own—because each standard is somehow appropriate for its own culture. Such a claim that we ought not to pass judgment on those deploying alternative frameworks is often dubbed “normative moral relativism.” Although these three different relativist doctrines are distinguishable from one another and can arguably be held consistently in different combinations, all three quite often go together. It must stressed however that only a view that allows different moral standards in a given area of concern to be in some sense equally valid is a genuinely relativist view. In order to ascertain whether there is a genuine difference in moral standards, and whether a given view is truly relativist, it seems that we must hold that there is an agreement on some facts—unrelated to the area of concern which is the point of/in contention. A Universalist view, holding that there are (true) substantive universal moral principles, could well allow—as in the parametric universalism of Scanlon (1998)—that these principles yield different moral requirements when applied to different circumstances. However, it is not a relativist view, since it allows opposed moral judgments to be generated from a single universal standard due to different circumstances. Diversity of moral judgments in a given area of concern is traceable, according to a parametric Universalist, to the different circumstances in which they are made, rather than to different moral standards. Anyone who holds that there are (objective) ethical truths must admit that the rightness or wrongness of an act is relative to the circumstances in which it is performed. Because people’s circumstances differ, what is (objectively) right for one person, might be different from what is (objectively) right for another. Even the most ardent defenders of moral objectivism or universalism must recognize that differing circumstances might well make some action or behavior right for someone and wrong for another. However, cases of “this is right for me and wrong for you” do not and cannot obviously support in any straightforward way any form of ethical relativism. We could then understand cultural relativism in a similar way, as simply putting forth a special view about how moral right or wrong varies with the agent’s circumstances. It holds in effect that (objective) moral rightness and wrongness depend on the prevailing culture’s beliefs about

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given action by members of the culture in question.15 In other words, if we want to know the objectively right answer to the question whether a given act is right or wrong, all we have to do is find out what the agent’s culture believes on that question: their beliefs determine what is objectively true or justified. In the end, it would seem that cultural relativism holds that what a culture believes about an act determines the truth about its objective rightness or wrongness in something like the way in which spatio-temporal location determines the truth about the weather conditions obtaining then and there. Though it seems obvious that we may or ought to be relativists about some things (e.g., etiquette, humor, culinary taste, standards of beauty) but not others (e.g., human dignity, flourishing, well-being, quality of life), late 20th century philosophical discussions of relativism have spent a fair amount of time simply trying to state the view coherently. The ethical relativist most familiar to us combines all three of the theses sketched out above in a way that best serves to illustrate the problem. Such a person begins typically with innocent observation of a diversity of moral practices, proceeds to infer that there is no single universal moral standard, and then confidently concludes that we should not judge the actions or behaviors of members of other cultures. Although this crude form of reasoning is obviously self-contradictory (the conclusion asserts a universal moral requirement the existence of which the premises deny), avoiding this kind of incoherence has proved surprisingly difficult—as Williams has quite rightly pointed out (1972, 1985). Philosophers have also been concerned with the extent of defensible tolerance. For any moral outlook, to sincerely hold that outlook seems incompatible with regarding it as merely one among a number of outlooks, each different, but not better than others. How, for example, could morality have the “grip on us” that it does if it does not lead us to condemn those who, however distant from us in time and space, radically violate its deepest tenets? The normative relativist requirement of tolerance apparently can only be taken seriously by those who have no sincere moral convictions and commitments. Thus, we might say that the basic dilemma 15

Such a view makes some objectionable assumptions about culture—as if it is ever monolithic and consensual operating in a deterministic, homogeneous way and equally on all members of a given culture. See Essay # 1 for discussions of inadequate conception of “culture” and “cultural complexity”.

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confronting a relativist is this: Either the “ought” in the claim that we ought not to condemn standards radically at odds with our own is relative “ought” from within our own standards or an “ought” tied to an absolute standard. The former is incompatible with sincerely embracing and living within a standard; the latter is incompatible with relativism. Does moral relativism lead then to moral skepticism? The latter holds that there are no goods grounds for believing anything is really the case from a moral point of view. Suppose what we morally ought to do is relative to the culture (or era) in which we find ourselves. Is this compatible with claiming that what we ought to do is what we really ought to do? Some philosophers, such as J. L. Mackie (1977), have argued that it is not. Moral beliefs, in his view, are beliefs about absolute moral standards of conduct. If what exist are multiple standards, each no better than the others for its context, then it follows that there is really nothing answering to our moral beliefs. Others, such as David Wong (1991) argue that moral beliefs are not about absolute standards but about prevailing standards, and therefore, in his view, there is something answering to these beliefs. Perhaps the most powerful consideration that has been mobilized in favor of the claim that there is a plurality of equally correct moral standards is that it provides the most satisfying explanation of existing differences over the question of whether something is the case—right or wrong. If relativism explains existing differences—differences that persists even against the background of agreement about non-contentious facts—then perhaps we should be relativists about the matter of contention. However, it does not follow from the fact that there are different moral frameworks for judging the rightness or wrongness of a given action or conduct that no single correct universal moral standard exist. The different frameworks might themselves be assessable as more or less close to some universal standard. Perhaps because of its complexity, it is simply difficult to understand or know the correct universal standard.16 It may well be that the existence of different frameworks could be explained by the absence of a universal standard. But it does not follow from the fact that there appears to be different frameworks for moral judgment that there are in fact different frameworks. The parametric Universalist in moral standards, 16

This may explain at least in part why so many forms of universalism in the past have been misconstrued, obtuse, and therefore untenable—as Nussbaum (2000) will correctly note.

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for example, holds that diversity is a result of the application of a very general but universally shared standard to locally diverse conditions. If this view is right, then the (philosophical, meta-ethical, or cultural) relativist position that there is no such universal standard lacks its main support, as an explanation of moral diversity.

2.2 Arguments and Counter-Arguments Over the years, various arguments have been advanced in support of the thesis of cultural relativism. The main ones include: (1) an argument based on the observed fact of cultural diversity. (2) An argument based on the recognized fact of moral disagreements. (3) An argument based on the presumed functional role of morality in society. Finally, (4) an argument based on the obvious or apparent lack of convergence in ethics as opposed to the natural sciences. I examine next these arguments in turn and proceed to put forth some possible (grounds for) counter-arguments and responses. 2.2.1 Argument from Cultural Diversity Much of the appeal of cultural relativism stems, as suggested earlier, from the observation or affirmation that different cultures have different moral standards and moral practices from ours, but they nevertheless get along at least as well, or reasonably well, with their standards and practices as we do in ours. Other things being equal we have no reason to doubt the sincerity with which different groups hold their values. Nor, do we need to deny that truth plays a crucial role in moral discourse, reasoning and judgment within a particular moral community. Consider in this regard the following view suggested for example by Harman (1977). According to Harman, a statement S1 “x is wrong” should always be interpreted as a shorthand for S2 “x is wrong in relation to moral framework, M.’ By uttering S1, I don’t specify the conditions under which it is true. Rather, it is the sentence and the context in which I state it that determine the conditions under which it is true. The context supplies the moral framework in which the sentence is to be evaluated. So, when I say for example that “’fox-hunting is right,” or “widow-burning is wrong,” the truth of either claim is determined within the relevant moral framework or context. There is no objectively correct moral framework, but there can be multiple frameworks. The constraint on whether a statement is really to be judged true is only one of internal consistency within the particular moral framework. Given the complexity of the

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relations between principles and situations to which they apply, consistency may be an ideal which could only be recognized by a thinker with perhaps unlimited time and cognitive powers so that reflection can allow their beliefs, attitudes, and values to come into a stable equilibrium. In later works (1996, 2000a, 2000b), Harman has elaborated his view so that it combines four claims: (1) there is a plurality of moral frameworks, none more correct than any other. (2) Moral judgments are elliptical and stand for more complex judgments whose truth-conditions include one of these frameworks. (3) Morality should not be abandoned. (4) Even if relative, moral judgments can play a serious role in practical thought (1996: 3-19). The second claim is an important adjustment: relativism is, he argues, not a claim about “what makes sense” in our moral statements but a claim about their truth-conditions. What we saying for example when we state that the slaveholder is doing something wrong makes sense. It is just that we are saying something false because the slaveholder is not party to an agreement giving him the motivation to act accordingly. But the third claim runs into the relativist dilemma. What sort of “should” would we be invoking in saying that morality should not be abandoned? Suppose “morality” refers to some moral framework: we should have some “morality” or other. Then either there is some absolute framework that makes this “should” true, or there is no standard at all that makes this true. From within the point of view of one morality, it is not true that some other morality should not be abandoned. 2.2.2 Similarities beyond/ beneath Differences As suggested earlier, it may be too rushed to conclude from diversity and variability that there is no single criterion or standard. As Wong (1991), a proponent of moral relativism, remarks the argument from diversity does not support relativism in any simple or direct way. One may countenance and save cultural differences and diversity without resorting to cultural relativism. Does the fact that different communities affirm as true propositions that are contradictory entail that both must be in some way true, and hence support relativism? I don’t think it follows. Diversity is arguably no disproof that there are some beliefs it is better to hold than others. It may be regarded as true in one community that we inhabit a planet revolving around a star. In another community, the people may sincerely believe that we inhabit a sphere-like universe attached to the back of a giant tortoise. Furthermore, these beliefs about the nature of our world may be consistent with the other beliefs and attitudes held in their

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respective communities. The fact of difference may be better explained by the fact that some beliefs are wrong. As for the task of explaining why certain beliefs are false, this is arguably the kind of task characteristic of cases in which there is, and there should be, both diversity and dialogue. The very same value may be expressed or realized in different ways. Differences in practices may be superficial differences in the sense that it is the very same fundamental value which finds expression differently. In this regard, it might be worth pondering an experiment conducted by the Emperor of Persia, Darius, and reported by the Greek historian Herodotus (presumably one of the first recorded pieces of anthropological investigation). Darius wanted to know how much Greeks would need to be paid in order to eat the bodies of their (deceased) fathers. No amount of money could induce them to do such a thing for it was absolutely contrary to the traditional and proper way of treating the dead. Turning to a group from the east of the Persian Empire, Darius asked how much they would need to be paid in order to burn their dead fathers. While burning was acceptable to the Greeks, no amount of money could induce those from the East to do such a thing for it was absolutely contrary to the traditional and proper way of treating the dead. They could only treat the dead properly and with respect by eating them. This example, and others like it, in more recent times, of radically conflicting commitments on what counts as the right thing to do have become a common staple in discussions of moral diversity, disagreement and relativism. But what can we safely conclude from such examples? From Darius’ experiment, I don’t think that we can safely conclude that values are relative, but rather that the value of respecting the dead can be realized in different ways. The variety of environments and contexts in which societies exist makes it unsurprising that fundamental or basic moral principles are implemented and expressed in different forms.17 2.2.3 Argument from the Fact of Moral Disagreements Another reason for the appeal of cultural relativism stems from “the fact of moral disagreements” (see Wellman, 1975; Miller, 1992; Gowans, 2000). They seem to be widespread and often appear intractable concerning

17

Various anthropological studies could be adduced in support of this point. One may focus in this regard on “honoring and respecting one’s parents” or “the respect for elderly members of the community” more generally.

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a number of past and contemporary issues.18 The failure to settle moral disputes supports the view that there is no single moral truth or fact of the matter, which could force such a settlement. A community in which one practice is right just cannot agree by its own lights with one in which that very same practice is wrong. It is then claimed that we can understand why the dispute is irresolvable by appeal to relativism. The ways in which the relevant facts and states are assessed are just distinct. 2.2.4 Pluralism and/or Universalism as a Better Response Does disagreement really occur if relativism is true? My hunch is that it does not. The appearance of disagreement may be explained, on a subjectivist understanding of relativism, as a clash of attitudes, as one person trying to get the other to stand (in relation) to the world as she does. However, if we assume that the opposing moral claims of different moral communities can each be true, then if your judgment is true (for you), what could get you to alter it? We are in agreement about the facts or states to which the judgment is directed. By simply stating opposing views, we are of course disagreeing, but then there is nothing further to be said. Arguably the hallmark of genuine disagreement is an assumption on the part of the interlocutors that there is a single answer. One (or perhaps both) of us is wrong. If relativism is right, then it looks as if it is only by (somehow) moving into a different framework or moral community that I could come to understand the rightness or wrongness of a given practice or belief. If this is so, universalism might then offer a better account of real disagreement. One could also argue that pluralism explains the fact of disagreement better than relativism.19 Pluralism is here taken to be the thesis that there is 18 The following issues may be mentioned in this regard: human sacrifice, slavery, pogroms, foot-binding, widow-burning, animal cruelty, experimentation on animals vs. humans, IPR and the poor’s health and medical welfare, GMF, global warming, bio-diversity, abortion, death penalty, torture, just war, violence against women, marital rape, pornography, female genital mutilation, women’s rights, free speech and free press, corporate responsibility, dissidence and political activism, obligations to others (near and dear vs. distant and foreign), conceptions of human rights, limits of tolerance, etc. 19 Both pluralism and universalism are discussed further and in detail throughout. In the closing section of this essay, I distinguish at least two variants of each. My purpose is double: making a case for the view that I wish to advocate in the final analysis, following Nussbaum in this regard, though with significant differences,

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not a single dominant moral criterion or value (e.g. individual welfare, or the good of the community), and that there is an irreducible plurality of morally relevant considerations. There are therefore independent kinds of value, which can pull moral judgment in different directions depending on the context and the perspective of the person deliberating or judging. Disagreement reflects apparently “incommensurable” and sometimes conflicting values and goods which frame deliberation and judgment to which moral communities respond. 2.2.5 Argument from the Functional Role of Morality in Society A third reason for the appeal to cultural relativism has to do with the functional role of morality. The function of morality is said to be, inter alia, to foster conditions of stability and cooperation making it possible to negotiate conflicts of interest between and within individuals. Those conditions can be realized by the adherence to, and application of different models of morality. Perhaps the most basic function of morality is the regulation and negotiation of conflict. A community committed, for example, to the values of dignity, humility, charity, compassion, and justice (including a notion of just retribution, and probably several others) has one normative framework in which conflicts can presumably be handled, resolved, or dissolved. The point however is that the very same problem (or set of problems) can be solved in many different ways. It is interesting to note that these values (as well as others) can be attributed to, and associated with Christian, Muslim, or Jewish communities, and possibly others—even if they are formulated and “cashed out” in different ways. The fact that a given problem can be addressed in different, yet equally viable ways may lend support to the “overlapping consensus” view that I uphold—along with Nussbaum. 2.2.6 Other, More Fundamental, Role(s) for Morality The role of morality is not just to keep order or stability so as to facilitate co-operation and help resolve potential conflicts. This is presumably the role of the law. Morality is (and should be) concerned with the standards of good and right to which law and individual judgment

as well as making clearer and more acute the fundamental challenge that we face today. See also Essays # 6, 7, & 8.

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ought to conform and aim. Whereas ethics is (and should be) concerned with the question of “how should we live?” individually and collectively.20 2.2.7 Argument from the Lack of Convergence in Ethics Finally, another reason for the appeal of cultural relativism has to do with the lack of convergence in ethics as opposed to the natural sciences, at this juncture of our history. We have no reason to impugn people in general with irrationality when it comes to moral matters. Yet, if there were a set of moral truths against which all actions should be evaluated and which are accessible to persons in general, then we should expect some degree of convergence on these moral truths. Convergence will tend to eliminate diversity and we have no grounds for thinking that this has happened. If we contrast ethics with the natural sciences, we note that there has been a very high degree of convergence of belief on the fundamental structure of the physical universe. This contrast has been cited by some philosophers as good reason to be skeptical about moral knowledge and progress (Mackie, 1977). 2.2.8 Pessimistic and Possibly Unjustified Conclusion It would be unreasonable not to concede that, unlike scientific enquiry of the natural world, there is no appearance of a moral convergence or agreement in ethics. How can this observation be explained (away)? Is it because moral questions are particularly difficult? Is it because of our cognitive and affective limitations that we have no answer that is accessible to us? Or, is it because certain moral issues are essentially indeterminate or vague? I don’t think that it is a cognitive failing or an indication of relativism that we have not identified or converged on the determinate facts of the matter. While it would be flagrantly unreasonable to deny the lack of convergence in ethics, it may be arguably unjustifiably pessimistic to conclude that cultural relativism (or even moral skepticism) follows from the above premise. Even more strongly, I think we might deny that there has been no convergence on moral standards. It may be difficult for us to accept the idea of “moral progress” in a world that has been marred by so much moral horror and tragedy—esp., during the 20th century. However, we can reasonably concede the following point. The 20

With regard to the distinction implied here between morality and ethics, and the proper and central question of the latter, I follow not only Williams, but the later Foucault as well (see Chokr, 2006 for a forceful defense of this point of view).

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widening acceptance worldwide that there are certain basic standards— e.g., such as most, though perhaps not all, of those contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can serve to frame how we ought to act can somehow be viewed as an empirical ground for the claim that there is moral development. It can also be taken as an explanation for the contention that the world could be a morally much improved place. This is not the expression of a naively optimistic outlook, but rather that of a realistic yet hopeful pessimism calling desperately for a hyper-activist political and ethical stance.

3. The Normative Variation and Its Justification The observation or affirmation of cultural diversity is often conjoined with another idea consisting in objecting to (what is perceived as) Western hegemony and imperialism by upholding that it is wrong for Western culture to be intolerant of other cultures and impose its ways on them. But this idea does not imply cultural relativism, as its proponents often claim. It could even be shown that it is probably even inconsistent with it. The intended connection between “cultural relativism” and “tolerance” is arguably based on an argument for normative (cultural) relativism. Such an argument is concerned with practice and policy rather than questions of ontology, knowledge or meaning. It is about first-order moral judgments— the kinds that address directly and substantively questions of what is good, right, and virtuous. To be more explicit, such an argument maintains that (NR1) One ought not to pass judgment on others who hold (substantially) different values from one’s own. (NR2) The actions generally approved in other cultures are objectively right for no other reason than they are generally approved in those cultures (cultural relativism) (NR3) One ought not to try to make those others conform to one’s values because their values are as valid as one’s own.

A serious question confronting this normative version of relativism is whether it can be coherently stated, let alone defended. Let me briefly explain why.

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Consider the following line of reasoning: (R1)Moral standards are relative to a particular culture or community: “right” means “right for a given society” (meta-ethical claim). (R2)The rightness or goodness of an action is determined by its functional role for a given society or community (sociological and anthropological claim). (R3)Therefore, one should not pass judgment on; one should respect, and not intervene, in the life or practices of other cultures or communities (normative claim).

This is clearly an instance of the kind of reasoning mentioned earlier (section 2), which leads, according to Bernard Williams (1972), to a relativism in a vulgar and unregenerate form. The conclusion makes a non-relativistic claim: it tells us what is right to do in our dealings with other societies and cultures, and in doing so it employs “right” in a nonrelative and Universalist sense, which is not permitted by R1. One can further impugn the defensibility of normative relativism by pointing out that it appears to entail paradoxically self-condemnation. Suppose in our community C1 the normative claim (R3) is accepted. What should we do when we see another community C2 intervene in the practices of some other community C3? If we criticize C2, then we seem to be breaching our very own principle, and so we must condemn ourselves. Yet how can we at once endorse a principle of non-intervention or tolerance while allowing to pass un-questioned and un-criticized the actions of those who violate it? The difficulty appears that normative relativism requires a sincere commitment to (R2) be supplemented with a kind of “do-nothing attitude” or “quietism” with respect to those who do not share that standard. Yet a failure to act in the face of a violation of the principle just casts the sincerity, commitment or seriousness with which it is held into doubt. The normative claim is here taken to be non-relative, and therefore universally applicable: this is clearly a self-refuting stance. Even if one is skeptical about the plausibility of normative relativism, the meta-ethical claim (R1) may nonetheless be a live option. Indeed, that would explain why it is true for me to say that C2 has acted wrongly in intervening in C3 and to criticize them for doing so. For, in our community, it is true that intervention is wrong. Equally, the people in C2 can insist that for them, by their moral standard or criterion, it is true that

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intervention is right (see Wong 1985; 1991 for a more positive view on normative relativism). Bernard Williams was interested in coming up with some way of stating normative relativism such that it is coherent and not vulnerable to self-contradiction. Recall that the self-contradictory ethical relativist view is the claim that, since there are no universal moral standards, no one ever ought to condemn the practices of other cultures. The main issue is whether philosophical or meta-ethical relativism can coherently constitute grounds for normative relativism. Coherent normative relativism requires recognizing the absence of an (external) vantage-point from which one can make meaningful evaluative comparisons between alternative moral frameworks. Such a vantage-point would result in what Williams calls a “real confrontation” between belief-systems—as opposed to a “notional” one (1981: 132-143). The basic idea is this: The possibility of normative relativism arises only when some action or practice is the locus of disagreement between holders of two self-contained and exclusive systems. Two belief-systems, B1 and B2, are exclusive of one another when they have consequences that disagree under some description but do not require either to abandon their side of the disagreement. When groups holding B1 and B2 respectively encounter each other, this can result in a confrontation between them. A real confrontation between B1 and B2 occurs when B2 is real option for the group living under B1. In a notional confrontation, in contrast, B2 is not a real option. B2 would be a real option for a group living under B1 if two conditions are met. First, those holding B1 could “retain their hold on reality” by living under B2, in the sense that they would not, for example, need to engage in radical self-deception. Second, they could acknowledge their transition to B2 in light of a rational comparison to B1. If the conditions for real confrontation are not met for those holding B1 however, then there is only a notional confrontation with B2 and there is “no point or substance” to considerations of whether B2 might be a better or worse belief-system than B1. If a member of B1 does not regard the confrontation with B2 as real confrontation, then “the language of appraisal—good, bad, right, wrong and so on is seen as inappropriate, and no judgments are made” (1985: 161). The suspension of such judgments amounts to adopting normative relativism about B1 and B2.

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The language of appraisal is appropriate with regards to B2 only if those holding B1 could “go over” to B2. The people (hoi polloi) who pursue the pleasures of so-called “low” culture may judge that there is little of value in a life crowded with the elites' activities of “high” culture. It is a real possibility that they could learn to love and enjoy opera, for example, and lose their taste for country music, so they may evaluate doing so on their own terms. Those from the “low” culture could judge “high” culture to be boring, while those from “high” culture could judge “low” culture to be tacky, tasteless and lacking depth. However, Williams observes, “the life of a Bronze Age chief or a medieval samurai are not real options for us: there is no way of living them” (1985: 161). They are too alien to permit us to make the same judgments between culture mavens. In this respect, however, Williams’ account (like Harman’s) fails to deliver what it set out to do—a coherent normative relativism. For, it is not clear in what sense it would not be “appropriate” to appraise these moralities as less morally enlightened than our own. If appraisals of B2 are inappropriate, then they must be inappropriate according to some beliefsystem B. Can B1, then, forbid the appraisal of other B’s? It is difficult to see how it could, if, as we assume, a belief-system requires and presupposes that it has a grip on the thinking of those within it that prevents them from taking an external view of it. Let us suppose that Williams thinks that “a real option” is an option that would be as good or better from a point of view external to both B1 and B2—say, the point of view of human flourishing and well-being. 21 This would be to abandon relativism. For, according to the relativist, there is no B external to particular belief-systems such as B1 and B2, i.e., a universal standard from which one could judge that appraisal is inappropriate. To evaluate B1 and B2 in terms of “human well-being” would be to hold up such a notion as a universal standard. Alternatively, suppose that Williams is thinking (like Harman) that this is somehow “a soberly logical thesis”: it is just nonsensical to judge medieval samurai morals to be better or worse than our own. Williams himself denies this claim, by saying that the vocabulary of appraisal in such cases “can no doubt be applied without linguistic impropriety” (1981: 141). But if we were to accept that this is a logical or linguistic impropriety, then he (like Harman) would have to explain how this could be so, given that it seems intelligible enough to say that their morals were worse in many respects than our own. 21 The pertinence of this point will become clearer when I turn in due course to my critical discussions of both Williams’ and Nussbaum’s views.

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3.1 Normative (Cultural) Relativism vs. Western Hegemony and Imperialism Some proponents of cultural relativism often charge that among the ethical beliefs of Western culture22 is that of its superiority and rightful supremacy over all others. They would presumably formulate such a belief as follows: Western values, ways and practices should be imposed on other cultures, and members of Western culture should blame, and interfere with, the actions of people in other cultures whenever these actions violate Western values. Let us assume for the sake of argument that cultural relativists are right that superiority and supremacy is a belief of Western culture. Then what they are telling us as members of Western culture is that it is (objectively) right for us to impose our ways on others and objectively right for us to blame and interfere with the actions of people in other cultures whenever our values condemn them. That means that cultural relativism does not support (NR3), or (R3) for that matter, but its contradictory statement. Besides, what account can a cultural relativist consistently give of the ethical principle stated in (NR1) above? If the principle is supposed to have trans-cultural validity, how can this be consistent with cultural relativism? If the principle is valid merely because it is one of our culture's ethical beliefs, then it deserves no priority over the alleged Western superiority and supremacy. And then it looks as if (NR1) and the alleged Western superiority/supremacy taken together imply the falsity of (NR2), that is, of cultural relativism. In that case, cultural relativism is selfrefuting for us Westerners (and, indeed, for the members of any culture whose ethical beliefs happen to be incompatible with cultural relativism). It follows from this that cultural relativism is totally incapable of combating any form of culturally entrenched (justification for) imperialism, racism, sexism, or ethnocentrism. For whenever we find these ugly propensities and phenomena built into a culture's beliefs, cultural relativism is committed to endorsing them; and if cultural relativism is

22 As if “culture” has always been consensual, one, indivisible, and otherwise, uncontested from within. This is certainly a questionable and highly problematic assumption not only about Western culture but also, I would argue, about any other culture, as a proper apprehension and understanding of “cultural complexity” would confirm. See Essay # 1.

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interpreted in such a way as to conflict with these beliefs, then it becomes self-refuting in that culture. In practice, cultural relativism is also used sometimes as a pretext for following whatever ethical beliefs one finds convenient. For instance, a Western-based multinational corporation operating in other parts of the world comes from a culture that believes that it is all right to seek and secure for oneself the highest profit one can within the bounds defined by the law. Cultural relativism could say they may do that—even if this means disrupting the traditions of that culture. But cultural relativism could also say that they need not blame or interfere with practices within that culture which might be considered wrong in their own culture. These practices could include violations of fundamental civil and political rights, repression of so-called “dissidents,” censorship of media outlets, policestate terror directed against minorities, religious groups, or migrant workers who protest brutally low wages, miserable, unsafe, and precarious working conditions through which corporations reap much of their profits. So interpreted, cultural relativism allows these corporations to do whatever they like and deem expedient, or strictly in their business interests—very narrowly construed. The above analysis and results suggest that cultural relativism does not do justice to the actual views of those who really want to promote crosscultural tolerance or oppose Western hegemony and imperialism. It looks like those views really consist in holding to certain (objective, transcultural) ethical principles about how the members of different cultures should act toward each other, such as that people should be open-minded and tolerant to all human beings, always treating them with dignity and respect. But those who presumably oppose “Western hegemony and imperialism” are often embarrassed to admit to such principles because they obviously come from the modern, Western Enlightenment tradition. To do so would immediately expose them to the dreaded charge of “brainwashing” or “ethnocentrism”—the former, if one is a member of a nonWestern culture, and the latter, if one is a Westerner. By contrast, cultural relativism's principled stance of cross-cultural neutrality seems then to buy immunity from this charge. But cultural relativism itself is arguably a modern Western idea every bit as much as Enlightenment moral principles are. The only difference perhaps is that, as I have suggested, cultural relativism is actually hostile to cross-cultural tolerance and mutual respect, whereas certain other principles of Western Enlightenment do favor them.

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We seem to end up in a paradoxical and somewhat perplexing position. This may be because we start somehow from the correct point that everyone's standpoint is somehow constrained and perhaps limited by their cultural perspective, and then proceed by directly contradicting this insight in trying immediately to occupy a non-existent “sublimely neutral standpoint” above all such constraints and limitations. Wouldn’t it be wiser to align ourselves with some standpoint situated within a given culture, or rather and more accurately within a given “cultural complex” which, despite its inevitable constraints and limitations, at least makes an effort to be critical of itself and tolerant of other cultural standpoints? We may be reluctant to take this wiser course because it may be hard to identify and adopt such a standpoint. We may realize that the biases and prejudices from which we start will undoubtedly lead us into misjudgments, mistakes and errors, probably culpable and morally objectionable ones. We may even be aware that by taking this path we can never hope altogether to escape the accusation of ethnocentrism, but we may resign ourselves to learn to live with it, as part of our human condition (see Rorty, 1991; Levi-Strauss, 1985).23 Cultural relativism is found far more appealing because its empty gestures enable its proponents to announce their good intentions and repudiate their cultural biases and prejudices in the abstract, with a mere sleight of the hand, as it were. It enables them to absolve themselves of cultural constraints and limitations in general without ever having to overcome any of them in particular. As we have seen, it even provides an endorsement for them, when that is needed. Could this be the reason why it has widespread appeal among the more sophisticated and elite members of both Western and non-Western cultures?24 In the case of the former, perhaps what proponents of cultural relativism really want is a justification and a license to behave like brutal and arrogant imperialists or oppressors while at the same time thinking of themselves as tolerant and humane cosmopolitans who have transcended all their cultural biases and prejudices. In the case of the latter, it would seem that proponents of 23

Levi-Strauss (1985) has argued that it may be an illusion that humanity can ever escape completely ethnocentrism, or even that it will care to do so. In his view, it is not only not a bad thing in itself, but, as long it does not get out of hand, a rather good one. As for Rorty, he claims, “we have to work from the networks we are, from the communities with which we presently identify,” and that “we can only hope to produce a better conception of rationality and a better conception of morality if we operate from within our tradition” (1991: 200, 202). 24 Other reasons for its enduring, yet misguided appeal are provided later on.

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relativism are typically the self-appointed and elitists “guardians of cultural purity and integrity.” They wish to maintain and legitimize their use and abuse of power within their respective communities, and seek to “justify” traditional beliefs and practices no matter how oppressive and unjust they might be. At the same time they claim to ward off the irrepressible incursions of Western cultural imperialism and other cultural influences in the name of dubiously and suspiciously construed notions of “cultural egalitarianism,” “diversity,” and “tolerance.”

3.2 Problems, Paradoxes, and Other Difficulties Even if cultural relativism lived up to its advertised claim and image as promoter of cross-cultural tolerance, it would still be extremely implausible because it seems to commit us to the objective rightness (in the context of a given culture) of all the moral beliefs and practices which have ever existed. Slavery was objectively right in ancient Greece and Rome, and even in the US not so long ago. Human sacrifices were objectively right for the Aztecs and other pre-Columbian, Mesoamerican cultures: it was right to cut the heart out of the still living human sacrificial offering. That practice is wrong to us, and would have been considered wrong in medieval Europe or Japan, but not in other parts of the ancient world. The Indian custom of suttee, requiring a widow to burn herself to death on her husband's funeral pyre, was also considered right in traditional India. The pogrom, or the periodic indiscriminate slaughter of Jews, which has long been part of the folkways of European Christian peoples in past centuries was also considered morally acceptable. Also objectively right is the genital mutilation of women, which is still practiced in a variety of cultures in Africa and elsewhere in Asia. And the list of examples can go on and on. Proponents of cultural relativism sometimes refuse to back down even when presented with the most outrageous and grisly of such cases. This should lead us to wonder if they would not be probably among the first to condemn these practices as strongly as anyone else, had they not backed themselves into this position by hastily adopting a philosophical stance without due reflection upon its full implications? Nevertheless, one must admit that the moral problems cultural relativism is trying to address are certainly real and serious ones. In some cases, it is simply not obvious what we should do or even think when confronted by practices of another culture that offend our moral sense and contradict our deepest convictions or intuitions. Some things that people

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do to one another in different cultures are, on the one hand, quite evidently the results of ignorance, wretched superstitions, myths, and poisonous ideologies, and the brutally unjust distribution of power and authority that are common and traditional in those societies. On the other hand, we can often see that in other cultures certain actions or practices have a different meaning, and we are quite aware that we somehow lack the conceptual resources to understand and evaluate the practices of alien societies. If we do nothing in the face of what is evidently (to us) evil or morally wrong, we completely forfeit our integrity. But if we act on the basis of convictions held from our admittedly incomplete and ethnocentric perspective, we run the risk of arrogantly setting ourselves up as infallible moral judges of people who may know more than we do about what is being judged. However, if traditional cultures in other parts of the world are changing so that they become more like modern Western culture in ways we approve, what should be our attitude? Should we applaud and support this process as the victory of moral progress, or should we deplore, regret and oppose these changes because they amount to the violent extinction of that culture's “priceless, unique and distinct heritage”? What is objectionable about cultural relativism is that it pretends to have found a simple, general, tidy and unambiguous answer to questions where any answer fitting this description is almost certainly wrong.

3.3 A Poor Man’s Anthropology or Sociology The general criterion of right and wrong which cultural relativism proposes is not helpful at all because it is inherently unclear and impossible to apply in the real world. Cultural relativism tells us that the rightness of an act depends on what the agent's culture believes about it. But most societies today are “a complex network of cultures and subcultures,” sometimes having widely divergent moral beliefs about important and controversial issues. For a given person in a given situation, how are we supposed to decide which culture or subculture the person belongs to? How many different cultures are represented in any given country today? Almost all countries are today multi-cultural societies. How many of us can be entirely sure what culture(s) or “cultural complex” we ourselves belong to? How many (or few) people does it take to set up a culture?

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In most cultures (our own, for instance), many ethical questions are the subject of endless disagreement and debate. This is arguably what got ethical relativism started in the first place. How are we to determine what the ethical beliefs of the prevailing culture are? What is the so-called “prevailing culture”? According to whom or which criteria does one characterize such a culture? Does this require an overwhelming consensus among the culture's members, or is it a matter of simple majority vote? Or does cultural relativism imply that the most old-fashioned and ethnically traditional moral judgment or opinion is always the right one? It seems that wherever (or whenever) there is any intra-cultural disagreement at all, the effect of cultural relativism will be to support the so-called “dominant view” within the culture by de-legitimizing all dissenting views and drowning out all contesting voices without giving them so much as a hearing. Cultural relativism implies that on any moral question within a culture an opinion or a judgment is always necessarily wrong whenever it goes against traditional beliefs very widely held in the culture in question. This means that those individuals (or groups) who raise moral questions about entrenched and accepted practices are always in the wrong. It also means that any movement for moral reform within a culture, even if it eventually succeeds, must have been in the wrong at the time it got started, and therefore, it must always be wrong to try to reform any culture's established and accepted moral beliefs and practices. This is clearly hard to countenance or accept from a normative philosophical standpoint. Cultural relativism seems to give plausible answers to ethical questions only in a culture (utterly unlike our own) that is homogeneous, unreflective, unchangeable and free of serious moral disagreements. Ironically, the very social and cultural complexities, mutabilities, and controversies that could have made cultural relativism attractive render it in fact useless, unclear and implausible as an account of ethical truth, if there is one, and even counter-productive and dangerous from a normative, pragmatic-political point of view—esp. at this juncture of history.

4. Other Reasons for its Enduring Yet Misguided Appeal What other reasons could be brought up to explain cultural relativism’s enduring (yet misguided) appeal to a diverse range of people, united only in the potential uses or abuses they can make of such a position for their respective, dubious and often conflicting, purposes? In this section, I am particularly interested in ascertaining further some of them. For this purpose, I examine the connection between this thesis and four sets of

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relevant considerations in an effort to heed again Williams’ injunction. These are: (1) dogmatism/ authoritarianism vs. open-mindedness and tolerance, (2) traditionalism / conservatism vs. modernism / progressivism, (3) the quasi-universality and pervasiveness of “bullshit” (see Essay # 3), and (4) ultimate intellectual defense mechanism and immunization against any criticism.

4.1 Dogmatism/Authoritarianism vs. Open-Mindedness/ Tolerance People are often attracted to cultural relativism because they think it expresses and supports attitudes of open-mindedness and tolerance, and that its rejection implies somehow a commitment to arrogant dogmatism and narrow-mindedness. The terms “relative” and “absolute” are taken to be opposites. Subsequently the opposite of “relativism” assumed to be “absolutism”, a term commonly associated with authoritarian and dogmatic connotations. Besides, dogmatism and intolerance seem to make sense only if the idea that “I am right and the other is wrong about something” is assumed. Otherwise, what are we dogmatic or intolerant about? But if everyone's belief is equally true (because “true for them”), then there never could be any occasion to think that one is any more (or less) right than anyone else about anything. Consequently, it seems to follow that there could never be any possible reason for being morally outraged or for treating anyone with anger, hostility or disrespect if they hold a belief different from mine. It is hard to see how this could be squared with our condition and even daily experiences. If “absolutism” is bad and “relativism” is its opposite, it does not follow however, that relativism is necessarily good, or better. From a pragmatic point of view, one does not always avoid a bad thing by flying to the opposite extreme, since that might turn out to be just as bad or detrimental. In any case, it is not clear that relativism really is the opposite of dogmatism, authoritarianism, closed-mindedness, and intolerance. In fact, it may even be just another version of the same thing. Let’s explore this issue further. One can safely say that, by definition, relativism never declares any belief absolutely true or false. This may incline us to think that it is open-minded. But what is it to be open-minded? Isn’t it to be disposed to think that one is fallible, that one could be mistaken in what one believes, so that what one now think is absolutely true might upon closer examination or due reflection turn out to be absolutely false. This is presumably a thought that a relativist can never

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have, because relativists are convinced that at any time all their beliefs are necessarily true (for them). Are they not? One shows open-mindedness by leaving open the possibility of changing one’s beliefs (coming to disagree with and rejecting what one used to believe) when one is given good reasons to do so. But can relativists ever have any reason for changing their beliefs, since relativism says that at every point their beliefs are already true (for them)? To be sure, relativism does not actually give anyone (individual or group) a reason for not changing their beliefs. But if anyone Individual or group) just happen to change their beliefs, then relativism would presumably say that their new beliefs are just as true (for them) as, but no truer (for them) than, their old beliefs were. In effect, relativism would seem to imply that that the right attitude toward one’s beliefs is always one of total self-complacency. If relativism is anti-authoritarian, it seems to be only in the sense that it takes away any reason one might have for considering the opinions and arguments of others in forming one’s beliefs—for instance, the opinion of someone better informed and more experienced, or simply someone else’s opinion). Let’s recall again that what relativism says: our beliefs are all true (for us) no matter what anyone else may say or think. Thus, it effectively undercuts any reason anyone might have for being critical about their own beliefs. As noted earlier, relativism implies that one is always infallible in whatever one believes. This is not only closed-minded but arrogant. To say, in effect, that everyone else is infallible too does not diminish in any way the closed-minded arrogance of this view. It merely adds to one’s own dogmatism the provision that it is all right for everyone else to be just as dogmatic as one is. As I understand it, tolerance is the willingness to let others be different from us, and especially, to let them disagree with us, even if they are wrong. If one takes such a line of reasoning, then one must admit that relativism undermines or even cuts down on the need to be tolerant, since it denies that anyone is ever wrong. How does this make the relativist tolerant? Does successfully fleeing from every danger make one courageous? It is as if relativists cannot even conceive of actually tolerating those they think are in the wrong, and the closest thing to tolerance they are capable of imagining is the principled refusal ever to admit that anyone could ever be wrong about anything. But relativism does not altogether eliminate the need for tolerance because people can be intolerant not only of those whose beliefs they think

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are wrong, but also of those who differ from them in other ways (in skin color, race, sexual orientation, gender, customs and folkways, or emotional sensibilities) even when the difference involves no disagreement in beliefs. When the need for tolerance in all such cases does arise, relativism provides no reason at all for being tolerant rather than intolerant. If someone believes that it is wrong to hate people who differ from us, relativism tells that person that that belief is true (for her); but equally, if someone believes in persecuting others, then relativism tells her that this belief is also true (for her). In short, relativism is just as likely to encourage intolerance as it is to encourage tolerance. And this is precisely what we should have expected. By saying that every belief is true for the person who holds it, relativism is absolutely neutral between all pairs of opposed beliefs. But that entails directly that relativism is absolutely neutral between the belief in tolerance and the belief in intolerance. What this shows is simply that tolerance is not the same thing as neutrality. Tolerance, properly understood, requires some positive convictions about why, when and to what extent we should let people believe and do what we take to be wrong. It implies that there must always be a threshold of the intolerable, or a limit to what can be tolerated. Relativism can never support or even admit any convictions of this kind, because it cannot even admit that anything is ever wrong.

4.2 Traditionalism and Conservatism vs. Modernism and Progressivism Religious and political conservatives or traditionalists often attack “relativism.” When they are accused of maintaining their views dogmatically or intolerantly, their reply typically amounts to saying that all they are doing is maintaining that there is such a thing as “the truth”, and that it is right to stand by the truth. Alternatively, when their views are challenged, they engage in the rhetorical move of asserting that their dogmatically held opinions are true—as if this is sufficient to justify the dogmatic and intolerant manner in which they hold them. Obviously, it is one thing to believe that there is truth, and quite another thing to believe that one is in sole and certain possession of it. Even if their beliefs were true, this does not automatically justify forcing them down other people’s throats. But their entrenched bad habits and erroneous reasoning do probably encourage the idea that it is inherently conservative to believe in

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“truth,” and that “relativism” is the right name for any view that is openminded, tolerant, liberal and progressive. I would be prepared to contend that what the conservatives and traditionalists oppose is not so much relativism in the sense discussed here, but some other beliefs, namely the following views: (1) traditionally accepted moral principles may not be correct; this is at least something about which intelligent and reasonable people may disagree. (2) Which moral rules and principles are correct is subject to change with time and circumstances. (3) Moral principles apply differently to different circumstances, so that what is right for one person in one situation can be wrong for another person in a different situation. (4) There are sometimes justified exceptions to even a moral rule that is correct in general. (5) Even if an accepted moral principle is correct, we should sometimes be tolerant of people who disagree with it and refuse to follow it. Each of these views might be described in some sense as “relativist.” It asserts that moral rules and principles should be considered “relative” to something [in (1) and (2), they are relative to the grounds or evidence for them, which may not, or may no longer, be sufficient; in (3), (4) and (5), to the conditions of their application, which may justify flexibility in applying them]. These forms of “relativity” do not however imply “relativism” in the sense discussed in this essay, and are even arguably inconsistent with it. For all of the views stated [(1)-(5)] presuppose that there is truth in moral matters, since they challenge traditional ideas about which principles are objectively correct, how certain we can be about this, whether moral truth can change, and how flexible we should be in adapting moral principles to different situations. Defenders of such views might want to remain vigilant and not let conservatives and traditionalists get away with the suggestion that they are vulnerable to the charges of incoherence and self-refutation that can be brought against relativism. As we have seen earlier, (cultural) relativism is itself a very conservative position: 25 it tends to lend uncritical support to dominant cultural views and practices. Those who want to question or criticize traditional practices, creeds and values at least have to admit that they might be wrong. But since relativism holds that everyone's belief is 25

In ancient Greece, Protagoras was well known for advocating very conventional views about how to live and what is right and wrong. See also Teson (2001) for a similar point in the context of a discussion regarding obstacles to the universal acceptance of human rights.

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already true (for them), it implies that there is never really any need for anyone to change their views about anything. One does not have to attack the very notion of objective truth in order to challenge traditional ideas about what it is, where it is to be found, or whose views have to be taken into account in looking for it—if that is our interest. On the contrary, it is only by presupposing that there is such a truth that you can legitimize challenges to mistaken ideas about what it is and how it should be sought. In fact, since objective or absolute truth is not truth for anyone in particular, this implies that everyone's standpoint needs to be considered and possibly be taken into account in searching for it.

4.3 Quasi-Universality/Pervasiveness of “Bullshit” and Relativism I examine next what some might consider to be a highly speculative and “unserious” hypothesis,26 namely, whether and in what sense there is a strong and substantial connection between the pervasive, ubiquitous, and quasi-universal presence of “bullshit” in virtually all aspects of our lives and the strong and widespread appeal that (cultural) relativism exerts today. I believe such a connection is plausible, and I attempt to substantiate such a claim. In this regard, it is worth noting the suggestion (made by Frankfurt, for example) that a (more than superficial) connection could also be established between the so-called trendy and dominant movement of “postmodernism” (itself viewed as a fairly advanced form of “bullshit”) and the appeal exerted by relativism (itself one of the articles of 26

Following the republication of a 1983/1988 essay by Harry Frankfurt, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, on “bullshit” (2005), this topic has recently gained some “serious” and “focused” attention in the Englishspeaking world (in both the academic and non-academic worlds, in the media and popular culture at large) to the dismay or shock of some, and the pleasure or satisfaction of others. Previously, the only other notable philosophical work dealing with this issue was Max Black’s discussion of The Prevalence of Humbug (1983). [“Humbug” is basically the English term for the American “bullshit”]. In contrast however, the French-speaking world has been familiar with numerous “serious” discussions of “bullshit”—commonly translated as la connerie ou la betise-- going back at least to the 17th-18th centuries, and of course, in more recent times in the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Clement Rosset, and Michel Onfray, to mention only a few. A number of hypotheses regarding this observation can be entertained but this is not properly speaking my concern herein. See for example G. A. Cohen (2002b) on the prevalence of “bullshit” in French academia. I address such issues and many others regarding “bullshit,” and most specifically, the views of Frankfurt (2005) and G. A. Cohen (2002; 2002b) in Essay # 3 titled “Even Deeper into Bullshit: A Philosophical Inquiry.”

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faith and core tenets of postmodernism). In this regard, it might be worthwhile entertaining a general hypothesis: Does relativism as a theoretical position thrive more in some periods of history than others? What features or characteristics, if any, distinguish such periods—even if, in the final analysis, what matters from a philosophical point of view is to determine if such a position can be justified apart from the appeal and attractiveness it may exercise? It should be obvious that this kind of hypothesis, entertaining or establishing a direct connection between “postmodernism,” “bullshit,” and “relativism,” raises larger philosophical problems, which are clearly beyond the narrow bounds of my present analysis. Nevertheless, the following questions could be entertained: Isn’t the academic world a producer of a particular kind of “bullshit” that is as nocuous as the one we more readily associate with the media, advertising and marketing, politics or politicians? Isn’t postmodernism itself, without too many circumspections, at least in some of its (extreme and radical) expressions and formulations, a form of advanced and sophisticated relativistic “bullshit”? (See Sokal and Bricmont, 1998).27 Much of what we are exposed to in mass or pop culture today is what we may call “bullshit”. There are obviously varieties and varying degrees of “bullshit”—some more substantial and noxious, with more “stench” than others—relative to various domains, areas or spheres of activity. But generally speaking, one could say the following, in an effort to characterize different degrees of “bullshit.” There is “bullshit” when I say something to you that isn't true, when I know it isn't true (1st degree), I know you know it isn't true (2nd degree), and I know you know I know it isn't true (3rd degree), but I know that if you hear it enough, it will probably influence your behavior, typically in my interests, or in some favored direction (4th degree). [This characterization is, I believe, compatible or in accord with Frankfurt’s take]. A special kind of bullshit consists in making wildly exaggerated claims for something: no one believes them, but the “bullshit-artist” foresees that people will end up acting as though they believed them, if only just a tad. 27 Writing in the Times Literary Supplement (1996) on the Sokal affair, Paul A. Boghossian described how the hoax and satire revealed for all to see the extent of “the brush-fire spread, within vast sectors of the humanities and social sciences, of the cluster of simple-minded relativistic views about truth and evidence that are commonly identified as `postmodernist'. These views license, and on the most popular versions insist upon, the substitution of political and ideological criteria for the historically more familiar assessment in terms of truth, evidence and argument.”

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Another kind of bullshit consists in a transparently self-serving interpretation of the world, such as the contrasting versions of events narrated by openly self-advertised representatives of political parties, or by the ostensibly “right-wing” and “left-wing” debaters on those TV shows in which important contemporary issues are reduced to scripted, half-serious “shouting matches” for the amusement and entertainment of the audience. Nobody expects the bullshit-artist to be objective or fair or even credible—indeed, he would not have even have gotten the job if what he is said could be taken at face value. The ability to produce “creative bullshit” is part of the job description. As everyone recognizes, (almost) all political rhetoric, advertising and marketing today is one sort of bullshit or another—some may call it “spin” or “hype.” Nobody believes them, or even takes them seriously. Yet the politicians who spend their donors’ money are the ones who get elected, and the products that are advertised and marketed on TV are the ones that sell. It is even fair to say that everywhere we look we are invariably subjected to some Ad or marketing campaign. To be “bullshitted” is to be exposed to something that seems at first at least to pretend to be truth, but which you know from the start is less than truth. You reject it as truth, but then gradually come to accept it as less than truth, but also as not quite nothing either. Bullshit therefore works partly by numbing our mind, dulling our desire for truth, and by getting us used to filling our mind with what we know is less than truth, with what is self-consciously phony, a showy or glitzy but of course unconvincing imitation of truth. Bullshit does not function on the level of reality, but on the level of subjectivity—the perceptions of the recipients (or bullshittees) and the interests of the bullshit-artists (or bullshitters). The psychological result of constant and massive bombardment by “bullshit” (in its various forms and varying degrees) is inescapable. It may perhaps help us to understand what relativists might mean by “true for me.” Bullshit is something other than and less than truth, something designed to dull my desire and appetite for truth. It is something I don't believe (yet eventually sort of believe), a substitute or ersatz for truth that functions effectively not because of its relation to reality, but because of its relation to our subjective susceptibilities to being deceived and manipulated at least partly with our own knowledge and consent. Bullshit puts itself forward as a sort of truth, which will affect our behavior as if we believe it, even though we really do not. Isn’t this one way in which the confused and

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self-contradictory notion of “true for me” might acquire a semblance of intelligibility? Paradoxically, as Jacques Bouveresse once put it, what is true does not always appear as such, and this could even be a detriment to the cause of truth; on the other hand, what only appears to be true is often more efficacious and somehow convincing, and therefore more readily accepted. Couldn’t we then say that relativism expresses somehow the consciousness of someone whose emotional-cognitive environment has been taken over by “bullshit,” so to speak? It is an environment in which nothing anybody believes is really believed; nothing anybody asserts is meant seriously, so nobody would be as crude or rude as to say that it was “true.” Nobody would care about the truth even if it came up and hit them in the face. Such a person would have come to regard being “bullshitted” as the normal, default state. Such a person might think that to really believe in something (and hold it to be true, period) is somehow abnormal, a relic of a more innocent age in which people did not yet realize that “everything is bullshit.” This also might explain why relativists (and some so-called “postmodernists) often think of themselves as sophisticated compared to people who have not gotten over the idea of “absolute or objective truth.” Relativism might even seem to be a way of protecting oneself against being taken in and deceived by bullshit, since it makes it explicit that no assertion is to be taken at face value and nothing anybody ever says is really to be believed. Interestingly though, people who bullshit others do however seriously hold some beliefs, even if they don’t express them: For example, they seriously believe that if the others are bullshitted often enough, they will behave in ways that serve the bullshitter’s interests at the expense of the bullshittee’s. It is only because the bullshittees seriously believe this too that they have any reason to protect themselves against bullshit by not taking it seriously. So it would seem that however prevalent, pervasive and ubiquitous bullshit might become, it never really abolishes genuine belief or assertion, or renders the notion of (absolute or objective) truth obsolete. In fact, one might wonder if it is not a self-defeating strategy to try to protect oneself from bullshit by not taking it seriously. Isn’t bullshit by its nature something that is not seriously believed, and that manipulates us despite the fact that we do not seriously believe it, and sometimes even because we do not believe it? Therefore, however prevalent bullshit may become in our emotional-cognitive or socio-cultural environments, we cannot ultimately avoid challenging it directly and in unsophisticated

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manner by just recognizing it for what it is and declaring bluntly that it is false. Admittedly, this may not always be the most expedient or diplomatic. But it is the nature of bullshit that it manipulates those who take a “let-itbe-attitude” or believe to be above the fray even more successfully than it does those who are not, since such attitudes often mean slouching into the acceptance of the very notions and dispositions that let bullshit work on you. The only way really to oppose bullshit is by being undiplomatic, by uncompromising chopping logic and rational arguments, and by insisting rather squarely on the obvious if boring fact that there is after all a distinction between telling the truth and telling lies. Isn’t there? As far as what we really know, we may concede that we don’t know much with certainty in the final analysis, but nevertheless we can still insist on a simple distinction between what is more or less and relatively speaking established or substantiated and what is mere fable, fabulous or fabrication.

4.4 Ultimate Defense Mechanism and Immunization As we have seen above, relativism says that whatever we believe is true for us irrespective of what anyone else believes. In effect, it marginalizes everyone else's standpoint except our own. In relation to bullshit, relativism tries to protect us from being manipulated by urging accommodation, and by blocking beliefs that others could try to implant in us against our knowledge and will, by cutting us off from any pretense at serious communication or dialogue with them. In relation to what we do seriously believe, however, relativism also cuts us off from serious communication or dialogue with others, and serves thereby as a selfprotective mechanism in another way. In the course of opening ourselves up to other ways of thinking (as when we do philosophy, for example), we may suddenly discover powerful arguments and theories we never considered before and which challenge the opinions and judgments we have always taken for granted. Needless to say, this can be very unsettling and disturbing, and could even make us feel intimidated and insecure. Relativism comes to the rescue by protecting our opinions and judgments (by making them all “true for us”). Because relativism is presumably “neutral” between all particular opinions and judgments, it enables us to remain above the fray, so to speak, by taking the high ground away from those who, by defending and lobbying for their particular version of the truth, make it all too obvious that they somehow have an axe to grind. A relativist never has to bother with the frustrating details of any real dispute (philosophical or otherwise) because

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his position explains ahead of time not only why the dispute will never get resolved, but also why this is perfectly all right. It is as if we can agree that inquiry, reasoning and argument are fine (if someone happens to feel like paying attention to them), but we are assured by the “guardians of cultural purity and integrity” that they will never seriously threaten our own beliefs, which remain true for us however the arguments come out. In this way, it seems that relativism encourages one kind of tolerance, namely, tolerance toward one’s own intellectual cowardice, laziness, ineptitude, and incompetence, for which some people have arguably a desperate need. When, furthermore, it purports to protect us against all those whose powerful arguments might threaten one’s comfortable little world of convictions and deeply held, though objectionable beliefs, relativism also makes us think we are tolerant toward others. Since it protects us somehow from experiencing their alternative views as a threat to ours [and prevents us from looking at them as “alternatives for us” or even “alternatives to us”—to appropriate and use freely another of Williams’ distinction (1985). Thus, it releases us from the need to resist their arguments or to argue back: We can just “live and let live”—as the popular bumper sticker philosophical statement puts it. Both the appeal of relativism and its so-called claim to tolerance are then grounded ultimately in the way it immunizes our dogmatically held opinions and judgments against any facts or critical reasoning that might possibly call them into question.

5. An Empirically and Normatively Adequate Approach As we have seen earlier (in Essay # 1), “culture” is the subject of intense and divisive political controversies at all levels (local, national, international, global and glocal). The intensity and divisiveness of these controversies are felt most acutely in areas such as identity politics or the politics of cultural differences and recognition, multiculturalism, crosscultural communication or incommensurability, or more specifically, with regards to the issue of cultural relativism vs. moral universalism, as it is brought to bear on the debates and struggles about human rights, democracy, human development, social and global justice. Besides, the phenomenon of “globalization” is commonly viewed and interpreted as one threatening cultural uniformity or homogenization around the world. It is in one sense taken to represent the new face of

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“cultural imperialism”. In effect, it is viewed mainly as “a threat to cultural diversity.” For this reason, the UNESCO proposed a convention on the “protection and promotion” of cultural diversity (2005). As I pointed out previously, its drafters worried that “the processes of globalization …represent a challenge for cultural diversity, namely in view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor countries.” The fear was that the values and images of Western mass culture, like some invasive weed, are threatening to choke out the world’s native flora. Subsequently, alarms are sounded and concerns raised about the imminent disappearance of “distinctive cultures”, and calls made to “preserve” all existing cultures— as if they each and all deserve to be saved, in each and all their respective components and elements. Upon critical scrutiny however, the UNESCO document reveals troubling contradictions and tensions. For example, it affirms both the necessity of protecting cultural diversity and the importance of the free flow of ideas, freedom of thought and expression, and human rights. However, as we know, the latter values will become universal only if we all choose to make them so. And it is manifestly unclear how to best arrive at this desirable result. In this context, shouldn’t we ask the difficult question: What are really important—cultures or peoples? Shouldn’t the most pressing question be instead: How can we articulate a viable Universalist ethics of globalization—judiciously and properly understood in its complexity? A defensible global ethics is arguably going to be one that tempers the respect for differences with a respect for the freedom of actual human beings to make their own choices. It is important to recognize that “diversity” and “freedom” may often be at odds, and the tensions between them are not always easy to resolve. The rhetoric of preservation and diversity does not seem of much help in dealing with the contradictions that emerge. Let us consider a couple of provisions included in the UNESCO convention on cultural diversity (2001). Take for example the principle affirming equal dignity and respect for all cultures. Does this mean each, any and all cultures, or what? Does this mean affirming the equal respect for each and all components or aspects of a given culture? Do the cultures deserving protection for diversity’s sake include the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) and the Taliban, other

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expressions of cultural purity and integrity, or fundamentalisms—whether they are religious or secular28? I, for one, certainly do not think so. Consider also the principle affirming the importance of culture for social cohesion, and its potential for the enhancement of the status and role of women in society. Doesn’t cohesion argue for uniformity or conformity? Wouldn’t enhancing the status and role of women involve changing, rather than preserving, some cultures—at least in some important respects? 29 28 I mean here to include various “dogmatic, political ideologies,” some of which claiming to be atheistic, agnostic, or laic, among the forms that fundamentalism can take. This point does not seem to be appreciated enough in contemporary discussions, and is therefore often overlooked. 29 In a recent article titled “A Secret History” that appeared recently in The New York Times (February 25, 2007), Carla Power reports about a project of bold and radical re-interpretation pertaining to Islam and women. Undertaken by Mohammad Akram Nadwi, a 43-year-old Sunni alim, or religious scholar, at the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies in Britain, such a project led him to rediscover a long-lost tradition of Muslim women teaching the Koran, transmitting hadith (deeds and sayings of the Prophet), discussing Islamic law with men and even making it, not to mention holding official posts, and lecturing in the men’s section at the mosque. His findings challenge prevalent notions of women’s roles within Islamic societies or communities. As Power points out, for Muslims and nonMuslims alike, the stock image of an Islamic scholar is a gray-bearded man. Women tend to be seen as the subjects of Islamic law rather than its shapers. And while some opportunities for religious education do exist for women—the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo has a women’s college, for example, and there are girls’ madrasas and female study groups in mosques and private homes, their options are very limited and the barriers and obstacles numerous. Eight years ago, Akram Nadwi embarked on what he thought would perhaps amount to a single volume biographical dictionary of female hadith scholars. He thought initially that he might find 20 or 30 women. To date, while trawling through dictionaries, classical texts, madrasas chronicles, letters and other citations, he has found 8000 of them, dating back 1400 years and his dictionary now fills 40 volumes. Admittedly, not all these women were previously unknown. Many Muslims acknowledge that Islam has its learned women, starting with one of the Prophet’s wives, Aisha. Several Western academics have written on women’s religious education. About a century ago, a Hungarian Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher estimated that 15% of medieval hadith scholars were women. But Akram Nadwi’s biographical dictionary is groundbreaking in its scope and its implications for Islam and the place of women in Islamic societies could be radical and farreaching in eliminating the visible and invisible cultural barriers that prevent women in the Islamic world from pursuing an (advanced) education, functioning as full citizens, and taking leadership positions in their communities. *In the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” and most specifically against

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Unquestionably, human variety and cultural diversity matter—not for their own sake or in themselves, but because they offer people different options to which they are entitled in order to flourish (see Mill, 1860/1982 for a classic argument to that effect). It is not to enable them to adapt merely to miserable and oppressive conditions (see Nussbaum, 2000: 111-166 for an insightful discussion of “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options”). If, however, we want to preserve a wide range of cultural and human conditions, it must be because it gives free people more live options as opposed to dead ones. Subsequently, it must be because it gives people the best chances to make their own lives as they see fit. Can we thereby justify enforcing diversity by trapping people within differences that they themselves long to reduce and seek to escape? We should not forget, as I already pointed out, that cultural differences are often the perfect cover for the continued imposition of unjust and oppressive traditional practices. We should also keep in mind, as Seyla Benhabib reminds us, “cultural boundaries circumscribe power in that they legitimize its use within the group or community” (2002: 7).

“radical and extremist islamists,” several Muslim scholars (men and women) have undertaken in good faith with tremendous integrity and courage similarly bold and radical re-interpretation of the classic and canonical texts of their religion. Their aim is to bring out the “true” message of “peace, tolerance, and justice” and the universal core ideas and tenets of Islam as one of three great religions of the Book. Many have done so, it goes without saying, at great risks to their lives and welfare.* Worth noting here is the recent case of Laleh Bakhtiar, an IranianAmerican Muslim woman, which has received some media attention. For the past two years, she has been working on a new translation of the Koran when she came upon Chapter 4, Verse 34, according to which “a rebellious woman should first be admonished, then abandoned in bed, and ultimately “beaten”—the most common translation for the Arabic word “daraba”—unless her behavior improves.” She nearly dropped the project right then, but later decided prodded by her faith that God could not be saying such a thing that there must another, more accurate and compelling way to translate this word. In the 20 or so English translations of the Koran available, the word in question was translated variously as: beat, hit, strike, scourge, chastise, flog, make an example of, spank, pet, tap, send way, or even seduce. She was therefore faced with a serious dilemma—all the more so that she is not an Islamic scholar with the appropriate credentials and she knew the opposition and outcry she would face from the Muslim community at large. In Germany last week, a judge citing the verse caused a public outcry and controversy after she rejected the request for a fast-track divorce by a Moroccan-German woman because her husband beat her. The judge, removed from the case, had written that the Koran sanctioned physical abuse (see the article on the subject by MacFarquhar, The New York Times. March 25, 2007).

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Let us recall again that “cultures are not museum pieces, to be preserved intact at all costs” (Nussbaum, 1999: 37). And that, political correctness aside, we need to come to grips with the unavoidability and even desirability of “cross-cultural contamination, intermingling and fertilization” (Appiah, 2006b). According to Appiah (2006a), it may be useful to distinguish between “preserving cultural artifacts” produced by different cultures over time from “preserving cultures.” It is hard to see how one could object to the former—commensurately of course with one’s means and resources, and morally justifiable priorities. But it is not clear how much we can or should preserve cultures as such—as if they can be preserved “frozen in time” like “pickles in a jar” if they are unable to survive through changes and adaptations and endure, even if only as a historical entity. Let’s not forget that cultures are made of continuities through changes, and the identity of a culture (as a historical entity) typically survives through these more or less radical changes. A culture which does not survive through various kinds of changes is not more authentic, but merely dead. This is true of any particular Western culture as well as any other non-Western culture. The so-called “preservationists” or “guardians of cultural purity and integrity” in the non-Western world, for example,30 often make their case by invoking the evil of “cultural imperialism.” The picture underlying their position can be depicted, in broad strokes, as follows: There is a global Western system of capitalism.31 It has a center and a periphery. At 30

This is not to imply that such protagonists don’t exist in the Western World as well. They obviously do. The Western world has its share of such individuals who wish to “preserve” cultures, local, particular, and exotic ones in any part of the world, which are in fact only their constructed representations thereof. Let us not forget the often romanticized, exotic, and fictive images of Africa, the Middle East, India and China that many Western intellectuals have often entertained uncritically for the past hundred years or so. It is also worth noting perhaps that their fictive images of various parts of the world have often led some to declare that this or that part of the world would “never be ready for democracy and human rights.” Finally, though it would be better perhaps to be more specific and explicit about the tenets of the so-called “preservationists,” I believe that the above discussion could make due in an ostensive or performative manner. 31 Capitalism, as we know it, is unquestionably of Western origin and nowadays it is indeed global—esp., with the emergence of a number of new major players such as India, China, Brazil, and Russia, not to mention Japan and South Korea, as well as the other so-called “Asian tiger economies.” However, it is far being

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the center—in the US and Europe—is a set of multinational corporations. Some of these dominate literally the media business. All however are actively seeking to sell their “products” around the world by promoting the creation of “desires” and “false needs” that can be fulfilled only by the purchase and use of these products. They do this explicitly through advertising and marketing, but more insidiously, they also do so through the messages implicit in videos, movies and in TV soaps, comedies, and dramas. Leading critics of media-cultural imperialism claim that “it is the imagery and cultural perspectives of ‘the ruling sector’ in the center that shape and structure the consciousness throughout the system at large.” From a certain (experiential) point of view, this claim seems to be borne out at least in part, but it is doubtful whether a socio-historical and political analysis of evidence (in due form) would corroborate this picture in an unmitigated and unqualified way. Recent studies in this area show interestingly enough that people around the world respond to these cultural imports differently depending on their values, needs and priorities in their respective and already very complex cultural contexts. In short, it seems that adaptations, re-interpretations, transfers and filterings are taking place in so many different ways. Besides, doesn’t talk of cultural imperialism “structuring the consciousness” of people living in the so-called periphery treat them like “blank slates” on which global Western capitalism unfettered writes its subliminal messages, leaving in its wake only “cultural automatons” or “zombies”? Isn’t this deeply condescending, apart from being unsupported by the complexities of cultural interactions and exchanges around the world in this era of both globalization and glocalization?

homogenous or of the same type everywhere, and it is no longer bi-polar, but rather multi-polar, more network-like, dynamic and arguably with several centers and multiple peripheral layers, with even reverse-directionality-and-subsidiarity, a phenomenon not yet appreciated or understood well-enough. Besides understanding how these different models work, or rather don’t work, and in effect, understanding the new global capitalist (dis)order, requires analytical and diagnostic tools that are far more up-to-date and sophisticated than the ones provided by the usual and dominant so-called “neo-liberal” perspective, the traditional liberal or Marxist approaches. In this regard, the analysis offered for example by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire (2000) is noteworthy. However, many other, more recent critical and sophisticated studies, from France particularly, abound. See for example: Aglietta & Berrebi (2007); Chavagneux (2007); Charolles (2006); Artus & Virard (2005); Cohen (2005); Greau, (2005).

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More often than not, a problematic conception of “culture” is at work implicitly or explicitly in the views of various protagonists involved in these debates about culture. As noted earlier, they write or talk as if “culture” were a homogenous, coherent, bounded, tightly woven, uncontested, unified, or unitary entity with a distinct nature, whose identityconstituting and deterministic role on individuals and groups of people is uniform, continuous, and stable. I contend that such a conception of “culture” underlying or underwriting many of the controversies raging today constitutes in fact a fundamental misconception, with profound and at times disturbing philosophical as well as political implications (see Essay # 1). It cannot be stressed enough, the concept of “culture” is “essentially a contested concept—like democracy, religion, simplicity, or social justice”, which is multiply defined, multiply employed, ineradicably imprecise (Geertz, 2000: 11). And a history of its evolution over the past couple of hundred years or so—to take a relatively limited yet arguably sufficient historical perspective—would attest to the vicissitudes it has undergone, the battles over its meaning, its use, and its explanatory worth. If however, as I have shown earlier (in Essay #1), we were to draw together some of the main insights and lessons that we have learned from various such efforts, we would come to recognize the facts of “cultural complexity” and be compelled to draw its consequences. This would inevitably lead us to articulate and defend an alternative, more appropriate conception, according to which “culture” is always already ineradicably plural, compound, inconstant, and always already multiply contested both from within and without. Such a conception constitutes, I believe, a direct challenge to the static “cookie-cutter conception of culture” with its focus on consensus, type, uniformity and commonality. In the face of the kind and degree of fragmentation, dispersion, intermingling, cross-fertilization and contamination characteristic of the (globalizing and “glocalizing”) world today, I submit that the view of culture, a culture, this culture, as a consensus on fundamentals—shared beliefs, feelings, values and practices—is hardly tenable except for the “guardians of cultural integrity and ethnic purity” who would like us to believe otherwise. Against such guardians, we must be prepared to countenance instead the composite, dynamic and heterogeneous nature of cultures. I must stress here that such a view does not aim to deny the significance of cultural differences, quite to the contrary. We should be willing and prepared to countenance them in a realistic and normatively justifiable way; however, we need not reify

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them because this would deprive us of the necessary resources to engage in social and political criticism and radical questioning intra and interculturally. To be sure, “Culture matters,” but not in an essentialist and strictly deterministic sense—as in the view articulated by Huntington & Harrison (2000) for example. In short, we are well advised in my view to draw the consequences of “cultural complexity” in a world that is undergoing both “globalization” and “glocalization” at the same time in an effort to articulate an adequate conception of culture and cultural analysis—from both an empirical and normative point of view. I contend that, if, and when we do, we would for example be able to come up with an account of the complex mechanisms of identity-formation for individuals and communities that is far more compelling empirically and normatively. We would also be able to better understand the complex internal dynamics of cultures as well as the diverse relationships that obtain (or not) between them at this juncture of history. I am also prepared to argue that it would enable us to better address the various issues mentioned above, and in particular, that of human rights—to mention only one of the issues referred to earlier. We would then easily come to see that the traditional debate pitting “cultural relativism” against “moral universalism” is in fact a dead-end, outdated and made irrelevant, so to speak, by the newly emerging historical conditions confronting us, and in which we find ourselves.

6. Two Possibly Viable Options: Williams & Nussbaum I believe that Williams is correct when he notes that, though cultural relativism conjures up a general moral problem, it is in reality either too early or too late (Williams 1972, 1981, 1985, 2002). Different cultural communities are either in contact or not. If, on the one hand, two communities and their outlooks have not encountered each other, then it is too early for any question to arise about their relations to one another and the judgments they form. Relativism is then not a very interesting or substantive thesis because there is nothing at stake between them. This allows for a sense in which cultural relativism is true. There can be in other words relativism at a distance between two historically distinct cultures. But if, on the other hand, two communities are already in contact with one another, then it is too late for cultural relativism. By virtue of being in contact, the communities have to some degree become interconnected. It is too late for cultural relativism in the sense that it can provide no answers to the question of how individuals and groups with

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different moral outlooks and judgments are to treat each other. Together they now form a new moral and conversational community, which must confront the morally basic questions of how its members ought live and relate to one another (see Benhabib, 2002). This is obviously the situation in which we are today, and which arguably involves (almost) the whole world. It seems then that only a departure from cultural relativism towards something like a “pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” can help us address the moral questions that we all face together in a “globalized” world, and in which we now form a new community confronted with urgent moral questions. Such a universalism must be one that remains however sufficiently respectful of cultural differences, while at the same time being constrained normatively by what is right and therefore good for each and all human beings, regardless of which culture or cultural complex they (claim to) belong to. As I pointed out at the outset, such a view is also that of a number of contemporary philosophers who are eager to clear the ground for such a perspective and defend it each in their own distinctive way from their respective philosophical and political standpoint. For this purpose, I intend in a forthcoming section (6.2) to focus on, and discuss in some detail Nussbaum’s bold, substantial, and timely proposal. First however, I turn next to Williams’ case against “ethical theory,” and his defense of “reflection” as an alternative in an effort to ascertain if he offers us a viable option.

6.1 Williams’ Case against Ethical Theory/ Defense of “Reflection” as Alternative Though Williams’ writings—subtle, imaginative and insightful as they are, have for the most part defined themselves over the years in opposition to one or another of the dominant ethical theories in contemporary moral theory, they have not however put forward an alternative theory. This is not of course to say that Williams’ contributions have been primarily negative or critical, but it means that “his positive contributions have not taken the form of theory construction” (Scheffler, 2002: 197). For Williams, traditional ethical theories have failed to orient themselves convincingly in relation to conspicuous features of ethical phenomena as actually experienced by situated human beings. They have overlooked or neglected dimensions of ethical life, the complexity of human life, the

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non-rational and emotional aspects of human nature, including the fact that people find value, as he says (1972), in such things as trust, submission, regret, uncertainty, risk, even despair and suffering.” This has led him to challenge the dominant agenda of contemporary moral philosophy; to question and raise serious doubts, not just about the alternative and rival answers that moral philosophers have traditionally given to certain standard and traditional questions, but more importantly, about whether the standard and traditional questions themselves are really the right ones for moral philosophy to be addressing. He has thus indicted the so-called traditional “morality system” and its underlying assumptions. Moreover, he has recommended that we replace the “thin” concepts (e.g., good, bad, ought, right, wrong, etc.) favored by the “morality system” and which are “general and abstract” and “do not display world-guidedness” by “thick” concepts (e.g., courage, shame, treachery, brutality, gratitude, promise, lying/truthfulness, etc.) which are “world-guided and actionguiding” (Williams, 1985: 140-34; 152). And on the basis of a distinction drawn between morality and ethics, he urged that philosophers return to the Greeks’ more inclusive and general starting point “How should one live?” In his view, such a question obviously invites considerations of all salient aspects of human life, as well as confrontations of life’s tough questions, presumably in a piecemeal fashion, with close attention being paid to the arts, literature and psychology, and more generally to the humanities and the social sciences. In effect, one could say that, for Williams, the fundamental alternative confronting moral philosophers today is between (1) an ethics based on theoretical, metaphysical criteria and (2) an ethics squarely and firmly anchored in the thick of human life and existence. In his famous 1985 work, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams extended his criticism with increasing vigor to the very idea of an “ethical theory” itself. To put it briefly, he does not believe that there is any legitimate philosophical question that is best answered by elaborating the kind of normative structure that philosophers commonly refer to as an “ethical theory.” “There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or selfcontained theory of what morality is…nor…can there be an ethical theory, in the sense of a philosophical structure which, together with some empirical fact, will yield a decision procedure for moral reasoning” (1981: ix-x). It is in this context that we may understand his powerfully

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articulated and defended criticisms of Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and Aristotelianism. However, in their evaluations of Williams’ work, several critics, who are otherwise sympathetic to a number of his ideas (including myself) have expressed doubts and reservations about the wisdom of, or warrant for, his wholesale repudiation and rejection of the so-called “morality system.” Thus, while Nussbaum, for example, agrees for the most part with his objections to Utilitarianism, she finds his critique and rejection of both Kantianism and Aristotelianism too sweeping and not nuanced or qualified enough. In fact, she believes that “there are many points of agreement between Williams’ approach to ethics and Aristotle” (2003: 24). She also believes that “Kant’s idea that we should always treat humanity as an end and never as a mere means” is also helpful for criticizing many inclinations we have, in both personal and political life. (2003: 11). Another question that she also finds puzzling concerns the relationship between the ethical and the political in Williams’ work (2003: 10). According to her, “Williams later maintained that his attack on ethical theory left intact the aspiration to construct political theories, which might be valuable guides.” But she then asks, quite pertinently: “where does this leave those among the great Western political theorists such as Aristotle, Cicero, Rousseau, Kant, and John Rawls, who put a moral theory at the core of their political theories?” (2003: 10). She goes on to note, also quite pertinently for my later discussion, that Williams has somehow singled out Rawls as an example of the criticized class of moral theories, and yet, his later statements to this effect seem to suggest that he might after all admit the usefulness of Rawls’ theory, given its political nature. In the end however, Nussbaum thinks quite rightly, I believe, that the source of the distinction between an acceptable aspiration to a theory of political justice and an unacceptable aspiration to a theory of individual morality is left obscure. Williams’ general failure to engage systematically with Rawls’ ideas about social and political justice leaves such important issues unresolved. In her mind, Williams never adequately confronted the question of a plausible account of the good in ethical theory (2003: 11). As for Scheffler, another sympathetic critic of Williams, he argues that Williams’ distinction between “thick” and “thin” concepts is flawed (see also Tappolet, 2004 for another argument to that effect), and therefore less effective against ethical theory than Williams takes it to be (2002: 199). A

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closer examination of the latter distinction leads him to identify what he regards as “an important instability in that position.” He wonders in particular if the elimination of ethical theory, given Williams’ own diagnosis of the urge that produces it, would leave Williams with enough resources to engage in the kind of social criticism he evidently wants to engage in (viz. discussions of racism, sexism, and social injustice). According to Scheffler, “There is in fact a conflict between Williams’ repudiation of ethical theory and his desire to engage in social criticism of oppressive social institutions.” (2002: 199). If Scheffler is right, this raises the question of whether ethical theory should be retained, or whether ethical criticism should instead be eschewed. The answer to this question depends in part on the force of Williams’ objections to ethical theorizing and those objections in turn depend in part on his doubts about the objectivity of ethics. In the final analysis, Scheffler suggests, quite rightly in my view, that “the possibilities of ethical objectivity may be greater than Williams allows.” (2002: 199). Insofar as that is so, his case against ethical theorizing is weakened even further. However, Williams has insisted that viable resources for moral and social criticism will remain available to us long after ethical theories have disappeared. He writes: “Nothing has been said should lead us to think that traditional distinctions are beyond criticism; practices that make distinctions between different groups of people may certainly demand justification, if we are not to be content with unreflective traditions which can provide paradigms of prejudice” (1985: 115). Williams calls his alternative to ethical theory “reflection,” and he states unequivocally that the latter should go in a direction opposite to that encouraged by the former. ”Respect for freedom and social justice and a critique of oppressive and deceitful institutions may be no easier to achieve than they have been in the past, and may well be harder, but we need not suppose that we have no ideas to give them a basis. We should not concede to abstract ethical theory its claim to provide the only intellectual surroundings for such ideas” (1985: 116, 198). And he adds: “It is quite wrong to think that the only alternative to ethical theory is to refuse reflection and to remain in unreflective prejudice. Theory and prejudice are not the only possibilities for an intelligent agent, or for philosophy.” (1985: 112). What does Williams mean by “reflection”? Is it really the case, as he insists that it enables to criticize moral practice without resorting to moral

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theory? I will next consider these questions in some detail in an effort to ascertain whether Williams’ alternative proposal is satisfactory. The concept of “reflection” is most at home within Critical Theory and Williams’ own use of the term owes clear debts to the way in which critical theorists, such as Habermas employ it.32 Although Williams does not offer a formal definition of what he means by “reflection,” the following passage serves both to give some sense of what he means and to indicate how, on his account, reflection differs from ethical theory. What sorts of reflection on ethical life naturally encourage theory? Not all of them do. There is reflection that asks for understanding of our motives, psychological or social insight into our ethical practices, and while that may call for some kinds of theory, ethical theory is not among them. Nor is it merely that this kind of reflection is explanatory, while that which calls for ethical theory is critical. Much explanatory reflection is itself critical, simply in revealing that certain practices or sentiments are not what they are taken to be. This is one of the most effective kinds of critical reflection. It is a different kind of critical reflection that leads to ethical theory, one that seeks justificatory reasons (1985: 112; italics added).

The kind of reflection Williams has in mind occurs when agents are led to see how they have acquired their normative beliefs and attitudes. This is by the way reminiscent of the “genealogical” approach advocated by both Nietzsche and Foucault. Critical theorists often speak of this as “emancipatory self-reflection”—which consists basically in freeing oneself from hidden forms of domination and repression through a depth explanation and understanding of social processes. Williams intends it however as a more extensive strategy for promoting not only freedom but justice and other ethical concerns as well. He allows that such reflection “may call for some kinds of theory” (e.g., psychoanalysis or even Marxist social theory) but not ethical theory, allegedly because ethical theory seeks justificatory reasons, which simply cannot be had. The strong justificatory urge of ethical theory is impossible to fulfill, according to Williams, because it involves a wish to see our moral life as endorsable from a

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For evidence of Williams’ debt to Critical Theory, see 1985: 166-7, esp. notes 11 and 12. See also his remarks about “reflective social knowledge” (1985: 199). In his Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), Habermas announces that his aim is “to recover the forgotten experience of reflection” (1971: vii), and the concept of “reflection” plays a central role—albeit not always clear—in much of his work. See also Geuss (1981: 61-63, 70, 79, 91-94).

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standpoint external to it; and many aspects of human moral life cannot stand up to such impartial rational scrutiny. In this regard, he writes: We may be able to show how a given moral practice hangs together with other practices in a way that makes social and psychological sense. But we may not be able to find anything that will meet a demand for justification made by someone standing outside those practices. We may not be able, in any real sense, to justify it even to ourselves. A practice may be so directly related to our experience that the reason it provides will simply count as stronger than any other reason that might be advanced for it (1985: 114; italics added).

There seems to be good sense behind Williams’ conviction that many of our moral practices are alas “human, all too human” (to use Nietzsche’s expression) and that they lose the only ground they have if we try to view them from a nonhuman (external) perspective—something like a God’s eye perspective. But does it follow from this that such practices cannot be critically evaluated, or that they can somehow be criticized effectively without invoking moral norms and justifications of these norms? Granted, our justifications often turn out to be more meager than we had hoped they would be, but does this diminish their necessity and importance in our thinking? It is worth noting here that Williams uncharacteristically suggests that “justice” may be one moral concept that “transcends the relativism of distance” (1985: 166), thus allowing us to appraise societies as just or unjust that are temporally and spatially quite distant from us. If this is so, then on Williams’ view we can appraise some aspects of moral practices from a standpoint external to them. However, it is hard to see what the force of these “justice appraisals” could be. Since the concept of “justice” is also a “thin” concept—one that is not “world-guided” in Williams’ account, it follows then that such appraisals must accordingly and ultimately lack any objective basis. Critical reflection only attains its goal when agents are arguably able to defend or dismiss social practices on the basis of arguments. 33 For 33

Habermas makes a distinction between “reflexive learning“and “non-reflexive learning.” The former involves defending or rejecting practical claims “on the basis of arguments” while the latter takes place when practical claims “are naively

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Habermas, for example, the search for justificatory reasons is not an esoteric practice indulged in only by ethical theorists. It is somehow built into the structure of everyday communication. In everyday communication we are constantly making various sorts of claims, and the communication continues only when there is a background consensus that the claims could be justified. When this background consensus breaks down, then justificatory reasons must be provided or else the communication itself will break down. In other words, for Habermas, the capacity to provide justificatory reasons is also part of the “communicative competence” that defines us as members of a linguistic community. Contrary to what Williams says, showing that certain practices “are not what they are taken to be” is merely a first step. Defending or dismissing a social practice on the basis of arguments always involves an appeal to moral norms that one believes is rationally justifiable, and this, in turn, necessitates the resources of moral theory. Theorists will continue to debate the precise ways in which such norms can and cannot be rationally justified; but there is no getting around the necessity of normative justification (and hence, of moral theory) once one decides to venture into the arena of social and political criticism. This is, I believe, where the single most important challenge confronting moral and political philosophy today lies. The character of the arguments we are inevitably forced to use in the moral sphere need to find their place within a larger theoretical framework in order to show that our criticisms are neither ad hoc nor self-serving for suspicious ideological purposes. Williams’ own use of the concept of “reflection” therefore not only runs counter to how Habermas intended it to be understood, but is ultimately self-defeating as well. 34 Reflective knowledge in the moral sphere requires the resources of normative theory. Habermas himself, in seeking to “recover the forgotten experience of reflection” in his early work (1971) was explicitly trying to re-appropriate a crucial insight of the taken for granted and accepted or rejected without discursive consideration” (1973: 15). 34 Nussbaum finds it difficult to figure out what Williams’ positive alternative to ethical and political theory amounts to, if anything. Interestingly enough, she writes: “It was only when the postmodernists showed him the excesses of his own position that he brought out, against them, his old Cartesian rationalism, and his always deep commitment to truth, along with an equally strong commitment to social criticism.” Moreover, she adds: “The dialectic between his Enlightenment self and his Nietzschean self makes his last, enigmatic book (Truth and Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy, 2002) especially precious to me” (2003: 22).

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classical Greek concept of theoria that most modern theorists unfortunately have dismissed, and that is, “the insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life” (1971: vii, 317). 35 In doing so, he was not only expressly acknowledging that critical reflection requires the resources of normative moral theory but also drawing attention to the fact that moral norms are embedded in, and presupposed by, all forms of critical thought. In the final analysis however, it remains that ethical theorizing may have to be done in a new way, perhaps even in a post-Williams’ way.36 I.e., a historicized way of doing ethics, anchored in the real, one that takes into account the variegated and complex phenomena of human life and existence, and whereby its “objectivity” is established on radically new grounds, and arguably in a non-metaphysical way.

6.2 Nussbaum’s Defense of a Pluralistic, Historically Enlightened Ethical Universalism Nussbaum’s effort in this regard is especially noteworthy, and in some sense, particularly conciliatory. Though her work intersects on many points with Williams’—esp., regarding his interest in ancient Greek thought and the moral and political importance accorded to the hitherto neglected phenomena of the imagination and emotions, she departs radically from him on a number of points. Thus, she rejects normative cultural relativism and seeks to articulate a Universalist ethical and political theory grounded in a Marxian/Aristotelian

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In recent years, Habermas seems to have softened his position in the sense that he now accepts the claim that “philosophy has no business playing the part of the highest arbiter in matters of science and culture.” However, he continues to hold that philosophy ought to concern itself with justificatory discourse in all areas of life and with the validity claims raised in all conversations. Philosophy’s proper role is thus that of interpreter or “stand-in” as opposed to that of a judge within a Kantian tribunal of reason (1990: 14, 19). 36 One may even note that a charitable interpretation and overall re-assessment of Williams’ work can justifiably lead us to believe that he would ultimately be supportive of the approach advocated herein, namely, one that attempts to bring together appropriately construed and judiciously re-conceived notions of “pluralism,” historical enlightenment,” and “ethical universalism.”

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conception of human flourishing,37 as a “free-standing conception.” She claims that the latter could be the object of a worldwide “overlapping consensus”—to use Rawls’ expression, without however restricting it or placing the kinds of constraints he places on it (1996: 133-72). By “overlapping consensus,” Nussbaum means “that people may sign onto this conception as the freestanding moral core of a political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or of human nature.” Indeed, she adds, “it is expected that holders of different views in those areas will even interpret the moral core of the political conception to some extent differently, in keeping with their different starting points (see Rawls, 1996: 144-5). Though her view is by her own admission closely allied to Rawls’ “political liberalism,” it differs from the latter’s in that she seeks to extend it beyond the narrower confines of “Western liberal democratic societies.” Whether this extension is defensible or not could constitute grounds for contention and controversy, and perhaps even a non-starter. I choose therefore to leave this issue aside for now. Besides, unlike Rawls’ procedurally oriented conception of justice,38 in her view the strongest form of social contract theory today, which 37

As Nussbaum interprets Aristotle and Marx’s use of his ideas, “the core of his account of human functioning is a freestanding moral conception, not one that is deduced from natural teleology or any non-moral source. Whether she is correct or not on this point, and this is clearly another possible point of contention, she insists however that her neo-Aristotelian proposal is intended in that spirit—and also (clearly unlike Aristotle’s) as a partial, not a comprehensive, conception of the good life, a moral conception selected for political purposes only. The only essentialism she wishes to countenance is internal, as opposed to external (1992). Her search for universal values does not proceed therefore from external metaphysical considerations, but rather from internalist considerations informed by history and our best knowledge about the world. By thus being anchored in our natural and historical reality, her moral inquiry seeks to derive some ethical principles or recommendations based only on a number of ethical premises. 38 In his reply to Habermas’ objection that “justice as fairness” is in fact more substantive than Rawls realizes or is prepared to admit, and not merely or strictly procedural, Rawls argued that these two aspects of a conception of justice are in fact connected and perhaps even inseparable. One may however choose to put the emphasis on one rather than the other. In his case, he prefers to emphasize the procedural aspect of his conception of justice. He then goes on to “return the ball” to Habermas and points out that the latter’s conception based on discourse ethics

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countenances a Kantian conception of the person as a rational being, her approach is arguably more of an outcome-oriented approach to justice.39 It eschews the Kantian conception and adopts instead Aristotle’s conception of the person as a social and political animal, who shares complex ends with others at many levels. While Rawls’ conception of “justice as fairness” is essentially “resourcist” and focuses on “primary social goods,” 40 Nussbaum’s conception of justice is underwritten by her focus on what she calls “central human capabilities” (that is, what people are actually and truly able to do and to be). Her approach is “in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being” (2000: 5).41 and communicative action is in fact more substantive that he realizes or is inclined to say (Rawls, 1996: 421-432). 39 One could say alternatively that it is an opportunity-based approach as long as one insists however that she is talking, just like Sen, about “real and substantive opportunities” and not merely “formal opportunities.” The former could yield desired and desirable outcomes (i.e., capabilities) if one has the means, resources and proper conditions for choosing (or not) to actualize them (i.e., achievements and functionings). Whereas the latter often add up to naught or mere lofty pronouncements as when one talks about the desirability for people “to bootstrap themselves” out of poverty and utter deprivation when in fact they have neither boots nor straps, nor even the minimal conditions under which they could acquire either of them. 40 For Rawls, the list of “primary social goods” includes (1) basic rights and liberties, (2) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities, (3) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and economic institutions of the basic structure of society, (4) income and wealth, and (5) the social bases of self-respect. He was also prepared to countenance (6) leisure time, and (7) freedom from physical pain (1996: 181-182). See also 182-87 for a discussion of the merits of his conception relative to the one proposed by Sen’s capabilities approach in an effort to address in a feasible and practical manner the serious problem of variations and heterogeneities among people. 41 Elsewhere she characterizes “central human capabilities” as “developed opportunities for functioning that are necessary for a life in accordance with human dignity.” Examples of these would be: the ability to live to the end of a human life of normal length, the ability to have health care, an education, to enjoy bodily integrity, to participate in the social and political life of one’s community, to be able to form one’s conception of the good life, to be able to use one’s senses, imagination and mind in a truly human way. to have and to care for friends, to have control over one’s material and political environment, to enjoy the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation up to an adequate threshold level, to

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Unlike Sen, who opts for a position of “deliberate and assertive incompleteness” in his version of the capabilities approach (1992: 49), Nussbaum identifies a list of ten such capabilities (2000: 78-80) as specific political goals and presents them within the context of a kind of “political liberalism” (as opposed to a “comprehensive liberalism”), “in a manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding.”42 She thus believes that “the capabilities can be the object of an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good” (2000: 5). She argues further that the capabilities in question should be pursued for each and every person, treating each as an end and none merely as a means for the ends of others—in accord with the Kantian categorical imperative. She adopts therefore what she calls “a principle of each person’s capability, based on a principle of each person as end (2000: 5)—which, she claims, has particular critical force with regards to women’s lives which are all too often, alas, viewed as accessories or appendages to the lives of others. Finally, she insists on the idea a threshold level for each capability, beneath which it is commonly held that truly human functioning is not available, and argues that the social and political goal of each society and community should be getting its members above this capability threshold. Her account is not intended to provide a complete theory of social justice, but designed instead to be a general and flexible framework which each community (society or nationstate) is to fill in on its own and in its own way—relative to its particular circumstances and conditions.43 By attempting thus to defend an approach to the foundations of basic political principles using the idea of human capability, Nussbaum believes that we can uphold “a form of universalism that is sensitive to pluralism and cultural difference” and that could “enable us to answer the most powerful objections to cross-cultural universals” (2000: 8). In effect, she is interested in developing a particular type of normative philosophical theory—not one that is monolithic, tyrannical or dictatorial but one that remains attentive and responsive to various particular empirical facts and considerations. enjoy a healthy emotional life, and so forth (for details on the complete and revised list proposed, see Nussbaum, 2000: 78-80). 42 Even though Nussbaum believes that “we need a substantive account of central political goods, of the sort that the capabilities approach gives us,” she insists that her approach is diametrically opposed to “Platonist accounts of the good” (2000: 8). 43 It is worth noting here that this is reminiscent of Scanlon’s “parametric universalism” discussed earlier.

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Nussbaum is not content with merely pointing to the “poverty of relativism” and putting forth “historical arguments about non-Western cultures that show the descriptive inadequacy of many anti-universalist approaches”—as Amartya Sen (1999), her colleague and pioneer of the capability approach in economics has presumably done. She has not only produced explicit and strongly nuanced arguments against relativism, whether it be derived from considerations about culture, diversity or paternalism (2000: 41-59),44 but sought to articulate a strong and sustained philosophical defense (of the need for) universal norms and values (2000: 13, 34-110). Against anti-theory thinkers (such as Williams, and even more radical ones such as Annette Baier and Richard Posner) who argue that all philosophical theorizing in ethics is somehow suspect and useless, and that we are better off sticking to everyday language, common intuitions and conceptions, Nussbaum writes, quite rightly, I think: I am convinced that this wholesale assault on theory is deeply mistaken, and that the systematic arguments of theory have an important practical function to play in sorting out our confused thoughts, criticizing unjust social realities, and preventing the sort of self-deceptive rationalizing that frequently make us collaborators with injustice. It’s perfectly obvious, too, that theory has great practical value for ordinary non-philosophical people, giving them a framework in which to view what is happening to them and a set of concepts with which to criticize abuses that otherwise might have lurked nameless in the background of life (2000: 35-6).

Nussbaum is acutely aware of the possible serious objection faced by anyone making a concrete proposal for a universal framework to assess and evaluate human well-being and flourishing in a particular cultural context. It may be objected for example that the particular categories and concepts chosen are likely to reflect immersion in one’s own particular theoretical or cultural tradition and may thus be external and, at least in some respects, the wrong ones for undertaking such an assessment in that context or even across contexts (2000: 39-40). She even wonders quite perceptively and boldly “whether it is appropriate to use a universal framework at all, rather a plurality of different though related frameworks,” and whether the proposed framework, if a single universal one, is 44

Since I have addressed similar arguments previously in my essay, and will do so again in the forthcoming discussion, I need not rehearse here or dwell on Nussbaum’s specific treatments, even though they are insightful and duly nuanced.

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“sufficiently flexible to enable us to do justice to the human variety we find” and that we have good reasons to countenance and take into account. She even acknowledges that the challenge is serious because so many proposals in the past “have gone wrong through insufficient attunement to cultural variety and particularity” (2000: 40). Nevertheless, she goes on to argue that however crucial it is to understand how a particular context shapes both the choices and aspirations of the people concerned, it remains that certain basic aspirations to human flourishing are recognizable across differences in context (2000: 31). For it is one thing to say we may need local and particular knowledge to fully understand the problems particular people face and properly direct our attention to the aspects of their lives that others may take for granted. “It is quite another matter to claim that certain very general values, such as the dignity of the person, the integrity of the body, basic political rights and liberties, basic economic opportunities, and so forth, are not appropriate norms to be used in assessing the lives of individuals—regardless of where they live” and what cultures they (claim to) belong to. And she asks rhetorically, or rather sarcastically: “How might one argue this more contentious point?” (2000: 41). Indeed, how could anyone in good conscience object to the desirability for each and all human beings of the general values and goals she mentions? Nussbaum recognizes the obtuseness and objectionable nature of various ways of thinking across cultural boundaries and urging a Universalist approach—e.g., those of the ethnocentric Enlightenment of yesteryears, colonialism, “neo-liberal global marketers,” and even some allegedly open-minded and progressive contemporary Western intellectuals. It is in part the blindness of these various ways to “cultural complexity” that has made many people skeptical about any and all forms of universalism. It is because such approaches seem obtuse—neglecting tradition and context and their role in constructing desire and preference, neglecting the many different conceptions of the good that citizens of different nation have and their urgent need to be able to live in accordance with these conceptions—that many sensitive thinkers feel all universalizing approaches are bound to be obtuse, and mere accomplices of a baneful globalizing process. Such thinkers see before them the prospect of a world in which all interesting differences, all the rich texture of value, have been flattened out, and we all go to McDonald’s together (2000: 32).

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But, of course, ethical universalism need not have such defect, and the fact that some (or even most) universalist approaches proved to be seriously objectionable need not compel us to indict any and all such approaches. Universal values may even be necessary, she reminds us, for an adequate critique of the misguided ways. “Pluralism and respect for differences are themselves universal values that are not everywhere observed; they require a normative articulation and defense” and that is one of the things Nussbaum hopes to provide (2000: 32). In this context, it may be relevant to recall the point made earlier, in my discussion of pluralism and universalism. I then argued that they offered and constituted a better and more appropriate response than relativism to the fact of real and genuine moral disagreements, as well as to the fact and genuine respect of cultural diversity. Calling for an ethical universalism need not consist in advocating a unique value or even one set of values. Nor does it have to take the traditional form based on authoritarian and paternalistic values and norms. It is instead underwritten and “justified” by a pluralism, which enables it to demonstrate its respect for cultural differences—under some minimal normative constraints. Thus, the kind of “pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” that she wishes to defend would be prepared to leave space to individuals who may wish to adopt a traditional way of life. But it would also be prepared and determined to criticize unjust cultural practices wherever they are found. In drawing correctly the consequences of cultural complexity in a historically enlightened way, she insists that intra-cultural criticism is deeply entrenched in all cultures. “Culture are dynamic and full of contestation” (2000: 59), and not static nor uniform or homogenous, as proponents of relativism often seem to assume or suggest. She is also prepared to countenance and even endorse the view according to which “we should provide spaces in which valuably different forms of human activity can flourish” (2000: 59). In other words, “we should not stamp out diversity, or even put it at risk, without a very good reason (2000: 59; italics added). However she is quick to add the following comment: “But in light of the fact that some traditional practices are harmful and evil, and some actively hostile to other elements of a diverse culture, we are forced by our interest in diversity itself to develop a set of criteria against which to assess the practices we find, asking which are acceptable and worth preserving, and which are not” (2000: 59). Finally, she is insistent on the fact that her view is underwritten by a political rather than a comprehensive liberalism. It is one that urges respect for the many

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different conceptions of the good that individuals may have, and promotes a political climate in which they will each be able to pursue the good (whether religious or ethical) according to their own lights, so long as they do no harm to others. In effect, as suggested earlier, what Nussbaum is advocating is the search for universals that are “facilitative rather tyrannical” or dictatorial, that create and protect spaces for freedoms and choices rather than dragooning people into one desired or desirable total and totalizing mode of being and living. Such an argument, she contends, is not only compatible but even required by the search for cross-cultural universals. For it is all about respect for the dignity of persons as choosers. This respect requires us to defend universally a wide range of liberties, plus their material conditions; and it requires us to respect persons as separate ends, in a way that reflects our acknowledgment of the empirical fact of bodily separateness, asking how each and every life can have the preconditions of liberty and self-determination. We have good reasons already, then, to think that universal values are not just acceptable, but badly needed, if we are really to show respect for all citizens in a pluralistic society (2000: 59-60).

Elsewhere in her discussion, she sums her position forcefully as follows: We want an approach that is respectful of each person’s struggle for flourishing that treats each person as an end and as source of agency and worth in her own right. Part of this respect will mean not being dictatorial about the good, at least for adults and at least in some core areas of choice, leaving individuals a wide space for important types of choices and meaningful affiliation. But this very respect means taking a stand on the conditions that permit them to follow their own lights free from tyrannies imposed by politics and tradition. This, in turn, requires both generality and particularity: both some overarching benchmarks and detailed knowledge of the variety of circumstances and cultures in which people are striving to do well (2000: 69).

To the critics who, despite her explicit claims to the contrary, accuse her of advocating a comprehensive Western-centric liberal doctrine, and another variant of the rigid ethical universalism of yesteryears construed in terms of a monolithic Western-centric content, albeit one that presumably aims to widen progressively so as to include other cultural contents, she

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replies forcefully and categorically that she has been misunderstood (see Barclay, 2003; Nussbaum, 2003c). In all fairness, Nussbaum is, once again, acutely aware that a major risk of ethical universalism is inclusivism, which is often motivated by good intentions and advocated in the name of justice. As she knows very well, “the road to hell is often paved with good intentions.” To avoid this trap, Nussbaum insists that her list of capabilities, which has been arrived at as a result of years of a broad and open “cross-cultural discussion” (2000: 76), does not provide for a specific achievement or functioning prescription. It only includes those meaningful spheres of a truly human life which are present in each country and for each and every person. No ethical content is to be defended at all costs, especially if such defense goes to the detriment of the other’s flourishing life. “It is in this sense that the list is, emphatically, a partial and not a comprehensive conception of the good.” (2000: 96). Her version of the capabilities approach and the ethical universalism underwriting it does not seek to impose specific functionings but to open up possibilities, by giving each person the opportunity to be herself, in the way she deems best. She insists that “capabilities” (and not functionings)45 are and must remain the appropriate political goal—i.e., to give each person the opportunities to choose (or not) to actualize certain valuable beings and doings in accordance with her conception of the good life (2000: 87).46 45

At times however, she seems to be wavering in this regard, or rather, to make an exception in the case of the most deprived and poorest people for whom it only makes sense to insist on certain basic and fundamental functionings or achievements. 46 As Nussbaum conceives of the capabilities, they obviously have a “very close relationship to human rights” (2000: 97). And though the language of “rights” play a powerful role in public discourse and international debates, one significant advantage of her focus on the “capabilities” is, as she points out, that it is not linked to one particular cultural and historical tradition, as the former is often believed to be—albeit wrongly. But this is another issue. Even Williams recognizes the advantage of the language of “capabilities” over that of “rights”, when he writes in his commentary over Sen’s view: “I am not very happy myself with taking rights as the starting point. The notion of a basic human right seems to me obscure enough and I would rather come at it from the perspective of basic human capabilities. I would prefer capabilities to do the work, and if we are going to have a language or rhetoric of rights, to have it delivered from them, rather than the other way around” (1987: 100). The relationship between the two concepts

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She also points out that her critics often fail to distinguish between two sets of issues which are easily conflated: one is the issue of justification, and the second, that of implementation (2000: 101-5). The former must be done in terms of rational and universally valid arguments, 47 while the latter must countenance plural specification, and will obviously be context-sensitive, taking into account the relatively different circumstances and resources available in different measures to different communities around the world, and therefore be multiply realizable (2000: 77). In her view however, “the legitimate concerns for diversity, pluralism, and personal freedom are not incompatible with the recognition of universal norms.” Indeed, she believes that “universal norms are actually required if we are to protect diversity, pluralism, and freedom, treating each human being as an agent and an end,” and that “the best way to hold all these concerns together (…) is to formulate the universal norms as a set of capabilities for fully human functioning, emphasizing the fact that capabilities protect, and do not close off, spheres of human freedom” (2000: 106). [I]n a time (…) when non-moral interests are bringing us together across national boundaries, we have an especially urgent need to reflect about the moral norms that can also, and more appropriately unite us, providing constraints on the (…) choices nations may make…. Seeking such norms is an urgent task; if we do not seek them, we will be governed without the input of our own critical reflection, by interests and processes that very likely could not withstand the scrutiny of ethical argument (2000: 32; italics added).

In the long run, Nussbaum believes that it would be highly desirable that “the community of nations should reach a transnational overlapping consensus on the capabilities list, as a set of goals for cooperative international action and a set of commitments that each nation holds itself to for its own people.” In agreement with Pogge (1989, 2002) on this point, insofar as her list is closely related to the contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, she contends quite rightly that “such a

(“capabilities” and “rights”) require however further scrutiny and such a task is obviously the limited scope of this essay (see Nussbaum, 2000: 98-101; and others of her writings on this matter). 47 In this regard, Nussbaum is, I believe, in agreement with Habermas. However, once again, I believe that such arguments must be couched as much as possible in non-foundationalist and non-metaphysical terms.

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consensus already exists about some items on the list,” and that “there is reason to hope that we can build from these to the others” (2000: 104). Especially in era of rapid globalization, the capabilities approach is urgently needed to give moral substance and moral constraints to processes that occurring all around us without sufficient moral reflection. It may be hoped that the capabilities list will steer the process of globalization, giving it a rich set of human goals and a vivid sense of human waste and tragedy, when choices are pondered that would otherwise be made with only narrow economic considerations in view (2000: 105).

For Nussbaum, justice must take priority in our social and political reflection (2000: 33).48 The capability approach she advocates begins, in the political arena, from a basic yet powerful intuition, namely, certain human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed.49 This, she says, must be understood as a freestanding moral idea, not one that relies on a particular metaphysical, religious or teleological view. In other words, she contends that her argument begins from ethical premises and derives ethical conclusions from these alone, and not from any further premises. To determine whether this is so or not would require a closer and tighter scrutiny than I can provide herein. In any case, this may be another point of fragility and contention in Nussbaum’s position. Nonetheless, she believes that we can get a consensus of the requisite sort, for political purposes, about the core of our moral argument concerning the moral claim of certain human powers (2000: 83). In an interview given in 2004, she stated unequivocally that she firmly believes that we can achieve an “overlapping consensus” on a list of basic and central capabilities as a basis for social planning and human development in a pluralistic world. Moreover, she added interestingly enough:

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Compare with Rawls’ claim (1971) that “justice is the first virtue of society.” As she states elsewhere: “The intuitive idea behind the approach is twofold: first, that certain functions are particularly central in human life, in the sense that their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of human life; and second, --this is what Marx found in Aristotle—that there is something that it is to do these functions in a truly human way, not merely animal way. We judge, frequently enough, that a life has been so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of the human being, that it is a life in which one goes living, but more or less like an animal, unable to develop and exercise one’s powers” (2000: 71-2). She also notes: “This idea of human dignity has broad crosscultural resonance and intuitive power” (2000: 72).

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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose contents is rather closely related to my capabilities list, was such a document, framed, as Jacque Maritain (one of the framers) stressed as a practical political account of central human goals that could be endorsed by people from all sorts of different religions and traditions. Many constitutions the world over have list of fundamental entitlements similar to my list, and the work I’ve done on constitutionalism and on the Indian constitution in particular has closely informed my work. The trick in getting such a consensus, as 50 both Maritain and Rawls stress, is to make the political conception “freestanding,” that is, not grounded in metaphysical ideas () that are the property of a particular tradition and not shared or sharable by all. *I see no reason why this can’t be done.* In fact, whether in Bangladesh or South Africa or Poland, it is done all the time. I think we should look for agreement on conclusions without agreement on premises, and that it is not despair but respect that informs such a search (2004: 63).

7. Closing Remarks In the final analysis however, it would seem that Nussbaum’s attempt to articulate and justify “a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” grounded in her version of the capabilities approach “seems to rely on intuition to a greater degree than procedural approaches” (of the kind that Rawls defended), as she herself admits in her most recent work (Frontiers of Justice, 2006: 83). She does seem to recognize some version of this problem and has periodically grappled with it (see for example 2000: 101-103). The charge here is one of question-begging on the part of what seems to be “a preconceived notion of justice.” How can Nussbaum deal with this charge and related problems? Two or three ways are worth considering. First, she could give an a priori foundationalist justification of her proposed list of capabilities. Second, she could refurbish and strengthen the a posteriori, naturalist and historical, case she made in Women and Human Development (2000: 101105)—namely, that the items of her list emerge from the way distinct yet interacting accounts and traditions of the conditions under which human and non-human life flourishes intersect and yield mutual agreement. Or third, it may be that bringing up the whole question of “justification” in this way is to misunderstand (the articulation of) her project. It may be that, instead of emerging from some given or found common notion of human flourishing, the items on the list are meant to constitute and articulate the 50

As noted earlier, we might also add Charles Taylor (2001) to this list.

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most basic and abstract modes of that flourishing, and rather than needing a foundation, it is meant to serve as one. While none of these proposals would satisfy everyone, they at least constitute some possible responses to the problem at hand. Strangely enough though, Nussbaum uses none of them in her work (2006). Instead, she puts forth the rather bizarre claim that Rawlsian social contract theorists rely on intuition just as much, if not more, than proponents of the capabilities approach, in the design of the contracting situation itself (2006: 183). In effect, what Nussbaum is saying is that Rawls’ original position (along with his proposed list of “primary social goods”) is just as questionbegging as her list of capabilities. Whether this is true or not is beside the point. I don’t see how dragging down the account of one’s opponent or competitor can serve as a defensible response to a criticism of one’s own view. In all candor, Nussbaum seems to have a remarkable knack for leading her readers right to the edge of these sorts of deep and intriguing philosophical knots, only to leave them almost completely untied. Of the three options sketched out above, it seems that only the second one constitutes a viable and defensible response, one that is consistent with the main thrust of her position. Since her latest work (2006) does not in the end shed more light on the problem at hand, we are better off, I believe, returning to her 2000 work. 51 She writes: “In general, the account of political justification I favor lies close to the Rawlsian account of argument proceeding toward reflective equilibrium” (2000: 101). And she proceeds to explain briefly how this kind of non-foundationalist and nonmetaphysical justification goes. We begin by laying out the arguments for a given theoretical position, holding it up against the provisional “fixed points” in our moral intuitions, and we then try to see how these intuitions both test and are tested by the conceptions we are examining. In particular, we look to see how the various conceptions we are examining correspond (or not) to our intuitions. In some cases, we may find good reasons for holding a particular conception or theory (e.g., the capabilities approach) and rejecting others (e.g., utilitarianism, subjective welfarism, social contract theory or resourcism). In others, our considered judgments or moral intuitions may 51

Is Nussbaum’s view in this regard different from the way it was articulated before 2000? This is perhaps a question worth entertaining, but better left for others to answer. She seems in any case to have taken a clearer and more explicit position by then.

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have to be rejected when we find out that the particular conception or theory we favor and uphold on other grounds cast them into doubt and calls them into question. By running through this process over and over, we may come in time to achieving some sort of consistency and fit with our considered judgments and moral intuitions taken as a whole. We do so by modifying particular judgments or intuitions when this is required and called for by a theoretical conception that seems in other respect powerful and compelling enough, and modifying or even rejecting the favored theoretical conception when it has failed to fit in with the most secure and stable of our moral intuitions or considered judgments. Needless to say, we seem to apply such a procedure toward reflective equilibrium in many different areas or domains, but Rawls applied it specifically to the political domain (1971: 20-2, 46-53; 1996: 28, 45, 381 n.12, 384, n.16) in seeking to “justify” a political conception of justice to which people with different comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good life can agree—within a Western-style liberal democracy with its attendant “public culture.” Obviously, such a procedure entails that we take into account not only our own intuitions or judgments and theoretical conceptions, but also those of our fellow citizens within the context of a nation-state (Rawls’ view) or fellow human beings across nation-states, within the broader context of the “global community” that we now constitute (Nussbaum’s view).52 In her 2000 work, Nussbaum takes only two steps by her own admission in applying this procedure in an effort to reach a wide reflective equilibrium about her approach within the national context (2000: 102). Presumably her 2006 work is meant to take further steps along this line within the broader global context, as it seeks to cover the cases not only the disabled, but of different nations and beyond, to include human species relative to other living species. As I have suggested earlier however, it is not clear how successful her argument and justification for it are in the last instance. Nussbaum recognizes that the process that such a procedure for political justification entails is bound to be protracted, long and arduous, 52 As Rawls later clarified, “wide, not narrow reflective equilibrium (in which we take note only of our own judgments) is plainly the important philosophical concept…This equilibrium is fully inter-subjective: that is, every citizen has taken into account the reasoning and arguments of every other citizen” (1996: 384-5 n.16).

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and may never in fact be complete. If this process were ever complete (if it ever could be), 53 then, she claims, “that very fact would give us the confidence to move ahead, boldly building the conception so affirmed into the foundations of both national societies of many sorts and international documents that specify what nations hold themselves to.” Moreover, she is quick to add: “Even then, however, we would still need to think about issues of appropriate procedure and about how to effect a transition from the current status quo in a nation to the capabilities conception” (2000: 102). It is true, as she points out, that we would be helped in this regard by the fact that we would have the actual agreement of all citizens; but, as she also recognizes, “we would still need to devise transitional procedures that are appropriately respectful of their choices (2000: 103). At this stage, and to her credit, I must say, Nussbaum asks the most crucial question. “What do we do about implementation, she wonders, when the process of political justification remains, as it always very likely will remain, incomplete—when we have a promising conception that has survived many tests and has the backing of many people, but regarding which no wide reflective equilibrium in the full Rawlsian sense has as yet been found?” (2000: 103). Admittedly, the political conception of justice itself makes already a great deal of room for pluralism with regards to comprehensive conceptions of the good. However, another serious issue with regards to pluralism itself emerges at this point: What should we do when other political conceptions remain possible contenders and still garner strong support? How should we proceed? From all the above, it seems clear that an unbridled and unconstrained pluralism is not attractive and in fact untenable from a normative point of view.54 Certain boundaries and constraints are needed. It is difficult to see how tolerance about alternative frameworks or conceptions can be maintained unless we suppose that there is some viewpoint independent of these alternative conceptions or frameworks from which to evaluate them. Many philosophers have concluded that there is such a viewpoint, although they concede it can only countenance a very broad standard that

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“Reflective equilibrium (…) is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get closer to it in the sense that through discussion, our ideals, principles, and judgments seem more reasonable to us and we regard them as better founded than they were before” (Rawls, 1996: 385). 54 For the articulation and defense of “rooted (moral) cosmopolitanism” and “pluralism under rigorous and severe normative restraints,” see Essay # 8.

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imposes limits on the range of acceptable conceptions or frameworks.55 Pluralism holds that a range of different conceptions or frameworks exists and can be tolerated, but only within limits. In other words, no matter how desirable pluralism and the tolerance it counsels are, there must be limits to what can and should be tolerated, i.e., a threshold of the intolerable that we should not cross with impunity. Pluralism must therefore be placed under rigorous normative constraints of some kind. There are naturally different forms of pluralism, and it is worth considering two of the most pertinent in this context. One form of pluralism might be based on a kind of indeterminacy among acceptable conceptions or frameworks: it begins with a universally valid, broad and general framework for any acceptable standard, including for example the demand that any valid standard must treat like cases in like manner—e.g., fairly and impartially. Such a framework alone is not itself a standard for determining rightness or wrongness, and so cannot provide any kind of meaningful guidance. It is, rather, like a second-order standard, or a standard for any acceptable first-order standards. We might say, furthermore, that this framework marks off and delineates somehow a “range” property of standards, in the sense that no standard fits the framework any better than any other standard—as when, for a given circle, no point within the circle is more within it than any other (Rawls, 1971: 508). As long as a given standard fits the framework, it is acceptable, but an indefinite number of different standards could meet it. This case offers no grounds for judging that any standard is “better” or “worse” than any other, based on the second-order framework, except to say that either a standard fits the framework or it does not. Limited and morally justifiable tolerance, then, would amount to approving of those standards within the range that fit the framework and disapproving of those outside of that range—based on the second-order standard of acceptability provided by the framework. A different form of pluralism would be based simply on epistemic modesty (i.e., a justifiable reticence to assert claims that one does not know to be true with any sufficient degree of confidence and certainty). This notion may be akin in some sense to Rawls’ notion of “burdens of judgment”: the latter also counsels in effect “reasonable pluralism” (1996: 56-66). It can be combined with parametric universalism, according to 55 Philosophers such as David Wong (1996) and Michael Walzer (1994) don’t shun the label “relativists,” but they are perhaps better described as “pluralists.”

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which a single universally valid framework yields different standards that deliver opposed conclusions in a given case depending on the circumstances of its application or implementation. Epistemic modesty implies here that even if there is a determinate answer to the question whether, for any given action, conduct, behavior, or practice, it is right or wrong, it may not be possible to be confident or certain enough of this judgment in any case. In other words, no one can be confident that she knows how that framework is to be put into practice in any particular culture. That is, she does not know which of the available standards that fit the framework is best, given the circumstances. And so, where one is not confident or certain about one’s judgment, one should be tolerant. In the end however, it is not clear that either kind of pluralism can serve our purposes to meet the challenge of developing a coherent, morally plausible or compelling defense of tolerance. Pluralism based on epistemic modesty implies a kind of diffidence in the face of alternative standards that is sufficient to prevent the modestly just from condemning the alternative standards. Yet it must also leave one confident in the importance of one’s own standard. As for pluralism based on indeterminacy, it allows us to see our own standard as acceptable in that it meets a certain minimum, but this is hardly the sort of endorsement that can sustain “its grip on us”—to paraphrase Williams—in the face of a variety of equally acceptable alternative standards from a moral point of view. “Reasonable pluralism” counsels tolerance of different practices that conform to alternative standards, and tolerance is acceptable and can readily obtain in a number of areas such as etiquette, humor, culinary taste, and perhaps even standards of beauty and others. However, the stakes are altogether different when it comes to what is deemed valuable, reasonable/rational, or worthy of the dignity of human beings. Because of the relative lack of importance in our thinking and living of the former areas, we can somehow maintain our way even while taking an external view of them as simply one way and one standard among others. However, in the case of the latter, the subject matter itself raises the stakes—as I pointed out at the outset. Once the stakes are raised, we seem less able to take an external view, to maintain our views about what is morally worth doing or being, or what is reasonable to believe. And yet, we must somehow come to terms with the plurality of values, traditions, and lifestyles in the world as we know it today. Is it however possible to avoid falling into a messy and indiscriminate pluralism that robs us of the

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necessary resources for criticism, social and political reflection without at the same time yielding to a monolithic, rigid and oppressive form of universalism? This is the challenge that philosophers such as Nussbaum have taken up, and it is, I believe, the right one. Her effort in this regard, though still fraught with various problems and difficulties as I have shown, is nevertheless compelling and commendable—despite her critics’ claims to the contrary. For this reason, she deserves to have the final word in this essay: Many people (…) confuse relativism with the toleration of diversity, and find relativism attractive on the ground that it shows respect for the ways of others. But of course it does no such thing. Most cultures have exhibited considerable intolerance of diversity over the ages, as well as at least some respect for diversity. By making each tradition the last word, we deprive ourselves of any more general norm of toleration or respect that could help us limit the intolerance of cultures. Once we see this, our interest in being relativists should rapidly diminish (2000: 49).

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Charolles, Valérie. (2006). Le Capitalisme contre le Libéralisme. Paris : Fayard. Chavagneux, Christian. (2007). Les Dernières Heures du Libéralisme : Mort d’Une Idéologie. Paris: Perrin. Chokr, Nader N. (2006). “Mapping out a Shift in Contemporary French Philosophy.” Yeditepe de Felsefe 5 (August 2006): 86-122. Chuang-Tzu. (2001). The Inner Chapters. Edited and translated by A. C. Graham, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Original Publication Date: 1981. Cilliers, P. (1998). Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems. London: Routledge. —. (2004). “Complexity, Ethics ad Justice.” Journal for Humanistics. 5/19, 19-26 Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP. —. (2005). “Complexity, Deconstruction, and Relativism.” Theory, Culture and Society 22/5, 255-267. Cohen, Elie. (2005). Le Nouvel Age du Capitalisme. Paris: Fayard. Cohen, G. A. (2002) “Deeper into Bullshit.” In Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Eds.). Contours of Agency: A Festschrift for Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (2002b). “Why One Kind of Bullshit Flourishes in France?” (Unpublished Manuscript). Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Derrida, J. (1988). Limited, Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Donnelly, J. (1984). “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 6: 400-419. Fayart, Jean-Francois. (2005). The Illusion of Cultural Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Frankfurt, Harry. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See also The Importance of What We Care About. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Geertz, C. (2000). Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Geuss, Raymond. (1981). The Idea of Critical Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gowans, C. (Ed.). (2000). Moral Disagreements: Classic and Contemporary Readings. London: Routledge. Graham, G. (1996). “Tolerance, Pluralism, and Relativism.” In D. Heyd (Ed.) Toleration: An Elusive Virtue. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 44-59. Greau, Jean-Luc. (2005). L’Avenir du Capitalisme. Paris: Gallimard. Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and Human Interests. (Trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro). Boston, MA: Beacon Press. —. (1973). Legitimation Crisis. (Trans. Thomas McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press. —. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Sherry W. Nicholsen). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hales, Steven D. (1997). “A Consistent Relativism.” Mind 106/427: 33-52. Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Harman, Gilbert. (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. (1996). “Moral Relativism” In G. Harman and J. J. Thompson (Eds.) Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 3-64. —. (2000a). “Moral Relativism Defended.” In G. Harman, Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3-19. —. (2000b). “Is There a Single True Morality?” In G. Harman, Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 77-99. Harrison, G. (1976). “Relativism and Tolerance.” Ethics 86: 122-35. Heylighen, F., Cilliers, P., & Gershenson, C. (2006). “Complexity and Philosophy.” In Robert Geyer & Jan Bogg (Eds.) Complexity, Science, and Society. Radcliffe Press. Posted online @ http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.cc/0604072. Huntington, Samuel. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Huntington, S. & Harrison, L. (2000). Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books. Krausz, M. (Ed.). (1989). Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Krausz, M. and J. W. Meiland. (Eds.). (1982). Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (Eds.). (1963). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. New York: Vintage Books. Levi-Strauss, Claude. (1985). The View from Afar. New York: Basic Books. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Maalouf, A. (2001). In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. New York: Penguin Books. MacIntyre, A. (1994). “Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification.” In L. Gormally (Ed.) Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honor of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe. Blackrock, County Dublin: Four Courts Press, pp. 6-24. Mackie, John. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books. Maritain, Jacques. (1951). Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mill, J. S. (1860/1982). On Liberty. New York: Penguin Books. Miller, Richard. (1992). Moral Differences. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Morin, E. (1992). “The Concept of System and the Paradigm of Complexity.” In M. Maruyama (Ed.) Context and Complexity: Cultivating Contextual Understanding. (pp. 125-136). New York: Springer-Verlag. Munthe, Christian. (2005). “On the Relation between Meta-ethical and Substantial Normative Forms of Moral Relativism.” In D. Westerstahl & T. Tannsjo (Eds.) Lectures on Relativism. Goteborg: Goteborg University, pp. 291-306. Nussbaum, Martha. (1988). “Nature, Function, and Capability.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Suppl. Vol. 1: 145-84.

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—. (1990) “Aristotelian Social Democracy.” In R. B. Douglass, G. Mara, and H. Richardson (Eds.) Liberalism and the Good. Routledge, pp. 203-52. —. (1992) “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” Political Theory 20: 202-46. —. (1993). “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.” In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Eds.) The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 242-269. —. (1995) “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.” In Altham, J. E. J. & Ross Harrison (Eds). (1995). World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (1999). “Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Mutilation.” In Nussbaum. Sex and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 118-29. —. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (2000b). “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Anthony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan.” Ethics 111: 102-140. —. (2003) “Tragedy and Justice: Bernard Williams Remembered.” Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum, October/November, 1-25. —. (2003b) “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (July/November): 33-59. —. (2003c) “Political Liberalism and Respect: A Response to Linda Barclay.” Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy 4: 25-44. —. (2004) “An Interview with Martha Nussbaum.” The Dualist (Fall): 59-69. —. (2006). Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Okin, S. M. (1998). “Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and Cultural Differences” Hypatia 13: 32-52. Pogge, Thomas. (1989). Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. —. (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press. Power, Carla. (2007). “A Secret History.” New York Times (February 25). Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rachels, J. (1999). “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism.” The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed., New York: Random House. Pp. 20-36. Rawls, John. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. —. (1996). Political Liberalism. NY: Columbia University Press. —. (1999). The Law of Peoples—with the Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Renteln, A.D. (1985). “The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 7: 514-40. Rescher, N. (1998). Complexity: A Philosophical Overview. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions. Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

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ESSAY # 3 EVEN DEEPER INTO “BULLSHIT”: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. But we tend to take the situation for granted. ... In consequence, we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so much of it, or what functions it serves. And we lack a conscientiously developed appreciation of what it means to us...Even the most basic and preliminary questions about bullshit remain...not only unanswered, but unasked... In other words, we have no theory (Frankfurt, 2005).

1. The Age of Bullshit—Philosophers on “Bullshit”1 Believe it or not, “bullshit” has recently become a serious object of concern and discussion among ordinary people, professionals of different stripes, and even among philosophers. Harry Frankfurt’s short essay (1986, 1988, and 2005) is a pioneering discussion of this widespread but largely unexamined phenomenon of our times. It is however far from being unobjectionable and fully satisfactory as G. A. Cohen’s follow-up critical paper (2002) has shown at least in part. Both have certainly contributed to this renewed attention and interest. It is worth noting in this regard the recent Open Court 2 collection of essays, Bullshit and Philosophy (Hardcastle & Reisch, 2006).3 1

In my discussion, I refer essentially to the 2005 version of Frankfurt’s analysis, On Bullshit unless otherwise indicated. I also refer to G.A. Cohen’s paper, “Deeper into Bullshit” (after which I take the title of my essay) and Frankfurt’s “Reply to Cohen” --both printed in Buss & Overton (2002). 2 Known for its effort at producing and publishing materials aiming to “popularize” philosophy and make it accessible to non-philosophers (Popular Culture and Philosophy Series). While we may readily understand how science can be popularized, and how this can be done effectively without irreparable loss of cognitive meaning and content, it may be questionable whether philosophy can

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And yet, in one sense, one could say that bullshit has always been philosophy’s nemesis—in one form or another, under other names, as that which is irrational, nonsense, meaningless, unclear, incomprehensible, unsubstantiated/ unsubstantiable, untrue, neither true nor false, outright false, untenable, or as too speculative, metaphysical, far-fetched, unrealistic, or merely as practically irrelevant to human life. The history of Western philosophy can even be characterized as the history of what different philosophers over the ages have regarded as philosophy’s other, i.e., as bullshit (albeit under different names). .

Even though the label of “bullshit” is more readily and commonly applied to what others say or do, rather than to one’s utterances, statements or actions (Black, 1983), it goes without saying, as Frankfurt recognizes at the outset, that we have each contributed our share of bullshit at some point or another. Everyone agrees that there is so much bullshit today that one may be tempted to call our age, “The Age of Bullshit” in contradistinction with other Ages, say, the “Age of Reason,” or the “Age of the similarly be popularized, and more importantly, whether it should be popularized—assuming that it is done in the right way, in a way that makes it always already relevant to the concerns of human beings in their diverse and multiple pursuits and interests, not the least of which being how to live a human life, worthy of living—and not bullshit one’s way through life. 3 It is arguably the same phenomenon that Max Black investigates in The Prevalence of Humbug (1983). Synonyms for “bullshit” besides “humbug” include the following: “bullcrap,” “baloney,”“horseshit,” “hogwash,” “balderdash,” “claptrap,” hokum,” “drivel,” “buncombe,” “quackery,” “hooey,” “poppycock,” “hot air,” and “imposture” to mention only a few. Black defines “humbug” as “deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes” (Frankfurt 2005: 6). Like Black, Frankfurt believes that bullshit involves “a deliberate misrepresentation” or “imposture,” as we shall see below. Like lying, bullshitting involves someone trying to deceive another. But, as will be made clearer by the foregoing discussion, there are important differences between them: bullshitting someone, while deceiving them, does not involve an outright lie. But where does the difference between the two lie? Which is worse or better? On what basis can we answer such a question? Suppose we can distinguish between two sets of issues about which someone may mislead another person: (1) one’s own feelings or attitudes, or (2) what is the case in the world. Black would argue that the primary purpose in “humbug” is not to deceive the listener about what is the case in the world, but to deceive that listener about some matter regarding oneself or one’s own qualities. As we shall see, Frankfurt’s main effort is directed at capturing the particular kind of dishonesty involved in bullshit, how it differs from lying, and in so doing, distinguishes his account from Black’s treatment of the subject.

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Enlightenment,” “the Romantic Age,” “the Age of Discovery,” or “the Space Age,” etc. It is fair to say no areas or spheres of activity at any level of our personal, professional or collective life escapes its encroachment— from advertising, marketing, public relations, politics, print and electronic mass media, mass or popular culture, journalism, religion and televangelism, corporate and business world, sports, to academia, including of course, philosophy, to mention only a few of them. It is therefore quite aptly put, when Frankfurt writes that bullshit constitutes “one of the most salient features of our culture.” Given the dangers and threats that its pervasiveness poses to the social fabric, the body politic and even to culture and civilization itself,4 it must be regarded as a form of “pollution,” and therefore requiring like the other environmental problems we face today political vigilance and mobilization. The reason why I included philosophy in the list above is because, despite claims to the contrary, philosophers cannot claim to have a natural immunity to bullshit (dishing it out, consuming it, or even being victimized by it). Given their avowed ideals of clarity in thought and expression, rationality in reasoning and argument, objectivity in inquiry, and truth-seeking goals as well as their training in a broad range of analytical techniques, methods and methodologies, which, presumably, are part of the ever-expanding “philosophical toolbox,” one may be tempted to believe without qualification that philosophers are more apt than other people to acquire and build an immunity to bullshit—given that they don’t have a naturally built-in such immunity (or do they?). But even such a belief is questionable from a radical point of view, in that the ideals of clarity, rationality and truth, or rather the conflicting construals and conceptions thereof, can themselves be viewed as fodder for the most elaborate forms of “bullshit” produced by philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, and perpetrated on the rest of humankind under dubious pretenses. Who among us has not had to deal in their own way with the rather widespread view or belief among ordinary people that philosophers are, despite claims to the contrary, merely “professional bullshitters,” who can pile it higher and in a more sophisticated manner than most lay-bullshitters 4

This obviously sounds like a strong claim, one that is based on a rather big assumption. I hope however it will become clearer why it is made by the end of this discussion.

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by virtue of their aptitudes with a bag full of tools, techniques and methods reserved to the initiated, and their esoteric and jargon-prone language, which make it even harder to decipher what it’s all about, if anything at all, or what its intended ultimate goal or purpose is. In this regard, I must mention my (almost) crippling fear at the outset of writing this essay: how can I write a piece on bullshit which does not itself turn out to be (at least for some) a piece of bullshit? If this were the ever-present question on the front screen of a philosopher’s mind each time he or she sets out to produce something, perhaps it might function a bit like the “Shavian probe” discussed by Max Black (in the form of questions put forth by Bernard Shaw: “do you really believe that?” Or more generally, “do you really mean that?”), and may thereby strengthen our alertness to creeping bullshit and bullshitting, or perhaps dissuade us from engaging in it casually or leisurely, or unconsciously. I imagine one could easily sustain a distinction between “professional” (or “expert”) and “common” (or lay-person) bullshitting. The former is often exhibited most acutely by marketing and advertising executives, PR agents, politicians, and philosophers (I would add) with years of on-thejob training and experience, and in some cases, backed up with ad hoc theoretical and advanced background knowledge. The latter is exhibited by almost everyone whether it is in the context of a family squabble, an interpersonal exchange, a discussion between friends or colleagues, during a job interview, or a commercial transaction, etc. Admittedly, some are more creative and better are it than others, and may therefore qualify as “bullshit artists” as Frankfurt points out. But even as such, they don’t quite yet measure up to the “professional bullshitters”—at least on the present construal of the distinction I am provisionally inclined to draw (see Bernal, 2006). It will be objected however that the widespread common view or belief about philosophy and philosophers as depicted earlier is arguably extreme, unfair, and trades in an over-simplistic generalization, which betrays a serious lack of understanding and appreciation of what good philosophers do and are supposed to do. In this regard, some may even draw out the distinction between the kind of philosophy done by “Analytic philosophers” and that done by so-called “Continental philosophers” in order to sustain an “us” vs. “them” posture which has infected contemporary philosophy for the past half-century or more. Apart from the fact that such a posture may not be desirable nor helpful, the critical assessment of these two

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conflicting and competing traditions has led many to conclude that their proponents have in fact been the worst enemies of philosophy itself in that they have each in their own way undermined its viability, relevance and usefulness—to such an extent that a louder and louder chorus now hails the demise or death of philosophy. As for those holding back, and seeking to articulate a reconstructed and transformed philosophy (over and beyond the Analytical-Continental Divide), in the form of a post-Analytical and post- or meta-Continental philosophy, the question still pending is about its presumed nature, role and place, and its distinctive approach, if any, in the Age of Bullshit (see Chokr, 2009). The study of “bullshit” is unquestionably afflicted by a complexity and fuzziness typical of an ordinary language term, and characteristic of an open-ended, cluster or family-resemblance concept (see Chokr, 1991 for a sustained treatment of such concepts). (1) As Frankfurt points out, “any suggestion about what conditions are logically necessary and sufficient for the constitution of bullshit is bound to be somewhat arbitrary.” For one thing, the term is often used “loosely, as a generic term of abuse, with no very specific literal meaning”—to describe or characterize, one might add, a broad range and varieties of statements, speech-acts, speeches, texts, actions, behaviors and practices. (2) “For another, the phenomenon is itself so vast and amorphous that no crisp and perspicuous analysis of its concept can avoid being procrustean.” (3) “Nonetheless, Frankfurt goes on to say in order to justify his endeavor, it should be possible to say something helpful, even though it is not likely to be decisive. Even the most basic and preliminary questions about bullshit remain, after all, not only unanswered but unasked.” One of the questions that one must immediately confront, as Cohen quite rightly argues is whether given (1) and (2), Frankfurt can justifiably get on with his effort which issue ultimately into a characterization of the “essence” of bullshit. Isn’t it the “essence” of bullshit, of the kind that philosophers are particularly so good at, to claim (3) that “it should be possible to say something helpful, even though it is unlikely to be decisive” and then reach out boldly beyond such a modest and undisputable claim to “characterizing the ‘essence’ of bullshit”? It is as if Frankfurt assumes that we all have some “specific, literal meaning” of “bullshit” implicitly in mind, and that by bringing it out, he will somehow thereby command our consensual agreement. But isn’t this a rather tall order?—given the varieties (in kinds and degrees) of bullshit and conflicting conceptions thereof that we must contend with (see Maes & Schaubroeck, 2006).

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Another question that we must address at this early stage of the inquiry has to do with the most promising or fruitful approach to take vis-à-vis this complex, “vast and amorphous phenomenon”? Should we take “a common-sense approach” (Preti, 2006: 19-32) or what we might call “an intuitionist, pragmatic, experiential approach” (de Waal, 2006: 99-114; see also Reisch, 2006: 33-48) which is in effect based on the following common place operational credo: I cannot give you a definition of “bullshit” in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but somehow “I know it if I experience it (see, hear, or read it)”? Interestingly, a similar credo was once adopted with regards to “pornography.” But as in this case, someone’s “pornography” is someone else’s “eroticism.” Similarly, someone’s bullshit is someone else’s truth or pearl of wisdom. How do we then stem the tide of such a creeping and paralyzing relativism? By appealing to what most people in a given society and at a given point in time converge or diverge on? We know that this does not resolve the problem, but merely pushes the relativism one notch up the ladder—from an individual subjective apprehension to that of a group, collectivity, or even a society.5 Should we take “a purely conceptual, linguistic, analytical approach,” and seek to answer the question of “what it is” by engaging to the extent possible in the clarification of the ordinary language use(s) of such a term?—even if we cannot and should not hope to come up with a clear-cut definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but at best a characterization of one or the other kind of conditions (see Aberdein, 2006: 151-170). Admittedly, this would still count as a form of clarification, and one that is desirable. But would it be sufficient given what is at stake? Should we for this purpose focus primarily on the distinguishing feature(s) of the bullshitter’s state of mind, as opposed to, say, the liar, or the humbugger? (Frankfurt). Or should we perhaps more aptly focus on the bullshit produced, i.e., the product, regardless of where, how and by whom it is produced, and most specifically, regardless of whether the bullshitter’s state of mind can be clearly distinguished from that of a liar, a humbugger, or even a truthful and sincere person? (Cohen). Should we combine both of the approaches above and take an inductive approach and examine in turn a number of different examples of 5

For a more substantial and critical discussion of the problem of relativism, see Essay # 2.

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“bullshit” and instances of “bullshitting’ so as to arrive at a rough characterization of what all these cases have in common both in terms of the production (activity or process) and the product, and thereby provide a defeasible core-cluster of features for the term (as a verb and as a noun)— even if we can only do so provisionally? (Black, 1983). Should we seek to develop a taxonomy and classification of the different types or kinds, and aspects of bullshit (Maes & Schaubroeck, 2006: 171-182)? Or should we seek to put in evidence the unity of bullshit despite all appearances to the contrary (Hardcastle, 2006: 137-150), and concern ourselves just with bullshit (Fuller, 2006: 241-258)? Alternatively, should we take a socio-cultural-political and historical approach seeking to examine most particularly the contexts in which bullshit is produced and seek to ascertain not only “when it is produced,” but by whom it is produced, and also for what purposes and to what ends, to do what to whom. This would require that we pay more attention to the diverse and multifarious uses to which it is put, and in the end, to taking proper measure of its impact on consumers or victims (individually or collectively), as well as on the social, cultural and political fabric at large. I am inclined to argue that an archaeological-genealogical approach (a la Foucault) might even be more helpful in enabling us not only to better understand its emergence and descent, perpetuation, reproduction and pervasiveness in the nexus of what is at stake in all of the socio-political and cultural struggles of our times, but also possibly find the kind of critical tools that would enable us to cope, resist, and fight against its evergrowing encroachment in all areas of everyday, academic, and professional life. One of the related questions that such an approach would enable us to address is whether some (social, cultural, political) contexts are more conducive to the production and reproduction of “bullshit” than others, and possibly come up with some more or less compelling considerations or hypotheses about the factors and “causes” that distinguish some contexts from others in this regard. Thus, to paraphrase Cohen in an extended unpublished version of his paper, “Deeper into Bullshit” (2002), we may perhaps be able to answer the question he raises, namely, “Why One Kind of (Academic-Philosophical) Bullshit Flourishes in France?” more so than in other countries. Or alternatively, we may be able to develop more perspicuous analyses in an effort to answer the question “Why is Bullshit so Pervasive in American Politics these days?”—or, for

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that matter, “Why is Bullshit so Pervasive in British, French, German, Middle Eastern or Chinese Politics, to mention only a few representative examples? (See for example Brandenburg, 2006; Evans, 2006: 185-202; Neumann, 2006: 203-214). One might also inquire into the question of whether some “cultures”6 are more conducive or prone, or more tolerant of bullshit than others. Naturally, the answers to these different kinds of questions will, as one might expect, yield different answers in different cases. But there may well be a degree of overlap, which is bound to be enlightening. Finally, another question has to do with whether we can reasonably envision a world without bullshit—not just one in which its incidence and prevalence has been drastically reduced, but where it has been eliminated or better yet, eradicated. Should we assume as if it goes without saying that such a world would be desirable, even if unattainable? Perhaps not. Eradicating bullshit could well be tantamount to destroying society altogether. It is indeed possible to take—as Mears (2002) 7 does, I believe—a less extreme, prejudicial or negative stance, and view instead the ubiquity of bullshitting as “an essentially social phenomenon” that is not only “worthy of investigation” but also capable of “informing and being informed by social theory.” In his study, Mears shows how bullshitting performs various useful functions in diverse contexts, e.g., in the socialization of children, in explorations of our sense of “self,” in the passing of time (small talk, chit-chat, joking, role-playing, or being funny), in the resolution of personal or interpersonal strains, in impression management, in our efforts to gain social, political or economic leverage, or to define and create “reality.” One may alternatively take bullshit the way the French moralists in the 17th century thought of “hypocrisy”—as a necessary lubricant of social relations, which in some sense contributes to making life in society possible or bearable. This approach notwithstanding, I don’t believe that one can make a straight-faced argument for the positive and beneficial effects of the exponential proliferation and ubiquity of bullshit (in its various forms) other than by taking a self-defeating and untenable position. The 6

The term “cultures” can here be taken in both a narrow sense (as when we talk about the culture of a neighborhood, a corporation, or an association) or in a broader, anthropological sense (as when we talk of French or Chinese culture). 7 In this regard, Mears seems to be in disagreement with Frankfurt’s characterization—which he views as unclear, limited and inadequate because it fails to appreciate the social functions of bullshit.

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epidemiological terminology used above is meant to convey the real dangers and threats that bullshit poses—in a way akin to an infectious pandemic disease—to our well-being and welfare, to the social fabric and the body politic, and some would even say, to civilization itself.8 Since the scenario of eradication does not seem to be a realistic one (or perhaps even a desirable one), the only option we have left is to keep it in check somehow, below a certain threshold of tolerance to be decided upon. But then the question is how do we go about achieving this desirable goal of “bullshit detecting, busting, and reduction”? How do we strengthen and shore up our “bullshit detectors” so as to ensure or boost our “bullshitimmunity”? Most specifically, what role can and should philosophy play in this regard? How should philosophy be reconceived, reconstructed and transformed so as to make it most suited for, and relevant in the Age of Bullshit (Chokr 2009, see also Essay # 9)? In this essay, I critically examine the contributions of Harry Frankfurt [section 2] and G. A. Cohen [section 3], and take a proper measure of their relative merits and weaknesses [sections 4 and 5]. I close my analysis by attempting to go further and even deeper into bullshit—research, detection and busting [section 6].

2. Frankfurt: On Bullshit 2.1 Bullshit as “Deliberate Misrepresentation” or “Imposture” vs. Lying What does “bullshit” mean? What is “bullshit”? What does it involve? If bullshit involves arguably “a deliberate misrepresentation” or “imposture,” and if, like lying, bullshitting involves someone trying to deceive another, are there not important differences between them. Clearly, bullshitting someone, while deceiving them, does not involve an outright lie. But where does the difference between the two reside? Which is worse or better? On what basis can we answer such a question?

8

In another context, I have entertained the somewhat speculative hypotheses, according to which there may be a significant (causal) connection or mutually reinforcing relationship between (1) Radical Cultural Relativism and Bullshit as well as between (2) the rising tide of Mediocrity-(Mediocracy)-Bullshit and a new form of “21st century fascism” which should be obviously a cause for concern (Chokr, 2009, see also Essay # 2).

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Suppose we can distinguish between two sets of issues about which someone may mislead another person: (1) his own feelings or attitudes, or what is the case in the world and (2) his own feelings and attitudes. One could argue (as Black had done, I believe) that the primary purpose of “bullshit” is not to deceive the listener about what is the case in the world, but to deceive that listener about some matter regarding oneself or one’s own qualities. Or one could attempt to capture the particular kind of dishonesty involved in bullshit, how it differs from lying, and in so doing, put forward a somewhat different treatment of the subject. This is precisely what Frankfurt undertakes in his analysis. He certainly holds that the bullshitter misrepresents himself in the way described above. However, (unlike Black in this regard) he does not think that it is helpful to say that bullshit is “short of lying” or like a lie, but not quite. One can fairly presume that, in his view, any use of language shares some features with lying—i.e., if we take the latter in a very broad sense, by virtue of being a use of language. In other words, any assertion we make is like a lie, and yet it is somehow different. To say merely that bullshit is like a lie does not seem to go, or take us very far in describing and characterizing what bullshit is in a distinctive way. Bullshit can often just involve deficient, shoddy, or careless communication—even or especially when it is couched in pompous and pretentious language. It may thus be due to a lack of preparedness coupled with a misplaced confidence in delivery that one’s deficiency and limitation will go unnoticed. In such cases, the content of what is said recedes in importance as long as the communication appears or sounds right, or is having the desired effect. But, as Frankfurt points out quite perspicuously: bullshit can also be very carefully crafted, and not just merely the effect of careless talk. The areas of advertising/ marketing, public relations, and politics, among many others, provide us with numerous examples of such undertakings on a daily basis. Great care is taken and sophistication is displayed in efforts to mislead others by members of these professions about their own feelings or attitudes, without quite lying (see Brandenburg, 2006 for an illuminating discussion of political communication). It might even be fair to say that the hallmark of smooth-talking and effective bullshit is careful thought and preparation. People who are capable of fooling others in this way without their noticing or caring are called “bullshit artists.” Frankfurt seem to think that there is some sort of tension between the idea that bullshit is often due to deficient, careless or shoddy communication and the idea that it can also be prepared

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and crafted very carefully and purposefully (2005: 22). He argues, though, that that there is always something sub-standard even to such carefully crafted bullshit, because even the bullshit artist is trying to “get away with something” or is “selling the listener short” in some respects. The bullshit may be careful about how he portrays himself and his message, but he is not careful about the truth of what s/he says or claims.

2.2 Bullshit, Truth, and Meaning It is fair to say that Frankfurt’s concern with truth constitutes the main thrust of his argument. By seeking to distinguish bullshit from lying, he aims to make us better understand what goes on when someone lies, and more importantly, by saying what a good use of language is not, it may even help to clarify what it is to speak or use language at all. In this sense, his analysis could well be viewed as making, among other things, a contribution to the philosophy of language—not to mention the philosophy of mind. In discussing bullshit and lying, Frankfurt seems to be relying on an insight captured most strikingly by Davidson (1984) in his theory of “radical interpretation.” According to some philosophers of language, such an insight gives us a very compelling reason for why one’s theory of meaning should be “truth-conditional.” Let me explain briefly why. One could reasonably argue that, at the most basic level, the purpose of language use, of the activity of speaking, is one of sharing truths. People speak in order to provide each other with handy and useful information about where to find what they need or want and avoid what they fear. This was the case when our basic concerns, in our earlier and most primitive incarnation, were food, water, shelter, and security from potential predators or enemies. It is still the case today when we speak about engineering, computer science, or economics; we are still communicating information that is of interest to other people, although we are admittedly communicating information of a different type, one that is not dealing with direct or basic needs, but with more indirect and sophisticated, secondorder or third-order needs.9 Whatever the case may be, in order to be an efficient participant in the linguistic community to which we belong, one 9

In this context, one may quite rightly wonder what kind of information we are communicating when speaking about philosophy, or when engaging in speculative, metaphysical flights.

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must speak the truth when speaking to each other. If one says something false for whatever reason, one is passing on potentially damaging information. Needless to say, we all say things that are false sometimes, but for the most part this is just due to honest mistakes. Most people do not try (at least most of the time) to say what is false. Everyone lies at some point or other. Whether it be a “while lie” or a “bare-faced lie” does not matter. Human beings disapprove of lying—not just for moral reasons, but arguably for semantic reasons as well. If everyone lied all the time, there would be nothing like a communication of handy and useful truths to others; in fact, there would be no speech and no language at all. If everyone lied all the time, language use would be pointless, speaking to each other would have no point, but most importantly, words could have no meanings at all if they were not used to communicate truth in the first instance. To cut short a longer line of reasoning, the point here is that language use (“speaking”) is for describing situations in the world, and if one ignores how the world is when using language or speaking, what one produces is not language, but nonsense or noise. In his analysis, Frankfurt seems to be relying on such an insight. Thus, he contends that without the activity of speaking the truth, there could be no lying at all. His reasoning seems to be as follows: the successful liar is someone who knows that others will take him to be speaking the truth, and who therefore derives benefit from the fact that what he says is false; he could not derive such a benefit if people did not have the expectation that what he says is true. But perhaps the best reason for holding lying to depend on speaking the truth is arguably the conceptual one mentioned earlier, namely, that no one could tell a lie if there were no established and well-entrenched practices of communicating information about how the world is to each other in the first place. Lying is just asserting something as true that one knows to be false. To be in the position to do this there has to be, first, a practice between people of asserting and interpreting sentences as true—at least for the most part. Lying depends, in other words, on speaking the truth in the same way. Lying consists in transacting in fake truth. To state more clearly the difference between bullshit and lying, as Frankfurt sees it, we might then say the following. In the case of lying, the liar is engaged in the practice of telling the truth just as the speaker who is speaking the truth is. The liar transmits to his interlocutor a piece of

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information that is of interest, portrayed or presented as true. The information that the liar transmits is of course false (or believed to be). Yet, it pretends to be true, or to be straightforwardly or verifiably true or false. Besides, in saying what he says the liar is somehow guided by the truth. He could not tell a lie if he did not have definite views or opinions about what is true or false, and consciously avoided telling the truth. In other words, a liar cares about what is true and is guided in what he says by what is true in as much as he avoids saying what is true (2005: 56-61). In the case of bullshitting, we might say, the situation is somewhat different. The bullshitter does not make a straightforward communication of something that he believes to be false. In reality, the bullshitter does not seem to care much about what he actually says. His aim is not to lead the consumer of bullshit or his interlocutor into believing something that is not true. Instead, his aim is to confuse the consumer or interlocutor into believing that he is communicating something at all, when in fact he is doing nothing of the sort. To put the contrast more succinctly, the bullshitter fakes (taking part in) the transmission of information, whereas the liar (wrongly) informs his interlocutor. In other words, the liar contributes paradoxically to the cooperative effort that is communication between people, but what he contributes is something bad. In contrast, the bullshitter pretends to contribute, but contributes nothing at all. The difference between the two: whereas the liar diminishes the stock of truth that his interlocutor may hold, the bullshitter pretends to share something with the interlocutor, but shares nothing at all. Frankfurt’s contribution seems to be focused on the relationship between bullshitting and truth-talking. In his view, the bullshitter not only portrays himself as believing or feeling what he does not (“deliberate misrepresentation” or “imposture”), but, in speaking, he also shows a disregard for what is true. For Frankfurt, this makes the bullshitter “a greater enemy of the truth than the liar” (2005: 61). One may naturally object to the idea articulated earlier, namely, that the bullshitter’s aim is not to lead the consumer or interlocutor into believing something that is not true. One may hold, as Cohen does (2002: 327-8), that bullshit is often designed to lead to a misapprehension on the part of the consumer or interlocutor. This is arguably true in politics, public relations, as well as in advertising or marketing, where bullshit is

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presumably used for precisely this purpose, to mislead people into believing something that is not (necessarily) true, e.g., that a particular ideology or political program is compassionate when in fact it is not, or that a particular product or service is better than those provided by competitors, when in fact they all equally defective. In response, one could reply however that one need not miss the precise point of the distinction Frankfurt wishes to make—even if, admittedly, lying may also be a form of bullshitting. Politicians and advertisers do of course lie to achieve their respective purposes. But the point is that, insofar as they are merely bullshitting, there is no specific thing that they want to mislead the consumers, or more generally the people, about. What bullshitters in politics and advertising want is not for the public to believe something specific, but rather that they believe whatever will make them buy the politician’s packaging or the company’s goods or services. One consequence of Frankfurt’s view is that bullshit need not actually be false. It is not the truth or falsity of a statement, or even its meaninglessness, that makes it bullshit. It is that it is uttered without regard or concern for what is true. According to Frankfurt, it is possible to make a true statement without concern for the truth and still utter bullshit. We may here think of the student bullshitting his way into an essay that is due, and yet still write (accidentally) something that is true. In reality, ordinary people are tempted to think of bullshit as something murkier and more multi-faceted than Frankfurt’s account suggests. Sometimes, bullshitters (like liars) are guided by the truth, but only after a fashion. Viz. government officials attempting to justify their course of actions or failed policies (in times of peace or war) and who, for this purpose, want to appear be “speaking the truth,” though often euphemistically (Brandenburg, 2006); despite (the appearance or even actuality of) speaking the truth, what they say is still bullshit. Much of the bullshit produced by political or advertising campaigns could just as well be treated as a type of lying. Furthermore, there are forms of bullshit produced by people who would not recognize themselves as indifferent to the truth. “An honest person might read some bullshit that a Frankfurtbullshitter wrote, believe it to be the truth, and affirm it…When that honest person utters bullshit, she is not showing a disregard for the truth. So it is neither necessary nor sufficient for every kind of bullshit that it be produced by one who is informed by indifference to the truth, or indeed, by any other distinctive intentional state” (Cohen, 2002: 331-2). This

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suggests that Frankfurt’s account may be confronted with a serious problem.

3. Cohen: Deeper into Bullshit 3.1 Bullshitters vs. Bullshit—or Producers vs. Product It is this kind of problem which, I believe, leads Cohen to go “Deeper into Bullshit” (2002),and to draw a distinction between (1) the intention of the producer of bullshit (that is bullshitting someone) and (2) the product that the bullshitter produces (the bullshit that he utters). For Frankfurt, as we have seen, bullshit is produced when one has a bullshitting intention; the essence of bullshit is the intention to bullshit someone that somehow lies behind it. Cohen, in contrast, holds that not all bullshit is bullshit, because it was produced with a bullshitting intention; some of it is bullshit simply by virtue of features of the statement or utterance itself, independently of the speaker’s intention (2002: 324). For example, what makes the “justifications” offered by government officials “bullshit” is not their intention in saying them, it is simply the terms themselves, the euphemisms and phrases they use in subverted ways which are bullshit. Similarly, what make much of “business-speak” bullshit is the phraseology and verbiage itself. Cohen is particularly concerned with a particular kind of bullshit—the kind that pervades some quarters of academia. As an example, he mentions scantily the writings of some Althusserian Marxists in France, but he holds in fact the view that much of French Philosophy quite generally is full of bullshit (2002: 322; 333).10 He describes a situation that academics of various stripes and philosophers, in particular, are familiar with. Reading pages and pages of impenetrable prose and jargon-filled text by some writer known for the complexity of his work, one sometimes 10 In a private communication, during which Cohen sent me an addendum (or part II) to his paper, “Deeper into Bullshit” (2002) dealing more extensively with the social, cultural, institutional, political and philosophical reasons why there is so much (much more than in other European countries) bullshit in Contemporary French Theory or Philosophy. He did not intend to publish it (as is, in any case) because of what he thought could be interpreted as a harsh and over-reaching criticism, bound to rekindle the flames between the so-called two main camps in contemporary philosophy, the Analytic vs. the Continental, or to put it differently, between the so-called “clear, precise and rigorous” vs. the “fuzzy, vague, and mystifying” approach to philosophy.

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gives up, brow-beaten into thinking that, as one cannot understand the presumably “deep and subtle points” the author is striving to make, s/he must be more sophisticated than one has assumed and perhaps even smarter than oneself. Cohen believes that such work is often bullshit, rather than being profound or too deep to understand. If one makes the effort to plow through, dig deeper, and persevere in our interpretative effort, past the mystifying jargon and distracting stylistic flourishes, to figure out what essentially is being said or stated, if anything at all, one finds that the text either makes no real sense, states something more obvious than it pretends or is willing to admit,11 or is simply flagrantly absurd and nonsensical. In Cohen’s view, the account offered by Frankfurt does not work well with this kind of bullshit for essentially two reasons. First, honest people often repeat on trust what other people seemingly trustworthy people say; if these people talk bullshit, this is liable to be repeated. But, on Frankfurt’s view, according to which bullshit requires dishonesty, as soon as the honest person repeats it, the utterance will stop being bullshit. Second, it is possible that an honest person may simply have a bullshit idea and voice it; especially if this is repeated by others, this person may even be encouraged to spout more similar bullshit and others may begin to produce such similarly packaged bullshit of their own under the spell of the original.12 Because of this possible disconnect between the shittiness of what is said and the utterer’s state of mind, Cohen thinks, as I pointed out earlier, that dishonesty is neither sufficient nor necessary for bullshit (2002: 331-2).

3.2 Bullshit as Produced “Unclarifiable Nonsense” Cohen’s approach consists in an effort to explain the features that an utterance or a statement must, as it were, “have in itself” if it is count as bullshit. Given Cohen’s interest, bullshit is seen as “a species of nonsense.” More specifically, he defines “bullshit” as that which is “unclarifiably unclear” or as “unclarifiable nonsense” (2002: 332-3). He does however 11 This, of course, does not discount the sobering view, according to which the main task of philosophy is “to make the obvious even more obvious than it appears”—as long as such a task is assumed honestly and sincerely. 12 Some may say that this is what happened among so-called “Lacanians” and followers of Lacan or among “deconstructionists” and followers of Derrida, both being viewed in some quarters as “master-bullshitters” (rather than “masterthinkers”).

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leave open the possibility that there can be even more sorts of bullshit, such as “rubbish” (arguments grossly deficient in logic or in sensitivity to empirical evidence) or “irretrievably speculative comment.”

3.3 Bullshit in Contemporary French Theory or Philosophy This may the right place to discuss some of the examples drawn from works by contemporary French philosophers among others, which have proved to be so much fodder for Sokal & Bricmont’s indictment of their bullshitting esp., when they write about the (natural or mathematical) sciences [in Intellectual Impostures (1998: 137-8ff)].13 Thus to say, as Baudrillard does, “…that the space of the event has become a hyperspace with multiple refractivity, and that the space of war has become definitively non-Euclidian” is so obscure that it does not really say anything. Similarly, it is hard to know what to make of passages like the following: In the Euclidian space of history, the shortest path between two points is the straight line, the line of Progress and Democracy. But this is only true of the linear space of the Enlightenment. In our non-Euclidian fin de siècle space, a baleful curvature unfailingly deflects all trajectories. This is doubtless linked to the sphericity of time (visible on the horizon of the end of the century, just as the earth’s sphericity is visible on the horizon at the end of the day) or the subtle distortion of the gravitational field. Perhaps history itself has to be regarded as a chaotic formation, in which acceleration puts an end to linearity and the turbulence created by acceleration deflects history definitively from its end, just as such turbulence distances effects from their causes.

What should we make of the following statement by Luce Irigaray?

13

Is “imposture” or “nonsense” the most apt term for characterizing the bullshitting of a number of contemporary French philosophers when discussing or writing about science? Therein lays, it seems, the cleavage between the English edition (Intellectual Impostures) and the American edition (Fashionable Nonsense) of Sokal & Bricmont’s book (1998)—which has caused such uproar in France where it was first published. In other words, which account better describes the kind of bullshit produced in some academic quarters, Frankfurt’s or Cohen’s? This is not, it seems, only a matter of editorial license, but a deeper philosophical problem.

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Essay # 3 Is E= mc2 a sexed question? Perhaps it is. Let us make the hypothesis that it is insofar as it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us. What seem to me to indicate the possibly sexed nature of the equation is not directly its uses by nuclear weapons; rather it is having privileged what goes the fastest…

Similarly, we must ask what is intended by Guattari or Deleuze when they write respectively as follows: We can clearly see that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear signifying links or arch-writing, depending on the author, and this multi-referential, multi-dimensional, machinic analysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality, the pathic non-discursive character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove us from the logic of the excluded middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the ontological binarism we criticized previously. In the first place, singularities-events correspond to heterogeneous series which are organized into a system which is neither stable nor unstable, but rather “metastable”, endowed with a potential energy wherein the differences between series are distributed…In the second place, singularities possess a process of auto-unification, always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses the series and makes them resonate, enveloping the corresponding singular points in a single aleatory point and all the emissions, all the dice throws, in a single cast.

Finally, what should we make, if anything, other than say that it is pure gibberish, when the revered Lacan writes? Thus, by calculating that signification according to the algebraic method used here, namely: S (signifier) —. —-= s (the statement), with S = (-1), produces [s = ¥-1] s (signified) Or when Lacan goes on to conclude that “the erectile organ...is equivalent to the ¥-1 of the signification produced above, of the jouissance that it restores by the coefficient of its statement to the function of lack of signifier (-1). “

If this is the kind of stuff they write when they write about the natural and mathematical sciences, should we not also be concerned about what

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they write in general about any other subject—whether it be in the social or human sciences or in the humanities at large? Should we not be concerned about the industrial output that followers of these so-called “master-thinkers” (or should I say, “master-bullshitters”) have produced under the banner of French Theory, Cultural Studies, or Postmodernist Philosophy more generally?

3.4 Bullshit and the Problem of Reflexivity Cohen’s disagreement with Frankfurt revolves around the following: whether bullshit should be characterized firstly in terms of the dishonest intent behind someone saying something, or in terms of some features of an utterance or statement independent of the intent with which it is uttered. Naturally, bullshit can also be characterized in both these terms. And Cohen considers in all fairness this possibility. But doesn’t this take away much of the precision that Frankfurt sought to bring in with his attempted “definition”? So perhaps, we should confront the question head-on, what is bullshit really? Is it someone deceiving another, or is it merely nonsense? To see if we can resolve the dispute, let’s consider the kind of bullshit that Cohen is clearly worried about. Let’s consider for example what is called “postmodernism” in the humanities. Even though the movement (if there was ever one) is probably on the way down, many philosophers have expressed concern about the fact that much bullshit masquerades as serious academic thought in postmodernism. What seems to puzzle and perhaps disturb Cohen (as well as other like-minded philosophers) about this movement is the absolute earnestness and preachy disposition with which its proponents attempt to convince scientists and analytic philosophers that the pursuit of truth in the whole of science is misguided, or worse yet, politically repressive. Frankfurt also seems to be concerned by the same trends, although he does not mention “postmodernism” by name. Instead, he talks of “various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are” (2005: 64). In order to avoid tarring unfairly all postmodernists with the same broad brush, let’s then follow Frankfurt’s lead and focus on the sorts of bullshit that worry Cohen. These include, the relativism about truth, according to which no one person may claim to have found the truth, because “nothing is ever really true or false anyway”. What is puzzling lies in the fact that many people seem to believe that there is no truth, and in exactly these terms. They repeat quite often enough that truth, and science, quite

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generally, is bunk. If what they say is indeed bullshit, as Cohen suspects, the problem is that the seriousness and honesty with which it is said, precludes it from being called bullshit on Frankfurt’s analysis. Furthermore, and quite apart from Cohen’s point, we often say of some people that they believe their own bullshit. What we mean is that they have become so caught up by the grand but empty things that they say and peddle to anyone willing to lend a gullible ear, and even attempt to act in ways bearing out this belief. Another problem for Frankfurt’s account then, is that, if bullshit involves one person attempting to deceive another, it seems difficult to explain how someone may come believe his/her own bullshit, as we so often say they do. Which account works best for this sort of bullshit? Cohen’s contribution brings up an aspect of the phenomenon that constitutes a serious challenge for Frankfurt’s account. Upon closer scrutiny however, his account in turn quickly shows its own difficulties and limitations. In the end, they both provide complementary insights into the phenomenon of bullshit, but, for reasons which shall be made clearer below, their respective account is limited and partial, and therefore in need of further development and additional considerations—as I will show in the forthcoming sections of this essay.

4. Cohen & Frankfurt Get Hoisted on their Own Petard The reason why Cohen gets hoisted on his own petard lies essentially with his defining bullshit as (unclarifiable) nonsense. Nonsense, in the philosophical sense, is a sentence that, while it may appear meaningful (because syntactically well-formed), is in fact not. A good example drawn from Chomsky’s work in linguistics is the following: “green ideas sleep furiously.” While this sentence pretends to say something about how the world is it in fact says nothing—other than evoking “poetically” some unexpected and surprising associations.14 One could even say that it is ununderstandable gibberish, or something of which we cannot say what would be the case if it were true. If this is nonsense, the problem for Cohen is that no one can truly believe it. What would it be for green ideas 14

I don’t think it is appropriate or tenable to exclude much of poetry as nonsense. Though it may not say, assert, or state something, poetry does suggest, evoke, allude, inspire, edify, and does probably so many other ineffable things that only poets and those with the right literary or aesthetic sensibility know about.

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to sleep furiously? Is this the way the world is like? Are ideas green? Do they sleep? Furiously? Now, and in contrast, try believing this instead: “the book I am reading, On Bullshit, is on the table,” or “my dog is called ‘Kat’,” or “the flowers have been placed in a vase.” In order to explain what he seeks to explain, (i.e., essentially honest academics telling us what they say in their works), Cohen has to assume that these people actually do believe what they say [see previous examples drawn from Sokal & Bricmont (1998)], something they cannot do if bullshit is nonsense. To say something honestly, one has to believe what one says, if bullshit is pure nonsense, it cannot be believed, and therefore, also cannot be said honestly. Cohen’s account is confronted with another problem—identified by Frankfurt. Cohen does not define what it is for an utterance or a statement to be unclear; in fact, he refuses to do so. For Frankfurt, this may amount to Cohen “…hoisting his account of bullshit by his own petard….” Not being able to define clarity, Cohen’s own account is unclear, and therefore, bullshit by its own standards” (Frankfurt, 2002: 341-2). Cohen’s concern, however, is serious and definitely not bullshit—this is the sort of bullshit that I also think we should be concerned about. So it is a shortcoming of his theory that it is liable to be lumped in together with bullshit by its own criterion. Cohen’s attempt to define bullshit as that which is “unclarifiably unclear” (or “unclarifiable nonsense”) fails for two reasons: firstly, nonsense is not something that anyone can honestly believe or say, and secondly, nonsense is not something that Cohen has defined in any useful or convincing way, so far. In all fairness, it should be noted that Cohen acknowledges the difficulty of providing a “theory of nonsense’’ for this would presume defining “sense” and “clarity,” which, he admits, cannot be done easily. His recognition may be motivated in part by his recollection of the failure of the verificationist project (Logical Positivism), which, in a sense, also sought to define bullshit (“metaphysics”) as nonsense.15 If we were to ask, for example, how could one defend Hegel and Heidegger—not to mention all the contemporary authors who take after them in some way or 15 One could as easily also mention Wittgenstein’s attempt in this regard, to define bullshit as “speaking where one should remain silent,” or as idling language,” or Kant’s when warning against “making knowledge claims about those things or phenomena which cannot be the objects of experience, are beyond the concepts and categories of our understanding, and of which we cannot know anything.”

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another—from the charge that their writings are bullshit—pure and concentrated or diluted and watered-down, whatever the specific case may be? I take it that Cohen would respond as follows: not by showing that they cared about the truth. This would be enough to get them off the hook, so to speak, if they were charged with being bullshitters under Frankfurt’s account. Rather, he would argue, one should try to show that their writings actually made some sense. Failing to have such an option, we might perhaps better be able to do so if we could prove the opposite, namely, that a given statement is hopelessly unclear (unclarifiable), and hence bullshit. Cohen’s proposed test is to add a “not” to the statement and see if this makes any difference to its plausibility. If it does not, then we can conclude that the statement is in fact nonsense or bullshit.16

5. Amendment and Improvement of Frankfurt’s Account Frankfurt also recognizes also the distinctively academic variety of bullshit as one particular kind in the lush garden,17 but he does not think that it is very dangerous compared with the sort of bullshit he is concerned about. While genuinely meaningless or nonsensical discourse may be infuriating and frustrating, or even constitute some sort of “pollution,” it is unlikely to be taken seriously for very long, Frankfurt believes, even in the academic world. The sort of bullshit that involves indifference to truth and veracity is in contrast far more insidious, in Frankfurt’s view. For, as he points out, “the conduct of civilized life, and the vitality of the institutions that are indispensable to it, depend very fundamentally on respect for the distinction between the true and the false.” How evil is the bullshitter? That depends on the how valuable truthfulness is. When Frankfurt observes that truthfulness is crucial in maintaining the sense of trust on which social cooperation depends, he is appealing to the instrumental value of truth. Whether truth has any value in itself, intrinsically, however, is a separate and far more challenging 16

Ironically, I was told by a Heideggerian scholar that Heidegger himself seems to have made precisely such a move. In the 4th edition of his work, “What is Metaphysics?” (1943), he stated “Being can indeed be without beings.” In the 5th edition (1949), this sentence becomes: “Being never is without beings.” 17 In his reply to Cohen, Frankfurt writes with some humor: “If I am reluctant to endorse Cohen’s claim that the sort of bullshit on which my attention was focused “is just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit,” it is not because I doubt his claim is true, it is only because I cannot help recalling that bullshit is an animal product and not a plant.”

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question—which deserves to be taken up in its own right in another context? (See Williams, 2002 for a compelling discussion in this regard). In the meantime, one might be tempted to conclude that the preceding analysis reinforces Frankfurt’s account as a plausible account of bullshit. I must quickly add however that the phenomenon that Cohen has identified (seemingly honest theorists of all sorts talking bullshit), not to mention the possibility that someone may come to believe his or her own bullshit, still poses some problems and challenges for Frankfurt’s account. At least two are worth mentioning: (1) how should we explain the fact that people may seem to talk bullshit even when they are entirely honest? (2) How should we explain the often noted fact that some people come “to believe their own bullshit”? Let’s consider what Frankfurt could say regarding the first problem. His answer might be to simply make the case that one cannot straightforwardly and without further qualification identify “unclarifiable nonsense” with bullshit, or hold an entire movement, tradition, or school of academic and philosophical thought to be bullshit. For Cohen, as we have seen earlier, anyone uttering a given unclear (unclarifiably unclear) statement can be said to be talking bullshit. Whereas, on Frankfurt’s account, before this epithet can be warranted one has to make sure that there was dishonesty behind the statement. In short, it is harder to make an accusation of Frankfurt bullshit stick. One could of course argue that this is indeed the right (or desirable) outcome. In other words, this is as it should be. Accusing someone of bullshitting, on Frankfurt’s account, is tantamount to accusing someone of dishonesty, and like all accusations of dishonesty, it is sensible to presume, it should not be made lightly. After all, bullshit is a loaded term and still a profanity for most people.18 Perhaps it is best reserved for cases of provable dishonesty or disregard for the truth. To do so however would be tantamount to saying that Cohen’s identification of much of what passes for French Theory or Philosophy today as bullshit is not grounded or judicious and therefore unwelcome. It is too strong a claim to make and uphold, perhaps even unfair. What would Frankfurt say about the second, and more challenging, problem? Let’s recall that, for Frankfurt, bullshit involves deception. If one were to believe one’s own bullshit, then this would presuppose 18

This is the case in the US or in China, for that matter, or anywhere else in between.

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deceiving oneself. But on the face of it, it is hard to see how this may be possible. Deception requires that the deceived not know that he is being deceived. If deceiver and deceived are one and the same person, then this appears impossible. And yet, common experience and a minimal knowledge of human psychology tell us that people do deceive themselves, more often than they would admit or than one would think.19 Can we then explain “coming to believe one’s own bullshit” in a Frankfurt account as a case of self-deception? Let us consider the case of someone who bullshits people repeatedly and with great success. His bullshitting behavior becomes second nature, more or less automatic: he repeats his own bullshit without giving it another thought. Now, suppose that the memory of the original deception begins to fade in the bullshitter’s mind, and that others encourage him to admire what he himself has said in the past. This person might be said to have become someone who repeats the bullshit of another, and less of an original bullshitter. We would say that he ends up believing his own bullshit, but that what he believes is still bullshit, by virtue of some implicit or background “chain of causal reference,”20 due to the fact that, when it was originally said, it was bullshit. We could then say that, on this construal, bullshit is something said (or believed) by someone who does not care about the truth of what he says, and says what he says to impress others or repeats something first said with that intention. In either case, what is actually said may be (trivially) true or simply false, or it may be nonsense. It does not really matter which it is as to whether what is said (and possibly believed) is bullshit. Or does it?

6. Bullshit—Research, Detection, and Busting Before proceeding further in this last section, it might be useful to take stock of my analysis so far. I have argued essentially that Frankfurt takes an activity-centered approach, concerned with the process of bullshitting, 19

Interestingly, recent research in clinical and cognitive psychology has established that there is a significant correlation between self-deception and mental health. In some respect, they confirm the view according to which realists (those less able to engage or indulge in self-deception) are very likely to be pessimists and depressives, while those who entertain a rosy and optimistic picture and a deluded vision of themselves are likely to be “healthier” mentally, and perhaps even more capable of coping with the trials and tribulations of daily living. 20 I am here referring to the kind of chain put into play by Kripke in his theory of Naming and Necessity (1980). Admittedly, this line of reasoning may seem to be stretched, and its plausibility questionable. Nevertheless, it could perhaps serve to bolster a Frankfurt’s account on this score.

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or producing bullshit, and which, for this reason, focuses primarily on the state of mind or intention of the bullshitter, not so much his goal, or his product. To use Cohen’s phrase, the focus, in Frankfurt’s activity-processintention-based account, is on the bull rather than the shit. Though his distinction between bullshit and lying is useful in some sense, it remains arguably inadequate, and the examples he interprets for this purpose are problematic and unconvincing. Besides, his characterization of the “essence” of “bullshit” as “indifference to truth or how things truly and really are” is itself bullshit because the latter phenomenon has no essence, to speak of. Nevertheless, it provides us with a clue as to one aspect or manifestation of “bullshit” particularly in the realm of everyday life, his primary focus. I have also shown how Cohen takes in contrast to Frankfurt an outputcentered approach, concerned with the product produced, namely, the shit, as a result of bullshitting, putting into play certain tactics, with special attention being paid to the goals (standard vs. ultimate) of the bullshitter, but regardless of how we may (or may not) characterize the intentions or state of mind of the bullshitter. The motives for producing bullshit are many and varied. Cohen’s output-product-[goal & tactic]-based account avoids, in my view, the pitfalls and weaknesses of Frankfurt’s, and gives us a treatment in which the focus is one the shit rather than the bull. Unlike Frankfurt, who is primarily focused on bullshit in everyday life, Cohen is particularly interested in the kind of bullshit that he was (almost) victim of in his youth, and about which he has become in his own words “the least tolerant people I know,” namely, the kind that academics and especially some philosophers—particularly though not exclusively French philosophers—are prone to engage in. According to him, the “essence” of bullshit is best characterized as “unclarifiable unclarity or obscurity”—of the kind that cannot even be redeemed in terms of any degree of plausibility by a “not” being inserted or subtracted (if it has one) in a given text or statement. Given the pervasiveness of this kind of bullshit in certain areas of philosophical and semi-philosophical culture, Cohen urges us to conduct a struggle against it. He recognizes that “something important is at stake here, and the character of what is at stake makes the bullshitter/bullshit distinction important,” to boot, there is a lot of work aiming at obscurity and sowing conspicuously a lack of concern with truth in philosophicalbullshit production. He nevertheless recommends that the “proper polemical target” be bullshit and not bullshitters. “These moral faults

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should not be our primary focus,” he writes, but “we may hope that success in discrediting the product will contribute to extinguishing the process.” In the end, though Cohen admits to the political nature of the struggle against bullshit, he seems to believe that the logical rigor of oldfashioned Analytic philosophy carried out in accord with rational and objective criteria of judgment and evaluation will enable us to stem the rising tide of bullshit and ultimately of bullshitters in academia. However, if Analytic philosophy so conceived has not been able to do so in its heydays, why should we be optimistic that it can do so at this juncture, or in these times of rampant and empty rhetoric? Besides, couldn’t the case be made that Analytic Philosophy also have its own brand of bullshit?21 I am inclined to argue for a third approach, which is not so much concerned with what is bullshit (the process or product), but with when is bullshit (as both process and product), and the context(s) in which it is traded. Admittedly, both Frankfurt and Cohen touch upon this aspect as well, but only in a secondary manner, as an afterthought, as it were. My approach in contrast will not so much be focused on the internal point of view [bullshitter (producer)—bullshit (product)], as it will be on the external point of view, namely, the impact of bullshit (as process and product) on individuals, groups, and communities, and ultimately on culture and society, its normative practices, values and ideals [Bullshitter (Producer)—Bullshit (Product)—Bullshittee(s) (Consumer(s) or Victim(s) in Situated Contexts)]. Such an approach would be properly archaeological-genealogical in character. Apart from the purely conceptual, linguistic analysis of the concept, it would offer us an apprehension of the social phenomenon that would be useful, I believe, not only for the purpose of academic study but most critically for that of political engagement and struggle. In what direction lies the way forward in terms of bullshit research, detection, and busting—for those seriously interested in the phenomenon, its exponential growth and prevalence? Does it lie in deciding whether bullshit involves, to put it succinctly, a deliberate attempt at dishonesty and misrepresentation on the bullshitter’s part, or whether it involves instead something that can be bullshit by virtue of some distinctive and 21 Admittedly, this remains to be documented and established. It would have to be done more than likely by taking a different tack on bullshit—not so much by looking for “unclarifiable nonsense,” but perhaps by considering how the obsessive concern with “rigor, clarity, and precision” can also be a source of a different kind of bullshit.

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autonomous features or characteristics of the utterance or statement? Isn’t such an attempt to “define” bullshit, or to choose between two “definitions” itself an instance of academic bullshit? The argument can certainly be made. One could even argue that what both Frankfurt and Cohen write is itself bullshit (of a different sort), or even a clever parody on Analytic philosophy. This is not to deny however those interested in, and writing on, bullshit may well be serious in their intent. They are undoubtedly interested in explaining why there is so much of it, its ubiquity, and its multiple and varied functions in diverse contexts (Mears, 2002). And in the process, they may be interested in providing those who object to it and who are “allergic” to it some critical tools which could enable them to detect, bust, and immunize themselves against bullshit whenever or wherever they are confronted with it. Thus, we could understandably view the attempt to “define” bullshit as part of the general effort to maintain the conviction that some utterances, statements, forms of exchange, or communications must (not) be disapproved, and to say which ones they are. It would be misguided to say for example that all of postmodernism, all of French Theory or Philosophy (or any other philosophical tradition or movement) is bullshit. Regardless of our philosophical affiliation, we would presumably want to be able to distinguish between (1) honest and truthful expression (2) lying, and (3) talking-writing bullshit, or bullshitting. This in turn presupposes that we uphold a plausible and defensible conception of “truth.” If one were to claim, as some postmodernists have, that there is no truth at all, wouldn’t this effectively undermine the distinction between (1), (2) and (3)? It might be appropriate to recall here one of the major concerns of Frankfurt: why is there so much bullshit in our culture? He recognizes that that there may be many reasons for this unprecedented state of affairs in our history, and it is precisely at this point, I believe, that the relevance and comparative advantage of an archaeological-genealogical approach can perhaps best be seen. Frankfurt explicitly discusses the following two: (1) Bullshit is “unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about” (2005: 63). More and more people (democratic or cosmopolitan citizens) are impelled to speak about things they know very little about, or about which they are to some degree ignorant, and to appear all the while as “experts.”

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(2) The impact of radical, anti-realism doctrines, postmodern critiques of truth, rationality, and objectivity,—not to mention the fact that “sincerity” has become an alternative ideal to “truth”, and thereby making “sincerity” itself bullshit (see Richardson, 2006). The proliferation and exponential growth of bullshit is due to the philosophical zeitgeist promoted by “various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are” (2005: 64). While we may readily agree with Frankfurt on the first reason, what should we think of his second reason? Is it the case that skepticism about truth and objectivity can only lead to much bullshit? A straightforward argument can be unpacked to show that here again Frankfurt is right on the mark. If the (philosophical and common) zeitgeist is such that we cannot say what things truly are, or we believe that there is no “how things truly are,” then of course this will lead to the proliferation of bullshit. If there are no facts of the matter as to how anything truly is, then anything goes. There can no better or worse descriptions, no genuine or false assertions, no lying or its opposite at all. Everything we would say in such a world would be bullshit, and at the same time, nothing would be. But if this was the case, then we would have to say that everything is somehow fake. This would not make sense however, unless we also have a notion of what is not fake. In other words, if there is fake speech, it is because we can distinguish it from genuine or real speech. Similarly, there cannot be fake art or fake money unless the real thing exists. Paradoxically, the very existence of bullshit seems to demonstrate that language users are for the most part really concerned with making assertions that purport to be about reality, about how things truly are. So, the view according to which no one can ever say or think something true, or that all thought and speech is simply incoherent and untenable. In the absence of truth, everything is bullshit, and nothing ever is. We have already ventured beyond the bounds of binary logic, and are in flagrant violation of the principle of noncontradiction. Let us consider a slightly different variant of the view that Frankfurt seeks to impugn. Instead of holding that there is no truth at all that can be reflected or not in what we say, one can argue that there is no one truth, but many different truths. Under such a view, we may say that each of us has her own individual truth, or that different cultures have their own

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truths. This is tantamount obviously to a form of relativism, which is rampant today, and which is often impugned to the legacy of Nietzsche’s perspectivism upon contemporary thought. Though I would be prepared to dispute (in another context) the culpability of Nietzsche in this regard, it is easy enough to show, independently of its possible source, why such a relativism whether in its subjectivist-individualist or cultural form is untenable and even incoherent (see Essay # 2). A straightforward application of Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language—in the Philosophical Investigations (1953) would suffice to undermine the subjectivist or individualist version of the relativism here in question. It simply does not work to say that there are many different truths for different individuals to aim at when they use language to speak or make an assertion. If, as language user, I only aim to believe and say something that is “true for me” but not “true for you,” then no one can ever fail to be correct. The word “true” loses its meaning: there is no point in calling anything “true.” It only makes sense if we assume that the beliefs or assertions to which it is applied could be wrong. But no one can ever be wrong if by “true” we only mean “true for me” and not “true for you.” If the game of believing and saying things is such that each of us can only aim to believe and say what is true for each one of us, who would want to play it? We would be always already winners. In some sense, it is not a real game. Relativism, in its subjectivist or individualist version, is untenable. As for the cultural version of relativism, it can also be disposed of by an application of the argument articulated by Davidson in his well-known paper “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1984) in which he discusses the possibility of people with radically different conceptual schemes. In a nutshell, it comes down to this: it does not make sense to say that each culture has its own culturally specific truth that it aims for. Let us consider the case of two presumably different cultures, American and Chinese. If believing for Americans is a matter of aiming at truth according to American culture and believing for Chinese is aiming at truth for Chinese culture, and these two types of truths are radically different, then it is fair to say that the Americans and Chinese would not both be believing except in their different ways; we might even have to say that they have completely different cognitive attitudes. If we wish to maintain that they both believe, then we would have to accept that they are doing something similar when they believe. It must be something similar

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enough that we can best make sense of by holding that they are both aiming to represent the same external reality as honestly and accurately as possible. When people from different cultures believe certain things, we would have to hold that they are indeed engaged in the same activity. Otherwise, we would not be able to make sense of people from other cultures as thinking beings at all, if we did not view them as believers or if we could not see them as getting (or failing to get) at the truth, just as we might also take ourselves to be hitting or missing the truth. For the American to make sense of the Chinese as a thinking being, the Chinese needs, when believing, to aim at the same cognitive target as the American, or at least, at a cognitive target that the American can understand, which amounts to saying the same thing, and, of course, vice versa. In sum, Davidson’s point I take it is this: rather than being different, cultures must at least similar enough so that we can call the members of those cultures believers. This requires enough of an overlap between what they all actually believe that we can no longer talk in a meaningful way about “truth-for-a-culture.” Radical cultural relativism is thus untenable. Despite all efforts in recent decades to defend relativism, it cannot provide us with a viable account of truth.22 And as I pointed out earlier, this is precisely what we need if we are going to make a meaningful distinction between (1) honest or truthful expression, (2) lying, and (3) talking—writing bullshit, or bullshitting. Everyone, in academia or outside, would want to be able to say of him or herself that he or she is making a statement or assertion truthfully and honestly, when this is indeed the case. And one can only say this if one does believe the statement or assertion to be true, when one says it. The notion of truthfulness or honesty, in academia as well as outside, presupposes that one is aiming at the truth in what one says. If bullshit involves “expressly disparaging truth,” then some versions of postmodernism may be considered to be “bullshit [that has] risen to consciousness of itself” (Cohen, 2002: 333). Saying that “there is no truth” is not bullshit, however; it is making a false statement, which provides the perfect alibi for much of the bullshit in our times by undermining the very idea that anyone can ever speak truthfully or honestly.

22 Bernard Williams makes a very illuminating effort in that direction with his essay in genealogy, Truth and Truthfulness (2002).

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References Aberdein, Andrew. (2006). “Raising the Tone: Definition, Bullshit, and the Definition of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 151-170. Bernal, Sara. (2006). “Bullshit and Personality.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 63-82. Black, Max. (1983). “The Prevalence of Humbug.” In The Presence of Humbug and Other Essays. www.ditext.com/black/humbug Brandenburg, Heinz. (2006). “Short of Lying—The Prevalence of Bullshit in Political Communication.” Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, Reading, April, 4-6, 2006. www.psa.ac.uk/2006/pps/Brandenburg.pdf Buss, S. & Overton, L. (Eds.). (2002). Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. (A Festschrift). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chokr, Nader N. (1991). Clusters’ Last Stand: Toward a Theory of the Process of Meaning-Making in Science. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Service, pp. 1-437. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/19075 or http://en.scientificcommons.org/36480998 —. (2009). Unlearning, or How Not to Be Governed. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic—Societas: Essays in Political and Cultural Criticism. Cohen, G.A. (2002). “Deeper into Bullshit.” In Buss, S. & Overton, L. (eds.) Contours of Agency. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 321-339. [Reprinted in Hardcastle & Reich, Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, 2006, pp. 117-136]. Davidson, D. (1984). “Radical Interpretation.” In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. —. (1984). “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. de Waal, Cornelis. (2006). “The Importance of Being Earnest: A Pragmatic Approach to Bullshitting.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 99-114. Evans, Marc. (2006). “The Republic of Bullshit—On the Dumbing Up of Democracy.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 185-202. Frankfurt. H. (1986). “On Bullshit.” Raritan 6: 81-100. —. (1988). On Bullshit. In The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, pp. 117-133. —. (2002). “Reply to G.A. Cohen.” In Buss, S. & Overton, L. (eds.) Contours of Agency. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 340-344. —. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fuller, Steve. (2006). “Just Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 241-258. Hardcastle, Gary L. & Reisch, George A. (Eds.). (2006). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court (Popular Culture and Philosophy Series). Hardcastle, Gary L. (2006). “The Unity of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 137-150.

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Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Maes, H. & Schaubroeck, K. (2006). “Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 171-182. Mears, Daniel P. (2002). “The Ubiquity, Functions, and Contexts of Bullshitting.” Journal of Mundane Behavior 3/2. www.mundanebehavior.org/issues/v3n2/ mears.htm Neumann, Vanessa. (2006). “Political Bullshit and the Stoic Story of Self.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 203-214. Preti, Consuelo. (2006). “A Defense of Common Sense.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 19-32. Reisch, George A. (2006). “The Pragmatics of Bullshit.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 33-48. Richardson, Alan. (2006). “Performing Bullshit and the Post-Sincere Condition.” In Hardcastle & Reisch (Eds.). Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court, pp. 83-98. Sokal, A. & Bricmont, J. (1998). Intellectual Impostures. London: Profile. [Published in the American edition as Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. NY: Picador, USA]. Williams, Bernard. (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. NJ: Princeton University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. New York: MacMillan.

ESSAY # 4 EMBODIED AND SITUATED COGNITION: SIGNIFICANCE AND PROMISE OF A PARADIGM SHIFT

1. From Thinking-Things to Embodied-Situated Minds If one takes a survey of the history of Western philosophy over the past half century or so, one would come to recognize that there has been a concerted effort to rethink the nature of cognition.1 On the deconstructive side, it has consisted essentially in questioning the whole notion of a disincarnate mind as a coherent object of investigation that is crucial for what it could reveal about the nature of human beings and their particular experience of the world, and in shunning and rejecting the related notions of “internal mental operations or representations as mirror of the world.” On the constructive side, it has consisted in focusing instead on the fact that most thinking in the real-world takes place in very particular (and often very complex) environments, is employed for very practical ends and purposes, and exploits the possibility of interaction with, and manipulation of, external and internal objects. In this way, the idea of “cognition” as a highly embodied and situated (and even constructive) activity slowly but surely regained its long overdue credit and recognition,2 and the suggestion that thinking beings are first and foremost “acting beings,” and therefore “embodied minds” began to take hold—not only in philosophy, but across a broad range of disciplines, most notably, 1

My diagnosis here is in agreement with the conclusion reached, among others, by Michael L. Anderson in his in-depth and detailed, critical survey of the field (2003: 91-130). My analysis in the foregoing discussion is greatly indebted to his illuminating treatment as will be attested by all the references throughout this essay. 2 In fact, one could argue that the idea is not new as much as it has been recovered by a radical reinterpretation of the history of Western philosophy.

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in social and cultural studies, which have been more readily receptive to such an idea, and as of late, in the cognitive sciences as well.3 We might even say that a “paradigm shift”4 took place as a result. It corresponds basically to the shift in focus from Descartes’ “thinking thing” and the concomitant picture of human beings in relation to the world and conception of subjectivity that subsequently emerged, to Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world’ and the concomitant picture and conception of subjectivity that followed in which “agency” and “interactive coping” play a central role. 5 This is arguably an important development in Western philosophy whose implications have not yet been drawn fully nor assessed properly as to their theoretical, methodological and practical consequences. In this essay, I examine the significance and promise of the “paradigm shift” evinced by the emergence and reception of the “embodied and situated cognition” research program (ESC)6 in the past few decades in an 3

There seems to have been however a time-lag and discrepancy between disciplines in terms of the impact of this idea, which may be the object of a worthwhile inquiry. In any case, it is fair to say that such rethinking began to take place only very recently, in the past 15-20 years or so, in other areas, such as the cognitive sciences, and in AI in particular, due in some good measure to the critical work of Dreyfus (1972/1992) and Brooks (1999), among others. I have myself urged and defended such effort in an earlier paper (Chokr, 1992). 4 By this expression, I mean to characterize the kind of radical change that take place when one outlook is substituted for another, or when a research program (with its assumptions, hypotheses, claims, theses, problem-solving methods and other tools, etc.) is increasingly adopted by a wider community of inquirers, and the established framework is subsequently jettisoned as inadequate and problematic (see Kuhn, 1970). 5 It would not be farfetched to situate the path taken by Foucault, Deleuze, and even Derrida, each in their way, as well as that of numerous other contemporary philosophers and phenomenologists, within this post-Cartesian and postHeideggerian horizon in which “the subject” has somehow been made “flesh,” and her body revealed to be far more constructed and constrained by the sociohistorical context (by language, discourse, and power/knowledge) than was assumed by traditional philosophy. 6 Naturally such a program comprises in fact various alternative formulations and versions (see Wilson, 2006; Cowart, 2006 for comments along this line), and it might be perhaps objectionable to adumbrate all of them in one category, as I have. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that despite differences and divergences between them, the various proposals for ESC seem to converge on a set of basic assumptions and claims. It is not unreasonable therefore to proceed as I do herein by identify the ESC program on such a basis. Besides, unlike those who prefer to

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attempt to figure out what all the fuss is about? Such program puts in question age-old assumptions, dichotomies and distinctions in the history of Western philosophy stretching back to Plato and onward to Descartes and beyond, up to the so-called “cognitivist framework” (CF), which has come to dominate in both (Anglo-American) philosophy and the cognitive sciences. 7 In order to better understand the main point(s) of contention between these programs, I begin by tracing historically the emergence of CF to the Cartesian legacy—properly understood and interpreted, and proceed to characterize the fundamental contrast between CF and ESC, as I see it, in light of some of the empirical work that has been done in recent years within the context of the latter in various fields, including developmental cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence/life/robotics, and the neurosciences.8 I then turn to a discussion of the notions of “embodiment” and “situatedness” in order to delineate the proper and necessary philosophical context for understanding ultimately what is at stake, in an effort to see how they are best “cashed in” both theoretically and empirically within the ESC research program. For this purpose, I consider briefly the works of phenomenologists such as Heidegger (1962), Merleau-Ponty (1989; 2002), and Schutz (1972; 1978; 1999), whose contributions in this context are unquestionable. I also examine the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1999) to take a proper critical measure of its contribution.9

separate this unified research program into two distinct component programs, one that is called “embodied cognition” and the other, “situated cognition,” I proceed by merging them together for reasons which shall become clearer by the end of my discussion. In the meantime, it may suffice to say that we are thus more likely to make progress on this agenda, and better understand human cognition in both its simplicity and complexity, as not only an embodied, but as a social and cultural activity. 7 One may speculate about the reasons why CF did not get the same kind of reception in Continental European philosophy as it did in Anglo-American Analytic philosophy. As I will suggest later in my discussion, the tradition of postHusserlian phenomenology in the former may go a long way to explain why. 8 I am here thinking in particular of the work of Thelen & Smith (1994), Thelen (1995, 2001), Brooks (1991, 1999, 2002), and Varela et al (1991), but obviously many more names could be mentioned here. 9 I follow in this regard the path charted by Anderson (2003: 103-109). It is nowadays widely recognized that the phenomenological tradition constitutes an

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In a final section, I refocus on the situatedness of human cognition in order to make a modest proposal that further emphasizes its importance and significance within a properly conceived ESC research program, in which, I contend despite claims to the contrary, the distinction between “embodied” and “situated cognition” does not make much sense. This much at least should become clearer by the end of my discussion. If, indeed, one of the challenges of the ESC research program is to provide a compelling account of what is meant by “embodiment” and what this entails (in terms of constraints, prescriptions or possibilities), the other challenge has to do with the meaning of our “situatedness” (not just in a natural environment but always in a socio-cultural context) as embodied beings, and the role that it (our understanding or perception of it) plays not only in low-level cognition, but most importantly, in high-level cognitive activities as well.10 In closing, I argue that the proposal I make about how it is best construed has, I believe, profound implications for future work at the intersection of philosophy, the cognitive sciences and socio-cultural studies, and possibly for re-conceiving these endeavors and their relations altogether.

important and incontrovertible source of insights into our embodied situatedness in the lived world. 10 Obviously, this will entail the rejection of certain assumptions and answering certain central questions differently than we have in the past. For example, can we properly understand its nature if cognition is conceived as involving merely the internal processes of an organism? Can and should “cognition” be distinguished from “perception”—as has been traditionally done? How does it relate to action, language and thought? Etc. From the start, we can safely assume however the uncontroversial distinction between low-level cognition (involving practically-oriented and concrete everyday tasks) and higher-level cognitive processes (involving more abstract, theoretical, second-order thinking). The question here is, as we shall see, whether a given account of cognition satisfactorily explains both levels (i.e., of cognitive simplicity and complexity), and whether the latter is accounted for in a substantially different way than the former. Besides, in view of the significance we accord to our understanding and perception of our situatedness as embodied beings in the socio-cultural context, most specifically, we might more readily come to see why a strict distinction between embodied and situated cognition is not theoretically tenable—except for methodological reasons.

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2. Cartesianism, Cognitivism, Post-Cognitivism or ESC Paradigm 2.1 The Cartesian Legacy It is widely assumed among philosophers that it is Descartes who has bequeathed upon us the duality of mind and body—or as some would prefer to put it, the “mind-body problem,” which we perhaps never really had. But as Anderson argues (2003: 92), this cliché, like other pieces of entrenched “common knowledge,” is inaccurate in some respects. He points out, quite rightly I believe, that Descartes’ arguments for the separation of body and soul are in fact part of a long legacy of dualistic thinking—stretching all the way back to Plato’s discussion of the immateriality of the soul, and to Christian metaphysical doctrine, which has presumably perpetuated such a discussion. Furthermore, he remarks that, for anyone who cares “to read the text,” although for Descartes body and soul were conceptually, and therefore, ontologically distinct, they nevertheless formed an empirical unity. The Cartesian legacy, properly understood and interpreted, consists, according to Anderson (2003: 92), in a way of thinking about our relation to the world—in particular, our epistemological relation—which serves to support and strengthen this ontological stance (see also O’DonovanAnderson, 1996, 1997). Thus he writes: Descartes’ famous ontological realization that he is a “thinking thing” is conditioned and tempered, one might say, by the epistemological admission that all he had accepted as most true had come to him through the senses; yet, it is precisely this intrusion of “the body” between “knowledge” and “the world” which is in the end unacceptable. The body must be part of the causal order to allow for perceptual interaction, but it is both unreliable (a cause of the senses’ deception) and, as it were, too reliable (because driven by physical forces, and therefore, a potential source of un-freedom). Thus, the body is for Cartesian philosophy both necessary and unacceptable, and this ambivalence drives mind and body apart in ways Descartes himself may not have intended (Anderson, 2003: 92-93; italics in text).

The explanation given further by Anderson runs as follows. While sensation requires the physicality of the body, the freedom and reliability of human reason and judgment seem to require the autonomy of the soul. If we have no choice about how the world appears to us—being somehow

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determined by our physical constitution—we can nevertheless step back from appearances, and allow for reflection and judgment, even if in the end this could lead to a skeptical attitude, and simply suspending or withholding belief. The postulation of “an inner arena” of “disengaged representation,” influenced to be sure by experience, but governed by reasons and not causes, is surely a natural way to try to account for this possibility (2003: 93).11 This is, I believe, the path that Descartes took, thereby underwriting what Dennett (1991) called a “theater model of the mind.” Furthermore, according to Anderson, this kind of reasoning and the tensions they evinced seem to have clearly played a crucial role in another, and arguably more important aspect of Descartes’ worldview, which is not often noted or appreciated enough in this context, and that is, the distinction between animals and humans. As we know, for Descartes, animals are mere mechanisms; though they may be complex and interesting in many ways, they are but mere physical automata or machines (1991: 365-6, 374). They clearly do have sensations, as attested by their biological endowment. 12 But, they arguably lack “thought” as attested by the fact that they do not possess a doubly articulated form of “language.” It is this denial that “sensing” and “acting” in the world require “thinking,” coupled with the identification of thinking with the higher-order reasoning and abstraction paradigmatically displayed in language use which constitutes, in Anderson’s view, the truest core of the Cartesian legacy. He believes quite rightly, I think, that it is from this legacy that the central assumptions and claims of cognitivism have somehow been derived (2003: 93).

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For a more substantial discussion and critique of the so-called “Cartesian disengagement” from a Heideggerian perspective, see Guignon (1983). 12 Here is what Descartes writes in this regard: “Please note that I am speaking of thought, and not of life or sensation. I do not deny life to animals, since I regard it as consisting simply in the heat of heart, and I do not even deny sensation, in so far as it depends upon a bodily organ. Thus my opinion is not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to human beings—at least to those who are not given to the superstitions of Pythagoras—since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill animals” (1991, Vol. III: 366; cited in Anderson, 2003: 93n4). [Pythagoras and his followers were presumably “vegetarians”].

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2.2 Cognitivism as a Research Framework Cognitivism as a research framework is arguably based on the following central claim: the functions of the human mind—of thinking— can be accounted for in terms of the manipulation of abstract symbols according to explicit rules. It is generally taken to comprise three elements: (1) representation, (2) formalism, and (3) rule-based transformations (Anderson, 2003: 93; see also Dreyfus, 1992; Clark, 1997). First, it defends the idea that cognition involves most importantly representation. In this sense, cognitivism is committed to the existence of “distinct, identifiable, inner or mental states or processes”—that is, symbols (broadly construed), “whose systemic or functional role is to stand in for specific features or states of affairs” (Clark, 1997: 43). Mental representations are thus seen somehow as mirrors of the world.13 However, just as in modern (formal) logic, and this brings us to the second element, it is the form of the symbol (or the proposition of which the symbol is a part), and not its “meaning,” which is the basis of the rule-based transformation. 14 Finally, we have the third most important aspect of cognitivism, namely, the commitment to explicitly specifiable rules of thought. In fact, this commitment follows naturally from the others: having disconnected the form of the symbol from its meaning, cognitivism rules out the possibility of content-sensitive processing, and only requires formal rules to govern the transformation from one cognitive state to another (Anderson, 2003: 93-94).15 Cognition is for the most part viewed 13

This is clearly reminiscent of Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), in which he articulates an indictment of Modern and Analytic philosophy by focusing on its underlying conception of “representations as mirrors.” 14 To some degree, of course, such formal abstraction is a necessary condition for representation—the token for “red” in my mental lexicon is not itself red, nor does it necessarily share any of the other properties of red. Indeed, the relation between sign and signifier seems in this sense necessarily arbitrary (despite possible suggestions to the contrary), and this thereby enforces a kind of distance between the “inner arena” of symbol processing and the “external world” of meaning and action. Still, the formal abstraction is nevertheless a matter of degree, and this aspect of cognitivism is arguably separate from the general issue of representation and should therefore be objectionable, if at all, on separate grounds (see Anderson, 2003: 93-94). 15 How can we differentiate symbolic from non-symbolic, rule-based from nonrule-based cognitive systems? This is actually a difficult and challenging question—as duly noted as well by Anderson (2003: 94 n6). It is unclear for example whether so-called “connectionist implementations” of simple reasoning

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as consisting in passive retrieval and processing of information— according to an input/output model. In effect, the cognitivist framework depicted above (in a rather simplified manner) sought to understand the human mind, and most distinctively, cognition, by focusing exclusively on an organism’s internal mental processes, specifically those involved in representation and computation, characterized in terms of formal operations on abstract, encoded symbols, which enable a given agent to devise solutions by means of a rule-based manipulation (information-processing or computation) to problems. Its favored methodological approach is separatist, dualistic, isolationist, and one might even say, schizophrenic. Rarely, if ever, due attention is paid to the environmental and interactional factors that are arguably essential to the formation of an accurate understanding and explanation of cognition and cognitive development. This framework has unquestionably influenced research in the cognitive sciences, particularly, in artificial intelligence—especially its early and foundational period.16 The latter seems to have appropriated all the assumptions and claims attributed above to CF, and to have further given support to the “computer metaphor of the mind.” It has even been argued that “good old fashioned artificial intelligence” (or GOFAI), comprising loosely speaking “any attempt to produce machine intelligence by methods primarily anchored in Cartesian and cognitivist assumptions,”17 has been since its inception up until recently the dominant research paradigm in AI (Anderson, 2003: 94; Dreyfus, 1992; Brooks, 1999, 2002).

use representations manipulated by rules? For detailed discussions of these kinds of issues, see Anderson, 2003: 94n6; see also Bechtel (1990); Bechtel & Graham (1999). 16 Should we take this period to be roughly from 1957 to 1977 as Dreyfus (1992) suggests, or should we accept that it extends up to 1981, and even up to 1991, as Brooks (1999: 153) claims, after further consideration? [See. Anderson (2003: 94n7)]. 17 Despite the commonly traded depictions and caricatures which abound in both the popular and academic literature, there may not have been in fact any AI research project that was strictly speaking GOFAI (see Anderson, 2003: 94).

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2.3 Post-Cognitivism and the Emergence of Embodied and Situated Cognition (ESC) Paradigm In recent times however, critics of various persuasions have compounded their arguments and analyses to draw our attention to the fundamental limitations of GOFAI and more generally, to the seriously problematic assumptions underwriting the Cartesian and cognitivist framework. Among them, a great deal of credit must be given to Dreyfus (1972; 1992) for his discussion of “the rule-described/expertise problem”; Brooks (1991, 1999, 2002) for pointing out the inherent limitations of the “the stored description model” and suggesting an alternative known as the “subsumption architecture”;18 Searle (1980) and Harnad (1990) for their treatment of “the symbol-grounding problem,” Horgan and Tienson (1989, 1999) for bringing up the “frame-problem,” as well as those authors who have raised “the relevance problem” and “the common sense problem.”19 All these critical contributions (and many more) have greatly served to focus the attention on the alternative, the “embodied and situated cognition” research program, as a more credible and promising one. In contrast to CF, the ESC program is particularly interested in understanding the ways in which mind, body and environment interact and influence each other to promote an organism’s adaptive success. It seeks explanations or explanatory frameworks that capture the way(s) in which an organism is embodied, the way(s) in which this embodiment simultaneously constrains and prescribes certain interactions with the environment. The mind is no longer apprehended (in a separatist, isolationist, dualist or schizophrenic way) apart from the body, or from its particular embodiment, but as always already embodied. Its favored methodological approach is subsequently relational, interactional, or even transactional. Contrary to what has been assumed commonly and for so long, “thinking beings” are first and foremost “acting (embodied) beings” in a given environment; they are thinking, one could say, because they act. Cognition is always already embodied, and thereby constrained as well as 18

Rodney Brooks’ collection of seminal essays (1999) comprises not only a sustained discussion of many of these problems and a critique of the central hypothesis of GOFAI (and its background cognitivist framework), but also the outlines of a philosophically astute and scientifically principled alternative that is clearly situated within the ESC program (Brooks, 2002; see also Anderson, 2003 for a substantial critical discussion of Brooks’ contributions). 19 For details and brief characterizations of the different problems mentioned, see Bechtel & Graham (1999); see also Nadel et al (2002).

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enabled. And it is based primarily on goal-directed actions (occurring in real-time), and it is therefore a situated and constructive activity. To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily interactions with the world. From this point of view, cognition depends on the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with particular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and all other aspects of life are meshed. The contemporary notion of embodied cognition stand in contrast to the prevailing cognitivist stance which sees the mind as a device to manipulate symbols and is thus concerned with the formal rules and processes by which the symbols appropriately represent the world (Thelen, 2001: xx; italics added).

It might be useful here to examine briefly some of the empirical work done in recent years within ESC—at the interface of developmental cognitive psychology, artificial life/intelligence/robotics, and the neurosciences in support of some of the main theoretical assumptions of ESC. According to Cowart (2006: 3), one could characterize the most general and convergent characteristics of the ESC program, despite the multiple and diverse formulations or versions of this program by researchers working in different fields or disciplines. These including at least the following theoretical assumptions or theses: (1) Primary of GoalDirected Actions (in Real Time). (2) Form of Embodiment Constrains Cognition. (3) Cognition is Constructive.20

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For my present purposes, it should suffice to note that empirical support for (1) can be found in the work of (a) developmental cognitive psychologists such as [Thelen & Smith (1994); Thelen, (1995; 2001)] who advocate a dynamics systems analysis in their studies of infant cognitive development, as well as in that of (b) researchers in artificial life/intelligence and robotics [Brooks (1991, 1999, 2002); Agree & Chapman (1987); Agre (1997); Mataric (1992); Tilden (1999) to mention only a few, who all reject the “stored description approach” of GOFAI, and advocate something like the “subsumption architecture model” proposed by Brooks]. Empirical support for (2) can be found in the work of Thelen & Smith (1994); Glenberg (1997, 1999); and Barsalou (1983, 1997, 1999, 2003), who have proposed various ways to explain how the form of embodiment constrains as well as enables cognition. Finally, empirical support for (3) can be found in the work of Varela et al (1991) on “structural coupling’; Lakoff & Johnson (1999) on “crossdomain mappings or schemas”; Glenberg (1997, 1999) on “mesh”; Fauconnier & Turner (2002) on “conceptual blending,” and Damasio (1994, 2000) who have argued in various ways that cognition is (to some extent) constructive.

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Despite all these notable and very significant empirical results, the ultimate success of the ESC research program rests however, as I have pointed out from the outset, on how the notions of “embodiment” and “situatedness” are “cashed in” both theoretically and empirically. It goes without saying that various proposals have been made over the years— some converging or overlapping, while others conflicting in some respects (see Wilson, 2006; O’Donovan-Anderson, 1996, 1997). How should we concretely understand these central notions? Which proposals should be or not be taken up? Can we for example specify in some detail how they act to constrain or prescribe our representational schemas and influence higher-order cognition? Can we afford to do without representations? Should we jettison and discard all such talk altogether? Does such a question even make sense with regards to the intelligent “higher primates” that we are? Should we countenance “sensorimotor representations,” in addition to, or instead of, “symbolic, formally encoded and abstract representations”? Could ESC countenance a notion of “abstract representations”? As we shall see by the end of this discussion, this problem is far from being a simple one. In fact, it may well be the heart of the matter. But first of all, among all the possible meanings that the notions of “embodiment” and “situatedness” could have or take, which particular ones should we attach to them, and why? Etc. These are arguably some of the tough questions that must be addressed by proponents of this research program.

3. Varieties of Embodiment and Situatedness In an effort to clear the ground for possible answers to these kinds of questions, and delineate the proper and necessary philosophical context for understanding ultimately what is at stake, I will next examine various ways of construing “embodiment” and “situatedness.” It should be obvious that apart from focusing attention on these notions, it is incumbent upon us to say something more substantial about their respective nature, meaning, and role. We need to determine how these notions are best “cashed in” from both a theoretical and empirical point of view.

3.1 “Being-in-the-World”: Phenomenology of the Body In this regard, the insights and resources of phenomenology, especially those provided by the works of Heidegger (1962); Merleau-Ponty (1989; 2002), and Schutz (1972; 1978; 1999) should be very useful to anyone

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interested in understanding the nature of our world, i.e., the lived world of our embodied and situated experience—even if they harbor at times some difficulties. As is known, the notion of embodiment and related basic themes that are by now familiar are at the center of (this tradition of) phenomenology: embodiment means not just having, and acting through, some physical instantiation, but recognizing that the particular shape and nature of one’s physical, temporal, and social immersion is what makes meaningful experience possible. Embodiment, we might say, is the property of our engagement with the world that allows us to make it meaningful. Embodied interaction is the creation, manipulation, and changing of meaning through engaged interaction with artifacts. It is worth noting that the work of Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time (1991) as well as that of Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, The Embodied Mind (1991) constitute two attempts, among many others, to capture the insights of phenomenology in a way directly useful to cognitive science (see also Chokr, 1992). As for Todes’ work, Body and World (2001), it makes an attempt that is properly speaking philosophical to give a thorough account of embodiment and its relation to mind. It goes without saying that more work along these various lines must be pursued, and is in fact being pursued (see Wrathall & Malpas, 2000; Petitot et al., 2000; Dourish, 2001). In the meantime, it behooves us to take stock of the fact that perhaps the most basic and theoretical, abstract way of explaining what it means to focus on the embodiment of the thinking subject comes to us from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger is arguably the first philosopher of “embodied interaction.” It was he who rejected the lingering Cartesianism in Husserl, the “abstract, disconnected intentionality of a Cartesian homunculus peering out at the world and seeing what’s there,” and replaced it with a radical rethinking of how the world reveals itself through our encounters with it. Heidegger stressed that we do not encounter an alien world of abstract properties, or a meaningless stream of sense data 21 which we must work to make meaningful and coherent; rather, in our everyday experience, the world is already structured in familiar and meaningful terms. For Heidegger, the most important element of our encounter with the world, which accounts 21 As logical empiricists, and other Analytic philosophers, typically believed throughout the first half of the 20th century, and even thereafter.

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for a good deal of the structure of experience, is practical interaction. “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, Heidegger writes, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use” (1962: 95). In a perspicuous passage, Charles Taylor characterizes Heidegger’s contribution in his well-known analysis of “being-in-the-world” as follows: Heidegger () shows that the condition of our forming disengaged representations of reality is that we be already engaged in coping with our world, dealing with the things in it, at grips with them…It becomes evident that even in our theoretical stance we are agents. Even to find out about the world and formulate disinterested pictures, we have to come to grips with it, experiment, set ourselves to observe, control conditions. But in all this, which forms the indispensable basis of theory, we are engaged as agents coping with things. It is clear that we couldn’t form disinterested representations any other way. What you get underlying our representations of the world—the kinds of things we formulate, for instance, in declarative sentences—is not further representations but rather a certain grasp of the world that we have as agents in it (Taylor, 1987: 4323; italics added).

As for Merleau-Ponty, he argues essentially along similar lines that perception and representation are always structured somehow by the embodied agent in the course of her purposeful engagement with the world. Representations are best viewed, he claims, as “sublimations” of bodily experiences, possessed of content already, and not as given content or form by a so-called autonomous mind. Our use and deployment of representations is somehow always already under the control of the acting body itself. It is as if it is saying “I can” rather than “I think”—as a Cartesian would claim (see Dreyfus, 2002: 367-383; see also Anderson, 2003: 104).22 His main point can be formulated as follows. The content and relations of concepts, i.e., the structure of our conceptual schemas, is primarily 22

Anderson notes quite rightly (2003: 104) that a more detailed explanation of the significance of such a claim would require a rather lengthy and substantial detour into a discussion of the bases of the categories of representation and the transcendental unity of apperception in both Descartes and Kant. Such a task cannot be undertaken in the present context. For some details however, see Todes (2001).

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determined by practical considerations, rather than by abstract, formal or logical criteria. Experience, consisting of on-going inputs from many different sources, is said to be unified into a single object of consciousness in terms of our practical orientation in/to the world. As for the subject, controlling the synthesis or integration of the contents of experience, it is the “body-subject” in its on-going active engagement with/within the world. As such, it is not to be viewed as some sort of thinking-subject saying “I think,” as if projected in “a theater model of the mind,” or exemplifying “a detached spectator consciousness.” As noted earlier however, embodiment has not only practical, but also social significance for the construction of meaning, for the articulation of the terms through which we encounter the world; it is not generally private, but rather a shared and social practice. The notion of “being-with-others,” we need to recall, is also important in Heidegger’s work, and it could certainly provide some help in understanding this aspect of embodiment. We might in this regard also turn to the contribution of Alfred Schutz, who is known for having brought phenomenological reasoning to the problems of sociology, or the problems of “being-with-others” (1972), and who, by taking as a focus the life-world, recast the problems of sociology itself. He was thus led to suggest that we need to turn away from the idea of “general laws” that operate outside the immediate purview of the actors whose behavior they regulate. For him, sociological problems were practical, mundane ones routinely encountered and solved by social actors in the course of their day-to-day activities. This implies, among other things, a methodology which includes close attention to the details of actual practices, as opposed to formalizations or abstract procedures, as well as to the ways in which things fit or not within these practices. One of the merits of approaching the problem at hand at this level of generality and abstraction is that it focuses our attention on an important and apparently always on-going philosophical project: reinterpreting human being in terms which put “action and agency” rather than “contemplation” or “passive, disincarnate thinking” at its center has clear and significant implications for a number of human endeavors—including, most notably, ethics (see Varela, 1999). 23 Continued and sustained re23

It should be obvious that the single most pronounced divide in the history of Western philosophy between Idealism and Materialism can be captured essentially in terms of such a differentiated focus. This divide obviously covers up quite a slew of other traditional distinctions and dichotomies which have constituted

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engagement with a certain tradition of phenomenology and other neglected or overlooked (historicist, pragmatist, materialist and hedonist) philosophical schools or traditions which have similarly put the body more squarely at the forefront of their preoccupations will undoubtedly prove essential to this renewed understanding of ourselves, and re-conception of our relation to the world.24

3.2 Philosophy of the Body, or Philosophy in the Flesh In the meantime, for the narrower project of getting a better understanding of our embodiment and situatedness, we are better off looking elsewhere. We might for example take a look at the work of Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999), whose title speaks clearly of its ambition. It has been considered by some to be one of the most interesting efforts in recent years to draw systematically the implications of the “embodied mind” hypothesis for philosophy and the cognitive sciences, and has been reported to contain the strongest, most systematic and up-to-date defense of the claim that all cognition eventually grounds itself in the body, in the flesh, or in embodiment (Anderson, 2003: 105).

“normal fare” in philosophy. To mention only a few, these include: (i) Rationalism vs. Romanticism, (ii) Realism vs. Anti-Realism/Constructivism, (iii) Objectivism vs. Subjectivism. 24 In this regard, one can only note disparagingly that the established canon of the history of Western philosophy has indeed been “but a footnote to Plato,” as Whitehead once remarked. It seems to have been written by philosophers committed for the most part to some form of Platonism or Idealism, who have privileged the disincarnate mind (the soul) over the body, and viewed the latter either as “the tomb of the soul,” as the source of uncontrollable and potentially dangerous passions, emotions, and therefore of excesses and deceptions, or in any case, as something to control and overcome. As a result, quite a few philosophers and thinkers, more Historicist, Pragmatist, Materialist and Hedonist in their outlook, who have quite rightly chosen to heed instead the “wisdom of the body,” or rather, of the “embodied mind” have (at least until recently) been relegated to the margins or dustbin of history, and their philosophical contributions have been neglected or given short shrift. In order to rectify this questionable and disturbing bias in favor of the former group, some authors have proposed a counter-history of (the History of) Western philosophy in which the latter group of philosophers and thinkers figures prominently and in more favorable terms than in traditional textbooks (see for example Onfray & Roparz, Contre-Histoire de la Philosophie, 1975-2006).

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To begin with, it might be useful to illustrate how, for Lakoff & Johnson, a given case of higher-order cognition can be traced back to its bodily bases by considering for example the metaphorical mapping of “Purposes as Destinations,” and the sort of reasoning about purposes which this mapping is said to support (1999: 52-3, 190-1, and 203-4). We imagine a goal as being at some place ahead of us, and employ strategies for attaining it which are analogous to those we might use on a journey to a place. We plan a route, imagine obstacles, and set landmarks to track our progress. In this way, our thinking about purposes (and about time, and states, and change, and many other things besides these) is said to be rooted in our thinking about space. It should come as no surprise to anyone, they argue, that our concepts of space—up, down, back, on, in—are deeply tied to our bodily orientation, and our physical movement in the world. According to Lakoff and Johnson, every domain which maps onto these basic spatial concepts (think of upright person, the head of an organization, facing the future, being on top of things) thereby inherits a kind of reasoning—a sense of how concepts connect and flow—which has its origins in, and retains the structure of, our bodily coping with space. As Anderson correctly notes (2003: 104), Lakoff & Johnson have in fact been arguing ever since their breakthrough work on Metaphors We Live By (1980) that the various domains of our mental life are related to one another by “cross-domain mappings,” in which a target domain (e.g., concept) inherits the inferential structure of the source domain (i.e., body, part, position). For example, the concept of an “argument” maps onto the concept of “war” (argument is war) and therefore reasoning about arguments naturally follows the same path: They write: “It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack…It is in this sense that the Argument is War metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing” (1980: 4; italics added). Suppose we distinguish at least four aspects of embodiment that play each a role in shaping, limiting, and grounding advanced cognition, namely (1) Physiology; (2) Evolutionary History, (3) Practical Activity, and (4) Socio-Cultural Situatedness. How does Lakoff & Johnson’s work fare on these scores? I will next discuss each briefly in an effort to further substantiate and better evaluate the approach advocated by Lakoff &

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Johnson. I will draw for this purpose on the critical treatments provided by both Anderson (2003: 103-110) and O’Donovan-Anderson (2000). 3.2.1 Physiology How does physiology come into play into the ESC program in an effort to characterize an aspect of embodiment? For Lakoff & Johnson, “the mind is inherently embodied” (1999: 3), not just because all its processes must be neurally or neuronally instantiated, but most importantly, because the particulars of our perceptual and motor systems play a foundational role in concept-formation or concept-definition and even in rational inference.25 “Reason, they write, is not disembodied, as the tradition has largely held, but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experiences” (1999: 4). From the earlier discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s contribution, we already know about a different way of characterizing the contribution of physiology to the content of abstract representations: our sense-organs are themselves instruments of exploration. Accordingly, the output of the visual system is not a static picture, but a dynamic series of sensory changes related to both the movements of the eye and head, and the motions of the object or quality that we perceive. Under such a view, we might say that the physiology and design of the visual system have a rather direct impact on the contents and overall structure of the representations, and more generally speaking, on the abstractions, which may emerge from it. To provide an account of these kinds of direct physiological constraints 25

If we take the example of color concepts, they are characterized by a “center-periphery” structure, with certain colors being “focal” and others, conceptualized in terms of the focal hue. In the category “red,” there are a central (prototypical) red as well as peripheral hues tending toward the purple, pink, and orange. “The center-periphery structure…is a result of the neural response curves for color in our brains. Focal hues correspond to frequencies of maximal ’neural response’” with the peripheral structure being determined by the overall shape of the neural response. “An adequate theory of the conceptual structure of red, including an account of why it has the structure it has…cannot be constructed solely from the spectral properties of surfaces. It must make reference to color cones and neural circuitry.” [Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 24); also cited in Anderson (2003: 105-106); my addition in parentheses, in order to suggest the relevance and applicability of Rosch’s work on prototypes and categorizations (see also Chokr, 1987)]. See also the discussion of the “structural coupling’ hypothesis proposed by Varela et al (1991) in this regard.

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on higher-order cognition and abstractions is presumably a crucial part of the task confronting proponents of ESC (Anderson, 2003: 106). 3.2.2 Evolutionary History How does the second aspect of embodiment which has to do with the evolutionary history of human beings come into play? Though the evolutionary history of a human agent is physiologically stored, its effects are presumably expressed indirectly. Here is how Lakoff & Johnson formulate their view in this regard: Reason is evolutionary, in that abstract reason builds on and makes use of forms of perceptual and motor inference present in “lower” animals. The result is a Darwinism of reason, a rational Darwinism: Reason, even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature. The discovery that reason is evolutionary utterly changes our relation to other animals and changes our conception of human beings as uniquely rational. Reason is thus not an essence that separates us from other animals; rather it places us on a continuum with them (1999: 4; italics added).

The point being made here is simply another way of capturing the idea mentioned earlier. We can almost always trace the rules of reason back to some more primitive modes of inference, as in the connections provided by metaphorical mapping across relevant domains. Though as Lakoff & Johnson put it further, they are not here making the rather obvious and uncontroversial claim that we need a body in order to be able to reason and think. Instead, as they put it, they are making a stronger and rather striking claim: “the very nature of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment.” In their view, “the same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems and modes of reason.” Hence in order “to understand reason we must understand the details of our visual system, our motor system, and the general mechanism of neural binding.” In other words, in their view “reason is not, in any way, a transcendent feature of the universe, or of disembodied mind. Instead, it is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies, by the remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains, and by the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world” (1999: 4; italics added). For Lakoff & Johnson, the method of constraint seems to be straightforwardly physiological—as Anderson correctly notes (2003: 107).

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They often insist that direct neural connections underlie the mappings in question. But the mode of constraint is one step more abstract than this. For, what are inherited from the source domains, however they are instantiated, are not the details of this instantiation, but the set of inference rules instantiated therein, thus giving rise to an abstract structural or dynamic similarity between the two domains. It is important to stress this point for reasons which shall become clearer in a moment (see end of section 3.2.3). Lakoff & Johnson’s work seems aimed for the most part at this aspect of embodiment, or, as cognitive scientists would call it, the “physical grounding problem” (Anderson, 2003: 104): Providing perspicuous and compelling characterizations of the structural and dynamic similarities between cognitive domains, and possibly tracing many of them back to very basic spatial, perceptual, and motor capacities. An alternative way in which the evolutionary history of the human agent might be fruitfully included in explanations of the bases of complex behavior consists in considering what has been called “emergence” (Anderson, 2003: 107).26 With regard to the case at hand, it is basically the view that given simple behaviors and a capacity to interact with an environment, an organism could exhibit complex behaviors (such as conceptual thinking, or higher-order cognition) that emerge due to the dynamic interaction between the basic capacities of a human agent and its environment, though they are not reducible to either of the simple capacities or behaviors, their sum total, or the environment alone. 3.2.3 Practical Activity Let’s now consider briefly the third aspect of the embodiment. The issue here has to do with the dynamic relation and interaction between an individual and the world. Or to put it in other terms, it has to do with the practical activity of the individual, and its relation to thinking and

26

The concept of “emergence” is gaining greater attention today—at the converging confluences of philosophy of science, complexity theory, systems theory, chaos theory, and quantum or non-binary logics—for its potential non-reductionist explanatory power and fruitfulness across disciplines and domains. I have been myself interested in its explanatory value for dealing with the problem of consciousness, a problem which has preoccupied me on and off for the past 20 years or so.

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cognition (e.g., problem-solving or coping)—an aspect which has been aptly and eloquently discussed by both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.27 Take for example the case often discussed by cognitive scientists (e.g., Anderson, 2003: 108) of a simple tool use: say, using a paper clip or tooth pick in order to retrieve a coin which has fallen between the cracks of a car’s back seats. How do we approach this simple practical problem? By all accounts, we don’t engage in some sort of pre-computing in order to determine the distance of the goal, the required shape the paper clip or tooth pick must take, and the precise trajectory (movement in space) to take to hook or nudge the coin. Instead, what we do is to stretch out and bend the clip or tooth pick by engaging in a rough and implicit estimate of what the task requires: we try it out, bend it differently, and try again. We may change the angle or direction from which we are viewing or approaching the coin. We may also reposition ourselves to better visualize the problem before us. We may make repeated attempts in order to better “apprehend” or “see” what shape the paper clip or tooth pick must take. What is the point we need to draw from such a case? Is it that we do no calculation or pre-computation at all? I don’t think it follows. Instead, as Anderson correctly points out, it would seem that our problem-solving strategies involve not only some sort of “computations” and “internal representations” but “repeated environmental interactions” as well, and perhaps even some cooperation between these two elements, or combination thereof. Following Anderson’s interpretation (2003: 108), we might say then that the practical cognitive strategies used in this simple case or similar cases, and even in more complex ones28 are constrained and shaped by what our body as a whole can do in certain circumstances. As well as by 27 In this context, it might be useful to draw a distinction between the “pragmatic” and “epistemic” level and characterize differently situated actions accordingly. “Epistemic actions” are those whose purpose, unlike pragmatic ones, is not to alter the world so as to advance physically toward some goal (as in laying a brick for a wall), but rather to alter the world so as to help make available information required as part of a problem-solving or coping situation. Examples might include: organizing the spatial layout of a hand of cards, looking at a chessboard from different angles, setting up mechanical parts in the order required for a correct assembly, etc. 28 It is doubtful that the assertion (or insertion) of a discontinuity here can be sustained or justified upon further examination. From the standpoint of economy and efficiency alone, such a hypothesis would arguably be discredited.

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our brain’s limited capacities, processing or computational resources, as some would prefer to say. A tool-free approach is ruled out by the shape, size, and flexibility of our fingers. We may come to such a realization on the basis of a rough visual calculation, or by first trying to reach the coin with bare fingers. The surrounding space (its size and configuration) may also constitute an additional constraint, which, together with our bodily features and characteristics, determines the range of possible bodily postures or attitudes. This in turn will constrain or limit the range of possible views of the target object, and will determine the difficulty of the visualization required, as well as the kinds of cognitive and motor strategies needed to solve the problem. After coming to some provisionally acceptable “definition” or “characterization” of the problem, we might then reshape the clip or tooth pick, and go on with our trial-and-error approach. It seems clear that cognition is somehow tied up with the shape, size, and motor capabilities of our body; by all indications, it seems to rely on the possibility of repeated interactions with the environment. Could this constitute yet another level of connection between cognition and physical embodiment that we need to take into account?29 Suppose we are interested in explaining how an individual grounds her own symbols. We would have to provide a fairly substantial account about 29 It might be worth considering here what the well-known Held and Hein experiment (1958) is said to have shown it involved two sets of kittens raised in the dark and exposed to the light only under controlled conditions. When they were in the light, one set of kittens was allowed to roam freely, although each kitten from this first group was fitted with a harness, itself attached to a basket in which a given member of the second group of kittens was placed in such a way that only its head was free to move about. Because the kittens were raised mostly in the dark, both groups developed the same motor capacities and physical repertoire. Similarly, kittens from both groups were exposed to the same amount and sort of visual stimuli. However, only kittens from the first group were in a position to move about and see at the same time. The results were quite striking, and were interpreted as indicating that the kittens from the second, constrained group had not developed an appreciation of the physical significance of their visual experience. For instance, when a normal kitten is held and brought close to the floor or a table top, it will reach out with its paws in anticipation of the contact. The constrained kittens did not exhibit such reaching behavior. Besides, they were more likely to bump into walls and fall off the edge of things, apparently not recognizing the significance of the relevant visual input (see Anderson (2003: 1089; see further discussion in forthcoming note).

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how various cognitive capabilities are bound up with, and shaped by, the individual’s specific form of embodiment. We would have to account most importantly for how practical activity plays a role in giving meaning to the particular experiences or representations of that individual as an always already situated being, in a given socio-cultural context. We would also have to provide an account (even if only partial and sketchy) of the conditions under which it is possible for a given individual to ground abstract symbols, as in the case of linguistic reference, in which practical activity, understood as a mode of epistemic access to the world, is a necessary condition of our general capacity to make references (Anderson, 2003: 109; see also Evans, 1982; O’Donovan-Anderson, 1997). It would seem then that practical, bodily activity can have cognitive and epistemic meaning even at the highest level of abstraction. It can be involved in a particular way of coping with a situation or solving problems in that situation. Generally speaking, it seems to be implicated in our cognitive development, as when we interact with our environment, apprehend and manipulate objects in an effort (to learn how) to recognize them, or appreciate the significance and meaning associated with them. As Clark puts it: “[T]he flow of thought and the adaptive success of reason are now seen to depend on repeated and crucial interactions with external resources” (1996: 68). In view of the emphasis placed on the role played by embodiment, goal-directed action, sensorimotor experiences on concept formation and categorization, and ultimately on cognition in its many forms, from the simple to the most complex, we must confront one possible radical objection that could be lodged against ESC. And it is this: ESC cannot be right because the physically disabled are obviously able to learn, acquire concepts, and communicate. If (the contents of) our concepts were indeed dependent upon the specific physical capacities of embodied agents, then presumably there would have to be detectable differences in the conceptual repertoire of differently able individuals—physically speaking. But are there such differences? This does not seem to be the case. To avoid possible misunderstandings on this score, a couple of points seem in order. As far I as I know, no proponent of in ESC has ever suggested that physical handicaps imply cognitive deficits, or that, if there were differences in conceptual contents or structures of differently able individuals, one would expect them to be detectable at the level of the linguistic mastery displayed in their conversational interactions. This is by

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the way the usual evidence brought up by those who object in a radical manner to ESC (Anderson, 2003: 113).30 On the other hand, it must be stressed that since language and linguistically available concepts are highly abstract phenomena one expects the criteria for participation in a linguistic community to be similarly somewhat abstract. Let us consider by way of examples the concept of “walking” or that of “seeing.” Could we argue that they can both easily be acquired by an individual who cannot walk or see, and who perhaps never could, as long as they are related to other concepts of movement or sight respectively, and various examples of walking or seeing exist which can somehow be ascertained? It would be a matter of placing a given concept within a logical and semantic (and possibly contrastive) network which is itself fairly well-grounded, even if there is no specific experience of walking or seeing for the person concerned which can directly serve to ground the concept. Presumably the blind or the disabled are not different from everyone else in that they can readily understand many (abstract and concrete) things which they have not themselves directly experienced— through analogies, stretches of the imagination, demonstrations, direct or indirect testimonies, thick or thin descriptions. It is perhaps worth recalling in this context that the metaphorical groundings proposed by Lakoff & Johnson—for instance, the Purposes as Destinations mapping discussed earlier—do not rely on specific experiences of particular modes of movement (my own experience of walking) but rather on the more abstract experience of motion through space.31 In their view, concepts are more often than not grounded in these kinds of higher-order derivations of experience, and in this case, in the experience of mobility itself, rather than in the particular experience and attendant feelings accompanying mobility.32 30

Anderson notes that the IQ assessments of children with spinal muscular atrophy or dystrophy seem to lend support to this hypothesis. 31 It is interesting to note a possible convergence in this regard between the work done by linguists Lakoff & Johnson and that of AI researcher and robotics engineers, Brooks, in that they both seem to adopt a system based on types rather than tokens, and for good reasons. 32 Notwithstanding what I have said above in support of the ESC research program, the following question begs to be asked: Shouldn’t there be differences in the particularities of embodiment or grounding for differently able individuals? An

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3.2.4 Socio-Cultural Situatedness Let’s turn finally to the fourth aspect of embodiment. It is arguably the most complex, and the level at which the distinction between embodied and situated cognition is arguably no longer tenable, as I have noted at the outset (see also Anderson, 2003: 109). It is for this very reason that this aspect of embodiment is most interesting from my point of view. We have seen above the ways in which practical activity and interaction with an environment can constitute cognitive strategies, and we have thus grounded cognition in agency. This is quite plausible generally speaking for organisms with low-level cognitive capacities, but for humans, these interactions are always themselves situated in a broader social and cultural context. Interactions can take place not just with individual objects or artifacts, but also with/within existing or persisting structures, which may be social or cultural, concrete or abstract, material or symbolic. Besides, actions themselves can have not just immediate environmental effects, but social or cultural ones; that is, actions have meanings which must, of course, play a role in their deployment. Consider for example the concepts of “icon,” “veil,” “flag,” “land,” “(mother/father) land” or, for that matter, that of “shrine.” In each case, one might say that no one set of (necessary and sufficient) objective features truly defines its meaning, which is best grasped in a complex web of religious, social, cultural, institutional, and even behavioral practices and relations. This much should at least be obvious. It is this aspect of our embodiment which compels us, I believe, to recognize that cognitive science is not as far removed from fields like sociology and cultural studies, as one may have initially surmised. We example of this is presumably provided by the Held & Hein kitten experiment discussed in an earlier note. This experiment suggests in fact that a sufficiently severe congenital disability might indeed be accompanied by difficulties in perceptual grounding, and therefore in attaching meaning to one’s perceptual experience. There should be, in other words, subtle differences in the perceptual experiences of differently able individuals, at least insofar as the affordances presented by the environment would necessarily differ. Stairs afford something quite different to a person in a wheelchair, and to a person who can walk. It is unclear how this difference can or should be tested, but it would seem as if ESC is committed to there being such a testable difference, and more generally speaking, “to a set of presumably testable empirical claims” (Anderson, 2003: 114).

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might even say that it directly borders on or even overlaps with them (Anderson, 2003: 110). The fact that action has social meaning, and that agency takes place within a complex web of cultural practices and structures not directly under the control of the individual actor, has long been for these areas of inquiry the basis upon which their analyses are founded. Our full understanding of this aspect of our embodiment dimension of cognition will depend on whether we are capable of making the various domains and their respective inquiries consistent with one another, and this would require in turn far more interdisciplinary work and interactions across disciplinary boundaries.33 Lakoff & Johnson’s work (1999) makes a rather sustained effort in this direction by dedicating a number of chapters (7-25) to various traditional philosophical issues, ethical and social concepts, and proposing ways in which they must be reconsidered in light of their research program.34 Yet, like many works situated with the ESC program, who claim to be articulating a philosophy of the body and drawing its radical implications, it has paradoxically very little to say explicitly about the nature of the body, “what the body is” (Anderson, 2003: 105). Despite its apparent and deceptive simplicity, this question hides arguably a greater difficulty. It may perhaps be the most difficult question of all, as several contemporary philosophers of the body have come to realize. In the final analysis, despite the admittedly obvious importance and promise of its central argument and approach, Lakoff & Johnson’s work seems to be overdrawn, thin, and deficient both in its argument and empirical support. Its main flaw is that the authors fail to grapple with a fairly large amount of related work in philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. In this assessment, I concur with other reviewers and critics (Steen, 2000: 200; Sowa, 1999: 3; O’Donovan-Anderson, 2000; Anderson, 2003: 110). We stand to gain more in our inquiries into embodied-and-situated-cognition by turning our attention instead to more 33

This point is revisited and stressed even further in the conclusion. See O’Donovan-Anderson (1996) for discussions of various interdisciplinary perspectives on embodiment. 34 They consider for example how we need to re-conceive the question of the mind obviously, that of metaphor in its relation to truth, realism vs. anti-realism, time, events and causes, the self, morality, and even how we should re-read or reinterpret key moments or figures in the history of Western philosophy (the PreSocratics/ Early Greek philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, the Analytic tradition, Chomsky’s linguistics) and the proper approach in philosophy today.

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substantial proposals which have been made in recent years, and the list has been growing steadily and quickly (e.g., Lave, 1988; Rogoff & Laveit, 1999; Tomasello, 2000; Turner, 2001; Thompson, 2007; Clark, 2008).

4. The Situatedness of Human Cognition Revisited 4.1 Situatedness and Scaffolds In my discussion of the various aspects of embodiment above, I have assumed continuity from lower to higher forms of cognition and intelligence. I have called attention to the ways in which cognition depends upon the physical characteristics, ability and situatedness of human beings, most specifically. It is clear that for humans this last dimension is crucial. In fact, I have suggested further that the unique reach and power of human intelligence is a result not so much of a unique ability to perform complex, symbolic cognition in abstraction from the environment, but is rather due in large measure to the remarkable richness of the environment in which we do our thinking (see Clark, 1999). If we wish to characterize our socio-cultural situatedness in a more perspicuous manner, we must then focus on the central role played by existing and persisting institutions and practices in enabling higher-level cognition. Structures such as these are quite aptly called “scaffolds” in cognitive science. They occur presumably when an “epistemic action” results in some more or less permanent or substantial aid in cognition, whether it is symbolic or socio-cultural in nature.

4.2 Language, Intermediary Structures, and Other Cognitive Aids Needless to say, human beings do very complex things only indirectly—from building computers, airplanes, jets, space shuttles, satellites, biological and nuclear weapons to designing expert-operating systems, managing multinational corporations, running large organizations, or governing countries. We typically do so by creating various kinds of intermediary external structures, physical and/or social, which can then prompt and coordinate a long sequence of individually tractable episodes of management and problem-solving, preserving and transmitting partial and incremental solutions along the way (Clark, 1997: 186).

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These structures include presumably language, 35 especially written language, and indeed all physically instantiated representations or cognitive aids, in general such as maps, diagrams, graphs, tables, schemas and models, as well as more mundane things like road-signs, arrangements, directions, and labels in everyday spaces, etc. These “scaffolds” allow us to break down a complex problem into a set of small, easier and more manageable ones. Apart from symbols systems, it is obvious that social structures, practices and procedures also fulfill that role. A simple and mundane illustration can be seen for example in the roles, hierarchies, and game plans of a football or soccer team. Along a continuous path, more complex cases such as running a large University, Microsoft or Google, the Boeing Corporation, or governing a country like the US or China provide also illustrations of the same (see Clark, 1997: 214).

4.3 Other Plausible & Promising Ideas and Considerations What can we plausibly infer from such examples, and the assumption confidently held that there is continuity between the simple and more complex cases? I would like to suggest that the following ideas and considerations must be considered as plausible and promising, as part of any viable proposal for better understanding the nature of our situatedness as embodied cognitive agents. 4.3.1 Human Brain—Distributed Complex Systems We might begin by entertaining the following idea: the so-called mature cognitive competencies which we commonly identify as mind and intelligence are more perhaps like “ship navigation” than “capacities of the bare biological brain.” The former, it is worth recalling, consists in a wellorchestrated adaptation of an extended complex system comprising individuals, instruments, and practices. Perhaps even, much of what we consider to be “our mental capacities” may likewise turn out to be emergent properties of the wider, environmentally extended and more complex systems of which human brains are just one part—albeit an important one (see Clark & Chalmers, 1998).

35

There is today a debate among cognitive scientists and philosophers as to whether or not the scaffolding of language (or the internet) does indeed “extend the mind.”

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4.3.2 Subjective Aspect of Cognition—First Person Perspective If it is also important to emphasize the role played in cognition by repeated interactions with an already highly structured environment, one should not perhaps overlook another aspect which the examples mentioned above bring to the fore, and that is, the first-person perspective of the individual agent. Recall that the agent’s behavior in these examples comes about only insofar he is aware of the socially instantiated role that he is playing (e.g., forward attack, chief executive officer, or president), and regulates his behavior with respect to both how he perceives the situation and understands his role within it. It may be necessary indeed to pay attention to the subjective aspect of cognition (Clancey, 1997). 4.3.3 Self-Identity, Self-Reference, and Self-Conscious Indexed Situatedness Also, understanding the functional interactions between humans and their environment may indeed require, as Clancey argues, a special notion of goal-driven action in real time that involves a certain kind of subjectivity. The kind of subjectivity involved is not going to be one that consists in possessing a subset of facts or (mis)conceptions about the world, as in descriptive models for example. Rather, it is going to involve a form of feedback between how the world is perceived and how a person conceives his or her identity. Such a view is based on the fact that conceptualizing situations, problems and alternate (courses of) actions inherently involves an aspect of self-reference in the perceptual-conceptual mechanism. Doesn’t a person’s understanding of “What is happening?” really go through “What is happening to me now?” (1997: 27). 4.3.4 Representations, Tacit Knowledge, Subjectivity, and Language Along with proponents of the ESC program, we have good reasons to question the hypothesis (central to GOFAI) which identifies “knowledge” with “explicit, stored or encoded, abstract descriptions or representations,” and “cognition” with the “rule-based, logic driven manipulation of such descriptions or representations.” We need to take more seriously the view that emphasizes the importance of “tacit knowledge” (inarticulate or inarticulable) in closely regulating behaviors and coordinating perceptual-motor interactions (see Polanyi, 1983). However, unlike some ESC proponents, I believe that we must continually focus on understanding human-level cognition by attending to, and casting light on, human

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subjectivity and language from a situated perspective. Even though such a view is not incompatible with the generally accepted ESC program, it nevertheless foregrounds a slightly different emphasis, and ultimately suggests a richer notion than is currently in use in the cognitive sciences— one that is arguably informed by the human sciences, or by a social and cultural perspective (see Clancey, 1997). 4.3.5 Situated Self-Consciousness and Language: Internal vs. External Role On any given example, one could draw different conclusions from the same interaction between an agent and a socially structured environment, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on the role of the environment, or on that of the agent’s understanding of that environment—and of course, the ways in which her self-conception influences that understanding, as in a case of “situated self-consciousness” (see for example Hendricks-Jansen, 1996). The same dynamic can be depicted with regards to human language. Rather than emphasizing, as I have done above, only the external role language can play, by conceptually structuring an environment or by allowing for external recording or storage of intermediate results in a complex cognitive process, we should also emphasize the internal importance of language as an aid in cognition. 4.3.6 Speaking and Doing: A Transactional Approach If human knowledge does not consist in “stored descriptions or representations,” what then is the relation of “what we say” to “what we do”? It might be best not to see “speaking” as “bringing out what is already inside,” but rather as a way of “changing what is inside.” In other words, speaking is no longer restating what has already been posted subconsciously inside the brain. Instead, it is itself an activity of representing and intervening.36 We could then say that our name for things and what they mean, our theories and our conceptions develop in our (embodied and physically situated) behaviors, as we interact with, reperceive and re-conceive what we and others have previously said and 36

Despite the obvious reference to his book, the claim here is broader and much more substantial than Hacking’s in Representing and Intervening (1983). The latter only relates representations to interventions in the context of scientific practices, and not to everyday practices.

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done. This causal interaction is different from the linear “describing what I perceive” or “looking for what I conceive.” Instead, it compels us to view the processes of looking, perceiving, conceiving, understanding, and describing as somehow arising together and shaping each other. Such an approach is best characterized as transactional (Clancey, 1997: 3). 4.3.7 ESC: Toward a Theory of Mechanism and Content Under such an approach, the situation within which agency must be understood and through which cognition takes place has, as indicated earlier, both internal and external dimensions. An individual agent’s “situation” is not itself static, but arises in the course of dynamic transactions between internal and external resources and structures which are to a large extent mutually constitutive. “Who the agent perceives herself to be” plays a role in what situation she sees herself in. Similarly, the perceived situation may affect the role an agent chooses to adopt. Cognition is thus situated in two ways: (1) by the way conceptualization relates to sensorimotor coordination, and (2) by the way conceptualization, in conscious beings, relates to the agent’s role, place, and values in society. A adequate theory of embodied and situated cognition must therefore include two accounts: (1) an account of the mechanism (intellectual and cognitive skills are also perceptual-motor skills), and (2) an account of the content (human activity is, first and foremost, organized by conceptualizing the self as a participant-actor, and this can only be done, I believe, with respect to communities of practice (see Clancey, 1997: 2728).

5. Consequences of a Paradigm Shift In closing, it might be useful to summarize the conflicting basic claims or tenets of both the Cognitivist Framework (CF) and the Embodied and Situated Cognition research program (ESC). The former, as we have seen, consists of at least the following five: (1) The Favored Approach to Analysis is essentially Separatist, Dualist and Isolationist, and Schizophrenic. (2) Cognition consists in an Organism’s Internal Processes, Mental Representations that mirror the World. (3) Cognition consists for the most part in Passive Retrieval and Processing of such Representations, according to an input/output model. (4) Representations are considered to be Symbolic, Abstract, and Encoded. (5)

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Primacy is given to Information-Processing, Computation and Calculation. (6) The Mind Metaphor is that of a (Rule-Based, Logic Driven) Computer. Cognitivism Separatist-Dualist-Isolationist Approach and Analysis

Embodied-Situated Cognition Relational/Interactional/Transactional Approach and Analysis

Cognition: Organism’s Internal Mental Processes/ Representations Mirror of the World

Cognition: Interplay between

Cognition=Passive Retrieval, Information-Processing

Cognition= Active Construction, based on Organism’s Embodied Goal-Directed Actions

Symbolic, Abstract, Mental, Encoded Representations

Sensorimotor, Physically Grounded, Situation-Specific “Representations”

Primacy of Computation, Rule-based Manipulation, for Problem-Solving

Primacy of Goal-Directed Action in Real Time for Practical/Coping Purposes

Computer Metaphor of Mind: RuleBased, Logic Driven

Coupling Metaphor of Mind: Constraints on Cognition

Table 4-1: Two Paradigms—Two Conflicting Research Programs

Similarly, one could characterize the basic claims and tenets of ESC as consisting of the following five counterclaims and tenets, which are deemed more plausible, empirically and theoretically compelling—if not outright true, by their proponents: (1) The Favored Approach to Analysis is essentially Relational, Interactional and even Transactional. (2) Cognition consists in the Interplay between Mind, Body, and Environment (however broadly or narrowly the latter is construed). (3) Cognition consists for the most part in Active Construction, based on Organism’s Embodied Goal-Directed Actions, according to a constructivist, dynamic, and interactive model. (4) Representations are considered to be “Sensorimotor Representations.” (5) Primacy is given to Goal-Directed Actions unfolding in Real Time and Practical Activities in context. (6) The Embodied Mind Metaphor is that a Coupling of Constraints [involving (a)

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Form of Embodiment, (b) Environment, and (c) Action] on Cognitive Processes. Given the conflicting and radically opposed assumptions and claims on which CF and ESC are based, it goes without saying that they cannot be both true. What should follow from this indisputable realization, for the purpose of future research on cognition, the mind, and the problem of consciousness? Can we afford to completely dispense with the theoretical and methodological apparatus of CF? Will ESC be able to satisfactorily explain not only low-level cognition (in terms of sensorimotor representations), but most importantly, “cognitive complexity” or higher-level cognition (of the kind that is involved for example in abstract, socio-culturally loaded concepts and categories, in meta-cognitive states such as the ability to think about one’s own thoughts, to think about thinking itself) without invoking or putting to use in some way symbolic, encoded representations or even computations? Can a complex, intelligent, and thinking being actually get by entirely without representations? What does it mean for a representation say, a motor representation of an action to be encoded in the body rather than in the head? These are clearly hard questions, whose answers constitute clear challenges and possible sources of further objections to ESC. Can and should we settle for an approach which leaves open the possibility of utilizing theoretical, conceptual and methodological tools from different, radically opposed frameworks? Is it the case that for some phenomena we may use the tools and methods of CF, even while for other phenomena we resort to the tools, concepts and methods of ESC instead? Is it the case that we may have in the end to accommodate at least two kinds of representations—sensorimotor and symbolic-abstract encoded? In other words, is a compatibilist position in this matter tenable—as some philosophers argue (Clark, 1997)? Or should we opt for a more rigorous and consistent approach, and stop hedging our bets, so to speak? After all, if the thesis of CF is incorrect, its assumptions, claims and methods are also bound to be incorrect or inadequate, and therefore useless for the newly reformulated problem at hand, according to ESC. New methods and new tools are needed which are consistent with the central thesis of the ESC program. Though there is no guarantee that the necessary new methods and tools will be developed for understanding and

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explaining the emergence and development of higher cognitive processes, we will certainly not get any closer to being able to do so if we don’t take the gamble and try to purse the ESC program systematically and consistently. In any case, a number of promising tools and methods have already been proposed [e.g., dynamic systems analysis (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen, 1995, 2001), cross-domain mappings or schemas (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), mesh (Glenberg, 1997; 1999), and structural coupling (Varela et al, 1991)], and no final assessment can as of yet be pronounced. It’s still too early in the game. But one thing is already certain: a paradigm shift has taken place, and no philosopher, social or cognitive scientist today can afford to ignore the central “embodiment and situatedness” thesis of the ESC program—a thesis, which, as I have indicated from the start, puts in question age-old, wide-ranging, and widely held assumptions in Western philosophy. It seems then that the only question before us now is this: How far are we willing and prepared to go in drawing and defending its philosophical, theoretical, methodological implications? ESC offers the outline of a bold, new comprehensive approach to understanding and explaining human cognition, intelligence, mind-body, and our physically grounded consciousness of “being-in-the-world” and “being-with-others.” This project will obviously require that we describe and explain in detail the myriads of ways in which cognition is physically grounded in the embodied characteristics, inherited abilities, practical activities, and interactive engagements of a living being with an environment. It objects radically against the claim that we are radically distinct from animals, uniquely possessed of a soul and the attendant power of abstract reason, ESC maintains our evolutionary continuity. We, like all animals, are essentially embodied beings, and our power of advanced cognition vitally depends on a substrate of abilities for moving around in, and coping with, the world which we inherited from our evolutionary ancestors. It also objects to the claim that cognition is the rule-based manipulation of abstract mental representations; ESC maintains that there is much more to human cognition than mental representation. Cognition exploits repeated practically-oriented interactions with the environment, not only by “using the world as its own best model,” but by creating “scaffolding structures” that greatly simplify, facilitate and advance cognitive tasks. The explicit representations that cognition does employ or deploy are generally limited, and once again, physically

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grounded as well as oriented to our context-specific needs as embodied beings. Finally, if, as I have suggested above, human intelligence lies less in the brain of an individual and more in the “social brain” or in the “societies of brains,” i.e., in “the dynamic and multiply diverse interactions of brains” with the wider and more complex world out there (Freeman, 1995), including most importantly the social and cultural worlds which are so central to human cognition, then perhaps the most distinctive contention of ESC is that the social sciences (sociology and cultural studies in particular) are not only important resources for the cognitive sciences, but in fact and in an important sense, part and parcel of

them.

References Agre, P.E. (1997). Computation and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Agre, P.E., & Chapman, P. (1987). “An Implementation of a Theory of Activity.” In Proceedings AAAI-87. Menlo Park, CA, Seattle, WA: AAAI Press, pp. 268272. Anderson, Michael, L. (2003). “Embodied Cognition.” Artificial Intelligence 149: 91-130. Barsalou, L. W. (1983). “Ad Hoc Categories.” Memory and Cognition 11/3: 211227. —. (1999). “Perceptual Symbols Systems.” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 22: 507-609. —. (2003). “Situated Simulation in the Human Conceptual System.” Language and Cognitive Processes 18: 513-562. [Reprinted in Moss, H., & Hampton, J. Conceptual Representation. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press. (pp. 513-566). Barsalou, L.W., & Prinz, J.J. (1997). “Mundane Creativity in Perceptual Symbol Systems.” In Ward, T.B., Smith, S.M., & Vaid, J. (Eds.), Creative Thought: An Investigation of Conceptual Structures and Processes. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association (pp. 267- 307). Bechtel, W. (1990). “Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.” In Lycan, W. G. (Ed.). Mind and Cognition: A Reader. New York: Blackwell Publishing. Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (Eds.). (1999). A Companion to Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Brooks, R. (1991). “Intelligence without Representation.” Artificial Intelligence 47: 139-159. —. (1999). Cambrian Intelligence: The Early History of the New AI. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (2002). Flesh and Machines: How Robots will Change Us. New York: Pantheon Books. Chokr, Nader N. (1992). “Mind, Consciousness and Cognition: Phenomenology vs. Cognitive Science.” Husserl Studies 9/3: 179-197.

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—. (1987). “Prototype Theory and Family Resemblances.” In Danny Moates & Richard Butrick (Eds.) On Inference. (Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference). Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, pp. 84-93. Clancey, W. (1997). Situated Cognition: On Human Knowledge and Computer Representation. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (1999). “Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition.” In Bechtel & Graham (Eds.) A Companion to Cognitive Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. —. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58: 7-19. Cowart, M. (2006). “Embodied Cognition.” Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, pp. 1-16. http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/embodcog.htm Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotions, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon Books. —. (2000). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harvest Books. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Descartes, R. (1991). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. III. (Eds.). M. Cottingham et al., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dourish, P. (2001). Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dreyfus, H. (1972). What Computers Can’t Do? A Critique of Artificial Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row. —. (1991). Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (1992). What Computers (Still) Can’t Do? A Critique of Artificial Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (2002). “Intelligence without Representation: Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation.” Phenomenological Cognitive Science 1 (4): 367-383. Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. (2002). The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books. Freeman, W. J. (1995). Societies of Brains. NJ: Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. Glenberg, A. (1997). “What Memory is For: Creating Meaning in the Service of Action?” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 20: 1-55. —. (1999). “Why Mental Models Must be Embodied.” In Rickheit, G., and Habel, C. (Eds.). Mental Models in Discourse Processing and Reasoning. New York: Elsevier. Guignon, C.B. (1983). Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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Harnad, S. (1990). “The Symbol Grounding Problem.” Physica D 42: 335-346. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. New York: Collins. Held, R., & Hein, A. (1958). “Adaptation of Disarranged Hand-Eye Coordination Contingent upon Re-afferent Stimulation.” Perceptual Motor Skills 8: 87-90. Hendricks-Jansen, H. (1996). Catching Ourselves in the Act: Situated Activity, Interactive Emergence, Evolution and Human Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (1989). “Representations without Rules.” Philosophical Topics 17: 147-174. Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (1999). “Rules.” In Bechtel & Graham (Eds.) A Companion to Cognitive Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. —. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mataric, M. J. (1992). “Integration of Representation into Goal-Driven Behaviour Based Robots.” IEEE Transactions on Robotics and Automation 8 (3): 304-312. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1989). The Structure of Behaviour. Philadelphia, PA: Duquesne University Press. —. (2002). The Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge. Nadel, L., et al. (2002). (Eds.). Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science. London: Macmillan. O’Donovan-Anderson, M. (1996). The Incorporated Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. —. (1997). Content and Comportment: On Embodiment and the Epistemic Availability of the World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. —. (2000). “Review of Philosophy in the Flesh.” Review of Metaphysics, June 2000. Onfray, M. & Roparz, H. (1975-2006). Contre-Histoire de la Philosophie. (48 Audio Compact Discs) Paris: French and European Publications. Petitot, J., et al. (2000). Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Polanyi, M. (1983). Tacit Dimension. London: Peter Smith Publishers. Port, R., et al. (1995). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rogoff, R., & Laveit, J. (1999). Everyday Cognition: Development in Social Context. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. NJ: Princeton University Press. Schutz, A. (1972). The Phenomenology of the Social World. Heinemann Educational Publications. —. (1978). The Theory of Social Action. Indiana University Press.

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ESSAY # 5 ON THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: JUSTIFICATION AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

1. Introduction In his well-known paper, “Can the Capability Approach be justified?” (2002), 1 Thomas Pogge sets out to examine critically the Capability Approach (hereafter CA),2 and take a critical measure of its comparative advantage relative to the “Rawlsian Resourcist” Approach (hereafter RR),3 arguably its main competitor, in an effort to determine which approach offers a plausible and workable public criterion of social justice. He concludes his lengthy and sustained analysis by claiming that CA is saddled with some serious conceptual, methodological and practical difficulties, and cannot therefore be justified, let alone be considered superior. Here is how he puts it: Can the capability approach be justified? Can it conceivably deliver at least one candidate public criterion of social justice that would be as clear and as workable and as plausible as the leading resourcist criterion, Rawls’ two 1

All references in this essay are to the original online pdf version (2002: 1-71), http://mora.rente.nhh.no/projects/EqualityExchange/Portals/0/articles/pogge1.pdf. It is published in Philosophical Topics 30/2: 167-228 (2002). 2 Unless referred to by acronym, I will use instead the expression “the capabilities approach’ in order to convey from the start the multi-dimensional, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing character of the capabilities (and corresponding functionings). 3 Pogge refers to the Rawlsian position as “resourcist” or a form of “resourcism” presumably because his notion of “primary social goods” is, in the final analysis, indexed to “income and wealth” as a measure of well-being in a liberal or social democracy. It presumes that in such a constituted society citizens would enjoy at least in principle equal rights, liberties, opportunities, and social bases for selfrespect.

On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 205 principles? Would such a capability criterion do better in addressing and highlighting the horrific injustices of the world in which we live? The evidence to-date suggests that the answers to these questions are no. That the capability approach has nonetheless done much to advance the discussion of social justice is a great tribute to its foremost champions: Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Pogge, 2002: 71).

Despite its recognized contribution to the discussion about social justice, CA is herein said to be inadequate as a theory of social justice. The alternative Pogge proposes is obviously an appropriately construed Resourcist Approach along Rawlsian lines (RR), yet somewhat expanded and more sophisticated.4 While Pogge’s effort to evaluate and critically engage CA is to be commended, we must recognize that the critical punch of his objections and criticisms rests upon (1) his way of formulating the problem and setting up the main point of contention between CA and RR, and whether it is as straightforward and unproblematic as he claims it to be, and (2) his characterization and representation of the capability approach, and whether it is fair and accurate enough. I argue in this essay that (1) is objectionable, and that subsequently, (2) is inaccurate and problematic in some significant respect(s), which I attempt to identify. I conclude that these failures constitute sufficient grounds for brushing aside his objections and criticisms, precisely because 4

There are different kinds of resourcism. One may distinguish at least the following five kinds based respectively on: (1) GNP per capita, (2) Disposable Per Capita Income, (3) Material Goods Entitlements (including income, non-market goods, and public goods), (4) Personal vs. Impersonal Resources (as in Dworkin, whereby the former include natural skills and talents, mental, physical, and intellectual abilities, while the latter are equivalent to materials goods), and finally, (5) “Social Primary Goods” (as in Rawlsian Resourcism, and which includes rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect). Unfortunately, these different kinds of resourcism are not always distinguished clearly or sufficiently, and as a result, arguments in defense of, or against, some version(s) are often taken to hold for, or against, other versions as well unjustifiably (see Robeyns, 2005 for a very fruitful discussion in this regard). If anything however, Pogge’s critical project may compel us to ask ourselves about the relative merits of different kinds of resourcism, and to provide perhaps what is most needed in this debate, greater conceptual clarity and descriptive accuracy. As we shall see later on, for example, Pogge’s list of “social primary goods” or “basic goods” includes a few more elements than Rawls’.

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they fail to hit their designated target(s). 5 Notwithstanding the real difficulties and problems still facing CA, I attempt in closing to articulate a qualified defense of CA and its conception of social justice by bringing out some of its comparative advantages relative to RR on variations of a simple case-scenario. In this regard, it should be noted that Sen does not claim that his version of CA amounts to a full-fledged theory of social justice, while Nussbaum has been making in recent years a bolder move toward what she calls “a partial theory of social justice” (2000; 2002). And so, whether CA generally speaking can and should be construed and evaluated as if it were putting forth a full theory of social justice is certainly problematic. Naturally one could consider what a CA-based theory of social justice would look like, assuming it could be fleshed out consistently on the basis of its core insights, concepts and tenets, for the purpose of a critical, comparative evaluation exercise. Assuming then that this is what Pogge is in effect attempting to do (the evaluation of its comparative advantage as a potentially full-fledged theory of social justice); we may still quite legitimately question his construal and characterization of CA. But perhaps and in anticipation, it is more appropriate to view CA as “a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change,” human development, poverty, inequality, and justice (Robeyns, 2005a: 94). 5

I must note that this essay was written long before my recent discovery of Sandrine Berges’ paper “Why the Capability Approach is Justified” (2007: 16-25). Though my analysis is congruent with many of the points she makes, I am here taking a different approach --as the forthcoming discussion will demonstrate. Berges disagrees with Pogge’s critical analysis in two respects: she disagrees with his claim that RR can just as effectively accommodate human diversity as CA does. In her view, Pogge’s arguments in this regard are weak, and RR in general could not provide a more satisfactory argument. She also disagrees with Pogge that the main point of contention between CA and RR should be couched in terms of compensation for natural disadvantage. As we shall see, I fully agree with this point. Berges goes on to argue that the concept of compensation itself is incompatible with Nussbaum’s version of CA, and that we have good reasons to regard this concept as unhelpful in establishing social justice. I would also be inclined to support such a conclusion. In the process, she attempts to highlight some of the differences between Nussbaum’s Aristotelian/Marxian account and what she calls “Sen’s more neutral account.” I am not sure what she means precisely by “neutral” because I am inclined to think that “neutrality” does not exist. But this is now beside the point.

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2. How Not to Construe the Capabilities Approach? In order to better and most effectively compare RR and CA (mostly Sen’s version) 6 and assess their relative advantages, Pogge seeks quite understandably to isolate the main difference between them. Such a step is necessary, he claims, to the process of determining “which approach can deliver the most plausible public criterion of social justice (Pogge, 2002: 1). However, from the start, Pogge proceeds as if “the debate about criteria of social justice” can be reduced to a narrower debate, i.e., namely, about “how institutional schemes are to be assessed and reformed in the name of justice” (Pogge, 2002: 2). Once Pogge makes this move, then the question (from his vantage point) becomes: “Should alternative feasible institutional schemes be assessed in terms of participants’ access to valuable resources or in terms of their participants’ capabilities, that is, access to valuable functionings” (Pogge, 2002: 16; italics added). Pogge states that, in order to answer this question, we must “confine ourselves” to “the central disagreement between the two approaches,” which he characterizes as follows. Resourcists believe that individual shares should be defined as bundles of goods or resources needed by humans in general, without reference to the natural diversity among them. These goods might include certain rights and liberties, powers and prerogatives, income and wealth, as well as access to education, health care, employment, and public goods—with different lists and different weights specified by different resourcist views. Adherents of the capability approach hold, by contrast, that individual shares should be defined so as to take account of “personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods in the person’s ability to promote her ends.” Thus, an egalitarian capability criterion holds that, under a just institutional order, persons with mental or physical frailties or disabilities would receive more resources than others, enabling them to reach the same level of capabilities, the same level of opportunities to promote human ends, insofar as this is possible (Pogge, 2002: 34; italics added).

By characterizing and presenting CA in this way, Pogge is clearly restricting it right from the start to the advocacy of an institutional order or scheme that distributes resources in a way that reflects each individual’s ability to convert resources into capabilities. Upon first apprehension, 6

Whenever relevant and appropriate, I will bring into the discussion the sometimes distinctive claims of Nussbaum’s version. See also Essay# 2 for further discussion.

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there seems to be nothing wrong with such a characterization. However, after closer scrutiny and reflection, this very characterization reveals itself to be the very basis upon which he subsequently makes his various (questionable) objections and other substantive criticisms of CA in his entire essay. One question we need to raise and ponder is this: Are there matters of social justice that do not result directly from, and are not dependent upon, institutional schemes as such? In other words, are there non- or extrainstitutional matters, such as social and cultural norms and practices, which have an impact on matters of social justice, and which must therefore be taken into account to some extent? I am sure Pogge would agree with this general point, but the question is about what he proposes more specifically for dealing (or not) with it. I submit that Pogge’s characterization of CA as one that is merely advocating an institutional order that distributes resources—albeit in such a way that reflects each individual’s ability to convert such resources into capabilities is itself arguably limited, and therefore inaccurate and unfair. Its limitation has to do with his mis-understanding of capabilities and functionings. In a nutshell, Pogge’s account fails to recognize the intrinsic value of capabilities, and the significance attributed to it in CA. To be sure, Pogge understands that “resources are of merely instrumental significance, and “are important only insofar as they give persons opportunities to pursue their goals” (Pogge, 2002: 34). But he seems to demonstrate his misunderstanding of “capabilities,” and of the capabilities approach, in general, when he attempts to assign an equivalent, merely instrumental, value to capabilities. He argues, for example: “Like rights and access to money, so the abilities to be well nourished and to move about are of mostly instrumental importance” (Pogge, 2002: 35). Pogge is right about one thing. Many of the capabilities, including those that he mentions, have significant instrumental value. E.g., the ability to move about is instrumental in the task of getting a glass of water from the kitchen, as well as in other tasks requiring movement. However, unlike resources, capabilities are not merely of instrumental significance.

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Capabilities are types of freedoms, to use Sen’s latest terminology,7 and as such, they are also and most importantly, intrinsically valuable (Sen, 1990). Capability is…the substantive freedom to achieve alternate functioning combinations, ([that is, combinations of the various things a person may value doing or being], or less formally put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles) (Sen, 1999a: 75).

A person with the capacity to be well nourished enjoys the freedom to choose between being well nourished and not being well nourished (e.g., as in fasting or going on a hunger strike). In contrast, a person with resources, even sophisticated resources like “access to money” or “access to food” may or may not be free to convert these resources to meet her actual needs, e.g., being well nourished. A person can for example have access to food, but lack the capacity to be well nourished, because of parasites, for example. Recall here the example often discussed by Sen and other capability theorists in this context. An affluent person who fasts or goes on a hunger strike may have the same functioning achievement in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute person who is forced to starve, but the first person does have a different “capability set” than the second: the first can choose to eat well and be well nourished in a way that the second cannot. (Sen, 1999a: 75; 1993). 7

In that terminology, capabilities are viewed as potential functionings, and the capability set consists of a combination of capabilities or potential functionings, in the same way that a person’s overall freedom can be said to be made up of a number of more specific freedoms. In this regard, Sen’s terminology converges with Nussbaum’s and many other CA scholars. But, according to Robeyns (2005a: 100), one does not find this plural usage of capabilities (as being the individual elements of one person’s capability set) in Sen’s earlier work; instead, one finds a singular and arguably more technical and less intuitive conceptualization of the term “capability” according to which each capability refers to one person, and vice-versa. Under such a construal, a capability is taken to be synonymous with capability set, which consists of a combination of potential functionings. A person’s capability is said to be equivalent to a person’s opportunity set. It is therefore important to keep track of Sen’s usage over time and in different contexts. We should also keep in mind that while the primary focus of Sen’s conceptualization is on “real or effective opportunities,” Nussbaum’s in contrast is on “skills, personality traits, dispositions, and internal powers to do and be.” For a very insightful discussion of the differences in their respective conceptualization of “capabilities,” see Crocker (1995)

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A proponent of resourcism could here point out the following truism: without access to food one cannot have the capability of being well nourished. This is obviously true. In this way resources are sometimes (perhaps even often) necessary, but they are rarely if ever sufficient for capabilities, and in turn, for functionings. Capabilities will sometimes depend on access to external (merely instrumental) goods, but they will also invariably require something internal, such as, for example, a properly working digestive system (or a psychological state of empowerment). Capabilities, it cannot be stressed enough, are actual (intrinsically valuable) opportunities for active doings and beings, and as such, they account for all that is necessary—external and internal—in order to achieve the relevant functionings. In other words, capabilities are both necessary and sufficient for achieved functionings. Pogge may quite rightly point out that this does not his claim, i.e., “that the abilities to be well nourished and to move about are of mostly instrumental importance,” because he would also characterize the corresponding functionings this way. Nevertheless, it does serve to underscore a distinctive feature of CA, namely, its insistence on the intrinsic value of the capabilities, over and beyond their merely, obvious instrumental value. It must also be stressed that, while capabilities, or real and substantial opportunities, are necessary and sufficient for functionings or realized achievements, they don’t however necessitate functionings. A person will have several capabilities (e.g., being nourished) in her capability set that she chooses not to realize (e.g., by fasting or going on a hunger strike). A person who has the capability to be well nourished is, by definition, a person who can choose to be well nourished. Pogge’s account of CA fails to fully appreciate and capture this aspect, and as a result, it holds rather problematically that the distribution of resources is often both necessary and sufficient for achieving capabilities and functionings. Pogge seems to think that a resourcist position that requires not just institutional distribution of primary goods, but the more sophisticated “access to primary goods” can somehow account for all that is necessary to achieve functionings. But here is a question worth entertaining: Can a resourcist, even of the most sophisticated kind, account for the institutional distribution of the most sophisticated resources, such as “access to the social bases of self-respect,” or provide a satisfactory account of an individual’s essential capacity “to imagine, think, and

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reason…in a truly human way” (Nussbaum, 2000: 78)? This is clearly doubtful. Such capabilities as the ones involved here require obviously internal powers and dispositions that can be cultivated and facilitated by appropriate external conditions and resources (e.g., education), but that can never be provided by them. It seems to me that Pogge’s failure to recognize the intrinsic value of capabilities leads him astray in his characterization of CA overall, and ultimately, in his evaluation of its merits and limitations. His misunderstanding becomes even clearer when we examine his treatment of an original criticism of resourcism formulated by Sen in Inequality ReExamined (1992: 19 n20; see also 1990). Sen’s original criticism of “Rawlsian resourcism” consisted in pointing out its use of strictly instrumental resources. But because Pogge wrongly assigns the same instrumental role to capabilities, he also wrongly believes that “Sen’s criticism of resourcism can be turned against himself” (Pogge, 2002: 35). In his effort to turn Sen’s criticism against him, he substitutes “capabilities” for “resources” in the following paraphrase of Sen: Equality in the space of capabilities is seen as important because they are instrumental in giving people equitable opportunity to pursue their respective goals and objectives. This distance introduces some internal tension in Sen’s theory, since the derivative importance of capabilities depends on their role in allowing persons to fulfill their ends (Pogge, 2002: 36; italics added).

What Pogge fails to recognize here is that when capabilities are properly understood as “freedoms” or “real and effective opportunities” to achieve “the various things a person may value doing or being (Sen, 1999a: 75), his criticism above loses all ground to stand on and becomes meaningless. Pogge’s failure to accurately or fairly represent and characterize CA becomes even clearer when he states the following: If Sen’s argument were sound, it would show that what matters for social justice is not equity in the space of capabilities (access to functionings) but equity in the space of opportunities to fulfill one’s particular ends (Pogge, 2002: 36).

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With this statement, Pogge confirms, I believe, that he does not fully understand the notions of “capabilities” and “functionings.” After all, capabilities are opportunities to fulfill one’s particular goals (that is, freedoms to achieve various lifestyles one has reason to value). One may here object, as Pogge does, that equality of capabilities does not entail equality of opportunities to fulfill one’s particular goals, for the simple reason that people have different goals. In his view, the question then remains why we should equalize capabilities when what people care about are their goals or ends. He admits however the question loses its significance if I were right that Sen regards capabilities or functionings as of intrinsic and not instrumental value. But if capabilities have even some instrumental value relative to self-chosen ends beyond functionings, then the question retains its relevance, in Pogge’s view. While Pogge is right, logically speaking, about the lack of entailment between “equality of capabilities” and “equality of opportunities,” one should not fail to recognize that an expansion of capabilities for each and all (in a more realistic sense, and ideally, an equal set of capabilities) would enable (differently situated) individuals with different goals and ends to better be able to achieve their respective goals or ends. This is part of the underlying rationale for CA, as I understand it. Besides, it does seem to me that Sen regards capabilities as having both intrinsic and instrumental value. He opts, if I may say so, for a dual-perspective on the capabilities. And so while Pogge’s question may still have some relevance (as it should), it does not undermine CA’s claim that a focus on, and an expansion of, capabilities (properly understood) is bound to translate into more substantive, real opportunities (as opposed to merely formal ones) for each and all. This is already a tall order to fill. In this regard, it is also instructive to note how Pogge deals with a passage quoted from Sen in which the latter attempts to establish the contrast between his CA and other contending theories, particularly, Rawls’ “social primary goods” resourcism. The passage from Sen (quoted here in full) reads as follows: I have tried to argue for some time now that for many evaluative purposes, the appropriate “space” is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods (as demanded by Rawls) but that of substantive freedoms—the capabilities—to choose a life one has reason to value. If the object is to concentrate on the individual’s real opportunity to pursue her objectives (as Rawls explicitly recommends), then account would have to

On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 213 be taken not only of the primary goods the persons respectively hold, but also of the relevant personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods into the person’s ability to promote her ends (Sen, 1999: 74; italics in text; emphasis added).

According to Pogge, as he pointed out earlier (2002: 34), an egalitarian capability criterion would then uphold that, “under a just institutional order, persons with mental or physical frailties or disabilities would receive more resources than others, enabling them to reach the same level of capabilities, the same level of opportunities to promote human ends, insofar as this is possible.” And he goes to write in a note that Sen’s formulation is defective by suggesting that the capability approach features criteria of social justice that take account of the specific ends that different persons are pursuing. This is not the case—he states. Capabilities are defined without regards for such ends. One person does not count as having lesser capabilities than another merely because the former chooses to pursue more ambitious ends. What matters for capability theorists is each person’s ability to promote typical or standard human ends—and not: each person’s ability to promote his or her own particular ends (Pogge, 34 n76; italics in text).

A few pointed questions should here suffice by way of replies and counter-objections: How does such a characterization fit with the fact that the capabilities approach is concerned with a person’s ability to promote his or her own particular ends over other ends, but, of course, only among typical or standard human ends? How does it fit with the fact that CA recognizes the importance of not just the doings and beings one achieves, but also the opportunities that one has, yet chooses not to pursue—in other words, with the freedom to choose to actualize some components of one’s capability set rather than others, properly conceived and understood?

3. Institutional Distribution Schemes vs. Other Factors When Pogge depicts CA as consisting merely in the advocacy of an institutional order that distribute resources, he simply misrepresents it. And yet, in all fairness, Pogge is clearly not committed to the simple and false view that when an individual is given certain resources x (i.e., access to food), she will necessarily have the capability for functioning y (e.g., being well nourished). He recognizes that, at least on CA’s account, the ability to convert access to resources into realized functionings varies among individuals such that when given access to equal shares of

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resources some people will be better able to meet their needs than others. Much of the variation in individuals’ abilities to convert resources into functionings results from what Sen called “personal heterogeneities.” People have disparate physical characteristics connected to disability, illness, age, or gender, and these make their needs diverse. For example, an ill person may need more income to fight her illness—income that a person without such an illness would not need…A disabled person may need some prosthesis, an older person more support and help, a pregnant woman more nutritional intake, and so on (Sen, 1999a: 70).

Note in passing that both Sen and Pogge discuss other causes for variation in the abilities to convert resources (e.g., climate, environment, intra-family distribution—which are often related to gender differences, and in this way, are linked to personal heterogeneities as well. Generally speaking, we may say that there are personal, social, and environmental factors that affect the conversion rates of different individuals differently situated (Robeyns, 2005a: 99). CA holds that some individuals may need more resources to achieve certain basic functionings than others. In addition, it holds that just institutions will work to ensure that all individuals can achieve a certain, adequate and sufficient, level of capability—even if it means (to a reasonable extent) providing some individuals with more resources than others. For example, because access to a certain amount of food may allow those without parasites to be well-nourished, but not those who suffer from parasites, CA may require that the latter (but not the former) be given additional resources to become well nourished (e.g., treatment for parasites or more food). Pogge understands well that personal heterogeneities, and in turn, an individual’s diverse capacities to convert resources into valuable functionings, play an important role within the capability approach, and that as a result, CA cannot be saddled with a “one-size-fits-all” distributional system, which typically serve to underwrite other kinds of egalitarian theories. It is therefore surprising to see him attribute the kind of distributional system that he does attribute to CA. This may be due in part to the fact that Pogge commits himself to the questionable assumption or position, according to which the only way capability theorists can hope to enhance capabilities—regardless of a particular individual’s situation, is through the distribution of (various quantities and qualities of) resources. Thus, in Pogge’s analysis, the capability theorist, like the

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resourcist, is concerned only with institutional distribution of resources.8 This is arguably his most serious mistake—as well as, more generally perhaps, that of theorists working under the consequentialist-contractualist framework which is dominant in much of Anglophone political philosophy today.9 To be fair, I am prepared to accept that this may not be an accurate characterization of Pogge’s view, though this could have been made clearer in his discussion. Perhaps Pogge is in fact putting forth a more sophisticated version of Rawlsian Resourcism, one that recognizes the intuitive core of CA, namely, that more than resources need to be distributed or taken into account, and that more than an institutional approach need to be countenanced in our theorizing about on social justice. Let’s be clear. The capability approach does hold that institutions should provide individuals with the resources they need in order to achieve a certain adequate level of functioning, and that due to disparate characteristics (physical and otherwise) some individuals will need and should be provided with more resources than they would otherwise be. However, it is wrong to assume or hold that the following proposition, “institutions should distribute more resources” captures the main thrust of CA’s program. It is clearly not CA’s only response to situations of deprivation in which individuals are unable or prevented from acquiring basic capabilities. Resources do obviously play an important role in CA, as they should, and it has been emphasized enough by the proponents of CA.10 However, due to their instrumental nature, resources can never be 8

Admittedly, we would want a theory of justice to include, among other things, a principle for the just and fair distribution (institutional and otherwise) of resources, but we would also want it arguably to include the appropriate “space” for evaluating and assessing comparative well-being and the quality of life, a sound aggregative principle, as well as an account of what constitute fair and morally justified procedural mechanisms of decision making and participation. It is clear that CA has something to say on the first two scores, but it arguably does not offer much (or very little) on the latter two (see Sen, 2006). 9 To explain more fully why the mistake is also that of the framework would require a far more detailed and substantiated discussion than I can provide in the present context. For some arguments to that effect, see Nussbaum (2006); see also Essay # 8. Pogge has over the years expressed a number of reservations about such a framework (1995), and even on some occasion called for its replacement. But he may be still far too indebted to it? 10 As Robeyns, for example, puts it: “For some of the capabilities, the main input will be financial resources or economic production, but for others it can also be

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sufficient for ensuring (the expansion of) capabilities. And so, to argue, that institutional redistribution of more resources is CA’s only response to deprivation is, I believe, to unfairly misrepresent the capability approach. That resource distribution alone is not sufficient for achieving a basic level of functioning regardless of one’s gender, for example, is a critical point widely recognized and repeatedly reinforced by CA proponents. The case for CA gets even stronger and clearer when we consider the non- or extra-institutional obstacles faced by women and girls in particular.11 CA recognizes that a woman’s ability to achieve valuable functionings is greatly diminished in a culturally sexist and patriarchal society—in which, despite formal access to legal rights and resources, she is considered— even by herself—to be a second class citizen. This is true for a number of complex reasons which have been rehearsed on a number of occasions by both Sen and Nussbaum. These reasons include not only “institutional factors” like access to resources and unequal treatment from institutions, but also “non- or extra-institutional factors” like cultural practices, a diminished sense of self-worth, adaptive conditioning and preferences, reduced options, feeling of powerlessness, relatively low bargaining power in both the private and public spheres, and many others. In their respective work, Sen and Nussbaum have shown rather convincingly that far too many women around the world are unfortunately still conditioned to expect less than men in the same circumstances [For details, extended discussions and concrete examples, see Sen (1999a: 189203; 1999b: 52-69); Nussbaum (1999: 3-210; 2000: 111-166)]. Even when granted access to rights and resources, women often do not feel worthy enough to take full advantage of them—as they should, or they may run into cultural beliefs and practices that may prevent them from enjoying the capabilities or functionings they are entitled to. Because women often lack the power (psychologically, socially and politically) to critically consider established norms and practices, and determine for political practices and institutions such as effective guaranteeing and protection of freedom of thought, political participation, social or cultural practices, social structures, social institutions, public goods, social norms, traditions and habits. The capability approach thus covers all dimensions of human well-being. Development, well-being, and justice are regarded in a comprehensive and integrated manner, and much attention to the links between material, mental, and social well-being, or to the economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of life.” (2005a: 96). 11 See Berges (2007) for a discussion of the situation of women and girls in Turkey.

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themselves whether to uphold or reject them, their capability set (the range of freedoms they enjoy) may not be very much improved by merely giving them legal and even physical access to rights and resources. Even relatively wealthy women, who enjoy a high standard of living, may not have the capabilities necessary to live a fully flourishing human life. One need only think for example of the cases in which women are forced to marry someone they did not choose, in which they endure physical and psychological violence, sexual abuse, forced pregnancy, etc. One also need to recall that in many cases the tensions between the requirements of the legal or juridical system and the often “unreasonable” demands of religion further aggravate women’s situations. The former are at best ineffective and at worst abusive. The latter are often incomprehensibly repressive—even by that religion’s re-interpreted light. From the standpoint of CA, women in situations of capabilities deprivation need more than a greater share of institutionally distributed resources. Resources are neither the only nor the best remedy for dealing with the kinds of situations described above. Properly understood, CA recognizes that the expansion of a person’s capability set often requires more than institutional distributions of resources and that people need not be mere passive recipients of institutional resources distributions and allocations. The concept of agency is central to Sen’s approach in this regard (1985).12 It is inextricably linked to resources and institutions (including education and employment); however it goes beyond these basic resources to remove “unfreedoms” by seeking to impact, change or improve the non- or extra-institutional 12

Sabina Alkire writes that for Sen “agency—a person’s ability to act on behalf of what he or she values and has reason to value—is intrinsically valuable, instrumentally effective in reducing poverty, and of central importance” (2008: 2). The capabilities approach is described as one which is “concerned with the opportunities that people have to improve the quality of their lives. It is essentially a “people-centered” approach, which puts human agency (rather than organizations such as markets or governments) at the center of the stage.” The crucial role of social opportunities is to expand the realm of human agency and freedom, both as an end in itself and as means of further expansion of freedom. The word “social” in the expression “social opportunity” (…) is a useful reminder not to view individuals and their opportunities in isolated terms. The options that a person has depend greatly on relations with others and on what the state and other institutions do. We shall be particularly concerned with those opportunities that are strongly influenced by social circumstances and public policy (Dreze & Sen, 1996: 6; italics added).

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attitudes and cultural practices, e.g., women allowing their husband to eat the bulk of their food, putting their health concerns behind those of their husbands and children; their feelings of unworthiness, their failure to fully appreciate their right to “bodily integrity,” as defined by Nussbaum: Being able to move freely from place to place, having one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e., being able to be secure against sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction (2000: 78).

As Sen puts it, a woman empowered as an agent is a woman who “acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well” (Sen, 1999a: 19; italics added). Such a woman is better equipped to recognize her needs and question the non- or extra-institutional factors such as current social values and cultural practices that limit her freedom. And as such, she would no longer be dependent on the distributional generosity of government institutions or even development assistance programs. Indeed, the agency of women can never be adequately free if traditionally discriminatory values remain unexamined and un-scrutinized. While values may be culturally influenced…it is possible to overcome the barriers of inequality imposed by the tradition through greater freedom to question, doubt, and—if convinced—reject. An adequate realization of women’s agency relates not only to the freedom to act but also to the freedom to question and reassess (Dreze and Sen, 1996: 274; italics added).

Nussbaum also values the concept of individual active achievement as an essential part of her capability approach—even though, unlike Sen, she does not see the need for the concept of “agency.” She does not use the term because she believes her version captures the important value of the concept without making use of it. She writes in this regard: When we think of health, for example, we should distinguish between the capability or opportunity to be healthy and the actual healthy functioning: a society might make the first available and also give individuals the freedom not to choose the relevant functioning. But I am not sure that any extra clarity is added by using a well-being/ agency distinction here: healthy functioning is itself a way of being active, not just a passive state of satisfaction…Sen would surely agree with this (Nussbaum, 2000: 14; italics added).

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However, her list of human functional capabilities—which she considers essential for human flourishing—requires the central concept of “practical reason” i.e., “being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life” (Nussbaum, 2000: 78-9). In some sense, the concept of practical reason goes a long way towards making explicit that CA requires that individuals be viewed and recognize themselves as “agents.” For Nussbaum, The notion of choice and practical reason used in the list is a normative notion, emphasizing the critical activity of reason in a way that does not reflect the actual use of reason in many lives…It also entails that there is something wrong with not seeing oneself in a certain way, as a bearer of rights and a citizen whose dignity and worth are equal to that of others (2000: 112; 113; italics added).

For both Nussbaum and Sen, simply having rights and access to resources is not enough. When properly understood CA requires not only that individuals receive the resources necessary to achieve a basic level of functioning, but also that they recognize themselves as a bearer of rights, and worthy of (at least) an equal share of resources. A man or woman empowered as an agent is not simply, once again, a passive recipient of resources, but an active critic of institutional practices and policies such as resource distribution schemes as well as non- or extra-institutional factors (i.e., cultural practices, social norms and values). A woman who actively recognizes her worth as equal to that of others is empowered to challenge unfair and oppressive cultural and social norms. A woman who sees herself as a bearer of rights and dignity, and as worthy of respect, is empowered to challenge violations to her “bodily integrity” (Nussbaum), no matter how widely accepted and even valued such violations are in her society. Such empowerment is, I believe, an essential aspect of the capability approach. Pogge fails to appreciate this when he restricts it to a simple proposition for the institutional distribution of resources.

4. Rawlsian Resourcism vs. the Capabilities Approach I am hard pressed to understand why Pogge does not even mention the essential role of individual empowerment either in terms of Sen’s agency or Nussbaum’s practical reason. He is obviously aware that for the capabilities approach it is important to recognizes the many complex ways in which various “personal heterogeneities,” including gender, can have an impact on a person’s capability set (real opportunities), and in turn, on her well-being. He also recognizes not only that non- or extra-institutional

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factors (e.g., culturally sexist values and practices) affect the well-being of individuals, but also that accounting for and taking into account such factors is important to both Sen and Nussbaum. Thus Pogge remarks: Offensive correlations need not manifest inherent injustice of an institutional order. They may instead be caused by prevalent cultural practices and attitudes, and are often so caused as Sen and Nussbaum have shown so effectively (Pogge, 2002: 11; italics added).

Pogge also refers specifically to the “very great contributions Sen and Nussbaum have made toward spreading awareness of the economic injustices inflicted specifically to women and girls” (Pogge, 2002: 24). Yet, strangely enough, he does not connect either Sen’s or Nussbaum’s work on gender empowerment in his characterization and representation of CA. Instead, he restricts the scope of CA to a narrow evaluation of alternative institutional resources distribution schemes, and in so doing, he once again mis-represents CA altogether. In effect, Pogge fails to recognize that gender and other forms of empowerment are part and parcel of CA. What is perhaps somewhat more troublesome is that Pogge charges (incorrectly, I believe) that “the capability approach may even weaken the feminist cause by suggesting—falsely—that women’s terrible and disproportionate suffering in most of this world is due to their being insufficiently compensated for their inferior natural endowments” (Pogge, 2002: 24).13 Given his mis-representation, it is not surprising that Pogge goes on to argue that the resourcist view is superior to CA in terms of the response that it gives to address the fact that women suffer more than men. Women’s suffering in the world as it is does not result from social institutions being insufficiently sensitive to the special needs arising from their different natural constitution. Rather, it overwhelmingly results from institutional schemes and cultural practices being far too sensitive to their biological difference by making sex the basis for all kinds of social (legal 13

Is it the case though that the feminist critiques formulated by capability theorists are orthogonal to the comparison between CA and RR, though perhaps not to other kinds of resourcism, as Pogge has presumably argued, and as Robeyns seems prepared to concede (2005b)?

On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 221 and cultural) exclusions and disadvantages. Women and girls have a powerful justice claim to the removal of these barriers, to equal treatment (in a resourcist sense). If these barriers were removed, if our social institutions assured women of equal and equally effective civil and political rights, of equal opportunities, of equal pay for equal work, women could thrive fully even without any special breaks and considerations (Pogge, 2002: 24-5; italics added).

What exactly is Pogge saying here? He seems to be arguing that if institutions were just, which is required in order to provide equal treatment to both men and women, then extra-institutional factors (potential obstacles to conversion rates) such as cultural attitudes and practices will simply dissolve on their own and their impact will only become marginal. It is as if Pogge is claiming that once the official, institutional recognition of women’s equal worth is achieved this will lead to a cultural-wide recognition not only in the public sphere but in the private sphere as well, and even in women’s own minds. If this reading is correct, then Pogge cannot be further apart from CA, for which an official institutional recognition is only one part of the empowerment of women, admittedly an important part, one that is necessary, but once again, rarely if ever sufficient. Naturally, there are good reasons for preferring a system in which treatment of both men and women is fair, but not necessarily equal in Pogge’s “resourcist sense,” insofar as it seems to hold that the best way to treat men and women equally is “to treat all women like men.” Such a fair system would presumably be able to account for genuine and relevant biological differences through special considerations for maternity leave and the real dangers of rape and domestic violence, without limiting women’s access to education, or property ownership, for example. But doesn’t such an account run the risk of eliminating not only harmful and oppressive cultural practices but also the rich and still viable ones, that, upon due reflection, the bearers of a given culture may have good reasons to value and keep?14 This is certainly a concern we should have. In contrast, by empowering individuals, women, in particular, and the communities to which they belong, to make these decisions by and for themselves, Sen’s and Nussbaum’s CA does not arguably run such a risk.15 14

If such an account cannot fairly be attributed to Pogge, then the risk highlighted here would apply to the proponents of resourcism who might hold such a view. 15 Qizilbash (1997) points however to a weakness of CA with respect to gender justice. Robeyns (2003) proposes a “politically legitimate” methodology for

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With regards to issues related to gender differences and other “personal heterogeneities,” Pogge’s position is that the institutional schemes required by the resourcist are “no less able to address most of the important deprivations and inequalities that so disfigure our world” (Pogge, 2002: 33). For Pogge, both the resourcist and the capability approaches are capable of accounting for the vast majority of deprivations that result from what Sen calls “personal heterogeneities.” So when it comes to deciding which approach is superior one may consider these kinds of consideration as irrelevant. Instead, the issue that is significant and about which the two approaches disagree, in Pogge’s view, is this: How to account for the remaining “pure” personal heterogeneities, or as he puts it: How institutional schemes are to respond to natural human diversity, with the reminder that such natural human diversity may arise from any combination of ordinary genetic variations, self-caused factors, and differential luck (Pogge, 2002: 33-4; italics in text).

Pogge’s discussion of natural human diversity in this context runs along the following lines: First, he limits CA (wrongly, I believe), like the resourcist approach, to a mere system for deciding how institutions should distribute resources. Second, he claims that there is in fact a great deal of agreement, albeit for different reasons, between CA and RR, about how the vast majority of individuals should be treated. Suppose we characterize the two approaches in terms of their respective responses to the traditional questions of (1) Who?—putative or actual recipients (2) What?—resources and/or capabilities (3) Why?—Reasons for giving (2) to (1)? We would quickly see that they may agree on (1), disagree on (2), and possibly (3). Who should get What? And Why? In Pogge’s view, CA will require additional compensatory resources in some cases. This may be true, but incomplete if we don’t add that it may also require additional compensatory measures—in both an institutional and extra-institutional sense. Third, Pogge claims that the relevant difference—against the background of their broad agreement—is simply a matter of how each approach proposes to distribute resources in view of the differential conversion rates that stem from natural human diversity. In Pogge’s view, such a difference comes down to this:

selecting relevant capabilities in an effort to address gender inequality and remedy the weakness of CA.

On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 223 Capability theorists assert, while resourcists deny, that a public criterion of social justice [that is, just institutional schemes] should take account of the individual rates at which persons with diverse physical and mental constitutions can convert resources into valuable functionings (Pogge, 2002: 1-2; italics in text).

In Pogge’s reading, the role for which the capability approach was intended by its own authors is, as he puts it, the “compensatory fine-tuning of the distribution of resources so as to take account of persons’ vertically diverse capacities to convert resources into valuable functionings” (Pogge, 2002: 60; italics added).16 Does CA hold that resource distribution can and often does have an impact on the functioning individuals enjoy? The answer is obviously yes, and Pogge is correct in this regard. Does CA hold that resource distribution should reflect individuals’ diverse capacities to convert resources into valuable functionings? The answer is again “yes,” and again Pogge is right in this respect. But does CA claim that resource distribution is the only way to influence the functionings individuals achieve and enjoy? The answer is clearly “no”. Yet, this is precisely what Pogge seems to suggest. And it is arguably because he makes such a suggestion that he fails in the end to take into account the role of active empowerment, an essential dimension of CA, to which I shall return shortly.

5. How to Accommodate Natural Human Diversities? In the meantime, I would like next to show that Pogge’s characterization of the role of natural human diversity within CA is also confused and problematic, and further contributes to his misrepresentation and unwarranted evaluation of CA. For both Sen and Nussbaum, CA requires that individuals be entitled to a certain threshold, or adequate and sufficient level of capability: for the former, through his requirement that individuals have equal access to “basic capabilities”—understood here as “the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings up to certain levels” (Sen, 1992: 46 n19; see also Sen, 2005); for the latter, through her list of central 16

I would dispute this characterization of what CA requires in this regard—i.e., vertical ranking.

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combined capabilities for (truly) human functionings (see Nussbaum, 1999: 41-2; 2000: 78-80; 2006: 76-78 for different versions of the list). Pogge characterizes those accounts that make use of “thresholds,” like the capabilities approach as sufficientarian. And as such, they seek to “assess any institutional order by the extent to which its treatment of any of its participants avoidably falls below some threshold (however defined). On such a view, Pogge hastens to add, an institutional order could be perfectly just even while it generates vast inequalities above the threshold” (Pogge, 2002: 8). This is, I guess, one way to put it, by way of implication. But it does not fit with the normative thrust and egalitarian spirit of CA. Besides, CA may well be required (if and when it is fleshed out into a fullblown theory of social and global justice) to countenance a notion of “ceilings” in addition to that of “thresholds”—at least with regards to certain goods, services, or resources more generally (see Holland, 2007). Furthermore, in his discussion of natural human diversity, Pogge seems to confuse two things which must arguably be distinguished: (1) The limited set of diverse human needs and abilities that are relevant to an individual’s achievement of a certain level of basic capabilities (that either Sen or Nussbaum would require, I believe). (2) The very large set of physical and mental differences that naturally occurs between human beings—no matter how irrelevant the difference may be to a person’s ability to achieve a reasonable threshold of capabilities. It is this confusion, I believe, which leads Pogge to make the dubious and questionable claim that CA requires the vertical ranking of each and every physical and mental feature (from suffering from a severe inborn disability to having freckles, an ugly smile, or being bald) of each and every person in a society. Objecting to my characterization above (in bold), Pogge writes: “Not each and every feature—only those that reduce persons’ ability to convert resources into valuable functionings.” I am prepared to accept this correction. But he quickly adds: “I do indeed think lots of features have this character and that it would be very hard to give a transparent accounting of how (dis)advantaged each member of society is, all things considered, by the totality of her/his physical and mental features.”17

17

Personal communication (August 2008): This comment is related to a later point about whether “having freckles” or not alters “the capability to love and be loved.”

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It does seem that for Pogge CA requires the listing and ranking of all the capabilities that a community could value (and this includes lots of them). Because of this, he concludes that it is an unduly complicated and impractical approach. Here is how he puts it: Using a list of capabilities in this way involves grading all of the citizens for their natural aptitudes towards each of the capabilities on the list, determining their specific deficits, and ensuring that these deficits are duly neutralized through suitable compensatory benefits (Pogge, 2002: 61).

In my understanding of CA, it is simply not the case that capability theorists insist on understanding all natural human diversity as vertical. The explanations given by Pogge in this regard (2002: 53-58) only aggravate his misrepresentation and mischaracterization of CA. According to Pogge, CA seeks to rank all sorts of variations between human beings—such as, for example, being blind, having green eyes, being tall, being quadriplegic, being bald, having a good smile, a good singing voice, being intelligent, etc.—as being better or worse features. CA would therefore advocate certain institutional schemes or orders that give greater shares to some people, but not to others. And in doing so, CA would presumably claim furthermore that the natural endowments of some are and “should be characterized as deficient and inferior, and those persons naturally disfavored and worse endowed—not just in this or that respect, but overall—not just in the eyes of this or that observer, but in the eyes of the shared public criterion of social justice” (Pogge, 2002: 54-5; italics added). It is as if Pogge were contending that for CA the task consists in ranking each and every citizen as better or worse off according to the capabilities they have by virtue of natural diversity, and then designing, reforming or fine-tuning an institutional scheme that distributes goods or resources in an effort to even out the playing field, not just between the severely deprived and those free to live a life they have reason to value or to achieve human flourishing, but between the hairy and the bald, between those with or without freckles, etc. This can only be a caricature of CA, and an unfair one. In a personal communication, Pogge replied that we need nevertheless to say why it is wrong. Though he points out that “having freckles or not” is not an example he uses, he goes on to argue that, if the capability to love and be loved is on the list, then “having freckles” may well reduce it

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(relative to having no freckles). And why wouldn’t CA require, in such a case, that the freckled be suitably compensated so that their capability to love and be loved is not inferior to that of others? CA may well require that some features which objectively reduce the capability here in question be suitably compensated for, but these may not include being hairy or bold, having freckles or not. It is therefore wrong to think that CA requires the vertical ranking and evaluation of each and every element of natural human diversity, or all individuals in terms of their natural human diversity.18 It is also wrong to suggest that it is the job of the capability theorist to propose or dictate the list of capabilities that a community will value. Even Nussbaum’s proposed list is meant to serve as fodder for further discussion. As for Sen (2004), he has opted in this regard for a “deliberate and assertive incompleteness”—to the (dis)satisfaction of many CA sympathizers.

6. Empowerment: Agency and Practical Reason To reconnect now with the previous thread of my reasoning, Pogge’s restriction of CA to a simple proposition for the distribution of resources is closely connected to his misunderstanding of the valuation-evaluation process, and ultimately, to his failure to capture Sen’s and Nussbaum’s emphasis on active individual empowerment. Contrary to what Pogge believes CA does not take citizens as mere dependents (recipients) of an institutional order that not only provides resources, but also dictates what capabilities people should value. Sen argues instead that With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as 18

As Robeyns (2005b) argues quite rightly, it is necessary under a properly construed and understood CA to distinguish between those features of natural human diversity that do and don’t require moral considerations in our measurements of well-being or inequality, and in our conceptions of social justice. Perhaps however such a question cannot be answered once and for all, for any and all contexts. It may be best left to each community to decide for itself (up to a point) which differences are morally relevant and which are not. “Up to a point” of course, otherwise we would open the floodgate to a rampant and self-defeating form of radical relativism, which would undermine the normative thrust of CA, its reconceived “ethical universalism”—one that is historically enlightened and pluralistic, and can serve to underwrite a more consistent, post-Rawlsian “political liberalism” (for further discussions, see Essays # 2 & 8).

On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 227 passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is a strong rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency (1999a: 11; italics added).

It is clear that, on such a view, individual agents choose to value and work to achieve certain functionings over others. Individual agents within communities and not (simply) outside capability theorists or experts establish a set of shared criteria for human development and social justice, and determine the value of various freedoms and unfreedoms that reflect their social-cultural context through what Sen calls “public discussion and a democratic understanding and acceptance” within their communities (Dreze and Sen, 1996: 79; see also Sen, 2004). Empowered as agents, individuals can question, assess, or reform institutions in the name of justice. The role of agency in the valuation and evaluation process (i.e., the process of choosing and achieving the functionings one values and has reason to value) is, as indicated earlier, a central component of Sen’s capabilities approach (1985). However, as Alkire stresses quite pertinently, “agency is inescapably plural in both concept and measurement.” (i) Agency is exercised with respect to goals a person values; (ii) it includes effective power as well as direct control; (iii) it may advance well-being or may address other-regarding goals; (iv) it entails an assessment of the value of a person’s goals, and finally (v) it incorporates a person’s evaluation of his or her responsibility for a state of affairs (2008: 4-6). In Nussbaum’s view, citizens must have an active role in determining what capabilities and functionings they value both as individuals and as members of a community. As is well-known, her version of CA promotes a list of ten “central combined capabilities,” including most notably practical reason, which holds an even more central place. Let’s recall again that by “practical reason,” Nussbaum means “the ability to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life.” But her list also includes: control over one’s political environment (i.e., being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life” (Nussbaum, 1999: 41-2; 2000: 80). Nussbaum’s list, as it has been noted, is essential to her version of CA in that “a life that lacks one of these capabilities, no matter what else it has, will fall short of being a good human life” (Nussbaum, 1999: 42; 2000: 82; 2002: 129-130). Yet, it must stressed, the capabilities that appear on Nussbaum’s list are deliberately general so as “to leave room for plural specification” (1999: 42; italics in text). Nussbaum’s version of CA—unlike Sen’s—

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takes a bold step toward articulating a criterion of social justice by prescribing a list of ten general capabilities and arguing further that such a list should be constitutionally enshrined by the different states and governments around the world. However, and this must also be stressed, Nussbaum does not prescribe a specific public criterion of social justice that can be instantiated in a particular institutional order. Rather, she relies, like Sen, on individual citizens’ participation in the deliberative and decision-making processes aiming at establishing institutional schemes that reflect their community’s values both in the specification of the capabilities included on her list, and in restructuring or extending the list, if need be. For Nussbaum, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the question of justification and that of implementation (2000: 101-105; 2006; 255-262). [P]art of the idea of the list is its multiple realizability: its members can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a reasonable pluralism in specification. The threshold level of each of the central capabilities will need more precise determination, as citizens work toward a consensus for political purposes. This can be envisioned as taking place within each constitutional tradition, as it evolves through interpretation and deliberation (Nussbaum, 2000: 77).

One of the fundamental points of contention and disagreement between Sen and Nussbaum is, as we know, about the specifics and details of the valuation/evaluation process within CA. For Sen, no specific set of capabilities is required for constitutions, but the valuation/evaluation process is inescapable, and must be undertaken by individual agents who decide democratically which capabilities should be valued (and how they should be weighed) as part of a basic threshold within their respective communities. “Partial” rather than “complete ranking,” “relative” rather than “absolute weighting” should never be taken as an excuse for doing nothing until we have a completely worked out theory. In contrast, Nussbaum argues that a list of basic capabilities should be constitutionally enshrined so as to ensure that everyone meets a minimum threshold of capabilities. But she also contends that citizens should exercise their practical reason and control over their political environment to interpret and deliberate the concrete specifications and determine precise capability thresholds. Both Sen and Nussbaum agree however, that, from the standpoint of CA, individuals are (and should be) viewed as more than passive recipients of benefits and as active participants in the

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valuation and evaluation process of capabilities and functionings, and even in the articulation and establishment of a more fully-fledged out criterion of social justice. Pogge’s discussion leaves out altogether the central dimensions of the valuation and evaluation process within CA, and fails to account for the essential aspect of individual empowerment (grounded in Sen’s concept of agency and Nussbaum’s concept of practical reason). One reason for this is, as suggested earlier, his restriction (and subsequent misunderstanding) of the capability approach as a mere institutional resource (re)distributor. Pogge may respond here that he chose to disregard the valuation/evaluation process in both Sen and Nussbaum because he wanted to keep the picture simple, and leave aside “internal diversities” to the capability approach (Pogge, 2002: 17). But isn’t this tantamount to staying clear from “where the action is” in terms of social justice by wanting, so to speak, “to keep the water clean by leaving the baby out”? He might also point out that he is only interested in the justifiability and feasibility of the capability criterion as a public criterion of social justice; he therefore did not find it necessary to address the empowerment dimension of CA. It is arguably not conceivable as part of a public criterion as it has more to do with the internal psychological and behavioral dispositions of individuals. If this is the case however one would have to recognize he is putting into play a different notion of “public criterion” and “social justice” than CA would countenance.19 In any case, I believe that, by failing to take into account the crucially important valuation and evaluation process, Pogge misrepresents altogether the capability approach. He misrepresents it even further when he seems to be inserting or imposing on CA his own vertical ranking method of evaluation. By focusing, as he does, on institutional distributions of resources, and neglecting the role of agency or practical reason, Pogge fails to appreciate an arguably important means of enhancing capabilities (freedoms) and removing obstacles (unfreedoms). He fails to see that it is not so much capability theorists who establish a specific public criterion of social justice as it is individuals and their communities who do, and ideally, they would do so in a democratic and deliberative way. Admittedly, the promotion of human freedoms under 19

As I will point out later, I suspect that Sen’s and Pogge’s notions of “public criterion” and “social justice” are underwritten by different moral intuitions and background assumptions.

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conditions of profound in-equalities and dis-symmetries in effective power poses a real challenge, but it is one that we must take up and seek to address head-on (see for example Deneulin, 2005 for a procedural proposal to this effect). Like many other critics of CA,20 Pogge fails to appreciate enough one of its distinctive features: its assertively incomplete and deliberately open and open-ended character when it comes to determining the value of capabilities in order to allow for the participation of empowered individuals and communities in the valuation/ evaluation process. CA does not seek to provide the kind of top down, public criterion of social justice that Pogge describes and attributes to it, and which involves vertical ranking of the capabilities. Nor would its proponents approve of any such effort. It would seem to be antithetical to its normative, theoretical and methodological thrust.

7. The Capabilities Approach and Social Justice In order to adjudicate in a more perspicuous manner, and if only provisionally, between CA and RR, it may be helpful to consider a number of variations on a simple case-scenario in order to ascertain and evaluate their respective positions and moral intuitions. Let’s start by considering the following case-scenario in which we have two persons A and B who live in the same society (e.g., a liberal or social democracy), and who, as it so happens, earn the same income. According to RR, inter-personal comparisons of advantage between them is relatively straightforward and can be easily carried out: since the two persons live in the same society, where they presumably have equal rights, liberties and opportunities, the measurement of their well-being will depend most crucially on the income and wealth they enjoy. But since exhypothesis, they have the same income, a proponent of RR would then say that they thus both have equal “opportunity sets,” in that they both can be said to enjoy (institutionally) secure access to those resources which could enable them to achieve equal or similar levels of well-being and development. A proponent of RR recognizes that, despite equal income, one person may have more happiness, opportunities, or capabilities. 20

Dworkin (2000: 299-303) for example seems to take CA as merely an effort to provide the foundations for a theory of equality or social justice.

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However, he would go on to claim, as Pogge does, that leaving such an inequality uncorrected does not render the society unjust. But doesn’t it?— the CA proponent would ask. To show that it does (and why), from his vantage point, he then invites us to examine the following three variations on the case-scenario in which the specific conditions of A and B are specified differently.

7.1 Hypothetical Test Case Scenario 7.1.1 First Variation Suppose A is a healthy man with all of his mental and physical functions, and that B is a disabled person, hemiplegic, paralyzed from the waist down. It is evident that, unlike A, B needs additional resources in order to function in a minimal sense. However, would the focus on resources in this case be sufficient? Does B have the basic functionings necessary to use the resources that are institutionally allocated to her, if she chooses to? She is probably unable to do so given that she cannot move by herself and her capability to convert resources is drastically reduced. Doesn’t justice require (at least intuitively) that attention be paid to her basic capabilities, or even to her achieved/ achievable functionings, and not merely to the amount of resources she receives or has access to, in principle? Doesn’t she have to be able to function in a basic sense in order to dispose of, and fully use the resources allocated to her and to which she presumably has secured access—from an institutional point of view? Do the conditions that need to be met involve necessarily (or merely) the institutional distribution of resources? Regarding the well-known case of Stephen Hawking, for example, Pogge argues that his rare talents in physics can somehow discount the judgments that he is naturally disfavored. This is arguably questionable on intuitive moral grounds. In his view, it is not clear that he is worse endowed than most others, and that justice requires us to tax other ablebodied citizens in order to help him come as close as possible to their level of physical mobility (2002: 62). But here we must ask once again whether the requirement of justice must necessarily take the form of an institutional distribution of resources, e.g., taxation? Also, contrary to what Pogge

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assumes, couldn’t one forcefully argue here that Hawking needs more than resources, but not necessarily more resources? 7.1.2 Second Variation Suppose A is a man, and B is a woman. In an institutionally and constitutionally just society, A and B have equal and secure access to a fair amount of resources distributed to them. Institutionally speaking, this distribution could be viewed as justice enough, or as fulfilling all that justice requires from a normative standpoint. While A’s options are relatively substantial, this may or may not be however the case for B. For example, because of a widely accepted belief and related practice in that society, a woman is expected to stay at home, and support her husband by “standing behind or by her man.” This may be deemed to be “a woman’s virtue.” If need be, she may even be expected to sacrifice her health and nutritional needs for her husband’s or children’s benefit. Here again, one may legitimately wonder if we can justifiably turn a blind eye, in our interpersonal comparisons of well-being, to the unjust though widely accepted beliefs and practices, and the subsequent capabilities deprivations of B? To use Sen’s terminology (1985; 1993), shouldn’t both her “agency freedom” and “well-being freedom”21 21

For Sen, “agency” refers to “the freedom or capability to bring about achievements one considers to be valuable or important, whether or not these achievements are connected to one’s own well-being” (Sen, 1992: 56-7; 1999a: 191; 1985). In this way, Sen draws a distinction between “agency” and “well-being” which, when combined with the distinction between “freedom “ and “achievement” enable us to characterize the “agency freedom” (vs. agency achievement) of an individual as well as her “well-being freedom” (vs. “well-being achievement”). A person’s agency achievement refers to the realization of goals and values she has reasons to pursue, whether or not they are connected with her own well-being. A person’s agency freedom refers to her effective freedom to bring about the achievements she values and which she attempts to produce. A person’s well-being freedom refers to her freedom to achieve those things that are constitutive of her well-being. A person’s well-being achievement refers to the state of well-being she achieves. These two distinctions imply at least four ideas: First, “a person can— and typically does—have goals and values other than the pursuit of her own wellbeing” (Sen, 1992: 56). Well-being freedom and well-being achievement involve choices concerning one’s own advantage. Agency freedom and agency achievement are correlated, among other things, with others-regarding concerns and choices. Therefore, for Sen, choosing is a separate capability to function. Second, the pursuit of one’s agency achievement or freedom may lead to a

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also be our concern on pain of upholding an account of social justice that condones somehow “repressive” or “oppressive” traditional beliefs and practices and defends the status quo? In other words, shouldn’t an adequately construed and sensitive theory of social (and cultural) justice taken into account the role that these beliefs and practices (as non- or extra-institutional factors) could play in preventing the conversion of resources into capabilities or actual functionings (Sen, 2006)? I believe that Pogge would agree with this point.22 7.1.3 Third Variation Suppose A is an educated, independent, successful middle-class professional woman and B is a traditional housewife who does not work and who depends on her traditionally-minded husband for the middleclass lifestyle she enjoys. A can reasonably pursue the kind of life she has reason to value and expand her capabilities set as she sees fit. In contrast, B’s agency freedom and well-being freedom are somewhat shrunk despite a high level of wellbeing achievement, while disposing of a fair bundle of resources. In other words, her capability set is determined or severely constrained by the beliefs, values, and expectations of her traditionally-minded husband. Even if she decides to use the resources available to her in order to get an

reduction of one’s well-being achievement or freedom. These two reasons explain why it is necessary and valuable to distinguish between the “agency” and the “well-being” aspect. Third, the increase of one’s well-being achievement does not always correlate with an increase of one’s well-being freedom. Fourth, the increase of one’s agency achievement does not always correlate with an increase in one’s agency freedom. A concrete example, best left here (as an exercise) to the reader’s imagination, could easily serve to illustrate the fruitfulness of these abstract concepts. See the example and subsequent analysis given by Robeyns (2005a: 102103) about two sisters similarly situated, Anna and Becca, with however one of them, Anna, choosing to exercise her agency freedom by going to the Genoa antiG8 demonstrations in order to achieve her agency goals, as she sees them in contrast to her sister. Robeyns concludes by saying that such “a focus on agency will always transcend an analysis in terms of functionings or capabilities, and will take agency goals into account. However she adds, it is typical for Sen’s work that he does not defend this as a closed theory or as a dogma: there can be good reasons to include other sources of information as well.” 22 If Pogge’s view can countenance this point, this may not be the case with less sophisticated proponents of resourcism.

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education or a job outside the home, for example, she would probably need to obtain her husband’s approval, which she may or may not get. In short, in all three cases, it seems clear that all sorts of non- or extrainstitutional factors and obstacles (stemming for the most part from traditional cultural beliefs, established social norms and entrenched practices) affect the conversion rates of individuals differently endowed naturally and differently situated contextually. Therefore, the institutional distribution of resources is not and should not be the only relevant consideration—though, once again, it is admittedly a necessary and significant one. If we conceptualize “social justice” merely in terms of fair and just institutional distribution of resources to qualified or putative recipients, then perhaps Pogge’s resourcist criterion might be good enough. But it should be noted here that the capabilities approach distinctively seeks to characterize “social justice” in a broader and richer manner, by expanding its range of concerns to include the various non- or extra-institutional factors or obstacles that may stand in the way of people’s conversions of resources into functionings. In addition, while it regards “resources” as a necessary component, it deems it to be often insufficient or inadequate. People are not (and should not be) viewed as mere passive recipients of institutional distributions, but most importantly as active agents, who can actively be involved in the pursuit of needed resources and in overcoming the various kinds of obstacles and un-freedoms they encounter in their respective context or community. It would seem that if we are truly interested—as any resourcist also should—in designing social and political institutions so as to limit the decrease in well-being and loss of capability and quality of life caused by disability, for example, or by any other source of “personal heterogeneities,” then we have to appeal (implicitly or better yet, explicitly) to a metric of well-being that is able to account for how resources affect functionings (and capabilities) differently, i.e., for how some people are able or not to convert the resources they may dispose of? A proponent of RR, such as Pogge, may have concerns that by acknowledging differential natural endowments and seeking to compensate for them (by institutional re-distribution of resources and by tackling non- or extra-institutional obstacles to conversions) may lead to the “stigmatization” of the individuals or groups involved, and may, in the

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end, do them disservice. Consider however, once again, the situation of most women and the disabled. Why would or should the acknowledgement of a disability and providing additional resources (institutionally and extra-institutionally) for various purposes necessarily lead to the stigmatization of the disabled? Similarly, why would or should the acknowledgement of women’s disadvantage and the resolve to provide them with additional resources (institutionally and extra-institutional) for various purposes necessarily do them disservice? As I pointed out earlier, I don’t quite follow Pogge’s reasoning in this regard. If natural endowments do affect some basic capabilities and core functionings in a significant way, it is unclear how and why concerns such as the ones mentioned could serve to justify the rejection of additional compensation and efforts in order to enhance the capabilities or core functionings of those deprived. Perhaps, it should be stressed in this context that, in fact, for all parties concerned (individuals, communities, governments, policy makers, political theorists, and philosophers, etc.) the central problem has arguably always been this one: How should we distinguish between those natural endowments (functionings-capabilities) that are morally relevant and a legitimate source of moral considerations and justice claims, from those that are not? Contrast, for example, (1) being paralyzed, (2) living in a parasitesinfested area, and (3) being pregnant with (4) being bald, (5) having freckles, (6) an ugly smile, or (7) not being attractive enough to find a partner, etc. It may strengthen the case for CA if its proponents could be more specific here in providing perhaps something like a principled way of making the relevant distinction, but this may not be necessary. It remains nevertheless that no plausible account or conceptualization of well-being, human development, not to mention, social justice can afford to ignore the differential impact of “natural human diversity,” to use Pogge’s expression, on functionings and capabilities. The force of our moral intuitions should not be discounted here. Shouldn’t we regard the lack of additional resources and remedies—both institutionally and non-institutionally—to expand the capabilities and functionings of a disabled person as an injustice? According to Pogge’s

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RR, this falls outside the scope of justice, strictly speaking.23 We have no duties of justice to alleviate the special needs of the disabled persons among us, because, he argues, we did not contribute to their emergence and do not benefit from their existence. We may however and more appropriately, he argues, have duties of humanity or solidarity to do so (2002: 33). As it has been noted however by several authors in recent years [e.g., Kittay (1999), Brighouse (2001; 2005), Robeyns (2004; 2005b)], including most forcefully by Nussbaum in her latest book (2006: 96-216), it may be a sign of the inherent limitation of the Rawlsian social contractualresourcist framework (of the kind that Pogge is advocating) that it counterintuitively places our duties toward the disabled outside the scope of social justice—more narrowly and ideally conceived. This is all the more surprising, they have argued, since proponents of such a framework agreed with Rawls that “justice is the first virtue of society” (1971; 1996). Whether RR is, as Pogge claims, “no less able to address most of the important deprivations and inequalities that so disfigure our world” (Pogge, 2002: 33) remains to be seen. Can the RR metric take into account (in principle or in fact), as part of a public criterion of social justice, differences attributable to the effects of personal heterogeneities (e.g., disability) and to the effects of contextual variables (e.g., social norms, cultural practices, natural disasters, climatic variables, etc.) for the purpose of interpersonal comparisons of advantage and well-being? Does the RR criterion of social justice “have every reason” to take account of personal heterogeneities caused by past inequalities in access to resources, and to compensate for the effects of past wrong-doing, as well as ensuring that the current institutional order neither produces nor reinforces such inequalities? Can RR also take account of the ways in which social norms and rules exacerbate the effects of adverse contextual variables—e.g., the ways in which adverse environmental events might be exacerbated by social norms and rules that result in individuals and groups living in miserable conditions or conditions of grave deprivations?

23

Rawls (1999) himself acknowledged the justice claims of the disabled, but thought they could not be addressed at the constitutional stage under the idealtheoretical, social-contractual approach on which his theory of justice as fairness is based. They were to be addressed later on at the legislative stage,

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8. Closing Remarks In our efforts to adjudicate between RR and CA as to which offers the best basis for the articulation of an adequate metric of well-being, interpersonal comparisons, and ultimately, for a criterion of social justice, we may have to contend with the fact that they rest in the end on divergent and perhaps irreconcilable fundamental moral intuitions, leading them to different conceptions and characterizations of the scope of social justice. This may be the main reason why, as I have shown, Pogge’s analysis of CA fails to adequately represent CA. I have argued that Pogge’s initial formulation of the problem in terms of institutional distribution of resources is problematic. This has in turn led him to overlook or fail to appreciate sufficiently a number of aspects and dimensions of CA, including the intrinsic value of the capabilities in addition to their instrumental value, the emphasis on non- or extra-institutional factors, the empowerment dimension, the diverse ways in which natural human diversity and differential conversion rates are accommodated, and last but least the complex and inescapable process of valuation and evaluation advocated by its proponents. I have shown furthermore the implications of such failures for adjudicating, as Pogge is interested in doing, between CA and RR.24 It is only fair to conclude that his objections to CA miss their target, and are therefore without critical punch. Far from serving his goal of establishing the superiority of RR over CA, they have in fact served indirectly the opposite goal, as I have attempted to show in a final defense of the fundamental intuitions underwriting CA. I have not herein established in a definitive manner the superiority of CA over RR. This was not my aim. I hope to have at least shown why other lines of objections and criticisms from a resourcist point of view are required in order to impeach the viability and justifiability of CA, properly understood. 25 In the meantime, proponents of CA can maintain with 24

It is interesting to note that Pogge’s position shifts somewhat depending on what the stakes are. With regards to providing a plausible, public, workable criterion of social justice, Pogge favors RR over CA; however, when it comes to finding an appropriately sensitive metric and measurement for global inequality and poverty, it would seems that Pogge favors CA over RR. See Pogge and Reddy, 2003a; Reddy and Pogge, 2003b. See also Robeyns, 2005b for a point along these lines, or to the same effect. 25 In this regard, one can argue that Sen (1990; 1999, 2006) is somewhat to be blamed for failing to sufficiently acknowledge the differences between the

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confidence that, despite the outstanding problems and difficulties still facing their approach, they still have some very good and strong reasons for advocating their conceptualizations of capabilities, human development and flourishing, their metric for measuring and assessing well-being, inequality and poverty, and ultimately, in the long run, for the articulation of a more fully fledged-out theory of social and global justice.

References Alkire, Sabina. (2008). “Concepts and Measures of Agency.” Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). Working Paper Series, pp.1-23. www.ophi.org.uk. Berges, Sandrine. (2007). “Why the Capability Approach is justified?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24/1: 16-25. Brighouse, Harry. (2001). “Can Justice as Fairness Accommodate the Disabled? “ Social Theory and Practice 27/4: 537: 560. —. (2004). “Primary Goods, Capabilities, and the Problem of the Public Criterion of Justice.” Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept 5-7. Crocker, David. (1995). “Functioning and Capability: the Foundation of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development Ethic, Part II.” In Nussbaum, M. & Glover, J. different kinds of resourcism discussed in an earlier note, and in particular, between (5) Rawlsian Primary Goods Resourcism and (3) Material Goods Entitlements. And to this extent and on this ground, one could well seek to impugn the strength and scope of his arguments. I assume that while Sen’s (as well as Nussbaum’s) critical arguments against resourcism are most effective and convincing against (1), GNP per capita (2) Disposable per capita income and (3) Materials goods entitlements, they are more controversially so against (4) Dworkin’s (personal vs. impersonal) resources and (5) Rawlsian primary goods. According to Berges (2007: 24n1&2), Dworkin’s resources are arguably closer to Sen’s capabilities, esp., when Dworkin talks of “internal resources” as means for achieving liberty rather than as a measure of well-being. Not all proponents of “resourcism” are concerned with how an index of resources can be used as a measure of well-being. As Robeyns (2005b) points out quite rightly, Sen has downplayed the differences between Rawls’ “social primary goods” and “resources” understood generally as individual entitlements of goods (Sen. 1999a: 72-3). He seems to suggest at times that Rawlsian primary goods amount to “material impersonal resources.” This does not seem to be a fair characterization as it reduces “primary goods.” Let’s recall once again that the latter include liberties, opportunities, and the social bases of self-respect, and they go well beyond entitlements to material goods. So, one could say that Sen’s arguments against resourcism cannot be extended straightforwardly without further qualifications to (5) or RR, despite (his) claims to the contrary. This constitutes, I believe, a legitimate way of objecting to Sen’s version of CA.

On the Capability Approach: Justification and Comparative Advantage 239 Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 153-198 Deneulin, Severine. (2005). “Promoting Human Freedoms under Conditions of Inequalities: A Procedural Framework.” Journal of Human Development 6 (1): 75-92. Dreze, Jean & Amartya Sen. (1996). India: Development and Participation. Oxford University Press. Dworkin, Ronald. (1981). “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 283-345. —. (2000). Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Holland, Breena. (2007). “Ecology and the Limits of Justice: Establishing Capabilities Ceilings in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach.” APT Conference 2007, October 11-14. University of Western Ontario, Canada. http://organizations.oneonta.edu/apt/APT_CONFERENCE/2007London/London_Program_Times.htm Kittay, Eva Feder. (1999). Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependence. New York: Routledge. Nussbaum, Martha. (1999). Sex and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (2002). “Capabilities and Social Justice.” International Studies Review 4/2: 122-135. —. (2006). Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pogge, Thomas. (1995). “Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of Assessing Social Institutions.” Social Philosophy & Policy 12/241. —. (2002). “Can the Capability Approach be Justified?” Philosophical Topics 30/2: 167-228. Online PDF version (2002: 1-71) is posted at http://mora.rente.nhh.no/projects/EqualityExchange/Portals/0/articles/pogge1.p df. —. & Sanjay Reddy. (2003a). “Unknown: The Extent, Distribution, and Trend of Global Income Poverty.” New York: Columbia University. Online PDF version posted at: www.socialanalysis.org. Qizilbash, M. (1997). “A Weakness of the Capability Approach with respect to Gender Justice.” Journal of International Development 9 (2): 251-262. Rawls, John. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. —. (1999). Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reddy, Sanjay & Thomas Pogge. (2003b). “How Not to Count the Poor.” New York: Columbia University. Online at: www.socialanalysis.org. Robeyns, Ingrid. (2003). “Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities.” Feminist Economics 9 (2/3): 61-92.

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—. (2004). “Justice as Fairness and the Capabilities approach.” Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-7. Online version at www.ingridrobeyns.nl/Downloads/Rawls.pdf —. (2005a). “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey.” Journal of Human Development 6/1 (March 2005): 93-114. —. (2005b). “Assessing Global Poverty and Inequality: Incomes, Resources, and Capabilities.” Metaphilosophy 36 (1/2): 30-49. Sen, Amartya. (1985). “Well-being, Agency and Freedom.” The Journal of Philosophy LXXXII: 169-221. —. (1990). “Justice: Means Versus Freedoms.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19: 111-121. —. (1992). Inequality Re-Examined. Oxford: Clarendon Press. —. (1993). “Capability and Well-being.” In The Quality of Life, edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.30-53. —. (1999a). Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. —. (1999b). Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press. —. (2004). “Capabilities, Lists and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation.” Feminist Economics 10: 77-80. —. (2005). “What Is It Like To Be a Human Being?” Lecture delivered at the Third Forum on Human Development, in Paris, France: January 17-19 on the theme: “Cultural Identity, Democracy and Global Equity.” www.hdr.undp.org/docs/events/global_forum/2005/speeches/Sen_keynote_eng .pdf —. (2006). “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?” Journal of Philosophy CIII/5 (May 2006).

ESSAY # 6 SOLIDARITY, MORAL UNIVERSALISM, AND COSMOPOLITANISM

1. Introduction Moral and political philosophy today finds itself in a paradoxical situation for, at a time when the world is reaching a fairly advanced state of interdependence and interconnectedness—economically, politically, and ecologically—sufficient to enable us to talk about its unity, or its concrete universality (de facto as opposed to de jure), the concepts and principles which have since the Enlightenment permitted Western philosophers to think morally about this unity, find their validity seriously contested and radically put into question. A properly conceived universal moral point of view, which could lead to a cosmopolitan perspective, seems to be lacking (conceptually and theoretically) at the moment when the world seems to constitute itself into a cosmopolitan whole ready to receive it. There is undoubtedly a lot more going on in the world than in our philosophies. So, the latter must be revised and reformulated if they are to be of any theoretical and practical relevance, and enable us to properly conceptualize the former. It is therefore incumbent upon us to find these elements (whatever they are— ideas, concepts, principles and institutions) and invent them, if necessary, in order to move from a simple system of interdependence and interconnectedness to a genuinely global solidarity and justice. Two sets of preliminary considerations are here in order. First, a moral conception, such as a conception of social justice, can be said to be universalistic, and therefore impartial, if it meets the following conditions: (i) it subjects all persons (assuming we agree on who is to count as a “person”) to the same system of fundamental moral principles; (ii) these principles assign the same fundamental moral benefits (for example, claims, entitlements, liberties, powers, and immunities) and burdens (for

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example, duties and liabilities) to all; and (iii) these fundamental moral benefits and burdens are formulated in general terms so as not to privilege or disadvantage certain persons or groups arbitrarily. Although “moral universalism” can be thus characterized, a fuller analysis would quickly reveal, as Thomas Pogge has shown (2001, p. 30-32), that it is not a moral position with a clearly defined and settled content, but merely an approach, i.e., a general schema that can be filled in (in various ways) to yield a variety of substantive moral positions. It can at best provide necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the acceptability of a moral conception. Second, we encounter some serious difficulties when we want to clarify conceptually and defend morally speaking the idea of “global solidarity.” We can understand at least intuitively these kinds of difficulties when we note for example that usually “solidarity” seems to be meaningful only within the context of a particular political or national community, or when it is extended beyond these confines, its field of action seems to be limited more to the misfortunes of others (due to natural or man-made disasters) than to the social and economic injustices to which others are subjected, and it seems to have no compelling power unless “innocent beings” rather than adults are involved. We would be relieved at least in part if these difficulties were only empirical (due to limitations in terms of information or motivation, or to practical obstacles, etc.) and had no impact at the conceptual and normative level. But we find similar difficulties when we seek or try to extend globally the ideas and propositions whose justifications are produced within the framework of the so-called “liberal democratic societies.” In the present paper, I attempt to clarify the general problem raised here by discussing briefly the contributions of two of the most influential philosophers in recent years, namely, Rorty and Rawls.1 I contend that they both reach a negative conclusion regarding global solidarity, but for different reasons. Rorty intends to give a “pragmatic” solution to the problem here at hand by arguing that the extension of solidarity need not be based on some presumed moral universalism anchored in some ontology of human nature, and that it remains a contingent matter thoroughly

1

My choice of these two philosophers is contingent based as it is in part on the fact that each made a contribution to the 1993 Amnesty Lectures Series at Oxford University on human rights (see Shute and Hurley, 1993). It is also based on the nature of the very problem that preoccupies me herein, in that each offers a solution which is among the most commonly discussed and cited today in moral and political philosophy.

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ethnocentric. As for Rawls, he proposes, in his later formulation, 2 a “political” conception of justice which intends to do away with “metaphysical foundations” (1985), and which, for this reason, could presumably be extended to the international level and used to describe, characterize and govern relations between States. Both Rorty and Rawls converge however in their inability to conceptualize international or global solidarity and justice in a convincing manner: the former, as we shall see, because of his ethnocentrism, and the latter because of his concern with an international social contract with “non-liberal States” or societies. My intention is neither to discuss their work systematically, nor to dwell particularly on their respective views of human rights, but merely and more modestly to evaluate their respective contribution to the problem here of interest. First, I will present briefly Rorty’s treatment in order to ascertain its relevance, but most importantly, in order to bring out its shortcomings and failures. Second, I will examine how Rawls’ attempt to overcome and address these shortcomings and failures, and most specifically, how nevertheless he only succeeds in globalizing his first principle of justice, that of liberty, but fails to extend to the global sphere his second principle, namely, the difference principle, whose purpose is presumably that of a just redistribution of wealth, goods, and opportunities. My discussion of both Rorty and Rawls will enable me, I hope, to delineate the space for raising certain crucial questions and articulate the conceptual and theoretical tools necessary from a moral point of view for the extension of solidarity beyond national boundaries to the global world. In this regard, we must consider two questions: (1) Can we be content to transfer to the international and global level the concepts and categories that work at the national or domestic level? (2) Must we conclude that the change in scale and the complexity of world affairs impose new and specific constraints and requirements which reveal the inadequacy of any approach that seeks to apply only liberal democratic principles to the world order? I would like to argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, if we can manage to properly conceptualize what we may call, paradoxically enough, a “plural universalism.” If, I as pointed out earlier, 2

I am assuming along with other interpreters of Rawls that the formulation of his political conception of justice (from 1985 onward) is different from his earlier, more metaphysical, theory of justice (1971).

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universalism is merely a general schema that can be filled in (in various ways) to yield a variety of substantive moral positions, it is therefore not impossible to conceive of “a pluralistic form of moral universalism,” i.e., “plural universalism.” Such a notion is arguably better suited for resolving the tension between “us” and “us all,” or between “sovereignty” and “global solidarity” (see Beitz’s dilemma, 1991, p.246).3 The pluralism that it implies would require us to abandon the “Statist paradigm” of international relations as well as the suspiciously abstract and metaphysically grounded concepts of moral universalism and cosmopolitanism of yesteryears, namely, of the Enlightenment tradition. In closing, I underscore briefly the importance of inter-national, transnational, or global solidarity to the character and content of a “cosmopolitan democracy.” By the latter, I mean the international, transnational, or global institutions (currently existing or to be created) involved in deliberation and decision-making, which exist (or might exist) in parallel and/or complimentary fashion to the currently existing system of sovereign States (for details, see for example Held and Archibugi, 1995). In other words, “cosmopolitan democracy” is perhaps the designation best given to the following two features or characteristics: The objective tendency toward dissemination of sovereignty (previously and thus far confined only to States and nation-States) to many other agents/actors or institutions commonly viewed as necessary conditions for the (slow, yet real) constitution and emergence of a transnational or global civil society. The question of value or normativity based upon such an objective tendency—which assumes that a just world order can only be obtained if we move from a system of sovereign States to one based instead on substantial and effective solidarity between individuals, peoples, nations, groups, and associations worldwide. My approach in the present context is framed within moral and political philosophy, and it is primarily concerned with questions of normative justification. As such, I must confess, my discussion will be cast at a relatively high level of abstraction. I now turn to Rorty’s view 3

The idea here is that Beitz’s dilemma is arguably a false one—because it is based on assumptions derived from an arguably outdated and inadequate framework for international relations.

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which can be characterized as being about “solidarity without moral universalism.”

2. Rorty: Solidarity without Moral Universalism Rorty’s enterprise consists in general terms in an attempt to dissolve all foundationalist or essentialist pretensions in philosophy, and replace the search for the truth by considerations stemming directly from efficacious actions and the relationship to the Other—whereby the future only yields better and better solutions than the present does. Instead of knowledge representing reality, he wishes to substitute hope (1999), and the only assumption he is prepared to make is that of contingency. Instead of objectivity, he aims for solidarity (1989). Such is, in broad strokes, the pragmatic approach adopted by Rorty, and it is reflected by the way in which he understands the very notion of “solidarity” itself. He writes: In order to clarify what we mean by “solidarity,” the traditional philosophical manner consists in saying that there is something in each one of us—our profound humanity—which resonates to the presence of this very something in other human beings (1989, p. 189).

In order to “know” (and understand) what solidarity is, and to whom it is owed, who, in other words, is part and member of the moral community, philosophy must therefore seek to “know” that something. Traditionally, philosophers believed that if we were able to define “what we are” metaphysically or scientifically, then we would obtain the answer to the other question, namely, “Who are we?”—which is, properly speaking, political. But Rorty thinks, in accord with his brand of pragmatism, that the former question is unanswerable and in fact a waste of time, while the latter correctly reframes the question of solidarity. And I must agree that in this regard he makes a good point. Rorty elaborates his position in “Moral Universalism and Economic Triage (1996)” as follows: “’Who are we?’ is quite different from the traditional philosophical question “what are we?” The latter is synonymous with Kant’s question, “What is Man?” Both mean something like “how does the human species differ from the rest of the animal kingdom?” or “among the differences between us and the other animals, which ones better most?” This “what?” question is scientific or metaphysical? By contrast, the “who?” question is political. It is asked by people who want to separate off the human beings who are better suited to

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some particular purpose than other human beings, and to gather the former into a self-conscious moral community: that is, a community united by reciprocal trust, and by willingness to come to fellow-members’ assistance when they need it. Answers to the “who?” question are attempts to forge, or re-forge, a moral identity. And he adds quite pertinently: Traditional moral universalism blends an answer to the scientific and metaphysical “what?” question with an answer to the political “who?” question. Universalism presupposes that the discovery of traits shared by all human beings suffices to show why, and perhaps how, all human beings should organize themselves into a cosmopolis. It proposes a scientific or metaphysical foundation for global politics. Following the model of religious claims that human beings are made in the image of God, philosophical universalism claims that the presence of common traits testifies to a common purpose. It says that the form of the ideal human community can be determined by reference to a universal human nature (Italics added).

According to Rorty, what traditional moral universalism seeks to accomplish is to propose an ultimate justification for what could become a global politics of a cosmopolitan community. If the moral point of view provided such a foundation and justification, we can see how the idea of human rights could readily settle the question of solidarity and justify its extension. The critique of moral universalism put forth by Rorty is in effect that any distinctive criterion of humanity (what it means to be human) that one could propose, i.e., reason, divine origin, essential nature, sociability, etc.) is based on a contingent vocabulary which ignores for the most part its historical grounding in a particular community. And in this era in which the culture of human rights has profoundly influenced and shaped liberal democratic societies, it is no longer necessary, Rorty claims, to resort to the foundationalist discourse of “human’ solidarity” (1993). If however moral universalism is only a way of talking, then the extension of human solidarity would be done with, as it would be restricted to the particular community most prominently using the language of human rights, namely, the Western world. The conclusion that follows from such a perspective is this: the vocabulary of solidarity remains ethnocentric and only connects or joins “us” i.e., we who, for contingent reasons, happen to have beliefs sufficiently close to “ours” to be convinced by our statements or pronouncements.

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A pragmatist must therefore in practice give priority to his community, and cannot justify his own habits or ways without circular reasoning— which, he hopes, is “virtuous” rather “vicious”. In an anti-foundationalist context, this maybe the best one could hope for. Thus, the human rights discourse and its engagement with human solidarity without borders or frontiers constitutes simply “that which is convenient for us,” and allows us to act efficaciously to make the future better than the present. According to Rorty, we must take our community seriously, for there is no other way for us to get an identity and keep our self-respect than by distinguishing ourselves from “Others”. If Rorty thus confines himself to this kind of critique of traditional moral universalism, it is hard to see how his approach can avoid a performative contradiction: Isn’t it itself pretending to have, or aspiring to universal validity? But if Rorty rejects the idea of a foundation for “cosmopolitanism,” he does not by the same token give up on its liberal aspirations. For he is still interested in broadening as much as possible the reference of the expression “people like us,” by making a case for a form of “sentimental education”4 capable of making different people more and more like us (and therefore, familiar)—not by reference to a given universal, but by considering as insignificant or irrelevant a larger and larger number of “differences”. What we have here is, as Rorty puts it in response to Lyotard, “cosmopolitanism without emancipation” (1991). A pragmatist’s utopia does not emancipate human nature, but only offers (cosmopolitan) stories that are good enough to edify those close to us. Such an extension of “us” would come about not as a result of progress in moral knowledge but as a result of “sentimental education.” Namely, our capacity to identify with, to relate to the Other, and feel (if only imaginatively) his/her pain, humiliation, or suffering. “Sentimental education”—a contingent pedagogical and political question—replaces for Rorty the traditional search for a philosophical foundation of human solidarity. Rorty proposes in effect a solidarity that can be universalized on an ethnocentric basis—as paradoxically as this may sound. But, according to Rorty, there is no paradox here, but at most, an irony. Indeed, as a pragmatist, he underscores, on the one hand, the fact that our moral relatedness, our capacity for identifying with, and feeling sympathy 4

Rorty calls on David Hume and Annette Baier to support the importance he places on “sentiments” and “sentimental education” (1993, p. 30).

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for the Other is empty unless it is connected to ways (or habits) of doings things and acting. To think of others as “us” requires not only willingness but the ability—otherwise we would be confined to entertaining “good (but empty) sentiments and feelings.” In the conclusion to this 1996 paper, Rorty writes: I have been putting forward a philosophical argument that depends upon three premises. The first is that the primordial philosophical question is not “what are we?” but “who are we?” The second is that “who are we?” means “what community of reciprocal trust do we belong to?” The third is that reciprocal trust depends on feasibility as well as on good will. The conclusion I draw from these premises is that thinking of other people as part of the same “we” depends not only on willingness to help those people but on the belief that one is able to help them. In particular, answering the question “who are we?” with “we are members of a moral community which encompasses the human species”, depends on an ability to believe 5 that we can avoid economic triage.

On the other hand, Rorty’s ethnocentrism is moderated by the fact that it is an expression of “those of us who have been taught to be suspicious of ethnocentrism” (1989, p. 271). A pragmatist or “liberal ironist” expresses solidarity with the suffering of others not so much on basis of a definitive vocabulary of universal solidarity as such, but on the basis of his doubts about himself. I am not sure if Rorty’s particular conception of ethnocentric, international solidarity can really avoid being paradoxical, or if it simply renews itself permanently under the guises of “irony.” What is certain to me are its normative shortcomings. I will now try to highlight them by leveling three different, yet related objections against his view.

2.1 First Objection: A Difference that Makes No Difference? If moral universalism is but our way of talking, and the criterion for a good way to talk is its pragmatic efficaciousness or its practical advantage, what difference is there between this vocabulary and the sentimental stories that Rorty is proposing or advocating? 5

Several authors (e.g., Pogge, Singer, and more recently Jeffrey Sachs) have come to the opposite conclusion in their analyses of the world’s situation, namely, that we are today able to help all those around the world who need help, i.e., we have the necessary material resources, but in fact (for a number of complex reasons) we lack the political will to do so.

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It is very likely that we have here, to use William James’ criterion, a difference (or distinction) that does not make a difference. If, furthermore, the vocabulary of solidarity concerning human rights is not final (or foundational), yet efficacious, why does Rorty devote so much effort to denounce its latent ethnocentrism? It is quite possible (even probable) that Rorty’s critical discourse is not as contingent as he claims it to be. Or worse yet, he may be only “breaking down already broken doors”? If this is so, then how can Rorty reach the pragmatist goal he gives himself, namely, to give greater coherence to our own culture of human rights? Does the kind of foundationalism that concerns Rorty and that he seeks to undermine have the importance he attributes to it in human rights discourse and practice? One can argue for example that we should jettison traditional, monistic or monolithic foundationalism with regards to human rights, but we can still be concerned with “plural ‘foundations’”6—albeit provisional, fallible and contextual, anchored differently in different philosophical and cultural traditions (see Essays # 1 & 2 & 7). Such an approach could be called “critical, moral contextualism,” or “a contextualist moral universalism” (based on the assumption of a “plural or pluralistic universalism” mentioned earlier and elaborated further below), that endorses a justificatory discourse (underwritten by the anti-foundationalist constructivist methodology of “wide reflective equilibrium”) about the delimitation of contexts and the variation of principles across them. I argue essentially that we should envision different fundamental moral principles applying in different contexts, and seek justifications for the delimitation 6

The term “foundation” may not be the most perspicuous one to use here because of its traditional connotations, but I use it nevertheless advisedly to convey a new sense of normative “justificatory grounding” in accord the pluralistic, antifoundationalist, constructivist methodology of “wide reflective equilibrium.” According to such a methodology, normative justification can be achieved by seeking coherence between the following elements—all of which can be subject to revision until a satisfactory level of coherence or equilibrium is achieved: (1) considered intuitions or convictions regarding particular cases, (2) moral rules and principles which can serve to underwrite these intuitions or convictions, (3) alternative background theories, e.g., moral theories, theories about human psychology, society, and history, and (4) common-sense knowledge and/or best available (broadly construed) scientific knowledge about human beings. The idea, of course, is that such a methodology can be applied by members of any given society or culture in order to arrive at a justification of an “overlapping consensus” say, on human rights—which does not implicate the varied and possibly conflicting comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrines, theories or worldviews that may exist in such a society.

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of contexts and the formulation of fundamental principles appropriate to them (see Pogge, 2001, pp. 38-9 for a similar line of reasoning).

2.2 Second Objection: No Institutional Form for Global Solidarity? The second objection has to do with the apparently “private” dimension or characteristic of solidarity in Rorty’s discourse. If indeed solidarity cannot be based on moral knowledge, but rather on sentiments, doesn’t he thereby foreclose any collective or public uniformity, and produce as many local varieties of solidarity as there are individuals and wills—with this possible consequence, if we were to caricaturize his view somewhat: “Solidarity (of the kind I am prepared to countenance), if I want to.” This objection is further supported by the following realization: The possible extension of the kind of solidarity that Rorty has in mind has no clear and definite institutional form. This may be an advantage, for example, not to limit solidarity to a “national sentiment.” But it also has the disadvantage of not enabling us to socially identify (and thus criticize morally) various forms of existing public solidarities. Solidarity as a bond between people and as social action seems to escape us: What could be the institutional implication(s) of an expanded “us”?

2.3 Third Objection: The Voiceless Others? The third and last objection stems from an attempt to answer the previous question. By talking about the expansion of the reference of “us” or “we” (i.e., liberally-minded postmodern bourgeois Western citizens) in order to include “the others,” it is as if others are voiceless. Rorty does not seem to give us a chance to hear these others. But to seek to include others in our moral community without paying attention to their voice, without caring for their identity may lead to erasing their difference and failing to recognize them as others. Rorty’s admitted ethnocentrism, that he yet wishes to criticize, does not seem to retain the desirable pluralism, which in contrast, as we shall see shortly, has preoccupied Rawls. At most, Rorty’s pragmatist utopia of a global world in solidarity seems only to affirm that reform proposals and constructive suggestions must be adopted “provided, he adds, that they succeed in adjusting to our typically Western socio-democratic aspirations and ideals on the basis of mutually judicious concessions…We (pragmatists)

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believe that this moderate ethnocentrism is unavoidable and fully justified.” (1991, italics added). These “mutual concessions” seem however to be closer to the requirements of a so-called “equitable” modus vivendi rather than to a sort of “overlapping consensus,” of the kind advocated by Rawls. [By “modus vivendi,” I mean a state of affairs that people come to accept and live by not because they agree with the values, norms or principles it embodies and exemplifies, but simply because it is imposed upon them and they think it is in their best interests to do so for the time being, given the balance of power between contending parties, and until such time when they can subvert it to their full advantage. Whereas, by “overlapping consensus”, Rawls means the kind of agreement (say, about a political conception of justice) that reasonable people can reasonably come to, despite their respective allegiance to divergent comprehensive philosophical, moral and religious doctrines, and to which they can be committed for good and appropriate reasons]. In summary, we find in Rorty a pragmatist’s conception of solidarity which, despite his rejection of moral universalism, preserves the hope for its extension worldwide to as many constituencies as possible. His antifoundationalist and anti-essentialist critiques may well serve to put aside and avoid “good humanitarian sentiments,” but it only proposes private sentiments of the same kind to achieve the expansion of solidarity. Furthermore, if it avoids reifying or hypostasizing humanity into a global or international community that does not yet exist, it does not give us however the means to decide upon or propose its desirable institutional forms. Finally, despite the fact that it raises explicitly the question of ethnocentrism, it does not consider it to be a problem nor does it consider its corollary, the problem of pluralism. In the final analysis, Rorty only proposes a new and sophisticated formulation of the problem of global or international solidarity in order to best bypass and thereby avoid it.

3. Rawls: A Law of Peoples without Global Justice Let us now turn to Rawls’ view on the problem here of interest. He too rejects from the domain or realm of justice (he does not use the term of “solidarity”) moral universalism under the name of “comprehensive doctrine, theory, or worldview.” That is why he declares his conception to be “political and not metaphysical” (1985). But unlike Rorty however, Rawls wishes to preserve the importance of the impartial moral point of

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view within the context of the extension of his “liberal conception of political justice” to the international realm—as attested by his use of the representation device of the “original position” at this level as well. For Rawls it is still a question (whether at the domestic/national level or at the global/international level) of formulating principles of political justice capable of generating a reasonable consensus despite the pluralism of “comprehensive doctrines, theories, and worldviews” that individuals may claim for themselves in the choice of their respective lifestyle or that peoples can adopt in their choice of a suitable and just political system— and despite the clashes that may thereby ensue from this state of affairs. The challenge is however greater here, since Rawls intends to show that his principles of international political justice, as formulated in The Law of Peoples (1993/1999), do not succumb to the threat or suspicion of cultural relativism. If he succeeds, he would have accomplished the extraordinary exploit of universalizing at the political level that which seems to be relative to the internal order only of liberal democratic societies. He would have provided in other words a political substitute to a metaphysical foundation of liberalism (Bridges, 2002). 7 But such an achievement, it turns out, would be immediately tempered by a considerable loss or trade-off, for, as we know, Rawls gives up the difference principle of his Theory of Justice (1971) in matters of international or global justice. Let us recall that according to the Difference Principle, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged people (maximin provision) and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (equal opportunity provision). Such a perspective generated little enthusiasm among Rawls’ readers and scholars, and I am among those who would prefer to jettison the socalled “Law of Peoples” rather than the possibility of a global distributive justice. But, I would confess that it is not a simple matter to say why, nor what should replace it—unless we can convincingly make the case for one or the other of the alternative proposals put forth by Beitz (1979), Barry (1982), Pogge (1994, 2001), or Sen (1999/2001) for example.8 7

Several readers and critics point out that, despite Rawls claims to the contrary, there is still a tension in his work between the political and metaphysical construal of his conception of political justice. 8 I will have more to say about Amartya Sen’s proposal later on. See also Essay # 5.

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The use of the “original position” device as a way to guarantee impartiality seems to readily commit Rawls to propose a conception of international political justice which involves the globalization the difference principle. And yet, this is not what Rawls does. Why?—we must ask. The first element of a response comes, says Rawls, from the very methodology of constructivism itself, which does not condone the application of one and the same principle to all cases, but instead specifies a procedure each time adapted to the subject being considered (1993, p. 46). This means that the parties in the “original position” will here be the “peoples” or societies, and not the individuals (as was the case in his Theory of Justice, 1971) so that the conception of political justice that results has a greater degree of generality and can be applicable or acceptable to non-liberal and non-democratic societies, or what he calls “well-ordered, decent, yet hierarchical societies.” The second element of a response follows from the first: a global “original position,” which would include all individuals before they decide upon their eventual constitution as groups or peoples, would make excessive use of a liberal conception of “individuals” as “free” and “equal.” This, he claims, would in effect reduce the basis for agreement about the Law of Peoples (1993, p. 65). Accordingly, we must therefore put aside, says Rawls, the political conception of the person that we find in the public culture of a liberal, democratic society, as well as the most egalitarian elements of the liberal ideals of justice. Only then, he claims, can we avoid prejudging and undermining the possibility of an agreement with non-liberal, non-democratic societies. Indeed, the agreement about a liberal conception of international political justice goes without saying between already liberal societies, even if they differ in terms of the specific formulation of their respective internal principles of justice. The Law of Peoples, which is derived from them is close to Kant’s proposal in Perpetual Peace (see Habermas, 1996) 9 and to many classical theories of international law—respect for treaties, non-intervention, right to self-defense but not to war, and respect 9

Commenting on Kant’s “Perpetual Peace,” Caspian Richards, for example, writes: “[T]he argument (…) runs along familiar lines for Contract philosophers, as follows: If each person (or people) is motivated purely by self-interest, they will then seek laws to protect their own interests against other people, and peace to guarantee their security” (1999; my addition in parenthesis).

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for certain minimal human rights. But it is already far more restricted than the European communitarian rights, for example. The basic human rights that Rawls believes “express a minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions for all peoples who belong, as members in good standing, to a just political society of peoples” do not depend on any particular comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature. They include: (1) the right to life, (2) the right to security, (3) the right to personal property, (4) the right to the elements of the rule of law, (5) the right to a certain liberty of conscience, (6) the right to association, and (7) the right to emigration. They are derived from two basic requirements: (a) a common good conception of justice, and (b) good faith on the part of officials to explain and justify the legal order to those bound by it. For these requirements to hold, Rawls claims, we only need to think of persons as responsible and cooperating members of society who can recognize and act in accordance with their moral duties and obligations (and not as in the liberal conception of justice, as citizens first, and free and equal members of society). For Rawls, when human rights are understood as such, they could not be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special to our Western tradition, and in that sense, they are, he claims after Scanlon “politically neutral” (1993, p. 55). The agreement with non-liberal and “hierarchical” societies (i.e., inegalitarian, yet well-ordered and decent societies, says Rawls) about the laws and principles of liberal peoples and societies could not however be obtained if it were more demanding about human rights. But Rawls believes—admittedly without much of an argument to back it up—that liberal societies as well as hierarchical societies would accept these minimally liberal principles to govern their relationships. And this would demonstrate, he concludes, that his Law of Peoples does not depend on the particular tradition of the West, and is therefore, “politically neutral,” including the minimal list of human rights derived from it (see Scanlon, 1979, pp. 83, 89-92). The international political society thus constituted is confronted with a paradox in that it is said to be just and liberally inspired even if some of its members are not “just” societies in their respective internal order according to that very same liberal conception. This paradox disappears however if one recognizes that justice between nations does not mean the same thing as justice within nations: The globalized theory of justice is no longer in effect the application or implementation at the global level of

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Rawls’ Theory of Justice. In Rawls’ view, for hierarchical societies to accept a minimum set of human rights represents a gain which makes up and compensate for the absence of an equivalent, global principle of difference. What’s more, such a principle would not be adequate to help those societies faced with “unfavorable conditions” in their efforts to become “well-ordered societies” (whether they be egalitarian or hierarchical) and thus adhere to the Law of Peoples. [By “unfavorable conditions,” Rawls means “the conditions of societies that lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and the resources, material and technological, that make well-ordered societies possible.” (1993, section VII)]. The last statement (before the bracketed definition) expresses best the limits of the Rawlsian conception of political justice between States, and its shortcomings as a conception of global justice and international solidarity. It comes down to saying that, even if assistance could and must be given to those societies facing “unfavorable conditions,” we cannot conclude that such an assistance must be given according the “maximin principle” in order to address and possibly redress the inequalities between the peoples of the great Global Society. On the one hand, this is so, because those societies which are not wellordered owe their misfortunes more to their corrupt political culture than to their lack of resources—says Rawls (1993, note 52, p.229). It is worth quoting Rawls in full in this regard. He writes: [T]he problem is often not the lack of natural resources. Many societies with unfavorable conditions don’t lack for resources. Well-ordered societies can get on with very little, their wealth lies elsewhere: in their political and cultural traditions, in their human capital and knowledge, and in their capacity for political and economic organization. Rather, the problem is commonly the nature of the public political culture and the religious and philosophical traditions that underlie its institutions. The great social evils in poorer societies are likely to be oppressive government and corrupt elites; the subjection of women abetted by unreasonable religion, with the resulting overpopulation relative to what the economy of the society can decently sustain. Perhaps, he adds, there is no society anywhere in the world whose people, were they reasonable and rationally governed, and their numbers sensibly adjusted to their economy and resources, could not have a decent and worthwhile life (1993, end of section VII).

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While there is some truth to what Rawls is saying, I must quickly point out that it is arguably one-sided and naïve in that it overlooks the profoundly inequitable world economic order and the often immoral role played by the rich countries of the world (i.e., liberal Western democracies) in setting up the rules of the game, and even in installing and maintaining the oppressive governments and corrupt elites of those countries in rather unfavorable conditions (for a detailed and in-depth discussion along this line, see Pogge, 2001). On the other hand, it is certain that hierarchical societies would refuse to adopt a liberal principle of distributive justice to govern the international order. The Law of Peoples, according to Rawls, is therefore presented only as a conception of justice between States concerned, not unlike classical theories of international law, by questions of peace and security between nations. It is not about a global or cosmopolitan justice, directly concerned with the fate of individuals, since it tolerates inequalities not only between, but within States—even if they are to the disadvantage of the worst-off. The international order and the domestic or national order are thus regulated by different principles of justice. This problem of double standard would not be satisfactory to a concerned global citizen (such as myself), and even less for the purposes of justice— as it turns out to be more a product of a conception of international reality than of that reality itself. This is, I guess, a failure commonly found among even the best of philosophers. The double standard in the principles of justice seems to be less and less justified in a world in the throes of globalization, i.e., subjected to the interpenetration ever more advanced of both national and international spheres, and even witnessing the disappearance of the distinction between internal and external politics. Admittedly, this interpenetration is one thing, and the international extension of the liberal principle of distributive justice quite another. The difference between them is that of the difference between an “objective” process (interdependence) and the promotion of a normative ideal (global solidarity and cosmopolitanism). But must we therefore accept this and conclude—from tolerance of non-liberal regimes in the name of respect for sovereignty to the double standard in principles of justice, and the abandonment of global solidarity and cosmopolitics? I, for one, don’t believe so, because it is not certain that we have here a real dilemma in the following form: either The Law of Peoples and pluralism or Global Justice and Equality.

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I would like next to formulate three possible objections (more of the order of critical remarks and not yet fully-fledged arguments) that may serve to back up my doubt, and exert on The Law of Peoples some critical pressures in the direction of a “global distributive justice.”

3.1 First Objection: The Statist Paradigm? My first objection has to do with the angle strictly “Statist” according to which Rawls examines the relations between peoples or societies. In this regard, his Law of Peoples remains framed within the traditional “Statist paradigm” of international relations. If we accept this paradigm, we could believe that the “system of States” does not constitute a cooperative scheme sufficient to deserve regulation according to a principle of distributive justice (Beitz, 1979, p. 154; Barry, 1982, p. 232). This however would be a rushed conclusion, for there are already other systems of international relations than that of the relations between States—whether they are ecological, cultural, economic, ethical, etc. And they serve to weave a network of exchanges that does not lead to less of a “sense of community” than Rawls’ Law of Peoples—even if it does not yet produce a fully-fledged such sense. In the same vein, Rawls has only but superficially dealt with the question of potential moral reasons capable of justifying the existence and importance of the “State”—which has, by the way, undergone an extraordinary expansion during the 20th century most notably. The commonly assumed identity between State, Nation, and People within contractual thought leaves little conceptual space for this kind of questioning. And yet, we can very well inquire—along with Thomas Pogge (1994) and others—about whether the requirements for global justice and international solidarity demand that we assume the political form of the State and the system of States as we know them, and as Rawls seems to prescribe, or whether we should instead seek to move beyond this paradigm.

3.2 Second Objection: Limits of Tolerance and Reciprocity? The second objection has to do the principle of tolerance and its prominent place within Rawls’ Law of Peoples. We may indeed doubt that the inter-States order that Rawls defines can really be “just and equitable” and capable of guaranteeing a consensus: Isn’t liberal tolerance for non-

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liberal regimes tantamount to a major concession, and even an outright compromise? What liberal and democratic societies give up (i.e., a principle of global distributive justice) seems indeed greater than what they gain, i.e., respect for minimal human rights in non-liberal societies. Whereas what “hierarchical societies” gain (i.e., their admission to the international political society) seems far greater than their losses (i.e., remaining “well-ordered societies” without too many restrictions of freedoms). In a certain way, Rawls’ Law of Peoples would thus be more acceptable to hierarchical societies than to liberal societies. Even more: If one follows Rawls’ reasoning, his “liberal” Law of Peoples could even be acceptable in a world composed only of well-ordered, but non-liberal, societies. The problem posed by his double standard in principles of justice is particularly acute in this admittedly caricaturized account. Now, suppose that, in order to tone down or mitigate this double standard, liberal societies agree to tighten up the limits of their “tolerance.” Would it be acceptable to expand The Law of Peoples by adding a distributive principle of some sort—even if it is not recognized as such by its beneficiaries (societies, groups, or individuals)? To underscore this possibility comes down to raising the question of reciprocity: Does international solidarity require it in principle—at the risk of being transformed into “assistance” or “humanitarian imperialism” (Barry, 1994)? It would then be less a matter of double standard in principles of justice, and more a question of the (possible) extension and application of the liberal distributive principle to the international sphere, inasmuch as the latter is characterized by inequalities such that reciprocity from beneficiaries is no longer possible. Can we still talk here of global justice?

3.3 Third Objection: Ethnocentrism or Historicism? The last objection takes us back to the question of ethnocentrism, or to the alleged historicism of his conception of political justice--to use Rawls’ expression. We may indeed doubt Rawls’ reasoning when he claims that the extension of a minimally liberal conception of justice to the Law of Peoples would suffice to prove its lack of ethnocentrism, i.e., that it is not relative only to those societies whose political culture is liberal (1993, p. 44). Given the duality domestic/national vs. global/international maintained by Rawls, all that the consensus regarding the Law of Peoples allows us to conclude is that this inter-States Law of Peoples is not intrinsically marked

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by the Western tradition (1993, p. 48). It does not follow however that the liberal conception of political justice within the domestic or national order does not bear the stamp of the West—unless, of course, its egalitarian elements and principles of social justice are removed from it. But then “liberal societies” would no longer be liberal. They would have “internalized” the proposed Law of Peoples—which is what Rawls undoubtedly hopes “hierarchical societies’ would do as well. The Law of Peoples does not seem to be the promised political substitute of a metaphysical foundation for liberalism, but instead its international application under false pretenses. In summary, what Rawls’ conception of political justice gains by its worldwide extension it loses in terms of its comprehension, and this presents risks for social justice within the internal order of liberal, democratic societies. In order to reduce or minimize the severity of the problem posed the duality of domestic/national vs. global/international, and its possible perverse effects, we must therefore go beyond Rawls’s Law of Peoples and the “Statist paradigm” it assumes, without however neglecting the plurality—or rather, the international division—of the world. This means that we must try to anchor pluralism at a level beyond or outside “sovereign States.”

4. Global Solidarity and Plural Universalism I will now attempt to clarify the notion of “international pluralism” (or “plural universalism”) and its role in conceptualizing global solidarity and justice. The fundamental idea can be put as follows: If we can’t completely eliminate the tension between the global and the local, or dissolve the duality of domestic/national vs. global/trans-national/international justice, it can nevertheless be reduced by the formulation of intermediary principles articulating the principles of justice at both different levels. In a sense, this is what Rawls invites us to do. Constructivism, he writes, adjusts and adapts a procedure for each case and presents them in an appropriate ordered sequence. I will then follow herein a similar approach but one that is simpler than Rawls’ “original position.” Inversely to the critique that I have just leveled against Rawls, it will be a matter of determining the sense in which a “pure cosmopolitanism” or “strict impartialism” must be moderated by the moral value that one may attribute to communities and their boundaries, and even to States (I will

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neglect here the question of the importance of this value). Subsequently, I will indicate how the reasons obtained thereby permit us to think of international solidarity neither in the monist manner of an abstract moral universalism (correctly criticized by Rorty), nor merely in terms of stability or peace and security between States (as in Rawls’ Law of Peoples) but as a “plural universalism,” i.e., as an (international, transnational, global and glocal) system of diverse forms and modalities of solidarity. The main thrust of my line of reasoning herein bears some strong similarities to the point made by Amartya Sen (1999/2001). In his paper, Sen investigates global dimensions seriously, in regard to the formation of international solidarity and the construction of identity patterns that go beyond national borders. He seeks a way between the established approaches of “grand universalism” and “national particularism,” while avoiding over-arching generalizations on the one hand and simplistic assumptions about the subjection of individuals to a national framework on the other. Taking off from a critical discussion of Rawls’ idea of justice as fairness, he argues that the proper conception of “plural affiliation” becomes central to the formulation of a third alternative. According to Sen, neither of the two approaches mentioned above can give us an adequate understanding of demands of global justice, and that there is a need for third approach which recognizes the plurality of relations involved across the globe. He claims that this idea expresses the range of multiple identities accessible to individuals and makes “justice” applicable to a corresponding diversity of socio-political realities, independent of national frameworks. Sen writes: “The starting point of this approach—I shall call it “plural affiliation”—can be the recognition of the fact we all have multiple identities, and that each of these identities can yield concerns and demands that can significantly supplement, or seriously compete with, other concerns and demands arising from other identities.” He notes in this regard the role of direct relations across borders between different people whose identities include, inter alia, solidarities based on classifications other than partitioning according to nations and political units such as class, gender, or political and social beliefs. “These groups, according to Sen, need not be as universally grand as the collectivity of “all” the people of the world, nor as specific and constrained as national states. There are many policy issues that cannot be reasonably addressed in either of these extremist formats.” Some of the issues might include: the environment,

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global warming, labor equity, women, children, cultural and natural world heritage, weapons of mass destruction, hunger and poverty, human rights, infectious diseases, etc. (see Inge et al, 1999 for detailed discussions along this line). Within the continuum that I intend to cover, the extreme positions are those of strict impartialism and strict particularism. The former is for example used by Peter Singer (1972) in a well-known paper on world hunger. From a utilitarian point of view, he concludes that it is necessary for the inhabitants of the rich countries to change their lifestyle and reduce their standard of living, and transfer some of their wealth (about 10% of their individual income) to the inhabitants of poor countries until an average level of equality for all is reached. This position is also that of “pure cosmopolitanism,” of an original position involving, without further clarifications, all individuals in the world. The objection which can immediately be made against this point stems from the importance (at least instrumental) that one must grant, in the first place, to the maintenance of the identity of the agent, and in the second place, to the character of the community, if we are to achieve the desired transfer or redistribution (see Fishkin, 1986). The other extreme position, namely, that of “strict particularism,” grants inversely a value to the individual identity or community and to none other: the impartial moral point of view is cleared away and is henceforth identified with that of the individual or community in question. It should be clear that both of these positions are untenable and must be done away with, for they are but another formulation of the double standard in principles of justice that we are trying to avoid (mediate or moderate). This goal can be achieved if we recognize a moral value to particular individuals or communities, but only under the assumption of the limits of the requirement for impartiality. Thus, to admit that belonging to a particular national community is a good thing for a person, or that such a national community possesses itself a moral value and the right to exist, does not in any way undermine impartiality, if such a recognition is granted to anyone individual or community. This value is thus no longer simply instrumental but intrinsic, and must therefore be taken into account by the determination of the plausible limits to a radical egalitarianism (as advocated by Singer, for example) or an intrusive solidarity. The tension between extremes or the duality of perspectives will then take the form of “a hierarchy of reasons of different kinds.” Hence, we can no longer hope

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for a unified or unitary solution or distributive scheme in order to conceptualize the question of global solidarity. This would be to recognize in international justice a fact already noted elsewhere in moral philosophy, and that is, the fragmentation of value, or the heterogeneity of moralities (see Stich, 1990). What does this all mean for the problem here in question? Let us take the example often discussed of natural resources and their distribution. From a Rawlsian perspective, several authors (e.g., Beitz, 1979, Rawls himself, 1971) draw a parallel between these resources and the natural talents of an individual: the distribution of the ones as well as the others seems arbitrary from a moral point of view, and is based on historical accidents or contingencies. And yet, just as talents and abilities have a particular relationship to the identity of the agent or person involved, similarly natural resources have a particular relationship to the identity of a given community or collectivity insofar as the latter is involved in their discovery, exploitation, and transformation. This remark is not intended here to defend a proprietary point of view (each State has full sovereignty over the resources located within its territory, and yet fully recognizes the UN Charter). Instead, it is a question of validating morally speaking certain “boundaries” (or limits) to international/transnational solidarity: forms of solidarity which already exist at the national or regional level need not be sacrificed, but must be respected and integrated in the best possible ways with those which already exist, are possible or might still emerge, at the global level. A community and its members have a moral right to try to preserve their identity as well as their wealth or resources—at least in a prima facie sense (and this could impose and require the rich to transfer wealth and resources to those communities threatened by “unfavorable conditions”). Thus, an illegitimate or immoral world order (because avoidably nonegalitarian) cannot become more legitimate if, in order to correct its deficiency, we had, without good reasons, to reduce its pluralism. With this last statement I seem to have reversed myself and dismissed my qualms and reservations about Rawls’ Law of Peoples since I now seem to affirm the moral right of States to exist, and thus preserve, if not perpetuate, their plural existence. But in fact it is not a question of status quo, if one considers as I have stated that pluralism does not concern only States, their diverse forms or regimes and the relations between them. The

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international domain includes indeed a variety always growing of agents and entities more or less capable of influencing the course of events in the world. I am here referring of course to inter- and supra-governmental organizations, but also and especially to associations and trans-national NGOs dedicated to culture, human rights, charitable and humanitarian work or political causes, and which in their totality constitute a network of communities more or less independent of traditional States and typically operating beyond the territorial confines of the latter. This network is often referred to as forming a “trans-national, global civil society” (Amartya Sen, 1999/2001). What would be a Law of Peoples, or more precisely, a global justice adapted to such a network? It would not of course replace sovereign States but only insure sometimes more substantial duties and obligations from international solidarity than Rawls’ Law of Peoples permits. Such a global justice must, by its very principles, articulate its diverse components in such a way as to dissolve the double standard discussed earlier. The pluralization of the interfaces between the domestic/national and the global/ international is thus another facet of contemporary globalization. The only difference is that the trans-national civil society still being constituted is already weaving “a fabric of multiple and diverse forms of solidarities,” and in this sense, it contains the normative dimension that inter-dependence alone can call for, but does not yet possess. This international and institutional pluralism gives body to the idea of an “international community” (often too quickly hypostasized into an abstract humanity) and is susceptible of making it even more resistant to globalization (i.e., homogenization) pressures. It can also offer a better ground and better channels for the extension and expression of solidarity on a global scale, which would then take the form not merely of an international solidarity, but that of “a worldwide system of solidarities.” These varied and multiple forms of solidarity would not necessarily be subsumed under a unique principle of justice. What matters most is the possible and desirable convergence of their respective efforts.

4.1 An Illustration—for Whatever It Is Worth A report by Philippe Riviere appeared in the Monde Diplomatique (“A Historic Agreement: At Last, Generic Anti-AIDS Medicine for SubSaharan Africa,” December 2003) about a case which can serve to illustrate the kind of “international solidarity” and “plural affiliation” discussed herein, and what it can achieve. The report is about a historical

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agreement which has finally been reached, after 5 years of struggles, between militants against AIDS and pharmaceutical companies [i.e., two major ones, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI)] granting licenses to produce cheap and affordable “generic anti-AIDS drugs” to a number of sub-Saharan African countries, in which the cases of AIDS have in recent years reached alarming proportions. These licenses, it must be noted, have been granted “voluntarily” thereby avoiding the humiliation of pharmaceutical companies by having concerned States passing laws in order to make these licenses mandatory. Furthermore, this accelerates the process and gives AIDS patients the hope that treatments will be more readily forthcoming. This agreement validates, by extending to the entire population of AIDS patients in the region, the formula proposed earlier by the Clinton Foundation to the South-African government concerning “generic treatments” at $140 per patient per year. There is no need to give here an account of the entire chronology of events (of negotiations, actions taken, lawsuits filed) which opposed those against the licensing of generic AIDS drugs to those who placed a premium on saving lives in what may be characterized as the most horrendous epidemic since the black plague. It shall suffice to point out that on this day, December 10, 2003, International Day for Human Rights and the 5th anniversary of Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a major victory was achieved by this agreement—which not only covers 47 African countries, but also include provisions which could ultimately benefit in a similar way, North African, Latin American, Eastern European, and Asian countries, where HIV/AIDS is also spreading at an alarming rate. This agreement testifies to the birth of a new kind of internationalism—confronting the globalization of both the epidemic and intellectual property protection. It shows that it is possible “to move mountains,” and obtain just and equitable results when diverse individuals, groups, associations, foundations and organizations around the world come together and combine their efforts in an expression of global solidarity on a specific problem.

5. Conclusion The examination of solidarity without moral universalism, as advocated by Rorty, allowed us to underscore the necessity of its institutional dimension. Rawls’ Law of Peoples subsequently appeared to regulate the “facts of pluralism” at the level of relationships between States, but only at the cost of having to abandon the egalitarianism of his Difference Principle. The duality of the principles of justice which thereby

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resulted turns out to be a problem for solidarity at the global level. I have tried to suggest a way to bypass this duality by taking into account “plural universalism” or “international pluralism.” This means first a plurality of principles and norms that any properly conceived global justice must articulate. It means secondly that we must countenance a plurality of international agents and institutions, among whom sovereignty must be distributed, and which would testify to the constitution of a trans-national civil society, and thus serve as the vehicle of an international system of solidarities. What would be the relationship that such an international system of solidarities could have with what I have called from the start “cosmopolitan democracy”? If solidarity is not confined to the system of relations between States, neither should democracy. Democracy may then occupy a distinct (un- or de-territorialized) space linking individuals and/or groups to States other than their own (both within and outside)—in addition to the relationship citizen-State of internal democracy, and in parallel to the relationships between States as characterized by Rawls’ Law of Peoples. From this point of view, cosmopolitan democracy requires not only the international system of solidarities but also that it functions as one of the forms for political mediation (i.e., procedures for discussions and debates, deliberations and decision-making, coordination between agents, institutions, and organizations, etc.) enabling its internationalization. There may well be here a circle—albeit, I would contend, a virtuous one— namely, that of the enactment of the political. Such enactment may also be a utopia—albeit, I hope, “a realistic utopia,” to use Rawls’ expression.

References Barry, Brian (1982), “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,” Nomos 24: 219-52. —. (1994), “Dirty Work in the Original Position. Comments on T. Pogge’s “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Paper presented at the Conference on “The Ethics of Nationalism, University of Illinois, April 22-24, 1994. Beitz, Charles (1979), “International Distributive Justice,” Part 3 of Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 125175. —. (1991), “Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs,” in D. Held (ed.) Political Theory Today. Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 236-254. Bridges, Thomas (2002), “Post-Metaphysical Liberalism: The Case of Rawls.”

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Reconstructing Philosophy: Philosophy and Civil Society. @ http://www.civsoc.com/reconphil/reconphil1.html Ellis, A. (1986) (Ed.), Ethics and International Relations. Manchester University Press. Fishkin, James (1986), “Theories of Justice and International Relations: The Limits of Liberal Theory,” in A. Ellis (ed.) Ethics and International Relations. Manchester University Press, 1986, p.1-12. Habermas, Jurgen (1996), “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace—With the Benefit of 200 Years Hindsight.” Lecture delivered at Hong Kong Baptist University. Excerpted in HK Economical Newspaper, May 16, 1996, p. 13. Held, D. (1991) (ed.), Political Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, D. and D. Archibugi (1995) (Eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy. London, Polity Press. Kaul, Inge et al (1999) (Eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York—Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pogge, Thomas W. (1989), “Globalizing the Rawlsian Conception of Justice,” Part 3 of Realizing Rawls. Ithaca: Cornel University Press, p. 211-280. —. (1994), “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 23, No. 3: 195-224. —. (2001), “Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics. Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.378-379. —. (1985), “Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14, No. 3. —. (1993), “The Law of Peoples,” in S. Shute and S. Hurley (eds.) On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993. New York: Basic Books, p. 41-82. Reprinted in (1999), The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. (1993/1996), Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. —. (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Richards, Caspian (1999), “A Commentary on the ‘Perpetual Peace’ of Immanuel Kant,” Journal for Interdisciplinary and Cross-Cultural Studies Vol. 2, ISSN # 1454-2978 @ http://www.paideusis.matco.ro/e1n2cr.html Riviere, Philippe. “A Historic Agreement: At Last, Generic Anti-AIDS Medicine for Sub-Saharan Africa,” Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2003. @ http://mondediplo.com/2003/12/19aids?var_recherche=Aids+Generic+Drugs Rorty, Richard (1991), “Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Reply to JeanFrancois Lyotard,” in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Philosophical Papers, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 211-222. —. (1989) “Solidarity,” in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge University Press, p.189-198. —. (1993), “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in S. Shute and S. Hurley (Eds.), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993. New York: Basic Books, p. 111-34.

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—. (1996), “Moral Universalism and Economic Triage.” UNESCO Forum. Paris, France. @ http://www.unesco.org/philweb/uk/2rpu/rort/rort.html —. (1999), Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin Books. Scanlon, T.M. (1979), “Human Rights as a Neutral Concern,” in P. Brown and D. Maclean (Eds). Human Rights and US Foreign Policy. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp., 83, 89-92. Sen, Amartya (1999/2001), “Global Justice: Beyond International Equity,” in Kaul, Inge et al (eds.) Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York—Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 116-125. Reprinted in Polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophizing 2 (2001): 1-31. ISSN 1616-2943 @ http://www.polylog.org/them/2/fcs1-en.htm . Shute, S and Hurley, S. (1993) (Eds.), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993. New York: Basic Books. Singer, Peter (1972), “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1: 229-43. Stich, Stephen (1990), The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

ESSAY # 7 HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING WORLD: A CONTEXTUAL, DYNAMIC AND CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACH

1. Introduction Few scholarly topics or contemporary issues engender more readily heated controversies and debates than the question of the universality of international human rights standards and norms. It is not surprising therefore that discussions of the cross-cultural applicability of human rights among researchers, activists, and politicians are still characterized for the most part by the opposition between Universalists and Cultural Relativists. In fact, there seems to be a never-ending debate on this question. On the one hand, Cultural Relativists see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as enumerating rights and freedoms that are culturally, ideologically and politically non- universal. They insist on the cultural relativity of moral and justice systems and human standards. They argue essentially that current human rights norms possess a distinctively “Western” 1 bias, and are therefore an “ethno-centric” construct with limited applicability, if any at all. There is a wide diversity of non-Western moral and justice systems embedded in their respective cultures—whether they are Asian, Confucian, African, Islamic, or Indigenous.2 These systems

1

The use of such a blanket term (Western as opposed to non-Western) is to say the least problematic as it suggests uniformity or homogeneity and covers up a far more complex reality. In fact, it is important to recognize that there is as much diversity and complexity in the “Western” world as there is in the “non-Western” world. And a more finely tuned and perspicuous analysis would have to seriously take this into account. However, in order to keep things simple in the present context, I will continue to use such blanket terms, advisedly.

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seem to conflict with the Western conceptions and the human rights derived from them. Any adequate and viable theory of human rights must, they argue, take into account such diversity. On the other hand, Universalists argue that human rights are fundamental entitlements of all persons—regardless of culture, race, sex, age, nationality, religion, or gender, etc. They are presumably grounded in human nature (a particular conception thereof) and as such, are universal and inalienable.3 To have human rights, they argue, one does not have to be anything other than a human being. The alleged or presumed universality of human rights is what gives the concept much of its moral authority and aura. Various other attempts have been made to reject or neutralize relativist propositions4 as involving confusions of human rights and human dignity, 2

It is widely accepted that for these cultures that the fundamental unit of moral concern and analysis is the community (rather than the individual), and that values other than (individual) rights, such as honor, dignity, belonging, care, identity, or balance have greater standing in their worldviews. 3 Depending on whether (or not) we choose to characterize human nature in terms of a fundamental interest in well-being or in terms of action or agency, we may distinguish broadly speaking between two main approaches: (1) the Interest-based Approach (e.g., Joseph Raz and James Griffin); and (2) the Agency-based Approach. The latter comes in two forms: (a) the Capability Approach (Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum) and (b) the Basic Needs Approach (Alan Gewirth, Michael Boylan, and Frances Stewart). The central question for (1) is this: What conditions are necessary to ensure minimal well-being among people in a given society? Its main contention is that people everywhere are entitled to at least a minimal level of well-being, as well as the liberties and goods or resources necessary for them to get there. In contrast, the Capability Approach seeks in its simplest form to promote human agency, i.e., to expand the capabilities for people to act and be. It seeks to do so through public policy initiatives and developmental strategies that promote individual liberties and opportunities to seek after those goods (activities, conditions, or resources) that each person believes will contribute to his or her flourishing as a human being—in accord with his or her conception of the good life. As for the second form of Agency-based Approach, which we can designate as the Basic Needs Approach, it seeks to uncover the origins of agency itself, and asks the following question: what are the essential elements that make the execution of human action possible? Under such an account, particular goods are set out as necessary for action, and they are typically arranged in a hierarchical order, starting with the most basic needs. 4 One of such attempts include the Social-Contract Approach, which seeks to provide a justification for human rights based upon conventional criteria such as

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rights, and duties, or simply as wrong-headed, logically self-defeating, ideological, or as not epistemologically well-grounded. The question of the “transferability” and “cross-cultural validity and applicability” of human rights continues however to be a battlefield of fierce, heated and passionate debate, with the various protagonists making strong, and widely varying, philosophical, political, or moral commitments. And as a result, the debate seems to be at an impasse. A number of questions are arguably implicated in these discussions. These include the following: What concept of human ontology (or human nature) is to be used? Should it be characterized essentially in terms of interest in well-being, agency, capabilities and flourishing, basic needs, or primary goods? What naturally extend or can strictly be derived from such a view of human ontology (or human nature)? What significance should be given to the notion of “culture” in the construction of a normative moral and judicial order based on human rights? Does diversity in moral and justice systems undermine any basis for the universality of human rights? Is it possible to formulate a universalism that recognizes and takes into account cultural diversity at the same time? If so, how does one go about it? In this context, it is important to note a somewhat puzzling fact. During precisely the same period as cultural relativism has been an active component of human rights debates, the theory has gradually, but effectively lost its import and viability in anthropology, and arguably, in philosophy as well. Generally speaking, this state of affairs came about as a result of various developments in these fields. During the past few decades, anthropology's conventional use of analytical concepts and theoretical tools has been subjected to severe criticisms from the general agreement or by modeling an impartial and rational choice behind a veil of ignorance. In the first case, the force of the justification depends upon real people representing their countries signing treaties and agreements in the world as we know it, within the context of internationally recognized institutions. In the latter case, the force of the justification is drawn from a hypothetical contract situation set in a fictional context, such as Rawls’ original position or Locke’s social contract. While such efforts at providing a non-foundationalist justification for human rights have been conceptually appealing to many in the past few decades, one may quite legitimately question whether they could sustain the universalism that is needed to fend off moral and cultural relativism. Isn’t the justification provided thereby subject to variation according to the real people involved, or the particular philosopher playing out the scenario according to his or her conception of the good life?

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standpoint of philosophical movements such as “deconstructionism,” “experimentalism,” “reflexivity,” “literary anthropology,” which converge for the most part under the broad banner of “post-modernism” As a result, many of the fundamental underlying assumptions of anthropology have been scrutinized, challenged, and subverted on the basis of the recognition of “an overall crisis in the social sciences.” 5 Anthropologists have been compelled to rethink their discipline's traditional relativistic position, and most importantly, its underlying assumption on “culture.” Culture was then viewed as a homogenous, integral, and coherent unity. But with the new developments, anthropology could no longer be done through the lens of culture relativity that made the world appear as culture gardens separated by boundary-maintaining values—as posited essences. Most importantly however, the contemporary “globalization” of economic, political, and social life has resulted in cultural penetrations and overlappings, in the coexistence in a given social space of several cultural traditions, and in more vivid interpenetrations of cultural experiences and practices due to the recent explosive developments in information and 5

Such a crisis was brought on by various converging developments in the humanities, and in particular, in philosophy in the past few decades which have come to be referred to by the catch-all, and not easily defined term of “postmodernism”. However, the renewed interest among social scientists in the concept of “culture” stems from the disillusionment with social science and its aspiration for a general, scientific account of social life in all its complexity. Such disillusionment is part and parcel of the general distrust and questioning among postmodernists of Western culture's commitment and almost blind faith in science, which resulted in what is sometimes called “scientism.” Those who believed in this “ideology” or “new secular religion” typically emphasized the search for rigorous and objective methods of inquiry, data gathering and analysis, which would enable “detached and impartial scientists” to provide accounts of timeless, context-free laws or law-like generalizations, controlled manipulations of clearly defined variables, and quantitative measurements (not just qualitative assessments) in their general pursuit of objective, true knowledge about the world. But the very notions of “truth,” “absolute, universal, and eternal truth,” “objectivity,” and “representations of reality” have all been radically put in question and undermined by postmodernists. As a result, such accounts are now competing on equal terms with, if they have not given way to, alternatives approach focusing on case-studies of local contexts and processes, interests, perceptions and conceptions. The investigator is thus always seen as implicated, engaged, and impacting the study from the start, and refraining from making outlandish claims about its “truth,” “objectivity,” or “universality.” The most that can be claimed is that it presents one possibly insightful and fruitful perspective among many (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979; see also Barth, 1989; Clifford, 1988; Clifford and Marcus, 1986).

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communication technologies, media, transportation, travels, and tourism. In order to capture this more fluid character of present-day relationships between “center” and “peripheries” and the realization that cultural flows are no longer territorially bounded, notions like “creolization,” “hybridization,” “vernacularization” “mixed and shared patterns of culture” and “cultural complexity” have emerged in the vocabulary of social scientists, and philosophers as well. “Culture” is increasingly viewed therefore as “a network of perspectives and points of view, or as an ongoing debate” (Geertz, 2000; Benhabib, 1995, 2002; see also Essay # 1). These theoretical shifts (and the related methodological changes) are not without significance for contemporary debates on the universality or relativity of human rights. These debates usually take place at an abstract, and highly generalized level, where “culture” is implicitly or explicitly conceptualized as a “static, homogenous, and bounded entity”, defined by its specific traits and features. These debates remain therefore caught in various outdated approaches to “culture contact” within which a rigid “us” vs. “them” dichotomy is constantly reproduced. In a world of increased fluidity, liquidity, mobility and intensification of cultural flows between centers and peripheries, the question is, of course, whether this theoretical perspective still reflects the reality of culture, let alone that of human rights. I would like to argue that recent historical developments as well as developments in philosophy and anthropology might not only contribute to moving the universalist/relativist debate out of the present impasse, but also assist in the formulation of a new and more promising conceptual framework for comprehending the real and symbolic dimensions of the current flows of human rights values around the world, and in particular, in non-Western cultures. In many parts of the world, different human rights discourses and practices have now become vehicles for the articulation of a wide variety of concerns of different people in different cultural contexts at different levels of socio-economic-political development. Human rights increasingly form part of a wider network of perspectives and points of view which are shared and exchanged between North and South, East and West, centers and peripheries, in multiple, creative, and often conflictual ways. But human rights have become “universalized” as values subject to interpretation, contextualization, negotiation, adaptation, and accommodation. In other words, they seem to have become “culture” in a rather diffuse sense.

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Here are a few different ways of characterizing this development by thinkers of diverse ideological persuasions. According to the Argentinean jurist and philosopher, Eduardo Rabossi, “(O)ne of the shapes we have recently assumed is that of a “human rights culture”. In an article titled “Human Rights Naturalized,” [he] argues that philosophers should think of this culture as a new and welcome fact of the post-Holocaust world. They should stop trying to get behind this fact, stop trying to detect and defend its so-called ‘philosophical presuppositions’”...My basic point, he adds, is that “the world has changed, that the human rights phenomenon renders human rights foundationalism outmoded and irrelevant” (1990; cited in Rorty, 1993: 115-6).

For Richard Wilson: The past few decades have witnessed the inexorable rise of the application of international human rights law as well as the extension of a wider public discourse on human rights, to the point where human rights could be seen as one of the most globalized political value of our times. The language of human rights has moved in to fill in the vacuum left by the demise of grand political narratives in the aftermath of the Cold War. Notwithstanding disputes over their conceptualization and application, human rights are among the few utopian ideals left, and there is still a remarkable degree of consensus by governments on the principle at least that certain rights be protected under international law ( 1997: 1; italics added).

As for Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, he writes: To my mind the idea of human rights is one of the most characteristic phenomena of our time. Despite its very recent and limited origin, this concept has quickly gained global significance, penetrating into the consciousness of millions of people in every corner of the world. It is commonly claimed to be embodied in the ideologies of political and social movements; and there is a wide demand for it to be integrated into the foreign policy of nations and the decision-making processes of international donors or lending institutions. The mass-media now routinely report on human rights issues; and scholars discuss them from various disciplinary perspectives... (1992: 430-1; italics added).

In Michael Ignatieff’s view: We are living in the first human society actually attempting to create a political community on the assumption that everyone—literally

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Essay # 7 everyone—has the right to belong. We are all embarked on the same perilous adventure, whether we can live with our differences or die because of them…[The Rights Revolution is] about enhancing our right to be equal and protecting our right to be different (2007)…Human rights have gone global by going local, embedding itself in the soil of cultures and worldviews independent of the West, in order to sustain ordinary people’s struggles against unjust states and oppressive social practices (2003).

The de facto, albeit contingent, historical emergence of a “globalized human rights culture” puts in question the very foundations of both universalists and cultural relativists' arguments about human rights, and undermine the credibility of their assumptions. In some sense, they are still caught up in what seems now to be a rear-guard battle, which is arguably irrelevant at this point of our history. Among the protagonists to this heated debate however, some have attempted to put forth a middle of the road position, based on a cross-cultural approach, which deserves our attention and scrutiny. Here is how I intend to proceed in this essay. After a number of preliminary considerations, I will show the merits and limitations of both kinds of approaches from a theoretical and methodological point of view: (i) the extremist one, pitting Universalists against Relativists and forcing them into an impasse, and (ii) the more moderate one, which recommends a cross-cultural approach. Then, 1 will attempt to articulate a new conceptual framework for thinking about, and practicing human rights worldwide, which goes beyond the extremist positions of universalism and relativism, and draws on some of the insights of the cross-cultural approaches mentioned above. In the process, I will make a case for a renewed search for philosophical foundations of human rights standards and values, thus arguing against the very influential and controversial views of a number of contemporary philosophers who object to such an endeavor. Such a framework will have a number of distinctive features: in addition to being based on reasonable and compelling philosophical assumptions, it will be contextual, dynamic (i.e., concerned with developments over time), and cross-cultural as well. Furthermore, situated beyond universalism and relativism, and acknowledging the rise of a “globalized human rights culture,” (albeit critically and in a nuanced and qualified manner), it will open the way for comparative, interdisciplinary, and cross-cultural studies, based on new conceptions of “human rights” and “culture.” In closing, I will draw some of its philosophical and political implications, and consider briefly the future prospects of human rights in light of our current situation.

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In an appendix, I will illustrate through a discussion of a number of case-studies some of the theoretical and methodological tenets of the approach and conceptual framework advocated herein.

2. Preliminaries, Assumptions, and Working Hypotheses Before proceeding further a number of caveats are in order. Despite its currency, its moral authority, and its great political force, the idea of human rights in fact conceals serious disagreements about its concept, rationale and content.

2.1 Kinds of Problems Raised by Human Rights Indeed, the concept of human rights raises problems that are, on the one hand, practical and urgent, and on the other hand, theoretical and abstract. And practical problems (faced for example by activists and proponents of human rights in the field) may well rest on theoretical problems. In turn these difficulties may themselves be rooted in problematic and objectionable philosophical assumptions. One may be tempted to call for “a division of labor” among human rights workers, and invite philosophers (after the fact, so to speak) 6 to elucidate the “philosophical foundations” of human rights. But some philosophers deny the possibility of there being any such foundations. Richard Rorty, for example, has argued that the quest for secure and justified philosophical foundations of human rights practices, found above all in the Kantian tradition, is doomed to fail and is practically useless (1993). This may well be the case for the kind of search that Rorty has in mind, but human rights advocates must somehow vindicate the philosophical correctness of their position if they are to avoid the charge of moral arrogance, imperialism or ethnocentrism. Furthermore, it is important to bridge the gap between theory and practice (or human rights activism) as much as possible. The importance of this task is particularly

6

As James Nickel pointed out, philosophers were not involved (as much as diplomats, lawyers, and UN policymakers) in the formulation and drafting of the Universal Declaration and Covenants. He writes: “There are few references to the philosophical foundations of human rights in contemporary documents... To gather as much support for the movement as possible, the philosophical underpinnings for human rights were left unspecified” (1987: 9; see also UNESCO, 1986).

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evident when we consider, as Jack Donnelly suggests, “the practical implications of the theoretical arguments of cultural relativism” (1989: 6). “Although the way in which we think about a problem does not determine the way we act, it may influence behavior.” In addition, “the way problems are conceptualized may also be important for justifying actions and policies” (Donnelly, 1989: 6). For example, if we can show that the violation of human rights is not an imperative requirement of development or politics as usual, which can be explained away by some hocus-pocus cultural relativist objection, but merely a convenience or an excuse for those who control development policy and political power (or even simply a cover for their self-enrichment), then repressive regimes may be deprived of one important trump card often used in their defense. Contrary to what some may claim, I think that clear thinking about human rights may well be the key to the struggle; it may even be essential for successful and effective political action on their behalf. In fact, in some sense, it is to the utopian belief in the power of clear, strong, and hopefully well-grounded ideas that the whole human rights project testifies to. So, conceptual clarity, the fruit of sound reasoning, is a necessary condition for effective action. For, as Donnelly puts it, “[A]t the very least it can help to unmask the arguments of dictators and their allies” (1989: 6). Conceptual clarity can also contribute to laying down the foundations for a genuine internal and cross-cultural conversation about the rationale and content of current international standards of human rights, i.e., the Universal Declaration (1948) and the two main International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966/1976).

2.2 Historical Perspectives Upon closer examination of these documents and their history, one may become more appreciative of the following points: (i) the imprint of the Enlightenment’s legacy 7 and the profound Western bias in their 7

Some authors who seek to establish the universalism of “natural” human rights would deny that they are the inventions of the Enlightenment, mere social constructions, and would thereby reject the thesis defended by H.L.A. Hart in his famous 1955 article, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” as well as the position articulated much earlier (19th century) by John Austin in his very influential “Lectures on Jurisprudence.” They would therefore seek to find in ancient or

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contents; 8 (ii) the hegemony of the Western world in almost all proceedings pertaining to human rights issues, despite formal, token earlier texts precursors or antecedents to the modern conception of human rights. Thus, they would argue for example that one could find a moral basis for human rights in the works of the Stoics (Michael Boylan), Roman writers and philosophers (Henrik Syse), or that the concept can even be extracted from Aristotle (Alan Gewirth). For Hart and Austin, in contrast, an examination of ancient European texts does not uncover an actual word for either “rights” or “duties.” If all concepts require words to express them, the absence of these words means that there is no operational concept of a right or duty. If there are no operational concepts, then such ideas did not exist before the Enlightenment. If such an argument is correct, then we must recognize that human rights were invented by Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson, Hume, Kant: they are not natural or true or universal, but rather arbitrary, historically contingent, constructions that apply only to those societies that choose to adopt (or adapt) them, just as one may adopt a particular technology or strategy. It is therefore questionable whether the concept of natural human rights is a legitimate universal category by which to judge a society and its practices. 8 We must however acknowledge that the Western philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment which has contributed to the formulation of the contemporary concept of human rights is far more complex and diverse than most accounts suggests, because they are mainly polemical in their approach. From its original incarnation in the doctrines of “natural rights” (around 1688), to that found later on in the works of Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Jefferson, The US Constitution, and in the 1789 French Declaration of Rights of Man in the 17th-18th centuries, the idea of human rights has undergone several major transformations, and has been used and claimed in the process by different political constituencies. Take for example the “individualism” often associated with the Western liberal conception of human rights. While Locke and Kant did place an emphasis on the “individual,” who must be protected from the encroachments by unjust and illegitimate governments, Rousseau, and to some extent Jefferson, seems to have had “communitarian” preferences giving priority to “collective autonomy,” or situating the individual's rights within the community. As for the “right to property” (found in Locke's list, along with the right to life, and liberty) which later became the “pursuit of happiness” in Jefferson (and in the US Constitution), it had a rather interesting political history. As a result, it got transformed from a defense by a privileged class, as the right to unlimited accumulation of private property, for conservative purposes (in the 17th and 18th centuries) into a defense of civil and political rights (by the late 19th-early 20th century). As Donnelly asks: how did that happen? And he answers: “Politics provide the only explanation for this bizarre situation” (1989:.29-30). By way of explanation, he states further: “The right to property was presented by its advocates as both a precondition for the enjoyment of the right to natural liberty and the most important consequence of the exercise of that natural liberty”—the “basic fight,” as it were. From this point, it was only a short step -politically, if not philosophically--to “presenting the (economic) right to property

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representation of the rest of the world, and the relative dependency of the Third World;9 (iii) the fact that “all major cultural traditions of the world reject, or are at least hostile to, some of these rights and/or their implications,”10 and finally, in view of the above considerations, (iv) of “the need to relate to each concrete, social, political, and economic as the paramount civil and political right” (1989: 30). In any case, by the late 19th early 20th century (the age of socialism and Marxism), the struggle was more and more seen as one between the rights to property (of the bourgeoisie) and the rights of the common working man. In this regard, most scholars agree, Marx was quite correct in his analysis of both the revolutionary and conservative roles of the bourgeoisie. Universal human rights were a powerful weapon for the rising bourgeoisie, used to free the process of capital accumulation from traditional restraints and justify political and social mobility. But once it gained power, it then used the same arguments to impede further change and prevent the rise and protection of lower, working classes. By the middle of the 20th century, in the aftermath of WWII, there was a tremendous push for human fights worldwide, but politics intruded again. With the rise of the two main blocs vying for world hegemony, the capitalist/liberal and the socialist/communist, the struggle progressively took another turn, this time between proponents in the former bloc of the priority of “the civil and political rights” and those in the latter bloc, who instead argued for the priority of the “economic, social, and cultural rights.” In terms of the contemporary situation, the opposition is now between the West/North and the East/South. Despite the repeated proclamations to stress the “interdependence and indivisibility” of all these rights by various UN resolutions over the years, some protagonists to the debate still (want to) hold on to this misleading and rather problematic dichotomy (for more detailed discussions on the historical emergence of the concept, see Donnelly [1985; 1989]; Nickel [1987]; Henkin [1978]). 9 The notion of “Third World” (as opposed to “First World” and “Second World”) may already sound a bit outdated today. It is perhaps more appropriate to talk of “developed,” “emerging,” and “developing” countries. 10 Because of the contradictions and double-standards often exhibited in national and international human rights discourse and practice, we must acknowledge that human rights violations are not confined to one area or region of the world (i.e., the Third World as opposed to the First and Second World). “The sad fact is that in the contemporary world virtually all international recognized human rights are regularly and systematically violated” (Donnelly, 1989: 42). So, to better serve the cause of human rights worldwide, it would be helpful perhaps to institute a truly worldwide watch of human rights and let the records of all countries publicly reflect their performances along a number of previously agreed upon axes and measures. This would mean putting an end to the current use by the US of “human rights reports” issued every year by the State Department as a weapon or tool of American foreign policy. It would also mean putting an end to the use of similar reports by China’s Foreign Ministry in reply to its Western critics, esp., the US.

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circumstances of each society” in order to ascertain the “cultural legitimacy” of human rights (An-Na'im, 1992: 428- 9; see also Cerna, 1994).

2.3 Tensions between Two Different Perspectives In view of the foregoing discussion, we must admit that the concept and practice of human rights is far more complex and problematic than commonly surmised. There seems to be a serious tension between two different perspectives -extreme end-points on a continuum, with several possible intermediary positions. First, as stated earlier, the moral authority of the idea of human rights comes from its presumed or alleged universality -i.e., human rights are the entitlements of all human beings throughout the world regardless of considerations of race, gender, sex, religion, etc. The practical realization of these rights (especially those commonly referred to as “the economic, social, and cultural rights”) is largely contingent upon conditions of wealth and economic development in a given country. This is also the case with regards to “civil and political rights”—as their realization and implementation involve some substantial costs, contrary to what many Western ideologues claim and want us to believe. These conditions refer only to the practical implementation of these rights and not to the concept of human rights itself and its content. Secondly, given the known tensions and conflicts between current standards and specific cultural traditions, the “universality of human rights” may be, at best, more of a potentiality than an actuality. Insofar as “culture” (as newly understood and conceptualized) may significantly influence individual, institutional, and collective behavior, there may well be some serious “cultural obstacles” to the practical implementation of those human rights not presently accepted in a given culture. To point out these tensions and to argue, along with An-Na'im, for the need to promote and expand “the cultural legitimacy of human rights in relation to specific cultural traditions” should not be taken as some “naive universalists” may be tempted to do and actually have, as another attempt to undermine and discredit the efficacy of human rights. “Naive universalists” tend to assume that any attempt to point out the actual or potential tensions and conflicts between the presumed (alleged, and/or desirable) universality of human rights and the actual relativity of the concept and its content to specific cultures, is either deliberately seeking to

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justify violations of human rights, or undermining their global efficacy. In contrast, “naive cultural relativists” are prone to interpret the tensions and conflicts mentioned and the need for cultural legitimacy of human rights as a total and radical rejection of the universality of the present international standards. But clearly either characterization or interpretation is too naive, too extremist, inaccurate, and therefore, not very helpful. I would like to argue for a more judiciously qualified position beyond universalism and relativism, whereby the reality of relativity does not exclude some degree of universality -de facto, if not de jure. In a nutshell, I would be inclined to endorse Donnelly’s view when he writes the following: Although the well-known dangers of cultural and political imperialism demand respect for cultural variety, I argue that we nonetheless ought to defend and seek to implement the universality of human rights norms, at least in broad outlines. Variations in the details of implementation may be allowed, and even required, in order to accommodate valued cultural practices and different historical backgrounds -so long as these alternative practices are not fundamentally incompatible with universal human rights norms -but our emphasis needs to be on universality rather than on relativity (Donnelly, 1989: 3; italics added).

2.4 On the Need to Develop an Adequate Approach For this purpose, we need to develop and adopt an integrated, contextual, dynamic, interdisciplinary methodology of internal and crosscultural analysis of human rights concepts, conceptions, and practices in order to apply it to specific case-studies. Consider for a moment the different kinds and range of issues included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenants on Civil & Political Rights and on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966 and ratified in 1976)—hereafter, 1 shall use the abbreviations (CPR) and (ESCR) followed by article numbers of the two known Covenants. [See also Appendices in Nickel, 1987 for complete texts of the various versions of these documents]:11

11

These documents are posted at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.

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International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights

Civil Rights: Recognition and equality before the law (CPR 16 and 26); rights of prisoners -concerning capital punishment, right to life (CPR 6), prohibition of torture (CPR 7), prohibition of slavery (CPR 8), prohibition of arbitrary arrest (CPR 9), and basic principles of the penal system (CPR 10); right to a fair trial: assumption of innocence (CPR 14), prohibition of ex post facto laws (CPR 15), and prohibition of imprisonment for debt (CPR—11 ); the right to liberty of movement (CPR 12): protection of foreigners in case of expulsion (CPR 13); the right of freedom of opinion: protection of the individual's sphere of freedom (CPR 17), freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (CPR 19), right to free speech (CPR 19), and prohibition of war and discrimination propaganda (CPR 20). Political Rights: Freedom of peaceful assembly (CPR 21), freedom of association (CPR 22), and the right to participation in political life (CPR 25).

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Economic Rights: The right to gain and sustain adequate standard of living: the right to adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing (ESCR 11.1), the right to be free from hunger (ESCR 11.2), the right to work (ESCR 6); labor rights: the right to just and favorable working conditions (ESCR 7), the right to form and join trade unions, and the right to strike (ESCR 8). Social Rights: The right to social security (ESCR 9); the right of families, mothers and children (ESCR 10): protection of the family, freedom of marriage (CPR 23), and rights of the child (CPR 24); the right to physical and mental health (ESCR 12) Cultural Rights: The right to education (ESCR 13): the fight to compulsory primary education (ESCR 14); the fight to take part in cultural life and the right to free scientific progress (ESCR 15); and the right of minorities (CPR 27).

A historical analysis of the conditions and circumstances under which these rights—as listed here in discrete and opposed categories or covenants—emerged- would reveal that the former covenant did have its initial impetus, social basis, and primary advocacy in the “bourgeoisie”, and later on, in the Western/Northern, liberal democratic camp while the latter covenant had its supporters among the working classes and socialist intellectuals, and later on, in the East/South alliance of the

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socialist/communist bloc and the Third World (for a detailed discussion, see Nickel, 1987; Donnelly, 1985; 1989; Henkin, 1978).12 But questions of historical genesis or constitution should not be confused with questions of theoretical justification—on pain of committing what philosophers and logicians call a genetic fallacy. One need not reject or denigrate civil and political rights because of their historically bourgeois or Western liberal heritage, just as one need not dismiss or disparage the economic, social and cultural rights because of their historical primacy among the working classes, socialist intellectuals, communist and Third World countries. In fact, as the workers of the European social-democracies have shown, civil and political rights can be used effectively to achieve the political recognition of economic and social rights.13 Contrary to those who, for political or ideological reasons, wish to maintain a dichotomy between rights, either by giving primacy and priority to one set over the other, or by denying categorically that one the set is composed of “human rights”, later UN resolutions (Vienna Declaration, 1993) sought to emphasize the “interdependence and indivisibility” of human rights, anchored a common principle, the “principle of human dignity inherent in all human beings.” “In fact, as Donnelly remarks, one of the principal reasons for abandoning the conventional dichotomy (...) is to overcome the ideological biases of both the left and the right with which that dichotomy was so long associated and which too often lead to politically dangerous arguments for the priority of one set and the neglect or even suppression of the other” (1989: 31). This fact notwithstanding, we must acknowledge however that while there may have been some serious focus and subsequently, significant 12

It is therefore not surprising that whenever China brings up the issue of human rights, it invariably insists on the priority of the latter rights over the former, and thus contrasts its approach to that of the North Atlantic, liberal, Western democracies. 13 Admittedly, the achievements of European social-democracies in this regard have been severely undermined, and in some cases even rolled back, since the onslaught of global neo-liberalism, starting in the 80s and culminating in the past few years in the worst crisis of capitalism we have experienced since 1929. As a result, some contemporary thinkers have even concluded that social-democracies are all but dead, except perhaps for some of the so-called Nordic countries.

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strides forward made regarding the civil and political rights, the same cannot be said of the economic, social, and cultural rights. But does this mean that we therefore need to rehabilitate and maintain the dichotomy? I think not. In fact, anyone working in the field, in situations of oppression and repression, can easily observe and attest to the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, which is “nothing, but a natural consequence of the underlying unity of human rights” (Kunnemann, 1995: 323, 325). I would also add, anyone who takes a careful and rigorous analytic look at the content of these rights would attest to the same. Such a perspective gives us “a clearer picture of the nature and range of human rights and allows us to see much more clearly their manifold interrelationships” (Donnelly, 1989: 36). That is, human rights are not about a dream world already made, but about a world in the making, a world of our making, where the all-encompassing and overriding guidelines and strictures they place on us might enable us in the long run to become more than mere “human beings,” i.e., animals endowed with some linguistic and cognitive abilities. Now, for heuristic and other reasons, we might consider different ways of categorizing and classifying human rights, and several have indeed been considered and proposed over the years [see for example, Donnelly (1989: 34-36), and Kunnemann (1995: 326-7)].14 But what do we stand to gain from such an approach? On the one hand, one might argue that any such categorization does not go far enough because it does not rest on a firm and justifiable theoretical ground. On the other hand, one might argue that any such categorization is for some reasons a step in the right direction. In contrast however, one might argue, as Donnelly puts it, that Transcending the conventional dichotomy may help to free us from the weight of past political controversies, open our eyes to long-ignored theoretical issues, and begin to shift our attention to the central question of the mechanisms and social processes by which human rights are respected, protected, and violated.

14

According to Kunnemann, “[t]he list of human rights enumerated in the Covenants is a mixture of different stages of applying what one could call fundamental human rights principles: (1) existential security; (2) participation in the life of the community; and (3) cultural and spiritual identity” (1995: 326).

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And he adds quite pertinently, I believe: We need categories that are fine enough to capture the complexity of human rights, precise enough to reveal important practical relationships, and open enough to be compatible with a wide range of possible theories (1989: 37).

In order however to provide a comprehensive, coherent, and perspicuous account and analysis of all these rights (and more) we need to combine, at minimum, the perspectives of law, political science, history, economics, anthropology, social psychology, sociology—and last but not least, philosophy, if we want to understand the conceptual foundations of human rights and the justifications for this or any other particular list—whether it be a list of “basic,” “fundamental,” “inalienable,” “minimal,” or “priority rights.” 15 In other words, “the study of human rights is an inherently multidisciplinary enterprise,” and must be approached “without regard for conventional disciplinary boundaries” (Donnelly, 1989: 5-6).16

2.5 Dynamic, Developmental Aspects of Human Rights. Having characterized the main aspects (theoretical and methodological) of the approach that I am advocating here, 1 would like now to focus for a moment on the dynamic, developmental aspects of human rights, that is, on the necessity and value of considering human rights issues over time. Assuming our current concept of human rights, we must recognize that the “list of human rights” (which has been derived from it) has evolved and expanded, and will continue to do so, in response to such factors as changing ideas of human dignity and justice, insult and injury, disrespect and un-recognition, the rise of new political forces, technological changes, new techniques of oppression and repression, and even past human rights successes. This would allow us to shift attention and resources to threats that were previously inadequately recognized or insufficiently addressed.

15 These are some of terms used by various contemporary political philosophers and thinkers in their efforts to make a case for what they consider to be a list of “defensible” and/or realizable human rights. 16 I would like to believe that the present essay exemplifies such an approach to some extent.

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Such an evolution is particularly clear in the emergence of economic and social human rights.17 Concepts, conceptions and derived lists of human rights emerged out of the political struggle for human dignity and justice and usually provide indices of the directions and stakes of that struggle. This is but one more side to the dialectical interaction between moral ideals and political realities that lies at the heart of the practice of human rights. Whether or not the list of enumerated rights in the current Covenants will continue to represent a “widely accepted consensus,” as some have claimed (Donnelly, 1989: 27), on the minimum requirements for a decent human life of dignity is, and one might add, ought to remain an open question—as they were never meant “to be the final word on the ideal of human rights,” but only “one, albeit important, step, in the process of implementing human rights, which started with the Universal Declaration” (Kunnemann, 1995: 334). Although abandoning this list altogether is out of the question, it is unlikely, according to Nickel, that anyone today would agree with every clause of a document formulated more than 60 years ago by a group of lawyers and diplomats (1987: 171). The Declaration is defensible for most of its content, and “it is not difficult to deal with the rest through axing and pruning” (Nickel, 1987: 171; italics added).

2.6 Some Developmental Proposals. In recent years, in part because of the slow conceptual development and implementation of the economic, social, and cultural rights, and in part because of the growing urgency felt by some philosophers, economists and human rights advocates for greater international policy action and application, a number of developmental proposals have been made to reconceive the list of rights, and set new and more urgent priorities based upon the concept of “basic needs”.18 The one that I find most relevant for my present purposes is the proposal articulated by Frances Stewart (1989). 17

Some have even talked about civil and political rights as being “1st generation,” while the economic and social rights were considered to be “2nd generation.” In recent decades, there has even been talk of “3rd generation” human rights, i.e., “cultural rights,” as well as “rights to development.” 18 It is also worth noting the proposal made—starting in the 80s-- by Amartya Sen (2009) and Martha Nussbaum (2006) putting forth instead the notion of (basic)

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Thus, Stewart writes: The failure of the economic and social system to achieve a basic minimum condition of life for hundreds of millions of people in the (third) world has led to widespread recognition of the need to give primacy to securing universal access to basic social and economic goods and services (1989: 347).

In effect, the “basic needs” approach was formulated largely in response to the failure of economic growth to alleviate poverty in many developing countries. If we can't provide human beings with the basic minimum required to lead a decent life, how can we expect to make progress in terms of civil and political rights, especially in those parts of the world where they are not a high priority, because poverty is rampant and a way of life?19 For, as the popular saying goes, “you're not really free on an empty stomach” or “you're not really human in abject poverty.” And so, one line of argument goes as follows: how can we continue to preach about human rights when universal satisfaction of these needs (at least on a minimal level) is currently feasible given the world’s wealth and resources, but blocked politically? Another line of argument goes as follows: the proliferation of international human rights agreements, covenants, and declarations with little or no attention paid to defining and spelling them out precisely, monitoring and enforcing them is likely to debase the status of human rights, and even make them lose their moral and political force, and turn them into merely “manifesto rights.” Our aim, Stewart argues, should be to explore the nature of plans and policies needed to fulfill basic needs, especially domestically but also internationally, in order to assess how and to what extent human rights to basic needs can be enforced, and to identify changes necessary to make the 1976 covenant and the 1986 declaration (on the right to development) more than pious hopes (1989: 347-8).

“capabilities” (and the related concept of “functionings”). In recent times, this proposal has gained a lot of attention and supporters. 19 In this regard, it might be worth examining the view articulated by Thomas Pogge in Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right. Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (2007); see also Pogge (2002).

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The basic needs approach to development focuses therefore on ways and means to ensure that everyone has access to enough basic goods and services to maintain a level of living above a basic minimum.20 It is hard to resist the emotional appeal of these kinds of arguments, unless one is willing to reveal “ideological and moral biases” that are hardly defensible. But problems and difficulties (theoretical and practical) abound as soon as we take a closer look at the merits of the proposal advocated. And it does not seem like they can be brushed off or dissolved for the sake of expediency and practical results, even though these might be desirable. First, how do we define the “basic minimum” in this context? Supposing we can define it, how do we create a consensus among the various basic minimum proposals? Second, how do we define “basic needs goods”? Can there be agreement on what to include and what not to include on that list? While some may want to include only a “core” which would include: food, water, health, education, and shelter, others would want to add “nonmaterial aspects” such as access to work, participation in decisions, and liberty. A quick look at the various lists proposed confirms that we are far from an agreement. Can we afford not to include nonmaterial aspects of basic needs? Third, should we view the satisfaction and fulfillment of basic needs as the only goal of economic development? If not, what weight should this objective be given, what degree of urgency associated with it, and what should be the timeframe under which it must be implemented? Fourth, assuming that we develop a clear, precise, and consensual understanding of “basic needs” and the “rights” associated with them, it will be necessary to develop an international monitoring system to determine whether or not progress is being made in the fulfillment of these needs and implementation of the corresponding rights. As Stewart points out, this can be seen as an attempt “to develop a moral and political agenda which would ensure fulfillment of basic needs and not leave the extent of fulfillment to contingent forces” (1989: 350; italics added). It is clear from my analysis that the basic needs approach requires a complex and difficult process of definition, monitoring, and enforcement. 20

Such an approach is avowedly “resourcist” in that it focuses primarily on goods and services, and contrasts with the so-called “capabilities” approach, which prefers to focus instead on what people can actually do and be, given their unique conditions and circumstances. See Essay # 5.

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And even then, there is no guarantee that it would lead to success.21 In fact, there is a danger that this complexity may mean that little is achieved. The basic needs approach is in fact linked to a top-down approach to development. Such an approach is common among officials of international organizations, notwithstanding the now fashionable rhetoric of “participation” at all levels, which seems to favor and point instead to a bottom-up approach. As Kunnemann argues: There is “a considerable risk that States and their organizations might take economic rights out of the hands of individuals and marginalized groups, whose empowerment versus the State is the essence of economic human rights—as it is with all other human rights.” The satisfaction of basic needs might then eventually even be used as a pretense for violations of economic human rights. This is what currently occurs in a number of countries trying to use what they call “economic rights” to justify top-down oppressive and marginalizing policies and developmental projects which violate human rights (1995: 336). (My addition: This is arguably what has been happening in a country like China).

We must keep in mind that the (1966/1976) Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights already encompasses most (if not all) of what would generally be called “basic needs goods”, including the right to food, health, shelter, education, and work as well as to many other non-material aspects of life. In addition, the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development further strengthens the Covenant. Furthermore, there is a sense in which all human rights are somehow already “basic” human rights, “in the fundamental sense that systematic violations of any human right preclude realizing a life of full human dignity, and that is, prevent one from enjoying the minimum conditions necessary for a life worthy of a human being”(Fields and Naar, 1992). In this case, to add “basic” becomes redundant. There is also a sense in which the basic needs or rights approach seems to imply that other human rights 21

One only needs to recall in this regard the difficulties faced by nations around the world in meeting the more recently formulated and agreed upon UN Millennium Development Goals, which are arguably by some accounts rather modest and insufficient (Pogge, 2004). For details on such MDGs and the relatively slow progress being made, see the recently released report available at http://bit.ly/niNndt, see alsohttp://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.

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need not be universally accepted and respected, and this does little more than open the door for violations. However, we must also recognize that the Covenant here in question contains 31 substantive articles and perhaps twice as many corresponding human rights, and that this is too extensive a list to provide adequate focus and direction for an international human rights policy and plan of action. This may in part explain why there has been so little done to “operationalize” the rights of the covenant here in question—not to mention that fact that many of its provisions are not considered to be human rights by some protagonists. Whatever the current theoretical and practical difficulties are with the basic needs approach, we may have to set ourselves limited and feasible tasks, in a stepwise manner, and adopt on pragmatic grounds a short list of priority rights that we need to focus on. But we should not, I think, confine our concerns in this respect to practical considerations only; we need sound theoretical guidance behind our choice of a priority, short list, and of the policies and actions adopted to implement it. To this task, I submit, philosophers could perhaps contribute significantly on the front end, and not merely on the back end, after the fact, as it were.

3. Analysis: Beyond Universalism and Relativism 3.1 Critique of Universalism from a Relativist Standpoint. The failure or inability of philosophers, social, political and legal theorists to agree on the foundations of human rights and their justifications, is perhaps the most obvious asset in the relativist's defense. This fact greatly strengthens the position of cultural relativists who support human rights as “historically contingent and culturally relative achievements,” and oppose the efforts of those philosophers seeking to articulate such foundations in the Kantian tradition, or establish an “Archimedean point” (albeit provisional) providing universal and rational justifications for generalizable moral norms and categories of justice. The underlying meta-ethical theory of such anti-foundationalist arguments approximates and even coincides with cultural relativism—despite claims to the contrary by their proponents. This situation has led some protagonists to express open contempt and hostility against the notion of human rights. Just as Jeremy Bentham, a century or so ago, stated that the idea of rights is “nonsense” and that of

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natural rights “nonsense upon stilts,” MacIntyre argues today that “the truth is plain: there are no such rights and belief in them is one with belief in witches and unicorns... Every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such things has failed” (1981: 67, 69). Proponents of cultural relativism typically point to “the historically contingent and culturally bounded nature of human rights discourses and practices,” and therefore to their “socially constructed nature.” According to them, human rights are inseparable from the mentality of the Enlightenment, and as presently construed are the product of particular historical circumstances, a particular society at a particular time: Europe in the aftermath of WWII22, and are therefore “A Western Construct with Limited Applicability” (1980). In their well-known paper by this title, Pollis and Schwab criticize what they see as a cultural and ideological ethnocentrism in the area of human rights and human dignity. In their view, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is “universal” only in pretension, not in practice, since it is the charter of an idealist European political philosophy “with underlying democratic and libertarian values, based on the notion of atomized individuals possessed of certain inalienable rights in nature” (1980: 1, 8). Because of the centrality and pervasiveness of the notion of “group” or “community” rather than that of the “individual” in many cultures, they conclude that “[t]he Western conception of human right is not only inapplicable” and “of limited validity,” but even “meaningless” to non-Western countries (1980: 13). From a different perspective, various scholars have questioned Western dominance in the area of human rights, and argued on behalf of their respective cultural traditions, whether they be traditional African, Islamic, or Asian cultures (see for example An-Na’im, 1992; Mbaye, 1992; Ouguergouz, 1993; Bielefeldt, 1995; Hountondji, 1988; Panikkar, 1982; Legesse, 1980).

22

And again, in the aftermath of the Cold War, when we have witnessed a renewed focus by Western powers in using “human rights” and “democracy” in an inconsistent and hypocritical way, as tools of foreign policy in the pursuit of their respective geo-political and economic interests. Recent events in the Arab world offer us further confirmation of this point. See Anderson (2011) for an illuminating and perspicuous analysis of the “Concatenation of the Arab World.”

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In response, Jack Donnelly (1982; 1989) argues that their views are based on confusion of human rights and human dignity, and between rights and duties -a position which he presumably shares with Rhoda Howard (1992), a widely read and respected sociologist of human rights. In their view, “most non-Western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human rights but the very concept” (Donnelly, 1982: 303).23 This point is further substantiated by an analysis of the political culture about human rights in Islam, traditional Africa, Confucian China, Hindu India, and the Soviet Union (1982: 306-311). Donnelly’s conclusion is that “the differences between Western and non-Western approaches to human dignity certainly are large” (1982: 304). But he views the incorporation of non-Western views, such as the valuing of “the group” or “the community” over that of the “individual”, as “a great risk” to the essential character of human rights, which come “dangerously close to destroying or denying human rights as they have been understood” (1982: 312). He summarizes his argument quite sensibly as follows: We must recognize the validity of claims of traditional values and institutions, as well as the rights of modem nations and states to choose their own destiny. At the same time, though, we feel a need to keep these choices restrained within acceptable bounds and reject an anything-goes attitude (1982: 313).

Many more examples of such disagreements can easily be found, but these should suffice to suggest that the debate about the universality or

23

This is a point which has been strongly contested in recent times by Amartya Sen (1999, 2006), for example. He argues that not only the concept but even the practice of human rights can already be found exemplified in Ancient India, at a time when Europe was still rather primitive, or in the throes of ignorance characteristic of the “dark ages.” To this effect, he often cites the edicts of the Buddhist emperor Asoka (3rd century BC), the writings and policies of Kautilya (who lived around the time of Aristotle, 4th century BC) as well as those the Muslim emperor Akbar who reigned between 1556 and 1605, which called, among other things, for the respect of life (human and non-human), for religious tolerance and freedom of conscience. While Sen’s examples may provide valuable and needed corrections to the established historiography of civilizations, it is questionable whether the underlying conceptions supporting these edicts are congruent or commensurable with modern or postmodern conceptions of human rights. In an attempt to establish the universalism of human rights, he not only goes back in time to period well before the European Enlightenment, but considers nonWestern sources.

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relativity of human rights is not only highly antagonistic, but it also takes place at an extremely abstract level. Whether the issue is ascertaining the existence of human rights in Africa or Asia for example, or showing these rights' ethnocentric origin in Western thought, the arguments presented by the various protagonists offer us more insights into them (and their respective “ideologies”) than about the so-called “other cultures” in which human rights are supposed to apply. For example, what do they mean by “traditional (African or Asian) societies”? There is as much diversity in Africa or Asia as anywhere else, if not even more. Who belongs to the category of “non-Western countries” for which Western human rights are meaningless? And finally, who is the “we” authorized (by whom?) to “keep choices restrained” and reject a socalled “anything-goes-attitude”? In the end, isn't this a clear expression of the much maligned Western hegemony discretely raising its head and slipping in, yet again? Why would it be “a great risk” to the idea of human rights as we know it to incorporate considerations of “group” or “community” rights, unless one holds the Eurocentric conception (based on individualism) to be the only valid one in our current historical situation? In fact, in many instances during the post-Cold War era, human rights have become more than instrumental mechanisms to protect individuals' rights and are instead nowadays expressive of tensions and conflicts around ethnic, indigenous, nationalist, and religious identities. In this context, there has been even talk of “cultural rights” and the rights of indigenous cultures, whose continued existence has come under serious threat in the face of Western imperialism and modernization. Given the level of generality and abstraction of the analyses provided by these protagonists, one may feel that almost all of the arguments presented are plausible, or equally true or false. Protagonists casually survey and gloss over a multitude of cultural details and particularities (about Asia or Africa) in a few pages, or paragraphs, just for the sake of formulating arguments or counter-arguments ad nauseam. Insofar as the debate on the universalism or relativism of human rights is so radically removed and disconnected from “the cultural realities” it presumes to speak about, it can hardly lead to anything but an impasse. As I pointed out earlier, one of the main reasons for such an impasse is the notion of “culture” repeatedly used and assumed by both Universalists and Relativists. They seem to take it as if it were an unproblematic, everyday term about which there is somehow an overall consensus. Thus,

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expressions such as “cultures,” “other cultures,” and “non-Western cultures” do carry with them a specific, underlying conceptualization. “Culture” is implicitly defined as “a homogenous bounded unit, almost as if it were a thing.” The debate reveals a continued preoccupation with outmoded and questionable conceptualizations of “culture,” “culture contact or exchange,” “cultural change” and “acculturation” inherited uncritically from the not too glorious past of anthropology.24 Despite the vigor and passion with which it is often carried out by the various protagonists, it remains somehow stuck in a rigid and useless dichotomy of “us” vs. “them.” The underlying conception of culture is not only problematic because it is too simplistic, mechanical, but also because it betrays strong evolutionary biases of the kinds found among early modernists, who believed in an unfettered progress and development as a one-way street, or as a scale on which people and societies can be plotted as “advanced technological/industrialized,” “developed,” “emerging,” “developing,” or “underdeveloped,” etc. There now seems to be widespread agreement among scholars, politicians and practitioners that in the years and decades to come some of the most important intellectual, moral, and ideological battles about human rights issues are likely to turn on their cross-cultural intelligibility and justifiability (Lindholm, 1992: 399). For this reason, a radically new and far more dynamic, contextual approach to culture is called for. In contrast to the traditional view of “culture” as “a self-contained, unitary, and unique whole of coherent patterns,” the new approach increasingly conceives of “culture” a “rhizomatic network” of perspectives and points of view (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988), or as “a more porous array of intersections where (diverse) distinct processes crisscross (and overlap) from within and beyond its borders” (Rosaldo, 1989: 20; my additions in parentheses), and within which more or less knowledgeable and powerful “social agents or actors” are engaged in various pursuits in “situated contexts.” Culture, the shared meanings, practices, and symbols that constitute the human world, does not present itself neutrally or with one voice. It is always multi-vocal and over-determined, and both the observer and observed are always enmeshed in it... There is no privileged position, no 24

We should keep in mind that the emergence of anthropology as a field of study and discipline goes hand-in-hand with the expansion of Western colonialism and imperialism.

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3.2 Critique of Relativism from a Universalist Standpoint. Though theoretically problematic, cultural relativism does have methodological merits, in that it open up vistas for various possible methods of social, cross-cultural investigations of human rights in the crucible of “thick descriptions” on the ground, so to speak (Geertz, 1983), whereas universalism provides little or no methodological guidance or framework for studying rights “on the ground.” Its methodological fruitfulness notwithstanding, cultural relativism is confronted with a number of difficulties and problems. Most importantly, as many philosophers have noted, it undermines its own truth claims and implies moral nihilism (Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Jarvie, 1984). In other words, relativism assumes a meta-narrative with totalizing claims while at the same time putting forth a self-undermining critique of the very possibility of meta-narratives and totalizing claims. In effect, it undermines the very possibility of ever formulating sound philosophical foundations for human rights. The contemporary doctrine of human rights is thus confronted with a fundamental paradox. On the one hand, it consists of relatively wellestablished set of prima facie international moral and legal standards. On the other hand, the human rights doctrine either is not or cannot be theoretically founded. And it is not the open contempt or hostility of some philosophers (e.g., Bentham or MacIntyre) which is most devastating to the cause of the contemporary doctrine of human rights, but rather the supportive theories of contemporary relativists—such as Rorty, Dworkin, Laclau, and Lukes. This doctrine, they argue essentially, is practically required, but theoretically unfounded, and without foundations. Actions to protect human rights are taken on the basis of principles, but the principles, from which they proceed, lack rational foundation. Rorty (1993) for example objects to attempts to provide human rights with theoretical foundations on the grounds that no such foundations can be “absolutely” or “objectively” true. Even though the problem is insoluble, and is better left behind us, Rorty argues, this should not inhibit action. He justifies the continued value of doing human rights in the historically contingent present rather than by appealing to a-historical

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universals presumably anchored by reason in some notion or other of “human nature” or “dignity” (1993: 116). And he concludes: “We see our task as a matter of making our own culture -the human rights culture- more self-conscious and more powerful, rather than of demonstrating its superiority to other cultures by an appeal to something trans-cultural... [T]he most that philosophy can hope to do is summarize our culturally influenced intuitions about the right thing to do m various situations” (1993: 117; italics added).

Further, he states quite daringly, I must say: [T]he emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge and everything to hearing sad and sentimental 25 stories...” (1993: 118-9; italics added).

The best argument that Rorty can provide for putting foundationalism and universalism behind us is that It would be more efficient to do so, it would enable us to concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education.., for, sentimentality may be the best weapon we have (1993: 122; 130; italics added).

Against Rorty, and others who buy into a similar line of reasoning, one could argue that his best defense for continued support of the Western human rights culture is indeed very weak, based as it is on “historically contingent facts,” “our best intuitions,” “manipulated sentiments and emotions,” and “sentimental education” (whatever that is), and eschewing any and all recourse to rational, foundational forms of thinking and argumentation. But as Wilson quite pertinently points out: Rights without a meta-narrative (i.e., a foundational meta-ethical theory) are like cars without seatbelts; upon hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passengers' safety is jeopardized (1997: 8). 25 Interestingly, in Inventing Human Rights (2007), Lynn Hunt sees the appeal to subjective “rights” as a product of the new print culture of the 18th century, arguing that the wider identifications encouraged by the novel endowed readers with a new sensibility and sensitivity to suffering. She traces the emergence of a concern with “human rights” as much to the psychology of the novel reader as to the arguments of the philosophers—with Rousseau, as philosopher-novelist scoring on both counts.

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The most disturbing use, or rather abuse, of cultural relativism is that it is often a central plank in the meta-narrative of those governments and leaders who actively oppose the application of international human rights standards in their countries. The presumed “tolerance” and “pluralism” of cultural relativism seems to underwrite a conservative political agenda: the tolerance and perhaps even maintenance of highly inegalitarian and repressive political systems, while ironically we devote our energies to the “sentimental education” of brutal, ruthless, and machiavellic dictators,26 and the predominantly subjugated masses of this world. One thing is undeniable, and that is, far too many governments around the world (East/West, North/South) carry out daily violations of human rights, from failing to uphold and protect basic civil, legal, and political rights to the most abominable and unspeakable acts of violence, torture, oppression and repression against their own people. And cultural relativism is often “one of the most useful ideology” in mounting a defense and bringing about international acquiescence in statesponsored violations, repressions, and acts of terrorism (Wilson, 1997: 9).

In an article titled “Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism” (1996), on which she collaborated with Peter Schwab (1980), Adamantia Pollis makes a strong, detailed, and nuanced case covering examples in all relevant parts of the world in an effort to establish this point. Michael Freeman (1994) captures the point as well, and extends his criticism to Rorty as follows: The problem of human rights theory arises primarily from conflict between the moral, legal, and political claims of the doctrine and the actions of governments in violations of the doctrine. Those who violate the doctrine can, and often do appeal precisely to the contingent and culturally relative character of moral beliefs. Rorty believes that human rights practice does not require a meta-ethical theory'. But his own clear advocacy of human rights action presupposes the meta-ethical theory that we should act according to our own convictions, since we can do nothing else (1989). 26

That are for the most part propped up and maintained in power against the wishes and desires of their people by the US and its Western allies, who are paradoxically so prone to lecture the world about the so-called “universality of human rights” whenever it suits them. The “revolutions” or rather “uprisings” which have swept across the Arab world in recent years have clearly reinforced this perspective.

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The problem with anti-foundationalist arguments for human rights is that their meta-ethical theory which approximates [or rather overlaps with] cultural relativism, is the same as that of the opponents of human rights. The problem for human rights theory is that it needs what some of its philosophical friends claim is impossible - a meta-ethical foundation which can “trump” cultural relativism [especially when it is used, or rather abused, by violators of human rights] (Freeman, 1994: 501; my additions in brackets).

Finally, as I pointed out earlier, cultural relativists do not seem to uphold an adequate set of principles for underwriting moral pluralism, since they, like universalists, hold on to an outmoded and misguided conception of “culture.” Such a view is based ultimately upon bounded and closed conceptions of linguistic and cultural systems, but it is severely put in crisis as soon we consider the emerging, inter-penetrating, intermixed, and overlapping cultural, economic, social, and political contexts worldwide. The relativists' efforts to undermine the concept and application of human rights by reference to “culture” ignore the global, trans-national and trans-cultural, phenomena sweeping the world, just as previous intellectuals in their time committed an unforgivable blunder by denying or ignoring the global reality of colonialism or neo-colonialism.

3.3 Relativize or Cross-Culturalize the Universal? Two contributions to the debate which seem to take “intermediate positions” between (or beyond) universalism and relativism deserve some attention and must be examined: (1) Renteln (1985; 1988; 1990) and (2) An-Na'im (1992). The main question that Renteln addresses is the following: Is a universalism that recognizes cultural diversity possible, and if so, how does one go about formulating it and laying down its foundations? She seeks to mediate between Universalists and Relativists by pointing out the misconceptions and misunderstandings surrounding “cultural relativism” (1985), and by providing an empirical basis for human rights. While she accepts cultural relativist descriptions of the world as made up of different cultures with divergent moral value systems, she paradoxically rejects the prescription of tolerance which conventionally results from such descriptions. Thus, Renteln undertakes (1990) an analysis of the various moral value systems around the world to see if there are general patterns of morality

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and justice which could possibly be integrated into a broadened, more grounded and informed universalism. In her attempt at integration of an empirical approach with universalism, she runs into two difficulties: the first has to do with the task of systematically documenting and reviewing the many different moral systems and worldviews. Too little empirical work has been done on the perception and conception of morality and justice worldwide (UNESCO, 1988). The second has to do with the obscurantism, reluctance, and at times downright cultural imperialism of UN policymakers and Western philosophers about human rights. Renteln (1990) argues that an expanded understanding of moral systems around the world is very much necessary to lend support to whatever “consensus” on human rights standards already exists, while advancing and advocating newer, more informed, better grounded standards. Such an understanding, she argues further, would allow us to know whether societies are indeed violating their own (internal) standards of right and wrong (as opposed to external ones). Such an assessment may prove doubly effective when combined with cross-culturally informed “universal” human rights standards. As she surveys the various worldviews cross-culturally, she notes that there is a remarkable diversity, and that human rights as such do not exist empirically. She claims however that there is 'only one ubiquitous' moral principle, and that is, “retribution tied to proportionality,” the punishment must be proportional to the gravity of the crime.27 One ancient expression of this principle is the Old Testament's “An eye for an eye, etc.” The first problem she confronts is a logical one: any move from prevalence to moral rightness is seriously objectionable, in that it would make a naive conflation of what is common with what is morally justifiable, i.e., of an “is” with an “ought”. Secondly, in her urge to present the “global evidence” for a single principle which supposedly underpins human rights standards, Renteln elides in the end the richness and detailed nature of empirical studies -which she rightly claims we need more of— and effaces the attitudes, perceptions, and practices invoked by social agents or actors in their local struggles, enmeshed as they are in complex power-relations. 27

One would have expected the Golden Rule (“do onto others what you have them do unto you”) to be the most ubiquitous and widely shared moral principle. Every culture or civilization seems to have enshrined such a principle in its fundamental tenets.

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Perhaps more damagingly, Renteln is caught on the horns of her own contradictory stance: she is a relativist who asserts the ethnocentric nature of any value judgments, yet who wants to formulate a universal conception of human rights through an empirical survey of local moral and justice systems. Arguably, if there is enough local evidence to formulate a universalistic foundation for human rights, then there must be enough evidence to dissolve fundamental claims of moral incommensurability. But is this truly the case? In sum, while I agree that the reality of the universality of human rights can be greatly enhanced by the marshaling of cross-cultural data and analyses, and Renteln should be commended for making a good effort in this direction (albeit problematic in many parts), I would argue, in accord with Jennifer Schirmer, that “the discussion of human rights must be further contextualized in two ways: in terms of the meanings of inner “cultural logics”, of the various “ways of world making” (Goodman, 1978), and in terms of power itself—between the powerful and the powerless.” For, These are issues that cannot be ignored in such an inter-dependent world in which “rights” (no matter how they are called or whose they are) are too often ignored altogether (1991: 149).

An-Na'im (1992) has also made an effort toward the formulation of “a cross-cultural approach” to human rights (1992: 1, 6), and his work deserves our attention and scrutiny. In his view, the goal of such an approach is to enhance the credibility of national and international human right standards by developing more effective ways to promoting and implementing those rights (1992: 1). While acknowledging that the ultimate theory of this approach is premature at the present stage, AnNa'im points out that “this theme has not yet received sufficient scholarly attention” (1992: 6). He therefore proposes that scholars from all parts of the world explore “the possibilities of cultural re-interpretation and reconstruction through internal cultural discourse and cross-cultural dialogue, as a means to enhancing the universal legitimacy of human rights” (1992: 3). As An-Na'im sees it however, the main difficulty of this kind of endeavor lies in the “cultural biases of various nations” and the “competing cultural perspectives which tend to undermine each other's priorities” (1992: 1). This proposal is appealing in many ways in that it seeks to promote greater mutual comprehension and dialogue, but, as with any such

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proposals, it is not easy to see how it can translate into a “bottom-up” approach, as An-Na'im wishes (1992: 7). The conceptualization and place accorded to “culture” seems to curb and dampen the initial promise of this cross-cultural approach. “Culture” seems once again to be an obstacle or something outside human beings, their thoughts, and their actions. But, as Preis correctly and emphatically points out, When culture is thus viewed as an externalized impediment to the struggle towards human rights, rather than as an integral part of the struggle itself, we are prevented from seeing the various contradictions, inconsistencies, and disagreements as culture—and perhaps the culture of human rights itself (1996: 295).

As a result, this cross-cultural proposal can easily lend itself to the charge of being “an idealistic, programmatic suggestion, characterized more than anything else, by self-evidence” and good intentions (Preis, 1996: 295). But as we know, the road to hell may well be paved with good intentions. If there was an easy solution to this kind of problem, we would not be dealing with the grave theoretical and practical implications of the cultural relativity of human rights. Would we?

3.4 Beyond Moral Universalism and Cultural Relativism Despite charges on the part of some governments of “cultural imperialism” in the implementation of international human rights standards and norms, a “human rights culture” is somehow emerging and gaining wider acceptance. It has even infiltrated the most remote areas of the world and been adopted at least in part by various people (in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America) to whom it was said to be “alien” and “meaningless”. It is simply no longer possible to live anywhere in the world, and not have regular encounters with bureaucratic agents or institutions of the nation-state. This is a part of the Western modem legacy which has been adopted unabashedly everywhere around world. It is because of the ever increasing potential and capability for violations of individual rights by such an institution and its agents that many protagonists to the debate insist on maintaining the Western concept of human rights. More and more people have also become increasingly aware of the role and potential impact of international organizations through a variety of venues, including direct or indirect contacts with and exposure to human

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rights activists, volunteers, and non-governmental organizations—such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc. As a result, the Universalist position seems to have gained some ground and been further consolidated. 28 Whereas the arguments of cultural relativists are increasingly undermined (de facto, as opposed to de jure) by the globalization of cultural, economic and political phenomena and by the emergence of what some have called the “the post-cultural, global world.” One major development in recent years makes this a greater potentiality than ever before; it is the extraordinary explosion in information and communication technologies (ICTs). A violation or transgression of human rights anywhere in the world is reported instantly and felt everywhere almost immediately. In this respect, the development of the World Wide Web and the Internet has played, and continues to play, a crucial role, whose real and long-lasting impact in terms of our institutions and practices is still to be assessed and measured properly. But some studies have already abundantly established its crucial role in what has been termed “the convergent revolutions” worldwide of the late 80searly 90s,29 which have brought about “democracy” and “human rights” to 28

Despite the positive role they have and can play in advancing the cause of human rights worldwide, we should not however hesitate to decry and even loudly criticize these activists and organizations, if need be, for their sometimes exacerbated ethnocentric tendencies, their sometimes misguided policies and behaviors in the countries in which they operate, and whenever their actions smack of a form of neo-colonialism, or to say the least, of “a missionary and paternalistic complex” in the name of “universal' human rights.” Similarly, and to emphasize a point made earlier, we should not hesitate to criticize the often inconsistent and hypocritical use of the “universality” of human rights of the US and its (Western) allies in the pursuit of their geo-political and economic interests (viz. Israel in Gaza, Libya vs. Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, or Saudi Arabia, etc.). 29 It is however important to keep in mind that: “revolutions” have occurred throughout our history, that they (may) occur only when certain historical, sociopolitical and economic conditions are met, and that people undertake them when they have had enough of a given established (dis)order deemed unjust and oppressive, that they do so by using whatever technological means they have at their disposal in order to communicate, coordinate, mobilize, and challenge the powers-that-be. Technologies by themselves do not make or bring about revolutions, while they may have a more or less effective role in facilitating communication, coordination, and mobilization; they do not have by themselves a causative role. However, as governments around the world become increasingly conscious of the subversive potential of the internet, we may expect that they will find increasingly sophisticated ways and means to undermine or neutralize it as much as possible—as long as they can do so without (appearing to be) violating

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many countries previously under repressive communist, fascist, or military regimes and dictatorships (Kedzie, 1997a & b; Leggewie, 1996).30 The socalled “Arab Spring” and the revolutions which have swept across North Africa and the Middle East in recent months (2011) illustrate more concretely the “human rights” potential of the internet. In each case, the nature of the confrontation between the people (the powerless) and their oppressive leaders (the powerful) has been radically altered simply by the mode of (re)presentation to a local and global audience, thereby revealing the power of the powerless and the weakness of the powerful. However, it must be stressed, “globalization” does not mean and should not necessarily be interpreted along the lines prescribed by a “diffusionist model” (often implicitly assumed or explicitly defended by some Universalists), whereby the “diffusion” is viewed as going one way from the so-called “center” (the West) to the “peripheries” (the rest of the world). In other words, globalization should not be equated with straightforward westernization, modernization, or standardization—for, in addition to various processes of homogenization and integration, it also implies diversity, multiplicity, and complexity, and a proliferation thereof. In fact, because a cultural form is global does not entail that everyone views, conceives of, or relates to it in the same way, nor should they be expected to. Its apprehension, conception, and interpretation are invariably “glocal” and will vary depending on local conditions and constraints as well as on the individual experiences of those concerned and their respective values. Globalization and the subsequently emerging “universality” (de facto) of human rights should be approached in terms of contexts, and requires therefore a contextual analysis, wherein the key (and always open) question ought to be: How to conceptualize the relationship between local/glocal and global discourses and practices? the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of expression of their citizens, or as long as they can justify their repressive measures by appealing to the “greater good,” “the good of the nation or the good of people,” or to the all-purpose need for greater security. In a recent book, The Net Delusion (2012), Morozov makes a powerful case for skepticism about the emancipatory or liberation potential of the internet, as well as about its uses and abuses by repressive or authoritarian states. 30 We should also mention the role played by the internet in earlier events such as the democracy movement in China, which has led to the brutal crackdown in Tiananmen Square (1989), as well as the insurrection movement of the Zapatistas led by Commandante Marcos in Chiapas, Mexico (1993).

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4. Towards a New Framework: Contextual, Dynamic, and Cross-Cultural I submit that it is not only possible to have contextualization without relativism,31 but that it is very likely that different contexts will remain connected and interlinked through a variety of global or trans-national, glocal or local processes in the foreseeable future. This being said, our efforts at interpreting human rights contextually or locally must be anchored in the experiences of the individuals or communities concerned, their histories, and the expressions of power relations between interest groups in their respective society. It should be stressed however that because an Arab, African, Hispanic, or Asian (individual or organization) uses the language of human rights against its government does not mean (nor should it) that human rights are being invoked in the traditional, Western, liberal sense of the term. To assume otherwise would be to blatantly disregard the degree to which the doctrine of human rights actually gets re-interpreted, re-worked, re-conceived and transformed in different contexts, whether the context is Western or nonWestern. Our task therefore should be to consider and study in greater details the degrees to which, and the ways in which a given people in a given society is (ready to be) engaged in a globalized culture of human rights, and open up to trans-cultural and trans-national processes. It should include a study of how human rights legal and moral concepts and categories frame, constrain, and shape local normative systems of morality and justice, and how they in turn oppose and resist trans-cultural and trans-national principles and values. It is rarely, if ever, a one-way process. In contrast to the dominant views on the subject, “human rights” are best conceived as “cultural practices,” and not as a concept defined from the Western standpoint on the basis of some human ontology. “Culture” is best viewed as an “open-ended, rhizomatic, convergent and divergent process” cross-cut, crisscrossed by various (local/glocal and global) influences, and affected by the actions and behaviors of human beings in specific and concrete contexts, often enmeshed in complex power31

To those who may be inclined to object that contextualism is just another name for relativism, I will simply point out that the former is mobilized only for a methodological reason, and not for the purpose of justification (as in the latter).

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relations—and not, once again, as a “bounded, unitary, and determinant entity” as many protagonists seem to assume. The ideas and practices concerning human rights are created by people in particular historical, social, and economic circumstances. And because power and power relations are a key aspect of, and embedded in, social relations, ideas and practices with respect to human rights can only be understood properly once their relation to particular forms and dimensions of power is fully grasped, and once we clearly accept the legitimacy of political and social demands generated in popular struggles and social movements that directly challenge the legitimacy of existing relations of power (Stammers, 1995:.488; 508). The notion of “human rights” implicated here is one that “enables, not disables, those whose voices are currently stifled by the dominant western discourses on human rights, both liberal and social democratic” (Stammers, 1995: 508). As for the notion of “power,” it is best understood [along the lines developed by Foucault (1980) and Steven Lukes (1977; 1991)] as being exercised (consciously or unconsciously) both by individual and collective social actors, and structurally through the patterning of practices, institutions, and social systems. It seems that a socially constructed concept such as human rights can never be put beyond context and power (Stammers, 1995: 508; italics added). A radical change or even something akin to a “paradigm shift” is arguably needed if we are to move forward in our discussions and our struggles for human rights.32 The new framework for understanding the variegated expressions of human rights should be based on appropriately defined and operationalized notions of “agency”/ “social actors or agents,” “power and power-relations,” and “cultural context.” Human rights would be viewed as “cultural practices” changing and developing over time under a variety of constraints and influences, both local/glocal and trans-national or global (including power-relations between national and international interest-groups). They would be viewed as involving real human beings, living and breathing social actors or agents in situated contexts, who are actively involved in constructing and re-constructing their understanding and practice of “human rights”, and of “the good life” in “a good society” without any “rigid” and “ossified” preconceptions as to what these notions are or should be. 32

Three efforts in that direction are worth mentioning: Long & Long (1992), Preis (1996), and Wilson (1997).

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With regards to the fundamental problem of reconciling respect for local conditions and contexts with the desire to see development, social change and progress in human rights take place in as many parts of the world as possible, all too often the models adopted or assumed are ones which see the impetus for change and progress as emanating from “centers of power” to various “parts on the periphery” in the form of strategic interventions by state interests or international organizations, and following some broadly defined “developmental or evolutionary path,” signposted by “phases or stages of development or evolution.” Such models are however seriously tainted by various problematic assumptions, i.e., naively determinist, linear, progressist, extemalist assumptions about “development” and “evolution”, and perhaps even by a paternalistic, neo-colonial, and Western-centric sense of superiority, not easily justifiable. While it may be true in some cases that certain important changes are brought about as a result of external forces, it is questionable whether theoretically our whole analysis of human rights should be based on the concept of external influence or determination. We must keep in mind that, All forms of external determination necessarily enter the existing lifeworlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by these same actors and structures (Long, 1992: 20).

For this reason among others, it must be stressed that the formulaic, linear, top-down or from center to periphery, forced applications and implementations of international human rights principles—whether it be in the guises of a diffusionist, developmental, progressist, or evolutionary model of social change- can lead to unintended consequences and actually harm the cause of developing sustainable human rights in a given area of the world. We may end up, as the title of an article on the international relief effort in Somalia in the 90s suggests, “Doing Harm by Doing Good” (de Waal & Omaar, 1993) - e.g., by developing and perpetuating dependencies of various kinds, by undermining the vitality and resourcefulness of local cultures and practices, by accentuating the demobilization and marginalization of local peoples and individuals who already feel left out, by “robbing” people of their “rights” to “selfdetermination”, to decide and shape their own destiny and welfare, at their own pace, as they see fit, etc.

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The role and activities of human rights and humanitarian organizations in various parts of the world (e.g., in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan, etc.--to mention only a few cases) need to be rethought in light of these kinds of considerations. While they can undoubtedly contribute in significant ways to the emergence of “an International Civil Society” (Otto, 1996), or even a “Global Civil Society” they can also cause tremendous damage to the cause even with the very best intentions—especially if they continue to function and operate under the wrongful assumptions of the models mentioned earlier. This is the main reason why, in addition to being contextual in the sense defined earlier, the approach advocated herein for the proper understanding of human rights must be dynamic, and must involve the interplay and mutual determination of both internal/local/glocal and external/global factors and conditions, and the fundamental recognition of the crucial role played by embodied human actors in situated contexts (see Essay # 7). It is unfortunate that much human rights theory today still clings to the rather naive and oversimplifying diffusionist, developmental, evolutionist model of the nature of the relationship between international human rights standards, their application or implementation, and outcomes. Such a model is to say the least suspect in that it fails to capture the complex and complicated processes underlying the actual re-interpretation or transformation of human rights during the implementation process. “There is no straight line from human rights policy to outcomes” (Long, 1992: 34). By looking at how power inhabits knowledge (and meaning-making activities), how it makes them possible, and by looking at how knowledge has been and can be an instrument of power—along the lines suggested by Michel Foucault (1980), we can easily come to see that human rights are above all the results of historical political struggles between individuals and interest groups. The human rights doctrine is in other words a set of politically motivated principles and values which orders and selects from “a surplus of signifiers”—to use Saussure's expression. This is not to say that representations and meanings do not matter in struggles over rights, quite to the contrary, since the ability to successfully carry out a struggle depends in part on the ideational and symbolic aspects (meanings, ideas, ideals, values, images, or representations) which shape the cohesiveness, direction and internal legitimacy of the project.

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Human rights discourse and action essentially involve a struggle over images of human rights and ‘the good society’ (Preis, 1996: 315).

Under this view, human rights are not founded on the eternal moral categories of Western philosophy, but are the results of concrete social and political struggles. They are embedded in local normative orders of morality and justice, but they are also caught up within webs or networks of power/knowledge alliances and meaning-making activities which extend beyond the local context. In this sense, the rights listed in the Universal Declaration and Covenants, i.e., the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, and even the still contested, yet emerging “third generations rights” are all claims for power by competing interest-groups, and such rights are continually transformed as the result of struggles over the political, symbolic, and economic resources within a given context. This proposal would be incomplete and deficient if we did not pay particular attention to the role and place of the modern state with regards to human rights. In some uncontroversial historical sense, human rights are the product of the rise of the modem nation-state, and a checkered legacy of nationalism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, post-colonialism, and global imperialism. Interestingly enough, the modem nation-state is the one legacy of the colonial West that has been adopted without residual resentment by almost every society in the world. The emergence of sophisticated apparatuses and technologies of control and repression, mass-violence and torture along with a highly individualistic political-economy created the conditions in which human rights became not only possible, but necessary. In short, human rights are both a product of, and a response to, the rise the modern nation-slate. So, our approach must also therefore focus on how the technologies of state repression, violence, and even terror as well as the more disciplinary and bureaucratized forms of' coercion and control, frame the global and local/glocal expressions of human rights. In the end, it cannot be emphasized enough, we must situate human rights within a multiplicity of power-relations at both the local/glocal and global levels, and seek to explore how, as a theory/practice, they are materialized, interpreted, re-interpreted, appropriated and re-appropriated, accepted or resisted, and transformed in a variety of contexts, lf we wish to address and clarify the relationship between the theory and practice of human rights, without resorting to the old and bankrupt tricks of

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traditional foundationalist philosophy (in the Kantian tradition), then we must examine the various cultural constructions of human rights in the lives of real human beings acting and interacting in situated contexts.

5. Conclusion The theory which emerges ultimately from this discussion is that human rights are “cultural practices” always “at work,” in the process of constituting, reconstituting and reformulating themselves. In the global, post-modern, post-cultural, post-philosophical, post- Cold War world of ours, the issue should no longer be “whether human rights are universal or relative, applicable or inapplicable, transferable or non-transferable” (Preis, 1996: 310). We are now confronted de facto, by virtue of historically contingent developments, with a situation where human rights constitute a significant part of the multiple and multi-directional cultural flows between all countries around the world (East/West, North/South). “Cultures” are no longer bounded, confined entities with definite moorings in a delineated space-time. People, along with cultural products, practices, ideas and ideals are refusing to be confined by geography, national or cultural boundaries. The lines between “us” and “them” are more than ever blurred. This may bode well for the emergence of a “we”—which Rorty (1989) speaks of, as the ironic expression of our solidarity, in the face of cosmic and historical contingency—- which would enable us to talk about ourselves as the enlightened human beings, no longer mere human beings, inhabiting planet Earth at this point in history. In this context, as Preis so aptly puts it, “the question of the relevance or irrelevance of human rights has become strictly irrelevant” (1996: 310). Admittedly then, we are now part of a “human rights culture”—as Rorty along with Rabossi pointed out. Human rights are “universal” as values, as ideological vehicles, and as “surpluses of signifiers' in action appropriated differently by different constituencies for different purposes—depending on the context. But this does not entail that the crucial and most important question has been finally answered, namely, whether our “global village” is progressing and moving forward in a straight and unequivocal direction toward the full realization of universal respect for human rights. Paradoxically, an inverse proportionality law can here be formulated: “The celebration of human rights is always inversely proportionate to the extent of human rights abuses” (Preis, 1996: 310).

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In view of this state of affairs, we must redouble our efforts, renew and refocus our analytical resources in order to enlarge and expand the understanding of the contemporary globalized/glocalized conditions of cultural complexity, in which human rights enter as both a defining, and a defined set of values and goals. One good place to start, I would like to argue in closing, is to identify and adopt fruitful and perspicuous proposals in order to explore how, when, and why human rights become (or not) invested with meaning and significance in various cultural contexts. The framework advocated herein, based essentially on the idea of human rights as “cultural practices,” along with the need for more detailed empirical and cross-cultural case-studies carried out in an interdisciplinary and comparative manner is, I submit, one of such proposals.

5.1 The Future of Human Rights—Prospects and Problems Lest we forget, the concept of human rights came into prominence rather suddenly, and its widespread use around the world grew rapidly; it could conceivably fade away and disappear from the political landscape and discourse just as quickly as it appeared. That is in part what history teaches us. As Nickel puts it, “the question posed is whether attention to human rights within domestic and international politics is merely a transient phenomenon, a fad, without deep and enduring roots” (1987: 177), or whether it is more than that. If it is the latter, then how are we to understand it and uphold it for future generations? For, what is at stake is our humanity, our future, and perhaps even our survival as a species entrusted with temporary custody and care of planet Earth. Nickel's answer is, I think, most appropriate. He writes: If the acceptance of human rights is to be maintained and increased around the world in the years ahead, the plausibility of the social and political vision they convey will be crucial. The Universal Declaration's vision of human societies without oppression or unmet basic needs has proved attractive over the last several decades. The Declaration's rights are demanding, however, and they raise questions of coherence and feasibility. These rights can conflict with each other, and complying with all of them is a difficult matter in many (most) countries. They both limit the freedom of governments to proceed as they wish and entail substantial implementation costs (1987: 171).

How can we best address the plausibility of the social and political vision, and the problems of coherence and feasibility of human rights, if

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not contextually, in a dynamic manner, and cross-culturally—that is, by adopting and adapting once more the approach advocated herein?

6. Appendix—Case-Studies: From Abstract Concepts & Principles to Concrete, Multi-dimensional and Multi-vocal Contexts In order to further strengthen the case for the approach advocated herein, I would like to consider a few case-studies which could serve to illustrate some of its fundamental assumptions, features, and tenets. I will discuss briefly the accounts provided by various authors on cases of interest in various parts of the world: Latin America, Africa, and the US. [For more details, see Wilson (1997) and Preis (1993, 1996)]. These are: the Guatemalan Cases (Richard Wilson, Jennifer Schirmer, and David Stoll); the Mexican Case (John Gledhill); the Hawaiian Case (Sally Engle Merry); the Mauritius Case (Thomas Hylland Eriksen); and finally, the Botswana Cases (Ann-Belinda Preis). Obviously, many more cases could have been considered and examined as well. It is hoped however that the discussion below of the cases selected for my present purposes will provide some insights which can easily be extended and applied to other cases, including more recent ones.

6.1 The Guatemalan Cases Three cases will be discussed under this heading: those examined by Wilson, Schirmer, and Stoll. 6.1.1 Two Murder Cases Richard Wilson (1997) looks into the genre of human rights reporting by investigating two murder cases in Guatemala: those of anthropologist Myrna Mack Chang, and the local politician Waldemar Caal Rossi. [A news report came out on April 28, 1998 about the alleged murder of Juan Gerardi Conedera, a catholic Bishop and human rights activist in Guatemala, which illustrates perfectly the point of Wilson's study].

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Human-rights Reporting operates implicitly or explicitly within a framework, with a particular set of legal criteria of truth, objectivity, facticity, and evidence, as well as under certain implicit assumptions about the distinction between criminal and state violence and about the kind of individual (victim) who is likely to be subjected to human rights violations. Events are somehow viewed, classified and categorized according to a template that fits all, and represented within a realist, objectivist and legalist language. This objectivist language and legal case method, Wilson argues, has however serious implications. If one pays attention for example to the local discussions and narratives about the murder of Rossi, we come to see how existing forms of human rights reporting fail to capture the multiplicity of perspectives on political violence emanating from the people involved, and therefore, engage even unwittingly in a process of de-contextualization. Human rights reports seem to impose meaning and coherence on messy, chaotic and indeterminate events in order to create discretely packaged bits of information good for global consumption. The reporting on Myrna Mack's murder shows how the subjectivity of author and victim, and their social circumstances are excluded in order to cultivate and promote an aura of authority, neutrality, and legitimacy. In short, Wilson argues for a greater variety, and for more contextual, forms of writing and reporting on human rights. 6.1.2 Dissolution of the Special Tribunals Jennifer Schirmer (1997) considers the circumstances surrounding the operation and dissolution of the Special Tribunals in Guatemala during 1982-3, which were established by General Rios Monte in the aftermath of a coup in March 1982 which brought him to power. Those Tribunals were special courts which combined elements of emergency counter-insurgency measures with more traditional elements of the country's legal system. They operated in secret and were run by appointed judges who had the power to impose the death penalty (16 men were executed by firing squad as a result). “Suspects” who appeared before them were deprived of even the semblance of meaningful legal representation and due process, and a number of them had been “disappeared”, as the expression goes, for months and tortured. The Tribunals converted suspects into “subversive guerillas and revolutionaries,” publicly pronounced guilty by army ministers even before their “trials” began.

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As can be expected, the international human rights community, including the Inter- American Court of Human Rights, campaigned vigorously to have these Tribunals abolished and in the end succeeded. In contrast, strange as this sounds, for many local human rights lawyers, this represented from their perspective a further deterioration of the rule of law in Guatemala. After the dissolution of the Special Tribunals, 112 prisoners were extra-judicially executed by the army upon their release; 400 sentences were transferred to the Supreme Court. According to local human rights activists, this further confused the situation by the even greater inter-mingling of the traditional rule of law with the kinds of clandestine and unlawful emergency procedures which had virtually cancelled the right to due process in the Tribunals. What had thus been created was a “legal lagoon,” in the words of a Guatemalan lawyer, where lawyers could no longer figure out which legal code was being used, and when—traditional or counter-insurgency, or a mixture thereof? From the point of view of the international community, their demands to see certain clandestine and unlawful practices end have been met, but from the point of view of the local human rights community, the same practices which undermined the role of law within the Tribunals have now been extended and further instituted within the formal legal system. In this context, Schirmer considers wider and more serious questions about how the formulaic, or mechanical, top-down, center/periphery application and implementation of so-called “universal” principles of human rights without a proper sense or understanding of the context in which they applied or implemented may actually hinder the development of sustainable rights in the long run. She concludes that human rights strategies would be better informed by an analysis of contingent, historical forms of legal principles and regulations, and the actions and intentions of local actors, rather than by Western liberal ideals of justice and rights formulated out of context from an arrogantly and self-righteously occupied position, often smacking of a suspect paternalism. 6.1.3 Role of Foreign Human Rights Activists David Stoll (1997) examines the role of foreign human rights activists, or internacionalistas, as they are called, in two local land disputes in the Ixil area of Guatemala. Human right activists went to Guatemala in numbers in the early 90s, and directly confronted the power of the Army upon their arrival, so as to open up and enlarge the cultural space for

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human rights in this country. They began by publicizing human rights cases, exhuming clandestine cemeteries, and acting as “human shields” to protect refugees returning from Mexico to their respective communities. In their dealings with the local populations, human rights activists found themselves caught up in the middle of long-standing as well as newly created tensions and conflicts among peasants, particularly over land rights. The activists' assumptions however were that social conflicts are reducible to dichotomies such as “victim vs. victimizer” or “the Army vs. the People.” These simplistic assumptions had serious implications on the ground for how they “inserted themselves” into local disputes and conflicts, and in fact “subverted” them. In the Ixil-speaking municipality of Chajul, refugees claim ownership of the fertile lands to which they fled during the counter-insurgency repression sweeps of the early 80s. They organized into the Communities of the Population in Resistance (CPRs), and received considerable support from foreign human rights activists. The activists placed their claims over those of other Ixils from Chajul, the K'iche, who fanned these same lands before the civil war and now want to return to the lands that they were forced to flee. In the late 80s, when the war abated, the dispute flared anew, this time with the Guatemalan Army backing the lxils of Chajul and the human rights activists supporting the K' iche's. Eventually, the human rights activists helped the K'iche reoccupy the land and take the dispute to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, DC. According to Stoll, the intervention of human rights activists in this local land dispute “verticalized” and “re-localized” it in the global legal arena, and in so doing, radically transformed it from its original local expression. It may have even contributed to the official sanction of rights violations against some of the people involved.

6.2 The Mexican Case According to John Gledhill (1997), socio-economic rights must be contextualized in reference to the forms of regulation and capitalist property relations in which liberal political institutions are embedded. He examines the works of liberal and libertarian thinkers such Locke, Mill and Hayek, and charts the rise of possessive individualistic discourse and the emergence of “natural law” principles and rights-based states, where individual rights transcend and even pre-date society. He then considers

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the work of John Rawls, and in particular, his assertions that political liberalism must embrace the “difference principle” for an authentic pluralism to emerge. The difference principle states that: “All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases for self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to everyone's advantage.” In other words, if there are to be any social and economic inequalities, then they “are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971: 62; 83). Gledhill's critique of Rawls operates at many different levels, but for our present purposes, it shall suffice to note that his main critical point is to question the degree to which liberalism (in the post-welfare US) can create a consensus within the body politic for the withdrawal of the state's responsibility to protect “basic rights” (the very bases for self-respect), and how disputes over rights may involve collective, or community-based as well as individualistic considerations. He contextualizes his discussion by considering the negotiations between the Mexican government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Indigenous rights politics (informing EZLN doctrine) calls for a “multicultural society”, the recognition of collective rights (i.e., land and mining rights), and political autonomy. It offers a different vision of the “common good” and “the good society” which results in a clash between individualistic and collective or community-based premises for rights, society, and liberty. Gledhill argues against the attribution of distinctive rights on the basis of an “indigenous identity”, because, he says, both victimhood and culture are fixed once they are granted a legal status. Further, he adds, neo-liberal states make space for “identity politics” if only to regulate and normalize dissent. And yet, at the same time, he can but recognize that indigenous politics in Mexico and elsewhere is such that it does seriously contest and threaten neo-liberalism and “disciplinarybureaucratic regimes” by advocating non-individualistic discourses and practices of entitlements and rights predicated upon a different moral political economy.

6.3 The Hawaiian Case Sally Engle Merry (1997) provides a close examination of the ways in which an indigenous rights movement in Hawaii used the Western legal

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framework of human rights for their own purposes. She shows how this movement operated at three levels at the same time: global human rights, national law, and local law, and thus exemplified the process of legal globalization and vernacularization, whereby Western law is deployed and reconfigured, in both local and global terms, i.e., in plural terms. She claims that such transnational cultural appropriations are fundamentally creative and represent various forms of resistance to global homogenization. Legal hybridization and vemacularization are part and parcel of the emergence of new national identities. Merry's case-study provides details about the appropriation and reinterpretation of international law by the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement at the People's International Tribunal of Native Hawaiians in 1993. Such a tribunal was formed to conduct a criminal trial, with the US government indicted on 9 charges. Much of its authority and legitimacy was based on the symbolic power of law recommending the return of Kanaka Maoli land and water rights, and political sovereignty to the Kanaka Maoli people. From a legal point of view, the tribunal provided a framework based on diverse sources in order to express the aspirations and claims of an emergent nationalism. Thus it was based on notions of descent, culture, tradition, but it also used and appealed to the language of sovereignty, citizenship and constitutionalism This case shows that the law is itself a site of contestation and protest, where even the hegemony of the state or federal law may be undermined from a plurality of perspectives and points of view from within and without the traditional legal framework.

6.4 The Mauritius Case In order to explore some of the contradictions between multiculturalists’ ideas and individual human rights, Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1997) examines the debates and practices around these issues in Mauritius. Essentially, he argues that the dual origin of nationalism in both the Enlightenment and Romantic thought created a tension, perhaps even a contradiction, between “the right to be equal” and “the right to be different”—which has since been exacerbated and brought to the surface by the increasingly poly-ethnic and multi-cultural character of societies around the world. According to Eriksen, all modem societies are now “multicultural”, and “multicultural politics” are universalistic in the way they operate. But while some versions of multiculturalism are compatible

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with human rights, others are not. The reason why multiculturalism is universalistic is that differences between people are the result of closer relationships which engender comparability and similarity. In this sense, “cultural uniqueness” implies a shared subscription to a global political discourse and practice. Eriksen illustrates these points by focusing on the conflicts surrounding discrimination on the basis of religion in private schools and the application of “state and customary law” to divorce among Muslims. Concerning the place of customary Muslim family law in divorce, it became apparent that the disparity in perspectives between younger female and older male Muslims belied any multiculturalists’ claim that “cultures” (as bounded and unified) have a single set of discrete “values”. Another multicultural paradox emerges, claims Eriksen, by virtue of the conflict between collectivist notions of cultural identity and notions of personal autonomy and personal identity inherent in human rights. In the present ideological context of neo-romanticism and hybridization, one must also have the right not to have an ethnic identity. In Eriksen's view, if multiculturalism is to co-exist with individual human rights, it must include a “dialogic principle” in political discourse and communication, as well as being tied to what people have in common, politically and economically, and in terms of shared meanings.

6.5 The Botswana Cases Both cases are based upon the work done by Preis (1993; 1996). 6.5.1 Women's Rights in Botswana Preis (1996) focuses on a crucial battle for women's rights in Africa, and in particular in Botswana, which unfolded in the early 90s. It concerns the highly-publicized court case, known as Unity Dow v. State of Botswana, in which, for the first time in the history of the country, a woman was challenging the government in court. The case has its origins in the Citizenship Act of 1984, amended by the government in order to restrict the categories of persons who could become citizens through birth or descent. While Section 4 of the Act stipulated that children born to Botswana women married to foreigners no

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longer had the right of Botswana citizenship by virtue of their birth there, Section 5 dealt with citizenship by descent, and prevented Botswana women married to foreign men from passing on Botswana citizenship to their children. Under the amended Act, only unwed Botswana women who gave birth to children of foreigners, and all Botswana men even those with foreign wives, were granted citizenship. Unity Dow is a prominent lawyer, leading member of a feminist organization, and a participant in the Women and Law Southern Africa Research Project, married to a US citizen (prior to 1984), with three children, two of whom were born in Botswana after 1984, and therefore affected by the Amended Act. They could not be citizens of Botswana even though they were born there, lived all of their lives there, and their mother is a Botswana citizen. In November 1990, Unity Dow decided to take her case to court to challenge the Amended Act (esp. sections 4 and 5). Essentially, she argued that her children were denied citizenship because her husband was a non-citizen. She also argued that if it were a man married to a foreign wife, his children would have been granted citizenship under the Act. So, she contended that her rights as a woman guaranteed presumably under the Botswana Constitution were violated. From the start, the case was viewed as a test-case, which could set precedent on behalf of all women in Africa. It was therefore extremely controversial within and outside Botswana. When the Judge under tremendous pressure presiding over this case rendered his opinion in June 1991, difficult as it was, in favor of Unity Dow, although few expected it, the polarized reactions were immediate and loud from various quarters. While many prominent women and men of Botswana rejoiced and welcomed this decision as a “breakthrough”, as another “defeat of sexism, discrimination and feudalism”, and as one more victory for “truth” and “women's rights” everywhere, many others viewed it as a frontal attack on their traditional beliefs, institutions and cultural values. “Traditional chiefs can now be challenged and upstaged by their eldest sisters” (Preis, 1996: 304) -some pointed out disapprovingly. Some government ministers even read it as “causing” a “big constitutional crisis” and vowed to appeal the decision, comes what may. Others began working behind the scenes to engineer a constitutional amendment which would legalize sex discrimination.

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But things did necessarily evolve as either party thought they would or should. Intruding into this conflictual, highly polarized local debate and struggle were global factors, e.g., the forthcoming Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, where the President of Botswana, which has been referred to as “Africa's success story” “shining star of democracy in Africa”, was heading up the Botswana delegation. Shortly before the Conference, the Citizen Act was changed to conform to the Judge's decision in this case. And Unity Dow's children became citizens of Botswana. This case considered by many to be “the most important event in Botswana since independence” deals clearly with the antagonism between “cultural values” and “rights” commonly found in human rights debates. It has many parallels or equivalents in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere in the world, where numerous women's organizations, movements, and networks have been fighting to place women's rights high and square on the continental and international agenda (Preis, 1996: 305). It clearly shows how “concepts such as cultural relativity.., are happily adopted by those who control the state” (Donnelly & Rhoda, 1987: 20). Nevertheless, if we were to reduce this rich and complex case to the antagonism between cultural relativity and universalism, we would be simplifying and trivializing it. As Preis puts it, “Much more is happening here than the legal category of constitutional sex discrimination or the ‘accountability’ versus ‘empowerment’ model of human rights struggles is capable of revealing” (1996: 305). Here are some of the other considerations that we could make. There is no Botswana culture -as a unitary, homogeneous and bounded whole to which human rights may apply. The culture is vehemently contested, fragmented, negotiated, and debated, and in the process, “creolized,” and “hybridized.” “This suggests, Preis writes, that the numerous disagreements and conflicts within this debate are not simply unpleasant, external disturbances to an otherwise stable ‘Botswana culture’, but rather, constitutive of it. Disagreement and conflict are culture, and in this particular case, the culture of human rights” (1996: 305; italics added). In this sense, the culture of human rights is an “ongoing debate” which is multi-vocal, “speaking, as it does, many different tongues” from a variety of perspectives, and multidimensional, in that it involves both local/internal/glocal and global/external factors.

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Furthermore, power/knowledge was clearly involved in the arduous negotiation process through which the human rights culture in Botswana emerged. Various discursive forms and positions were adopted and manipulated by various actors in specific contexts as they pursued their respective goals. While new and novel discursive forms did emerge in the process, one must admit that stereotypical and unproductive forms abounded: for example, Botswana feminists demonizing the “patriarchal system” of Botswana, with the help of their Western sisters, while government officials assumed that the “traditional subservience” of African women will help them win and set the country back on the right path. 6.5.2 Democracy and Human Rights from within and without Finally, while we are still on the Botswana case, let us consider how this country's record on human rights is seen from “inside” and “outside”. This case is interesting because of what it further reveals about the “human rights culture” in general. In Western newspapers and other media, in the reports of various human rights organizations, (and probably in the views of some Botswana men and women as well who are exposed to such sources of information), Botswana is typically depicted as “unique,” “Africa's success story,” a “shining star of democracy,” with a surprisingly good human rights record (for an African, and a Developing country, from a global point of view). Its economic performance in the past two or three decades made it “one of the fastest growing economies in Africa” with “one of the highest growth rates in the world.” It is certainly the case that Botswana, unlike many of its African neighbors, can boast of many achievements in the economic and political spheres. On the latter front, Botswana has had a multiparty electoral system since independence, with actual, free, open, and truly competitive elections held since at regular intervals as stipulated by the Botswana Constitution; a parliamentary system with protection of individual rights, freedom of association, of the press, and an independent judiciary with the rule of law. And perhaps most remarkably, Botswana can boast of not having any political prisoners—at least according to “official” reports. But on the other hand, there is the story from the “inside” told by some of Botswana most prominent intellectuals, scholars and lawyers.

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Botswana's case and record is not viewed in the proper framework, they argue, because it is compared to other nation-states in Africa and in the Third World. Comparatively, Botswana becomes an exception, a model to emulate, etc. But if one takes a closer look, and consider Botswana on its own terms, so to speak, we may not be as enthusiastic and positive as many Western observers want us to believe. In the same breathe, they then mention instances of grave and serious violations of some the supposedly protected rights, i.e. the right of assembly, due process, freedom of expression, and the uses and political abuses of the death penalty, etc.

6.6 Closing Remarks What this case (like the others) reveals is not only “that there is disagreement about a country's human right performance, but that the culture of human rights (its meanings, practices, and symbols) does not present itself neutrally or with one voice. This is probably the most ‘universal’ characteristic of human rights” (Preis, 1996: 309; italics added) Perhaps most importantly however is the fact that the reality of “human rights” is culturally constructed, by both local/internal/glocal and global/external forces, involving both observers and the observed, insiders and outsiders, and even the present writer and researcher. While this last point was suggested earlier in an implicit manner, it need to be stressed now and made even more explicit. As a thinker and writer on the issue of human rights, I am myself implicated and involved in the theoretical and methodological stakes of the debate, and I can therefore claim no privileged position, no special or absolute perspective, and no final recounting or account (see Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979: 56). “There is simply no objective position from which human rights can truly be ‘measured’” (Preis, 1996: 309). This ought to give pause, and constitute a serious challenge to the current practice of putting together “human rights records” on various states by organizations, such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, Human right Watch, or by the US State Department, because such reports are always partial, politically motivated, committed, incomplete, even while claiming the mantel of “impartiality” and “objectivity”. But if, in addition, as suggested from the start of this project in the discussion of the “overall crisis in the social sciences,” traditional conceptions and standards of “observation,” “objective distance,” and even

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“scientific objectivity” are problematic, the possibility for human rights studies to have “objects” (of study) in the traditional scientific sense is itself in question in a particularly poignant way. Insofar as we can no longer stand outside, looking at, observing, objectifying a given already constituted human rights reality, (since we are always already involved and engaged with it and thereby affecting and transforming it), we are better off coming to grips with the fact that the human rights reality is constructed by the people involved with it, and interacting with one another, and to that extent, still “an evolving reality” which resist any final and complete summary at this juncture of history.

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ESSAY # 8 ON JUSTICE IN A GLOBALIZING AND GLOCALIZING WORLD: IN DEFENSE OF “COSMOPOLITAN PLURALISM”

We don’t live in a just world. This may be the least controversial claim one could make in political theory. But it is much less clear what, if anything, justice on a world scale might mean, or what the hope for justice should lead us to want in the domain of international or global institutions, and in the policies of states that are in a position to affect the world order. By comparison with the perplexing and undeveloped state of this subject, domestic political theory is very well understood, with multiple highly developed theories offering alternative solutions to well-defined problems. By contrast, concepts and theories of global justice are in the early stages of formation, and it is not clear what the main questions are, let alone the main possible answers. I believe that the need for workable ideas about the global or international case presents political theory with its most important current task, and even perhaps with the opportunity to make a practical contribution in the long run, though perhaps only in the very long run (Nagel, 2005: 113).

1. The Fundamental Dilemma of Liberalism “All human beings are entitled to equal moral consideration simply by virtue of being human.” Should such a principle be applied merely to people within the confines of a state or nation-state? Or can and should it be extended to the world’s population at large? This is, I believe, succinctly put, the main problem confronting moral and political philosophy at this juncture of our history. The principle above expresses what is arguably the highest and noblest of all possible values, and its formulation attests, at least in principle, to the (rational) “maturity” (Kant) that human beings have reached as a result

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of the Enlightenment’s legacy.1 It serves to underwrite and give meaning to the very concept of “human rights.” As is well-known, it also captures basically the moral egalitarianism (or moral universalism) characteristic of liberalism—as a philosophical and political doctrine. Even though liberal philosophers may disagree about the nature and scope of the moral considerations 2 that such a principle entails, they converge in the belief that it is anathema to allow justice to rest upon morally irrelevant differences between individual humans. Nothing which is a matter of luck (or rather lack thereof) 3 can serve as a basis for justifying differential or unequal treatment. The revolutionary dimension of liberalism (as it enshrined such a view) is to be located precisely in its requirement of impartiality with regards to human beings, regardless of class, race, gender, religious creed, health condition, and one might add, birthplace, residency, nationality, or citizenship. 4 Consistently with the moral requirement of impartiality, all of these possible sources of differences between people must be deemed arbitrary, historically contingent, and therefore morally irrelevant. And yet, the egalitarian and impartial guarantees of liberalism were traditionally applied only within the confines of a state or country. Indeed, as Nagel points out (2005), our best worked-out liberal theories of justice have been for the most part concerned with that small subset of humanity which shares birthplace, residency, nationality, or citizenship within a given state, and do not extend to the entire population of the world. But the question must be raised and addressed: Aren’t birthplace, residency, nationality, or citizenship as morally arbitrary, and therefore irrelevant for the purpose of

1

Without suggesting that the Enlightenment was one and its legacy somehow unitary and undivided, I believe nevertheless that such a claim can be defended. 2 Naturally such a distinction can serve generally speaking to demarcate the positions of political philosophers of various stripes, but as we shall see below, it comes into play particularly between the protagonists to be discussed in the present context. 3 According to the doctrine of luck egalitarianism, a person should not be worse off than anyone else, in respect of some given metric or currency of goods, as a result of brute bad luck. It has proved to be very influential in recent times among political philosophers, most notably, Gerald Dworkin, G.A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer. See Elizabeth Anderson (1999) for a critique of this point of view; see also Arneson (2000) for a reply to Anderson’s objections. 4 But whether these different considerations are all of the same order and category morally speaking is in part what is at stake between the various protagonists to the debate on the consistency of liberalism, and therefore, what divides them.

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justice, as race or gender?5 After all, none of us freely choose6 our parents or our place of birth. State boundaries do not merely separate one territorial jurisdiction from another, but often the rich from the poor. Being born on the right (or left) side of a boundary—an arbitrary line—often means literally the difference between life and death, or in any case, between a well-off life and one of deprivation (in absolute terms). Allowing justice to be based upon such fortuitous and arbitrary considerations strikes at the very heart of liberalism, its impartial egalitarianism and moral universalism. The question of whether and how to extend liberalism (as a moral and political philosophy) to the international or global realm brings up what seems to be a basic contradiction in how it ought to understand itself. We might characterize it as constituting the fundamental dilemma of liberalism. How should (liberal) political philosophers understand the moral status of states, nation-states, or national boundaries when dealing with international justice, or should I say, indiscriminately, with global justice?7 And how should we conceive of justice, if it can be done at all, in the international or global context as opposed to the national or domestic context—assuming, of course, these are the only contexts worth considering? “Most philosophers who deal with the question of global justice fall into one of two groups: either they deny the applicability of any conception of (distributive) justice at the global level, and are content with a simple refurbishment of the traditional Law of Peoples (the statists—e.g., Rawls), or else they seek to apply at the global level the same method and the same principles as apply at the domestic level (the globalists—e.g., Beitz and Pogge)” [(Chauvier, 2001: 91; parentheses added)]. For the latter, “the global context is the primary context of justice, and other, more 5 According to Thomas Pogge, “nationality is just one further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are inescapable and present from birth” (Pogge, 1989: 247). And as Joseph Carens puts it, they seem to place an almost feudal notion of birthright privilege back into the heart of liberal theory (Carens, 1992). 6 I am here making the assumption commonly made by contemporary philosophers, i.e., that moral considerations and judgments have force only if agents have freely chosen to act or live in a particular way and are therefore responsible for their choices. 7 By putting things this way, I am obviously suggesting from the start that it may be necessary to make a distinction between these two notions, contrary to what is commonly and loosely assumed.

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local contexts can only be legitimate once the first one is well-ordered.” As for the former, they “do not deny that there are relevant justice claims in the international sphere. They merely argue that their scope must be restricted and that upholding merely an updated version of the traditional ius gentium (law of peoples) would suffice—provided some modest provisions are made for socio-economic justice (Forst, 2001b: 169-70). Rawls’ Law of the Peoples (1993/1999a) is here, of course, the main reference. It is referred to as “the most recent elaborate (and in a sense paradigmatic) normative theory in that respect” (2001b: 170n2). The main justification for this restriction is that, with respect to political and distributive justice, the globe is not the primary context of justice. In contrast to the ‘thick’ context of domestic justice, the international context is merely a secondary one, and a ‘thin’ one” at that (Forst, 2001a; Walzer, 1994). Rawls’ view is considered (by his sympathizers and critics alike)8 as the most elaborate and sophisticated (yet unsuccessful) recent effort at articulating a theory of international justice which in some sense could be viewed as seeking to accommodate most of the claims of statistsparticularists-partialists-cultural perfectionists-nationalists (liberal or nonliberal) while at same time making a gesture toward (liberal) socioeconomic justice beyond the national or domestic sphere—without however adopting a more egalitarian, cosmopolitan point of view, which is deemed to be too unreasonable, objectionable and unjustifiable. For this reason, I believe, therefore, that the most significant confrontation to focus on, for the purpose of advancing the debate, is that between Rawls and his most ardent critics, namely, the so-called “Rawlsian cosmopolitans” (e.g., Beitz and Pogge).9 In passing however, it would also serve our present purpose to consider and discuss the views of those who defend some form of nationalism, partialism or particularism. After some discussion of the relative merits and problems of different approaches to the problem—depending on what one considers to be the central question or main point of contention, I undertake a brief examination of the reasons why, in my view, these different proposals have failed to satisfactorily resolve or dissolve the dilemma of liberalism.

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See for example Forst (2001b: 170n2), Wenar (2001: 84), and Tamir (1993: 120). Even though, as of late, one could argue that Pogge is no longer “an unqualified supporter of the Rawlsian approach” (see Wenar, 2001: 81). 9

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Next, I attempt to motivate and sketch out briefly some of the main tenets and distinctive features of an alternative view that I call in short “cosmopolitan pluralism” 10 situated between or beyond the two main contending views—those of Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics. I contend that it will countenance the moral or normative component of liberal cosmopolitanism while at same time paying due and proper consideration to the political, cultural and moral pluralism that is an incontrovertible feature of our world—and that any adequate political theory of justice must in my view acknowledge and countenance, 11 without however sacrificing or compromising unduly some of our highest and noblest normative ideals and values.12 According to the adequacy criterion for political theory formulated by Rawls for his own purposes, and that is, the criterion of “realistic utopia,” a judicious and justifiable balance between these two kinds of considerations is required. In other words, a political theory to be adequate must be utopian, yet realistic—or realistic, yet utopian. In this sense, we might say, to use Rawls’ apt terminology, that it should be “realistically utopian.”13 Rawls sets up the criterion in The Law of Peoples as follows: Political philosophy is “realistically utopian,” he writes, “when it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility, and in so doing reconciles us to our political and social condition” (1999a: 11; italics added). 10 In due course, I will attempt to characterize my position more fully. I believe that its distinctiveness can be defended, but whether it can serve to solve or dissolve the dilemma of liberalism is a question that is best left to the readers and critics to judge. 11 Too often, as Onora O’Neill noted in other contexts (1988, 1996), moral and political philosophers fail to strike a judicious balance between two desirable consideration, “idealization” and “abstraction,” and as a result, they often put forth theories that fail to meet the minimal adequacy requirements. If we may consider the former to consist in “adding in too much” of the ideal considerations so as to make the best possible case for our theories, then the latter may be said to consist in “leaving out too much” of the relevant, real-life, and non-ideal conditions. Chauvier, for example, chooses to bracket or leave aside the complexity that such a move (i.e., countenancing cultural and moral pluralism) would entail (2001: 91). 12 The challenge taken up here is arguably one of the most difficult that we must face in political philosophy today (see in this regard Nagel, 2005: 113). 13 I will use Rawls’ adequacy criterion so as to determine whether a particular political theory is more inclined toward the realistic end of the spectrum as opposed to the utopian end, or whether (in the best possible case), it strikes a virtuous or judicious balance between these two kinds of desirable considerations.

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In the end, I argue that “cosmopolitan pluralism” is not only morally compelling and utopian enough, but politically realistic as well (without being overly compromised by excessive accommodation of the current international reality), while avoiding the most serious pitfalls of both of the main contending views in political philosophy today.

2. Nationalism, Political Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism The problem of international or global justice is admittedly a very difficult problem for political philosophy for the reasons mentioned earlier, but most importantly, because it requires that our moral idealism be judiciously tempered by a healthy and proper dose of political realism. Our theoretical proposals in this area must be evaluated and tested not only in terms of their logical or moral validity, but in terms of their degree of practicability and feasibility in the real world as we know it—while at the same time, I would add, not succumbing in a servile and obedient manner to all of its dictates and limitations, esp., on the moral front. The question that we must then consider is this: how do the proposals discussed above fare on this score, or criterion? More specifically, how well do they each enable us to understand the moral status of national boundaries, and adjudicate between our moral obligations to our fellownationals or citizens and those we owe our fellow-human beings anywhere in the world—esp., those needy and worst-off?

2.1 Alternative Approaches: Context of Justice vs. Primary Object of Moral Concern There are surely different ways to go about answering these questions in an effort to confront the fundamental dilemma of liberalism. I will briefly sketch out two main approaches, and discuss their respective implications for the problem at hand. Needless to say, it does make a difference in philosophy which question one deems most important to answer, how one formulates it, and subsequently, which approach one chooses to take.14 For, the nature of the central question one poses, and 14

While (I) can be seen more straightforwardly as presenting alternatives for addressing, solving or dissolving the dilemma of liberalism, in contrast (II) serves to separate those who prefer to frame the issue of justice within a statist, international or trans-national framework as opposed to the more cosmopolitan-inclined who would rather frame the issue in terms of global justice and justice claims owed

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how it is formulated commits us right from the start to a number of more or less defensible assumptions about the problem at hand, and how one proposes to resolve or dissolve it. (I) Primary Context. Depending on what one considers to be the primary context of justice,15 one may choose to address the dilemma of liberalism in one or the other of the following logically plausible options: by grasping one of the horns—either the right one or the left one, or by seeking to escape between the horns, and this can presumably be done in a number of ways. [Naturally, it is a separate issue whether any of these options makes sense or is feasible from a moral and political point of view]. (II) Primary Object or Unit of Concern. Alternatively, one may choose to focus instead on what one deems to be the primary object or unit of moral concern in matters of justice: should it be the relations between states, nations or peoples—or more generally, characterized as political communities with their own political institutions, or politically organized groups of people,16—whereby our concern is to assess whether or not they just and fair? Or should it be the relations between all individual human beings anywhere in world—whereby our concern is to assess the welfare and well-being of each? First, suppose we take approach (I)—let’s call it the “Context(s) of Justice” Approach.

2.2 Context(s) of Justice Those theorists17 who wish to grasp the right horn of the dilemma may seek to dissolve the apparent conflict or tension within liberalism by to each and all individuals in the world—regardless of their citizenship or nationality. See Brown, 1997; Beitz, 1999a for very helpful overviews of the literature. 15 This question is obviously related to the question of the scope of justice. On this point, see for example Forst, (2001b: 169). See also Forst’s book by this title (2001a). 16 As in Rawls in the Law of Peoples (1999a), or in Chauvier (2001: 91n2). 17 They may be divided into (a) Communitarians and Meta-Ethical Particularists (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre [1984ab, 1988]), Michael Walzer [1977, 1983, 2003], Michael Sandel [1982, 1992], Margalit and Raz [1995] and (b) Liberal Nationalists and Cultural Perfectionists (Yael Tamir [1993], David Miller [1995, 1998], Charles Taylor [1989, 1992, 1993, 1994], Will Kymlicka [1989], [Joseph Raz [1986]). Some qualifications have to be made about the specific positions of

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demonstrating that its impartiality (moral egalitarianism) can only be applied properly within the context of a nation, culture, or sovereign state. In their accounts, it is said essentially that we must favor our own, fellownationals or fellow-citizens,18 compatriots, or community members. This favoritism and partiality should not be viewed as a source of embarrassment or moral inconsistency, but rather as the origin of human affiliation and communal ties. The proponents of these kinds of views argue in effect that liberalism as characterized earlier—including its reliance upon a notion of impartiality—is either incomplete or incoherent. For them, the nature of the national community—understood most crucially in terms of cultural membership and shared self-understanding—is such that it legitimates or demands partiality towards fellow members. Nationality is understood as generating (necessary and sufficient) reasons for preferring the interests of one’s fellow-nationals, in a manner markedly similar to that generally assumed to hold in such otherwise disparate contexts as relationships of family or friendship.19 The national group, on this understanding, demands loyalty and partiality which contradicts the liberal reliance upon abstract impartial moral reasoning. Indeed, another kind of objection raised against liberalism has to do with its appeal to abstract universalizing principles and reasoning, which, it is argued, often fail to be compelling to real, human beings concretely situated, with emotionally and psychologically real allegiances and strong loyalties. The moral importance of community is thus said to solve the dilemma posed here. It solves it by showing that liberalism cannot be coherently applied at the global level. If liberalism’s impartiality has any value at all—a point about which these different theorists disagree 20 —it will be important only within the confines of a

the philosophers listed here. For further details on this distinction, see Hurka, 1997, Blake, 2005. 18 The significance of the distinction between these two notions will emerge in due course. 19 It should be noted however that while “family” involves an involuntary form of association (we don’t choose our family), “friendship” in contrast involves a voluntary form of association (we do choose our friends), and this arguably makes a difference about the kind of moral obligations incurred in each. See Scheffler (1994). 20 Walzer for example is, I believe, less negative than MacIntyre in this regard—as well as about the value of liberalism generally speaking. Tamir believes that impartiality is still applicable within the national sphere and is compatible with the partiality towards one’s fellow nationals.

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local cultural community. The depiction of liberalism as above is therefore at best incomplete; there is an inherent range-limitation on the applicability of liberal principles, one which prevents the extension of liberal principles and values to the global context. For convenience, we can distinguish at least two ways in which these kinds of arguments have been made, and numerous variations within each broadly construed argumentative framework: (a) the arguments of communitarians-meta-ethical particularists and (b) those of liberal nationalists-cultural perfectionists. There is in fact no clear line of separation between philosophers using one approach as opposed to the other, and frequently those starting with one approach end up using the other approach as well. The distinction may however be useful to highlight and evaluate the implications of their respective arguments. In a nutshell, the distinction goes to the manner in which the national community is used to construct a clear division in the content and priority of our moral duties. For proponents of (a), duties to fellow nationals differ in kind because the national community is the source of the language and values employed in the practice of moral judgment; it is in effect the prerequisite for moral reasoning and language; partiality to the interests of one’s fellow-nationals is therefore a consequence of the nature of morality itself.21 In contrast, for proponents of (b), the priority attributed to the interest of one’s fellownationals is a consequence of the importance of community membership for the human good. 22 On this account, distinct moral duties to one’s 21

It is in some sense true, as MacIntyre points out in After Virtue (1984: 220) in his effort to follow Aristotle in making the argument that ethical evaluation must take culture, society and politics into account, that “I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations.” And that “these constitute the givens of my life, my moral starting point.” But one must quickly answer back that apart from validating a moral relativism of the worst kind that is hardly tenable, it makes a logical mistake by confusing the source of our morality with its range of applicability, or alternatively, it seems to confuse origin with validity. 22 Again, while it may be foolish to deny the importance of community for human flourishing (and this may be what traditional proponents of liberalism are presumably said to have failed to do by their excessive emphasis on the individual), we should immediately ask ourselves what the ultimate consequences of such a view would be politically and practically, if they were drawn consistently, in a world that is for the most composed of multi-national societies. Should each distinctive national culture be given control over its own political institutions, or even its own state? Can the delineation and demarcation between so-called “distinct national or cultural communities” be done as easily as it is here surmised?

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fellow-nationals flow from the importance of the flourishing and protection of the national and cultural community.23 In contrast, those theorists, more properly called cosmopolitan liberals (or “Rawlsian cosmopolitans”), who wish to grasp the left horn of the dilemma, 24 claim instead that the contradiction of liberalism revealed earlier is in fact genuine and very serious indeed. To prove that liberal thought is indeed a coherent and appealing political conception of justice, it must live up to the moral egalitarianism/ universalism inherent in its self-description, and reject any construal based on arbitrary considerations such as, most specifically, boundaries, nationality, citizenship, or residency. It is said that we must therefore focus on the welfare, wellbeing and dignity of each and all humans regardless of where they are presently situated in the world. According to at least one construal of this kind of global or cosmopolitan liberalism (Beitz, 1979, 1985, 1994), “states” must work together to improve the lot of the least-advantaged members of the world’s population 25 —not simply the least well-off of Should secession by different groups be encouraged? And besides, can’t the voices and interests of minority cultural or national groups be adequately and fairly represented in a judiciously established democratic political system? Etc. 23 Each in their own way, Tamir (1993) and Miller (1995) claim to provide the kind of justification for liberalism’s nationalist partiality that Rawls should have provided in order to ultimately support his proposal for international justice, but failed to do. See also Scheffler (2003). 24 We may distinguish between the following forms of cosmopolitanism: (a) Cosmopolitan Consequentialists/ Utilitarians (Peter Singer [1972, 2002]; Peter Unger [1996]); (b) Rawlsian Cosmopolitan Liberals (Charles Beitz [1979/1999, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1999, 2000, 2001], Thomas Pogge [1989, 1992, 1994, 2001, 2002, 2006], Brian Barry [1982, 1989, 1991, 1998, 1999]; Thomas Scanlon, [1974]); and (c) Cosmopolitan Capability Theorists (Amartya Sen [1992, 1999, 2004] and Martha Nussbaum [1993, 1996, 2000, 2006]. Though there may well be (c) libertarian cosmopolitanism as well, it clearly does not fall within the range of my specific concerns herein. In fact, the latter form may well be part of the problem (rather than the solution) that those of us concerned with international or global justice (however it is ultimately construed) seek to address, viz., global inequalities and disparities as a result of the unleashed blind market forces, unbridled, mismanaged and unfairly imposed world economic order along with the institutions, practices, and rules that sustain it. See Cohen (1996) for a discussion of alternative forms of cosmopolitanism. 25 Some critics of Beitz’s view have taken his call upon “states” as moral agents and main actors of justice who need to take a more active role in meeting the demands of justice of the least well-off to mean that states should place the interests of the citizens of other states before or on the same level as those of their

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their own people—in the allocation (distribution and re-distribution) of resources, wealth, and opportunities. If this construal makes liberalism a considerably more radical proposition than we had hitherto suspected, well, so much the worse for our ordinary expectations and traditional assumptions about our moral obligations, and to whom they are first and foremost owed. Liberalism was certainly a radical thesis when it was first proposed as a moral and political doctrine, and it was used to criticize established distinctions and hierarchies based on class and gender that had hitherto been considered to be natural and obvious. In this sense, one may argue the distinctions and hierarchies based on birthplace, citizenship, residency and nationality are simply the latest objectionable bases of inequality to be ruled out by the moral egalitarianism and universalism of consistently construed liberal thinking. Finally, those, starting with Rawls (in The Law of Peoples), who wish to escape between the horns of the dilemma, argue that we must replace the impartiality, moral egalitarianism and universalism with a related concern with reciprocity and toleration,26 as well as equality of peoples own citizens. But this need not be the case. Beitz may be simply calling upon states as moral agents to expand the range of their moral concerns and considerations to include more than they have so far the interests of the least welloff anywhere, in addition to, and alongside their concerns for the welfare and wellbeing of their own citizens. Far from being unrealistic, therefore, I think that such a view reflects in fact a far more realistic dimension of the otherwise cosmopolitan outlook—apprehended in its political and institutional component, as opposed to its moral or normative component. It is certainly far more realistic than Pogge’s proposal urging that we go beyond the traditional concept of political sovereignty (1992; 2002), and his subsequent call for a multiplication of points of sovereignty both horizontally and vertically—with no final resting place—so as to create a global institutional scheme that is powerful enough to meet the demands of global justice, but appropriately constrained by a system of checks and balances between the various points so as to avert or avoid any totalitarian or despotic developments that such a scheme may lead to. See also Hedley (1979; 1985) for possible objections to the kind of proposal that Pogge defends—which may lead to the “remedievalization of sovereignty” and world disorder and anarchy. 26 Rawls’ notion of “toleration” in this context is to say the least far from being unproblematic. There are arguably however different conceptions of “toleration”, and the one implicated in Rawls’ discussion is not the only conception of liberal toleration (see Kok-Chor Tan, 2000 for a critical analysis along these lines). In one conception, it expresses a substantive moral view that individuals have a right to be treated as moral agents-part authors of their own lives and to enjoy the liberal conditions necessary for them to develop their own conceptions of the good. If such a conception is accepted, then there are at least two ways in which liberalism

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and respect for their right to self-determination. Such “accommodation” is said, Rawls insists, to “express liberalism’s own principle of toleration for other reasonable ways of ordering society” (1999a: 43). The traditional liberal concern with ethical individualism and egalitarianism in (re)distribution is said to be misplaced when applied to the international or global context. 27 Liberals, it is argued, have good reasons to articulate principles (of conduct) that constrain and regulate the actions of other states at the international level. But they also have good reasons, Rawls claims, to ensure that these principles are not only acceptable to liberal states, but to illiberal, albeit decent states as well. 28 It is necessary to accommodate the pluralism inherent in the international context 29 by could express tolerance in the international sphere: (1) the cosmopolitan expression, in which the goal of international or global justice is to create such forms of life for all persons, at home and abroad; (2) Rawls’ social-statist liberal expression, in which toleration is predicated upon corporate and political forms, and different forms of political governance are regarded as the international analogue to domestic conceptions of the good and the comprehensive doctrines underwriting them. But as indicated above, there is nothing inevitable about this approach to liberal toleration abroad, and we may have good reasons for preferring the alternative—if only for consistency. 27 See John Rawls [1971/1999, 1993/1996, 1993/1999a, 1999b]; see also Ronald Dworkin [1981, 1986, 2000], Thomas Nagel [2005] for a differently construed proposal to the same effect—also characterized as exemplifying “the political conception of justice”; finally, see Michael Blake [2001, 2005]) and Richard Miller [1998] for an institutional approach that seeks presumably to offer the kind of justification that Rawls failed to provide for restricting the applicability of liberalism to the national sphere, by focusing on the liability to the coercive instruments of state governance and the autonomy restrictions that only fellowcitizens share. 28 This aspect of Rawls’ proposal has been the butt of numerous objections and criticisms. See David Miller (2000), Follesdal (1997), Eckert (2004). Some focused on the justification (or lack thereof) given by Rawls for accommodating “illiberal societies.” Others have questioned whether Rawls’s “criteria of decency” [(i) non-expansionist foreign policy, (ii) respect for “basic human rights” (a very short list, shorter than the UDHR, and the list commonly upheld by liberal democracies), (iii) some form of rule of law] constitute sufficient normative constraints from a politically liberal point of view—so as to avoid justifying toleration of the intolerable. 29 In anticipation, it should be said that I draw a distinction between the pluralism that Rawls seeks to countenance, strictly speaking, within the “statist paradigm” or “system of dispersed sovereignty,” and the more robust, yet normatively constrained, ordered “pluralism” which will serve to underwrite my defense of “cosmopolitan pluralism.”

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virtue of the fact that there are differently constituted and politically organized forms of societies. According to the methodology adopted here by Rawls, the distributive principles in the international context cannot be as demanding as those egalitarian principles applicable in the national context.30 And so therefore the Difference Principle, contrary to what his cosmopolitan critics claim, is not applicable at the international or global level. Instead, Rawls makes some provision for socio-economic justice through what he calls the “duty of assistance” which has a clear “target” and “cut-off point” (1999a: 115-119). According to such duty, well-off, well-ordered and decent societies should assist only those “burdened societies” in “unfavorable conditions,” who wish to become well-ordered and decent regimes as well, and operate under a just and fair system.31 In this way, Rawls believes that the dilemma of liberalism is not so much solved as dissolved because the categories of race or gender, for example, cannot be equated with those of nationality, residency and citizenship. We cannot reasonably justify the application of the liberal (distributive) principles of justice that are applicable in the domestic or national context to the international or global realm. A sustained critical examination of the main arguments underlying and underwriting these different accounts and proposals would show more convincingly why none of them is entirely satisfactory and without difficulties, even though some have clearly some merits. For now, the following summary-evaluations should suffice. National partialists or particularists as well as liberal nationalists or cultural perfectionists tend to overstate the importance of the boundary or border—whether it be national, cultural, or territorial. They are unduly realistic in trying to give reality to a notion that is more imaginary (though not fictitious)32 than one thinks, and not utopian enough in that they tend 30

Whether or not the principles that Rawls ultimately defends are demanding (enough, or at all) has also been the object of much spilled ink in recent years. My view is that they are not as demanding as they could and should have been. 31 Apparently the people living in “outlaw societies” and other “illiberal and indecent societies” don’t receive in Rawls’ proposal any moral considerations in terms of their justice claims. 32 In Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (1991), a work which is often quoted and referred to, Benedict Anderson has argued that nations are perhaps best viewed as “imagined communities”—not in the sense that they are purely fictitious entities, but that they exist only in the shared imaginings of those who consider themselves members of the nation. If the

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to be conservatives in their political institutional designs and nostalgic in their moral aspirations (see Scheffler, 2003). Cosmopolitan liberal impartialists, in contrast, tend to assume away what moral relevance the border or boundary might have in these three respects—as a national, cultural or territorial demarcation. They are perhaps unduly utopian in thinking or hoping that human beings and the world can readily accommodate their lofty and high-minded moral aspirations, but arguably not realistic enough in that their political designs may require radical or even revolutionary changes in terms of the global institutions and practices for their unimpeachable and consistent moral ideals and values to become common currency and reality. As for Rawls’ international project, by seeking to justify what one may call a “pluralistic social contractarianism,” he adopts a notion of “toleration” which, as we have seen, we have good reasons to regard with suspicion. For this reason, among others, it is arguably far more “realistic” than it ought to be in that it fails to make liberalism consistent, compromises far too much its central tenets, and arguably seeks to unjustifiably accommodate states and forms of government that should not be accommodated from a moral standpoint. As such, it is not “utopian” enough precisely because its moral aspirations (its impartial moral egalitarianism and ethical universalism) are substantially tempered and compromised by its excessive concern with observing a certain political realism at the international level.

2.3 Primary Object or Unit of Moral Concern Suppose however we take instead approach (II), as sketched out earlier: let us call it the “Primary Object or Unit of Moral Concern” Approach. Then, the main problem and point of contention can said to be that dividing those we may call the statists and those that we may call the globalists. The former basically take political communities organized into states to be the main agents of justice (i.e.,, who is asked to be just and who receives just treatment), while the latter take persons, regardless of creation of those shared imaginings requires not only (selective) memory of shared aspects of lived history, but forgetting as well (of other sources of unified history, and of disunity within the national past), then nations are hardly the kind of unproblematic entities commonly assumed to be by the protagonists here in question.

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their political membership, as the primary focus of justice (at least as far as the question of who receives just treatment is concerned) [Forst (2001b: 169); see also Barry (1999)]. As drawn here, this distinction is too general and hides in fact a fair amount of complexity and diversity in the points of view articulated and defended by different proponents who fall loosely speaking in one category or the other. Thus, statists may include a diverse group including liberals who insist on the autonomy of peoples, communitarians who reminds us of the importance of the integrity and flourishing of communities, nationalists who insist on the priority of national and patriotic ties, as well as various so-called defenders of “states-sovereignty” who argue that the right to self-determination and sovereign independence from undue (unjustified and unjustifiable) external interferences is paramount. Among statists, there are also those theorists who articulate and defend a view that is neither this nor that, strictly speaking, but a little bit of this and that, or even all these differentiated points of view at once.33 As for the globalists, though they seem to converge on a single “metaprinciple,” namely, that of the primacy and priority of the global context of justice, they clearly have different ways and approaches to motivating and defending it, not to mention different proposals for bringing about global justice (minimally or maximally) 34 —viz. Beitz, Pogge, Brian Barry Charles Jones, Mollendorf, van Parijs, Hinsch, Wenar, etc. Despite its generality however, the statists-globalists distinction serves nevertheless to highlight the central point of contention between political philosophers today—esp., with regards to the main question raised earlier at the outset, and that is, how should we deal with the moral status of states, nation-states or national boundaries when examining the question of international or global justice? Does the world as whole constitute in any way a proper context of justice, or even the primary one? Or should justice 33 In some sense, one could argue that Rawls in the Law of Peoples is trying to do just that. This would of course require a more detailed analysis and a more forcefully articulated argument. But those familiar with the work may intuitively grasp my point, although it would have to be qualified with regards to each specific instance of the various components of his view --in other words, how he tries to accommodate the concerns of liberals, communitarians, nationalists, as well as those of the defenders of state sovereignty at once. See Wenar, 2001; 2006. 34 Forst (2001: 181) draws such a distinction in an effort, I believe, to bring a greater degree of “realism” to his view of justice at the international, or rather, trans-national level.

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be restricted more cogently to the national or domestic context? Or to put it more perspicuously, is there a context beyond the latter, yet which does not quite yet encompass the globe as “one big village”35 in which justice claims can be made and adjudicated in a consistent, meaningful and justifiable way? When I turn in the next section of this essay to the articulation and defense of the alternative view of “cosmopolitan pluralism” in the next section, I will addressing most specifically these kinds of questions both directly and indirectly—in an effort to situate my position differently along the statists-globalists distinction, and give a flavor of its distinctiveness and comparative advantage relative to the central point of contention under approach (II) [i.e., what is or should be the primary object of moral of concern?]. In the meantime, let’s suppose however that the articulation and defense of my alternative view is set against the background of, and within the parameters of approach (I), [i.e., what is or should be the proper and relevant context(s) of justice?]. I would then be prepared to defend the following arguments and conclusions regarding the contending proposals. Those of the “communitarians-meta-ethical particularists and liberal nationalists-cultural perfectionists” in defense of nationality and partiality are either untenable or incoherent in the final analysis; they are far from satisfactory as an answer to the fundamental dilemma of liberalism. As for Rawls’ proposal in The Law of Peoples (1993/1999a), it is arguably too realistic and too undemanding, despite claims to the contrary by some (e.g., Wenar, 2001; Caney, 2001). Rather than seeking to justify its desirable and realistic transformation to accommodate our more demanding ideals and values, it seems instead to be overly concerned with accommodating and justifying current international reality, and perhaps tolerating “the intolerable” even from a liberal point of view; it is therefore not utopian enough. In the end however, it seems that the final evaluation of Rawls’s project for international justice may rest on his social contractarian and constructivist methodology, how it is construed and why 35

In Essay # 1, in which I consider the impact of “cultural complexity” due to both “globalization” and “glocalization” in the world today, I have argued that such an expression, though used frequently these days, is at best still a metaphor.

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it is deployed in the way he does deploy it.36 Why should we regard the international context as being so radically different from the domestic one, and as requiring a differential moral treatment—from the standpoint of liberalism? The basis upon which Rawls makes such a distinction is either unconvincing or unclear. It is difficult to find in Rawls a justification that can pass muster. 37 Until such a justification is found or given, [many 36

In addition to Rawls’ different construal and deployment of his methodology, one could also take issue with the following (more or less related) points of contention: his rejection of the conception of persons as free and equal, his subsequent adoption of the notion of “peoples” that he puts into play, and the underlying assumptions he makes about it, his “criteria of decency” and idea of “decent” peoples who are accepted as full members of the Society of Peoples even though they are illiberal, his notion of “liberal toleration,” his distinct notion of (restricted) basic human rights and the role they play in his scheme—though they remain unjustified, the merits of his objections to his cosmopolitan critics on the basic structure and forms of cooperation, his restriction of the applicability of the Difference Principle, his defense of the duty of assistance, his analysis of the causes of wealth and poverty, the fact that his theories of justice for the domestic/national and international/global context seem to be inconsistent, etc., etc.—and I could go on and on. For a more restricted critical evaluation however, one could choose to focus on the following two questions: (1) Why does Rawls insist that contractarian justice in the international sphere must take the form of a contract between “peoples” rather than between individual “persons”? (2) Why does Rawls reject more egalitarian proposals in the area of international justice? Obviously, they have to do respectively with (1) the methodology Rawls adopts and deploys in this context, and the justification he offers based on his conception of “toleration,” and with (2) his analysis of distributive justice between peoples and the justification he gives for making a far more modest proposal than he has defended in the domestic political context. 37 For the sake of argument, several reasons might be invoked to make such a distinction. Perhaps a more appropriately construed notion of “peoples” might be useful here. Besides, if we reject the cosmopolitan notion of “toleration,” one may possibly defend a view about the way in which individuals relate to their political context that would make Rawls’ own extension of the liberal project more plausible if not uniquely appropriate. On this account, one would have to argue that the only way to respect individuals is to respect the forms of life they have chosen together for themselves. This kind of argument would serve in turn to justify the respect one should grant divergent forms of political organization. Alternatively, one may choose to focus instead on the coercive powers of institutions, and seek to ascertain their importance in terms of how the institutional forms and structures that exist within the domestic political context are relevantly different from those present in the international context, and whether or not they can serve to motivate justifiable, differentiated and prior moral considerations to our fellow-nationals or citizens as opposed to (needy) foreign and distant strangers.

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theorists today are trying to do just that], and Rawls’ international contractarian approach is vindicated, his cosmopolitan critics are right to question the justice of global distribution, and call upon us to heed the moral claims of all human beings—far and near, regardless of their place of birth, residency, nationality or citizenship—facing deprivation and degradation, avoidable poverty, hunger, and disease worldwide. Finally, regarding the proposals of the so-called “Rawlsian cosmopolitans” (Beitz and Pogge), it is indeed still questionable whether Rawls’ theory can be used for the purposes they each have in mind. Rawls’ arguments begin by taking for granted not only the fact of interdependence and trade, but more significantly (for his own purposes), the coercive powers of territorial states or governing political institutions as they currently exist. One might therefore object to any attempt to use his arguments (as Beitz and Pogge seem interested in doing) to argue that the former fact (interdependence) is sufficient to require the creation of the latter (new form of global institutions, government and governance). If one could object to Beitz that interdependence without government does not constitute an adequate basis for the full use of Rawls’s theory of justice (although Beitz actually decouples its two components),38 then one could also object to Pogge’s suggestion that interdependence calls for, and It may be possible to argue, as some have (Blake, 2001; Wenar, 2001: 81ff), that Rawls’ egalitarian distributive principles exist primarily as a way of justifying coercive legal systems and structures to those whose actions are constrained by such system and structures. Assuming this is right, the proponents of such a view may then go on to claim that the demands of distributive justice are not in fact appropriately made outside the domestic political context, and that, far from being “the last refuge of feudal privilege,” inequality in the international context is in the final analysis a form of inequality whose injustice cannot be established on the basis of Rawls’ theory. Regarding the first alternative, I seriously doubt that it can be pulled off successfully. As for the second alternative, I believe that a critical examination would enable us to impeach it forcefully and convincingly. See later discussion of the arguments provided by Arneson (2005) to this effect. 38 Whether Rawls’s principles of justice (those of (1) liberty and (2) the distributive principles of equal opportunity and the difference principle) could be decoupled or disconnected in the way that Beitz does is certainly a good point of contention—given the strictures and constraints explicitly placed by Rawls on their application. This may also be one of the reasons why Rawls does not choose to globalize his principles in the way that Pogge seeks to do (both) and Beitz suggests (only the second), and does not opt for the egalitarian cosmopolitan perspective. Could this also serve to explain at least in part why Rawls faces a tough challenge in his international project? I believe so.

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mandates, the creation and setting up of such new global government. In the end, neither theorist has yet been able to establish convincingly that the globalizing world requires the globalization of Rawls’ principles of justice.39 Though their proposals are compelling and unobjectionable from a moral point of view, they are nevertheless arguably either too idealistic or utopian, and therefore not realistic enough because they have so far failed to provide a clearly feasible and sustainable program of political action to turn their morally compelling vision into reality—“in the world as we know it,” or, as we could readily and realistically envision it today and in the not-too-distant future.40 The challenge that Rawls faced in the articulation of his international project is undoubtedly related to the difficulty of (re)-(dis)-solving the fundamental dilemma of liberalism when extended and applied to the international arena. In the domestic arena, it seems relatively easier to work out a liberal conception of both justice and stability, based on principles which are fair to individual agents, and supported in turn by them within the context of “a public political culture,” with a long and rich history. In contrast, as we have seen, in the international arena, the primary agents are arguably not individuals, but rather coercive states, in control of legal systems which in turn control the lives of individual moral agents. Now of course, one may argue (along the lines taken by his cosmopolitan critics) that though individuals are not the primary agents of justice (or political actors), they ought to be nevertheless the primary subjects of moral concern—in accord with the tenets of liberalism’s ethical individualism. But this may be too idealistic, right off the bat.

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If however either one claims more modestly that the globalizing world (and the inequalities and deprivations that it seems to create) requires the articulation of a more egalitarian principle of re-distributive justice, other than the Difference Principle, then obviously one would have to reconsider the working designation of “Rawlsian cosmopolitans.” Perhaps, I argue, they are better off disowning their Rawlsian heritage, and opting more boldly for the independent and original articulation of their own consistent cosmopolitan liberalism. It may well prove to be more akin to, or in any case have great affinities with, my “cosmopolitan pluralism” than they had anticipated or expected. 40 I must admit however that in reading through their respective works I find that they are sincerely and explicitly concerned by such considerations.

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A modest dose of realism would compel us to recognize that stability (in the international arena, as opposed to the domestic one) requires the principled agreement not of individual agents but of the states which are often opposed, oppressive or coercive to individuals. It seems then that what in the domestic context was a package deal [stability and (individual) justice] may require a choice or trade-off in the international context [stability or justice, but not necessarily both]. Thus, for example, institutional stability can arguably be attained at the cost of leaving many members of the world’s population to suffer and endure oppressive practices under governments and in societies which do not view them as free and equal citizens entitled to participation of the process of self-rule. Or alternatively, liberal commitment to the equal moral worth of all individuals can be maintained, or in any case, upheld, at the cost of facing up the fact that such a commitment will be rejected by many of the world’s current sovereign states. To follow through with this reasoning (under certain assumptions), 41 it seems that we cannot achieve both of the desirable values of stability and global justice at the same time—by bootstrapping, for example, the respect for illiberal societies out of the respect of autonomous moral individual agents. Or can we? It seems then that we must make a choice between two competing visions of liberalism, the cosmopolitan vision and the Rawlsian vision. These two visions are not so much in direct disagreement as they represent different proposals for how the fundamental tenets of liberalism are to be extended given the distinctly challenging circumstances of international politics. Consistently then, it would seem that the only option left (to explore) is to find another way for escaping between the horns by articulating a view between the Scylla of Rawls’ International Political Liberalism and Charybdis of (Rawlsian) Cosmopolitan Liberalism.42 Though much work 41

The exclusive disjunction under which this reasoning is carried through may actually be a false one, caused by definitional rigidity or dubious and objectionable assumptions in political theory about international relations and circumstances. For example, it may well be that the so-called (institutional) stability achieved at the cost of justice is in fact no stability or rather shaky, for how can there be stability of the kind worth having and maintaining without (minimal/maximal) justice for all. The inequalities that exist within states and between states globally could arguably be viewed as the greatest threat to stability, security, world order and peace—not only between particular groups of nations but in the world at large. 42 Beitz distinguishes instead between “social and cosmopolitan liberalism” to demarcate his view from that of Rawls at the international level (1999b: 515-529). However, I believe that despite Rawls’ efforts to distance his view from the strictly

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has been done in recent decades in this area, it is widely agreed that much more remains to be done, if we are to have a morally compelling and politically adequate theory of international or global justice (Nagel, 2005: 113).

3. Cosmopolitan Pluralism: For a More “Realistic Utopia” In my effort to articulate an alternative view, I attempt to weave a more or less coherent proposal which makes use of the best and most valid points of each of the preceding ones, without being saddled by their weakest and most objectionable points. While it takes into account as much as possible the world as we know it, and its incontrovertible realities and circumstances, at least for the foreseeable future, it introduces at the same time a good dose of utopian thinking—always with an eye to what we can realistically hope to achieve practically here and now and in the foreseeable future. It should become obvious that my conception of the task of political philosophy is both justificatory and reformatory or revolutionary—each approach duly taken in the proper and relevant context. I am not however claiming that the proposal that I will next attempt to sketch out in an effort to make a case for what I now call in a more nuanced and qualified manner “rooted cosmopolitan pluralism under rigorous normative constraints” will be able to fully come to grips with the dilemma of liberalism. I can only hope that it will prove worthy of some attention—as I try to show (if only in a programmatic and gesturing manner) how it can avoid or address some of the outstanding problems and difficulties faced by the other main contenders. So as to avoid possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations, I should clarify the nature and scope of my undertaking herein. My primary concern is not so much to put forward a fully justified and substantiated alternative set of distributive principles for the international context or to articulate a full-blown alternative theory of (international, transnational, supranational or global) justice. The alternative view that I advocate does however have some specific proposals to make in both respects. I am only interested more modestly in putting forward in a programmatic manner a number of considerations (theoretical, empirical, conceptual, moral and statist perspective in international affairs, it is still fairly speaking situated within it. See Buchanan (2001).

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political) which, I believe, any adequate political theory today must take into account from both a normative and empirical point of view, and which could enable us to move beyond the confining and limiting parameters set by the debate between statists and globalists (or between the Rawlsians and Rawlsian cosmopolitans) in a more qualified and fruitful manner. I contend that such a theory must not only be compelling and consistent from a moral point of view, but also politically feasible or practicable, and therefore realistic in some sense. In other words, it must not only be purely descriptive and merely accommodating of the current state of world affairs but perhaps most importantly, prescriptive and normative as well.43 Normatively, it must call upon us to strive to attain moral ideals not yet realized but achievable with some concerted, good faith efforts on the part of all concerned at all levels—at the infra-national level, locally, regionally, at the inter-national level, at the trans-national level, and at the supra-national or global level, whenever applicable. Descriptively, from a structural or institutional point of view, it must reflect the multi-level, ordered pluralism of the world as we know it today. Thus, in order to properly take my bearings, a number of preliminary considerations and clarifications are here appropriate and called for.

3.1 The Concept of Justice Let’s begin with the concept of justice itself. As we know, such a concept is used to evaluate many different things, including criminal law and the market economy. Thus, in a very general sense, the international requirements of justice include for example standards and norms governing the justification and conduct of war as well as standards and norms defining some basic set of human rights. These two kinds of standards and norms have in fact achieved some degree of international recognition over the past 50 years or so. They define certain types of criminal conduct, usually by states, against other states or against individuals or ethnic groups” and involve what are now called “war crimes or crimes against humanity.” They constitute significant developments and noteworthy advances in justice. 44 There are however other aspects of 43 This statement may quite legitimately be interpreted as conveying in short order my conception of political philosophy and its most distinctive task(s). 44 According to Baltasar Garzon, Spanish Supreme Court Judge, who, among others of his legal exploits, has sought the indictment of General Pinochet under Spanish Law, and even considered his referral to the newly constituted

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justice that we should also be concerned with, and which are of primary interest in the context of this discussion. They concern social justice, or socio-economic justice, and the difficult question in this regard is whether we can make anything of it at the inter-national, trans-national or supranational level,45 and perhaps more radically, “whether we can even form an intelligible ideal of global justice” (Nagel, 2005: 114). The concept of justice46 is typically applied as a normative notion to evaluate many different things, most notably subjects (individuals, persons, groups, collectivities, communities, nations. states), their conduct (practices, actions, behaviors, whether they consist in commissions or omissions), as well as the social arrangements and institutions (including the rules and regulations, laws, standards, norms and principles) according to which subjects function or conduct themselves in a given (delineated or demarcated territorial) context.47 Focusing for our present purposes on the last of its possible applications, or what we call, social justice, we commonly assume that (a) social rules, arrangements and institutions are just or unjust to some (b) recipients (targeted/non-targeted) in virtue of their (intended/non-intended) effects on (c) the net benefits (vs. harms)48 these recipients have or are entitled to, relative to (d) their contributions or the burdens they endure or have to endure. Thus construed, social justice can be understood as a four-place International Criminal Court of Justice sitting in the Hague, the creation and further empowerment of the latter court in recent years should be regarded as one of the most significant legal achievements in international law since WWII, given its supranational jurisdiction—and despite the opposition of the sole remaining “super-power,” the US. 45 I will have more to say on this characterization of the world institutional order in terms of levels and different orders of normativity operating at these different levels. 46 Unless otherwise indicated, my discussion herein proceeds on the basis of the entry on “Justice” by Thomas Pogge in the International Encyclopedia for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Eds. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 2001a, 8055-8061. The treatment I give is however significantly modified. 47 Despite any strictures I may have placed or qualifications I may have made, I am here putting forth a formulation that does not beg the question against “global or supranational justice.” 48 How these notions are (or should be) specified, defined and measured is part and parcel of the political debate. I will return to them when I discuss the distribution questions that preoccupy political theorists and philosophers today.

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concept serving to characterize the relationship between (a) (b), (c) and (d) above, and most specifically, to adjudicate and evaluate the claims of (b).49 It can easily be shown that such an understanding and construal of social justice, which seeks basically to assess and evaluate the justice of social rules, arrangements and institutions merely from the perspective of recipients, encourages consequentialist (utilitarian) or contractualist (Rawlsian) conceptions of liberal justice (see Pogge, 1995b).50 But does social justice depend merely on “who gets what” (how much and why)—though this is admittedly an important consideration? Doesn’t it depend also on how social rules, arrangements and institutions affect the what (goods/ benefits vs. harms/ ills) that considered or putative recipients get or are entitled to? Doesn’t it also matter what contributions or burdens they are asked to make or expected to endure? More precisely, doesn’t it depend on the relations these arrangements and institutions establish between those who implement or impose them and those upon whom they are implemented or imposed? In other words, doesn’t it depend also on how whoever gets what, gets it, and that is, under what particular relational conditions and circumstances, under what kinds of established or imposed rules, arrangements or institutions, established and imposed by whom? Are the imposed or implemented rules, arrangements and institutions justified (or justifiable)51 by those who impose or implement them, or whose task it

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My treatment is slightly different from Pogge’s (2001a) in that I begin by construing the commonly understood concept of justice as a four-place concept rather than, as he does, as a three-place concept. I also believe that the qualifications (not included in Pogge) that I introduce in parentheses are important as well. The implications and significance of this different starting point are already clear enough, but they shall hopefully become clearer as I proceed. To start with, I next move on to argue for the adoption of a five-place concept rather a fourplace concept, as Pogge urges, in order to introduce a greater degree of perspicuity and precision in our moral and political analyses and judgments. 50 This analysis serves to illustrate in general the significance of a concept— properly construed and defined, and in particular, the importance of the theoretical and methodological implications of the concept of “justice” for the currently dominant political theories. 51 Like most contemporary political philosophers, I take the problem of justification in this context and generally speaking to be crucial—as will be attested by my discussion later on. I am even inclined to support Forst’s normative proposal (1999; 2001b) in defense of “one basic right,” i.e., the right to justification” for each and all human beings, regardless of their residency, citizenship, or nationality, as the single most important and unobjectionable

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is to impose and implement them? Are they justified or justifiable to those who are supposed to enjoy their putative benefits, endure the burdens and coercions they entail, and thus required to make some contributions? In this context, we may also ask more pointedly the following question: What role, if any, do the designated or putative recipients play in choosing, shaping or implementing these rules, arrangements or institutions -whether it be in a liberal democratic system or some other form of political organization under which they live, and which makes suitable institutional or political provisions to that effect? How do these enable or not the possible expansion of the included or putative recipients of moral concern—as would be dictated for example by what I call “a concentriccircles model of morality”? 52 How do these enable or not the possible increase of the benefits or goods (vs. harms) they (might) receive? And otherwise, a reduction of the burdens they (have to) endure? How do they enable citizens to decide on the nature and extent of their burdens, as well as on the contributions expected of them?53 Etc. principle for a theory of justice. Could this be a way to cash in “the right to have rights” once proposed by Arendt? 52 That is, one in which moral concerns and considerations are progressively extended outward as in increasingly larger and larger concentric circles so as to include more and more people, not only those that are near and dear, but far and distant, and even strangers or foreigners. I believe, for example that the citizens of well-off liberal democracies could more readily extend the circle of their moral concern to needy and distant strangers, the worst-off of the world, if given half the chance and opportunity to do so, or perhaps if given the relevant information not only about the abysmal conditions of millions of people around the world, starting with their own countries, but also about how little their respective governments are truly and effectively doing—in their name—to alleviate or address severe deprivations and gross inequalities and inequities. It is here worth noting some possible objections to this view based on general arguments to the effect that (1) our understanding of what we do in moral terms depends on those affected being dear and near to us, and (2) morality is meaningful and comes into its own with “imputable states of affairs or events,” but since poverty or world hunger is not clearly imputable to a responsible or guilty culprit, people are not morally mobilized to do something against it. For a short and tightly argued piece on these issues, see Bittner (2001: 24-31). I will have more to say on these issues as this discussion unfolds. 53 In the preceding paragraph, my line of questioning was intended to bring out two distinctive orientations that political theories of justice commonly take under the currently dominant social contractarian-consequentialist paradigm, comprising four different positions: on the first axis, we find those who take primarily a recipients-orientation as opposed to those who focus instead on the

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Following Pogge’s move in this regard (2001), I agree that we stand to gain in perspicuity in our political theorizing by expanding the commonly understood four-place concept of social justice (however it is construed) into a five-place concept so as to include (e) those moral agents- politicalinstitutional actors of justice54 conceiving, designing, implementing and imposing social rules, arrangements and institutions. These may include “state and non-state actors or agents”: states or nation-states, peoples, leaders, policymakers, representatives, intellectual elites, development agencies, governmental or non-governmental organizations working at all levels—locally, nationally, regionally, internationally, trans-nationally and globally, “government networks,”55 social and political movements, multinational or trans-national corporations (MNCs or TNCs), groups, associations, communities, and even individual activists worldwide.56 (institutional/individual) agents of justice; on the second axis, we find those who take for the most part a structural-institutional orientation as opposed to those who choose a relational-interactive approach. In effect, we can easily situate all of the main contending theories of justice on the following political map: [1] (a) recipients-orientation vs. (b) agents (institutional/individual); [2] (a) structuralinstitutional orientation vs. (b) relational-interactive orientation. [See Pogge (2006) for his characterization of Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971/1999) as fitting under [2] (a) and [1] (a), while, he argues, Rawls’ Law of the Peoples (1999a) is more squarely to be situated within [2] (b)]. *It would be easy to show that an adequate conception or theory of justice must in fact countenance all of these different, yet related orientations.* Which orientation receives and warrant greater emphasis may vary and will depend on the context at hand. While it is obvious in the domestic or national context that the state is rightfully presumed to be the main agent of justice, which entity (or entities) can be presumed similarly to be the main agent(s) of justice in the international, transnational or global context? 54 Onora O’Neill (2001) has also emphasized the importance of this perspective in our theories of justice. But she has particularly stressed the fact that states are and still remain the main agents of justice—who can do the greatest good if morally and politically motivated to do so, even if they are also the agents responsible for some of the most egregious injustices, violations and failures vis-à-vis the claims of their citizens. 55 These networks are often mentioned among the numerous less-than-formalstructures that are responsible for a great deal of international governance. “Such networks typically bring together officials of different countries with a common area of expertise and responsibility, who meet to communicate regularly, harmonize their practices and policies, and operate by consensus, without having been granted decision-making authority by any treaty. Examples include: networks of environmental regulators, anti-trust regulators, central bankers, finance ministers, securities commissioners, insurance supervisors, or police officials” (Nagel, 2005; 139; see also Slaughter, 1997; 2004).

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Unless this perspective is included, Pogge argues quite rightly, we cannot explain, for example, that social rule, arrangements and institutions generating avoidable harms or burdens by requiring certain agents or actors to inflict them are more unjust than rules, arrangements and institutions generating equal harms or burdens by failing to deter harms, crimes, abuses, corruption, or to mitigate handicaps and disparities due to natural and broadly construed environmental conditions. 57 Unless this perspective is included, we would be unable to accommodate and countenance the robust, yet ordered pluralism of actors or agents of justice. This makes arguably a significant difference, to which political theory must be attentive.

3.2 Demarcation, Distribution, and Contribution In this context, political philosophers are typically concerned with three sets of pertinent and related questions.58 These are: the demarcation questions [DQ1], the distribution questions [DQ2], and the contribution questions [CQ]: First, let’s consider the demarcation questions [DQ1]: Who is (to be) included within the scope of justice? What are the limits, if any, of equality as a demand of justice? 59 Who are or should be putatively the 56

I am hereby already hinting at the underlying conception of “pluralism” (beyond the purely statist paradigm of international relations) that I will seek to incorporate in my defense of “cosmopolitan pluralism.” 57 Assuming we can draw the usual philosophical distinction between positive and negative duties, then we say that, according to the former, one must carry out a specific action or do something specific in order to fulfill our moral obligation, while according to the latter, one must refrain from doing something that may otherwise be harmful to someone or some people toward whom we have a moral obligation not to engage in or support any activities, practices or institutions that may harm them. In parallel, it is easy to see that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between “doing something that is harmful” and “failing to do something” that is equally avoidably harmful. Pogge also provides such an analysis for his own purposes in different contexts (1995a; 2002). 58 It should be obvious to anyone reading through these questions as they are here formulated why they are so related—even though the order of presentation reflects also in part the order of (logical or moral) priority. 59 At this point, I don’t make any substantive claims about the nature, extent or object of the equality that I here put into play formally as a demand of justice. My inclination however is not to fetishize “equality” as such (Frankfurt 1988), and to argue instead for equality of effective and substantive opportunities—evaluated in

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recipients? Assuming we have settled the question of actual or putative moral obligations to others, 60 which unit (individuals, groups, communities, peoples, societies, or states) should be the proper object and focus of our moral concern, in what context (national/domestic vs. international/ transnational/ global), and why? How and on what basis is such a determination to be done? What justification can we give that withstand critical and moral scrutiny? To paraphrase Scanlon’s contractualist criterion (1998), we could say: what reasons can we provide that could not be rejected (rather than, that would be accepted) by any reasonable person or people in the relevant context?61 In this last regard, one also has to address other related demarcation questions such as these: Are our moral obligations for justice owed first and foremost, and only to our fellow-nationals, citizens, compatriots, or more generally, to members of our communities by virtue of the “special ties of solidarity” (however construed) that somehow bind us together (Waldron, 1993)? Or do they also extend to foreign and distant strangers across territorial boundaries into other nations and states? What sorts of moral obligations do we have toward the very poor and worst-off in these nations and states? Do the needs of the relatively worst-off in our lands always trump up those of the absolutely worst-off in other lands? Or, as Richard Arneson puts it, “do patriotic ties limit (and one might add, override) global justice duties?” (2005). Interestingly enough, Arneson examines three arguments for patriotic priority (based respectively on fair play, coercion, coercion and autonomy) put forth by theorists (such as Michael Blake, Richard Miller), who otherwise accept that we have global justice duties to alleviate the conditions of distant needy strangers, but hold that these duties are seriously and significantly constrained by our special ties (and corresponding moral obligations) to needy fellow countrymen. After careful scrutiny, Arneson concludes quite rightly, I believe, that none of

the space of “capabilities”—relative to different contexts. See Caney (2001: 123144) for a convincing defense along these lines, though not framed in the space of “capabilities.” 60 In order not to beg the question regarding any putative global duties of justice we may have—esp., toward foreign and distant needy persons around the world, I believe such a distinction is warranted—at least provisionally. 61 This criterion (in its negative formulation) could arguably be viewed as underwriting Forst’s “basic right to justification” (1999; 2001b).

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these arguments is successful. [For a similar line of criticism of these kinds of theorists, see Kok-Chor Tan (2003; 2004)]. Second, the distribution questions [DQ2] are considered in turn: To what are the designated or putative recipients entitled by virtue of the moral obligations owed to them? What are the goods, benefits and advantages that designated or putative recipients should get? What, in other words, should be distributed? Should they be resources (Dworkin), primary social goods (Rawls), guaranteed basic income (van Parijs), capabilities (Sen, Nussbaum), human rights (Pogge), opportunities (Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Caney), utilities (J.S. Mill, Marshall), in the form of desire-satisfaction, preference-fulfillment, happiness, or some other more objective form of well-being? How should each of these notions be conceived or construed? Should, for example, “resources” be construed in a broad and general sense, or in a narrower and more specific sense? Should “primary social goods” be viewed as in Rawls, as all-purpose means? Are these notions sufficiently sensitive to the heterogeneities and diversities in the conditions of people, their unequal conversion rates in the face of different kinds of obstacles? I believe that the notion of “capabilities” fares much better in this regard. It is for this reason a more compelling candidate as a metric of distributive justice. Which conception of “capabilities” should be adopted—Sen’s or Nussbaum’s, capability as set of options or freedoms, or as combined general capabilities or powers provided adequate external conditions are met that permit the development of internal capacities? Is it possible to combine the two conceptions in a coherent synthesis? How should we conceive of “human rights”—in positive terms, or in negative terms, as Pogge argues (1995a, 2002)? How should “opportunities” be conceived—merely in formal or procedural terms, as “access to a door without the necessary means to go through,” or in “real and substantive’ terms? How do we adjust our conception of opportunities relative to the different contexts and different conceptions of the good life? Can “utilities” provide an adequate metric for a just and fair distribution? Because of the repeated and forceful criticisms and objections raised by both Sen and Rawls against it as a proper metric, it is arguably in high disrepute and for good reasons. What more objective measurement of well-being can be proposed?

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My own view, 62 to put it succinctly, on the most appropriate and defensible metric or currency of distributive justice leans most favorably toward the capabilities approach, because it scores, I believe, a number of crucial points over those proposing “resources,” “income,” or primary social goods,’ or “utilities,” to mention only the main contenders (Sen, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2004; Nussbaum, 2000; 2006; Robeyns, 2004). Besides, as both Sen and Nussbaum have shown on several occasions, it is readily compatible with those approaches couched in terms of “opportunities” and “human rights.” Capabilities at least in Sen’s sense could be viewed as real and substantive “opportunities.” Capabilities could also be construed as human rights (or as “fundamental entitlements”), and vice-versa, despite modest losses in conceptual clarity or normative power in the former, as Nussbaum has shown (1997). In this regard, I also find Pogge’s view (2002, and thereafter) quite compelling. According to Pogge, human rights are best construed and conceived negatively; subsequently, one could basically interpret the main thrust of his proposal for global justice in terms of articles 25 and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Art. 25 states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.” Art. 28 states: “Everyone is entitled to a social and institutional order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” As noted earlier, the former could be viewed as the basis for achieving what I call “minimal justice” (i.e., what must urgently be done to meet the most urgent claims of each and all human beings). Whereas the latter, which could be interpreted as calling for a new global institutional order in order to fulfill all the rights and freedoms enumerated is best viewed as the basis for achieving “maximal justice.” Such a utopian and perhaps unrealistic goal requires perhaps that we take a very long and very optimistic perspective into the future. Now turning to the next question that must be answered—under DQ2: What form(s) should the distribution take? In other words, according to which principle(s) should the distribution be done?—the principle of equality (equality of what?), maximin or difference principle, minimax principle, priority principle, needs-based assessment and fulfillment, 62

Obviously, the defense of the position that I am here taking on the distribution questions will require a more substantial and extended treatment that can’t be provided herein.

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measurement of (relative/absolute) capability or functioning deprivation, aggregate maximization, or something else entirely? And furthermore, how exactly and on which normative basis should any of these principles be construed? These are all difficult questions, and the stuff that makes up much of what is still hotly discussed and debated today in political philosophy. Consistently with my answer to the previous question however, I would argue that the “assessment or measurement of (relative/absolute) capability or functioning deprivation” 63 would be adequate enough. Whether capabilities (as freedoms or sets of options) or functionings (as basic and valuable beings and doings) becomes the primary focus and object of concern will depend on the current condition of the people concerned. However, as both Sen and Nussbaum have maintained, “capability—expansion should remain the political goal” from a consistently liberal point of view. It is crucial that for a liberally-minded approach that seeks to remain justifiably non-paternalistic “not to push people into functionings” that may or may not be valued or deemed valuable according to their conception of the good life. Third, we must also consider the contribution questions [CQ]: What burdens (coercions, limitations or restrictions of autonomy, power and domination relations, rules and procedures, arrangements and institutions, or even taxes and taxations, etc.) do the designated or putative recipients (have to) endure? Are they justified or justifiable? What other sacrifices, compromises, or trade-offs are they required to make? Are these tolerable or justifiable? What other direct or indirect contributions—in kind, in cash, in terms of resources, time and effort—are they expected to make? Are the burdens, sacrifices, compromises, trade-offs, and other contributions equally shared by all designated or putative recipients of benefits and goods? Can an unequal share of burdens and contributions be justified to all concerned in a given context? Can the “special ties and bonds” (communitarian, national, or cultural) that presumably bind some people more than others justify an unequal distribution of the benefits and goods? In other words, can these “special ties and bonds” serve to provide the necessary justification for unequal treatment? Can such a purported justification withstand critical moral scrutiny? I don’t think so. 63

I should perhaps add: provided however that the techniques of measurement— including both quantitative and qualitative methodologies—continue to be refined and developed further so as to facilitate different kinds of assessments.

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As attested by the growing literature in recent years, there are here substantial grounds for serious disagreements with regards to the three sets of questions considered above. For one thing, one may radically question the (contractualist-consequentialist) framework under which all of these discussions are carried out in much of Anglophone political philosophy today (Pogge, 1995b). The latter has come to focus less on the conduct of moral agents or political actors and more on the arrangement of social institutions or “basic structures” or “regimes.” The moral assessment of such institutional schemes, it is said, should be guided by suitably constrained prudential deliberations on behalf of their prospective recipients or participants (Contractualism). This idea leads to a broadly consequentialist assessment of institutional schemes which makes the justice of any scheme a function of how it (compared to its feasible alternatives) affects its individual recipients or participants. How should the well-being of individuals be measured? How should such measurements be aggregated, if need be, according to which principle?64 On the other hand, one may quite forcefully object to my way of putting the last question under DQ1 in that I seem to leave open the possibility, contrary to what many liberal nationalists and social contract political theorists, as well as traditional political philosophers (e.g., Hobbes) claim, that justice may be (and must be, at this juncture of history) extended internationally, if not globally, at least trans-nationally (pace Rawls, Dworkin and Nagel). And it need not be conceived as achievable only with the bounds of a sovereign state. I believe we must do so (i.e., keep the possibility open) on pain otherwise of begging the question right from the start—by buying into the traditionally accepted construal of the concept of justice, and the traditional way of conceiving of the task of political philosophy. But, as I have suggested earlier, we must seriously contemplate the possibility of re-conceiving entirely the task of political philosophy at this juncture of our history. 64 In his essay (1995b), Pogge questions the framework itself by bringing out three problems: (i) however specified, it favors institutional schemes that tend to overcompensate for minor natural inequalities (e.g., in cheerfulness and good looks); (ii) it fails to maintain fair equality of opportunity when doing so would be expensive, and (iii) it favors penal institutions that permit excessive punishments and restrictions of the basic liberties of suspected criminals whenever these lead to greater gains for the security of basic liberties on the whole. In view of these paradoxes, Pogge argues, it is perhaps time to examine alternatives to this reigning paradigm. My inclination is to agree with such a call, although not exactly or exclusively for the same reasons.

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Besides, on what basis can we legitimately and justifiably answer the fundamental demarcation questions [DQ1]? Could such a basis be, for example, the special moral obligations we owe to fellow-nationals (a cultural matter) or to fellow-citizens (a political matter)? Which is it? I am here drawing a distinction between these two expressions more strictly than is the case in common usage in order to capture the different ways in which partiality can be defended against the moral egalitarianism and universalism of liberalism. If it is the former, then we may have to admit that some peoples around the world owe some special moral obligations to their fellow-nationals who live across several borders. If it is the latter, then do our special moral obligations extend similarly and with the same force to those of our fellow-citizens (not necessarily our fellow-nationals) who happen to live in other countries by choice—leaving aside the case of those who have been assigned by their governments for work-related reasons? Or do we have to say that these fellow-citizens have somehow forfeited the debt of special obligations we owe them by moving to another territorial state? Shouldn’t their welfare and well-being be our concern wherever they are—that is, if citizenship is indeed “portable”? If this is the case, then can we meaningfully care for their welfare and well-being in those other countries without at the same time being concerned by the welfare and well-being of the people (nationals/citizens) of those other countries in which they live and work?65 The difficulty of these kinds of questions is quickly revealed and further compounded when, staying at home, we recognize the multinational and multi-cultural character of many (perhaps most) countries or states around the world, and the challenging problems posed by the increasing waves of (illegal/legal) immigrants into their territorial boundaries. Does it make sense to say that we have no moral obligations to those (legal/illegal) immigrants in our midst, and that we owe them nothing? This would certainly make a mockery of any notion of morality 65

Despite the fact that our political institutions are in many ways still lagging behind, and the fact that some of our political theories with a clear cosmopolitan or globalist inclination may be running far ahead of our times and its realities, it is hard not to recognize nevertheless the reality of our connectedness and togetherness in terms of our overall welfare and well-being. For this purpose, a measured, consistent and realistic recalibration of both our political institutions as well as our theories may be in order. This is in part what this essay aims to argue.

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that we may have—especially if we characterize morality in general terms as the concern for one’s fellow human beings, and particularly those that are absolutely worst-off among us. Wouldn’t it? Suppose however that one adopts an institutional approach to political philosophy, in which we take certain aspects of the world as given constraints for the purpose of political theorizing—whether it be (i) the fact of moderate scarcity, or (ii) the existence of the current “system of dispersed or distributed sovereignty” (resulting into the states or so-called nation-states we have in the world as we know it).66 Does this mean then that our task is to find principles by which state borders might be determined and defended—such that, for example, only fellow-nationals should be allowed to be co-citizens in a given state?67 Apart from being methodologically problematic, such a proposal could easily be countered (within the assumed framework) by arguing that we are better off instead taking the existence of state powers and institutions as a pre-theoretical given, and then ask what, if anything, might justify the coercive grasp of these powers, and the subsequent liability or loss of autonomy (if any) that it inflicts on its citizens for the sake of a mutually cooperative and beneficial arrangement in which citizens accept to share in the opportunities, benefits and goods offered as well as the burdens and risks? Such a question is justificatory, and it is arguably such a question that Rawls is best understood to have asked, but left unanswered in the end (e.g., Wenar, 2001; Blake, 2001).

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The first supposition is hardly tenable given the actual wealth and resources of the world, and the morally outrageous disparities in distribution that exist (Dreze and Sen, 1989). As for the second, one may well argue that it is the result of the Westphalian order created several centuries ago, and that while it may have served a good purpose for however long, it is no longer adequate enough as a basis for the newly emerging condition of the world. We need to consider some alternative principles in order to bring a radically “new global order” that is more equitable and fair (Buchanan, 2001). This is what some of the most radical among cosmopolitans are in effect arguing (see Kok-Chor Tan, 2004). 67 It has sometimes been argued by liberal nationalists (e.g., Tamir, Miller) that the flourishing and protection of the national-cultural community is a human good, and that as such, it requires the members of each national-cultural community control their own political institutions. Such a call not only flies in the face of the reality of the world, but it is flatly unrealistic and untenable. If it were to be acted upon, it would require that we condone secessions in many parts of the world or in any case massive relocation programs of a kind that are hardly conceivable, let alone practicable or feasible (see Buchanan, 2004).

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3.3 Reformulation of the Problem for Political Liberalism To follow through with the most over-arching line of reasoning carried out so far, the problem for liberal political theory can then be reformulated as follows: Unless liberal theory can satisfactorily explain why a social contract should include only certain individuals while leaving others out, a global contract seems the only possible option, “making the life prospects of the globally least advantaged the primary standard for assessing our social institutions.”68 Rawls does not choose this option and prefers, like other liberal writers, to start from, “what is and grope towards the ought.”69 The “is” in this case is a world divided into nation-states (or rather, into states). But a coherent liberal theory should either endorse this world order and explain its virtues, or reject it and suggest ways of changing it. Accepting it without explaining it seems unjustified (Tamir, 1993; 120; additions in parentheses).

Under the traditional so-called “political conception,” the absence of global sovereignty constitutes a serious obstacle to the realization of 68

This would be tantamount to a global application of Rawls’ Difference Principle—which is recommended by some cosmopolitan liberals (e.g., Beitz, 1979: 152; Barry, 1989: 187-9; Pogge, 1989; Scanlon, 1974: 202-4), but rejected by others who view it as unrealistic and ethically objectionable given the altogether different “circumstances of justice,” to use Hume’s expression, that characterize the international arena, in contrast to the national context (Chauvier, 2001: 91). 69 One may here articulate a Humean inspired objection based on the fact-value distinction, and against the naturalistic fallacy, according to which one cannot logically derive an “ought” (a value) from an “is” (a fact). But, apart from the forceful and convincing arguments against the validity of the fact-value distinction and about its collapse provided by Putnam (2004), this kind of objection would be missing the point: no value is derived from a fact, no “ought” is derived from an “is.” We nevertheless expect Rawls to provide an accurate and compelling account of what is, and a justification for what ought to be. This reasoning may also be viewed more generally as part of an objection against Rawlsian cosmopolitans along the following line. Even an objective (global) interdependence (as a fact of the increasingly globalizing world) does not constitute actionable justification for a normative injunction about what ought to be done. In all fairness however, cosmopolitans could argue that they are simply asking themselves what we ought to do in the face of an impeachable fact; in other words, how should we live and structure the (international, transnational and supranational or global) institutions that impact the world in the face of the increasing, undeniable, “objective interdependence” so as to avoid morally objectionable and egregious poverty, hunger, and obscene inequalities.

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justice globally. It assumes that “sovereign states are not merely instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting fellow citizens (or should I say, fellownationals) of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice” (Nagel, 2005: 120). Sovereign states, it is said, have the boundaries and populations they have for all sorts of accidental and historical reasons. Given that they exercise coercive power over their citizens, and in the best (democratic) scenarios, in their name, those citizens have a duty of justice toward one another through the legal, social and economic institutions that sovereign powers make possible. Subsequently, this duty of justice is said to be sui generis, and presumably not owed to everyone in the world. Furthermore, it is not considered to be an indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to everyone in the world, such as a duty of humanity. Justice, it is therefore said, is owed through shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation: it is characterized in short as an associative obligation— that derives primarily and exclusively from the relations that exist between fellow-citizens or nationals—or as some put it, between those that are near and dear, and that we can see or hear. If one upholds such a view, the absence of global justice will not be a cause for great concern; it may even be expected to follow from assumed premises. One may still however find cause for much concern in the scale and depth of the misery we see around the world, and in the intolerable injustice internal to so many of the world’s sovereign states. One may even come to accept that one has a duty to promote just institutions for societies that don’t have them—albeit a secondary duty, with our first duty being to our own society and its members. But one would still not believe that the duty of justice—and its attendant requirements—apply to the world as a whole, unless and until, as a result of historical developments (required or not by justice, or by some other normative considerations of stability, security, order and peace), the world comes to be governed by a unified world government, or at least, as federation of states. While most, if not all, political theorists would object to the former for reasons similar to those given by Kant and Rawls in more recent times [Rawls (1999: 36); Kant, 1970 (1784, 1795)], some globalist, some cosmopolitan thinkers consider the latter option not only desirable but necessary (Follesdal, 2001: 242). This would seem to be the line of reasoning that follows consistently.

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If however, and in contrast to the traditional political conception, one takes a more cosmopolitan perspective, one would come to view the existence of sovereign states (and the traditional conception of sovereignty underwriting their existence) as an obstacle, which may well be insurmountable for the time being and for the foreseeable future, to the pursuit or establishment of global justice. One may nevertheless consider it to be morally inconsistent not to wish for the world at large a (different) system of institutions that could achieve the same standards of fairness and equal opportunity that liberals want for their own society. Once again, the accident of being born in a poor country rather than a rich one would be deemed as arbitrary a determinant of one’s fate as the accident of being born into a poor rather than a rich family in the same country. Even if, assuming the traditional conception, we may not be warranted strictly speaking in describing the world as unjust given the absence of global sovereignty, we may nevertheless and all the same decry the absence of justice. Alternatively, we may want to question the traditional coupling of justice and sovereignty, and seek to endow the world’s institutions (those currently existing and those that may feasibly be brought into existence in short order) with sufficient sovereignty and power so as to enable them to achieve a higher degree of justice on a global scale. Admittedly, the world does not yet have institutions comparable in terms of their coercive powers and associative moral obligations to those we presumably find in sovereign states. But once again it must also be recognized that the world—especially in this accelerated and intensified phase of globalization that we are all witnessing and enduring (albeit with different fortunes and consequences for our well-being and life prospects depending on where we live)—has an increasingly larger number of institutions with global reach, with an increasing (though differentiated) impact on the sovereign power of states, as well as the life-prospects and (absolute/relative) advantages of individuals and communities around the world. The question must therefore be raised and seriously entertained: Is there anything that can be done in terms of how we design and implement the institutions on the basis of which inter-national relations, trans-national, supra-national or global affairs are conducted so as to dramatically mitigate or reduce the widening disparities and inequalities that are now so familiar? (See Held, 2000; for a discussion of how we may re-invent politics by regulating globalization). It may be worth recalling again briefly the now well-known “facts of global inequalities”: Roughly 20% of the world’s population live on less

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than a dollar a day, and more than 45% live on less than two dollars a day, whereas the 15% who live in the high-income economies have an average per capita income of 75 dollars a day (Pogge, 2001: 6-23 for a different set of figures and statistics, see also Pogge, 2002: 97-99, 2005; Nagel, 2005: 118; Stieglitz, 2002: 25). How should we deal with these disturbing facts? Should we even care to do something about them? A more pertinent and direct question is here warranted, it seems to me: Do the rich countries of the world (and their citizens) have a causal or moral responsibility for alleviating this state of affairs? 70 Do the current, historically contingent institutions of the world’s political and economic order have something to do with this profoundly disturbing state of affairs—to put it mildly? Short of calling for a world government with global sovereignty, is there anything that can be done realistically (and more than what we are currently doing) in the name of doing justice to our fellow human beings around the world? Are our moral obligations of justice owed only to our fellow-nationals or fellow-citizens? Can such a view be deemed morally defensible, even if it can be justified politically?71 Or is this more a matter of humanitarian duty and charity rather than one of justice? Nagel writes in this respect: The facts are so grim that justice may be a side issue. Whatever views one takes of the applicability or inapplicability of standards of justice to such a situation, it is clearly a disaster from a more broadly humanitarian point of view. I assume there is some minimal concern we owe to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and early death 70

Such a distinction can perhaps help make the point that the rich countries of the world—for the most part, Western liberal democracies—owe the rest of the world more than foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, or charity. If we first accept that they do have some moral obligations out of benevolence, beneficence, or the duty of humanity, and if we can further establish that to a large extent the rich countries got rich over the course of their recent history on the back of the poor countries of world by implementing and enforcing unfair arrangements, and have even caused their poverty or prevented their due and potential development, then it becomes clear that the former owe a lot more to the latter—i.e., they owe them what (compensatory) justice requires. For an argument along these lines, see Pogge (2002). 71 I believe the distinction between “morally defensible” and “politically justified” is here warranted, and will also prove useful later on in my discussion—when particularly I use Rawls’ adequacy criterion against his own proposal for international justice to resolve the dilemma of liberalism, as well as those of his cosmopolitan critics.

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Essay # 8 from easily preventable diseases, as all these people in dire poverty are. Although there is plenty of room for disagreement about the most effective methods, some form of humane assistance from the well-off to those in extremis in clearly called for quite apart from any demand of justice if we are not simply ethical egoists. The urgent current issue is what can be done in the world economy to reduce extreme global poverty (Nagel, 2005; 118; italics added).

He goes on to add that these basic duties of humanity present however serious problems regarding what we should do individually and collectively in order to fulfill them given the absence of global sovereignty, and in spite of the obstacles often presented by malfunctioning sovereign states. But this is a different question, says Nagel, “one that is morally less urgent but philosophically harder.” It is arguably important to keep these two dimensions (individual vs. collective moral duties and responsibilities) separate, and to examine what each requires of us from a moral standpoint. Peter Singer’s arguments (1972) have often focused on the former, while Pogge (1989; 2002) has more often insisted on the second, and most specifically, on the importance of not confusing these two dimensions. Singer’s argument has tended to focus on the capacity of moral agents to live up to the demands posited by his cosmopolitan liberal-utilitarian perspective. The problem with such an approach is that, in the domestic context, we have a focus not simply on individual morality, but upon the moral evaluation of social institutions and practices—that is, upon social justice, as distinct from morality. Liberal justice does not concern itself primarily with the kind of moral choices that Singer seems interested in, but with the background institutions within which these choices are made. In this regard, Pogge is quite right in pointing that “we must keep sharply distinct …how the ground rules of a social system ought to be assessed/ designed, from the (secondary) subject of how actors (including individuals, associations, the government) may and should act within an ongoing scheme whose terms are taken as fixed. The former of the subjects, justice, is concerned with the moral assessment and justification of social institutions; the latter, morality, with the assessment of conduct and character” (Pogge, 1989: 17). The liberal theory of justice does not go simply towards the legitimacy of individual choices, but to the legitimacy of the social system within which these choices are made. It analyzes in Rawls’ phrase “the basic structure of society” rather simply the individual decisions made as to the use of resources. A fuller extension of the

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globalization of morality, therefore, requires an examination of the form and nature of the global society, so as to inquire as to whether liberal principles ought (not) to hold at the global level as well. A logical extension of Singer’s project then is the examination of the institutions and practices which hold sway in the global arena, to see if these might (not) be by the same liberal principles which are generally applied only within the domestic sphere. It is this extension that is provided by “Rawlsian cosmopolitans” such as Pogge and Beitz. From the standpoint of our common and ordinary understanding, justice requires more than mere humanitarian assistance to those in desperate in need, and injustice can occur even when no one is in desperate need or starving to death. If we assume that our humanitarian duties make sense on the basis of our assessment of the absolute rather than relative level of need of the people we are in a position to help without incurring for ourselves great costs or sacrifices, 72 justice, in contrast, is about evaluating the relations between the conditions of different groups of people around the world and the causes of the inequalities that obtain between them. And so, our concern should be, as Nagel quite rightly puts it: “…how to respond to world inequality in general from the point of view of justice and injustice rather than humanity alone.” The answer we give to that question will depend crucially on “one’s moral and political conception of the relation between the value of justice and the existence of the institutions that sovereign authority makes possible” (2005: 119), or alternatively, I would say, on how we construe or envision political sovereignty and propose to reform it so as to make it more responsive to today’s more pressing moral and justice-claims—not only from our fellow-citizens, but perhaps more urgently, from far more needy foreign and distant strangers.

3.4 The Task(s) of Political Philosophy In light of the preceding discussion, the question about what should be the proper task of political philosophy must be raised anew and answered—if only briefly: Is it to take for granted the existence and range of the current governing institutions and then seek to find principles on the basis of which the powers of these institutions can be justified? Or is it to 72

A point that both Singer and Pogge have made repeatedly each in their way in order to point out our moral bankruptcy in the face of our continued inaction and lack of sufficient concern.

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critically evaluate all existing institutions in order (i) to ascertain their justification and moral as well as political legitimacy, (ii) to take a measure of the gap separating their stated purposes and actual achievements, and (iii) whenever need be or appropriate, to engage in theorizing which abstracts away from them all and makes proposals about alternative, feasible institutions which could be set up? Is it neither exclusively, or is it both—in different measures and orders of priority at different times and for different purposes? In my own view, it must be the latter. In the meantime, it might be useful to map out (as in the table below) the main contending political theories of justice—based on what their primary emphasis, orientation or focus is—which can be situated within the predominant contractarian-consequentialist paradigm of contemporary political philosophy. Needless to say, I am here concerned with the primary emphasis or focus of each theory, even though other considerations may also be included within their respective scope.

(1) Recipients

(3) Agents / Actors

(2) Structures-Institutions

(4) Relations-Interactions

Table 8-1: Primary Emphasis—Different Political Theories

In the relevant context(s) of justice, (1) who are or should be the primary recipients? Whose claims to justice must be heeded first, second, third, etc.? (2) What are the best, most effective and justifiable structures or institutional schemes which would enable us to meet the claims of the targeted (non-targeted) recipients? (3) What are the primary and /or secondary agents of justice? What social actors can be counted on to meet the demands of justice? And finally, (4) what are the rules and procedures, morally justifiable, that can best serve to regulate in a just and fair way the relations and interactions between all concerned parties—however narrowly or broadly we construe the latter, whether they be individual citizens in a given country or peoples and states around the world? As my discussion so far has hopefully shown, it matters a great deal what one considers the relevant context of justice for determining the scope of (a theory of) justice. Does for example the international, transnational or supranational and global context constitute a relevant

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context of justice? Do the “circumstances of justice” found in that context warrant or justify the application or applicability of the same principles (or similar to those) applied in the national or domestic context? Clearly an answer to question (1) above will depend on how we answer the preliminary question of context. Nevertheless, it is unimaginable that a theory of justice will have or make no provisions on such a question. Depending on the philosophical, political, and methodological assumptions one makes in constructing one’s theory, we may choose to focus on (2) as Rawls did in the Theory of Justice (1971) or on (4) as he did in The Law of Peoples (1999a),73 or one may, as some proponents of deliberative democracy argue, focus on procedural rules (and therefore on (4)) rather than substantive principles in the hope of thereby achieving a higher degree of consensus. 74 While considerations about who are or should be the main agents of justice have often been implicit, the significance of such a focus has been highlighted and stressed in recent years by several theorists—including Pogge (2001ab) and Onora O’Neill (2001).

3.5 States, Nation-States, and National Boundaries Revisited Though some theorists still refer indiscriminately to states or nationstates, there are in fact strictly speaking few nation-states, if any at all (Hurrell, 2001: 52; Tamir, 1993: 120; Blake, 2005). Most, if not all, of the states in the world today are multi-national (and multi-cultural) states. For the most part, they have come to be as such by virtue of historically contingent developments over a period of time—except for those that were constituted as such by design, on the basis of their chosen constitutional provisions (e.g., US, Canada, and possibly Australia, though I am not sure) as well as those that became independent in the aftermath of decolonization in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is therefore one of the givens we have to work with in political theory today. It goes without saying that many of the advantages that accrue to these states by virtue of their composition are counter-balanced by the enormous problems and 73

In a recent paper, Pogge (2006) brought out this contrast between Rawls’ theories in an effort to show the incoherence he finds in his work. 74 As we know, there is a serious disagreement between Rawls and these proponents not only about the viability of an approach that focuses only on procedural rules (that is “thin” on substance or without any substantial commitments to substantive principles) and whether the degree of consensus sought and hoped for by such proponents is realistic. See Benhabib, 2002; see also Rawls, 1993/1996.

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challenges they have to face for the exact same reason. No one can deny the difficulties that multi-national and multi-cultural societies are facing today: it suffices to open any newspapers to learn about the challenges faced by various countries in different regions in their respective efforts to do justice to the different claims of their diverse constituencies—whether these claims are claims of recognition or of distributive justice. This is of course not to mention that the national and cultural map of many regions has been further scrambled by the massive flow of peoples across borders and swelling waves of immigrants which have been going on for quite some time and which have been accelerated and dramatically expanded in this era of globalization (Carens, 1987). This being said, it is still the case that national boundaries, or rather, state territorial borders are an undeniable fact of the world as we know it, and that duly or unduly constituted governments or states still do have the (justified or unjustified) monopoly of power and coercion over the inhabitants and population living within their respective territorial boundaries. 75 It is also an undeniable fact that states—whether liberal, non-liberal, illiberal, or outright autocratic and dictatorial—will be and will remain part of the picture in international relations (i.e., the “system of dispersed or distributed sovereignty”) for the foreseeable future, and are therefore entitled, at least according to current international law, to the respect of their respective sovereignty (however qualified), and this, despite the continuous but incremental changes in our conception of sovereignty which have occurred in the aftermath of WWII, and most notably, since 1991 (Strange, 1996).76

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This is so regardless of the fact that some of these states grant their citizens a right to exit (i.e., a right to emigrate) and others the corresponding right to immigrate, without which the former is without content. 76 The current international system, constituted under the “system of distributed or dispersed sovereignty,” is, as we know, a more or less direct product of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the order that it established thereafter based on the following principles: 1—The principle of the sovereignty of nation-states and the concomitant fundamental right of political self-determination; 2—the principle of (legal) equality between nation-states; 3—the principle of internationally binding treaties between states; and, 4—the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of other states. Admittedly, the conception of international relations enshrined here has been undergoing changes since WWII, and especially since the end of the Cold War, not to mention that it has been frequently criticized by politicians and theorists alike of different persuasions for being inadequate and even responsible for the continued discord that still exist today (Buchanan, 2001).

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It is unquestionable that substantial and significant changes have taken place, esp., in the past few decades as a result of globalization. These changes have compelled some theorists to question the viability and meaning of state sovereignty in such a newly evolved context, and others to re-affirm it in reaction (Mann, 1997).77 While we may acknowledge, for this and other reasons, that state sovereignty is no longer what it used to be, we must also reasonably and realistically recognize that states still are and will remain for the foreseeable future the main and most powerful agents (of justice or injustice, for that matter) on the international scene today. To be sure, the intensity, density and depth of the changes78 which the world has been undergoing and witnessing in recent decades due to globalization in various areas (e.g., trade, finances, environment, politics, and culture) must be properly and fully countenanced by any viable or adequate political theory today. Obviously, how and in what specific ways a given theory chooses to do so will constitute a distinguishing mark of its strengths or weaknesses. This may in fact lead us to envision certain possibilities and consider options which were previously off the table, so to speak. Most specifically, this may lead to diagnose in a new way newly emerging features or facets of the problems of inequity, inequality, disparity and deformity of the world order unfolding before us. For example, we may well come to recognize that far from there being a viable or desirable comprehensive, systematic, and total solution to all the different kinds of problems we face (because such a solution always carried with it the “totalitarian temptation” that we should avoid at any and all costs, we are better off devising a more modular, flexible, and pluralistic approach, that is best adapted to countenancing levels-spheres-

Nevertheless, nothing of the same order has yet been produced to replace it, and found a new world order—as many have been calling or hoping for. 77 Some seem to have prematurely predicted the demise and future disappearance of the state (or nation-state) as we have known it (Gosepath, 2001: 154-5), while others, more alarmed or concerned about the negative impact of globalization have called for the reinforcement and strengthening of the state, its structures and apparatuses, as a way of mitigating and counteracting more effectively what they view as essentially undesirable and profoundly destabilizing and damaging consequences of this apparently unstoppable phenomenon (Donnelly, 2002; see also Bayart, 2004). 78 To the terms that Hurrell (2001:33) puts into play in his analysis, I am here adding the term of “intensity” because I believe it serves to characterize a dimension of globalization often neglected or overlooked.

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and-scapes-specific considerations. 79 Nevertheless, short of engaging in wishful thinking or plain and unrestrained utopianism, our theorizing about international (or global) affairs must be anchored in the world as we know it—not necessarily as it is and as it will always be, but as it is, and as it could be or could become realistically given already emerging developments, trends, dispositions or propensities 80 —and otherwise, incremental nudges toward a “new world order” that are already under way, in different measures and differently at different levels.

3.6 International vs. Global— Supranational vs. Transnational Justice I did not say “new global order” earlier because I believe that an adequate political theory must be based on an empirically accurate and historically realistic characterization of the situation of the world today. As such, it must make a distinction between “international justice” and “global (or supranational) justice”—no matter how strongly we may wish that they coincide and become indistinguishable. And it is clear that a number of globalists or cosmopolitans entertain such a wish. If, as I pointed out earlier, the “system of distributed or dispersed sovereignty” is still the system according to which relations between sovereign states or national entities are established and maintained, then inter-national justice is about the normative and legal principles on the basis of which such relations are (and should be) evaluated and judged. As for “global (or supranational) justice,” while it arguably makes sense as a normative ideal of justice, we must recognize that it does not yet have “the requisite (bounded and unified) institutional structure” to validate, justify and implement it in practice. In any case, one may legitimately question whether such a structure exists already. 79 Indirectly, I am trying to suggest here that the pluralism we should seek to countenance and accommodate must be robust indeed, and not merely one that recognizes the multiplicity and diversity of variously existing forms of life (in terms of political-economic organization, cultural practices, moral beliefs and systems), but also one that takes into account the merit(s) of devising and implementing many different area-domain-scape-level or sphere-specific pragmatic solutions, under the highly reasonable tenet of a kind of “holistic pragmatism,” according to which there are many different right ways of doing things rightly, just as, conversely, there are many different, yet wrong ways of doing things wrongly. 80 The qualification introduced here is part and parcel of the alternative view that I propose under the designation of “cosmopolitan pluralism.”

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In “The Global Scope of Justice,” Gosepath writes interestingly enough the following: “By developing universalistic conceptions of justice, philosophy came up with a theory of global theory that was, and still is, running ahead of its time, since it corresponds to a process of globalization and diminishment of national-state power of which people are only now becoming aware. Philosophy is here not even too late. Minerva’s Owl must this time wait for daybreak, here not needing to start its flight only at night.” He goes on to add: “Justice can no longer be conceived merely in terms of the nation-state when nation-states are increasingly losing their original power to supra-national actors—when supra-national political allegiances such as the EU and NATO, and internationally operating corporations with enormous amounts of private money, are much bigger, stronger, and more flexible than many states could be. We seem to be moving towards a new post-national constellation (Habermas, 1998).” And he concludes: “For this challenge of globalization, a conception of global instead of national justice seems the most, if not the only appropriate contemporary answer” (2001: 154-5; italics added). While it is correct to say “justice can no longer be conceived merely in terms of the nation-state,” it is unclear how fast we are really moving toward a post-national constellation, as Gosepath remarks. Like many cosmopolitans in this regard, he may be moving too fast and somehow rushing ahead of himself. By “requisite institutional structure,” I mean something similar to the “basic structure” (in the broadest sense of Rawls’ term) of a given society or state81—with the kind of coercive power that the latter typically enjoys

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With the additional proviso that I would not characterize such a structure in terms of the ideal theory as Rawls does—as a self-sufficient, territorially bounded society whose (adult, normally functioning) members see themselves and each other as “free and equal persons” seeking to establish mutually advantageous and beneficial terms of cooperation. See Nussbaum, 2006 for an argument along this line. It should also be noted that Rawls has in fact considerably narrowed down the notion of “basic structure” in his later work (1996: 255-288) in which he characterizes it in terms of political constitution or “constitutional fundamentals.” I agree with Pogge’s criticism of Rawls in this regard. This cannot be right, because, on such a construal, Rawls would have nothing to say about social systems which don’t have such a structure. I don’t think however that the notion of “basic structure” should be broadened in a self-serving, ad hoc way so as to include any set of rules whatsoever known in advance which shapes the interactions and exchanges between individuals in the public arena. It should obviously include sets of rules in terms of which interactions and exchanges take place, but only those which are conceived and implemented under a given system of legal and political

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for better or worse, and which is often backed up by an appropriately constituted “public political culture.” To be sure, I am not here taking issue with, or denying the increasingly significant role and the unquestionably real impact that a larger and larger number of institutions of various kinds (operating at different levels under different orders of normativity) have today on the different countries and regions of the globe as well as more directly on the life prospects of individuals within these countries and regions.82 I am simply recognizing the obvious and making it even more obvious, and that is, there is no global state or world government—not yet, and perhaps there will never be one, or rather, there should never be one, for all the well-known reasons that several philosophers since Kant (including Rawls) have brought up. There is no global state, and there are, therefore, no related and unified global institutions with the recognized and justified coercive power and mandate to bring about global justice for each and for all. In view of this state of affairs, one may question, as some philosophers have done (e.g., Nagel, 2005: 113-5),83 whether we can even make sense of the notion of “global justice”—given the prevailing partitioned state of the world and the currently still predominant conception in political theory. It is not my intention here to defend the view according to which political theory and philosophy must necessarily and exclusively confine its work to the justification of currently existing institutions, and that philosophy can only come late and must somehow hold its time in thought, or that the Owl of Minerva can only take its flight at dusk. Quite to the contrary, I believe that philosophy may actually in some situations run ahead of its time, and the Owl of Minerva may even have to wait until daybreak to take its flight. But it need not. The real challenge for (political) philosophy is to determine more precisely how far ahead of its time can it afford to run so as to still be relevant and applicable in its time, or so as to still be viewed as relevant and applicable in some not-too-distant and reachable future, rather than as merely speculative, idealistic, and utopian—flying high in the clouds, so to speak, and not grounded enough in the realities of life here on earth—given what both human beings and coercion—at least if we care to remain broadly speaking within the Rawlsian framework. 82 Pogge’s work in this regard is, I believe, quite strong and compelling. See also Hurrell, 2001: 32-54. 83 It must be noted that, in accord with what he calls the “political conception,” Nagel (2005) ties the notion of justice to that of a bounded, territorial sovereign state.

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institutions might realistically become 84 —in the pursuit of reasonable goals and (minimal vs. maximal) ideals of justice. If, however, what I suggested above is correct, then we must recognize that it is not only possible but required of us to make sense of another closely related notion, that of “trans-national justice” (Risse-Kappen, 1995). While state or national boundaries are realities we must still contend with, esp., when we are traveling, we cannot deny that they have become highly “porous” and permeable, and perhaps even merely “virtual.” As a result, they are unable to contain the massive flows across them of goods, services, information, capital and people. 85 While they are still nominally the markers of the internationally recognized territorial sovereignty of states, they are increasingly powerless in the face of the numerous and different kinds of trans-national incursions and transactions characteristic of the global era—by members of the so-called “global civil society,” including NGOs, individual experts, multinational corporations, social and political movements, and even governments, etc. (O’Brien, 2000). The notion of “global civil society” is, I believe, often used without much discrimination between the different kinds of actors or agents that it actually includes or covers. It might perhaps be useful to distinguish for example between (i) civic actors (“MNCs of the heart” or NGOs) from (ii) economic actors (MNCs or TNCs whose moral and social responsibilities are increasingly being redefined as in The Global Compact), and from (iii) individuals or groups of (scientific, policy, or legal) experts—who all have an increasing role beyond the borders of their respective countries of origin. Their roles are however of a different nature and their respective impact must be differentiated and evaluated differently.

84 This contrasts with the view of Rousseau, adopted by Rawls in The Law of Peoples (1999: 7), according to which “realistically utopian” political philosophy is necessarily constrained by “men as they are,” and by “laws (or institutions) as they might (should, or ought to) be.” 85 It may be said for example that the “perceived” benefits of globalization are such that governments and states no longer find it necessary or in their interest to police their borders as they once did. Or they are even no longer able to do so. But this would be neglecting the “flip-side” of globalization—increased illegal activities, trafficking, not to mention the security risks posed by emboldened radical and extremist individuals and groups, or so-called “terrorist threats” since 9/11—which seems to have provided the necessary “justification” (or pretext) for implementing what already looks like a very tight and secure system of surveillance and control.

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And so, as some theorists have argued (O’Neill, 1991; Forst, 2001b), we can rightfully and meaningfully talk instead of “transnational justice” and we should. Subsequently, we should seek to articulate and clarify the principles on the basis of which we can judge, evaluate and justify the relations, exchanges, and others transactions taking place in the world today across nations, trans-nationally, so to speak, between all the different actors implicated, whether individually or collectively, regionally or sub-regionally. Such a notion not only makes sense, but it is also less problematic than that of “global justice” because the institutional reality and attendant practices that it seeks to evaluate and justify already exist and are arguably “thicker.” The distinctions and qualifications made in this section can only serve our purposes in helping us to articulate a theory that is not only realistic in that it captures the multi-layered and complex nature of uneven developments taking place at different institutional levels under different orders of normativity in the world today. But also a theory that is realistically utopian in that it enables us to better see that while some progress is made on one or several levels, it is neither continuous nor gained once for all given a number of backslidings, and that much more needs to be achieved, more consistently on this and other levels as well— including intra-nationally. The complex yet real picture which is part and parcel of the “ordered pluralism” that I have in mind could be sketched out as follows: we have first (1) the inter-national order as enshrined in the traditional law of peoples, the Charter of the UN, and all the UN-related institutions. Second, (2) the trans-national order as regulated and enshrined in organizations like the GATT, WTO, ILO, IMF, WB, etc. as well as various Regional Free-Trade Agreements, Special Trade Zones, Regional Integrations, etc. And third, we have (3) the supra-national order as reflected for example in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Criminal Court of Justice, as well as Treaties, Protocols, or Institutions dealing with the Environment, Global Warming, Public Health and Infectious Diseases, etc. These levels and orders of normativity are clearly related and interacting in many ways. It goes without saying that the activities of NGOs and various other Non-State Actors and Agents can be felt at all levels in different ways and degrees. Obviously, each of these levels or orders has a differentiated impact on what transpires in terms of meeting

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the demands of justice within each nation or country, and across nations and countries. One could also say that the degree of justice achieved within each country may in part depend on its level of compliance (or noncompliance) with each level of order, or rather, on how it is treated at that level. One thing is clear is that, in the past half-century, we have been witnessing a proliferation of legal instruments and tools at all levels with varying degrees of fairness and normativity, with unequal effectiveness in terms of their constraining jurisdictional power. When we add up however the developments at all the distinguished levels, we get a more nuanced picture than we would otherwise—i.e., one which compels neither straightforward naïve optimism nor outright extreme pessimism, but the recognition of a mixed bag of somewhat encouraging achievements as well as very disappointing setbacks in some cases. However, the repeated calls in recent years for the more or less radical reforms of the institutions operating at each of these different levels and orders—whether it be of their rules and procedures, their structures and modalities of representation, or their juridical, legal and other coercive or disciplinary mechanisms to ensure fairness, discipline and compliance, etc.—testify to the widespread recognition of the deficits, failures, shortcomings, and inadequacies of these institutions in dealing with our political and economic realities, and in addressing the cosmopolitan moral demands of the 21st century. Naturally, we can only conclude, by paraphrasing the words of the poet Robert Frost that “we still have a long way to go before we sleep.”

4. Closing Remarks By way of closing remarks, I will attempt to clarify the conception of “cosmopolitanism” I subscribe to, and specify further the underlying conception of “pluralism” I wish to put into play in the context of formulating an adequate political theory—one that is applicable beyond the national or domestic sphere, yet short of the global sphere—as such, and which might serve our purpose in addressing the fundamental dilemma of liberalism.

4.1 Rooted Moral or Normative Cosmopolitanism As I suggested earlier, I distinguish between moral or normative cosmopolitanism and institutional, legal or political cosmopolitanism. The distinction is now commonly drawn. Consistent liberals must, I contend, at

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least uphold the former kind of cosmopolitanism, according to which the primary object or unit moral concern should be the individual person— regardless of residency, citizenship or nationality, as the minimum required for theoretical and moral consistency. It should be viewed at the same time as the highest moral aspiration, utopian in a sense, and as the most difficult challenge facing different people as they each in their own rooted and distinctive way try to give it a more substantial reality in the long course of history. It is nevertheless a realistically utopian goal, whereas to aim for the latter, that is, for the institutional, legal, or political kind, would be outright idealistic, utopian, and unrealistic—not to mention, undesirable and perhaps even dangerous. Apart from the despotic and totalitarian temptation to which a political, legal, or cosmopolitanism would be prone, it would more than likely undermine the very conditions for a genuine and robust pluralism and diversity. I consider the latter to be not only as a fact that we have to contend with (a la Rawls), but a normatively desirable state of affairs giving us more options and alternatives to choose from, as we seek to find alternative institutional schemes or pragmatic solutions that would enable us to meet the claims of justice for each and all. But I also contend that our moral/normative cosmopolitanism should be viewed as rooted, in the sense articulated and defended by Appiah (2006), for example. In other words, it should be viewed as growing its roots locally, in a given soil—national, cultural, or territorial, and expanding outwardly organically, so to speak, as in “a concentric-circles model of morality,” to encompass in due time the whole population of the world. It should be viewed as such because I cannot conceive of it as being merely imposed from the outside, and being or remaining authentic or normatively compelling in any way—although, admittedly, the cosmopolitan outlook of a given people could be favorably influenced and even shaped by external factors, dissident voices, points of views anchored in other cultures and in the belief system of other peoples. This has always been going on and will continue to go on even more in this era of globalization. Besides, the rootedness of such a moral cosmopolitanism would enable us to address some of the concerns of communitarians, particularists and cultural perfectionists about the importance of community and belonging for the human good. Such a “rooted moral cosmopolitanism” could be accommodated by a number of mutually reinforcing values and institutional schemes or

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frameworks—wherein the “robust, yet ordered pluralism” that it calls for comes in—provided that they are all considered under the single most important normative constraint: Do they serve to protect or enhance the dignity and well-being of the human beings concerned?

4.2 Robust yet Ordered Pluralism—Under Rigorous Normative Constraints My approach would seek to countenance as much as possible what I call a “robust, yet ordered pluralism under a rigorous normative constraint.” In fact, it would have to be apprehended at both the descriptive and normative levels, not only in the political-economic domain but in the social-cultural and moral domains as well, provided however, as I emphatically stipulated above, that the institutional schemes, modes of political and economic organization, values, norms, and practices countenanced in any of these different domains serves to protect or enhance the dignity and well-being of each and all human beings concerned. One may alternatively formulate the normative constraint here placed as consisting of one basic right for each and all human beings, and that is, the right to justification—underwritten by the negative formulation of the contractualist criterion—Scanlon’s formulation. At the descriptive level, a robust pluralism (of institutions, rules, and arrangements) must countenance the indisputable “facts of pluralism” that we observe in the world at large as we know it today, but it must do so in an empirically nuanced and qualified manner, one that is capable of recognizing the multi-level and dispersed (or if one prefers, ordered) structure of international affairs and institutions. Whether a federal institutional order at the global level might prove justifiable or practically feasible at some point in the future remains to be seen. In the meantime, we should perhaps heed the lessons learned from witnessing the birthing, growth and development pains of the European Union in the past 50-60 years—up the recent setback with regard to the ratification of an EU constitution (see Brown, 1994; Pogge, 1997). At the normative level, a robust pluralism (of values) must be countenanced such that, in addition to the moral value of justice, our political theorizing takes into account other non-moral, yet normative values, those of stability, security, order and peace, for example. A political theory that is empirically and normatively adequate must seek to countenance a plurality of actors and agents of justice, and the fact

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that these actors or agents may and often do engage in a plurality of affiliations and relationships of solidarity (sometimes over-lapping and crisscrossing) with other like-minded actors or agents around the world, and increasingly along new and scrambled lines of political alliance, still not very well understood by many current political theories.86 This is a point, often stressed by Sen (1999; 2006) for example, in his discussion of justice in the newly emerging globalizing & glocalizing world, which I seek to validate here. All the while however, one need not neglect or belittle the role that states (even in their reduced or qualified sovereignty and diminished powers) can play as agents of justice, if they are moved by the right policies and priorities as morally responsible agents. Recognizing a plurality of legitimate “contexts of justice” (with differing claims and different degrees of normativity), such a theory would seek to accommodate a plurality of pragmatic solutions at all levels (local, regional, national, international, transnational supranational, global or even “glocal”) adopted for justified or justifiable political reasons to all those concerned. These solutions must be graded, structured or classified, and phased out over time depending on the urgency of the moral or justice claim at hand—minimal or maximal justice claim. Finally, it would seek to uphold the five-place concept of justice discussed earlier in order to give our moral evaluation and analyses greater perspicuity and power of qualification. It would have distinct answers to the DQ1, DQ2, and CQ. To the question: Whose claims of justice should be heeded and met? The answer is obvious. Its cosmopolitanism would be underwritten, as I suggested earlier, by a “concentric-circles model of morality.” As such, it would defend the principle of “basic right to justification” for each and all human beings, and would uphold the guarantee to each and all—regardless of residency, citizenship or nationality—of an adequate set of freedoms and liberties, and human rights—a far more extensive than Rawls’ basic list, and more in line with the UDHR, arguably along Pogge’s characterization in terms of articles 25 and 28 which I have argued earlier could be viewed as corresponding respectively to the demands of “minimal justice” and “maximal justice.” As for its answer to the central question under DQ2: Which specific 86 Studying how scrambled they are, and why they are scrambled in the way they are, could prove rewarding. In their book, Empire, Hardt and Negri (2000) attempt, among other things, to analyze the nature and dynamics of the new, scrambled political alliances in an effort to take a measure of the revolutionary potential of the so-called “multitudes.”

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principle of (re)distributive justice it would opt for? Its answer to this question remains open—though not completely undecided.87 Consistently with its avowed pluralism, the approach advocated here to the possibility that it could accommodate a number of principles in this regard currently on the table—without contradictions—as long as the space in which relevant and necessary evaluations, comparisons, and measurements are made is that of the “capabilities and functionings” of each and all individuals—relative to their respective contexts and conditions. The metric of the “capabilities’ has a comparative advantage in that it is compatible and can even be complementary with that of “resources,” “primary social goods,” “opportunities” and, of course, ”human rights” (see Essay # 5). A political theory construed under the empirical and normative considerations imposed by a “cosmopolitan pluralism”—of the kind advocated here—would pay particular attention to the CQ: What are people (actual or potential recipients) asked or expected to endure or contribute for the benefits owed to them? What role, if any, they have or could have in setting or changing the rules and arrangements according to which distributive policies are carried out in a given context? Etc. Finally, such a political theory would seek to countenance several different orientations at once or in turn. It would be recipient-oriented but it would also be agent- or actor-oriented. By the latter I mean, among other things, that it would pay attention to the agency and the capabilities of people to help themselves, and how to enhance them, rather than viewing them merely as passive recipients of benefits or entitlements. Furthermore, it would focus on the plurality of actual, implicated or designated or potential agents of (in)justice at various levels. It would also be structuralinstitutional in its orientation, but it would not fail to concern itself with the relational-interactive dimension—in which serious attention has to be paid the rules and procedures in place and according to which relations are established, transactions or interactions are carried out, and most specifically, attention must be paid to the often asymmetrical powerrelations that may be sustained by the established institutions and practices between the parties concerned. 87 The debate about the main candidates for a metric of distributive justice is far being resolved, and shows the promise of combining two or three of the current contenders discussed earlier. In the meantime, it is an advantage of the metric favored by my view (another index of its normative pluralism) that it is compatible and even complementary with two or more other contenders.

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In the end, I contend such a political theory—one based on (1) a rooted moral cosmopolitanism and (2) a robust, yet ordered pluralism under normative constraint (when fully fleshed out and substantiated) would engage in the required and judiciously appropriate amount of abstraction and idealization, but it would remain focused on the non-ideal conditions (rather than the ideal ones) under which we find ourselves for the most part. And because its central and most fundamental normative thrust consists essentially in urging that, at all levels and in all domains, we narrow or close the ever-yawning gap between our morally lofty intentions, statements and pronouncements and our actions and actual practices, I believe it is well-placed to deliver on its promise of a more “realistic utopia.”

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Donnelly, Jack (2002) “Human Rights, Globalizing Flows, and State Power.” In Alison Brysk (Ed.) Globalization and Human Rights. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 226-241. Dreze, Jean and Amartya Sen (1989) Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dworkin, Ronald (1981) “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 283-345. —. (1986) Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. (2000) Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eckert, Amy (2004) “A More Original Position: Toleration in John Rawls’ Law of Peoples.” HRHW working papers No. 18. Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Colorado. http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working/2004/18-eckert-2004.pdf Follesdal, Andreas (1997) “The Standing of Illiberal States, Stability, and Toleration in John Rawls’ Law of Peoples.” Acta Analytica 18:149-60. —. (2001). “Federal Inequality among Equals: A Defense of Contractualism.” In Thomas Pogge (Ed.). Global Justice. Metaphilosophy Series. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 242-261. Forst, Rainer (1999) “The Basic Right to Justification: Toward a Constructivist Conception of Human Rights.” Constellations 6: 35-60. —. (2001) Contexts of Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press. —. (2001) “Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice.” In Thomas Pogge (Ed.). Global Justice. Metaphilosophy Series. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 169-187. Frankfurt, Harry (1988). “Equality as a Moral Ideal.” In The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gosepath, Stefan (2001). “The Global Scope of Justice.” In Thomas Pogge (Ed.). Global Justice. Metaphilosophy Series. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 145168. Habermas, Jurgen (1998). The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Held, David (2000) “Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics.” International Sociology 15: 394-408. Hurka, Thomas (1997) “The Justification of National Partiality.” In Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (Eds.). The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hurrell, Andrew (2001). “Global Inequality and International Institutions.” In Thomas Pogge (Ed.) Global Justice. Metaphilosophy Series. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 32-54. Kant, Immanuel (1970 (1784)) “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective.” In Kant’s Political Writings (edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-53 —. (1970 (1795)) “Perpetual Peace.” In Kant’s Political Writings (edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kok-Chor Tan (2000) Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice. University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University. —. (2003) “Patriotic Obligations.” The Monist 86: 434-453. —. (2004) Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1984a) After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University. —. (1984b) “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” The Lindley Lectures Series. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. —. (1988) Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Mann, Michael (1997) “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and the Rise of the Nation-State?” Review of International Political Economy 4: 472-96. Margalit Avishai and Joseph Raz (1995) “National Self-Determination.” In Will Kymlicka (Ed.) The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, David (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. (1998) “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice.” In David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (Eds.) International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 164-81. —. (2000) “The Good, the Poor, and the Ugly: John Rawls and How Liberals Should Treat Non-Liberal Regimes.” Times Literary Supplement, March 24. Miller, Richard (1998) “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27: 202-224. Nagel, Thomas (2005). “The Problem of Global Justice.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/2: 113-147. Nussbaum, Martha (1992) “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.” Political Theory 20: 202-46. —. (1993) “Non-Relative Virtues.” In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Eds.) The Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. (1996) “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” In Joshua Cohen (Ed.) For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Boston: Beacon. —. (1997) “Capabilities and Human Rights,” 66 Fordham Law Review 273: 52. —. (2000) Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (2006). Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. O’Brien, Robert et al (2000) Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Neill, Onora (1988) “Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism.” Ethics 98/4: 705-722. —. (1991) “Transnational Justice.” In David Held (Ed.) Political Theory Today. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 276-304.

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—. (1996) Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (2001) “Agents of Justice.” In Thomas Pogge (Ed.). Global Justice. Metaphilosophy Series. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 188-203. Pogge, Thomas (1989) Realizing Rawls. New York: Cornell University Press. —. (1992a) “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” Ethics 103: 48-75. —. (1992b) “Loopholes in Morality.” Ethics 89: 79-98. —. (1994a) “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” In Chris Brown (Ed.) Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives. London: Routledge, pp. 89-122. —. (1994b) “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23/3: 195-224. —. (1995a) “How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?” In Joachim Hruschka (Ed.) Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik vol.3. Berlin: Dunkler & Humbolt, pp. 103-20. —. (1995b) “Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of Assessing Social Institutions.” Social Philosophy and Policy 12: 241-66. —. (1997) “Creating Supra-National Institutions Democratically: Reflections on the European Union’s Democratic Deficit.” Journal of Political Philosophy 5: 163-82. —. (1998) “The Bounds of Nationalism.” In Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen and Michel Seymour (Eds.). Rethinking Nationalism. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, pp. 463-504. —. (1999) “Human Flourishing and Universal Justice.” Social Philosophy and Policy 16/1: 333-61. —. (2001) “Justice.” In The International Encyclopedia for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, (Eds. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes). Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 8055-8061. —. (2001) “Priorities of Global Justice.” In Thomas Pogge (Ed.). Global Justice. Metaphilosophy Series. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 6-23. —. (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press. —. (2005). “World Poverty and Human Rights.” Ethics and International Affairs 19/1; —. (2006) “Do Rawls’ Theories of Justice Fit Together?” In Rex Martin and David Reidy (Eds.). Rawls’ Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Rawls, John (1971/1999) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. (1999a) The Law of Peoples—with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. —. (1993) “The Law of Peoples.” In Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (Eds.) On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, 1993. New York: Basic Books, pp.41-82. —. (1993/1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University. —. (1999b) Collected Papers. (Ed. Samuel Freeman). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Risse-Kappen, Thomas (Ed.). (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robeyns, Ingrid. (2004). “Justice as Fairness and the Capabilities Approach.” Unpublished Manuscript. Paper presented at the 4th Conference on the Capability Approach, Pavia, Italy, September 2-5, 2004. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University. —. (1992) “The Procedural Republic and the Encumbered Self.” In Shlomo Avineri and Avineri Avner (Eds.) Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scanlon, Thomas M. (1974) “Rawls’ Theory of Justice.” 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 5 (May) —. (1998) What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Scheffler, Samuel (1994) “Families, Nations, and Strangers.” The Lindley Lectures. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. —. (2003) Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sen, Amartya (1980) “Equality of What?” In Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Cambridge: MIT Press, 353-69. Reprinted in Sterling M. McMurrin (Ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980, pp. 195-220. —. (1987) The Standard of Living. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (1992) Inequality Re-Examined. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. —. (1996) “Capability and Well-Being.” In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Eds.) The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 30-53. —. (1999) Development as Freedom. New York: Random House. —. (1999). “Global Justice: Beyond International Equity.” In Inge Kaul et al (eds.) Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 116-125. —. (2004. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. (2006) Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. New York: Norton& Cie. Singer, Peter (1972) “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 229-43. —. (2002) One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1997) “The Real New World Order” Foreign Affairs 76/5: 183-97. —. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Stieglitz, Joseph (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Penguin Books. Strange, Susan (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tamir, Yael (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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ESSAY # 9 “PHILOSOPHY”—AFTER THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

1. Introduction Why are we asking ourselves this question about “rethinking Philosophy today”? 1 Unless we are doing so merely as an academic exercise, as an opportunity to repeat once again the obvious and trivial or what is commonly accepted, it can only be because “Philosophy” is in a state of deep and serious crisis. We are no longer clear or certain about what Philosophy is or should be, nor, of course, about its role and place, if it could and should have any. In the past few decades, severe and sustained criticisms have been leveled by so-called “postmodern philosophers” (such as Rorty, Lyotard, Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, to mention only a few of the most prominent) against “the Tradition.”2 By drawing in various ways on the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Dewey, among others, they have radically put in question and undermined our traditional conceptions of Philosophy, its tasks and goals, claims and pretensions, methods and methodologies, its public image and self-image. In short, 1

This essay is a revised and condensed version of the paper prepared for the XXII World Congress of Philosophy held in Seoul, Korea (July 30-August 5, 2008) on the theme “Rethinking Philosophy Today.” 2 I refer to “the Tradition” herein to characterize the diverse set of “philosophical conceptions and practices” stretching from ancient Philosophy (Plato and Aristotle) onward up to the first half of the 20th century. It includes Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Modern Philosophy--the so-called “rationalist” and “empiricist” traditions (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), German Idealism, Romanticism, Kant and the opposing Romantic or Hegelian reaction, the Materialist reaction against Hegel, Post-Kantian and PostHegelian Philosophy, Nietzsche, Logical Positivism or Empiricism, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Existentialism, Marxism, and 20th century AngloAmerican systematic Analytic Philosophy (Nielsen, 1991).

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everything that Philosophers once held dear, and that some still hold dear today, moved as they are, in John Dewey’s words, by a quest for Certainty and nostalgia for the Absolute. Many have come to view these radical, postmodern criticisms as having brought on the “End of Philosophy” (Kenneth, 1986; Rajchman, 1985; Nielsen, 1991). If that is so, where do we go from there? What is there left for Philosophers to do, if anything, that is worthwhile? Do we simply accept the postmodern critics’ verdict, and simply take up whatever they have proposed to replace Philosophy—i.e., “philosophy” as more or less “edifying conversation,” as “the search for alternative, more creative and imaginative, re-descriptions” or as “learned and witty kibitzing” (Rorty), as proliferation of “paralogical narratives” or as “testimonial to the differends” (Lyotard), as “literature, textual criticism, or deconstruction” (Derrida, Rorty), as “liberation of desire in its most repressed and diverse forms” or as “creation of concepts” (Deleuze), as “intellectual nomadism,” as “intellectual guerilla warfare and local resistance,” (Deleuze, Foucault), or as “archeological and genealogical studies” (Foucault)? Or do we consider boldly and imaginatively an alternative, what an alternative might look like after them (see for example Dann, 2006; Arac, 1988; Royle, 1995; Best, 1995; Roberts & Crossley, 2004; see also Chokr, 2006a)? This is what I intend ultimately to do in this essay by sketching out a [10-points] programmatic proposal for a reconstructed, renewed, and thereby transformed post-postmodern “philosophy”—after the end of Philosophy.3 In anticipation, and to put it succinctly, it would have to be a new kind of “Critical Theory,” one that satisfies three general conditions—apart from any other adequacy requirements. First, it would have to make good (structurally and substantially) on the theoretical and empirical dimensions, the descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory power as well as the normative, critical, and emancipatory thrust of the kind of Critical Theory—developed and defended earlier and in turn by Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Habermas, and more recently by Andre Gorz, Seyla Benhabib, Axel Honneth and Nancy Frazer. 4 3 Henceforth, I adopt and put into play Rorty’s distinction (1979) between “Philosophy” (capital P) and “philosophy” (lower case p) in order to denote respectively the traditional conception of Philosophy and what a more sober “philosophy” in the aftermath of “postmodernism” should be, once it is reconstructed, renewed and transformed. 4 The works of these authors are relatively well-known. I will only refer to them when needed.

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Second, it would have to be unburdened by their respective deficits and limitations duly and properly assessed—not only with respect to their assumptions, central claims and main theses, but especially with regard to “the legacy of the Enlightenment” that we need to preserve, continue, and reactivate for our times. 5 Third, it would have to show in a more compelling and convincing manner how we can steer a course toward a “third way” between (or beyond) “absolutism” and “radical relativism” (or “pure historicism”). Given however the restricted scope of my project under the present circumstances, I cannot herein do justice to the details and nuances of either the Tradition or its Postmodern Critique by either of the major and minor protagonists. I can only proceed in very broad strokes to convey a rather simplified (and thus necessarily partial and unfair), yet hopefully clear, and for the most part accurate enough, picture of the situation and the challenge confronting us.6 For this reason, I propose to structure my discussion in the form of one over-arching question. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a number of assumptions, theses, and claims defended by Philosophy and the Tradition have been radically and convincingly 5

Such an assessment is bound to be very enlightening, but it is obviously beyond the scope of the present essay. However, a careful reading by the already initiated of the forthcoming discussion should already bring out some clear points of divergence and demarcation. Here, I have in mind for example the works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, Benhabib, Honneth, and Frazer. The question here may be not so much of “finishing or completing the unfinished project of the Enlightenment” by seeking to justify its “faith in reason and rationalism” on the basis of an ideal (speech act) or transcendental (communicative) situation as it is one of redefining “what the Enlightenment means for us today, for our times.” Perhaps, as Bruno Latour (2007) pointed out, “we have never been modern.” What does it then mean “to permanently reactivate the (self) critical attitude” as a testament to what we have inherited from the Enlightenment? That is the main question. For details, see Chokr, 2009. See also Nielsen (1991) and Bohman (2005) for two different yet equally insightful analyses 6 By way of convenient shortcut, it is worth noting however that the Tradition, or what is referred as such, already contained many elements for a “postmodern” selfcritique—before the letter. All the protagonists that are commonly subsumed under such a label were not cut of the same cloth nor were their ideas and propositions cast in the same mold. As Hegel rightly noted, each period in the history of philosophy already contained in various ways the “seeds” for its own radical criticism and overcoming. It should also be noted as a further caveat that the socalled “Postmodern Critiques” are not all judicious, on target, appropriate, or worth taking seriously. For more, see Essay # 3, see also Chokr, 2009.

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undermined. 7 The following question is then entertained: Can we reasonably (meaningfully or viably) still seek to articulate and defend a “philosophy”—after the end of Philosophy—as a new kind of Critical Theory which meets a number of adequacy requirements. Is such a project coherent and realistically feasible?

2. The Tradition and its Postmodern Critique If we were asked to come up with a brief summary of the main assumptions, theses, or claims defended by the Tradition, which have served to give Philosophy its self-image and public image over the centuries, what could we say? We would arguably have to include the following: (1) Metaphysics (of Presence). Essentialism. (Phallo-) Logocentrism. (2) Dualism. Rationalism-(Classical) Empiricism / Cognitivism / Scientism. (3) Objectivism / Foundationalism / Representationalism. (4) Idealism / Subjectivism / Humanism. (5) Kantianism. (6) Historical Materialism/ Determinism. Structuralism/ PostStructuralism. (7) Existentialism. (8) Moral Universalism. (9) A Political Utopia: Liberal or Social Democracy, Capitalism or Socialism—with or without a Human Face? A fair and judicious assessment of the Tradition can only concede that Philosophy has had many blind spots, and often promised more than it can actually deliver. However, this does not imply that it must be rejected outright and wholesale without further qualifications. Actually, it seems that unless one can defend some modified, qualified, more balanced and judicious versions of these assumptions, theses, or claims, there is not going to be much, if anything, for philosophy to do. In fact, any further “philosophical” discussion would be moot and pointless. A serious, critical and constructive philosophical engagement with the Tradition can only yield some valuable insights into what forms or modalities philosophy can still viably take in the aftermath of “postmodernism,” and the kinds of assumptions, theses, or claims it can more reasonably and “justifiably” uphold and defend. These may arguably include a more or less coherent cluster of the following tenets:

7

In the final analysis, I would probably want uphold a more qualified and nuanced view.

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(1) Anti-Metaphysics. Anti-Essentialism. Naturalism. Ontological, Theoretical and Methodological Pluralism. Ontologies of Difference, Differance, Dispersion, Discontinuity, and Dissemination. (2) AntiDualism. Radical Empiricism / Anti-Cognitivism [Embodied and Situated Mind/ Cognition. Emotivism]. Anti-Scientism. (3) Inter-subjectivism. Anti-Foundationalism. Anti-Representationalism. (4) Pragmatism. Social Constructivism. Anti- or Post-Humanism. Feminism. Gyno-centrism. Ecocentrism. (5) Post-Kantianism [e.g., Defense of a Historical, ContextSensitive, Perspectival, Interpretive, Coherentist and Pragmatic Approach, yet anti-Historicism, anti-Contextualism, anti-Perspectivism, and antiRelativism about Truth]. (6) Post-Dialectical Idealism and Materialism / Post-Hegelianism. Post-Marxism. Post-Structuralism. (7) Aestheticism/ Dandysm. Anarchism/ Libertarianism/ Hedonism. (8) A Different Conception of “Universalism” [e.g., A Pluralistic, Historically Enlightened, and Non-Ethnocentric Ethical and Rational Universalism]. (9) Another Political Utopia—concrete and realistic: A Radical “Democracy to Come”. Capitalism or Socialism with a Human Face? Let us assume that we put aside the quest for Certainty and nostalgia for the Absolute characteristic of the Tradition. Is it still possible for us to heed Dewey’s injunction (1917, 1957) and re-construct “philosophy” in such a way so as to purchase for ourselves some normative, critical grounding?8—One which would enable us to make sense of our lives in a more integrated and reflective way, coherently and meaningfully take stock of the kind world we live in, to have some kind of ethical and rational conception(s) of how we might alter it to make it a more tolerable or livable place? I believe that it is not only possible, but also urgent to do so. To better appreciate the urgency of such a task, let us keep in mind the following diagnosis about our current situation at this juncture of history: This century contains the potential to be either the worst or the best of times for humanity. The worst of times because there is no end in sight to the struggle between the dehumanizing Global Economy and the dark 8

Even if such grounding turns out to be one that is multiply founded, and the object only of a hard-won “overlapping consensus” rather than a “perfect consensus,” or, merely the normative ideal of “a robust and ordered pluralism, yet under rigorous ethical constraints.” See the debate between Rawls (1996), Habermas (1984, 1987b, 1989, 1990), and Nussbaum (2000, 2006) on this matter. See also Essays # 1, 2 & 8 for further discussions.

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Essay # 9 irrational forces (of sexism, racism, and other kinds of fundamentalism) threatened by its hegemony. Unlike any other time in history, ours possesses sufficient stupidity, power and hatred to destroy the conditions for the possibility of life on [the] planet before they may be preserved anywhere else; the destructive powers at our disposal far exceed humanity’s present capacity to express love or altruism. Yet, it could very easily be the best of times because, for the first time, we have material resources sufficient to nurture the entire population of the Earth (Ranasinghe, 2001).

I suspect that some postmodern thinkers might respond that someone with an impulse such as the one described above is still (though perhaps unwittingly or unconsciously) seeking “metaphysical comfort” where there is none to be had. My short answer is to point out what I take to be our main challenge at this juncture of our history: “finding precisely a way to keep our ethical compass without (having or seeking) metaphysical comfort.” And to put into play Wittgenstein’s facetious question (“do we need to scratch if it does not itch?”), I would say in response to Rorty and other like-minded thinkers that “we need to scratch because it does itch.”

3. Which Kind of “Critical Philosophy”? A Sketch I therefore turn next to the “post-postmodern” programmatic proposal for a reconstructed, renewed, transformed, and transformative “philosophy” that I wish to make. I can only articulate here in somewhat lapidary manner some of the fundamental requirements (1)-(10) that such a “philosophy” must in my view meet—if we are to successfully scratch our itch (see Chokr [2009] for another take).9

3.1 The Real Problems of Human Beings I suppose that we should aim for a philosophy that is focused on, and capable of dealing in a constructive and substantial way with the real problems that human beings face and are confronted with on a short and long-term basis, in their always changing social, cultural, political, economic, and natural environments.10 9

My task here will obviously consist in attempting to weave a more or less coherent fabric out of some of the assumptions, theses, and claims listed above that I still deem reasonable and defensible. 10 The kinds of “problems of men and women” (to update Dewey’s expression [1946]) that “philosophy” could deal with, and seek to address must include, but

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3.2 Philosophy and Forms of Rationality I suppose that we should relinquish the image of Philosophy as “the tribunal or guardian of Reason,” as an autonomous and distinct discipline sitting in judgment over all other human endeavors, disciplines and their respective claims. We should even reject the image of “caretaker of rationality” (Habermas, 1987, 1990). Working under the now widely accepted and reasonable assumption that theory itself is only a form of practice, our focus should be, as several philosophers (Aristotle, Heidegger, Nussbaum) have suggested, on “practical reason” (phronesis) as the primordial way by which we, humans, cope creatively with the world. Rather seeking to recover or salvage some “rationality in the singular” (Habermas), we should perhaps follow Foucault’s suggestion here, and be more attentive to the various “forms and spheres of rationality,” the mapping and charting of their development, to what they might have in common and to their possible differences. Perhaps, as suggested by Habermas (1992, 1995) in another context, the role of “stand-in” or “interpreter” for philosophy (with respect to the human and social sciences) could be justified.11 It could then in a more modest “under-laborer’s way” not be limited to the following: sexism, racism, discrimination, alienation, exploitation, hunger, poverty and pauperization, malnutrition, illiteracy, sustainable economic and social development, environmental pollution, degradation, and destruction, biological and cultural diversity, (physical and psychological) violence, just war and peace, ethics of terrorism, the question of safety and security, end-of-life issues, children rights, women’s rights, human rights, nuclear threat, weapons of mass destruction, ideological uses of science, the role of the media, the potential benefits and dangerous consequences of the new information and communication technologies, political legitimacy, inequity and inequality, autonomy, freedoms and capabilities, human development, (anti)globalization, imperialism, health and health care, biomedical issues, science and technology in society, techno-science and scientism, capitalism or socialism with/without a human face, religious fanaticism and extremism, fundamentalism (secular and religious), margins of political protest, contest, dissent, and opposition in modern societies, political struggles and activism, business and corporate social responsibility, democracy and its discontents, the question of “democracy to come,” governance and governmentality, the rising tide of mediocrity and bullshit, the problem of learning, unlearning, (mis)-education, the dummification of the masses and the multitude, emergence of new form of “fascism,” etc. [In passing, note that many of them typically fall under the purview of what is known nowadays as “Applied Philosophy”]. For an alternative perspective against the Tradition, see Maxwell’s recent paper “What Philosophy Ought to be” (2014). 11 However, consistently with provision (3), such a role would have to be extended to the arts and humanities as well. See Adorno, 1970; Marcuse, 1978.

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(or as “one voice among others”) help somehow in addressing the problems confronting us by bringing to bear on their discussion the relevant moral and factual issues and by identifying some of the underlying ideological forces at play.

3.3 Critical Alliances across Disciplinary Boundaries If we are prepared to countenance and accept such a perspective, then we should more readily be willing to view philosophy as continuous with (1) the human and social sciences12 as well as with (2) the other disciplines of the humanities, with the arts, with literature and literary studies, and even as forming a critical alliance with them. Obviously, “philosophy” has significant and substantial “overlapping concerns” with either kind of inquiries. This may be the case, for example, in terms of empirical and factual constraints upon theory, or in terms of normative considerations having to do with the aesthetic construction and self-creation of individuals or with the moral-sentimental education and edification of citizens. Philosophy must therefore become thoroughly inter- trans- crossor multi-disciplinary as well as inter- trans- cross- or multi-cultural in its approach.

3.4 Ethics as First Philosophy A transformed philosophy would have to be anti-essentialist and antimetaphysical—-as much as it is possible “to overcome metaphysics,” at least as it was traditionally conceived of and practiced.13 We should stop regarding metaphysics as “first philosophy” and we should no longer seek to systematically articulate and justify a metaphysical system as such,

12 These endeavors could be viewed as “moral sciences” in the sense advocated by Bohman (2005). 13 It is arguably impossible “to overcome metaphysics” completely and definitively --in the sense of not having or making any metaphysical or ontological commitments. It is even unclear what such an overcoming would mean. Similarly, it is not clear what “ceasing all overcoming” and “leaving metaphysics to itself” would amount to, nor if a clear distinction between these two notions can even be drawn so easily. The analyses given by Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Derrida could be plausibly interpreted along these lines and to that effect. Besides, isn’t it arguably still be possible (and perhaps even required) to defend a kind of “internal essentialism” [as in Nussbaum (2000), for example], that does not succumb to the anti-metaphysics objection?

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prior to and as a justificatory basis for any of our endeavors or undertakings. In short, we should leave metaphysics aside to itself. In this regard, we are, I believe, better off heeding Levinas’ recommendation and take ethics instead as “first philosophy”—that is, if we wish to retain such a designation. In contrast to morality, which is preoccupied with the rules and principles on the basis of which we can act or judge an action as right or wrong, good or bad, ethics would here have to be taken as essentially concerned with more fundamental questions: “How should I live (with myself, with the other)? How should we live together (in this or that society, in this world)?” [See Williams (1985) for another take on this distinction].

3.5 Naturalism and Anti-transcendentalism Consistent with the first part of the previous requirement, “philosophy” would then have to be thoroughly naturalistic and ecological in its orientation. It would uphold strictly the continuity between the Universe, the World, The Natural Realm, the Animal Kingdom and the Human Realm. For, as the poet once said “we are all made of the same stuff as stars are made of. We are stardust.” On the first score,14 it would therefore appeal to nothing but what is in/ of/ about this world, and as much as possible, it must eschew any abstract, speculative, transcendental entities, situations, moves, or arguments, and guard against indulging in any kind of transcendentalism.15 As much as 14

It is worth noting that there is today a resurgence of interest in a post-Kantian naturalism—in some cases, advocating a return to the presumed naturalism of Kant’s pre-critical philosophy. In this regard, the new Critical Theory would be radically different from the conception defended by Habermas (1984, 1987b). 15 I realize that such a statement may offend or irritate some who are prone to engaging in “theosophy” while fraudulently claiming to be doing “philosophy.” Well, so be it. I am prepared to let “religion” be—for “the multitudes” who still need it and have yet to be weaned from it—as long as it is kept to its own circumscribed faith-based domain, separate from “philosophy.” However, as several recent studies have shown this phenomenon seems to represent an “infantile remnant” of our handicapped evolution and immaturity, or worse yet, a “peculiar condition” from which the weak-minded masses of the world have yet to be cured, and which requires “articles of faith and dogma” as so many “mental crutches.” More than any other factor in history, it seems on balance to have caused humans more grief, torment, violence, deaths, carnage, and mayhem than good. And this, despite all the morally lofty precepts, values, and ideals preached

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possible, it must not assume or commit itself to “fictitious or non-existing entities.” It must not assume or commit itself to more than it can safely, reasonably, and plausibly account for on the basis of the best and broadest “knowledge-base” we can call upon at any given moment in our history. On the second score, it would carry out “a radical critique of ecological reason” in an effort to defend a conception of ecology, which offers us a unique political standpoint from which we can undertake a systematic evaluation of both the capitalist and socialist mode of (re)production, and eventually consider an alternative world order (Gorz, 1975, 1977, 1991, 1997). Such a conception would be clearly demarcated from all naïve, romantic, luddite, and mystical conceptions, and would seek to outline the possibilities for a new understanding of “our being-in-the-world” on the basis of duly justified ethical and aesthetical considerations.

3.6 Fallibilism and Experimentalism “Philosophy” as conceived here would have to be fallibilistic in the way the sciences are—yet without becoming “scientistic.”16 It would also by all of the world’s religions. Anyone with any sense of honesty and intellectual integrity must recognize that “our times are out of joint” in large part because of the religious phenomenon. Religion can reasonably be blamed for most of the world’s violence today. More than 200 years after the Enlightenment’s subversion of its unquestioned hegemony, it is indeed quite surprising to see how much of an impact and influence it still has today on individuals, groups, nations, and the world at large. Could a neuro-biological explanation of a “kludge’ in the evolution of our brain be the answer to this puzzle? 16 Typically, the term “scientism” is used to mean that what science (the natural sciences) cannot tell us humankind cannot know. It is, in other words, the belief that the sole mode for knowledge and understanding is science; nothing else has or can have any genuine cognitive status. Such a view is obviously narrow-minded and even potentially dangerous. In contrast, I would like to suggest that “philosophy” must always remain open and receptive to alternative “ways of knowing” (feminist, non-western, non-traditional, or simply “subjugated”) without succumbing naively to their “romantic” or “exotic” charm, or accepting necessarily their possibly “exclusionary” or “deviant” logics (see Chokr, 2009). However, unlike Rorty (1982, 1990, 1998) and other like-minded postmodern thinkers, who seem to have very little regard for the unique epistemic power and efficacy of the sciences, and regard them merely as alternative forms of description (in some particular, historically contingent vocabularies), I would like to retain some measured, judicious, and well-deserved respect and special consideration for them (see also Williams, 1983; 2002 for a similar point). His radical anti-science stance

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have to be experimental in the way of the arts—yet refrain from dissolving into a merely “aestheticizing” or “romanticizing” endeavor. It should be ready to acknowledge its mistakes and errors, and be prepared to take whatever steps are necessary and relevant to correct them. In short, it should strive not to place roadblocks of the path to inquiry in its multiple and diverse forms. It should “let a thousand flowers bloom” (Mao) truly and effectively. “Philosophy” should once and for all and unrepentantly eschew the quest of Certainty and cure itself of the nostalgia for the Absolute (Dewey, 1960). When ontological commitments are held in a non-fallibilistic way, they tend to become “articles of faith,” and the old, unholy link between Philosophy and Religion is rekindled, thereby clearing the ground once again for another wave of dogmatism, fundamentalism, and fanaticism.

3.7 Inhabiting Time and Space A reconstructed “philosophy” would have to be anti-foundationalist, anti-representationalist,17 yet historically minded and context-sensitive in its approach, without however being relativistic (in a self-defeating way i.e., in the sense of “anything goes” and “any practice in given context is equally as good as any other in another context”) or naively ethnocentric (in the sense that “only our ways go”). and his so-called “pragmatism without method” are, to say the least, rather unpragmatic. Classical pragmatists have always maintained a marked and measured consideration for the sciences, even though some seem to have at times fallen prey to “scientism.” 17 The term “anti-foundationalist” is unfortunately sometimes construed in such a broad way as to impugn and reject any argued claim that there are “objective” (intersubjectively) warranted beliefs. Such a construal is wildly stretched however, and tends to eviscerate the anti-foundationalist perspective by rejecting epistemological accounts that are clearly coherentist rather than foundationalist. To say that “philosophy” must be anti-representationalist is simply another way of saying that the epistemological project based on the “mirror of nature’ is no longer valid, as Rorty (1979, 1982) and others have shown. We should no longer seek the foundations of knowledge in properties or data of the mind that can be said to mirror or represent (via language) objects and phenomena in the world. We should now more readily accept that knowledge is always already situated, through and through socially constructed and historical (see Essay # 4). Our communicative interests are always already “compromised” by other (political and personal) interests (see Essay # 7). This is not however to impugn and reject the use of representations as such, as possibly useful heuristic modeling devices which can facilitate inquiry.

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Once “philosophy” takes time seriously, and undertakes, as McCumber (2005) suggested, what it should have long ago sought to accomplish, namely a critique of temporal reason, it becomes a philosophy in time, a philosophy of time, whose main concern is “how to inhabit time” (Chokr, 2006b). It must therefore be historically minded, without however falling into historicism, or a temporal relativism. It is not possible for “philosophy” to inhabit time and be historically minded in the proper sense without at the same time being concerned with “how to inhabit space” as well. For this reason, it must also be context-sensitive (i.e., sensitive to time and space) without however being reduced to a context or upholding a radical form of contextualism. For, this is simply another name for (moral, cultural, and epistemological) relativism. (See Essays # 1 & 2 for more detailed arguments against cultural relativism). So far, philosophers have not be able to provide any justificatory foundations for science, morality, politics, religion or anything else, for that matter. It is therefore incumbent upon us to recognize that all “justification” is context-bound and situated, and involves inescapably references to existing social practices. Besides, we as human beings are confronted not so much with the so-called “eternal or perennial philosophical problems” (for the most part, only “philosophers” problems’) but by specific problems of life and living that do not fall exclusively, if at all, under the restricted domain of a particular discipline or academic endeavor. “Justification” may appeal to many different things in many different contexts, and may involve most importantly a myriad of frequently conflicting perspectives and social practices (Habermas, 2005). Nevertheless, we would want to be able to discriminate the better from the worse, (if not the best), and make critically informed decisions and reasoned choices regarding these (shared) problems that can withstand the test of inter-subjective and inter-cultural critical scrutiny.

3.8 A Pluralistic, Historically Enlightened Universalism For this purpose, “philosophy” needs to articulate a new form of “pluralistic and historically enlightened, and non-ethnocentric ethical and rational universalism” 18 that is not anchored in the Enlightenment’s traditional bag of Eurocentric, metaphysical assumptions and constructions about Reason, Rationality, Human Nature, or even the Person. Yet, it must have normative justificatory power of the kind that can arguably be 18

See Nussbaum (2000; 2006); Essay # 2 for further details on such a view.

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achieved by the use of a constructivist and hermeneutical methodology aiming for what Rawls (1996), and others, along the way, characterized as a “wide reflective equilibrium” through an expanded circle of interpretations and considerations (see Nussbaum, 2000; Nielsen, 1991, see also Essays # 2 & 8). Such a methodology, which is in effect part of a coherentist model of reasoning, justification, and rationalization, would seek to produce and perspicuously display coherence and consistency among a large cluster of considerations, including: (a) our considered ethical judgments or convictions, (b) a cluster of ethical principles, (c) a cluster of background theories, including most centrally moral and social theories—and among them social theories that are quite empirical about our social life-world and how we effectively function in it, and finally, (d) an empirically based, broadly scientific conception and account of human nature. Clearly, there will be some overlap between (c) and (d). Any reasonably adequate account of human nature must be an account of how we are social animals through and through—as Aristotle pointed out. Such an account must also acknowledge however that we are also part of the animal kingdom as well and must therefore provide a careful and compelling story about the kinds of biological creatures we have become as a result of evolution, and how that relates to our social nature.19 19

See Nussbaum (2000, 2006) for a particularly interesting effort in this direction. She articulates a neo-Aristotelian/Marxian account (claimed to be only “internally essentialist” within the context of her version of the Capabilities Approach—as a (partial) theory of social and global justice. See also Habermas (1970, 1979, 1986, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005) for an articulation of a post-Marxist dualist account of society based on a distinction between “communicative reason” and “instrumental reason”—and which, for this reason, excludes in a most problematic way “work” and “the economy” from ethical reflection. His discourse-theoretic reconstruction of the normative foundations of democracy assumes the formal separation of democratic political practice from the economic system. For Habermas, democratic autonomy presupposes a vital public sphere protected by a complex schedule of individual rights. These rights are supposed to secure the formal and material conditions for democratic freedom. However, because Habermas defends the view that the economy must be left to function according to endogenous “market dynamics,” he basically accepts as a condition of democracy (the formal separation of spheres) a social structure that is in fact anti-democratic. As a result, the value of self-determination that his theory of democracy presupposes is contradicted by the actual operation of capitalist markets. Further and more radical democratic development requires at least that the steering mechanisms of the capitalist market be challenged.

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3.9 An Integrated, Holistic and Comprehensive Approach A reconstructed “philosophy” would have to be holistic, integrative, and comprehensive—without raising anew the specter of a “totalizing or totalitarian meta-narrative” (compare and contrast with Habermas, 1994). Otherwise, it would be reduced to being merely a form of ad hoc piecemeal social criticism (as in Dewey and Rorty), which is arguably bound to be ineffective and worthless. It would not be able to generate the kind of normative critical power that we should expect from an adequately reconstructed philosophy. Only if we are able to grasp “how things hang together in the most general terms” (Rorty’s adaptation of Sellars) can we hope to make a case for a distinctive contribution from “philosophy”—one that is at once integrative, (self) reflective, and normatively critical. If we cannot, we would probably have little choice but accept Rorty’s desideratum, and let “philosophy” simply wither and disappear, or be subsumed under, and dissolved into, some other discipline. Pace Rorty, “philosophy,” even in a post-metaphysical and post-foundationalist age, can never end nor die—as long as there are reflective human beings moved by the desire or urge to take an honest over-view of their situation, by standing upright. It need not therefore be reduced or condemned to being merely a matter of “more or less edifying conversations” or “learned and witty kibitzing.”

3.10 A Clear Emancipatory Thrust Finally, and to cut a long story short, I suppose that the new “critical philosophy” would have to articulate a framework at once theoreticalempirical, which is also descriptive, explanatory, interpretive and, of course, normatively critical—with a clear emancipatory thrust.20 If it is to be more than a dramatic narrative or another expression of well-intentioned, wishful thinking, it would have to show us how “the basic structure of society” (Rawls) came to be formed, the range of its 20

This is arguably what Critical Theorists have typically attempted to do with more or less success. See for example Habermas with his communication action theory (1984, 1987b). Two of its most questionable features include its focus on ideal-rational (communicative) situations for its justificatory force, and its failure to capture the “creative” (and therefore “unruly”) dimension of communication action. See for example Benhabib, Bohman, Honneth, and Frazer for various efforts to go beyond Habermas.

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feasible transformations, and the mechanisms or processes for its transformation. It would also have to provide a “rational justification” (in the sense advocated in (8)) for saying of its possible transformations that some are better than others are, and why. In the course of such articulation, it would have to consider the comparative adequacy of forms of life, ways of living and being-in-the-world that might claim our allegiance or support—including, of course, the various forms of social, cultural, political, economic, and ecological systems that we know of. In short, such a framework would have to provide a fairly developed and substantial critique of culture, society, and ideology.21

4. Philosophical Coda—A New Beginning for Critical Theory The framework proposed here consists in effect of a number of stakedout claims regarding: (1) the proper scope and subject matter of philosophy, (2) its role and place—its public image and self-image, (3) its inter-disciplinary relationships and alliances, (4) a meta-philosophical characterization of what constitutes “first philosophy,” (5) its fundamental theoretical and practical orientations, (6) its methodological inclinations, (7) its fundamental social-historical epistemology, (8) its pragmatically motivated, meta-ethical stance, and (9) two sets of its meta-theoretical, critical requirements (i.e., [9], [10]). As such, it may offer us, I believe, a way to chart a viable course between (or beyond) “absolutism” and “radical relativism.” In so doing, it would then enable us to understand 21

I here take “culture” in a very broad sense, as a more or less integrated, yet complex pattern always evolving and changing by virtue of internal contestations and external challenges (see Essays 1 & 2). It includes the material and symbolic conditions of (re)production, as well as all of the major components, elements, or aspects commonly associated with it. A “society” is not just a “collection of atomistic and isolated individuals.” It consists instead of “social individuals,” who are both relatively “free” to create their world in that they can bring about new institutions and a correspondingly new social paradigm, and at the same time “unfree,” because they are to some extent “created” or “constituted” by their world (Chokr, 2009). As for the concept of “ideology,” it is taken in the sense commonly defined by critical theorists. Namely, as “a generally distorting and deceptive framework that shapes individual consciousness, as well as guides and legitimates belief and action, and renders experience meaningful” and that generally presents itself all the while as a bearer of “the truth” about our reality and our condition in the world as we know it. Typically, it substitutes limited special interests for the interests of all and presents current historical practices as inevitable, necessary, and even natural (see Essay # 2).

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better who (or what) we are, how we think, speak, act, and live.22 It would enable us to better understand how we have come to be this way, think, speak, act, and live the way we do, and possibly, what we might become, how we might think, speak, act and live otherwise. In addition, where there are alternatives, it might suggest to us who or what we might become (and why), what kind of society would be a more just society (and why). Perhaps, it might suggest not merely what a more just society would look like, but what a more truly human (though not human-centered) or more humane society would be—or ironically, and perhaps more to the point, what a “truly harmonious society” could be.23 For, I believe in the final analysis that talk of justice, plainly, does not exhaust the dimensions of an ethical, critical, and normative appraisal of society and culture (see Essay # 8). 24 This may have to be taken as part of a new vision for a more concrete and realistic political utopia, perhaps that of a “democracy to come”—as suggested by Derrida and pursued by others in various ways, e.g., in the form of a more radical, plural, and inclusive, or simply more consistently liberal and cosmopolitan, democracy. An immediate and obvious objection to the project of reconstruction and transformation of philosophy that I am advocating is that it cannot be done. Such an objection can be taken in at least ways: (1) Such a project is conceptually incoherent and therefore untenable, or (2) the task of pulling it off is to say the least very difficult and daunting, and more than what one person can ever cope with. Perhaps, it is so daunting and overwhelming that one should give it up before starting. My short answers

22

In this regard, it could proceed for example in accord with Foucault’s proposal (1984ab, 1997, 1998, 2000), and that a properly carried out “critical ontology of ourselves” would reveal by way of something like his archeological-genealogical approach. 23 This is obviously in reference to the latest ideologically loaded concept put forth by the current leadership of the People’s Republic of China, and therein lays the irony. It may however be appropriate for moral and political philosophy to take up seriously the task of clarifying the meaning of such a highly normative expression of a higher ideal and exploring all the realistic ways by which it can be given substance, and possibly turned into reality. Or would this ascribing to an unrealistic political utopia? See Essay # 8. 24 Compare and contrast with Rawls’ view (1971; 1996) according to which “justice is the first virtue of society,” and with Nussbaum’s view (2000: 33), according which “justice must take priority in our social and political reflection.” See Essay # 6 for a critical assessment of the proposals put forth by Rorty and Rawls.

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are: (1) As far as I can see, I do not think it is conceptually incoherent.25 However, I am now better able to appreciate the difficulty and challenge for a view which seeks to countenance both a “robust (though ordered) pluralism” and “rigorous (universalist) normative or ethical constraints. Regarding it practical feasibility, I would say that (2) it need not be an individualistic affair, but a multi-generational, collective project. Besides, there are already several “remarkable precursors and forerunners” who have already charted the path, and on whose works, we can build.26 We need not re-invent the wheel nor start from scratch.

References Adorno, T. W. (1966). Negative Dialectics. New York: Continuum. —. (1970). Aesthetic Theory. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Arac, Jonathan (Ed.) (1988). After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges. NJ: Rutgers University Press. Baynes, Kenneth et al. (1986). After Philosophy: End or Transformation? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Benjamin, W. (1968). Illuminations. Introduction by Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. —. (1978). Reflections. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Best, Steven (1995). The Politics of Historical Vision: Marx, Foucault, and Habermas. New York: The Guilford Press. Bohman, James. (2005).”We, Heirs of Enlightenment: Critical Theory, Democracy, and Social Justice.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13/3: 353377. Chokr, Nader N. (2006a). “Mapping out a Shift in Contemporary French Philosophy.” Yeditepe de Felsefe 5 (August 2006): 86-122. —. (2006b). “Philosophy in Time, or How to Inhabit Time?—A Critique of Temporal Reason.” Philosophy in Review/ Comptes Rendus Philosophiques 26/3 (June 2006): 210-213. —. (2009). Unlearning, or How Not to Be Governed. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic—Societas: Essays in Political and Cultural Criticism. Dann, Elijah G. (2006). After Rorty : The Possibility for Ethics and Religious Belief. New York: Continuum. 25

I remain open to the possibility of being shown that I am wrong anytime. This, I take to be the reward for taking the risk of staking out one’s position and submit it to open and critical scrutiny in a post-postmodern age. 26 We could mention in this regard Max Weber, Durkheim, Marx, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Bourdieu, Foucault, Habermas, etc. We should also include the efforts made more recently by Hardt and Negri, Gorz, Benhabib, Frazer, and Bohman, as well as those of Axel Honneth, Slavoj Zizek, W.I. Robinson, Erik Olin Wright, among so many others. See Chokr (2009) for a more developed treatment.

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Dewey, John (1917). “The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy.” In Creative Intelligence. New York: Holt. —. (1946). Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library. —. (1957). Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. —. (1960). The Quest for Certainty. New York: Putnam Books. Foucault, Michel. (1984a). “What is Enlightenment?” In Paul Rabinow (Ed.). Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth. Essential Works, 1954-1984. New York; The New Press, 1997, pp. 303-319. —. (1984b). “Ethics as the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.” In Paul Rabinow (Ed.). Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth. Essential Works, 1954-1984. New York; The New Press, 1997, pp. 281-301. —. (1997). Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth. Vol. I: Essential Works. Ed. Paul Rabinow. NY: The New Press. —. (1998). Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. Vol. II: Essential Works. Ed. J.D.Faubion. NY: New Press. —. (2000). Power. Vol. III: Essential Works, 1954-1984. Ed. J.D. Faubion. NY: The New Press. Gorz, André (1975). Ecologie et Politique. Paris : Galilée. —. (1977). Ecologie et Liberté, Paris : Galilée. —. (1977). Fondement pour une Morale. Paris : Galilée. —. (1983). Les Chemins du Paradis. Paris : Galilée. —. (1991). Capitalisme, Socialisme, Ecologie. Paris: Galilée. —. (1997). Misère du Présent, Richesse du Possible. Paris: Galilée. —. (2003). L’Immatériel. Paris: Galilée. Habermas, Jurgen (1970). Toward a Rational Society. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. —. (1971). Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. —. (1973a). Theory and Practice. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. —. (1973b). “Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests.” Philosophy and the Social Sciences. 3: 157-159. —. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. —. (1979). Communication and the Evolution of Society. Boston: Beacon Press. —. (1984). A Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1. Boston: Beacon Press. —. (1986). Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity. Ed. Peter Dews. London; Verso. —. (1987a). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. MIT Press. —. (1987b). A Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Boston: Beacon Press. —. (1988). On the Logic of the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. MIT Press. —. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. MIT Press. —. (1992). Post-metaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. —. (1993). Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. MIT Press. —. (1994). “What Theories Can Accomplish—and What They Can’t.” in The Past as Future: Habermas interviewed by Michael Haller. Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 99-120. —. (1995). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. (2000). Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. MIT Press.

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INDEX

Adorno, T.W., 388, 389, 393, 403, 405 agency, 119, 168, 180, 190, 191, 196, 217, 218, 219, 227, 229, 232, 233, 269, 270, 304, 379 Alkire, Sabina, 217, 227, 238 Anderson, Benedict, 45, 55, 338, 380 Anderson, Elizabeth, 327, 380 Anderson, Michael L., 167, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 200, See Embodied Cognition Anderson, Perry, 290, 321 An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed, 51, 55, 56, 273, 278, 279, 290, 297, 299, 300, 321 Appadurai, Arjun, 8, 55, See globalization Appiah, K.A., 8, 9, 19, 33, 34, 38, 55, 101, 129, 321, 376, 380 Arendt, Hannah, 37, 55, 350, 403 Arneson, R., 132, 327, 343, 353, 354, 380 Avineri, S., 8, 55, 385, See globalization and human rights Barclay, Linda, 120, 129, 132, See Nussbaum and Political Liberalism Barry, Brian, 252, 257, 258, 265, 335, 340, 360, 380 Barsalou, L.W., 176, 200 Bayart, Jean-François, 369, 380 Bechtel, W., 174, 175, 200, 201, 202 Beitz, Charles, 6, 244, 252, 257, 262, 265, 328, 329, 332, 335, 336, 340, 343, 345, 360, 365, 380

Benhabib, Seyla, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 25, 31, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 56, 61, 66, 100, 105, 129, 272, 321, 367, 381, 388, 389, 400 Berges, Sandrine, 206, 216, 238 Bernstein, R., 21, 26, 56 Black, Max, 92, 138, See bullshit Blake, Michael, 333, 337, 343, 353, 359, 367, 381 Boghossian, Paul, 93, 129, See bullshit Bohman, James, 389, 394, 400, 403 Boylan, Michael, 269, 276, 321 Brighouse, Harry, 236, 238 Brooks, R., 168, 169, 174, 175, 176, 189, 200 Brown, Chris, 332, 377, 381, 384 Bruner, Jerome, 44, 56 Buchanan, Allan, 346, 359, 368, 381 bullshit, 3, 88, 92–96, 135–66, 393 Bullshit and Philosophy, 135, 165, 166 bullshit in Contemporary French Theory or Philosophy, 149, 151 research, detection, and busting, 143, 158, 160 Byrne, D., 10, 56 Caney, Simon, 341, 353, 354, 381 Carens, Joseph, 328, 368, 381 Chokr, Nader N., 10, 26, 30, 56, 77, 130, 139, 143, 165, 168, 178, 183, 200, 388–90, 392, 396, 398, 401, 403 Chuang-Tzu, 63, 129, 130, See cultural relativism and moral relativism Cilliers, P, 10, 11, 56, 57, 130, 131

408 Clancey, W., 194, 195, 196, 201, See Situated Cognition Clark, A., 173, 188, 192, 193, 198, 201, See Embodied and Situated Cognition clash of civilizations, 7, 20, 34, 46 Clifford, James, 271, 321 Cohen, G.A., 3, 92, 102, 130, 135, 139–42, 143, 147–61, 164, 165, 327, 335, 354, 381 Cohen, Joshua, 381, 383 complex internal dynamics of cultures, 1, 12, 37, 104 conceptual blending, 176, 199, 201 configurational conception of culture, 14 cosmopolitan pluralism, 6, 330, 331, 337, 341, 344, 346, 352, 370, 379 cosmopolitanism, 4, 29, 34, 126, 244, 247, 256, 259, 261, 330, 335, 375, 376, 378, 379 Critical Theory, 6, 109, 130, 382, 388, 390, 395, 401, 403, 405 Crocker, David, 209, 238 cultural analysis, 1, 5, 12, 24, 26, 38, 39, 43, 45, 104, 280 double hermeneutics, 43 empirical and normative considerations or point of view, 1, 12, 26, 38, 64, 104, 379 point(s) of view: participants vs. observers, 41 processes of identity formation, 43 cultural complexity, 1, 5, 10, 11, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 60, 64, 65, 70, 82, 103, 104, 117, 118, 272, 309, 341 Cultural Egalitarianism, 16 Cultural Essentialism, 16, 24 Cultural Idealism, 16, 24 cultural relativism, 1, 2, 7, 12, 17, 39, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 97, 104, 105, 112, 164, 252,

Index 270, 275, 289, 290, 294, 296, 297, 398 culturalistic fallacy, 16 culture, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8–20, 21, 24–59, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 78–87, 92, 93, 97–105, 112, 118, 125, 128, 135, 137, 142, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 182, 221, 246, 249, 253, 255, 258, 263, 268–74, 279, 290–300, 303, 308, 314, 315, 318, 319, 320, 333, 334, 344, 369, 371, 401, 402 Damasio, A., 176, 201, See Cartesian Legacy Davidson, Donald, 145, 163, 164, 165, 405 Dawkins, R., 56, See memes de Waal, Alex, 140, 165, 305 Deleuze and Guattari, 37, 56, 130, 152, 293, 321 Deleuze, G., 11, 92, 168, 388 democracy, 1, 7, 10, 35, 48, 50, 52, 97, 101, 103, 125, 204, 230, 244, 265, 290, 301, 302, 318, 319, 367, 393, 399, 402 Dennett, Daniel, 172, 201 Denton, T., 10, 56, See Cultural Complexity Derrida, Jacques, 11, 28, 56, 130, 150, 168, 387, 388, 394, 402, 406, See Cultural Complexity Dewey, John, 387, 388, 391, 392, 397, 400, 404 Donnelly, J., 8, 56, 66, 130, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 291, 318, 322, 369, 382, See human rights Dreyfus, H., 168, 173, 174, 175, 178, 179, 201 Dreze, Jean, 217, 218, 227, 239, 359, 382 Drori, Gili, 11, 56, See Glocalization Dworkin, Ronald, 205, 230, 238, 239, 294, 322, 327, 337, 354, 357, 382

‘Philosophy’– After the End of Philosophy embodied and situated cognition, 3, 167, 168, 170, 175, 190, 196 Cartesian legacy, 3, 169, 171, 172 cognitivist framework, 3, 169, 174, 175, 196 embodied cognition, 169, 176, 200, 201, 203 embodied mind, 167, 178, 181, 197, 202, 203 Philosophy in the Flesh, 181, 202, 203 situated cognition, 169, 201 Empowerment, 210, 219, 220, 221, 223, 226, 229, 237, 288, 318, 348 end of ideologies, 7, 20 End of Philosophy, 6, 388 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 310, 315, 316, 322 Ethnocentrism, 17, 48, 58, 258 Falk, Richard, 27, 29, 30, 52, 56 Fauconnier, G., 176, 199, 201, See Conceptual Blending Fayart, Jean-Francois, 20, 34, 130 Fikentscher, W., 10, 57, See Cultural Complexity Follesdal, Andreas, 337, 361, 382 Forst, Rainer, 329, 332, 340, 349, 353, 373, 382 Foucault, Michel, 77, 109, 141, 168, 304, 306, 322, 387, 388, 393, 402, 403, 404 Frankfurt, Harry, 3, 92, 93, 130, 135–66, 352, 382 Freeman, Michael, 296, 297, 322 fundamental misconception of culture, 1, 10, 28, 36, 46, 49, 103 Geertz, Clifford, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 42, 49, 53, 57, 58, 103, 130, 272, 294, 322 generic conception of culture, 13 Geuss, Raymond, 109, 130, See Critical Theory Gewirth, Alan, 269, 276, 322

409

Gledhill, John, 310, 313, 314, 322 Glendon, Mary Ann, 53, 57, See Human Rights globalization, 1, 8, 9, 11, 19, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 37, 63, 66, 97, 98, 102, 104, 122, 253, 256, 263, 264, 271, 301, 302, 315, 341, 344, 362, 365, 368, 369, 371, 373, 376, 393 glocalization, 1, 11, 19, 29, 36, 38, 64, 102, 104, 341 Gorz, André, 388, 396, 403, 404 Gosepath, Stefan, 369, 370, 371, 382 guardians of cultural integrity and ethnic purity, 11, 32, 103 Habermas, Jurgen, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 130, 253, 266, 371, 382, 388, 389, 391, 393, 395, 398, 399, 400, 403, 404, 405 Hannerz, U., 10, 57, See Cultural Complexity Hardcastle, G.L. and Reisch G.A., 135, 165, 166, See Bullshit and Philosophy Hardt, M. and Negri, A., 102, 130, 378, 382, 403, 405 Harman, Gilbert, 61, 72, 73, 81, 131, See Moral Relativism Hegel, 155, 387, 389 Heidegger, Martin, 155, 156, 168, 169, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 201, 202, 203, 387, 393, 394, 406, See Phenomenology of the Body being-in-the-world, 27, 168, 179, 199, 396, 401 Held, D., 244, 265, 266, 362, 382, 383 Henkin, Louis, 278, 282, 322 Heylighen, F. et al, 10, 11, 57, 131, See Cultural Complexity Holland, Breena, 224, 239 Horkheimer, Max, 388, 389, 403, 405

410 Howard, Rhoda, 291, 322, 323 human cognition, 3, 169, 170, 199 embodiment, 3, 169, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 199 situatedness, 3, 40, 169, 170, 177, 181, 192, 193, 199 human development and social justice, 1, 4, 7, 50, 227 human rights, 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 30, 35, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 66, 75, 91, 97, 98, 101, 104, 120, 242, 243, 246, 247, 249, 254, 255, 258, 261, 263, 268–321, 327, 337, 342, 347, 354, 355, 378, 393 Huntington, Samuel, 7, 8, 20, 24, 33, 45, 55, 57, 104, 131 Hurrell, Andrew, 367, 369, 372, 382 identity politics, 1, 7, 97, 314 identity-formation, 1, 12, 104 impartialism, 259, 261 imperialism, 8, 18, 19, 60, 78, 82, 83, 85, 98, 101, 258, 275, 280, 292, 293, 298, 300, 307, 393 Jameson, Fredric, 8, 57 justice, 5, 62, 66, 76, 83, 97–126, 204–40, 241, 243, 251–65, 268, 270, 284, 285, 289, 298, 299, 303, 307, 312, 326–80, 389, 399, 402 cultural justice, 51, 67 global justice, 5, 6, 58, 224, 238, 251, 252, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 263, 265, 267, 325, 326, 328, 331, 335, 336, 337, 340, 345, 346, 348, 353, 355, 361, 362, 372, 374, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386 social justice, 4, 10, 52, 58, 103, 108, 115, 132, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 213, 215, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 259, 348, 349, 351, 364, 383, 403

Index Kant, I., 30, 57, 60, 107, 155, 179, 191, 245, 253, 266, 277, 326, 361, 372, 382, 387, 395 Kaul, Inge, 58, 266, 267, 325, 385 Kok-Chor, Tan, 336, 354, 359, 383 Krausz, M., 63, 68, 131, See Relativism Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C., 10, 14 Kunnemann, Rolf, 283, 285, 288, 323 Kymlicka, W., 18, 19, 57, 332, 383 Lakoff, G., 169, 176, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 189, 191, 199, 202, See Embodied Mind Lear, Jonathan, 47, 57 Levi-Strauss, Claude, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 57, 65, 84, 131 liberalism, 5, 51, 60, 118, 252, 259, 314, 326–46, 358, 363, 375 neo-liberalism, 282, 314 Political Liberalism, 6, 48, 58, 60, 113, 115, 132, 226, 239, 266, 314, 325, 331, 345, 360, 384, 406 Long, Norman, 304, 305, 306, 323 Lukes, Stevens, 16, 57, 294, 304, 322, 323 Lyotard, Jean-François, 7, 50, 57, 65, 131, 247, 266, 387, 388, 405 Maalouf, Amin, 34, 57, 131 MacIntyre, A., 68, 131, 290, 294, 332, 333, 334, 383 Marcuse, Herbert, 388, 389, 393, 403, 405 Maritain, Jacques, 30, 53, 58, 67, 123, 131, See Human Rights Marx, Karl, 8, 55, 113, 122, 277, 403 Marxian, 67, 112, 206, 399 Marxism, 277, 323, 387, 391 Mears, Daniel P., 142, 161, 166, See Bullshit memes, 37 Merleau-Ponty, M., 169, 177, 178, 179, 183, 186, 201, 202

‘Philosophy’– After the End of Philosophy Merry, Sally Engle, 310, 314, 315, 323 Mill, John Stuart, 18, 58, 100, 131, 313, 354 Miller, David, 332, 335, 337, 359, 383 Miller, Richard, 74, 131, 337, 353, 383 Modern View of Culture, 12 moral relativism, 61, 65, 68, 69, 71, 73, 131, 134, 334 Morin, Edgar, 11, 58, 131, See Cultural Complexity Morsink, Johannes, 53, 58, See Human Rights multiculturalism, 1, 7, 17, 18, 39, 97, 315, 316 Nagel, Thomas, 326, 327, 330, 337, 346, 348, 351, 357, 361, 363, 364, 365, 372, 383 nationalism, 34, 55, 60, 265, 307, 315, 329, 331, 338, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386 Nickel, James W., 275, 278, 280, 282, 285, 309, 324 Nielsen, Kai, 384, 387, 388, 389, 399, 405 Nietzsche, F., 109, 110, 163, 387 Nussbaum, Martha, 2, 3, 9, 20, 30, 48, 56, 58, 60, 65, 66, 67, 71, 75, 76, 81, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 111, 112–29, 113, 115, 116, 120, 121, 124, 129, 131, 132, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 236, 238, 239, 240, 269, 285, 321, 324, 335, 354, 355, 356, 371, 383, 385, 391, 393, 394, 398, 399, 402, 405 O’Donovan-Anderson, M., 171, 177, 183, 188, 191, 202, See Embodied Mind O’Neill, Onora, 330, 351, 367, 373, 383

411

overlapping consensus, 23, 30, 48, 50, 52, 60, 67, 76, 113, 115, 121, 122, 249, 251, 391 paradigm shift, 3, 168, 199, 304 particularism, 12, 60, 61, 260, 261, 329 phenomenology, 169, 177, 178, 181, 200, 202, 203, 387 philosophy—after the end of Philosophy, 6, 387, 388, 390 Pierik, R., 16, 41, 58, See Identityformation plural universalism, 4, 243, 259, 260, 265 pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism, 2, 12, 30, 47, 55, 105, 118, 123 Pogge, Thomas, 4, 6, 66, 121, 132, 204–38, 239, 242, 248, 250, 252, 256, 257, 265, 266, 286, 288, 324, 328, 329, 335, 336, 340, 343, 347–57, 360, 363, 364, 365, 367, 371, 372, 377, 378, 381, 382, 384, 386 Pollis, Adamantia, 290, 296, 324 Post-Cognitivism, 171, 175, See embodied and situated cognition postmodern philosophers, 6, 387 practical reason, 219, 227, 228, 229, 393 Preis, Ann-Belinda S., 300, 304, 307, 308, 310, 316, 317, 318, 320, 324 processes of identity formation ascription by others, 43 community building, 41, 43 inscription, 41, 42, 43 self-ascription, 41 Putnam, Hilary, 22, 58, 61, 63, 132, 360, 404 Qizilbash, M., 221, 239 Rabossi, Eduardo, 51, 273, 308, 325 radical hope, 47 Rawls, John, 4, 6, 23, 30, 52, 58, 60, 62, 67, 107, 113, 114, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 204,

412 205, 212, 236, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 250–67, 270, 314, 325, 328–86, 391, 399, 400, 402, 406 Rawlsian Resourcist Approach, 4 Raz, Joseph, 269, 332, 383, 384 realistic utopia, 6, 265, 330, 380 reasons for fearing relativism, 2, 61 received view of culture, 13, 28 Renteln, A.D., 63, 66, 132, 297, 298, 299, 325, See Human Rights and Relativism Rescher, N., 11, 58, 132, See Cultural Complexity Robeyns, I., 205, 206, 209, 214, 215, 220, 221, 226, 233, 236, 237, 238, 239, 355, 385, See the Capabilities Approach Robinson, W.I., 8, 58, 403 rooted cosmopolitanism, 34 Rorty, Richard, 4, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 51, 58, 65, 84, 132, 173, 202, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 260, 264, 266, 273, 275, 294, 295, 296, 308, 325, 387, 388, 392, 396, 397, 400, 402, 403, 405, 406 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 62, 107, 133, 277, 295, 372 scaffolds, 192, 193 Scanlon, T.M., 64, 69, 115, 133, 254, 267, 335, 353, 360, 377, 385 Scheffler, Samuel, 65, 105, 107, 108, 133, 333, 335, 339, 385 Schirmer, Jennifer, 299, 310, 311, 312, 325 Schutz, A., 169, See Phenomenology Searle, John, 175, 203 Sen, Amartya, 20, 33, 35, 48, 116, 132, 205, 239, 240, 252, 260, 263, 269, 285, 291, 335, 382, 383, 385 Singer, Peter, 134, 248, 261, 267, 335, 364, 365, 385 Social constructivism, 38

Index Sokal, Alan & Bricmont, Jean, 93, 133, 151, 155, 166, See Bullshit solidarity, 4, 29, 236, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 308, 353, 377 Stacey, R. et al, 10, 59, See Cultural Complexity Stammers, Nell, 304, 325 Stewart, Frances, 269, 285, 286, 287, 325 Stieglitz, Joseph, 363, 385 Stoll, David, 310, 312, 313, 325 Tamir, Yael, 329, 332, 333, 335, 359, 360, 367, 385 Task(s) of Political Philosophy, 346, 357, 365 Taylor, Charles, 18, 19, 53, 54, 59, 67, 123, 133, 179, 203, 332, See Human Rights, See Multiculturalism Taylor, M.C., 11, 59, 133, See Cultural Complexity Teson, Fernando, 50, 59, 91, 133, See Human Rights the Capabilities Approach, 4, 48, 58, 116, 122, 132, 204, 205, 206, 207, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 227, 229, 230, 238, 239, 240, 269, 324, 383, 385, 399, 405 human diversity, 206, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 235, 237 the Tradition, 6, 387, 389, 390, 391, 405 Thelen, E., 169, 176, 199, 203 Theory of Mechanism and Content, 196 Thompson, E., 178, 192, 203 Todes, S., 178, 179, 203, See Embodied Mind transactional approach, 195, 197 Turner, Terence, 25, 59, 176, 192, 199, 201, 203, See Multiculturalism

‘Philosophy’– After the End of Philosophy Tylor, E.B., 15, 59, See Culture UNESCO, 9, 15, 18, 59, 98, 133, 267, 275, 298, 325 universalism moral universalism, 1, 2, 7, 12, 39, 47, 49, 51, 52, 60, 66, 97, 104, 241–52, 260, 264, 327, 328 Urry, J., 10, 59, See Cultural Complexity Varela, F., 169, 176, 178, 180, 183, 199, 203, See Embodied Mind vulnerability, 47 Walzer, Michael, 61, 127, 133, 329, 332, 333, 386 Weber, Max, 37, 59, 403 webs of meanings, narratives, and interlocutions, 37 Wenar, Leif, 329, 340, 341, 343, 359, 386

413

West, Patrick, 17, 20, 32, 56, 59, 254, 259, 272, 274, 278, 296, 302, 307, 308, See Multiculturalism Western hegemony, 60, 78, 83, 292 Williams, Bernard, 2, 25, 46, 59, 61, 64, 65, 70, 77, 79, 80, 81, 88, 97, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 120, 128, 129, 132, 133, 157, 164, 166, 395, 396, 406 “reflection”, 2, 65, 105, 108, 109, 111 Wilson, Richard, 273, 295, 296, 304, 310, 311, 322, 323, 325 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 36, 59, 155, 163, 166, 387, 392, 394 Zizek, Slavoj, 403